Kent Academic Repository

FRAMING THE IRAQ WAR: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE MAINSTREAM WESTERN NEWS MEDIA'S EXPLANATIONS OF VIOLENCE DURING THE OCCUPATION OF IRAQ

Mr Daniel Burrows
Student Number: 06902360

School of Social Policy, Sociology and Social Research

Supervisors: Professor Keith Hayward and Dr Doug Stokes

Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Kent
July 2013

"It is not enough for journalists to see themselves as mere messengers without understanding the hidden agendas of the message and myths that surround it."

John Pilger, 2012.

ABSTRACT

This dissertation provides a contribution to the criminology of war from the perspective of cultural criminology. The research conducted a critical analysis of the mainstream Western news media's explanations of violence during the US-led occupation of Iraq. The sample covered the period from 19th March 2003 – 1st January 2009. This period spanned the beginning of military operations, the height of the counter insurgency war up to the systematic reduction in Coalition forces, after the transfer of security control of the Green Zone in Baghdad to Iraqis. The study utilised a discourse analytic approach to critically assess the explanations of violence found in articles from print news sources in both the US and UK. These explanations were contrasted with alternative arguments found in marginal, left-leaning news sources, to test the hypothesis that the mainstream media wilfully neglected to present a comprehensive analysis of state criminality in occupied Iraq. The research utilised data from the Wikileaks Iraq War Logs and human rights reports in order to provide evidence of the consistent resort to state-sanctioned violence by the occupying Coalition and associated proxy forces. It was found that the mainstream media were complicit in hiding evidence of state criminality during the occupation. Instead, the media sources sampled characterised the violence inherent to the occupation of Iraq as the product of entrenched ethnic divisions, the influence of foreign jihadists migrating into Iraq, or the result of mistakes made in the administration of the occupation by the Coalition. Congruence was found between these explanations and those adopted by political leaders. Each of these explanations were found to have some merit but served to marginalize state criminality from popular public discourse. In short: the thesis argued that the mainstream media constructed a hegemonic discourse in line with official government and military accounts of the conflict.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

It is June 2007. The occupation of Iraq has now been underway for just over four years. An Iraqi man lies prostrate on the floor of his cell in a detention facility run by the Iraqi Army near the town of Tal Afar, Northern Iraq. He has been charged with the suspected deployment of an improvised explosive device and is being held for questioning. He has been here now for several days after being arrested by the Iraqi Army who are still operating under the guidance of Coalition military forces. His skin is raw and in places is beginning to decay due to the lack of medical attention to his wounds. In the time that he has been here, the unnamed Iraqi man has been interrogated more times than he can remember by an Iraqi Lieutenant Colonel, who has questioned him in regard to alleged terrorist related activities. The man's consistent denial of any involvement in any acts of terrorism has fallen on deaf ears; his guilt is assumed. The Lieutenant Colonel with cold, calculated, precision gradually intensified his approach to the interrogation. Acid and corrosive chemicals were poured onto the Iraqi man's body resulting in 3rd degree burns that eventually required the amputation of his right leg below the knee. The detainee had pleaded his innocence time and again but the Lieutenant Colonel had remained unimpressed with his claims. In response the Iraqi man's fingers were cut off one by one but still he pleaded his innocence. After a final beating he was returned to his cell and later released. No charges were ever brought against him. The wounds inflicted during his time in detention a lasting reminder of his innocence.

The Lieutenant Colonel was never arrested nor removed from his position, despite the full awareness of US Coalition authorities of the enhanced interrogation techniques practiced under his command. This is because US forces within the Coalition have also been involved with the use of enhanced interrogation techniques against Iraqi detainees, often in conjunction with Iraqi forces, whilst at other times handing over detainees to Iraqi forces knowing the suffering that they will be subjected to. For example, as early as August 2005, another unnamed Iraqi man was detained by US Coalition forces, who during his interrogation beat him remorselessly, threatened him with guns and knives, and even took the bizarre step of throwing a cat onto his face. The man was eventually transferred to the custody of Iraqi Police who proceeded to beat him with blunt objects before releasing him without charge. Neither the US Coalition military forces nor the Iraqi Police involved in the abuse were ever investigated.

These are just two examples of the widespread state-sanctioned violence that took place during the occupation of Iraq.[1] However, if you were to read the pages of the mainstream newspapers in the US or the UK during the height of the occupation, this is not the vision of Iraq that was typically represented. Instead, explanations of Iraq's descent into violence in the wake of the US-led invasion within the mainstream media focused almost exclusively on more palatable accounts that typically characterised the violence in one of three ways: either as the consequence of ethnic conflict borne of years of ethnic tensions that exploded in the power vacuum left by the deposal of Saddam Hussein; the result of foreign fighters linked to Al Qaeda, migrating into the country to wage Jihadic war against "imperialist" western forces; or the inevitable consequence of numerous organisational blunders by the Coalition in the administration and governance of post-invasion Iraq. A typical example of the mainstream media's reporting of the conflict is illustrated by Neil MacFarquhar's (2004) comments in *The New York Times* one year into the occupation of Iraq. MacFarquhar writes that the country is facing a "civil war" that will "inflame existing divisions" as indigenous forces and foreign terrorists fight for control of the country. He concludes by saying that the US is paying the price "for entering Iraq with no coherent plan beyond toppling Saddam Hussein".

This thesis then presents a critique of the Western media's analysis of the occupation of Iraq that falls within the wider existing tradition of critical media analysis of the Iraq War.[2] This tradition argues that the mainstream media dutifully reported *official* explanations of the conflict, in both the run-up to the invasion and during the occupation itself (see for example: Kellner, 2005, Altheide, 2009, Bonn, 2010, Campbell, 2010). The argument presented in this dissertation concurs with this analysis, but goes further; suggesting also that the mainstream print news media constructed a dominant discourse that was used to explain (and at certain times even hide) the levels of violence seen in post-invasion Iraq. This dominant discourse uncritically represented official explanations of this violence by often drawing directly upon statements made by government and military leaders. This gave the discourse greater legitimacy and in turn afforded the official sources of this discourse greater credibility.[3] Not

---

[1] Taken from the Wikileaks Iraq War Logs: 16/6/07 and 30/8/05 respectively.

[2] The Iraq War and the occupation of Iraq discussed in this research refer to the most recent invasion of Iraq, commencing on the 20th March 2003.

[3] See Christopher Hedges (2009: 171-178) on the all-too-cosy relationship that existed between the US government and the major network news broadcasters over the Iraq war.

only this, but the mainstream Western media account also chose to ignore alternative arguments that were equally relevant to explaining the violence that was characteristic of post-invasion Iraq. These arguments, readily available to the mainstream media from existing human rights reports and left leaning online news organisations, in contrast to official proclamations, suggested that the violence seen during the occupation should also be seen as the product of *state-sanctioned violence* - or what the criminological literature refers to as "state crime". In other words, as a deliberate and systematic facet of the counter-insurgency war undertaken by Coalition troops and their associated proxy forces. Put bluntly, what this represents is a classic example of the hegemonic production of news within the mainstream print news media reporting of the Iraq War.

It is the intention of this research to make a contribution to the burgeoning study of 'the criminology of war' through a critical analysis of the mainstream media. It is also the aim of this research to provide evidence from the Wikileaks Iraq War Logs and human rights reports, which prove that violent state crime was a regular feature of occupied Iraq, a feature largely ignored in the mainstream media's account. The Iraq War Logs are a database of 391,832 significant incident reports filed by US soldiers involved in the day-to-day process of fighting a counter-insurgency war. Published by the whistle-blowing website Wikileaks online in October 2010, they were allegedly leaked to the organisation by a US intelligence soldier, Private First Class Bradley Manning. The files contain evidence of a significant level of state approved criminality, including the use of torture, extrajudicial killings and evidence of death squads, during the course of the occupation. This dissertation demonstrates the utility of this data source for criminologists, arguing that without the release of this cache of data our knowledge of state criminality committed by US forces during the occupation of Iraq, would have remained extremely limited, due to the dearth of public discourse on the subject.

The Wikileaks whistle-blowing website serves as an example of the fast changing world of information exchange in the wake of the digitisation of information. It is a resource that can provide criminologists with the opportunity to gain access to sensitive, previously classified material, which can potentially help to push forward the development of the criminology of war and the related study of state crime. If we are to see an increase in whistle blowing as a result of the digitisation of information, websites such as Wikileaks will provide a vital resource for the criminological study of state crime. This was certainly the case with regard to

the Iraq War Logs. Steinmetz (2012) argues the response to the organisation, its founder Julian Assange, and Bradley Manning, by the US government, is indicative of the exposure of government wrong-doing contained within the files. The evidence of state crime presented in the Iraq War Logs confirms Steinmetz's argument.[4]

At this point, having discussed the nature of government wrongdoing that forms the primary focus of this analysis, it is necessary to provide a working definition of criminality within the context of warfare. For the purposes of this thesis, this definition is constructed from a meeting of two criminological approaches to understanding deviancy: those drawn from a legal tradition and those from the growing field of zemiology or, a harms based approach to understanding what constitutes criminality.

A tension exists in the study of crimes committed during warfare. On the one hand, there are studies that take a legalistic approach to conceptualising state crime (see for example: Kramer and Michalowski, 2005, Matthews and Kauzarlich, 2007), arguing that those actions committed by nation states during warfare, are already prohibited under International Humanitarian Law, as a result of the 1907 Hague Protocols and the 1949 Geneva Conventions on human rights.[5] As a result, these studies argue that a ready framework for criminology to engage with the study of crimes of the state already exists. Whilst this argument is an accurate assertion, there is a problem that exists in operationalising this approach, namely that nation states will often wilfully ignore these prohibitions. For example, states will often argue that they have the right to defend themselves against a perceived threat to their national security, even if no threat can be proved and no military action is ratified by the international community, such was the case in the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq. Similarly, states have the power to change the designation and status of detainees, as demonstrated by the US in the course of the war on terror. In this instance, detainees were classified as 'illegal combatants', removing their status as prisoners of war and with it, any

---

[4] For a more detailed discussion of the rationale behind the reliance on the IWL as a source of data please refer to chapter 1: Methodology.

[5] Those actions prohibited include: the use of physical and psychological violence, the instrumental use of torture, degrading treatment, and the prevention of the right to fair and and just judicial proceedings, of prisoners of war. Similar prohibitions against the use of violence and coercion exist regarding civilian populations, who should in all circumstances, no matter their ethnicity, religion, gender, age, wealth, be treated humanely (Geneva Conventions III, IV, 1949). The 1907 Hague Protocols dictate that *all* parties involved in the prosecution of armed conflict will be bound to these rules of war, including: armies, militia and any other personell involved in operations under the auspices of the occupying power.

protection afforded to prisoners of war under the Geneva Conventions of 1949.[6] Finally, as will be discussed in-depth later in this thesis,[7] occupying powers have the capacity to enact what Agamben (2005) describes as a state of exception. This state of exception, declared during times of real or imagined emergency, enables occupying powers such as the Coalition in Iraq, to justify the suspension of the existing rule of law (nationally or internationally), to be replaced by a legislative agenda determined by, for example, the occupying force. This reorganisation of law has the capacity to legitimise actions that in all other circumstances would be considered criminal. In summary, relying purely on legalistic approaches to criminality hampers the capacity for criminology to successfully engage with an analysis of state crime.

With this in mind, this thesis argues that utilising zemiology can help to push forward criminological understandings of state crime, by considering those actions that are not covered by national and international laws (or are wilfully ignored through the declaration of a state of exception), but are still harmful to those on the receiving end of violent, coercive state action (Hillyard and Tombs, 2004).[8] To this end, the thesis conceptualises state crime by drawing upon Green and Ward's (2000) argument that a social harm based understanding of criminality, should locate its definitions within existing international human rights standards. This serves to underpin the legitimacy of these definitions, whilst at the same time drawing attention to the illegitimacy of a nation states actions when international law has been labelled as inadequate by occupying powers and subsequently ignored (Agamben, 2005) or, if existing legalistic notions do not make adequate provision for the prohibition of specific physical harms (Hillyard and Tombs, 2004).

With this in mind, this thesis considers a working definition of the crimes of war in the following manner: *the instrumental and coercive use of physical violence against civilians and detainees by the military forces of the occupying powers.*[9]

---

[6] However, the 1907 Hague Protocols, Article 3, clearly state that 'belligerent parties may consist of combatants and non-combatants' but in all cases, have the same rights as prisoners of war.

[7] See Chapter 6.

[8] The theoretical model developed in chapter 7 discusses in detail the contribution that the study of social harm can make to the study of state crime and as a result will not be discussed in-depth here.

[9] These forces include: co-opted, indigenous militias and security forces, as well as private military contractors, regular military and special forces. The broader scope of actors included in this definition, is intended to capture the multitude and complexity of actors that were engaged in the conflict in Iraq, under the control of the Coalition.

In summary, this dissertation seeks to make a contribution to the criminology of war, through a critical analysis of the mainstream media's account of the conflict, which draws upon an, as yet unused resource, to show that state-sanctioned violence was a prominent feature of occupied Iraq. To this end, the research poses two primary research questions:

1. How do we account for the scale and ferocity of violence associated with post-invasion Iraq?
2. What contribution can cultural criminology make, to the growing literature on state crime?

In order to answer these questions, the research proposes and tests the following hypotheses:

1. The mainstream Western media wilfully neglected to present a comprehensive analysis of evidence of state criminality in occupied Iraq.
2. Coalition and associated proxy forces in occupied Iraq were responsible for actions that amounted to examples of state criminality.

Having summarised the purpose of this research let us now review the existing literature associated with the criminology of war. Ruth Jamieson (1998) argues that war is an area that has been consistently ignored as a subject of criminological enquiry, with little attention paid to mapping the connections between war and crime. Instead, criminology has preferred to leave this analysis to scholars of International Relations, or investigative journalists, despite the actions of soldiers in war often mirroring the concerns of criminological analysis, such as interpersonal violence, obedience to authority, and the post-conflict policing of diverse civilian populations. The theatre of war also consistently offers up examples of mass violence and victimization against civilians and prisoners of war, which, if viewed in the domestic setting, would fall under the purview of criminologists. Yet due to criminology's reluctance to engage in the study of warfare its understanding of the subject is still in its developmental stage (Jamieson, 1999). More recently, Alette Smeulers and Roelof Haveman (2008) have also highlighted the need for criminology to establish a research agenda that specifically focuses on war as a source of violent crime - a research agenda that they refer to as 'Supranational Criminology'. John Lea (2007) agrees that criminology has largely ignored the study of warfare. He argues that the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq have increased the urgency for criminology to seriously engage in a research agenda, which provides critical

analysis of military conflicts (see also: Friedrichs, 2000). Lea suggests that for criminologists to be able to develop their understanding of warfare (and to effectively conceptualise war crimes) they should utilise existing international standards of human rights as a point of reference (see also: Green and Ward, 2004, Jamieson and McEvoy, 2005).

Vincenzo Ruggerio (2006:185) also strongly advocates the development of a 'new criminology of war', in which the focus should be upon mass victimization and the violation of human rights. Ruggerio makes the distinction between what he terms 'crimes in war' and 'war crimes'. Crimes in war refer to individuals turning to violent acts as a result of necessity due to the chaos and instability inherent in military conflicts. In contrast, he argues that war crimes refer to targeted acts of violence such as torture, extrajudicial killings and mass detentions, which fall under the rubric of the discipline's study of state criminality. This is because although individuals carry out these actions they are ultimately attributable to the state that is prosecuting the conflict, due to the state's doctrine governing the actions of individuals at war (see also: Ross, 2003). For Ruggerio these crimes are made possible through the legitimation of violence that is a prerequisite of war. This has the effect of neutralising responsibility for the violence carried out in the name of the state. With this in mind, Cohen's (2001) study of the denial of atrocity is also applicable to the study of war, whereby the denial of responsibility for war crimes, becomes a key legitimising factor for the techniques of neutralisation, which Ruggerio argues helps to explain the aetiology of war crimes.

However, whilst the criminological study of warfare is certainly still in its infancy, there have been several notable contributions to its development. For instance, there has been significant criminological interest into the study of genocide (Morrison, 2006). For example, Herbert Kelman and V. Lee Hamilton's (1989) research into the My Lai massacre in which US soldiers killed 400 unarmed Vietnamese civilians. Kelman and Hamilton sought to identify the conditions within which state criminality of this nature can occur. They argued that these actions were the result of obedience to authority, when that authority makes these actions expected or tolerated. They also highlight that this authorization has the effect of dehumanising the victims, making actions of this nature easier to carry out, whilst these behaviours may also become a routinised aspect of duty within armed conflict (see also: Kelman, 1973, 1995). There are distinct similarities here between Kelman and Hamilton's analysis and that of Hannah Arendt's (1964) famous account of the trial of Adolf Eichmann.

Here Arendt argues that a person does not need to be evil to carry out evil actions such as genocide, on the contrary, it is entirely possible for ordinary people to commit evil acts when the wrong doing is banalized. This is to say that evil is possible when evil actions become routine and subsequently morally neutralised (see also: Browning, 1998). Zygmunt Bauman (1989), in his seminal study of the Holocaust, makes a similar argument, stating that the actions of Nazi soldiers in this context became normalized through the bureaucratisation of genocidal deviance. In this instance, Bauman argues that the extermination of unwanted people became an 'administrative task', which both dehumanised the victims, and made the process a routine, vocational activity. More recently Andrew Woolford (2006) has argued that the study of genocide, whilst paying significant attention to the death tolls resulting from genocidal atrocities, pays little attention to the specific activities involved in the process, including torture, rape and mass detention to name but a few. John Hagan and Joshua Kaiser (2011a) would seemingly agree with Woolford's critique. Hagan and Kaiser argue that our definitions and thereby understandings of genocidal violence must be extended. They assert that the criminological attention to the more visible aspects of genocidal violence, that of 'extermination',[10] is limited in its scope. They identify within the United Nations definition of genocide the additional notion of 'elimination', or actions that amount to 'deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction' (Ibid: 2). They cite the work of de Waal (2005), to support their contention that academics and politicians alike have ignored, and subsequently marginalized, this integral aspect of genocide in Darfur.[11]

Hagan and Kaiser (2011a) identify the use of intentional state sponsored and led attacks on Black African Darfuri's. These attacks, whilst including the use of direct lethal force, also targeted food and water supplies and focussed on dislodging residents from their homes in their thousands.[12] Hagan and Kaiser argue that this these actions amount to genocide by elimination: that the Arab population of Darfur, with direct government support, directly targeted the Black population, with the intent of making the conditions of life so intolerable

---

[10] Defined within the 1948 Genocide Convention as 'acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group' (Hagan and Kaiser, 2011a: 2).

[11] Alex De Waal (1997, 2005, 2007) has written extensively on conflict within the African continent. A great deal of his research has focussed on the ongoing conflict in Darfur and whilst he contends that the application of the label 'genocide' to the actions of Arab Darfuri's against their Black counter-parts is difficult to apply, he notes that their actions do fit the United Nations wider definition, which includes *elimination*.

[12] To be more specific, these attacks included: Burning crops, poisoning water supplies and demolishing villages. In short: forced mass displacement, of a targeted population, making it impossible for their return.

that the Black Darfuri's not murdered by the Janajaweed militia, in conjunction with government forces, were forced to leave the country.

It is clear from Hagan and Kaiser's analysis that they seek to reinvigorate the criminological study of genocide (2011b). In drawing our attention to the violent conflict within Darfur and challenging our preconceptions of what constitutes genocide, Hagan and Kaiser make an important contribution to the study of what is widely considered the worst of all crimes (Allen, 2011). They maintain the relevance of genocide within criminological debate, challenge criminologists to question their inattention to genocidal violence and promote an 'activist criminology' (Moon, 2011), which this thesis argues is integral to the criminological study of state-sanctioned violence. However, emphasising the importance of Hagan and Kaiser's work, they have encountered a range of critical engagement with their thesis, which disputes the value of extending the application of the genocide label. For example, Tim Allen (2011) argues that the notion of forced displacement as an aspect of genocide, is too broad a definition. Allen argues that the use of the label of genocide in fact inhibits the scope of effective political solutions by branding all perpetrators as 'evil'. Michael Mann (2011) voices a similar critique, arguing that the UN definition of genocide is itself too broad, making any instrumental massacre an act of genocidal violence. For Mann, the genocide label must be limited in its scope to include only acts that approach 'virtual total elimination', in order for it to maintain its relevance.

These criticisms of Hagan and Kaiser's argument seem dismissive of the suffering that the writers identify in their work. However, this is not the intent of their critics. They seek to prevent the genocide label from becoming the default definition of widespread state sanctioned violence, primarily because of the emotive nature of the term. This is something that this thesis agrees with: to apply the label of genocide in an academic or political context, can limit the depth of the analysis. This is because its emotive connotations can detract from the complexity of human interactions that are integral to understanding crimes of this nature.[13] It is the contention of this thesis that a more substantive academic analysis could be achieved through adopting a more nuanced approach that the powerfully evocative and emotive label of genocide inhibits. This would enable a broader, more detailed analysis of the

---

[13] This is a theme that this thesis will develop in Chapter 7, where a theoretical model for analysing crimes of the state from the perspective of cultural criminology, will be suggested and developed.

crimes taking place, as well as widening the scope of responses to these crimes. After all, Hagan and Kaiser (2011b) themselves accept that the label of genocide to the situation in Darfur may not stick. In summary, Hagan and Kaiser's critics argue that halting and prosecuting genocide is an extremely difficult task, due to its politically charged nature. To this end, a more fruitful discussion can be observed through the marginally less emotive discourse of state criminality, a controversial and marginalized topic itself, but one that provides greater room for manoeuvre both academically and politically. As Allen (2011:35) appropriately concludes: 'to be useful, the bar for genocide needs to be kept high'.

However, Hagan and Kaiser have made an important contribution to the significantly under-developed criminological study of warfare. As Woolford (2006) notes, even though criminology has attempted to develop the study of genocide it, alongside the wider criminological discussion of crimes of the state, remains relatively limited in its understanding. This limited criminological engagement into the atrocities of warfare, certainly extends to the study of the Iraq War, where criminology to date, has failed to consider in detail specific examples of state criminality during the conflict. By way of clarity let us now consider some of the existing literature that has discussed the Iraq War.

Penny Green and Tony Ward (2004) briefly discuss the civilians killed by Coalition forces in the initial invasion of the country. This is placed within the wider context of a historical analysis of US complicity in the Iraqi arms trade, turning a blind eye to Iraq's use of chemical weapons, and the sanctions regime deployed against Iraq in the wake of the First Gulf War, which resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians. Green and Ward do highlight the possibility of war crimes being carried out by the Coalition during the conflict, but they are perhaps too optimistic in their statement that public protest can limit these crimes. This is especially the case, when considered in light of the marked violence that became such a feature of the occupation itself, a subject of particular significance to this research. Similarly, Ruth Jamieson and Kieran McEvoy (2005) briefly allude to the role that military contractors played in the abuses at Abu Ghraib, within the wider context of the notion of the othering of responsibility for state criminality by nation states, but do not develop a specific analysis of the violent occupation of Iraq within their research. The same is true of Ronald Kramer and Raymond Michalowski's (2005) work on the invasion of Iraq. They draw upon international humanitarian law to argue that the US-led invasion of the country was itself an illegal act that may be considered as a war crime. Likewise, the work of

David Whyte (2007, 2010) and Michael Welch (2008) draw our attention to the neo-liberal restructuring of Iraqi society, through the construction of a 'state of exception' (Agamben, 2005). They argue that through the circumvention of existing national and international laws, and their replacement by the laws of the Coalition Provisional Authority, the US Administration in Iraq was able to introduce extensive neo-liberal socio-economic reforms. As a result both writers conclude that the invasion and occupation of Iraq constitutes an example of state-corporate criminality.

These studies have certainly made important contributions to the criminological analysis of the Iraq War, but a sustained critical engagement with the conflict from within the discipline has thus far been limited. In recent years however we have begun to see some work that has begun to influence the criminological analysis of the Iraq War and the criminology of war more generally. The cultural criminologist and terrorist scholar, Mark Hamm (2007), has analysed images showing some of the abuses carried out by Coalition forces at Abu Ghraib prison. He argues that these actions were not those of rogue soldiers behaving outside of the remit given to them by the state. In reality, they were the behaviours of state actors following their directives to the letter. He concludes that the images represented the doctrinal application of orders designed to break detainees as quickly as possible by utilising the full range of available coercive techniques. Likewise, Naomi Klein (2007) has argued that the invasion and occupation of Iraq is an example of what she terms neo-liberal shock therapy, which has historically been a core component of US foreign policy (most notably in South America). Klein argues, that a key aspect of this so-called neo-liberal "shock therapy" is the violent suppression of any indigenous opposition. In Iraq, she argues that this violence has taken the form of mass detentions and torture, as well as the use of death squads directed against suspected insurgents and their supporters. John Lea and Kevin Stenson's (2007) work on the nature of 'governance from below', can also be extremely useful to an analysis of the criminology of war, in particular the notion of the pluralisation of actors governing on behalf of the state. Lea and Stenson's analysis can be used to assist in an understanding of the way in which state crime within counter-insurgency conflicts is made possible. This is through viewing the actions of individuals involved in the prosecution of counter-insurgency warfare as acting on the overall rationale of the state itself. This means that the state, far from being absent from the actions of individuals prosecuting counter-insurgency wars, is in fact the hand that guides this action (see also: Stenson, 1998).

It is the contention of this thesis that influential research such as that outlined above can help in the construction of a 'constitutive cultural criminology of state crime'. Drawing on Keith Hayward's (2011) call for a more integrated, multi-level, and interdisciplinary approach to cultural criminology, and taking inspiration from the constitutive criminology of Stuart Henry and Dragan Milovanovic (1996), this study stresses the importance of macro, meso and micro processes in its theoretical analysis of the Iraq War. In so doing, it attempts to answer the call from within cultural criminology itself (Ferrell et al, 2008: 75-76) to develop a nuanced and critical cultural criminology of the state.

In summary, then, this research seeks to contribute to the ongoing criminological study of state crime, from the perspective of cultural criminology, within the rubric of the criminology of war. In particular the research focuses on the thus far limited analysis (within criminology) of the state-sanctioned violence within the counter-insurgency war in occupied Iraq. In doing so, the thesis introduces criminology to a valuable new data source, which has the capacity to further develop the criminology of war: the Wikileaks Iraq War Logs. Having outlined my substantive argument and identified the existing gap in the literature. I now turn to the specific content of the chapters that follow.

The thesis begins by providing a detailed description and justification of the methodological approach used in this research. This chapter presents an outline of the discourse analytic approach used to analyse the representation of violence in Iraq during its occupation by US-led Coalition forces. Additionally, the chapter discusses the utilisation of the Lexis/Nexis media search facility, as the primary repository for the collection of data. Following from this, details of the sampling frame for each of the media samples are discussed including: the selection of US and UK print news media sources, the time frame from which the sample was drawn, the key words used to draw out the sample, and the eventual sample size resulting from this sampling frame. The resulting samples may be summarised in the following way:

1. Iraq as a country beset by historic ethnic divisions
2. The influence of foreign fighters entering Iraq during the occupation
3. The role that mistakes made by US administrators played in exacerbating the counter-insurgency war

4. The analysis (within the Western print media) of the prominence of the discussion of acts, which may be considered as crimes of the state, during the occupation

In addition to a discussion of the methodology applied to the media analysis aspect of this research, this chapter also provides details of the way in which evidence was gathered from the Wikileaks Iraq War Logs, human rights reports and reports from the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI). This aspect of the chapter also includes a discussion of the difficulties encountered during the collection of data from the Wikileaks website. These difficulties were the result of cyber attacks targeted against the organisations website. In the wake of the release of the War Logs the discussion details how the research dealt with this issue. Finally, the chapter presents a brief discussion of the ethics of whistle blowing, applied to the Wikileaks organisation and by association, the academic use of this data. Concluding that it is not only ethically justifiable for academics to make use of this rich source of data, but that it is an intellectual responsibility to disseminate data which exposes evidence of wide scale state criminality (Bok, 1989, Chomsky, 1996).

Chapter two is the first of three chapters to discuss the mainstream media's dominant explanations of the violence seen during the occupation of Iraq. The chapter presents a detailed analysis of the framing of this violence, which is seen as a result of Iraq's dominant ethnic groups, the Shi'a, Sunni and Kurd's, competing for power within the power vacuum left by the removal of Saddam Hussein as ruler of Iraq. Utilising a sample drawn from US and UK print news media, the chapter presents evidence that the analysis of historic ethnic divisions in Iraq, formed a dominant narrative discourse within the mainstream media. This discourse contends that a significant volume of the violence encountered by Coalition forces was attributable to these pre-existing divisions. The discussion accepts that this analysis can contribute in part to our understanding of this violence, but it is also argued that this framing of the conflict, contributes to the marginalization of the discourse of state criminality within the mainstream press. The chapter argues that far from presenting an unbiased analysis of the situation in Iraq, the media uncritically represented official accounts of the conflict as uncontested facts. The narratives presented as factual information within these reports were either drawn directly from government and military sources or closely mirrored the statements made by government officials. It is concluded that this corresponds with the 'manufacturing consent' analysis of the mainstream media, as presented by Edward Herman

and Noam Chomsky (1989) (see also: Herman, 2000 and Chomsky, 2002), in which the mainstream media is rarely critical of the legitimacy of government actions, serving instead as the mouthpiece of government rhetoric and policy.

Chapter three presents the second analysis of the mainstream print news media's account of the post-invasion violence that engulfed Iraq in the wake of the occupation. In this chapter, the analytical focus is turned towards the media's representation of the problem of foreign fighters migrating across Iraq's borders, in order to combat Coalition forces, their allies, and their supporters. The media narrative argued that these fighters infiltrated Iraq in significant numbers, from Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Many of these fighters were depicted as affiliated with Al Qaeda, coming to Iraq to bolster the forces of the Jordanian militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who was widely considered to be the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq. Such is the interconnectivity of each of the dominant framings of the occupational violence depicted within the media, that this framing is seen to overlap with the notion of historic ethnic divisions discussed in chapter two. In particular, there is congruence between the analyses of the Sunni resistance to the occupation and the resulting insurgency, and the role played by foreign fighters in exacerbating the growing violence between the formerly dominant Sunni, and the newly dominant Shi'a. Whilst it is acknowledged that foreign fighters were certainly present in Iraq during the occupation, and played a key role in perpetuating, prolonging, and intensifying the violence seen during this period. The chapter makes the argument that the significance of the role played by foreign fighters was over emphasised by the media's reporting. As was the case with the historic ethnic divisions narrative, the media sample uncritically accepted and represented official accounts of the tenacity, sophistication and influence of foreign fighters, which Coalition forces were tasked with countering. This was a subject that served to draw clear links between the occupation and the ongoing "War on Terror", giving weight to the legitimacy of the conflict, through the foreign fighters discourse. The chapter argues that we see a hegemonic mediated account of the violence in occupied Iraq that marginalized alternative arguments from mainstream debate.

With this in mind, chapter four presents the final narrative construction of this violence, as seen within the mainstream media sample. In this chapter, the focus is on the role that mistakes made by US administrators in Iraq, played in further exacerbating the violent insurgency. The media's framing of this issue argued that the main mistakes made in the administration of the occupation of Iraq were as follows:

- The de-ba'athification of Iraqi society, which involved the removal from positions of influence, anyone found to be members of the former ruling Ba'ath Party. It was argued within the sample that this had the effect of making enemies of 50,000 Iraqi civilians, who may have only joined the party through necessity, not allegiance to Saddam Hussein.
- The disbanding of the Iraqi military and security forces, which it was argued created a security vacuum in the country at a time when security was needed to stabilise Iraq in the wake of the US-led invasion, so that the rebuilding process could begin. In a similar vein to the de-ba'athification of Iraqi society, it was argued that this order had the effect of making enemies of 350,000 well-armed and trained men.
- Finally the media was critical of the decision to invade the country with insufficient troops to secure the country after the invasion. It was argued that this created a lawless atmosphere in which the insurgency was able to flourish.

In contrast to the previous narrative constructions of the occupation this framing of the conflict within the sample clearly presented a critical analysis. However, it is argued that far from presenting a radical critique of government policy, the mainstream media were only presenting criticisms that had already been discussed and acknowledged by government and military officials. Therefore, whilst this gives the impression of a wide-ranging criticism of government policy within the media, it is argued that in reality this narrative construction of the conflict contributes to the marginalization of state-sanctioned violence from popular discourse. With this in mind, it is argued that the three media narratives highlighted within the analysis, construct a dominant understanding of the violence observed in post-invasion Iraq.

In order to confirm this argument, chapter five turns its analytical focus to the representation of actions that may be considered to be examples of state criminality within the mainstream media. It is argued that despite the availability of evidence of state criminality from human rights organisations and United Nations reports that the mainstream media wilfully neglected to present a detailed analysis of this evidence. Additionally, when evidence of actions that may be considered as acts of state crime were presented, these incidents were portrayed as the actions of rogue soldiers and not the responsibility of the state. In short, acts such as torture and extrajudicial killings, did not generate a critical analysis within the media sample of the wider conduct of the counter-insurgency war, except in a small minority of examples. As a result of this analysis, it is argued that in order to find a discussion of state criminality during

the counter-insurgency war in Iraq, it is necessary to look beyond the mainstream media, towards sources that may be considered as highbrow, left leaning media organisations, far from the mainstream. As a result, in order to be aware of state criminality in occupied Iraq, individuals require both a certain level of knowledge about these organisations and an existing interest in this kind of analysis, due to its existence on the margins of popular media discourse. It is argued therefore that the media's analysis of the violence within the Iraq War represents only a partial account of the conflict. In this light the thesis argues that the mainstream media's analysis of the occupation of Iraq is a prime example of the hegemonic media constructing the boundaries of popular discourse. With this critique in mind, it is at this point that the thesis turns its attention towards evidence of the alternative analysis of the violence inherent to post-invasion Iraq: the doctrinal use of state criminality in prosecuting the counter-insurgency war absent from mainstream accounts of the conflict.

Chapter six demonstrates that state criminality carried out by Coalition and associated proxy forces was a prominent feature of the counter-insurgency war in occupied Iraq. To make its case, the chapter draws on empirical data gathered from the Wikileaks Iraq War Logs, in conjunction with human rights reports from Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and Human Rights First, and reports concerning the human rights situation from the UNAMI. The chapter presents detailed evidence of the consistent resort to actions, which may be considered as acts of state criminality, *throughout the occupation of Iraq*. These actions include the consistent use of torture and the associated abuse of detainees by Coalition forces, the Iraqi Army and security forces, as well as militias co-opted into the counter-insurgency war by the Coalition. There is also evidence of the extrajudicial killing of civilians by Coalition forces, by both air and ground units, whilst the data also provides evidence that military contractors were responsible for similar crimes. The chapter discusses evidence of co-opted militias, attached to the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior, working as sanctioned death squads and assassination teams, targeting Iraqi civilians. Evidence is also presented that these militias have been responsible for the operation of illegal detention facilities throughout Iraq. In summary chapter six argues that state criminality was a prominent feature of the counter-insurgency war in Iraq. Specifically, that it was utilised as an aspect of an 'enemy centric' approach to the insurgency, which focused its efforts on finding and killing suspected insurgents and their supporters, as opposed to seeking to gain the support of the civilian population (i.e. a 'population centric approach). Additionally, drawing on the work of Giorgio Agamben (2005), it is argued that this approach is the result of a 'state of exception'

created in Iraq from the very beginning of the occupation. It is also argued that this state of exception was a key factor in enabling the US-led Coalition to prosecute the neo-liberal restructuring of Iraq through the application of what Naomi Klein (2007) refers to as the "shock doctrine". Building on this analysis, chapter seven seeks to produce a theoretical model through which the state-sanctioned violence discussed in chapter six, may be further understood and theorised.

Chapter seven posits a theoretical framework, which it is suggested should form the basis of a 'constitutive cultural criminological approach' to understanding the criminology of counter-insurgency warfare. The chapter situates this analysis within the overarching themes of Henry and Milovanovic's (1996) constitutive criminology, Katja Franco Aas' (2012) call for 'a criminology of the periphery' (which is both transnational in scope and context specific in its analysis), and Hayward's (2011) call for the development of a cultural criminology that seeks to integrate macro, meso and micro levels of analysis when dealing with maters associated with state crime and terrorism). With these themes in mind, the chapter outlines and argues for the inclusion of six integrated theoretical tropes within (in the case of this dissertation) the analysis of counter-insurgency warfare. These tropes can be summarised as follows:

1. Firstly, drawing on the arguments of historical sociology, and maintaining the multi-disciplinarity of cultural criminology, it is argued that any analysis of state criminality within counter-insurgency warfare must be located within wider socio-historical processes.

2. Second, it is argued that, for criminology to effectively conceptualise state criminality, it must work within a human rights discourse, which characterises state crime through the lens of physical and social harms.

3. Third, criminologists must understand the structural interests of a nation state, before it can understand the resort to state criminality by these states.

4. Fourth, that there is a need to understand the way in which counter-insurgency wars are governed, in order to fully comprehend how state criminality can take place within these conflicts.

5. Fifth, that we must seek to understand the actions of individuals and small groups during the prosecution of counter insurgencies, as it these groups that act to operationalise state policy imposed from above.

6. Finally, it is argued that there is a need to understand the role that the mainstream media plays in constructing popular discourse, legitimising state policy and marginalizing alternative, critical arguments. This is specifically in regard to the counter-insurgency war in Iraq and more generally with regard to state criminality.

In summary, the core argument of chapter seven is that to provide a comprehensive analysis of state criminality within counter-insurgency warfare, with particular application to the occupation of Iraq, an integrated, constitutive approach is required. Such an analysis is able to appreciate macro, meso and micro level processes, which far from operating in isolation from one another are in fact inseparable.

The conclusion to the thesis draws together the threads of the argument presented in what follows. Firstly, that the mainstream print news media in the US and UK presented only a partial account of the counter-insurgency war undertaken during the occupation of Iraq. Secondly that evidence of an alternative explanation can be found in the data provided by the whistle-blowing organisation Wikileaks, and that this evidence suggests the widespread, doctrinal use of state criminality, throughout the counter-insurgency war. Finally, through the critical analysis of the mainstream media's account of the Iraq War, the thesis has demonstrated the potential of whistle blowing to further develop the study of state criminality. In this instance it has also enabled this thesis to make an original contribution to the study of the criminology of warfare, through an analysis of counter insurgent violence in Iraq, a subject that until now has not been tackled within the discipline.

This Introduction has both presented an overview of the arguments contained within the subsequent pages of this dissertation, and summarised both the underlying arguments and original contribution that the research makes to the criminology of war. Let us now commence our media analysis in an effort to show that the mainstream media was complicit in hiding the intense human suffering experienced by Iraqi civilians at the hands of US Coalition forces and their proxies during the occupation of Iraq.

CHAPTER 1

METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The purpose of this research was to test the hypothesis that the media representation of the Iraq War, presented a set of narratives, which constructed a popular discourse that served to marginalize state criminality as a focal point of debate surrounding the conflict. Additionally, the research sought to assess whether these narratives uncritically presented official explanations of the violence inherent to the occupation of Iraq, as accurate depictions of reality. In doing so, the research turned its attention to documents from human rights groups, the United Nations (UN) and the Wikileaks organisation, to assess the legitimacy of the discourse presented by the media's account of the conflict, and to discover the extent of state criminality within the confines of occupied Iraq.[14]

With this in mind, the research utilised a discourse analytic approach, applied to both the analysis of a selection of mainstream print news media articles, and documents derived from the sources outlined above. This was intended to enable an exploration of the relationship between the discourse presented within the mainstream media, and the 'reality' depicted by both human rights reports and the data published by Wikileaks. In taking this approach, the thesis has been able to provide evidence that the printed press was responsible for reporting, largely uncritically, official versions of the occupation of Iraq, presented by government sources. This was despite the fact, that human rights organisations and the UN had already reported that serious abuses of human rights, in violation of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), committed by both Iraqi and Coalition forces, were a prominent aspect of the post-invasion environment. These reports were further confirmed by the publication of the Iraq War Logs (IWL), by Wikileaks, which this study will use to provide further evidence of the use of persistent state criminality during the occupation, by both Coalition forces and their associates.

---

[14] The data from the Wikileaks Iraq War Logs is available online at http://wikileaks.org/irq/. However an appendix of this data can be supplied on request.

As such, the exposition of the methodology used in this research will proceed as follows: Firstly there will be a brief discussion of discourse analysis as a methodological approach, outlining its advantages and limitations with regards to this project, before stating more specifically, how the approach was operationalised in the course of this research. Secondly, the discussion will turn to the selection of human rights reports, used to initially assess the prevalence of state criminality in occupied Iraq. Thirdly, the chapter will discuss the process that the author went through, in utilising the IWL as a source of empirical data. Finally, the discussion will offer some methodological reflection upon the problems of using online data sources, as well as the ethics of using previously classified data in social research.

1. An overview of discourse analysis

As stated above, the primary research method deployed in this study is a discourse analysis of both the mainstream media and documents drawn from human rights groups and the Wikileaks organisation.[15] As such, it is appropriate to outline the core ideas associated with this approach to social research, and their applicability to this study.

Discourse analysis starts from the conceptual premise that, whilst the lived experience of everyday life is real for those who practice it, perceptions and understandings of that reality are a product of discourse, when discourse is understood as a collection of interrelated 'texts', which bring social reality into existence (Potter and Wetherell, 2003). The everyday physical and symbolic reality in which people live is therefore understood through the discourse present in cultural 'texts' (Altheide, 1996). These 'texts' may come from a variety of sources, including the news media, political figures, human rights groups and even academics. Additionally, texts, as understood within discourse analysis, are not limited to the written word, on the contrary they refer to still or moving images, works of art, music and national monuments, to name but a few. It is through these texts, working in conjunction with one another, that social reality becomes meaningful for social actors. As such, discourse analysis contains a strong social constructivist theme, underpinning its analytical focus. The approach seeks to recognise that whilst 'texts' make claim to factual or truthful depictions of reality, the legitimacy of these claims must be scrutinised, whilst it must be understood that meaning, is the product of the fluid interaction between discourse and social action (Jorgenson and

---

[15] This approach is something that Altheide (1996:23) has referred to as 'qualitative document analysis'.

Phillips, 2002, Fairclough, 2003). This is to say that, the individual and often collective experience of social reality is both written for us and by us, through a multitude of conflicting, corroborating and interacting discourses. As Phillips and Hardy (2002:2) put it:

"Without discourse, there is no social reality, and without understanding discourse, we cannot understand our reality, our experiences, or ourselves".

This is not to say that discourse is created outside of the influence of social actors, far from it social actors play a key role in constructing the discourses that form understandings of the world around us. Discourse is both formed by and a creator of, social practice (Fairclough, 2001, Wodak, 2001, Potter and Wetherell, 2003). However different actors have varying degrees of access to the capacity to promote one discourse over another. For example, both politicians and the news media hold a privileged position when it comes to the construction of particular discourses. As such they have a greater capacity to produce a widely accepted discourse that would construct the understanding of a particular social issue, for a larger group of social actors, than someone who does not have the same access to this capacity (Fairclough, 2001). However, this is not to say that every actor reads a text in the same manner, as every person brings his or her own interpretation to, for example, a newspaper article. Nevertheless, if news articles consistently present a series of narratives over a period of time, which consistently marginalize or ignore alternative narratives, as this study suggests, then the marginalized narrative will not form a dominant discourse.

Likewise, discourses do not exist in historical isolation from one another, and in many ways a new discourse is dependent upon the prior or continued existence of another, for it to be accepted (Wodak, 2001, Jorgenson and Phillips, 2002, Fairclough, 2003). For example, the discourse explaining the violence associated with occupied Iraq, was in part contingent on the pre-existing construction of Iraq as a failed state, which under Saddam Hussein, was characterised by violence and terrorism.

With this in mind, it is also important for the analysis of discourse and its effects to understand the 'context' in which discourse is produced. Context in this regard, refers to the social and historical processes, actors, relationships and practices, which characterize the

subject of study, or the social situations surrounding the document[16] in question (Phillips and Hardy, 2002, Altheide, 1996). These social situations must be understood, in order to understand the significance of the document under study (Fairclough, 2003). For example, the social situations, in which the media reports of the occupation of Iraq were produced, can be considered in the context of the War on Terror. This context provided the justification for the initial invasion of the country, and continued to inform the logic of the ongoing occupation: terrorism must be fought in Iraq, so as not to fight it closer to home: whilst democratising Iraq would make the world a safer place. As a result of this context, the Coalition was automatically cast as the 'good guys'. This meant that the blame for the violent environment in which the occupation was conducted, could be explained through narratives that largely exonerated the Coalition from culpability for the violence, at least in a direct capacity. As such, the texts present in the mainstream media, in this instance, were responsible for defining the situation and clarifying meaning for the audience.

However, a text that is the focus of analysis must be broken down into two further overlapping concepts in order to fully capture the meaning of the text, these are: frames and themes (Altheide, 1996). Frames can refer to the 'schematic of interpretation', which allows people to make sense of the information presented to them (Goffman, 1975:55). In the case of the analysis of the mainstream media, the frames considered here refer to the ways in which broad themes emerge in articles, enabling the categorisation of reports for the researcher, and framing the readers understanding of the events described in the text (Fairclough, 2003). This enables the researcher to sample a selection of news articles and place them within a broad framework. This framework may then be used to assess the contribution that the frame has made to an overall discourse. As has been found in this study, several framings of the Iraq War served to form a dominant discourse, which marginalized state criminality as an explanatory discourse, for the violence associated with the occupation (see chapters: 2, 3 and 4).

However, frames themselves are too broad in scope to fully understand the way in which a text has been constructed. Themes may be considered as mini-frames within the text, the ways in which the text is structured within its overall framework. As such, themes within the frame can be drawn out, in order to effectively understand the way in which a particular text has been constructed (Altheide, 2006). For example, one of the themes that emerged from the

---

[16] In the case of this study: news article, human rights report or incident report from military personnel.

analysis of the media discourse, explaining the violence inherent to the occupation of Iraq, was that Sunni insurgents were unwilling to take part in Iraq's new political landscape. This theme itself was found within the wider historic ethnic divisions frame. In summary, themes represent the recurring theses', which make up news reports. Frames, are the overall structure of a report, they set the boundaries of debate within the report itself, whilst frames, as is argued in this thesis, come together to form a dominant discourse, or way of understanding, the social reality presented to us. Often, these dominant representations marginalize and obscure from view, alternative understandings of the social world (Wodak, 2001, Fairclough, 2003).

Having explained the constituent aspects of discourse analysis it is worth now briefly examining the various ways in which discourse analysts focus their studies. Phillips and Hardy (2002), identify four primary ways in which discourse analysis is carried out, these include: Social linguistic analysis, interpretive structuralism, critical discourse analysis, and critical linguistic analysis. Social linguistic analysis may be characterised as an approach, which undertakes a close reading of a text in order to understand its organization and construction i.e. the way in which discursive acts construct action itself, and what frames and themes are drawn upon to inform particular actions. In so doing, it is possible to understand, for example, what discourse(s) are important in informing the decision making process of a panel of judges deciding the winner of a competition, when the text under analysis is a recording or transcript of their discussions leading to this decision. As Phillips and Hardy (Ibid: 23) suggest:

> "Studies of this kind, which focus upon the constructive aspects of texts, help us to understand not only the discursive microdynamics of individual decisions, but also the discursive foundations of the social reality in which those decisions are located".

Interpretive structuralist approaches focus on the way in which discourse can be used to influence action, be this to legitimise or delegitimise particular behaviours. In a similar vein to social linguistic analysis, interpretive structuralism looks at the way in which discourse is constructed, but also combines this with an analysis of how individuals understand discourse and how this understanding is influential on their actions (Wodak, 2001). As such, interpretive structuralism may combine the analysis of texts with, for example, interviews. Additionally, this approach may engage in a temporal analysis of texts, in order to gauge the

23

wider changes in discourses over time, the influences upon these changes, and their social effects (Ibid).

Critical linguistic analysis, in a similar vein to social linguistic analysis, tends to focus upon singular texts in detail. However, the approach shares similar concerns to that of critical discourse analysis, in that it seeks to understand how dominant discourses are used within a text (Phillips and Hardy, 2002). This approach could readily be used in the analysis of political speeches, in order to understand how particular themes and frames surrounding an underlying discourse may be used to induce public support for policy initiatives.

Finally, critical discourse analysis refers to the study of the way in which discourse is used to privilege some discursive positions over others. Influential in this tradition is the work of Michel Foucault, who in his inception of discourse analysis, sought to understand the role of power, in the construction of knowledge and dominant discourse (Fairclough, 2003). The Foucauldian position considers knowledge as socially constructed and therefore not as a representation of reality. Here, truth is a discursive construction, in which 'different regimes of knowledge determine what is true and false' (Jorgenson and Phillips, 2002:13). In so doing, this approach draws upon a wide range of texts, in order to illustrate how disparities in power and access to forums in which texts are produced for wider audiences, may lead to dominant claims to truth (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997). Studies utilising this approach, are useful in revealing the way in which discursive practices found in texts, help to construct dominant understandings of social reality and the way in which these understandings serve to privilege some actors over others, or to marginalize some understandings of social reality over others (van Dijk, 1993). Through such an analysis, we can understand the construction of 'truths' and the impact of these, upon action.

Phillips and Hardy (2002) however, acknowledge that these are not strict categories, which researchers must adhere to. On the contrary, research utilising discourse analysis may well traverse a number of these approaches. Indeed, Fairclough (2001), argues that discourse analysis should not be seen as a transferable skill, in the traditional sense of a research method. Instead, he argues that it is a flexible approach to understanding discourse and its effects, within broader social processes (see also: Potter and Wetherell, 2003). With this in mind, the approach adopted here, may be considered to be working within the tradition of critical discourse analysis. Seeking to understand the construction of dominant discourses,

within the mainstream media, surrounding explanations of the violence within occupied Iraq. It then turned to a document analysis of human rights reports and the IWL, in order to show that the mainstream media wrongfully (or wilfully) marginalized the discourse of state criminality, which could also help to explain this violence. With this in mind, and having outlined what discourse analysis as a methodological approach entails, we will now turn to a discussion of the manner with which this methodology has been used to analyse the mainstream media reports.

2. Media analysis of representations of violence in the Iraq War

The following discussion will summarize the methodological approach to the media analysis carried out in this research. This will entail more specifically, comments on the selection of sources, where the data was drawn from, and a discussion of the way in which the sample was selected. Finally, this section of the discussion will also offer some reflection upon the limitations of the methodological approach adopted in the course of this research.

2.1 Sources

The study selected three newspapers, from both the US and UK, as these were the two main protagonists in the Coalition that invaded Iraq, and had been the main actors involved in seeking international approval for military intervention in the country. From the US, the sources selected were: *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post* and *USA Today*. These newspapers were selected for their wide circulation, as at the time of conducting the analysis, they were all ranked within the top five most read newspapers in the United States. The newspapers were also considered to present relatively neutral political positions in their reporting, although admittedly *The New York Times* has been considered to sometimes present a liberal (left leaning) bias in its reporting. However, as the purpose of the media analysis was to assess the representation of the occupation of Iraq within the mainstream media, this was considered as acceptable, because given *The New York Times* political position, greater criticism of the Bush administration's policy towards Iraq was expected.

From the UK, the sources selected were: *The Guardian*, *The Daily Telegraph*, *The Times* and their Sunday equivalents, *The Observer*, *The Sunday Telegraph* and *The Sunday Times*. Although certainly not as widely circulated as British tabloid newspapers, this selection

represents the highest circulation for the broadsheet newspapers, which were considered to be more likely to produce a more comprehensive analysis of the Iraq War than their tabloid counterparts. Broadsheet newspapers tend to pay greater attention to the details of a story than their tabloid counter-parts and as a result have the capacity to produce more critical accounts of their subject matter. With this in mind, these sources were selected on the basis that if they were themselves constructing dominant narratives, which adopted the states explanation of the violent conflict and ignored detailed discussions of state crime, the results of the media analysis would benefit from greater validity. These sources also cover a wide range of political opinions, with *The Guardian* largely coming from the left of the political spectrum, and thus considered to be more likely to voice critical concerns regarding the Iraq War. Whilst *The Daily Telegraph* and *The Times*, largely adopt centre-right positions, meaning they would be more likely to be critical of the traditionally centre-left, New Labour government of Tony Blair. However, future research into the UK media's analysis of the violent occupation of Iraq could benefit from an analysis of both the accounts of tabloid newspapers and television news sources.[17] In so doing, a more comprehensive analysis of the mainstream media's constructive analysis of the Iraq War could be achieved and provide the potential for a comparative analysis of the positions adopted by different news mediums. However, in addition to the above reasoning, it was decided that in order to maintain the manageability of the data in this research, that a broader analysis encompassing both tabloid journalism and television news was not feasible.[18]

2.2 Sample

The study made use of the Lexis/Nexis online catalogue, in order to gain access to its media sample. Lexis/Nexis contains a searchable archive of a multitude of local, regional, national and international media publications. The archive was sufficiently well resourced, to cover both the selected time frame for the sample, as well as the selected sources outlined above. Additionally, Lexis/Nexis makes the process of collecting research data for media analysis much more user friendly than, for example, making use of the more labour intensive process

---

[17] This latter point should also apply to US television news sources, who have a reputation for adopting partisan accounts of conflicts involving US forces, with alternative explanations and/or debates relegated to the margins of popular discourse (Robinson, 2002, Altheide, 2009, Ryan and Switzer, 2009).

[18] This is doubly so when considered in conjunction with the demands of data collection and analysis, stemming from the investigation of both Wikileaks and human rights reports, to uncover evidence of state criminality in occupied Iraq.

of library card catalogues, or microfiche collections (Altheide, 1996). It is also often more reliable for searching media sources than these collections, as the size of the database means that sources are rarely omitted. Thus, when a search is conducted, the researcher can be assured that all possible articles from the selected sources within the given time frame have been included in the search. In the case of this project the articles sampled conflated both editorial content and news reporting, we will discuss the reasons for this momentarily, but first it is necessary to differentiate between the two writing styles.

Editorial content has been described by Firmstone (2003:3) as the 'voice of the newspaper', they are distinct from news reports in that editorials present the views of writers who are considered respected voices, capable of passing informed comment upon a given subject matter. They are opinion pieces whose comments more often than not reflect the position of the publication. In contrast news reports are formatted to present compelling stories drawn from the information available to journalists at the time of writing. These reports are presented as factual interpretations of the available data and regularly draw upon official sources, such as politicians or military officials, to support their extrapolations. As has been noted, editorial content and news reporting has been conflated within the sample however, the thesis does not see this as a limitation given the focus of the media analysis. The purpose of this aspect of the research is to demonstrate   that   the   mainstream   news   media presented a series of dominant narratives surrounding explanations of violence during the occupation of Iraq, which reflected official positions and marginalized an analysis of state crime from popular discourse. With this in mind, it is argued that the conflation of the two writing styles described above, would serve to further highlight the dominant framings of the conflict found in the pages and columns of the sampled news sources. In short, the presence of editorials supporting the framings of the conflict found in news reporting would provide further affirmation of observable dominant media narratives.

Having acknowledged the conflation of editorial content with news reporting, we turn now to a discussion of the time frame from which the sample was drawn. More specifically; what this time frame was and why this particular time frame was selected, before moving on to discuss the search terms used to generate the sample within this time frame.

The sample of newspaper reports was limited to the period between the 19th March 2003 and the 1st January 2009. This was done for two specific reasons: Firstly, the specified dates

encompass the official beginning of Coalition military operations in Iraq, up until the transfer of security control over the Green Zone in Baghdad, to Iraqi forces, the beginning of the end of large scale, Coalition military involvement in the country. This time frame was able take in the most violent stages of the occupation of Iraq, before the levels of violence began to subside, in the wake of the troop surge initiated in January 2007. It was also able to take in reports that included the impact of the troop surge on the occupation. Secondly, this time frame not only provided the means to cover a significant aspect of the occupation, but also made the size of the sample generated by this time frame manageable from a research perspective. This was especially important, given that the media analysis took in four separate sampling frames, in order to explore how the media sample had sought to explain the violence that had beset post-invasion Iraq. These sampling frames were characterised as follows: The importance of historic ethnic divisions, the presence of foreign fighters who had migrated into the country during the occupation in a bid to inflame the conflict, the mistakes made by the US-led Coalition in the administration of the occupation, and the resort to state-sanctioned violence, to pacify the insurgency. Having set out both the time frame from which the sample was drawn, and the frames that were explored to assess their prominence within the media's overall explanatory narrative, the discussion will now outline the key search words used to explore these four frames. It must be noted however, that whilst each of these frames was assessed in order to consider their prominence within the sample, they are not mutually exclusive categories. On the contrary, these categories were found to readily overlap within the articles that made-up the sample, resulting in what discourse analysts call an interdiscursive analysis. However, they serve as useful frameworks, in order to make sense of the narrative construction of the explanations of violence, found within the sample.

2.3 Iraq's historic ethnic divisions

This frame was considered, in order to assess the importance that the sample placed upon Iraq's ethnic divisions, between its diverse ethnic groups,[19] as a key factor in explaining the country's dissent into violence. As such, the search terms used mirrored the title of this frame: Iraq – Historic – Ethnic – Divisions. Additionally, Lexis/Nexis was instructed to find articles, which contained these words within at least one paragraph, in order to capture as wide a sample as possible, without generating results that just carried, for example, one word

---

[19] Particularly the divisions between the country's dominant groups: The Sunni, Shi'a and Kurds.

within a document, but did not actually relate to the frame itself. From previous attempts, when this condition was not inserted into the search, an unmanageable number of results were generated.[20] This was due in part to the key word search system that the database employs, and the fact that the Iraq War has formed such a prominent aspect of recent history. As a result, this condition was applied to all subsequent searches.

The results of this search generated 326 articles from the US newspapers and 257 from the UK. After a systematic reading of these articles, it was found that 45 articles from the US sample, and 67 from the UK sample, were directly relevant to the sampling frame. However, the notion of historic ethnic divisions, as a key reason for the violence within occupied Iraq, would also appear in subsequent searches within the remaining frames. It was found, for example, that this frame formed a prominent aspect of both the foreign fighters frame, as well as the media's treatment of the mistakes made by the US-led Coalition in Iraq, particularly with regard to the debaathification of Iraqi society, as well as the disbanding of the Iraqi Army and security forces. As noted above, these frames are not mutually exclusive, but mutually constitutive of an overall explanation of the violent occupation of Iraq.

2.4 Foreign fighters

As the invasion of Iraq was conducted under the rubric of the War on Terror, this frame was considered in order to assess how prominent the notion of foreign fighters, migrating into the country to fight Coalition forces as a primary front in the War on Terror was, within the media sample. To do this, the key words used to generate the sample were as follows: Iraq – War – Foreign – Fighters. Again, these words were used in order to ensure that the sample generated results directly related to the Iraq War. Whilst the choice of 'foreign fighters' as search terms, were based upon the terminology used in speeches, by prominent members of the Bush Administration, to describe the presence of such groups within the country. These criteria generated 124 reports from US newspapers, and 231 from the UK. Of which, 61 articles from US newspapers, and 127 from the UK, were found to be directly relevant to the sampling frame.

---

[20] In this instance Lexis/Nexis produced 'more than 3000 results'.

2.5 US mistakes

As a result of the violence that plagued Iraq, whilst under the control of the US-led Coalition, this frame sought to assess the prominence of a critique of the US' administration of the occupation. In contrast to the previous frames, this overall framework was organised into three different searches, pertaining to perceived mistakes made during the occupation: The debaathification of Iraqi society, the disbanding of the Iraqi military and security forces, and the deployment of too few troops in order to provide long lasting security in the post-invasion environment.

To this end, the key word searches used to generate the sample were as follows: With regard to the debaathification of Iraq, the words Iraq – debaathification were used for the UK sample, whilst for the US sample, Iraq – de-ba'athification was used. This was because it was found during an initial reading, that there was a linguistic discrepancy in how each nation presented the issue. For the disbanding of the Iraqi military and security forces, the words Iraq – army – disbanding, were found to be appropriate for both US and UK samples. Finally, in considering the notion that the US went into Iraq with too few troops in order to successfully secure the country, in the wake of initial military operations, the words Iraq – insufficient – troops, were found to be applicable to both samples.

These search terms generated a sample which is detailed as follows: For the UK, the debaathification theme produced 68 directly relevant articles, from a total of 113 results: for disbanding the Iraqi military and security forces, 49 articles, from a total of 98 results: and finally with regard to the theme of insufficient troop numbers, 41 articles from an overall sample of 201. For the sample of US newspapers, de-ba'athification generated 75 articles, from 309 results, for disbanding Iraqi forces, 58 articles, from 144 results, and finally, the theme of insufficient troops, generated 57 directly relevant articles, from 279 results. In summary, this created a combined total of 348 relevant reports, from 1144 articles, for the US mistakes frame.

2.6 State crime

This was the final frame used in assessing the samples representation of the Iraq War, and was particularly important in order to understand whether state-sanctioned violence had been

marginalized as an explanatory discourse, within the context of the occupation of Iraq. As a result, several search terms were used, in order to cover a variety of potential problems that the media could have focused upon. These included: War – crimes – Iraq, state – crime – Iraq, torture – Iraq, Private – Security – Contractors – Iraq, Private – Military – Contractors – Iraq and Military – Contractors – Iraq.

These terms were considered to cover a sufficiently wide range of issues that to some extent were already known within the public sphere. For example, the torture and abuse of detainees had been found at least once with regard to Abu Ghraib prison, as a result, this was an issue that could have played a prominent role in the samples analysis of the conflict. Likewise, Jeremy Scahill (2007) has documented the role of military contractors in Iraq. Scahill's book on the private security contractor Blackwater, presented a damning analysis of the companies activities and their links to the Bush Administration. As a result, it is not unreasonable to assume, that the selected sources were aware of the potential for state-sanctioned violence to be a prominent factor within occupied Iraq. Similarly prominent writers including John Pilger, Naomi Klein and Noam Chomsky, had all criticised the conflict on these grounds. However, the representation of this frame within the sample was found to be limited: for the sample of UK newspapers, 91 results were generated from the search, of which, 27 were directly relevant to the state crime frame: for US newspapers, a total of 16 articles were found, of which 9 were directly relevant. At this point then, having discussed the way in which the media sample was drawn, it is time to consider the limitations of this approach.

3. Limitations

Whilst critical discourse analysis is a useful research tool, in order to assess the construction of particular understandings of social phenomena, it is clear that the approach suffers from some limitations. One of the primary criticisms often levelled at discourse analysis, in all its forms, is its inherent subjectivity. For instance, the selection of media frames may be considered as a subjective interpretation of the researcher. This criticism suggests that any frame may be selected, to which empirical data may correspond. However, whilst this criticism is accurate to some degree, it is also flawed in its assumption, as if the selected frames were inappropriate or inaccurate, this would be reflected in both the size of the sample generated and more importantly, the content of that sample (Altheide, 1996). Although the process of selecting media frames may be subjective, if these frames are not represented

within for example, the mainstream media, as was the focus of this study, then very little data would have been gathered, and the representation of social reality presented in that data would reveal that the researchers assumptions were flawed. This would be an interesting research finding in itself.

Additionally, in order to avoid as much as possible the issue of bias in the selection of media frames, and the collection of data from these frames, the research applied multiple search terms in the search for data, which critically considered state criminality as a prominent feature of the occupation of Iraq. As illustrated above, these search terms sought to cover a wide range of possible examples of state criminality, which the sample had the opportunity to discuss, due to the existing publication of these issues within the public domain.

A similar criticism is that the interpretation of content within the sample is itself subjective, and therefore open to interpretation and reinterpretation, as opposed to being a process of discovery, providing definitive answers. This itself leaves discourse analysis open to questions of reliability, if not in the process of collecting data, then in the reading of this data. However, discourse analysis is self-consciously an interpretive project, which seeks to understand, in this instance, the narrative construction of social reality in the media (Wodak, 2001, Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002, Fairclough, 2003). Admittedly, some readers will approach the texts used in this analysis in a manner that dismisses popular, mediated understanding of social reality, relying instead on their own intellectual abilities, whilst others, may look to less mainstream texts, in order to understand their social reality. The purpose of this research has been to show, that the sample presented an understanding of the Iraq War, which by its marginalization of state criminality, had the effect of defining this framework out of popular public discourse. Although less mainstream publications may have sought to tackle the issue, these do not receive the same attention as popular publications, limiting their capacity to set discursive agendas. As such, given the controversial nature of a state crime discourse, if it were to form a prominent part of popular knowledge, its discussion within the mainstream press would be unavoidable.

In summary, having considered and attempted to account for, some of the limitations associated with discourse analysis, in the wake of a thorough description of the methods deployed in this research, the discussion will now turn to the final aspect of this project: the

search for evidence of state criminality in occupied Iraq, from human rights reports, and the Wikileaks IWL.

4. Collecting empirical evidence of state crime

In contrast to the interpretive process of critical discourse analysis, utilised in the analysis of the media sample, in the first half of this study, the second half of the study (seeking to provide evidence that state criminality was a regular feature of the occupation landscape) was presented with an interesting problem: how to uncover evidence pertaining to state criminality, when due to funding constraints and the inherent danger of visiting a country in the midst of a violent occupation, the researcher is unable to visit the research environment in person?

To solve this problem, the research relied upon Internet access to documents published by both human rights organisations, and the IWL published by Wikileaks, allowing the research to access both sensitive and censored data, without needing to be physically present in the field, a clear advantage for this type of research (Mann and Stewart, 2000). However, as will be discussed later in this section, the stability of these data sources, is often frustratingly unpredictable, and as such, research of this nature, must be as flexible as possible. For the sake of consistency, these reports were taken from within the same time frame as that used in the media analysis above.[21] Additionally, as noted above, this time frame encompassed the most violent and chaotic aspects of the occupation, before this violence began to dissipate after the troop surge. Taking these in turn, we will first consider the gathering of data from human rights reports.

4.1 Human rights reports

The reports used in this study were drawn from a selection of three independent human rights groups, alongside reports from the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq. The United Nations reports on human rights in Iraq[22] were used not only for their detailed analysis of the human rights situation, but also to corroborate the reports from the independent human rights

---

[21] Although the IWL covered the period beginning from the 1st January 2004.
[22] Which in between 2003 and 2007 were released every two months, but eventually reduced to two publications a year, as levels of violence declined in the wake of the troop surge.

groups, as the UN was considered to be a politically neutral arbiter, whose primary purpose was to encourage nations involved in the occupation, to observe and uphold international standards of human rights.

As noted, these reports were contrasted with reports from three separate human rights organisations: Amnesty International, who released annual reports on the human rights situation in Iraq, from 2003 onwards. Human Rights First, who produced a detailed analysis of the role of military contractors in Iraq. Human Rights Watch, who have produced a series of reports on various aspects of the human rights situation in occupied Iraq, from 2003 until the present day. These organisations were selected on the basis that they are firstly, three of the most prominent international human rights organisations in the world. Secondly, that they each have a record of producing detailed and well informed reports, on human rights situations across the world. Finally, they are independent from state governments and work to promote human rights, even if, as is the case with Human Rights First, it is their own government that they are critical of.[23]

However, whilst these sources produced a valuable insight into the human rights situation in Iraq, they did not present a sufficiently comprehensive source of data to constitute the evidence base for this research project. Similarly, the data presented within the human rights reports was not as specific as the data emerging from the fortuitous release of the IWL. This highlights the difficulty presented to researchers analysing crimes committed at war: there is no regularly updated database of recorded atrocities to draw the data from, victims are often unable to speak, be this through death, fear or intimidation, and the perpetrators have the capacity to hide or legitimise their actions and discredit accusations against them (Cohen, 2001).[24] As a result, with the release of the IWL in October 2010, the research turned its attention to this new data source, in order to expand the evidence base used to prove the existence of state criminality in occupied Iraq.

---

[23] Human Rights First, based in New York, works primarily to hold the US accountable to the highest standards of human rights, arguing that 'upholding human rights is not only a moral obligation; it's a vital national interest. America is strongest when our policies and actions match our values'.

[24] This also underscores the need for criminologists involved in the study of state criminality to both further publicise and act as public academics. Or, perhaps more realistically, to borrow from Herbert Marcuse (1967), to act as 'catalysts' of historical change by engaging with and supporting the work of whistle blowers, human rights groups and other likeminded associations, to expose the nefarious activities of nation states. We will return to this discussion in the concluding pages of this thesis.

4.2 Wikileaks and the Iraq War Logs

On the 22nd October 2010, the Wikileaks organisation released the Iraq War Logs. These logs were made up of 391,832 reports on 'significant actions', from soldiers within the US military. As such, they detail events on the ground as seen, heard and understood by US forces deployed to occupy Iraq, providing an insight into the conflict from the point of view of those acting in it. The war logs offered the research the specific, detailed first hand accounts of illegitimate, violent actions that the human rights reports were unable to match. As a result, these were an extremely valuable resource from which to assess the prominence of state criminality during the occupation of Iraq, both from the point of view of those not only directly involved in the day-to-day conduct of the occupation, but who were also the leading military force responsible for counter-insurgency operations within the occupying Coalition.

However, due to the size of the sample it would have been both impractical and ineffectual, to search through each report individually. Therefore, the analysis of the documents used a key word search format, utilising terms that would enable the search to capture within its sample, actions that constituted state-sanctioned violence. These terms were based upon indications of human rights abuses, within the previously covered human rights reports discussed above, whilst were also generated reflexively as the data was explored. These terms were: 'torture', 'private security company', 'Blackwater', 'Fallujah siege', 'government militia', 'Coalition kill', 'Wolf Brigade',[25] 'Apache', 'UAV',[26] 'gun run',[27] 'detainee abuse', 'kick detainee', 'escalation of force'.

However, a key issue when conducting research online is the need to maintain access to your data source, or participants (Mann and Stewart, 2000). This became a serious issue during the data collection phase of this project. This was due to a mass distributed denial of service attack on the Wikileaks servers, shortly after their release, leading to the complete shut down of the site for weeks at a time. Likewise, on its return to service, after being forced to migrate

---

[25] A specific militia, found in the course of searching for government militia.
[26] Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
[27] A gun run refers to the deployment of military aircraft over a targeted area that have been ordered to fire indiscriminately upon infrastructure, vehicles and people within this area. This search term was generated by the data revealed in the searches for Apache and UAV.

its servers through several different companies,[28] the IWL had been seriously corrupted. This damage was manifested in both the capacity to use the key word search function, as well as the ability to search through more than 4 pages (40 reports) of searches generated through clicking on functional sections of the IWL.[29]

As a result, the research at this point sought to locate an alternative source for the Iraq War Logs. In order to do this, the research made use of Twitter to find links to 'mirrors' of the Wikileaks website that had been set-up by sympathetic supporters. These supporters were seeking to counter what they considered to be an unjust attempt to prevent further analysis of the IWL data, by interested members of the public and academics alike. However, these mirror sites were unfortunately unable to effectively reproduce the IWL, being set-up as they were, after the denial of service attacks had begun. Once again, this created the necessity of finding an alternative data source, which was eventually uncovered in the form of a blog, based in Germany.[30] This blog had replicated its own searchable version of the IWL. At this point, the research was able to recommence in earnest, resulting in a total of 224 relevant documents, being generated from 1934 searched reports.

In summary, the IWL have provided this project and future projects, seeking to assess state criminality in Iraq, with an invaluable resource for uncovering crimes, which are often very difficult to discover. In part this is due to the state's capacity to control access to this information, but also because crimes of this nature are often absent from public discourse, resulting in the limited documentation of these crimes, in comparison to the traditional political, media and academic focus on street-level criminality. The reports are authentic, evidenced by the international response to them.[31] They are also credible in their depiction of

---

[28] Caused by the US Government pressurising US based companies to with hold web hosting services from Wikileaks.

[29] Ironically, as I write this chapter, the organisations website is once again under a mass distributed denial of service attack, by a group referring to themselves as 'Anti Leaks', which has once again resulted in the complete shut down of the website.

[30] Called: 'mein-parteibuch.org – The Cats Xataface to the Wikileaks Iraq War Logs'. However, this site itself, suffered from an unreliable server, meaning that on some occasions this site was also inaccessible.

[31] As well as the thus far indefinite imprisonment, in isolation, without trial, of Private First Class Bradley Manning, a US Army Intelligence Analyst, accused by the US Government, of leaking the documents to Wikileaks. His detention under these conditions has also led to 295 academics signing a petition in protest against his treatment, which they argued violated the US constitution.

events encountered by the reporting units due to their function as official daily reports.[32] Therefore, Wikileaks must be considered as an exceptional source for academic research of this nature. However, as a result of the continued denial of service attacks on the organisation, combined with the restructuring of the IWL in the wake of these attacks, resulting in the removal of the key word search function, searching this data has become an increasingly difficult task. However, this is a task that requires further attention, given the important purpose that Wikileaks serves, with regard to the exposure of state criminality. To bring this discussion to a close, we will now briefly reflect upon the ethics of the work conducted by Wikileaks, with particular attention paid to the IWL, and the implications of this for the ethics of social research.

5. Ethical concerns related to the Wikileaks Iraq War Logs

Whilst neither media analysis nor publicly available document analysis require attention to the usual ethical considerations associated with research involving human participants, such as informed consent, the need to debrief participants, or ensure their physical safety. There are several notable ethical concerns regarding the use of sensitive data, or data that was deemed as classified by state governments, before being made public without the state's consent, as was the case with the IWL.

The disclosure of secrets is not an issue that should be taken lightly, indeed when secrets are disclosed through malice, personal gain or through a lack of forethought; they can be both extremely damaging and ethically unsound. When whistle blowing organisations such as Wikileaks, choose to release classified documents into the public arena, it must be with the utmost sincerity and concern for an issue or action which is unethical and should be held to account (Perrucci et al, 1980). As Uys (2008) suggests, the process of whistle blowing that organisations such as Wikileaks engage in, may be described as 'ethical resistance' to organisational wrongdoing. The whistle blower then, may be considered as a concerned citizen, motivated predominantly by public interest in exposing the wrong doing that they have discovered when they realise that internal accountability has failed (Ray, 2006, De

---

[32] Their credibility is further enhanced by the fact that if there had been a desire to hide evidence of state criminality within the reports, then evidence of torture, extrajudicial killings, death squads, etc, would have been absent.

Maria, 2008). Whilst Wikileaks has certainly released some dubious material in the past,[33] which does not conform to these ethical conditions, in many instances, the material released adheres to their original mission statement:

> "Our primary mission is in exposing oppressive regimes... to be of assistance to people of all regions who wish to reveal unethical behaviour in their governments and corporations. Our goal is to bring important news and information to the public". Wikileaks, (2007)

This is certainly the case with regards to the details presented within the IWL, particularly, and in contrast to the initial release of similar documents regarding Afghanistan, when care was taken to remove details that could lead to individual harm, such as the names of military personnel, informants, detainees, insurgents or civilians. As the ethical philosopher Sissela Bok (1989) has argued, if people act in ways that blatantly seek to cause harm, when alternative options were available, then those who are in a position to illuminate this action, have an obligation to do so. However, whilst this argument is ethically sound, one must also bear in mind the counter argument, that the publication of classified documents such as the IWL, or Afghan War Diaries, can put military personnel and civilians, at risk. Whilst there may be some truth to this, data proving this relationship is not readily available. Also from an ethical perspective, this argument does not add up, as if we were to accept this logic, this would prohibit the exposure of the initial criminality. Therefore, we would have to accept that state criminality took place, leading to numerous human rights abuses, by powerful nations, who have the capacity to hide their actions from public view. As Singer (1992) suggests, the way to avoid continued institutionalised corruption is to make the relevant issues public knowledge (see also: Perrucci et al, 1980, Ray, 2006).

With this in mind, the publication of the IWL, served an ethically viable position, which sought to expose the wrong doing of a nation state and its actors, which until the release of the reports, had largely been able to hide these actions from full public view. This capacity for states to shroud their nefarious actions in secrecy, particularly with regard to state criminality, not only obscures the actions already committed, but also makes it possible for

---

[33] For example, some of the diplomatic cables released as a part of 'Cablegate', whilst interesting at the level of diplomatic group dynamics, did not serve to uncover unethical or dangerous policy decisions.

actions in the same vein to continue. It is this point more than any other, which legitimises Wikileaks publication of the IWL: through their publication, the use of state-sanctioned violence became a popular discourse, creating greater scrutiny of the respect (or lack there-of) states have for human rights, both domestically and abroad.

This itself ties in with criminology's disciplinary direction, which for so long has been more concerned with the analysis of the state's definition of criminality, than the crimes of the state itself. Schwendinger and Schwendinger (1970) accurately suggested that criminologists are left with two choices: to act as the defenders of the social order, or the guardians of human rights. It is the contention of this thesis that criminology should play an important role in the maintenance of human rights. With resources such as Wikileaks at its disposal, criminology is presented with an opportunity to further develop its critical ontology within the study of state criminality. Therefore, whilst the decision to engage in research that tackles controversial issues or sensitive data can never be taken lightly and should always remain within the boundaries of good ethical practice, if these conditions are met, then criminologists are obligated, as are whistle blowing organisations such as Wikileaks, to critically engage with these issues.

However, organisations (or nation state's) typically view whistle blowing as a deviant act, which threatens their credibility and capacity to realise their national interests (Uys, 2008). In these instances, whistle blowers (such as Bradley Manning, Julian Assange or Wikileaks more generally) become the target of punitive actions. Likewise, despite the increased protections offered to whistle-blowers by governments across the world (De Maria, 2008), there is little evidence that these protections are enforced. For example, individuals identified as associated with the hacking group 'Anonymous',[34] are increasingly being arrested and prosecuted throughout the world, for actions that may be considered as whistle blowing (Cadwalladr, 2012) such as, the dumping of data resulting from hacking activities onto websites such as *pastebin*. Increasingly, these activities are themselves being policed, as sites of this nature provide facilities for users to inform and pressurise site owners to remove such material. It is conceivable that academics involved in the analysis and dissemination of findings derived from leaked, previously classified material may themselves be subject to

---

[34] A loosely connected group, comprising primarily of teenagers and young adults, who have been responsible for acts including the distributed denial of service attacks on Visa and Paypal, after they refused to process donations to Wikileaks.

punitive procedures; This may be through censorship within their academic departments, or an increasing difficulty of advancing their careers due to association with the controversy of publishing the findings from such data, or as was the case with the Anonymous hackers, the increased monitoring of their activities by state agencies, potentially leading to their arrest. Whilst these are all clear and present risks when dealing with material of this nature, it remains an ethical necessity for academics to use what little power they have, to contribute to the ongoing exposure of institutionalised wrongdoing. This is something that this thesis seeks to make a contribution to. With this in mind let us now turn to the first of four chapters that will critically analyse the media's construction of explanations of violence during the occupation of Iraq.

CHAPTER TWO

The Construction of the "Historic Ethnic Divisions" Narrative in the Western Mainstream Print News Media

Introduction

From the outset of the Iraq War on March 20th 2003, reportage within the mainstream media sought to provide a number of frameworks to explain the levels of violence that quickly engulfed the country in the wake of the US-led military occupation. The following analysis represents the first of three chapters that will analyse the prominence of what this study considers to be the three most frequently occurring framings of the violence that was so commonplace during the occupation stage of the Iraq War.[35] The first of these framings, defined as Iraq's historic ethnic divisions, will form the primary focus of this chapter.[36] In order to present a clear structure to the analysis, the discussion of the media sample will proceed chronologically in order to distinguish the developing nature of the historic ethnic division narrative in the media sample. It is the contention of this thesis that this framing formed one aspect of a dominate media narrative, which marginalized accounts of state-sanctioned violence by Coalition and associated proxy forces during the occupation of Iraq.[37] It is argued that this narrative largely uncritically represented official accounts of the daily violence encountered by Coalition forces in Iraq.

This chapter will therefore present the argument that one of the dominant explanations presented by the US and UK[38] mainstream media of the violence that has been associated with post-invasion Iraq was that it was due to an ethno-sectarian conflict whose origins lay in the arbitrary construction of Iraq as a nation-state by the British and French at the fall of the Ottoman Empire. It will be illustrated with reference to the socio-historical literature that Iraq was divided between three major populations which formed the foundations of the country: the Shi'a Arab majority that historically had been marginalized from power within Iraq and

---

[35] Summarised as: Iraq's historic ethnic divisions (this chapter), the presence of foreign fighters (chapter three) and the mistakes made by the US-led Coalition in the administration of the occupation (chapter four).

[36] For a discussion of the methodology used to generate the media sample discussed in this chapter refer to chapter two.

[37] The discussion of state criminality during the course of the occupation of Iraq by Coalition forces will form the major analysis of the latter half of this thesis.

[38] Considered to be the leading partners in the Coalition that invaded and occupied Iraq.

throughout most of the Middle East; the Sunni Arab minority who had maintained power in Iraq since independence from British colonial rule in 1932; and the Kurdish peoples of Northern Iraq, who have consistently found themselves in the position of violently oppressed minority as they have sought their independence from the Iraqi state. This explanatory narrative frames Iraq as a nation that held the potential to fracture into a series of catastrophic divisions along ethno-sectarian lines, which in the wake of the removal of Saddam Hussein from power, exploded into a fight for socio-political dominance.

In presenting this analysis, it will become clear that the explanatory narratives used within the media sample to explain this violence are not mutually exclusive, interacting with one another throughout this and the subsequent analyses in chapters three and four. However, before presenting the analysis of the media's account of Iraq as a country divided by ethnic conflict, the discussion will briefly outline the theoretical framework through which the media's analysis is assessed.

1. Theoretical framework

The representation of Iraq's historically developed ethnic divisions within the mainstream media will be assessed against two models of media analysis: "The CNN Effect" (Livingston, 1997, Robinson, 2002) and "Manufacturing Consent" (Herman and Chomsky, 1988, Herman, 2000). Taking these theoretical models in turn we will now outline their core arguments.

The CNN effect argues that the news media has the power to be an influential force on government policymaking (Robinson, 2011). The theory's original focus was on the impact of 24-hour live news coverage on government policymaking. The model contends that the media's influence in this vein is most powerful "under conditions of policy uncertainty" (Robinson, 2002, p.128). Put another way, it argues that the media can be an important driver of foreign policy agendas and that the media can independently influence foreign policy decision-making. This process can sometimes occur against the foreign policy wishes of government officials (Robinson, 2011).[39] To this end, Wolfsfield (1997) and Entman (2004)

---

[39] The original conceptualisation of the model focussed on the mainstream media's influence on governments to provide humanitarian aid during international crises. Most influential in the creation of this model was the media's coverage of humanitarian crises in Iraq (1991) and Somalia (1991-1992). In these instances it was argued that the media's emotional reporting of these issues led to military intervention on humanitarian grounds

argue that a lack of consensus on government policy direction within ruling elites is a prerequisite for the media to influence policy (see also: Baum and Groeling, 2009). This can lead news media sources to present more critical and emotive responses to government policy and over-report criticisms voiced by policymakers. The theory contends that this can lead to policymakers being influenced by media reporting when policy direction is unclear (Bahador, 2007). Livingston (1997) outlines three ways in which the media can potentially influence government policymaking:

1. The media as "accelerant": the presence of media attention to government policymaking is the cause of hasty decision-making, due to the constant presence and analysis of policy issues within media analysis. This limits the time policymakers have to reflect upon imminent policy decisions and intelligence and advice on the best course of action.

2. The media as "impediment": media coverage can act restrictively upon available policy options by presenting either emotional coverage of events, which stimulate demand from the public for a particular course of action, or may inadvertently expose government policy or military operations as a result of their coverage.

3. The media as "agenda setting agents": media coverage of policy issues can have the effect of "reordering" government policy agendas, as politicians are forced to respond to the coverage of socio-political issues presented in by the media.

In summary, the CNN effect argues that the media has the capacity to both set and modify government policy decisions and agendas. This means that the media would have to present positions that were counter to or critical of existing government policy in order to generate a shift in this policy.

In contrast to the CNN effect, the manufacturing consent model contends that the mainstream media's influence on government policy is partial at best (Gowing, 1994). In contrast to the CNN effect, it contends that more often than not media reporting acts as an adjunct of government policy. This means that the media largely replicates dominant political framings of domestic and international issues (Herman and Chomsky, 1988, Herman, 2000, Chomsky,

---

(Robinson, 2011). Bahador (2007) argues that the CNN effect was also influential in Western intervention in Kosovo (1998).

2002). The model argues that this is due to five interconnected "filters" that restrict the mainstream media's capacity to critically discuss socio-political issues:

1. Ownership: the owners of media organisations seek to protect their business interests, and as a result, the critical scope of reporting within these organisations is limited in order not to detrimentally impact upon the profitability of the organisation.

2. Funding: most news media organisations are reliant upon advertising as their primary source of revenue. This also limits the critical capacity of news reporting as media organisations must cater to the political positions of their key advertisers.

3. Sources: the mainstream media has privileged access to official sources in the government and military, which provide media organisations with insider accounts of the policymaking process. However, these sources have a vested interest in policy decisions being presented in the best way possible. Additionally, if the media choose to present a critical account of official policies or decision-making, they may lose their privileged access to these sources, inhibiting the media outlets' capacity to compete with its rivals.

4. Flak: if media organisations do present a critical account of government policy, pressure groups can emerge to discredit the organisation, which can have a significantly detrimental effect on its credibility, readership numbers and advertising revenue.

5. Fear: originally characterised as the fear of communism. Chomsky (2002) updated this filter to include the fear of terrorism and support for government anti-terror agendas, whereby news organisations that are critical of such agendas are silenced through the labelling of these organisations as terrorist sympathisers.

As a result of these five filters, the manufacturing consent model contends that the mainstream news media uncritically represents government policy decisions. As a result, the media is as responsible for generating public support to those policies as the politicians who have taken the decisions. In Robinson's (2002:129) study of US mainstream media, he argues that although the media has the capacity to mobilise popular opinion against government policy, for the most part, the media serves to manufacture consent to this policy:

"In all of the cases examined the media, whilst at times influencing policy, still reflected policy preferences of...the US elite foreign policymaking community.

44

Elite...manufacturing consent theory is borne out by this study, although further research into non-elite groups...might be worthwhile in order to assess their influence."

Hawkins (2011) suggests that manufacturing consent to government policy is not necessarily the result of what is reported in the media, but a function of what is left out of media reporting. He contends that the mainstream media selectively and disproportionately reports on international conflicts. Drawing on the core assumption of the CNN effect model, Hawkins (2011:1) argues that if we assume that media reporting can have an impact on government policy, then "it follows that by not producing coverage, the media contribute to the lack of policy". This functions to create a lack of public attention to aspects of conflicts that government officials wish to remain hidden. By extension, this means that through the media's selectivity and silence on aspects of warfare such as state criminality, that the media is complicit in the continuation of these activities.

In summary, the following discussion will assess the media's representation of Iraq's historic ethnic divisions in light of the CNN effect and manufacturing consent models of the mainstream media. This will provide a theoretical basis to assess the media's account and to consider whether the boundaries of legitimate debate were limited by the dominant accounts presented in the mainstream media, and to consider whether this account (in conjunction with those to follow in chapters three and four) served to marginalize state crime from popular public discourse.

2. 2003: Divided Iraq in need of stability

Reporting in the articles reviewed from both the UK and US news media, in the pre-occupation period of Operation Iraqi Freedom, take a similar approach to understanding the potential pitfalls of the coming occupation. In both the UK and US press samples, the emergent theme was one of Iraq as a state whose population was made up of multiple ethnic groups, struggling to live in harmony with one another and competing groups were only kept in check by the ruthless dictatorship of Saddam Hussein. The UK newspapers *The Sunday Telegraph* and *The Observer* took the Northern Iraqi city of Kirkuk as an example of the potential ethnic violence that could erupt throughout Iraq, should the application of American military power during the occupation prove to be inadequate.

According to Stansfield (2008) and Tripp (2007), Northern Iraq is a region inhabited primarily by the Iraqi Kurds, who have consistently fought for the right to self-governance. The 1920 Treaty of Sevres, laid out by the British government of the time, outlined the processes for a referendum on the future autonomy of the northern Kurdish population. However, the subsequent Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 superseded this treaty and instead incorporated a large section of the Kurdish territory into the newly defined borders of Iraq. This decision represented a betrayal of the Kurds by the British who had promised them autonomy. As a result, the Iraqi Kurds have sought to gain their autonomy ever since, through bloody rebellion against the Iraqi leadership, be it the British installed monarchy of King Faisal I or Saddam Hussein's Baa'th Party. This rebellion against their political marginalization and incorporation into the Iraqi state had been consistently suppressed by the Iraqi armed forces, most infamously by Saddam Hussein's deployment of chemical weapons in Halabja in 1988, leading to the deaths of thousands of Iraqi Kurds (Stansfield, 2008). With historical oppression of the Kurds in mind, Burke (2003), writing in *The Observer* notes, "unless…[US] troops secure Kirkuk and Mosul first, there will be a bloodbath as Kurds settle old scores", characterising Northern Iraq prior to this as "an ethnic and political tinderbox". Similarly, Pryce-Jones (2003) writing in *The Sunday Telegraph* argues that "the various groupings that inhabit Iraq…will fracture, and…degenerate into civil war", before, in a similar vein to *The Observer* article of the same date, considering Kirkuk as "a good example of the kind of problem that lies in wait". Pryce-Jones (Ibid) states that "Iraqis will seek revenge…on each other" if order and stability is not quickly restored to the country after the invasion (see also: Beaumont et al, 2003, Gibbes and Katwala, 2003, Stocking, 2003). Interestingly, at this early stage of the conflict, despite massive criticism of the lack of a concrete UN mandate to invade Iraq, neither newspaper makes any suggestion that the invasion should not have happened in the first place. Instead, there is simply the warning that the occupation stage of the operation is likely to be far more difficult than the invasion and defeat of the Iraqi armed forces.

US reporting from the same period indicates a similar framing of the present and future of the conflict; winning the war will prove to be the easy aspect of the mission due to the massive superiority of US forces, but winning the peace is thought to be far more problematic as a direct result of the entrenched ethnic divisions that are considered to be such a prominent feature of Iraq. Both *The Washington Post* and *The New York Times* argued that American optimism that the conflict would be short-lived was misplaced, as what eventually proved to

be a comprehensive military victory over Iraq's conventional forces soon transformed into a long, drawn-out, unconventional, counter-insurgency war. As *The Washington Post* states "Even after Iraqi forces are defeated, U.S. commanders will face a daunting task to maintain security in a country riven by ethnic divisions" (March 21st 2003). This theme is echoed by *The New York Times*, noting that after the initial military victory, there is the potential for order to break down and "long-repressed ethnic or religious tensions could explode" (March 24th 2003). *The New York Times* (April 10th 2003), presents a similar article, stating that American military victory "may be achieved in a matter of days, not months" but warning of "an ominous potential for…bloodshed in a nation riven with ethnic divisions and hatreds" referring to Iraqis as "a long-oppressed populace [that] has plenty of scores to settle". This article followed a report by Schmitt (2003) in the same newspaper the previous day, stating that as a result of the country's "diverse religious and ethnic make-up, Iraq poses the most formidable set of security issues the military has yet faced" (see also: Rohde, 2003). These articles can be seen to lay the grounds for a bloody occupation, in which intense fighting and the loss of civilian life would be inevitable.

However, as was the case in the reports coming from the UK, there remains no direct critique of the decision to invade Iraq, with Schmitt's (2003) article quoting US General George A. Joulwan's belief in the importance of the conflict; "It's not only nation-building for Iraq, but security-building for the US". *The Washington Post* (March 21st 2003) went further, arguing that the rewards to the US and its allies would be great as long as they have the will to maintain their commitment to the conflict. Similarly, *The New York Times* (April 10th 2003) argues that the Iraq War must be a conflict of liberation and not conquest. If this is the case, then the war has the potential to be "the opening chapter in a positive and historic transformation of Iraq", providing the country is quickly stabilised after the initial invasion. However, in assessing the US and UK news media's depiction of the importance of Iraq's inherent ethnic divisions, to an understanding of the potential for the country to erupt into bitter inter-ethnic conflict, we must also assess the origins of these divisions as depicted within the sample.

The first indication of the media's conception of the origins of Iraq's ethnic divisions is seen only days after the beginning of the invasion, in both the UK and US media. Said Aburish in *The Guardian* of March 24th 2003, locates Iraq's ethnic divisions within its formative history, citing the arbitrary nature of state creation by the British as a key reason for a diverse ethnic

make-up that has always lacked cohesion. The report refers to the secretive Sykes – Picot agreement of 1916 between the British and the French. Academic analysis of this agreement argues that this divided up the Middle East into a series of newly formed states that expressed little to no concern for their ethnic make-up. As a result, multiple ethnic groups were thrown into a melting pot that was further complicated by the British colonial objective of maintaining Iraq as a "Mesopotamian branch of the British Empire" (Thornton, 2005:155). Returning to Aburish (2003), he argues that the possibility of developing a stable Iraq in the midst of this new complex ethnic make-up was further complicated by Iraq's rich supply of natural resources, both a "source of weakness and strength" to Iraq. Daniel Yergin 1991) in his seminal academic work *The Prize*, argues that due to the growing importance of oil to the global economy, Iraq became an ever more attractive prospect for imperial engagement. As a result, each Western foreign engagement within Iraq since its formation has resorted to "bloodshed and cruelty", leaving Iraq divided and bitterly resenting what Aburish (2003) refers to as a "humiliation" that Iraqis (and the Arab world) have suffered at the hands of colonial intervention. Further emphasising his point, Aburish highlights the famous proclamation of the British installed monarchy of King Faisal I: "In Iraq, there are no Iraqis" (see also: Philps, 2003).[40]

Cockburn (2003), writing in *The Washington Post,* alludes to the popular wisdom within the American conception of Iraq as "an artificial state, created 80 years ago by order of the British out of…the Ottoman Empire" in which deep divisions between competing ethnic groups reign. However, Cockburn locates these divisions not amongst the Iraqis themselves, whom, he argues, are actually a remarkably unified people, citing the 1920 revolt against British colonial rule by Sunni and Shi'a as the first prominent example of this, but with imperial interference and, most importantly, the dictatorial rule of Saddam Hussein. He argues that although an insurgency in Iraq is likely, this will most likely take the form of a unified insurgency against the Coalition's occupying forces. However, whilst Cockburn's predictions are not entirely inaccurate, from the sample of articles considered in this study, he represents a lone voice predicting Iraqi inter-ethnic unity.

---

[40] The full quote from King Faisal I expresses Aburish's (2003) point even more clearly: ''In Iraq…there is still no Iraqi people, but unimaginable masses of human beings, devoid of any patriotic ideal…connected by no common tie…prone to anarchy, and perpetually ready to rise up against any government whatsoever.'' (King Faisal I quoted in Stansfield, 2008, p50).

The recurring themes that explain the origins of Iraq's divisions and its population's capacity for violent uprising locates them within the construction of the modern Middle East at the fall of the Ottoman Empire, and the broken promises of an Imperial British administration within Iraq. Philps (2003), writing in *The Daily Telegraph,* highlights what he sees as inherent ethnic tensions that serve to make "Iraq perennially unstable". Copeland (2003), writing in *The Washington Post,* draws direct parallels between British rule in Iraq and the American-led invasion, arguing that the Iraqis distrusted the British in the 1920s and the subsequent leaders it installed, as initially perceived liberation from the Ottoman Empire turned into an extended occupation that denied self-determination. Copeland adds that if the US seeks to "impose its values on [the Iraqi] people", then Iraqis will equally distrust and revolt against the US. Woollacott (2003), writing in *The Guardian,* would agree with Copeland. Citing Toby Dodge (2003), he writes that the US is "facing the consequences of that British failure and is "in danger of repeating it". This is the scenario that very quickly took shape during the occupation when it became clear that the US could not control the security situation, was inadequately prepared for the administration of Iraq's proposed transition to democracy and constructed the interim Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) along sectarian lines, whilst limiting the power the IGC held. The interaction of these errors with the framing of Iraq as an inherently volatile and divided society began to be displayed as early on as September 2003, in which Maddox, writing in *The Times,* characterised the IGC that was hand-picked by Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) administrator Paul Bremer as "lacking popular support, split along ethnic and religious lines, with no way to resolve rows". This shows that the media critique of the US's role in Iraq evolved from one that warned of the importance of maintaining order and security, whilst avoiding the imposition of American interference in Iraq's burgeoning political transformation, for fear of this being considered as another imperial intervention in Iraqi affairs, into a critique of US administrative errors. These errors interacted with the growing presence of AQI, serving to further inflame the country's pre-existing ethnic divisions. For example, *The Times* refers to Iraq as having become the key focus of "Al-Qaeda's continuing war on the West", arguing that the ethnic divisions inherent to Iraq will be "fanned and exploited" by Al Qaeda (October 28th 2003, see also: Sherwell and Berry, 2003).

These early depictions of the occupation of Iraq began to help frame popular understanding of Iraq's dissent into violence. The discourse serves to present Iraqis as a violent, divided people, with whom Coalition forces would have to take a stern approach in order to ensure

the stabilisation of the country. As a result, this discourse presents the possibility of a violent occupation as a distinct possibility that the public should be prepared for.

3. 2004: Ethnic conflict and the presence of Al Qaeda

As the occupation of Iraq continued into 2004, the reporting of the conflict within the sample maintained that the occupation was characterised by intense ethnic divisions. However, the reports began to place increasing emphasis on the role that AQI was playing in inciting ethno-sectarian violence, attaching ever-greater significance to the influence of AQI as a framework for understanding the increasing levels of violence within the occupied state. The prominence of AQI and foreign jihadists more generally, within the UK and US media, will form the primary focus of the following chapter; however, its use as an explanatory framework through which to understand the ethnic divisions narrative make it an invaluable contribution to this chapter's analysis. This interaction was found particularly within the US reports, whose emphasis on the influence of AQI in provoking already significant ethnic tensions followed a similar trend to the proclamations coming from the highest levels of the Bush Administration throughout 2004. These statements sought to frame the war in Iraq as a key front within the wider War on Terror, as Iraq's security increasingly suffered from the brutalising machinations of foreign jihadists. For example, in a speech in March 2004, President Bush re-affirmed the administration's belief that a free and democratic Iraq was a key aspect of the wider War on Terror:

> "Every nation…has an interest in a free, successful, stable Iraq. And the terrorists understand their own interest in the fate of that country. For them, the connection between Iraq's future and the course of the War on Terror is very clear" (President George W. Bush, 19th March 2004).

Bush continued to build the connections between Iraq and international terrorism, arguing that the terrorists plaguing Iraq's liberation were attempting to weaken the will of the Coalition by attacking Coalition forces and "targeting innocent Iraqis and foreign civilians for murder" (2004a). This sentiment is repeated in June (2004b) in a press statement conducted alongside British Prime Minister Tony Blair, which sought to praise Iraq's rapid transition from the administrative control of the CPA to the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG). However, whilst trumpeting the steady progress being made along the Coalition's "five-part plan for

self-government", [41] Bush cautioned that Iraq's continued progress will not be without struggle, as their development has increasingly come under threat from attacks by "foreign terrorists". Having established that the primary threat to Iraq's security stems from foreign terrorists migrating into Iraq, Bush emphasises the wider significance of succeeding in enabling Iraq's transition to democracy: "In Iraq, we're serving the cause of our own security, striking the terrorists where we find them, instead of waiting for them to strike us at home" (ibid). Bush reasserts the Administration's position on the violence plaguing Iraq one month later, in a wide-ranging speech that concentrated on the progress being made in the War on Terror in nations throughout the world. When discussing Iraq's position within the bigger picture, the President states that Coalition and Iraqi security forces were conducting operations side-by-side "to defeat the terrorists and foreign fighters who threaten their nation and the world" (Bush, 2004c). A press conference conducted with Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi in September illustrates similar sentiments; that the majority of Iraqis are fighting to bring freedom and democracy to their nation, against a violent insurgency that has been inflamed by foreign terrorists. Allawi himself comments that Iraq is "facing [an] international terrorist onslaught" (Bush, 2004d).

These statements are indicative of a particular framing of Iraq's descent into violence from the very top of the Bush Administration; that despite great progress being made in Iraq, foreign terrorists who view Iraq as a key front in their war with America and the West have dented this progress. This position was increasingly adopted within the mass media, which began to integrate the framing of Iraq as an inherently divided nation, with the suggestion that these divisions were being exacerbated by the growing influence of AQI and other foreign jihadists, to be discussed below. This provides strong evidence that the media reporting of the violence associated with post-invasion Iraq served the primary purpose of manufacturing consent to the official explanations. This is to say, that media reporting of the violence being played out in occupied Iraq was closely tied to the statements made by key figures within the Bush Administration and other prominent figures associated with the occupation. This limited the scope for legitimate criticism of the conflict to the false pretences produced for going into Iraq (the falsification of evidence of Weapons of Mass Destruction and links between

---

[41] These five steps were: 1. Hand over authority to a sovereign Iraqi Government. 2. Help to establish the stability and security in Iraq that democracy requires. 3. Continue rebuilding Iraq's infrastructure. 4. Encourage more international support. 5. Move toward free, national elections that will bring forward new leaders empowered by the Iraqi people White House Office of Communications (2004).

Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda) and the deteriorating security situation, that was leading to the deaths of increasing numbers of Coalition military personnel and the slowing of progress towards a stable, democratic Iraq.

Media reporting between 2004 and 2005, in both the US and the UK newspapers sampled, provides support for the above analysis. For example, MacFarquhar (2004), writing in *The New York Times*, reports that Iraq is "facing a civil war", acknowledging fears throughout the Arab world that the violence stemming from indigenous resistance forces and terrorist organisations "will further inflame existing divisions in Iraq". As well as the interaction of the first two narratives, which this study argues compete for prominence within the media reporting on post-invasion violence in Iraq,[42] the third narrative that this study will assess is included in the report; the American mistakes thesis, or more specifically in this context, the lack of planning for the reconstruction of post-invasion Iraq. From the outset of the article, MacFarquhar argues that Washington is beginning to pay the price "for entering Iraq with no coherent plan beyond toppling Saddam Hussein". Quoting Mohammed Kamal, who is a professor of political science at the University of Cairo, "the Americans don't have a plan on how to get out of this mess that they put themselves in". An article by Broder (2004), days later in *The Washington Post*, takes a similar line of critique, suggesting that the US was aware "that the historical divisions among the three major religious/ethnic groups in the country remain", yet still went into Iraq underprepared (see also: Burns and Worth, 2004). This leads Broder to criticise the misplaced idealism of President Bush, arguing that a vision of a democratic Iraq, whilst admirable, can lead to disasters "especially when impatience produces hasty decision-making".

Less than a week after the initial *New York Times* report, as discussed above, the same newspaper printed the full transcript of a press conference held by President Bush without criticism, in which he dismisses notions of a civil war erupting in Iraq, but acknowledges, "Terrorists from other countries have infiltrated Iraq to incite and organise attacks". There are two interesting aspects to his comments: the Iraqi people are not descending into civil war and that any violence being carried out by Iraq's ethnic groups has been incited by foreign terrorists, drawing important links between the occupation of Iraq and the wider War on

---

[42] That Iraq is riven with historically constructed ethnic divisions and that foreign terrorists have been largely responsible for both inflaming these divisions and carrying out their own violent attacks.

Terror (April 14th 2004). In summary, as the occupation of Iraq came to the end of its first year, alongside the understanding of Iraq as an inherently divided society, US media reports began to echo presidential statements that pointed towards the insidious influence of foreign terrorists upon the fragile security situation, whilst also beginning to critique the Bush Administration's post-invasion planning for Iraq's return to a feasible, sovereign state. Although this may be seen as an increasingly critical trend within the US media, these criticisms do not represent a critique of the invasion and occupation from outside of the usual realms of debate, that although initially the war was seen to serve America's national security interests, these interests were now being jeopardised by inept administration of the occupation, and a lack of understanding of Iraq's historic ethnic divisions. Whilst these arguments are not inaccurate, they are equally not a radical critique of US foreign policy, nor do they begin to directly criticise the military's role in the daily violence experienced by the Iraqi people, or the US Government's role in shaping the military response to this violence. In short, although a critical line of enquiry is beginning to emerge within US media reporting in 2004, this critique tends to remain within the realm of acceptable debate, thus adding greater credibility to the manufacturing consent framework for understanding the role of the mass media (Herman and Chomsky, 1988, Herman, 2000, Chomsky, 2002).

UK reporting during this period takes on a comparable position to that of the US media, retaining its focus upon the ethnic divisions narrative, whilst integrating this within an understanding of this violence as being further stimulated by the presence of foreign terrorists, most prominently AQI. This position is typified within the sample by three articles in particular, the first of which acknowledges the presence of the Jordanian-born terrorist, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (Burke, 2004). As will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter, al-Zarqawi became an increasingly prominent thorn in the side of the Coalition and the Iraqi population, according to academic analysis of the conflict (Michael, 2007, Hashim, 2009). Burke's (2004) article taken from *The Observer* also makes the increasingly common observation that Iraq continues to suffer from "significant inter-ethnic tensions", in this instance, located in the northern city of Kirkuk. Moore (2004), writing in *The Times*, also cites the growing influence of al-Zarqawi, and continues to highlight the importance of understanding Iraq's divisions historically. In discussing the "schism" within Islam that led to the divisions between Sunni and Shi'a Muslims, Moore argues that this schism "has provided cause for centuries of hostility, mostly found today in Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan". He cites the assassination of a Sunni militant leader in Iraq, and the torching of Shi'a shrines in

the riots that followed as a result of the assassination, as evidence for his argument. On the same day, in the same newspaper (*The Times*), another article leads with the headline "Al-Qaeda linked with attempt to provoke civil war" before quoting the then US Vice-President Dick Cheney, as attributing a series of attacks in Baghdad and Karbala to Al Qaeda: "These attacks are desperation moves by Al Qaeda affiliated groups". The article proceeds to link these attacks with rising fears of a growing "sectarian conflict" within the country, quoting Tony Blair's arguments, which echoed those coming from the White House that those responsible for the latest bout of violence were trying to "set the different religious communities in Iraq against each other" (Beeston and Hider, 2004).

These articles show an increasing congruence between the political and media understandings of the daily violence that was being faced by Iraqi civilians and Coalition forces. These depicted a country defined by its complex ethno-sectarian composition, being driven towards civil war by foreign terrorists intent on magnifying those divisions. With these divisions in mind, UK reporting became very critical of the composition of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC). Howard (2004) and Steele (2004), writing in *The Guardian*, both considered the construction of the IGC to have reflected the inherent ethnic and sectarian divisions within Iraq, as "it was chosen almost entirely on regional, ethnic and sectarian lines" having the consequence of "entire ministries being filled nepotistically with officials from the boss's party, tribe or region" (Steele, 2004). The IGC's divisions were also used as an exemplar of Iraq's wider social problems in a report in *The Times*, which discussed the refusal by five Shi'a members of the IGC to sign the post-war interim Iraqi constitution, which also encompassed the Transitional Administrative Law framework for the country. This was a document that was considered to be one of the most important steps towards Iraq's transition to democracy by the Coalition (Bush, 2004e). The refusal to sign the constitution was described by *The Times* article,[43] as plunging Iraq's future into doubt as "sectarian divisions scuppered the signing ceremony" (Beeston, 2004). These divisions were something that President Bush once more blamed on the continuing influence of Al Qaeda (Bush, 2004e). As a result, the mainstream media and official statements argued that the ethnic divisions that characterised the battle for control in the power vacuum of post-Saddam Iraq were taking

---

[43] See also: Beaumont (2004), who wrote in The Guardian that the issues bought up by the refusal to sign the interim constitution "reveals [the] widening divisions within Iraq's different ethnic groups" noting that the five Shi'a members of the IGC who refused to sign the constitution wanted a constitution that would be "ratified by a simple majority, which would favour their ethnic majority in the country".

place at ministerial level as well as on the streets. Locating these problems as an aspect of the wider War on Terror, it was the contention of media and official accounts that AQI were exacerbating these issues.[44]

The remaining reports sampled from this period maintain a focus on Iraq's historic ethnic divisions, often discussed in the context of the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the arbitrary construction of the Iraqi state by the British and the French. The reports take the position that this led to years of instability,[45] and an eruption of predictable ethno-sectarian violence in the power vacuum that was created by the removal of Saddam Hussein. A typical example can be found in Rees-Mogg's (2004) article in *The Times*, in which he argues that Iraq's divisions are historical in nature, were suppressed under Saddam Hussein, and are now being given new life in the wake of the US-led invasion and the removal of the strong-arm leadership of the country's former dictator (see also: Chua, 2004, Moore, 2004.

4. 2005: Iraqi elections and criticisms of the administration of the occupation

The security situation in the second full year of the Coalition's occupation of Iraq became increasingly volatile; tensions continued to grow between Iraq's disparate communities. Academic analysis of this period argues that Sunni fears that they would be increasingly marginalized within the new Iraqi political system were being realised. For example, Rafaat (2007) argues that this was particularly evident following the elections of the 30th January, which led to the political dominance of the Shi'a community with the combined Kurdish parties[46] taking 26% of the vote. According to Rafaat, this afforded the Kurds a deciding vote on government policy, giving them significant power in their negotiations for an autonomous Kursdistan. As a result, the roles in Iraq had been reversed; the Shi'a, who had long been the

---

[44] Academic analysis of these accounts confirms that the presence of foreign fighters affiliated with Al Qaeda played a part in exacerbating existing ethnic tensions in the country (see for example: Hubbard, 2007, Hashim, 2009, Hughes, 2010). However it is not the intention of this discussion to entirely dismiss these accounts, but to show that the media dutifully reported official accounts of the occupation and wilfully neglected alternative arguments that suggested state-sanctioned violence was a prominent feature of the violence that engulfed occupied Iraq.

[45] There were six military coups against the government of Iraq between 1936 and 1941 alone. The ongoing instability would eventually lead to the British re-taking colonial control of Iraq, before this was ended and the British installed Hashemite royal family removed, in a bloody military coup in 1958 (Khadurri, 1960, Fieldhouse, 2006).

[46] Made up of a joint Kurdish bloc formed of the two dominant Kurdish political parties; the Kurdistan Alliance (PUK) and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) (Katzmann and Prados, 2007).

oppressed minority in Iraq,[47] had attained political dominance at the expense of the Sunni, exacerbating the progressively worsening ethnic divisions in the country. The result of this upheaval in Iraqi politics was felt most keenly on the streets of Iraq's cities and in the heartlands of rural Iraq[48] in which the Sunni insurgency became more and more active, hitting Shi'a targets on a daily basis as they sought "to return the Sunni Arab community to a position of supremacy" (Karam, 2007, p. 91). The Shi'a-dominated Iraqi government responded in kind, seeking to maintain their political power by using the largely Shi'a security forces to crack down on the Sunni insurgency. Throughout 2005, the ethno-sectarian violence that was already an established feature of the UK and US news reporting on Iraq was renewed on both sides of the Atlantic and remained a prominent feature throughout the year.

Reports included within the sample of UK print media began in mid-January in *The Daily Telegraph* (2005). The article, for which no author was cited, outlines the potential problems that the Iraqi elections could cause. In particular, that the divisions between the parties were being fought not on local political or social problems, but on a national scale, in which the key issues were drawn directly from "religious or ethnic lines". The article also raises concerns over the validity of the election as Sunni voters could be deterred from voting, as the insurgency had threatened to launch attacks against any Sunni associated with the election, due to its association with the perceived imperial machinations of the occupation.[49] However, this would leave the Shi'a with almost total control in the country, a situation that neither the Sunni civilians nor the insurgency wanted to happen. Fairweather (2005), also writing for *The Daily Telegraph*, continues to highlight the influence of AQI and al-Zarqawi in particular. Fairweather's article focuses on an AQI attack that killed 28 people and was specifically designed to disrupt the imminent Iraqi elections. Fairweather notes that the influence of AQI violence as well as the Sunni insurgency means "Sunni Arab parties have withdrawn from the elections, leaving the vote likely to be dominated by Shi'a groups". The

---

[47] Since Assistant Secretary of the State to the Colonies Gertrude Bell, had encouraged the British government to work more closely with the nationalistic Sunni, instead of what she considered to be the more reactionary Shi'a, leading to the installation of the Sunni Hashemite royal family under King Faisal I (Fieldhouse, 2006).
[48] Particularly in the al-Anbar region, where the Sunni tribes were primarily based and at this time had formed an alliance with AQI, who they felt provided them a greater level of security and opportunity to regain their historical position of power within Iraq, than the invading Coalition forces (Karam, 2007, Hashim, 2009).
[49] Hughes (2010) confirms the media's analysis, arguing that Sunni insurgents had become increasingly violent towards any Sunni seen to be siding with the elections imposed by the Coalition, which the insurgents were fighting against.

article quotes one Iraqi man as saying "we can not live in this country, let alone vote", emphasising the deteriorating security situation and the daunting scale of divisions between Iraqis, before finishing the article by noting that "the division of the country along ethnic lines has led some to believe that Iraq may be sliding into civil war" (Fairweather, 2005). This shows a continuation of the ongoing framing of the landscape of post-invasion Iraq, as one characterised by entrenched ethnic divisions, which are a primary reason for the daily violence seen in the country (see also: Beeston, 2005a, Carroll, 2005a, 2005b, Jaber, 2005).

The Times newspaper also picks-up on the dual issues of the elections and the impact that they had in furthering the bitter ethno-sectarian rivalries that, at this time, were beginning to dominate the setting of Iraqi domestic politics and security. For example, Loyd (2005) argued that the "ethnic and sectarian platform of the elections" may "confound the committee's ability to run a strong…counter-insurgency strategy", as Coalition forces sought to pass responsibility for fighting the insurgency onto indigenous Iraqi forces. Hider (2005a), in discussing an upsurge in violence during April of that year, locates the reasons for the violent insurgency within Sunni "disenfranchisement" from Iraq's new political processes, leading to a civil war being fought between rival ethnic groups: those who formerly had power and those who had recently acquired power. Hider (2005b), writing on the same issue three days previously, described the current situation as "an outbreak of violence that has been compared to "ethnic cleansing" between the Sunni insurgents who, in this instance, had demanded that the Shi'a residents of Madain[50] abandon the town or they would kill the 100-plus hostages they were holding. Hider notes that in response to this, Shi'a militias had formed and were carrying out "tit-for-tat kidnappings and murders" (Ibid). This series of articles shows that the framing of Iraqi violence within the sample continued to be in the format of persistent ethnic divisions that were becoming increasingly complicated by the presence of AQI and the impact of the January elections. This, it was suggested, had left Iraq's political power in the hands of the Shi'a, giving the Sunni insurgency added impetus to succeed in destabilising Iraq.[51]

---

[50] A city located 20 miles South East of Baghdad.

[51] Academic analysis of the impact of these elections on Iraq's ethnic divisions and the violence associated with these confirms the media's account (Karam, 2007). However, as noted above, whilst it is not argued that these media accounts are inaccurate it is argued here that the media chose to present the analysis of Iraq's ethnic divisions in detail and largely ignore an analysis of state crime.

Articles taken from *The Guardian* during 2005 also focus on the growing tensions between Iraq's primary ethnic groups. For example, Tisdall (2005) argues that Iraq has already descended into sectarian conflict, [52] depicting Iraq's new constitution as "potentially institutionalis[ing] ethnic and religious divisions". The article argues that US pressure for Iraqi political parties to agree upon a constitution was a key factor, which led to Shi'a and Kurdish politicians overruling Sunni objections to the conditions of the document. Although the article cites US pressure as an explanation for why Shi'a and Kurdish politicians dismissed Sunni protests, this does not represent a particularly critical response to US influence on this process. The article's primary focus remains on the entrenched divisions that have been consistently framed as a prominent explanation of Iraq's disunity and violence within the media. The report continues by arguing that Shi'a and Kurdish politicians were acting "in a self-interested way, at the expense of the Sunnis" (Tisdall, 2005). One month later, in October, Hirst (2005) writes that the "weak federal constitution" being adopted by Iraq could potentially unleash an "ethnic and sectarian crisis across the region". Although these claims may be exaggerated, the article represents the continued strength that the ethnic divisions argument held within the UK media. Not only does this article highlight the failings of the new Iraqi constitution, it returns the analysis to its earlier understandings: that the divisions in Iraq are a direct result of the 1916 Sykes–Picot agreement and the drawing of "arbitrary, colonial-style frontiers across pre-existing ethnic, sectarian, tribal or commercial links". It is argued that this in turn "grossly affronted" Arab aspirations to a unified Middle East "that came with liberation from Ottoman rule" (Hirst, Ibid). In summary, although during this period criticisms were raised of the Coalition's involvement in the development of the Iraqi constitution, these criticisms were framed primarily within a discussion that focused on the irrational and violent nature of Iraqi politicians. This means that although criticisms of the US-led Coalition were voiced, they were a product of the existing characterisation of Iraq as a divided and violent state, which remained the dominant narrative construction that had been established within official and media accounts.

In summary, the ethnic divisions narrative remained a dominant framing in the UK media, of the post-invasion violence within occupied Iraq during 2005. However, this framing was expanded to include within its discussions the role that both the January 2005 elections and the October 2005 vote on the proposed constitution played in inflaming these pre-existing

---

[52] The title of Tisdall's article reads: "Constitution may exacerbate sectarian conflict".

and ever-exacerbated divisions. Likewise, the role of AQI, first discussed in detail during 2004, continued to present a prominent aspect of the UK media's understanding of the increasingly volatile ethnic tensions on display in Iraq. This illustrated the interacting dominate framings at play within the mass media's depiction of post-invasion violence in Iraq,[53] both in the UK, and as will now be discussed, the US.

At the turn of 2005, heading towards the Iraqi elections, Anthony Shadid, writing in *The Washington Post*, pulls together many of the proclamations coming from the Bush Administration concerning the upcoming Iraqi elections and those that seek to disrupt them. Shadid (2005) took a small sample of Iraqi civilians outside of a café which, according to the article, is resplendent with images from Iraq's past dating back to the Ottoman Empire and British rule. Shadid cites the discussions taking place among these ordinary Iraqis as an example of the wider sentiment allegedly being displayed inside Iraq, which succinctly articulates the dominant theme within the US media and political discourse at the time: "Going to the polling stations is a victory for the Iraqi people" and "the elections are more important than the candidates" and finally "It's one of my wishes to die at the gate of the polling station…I want to be a martyr for the ballot box". In discussing this positive framing of the upcoming Iraqi elections, Shadid situates this within the historic ethnic divisions which, he argues, in a similar vein to many of the reports discussed within this chapter, are a result of the division of Iraq at the end of Ottoman rule. These divisions, he suggests, will finally be unified in the wake of the upcoming elections. Tellingly, the positive framing of the Iraqi elections presented in Shadid's article echoed those emanating from President Bush, who commented in one interview: "This [the Iraqi elections] is a historic opportunity for the people of Iraq" and that "I know they [Iraqis] cherish the idea of being able to vote", before emphasising that after the elections "a government elected by the people will be making the decisions…sovereign decisions made by an elected government" (Bush, 2005a). This displays the congruence between the positions adopted by both the mainstream media and the US Government

---

[53] Which this study argues include: The inherent historic ethnic divisions present within Iraq, the presence of foreign jihadists inflaming these divisions, in particular AQI and the role that US mistakes in its capacity as occupier have played in fomenting the violence associated with post-invasion Iraq. These latter two framings will be discussed in depth in the following two chapters.

USA Today also produces a positive spin on the elections. Taking the city of Najaf as a case study in Iraqi politics, it argues that while there may be "historic ethnic divisions" in other areas of the country, Najaf represents the potential unity that Iraq could achieve if the elections go to plan. Instead of national agendas forming the fulcrum of division in Najaf, the article discusses how local issues, such as the provision of essential services for the poor and increasing internet access, are the primary concerns. The essence of the article is that the elections in Iraq have begun to transfer the battle for power in the country from the killing fields to the debating chamber, concurring with the sentiments of the Bush Administration (Komarow, 2005). Unsurprisingly, on the day of the elections, President Bush made a statement to the press congratulating the Iraqi people on their success in expressing "the voice of freedom". Continuing his praise, Bush places the responsibility for any future violence being carried out in the country on "terrorists and insurgents" waging "their war against democracy", arguing that the elections have shown Iraqis to have unified behind a free and democratic state (Bush, 2005b).

However, at this time, media analysis of the elections began to distance itself from the rhetoric coming from Washington. Agreeing that the violence still being played out in the country was, in part, due to foreign terrorists, the US media maintained a focus on the historic ethnic divisions within Iraq, arguing that these divisions were as fraught as at any other time during the occupation. In particular, *The New York Times* argued throughout 2005 that the entrenched ethnic divisions within Iraq were as fearsome as ever; that the January elections and, latterly, the vote for the constitution had both epitomised and reinforced these divisions, for example: "Kirkuk is the setting for all the ethnic-sectarian conflicts that are the historic reality of Iraq" (Mackey, 2005), "this election might be the beginning of the end for a unified Iraq thanks to multiple accidents of history" (Rosen, 2005). One article more than any other crystallizes the position of *The New York Times*; written four years to the day after the attacks of 9/11, it presents a wide-ranging critique of the war on terror and the conflict in Iraq. The article argues that the war in Iraq should have been avoided at all costs. Referring to the Sykes–Picot agreement, the article's author, Mark Danner, argues that Iraq is now "splitting apart along the lines where French and British negotiators stitched it together", while these divisions are simultaneously being fomented by the presence of AQI, in particular al-Zarqawi. In a critique that brings together all three of the proposed dominant understandings of Iraq's descent into violence, Danner criticises the US-led invasion and occupation as having "the fanciest weapons but [they] have never had sufficient troops, or political will, to

assert effective control over the country" (2005). In addition to this burgeoning critical position within the US media, *The Washington Post* acknowledges that, although they view the January elections as giving the country's transition to a viable democratic state "momentum", this has now been lost and the country risks "civil war" if the US pulls out (Wright, 2005). Additionally, the *Post* argues in August that the proposed constitution "does not do enough to heal divisions or ensure rights for Iraq's...ethnic...minorities" (Wright, 2005).

But what theoretical analysis can be applied to this growing criticism of the American administration of the occupation? Although it is clear from the sample of print media that there was a growing disparity between the political rhetoric and media reporting, particularly in the case of the depiction of the impact of the January elections and the writing of the Iraqi constitution both in the UK and US media reports, this critique remained within the boundaries of the existing debate surrounding Iraq's descent into violence. This is to say that the criticism never deviated from an analysis of Iraq as beset by existing historic ethnic divisions, which were being exacerbated by both foreign jihadists and US mistakes in the administration of the occupation. This means that Robinson's (2002) understanding of the mass media as capable of critique in times of policy uncertainty holds true. As the US sought to develop its exit strategy from Iraq at the same time as facing an apparently never-ending sectarian conflict, it found itself caught between its pre-war goals and the reality of increasing domestic dissent over a conflict that had promised to deliver a step forward in securing US national interests in the War on Terror, yet was delivering the reverse. However, Robinson (ibid) also notes that the mass media is capable of manufacturing consent to a particular framing of political issues. With this in mind, it is clear from the media reporting of the influence of AQI on the violence inherent to Iraq's post-invasion security situation, that at the same time as a growing criticism of the occupation, there was equally a towing of the party line: that Iraq's insurgency and disunity would be far less pronounced if it were not for the present of AQI. In addition to this, at no point in discussing the increasingly violent divisions in the country, did the media sample seek to question the prosecution of the counter-insurgency war by Coalition forces. This has the effect of removing the actions of the Coalition military from the debate, when in reality, as will be discussed in the latter half of this thesis, their actions were equally important to an analysis of the violence that beset post-invasion Iraq.

These themes continued to play a prominent role in the media's reporting of the occupation as it entered 2006. This provides further evidence for the prominence of the historic ethnic divisions narrative within the mass media throughout the occupation of Iraq, and the interaction of this with both the foreign jihadists and US mistakes narratives to be discussed in chapters three and four.

5. 2006: Iraq's ethnic divisions as quickly becoming insurmountable

Interestingly, the sample of articles from US newspapers in 2006 only yielded two reports, focusing on the ongoing ethno-sectarian violence dividing the country. These focused in particular on the aftermath of the bombing of the al-Askariyya shrine in Sammara.[54] Knickmeyer (2006), writing in *The Washington Post,* refers to clashes between outlawed Shi'a militias of the ruling religious political parties and Sunni insurgents, as "unprecedented". He describes Shi'a militias launching attack after attack on Sunni mosques, leaving Sunni civilians formerly opposed to al-Zarqawi's violent tactics as wishing he would "punish anyone who attacked us [Sunni] and our holy sites". The US Government seemed well aware of the potential outbreak of ethno-sectarian violence in the wake of the bombing, as indicated in a statement made by President Bush, which called for the Iraqi people to refrain from a violent response:

> "I ask all Iraqis to exercise restraint in the wake of this tragedy, and to pursue justice in accordance with the laws and constitution of Iraq. Violence will only contribute to what the terrorists sought to achieve by this act" (President Bush Statement, 22nd February 2006).

President Bush's response to the bombing of the al-Askariyya Shrine (2006a), indicates that the US Government was well aware of the existing divisions between Iraqis, and although they may have been reluctant to cite these divisions publicly prior to the invasion in order to limit public disapproval, it seems clear that the Administration was equally fearful of these pre-existing divisions being further exacerbated by AQI. In the President's monthly radio address in March 2006, he again discusses the incident and its ramifications in a similar light.

---

[54] This is one of the most sacred holy sites for Shi'a Muslims in Iraq as the Shrine holds the tombs of the 10th and 11th Imams, as a result, its bombing by Sunni militants linked to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was an extraordinarily provocative act (Hashim, 2009).

Referring to the Shrine as "one of Shi'a Islam's most holiest sites", he noted that after the bombing, armed Shi'a militia began "reprisal attacks on Sunni mosques" with hundreds of innocent Iraqi's dying in the subsequent violence (Bush, 2006b). Although discussing Iraq's ethnic divisions within this address, the former President is careful to relate the stimulus for this violence with foreign terrorists such as al-Zarqawi, which although accurate in this instance, serves the purpose of deflecting attention from the Coalition's role in the counter-insurgency conflict. As chapter six in particular will discuss, the doctrinal use of state-sanctioned violence by Coalition forces served to further inflame the insurgent violence, which in response not only targeted Coalition forces, but anyone seen to align themselves with the Coalition. Due to the transfer of power from Sunni to Shi'a Iraqis in the wake of the Coalition's invasion of Iraq, the Shi'a population were seen as a primary target for Sunni insurgents (Hubbard, 2007, Michael, 2007).

Taking the President's statements, in conjunction with the reporting of the bombing in *The Washington Post* and a report by Feldman (2006) in *The New York Times*, which focuses on the theme of Sunni insurgent violence and counter violence by Shi'a militias, it is clear that both the media reporting and political rhetoric were closer than ever. Feldman (2006), for example, considers the potential for civil war in the wake of the increase in ethnic violence. He suggests that the Kurds and Shi'a are forming an "uneasy marriage of convenience" within the Iraqi government, as their own "mutual distrust" is negligible in comparison to their "suspicion of the Sunnis". This provides further support for the position taken by Robinson (2002) and Herman and Chomsky (1988) that the media has the capacity to manufacture consent to official framings of events. In this instance, although AQI had been responsible for carrying out another tragic terrorist attack, it was argued by both politicians and media outlets that the impact of this attack would have been far less incendiary had there not been pre-existing ethnic divisions within Iraq, which held the potential to deteriorate further into a fierce ethno-sectarian civil war. As noted above, there is no critical analysis of the role that Coalition forces may be playing in fomenting and sustaining this violence through their actions in prosecuting the counter-insurgency war.

UK reporting during 2006 also retains a focus on the deterioration of the entrenched historic ethnic divisions running riot throughout Iraq. All three news sources included within the sample suggested that these divisions were fast becoming insurmountable, and that a federal partition of Iraq down ethno-sectarian lines may now be the only way to save the country

from itself. Examples from *The Daily Telegraph* provide an insight into the themes present within the UK news media when discussing Iraq's deteriorating security situation and the potential solutions. Russell and Poole (2006), present the argument that removing Saddam Hussein from power unleashed a "Pandora's Box of ethnic divisions" in the power/security vacuum left by his departure. Poole (2006a), writing again for *The Daily Telegraph* later in the year, cites the outgoing British Ambassador to Iraq's warning that civil war was the most likely outcome in the country and that "a *de facto* division of Iraq is probably more likely...than a successful...transition to a stable democracy". Poole juxtaposes these comments with the statements of two US Generals: General John Abizaid, then commander of US Central Command and General Peter Pace, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Citing Abizaid's testimony before a US Senate Committee, that the sectarian violence in the country was "as bad as he had ever seen it", and Pace, who argued, "Iraq could plunge into civil war", Poole presents the case that Iraq in its current condition is beyond saving.[55] He contextualizes his argument within that, asserting that Iraq's divisions are now insurmountable within the division of the wider Middle East as a result of the Sykes–Picot agreement at the fall of the Ottoman Empire; a running theme within the official and media analysis of Iraq's ethnic tensions from both sides of the Atlantic.

The solution to these problems is fairly consistent in all three of the UK newspapers considered in the sample. Professor Gareth Stansfield, writing in *The Sunday Telegraph*, argues that the only solution left to Iraq in the wake of the current explosion in violence is a five-way federal split of the country, stating that this is the "last and only chance of holding Iraq together in the absence of a dictator of Saddam's dimensions" (2006). Tisdall (2006) writes in *The Guardian* that a federal division of the country may solve Iraq's problems if carefully managed, but even this is fraught with difficulties, as even though Iraq has been characterised as having inter-ethnic conflict, it is also subject to intra-ethnic conflict.[56] Finally, Galbraith (2006), writing in *The Sunday Times*, also points towards a federal division of the country as the only solution to Iraq's entrenched historic divisions. At no point, however, does the media analysis suggest that a change in the aggressive conduct of the

---

[55] Beaumont (2006) writing in The Observer also argues that it is Iraq's entrenched, historic ethnic divisions that are 'ripping apart' Baghdad (see also: Steele, 2006a).

[56] This can be seen in the competition for political supremacy between the armed wing of the Shi'a Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution of Iraq (SCIRI, now known as The Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq, (SICI)), the Badr Brigade, who Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Malaki has often utilised (Schmidt, 2008) and the Mahdi Army led by Muqtada al-Sadr (Hubbard, 2007).

counter-insurgency war could help to alleviate the intense violence caused by the ethnic conflict.

In summary, although the ethnic divisions debate declined in the US press during 2006, the articles from the sample still discussing the issue argued that it was as brutal as ever, with some observers, according to *The New York Times*, suggesting that a civil war between Iraq's divided factions had already begun (Feldman, 2006). UK reporting of Iraqi violence, in contrast to that of the US, maintained a far more prominent focus on the country's ethnic divisions, considering them almost insurmountable, and arguing that the break-up of Iraq may be the only way to save the country and its inhabitants from themselves. Thus, the ethnic divisions narrative still represented a significant aspect of the mediated understanding of Iraq's post-invasion violence. Although this theme declined somewhat within the sample of US media reports, the reports that were present mirrored the announcements made within the US Government. In addition to this, the ethnic divisions narrative once again became more active in the US media during 2007, meaning that despite the relative paucity of articles during 2006, this understanding of Iraq's violence had not been consigned to the past.

6. 2007 – 2008: Renewed efforts to stabilise the security situation

With the decline in US media reports surrounding the framing of Iraq as a country beset by ethnic divisions during 2006, no UK reports during 2007 on this framing were found at all. Although one report emerged from *The Times* in 2008, which suggests that the impact of the US troop surge, in conjunction with the rejection of AQI by Sunni insurgents, also known as the Sunni Tribal Awakening, was responsible for helping to alleviate some of these tensions.[57] The report acknowledges the "sharp drop in violence" since this "event", but in a return to the ethnic divisions argument, argues that the walls that have been erected by US soldiers around Baghdad in order to keep warring factions apart, act as little more than a sticking plaster over a gaping wound. Noting that the residents of Baghdad feel that the walls

---

[57] Academic analysis of this issue suggests that the troop surge and the associated shift in counter-insurgency doctrine away from the aggressive approach originally adopted, did start a decline in the violence (see for example: Michael, 2007, Kilcullen, 2009, Hashim, 2009, Phillips, 2009). However, the surge in troops did lead to a decline in insurgent violence throughout Iraq, the Iraq War Logs and independent human rights reports indicate that state-sanctioned violence continued after during this period. This will be discussed in detail in chapter 5, whilst the media's neglect of this violence will be discussed in chapter 4.

are the only things that have led to this relative calm; "A person would still be killed for straying into the wrong neighbourhood" (Haynes, 2008).

The security walls erected between many of Baghdad's neighbourhoods during 2007 form a major aspect of the US news reporting during this period. Both *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* discuss the impact of the walls, noting that although they may increase security, this security was only temporary and came at a price. As one Iraqi who is quoted by Wong and Cloud, 2007, writing in *The New York Times* states "the hatred will be much greater between the two sects" as a result of the separation, a sentiment echoed by the report in *The Times* discussed above.[58] However, despite these changes to US policy in Iraq, the reports from the US media in this period maintain a focus upon the scale and ferocity of violence that stems from the bitter ethno-sectarian tensions dividing the country. As *The New York Times* notes, this has led to either Shi'a militias or Sunni insurgents controlling different areas of Iraq (Wong and Cave, 2007). As a result, Kurdish security forces were asked to patrol Baghdad, as according to another article in the same paper, they were seen as a relatively neutral force in the ongoing dispute between Sunni and Shi'a Iraqis (Wong and Jaff 2007, see also: Constable, 2007 and Scott-Tyson, 2007a, writing in *The Washington Post*).

The nature of this reporting is unsurprising, given that from the outset of 2007 President Bush addressed the nation to outline the need for a change in strategy, as Iraq has been subject to "a vicious cycle of sectarian violence" that has been augmented by AQI, to which he reassures "we will continue to pursue al-Qaeda and foreign terrorists". The US Government continued to emphasise the need for a drastic change in the security situation in Iraq in March, when the President made it clear that to maintain any hard-won progress made towards enhancing the security situation in the country, US troops in Iraq require Congress to grant "emergency funding" measures (Bush, 2007b). The President discusses the renewed security operation in Iraq in speeches and press statements on the issue throughout 2007, (for example see: Bush, 2007c, Bush, 2007d) showing that the situation in Iraq during this period was not felt to be stable or secure. This, as discussed above, was reflected in the sample of

---

[58] Academic analysis of the conflict suggests that as a result of the sheer scale of the ethnic violence bringing Iraq to its knees, the US felt that it had little choice but to try a series of drastic measures that included the troop surge, the Sunni Awakening and the erection of the security walls (Philips, 2009). However there has been little academic analysis suggesting that a change in the aggressive approach to counter-insurgency would have reduced ethnic violence.

US media reports taken from the same period, emphasising the relevance of the manufacturing consent argument (Robinson, 2002, Herman and Chomsky, 1988), to an understanding of media reporting of the ethnic divisions narrative in understanding the violence in post-invasion Iraq. Alternative arguments may have questioned the continued presence of forces in Iraq on the grounds that these forces had arguably overseen the most violent period in Iraqi history.

Moving forwards, articles discussing ethnic violence in the US media sampled in 2008 were both limited in number and focused on the improving security situation in the country. Two examples, from Raghaven (2008) writing in *The Washington Post* and Rubin (2008) writing in *The New York Times*, best illustrate this point. Raghavan notes that Iraq's "feuding sects" were showing signs of unity as they came together to sign a security accord that would see the US military gradually draw down its troop presence, before a complete withdrawal in 2011. Whilst Rubin illustrates the same point, by taking the example of the Iraqi Parliaments introduction of wide ranging legislation that, in quoting a Sunni politician, "proved that Iraqis are one bloc and Parliament is able to find solutions that represent all Iraqis" (see also: Partlow, 2007a, Semple, 2007). These reports mirror the statements emanating from the White House at this time, with the surge in troops largely being seen as a success within the American Government, "while there is more to be done, sectarian violence is down dramatically" (Bush, 2008). However, while the Sunni Awakening and the troop surge did bring about greater security, with the Sunni insurgency turning its back on AQI, Hashim (2009), argues that the security gains made may only be temporary or even illusory, if the Sunni feel that they're still marginalized from Iraqi politics by the Shi'a dominated government. This means that although the political and media positions may have been harmonious at this time, as they were throughout the occupation, the reality on the ground in Iraq may have been very different. Given the evidence of state criminality provided by the Iraq War Logs discussed in chapter six, it can be argued that the framing of Iraq by government officials and the media organisations, consistently presented only a partial analysis of the conflict.

Conclusion

This chapter has presented the case that the narrative of historic ethnic divisions were presented as a characteristic of Iraqi society, serving to form a prominent explanatory

framework within the mainstream media's analysis of the Iraq War. This framing of Iraq gained prominence from the very beginning of Coalition military operations inside the country on the 20th March 2003. However, this narrative was not isolated from the two competing narratives, which this study argues are equally important to an understanding of the media's framing of the violence inherent to occupied Iraq; the influence of AQI and the preponderance of US mistakes in the administration of occupied Iraq. On the contrary, these three narratives are interconnected within the media's reporting.

The media's reporting of Iraq's descent into violence both deviated from and supported the US Government's public statements on the subject. The US Government refused to acknowledge the entrenched ethnic divisions within Iraq until it became impossible to do so any longer, choosing instead to link this violence to international terrorism. The UK and US media, however, maintained a focus on these divisions throughout the occupation. Likewise, the media sample did present a critique of the administration of the occupation. This can be analysed through the CNN effect model discussed at the beginning of this chapter: that the media has the capacity to influence government policy when governments display policy uncertainty. However, whilst in the case of Iraq, media criticism did not influence government policy directly; the critical reporting of the occupation provides evidence that the mass media does not always support the proclamations of central government.

However, this critical trend within the reporting of the ethnic divisions within Iraq can itself be considered in a critical light. The criticism provided by the media reporting of this first narrative does not deviate from the realms of acceptable debate. That is to say, it is possible to pose critical questions of government policy without directly questioning the legitimacy of the overall policy. Put another way, arguing that Coalition policy in Iraq represented a series of floundering errors of judgement or honest mistakes, is very different to questioning the legitimacy of a state's policies themselves. With regards to the framing of Iraq's descent into violence within the rubric of historic ethnic divisions, it can be concluded from this analysis that Robinson (2002:129) is right to argue that the media, by and large, reflects the policy preferences of "the elite foreign policymaking community". This is illustrated by the parallels between the Bush Administration's emphasis on the influence of AQI on the violence within the country and the media's reporting of the interaction between AQI and the historic ethnic divisions argument. There was a striking similarity between the two positions, which provides support for the manufacturing consent analysis of the news media (Robinsons, 2002,

Herman and Chomsky, 1988, Herman, 2000, Chomsky, 2002). It is the contention of this thesis that the media selectively focused on certain aspects of the conflict. This is something that Hawkins (2011) argues is a consistent feature of media reporting of international conflicts. This contributed to the marginalization of state crime from public discourse.

This marginalization of a discussion of state criminality in Iraq represents a shameful neglect of an equally important understanding of the post-invasion landscape of the country. This neglect contributed to the continuation of an aggressive counter-insurgency policy by Coalition forces by hiding them from public knowledge. It is the contention of this discussion that this means that the mainstream media is complicit in the propagation of the indiscriminate violence that functioned as a prominent tactic within the counter-insurgency war. The following chapter, discussing the framing of the violence inherent to the occupation as a result of the influence of foreign fighters migrating into Iraq across its borders, will further develop this line of analysis.

The Construction of the "Foreign Fighters" Narrative in the Western Mainstream Print News Media

Introduction

Building on the foundations laid in the previous chapter's analysis of the "historic ethnic divisions" narrative as an explanatory framework through which the mass media sought to frame popular understandings of post-invasion violence in Iraq, this chapter will present the second of the three primary frameworks that this thesis contends were the dominant framings of the violence that beset the post-invasion environment of occupied Iraq: the "foreign fighters" narrative.[59] This narrative, as presented within the mainstream media, focuses on the presence of foreign fighters who have migrated across Iraq's borders from neighbouring countries: Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Jordan, in order to enact combat against Coalition forces, their allies and their supporters within Iraq. The narrative encompasses more than the actions of unaffiliated foreign fighters, also covering the objectives and actions of Al Qaeda Iraq (AQI) and its leader, the Jordanian militant, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. In a similar vein to the discussion of the historic ethnic divisions narrative, the foreign fighters framework through which the mass media constructed popular understanding of the Iraq War, is not isolated from its counterparts within this thesis. The foreign fighters narrative has been linked to the Sunnis' resistance to the occupation, the fomenting of the pre-existing ethnic divisions between the Sunni and Shi'a populations and the inept administration of the occupation of Iraq by the US-led Coalition.[60] As with our analysis of the prominence of historic ethnic divisions in the previous chapter, these reports were juxtaposed with a series of official press statements and national addresses from government officials.

This chapter will present the argument that the foreign fighters narrative constituted a dominant explanation of Iraq's post-invasion violence in the US and UK print news media. This narrative suggested that the violence observed in occupied Iraq was enhanced,

---

[59] In order for the analysis to remain consistent, the data that forms the basis of this chapter's sample has been drawn from the same print news sources and utilises the same chronological framework as that in chapter 2. For a discussion of the methods used to conduct the media analysis refer to chapter 1. For the purposes of clarity the chapter will also present its analysis of the media sample chronologically.

[60] Whilst these connections will be made when appropriate, they will not be discussed in depth as a result of being the primary focus of the previous and forthcoming chapters respectively.

exacerbated and prolonged by the presence of foreign fighters migrating across Iraq's borders. The chapter will question the significance that these issues were given by government and military sources in the mainstream media.

Even in the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq, high-ranking US Government officials sought to draw strong links between Iraq and the Al Qaeda terrorist network. As Altheide (2009) has argued, the build-up to the invasion was based not only on fraudulent claims of the presence of Weapons of Mass Destruction, but by preying on international fears of global terrorism and Al Qaeda in particular.[61] Robinson (2009) makes a similar argument, suggesting that politicians in the lead-up to the war consistently espoused non-existent links between Iraq and international terrorism (see also: Kellner, 2004, Ryan and Switzer, 2009).

These links between Al Qaeda and Iraq were consistently adopted in official and media accounts throughout the occupation.[62] In sum, although it is not inaccurate to suggest that the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq gave Al Qaeda further grievance with the US and its allies, its importance to an analysis of post-invasion violence in Iraq has been overstated at the political and cultural levels. This is evident in the media's analysis of the presence of foreign fighters in Iraq.

1. 2003: Foreign jihadists as the primary resistance to the Coalition

Reports from the sample of UK and US news sources reviewed in the pre-occupation period of the Iraq War differ in their emphasis on the problems being faced by the invading Coalition forces. The sample drawn from the UK newspapers actively pursued a foreign fighters narrative virtually from the outset of the March 20th invasion. For example, *The Daily Telegraph* reported only five days into Operation Iraqi Freedom that British forces attempting to take control of the southern city of Basra were for the most part being

---

[61] For example, former Secretary of State, Colin Powell's assertion before the United Nations that Iraq and the Al Qaeda terrorist network worked together within a "sinister nexus" combining "classic terrorist organizations" (The Guardian, 2003). This statement that echoed by former Vice-President Dick Cheney's comments that Iraq and Al Qaeda had a relationship "that developed throughout the decade of the 90s, that was clearly official policy" (MSNBC, 2003).

[62] This was the case even after military figures such as General David Petraeus, former commander of Coalition forces in Iraq, and academic analysis of the insurgency (see for example: Cordesman, 2006, Fishman, 2006) had confirmed that foreign fighters accounted for no more than 5-10% of the total number of insurgents operating in Iraq.

welcomed by the indigenous population, who, the article claims, saluted the advancing forces with calls of "America is good…Saddam is finished…thanks be to God", whilst citing one British Army officer as stating that Iraqi forces defending Basra had no interest in fighting and sought peace as quickly as possible, arguing that "they don't want to shoot at us and we don't want to shoot at them" (Bishop, 2003). However, despite this depiction of a peaceful, welcoming, indigenous population, the article identifies an area of intense resistance to the advancing Coalition forces as stemming from "diehards" that the article suggests come from "foreign mujahideen fighters" that have "travelled to Iraq to seek martyrdom" by opposing the US-led invasion. The spectre of Al Qaeda is also raised towards the end of the article, highlighting the as yet unproven possibility that Al Qaeda "sympathisers" may have embedded themselves within the Iraqi populace (Ibid). The position articulated by *The Telegraph* describes an Iraq in which the only obstacles to peace are the "diehards" and foreign fighters, a position that echoes former Vice-President Dick Cheney's comments on March 16th 2003, in which he stated that due to the desperate situation that Saddam Hussein had fostered within Iraq, Coalition forces would in fact be welcomed as "liberators" by the Iraqi people (NBC, 2003). However, Cheney was conveniently ignoring the impact of the brutal sanctions regime enacted at the end of the first Gulf War. This regime blunted Saddam Hussein's influence within the region, but also served to cripple the Iraqi people, who came to view the US as a modern day colonial oppressor in the wake of their reluctance at the end of the Gulf War to remove Hussein from power, having already encouraged Iraqis to rise up against him, as Stephen Zunes puts it:

> "In this respect, the United States won the battle, but lost the war. The United States defeated Saddam Hussein's army, but is now faced with tens of millions of Arabs, both inside and outside Iraq, who are more hostile to the United States than they had been previously and with whom the United States will have to contend with for years to come" (Zunes 2003, p85).

This pre-occupation trend of pointing to foreign fighters and Al Qaeda as the primary sources of resistance within Iraq in the UK news continued in *The Times*. In a wide-ranging article, McGrory (2003) states that the newspaper had learnt that Saddam had imported hundreds of foreign fighters into Iraq prior to the Coalition invasion in order to "spearhead his fight against American and British forces". McGrory argues that the foreign fighters provided the "fiercest resistance" to the Coalition's advance and uncritically cites Pentagon sources to

argue that the presence of foreign fighters provides clear links between Al Qaeda and the outgoing Iraqi Regime, thereby drawing links between the Iraq War and the wider War on Terror. McGrory's (Ibid) article draws together a number of the key themes that emerge throughout the sample, situating the Iraq War within the wider rubric of the War on Terror, suggesting that foreign fighters have begun migrating into the country, and arguing that these fighters are providing the backbone of the insurgency.

Academic analysis of this claim suggests that it was an exaggerated argument and that the number and influence of foreign fighters was limited by comparison to the ethno-sectarian conflict (al-Khalidi and Tanner, 2006, Felter and Fishman, 2007, Boyle, 2009). The political and media argument that the invasion and occupation of Iraq was an essential component of the War on Terror, developed throughout the occupation, was more an ongoing justification of the conflict than an accurate analysis of the daily violence.

The US reports taken from the sample at this pre-occupation stage of the invasion differ in content and tone to those in the UK. For example, Lynch and Komarow, (2003) writing in *USA Today*, focus more on the heroic progress that Coalition forces, in particular US troops, were making in the face of stiff resistance from Iraqi Republican Guard forces. The early phase of the operation drew only minor comment on the presence of foreign fighters in Iraq from *The Washington Post*. For instance, Baker (2003) notes a firefight between an estimated 200 fighters and the 5th Marine Regiment that resulted in the deaths of the majority of the men who "appeared to be Syrian or Jordanian". The report also notes the growing presence of elements of "guerrilla volunteers from other Arab countries", quoting Lt. Col. George Smith as saying "We're starting to see these elements [foreign fighters]…moving into Iraq trying to fill the power vacuum" (Ibid).

However, despite a limited engagement with the foreign fighters narrative within the US press during the early stages of the invasion, this framing evolved to play a far more prominent role from the middle of 2003 onwards. The first notable instance of this evolution occurred in *The Washington Post* on the 18th June. In this article, Graham (2003) discusses the so-called "guest-worker jihadists" who had migrated to Iraq in time to provide significant resistance to the US-led invasion, and had remained in Iraq after President Bush had declared the end of major combat operations on May 1st. What was unclear, according to the report, is whether these jihadists represented a hangover from the initial flood of fighters into the

country, or a "resurgent influx" that had entered subsequently. This theme is also taken up by *The New York Times*, who, despite acknowledging that there has been no "definitive proof" of the presence of foreign fighters in Iraq, present without critique the circumstantial evidence that supplies held by fighters who had been killed by US forces came from neighbouring countries such as Syria and Algeria. The argument is made throughout that "foreign fighters are still arriving in Iraq" (Rohde, 2003). Gordon and Jehl (2003) reaffirm this understanding of the conflict the following week, stating that "busloads of [foreign] fighters" entered Iraq via Syria to fight American forces. The article uncritically cites American military officials who argued that "foreign fighters continue to play an active role in Iraq" with the objective of raising "the American casualty toll" in order to pressure the US and its allies to withdraw. In order to support these claims, Gordon and Jehl (Ibid) cite then Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld as saying; "there are clearly more foreign fighters in the country than we ever knew, and they're popping up all over". Emphasising the mainstream media's adoption of official accounts of the role of foreign fighters in Iraq, President Bush echoed Rumsfeld's sentiments in a statement to the press later that year, stating that "foreign terrorists are trying to create conditions of fear and retreat because they fear a free and peaceful state" (Bush, 2003).

This uncritical representation of foreign fighters as playing a major role in the growing insurgency against Coalition forces continues in the US news reports sampled throughout the remainder of 2003. In September, *The New York Times* takes a critical view of the false pretences used to justify the invasion of Iraq, but states that the presence of foreign fighters crossing into Iraq from "Syria, Iran and Palestine" could lead to Iraq being to America what Afghanistan was to the Soviet Union: a war of attrition that would ultimately result in failure (Ignatieff, 2003). Another article discusses the growing links between the indigenous insurgency carried out primarily by the disenfranchised Sunni and "foreign fighters, mainly Islamic militants, who have filtered into Iraq...suspected of having ties to Al Qaeda" (Schmitt, 2003). In turn, *The Washington Post* in October draws attention to a theme that is discussed throughout the sample with increasing urgency: that Syria allowed foreign fighters to freely cross its borders into Iraq "to torment US troops" (Kessler and Allen, 2003). The same paper labels these foreign fighters as "Jihad International" in an article published in November, emphasising earlier positions that the main resistance to a free Iraq is the presence of foreign jihadists, while that indigenous Iraqis largely reject their presence and are providing increased intelligence to US forces to stop them (Ignatius, 2003). Finally, *The New*

York Times reports in late November that increased border security has been responsible for decreasing the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq (Brinkley, 2003). This supports comments made by President Bush in a press conference on October 28th in which he states:

> "We are mindful of the fact that some might want to come into Iraq to attack and to create conditions of fear and chaos...and that is why it is important that we step up training for Iraqis, border patrol agents, so they can enforce their own borders" (President Bush Statement, 28th October 2003).

Having considered the framing of the foreign fighters narrative within the US print media, we now return to the UK media's representation of events. As already stated, the foreign fighters framework played a significant role in the sample of UK news sources from the beginning of the conflict and this framing continued to play a key role throughout 2003. MacAskill (2003), writing in *The Guardian,* cites then US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, in a speech directed towards Iraqis themselves, in which he warns them against the presence of "foreign fighters" intent on hijacking Iraq "for their own purpose", calling for information on the location of this subversive element to be provided to US forces. Moving through the year into June, the framing of the occupation of Iraq as a key battle within the wider War on Terror becomes an unavoidable detail within the media sample. Beeston, writing in *The Times* (2003), reports an US attack on a "terrorist training camp" that, according to the report, provides "evidence that foreign fighters, who put up some of the toughest resistance against Coalition troops...are still operating in Iraq", implying that these fighters were present prior to the invasion and further locating the conflict within the wider War on Terror. *The Times* follows up this analysis later in June, where a focus on British forces makes the reader aware of their concerns at the presence of "foreign mercenaries", "foreign fighters" and Iran's "Badr Brigade",[63] quoting a British Army Officer as saying; "We knew they had to be hiding somewhere" (McGrory and Beeston, 2003).

Once again the issue of foreign fighters remains prominent within UK media. However, the article fails to highlight US support for the political wing of the Badr Brigade. Known as The

---

[63] The Badr Brigade was the paramilitary wing of SCIRI (The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq), or as it is now known, the Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq (SICI) (Mowle, 2006). SCIRI originated in Iran during the Iran – Iraq War and has allegedly been granted training by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. It has been responsible for numerous sectarian attacks on Iraq's Sunni population. (Dodge, 2007, Schmidt, 2008).

Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the political wing of the Badr Brigade was composed largely of exiled Shi'a Iraqi politicians who had fled to Iran during the Iran–Iraq War. Academic analysis of SCIRI argues that the US Government supported SCIRI's return to Iraq and in turn SCIRI supported the Coalition's socio-political reconstruction of the country, aware that the Coalition would ensure that the Shi'a majority would attain socio-political domination in Iraq after decades of minority Sunni rule (Schmidt, 2008). Although the US did not outwardly support the paramilitary aspect of their organisation, they favoured the returning political exiles, many of whom they had been in contact with consistently throughout the 90s and prior to the 2003 invasion. One implication of this was the appointment of Bayan Jaber Solagh, a former Badr Brigade officer, to the Ministry of the Interior after the January 2005 elections (Cordesman, 2008, Mowle, 2006, Hubbard, 2007). In summary, the media neglected to report on the links between the Badr Brigade's political leaders and the US Government, instead further enhancing the foreign fighters narrative.

The UK news at this time was simply reporting what they were being told, with little to no deviation from the line being taken by government and military officials. This trend is evident in *The Sunday Telegraph*, who blame foreign fighters for "a suicide campaign" drawn from "Islamic radicals" volunteering for ""martyr" operations inside Iraq (Sherwell and Bentham, 2003); *The Guardian*, who quoted US Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez as arguing that Iraq "was becoming a "terrorist magnet"" (Steele and Campbell, 2003) and *The Times* stating once again in August, that foreign fighters had been "flooding into Iraq across the Syrian and Saudi borders", meaning that there was no reason to suspect that the increasingly violent resistance "enjoyed wide support from ordinary Iraqis" (Maddox, 2003). This shows the ongoing construction of the conflict as one that would be progressing smoothly towards a peaceful transition to democracy, if it were not for the presence of foreign terrorist elements in the country. However, this depiction of the occupation was flawed. As already noted, foreign fighters were present in the country and did form an important aspect of the conflict, but as academic analysis has argued, the main source of resistance to Coalition forces stemmed from Iraqis, in particular the Sunni (Boyle, 2009, al-Khalidi and Tanner, 2006). As discussed in the previous chapter, the Sunni were fearful of the impact that majority Shi'a rule in Iraq would have on them, after the oppression enforced against Shi'a Iraqis since state formation (Karam, 2007, Stansfield, 2008, Tripp, 2007).

Likewise, this construction of the conflict continued to serve the political purpose of linking the occupation to the War on Terror.

The analysis presented to the public by the UK news media was consistently reinforced by President Bush and in turn, re-reported within the media sampled. *The Times* quotes Bush's comments to US reporters that Al Qaeda were in operation in Iraq: "There is a foreign element that is moving into Iraq…Al Qaeda type fighters, who want to fight us" adding that "they hate freedom" (Reid, 2003). This implies that the foreign fighters who had chosen to travel to Iraq were the only obstacle to a free and democratic society. This constructs any expression of resistance to the military occupation of Iraq as a rejection of freedom; a contradictory argument to adopt, given that the right to resist occupation is itself an expression of freedom. *The Guardian* also reports Bush's comments, choosing to emphasise the Presidents assertion that Iraq was "turning out to be a continuing battle in the War on Terrorism". By placing significant emphasis on AQI and the fight against terrorism more generally, the article maintains that the focus on the global War on Terror should ensure greater international support to the occupation of Iraq (Teather and Goldenberg, 2003). A day later, *The Sunday Telegraph* asserts that, were the Coalition to waver in its mission in Iraq, this would send a signal of weakness to Al Qaeda, stating categorically that "Iraq is now the front line in the War on Terror" (Coughlin, 2003). Finally, *The Observer* reports the arrest of multiple foreign fighters connected to Al Qaeda, arguing that this potentially confirms suspicions that Saddam loyalists had formed an alliance with "the hundreds of Jihadist fighters entering Iraq" (Beaumont and Helmore, 2003).

This trend remained within the sample of UK media sources until the end of 2003, with an increasing emphasis not only on the idea of foreign fighters, but more specifically on the presence and activity of AQI. *The Times* replicates a letter sent to the British government by Professor Sir Bryan Thwaites. Thwaites reasserts the active involvement of AQI, but also points directly towards the impact of numerous (unspecified) mistakes made by the Coalition in the conduct of its occupation and administration of Iraq. This further illustrates the interconnectivity of the three primary media framings of the Iraq War discussed in this thesis. Beaumont (2003), writing in *The Observer* brings all three of these narratives together when discussing the increasing organised insurgency. Beaumont argues that AQI, along with Sunni tribal leaders and criminal elements in the country, were beginning to unite against the Coalition, leading Donald Rumsfeld to prepare Iraqis and Americans for "a long, hard slog".

Beaumont argues that this is due to a lack of intelligence being available to Coalition military forces as a result of increasing Iraqi distrust of the occupation, due to their inability to provide security and the promised rebuilding of the nation's infrastructure. As if to confirm the worsening situation in the country, the end of the article notes for the first time the potential presence of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (linking him directly to AQI), as the man providing the organisational know-how for the foreign fighters operational in Iraq.

In summary, the first year of the Iraq War was reported by the UK and US media as not only presenting a delicate ethno-sectarian divide that needed to be bridged, as discussed in the previous chapter, but also as a situation that was complicated by the insidious presence of diehard foreign fighters linked to, if not full-time members of, Al Qaeda. These foreign fighters were depicted as determined to transform Iraq not into the bastion of democracy in the Middle East, as hoped for by the Coalition, but into the most important battleground for Al Qaeda's war with the West. This was supported by the rhetoric emanating from prominent political and military officials, providing support for the manufacturing consent model of the mass media. This analysis also conforms to existing academic analysis of the representation of Iraq in the months prior to the invasion of Iraq.

The use of official sources in this manner gives news articles wider credibility. However, as Gramsci's (1971) well-known analysis of the media suggests, the uncritical representation of official accounts of social-political issues means that the media is merely a translator of government policy. Pilger (2010) contends that this approach to news reporting draws into question the purpose of journalism. Pilger argues is to present truthful information, requiring that statements made by politicians are verified before being reported. In the media's analysis of the Iraq War, this was often not the case, as media reporting largely neglected to question the state's role in the violence witnessed in the country; a discussion that will form the primary analysis in chapter five. This section of the media sample provides clear evidence of a US news media that manufactures consent to the dominant political conception of events on the ground in Iraq. Herman and Chomsky's (1988) argue that popular media outlets are, more often than not, reliant upon official sources (defined as Government officials, press statements and/or private entities such as Think Tanks and business corporations) to provide them with information in the absence of having reporters on the ground. The reporting of the foreign fighters narrative at this early stage of the Iraq War supports this argument (see also: Herman, 2000, Chomsky, 2002).

This is not to say that major news sources do not have reporters on the ground. However, since what Hallin (1989) refers to as "the uncensored war" in Vietnam, journalists are now often embedded with military personnel. This was the official response to the media's involvement in Vietnam, in which reportage of the everyday brutality of warfare led to a conflict with the more positive government portrayal of the hostilities, contributing to America's eventual withdrawal from the country. As Hallin states: "It was the journalists' view that prevailed with the public, whose disenchantment forced an end to American involvement" (pp. 3-4). This is similar to the impact of the mass media described within the CNN effect theory of media influence, in which policymaking may be influenced by the mass media during times of political uncertainty regarding the direction of policymaking (Livingston, 1997, Robinson, 2002). However, Jeffords and Rebinovitz (1994) argue that during the First Gulf War the US Government evolved its media strategy, preventing journalists from moving freely throughout the war zone without military escort, whilst in other cases completely denying access to locations that could portray events on the ground in a negative light. Pilger (2010) argues that the control of war reporting was further enhanced by the requirement for journalists to have their reports approved by military public relations officers before they could be disseminated. This means that even when reporters have the opportunity to report from inside war zones, this reporting is often micro-managed by the presence of the military and/or government officials. However, despite the control exerted over embedded journalists, human rights reports containing evidence of consistent state-sanctioned violence and alternative explanations advocating this analysis were available to mainstream news organisations. This alternative analysis was largely excluded from popular discourse.[64]

In 2003, the mainstream media helped to make the Iraq War inevitable through the consistent linkage of Iraq with international terrorism (see for example: Jackson, 2005, Kellner, 2005). As noted previously, the presence of foreign fighters in Iraq and the ethno-sectarian tensions amongst Iraqis is not disputed; however, the emphasis on foreign fighters has certainly been exaggerated, whilst the framing of the War in this manner has served in part to marginalize and delegitimize a critical analysis of state crime in Iraq, a key point of debate that will be discussed in depth later in this thesis. However, we now turn our analysis to the reporting of foreign fighters within the sample during 2004.

---

[64] The neglect of these alternative arguments will be the primary focus of chapter 5.

2. 2004: Linking the Iraq War with the War on Terror

The results generated by the sample of US media reports during 2004 maintained a focus on the pre-eminence of foreign fighters operating within the country and serving as the main obstruction to socio-political reconstruction in Iraq. For example, Tyler (2004) expends significant effort in the construction of an article that draws the reader's attention to the official line coming from former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair. In the run-up to the January 2005 elections in Iraq, Blair describes Iraq as the "crucible" of international terrorism, making the case for this by quoting British General Sir Mike Jackson, who argued that the Coalition were now facing a "counter-insurgency war" involving "a number of foreign fighters...who were coming across Iraq's still porous borders". This article, taken from *The Washington Post*, is mirrored by an article in *The Daily Telegraph* by the paper's political editor, George Jones, utilising similar quotes and drawing attention not only to global terrorism, but AQI and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in particular (2004). Returning to Tyler (2004) in *The Washington Post*, he argues that the majority of these foreign fighters have migrated into Iraq across the border with Syria, a recurring theme throughout the US sample during 2004. For example, Allen (2004), writing for *The Washington Post* draws attention to comments directed towards the Syrian government by then National Security Advisor to the US Government, Condoleeza Rice. Rice claimed that Syria may not only be providing the supply of weapons and fighters for the Iraqi insurgency, but may have been the recipients of Weapons of Mass Destruction from Iraq prior to the Coalition invasion. Again, this framing of the conflict is mirrored within the UK media, with Beeston (2004) writing in *The Times* that Syria had actively encouraged both "secular and Islamist fighters" to cross its borders into Iraq and had cooperated with "associates of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi". In this example, the links between the Iraq War and international terrorism are emphasised once more. This serves to provide a continuing justification for the conflict as an essential front in the War on Terror.

The development of this line of discussion continues in an article in *The Washington Post* that emphasises US grievances with Syria through the potential imposition of trade sanctions against the regime, partly as a response to Syria permitting "foreign fighters to pass through its territory...[to] infiltrate Iraq" (Williams, 2004). Yet the focus on Syria's attitude towards Iraq's unstable security situation is not limited to *The Washington Post*. *USA Today* also supports the official line coming from Washington, that Syria has not only been responsible

for permitting significant numbers of weapons and fighters to cross into Iraq, but for allowing former "Iraqi regime members" to cross into Syria during the initial phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom, including Saddam's sons, Uday and Qussay Hussein (Slavin, 2004).[65] Schmitt (2004), writing in *The New York Times,* also displays a clear concern with the presence of foreign fighters in a story that focuses upon American efforts to implement high-tech border security and 24-hour border patrols that has, according to the report, "choked the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq from Syria". The article also acknowledges that whilst these fighters were "relatively small in number", they provided the "backbone" of the resistance and were masterminding "many of the attacks" (Ibid). This latter point, that the foreign fighters, although small in number, were extremely effective, played a key role in the insurgency will be returned to later in this chapter. Suffice to say, at this point, it represents an evolution in the nature of the foreign fighters narrative from a framing of the insurgency as dominated by foreign fighters to one in which foreign fighters represent a small but deadly minority.

As already discussed, the UK media, like its US counterparts, continued to emphasise the presence of foreign fighters in Iraq throughout 2004. For instance, McGrory (2004), writing in *The Times*, returns to the analysis he articulated throughout 2003, of the insurgency in Iraq as characterised by a "growing army of militants...playing an ever-larger role in the insurgency". Similarly, *The Guardian* reports on a bomb blast that could be attributed to "Al Qaeda" or "any number of foreign terrorist groups operating inside Iraq", according to British Brigadier-General Mark Kemmit (McCarthy, 2004). Finally, Gilmore (2004), writing in *The Sunday Telegraph*, notes the presence of "senior Al Qaeda members" in Fallujah, while at the same time focusing on the presence of al-Zarqawi, and AQI's intent to turn the conflict into a "holy war" according to an "Al Qaeda informant".

The role of AQI and the situating of the Iraq War within the wider War on Terror is consistently emphasised by President Bush in numerous statements throughout 2004. For example in a statement to the press on the issue of the transition to Iraqi sovereignty, he states:

---

[65] Uday and Qussay Husseln were killed by US forces on 22nd July 2003 after a shootout in Mosul, Iraq's second largest city, located in the North of the country.

"...Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups are actually there in Iraq now, what is happening in Iraq, the battle in Iraq, the battle for Iraq and its future...is, in a genuine sense, the front line of the battle against terrorism and the new security threat that we face" (President Bush Statement, 28th June 2004).

The following month, the President again emphasised the nature of the conflict in Iraq. In a statement regarding progress in the War on Terror, he highlighted the role that indigenous Iraqis were playing alongside Coalition forces to "defeat the terrorists and foreign fighters who threaten their nation and the world" (Bush, 2004b). This comment stresses the notion that Iraqis do not support the insurgency, an insurgency that, according to this statement, is led by foreign fighters and for the most part does not include Iraqis themselves; as illustrated in the academic literature, this does not represent the on the ground reality of the conflict, in which the vast majority of insurgents stemmed from Iraqi resistance fighters (Hashim, 2003, 2009).

However, although the sample generally supported the official version of events in Iraq, *The Daily Telegraph* presented an inconsistent analysis of the role of foreign fighters throughout 2004. This framing was presented as unquestionable in its importance to understanding the lived reality of post-invasion violence in Iraq[66] and conversely casting some doubt on the importance attributed to this analysis. For example, Fairweather (2004b) argues that the small number of foreign fighters held in Iraqi prisons casts doubt over Coalition and Iraqi officials' claims that these groups were largely responsible for the resistance encountered in the country. However, four days later, Harnden (2004), writing again in *The Daily Telegraph,* presents sensational claims that the foreign fighters linked to AQI and its leader al-Zarqawi, had potentially "seized materials for weapons of mass destruction" in the wake of the security vacuum created by the US-led invasion (Harnden, 2004). Finally, in an article that takes a position that is closer to the truth of what Coalition forces and Iraqi civilians faced in Iraq,[67]

---

[66] For example Fairweather (2004a) writes that the Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi blamed a suicide attack on 'foreign fighters' in an article that primarily focuses on the disruptive nature of the foreign fighters active in Iraq. Likewise Gedye (2004) refers to foreign fighters as 'flocking' into the country 'to wage war on the Coalition and new Iraqi security forces'.

[67] In 2005 the Iraqi Intelligence Service estimated that there were at least 40,000 'hardcore' insurgents operating in Iraq with a possible 200,000 'part-time' fighters and volunteers, of these it is suggested that around 1,000 were foreign fighters who had travelled to Iraq with the purpose of fighting the occupation and its supporters, including indigenous Iraqis (Globalsecurity, 2005). These estimates, particularly those of the number of foreign

The Sunday Telegraph argues that although "many of the terrorists were foreigners", these "foreigners" had joined forces with the indigenous insurgency (Rayment, 2004). In summary, a moderately critical position did exist within *The Daily Telegraph*, but the contradictions and minor focus on this aspect of its reporting do not constitute an overtly critical stance towards the analysis presented by government and military officials. Likewise, as government officials began to admit that their estimates of the numbers of foreign fighters in the country had been over-stated, their own framing of the argument shifted as well. This framing suggests that although the foreign fighters may be small in number, they represent one of the most violent and effective elements of the insurgency, [68] a position that media reporting within *The Daily Telegraph* adopts itself. For example, Hastings (2004) states that foreign fighters "are among the most fanatical and violent foes of the occupation forces", before arguing that an indigenous Iraqi insurgency must be considered as equally important to an analysis of the situation on the ground in Iraq. Russell (2004), also writing in *The Daily Telegraph,* takes a similar position, arguing that the insurgency "may be as much a home-grown revolt" as an "onslaught of Islamic terrorists". This argument is supported by the academic evidence, which argues that the resistance in Iraq can be considered a "multiple insurgency", in which several competing groups, from all areas of a divided Iraqi society, are fighting for a complex plethora of competing objectives, as opposed to an insurgency that is governed simply by a small number of foreign terrorists (Hashim, 2003, see also: Boyle, 2009). This displays a shift in the nature of the foreign fighters argument, but it is not the end of this argument, nor is it a major critique of the official government analysis. Rather, the news media's analysis, after a period of uncertainty, once again adopted the same position as that taken by the government.

This is confirmed by a return to the foreign fighters narrative by both UK and US media organisations and government officials in the remainder of 2004. *The Times* and *The Sunday Times,* for example, depict the second siege of Falluja[69] by US forces as primarily a battle

---

fighters present in Iraq, are more reliable given their source and are consistent with reports from the US Defence Departments own estimates made public in 2007 (Felter and Fishman, 2007).

[68] For example, US General John P. Abizaid stated exactly this in 2005: 'While the foreign fighters aren't large in number, they are deadly in their application'.

[69] The first siege of the city of Falluja took place on 5th April 2004 after a four Private Military Contractors from the American company 'Blackwater' were killed by an angry mob and five US soldiers had been killed days before. In response, the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, Ambassador Paul Bremer, gave the order to 'clean out Falluja', allegedly to take steps to improve the security situation nation-wide (Bremer, 2006, pp. 314-315). However, the aggressive rhetoric and resulting military assault would ultimately do little to this end.

against foreign fighters either directly linked to al Zarqawi or following his orders during the fighting itself (Beeston, 2004, Jaber, 2004). This position is echoed by Spinner (2004) in *The Washington Post*, who argued that Falluja "had become a base for foreign fighters" as well as "the base for Abu Musab al-Zarqawi". The position adopted within these reports, support the statements coming from the White House at the time, as Bush (2004c) states: "we've got troops in harm's way in the Falluja area right now...There are still terrorists there who are trying to stop the march of freedom". Three days later in a press conference conducted by Tony Blair, the same purpose in Fallujah is reiterated: "to rid Fallujah of...foreign terrorists" (Bush, 2004d).

This analysis is also applied to wider Iraq as well. For instance, Norton-Taylor (2004), writing in *The Guardian,* raises the spectre of Al Qaeda in Iraq as operating at only a fraction of its potential capacity. Fairweather (2004c), writing for *The Daily Telegraph,* produces an extended article on the issue of Syrian fighters crossing the border with Iraq in large numbers to "battle with the hated Americans". US reports remained equally consistent. For example, Komarow (2004), writing in *USA Today,* focuses on the difficulties faced by Iraq's new security forces against the presence of AQI and unaffiliated foreign fighters. Cordesman (2004), writing for *The Washington Post,* argues that there can be no withdrawal from Iraq, despite misgivings regarding the reasons for invading, as Al Qaeda would only grow in will and in strength.

In summary, the articles derived from the media sample in 2004 continued to adopt official explanations of the violence inherent to post-invasion Iraq. The media did display some uncertainty in deviating from this analysis in a limited number of articles. However, these articles did not deviate from debates that were already an aspect of dominant public discourse i.e. the insurgency as a product of historic ethnic divisions. After this minor deviation, media reporting returned to the framing of the violent insurgency as the product of significant numbers of foreign fighters seeking to prevent the stabilisation of Iraq. In this instance, the CNN Effect model of media analysis is limited and the manufacturing consent model of greater validity. Scott Bonn (2010) supports this analysis. Bonn argues that far from presenting an independent analysis of the Iraq War, the mainstream media supported the US Government's account of the conflict. This, he argues, created a moral panic that provided public support for the invasion and occupation. Moving forward, we will consider articles

drawn from 2005, in which a similar congruence between official government explanations and the mainstream media's account can be observed.

3. 2005: Syrian influence in Iraq

Articles taken from the UK sample during 2005 focused primarily on two key issues, the most prominent being the migration of foreign fighters into Iraq across the border with Syria, and, slightly less prominently, a shift in the structure of the foreign fighters narrative. This shift entailed the framing of the insurgency as no longer solely fuelled by foreign fighters. Instead, as a result of official estimates of their numbers becoming more widely scrutinised, media reporting began to concur with academic analysis of the insurgency; that it was a multiple insurgency involving a diverse range of actors (Hashim, 2003). For example, Poole (2005), writing in *The Daily Telegraph,* adopts this argument. However, although reporting of the insurgency now accepted its multifaceted nature, the media sample still argued that the foreign fighters involved in the insurgency were the most deadly and effective aspect. For example, Whittaker and MacAskill (2005), writing in *The Guardian,* consider the "myth" of foreign fighters in Iraq in the wake of a Centre for Strategic and International Studies report (2005), stating that the numbers of foreign fighters, although increasing year on year, still represent only 5-10% of the total number of insurgents. However, Whittaker and MacAskill (Ibid) warn that the presence of these fighters is "cause for alarm" due to the effectiveness of their operations. They also highlight the assertion that the majority of foreign fighters operating in Iraq originate from Syria, a key theme that we will now return to.

Syria's aid to the Iraqi insurgency through food supplies, weapons and fighters has been a topic that has been discussed throughout media reporting in both the UK and US since the beginning of the occupation. Yet in 2005, this subject became more important than ever within the UK sample in particular. For instance, La Guardia (2005), writing in *The Daily Telegraph,* reports that the Syrian regime is no more than a puppet of its former Ba'athist-led government. As a result, it was allowing Syrian Ba'athists to cross the border into Iraq to join up with the insurgency. Howard (2005a) writing for *The Guardian* focuses first on US efforts to close the Syrian border by increasing offensive patrols along and across the border. One month later, however, Abdul-Ahad (2005) reminds *Guardian* readers of the problems with Syria in an in-depth interview with a Syrian insurgent. The article outlines how Syrian border towns had sent "buses loaded with mujahideen into Iraq" and that the occupation of Iraq has

inflamed the passions and hatred of "whole nations" against America. Beeston (2005) in *The Times,* and Baxter (2005) in *The Sunday Times* the following week, both report on US warnings to the Syrian government to halt the flow of insurgents across its borders. Beeston argues that this is essential, as in quoting a "US military officer" he argues that the flow of Syrian fighters may well be responsible for fuelling al-Zarqawi's AQI insurgency.[70] Beeston and Hider (2005) in *The Times* make a similar argument one month later, in an article suggesting that if it were not for the flow of Syrian fighters into Iraq then the country's transition to a stable democracy would have been completed. They quote Donald Rumsfeld to confirm the importance that Syria holds to completing the mission in Iraq:

"It is a fact that terrorists come across the Syrian border. It is also a fact that Syria is a dictatorship with a very large intelligence community. And one has to assume they know it is going on in their country" (Rumsfeld quoted by Beeston and Hider, Ibid)

This position is also articulated within a US State Department daily press briefing, in which acting State Department Spokesperson Tom Casey reiterates the US stance on Syrian inaction towards the problems along its border with Iraq:

"There's more they can do along the border to tighten controls…there is more that they can do to deal with the regime elements that are operating out of Syria itself and are supporting or encouraging the insurgents there…it's not simply a matter of them not being able to take the actions; part of it is an unwillingness to take the actions that we know are necessary and they know are necessary" (State Department Daily Press Briefing, 9th May 2005).

The reports focusing on the Syrian issue, although more prominent, are not limited to the UK sample, appearing on several occasions within the US reports. Osman (2005) in *The Washington Post* takes stock of a "typical jihadist's journey" in which he notes that the

---

[70] Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, although mentioned consistently as the leader of the foreign terrorists migrating into Iraq whenever AQI were discussed, did not feature as a prominent figure in and of himself in the reports. The exception to this was found in Moniz (2005) writing for *USA Today* who, citing Donald Rumsfeld, argued that al-Zarqawi was the number one military target in Iraq. As well as an article by Jehl (2005b), in *The New York Times*, which discusses a letter sent to al-Zarqawi by Al Qaeda's 'number 2' Ayman al-Zawahiri, expressing concern that al-Zarqawi's aggressive tactics towards Shi'a Iraqis risked alienating Al Qaeda within Iraq and that this would not serve the political aims of the organisation; 'to involve the Muslim masses in the battle [against America]'.

recruitment campaigns aimed at these young men "are funded by Syrian officials". Whilst *The New York Times* discussed the impact of US offensives along the border with Syria to clamp down on the flow of foreign fighters and supplies, as the article argues, Syria seems incapable or unwilling to do so (Glanz, 2005, Risen and Sanger, 2005).

However, while academic analysis has shown that Syria has played a role in the Iraq War by passively supporting the insurgency, due to its opposition to the US-led invasion (Cordesman, 2005, Hashim, 2009), it is argued by Hashim (2009:69) that the level of this support has been overstated by both the US Government and the mainstream media. Hashim cites comments made by Iraqi insurgents themselves, who feel that they are "the only resistance movement in modern history that has received no help or support from any country. The reason…we are fighting America". Hashim (Ibid) acknowledges that this comment does exaggerate the argument, but argues that it is accurate, as even if Syria did oppose the occupation of Iraq, they had to balance this position with a pragmatic attitude towards America. However, Hashim argues that the sympathy exhibited by Syria has led to a less than active approach to the management of their border with Iraq. This led to Syrians migrating into Iraq to join the insurgency and often coming under the control of al-Zarqawi. This thesis does not dispute the presence and actions of foreign fighters in Iraq, but argues their activities form only one aspect of a far wider problem of violence and intimidation within Iraq.[71]

We will now turn our attention to the second of the key themes that have emerged within the articles sampled from 2005, that of the continued evolution of the foreign fighters narrative as a framework through which to understand the ferocity of violence associated with post-invasion Iraq. The first point of contention here is the acknowledgement within some reports that the numbers of foreign fighters operational in Iraq has been greatly exaggerated. As already noted, the Centre for Strategic Studies argues that foreign fighters accounted for only 5-10% of the total insurgency (Cordesman, 2005). However, UK and US news reports continued to emphasise the importance of tackling foreign fighters. For example, Whitlock (2005), writing in The *Washington Post,* suitably illustrates the evolution in reporting, arguing that although "most insurgents are Iraqis…foreign fighters pose a major threat", before directly quoting then CIA Director Porter Goss as arguing that one of the major

---

[71] Summarised as stemming from indigenous Iraqis, foreign fighters, mistakes made in the administration of the country (discussed in the following chapter) and state crimes committed by Coalition forces, the central discussion of the latter half of this thesis.

concerns with the presence of foreign fighters in Iraq was the exploitation of the conflict "to recruit new anti-US jihadists".[72] Howard (2005b), writing in *The Guardian,* makes a similar argument, stating that it is only recently that the numbers of foreign insurgents have significantly decreased, indicating a weakening of their capabilities. Howard argues that this has led to a number of foreign fighters as having utilised Iraq as a "combat training ground", then returning to their countries of origin at the request of Al Qaeda, in order to transfer their combat experience elsewhere. Likewise, according to Harnden (2005) in *The Sunday Telegraph,* although Iraqis may outnumber the foreign fighters, it is AQI that must take responsibility for their radicalisation against the Coalition. This emphasises the evolving idea that despite relatively small numbers of foreign fighters present in Iraq, they have been extraordinarily active. Significantly, this article ignores the capacity of Iraqi civilians to choose to resist the invasion and occupation of their country, as well as the fact that the Sunni population of Iraq, fearing a socio-political backlash from the majority Shi'a, took-up arms to fight for their own freedom from oppression, as discussed in the previous chapter. Wong (2005), writing in *The New York Times,* acknowledges this point, arguing that the reason Sunni insurgents and AQI fighters had worked together was due to the Sunnis' belief that AQI could halt the Shi'a ascension to power.[73]

Having illustrated the key themes emerging from the sample during 2005, it is clear that a strong manufacturing consent theme remains within the reporting of this framing of the Iraq War. There is a two-fold illustration of this within the discussion: firstly, the sample has been largely uncritical in its reporting of official accounts regarding the nature of the conflict. This is exemplified by the prominent utilisation of direct quotes from government officials and White House press statements. Secondly, once it became clear that official estimates of the number of operational insurgents inside Iraq's borders were inaccurate, instead of starting to question official accounts of the conflict, media organisations shifted their positions to mirror

---

[72] *The New York Times* also highlights this fear when discussing a report issued by the National Intelligence Article that suggests that the Iraq War 'could provide recruitment, training grounds, technical skills and language proficiency for a new class of terrorists who are 'professionalized' and for whom political violence becomes an end in itself' (Jehl, 2005a).

[73] The academic literature confirms these fears, arguing that one reason that the AQI leader al-Zarqawi supported the Sunni insurgency, was because he felt that the Shi'a, like the US-led Coalition, had no right to attain power in Iraq (see for example: Beckett, 2005a, Chehab, 2006, Fishman, 2006, Michael, 2007, Boyle, 2009). Phillips (2009) argues that the Sunni's relationship with AQI was the primary reason for the Sunni Awakening and the associated decline in violence after 2007. This was because the Sunni tribes rejected the strict ideology of AQI that had led to violence between the two allies. Phillips argues that the alliance between the two was important in the decline of AQI elements in the insurgency.

that of government officials. This meant that the reporting in this period continued to draw links between the Iraq War and the War on Terror to generate continued support for the conflict. As has been discussed, these findings support existing academic analysis of the media's reporting of the Iraq War that argue that the media was unwavering in its support of official explanations. For example Kull, Ramsay and Lewis (2004) conducted interviews with television news anchors that led them to conclude that the reporting of the early stages of the Iraq War purposefully sought to reinforce official accounts (see also: Rendell and Broughel, 2003). This discussion, in conjunction with this existing literature, provides further support for a hegemonic model of the mainstream media. This continues to be the case in reports drawn from the sample in the following year.

4. 2006: Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and Al Qaeda Iraq

In contrast to the data analysed thus far, 2006 yielded less articles than previous years. However, the articles that the sample generated focused on two important themes that have emerged throughout the analysis: the evolution of the role of foreign fighters, particularly the increasing cooperation with the indigenous Sunni insurgency, and the importance given to the role of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in his leadership of AQI. 2006 is of principal importance to this latter point, as this was the year in which al-Zarqawi was killed by a US air strike on June 7th. As a result, several detailed articles emerged proclaiming the end of AQI and focusing on the significant role that al-Zarqawi had played in fomenting the violence that had beset Iraq to this point.

The first of these articles, for which no author is cited, focuses on the nature of a US plan for the generation of an "anti-Islamist conflict" around the world (*The Guardian*, 2006). Iraq is considered the first of multiple Islamic countries that are thought to pose a threat to the US[74]. The article draws attention to the first key framing of the insurgency to emerge in 2006, which is similar to academic analysis of the conflict as a multiple insurgency (Hashim, 2003).[75] In the article AQI, "nationalists and foreign jihadists" are characterised as fighting to

---

[74] Including: Afghanistan, where military operations are on going, Iran, where a diplomatic solution would be preferred, but the article argues military action by the US and Israel is possible, Syria, which, as discussed throughout this chapter, has been a major focus of US attention and other nations/regions including: Lebanon, South East Asia and Pakistan/Kashmir (The Guardian, 2006).

[75] Hashim (2003) argues that the multiple competing insurgent groups, with competing interests in Iraq, means that there is more than one insurgency taking place. This is similar to the notion of 'net war' as suggested by

rid the country of "foreign forces". This displays the view within the mass media that the insurgency is being fought on multiple, often-overlapping fronts, which, as argued previously, represents a shift in the framing of the conflict from one dominated by foreign fighters and passive Iraqis, to a multiple insurgency. Ricks (2006), writing in *The Washington Post*, adopts a similar line of discussion, in which Iraq's Sunni insurgency has mistakenly allowed AQI and al-Zarqawi in particular, to become the figurehead of the movement, marginalizing themselves from the political process and alienating themselves from fellow Iraqis. This is most notably displayed by al-Zarqawi's initiation of a series of attacks upon Shi'a civilians, their leadership (in the form of the assassination of the senior SCIRI leader the Ayatollah Muhammed Baqir al-Hakim), and the bombing of multiple holy sites throughout Iraq, including Baghdad, Karbala and Najaf.[76] This tactic had led to the very real possibility of a civil war erupting between Sunni and Shi'a Iraqis, as Shi'a Iraqis responded to al-Zarqawi's provocation by launching reprisal attacks against Sunni communities, with the Sunni responding in kind.[77] Baldwin (2006) argues in *The Times* that this has led to the possibility that Iraq will become "a safe haven for terrorists", as AQI's support for the Iraqi insurgency had served the purpose of influencing and radicalising "Muslim public opinion" against the West. However, it could be argued that al-Zarqawi's targeting of Iraqi civilians was one of the reasons behind his downfall, as other Sunni insurgent groups began to cut their ties with AQI once they began to see al-Zarqawi's tactics and rigid, politico-religious ideology as incompatible with their own tactics and objectives, as will now be discussed.

The first indication of AQI pushing their authority to breaking point emerges in a report by Jaber (2006) in *The Sunday Times* discussing the murder of a Sunni Tribal leader by AQI as he had been "too sympathetic towards the United States during talks', referring to him as 'a traitor who deserved to be killed". The impact of this on AQI's relationship with the Sunni insurgency was made clear in an article by Poole (2006) in *The Daily Telegraph* entitled

---

Hoffman (2004). He argues that the multiple insurgent groups in Iraq are largely unconnected in their ideology and demands and only join forces to exchange information, supplies, tactics and to carry-out attacks (see also: Beckett, 2005b).

[76] This campaign against the Iraqi Shi'a was epitomised by the bombing of one of the most sacred Shi'a holy sites in the country in February 2006; the al-Askariyya shrine in Sammara. The shrine, which held the tombs of the 10th and 11th imams, was the most provocative act of al-Zarqawi's tenure in Iraq and cemented the major rift that al-Zarqawi had sought to develop between the Shi'a and Sunni communities (Beckett, 2005a, Riedel, 2007, Hashim, 2009).

[77] Academic analysis of this period argues that the objective of these actions by AQI was to create such an unstable environment that the Coalition would be forced to withdraw (see for example: Michael 2007, Boyle 2009, Hashim 2009)

"Sunni insurgents have al-Zarqawi running for cover", as Sunnis responded to AQI's increasingly intimidating behaviour by forming tribal alliances against AQI and purging the Anbar region of "three-quarters of Al Qaeda supporters". Academic analysis of this AQI at this time argues that this represented the beginning of the much heralded "Sunni Awakening" movement that would see AQI's influence significantly reduced in Iraq (see for example: Michael, 2007, Kilcullen, 2009, Hashim, 2009, Phillips, 2009).

AQI's fading influence was confirmed within the sample during June in a series of articles that reported on the death of al-Zarqawi. Howard (2006), in *The Guardian*, quotes Iraq's National Security Advisor, Mowafaq al-Rubaie, as saying "We believe this is the beginning of the end of Al Qaeda in Iraq", whilst US military officials were pleased with what they considered to be the "best intelligence about the workings of the insurgency since the invasion of 2003". Whitlock (2006), writing for *The Washington Post*, argued that his death "could mark a turning point for Al Qaeda" by the removal of its figurehead in Iraq; a man who had attracted and united many of the foreign fighters operating in the country. However, the article warns that according to Saudi National Security officials, groups of foreign fighters unaffiliated with al-Zarqawi had grown more influential than AQI and, as such, would still pose a grave threat to the stability of the country. Jaber, Baxter and Smith (2006) in *The Sunday Times* write of the "face of barbarism" that al-Zarqawi represented in Iraq, arguing that his actions were the main reason why the country had come so close to civil war,[78] an argument that carries some weight but detracts from the capacity of Iraqis to decide for themselves. After all, the insurgency in Iraq had begun before al-Zarqawi had immersed himself within it. The article continues, glorifying in the removal of the influential figure of al-Zarqawi, but quotes a warning from a remaining AQI fighter that alludes to the nature of the media framing of the conflict to come; "The Death of al-Zarqawi will not cease attacks or operations in Iraq. The insurgency or resistance in Iraq against the occupation is not dependent on one man".

Al-Zarqawi's death was met with a mixture of jubilation and pessimism with regard to its impact upon the future of the insurgency. However, the discussion of al-Zarqawi within the wider context of Al Qaeda as a global terrorist organisation served once more to place the

---

[78] The Daily Telegraph (2006), The Guardian (2006) and Beeston (2006) in The Times also produce detailed articles on the death of al-Zarqawi and the cautious hoe with which it should be treated.

Iraq War within the rhetoric of the wider War on Terror. This justified the continuing intervention in the country and constructed the indigenous insurgency as a peripheral movement, which would not have become so vehemently opposed to the occupation if it were not for the malevolent influence of Al Qaeda. This is a position that President Bush adopted throughout a series of speeches during 2006, referring to the death of al-Zarqawi as "an important victory in the global War on Terror" (Bush, 2006a), arguing that al-Zarqawi died "in the free and democratic Iraq that he fought so hard to prevent" (Ibid). However, like the reports of al-Zarqawi's death, Bush makes it clear that the Iraq War was far from over, but sees the man's death as "a major blow to Al Qaeda and the killers and terrorists that are trying to spread violence and suffering, and stop the emergence of a new democracy" (Bush, 2006b). This statement squarely located the majority of the violence within the Al Qaeda network, to which al-Zarqawi's death had provided a major setback, presenting an opportunity for the Iraqis and the Coalition to bring security to "Americans and Iraqis and the world" (Bush, 2006c). With the demise of al-Zarqawi and the rejection of AQI by the Sunni insurgency depicted throughout 2006, the Sunni Awakening movement, in conjunction with the much-vaunted troop surge initiated by the US Government, unsurprisingly became the primary framing of the foreign fighters narrative during 2007, a subject discussed below.

5. 2007: The troop surge and the continued presence of foreign fighters

In 2007, reporting of the burgeoning success of the "surge" in Coalition forces and the "Sunni Awakening" movement was tempered by the continuing insistence that Iraq was a haven for foreign terrorists. For example: Baldwin and Beeston (2007), writing in *The Times,* focused on Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice's talks with Syria and Iran in an effort to thaw relations and encourage them to more closely monitor their borders. Harnden (2007), writing in *The Daily Telegraph,* argues that "almost half" of the foreign fighters entering Iraq "are believed to be Saudi nationals". Fielding and Baxter (2007), writing in *The Sunday Times,* take this analysis further by stating that "Saudi Arabia is the hub of world terror", stating that over half of the foreign fighters held in "Camp Cropper near Baghdad are Saudis". Black (2007), writing in *The Guardian,* makes a comparable claim. A similar theme is found in US newspapers, including Whitlock (2007) in *The Washington Post* and Elliot (2007) in *The New York Times,* who argue that terrorist networks linked to AQI are luring disenchanted Moroccan youths to Iraq to continue the fight against the Coalition forces and the US in particular. Finally, Cooper (2007) also in *The New York Times,* highlights US frustrations

with its Saudi "allies" over the issue of foreign fighters entering Iraq and Saudi Arabia's reticence in preventing this. As already discussed, this framing of the conflict, although not entirely inaccurate, has been heavily exaggerated within the mainstream media, serving as a continual reminder to the public that the conflict is part of a wider global War on Terror. This media framing reinforced the position adopted by the US Government and its allies:

> "As we think about this important front in the war against extremists and terrorists, it's important for our fellow citizens to recognize this truth: If we were to leave Iraq before the job is done, the enemy would follow us home". (President Bush Press Conference, 15th February 2007a)

At the same time as making these comments, Bush begins to assert the successful beginnings of the troop surge, arguing that initial indications of its success or failure had been "encouraging", a position adopted by almost all of the articles sampled from 2007. For example, Baxter, Colvin and Saffar (2007), in *The Sunday Times*, report on the first impact that the surge was having in Iraq. This involved a 4,000 strong force of US Marines entering the city of Ramadi in order to flush out insurgents and AQI fighters, from a city characterised as consistently "lawless", run by insurgents and foreign fighters throughout the majority of the Coalition occupation. The article also points to the Awakening movement by quoting a prominent Sheikh who wishes to see the Anbar region "rid of terrorists who would "try to engineer our future with mortars and roadside bombs"".[79] Jafer and Amman (2007), writing in *The Sunday Times* in April, further emphasise the successful nature of the troop surge in conjunction with the Sunni Awakening. In an article entitled "Sunnis try to blast Al Qaeda out of Iraq", they outline how Sunni insurgents formerly allied with AQI had turned their back on them, assassinated their leader and forced their fighters to flee from the Anbar region after passing their details to US and Iraqi commanders. Hider (2007), writing in *The Times*, points to even more success, as the replacement leader of AQI, Abu Ayyub al-Masri, was reportedly killed "in a battle with a rival Sunni militant group".

According to media and political analysis then, the Sunni Awakening played a major role in the turnaround in the security situation in the country, an argument that is confirmed in much

---

[79] The irony that the Coalition had sought to engineer Iraq's future through a military invasion is lost in Baxter, Colvin and Saffar's (2007) article.

of the academic analysis.[80] For instance, Phillips (2009) argues that divisions began to emerge between AQI and the Sunni tribes of Al-Anbar province as early as 2005. He argues that AQI operatives began to embed themselves within tribal society, exploiting local kinship ties through forced marriages, attempting to take over the tribes' profitable black market activities and responding with savage violence to any opposition voiced by tribal leaders. This resulted in the tribes of the Al-Anbar province forming the "Al-Anbar Salvation Council", comprising 25 tribes that were opposed to the presence of AQI, acting as the precursor to the "Sunni Awakening" (Michael 2007, Hashim, 2009, Kilcullen, 2009, Phillips, 2009). The troop surge gave the Sunni tribes the opportunity to reinforce their opposition to AQI, as now they felt that US forces would remain in Iraq until they had achieved stability, whereas previously it was felt that if they rejected AQI they would suffer in the absence of US military and political support. As a result of the tribes' grievance with the brutality of AQI and their targeting of Sunni civilians in order to force Sunni acquiescence to their authority, the tribes sought to re-take control of their futures. This is illustrated by Raghavan (2007) in *The Washington Post* by a quote from a Sunni insurgent commander, who emphasises his disillusionment with the vicious use of force employed against Sunnis by AQI:

> "Al Qaeda has killed more Iraqi Sunnis in Anbar during the past month than the soldiers of the American occupation have killed within three months. People are tired of the torture…we cannot keep silent anymore" (Islamic Army Commander, quoted by Raghavan, 14th April 2007).

The troop surge and the accompanying Sunni Awakening remained the primary media focus throughout the remainder of 2007. This analysis emphasised the surge's increasing success in seriously disrupting AQI's operational capabilities (see for example: Beeston, 2007, Reid, 2007b, Colvin, 2007). At the same time it highlighted, in conjunction with President Bush[81]

---

[80] However Simon (2008) argues that despite the short term stability gained, the troop surge did not solve the competition for power amongst Iraq's competing ethnic groups and as such the security gains achieved through the surge may be short lived as a socio-political problem was being tackled with a military solution.

[81] For example: 'Anbar province is a good example of how our strategy is working. Last year, an intelligence report concluded that Anbar had been lost to Al Qaeda…I sent an additional 4,000 Marines to Anbar as part of the surge. Together, local sheiks, Iraqi forces, and Coalition troops drove the terrorists from the capital of Ramadi and other population centres. Today, a city where Al Qaeda once planted its flag is beginning to return to normal…the success of a free Iraq is critical to the security of the United States. A free Iraq will deny Al Qaeda a safe haven'. (President Bush, Address to the Nation, 13th September 2007b)

and General David Patraeus, the Commander of Coalition forces in Iraq, that pulling out of the country now would only pave the way for Al Qaeda to reinvigorate its campaign in Iraq with its own surge (Reid, 2007a, 2007b, *The Sunday Times*, 2007).

In summary, the sample from 2007 emphasised two key areas of the foreign fighters framework: the migration of jihadists across Iraq's borders and the successful application of the troop surge alongside the Sunni Awakening movement, whilst being sure to make the case that any Coalition withdrawal from the country at this stage would have devastating consequences for Iraqis and the rest of the world in its war against terrorism. Thus, the foreign fighters narrative still represented a significant aspect of the mediated understanding of Iraq's post-invasion violence throughout 2007, framing Iraq as a significant front in the War on Terror at the expense of an analysis of state-sanctioned violence within the country.

6. 2008: Al Qaeda still active in Iraq

As was the case with the ethnic divisions narrative discussed in the previous chapter, the number of reports focusing on the issue of foreign fighters operating in Iraq declined during 2008, generating 9 reports in total. As discussed above, the reason for this decline in reports can be found in the successful application of the US troop surge and the associated Sunni Awakening movement that accompanied it. However, the main focus of the reports drawn from 2008 retained a focus upon the role that foreign fighters still played in the country and the diligence required to maintain the achievements of the new strategy.

A case in point comes from Fletcher (2008), writing in *The Times*, who refers to letters written by one of AQI's leaders in Anbar Province on the subject of the Sunnis desertion of AQI in the wake of the Awakening movement. The letter characterises AQI in "an extraordinary crisis", stating that there had been a "total collapse in the security structure of the organisation". However, in a return to the framing of the conflict that has persisted throughout the sample, the report warns, in citing "US intelligence officials", that "Al Qaeda [in Iraq] was far from a spent force"; the letters representing only "snapshots" of two relatively small areas of the Anbar region. This return to the framework utilised throughout the sample is further illustrated by MacAskill (2008) in *The Guardian*, discussing a suicide attack carried out in Iraq by a Kuwaiti who had been released from Guantanamo Bay three years previously. This reinforces the notion that the occupation of Iraq is a key aspect of the

wider War on Terror by not only directly associating suicide attacks in Iraq with foreign fighters,[82] but by linking Iraq to the military detention centre in Guantanamo, Cuba,[83] as an "essential" measure to protect the US and its allies from the alleged security threat posed by the detainees. Finally, in order to underline the diligence required to maintain the increased stability within Iraq and the decreased operational capacity of AQI, Black and MacAskill (2008) in *The Guardian* and Spillius (2008) in *The Daily Telegraph* report the same day on a raid across Syrian borders by US Special Forces targeting foreign fighters. Schmitt and Mazzetti (2008) write a similar article in *The Washington Post* the following day[84]. This reiterates an argument made throughout the sample and consistently by US officials that Syria has been responsible for, at best, allowing foreign fighters across its borders into Iraq and at worst, actively supporting them. This framing of the conflict continued to highlight that the Iraq War was not over despite the progress being made, whilst also reassuring readers that the invasion and occupation was a justified endeavour. This is due to the framing of the conflict throughout the occupation as a war that sought to fight terrorism at its source.

Conclusion

This chapter has presented the argument that the War in Iraq was, in part, framed as a conflict that, were it not for the presence and effectiveness of significant numbers of foreign fighters, would have been over quickly. This has been supported by news articles sampled from media outlets in both the US and UK which have illustrated the significance that this framing of the Iraq War was given within the mainstream media. As was the case with the historic ethnic divisions narrative discussed in the previous chapter, these reports often mirrored the position adopted by government officials. The mutual legitimacy attributed to the foreign fighters

---

[82] The article also states that '90% of suicide bombers have been foreigners' (MacAskill, 2008).

[83] Set-up to hold arrested 'combatants' in the War on Terror for indefinite periods prior to trial by military court. Steyn (2004:10) describes these trials as 'the types of trials associated with utterly lawless, totalitarian regimes' before stating that 'the only thing that could be worse is simply to leave the prisoners in their black hole indefinitely'.

[84] Schmitt and Mazzetti (2008) also discuss the 'secret order' signed by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in 2004, which made raids within the borders of sovereign states such as this possible. The most recent and highest profile example of this may be the US Special Forces raid in Pakistan that resulted in the death of Osama Bin Laden. An article in USA Today (2008) for which no author was stated, argues that as a result of the damage done to AQI, President Bush will now turn his attention to rooting out Al Qaeda in 'Afghanistan, Pakistan…and anyplace else it establishes its malignant presence'. The article notes however, that Al Qaeda would not have a presence in Iraq at all, if 'the United States had not invaded and then mismanaged the aftermath'. This discussion of the mistakes made by US administrators in Iraq within the mainstream media will form the focus of the next chapter.

narrative by corroborating statements in mainstream media and from government officials, created another popular discourse through which the violence associated with the occupation could be understood.

In conclusion, in contrast to the historic ethnic divisions narrative,[85] the media's analysis of foreign fighters migrating into Iraq, as a dominant explanation of the violence associated with the insurgency, rarely questioned the legitimacy of official accounts of this narrative. This is not to say that the media acted as the "faithful servant" (Wolfsfeld, 1997) of the government in terms of its support or opposition for the conflict itself, but that it largely supported official accounts of the nature of the conflict on the ground. This was the case even when it became clear that the numbers of foreign fighters migrating into the country had been greatly exaggerated. At this point, instead of adopting a critical position that asked serious questions about the nature of the conflict, official policy in and on Iraq, and why the foreign fighters narrative had been so exaggerated by government officials, the media sample tended to adopt the evolutionary framing of the narrative created by prominent political figures; that the numbers of foreign fighters may have been limited, but they were an effective and deadly aspect of the insurgency.

This is similar to the Robinson, Goddard and Parry (2009) analysis of UK media coverage of the invasion of Iraq. They found that media reporting largely reflected the positions adopted by Coalition military briefings, although, as was the case with the ethnic divisions narrative, they found that at times a more "oppositional" tone could be found. As a result, they argue that a more nuanced approach to understanding the media is required than a straightforward "elite-driven model". In this instance, it can be argued that the mainstream media were not driven by elite accounts, but that their seeming reluctance to consider alternative explanations[86] and present a detailed account of the evidence regarding alternative accounts of the conflict, meant that a series of dominant explanatory narratives were constructed. This

---

[85] However as discussed in the previous chapter, this analysis although deviating somewhat from official accounts of the conflict remained within the boundaries of pre-existing public discourse.
[86] One alternative explanation of this violence, that of widespread state criminality, was available to mainstream news sources in the form of independent human rights reports and reports by the United Nations on the humanitarian situation in Iraq. Similarly left leaning, marginal news organisations such as *The Nation* and *The New Statesman*, and prominent leftists thinkers such as Naomi Klein and Noam Chomsky, had written articles throughout the occupation of Iraq, which considered the impact of state criminality, as carried out by Coalition forces, on the Iraq. A discussion of this material and its neglect within the mainstream Western media will form the basis of the discussion in chapter five.

is evidence of idle journalism responsible for the formulation of an overarching dominant discourse (Pilger, 2010). As was the case with the ethnic divisions narrative, the foreign fighters framing within the media sample only encouraged debate within the narrow discursive margins of official explanations.

This reinforces the underlying argument of this thesis: that the media's account of the conflict marginalized from popular discourse an equally significant analysis of the Iraq War as a case study in state crime. Therefore, we may conclude that, in conjunction with the previous chapter's discussion of Iraq's ethno-sectarian divide, the mainstream media in this instance served to manufacture consent to a dominant political position, far more than operating as a forum for critical debate (Robinson, 2002, Herman and Chomsky, 1988, Herman, 2000, Chomsky, 2002). The next chapter will discuss the framing of the conflict as characterised by fundamental errors made in the administration of the occupation by the Coalition. It is argued that this final framing of the conflict, although critical in its position, performed the same function as the framings discussed thus far.

The Construction of the "US Mistakes" Narrative in the Mainstream Print News Media

Introduction

The primary focus of this chapter is a media analysis of the 'US Mistakes thesis'.[87] This is the argument demonstrated within both the mainstream media and academic literature, that the US-led occupation of Iraq was plagued by numerous fundamentally flawed decisions in the administration of the occupation of the country. Whilst there are a multitude of criticisms levied at the US authorities in Baghdad and Washington with regard to this issue, this chapter will focus upon the most prominent of these critiques: the 'de-Ba'athification' of Iraqi society, the disbanding or dissolving of the Iraqi military and the insufficient number of Coalition forces deployed to secure the country in the aftermath of the invasion. The analysis will be structured in a similar manner to the preceding media analyses, focusing on the representation of the above criticisms of the conflict within the mainstream media, whilst comparing these with official statements from key political figures.[88] This will provide an assessment of the mainstream media's role in framing dominant understandings of the conflict, which corresponded to official accounts, to the detriment of a more vehement critique of the Iraq War.

It is the contention of this discussion that the analysis of mistakes made in the administration of the occupation helped to construct a dominant narrative of the failings of the US-led occupation. This narrative gave the appearance of a consistent critique within the mainstream media but in reality this critical stance had already been raised by official explanations of the violence inherent to the occupation of Iraq. This means that the critique of mistakes made during the occupation does not represent a major deviation from the realms of acceptable debate regarding the conflict. In short, although elements of the CNN Effect (Livingston, 1997, Robinson, 2002) may be observed within the media reporting of mistakes made by Iraq's erstwhile occupiers, alongside US government responses to these critiques, these arguments do not present a far-reaching criticism beyond the realms of existing public debate.

---

[87] For a discussion of the methods used in this analysis refer to chapter two.

[88] In contrast to the chronological structure adopted in chapters two and three, this chapter will present its analysis thematically in order to provide a succinct overview of the mistakes identified in the media sample.

In summary, as was the case with the previous media analyses[89] conducted in this research, the construction of mistakes made by the US-led Coalition served to frame the boundaries from which critical analysis of the conflict could be articulated.

In addition to the media analysis and the concurrent analysis of official government statements and press releases, there will be a focus upon the academic literature pertaining to criticisms of the administration of the occupation of Iraq. This will enable an assessment of the veracity of the story told by mainstream media sources and government officials.

1. De-Ba'athification

De-Ba'athification, at its most basic level, refers to the process initiated by the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), Paul Bremer, at the behest of politicians in Washington, to disestablish and dissolve the Party's structures from Iraqi society and ensure that its members could no longer hold positions of authority within the Iraqi government, military or security institutions or ministries. CPA Order No. 1,[90] the first official act of Paul Bremer's tenure as US Ambassador to Iraq, ensured that Iraqis ranked in the top four levels of the Ba'ath Party's membership structure, would be "removed from their positions and banned from future employment in the public sector". Likewise, those members of the "more junior ranks" of the party would also be removed from their employment, be they medical personnel, engineers or University educators. This meant that significant numbers of able, educated Iraqis would be prohibited from assisting in the re-building of their country in the post-invasion environment. Although clearly a disruptive measure, Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, argued that de-Ba'athification was necessary despite causing "some inefficiencies", in order to make it clear to "forward looking Iraqis" that the Coalition had arrived in Iraq to bring about freedom from the tyranny of the Ba'ath Party. It would "eliminate the remnants of Saddam's regime" in order to "repair the social fabric [of Iraq]" and "to heal the wounds the Ba'athists inflicted" (Rumsfeld, 2003a). However, both Bremer's sweeping approach to de-Ba'athification and the Bush administrations support for the order were misjudged, as the order did not attempt to distinguish between those Party members

---

[89] By way of recap: the construction of Iraq as a country divided by historically constructed ethnic identities and the notion that the violence resulting from these divisions had been exacerbated by the presence of foreign fighters, migrating into Iraq to fight perceived Western interference in Islamic affairs.

[90] Signed into law on the 16th May 2003.

who had committed crimes against the Iraqi people and those who had no choice but to join the Party, engendering a sense of bitterness and contempt among vast numbers of primarily Sunni Iraqis,[91] early on in the occupation.

It is the sweeping nature of the de-Ba'athification decree, which has led to a swathe of criticisms levied at the Bush administration, and Paul Bremer in particular. Within the academic literature, Phillips (2006) condemned the order as too swift and far-reaching and poorly organised, serving to exclude valuable members of Iraqi society from the rebuilding process. Diamond (2005) suggests that the order effectively dissolved the state itself, as after years of Saddam's rule, the Ba'ath Party essentially represented the only functional government apparatus in Iraq. Rathmell (2005:1024) supports this view, arguing that the decisions to de-Ba'athify Iraq and disband its army "gave legal sanction to the paralysis of [the Iraqi] government".

Similar arguments can be observed within the mass media. For instance Steele (2004) and McCarthy (2005) writing in *The Guardian* note that there was a feeling within the Sunni community that de-Ba'athification was a retributive measure deployed against the population after years of Sunni socio-political dominance under Saddam's rule. This extended beyond a mere sense of victimisation within the Sunni community, representing instead the instant disenfranchisement of the Sunni community from Iraq's newly evolving socio-political landscape. Danner (2006) writing in *The Times*, argued that the impact of this being that pre-existing ethnic tensions between Sunni and Shi'a Iraqis, were quickly highlighted and exacerbated by the order. This became a contributory factor to the growing insurgency that was dominated primarily by marginalized Sunnis, which threatened to plunge Iraq into a long-term, bitter ethnic conflict, as discussed in previous chapters. With these points in mind, the following exposition will consider; the representation of the de-Ba'athification decree in the mass media and official responses to the evolving security situation in the country that focus on the issue of de-Ba'athification, as well as the academic response to the impact of CPA Order No. 1 on the occupation of Iraq.

---

[91] Who were disproportionately affected by the order as a result of their socio-political dominance in the wake of years of the Sunni led dictatorship of Saddam Hussein.

The order to de-Ba'athify Iraqi society in the aftermath of the fall of the old regime was considered by the Bush administration to be a key symbolic moment in the conduct of Operation Iraqi Freedom. As Paul Bremer (2006a: 39) argues, Washington could not emphasise enough "the political importance of the decree",[92] illustrated by US Under Secretary of Defence Douglas Feith's comments to Bremer prior to his departure to serve as the head of the CPA: "We've got to show all the Iraqis that we're serious about building a New Iraq" (Ibid). For US officials in both Washington and on the ground in Iraq, de-Ba'athification would be the first sign to the majority of Iraqis that the Coalition was bringing about a change for the better. This conviction was echoed during the first months of media reporting of the signing into law of CPA Order No. 1, with both US and UK newspapers drawn from the sample, taking an uncritical approach towards the de-Ba'athification process.

Kelidar (2003), writing for *The Daily Telegraph*, notes that Bremer's firm support for the process "has received universal appreciation" (see also: *The Daily Telegraph* 26th March '03, Sparrow, 2003, Baxter, 2003, Sherwell, 2003), whilst the US media took an even more positive approach to the process. Hoagland (2003) argues in The *Washington Post* that de-Ba'athification has not been placed high enough up the US agenda in Iraq and that a "root-and-branch destruction of Ba'ath rule" is required in order to "break the emotional wall of fear" that has enveloped Iraqis subjected to a regime that, Hoagland argues, took many of its cues from Nazi Germany. This link between de-Ba'athification and "de-Nazification" at the end of World War II helps provide a cast iron justification for the process through the memory of the horrors of World War II and further legitimation for the war itself. For example, Berman (2003) writing for *The New York Times*, draws parallels between the Totalitarianism practiced in Nazi Germany and the role it played in inspiring the ideology of the Ba'ath Party in Iraq. He argues that if Iraq's past resembled Nazi Germany, why shouldn't its future resemble "Europe's...happier experience in more recent years", a positive spin on the policy, which mirrors the Bush Administration's support for the policy discussed above with reference to Donald Rumsfeld (see also: Buruma, 2003, Ignatius, 2003a, Slevin and Chandrasekan, 2003, Wilson, 2003).[93]

---

[92] The order had been "'signed off'" by the three major US offices invested in the outcome of the Iraq War; The White House, the Department of Defence and the State Department (Bremer, 2006, p.40)

[93] Slevin, (2003), writing for *The Washington Post*, also draws attention to the position adopted by Washington, quoting a 'senior U.S. official' who states: "'De-Baathification will necessarily entail some inefficiency in the running of government. That's a price we are willing to pay to be sure that we extirpate Baathism from Iraq's society'".

1.1 Criticisms of de-Ba'athification

Within months of the de-Ba'athification order being signed into law multiple criticisms of the policy and its effects began to surface within the print news media. A logical theme emerged within US news sources. For example, Mathews (2003) writing in *The Washington Post* argued that the order firstly tarnished any Sunni with the same brush as "Ba'athist's" or "Saddam loyalists". Steele (2003), writing in *The Guardian*, argued that this left the formerly dominant Sunni population disenfranchised from the socio-political reconstruction of Iraq and feeling a sense of "collective punishment [or] conviction without any charge". The policy was also widely criticised for threatening the structure of the Iraqi state by removing doctors, educators and other skilled professionals needed in the reconstruction of the country, from their positions, even if, as was the case with many members of the Ba'ath Party, they had only joined in order to be able to work and were not staunch supporters of the regime (Asquith , 2003, Lamb, 2003, Allen-Mills, 2003). However, perhaps the most damning critique of the policy in the mainstream news media was that its indiscriminate application meant that thousands of Sunni civilians had been turned into new enemies of the occupation within moments of Bremer's hand signing the order. Freidman (2003a) notes in *The New York Times* that "Iraq is full of angry men". Whitaker (2003) in *The Guardian* argued that this was an issue that was magnified when combined with Bremer's second order to disband the Iraqi Army. Critiques of this nature continue within the media portrayal of de-Ba'athification (see also: Allawi, 2003, Ignatius, 2003b, Ignatius, 2003d, Sachs, 2003, McCarthy, 2004a), up to and including the point at which the policy began to be relaxed (to be discussed below).

In a similar vein to the media's critique, academic analysis of the de-Ba'athification of Iraqi society takes the stance that the occupation of Iraq was a flawed endeavour before military operations had begun. Diamond (2004) argues that this was due to a lack of appreciation for how the Iraqis themselves would view their "liberators" (see also: Dodge, 2005). Although many Iraqis were pleased to be delivered from the brutal regime of Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath Party, they were equally suspicious of the underlying motives of the Anglo-American alliance that led the operation. In a country that historically has been divided along ethnic and

sectarian lines by imperial intervention at the fall of the Ottoman Empire, [94] those beneficiaries of imperial interference at that time, the Sunni, were now faced with the prospect of losing their control of the Iraqi state. Despite the Ba'ath regime's brutality, the Sunni recognised that its almost complete domination of the Ba'ath Party, afforded them great privileges within the Iraqi state in comparison to their counterparts, particularly the Shi'a who made up the majority of the population. As a result, the Sunni feared that the regime's decapitation could have the potential to not only remove them entirely from the socio-political reform of the Iraqi state, but could lead to violent reprisals against them by the multitude of ethnic groups that had suffered under Ba'ath Party rule (Diamond, 2004, 2005b). These fears quickly appeared to be justified when the order to de-Ba'athify Iraqi society was the very first issued by the CPA on assuming control of Iraq from the much maligned Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA). [95] The de-Ba'athification campaign was far too broad, excluding the vast majority of former Party members from significant positions within the difficult tasks of rebuilding, and then in maintaining and developing the Iraqi state in the aftermath of regime change and foreign occupation (Stover et al, 2005, Cobb, 2007, O'Leary, 2009). As Dodge (2005) suggests, the objectives of complete regime change, combined with the creation of a new, modern ruling elite, were incompatible with the necessity to restore order, public services and amenities, when those with the expertise to achieve this were being excluded from the process.

Hendrikson and Tucker (2005) argue that de-Ba'athification served not only to hinder the rebuilding process but also to antagonise the Sunni population. Diamond (2004) argues that as a result, the Sunni felt they were being collectively punished for the crimes committed against Iraqi civilians by Party members who belonged to the upper echelons of the Ba'ath Party, regardless of whether or not they were actively involved in the Party's dark history. As a result, many Sunni civilians who did not initially join the insurgency and who, as Hashim (2006:18) argues, were waiting to see if the Coalition would prove to be liberators or occupiers, were turned against the Coalition by "the mindset and policies of the Bush Administration and occupation officials towards [the Sunni community]". Hashim argues that

---

[94] Discussed in detail throughout Chapter 1.

[95] ORHA was set up in January 2003 under the leadership of retired General Jay Garner, with the remit to ensure law and order in the aftermath of regime change, restore basic amenities and to begin the long and arduous process of putting Iraq back together socially, politically and economically (Hashim, 2006). ORHA failed in each of these tasks and was replaced by the CPA by the 16th May 2003, the day Paul Bremer issued his first order; the de-Ba'athification of Iraq.

for the most part the Sunni had initially determined that they would "wait and see" what Coalition policy in occupied Iraq would be.[96] Once it became clear that these policies would be less than beneficial to their aspirations,[97] especially in the wake of years of socio-political dominance being removed in an instant, they felt compelled to take up arms against the occupation.

O'Hanlon (2004) provides further support for Hashim's argument, making the case that the mismanagement and poor decision making of administrators in Iraq and Washington, led to "fence sitters" turning to armed insurrection, in frustration at their circumstances and the volatile security situation.[98] Pfiffner (2010), Hashim (2009) and Zunes (2007) agree, arguing that the de-Ba'athification order, combined with the decision to disband the Iraqi Army and security services (to be discussed below in section 2), alienated the Sunni population primarily effected by the order, who were no longer able to support themselves or their families let alone make a contribution to the new Iraqi state. The decision served to undermine the existing state infrastructure, which had previously been largely governed by the Sunnis, making it impossible to ensure security or a semblance of normality and creating an army of disaffected, angry, armed and trained men. Hoy, Jr. (2004:13) agrees that both the decisions to de-Ba'athify Iraqi society and to disband the Iraqi Army were "incompatible with reconstruction efforts", failing to illustrate to Iraqis that the Coalition had not entered Iraq to replace one dictator with another, but to bring a new era of freedom and prosperity to the country (see also: Stover et al, 2005). As the CIA's chief analyst in Baghdad said to Paul Bremer on hearing of the implementation of CPA Order no. 1: "Well, that's 30, 000 to 50, 000 pissed off Ba'athists you're driving underground", and on CPA Order no. 2 (disbanding the army), "That's another 350, 000 Iraqis you've pissed off, and they've got guns" (quoted by Hoy, Jr., 2010:9).

---

[96] With the exception of former regime diehards who would have fought the Coalition no matter what their policies were.

[97] A process that Hashim (2006, p280) refers to as 'Sunniphobia', an entrenched ideological and intellectual opposition to Sunni involvement in post-Saddam Iraq, an opposition that Hashim argues extends from the top of the US administration, to be strategically and tactically operationalised on the ground in Iraq, with dire consequences.

[98] A situation that was itself directly linked to the decisions to disband the Iraqi army and security services and the conclusion that the administration of the invasion and occupation of Iraq could be conducted by force levels that were significantly less than those recommended by military advisors prior to the war (Phillips, 2006).

This anger is unsurprising, given that, according to Pfinner (2010), CIA advice regarding the post-invasion landscape in Iraq was completely ignored by US officials in Washington and Baghdad. For example, the CIA warned officials that after years of Sunni dominance over and oppression of Iraq's diverse ethnic groups, there was a significant chance that the tensions present in the country would boil over into an ethnic and political fight for power in the vacuum left by Saddam's downfall. Citing former chief of the CIA Directorate of Intelligence Richard Kerr to support his argument, Pfinner states that if CIA assessments of the post-invasion situation in Iraq had been heeded, then the decision to approach de-Ba'athification with such broad-brush strokes would not have been taken. Dobbins (2007) agrees, citing former CIA Director George Tenet's corroborated claims that the Agency had warned the Bush Administration of the difficulties that an occupied Iraq would pose, arguing that the problem in Iraq at this stage, was not the provision of flawed intelligence, but the flawed application of the intelligence provided. [99] This was in part due to the Bush Administration's reliance upon the Iraqi exile Ahmed Chalabi and his Party, the Iraqi National Congress, for intelligence prior to the invasion of Iraq (Phillips, 2006). [100]

Ahmed Chalibi had been a prominent figure within American political circles since the mid-nineties and became an increasingly influential figure with regards to the Bush Administration's policy of regime change in Iraq. This was primarily because he had convinced US officials that he could provide them with the bastion of liberal democracy in the Middle East that the administration so craved, the "intelligence" and confident assurances he provided served to remove any lingering doubts over his legitimacy (Diamond, 2005a, Hashim, 2006, Phillips, 2006, Byman, 2008). As a result, Chalibi became a key figure in the early stages of the occupation of Iraq, wielding significant influence within the CPA and pushing for a wide-ranging purge of Ba'ath Party members from Iraqi civil society. The problems created by the initial application of the de-Ba'athification order were further compounded by the decision taken by Paul Bremer to turn over the leadership of the Iraqi de-Ba'athification committee to Ahmed Chalibi (Bremer, 2006a, Phillips, 2006), a problem that was noted in both the academic literature and media analyses of the conflict, which we will now turn to.

---

[99] Ricks (2006) in *The Washington Post* reported on the flawed application of intelligence in Iraq.
[100] Rieff (2003) writing for *The New York Times* was critical of the Coalition's reliance on Iraqi exiles.

Constable (2004b) writing in *The Washington Post*, describes Chalabi's ardent support for the de-Ba'athification process when quoting Chalibi's remarks to journalists who questioned the suffering of former Ba'athists effected by the order: "This party is a criminal party…it became an institution for control, repression and corruption" (see also: Sachs, 2003, McCarthy, 2004b, Hilton, 2004 and Wintour, 2007a). Whilst to some extent Chalibi's assertions are not inaccurate, this statement is indicative of the sweeping approach taken by the CPA towards the Ba'ath Party purges; refusing to acknowledge that many within the party were not ardent Ba'athists, but were forced to join through concerns for their safety or their responsibilities towards their families, the results of which have been discussed above. Had the CPA and US Government not relied so much upon the information and opinion of exiled Iraqi politicians both before and during the conflict, the impact of CPA Orders No. 1 and 2 may never have been felt, leading potentially to a far more stable security situation in which the country's long rebuilding campaign could begin. This is not to say that an armed resistance to the occupation would not have emerged, but the capabilities and intensity of this resistance would have been greatly limited, as they would have been stripped of the manpower, leadership and motivation that the decisions to de-Ba'athify Iraq and disband the military provided them.

However, as it was quickly becoming clear that the de-Ba'athification policy was doing far more harm to the country than good, the process began to be slowly scaled back by the CPA. This was a feature of both the media sample and academic analysis. For instance, both Wong (2004) and McCarthy (2004) in *The New York Times* and *The Guardian* respectively, report on the policy rollback that would allow the return to government positions of those "who were Baathists in name only" (Wong, 2004).[101] However, the scaling back of the process did not come without a defence of the original motivations behind the order from Paul Bremer. As McCarthy (Ibid) notes, Bremer's office released a statement that argued the policy itself will remain, but its implementation must be changed in order to prevent the indiscriminate purges carried out in its name. Bremer (2006a:42) himself acknowledges that the order "was not perfect".[102]

---

[101] This is a notion that academics, military and CIA advisors uphold should have been the case from the start (see for example, Diamond, 2004, Dodge, 2005, Hashim, 2006).

[102] This begs the question as to why such a drastic decision, which would have disastrous effects upon thousands of Iraqis, was taken if the order was not clearly thought through? Despite the understandable notion of removing those from government who had committed atrocities in the name of the Ba'ath Party, the far-

The mainstream media, in line with official statements, welcomed the decision to review and scale back the de-Ba'athification order in Spring 2004, with both Bremer and the Bush Administration publicly admitting to mistakes in its implementation at the time (see: Burns and Fisher, 2004, Constable, 2004c, Posner, 2004, Vick, 2004, Wright and Ricks, 2004, Oppel Jr, 2005). Additionally, three years later during a joint press conference held by Tony Blair and George W. Bush and reported extensively in the mainstream press, the leaders jointly admitted that the process took far longer than necessary to implement (Kessler and Fletcher, 2006, Sanger and Rutenberg, 2006, Baker, 2007a). This was due in part to Chalibi's influence within the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) and partly due to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's reluctant acceptance that the de-Ba'athification laws needed to be reconsidered, in the wake of recommendations stemming from the Iraq Study Group Report (2006),[103] as a part of his plans for national reconciliation. These plans were designed in part to appease Sunni insurgents however, he insisted that despite promises to review the laws, these came with no guarantees that they would be softened, further exacerbating existing discontent as reported by Howard (2006b) and Steele (2006b) in *The Guardian* (see also: *The Guardian*, May 22nd 2006 and Semple and Wong, 2006).

The remainder of the media reporting on the issue of de-Ba'athification in both UK and US news sources consistently criticised the order and its far-reaching implications. For example Wintour (2007b) writing in *The Guardian*, states that the orders to de'Ba'athify Iraqi society and disband the Iraqi military were "two critical errors". Helm (2006) writing in *The Daily Telegraph* argues that these two decisions "left a vacuum that allowed Iraqi insurgents to launch their own terror offensive". Norton-Taylor (2008) writing for *The Guardian*, quotes Lord Boyce, who is described as "Britain's most senior military advisor" as saying the de'Ba'athification order had been "the biggest mistake" of the occupation (see also: D' Ancona, 2004, *The Sunday Times* 10th October 2004 and 8th October 2006, Chehab, 2005, Zakaria, 2006, Chandraskeran, 2007a, Farrell, 2007a, Gordon and Zeleny, 2007). In addition

---

reaching nature of the order can be traced to Ahmed Chalibi's influence within the US government in the build-up to the invasion and in the foolhardy decision to hand responsibility for the administration of the order to Chalibi in November 2003, who extended the order beyond its original remit and slowed down the process by which former Ba'athists could appeal their removal from government positions (Diamond, 2005, Bremer, 2006a).

[103] Recommendation 27 advises Iraqi leaders to 're-integrate Ba'athists and Arab Nationalists' back into Iraqi society, excluding only leading figures within the former regime from this process, encouraging the 'return of qualified Iraqi professionals' (P. 45). This is arguably how the de-Ba'athification of Iraqi society should have orginally proceeded.

to this, CPA head Paul Bremer was heavily criticised for his lack of foresight in issuing the order and the impact the order had upon the fragile security situation in the country. For instance, Ricks (2006) in *The Washington Post*, criticised Bremer for creating "a new class of disenfranchised, threatened leaders", which was largely responsible for the widespread insurgency. Chandraskeran (2007b) in the same newspaper, uses quotes from US congressman Christopher Shays, to argue that Bremer's order to de'Ba'athify Iraq were decisions that "we're still paying for today" noting that if the decision had not been taken, then Iraq would be in a better and "very different place today" (see also: Gates, 2007, Goldenberg, 2007a, Goldenberg, 2007b, Kingstone, 2007).

1.2 Summary

US and UK news sources, in conjunction with existing official accounts of the conflict, argued that the de-Ba'athification of Iraq was a key error in the administration of the occupation. Likewise, former CPA head Paul Bremer was labelled as the primary reason that Iraq had slipped into a deadly counter-insurgency war, due to this decision. This narrative (in conjunction with the decision to disband the army and to invade with insufficient troops, to be discussed in sections 2 and 3 below) was used to explain the prolonged occupation of the country. The narrative also served the wider purpose of seemingly presenting a consistent critique within the mainstream media of the conflict. However, the criticisms presented within the mainstream media only reinforced those statements made by government and military officials. In short, no criticism had been made that did not already exist as a dominant public discourse.

The order to de-Ba'athify Iraq displayed a distinct lack of understanding of the complexities of the Iraqi state by the United States and its allies. This mistake was exacerbated by their reliance on Iraqi exiles who had their own agendas. The order, although seemingly well intentioned, was ill-conceived and poorly operationalised and resulted, in conjunction with other key errors, in the descent of occupied Iraq into chaos and violence. This created a security vacuum that Coalition forces were unable to fill, serving as a contributing factor to the deployment of aggressive displays of coercive force used against Iraqi civilians by Coalition forces and their proxies, to be discussed in detail in chapter 6.

The media sample was supported by academic analysis of the conflict, with both agreeing that the order was doomed to failure from the outset due to its indiscriminate approach. This was in contrast to the confidence placed in the order by government officials in Washington and Baghdad, who felt the policy was essential to the establishment of a post-invasion socio-political structure in Iraq that made a clean break with the old regime. However, as it became clear to observers on the ground in Iraq and their counter-parts in Washington that more harm than good was being achieved by its implementation, Coalition and Government officials began to back-track on their whole-hearted support for its implementation, bringing their position in line with those adopted by the mass media and academic commentators.

This suggests that the change in Government position conforms to the conditions of the CNN effect model of media analysis: that the consistent critique voiced within the mainstream media served to influence the policy agenda in Iraq (Livingstone, 1997, Robinson, 2002). However, it is not applicable for two key reasons: firstly, officials in Iraq (and the CIA) realised that the policy was flawed both prior to and within months of its implementation, meaning that the media critique of the policy was not contributing anything new to its analysis. Therefore the media was not placing pressure upon US officials that was not already being exerted by a sizeable dissenting minority from within their own advisors. Secondly, the criticism of the faulty de-Ba'athification policy does not represent a major departure from the acceptable boundaries of legitimate discourse surrounding the critical analysis of the Iraq War. This is typified by the internal critique levelled against the policy by regime officials. With this in mind, the analysis of the media's response to the de-Ba'athification of Iraqi society can be examined in a similar manner to that of the media's depiction of foreign fighters and ethnic divisions in Iraq. This is to say that the media critique remained within acceptable boundaries of debate and thus served to manufacture public consent to existing debates (Herman and Chomsky, 1988, Herman, 2000, Chomsky, 2002).

This deception is also evident prior to the invasion of Iraq. Bonn (2010) argues the conflict was legitimised by the depiction of Iraq as a global evil that presented a major threat to international security and the security of the American public. He argues that political figures, in conjunction with the mainstream media, constructed public discourse and marginalized alternative arguments (see also: Altheide, 2006). As Gerbner (1969) suggests, the immersion of the vast majority of the viewing public within mediated constructions of social reality, make it extremely difficult to construct an accurate, alternative version to that

represented by political leaders. Moving forward we will now consider the media's representation of the decision to disband the Iraqi Army.

2. Disbanding the Iraqi Army

The decision to disband the Iraqi Army and to build a new army from the bottom up, represents one of the most controversial orders issued by the CPA during its tenure in Iraq for three key reasons: firstly, because one of the prerequisites of any occupying force is to ensure the security and safety, as far as is reasonably possible, of the indigenous population. This was something that, given the small size of the invading army, could not be guaranteed by their presence alone. Secondly (and directly linked to this first point), because many of the former members of the Iraqi military ended up joining the Iraqi insurgency as a result of the loss of respect, income and purpose that their role in the army provided. Finally, because the order to disband the army flew in the face of advice issued to the US Government and Paul Bremer by several notable voices including; high-ranking US Army officers, [104] The Transition to Democracy in Iraq Report (2002) penned by the Democratic Principles Working Group[105] and the Future of Iraq Projects Defence Policy and Institutions Report (2002),[106] commissioned prior to the invasion by the US government.[107] All anticipated the power vacuum that would follow in the wake of regime change in conjunction with the insufficient numbers of Coalition forces deployed to occupy Iraq (Diamond, 2005a). As al-Istrabadi suggests (cited in Phillips, 2006, p. 152), given the circumstances: "I don't understand why

---

[104] Including Lt. General Jay Garner, who headed ORHA before his replacement by Paul Bremer and the CPA (Fella, 2004, Woodward, 2007), who was arguably ignored due to the extremely negative appraisal of the role ORHA played in the early days of the occupation by US officials.

[105] Fully aware of the potential impact of relieving hundreds of thousands of heavily armed men of their jobs, the report suggests that the approach to demobilisation should be voluntary, offering former personnel the chance to leave, those who stayed would be offered re-training or the re-application of their skills to re-building Iraq, leading eventually to their contracts being taken over by the new government ministry in charge of re-building infrastructure. Finally, to ensure those that are requested to leave the service are adequately compensated with a sufficient pension scheme, as like those subject to the de-Ba'athification order, many personnel within the army were guilty of no crimes against the Iraqi people and should have been assessed appropriately to accurately determine their roles (Dawisha, 2004).

[106] Who suggested gradually halving the size of Iraq's armed forces, whilst ensuring that those who had been demobilised had sufficient means to support themselves and their families, were able to re-train or to apply existing skills in other areas of Iraq and to have a vested interest in the rebuilding of the country.

[107] *The Washington Post*, 27th November 2003, also picked up on this, noting that the Future of Iraq Project 'envisioned a key role for reformed elements of the Iraqi Army and warned that disbanding the armed forces would create a power vacuum', whilst Carlsen (2004), also in *The Washington Post*, quoted a report from The Army War College that stated that disbanding the Iraqi Army "led to the destruction of one of the only forces of unity within the society" (see also: Teather, 2003, writing in *The Guardian*).

111

you take 400,000 men who were highly armed and trained, and turn them into your enemies".[108]

However, these warnings were ignored by both the US Government and CPA officials, resulting in Paul Bremer issuing CPA Order No. 2 "Dissolution of Entities" on the 23rd May 2003, as a means of demonstrating to the Iraqi people (primarily the formerly oppressed majority Shi'a and Kurds) that there had been real change in Iraq as a result of the Coalition's removal of the Ba'ath regime (Byman, 2008). This wide-ranging order dissolved the entire Army, not just loyal Saddamists or commanders within Saddam's inner circle. This exacerbated the destabilizing impact of CPA Order No. 1 and significantly contributed to the disastrous security situation that was to beset post-invasion Iraq (Clarke, 2004, Sharp, 2005, Cobb, 2007, Byman, 2008). The following discussion will review the media and academic response to CPA Order No. 2, in order to assess its prominence and treatment within the mainstream media and to consider their similarity to academic understandings of its impact upon the occupation. However, due to a significant proportion of the media critique of CPA Order No. 2 making similar criticisms to those aimed at Bremer's decision to de-Ba'athify Iraqi society (as both orders disproportionately targeted and effected Sunni Iraqis, leading to many joining the insurgency and significantly destabilising the fragile security situation), the following discussion is deliberately more concise, in order to avoid replicating arguments made against CPA Order No. 1

2.1 Criticisms of the decision to disband the Iraqi Army

The media sample related to CPA Order No. 2 generated a series of reports that were consistently critical of the decision taken by Bremer to disband the Iraqi Army. Only one article from the sample supported Bremer's decision and his role as US Ambassador to Iraq and head of the CPA. Reporting only one month into his tenure, *The Washington Post* (June 1st 2003), praised the decisions Bremer had taken thus far, including the decision to disband the Iraqi Army, referring to him as "the no nonsense diplomat" who had made "clear to the country that for now he [was] in charge". The comments reflect the positive mood within the Bush Administration regarding the development of post-invasion state infrastructure and security personnel in the wake of the defeat of Saddam's regime. For example, Donald

[108] Member of the Democratic Principles Working Group.

Rumsfeld highlights the "successes" of the occupation thus far in a Department of Defence press conference in October 2003, emphasising in particular the increasingly successful development of the new Iraqi Army, stating that at that point some 100, 000 Iraqis were "currently under arms...providing for the security of the Iraqi people".

However, as noted, the remainder of the reports accurately considered the decision to disband the Iraqi Army to be a "monumental blunder" (Cook, 2005) or a "grotesque error" (Gray, 2007, see also: Whitaker, 2003, Thomas and Beckel, 2005, Kornblut, 2006, Chandrasekaran, 2007b). Krugman (2004) writing in *The New York Times* argues that the decision was part of "a chain of blunders" that compromised post-war security. This was on the grounds that, in a similar vein to CPA Order No. 1, overnight this had created thousands of new enemies that would join the insurgency, led by the embittered Sunni population (Borger, 2003, Flint, 2003, Jenkins, 2003, Woollacott, 2004, Gordon, 2008), which Coalition forces were ill-equipped to combat due to insufficient troop numbers required to carry out a dual occupation and counter-insurgency mission (Knickmeyer, 2005). Maddox (2004) writing in *The Times* makes a similar argument, stating that the decision "left 400,000 men at home, with their weapons...with a grievance against the coalition". She argues that at least some of these will have joined the insurgency (see also: Maddox, 2006). In addition to this, Steele (2004) writing in *The Guardian,* argued that the decision placed the final nail in the coffin of the Iraqi state: if the de-Ba'athification order had dismantled the civilian side of the Iraqi state, disbanding the army achieved the same goal with the security infrastructure (see also: Steele, 2005). However, Philps (2005) writing in *The Daily Telegraph* argued that in contrast to the de-Ba'athification order, these new enemies were already armed, highly trained military personnel, who knew where the Iraqi military housed ammunition reserves across the country, further contributing to the pervasive sense of insecurity sweeping across Iraq in the wake of the invasion.

Articles from this period also argued that the growing anger and resentment amongst Iraqi Sunni's towards the US-led occupation, was further exacerbated as they became increasingly marginalized within the new, free, Iraq (see: Ignatius, 2003c, Constable, 2004a, Jenkins, 2004, Keegan, 2004, Shawcross, 2004, Freedman, 2005). However, Filkins and Sengupta writing in *The New York Times*, argue that some of the anger felt by these decisions could still have been avoided. This would have been possible if on dismissing the entire Iraqi Army, former soldiers and officers had been provided with more significant pension

payments than the insignificant amount granted by the CPA, whilst they were forced into unemployment (see also: Cavendish, 2007). Gordon (2004) in the same newspaper argued that at the very least, significant severance payments should have been made available so that they could still provide for their families. McCarthy (2003) writing in *The Guardian* agrees with this position. Quoting Paul Bremer's predecessor General Jay Garner, McCarthy argues that the decision to disband the army had left Iraqis "suffering because the head of the household's out of work". McCarthy argues that this also left the rebuilding process massively under-resourced. As Reiff (2003) also in *The New York Times* notes, there are 6 members of an average-sized Iraqi family, meaning that around 10% of the Iraqi population of some 23 million, were detrimentally effected by the CPA's first two orders. If only a small minority of this number were to take up arms, they would pose a significant threat to Coalition forces and the much-vaunted transition to democracy in Iraq. Hashim (2006:98) agrees with the media's assessment, arguing that this was eventually the case, as the order to disband the army became less about money and more a matter of "honour and pride" around the capacity of Iraqi men to provide for their families.

The mainstream media's analysis of the decision to disband the Army also criticised the new Iraqi Army in which Rumsfeld had displayed such faith. This critique suggested that the new recruits lacked the required military and security training to effectively replace the undermanned Coalition forces. As the security situation quickly deteriorated, it became increasingly clear to administrators on the ground and the mass media that the decision to disband the army was a grievous error in need of reversal, as reported by Freidman (2003b) in *The New York Times* (see also: Borger, 2003, The Observer, 7th September 2003, Wong, 2005).[109] Shanker and Schmitt (2003) in the same newspaper argue that it became clear that US officials in Iraq were beginning to consider recalling former Iraqi soldiers in order to supplement the new Iraqi Army[110] that Coalition forces were training. The context of this decision is even more interesting given that it was argued within the press that the new recruits were themselves ill-equipped to deal with an intense counter-insurgency campaign

---

[109] In a similar vein to reporting of the de-Ba'athification order McElroy (2008) writing in The Daily Telegraph blames Paul Bremer for the decision to disband the Iraqi Army and the resulting intensification of the insurgency.

[110] Lamb (2003), reporting in *The Sunday Times*, discussed the British response to this, noting that British forces in the South had ignored the order to disband the Iraqi Army, instead, in stark contrast to the US, employing former Iraqi soldiers to guard major public buildings and facilities. This is an indication of the disagreements and concerns, which many in Iraq had with CPA Order No. 2 and its likely effects.

(*The New York Times*, 11th April 2004). Similarly Pincus (2006a) writing in *The Washington Post* argued that the new Iraqi Army was also unreliable and ill disciplined (see also: Pincus, 2006b). Tavernise and Burns (2005) in *The New York Times*, argued that Iraqi recruits had been rushed through their hastily constructed training programmes, leaving Coalition forces believing that it would take years before the new army would be effective without Coalition supervision. Cohen (2006) writing in the same newspaper argues that the new army was heavy handed and discriminatory in its approach as it was primarily constructed of Shi'a Iraqis.

This latter point completes the final major press critique of the decision to disband the Iraqi Army: if the plan in the aftermath of the invasion was to build a new Iraqi Army from scratch, this was short-sighted, especially when considered in conjunction with the decision to occupy the country with too few troops. Likewise, even if planning for the post-invasion landscape expected the Iraqi state to remain largely intact in order to the pave the way for a smooth transition between the old and new regimes. CPA Orders No. 1 and 2 completely dismantled the existing state structure, an outcome that must have been anticipated and, therefore, directly contradicts the original post-invasion strategy.[111] With the benefit of hindsight, the mainstream media was extremely critical of the decision to disband the Iraqi Army throughout the military occupation, adopting a similar line of critique to the media reporting of the order to de-Ba'athify Iraqi society; that the two orders had a disastrous impact upon post-invasion security and the social marginalization and political disenfranchisement of Iraqi Sunnis, arguments that find support within the academic literature.[112]

Very little of the academic literature defends the order to dissolve the Iraqi Army. Indeed, only Paul Bremer in his account of his time as the head of the CPA and during press interviews on his return, suggest that the decision was prudent. Bremer (2006a, 2006b, 2007a) argues that the Iraqi Army had dissolved itself by the time the CPA had taken office in Iraq, after being given a push towards the exit by the onslaught of the shock and awe

---

[111] Academic analysis has argued that this is indicative of the competitiveness, lack of communication and disagreements between the US Departments of State and Defence during the build-up to the invasion (Diamond 2005a, Phillips, 2006 and Woodward, 2007

[112] Yeoman (2007) in *The Times* argues, based on comments by General Sir Mike Jackson, that the decision to turn over control of post-war Iraq to the Defence Dept from the Dept of State was a catastrophic error, which led to any and all pre-war planning being wasted (see also: Sullivan, 2005).

tactics of the US-led invasion (see also: Byman, 2008). Bremer argues that the decision to make this official and to form a new Iraqi Army was a matter of course given the circumstances. However, the decision to disband the army had been taken prior to the invasion and occupation by politicians within the US government, including Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz and Under Secretary of Defence Douglas Feith (Diamond, 2005a, Bremer, 2006a, Phillips, 2006, Woodward, 2007).[113] This means that even if the Iraqi Army had not dissolved itself, in all likelihood the order would still have been issued, in adherence to the logic applied to the order to de-Ba'athify Iraqi society: the new Iraq must represent a clean break from the old in order for it to be successful. The motivation for the dissolution of the army stemmed from the belief that the Iraqi people would no longer tolerate an army that had consistently abused them in order for Saddam to maintain his hold on power (Bremer, 2006a). O'Leary (2009) agrees with Bremer's assessment, arguing that it was essential to disband an army that had been responsible for the genocide of its own people for a unified Iraq to emerge. O'Leary argues that it was not the decision to disband the army that was the problem, but the mismanagement of the demobilization process, which lead to numerous disgruntled former soldiers and officers turning against the Coalition. However, Hashim (2006) disagrees with this depiction of the perception of the Iraqi Army, arguing that despite the history of the Iraqi Army not being steeped in glory, the vast majority of Iraqis took great pride in their army, believing that it was Hussein who had distorted and manipulated the army's role (see also: Allawi, 2007). Hashim (2006:95-96) quotes from a former Iraqi officer who succinctly illustrates this point:

"...The Iraqi Army is one of the most important national pillars and a symbol of the homeland and the people's pride and dignity. Our army has always been like this...until...it was undermined...by the ruling regime...Cronyism and parochial, sectarian, ethnic and tribal discrimination became rampant."

Hashim's (Ibid) argument is supported by Diamond (2005a) and Ricks (2007), who agree that the Iraqi Army should have been retained as much as possible, to provide at a minimum public order duties and the responsibility for securing ammunition caches throughout Iraq.

---

[113] The issue of the Defence Departments failed planning and administration of Operation Iraqi Freedom, is also discussed within the mainstream media, see: The Guardian, 8th October 2003, Reid (2004), Freedman (2005), Weisman (2006), Yeoman (2007), Maddox (2008).

Diamond goes on to suggest that this would not have been difficult to achieve, despite Bremer's protestations that the army had dissolved itself in the face of the US-led invasion. Diamond states that all soldiers and officers of the existing Iraqi Army should have been notified of their retention as soon as the regime had fallen. As Hashim (2006) and Phillips (2006) note, many of the existing army expected to play a prominent role in rebuilding their country and would have been willing and able to do so. After receiving notification, those soldiers and officers who responded, could have been vetted to ensure that they were not Saddam loyalists or those who had committed heinous crimes against the Iraqi people.[114] After this had been established, both Hashim and Phillips argued that they could have been quickly re-admitted into the Iraqi Army, or processed to receive continuing wages whilst co-opted into civilian positions within the rebuilding process (see also: Dawisha, 2004).

With these arguments in mind, it is clear that the US government and the CPA held within their grasp the power to dictate the immediate post-invasion landscape of Iraq; the Iraqi Army had the potential to be a force for unity to which the Iraqi people could rally behind as the country was rebuilt with the help of the Coalition, or, as was the case, it could have been a growing source of opposition to the US-led Coalition and its ambitions. Ferguson (2008) agrees with this assessment, arguing that more than any other error in the administration of the occupation of Iraq, the decision to disband the Iraqi military influenced the formation and structure of the insurgency. As Phillips (2006:153) reflects in reference to the CPA's first two orders:

> "The Bush Administration had committed one of the greatest errors in the history of US warfare: it unnecessarily increased the ranks of its enemies. Embittered Arab Sunnis, who had dominated the military establishment, would re-emerge to lead the insurgency."

---

[114] This is admittedly a complicated process. However, the violent outcome of not having gone through this process suggests that the effort may well have been worthwhile. It is worth noting, however, that the retention of many within the Iraqi Army is not seen as a fix-all solution to Iraq's problems, undoubtedly there would have remained significant numbers of operational insurgents, however, the problem would have been somewhat alleviated by two key factors occurring as a result of not disbanding the army: Firstly, that vast numbers of disgruntled, armed and trained men, with knowledge of and access to weapons caches, would not have joined the insurgency and secondly, many of those that would have joined the insurgency would now be supporting the Coalition and the burgeoning Iraqi state by providing additional security forces, as well as offering intelligence to Coalition forces, the absence of which proved to be a significant problem in itself (Byman, 2008).

The academic literature then, considers the result of CPA Order No. 2 in the same light as that discussed within the mass media: as creating thousands of unnecessary enemies who significantly contributed to the pervasive violence that engulfed the country in the wake of the Coalition invasion. However, there is greater analytical sophistication within the academic literature that requires discussion here. For example, the nature of the Sunni insurgency was greatly enhanced by the dismissal of the Iraqi Army. Many of the now disgruntled former officers[115] and recruits, felt the only way they could make their collective political voice heard was through the pursuance of violent political statements against those who they had come to view as their oppressors. This is clearly a problem for an occupying force, as they are left defending themselves instead of focusing on rebuilding essential state infrastructure and reforming its socio-political organization (Diamond, 2005b). As Eisenstadt and White (2005) argue, the insurgency provided those inclined amongst the disenfranchised Sunni, with a powerful tool with which to influence Iraq's future (see also: Woodward, 2007, Byman, 2008). In addition, the lack of a sizeable, indigenous security force, with the legitimacy to police its own turf, combined with the absence of sufficient Coalition forces to provide security for the country, meant that Iraq's borders were left almost entirely unguarded. As a result, foreign fighters sympathetic to Al Qaeda's goals in Iraq were able to enter into the country, further disrupting the occupation and Iraqi politicians. These politicians themselves were increasingly viewed as American puppets by both the insurgency and the foreign fighters. Dodge (2005) argues that this was a legacy of the US's reliance on exiles to fill government posts (see also: Diamond, 2005b, Hashim, 2006, Woodward, 2007). One unifying aspect of the order to disband the Iraqi Army was that indigenous insurgents and foreign fighters began to find common cause against the occupation, forming short and long-term alliances, which provided greater strength to the insurgency through their unity.[116] This intensified the frequency and destructivity of the insurgent violence throughout Iraq.

The instability, violence and insecurity that followed as a result of the numerous intersecting mistakes, meant that within months of issuing the order to dissolve the army, the Coalition was faced with the need to recall former soldiers in order to plug the security gap created by

---

[115] Who were able to provide leadership to the initially disparate insurgency.
[116] This was a situation that would only begin to be resolved once the US troop surge utilised in conjunction with the gradual re-integration of Sunni Iraqis into Iraq's redevelopment, initiated by General Pertraeus, gave the Sunni tribes reason to break their ties with the foreign fighters, as they saw the chance for their socio-political marginalization to be reversed (Kilcullen, 2009).

policy (Bremer, 2006a, Hashim, 2006). This had left the Coalition and US administrators in a quagmire of their own making, with the recalled Iraqi military managing an unstable and deteriorating security situation, instead of maintaining security and building for the future in the aftermath of regime change.

2.2 Summary

The similarities between the media reporting of CPA Orders No. 1 and 2 are clear; both orders are briefly glorified within the media sample as a positive step towards the rebuilding of the Iraqi state in a manner that broke with the abuses committed by its former rulers. However, within a very short space of time, as it became clear that progress was not being made, both in the rebuilding process and the security situation, the media highlighted the crucial error made in de-Ba'athifying Iraq and disbanding the military. Neither of these trends is surprising when considered in light of the manufacturing consent argument, as initial support for government policy within the mainstream media was always likely given the history of the Iraqi Army's abuses under Saddam Hussein.[117] Likewise, as the deteriorating security situation in conjunction with the looming prospect of a long occupation evolved, this represented a way to frame critical analysis of the conflict without deviating from acceptable public discourse. This point is exemplified by the fact that US government officials began to distance themselves from the decision making process that led to the order, seeking to portray Paul Bremer as a maverick who had taken the decision upon himself without consultation with Washington. This is illustrated by a statement made by President Bush who himself acknowledges that the decision was a monumental error:

> "The policy was to keep the army intact; didn't happen...I said [to Paul Bremer], "This is the policy, what happened?"" (Quoted by Rutenberg in The New York Times, 2nd September, 2007)[118]

---

[117] Two of the more prominent examples of these abuses are the deployment of chemical weapons against the Kurds in Halabjah (1988) and throughout the Iran – Iraq (Stansfield, 2008).

[118] This is a point that Bremer (2007b) vehemently contests, insisting that the decision had been approved by the Department of Defence and forwarded to the State Department by Donald Rumsfeld. Former head of ORHA, Lt. General Jay Garner (2006), one of the orders biggest critics, supports Bremer's assertions: "I don't fault Ambassador Bremer for that. I think that was another decree that he bought over in his briefcase...he was told to do that".

119

The media analysis of the decision to disband the Iraqi military thus falls outside of the conditions of the CNN effect model, as it has not provided a radical critical departure from discussions that were ongoing during the course of the occupation. Likewise, the critique was one that had already been accepted and initiated by the US government, in particular the Department of Defence, who Bremer argues had set him up as a scapegoat for any missteps in Iraq (Bremer, 2006a). The news media, although appearing critical in nature, actually served to reinforce the construction of events taking place within the Bush Administration. This framed the boundaries within which events could be understood and criticisms voiced.

Jackson (2006:17) argues that the construction of a particular understanding of the War on Terror is beneficial to the maintenance of dominant political discourse, serving to obscure the far "greater violence and suffering" caused by Coalition policies in Iraq. Kellner (2005) echoes this point, arguing that the media reporting of the Iraq War largely supported Bush Administration policies, which, as is argued here, is despite their appearance of dissent. None of the media sample reviewed suggested that due to the fragile security situation created in the wake of these orders that aggressive counter-insurgency policies were adopted to stabilise the situation.[119] This is despite evidence of state sanctioned violence being available in human rights reports released throughout the occupation. A significant critical media narrative along these lines would have showed that the mainstream press was unbiased in its account of the violence inherent to the occupation however, this was not forthcoming as shall be discussed in chapter five. The absence of a significant critical discourse within the mainstream media continues in the media's analysis of the number of troops used to secure Iraq during the occupation. This is a subject that we will now turn to.

3. Insufficient Coalition forces to provide security during the occupation

Although the decisions to disband the Iraqi Army and to enact a strict de-Ba'athification order virtually dismantled Iraq's existing state security infrastructure. The disastrous impacts that these decisions had upon the levels of post-invasion violence that beset Iraq could still have been minimised, if sufficient Coalition forces had been deployed to secure Iraq, as recommended to the US Department of Defence prior to the invasion. For example, General

---

[119] Blakeley (2009) argues that US foreign policy has a long history of the aggressive use of state sanctioned violence to meet its national security interests. For example, the Vietnam War's Phoenix Programme, the use of the Contra's in Nicaragua or US support for Pinochet's military coup in Chile.

Eric Shinseki, US Army Chief of Staff prior to the invasion of Iraq, argued that the occupation force would require several hundred thousand troops in order to ensure post-invasion security provisions were sufficient (O'Hanlon, 2004, Diamond, 2005a, Byman, 2008). Likewise, the US State Department's Future of Iraq Project, advised the Department of Defence of the likely problems the Coalition would encounter in Iraq and the need for sufficient troop levels to account for this, this too was dismissed by Rumsfeld (Hendrikson, 2005). Similarly, US Central Command (CENTCOM) had recommended that close to 500,000 troops would be required to effectively conduct security and stabilization operations. However, Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld argued this represented "everything that was wrong with the military", as it was "too heavy on troops, was logistically cumbersome" and perhaps most importantly, as Rumsfeld did not wish to be involved in a long-term occupation of Iraq, "would take far too long to execute" (Cobb, 2007:47). In conjunction with Rumsfeld 's vision of a reorganised structure and ideology for the US military, Dodge (2005) argues that Ahmed Chalibi and a host of Iraqi exiles played a significant role in solidifying Rumsfeld's approach to the conflict. As already noted, Chalibi was considered by the US government to be a top advisor on all matters Iraq. His strong adherence to the "decapitation thesis"[120] and his predictions that Coalition forces would be welcomed with open arms, meant that the US Administration were hearing exactly what they wanted to hear. Dodge (2005:29) notes that the result of this was "the need for major occupation forces or detailed planning…[being] negated". O'Leary (2009) extends this line of critique, arguing that Rumsfeld's approach to Iraq was akin to war-gaming. O'Leary contends that Rumsfeld showed complete disregard for Iraqi history, politics and its people, convinced by his own vision for the future of the US military, the influence of Iraqi exiles and the misguided analysis of the future of post-invasion Iraq by Washington policy makers (see also: Cockburn, 2007a, Kaplan, 2008).

In addition to members of the US Governments' own personnel recommending a large force size to occupy Iraq, a comprehensive study conducted by James Dobbins (2003) of the Rand Corporation, suggested that for the occupation of Iraq to prove successful, troop numbers would need to be in the region of twenty security officials to every thousand civilians; in Iraq this would mean a force size of between 400,000–500,000 personnel. The study, based on a

---

[120] The idea that if Saddam Hussein was removed from power, then the remainder of the regime would capitulate, leaving key state structures intact in order to pave the way for a smooth transition to a democratic Iraq.

review of successful military interventions in nations such as Bosnia and Kosovo, argued that the amount of resistance encountered in nation-building exercises, is dependent upon the amount of change intended. The programme in Iraq was extremely ambitious, yet, the US had decided to go ahead with only a moderate force size, when it would have been better served going in with a large force size, which deterred dissent and provided security and stability early on. This would have the affect of enabling the swift reduction of overall force requirements later in the occupation. In short: the higher the number of "stabilization troops", the lower the casualties suffered and inflicted. This approach would also have enabled the ambitious programme of reforms planned for Iraq to be made in a far more stable environment (Dobbins, 2003, 2006, Byman, 2008).

Dobbins passed a draft version of his report to Paul Bremer prior to the latter's departure to Iraq. This convinced Bremer that a far larger force size would be required than presently committed, in order to provide the diverse range of security operations that would be necessary, including; policing, border control, guarding ammunition dumps, maintaining prison facilities, training new police and military forces, counter-insurgency and generally providing an environment in which the massive rebuilding project could securely take place. Bremer passed the report onto Rumsfeld, who ignored its conclusions, as well as subsequent requests from Bremer for extra troops, a request that he also made to President Bush, resulting in an equally disinterested response (Dobbins, 2006, Bremer, 2006). Hendrickson and Tucker (2005) contend however, that the large force size recommended by many prior to the invasion and consistently throughout the occupation, was simply impossible for the US and their reluctant allies to implement, arguing that even if the Coalition invaded with the recommended troop levels, these levels would have proved impossible to sustain in the long-term, due to the current size of the US Army and Marine Corps. These comments raise two interesting points: firstly, if the US, the primary force entering Iraq, did not have sufficient troop reserves to sustain an extended, large-scale commitment, which many of the world's nations best equipped to support the deployment opposed (for example, France and Germany), the risk should not have been taken in the first place. Dobbins (2007) argues that continued containment of the regime would have been the most prudent course of action. Secondly, as Byman (2008) argues, if the Administration was adamant that it was going to invade Iraq, then post-invasion planning should have been conducted down to the finest detail, instead of being based on overly optimistic visions the transition to democracy and an entrenched ideological opposition to the future role of Sunni Iraqis (see also: Hashim, 2009).

Despite well-informed opinions to the contrary, Rumsfeld and the man in charge of planning the military operation, General Tommy Franks, concluded that a force size of less than 200, 000 personnel could and would conduct the invasion and occupation of Iraq (Clarke, 2004, Diamond, 2005a, Cobb, 2007). This number was certainly sufficient for the invasion phase of the operation, with Rumsfeld's emphasis on small, mobile forces, supplemented by advanced technology and tremendous airpower[121] expertly manifested in the form of the "shock and awe" tactics utilised during the invasion phase of the conflict. However the force size was not large enough to undertake the multiple security roles required of an occupying force. For example, directly after Saddam's resistance had been broken, the first priority for Coalition forces should have been the restoration of law and order, providing security for Iraqi civilians and certainty as to who was in control to those who might seek to take advantage of the chaotic post-war circumstances. This was not the case. Coalition forces lacked numbers and training in public order maintenance, meaning that the streets of Iraq were rife with looting, violence and organised crime. Coalition forces largely ignored such activities due to an absence of training and instruction in how to transition from a war footing to a policing role. This critical mismanagement of the earliest stages of the occupation was responsible for breeding a culture of violence, disrespect for Coalition forces and the rule of law and a sense of pervasive social Darwinism, as essential services and provisions were not provided (Dodge, 2005, Hashim, 2006). The contention that the force size was too small and poorly trained in the skills required for an extended occupation, alongside debates over the thinking behind the decision to proceed with such an under-prepared occupying force, formed the key critical discussions of the occupation of Iraq within the mainstream media, to which we will now turn.

---

[121] Sometimes referred to as the 'Rumsfeld Doctrine', this reliance on a smaller, more mobile military, ready to deploy anywhere in the world at any moment, also comprised an increased reliance on 'military outsourcing', or the use of Private Military Companies to fulfil roles traditionally taken on by military personnel. This initially uncontroversial policy of using civilian contractors for military duties played a major role in the occupation phase of the Iraq War, with estimates suggesting that up to 100, 000 contractors were operating in the country at any one time. The imprecise figures were a result of the US Department of Defence indicating to contractors that they were not required to be keep them abreast of the numbers of personnel deployed in the course of fulfilling their contracts, whilst these companies also regularly sub-contracted their agreements elsewhere if money could be made or saved in the process (Hossein-Zadeh, 2007, Scahill, 2007, Human Rights First, 2008). The use of Private Military Contractors and their impact in occupied Iraq will be discussed in depth in the second part of this thesis.

3.1 Criticisms of the insufficient number of Coalition forces

As with media discussions of the decisions to disband the Iraqi army and de-Ba'athify Iraqi society, the mainstream media were largely critical of the level of troops deployed to conduct the war in Iraq.[122] The key themes were centred on the recurring idea that troop levels were sufficient for a spectacular military victory during the invasion phase of the conflict but insufficient to sustain a successful long-term occupation of a country.

To this end, the print media sought to lay the blame for this error in judgement at the feet of Donald Rumsfeld early on, as it became clear that even the invasion phase of the operation was hampered by the small force size (see: Coman, 2003, DePalma, 2003, De Young, 2003, Harnden, 2003). It was also argued that Rumsfeld's emphasis on re-imagining US military ventures in the guise of light weight, technologically advanced forces, sweeping through the battle-field, had left US forces woefully unprepared for the challenges posed by a long-term occupation. Batiste (2006) articulates this point in *The Washington Post* stating, "previous planning identified the need for up to three times the troop strength...committed to remove the regime in Iraq and set the conditions for peace". It was argued that the indigenous population treated this with suspicion. For example, Von Drehle (2005) writing in *The Washington Post* argued that part of Rumsfeld's view of Iraq was to balance the resources sent to the occupation, with the "necessary investments in a transformed, high-tech military of the future". This emphasised the less-is-more approach which Rumsfeld sought to impress upon the US military as discussed at the outset of this chapter. However, the result of this was that the Coalition was left with too few troops to ensure post-invasion security, as Riddell (2003) writing in *The Times* suggested, "America knows how to win wars, but not how to win the peace" (see also: Burkeman, 2003, Slevin, 2003b, Sanger, 2003, Beeston and Philp, 2004, Ricks and Wright, 2004, *The Washington Post*, 10th December 2004, Riddell, 2005, Evans, 2006, Sullivan, 2006a). Similar critiques can be found elsewhere, for example, Sullivan (2005) writing in *The Sunday Times* argued the US "walked backwards into the task with insufficient resources". Swain (2005) in the same newspaper, argued that the number of troops on the ground in Iraq were "insufficient and inadequate".

---

[122] With the exception of one article in *The New York Times*, which glories in the burgeoning military victory with very little foresight, quoting former Defence Secretary William S. Cohen as claiming; 'By any standard, it is a remarkable military achievement' (Apple, Jr, 2003).

The critique of Rumsfeld's new military doctrine was perhaps most scathingly articulated by his successor as Secretary of Defence, Robert Gates, prior to taking up his new role. Gates statement that "there clearly were insufficient troops in Iraq after the initial invasion to establish control over the country", was reported in *The Daily Telegraph* (Harnden, 2006), *The Washington Post* (Milbank, 2006) and *The Times* (Reid, 2006). To this end, the critique presented within the sample contends that Coalition forces were unable to prevent the onset of the violent insurgency that gripped Iraq shortly after the defeat of the Iraqi military. This point is epitomised by Dionne Jr. (2003) writing for *The Washington Post*, who contrasts Bush's comments in a press conference in July 2003 in which he stated "bring 'em on" in response to concerns regarding the escalating violence engulfing Iraq, with the assertion that troop levels were not sufficient to guarantee their own security, let alone those of the Iraqi people.

Jehl and Filkins (2003) writing in *The New York Times,* draw on comments made by General Ricardo Sanchez, then the senior military commander in Iraq, to suggest the problems resulting from the small Coalition force size. These problems included: porous borders with Syria and Iran allowing foreign fighters to enter the country without resistance (see also: Gedye, 2004, MacAskill, 2004, McCarthy, 2004c), an increasing number of anti-Coalition insurgents alongside a developing ethno-sectarian civil war, the inability to hold a region once captured and the Coalition's limited capacity to secure munitions dumps throughout Iraq (see also: Hart-Sinnreich, 2004, Herbert, 2005, Sullivan, 2006b, Scott-Tyson, 2007b). However, whilst it is clear that the small numbers of troops used to occupy Iraq certainly exacerbated these problems, it is not a stand-alone issue.

For example, the ethnic divisions discussed previously, would not have been so pronounced had the CPA not issued the order to de-Ba'athify Iraqi civil society. Similarly, the penetration and effectiveness of foreign fighters in Iraq would have been significantly undermined, had CPA orders 1 and 2 not been issued in such a sweeping fashion.[123] This had the effect of pushing together Iraqi insurgents and foreign fighters, leading insurgents to share similar goals (all be it with differing starting points and potential outcomes) with the foreign fighters operating in Iraq; to remove Coalition forces from the country. Likewise, whilst these issues

---

[123] Hashim (2006:386) illustrates the impact of these orders on Sunni Iraqis. He quotes, among others, one Sunni Iraqi as stating: 'We feel like we don't exist or are put aside…I feel like the Americans after the occupation they supported only the Shiites and they ignore us on purpose. We are part of the Iraqi people [as well]'.

remained, if sufficient troops had originally been deployed, civil disorder and the insurgency could have been approached with far greater confidence, both from the point of view of Coalition forces, Iraqi civilians and governing officials. With this in mind, media reporting persisted with its critique of the levels of troops operating in Iraq, the media framing tending to depict the conflict as a misadventure that had been mismanaged from the start. However, pronouncements from prominent US Administration officials as to the need for a sustained surge of troops into Iraq was, unsurprisingly, met with renewed optimism and support within the press.

Shortly after the appointment of Robert Gates as Secretary of Defence, Republican Senator John McCain (2007) released an article in *The Washington Post* supporting a sustained troop surge, which, despite the "many mistakes" made since the invasion and occupation of the country, would provide Iraq with the best possible chance to turn things around. His final statement returns the framing of the conflict to one of national security, the essence of the original justification for the invasion, as a stark reminder to an increasingly dissatisfied public who were promised a swift end to hostilities. A follow-up article three days later produced an equally positive spin on the Administration's new approach to the conflict, depicting a Commander in Chief who was taking charge of the situation whilst others around him faltered, unashamedly framing the troop surge in a positive light with little critical analysis regarding the mismanagement of the conflict to date, or indeed the decision to invade in the first place (Abramowitz, Wright and Ricks 2007). UK framing of the troop surge, although less optimistic than their American counter-parts, still sought to spin the surge in a positive light, arguing that the surge represented Iraq's last chance before politicians in Washington began calling for troops to be withdrawn and for Iraq to be left to its likely demise (*The Daily Telegraph*, December 21st 2006, Farrell, 2007b, *The Times*, March 1st 2007, Tisdall, 2007). In sum, initial framing of the nature and future of the troop surge into Iraq was largely positive and uncritical, supporting the Government's position, all be it with a degree of humility drawn from years of failure in a conflict that had quickly spiralled out of control.

Academic analysis of the troop surge, in conjunction with General Patreaus' focus on a counter-insurgency doctrine that sought to invest in Iraqis a sense of involvement in their own protection with the knowledge that the Coalition were directly supporting their efforts, created a reconnection with the Sunni tribes of the Anbar Province. It was argued that Patreaus' re-integration of Coalition forces into Iraqi culture and his emphasis on

understanding the culture in which the Coalition were immersed, helped to encourage their rejection of what had become an increasingly manipulative and disrespectful relationship with Al Qaeda Iraq, going a long way towards gradually reducing the daily levels of violence (Kilcullen, 2005, Byman, 2008, Hashim, 2009, O'Leary, 2009).

This provided vindication for the Bush Administration and an opportunity for the media to continue their positive framing of the President's handling of the troop surge, whilst reiterating that the blame for the lack of troops should be laid at the feet of the now former Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld (Baker, 2007b, Bumiller, 2007 De Young and Baker, 2007, Partlow, 2007b, Sullivan, 2007, Yeoman, 2007, Mansoor, 2008). There is certainly a degree of truth in the criticism of the former Defence Secretary, but it seems politically expedient to blame a man no longer in office for the mistakes of the past, in a similar manner to the blame laid at the feet of Paul Bremer for decisions taken with the full support of Washington, after his term as Ambassador of Iraq had ended.

3.2 Summary

The media's reporting of the levels of troops operating in Iraq represented the most significant sustained criticism of the Bush Administration's handling of the conflict. This arguably conforms to Robinson's (2002) analysis of the CNN Effect (see also: Livingston, 1997), as media reporting of this aspect of the conflict consistently criticised the insufficient numbers of troops deployed, suggesting this was a serious flaw in the administrations planning of both the invasion and occupation. Once it became clear to the wider public through media reporting of the conflict, that significant aspects of Coalition policy was ineffective, the pressure to make changes to the Bush Administration's Iraq strategy grew. This left the Presidency of George W. Bush with two options: pull out of Iraq entirely and potentially see even greater instability spread throughout the resource rich Middle East, or bowing to four years of public pressure, send more troops. With the decision taken to send more troops, media reporting of the decision was positive, returning to a position of support for the Government, particularly once it became clear that the levels of violence were dropping significantly as a result. However, whilst this model can be applied to the analysis of media criticisms of the numbers of troops present in Iraq, due to the direct policy change that occurred in the wake of the consistent criticism, overall, reporting of the Iraq war largely supported the US Government's position.

Conclusion

The mainstream western media's analyses of the levels of violence in post-invasion Iraq were explained through the prism of the three primary narratives articulated within this thesis. The absence of a strong critical analysis of Coalition counter-insurgency strategy must therefore be questioned. This neglect is the focus of the following chapter, but based on the analyses of the mainstream media discussed thus far, we may conclude that the mainstream media helped to construct a dominant explanation of the violence inherent to occupied Iraq. This explanation supported official accounts and it may be argued, manufactured public consent to official discourse. Bonn (2010) articulates similar findings: that US news services dutifully reported the Bush Administration's framings of the Iraq War. This is a contention also supported by Kellner (2005:230) who, in reviewing media reporting of the Iraq War, characterises a mainstream media that was critical of the war itself, Bush's policy in Iraq and the deaths of Coalition troops, but rarely if ever directly contravening the US Government's construction of the conflict:

> "During the Bush-Cheney administration, the corporate media tended to be *lap dogs*, failing to investigate in any depth the scandals of Bush and Cheney…and the destructive consequences of their domestic and foreign policies". [Italics are author's own]

Kellner notes that even during the reporting of the torture of prisoners at Abu Ghraib and evidence that suggested Administration officials were responsible for relaxing their attitude towards human rights in Iraq, the media absolved the Administration from culpability for the abuses. This is an analysis supported by recent research by Collins *et al* (2011:16) who argue that US news in particular is "reluctant to depict state crimes in which the United States is involved", finding only one article of a sample of more than 1400, which suggested that Bush Administration officials may be culpable for the torture and abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib. However, as Hamm (2007) argues, the "sins of Abu Ghraib" were the direct responsibility of the Bush Administration from the top down, with officials on the ground in Iraq operationalising the mantra to "take the gloves off" when dealing with suspected insurgents. As Kellner (2005) notes, no Administration official has, or is ever likely to be prosecuted for the persistent, widespread abuse of prisoners in Iraq.

In summary the media constructed popular understandings of the conflict, which acted as a conduit through which people were not told what to think, but were told what to think about (Cohen, 1963, McCombs and Shaw, 1972, Altheide, 2006). As Barthes (1977) argued, there is no longer an untainted, objective understanding of reality, reality consistently changes and shifts based in no small part upon the construction of reality with which we are presented. This construction of reality is itself made intelligible by consistently evolving systems of meaning, which themselves are renegotiated for us through political agendas and representations of those agendas within the news media. This means that, in the absence of privileged access to expert knowledge, the only arguments that can be critically deconstructed are those that are presented to the public domain. Chapter five will express this argument through an analysis of the limited discussion of state crime in Iraq within the mainstream media. Whereas chapter six will confirm the prominence of state-sanctioned violence in occupied Iraq by Coalition and associated proxy forces. It is argued that persistent, unfettered examples of state crime took place throughout much of the occupation and were wilfully ignored by the mainstream media.

CHAPTER 5

The Representation of State Criminality in the Western Mainstream Print News Media's Analysis of the Iraq War

Introduction

The proceeding three chapters have presented evidence that the mainstream media disseminated a series of constructed narratives that explained the violence associated with post-invasion Iraq. It is the contention of this thesis that these explanations presented us with only a partial understanding of this violence. This is despite the fact that evidence of state criminality was widely available to the mainstream media from prominent sources such as the United Nations and human rights organisations, and that concerns over the issue of state criminality had been commensurately raised by prominent critical voices such as Naomi Klien (2007), Noam Chomsky (2004) and John Pilger (2010). Drawing on these alternative accounts, and especially the work of these three authors, the argument will be made that the mainstream media wilfully neglected to discuss in detail actions, which as defined within the criminological literature, constitute state criminality. In short it will be argued that the mainstream media's analysis of the counter-insurgency war in Iraq is an example of the hegemonic production of news in which dominant framings of the conflict, based on confirmed official accounts, marginalized alternative arguments that were readily available to media outlets.

The chapter starts by presenting an analysis of the mainstream media's limited, and highly selective engagement with the available evidence of state-sanctioned violence in occupied Iraq.[124] This account will then be contrasted with the alternative arguments presented by Klein, Pilger and Chomsky. These alternative accounts of the occupation, will then be contextualised within the state crime literature, in order to show that these alternative arguments do indeed constitute prima facie examples of state criminality as defined within the criminological literature.

---

[124] For an account of the way in which this evidence was gathered refer to the discussion presented chapter 2 on the methodological approach used in this thesis.

130

1. Conspicuous by its absence? The state crime story in the mainstream media

The media sample generated by numerous searches within the Lexis: Nexis database, was most notable for the seeming reluctance of the mainstream press to engage in a discussion of actions that constitute state criminality, this is particularly the case when considered in conjunction with the dominant explanations for Iraq's violent occupation discussed in previous chapters. In addition to this, those articles within the sample that do touch upon issues related to state crime, are generally depicted in one of two ways; either as one off incidents, which are not representative of a consistent pattern of behaviour, or as the actions of a limited number of individuals, who do not represent the wider military philosophy of their superiors or their colleagues operating in Iraq. Indeed, within the entire sample[125], only six articles, produced a consistent critique of the conflict aimed at the state itself, which made allegations of war crimes against state officials, as opposed to locating state criminality as the result of individuals making decisions outside of the influence of the state. However, before turning to those articles that did produce a consistent critique we will first analyse the dominant framing of these actions, which did not directly or specifically criticise government policy.

1.1 State crimes as isolated incidents or as unrepresentative of the wider nature and conduct of the occupation

The most prominent articles related to the first of these framings consider the torture and abuse of Baha Musa, an Iraqi hotel worker killed in custody by British soldiers. The eleven soldiers accused of carrying out the abuse were due to face court martial under charges of "inhumane treatment" of prisoners, a direct contravention of Article 147 of the fourth Geneva Convention (1949). Gibb (2005) writing in *The Times,* whilst acknowledging the comments of the solicitor prosecuting the case that the abuse took place over a period of several days by soldiers working in shifts, also questions whether the specific charges should have been brought at all. The main reason for their trial, according to the newspaper was due to the International Criminal Court's (ICC) insistence on a trial. However, instead of discussing the gravity of an international body pressing for charges of war crimes to be brought against British soldiers, the article questions the legitimacy, authority and jurisdiction of the ICC,

---

[125] The sample generated 107 articles of which 36 were relevant to activities that may be defined as state crime.

which in essence forced the hand of the British Army to initiate proceedings. The article cites American objections to the ICC's capacity to circumvent state sovereignty, as a notion that British authorities should explore. US objections to the ICC led them to sign bilateral agreements throughout the world, in order to prevent the extradition of American citizens to the ICC. (Gib, 2005, see also: Robins, 2005).

One year later, as the court martial began in earnest, Morris (2006a) writing in *The Guardian*, describes the key aspects of the trial to this point. He points out that prosecuting QC, Julian Bevan, stated quite clearly, that the reason the soldier's commanding officer, Colonel Jorge Mendonca, did not intervene to stop the abuse taking place was "because it was considered normal practice". This comment clearly suggests the widespread use of the abuse and torture of detainees in British military custody during the occupation of Iraq. Despite this, Morris chooses not to question this possibility, nor suggest that the abuses may be more widespread, choosing instead to emphasise the ineffectual leadership of Colonel Mendonca (see also: Morris, 2006b, Evans, 2008). This illustrates that the construction of the torture and abuse of prisoners in this instance, conforms to the "bad apples" thesis articulated above, a common theme in both the media and political explanations of abuse, as illustrated by Hamm (2007).[126]

Applying Hamm's conclusions to *The New York Times'* depiction of US run prisons, in the aftermath of Abu Ghraib, causes us to question the papers impartiality. Schmitt and Shanker (2005) writing for *The New York Times* sought to illustrate the US military's dedication to the humane treatment of detainees. Utilising quotes from US military figures operating in Iraq, including Major. General John D. Gardner, they argue that the refusal to hand-over detainees to Iraqi run prison facilities is an indication of this. This is despite massive over-crowding in Coalition run facilities. The article also reminds readers of the nature of the determined adversaries faced by Coalition forces. Using examples of detainees held in Coalition run prison facilities, they argue that these detainees are designated as either "dangerous" or "extremely dangerous" by Coalition forces. Due to these designations they argue that these

---

[126] The "bad Apples" thesis as discussed by Hamm (2007), argues that US officials sought blame the abuses by US military police at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq on rogue soldiers. US officials argued that their actions were unrepresentative of the wider conduct of US military forces and that the full force of military justice would be applied as a result. Hamm (Ibid) shows that the actions of US personnel at Abu Ghraib were in fact illustrative of the doctrinal use of aggressive interrogation techniques ordered by high-ranking officials within the US government.

detainees are not considered eligible for release despite the extreme over-crowding within the detention system. In more than 60% of cases, the article claims, parole boards were now declining to release detainees, due to the threat they represented, despite the pressures the system was under. Likewise, an article for which no author was cited, was printed one month previously in the same newspaper, condemning the alleged abuse of detainees by Iraqi Interior Ministry officials, stating that the US would not tolerate such abuses (*The New York Times,* 2005). These were the only two articles drawn from the US sample that mentioned torture or detainee abuse despite, as already noted, the relatively recent publication of the abuses of Abu Ghraib in May 2004. This is an unsurprising finding given the official sources often relied upon by mainstream news organisations. However, in light of the abuses at Abu Ghraib, we may be critical of the press' role in sustaining these abuses by accepting official explanations of events.[127] This is because little attempt was made by the mainstream media to uncover whether Abu Ghraib was an isolated incident or the tip of the iceberg. However, data from the Wikileaks Iraq War Logs (IWL) to be discussed in the following chapter, suggests that Abu Ghraib was not the work of "rogue soldiers", but illustrative of a consistent pattern of abuse throughout the occupation. Likewise these files also indicate that the practice of handing over detainees to Iraqi forces, despite knowledge of the abuse that they would be subjected to, was also commonplace amongst Coalition forces. Additionally, human rights reports from a variety of organisations, including the UN, documented from the beginning of the conflict, provided evidence that the torture and abuse of detainees, the presence of officially sanctioned militias, and reports of Coalition forces killing civilians, was commonplace. This means that the mainstream news media have no excuse for being unaware of the consistent resort to state criminality by Coalition forces in Iraq. Pilger (2010) contends that the mainstream news media is implicated in these abuses (discussed below), as a result of their apparent refusal to directly question the conduct of the counter-insurgency.

However, although the media's engagement with state criminality was limited, there were three notable reports regarding the murder of 24 civilians by a squad of US Marines in Haditha, North Western Iraq. Whilst neither the US or UK news sources sampled, attempted to defend the incidents given their indiscriminate nature and attempted cover-up in the aftermath, they were reported in noticeably different ways: Goldenberg and Pilkington (2006)

---

[127] As Hamm (2007) notes, Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld argued that the abuses were the work of 'a small number of US military [personnel]', whilst Vice-President Dick Cheney stated that they were the work of 'rogue soldiers' (p. 269), in essence the "bad apples" thesis (see also: Rumsfeld, 2004).

writing in the left leaning *Guardian* newspaper portrayed the killings as "the deadliest single incident of suspected war crimes in the Iraq conflict". They highlight the abuses of Abu Ghraib and several incidents involving the deaths of Iraqis under interrogation as additional examples, suggesting, but not confirming, that war crimes in Iraq were more widespread than had been previously reported (Goldenberg and Pilkington, 2006). A second article, by Goldenberg (2006a) in *The Guardian*, again does not attempt to make palatable the actions of the squad of Marines involved in the killings. Here, the Marines are described as being instructed by their Staff Sergeant, to go door to door, and to "shoot first, ask questions later". However, the article also notes that this was in response to a member of their squad having been killed shortly before the shooting, by a roadside bomb. But like the majority of the articles reviewed, at no point does the article take a critical position regarding the role of the state in the prosecution of the conflict, despite acknowledging that this is just the "gravest allegation of war crimes to date". Goldenberg (2006b), once again questioning the actions of Coalition forces in Iraq, draws attention to what she describes as the "fourth war crimes investigation" taking place against US forces. Here five US soldiers were accused of the rape and mass murder of an Iraqi family. However, once more, Goldenberg did not make the argument that these actions were the result of a consistent, doctrinal use of excessive force, during the counter-insurgency. In a similar vein to US reporting of this incident (to be discussed below), UK reporting reverted to the notion of a rogue squad of Marines, as opposed to questioning the general conduct of a counter-insurgency war, which was consistently claiming the lives of large numbers of civilians.[128] Goldenberg's careful critique of the crimes she discusses perhaps illustrates Pilger's (2010) notion of fear at work, in which Goldenberg is careful to present a critical analysis, which ultimately questions specific actions, but not the very legitimacy of state policy itself, in order to shield herself from the loss of access to official sources or wider marginalization within her profession.

Scott-Tyson (2006), writing for *The Washington Post*, likewise reverted to the "Bad Apples" thesis, routinely adopted within the mainstream media, to explain the illegitimate use of force by Coalition forces, in explaining the killings in Haditha. Sourcing its material from multiple politicians and military personnel, the paper depicted the events as a one off incident, which

---

[128] Oliver (2003), writing in *The Daily Telegraph*, presents a similar analysis, with regard to the shooting of an Iraqi family, by the name of al-Kawas. Noting that an Irish law firm, responsible for representing the families of the victims of the 'Bloody Sunday' shootings by British forces in Northern Ireland, was seeking to bring war crimes charges against British and American soldiers, accused of the killing of the Iraqi family.

did not reflect the wider conduct of US forces operating in Iraq. The article also discusses the seriousness with which the US government and military were treating the issue in order to prevent any future reoccurrence. This serves to reinforce the positive public image of US forces operating in Iraq, alongside the reputation of the US government. The final lines of the article quote Republican Congressman Duncan Hunter, stating "[No one should] tar the honourable service of…brave Americans in Iraq…with the reported actions of one squad, in one city, on one morning".

Although these six articles draw attention to certain incidents as war crimes, as has been discussed, these depictions consider such incidents as isolated events for which the state is not responsible. As Vernon (2004) argues in *The New York Times*, soldiers' accused of war crimes cannot lay their actions at the feet of their superiors, the responsibility is their own. This was also the most consistent portrayal of these crimes within mainstream news sources. This representation excuses the training soldiers receive to prepare them for war, excuses the counter-insurgency doctrine applied in Iraq (to be discussed in detail in the following two chapters), and excuses the neo-liberal "shock therapy" applied to the country as characterised by Naomi Klein (2007), which she argues is a primary explanation of the violence inherent to the occupation (Klein's analysis is discussed in more detail in section 2 of this chapter).

Additionally, the potential impact of the articles as examples of war crimes is muted by the limited engagement of the mainstream press in a critical discussion of the conduct of Coalition forces, guided by a counter-insurgency doctrine generated by state and military officials in Iraq. This is particularly the case when considered against the backdrop of the almost daily, ubiquitous reporting of ethno-sectarian violence, foreign fighters and administrative errors, as explanations for the violence consuming the country (see chapters 3, 4 and 5).

There is also an inconsistency in the reporting of war crimes most noticeably in the samples drawn from UK news sources. This inconsistency is illustrated most strikingly by the depiction of four articles of the alleged torture and killings of Iraqi detainees as a political inconvenience for Tony Blair (Ashley, 2004, Milne, 2004, Webster, 2004). These articles were not intended to focus upon the issue of torture and abuse as an example of widespread state criminality. However they serve as an example of the lack of attention paid to the issue of state criminality that these articles represented three of the four reports, generated by

conducting a Nexis search on UK news sources, for torture in Iraq. However, the final of the four articles generated by this search, does constitute a rare critical engagement with the notion of state crime during the conduct of the occupation.

Hilder (2005), writing in *The Times*, produces an article that poses serious questions regarding the Coalitions utilisation of proxy forces to conduct interrogations of Iraqi detainees, resulting in the abuse, torture, and murder of those in custody. Hilder criticises Coalition forces for not only recruiting these interrogators in the first place, but also "turning a blind eye" to their activities, in a conflict which allegedly sought to end the abuse of human rights in the country. It is the case that this one article illustrates the capacity of the mainstream media to critically engage with actions that constitute examples of state crime in a meaningful way. There is however a difference between presenting a consistent critical narrative and occasionally criticising government policy. Journalists are not criminologists and are therefore not going to directly discuss the concept of state crime but they do have the capacity to engage in a wide-ranging critique of the prosecution of the counter-insurgency war, enabling them to critically discuss acts that the criminological literature would most certainly define as state criminality. As Pilger's (2010) critique emphasises, the mainstream media all too often uncritically reported official versions of events without questioning their legitimacy, despite existing evidence to the contrary. This chapter is in agreement with Pilger's analysis, arguing that a consistent, far-reaching critique of the conduct of the counter-insurgency war in the mainstream media has been conspicuous by its marginalization.

1.2 The mainstream media's critique of military contractors

Interestingly, the most vociferous critiques voiced in the sample, targeted their anger at the questionable use of outsourcing of military operations to Private Military Contractors (PMCs), by the US government. This led to PMCs acting with impunity throughout the conflict, causing media sources to question the conduct of contractor personnel in Iraq. For example, Barnett (2003), writing in *The Observer*, questions the outsourcing of law and order functions to DynCorp, a PMC whose record prior to its deployment in Iraq, involved human trafficking, in the form of the buying and selling of prostitutes during its time conducting policing operations in Bosnia. Barnett suggests that part of the reason for DynCorp winning its security contract in Iraq was through political favour towards the company, within the

Bush Administration, due to its significant financial contributions to the Republican Party (see also: Traynor, 2003, Gray, 2004, Beaumont, 2008). Baldwin (2007), writing in *The Times*, and Jones (2007) writing for *The Guardian*, make a similar critique of the Bush Administration and the role of PMCs in Iraq. Both articles are critical of the actions of the military contractor Blackwater, in particular, characterising them as "trigger-happy mercenaries" (Baldwin, 2007). Or as Jones (2007) argues, as opportunists, profiting from "death and destruction". Both articles, in a similar vein to Barnett (2003), criticise the mass deployment of PMCs by the US government. The primary focus of this criticism is their violent behaviour towards Iraqi civilians, often resulting in their deaths, for which they are rarely held accountable.[129]

As the articles note, the result of the Bush Administration's outsourcing agenda, has seen the mass privatisation of warfare in Iraq. This has turned private warfare into a major industry that has seen turnovers for companies such as Blackwater, increase exponentially at the expense of accountability for, and regulation of their actions. This is consistent with Klein's (2007) contention, that the aetiology of the crimes associated with occupied Iraq is located in the neo-liberal re-structuring of the Iraqi economy. The upshot of which, is the subjugation of international law to the norms and values of the "free" market. This is evident in several articles that highlight the legal grey areas in which the increasing number of PMC personnel operate. These articles stress the difficulty of prosecuting contractor personnel, who are drawn from a multitude of country's, particularly when in conjunction with the protection from prosecution afforded to civilian contractors, both by US and Coalition law in Iraq. As a result of the size of the contractor force operational in Iraq, the articles argue that the backgrounds of contractor personnel often go unchecked by their employers and their actions on the ground unregulated. The articles conclude that they operate with impunity and are the primary cause of a significant number of civilian casualties as a result (McGrory, 2004, see also: Baldwin, 2007, Evans, 2008).

However, as noted from the outset of this discussion the articles discussed here (with regards to the role of military contractors) represent exceptional examples of the nature of the

---

[129] By contrast, Pincus (2008), writing in *The Washington Post*, lauds the fact that PMCs were only known to have been involved in one fatal shooting incident in Iraq, due to improved oversight over their activities in the previous 10 months. The article endorses military contractors as a useful addition to US forces, advocating their continued deployment in US-led conflicts, despite the atrocities associated with contractor personnel in the past.

reporting on the violence inherent to the Iraq War. These articles were too irregular to constitute a consistent framing of the conflict, in contrast to those discussed in the previous chapters of this thesis. Having established the way in which the mainstream print news media primarily represented acts amounting to state criminality in Iraq, we will now turn to the six articles drawn from the sample that *did* articulate a critical analysis of the Coalition's overarching counter-insurgency strategy in Iraq.

1.3 The mainstream media's critique of counter-insurgency warfare in Iraq

There were a limited number of articles that directly criticised both the conduct of the counter-insurgency war and the US and UK governments for authorising this conduct. For example, George Monbiot (2003), writing in *The Guardian*, criticises the hypocrisy of US forces for contemplating the use of banned neuro-chemical weapons, designed to induce fear, convulsions, hallucinations and pain, in their targets. Interestingly, Monbiot (2005) raises a more vociferous critique of the media's reporting of the Iraq War, in the mould of John Pilger's analysis of the conflict to be discussed shortly. Here Monbiot argues that the mainstream media has been responsible for minimizing US and UK war crimes in Iraq, suggesting that the reporting of civilian deaths in the conflict is inaccurate, both in terms of scale and the identification of those responsible. Although this is a timely critique, it is in every way an *exceptional article*, in that it criticises both the conduct of the conflict and its uncritical reporting by the mainstream media. It is the only article within the sample to make this critique.

In addition to Monbiot's critique, four articles written by Gibb (2004) in *The Times*, and Smith (2003), MacAskill (2004) and Milne (2008), all writing for *The Guardian*, suggest that the British government, in association with the US, are responsible for war crimes during the invasion and occupation. Smith, Gibb and MacAskill report on the actions of Greek Lawyers, who submitted a case to the International Criminal Court to charge Tony Blair and other British ministers, with war crimes offences. Each article notes that sufficient evidence existed to bring such charges but also that this eventuality was unlikely. Finally, Milne makes the case that the violence inherent to the occupation of Iraq, was the result of an occupational approach to counter-insurgency, which refused to accept opposition to foreign occupation. This approach resulted in an aggressive counter-insurgency strategy that strongly contributed to the estimated 600,000 civilian deaths calculated by the Lancet medical journal (2006).

Milne's article provides the closest articulation of Klein (2007) and Pilger's (2010) arguments drawn from the media sample. It also serves to emphasise the argument made by Pilger and illustrated in here that state criminality was confined to the metaphorical margins of the media's reporting of the conflict.[130] This is despite existing evidence to the contrary and the clear capacity to use this evidence as illustrated in the few articles that did choose to focus on the issue.

In summary, the mainstream media sampled did not concern itself with a wide-ranging critical discussion of state crime in Iraq, choosing instead to frame its ineffectual discourse (with a few notable exceptions), either as the actions of rogue individuals or groups who did not represent the wider actions of Coalition forces, or as a footnote within a wider debate. In addition to this, the sample of US media produced the lowest number of articles that directly discussed state crime, a finding that supports Collins *et al*'s (2011) research, which argues that US media are "reluctant" to openly discuss state crimes in which the US has participated and, as has been suggested by the findings of this research, will try to portray these activities as a rarity that is inconsistent with US military policy. Collins et al (Ibid) also suggest that UK media sources are more likely to discuss incidents of state crime no matter the culprit. This is a conclusion that is supported by this discussion, in which a significantly greater number of articles published in UK newspapers discussed aspects of state criminality, than those published in the US. However, the articles discussed in the sample generated in this research discussing aspects of state crime, were often only indirectly focused upon this as an issue and their frequency, in comparison to alternate explanations of post-invasion violence, was very limited. This conforms to Pilger's (2010) contention that war reporting within the mainstream media, often presents a diluted account of the lived reality of warfare.

These findings illustrate then, that from 2003 – 2009, reports focusing on state crime during the invasion and occupation of Iraq, were a marginal concern within the mainstream media, which placed far greater importance on the role of ethno-sectarian violence, foreign fighters and occupational errors. As a result, these findings parallel conclusions drawn by others who argue that the media reporting of the Iraq War, for the most part, uncritically supported

---

[130] I.e. Relative to the acceptable face of violence in Iraq, which framed the majority of the occupation, discussed in previous chapters: e.g. ethno-sectarian divisions, foreign fighters and administrative errors

constructions of the conflict, as presented by government officials (Rampton and Stauber, 2003, Kellner, 2005, Altheide, 2009, Bonn, 2009, Collins et al 2011). This framing of ongoing events is in many ways dependent upon the sources used in the development of news articles, which tend to rely upon government and military officials, resulting in the reproduction of a discursive agenda as envisioned by these officials. It is unsurprising when considered in this light that state crime is not on the media's agenda, unless these issues have been unavoidably placed in the public eye - for example, the massacre of civilians in Haditha, the Abu Ghraib prison scandal (Hamm, 2007, Danner, 2004, Hersh, 2005), or the questionable practices of PMCs (Scahill, 2007). However, even in discussing these events, their gravity is diffused through a process that both establishes their uncommon nature, and seeks to label appropriate scapegoats, so as to absolve the parent state of any responsibility for their actions.

However, in contrast to the dominant accounts presented within the mainstream media and the minor critical accounts of practices that constituted state criminality, alternative explanations of the violence seen in post-invasion Iraq were available. These alternative explanations were voiced by prominent critical figures such as Naomi Klein, Noam Chomsky and John Pilger, who all argued that the primary explanation of the violence that engulfed the country was due to systematic state-sanctioned violence committed by Coalition and proxy forces. This discussion will now turn its attention to an analysis of these alternative arguments, contrasting these accounts with the criminological literature in order to assess whether they actually amount to state criminality. Finally, the discussion will attempt to provide an answer to the following question: why did the mainstream media largely ignore these alternative arguments in favour of the dominant narratives they presented?

2. An alternative account of post-invasion violence in Iraq

Estimates of the number of deaths resulting from the invasion and occupation of Iraq vary from 108,423 - 118,475 (Iraq Body Count, 2012), to 654,965 as reported by *The Lancet* (2006). Although there is a discrepancy in these estimates, they both indicate that large numbers of civilians have died in Iraq as a direct result of the US-led military intervention. Yet as we have seen, explanations of the violence that led to this high death toll within the mainstream media rarely attend to the contribution of Coalition and associated proxy forces to this figure.

This is a curious phenomenon given that, as early as September 2003, Naomi Klein, writing in *The Nation*,[131] began to write about the signs of state-sanctioned violence being carried out by Coalition forces in newly occupied Iraq. In this early article, Klein (2003) highlights the resort to intense violence, as a necessary *prerequisite* of "neo-liberal shock therapy", which, she argues, is the guiding logic behind the invasion. We will return to this point shortly when discussing her seminal work *The Shock Doctrine*. However for now we may say that a prominent critical voice in Naomi Klein, raised concerns regarding the prosecution of the occupation of Iraq by Coalition forces, which asked the difficult questions of the US government that the majority of the mainstream media ignored.

Later, publishing on her personal website, Klein (2004a) continues this line of critique, arguing that the economic reforms enacted by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), are illegal under both the Hague Regulations of 1907 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949 governing occupying powers. She cites the use of violence inherent to these economic reforms and directed against Iraqi civilians, as a primary reason for the instability and growing insurgency against the Coalition (see also: Klein, 2004b). Similarly, Klein (2008) argues that US oil deals in Iraq (that have come about as a result of the culmination of these illegal economic reforms) are themselves a violation of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, stating that the invasion was intended to heist the country's national resources.

This combination of intense violence, utilised to further national security interests, although not directly stated by Klein, is an example of state criminality by any criminological definition. For example, Chambliss (1989:185), in his address to the American Society of Criminology (widely regarded as the disciplines clarion call for an in-depth analysis of state criminality) developed the concept of "state-organised crime". Chambliss considered these to be acts that were defined by law as criminal and committed by state agents in the course of

---

[131] *The Nation* defines itself as a news agency that presents analysis of politics and culture from the left, noting in its mission statement that: '*The Nation* will not be the organ of any party, sect, or body. It will, on the contrary, make an earnest effort to bring to the discussion of political and social questions a really critical spirit, and to wage war upon the vices of violence, exaggeration, and misrepresentation by which so much of the political writing of the day is marred'.

their jobs as state representatives. Drawing on the realist analysis of international relations,[132] Chambliss argued that states readily resort to breaking their own (and international) laws, in order to fulfil their national security interests.

Prior to Chambliss' address, criminology had been reticent to analyse state criminality, particularly in comparison to the pantheon of criminological scholarship on street crime. This has meant that the criminological study of state transgression is widely regarded as still in its infancy (Tombs and Whyte, 2002, Rothe et al, 2009, Michalowski, Chambliss and Kramer, 2010).[133] This is in part due to the conceptual difficulty of criminology to engage with the crimes of the state, a result in turn of the discipline's reliance upon state-deferential definitions of crime. The state's definition of criminality means that the state has the capacity to make and break laws without sanction if it serves their own interests. In short state law can provide a framework in which state crimes may be deemed as justifiable (Barak, 1991, Chambliss, 1989, Stanley, 2005), whilst state actions may be framed in such a way that they appear justifiable through what Cohen (1995, 1996, 2001) refers to as "states of denial". This means that those actors involved in criminality on behalf of the state, are often not characterised as deviant, but as efficient and effective actors, securing the state's interests.[134] By contrast the victims of the efficient and effective actions of the state are often depicted as fundamentally linked to danger (Cohen, 1996, Crelinstein, 2003),[135] or they may be dehumanised as a less developed, and barbaric culture (Young, 2007, McCulloch and Pickering, 2009).[136] According to Huggins et al (2002), this has the effect of making violent punitive actions towards them more palatable if revealed, through their devalued position in relation to state actors (Stanley, 2005).

---

[132] Realist theories of International Relations argue that a state's foreign policy is consistently based on the maximisation of their power and security relative to their rivals, locating the motivations for these actions, as the maintenance or extension of state power and control (see for example: Mearsheimer, 2001, Chomsky, 2004).

[133] It should be noted that, prior to Chambliss' address, notable contributions to the criminological study of the state had been made. These contributions grew out of critical criminology's concern with the way in which state's governed their people, and utilised their power, in order to enhance their national security interests (see for example: Schwendinger and Schwendinger, 1970, Frappier, 1985, Huggins, 1987, Pearce, 1976).

[134] This criticism may be levelled at the mainstream media's depiction of the Iraq War discussed in the course of this research, due to their decisions to ignore evidence of state criminality published by human rights reports and the United Nations, as well as the alternative arguments presented by Naomi Klein, Noam Chomsky and John Pilger discussed in this chapter.

[135] In Iraq this could be through links to insurgents, foreign terrorists or by characterising the war as an unwelcome but necessary feature of the global War on Terror.

[136] Such as the characterisation of Iraq's historic ethnic divisions within the mainstream media.

Taking-up Chambliss' call, Barak (1991:275), developed his own contribution to the definition of state criminality. Choosing to define his work at this stage as the study of "political crime", Barak argued that these acts were by nature repressive and committed by and/or on the behalf of the state and its ruling elites, in order to maintain its political and economic dominance. Kramer (2004:174) agrees, arguing that state crime constituted any direct violence committed by states or state agents in order to defend their economic and political position within global affairs (see also: Hagan, 1997, Friedrichs, 1998, Hillyard, 2006).

With these criminological understandings of state crime in mind, it is clear that Klein's arguments constitute a prima facie example of state criminality. However, it is also important to recognise that Klein's critique of the occupation not only focuses on the violence as a catalyst for economic reforms, but also as an aspect of an aggressive and indiscriminate counter-insurgency doctrine. For example, Klein (2004c) writing again in *The Nation*, highlights both extrajudicial killings by Coalition forces, as well as the desertion of soldiers in the newly reformed Iraqi Army (who stated that they did not join the Army to kill other Iraqis). Writing in *The Nation* again in 2004, Klein highlights the role of military contractors in the interrogation of detainees in Coalition run prisons. In this article she cites the intensification of the use of humiliation, torture and abuse of detainees by military contractors, as an apprenticeship designed to increase demand for their "interrogation services" (Klein, 2004d). Additionally, Klein (Ibid) notes that contractors are operating with the full support of the US government, who blocked attempts by Iraqi authorities to ban military contractors from interrogating prisoners.

Finally, Klein (2004e) presents a damning indictment of the direct targeting of unarmed Iraqi civilians by Coalition and associated proxy forces, stating as a result that President Bush may himself be classified as a terrorist. In this article, published on her personal website, she discusses her observations of Iraqi soldiers, who she notes have been trained and directed by Coalition forces, opening fire upon civilian demonstrators. It transpired that after these demonstrators fled to their homes, US military tanks, helicopters and jets began firing indiscriminately at civilian infrastructure, the civilians themselves, and passing ambulances, killing 47 people in the process. Klein also notes a similar incident taking place in Najaf on the same day in which 20 civilians were killed and 150 injured.

Klein's descriptions of the actions of Coalition forces and the Iraqi Army in this article have all the hallmarks of crimes of the state as classified within the criminological literature. For instance, Kauzarlich and Kramer (1998) argue that the crimes of war, such as the targeting of civilians, extrajudicial killing, civilian displacement and the indiscriminate use of force, should all be classified as acts of state criminality. Likewise Barak (1990, 1991), building on the work of Chambliss (1989),[137] defined a wide range of activities considered as crimes of the state. These included: murder, rape, espionage, corruption, cover-ups, wire-tapping, disinformation, kidnapping, assassinations, arms dealing, counter and state terrorism, violating both domestic and international law, which also includes the violation of universally defined human rights. Hagan (1997) defines state criminality as crimes committed in order to fulfil a political ideology, in which offenders believe they are acting in pursuit of a higher purpose. To this end, crimes of this nature committed by governments include those cited by Chambliss and Barak. Mathews and Kauzarlich (2007) have also argued that actions that violate international humanitarian law, human rights conventions, or violations of domestic laws constitute state criminality (see also: Kramer and Michalowski, 2005).

With these criminological definitions of state criminality in mind, it is possible to argue that Klein's reports are clear examples of crimes committed by the US-led Coalition in Iraq: according to Klein's critique they have committed acts of state-sanctioned violence directly targeting Iraqi civilians, in order to further the state's national security interests. Additionally Klein's distinction between the state and state actors highlights an important distinction made within the criminological literature. This is that the state's structure is composed of several interconnecting parts. Ross (2003) argues that these parts may be characterised as follows: the ideological doctrine of the government, which guides state actions, the organisational units of the state, which are considered as governmental departments or institutions, and finally, individual actors fulfilling their roles as agents of state policy (see also: Kauzarlich et al, 2001, Tombs and Whyte, 2003, Green and Ward, 2004, Kramer and Michalowski, 2006, Doig, 2011). It is this definition, which clarifies Klein's contention that seemingly individual acts within the Iraq War, are the product of the interconnectivity of actions *between* multiple

---

[137] Chambliss situated his own initial definition of state criminality as a product of smuggling, linked to wider criminal state practices, such as the funding of covert CIA operations in Vietnam and Nicaragua. In particular, he cited the Air America programme during the Vietnam War, which smuggled both opium and weapons, in order to fund and arm covert operations during the conflict. He also cites the Iran Contra scandal, in which the CIA sold millions of dollars worth of weapons to Iran, in order to fund the Contra insurgency in Nicaragua.

state institutions and actors, constituting examples of state criminality. It can also be argued that, if a prominent figure such as Naomi Klein was fully aware of and reporting on actions of this nature, then mainstream media organisations would have been equally aware of these reports. In light of the media analysis conducted in this research, the only conclusion we can come to is that the mainstream media chose to ignore these alternative arguments, in favour of the dominant framings discussed in chapters 3, 4 and 5. This means that wider public awareness of the Coalition's role in perpetuating violence against Iraqi civilians would have been obscured and marginalised in left leaning, high-brow media organisations, or the personal websites of writers who, although highly regarded in academic circles, are not mainstream media figures.

In contrast to the dominant narratives presented in the mainstream media, Naomi Klein (2007) has also argued in her book *The Shock Doctrine* that the ethno-sectarian divisions, foreign fighters, violence and extremism, which engulfed Iraq, cannot be separated from the invasion and occupation itself. Likewise, she argues that this violence cannot be fully understood as a result of the "incompetence and cronyism" (Ibid: 351) of the Bush Administration's occupation of the country. For Klein, the violence that became such a feature of occupied Iraq, leading to the high numbers of civilian casualties, stemmed directly from the Bush Administration's attempt at nation creating, as opposed to nation building. This process is characterised by Klein as the complete social, economic and political restructuring of the country, requiring the existing state to be erased and replaced with the vision of a neo-liberal state. Klein argues that the motivation for this attempt at nation creating lies within the US' perceived national security interests. These, she argues, are concerned with the neo-liberal restructuring of a region which is rich in natural resources and could provide a stepping-stone to the neo-liberalisation of the entire region (Stokes 2009). This policy, she argues, is historically consistent with the United States utilisation of the doctrine of "disaster capitalism" as a model for foreign policy intervention that restructures national economies in a manner that is beneficial to US interests (this will be discussed in more detail in chapter 6). As Klein (2007: 330) notes, this idea contains "at its core, the certainty of extraordinary colonialist violence", in order to have a clean slate from which to create the new Iraqi state. According to Klein, this violence began with the so-called "shock

and awe" tactics[138] deployed during the invasion phase of the occupation, which utilised extraordinary levels of force, in order to pave the way for the introduction of neo-liberal reforms.

However, Klein argues that this violence continued into the occupation phase of the conflict, as the US-led administration reneged upon the promise of a quick transfer of power to an elected Iraqi government, and reconstruction efforts failed to provide Iraqis with even modest amenities.[139] It is Klein's contention that in the wake of these broken promises, Iraqi resistance to the Coalition grew. In order to counter this opposition Klein argues that Coalition forces responded with levels of violence relatively equivalent to the shock and awe tactics of the initial invasion. According to Klein these tactics involved the mass detention and torture of alleged subversives, in "gloves off" interrogations designed to break the physical and psychological resistance of detainees as quickly as possible. These interrogations were carried out by US military personnel, military contractors, and Iraqi security forces, who utilised techniques pioneered by the US in Latin America (for example, the use of cattle prods and drills as instruments of coercion, was commonplace). In addition, Klein (Ibid) argues that some Iraqi security forces, trained by US military units under the guidance of retired Colonel James Steele (who served as Ambassador Paul Bremer's deputy within the Coalition Provisional Authority)[140] had been turned into paramilitary death squads. Klein argues that these US-trained death squads operated out of the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior, abducting, torturing and executing Iraqi civilians on a regular basis.

The arguments made by Klein (2007) in her book, regarding the violence inherent to the occupation, can be considered as an example of state-corporate criminality as conceptualised within the criminological literature. For example, Kramer et al (2002) argued, that state-corporate crime occurred at the nexus of state interests and corporate economic goals, illustrated in Klein's arguments regarding Iraq. Similarly, Friedrich's (2000) argues that there are important interconnections between violent state crimes and corporate criminality, with

---

[138] Shock and awe tactics are specifically designed to not only dismantle the physical environment, but to break the psychological will of the enemy (Klein, 2007, Pilger, 2010).

[139] For example, clean water, electricity, jobs, and security.

[140] According to Klein, Steele's career within the US military is most notable for his tenure in Latin America during the 80s and 90s, particularly in El Salvador. During this period he had been most prominently associated with the training, arming and deployment of death squads, a tactic specifically designed to induce fear and passivity amongst opposition groups and their suspected supporters.

the former often acting to ensure the latter's success. In a similar vein to Klein's (2007) characterisation of neo-liberal shock therapy, as the motivations for the violent suppression of the insurgency in Iraq, criminologists have also been attentive to the importance of the state-corporate interaction, to an analysis of state-sanctioned violence in Iraq. For example, Whyte (2007, 2010) and Welch (2008) have argued that the neo-liberal restructuring of the country was the primary motivation for the invasion, which saw the circumvention of international laws and the complete socio-economic restructuring of the country in order to make this possible (see also: Ruggerio, 2007, 2010).

In summary, throughout the occupation of Iraq, Naomi Klein presented a consistent critical analysis of the actions of Coalition forces on the ground in Iraq, linked to US national security interests, which constituted examples of state criminality. This analysis could be found in the publication of articles in the left leaning *The Nation* magazine, and her book charting the United States violent neo-liberal foreign policy - all arguments that were readily available to, but ignored by, the mainstream news media. Although it is the case that individuals of the same political persuasion as *The Nation* and with a certain level of existing knowledge of such arguments and publications, would have been aware of Klein's writing, for the average person gaining their knowledge of global events from the mainstream media, these accounts were at best minor arguments, confined to the periphery of popular discourse.

However Naomi Klein's critique of the Iraq War was not the only critical voice ignored by mainstream news agencies. Both Noam Chomsky and John Pilger also wrote articles in a similarly critical vein to Naomi Klein in a variety of left leaning, marginal publications that, if visible in mainstream news sources, would have provided an alternative and more balanced account of the occupation.[141] For example, Chomsky (2004) is critical of the promotion of John Negroponte to the position of US Ambassador to Iraq, highlighting his record in a similar role as Ambassador to Honduras. During this time, Chomsky highlights Negroponte's role in covering-up the activities of military and paramilitary death squads, whose actions he

---

[141] These sources included: *ZNet*, which is a news source specifically designed to publish articles that present an alternative to mainstream media accounts, presenting information that otherwise would be lost amongst mainstream accounts. *The Khallej Times*, which is an English language news source based in the United Arab Emirates, presenting news reports on the Middle East region from the point of view of the residents of the region. *The New Statesman*, which is a current affairs magazine noted for its progressive political outlook, independent from, and scepticism of Western state agendas. Additionally, both Pilger and Chomsky's personal websites, contain archives of their writing on Iraq.

argues constituted large scale state terrorism. Chomsky suggests that given Negroponte's appointment, similar practices were almost inevitable in Iraq.

Moving forward, Chomsky (2007) writing in *ZNet,* argues that state terrorism carried out by the US-led Coalition, had driven significant numbers of the population towards insurgency, in order to protect themselves from Coalition aggression. A similar critique is voiced again in *ZNet* one year later, when Iraq is characterised as a land of "wreck and ruin" as a result of the extreme violence associated with the Coalition's counter-insurgency strategy, noting that this violence has received an equally violent response (Chomsky, 2008a, see also: Chomsky, 2008b). These are arguments that as we saw in the media sampling chapters were almost entirely invisible in mainstream accounts of the conflict.

Additionally, Chomsky (2006a) suggests from the outset of the invasion and occupation of Iraq that the war was an act of aggression, which is illegal under international law, despite US claims to exceptional circumstances warranting military action. Chomsky suggests that this invasion was made possible by the US' overwhelming military power, which is unsurpassed by any other nation in the world, making effective opposition to the war impossible. Criminology's thus far limited engagement with the analysis of the Iraq War has drawn similar conclusions supporting Chomsky's arguments. For example, Kramer and Michalowski's (2005) argue that the invasion of Iraq was itself a violation of international law, as the war was in violation of the UN Charter.[142] They argue that this is in spite of US attempts to justify the conflict through the doctrine of preventative war, as there was no legitimate basis to the threat they claimed Iraq posed. Likewise, despite attempts by the Bush Administration to justify its protracted use of force, through false claims that Iraq held weapons of mass destruction and that Saddam Hussein had strong links with Al Qaeda, the doctrine of preventative war is itself not ratified under the UN Charter. This means that without international agreement on the need for military intervention in Iraq by the UN Security Council, the war would still amount to a violation of international law (Ibid), despite US claims to exceptional circumstances. For Kramer and Michalowski (2011), it is the United States political, economic and military power, which made the invasion of Iraq possible. This resulted in the manipulation of international law, which for Kramer and Michalowski (Ibid), means that the invasion itself constituted an illegal war of aggression.

---

[142] Article 2(4), Kramer and Michalowski (2005:448).

Chomsky (2006b) also highlights the influence of US national security interests in the decision to invade Iraq. Making a similar argument to those of both Klein, and the criminological literature on state criminality, Chomsky argues that the primary impetus for the invasion and the violence inherent in the occupation was the drive to ensure access to the regions natural resources. He continues, suggesting that the ongoing violent occupation at this time was due to the need to secure these interests and not to protect the Iraqi people from the foreign fighters and ethno-sectarian conflict, which the mainstream media and political and military sources stated publicly were the primary objectives (see also: Chomsky, 2006c, 2008c). Chomsky's critique of the mainstream media's representation of the conflict continues in a similar vein to that of Monbiot (2005) discussed above. Writing in *ZNet*, Chomsky (2007b, 2008a) argues that the mainstream media has downplayed the number of civilian deaths resulting from the Coalition's counter-insurgency war, arguing that the media's reporting has "towed the party line" in an effort to generate popular support for government policy on Iraq. We will return to this line of criticism shortly when referring specifically Pilger's film *The War You Don't See* (Lowery and Pilger, 2010), but having considered both Klein and Chomsky's writing on the Iraq War, let us now turn to Pilger's work in print on the same subject.

Writing in *The New Statesman*, John Pilger (2005, 2006a) articulates a similar critical argument to those expressed by Klein and Chomsky. For example, he argues that the lived experience of the occupation of Iraq, in stark contrast to the vast majority of mainstream news media stories, was characterised by paramilitary death squads, the routine torture of detainees, and the purposeful targeting of civilians and extrajudicial killings by Coalition and associated forces. Pilger argues that events such as those he describes in Iraq, are largely unreported in the mainstream media and as a result, are able to carry on largely unchecked, due to the lack of public awareness (Pilger, 2005, 2006a). Similarly, if reports of deaths caused by Coalition or associate forces are reported in the mainstream media, Pilger (Ibid) argues that these are largely downplayed and represented as isolated incidents, unrepresentative of the wider values of soldiers or the state. The media reports sampled in this chapter confirms Pilger's assertion, illustrating a construction of the Iraq War that almost entirely marginalizes state crime from its account.

Pilger's argument parallels criminological analysis of counter-insurgency. For example, Jamieson and McEvoy (2005) have drawn attention to US counter-insurgency operations in Latin America. Drawing on the work of McClintock (2002), they argued that US forces were directly involved in the creation, training, and deployment of paramilitary death squads similar to those that Klein and Pilger have suggested were operating in Iraq. They suggest that US foreign policy has historically utilised state-sanctioned violence, in order to realise its national security interests. Green and Ward (2004) have also highlighted the killing of civilians as a weapon of war. Drawing on the seminal work of Quinney (1979), they focus on the My Lai massacre during the Vietnam War, in which some 400 unarmed, unresisting, women, children and elderly men, were killed by US forces. They argue that, although it was soldiers who fired the shots that killed these people, individual responsibility is limited, as soldiers act upon orders handed down to them by state officials (see also: Kauzrlich et al, 2003). It is Pilger's contention that Coalition leaders advocated a similar aggressive approach to the occupation of Iraq. The following chapter will confirm this contention by presenting data from the Wikileaks Iraq War Logs.

Pilger (2006b,c) presents an even starker criticism of the conflict, describing the invasion and occupation of Iraq as a "slaughter", comprising the use of death squads, chemical attacks, and torture, as well as the use of uranium-tipped bullets and cluster munitions. He concludes that the primary instigators of the conflict, George W. Bush and Tony Blair, are killers on an industrial scale. However, as Pilger (Ibid) notes, the mainstream news media for the most part did not report on these events, something that he states has historical precedent within media reporting. This he argues makes the mainstream press complicit in the suffering of Iraqi civilians at the hands of Coalition forces, a theme that Pilger returns to in the documentary *The War You Don't See* (Lowery and Pilger, 2010).

Pilger's documentary focuses its analysis on the most popular television news reporting, in both the US and UK, asking three primary questions:

1. What is the role of the mainstream media in war reporting?
2. Why do many mainstream journalists beat the drums of war, despite knowing the lies and half-truths, which governments tell?
3. How are the crimes of war reported and justified, when they are "our" crimes?

In answering these questions, Pilger argues that there is a serious discrepancy between the lived reality of war as experienced by civilians caught-up in military conflicts, and the mediated reality presented to viewing audiences through political statements and news reports. The reasons for this discrepancy, Pilger argues, can be explained through several interrelated factors:

- The mainstream media's reliance on official sources for information leading to the manipulation of media outlets by government officials.

- The fear amongst journalists of losing access to these official sources should they write a report that overtly criticises these sources and the organisations they work for. Additionally, the fear that the news outlet may collectively lose its privileged access to official sources and institutions and linked to this, the fear of journalists losing their jobs. For Pilger, fear plays a major role in shaping the actions of the mainstream media.

- The rise of the "embedded journalist", whose independence is severely limited by acquiescence to conditions, laid down by the military within which they are operating. This means that the movement of journalists through war zones is carefully choreographed, and in some cases, so is the way in which journalists report the scenes that they are exposed to.

- This last point, Pilger argues, means that, as a result, embedded journalists, in contrast to their independent counter-parts, are not usually seen to report events from the point of view of the civilians involved, instead reporting conflicts from the point of view of the troops.

- Embedded journalists may also be bought to scenes which themselves have been set-up by Psychological Operations Officers in order to project a propaganda message, or "necessary illusion", to the watching world. Pilger's documentary cites the toppling of the statue of Saddam Hussein as an example of this.

- Finally, with regard to the invasion of Iraq, Pilger argues, with testimony from prominent figures in the news industry, that due to the links made between Iraq, 9/11 and international terrorism, by government officials in the US and UK, that journalists did not ask administration officials difficult questions concerning the invasion, or the violence inherent to the occupation.

Pilger argues that these factors strike at the very core of the journalistic purpose: to present the undiluted truth of matters of public interest and to question the official representation of

events against independently verified sources. However, as the film estimates, between 80 – 90% of mainstream news stories are "officially inspired" i.e. they are based on official accounts provided to news agencies. This suggests that the journalistic imperative to scrutinise the "facts" before reporting them as truth has been lost. As this chapter and those before it have argued, this has been a feature of the mainstream media's reporting of the Iraq War, a position with which both Pilger's writing and his documentary filmmaking concurs.

In summary, the alternative explanation of the levels of violence seen in Iraq presented by Pilger, Klein and Chomsky, suggests that the Coalition were consistently responsible for committing serious crimes against the Iraqi people, during the invasion and occupation of the country. However, in the sample utilised in this research these alternative accounts, although widely available to mainstream news sources were, with few exceptions, wilfully neglected in the analysis that they presented to their readership. Although a partial account of state criminality did exist within mainstream news sources, relative to the dominant explanations presented by these sources (discussed in chapters 2, 3 and 4), these accounts were generally cursory and sought to blame individual actors, instead of analysing the state's role in constructing counter-insurgency doctrine. In short this is an example of hegemonic media reporting, as illustrated in Antonio Gramsci's (1971) conception of journalists as "translators" of government policy, or Herman and Chomsky's (1988) notion that the mainstream media helps to manufacture consent to the state's official position.

Conclusion

In conclusion this chapter has argued that there *is* an alternative explanation for the violence that engulfed post-invasion Iraq to that which was presented within the mainstream media: that state criminality formed a major aspect of the occupation. Instead the mainstream media presented a particular framing of the conflict, in which Coalition forces and their political leaders attempted to combat a violent ethno-sectarian civil war, whilst fighting foreign fighters, and doing so in the wake of numerous errors in the administration of the occupation. As has been acknowledged, these factors played a role in exacerbating the violent conditions of the occupation. But even prior to the release of the Wikileaks Iraq War Logs, there was ample evidence from the United Nations and human rights groups to suggest to the mainstream media that the official analysis of events, which they uncritically presented, was questionable. Although reports directly criticising the legitimacy of state policies in Iraq did appear, these reports were in everyway the exception rather than the norm.

This has important implications for the study of state criminality in occupied Iraq (as well as in subsequent theatres of war/occupation). Most importantly, that the media's failure to report this alternative reading of the occupation, as a prominent explanatory narrative, meant that the crimes of the Coalition in Iraq would have been consigned to a historical footnote and considered as isolated incidents, unrepresentative of wider processes, if alternative sources had not emerged. This makes Pilger's (2010) critique of the mainstream media's uncritical representation of official positions, and associated failure to scrutinise official accounts, an accurate and compelling argument. As this chapter has illustrated, in order to find prominent analyses of actions amounting to state criminality in occupied Iraq, a certain level of knowledge regarding both counter-insurgency warfare and critical writers and publications is required. The work of Klein, Chomsky and Pilger is generally found in highbrow, left leaning media organisations and on their personal websites, therefore their views are confined to a limited minority of people, resulting in a significantly lower circulation. In short specialist knowledge is required to even be aware of the existence of these alternative arguments.

However, thanks to the actions of US Army Intelligence soldier, Private Bradley Manning,[143] the Wikileaks organisation were able to provide the alternative source that the media had largely ignored, preventing the dominant account of the conflict from becoming the only version. The Iraq War Logs enabled this thesis to access a wealth of (previously hidden) empirical data, in the form of daily reports from US forces on the ground in Iraq, which point towards the doctrinal use of violent state criminality suggested in Pilger, Klein and Chomsky's alternative arguments. It is the contention of this thesis, that if these files were not released, then the media analysis of the Iraq War would have largely ended at this point. With this in mind, the following chapter will present a sample of this data, alongside reports from human rights organisations and the United Nations,[144] in order to provide empirical evidence of the consistent, doctrinal use of state criminality by Coalition forces and their associates during the Iraq occupation.

---

[143] It must be noted, that at this point, these allegations against Private Manning remain unconfirmed.
[144] As noted, reports from the UN and human rights groups were readily accessible to media outlets prior to the release of the Iraq War Logs, further damning the representation of the war in the mainstream media.

State Crime in Occupied Iraq: evidence from Wikileaks, human rights organisations and the United Nations

"The very agent responsible for upholding the law is actually responsible for the crime...for large parts of the world's population, state agents (or paramilitary groups) are the normal violators of your legally protected rights" (Cohen, 1993:101-102).

Introduction

Thus far this thesis has presented a critical analysis of the construction of a series of dominant narratives within the mainstream press in the US and UK, which served to divert attention from the criminal violence implemented by the reconstituted Iraqi authorities and the occupying Coalition forces. These dominant media narratives not only diverted attention from the criminal violence enacted against Iraqi civilians, but pushed to the sidelines public debate surrounding the causes of violence in Iraq, suggesting that the vast majority of this violence was due to power struggles amongst the Iraqi people or due to foreign jihadists infiltrating the country's borders, or sometimes due to mistakes made in invasion planning and the administration of the occupation. The following analysis, however, will present the alternative argument that state crime carried out by Coalition forces and Iraqi authorities presented Iraqi civilians with just as much cause for concern as any of the dominant narratives constructed within the media sample, resulting in a consistent pattern of criminal violations of the basic human rights of the Iraqi people.

The discussion that follows will be based primarily around a sample of empirical data generated by the Wikileaks Iraq War Logs (IWL).[145] The sample comprises some 215 reports drawn from the IWL, which suggest that the occupation of Iraq was punctuated by actions that amounted to consistent examples of state crime throughout the Coalition's time in Iraq.

---

[145] Published on the 22nd October 2010, the IWL are a collection of 391, 832 US Army field reports from the period of the 1st January 2004 – 1st January 2009. The War Logs were selected because they provide an insight into the daily conduct of the counter-insurgency conflict, from the point of view of soldiers directly involved. Without being able to visit Iraq during the course of the research (due to both concerns with funding and personal safety), the War Logs provided the best possible way of gaining virtual access to this environment. For a more detailed account of the rationale behind this reliance on the IWL as a data source please refer to chapter 1: Methodology.

These include the widespread abuse and torture of detainees in the custody of both Coalition military and Iraqi regular and irregular[146] forces, and the training, arming and deployment of militias as proxy forces by the Coalition, created to target the insurgency and its supporters, operating largely indiscriminately as death squads, assassination teams and interrogators, without official reprimand from Coalition forces. In addition to this, the logs detail the often unrestricted use of excessive force by Coalition forces, both on the ground and in the air, against Iraqi civilians. Whilst the reports also detail the harm caused by Private Military Contractors (PMCs) against Iraqi civilians, who bore the brunt of Coalition attempts to pacify and control the increasingly unstable environment they inhabited. To enhance and supplement the data gathered from the IWL, further evidence will be presented from the Wikileaks "Cable Gate" files, [147] as well as data collected from human rights reports published by the United Nations Assistance Mission to Iraq (UNAMI), United Nations Security Council meetings and the independent human rights organisations Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and Human Rights First. This has been done in order to further substantiate the evidence presented by the Wikileaks Iraq War Logs. These findings will be explored in detail below, through the lens of some notable theoretical contributions to the study of state criminality. This will present us with a way of negotiating and understanding the complexities of the empirical data presented.

1. Theoretical Backdrop

Kramer and Michalowski (2005:447) argue that the invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq was itself a state crime from the outset. Drawing on Chambliss (1995), they argue that although international law is conceptually and practically problematic due to the notion of state sovereignty, any violations of international law should be regarded within criminology as an example of state crime "even when they do not violate domestic law", as most nation states have ratified these agreements. Citing Green and Ward's (2000) definition of state criminality, which argues that the legalistic approach to understanding state-sanctioned violence is too narrow; rather, criminology should seek firstly, to conceptualise state crime through a human rights discourse, alongside the idea that the physical and social harm caused

---

[146] Defined as militias or 'sponsored insurgent groups' (IWL: 6/1/06)
[147] Wikileaks began publishing the Cable Gate files on the 28th November 2010; they represent what will eventually total some 251, 287 leaked US embassy, consulate and diplomatic mission cables from around the world.

by "state-sanctioned deviance", (cited in Kramer and Michalowski, 2005:448), would receive widespread condemnation, should it be uncovered.

Applying Green and Ward's understanding of state crime also allows for the introduction of Jamieson and McEvoy's (2005) notion of collusion as an explanatory tool through which state crime may be understood. They argue that nation states "other" the responsibility for state crime, through state collusion with third-party or proxy forces. The mechanisms through which this is achieved include the setting-up of "counter-gangs" to terrorise host communities allegedly harbouring "enemies" or from which the "enemy" is drawn, and when required utilising legal frameworks to aid the operations of counter-gangs or create the circumstances whereby the denial of responsibility becomes possible. These ideas may be related to the data gathered here, with the CPA creating the legal framework that conforms to Agamben's (2005) concept of "states of exception", which both Whyte (2007, 2010) and Welch (2008), apply to the Iraq War. This will be discussed shortly. Through this, denial of responsibility becomes possible, as proxy forces in the form of military contractors, militias and the reformed Iraqi Police and Army, all employed or set up by the Coalition and often found working in tandem with Coalition forces, committed multiple acts of state crime throughout the occupation. Thus it is possible to say, as will become clear within this discussion, that while Iraqi forces have been responsible for crimes of the state in Iraq, some of the responsibility for these crimes lies with the Coalition and its leaders, through the process of collusion and the denial of responsibility. Therefore, Green and Ward's definition is undoubtedly useful due to the scope it grants criminology to develop an analysis of crimes of the state, outside of often restrictive legal frameworks (something that criminology has at times struggled to do), and will itself serve as a conceptual tool within this chapter.

However, Kramer and Michalowski (2005) argue that in the case of the Iraq War, the breadth of this definition is unnecessary, as the war itself was in violation of the UN Charter.[148] Despite US attempts to justify the conflict through the doctrine of preventative war, there was no legitimate basis to the threat they claimed Iraq posed. Likewise, despite attempts by the Bush Administration to justify its protracted use of force through false claims that Iraq held weapons of mass destruction and that Saddam Hussein had strong links with Al Qaeda, the doctrine of preventative war itself is not ratified under the UN Charter. This means that even

---

[148] Article 2(4), Kramer and Michalowski (2005:448).

without international agreement on the need for a military intervention in Iraq by the UN Security Council, the war would still amount to a violation of international law (Ibid). For Kramer and Michalowski (2011), it was US political, economic and military power that made the invasion of Iraq possible, resulting in the manipulation of international law, which for Kramer and Michalowski (Ibid), means that the invasion constituted an illegal war of aggression. In addition to this, the UN confirms that once the war had been initiated, it was subject to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). This covenant, ratified by the UN General Assembly, states that international human rights standards apply extraterritorially to all international armed conflicts without exception; a position that the US voted in favour of (UNAMI, Human Rights Report, 1st July-31st December 2007). However, exceptionalism was the norm within occupied Iraq.

With this in mind, it becomes possible to draw links between Kramer and Michalowski's approach to understanding the Iraq War as an example of state crime, and Whyte's (2007, 2010) use of Agamben's (2005) notion of neo-liberal states of exception. Agamben (2005) argues that states of exception involve the suspension of the normal rule of law during times of perceived or actual emergency, in which the state argues that the normal rule of law would inhibit the restoration of normality, security and order. Whyte (2010), drawing on this concept, argues that the state initiating the suspension of the normal rule of law must provide a justification for its plans. When considering Kramer and Michalowski's (2005) argument that the invasion was itself an example of state crime, the application of the state of exception provides a clearer conceptualisation of the decision to invade: the US and UK Governments argued that Iraq represented an existential threat to their sovereignty, and that international law and governance was insufficiently equipped to protect the world from the potential for further catastrophic attacks. As a result, the Coalition sought to justify its invasion through what may be seen as an international state of exception, in which the absence of official international support for the proposed invasion was ignored, with their resort to an aggressive pre-emptive strike against Iraq being justified through the international communities inaction, in the face of what the Coalition argued was an imminent threat to their sovereignty (McCulloch, 2004).[149] But as McCulloch (Ibid: 318) argues, "pre-emption places the burden

---

[149] McCulloch (2004:321) argues that this illustrates a move from the 'rule of law to the rule of force' at both the national and international level. Here the 'checks and balances' that are in place to mitigate the resort to force, have been eroded by US exceptionalism in the War on Terror and the creation of states of exception through the construction of international emergencies, such as the need to invade Iraq.

of proof on the "enemy""; they must prove that they act benignly, however, the very construction of the "enemy" makes the burden of proof an impossible task. The theme of the construction of the distant other as the aggressor-in-chief will be returned to shortly, but for now the chapter will further explore the notion of states of exception.

1.1 The state of exception in Iraq

As Whyte (2007) notes, the international state of exception created in the lead-up to the invasion was extended into the occupation phase of the Iraq War, through the creation and actions of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). Whyte (Ibid: 190-192) focuses his analysis on the creation of a neo-liberal market amenable to Anglo-American interests in Iraq, arguing that the CPA and US Government initiated policies that "subjugated the norms of international law to the norms of the "free market", arguing that the reconstruction of the Iraqi economy was a corrupt endeavour, beset with crimes against the Iraqi state that were designed to establish "neo-colonial dominance in occupied Iraq". However, whilst Whyte's analysis of the restructuring of the Iraqi economy is an important and necessary addition to the ongoing analysis of the Iraq War within criminology, the notion of exception central to his analysis is equally relevant to the conduct of the counter-insurgency war.

The inception of the CPA as the primary governing body in Iraq almost immediately bought with it wide-scale legislative reformation of the post-invasion landscape. Whilst some kind of legislative reform is required in post-invasion situations in order to maintain order and begin the rebuilding process, as already noted by Whyte (Ibid.) with regard to relevant provisions for this process within Article 64 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.[150] The power afforded to the CPA and Paul Bremer (in conjunction with the US Government), granted the capacity to make and enforce whichever laws it felt were necessary, without the restrictions on power normally present within democratic structures (Whyte, 2010). This executive power, placed in the hands of Bremer as the figurehead of the US Government in Iraq, helped to construct a post-invasion environment, in which state-sanctioned violence was able to flourish. Whilst Whyte (2007) cites a number of CPA Orders linked to the restructuring of the Iraqi economy in favour of US economic interests, there were several orders issued by the CPA which made

---

[150] 'Allegedly to maintain the orderly government of the territory, and to ensure the security of the occupying power' cited in Whyte (2007:182).

it possible for the US military and associated proxy forces to ensure that these economic interests were met. Additionally, this also constructed an environment which enabled regular and irregular military forces to operate with impunity. The orders of greatest relevance to an understanding of the Coalition's military and security relationship with the Iraqi people are:

- Order 1: The de-Ba'athification of Iraqi society
- Order 4: Associated with order 1, directing the seizure of the assets of the Ba'ath Party and its members
- Order 5: The establishment of the Iraqi de-Ba'athification council
- Order 2: Dissolution of entities, which disbanded the Iraqi military and security forces

These orders helped to create the violent conditions inherent to occupied Iraq by dismissing up to 400,000 former Ba'ath Party members, military and security personnel overnight. This left a security vacuum populated by heavily-armed, disenfranchised and disgruntled former public sector employees. Without the oversight of Coalition forces, the conditions for the prolonged insurgency that followed were in place.

However, the clearest indication of the state of exception in Iraq with regard to the counter-insurgency war that followed is illustrated by CPA Order 17, referring to the legal status of personnel associated with the CPA, Multi-National Force Iraq (MNFI) and "certain missions". Order 17 provided all personnel within the Coalition military, civilian administrators, military contractors and their employees, with complete immunity from legal sanction and prosecution for activities in Iraq.[151] However, Order 17 had a predecessor in the form of Executive Order 13303 issued by President Bush on the same day that the UN Security Council granted the CPA authority to govern post-invasion Iraq (Whyte, 2007, Welch, 2008). Executive Order 13303 shielded all US personnel from any and all judicial proceedings that may be initiated regarding the Defence Fund for Iraq (DFI), essentially giving US personnel carte blanche to act as they pleased with regard to Iraqi reconstruction funds. This is something that both Whyte (2007, 2010) and Welch (2008) argue led to corruption on a massive scale.

---

[151] Amnesty International (2004) comments that this order also completely inhibited the authority and capacity of independent investigation into human rights abuses by Coalition and associated forces.

In essence, these two orders provide a stark example of the social construction of deviancy within national and international states of exception. At the international level, President Bush made it possible for US personnel to use the money from the DFI as they saw fit. This was something that Paul Bremer (2006) deemed a necessary evil within the chaotic environment of post-invasion Iraq. However, the upshot of this lack of independent oversight over the distribution of the DFI led to billions of dollars disappearing from the fund (Welch, 2008). At the national level, Order 17 represents a similar example of the rejection of the normal rule of law, characteristic of states of exception, as was the case with media accounts of the violent day-to-day struggle for Iraq. It also succeeded in defining out the possibility of Coalition military and civilian personnel, committing acts that could be considered state crimes, whilst conversely, the crimes of those involved in the insurgency, alongside those of foreign fighters, were very real, with real victims. Furthermore, whilst the crimes of the insurgency should have been policed, so too should the crimes of those involved in the occupation, including those of torture, detainee abuse and extra-judicial killings (to be discussed below).

However, the actions of Coalition forces are largely palatable in the eyes of the public and the vast majority of mainstream discourse, as, for the most part, they have not been constructed as deviant within media accounts of the occupation, or within legal restrictions on the behaviour of the occupiers. This creates a dynamic, which places the occupiers in a position of moral superiority to the occupied, in which "they" (anyone who opposes or criticises the occupation) are the deviants and "we" (the occupying power) are the enforcers of legitimate norms, values and behaviours. Whilst the occupier in defence of their objectives may make mistakes, they are never malicious. Whereas almost all actions carried out by the opposition are by definition irrational, provocative and offensive, without justification (Young, 2007, McCulloch and Pickering, 2009). The IWL themselves provide a telling indication of the "othering" and de-humanisation of "them", in the manner with which Coalition forces refer to the Iraqi opposition, as "Anti Iraqi Forces" (AIF). This is something also noted by Kilcullen (2009) in his observations of American military briefings to Iraqi bureaucrats, referring to the "kinetic" operations of Coalition forces against AIF, a phrase he highlights himself as "quite Orwellian" (p.121). Welch (2008:266) finds similar processes at work within the wider War on Terror and the designation of "shadowy enemies of the state" as "unlawful enemy combatants". A direct result of Order 17, then, is that the actions of Coalition personnel and associated proxy forces, such as the Wolf Brigade and the Special Police Commandos (to be

160

discussed later), were conducted in the knowledge that no official reprisals would take place. Essentially, state crime had been constructed as a legal impossibility within the confines of occupied Iraq. However, if we apply Green and Ward's (2000) argument, state crime should be considered as any violation of human rights or state-sanctioned action that would receive widespread condemnation in any other circumstance. Then the counter-insurgency model adopted by the Coalition in Iraq, allied to the suspension of the normal rule of law, afforded the Coalition the capacity to act as it saw fit.

In summary, then, the CPA enacted a state of exception in Iraq through the bastardisation of the rules governing occupying powers by issuing multiple economic, social and security-based orders, which contravened international law. With regard to the restructuring of the Iraqi economy (Whyte, 2007, 2010), this created the conditions for a long-lasting opposition to the occupying powers, whilst providing the coercive apparatus of these powers with a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, therefore enabling them to act aggressively to stamp-out threats to their proscribed legitimacy. This is something that Kramer (1994:171) calls "violence as structure", in which states create the conditions for, or provide structural support to, institutionalised practices which cause physical or non-physical harm.

The permissive conditions created for the counter-insurgency campaign through the exceptional circumstances constructed via the legal power of the CPA's legislative agenda, shaped the circumstances in which a culture of impunity could thrive amongst the many and varied regular and irregular security forces operating in Iraq (Welch, 2008). Within this culture of impunity, violent, transgressive behaviour, which in any other circumstance would be criminalized, became normalised or even a matter of routine in the case of the abuse and torture of detainees. One prominent example of this, discussed by Hamm (2007), is the abuse of prisoners by military police and PMCs[152] at Abu Ghraib prison, in which Hamm identifies a structural logic that informs and guides the actions of personnel on the ground (see also: Danner, 2004, Hersh, 2004, Taguba, 2004, Greenberg and Dratel, 2005). Further examples of the torture and abuse of prisoners are prevalent within the IWL, which indicate a further

---

[152] Human Rights First (2008) reports that several private contractors, from multiple companies worked at Abu Ghraib prison and were involved in the abuses that took place there, although unlike their regular military colleagues they have never been prosecuted for their involvement. Shortly after the events of Abu Ghraib became public knowledge, Paul Bremer introduced CPA Order 17, granting contractors immunity from prosecution. This order also contained a self-renewing element, which guaranteed that contractors would remain immune from prosecution even after the official hand over of power back to Iraqis.

161

structural logic governing the behaviour of military personnel, through a Fragmentary Order (FRAGO)[153] issued to the US military. FRAGO 242 instructs US members of the Coalition forces not to investigate any breach of the laws of armed conflict unless Coalition forces are directly involved. FRAGO 242 was later amended with FRAGO 039, which stated that if Iraqi forces are involved in breaches of these rules against Iraqi detainees or civilians, Coalition forces are expected only to log an initial report of the incident, making no further attempt to stop the action or to prevent future breaches. As a result, legislation governing the good practice of Coalition personnel in reality served to sustain a cultural environment in which torture became a part of everyday life for detainees, whilst simultaneously enabling those aware of the practice to cognitively distance themselves from responsibility for the abuse (Crellenstein, 2003), or deny responsibility for abuses altogether (Jamieson and McEvoy, 2005).

However, there is very little difference between those actively involved in the act and those who deny responsibility for stopping the act through obedience to orders. The legislation permits those who are fully aware of the suffering, and who have the power to stop it, to effectively neutralise their own responsibility and accountability to those powerless to help themselves. Cohen (2001) agrees, arguing that both torturer and observer occupy a "moral void" where their actions are legitimised, in this case by the absence of sanctions directed towards the torturer, and the observers retreat into the obedience to authority. This may be considered in conjunction with the notion of othering discussed above, which serves as a dehumanising function towards the indigenous population; a purpose fulfilled in part by the approach taken towards counter-insurgency in Iraq, serving to further strip indigenous Iraqis of their humanity.

Clearly within a war zone, violence is a normalised aspect of daily routines. However, the initial approach taken to counter-insurgency operations in Iraq served to exacerbate the culture of impunity laid down by the legislation passed by the CPA and US Government, by enacting an enemy-centric approach to counter-insurgency. Kilcullen (2009) characterises this approach to counter-insurgency in a number of ways, which he argues served to alienate civilian populations from Coalition forces, in particular the Sunni, who as a result of the restructuring of the Iraqi socio-political landscape in favour of the Shi'a (discussed

---

[153] A Fragmentary Order is a summary of a complex requirement made of US military personnel.

previously in the media analysis of both the foreign fighters and US mistakes narratives), made-up the vast majority of insurgents.[154] Certainly, until the troop surge of 2007, the Coalition attitude towards counter-insurgency in Iraq involved a "kinetic" approach to operations, focusing on killing or capturing insurgents, often at a high personal and material cost to civilian populations in "repetitive raids" from forward operating bases, located some distance from the civilians they were there to protect (Ibid: 124). Operations of this nature, in conjunction with the enemy-centric approach to counter-insurgency, stem from the Coalitions concern with "force protection" over the more important goal of securing popular support against the insurgents. This meant that the primary contact that Iraqi civilians had with Coalition forces was observing them at their most destructive, treating Iraqis with as little respect as the agents of the regime they had removed (Danner, 2004). Coalition forces regularly appeared without warning to detain suspected insurgents with heavy-handed tactics in mass detention operations, which often led to civilian deaths, removing the greatest weapon in the Coalition's arsenal: the support of the civilian population. This meant that civilians were increasingly reluctant to inform on the activities of insurgents, causing many Iraqi civilians to side with, provide direct support for, or join the insurgency, something Kilcullen refers to as the "accidental guerrilla syndrome" (Ibid).

Here we see that, due to the nature of the counter-insurgency's enemy-centric focus, violence on both sides of the conflict was intensified. Sunni populations became increasingly isolated from the new Iraq, believing that both the newly installed Shi'a-dominated Iraqi government and Coalition forces were targeting Sunni populations in an attempt to cleanse Iraq of their presence, as reprisal for years of Ba'athist rule. As a result, the Sunni believed they were fighting for their very survival, whilst Coalition forces, alongside government militias and the Iraqi Police and military, acted with increasing aggression, with the knowledge that the transformative legislative agenda actioned by the CPA protected them from legal sanction. In summary, we see in Iraq a culture of impunity working side-by-side with an offensive and aggressive counter-insurgency approach, which showed little concern for the well-being of the civilian population. This created the conditions in which violent, coercive collective action, could take place against Iraqi civilians, going largely unchecked.

---

[154] Or those defined as such, Shi'a militia groups also operated throughout Iraq and instead of being another focus of the counter-insurgency effort, were invited to join Iraq's security forces in opposition to the insurgency.

Collective action within war zones is not a new phenomenon, as Tanner (2011), drawing on Christopher Browning's (1992) research that sought to understand how the members of the reserve police battalion 101 were able to involve themselves in the final solution during the Second World War, outlines with regard to the Rwandan genocide. Within both studies, it is argued that collective action resulting in mass violence is not so much the product of individual dispositions towards violence, or taking a sadistic pleasure in the brutality of human suffering, but more a consequence of obedience to authority and/or conformity to the behaviour of one's peers. This obedience to authority was famously illustrated by Stanley Milgram (1963, 1965), who showed that individuals were capable of inflicting intense pain, and even death, through deference to authority figures and destructive obedience. As Hannah Arendt (1963) suggests, the actions of those involved in human atrocities often stem from a place of banality rather than sadism. Those involved in the horror of state-sanctioned violence are often simply responding to the procedural role that their vocation demands.

As a result, acts of violence such as torture and extra-judicial killing are not understood by the perpetrators in relation to the reality of the experience, in terms of reflexive empathy with the victims. Instead, the understanding of these actions and responsibility for them is deferred and reaffirmed through the "chain of command and the group he [/she] is affiliated with" (Tanner, 2011:271), committing what in any other circumstance would be defined as a deviant act and censured (Green and Ward, 2000). Within the context presented by the Iraq War (or Rwanda or the Second World War), violent behaviour such as torture may become normalised, or even perceived as desirable, if appropriate reprisals are not applied to the deviant behaviour.[155] As Becker (1964:9) argued, "deviant behaviour is behaviour that people so label".

This argument can be further clarified by introducing Sutherland's (1940) concept of differential association, in order to understand the impact of one's peers upon the normalisation of transgressive behaviour. In Sutherland's account, applied to a clarion call for the sociological investigation of white-collar crime, differential association refers to the process in which group values, attitudes towards and motives for criminal behaviour (in this case state crimes) , are learnt through interactions with those around us, making collective

---

[155] Human rights abuses of this nature are made even easier to cognitively negotiate, through the othering of victims, discussed above (Young, 2007, McCulloch and Pickering, 2009).

action possible through repetitive, cyclical behaviour, legitimised through collective action or participation.

When applying these ideas to the counter-insurgency war in Iraq, there are several interrelated points to bear in mind: that due to the permissive environment created by the complete legislative reform undertaken by the CPA and the US Government[156] and the associated culture of impunity that Coalition personnel and proxy forces on the ground experienced, the collective action by Coalition personnel, military and associated proxy forces, enhanced through the social construction of deviancy and the criminal other (Becker, 1961, Young, 2007, McCulloch and Pickering, 2009), resulted in state crime taking place within both the economic reconstruction of Iraq (Whyte, 2007, 2010, Welch, 2008) and the counter-insurgency campaign. Through the above exposition, we have an explanatory framework through which the multiple acts of torture, prisoner abuse, extra-judicial killings and the excessive and indiscriminate use of force throughout Iraq, during the occupation, can be understood. The remainder of this chapter will present evidence from the IWL and human rights reports, which demonstrate that the actions of Coalition and associate forces, in the course of the war in Iraq, consistently carried out widespread human rights abuses, which conform to Green and Ward's (2000), definition of state crime.

2. The Torture and Abuse of Detainees

One of the most consistently documented examples of state crime to emerge from the publication of the IWL were incidents of torture and abuse of Iraqi detainees at the hands of their interrogators and/or arresting forces,[157] with thousands of Iraqis held in "harsh conditions", without charge or trial for "anti-Coalition activities", in centres "not on the map" and denied access to legal representation (Amnesty International, 2005).[158] Those involved in

---

[156] Illustrative of both a national and international state of exception.
[157] Abuses included: Severe beatings by hand or with the use of bludgeoning tools, electric shocks applied to extremities and the genitals, rape, the use of drills to bore holes in the bodies of detainees, ripping out toe and finger nails with pliers, acid and chemical burning, tooth and eye extraction (UNAMI Human Rights Report, 1st July – 31st August, 2006, Amnesty International, 2009).
[158] Amnesty also notes in the same report that many of these detainees hold the unwanted status of 'ghost detainees', hidden to prevent the International Committee of the Red Cross from checking on their conditions. This is supported by the UN, who note that the family of many detainees were unable to locate their relatives in any official detention facilities (UNAMI Report 1st July – 31st August, 2005).

these activities ranged from Coalition forces[159] to Iraqi Police, military and general security personnel, as well as militias such as the Wolf Brigade and the Special Police Commandos, themselves set up under the guidance of the Coalition to supplement the occupation's military presence.[160] Whilst a great deal of IWL reports relate to abuses conducted by Iraqi forces (to be discussed shortly), Coalition forces were fully aware of these abuses. However, beyond filing the field reports that constitute the IWL, more often than not, no further investigation was conducted, and the activities were not subject to official sanction or reprimand. This is detailed within the reports as "paperwork has been sent up through the necessary channels", often followed by the statement that the file had been closed (see for example: IWL, 25/5/06, 17/7/06, 13/8/06, 3/10/06a).

This is due primarily to FRAGO 242, which stipulates that unless Coalition forces are directly involved in the abuse, no investigation into the alleged or witnessed abuse is required. This policy is itself stated quite clearly in many of the reports of torture and abuse drawn from the IWL; for example, a report from June 2006 details allegations of abuse by the Iraqi Police on detainees, reported by a US Marine patrol in Husaybah, stating:

> "For information, the attachments document an alleged ISF [Iraqi Security Force] on IZ [Iraqi detainee] violation (detainee abuse)…As Coalition forces were not involved in the alleged abuse, no further investigation is necessary." (IWL: 6/6/06a)

This is the case even when, as was found in the above report, the alleged abuse is supported by corroborating evidence from medical examinations conducted by Coalition personnel in the wake of allegations being made by detainees. Although it must be noted that at the end of this particular report, it was stated that a "Police Transition Team" was working with the Iraqi Police station involved to take "appropriate remedial measures". However, given the regularity of incidents of detainee abuse and torture indicated by the IWL throughout the occupation, the seriousness with which these inconsistent and occasional reprimands were taken, both by those issuing them and those receiving them, remains dubious. The inhumane treatment of Iraqi prisoners by the Coalition and Iraqi forces amounts to a violation of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), governed by the 1907 Hague Protocols and the four

---

[159] Considered to be the "systematic and illegal abuse of detainees" (Amnesty International, 2005).
[160] A meeting of the UN Security Council on the 15th March 2006 notes, that both Coalition forces and Iraqi security forces, were responsible for 'de-facto arbitrary detentions, torture and extra-judicial killings'.

re violations of IHL and are considered as war crimes
451). With this in mind, the actions of Coalition and Iraqi
e crimes without the need, in this instance, to resort to the
established by Green and Ward (2000). To begin this
ure and abuse identified within the IWL, we will firstly
nous Iraqi forces, before outlining how Coalition forces
is in some of the documented abuses, before finally
n forces operated alone.

s in detainee abuse and torture

lice forces were consistently responsible for some of the
ried out during the occupation, taking place not only in
ations and army bases equipped with rooms specifically
oint comes from Husaybah Police Station, the site of a
ure and abuse of detainees appearing in the IWL. A
ecting the station discovered an interrogation room that
during interrogation. On entering the room, they found
d floors, wires used to administer electric shocks and
d medical tape attached. Similarly, another inspection
that the torture of prisoners, including the removal of
rce confessions to acts of terrorism. The associated
report states that the prisoner was not willing to make a sworn statement of the nature of the
torture he had been submitted to as he feared further abuse would take place, implying that
the torture of detainees within the centre was a frequent occurrence (IWL: 8/7/06). Although
the latter of these two incidents hints at the nature of the torture prisoners were subjected to,
one particularly disturbing report gives an indication of the extent of the odious practices
taking place behind locked doors in detention facilities throughout the country at this time.

In June 2006, a report was filed detailing the experiences of an Iraqi man detained by the
Iraqi Army and interrogated by a Lieutenant Colonel, who questioned him regarding
"terrorist activities". The man then alleges he was beaten and had acid and chemicals applied
to large parts of his body, resulting in third-degree burns requiring major surgery following
his release, including: his right leg being amputated below the knee, along with several toes

167

on his left foot, the amputation of several fingers on both of his hands, whilst he was left with extensive scarring over much of his body. Warrants were issued for the Lieutenant Colonel's arrest but he remained in his post, despite the Coalition informing the head of Police Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior. Likewise, Coalition forces themselves made no direct attempts to prevent further incidents being carried out under his command (IWL: 16/6/07).

It was also the case that during prisoner interrogations in which torture was used, psychological torment was also utilised as an interrogation technique, involving threats against the detainee themselves as well as their family and friends. For instance, in March 2006, twenty soldiers from the Iraqi Army apprehended a man allegedly in possession of anti-Coalition propaganda. A medical examination in the wake of his release confirmed he had been choked, beaten around the head and groin and bitten on the arm, and in addition to this mistreatment, the soldiers also threatened to kill his family and to rape and sodomise him if he refused to cooperate (IWL: 10/3/06).

A further example describes Coalition forces attending an Iraqi police station where reports of detainee abuse had been documented. After interviewing several detainees, it became apparent that "drug or medicine users" were being blindfolded, hung upside down and beaten, whilst "the use of an electrical device" had also been confirmed (IWL: 10/2/04). The application of electric shocks to prisoners during interrogations seemed a relatively common practice amongst Iraqi detention facilities. One report detailed the use of electricity applied to a detainees "hands, left ear and genitals", interspersed with regular beatings. The nature of his interrogation seemed to be expected by the detainee as he did not report for a medical screening in the wake of his torture, and had to be told that he had been abused (i.e. that the nature of his interrogation is not or should not be normal practice) by his interpreter (IWL: 3/5/09). The date of this report indicates that, even as Coalition forces were preparing to hand over complete control of Iraq to Iraqis, torture was still a regular atrocity that the Coalition was fully aware of (see also: IWL: 11/12/05, 6/3/06, 2/5/09a). On occasion, Coalition personnel, as in the first incident detailed above, would investigate these abuses. However, no one was arrested or removed from the facility, and there were no Coalition personnel permanently stationed to ensure continued good practice.

This type of follow-up investigation was the exception rather than the norm in Iraq, due primarily to FRAGO 242 and the amended FRAGO 039 (discussed above), which meant that

the usual course of action was to refer incidents to the relevant Iraqi commanding officer. Whilst this would be an appropriate course of action in an environment where torture was the exception to the rule, in Iraq, torture and prisoner abuse were an endemic feature of the post-invasion landscape as evidenced by the examples to follow. As such, the Coalition's reticent approach to the abuses being perpetrated by Iraqi security forces essentially gave the green light for these practices to become entrenched and commonplace amongst Iraqi run facilities (IWL: 10/10/04 see also: IWL: 7/5/06a, 7/6/06, 16/8/06, 13/12/06a, 21/12/06a, 22/12/06, 7/10/08). UNAMI also notes their "grave concern" that incidents of torture, abuse, as well as targeted assassinations, go "inadequately investigated and therefore unpunished" (UNAMI human rights report, 1st March-30th April 2006).

For instance, in May 2006, an Iraqi man was abducted from his home during the night and taken to an "underground" bunker where he was subjected to "months" of torture at the hands of the Iraqi Army. The techniques he was subjected to included being bound in "the...stress position" similar to those photographed at Abu Ghraib (Hamm, 2007, Danner, 2004, Hersh, 2004), being beaten with "blunt objects" on the back and legs, and having an electric drill used to bore holes into his legs. No criminal investigation was conducted in the wake of this discovery, despite the man being transferred to Coalition custody (IWL: 25/5/06, see also: IWL: 23/4/09). Another Iraqi man also gives an equally abusive account of his and a friend's detention by the Iraqi Army, three months previously. Taken from the front of his house, they were transported to three separate locations, severely beaten at each and warned not to tell anyone about the abuse. However, after the second interrogation they were taken to an "open area" where Iraqi soldiers were "getting ready to shoot them", before an Iraqi officer intervened (IWL: 15/2/06). Although it is unclear from the report whether the soldiers were intending to execute the men without trial, or simply subject them to psychological torture, the incident still serves as a telling example of the nature of the Iraqi security forces' relationship with the civilian population. This relationship seems based upon abusing the power afforded to them by the Coalition, which was left largely unchecked.

The brutal beating of detainees was also common practice. For instance, on the 7th March 2006, an Iraqi man made allegations that when detained, the Iraqi Army had "hit him with a chain, cable wire, a pistol and used hot pepper on him" (See also: IWL: 11/2/06, 18/4/06, 7/5/06b, 10/5/06, 24/7/06, 4/8/06, 27/11/06, 16/12/06, 22/5/07, 2/4/09, 18/7/09). A similar incident was reported in August 2006 in Husaybah, in which Iraqi Police detained a taxi

driver on exiting his vehicle. He was taken to an "unknown location" where over the following three days he was repeatedly beaten on the chest, back, arms and legs, before being taken to the Husaybah Police Station, where US Marines took over custody. The report clearly states that after a medical examination and interview with Coalition forces, they had concluded that "after reviewing all the evidence available...the allegation of detainee abuse is substantiated". However the report also recommends that "no further investigation is warranted", having fully documented the activity (IWL: 23/8/06). The full documentation of activities was clearly a common practice, with the field reports often stating, as above, that a medical exam had been conducted, which regularly confirmed the allegations of torture and abuse that were being made. However, with troubling regularity, no action was taken beyond the filing of a report (See also: IWL: 15/12/05, 12/3/06, 2/7/06, 10/8/06, 12/9/06, 17/10/06, 18/10/06, 4/11/06, 14/11/06, 5/8/07, 17/11/07). Likewise, a further report provides details of Iraqi Army personnel abusing multiple detainees (IWL: 21/12/06b).[161] The report states that its intention is for information purposes only and that "as Coalition forces were not involved in the alleged abuse, no further investigation is necessary" (See also: IWL: 27/6/06, 23/10/06, 19/11/06, 1/1/07[162]).

Whilst some of the reports detailed above state that the incident has been referred to the relevant Iraqi Army or Police Commander, given the continuing prevalence of incidents of torture and abuse, which Coalition forces were clearly aware of, it must have been clear to them that these incidents were not being dealt with in the serious manner required. In fact, the routine brutal beatings and maltreatment of prisoners by Iraqi forces had become normalised, as evidenced in another report. Here, an Iraqi Police Chief states when questioned by Coalition forces about the discovery of Iraqi prisoners in need of urgent medical attention due to severe injuries sustained during interrogations, that "he was aware of the beatings and supported it as a method of conducting investigations" (IWL: 2/5/09b).[163]

---

[161] A similar report details injuries sustained by seven detainees during a 'tactical interrogation' by Iraqi Army soldiers. Although the report does not provide details of what 'tactical questioning' entails, the fact that the report refers to a specific type of interrogation suggests that this is a regularly used technique (IWL: 6/10/06).
[162] In this incident the detainee was beaten so severely that he died.
[163] The 'instruments' used to inflict the injuries were found stored in the office of the Police Chief, and had 'blood marks' on them. The Coalition team confiscated the 'tools of torture', but the impact of doing so was almost certainly negligible given that these tools could very easily be replaced.

This means that the Coalition was failing in its obligations under IHL as an occupying power to ensure the humane treatment of detainees by those acting as their proxy security forces. As a result, these incidents detail two examples of state crime: firstly the direct collective action of the Iraqi security forces against Iraqi detainees and secondly, the Coalition's complicity in these actions by both the legislative restriction on their capacity to intervene and their limited investigative strategy, which passed responsibility for reprimanding the torturers over to those in charge of the activities taking place, mirroring Jamieson and McEvoy's (2005) concept of collusion. As Tanner (2011) and Browning (1992) suggest, violent collective action is enabled by the deferral of responsibility to the chain of command, when this chain of command fails in its duty of care towards detainees by allowing, if not condoning, torture, then a culture of impunity is able to thrive and a pattern of learnt collective action can quickly become commonplace. For example, on 10th June 2005 in Basra, three civilians who were suspected of drinking wine and "may have tried to steal bananas" were tied-up in the street and then "severely beaten" by ten Iraqi Internal Affairs Police officers who later denied all knowledge of the incident, or that any irregularities had taken place, illustrating that in Iraq the slightest indiscretion had become cause for aggressive and often unusual[164] collective action. This is particularly the case when those arrested and detained are thought of not as human beings, but as potentially dangerous insurgents, or, as is so common in the parlance of the field reports discussed here, as "Anti-Iraqi Forces" (Kilcullen, 2009).

Thus far then, this discussion has illustrated a consistent pattern of torture and abuse being carried out by Iraqi forces, with little to no attempt to prevent these abuses by the occupying Coalition. It has been established that these abuses primarily constitute human rights violations by Iraqis on Iraqis, but also that the Coalition is culpable for these abuses by failing to fulfil its obligations under IHL, to ensure the humane treatment of detainees (Kramer and Michalowski, 2005, Jamieson and McEvoy, 2005). However, there is a second strand to this discussion of torture and abuse in which Coalition forces have worked in conjunction with Iraqi personnel, either by directly observing the abuse taking place, or by turning over detainees to Iraqi security forces. Given the number of documented incidents of torture and the implementation of FRAGO 242/039, Coalition forces had full knowledge that

---

[164] On the 30th August 2005, a man detained and interviewed by Coalition forces, was beaten during his interrogation and had a Cat thrown on his face, before being transferred to Iraqi forces who also beat him during questioning.

prisoners turned over to Iraqi forces would, in all likelihood, face torture at the hands of their captors.

2.2 Torture and abuse of detainees by Iraqi military and police, working with Coalition forces

As the occupation advanced, new Iraqi forces were quickly put into service after short training periods alongside pre-existing Iraqi Army and Police forces, in the wake of the realisation that disbanding the existing Army and Police was a mistake. This resulted in Coalition Regular and Special Forces frequently conducting operations alongside their Iraqi allies involving the capture, detention and interrogation of suspected insurgents. Presumably, the advantage gained from newly formed Iraqi forces working in tandem with the highly trained Coalition military was for the Iraqis to learn the techniques, behaviours, attitudes and actions required when performing counter-insurgency operations, and to practice these procedures with the guidance of Coalition forces. However, the War Logs indicate that these learnt practices often constituted excessive force at the point of capture, followed by torture and abuse during interrogation once detainees had been turned over to Iraqis forces, which the Coalition were fully aware of. To this end, the War Logs provide several files, which present corroborating evidence.

For example, in October 2006, the Iraqi Army, in a joint operation with a Coalition "Task Force", detained a high-value target who was then transferred over to Iraqi Army custody. The Iraqi unit's commanding officer informed his soldiers not to hit or kick the detainee in particular areas (redacted in the reports), as he had an existing medical condition that could lead to seizures, but the officer informed them that they had free reign to abuse any other parts of the body (IWL: 13/10/06). In another example from May 2007, the Iraqi Army were working in conjunction with a US "Special Operations Task Force" to detain a man suspected of having contact with an insurgent cell responsible for planting Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) (IWL: 22/5/07). After the operation, the detainee was transferred to the custody of the Iraqi Army, who "beat and tortured him" during his interrogation (See also: IWL: 9/5/06, 26/11/05, 16/3/06a, 17/3/06, 25/7/06, 3/10/06b). A similar incident involving the Iraqi Army and US Special Forces resulted in a detainee being abused at the point of capture, where he was beaten with a picture frame, punched, kicked and stamped upon by Iraqi Army soldiers, in full view of their accompanying Special Forces team who did not

172

attempt to intervene to stop the abuse, and "smacked him in the face" on arrival at the Forward Operating Base. No investigation into this incident was indicated within the report, despite medical examinations after the incident confirming the detainee's injuries and the involvement of a US Special Forces unit, who both condoned and colluded in the abuse through their failure to prevent it and their contributions to it (IWL: 13/12/06b, see also: 24/8/05, 12/5/06, 15/5/06, 18/5/06, 28/5/08). Further emphasising the cooperative nature of the relationship between Coalition and Iraqi forces, a report from May 2005, discusses the results of a "Joint Interrogation Project" between the Coalition and Iraqi Police. Here, three detainees were hung by their wrists and beaten all over their bodies until they confessed to acts of terrorism. A medical examination confirmed their injuries. The reaction to this by Coalition personnel was consistent with many of the response patterns discussed already: no investigation was required or conducted beyond filing a field report (IWL: 29/5/05).

The above example directly contravenes FRAGO 242, which stipulates that if Coalition forces were involved in any way with the abuse then a full investigation must be initiated, which more often than not was not forthcoming. This was also the case when a detainee reported that members of the Iraqi Police in the presence of Coalition soldiers had beaten him with a "four-foot pipe". However, this incident stands out more than others as, after the Iraqi Police had finished beating the detainee, a Coalition soldier, described as a "white male", proceeded to exact his own punishment on the detainee by repeatedly kicking him, whilst a female soldier, described as "short, stocky, with blonde hair", attempted to stop him (IWL: 29/6/06). The policy of no investigation was continued in this example, despite the requirement to investigate allegations of abuse by Coalition forces. This is arguably even more important when Coalition forces are torturing detainees in conjunction with Iraqi forces, given that those Iraqi forces are learning how they are expected to treat detainees within the "new" Iraq from their Coalition allies. If, in observing this behaviour, they can see that the de-humanisation, abuse and torture of prisoners is considered acceptable conduct, then there is no reason for them to behave any differently and, judging from the scale of torture in Iraqi detention facilities, they did not behave in any other way than that which was expected of them (Tanner, 2011).

It seems, then, that even when Coalition forces were involved directly or indirectly with the allegations of abuse, the directives outlined within FRAGO 242 were not followed with any consistency. They were applied in an *ad hoc* fashion, as is the prerogative of those who

define the rules governing states of exception, unless Coalition forces were not involved at all, in which case the order not to investigate was more often than not followed to the letter. As Becker (1964:12) argues, "the degree to which an act will be treated as deviant depends…on who commits the act". But perhaps more importantly in the case of Iraq, the application of the deviant label and its associated sanctions depends upon "who feels he has been harmed by [the act]". Given that the victims of these acts tended to be Iraqis of little social status (arguably applicable to all Iraqis outside of those holding public positions in occupied Iraq), or those defined as the violent other through their designation as "anti-Iraqi forces" (Young, 2007, Kilcullen, 2009), the application of the deviant label was largely absent, allowing the behaviour to persist within the culture of impunity afforded to the deviancy enacted, alongside its actors and instigators in Iraq. This also appears to be the case when media correspondents, embedded with the US military, compiled photographic evidence of incidents of the abuse they encountered.

In December 2006, an Iraqi Army detachment, in a joint patrol with US forces, detained three men who were found transporting a mortar in their vehicle. An initial confrontation at the scene of the arrest, where one of the detainees attempted to grab the weapon of one of the Iraqi Army soldiers, resulted in appropriate force being utilised to control the situation. However, while en route to "Forward Operating Base Hawk", the Iraqi Army detachment pulled over to the side of the road and removed one of the detainees from the vehicle. Pushing him to the ground, he was punched, kicked and beaten with the butt of an AK47 assault rifle, in full view of the on-looking US forces, who made no attempt to intervene. Later, on arrival at the military base, the embedded reporter showed pictures of the incident to the "patrol leader", who referred him to the "Battalion Public Affairs Officer", instead of initiating an investigation (IWL: 30/12/06, see also: 3/8/05). This implies that, as there was no indication of an investigation into this incident within the report, and no photos of this abuse have appeared within the mainstream media, the public affairs officer persuaded the embedded journalists that this incident was not something that required reporting to their editors, arguably due to the detainees' label as anti-Iraqi forces; nor did it require further investigation, as the incident had been observed, reported and filed. This is also an indication of the greater control applied to war correspondents by US forces in the years after Vietnam. As far as is possible, the mainstream media are printing the appropriate story, constructing an appropriate wartime narrative (Hallin, 1989, Jeffords and Rebinovitz, 1994, see also: Altheide, 2009, Kellner, 2004 on the Iraq War and Pilgers 2010 documentary, *The War you*

don't see, which critiques embedded journalism, from the Vietnam War, into the present day).

In summary, Coalition personnel worked closely with indigenous Iraqi forces during the process of re-training and re-deploying the Iraqi Army and Police. Likewise, the example that Coalition personnel set for their Iraqi counterparts was generally consistent, reinforcing a particular approach to counter-insurgency and the treatment and interrogation of detainees. However, as the War Logs make clear, the consistent approach that the Iraqi forces became accustomed to was one that condoned and positively reinforced the mistreatment of the targets of counter-insurgency operations, both during their detention and in the interrogations that followed. From this, two points can be made: first, despite the Coalition's full awareness of the serious mistreatment of detainees in the custody of Iraqi forces, they continued to hand over detainees to those forces. This suggests that the observation of human rights was not one of the Coalition's primary concerns during the occupation, despite this being cited as one of the primary reasons for invading Iraq after weapons of mass destruction were found to be conspicuous by their absence. This amounts to collusion and complicity in crimes of the state (Jamieson and McEvoy, 2005). Secondly, it is clear that Iraqi Forces quickly learnt through differential association (Sutherland, 1940) that the observation of international conventions on human rights was not something that required their attention. This resulted in a consistent pattern of torture and abuse by Iraqi Forces, either operating alone or side-by side with the Coalition, who themselves were more than capable of carrying out their own parallel acts of deviance.

2.3 Torture and abuse of detainees by Coalition forces

Although less prominent within the War Logs than reports associated with their Iraqi allies, Coalition forces made some significant contributions to the torture and abuse of detainees. Whilst Hamm's (2007) discussion of the abuses carried out at Abu Ghraib prison suggests that abuses by US forces represented a *modus operandi*, emanating directly from the top of the US Government,[165] it does not illustrate the scope of these abuses, which stretched beyond the confines of a prison complex and into the day-to-day operations of Coalition

---

[165] Additionally, Major General Antonio Taguba's (2004) investigation into these abuses found the behaviour to be 'systematic', although stopped short of suggesting a doctrinal consistency to the actions.

Forces. Naomi Klein (2007) cites this routine resort to coercive violence as a primary aspect of her concept of the "shock doctrine", a methodological approach to the neo-liberal restructuring of state economies. This section will consider in particular the abuse of detainees.

Within the reports there were several notable instances of detainees being abused by Coalition soldiers prior to their transfer into custody, none of which led to an inquiry into the alleged mistreatment. These abuses included: the choking and assault of multiple restrained detainees (IWL: 23/5/07); the removal of all of the detainees' clothes before being kicked into submission and transported back to the units base for questioning (IWL: 26/2/08); kicking restrained and blindfolded detainees in the back of the neck (IWL: 12/3/06); kicking and punching detainees in chest, legs and arms before forcing "hands down the detainees throat" (IWL: 6/6/06b) and, more generally, the consistent physical abuse and excessive use of force against detainees, during detention operations country-wide (see: IWL: 14/9/05, 28/11/05, 2/12/05, 3/12/05, 6/12/05, 10/12/05, 5/5/06, 22/5/09).

However, some incidents were investigated. For example, in January 2007, a detainee was taken from his home whilst he was sleeping. Once taken outside, he had one part of his body, (redacted, presumably his head), beaten against the side of his house before receiving punches to his "face, on his sides, in his abdominal region and on his back". On arrival at a police station, the abuse continued. He was violently assaulted "for approximately thirty minutes", before the ordeal came to an end (IWL: 25/1/07, see also: 12/7/06, 1/2/07, 3/2/07, 23/11/07). However, as already noted, the decision to investigate incidents of abuse was remarkably inconsistent, and from the field reports seen in this research, investigations in the wake of abuse allegations were the exception rather than the norm.

The cases of abuse carried out by Coalition Forces considered thus far have largely referred to abuses at the point of capture, where some element of force would be expected should detaining forces encounter resistance. However, many of the incidents discussed above were carried out post-capture, once the detainee had already been immobilised, meaning that there was no justification for the resort to violence as the detainees no longer posed a potential threat. This clearly violates IHL and, in particular, the rights of prisoners to be treated humanely and with dignity during armed conflict (Kramer and Michalowski, 2005),

proscribed within the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (No. III), which more specifically prohibit:

> "Violence to life and person, in particular murder…mutilation, cruel treatment and torture…outrages to personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment".

One such example from custody states that a detainee was restrained and blindfolded during questioning, beaten with a pipe and punched, kicked and slapped on all areas of his body by Coalition forces during interrogation (IWL: 11/7/06). A later medical exam revealed injuries consistent with the allegations. Another example reports that a detainee, after being detained and interrogated by Marines,[166] was then transferred to a cell where he was restrained and blindfolded before the Marines "began kicking him and hitting him with a stick on his chest…and back". The report also describes other activities that were redacted, but confirms that the allegation was serious enough to warrant investigation, although beyond gathering evidence, there is no indication of the outcome of this investigation (IWL: 26/8/05).

In another incident near Ramadi in October 2005, in which evidence cited within the reports included "three witness statements…two scars and marks sheets…[and] digital photos" alongside medical reports, confirms the abuse that took place which consisted of detainees being kicked over much of their bodies and beaten with soldiers' helmets (IWL: 11/10/05a). A second report further corroborates the abuses cited within the first (IWL: 30/11/05). Similar evidence of a separate incident was observed by the mounted camera on an Apache Helicopter, which observed a Coalition soldier kicking a suspected insurgent on the right-hand side of his body after the insurgent had already surrendered and was kneeling with his hands behind his head (IWL: 14/8/06). Likewise, Amnesty (2005) confirms in its annual review of Iraq that Coalition forces had been responsible for human rights abuses, including arbitrary detentions and the torture and abuse of detainees (see also: UNAMI human rights report, 1st May-30th June 2006, 1st July-31st August 2006).

UNAMI also notes that detainees based in Coalition detention facilities were held in custody for extended periods without charge, judicial review of their cases, or access to legal

---

[166] The report notes that he was treated well during his initial detention and interrogation.

representation, consistent with IHL. The US Government's position on this issue remains consistent with its declaration of the state of exception within Iraq and parallels the conditions of detainees in Guantanamo Bay: IHL does not apply to security-orientated detentions by Coalition forces in Iraq. However, this assertion is based upon the distinction of insurgents as illegal combatants, despite the right of the Iraqi people to resist armed occupation. As a result, detainees should be subject to the same human rights as any other person within an armed conflict, including the due process associated with IHL (UNAMI, human rights report, 1st September-31st October 2005, 1st November-31st December 2005, 1st April-30th June 2007, 1st July-31st December 2007).

To summarise, although the data collected from the IWL indicates that Iraqi forces carried out the majority of incidents of torture and abuse of prisoners/detainees, it is also clear that the abuses carried out by Iraqi forces would not have been possible without the assistance, both directly and indirectly, of the Coalition military. These are examples of collusion, as conceptualised by Jamieson and McEvoy (2005), whether this be this the act of turning a blind eye to the violent mistreatment of detainees, or not acting with sufficient diligence to prevent further abuses at Iraqi administered detention facilities once torture and abuse had been uncovered. However, the Coalition also contributed to the abuse of detainees, either when working in tandem with Iraqi forces or of their own volition, in a similar vein to those publicised at Abu Ghraib (Danner, 2004, Hersh, 2004, Hamm, 2007).

As discussed throughout this section of the analysis, the torture and abuse of prisoners by Iraqi and Coalition forces can be partly explained through the immunity from prosecution granted to Coalition personnel through CPA Order 17 and Executive Order 13303. This meant that Coalition forces could conduct the occupation in the full knowledge that they were virtually immune from all legal sanctions against their actions, unless, as was the case in Abu Ghraib, these actions reached the forefront of the public's imagination. In which case, prosecutions under military law would be inevitable due to national and international outrage at the incidents. This enabled Coalition forces to act collectively when defying IHL.

The abuses detailed above are the responsibility of the US, both through its creation of a state of exception within Iraq and the resulting impunity, created in its wake. The US failed to fulfil its obligations as an occupying power to ensure the humane treatment of detainees, both by its own personnel and by those Iraqis entrusted as proxy forces.

3. Beyond torture and detainee abuse: further evidence of the direct involvement in state crimes by Coalition forces

The Coalition military undoubtedly faced a difficult challenge to maintain security in the wake of its invasion of Iraq. They faced mounting civilian distrust of the Coalition occupation and its motives, and a growing insurgency that was created out of the marginalization of the Sunni in the wake of CPA Orders 1, 2, 4, and 5. These challenges were exacerbated by an aggressive, enemy-centric approach to counter-insurgency and the provision of security throughout Iraq, as already noted.

However, IHL (also referred to as the Rules of Armed Conflict) governed the invasion and occupation of Iraq by the Coalition military. These laws require those involved in an armed conflict to make clear distinctions at all times between combatants and civilians. This means that civilians and civilian buildings may not be targeted and operations may only be directed against military objectives (Human Rights Watch, 2003). Allowances to these rules may be made in some circumstances, for example, if targeting civilian infrastructures "offers a definite military advantage" (Ibid). However, this consideration is tempered by the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks against military objectives, which do not attempt to make any distinction between civilians, civilian infrastructure and legitimate military targets. Inherent to this latter point is the concept of proportionality; where attacks are considered as indiscriminate or loss of civilian life was excessive in relation to the defined military advantage achieved (Ibid). In summary, military involvement in conflicts is governed by the principle of protecting civilians and civilian infrastructure from harm, to which end, a series of precautions must be observed, including: ensuring that targets are positively identified as enemy combatants or infrastructure before acting, taking all feasible precautions to limit civilian loss of life, applying the appropriate methods to ensure this or refraining from launching attacks that would cause unjustifiable loss of civilian life (Ibid).[167]

---

[167] Clearly these rules are open to interpretation within armed conflict, both during and after the event however, they do provide a guideline by which the actions of Coalition forces may be assessed, in conjunction with the theoretical foundations already laid out within this discussion. Additionally, the point was made at a meeting of the UN Security Council that the Coalition and Iraqi forces, were particularly responsible for ensuring their actions were in full accordance with international human rights and humanitarian law, stating that the UN was deeply concerned at the continued reports of violations of these standards (15th June 2006).

With the above rules governing armed conflict in mind, we will now consider some of the actions sampled from the IWL that constitute violations of these rules; amounting therefore to state crimes as defined by the criminological literature (see for example: Chambliss, 1989, Barak, 1990, Green and Ward, 2000). The discussion will consider in turn: 1) the Coalition's neglect of the procedures regarding the escalation of force at road-based checkpoints, 2) the indiscriminate use of airpower, and 3) the rejection of many of the above rules of armed conflict during the siege of Fallujah in 2004.

3.1 The neglect of escalation of force procedures by Coalition forces at checkpoints

Escalation of force procedures were laid down in a detailed manual governing rules of engagement for US forces operating in Iraq. IHL contends that armed forces must follow these procedures to the letter.[168] The procedures governing escalation of force stated that all effort should be made at checkpoints to gain the attention of approaching vehicles or people. These included audio and visual warnings that, in the event of failure, may be followed by shots fired into the air or in the vicinity of the approaching target. If these actions failed, then Coalition forces were authorised to fire at tyres and/or the engine of an approaching vehicle. If this also failed, only then were they authorised to use deadly force against the occupants (US–Iraq Consolidated ROE, 2005).

However, these procedures often went unobserved. For example, in August 2006, a civilian vehicle containing a women and her child strayed accidentally into a checkpoint area. The vehicle was instantly fired upon, killing the child and injuring the female driver (IWL: 28/8/06). Another incident from September 2008 was considered to be a "suspicious incident", as escalation of force procedures were not followed, resulting in the death of an Iraqi man (IWL: 12/9/08a). Yet another incident in which escalation of force procedures were not followed occurred in April 2007, in which a local national was killed whilst driving his truck towards a checkpoint. The report concludes by saying that no vehicle bearing improvised explosive devices were discovered, implying that the vehicle had been "stopped" due to the fears associated with these devices, combined with the enemy-centric approach to counter-insurgency, which focused on stopping perceived threats and not on the safety of

---

[168] Although as a result of the state of exception created pre and post-invasion of Iraq, the rules of engagement laid down within this manual can be considered to be fairly perfunctory.

civilians (IWL: 1/4/07, see also: IWL: 27/11/06, 28/8/08, 12/9/08b, 18/12/09). In addition, the associated Iraqi Army and security forces were also responsible for several notable incidents in which escalation of force procedures were not observed. This was due to inadequate effort to fire disabling, as opposed to lethal, shots. For example the Iraqi Army shot into the cab of a Tanker truck that had already passed through the checkpoint (IWL: 15/9/08, see also: IWL: 15/2/07, IWL: 8/6/07). The Iraqi Army was also involved in shooting into the cab of a fuel truck after one warning shot had been fired, resulting in the death of a child (IWL: 8/6/07). Finally, a local man was killed by the Iraqi Army after his car was alleged to be "speeding towards the checkpoint" (IWL: 16/1/07).

In summary, escalation of force procedures were not followed and were insufficient in the environment of occupied Iraq. The war had made far more enemies than friends through its aggressive prosecution, resulting in insurgents forming an integral, shadowy aspect of the environment, including some being embedded within the Iraqi Army and Police. This meant that Coalition forces and their Iraqi counterparts were very quick to resort to lethal force at checkpoints, rather than taking due care in establishing whether their targets were legitimate or not, as they were far more concerned with force protection.[169] This is an understandable reaction for an untrained civilian but not the role of a highly-trained soldier. Secondly, the civilians moving towards these checkpoints were extremely wary of the people they were approaching, with both Iraqi and Coalition forces responsible for large numbers of civilian casualties, disappearances and, as already noted, acts of torture and abuse. As a result, civilians approaching checkpoints would have been understandably fearful, potentially leading to erratic behaviour if those manning the checkpoints started waving their weapons in the air before firing them (see IWL: 14/6/05a, 11/12/05, 16/1/07).

Given these circumstances, it may be argued that the escalation of force procedures did not sufficiently seek to limit civilian casualties or adequately distinguish between civilians and legitimate threats, as required by the rules governing armed conflict. To this end, David Petraeus sought to amend the existing escalation of force procedures after 2006 (Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 2010), in conjunction with his adaptations to the counter-insurgency doctrine applied to Iraq, which endeavoured to move towards a people-centric approach to the insurgency. However, these amendments appeared to be insufficient, as many of the

---

[169] The principle of ensuring their own well being before that of the civilians they were charged with protecting.

reports outlined above occurred after this change in approach. This is further evidenced by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism's estimate that 80% of deaths from escalation of force incidents comprised civilian casualties; whereas, by contrast, only 14% were positively-identified insurgents (2010). This analysis suggests a violation of the rules of armed conflict by both occupying and indigenous forces and, as such, constitutes state crime.

3.2 The indiscriminate use of airpower by Coalition forces

Rules of armed conflict violations were not limited to the problems associated with escalation of force procedures. The application of airpower, a valued weapon within the Coalition's armoury, was often applied indiscriminately against supposed insurgents or buildings suspected of containing insurgents, without any positive identification of targets. One key example of the failure to positively identify a legitimate target before authorising the use of lethal force is found in the War Logs in July 2007. Here an Apache[170] engages what it believes are up to 9 "AIF"[171]. However, the report clearly states that the pilots could not "PID [positively identify] shooter" yet were still authorised to open fire. The result of this incident listed 17 total casualties, including 2 wounded civilians, 2 wounded "enemies" and 13 "enemies" killed (IWL: 12/7/07). However, this incident served to draw significant attention to the conduct of Coalition forces during the occupation, as Wikileaks released a video matching the report showing the Apache gunning down a group of civilians, who included Reuter's photographer Namir Noor Eldeen and his driver. This illustrates the importance of the positive identification requirement of the rules governing armed conflict. A similar event involved an Apache strike on an "unidentified enemy", classified as such because their movements matched the Coalition's analysis of enemy "tactics, techniques and procedures". However, once again, no positive identification was made and maximum force was utilised, resulting in the target's death (IWL: 20/8/07). Additionally, Amnesty International (2008) also identified the use of indiscriminate and excessive force by Coalition helicopters, after being sent to target one man suspected of abducting Coalition soldiers. The helicopters fired upon and killed 13 civilians in the process.

---

[170] Referred to in the War Logs with the aggressive nicknames "Black Death" or "Crazy Horse".
[171] An acronym for "Anti Iraqi Forces".

The UN has also confirmed multiple incidents in which the use of excessive force in civilian areas via targeted air strikes resulted in avoidable casualties and civilian displacement. One of the most notable incidents among those described by the UN concerns the deaths of seven children when US helicopters opened fire upon a school in a village near Diyala (UNAMI human rights report, 1st April-30th June 2007). Drawing attention to the requirement by law for all parties involved in the conflict to take all effective measures to minimize civilian casualties, the reports indicate that these tactics amount to violations of international law and a denial of the protection of human rights (see: UNAMI human rights report, 1st September-31st October 2005,[172] 1st May-30th June 2006, 1st July–31st August, 2006, 1st January-31st March 2007, 1st July-31st December 2007).

Another example illustrating the lack of concern for civilian life demonstrated by the failure to positively identify targets occurred after small arms fire was received by a Coalition patrol. The patrol could not positively identify the shooter other than stating that there may be "possible AIF" in the vicinity. Despite this, the report states that a "gun run"[173] was carried out. This halted the small arms fire, but also killed fourteen civilians in the process (IWL: 16/7/07, see also: IWL: 14/6/05b, 5/12/05, 21/5/08). In addition to this, in November 2005, Iraqi Security Forces uncovered the bodies of 25 civilian men, women and children from areas attacked by Coalition forces. The ground forces involved claimed to have positively identified insurgents in all locations where civilian bodies were recovered, but no effort was made to assess whether civilians would be targeted by the air strikes that followed (IWL: 11/11/05). Finally, the War Logs describe the gunning down of two insurgents who were attempting to surrender to a Coalition Apache helicopter. However, the Apache pilots were advised – without justification – that it was not possible for enemy combatants to surrender to aircraft and were advised to pursue and terminate these "valid targets". Both men were listed as killed in action (IWL: 22/2/07). This action alone is in clear breach of Article 3 of the Fourth Geneva Convention that states:

"Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of the armed forces who have laid down their arms…shall in *all circumstances* be treated humanely".

---

[172] Referred to here as the resort to 'aerial bombardment'.
[173] A gun run refers to airborne forces strafing an area indiscriminately with massive amounts of firepower.

In reviewing the above evidence, it is possible to argue with some certainty that Coalition forces, at least in these incidents, violated the rules of armed conflict through their failure to positively identify legitimate targets. Therefore, Coalition forces failed in their obligations under international law to effectively discriminate between civilians and enemies. Instead, overwhelming force was deployed, resulting in disproportionate levels of civilian casualties, which by law could and should have been avoided. Similar incidents were seen during the first Coalition siege of Fallujah to which our analysis will now turn.

3.3 Coalition actions during the siege of the city of Fallujah

The first siege of the city of Falluja, in April 2004, was conducted in response to the much publicised murders of four Blackwater contractors after their convoy was ambushed driving through the city, as well as the killing of five US soldiers in the area. In response, Paul Bremer issued a rallying cry to Coalition forces and the watching world:

"The [security] situation is not going to improve until we clean out Falluja. In the next ninety days it is vital to show that we mean business". (2006:314–315)

The results were dramatic. On the 5th April 2004, US Marines began to lay siege to the city with the objective of removing all opposition elements (primarily Sunni insurgents). However, such was the ferocity with which the operation was conducted that civilian casualties were proportionally very high. This was due primarily to Coalition forces neglecting to ensure that targets were positively identified as enemies, in conjunction with the use of overwhelming indiscriminate force to pacify the city. This is illustrated within the sample by several incidents, including the destruction of five buildings in response to a squad of Marines receiving small arms fire and an RPG. Calling in air-support, their response may best be described as disproportionate:

"CAS responded and fired 2 x Hellfire missiles, 14 x 2.75 Rockets and approx 2000 x 7.62/50 Cal Rounds. The enemy fire was neutralised and a total of five buildings were destroyed" (IWL: 28/4/2004).

The action, although effective, took no consideration of civilian casualties, a requirement under IHL, nor did the report mention casualty numbers of any kind, something that is

184

indicative of the approach adopted by the forces that entered the city (see also: IWL: 20/4/04, 21/4/04). Only one report makes any mention whatsoever of the city's civilian presence. On 10th April 2004, Coalition forces received small arms fire from numerous houses that "contained non-combatants". Over the course of the day, 27 "enemies" were killed in action. However, the report indicates that at least 11 of these "enemies" were wearing "xxx head-dresses and xxxxx xxxxxx sneakers", implying that these "enemies" were in fact female civilian casualties (IWL: 10/4/04). This pattern of disinterest in the lives of the civilians still present in Fallujah continued throughout the siege. Coalition forces made full use of their air-power in the absence of the positive identification of enemy targets (IWL: 17/4/04) or knowledge of the location of fire being received. This led to the arbitrary destruction of buildings, often to remove one unidentified gunmen whose location was unspecified (IWL: 15/4/04). Given the presence of civilians still in the city, the levels of civilian casualties were likely to be high as a result of the indiscriminate nature of the offensive, something that was further exemplified in the second siege of the city, which took place between November and December of that year.

Prior to entering the city, the residents were advised to leave by Coalition forces. However, 50,000 civilians remained within the city, having nowhere more secure to go. Parker (2006:24), quoting a US Colonel, illustrates the way in which those remaining in the city were considered by Coalition forces: "anyone still in the city [after the aerial bombardment] will be regarded as a potential insurgent", despite there only being an estimated 2,000-3,000 insurgents spread among the remaining civilians. At the conclusion of the siege, the Red Crescent indicated that around 800 civilian deaths had been caused; by comparison 1,200 insurgents had been killed or captured (Prosser, 2004). Although estimates of the civilian death toll were difficult to make due to the US military's policy of not counting civilian casualties (Rumsfeld, 2004).

When considering the military advantage achieved in Fallujah against the number of civilian casualties and the massive destruction of civilian infrastructure, it can be argued that the Coalition's attack on Fallujah did not meet international standards of humanitarian law for three key reasons. Firstly, the assault was largely indiscriminate, making little distinction between civilians, civilian infrastructure and military targets. Secondly, Coalition forces

failed to consistently positively identify their targets before firing [174], finally, the indiscriminate nature of the attacks caused disproportionate civilian loss of life and property that did not match the gains made to military objectives. These objectives, defined through the wider scope of the war, were to strike a significant blow against insurgent operations in Iraq. However, given that the insurgency did not peak in ferocity until 2006, the violent siege of Fallujah further exacerbated the insurgency. This is another example of Kilcullen's (2009) critique that the approach taken to counter-insurgency in Iraq prior to the troop surge served to turn more people into insurgents than actually countering the insurgency.

Further evidence of the indiscriminate use of force by Coalition forces is found outside of the siege of Fallujah. Here Coalition soldiers were found to shoot at civilians in unprovoked attacks whilst out on patrol. These actions led to the target either being wounded (IWL: 2/7/05, 24/5/09), killed (IWL: 11/10/05b, 2/11/05b, 4/11/05, 30/12/05, 16/3/06b, 24/5/08, 9/6/08, 28/5/09) or left with damage to their vehicles (IWL: 21/11/05). UNAMI also notes that Coalition ground forces have been implicated in the consistent unlawful killing of civilians during "raid and search" operations (UNAMI human rights report, 1st January-28th February 2006, 1st March-30th April 2006[175], 1st May-30th June 2006, 1st April-30th June 2007). One prominent example concerns the killing of 24 civilians by US soldiers, in Haditha in November 2005, in which the US Marine Corp concluded that all murder charges would be dismissed for lesser charges, despite the unprovoked, targeted nature of the killings (UNAMI human rights report, 1st May-30th June 2006, 1st April-30th June, 2007, 1st July – 31st December 2007). Another report implicates Coalition snipers positioned on rooftops, shooting to kill anyone caught in the streets after an imposed curfew, killing 6 civilians and injuring 7 near Ramadi (UNAMI human rights report, 1st July – 31st August, 2006). Once more, these examples display a lack of concern for civilian life consistent with the dehumanisation of Iraqi civilians by Coalition forces during the occupation.

---

[174] The US military approach to the siege harked back to Vietnam, in which it was rationalised that the only way to save towns from the Vietcong was to destroy them: 'I really hate that it [Falluja] had to be destroyed. But that was the only way to root these guys out...The only way to root them out is to destroy everything in your path' (Captain Paul Fowler, US Infantry 1st Division, quoted by Parker (2006:23).

[175] This report also indicates, that in one prominent incident, in which 15 civilians were found to have been shot by US Marines, after a Marine had been killed by a roadside bomb, the US forces had originally attempted to cover-up the incident. Reporting that a bomb blast had killed the civilians, it took the discovery of a video by a local NGO, to force US Marines to admit to the killings.

Bringing this section to a close, it is clear from the evidence discussed above that Coalition forces were responsible for violations of IHL, due to an aggressive, indiscriminate approach to military objectives, which amounted to crimes of the state.[176] However, further explanatory value may be derived from the state of exception created within post-invasion Iraq, which protected Coalition forces from prosecution by both Iraqi authorities and external bodies (Whyte, 2007, 2010, Welch, 2008). This created a culture in which US forces understood that their actions would typically not lead to legal sanction unless prompted by widespread public demand. However, given the seriously limited reporting of state criminality in Iraq by the mainstream media (until the release of the IWL), this demand for legal action was not created. Taking these points together, we can see both how these incidents were made possible and why, to this point, very few Coalition military personnel, or governing figures, have faced trial for war crimes in Iraq.[177] The discussion will return to the role of Coalition personnel during the occupation through an analysis of the actions of military contractors in section five. However, we will now consider the role played by militias operating as officially sanctioned active forces within the counter-insurgency war.

4. Evidence of state crimes by officially sanctioned militias in Iraq

On 6th July 2004, Paul Bremer signed into law CPA Order 91 authorising the co-opting of Iraqi militias into the existing Iraqi security forces within the Ministries of Interior and Defence. In a programme that bears similarities to previous US-led counter-insurgency operations[178], indigenous militias were armed and trained by Coalition forces and utilised to target insurgents and their supporters. The programme in Iraq bought about the creation of "sponsored insurgent groups", such as the Wolf Brigade and Special Police Commandos, confirmed by the IWL[179] (6/1/06, 6/2/06, 4/3/06), operating primarily out of the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) under the auspices of Bayan Jabr Solagh, a former leader of the Badr

---

[176] Beyond the consistent involvement in torture and detainee abuse already discussed.

[177] UNAMI noted with "grave concern" that cases of assassinations, torture and detainee abuse, by a range of Coalition and indigenous groups were frequently under-investigated if at all (Human Rights Report, 1st March – 30th April, 2006).

[178] Jamieson and McEvoy (2005:509) argue that this approach to counter-insurgency sets America apart from other countries. Citing McClintock (1992), they argue that US Special Forces and the CIA are regularly responsible for the training and deployment of indigenous forces as a primary tactic in counter-insurgency conflicts, with "pro-state paramilitary death squads…[operating] in jurisdictions like Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua and other places".

[179] Also corroborated by Amnesty International (2007), noting that Iraqi Security Forces operating out of the Ministry of the Interior, linked closely to Shi'a militias from whom their numbers were drawn, were involved in "death squad style killings".

Brigade militia, appointed head of the MOI after the January 2005 elections (Hubbard, 2007, Mowle, 2006). The Coalition were fully aware of their activities and operations (IWL: 30/5/05, 6/6/05, 17/6/05a), often working in conjunction with each other (IWL: 26/12/04, 28/12/04, 22/4/05, 16/6/05, 17/6/05b, 2/11/05c, 28/1/06[180]), or ensuring that the militias reported operations back to Coalition forces (IWL: 30/5/05). The War Logs indicate that the upshot of the introduction of militias into the counter-insurgency war was the creation of death squads,[181] assassination teams and MOI-run illegal detention facilities. In a similar vein to the Iraqi Army and Police, militias running these facilities tortured and abused detainees, and often handed over to them by Coalition forces. The following exposition will consider some of the examples of these crimes borne out by the War Logs.

Several reports show the existence and operational activities of "Death Squads" and "Assassination Teams", primarily referred to as working out of the MOI (IWL: 25/11/06a, see also: IWL: 16/12/05, 15/5/06, 5/9/06). One report, from November 2005, indicates that 4-5 "assassination teams" working in the southern city of Basra were drawn from multiple government departments and security institutions, including: the Iraqi Police, Iraqi Police Dept. of Internal Affairs, the Basra Intelligence Office, the Basra Governors Office and the MOI. The report states that these groups represent a threat but no further action is suggested beyond documenting their existence (IWL: 16/11/05).

A further report from Baghdad, indicates the existence of a "command and control cell" working from within the MOI, carrying out assassinations and attacks with improvised explosives, as well as spying on the Iraqi Police and Government officials (IWL: 20/11/05). Another report shows signs of MOI death squads operating in conjunction with the Jaysh al

---

[180] Referred to in this example as a "Joint Coordination Cell" pertaining to the close working relationship with Coalition forces. Here MOI commandos and Coalition forces were working together to detain a "high value target" (see also: IWL:5/3/06).

[181] Former UN Chief Inspector of Human Rights in Iraq John Pace confirmed the existence of death squads operating out of the MOI. He noted their similarity to the behaviour of death squads in South America, which the US had been responsible for training through the School of the Americas (Pilger, 2007). John Negroponte, the man in charge of the CIA's death squad programme in South America was named the US Ambassador to Iraq on 19th April 2004. Pace argued: "My observations would confirm that…we saw numerous instances where the behaviour of death squads was very similar, uncannily similar to that we observed in other country's, including El Salvador… Regrettably hardly any of this violence is ever investigated or followed up. So I would say yes, there are death squads [in Iraq]. They do follow a pattern in Iraq" (John Pace interviewed by *Democracy Now*, February 28th 2006).

Mahdi, a militia unaffiliated with the Coalition or the new Iraqi government.[182] The report states that the groups were moving towards Baghdad to conduct kidnap, torture and execution operations against Sunni civilians, in reprisal for alleged "sniper attacks" on Jaysh al Mahdi militia members (IWL: 20/8/06). Two further reports indicate the continued cooperation between MOI "assassination teams" and the Jaysh al Mahdi militia conducting operations in Baghdad (IWL: 24/9/06, 25/11/06b). UNAMI also notes that death squad activity has been present within militias operating directly out of the MOI, leading to extrajudicial executions, mass detentions and torture (UNAMI, human rights report, 1st January-28th February 2006).

The IWL also indicate cooperation between the Iraqi Army and militias as observed by a Coalition "security patrol" outside of a town whose location is unspecified. The report describes Iraqi families fleeing the town whilst the Iraqi Army and accompanying militias proceeded to execute "local nationals" and fire their weapons indiscriminately into the town. The observing Coalition forces did not engage what can only be described as a death squad in action, instead remaining passive observers, recording the incident and neglecting to count the number of civilians injured or killed as a result of the action, indicated by the statement "civilian battle damage assessment unknown" recorded at the end of the report (IWL: 14/5/07). UNAMI human rights report (1st July–31st August 2005) provides further evidence of the death squad activities of forces working from the MOI illustrated within the War Logs. MOI forces were responsible for the extra-judicial killings of 36 men whose bodies appeared after their disappearance "blindfolded, handcuffed and bearing signs of torture". The report continues describing a similar incident, resulting in the bodies of 11 men reappearing dead at the "Medico Legal Institute" three days after their detention by MOI forces (see also: UNAMI human rights report, 1st September-31st October 2005,[183] 1st January-28th February 2006, 1st April-30th June 2007). Militias had also set up checkpoints where escalations of force procedures were not followed, resulting in civilian deaths (IWL: 28/10/06). Another report indicates that militias had also conducted the kidnapping of Government personnel (IWL: 19/8/07). Coalition personnel investigated neither of these incidents.

---

[182] Also known as the Mahdi Army the Shi'a militia movement led by Muqtada al Sadr (Dodge, 2007, Hubbard, 2007).
[183] This report also notes the involvement of Iraqi Army and Police forces, in kidnappings, extrajudicial killings and sectarian attacks.

Death squad activities were not the only crimes associated with the MOI militias whose responsibilities beyond fighting a counter-insurgency war also included the detention of suspected insurgents and their supporters. However, it was often the case that these operations led to mass, indiscriminate detentions of Iraqi civilians, denied due process, and subjected to torture and abuse for crimes that often amounted to no more than being Sunni or a member of another Iraqi minority (Amnesty International, 2006). For example, the UNAMI reports, "that members of the Turkomen, Arab and Kurdish communities…are victims of arbitrary detention under the accusation that they are "terrorists"". In many of these incidents, the report states that the families of detained individuals have no idea of their whereabouts for months on end and, if the detainees were released, they often reported that they had been tortured during their confinement (UNAMI human rights report, 1st July-31st August 2005, see also: 1st November – 31st December 2005, 1st March-30th April 2006, 1st May – 30th June 2006, 1st July-31st August 2006,[184] 1st January – 31st March 2007, 1st April - 30th June 2007). As the dates of these reports suggest, this process was ongoing throughout the occupation. This implies that little was done by the occupying Coalition or burgeoning Iraqi Government to ensure that the basic human rights of detainees were met. Whilst another report from 2005 states that the MOI continued to detain "hundreds" of Iraqi civilians "despite judicial order for their release" (UNAMI human rights report, 1st September - 31st October 2005).[185]

The IWL corroborate these reports, with one indicating the discovery of a "MOI illegal detention facility", containing detainees displaying "signs of torture" (IWL: 10/4/06). On this occasion, Coalition forces did conduct an investigation, but there was no indication that the facility had been shutdown as a result. Fitting with the pattern of complicity in these abuses, the investigation of crimes committed by MOI security forces was the exception rather than the norm. Other reports within the War Logs confirm the mass detention operations conducted by MOI commandos (27/11/05).[186] In another example, 70 Iraqis were detained

---

[184] This report also indicates the existence of an illegal detention facility in Al Jadariya, known as "Bunker", which Coalition forces had also been aware of, however, it must be noted, that Coalition forces did enact the closure of the facility. Although, how long they were aware of its existence before shutting it down, is not stated.. The facility was run by militias, with the full knowledge and cooperation of the Ministry of Interior, and was notable for the consistent torture of detainees, some of whom had died during the process.

[185] UNAMI also clarifies the authority of the MOI, stating that the ministry is only authorised to hold detainees for short periods of time. The responsibility for the detention of criminals and insurgents lies with the Ministry of Justice (Human Rights Report, 1st March – 30th April, 2006).

[186] In this example, Iraqi Police had been ordered to "stay clear of the area", whilst no specific reason is given for this order in the report, the order itself does seem inconsistent with the goals of the operation, whereby large scale detention operations could only be helped by the Iraqi Police whose job it is to detain criminals.

directly after an attack on a Special Police Commando unit and taken to a MOI detention facility (IWL: 26/6/05). Finally, in a report that bears the greatest similarity to the UNAMI, MOI personnel arrived at an Iraqi Police station with forged MOI prisoner transfer forms. Unaware of the forgeries until after the event, the Iraqi Police transferred 12 prisoners into their custody, 9 of the prisoners' bodies were later found bearing signs of torture, whilst 3 of the prisoners survived and were transferred to hospital (IWL: 22/2/06). As an additional sign of the impunity with which groups operating out of the MOI acted, a report from February 2005 describes 10 MOI personnel detaining 2 Iraqi Police Officers. Investigating allegations of abuse by MOI personnel, the officers were detained at the MOI and beaten by the MOI personnel until they were stopped by Iraqi Police reinforcements (IWL: 1/2/05). However, even though Coalition forces were fully aware of the conduct of the MOI commandos and their cooperation with non-affiliated Shi'a militias, they continued to transfer prisoners into their custody (IWL: 2/11/05a, 12/12/06).

Drawing this section to its conclusion, it can be argued that as a result of CPA Order 91, militias began to operate officially out of the MOI with the full knowledge and cooperation of Coalition forces. This is unsurprising given America's historical approach to counter-insurgency operations abroad, where indigenous militias have been consistently utilised to pacify insurgencies, from South America to Vietnam (Klein, 2007, Blakeley, 2009).[187] Likewise, prominent US officials in Iraq, such as US Ambassador to Iraq, John Negroponte, and Paul Bremer's deputy, Colonel James Steele, played prominent roles in the creation of death squads in El Salvador during the 80s and 90s. However, the deployment of militias in Iraq would not have been as easily implemented in the absence of the national state of exception[188] (Whyte, 2007, Welch, 2008). This meant that Iraq became a legislative blank slate, allowing the CPA to shape Iraqi law to its advantage. These laws provided an environment in which Shi'a militias became irregular security forces acting within an enemy-centric counter-insurgency (Kilcullen, 2009) that was focused upon Sunni Iraqis. In turn, the insurgency was itself exacerbated by the decision to disband the Iraqi Army and Police force, formerly staffed primarily by Sunnis (Order 2), and the orders to "de-Ba'athify" Iraq and to

---

[187] The importance of situating an analysis of state crime within historical processes will be discussed in detail in chapter seven.

[188] UNAMI (1st September 2005 – 31st October 2005) also expressed concern at the "continued extension of the state of emergency" in Iraq a pre-condition for the creation of states of exception (Agamben, 2005, Whyte, 2007, 2010).

seize the assets of former Ba'ath Party members (Order 1 and 4). At this point, Sunni Iraqis understandably felt that they were being made the scapegoats for years of abuses by Saddam Hussein and those at the top of the Ba'ath Party, fearing reprisals by Shi'a Iraqis as power was removed from the Sunni and placed largely in the hands of the Shi'a. One of the most damaging examples of this transfer of power was the decision to place a former Shi'a militia leader (Bayan Jabr Solagh) in control of the MOI (Mowle, 2006, Hubbard, 2007), where the Wolf Brigade and Special Police Commandos were based.

The evidence discussed here provides us with an analysis of the restructuring of Iraqi society, which created an environment focused on stamping out the insurgency at all costs, with officially sanctioned Shi'a militias co-opted and directly involved in the counter-insurgency war. These militias carried out crimes that were fully supported by the new Iraqi Government. In addition to the extra-judicial killings, abductions and torture practiced by the various death squads operating out of the MOI, Coalition forces were fully aware of these actions, and, based on the evidence discussed here, did very little to prevent them. This means that, in addition to the crimes committed by the death squads themselves, the Coalition were guilty of collusion in these actions. Jamieson and McEvoy (2005) argue that collusion, referring to the premise of fighting terror with terror, involves ignoring the violent and coercive acts of proxy forces, or encouraging these acts through the denial of responsibility for them.[189] As illustrated here, this was the case with regard to the militias working within the MOI, as Coalition forces often ignored their crimes and were directly responsible for their recruitment. Therefore, in a different manner to the process of collective action that led to the torture and abuse of detainees by the Iraqi Army and Police, the Coalition must take some responsibility for the crimes of the militias operating in Iraq, through their collusion in these actions. By contrast, there is evidence from both the IWL and human rights reports that associated Coalition forces, in the form of military contractors, were directly responsible for criminal acts against Iraqi civilians throughout the occupation, a topic that will form the final aspect of this analysis.

---

[189] This conforms to Green and Ward's (2000) understanding that criminology must extend its analysis beyond the realm of legalistic definitions of state criminality that are often too narrow and difficult to apply within states of exception. This theme will be returned to in chapter sevens discussion of a suggested theoretical approach to a cultural criminology of state crime.

5. Evidence of crimes by military contractors

During the occupation of Iraq, it was estimated that at their peak 100,000 military contractors were operating in the country, under various contracts linked to the Coalition (Hossein-Zadeh, 2007, Scahill, 2007). Their responsibilities ranged from activities as mundane as delivering kitchen equipment[190], to providing round-the-clock security to CPA head Paul Bremer (US Special Inspector General for Iraq, Quarterly Report, July 2004).[191] As a result, almost half of the active military personnel operating in Iraq were drawn from military contractors with the support of accompanying legislation. CPA Order 17 granted immunity to any form of prosecution under Iraqi legal processes to US contractors operating in Iraq:

> "Contractors shall be immune from Iraqi legal process with respect to acts performed by them pursuant to the terms and conditions of a Contract or any sub-contract thereto" (CPA Order No. 17, paragraph 3, p. 5).

This meant that military contractors working in Iraq were free to pursue the objectives of their contracts in any means they deemed necessary. In addition, their role traversed a grey area of occupational identity as they were operating legally under the employment of the US Defence Department, protected by exceptional legislation, with their behaviour and action ungoverned by military law or rules of engagement. In short, accountability was minimised. This creates a dual logic to understanding the actions of contractors on the ground in Iraq. Firstly, at the micro level of analysis, the actions and behaviour of the contractors in the course of their work is governed by two selfish motives: their own survival and the drive to do whatever is necessary to fulfil their contractual obligations. If these obligations are not fulfilled, they will not get paid and the company they work for may lose future lucrative contracts. Secondly, at the macro level of analysis, the opening-up of Iraq to military contractors allies itself to both the neo-liberal restructuring of the Iraqi economy (Whyte,

---

[190] The responsibility assigned to the contractors killed by Iraqi civilians near Fallujah that contributed to the decision to lay siege to the city (Scahill, 2007).

[191] The primary reason for the massive expansion in military outsourcing was the Rumsfeld Doctrine that sought to re-envision the structure of US military forces into the 21st century. This doctrine focused on the creation of a smaller more mobile force, ready for immediate deployment anywhere in the world, backed-up by unsurpassed military technology and devastating airpower, with the capacity to deploy extra forces as and when required. These extra forces it was argued could be drawn from the private sector (Scahill, 2007).

2007, Welch 2008) and Rumsfeld's objective of creating a leaner and cheaper US military (Scahill, 2007).

Naomi Klein (2007) sees this as one aspect of the "shock doctrine", or the application of the logic of business to military outsourcing, in a competitive marketplace restructured along neo-liberal economic policies. For Klein (Ibid), Iraq represented the new, unrestricted frontier that these companies were encouraged to exploit in the wake of the removal of more than a decade of economic sanctions. Klein argues, citing shock therapy economist, Thomas Friedman, that once Iraq's economy had been restructured, this would provide the catalyst for the remainder of the resource-rich region to follow.[192] This discussion will be tackled in more detail in the following chapter. However, it is the contention of this thesis that the counter-insurgency model discussed in this chapter conforms to Klein's characterisation of the shock doctrine approach to economic reform.

As a result, the state of exception within which military contractors operated in Iraq led to a complete disregard for the rules of war and the rule of law, exhibiting behaviour that displayed a level of bravado, arrogance and disrespect, to both indigenous Iraqis and their Coalition allies. This led to levels of unprofessionalism that had deadly consequences for those perceived to be in their way. We will now discuss the evidence that shows the consequences of these attitudes and behaviours for Iraqi civilians. Firstly, the discussion will consider some comparatively minor incidents in order to illustrate the lawlessness associated with the behaviour of military contractors in the course of their missions. Secondly, we will consider some specific examples where this behaviour led to multiple fatalities for which no prosecutions were bought due to the legal immunity afforded to US personnel.

Evidence gathered from the IWL makes it clear that military contractors working in Iraq had little respect for either the Coalition forces or Iraqis they encountered on a daily basis. The very presence of contractors in an area could lead to massive civilian casualties, as this alerted insurgents to opportunities to attack vulnerable targets (IWL: 10/3/08).[193] Contractors

---

[192] Utilising military power in order to induce widespread socio-economic reform is something that the US has historically operationalised, particularly in South America (Chomsky, 2003, Klein, 2007, Blakely, 2009), but also in previous interactions with the Middle East (Yergin, 1991, Klein, 2007, Gasiorowski, 2007, Mufit, 2007).

[193] This incident resulted in 1 civilian killed and a further 34 wounded, as insurgents attacked a hotel containing members of the World Health Organisation, with a Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED).

also showed disregard for the rules governing checkpoint procedures, endangering both Coalition forces and civilians. For example, Coalition contractor convoys regularly ignored checkpoint procedures, often attempting to drive straight through, ignoring all warnings given by forces manning the checkpoints and only stopping after rounds were fired towards the vehicles (IWL: 4/7/08, 16/7/08). However, in cases where Iraqi forces were manning checkpoints, contractors were known to drive straight through on returning, whilst returning fire in the process, showing an inherent lack of respect for the authority of Iraqi forces (IWL: 23/7/05, 30/12/06, 12/8/08a). Additionally, contractors would often approach checkpoints with such speed and recklessness in their attempts to pass straight through that accidents were caused, which resulted in damage to vehicles and equipment and injury to those manning the checkpoint (IWL: 4/11/07).[194] A similar incident involved a contractor convoy from the company Custer: Battles, shooting randomly as they passed through a checkpoint without stopping, and blocking the checkpoint. This resulted in Iraqi Police pursuing the convoy to their destination where they demanded compensation for the civilians who they had fired upon (IWL: 22/12/04). Compensation was also paid to an Iraqi family after a contractor convoy ran down and killed their child in front of them. The convoy stopped and gave the family money. However, legal action against the contractors, if possible, would have been more appropriate (IWL: 9/5/06).

Arguably, the most dangerous incident of this nature taken from the sample involved a security detachment from Blackwater ignoring a cordon and checkpoint set up by Coalition forces to protect passers-by from an IED dropped by a car. Placing their own lives at risk, those of Coalition forces in attendance and the lives of nearby civilians, the security detachment ignored the checkpoint, driving straight through the cordon, setting-off the explosives (IWL: 26/2/07). In this incident there were no recorded casualties. However, this serves as another example of the impunity with which contractors acted in Iraq: consistently ignoring the rules and regulations designed to bring about a semblance of safety and order within a chaotic and violent environment and allying themselves to nobody but the contract they were tasked with fulfilling.

---

[194] In this incident the contractor made no attempt to stop and check on the condition of the injured personnel, or help with the recovery of equipment damaged through their actions. The person manning the checkpoint had to be taken to Hospital but survived.

Another cluster of incidents tell us even more about the impunity with which military contractors acted and the lack of respect they had for the lives of the Iraqis whose country they were profiting from. Multiple reports from the War Logs describe military contractors resorting to the routine use of lethal force as a deterrent or precautionary measure, often directed at civilians.[195] These include firing their weapons towards civilians from the roadside (IWL: 15/3/05, 16/3/05, 2/9/05, 31/8/07); when driving into towns (IWL: 19/10/05); when driving in convoys at vehicles considered to be driving too close (IWL: 10/1/05,[196] 20/3/05, 30/4/05,[197] 13/1/09); and the negligent discharge of weapons displaying inadequate training (IWL: 21/5/09). UNAMI (Human Rights Report, 1st July – 31st December, 2007) also confirms several incidents of this nature. On 9th October 2007, contractors from Unity Resources Group killed two women after opening fire upon their vehicle; on the 18th October, an unnamed PMC convoy opened fire on a taxi, injuring 3 civilians; on the 10th November, contractors from Dyncorp International shot and killed a taxi driver, leaving the scene without reporting the fatality; finally, on the 19th November, an Iraqi woman was injured after an unprovoked shooting by contractors from the Almco company. Similar incidents are also described in the IWL.

For example, a report from September 2008 describes a military contractor convoy shooting a civilian twice in the chest, killing the man after he attempted to overtake the convoy in his taxi. The contractors attempted to cover up the incident, but the in-car recorder installed in their vehicle placed them at the location at the same time as the event. There was no indication of an investigation into this incident but the report warns that this event may "elicit political, media or international reaction" (IWL: 10/9/08). In a similar incident, Blackwater contractors were reported "shoot[ing]-up a civilian vehicle, rounds were also shot over [their] heads", resulting in the death of one occupant and injury to two others (IWL: 14/5/05, see also: IWL: 10/10/04, 2/5/06, 2/11/06). In yet another episode, a Coalition convoy with contractors from Global Risk Strategies was fired upon; however, no positive identification of the assailant could be made so the Coalition forces held fire. In contrast, the contractors

---

[195] Human Rights First (2008) estimates that military contractors have discharged their weapons towards civilians on hundreds of occasions, without warning or justification.

[196] Coalition forces observed this incident in its entirety but did not intervene, as they do not have the power to do so. As Brigadier General Karl Horst puts it: 'These guys run loose in this country and do stupid stuff. There's no authority over them, so you can't come down on them hard when they escalate force...They shoot people, and someone else has to deal with the aftermath' (Quoted in Human Rights First (2008:1).

[197] Contractor vehicle and the civilian car were driving in opposite directions on opposite sides of the road in this incident, which led to the civilian car ending up in a ditch. Contractors did not stop to discover impact of their actions, leaving a taxi driver to stop and take the injured driver to Hospital.

travelling with the convoy began indiscriminately returning fire, resulting in 3 civilians being killed and a further 8 wounded (see also: IWL: 9/4/05, 22/3/06).

At face value, this incident is itself a violation of IHL, amounting to the murder of Iraqi civilians through the use of excessive and indiscriminate force in response to an unidentified threat. However, when requested to assist Coalition forces with their investigation into the incident, Global Risk Strategies responded by saying that it is company policy "not to provide assistance to investigations once they have commenced" (IWL: 10/4/06). This example, more than any other within the data gathered from the War Logs, displays the lawlessness with which military contractors were able to act in Iraq, due to the state of exception in operation within its borders. This is something highlighted by the UN, who encouraged US authorities to investigate all credible reports of deaths caused by military contractors, and to establish effective mechanisms for accountability (UNAMI, Human Rights Report, 1st July-31st December 2007). These incidents also emphasise the othering of Iraqis by military contractors (Young, 2007, McCulloch and Pickering, 2009). This created a dehumanising philosophy, which resulted in Iraqis being treated as obstacles to negotiate in the pursuit of their contracts, instead of human beings with human rights.

Contractors were also responsible for a number of friendly fire attacks upon Iraqi forces. Several incidents within the sample describe military contractors firing unprovoked on uniformed and identifiable Iraqi Army personnel. In one incident, Iraqi Army soldiers were fired upon by contractors from inside a building, after attending a report that insurgents were based inside. The Iraqi Army safely cleared the building, surprised to find that the people firing on them were their allies (IWL: 27/3/06). A similar incident involved a contractor convoy firing upon Iraqi Army personnel as they drove past them (IWL: 17/1/05). In another incident, a contractor detachment from Sabre Group opened fire upon a civilian vehicle before turning their guns on Iraqi Army personnel as they manoeuvred to arrest them. However, within hours of their arrest a call was made to their employers who demanded their release, which the Iraqi Army, with no juridical oversight to hold them, complied with immediately (IWL: 3/2/07b).

The reports also detail operations where contractors and Iraqi forces were working together; however, the outcomes of these operations were less than ideal. Two examples gathered from the sample both take place in and around Baghdad Airport. The first describes contractors from Global Security, responsible for guarding the airport "Terminal, Towers and Airfield"

walking out of their job, which, according to the report, left the airport with a serious security problem (IWL: 7/9/05). Whilst the second incident, also involving Global Security in a joint operation with the Iraqi Army, led to a dispute between the Iraqi Army commander and contractor personnel in which one man was arrested. Global Security responded by deploying a roadblock that prevented access to Baghdad Airport. Although the report does not state how the dispute was resolved, given the legal status of contractor personnel it is reasonable to assume that the contractor who was detained was released relatively quickly, as at the time of writing the report the roadblock had been dispersed (IWL: 12/8/08b).

The legitimacy of these operations must also be questioned, as they constitute the use of unregulated, irregular military forces, which are in reality mercenaries legitimised through their contracts with the Coalition. However, if these mercenaries are deployed to conduct missions normally reserved for regular military personnel, then the same rules of armed conflict applied to their counterparts must govern the mercenaries themselves. There is a distinct difference between providing services as a security guard for a building, convoy or individual and conducting official operations alongside regular military forces (see IWL: 29/3/05, 5/4/05).

In summary, the data gathered from the sample portrays military contractors in a negative light, showing a lack of discipline and respect for their Coalition colleagues and their Iraqi allies, as well as a distinct lack of concern for the lives of Iraqi civilians. This can be explained through a process of othering enabled in part by their immunity from prosecution. If the actions of military contractors had been more strictly regulated by the Coalition, then the behaviour of contractors may have been modified. However, given the widespread disregard for civilian life seen in the sample, it is evident that contractor violence was not the product of a lack of oversight, but a doctrinal policy of military aggression inherent to the counter-insurgency war. But the sample drawn from the War Logs in this instance does not fully expose the extent of the crimes carried out by military contractors against Iraqi civilians. To explore this further, we will now consider some key examples drawn from a report by Human Rights First (2008). The report reviewed some 600 declassified "serious incident reports" from the Iraq War, which expand upon the data reviewed thus far.

5.1 The crimes of military contractors: evidence from Human Rights First

Within the report there are several notable occasions in which the actions of military contractors were directly attributable to the deaths of Iraqi civilians or recklessly and purposefully endangered their lives. For example, Marines detained contractors working for Zapata Engineering on 28th May 2005 for repeatedly firing their weapons at civilians and Marines. Although the contractors lost their jobs with the company, no prosecutions were bought against them (Human Rights First, 2008). Similarly, on 8th July 2006, contractors from Triple Canopy fired upon Iraqi civilian vehicles. In a quote that emphasises the sanctity with which contractors held the lives of Iraqi civilians, contractors from Triple Canopy stated in an interview with Human Rights First that before commencing work that day, one of their colleagues had said that they wanted "to kill somebody today" (Ibid: 2).[198]

However, the company most routinely involved in the use of lethal force against civilians was Blackwater.[199] Human Rights First (2008) singles out three occasions in particular where Blackwater employees caused the deaths of Iraqi civilians whilst "protecting convoys", (Ibid: 6) despite the absence of a direct threat. On October 24th 2005, Blackwater personnel fired upon a civilian vehicle moving in their direction, disabling the vehicle and killing a bystander at the side of the road. On November 28th 2005, Blackwater contractors caused no less than 18 road accidents whilst travelling to and from the Ministry of Oil. Afterwards, Blackwater administrators themselves described the statements taken from their employees as at best, "dishonest". Finally, on 25th June 2005, an Iraqi man, a father of six, was shot and killed at the side of the road by Blackwater employees. The contractors failed to report the shooting, seeking to cover-up the incident.

These incidents are important contributions to our understanding of the impunity with which military contractors operated in Iraq. However, one of the most infamous incidents occurred at Nisoor Square, Baghdad. Here employees of Blackwater were travelling in convoy when,

---

[198] Former employees of the contractor Custer: Battles, admitted in an interview to NBC News, that they had resigned because their colleagues, as standard behaviour, "terrorized civilians, shooting indiscriminately as they ran for cover, smashing into and shooting-up cars" (cited in Human Rights First, 2008: 7). The Human Rights First's report goes on to detail multiple incidents of this nature drawn from declassified Significant Incident Reports. Additionally, in scenes reminiscent of the computer game Grand Theft Auto, videos published on Youtube (2012) provide further evidence showing military contractors driving through Iraq, running down civilians, driving into traffic in their way and shooting indiscriminately as they pass traffic and people in the street.

[199] Now known as 'Academi' and before that 'Xe'.

unprovoked, they opened fire upon the surrounding civilians, killing 17 and wounding 24 (Human Rights First, 2008). Diplomatic cables published by Wikileaks also confirm this incident, adding that 7 vehicles were also incinerated in the action and that two of the wounded came from the Iraqi Security Forces (Cable Gate: 22/10/07).[200] The Cable also notes that the Iraqi government demanded that the contractors were held accountable. UNAMI confirms that the Iraqi government demanded that the US ceased contracting Blackwater in Iraq in any capacity (Human Rights Report, 1st July – 31st December 2007) considering the incident "pre-meditated murder". However, with no existing measure of criminal accountability at the time of the incident, neither the Iraqi nor US Government bought charges against them.[201]

In reviewing the actions of military contractors in Iraq, it can be seen that the immunity from prosecution afforded to them by the US Government and CPA provided the catalyst for numerous abuses. However, this immunity from prosecution alone is not a sufficient explanation of the events that took place. To understand this further we can say that, as was the case with the enemy-centric approach to counter- insurgency (Kilcullen, 2009), military contractors in Iraq dehumanised Iraqi civilians, viewing them as obstacles in the way of their mission. However, the obstacles encountered by contractors and regular military forces were viewed in different ways, but were an aspect of the same neo-liberal restructuring suggested by Klein (2007). For regular Coalition forces, these obstacles got in the way of the suppression of the insurgency. [202] For military contractors, the obstacles in their way prevented the fulfilment of their contract and therefore the money they and their companies would receive. This links to Whyte's (2007) analysis of the neo-liberal restructuring of Iraq and the CPA orders passed to enable this process to take place. CPA Order 17 protected

---

[200] The cable also notes that the Iraqi government has information on seven other events involving Blackwater employees killing 10 and wounding 15 other Iraqi civilians. As a result of incidents such as this, the Iraqi government after June 2006 did not renew the companies operating license, as such the company were operating without a license after this point. This provides further evidence of the lawlessness with which the state of exception in Iraq allowed Coalition personnel and proxy forces to operate.

[201] A diplomatic cable from January 2009 indicates that then Iraqi President Jalal Talabani was still attempting to apply pressure to the US Government to bring about prosecutions (Cable Gate: 5/1/09). In early 2009 the Status of Forces Agreement between the US and Iraq was changed, granting Iraqi judicial oversight over the actions of Coalition forces and associated personnel. This forced US authorities to obtain permission from the Iraqi government before conducting military operations (Amnesty International, 2009).

[202] At least until the troop surge and General Patreaus' associated shift in emphasis from enemy centric to population centric counter-insurgency.

military contractors from legal sanction, enabling them to make huge profits from the occupation of Iraq (Scahill, 2007).

In summary, the occupation of Iraq saw the creation of a state of exception, which gave the green light to contractors to act as they saw fit in the pursuit of their financially-driven objectives. This made it easier for contractors to dehumanise the civilian population as their deviancy was largely permissible and often not officially labelled as deviant (Becker, 1964, Green and Ward, 2000, Tanner, 2011). In this instance, the construction of laws served as an important component in the structuring of identity and associated action.[203] If it is not made clear that certain behaviours, attitudes and actions are unacceptable, then these behaviours will flourish as illustrated by the evidence drawn from this sample.

Conclusion

Having encountered a diverse range of state-sanctioned violence perpetrated by numerous actors during the occupation of Iraq, it is possible to draw several conclusions as to how these actions came into being. The occupation of Iraq encapsulated the perfect structural arrangements whereby crimes of the state were made possible: through the creation of a state of exception both prior to the invasion and during the occupation, in which state actors were empowered to act with purpose and impunity through the legislative provisions made for them. Additionally, the procedural logic of the counter-insurgency war that followed the invasion was one that favoured aggression and violence against the "enemy". This served to further exacerbate the violence by marginalizing potential allies and aggravating existing tensions. Likewise, the integration of militias into the security structure within the counter-insurgency war further highlighted the tensions between the "enemy" and its supporters, and the state and its associates. Convergent with the structural conditions of the occupation of Iraq was the chaotic environment that the occupation created. This made it virtually impossible to ensure security or, equally importantly, to police the behaviour of those involved in both the insurgency and the counter-insurgency.

---

[203] This theme will be returned to in more detail in chapter sevens discussion of a suggested theoretical model for understanding state crime.

With these conditions in place, state-sanctioned violence was able to flourish through a combination of several integrating factors including: collective action (Tanner, 2011); stimulated through a combination of differential association (Sutherland, 1940); and adherence to the unofficial expectations and procedures (Arendt, 1963) governing the counter-insurgency. Likewise, the socially-constructed notion of what was defined as deviant behaviour and what remained legitimate further served to facilitate a permissive environment where acts deemed unforgivable in any other circumstance became a normalised. This meant that state-sanctioned violence was both chronologically and geographically spread throughout the occupation.

In summary, this chapter has sought to document a conflict that has thus far been under-researched in terms of a criminological analysis of state crime. The next chapter will seek to develop a multidimensional theoretical approach to the study of state crime. It is argued that this theoretical model can both provide cultural criminology with a framework to understand state crime and contribute to the study of the criminology of war.

Theorizing Post-invasion Iraq: Towards a Cultural Criminology of State Crime

Introduction

This thesis has presented the argument that the mainstream US and UK news media offered a largely uncritical representation of the counter-insurgency war that characterised occupied Iraq. It has also documented the crimes committed by the Coalition during the occupation. This chapter seeks to provide a theoretical framework through which we can make sense of the empirical data presented within the preceding chapters. In doing so, the chapter will set out and develop seven theoretical themes, which the author argues should form the basis of an integrated, constitutive approach to developing the cultural criminology of state crime. This approach aims to highlight the interconnectivity of macro, meso and micro processes, and the need for a multidimensional approach within state crime research. It will be demonstrated that the meso and micro processes visible in occupied Iraq were emergent from, but not reducible to, the structural conditions of the US' decision to invade Iraq, as based upon US national security interests in the region's natural resources.

The theoretical tropes developed in the discussion that follows may be summarised as:

1. The need to develop a criminology of state crime that is integrated, constitutive and transnational.

2. The importance of placing any criminological analysis of the state within broader socio-historical processes in order to contextualise the dynamics of state criminality and appreciate their complexity

3. The need for criminology to be able to conceptualise state crime beyond the disciplinary boundaries of state-imposed legal definitions; initially, within the realm of IHL and, if this is insufficient, to extend our conceptions of the phenomenon to the notion of social harm.

4. Understanding the link between state structural interests and state crime.

5. To explore the ways in which counter-insurgency warfare is governed.

6. The importance of understanding small group dynamics or the actions of individuals involved in prosecuting counter-insurgency strategies.

7. Finally, to understand and explore the representation and construction of "knowledge" by politicians and the mainstream media, and the wider implications of this for the legitimation and persistence of state-sanctioned violence.

The above framework can provide a corrective to existing approaches to the study of state crime which, at present, tend to be reluctant to engage in such approaches (Green and Ward, 2004, Morrison, 2006). This is not to say that existing approaches have proven fruitless in their endeavours. On the contrary, research into state crime has exponentially increased the pace of its development in the last twenty years and I will be drawing on aspects of this research throughout. However, existing approaches to the study of state criminality are limited by their theoretical and analytical isolation, inhibiting a genuinely holistic critical and cultural criminology of state crime. The primary aim of this chapter, then, is to suggest an integrated and symbiotic approach to the criminological study of state crime. Having outlined the substantive purpose of this chapter, let us begin to map-out the constitutive, cultural criminological approach to understanding state crime.

1. Integrated, constitutive, transnational: framing a cultural criminology of state crime

Synthesising macro, meso and micro levels of explanation is not a new notion within criminology. Henry and Milovanovic's (1996) constitutive criminology is perhaps the most comprehensive theoretical contribution to this endeavour to date, and will be discussed shortly. Other notable figures have also made useful contributions to this project. For example, Hayward (2004, p.147) has advocated the need for criminology to appreciate the interconnectivity of the existential experience of everyday life, with the "cultural and spatial forces" that act upon the situated self, influencing our "willingness or reluctance to engage in criminal activity". Similarly, Hamm's (2007) research into the crimes committed by military police and private contractors at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq utilised the holistic approach taken by cultural criminology to locate the actions of those involved in the torture and abuse as a product of state doctrine. Likewise, Hayward (2011) has argued that a critical ontology should seek to be multidimensional in nature, based on the cross-pollination of macro, meso and micro levels of analysis. Additionally, Morrison (2006) has argued that the separation of these levels of analysis no longer serves as a sufficient approach to understanding the late

modern social world, whose multitude of peoples, places, spaces, institutions, governments and interests are now inseparable from one another.[204] Further to this, Barak (2009) has argued for a criminology that does not consign to the scrapheap the existing "partial truths" (p. xiii-xv) offered by insular criminological analyses, but instead develops an approach that appreciates the contributions that these studies have made. In doing so, he attempts to develop "more holistic explanations" of criminological analysis (see also: Barak, 1998).

However, within state crime research, the synthesis of these analytical levels has gone largely unexamined, with the focus remaining upon the structural processes that lead states to resort to criminality and the associated documentation of this criminality (see for example: Chambliss, 1989, Kramer and Michalowski, 2005, Kramer, Michalowski and Rothe, 2005, Whyte, 2007, 2010). In short, much state crime research begins and ends its analysis as a top-down understanding of an issue, which in reality must be understood through the interaction of multiple interconnected processes, at the macro, meso and micro levels.

Additionally, research into state criminality often fails to draw clear links between the activities of actors involved in state crime and wider social processes that may contribute to the capacity for these actions to take place. For example, if we apply Edwin Sutherland's (1940) notion of differential association to the behaviour of forces acting within a counter-insurgency war, there must be an appreciation of more than just the behaviour of those involved. Beyond the phenomenological understanding of the acts themselves are the structural processes that make these acts not only possible, but routine. Likewise, we must also consider the role that media representation plays in legitimising these actions in the eyes of the public.[205] As we have seen, the news media plays a key role in sustaining state-sanctioned violence (Robinson, 2002, Bonn, 2010).

However, the analysis of media representations themselves are often taken to the point of obsession, in which the representation of terrorism, or the marginalization of state terrorism,

---

[204] Morrison's (2006) argument also acknowledges the need for criminology to reconceptualise itself as a transnational academic discipline; an argument that this thesis agrees would benefit criminological analysis and an argument that will be developed later in this discussion.

[205] In some instances, for example, the abuses of Abu Ghraib, it becomes unavoidable for the media to discuss these issues. In examples such as this Cohen (2001) argues that politicians go through a process of denial: At first governments seek to deny all knowledge of such activities, before acknowledging the actions as acceptable means of conduct (such as enhanced interrogation techniques), before finally stating that the events were necessary tactics against a formidable adversary.

becomes the singular concern of academic analysis. Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS), for example, is often guilty of over-emphasising discursive and constructionist approaches to deconstructing modern narratives of terrorism and counter-terrorism (see for example: Jackson, 2005, 2009, Raphael, 2009, Altheide, 2009). This focus on constructionist critiques, whilst valuable to an understanding of the metaphorical wool being pulled over our eyes, tends to ignore the reality of the *consequences* of the state's political and economic concerns. Constructionist critiques also ignore the importance of understanding small group dynamics within, for example, counter-insurgency warfare.

As must now be clear, the primary criticism being levelled here is that the isolation of structure, agency and the construction of 'knowledge' from one another, limits the scope and validity of the conclusions that may be drawn. As both Gunning (2009) and Della Porta (1995) have argued with regard to researching terrorism, failure to integrate these three levels produces inadequate explanations of terrorist violence. Whilst this thesis focuses on state criminality within counter-insurgency warfare, the criticisms levelled by Hayward (2011), Gunning (2009) and Della Porta (1995) towards studies of non-state terrorism are readily applicable to the study of state crime. An appreciation of the interconnections of these levels of analysis is thus one of the key principles of what a cultural criminology of state crime should look like.

However, a cultural criminology of state crime must push its epistemological position beyond the integration of the analytical levels discussed here. For a holistic understanding of state criminality to be possible, it is necessary for the study of state crime to open itself up to inter-disciplinarity in its approach. Cultural criminology has embraced inter-disciplinarity, drawing insight from a variety of academic disciplines including, but not limited to: media and film studies, cultural studies, genocide and war studies, philosophy and cultural anthropology, to name but a few (Hayward, 2011). Cultural criminology, then, is ideally placed to present studies of state criminality, with not only an integrated, but an interdisciplinary framework upon which to build upon our existing academic understandings of state crime. With this in mind, this discussion now turns to a brief analysis of the 'constitutive criminology' of Henry and Milovanovic (1996), as the founding inspiration for an interdisciplinary framework.

Constitutive criminology starts from the position that human agents are responsible for actively creating the world around them through interactions with their fellow human beings.

However, in addition to this, reality is also a constructed and negotiated process. This takes place through discursive practices found in human culture, such as the speeches of politicians, the production of news, television and film and the arguments of academics and of social commentators. Human beings are active producers of the reality in which they exist, but they are also consumers of that reality; their comprehension of reality (and behaviour within it) being contingent upon the production and reproduction of meaning and action. But human behaviour is also contingent upon the social and organisational structures that they have created. The constitutive approach, then, argues that human agents are both active and passive in their interactions with the social world, "both agents and structure are mutually constitutive" (Henry and Milovanovic, 1996:37). Social actors can be considered to be aware that what they create through their own actions is experientially subjected to the creations and actions of others. In other words, we are "partially blind builders" (Ibid), affecting and affected by both the social structure and human culture simultaneously, as Henry and Milovanovic (1996: x) put it:

"Constitutive criminology takes a holistic conception of the relationship between "individual" and "society" which prioritises neither one nor the other, but examines their mutuality and interrelationship."

So far, so integrated, but constitutive criminology seeks to establish an approach that is, by its very nature, inclusive and 'reconstructive' of a multitude of existing social [206] and criminological theories, including structural Marxism, structuration theory, phenomenology, symbolic interactionism, and social constuctionism (Henry and Milovanovic, 2001). It is this willing interdisciplinary engagement (alongside its integrated understanding of crime), which makes the constitutive approach appealing to cultural criminologists of state crime (Hayward, 2004). As was stated in the introduction to this chapter, for criminology to be able to adequately understand both how and why state criminality is able to persist within counter-insurgency warfare, it must be willing to work outside of its (often self-imposed) disciplinary boundaries.

---

[206] For example, the application of chaos theory to inform their theoretical goal of seeking to transcend the dualities of modernism and postmodernism.

With this in mind, it is necessary for the criminology of the state to move beyond the often contemporaneous nature of its study and appreciate the value of historically- informed research. To move beyond state-defined definitions of criminality and engage with International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and human rights conceptualisations of social and personal harm, studies of state crime should also engage with International Relation's approaches to understanding the structural motivations that influence the state's foreign policy. In addition to this, it is also necessary for criminologists engaged in the study of state crime to investigate how state actors are governed in conflict situations. Finally, an analysis of the media's complicity in hiding alternative accounts of international conflicts can help us to form a constitutive cultural criminology of state crime.

As the constitutive approach suggests, human action is in many ways defined through the social environment that people find themselves in. Background social and organisational structures and discursive understandings combine to inform human action and, importantly for the criminology of the state, the influence of these background factors and discursive practices define human understandings of their actions as criminal or not.

However, of equal concern to this thesis is criminology's engagement with the global. In recent years, there have been calls from within criminology for the discipline to reorientate its focus towards a more transnational configuration that appreciates the interconnectivity of the social world in the wake of the progress of globalisation (Hardie-Bick, Sheptycki and Wardak, 2005, Morrison, 2006, Smeulers and Haverman, 2008, Aas, 2012a, 2012b). But it is not only the interconnectivity of the local, national and global that is of concern to criminologists. Of equal concern is the Western-centric production of criminological theory, and its claims to universality (Aas, 2011, Buroway, 2008). To summarise, the fact that the vast majority of the production of criminological analysis takes place in the Western world means that criminology often lacks any concern with what Aas (2012a) refers to as the global "periphery" and the "deviant globalisation" affecting these areas (Gilman 2005 cited in Aas 2012). Instead, criminological analysis is often satisfied with the universality of its findings, unconcerned with the global periphery, a region left to social scientists indigenous to these areas. In contrast, transnational criminology proposes that a greater understanding of global-national-local dynamics can provide a comprehensive analysis that is lacking in mainstream criminology (Tsing, 2005 cited in Aas, 2012).

This raises two points. First, scholars satisfied with ignoring the global periphery fail to appreciate the interconnectivity of global spaces; for example, how increasing global movement of people, information and trade impact upon both national and local interests. Second, that Aas' critique is too strong when it comes to both cultural criminology and the study of state crime, as studies of state criminality are, by their very nature, critical and often decentralised in their analysis. For example, studying the periphery and more often than not, the capacity for states in the Global North to exert coercive power over states in the Global South (see for example: Blakeley, 2007, 2009, Kramer and Michalowski, 2005, Morrison, 2006, Whyte, 2007, 2010). Likewise, cultural criminology is itself concerned with context-specific analysis, or, put in Aas' terms, a concern with the tendency for criminological theorising to make claims to universality. In response to Aas (2012), in no way does this thesis seek a universally applicable theory to understanding state crime. On the contrary, it is in every way context-specific in its focus of the US led invasion and occupation of Iraq.

Constitutive cultural criminology of state crime is by its very nature transnational, as it proposes that we must appreciate the interconnectivity of global processes, within a context specific analysis of state criminality. Therefore, a cultural criminology of state crime is capable of engaging with the concerns that Aas (2012a, 2012b, 2011), Buroway (2008), Morrison (2006), and Tsing (2005), have voiced. As a result, a cultural criminology of state crime can contribute to the reorientation of the discipline outside of the idealised 'civilised space' with which it has largely been concerned (Morrison, 2006). In essence, by transcending the national and applying constitutive principles to our analysis, we accomplish two important things: to push criminological theory forward by engaging with hitherto rarely seen spaces within criminology and to turn the criminological lens back on our dominant and entrenched ontological positions (Hardie-Bick, Sheptycki and Wardak, 2005, Aas, 2012).

We have now laid out the overarching framework that has inspired the approach to understanding the state criminality presented within this thesis. It is now appropriate to begin the process of fleshing out the theoretical tropes mentioned in the above discussion. This will proceed through six concise discussions that lay out the underlying principles of each remaining trope that is to be applied to an understanding of the occupation of Iraq.

2. Locating the past in the present: the importance of historically informed research

According to Philip Abrams (1980), many of the most serious problems that social scientists negotiate need to be understood as aspects of historical processes. Taking this further, Abrams argues that the reason that there is no relationship between history and sociology is that they are fundamentally the same thing. Both sociology and history seek to piece together the interconnected puzzle of human structure and agency. With this in mind, he advocates a conception of structure and agency as processes shaped by time. In the same way that the macro, meso and micro are inseparable, interconnected levels of analysis, a historical sociology acknowledges that people both make their own history and, in turn, are made by it. Abrams was not alone in his contention that sociology and history are inseparable academic disciplines. Steinmetz identifies Robert Lynd's contention, written in 1939, that social scientists should begin to engage in historical writing. Steinmetz also notes that Sewell Jr. (2005) made a similar call sixty years later. He concludes that the mutual disengagement that exists between history and the social sciences is a result of the social sciences focusing on positivistic approaches to research.

However, some of the most notable sociologists in history have produced analyses in which the knowledge and understanding of history, has been integral to their ground breaking research, most notably Max Weber's *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* and Norbert Elias' *The Civilizing Process*, (Szakolczai, 2000). Additionally, Marx and Engels analysed the historically-constructed nature of power and the way in which this shapes the choices available to social actors in the present (Abrams, 1980). Likewise, Giddens (1979) asserted that temporality must form an integral aspect of social theory, arguing that human social and organisational structures, individual interactions and even discursive representations of reality, cannot be isolated from historical processes. These structures, actions and meanings, are all temporally significant as part of a historical continuum that shapes and regulates each. In essence, then, historical sociology argues that the present can only be understood as a product of the past, and that engaging in an entirely contemporaneous analysis limits the conclusions that can be derived from research findings. Thus theoretical models must be imbued with the essence of historical processes.

The value of historically-informed research is something that cultural criminology is gradually beginning to appreciate. Jackson-Jacobs (2004) argues that historical analysis is essential to understanding changing patterns of crime and its control. Likewise, Presdee

(2004:43) argued for the value of biographical and autobiographical approaches to criminological research, stating unequivocally that it is not enough simply to speak of history, "we must historicise, analyse that which we describe". Additionally, Morrison (2006) produced an extensive historically-informed analysis in his call for a globally orientated criminology. Therefore, a historically- informed analysis can help us to understand some of the dynamics of the violence associated with post-invasion Iraq. Consequently, through understanding Iraq's historical development, one will better understand the violence that was such a prominent feature of post-invasion Iraq.[207] To this end, the analysis will consider the role of history in constructing Iraq's ethno-sectarian divisions.

2.1 Iraq's historical development

Although it is not the purpose of this thesis to compile a complete history of Iraq,[208] it will summarise three of the key influences upon the explosion of violence that engulfed Iraq in the wake of the invasion and subsequent occupation: 1) the arbitrary nature of state formation at the fall of the Ottoman Empire, 2) the violent contestation of power throughout the country's history, and 3) the dominant role of the Sunni throughout Iraqi history. Through an exposition of these three historical processes, a better comprehension of the Iraqi insurgency, beyond the notion of terroristic violence espoused by Coalition leaders, can be achieved.

Ottoman control of the region that would become Iraq was bought swiftly to an end shortly after the Arab–British alliance known as the Hussein–McMahon correspondence. This alliance was formed after the British promised the Arabs who fought alongside them the right to self-determination following the fall of the Ottoman Empire (Lewis, 2009). However, prior to this, the British had already agreed upon a division of Ottoman territory with the French, in the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement. Therefore, ignoring the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence, the British reneged upon their agreement with their Arab colleagues and, alongside the French, began dividing the spoils of the old Ottoman Empire between them. (Stansfield, 2008). Once the people affected by the arbitrary division of the former empire became aware of Britain's intentions to renege on its promise of self-determination for them,

---

[207] Hagan and Kaiser's (2011a) analysis of the conflict in Darfur, is itself historically imbedded. They highlight the historical development of ethnic divisions within the country as an integral explanatory trope to their analysis of the forced mass displacement and genocide, by both elimination and extermination, of the Black African population of Darfur, by Arab Darfuri's.

[208] Detailed accounts have been devoted entirely to this subject for example: Lewis (2009), Stansfield (2008), Tripp (2007), Khadduri (1960).

the first Iraqi revolts against British imperial rule in Iraq began (Lewis, 2009). Britain's imperial intentions and the resulting revolts against them sowed the seeds of distrust within Iraq. British betrayal[209] and the following violent military suppression of nationalist uprisings against the British-imposed Hashemite royal family became a historical memory for the Iraqi people. This memory was maintained and reinforced until the British-supported Hashemite royal family was finally removed by a bloody coup in 1958 (Stansfield, 2008).[210] During the following ten years, the Ba'ath Party would rise to power.

It is clear that Iraq is a country that has been faced with numerous challenges, often not of its own making. From its inception at the fall of the Ottoman Empire, a variety of previously unassociated ethnic and religious groups were thrown together. This melting pot of competing interests and beliefs, combined with the distrust of the British and imposed royal family, created the conditions in which violent struggles for control, often ruthlessly suppressed[211], became a common occurrence. Additionally, it can be argued that violence itself became the dominant method of political expression, particularly when all other avenues had been closed off. As a result, we begin to see a historical pattern of political necessity to rise-up against the perceived illegitimacy of the country's rulers by the people themselves.[212] With this in mind, we can perhaps understand some of the violence that engulfed Iraq after the Coalition invasion. However, to fully appreciate the complexity of this violence, we must first understand Saddam Hussein's influence upon the socio-political map of Iraq.

The Ba'ath Party rose to power in a coup backed by the CIA and American oil companies[213] on the 30th July 1968 (Tripp, 2007). The coup itself lacked the violence of past changes in

---

[209] For example: The League of Nations (pre-cursor to the UN), ratifying the right of British and French imperial rule over Iraq in April 1920. The enactment of a twenty year Anglo-Iraqi treaty, which ensured British imperial rule in Iraq 'on the cheap', by installing the Sunni Hashemite royal family as 'rulers' of Iraq, acting on behalf of the British government. It was thought that the Sunni would be more compliant than the Shi'a, who Gertrude Bell, advisor to then Secretary of State for the Colonies, Winston Churchill, thought reactionary and potentially a problem for the stability of the imperial project (Thornton, 2005, Fieldhouse, 2006).

[210] For example the order given to the Iraqi military to massacre the Assyrian uprising in 1933 (Lewis, 2009), the Shi'a revolts against political marginalization in 1935 (Jaber, 2003), the country's first military coup in 1936 and the resulting assassination of the leader of that coup in 1937 (Tripp, 2007), and the period from here until 1941, which involved a further six military coups (Khadduri, 1960).

[211] Thornton (2005) draws parallels with the relationship between Britain and the Iraqi people in 1920 and the US in Iraq in 2003, noting in particular the use of 'shock and awe' military tactics to suppress popular uprisings against the occupiers.

[212] Abrams (1980) argues, human agency is a product of historical processes guiding this agency: even as we write history, we are written by it.

[213] Who were concerned at Soviet overtures towards the Iraqi National Oil Company.

power, but the rule that was to follow was punctuated by the state's deployment of its coercive powers to violently control the population; once again an example of historical processes shaping present practice. However, state violence under Ba'ath control was not due to an aversion to democratic ideals within Iraqi society, but rather a result of the arbitrary nature of state creation discussed previously. As Stansfield (2008) notes, the plethora of competing political, ethnic and religious movements interacting in Iraq, means that Iraqi politics has an externally imposed predisposition to authoritarian regimes, who act to ensure that their seat at the top table is not stolen from under them by someone with equally lofty ambitions. Likewise, ethnic groups marginalized by these regimes would take up arms to defend their people.

In 1979, Saddam Hussein was made leader of the Ba'ath Party. Upon entering office, he immediately removed suspected internal threats to his power,[214] decapitating the hierarchy of the Ba'ath Party in the process, and ensuring that only close family members and friends made up his inner circle.[215] Nationally, he set about constructing Iraq's identity through perpetual war,[216] whilst also continuing the Sunni population's dominance of the Iraqi socio-political landscape, crushing any challenges to this dominance.[217] Saddam continued to use the now historical process of combating opposition with violence. But, Hussein's rule also served to further cement the divide between the powerful Sunni political classes and the rest of Iraq's ethnic and religious groups. As noted, the minority Sunni population had maintained power throughout Iraq's turbulent past, having first been gifted power through imperial convenience, itself a source of resentment. As a result, Iraq's powerless ethnic and religious groups were understandably a source of concern for the formerly dominant Sunni, as the Coalition military removed Hussein from power in April 2003.

Therefore, an understanding of Iraq's historical development offers a better understanding of the violence that was such a feature of post-invasion Iraq. As already noted, the historical experiences of violent political struggle by the Iraqi people, the result of imperial

---

[214] He claimed to have unearthed an attempted coup and proceeded to purge opponents from the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council and the Ba'ath Party (Tripp, 2007).

[215] This occurred after multiple uprisings against his regime, reinforced his paranoia at the possibility of losing power, as countless regimes before.

[216] Most notably the Iran-Iraq War between 1980-1988 and the invasion of Kuwait (deemed by Hussein to be the 19th province of Iraq), which itself would lead to the first Gulf War (Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe, 2008).

[217] Most notably, the crushing of the Shi'a uprisings in the south and Kurdish uprisings in the north, in the wake of the regimes perceived weakness at the end of the first Gulf War, as well as the use of chemical weapons against the Kurdish population in Halabja, prior to this at the end of the Iran-Iraq War (Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe, 2008, Stansfield, 2008).

interference, can be seen to have created the conditions for violent action. However, during the most recent occupation of Iraq, the violent uprisings and responses to them have been directed in a very specific manner as a result of years of dominance by one particular group. The Sunni population of Iraq have held power for the vast majority of the country's history. However, in the wake of the Coalition's invasion and occupation, Sunni socio-political power was lost. Sunnis were largely purged from positions of authority in the government, military and security services, as a result of the Coalition Provisional Authority's (CPA) governance, a theme that will be returned to in section five. In turn, the majority Shi'a population of Iraq, with little appreciation for the irony of the situation by US authorities, were gifted power. The result of this was that the Sunni population, after years of socio-political dominance, feared reprisals at the hands of the Shi'a and resented their loss of power. Consistent with Iraqi history, the Sunni took up arms to combat both the loss of power and the perceived threat posed by an Iraqi government backed by external forces. This was a struggle that had been a feature of Iraq for decades, rather than terroristic violence as an aspect of the War on Terror[218]. Likewise, the counter-insurgency, carried out by non-Sunni Iraqis in conjunction with their Coalition forces, was consistent with the use of coercive violence to pacify uprisings throughout Iraqi history.

Having considered the influence of Iraq's history on the post-invasion landscape, the next subsection will consider the role of history in shaping the US' approach to counter-insurgency warfare. Similarly, links will be drawn between the history of US counter-insurgency operations and the occupation of Iraq.

2.2 US counter-insurgency wars

As has been researched and acknowledged elsewhere (see for example: Kolko, 1988, McClintock, 2002, Stokes, 2004, Blakeley, 2009), a significant aspect of US foreign policy after World War II, throughout the Cold War and into the 1990s, has been characterised by a combination of direct and indirect counter-insurgency wars. As has been found in this research, state-sanctioned violence often becomes indiscriminate as it seeks to clamp down upon insurgencies. For example, in Vietnam, the Phoenix Programme armed, trained and directed militias drawn from the indigenous population to target any suspected insurgents and

---

[218] Although, as this thesis has discussed, some foreign fighters affiliated with Al Qaeda did enter Iraq in order to attack Coalition forces and disrupt Iraq's reconstruction.

their supporters to clamp down on the Vietcong. Torture and extrajudicial killings were often utilised as a standard technique designed to crush the Vietcong and their supporters through terror (Blakeley, 2009). Similar processes have been seen in Iraq. For example, the use of Iraqi Shi'a militias such as the Special Police Commandos or Wolf Brigade to target Sunni communities, in an effort to terrorise suspected insurgents and their supporters. Likewise, less public wars in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Columbia have also seen the use of death squads, leading Ret. General Wayne Downing to refer to the utilisation of militias in Iraq as 'the Salvador option', naming the Special Police Commando units in the process (NBC, Today Show, January 10th, 2005). These units, as illustrated in the empirical analysis of state criminality in Iraq, were responsible for numerous human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings of civilians and the torture and abuse of detainees, all under the auspices of Coalition forces.

Additionally, the US has a long history of violent interventions in order to further its national security objectives (McClintock, 2002, Blakely, 2009). Without pursuing the details of these objectives at this stage,[219] it is worth acknowledging that US economic and political interests have often been well-served, through direct and indirect interventions throughout South America and the Middle East. It is clear that national security objectives change over time; however, the means of achieving these objectives remain consistent, be it indirectly removing left-leaning leaders from power in South America (Blakeley, 2009), providing training and support for military coups (McClintock, 2002), or directly enacting neo-liberal reforms in Iraq (Klein, 2007, Whyte, 2007, 2010). Many of the techniques utilised within these counter-insurgency wars have been seen on the ground in Iraq. These are therefore an example of the fall an enemy-centric approach to counter-insurgency that Kilcullen (2009) argued was evident in Iraq i.e. the focus on killing the enemy and their associates over the co-opting of the civilian population into rejecting insurgency.

In summary, a historical analysis of the Iraq War presents us with a deeper understanding of the dynamics of the counter-insurgency, allowing us to appreciate the perspectives of Iraqis involved on both sides of the conflict in the context of Iraq's historical development. Likewise, it leads us to understand that the US has a history of reverting to the use of particular types of counter-insurgency warfare seen in Iraq and reminds us of the use of

---

[219] These will be discussed in detail with regard to the structural motivations for invading Iraq and the restructuring of Iraq through the declaration of a state of exception (Whyte, 2007), in section 4 below.

military intervention by the US in order to further foreign policy objectives. This suggests that the insurgency and the counter-insurgency are both the product of historical processes. With this brief historical analysis completed, it is possible to view the importance of historically-informed research to any criminology of state crime. Indeed, without this historically contextualised understanding of Iraq and counter-insurgency, the following discussion of the macro, meso and micro analytical levels would hold less explanatory value. However, before we proceed, it is necessary to also consider how criminology as a discipline can conceptualise state criminality within Iraq.

3. Conceptualising state crime in Iraq: from International Humanitarian Law to social harm

It is well known that criminology has had difficulty conceptualising violence that is organised and perpetrated by the state. This is due to criminology's reliance as a discipline on the state-deferential definition of crime. Criminology often seems to accept the state's claims to the monopoly on the use of legitimate violence (Hillyard and Tombs, 2004, Kauzarlich, 2007, Green and Ward, 2009). The acceptance of this definition precludes the possibility of those in positions of power being defined as criminal actors, who benefit materially and politically from coercive social and physical acts, directed at perceived opposition actors (Reiman, 2010). In sum, the structure of national criminal law itself guides our attention towards the crimes of the powerless. By contrast, the powerful (in this instance the state itself) are definitionally incapable of committing crime against those they govern or those they are in conflict with.

However, this reliance on a state-deferential definition of criminality is something that criminologists involved in the study of state crime have sought to move beyond. Indeed, one of the most significant leaps in theoretical and empirical criminological analysis has been the conceptualisation of crime beyond national legal frameworks (see for example: Schwendinger and Schwendinger, 1970, Barak, 1991, Green and Ward, 2004). Studies of state crime maintain that domestic legalistic definitions of criminality are but one way of conceptualising crime, whether this be as directed by the state or as carried out by individuals acting on behalf of the state (Kauzarlich, 2007), or, as Green and Ward (2009) suggest, understanding the inseparable interaction between these two levels. Studies of state criminality seek alternative ways of enabling criminology to conceptualise and analyse the states role as director, producer and actor, in physical and social violence, both within and

beyond its own borders (Aas, 2012). Similarly, cultural criminology seeks to conceptualise crime beyond the boundaries of state-deferential definitions of crime, meaning that zemiology, or the study of social harm, provides a constitutive cultural criminological approach to the study of state crime with the conceptual tools needed for this endeavour.

For example, reference to International Humanitarian Law (IHL) with regard to the Iraq War, has sought to prove the illegality of the decision to go to war itself. Kramer and Michalowski (2005:448) argue that criminology is already sufficiently positioned to critically analyse the Iraq War in this light, as existing IHL "establishes the United States and the United Kingdom as guilty of state crimes linked to the invasion and occupation of Iraq" (see also: Kramer, Michalowski and Rothe, 2005, Jones and Howard-Hassman, 2006). They argue that the United Nations Charter supersedes domestic legislation and the rights of nations to act in accordance with their own conceptions of right and wrong. The Charter essentially establishes the laws of international relations. In particular, they refer to Article 2(4), which strictly prohibits the threat of, or resort to the use of force, except in self-defence (see also: Davis, 2006, Kauzarlich, 2007). This notion of self-defence was key to the arguments made by the US and UK governments for the need to invade Iraq in the first place. However, Kramer and Michalowski (2005) dismiss these claims, as there is no right to preventative war enshrined in IHL. Likewise, if the UN Security Council deemed Iraq to pose an imminent threat to the safety and security of the international community, they would have to authorise military action, which they did not (Lepard, 2006). However, as we now know, this decision was ignored, directly contravening the clearest laws governing international relations with, as illustrated by this research, disastrous consequences for the Iraqi people. Put simply: the invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq was illegal, as noted by then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan (Davis, 2006).

However, as a result of the decision to ignore IHL, the US argued that it had the right to act in exceptional circumstances, contravening the will of the international community in order to defend its sovereignty. As Jones and Howard-Hassman (2006:64) have indicated, the realist interpretation of international relations, based upon mutual suspicion and competition among states, means that in the absence of a global sovereign, international law can be disregarded when national interests are at stake. However, national interests are very much a divine right, readily introduced into international debates as and when required; something that was clearly illustrated by the US-led invasion of Iraq. As a result, even if criminology can

conceptualise state crime through IHL, and if nations can circumvent these governing practices through the declaration of exceptional circumstance, then the value of criminological analysis in this light is limited. With this in mind, it would be of value to engage the Geneva Conventions on Human Rights, in the context of the occupation itself.

As Lepard (2006) asserts, it must be questioned whether those states choosing to intervene in Iraq complied with the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their protections of civilians during armed conflict, and the rights of detainees to be treated humanely (see also: Kramer and Michalowski, 2005, Jones and Howard-Hassman, 2006). As this study has shown, Lepard was absolutely right to ask these questions, as the data from Wikileaks and numerous Human Rights organisations show the systematic and consistent resort to violations of these conventions. However, as was the case with the invasion of Iraq itself, the resort to exceptionalism during the occupation circumvents many of the conventions governing the provisions made for civilians and detainees within international conflicts. In particular, as discussed in chapter six, the sweeping legislative upheaval carried out by the CPA and US government, in order to administer the occupation. [220] This, in conjunction with US's aggressive approach to counter-insurgency and associated co-opting of indigenous militias into the counter-insurgency war, meant that the conventions protecting civilians and detainees were often disregarded. This exceptionalism left little opportunity for international law to prosecute human rights abuses during the occupation. When examples were made (as in the case of Abu Ghraib prison) these were the exception and failed to connect the use of violence by individual actors, with a doctrine governed by the state (Green and Ward, 2009). To summarise, we have seen that national state-deferential definitions of crime, IHL and the Geneva Conventions governing state behaviour in armed conflict, are all in some way ineffective when conceptualising state crime; they serve to illustrate the state's capacity to redefine legalistic notions of its behaviour in both national and international settings, which, if carried out by non-state actors on their own behalf, would be defined as criminal by the state. In this instance, when national and international legalistic approaches are insufficient, it

---

[220] In particular CPA Order 17 and Presidential Executive Order 13303, which afforded US civilian and military personnel immunity from prosecution under Iraqi Law, and FRAGO 242, which removed the responsibility for US forces to intervene when witnessing clear human rights abuses (despite their obligations under the Geneva Conventions to ensure the safety as far as possible of the civilian population), unless US forces were directly involved. However, as the data gathered in this study has shown, even in instances where US personnel were directly involved, more often than not, no action was taken.

is necessary for criminology to employ its imagination and move beyond the legal realm, towards the notion of social and physical harms.

3.1 A social harm perspective of state crime

As stated at the outset of this section, criminal law is not sufficiently wide in scope to deal with many of the most serious social and physical abuses that can befall a society, group or individual (Hillyard and Tombs, 2004, Rothe et al, 2009). Indeed, the vast majority of behaviour that criminologists refer to as state criminality would certainly be considered criminal if committed by non-state actors, i.e. kidnapping, torture, murder etc. However, defining social harm is a difficult task, particularly in terms of the potential breadth to which such a concept could be applied. Therefore, its boundaries need to be distinct and objective, as Hillyard and Tombs (Ibid.) note, a social harm perspective would need to encompass actions that at present do not fall under the remit of criminal law but arguably should do, given the damage they cause (see also: Tifft, 1995, Tifft and Sullivan, 2001, Kauzarlich, 2007). Green and Ward (2000) argue that criminology should base its concept of social harm upon a dual interaction with existing human rights ideals (found within the Geneva Conventions of 1949) and the notion that, as illustrated above, state-sanctioned violence in any other circumstances would be deemed illegal. With this in mind, physical harms,[221] in the case of this study, direct and excessive violence against civilian targets and detainees in counter-insurgency wars, should be included. As Hillyard and Tombs (Ibid: 19) suggest, these may include: "death, torture and brutality by state officials".

However, there are potential pitfalls with a social harm perspective, particularly the notion of relativity, in which harm for one group is not harm for another. For example, with regards to the occupation of Iraq, US personnel, civilian and military may consider the 'harms' committed against Iraqi civilians and detainees to be justifiable in the context of a counter-insurgency war. By contrast, Iraqi civilians affected in direct and indirect ways by this action would almost certainly take the opposite position. Here we return to the concept of Western-

---

[221] Hillyard and Tombs (2004) outline several types of harm that could make-up this approach, including: Physical harm, financial-economic harm, emotional and psychological harm and notions of cultural safety, which focuses on an individuals access to 'cultural, intellectual and informational' (p. 20) resources, which enhance development. However, due to the focus of this study, this discussion will focus upon the notion of physical harm.

centric understanding of crime and deviance and the need for criminologists from both the mainstream and critical traditions to think reflexively and to involve themselves in the study of the global periphery (Smeulers and Haveman, 2008, Aas, 2012). In so doing, the social harms perspective can provide criminologists from both mainstream and critical traditions with the conceptual tools to move beyond crime itself and thus release the self-imposed shackles of state-deferential definitions of criminality (Tifft, 1995, Tifft and Sullivan, 2001, Hillyard and Tombs, 2004, 2005, Rothe et al, 2009). Likewise, we can potentially begin to redress the dominance of the Global North over the Global South being played out within academia itself, whereby the actions of dominant states in the North are legitimised through mainstream academic narratives (Jackson, 2008). Also, when considering Green and Wards' (2000) argument, that a social harm perspective applied to state-sanctioned violence should draw its inspiration from existing understandings of human rights, the problem of relativity is potentially removed. This is because existing internationally ratified frameworks, ignored as irrelevant or inconvenient by some states and some academics, can be utilised to inform definitions of physical harms. As Ward (2004) has argued, almost any state action could be categorised as harmful to somebody; as such, definitions of physical harm in relation to the state arguably need to be informed by behaviours that in any other setting would be considered to be criminally deviant by the viewing audience (Green and Ward, 2000, Ward, 2004).[222]

The actions of Coalition forces and their proxies in Iraq, amounting to serious physical harm, as illustrated in chapter six, guided by the exceptional rules governing their behaviour, certainly fall under the rubric of social harm when approached in the manner outlined here. With this in mind, it is the contention of this thesis that a social harm approach to understanding state crimes can be of value in negotiating criminology's limitations when "allowing its subject matter to be significantly determined by the vagaries of international politics" (Rothe et al, 2009:7).

---

[222] In this sense, state crime is both instrumental (carried out for a particular purpose) and performative (Ward, 2005), designed to carry with it a message for numerous audiences, which themselves can legitimise or delegitimize the action depending on its reception. This interaction between instrumental and performative violence, will be discussed in more depth with regard to the structural motivations for state criminality and the nature of small group dynamics within counter insurgencies, later in this discussion. Additionally, the receptive aspect of this constitutive analysis will be considered, with regard to the role of the mainstream media in constructing understandings of state actions.

This section has shown the application of the social harm perspective to an analysis of state crime. The social harms perspective, as applied to state-sanctioned violence, provides criminology with an analytical capacity that can potentially help to push the discipline away from its label as a justifier of coercive state practices. This study has found that the perspective is particularly useful in circumstances such as the Iraq War, in which normal legal statutes governing international conflicts were circumvented, leaving criminology without its usual conceptual tools to assess the violence inherent to the occupation. The social harm perspective serves to push criminology to contribute to debates hereto beyond its disciplinary boundaries (Hillyard and Tombs, 2004, 2005), considering the experiences of the global periphery (Aas, 2012), understanding the instrumental and performative crimes of the state (Ward, 2004) and stepping away from the de-facto adoption of strictly legalistic approaches to the field (Reiman, 2010).

So far then, we have laid out the importance of historical processes to research agendas within studies of state criminality. Additionally, we have considered the ways in which state-sanctioned violence can be re-conceptualised within criminology. This discussion now turns its analytical gaze to the structural motivations that both informed the decision to invade Iraq in the first place and instructed the neo-liberal restructuring of the country (Roberts et al, 2003, Klein, 2007). This section, consistent with cultural criminology's multidisciplinary approach, will utilise perspectives drawn from politics and international relations as an aspect of a constitutive approach to state crime. It will argue that it was the state's structural motivations and reforms that not only influenced the decision to invade Iraq, but also created the conditions through which both state-corporate crime (Whyte, 2007, 2010, Welch, 2008) and violent state crime became possible, through the declaration of a state of exception (Agamben, 2005). This, in turn, led to the suspension of both national and international laws governing Iraq. In short, if Iraq's primary export were avocadoes and not oil, then the US-led invasion and occupation would not have taken place (Stokes, 2009).

4. The structure – state crime relationship

The invasion and occupation of Iraq took place under the guise of the ongoing War against Terrorism, with Saddam Hussein accused of connections with Al Qaeda, of being in possession of weapons of mass destruction and posing a major threat to the security of the global community (Powell, 2003). However, as Cohen (2001:102) argues, through the

discourse of official denial, states regularly distort the truth in order to realise their national security interests. Cohen's thesis is clear with regard to the invasion of Iraq: as the occupation played out, it became clear that none of the original justifications for the invasion were accurate, begging the question: what were the underlying national security interests that guided the US-led military intervention? It is necessary to engage with these underlying interests in order to understand why the invasion and occupation of Iraq took place. If these underlying interests did not exist, then the subsequent state-sanctioned violence would not have taken place.

These interests can be summarised as: an economic interest in the country's oil reserves, and strategic interest in maintaining a military presence that can control a resource-rich region, crucial for global capitalism (Blakeley, 2009, Stokes, 2009). These interests themselves have historical precedent. As Yergin (1991) has discussed in some detail, historically, US interests in the Middle East have focused upon maintaining free access to the region, as a key aspect of the global economy (see also: Mufit, 2007). To this end, the US has engaged in a wide range of coercive activities, including the sponsorship of military coups in Iraq (as noted above in section 2) and Iran in 1953 (Gasiorowski, 2007), within the wider context of ensuring that the region stayed out of Soviet control as much as possible during the Cold War. As Yergin (1991:468) illustrates, quoting former US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles:

> "Not only would the free world be deprived of the enormous assets represented by Iranian oil production and reserves, but the Russians would secure these assets and thus henceforth be free of any anxiety about their petroleum resources. Worse still...if Iran succumbed...there [would be] little doubt that in short order the other areas of the Middle East, with some 60 percent of the world's oil reserves, would fall into Communist control."

However, these national interests were not limited solely to the Middle East. The US's approach to dealing with regimes in Central and South America that maintained economic policies that were not conducive to American interests, has been well documented by politics and international relations scholars (see for example: McClintock, 2002, Chomsky, 2003,

Gareau, 2004, Stokes, 2005, Blakeley, 2009, Pilger, 2010).[223] Chile, Nicaragua, Cuba and Guatemala, to name but a few, have been subjected to a foreign policy that included the arming and training of militias to remove democratically-elected leaders from power. US-taught techniques of torture and violent interrogation became routine practice for forces operating in the region on behalf of American interests. As Stokes (2009:90) affirms, political violence is intrinsically linked to the 'internationalisation of capitalism'.

Yet it is not enough to simply invade a country and expect economic reforms to organically evolve. Likewise, it is not sufficient to instigate an internal revolt against elected leaders and expect economic reforms to follow. What is required is a careful conversion of the state's existing economic policies, and the removal of structural obstacles to the realisation of neo-liberal reform (Whyte, 2010). In order to make economic reforms possible, it is necessary to introduce a state of exception into the country. This is not a new tactic within global, national and local governance, as Georgio Agamben (2005) has made clear. Agamben makes the case that governments across the world and throughout history have used the declaration of a state of exception as a pretext to circumvent the normal rule of law, which itself is defined by the state. Therefore, as the state defines the normal rule of law, it has the power, if not the moral right, to suspend these laws as it sees fit and to introduce 'emergency' laws that inhabit a grey area that is neither lawless nor lawful. This is because, as Agamben (Ibid: 1), drawing on Carl Schmitt's well-known assertion, states: 'the sovereign [is] he who decides on the state of exception'. The capacity to supersede the existing rule of law is an integral aspect and example of the power of the state. Agamben's views are similar to Klein's (2007); the declaration of exceptional circumstances is a necessary aspect of the neo-liberal reconstruction of societies, which, as illustrated, has formed a doctrinal aspect of US foreign policy since World War II. With this in mind, it comes as no surprise that the resort to a state

---

[223] McClintock Traces the role of counter-insurgency warfare in US foreign policy. In 'Understanding Power', Chomsky locates strategic, economic and resource driven interests, as the primary drivers of the utilisation of military power (either directly or by proxy), or the utilisation of economic sanctions and political isolation, of states who refuse to act in their interests. Gareau presents a detailed analysis of the US' role in supporting state terrorism, in order to bring about regime change in various states in Latin America, in the pursuit of its national interests. Stokes' in-depth case-study of the role that US support for state violence plays in Columbia, violence that is designed primarily to ensure the maintenance of Columbian support for US national security interests in the region, including the protection of US economic interests and strategic access to Columbian oil. Ruth Blakeley analyses the role states in the global north play in terrorizing states in the global south, in order to maintain their own economic interests and political power and to globalise neo-liberal economic practices. Pilger's documentary 'The War on Democracy' provides an international review of America's utilisation of state violence throughout Central and South America in the maintenance of its national security interests.

of exception has been used throughout history as a weapon in the arsenal of government.[224] Having outlined the importance of locating international relations approaches to understanding state structural interests, within a constitutive approach to the study of state crime, we can now apply this approach to the Iraq War.

4.1 The structure – state crime relationship in the Iraq War

In Iraq, in contrast to the more indirect approaches seen in Central and Southern America, the US returned to a "territorial" approach to ensuring its national interests could be met (Stokes, 2009). Military power was deployed in order to extend US extra-regional hegemony to a region that, as we have seen, has been of historic importance to the US due to its wealth of natural resources and associated strategic importance (Layne, 2007). Similarly, Klein (2007) has argued that the invasion and occupation of Iraq was the latest instalment in a historic US policy of utilising crises',[225] to introduce neo-liberal economic reforms; referred to by Klein as the "shock doctrine" (see also: Schwartz, 2007, Ruggiero, 2010). In the case of Iraq, Klein (2007:8) argues that the shock doctrine involved reforms amounting to "mass privatisation, complete free trade,[226] a 15% flat tax [and] a dramatically downsized government". The Iraq War represented a rational foreign policy decision based upon perceived national interests, which had a historic precedence in US foreign policy towards states in the Global South. Klein cites the 1973 military coup that led to Salvadore Allendes' removal from power and his replacement with General Augusto Pinochet and the rule of the Argentinian military Junta as evidence of this policy in US history among other notable examples.[227] Klein provides evidence that through the doctrine of "disaster capitalism" espoused by the Nobel Prize

---

[224] Agamben (2005), conducted a historical analysis that incorporates the attack on civil liberties during the Third Reich, with regard to the suspension of the Weimar Constitution (P.14-15), the state of siege authorised by the Italian government in Palermo, Milan and Naples to suppress 'disturbances' (p.17), and the military order issued by George W. Bush to supersede the existing US PATRIOT Act, authorising indefinite detention and trial by military commission, anyone suspected of activities that threaten the security of the United States (p.3), to name just a few examples.

[225] In the case of Iraq, articulated firstly as an international security crisis linked to the War on Terror, and during the occupation, as a national crisis linked to instability created by the insurgency war.

[226] In Iraq this meant that the vast majority of contracts for lucrative reconstruction projects were given to foreign firms, as oppose to Iraqi companies (Cockburn, 2007).

[227] Including: Russia, in which Yeltsin utilised dictatorial powers to enforce neo-liberal reforms and ruthlessly suppress democratic opposition to this process. Bolivia, whose democratically elected president Jeffrey Sachs, was convinced to renege on his election pledges and adopt the Friedman model of economic reform, then utilising his security infrastructure to suppress opposition. Poland, who followed the Sachs model, China, undeterred from using brutal repression to protect similar economic reforms and South Africa, whose transition from Apartheid Klein argues, was conditional on the introduction of neo-liberal shock therapy.

winning economist Milton Friedman, used in conjunction with the routine use of extreme violence against resistant populations, there has been a history of both direct and indirect military and political interventions led by the US. These interventions have been designed to bring about crises' that, according to Friedman's ideology, create the conditions in which neo-liberal reforms may be pushed through.

Roberts *et al* (2003), take a similar approach, arguing that the war in Iraq was partly aimed at taking control of its national resources, whilst simultaneously opening up the country to international business interests by introducing widespread socio-economic reforms (see also: Agnew, 2003). This is based upon the notion that Iraq forms one country within what Barnett (2003, cited in Roberts *et al*, 2003) refers to as a region lacking sufficient integration into the global economy. This corresponds with Klein's (2007) analysis of the shock doctrine, as the laws introduced by Paul Bremer and the CPA represent the implementation of this doctrine at a vastly accelerated rate. To this end, Roberts *et al* (2003:893) suggest that US foreign policy in Iraq is based upon the premise of assimilating nation states in the region which lack integration, into the functioning "core" of the global economy; simultaneously removing "security impediments" in the process through the application of military power. Stokes (2005) refers to this as acting transnationally in order to achieve long-term national security interests.

As Whyte (2007) has discussed, this weapon was deployed effectively in Iraq in order to introduce the wide-ranging neo-liberal economic reforms that Klein (2007) considers to be a consistent theme throughout US history. The laws introduced within the state of exception, to ensure that these reforms could progress unencumbered, included massive reforms to the banking sector, international trade rules based upon the World Trade Organisation, the privatisation of state enterprises and the deregulation of the labour market, among others (Whyte, 2007, see also: Klein, 2004, Welch, 2008). In addition to the economic reforms introduced by the CPA, Order 17 provided Coalition civilian and military personnel with complete immunity from prosecution by Iraqi courts or international bodies, through the US-led Coalition's surrogate control of Iraq. As discussed in the previous chapter, this was preceded by Presidential Executive Order 13303, which, tellingly, also granted immunity from prosecution to any US personnel involved in the reconfiguration of the Iraqi economy (Welch, 2008). This immunity gave the US the capacity to enact its reforms without fear of judicial sanction, granting it the freedom to introduce the neo-liberal reforms to the Iraqi

economy that it deemed necessary. Whyte (2007) argues that the corruption and reconstruction of the Iraqi economy in this manner is an example of state-corporate criminality, in which the mandate of the CPA laid down by the UN was breeched by the excesses of the economic reforms enacted. The Iraqi economy and the Iraqi people were made to suffer in the name of foreign investment, capital accumulation and hegemonic control of a key region of the world (see also: Green and Ward, 2004). This was a blueprint for neo-liberal economic reform, which was constructed so that future Iraqi governments, supportive of US economic interests, could continue their development (Welch, 2008, see also: Klein, 2004).

However, whilst Iraq was undoubtedly the site of state-corporate criminality, the state of exception enacted also provided the conditions whereby violent state crime or physical harms committed by state actors or proxies, acting on behalf of the state (Hillyard and Tombs, 2004), occurred as a matter of routine. As Ruggerio (2010) has argued, there are both *crimes in war*, referring to the state-corporate crimes discussed above, and *war crimes*, the violent state criminality that is often linked to state-corporate criminality. Drawing on the same legislative immunity from prosecution, CPA Order 17 also created the structural conditions that helped to foster the criminality inherent to the aggressive counter-insurgency campaign illustrated by the data gathered in this research.

As discussed in the previous chapter, the CPA introduced numerous legal reforms, which served to create a security vacuum in Iraq in which violence was able to flourish. Within this security vacuum, violent state criminality was the primary means of conducting the enemy-focused counter-insurgency operation. As in previous US counter-insurgency conflicts, this led to torture, abuse, extrajudicial killing and the utilisation of militias, as standardised tactics within the military's approach. The state of exception created in Iraq that allowed these practices to take place unopposed, could be understood as an example of the social construction of criminality. The so-called 'exceptional' circumstances, behaviours and practices, considered in all other social situations to be abhorrent, become a routinised part of everyday life. This leaves those involved in counter-insurgency operations fully aware of their immunity from prosecution and creates a culture of impunity shaped by the conditions of the state of exception (Welch, 2008). Unregulated violence becomes normalised in the

service of the state.[228] As Kramer (1994) suggests, this is the implementation of violence by structure.

The violence by structure created by the state of exception enacted in Iraq is a product of the international state of exception that led to the US military invasion. Additionally, these states of exception are themselves a product of the overriding drive for the "internationalisation of capitalism" (Stokes, 2009), or the neo-liberalisation of the globe through the application of "shock therapy" (Klein, 2007). These underlying ideological processes inform the structural logic inherent to states of exception. This, in turn, makes the use of political violence as a regular aspect of counter-insurgency warfare possible or, as Klein argues, inevitable.

Understanding international structural processes within historical narratives is fundamental to the vision of a constitutive cultural criminology of state crime proposed in this thesis. However, a cultural criminology of state crime must also consider the role of governance. The discussion now turns to an analysis of the nature of governance within Iraq's counter-insurgency war.

5. Governance in occupied Iraq: fragmented power and a culture of impunity

Within the governmentality literature there are two primary approaches to understanding the nature of governance: the analysis of government policy and practice, or the nature of governmentality itself, and the social constructionist analysis of social problems, focusing in particular on the shaping of public understandings of social problems and the appropriate government response to them (Lippert and Stenson, 2010). The first of these positions (we will return to the second later in this section) is concerned with the way in which government guides and directs action: the rationalities (Donzelot, 1979, cited in Lippert and Stenson, 2010) or ideologies that inform the practice of government, the plans made to carry out the vision articulated in the rationality, and the means by which these ideas are carried out.

---

[228] Clearly this process involves more than the structural conditions discussed here, for example the demonisation of the other (Young, 2007, McCulloch and Pickering, 2009), the media's neglect of state criminality, or the representation of this criminality as necessary, legitimising the process for actors and public alike (Herman and Chomsky, 1989, Altheide, 2006). Or additionally, the role that small group dynamics can play in constructing and reinforcing the violent behaviours that become normalised in counter-insurgency wars (e.g. Sutherland, 1940). These processes will be discussed in subsequent sections hence their omission at this stage.

Applying these ideas to the occupation of Iraq, we quickly see the benefit of an analysis of governance.

5.1 The nature of governance in occupied Iraq

As already discussed, the underlying rationale guiding the invasion and occupation of Iraq can be placed under the rubric of neo-liberalism (Klein, 2007. Whyte, 2007, 2010, Welch, 2008). This governing rationale informed the decision to invade the country, the way in which the country was reconstructed and, importantly, the way in which the counter-insurgency was managed. The counter-insurgency war was based upon an enemy-centric approach, meaning that the primary concern of those involved was to stop the insurgency at all costs (Kilcullen, 2009). This promoted an aggressive approach to the conduct of the occupation by Coalition forces that amounted to the consistent and doctrinal use of excessive violence that showed little concern for civilian life. However, the approach itself was also informed by a neo-liberal rationale, which promoted the minimization of actors directly associated with the state (Coalition forces) and the dispersal of responsibility for counter-insurgency operations to a variety of proxy forces. The most notable of these, linked directly to the neo-liberalisation of Iraq, were PMCs acting on the state's behalf, but only due to the financial incentive offered to them. Lea and Stenson (2007) have noted this with regard to the domestic privatisation of security. The role of PMCs in Iraq became increasingly blurred between the civilian security functions they were supposed to fulfil and an active role as a state military functionary. In particular, the involvement of PMCs in security operations, in conjunction with both Coalition and Iraqi security forces, is an example of a method of supplementing existing forces at short notice. This was an integral aspect of Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld's vision of the future of the US military (Scahill, 2007).

However the dispersal of responsibility for counter-insurgency operations was not solely located with PMCs. It occurred through several different paths that included the involvement of the reconstituted Iraqi military and security forces and the co-opting of militias into these forces.[229] This is something that Lea (2001) refers to as the blurring of criminality and warfare, where disaggregating criminals from the police and the army becomes virtually

---

[229] CPA Order 91 authorised the inclusion of existing Iraqi militias, operating outside of state control, into the security forces, in order to target suspected insurgents and their supporters.

impossible. In this instance, criminal conduct, such as the torture and abuse of detainees by Iraqi military and security forces described in the Iraq War Logs becomes a desirable tactic within counter-insurgency warfare. As a result, state-sanctioned criminality becomes a form of governance from below (Stenson, 1998). In summary, what we see in the occupation of Iraq, and for Lippert and Stenson (2010) as a more general ideological approach to governance, is the rationale informing governance from above being based intrinsically on neo-liberal rationales and the rolling-back of the state. In turn, this rationale means that the primary application of governance comes from below by forces that understand the role that is required of them, i.e. an aggressive approach to shutting down the insurgency. As Lea and Stenson (2007) note with regard to British policing, there is a plurality of actors involved including private security, CCTV operators, neighbourhood watch, Police Community Support Officers and the Police themselves. These actors adhere to the same rationale for how British society should operate and how to prevent transgression. However, instead of a separation of the notions of top-down and bottom-up governance, these two approaches can be conflated. In short, governance from below becomes in effect an arm of the state. Instead of conceiving of the neo-liberal reorganisation of governance as the complete rollback of the state, in effect the capacity of the state to govern has expanded through the pluralisation of actors governing on their behalf (Lea and Stenson, 2007).[230]

This pluralisation of responsibility can also be understood as an example of the fragmentation of state power within counter-insurgency warfare. Contrary to Weber's (1968) notion of the state's monopoly on the use of force as a defining feature of state power, the evolution of the state along neo-liberal lines has seen the state become the primary regulator of force, but no longer the sole purveyor of it (Welch, 2009). In Iraq, although a particular rationale (neo-liberalisation) and doctrine (enemy centric approach), governed the counter-insurgency war, a plurality of actors were authorised to act in this capacity. This authorisation is the product of economic and commercial drivers, which influence the state's increased reliance on proxy forces over regular military (Newburn, 2007). This is symptomatic of Rumsfeld's vision for

---

[230] This is not intended to subtract from the importance of human experience and agency, in the conduct of the counter-insurgency in Iraq on the contrary, this is an integral aspect to understanding the counter-insurgency and will be discussed later in this chapter. However, it is the contention of this thesis, that governance plays an important role in actors' understandings of their place within the social environments in which they operate. In a similar manner to a diffused network of organised crime or perhaps more appropriately, a terrorist network, actors involved within a counter-insurgency are able to understand their roles, through knowledge of and adherence, to an underlying rationale.

the future of the US's approach to military conflicts (Scahill, 2007). In Iraq, as Welch (2009) notes, the deployment of PMCs surpassed any previous resort to military outsourcing in history. When combined with the exceptional laws introduced by the CPA exempting Coalition personnel from prosecution, the fragmented distribution of power in this manner helped create the culture of impunity, which contributed to the levels of state-sanctioned violence observed in the country. As a result, PMC's were heavily involved in the violent often deadly use of force against Iraqi civilians. This loss of life draws into question the legitimacy of the diffusion or fragmentation of state power, particularly when the immunity from prosecution offered to those involved suggests an awareness of the likely loss of life.

However, the fragmentation of power is not limited to PMC's. As noted above, the occupation of Iraq diffused power to both Iraqi militias and the reconstituted Iraqi military and security forces. Nevertheless, one of the primary reasons for Iraqi members of the security forces being able to behave in this manner is located within governance of Iraq. Here I refer to FRAGO 242 and updated order FRAGO 039 that instructed US Coalition personnel not to intervene to stop acts of violence carried out by Iraqis on Iraqis. The evidence discussed in the previous chapter illustrates that these orders were, for the most part, followed to the letter. As a result, this contributed to the impunity with which proxy forces acting on behalf of the Coalition conducted themselves during the counter-insurgency, as very rarely was any sanction, official or otherwise, brought against them.

In summary, the governance of the Iraq War was based primarily on the fragmentation of power to a variety of different actors, which contributed to an environment in which impunity reigned. Traditional state actors in the Coalition reinforced violent actions by state proxies. This further contributed to the impunity inherent to counter-insurgency forces. If we draw on Lea and Stenson's (2007) notion that state power has actually expanded through its diffusion, it may be argued that the pluralisation of actors, the rationale informing their action and the legislation governing them contributed equally to the violence that they enacted during the counter-insurgency (Welch, 2009). It is also clear that proxy forces operating on behalf of the Coalition in Iraq had their own agendas. For example, Shi'a militias were concerned with carrying out their own acts of violence against Sunni communities and PMCs were primarily concerned with fulfilling their contracts. It is clear that the relationship between the state and its proxies is not based purely on mutual interests or indeed fully interdependent (Lea and Stenson, 2007). However, an appreciation of the relationship itself can help us to understand

the complex nature of the violent occupation of Iraq. It is appropriate at this point to consider the second of the two approaches to the study of governance: the construction of social problems and the role this plays in shaping both the public's understanding of these problems, as well as justifying the role that actors involved in solving these problems take on.

5.2 Social constructionist understandings of governance and the Iraq War

Lippert and Stenson (2010:478), drawing on the work of Spector and Kitsuse (1973, 1977), characterise the constructionist project in governmentality studies as a programme that analyses social problems not as an objective reality, but as "claims-making activities" by a variety of social actors. [231] These actors are the subject of interrogation within the constructionist approach to understanding governance, which assesses who is responsible for the claims to objective truth being made, and what values and interests these claims serve (Lippert and Stenson, 2010). These 'activities' and 'claims' can be found with regard to the Iraq War in the statements made by politicians and the representation of the conflict within the mainstream media. Of particular relevance to the construction of the perception of the conflict itself, is the depiction of Iraq as descending into a violent insurgency, whereby warring ethnic groups and foreign fighters migrating across Iraq's borders, sought to disrupt the reconstruction of the country in the wake of the US-led invasion.

As discussed in chapter's three and four, the role of Iraq's historic ethnic divisions and the migration of foreign fighters into the country formed a major aspect of the representation of the conflict by both the mainstream media in the US and the UK and the comments of political leaders. However, their emphasis by both parties served to marginalize debates surrounding the nature of the counter-insurgent response to these problems, justifying the actions of those involved. Consistent with the social constructionist approach to governmentality and interconnected with this last point, these narrative constructions of the problem helped to justify the exceptional circumstances which were utilised to introduce the legislation that governed the conflict. As discussed in section four in relation to Agamben (2005), Whyte (2007, 2010) and Welch (2008), this legislation was only possible through the

---

[231] Including: Lobby groups, moral entrepreneurs, government officials, media representatives, regulatory bodies, professionals and social scientists (Lippert and Stenson, 2010:478).

resort to a state of exception. This state of exception itself was only made palatable[232] by the construction of the problem and the required response to it. If it were not for the release of the Iraq War Logs by Wikileaks the full extent of the crimes carried out during the occupation of Iraq would in all likelihood never have been known. As we have seen, the response to the problem of insurgency in Iraq often amounted to a doctrinal use of indiscriminate state-sanctioned violence.

With the above analysis in mind this thesis is in agreement with Lippert and Stenson (2010). Understanding the real conditions of the practice of governance, in conjunction with an analysis of the social construction of problems and the ways in which these problems should be solved, is an interconnected activity. As we have seen in the case of Iraq these two factors are inextricably linked: the manner with which the occupation was governed was dependent upon the initial construction of the problem in the run-up to the invasion and during the occupation. This provided the conditions within which a state of exception could be enacted and the governance within these exceptional circumstances could go largely unchallenged. This thesis concurs with Welch (2008:265), who notes that the nature of governance has serious implications for the conduct of counter-insurgency operations, arguing that impunity resists accountability.

However, whilst an analysis of the nature of governance within counter-insurgency war is an important consideration for the study of state criminality, it is also necessary to understand the role of individuals tasked with prosecuting these conflicts. The lived experience of soldiers at war, the interactions between group members and the construction of identity within conflict situations, is fundamental to the criminological understanding of state crime. To this end, the following section will seek to further develop the constitutive approach discussed in this chapter through a micro level analysis of the role of soldiers at war.

---

[232] As the thesis has stated previously (see the media analysis of the representation of US mistakes made in the administration of the occupation), criticisms against the approach to the occupation were made. However, these criticisms rarely focused on the conduct of the counter-insurgency, unless undeniable evidence was presented, as in the case of Abu Ghraib, or if the deaths of Coalition troops were deemed to be too higher price to pay. Instead these criticisms tended to represent the decision making of the CPA and Bush Administration as inept, making the occupation unnecessarily difficult, as oppose to criminally violent.

6. Theorising the role of soldiers at war in Iraq

Acts of state criminality in Iraq may be conceptualised as examples of what Tanner (2011), drawing on the work of Christopher Browning (1992),[233] has referred to as 'collective action'. This may be considered as the participation in mass violence as being contingent upon the relationship that groups and individuals have with their social and situational environment. The environment in which groups and individuals operate, offers modes of conduct that actors adopt, regardless of their identity and personality outside of these circumstances. However, in applying this idea to state criminality as an aspect of counter-insurgency operation in Iraq, we must first offer an understanding of the nature of small group dynamics. This, in conjunction with the state's ideology and the way in which conflicts are governed, helps to construct the modes of conduct adopted by counter-insurgency operatives.

6.1 Applying sub-cultural theory to military forces in occupied Iraq

Cottee (2011a) utilises Marc Sageman's (2004) 'bunch of guys' thesis to explain Al Qaeda-inspired groups or affiliates in the Western world as an example of a collective response to strains encountered within modern life. Cottee (Ibid) argues that understandings of terrorists and terrorist groups as pathological actors, driven by poverty and indoctrination, are wide of the mark. Instead, as Sageman (2004) argues, in reality these groups are the product of isolated individuals coming together and forming a collective identity in opposition to that of their host country. The resort to terrorism, in turn, is the result of small group dynamics based on a 'collective identity' founded in religious belief, in which individuals within the group encourage each other into acts of greater extremism. Although Cottee's (2011a) analysis focuses on non-terrorism, there is scope to apply his analysis to the study of state crime. Of particular relevance is the role that group ties or group affiliations play in the construction of identity. As Cottee (Ibid: 735) suggests, terrorist groups provide "their members with a powerful and seductive narrative" through which they can make sense of their own identities, understand their roles and learn behaviours deemed appropriate by the group. Parallels here can be observed between terrorist groups and military units acting in conflict situations,

---

[233] Browning sought to understand the actions of the reserve police battalion 101 and their role in the final solution, in Poland during World War II.

233

particularly the notion of group identity and affiliation, in the construction and learning of appropriate behaviour. However, before we explore this point in more detail, a discussion of Cohen's (1955) classic study of delinquent gang culture will help to further inform our analysis.

Cohen's (Ibid) subcultural approach to understanding delinquency explores the ways in which youth cultures respond to social strain, as conceived by Robert Merton (1938). Merton argued that individuals often respond to the pressures exerted in modern Western society in non-conformist ways. Taking culture as the starting point, Cohen (1955) argues that culture is made up of beliefs, values and codes of conduct and specific tastes and prejudices, which are inherent to and learnt through participation in social groups. By contrast, a subculture is considered distinct from its host culture, having characteristics that have developed in opposition to the host culture. Cohen observes this trait in the delinquent gangs he studied, in which the delinquent gangs inverted the values of their host culture to form the subcultural values they created. Cohen argues that the inversion of these values is designed to solve the problems that people experiencing strain have identified. This is the primary purpose of forming a subcultural group. It is the negative behavioural aspects of these gangs, in opposition to the values of the host culture that Cohen observed, which is of further explanatory value to our analysis.

The dominant culture within the Iraq War, with regard to military units involved in the invasion and occupation, may be considered as respect for the basic human rights of the Iraqi people, in the context of IHL and the 1949 Geneva Conventions on human rights. It is these principles that should govern the actions of forces involved in armed conflict but often does not. However, these cultural norms were turned upside down in two distinct ways: firstly, at the level of governance, which as we have discussed is informed by a particular structural rationale i.e. neo-liberalism. It is this rationale that guided the legislative changes made by the CPA and provided immunity to Coalition forces and associated personnel. Likewise, it is this rationale that informed the aggressive approach to solving the problem of the insurgency, which obstructed the neo-liberal rationale informing the occupation, creating strain for the Coalition. Inseparable from this first point, is the inversion of these norms by actors directly involved in conducting the counter-insurgency, who, informed by their immunity from prosecution and focus on stopping the 'enemy', adopted similarly inverted cultural values. This made possible the adoption of violent group identities as seen in Cottee's (2011a)

analysis of Western Al Qaeda cells. It is this synthesis of the macro influence of structure with the micro level analysis of the actions of Coalition forces and their associates, which is fundamental to an understanding of state criminality within the Iraq War. This may be summarised as collective action (Tanner, 2011) to solve a structurally imposed problem (Cohen, 1955). However, whilst Cohen's (1955) subcultural analysis provides an important piece of the puzzle, there is more to this process than group identity. We need to explore how actors involved in a counter- insurgency can adopt behaviour that in all other social circumstances would be considered abhorrent. To do this, the groundbreaking works of both Howard Becker (1964) on the construction of deviant behaviour, and Edwin Sutherland (1940) on learnt transgression, will be considered in relation to the small group dynamics of actors in the counter-insurgency.[234]

6.2 The construction of deviance in occupied Iraq

For Becker (1964), whether an act is considered to be deviant or not depends upon people's reaction to it. By extension, it follows that whilst deviant behaviour is a construction of those who observe it, so too may behaviour normally defined as deviant be constructed as expected or even desirable if the behaviour receives no negative response. When placed in the subcultural context of actors involved in the Iraq War, we can see this process taking place, through a combination of the immunity from prosecution granted to Coalition personnel and the enemy-focused counter-insurgency. These two factors contributed to the construction of normally deviant behaviour, such as the torture and abuse of detainees as acceptable conduct within the counter-insurgency. This process contributed to the capacity for those involved in

---

[234] Whilst the focus here is on the application of criminological approaches to this analysis, there is also a wider literature explaining the transgressive behaviour of soldiers at war external to criminological theory. These include: international relations approaches that argue that soldiers are trained to be inherently aggressive as a normalised aspect of their identity alongside the disciplining of soldiers to adhere to the requirements of their mission over all other concerns. It is argued that the construction of the soldier's identity in this manner ensures that their identities are invested in fulfilling their orders and limiting the capacity for reflexive thought (see for example: Walzer, 1981, Nadleson, 2005, Eriksson Baaz and Stern, 2009). Social psychological approaches agree that soldiers are trained to reflexively obey orders, but add that the situational pressures of warfare (such as fear, disorientation and the completely alien circumstances of war) cause soldiers to behave in ways that are substantially different to normally accepted behaviour. These behaviours are in turn normalised through observing the corresponding behaviour of those around them (see for example: Ricks, 1997, Bourke, 2000, Kekes, 2005, Doris and Murphy, 2007). Finally, social anthropologists such as Sluka (2008) have argued that the de-humanisation of those defined in opposition to invading or occupying forces, subjectively justifies the killing of otherwise innocent people. Sluka argues that this is a cultural universality throughout history for people fighting for what they believe is their survival, be this in self defence, or in defence of their way of life (see also Sluka's, 2000, edited collection on the anthropology of death squads).

this violence to continue to conduct themselves in this manner without seriously questioning the legitimacy of their actions or the ramifications for their victims.[235]

However, this argument can be further developed through an engagement with Sutherland's (1940) notion of differential association. If Becker's (1964) assertion is accurate, and if the violent behaviour of Coalition actors and their affiliates was deemed acceptable within the legislative conditions of the counter-insurgency, then their deviant behaviour must have been seen as desirable by their colleagues for this process to be successful. To put this more simply: Sutherland (1940) argues that deviant behaviour is learnt through the process of differential association. He defines this process as group values and attitudes towards, and motives for criminality, as being learnt through interactions with those around us. In Sutherland's (Ibid) case he applies this to the study of white-collar criminality in the workplace. In our case, the workplace is a war zone, in which military units have been tasked with stemming an insurgency and granted carte blanche to act outside of the normal values governing behaviour.[236] As a result, it can be argued that those involved in the counter-insurgency had normally deviant behaviour, mutually reinforced as desirable by their colleagues. Although soldiers may consider themselves only to be fulfilling orders, the rules governing armed conflict define deviance in this context. That US military culture reinforced this behaviour in Iraq does not detract from its deviance. Expanding on this theme of group dynamics, we may turn our attentions to the work of Jack Katz (1988) and his imaginative analysis of the subjective experience of transgression. This next section will help us to understand the resort to state-sanctioned violence as a response to the ontological insecurity experienced by soldiers at war.

6.3 The lived experience of war

Katz's (Ibid) work is based on the premise that criminology, in seeking to explain the background and structural causes of crime, deemed almost irrelevant the experiential attractions that criminality provides. Katz seeks to analyse the seductive emotionality of

---

[235] This process is also linked to Young's (2007) notion of othering the enemy within the War on Terror and Katz's (1988) work on the expressive nature of transgression. These two concepts will be returned to later in this section of the discussion.

[236] As already noted, these are defined as the rules governing armed conflict enshrined in IHL and the 1949 Geneva Conventions on human rights.

transgression through a series of explorations of a variety of different criminal acts, including: homicide, shoplifting, and armed robbery and their associated emotional thrills, which in turn include the self-righteous justification of murder, the thrill of shoplifting and superiority of the armed robber. It is these emotional experiences that can also be seen in the theatre of war. Cottee (2011b: 439), drawing on Sebastian Junger's 'piercing phenomenology of war', considers the subjective reality of war to be a complex narrative of competing emotional states. Here frontline actors experience "intense foreboding and fear" but also 'crave and find enormously exciting and intoxicating' the experience of conflict (Ibid: 446, see also: Breen-Smyth, 2010). As Cottee (2009) argues in his review of Ian Baruma's 'Murder in Amsterdam',[237] criminology often neglects to consider what Hayward (2004:148), drawing on Katz (1988), refers to as "the lived experience of criminality". It is this lived experience that makes the Katzian analysis of criminality applicable to the study of war and state-sanctioned criminality. In particular, the idea that criminal behaviour, or behaviour that subverts (or inverts) cultural norms, is as Hayward (2004) argues not only intensely exciting, but linked to a need to reassert control in an ever-changing, unstable late modern world.

This notion of the instability of existence experienced by actors in the late modern world essentially refers to the idea of ontological insecurity, in which our experiences of everyday life are based upon actual or perceived risk, fears and anxieties, and material and existential concerns (Young, 1999). Drawing on Hayward (2004), who applies the idea to crimes committed within late modern consumer cultures, the argument may be made that crime is a way of reasserting control in an out of control world. This idea can be extended into the realm of warfare. After all, war zones are some of the most chaotic places on earth, in which perceived and real existential threats to those involved cast an ever-present shadow over daily life. This creates what Cottee (2011b) and Junger (2011) have argued is an intense mix of fear and excitement, producing ontological insecurity. Within a counter-insurgency conflict such as the occupation of Iraq, in which clear distinctions between friend and foe are non-existent, following the logic of ontological insecurity existential threats would be even more pronounced. In contrast then to the existential anxieties posed to the self within late modern consumer culture (Hayward, 2004), the existential threat posed to Coalition forces and associated proxies in Iraq is one that threatens their continued existence itself. It can be argued then that the attempts to reassert control over these threats in the course of the

---

[237] An analysis of the murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh.

counter-insurgency influenced the resort to the levels of violence witnessed in Iraq. Whilst, undoubtedly, military combat can be viewed as an exhilarating experience, the exhilaration experienced is contingent on the threat to life. State criminality within counter-insurgency wars is not necessarily seductive, but an existential necessity. In Iraq this was structurally legitimised through the subcultural rejection of the rules governing armed conflict.

The legitimation of violence within the Iraq War provided actors involved in state criminality with the capacity to neutralise their deviancy. Adapting Sykes and Matza's (1957) study of delinquent techniques for neutralising responsibility for deviancy, we can suggest that the legislation providing Coalition forces with this capacity to neutralise their deviancy represents both a structural and subjective technique of neutralisation, involving both state and state actor. This is due to the characterisation of the counter-insurgency as a subculture working within the wider culture of respect for human rights governing the Iraq War. This was also made possible through the fragmentary orders issued to govern the conduct of US forces in their interactions with their Iraqi counterparts. As discussed in chapter six, FRAGO 242 and FRAGO 039 ordered US forces not to intervene to stop acts of violence committed by Iraqi forces against other Iraqis. This means that the capacity for neutralisation is provided for military units by the state itself.

This process served to reinforce the behaviour among Iraqi military and security personnel, as in a similar way to the differential learning experienced by Coalition forces, Iraqi forces received little to no official sanction to discourage them from further abuses. Additionally, these orders allowed those aware of the practice to cognitively distance themselves from responsibility for the abuse, as they had been ordered not to intervene (Crellenstein, 2003). This also enabled the denial of responsibility for these abuses (Jamieson and McEvoy, 2005). This process may be intrinsically linked to the othering of opposition forces, found in the 'Orwellian' language used to portray opposition forces in Iraq during US military briefings. Coalition forces had internalised this description thereby extending the process of dehumanisation found in the media and political representation of the Iraq War (Young, 2007, McCulloch and Pickering, 2009).[238] Breen-Smyth's (2010:462) interview with an Iraq veteran leads to similar conclusions: "such a simple thing as the use of an acronym, can have

---

[238] This discussion forms an aspect of the final theoretical trope, which this thesis contends should form an integral aspect of a constitutive criminology of the state, the role of media representation. Therefore the analysis will refrain from tackling this in detail at this point.

a powerful affect when it comes to considering a detainee as a human being or not". According to the veteran, basic Army training was also designed to encourage soldiers to disregard the human rights of non-uniformed combatants (Ibid).

The capacity for Coalition forces to neutralise their responsibility for the deviancy of others presents an interesting juxtaposition with the Katzian lived experience. However, this does not mean that the approaches are incompatible, as whilst extreme violence presents a strong corrective to the ontological insecurity that war presents, so too does the resort to obedience when confronted with situations that question one's sense of self. As Cohen (2001) has argued, individuals are capable of existing in multiple constructed realities, which do not necessarily compliment one another. As a result, military forces in the Iraq War were able to carry out acts of extreme, expressive violence in order to negotiate their ontological insecurity, whilst in contrast falling back on legislation to help them negotiate threats to their sense of self. Indeed, there is a long sociological history of analysing war in this manner; for example, Hannah Arendt's notion of the banality of evil, in which she concluded that the actions of Adolf Eichmann during the Holocaust could be explained through obedience to authority, rather than inherent sadism (see also: Kellman and Hamilton, 1989, Green and Ward, 2009). This notion provides an avenue for a further synthesis of the Katzian excitement found in transgression and the adherence to authority. Here the psychological attributes required to maim and kill are synchronised with obedience to authority figures. This situates micro processes within the governing principles of the Iraq War.

In summary, we have set out a framework to understand the role that small group dynamics played in the conduct of state criminality. This framework has suggested that military units share the characteristics of a subcultural group (Cohen, 1955), whose deviant behaviour is reinforced through a lack of both legislative and/or group sanction (Becker, 1964, Sutherland, 1940). It has been argued that the resort to extreme violence is both a way of reasserting existential control (Katz, 1988, Hayward, 2004) within a conflict situation, which is itself reinforced by exceptional legislation governing the actions of military units. With this in mind, we can suggest that collective action in the form of state-sanctioned criminality was strongly influenced by the role of small group dynamics. These small group dynamics are interconnected with the process of governance, the structural motivations for invading Iraq and the influence of both US and Iraqi history. With this in mind, there is one final theoretical theme that requires exploration within a cultural criminology of state crime: the role of the

mainstream media in constructing popular public discourse and the effect that this has in neutralising opposition to government policy.

7. Understanding the media's hegemonic framing of the Iraq War

A fundamental aspect of this thesis has been the media's representation of the Iraq War. As previous chapters have illustrated, the media narrative of the conflict largely ignored state-sanctioned violence within its coverage, preferring other explanatory frameworks to understand the chaotic and violent situation that was played out during the occupation. These frameworks either supported official accounts of the conflict or did not deviate from existing public discourse. The mainstream media's framing of the conflict did offer a partial understanding of the violence inherent to post-invasion Iraq, but marginalized public debate regarding the legitimacy of the counter-insurgency tactics used in Iraq. This served to shape the boundaries of popular public discourse on the conflict.

Academic analysis of the mainstream media has often shown that media organisations have the power to dictate legitimate public discourse (Shepherd, 2008, Robinson, 2009). Ericson et al (1989) argue that the news media constructs who can be trusted to produce authoritative accounts of socio-political issues, which accounts are reliable, and which should be marginalized. Likewise, Zulaika and Douglass (2008) suggest that there is often much more to the story told within media narratives than is actually presented; as such, what is left out of the media narrative should be of primary concern for social scientists (see also: Jackson, 2007). As Stohl (2008) argues, this involves subjecting state-centric understandings presented in the media to appropriate tests against available empirical data. This is certainly the case with the occupation of Iraq, as without the release of the Wikileaks Iraq War Logs we would never have known the scale of state crime conducted by Coalition forces and their proxies over the course of the occupation. As a result, there are two primary questions that require answering in the following discussion: why did the mainstream news media present the Iraq War in this way? What impact did this coverage have upon the practice of state crime in Iraq?

Taking these questions in turn, we begin our analysis by assessing how the mainstream media constructed its narrative agenda with reference to the occupation of Iraq. As illustrated within the media analyses carried out in this research, the mainstream press in the US and UK largely reported the claims made by politicians regarding explanations for the violence

associated with post-invasion Iraq in an uncritical manner. Robinson (2009) notes a similar trend in the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq, whereby the news media uncritically reported the claims made by politicians regarding links between Saddam Hussein and Osama Bin Laden, despite the absence of any evidence tying the two together. Altheide (2009:66) makes a similar argument regarding the lead-up to the Iraq War, noting that politicians in the US made a significant effort to present the invasion of Iraq as "tantamount to attacking terrorists" (see also: Kellner, 2004, Ryan and Switzer, 2009). As Atheide notes, the news media made very little effort to refute these claims, representing them as factual accounts that made a strong case for the invasion.

However, this is one specific aspect of a wider approach to making palatable the invasion and occupation of a country. As Kellner (2003) has argued, the narrative of terrorism has been used ever since the attacks of 9/11 to present an image of a world that has changed for the worst. In this world, the threat of terrorism is on every street corner, in every town and every city, and the only way to prevent another 9/11 is to take the fight to the terrorists; something that Ryan and Switzer (2009) refer to as a 'name calling' propaganda strategy. This strategy is designed to transfer negative stereotypes into the public's consciousness and serves as a tool through which the 'othering' of Iraq and Iraqis is made possible (see also: Young, 2007). Stohl (2008) argues that this is precisely the way in which counter-insurgency conflicts are characterised. As a result, aggressive foreign policy decisions are more easily accepted, as any existing concerns for the loss of life that may be incurred have been negated through the othering process (Robinson, 2009, Breen-Smyth, 2010). Kellner (2005) argues that this narrative construction of fear had serious consequences for both domestic and foreign policy in the US. With regard to US foreign policy, we may argue that the framing of the world as a dangerous place convinced people that the invasion of Iraq (and Afghanistan) was necessary to protect them from terrorism. This is similar to Atheide's (2006) argument that terrorism has played an important role in creating a pervasive sense of fear that coerces public acceptance of increasingly draconian domestic security practices. What this discussion has outlined is a consistent effort by politicians to utilise the news media in order to make palatable their policy decisions to the wider public. This meant that the invasion of Iraq could only be considered as a positive foreign policy decision, as Iraq was a bastion of terrorism and in the post-9/11 world, terrorism was not only to be feared but wiped out (Altheide, 2009).

This is consistent with long-standing accounts of the mainstream press. For example, Gramsci (1971) asserted that the news media act as 'translators', who help to legitimate elite policy and ideology to the public. This, he argued, is done through the positive depiction of government policy, which often utilises emotive language to aid in the legitimation of these policies. Similarly, Herman and Chomsky (1988) argued that the news media primarily represent the views of government in a positive, or at worst, neutral manner, due to their close ties with political and economic elites (see also: Bennet, 1990, Herman, 2000). Likewise, Stuart Hall (1978:52), in the seminal criminological work 'Policing the Crises', considered the state, state agencies and the news media to be:

> "[Active agents] in defining situations, in selecting targets, in initiating 'campaigns'…in selectively signifying their actions to the public…in legitimating their actions through their accounts of situations which they produce".

A more contemporary analysis comes from Bennett (2006, 2007) who states that news stories tend to reflect the dominant framing of political elites and as such are largely a communication tool of those elites. Altheide (2009) notes the editorial admissions of US newspapers (including *The Washington Post* and *The New York Times*, two of the news sources analysed in this study), in their coverage of the Iraq War, lacked credibility due to their acceptance of government positions.

In summary, the mainstream media often only presents partial accounts of the stories they tell. This is particularly evident when media stories uncritically report official explanations of events. With this in mind, it is important for the cultural criminology of state crime to critically analyse media constructions of international conflicts. In the next section we will apply this notion to the occupation of Iraq, arguing that the media's refusal to criticise counter-insurgency tactics helped to provide the conditions for state crime could continue.

7.1 The mainstream media and the occupation of Iraq

Given the well-documented mismanagement of the counter-insurgency campaign with regard to the unpredictable and fierce daily violence that characterised the occupation, both within

the media and academic literature (see: Diamond, 2005a, 2005b, Phillips, 2006, Ricks, 2007, Ferguson, 2008), and the associated unpopularity of the ongoing conflict,[239] the occupation of Iraq arguably contained the perfect conditions for the media to radically criticise government counter-insurgency policy. As discussed already in this thesis, criticisms of government policy were made, but these criticisms fell within the boundaries of the US-led Coalition's own narrative of its failings (see also: Kellner, 2005, Altheide, 2009, Bonn, 2010). As a result, counter-insurgency policy in Iraq, which was largely indiscriminate in its differentiation between civilians and insurgents, continued at pace. Likewise, the need to stay the course and defeat terrorism in Iraq became the de-facto rhetoric of government policy. This rhetoric was reproduced in the mainstream media.[240] Whereas a criticism of the counter-insurgency programme on the grounds of the abuse of human rights and the indiscriminate application of deadly force was not forthcoming. This made it possible for the Coalition to continue this action unencumbered by consideration for media and public opinion.[241] This was because the media do not report on these issues and the public was unaware of them.

The mainstream media's reporting of the conflict then effectively served to define out of public discourse the notion of state crime on both a wide and systematic scale (Kellner, 2005, Bonn, 2010). In turn, this served to legitimise Coalition policy towards the insurgency, as no criticism or associated public pressure – the primary function of the CNN effect model of media analysis (Livingston, 1997, Robinson, 2002) – was levelled to this end. This meant that the capacity for the public to make their own critical voice heard was neutralised by the media's negligent reporting (Ryan and Switzer, 2009, Hawkins, 2011). This is despite human rights reports prior even to the release of the Iraq War Logs indicating that state-sanctioned violence was a reality in occupied Iraq. This meant that questions as to the conduct of the counter-insurgency had been raised in the public domain, but despite these questions, the

---

[239] Opinion poll data shows that the American public's approval of the Iraq War gradually decreased throughout the occupation, up until the gradual reduction in violence that accompanied the troop surge. However, despite this change in approval of the war itself, in conjunction with the positive affect on levels of violence generated by the surge, American public opinion on the decision to go to war itself, remained negative, with 54% of people polled feeling this way, up from 22% at the beginning of the conflict (Pew Research, 2008).

[240] Whilst admittedly the troop surge and change from enemy centric to population centric counter-insurgency operations, did lead to a significant reduction in the levels of violence within Iraq, even during this period (2007-2009), state criminality continued to be a problem, as illustrated within the empirical data. Something that the popular press remained largely inattentive to.

[241] As already noted, in some exceptional cases the government was required to respond to the publication of stories that unavoidably presented the conflict in an unflattering light, for example the abuse at Abu Ghraib. However, this abuse was treated as the actions of soldiers that did not represent the American way of war, meaning the criticism of this action was limited in its capacity to exert pressure on government policy.

mainstream press failed to present an unbiased view of the conflict, making them complicit in the criminality that took place. As Campbell (2010) suggests, the media's lackadaisical approach to critical understandings of the War on Terror has real consequences for those on the receiving end of its more nefarious practices. Keeping these secrets through partisan reporting and lack of objective, critical approaches to government narratives makes the mainstream media complicit in these crimes (Pilger, 2010).

During the Iraq War, the media focused on the destructive action of the insurgency and series of narratives that sought explain this, but not on the actions of the Coalition counter-insurgency war. However, whilst the actions of the insurgents were understandably characterised as violent, irrational, barbaric and illegitimate, the reverse was true of similar actions carried out in the course of countering the insurgency (Stohl, 2008) with few notable exceptions. However, in these rare instances, the reaction was either deemed as necessary and unavoidable[242] or as the actions of rogue soldiers (Bennett et al, 2006, Shepherd, 2008).

In summary then, media reporting of the Iraq War was largely partisan and uncritical in its representation of government accounts of the counter-insurgency. This was due in no small way to the media's reliance on official sources for the information presented in their stories in conjunction with a lapse in journalistic objectivity (Altheide, 2009, Ryan and Switzer, 2009, Bonn, 2010, Pilger, 2010). As a result, media analysis of the Iraq War failed to ask serious questions about the way in which the counter-insurgency was conducted. However, this also served two further purposes: firstly, that the Coalition was able to conduct the counter-insurgency war in any way it saw fit, as secondly, the public was for the most part unaware of the indiscriminate nature of the violence carried out by Coalition and proxy forces.

To bring this section to a close, we may say that the mass media has an important role to play in constructing meaning and discursive frameworks of understanding through which international conflicts are seen to play out. However, this representation serves a function that moves beyond the discursive and into the real (Shepherd, 2008, Campbell, 2010). Media representations, in shaping narrative frameworks, contribute to the capacity for coercive state-sanctioned violence to continue. As Ryan and Switzer (2009:60) have both argued, the

---

[242] Such was the case with the siege of Fallujah, in April and November of 2004, in which the siege was characterised as a necessity to rid the city of insurgents who had become embedded within its walls.

media would better serve the public if they reverted back to the "principles of objectivity that were once a tradition in journalism". However, as some notable critics have shown, the media's primary interests are not necessarily associated with this kind of integrity (Herman and Chomsky, 1988, Herman, 2000, Kellner, 2005, Altheide, 2006, 2009). This has implications for the criminological study of the mainstream media: it is right to critically deconstruct the mass media but it must be with a view to the real socio-political consequences that these media constructions have (Shepherd, 2008, Campbell, 2010). As we have seen in the case of the Iraq War, these consequences go beyond an ill-informed population. The mainstream media's reporting of warfare has a very real impact upon the victims of counter-insurgency warfare. In Iraq, this enabled the counter-insurgency war to be prosecuted with little concern for its potential victims.

Conclusion

This discussion has suggested a constitutive theoretical framework from the perspective of cultural criminology, inspired by the work of Henry and Milovanovic (1996), through which the empirical data presented within this thesis can be understood. This undertaking has sought to apply Keith Hayward's (2011) call for the development of a more integrated, interdisciplinary approach to the cultural criminological study of state crime, which considers macro, meso and micro level processes. Additionally, the discussion has sought to acknowledge Katja Franko Aas' (2012) call for criminology to engage with the global periphery, by discussing the Iraq War not in the context of Coalition failure to effectively occupy Iraq, but as a counter- insurgency war that purposefully targeted Iraqi civilians. In doing so, a multidisciplinary framework, which drew upon the theoretical insights of historical sociology, zemiology, politics and international relations, as well as the study of governance and criminology, was utilised to develop seven theoretical sub-themes. It is the contention of this thesis that this approach is integral to an understanding of state crime within the context of the Iraq War. The multidimensional analysis adopted within this approach, which has sought to widen its analytical lens, can contribute a constitutive cultural criminological understanding of state crime in Iraq, to the criminological study of war.

However, whilst this analysis has sought to suggest a constitutive framework through which future studies of state criminality in the context of war may begin, it does not contend that these are the only avenues of consideration. On the contrary, it is hoped that this framework

can be added to in the future in order to further develop the growing understanding of the criminology of state crime from above, from below and everything in between.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this thesis has been to critically assess the mainstream print news media's framing of the Iraq War, in particular, the media's explanation of several interconnected factors, which contributed to the violence that engulfed the country after the US led invasion. Secondly, the thesis has sought to suggest, based on empirical data gathered from the Wikileaks Iraq War Logs, an alternative explanation of this violence that argued that to fully understand the violence inherent to the occupation of Iraq, an analysis of state criminality by coalition and associated forces during the counter-insurgency war, must be considered. This was an explanation that was largely ignored and marginalized within the mainstream media's analysis. Finally, the thesis has sought to suggest a theoretical framework, from the perspective of cultural criminology that may contribute to the disciplines understanding of state criminality, within the context of counter-insurgency warfare. In comparison to the criminological study of state-defined criminality, the criminology of war has been an under researched area (Jamieson, 1998), and this is particularly the case with regard to the Iraq War. As such, this study attempted to make a contribution to redressing this gap in the research literature.

With this in mind, the research posed two key questions:

1. How do we account for the scale and ferocity of violence associated with post invasion Iraq?
2. What contribution can cultural criminology make, to the growing literature on state crime?

Whilst in order to provide answers to these questions, the research worked from the following hypotheses:

1. The mainstream Western media wilfully neglected to present a comprehensive analysis of the evidence of state criminality in occupied Iraq.
2. Coalition and associated proxy forces in occupied Iraq were responsible for actions that amounted to examples of state criminality.

In order to answer these questions and prove or disprove the hypotheses, the research firstly conducted an analysis of the mainstream media's account, of the occupation of Iraq. This analysis concluded that the media sampled, produced a series of explanations that uncritically supported official constructions of the conflict. These constructed realities, not only framed the conflict in a particular way, but also marginalized state criminality from popular discourse. This was despite the availability of reports from human rights groups and the United Nations, suggesting the involvement of coalition forces in activities, which based on the existing criminological literature, may be defined as state crime. The dominant media construction of the conflict, may be summarised as follows:

1. That the removal of Saddam Hussein from power led to the revival of long dormant ethno-sectarian divisions between Iraq's primary competing factions, the Sunni, Shi'a and Kurds. It was the contention of the media's reporting, that these groups were seeking to establish their claims to power, through violent means, in the power vacuum left by Saddam Hussein's removal from office in the wake of the US led invasion.

2. That significant numbers of foreign fighters affiliated with Al Qaeda, angry at perceived western interference in Islamic states, were migrating into Iraq, in order to continue their fight against the west and the United States in particular. This further hindered reconstruction efforts and inhibited the transition to democracy, which according to the mainstream media was the primary goal of the intervention.

3. Finally, that the US had made a series of mistakes in the administration of the occupation of Iraq, most notably, the debaathification of Iraqi civil society, the disbanding of the Iraqi military and security forces and invading the country with insufficient forces, to provide security during the occupation phase of the operation. As a result, it was the media's contention that through these occupational errors, the transition to a stable, democratic state, was jeopardised, as indigenous and foreign dissidents, exploited these errors.

Once the media's framing of the conflict had been established, the thesis sought to question this account. As such, it was argued that whilst the framing of the conflict found within the mainstream media, did serve some explanatory value, there was also an alternative argument, which the media had chosen not to explore in anything approaching the depth and detail, devoted to the explanations discussed above. This argument can be summarized as the

doctrinal use of violence, constituting state criminality, by coalition and associated proxy forces, such as coalition-sanctioned indigenous militias and military contractors, prosecuting the counter-insurgency war. The research found that this argument formed only a marginal aspect of the mediated explanation of the conflict. Whilst it was also found that reports that did focus upon incidents that may be described as state criminality, sought to present these incidents as the actions of individuals, for which the state was not responsible. This media framing was used in place of a critique of the coalition's overall approach to counter-insurgency, which as later analysis showed (to be discussed below), constituted an aggressive, enemy centric approach, which displayed little concern for the lives of Iraqi civilians. As such, whilst the mainstream media did at times report upon incidents of state criminality, the framing of these reports, with few exceptions, absolved the state from responsibility for the limited number of abuses, which the media had reported to have taken place during the counter-insurgency war. In short, the mainstream media's treatment of the violence associated with occupied Iraq is an example of the hegemonic production of news.

In order to establish the efficacy of this alternative argument, the research drew upon data gathered from the Wikileaks Iraq War Logs, human rights reports and analyses of the human rights situation in the country, from the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq. These sources were utilised to provide evidence that state criminality was a prominent feature of the occupation. This solved the problem of generating reliable data in the absence of conducting research on the ground in Iraq. The findings from these sources, showed that state crime in the form of torture, detainee abuse, mass detentions, extrajudicial killings and the presence of death squads, was a consistent feature of the Iraq War. Additionally, the findings showed that these crimes were carried out by a diverse array of forces, which included coalition soldiers, but also, military contractors, the Iraqi Army and Police and militias, co-opted into the counter-insurgency effort. In the wake of these findings, it may be said that, not only did the mainstream media marginalize state criminality from popular discourse, but that without the release of the Iraq War Logs, the extent of state criminality conducted by coalition and associated forces during the occupation of Iraq, would have remained unknown.

As such the analysis of the Wikileaks data and accompanying human rights reports, established that the mainstream media's account of the occupation was only a partial analysis, which both relied upon and uncritically represented, official representations of events. With this in mind, the research sought to suggest a theoretical framework, applied to the thesis'

case study of the Iraq War, which could help criminology to develop an integrated understanding of state crime. The underlying argument of this theoretical framework, inspired by Henry and Milovanovic's (1996) constitutive criminology, was that to fully understand state crime, criminology must take a constitutive approach, which seeks to integrate macro, meso and micro level analyses. At this point I should point out that I make no grand claims about the originality of this multi-level approach (indeed elsewhere in the social sciences integrated macro, meso, and micro analyses are fairly common). Rather, my intention is simply to suggest that, currently, case studies of state crime – within criminology at least – tend to be reluctant to engage in such an approach (Green and Ward, 2004, Morrison, 2006). Likewise, in response to the critique from within criminology that it rarely engages with the global periphery (Morrison, 2006, Aas, 2012, Hardie-Bick, Sheptycki and Wardak, 2005), it was argued that this approach to state criminality must be, by its very nature, transnational. With this in mind, it was proposed that the study of state criminality must be located within a particular context, such as the occupation of Iraq, which does not seek to universalise its findings, and is conscious of the influence of wider global processes upon the specific context under investigation. To this end, this framework outlined six theoretical tropes that criminologists studying state crime, in the context of counter-insurgency warfare, should consider in their analysis. These may be summarised as follows:

1. The importance of locating any analysis of state criminality during counter-insurgency warfare, within wider socio-historical processes. It was argued that this historical contextualization, must seek to understand the historically constructed dynamics of both the targeted population, and the methods of counter-insurgency deployed by the offending state. With regards to Iraq, it was argued that the country has had a history of violent struggle, against externally imposed rule, since its inception as a nation state (Tripp, 2007, Stansfield, 2008). Likewise, the US has a long history of conducting violent counter-insurgency wars, in order to enhance its national security interests (Blakeley, 2009).

2. The need for criminology to conceptualise state criminality within a perspective that, drawing upon existing human rights ideals, characterises state criminality through the lens of physical and social harm – what we might describe as a putative zemiology of state crime (Tifft, 1995, Tifft and Sullivan, 2001, Hil and Robertson, 2003, Hillyard and Tombs, 2004, 2005). As a result, criminology would be able to move its analysis beyond both the boundaries of state-deferential definitions of criminality, and the

limitations of international humanitarian law, which states often fail to adhere to if their national interests are at stake.

3. The contention that state criminality cannot be properly understood, in the absence of an analysis of a state's structural interests, as a key motivation for enacting state-sanctioned violence; as without the underlying impetus for military intervention, based upon a state's perceived national security interests, the resort to violent state criminality would be unnecessary. It is argued that in Iraq, this rationale is based upon the neo-liberal reconstruction of the country, or as Klein (2007) argues, the application of neo-liberal "shock therapy", to a country rich in natural resources, and as such, a key national security interest to the US (Stokes, 2009).

4. The need to analyse the way in which counter-insurgency wars are governed, in order to understand how state criminality, within these environments, may take place. In particular, it is necessary to understand the links between the overriding structural rationale informing the governance of the counter-insurgency, which in this case involved the rolling back of the state, and the way in which this influences the nature of imposed governance. In Iraq, it is argued that this had the effect of diffusing authority and influence by empowering a multitude of competing actors, (e.g. coalition forces, militias and military contractors), ultimately creating a pluralisation and diffusion of responsibility. In short, this is an example of the fragmentation of power, in which the state no longer holds the monopoly on the use of violence (Weber, 1968), but has become the primary regulator of it (Welch, 2009).

5. To understand the actions of actors directly involved in the prosecution of counter-insurgency strategies, as whilst macro and meso influences are important, it is the actions of individuals, authorised to act in their roles as state employees (or proxies), who ultimately operationalise and prosecute state policies. As a result, individual actions are the outcome of a complicated series of macro and meso processes. In Iraq, these processes led to widespread, mutually reinforcing, collective action (Tanner, 2011) during the counter-insurgency. This action, it was argued, was dependent upon the social and situational environment in which individuals operated, which in turn led to the routine adoption of violent modes of conduct, regardless of individual identity and personality.

6. Finally, the thesis argues that criminologists studying state crime must understand the role of the mainstream media in constructing the boundaries of legitimate debate within countries conducting counter-insurgency wars. It was argued that the media

plays a powerful role in legitimising state policy and action, which in turn, can serve to help perpetuate the continuation of these policies. As was illustrated with regards to the Iraq War, the media marginalized (fairly easily accessible accounts of) state criminality from popular discourse. It was argued that this marginalization had the effect of enabling the coalition to continue to conduct the counter-insurgency as it saw fit. This was because the public, were unable to pressurise the coalition, as they were not in possession of the knowledge of the crimes taking place.

It is the contention of this thesis that these theoretical themes can contribute to the development of the criminology of war, from the perspective of cultural criminology. They can also serve to provide the study of state criminality in the context of war with a much-needed constitutive framework (Henry and Milovnovic, 1996), absent from much of the extant state crime literature, which may be applied to or considered in, future studies of state criminality. Whilst clearly the approach taken in this thesis, does not make claims to universality, the theoretical approach suggested here could be used as the initial basis for researchers seeking to study state crime in an integrated manner. Additionally, it is hoped that whilst this may form the basis of such research, it should not be considered the finished article. Indeed, whilst this project has begun to develop a constitutive, cultural criminology of state crime, it is clear that this is not an exhaustive analysis, drawn as it is, from a specific, singular context. Future research projects should seek to build upon this theoretical framework, within the specific contexts with which they engage. These contexts will undoubtedly bring out new (and presumably context specific) theoretical avenues of exploration, which were absent from the context of this study, pushing forward the development of the criminological study of state criminality in war.

Continuing this developmental theme, the criminological study of state crime could benefit significantly from greater engagement with Wikileaks, as both a source of data, and as an organisation in its own right. Relatedly, if criminologists serious about the study of state criminality wish to continue to have access to such a rich source of data, they should seek to publicise and defend the organisation, within academic forums, such as international conferences, research publications and as a form of 'public criminology' (Loader and Sparks, 2010). This public criminology, should seek to develop a public dialogue on issues related to state crime, circumventing the media marginalization of the issue. It should also develop closer links and work directly with, organisations outside of academia (such as Wikileaks,

State Watch, Openleaks, American Civil Liberties Union, Repreive) directly involved with the prevention and control of state crime. To this end, criminology must seek to narrow the gap between public perceptions of crime and deviance, and criminological research into the issues of public interest, which are its primary concern. This would go someway not only to promoting a positive image of the whistle-blowing organisation, but would also help to check the assault enacted by the US and UK governments, on the freedom to engage in the critical analysis of state practices. This has seen the organisation, its lead spokesperson Julian Assange and Private First Class Bradley Manning, unfairly and unjustly treated in an effort to discourage future whistle-blowers. By association criminologists concerned with the critical analysis of state practice should be equally concerned with these attacks. As such, critical and cultural criminologists should seek to engage in academic practices, which both highlight these issues, and through the display of solidarity with organisations such as Wikileaks, offer greater legitimacy to their role.

This thesis, serves as an example of the importance of whistle-blowing organisations, to the analysis of state criminality and the abuses of state power. This is because, it is clear from the analysis presented in this thesis that without the release of the Iraq War Logs, exposing to scrutiny the actions of US forces during the occupation, that we would have had very little idea of the full and systematic extent of violent state criminality that took place in post-invasion Iraq. Whilst the process of leaking and revealing these documents may itself constitute an illegal act, criminologists involved in the study of state crime, are all to aware of the limitations of state-deferential definitions of criminality. As such, although the leaking of classified state documents is illegal, the acts that are documented within these documents are acts that are of greater significance than the act of stealing the files themselves. After all, it must be remembered that the actions discussed in this thesis were actions that were hidden from public view, enabling their continued practice. As we have seen, the mainstream media's reporting of the conflict, for the most part, reinforced official versions of events, refusing to act on the journalistic imperative to ask difficult questions of political leaders. This meant that the so-called 'free press' acted as little more than a microphone, for the announcement of the US-led policy agenda in Iraq. This illustrates that little has changed since Antonio Gramsci's depiction of the press, as 'translators' of government policy (1971). As such the role adopted by the mainstream media had the effect of hiding from view the more nefarious aspects of the coalition's approach to counter-insurgency in Iraq, which Wikileaks ultimately revealed.

As Steinmetz (2012) has acknowledged, the capacity to hold the world's most powerful nation states accountable for their crimes, is but a critical academic's necessary self-delusion, but a step towards this accountability is the increased documentation, analysis, and publication of evidence of state criminality. However, as criminologists studying state crime will understand, finding empirical data that the state would prefer remains hidden is an extraordinarily difficult, and potentially dangerous task. As such, the increased legitimation and protection of whistle-blowing websites and their sources, leading to an increasingly well-informed populace, is an essential step towards the wider accountability of states for their actions, something that criminologists working in this area, are by vocation, seeking to achieve.

Moving forward, future research into state crime, specifically focussed on the Iraq War, should seek to delve further into the data provided by the Iraq War Logs. One of the weaknesses of this research was its restricted capacity to engage with the leaked data. This was due to the cyber attacks on the Wikileaks website perpetuated and encouraged by both the US and UK governments. The attacks upon the Wikileaks servers, forced the website to shutdown, whilst in the aftermath, the attacks had served to corrupt the Iraq War Logs themselves, impacting upon the effective usability of the data. As a result, although sufficient data was gathered from the War Logs in conjunction with human rights reports and reports from the UN, there is cause to re-examine these files, as based on the data gathered in this research, further evidence of state criminality during the occupation of Iraq, would undoubtedly be uncovered through additional examination of the available data.

In addition to the Iraq War Logs, the Afghan War Diaries also published by Wikileaks, could prove to be an equally fruitful source of data for further criminological research into counter-insurgency warfare. This is considered to be a possibility due to the involvement of the same US governmental administration responsible for the enemy centric approach to counter-insurgency adopted in Iraq. As a result, it is possible that this approach constitutes a standard doctrinal method of counter-insurgency, which a comparative analysis of the Afghan War Diaries may reveal.

In conclusion, this research has utilised a previously unavailable source of data, in order to provide a useful addition to the growing body of work on the study of state criminality, within the context of the criminology of war. It has developed a constitutive theoretical

framework, which can provide future studies of state criminality within the context of war, with a model that integrates macro, meso and micro processes. In doing so, the research has contributed to redressing the current lack of engagement with the criminological analysis of the occupation of Iraq. This analysis provided evidence from the point of view of coalition soldiers involved in the counter-insurgency war, that state sanctioned violence was widely used by both coalition and associated proxy forces, in order to suppress opposition to the occupation. This approach to counter-insurgency significantly contributed to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians at the hands of these forces. It is hoped that with wider engagement with the crimes of the state by criminologists, the discipline can contribute to the future prevention, or at least limitation, of the violent state crimes that characterised occupied Iraq. However, in order for this to be a successful endeavour, it is necessary for criminologists to move the debate outside of the insular world of academia and into the public sphere, in order to counter the hegemonic discourse associated with the practices and proclamations of politicians and the mainstream media.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aas, K., F. (2011). Visions of global control: Cosmopolitan aspirations in a world of friction. In: Bosworth, M. and Hoyle, C. eds. *What is criminology?* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Aas, K., F. (2012). The Earth is one, but the world is not: Criminological theory and its geopolitical divisions. *Theoretical Criminology*, 16(1) 5-20.

Aas, K., F. (2012) (In)security-at-a-distance: Rescaling justice, risk and warfare in a transnational age. *Global Crime*, 13(3), 1-19.

Abdul-Ahad, G. (2005). *From Here to Eternity*. The Guardian. 8th June. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Abramowitz, M., Wright, R., and Ricks, T. E. (2007). *With Iraq Speech, Bush to Pull Away From His Generals*. The Washington Post. 10th January. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Abrams, P. (1980). *Historical Sociology*. Somerset: Open Books Publishing Ltd.

Aburish, S. (2003). *Comment and analysis: The west has given Saddam the role he always longed for: The Iraqi dictator's brutal successes may now appear greater in retrospect*. The Guardian. 24th March 2003. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Agamben, G. (2005). *State of Exception*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Agnew, J. (2003). American hegemony into American empire? Lessons from the invasion of Iraq. *Antipode*, 35(5), 871-885.

Al-Khalidi, A. and Tanner, V. (2006). *Occasional Paper: sectarian violence: radical groups drive internal displacement in Iraq*. The Brookings Institute.

Allawi, A. (2003). *In Search of Justice, Not Vengeance.* The Washington Post. 28th December. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Allawi, A. A. (2007). *The Occupation of Iraq.* Yale University Press.

Allen, M. (2004). *Syria Role On Iraqi Arms is Studied.* The Washington Post. 10th January. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 19th May 2011.

Allen, T. (2011). Is 'genocide' such a good idea? *The British Journal of Sociology, 62(1), 26-36.*

Allen-Mills, T. (2003). *US Digs in for a Deadly Mind Game.* Sunday Times. 20th July. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Altheide, L. (1996). *Qualitative media analysis: Qualitative research methods series no.38.* London: Sage.

Altheide, D., L. (2006). *Terrorism and the politics of fear.* Lanham, MD: Alta Mira.

Altheide, D. L. (2006). Terrorism and the Politics of Fear. *Cultural Studies ⇔ Critical Methodologies,* 6(4), 415-439.

Altheide, D., L. (2009). Terrorism programming. *Critical Studies on Terrorism,* 2(1), 65-80.

Amnesty International. (2004). *Annual Report Iraq. [internet site] Available:* <www.amnestyusa.org/annualreport.php?id=758A1EBE5BB6C22480256E9E005A99DF&c =IRQ>. Accessed: 12th January 2011.

Amnesty International. (2005). *Annual Report: Iraq. [internet site] Available:* <www.amnesty.org/annualreport.php?id=ar&yr=2005&c=IRQ>. Accessed: 12th January 2011.

Amnesty International. (2006). *Annual Report Iraq. [internet site] Available:* <www.amnesty.org/annualreport.php?id=ar&yr=IRQ>. Accessed: 12th January 2011.

Amnesty International. (2007). *Annual Report Iraq. [internet site] Available:* <www.amnesty.org/annualreport.php?id=ar&yr=2007&c=IRQ>. Accessed: 12th January 2011.

Amnesty International. (2008). *Annual Report Iraq. [internet site] Available:* <www.amnesty.org/annualreport.php?id=ar&yr=2008&c=IRQ>. Accessed: 12th January 2011.

Amnesty International. (2009). *Annual Report Iraq. [internet site] Available:* <www.amnesty.org/annualreport.php?id=ar&yr=2009&c=IRQ>. Accessed: 12th January 2011.

Apple Jr, R. W. (2003). *Dash to Baghdad Leaves Debate in Dust.* The New York Times. 5th April. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Arendt, H. (1964). *Eichmann in Jerusalem.* Harmandsworth: Penguin.

Ashley, J. (2004). *Poor Comical Ali – he just can't stop himself spinning: To Blame This Crisis on Media Negativity Must be Some Kind of Joke.* The Guardian. 13th May. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 1st December 2011.

Asquith, C. (2003). *Righting Iraq's Universities.* 3rd August. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Bahador, B. (2007). *The CNN Effect in Action: How the News Media Pushed the West toward War in Kosovo.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Baker, P. (2003). *Firefight, Suicide Bombing Leave One Marine Dead, 26 Wounded.* The Washington Post. 11th April. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 19th May 2011.

Baker, J. A. (2006). *The Iraq Study Group Report.* Washington.

Baker, P. (2007a). *As he Touts a Way Forward, Bush Admits Errors of the Past.* The Washington Post. 11th January. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Baker, P. (2007b). *Bush Shows New Willingness to Reverse Course.* The Washington Post. 4th March. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Baldwin, T. (2006). *US Admits Iraq is Terror Cause.* The Times. 29th April. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Baldwin, T. (2007). *Blackwater Denies Rogue Mercenary Charge.* The Times. 3rd October. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 1st December 2011.

Baldwin, T. and Beeston, R. (2007). *Progress as Rice Talks to Syria and Chats With Iran.* The Times. 4th May. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Barak, G. (1990). Crime, criminology and human rights: Towards an understanding of state criminality. In: Friedrichs, D., O. (1998). eds. *State crime, 1: Defining, delineating and exploring state crime.* Aldershot: Ashgate.

Barak, G. (1991). *Crimes by the capitalist state: An introduction to state criminality.* Albany: State University of New York Press.

Barak, G. (1998). *Integrating Criminologies.* Allyn and Bacon.

Barak, G. (2009). *Criminology: An integrated approach.* Rowman and Littlefield.

Barnett, A. (2003). *Battle for Iraq: Scandal-hit US Firm Wins Key Contracts.* The Observer. 13th April. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 1st December 2011.

Barthes, R. (1977). Image, Music, Text. Hill and Wang.

Baruma, I. (2003). *How Iraq can get Over it's Past.* The New York Times. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Batiste, J. (2006). *A Case for Accountability.* The Washington Post. 19th April. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Baum, M. and Groeling, T. (2009). *War Stories: The Causes and Consequences of Public Views of War.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Bauman, Z. (1989). *Modernity and the Holocaust.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Baxter, S. (2003). *Call me Jay, the New Boss of Iraq.* Sunday Times. 6th April. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Baxter, S. (2005). *US Warns Syria to Stem Flow of Insurgents into Iraq.* Sunday Times. 29th May. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Baxter, S. Colvin, M. and Saffar, H. (2007). *Surge Tactics to Tame Ramadi, City of Anarchy.* The Sunday Times. 25th February. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Beaumont, P. (2006). *Dispatch: inside Baghdad.* The Observer. 17th September. [internet] Available: http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Beaumont, P. (2008). *Review: From the dogs of war to ordinary Joes with guns.* The Observer. 6th July. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 1st December 2011.

Beaumont, P. and Helmore, E. (2003). *Shrine Attack Linked to UN Blast: Al Qaeda Arrest and Identical Explosives Suggest Bombings are Part of Larger Strategy.* The Observer. 31st August. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Beaumont, P. and Graham, P. (2003). *The World: Special Report: Iraq Terror Spirals Out of Control as US Intelligence Loses the Plot: Occupying Forces Face a Long, Hard Slog as Baathists, Zealots, Criminals, Tribal Leaders and Al Qaeda Unite in a Deadly Alliance of Hatred. Watching and Waiting.* The Observer. 2nd November. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Beaumont, P., Graham, P., Burke, J., Vulliamy, E., Harris, P. and Ahmed, K. (2003). *Focus: Battle for Iraq: The Aftermath: Painful Rebirth of Iraq After Saddam.* The Observer. 13th April. [internet] Available: http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Beaumont, P. (2004). *The World: Boycott halts the plans for Iraqi constitution: Shia majority objects to Kurdish power of veto.* The Observer. 7th March. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Becker, H. (1964). *Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance.* The Free Press, Macmillan: New York.

Beckett I. F. (2005a). *Insurgency in Iraq: An historical perspective.* The Strategic Studies Institute.

Beckett I. F. (2005b). *The Future of Insurgency.* Small Wars and Insurgencies, 16(1), 22-36.

Beeston, R. and Hider, J. (2004). *Al-Qaeda linked with attempt to provoke civil war.* The Times. 3rd March. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Beeston, R. (2003). *Ragged Resistance Draws US in for the Long Haul.* The Times. 14th June. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Beeston, R. (2004). *Iraq pact collapses as Shias pull out.* The Times. 6th March. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Beeston, R. (2004). *Marines Storm Fallujah as Street Fighting Begins.* The Times. 9th November. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Beeston, R. (2005a). *The Sectarian Bug is Spreading – Will it Spark Civil War in Iraq.* The Times. 4th June. [internet] Available: http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Beeston, R. (2005b). *Syria Warned on Exporting Terror.* The Times. 20th May. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Beeston, R. (2006). *How a Junior Partner in Global Jihad Found his Truly Murderous Calling.* The Times. 9th June. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Beeston, R. (2007). *America Can't Just Walk Away From the Fight With al Qaeda, US General Insists.* The Times. 21st June. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Beeston, R. and Hider, J. (2004). *Terrorists Cross Syrian Border to Join Iraqi Rebels.* The Times. 3rd June. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Beeston, R. and Hider, J. (2005). *Following the Trail of Death: How Foreigners Flock to Join Holy War.* The Times. 25th June. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Beeston, R. and Philp, C. (2006). *The Parting Shot of Iraq Envoy: a civil war is getting closer.* The Times. 4th August. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Becker, H. (1964). *Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance.* The Free Press, Macmillan: New York.

Bennett, L. (1990). Toward a theory of press-state relations in the United States. *Journal of Communications,* 40(2), 103-125.

Bennett, L. (2006, seventh edition). *News: The politics of illusion.* New York: Longman.

Bennett, L., Lawrence, R., and Livingston, S. (2006). None dare call it torture: Indexing and the limits of press independence in the Abu Ghraib scandal. *Journal of Communication,* 56(3), 467-485.

Bennett, L., Lawrence, R., and Livingston, S. (2007). *When the press fails: Political power and the news media from Iraq to Katrina.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Berman, P. (2003). *Learning Not to Love Saddam.* The New York Times. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Bishop, P. (2003). *Desert diehards keep allies at bay in Basra.* The Daily Telegraph. 24th March. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Black, I. (2007). *International: Saudis Make-up 41% of Foreign Fighters in Iraq....* The Guardian. 23rd November. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Black, I. and MacAskill, E. (2008). *US Forces Kill Eight in Helicopter Rain on Syria.* The Guardian. 27th October. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Blakeley, R. (2009). *State terrorism and neo-liberalism: The north in the south.* London: Routledge.

Bok, S. (1989). *Secrets: On the ethics of concealment and revelation.* New York: Vintage Books.

Bonn, S. (2010). *Mass Deception: Moral panic and the US war on Iraq.* Rutgers University Press.

Borger, J. (2003). *US Using Saddam's Spies to Combat Terrorism.* The Guardian. 25th August. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Bourke, J. (2000). *An Intimate History of Killing.* Basic Books.

Boyle, M.J. (2009). Bargaining, Fear and Denial: Explaining Violence Against Civilians in Iraq 2004 – 2007. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 21(2), 261 – 287.

Breen-Smyth, M. (2010). Terrorism, war and the economy of scale: an interview with Ted Goodnight in *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 3(3), 459-466.

Bremer III. P.L (2006). *My Year in Iraq.* Simon and Schuster Ltd.

Bremer, L. P. (2006a). *My Year in Iraq.* New York: Threshold Editions.

Bremer, L. P. (2006b). *The Lost Year in Iraq: Interview: L. Paul Bremer III. [internet site] Available:* <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/yeariniraq/interviews/bremer.html>. Accessed: 12th August 2006.

Bremer, L. P. (2007a). *What we Got Right in Iraq.* The Washington Post. 13th May. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Bremer, L. P. (2007b). *How I Didn't Dismantle Iraq's Army.* The New York Times. 6th September. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Brinkley, J. (2003). *U.S. Officers in Iraq Find New Signs of Infiltration by Foreign Fighters.* The New York Times. 19th November. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 19th May 2011.

Broder, D, S. (2004). *Idealism in Search of a Plan.* The Washington Post. 15th April. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 9th March 2011.

Browning, C. (1992). *Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland.* HarperCollins.

Bumiller, E. (2007). *At an Army School for Officers, Blunt Talk About Iraq Strategy.* The New York Times. 14th October. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Burke, J. (2003). *Battle for Iraq: The Northern Front: A-Day for the Kurds.* The Observer. 23rd March 2003. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Burke, J. (2004). *Nine killed in attack on Iraq police.* The Observer. 1st February. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Burkeman, O. (2003). *Post-war Iraq: Vision of the Neocons Stays Fixed on Making Hard Choices: US Hawks Break Ranks.* The Guardian. 23rd September. Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Burnham, G., Lafta, R., Doocy, S. and Roberts, L. (2006). Mortality after the 2003 invasion of Iraq: A cross-sectional cluster sample survey. *The Lancet*, 11th October.

Burns, J. F. and Fisher, I. (2004). *US Seeking to Stabilise Iraq, Casts Baathists in Lead Roles.* The New York Times. 3rd May. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Burns, J., F. and Worth, R., F. (2004). *Iraqi Campaigns Raises Question of Iran's Sway.* The New York Times. 15th December. [internet] Available: http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Buroway, M. (2008). Rejoinder: For a subaltern Sociology?. *Current Sociology*, 56(3), 435-444.

Bush, G. W. (2003). *President Holds Press Conference.* October 28th. [internet site] Available: <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/10/20031028-2.html>. Accessed: 24th May 2011.

Bush, G. W. (2004a). *President Bush reaffirms resolve to war on terror, Iraq and Afghanistan.* March 19th. [internet site] Available: <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/03/20040319-3.html>. Accessed: 21st March 2011.

Bush, G.W. (2004b). *President Bush Discusses Early Transfer of Iraqi Sovereignty.* June 28th. [internet site] Available: <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040628-9.html>. Accessed: 24th May 2011.

Bush, G.W. (2004c). *President Bush Discusses Progress in the War on Terror.* July 12th. [internet site] Available: <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/07/20040712-5.html>. Accessed: 24th May 2011.

Bush, G. W. (2004d). *President Bush and Prime Minister Allawi Press Conference.* September 23rd. [internet site] Available: <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/09/20040923-8.html>. Accessed: 21st March 2011.

Bush, G.W. (2004e). *President and Prime Minister Blair Discussed Iraq, Middle East.* November 12th. [internet site] Available: <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/11/20041112-5.html>. Accessed: 24th May 2011.

Bush, G.W. (2004f). *President's Remarks to the Press Pool.* November 9th. [internet site] Available: <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/11/20041109-10.html>. Accessed: 24th May 2011.

Bush, G, W. (2004e). *Nationwide radio address: Iraq fighting terrorists for new constitution.* March 6th. [internet site] Available: <http://usgovinfo.about.com/cs/uspresident/a/radio030604.htm> Accessed: 21st March 2011.

Bush, G.W. (2004c). *President's Remarks to the Press Pool.* November 9th. [internet site] Available: <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/11/20041109-10.html>. Accessed: 24th May 2011.

Bush, G.W. (2004e). *President and Prime Minister Blair Discussed Iraq, Middle East.* November 12th. [internet site] Available: <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/11/20041112-5.html>. Accessed: 24th May 2011.

Bush, G, W. (2004e). *Nationwide radio address: Iraq fighting terrorists for new constitution.* March 6th. [internet site] Available: <http://usgovinfo.about.com/cs/uspresident/a/radio030604.htm> Accessed: 21st March 2011.

Bush, G. W. (2005a). *Interview of the President by Al Arabiya Televisions.* 26th January. [internet site] Available: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050126-7.html>. Accessed: 21st March 2011.

Bush, G. W. (2005b). *President Congratulates Iraqis on Election.* 30th January. [internet site] Available: <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050130-2.html>. Accessed: 21st March 2011.

Bush, G. W. (2006a). *President Extends Condolences and Condemns Bombing of the Mosque in Samarra to Iraqi People.* 22nd February. [internet site] Available: <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/02/20060222.html>. Accessed: 21st March 2011.

Bush, G. W. (2006b). *Presidents Radio Address.* 11th March. [internet site] Available: <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060311.html>. Accessed: 21st March 2011.

Bush, G.W. (2006c). *Presidents Radio Address.* June 10th. [internet site] Available: <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/06/20060610.html>. Accessed: 24th May 2011.

Bush, G.W. (2006d). *President Bush Meets With Interagency Team on Iraq.* June 12th. [internet site] Available: <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/06/20060612-1.html>. Accessed: 24th May 2011.

Bush, G.W. (2006e). *Press Conference of the President.* June 14th. [internet site] Available: <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/06/20060614.html>. Accessed: 24th May 2011.

Bush, G. W. (2007a). *Presidents Address to the Nation.* 10th January. [internet site] Available: <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070110-7.html>. Accessed: 21st March 2011.

Bush, G. W. (2007b). *President Bush Discusses Iraq War Emergency Supplemental. [internet site] Available:* <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/03/20070323-1.html>. Accessed: 21st March 2011.

Bush, G.W. (2007c). *Press Conference by the President. [internet site] Available:* <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/07/20070712-5.html>. Accessed: 21st March 2011.

Bush, G.W. (2007d). *Presidents Radio Address. [internet site] Available:* <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/08/20070811.html>. Accessed: 21st March 2011.

Bush, G.W. (2007e). *President Bush Discusses Progress in Afghanistan, Global War on Terror.* February 15th. [internet site] Available: <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/02/20070215-1.html>. Accessed: 24th May 2011.

268

Bush, G.W. (2007f). *Address by the President to the Nation on the Way Forward in Iraq.* September 13th. [internet site] Available: <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/09/20070913-2.html>. Accessed: 24th May 2011.

Bush, G.W. (2008). *President Bush Discusses Iraq.* [internet site] Available: <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/04/20080410-2.html>. Accessed: 21st March 2011.

Byman, D. (2008). An Autopsy of the Iraq Debacle: Policy Failure or Bridge Too Far? *Security Studies*, 17(4), 599 – 643.

Cable Gate. (22nd October 2007). *PSD Incident Update: Embassy approves condolence payments; Gov't of Iraq (GOI) investigation report released, Regional Security Office (RSO) activity.* [internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Cable Gate. (5th January 2009). *Iraqi President and Vice President discuss Iran-Iraq border dispute, elections and security with Colonel McCain.* [internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Cadwalladr, C. (2012). *Anonymous: behind the masks of the cyber insurgents.* The Guardian. September 8th. [internet site] Available: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/sep/08/anonymous-behind-masks-cyber-insurgents>. Accessed: 9th September 2012.

Casey, T. (2005). *State Department Daily Press Briefing.* 9th May. [internet site] Available: <http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2005/45876.htm>. Accessed: 24th May 2011.

Campbell, A. (2010). Imagining the war on terror. In: Hayward, K., J. and Pressdee, M. eds. *Framing crime: Cultural criminology and the image.* Routledge – Cavendish.

Carlsen, P. (2004). *The Best-Laid Plans go Oft Astray.* The Washington Post. 27th January. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Carroll, R. (2005a). *Coalition Raid to Free Shi'a Hostages.* The Guardian. 18th April. [internet] Available: http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Carroll, R. (2005b). *Iraq Extends Constitution Deadline.* The Guardian. 16th August. [internet] Available: http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Cavendish, C. (2007). *Don't You Get it? It's a Jobs Surge we Need.* The Times. 14th June. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Chambliss, W. (1989). State Organised Crime – The American Society of Criminology, Presidential Address, 1988. *Criminology*, 27 (2), 183-208.

Chandrasekaran, R. (2007a). *On Iraq, US Turns to Onetime Dissenters.* The Washington Post. 14th January. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Chandrasekaran, R. (2007b). *Back on Capitol Hill, Bremer is Facing a Cooler Reception.* The Washington Post. 6th February. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Chehab, Z. (2005). *Civil War Can Be Averted.* The Washington Post. 11th December. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Chehab, Z. (2006). *Iraq Ablaze: Inside the Insurgency.* I.B. Tauris and Co Ltd.

Chomsky, N. (1996). *Power and prospects: Reflections on human nature and the social order.* Boston: South End Press.

Chomsky, N. (2002). *Media Control: the spectacular achievements of propaganda.* New York: Seven Stories Press.

Chomsky, N. (2004). *Hegemony or Survival: America's quest for global dominance.* New York: Henry Hold and Co.

Chomsky, N. (2004). *From Central America to Iraq.* 6th August. [internet site] Available: <http://chomsky.info/articles/20040806.htm>. Accessed: 20th August 2012.

Chomsky, N. (2006a). *A just war? Hardly.* 9th May. [internet site] Available: <http://chomsky.info/articles/20060509.htm>. Accessed: 20th August 2012.

Chomsky, N. (2006b). *Superpower and failed states.* 5th April. [internet site] Available: http://chomsky.info/articles/20060405.htm. Accessed: 20th August 2012.

Chomsky, N. (2006c). *Beyond the ballet.* 6th January. [internet site] Available: <http://chomsky.info/articles/20060106.htm>. Accessed: 20th August 2012.

Chomsky, N. (2007a). *Cold War II.* 27th August. [internet site] Available: http://chomsky.info/articles/20070827.htm>. Accessed: 20th August 2012.

Chomsky, N. (2007b). *What if Iran had invaded Mexico?* 5th April. [internet site] Available: <http://chomsky.info/articles/20070405.htm>. Accessed: 20th August 2012.

Chomsky, N. (2008a). *Good news: Iraq and beyond.* 16th February. [internet site] Available: <http://chomsky.info/articles/20080216.htm>. Accessed: 20th August 2012.

Chomsky, N. (2008b). *Where's the Iraqis voice?* 1st February. [internet site] Available: <http://chomsky.info/articles/20080201.htm>. Accessed: 20th August 2012.

Chomsky, N. (2008c). *Can a Democrat change US Middle East policy?.* 3rd April. [internet site] Available: <http://chomsky.info/articles/20080403.htm>. Accessed: 20th August 2012.

Chua, A. (2004). *Comment and Letters: Our most dangerous export: Imposing free market democracy in Iraq has unleashed ethnic hatred.* The Guardian. 28th February. [internet] Available: http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Clarke, R. (2004). *Against All Enemies: Inside Americas War on Terror.* London: Simon and Schuster.

Coalition Provisional Authority, (16th April 2003). *Order No. 1: De-baathification of Iraqi Society.* *[internet site] Available:* <http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030516_CPAORD_1_De-Ba_athification_of_Iraqi_Society_.pdf>. Accessed: 10th August 2011.

Coalition Provisional Authority, (23rd May 2003*). Order No. 2: Dissolution of Entities.* [internet site] Available: <http://www.casi.org.uk/info/cpa/030523-CPA-Order2.pdf>. Accessed: 10th August 2011.

Cobb, A. (2007). A Strategic Assessment of Iraq. *Civil Wars*, 9(1), 32 – 60.

Cockburn, A. (2003). *Identity Iraq, more unified than it looks.* The Washington Post. 23rd March. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 9th March 2011.

Cockburn, A. (2007a). *Rumsfeld: His Rise, Fall and Catastrophic Legacy.* New York: Scribner.

Cockburn, P. (2007b). *The Occupation: War and resistance in Iraq.* Verso.

Cohen, B. C. (1963). *The Press and Foreign Policy.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Cohen, R. (2006). *Iraq's Biggest Failing: There is no Iraq.* The New York Times. 10th December. [internet site] <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk> Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Cohen, S. (1988). *Against criminology.* New Jersey: Transaction Publishers.

Cohen, S. (1993). Human Rights and Crimes of the State: The Culture of Denial. *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology*, 26, 97-115.

Cohen, S. (1995). State crimes of previous regimes: Knowledge, accountability and the policing of the past. *Law and Social Inquiry*, 20(1), 7-50.

Cohen, S. (1996). Government responses to human rights reports: Claims, denials and counter-claims. *Human Rights Quarterly*, 18, 517-543.

Cohen, S. (2001). *States of Denial: Knowing about Atrocities and Suffering.* London: Polity Press.

Collins, V. E., Farrell, A. L., McKee, J. R., Martin, F. A., and Monk-Turner, E. (2011). The State of Coverage: The Medias Representation of International Issues and State Crime. *International Criminal Justice Review*, 21 (5), 5-21.

Coman, J. (2003). *Not Everyone Wants to be Seen too Close to Don Rumsfeld Right Now.* Sunday Telegraph. 30th March. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Constable, P. (2004a). *Past and Future Clash on Iraqi Army Day.* The Washington Post. 7th January. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Constable, P. (2004b). *Iraqis Revise Policy on Ex-Baath Members.* The Washington Post. 12th January. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Constable, P. (2004c). *Iraq's Former Baathists Eager to Return to Work.* The Washington Post. 4th May. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Constable, P. (2007). *Area's Sunnis and Shiites Keep a Delicate Balance Across Divides.* The Washington Post. 8th March. [internet] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk> Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18th October, 1907. [internet] Available: <http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=4D47F92DF3966A7EC12563CD002D6788> Accessed: 24th May 2012.

Cook, R. (2005). *Fireworks in Washington, Despair Around the World: The Bush Administration is in Denial About its Disastrous Failure in Iraq.* The Guardian. 21st January. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Cooper, H. (2007). *US Officials Voice Frustrations With Saudis, Citing Role in Iraq.* The New York Times. 27th June. The New York Times. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 19th May 2011.

Copeland, L. (2003). *All over again.* The Washington Post. 6th April. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 9th March 2011.

Cordesman, A.H. (2004). *The Facts we Must Face; There's no Turning Away From Iraq's Harsh Realities.* The Washington Post. 4th April. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 19th May 2011.

Cordesman, A.H. (2005). *Iraq's Evolving Insurgency.* Centre for Strategic and International Studies.

Cordesman, A.H. (2006). *Zarqawi's Death: Temporary "Victory" or Lasting Impact?* Centre for Strategic and International Studies.

Cordesman, A. (2008). *Sadr and the Mahdi Army: Evolution, capabilities and a new direction.* Centre for Strategic and International Studies.

Cottee, S. (2011a). Jihadism as a subcultural response to social strain: Extending Marc Sageman's "bunch of guys" thesis. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 23(5), 730-751.*

Cottee, S. (2011b). Fear, boredom, and joy: Sebastian Junger's piercing phenomenology of war. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism,* 34(5), 439-459.

Couglin, C. (2003). *The UN is Unfit to Take Over Rebuilding Iraq Con Couglin Says the Allies are not to Blame for Security Failures.* Sunday Telegraph. 24th August. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Crellenstein, R. D. (2003). The World of Torture: A Constructed Reality. *Theoretical Criminology,* 7(3), 293-318.

D Ancona, M. (2004). *It is Blair, not Bush, Who Needs Our Troops to go to Baghdad Politics.* The Sunday Telegraph. 24th October. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Danner, M. (2005). *Taking Stock Of the Forever War.* The New York Times. 11th September. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 9th March 2011.

Danner, M. (2006). *The Fatal Fantasy.* The Sunday Times. 10th December. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Davis, M., C. (2006). Human rights and the war in Iraq. *Journal of Human Rights,* 4 (1), 37-44.

Dawisha, A. I. (2004). Iraq: Setbacks, Advances, Prospects. *Journal of Democracy,* 15(1), 5 – 20.

Defence Policy and Institutions Working Group. (2002). *The Future of Iraq Project.* US Department of State.

De Maria, W. (2008). Whistleblower's and organisational protestors: crossing imaginary borders. *Social Problems,* 56(6), 865-885.

Democratic Principles Working Group. (2002). *The Transition to Democracy in Iraq.* US Department of State.

DePalma, A. (2003). *Battles in Central Iraq; Defiance in Baghdad and Quarrels in Washington.* The New York Times. 1st April. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

De Waal, A. (1997). *Famine Crimes: politics and the disaster relief industry in Africa.* London: African Rights and the International African Institute.

De Waal, A. (2005). *Famine that Kills: Darfur, Sudan.* New York: Oxford University Press.

De Waal, A. (2007). Reflections on the difficulties of defining Darfur's crisis as genocide. *Harvard Human Rights Journal 20, 26-33.*

De Young, K. (2003). *US Wants Better Odds on Baghdad; Move on Iraqi Capital Contingent on Conditions.* The Washington Post. 31st March. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

De Young, K. and Baker, P. (2007). *White House Gives Iraq Mixed Marks in Report; Assessment of Progress is to be Released Today.* The Washington Post. 12th July. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Diamond, L. J. (2004). What Went Wrong in Iraq. *Foreign Affairs,* 83(5), 34 – 56.

Diamond, L. J. (2005a). *Squandered Victory.* New York: Henry Holt and Company.

Diamond, L. J. (2005b). Lessons from Iraq. *Journal of Democracy,* 16(1), 9 – 23.

Dionne Jr, E. J. (2003). *Behind the Failure.* The Washington Post. 22nd August. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Dobbins, J. (2003). *Americas Role in Nation Building: From Germany to Iraq.* Rand Corporation.

Dobbins, J. (2006). *The Lost Year in Iraq: Interview: James Dobbins. [internet site] Available:* <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/yeariniraq/interviews/dobbins.html>. Accessed: 12th August 2006.

Dobbins, J. (2007). Who Lost Iraq? *Foreign Affairs*, 86(5), 61 – 74.

Dodge, T. (2003). *Inventing Iraq: The failure of nation-building.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Dodge, T. (2005). *Adelphi Paper 372: Iraq's Future: The aftermath of regime change.* New York: Routledge.

Dodge, T. (2007). The Causes of US Failure in Iraq. *Survival*, 49(1), 85-106.

Doig, A. (2011). *State crime.* Abingdon: Willan Publishing.

Doris, J., M. and Murphy, D. (2007). From My Lai to Abu Ghraib: The moral psychology of philosophy. *Mid West Studies in Philosophy,* 3(1), 23-55.

Eisenstadt, M. and White, J. (2005). *Assessing Iraq's Sunni Arab Insurgency.* Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

Entman, R., M. (2004). *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Ericson, R., Baranek, P., and Chan, J. (1989). *Negotiating control: A study of news sources.* Milton Keynes: Open University Press.

Eriksson Baaz, M., and Stern, M. (2009). Why do Soldiers Rape? Masculinity, Violence and Sexuality in the Armed Forces in the Congo (DRC). *International Studies Quarterly,* 53(2), 495-518.

Evans, M. (2006). *Army Too Small, Too Busy and has No Time to Train, Minister Says*. The Times. 22nd December. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Evans, M. (2008). *Yesterday's settlement over Baha Musas death in British custody has implications for all involved and far beyond*. The Times. 11th July. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 1st December 2011.

Fairclough, N. and Wodak, R. (1997). Critical discourse analysis. In: van Dijk, T. ed. (second edition). *Discourse studies: A multidisciplinary introduction*. London: Sage.

Fairclough, N. (2001). Critical discourse analysis as a method in social scientific research in Wodak, R. and Meyer, M. *Methods of critical discourse analysis*. London: Sage.

Fairclough, N. (2003). *Analysing discourse: Textual analysis for social research*. London: Routledge.

Fairweather, J. (2004a). *Falklands Para Dies in Baghdad Suicide Bombing*. The Daily Telegraph. 15th June. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Fairweather, J. (2004b). *Iraqis Bring in Draconian New Laws as Rebels Take Fight to Centre of Baghdad*. The Daily Telegraph. 8th July. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Fairweather, J. (2004c). *All Aboard the Terrorists Bus to Iraq Mujahideen Mosques are Springing up all Over Syria to Arm Militants and Send Them Across the Border to do Battle with the Hated Americans*. The Daily Telegraph. 2nd December. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Fairweather, J. (2005). *28 killed as bombers aim to wreck the Iraqi election*. The Daily Telegraph. 20th January. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Farrell, S. (2007a). *Car Bomb Kills 9 Civilians in Baghdad.* The New York Times. 26th November. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Farrell, S. (2007b). *Market Blasts Kill 88 as First Troop Surge Units Deploy in City.* The Times. 23rd January. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Feldman, N. (2006). *Disunities.* The New York Times. 9th April. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 9th March 2011.

Fella, G. (2004). *Security Strategy for Post-war Iraq.* US Department of Defence: Army War College Carlisle.

Felter, J. and Fishman, B. (2007). *Al Qaida's Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A first look at the Sinjar Records.* Combating Terrorism Centre, West Point, New York.

Ferguson, C. (2008). *No End In Sight: Iraq's Descent Into Chaos.* Public Affairs.

Ferrell, J., Hayward, K. and Young, J. (2008). *Cultural Criminology: an invitation.* London: Sage.

Fieldhouse., D., K. (2006). Western Imperialism in the Middle East 1914 – 1958. Oxford University Press.

Fielding, N. and Baxter, S. (2007). *Saudi Arabia is Hub of World Terror.* The Sunday Times. 4th November. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Filkins, D. and Sengupta, S. (2004). *Iraq Government Considers Using Emergency Rule.* The New York Times. 21st June. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Firmstone, J. (2003). *'Britain in the Euro?': British newspaper editorial coverage of the introduction of the Euro.* Centre for European Political Communications, Working Paper Series, 5, 1-27.

Fishman, B. (2006). *After Zarqawi: The dilemmas and future of al Qaeda in Iraq.* The Washington Quarterly, 29(4), 19-32.

Fletcher, M (2008). *Al-Qaeda leaders admit: 'We are in crisis. There is panic and fear'.* The Times. 11th February. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk> Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Flint, J. (2003). *Free After 50 Years of Tyranny.* The Observer. 5th October. <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Freedman, L. (2005). *Rumsfeld's Legacy: The Iraq Syndrome?.* The Washington Post. 9th January. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Friedman, T. L. (2003). *The Humiliation Factor.* The New York Times. 9th November. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Friedman, T. L. (2003b). *Free Advice to G.O.P.* The New York Times. 23rd October. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Friedrichs, D., O. (1998). Introduction. In: Friedrichs, D., O. ed. *State crime, 1: Defining, delineating and exploring state crime.* Aldershot: Ashgate.

Friedrichs, D., O. (2000). State crime of governmental crime: Making sense of the conceptual confusion. In: Ross, J., I. ed. *Controlling state crime.* New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.

Fishman, B. (2006). After Zarqawi: The dilemmas and future of al Qaeda in Iraq. *The Washington Quarterly*, 29 (4), 19-32.

Galbraith, P. W. (2006). *One divided by three is the only Iraq solution.* The Sunday Times. 29th October. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Garner, J. Lt. General. (2006). *The Lost Year in Iraq: Interview: Lt. General Jay Garner (Ret).* *[internet* *site]* *Available:* <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/yeariniraq/interviews/garner.html>. Accessed: 12th August 2006.

Gates, A. (2006). *After the Fall of a Dictator, the Rise of Confusion.* The New York Times. 17th October. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Gasiorowski., M. (2007). US foreign policy towards Iran during the Mossadegh era in Lesch., D., W. (fourth edition). *The Middle East and The United States: a historical and political reassessment.* New York: Westview Press.

Gedye, R. (2004). *Bin Laden Ally in Sept 11 Tape Gives Himself up.* The Daily Telegraph. 14th July. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Gedye, R. (2004). *Afghanistan and Iraq on Knife Edge.* The Daily Telegraph. 30th July. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Geneva Convention III. (1949). Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. 12th August 1949. [internet site] Available: <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e636b/6fef854a3517b75ac125 641e004a9e68>. Accessed: 24th May 2012.

Geneva Convention IV, Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. (1949). Article 147. [internet site] Available: <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/380?OpenDocument>. Accessed: 27th December 2011.

Gerbner, G. (1969). Toward "cultural indicators": The analysis of mass mediated message systems. *Communication Review,* 17(2), 137–148.

Gibb, F. (2004). *Blair faces war crimes accusations.* The Times. 3rd March. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 1st December 2011.

Gibb, F. (2005). *First Trial for War Crimes Under New Act.* The Times. 21st July. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 1st December 2011.

Gibbes, E. and Katwala, S. (2003). *Battle for Iraq: War briefing.* The Observer. 13th April. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk> Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Gilmore, I. (2004). *Fallujah Bloodbath Casts Shadow on Handover Plan Iraqi Police and Militia Heavily Outgunned by Suspected al Qaeda Forces.* Sunday Telegraph. 15th February. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Glanz, J. (2005). *US Troops Begin New Offensive in Iraqi Desert Near Syrian Border.* The New York Times. 18th June. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 19th May 2011.

Global Security. (2005). Military: Iraqi Insurgency Groups. 8th August. [internet site] Available: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_insurgency.htm>. Accessed: 24th May 2011.

Goffman, E. (1975). *Frame analysis: An essay on the organization of experience.* Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Goldenberg, S. (2006a). *Marines May Face Trial Over Iraq Massacre.* The Guardian. 27th May. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 1st December 2011.

Goldenberg, S. (2006b). *Five US soldiers in Iraq rape and murder inquiry.* The Guardian. 1st July. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 1st December 2011.

Goldenberg, S. (2007a). *Bush Did Know of Plan to Disband Iraqi Army.* The Guardian. 5th September. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Goldenberg, S. (2007b). *US Commander Hints at Iraq Rollback Next Year.* The Guardian. 5th September. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Goldenberg, S., and Pilkington, E. (2006). *Four US Marines Charged With Iraq Murders: Eight Face Life Sentences Over Haditha Killings: Court Hearing Follows Admission of Cover-up.* The Guardian. 22nd December. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 1st December 2011.

Gordon, M. R. (2004). *Debate Lingering on Decision to Dissolve the Iraqi Military.* The New York Times. 21st October. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Gordon, M., R. (2008). *Fateful Choice on Iraq Army Bypassed Washington Debate.* The New York Times. 17th March. [internet site] <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk> Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Gordon, M. R. and Jehl, D. (2003). *After the War: Militants: Foreign Fighters Add to Resistance in Iraq, U.S. Says.* The New York Times. 22nd June. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 19th May 2011.

Gordon, M. R. and Zeleny, J. (2007). *Latest Plan Sets a Series of Goals for Iraq Leaders.* The New York Times. 8th January. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Gowing, N. (1994). *Real-Time Television Coverage of Armed Conflicts and Diplomatic Crises: Does It Pressure or Distort Foreign Policy Decisions?* Cambridge, MA: The Joan Shorenstein Barone Center, John F. Kennedy School of Government.

Graham, B. (2003). *Facing Well-Planned Attacks, U.S. Alters Tactics to Military Sweeps.* The Washington Post. 18th June. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 19th May 2011.

Gray, J. (2007). *The Death of This Crackpot Creed is Nothing to Mourn: The Wider Conflict Engulfing Iraq Lays Bare the Absurdity of Liberal Interventionism – and the Decline of US Power.* The Guardian. 31st July. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Gray, S. (2004). *Iraq targets private guards.* Sunday Times. 6th June. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 1st December 2011.

Green, P., and Ward, T., (2000). State crime, human rights and the limits of criminology. *Social Justice,* 27(1), 101-120.

Green, P., and Ward, T. (2004). *State crime: Governments, violence and corruption.* London: Pluto Press.

Green, P. and Ward, T. (2005). Introduction. *The British Journal of Criminology,* 45(4), 431-433.

Green, P., and Ward, T. (2009). Violence and the state. In: Coleman, R., Sim, J., Tombs, S., and Whyte, D. eds. *State, power, crime.* London: Sage.

Hagan, F., E. (1997). *Political Crime: Ideology and criminality.* Allyn and Bacon.

Hagan, J., and Kaiser, J. (2011a). The diplaced and dispossessed of Darfur: explaining the sources of a continuing state-led genocide. *The British Journal of Sociology, 62(1), 1-25.*

Hagan, J., and Kaiser, J. (2011b). Forms of genocidal destruction: a response to commentators. *The British Journal of Sociology, 62(1), 62-68.*

Hall, S., Critcher, C., Jefferson, T., Clarke, J., and Roberts, B. (1978). *Policing the crises: Mugging, the state and law and order.* London: MacMillan.

Hallin, D. C. (1989). *The Uncensored War.* University of California Press Ltd: London.

Hamm, M. (2007). High Crimes and Misdemeanours: George W. Bush and the sins of Abu Ghraib. *Crime, Media and Culture,* 3(3), 259 – 284.

Hardie-Bick, J., Sheptycki, J, and Wardak, A. (2005) Introduction: transnational and comparative criminology in a global perspective. In: Sheptycki, J and Wardak, A. eds. *Transnational and comparative criminology.* Routledge – Cavendish.

Harnden, T. (2003). *Former Generals Attack Rumsfeld Tactics, Defence Secretary Accused of Ignoring Pleas for Extra Men.* The Daily Telegraph. 26th March. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Harnden, T. (2004). *Terrorists Could Have Iraq's WMD.* The Daily Telegraph. 12th July. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Harnden, T. (2005). *US Army Admits Iraqis Outnumber Foreign Fighters as its Main Enemy.* The Sunday Telegraph. 4th December. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Harnden, T. (2007). *Saudis are no Brothers in Arms.* The Daily Telegraph. 1st August. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Hart Sinnreich, R. (2004). *False Hopes in Iraq.* The Washington Post. 5th December. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Hashim, A.S. (2003). The Insurgency in Iraq. *Small Wars and Insurgencies,* 14(3), 1 – 22.

Hashim, A. (2006). *Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq.* London: Hurst and Company.

Hashim A.S. (2009). *Adelphi Paper 402: Iraq's Sunni Insurgency,* The International Institute of Strategic Studies: Routledge.

Hastings, M. (2004). *There Will be no Peace in Iraq Until Blair Talks Sense. It is Folly to Link Iraq Insurgency with the war on terror, Says Max Hastings.* Sunday Telegraph. 26th September. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Hawkins, V. (2011). Media Selectivity and the Other Side of the CNN Effect: the consequences of not paying attention to conflict. *Media, War and Conflict*, 4(1), 55-68.

Haynes, D. (2008). *A city redrawn by the death squads, bombs and beheadings.* The Times. 17th March. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Hayward, K. (2004). *City Limits: Crime, consumer culture and the urban experience.* London: Glasshouse Press.

Hayward, K. (2011). The Critical Terrorism Studies – Cultural Criminology Nexus: Some thoughts on how to toughen up the critical studies approach. *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 4(1), 57-73.

Hedges, C (2009) *Empire of Illusion*, New York: Nation Books.

Helm, T. (2006). *Blair was Overruled by Bush on Post-War Strategy says Hoon.* The Daily Telegraph. 9th December. [internet site] <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk> Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Hendrikson, D. C. and Tucker, R. W. (2005). Revisions in Need of Revising: What Went Wrong in the Iraq War. *Survival,* 47(2), 7 – 32.

Henry, S., and Milovanovic, D. (1996). *Constitutive Criminology.* London: Sage.

Herbert, B. (2005). *Dangerous Incompetence.* The New York Times. 30th June. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Herman, E. and Chomsky, N. (1988). *Manufacturing Consent.* New York: Pantheon.

Herman, E. (2000). The Propaganda Model: A Retrospective. *Journalism Studies,* 1(1), 101 – 112.

Hider, J. (2005a). *Leave town or die, Shias told.* The Times. 18th April. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Hider, J. (2005b). *Iraq hostages found massacred.* The Times. 21st April. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Hider, J. (2005c). *West Turns Blind Eye as Police Put Saddam's Torturers Back to Work. The* Times. 7th July. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 1st December 2011.

Hider, J. (2007). *Top al Qaeda Leader Killed by Iraqi Insurgents Angry at Bloody Tactics.* The Times. 2nd May. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Hillyard, P., and Tombs, S. (2004). Beyond Criminology? In: Hillyard, P., Pantazis, S., and Tombs, D. eds. *Beyond Criminology: Taking harm seriously.* London: Pluto Press.

Hillyard, P., and Tombs, S. (2005). Beyond criminology? In: Hillyard, P., Pantazis, S., Tombs, D., Gordon., Dorling, D. eds. *Criminal obsessions: Why harm matters more than crime.* London: Crime and Society Foundation.

Hillyard, P. (2006). Political crime. In: McLaughlin, E. and Muncie, J. (second edition) eds. *The Sage dictionary of criminology.* London: Sage.

Hillyard, P., and Tombs, S. (2007). From "crime" to social harm? *Crime, Law and Social Change,* 48(1-2), 9-25.

Hil, R. and Robertson, R. (2003). What sort of future for critical criminology? *Crime, Law and Social Change,* 39(1), 91-115.

Hilton, I. (2004). *Need to build a case for war? Step forward Mr Chalibi: If governments are going to rely on intelligence, its reliability is crucial.* The Guardian. 6th March. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Hirst, D (2005). *Comment and Debate: The carve-up of Iraq will spawn a redivision of the Middle East: The adoption of a weak Iraqi federal constitution is likely to unleash an ethnic and sectarian crisis across the region.* The Guardian. 18th October. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Hoagland, J. (2003). *De-Baathification, Root and Branch.* The Washington Post. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Hoffman, B. (2004). *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq.* The Rand Corporation, OP-127-IPC&MEEP.

Hossein-Zadeh, I. (2007). *Why the US is not Leaving Iraq: The booming business of War Profiteers.* Global Policy. Available at: http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/168/35996.html#author>. Accessed: 12th August 2011.

Howard, M. (2004). *Iraq: Divisions over Islam delay moves towards sovereignty.* The Guardian. 28th February. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Howard, M. (2005a). *US Claims Success in Iraq Border Offensive.* The Guardian. 10th May. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Howard, M. (2005b). *International: Foreign Fighters Leaving Iraq to Export Terror, Warns Minister.* The Guardian. 3rd October. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Howard, M. (2006a). *Beginning of the End for Zarqawi Group, Says Iraq.* The Guardian. 16th June. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Howard, M. (2006b). *Iraq PM Unveils First Blueprint for Peace.* The Guardian. 24th June. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Hoy, Jr, J.R. (2004). *The Rise and fall of the Renaissance Party: Implications of De-Baathification on Iraqi Society.* Carlisle Barraks, Pennsylvania: US Army War College.

Hubbard, A. (2007). Plague and Paradox: Militias in Iraq. *Small Wars and Insurgencies,* 18 (3), 345-362.

Huggins, M., K., Haritos-Fatouros, M. and Zimbardo, P., G. (2002). *Violence workers: Police torturers and murderers reconstruct Brazilian atrocities.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Huggins, M., K. (2010). Modern institutionalised torture as state-organised crime. In: Chambliss, W., J., Michalowski, R., and Kramer, R., C. eds. *State crime in the global age.* Cullompton: Willan Publishing.

Hughes, G (2010). The Insurgencies in Iraq, 2003-2009: Origins, Developments and Prospects. *Defence Studies,* 10 (1), 152 – 176.

Human Rights Watch. (2003). *Off Target: The Conduct of the War and Civilian Casualties in Iraq.* [internet site] *Available:* http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,HRW,IRQ,402f70084,0.html>. Accessed: 24th May 2012.

Human Rights First Report. (2008). *Private Military Contractors at War: Ending the culture of impunity.*

Ignatieff, M. (2003). *Why Are We In Iraq?; (And Liberia? And Afghanistan?).* The New York Times. 7th September. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 19th May 2011.

Ignatius, D. (2003a). *Wolfowitz's War: Not Over Yet.* The Washington Post. 13th May. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Ignatius, D. (2003b). *Memo to Rumsfeld: Good Thinking. The* Washington Post. 7th November. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 19th May 2011.

Ignatius, D. (2003c). *One Iraqis Insights.* The Washington Post. 10th December. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Ignatius, D. (2003d). *A Kings Advice.* The Washington Post. 16th December. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Iraq Body Count. (2012). *Documented civilian deaths from violence.* [internet site] Available: http://www.iraqbodycount.org/ Accessed: 20th August 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (10th February 2004). *Coalition forces party...went to the police department to investigate a statement that...detainees are tortured in prison.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (10th April 2004). *SAF attks on X/X Marines in Fallujah: Counter Attk results in 27 EKIA, 20 detain.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (15th April 2004). *RPG and SAP attk on xxxx/xxxx Marines in the vicinity of Fallujah: 10 EKIA 2 buildings destroyed.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (17th April 2004). *Complex attk on a 1st Tank patrol in the vicinity of Fallujah: 1 EKIA.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (20th April 2004). *RPG and SAF attk on 1/5 mar IVO Fallujah: 8 En KIA.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (21st April 2004). *SAF attk on mar in NW Fallujah: 3 CF WIA 36 En KIA.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (28th April 2004). *SAF attk on x/x Marines IVO Fallujah: Buildings destroyed.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (10th October 2004). *A possible fuel convoy with US force protection fired at IZ pick up truck..Km...of...AS...woman sitting in the back of this pick up truck was hit in the shooting. At the moment the woman is in A.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (22nd December 2004). *At 222230CDEC0...at...Camp reported three IPS vehicles entering the port with lights flashing. A Sqn then received a broken report from Olive Security that a private security firm had fired....* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (26th December 2004). *SAF attk on...patrol west of...prison: > Coalition forces inj 2x detained.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (28th December 2004). *Cordon and search by.../and ips > in the vicinity of...wa:...detained.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (10th January 2005). *SAF attk on INIS employee IVO CP1 Baghdad (zone 1): 1 CIV killed.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (17th January 2005). *Suspected blue on green ivo:...inj/damage.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (1st February 2005). *SAF attk on by FPS in Kirkuk: IPS inj,... detained.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (15th March 2005). *Escalation of force by...IVO Ramadi: Inj/damage.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (16th March 2005). *Escalation of force by…2D mar div IVO Ramadi:…inj/damage.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (20th March 2005). *Escalation of force by CIV contractor in Basrah: CF inj/damage.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (29th March 2005). *Raid by…ivo ar Ramadi:…AIF det,…inj/damage.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (5th April 2005). *IED attk on…ivo Ramadi:…inj/damage.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (9th April 2005). *Blue on blue reported by…of camp blue:…minor damage.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (22nd April 2005). *AIF det by…in Ramadi: …det,…> coalition forces inj/damage.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (30th April 2005). *Accident: CIV veh crashed into ditch…of Fallujah:…CIV inj…CF inj/damage.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (9th May 2005). *Veh accident by CIV PSD IVO Nasiriyah: 1 CIV killed, 0 CF inj/damage.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (14th May 2005). *Escalation of force by Blackwater PSD in Baghdad (Zone…): 1 CIV KIA 2 CIV WIA.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (29th May 2005). *Suspected detainee abuse in the vicinity of Mosul.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (30th May 2005). *Raid by Wolf Brigade in Baghdad (zone): Dry hole…Inj/Damage.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (6th June 2005). *Raid by Wolf Brigade in Baghdad (zone): Det…Inj/damage.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (10th June 2005). *Alleged Iraqi abuse by IPS in Basrah.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (14th June 2005a). *Escalation of force by 1-5 IVO: 7 CIV Killed, 2 Civ injured, 0 CF.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (14th June 2005b). *Civ killed by IVO Kirkuk: Civ killed, CF inj/Damage.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (16th June 2005). *Offensive actions > in support of > observation post squeeze play by…AR in Baghdad (zone):…det.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (17th June 2005a). *Raid in support of observation post. Squeeze play by Wolf Brigade in Baghdad: Det…Coalition Forces.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (17th June 2005b). *Cordon/search by…in Baghdad (zone): Det… Coalition forces Inj/Damage.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (26th June 2005). *Small arms fire attk on IPS in Baghdad (zone): Det...IP KIA...civilian killed > coalition forces...inj.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (2nd July 2005). *Blue on White IVO...CIV inj, CF inj/Dam.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (23rd July 2005). *Green on green ivo ar: ...inj/damage.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (3rd August 2005). *Detainee abuse by IPS in Basrah: inj/damage.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (24th August 2005). *Alleged detainee abuse by detaining unit ING forces.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (26th August 2005). *Alleged detainee abuse by Marines when detained.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (30th August 2005). *Alleged detainee abuse by Iraqi Police then...Coalition Forces beat him.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (2nd September 2005). *PSD engagement IVO Basrah:...CIV inj,...CF inj/damage.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (7th September 2005). *Security contractor walk out:...inj/damage.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (14th September 2005). *Alleged detainee by weapons CO.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (16th December 2005). *...Killed by...in SW of Iskandariyah: ...Civ Killed...Civ inj.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (11th October 2005a). *Alleged detainee abuse...in the vicinity of Ramadi.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (11th October 2005b). *Blue on White: In Baghdad (Zone): CIV killed. CF inj/Dam.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (19th October 2005). *CLP firing warning shots...by TF...IVO Bayji:...inj/damage.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (2nd November 2005a). *AIF Det by...ACR in Baghdad (zone):...Det...coalition forces inj/damage.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (2nd November 2005b). *Blue on White by...in Mosul: CIV killed...CF inj/Dam.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (2nd November 2005c). *AIF Det by – ACR in Baghdad (ZONE): Det, coalition forces inj/damage.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (4th November 2005). *Possible Blue on White by TF...IVO Tikrit: CIV Killed., CF inj/Dam.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (11th November 2005). *CIV bodies found/cleared by...in Husaybah...CIV: Civilian killed...CF > Coalition Forces Inj/Damage.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (16th November 2005). *Report: Assassination teams in Basra.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (20th November 2005). *Threat report: Command and control cell in Baghdad.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (21st November 2005). *Blue-on-White BDE IVO Basrah:...Inj/Dam.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (26th November 2005). *Detainee abuse allegations against IA IVO Fallujah: inj/damage.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (27th November 2005). *Intelligence report: MOI moves into...to arrest...AIF....* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (28th November 2005). *Alleged detainee abuse in the vicinity of Fallujah.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (30th November 2005). *Alleged detainee abuse in the vicinity of Ramadi.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (2nd December 2005). *Alleged detainee abuse in vicinity of Fallujah.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (3rd December 2005). *Det abuse by Marines.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (5th December 2005). *Blue on White on convoy IVO Mosul: LN killed, LN inj, CF inj/UNK veh.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (6th December 2005). *Alleged detainee abuse in vicinity of Mosul.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (10th December 2005). *Alleged detainee abuse in vicinity of Fallujah.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (11th December 2005a). *Det abuse summary.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (11th December 2005b). *Escalation of force by 2-502 IVO (Zone…): 1 Civ killed, 1 Civ injured.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (15th December 2005). *Alleged detainee abuse by Iraqi soldiers of the 2D Battalion, 2D Brigade.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (16th December 2005). *...Killed by...in SW of Iskandariyah: ...Civ Killed...Civ inj.* [Internet site] Available: http://wikileaks.org/irq/ Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (30th December 2005). *Alleged...violation by CF IVO Hadithah: Civ killed, CF inj/dam.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (6th January 2006). *Threat warning: Possible rocket attack on forward operating base DANGER.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (28th January 2006). *Raid conducted by...IVO...: Det, CF...Inj/Damage.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (6th February 2006). *IED attk on CDO IVO Samarra: 1 IP Kia, 1 IP Wia, 0 CF inj/dam.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (11th February 2006). *Alleged abuse of detainee by IA.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (15th February 2006). *Alleged detainee abuse summary report.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (22nd February 2006). *Murder of Sunni Prisoners in Basrah; 9 civ killed, 3 civ inj, 0 cf inj/damage.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (5th March 2006). *Raid conducted by...> in vicinity of:...det...inj/damage.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (10th March 2006). *Allegation of detainee abuse against IA.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (12th March 2006). *Allegation of detainee abuse...in vicinity of Ramadi.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (16th March 2006a). *Alleged detainee abuse by MNF in///inj/damage.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (16th March 2006b). *Alleged...violation by CF...of:...inj/dam.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (17th March 2006). *Alleged detainee abuse by MNF – IVO: Inj/dam.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (22nd March 2006). *SAF Attk on Civs Rptd by 3/6 IA in sabi at (ZONE 28): 1 Civ Killed, 12 Civ Inj.* [Internet site] Available: http://wikileaks.org/irq/ Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (27th March 2006). *SAF attk...by/...MITT (...village zone):...inj/damage.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (4th April 2006). *Threat warning: AQIZ to kidnap ivo > in vicinity of IZ (...> Marine).* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (10th April 2006). *SAF attk on 300th MP in Fallujah: 3 CIV Killed, 8 CIV inj, 0 CF inj/damage.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (18th April 2006). *Alleged detainee abuse by IA IVO...inj/dam.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (2nd May 2006). *(Blue) Blackwater on White in Baghdad (ZONE): 1 Civ killed, 0 CF inj/dam.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (5th May 2006). *Alleged detainee abuse...in vicinity of....* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (7th May 2006a). *Alleged detainee abuse by IA by FSB IVO Tal Afar: inj/dam.* [Internet site] Available: http://wikileaks.org/irq/ Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (7th May 2006b). *Alleged detainee abuse by IA by FSB IVO Tal Afar: inj/dam.* [Internet site] Available: http://wikileaks.org/irq/ Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (9th May 2006). *Alleged detainee abuse.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (10th May 2006). *Alleged detainee abuse by IA IVO Tal Afar inj/damage.* [Internet site] Available: http://wikileaks.org/irq/ Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (12th May 2006). *Alleged detainee abuse by IA...CF coalition forces, in vicinity of Kirkuk.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (15th May 2006). *Drive by shooting on civ IVO:…inj/dam.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (16th May 2006). *Alleged detainee abuse in vicinity of FOB forward operating base.* [internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (18th May 2006). *Alleged detainee abuse…in the vicinity of Fallujah.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (25th May 2006). *Alleged detainee abuse by IA at the Diyala Jail in Baqubah.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (6th June 2006a). *Alleged detainee abuse by IP in Husaybah.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (6th June 2006b). *Alleged detainee abuse in the vicinity if Balad.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (6th March 2006). *Alleged detainee abuse.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (7th March 2006). *Alleged detainee abuse.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (12th March 2006). *Allegation of detainee abuse.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (22nd March 2006). *SAF Attk on Civs Rptd by 3/6 IA in sabi at (ZONE 28): 1 Civ Killed, 12 Civ Inj.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (10th April 2006). *Illegal detention facility….* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (7th May 2006a). *Alleged detainee abuse by IA by FSB IVO Tal Afar: inj/dam.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (7th May 2006b). *Alleged detainee abuse by IA by FSB IVO Tal Afar: inj/dam.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (10th May 2006). *Alleged detainee abuse by IA IVO Tal Afar inj/damage.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (15th May 2006). *Drive by shooting on civ IVO:...inj/dam.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (7th June 2006). *Alleged detainee abuse by IP in Husaybah: inj/dam.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (16th June 2006). *(Suspicious Incident).* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (26th June 2006). *Suspected detainee abuse by IP in Husaybah.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (27th June 2006). *Alleged detainee abuse.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (29th June 2006). *Alleged detainee abuse.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (2nd July 2006). *Alleged detainee abuse by IA.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (8th July 2006). *Alleged abuse by IA.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (11th July 2006). *Alleged detainee abuse by coalition forces.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (12th July 2006). *Alleged detainee abuse.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (17th July 2006). *Alleged detainee abuse…in vicinity of Baquba.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (24th July 2006). *Alleged detainee abuse by IP in…(ZONE):…inj/dam.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (25th July 2006). *Alleged detainee abuse…by…Brigade Combat Team (US) in…(ZONE): CF inj/damage.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (4th August 2006). *Alleged detainee abuse by IA in vicinity of Kirkuk.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (10th August 2006). *Alleged detainee abuse by Iraqi Police Force.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (13th August 2006). *Alleged detainee abuse in the vicinity of Baqubah.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (14th August 2006). *Alleged detainee abuse.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (16th August 2006). **Alleged detainee abuse in Ramadi; CF involvement.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (20th August 2006). *Threat warning: JAM kidnap/execution ops ivo Baghdad.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (23rd August 2006). *Alleged detainee abuse by Iraqi Police in Husaybah.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (28th August 2006). *Escalation of force: Civ WIA…Civ KIA.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (5th September 2006). *Murder of DBE IVO Basrah; 1 IP KIA, no damage.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (12th September 2006). *Alleged IA on IZ violation (Detainee abuse).* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (24th September 2006). *Warning: JAM plans kidnap ivo Baghdad.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (3rd October 2006a). *Alleged ISF misconduct in: Civ killed, CF inj/damage.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (3rd October 2006b). *Alleged detainee abuse…by…CAV in…(ZONE):…inj/dam.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (6th October 2006). *Alleged detainee abuse.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (13th October 2006). *Alleged detainee abuse.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (17th October 2006). *Detainee abuse by IP in vicinity of Coalition Forces.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (18th October 2006). *Alleged detainee abuse by IA.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (23rd October 2006). *Alleged detainee abuse…IA.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (28th October 2006). *Escalation of force by IP IVO: Civ inj, CF inj/Dam.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (2nd November 2006). *(Suspicious incident) Other Rpt by IVO Baghdad (ZONE): Civ KIA.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (4th November 2006). *Alleged detainee abuse.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (14th November 2006). *Alleged detainee abuse by IA.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (19th November 2006). *…by…DBE: Inj/dam.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (25th November 2006a). *Murder threat by…MOI death squad ivo Baghdad (zone…)(Route): …inj/damage.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (25th November 2006b). *Assassination threat by JAM ivo Baghdad (zone…)(route…via ASR): Dam.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (27th November 2006). *…by…-IA: Inj/dam.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (12th December 2006). *(Non-combat event) other RPT by:…Inj/dam.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (13th December 2006a). *...by-...IA in vicinity of Ad:...Inj/dam.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (13th December 2006b). *(Non-combat event) Other RPT by SF group and IA.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (16th December 2006). *(Non-combat event) other RPT by//IA IVO (ZONE)...inj/dam.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (21st December 2006a). *...by 3D BDE,...Div IA MITT > in the vicinity of...Fallujah: Inj/dam.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (21st December 2006b). *Brigade...in the vicinity of...Fallujah: Inj/Dam.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (22nd December 2006). *...by IP IVO...Haditha: Inj/dam.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (30th December 2006a). *(Non-combat event) Other RPT.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (30th December 2006b). *IED explosion attk on...IVO:...ISF WIA...CIV WIA.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (1st January 2007). *...by IP IVO Fallujah:...Inj/dam.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (16th January 2007). *Escalation of force by IA IVO Baghdad: Civ KIA.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (25th January 2007). *(Non-combat event). Other > Report.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (1ˢᵗ February 2007). *Other by 2D Lar IVO Ad:...Inj/dam.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15ᵗʰ September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (3ʳᵈ February 2007). *(Non-combat event). Other > RPT in the vicinity of At Taji.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15ᵗʰ September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (3ʳᵈ February 2007b). *...by IA...ivo...Khalis (route):...inj/damage.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15ᵗʰ September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (15ᵗʰ February 2007). *Escalation of force by IA in vicinity of Ramadi: Civ KIA.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15ᵗʰ September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (22ⁿᵈ February 2007). *Small unit actions by...CAV IVO at Taji:...AIF KIA.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15ᵗʰ September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (26ᵗʰ February 2007). *IED Explosion (IED) attk on...(route...): 0 inj/dam.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15ᵗʰ September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (1ˢᵗ April 2007). *Escalation of force...in vicinity of Mosul: Civ KIA.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15ᵗʰ September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (14ᵗʰ May 2007). *(Suspicious incident) Other RPT by...ivo (route): ...inj/damage.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15ᵗʰ September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (22ⁿᵈ May 2007a). (Non-combat event). Other RPT in the vicinity of Fallujah. [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15ᵗʰ September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (22ⁿᵈ May 2007b). *...By IP IVO Ramadi: Inj/dam.* [Internet site] Available: http://wikileaks.org/irq/ Accessed: 15ᵗʰ September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (22ⁿᵈ May 2007). *...By IP IVO Ramadi: Inj/dam.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15ᵗʰ September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (23rd May 2007). *...by TF Task Force.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (8th June 2007). *Escalation of force by IA: Civ KIA.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (12th July 2007). *Direct fire (small arms)...Civ WIA...AIF KIA...AIF WIA.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (16th July 2007). *Small unit action...IVO Baghdad...: Civ KIA...AIF WIA...AIF KIA.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (5th August 2007). *(Non-combat event) other RPT by BIAP...Annex, forward operating base...IVO...(ZONE): inj.dam.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (19th August 2007). *(Criminal event) Kidnapping Rpt by local national IVO Baghdad (ZONE): Inj/Dam.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (20th August 2007). *Small unit actions by SWT from...CAV:...AIF KIA.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (31st August 2007). *Escalation of force by...trans bn ivo (route):...inj/damage.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (4th November 2007). *Non-combat event: Accident rpt/ISF WIA.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (17th November 2007*). (Non-combat event) other RPT > forward operating base WARRIOR: Inj/dam.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (23rd November 2007). *(Non-combat event) Other > report > Military Police > Commanding Officer.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (26th February 2008). *(Friendly action) Detain report.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (10th March 2008). *(Explosive hazard) IED explosion Rpt (Vehicle borne IED (VBIED)) 3-4 MITT: 1 Civ KIA, 34 Civ WIA, 1 UE KIA.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (21st May 2008). *(Friendly fire). Blue-White Rpt Ad Din OPS/: Civ KIA.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (24th May 2008). (Friendly fire) Blue-White Rpt Ops/: Civ KIA. [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (28th May 2008). *(Non-combat event) Other RPT...MITT:..Inj/dam.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (9th June 2008). *(Other) Other RPT Baghdad OPS/: Civ WIA.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (4th July 2008). *(Friendly action) Escalation of force RPT TF...in (ISO TF Ramadi):...inj/dam.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (16th July 2008). *(Friendly action) Escalation of force RPT contract security/...BCT...inj/dam.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (12th August 2008). *(Non-combat event) other RPT...PSC/ISF:...inj/dam.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (12th August 2008b). *(Friendly action) detain RPT Baghdad ops/:...inj/damage.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (28th August 2008). *(Friendly action) Escalation of force RPT //IA and ///ACR: inj/dam.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (10th September 2008). *(Friendly action) Escalation of force RPT potential PSC EOF: 1 CIV KIA.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (12th September 2008a). *(Suspicious incident) Other RPT CF: Civ KIA.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (12th September 2008b). *(Suspicious incident) Other RPT CF: Civ KIA...UE Det.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (15th September 2008). *(Friendly action) Escalation of force RPT TF – IA: Civ KIA.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (7th October 2008). *Other RPT > Military Police > Commanding Officer: Inj/dam.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (13th January 2009). *(Friendly action) attack RPT Baghdad OPS/:...Inj/dam.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (2nd April 2009). *(Other) RPT...Detention Interrogation Team > Combat outpost old > Ministry of Defence/JSS...[Alleged abuse]:...Inj/dam.* [Internet site] Available: <http://wikileaks.org/irq/>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (23rd April 2009). *(Friendly action) detain > Report unknown…unit: Inj/dam.* [Internet site] Available: <u><http://wikileaks.org/irq/></u>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (2nd May 2009a). *(Other) Other RPT IP station personnel.* [Internet site] Available: <u><http://wikileaks.org/irq/></u>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (2nd May 2009b). *(Friendly action) Detain > report unknown…unit: Inj/dam.* [Internet site] Available: <u><http://wikileaks.org/irq/></u>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (3rd May 2009). *(Friendly action) Detainee Rpt.* [Internet site] Available: <u><http://wikileaks.org/irq/></u>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (21st May 2009). *(Friendly action) Other Rpt Armoured Group: Inj/Dam.* [Internet site] Available: <u><http://wikileaks.org/irq/></u>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (22nd May 2009). *(Suspicious incident) Other Rpt: Inj/dam.* [Internet site] Available: <u><http://wikileaks.org/irq/></u>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (24th May 2009). *(Friendly fire) Blue-White Rpt Ops/: Civ WIA.* [Internet site] Available: <u><http://wikileaks.org/irq/></u>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (28th May 2009). *(Suspicious incident) Other Rpt….JCC: Civ KIA.* [Internet site] Available: <u><http://wikileaks.org/irq/></u>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (19th July 2009). *(Suspicious incident) other > Report:…Inj/dam.* [Internet site] Available: <u><http://wikileaks.org/irq/></u>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (29th July 2009). *(Other) RPT…Detention Interrogation Team: Inj/dam.* [Internet site] Available: <u><http://wikileaks.org/irq/></u>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Iraq War Logs. (18th December 2009). *(Friendly fire) Blue-White RPT CO / CAB : CIV WIA.* [Internet site] Available: <u><http://wikileaks.org/irq/></u>. Accessed: 15th September 2012.

Jaber, H. (2004). *Suicide Squads Await US Troops Assault on Fallujah*. Sunday Times. 7th November. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Jaber, H. (2005). *Iraqi Police 'linked to ethnic cleansing'*. Sunday Times. 9th October. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk> Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Jaber, H. (2006*). Sunni Leader Killed for Joining Ceasefire Talks.* The Sunday Times. 5th February. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Jaber, H. and Amman, A.R. (2007). *Sunnis Try to Blast al Qaeda Out of Iraq.* The Sunday Times. 1st April. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Jaber, H. Baxter, S. and Smith, M. (2006). *How Iraq's Ghost of Death was Cornered.* The Sunday Times. 11th June. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Jackson, R. (2005). *Writing the War on Terror: language, politics and counter-terror.* Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Jackson, R. (2006). *The State and Terrorist Sanctuaries: A Critical Analysis, paper prepared for the British International Studies Association (BISA) Annual Conference,* 18th-20th December, University of Cork, Ireland.

Jackson, R. (2007). *The core commitments of critical terrorism studies.* European Political Science, 6(3), 244-251.

Jackson, R. (2008). *The ghosts of state terror: Knowledge, politics and terrorism studies. Paper prepared for the International Studies Association (ISA) Annual Conference,* 26-29 March, 2008, San Francisco, USA.

Jackson, R., Breen Smyth, M., and Gunning, J., (2009). Critical terrorism studies: framing a new research agenda. In: Jackson, R., Breen Smyth, M., and Gunning, J., eds. *Critical terrorism studies.* Abingdon: Routledge.

Jackson-Jacobs, C. (2004). Taking a beating: The narrative gratifications of fighting as an underdog. In: Ferrell, J., Hayward, K., Morrison, W., and Presdee, M. eds. *Cultural criminology unleashed.* London: Glasshouse Press.

Jamieson, R. (1998). Towards a criminology of war in Europe. In: Ruggerio, V., South, N. and Taylor, I. eds. *The new European criminology: Crime and social order in Europe.* London: Routledge.

Jamieson, R. (1999). Councils of war. *Criminal Justice Matters*, 34(1), 25-29.

Jamieson, R. and McEvoy, K. (2005). State Crime by Proxy and Juridical Othering. *The British Journal of Criminology*, 45(4), 504-527 .

Jeffords, S. and Robinovitz, L. Introduction. In: Jeffords, S. and Robinovitz, L. eds (1994). *Seeing Through the Media: The Persian Gulf War*. Rutgers University Press.

Jehl, D. (2005a). *US Panel Sees Iraq as Terror Training Area*. The New York Times. 14th January. [internet site] Available: http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk. Accessed: 19th May 2011

Jehl, D. (2005b). *Full Qaeda Letter to Iraq Ally Speaks of Group's Global Goal*. The New York Times. 12th October. [internet site] Available: http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk. Accessed: 19th May 2011

Jehl, D. and Filkins, D. (2003). *Rumsfeld Eager for More Iraqis to Keep Peace*. The New York Times. 5th September. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Jenkins, S. (2003). *The Only Hope Now is to Divide Iraq Into Three*. The Times. 3rd December. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Jenkins, S. (2004). *Invasion Apologists are Using Cliché Camouflage.* The Times. 14th April. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Jones, A., L., and Howard-Hassman, R., E. (2006). Under strain: Human rights and international law in the post 9/11 era. *Journal of Human Rights*, 4 (1), 61-71.

Jones, G. (2004). *Blair: We Face a New War in Iraq.* The Daily Telegraph. 20th September. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Jones, T. (2007). *A True Land of Opportunity: Where there's Death and Destruction, there's Profit – as security companies in Iraq know only too well.* The Guardian. 12th June. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 1st December 2011.

Jorgensen, M. and Phillips, L., J. (2002). *Discourse analysis as theory and method.* London: Sage.

Junger, S. (2011). *War.* London: Fourth Estate.

Kaplan, F. (2008). *Daydream Believers: How a Few Grand Ideas Wrecked American Power.* Wiley.

Karam, S. (2007). The Multi-Faced Sunni Insurgency: A Personal Reflection. *Civil Wars,* 9(1), 87 – 105.

Katzmann, K. and Prados, A. B. The Kurds in post-Saddam Iraq. In: Malbouissan, C. D. ed. (2007) *Focus on Islamic Issues.* Nova Publishers.

Kauzarlich, D and Kramer, R., C. (1998). *Crimes of the American nuclear state: At home and abroad.* Boston: North-eastern University Press.

Kauzlarich, D., Matthews, R., A., and Miller, W., J. (2001). Towards a victimology of state crime. *Critical Criminology*, 10(3), 173-194.

Kauzarlich, D., Mullins, C., W. and Matthews, R., A. (2003). A complicity continuum of state crime. *Contemporary Criminal Justice Review,* 6(3), 241-254.

Kauzarlich, D. (2007). Seeing war as criminal: Peace activist views and critical criminology. *Contemporary Criminal Justice,* 10(1), 67-85.

Keegan, J. (2004). *Fresh Hostilities Don't Alter the Justice of Deposing Saddam Critics of Blair Renewed Fighting in Iraq Ignore All That Has Been Achieved.* The Daily Telegraph. 21st September. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Kekes, J. (2005). *The Roots of Evil.* Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

Kelidar, A. (2003). *Iraq Must not be Allowed to Split Along the Sunni/Shia Divide.* The Daily Telegraph. 21st May. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Kelman, H. (1973). Violence without moral restraint: Reflections on the dehumanisation of victims and victimizers. *Journal of Social Issues,* 29(4), 25-61.

Kelman, H. and Hamilton, V. (1989). *Crimes of obedience.* Yale University Press.

Kelman, H. (1995). The social context of torture: policy process and authority structure. In: Crelinson, R. and Schmid, A. eds. *The politics of pain.* Oxford: Westview Press.

Kellner, D. (2003). *From 9/11 to terror war: The dangers of the Bush legacy.* Lanham, M.D: Rowman and Littlefield.

Kellner, D. (2004). Media propaganda and spectacle in the war on Iraq: A critique of US broadcasting networks. *Cultural Studies, Critical Methodologies,* 4, 329-338.

Kellner, D. (2005). *Media Spectacle and the Crisis of Democracy.* Paradigm Publishers.

Kessler, G. and Allen, M. (2003). *U.S. Response to Attack by Israel is Muted; Syria is on the Wrong Side in War on Terror, Officials Say.* The Washington Post. 6th October. Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 19th May 2011.

Kessler, G. and Fletcher, M. A. (2006). *Bush, Blair Concede Missteps; But Leaders Say War Was Justifies.* The Washington Post. 26th May. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Khadduri, M (1960, second edition). *Independent Iraq 1932 – 1958: A study in Iraqi Politics.* London: Oxford University Press.

Kilcullen, D. (2005). Countering Global Insurgency. *The Journal of Strategic Studies,* 28(4), 597 – 617.

Kilcullen, D. (2009). *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One.* London: Hurst and Company.

Kingstone, H. (2007). *Toppled in Baghdad, Clueless in Whitehall.* The Sunday Times. 21st October. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Klein, N. (2003). *Free trade is war. The Nation.* 11th September. [internet site] Available: <http://www.naomiklein.org/articles/2003/09/free-trade-war>. Accessed: 20th August 2012.

Klein, N. (2004). *Bush's Iraq an Appointocracy.* 22nd January. [internet site] Available: <http://www.naomiklein.org/articles/2004/01/bushs-iraq-appointocracy>. Accessed: 20th August 2012.

Klein, N. (2004). *Freedoms fires.* 5th April. [internet site] Available: <http://www.naomiklein.org/articles/2004/04/freedom-fires>. Accessed: 20th August 2012.

Klein, N. (2004). *Mutiny in Iraq.* The Nation. 28th April. [internet site] Available: <http://www.naomiklein.org/articles/2004/04/mutiny-iraq>. Accessed: 20th August 2012.

Klein, N. (2004). *Shameless in Iraq.* The Nation. 25th June. [internet site] Available: <http://www.naomiklein.org/articles/2004/06/shameless-iraq>. Accessed: 20th August 2012.

Klein, N. (2004). *You break it, you pay for it.* The Nation. 24th December. [internet site] Available: <http://www.naomiklein.org/articles/2004/12/you-break-it-you-pay-it>. Accessed: 20th August 2012.

Klein, N. (2007). *The shock doctrine: The rise of disaster capitalism.* New York: Metropolitan Books.

Klein, N. (2008). *Disaster capitalism: State of extortion.* 3rd July. [internet site] Available: <http://www.naomiklein.org/articles/2008/07/disaster-capitalism-state-extortion>. Accessed: 20th August 2012.

Knickmeyer, E. (2005). *Sunnis Urged by Clerics to Join Military; Edict Breaks With Long-Standing Position; Shiite Ayatollah Makes Similar Call.* The Washington Post. 2nd April. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 9th March 2011.

Knickmeyer, E. (2005). *Envoy Faults Militias Interference in Iraq Vote.* The Washington Post. 17th December. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Knickmeyer, E. (2006). *Curfew Takes it's Toll On Iraqis; Attacks Kill Dozens As Stores, Hospitals Run Out of Supplies.* The Washington Post. 27th February. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 9th March 2011.

Komarow, S. (2004). *Iraq's Security Forces Brace for Larger Role.* USA Today. 28th June. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 19th May 2011.

Komarow, S. (2005). *Parties waging polite battle to control Najaf.* USA Today. 26th January. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 9th March 2011.

Kornblut, A. E. (2006). *Fire-fighters Endorse Clinton for Senate.* The New York Times. 20th April. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Kramer, R. (1994). State violence and violent crime. *Peace Studies,* 6(2), 171-175.

Kramer, R., C., Michalowski, R., J. and Kauzarlich, D. (2002). The origins and development of the concept and theory of state-corporate crime. *Crime and Delinquency,* 48(2), 263-282.

Kramer, R. C., and Michalowski, R. J. (2005). War, Aggression and State Crime: A Criminological Analysis of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq. *The British Journal of Criminology,* 45(4), 446-469.

Kramer, R., Michalowski, R., and Rothe, D. (2005). The supreme international crime: How the US war in Iraq threatens the rule of law. *Social Justice,* 32(2), 52-81.

Kramer, R., C., and Michalowski, R., J. (2006). The original formulation. In: Michalowski, R., J. and Kramer, R., C. eds. *State-corporate crime.* New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.

Kramer, R.C., and Michalowski, R. J., (2011). Empire and Exceptionalism: The Bush Administrations Criminal War against Iraq. In: Rothe, D. L., and Mullins, C. W., eds. *State Crime: Current Perspectives.* New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Krugman, P. (2004). *What Went Wrong.* The New York Times. 23rd April. [internet site] <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk> Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Kull, S. Ramsay, C. and Lewis, E. (2004). *Misperceptions, the Media and the Iraq War.* Political Science Quarterly, 118(4), 569-598.

La Guardia, A. (2005). *Syria Must Get its Act Together Before it is Too Late.* The Daily Telegraph. 14th March. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Lamb, C. (2003). *British Refuse to Adopt US Peace Tactics.* Sunday Times. 22nd June. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Lea, J. (2001). *Crime as governance: Reorienting criminology.* [internet site] Available: <http://www.bunker8.pwp.blueyonder.co.uk/>. Accessed: 4th July 2012.

Lea, J. (2007). *Crime, War and Security.* [internet site] Available: <http://www.bunker8.pwp.blueyonder.co.uk/>. Accessed: 4th July 2012.

Lea, J., and Stenson, K. (2007). *Security, sovereignty and non-state governance "from below".* [internet site] Available: <http://www.bunker8.pwp.blueyonder.co.uk/>. Accessed: 4th July 2012.

Lepard, B., D. (2006). Iraq, fundamental ethical principles and the future of human rights. *Journal of Human Rights,* 4 (1), 53-59.

Lippert, R., and Stenson, K. (2010). Advancing governmentality studies: Lessons from social constructionism. *Theoretical Criminology,* 14(4), 473-494.

Lewis, M Historical Setting in Library of Congress (2009) *A Country Study: Iraq.* Federal Research Division: Library of Congress. [internet site] Available: <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/iqtoc.html>. Accessed: 14th April 2010.

Livingston, S. (1997). *Clarifying the CNN Effect: An examination of media effects according to type of military intervention,* research paper R-18, June, Cambridge, MA: The Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy. Harvard University.

Loader, I and Sparks, R. (2010). *Public criminology?* Routledge.

Loyd, A. (2005). *Can the Iraqis crush a swarm of wasps.* The Times. 21st February. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Lowery, A. and Pilger, J. (2010). *The war you don't see.* [DVD]. Dartmouth Films.

Lynch, D. J. and Komarow, S. (2003). *Allied troops endure toughest day of fighting, speed toward Baghdad.* USA Today. 24th March. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 19th May 2011.

MacAskill, E. (2003). *Iraq: After the War: Iraqis Left Baffled as Don Drops in for a Chat.* The Guardian. 1ˢᵗ May. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

MacAskill, E. (2004). Afghanistan Could Implode, MPs Warn. The Guardian. 30ᵗʰ July. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5ᵗʰ August 2011.

MacAskill, E. (2004). *UK should face court for crimes in Iraq, say jurists.* The Guardian. 21ˢᵗ January. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 1st December 2011.

MacAskill, E. (2008). *Ex-Guantanamo Prisoner Took Part in Iraq Bombing, Says US: Pentagon Claims Kuwaiti Carried Out Suicide Attack: Fears Case Will Harm Civil Rights Bid to Free Inmates.* The Guardian. 8ᵗʰ May. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

MacFarquhar, N. (2004). *Arabs Worry Over Extremism While Evoking Vindication.* The New York Times. 9ᵗʰ April. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 9th March 2011.

Mackey, S. (2005). *The Coming Clash Over Kirkuk.* The New York Times. 9ᵗʰ February. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 9th March 2011.

Maddox, B. (2003). *Invisible band of exiles has big credibility gap to bridge.* The Times. 2ⁿᵈ September. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Maddox, B. (2005). *Signing-up an Armchair Army Still Armed to the Teeth.* The Times. 14ᵗʰ April. [internet site] <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk> Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Maddox, B. (2006). *The War Was Right, But we Made Mistakes Afterwards.* The Times. 17ᵗʰ March. [internet site] <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk> Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Maddox, B. (2008). *Where it all Went Wrong.* The Times. 18th March. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Mann, C. and Stewart, F. (2000). *Internet communication and qualitative research.* London: Sage.

Mann, M. (2011). Processes of murderous cleansing/genocide: comment on Hagan and Kaiser. *The British Journal of Sociology, 62 (1), 42-48.*

Mansoor, P. (2008). *How the Surge Worked.* The Washington Post. 10th August. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Marcuse, H. (1967). Liberation from the affluent society. In: Kellner, D. ed. *The New Left and the 1960s: collected papers of Herbert Marcuse, volume 3.* New York: Routledge.

Mathews, J. (2003). *Iraqis Can do More.* The Washington Post. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Matthews, R., A. and Kauzlarich, D. (2007). State crimes and state harms: A tale of two definitional frameworks. *Crime, Law and Social Change*, 48(1-2), 43-55.

McCain, J. (2007). *Send More Troops.* The Washington Post. 7th January. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

McCarthy, R. (2003). *Wife of Saddam Henchamn Held by US After Raid.* The Guardian. 27th November. [internet site] <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk> Accessed: 6th March 2011.

McCarthy, R. (2004). *Blasts Aimed at Increasing Hatred and Suspicion in Iraqi Haven.* The Guardian. 2nd February. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

McCarthy, R. (2004a). *Iraq Uprising.* The Guardian. 13th April. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

McCarthy, R. (2004b). *Iraq: U turn on hiring of Baath Party members.* The Guardian. 23rd April. <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

McCarthy, R. (2004c). *Threats Force Delay of Crucial Iraqi Congress: Country is a Battleground for Terrorists, MPs Warn.* The Guardian. 30th July. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

McCarthy, R. (2005). *Iraq Trapped in a Terrible Vice Between Ruthless Insurgents and Unloved Occupiers.* The Guardian. 12th February. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

McClintock, M. (1992). *Instruments of State Craft: U.S. Guerilla Warfare, Counter Insurgency, and Counter-Terrorism, 1940-1990.* New York: Random House.

McCombs, E. M., and Shaw, D. L. (1972). The Agenda Setting Function of Mass Media. *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 36(2), 176 – 187.

McCulloch, J. (2004). Blue Armies, Khaki Police and The Cavalry on the New American Frontier: Critical Criminology for the 21st Century. *Critical Criminology,* 12(3), 309-326.

McCulloch, J. and Pickering, S. (2005). Suppressing the financing of terrorism: Proliferating state crime, eroding censure and extending neo-colonialism. *British Journal of Criminology,* 45(4), 470-486.

McElroy, D. (2008). *Critics Blame US Envoy for 'Biggest Mistake' of Occupation.* The Daily Telegraph. 18th March. [internet site] <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk> Accessed: 6th March 2011.

McGrory, D. (2003). *Saddam's secret foreign legion.* The Times. 12th April. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

McGrory, D. and Beeston, R. (2003). *Army Begins the Hunt for Mystery Guerrilla Force.* The Times. 25th June. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

McGrory, D. (2004). *Clampdown on Rogue Security Guards.* The Times. 30th August. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 1st December 2011.

McGrory, D. and Evans, M. (2004). *North Africa Helps in Hunt for Militants.* The Times. 22nd January. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Mearsheimer, J. (2001). *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.* New York: W. W. Norton.

Michalowski, R., Chambliss, W., J., and Kramer, R., C. (2010). Introduction. In: Chambliss, W., J., Michalowski, R., and Kramer, R., C. eds. *State crime in the global age.* Cullompton: Willan Publishing.

Michael, G (2007). The Legend and Legacy of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. *Defence Studies* 7(3), 338 – 357.

Milbank, D. (2006). *Senators so Very, Very, Not Contrary Towards Gates.* The Washington Post. 6th December. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Milne, S. (2004). *A Change of Leadership is now in Labours Interests: A Bloodless Succession is Possible, But Blair Seems Determined to Cling-on.* The Guardian. 17th June. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 1st December 2011.

Milne, S. (2008). *Comment and debate: Iraq five years on.* The Guardian. 20th March. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 1st December 2011.
Moore, T. (2004). *Schisms led to centuries of hostility.* The Times. 3rd March. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Monbiot, G. (2003). *Comment and analysis: Chemical hypocrites: As it struggles to justify its invasion, the US is getting ready to use banned weapons in Iraq.* The Guardian. 8th April. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 1st December 2011.

Monbiot, G. (2005). *Comment and debate: The media are minimising US and British war crimes in Iraq.* The Guardian. 8th November. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 1st December 2011.

Moniz, D. (2005). *Do not Give Zarqawi Refuge, Rumsfeld Warns.* USA Today. 2nd June. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 19th May 2011.

Moon, C. (2011). The crime of crimes and the crime of criminology: genocide, criminology and Darfur. *The British Journal of Sociology, 62(1), 49-55.*

Morgan, R. (2000). The utilitarian justification of torture: Denial, desert and disinformation. *Punishment and Society*, 2(2), 181-196.

Morris, S. (2006a). *Colonel Failed to Stop Him Men Abusing Iraqis: Court Martial Told of Duty to Protect Prisoners. Killing of Military Police Raised Tensions in Camp.* The Guardian. 22nd September. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 1st December 2011.

Morris,S. (2006b). *Basra Heat and Overwork Tested Troops, Court Martial Told.* The Guardian. 23rd September. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 1st December 2011.

Morrison, W. (2006). *Criminology, Civilisation and the New World Order.* Abingdon: Routledge.

Mowle T. S. (2006). *Iraq's Militia Problem. Survival*, 48(3), 41-58.

MSNBC. (2003). *Meet the Press: Dick Cheney, transcript for March 16th.* [internet site] Available: http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/cheneymeetthepress.htm Accessed: 24th May 2011.

MSNBC. (2003). *Meet the Press: Dick Cheney, transcript for Sept 14th.* [internet site] Available: <http://msnbc.msn.com/id/3080244/default.htm>. Accessed: 24th May 2011.

MSNBC. (2005). *Meet the Press: General John P. Abizaid, transcript for October 2nd*. [internet site] Available: <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9542948/ns/meet_the_press/t/transcript-october/>. Accessed: 24th May 2011.

Mufti, M. (2007). The United States and Nasserist Pan-Arabism. In: Lesch., D., W. ed. (fourth edition). The Middle East and the United States: A historical and political reassessment. New York: Westview Press.

Nadleson, T. (2005). *Trained to Kill*. John Hopkins University Press.

Newburn, T. (2007). Governing Security: The rise of the privatised military. In: Downes, D., Rock, P., Chinkin, C., and Gearty, C. eds. *Crime, social control and human rights – essays in honour of Stanley Cohen.* Collumpton, Devon: Willan.

Norton-Taylor, R. (2004). *Thinktank: Invasion Aided al Qaeda.* The Guardian. 20th October. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Norton-Taylor, R. (2008). *Building Peace in Iraq Harder Than Expected, says Miliband.* The Guardian. 21st March. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

OHanlon, M. E. (2004). Iraq Without a Plan. *Policy Review,* 128(6), 1-11.

OLeary, B. (2009). *How to Get Out of Iraq With Integrity.* University of Pennsylvania Press.

Oliver, T. (2003). *Irish law firm in war crimes suit.* The Daily Telegraph. 1st September. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 1st December 2011.

Oppel Jr, R. A. (2005). *Rice, in Baghdad, Urges Sunni Role in Constitution.* The New York Times. 16th May. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Osman, H. (2005). *What do the Insurgents Want? Different Visions, Same Bloody Tactics.* The Washington Post. 8th May. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 19th May 2011.

Pace, J (2006). *Exclusive Interview with Former UN Human Rights Chief in Iraq,* Democracy Now, February 28th 2006. Available at: <http://www.democracynow.org/2006/2/28/exclusive_former_un_human_rights_chief>. Accessed: 25th May 2012.

Parker, K. (2006). *War Crimes Committed by the United States in Iraq and Mechanisms for Accountability.* Consumers for Peace.

Partlow, J. (2007a). *Shiite Bloc Condemns US Policy of Recruiting Sunni Tribesman.* The Washington Post. 3rd October. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Partlow, J. (2007b). *Insurgents Hit Bridge North of Baghdad.* The Washington Post. 3rd June. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk> Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Perrucci, R., Anderson, R., Schendel, D and Trachtman, L. (1980). Whistleblowing: The Professionals Resistance to Organizational Authority. *Social Problems,* 28(2), 49–64.

Pew Research Center (2008). *Public attitudes towards the war in Iraq: 2003-2008.* March 19th. [internet site] Available: <http://pewresearch.org/pubs/770/iraq-war-five-year-anniversary>. Accessed: 2nd July 2012.

Pfiffner, J.P. (2010). US Blunders in Iraq: De-Baathification and Disbanding the Army. *Intelligence and National Security,* 25(1), 76 – 85.

Phillips, A. (2009). How al Qaeda Lost Iraq. *Australian Journal of International Affairs,* 63(1), 64-84.

Phillips, D.L. (2006). *Losing Iraq: Inside the Post-war Reconstruction Fiasco.* New York: Basic Books.

Phillips, N. and Hardy, C. (2002). *Discourse analysis: Investigating processes of social construction*, 50. London: Sage.

Philps, A. (2003). *No end to ethnic and religious tensions.* The Daily Telegraph. 11th April. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Philps, A. (2005). *We Can't Hand Iraq Over to the Warlords. The* Daily Telegraph. 24th August. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Pickering, S. (2005). Crimes of the state: The persecution and protection of refugees. *Critical Criminology*, 13(2), 141-163.

Pilger, J. (2005). *The ghost at Gleneagles.* 11th July. [internet site] Available: <http://johnpilger.com/articles/the-ghost-at-gleneagles>. Accessed: 20th August 2012.

Pilger, J. (2006a). *Return of the death squads: Iraq's hidden news.* 4th May. [internet site] Available: <http://johnpilger.com/articles/return-of-the-death-squads-iraqs-hidden-news>. Accessed: 20th August 2012.

Pilger, J. (2006b). *The War Lovers.* 23rd March. [internet site] Available: <http://johnpilger.com/articles/the-war-lovers>. Accessed: 20th August 2012.

Pilger, J. (2006c). *The Blair Doctrine: blood and money.* 6th November. [internet site] Available: <http://johnpilger.com/articles/the-blair-doctrine-blood-and-money>. Accessed: 20th August 2012.

Pilger, J. (2007). *The War on Democracy.* Youngheart Entertainment, Granada, Michael Watt.

Pincus, W. (2006a). *US Officers Detail Problems with Iraqi Soldiers*. The Washington Post. 1st November. [internet site] <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk> Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Pincus, W. (2006b). *Training Iraqis may Pose Risks for US*. The Washington Post. 10th December. [internet site] <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk> Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Pincus, W. (2008). *Fatal shootings by Iraq contractors drop in 2008.* The Washington Post. 20th December. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 1st December 2011.

Poole, O. (2005). *How Troops Struggle in a War Raging on Five Fronts.* The Daily Telegraph. 16th September. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Poole, O. (2006a). *Iraq is likely to slide into civil war Outgoing ambassador warns of 10 years of mess and difficulty.* The Daily Telegraph. 4th August. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Poole, O. (2006b). *Divisions that haunt past, present and future.* The Daily Telegraph. 24th October. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Poole, O. (2006c). *Sunni Insurgents have al-Zarqawi Running for Cover.* The Daily Telegraph. 11th March. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Posner, E. (2004). *Bring Back the Baathists.* The New York Times. 28th April. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Potter, J. and Wewtherell, M. (2003). *Discourse and social psychology.* London: Sage.

Powell, C. (2003). *Full text of Colin Powell's speech: US Secretary of States address to the United Nations Security Council.* [internet site] Available: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/feb/05/iraq.usa>. Accessed: 23rd April 2010.

Presdee, M. (2004). The story of crime: Biography and the excavation of transgression. In: Ferrell, J., Hayward, K., Morrison, W., and Presdee, M. eds. *Cultural criminology unleashed.* London: Glasshouse Press.

Prosser, A. (2004). *Iraq: Civilian Suffering in the Falluja Assault.* Center for Defense Information, December 13th 2004. [internet site] Available at: <http://www.cdi.org/program/issue/document.cfm?DocumentID=2762&IssueID=62&StartRow=1&ListRows=10&appendURL=&Orderby=DateLastUpdated&ProgramID=69&issueID=62>. Accessed: 24th May 2012.

Pryce-Jones, D. (2003). *For Sunnis, Shias and Kurds, when war stops, the trouble starts.* Sunday Telegraph. 23rd March. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Quinney, R. (1979, second edition). *Criminology.* Boston: Little Brown.

Rafaat, A. (2007). U.S. - Kurdish Relations in Post-Invasion Iraq. *Middle East Review of International Affairs,* 11(4), 79-89.

Raghavan, S. (2007). *Sunni Factions Split With al Qaeda Group; Rift Further Blurs Battle Lines in Iraq.* The Washington Post. 14th April. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 19th May 2011.

Raghavan, S. (2008). *Security Accord Approved in Iraq; Vote by Parliament Hailed as Historic.* The Washington Post. 28th November. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 9th March 2011.

Rampton, S. and Stauber, J. (2003). *Weapons of Mass Deception.* New York: Penguin.

Rathmell, A. (2005). Planning Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Iraq: What can we Learn? *International Affairs,* 81(5), 1013 – 1038.

Ray, L., S. (2006). Whistleblowing and organisational ethics. *Nursing Ethics,* 13(4), 438-445.

Rayment, S. (2004). *We're Back at War in Iraq, Says General.* Sunday Telegraph. 19th September. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Reid, T. (2003). *Bush Finally Admits War is not over.* The Times. 23rd August. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Reid, T. (2004). *I Warned Bush of Disaster, US General Claims.* The Times. 2nd August. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Reid, T. (2006). *America is not Winning the War in Iraq, Says the Man Who Will Head Pentagon.* The Times. 6th December. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Reid, T. (2007a). *Iraq's Squabbling Politicians Fail Tests as US Holds Them to Account.* The Times. 13th July. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Reid, T. (2007b). *Petraeus Paves Way for US Troop Withdrawals Next Year.* The Times. 16th August. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Reiman, J. (2010, ninth edition). *The rich get richer and the poor get prison.* Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Rendell, S. and Broughel, T. (2003). *Amplifying Officials, Squelching Dissent.* Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting. [internet site] Available: <http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=1145> Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Ress-Mogg, W. (2004). *It is written in the sand: we can not run from Iraq.* The Times. 12th April. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Rhode, D. (2003). *In Newly Occupied Mosul, US Colonel Faces 1.7 Million Added Responsibilities.* The New York Times 13th April. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk> Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Ricks, T. (1997). *Making the Corps.* New York: Scibner.

Ricks, T. E. and Wright, R. (2004). *Powell Advised Bush to Add Iraq Troops; Secretary Joined Blair and Bush in Talks.* The Washington Post. 24th December. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Ricks, T.E. (2006). *In the Battle for Baghdad, US Turns War on Insurgents.* The Washington Post. 26th February. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 19th May 2011.

Ricks, T. E. (2006). *In Iraq, Military Forgot the Lessons of Vietnam.* The Washington Post. 23rd July. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Ricks, T. E. (2007). *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq.* Penguin Books.

Riddell, P. (2003). *America Must Share its Imperial Burden.* The Times. 24th April. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Riddell, P. (2005). *As Asia's Waters Recede, Iraq's Steep Death Toll Emerges.* The Times. 7th January. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Riedel, B. (2007). Al Qaeda Strikes Back. *Foreign Affairs,* 86(3), 24 – 41.

Rieff, D. (2003). *Blueprint for a Mess.* The New York Times. 2nd November. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Risen, J. and Sanger, D.E. (2005). *Border Clashes as US Pressures Syria Over Iraq.* The New York Times. 15th October. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 19th May 2011.

Roberts, S., Secor, A., and Sparke, M., (2003). Neo-liberal Geopolitics. *Antipode,* 35(5), 886-897.

Robins, J. (2005). *Should the Army be on This Charge?* The Times. 26th July. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 1st December 2011.

Robinson, P. (2002). *The CNN Effect: The myth of news, foreign policy and intervention.* London: Routledge.

Robinson, P. (2009). Editor's introduction: Communicating terrorism. *Critical Studies in Terrorism,* 2(1), 1-5.

Robinson, P. (2011). The CNN Effect Reconsidered: mapping a research agenda for the future. *Media, War and Conflict,* 4(1), 3-11.

Robinson, P., Goddard, P., and Parry, K. (2009). U.K. Media and Media Management During the 2003 Invasion of Iraq. *American Behavioural Scientist,* 52, (5), 678-688.

Robinson, P., Goddard, P., Parry, K., and Murray, C. (2009). Testing Models of Media Performance in Wartime: U.K. TV News and the 2003 Invasion of Iraq. *Journal of Communication,* 59, (3), 534-563.

Rohde, D. (2003). *After the War: Hussein Die-Hards: Carnage and Clues Are Left in Camp Destroyed by U.S.* The New York Times. 14th June. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 19th May 2011.

Rolston, B. and Scraton, P. (2005). In the full glare of English politics: Ireland inquiries and the British state. *British Journal of Criminology,* 45(4), 547-564.

Rosen, N. (2005). *In The Balance.* The New York Times. 20th February. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 9th March 2011.

Ross, J., I. (2000). Controlling state crime: Toward an integrated structural model. In: Ross, J., I. ed. *Controlling state crime.* New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.

Ross, J., I. (2003). *The Dynamics of Political Crime.* London: Sage.

Rothe, D., L. and Mullins, C., W. (2010). Crimes of the state. In: Rothe, D., L. and Mullins, C., W. eds. *State crime: Current perspectives.* Rutgers University Press.

Rothe, D., L., Ross, J., I., Mullins, C., L., Friedrichs, D., Michalowski, R., Barak, G., Kauzarlich, D., and Kramer, R., C. (2009). That was then, this is now, what about tomorrow? Future Directions in state crime studies. *Critical Criminology,* 17(1), 3-13.

Rubin, A. J. (2008). *Ending Impasse, Iraq Parliament Backs Measures.* The New York Times. 14th February. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 9th March 2011.

Ruggerio, V. (2006). *Understanding political violence.* Open University Press.

Ruggerio, V. (2007). War, crime, empire and cosmopolitanism. *Critical Criminology,* 15(3), 211-221.

Ruggiero, V. (2010). War as corporate crime. In: Chambliss, W., Michalowski, R., and Kramer, R., C. eds. *State Crime in the Global Age.* Collumpton, Devon: Willan

Rummel, R., J. (1994). Democide in Totalitarian states: Mortocracies and megamurders. In: Charny, I., W. ed. *Genocide: a critical bibliographic review*, 3. New Brunswick and London: Transaction.

Rumsfeld, D. (2003a). *Transcript of Remarks by Secretary of Defence Donald H. Rumsfeld to the Council on Foreign Relations.* 27th May. [internet site] Available: <http://www.cfr.org/iraq/remarks-secretary-defense-donald-h-rumsfeld/p5998>. Accessed: 10th August 2011.

Rumsfeld, D. (2003b). *Department of Defence News Transcripts: Secretary Rumsfeld Briefs on Iraq.* 30th October: [internet site] Available: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iraq/2003/10/iraq-031030-dod02.htm>. Accessed: 10th August 2011.

Rumsfeld, D. H. (2004). *Testimony of Secretary of Defence: Testimony as Prepared by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld,* The Senate and House Armed Services Committees, Friday, May 07. [internet site] Available: <http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=118>. Accessed: 27th December 2011.

Russell, A. (2004). *Saddam's Order to Fighters Casts Doubt on Link to al Qaeda.* The Daily Telegraph. 15th January. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Russell, A. (2006). *Defeating Saddam opened Pandora's Box in Iraq, says US envoy.* The Daily Telegraph. 8th March. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Ryan, M. and Switzer, L. (2009). Propaganda and the Subversion of Objectivity: media coverage of the war on terrorism in Iraq. *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 2(1), 45-64.

Sachs, S. (2003). *A Region Inflamed: Occupation.* The New York Times. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Sanger, D. E. (2003). *Bush Bets That the World Will Help Him in Iraq.* The New York Times. 7th September. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Sanger, D. E. and Rutenberg, J. (2006). *Bush and Blair Concede Errors, But Defend War.* The New York Times. 26th May. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Scahill, J. (2007). *Blackwater.* Serpents Tail.

Schwartz, M. (2007). Neo-liberalism on Crack: Cities under siege in Iraq. *City,* 11(1), 21-69.

Scott Tyson, A. (2007). *The Two Sides of Baghdad Barriers; Walls Save Lives But Also Disrupt Flow of Daily Life.* The Washington Post. 30th April. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 9th March 2011.

Schmidt, S. (2008). *Shia Islamist Political Actors in Iraq: Who are they and what do they want?* Danish Institute for International Studies Report.

Schmitt, E. (2003). *A Nation at War: Law and Order; Plans for policing Postwar Iraq.* The New York Times. 9th April. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 9th March 2011.

Schmitt, E. (2003). *The Struggle For Iraq: Resistance; Iraq Bombings Pose a Mystery U.S. Must Solve.* The New York Times. 7th September. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 19th May 2011.

Schmitt, E. (2004). *U.S. Commanders Say Increased Border Patrols Are Halting the Influx of Non-Iraqi Guerrillas.* The New York Times. 20th April. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 19th May 2011.

Schmitt, E. and Shanker, T. (2005). *US Citing Abuse in Iraqi Prisons, Holds Detainees.* The New York Times. 25th December. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 1st December 2011.

Schmitt, E. and Mazzetti, M. (2008). *Secret Order Lets US Raid al Qaeda in Many Countries.* The New York Times. 10th November. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 19th May 2011.

Schwendinger, H. and Schwendinger, J. (1970) Defenders of order or guardians of human rights? *Issues in Criminology*, 5(2), 123–157.

Scott-Tyson, A. (2006). *Death Toll Rises in Haditha Attack, GOP Leader Says.* The Washington Post. 20th May. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 1st December 2011.

Scott-Tyson, A. (2007a). *The Two Sides of Baghdad Barriers.* The Washington Post. 30th April. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk> Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Scott-Tyson, A. (2007b). *GAO Faults US Military Over Munitions in Iraq; Report Says Insurgents Took Unsecured Explosives.* The Washington Post. 23rd March. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Semple, K. (2007). *Iraq Premier Meets Leaders in Area Torn by Insurgency.* The New York Times. 14th March. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk> Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Semple, K. and Wong, E. (2006). *Can They All Get Along in Iraq? Despite the Report, Maybe They Can't.* The New York Times. 8th December. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Shadid, A. (2005). *In Café Debate, a Victory for Elections; At Intersection of Old and New Iraq, the Vote Itself is What Counts.* The Washington Post. 14th January. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 9th March 2011.

Shanker, T. and Schmitt, E. (2003). *The Struggle for Iraq: The Military; U.S. Considering Recalling Units of Old Iraq Army.* The New York Times. 2nd November. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Sharp, J.M. (2005). *Iraq's New Security Forces: The Challenge of Sectarian and Ethnic Influences.* Congressional Research Service: Report for Congress.

Shawcross, W. (2004). *Iraq: It's Not as Bad as it Looks.* The Sunday Times. 19th September. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Shepherd, L., J. (2008). Visualizing violence: Legitimacy and authority in the war on terror. *Critical Studies on Terrorism,* 1(2), 213-226.

Sherwell, P. (2003). *US Fears Diehard Baathists are Behind Attacks on Troops.* Sunday Telegraph. 8th June. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Sherwell, P. and Berry, J. (2003). *Iranian Agents Flood into Iraq Posing as Pilgrims and Traders.* Sunday Telegraph. 28th September. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk> Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Sherwell, P. and Bentham, M. (2003). *Saddam's Top Aide Organised Suicide Squads on Syria Trip.* Sunday Telegraph. 29th June. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Simon, S (2008). *The Price of the Surge.* Foreign Affairs, 87(3), 57 – 77.

Singer, A. (1992). The Whistleblower: Patriot or Bounty Hunter? *Across the Board,* 29, 16–22.

Slavin, B. (2004). *Sons of Saddam had Left to Syria.* USA Today. 11th March. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 19th May 2011.

Slevin, P. (2003a). *US Bans More Iraqis from Jobs; Move Called Necessary to Purge Party Numbers.* The Washington Post. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Slevin, P. (2003b). *Baghdad Anarchy Sparks Call For Help.* The Washington Post. 13th May. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Slevin, P. and Chandrasekaran, R. (2003). *Iraq's Baath Party is Abolished.* The Washington Post. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Sluka, J. ed. (2000). *Death Squad: The anthropology of state terror.* University of Pennsylvania Press.

Sluka, J. (2008). Terrorism and Taboo: An anthropological perspective on political violence against civilians. *Critical Studies on Terrorism,* 1(2), 167-183.

Smeulers, A. and Haveman, R. (2008). Introduction. In Smeulers, A. and Haveman, R. *Supranational Criminology: towards a criminology of international crimes.* Antwerp: Intersentia Publishers.

Smith, H. (2003). *Greeks accuse Blair or war crimes in Iraq.* The Guardian. 29th July. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 1st December 2011.

Sparrow, A. (2003). *Where Will the Wests Alliances be when it's all Over? Will There Still be a Role for Nato?* The Daily Telegraph. 26th March. Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Spector, M., and Kitsuse, J. (1973). Social problems: A reformulation. *Social Problems,* 12(2), 145-159.

Spector, M., and Kitsuse, J. (1977). *Constructing Social Problems.* Menlo Park, CA: Cummings Publishing.

Spillius, A. (2008). *US Kills Eight in Syrian terror Raid.* The Daily Telegraph. 27th October. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Spinner, J. (2004). *Marines Await Orders to Attack Fallujah; Interim Iraqi Government to Give Green Light; Allawi Losing Patience With Talks.* The Washington Post. 30th October. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 19th May 2011.

337

Stanley, E. (2005). Truth commissions and the recognition of state crime. *The British Journal of Criminology,* 45(4), 582-597.

Stansfield, G. (2006). *The only solution left for Iraq.* The Sunday Telegraph. 29th October. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Stansfield, G (2008). *Iraq.* Polity Press.

Steele, J. (2003). *Iraq Fallout.* The Guardian. 30th August. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Steele, J. (2004). *Comment and Analysis: Hammers and Anvils: Only if the UN breaks with US plans for a cosmetic handover can it win Iraqi confidence.* The Guardian. 22nd April. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Steele, J. (2004). *Iraq: The handover: US Man Bows Out, Still the Optimist: After Limited Success, Paul Bremer Transfers Power to a Country Still Racked by Turmoil.* The Guardian. 28th June. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Steele, J. (2005). *Comment and Debate: Only Negotiation with Iraq's Resistance can Bring Peace.* The Guardian. 16th December. [internet site] <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk> Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Steele, J. (2006a). *Power Contest: horrors of closet civil war played out in no mans land: Diyala: province of death.* The Guardian. 6th December. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk> Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Steele, J. (2006b). *Iraqi Leader Unveils Reconciliation Plan But no Clear Path to Disarming Militias.* The Guardian. 26th June. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Steele, J. and Campbell, D. (2003). *Iraqis Kill Five More US Soldiers.* The Guardian. 28th July. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Steinmetz, G. (2007). The Relations Between Sociology and History in the United States: The current state of affairs. *Journal of Historical Sociology*, 20 (1/2), 1-12.

Steinmetz, K., F. (2012). Wikileaks and realpolitik. *Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology*, 4(1), 14-52.

Stenson, K. (1998). Beyond histories of the present. *Economy and Society*, 27(4), 333-352.

Steyn, J. (2004). Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole. *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, 53(1), 1-15.

Stohl, M. (2008). Old myths, new fantasies and the enduring realities of terrorism. *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 1(1), 5-16.

Stokes, D. (2005). *Americas other war: Terrorizing Columbia*. Zed Books.

Stokes, D. (2009). Ideas and Avocados: Ontologising Critical Terrorism Studies. *International Relations*, 23(1), 85-92.

Stocking, B. (2003). *Focus: Comment: Battle for Iraq*. 13th April. The Observer. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk> Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Stover, E., Megally, H. and Mufti, H. (2005). Bremer's "Gordian Knot": Transitional Justice and the US Occupation of Iraq. *Human Rights Quarterly*, 27(3), 830 – 857.

Strobel, W. (1997). *Late Breaking Foreign Policy*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.

Sullivan, A. (2005). *Secret Memos Fuel US Doubt on Iraq*. The Sunday Times. 26th June. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Sullivan, A. (2006a). *Lebanon is the Sideshow to Iran's Sinister Moves on Iraq*. The Sunday Times. 30th July. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Sullivan, A. (2006b). *Blame Rummy for a War Plan That Went Wrong.* The Sunday Times. 15th January. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Sullivan, A. (2007). *Only One Republican Can End This War With Honour.* The Sunday Times. 18th November. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Swain, J. (2005). *Making a Killing.* Sunday Times. 23rd October. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Sykes, G., and Matza, D. (1957). Techniques of neutralisation: A theory of delinquency. *American Sociological Review*, 22(6), 664-670.

Szakolczai, A. (2000). *Reflexive Historical Sociology.* London: Routledge.

Taguba, A. M. (2004). *US Army 15-6 Report of Abuse of Prisoners in Iraq.* Wasington: Department of Defence.

Tanner, (2011). Towards a Pattern in Mass Violence Participation? An Analysis of Rwandan Perpetrators Accounts from the 1994 Genocide. *Global Crime,* 12(4), 266-289.

Tavernise, S. and Burns, J. F. (2005). *As Iraqi Army Trains, Word in the Field is it May Take Years.* The New York Times. 13th June. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Teather, D. (2003). *Pentagon Was Warned of Iraq Chaos After War: State Department Report Predicted Widespread Looting That Caught the US Military by Surprise.* The Guardian. 20th October. <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Teather, D. and Goldenberg, S. (2003). *Foreign Terrorists Infiltrating Iraq, US Warns.* The Guardian. 23rd August. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

The Daily Telegraph. (2003). *The Iraqi's Revolt.* 26th March. [internet site] Available: <u><http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk></u>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

The Daily Telegraph (2005). *Where Bush Must Succeed.* 18th January. [internet site] Available: <u><http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk></u>. Accessed: 6th March 2011.

The Daily Telegraph. (2006). *The Death of an Evil Man Brings Hope to Iraq.* 9th June. [internet site] Available: <u><http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk></u>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

The Daily Telegraph. (2006). Bush Puts His Hope in One Last Push. 21st December. [internet site] Available: <u><http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk></u>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

The Guardian. (2003). *Full text of Colin Powell's Speech, Part 2.* 5th February. [internet site] Available: <u><http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/feb/05/iraq.usa3></u>. Accessed: 24th May 2011.

The Guardian. (2003). *Donald Rumsfeld: Washington's Warlord.* 8th October. [internet site] Available: <u><http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk></u>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

The Guardian. (2006). *Special Report: Pentagon Review: The US Has Set Out its Plan for a Generation of anti-Islamist Conflict. This Shows Where American Forces are now – and Where Future Targets may be.* 15th February. [internet site] Available: <u><http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk></u>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

The Guardian. (2006). *Iraq's New Government: A Demanding Agenda.* 22nd May. [internet site] Available: <u><http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk></u>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

The Guardian. (2006). *Leading Article: Iraq: Death of a Fanatic.* 9th June. [internet site] Available: <u><http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk></u>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

The New York Times. (2003). *A New War.* 24th March. [internet site] Available: <u><http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk></u>. Accessed: 9th March 2011.

The New York Times (2003). *The Fall of Baghdad.* 10th April. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 9th March 2011.

The New York Times. (2004). *State of the Union.* 21st January. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 9th March 2011.

The New York Times. (2004). *The Story Line in Iraq.* 11th April. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

The New York Times. (2004). *Transcript of Bush's Remarks on Iraq: We Will Finish the Work of the Fallen.* 14th April. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 9th March 2011.

The New York Times. (2005). *Iraq-US Rift Over Torture.* 18th November. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 1st December 2011.

Tombs, S. and Whyte, D. (2002). Unmasking the crimes of the powerful. Critical Criminology, 11(3), 217-236.

The Observer. (2003). *Four Steps to Peace in Iraq: America Must Share the Burden.* 7th September. <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

The Sunday Times. (2004). *Send More Troops.* 10th October. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

The Sunday Times. (2006). *Time for Change in Iraq.* 8th October. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

The Sunday Times. (2007). *Can Americas Strategy Succeed?* 27th May. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

The Times. (2003). *Repairing Wests Errors Over Iraq.* 2nd October. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

The Times. (2003). *Terrorisms battlefield.* 28th October. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 6th March 2011.

The Times. (2007). *US Forces Have Six Months to Save Iraq.* 1st March. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

The Washington Post. (2003). *Adjusting to Iraq.* 1st June. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

The Washington Post. (2003). *Staying Power and Stabilization in Iraq.* 27th November. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

The Washington Post. (2004). *Don't Blame Me.* 10th December. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

The Washington Post. (2003). *First Strike.* 21st March. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 9th March 2011.

The Washington Post. (2008). *Mr Assad's Medicine; After Sponsoring Terrorism Against Three of it's Neighbours, Syria Plays the Victim When its own Border is Breached.* 28th October. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 19th May 2011.

Thomas, C. and Beckel, B. (2005). *What we Won't Agree on: Iraq. USA Today.* 10th November. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Thornton, W., H. (2005). *New World Empire: Civil Islam, terrorism and the making of Neo-globalism.* Rowman and Littlefield Publishers INC.

Tifft, L. (1995). A social harms definition of crime. *The Critical Criminologist,* 6, 9-13.

Tifft, L., and Sullivan, D. (2001). A needs-based, social harms definition of crime. In: Henry, S., and Lanier, M. eds. What is crime? *Controversies about the nature of crime and what to do about it.* Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.

Tisdall, S. (2005). *Iraq: World briefing: Constitution may exacerbate sectarian conflict.* The Guardian. 2nd September. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Tisdall, S. (2006). *Iraq: World Briefing: Treading a Federal Tightrope.* The Guardian. 24th October. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Tisdall, S. (2007). *US Commanders Admit: we face a Vietnam style collapse: Elite officers in Iraq fear low morale, lack of troops and loss of political will.* The Guardian. 1st March. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Traynor, I. (2003). *The Privatisation of War.* The Guardian. 10th December. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 1st December 2011.

Tripp, C (2007, third edition). *A History of Iraq.* Cambridge University Press.

Tyler, P.E. (2004). *Blair Urges Other Nations Not to Waver in Crucible for Iraq.* The New York Times. 20th September. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 19th May 2011.

USA Today (2008). *With al Qaeda on the Run, Bush Turns Focus to Iran.* 11th April. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 19th May 2011.

US Department of Defense. (2005). *Consolidated US Forces Rules of Engagement for Iraq.*

US Special Inspector General for Iraq. (2004). *Special Inspector General for Iraq Quarterly Report,* July 2004.

USMC99991. (2012). *Private Military contractors in actions HARDCORE shooting up everyone* April 30th 2012. [internet site]. Available: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8ZXWmJZMXyg>. Accessed: 26th May 2012.

United Nations (2005). *Assistance Mission for Iraq: Human Rights Report 1st July – 31st August.*

United Nations. (2005). *Assistance Mission for Iraq: Human Rights Report 1st September – 31st October.*

United Nations. (2005). *Assistance Mission for Iraq: Human Rights Report 1st November – 31st December.*

United Nations. (2006). *5386th Security Council Meeting.* 15th March. New York.

United Nations. (2006). *5463rd Security Council Meeting.* 15th June. New York.

United Nations. (2006). *Assistance Mission for Iraq: Human Rights Report 1st March – 30th April 2006.*

United Nations. (2006). *Assistance Mission for Iraq: Human Rights Report 1st May – 30th June.*

United Nations. (2006). *Assistance Mission for Iraq: Human Rights Report 1st July – 31st August.*

United Nations. (2007). *Assistance Mission for Iraq: Human Rights Report 1st January – 31st March.*

United Nations. (2007). *Assistance Mission for Iraq: Human Rights Report 1st April – 30th June.*

United Nations. (2007). *Assistance Mission for Iraq: Human Rights Report 1st July – 31st December.*

Uys, T. (2008). Rational loyalty and whistle blowing: the South African context. *Current Sociology,* 56(6), 904-922.

Vernon, A. (2006). *The road from My Lai.* The New York Times. 23rd June. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 1st December 2011.

Van Dijk, T. (1993). Principles of critical discourse analysis. *Discourse and Society,* 4, 249-283.

Vick, K. (2004). *US Official Acknowledges Mistakes in Iraq.* The Washington Post. 24th April. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Von Drehle, D. (2005). *Wrestling With History; Sometimes You Have to Fight the War You Have, Not the War You Wished For.* The Washington Post. 13th November. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Ward, T. (2004). State harms. In: Hillyard, P., Pantazis, S., and Tombs, D. eds. *Beyond Criminology: Taking harm seriously.* Pluto Press.

Weber, M. (1918). *Politics as vocation.* [internet site] Available: <http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/ethos/Weber-vocation.pdf>. Accessed: 5th April 2011 .

Weber, M. (1968). *Economy and Society, 3.* New York: Bedminster Press.

Webster, P. (2004). *Fear and Loathing Mark Rivals Decade.* The Times. 12th July. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 1st December 2011.

Welch, M. (2003). Trampling human rights in the war on terror: Implications to the sociology of denial. *Critical Criminology,* 12(1), 1-20.

Welch, M. (2008). Ordering Iraq: Reflections on Power, Discourse and Neocolonialism. *Critical Criminology,* 16(4), 257-269.

Welch, M. (2009). Fragmented power and state-corporate killings: A critique of Blackwater in Iraq. *Crime, Law and Social Change,* 51(3-4), 351-364.

Westmarland, L. (2006). Human rights. In: McLaughlin, E. and Muncie, J. (second edition) eds. *The Sage dictionary of criminology.* London: Sage.

White House Office of Communications. (2004). *Fact Sheet: The Transition to Iraqi Self-Government.* Washington: The White House.

Whitaker, B. (2003). *Iraq's Fresh Start may be Another False Dawn.* The Guardian. 5th September. <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Whitaker, B. and MacAskill, E. (2005). *Muslim Extremists: War in Iraq: Report Attacks myth of Foreign Fighters.* The Guardian. 23rd September. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 16th May 2011.

Whitlock, C. (2005). *In Europe, New Force for Recruiting Radicals; Ansar al-Islam Emerges as Primary Extremist Group Funnelling Fighters Into Iraq.* The Washington Post. 18th February. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 19th May 2011.

Whitlock, C. (2006). *Death Could Shake al Qaeda in Iraq and Around the World.* The Washington Post. 10th June. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 19th May 2011.

Whitlock, C. (2007). *Terrorist Networks Lure Young Moroccans to War in Far-Off Iraq; Conflict is Recruiting Tool for al Qaeda Affiliates.* The Washington Post. 20th February. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 19th May 2011.

Whyte, D. (2007). The Crimes of Neo-Liberal Rule in Occupied Iraq. *The British Journal of Criminology,* 47(2), 177-195.

Whyte, D. (2010). The Neo-Liberal State of Exception in Occupied Iraq. In: Chambliss, W., Michalowski, R. J., and Kramer, R. C., eds. *State Crime in the Global Age.* Willan Publishing.

Wiesman, J. (2006). *Democrats Target Rumsfeld: Lawmakers to Seek Vote of No Confidence I Defence Secretary.* The Washington Post. 1st September. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Williams, D. (2004). *Syria - EU Trade Deal Stalls Over Chemical Weapons Issue.* The Washington Post. 8th April. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 19th May 2011.

Wilson, S. (2003). *Bremer Shifts Focus to New Iraqi Economy; US Occupation Chief Cites Progress on Restoring Order.* The Washington Post. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Wintour, P. (2007a). *Labour Must Admit Iraq Errors, say Ministers.* The Guardian. 18th January. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Wintour, P. (2007b). *The Blair Years: Bogged Down in Baghdad.* The Guardian. 11th May. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Wodak, R. (2001). The discourse-historical approach in Wodak, R. and Meyer, M. *Methods of critical discourse analysis.* London: Sage.

Wolfsfeld, G. (1997). *The Media and Political Conflict.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wong, E. (2004). *Policy Barring Ex-Baathists From Key Iraq Posts is Eased.* The New York Times. 23rd April. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Wong, E. (2005). *US and Iraqis Start Offensive Where Marines Were Killed.* The New York Times. 6th August. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 19th May 2011.

Wong, E. (2005). *Iraq Asks Return of Some Officers of Hussein Army.* The New York Times. 3rd November. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Wong, E. and Cloud, D. S. (2007). *U.S. Erects Baghdad Wall To Keep Rival Sects Apart.* The New York Times. 21st April. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 9th March 2011.

Wong, E. and Warzer, J. (2007). *In Twist of History, Kurds Patrol Baghdad.* The New York Times. 24th April. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 9th March 2011.

Wong, E. and Cave, D. (2007). *Baghdad District Is a Model, but Only for Shiites.* The New York Times. 22nd May. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 9th March 2011.

Woodward, B. (2007). *State of Denial.* Simon and Schuster.

Woolford, A. (2006). Making genocide unthinkable: three guidelines for a critical criminology of genocide. *Critical Criminology,* 14(1), 87-106.

Woollacott, M. (2003). *Comment and Analysis: To leave now would be a betrayal of the Iraqi people: The US is repeating the mistakes Britain made in the 1920s.* 17th October. October. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Woollacott, M. (2004). *Iraq's Insurgents are More Nihilist Than Nationalist: Sunni Rebels Must Understand They Would Lose a Fight With the Shia.* The Guardian. 6th February. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Wright, R. (2005a). *Iraqi Official Appeals for Greater U.S. Role.* The Washington Post. 3rd June. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 9th March 2011.

Wright, R. (2005b). *Constitution Sparks Debate on Viability.* The Washington Post. 25th August. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 6th March 2011.

Wright, R. and Ricks, T. E. (2004). *US Faces Growing Fears of Failure.* The Washington Post. 19th May. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Yeoman, F. (2007). *Former Army Chief Condemns US for Short-Sighted Policy on Iraq.* The Times. 1st September. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Yergin, D. (1991). *The Prize: The epic quest for oil, money and power.* Simon and Schuster Ltd.

Young, J. (1999). *The exclusive society: Social exclusion, crime and difference in late modernity.* London: Sage.

Young, J. (2007). *The vertigo of late modernity.* London: Sage.

Zakaria, F. (2006). *A Political Path Out of Iraq.* The Washington Post. 31st May. [internet site] Available: <http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk>. Accessed: 5th August 2011.

Zulaika, J. and Douglass, W., A. (2008). The terrorist subject: Terrorism studies and the absent subjectivity. *Critical Studies on Terrorism,* 1(1), 27-36.

Zunes, S. (2003). *Tinderbox.* London: Zed Books.

Zunes, S. (2007). The United States in Iraq: The consequences of occupation. *International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies,* 1(1), 57 – 75.