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Comparisons and Deprivation in
Ethnic Minority Settings

Hanna Zagefka

Thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements of the University of Kent for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy

May 2004

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Abstract

This research is concerned with comparison choices and deprivation in ethnic minority settings. Predictions were derived mainly from Social Comparison Theory, Relative Deprivation Theory (RDT), Social Identity Theory (SIT), and Stigma Theory. A primary research question concerned which reference targets (out of a multitude of possibilities) members of ethnic minorities and majorities compare themselves with in order to assess their personal economic situation, and that of their ingroup. Antecedents of comparison choices were explored (Similarity, Contact, Acculturation Strategies, Comparison Motives, Permeability of group boundaries and perceived Stability of the social stratifications). Further issues concerned the conditions under which feelings of relative deprivation arise, and what some of the consequences of relative deprivation are (e.g. Self-esteem, Life-satisfaction, and subjective Importance attributed to 'being well-off'). Particular attention was paid to a) the (SIT-based) prediction that ingroup identification affects comparison choices, b) the (RDT-based) prediction comparisons affect feelings of relative deprivation, c) the (Stigma-Theory-based) prediction that threatening, upward comparisons with others who are better off will be avoided, and d) the relationship between identification and deprivation, which has repeatedly and justly been identified in the literature as in need of further clarification. The following studies were conducted to speak to these issues: Four cross-sectional surveys ($N = 235$ ethnic minority members in the UK; $N = 166$ ethnic minority and 351 majority members in Germany; $N = 317$ ethnic majority members in Germany; and $N = 166$ ethnic minority and 116 majority members in Germany), one longitudinal survey ($N = 118$ ethnic minority members in the UK), and two experiments ($N = 76$ Italians and 111 Italians in Italy, respectively). *Inter alia*, consistent evidence was yielded that members of both minorities and majorities prefer intragroup comparisons (with other ingroup members) and temporal comparisons (with themselves in the past) over all kinds of intergroup comparisons; that ingroup identification is positively related to comparisons with intragroup and temporal (but not intergroup) targets; and that identification and deprivation are negatively related. Evidence for the RDT prediction that comparisons inform feelings of deprivation and for the Stigma/Self-protection prediction that threatening upward comparisons are avoided was comparatively weak. Several moderation and mediation hypotheses were proposed and tested to explain this state of affairs. It is considered how – in the light of the present data - existing theories might benefit from certain revisions, and further important research topics that stem from the present work are discussed.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction and Contextualisation

In the last century Europe has witnessed some enormous migration movements, such as the migration of Asians from former colonies to the UK, the migration of guest workers to Germany in the 50s and 60s, the repatriation of German *Aussiedler* after the political changes in the former Eastern block, and the migration of numerous refugee groups from various war-torn areas all over the world to European countries. These developments have brought very different ethnic and cultural groups – some of which might not even have been aware of each other's presence formerly – into close proximity with each other, and have thus multiplied the number of different kinds of (intergroup) comparisons people might engage in. Furthermore, feelings of deprivation and intergroup conflict often seem to arise when different groups are proximal to each other, as seen in the recent violent conflicts among Muslim and English youth in Bradford and other northern English cities (BBC, 2002a).

In the light of this, it seems both timely and important to investigate: (a) which comparison referents members of ethnic minorities and majorities choose in order to assess their economic situation; (b) relative to which comparison targets members of those groups feel deprived; and (c) what some of the antecedents and consequences of these two variables are, as well as the relationship between them. The present research, which was carried out mainly with ethnic minority and majority members in England and Germany, aims to shed some light on these issues.

It has been pointed out that both comparison and deprivation processes have not been sufficiently examined in naturalistic settings (Ellemers, 2002; Locke & Nekich, 2000), and that little is known about comparison choices and the relative frequency of different types of comparisons in situations in which group identities are important (Brown, 2000; Deaux, 2000a). Consequently, one of the main aims of this research was to establish which comparisons occur in settings with different ethnic groups, to detect emerging patterns, and to determine which variables influence comparison choices when people think about their economic situation and evaluate whether they are relatively deprived. Consequences of perceived deprivation, especially with regard to

self-protective strategies and attempts by participants to maintain a positive social identity, were also examined.

Given factors like the progress of globalisation, European integration, and falling birth rates in many European countries, in the near future Europe will arguably be faced with having to review its migration policies as well as its strategies for integrating resident ethnic minorities. The UK and Germany are likely to be at the forefront of these developments, with both countries already accounting for a huge proportion of minority populations in Europe. For instance, the UK accounted for 272,000 migrants to Europe in 1991 and for 98,000 asylum applications in 2000, and Germany accounted for 1199,000 of migrants and 79,000 asylum applications (Centre pour l'egalite des chances et la lutte contre le racisme, 2001; Office for Official Publication of EC, 2001), making them very interesting fields for investigation. Before reviewing in Chapter 2 the relevant psychological literature that inspired and influenced this thesis, I will commence by briefly describing the minority-majority settings in both countries, in order to provide the reader with some context against which the findings of this thesis may be understood. This will be followed by some brief theoretical reflections on the nature and definition of one of the major concepts for the present thesis, namely 'ethnic minorities' and 'ethnic majorities'.

Ethnic Minorities in the UK

As one journalist of the 'Economist' recently and quite aptly pointed out, 'immigration, it seems, hardens hearts and softens brains like few other issues' (The Economist, 2001a). Throughout Europe, racism and negative attitudes toward ethnic minorities are frequent (c.f. Pettigrew, 1998; Pettigrew et al., 1998), and Britain is no exception. A recent Europe-wide survey Thalhammer, Zucha, Enzenshofer, Salfinger, & Ogris (2000) found that 15% of Whites in the UK have an 'intolerant' attitude towards minority groups, and 44% would not accept people into the country even if they were fleeing from countries where there is serious internal conflict (see also The Observer, 2001). These findings are confirmed by another recent survey conducted by the BBC (2002b), which reports that 44% of white British respondents believed that immigration has damaged Britain over the last 50 years, and 1/3 said that they believe immigrants do not integrate or make a positive contribution to Britain. These attitudes of the British majority are obviously not lost on ethnic minority members either: 53% of Blacks and

41% of Asians in the UK responded positively to the question of whether Britain is a racist society, 63% of Blacks and 67% of Asians reported having at least once been made to feel a criminal because of their skin colour, and 38% of Blacks and 40% of Asians reported having personally experienced verbal racial abuse. Violent intergroup encounters like the race riots in Brixton in the 80s and more recently in the English north, and facts like the far-right British National Party winning three local council seats in May 2002, also testify to the fact that minority-majority relations in Britain are far from unproblematic.

Migration to England from former colonies of the British Empire has a long history (BBC, 2002c), starting with the slave trade. After the abolition of slavery in 1833, the 'import' of African slaves gave way to an increased 'import' of Indian 'servants'. Migration from former colonies was then encouraged after WWII in order to combat labour shortages, particularly in the steel and textiles industries. Legislation allowed people from the Empire and Commonwealth unhindered rights to enter Britain. This law has since been revised, first in 1962 with the 'Commonwealth Immigrants Act', which removed the right of automatic entry for Commonwealth citizens, and with more restrictions following in the 70s, making immigration for these people substantially more difficult. Since then, migration from the former colonies has declined (with some notable exceptions, like the mass expulsion and migration of African Asians from Uganda to the UK in the 70s). However, by the same token, asylum seeker arrivals have risen. Many asylum seekers today try to reach Britain (which is perceived by many refugees to be a more attractive country of refuge than, for instance, France) via the Channel Tunnel, often risking (and sometimes losing) their lives through clinging on to the bottom of trains or hiding in the back of lorries (The Economist, 2001a, 2001b). Today, there are more than four million non-white Britons resident in the UK (ca. 7% of the total population), with almost one million Indians forming the largest minority group (Katwala, 2001). Further, ca. 1.8 million Muslims reside in Britain (Kelso, 2002), a large number of which is accounted for by people originating from Pakistan or Bangladesh. Recently, the number of immigrants to the UK has for the first time overtaken the natural growth of the population (Duckworth, 2001), a development which in the long run is likely to cause fundamental changes to the demographic structure of Britain, making the topic of minority-majority relations all the more important.

Many ethnic minority members in the UK hold a British passport and, maybe due to the fact that it is relatively easier in the UK to obtain citizenship than in Germany (requirements are being born to British parents; being resident for a minimum of five years, plus language skills) or maybe due to Britain's comparatively longer history of migration, the concept of a non-white Briton seems to be more accepted and acceptable in the UK than the concept of a non-white German in Germany. By the same token, it should be noted that by holding a British passport, ethnic minority members in the UK will only ever be able to be classified and acquire for themselves formal inclusion in the category 'British'. Inclusion in the high-status category 'English', which is the more important one for privileged white Britons' self-definitions (c.f. Grimston, 2000, who reports that the vast majority of white Britons do not define themselves as British, but instead as English, Scottish, or Welsh), remains unattainable for ethnic minority members (because this category is legally meaningless: passports are 'British', not 'English'). In other words, minority members might acquire membership in the state, but not in the nation. However, not being able to ever formally or legally gain membership in the high status group of 'English people' is not the only disadvantage that ethnic minority members in the UK face. *All* ethnic minority groups in England still suffer – compared to white Britons – from bad housing, poor quality public services, inferior job opportunities (unemployment rates, wages, promotion) and high poverty, as well as straightforward race discrimination (Kellner, 2002). For instance, 82% of Bangladeshi households, 80% of Pakistani households, 44% of Indian households, 41% of black Caribbean households, and 36% of Chinese households earn less than half of the national average income, compared to only 27% of white households. British Muslims' unemployment rate is up to five times higher than that for white Britons: In 2001, unemployment rates for Bangladeshis was 25%, and for Pakistanis 16%, compared to 5% for white people (Dood, 2002). Blacks, Pakistanis, and Bangladeshis are also failing at school (with approximately only 32% obtaining good 'GCSE' and 'A level' results, compared to 50% of Whites). Nonetheless, all is not doom and gloom, as it should also be pointed out that Chinese and Indians are now actually outperforming Whites at school, with 70% and 60% respectively obtaining good 'GCSE' and 'A level' scores (Kellner, 2002). Nonetheless, taken together these figures should still give cause for concern, as indeed it has been pointed out that racial discrimination and economic exclusion might result in both drug abuse and other psychosomatic symptoms, as well

as in minority members resorting to alternative economic options, like involvement in the drug trade (Pearson & Kamlesh, 1998).

Ethnic Minorities in Germany

Ethnic minority members in Germany are hardly more fortunate than those in the UK. Thalhammer and colleagues (2000) report low levels of acceptance of immigrants by Germans, with 18% having an 'intolerant' attitude towards minority groups, and more Germans were in favour of repatriation of immigrants than majority members in other European countries. 30% of Germans would not accept people from Muslim countries who wish to work in the EU (comparing unfavourably to 17% of non-acceptance in the UK), and 39% would not accept people fleeing from countries where there is serious internal conflict (comparing mildly favourably to 44% of non-acceptance in the UK). A recent survey by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (Hofmann, 2000) underscores these findings, and the fact that xenophobia is widely spread in Germany. For instance, 32% of respondents thought that German women should not marry foreigners, and the majority of respondents were against further migration and admission of new immigrants. Contrary to popular belief, this report also found that racism was not confined to underprivileged Germans, but that it also has some currency among the educated middle classes. Again, the attitudes of the German majority are reflected by minority members' experiences. For instance, a report by the Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung, presenting data from a representative sample of Turks in Germany, highlights that ca. 60% of participants felt that they are often/sometimes targets of discrimination due to their origin (Wilamowitz-Moellendorff & Eisel, 2001).

Compared to the UK, systematic and large-scale migration is a relatively recent phenomenon in Germany. Up to date, Germany does not conceive of itself as an *Einwanderungsland*, i.e. a nation that receives migrants. The *ius sanguinis* (i.e. blood citizenship, the principle that citizenship is acquired by descent and by descent only – being born to German parents or having German ancestors – with some subordinate importance also being placed on cherishing and perpetuating the German culture, thrown in just for good measure) was elected one of the principles of the German nation at its foundation in 1871. The *ius sanguinis* is thus deeply intervolved with the German 'founding myth'. Consequently, when Germany actively recruited millions of migrant workers in Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and Yugoslavia in the 1960s in order

to deal with existing labour shortages, the idea was that these ‘guest workers’ would only provide temporary economic relief and return home as soon as the German economy would again be able to do without them. Hence, in spite of the fact that many of the ‘guest workers’ have stayed on and become permanent residents, for decades the (West) German state failed to devise any integration policies or programs whatsoever. For instance, children born to Turkish parents in Germany were not entitled to German citizenship, and guest workers were not allowed to vote in national elections even after decades of being residents in Germany. To be fair, some of these issues have since been redressed by a (hotly debated) reform of the citizenship law in 1999. This reform has made it easier for resident Non-Germans to obtain German citizenship. But from some perspectives the new law still leaves much to be desired for, and fell short of what could have been achieved. For example, dual citizenship is still explicitly undesirable, forcing second and third generation children to choose between being German (and holding a German passport) *or* maintaining the cultural and legal ties with their country of origin which their parents often still strongly value. Germany today is in a process of trying to reconcile the facts that a) due to extremely low birth rates it will probably be necessary for the country to become an *Einwanderungsland* in order to have a sustainable economy in the future, and that b) not being an *Einwanderungsland* is still an important component of the German *Selbstverständnis*. A number of inflamed public debates and questions around issues of migration, the perceived difficulty of which to ‘liberal’ members of traditional countries of migration like the US or Canada must seem bizarre and amusing at best, but which to ‘liberal’ Germans nonetheless present themselves as controversial questions, are symptomatic of this dilemma. An example is the hefty debate about the German *Leitkultur* (literally: the culture that takes the lead), a term invented by a conservative German politician to signify the idea that the German culture should be regarded as somewhat superior and more important than minority cultures (c.f. Leicht, 2000). Another – more recent – example of a public debate about how cultural differences should be managed is the *Kopftuchdebatte* about the question of whether female students and teachers should or should not be allowed to wear at school the head-dress required by strictly practicing Muslims (c.f. Aziz, 2003; Cziesche et al., 2003; and The Economist, 2003, for a similar debate in France). Amusingly, the central constitutional court (*Karlsruher Verfassungsgericht*) has just recently ruled that it will not rule on this question (which again is indicative of the explosive nature of this question in the German context) and has passed the decision down to the *Länder* courts,

which will now lead to a confusing mosaic whereby the headscarf is permitted in some Länder but not in others, most likely leading to further cases being brought forward against unequal treatment, which will then put the question back on the desk of the Karlsruher judges. It is also worth noting that as many as 53% of white Germans are presently against headscarves at schools (Cziesche et al., 2003).

However, debates about how to integrate former guest workers and their descendents are not the only questions that occupy the public debate, just as former guest workers are not the only minority group in Germany. Another important minority group are *Aussiedler*, i.e. ethnic Germans who emigrated to Germany from states of the former Eastern Bloc in the 1990s after the *perestroika* and the subsequent break-up of the USSR. For many of these *Aussiedler*, their ancestors had followed a call eastwards by Katharina II in the 18th century, and their families had continued to maintain some aspects of their German identity. In post-WWII USSR, many of these Germans were held co-responsible for German crimes, and were consequently exposed to institutionalised and everyday discrimination, stigmatisation, deportations, and forced re-settlement (Kultusministerium, 2000). Hence, unsurprisingly, many *Aussiedler* chose to migrate to Germany after the opening of the borders made this possible. Because of the German notion of blood citizenship, *Aussiedler* - in contrast to other immigrant groups - were and are granted citizenship and full citizen rights immediately upon arrival (provided that they can successfully demonstrate German ancestry), which makes them the most privileged immigrant group in Germany (Dietz, 2000). Nonetheless, *Aussiedler* often find that they differ culturally from the German mainstream and that they are not always readily accepted (Schmitt-Rodermund & Silbereisen, 1995). For instance, 48.5% of ethnic Germans from the former Soviet Union reported having been discriminated against due to their migration background (Dietz, 2000).

Another important minority group in Germany are asylum seekers. While after the second world war Germany saw itself as having a historic responsibility of granting refuge to political refugees all over the world, and accepted large numbers of asylum seekers into the country, in the 90s perceptions changed, with the *Historische Schuld* being de-emphasised and economic and social inconveniences of harbouring large numbers of people in need being emphasised (the latter going hand in hand with a growing tendency of questioning the 'genuine' motives of asylum seekers, and the perception that the majority of applicants were more interested in wanting to profit from

Germany's economic wealth rather than fleeing political prosecution). The asylum law was changed in 1993 (introduction of the 'Secure Third Country Law'), making it much more difficult to be accepted as a political refugee, which has resulted in a dramatic drop of applications (440 000 applications in 1992, and 130 000 in 1995; The Economist, 2001a). Nonetheless, even after the reforms, the numbers of refugees which Germany harbours are still high in a worldwide comparison (in 2001, Germany still provided refuge to just under a million people, which made it third only on a worldwide scale to Pakistan and Iran in terms of absolute numbers of refugees; The Economist, 2001a). Needless to say, those refugees that have their applications pending are only provided with the absolute bare minimum necessary for survival in the country (Boem, 1999). Then again, in this, Germany unfortunately hardly differs from the UK and other European countries.

Today, there are more than seven million non-Germans (*Ausländer*) in Germany (c.f. Beauftragte der Bundesregierung fuer Migration, Fluechtlinge und Integration, 1999), and every fifth *Ausländer* was born in the country. The biggest minority group are the Turks, with about two million people (Maddox, 2002). In North Rhein Westphalia (NRW), where the data for the present thesis was collected, 11% of the population was non-German in 1999, the vast majority of which live in the industrial area in NRW (*Ruhrgebiet*; ca. 620 000 *Ausländer*; Wolf, 1999). Additionally, more than 4.7 million *Aussiedler*, which do not appear in the official foreigners' statistic, migrated to Germany between 1950 and 2000 (Kultusministerium, 2000). It is fair to say that the majority of immigrants and *Ausländer* in Germany today are still not well integrated (Gaschke, 2003), and Turks and other immigrant groups are still frequently the target of discrimination and hostilities (Zick & Wagner, 1993). There is segregation of housing, and unemployment rates among foreigners are up to twice as high as for Germans (Krause, 2002). Looking at income patterns, foreign guest workers display a much poorer earnings performance than native West Germans (Schmidt, 1997). The disadvantage amounts to an earnings gap of approximately 20%. While in most classic immigrant countries such an initial gap is not unusual for new arrivals to the country, this gap is usually found to diminish after a substantial time of residence. Not so in Germany: No stable pattern of earnings growth is associated with the migrants' duration of residence; Turks, for instance, can be expected to earn significantly less than Germans even after decades of working in the country (Schmidt, 1997). In contrast, things actually look more positive for *Aussiedler*: Although they too initially earn less

than native West Germans (with an income differential of about 14%), they actually catch up over time, i.e. as their length of residence expands (Schmidt, 1997). However, as in the UK, earning differentials are not the only indicator of *Ausländers'* disadvantaged status. Foreigners, with very few exceptions to the rule, tend to also fail at school (or tend to *be* failed by the schooling system, c.f. Zaimoglu, Kolat, Pekdeger, & Yueksel, 2003). 1/5 of students who left school without a qualification in 1999 were not of German origin (Buettner, 2000); with others claiming even more dramatic figures, i.e. that 1/5 of children of foreign parents leave school without a degree (Krause, 2002). Only about 3.4% who earn the highest school degree of *Abitur* are not of German origin (Krause, 2002). Given these facts and figures, it is surprising that not every survey of minority members in Germany finds them reporting high levels of perceived discrimination and deprivation. For instance, a recent survey of a randomly drawn sample of Turks in Germany found that the majority of participants did not feel deprived and reported being happy with their financial situation, with ca. 55% thinking that their situation is either good or very good (Wilamowitz-Moellendorff & Eisel, 2001, 2002). We will come back to this puzzling finding later on.

The Concept of 'Ethnic Minorities': Definitional Issues

A study of perceived deprivation and comparison choices in ethnic minority settings requires conceptual clarity not only about comparisons and deprivation, which I will attend to further down, but also about the terms 'ethnic minority and majority groups'. Indeed, the need for a working definition of the social groups under consideration here might have become apparent from the previous few sections, in which the terms 'immigrants', 'minorities', and 'ethnic minorities' were used pretty much interchangeably. For instance, while in everyday language in Germany people happily refer to someone as an 'immigrant' even if the person or sometimes even the parents of the person in question were born in Germany and only prior generations originate from elsewhere, the same person would be referred to as an 'ethnic minority member' member in the UK, with the term 'immigrant' being reserved purely for people who have a personal history of migration. Thus, the question needs answering what ethnic minority and majority groups *are*, and which groups count as distinct ethnic minorities – as opposed to an ethnic majority - within any one country. Unfortunately, although psychologists have accumulated a substantive body of research on so-called ethnic

minorities, they do not tend to problematise the term, and theoretical reflections on what constitutes such a group are largely missing (Verkyten, 2000). (Ethnic) groups are seen as 'out there' and obvious, and psychologists have failed to theorise adequately about the nature of this category and unit of analysis. This shortcoming is seen as problematic for two reasons: Firstly, in order to yield meaningful findings within the social sciences, it is generally thought necessary to operate with exact definitions, in order to guard against mis-understandings and mis-interpretations: to be sure, scientific language has to be more exact than everyday language, we cannot only 'take a leap of faith' and assume that the audience associates the same meaning with a certain term as the author. Secondly, while psychologists are often concerned with 'social groups' and are considerably less interested in theorising about different sub-types of this generic term, it can be commonly observed in our social world that some social groups are associated with rather different behaviour and meaning for their members than others: it is considerably more common for people to kill members of a different ethnic group over some intergroup dispute than it is for people to kill members of a different gender group or tennis club. Explaining such disparities definitely falls within the realm of psychology, but psychologists are ill-equipped to provide explanations unless they are willing to theorise about the nature of those different groups at least to some extent.

Tajfel (1978b) defines social categorisation as 'a process of bringing together social objects or events in groups which are equivalent with regard to an individual's actions, intentions and system of beliefs'. This is the starting point for most social psychological work in intergroup relations, which examines what happens *after* categorisation has taken place. To be fair, some psychological work does consider the properties of stimuli that make it likely for them to be subsumed into common categories, without, however, seeming to get to the core of the problem (c.f. Ellemers & Barreto, 2001; Oakes, 2001; Simon, Aufderheide, & Kampmeier, 2001). To focus on a prominent example, Campbell (1958) argues that common fate (e.g. having poorer educational outcomes), similarity (e.g. similar appearance, language), and proximity (e.g. living in the same area) lead to people being categorised as belonging to the same group. I.e., perceived entitativity is a necessary precursor for joint categorisation (see also Bar-Tal, 1998; Crawford, Sherman, & Hamilton, 2002). However, this leaves several important questions unanswered. For example, some people who have a common fate might not be perceived or perceive themselves in these terms, and vice versa. Think of various social movements like feminism or the push for international

solidarity of socialist workers: For many of these movements, a phase of not feeling subjugated to the same conditions, i.e. not having a sense of common fate, is succeeded by mobilisation and the claim that a certain common fate should lead to solidarity between people who are exposed to the same conditions, which in turn is succeeded with a waning of both the popularity of the movement and the perception of common fate of and by the group members. The point is that the waxing and waning of a perception of common fate does not depend only on 'objective conditions and reality', but is subject to fads, trends, social persuasion, and preferred modes of constructing and presenting social reality. Hence, a common fate of two or more people cannot be 'read' from social reality in a straightforward way, and therefore the perception of social entities is not straightforward. It is not enough – although it is definitely an important starting point – to state that common fate will lead to the perception of entitativity. This statement has to be followed by elaborations on why, when, and how perceptions of common fate come about. Campbell's second most important condition for the perception of entitativity, i.e. similarity, hardly throws up fewer questions. Given the multitude of dimensions along which people and objects might be perceived as either dis-similar or similar, the question remains why some dimensions become salient and important for categorisations and others do not. For instance, Medin and Wattenmaker (1987) point out that plums and lawnmowers are unlikely to be categorised together, even though they are clearly similar on a number of dimensions (both weigh less than 1000 kg, both cannot hear, both have a distinct smell, both can be dropped). Thus, the question remains why and when are certain people perceived to be more similar to each other than others?

Another – maybe the most – important approach trying to explain how the world is structured into social categories is Self-Categorisation Theory (Turner, 1987), which draws on Bruner's (1957) work and emphasises the importance of category 'accessibility' (the ease of cognitive accessibility, i.e. the ease with which a category 'springs to mind') and 'fit' (the degree of fit of the category with the actual similarity and differences between people in a given situation). 'Accessibility' is thought to be a function of both the perceiver's personal/social history (i.e. which categories are chronically accessible and have frequently been used in the past) and temporal situational goals (i.e. what a person is looking to achieve in a given situation). 'Fit' is thought to be about the degree of correspondence between psychologically imposed structure and categories and objective reality, i.e. a good fit is a 'veridical selective

representation' of reality; categorisation is seen as not arbitrary and subjective structuring, but as corresponding (selectively) to some objective reality (Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994). 'Accessibility' is supposed to account for the selective aspect of perception (perceiver readiness), whereas 'fit' (both comparative, i.e. associated to meta-contrast ratios, and normative, associated with content dimensions) is supposed to tie perception firmly in objective reality. Again, however, SCT's explanation about how we come to perceive people as members of different ethnic groups seems unsatisfactory: If I categorise along a certain divide because this divide is 'chronically accessible' to me, how did it become chronically accessible in the first place? Further, how do preferences for certain modes of categorisation become socially shared? Why is it that certain goals related to intergroup categorisation (for instance doing better than people of a different skin colour) become important to me in certain situations? With regards to 'fit', the argument appears tautological: the question of 'which category will spring to mind' is answered by 'the category that most easily springs to mind', and the question of 'which category will fit the situation' is answered by 'the category that best fits the situation'.

In order to define the nature of 'ethnic groups' and in order to break the circular argument, it is helpful to turn to literatures other than social psychology, such as political science, anthropology, and sociology. What is more, an attempt to not answer the question of 'which people will be perceived as similar' with 'those people that are perceived as similar' quickly leads us to the question of whether perceived similarity is based in objective reality or whether it is a purely subjective-psychological phenomenon (the psychologists' focus is usually on what people *perceive*; the question of whether this perception matches reality, matches *Wirklichkeit*, is usually neglected, with some exceptions, see the discussion of SCT above). As Carritte (2003) helpfully points out, reflections on ethnic groups in the political science literature are twofold: Firstly, what characteristics are markers of ethnic groups, and secondly, are those characteristics relatively fixed (primordial) or subject to human agency (constructed)?

In trying to answer the first question, there is considerable disagreement among scholars as to what constitutes an ethnic group, and often the term ethnic group is conflated and confused with others such as 'cultural group' and 'nation' (c.f. Eller, 1999; Oommen, 1997; note that most international relations scholars refer to 'nation' as a group which has a strong sense of belonging associated with a certain territory,

Connor, 1994). Cartrite (2003) provides an overview of the major works in political science that define necessary components of ethnic groups (see table 1):

Table 1

Definitions of ethnic groups

	cult	desc	terr	lang	Hist ory	will	sym bol	reco gni	threat	relig	econ	psyc
Herder (1770)				1								
Renan (1882)						1						
Stalin (1914)			x	x							X	X
Kohn (1944)	4	6	2	5		1				3		
Hroch (2000)	X		x	x						x	X	
Connor (1994)		1										
Hechter (1999)	1											
Van den Berghe (1981)		1	2						3			
Gellner (1983)	1							2				
Horowitz (1985)		1	2		3				4			
Smith (1991)	4	1	3		2	5	6					
Eriksen (1992)	X							x				
Haas (1997)							1					
Gurr (2000)	3	1				2						

Note. The defining properties in the chart are as follows: common culture; (myth of) common descent; attachment to or claims of ownership of a certain territory; shared language; common history; 'will' to be a group; existence of group symbols such as flags; mutual recognition of group membership; threat to cultural existence; common religion; economic ties; and psychology. Elements are arranged from most to least frequently occurring. Works are ordered according to the original publication date; some of the publication dates listed in the table are of subsequent editions or reprints. In those cases in which authors do not distinguish between the relative importance of the factors they discuss, the components are merely indicated. For authors that do articulate relative importance, a coding is provided from most important (1) to least important (varies).

As becomes clear, there is significant disagreement among scholars as to what the defining features of ethnicity are (c.f. also Liebkind, 1989). Also, definitions of ethnic groups, cultural groups, and nations are often overlapping, and the terms are used interchangeably (and hence Cartrite includes in his analysis also works that belong to the nationalism literature). Nonetheless, some common themes might be derived from his analysis: Shared culture is the most frequently cited component (7 times), followed by (myth of) common descent (6, though note that this property has the most 1s

associated with it), and territory (6). The groups highlighted in the present work (e.g. Pakistanis in Britain, Turks in Germany) generally meet these criteria, as they can be seen to share a common culture, adhere to a myth of common descent, and display an attachment to a specific territory, even if this territory is not the country of residence for most of the participants (i.e. the territory is Pakistan rather than England for London Pakistani participants of my studies. This is not to say that British Pakistanis do not feel an attachment to Britain, or will not be attached to the territory of their country of residence. Still, a certain ‘country-of-origin territory’ crucial for ethnic self-definitions can be located for all minority groups the current work attends to). Therefore, the ethnic minority participants of the present work can be described as members of ethnic groups in *diaspora*.

One issue that should be pointed out, however, is that Cartrite’s classification does not distinguish between works that discuss common descent as genetic or akin to race, or as constructed and as myth. This shortcoming directly points us toward the second question outlined above, i.e. the extent to which ethnicity is fixed (primordial) or subject to human agency (constructed). This question is important in thinking about the origins of ethnic groups: Where do they come from, and why are they so powerful? Primordialism and, relatedly, essentialist accounts of ethnicity maintain that ethnic groups have a certain “essence”, e.g. a national character, which is inherited and must thus have a biological basis. For instance, a person of German descent will be a German even if born and brought up in England, even if the person is unaware of the German descent and does not speak German, because of the inherited German “essence within” that cannot be eradicated. Such primordialist and essentialist positions are what Ronald Suny calls the “sleeping beauty” approach to ethnicity: Ethnic categories are seen as “out there”, as existing independent from their representations. An ethnic group is an ethnic group by “nature”, even if group members might be unaware and oblivious (i.e. sleeping) to their shared membership.

In contrast, other accounts highlight the constructed, fabricated aspect of ethnicity. Yet, the points of departure vary greatly: While some have emphasised the impact of communication nets on identity construction (Deutsch et al., 1957), others have emphasised instrumentalist concerns, the rational workings of the world economy and social and economic interests of individuals (e.g. Brass, 1979; Hardin, 1995; Hechter, 1999). Yet others have focussed on historical legacies, and the construction thereof. For instance, Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) speak of ‘invented traditions’,

whereas Anderson (1983) coined the phrase 'imagined community', highlighting nations as modern cultural artefacts which are imagined because their members will never know, meet or even hear of most of their fellow-members, and yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion. Thus, the nation – or ethnic group - only exists through its social representation, i.e. only as text and narrative, which needs to be unmasked and deconstructed. Or, as Eller (1999) puts it: "Any amount of cultural difference is enough to build an ethnic group on, but no amount is enough to ensure that an ethnic group is built on it. Ethnicity is, ultimately, a construction, like all other forms of social and cultural life". It should be noted that positions that emphasise the fabricated aspects of social groups vary greatly in their radicality, ranging from modernist to postmodernist paradigms, from those emphasising construction to those emphasising deconstruction, from those that contend that there is only discourse and fictive ethnicity (e.g. Balibar & Wallerstein, 1991) to those that see identity choices as somewhat restricted by ethnic history and political geography (e.g. Billig, 1995).

As Laitin (1998) points out, there is now growing consensus among academics that ethnic groups and nations are constructed, rather than primordial, i.e. based on biological difference (c.f. also Smith, 1998). However, reflections on the political implications of anti-essentialism have recently also resulted in some voices promoting anti-anti-essentialism among social scientists (Modood, 1998). Essentialist notions are not only crucial components of the ideology of racists who wish to claim superiority for their group, but also of the arguments of indigenous and other minority groups who wish to protect themselves and their interests. Thus, liberal academics who like to see themselves siding with the 'oppressed' might sometimes be ill-advised to advance the anti-essentialist argument. Moreover, even though the academic canon nowadays agrees that ethnicity is constructed, strong primordialist notions continue to be prevalent in the popular discourse and in lay conceptions (Gil-White, 2001). Thus, notions of race, clear group boundaries, and genetic/biological differences still have a lot of currency in (non-academic) people's thinking.

Some terminological fuzziness, already touched upon above, further complicates matters. Even though the term 'ethnicity' was originally proposed to refute the notion of essential biological differences between social groups (Huxley & Haddon, 1935), it has now come to assume and is often used to imply exactly those essentialist connotations which it was originally meant to do away with: This can take the form of 'traditional' primordialism, whereby ethnic groups and nations are equated with variants of extended

kin groups, i.e. “races” (c.f. for instance Van den Berghe, 1978), or the form of cultural primordialism, whereby the culture of different ethnic groups is presented as just as divisive, impermeable, and immutable as biological differences (see e.g. Geertz, 1973; Shils, 1957). Even the Britannica Concise Encyclopaedia (2002) defines an ‘ethnic group’ as a people having ‘common ties of *race* (my emphasis), language, nationality, or culture’; and the term ‘ethnic nationalism’ is used to describe the ideology of those groups who emphasise blood-ties, and whose ideas circle around the distinctiveness of their group in *biological* terms (Ignatieff, 1994). In short, ethnicity is used to mean and describe things as different from each other as race, biological/natural divides, quasi-immutable cultural divides, and divides that are seen as entirely socially constructed.

This makes it necessary to clarify that the term ethnicity and ethnic group as used in the present work does not imply the existence of natural, biological group demarcations, and that such socio-biological and primordialist positions are regarded untenable by the author (c.f. also Giddens, 1989; Rex, 1986). Yet, at the same time it is necessary to acknowledge that (ethnic) group membership choices are regarded as somewhat restrained by *social* reality: People have a psychological need to categorise information – about other human beings and otherwise - in order to deal with huge loads of cues at any given point in time (Turner, 1987). It so happens that it is social practice to do this along certain demarcation lines, such as skin colour, and not along others. Even though there is nothing ‘primordial’ about these demarcation lines, i.e. while the cleavages are socially constructed by a practice that can be analysed and deconstructed, they are real in the sense that they are part of a socially shared reality that is resilient to a certain degree. As Billig (1995) points out, ‘voluntary ethnicity’ is not an option most of the time, if only because other ethnic communities are unlikely to accept such a radical definitional and boundary change. However, although actors might face practical limitations in their possible choice of membership in different ethnic groups, the notion of *choice*, of conscious (self-) definition is important in order to call any one ethnicity into existence: Ethnicity does not exist outside of its social representation, it is not and cannot be a ‘sleeping beauty’. Yet, even though ethnicity is seen as equalling its social representation here (and asserting this means that a degree of ‘self-definition and awareness’, or what in table 1 is called ‘will’ and ‘recognition’, is added to the necessary components of ethnicity), at the same time it is maintained that those representations are ‘thick’, i.e. resistant to radical mutations that are brought about quickly, even though ultimately (i.e. if change is gradual rather than radical, and if the

time frame is long enough) I see no theoretical limitations on the mutations that are possible. In sum, while I reject the notion of ethnic groups as consisting of members that share a common descent, I do acknowledge that a myth of common descent is a powerful part of people's social realities (and that under certain circumstances it can be the politically 'sound' approach to back such myths, in what has been called 'strategic essentialism', Verkyten, unpublished manuscript). In this, I endorse and go back to the maybe not first, but classic definition of 'ethnic group' by Max Weber, who defines it as "those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent (...), it does not matter whether or not an objective blood relationship exists" (Weber, 1968, p. 389).¹

Having discussed the term 'ethnic group' in this way, it remains to be illuminated what is meant by 'ethnic minority'. Unfortunately, it is not uncommon in everyday language and among scholars to employ 'ethnic group' exclusively to refer to minority groups, as a 'group which exists as a subgroup of a larger society' (Theodorson & Theodorson, 1969; c.f. also Morris, 1968; Schermerhorn, 1970; Yinger, 1994). The present author agrees with those scholars that find this limitation of the term ethnic group unhelpful (e.g. Connor, 1994). In the present work, 'ethnic group' can apply to both minorities and majorities within any one country (c.f. Banton, 2000), as both these groups can have a shared culture, myth of common descent, and subjective, strong group attachments. However, while the ethnic majority as a general rule lives on the very territory they lay claims to, the ethnic minority is away from what is perceived to be their 'homeland': Ethnic minority members are in diaspora.

Finally, it should be pointed out that the term 'minority' itself is used in ambivalent ways in the psychological literature, sometimes referring to purely numerical relations between groups (e.g. Bettencourt & Bartholow, 1998; Leonardelli & Brewer, 2001), and sometimes referring to power relations (e.g. Tajfel, 1981; for an

¹ It should also be noted that one of the groups the present work focuses on, i.e. Aussiedler, are likely to resist being labelled an 'ethnic minority', because their privileged status relative to other minorities is a direct result of the German *ius sanguinis* and the idea that Aussiedler are *ethnically* German. However, those who regard Aussiedler as ethnically German typically buy into the 'race' meaning of ethnicity, which is – as we have seen above – incorrect. Instead, it is preferable to employ ethnicity to describe *cultural* differences (although a cultural reading of ethnicity brings about problems of its own, c.f. Verkuyten, unpublished manuscript), and since many Aussiedler are without doubt at least somewhat culturally different from the German mainstream, they can be described as a distinct ethnic group. Further, note that many German majority members would actually question the 'German essence' of Aussiedler which is prescribed by German law and which the Aussiedler themselves capitalise on. Therefore, Aussiedler are 'ethnicised' by the German mainstream, which tends to question the assumption of German law of racial identicalness. This is a further reason why I subsume them with the other minority groups under the common term 'ethnic minority'.

overview, see Simon, Aufderheide, & Kampmeier, 2001). However, those two definitions coincide in the groups the present work focuses on, i.e. the present minority groups are subordinate to the majority groups with regards to both size and power. Therefore, the distinction between numerical and power definitions of 'minority' need not be discussed further here.

A final disclaimer and/or 'owning up'. The emergence of postmodernist deconstructivist accounts has called into question the existence of an *objective* reality which is independent from the researcher's perspective, construction processes and modes of description (c.f. Madill, Jordan, & Shirley, 2000; Zagefka, 2000), cumulating in a 'crisis of representation' (Berg & Fuchs, 1993). While it is beyond the scope of the present work to outline in detail all epistemological paradigms and positions currently found in social scientific research, it should be noted that the present author follows critics who maintain that social scientific research has inherently subjective and political components (Gergen & Leach, 2001). Social psychology cannot be value free (Billig, 2002), and – as Tajfel (1981) himself pointed out - the scientist therefore has a *duty* for non-neutrality, in the sense that "the researcher's task is to find which beliefs [i.e. which naïve social psychological hypotheses held by humans, my clarification] are worthy of respect and which are not". It is in this spirit that conclusions will be drawn from the findings of the present research. I will aim to employ social psychological reasoning and draw conclusions in a way that appears to me not only to make most 'sense of the world' (and data), but also in a way that to me appears most socially and ethically responsible. If, along the way, the procedure I adopt or the arguments I make do not appear 'impartial', I do not see this as a weakness: They are not meant to be. Having hopefully reached some clarity on the for the present work important contextual and meta-theoretical issues, in the next chapter I will now proceed to review the major social psychological theories that informed the work for the present thesis.

CHAPTER 2

Theoretical Background and Literature Review

In the following, the relevant psychological literature will be reviewed and the main research hypotheses will be sketched out. This work was informed by a number of distinct literatures or fields within social psychology, and these will be discussed in turn and roughly in the order in which they historically emerged. These are theories and research in Social Comparison; Relative Deprivation; Social Identity; and Stigma. Two additional areas important in the present context, namely theories and research in Equity/Justice and Acculturation, will also be briefly reviewed. Although this chapter will be structured according to research areas, the reader should keep in mind that there is some substantial overlap in the theorising of the different approaches, and that it is not uncommon for researchers mainly working in one field of investigation to comment on issues in another. These facts will be reflected in my discussion. Further, it should be noted that all research fields reviewed are of very substantial volume. Therefore, my discussion will necessarily be somewhat cursory and selective.

Social Comparison Theory and Research

In his seminal paper on social comparison, Festinger (1954) argued that “there exists, in the human organism, a drive to evaluate his opinions and his abilities”. Festinger theorised that in the absence of objective, physical reality and standards, people would evaluate their opinions and abilities by comparing with others, and that this aim would best be met by comparisons with *similar* others. He also argued that people will strive to improve their performances (‘unidirectional drive upwards’), which might lead to people tending to compare upwards (with others who are better) rather than downwards as a result of the drive to excel. Few papers have motivated as much research interest as Festinger’s (1954) outline of social comparison theory (for a brief history of social comparison theory, see Buunk & Gibbons, 2000; Suls & Wheeler, 2000; Wheeler, 1991), and the principles he formulated originally for the evaluation of opinions and abilities have successfully been applied to other domains also (e.g. Schachter, 1959; Schachter & Singer, 1962). The classic studies on social comparison employed a rank

order paradigm whereby the participants would undertake some test, be given fake feedback about their result, and then be asked which other person's score they would like to know out of a group of people occupying different ranks in a hierarchy ranging from 'best test result' to 'worst test result' (Latane, 1966). The rank chosen was then interpreted as a comparison choice. These studies typically confirm Festinger's original hypotheses about the choice of both similar and upward targets, with participants tending to choose the person occupying the rank *just above* themselves (Wheeler, 1966). Support has also been found outside the classic rank order paradigm and laboratory setting (Nosanchuk & Erickson, 1985). However, subsequent research has led to some important clarifications and moderations of Festinger's original formulation of the hypothesis, the most important of which will briefly be summarised in the following. These include: The Related-Attributes Hypothesis; Downward Comparison Theory; Other Comparison Motives; Temporal Comparison Theory; and Intergroup Comparisons.

The Related-Attributes Hypothesis. To begin with, although Festinger initially talked about a preference for 'similar' comparison objects in the sense of a similar standing on the comparison dimension of interest, others have pointed out that 'similar' should rather be read as 'similar on related attributes' (Goethals & Darley, 1977; Wheeler & Zuckermann, 1977). Thus, rather than seeking out others with similar political opinions or similar test scores, people should seek out others with a similar socio-economic background, age, gender etc. The 'related attributes' hypothesis has been widely confirmed, both within the classic rank order paradigm (Wheeler, Koestner, & Diver, 1982; Zanna, Goethals, & Hill, 1975) and in other settings (Huguet, Dumas, Monteil, & Genestoux, 2001; Luk, Wan, & Lai, 2000; Major, 1994). Moreover, frequent contact with a potential comparison target has also been shown to make comparisons with this target more likely (Gartrell, 2002; Hegelson & Mickelson, 1995; Singer, 1981).

Downward Comparison Theory. While Festinger initially stressed the importance of a *self-evaluation* motive for engaging in comparisons, other motives have since been discussed. Of these, *self-enhancement* and *self-protection*, i.e. a need to see oneself in a positive light, has received considerable emphasis. Downward Comparison Theory (DCT, Wills, 1981) suggests that people will engage in and actively seek out downward comparisons (i.e. with less fortunate others) in order to protect their (threatened) self-esteem and to feel better about themselves and their outcomes.

Relatedly, others have suggested and presented data in support of the fact that social comparisons can serve self-protective functions, through the avoidance or reinterpretation of comparison information which might be ego-threatening, and the selective search for favourable comparisons (Affleck & Tennen, 1991; Buunk & Oldersma, 2001; Buunk & Ybema, 1995; Gibbons, Benbow, & Gerrard, 1994; Gibbons & Gerrard, 1991; Goethals & Klein, 2000; Goethals, Messick, & Allison, 1991; Hakmiller, 1966; Hoorens, 1995; John & Robins, 1994; Klein, 1997; McCarrey, 1984; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & LaPrelle, 1985; Tesser & Paulhus, 1983; Wood & Giordano-Beech, 1999). To give just one example, Wood, Taylor, and Lichtman (1985) found that women suffering from breast cancer tend to compare with other worse-off patients in a self-enhancing way.²

Other Comparison Motives. The fact that comparisons can be motivated by factors other than evaluation, and – to put it another way – that different motives instigate different types of comparisons, has been acknowledged well before the development of DCT (Fazio, 1979; c.f. also Hegelson et al., 1995; Ouwerkerk, 2000, for more recent work). Further, evaluation (as highlighted by Festinger) and enhancement/protection (as emphasised by DCT) are not the only motives that have been discussed in the literature. Various other motives might play a role, such as *self-improvement* (Gibbons & Buunk, 1999; Huguet et al., 2001; Taylor & Lobel, 1989; Wood & Taylor, 1991) or *equity and justice concerns* (Haeger, Mummendey, Mielke, Blanz, & Kanning, 1996; Levine & Moreland, 1987; Taylor, Moghaddam, & Bellerose, 1989). Equity concerns are thought to lead to upward comparisons, i.e. comparisons with others who are better off, with the ultimate aim of pointing out social injustice and instigating social change (cf. Bourhis & Hill, 1982). Taken together, ‘evaluation’ and ‘improvement’ motives might prompt comparisons with objects that are similar on related attributes and/or upward, an ‘enhancement’ motive might prompt comparisons with downward targets (Wood & Van der Zee, 1997), and justice and equity concerns, either on behalf of the self/ingroup or on behalf of other people/outgroups, might lead to comparisons between a discriminated and a privileged object. However, it should be noted that while previous research acknowledges that different motives might lead to

² There is an obvious question of how people would avoid upward comparisons and seek out (gratifying) downward comparisons without having compared in the first place to establish the ‘direction’ of the comparison. So, the avoidance of certain comparisons presupposes just these very comparisons. Hence, what is called here (and in the literature) for simplicity’s sake ‘downward comparisons’ really pertains to the *elaboration* on and *repetition* of a certain downward comparison that has previously been made at least once.

different types of comparisons, motives are often only inferred in retrospective after a comparison choice has been made. Very little research either manipulates motives or assesses them directly.

Temporal Comparison Theory. One major extension of social comparison theory is its application to the temporal domain. Temporal Comparison Theory was originally formulated by Albert (1977), borrowing from and applying social comparison principles to the temporal domain, and stating that people frequently compare themselves with their own situation at different points in time in order to assess their relative standing. In spite of the early formulation of this hypothesis, after its initial publication it was largely forgotten, and until very recently temporal comparisons have been neglected almost completely. However, of late, they have been 'rediscovered', with growing numbers of researchers now emphasising that their importance has been underestimated and that they merit more attention (Brown & Haeger, 1999; Guimond & Dambrun, 2002; Wilson & Ross, 2000). The importance of temporal comparisons has recently been confirmed by research focussing on a variety of domains (Affleck et al., 1991; Beike & Niedenthal, 1998; Bogart, Gray Bernhardt, Catz, Hartmann, & Otto Salaj, 2002; Karney & Frye, 2002; Klauer, Ferring, & Filipp, 1998; Masters & Keil, 1987; Mummendey, Klink, Brown, & Simon, 2001; Suls, Marco, & Tobin, 1991; Suls & Mullen, 1982). For instance, one line of research has focussed on the development of comparisons over the life span, with results largely demonstrating that the frequency of temporal comparison increases as people get older, hence underscoring their importance (Brown & Middendorf, 1996; Butler, 1998; Suls, 1986; Suls & Mullen, 1983, although, see Robinson Whelen & Kiecolt Glaser, 1997).

It should be particularly pointed out that there now also exists some evidence that temporal comparisons might be of great importance precisely *because* they allow people to see themselves in a positive light. People wishing to do so might not only seek out downward social comparisons, but they might also resort to temporal comparisons in order to establish a positive social identity (Wilson & Ross, 2000). Temporal comparisons might be particularly amenable to self-gratifying cognitive distortions that result in favourable comparative outcomes (Frye & Karney, 2002; McFarland & Alvaro, 2000; Wilson & Ross, 2001). For instance, McFarland and colleagues have very effectively demonstrated how a motivation for self-protection and enhancement can lead to perceptions of personal improvement over time, through illusions and distorted perceptions of the temporal past referent (i.e. making the self out to have been worse

than objectively true, in order to feel better about having *improved* so much). Last but not least, it should be noted that while, until recently, little research has been concerned with temporal comparisons, even less has simultaneously focussed on different types of comparisons, such as both social and temporal ones, or aimed to establish the relative importance of both (Tropp & Wright, 1999; Tyler & Smith, 1998).

Intergroup Comparisons. Most of the studies on comparisons to be found in the literature, and consequently most of the works cited above, are concerned with comparisons between individual people. Further, most research has utilised laboratory paradigms (Blanton, Buunk, Gibbons, & Kuyper, 1999) and performance related comparison choices, and the few field studies that have been conducted typically focus on medical patients and comparisons those make to either evaluate their condition or to self-enhance. Hitherto, little attention has been paid to the vast number of potentially possible and potentially influential *intergroup* comparisons that might be relevant in many settings (for some notable recent exceptions, which will be discussed more fully in some of the following sections on social identity and relative deprivation, see (Haeger et al., 1996; Kessler & Mummendey, 2002; Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, & Mielke, 1999; Mummendey, Klink, Mielke, Wenzel, & Blanz, 1999). However, recently the importance of taking group memberships during comparison behaviour into consideration has been emphasised (Buunk & Mussweiler, 2001); the potential importance of intergroup comparisons has been stressed (Brown, 1988); and indeed some evidence has been published underscoring the importance of intergroup comparisons (Brown & Haeger, 1999). While most of these developments will be discussed in more detail below, it should at this stage be pointed out that these approaches fall roughly into two categories. On the one hand, there are those that stress the importance of intergroup comparisons (i.e. comparisons between the ingroup and some outgroup). On the other hand, there are those that stress the importance of group memberships of the comparer and the comparison target (c.f. e.g. Grier & McGill, 2000; Heine, Lehman, Peng, & Greenholtz, 2002; Smith & Spears, 1996; Verkuyten & De Wolf, 2002), and which distinguish between intragroup comparisons (whereby the self is compared to some other individual member of the ingroup) and intergroup comparisons (in this context, meaning a comparison between the self and some member of a relevant outgroup). For instance, Brewer and Weber (1994) argue that the effect of social comparisons on self-evaluation might differ, depending on whether the comparison object is intra- or intergroup. Indeed, Bylsma and Major (1994) found the


effect of same-sex comparisons to be more influential for pay satisfaction than the effect of cross-sex comparisons. Similarly, Martinot and Redersdorff (2002) propose that upward comparisons with outgroup members (but not with ingroup members) might be dismissed as irrelevant in a self-protective manner under some circumstances. In short, the important point here is that all kinds of intergroup comparisons, be they on the group level and on a level of individuals, have been very much neglected in research on comparisons. Moreover, something else is apparent: There are many different types of comparisons, e.g. interpersonal, intergroup, temporal, involving individuals or the group level, etc. The volume of potential types of comparisons makes it necessary to derive some classification system in order to guarantee conceptual clarity. Indeed, a number of taxonomies have been proposed in the literature, and these will briefly be reviewed in the next section.

Taxonomies of Comparisons. Attempts to systematise types of comparisons range from theoretical differentiations between a few different types to fully developed taxonomies. However, these do not always propose terminologies that are compatible with one another (see Deaux, 2000a; Haeger et al., 1996; Levine & Moreland, 1986, 1987; Masters & Smith, 1987; Smith, Shull, & Miller, 2000). Some emphasise different *comparison targets* (e.g. comparisons with another ingroup member, an outgroup member, an outgroup as a whole, the self or the ingroup at a different point in time (future or past), the self as it should/could be (possible selves perspective), an objective/physical comparison standard, etc.); and others emphasise different *comparison dimensions* (e.g. political, economic, cultural), different *comparison directions* (upward, downward or lateral), or different *comparison subjects* (i.e. differences in the self-focus, e.g. the self as an individual person, the self as a member of a particular group, the whole ingroup as self-focus etc.). Obviously, all these distinctions can be combined with each other in multiple ways, as indeed they are in many taxonomy models. None of the models comprises all possible kinds of permutations, and attempting this would likely make the model too complex and therefore theoretically unhelpful. In the following, I will for illustrative purposes just briefly summarise one of the taxonomies that has been proposed, i.e. the one by Haeger and colleagues (1996), which distinguishes between five different parameters: a) the comparison subject (individual; self as group member; whole ingroup as referent); b) the comparison object (self-referent (either at the same point in time, e.g. the self on

different dimensions a la 'I can't draw, but I can spell', or at a different point in time, e.g. self now vs. self in the past or future); individual (i.e. another person); or another person as group member; or an outgroup); c) the comparison dimension (e.g. social competence or material standing); d) the comparison result (e.g. self-referent better vs. self as worse); and e) the time frame (e.g. present vs. past, present vs. future). For an illustration, see figure 1.

Figure 1

A taxonomy of self-referential comparisons (adopted from Haeger et al., 1996)



This taxonomy is particularly useful in the present context because it distinguishes between the 'self as a group member' and the 'whole ingroup' on both the subject and object levels, and because it combines temporal and social comparisons. Both these distinctions are crucial in the context of the present research.

A critical Evaluation of the Comparison Literature. Having summarised the most important developments in comparison research, I will now proceed with a critical review of this literature, and sketch out some initial conclusions that can be drawn for the present thesis. Even though the research developments described above have beyond

any doubt greatly enhanced our understanding of comparison processes, a couple of issues still need clarifying. One concerns the empirical evidence that has (or has not) been put forth in support of various theories that have been developed, another concerns the somewhat confused or confusing theorising in this field. Firstly, not all proposed effects have yielded univocal support. For instance, not all studies have found evidence for the use of downward, self-enhancing comparisons for participants that can be expected to have a strong motive to enhance (Schulz & Decker, 1985; Van der Zee, Oldersma, Buunk, & Bos, 1998). Also, the related attributes hypothesis has been qualified, with some authors arguing that related attributes do not influence emotional reactions to comparisons to as great an extent as originally assumed, and that the timing of when the related attribute information becomes salient is important (Kulik & Gump, 1997; Webster & Smith, 2000). What is more, the comparison direction has not always been found to have as straightforward a relationship with affect as initially proposed – i.e. upward comparisons leading to negative affect and self-esteem threat, and downward comparisons leading to positive affect and enhanced self-esteem (c.f. Brandstatter, 2000; Collins, 1996; Gibbons et al., 2002; Kimmelmeier & Oyserman, 2001; Ross, Eyman, & Kishchuk, 1986; Wood et al., 1985). Upward comparisons have sometimes been shown to have positive effects, and downward comparisons to have negative effects, such as for instance inspiration following upward comparisons, or guilt following downward comparisons (Branscombe & Doosje, in press; Buunk, Collins, Taylor, VanYperen, & Dakof, 1990; Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998; Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003; Kimmelmeier & Oyserman, 2001; Leach, Snider, & Iyer, 2002). Some data suggesting that comparisons might be automatic (thus leaving little room for the selective use of comparisons that meet certain ends) is also problematic for downward comparison theory (Gilbert, Giesler, & Morris, 1995). Moreover, some data has been presented that contradict the DCT hypothesis that negative affect and low self-esteem lead to downward comparisons, and that instead show these variables to be related to more *upward* comparisons, a finding which is in line more with a selective affect-cognition priming model than with DCT (Wheeler & Miyake, 1992). Wheeler (2000) has also pointed out that there is more support for the cognitive model of depression (which states that low self-esteem/depressed people will seek upward comparisons) than for DCT (which states that those with low self-esteem and those depressed should show a particularly strong preference for downward comparisons, in order to enhance). While these developments have lead to some researchers calling the

usefulness of DCT into question, and even proposing that it should be abandoned altogether, those radical suggestions have not been followed by the canon, and researchers have instead turned to investigating moderators of the effect of comparison direction on subsequent affect and self-esteem. For instance, *self-esteem* and *perceived control* have been proposed to moderate the affective consequences of upward and downward comparisons (Aspinwall & Taylor, 1993; Buunk et al., 1990; Mendes, Blascovich, Major, & Seery, 2001; Testa & Major, 1990). Others have proposed that *similarity* with and the perceived likelihood to *become* like the comparison target moderate the effect of comparison direction on affect (Crosby, 1976; Gibbons et al., 1994; Lockwood, 2002; Martin, 1986; Olson, 1986; Wills, 1991). Related to the idea of 'similarity' as a moderator is the idea that the relationship is moderated by a perception of a 'common bond' (which leads to a positive effect of upward comparisons, since the comparer can 'bask in reflected glory', Brown, Novick, Kelley, & Richards, 1992). Similarly, Tesser, Millar, and Moore (1988) propose 'psychological closeness' to the comparison target as a moderator. Some findings coming out of the 'assimilation-contrast' line of research can also be understood as conceptualising similarity as a moderator, with the occurrence of either identification with or contrast away from the comparison target affecting affective consequences of upward and downward comparisons (Buunk & Ybema, 1997; Buunk, Ybema, Gibbons, & Ipenburg, 2001). In sum, while it seems premature to discount the usefulness of DCT and the importance of enhancement motives and consequent selective search for self-gratifying comparisons, the theory definitely merits some qualifications, and the mechanisms might not be as straightforward as initially assumed.

A second issue that is worth commenting on, and which might be apparent to the reader from the previous paragraph, is the somewhat circular and contradictory theorising that can be found in the comparison literature. For instance, approaches like DCT conceptualise self-esteem both as an antecedent of comparisons (see also Smith & Insko, 1987; Strube & Roemmele, 1985) and as a consequence of comparisons (e.g. Wood, Giordano Beech, Taylor, Michela, & et al., 1994). Further, as spelled out above, some researchers conceptualise self-esteem as a moderator (of the effect of comparison direction on subsequent affect). Thus, 'self-esteem' can either be seen as an antecedent, a consequence, or a moderator. Note further that this confusion cannot easily be resolved with a recourse to the distinction between state and trait self-esteem, as both types have been proposed to play these differential roles. The picture is not much

clearer with regards to ‘similarity’. As outlined above, similarity (on related attributes) is often conceptualised as an antecedent of comparisons (i.e. causally and positively leading to comparisons). At the same time, as seen in the previous paragraph, similarity has also been proposed to *moderate* the effects of comparison direction on affect. But this is not all: similarity can also be understood to be a *consequence* of comparisons. For instance, some research into the similarity-contrast effect can be understood as conceptualising similarity as a dependent variable: Comparisons might lead to assimilation (i.e. increased perceived similarity) with or contrast away from the comparison target, and assimilation and contrast might further occur in self serving ways (Kuehnen & Hannover, 2000; Mussweiler, Gabriel, & Bodenhausen, 2000; Pelham & Wachsmuth, 1995; Smith, 2000; Stapel & Koomen, 2001). Relatedly, it has been shown that similarity to the comparison target might be strategically adjusted, with participants emphasising category memberships that are different for the comparison target and the self after threatening upward comparisons (Mussweiler et al., 2000). Further, while – as mentioned above – Tesser has proposed similarity to be a moderator, his Self-Evaluation Maintenance model also includes a feedback loop, so that ‘psychological closeness’ might be altered as a result of an unfavourable comparison (Tesser, 1991). Others have also pointed out that similarity may be strategically adjusted in order to discount unfavourable comparisons as undiagnostic (Ouwkerk & Ellemers, 2002), or that ingroup identification (a concept also closely related to intragroup similarity, as we shall see below) is a consequence of upward intragroup comparisons for members of low status groups (Martinot, Redersdorff, Guimond, & Dif, 2002). Thus, just like self-esteem, perceived closeness/similarity is conceptualised as an independent variable, a dependent variable, or a moderator, depending on the particular researcher or article in question (see also Kruglanski & Mayseless, 1990, on the (ir)relevance of similarity).

In sum, what does this all mean for the present research? One of the aims of the present research was to redress some of the shortcomings and put in the spotlight some of the questions that have been neglected so far. The present research was designed to provide data about *which* comparisons are made in the field by members of various ethnic groups, which is something we know precious little about: Research on spontaneous comparison choices, especially in the area of intergroup studies, has been sparse so far (Brown, 2000). Another aim was to investigate simultaneously temporal and social types of comparisons, and to focus on comparison processes in intergroup

contexts, i.e. mainly in a context in which ethnic groups are important. As outlined above, little research on comparison choice has been conducted in intergroup contexts so far, and the few studies that exist have mainly focussed on comparisons between men and women, disabled and 'healthy' people, or East and West Germans, but not on different ethnic groups. Another objective was to assess the effects of 'motives' on comparison choices. As pointed out above, motives have rarely been directly examined or manipulated, and the present research aimed to rectify this omission. Further, it was of interest to see whether some of the insights from the interpersonal literature reviewed above would generalise to an intergroup context. For instance, would similarity with and contact with a certain target would increase chances that this target would be chosen as a comparison referent, and would self-esteem be affected by upward comparisons? The reason why similarity and self-esteem, in spite of the confusion and different possibilities outlined above, were chosen as independent and dependent variables respectively (rather than *vice versa*, or than having them as moderators) has to do with some of the insights gained in research fields other than comparison research, as will become clear later. I will now turn to the next set of perspectives that informed the present work, namely relative deprivation theory and research.

Relative Deprivation Theory and Research

Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, Star, and Williams (1949) were the first to observe that satisfaction (or otherwise) with one's outcomes depends more on the outcomes of salient comparison others than on objective prosperity. In their study of American soldiers, they found that in some sections of the military in which conditions were quite good compared to other sections, the dissatisfaction of soldiers was actually *higher*, leading to the realisation that feelings of deprivation must be informed by factors other than objective conditions. Although Stouffer and colleagues never proposed a formalised theory of relative deprivation (a task which was left to researchers like Crosby, 1976; Gurr, 1970; and Runciman, 1966), the notion described above is at the heart of relative deprivation theory: Feelings of satisfaction depend on subjective, rather than objective, standards (Olson, Herman, & Zanna, 1986), and they depend heavily on the choice of comparison referent (Pettigrew, 1967; Smith, Spears, & Hamstra, 1999; Tropp & Wright, 1999; Walker & Pettigrew, 1984; Walker & Smith, 2002): While a person might not feel deprived or might feel even gratified relative to object A, he/she

might well be deprived relative to object B. However, if object A happens to be a more salient, frequent, or important reference point, feelings of deprivation are unlikely to arise. Thus, perceived deprivation is relative, not absolute. The following two quotes (cited in Martin, 1986), are good illustrations of this proposed principle:

‘(He), youngest of three children, lived with his mother in an 8-story apartment in the South Bronx, a mostly black and Puerto Rican neighbourhood. “I didn’t know any different. I didn’t have anything to compare it to.... I didn’t see it as tough. It was my home”’.

‘An Appalachian woman was hired by the Office of Economic Opportunity to work as a community organizer in her own impoverished black neighbourhood. She spent her time making fruit pies for her poorer neighbours. When asked by a friend how she felt about the amount of money she was earning in this job (her income was slightly above the poverty line), she replied, “I am very content; I have more than my neighbours.” Her friend continued, “What about the people on ‘the hill’?” (This was a wealthy residential area, clearly visible from the organizer’s front yard.) “My life is here. I don’t think about them”’.

While it will be clear to the reader that both quotes above are from people who might from some perspectives be described as deprived, surprisingly neither one expresses great discontent with his/her situation. Thus, deprivation is relative, and dependent on comparisons people do or do not engage in. Even though some researchers have found a relationship between real indices of *objective* deprivation (such as the Gross Domestic Product, an individual’s income/socio-economic status, or the income distribution of a community) and variables like general life happiness and subjective well-being (Hagerty, 1999, 2000; Schyns, 2001; Twenge & Campbell, 2002), *subjective* feelings of deprivation are generally assumed to be a much stronger predictor of various outcome measures. The concept of *subjective* deprivation is also crucial for explaining why sometimes members of objectively advantaged groups feel deprived and aggrieved (Pettigrew, 2002; Taylor, 2002). Although the notion that feelings of relative deprivation are the result of comparison processes is absolutely crucial and central to Relative Deprivation Theory, very little research has been devoted to this link (Ellemers, 2002). In deprivation research, typically feelings of deprivation are assessed (with an eye to trying to investigate their consequences), and the occurrence of some comparison or other which is assumed to have preceded the feeling of deprivation is inferred *a posteriori*, rather than being directly examined. Importantly, deprivation

theory has little to say on which comparison referents will be chosen. Although - paralleling hypotheses in the Social Comparison literature - early scholars have proposed a preference for *similar* targets (Gurr, 1970; Runciman, 1966), very little research has been done to follow up on this prediction. One notable exception is Crosby (1982), who indeed found that women tend to choose intragroup targets (i.e. other women) which are arguably more similar to themselves than intergroup targets (men) in order to evaluate pay satisfaction. However, little research has gone beyond this finding.

Definitions and Types of Deprivation. One factor that has led to considerable confusion is that there are numerous different definitions of relative deprivation (RD) to be found in the literature, resulting in different researchers using the same label to describe different constructs. For instance, deprivation has been defined as a discrepancy between value expectations (what people believe themselves to be entitled to) and value capabilities (what people think they are capable of getting and keeping, Gurr, 1970). Others have defined it simply as an is-ought discrepancy (Schmitt & Maes, 2002), or have emphasised both wanting and deserving as necessary conditions for RD (Olson, Roese, Meen, & Robertson, 1995), or have highlighted the importance of both negative outcomes and illegitimacy appraisals as necessary components of RD (Kawakami & Dion, 1995), or have emphasised the importance of both cognitive (i.e. awareness/knowledge of disadvantage) and affective (anger, resentment, dissatisfaction) components of RD (Guimond & Dube-Simard, 1983; Petta & Walker, 1992; Tropp & Wright, 1999). However, while some researchers conceptualise the affective, resentment component as an integral facet of relative deprivation, others see it as an outcome measure, i.e. as a consequence of relative deprivation (Olson, 1986; Sweeney, McFarlin, Inderrieden, 1990). Moreover, whereas some definitions of deprivation only entail two components (e.g. is-ought discrepancy, see above), others are more complex. In his referent cognitions theory, Folger (1986) names three necessary conditions of relative deprivation: One must be able to imagine better outcomes; one must be likely to obtain better outcomes in the future; and the alternative outcomes must seem fairer. Crosby (1976) lists as many as five necessary conditions. Needless to say, these different conceptualisations of RD also have resulted in different approaches to measure it (c.f. Corning, 2000). Also, some studies have found different components of RD to load on the same factor and to correlate well with each other (Tropp & Wright, 1999), and others have found that they do not, and should be used as separate predictors rather

than to be subsumed under the same construct/integrated into one scale (Wright & Tropp, 2002). In short, the only premise that most RD researchers seem to be able to agree on is that the construct of RD is multi-faceted (Dar & Resh, 2001), although there is considerable disagreement about which facets are important, or how different facets hang together (c.f. Walker & Smith, 2002).

The concept of RD is not only complex because of these definitional issues. Just as different types of comparisons can be distinguished (see above), so too can different *types* of deprivation be differentiated. For instance, people might feel deprived relative to real *or* imagined outcomes (Folger, 1986; Walker & Pettigrew, 1984). Another important distinction is between personal and group level deprivation (Crosby, 1976; Runciman, 1966; Vanneman & Pettigrew, 1972). Runciman thought of 'egoistic' (i.e. personal) deprivation as being deprivation of the self vis-à-vis other individuals, and of 'fraternalistic' (i.e. group) deprivation as being deprivation of the ingroup vis-à-vis an outgroup). The largely accepted assumption is that intra- and interpersonal comparisons lead to personal RD, resulting in individual-level behaviour, and that group comparisons lead to group level RD and group level behaviour (Walker & Pettigrew, 1984); and that personal and group level disadvantage are related but distinct constructs (Tougas, Brown, Beaton, & St-Pierre, 1999). It has also been pointed out that personal and group deprivation can themselves be combined in different ways: An individual can be or feel either a) not at all deprived, b) personally but not group deprived, c) group but not personally deprived, or d) personally and group, i.e. doubly deprived (Vanneman & Pettigrew, 1972). Most approaches emphasising group RD talk about perceived deprivation of the ingroup vis-à-vis some outgroup, and were developed in response to approaches emphasising individual RD, i.e. RD of some individual person versus other individual people. Nonetheless, it should be pointed out that perceived deprivation of the ingroup is not the only possible type of RD for which group memberships might be important. Another possible type of RD would be if an individual person feels deprived vis-à-vis another individual ingroup member or vis-à-vis an outgroup member. Thus, this is RD based on comparisons between individual people *while* group memberships are *salient*. Although some researchers, particularly those in the Social Identity tradition, would argue that it is not necessary to distinguish between comparisons of the *self as an ingroup* member and comparisons of the *ingroup as a whole* (Smith, Spears, & Hamstra, 1999, c.f. also Tajfel & Turner, 1986), it will be argued here that this distinction is important. I will come back to this question later.

Another type of deprivation that has been suggested is deprivation relative to a temporal, self-referent standard, whereby an individual feels that he or she is worse off than he or she used to be. The reference point might be either in the future (Dif, Guimond, Martinot, & Redersdorff, 2001) or in the past (the latter being what Gurr, 1970, called 'decremental deprivation'). An important variant of a theory of temporal deprivation is Davies' (1969) J-curve hypothesis, which posits that feelings of deprivation will be most acute not after a period of prolonged economic struggle, but after a period in which the economy prospers, followed by a sudden downturn. Under these conditions, the gap between actual and expected living standards should be biggest according to Davies. However, maybe due to the fact that evidence in support of the J-curve hypothesis is not very strong (Miller, Bolce, & Halligan, 1977), temporal deprivation has not been the centre of research activity over the last decades. It is only now that a renewed interest in this kind of deprivation is emerging (Pettigrew, 2002; Tougas & Beaton, 2002), an interest which parallels the renewed interest in temporal comparisons in the Comparison literature (see above).

Consequences of deprivation. As noted above, much of RD research has been concerned with the consequences of perceived deprivation (e.g. Dion, 1986). The focus has usually been to predict either negative intergroup attitudes and prejudice or support of collective action and protest aimed at initiating social change. RD has usually been found to be a strong predictor of *intergroup attitudes* (Appelgryn & Bornman, 1996; Appelgryn & Nieuwoudt, 1988; Dion, 1986; Grant & Brown, 1995; Olson & Hafer, 1996; Pettigrew et al., 1998; Thalhammer et al., 2000; Tripathi & Srivastava, 1981; Vanneman & Pettigrew, 1972; although see Duckitt & Mphuthing, 2002; who did not find strong effects; and Guimond & Dambun, 2002, who show that gratification might also be linked to intergroup hostility). Relatedly, some work demonstrates that perceived economic competition with immigrants predicts negative attitudes towards these immigrants (Esses, Jackson, & Armstrong, 1998). Other work in the Realistic Group Conflict Theory tradition, which shows that realistic intergroup conflict (whereby intergroup goals are inversely related; i.e. 'their gain is our loss') impacts on intergroup attitudes (Brown, Maras, Masser, Vivian, & Hewstone, 2001; Sherif, 1966), can be interpreted as further proximal evidence for the effect of deprivation on intergroup attitudes. In addition, some evidence has been obtained that *double*

deprivation might be a stronger predictor of outgroup prejudice than either individual or group deprivation taken singly (Vanneman & Pettigrew, 1972).

As evidence from the relative deprivation, collective action/movements, and even justice literature shows, RD has also been found to be a strong predictor of support for collective action and protest (Abeles, 1976; Crawford & Naditch, 1970; De la Rey & Raju, 1996; Dibble, 1981; Guimond & Dube-Simard, 1983; Hinkle, Fox-Cardamone, Haseleu, Brown, & Irwin, 1996; Jasso, 1993; Kawakami & Dion, 1993, 1995; Kelly & Breinlinger, 1996; Kelly & Kelly, 1994; Klandermans, 1997, 2001; Moghaddam & Perreault, 1992; Olson & Hafer, 1996; Olson et al., 1995; Smith & Gaskell, 1990; Smith & Ortiz, 2002; Walker & Mann, 1987; Walker, Wong, & Kretzschmar, 2002; Wright & Tropp, 2002, however see Brush, 1996). Further, some evidence has been obtained that the affective component of RD might be a more powerful predictor of collective action than the cognitive component (Grant & Brown, 1995; Wright & Tropp, 2002); and that it is particularly group level deprivation which is linked to collective action, with individual level RD being linked more to personal stress and depression (Dube & Guimond, 1986; Smith & Ortiz, 2002; Walker & Mann, 1987; Walker & Pettigrew, 1984; see also Salovey & Rodin, 1984; Tesser & Campbell, 1983). Yet others have argued that double deprivation (i.e. both on the personal and on the group level) might be a yet better predictor of collective action than group deprivation by itself (Flacks, 1970; Foster & Matheson, 1995).

Identification in Deprivation Research. There is considerable confusion in the literature about the role of an individual's strength of identification with its ingroup. While some researchers propose identification to be directly related to deprivation (e.g. Dion, 1979; Petta & Walker, 1992; Trew & Benson, 1996; Tropp & Wright, 1999, although note that there is considerable disagreement about the causal direction of this link), others propose it to be directly related to support for collective action (Klandermans, 2001; Wright & Tropp, 2002), and yet others propose it to moderate the reactions to collective deprivation like for instance support for collective action (Hinkle et al., 1996; Kawakami & Dion, 1993; Kelly & Breinlinger, 1996; Smith et al., 1999), or to moderate the effect of intergroup conflict on intergroup aggression (Struch & Schwartz, 1989). I will come back to this issue later when, after a discussion of social identity theory and a more in-depth discussion of the construct of identification, I shall be better equipped to disentangle those different approaches.

The Person-Group Discrepancy. The deprivation literature has not stopped with asserting that there are different types of deprivation, such as deprivation on the individual and the group level. Some effort has also been expended on comparing mean levels of different types of perceived deprivation. It is now a well established finding that people, in all kinds of situations, tend to report *less* personal than group deprivation and discrimination (Crosby, Pufall, Snyder, O'Connell, & Whalen, 1989; Nagata & Crosby, 1991; Olson et al., 1995; Taylor, Wright, Moghaddam, & Lalonde, 1990; Verkuyten, 1998, 2002). For instance, although most women might agree that women as a whole are deprived vis-à-vis men, the majority of women would nonetheless claim that their individual, personal situation is not one of deprivation. To a certain extent, this finding is puzzling, as it is logically impossible for *all* members of a group to be personally well off, but for the group as a whole to be nonetheless deprived. It has been proposed that there are two bases to the Person-group discrepancy (PGD), a cognitive and an emotional/motivational one (Crosby, Cordova, & Jaskar, 1993). First of all, the effect may be due to the use of different comparison reference frames underlying personal and group deprivation. Perceived personal deprivation is thought to be the result of comparisons mainly with other people (interpersonal comparisons) or other ingroup members (intragroup comparisons). Perceived group deprivation, on the other hand, is thought to be the result of comparisons of the ingroup with other groups (intergroup comparisons; see Postmes, Branscombe, Spears, & Young, 1999, see also Heine et al., 2002). For example, women on average are less likely to be and feel deprived vis-à-vis other women than vis-à-vis men; and these differential comparisons can be expected to result in less perceived personal than group deprivation. Besides, another basis of the PGD is thought to be emotional/motivational. Nagata and Crosby (1991) have pointed out that the feeling of personal disadvantage can be painful, and that people therefore misconstrue comparative information in a self-serving way. Unless forced to make unpleasant comparisons that reveal the personal disadvantage, they will avoid them. In a similar vein, Postmes et al. (1999) propose that people are 'personally motivated' to minimise their individual disadvantage because its realisation is psychologically painful. In contrast, people are 'socially motivated' to maximise their group disadvantage for strategic reasons, i.e. to emphasise injustices with the ultimate goal of bettering the ingroup's position (note that the assumption that people are most motivated by 'equity concerns' on a group level contradicts – as we shall see below – to a certain extent Social Identity Theory, which proposes 'enhancement' as the most

powerful, default motivation in intergroup contexts). Although both the motivational and the cognitive explanation of the PGD seem plausible, it should also be noted that the cognitive one has received somewhat more attention and empirical support so far (e.g. Kessler, Mummendey, & Leisse, 2000; Quinn & Olson, 2003). The logic of both the cognitive and the motivation arguments is relevant for the present research, in a manner that will be outlined below.

A summary, and implications for the present research. In sum, what does this all mean for the present research? It should have become apparent that one of the major shortcomings of the RD work so far is that comparison choices have rarely been directly assessed, and the current research aimed to redress this. Also, relative deprivation has traditionally only been studied with regards to one (usually better off) outgroup. Recently, it has been pointed out that relative deprivation should be studied with simultaneous reference to various comparison targets and groups, such as RD of some minority vis-à-vis the dominant majority *and* vis-à-vis other minorities (Tropp & Wright, 1999), and the current research was designed to do just that. Importantly, the current research aimed to investigate both feelings of RD and antecedent comparison choices, the latter of which have been neglected almost completely so far within RD research, and have usually only been inferred *a posteriori*, rather than being directly examined. A further aim of the present research was to test whether specific feelings of RD might be avoided or, in contrast, emphasised according to strategic principles, as suggested in the literature on the PGD. What is more, I aimed to test the neglected prediction by early RD scholars that similarity would lead to comparison interest and through this to feelings of RD. Since similarity is mainly conceptualised as an antecedent in the RD literature (although not only, see Crosby, 1976, who proposes it to moderate the effects of upward comparisons/deprivation on affective consequences), I decided to initially consider it an independent variable (in spite of the fact that other conceptualisations are possible, see the discussion of the Social Comparison literature above). Moreover, the present research sought to test the effects of RD on psychological well-being, life-satisfaction, and self-esteem, since these outcome variables have been somewhat neglected in favour of other consequences of RD, such as intergroup attitudes/prejudice and support for collective action (see above). Finally, another aim was to illuminate the role of ingroup identification in connection with feelings of RD. I will come back to this last point later.

Social Identity Theory and Intergroup Relations Research

While social groups have until recently been almost completely neglected in Comparison Research; and Deprivation Research – at least in the psychological literature - started off focussing on individuals initially and then later ‘added’ the group concept and the concept of group based deprivation, the notion of social groups has been absolutely crucial to Social Identity Theory (SIT) right from its birth. SIT, which has inspired an enormous amount of research activity since its original formulation (see e.g. Brewer & Brown, 1998; R. Brown, 1998; Brown & Gaertner, 2001; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999; Turner, 1987; Worchel, Morales, Paez, & Deschamps, 1998), posits that an individual’s membership in a social category or group can constitute an important aspect of his or her self-concept. People can categorise themselves at a personal or at a group level, thus perceiving themselves either as unique individuals or in the light of a relevant group membership. If personal identity is salient, interpersonal behaviour and comparisons are likely to occur, and intergroup behaviour and comparisons will arise when group memberships and social identities are salient (Smith et al., 1999; Turner, 1984). SIT states that people have a need for a positive social (group) identity and therefore strive to distinguish their ingroup positively from relevant outgroups (Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986). It is suggested that people engage in intergroup comparisons in which they try to construe their group as both different from and superior to other groups. Thus, the prime and universal motives for intergroup comparisons are thought to be group enhancement and improvement, leading to people systematically favouring their ingroup over outgroups. This hypothesis, which was originally inspired by and put forth in order to explain the occurrence of an ingroup favouring bias even in minimal group settings (Tajfel, Flament, Billig, & Bundy, 1971) has yielded extensive support (Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992). The outcomes of intergroup comparisons are thought to directly influence the self-esteem that members derive from their group membership. In sum, the notions of intergroup comparisons – or, to be more precise, *biased* intergroup comparisons – which are motivated by enhancement and whose outcome directly affects group members’ self-esteem, are central to SIT.

Which Comparisons? However, as we shall see, it is very difficult to derive more precise predictions from these general assertions about exactly *which*

outgroups might be chosen as comparison referents (Brown, 2000). In real-life intergroup situations, there often is a wealth of potentially available outgroup referents, comparisons with many of which might serve the purpose of enhancement. On the most general level, it can be assumed that the identities that are salient in a particular situation will inform the comparisons that are made (Ellemers, 2002). The theory states that '*similarity, proximity, and situational salience* are among the variables that determine outgroup comparability' (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), i.e. that make comparisons with a group more likely. In this context, similarity is understood as a similar standing of the outgroup on the social hierarchy. Further, it is suggested that structural variables like the *impermeability* of group boundaries and the *instability* or *illegitimacy* of the social stratifications and the power hierarchy of groups in a society can render previously incomparable groups more relevant, and make them the target of comparison activity. As Tajfel (1978a) put it, 'Perceived illegitimacy and instability of the perceived intergroup relations provides a bridge from non-comparability to comparability'. This is thought to be the case because in these contexts the psychological possibility arises that the existing social stratifications might be changed, i.e. 'cognitive alternatives' become available. However, predictions that might be derived from these assertions cannot be very precise, given that under conditions of impermeability, illegitimacy, and instability there might still be a wealth of previously incomparable outgroups to choose from as new reference points. Given that SIT emphasises the importance of an 'enhancement' motive (a notion which is reminiscent of Downward Comparison Theory described above, which was however developed somewhat later than SIT), one could expect mainly downward, self-gratifying comparisons to occur (Hogg, 2000). However, another motive implicit in the formulation of SIT is 'improvement', i.e. a desire to better and improve the group's position. Such a motive might lead to upward comparisons with privileged outgroups, since those could be used to support an equity claim for better material rewards for the ingroup (Van Knippenberg & Van Oers, 1984). In spite of the fact that the notion of comparison is central to SIT, studies in which participants were asked to choose a comparison referent relevant to them out of several possible ones remain sparse up to date (Brown, 2000; Brown & Zagefka, 2004; see Brown & Haeger, 1999, for an exception). So, there is little empirical evidence we could build on in order to derive at a more precise formulation of the original theory with respects to outgroup comparison choice.

Identity Management Strategies. Given that people generally strive for a positive social identity, there is obviously a question of what they might do if this positivity is unattainable. The theory proposes that if people cannot successfully positively distinguish their group from a relevant outgroup, because, for instance, the ingroup is disadvantaged or inferior, they might engage in a variety of strategies in order to maintain a positive social identity (Tajfel, 1978b). These are upward *individual mobility* (i.e. leaving the low-status ingroup), *social creativity* (e.g. switching the comparison dimension, switching the comparison target, re-evaluating the dimension), and *social competition* (e.g. collective action and protest). Tajfel assumed that the choice of strategy – just like the comparison choices – would be influenced by structural variables. He was particularly concerned with differentiating between what he called ‘belief systems’ of ‘social mobility’ versus ‘social change’ (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). The default strategy was assumed to be individual mobility, with other strategies only being chosen under conditions of highly impermeable group boundaries where individual mobility is not possible. Social competition was thought to be especially likely under conditions where intergroup relations are unstable and/or illegitimate. Considerable evidence has been put forth in support of structural variables influencing identity management strategy choices (Ellemers, 2001; Ellemers & Barreto, 2001; Jackson, Sullivan, Harnish, & Hodge, 1996; Lalonde & Silverman, 1994). However, structural variables have been shown to not only impact on strategy choice but also on ingroup identification (Ellemers, van Knippenberg, & Wilke, 1990), and initial strength of identification and ‘group commitment’ might also inform strategy choice (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1997, 2002). Some researchers have further proposed that identification mediates the effect of structural variables on identity management strategies (Mummendey, Kessler et al., 1999; Mummendey, Klink et al., 1999), and more generally the causal order of the proposed processes has been questioned (Kessler & Mummendey, 2002).

Related to the work on ‘individual mobility’ versus ‘collective action’ and social change is some work on the effects of ‘tokenism’ (Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990). This is a case whereby group boundaries are virtually closed, making individual mobility very difficult, while a few – very few – exemplars of low status group members who have successfully transcended group boundaries exist. This line of research generally supports the SIT prediction that disadvantaged group members prefer individual action and mobility when group boundaries are permeable, and that they only

resort to collective action when group boundaries are impermeable. However, in addition, this research shows that the *illusion* of permeability is easily created. Very few exemplars of disadvantaged group members who have successfully managed the transition are necessary to create in members of the disadvantaged group the idea that mobility is possible, and to prompt them toward individual rather than collective action (Boen & Vanbeselaere, 2000; Wright, 1997; Wright & Tropp, 2002).

The present research is particularly interested in the third strategy initially proposed by SIT, i.e. the social creativity strategy. Although not all research shows that the structural variables proposed by SIT satisfactorily explain the use of social creativity strategies (Mummendey, Kessler et al., 1999; Mummendey, Klink et al., 1999), their general importance has been widely confirmed. For instance, people may avoid unfavourable comparisons with advantaged outgroups and instead selectively search for other outgroup referents comparisons with which might be more gratifying (Bourhis & Hill, 1982; Cadinu & Reggiori, 2002; Turner & Brown, 1978; Turner, Brown, & Tajfel, 1979). They might also search for new comparison dimensions on which the ingroup stands more favourably (Cadinu & Cerchioni, 2001; Hinkle, Taylor, Fox-Cardamone, & Ely, 1998; Lindeman & Koskela, 1994), or they might re-evaluate the importance of the unfavourable comparison dimension (Brown & Ross, 1982; Wagner, Lampen, & Syllwasschy, 1986; although, see Kanning & Mummendey, 1993), or re-define negative comparison outcomes into positive ones (e.g. 'Black is beautiful', Brown, 2000; Capozza, Bonaldo, & DiMaggio, 1982; Crocker & Major, 1989; Finlay & Lyons, 2000; Hagerty, 2000; Hinkle & Brown, 1990; Pettigrew, 1967). It has also been suggested that people may resort to comparisons over time to establish a positive social identity (Blanz, Mummendey, Mielke, & Klink, 1998; Brown & Haeger, 1999; Ellemers, 2002; Haeger et al., 1996).

Identification as affecting Comparisons. Ingroup identification is thought to be associated with a person's readiness to use social categories for self-definition (Turner, 1999), and should therefore also influence comparison preferences: High identifiers might engage relatively more in intergroup comparisons than low identifiers (Smith, Spears, & Hamstra, 1999). Whereas some researchers debate the possibility of conceptualising identification as a continuous construct (i.e. the idea that some people might be more identified than others, and that degrees of identification strength might be measured, Turner, 1999), others have proposed continuous measurement scales for identification, and have argued that identification can be expected to systematically

correlate with various intergroup outcomes. The scales proposed to measure identification vary widely. Many theorists see identification as a multi-faceted construct, and distinguish between, for instance, cognitive and affective components of identity (i.e. a cognitive awareness of belonging to a group versus an affective, emotional sense of belonging). It is beyond the scope of the present work to thoroughly review the different types of components of identification and their measurements that have been proposed (e.g. Bergami & Bagozzi, 2000; Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Brown, Condor, Matthews, Wade, & Williams, 1986; Brown & Williams, 1984; Deaux, 1996; Deaux & al., 1995; Ellemers, Kortekaas, & Ouwerkerk, 1999; Garza & Herringer, 1987; Jackson & Smith, 1999; Phinney, 1992; Romero & Roberts, 1998; Simon, 2004; Stets & Burke, 2000; Stryker & Burke, 2000). It should suffice at this point to say that the present author conceives of identification as a continuous construct which might systematically co-vary with other features of an intergroup relationship. For instance, it has been proposed that those high on identification should care more about their ingroup, and should consequently be more motivated to positively distinguish their ingroup from relevant outgroups. This might be expected to lead to high identifiers showing more ingroup bias and more biased intergroup comparisons (Brown, 1995; Dietz Uhler, 1999), and one might hypothesise that high identifiers might be *more* interested in intergroup comparisons than low identifiers as a result of their heightened motivation for positive intergroup differentiation.

A critical review and implications for the current research. While the lively area of intergroup relations research inspired by SIT has beyond any doubt greatly enhanced our understanding of intergroup processes, it should not go unnoticed that not all relationships originally proposed have yielded unequivocal support. One concerns the prediction that ingroup identification should be positively related to intergroup bias and more biased ingroup comparisons, which has not always been supported (Brown, 2000). This has led to the proposition that the link might in fact not be as universal as originally assumed, but might only hold true for certain types of groups, i.e. those that are both 'collectivist' and 'relational' (Hinkle & Brown, 1990). However, the groups I am concerned with here, i.e. ethnic groups, can be assumed to fall into this very quadrant of the Hinkle and Brown taxonomy of groups. Further, as we shall see below, much of the (both confirming and disconfirming) research regarding this question has been conducted in the laboratory, and the generalisability of those findings to real-life

groups like ethnic groups must not be automatically assumed. Therefore, one of the core aims of the present research remained to establish the relationship between identification and biased – in the sense of self-serving/enhancing – intergroup and other types of comparisons for ethnic groups.

However, a second central assumption of SIT has been called into question, namely the idea that people display ingroup bias and intergroup discrimination in order to enhance their self-esteem (Hogg & Abrams, 1988). From this, it might be inferred that, on the one hand, low self-esteem should causally lead to more attempts to discriminate in an effort to restore and enhance the self-esteem, and that, on the other, discrimination causally leads to an increase in self-esteem (Abrams & Hogg, 2001). Thus, a positive correlation between these variables might be expected. Then again, empirical evidence has not always supported these predictions (Hogg & Abrams, 1990). One reason might be that it is important to distinguish between personal (individual level) and collective (group level) self-esteem, and that not all studies have taken this important distinction into consideration (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1991, 1992; Rubin & Hewstone, 1998). Another reason might be that discrimination and association with groups might in fact be motivated by factors other than the enhancement/improvement motives originally suggested by SIT. Various other motives have been suggested, such as a 'search for meaning' and 'uncertainty reduction' (Hogg, 2001; Hogg & Abrams, 1990, 1993; Hogg & Mullin, 1999). The importance of uncertainty had already been pointed out by Festinger (1950), who stated that affiliation in groups fulfils a 'social reality' function (uncertainty reduction through confirmation of shared beliefs) and a 'locomotion' function (facilitation of goal achievement). A host of other motives have recently also been discussed (Aharpour & Brown, 2002; Deaux, 2000b; Deaux, Reid, Mizrahi, & Cotting, 1999; Salazar, 1998; Sedikides & Strube, 1997). In sum, one of the aims of the present research remained to establish in how far intergroup discrimination, in the form of self-serving biased intergroup comparisons (i.e. a selective search for gratifying comparisons), would show a systematic relationship with self-esteem outcomes for ethnic groups.

As already alluded to above, much of the research inspired by SIT has been conducted in the laboratory, with ingroup bias frequently being operationalised as a difference between reward allocations to ingroup and outgroup members (Brown, 1995). While some scholars have argued that this fundamentally and irredeemably renders its applicability to real-world phenomena, particularly those of extremely

violent nature, questionable (Billig, 2002); others have argued that we need to start applying SIT principles to real-world groups (Huddy, 2001), and have started to do so (Capozza & Brown, 2000). Recently it has been emphasised that the time is ripe to investigate identity management strategies in multicultural settings (Brown, 2000), and the present work set out to do precisely that.

Paralleling the call to investigate motives other than self-enhancement as the causal factor of group identification, other motives have also been discussed as determining comparison behaviour. I already alluded to this above (see Van Knippenberg's work). For instance, Haeger and colleagues (1996) have suggested that people might sometimes be motivated to stress that their group is worse off than others in order to emphasise injustices and initiate social change. However, to date, little empirical work has been dedicated to exploring the motivating forces of intergroup comparisons.

In sum, the present research set out to clarify which outgroups would prove to be relevant comparators for members of different ethnic groups, to test the validity of the enhancement as well as other motives for informing comparison choices, to test the – by now familiar – prediction that there should be a preference for *similar* comparison outgroups, and to test some of the effects of structural variables such as permeability, stability and illegitimacy. A further aim was to clarify the impact on identification on (biased, i.e. self-gratifying) comparison choices, and to test the effect of comparison information (in the form of RD) on self-esteem. A focal emphasis was also to investigate the use of identity management strategies, particularly of the creative kind (such as de-emphasising the importance of an unfavourable comparison dimension), in real-life settings with ethnic groups.

Stigma Theory and Research

Another research area that informed the theorising of the present research focuses on Social Stigma. Stigmatised groups have been defined as groups that are 'devalued not only by specific ingroups but by the broader society or culture' (Crocker & Major, 1989), and groups as varied as obese people, handicapped people and ethnic minorities have been summoned under this label. However, even though stigma was conceptualised originally as a relatively stable trait, theorists have now moved towards a more contextualised, situation specific definition of stigma (L.M. Brown, 1998;

Crocker, 1999; Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998; Crocker & Quinn, 2001), which defines stigma as 'the possession of, or belief that one possesses, some attribute or characteristic that conveys a social identity that is devalued in a particular context' (Major, Quinton, & McCoy, 2002). An important and frequent finding, which generalises across all kinds of groups that can be described as stigmatised, is that members of these groups do not in principle show lower self-esteem and affect than non-stigmatised, 'mainstream' people (Crabtree & Rutland, 2001; Diener & Diener, 1996; Phinney, 1990; Rubin & Hewstone, 1998; Schneider, Major, Luhtanen, & Crocker, 1996; Verkuyten, 2001). For instance, Ross, Eyman, and Kishchuck (1986) found that life satisfaction is high across *all* classes of society. Given the converging evidence for the negative consequences of unfavourable (interpersonal and intergroup) comparisons proposed in the Social Comparison, Relative Deprivation, and Social Identity literature, and given the fact that members of stigmatised groups should in many everyday life situations be subjected to prejudice, discrimination and devaluation, this finding seems rather surprising. Crocker and Major (1989) have suggested that the phenomenon might be explained by the use of certain self-protective strategies by the stigmatised, which act as a 'buffer' between experiences of discrimination and self-esteem. Specifically, they suggest three strategies: a) members of stigmatised groups will compare their outcomes to those of ingroup members, rather than to those of relatively advantaged outgroup members; b) they will selectively devalue those dimensions on which their group is worse off, and instead place enhanced value on those dimensions on which their group excels; and c) they will attribute negative feedback to prejudice against their group, rather than to their own individual incapability. In the following, each of these proposed strategies will be briefly discussed.

The Intragroup Comparison Bias. Crocker and Major (1989) propose that there are numerous factors that lead to a preference of intragroup over intergroup comparisons. Firstly, the effect is thought to be due to perceived *similarity*. Members of (stigmatised) groups should be particularly likely to compare themselves with fellow ingroup members, rather than with outgroup members, because generally people tend to feel most similar to ingroup members. Secondly, *proximity and contact* are thought to be driving forces toward intragroup comparisons. Crocker and Major argue that members of stigmatised groups should have a tendency to engage in comparisons with ingroup members rather than with outgroup members because stigmatised groups are often situated in very segregated environments in which intergroup contact is rare. Most

importantly, however, the authors suggest that members of stigmatised groups will show a preference for comparisons with ingroup members rather than outgroup members for *self-protective reasons*, because the former are less likely to be upward (i.e. targeted at someone who is more fortunate) among members of disadvantaged groups. None of these ideas is particularly new, with the importance of similarity and contact having been discussed already in the Comparison, Deprivation, and Social Identity literature, and the importance of self-enhancement motives having been emphasised particularly by Downward Comparison Theory and Social Identity Theory. Still, the authors can be credited by trying to apply these principles to some real-life groups like, for instance, women or Blacks in the United States (Major, 1994), while much of the previous work discussed above has focussed on either purely interpersonal settings (for Comparison Research) or minimal, laboratory based groups (for Social Identity Research). Evidence for the importance of a self-serving intragroup comparison bias and a preference for downward/ lateral comparisons over harmful, upward, intergroup comparisons for members of stigmatised groups has been found in a variety of domains (see e.g. Finlay, Dinos, & Lyons, 2001; Siegel, 1995). For instance, black students in the States or handicapped students have lower self-esteem in integrated schools than in segregated schools (Deaux & Martin, 2001; Drury, 1980; Finlay & Lyons, 2000). These findings can be explained in terms of the surplus in intergroup contact in integrated schools, and the resulting frequent occurrence of intergroup, upward comparisons (Rosenberg & Simmons, 1972).

A number of qualifications or extensions to the intragroup comparison bias hypothesis have been put forth. For instance, Major (1994) has suggested that this bias not only protects stigmatised people's self-esteem, but that it also leads to illusory entitlement beliefs: People remain unaware of social inequalities and discrimination. They have also suggested that the group status of the comparison target (ingroup versus outgroup) and the comparison direction (upward or downward) might interact in their effect on self-esteem, such that comparing unfavourably with an ingroup member has worse consequences for the self-esteem than comparing unfavourably with an outgroup member (Major, Sciacchitano, & Crocker, 1993, c.f. also Martinot & Redersdorff, 2002). In addition, Smith and colleagues (1999) have suggested that the standing of the comparison subject relative to *ingroup* members might also play a role: Minority members who are personally advantaged might limit their comparison choices to other ingroup members, because this perspective offers them the possibility of focusing on a

favourable personal outcome rather than on an unfavourable intergroup outcome. In contrast, people who are doubly deprived (i.e. both vis-à-vis ingroup and outgroup members) should not display such a bias in their comparisons because they will have little to gain from it (Smith, Spears, & Oyen, 1994). Smith and colleagues did not find much support for this hypothesis with their laboratory based groups. However, to my knowledge, to date their idea has not been followed up with real-life groups (and one of the studies of the present program of work aimed to do just that). I will come back to this issue later. Finally, it should be noted that stigma researchers echo the SIT prediction that an individual's strength of identification will also influence comparison choices. Like SIT researchers before, they suggest that high identifiers will be more likely to make intergroup comparisons (Crocker et al., 1998; Major, 1994). Again, I will come back to this hypothesis later.

Finally, it should be noted that the self-protective/self-enhancement approaches as advocated by SIT and Stigma research contradict, to a certain extent, one of the central hypotheses of Relative Deprivation Theory. Whereas the self-protective approach argues that *comparison choices* depend on feelings of deprivation, such that one avoids upward comparison targets relative to which one feels deprivation, RDT assumes that levels of *overall perceived deprivation* depend on comparison choices (cf. Kessler et al., 2000). Thus, while the self-protection hypothesis proposes a negative causal effect of deprivation relative to an object on interest in comparing with this object, RDT suggests a positive causal effect of comparing with an object relative to which one is deprived on resulting feelings of overall deprivation. So, the two perspectives differ both in the causal *direction* and in the *valence* with which they propose comparisons and deprivation to be related. One of the aims of the present research was to disentangle these mechanisms.

Devaluation of the unfavourable dimension. The second strategy proposed by Crocker and Major (1989), i.e. the idea that stigmatised people might devalue the importance of a dimension on which they fare badly (such as the importance of going for a run for people that sit in wheelchairs) should not need much further explanation, since it should also be sufficiently familiar from some identical SIT predictions outlined above. Again, substantial support has been yielded for this hypothesis (see above, see also Major & Schmader, 1998; Schmader & Major, 1999; Schmader, Major, Eccleston, & McCoy, 2001). Some findings from the 'stereotype threat' literature, which show that underachievement/bad performance might cause women to distance themselves, i.e. to

disengage, from domains where they feel continually devalued (such as the natural sciences or mathematics), might be interpreted as further evidence (Quinn & Spencer, 2001).

Attributions to prejudice. The last of Crocker & Major's hypotheses, the idea that negative outcomes might be attributed to prejudice rather than to own individual incapacities, is probably the most novel one out of the three (although, see Dion, 1986, who already suggested some years earlier that fraternal deprivation might help to preserve self-esteem, because failure need not be seen as a consequence of individual short-comings). Beyond any doubt, however, the third strategy is the one that has proven most controversial. While some evidence has been put forth in favour of the idea that attributing negative outcomes to prejudice might protect an individual's positive sense of self (see Crocker, Voelkl, Testa, & Major, 1991, who found an effect on some of their emotional outcome indices, although the self-esteem measure was not affected in the predicted manner; see also van Laar, 2001), others have found no support for the hypothesis, or have instead found perceptions of discrimination and self-esteem and other indices of psychological well-being to be *negatively* related (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999; Crandall, Tsang, Harvey, & Britt, 2000; Jasinskaja-Lahti & Liebkind, 2001; Leonardelli & Tormala, 2003; Liebkind & Jasinskaja-Lahti, 2000a; Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002; Schmitt, Branscombe, & Postmes, 2003; Schmitt, Spears, & Branscombe, 2003; Verkuyten, 1998). This has led some scholars to criticise fundamentally the hypothesis, and to argue instead that perceptions of and attributions of negative outcomes to prejudice are costly and painful, rather than self-protective (Kaiser & Miller, 2001; Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002).

The most coherent *alternative* hypothesis is the Rejection-Identification Model put forth by Branscombe and colleagues (1999). These authors argue that rejection and perceived discrimination negatively impact on self-esteem and well-being. Further, discrimination is also proposed to positively affect ingroup identification, which in turn positively impacts on well-being. Hence, rejection is thought to have a *direct* negative effect on self-esteem and well-being, *and* an *indirect* positive one, mediated by identification (see e.g. Jetten, Branscombe, Schmitt, & Spears, 2002, for some empirical support of the model). A good illustration for the equivocal evidence in support of both Crocker and Major's attribution hypothesis and Branscombe et al.'s model is a study by Liebkind and Jasinskaja-Lahti (2000b). They found a negative effect of discrimination on well-being, using regression analyses. However, a between group analysis of the

same data yielded a different pattern (i.e. the group that perceived the most discrimination was *not* the one that had the lowest level of well-being). So, in a way, this study yielded support for both hypotheses presented above.

Crocker and Major have since put forth some qualifications in defence of their original hypothesis. For instance, Crocker, Cornwell, and Major (1993) have suggested that these kinds of attributions might only occur in *some* stigmatised groups but not others. Further, Crocker et al. (1998) have argued that perceptions of discrimination will negatively impact on individuals' self-esteem if these individuals buy into mainstream ideologies (i.e. if they perceive the discrimination as legitimate and blame themselves rather than the 'system'). Moreover, the authors have proposed that it is important to distinguish between one the one hand being discriminated and perceiving oneself chronically as a victim of discrimination (which might have negative effects on self-esteem) and on the other hand *attributing specific* instances of negative treatment to discrimination (which is suggested to have positive effects on self-esteem, Major, Quinton et al., 2002). Also, it has been suggested that *identification* might moderate the effect of perceived discrimination (Major, Quinton et al., 2002, although they also propose the two variables to be directly and bi-directionally linked), and that identification might moderate the effects of attributions to prejudice on well-being (McCoy & Major, 2003). Relatedly, others have argued that members of disadvantaged groups might report and attribute outcomes to discrimination only in private contexts but not in public contexts when a member of the majority is present (Stangor, Swim, Van Allen, & Sechrist, 2002).

A critical evaluation, and implications for the current research. The stigma research area has grown enormously since its initial emergence at the beginning of the 1990s (see e.g. Harvey, 2001; Heatherton, Kleck, Hebl, & Hull, 2000; Kurzban & Leary, 2001; Oyserman & Swim, 2001; Pinel, 1999). However, even though some of the research activity has focussed on ethnic minority groups, most of stigma research has been concerned with other groups like people with health or psychological problems, women, or overweight people. To be sure, stigma research has been almost exclusively conducted in the States (with some notable exceptions to this rule, see Verkuyten, 2001). Therefore, it seems highly relevant to investigate the applicability of stigma principles to ethnic groups, particularly in European settings. The present research set out to do so.

A test of the applicability of stigma principles is all the more important since there is some confusion in the literature about just how generalisable the principles might be. While Crocker and Major (1989) originally argued that their self-protective strategies and coping mechanisms are valid not only for a huge variety of stigmatised groups but even for members of advantaged groups in principle (see also Crocker et al., 1998), the authors themselves occasionally argue that this is not the case. For instance, Crocker, Cornwell, and Major (1993) point out that attributions to prejudice as a means of self-protection might not occur for all kinds of stigmatised groups, and Schmader, Major, and Gramzow (2001) argue that disengaging from and devaluing dimensions on which one does badly might not work the same for all (in their case ethnic) groups. Because of these contradictory positions regarding questions of generalisability, a test of stigma theory principles on European ethnic groups appears timely.

In trying to put these principles to the test, however, one might encounter a number of difficulties, arising from the theorising in the Stigma field. For instance, the terminology used is not always clear and unambiguous. As an example, in their 1989 article, Crocker and Major propose that *attributions mediate* affective reactions to an outcome. Yet, they then go on to discuss the processes as if they thought of attributions as a moderator, rather than a mediator. Confusions like this obviously leave the field researcher wondering precisely which model to build and statistically test.

Further, as outlined above, the authors (Crocker & Major, 1989) propose that discrimination of people on the basis of their group membership negatively impacts their *self-esteem*. Thus, discrimination is conceptualised as an IV (independent variable) and self-esteem as a DV (dependent variable, c.f. also Major et al., 1993). However, in order to 'bolster' their self-esteem, stigmatised people are supposed to make attributions to discrimination and prejudice (making self-esteem the IV, and discrimination the DV). Also, elsewhere they have proposed that initial levels of self-esteem will not only influence attributions to/perceptions of discrimination, but also the choice of self-management strategies themselves (Crocker, Blaine, & Luhtanen, 1993, see also Verkuyten, 1997, for some empirical evidence on this). Thus, self-esteem is simultaneously, or alternatively, seen as both IV and DV. Apart from the fact that the proposed causal order of the processes is somewhat confusing, the argument also seems rather circular (see Kaiser & Miller, 2001, although to be fair, in a recent contribution the authors have attempted to somewhat clarify the argument, see Major, Quinton et al., 2002). Also, in yet other publications self-esteem suddenly features as a moderator, or,

to be more precise, it is *called* a moderator even though it is discussed as if it was conceived of as an IV, influencing identity management strategies (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992).

Similarly, recall that in their 1989 article Crocker and Major proposed that *similarity* causally affects comparisons (similarity as IV, comparisons as DV). However, later they go on to propose that upward and downward comparisons can both have both positive and negative effects on esteem (Major, Testa, & Bylsma, 1991). Which effect will be observed is suggested to be dependent on two moderators: The perceived controllability, and the esteem-relevance of the comparison, with the latter in turn proposed to be affected by the similarity to the comparison other and the importance of the comparison dimension. Thus, while similarity is sometimes conceptualised as an IV, here it is proposed to causally affect a moderating variable (thus, effectively making it a moderator itself).

The role of *identification* is hardly clearer: While Branscombe and the supporters of the rejection-identification model clearly think of it as a *mediator* (see above), the defendants of the original Crocker and Major hypothesis have proposed it to be a *moderator* (Major, Quinton et al., 2002; McCoy & Major, 2003). Even though this confusing terminology has to date not been a great problem for stigma researchers, who have focussed mainly on experimental data and manipulated variables as they seemed fit, things become substantially more difficult if one endeavours to deal with survey data, particularly of a cross-sectional nature, and if one is dependent upon building good statistical models. In sum, the roles of self-esteem and similarity in the stigma literature are hardly less confusing than their role in the comparison literature. Thus, one of the aims of the present research was to establish how the relationship between self-esteem and one particular kind of discrimination, i.e. economic discrimination/deprivation, would pan out for ethnic minority members in a European context.

A last issue that should be pointed out is that stigma research, albeit being ambivalent about the exact relationship of self-esteem with other variables, has made important contributions to the clarification of the self-esteem concept itself. Luhtanen and Crocker (1992) have developed a scale of collective self-esteem, and have argued that it is important to distinguish between the concepts of individual self-esteem (i.e. a sense of self-worth of the individual person) and collective self-esteem (i.e. a sense of worth attached to or derived from being a member of a certain group, see also Crocker, Blaine, et al., 1993; Crocker, Luthanen, Blaine, & Broadnax, 1994; Crocker & Wolfe,

2001; Long, Spears, & Manstead, 1994; Luhtanen & Crocker, 1991). It has been suggested that discrimination and prejudice might be more related to collective than to individual self esteem, and a neglect of the distinction between individual and group based self-esteem has also been employed to explain the lack of support for SIT's self-esteem hypothesis (see above). Nevertheless, although the notion of collective versus individual self-esteem has proven valuable in this sense, it should also be noted that it has led to some further confusions: The measurement of collective self-esteem is often similar to the measurement of the affective component of identification. Thus, while some researchers would claim to be able to draw conclusions from their data about the relationship of, for instance, discrimination and self-esteem, others would interpret the very same data as speaking to the relationship between discrimination and identification. The problems arising because of this will become especially visible in the next section. However, before moving on to this question, the main research hypotheses for the present research that stem from the stigma literature will be summarised.

I aimed to test, for ethnic minorities in a European setting, whether there would be evidence of a self-protective intragroup comparison bias. In this sense, a main research question was whether members of ethnic groups would tend to compare their own economic situation more with that of ingroup members than with that of outgroup members in order to evaluate how they are doing.³ The use of a self-serving comparison bias has to my knowledge not yet been comprehensively tested with ethnic groups. Thus, one of the main aims of the present research was to fill this gap. The use of a self-protective strategy in the form of a devaluing of unfavourable comparison dimensions was also investigated. It was also investigated what the relationship between identification and comparison choices would be. Additionally, in the light of the

³ It should be pointed out that the main hypothesis about comparisons in stigma research talks about comparisons of the kind whereby an individual person evaluates his or her lot compared to some other person's lot under conditions where group memberships are salient (e.g. Blanton, Crocker, & Miller, 2000). I.e., the person is aware during the comparison whether the comparison referent is an ingroup or outgroup target. As already mentioned above, these kinds of comparisons would classify as intergroup comparisons according to some SIT researchers. According to SIT, in order for a comparison to be of intergroup nature it is not necessary for the comparison referents to be groups (ingroup versus outgroup). The assumption is that when group identities are salient, the individual self is perceived as interchangeable with other group members, and SIT would therefore not differentiate between intergroup comparisons on the group level (ingroup versus outgroup) and intergroup comparisons on the individual level (self vs. ingroup member or self vs. outgroup member). However, it will be argued here that this distinction is important, because these types of comparisons can have different outcomes. For instance, a woman might well not feel deprived vis-à-vis other women (self vs. ingroup members), and might not even feel personally deprived vis-à-vis men (self vs. outgroup members), but might still think that women are deprived as a whole (ingroup vs. outgroup). For this reason, I will differentiate between these different types of comparisons (see below).

Crocker/Major-Branscombe debate about the relationship between discrimination and self-esteem, the research sought to test how economic discrimination and self-esteem would be related in the present setting. Further, this research was an attempt to disentangle the RDT prediction that comparisons would causally affect deprivation (i.e. comparisons as IV, deprivation as DV) from the SIT/Stigma prediction that deprivation relative to an object causally affects interest in comparing with it (i.e. deprivation as IV, comparisons as DV). Finally, it was of interest to test different predictions about the nature of the identification-deprivation link. Some hypotheses with regards to this relationship will be spelled out in the following.

The Identification-Deprivation relationship

As previously indicated, one of the aims of the present research was to illuminate the relationship between ingroup identification and deprivation. Predictions about the nature of this link can be found in Relative Deprivation, Social Identity, and Stigma Research. For the sake of coherence and ease of understanding, it was chosen to discuss these predictions jointly under one heading, rather than within the sections pertaining to each of these research areas. I will commence by summarising some of the empirical evidence speaking to the relationship between identification and deprivation, and then summarise some hypotheses that might be derived from the literature. It should be pointed out that some of the hypotheses below are derived from work that focuses on discrimination rather than deprivation. Nonetheless, because some element of unfairness is an integral component of RD (see above), I understand deprivation as *one* specific case of discrimination, i.e. economic discrimination. Therefore, I see no problems with letting the development of the argument be inspired by some work on discrimination also, particularly because coherent hypotheses in the literature about the identification-deprivation link are sparse. Mixed results can be found in the literature, with some studies demonstrating a positive and some negative relationship between identification and deprivation (Tougas & Beaton, 2002). Others have found identification to *moderate* the effects of deprivation on variables like collective action participation and intergroup attitudes (Hinkle, et al., 1996; Kawakami & Dion, 1993; Kelly & Breinlinger, 1996; Smith et al., 1999), whereas yet others primarily think of it as a mediator (e.g. between structural aspects of the situation and identity management strategies (Mummendey, Klink et al., 1999). Moreover, as yet, the direction of causality remains indeterminate,

and various scholars have proposed that there is likely some element of bi-causality (c.f. Major, Quinton, & McCoy, in press, 2002; Petta & Walker, 1992; Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Tougas & Beaton, 2002).

Tropp and Wright (1999) hypothesised that highly identified group members should report greater perceived deprivation in intergroup comparisons than low identifiers, due to the high identifiers being more committed, and desiring more for their ingroup. Their data, provided by Latino and African-American respondents, supported this prediction for both self-outgroup and ingroup-outgroup comparisons. However, although the majority of studies found in the literature seem to speak in favour of such a positive link between identification and deprivation, not all empirical evidence points unanimously in the same direction.

Mummendey, Kessler and colleagues (1999) found a *positive* association between identification and fraternal resentment for (lower-status) East Germans (vis-à-vis West Germans); Kessler and Mummendey (2002) found identification and resentment of group deprivation to be *positively* correlated for East Germans; Ellemers and Bos (1987) found a *positive* link between identification and group deprivation Dutch for shopkeepers (vis-à-vis immigrant shopkeepers) in Amsterdam; Petta and Walker (1992) found a *positive* link for Italian immigrants in Australia; Duckitt and Mphuthing (2002) found that cognitive RD and perceived illegitimacy did not causally affect identification amongst Africans in South Africa, but that affective RD *positively* affected identification (while identification did not causally affect either cognitive or affective deprivation); Abrams (1990) found a *positive* link between identification and group deprivation for Scottish participants; and Gurin and Townsend (1986) found a *positive* correlation between gender identity and collective discontent.

Conversely, Tougas and Veilleux (1988) found *no link* between identification and group deprivation for women; Lalonde and Cameron (1993) found *no link* between identification and group disadvantage for immigrants; Guimond and Dube-Simard (1983) found a *zero* correlation between identification and (cognitive) perceptions of deprivation for Quebec nationalists (although they did find a link between identification and dissatisfaction); and Ellemers and Bos (1987) found a *zero correlation* between identification and personal deprivation for Dutch shopkeepers.

What is more, Abrams (1990) found a *negative* correlation between identification and self-outgroup deprivation for Scots; Abrams, Hinkle, and Tomlins (1999) found a *negative* effect of anticipated deprivation on identification for Hong

Kong residents which was moderated by perceived control; and Smith and colleagues (1999) artificial laboratory group participants with higher identification also displayed a tendency to perceive *less* deprivation (c.f. also Dion, 1979; Trew & Benson, 1996; Veilleux, Tougas, & Rinfret, 1992, for further studies on this issues).

Moving a bit further away from the concept of deprivation, and looking at its proxies such as discrimination, the picture is hardly clearer. Some of the empirical evidence inspired by the 'attributions to prejudice' versus 'rejection-identification' debate outlined above might also be of interest, particularly because some of the measures of collective self-esteem used in those studies are very similar to the affective component of identification (see above). In this sense, research inspired by the rejection-identification model yields both support for a positive effect of discrimination (and deprivation?) on identification *and* for a negative effect of discrimination (and deprivation?) on the affective component of identification (i.e. collective self-esteem). For example, Schmitt, Branscombe, and colleagues (2003), as well as Branscombe, Schmitt, and Harvey (1999) found a positive link for African Americans between discrimination and identification; and Jetten and colleagues (2002) found that perceived discrimination led to higher ingroup identification for people with body piercings. It has also been suggested that this effect might be moderated by structural variables such as permeability and legitimacy (Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002). Another interesting study is by Sellers and Shelton (2003), who failed to demonstrate an effect of their identification measure on perceived discrimination. Then again, their 'centrality' subscale, which is quite a similar measurement of identification to some of the measures used in the research reviewed above (notably, the Brown et al. 1986 scale), did have a positive lagged effect on perceived discrimination for their African American participants (note, however, that the authors did not test the other causal direction, i.e. the effect of discrimination on identification. Their results should therefore not be interpreted as evidence against the opposite causal direction).

Further, Levin, Sidanius, Rabinowitz, and Federico (1998) found that identification and legitimising ideologies are negatively related to minority members (arguing for a *positive* link between identification and deprivation); Major, Gramzow and colleagues (2002) found that identification and perceived ease of individual mobility was negatively related for minority members (arguing for a *positive* link between identification and deprivation); Sachdev and Bourhis (1985) show that people identify more with powerful groups (arguing for a *negative* link between identification

and deprivation); and others (Roccas, 2003; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1987) have also shown that people identify more with high status groups (which might translate into a *negative* correlation between deprivation and identification).

One reason for these divergent findings might lie in the operationalisation of deprivation and identification, respectively: As we have seen above, numerous different operationalisations and measures of deprivation have been used (particularly, with some focussing on personal and other on group level deprivation); likewise, identification has been measured in different ways, with the concepts of the affective component of identification often overlapping with collective self-esteem measures. However, it is unlikely that the very diverging and heterogeneous findings can be explained purely by the use of different measurement instruments. In the following, some theories, which have been proposed to explain the nature of the identification link, will be summarised.

What Relative Deprivation Research has to say: Cognitive vs. affective identification, and their differential effects. Some attempts at clarification have been made by Petta and Walker (1992), Tougas and Beaton (2002) and Walker (1999; see also Guimond & Dube-Simard, 1983). Although the accounts differ somewhat from each other, they all pose that it is central to distinguish between individual and collective constructs, and between affective and cognitive components. Petta and Walker (1992) distinguish between cognitive and affective components of deprivation, and between individual and collective deprivation. They propose that cognitive deprivation positively influences identification, which in turn positively influences affective deprivation. Walker (1999) suggests that personal deprivation should lead to lower personal self-esteem, while collective deprivation should lead to lower group self-esteem (translating into a *negative* effect of RD on the affective component of identification). Also, they see their model valid in addition to, rather than instead of, other models which see RD as a consequence of identification. Tougas and Beaton (2002) suggest that the cognitive/descriptive component of identification should causally and *positively* affect perceived deprivation, while deprivation in turn should causally and *negatively* affect the affective, evaluative component of identification. Thus, this approach sees one component of identification as the IV, and another one as the DV, whilst deprivation is thought of as functioning simultaneously as IV and DV (mediation).

What Social Identity Theory has to say: Positive effect of identification on deprivation, mediated by comparisons. According to the classical SIT approach (Tajfel

& Turner, 1986), group identification might be expected to cause higher group level deprivation (for minority members). This might be the case because for highly identified individuals an intergroup context should be more salient, they should engage in more intergroup comparisons (Doise, 1988), and thus be more likely to feel deprived on a group level (at least if they are 'objectively' disadvantaged). On the other hand, people for whom their *personal* identity is salient should make comparisons and evaluations on the interpersonal (and possibly intragroup) level (see also Kawakami & Dion, 1993; and Smith et al., 1999, who make similar predictions). So, essentially, according to this perspective, high group identification should cause high perceived group deprivation (DV), mediated through intergroup comparisons.

However, Tajfel and Turner (1986) also predict that conflicts of group interests lead to heightened identification. Although the theory remains relatively vague as to precisely why this effect might be expected, we might dare some speculations. Conflict of interests might be interpreted as one type of identity threat and, on the basis of SIT, it might be predicted that threats to a person's social identity will lead to this person being increasingly motivated to differentiate his or her ingroup positively from outgroups (Brown, 1995; Brown & Ross, 1982). Since SIT proposes positive distinctiveness to be achieved mainly through intergroup comparisons, we might expect that conflict of interest and threat will lead to a higher self-enhancement motivation and to more (both qualitatively and quantitatively speaking) self-enhancing intergroup comparisons. Identity should increase as a consequence of these enhancement motives and enhancing intergroup comparisons. Group based or group level deprivation might be interpreted as both an identity threat and an instance of intergroup conflict (since economic goals of groups are often perceived to be negatively interdependent or zero-sum, Esses et al., 1998). Therefore, deprivation might increase identification, mediated by increased enhancement motives and an increased use of enhancing intergroup comparisons.

What Stigma Research has to say: Positive effect of deprivation on identification, mediated by salience and psychological needs. Looking at a different - albeit to deprivation closely related - variable, Crocker and Major (1989) have suggested that discrimination (and deprivation?) causally and negatively affects (collective) self-esteem, which causally and positively leads to attributions of outcomes to discrimination, which causally and positively affects (collective) self-esteem. Even if one makes the theoretical leap from collective self-esteem to identification by equating it with the affective identity component, it is difficult to derive precise hypotheses from

these ideas, as in field work it will be very difficult to distinguish between being exposed to discrimination and attributing outcomes to discrimination. Further, the argument seems rather circular (see above). Branscombe and colleagues (1999) suggest in their rejection-identification model that discrimination should cause enhanced levels of ingroup identification (DV). In this model, not discrimination/deprivation, but identification is conceptualised as the DV. They also found some evidence for a causal (and positive) link from identification to discrimination, but their evidence for the causal direction from discrimination to identification is much stronger (then again, see Operario and Fiske, 2001, who present a stronger case for ethnic identification causally affecting perceptions of deprivation). Branscombe et al. suggest that discrimination should enhance levels of ingroup identification because it should firstly make the intergroup situation more salient, and should secondly increase the individual's need to belong (i.e. positive group membership in compensation for aversive discrimination experiences). However, the rejection-identification model also posits a negative effect of discrimination on well-being. Collective self-esteem might be taken as a proxy for well-being (and, as seen above, collective self-esteem is very similar to the affective component of identification). Thus, even if one is willing to equate discrimination with deprivation, it is difficult to derive very precise predictions from this model for the relationship of identification and deprivation.

It should be noted that some of the ideas outlined above at least partially contradict each other. For instance, where Branscombe and colleagues propose a *positive* effect of discrimination on identification, Tougas, Beaton, and Walker propose a *negative* effect (on the affective component of identification). The fact that both positive and negative correlations between identification and deprivation can be found in the literature suggests the presence of some influential *moderating* variables. This thesis set out to test the models explaining the identification-deprivation link. In addition, the idea of important moderation variables was elaborated and tested. Predictions are presented below (see studies 3 and 4).

Equity and Justice Theory and Research

While both SIT and Stigma Theory mainly emphasise the importance of an enhancement motive (although there are some exceptions, see Haeger et al., 1996, above), the potential importance of other motives, i.e. equity and justice concerns, is

sometimes acknowledged in the Comparison literature (see above). Nonetheless, even in this literature other motives are often only tangentially discussed. Further, there has recently been a growing awareness of their potential importance (c.f. Miller & Kaiser, 2001, who emphasise that both enhancement and equity can be understood as coping responses to stigma). Therefore, it seems indicated to briefly elaborate on another research field which has long placed these kinds of motivations centre-stage: Justice Research, and particularly Equity Theory, Just-World Belief Theory, and System-Justification Theory.

As one would expect, Justice Research is concerned with people's evaluations of the fairness and justice of their outcomes, although the field has recently experienced a shift from an emphasis on fair outcomes (outcome justice) to an emphasis on fair treatments (procedural justice, see Tyler & Lind, 2002, see also Bierbrauer & Klinger, 2002). Justice perceptions have been shown to be influenced by contextual/cultural factors (Leung & Morris, 2001), as well as by variables like unfulfilled wants, perceived violations of entitlement, attributions of blame, and comparison processes (Freudenthaler & Mikula, 1998; Schmitt & Maes, 1998). Traditionally, justice research has been concerned with the evaluation of justice of the outcomes for the self. Many hypotheses to be found in this literature are reminiscent of ideas reviewed above, such as the claim that justice evaluations of minority members will be influenced by a preference to compare with other disadvantaged ingroup members or the personal past, rather than with members of the advantaged majority (Tyler & Smith, 1998). The preference for intragroup comparisons, as well as a proposed tendency of minority members to perceive the social stratifications as legitimate, and the denial of personal discrimination (even though discrimination on the group level might be admitted to) are seen as coping strategies for disadvantaged group members (Tyler & Smith, 1998).

However, more recently the importance of justice and equity concerns on behalf of other people or outgroups has been emphasised (Tyler, 2001). For instance, the behaviour of people who helped Jews during the Holocaust is a good example of altruistic behaviour whereby group borders do not coincide with the borders of the moral community (Reykowski, 2002). 'Equity in favour of others' can be a strong motivating factor, and observing deprivation in someone else can trigger strong reactions (Tiraboschi & Maass, 1998). The recently growing interest in intergroup emotions in the field of intergroup relations is underscoring this, with the finding that existential guilt (about being privileged) can be a strong predictor of behavioural

intentions to rectify the injustices others are faced with (Schmitt, Behner, Montada, Muller, & Muller Fohrbrodt, 2000).

Equity Theory. The fundamental premise of Equity Theory, which echoes many of the ideas outlined above, is that judgements of fairness and feelings of satisfaction are socially determined (Adams, 1965). People evaluate the fairness of their outcomes by comparing them to other people's outcomes, and the choice of referents is thus crucial for resulting equity evaluations (Singh, 1994; Summers & DeNisi, 1990; Sweeney, 1990). The prediction to be found in equity research about which referent will be chosen for comparative purposes should also be familiar: People are thought to seek out *similar* comparison others (Konopaske & Werner, 2002). Like some of the other theories reviewed above, Equity Theory is another theory that sees a central role for social comparison processes (although the interest in social comparison has diminished somewhat with the recent trend to focus on *procedural* justice, Folger & Kass, 2000). Unlike some of the other theories above, however, equity theory assumes justice and fairness motives (rather than enhancement or other motives) to be critical and most important: People compare with others in order to assess the fairness of their lot, or possibly in order to demonstrate the unfairness of their group's inferior outcomes in order to promote social change (Austin, 1977). Implicit in these ideas is the notion of causal attribution (Weiner, 1980), i.e. peoples' ideas about the locus of control of the forces responsible for their situation, and whether they tend to attribute their outcomes to their personal abilities or effort or, instead, to external factors. In the following, some hypotheses will be outlined that take on the notion of attribution more explicitly.

The Just-World Beliefs. The Just-World Hypothesis (Lerner, 1980) posits that people are often inclined to see the world as just and fair, and that they are reluctant to perceive or admit the world as unjust or random (e.g. Ambrosio & Sheehan, 1990; Dalbert & Katona Sallay, 1996; Hagedoorn, Buunk, & Van de Vliert, 2002). People high on Just-World Belief (JWB) tend to blame poor/disadvantaged groups and innocent victims themselves for their misfortune, rather than holding responsible unjust procedures, forces, or social stratification systems (Harper, Wagstaff, Newton, & Harrison, 1990; Rubin & Peplau, 1973). It is especially noteworthy that recently some research has been published which suggests that members of disadvantaged groups might be particularly high on JWB, even more so than members of advantaged groups (Dalbert & Yamauchi, 1994; Hunt, 2000; although see Calhoun & Cann, 1994). It has also been shown that the BJW is negatively related to discontent and assertive action

among members of disadvantaged groups (Hafer & Olson, 1993), and this tendency might explain why people so often accept their disadvantage, rather than to rebel and try to initiate change (Olson & Hafer, 2001).

System Justification Theory. A very similar if not identical idea is at the core of system justification theory (SJT). This theory proposes that people are motivated to justify and rationalise the way things are, so that existing social arrangements are perceived as fair, legitimate, justifiable and necessary (Jost, 2001; Jost, Burgess, & Mosso, 2001). This is thought to be a consequence of people wanting to see their environment as stable, understandable, predictable, and meaningful. This might mean that people either rationalise the status quo, or that they internalise inequalities and form a depressed sense of entitlement (Jost & Hunyady, 2002). The tendency to perceive social arrangements as fair has successfully been demonstrated for members of privileged groups (Cozzarelli, Wilkinson, & Tagler, 2001), although SJT also proposes that the tendency toward system justification is particularly pronounced among members of disadvantaged groups (Jost & Hunyady, 2002; Jost, Pelham, Sheldon, & Sullivan, 2003), resulting in a tendency among disadvantaged people to blame themselves for their circumstances, rather than some unfair social system. Some evidence for a particularly pronounced tendency toward self-blame among members of disadvantaged groups can also be found in the attribution literature (e.g. Oishi, Wyer, & Colcombe, 2000, who found that European Americans attribute positive events internally and negative events externally, and the reverse was true for Asian Americans). Hence, SJT poses the same explanation as found in the stigma and JWB literature for why members of disadvantaged groups often do not engage in more social action and protest behaviour: They are 'blind' to their disadvantage; they do not see it. Given how similar these ideas are to some hypotheses to be found in stigma research, it is hardly surprising that recently there has been quite a lot of collaboration across the boundaries of these research fields. For instance, in a recently published book on the psychology of legitimacy (Jost & Major, 2001), stigma researchers Major and Schmader (2001; c.f. also Major, Gramzow et al., 2002) argue that that members of disadvantaged groups have a motivation to enhance and protect their self-esteem, and that they are also motivated to perceive the world as legitimate and just. Further, appraisals of illegitimacy are proposed to have a damaging psychological effect in the long term, and the authors theorise that it might be precisely because of this that people widely endorse

legitimising beliefs (note that many of these ideas seem to be somewhat derivative of Marx's notion of 'false consciousness').

Given the recent upsurge of affirmative action policies in many Western Democracies (e.g. the US and the UK), there is likely to be an increased political awareness among the populace of systematic group based disadvantages and discrimination working against members of particular groups (Appelt & Jarosch, 2000). One of the aims of the present work was therefore to investigate how far members of ethnic minorities would display equity concerns and be high on 'system blame', or how far they would instead blame themselves for their situations and be high on JWB and system justification. The 'equity on behalf of others' motive was also examined. Further, justice scholars have recently emphasised that not much research has focussed on both intrapersonal (temporal) and social comparisons, and that in most studies comparison objects are predetermined by the experimenter and that few studies have allowed the participants to select their own comparison objects (Tyler & Smith, 1998). Hence, the effects of different motives for comparison choices (out of a range of different comparison objects) were investigated here (although, again, it should be noted that different causal predictions can be found in the literature. While most theories reviewed above propose motives to influence comparison processes, some scholars – e.g. Leach et al., 2002 - instead propose motives to be *influenced* by comparison processes).⁴

Acculturation Theory and Research

A concept that has been recognised to be of enhanced importance for research in immigrant settings with different ethnic or cultural groups, and that thus should be considered here, is that of acculturation. Acculturation has been defined as the changes in the original cultural pattern of either or both groups as a result of contact between them (Redfield, Linton, & Herskovits, 1936, c.f. also Chun, Organista, & Marin, 2003; Dawson, Crano, & Burgoon, 1996; Ghuman, 2000; Orr, Mana, & Mana, 2003; Ryder, Alden, & Paulhus, 2000, for the definition and operationalisation of acculturation).

⁴ Note that in his 'Group Value Model', Tyler emphasises that while SIT only focuses on intergroup comparisons, it might be useful to also take intragroup comparisons into consideration. He argues that group members might derive a positive social identity from comparing favourably with other members of the ingroup. Again, his argument emphasises the need to distinguish between intergroup comparisons on the group level (ingroup versus outgroup) and intergroup comparisons on the personal level (self vs. other ingroup member or self vs. outgroup member). I will come back to this issue further down.

Berry (1980, 1997) differentiates between different acculturation strategies or preferences, namely *integration*, *assimilation*, *marginalisation* and *separation*. Immigrants who employ different strategies might differ with regards to their wish to maintain their original culture, i.e. a cultural identity that is dissimilar to and distinct from the one of host community members, and their wish to establish contact with host community members. While individuals who favour *separation* do not want to have contact with the host majority but are interested in maintaining their original cultural identity, individuals who favour *marginalisation* are neither interested in contact with the host majority nor in maintaining their original cultural identity, whereas *integrationists* want to maintain a distinct identity but also seek contact with the host community. Finally, *assimilationists* do not want to maintain a distinct cultural identity. They prefer taking on the cultural identity of the host community whilst simultaneously seeking contact with the host community. Most studies have found a strong tendency for immigrant groups to favour integration (Berry, 1997; Van de Vijver, Helms-Lorenz, & Feltzer, 1999; Van Oudenhoven, Prins, & Buunk, 1998). Furthermore, integration has been shown to be the most adaptive strategy in many settings, being associated with the best acculturative outcome (Berry, 1997, 2001; Berry, Kim, Minde, & Mok, 1987; Liebkind, 1996, 2001; Phinney, Chavira, & Williamson, 1992; Zagefka & Brown, 2002; for further research into these issues, also see Dona & Berry, 1994; Dietz & Roll, 1998; Flaskerud & Uman, 1996; Jasinskaja-Lahti & Liebkind, 2001; Jasinskaja-Lahti, Liebkind, Horenczyk, & Schmitz, 2003; Jerusalem, 1988; Liebkind & McAlister, 1999; Padilla & Perez, 2003; Schmitt-Rodermund & Roebbers, 1999; Schmitt-Rodermund & Silbereisen, 1995, 1999; Schmitt-Rodermund, Silbereisen, & Wiesner, 1996; Zheng & Berry, 1991; Zick, Wagner, van Dick, & Petzel, 2001). Thus, the immigrant's successful adaptation requires a successful balancing of their heritage culture and the culture of the society of settlement (Sam, 2000). Note that the strategy of integration, which is frequently associated with the most adaptive outcomes for minority members and which essentially consists of a positive orientation toward both the minority and majority culture, also coincides with some similar ideas expressed in the political sciences, i.e. that multiculturalism should be the policy option of choice (Kymlicka, 2002).⁵

⁵ A further important development in the acculturation field is that it has been pointed out that not only the strategy preferences of the minority members, but also the preferences of the majority members might play a crucial role, as well as the interplay between the two (Bourhis, Moise, Perreault, & Senecal, 1997; Laitin, 1998; Phinney, Horenczyk, Liebkind, & Vedder, 2001; Piontkowski, Florack, Hoelker, &

In sum, it should have become clear that both acculturation strategy preferences and comparison processes have been proposed to impact on variables like acculturative stress and well being on the part of the ethnic minority members. However, again, predictions are not unequivocal: While for instance Crocker and Major (1989) would argue that integration should lead to lowered self-esteem due to the surplus of contact and intergroup comparisons (compared to marginalisation or separation), acculturation research has yielded some results that contradict this prediction, and that seem to show the opposite (see above). Given this state of affairs, it might be worthwhile to explore what the interplay between acculturation strategies and comparisons is. According to Festinger's similarity hypothesis, people tend to compare themselves to similar others in order to evaluate their abilities and opinions. Furthermore, Hegelson and Mickelson (1995) operationalise comparison preference in terms of seeking contact. It can be inferred that separationists and marginalisationists, who neither seek contact with members of the host society nor seek to take on the host society's culture (thus avoiding similarity with host society members), should engage in intergroup comparisons to a lesser extent than individuals who prefer either assimilation or integration. Also, while integrationists who do seek contact but do not want to take on the host society's culture should show an intermediate level of comparisons with host society members, assimilationists (who want to have both contact with and be similar to host society members, through taking on their culture) should show the highest level. Recently, it has been pointed out that social comparison processes in immigrant settings have not received their due empirical attention so far (Brown, 2000; Deaux, 2000a). The present research not only aimed to rectify this by investigating comparisons members of ethnic minorities and majorities engage in, but also to address how social comparisons might be related to acculturation strategies.

Summing Up

A brief summary of the broader research questions might be helpful at this point. Overall, this research was concerned with investigating which comparisons members of ethnic minorities and majorities engage in when they want to evaluate their economic situation. As we have seen above, in spite of the centrality of comparison processes to

Obdrzalek, 2000; Piontkowski, Rohmann, & Florack, 2002; Roccas, Horenzyk, & Schwartz, 2000; Sinclair, Sidanius, & Levin, 1998; Verkuyten & Thijs, 2002b; Ward & Chang, 1997; Zagefka & Brown, 2002).

many social psychological theories, there is a paucity of studies in which comparison targets were not pre-determined by the researcher, and to date little work has been done to investigate comparisons in naturalistic settings. Moreover, few research has simultaneously focussed on both social and temporal comparisons, like the present research endeavoured to do. Another aim was to assess perceived deprivation relative to different targets. Again, heretofore little research has considered RD relative to several targets simultaneously. Also, the present research aimed to illuminate which variables determine comparison choices. As we have seen, different research traditions and models often conceptualise the same variables either as IVs, DVs, moderators or mediator. In my work, I tried to follow those predictions for which the most consensus between theorists can be found across different research areas. Hence, similarity, as well as proximity and contact, and motives (such as evaluation, enhancement, and equity/justice concerns), were conceptualised as antecedents of comparisons. Further antecedents were acculturation strategies, and – following SIT predictions – ingroup identification and permeability/stability. A particular emphasis of the present work was to investigate the hitherto little-tested RDT assumption that feelings of deprivation are dependent on comparison choices. In juxtaposition, the self-enhancement hypothesis of particularly the stigma literature was tested, which proposes the opposite causal direction in linking comparisons and deprivation: It was tested whether comparisons with objects relative to which deprivation is high would be avoided. In addition, it was tested whether feelings of deprivation would result in lowered self-esteem and life-satisfaction, and whether being deprived would result in de-valuing the importance of the dimension of ‘economic wealth’, as predicted by both SIT and stigma research. Finally, the nature of the relationship between identification and deprivation was explored.


Thus, the present work aimed to integrate predictions and theories found in several distinct areas of research within social psychology. It has long been acknowledged that such an integration might be sensible and fruitful and will result in a productive cross-fertilisation and the development of novel research ideas (e.g. Ellemers, 2002; Kawakami & Dion, 1995; Niens & Cairns, 2001, 2003; who call for an integration of SIT and RDT). A number of books have been published which are trying to integrate different perspectives, although these publications usually do not go much beyond dealing with separate research areas in separate chapters, and binding these chapters in a joint hard cover (c.f. Olson, Herman, & Zanna, 1986, who jointly discuss

comparison and deprivation research; and Masters & Smith, 1987, who discuss justice, comparison, and deprivation research). Thus, to date, real integrative attempts remain relatively sparse (for a few empirical exceptions, see Ellemers, Wilke, & van Knippenberg, 1993; Kessler & Mummendey, 2002; and Mummendey, Kessler et al., 1999, who combine SIT and RDT hypotheses; Wenzel, 2000, 2001, who combines justice and social identity research; and Appelgryn, 1991, who combines Social Comparison and RD theories). The present research was intended to follow in the footsteps of these promising first efforts.

The main research questions can be summarised in a model (see figure 2). But, I would like to be clear that this model is of preliminary and heuristic nature. None of the studies to follow simultaneously attended to all its components. Moreover, since predictions that can be derived from the literature are often contradictory to each other or even circular, the nature of this research was necessarily somewhat exploratory. For instance, as we have seen, some theories would predict a direct link from identification to comparisons, others predict a direct link from identification to deprivation, and yet others a direct link between comparisons and deprivation. Therefore, the model described in figure 2 is only intended to provide the reader with a more comprehensive – if very general and broad - overview of the processes the current work focussed on. It should not be understood as a definitive description of the processes, and at no point in this thesis will a structural equation model be presented that resembles and includes all the processes summarised here.

Figure 2

A heuristic model



Types of Comparisons and Deprivation. Finally, before moving on to study 1, a few words should be said about the exact types of comparisons and deprivation the present research attends to. Although many of the taxonomies described above provided a useful source of inspiration, none matched precisely the focus of the present work. Comparisons in the present context were mainly operationalised as '*Comparison Interest*' (*CI*). Table 2 displays different types of comparisons the current work focussed on, i.e. different combinations of self referent and object referent, as well as the labels used below to refer to them. Although the table is not exhaustive of all types of comparisons attended to in this thesis, those that are omitted for now are easily derived and introduced later on in the text, where the reader, after having familiarised her- or himself with the labels and rationale underlying the taxonomy, should have no problems following which constructs are referred to.

Firstly, it is important to distinguish between *upward comparisons* (i.e. comparisons where the comparison target is better off than the comparison subject/self), *downward comparisons* (where the target is worse off than the self) and *lateral comparisons* (where comparison target and self are on the same level). Secondly, *temporal comparisons* (i.e. comparing the self/ingroup with the same target at a different point in time) have to be distinguished from *social comparisons* (where comparison subject/agent and object differ). Social comparisons can be further subdivided into the following modes of self- and other-focus, which are paired as follows: a) The self as an individual person versus some other individual whilst group memberships are not salient (*interpersonal comparison*), b) the self as an ingroup member versus some other ingroup member while group memberships are salient (*intragroup comparison*), c) the self as an ingroup member versus some outgroup member while group memberships are salient (*intergroup comparison, group membership level*), d) the whole ingroup versus an outgroup (*intergroup comparison, group level*). At different points in the discussion above, the need to distinguish between intergroup comparisons on the group level (ingroup vs. outgroup) and intergroup comparisons on the individual level (self vs. ingroup member or self vs. outgroup member) has been mentioned. Table 2 honours this distinction. Also, it should be noted that one and the same comparison might be categorised as either an interpersonal or as an intragroup or intergroup comparison, depending on the circumstances and on whether group memberships are salient at the time the comparison is made.

Furthermore, there are potentially endless variations of intergroup comparisons, since the ingroup might be compared to any given outgroup. Thus, a member of a particular ethnic minority might compare herself with a member of the ethnic majority, or with a member of some other ethnic minority.

For practical reasons and in order to keep the scope of this work within a manageable range, the present research was forced to restrict itself to comparisons along one dimension: economic well-being or relative deprivation/gratification (although other types of deprivation, e.g. political deprivation, of course exist, c.f. Connor, 2001). Table 2 provides a summary of the types of deprivation included in the study, as well as their working operationalisations and the labels used to describe them. Most importantly, whilst using Runciman's original distinction between personal and group deprivation, another type was added: Group membership deprivation. While Runciman's original egoistic deprivation is referred to as 'Personal Relative Deprivation' (PRD), defined as deprivation that results from negatively comparing the self to other people while group memberships are not salient, Runciman's fraternalistic deprivation is referred to as 'Group Relative Deprivation' (GRD), defined as deprivation that results from negatively comparing the ingroup to other groups. However, 'Group Membership Relative Deprivation' (GMRD) is defined as deprivation that results from negatively comparing the self to other people while group memberships are salient (i.e. comparing the self to an ingroup member, or comparing the self to an outgroup member). Note further that Group Membership Deprivation was assessed both vis-à-vis specific targets (labelled specific GMRD), and on an overall level (the overall level being the average Group Membership Deprivation calculated across all targets, labelled overall GMRD). Again, table 2 falls short of providing a complete taxonomy of types of deprivation attended to in the present research, and it certainly does not include all types of theoretically possible RD. However, it does provide some operational definitions, which will assist the reader in following other types of RD introduced later on in the text.

Table 2

Operational taxonomy of (Likert-scale) comparison interest (CI) and specific deprivation measures included in the study

Subject referent	Object (target) referent	Target Label	Comparison & Deprivation Label
self	Other ingroup members in country of residence	Intragroup	CI, GMRD
self	Self in past	Temporal	CI, GMRD
self	Members of <i>other</i> minorities (for minority participants), members of minorities (for majority participants)	Minority	CI, GMRD
self	Members of the majority (relevant for minority participants only)	Majority	CI, GMRD
self	Other people, regardless of their group membership	Inter-personal	CI, PRD
self	North Americans in America	American	CI, GMRD
self	French people in France	French	CI, GMRD
self	People in other countries (i.e. not the country of residence), i.e. mean of American CI & French CI	Outgroups outside	CI, GMRD
self	Turks in Germany (for non-Turkish respondents only)	Turkish	CI, GMRD
self	Aussiedler in Germany (for non-Aussiedler respondents only)	Aussiedler	CI, GMRD
self	People in the developing world	Developing world	CI, GMRD
self	Asylum seekers	Asylum	CI, GMRD
self	People in country of origin (for minority respondents only)	Origin	CI, GMRD
self	Overall (i.e. mean) deprivation relative to all possible targets (includes both specific and general GMRD items)	Overall	GMRD
group	Overall (i.e. mean) deprivation of the ingroup as a whole	Overall	GRD

Note. CI = Comparison Interest, RD = Relative Deprivation, GMRD = Group Membership Relative Deprivation, PRD = Personal Relative Deprivation, GRD = Group Relative Deprivation.

CHAPTER 3

Study 1: A Survey of Ethnic Minority Members in the UK

Introduction

To investigate some of the mechanisms around comparisons and deprivation in ethnic minority settings, a first study was conducted among minority members in the UK, with the intention to explore which comparisons minority members do make, and relative to which comparison objects they feel deprived. As outlined above, one important shortcoming of previous research is that very few studies have examined these issues simultaneously for a *number of different* comparison targets; most studies have only looked at one target at a time (Tropp & Wright, 1999). Thus, this study aimed to redress this state of affairs, by simultaneously including a number of comparison objects. What is more, the following issues were explored: Self-protective strategies of minority members, RD as dependent on comparisons people make (as is suggested by RDT), consequences of perceived deprivation, and the link between deprivation and identification. More specifically, the following hypotheses were derived from the literature reviewed above.

It has been suggested that minority members protect their positive self-image by preferring comparisons with other ingroup members to comparisons with (advantaged) outgroup members (Crocker & Major, 1989). The underlying assumption is that on average members of stigmatised groups will fare better compared to members of their ingroup than they will compared to members of the superior outgroup, and that they should therefore prefer intragroup over intergroup comparisons. The motivating factor is assumed to be that people strive to see both themselves and their group in a positive light, and that they avoid information that reflects negatively on the self and ingroup (enhancement). Thus, people avoid negative comparison information, and instead seek out positive information. Further, some of the work reviewed above suggested that comparisons with the self in the past are particularly amenable to self-serving distortions. For instance, people might mis-portray their past selves as having been worse than they in fact were, in order to feel better about their present selves, and in order to maintain some illusion that even if the present situation is not too pleasant or

positive that at least it is better than it once was (McFarland & Alvaro, 2000). Therefore, it was proposed that minority members on average would perceive themselves to fare better relative to a temporal comparison referent than relative to social (intergroup) referents. Consequently, it was predicted that participants would also prefer temporal comparisons over social (intergroup) comparisons. Summing up, the following hypotheses were generated:

H1. Participants would perceive themselves to be less deprived relative to ingroup members (intragroup GMRD) and relative to the past (temporal GMRD) than relative to other social (intergroup) targets. From this, and given the proposed motive for self-enhancement and self-protection, H2 follows:

H2. Interest in comparing with ingroup members (intragroup CI) and with the past (temporal CI) is higher than interest in comparing with other social (intergroup) targets. However, although H1 and H2 pose predictions about mean levels of CI and GMRD, the rationale can also be expressed in correlational terms:

H3. Deprivation relative to an object will negatively influence interest in comparing with this object (Crocker & Major's self-protective hypothesis). Therefore, perceived deprivation relative to an object (specific GMRD) and the interest in comparing with this object (CI) will be negatively correlated for all objects.

Turning now to RDT, this family of theories assumes that feelings of deprivation will depend of comparisons people do or do not engage in. While this is a plausible and widely accepted assumption, we have seen above that hitherto little research has been done to test it. The present research aimed to redress this. As outlined above, it was predicted that overall minority participants would be likely to feel deprived relative to majority members, and less deprived or even gratified relative to members of their ingroup and their own past. From this, H4 follows:

H4. Feelings of overall deprivation (overall GMRD, and overall GRD) are heightened (i.e. positively affected) by a strong interest in comparing with majority members, and are lowered (i.e. negatively affected) by a strong interest in comparing with ingroup members and the past.

A further widely accepted but little tested assumption (following from both the RDT and the stigma literature) is that feelings of deprivation would negatively affect various indices of psychological well-being. Moreover, previous research has demonstrated the existence of a systematic relationship between RD and group

identification, but mixed results have been obtained as to the valence and direction of this link. From this, H5 follows:

H5. Deprivation (both GMRD and GRD) will negatively affect indices of self-esteem and life-satisfaction. Also, a relationship with identification was expected, but no specific predictions were held about the nature of this relationship. Rather, given the diverse findings and hypotheses about the deprivation-identification relationship reviewed above, the RD-identification link for ethnic minority members in the UK was tested in an exploratory manner.

Further, as we have seen above, the self-protective hypothesis (Crocker & Major, 1989; Mummendey, Klink et al., 1999) does not only make predictions about the selective use of comparisons in order to maintain or protect a positive social identity, but also about some other variables. For instance, one of the 'creative strategies' proposed by SIT is concerned with the 'importance' attributed to a certain comparison dimension. Members of stigmatised groups can protect their positive sense of self by playing down the importance of dimensions on which they fare badly, and by instead emphasising the importance of alternative comparison dimensions on which they are superior. From this, H6 follows:

H6. A negative effect of deprivation (both GMRD and GRD) was predicted on the 'importance' attached to 'being well off'.

Finally, in chapter 2 we have encountered some theories that would predict a direct effect of ingroup identification on comparison choices. On the basis of SIT, one might expect that high identifiers are more motivated to positively distinguish their ingroup from relevant outgroups, and since positive distinctiveness is thought to be primarily achieved through intergroup comparisons, high identifiers might consequently engage in more intergroup comparisons than low identifiers. As we have seen above, similar predictions about a positive effect of identification on intergroup comparisons can be found in the stigma literature, and even in the justice literature. The last prediction was concerned with a test of this effect:

H7. identification will correlate positively with an interest in intergroup comparisons.

Method

Participants

Two hundred and thirty-five secondary school students (12-15 years of age; 107 females; 128 males) filled out questionnaires during class time. Data were collected in an area of West London in which the percentage of minority members, especially of Asians, is particularly high, and very visible. Most of the participants of the study were second or third generation immigrants, whose parents or grandparents had migrated to Britain. Students were given a list of groups, including the option of naming groups that were not listed, and asked which group they felt they belonged to *most*, i.e. which group was most important to them when they think about who they are (see questionnaire in appendix 1). According to the students' self-classification, 96 were Sikhs, 72 were Indians, 21 were Pakistanis, 15 were Somalis, 11 were Hindus, 6 were Afghans, 5 were Afro-Caribbeans, and 9 students belonged to a variety of other groups. Note that the students were also given the option to identify themselves as 'English'. Interestingly, none of the students opted for this.⁶ Note also that some of the self-classifications offered to participants are not mutually exclusive. National as well as ethnic and religious categories were included because I wanted the students to choose the group that is really most important to them, and not to limit artificially the range of possible groups. The vast majority of students indicated that they had been born in England, and

⁶ A separate version of the questionnaire had been constructed for 'English', i.e. majority students. Since none of the participants self-classified in that way, this questionnaire was not used and will not be discussed here. Previous research (Gonzalez, Brown, & Zagefka, 2003; Zagefka & Brown, 2002) has shown that when investigating group identities in ethnic settings, it is methodologically (as well as ethically) most sound to let the participants indicate their group identities themselves, rather than – for instance – rely on the teacher's classification of their students. A further question is whether the way of assessing ethnic group identities might have given rise to demand characteristics, i.e. students were 'forced' to describe themselves in these terms, even if the terms might not be of high relevance in their everyday lives and experiences. Evidence has been found – mainly in a Dutch context – that ethnic group identities are of some importance for young research participants, but that their importance by the same token should not be overestimated (Verkuyten, Masson, & Elffers, 1995, see also Hurtado, Gurin, & Peng, 1994; Lay & Verkuyten, 1999). A couple of indicators are available in the present context that point toward ethnic group identities being of relevance to the research participants independent from demand characteristics (these also pertain to the other studies reported below). First of all, students also completed an open ended 'Who am I' task. Since I did not find strong support for the hypotheses that inspired this item, and for brevity's sake, results for this task will not be discussed below. However, students mentioned ethnic group identities frequently in their responses, indicating that those identities are at least somewhat salient and important. Further, mean levels on the identification measures (to be presented below) are generally high, also speaking to the importance of the social categories the present work focussed on.

of those students born elsewhere, the majority had been living in the country for more than three years. 44% indicated that English was their main language.

Procedure

Before conducting the study, the questionnaire had been pilot tested, to assure good comprehensibility of the questions, and reasonable alpha levels of the scales. Before filling out the questionnaires, all participants were given a detailed, oral briefing (in simple, accessible language) about the issues of the questionnaire. They were given some explanations about the existence of different groups (e.g. Turks, Indians, British, Hindus), and were told that children in the class might belong to different groups. It was explained to them how people could compare themselves to other people (ingroup or outgroup members) or to themselves in the past when they want to assess how they are doing (the order of examples was counterbalanced between sessions). The instructions were modelled on those used by Wilson and Ross (2000). Also, it was explained to students how some people are better off than others in economic terms, and they were invited to think about their own situation relative to various comparison targets. Students were familiarised with the use of Likert-scales, and were given the opportunity to ask questions about anything they were not clear about. All participants were thoroughly debriefed after completion of the questionnaires, and the results of the study were fed back to the headmistress and teachers that had been involved.

Measures

The questionnaire included the following measures: First, students' *comparison interest (CI)* in various targets was assessed. Respondents read the following text:

'Please think about success in life. As you know, some people have it hard in life and others have it easy. Some people find good jobs easily and have a lot of money. They live in nice houses and can buy many things, while others cannot do that. If you want to know how well off you and your family are, how important is it for you to compare with each of the following in order to see how well you are doing?'

Students were then given five targets, and their interest in comparing with each target was measured on a 5-point scale (1 = not at all important to 5 = very important). Comparison options (all single-item measures, see also Table 1) were: 'members of

your own group' (*intragroup CI*); 'your own situation in the past' (*temporal CI*); 'members of another minority group in England' (*(other) minority CI*); 'English people' (*majority CI*); and 'people that are important to you, and it does not matter which group they belong to' (*interpersonal CI*). This last item was included to do justice to the fact that people are not necessarily aware of group memberships when engaging in comparisons. Rather, conceivably sometimes people simply compare with other *people*, without being aware of their respective group memberships, i.e. without group identities being salient. The order of the items was randomised for each respondent.

After this, students were asked to make a *categorical comparison choice*. They were asked which one of the above five options they would find *most* important to compare with if they were allowed to choose only one.⁷

To measure *specific deprivation relative to each of the targets*, participants were then asked how well they were actually doing compared to each of the five targets (1 = much better to 5 = much worse, after scale reversal). Those single-item measures were called '*intragroup GMRD*', '*temporal GMRD*', '*minority GMRD*', '*majority GMRD*', and '*interpersonal GMRD*' (see Table 1).

To measure what was termed *overall group membership relative deprivation (GMRD)*, the measures described by Tropp and Wright (1999) were used. Students indicated how well off they felt overall (1 = very to 5 = not at all, after scale reversal), and how angry or satisfied they were with their situation (1 = very satisfied to 5 = very angry, after scale reversal). These two items were combined with all five specific deprivation measures described above, to form a reliable scale of overall GMRD (7-item scale, Cronbach's alpha (α) = .77).

Perceived overall group relative deprivation (GRD) was measured by the students indicating whether they thought that the situation of their group is worse than that of the English, whether they thought that members of their group have it harder than English people, and how satisfied or angry they were with the situation of their group (3-item scale (with the third item being reverse scored), 1 = low group deprivation, 5 = high group deprivation, α = .55).

⁷ The Comparison Interest (CI) scales were developed in an attempt to devise a more powerful, interval measure of comparisons than the categorical measures typically used in comparison research. Analysis for both the present and subsequent studies generally demonstrate a good validity of the CI measure. For instance, repeated measures ANOVAs with categorical comparison choices as a between subjects factor and CI in different objects as levels of a repeated measures factor show that there is a good correspondence between categorical choices and interval CI, with respondents typically scoring highest on the CI scale that pertains to the object they also choose on the categorical measure.

Note that for practical reasons (mainly to remain within the time limits imposed by the schools, as well as within the students' ability and attention span), it was not possible to have a larger number of items to measure each construct. Therefore, this and some of the other reliability indices might appear lower than ideal. Then again, since lowered reliabilities lead to more conservative testing, significant results obtained with these scales should be given even more weight. This rationale also applies to some of the other studies presented below.

The *group identification* scale consisted of a combination of six items adapted from Brown et al. (1986) and Ellemers, Kortekaas, et al. (1999). The measure comprised both cognitive and affective items. Examples are 'I see myself as a member of my group'; and 'I am proud of my group' (1 = low identification to 5 = high identification, $\alpha = .66$).⁸

To measure *personal self-esteem*, five items were adapted from Rosenberg and Simmons (1972). Example items are 'At times, I think I am not good at all', and 'I am able to do things as well as most other people' (1 = low self-esteem, 5 = high self-esteem, $\alpha = .64$).⁹

General life satisfaction was measured using three items from Diener, Emmons, Larsen, and Griffin's (1985) satisfaction with life scale ('I am satisfied with my life', 'The conditions of my life are excellent', 'So far, I have received most of the important things I want in life'), (for each of these 1 = disagree to 5 = agree, $\alpha = .75$).

'*Importance*' placed on the dimension of being well off was assessed by a simple, one item measure: 'How important is it to you to be well off?', (1 = not at all to 5 = very).

Additionally, students indicated their age, sex, country of birth, how long they had been living in England, and the group membership of their mother and father, respectively. For all studies, it was tested for potential effects (correlations, and

⁸ Various other measures reviewed in the section on SIT in chapter 2 (see above) also influenced the construction of the identification measure. Further, it should be clear from my discussion of 'ethnic groups' in chapter 1 that I follow scholars who perceive social identities to be at least partially constructed and context dependent (c.f. Antaki & Widdicombe, 1998; Barreto, Spears, Ellemers, & Shahinper, 2003; Day, 1998; Eithier & Deaux, 2001; Kinket & Verkuyten, 1999; Suny, 2001). However, in spite of this, there is also often considerable cross-situational stability of people's self-definitions (Huddy, 2001). It is for this reason that I see results obtained with an identification interval measure as meaningful; and that I see participants' scores on this measure expressing more than a situational preference, i.e. a somewhat stable trait of 'identity strength'.

⁹ Note that in line with early theorising in the stigma field, it was chosen to focus on *personal* self-esteem (rather than collective self-esteem) as a proxy for psycho-social well-being of minority members.

interactions with IVs) of these demographic variables on the dependent variables. Unless noted otherwise, they did not have any notable effects.

Results¹⁰

Analyses for the following broad themes will be presented: i) Descriptive analyses and group differences, ii) ANOVA and Chi-square results, testing for differences in comparison interest (both the interval CI measure and the categorical choices) and perceived specific Group Membership Relative Deprivation (GMRD) relative to different objects (speaking to H1 & H2), iii) Regressing comparison interest (CI) in different objects from perceived specific deprivation relative to this object (H3), iv) regressing overall Group Membership Relative Deprivation (GMRD) & Group Relative Deprivation (GRD) from CI in different objects to test the RDT prediction that comparisons inform feelings of deprivation (H4), v) correlates of deprivation: identification, self-esteem, and life satisfaction (H5), vi) standing and importance placed on the dimension (H6), vii) the relationship between comparisons and identification (H7).

Descriptive analyses and group differences

Overall, students' ingroup identification was well above the midpoint of the scale ($M = 4.41$), they had on average high self-esteem ($M = 4.07$), and high life satisfaction ($M = 3.97$). It is noteworthy that a lot of evidence is available underlining the importance of focussing research on *specific* ethnic groups, rather than on ethnic minorities in general. Of course, different groups cannot be expected to have the same experiences and attitudes, just as majority members' attitudes differ toward different minority groups (c.f. e.g. Arends-Toth & Van de Vijver, 2003; Celious & Oyserman, 2001; Lalonde &

¹⁰ It should be noted that for both this dataset and the studies to follow, numerous further analyses were carried out. Brevity forbids discussing all of these. As a general strategy, those analyses that pertain most directly to the hypotheses, and those that yielded the most coherent results, will be reported. In addition, some further important findings will be briefly summarised in footnotes. For the present study, these were as follows: the data replicated prior work on the well-established Person-Group-Discrepancy (PGD); overall GMRD was lower than overall GRD. Further, regression analyses predicting overall GMRD from all specific GMRD items showed that overall RD was most affected by intragroup GMRD and majority GMRD. This shows that although - as we will see below - participants indicated to not be interested in comparing with the English, this does not mean that this comparison was irrelevant and meaningless. It clearly had psychological consequences; i.e. it affected feelings of overall GMRD. These results provide further support for the self-protective argument.

Cameron, 1993; Verkyten & Thijs, 2002a). Therefore, I endeavoured to analyse results for minority groups separately wherever possible (although these attempts were somewhat hampered by the small N for some of the ethnic minorities). Further, in spite of important differences between different ethnic groups, there often are also important similarities. For instance, we have seen that *all* ethnic minority groups in the UK and in Germany are somewhat deprived and disadvantaged compared to majority members. Therefore, when in the analyses below the grouping variable was sometimes 'minority' versus 'majority', I see the results stemming from such an analytic strategy as meaningful. Wherever analyses for separate minority groups indicated that psychological processes are too different for the groups to be summarised into a common category for analytic purposes, I refrained from doing so.

With regards to the present study, analyses focussed on Indians ($N = 72$), Pakistanis ($N = 21$), Sikhs ($N = 96$), and Somalis ($N = 15$). Somalis were included although the N for this group was small, because it was the only Non-Asian group verging on being big enough to be analysed separately. It was tested for differences on all variables included in the study, and differences were found with regards to comparison preferences, and with regards to deprivation. A Chi-square analysis with 'group' and 'categorical comparison choice' yielded a significant result, $\chi^2(6) = 15.78$, $p < 0.02$. While Pakistanis and Somalis were more likely to compare with members of their ingroup, Indians and Sikhs were more likely to compare with their own personal past in order to find out how well-off they are. In addition, an ANOVA revealed that Somalis felt more deprived overall than any of the other groups, $F(3, 172) = 4.31$, $p < 0.01$. A reason for the intergroup differences in comparisons might be that Pakistanis and Somalis are small minorities in the setting we are looking at, whereas Indians and Sikhs are big minorities, to the extent of almost being a majority in this specific setting. Maybe Pakistanis and Somalis therefore have more ingroup cohesion, clinging together with other members of their minority more, and being therefore more prone to compare with other ingroup members. Furthermore, most Somalis were refugees and most of them had therefore not been in England for as long as members of the other groups. This might be an additional factor why comparisons with the own past might not be as diagnostic and might attract less interest for them, and it might also explain why they are higher on perceived deprivation: This perception is likely to match 'objective' deprivation. However, because these mean differences did not translate into differences

in *associations* between the constructs of interest, in the following, analyses will mainly focus on the group of ‘ethnic minority members’ as a whole.

Comparison Interest and perceived specific GMRD relative to different objects

As outlined above, it was predicted that intragroup and temporal GMRD would be smaller than GMRD in the other targets (H1), and that CI in those two targets would be biggest (H2). Categorical comparison choice frequencies are displayed in table 3.

Table 3

Percentage of choices for each categorical comparison target

Categorical Comparison Target	<i>N</i> = 200
Ingroup member in country of residence (intragroup)	19.5
Temporal	34.5
Members of (other) minorities in country of residence	0.5
Majority (Germans or English)	4.0
Interpersonal	41.5
Chi-Squared	130.90***

Note. *** $p < .001$.

As is apparent, respondents expressed a strong interest in interpersonal comparisons, but also marked interest in temporal and intragroup comparisons. Comparisons with majority members or members of other minorities were hardly of interest. A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to test for significant differences between the CI in different targets, and another one to test for significant differences between perceived GMRD relative to each object. For CI, this produced a significant effect, $F(3.57, 811.01) = 15.50, p < .001, MSE = 0.93$. The effect for specific GMRD was also significant, $F(3.63, 803.99) = 3.06, p < .02, MSE = 0.59$.¹¹ A conservative method, i.e. post-hoc pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni adjusted alpha levels, was used to test for significant differences between means. As expected, intragroup and temporal CI was

¹¹ One should note that for this and some of the following analyses throughout the thesis, the *N* is sometimes smaller than the size of the sample, due to missing data. Also, for this and all the following analyses for which the sphericity assumption was violated, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected values are reported.

bigger than CI in the other targets. With respect to GMRD, the prediction was partly supported (looking at significant differences between means), with temporal but not intragroup GMRD being smaller than the GMRD relative to the other targets (however, the trend was in the right direction, with temporal and intragroup GMRD having the smallest means). For a summary of cell means, see table 4.

Table 4

Mean CI and specific GMRD for various targets

Targets	CI		Specific GMRD	
	N = 228		N = 222	
Intragroup	3.08	a (1.47)	2.27	ab (0.89)
Temporal	3.04	a (1.27)	2.18	a (1.05)
Members of (other) minorities	2.70	b (1.34)	2.31	ab (0.93)
Majority members	2.56	b (1.36)	2.40	b (0.95)
Interpersonal	2.65	b (1.36)	2.36	ab (0.92)

Note. High values indicated more CI and more GMRD. Subscripts denote significant differences between CI and GMRD in different targets at $p < .05$. Standard deviations in parentheses.¹²

Thus, the analyses supported the prediction that ‘intragroup CI’ and ‘temporal CI’ would be higher than CI in the other targets. Further, the repeated measures analyses support the idea that there might be a systematic link between CI specific GMRD, with CI being high in those objects relative to which GMRD is low. Still, since a comparison of mean levels cannot yield any strong support for two constructs being systematically linked, the pairwise correlations for reach of the targets were analysed next.

Regressing CI in different objects from perceived specific Deprivation relative to this object: evidence for a Self-protective strategy?

According to the ‘self-protection hypothesis’ (H3), negative pairwise correlations between specific GMRD and CI were expected, due to participants avoiding

¹² Since RD scores in Table 4 are generally below the midpoint, it is probably more accurate to describe our participants as more or less ‘gratified’ rather than ‘deprived’. However, for the purpose of our research, the choice of label here is not important, for two reasons: First, because the focus was either on *relative* levels of deprivation/gratification vis-à-vis different targets, i.e. comparisons between means (rather than absolute values), or on the *relationships* and associations between different variables (again rather than absolute values). For both these issues, it is irrelevant whether participants on average score below or above the midpoint of some scale. Second, because the precise meaning of the mid-point is always dependent on the subjective selection (by the researcher) and interpretation (by the participants) of the endpoints of the scale, mean-vs.-midpoint comparisons are often problematic anyway.

comparisons with objects relative to which they feel deprived. The pairwise correlations were as follows: $r = -.20$ for the intragroup target, $-.11$ for the past target, $-.12$ for the interpersonal target, $-.09$ for the majority target, and $-.11$ for the (other) minority target. Only the correlation for the intragroup target was significant (at $p < .01$), and the correlations for the past and interpersonal target were marginally significant (at $p < .09$). Thus, although all pairwise correlations were negative and therefore in the predicted direction, the evidence was relatively weak, since correlations were only modest, and some failed to reach significance.

GMRD & GRD from CI in different objects: Comparison Choices as antecedents of RD?

Some more regression analyses were carried out, to test the RDT prediction that interest in different comparison targets should influence feelings of overall perceived deprivation (H4). It was hypothesised that feelings of overall GMRD and GRD should be negatively predicted by intragroup and temporal CI, and positively by CI in majority members. This was because, in general, deprivation vis-à-vis temporal and intragroup targets should be low for minority members, and deprivation vis-à-vis majority members should be high.¹³ Separate analyses were carried out to predict GMRD and GRD, respectively. ‘Intragroup’, ‘temporal’, and ‘majority’ CI were the predictors (it was decided to only include CI objects for which there were relative specific predictions, in order not to overload and overcomplicate the analysis). Results are displayed in table 5.¹⁴ As can be seen from table 5, mixed results were found for the RDT prediction. As expected, GRD was (marginally) negatively predicted by intragroup CI, and positively by majority CI. However, temporal CI failed to be a significant predictor, and the regression for GMRD did not yield any significant betas.

¹³ Note that this prediction follows Crocker & Major’s argument (1989). However, of course the perceptions will not hold true for *every* minority member, as there are likely to be some minority members who perceive a lot of deprivation relative to intragroup or temporal targets. Nonetheless, overall and on average, RD relative to these targets should be low, i.e. this should be true for *most* minority members, translating into the expected associations spelled out above.

¹⁴ Various other models had been tested also to explore the effect of comparisons on deprivation. For instance, various comparison bias indices (operationalised through difference scores) were used as predictors. None of these other models helped to clarify the relationship further.

Table 5

Predicting overall deprivation (GMRD & GRD) from CI

		Overall GMRD N = 232	Overall GRD N = 219
	Mean levels	2.19	2.58
Overall Model	R^2	.01	.03
	F	0.56 (3, 228)	2.53 • (3, 215)
Individual Betas	Intragroup CI	-.01	-.15 •
	Temporal CI	-.07	.10
	Majority CI	-.02	.17*

Note. • $p < .07$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. Df in parentheses.

Correlates of perceived Deprivation: Life-satisfaction, Self-esteem, and Identification

Next, some analyses pertaining to H5 were carried out. First, analyses were conducted to test whether RD would be negatively linked to personal self-esteem and life satisfaction. It was also explored whether GMRD and GRD would interact in their effect on these DVs.

When regressing *self-esteem* from GMRD, GRD, and the interaction between the two (entered in a second step in hierarchical regression), both steps of the model were significant, $R^2 = .03$, $F(2, 216) = 3.71$, $p < .03$ at step 1 and R^2 change = .03, $F(1, 215) = 6.81$, $p < .01$ at step 2. The betas for GMRD and the interaction term were significant, $\beta = -0.14$, $p < .05$ for GMRD, and $\beta = 1.32$, $p < .01$ for the interaction. An ANOVA was conducted with the two median split deprivation scales as IVs and self-esteem as DV in order to interpret the interaction. Results showed that those participants who were 'doubly gratified', i.e. who fell into the low GMRD/low GRD group, displayed the highest self-esteem ($M = 4.25$). Next came those in the high GMRD/low GRD group ($M = 4.04$), then those in the low GMRD/high GRD group ($M = 3.99$), and finally those in the high GMRD/high GRD group ($M = 3.94$). In sum, the lower the GMRD, the higher the self-esteem. Furthermore, low GMRD and low GRD have a multiple positive effect on self-esteem.

When regressing *life-satisfaction* from GMRD, GRD, and their interaction, only the first step of the model was significant, $R^2 = .20$, $F(2, 217) = 27.50$, $p < .001$. The

beta for GMRD was significant at $\beta = -0.45$, $p < .001$. Thus, the lower the GMRD, the higher the life satisfaction.

Next, *identification* was regressed from GMRD and GRD. Note that no specific hypothesis as to the direction of the identification-deprivation link had been held. Identification was the DV, rather than the IV, for practical, rather than theoretical, reasons. The analysis yielded a significant result, $R^2 = .08$, $F(2, 213) = 9.69$, $p < .001$. The betas were $\beta = -0.14$, $p < .05$ for GMRD, and $\beta = -0.22$, $p < .001$ for GRD. Thus, both GMRD and GRD were *negatively* linked to identification.

Standing and Importance placed on the dimension of being 'well off'

A further regression was carried out to test whether people might devalue the importance of dimensions that are unfavourable to them (H6). It was hypothesised that there would be a negative effect of deprivation on 'importance'. 'Importance' was regressed from overall GMRD and GRD. The overall model was significant, $R^2 = .07$, $F(2, 217) = 8.14$, $p < .001$. Both betas were significant, $\beta = -0.25$, $p < .0001$ for GMRD, and $\beta = 0.17$, $p < .05$ for GRD. Thus, although our prediction was confirmed with regards to GMRD, the effect for GRD was actually in the opposite direction.

The relationship between Identification and Comparisons

Finally, in order to test H7, identification was regressed from CI in all five objects. The overall model was non-significant, $R^2 = .02$, $F(5, 217) = .94$, *ns*, and none of the betas was significant.

Discussion

To briefly summarise the main results, support was found for H1, in that RD was lowest compared to the intragroup and temporal target (repeated measures analysis). H2 was also supported, in that CI was highest for the intragroup and temporal targets. This finding is in line with evidence yielded in other settings: For instance, using university affiliations as grouping variable, Smith and Spears (1996) found more evidence for intra- rather than intergroup comparisons. Also, it should be noted that interest in interpersonal comparisons was particularly high according to the categorical choice, but

not according to the interval scales. One explanation for this could be that categorical choice responses might have been influenced by social desirability effects. It is conceivable (and, according to students' comments during data collection, likely) that there was a strong social norm for students to be 'colour blind' rather than 'colour conscious', and that it was perceived as more acceptable to compare oneself with other *people*, rather than with members of certain groups. Possibly, this social norm came more to the fore in the very direct categorical choice than in the less straightforward (and randomised) interval scales. In addition, in retrospect, it seemed doubtful whether the 'interpersonal' item was really capturing purely interpersonal comparisons, given that the other questions in the questionnaire would have already set up a situation in which group memberships could be expected to be highly salient. For these reasons, it was decided to not include the 'interpersonal CI' item in the following studies.

Even though the support for H1 and H2 does not directly speak to a causal link between RD and CI, correlational analyses did. As predicted by H3, pairwise correlations were negative for all targets. However, the evidence was not overly strong, as only the correlations for the intragroup and temporal targets reached significance. Findings for H4, i.e. the prediction that feelings of overall deprivation would be affected by comparison behaviour, were of similar magnitude: Some support was found for the prediction, in that GRD – as expected – was positively predicted by majority CI, and negatively by intragroup CI. However, temporal CI did not yield any significant effects, and no significant effects were found in predicting GMRD. In sum, weak evidence was found for H4.

One reason why the evidence for H3 and H4 was weak might be the fact that they contradict each other to a certain degree, in proposing the same variables being linked, but contradicting each other as to both the causal *direction* and the *valence* of this link. Consider the case of the minority: While RDT suggests a *positive effect* of CI in upward targets (like majority members relative to which one is deprived on average) on feelings of *overall* RD, the self-protective rationale (as developed in the stigma literature, Crocker & Major, 1989) predicts a *negative effect* of *specific* RD relative to a specific target on CI in this target. That is, high levels of RD relative to a target (e.g. majority members) should cause one to avoid comparisons with this target. Now, although the RDT perspective talks about *overall* RD, and the self-protective perspective talks about *specific* RD (i.e. RD relative to a specific target), those two variables are nevertheless closely interlinked: Overall RD is made up of all kinds of

specific RDs in relation to psychologically important targets. Hence, the RDT and self-protective perspectives contradict each other to a certain extent. If the two proposed mechanisms with their opposite causal directions and opposing signs come into play together, they should cancel each other out, and might result in the rather weak overall results for the relationship between comparisons and deprivation. Hence, one aim of study 2, which employed an 'order' manipulation, was to tease out these effects further.

As predicted by H5, deprivation had a negative impact on both self-esteem and life-satisfaction. Further, evidence was found that GMRD and GRD interacted in predicting self-esteem. This finding is in line with some other evidence, which shows that both intra- and intergroup evaluations can affect personal self-esteem (Sheeran, Abrams, & Orbell, 1995, note that the authors call these evaluations themselves *comparisons*), and that different types of deprivation interact in predicting other outcome variables too, like for instance collective action (Foster & Matheson, 1995).

Furthermore, the relationship between identification and both GMRD and GRD was found to be negative. This result clearly contradicts several of the theories outlined in chapter 2 about the nature of the link. Let me first briefly review the theories based in relative deprivation research. Recall that Petta and Walker (1992) generally expected positive associations, and the current data is clearly not in line with this. Walker (1999) predicted that collective deprivation should lead to lower group self-esteem, and our data clearly more support this idea. However, while Walker's prediction pertains to the affective, self-esteem component of identification, the present measure comprised both cognitive and affective components. Finally, Tougas et al. (2002) had argued that cognitive identification would positively affect RD, which in turn would negatively affect affective identification. In order to test this idea, further analyses had been carried out on the present data, separating the cognitive from the affective component of identification. Still, this did not yield support for the Tougas et al. hypothesis. The data were also not in line with the SIT account of the identification-deprivation link: First of all, recall that SIT would generally expect a positive association, and second of all this effect should be mediated, of sorts, by intergroup comparisons. Our data are not in line with this, because they a) yielded a negative association and b) identification was unrelated to intergroup comparison interest, and the latter can therefore not possibly function as a mediator. Finally, the Rejection-Identification Model would also predict a positive effect of deprivation on identification, which we could not support. In sum, none of the theories that have been put forth seem to adequately be able to explain our

data. Some of the following studies were designed specifically to investigate the relationship between identification and deprivation further.

Looking at the evidence for H6, i.e. the prediction that deprivation would negatively affect 'importance', results were mixed: The predicted negative effect was found for GMRD, but a *positive* effect was found for GRD. Nonetheless, this positive effect might make sense too: While people do not like to think of themselves as disadvantaged on dimensions that are important, and might hence play the importance of unfavourable dimensions down, it might be sensible for them under certain circumstances to stress group deprivation and the importance of it (Haeger et al., 1996). If the ethnic ingroup is highly deprived, and if this deprivation is attributed to the system being unfair (rather than to the self and ingroup being lazy and incompetent), this implies the necessity for social change and the improvement of the group's position. In order to point out the need for social change, minority members might well come to *stress* the importance of the economic dimension, rather than to play it down. This possibility, and the importance of equity and justice concerns, was followed up by some of the later studies (see below).

Finally, no support was found for H7, which had proposed a systematic relationship between identification and comparisons, particularly a positive effect of identification on intergroup comparison interest.

To briefly recap the most important results, evidence was found that ethnic minority members were interested in comparing with their own situation in the past, or with the situation of fellow ingroup members. Interest in comparing with members of the majority, i.e. English people, in order to assess one's economic situation was *remarkably* low. Weak support was found for most of the predictions, e.g. for a self-protective strategy (avoidance of upward comparisons), and for comparisons affecting feelings of RD (RDT prediction). No evidence whatsoever was found for the prediction (based on SIT) that identification should systematically correlate with comparison preferences. Three issues emerged that will be followed up: a) the possibility that evidence for the self-protective hypothesis (H3) and evidence for the RDT hypothesis (H4) was weak because of some inherent contradictions between the two rationales, b) the need to illuminate the relationship between identification and deprivation with the help of other than currently existing theories, c) the possibility that the importance of a dimension will be played down as a consequence of an unfavourable standing on this dimension, as originally proposed by SIT, only if the prevalent motive is enhancement.

If the motivation is instead equity and justice, the importance might on the contrary be emphasised (which could explain why GMRD correlated negatively with 'importance' and GRD correlated positively: Possibly enhancement motives were more pronounced for GMRD, whereas justice concerns were more relevant when thinking about GRD). Study 2 was designed to particularly focus on the first of these three issues.

CHAPTER 4

Study 2: A Survey of Ethnic Minority and Majority Members in Germany

Introduction

A large scale survey study was carried out, including both minority and majority members in Germany. Again, it was intended to explore which comparisons minority members make, and relative to which comparison objects they feel deprived. A key question was whether the pattern of results (with regards to perceived deprivation relative to and comparison interest in various targets) obtained in study 1 would be replicated in a different national context, and to see how results would be for minority members compared to majority members. This study included ethnic majority as well as minority members, for various reasons: First of all, since comparisons have up to date hardly ever been examined in naturalistic settings (Locke & Nekich, 2000), naturally the question of which comparisons *majority* members engage in is just as under-researched as the question which comparisons minority members engage in. Despite the fact that the comparisons of minorities are an intriguing and important issue for research, majority members' comparisons are of no lesser theoretical and practical importance. Do majority members compare with members of ethnic minorities, i.e. are minority members psychologically important referents? What follows from such types of comparisons, and which factors motivate them (e.g. guilt, a desire for solidarity and for supporting the 'underdog' or, in contrast, feelings that one's own privileged position is threatened, and a desire to defend it)? Also, many of the theories reviewed in chapter 2 should not only be valid for minority members, but also for majority members. For instance, it should have become clear in chapter 2 that RDT proposes deprivation to be a consequence of comparison processes irrespective of which group the comparison subject belongs to. Similarly, many processes as proposed by SIT (such as a need for positive distinctiveness) were proposed to be generic and valid for *all* groups. What is more, stigma researchers have suggested that coping mechanisms and self-protective strategies should in principle work for majority members just the same as for minority

members. For these reasons, the present study adopted a dual focus, and included both members of the ethnic minority and majority.

An important aim of study 2 was to clarify some of the contradictions regarding H3 and H4 of study 1. Recall that the self-protective rationale predicts comparisons with upward targets to be avoided (i.e., a negative causal effect of deprivation relative to a target (specific GMRD) on interest in comparing with it). In contrast, RDT predicts deprivation to be a result of comparison processes (i.e., a positive causal effect of comparisons with upward targets on feelings of overall deprivation). The neatest way of disentangling such different causal directions of different proposed valence would of course be to conduct two experiments, and to vary either variable in turn and assess the effect on the other one. However, I saw immense practical and ethical problems with this. First of all, both comparison interest and perceived deprivation are hard to manipulate in the field, where participants usually have well-developed and elaborate ideas about their economic situation. Those should make it very hard to 'push' or 'pull' variables like comparison preferences or perceived deprivation in either direction via experimental manipulations. Secondly, I also saw ethical problems with inducing through experimental manipulations in the participants the idea that they are deprived, even if this had been followed by an immediate debrief after the experiment. Therefore, a different way of attempting to disentangle the RDT and self-protective processes was chosen, and study 2 employed an 'order' manipulation instead: The order of the CI and GMRD items was varied, with half the sample responding the CI items first, and the other half responding to the GMRD items first. Such a method has successfully been employed in order to assess the causal impact of variables that cannot easily be manipulated experimentally (Schwarz & Strack, 1981). For example, Bohner and colleagues (1998) have used this method to analyse the impact of 'attitudes' on men's self-reported likelihood of raping a woman (the latter being another variable which is difficult to manipulate experimentally for both practical and ethical reasons). The logic behind varying the order of items is simple: Suppose a variable 'a' is hypothesised to have an effect on variable 'b', but variable 'b' is not expected to have an effect on variable 'a'. If a questionnaire asks about 'a' first, the construct that 'a' measures should be very salient and cognitively accessible to participants, and affect their responses to the assessment of 'b'. Hence, a strong correlation between measures of 'a' and 'b' would be expected. In contrast, if 'b' was assessed first, and 'b' does not causally affect 'a', assessment of 'b' should not influence responses to the measures for 'a', resulting in

a null- or substantially weaker correlation between ‘a’ and ‘b’. In short, for a causal variable to have an effect, it must be cognitively accessible, and measuring this variable *first* will increase its accessibility. Turning to the topic of interest here, the following predictions were made: According to the self-protective hypothesis (see H3, study 1), specific deprivation vis-à-vis a certain target has an aversive (i.e. negative) effect on comparing with this target. Thus, we expected a negative pair-wise correlation between specific GMRD and CI for each of the targets for those participants that answered the GMRD items first. Further, RDT assumes that levels of *overall* RD depend on comparisons people make (i.e. CI affects RD, see H4, study 1), but RDT does not make predictions about relative deprivation vis-à-vis *specific* targets. Thus, no expectations were held about significant correlations for those participants that answered the CI items first.

Another aim of study 2 was to investigate antecedents of comparison choices. While study 1 had mainly focussed on the effects and consequences of RD (self-esteem, life-satisfaction, importance of the dimension), the present study was designed to explore possible antecedents of Comparison Interest, particularly similarity, contact, and acculturation strategies. Recall that all of the major research areas reviewed in chapter 2 (Comparison Theory, Relative Deprivation Theory, Social Identity Theory, and Stigma Theory) have generated the prediction that both perceived similarity to and contact with/proximity to a target should increase interest in comparing with this target. Study 2 aimed to put this hitherto little investigated hypothesis to the test. The effect of acculturation strategies on CI was also assessed. As outlined in chapter 2, acculturation strategies have been found to be a very important construct in ethnic minority settings, and hence the present research aimed to pay tribute to this construct. Although no predictions about the nature of the effect of acculturation strategies on CI can be found in the literature, the following seemed plausible (the reader might also refer back to chapter 2, for a more detailed discussion): Minority members who are high on ‘cultural maintenance’ can be thought to have a positive orientation toward their ethnic ingroup. Further, minority members who are high on ‘desire for contact’ can be thought to have a positive orientation toward the ethnic majority group. For majority members, both a high desire for minority members’ retaining their original cultural identity, and a high desire for contact with minority members, can be thought to reflect a ‘positive’, ‘approach’ orientation toward minority members. It was assumed that a generally

positive, approach attitude to an object would be associated with being interested in and open to it in general, and therefore have a positive effect on CI.

In sum, the following issues were explored for both members of the ethnic minority and majority: Self-protective strategies of minority members, RD as dependent on comparisons people make (as suggested by RDT), and an attempt was made to reconcile these two predictions with each other with the help of an 'order' manipulation. Additionally, antecedents of comparisons (similarity, contact, acculturation strategies) were tested. In addition, the link between deprivation and identification was explored (for the detailed theoretical background to this issue, c.f. chapter 2 and the introduction to study 1). Again, this latter issue was of exploratory nature, and no specific predictions were made. It was however of interest whether the negative correlation found for ethnic minority members in the UK would be replicated for members of different ethnic groups in Germany. Finally, it was tested whether we would have more luck than in study 1 to find a systematic relationship between ingroup identification and comparison preferences (c.f. chapters 2 & 3 for a more detailed discussion of the theoretical background to this issue). The main research hypotheses can be summarised as follows:

As outlined above, it has been suggested that perceived similarity and contact between the self and ingroup members should be higher than similarity and contact between the self and other social comparison targets, such as members of various outgroups. This should be true for both minority and majority members. Thus, H1 was:

H1. Both minority and majority respondents will feel more similar to, and will perceive themselves as having more contact with, ingroup members than with members of other groups.

Further, as already outlined for study 1 (and supported by the data), ethnic minority members are less likely to feel deprived vis-à-vis ingroup members and temporal targets than vis-à-vis members of other groups, particularly members of the majority. Thus, H2 was formulated:

H2. For minority members, perceived deprivation relative to ingroup members and the past will be lower than perceived deprivation relative to other comparison targets.

Furthermore, both similarity and contact are proposed to have a positive effect on comparison interest. In addition, deprivation vis-à-vis an object is proposed to have a

negative effect on the interest in comparing with this object (self-protective rationale). Thus, H3 follows:

H3. Speaking in correlational terms, there will be a positive effect of similarity to and contact with a given target on interest in comparing with this target. There will be a negative effect of perceived deprivation relative to a target on interest in comparing with it. These processes are proposed to be generic and applicable to members of all groups (c.f. chapter 2). Therefore, the effects were expected to be true for both minority and majority members.

So, to recap, for minority members, it was expected that perceived deprivation vis-à-vis ingroup members and temporal targets would be lower than for other targets, and that similarity and contact with ingroup members would be higher than for other social targets. For majority members, it was expected that similarity and contact with ingroup members would be higher than for other social targets. Given that similarity and contact are predicted to positively affect CI, and that deprivation is predicted to negatively affect CI, this leads to the following prediction about mean levels of comparison interest in different targets:

H4. Both minority and majority members were expected to be most interested in comparing with the intragroup and temporal target (for minority members this effect was expected to be due to similarity, contact, and deprivation, and for majority members this effect was expected to be due to similarity and contact). Thus, it was expected to find the same pattern of differences in the mean comparison interest (CI) in different targets as in study 1.

Further, the RDT prediction that levels of overall perceived deprivation depend on comparisons people make was tested. As outlined above, it was predicted that overall minority participants would be likely to feel deprived relative to majority members, and less deprived or even gratified relative to members of their ingroup and their own past. From this, H5 follows:

H5. For minority members, feelings of overall deprivation (overall GMRD, and overall GRD) are heightened (i.e. positively affected) by a strong interest in comparing with majority members, and are lowered (i.e. negatively affected) by a strong interest in comparing with ingroup members and the past. No specific predictions for majority members were held (since it was not anticipated how high RD would be vis-à-vis different targets for majority members), but the effects of CI in different targets on levels of overall RD were nevertheless explored for majority members.

H6. Following the logic of the ‘order’ manipulation, a negative correlation between specific GMRD and CI was expected for those participants that answered the GMRD questions first. Since the self-protective mechanisms that are supposed to cause the negative effect of specific GMRD on CI are supposed to hold true for all people and situations, this effect was expected for both minority and majority respondents, and for all comparison targets.

The effect of acculturation strategies on comparisons was also examined. As outlined above, a positive orientation toward ingroup and/or outgroup was expected to result in high comparison interest, and a negative orientation toward ingroup and/or outgroup was expected to result in low comparison interest.

H7. For minority members, cultural maintenance (i.e. maintaining and protecting the original culture) was expected to have a positive effect on intragroup CI, and a negative effect on majority CI. ‘Desire for contact’ (with the majority/outgroup) was expected to have a positive effect on majority CI, and a negative effect on intragroup CI. For majority members, both acculturation dimensions can be interpreted as expressing a positive orientation toward ethnic minority groups, and were therefore expected to have positive effects on interest in comparing with minority members.

Finally, it was of interest to see whether we could replicate the negative correlation between identification and deprivation found in study 1 (although no strong expectations regarding the possibility of this were held). Also, it was endeavoured to test whether identification would be positively related to intergroup comparison interest, as predicted by SIT. Therefore,

H8 predicted a negative correlation between identification and deprivation, and

H9 predicted a positive effect of identification on the interest in comparing with outgroup targets (for both minority and majority respondents).

Method

Participants

Five hundred seventeen secondary school students (351 majority members; 166 minority members; 13–17 years of age; 236 females; 281 males) filled out questionnaires during class time. Data were collected in the industrial area of Germany (Ruhrgebiet), in which the minority population, especially of Turks and Aussiedler, is a

lot denser than in other parts of Germany, and very visible in many districts. Most of the participants of the study were second or third generation immigrants, whose parents or grandparents had migrated to Germany. Of those students who had not been born in Germany, the vast majority had been living there for more than three years, and the majority was holding a German passport (some had dual citizenship). According to the students' self-classification, among the minority students were 79 Turks, 21 Aussiedler, 19 Polish students, and 9 Russians. The remaining minority students were from a wide variety of places.

Procedure

Prior to the main study, the content of the questionnaire had been carefully discussed and revised with several teachers, as well as being pilot tested on a small sample. Before filling out the questionnaires, students were given oral instructions (about the existence of different groups, the meaning of 'economic situation', etc.) similar to the ones described for study 1. After the data collection, all participants were thoroughly debriefed, and the results of the study were fed back to the headmistress and teachers that had been involved.

Measures

The questionnaire contained the following measures:

Comparison interest (CI) was assessed with the same procedure as in study 1. However, the comparison targets differed slightly. Interest in comparing was measured with regards to 'your own situation in the past'; 'Germans'; 'Turkish people in Germany'; 'Aussiedler in Germany'; 'Americans in America'; 'French people in France'; and 'members of your own group' (this last item was only for students who were not German, Turkish, and not Aussiedler. Note that the sample did not include any French or American students). The order of these items was randomised for each participant. The targets 'French' and 'Americans' were included with an intention to enlarge the number of potential comparison objects offered, and because pilot data had shown that these two outgroups might be interesting comparison targets (French because of their local proximity and Americans because of their perceived high status). In order to be able to assess comparison interest in those two objects, the interpersonal

comparison object (which a-posteriori was thought to be problematic anyway) was dropped from the design. It was decided to include ‘Turkish people’ and ‘Aussiedler’ explicitly, because these two are the biggest and most salient minority groups in Germany, particularly in the area in which the study was conducted.

Responses were later recoded into the following categories (cf. Table 7): Interest in comparing with ‘members of the ingroup in Germany’ (e.g. Germans in Germany for Germans, Turks in Germany for Turks – *intragroup CI*); ‘the own situation in the past’ (*temporal CI*); ‘members of (another) minority in Germany’ (i.e. Aussiedler for Turks, Turks for Aussiedler, and the mean of Aussiedler and Turks for Germans and minority members that were neither Turks nor Aussiedler – *(other) minority CI*); ‘Majority members’ (i.e. Germans, for minority members only – *majority CI*); ‘Americans’ (*American CI*); ‘French’ (*French CI*); and the mean between American CI and French CI, which was called ‘*outgroups outside CI*’, (1 = low comparison interest to 5 = high comparison interest, for all items).

Then, students were asked to make a *categorical comparison choice*. Again, comparison targets presented differed from the targets presented in study 1. Students were asked to pick either one group within Germany (options: Germans, Aussiedler, Polish, Italians, Albanians, Turks, Spanish, Asylum seekers) *or* outside Germany (options: Turks in Turkey, Americans in America, Polish in Poland, French in France, Dutch in Holland, English in England, Russians in Russia, Greeks in Greece). The aim here was to constrain comparison choices as little as possible through offering many options. Although pilot data indicated that the targets listed above were more likely to trigger comparison interest than many others, it was not hypothesised that all those targets would be frequently chosen. Rather, offering many options was an attempt to make sure that no important comparison target was overlooked in the continuous comparison interest scales. Furthermore, this approach attempted to counteract concerns that the use of rather global and abstract umbrella term (i.e. ‘members of another minority group’) as utilised in the categorical choice in study 1 might artificially lower the frequency with which this category would be chosen (the assumption being that *specifically* naming a *particular* salient minority outgroup might attract more categorical choices). In order to include as many social comparison referents as possible, no temporal comparison option was offered in the German study. All targets were randomly and evenly spaced out on one page, so as to not prompt responses to any of the targets through a prominent position in the layout.

To measure *specific deprivation relative to each of the targets*, participants were asked how well they were actually doing compared to each of the comparison targets listed in the Likert-scale comparison choice (1 = much better to 5 = much worse, after scale reversal). Answers were then recoded following the same principle as outlined for the *CI* items above, into the following categories (cf. also Table 7): 'intragroup', 'temporal', 'minority', 'majority' (for minority participants only), 'American', 'French', and 'outgroups outside' GMRD (the latter, 'outgroups outside', being the mean of American & French GMRD).

Again, students indicated how well off they felt overall (1 = very to 5 = not at all, after scale reversal), and how satisfied or angry they were with their situation (1 = very satisfied to 5 = very angry, after scale reversal). Those two items were then combined with the six specific deprivation scores described above (5 for majority members), to form a 7-item scale (6-item scale for majority members) of *overall GMRD* (Cronbach's alpha (α) = .67).

Perceived overall group relative deprivation (GRD) was measured by the students indicating how well off they felt their group was overall, and how satisfied or angry they were with the situation of their group (2-item scale, after scale reversal: 1 = low group deprivation, 5 = high group deprivation, α = .77).

The *identification* scale was an abbreviated version of the one used in study 1 (two items: 'I see myself as a member of my group', 'I like being a member of my group'; 1 = disagree to 5 = agree, r = .76).

Perceived similarity to and *contact* with various comparison targets were measured on 5-point scales (1 = not at all to 5 = very much), respectively. Students indicated how similar they felt to (and how much contact they had in their everyday life with) Germans, Turks, Aussiedler, Americans, French, and members of their own group (this last item was only filled out by students who were not German, not Turkish, and not Aussiedler, and again answers were recoded following the same principle as outlined for the *CI* items above).

For the measurement of *acculturation strategy preference*, students read a brief (pictorially illustrated) explanation of the concept of culture (explained as differences in the way of life, manifesting itself in things like clothing, language, and religion), followed by this text:

"Clothing, language and religion were only examples. The culture of Germans and the culture of other groups in Germany can differ in many other ways as well.

Families which come to Germany from other countries can either adapt the German way of living and the German culture, or they can stick to their own way of living and their culture. What do you think about non-German groups in Germany (here, students who were not German were asked to think specifically of their own cultural group when answering the next questions)? Do you think that non-Germans should...”

a) maintain their own culture, b) maintain their religion, language and clothing, c) maintain their old way of living (1 = not at all to 5 = very much for all three items, $\alpha = .86$).

Students also indicated whether they thought that members of non-German groups in Germany (members of their own group for non-German students) should have German friends and should spend time with Germans after school (1 = not at all important to 5 = very important, inter-item correlation = .91).

Finally, students indicated their age, sex, country of birth, how long they had been in Germany, and the group membership of their mother and father.

The order manipulation. In order to test the causal direction of the CI - specific GMRD relationships, an order manipulation was introduced, whereas approximately half the students received a questionnaire where the CI items featured first, and the other half received a questionnaire where the specific GMRD items featured first.

Results¹⁵

Analyses for the following broad themes will be presented: i) Descriptive analyses and group differences, ii) Chi-square and ANOVA results for comparison interest (interval CI measure and categorical choices) and perceived specific GMRD relative to different objects (speaking to H2 & H4), iii) perceived similarity to and contact with various targets (H1) iv) Regressing CI in different objects from perceived specific deprivation relative to this object, similarity, and contact (H3), v) the order-manipulation, and CI - RD link (H6), vi) regressing GMRD & GRD from CI in different objects (H5), vii) correlates of deprivation: identification (H8), viii) the effect of acculturation strategies (H7), and ix) the effect of identification on comparison choices (H9).

¹⁵ Some further analyses were conducted, which are not elaborated on below. Among others, these yielded further evidence for the PGD, in demonstrating that overall GMRD was lower than overall GRD.

Descriptive analyses and group differences

For minority respondents, the mean identification was $M = 4.30$, the cultural maintenance preference was 3.80, and the contact preference was 4.09. For majority respondents, identification was 4.24, the cultural maintenance preference was 2.87, and the contact preference was 3.68. Germans were less in favour of cultural maintenance and lower on preferred contact than minority members. Further, minority members displayed slightly higher levels of ingroup identification, a finding that has also been obtained in previous studies (e.g. Verkuyten, 2002).

Comparison Interest (both CI and categorical choices) and perceived specific GMRD relative to different objects

To focus on the categorical choices first, an initial analysis on the frequency with which each type of categorical target was chosen revealed that the choice frequencies for all individual groups that could be described as ‘Members of (other) minorities in the country of residence’ (e.g. Turks in Germany for Germans, Italians in Germany for Turks, etc.), and as ‘members of outgroups outside Germany’ (e.g. Greeks in Greece for Turks) were extremely low. Therefore, those choices were recoded and subsumed under those two headings, respectively. Other categories were ‘majority members’ (i.e. Germans for minority members), ‘ingroup members in the country of residence’ (e.g. Turks in Germany for Turks, Germans in Germany for Germans, etc.), and ‘people in the country of origin’ (e.g. Turks in Turkey for Turks, Polish people in Poland for Polish people, etc.). Results are displayed in table 6.

As can be seen in Table 6, *minority members* expressed most interest in intragroup comparisons, but also substantial interest in comparisons with people in their country of origin, and German majority members. *Majority members* expressed most interest in intragroup comparisons, as well as interest in comparisons with various other groups within Germany (the modal choice in this category being asylum seekers with 31%) and outside Germany (the modal choice in this category being Americans with 47%).

Table 6

Percentage of choices for each categorical comparison target

Categorical Comparison Target	Minority members <i>N</i> = 95	Majority, i.e. Germans <i>N</i> = 277
Ingroup member in country of residence (intragroup)	57.9	65.8
Members of (other) minorities in country of residence	2.1 ^a	15.8 ^a
Majority (Germans or English)	18.9	N/a
Members of outgroups outside Germany	1.1 ^a	18.4 ^a
People in the country of origin	20.0	N/a
Chi-Squared	100.52***	130.88***

Note. ^a Since these categories is constituted by a frequency sum across a number of groups, percentage values for this category are likely to be artificially enhanced. *** $p < .001$.

Thus, again evidence was found for the importance of *intragroup* comparisons. Yet, comparisons with people in the *country of origin* and with the *majority members* were also important for minority respondents, and comparisons with members of (*other*) *minority groups* in the country of residence or comparisons with *outgroups outside the country of residence* were also important for majority respondents. However, frequencies for those latter two categories are likely to be over-estimates (see note to the table). While these data provide some initial indication which comparison referents might or might not be of interest, we will now turn to evidence from the CI Likert scales to shed some more refined light on these issues. Further testing H2 and H4, repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted to test for significant differences between the CI in and GMRD relative to different targets. It was predicted that intragroup and temporal CI would be bigger than CI in the other targets, and GMRD relative to those targets would be lower (at least for minority members). For a summary of cell means, see Table 7.

All ANOVAs produced significant effects, $F(4.38, 586.77) = 71.62, p < .001, MSE = 1.14$ for minority members' CI, $F(4.39, 540.04) = 18.47, p < .001, MSE = 0.95$ for minority members' GMRD, $F(3.52, 1163.73) = 171.78, p < .001, MSE = 1.41$ for majority' members CI, and $F(3.71, 1107.76) = 25.68, p < .001, MSE = 0.93$ for majority members' GMRD. As expected, post-hoc pairwise comparisons showed that intragroup and temporal CI was bigger than CI in the other targets for both the minority and majority sample. As predicted, for minority members, deprivation relative to

intragroup and temporal CI targets was lower than relative to the other targets (no specific prediction had been made for majority members).

Table 7

Mean CI¹⁶ in and GMRD relative to various targets

Targets	Minority members		Majority members	
	CI N = 135	GMRD N = 124	CI N = 332	GMRD N = 300
Intragroup	3.95 a (1.08)	2.04 a (0.95)	3.85 a (1.10)	2.38 b (0.82)
Temporal	4.09 a (1.14)	2.08 a (1.15)	3.77 a (1.21)	2.21 ab (1.05)
Members of (other) minorities	2.50 cd (1.14)	2.66 bc (1.16)	2.38 b (1.19)	2.05 a (1.09)
Majority members	3.07 b (1.24)	2.55 b (0.96)	N/a	N/a
Americans	2.82 bc (1.29)	2.83 c (0.99)	2.65 b (1.20)	2.58 c (0.91)
French	2.38 d (1.11)	2.81 c (0.97)	2.35 b (1.10)	2.57 c (0.88)

Note. High values indicated more CI, and more GMRD. Subscripts denote significant differences between CI in different targets within each sample at $p < .05$ (with adjusted alpha-levels). Standard deviations in parentheses.

Perceived Similarity to and Contact with various targets

For both the minority and the majority sample, two repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted to test for significant differences between various comparison targets with respect to a) the perceived similarity to them, and b) the perceived contact with them. In accordance with H1, it was expected that participants would perceive the intragroup CI target as more similar than the other social targets, and they would perceive to have more contact with the intragroup CI target than with the other social targets (true for both minority and majority members). Pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni adjusted alpha levels were used to test these predictions. For a summary of cell means, see Table 8.

All ANOVAs produced significant results, $F(2.99, 406.01) = 258.60, p < .001$, $MSE = 1.18$ for perceived similarity in the minority sample, $F(3.11, 441.22) = 280.68$,

¹⁶ Note that 'group' (Turks, Aussiedler, Polish, i.e. the biggest minority groups) did not significantly moderate the CI preferences. When testing whether 'group' (minority vs. majority) had a significant effect on CI, this yielded a significant interaction (see Brauer & Judd, 2000). However, the interaction simply showed that everyone was most interested in comparing with the intragroup CI target. Also, some evidence was found that minority respondents might be more interested in temporal CIs than majority respondents. 'Group' (Turks, Aussiedler, and Polish) did not significantly moderate the repeated measures effect for GMRD.

$p < .001$, $MSE = 1.28$ for contact in the minority sample, $F(3.16, 1052.54) = 934.17$, $p < .001$, $MSE = 0.85$ for similarity in the majority sample, and $F(3.16, 1086.39) = 959.23$, $p < .001$, $MSE = 0.93$ for contact in the majority sample. As predicted, perceived similarity and contact with intragroup CI targets was bigger than similarity and contact with any of the other social targets. As expected, this was true for both minority and majority participants. Although the results so far do not directly provide evidence for a systematic link between CI on the one hand and similarity, contact, and deprivation on the other hand, they certainly do not contradict this possibility either. In the following, the relationship between those variables will be explored further.

Table 8

Similarity to and contact with various targets

Targets	Minority members		Majority members	
	Similarity $N = 137$	Contact $N = 143$	Similarity $N = 332$	Contact $N = 345$
Intragroup	4.37 a (0.97)	4.27 a (1.19)	4.49 a (0.92)	4.68 a (0.70)
Members of (other) minorities	1.51 c (0.89)	2.06 c (1.11)	1.30 c (0.70)	2.14 c (1.19)
Majority members	2.54 b (1.26)	3.74 b (1.25)	N/a	N/a
Americans	1.40 c (0.77)	1.32 d (0.78)	1.86 b (1.15)	1.28 b (0.75)
French	1.35 c (0.87)	1.24 d (0.71)	1.39 c (0.78)	1.21 b (0.57)

Note. High values indicated more similarity and contact. Subscripts denote significant differences between CI in different targets within each sample at $p < .05$ (with adjusted alpha-levels). Standard deviations in parentheses.


Regressing CI in different objects from perceived specific Deprivation relative to this object, Similarity, and Contact

Next, regression analyses were used for a direct test of whether CI would be positively predicted by perceived similarity to the target, positively by frequency of contact with the target, and negatively by perceived deprivation relative the target (self-protective rationale, H3). For *minority members*, four regressions were calculated, with a) *intragroup* CI, b) CI in members of *other minorities*, c) CI in members of *outgroups outside* Germany (i.e. Americans and French people), and d) CI in members of the *majority* as dependent variables. Independent variables were perceived similarity to, frequency of contact with, and perceived deprivation relative to each of these targets,

respectively. For *majority members*, three regressions were calculated, with a) *intragroup* CI, b) CI in members of *minority groups* in Germany (i.e. mean of Aussiedler and Turks), and c) CI in members of *outgroups outside* Germany (i.e. Americans and French people) as dependent variables. Independent variables were again similarity with, contact with, and deprivation relative to each of these targets, respectively.¹⁷ Results from the regression analyses are displayed in Table 9.

Table 9

Predicting CI from perceived similarity, contact, and specific deprivation



Comparison Interest in...	Minority				
	Overall model		Individual standardised betas		
	R^2	F	Contact	Similarity	Deprivation
Intragroup	.15	7.44*** (3, 123)	0.04	0.28*	-0.16●
Members of (other) Minorities	.44	38.38*** (3, 146)	0.68***	0.05	0.02
Members of outgroups outside Germany	.06	3.63* (3, 148)	0.30**	-0.18	0.11
Majority members	.05	2.92* (3, 147)	0.15●	0.09	0.10
Majority					
Intragroup	.08	9.53*** (3, 300)	0.02	0.19**	-0.17**
Members of (other) Minorities	.14	17.57*** (3, 323)	0.24***	0.21***	-0.02
Members of outgroups outside Germany	.11	13.44*** (3, 324)	0.14*	0.25***	-0.04

Note. ● $p < .07$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. Df in parentheses.

As can be seen in Table 9, for minority members, perceived similarity and perceived deprivation predicted intragroup CI, whilst contact predicted interest in comparing with members of other minorities, outgroups outside, and members of the majority, respectively. For majority members, perceived deprivation significantly predicted

¹⁷ Since the regressions for Americans and French people (and for Aussiedler and Turks for majority participants) yielded very similar patterns, those two targets were combined into the category 'members of salient outgroups outside Germany' (and 'members of (other) minorities' for majority participants), in order to present the results in as clear a way as possible. Similarity to, contact with, and deprivation perceived relative to those targets was averaged, respectively.

intragroup CI, perceived similarity significantly predicted CI for all three dependent variables, and contact predicted CI in the two outgroups (minorities in Germany, and outgroups outside).¹⁸ In sum, while similarity and contact were important in determining CI, these effects seem to be differentially strong, depending on the specific CI object, and on whether the agents are minority or majority members. Moreover, the negative effect of specific GMRD on CI – predicted on the basis of a self-protective rationale – was found only if the target was intragroup. In order to explore further why the negative effect of GMRD was not observed with respect to the other targets, next, pairwise specific GMRD-CI correlations were analysed, taking the order manipulation into consideration.

The order-manipulation, and CI-RD link

Correlations were conducted for minority and majority members separately, for order 1 (interest in comparisons first) and order 2 (perceived deprivation first) separately, and separately for each CI object. In line with H6, it was expected that high specific GMRD would causally and negatively affect CI. Therefore, I expected to find significant negative correlations for order 2, but not for order 1. Another way of interpreting order manipulations is not to look at the significance levels of individual correlations, but to instead *compare* the significance of a correlation between two variables in the two order conditions (Schwarz & Strack, 1981). Following this logic, in the present context one would expect to find a *stronger* (negative) correlations for order 2, compared to order 1. Although the method of analysing significant *differences* between correlations can still be found in recent publications (Bohner et al., 1998), it has come into criticism (Rogosa, 1980), since it is only a valid procedure under certain assumptions (which are usually not testable with cross-sectional data. Note that although Rogosa was particularly concerned with cross-panel correlations, the logic of his criticism also applies to the comparison of correlations yielded by different ‘orders’). A more detailed discussion of these problems can be found in chapter 6, where the analytic strategies for analysing the longitudinal data presented in this chapter are discussed. For now, it should suffice to say that the results of the tests for significant differences between correlations should be treated with caution, and the reader is advised to pay more attention to the individual

¹⁸ Although for this and the regression analyses presented in the following some of the predictor variables were correlated, collinearity was not a problem in any of the analyses. For the analyses presented in Table 9, all tolerance values were substantial, with most being higher than .80.

correlations (and their respective significances) themselves. Results are displayed in table 10.

Table 10

Correlations between specific GMRD and CI, separate for the two order conditions

Object	Order of the questions						Differences between the two correlations significant at $p =$
	Interest in comparisons first (Order 1)			Relative deprivation first (Order 2)			
	r	p	N	r	p	N	
	Minority sample						
Majority	-0.06	0.6	86	-0.16	0.2	71	.27
Temporal	-0.09	0.4	87	-0.04	0.8	72	.38
Americans	-0.17	0.2	85	0.06	0.7	71	.08
French	-0.12	0.3	84	0.03	0.8	70	.19
Intragroup	-0.34	0.004	72	-0.18	0.2	59	.17
other minorities	-0.09	0.5	85	0.04	0.8	70	.22
	Majority sample						
Intragroup	-0.17	0.03	165	-0.29	0.001	146	.14
Temporal	-0.15	0.06	174	-0.15	0.06	158	.50
Americans	-0.09	0.3	176	0.08	0.4	159	.07
French	-0.06	0.4	176	0.16	0.03	159	.03
Aussiedler	-0.08	0.4	176	0.11	0.2	160	.05
Turks	-0.07	0.4	176	0.14	0.09	163	.03

Note. High values indicate more CI and GMRD.

As can be seen in table 10, few of the pairwise correlations (or comparison of significance between pairwise correlations for the two order versions) were in line with this prediction. Rather, significant effects showed the following: For minority members, intragroup CI negatively predicted intragroup GMRD. Further, comparisons of significances for the two orders showed that the (negative) effect of American CI on American GMRD is (marginally) stronger than the effect in the other causal direction. For majority members, intragroup and temporal CI negatively predicted GMRD. Further, comparisons of significances for the two orders showed that the (negative) effect of American CI on American GMRD is (marginally) stronger than the effect in the other causal direction; and that the (positive) effects of French, Aussiedler, and Turkish GMRD on the respective CIs is stronger than the effects in the other direction, respectively. Out of a total of 36 significance tests, only two results were in the predicted direction: Deprivation relative to ingroup members and the temporal target predicted the expected decrease in comparison interest for majority members. In sum,

and contrary to the predictions, it was shown that either the effect of CI on GMRD was stronger than vice versa, or the effects of GMRD on CI that were found were positive (and therefore in the wrong direction).

Regressing GMRD & GRD from CI in different objects: Comparison Choices as antecedents of RD

Regression analyses were carried out, to test the RDT prediction that interest in different comparison targets should influence feelings of overall perceived deprivation (H5). For minority members, it was hypothesised that feelings of overall GMRD and GRD should be negatively predicted by intragroup and temporal CI, and that feelings of RD should be positively predicted by CI in majority members. No specific hypotheses were held for majority members, but the relationships were examined in an exploratory manner. Separate regressions were conducted for the minority and majority samples, and separate analyses were carried out to predict GMRD and GRD, respectively. 'Intragroup', 'temporal', and 'majority' CI were the predictors.¹⁹ Results are displayed in Table 11.

As can be seen in Table 11, even though not all the regressions were significant, some support for the hypothesis was found. Intragroup CI negatively predicted GRD for both samples, and it negatively predicted GMRD for the German majority sample. Temporal CI negatively predicted GRD for the minority, and GMRD for the majority. Majority CI did not have any significant effects.

¹⁹ Several other models were also tested to explore the link between CI and deprivation. For instance, various CI bias indices (operationalised as differences scores) were tested. While some of these alternative models yielded significant results, others did not. Thus, not all of these models shall be elaborated on here, in order not to over-complicate the presentation. However, one example shall be given to illustrate which other models were tested: For the majority sample, it was tested whether the self-protective and intragroup comparison preference rationale would also hold, vis-à-vis people in other (and economically superior) nations. Thus, a CI bias index was calculated, subtracting the mean of American and French CI from intragroup CI (hence, high scores on this index indicate an intragroup CI bias, and low values an intergroup CI bias). This index was regressed from GMRD, GRD, and their interaction (entered in a second step in the regression). Both steps of the regression were significant, showing, as expected, that the intragroup bias was negatively related to GMRD and GRD, and the two RD indices interacted in the predicted fashion.

Table 11

Predicting overall deprivation (GMRD & GRD) from CI

		Minority members		Germans	
		Overall GMRD N = 138	Overall GRD N = 138	Overall GMRD N = 340	Overall GRD N = 333
Mean levels		2.12	2.25	1.99	2.16
Overall Model	R^2	.04	.13	.09	.02
	F	1.81 (3, 134)	6.61 *** (3, 134)	16.09 *** (2, 337)	3.39 * (2, 330)
Individual Betas	Intragroup CI	-.11	-.17 *	-.21 ***	-.14 *
	Temporal CI	-.09	-.21 *	-.17 **	.001
	Majority CI	-.08	-.13	N/a	N/a

Note. • $p < .07$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. Df in parentheses.

Correlates of perceived Deprivation: Identification

Next, the link between identification and deprivation was explored (H8). Whilst not holding any specific predictions about the outcome of the analyses, it was intended to test whether the link would be positive (and therefore in line with findings reported, for instance, by Tropp & Wright, 1999) or negative (and therefore in concordance with the results of study 1). As for study 1, identification was regressed from both GMRD and GRD. For the *minority sample*, the model was significant, $R^2 = .25$, $F(2, 159) = 27.45$, $p < .001$. Both betas were significant, $\beta = -0.14$, $p < .05$ for GMRD, and $\beta = -0.43$, $p < .001$ for GRD. For the *majority sample*, the model was again significant, $R^2 = .09$, $F(2, 339) = 17.29$, $p < .001$. Again, both betas were significant, $\beta = -0.13$, $p < .02$ for GMRD, and $\beta = -0.24$, $p < .001$ for GRD. Thus, results replicated the findings of study 1, rather than previously published data: RD was *negatively* linked to identification.

The effect of Acculturation Strategies

Next, the relationship between acculturation strategies and CI was explored (H7). Median splits were conducted on both the cultural maintenance and contact dimension, and separately for minority and majority members. Participants were then classified according to whether they were high or low on each dimension, respectively. The two

dimensions were combined to yield the Berry's four acculturation strategies. Frequency distributions (percentages) for strategy preferences are displayed in table 12. As is apparent from the table, both the minority and majority samples displayed a slight preference for integration over the other strategies.

Table 12

Acculturation strategy preferences for minority and majority members

	Minority members (%)	Majority members (%)
Integration	31	37
Assimilation	21	19
Separation	21	15
Marginalisation	26	28

Predicting CI. Cultural maintenance (high vs. low) and desire for contact (high vs. low) were used as between subjects factors, and interest in all different comparison objects were entered as levels of a repeated measures factor, to explore the relationship between acculturation strategies and CI.²⁰ For the minority sample, this did not yield any significant interactions between the repeated measures factor and the between subjects factors, thus showing no evidence that acculturation strategies would differentially affect CI in different objects ($F(5, 650) = .21, ns$, for the interaction with cultural maintenance, $F(5, 650) = 1.39, ns$, for the interaction with desired contact, and $F(5, 650) = 0.05, ns$, for the three-way interaction). In the light of this, a more refined analysis was conducted, entering only the intragroup and majority CI as levels of the repeated measures factor. It was predicted that 'cultural maintenance' would have a positive effect on intragroup CI and a negative effect on majority CI, and that 'preference for contact' would have a positive effect on majority CI and a negative effect on intragroup CI. Nevertheless, again, no significant interactions were found ($F(1, 134) = 0.93, ns$, for the interaction with cultural maintenance, $F(1, 134) = 0.08, ns$, for the interaction with desired contact, and $F(1, 134) = 0.28, ns$, for the three-way interaction). When carrying out the same analysis for the majority sample (entering

²⁰ It was chosen to use the median splits and conduct ANOVA, rather than regressions with the interval scales, for the following reasons: Firstly, ANOVAs allowed us to look at the effect of acculturation strategies on different CI objects simultaneously (rather than predicting CI in each object one by one). Secondly, such a procedure stays more true to the theory and conceptualisation of Berry's strategies (which are clearly conceived of in categorical terms). Further, regression analyses were also conducted to supplement the analyses reported above. These analyses did not add any significant insights.

'cultural maintenance' and 'preferred contact' as between subjects factors, and the CI items as levels of a repeated measures factor), both between subjects factors significantly interacted with CI, $F(5, 1615) = 9.24, p < .001, MSE = 0.94$ for cultural maintenance, and $F(5, 1615) = 7.04, p < .001$ for desired contact. The two between subjects factors did not interact with each other, and there was no significant three-way interaction. Means are displayed in table 13.

Table 13

The effect of acculturation strategies on CI for majority participants

Target	Cultural maintenance	
	High	Low
Intragroup	3.77 (1.05) a	3.97 (1.13) a
Temporal	3.72 (1.19) a	3.83 (1.25) a
Americans	2.83 (1.21) a	2.46 (1.16) b
French	2.58 (1.09) a	2.10 (1.05) b
Aussiedler	2.78 (1.16) a	2.07 (1.11) b
Turks	2.72 (1.11) a	1.85 (1.12) b
	Desired Contact	
	High	Low
Intragroup	3.79 (1.05) a	3.96 (1.13) a
Temporal	3.83 (1.18) a	3.70 (1.26) a
Americans	2.86 (1.14) a	2.38 (1.21) b
French	2.59 (1.06) a	2.04 (1.08) b
Aussiedler	2.79 (1.67) a	1.99 (1.06) b
Turks	2.69 (1.15) a	1.81 (1.07) b

Note. High values indicate high CI. Standard deviations in parentheses. Subscripts denote significant differences (row-wise).

Interpreting the interactions, pairwise comparisons revealed the following: Those high on cultural maintenance, and contact, respectively, were more interested to compare with: Aussiedler, Turks, Americans, and French. No differences were found for intragroup and temporal CI. So, in sum, for majority members a 'positive' (i.e. tolerance on the cultural maintenance dimension, and openness to contact) orientation toward minorities is associated with higher interest in comparing with (and possibly higher interest overall, e.g. to learn about) members of all other groups. For minority members, acculturation strategies and CI were unrelated.

Predicting deprivation. In light of the fact that no effects of acculturation strategies on CI were found for the minority sample, it was decided to instead explore whether there might be a relationship between acculturation strategies and deprivation (specific GMRD). For minority members, cultural maintenance (high vs. low) and

desire for contact (high vs. low) were used as between subjects factors, and GMRD for all different objects were entered as levels of a repeated measures factor. This did not yield any significant interactions involving either of the between subjects factors ($F(5, 595) = 1.12$, *ns*, for the interaction with cultural maintenance, $F(5, 595) = 1.01$, *ns*, for the interaction with desired contact, and $F(5, 595) = 0.23$, *ns*, for the three-way interaction). Restricting this analysis to only include majority and intragroup GMRD as levels of the repeated measures factor did not change this null-result. Therefore, no evidence was found that acculturation strategies differentially affect (or are affected by) specific deprivation relative to different objects. However, 'desired contact' did have a significant main effect, $F(1, 119) = 4.20$, $p < .05$, $MSE = 2.16$. Respondents who desired contact felt less deprived than those who did not desire contact ($M_s = 2.41$, 2.64).

When repeating this analysis for the majority respondents ('cultural maintenance' and 'contact' as between subjects, all GMRD items as repeated measures levels), this yielded a significant interaction between cultural maintenance and the repeated measures factor, $F(5, 1465) = 2.30$, $p < .05$, $MSE = 0.69$, a significant main effect for cultural maintenance, $F(1, 293) = 6.28$, $p < .02$, $MSE = 2.13$, and a significant interaction between the two between subjects factors, $F(1, 293) = 4.24$, $p < .04$. Since the main effect was qualified by two interactions, it will not be interpreted. To interpret the interaction between 'cultural maintenance' and 'desired contact', simple main effects analyses showed that those respondents who preferred separation overall felt more deprived than those respondents who preferred any of the other strategies ($M_s = 2.53$ for separation, 2.29 for integration, 2.26 for assimilation, and 2.19 for marginalisation). To interpret the interaction between 'cultural maintenance' and the repeated measures factor (see table 14), pairwise comparisons showed that those who were in favour of cultural maintenance felt more deprived (sic!) vis-à-vis Aussiedler, Turks, and French people than those who were against cultural maintenance.

Table 14

The relationship between acculturation strategies and specific deprivation for majority participants

Target	Cultural maintenance	
	High	low
Intragroup	2.36 (0.78) a	2.64 (0.83) a
Temporal	2.21 (1.04) a	2.19 (1.03) a
Americans	2.62 (0.85) a	2.51 (0.95) a
French	2.66 (0.78) a	2.46 (0.96) b
Aussiedler	2.15 (1.07) a	1.84 (1.10) b
Turks	2.15 (0.97) a	1.98 (1.14) b

Note. High values indicate high deprivation. Standard deviations in parentheses. Subscripts denote significant differences (row-wise).

The effect of Identification on Comparison Choices

In order to test H9, identification was regressed from CI in all the various targets. For minority members, the model was significant, $R^2 = 0.11$, $p < 0.03$. The beta for the own past was significant ($\beta = 0.26$, $p < 0.005$). Thus, the higher the identification, the higher the interest in comparing with the past. For majority members, the model was significant; $R^2 = 0.08$, $p < 0.001$. The intragroup beta was significant ($\beta = 0.24$, $p < .001$). Thus, the higher the identification, the higher the intragroup CI.

Discussion

To briefly summarise the main results, support was found for the prediction that both minority and majority members would feel more similar to and have more contact with ingroup members than with other social targets (H1). Also, as expected, for minority members perceived deprivation was lowest relative to the intragroup and temporal targets (H2). Further, as expected, and replicating the findings of study 1, CI was highest for the intragroup and the temporal targets, and this was true for both minority and majority members (H4). However, categorical comparison choices yielded some evidence that for minority respondents comparisons with 'people in the country of origin' were also rather important. This item was chosen so frequently that it was decided to include it in the interval comparison items in following studies (see study 4). While the pattern of means described so far cannot provide direct proof that the high CI for the intragroup and temporal targets was a result of similarity, contact, and

deprivation, regression analyses had been carried out to test this prediction more specifically.

These yielded support for H3, i.e. that similarity and contact positively affect CI, and specific deprivation relative to a target negatively affects CI in this target (self-protective hypothesis). The pattern that emerged, however, seems to show that the independent variables are differentially influential, depending on the specific comparison target, and on whether the agents are minority or majority members. The negative link between RD to and CI in a target – predicted on the basis of a self-protective rationale - was found only if the target was intragroup, but it was found for both minority and majority members. The positive link between contact and CI was found only for intergroup comparisons, but not for intragroup comparisons (true for both minority and majority members). Similarity significantly predicted CI in all targets for majority members, but only intragroup CI for minority members. Taken together, these results provide support for H3, whilst at the same time underlying the importance of investigating CI and RD relative to a whole range of different targets, and of focussing on both minority and majority groups.

Having said this, it was still a bit disappointing that RD only affected CI for the intragroup target, and that evidence for the self-protective rationale was therefore – just as in study 1 – relatively weak. No stronger effects were found either when the order manipulation was taken into consideration: We did not find more negative relationships when only focussing on those participants that had answered the GMRD items first. Thus, no support was found for H6. How can the (null-) results obtained with the order manipulation be explained? First of all, generally finding effects of CI on GMRD (as the – unpredicted – effects displayed in table 10) might make sense: It is possible that a heightened CI in a certain object might ‘correct’ or affect perceived deprivation relative to this object, for instance as a consequence of a ‘reality check’ or of the agent forming a richer or more accurate picture of the situation. This might explain the negative effects of CI on GMRD. However, how can the positive effects of GMRD on CI be explained? Conceivably, a self-protective strategy is not always the most important one. For instance, in situations where people have high equity and justice concerns, feelings of deprivation relative to an object might *increase* interest in comparing with this object, in an attempt to be more sensitive to injustices or in order to point out these injustices to others. In such situations, one would expect positive effects of GMRD on CI. Therefore, the next studies (3, 4, and 5) *explicitly* assessed *motives* for making certain comparisons,

and tested for possible moderation effects of motives. The introduction to the next study provides a detailed outline of some hypotheses regarding this issue. Moreover, given that the order manipulation failed to illuminate the relationship between RD and CI, one of the following studies (no 5) employed a longitudinal design, in order to tease out causalities and directions of the significant effects.

Turning now to the RDT predictions, again (i.e. as in study 1) weak evidence was found that feelings of overall RD depend on comparisons people make. In support of H5, intragroup and temporal CI negatively affected overall RD. In spite of this, majority CI had no effect in the minority sample, and furthermore some of the R^2 's were rather low. Looking at the effects of acculturation strategies on CI, no effects in support of H7 were found for minority members, while the predictions for majority members were supported. In light of the disappointing null-results for the minority sample, it had also been explored what the relationship between acculturation strategies and deprivation is. This yielded that a desire for contact was negatively related to RD for minority members, that those majority members who favoured separation felt most deprived overall, and that those majority members who favoured cultural maintenance felt more deprived overall (sic). In light of the weak effects on CI, it was decided to not focus on acculturation strategies in the further studies.

Finally, again a negative relationship between identification and deprivation was found (H8), replicated the findings of study 1, rather than some previously published data (e.g. Tropp & Wright, 1999). Again, this finding clearly contradicts those hypotheses outlined in chapter 2 which predict the correlation to be positive. Further, additional tests which used separate measures for the cognitive and affective components of identification and deprivation, respectively, yielded no evidence in support of Tougas and Beaton's (2002) and other predictions which emphasise the importance of distinguishing between the cognitive and affective components of the constructs. Some hypotheses were developed to explain the findings and lack of support for all of the three models introduced in the theoretical chapter (see introduction for the studies 3 & 4), and they were subsequently tested.

In contrast to the results of study 1, this time a systematic relationship was found between identification and comparison interest (H9). However, the results were opposite to the effects SIT would predict: High identification was not related to more intergroup CI. Instead, it was related to more temporal CI (for minority members) and more intragroup CI (for majority members). Again, I will come back to this contradiction

between what the data yielded and the hypotheses that can be derived from the literature further on.

CHAPTER 5

Studies 3 & 4: Two further Surveys of Ethnic Minority and Majority Members in Germany

Introduction

Two survey studies were conducted, including both minority and majority members in Germany. Since the two studies dealt with conceptually very similar issues, they will be presented jointly in one chapter. Again, it was intended to explore which comparisons minority and majority members do make, and relative to which comparison objects they feel deprived. Moreover, the possibility was considered that the relatively weak evidence obtained in studies 1 and 2 for the RDT prediction (RD affected by CI) and for the self-protective hypothesis (CI low in targets relative to which RD is high) might have been due to the fact that CI was measured with one item only per target. Possibly, this might have caused reliability problems, preventing me from finding existing effects. Therefore, studies 3 and 4 aimed to employ multi-item measures for CI in different targets. What is more, and more importantly, these studies were designed to assess comparison 'motives' directly, and to test various moderation hypotheses, which will be described in the following.

The Identification-Deprivation link, and four moderation hypotheses

Since none of the three family of theories about the nature of the identification-deprivation link discussed in the theoretical chapter fitted the data of studies 1 and 2, a search for an alternative explanation for the consistent negative correlation began. Given the inherent contradictions between the explanations that are found in the literature (e.g. with the Rejection-Identification Model expecting *positive* effects of discrimination/deprivation on identification, and Tougas et al. (2002) proposing *negative* effects of deprivation on (affective) identification), the theorising focussed on potential *moderators* of the identification-deprivation relationship. The following four possibilities were proposed:

Identification might lead to either high or low deprivation, depending on the motives that are prevalent. If strong enhancement motives (i.e. a desire to feel good about the ingroup) are present, those who are most identified with their group should play deprivation down the most, because those high identifiers – who care most about the ingroup – should ‘belittle’ and ‘shut out’ anything that reflects badly on the group (such as being deprived) more than low identifiers (scenario a: identification *negatively* affects deprivation if enhancement motives are prevalent). In contrast, if strong equity motives – i.e. a desire to point out that oneself or one’s group is treated unfairly and is not getting what it deserves – are present (Taylor et al., 1989; Levine & Moreland, 1987; Tyler, 2001), those who are most identified should emphasise deprivation the most, because those high identifiers – who care most about the ingroup – should emphasise unfair treatment of the ingroup more than low identifiers (scenario b: identification *positively* affects deprivation if equity motives are prevalent).

Then again, it seemed also worthwhile pursuing the idea that deprivation might causally affect identification. The reasoning here was informed by some research (outlined in more detail in chapter 2) carried out by Wright and colleagues (Wright & Taylor, 1998; Wright et al., 1990; Wright & Tropp, 2002), who have shown that in the event of tokenism, whereby some few members of a disadvantaged group do make it into well-paid, high-powered positions, people tend to prefer individual strategies (i.e. action targeted at the improvement of their personal situation) over collective ones (i.e. action targeted at improving the situation of their group) in order to seek improvement. Even if the chances that people improve their situation by individual strategies are incredibly slim, a few tokens seem to be enough to trigger a preference for individual strategies. Collective action is found to be only endorsed when individual action does not appear at all instrumental. Wright and colleagues see this mechanism as the main explanation for why not more social protest behaviour can be observed for various disadvantaged groups, such as women or ethnic minorities.

‘Action preferences’ (individual vs. collective), are proposed here to moderate the effect of deprivation on identification: If a belief in ‘individual action’ is prevalent, those who are more deprived should lower their identification to a greater degree, because they should be more motivated to act individually (i.e. to disengage from their group) to improve their situation than those who are less deprived (scenario c: deprivation *negatively* affects identification if individual action is endorsed). In contrast, if a belief in ‘collective action’ is prevalent, those who are more deprived should

increase their ingroup identification, because they should be more motivated to act together with other group members and to form a strong sense of community, group cohesiveness and common fate in order to improve their situation alongside that of their group, than those who are less deprived (scenario d: deprivation *positively* affects identification if collective action is endorsed). Hence, reduced identification here is interpreted as a means of *psychologically* leaving the group (Abrams et al., 1999). Whether people respond to deprivation by psychological mobility or not will depend on their beliefs about which strategies (individual or collective) will be best suited to alleviate their deprivation, or – in other words – whether they perceive the response of psychological mobility as instrumental and functional. In sum, the following hypotheses were posed:

- A. identification *negatively* affects deprivation if enhancement motives are prevalent.
- B. identification *positively* affects deprivation if equity motives are prevalent.
- C. deprivation *negatively* affects identification if individual action is endorsed.
- D. deprivation *positively* affects identification if collective action is endorsed.

Two of those scenarios would fit the data obtained in studies 1 and 2 (options A and C). A negative correlation between identification and deprivation would be expected if either the prevalent ‘motive’ was enhancement, or if the prevalent action preference was individual action. Both these seem likely in the samples of studies 1 and 2: It is easily imaginable that the ethnic minority students were mainly motivated by ‘enhancement’: Nothing in the way that the surveys were set up could have prompted them toward ‘equity’ or fairness concerns. Also, it is easily imaginable that the ethnic minority students overall would show a preference for individual rather than collective action. Of course, a number of important tokens are always available for ethnic minority members to refer to. For instance, in Germany one of the quite prominent politicians at the time was Turkish, in the UK one of the popular TV-presenters was Black (and that is not even to mention all the Asian- and African- looking presenters on channels like MTV, singers, and sports celebrities the respondents would have been likely to ‘look up to’, given their age). In sum, there is reason to assume that the studies were conducted in settings where tokenism was present, and that respondents therefore had an overall preference for ‘individual action’ as an improvement strategy. The hypothesis with regards to ‘motives’ was tested in studies 3, 4, and 5.

It should also be noted at this stage that in addition to the moderation hypothesis, a mediation hypothesis was tested. As we have seen in chapter 2, on the basis of SIT one might expect that highly identified group members will be more motivated to positively distinguish their ingroup from relevant outgroups. In other words, they will be higher on an enhancement motive. Also, SIT assumes that positive distinctiveness is achieved mainly through intergroup comparisons, and high identifiers might therefore also engage in more intergroup comparisons. However, even though SIT originally argued that a positive social identity will be obtained through gratifying *intergroup* comparisons, it might be the case that particularly members of ethnic *minorities* might often do not have many intergroup comparisons with gratifying outcome available to them (because they will be worse off than most social outgroup comparison targets). Therefore, when motivated by enhancement, members of minorities might instead resort to gratifying intragroup and temporal comparisons (see also Tyler's 'Group Value Model', for some similar hypotheses, e.g. Tyler, DeGoeij, & Smith, 2001). Hence, it was tested whether the negative effect of identification on deprivation is mediated by either 'motives' (for all participants) or potentially gratifying intragroup and temporal comparisons (for minority members only). The idea was that identification might be positively related to enhancement and/or intragroup and temporal CI, and that these variables would in turn negatively affect perceived deprivation.

The effect of RD on CI, and a moderation hypothesis

Another aim of studies 3 and 4 was to explain why previous studies had not yielded stronger support for the self-protection hypothesis as advanced by Crocker & Major, which predicts that minority members should avoid comparisons with majority members on the basis that majority members are relatively advantaged, and should instead prefer comparisons with ingroup members who are less likely to be relatively advantaged, and who might even be relatively disadvantaged. This hypothesis was operationalised, *inter alia*, through a negative correlation and causal effect of specific GMRD on the associated CI. Recall that both studies 1 and 2 had found weak evidence for the existence of such an effect. Even though the present work, drawing particularly on the literature on minority and stigmatised groups, set out assuming that self-protection and enhancement would be the most relevant motives in ethnic minority settings, a number of other motives have been mentioned in the literature (see above).

So, again, ‘motives’ were proposed to be influential in the effect on specific GMRD and CI. Implicit in the Crocker & Major’s (1989) argument is the assumption that self-protection and enhancement would be the strongest motivating factor for members of stigmatised groups. Yet, on reflection, this does not seem to be necessarily the case. Members of disadvantaged groups might be equally motivated by fairness, justice, and equity concerns, or indeed by trying to arrive at an accurate assessment of the situation (i.e. an objective ‘evaluation’). Therefore, studies 3 and 4 aimed at assessing the prevalence and relative importance of different comparison motives. The focus was on four potential motives: ‘Enhancement’, ‘Evaluation’, concerns about the self and ingroup being treated unfairly, and a motive to rectify this state of affairs and to redress social injustices (‘Equity own’), and finally concerns about others and other groups being treated unfairly, and a motive to rectify this state of affairs and to redress social injustices (‘Equity other’). It was proposed that the effect of specific GMRD on CI would be dependent on prevalent motives. High specific GMRD would lead to high CI if the prevalent motive is ‘equity own’. This would be the case because if people are motivated by ‘equity own’ they would be particularly likely to seek out (comparative) information on how they are treated unfairly, and they would want to emphasise the extent of the unfairness (both privately, i.e. to themselves, and to others, for instance in conversations). On the other hand, high specific GMRD would lead to low CI if the prevalent motive is ‘enhancement’, because if people are mainly motivated to feel good about themselves and to see themselves in a positive light, they would avoid and ‘blank out’ any negative information that reflects badly on the self or the ingroup. In sum, the effect of specific GMRD on CI was proposed to be moderated by ‘motives’. Two scenarios can describe the envisaged moderation hypothesis:

A. Specific GMRD will have a positive effect (and correlate positively with) the associated CI if the prevalent motive is ‘equity’.

B. Specific GMRD will have a negative effect (and correlate negatively with) the associated CI if the prevalent motive is ‘enhancement’.

The effect of Identification on Comparison Interest, and a moderation hypothesis

Finally, another concern of studies 3 & 4 was to resolve some of the apparent contradictions between effects that would be expected on the basis of SIT, and effects found in studies 1 and 2. As outlined in the theoretical chapter, SIT would predict

ingroup identification to be positively related to intergroup CI. However, studies 1 and 2 found no relationship between those two variables. Instead, identification was either unrelated to CI (study 1) or positively related to intragroup and temporal CI (study 2). How can those contradictions be explained? Again, comparison motives were seen as a likely explanatory and moderating factor.

A. Identification will lead to high intragroup and temporal CI when enhancement motives are prevalent. This should be expected because intragroup and temporal targets are likely to be downward (or at least less likely to be upward), and therefore more gratifying. This will hold true especially for minority members (and possibly also for majority members).

B. For minority members, identification will lead to high majority CI if 'equity own' motives are prevalent. This should be the case because under those circumstances people will be likely to seek out information on how they are doing badly and how they are discriminated against, and will be motivated to emphasise those injustices in an attempt to rectify them.

In the following, the hypotheses of studies 3 and 4 will be briefly outlined. Not much elaboration is necessary, because the rationale for these predictions should be fairly clear from chapter 2, the introductions to studies 1 and 2, and the moderation hypotheses outlined above. However, it should be noted that some of the hypotheses proposed below are alternatives to each others, and the underlying reasoning verges on being circular in parts (e.g., it will be predicted that there will be a systematic relationship between identification and deprivation, and between deprivation and comparisons, and between comparisons and identification). This cannot be avoided, since hypotheses to be found in the literature are themselves contradictory, and not very precise. What is more, hardly any empirical work has explicitly investigated and tested the effects of interest here. Therefore, there was little to build on in trying to rule out particular hypotheses, and to narrow down the focus of what was to be tested. Throughout, I have attempted to number the hypotheses and to structure the results clearly, in order to aid an integration of the large volume of tests and results, and in order to make it possible for the reader to draw some integrating conclusions.

H1. As in the previous studies, it was expected that minority participants would feel least deprived relative to the intragroup and temporal comparison targets.

H2. As in the previous studies, it was expected that for both minority and majority members, CI would be highest in the intragroup and temporal targets.

H3. Given that both studies 1 and 2 found a negative link between identification and deprivation, and given the ‘moderation through motives’ hypothesis outlined above (which predicts a negative effect of identification on deprivation when enhancement motives are present), it was expected that overall ‘enhancement’ motives, rather than ‘equity own motives’, would be prevalent in minority settings such as the ones that studies 1 – 4 focussed on. The strength of two other motives, i.e. ‘evaluation’ and ‘equity other’, were explored, but no specific hypotheses were held as to these latter two motives.

H4. It was hypothesised that both minority and majority members would compare with intragroup and temporal targets more for ‘enhancement’ than for ‘equity’ reasons, and it was expected that minority members would compare with majority members more for ‘equity own’ than for ‘enhancement’ reasons. In short, H4 predicted a main effect of motives on comparison interest.

H5. As in studies 1 and 2, the RDT prediction was tested that feelings of overall RD depend on comparisons people make. More specifically, for minority members, it was expected that intragroup and temporal CI would negatively affect feelings of overall deprivation, and that majority CI would have a positive effect.

H6. It was expected that the negative link between identification on deprivation found in studies 1 and 2 would be replicated here (main effect). As outlined in detail above, it was proposed that this effect would be moderated through ‘motives’, such that the effect of identification on deprivation would be negative particularly if the prevalent motive was ‘enhancement’, and that it would be positive if the prevalent motive was ‘equity own’ (moderation effect). This was expected to hold true for all participants.

H7. As an alternative to H6, it was proposed that the negative effect of identification on deprivation might be *mediated* by either motives or comparison preferences. It was posed that possibly high identifiers would be higher on the enhancement motive or lower on the equity motive (for all participants), and/or more interested in intragroup and temporal comparisons (for minority members). Possibly, one or several of these factors would explain or mediate the negative effect of identification on perceived deprivation. These predictions are, as we have seen above, in line with an SIT rationale, on the basis of which one would expect precisely such an effect: High identifiers will be more motivated to positively distinguish their ingroup

from relevant outgroups. That is, they will be higher on an enhancement motive. Further, because SIT also posits that positive distinctiveness is achieved mainly through comparisons, high identifiers might also engage in different comparisons than low identifiers. For minority members, particularly intragroup and temporal comparisons might be gratifying (and not intergroup comparisons, as originally proposed by SIT). Thus, it seems plausible that identification might be positively related to enhancement and/or intragroup/temporal CI, and that these variables would in turn affect perceived deprivation.

H8. Following the self-protective rationale outlined for previous studies, it was expected that perceived deprivation relative to a target would negatively affect interest in comparing with it (main effect). However, given that evidence for this mechanism found in studies 1 and 2 was not overly strong, it was tested whether the effect of RD on CI might be moderated by motives: As outlined in the moderation hypothesis above, RD was expected to negatively affect CI if the prevalent motive was ‘enhancement’, and RD was expected to positively affect CI if the prevalent motive was ‘equity own’. This was expected for all participants.

H9. In an attempt to clarify the contradictions between results obtained in studies 1 and 2 (Identification being unrelated to comparisons, or positively related to intragroup and temporal CI) and predictions that follow from SIT (Identification being positively related to intergroup CI), a third moderation hypothesis was tested (see above): It was predicted that for minority members identification would be positively related to intragroup and temporal CI under conditions where ‘enhancement’ motives are most important, and that it would be positively related to intergroup CI under conditions where ‘equity own’ motives are most important only. For majority participants, the link between identification and those variables were assessed in an exploratory manner.

Method

Study 3 comprised a majority group sample in Germany; Study 4 comprised a minority and a majority sample in Germany. The Method for study 3 will be described first, followed by the Method for study 4.

Study 3

Participants

Three hundred and seventeen secondary school students filled out questionnaires during class time. Data were collected in a small, middle-class German town, in which the percentage of minority members is rather low. This sample was chosen to provide a 'control' group, i.e. a sample of majority members in a setting where majority members really are in the numerical majority (for most of the other specific field settings, majority members were not in a clear numerical majority; rather, majority status was determined by economic and status superiority). It was thought to be of interest to compare results obtained in such a setting to those obtained for majority members in the other settings. Like in previous studies, participants were asked to indicate their ingroup, i.e. to identify which group they felt they belong to most. Seventeen of the participants identified themselves as belonging to a group other than the Germans. Due to this number being rather small, these participants were excluded from further analyses, rather than analysed separately. For the remaining sample, the mean age was 14.5 (148 females; 152 males).

Procedure

Before the actual study, the CI scales were pilot tested on a sample of thirty university students. Initially, the scale had included three items per object. Reliability checks recommended not including one of the items in the studies proper.

Before filling out the questionnaires, all students were given a detailed, oral briefing about the issues tackled in the questionnaire (e.g. the existence of different groups, the meaning of 'economic situation' and 'deprivation', etc), delivered in simple, accessible language. The instructions were modelled on those used by Wilson and Ross (2000), and are described in more detail for study 1. Students were familiarised with the use of Likert-scales, and were given the opportunity to ask questions about anything they were not clear about. Upon completion of the questionnaire, students were thoroughly debriefed, and the feedback about the results of the study was given to the headmaster and teachers that had been involved with the study.

Measures²¹

First, students' *group identification* was measured, using four items adapted from Brown, Condor, Matthews, Wade, and Williams (1986), and Ellemers, Kortekaas, and Ouwerkerk (1999). Examples are 'I see myself as a member of my group'; and 'I happy to be a member of my group' (1 = low identification to 5 = high identification, $\alpha = .89$).

Next, students' *comparison interest (CI)* in various targets was assessed. Respondents read the following text: 'As you know, some people have it hard in life and others have it easy. Some people find good jobs easily and have a lot of money. They live in nice houses and can buy many things, while others cannot do that.' Students then answered the following two questions: 'If you are thinking or talking about how well off you and your family are, how important is it for you to compare with each of the following in order to see how well you are doing?' and 'How often do you compare with each of the following in order to see how well you are doing?'. Each question was answered with respect to seven targets (1 = not at all important to 5 = very important):

'Germans' (majority CI = *intragroup CI* for German respondents, $\alpha = .69$); 'your own situation in the past' (*temporal CI*, $\alpha = .75$); 'Aussiedler' (*Aussiedler CI*, $\alpha = .61$); 'Turks in Germany' (*Turkish CI*, $\alpha = .64$); 'Asylum seekers' (*Asylum CI*, $\alpha = .61$); 'Americans' (*American CI*, $\alpha = .60$); and 'people in the developing world' (*developing world CI*, $\alpha = .65$). The mean between 'Aussiedler' and 'Turkish' CI formed an index of (*other*) *minorities CI* ($\alpha = .62$). In the parentheses, the labels by which the constructs will be referred to from here on are displayed, as well as the pairwise inter-item correlations. The order of the seven targets was randomised for each respondent.²²

Next, participants' *general comparison motives* were measured. Students read the following text: 'Why are some comparisons more important to you than others when you think or talk about the situation of yourself and your family? There are many good reasons why people might compare themselves. None of the reasons are bad. Remember that no one will see your answers'. Then, they responded to the following four items: 'I am interested in comparisons that show that we (my family and other members of our

²¹ The original questionnaire exists in two versions, one for German and one for Non-German respondents. Because Non-German participants were excluded from the study, only the questions answered by German respondents are described here.

²² The third world and asylum targets were added in an effort to provide some additional targets that a) respondents might direct 'equity other' motives to, and that b) might be downward CI objects for ethnic minority respondents.

group) are treated unfairly and get less than we deserve' (*Equity own motive*), 'I am interested in comparisons that show members of other groups are treated unfairly and get less than they deserve' (*Equity other motive*), 'I am interested in comparisons that help me evaluate our situation as correctly and accurately as possible' (*Evaluation motive*), and 'I am interested in comparisons that help me feel good' (*Enhancement motive*). Responses were measured on 5-point scales (1 = never true to 5 = always true), and the order of items was randomised for each respondent.

Next, participants' *specific comparison motives* were measured. Using the wording described above, participants indicated how much they are motivated by Equity own, equity other, evaluation, and enhancement, when comparing with a number of specific comparison referents ('When you are thinking or talking about how you and your family are doing, *why* do you then compare with x?'). Targets were 'the own situation in the past' (*temporal*), 'other Germans' (*intragroup*), and 'members of other groups in Germany (e.g. Turks, Aussiedler, Asylum seekers)', (*(other) minority*). Note that for the temporal comparison referent, the 'equity other' motive was not assessed; only the other three motives were included. Again, responses were measured on 5-point scales (1 = not at all true to 5 = very true), and the order of items was randomised for each respondent.

To measure *specific (group membership) deprivation relative to different targets (GMRD)*, participants were then asked how well they were actually doing compared to each of the seven targets that featured in the CI items (1 = much better to 5 = much worse, after scale reversal). Those single-item measures were called '*intragroup GMRD*' for deprivation relative to Germans, '*temporal GMRD*' for deprivation relative to the own past, '*Aussiedler GMRD*' for deprivation relative to Aussiedler, '*Turkish GMRD*' for deprivation relative to Turkish people, '*Asylum GMRD*' for deprivation relative to Asylum seekers, '*American GMRD*' for deprivation relative to Americans, '*developing world GMRD*' for deprivation relative to people in the developing world, and '*(other) minority GMRD*' for the mean of 'Aussiedler' and 'Turkish' GMRD.

To measure what was termed *overall group membership relative deprivation (overall GMRD)*, students indicated how they and their family were doing overall (1 = very well to 5 = not at all well, after scale reversal), how satisfied they were with their situation (1 = very to 5 = not at all, after scale reversal), how sad they were when thinking about their situation (1 = not at all to 5 = very), and how angry they about their situation (1 = not at all to 5 = very). These items were combined with all seven specific

GMRD items (vis-à-vis specific comparison objects), to formed a reliable scale of overall GMRD, $\alpha = .82$.

Perceived overall group relative deprivation (overall GRD) was measured using the same four general items as for overall GMRD (see above), but this time students were invited to think about their group as a whole, rather than about their family. The four items formed a reliable scale, $\alpha = .76$.

Additionally, students indicated their age, sex, country of birth, language habits, citizenship, how long they had been living in Germany, and the group membership of their mother and father, respectively. Effects for these variables were tested, and are reported below where significant effects were obtained.

Study 4

Participants

Two hundred eighty nine secondary school students (116 German majority members, 166 minority members, with 7 failing to indicate their group membership; mean age = 16.15; 148 females, 134 males, with 7 failing to indicate their sex) filled out questionnaires during class time. Data were collected in the industrial area of Germany (Ruhrgebiet), in which the minority population, especially of Turks and Aussiedler, is very high. Most of the minority members (75.5%) were born in Germany, 10% were born in Turkey, and the rest was born in a wide variety of places. Of those 49 minority members that were not born in Germany, the vast majority had been living in Germany for longer than 3 years. Only 4% of minority members indicated that German was their mother tongue, and 118 (71%) indicated that Turkish was their mother tongue. Following the self-classification procedure described above, 121 of the minority students identified themselves as Turks, 13 originated from the Balkans (Macedonia, Bosnia, Albania, Kosovo), 8 from the former Eastern bloc (Polish, Russian, Aussiedler), 9 from European states (Spain, Greece, Italy, Netherlands), and the remaining 15 originated from a wide variety of places.

Procedure

Procedures were identical to the ones described above for study 3.

Measures

The questionnaire that was administered was very similar to the one used in the study 3. The few differences that did exist are specified below.²³ Cronbach's alpha for the *identification* scale was $\alpha = .83$. *Comparison interest* in different objects was assessed using the CI questions described above, with the following exceptions: Students who identified themselves as belonging to a group other than the Germans also answered the CI questions with regards to two additional objects, i.e. 'members of your own group' and 'people in the country where you and/or your parents are from'. The order of the items was randomised for each respondent. In order to interpret the responses in a meaningful way, responses were recoded, resulting in the following categories: '*Intragroup CI*' (e.g. German CI for German respondents, Turkish CI for Turkish respondents, own CI for respondents that were neither German, nor Aussiedler, nor Turkish (note that the sample did not include any Asylum seekers or Americans), $\alpha = .86$); '*temporal CI*' ($\alpha = .65$); '*origin CI*' (only for minority group members, $\alpha = .71$); '*majority CI*' (i.e. comparisons with Germans, only for minority group members, $\alpha = .77$); '*developing world CI*' ($\alpha = .66$); '*American CI*' ($\alpha = .69$); '*Asylum CI*' ($\alpha = .57$); and '*(other) minority CI*' (equal Aussiedler CI for Turkish respondents, Turkish CI for Aussiedler respondents, and the mean of Aussiedler CI and Turkish CI for all respondents that were neither Aussiedler or Turkish – including Germans, $\alpha = .76$).

General comparison motives were measured in the same way as described for the study 3 (again, the order of the general motive items was randomised for each participant). However, *specific comparison motives* – even though still assessed using the same items – was now a between subjects factor, rather than a within subjects factor. Thus, whereas in the study 3 participants had answered the motive questions with respect to three different targets, each participant only answered the motive questions with respect to *one* target this time. Possible targets were, as before, a) 'the own situation in the past' (*temporal*), b) 'other ingroup members' (*intragroup*), and c) 'majority members' (i.e. Germans) for minority respondents or 'members of minorities (e.g. Turks, Aussiedler, Asylum seekers)' for majority respondents (*i.e. majority or (other) minority CI*). Participants were assigned randomly to one of these conditions. In

²³ Note that there were a few minor changes in the wording of the instructions to the students between the study 3 and study 4 versions of the questionnaire which are not explicitly discussed here. These were due to suggestions and requirements of the headmaster of the school where the data for study 4 was collected. However, because these changes were very minor, they do not merit a more detailed discussion here.

order to not have this between subject factor affect responses to the other items in the questionnaire, the specific motive items were moved to the end of the questionnaire. It was decided to have the specific motive questions as a between subjects factor in order to make possible the inclusion in the questionnaire of an additional general motive scale (see below).

To measure *specific (group membership) deprivation relative to each of the targets*, participants were presented with the same items as participants in study 3. Again, Non-German participants also answered how deprived they felt relative to 'members of their own group' and relative to 'families in the country where you and/or your parents are from'. Responses were recoded following the same principles as outlined for the CI items above. This resulted in one-item measures for the following constructs: '*intragroup GMRD*' (e.g. deprivation relative to Germans for German respondents, deprivation relative to Turks for Turkish respondents, etc.); '*temporal GMRD*', '*(other) minority GMRD*' (i.e. the mean deprivation relative to Turks and Aussiedler for Germans, deprivation relative to Turks for Aussiedler, deprivation relative to Aussiedler for Turks, etc.); '*majority GMRD*' and '*origin GMRD*' (for minority participants only), '*American GMRD*', '*developing world GMRD*', and '*Asylum GMRD*'.

Overall group membership relative deprivation (GMRD) and *overall group relative deprivation (GRD)* was measured using the same items as in study 3, and the resulting alphas for the two scales were .81 for GMRD, and .69 for GRD, respectively.

Finally, an *alternative general motive scale* was included in study 4. This was done in order to test whether an alternative operationalisation of general motives might yield more predictive power. In order to assess *system blame/equity motives*, students answered the following items (1 = not at all true to 5 = very much true): 'Members of my group are treated unfairly and have it harder than others', 'Members of my group have to fight harder than others in order to get what they deserve', 'I want people to realise that many members of my group are treated unfairly', and 'People have to realise that members of my group are not getting what they deserve' ($\alpha = .82$ for this 4-item scale). One (reverse-coded) item was deleted from this scale, in order to improve reliability. In order to assess *enhancement motives*, students answered the following two items, using the same response format: 'I always listen carefully when someone says something good about my group', and 'I do not like hearing bad things about my group'

(inter-item correlation = .59).²⁴ Finally, again some demographic information was assessed.

Results

Results will be presented structured according to topics, rather than separately for the two studies, and most results will be summarised in joint tables, to facilitate cross-study comparisons. Results will be discussed under the following headings:

- i) Descriptive analyses and group differences
- ii) Mean Comparison Interest and Specific Deprivation relative to different targets, repeated measures analyses (speaking to H1 & H2, i.e. testing whether intragroup and temporal GMRD would be lower than GMRD vis-à-vis other objects, and whether intragroup and temporal CI would be higher than CI in the other objects)
- iii) General comparison motives, repeated measures analyses (testing H3, i.e. whether overall the endorsement of the enhancement motive would be higher than the endorsement of the equity own motive)
- iv) Specific comparison motives, repeated measures analyses (testing H4, i.e. whether 'enhancement motives' would be connected to intragroup and temporal comparisons for all participants, and 'equity own' motives to intergroup comparisons for minority members)
- v) Predicting overall Deprivation (GMRD & GRD) from CI, motives, and identification, as well as the motive*identification interaction. These regression analyses tested H5, i.e. the RDT prediction that comparisons will influence levels of overall perceived deprivation; and H6, i.e. the prediction that the effect of identification on overall RD will be moderated by motives
- vi) Mediation analyses to test whether the (negative) effect of identification on deprivation is mediated by motives (enhancement, equity own) or by CI (intragroup, temporal), as proposed by H7

²⁴ It was contemplated to combine 'equity own' and 'enhancement' motives, as measured with operationalisations 1 and 2, into a joint scale. However, conceptually they seem sufficiently distinct to keep them as two separate indices (with one focussing explicitly on comparisons, and the other one being more general). Also, factor analyses showed that items loaded on three distinct factors (one for the four general motives of operationalisation 1, one for 'equity own/system blame' of operationalisation 2, and one for 'enhancement' as measured with operationalisation 2). This three-factor structure emerged for both the minority and the majority sample. Therefore, it was decided to keep the two measurement approaches separate, and to form two distinct scales for the 'equity own' and 'enhancement' motives, respectively.

vii) Predicting CI from motives, specific deprivation, identification, and the deprivation*motives and identification*motives interactions. These regression analyses tested H8, i.e. the prediction that deprivation vis-à-vis an object would interact with motives in impacting on interest in comparing with this object, and H9, i.e. the prediction that the effect of identification on CI would be moderated by motives for minority members (so that identification would lead to high intragroup and temporal CI under enhancement conditions, and to high intergroup CI under equity own conditions). The main effect of motives on CI in this analysis also spoke to H4 (i.e. motives will directly impact on comparisons).

Descriptive analyses and group differences²⁵

In study 4, overall minority respondents were more identified with their group than majority respondents, replicating a well-documented effect ($t(1, 280) = -3.67, p < .001, Ms = 4.38, 4.02$). Those born in Germany ($N = 115$) felt less deprived overall than those born elsewhere ($N = 38; F(1, 151) = 20.56, p < .001, MSE = 0.31; Ms = 2.22, 2.47$).

Mean Comparison Interest and specific Deprivation relative to different targets

Recall that as for previous studies, it was expected that CI in the intragroup and temporal targets would be highest, for both minority and majority members (H2). Further, it was expected that RD relative to the intragroup and temporal target would be lowest for minority members (H1).

Study 3. Two repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted, testing for a) significant differences in the interest in comparing with various objects, and b)

²⁵ A number of other analyses were also conducted that are not reported, the most important of which shall be briefly summarised here. First of all, Categorical CI items had been included in studies 3 & 4. However, a free and unstructured response format was employed, which yielded numerous problems (both missing data and coding difficulties), and consequently the results are not elaborated on here. Further, some analyses were carried out to test for the *correspondence between responses on the interval CI measures and the categorical comparison choices*. In spite of the problems with the categorical measure, these analyses yielded good agreement between the two measurement approaches. Further analyses focussing on *the relationship between different motives* showed that all motives were moderately and positively correlated with each other. A further analysis was conducted with overall GMRD and GRD as two levels of the repeated measures factor, and 'group' as a between subjects factor. This did not yield an effect for group (thus, surprisingly, overall RD was the same for minority and majority respondents), but a significant effect for the repeated measures factor was found: GRD was higher than GMRD, providing further evidence for the well-documented PGD effect.

significant differences in levels of perceived deprivation relative to various objects. The analysis for comparison interest yielded a significant result, $F(3.59, 1055.41) = 66.60, p < .001, MSE = 1.19$; as did the analysis for deprivation, $F(3.82, 971.35) = 275.07, p < .001, MSE = 0.55$.

Study 4. For each the majority and the minority samples, two repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted, testing for a) significant differences in the interest in comparing with various objects, and b) significant differences in levels of perceived deprivation relative to various objects. For the *Majority*, both analyses yielded significant results, $F(4.38, 476.91) = 26.58, p < .001, MSE = 1.39$ for comparison interest, $F(3.78, 339.76) = 12.58, p < .001, MSE = 1.42$ for deprivation. For the *Minority*, the analysis for comparison interest yielded a significant result, $F(5.66, 844.09) = 52.81, p < .001, MSE = 1.25$; as did the analysis for deprivation, $F(5.59, 686.96) = 18.58, p < .001, MSE = 1.01$. When including 'Group membership' (minority vs. majority) in the above analyses, it significantly interacted with the repeated measures factor of CI, $F(4.06, 1026.91) = 3.12, p < .02$, but not with the repeated measures factor of specific deprivation. For a summary of means, see table 15.

Table 15

Mean comparison interest and specific deprivation relative to different targets

CI targets	Majority members (study 3) N = 300		Majority members (study 4) N = 116		Minority members (study 4) N = 166	
	CI	Deprivation	CI	Deprivation	CI	Deprivation
Intragroup	2.66 a (1.27)	2.71 e (0.66)	3.32 a (1.45)	2.22 bc (0.83)	3.40 a (1.34)	2.13 abc (0.95)
Origin	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	3.31 a (1.28)	1.79 a (0.93)
Temporal	2.57 a (1.25)	2.38 d (0.91)	2.75 b (1.31)	1.93 ab (.96)	3.05 ab (1.32)	2.19 bc (1.18)
Majority members	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	2.81 bc (1.25)	2.33 c (0.79)
developing world	2.56 a (1.18)	1.18 a (0.71)	2.47 bc (1.32)	1.75 a (1.31)	2.39 c (1.28)	1.82 ab (1.10)
Members of (other) minorities	1.67 c (0.70)	1.97 c (0.71)	2.09 cd (1.13)	2.45 c (1.19)	2.06 d (1.03)	2.25 c (1.09)
Americans	2.23 b (1.06)	2.98 f (0.73)	2.41 bc (1.28)	2.74 d (1.01)	2.01 d (1.09)	2.91 d (1.13)
Asylum seekers	1.74 c (0.86)	1.65 b (0.77)	1.87 d (0.99)	2.08 b (1.33)	1.94 d (1.06)	2.08 abc (1.19)
Marginals	2.24	2.15	2.43	2.23	2.62	2.19

Note. High values indicated high CI and deprivation. Subscripts denote significant differences based on post-hoc pairwise comparisons between means per column at $p < .05$. Standard deviations in parentheses.

Thus, in study 3, respondents were most interested to compare with ingroup members, their own past, and people in the developing world. They felt least deprived vis-à-vis people in the developing world, asylum seekers, and minority members.

In study 4, minority members were most interested in comparing with members of their ingroup, people in their country of origin, and their own past. Majority members were most interested in comparing with ingroup members, their past, and people in the third world (the same modal choices as in study 3). Simple main effects analysis revealed that the interaction between CI and group was due to majority members being more interested in comparisons with Americans, $F(1, 253) = 6.31, p < .02$, and due to minority members being marginally more interested in comparing with the past, $F(1, 253) = 3.01, p < .09$. Minority members felt least deprived vis-à-vis people in their country of origin, people in the third world, and asylum seekers, and majority members

felt least deprived vis-à-vis people in the third world, asylum seekers, and their own past.

In sum, at a first glance there does not seem to be any straight forward support for the 'self-protection' hypothesis that CI is highest in those objects relative to which RD is lowest, although there are some indicators pointing toward possible self-protective and enhancing mechanisms: For instance, minority members were more interested than majority members in temporal comparisons, which are thought to lend themselves to distortion and self-enhancing purposes. Moreover, now comparing across majority members of studies 3 and 4, the following is striking: Majority members in study 4, who obviously feel more deprived vis-à-vis asylum seekers and other minority members than the majority respondents of study 3, report feeling less deprived vis-à-vis their own past and ingroup members, and are evidently also more interested in temporal and intragroup comparisons than study 3 participants. Again, this might be a result of a compensatory, self-protective effort. However, some of the analyses reported below will be more suited to test these possibilities.

General Comparison Motives, repeated measures

Recall that it was expected that generally the enhancement motive would be stronger than the equity own motive (H3, with no specific predictions about evaluation and equity other).

Study 3. A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with the four general motives (measurement approach 1) as levels of a repeated measures factor. The analysis yielded a main effect for 'motives', $F(2.80, 810.19) = 54.37, p < .001, MSE = 1.17$. Pairwise post-hoc comparisons showed that participants were generally most interested in the 'equity other' and 'evaluation' motives and least interested in the 'equity own' motive (for the pattern of means, see table 16).

Study 4. First, a repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with general motives (measurement approach 1) as levels of a repeated measures factor and 'group' (Germans vs. minority members) as a between subjects factor. This yielded a main effect for 'motives', $F(2.82, 759.57) = 10.87, p < .001, MSE = 1.07$, and a significant group*motive interaction, $F(2.82, 759.57) = 2.69, p < .05$. The main effect was

interpreted using pairwise post-hoc comparisons. It showed that generally participants were more interested in 'enhancement' and 'evaluation' than in 'equity own' or 'equity other'. However, this main effect was qualified by an interaction with group: While minority members were more interested in 'enhancement' and 'evaluation' than in 'equity own' or 'equity other', majority members were as interested in 'equity own' as they were in 'enhancement' and 'evaluation', whereas 'equity other' was least popular for majority members (for the pattern of means, see table 16). Thus, the popularity of the 'equity own' motive among majority members possibly indicates that privileged majority members *subjectively* feel *more* deprived than minority members.

Second, a repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with the alternative general motive items for 'enhancement' and 'system blame/equity own' (measurement approach 2) as two levels of a repeated measures factor, and 'group' as a between subjects factor. This yielded a significant effect for 'motives', $F(1, 277) = 176.40, p < .001, MSE = 0.92$ (and a significant effect for group, $F(1, 277) = 13.97, p < .001, MSE = 1.24$, which is of less interest in the present context). The two factors did not interact. Pairwise post-hoc comparisons showed that participants were much more motivated by 'enhancement' than by 'system blame/equity own', and overall minority members scored higher on the motive items than Germans (see table 16).

Overall, all analyses supported the prediction that 'enhancement' motives would be stronger than 'equity own' motives (H3). Still, they also speak to the importance of other motives. For instance, 'evaluation' was consistently high.

Table 16

General comparison motives

general motives	Majority members (study 3) <i>N</i> = 300	Majority members (study 4) <i>N</i> = 115		Minority members (study 4) <i>N</i> = 156		Total sample (study 4) <i>N</i> = 271	
	Measurement approach 1	Measurement approach 1	Measurement approach 2	Measurement approach 1	Measurement approach 2	Measurement approach 1	Measurement approach 2
Enhancement	2.89 b (1.18)	3.37 a (1.15)	3.69 a (1.19)	3.49 a (1.26)	4.02 a (0.96)	3.44 a (1.21)	3.86 a (1.03)
Evaluation	3.25 a (1.08)	3.21 a (1.20)	n/a	3.35 a (1.10)	n/a	3.29 a (1.14)	n/a
System blame/ Equity own	2.35 c (1.23)	3.18 ab (1.33)	2.57 b (1.06)	2.90 b (1.27)	2.96 b (1.06)	3.02 b (1.31)	2.76 b (1.07)
Equity other	3.35 a (1.12)	2.94 b (1.29)	n/a	3.06 b (1.27)	n/a	3.01 b (1.27)	n/a

Note. Subscripts denote significant differences between means per column at $p < .05$. Standard deviations in parentheses.

Specific Comparison Motives, repeated measures

Recall that it had been predicted that generally participants would compare with temporal and intragroup targets more for ‘enhancement’ than for ‘equity’ reasons, and that minority members would compare with intergroup targets mainly for ‘equity own’ reasons (H4).

Study 3. Various repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted, comparing the strength of the motives for comparisons with each of the three targets, respectively, and comparing the strength of one motive when comparing with different targets (i.e. across targets, note that it was chosen not to include these analyses into an overall analytic design in order to be able to include the ‘equity other’ motive, which had not been assessed with respect to the temporal target). All repeated measures analyses were highly significant: Testing the strength of different motives when comparing with the past object ($F(2, 556) = 167.16, p < .001, MSE = 0.93$), testing the strength of different motives when comparing with ingroup objects ($F(3, 834) = 89.05, p < .001, MSE = 0.99$), and testing the strength of different motives when comparing with outgroup objects ($F(3, 834) = 119.45, p < .001, MSE = 1.05$), (see table 17, column-wise).

Comparisons of differences in the importance of one motive when comparing with different objects also yielded significant results: Testing the strength of the 'evaluation' motive for the three different objects ($F(2, 532) = 12.43, p < .001, MSE = 0.63$), testing the strength of the 'enhancement' motive across different objects ($F(2, 536) = 23.90, p < .001, MSE = 0.56$), testing the strength of the 'equity own' motive across different objects ($F(2, 536) = 6.50, p < .001, MSE = 0.44$), and testing the strength of the 'equity other' motive across different objects ($F(1, 274) = 48.49, p < .001, MSE = 0.90$).

As column-wise comparisons in table 17 reveal, past CI was driven mainly by a motive to 'enhance' and 'evaluate', intragroup CI was driven mainly by 'evaluation' and 'equity other', and intergroup CI was driven mainly by 'evaluation' and 'equity other'.

Study 4. As a between subjects factor, students had been asked which motives they would have when comparing with either the past, or ingroup members, or outgroup members. Participants were randomly assigned to one of these three conditions. This factor 'comparison object' was used as a between subjects factor in a repeated measures ANOVA, in which the four 'motives' were entered as four levels of a repeated measures factor (there were only three levels for the temporal target, since for this target 'equity other' had not been assessed). 'Group' was entered as an additional between subjects factor. This yielded a significant interaction between 'motives' and 'comparison object', $F(5.63, 759.36) = 3.84, p < .001, MSE = 1.17$. 'Group' did not yield any significant main or interaction effects. Two main effects were found, for 'motives' and for 'comparison object', but these are of subordinate importance and will not be discussed here. For a summary of means, see table 17. Even though there was no significant three-way interaction with 'group', separate means for the minority and majority sample of study 4 are provided in table 18, for ease of interpretation.

Looking at table 17, across all participants, temporal CI was driven by 'enhancement' and 'evaluation', intragroup CI by 'enhancement' and 'evaluation', and intergroup CI by 'evaluation' and 'equity own'. Observing table 18, it seems that for both majority and minority members temporal and intragroup comparisons are driven by a desire to enhance and evaluate, and intergroup comparisons are driven mainly by 'evaluation' and an 'equity own' motive (conclusions mainly based on column-wise differences).

Table 17

Specific comparison motives

specific motives	Majority members (study 3) N = 300			Total sample (study 4) N = 282		
	Past object N = 279	Ingroup object N = 279	Outgroup object N = 279	Past object N = 97	Ingroup object N = 91	Outgroup object N = 98
Enhancement	2.19 b x (1.15)	2.09 c x (1.12)	1.77 b y (1.04)	3.26 a y (1.29)	2.71 b x (1.33)	2.51 b z (1.42)
Evaluation	3.05 a x (1.23)	3.07 a x (1.23)	2.78 a y (1.26)	3.34 a x (1.17)	3.07 a x (1.29)	3.03 a x (1.28)
System blame/ Equity own	1.57 c y (0.92)	1.75 d x (1.08)	1.61 b y (1.02)	2.39 c x (1.24)	2.28 c x (1.30)	2.65 b x (1.43)
Equity other	n/a	2.35 b y (1.19)	2.91 a x (1.31)	n/a	2.35 c y (1.19)	2.17 c y (1.13)
Marginals	2.27	2.32	2.27	2.99	2.60	2.59

Note. Different subscripts denote significant differences between means according to pairwise post-hoc comparisons with Bonferroni adjusted alpha levels at $p < .05$. abc = column-wise comparisons, xyz = row-wise comparisons. Standard deviations in parentheses.

Table 18

Specific comparison motives, study 4, means for majority and minority members

specific motives	Majority members (study 4) N = 116			Minority members (study 4) N = 166		
	Past object N = 35	Ingroup object N = 35	Outgroup object N = 39	Past object N = 54	Ingroup object N = 53	Outgroup object N = 52
Enhancement	3.20 a (1.41)	2.66 ab (1.35)	2.67 b (1.54)	3.31 a (1.24)	2.74 b (1.35)	2.44 bc (1.32)
Evaluation	3.37 a (1.40)	3.03 a (1.29)	3.21 a (1.24)	3.33 a (1.05)	3.11 a (1.29)	2.92 a (1.31)
System blame/ Equity own	2.17 b (1.20)	2.20 b (1.26)	2.87 ab (1.43)	2.52 b (1.28)	2.32 b (1.34)	2.52 ab (1.42)
Equity other	n/a	2.17 b (1.07)	2.46 b (1.10)	n/a	2.43 b (1.26)	1.98 c (1.11)

Note. Different subscripts denote significant differences between means according to pairwise post-hoc comparisons with Bonferroni adjusted alpha levels at $p < .05$. abc = column-wise comparisons. Standard deviations in parentheses.

In sum, the prediction that 'enhancement' tends to motivate intragroup and temporal comparisons more so than 'equity own' was supported for all participants. Further, intergroup comparisons were, as predicted, more motivated by 'equity concerns' than

by ‘enhancement’. While intergroup comparisons of the minority and majority samples of study 4 were driven more by ‘equity own’, intergroup comparisons of the majority sample of study 3 were more driven by ‘equity other’ (note that not all pairwise comparisons reached significance, but the pattern of means was generally in the right direction). Still, results from both studies underscore the relevance of equity motives for intergroup comparisons - be it on behalf of the self or some other person/group. Finally, the analyses yielded some indication for the importance of yet other motives, most notably ‘evaluation’.

Predicting overall Deprivation (GMRD & GRD) from CI, Motives, and Identification

Recall that this analysis was conducted to mainly test two predictions. The first aim was to test H5, i.e. the RDT prediction that feelings of overall deprivation are informed by comparisons people make (and more specifically, that for minority members intragroup and temporal CI would negatively influence overall deprivation, and that majority CI would positively influence overall deprivation). Secondly, another objective was to test H6, which expected to replicate results from studies 1 and 2 in finding a negative link between identification and deprivation overall, and which tested whether the negative main effect of identification on deprivation would be moderated by motives. Identification was predicted to have a positive effect if equity motives are strong, and a negative effect if enhancement motives are strong. 2-way interaction terms between identification and motives were built to test this. In addition, it was considered whether the effects of equity and enhancement might have to come *together* to produce the effect: It was considered whether identification would impact negatively on deprivation only if enhancement is high *and* equity is simultaneously low, and whether it would impact positively on deprivation if enhancement is low *and* equity simultaneously is high. 3-way interaction terms were built to test for this.²⁶

²⁶ In addition to the analyses reported above, a whole host of other analyses were conducted also. Some of these yielded inconsistent findings, others did not any new value to what is reported above. However, some examples shall be given of other models that were tested. For instance, overall RD was regressed from ALL CI items (in the analyses above, only the most important targets were included). Further, RD was predicted from ALL motives (i.e. also equity other and evaluation). Further, in order to test the moderation hypothesis, the above analyses were conducted but excluding the CI items from the first step, interactions between identification and the other two motives (equity other & evaluation) were tested, and interactions between identification and motive-bias indices (operationalised through difference scores) were tested. Also, pairs of variables (ident + x) and their interaction terms were entered as the only predictors, disregarding any other motives. Further, in order to interpret significant interactions, it was tried to median split identification rather than motives. Further, it was tested whether the relationship

Study 3. Two separate regression analyses were conducted, predicting GMRD and GRD. In both cases, the same predictors were used: In a first step, CI in ingroup members and in the past were entered, to test whether comparison preferences and behaviour would predict feelings of overall deprivation (no specific predictions had been held for majority members, but the question was explored). Also, identification and ‘equity own’ and ‘enhancement’ motives were entered in the first step. In a second step, the two-way interactions between the two motives and identification, respectively, were entered. In a third step, the three way interaction between identification and both motives was entered. Steps 2 and 3 tested whether motives would moderate the effect of identification on deprivation. A summary of the model and the individual betas are displayed in table 19.²⁷

Study 4. For each the minority and the majority sample, two separate regression analyses were conducted, predicting GMRD and GRD. The models for the majority employed the following predictors: In a first step, CI in ingroup members and in the past were entered. Further, identification and ‘equity own’ (both measurement approaches) and ‘enhancement’ (both measurement approaches) motives were also entered in the first step. In a second step, the two-way interactions between each of the four motive indices and identification, respectively, were entered. In a third step, the three-way interaction between identification and the two motives measured with approach 1 was entered, as well as the three way interaction between identification and the two motives measured with approach 2. For the minority sample, the model was the same as for the majority, apart from the fact that in step 1 also ‘CI in majority members’ was included. A summary of the model and the individual betas are displayed in table 19. Note that non-significant betas for interaction terms are omitted from the table, in order to make it easier for the reader to focus on the important pieces of information. Cells for non-significant betas for interaction terms are left blank.

between identification and GMRD/GRD might be curvilinear (through tertile-splitting both identification and the deprivation indices, respectively). No curvilinear pattern was found.

²⁷ Throughout this thesis, regression analyses based on uncentred scores are presented. It has been noted that centering is particularly important when testing interactions in regression (Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken, 2003; Jaccard, Turrisi, Wan, 1990), in order to guard against multicollinearity. However, multicollinearity is particularly problematic in cases where the scaling for the individual predictors that form the interaction term differ largely, and this is not the case for the present data. Further, regressions were also run on centred variables, and the results were not substantially different from the ones on the uncentred variables.

Table 19

Predicting overall deprivation (GMRD & GRD) from CI, motives, and identification

		Majority members (study 3)		Majority members (study 4)		Minority members (study 4)	
		GMRD N = 283	GRD N = 280	GMRD N = 109	GRD N = 110	GMRD N = 148	GRD N = 147
Overall Model	R^2	.12	.16	.13	.19	.17	.20
	F	7.62*** (2, 277)	10.73*** (5, 274)	2.18* (7, 101)	3.34** (7, 102)	3.50*** (8, 139)	4, 23*** (8, 138)
	ΔR^2 (step 2)	0.01	.03 *	.03	.03	.01	.06 *
(step 1)	Intragroup CI	-.05	-.08	.13	-.16	.18 *	-.05
β s	Temporal CI	.21 ***	.22 ***	-.02	.15	.04	.06
	Majority CI	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	.08	.09
	Enh (1)	-.006	.04	.09	-.12	.25 **	-.02
	Eq own (1)	.15 *	.04	-.01	.16 ●	-.14	.11
	Enh (2)	n/a	n/a	-.06	-.17 ●	-.21 *	-.28 ***
	Eq own (2)	n/a	n/a	.15	.32 ***	.19 *	.25 **
	Identification	-.27 ***	-.35 ***	-.30 **	.05	-.11	-.11
	(step 2)	Enh (1)		.73 **			
IA of ident with...	Eq own (1)	-.54 ●	-.62 *				
	Enh (2)	n/a	n/a				
	Eq own (2)	n/a	n/a				-1.44 *
(step 3) IAs of ident with...	Eq own (1)*		-.45 ●		-1.28 ***		
	Enh (1)						
	Eq own (2)*	n/a	n/a	1.27 *			
	Enh (2)						

Note. (1) = measurement approach 1. (2) = measurement approach 2. 'Enh' = Enhancement, 'Eq own' = 'Equity own', 'IA' = 'interaction', 'ident' = 'identification'. ● $p < .09$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. Df in parentheses.

As can be seen in table 19, all models were significant. Looking at step 1 first, for study 3, temporal CI, the 'equity own' motive, and identification were significant predictors. For study 4, CI intragroup, identification, and all four motive indices yielded significant results. I will first reflect on the support for H5, i.e. the prediction that comparison choices should affect overall RD. Summing up the results for CI across both studies, only very weak evidence was found that CI predicts overall RD. High temporal CI lead to high GMRD and high GRD in study 3, but it had no significant effects in study 4 (i.e., only 2 out of 6 tested betas were significant). Majority CI was not a significant predictor in any of the regressions (0/2 betas significant), and the only significant beta for intragroup CI was found when predicting GMRD for minority members in study 4 (1/6 betas significant). Further, intragroup CI had a positive effect (which was therefore opposite to the predicted direction). Thus, overall, evidence for the RDT prediction was very weak.

I will now focus on the main effects of motives (taking into consideration evidence from both studies, and evidence from both measurement approaches for motives). Even though no specific hypotheses had been held about a main effect, an interesting pattern emerged. Looking at the effect for the 'equity own' motive, it was positively related to deprivation (5/10 betas significant). 'Enhancement', on the other hand, yielded both positive and negative betas (1/10 positive, 3/10 negative). Both these findings make sense: those more deprived might also be more motivated to emphasise injustices against them in order to induce some social change. They might therefore be higher on the 'equity own' motive. On the other hand, those high on an 'equity own' motive might emphasise RD strategically, in order to undermine their claim that social change is necessary. The mixed results with regards to enhancement might also make sense: Those who enhance less should perceive/ be more susceptible to feelings of RD (negative effect). On the other hand, those who feel highly deprived might have an increased need to 'make up' for this negativity, and might therefore be higher on an enhancement motive (positive effect).

Attending now to H6, and looking at the effect for identification, again an overall *negative* relationship with RD was found (with 3 out of 6 betas reaching significance). The interactions tested whether this negative effect might be explained through a moderation effect of 'motives'. It had been assumed that identification should have a positive effect on RD if equity motives were strong, and it should have a negative effect on RD if enhancement motives were strong. For study 3, 'enhancement' and 'equity own' significantly interacted with identification in predicting deprivation. The three way interaction was marginally significant when predicting GRD. For study 4, Equity own (measurement approach 2) significantly interacted with identification in predicting GRD for the minority sample, and two of the four three way interactions that were tested for the majority sample were significant.

In order to interpret the significant two-way interactions, the samples were median split into those high vs. low on the two motives, respectively. Then, the regressions were run again separately for the two groups, and the betas for identification in predicting deprivation were examined. In order to interpret the three-way interaction, regressions were re-run, focussing on the two sub-groups which were relevant for the present hypothesis: These are those that were either 'high on enhancement *and* low on equity own', or those that were 'high on equity own *and* low on enhancement' (always determined by median splits). Betas for identification in predicting deprivation (using

the same regression models as described in table 19) were then compared for those two sub-groups.²⁸ Results are displayed in table 20.

Table 20

Interpreting significant interactions between motives and identification when predicting overall deprivation (GMRD & GRD)

			Enhancement		Effect as predicted?
Sample	DV	Motive type	High (Beta should be smaller/more negative in this condition)	Low	
Study 3	GRD	1	-.23** (175)	-.46*** (105)	No
			Equity own		
			High (Beta should be bigger/more positive in this condition)	Low	
Study 3	GMRD	1	-.31*** (119)	-.24** (164)	No
Study 3	GRD	1	-.08 (117)	-.38*** (163)	Approximately
Study 4 minority	GRD	2	-.24 • (68)	-.04 (79)	No
			3-way interaction		
			Enh high, Eq own low (Beta should be smaller/more negative)	Enh low, Eq own high (Beta should be bigger/more positive)	
Study 3	GRD	1	-.23* (84)	-.67** (26)	No
Study 4 majority	GRD	1	-.11 (32)	.25 (20)	Yes
Study 4 majority	GMRD	2	-.16 (27)	-.56* (21)	No

Note. Displayed are standardised regression coefficients. (1) = measurement approach 1. (2) = measurement approach 2. 'Enh' = Enhancement, 'Eq own' = Equity own. • $p < .09$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. Cell Ns in parentheses.

To recap, it had been expected that identification would correlate positively with RD under 'equity' conditions, and negatively under 'enhancement' conditions. Out of 30 interactions that were tested (see table 19), 7 were significant or marginally significant.

²⁸ It should be noted that another method of interpreting interactions, which is thought to be superior, is available (Aiken & West, 1991; Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). However, although Aiken and colleagues recommend looking at the relationship between the IV and DV at three levels of the moderator (usually the mean, +/- one standard deviation), I had some specific hypotheses about the relationship at *two* levels of the moderator (motive endorsement low vs. high). Therefore, it was decided to compare the regression coefficients at just two levels of the moderator.

However, table 20 shows that only 1 of these 7 significant interactions was clearly consistent with the prediction. As expected, predicting GRD for the majority members of study 4, identification negatively predicted GRD for those in the 'Enhancement high/Equity low' condition, and it positively predicted GRD for those in the 'Enhancement low/Equity high condition'. Furthermore, the results for predicting GRD in study 3 were approximately in the right direction, with identification having a less negative effect on deprivation under 'Equity high' conditions than under 'Equity low' conditions. However, as table 20 reveals, 5 out of the 7 significant interactions yielded patterns that were very clearly in the 'wrong' direction. Therefore, it has to be concluded that no support was found for H6, which had predicted that the effect of identification on deprivation would be moderated by motives (positive effect under equity conditions, and negative effect under enhancement conditions). Nevertheless, it should also be noted that the *N*s, particularly for the 3-way interactions, are very low, which makes it difficult to draw strong conclusions.

Is the (negative) effect of Identification on Deprivation mediated by Motives (enhancement, equity own) or by CI (intragroup, temporal)?

Since there was only very limited support for the hypothesis that motives would moderate the effect of identification on deprivation, four alternative mediation hypotheses were tested. As outlined in H7, it was posed that high identifiers would be higher on the enhancement motive, lower on the equity motive, and/or more interested in potentially flattering intragroup and temporal comparisons (the latter particularly for minority members), and possibly one or several of these factors would explain or mediate the negative effect of identification on deprivation. Following Kenny & Baron, three necessary conditions for mediation can be defined: 1) the mediator has to be predicted by the IV, 2) the DV has to be predicted by the IV, and 3) when predicting the DV simultaneously from both the IV and the mediator, the beta for the mediator must still be significant and the beta for the IV has to be significantly reduced. Results for both study 3 and study 4 are displayed in table 21.

Table 21

Is the (negative) effect of identification on deprivation mediated by motives or CI?

	Pairwise correlations between identification and potential mediators (motives, CI)		
	Majority members (study 3)	Majority members (study 4)	Minority members (study 4)
Enhancement (1)	.31 ***	.02	.10
Equity own (1)	.19 ***	.02	.003
Enhancement (2)	n/a	.36 ***	.24 **
Equity own (2)	n/a	-.03	-.06
CI intragroup	.28 ***	.35 ***	.13 ●
CI temporal	.04	.10	.11
	Pairwise correlations between identification and the DVs, i.e. deprivation (GMRD & GRD)		
GMRD	-.25 ***	-.28 **	-.14 ●
GRD	-.34 **	-.11	-.21 **
	Betas for IV when predicting GMRD, whilst including mediator...		
Enhancement (1)	Mediator was <i>ns</i> in this model	n/a	n/a
Enhancement (2)	n/a	Mediator was <i>ns</i> in this model	Mediator was <i>ns</i> in this model
CI intragroup	Mediator was <i>ns</i> in this model	Mediator was <i>ns</i> in this model	-.17 ($z = 1.53$)
CI temporal	n/a	n/a	n/a
	Betas for IV when predicting GRD, whilst including mediator...		
Enhancement (1)	Mediator was <i>ns</i> in this model	n/a	n/a
Enhancement (2)	n/a	n/a	-.17 * ($z = -1.80$)
CI intragroup	Mediator was <i>ns</i> in this model	n/a	Mediator was <i>ns</i> in this model
CI temporal	n/a	n/a	n/a

Note. (1) = measurement approach 1. (2) = measurement approach 2. ● $p < .09$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. z values for the test of significant reductions are displayed in parentheses.

The table should be read as follows: In the top panel, results for condition 1) are presented, i.e. pairwise comparisons for IV-mediator. Then, results for condition 2) are displayed, i.e. the IV-DV correlations between identification and deprivation. If the mediator-IV and IV-DV correlations were *both* significant *and* in the right direction, it was proceeded to test whether condition 3) would also be met when predicting GMRD (3/4 of the table from the top), and GRD (bottom panel of the table). Thus, each cell of the lower half of the table pertains to a complete regression analysis. However, instead of displaying results for the whole regression (like overall R^2 s etc.), in order not to overcomplicate the presentation, it was decided to display only information directly

relevant to Kenny's third condition. As is apparent from table 21, no mediation was found for study 3. For study 4, for the two cases (out of 24 mediation tests) where there was a reduction in the IV-DV link after including the mediator (and where the other Kenny conditions were also met), it was tested whether this decrease was significant. This was done following a procedure outlined by Kenny (<http://nw3.nai.net/%7Edakenny/mediate.htm>, see also Baron & Kenny, 1986). For each of the tests, a z -value was calculated (see table 21). Consultation of a z -table yielded that z -values of 1.96 or bigger are significant at $p < .05$ for two-tailed testing. Hence, neither of the two potential mediation effects reached significance, and little support was found for H7.²⁹

Predicting CI from Motives, specific Deprivation, and Identification

Regression analyses were conducted, predicting comparison interest in various specific targets by motives, identification, specific deprivation relative to the target, and various interaction terms. The analyses aimed to test the following predictions:

H8, which had predicted that the effect of deprivation on CI would be moderated by motives. In line with the self-protective hypothesis, it was expected that participants would avoid comparing with objects relative to which they feel deprived (i.e., specific deprivation relative to a target and interest in comparing with it will correlate negatively). However, this should only be observed for those participants high on the 'enhancement' motive. In short, it was expected that deprivation vis-à-vis an object would *decrease* CI in this object if 'enhancement' motives are strong, and that it would *increase* CI if 'equity own' motives are strong. Various interaction terms were built to test whether the negative effect of deprivation would only occur for those participants high on the enhancement motive, or low on the equity motive, respectively.

H9, which had predicted that the effect of identification on CI would be moderated by motives. It was predicted that identification would increase intragroup and temporal CI if 'enhancement' motives are strong, and that it would increase intergroup CI if 'equity own' motives are strong (particularly for minority members, effects were explored for majority members). Again, various interaction terms were built to test whether the effect of identification on CI would be moderated by motives.

²⁹ While not directly aim of the mediation analysis, results spoke to another interesting question: what is the relationship between identification and motives? Additional analyses were carried for studies 3 & 4, regressing identification from all four general motives. These supported evidence displayed in table 21 that identification is positively related to both 'enhancement' and 'equality own'. In addition, it tended to be negatively related to 'equity other'.

Finally, the analyses also spoke to *H4*, which had suggested that motives might not necessarily moderate the effects of other variables on CI, but that they might instead have a main effect. It had been proposed that ‘enhancement’ motives should increase intragroup and temporal CI (for all participants), and that ‘equity own’ motives should increase intergroup CI (specifically for minority participants).

In order to keep the volume of information obtained within limits that would still make possible a synthesis and interpretation of the results, it was decided to focus only on the most important comparison objects: The DVs were, respectively, intragroup CI, temporal CI, and majority CI for *minority respondents*, and intragroup, temporal, and (other) minorities CI for *majority respondents*. Moreover, again in an attempt to keep the volume of analyses within a reasonable limit, it was decided to test only the effects of the two most important motives: ‘Enhancement’ and ‘equity own’ were used as IVs. Both measurement approaches (1 and 2) for motives that were used in study 4 were entered as predictors in the models of study 4. Further, for study 3, analyses were conducted separately using either the general motives or the specific motives (pertaining to each of the respective DVs, i.e. comparison targets) as IVs, to see whether one of the two would turn out to be a better predictor (this was not possible for study 4, because specific motives had been assessed as a between subjects factor, resulting in *Ns* too low to carry out separate regressions using specific motives as predictors on the study 4 data). Results for the majority participants of study 3 are presented in table 22, results for the minority sample of study 4 are presented in table 23, and results for the majority sample of study 4 are presented in table 24. Note that only significant betas for interaction terms are displayed in tables 22-4. Cells for non-significant betas were left blank, in order to make it easier for the reader to focus on the important results. Significant interactions found in tables 22-4 are interpreted in table 25.³⁰

³⁰ Numerous other analyses were also carried out for both studies 3 & 4. Reported above are the ones that yielded the most coherent results. However, some of the other tests shall be briefly mentioned. In order to test the self-protective hypothesis, pairwise correlations between specific RD and CI were calculated for ALL objects. In line with results from the previous studies, this generally yielded negative correlations. However, only the correlation for the intragroup target reached significance. In order to test the relationship between identification and CI, identification was regressed from ALL CI items. This supported that the most important association was between identification and intragroup CI (positive effect). In order to test the relationship between CI and motives, CI for ALL targets were regressed from ALL motives. Further, in spite of the small *N*, regressions using specific motives were also calculated for study 4. Further, in order to test the effect of the deprivation* motives and identification* motives interactions on CI, various other models had been tested too. For instance, instead of the ‘pure’ CI indices, various CI bias indices were tested, as well as CI in the other objects excluded from the analyses reported above (e.g. predicting Turkish CI, developing world CI, etc). Further, the other two motives disregarded above (i.e. equity other and evaluation) were tested as potential moderators. Also, motive biases (operationalised as difference scores) were tested as potential moderators. Further, models were

Table 22

Predicting CI from motives, deprivation, and identification, study 3

CI object (DV)		General motives			Specific motives		
		Ingroup <i>N</i> = 254	Past <i>N</i> = 272	(other) minorities <i>N</i> = 272	Ingroup <i>N</i> = 249	Past <i>N</i> = 263	(other) minorities <i>N</i> = 265
Overall Model	R^2 (step 1)	.12 ***	.003	.02	.19 ***	.16 ***	.08 ***
	$R^2 \Delta$ (step 2)	.002	.03	.02	.04 **	.03 *	.03 •
	F (step 1)	8.94 (4, 249)	.20 (4, 267)	1.25 (4, 267)	13.87 (4, 244)	12.50 (4, 258)	5.57 (4, 260)
(step 1)	Enh (1)	.16 *	.04	.08	.26 ***	.29 ***	.11 •
β s	Eq own (1)	.08	.03	.03	.14 *	.22 ***	.20 **
	specific RD	-.07	.005	.03	-.05	-.04	.01
	ID	.21 ***	-.006	.07	.17 **	-.05	.02
(step 2)	RD * enh (1)		.43 •				
IAs	RD * eq own (1)					.40 *	
	ID * enh (1)						
	ID * eq own (1)				-.81 *	-.49 •	-.58 •

Note. (1) = measurement approach 1. (2) = measurement approach 2. 'Enh' = Enhancement, 'Eq own' = 'Equity own', 'IA' = 'interaction', 'ID' = 'identification'. • $p < .09$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. *Df* in parentheses. Note that CI and deprivation indices for '(other) minorities' were calculated as the mean of CI Turkish, Aussiedler, and Asylum for this analysis.

Before turning to table 23 which presents results for study 4, the main results from table 22 will briefly be summarised. According to H8, it had been expected that deprivation relative to a target would impact on CI in this target. It had also been predicted that the effect would be moderated by motives. Results showed no significant main effects for RD, and only two out of the twelve tested interaction terms were significant or marginally significant. According to H9, it had been expected that identification would impact on CI, and it had further been expected that this effect would be moderated by motives. Identification significantly predicted interest in comparing with intragroup targets, but not interest in the other targets. Three out of the twelve tested interaction terms were significant or marginally significant. According to H4, it had been expected that motives will have a main effect on CI. As predicted, 'enhancement' was positively related to intragroup and temporal CI. Also, 'Equity own' positively predicted intergroup CI when the specific motives were used (this effect had only been expected for minority members, with no specific preconceived predictions for majority members).

tested that only included specific deprivation and *one* of the potential moderators at a time, excluding other IVs and potential moderators. 3-way interactions were also examined.

Table 23

Predicting CI from motives, deprivation, and identification, study 4 minority members

CI object (DV)		Ingroup <i>N</i> = 152	Past <i>N</i> = 148	Majority <i>N</i> = 154
Overall Model	R^2 (step 1)	.12 **	.07 ●	.12 **
	$R^2 \Delta$ (step 2)	.07	.07	.05
	<i>F</i> (step 1)	3.47 (6, 145)	1.86 (6, 141)	3.45 (6, 147)
(step 1)	Enh (1)	.05	.19 *	.19 *
β s	Eq own (1)	.20 *	.002	.05
	Enh (2)	.16 *	.05	.03
	Eq own (2)	.06	.06	.16 ●
	specific RD	.05	-.12	-.14 ●
	Identification (ID)	.10	.09	.06
(step 2)	RD * enh (1)		.67 ●	
IAs	RD * eq own (1)			
	RD * enh (2)			
	RD * eq own (2)			
	ID * enh (1)	-1.39 ●		-1.47 *
	ID * eq own (1)			
	ID * enh (2)		1.47 ●	
	ID * eq own (2)			

Note. (1) = measurement approach 1. (2) = measurement approach 2. 'Enh' = Enhancement, 'Eq own' = 'Equity own', 'IA' = 'interaction'. ● $p < .09$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. *Df* in parentheses.

Before turning to the next table, the main results from table 23 will briefly be summarised. According to H8, it had been expected that deprivation relative to a target would impact on CI in this target. It had further been predicted that the effect would be moderated by motives. In line with a self-protective hypothesis, specific RD negatively predicted interest in comparing with majority members (but not with the other targets). Only one out of the twelve tested interactions was significant. According to H9, it had been expected that identification would impact on CI, and it had further been expected that this effect would be moderated by motives. Identification did not yield any significant main effect, and three out of the twelve tested interaction terms were (marginally) significant. According to H4, it had been expected that motives will have a main effect on CI. As predicted, some evidence was found that 'enhancement' is positively related to intragroup and temporal CI, and that 'Equity own' is positively predicted intergroup CI. Then again, effects were also found in the other (unpredicted)

direction, in that ‘enhancement’ was also related to intergroup CI, and ‘equity own’ was also related to intragroup CI.

Table 24

Predicting CI from motives, deprivation, and identification, study 4 majority members

CI object (DV)		Ingroup <i>N</i> = 96	Past <i>N</i> = 106	(other) minorities <i>N</i> = 110
Overall Model	R^2 (step 1)	.19 **	.12 *	.06
	$R^2 \Delta$ (step 2)	.17 **	.09	.10
	F (step 1)	3.67 (6, 89)	2.33 (6, 99)	1.06 (6, 103)
(step 1)	Enh (1)	.14	.26 **	-.04
β s	Eq own (1)	.006	.06	-.06
	Enh (2)	.11	.02	-.02
	Eq own (2)	-.02	.04	.23 *
	specific RD	-.18 ●	-.17 ●	-.14
	Identification (ID)	.25 *	.06	-.06
	(step 2)	RD * enh (1)		
IAs	RD * eq own (1)			
	RD * enh (2)			
	RD * eq own (2)			
	ID * enh (1)			
	ID * eq own (1)	-2.01 ***		
	ID * enh (2)			
	ID * eq own (2)	1.53 *	1.54 *	1.59 **

Note. (1) = measurement approach 1. (2) = measurement approach 2. ‘Enh’ = Enhancement, ‘Eq own’ = ‘Equity own’, ‘IA’ = ‘interaction’. ● $p < .09$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. *Df* in parentheses. Note that CI and deprivation indices for ‘(other) minorities’ were calculated as the mean of CI Turkish, Aussiedler, and Asylum for this analysis.

The main results displayed in table 24 can be summarised as follows: In line with H8, and as predicted by a self-protective rationale, specific RD negatively influenced CI for the intragroup and temporal targets (marginal effects). In spite of this, none of the twelve interactions were significant. In line with H9, identification was positively related to intragroup CI (but it was unrelated to CI in the other targets). Four out of the twelve interactions with identification were significant. In line with H4, ‘enhancement’ positively predicted temporal CI (but not intragroup CI). Further, ‘equity own’ positively predicted intergroup CI (hypotheses for this effect had been held for minority participants only).

To see whether the interactions found in tables 22-4 were in the directions predicted by H8 and H9, the samples were median split into those high vs. low in the motive, respectively. Then, the regressions of tables 22-4 that yielded significant interactions were re-run, but this time separately for the sub-samples, and betas for the IVs of interest were compared for those in the high versus low motive conditions, respectively. Results are displayed in table 25.

To briefly outline the expected pattern of results: According to H8, a negative link between RD and CI was expected for those with high enhancement motives (or, the correlation was expected to be *more* negative for those high than for those low on enhancement), and a positive link between RD and CI was expected for those with high equity motives (or, the correlation was expected to be *more* positive for those high than for those low on equity own). According to H9, identification was expected to be associated with high interest in intragroup and temporal comparisons for those participants high on an enhancement motive (translating into an expectation that the correlation should be *more* positive for those high on enhancement than for those low on enhancement), and it was expected to be associated with high interest in intergroup comparisons for those participants high on an 'equity own' motive (translating into an expectation that the correlation should be *more* positive for those high on equity than for those low on equity).

Table 25

Interpreting significant interactions found in tables 22-4

Sample	Interaction of...	DV, and model	β for motive high	β for motive low	Pattern as predicted?
Study 3	RD* enh (1)	Temporal CI, general motives	.11 (172)	-.20 * (100)	No
	RD* Eq own (1)	Temporal CI, Specific motives	.13 (94)	-.13 • (169)	Yes
	ID* Eq own (1)	Intragroup CI, Specific motives	.11 (110)	.23 ** (139)	n/a
	ID* Eq own (1)	Temporal CI, Specific motives	-.18 • (94)	-.01 (169)	n/a
	ID* Eq own (1)	(other) minorities CI, Specific motives	-.03 (90)	-.05 (175)	n/a
Study 4 minority	RD*Enh (1)	Temporal CI	-.04 (80)	-.26 * (68)	No
	ID* Enh (1)	Intragroup CI	-.03 (83)	.24 • (69)	No
	ID* Enh (1)	Majority CI	-.13 (84)	.26 * (70)	n/a
	ID* Enh (2)	Temporal CI	.34 ** (74)	-.09 (74)	Yes
Study 4 majority	ID* Eq own (1)	Intragroup CI	.09 (37)	.36 ** (59)	n/a
	ID* Eq own (2)	Intragroup CI	.49 *** (48)	-.02 (48)	n/a
	ID* Eq own (2)	Temporal CI	.31 * (50)	-.19 (56)	n/a
	ID* Eq own (2)	(other) minorities CI	.15 (53)	-.34 * (57)	n/a

Note. (1) = measurement approach 1. (2) = measurement approach 2. 'Enh' = Enhancement, 'Eq own' = 'Equity own', 'ID' = 'identification'. • $p < .09$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. Cell Ns in parentheses.

Let me first consider the evidence for H8, which had predicted that RD should positively influence CI under 'equity' motives, and that it should negatively influence CI under 'enhancement motives'. Out of the 36 interaction terms that were tested (12 for study 3, 12 for study 4 minority members, 12 for study 4 majority members, see tables 22-4), only 3 were significant. Out of those 3, only 1 interaction was in the expected direction (see row 2 of table 25). In sum, no evidence was found in support of the hypothesis that the effect of perceived deprivation vis-à-vis a target on CI in it is moderated by motives.

Next, the evidence for H9 will be considered, i.e. the idea that identification will lead to more intra- and temporal CI if enhancement motives are strong, and that it will lead to more intergroup CI if equity motives are strong. First of all, out of the 36 interactions that were tested relating to this hypothesis, 10 reached significance. However, note that 8 analyses of table 25 are marked as n/a. According to the hypothesis, equity motives should *only* influence intergroup CI, and *not* intra- and temporal CI. Enhancement motives should only influence intragroup and temporal CI, and not intergroup CI. Further, clear hypotheses were only held for minority members.

However, as seen in table 25, some of the significant interactions were for, e.g., ‘equity’ moderating the effect of identification on intragroup and temporal CI. These results do not directly speak to the hypothesis, and will not be further interpreted. This reduces the number of significant interactions to be interpreted from 10 to 2. Out of those 2, only 1 was in the expected direction (the ID*enh(2) interaction for study 4 minority members). Two further results were approximately in the line with the hypothesis. The first one was for the study 4 minority sample. Identification was positively related to majority CI *only* if enhancement motives were low. Recall that no specific prediction had been held for enhancement moderating the effect of RD on intergroup CI (it had only been predicted to moderate the effect on intragroup and temporal CI). Nonetheless, this pattern of results makes sense: Comparisons with majority members are unlikely to be gratifying for ethnic minority members. Therefore, we might expect to find the positive effect of identification on intergroup comparisons (as would be predicted by SIT) *only* if enhancement motives are low. The second result that was approximately in line with the predictions was found for study 4 majority members. Here, identification was related positively to interest in comparing with outgroup members *only* when equity motives were high. This had been expected, but only for minority members (and, as seen in table 25, the effect was not found for minority members, but for majority members). In sum, a number of interaction terms speaking to H9 yielded significant results, indicating that motives might indeed be of some importance. Yet, most of the effects were not in line with what had been expected. Therefore, little support was found for H9.

Discussion

Results will be discussed jointly for both studies, in the order in which the analyses were presented.

Comparison Interest and Specific Deprivation relative to different targets. No support was found for the H1 prediction that deprivation relative to intragroup and temporal targets would be lowest for minority members (instead, they felt least deprived vis-à-vis people in their country of origin, people in the third world, and asylum seekers). However, some support was found for H2 regarding comparison interest: Whereas majority members consistently displayed most interest in the ‘intragroup’, ‘temporal’, and ‘developing world’ objects, minority members consistently displayed

most interest in the ‘intragroup’, ‘temporal’, and ‘origin’ objects. Thus, while supporting the H2 prediction and replicating previous findings that interest in intragroup and temporal comparisons is highest for both minority and majority members, these results also underline the importance of two additional comparison targets (which had not been included in the previous studies): ‘developing world’ for majority members, and ‘people in the country of origin’ for minority members.

So, in contrast to the results of studies 1 and 2, the pattern of means here did not yield straightforward support of the ‘self-protection’ hypothesis that CI would be highest in those objects relative to which RD is lowest, although – when comparing responses of majority members in both studies - some (weak) evidence was found for potential ‘compensation’ for deprivation and self-protection (by de-emphasising deprivation vis-à-vis temporal and intragroup objects, and increased CI in these targets, among study 4 respondents).

General comparison motives. Overall, i.e. across studies, evidence was found that evaluation, and possibly even more so enhancement, were very strong motivators. Equity concerns (both regarding the own group and other groups) were much less important (the only exception being study 3 majority participants, who scored highly on ‘equity other’, however this might have been driven by social desirability effects). This is in line with the H3 prediction that enhancement motives are more prevalent in ethnic minority settings than equity motives, possibly explaining the negative valence of the effect on identification on deprivation.

Specific comparison motives. Some clear evidence was found that different comparisons satisfy, and are made in order to meet, different needs. For both majority and minority members, intragroup and temporal comparisons satisfy ‘enhancement’ and ‘evaluation’ motives (for the majority members of study 3, intragroup comparisons also satisfied an ‘equity other’ motive). In contrast, intergroup comparisons were driven by equity concerns: For majority members of study 3 intergroup comparisons satisfied ‘evaluation’ and ‘equity other’, and for both minority and majority members of study 4 intergroup comparisons ‘evaluation’ and ‘equity own’ motives. These results are in line with H4 (which had predicted that intragroup and temporal comparisons were made more for enhancement reasons than for equity own reasons for both minority and majority participants, and that intergroup comparisons were made more for equity own

than enhancement reasons for minority participants). Further, note how these results also make sense in light of the ‘self-protection’ hypothesis, which posits that intragroup and temporal comparisons should be more gratifying and enhancing than intergroup comparisons, at least for minority members.

Predicting overall Deprivation (GMRD & GRD) from CI, motives, and identification. Little evidence was found for H5, which had predicted that interest in specific comparisons influence feelings of overall deprivation. To recap, it had been expected that interest in temporal and intragroup comparisons would be associated with less perceived deprivation for minority members. Temporal CI did not have any significant effects for minority members of study 4, and no evidence was found for the prediction regarding intragroup CI, with high intragroup CI actually leading to *more* GMRD. Moreover, it had been expected that interest in comparing with majority members would be associated with more perceived deprivation for minority respondents. No evidence was found for this. These results were particularly disappointing, given that compared to studies 1 and 2 a more reliable 2-item measure had been employed to measure CI in different objects. It had been expected that evidence for the RDT hypothesis (H5) would be stronger than in studies 1 and 2, as a result of this more reliable measurement instrument. Instead, results indicated that feelings of RD might be informed by factors other than specific comparison choices participants made. Likely candidates are preconceived ideas, or evaluations by “significant others”, or representations in the media, which might influence minority members’ feelings of RD as well as, or maybe even more so than, actual comparison behaviour and comparisons they do or do not engage in. Alternatively, the null-results might be a result of ‘mess’ in the survey data, and maybe experimental designs would be more apt for exploring these relationships.

Even though no specific *a priori* hypotheses had been held (i.e., over and above the mediation analysis, see below), some evidence was found that motives are linked to RD. The ‘equity own’ motive correlated positively with RD. This makes sense, since people with high perceived RD should be high on the equity motive, and vice versa. The link with the ‘enhancement motive’ was less straightforward: Although most of the significant correlations across the three studies were negative, one was actually positive. Still, those mixed results do make sense: While those who are high on enhancement should have a tendency to play their deprivation down (leading to a negative

correlation), those high on deprivation should consequently also be higher on the enhancement motive, because they should have a above-average need to make themselves feel better (leading to a positive correlation).³¹

Finally, as predicted, more support was found for the link between identification and deprivation being negative. However, no support was found for H6, which had proposed that the effect of identification on deprivation would be moderated by motives. Out of the 30 interactions that were tested in total across the two studies (see table 19), 7 were significant (by chance, one would expect only 1.5 to be significant given an alpha level of .05). However, only one of these was clearly in the expected direction. Thus, given that more of the interactions were significant than would have been expected by chance, it has to be concluded that motives do play a role; however that role does not seem to be in line with our hypothesis.³²

Is the (negative) effect of identification on deprivation mediated by motives or by CI? Out of 32 tests for mediation across both studies, two sufficed Kenny's conditions to a degree that it was worth testing whether a reduction of the path valence was significant. But, neither of the *z*-values reached significance. Therefore, the mediation hypothesis of H7 was not supported. However, the analyses nevertheless prove another important fact: identification and motives are not independent of each other (particularly, those who are more identified seem to be high on 'enhancement' and 'equity own', see table 21). Although – as already pointed out elsewhere - relationships were not so strong that they caused collinearity problems for the regressions that tested moderation hypotheses, this might have been an additional factor that made it harder to yield significant results when testing whether the effect of identification on deprivation would be moderated by motives.

Predicting CI from motives, deprivation, and identification. Most of the overall regression models, which tested H8 and H9 and also spoke to H4, were significant at step 1, and a number were significant at step 2. Looking at the support for H8, some weak evidence was found for the self-protection hypothesis that high deprivation relative to an object will lower CI in this object. However, negative relationships were

³¹ The possibility of this bi-directional link between enhancement and RD was explored in study 5, but results were inconclusive.

³² It should be noted that since tests presented here are not strictly independent (due to there being a certain overlap between IVs and DVs employed in different tests) this should be taken as a rule of thumb indication only.

only found in the study 4 data, but not the study 3 data. The fact that not more of the relevant betas were significant is particularly disappointing given that – in contrast to studies 1 and 2 – a more reliable 2-item measure had been employed to assess CI. Further, no evidence was found for the hypothesis that the effect of RD on CI would be moderated by motives.

Focussing now on H9 and the impact of identification on CI, the data replicate results from study 2 rather than supporting SIT, in that identification was linked to intragroup CI and not to intergroup CI. Looking at the effect of identification on intragroup CI across studies 3 & 4 (see tables 22-4), 3 out of 4 betas were (positively) significant. None of the 4 betas for identification predicting temporal CI were significant, and none of the 4 betas for identification in predicting intergroup CI were significant. Also, H9 had proposed that the effect of identification on CI would be moderated by motives. Very little evidence was found in support of this prediction.

Looking at the main effect of motives on CI, H4 had proposed that an ‘enhancement’ motive would lead to more intragroup and temporal CI, and that an ‘equity own’ motive would lead to more intergroup CI (particularly for minority members). The repeated measures analyses for ‘specific motives’ had already yielded some evidence speaking to H4. However, further evidence was yielded from the present regression analysis. Out of the 18 betas for ‘enhancement’ that were tested across studies 3 and 4 (see tables 22-4), 8 were significant or marginally significant. All of these effects were positive. However, some evidence was found that ‘enhancement’ is positively related to ALL CI targets, i.e. not only to intragroup and temporal, but also to intergroup targets (the latter surprisingly enough also for minority members). Out of the 18 betas for ‘equity own’, 6 were significant. All significant betas were positive, yielding some evidence that a high motive in equity own leads to high CI. However, again, positive effects were not only found for those objects for which they had been expected (i.e. intergroup targets), but instead for all three comparison targets under investigation (i.e. also for intragroup and temporal targets). In sum, even though motives – as expected – do seem to be systematically related to interest in comparing with different objects, the effects do not seem to be as straightforward as proposed by H4.

To recap, studies 1 to 4 have shown the following (the reader might also find it helpful to refer back to figure 2 for the purpose of summarising): Generally, both ethnic

minority and majority members displayed a preference for intragroup and temporal comparisons over intergroup comparisons. While studies 1 and 2 showed that perceived deprivation relative to intragroup and temporal targets was also lower than deprivation relative to other targets for minority members, evidence from studies 3 and 4 was less clear. Study 3 had yielded some evidence that comparisons are influenced by similarity and contact (but not acculturation strategies, at least not for minority members), and study 1 had yielded some evidence that deprivation negatively affects life-satisfaction and personal self-esteem. Studies 3 and 4 had yielded some evidence that motives influence comparison choices, but the pattern that emerged was not very neat. This, as well as a number of other issues, remained to be clarified:

Firstly, as outlined in chapter 2, it was expected that participants would strategically play down the importance of dimensions on which they fare badly. Hence, a negative effect of deprivation was expected on the perceived ‘importance of being well-off’. However, study 1 had yielded a negative effect of GMRD on ‘importance of being well-off’, and GRD had yielded a positive effect on the same variable. As indicated above, an experiment (study 6) was designed to illuminate the underlying mechanisms.

All studies yielded weak and inconsistent evidence for the ‘self-protective’ hypothesis, i.e. that comparisons with targets relative to which one is deprived will be avoided. All studies also yielded weak and inconsistent evidence for the RDT hypothesis that feelings of overall deprivation are dependent on comparisons people do or do not engage in. It had been proposed that this weak evidence might be due to the inherent contradictions between the self-protective and RDT hypotheses: While the self-protective strategy proposes a *negative* causal effect of deprivation relative to an object on interest in comparing with it, RDT proposes a *positive* causal effect in the other direction, i.e. a positive effect of comparing with an upward target on feelings of deprivation. Various attempts – all relatively unsuccessful - had been made to tease out those two effects: Employing a more reliable two-item measure of CI did not help; the ‘order’-manipulation of study 2 failed to clarify matters, and no support was found in studies 3 and 4 that the effect of RD relative to a target on CI in this target would be moderated by motives. Thus, study 5 was designed to try another approach to clarify the underlying processes: a longitudinal design.

Evidence from Studies 1 – 4 suggested that identification would either be unrelated to comparisons (study 1), or that it would be related positively to intragroup

and temporal CI, rather than to intergroup CI as SIT would have it. It had been proposed that this apparent contradiction might be due to 'motives' moderating the effect of identification on comparisons. However, studies 3 and 4 did not yield empirical support for this hypothesis. Therefore, the relationship between identification and comparisons remained a focal point of interest in study 5.

Studies 1 – 4 all yielded findings showing that identification and deprivation are *negatively* related. As outlined above, these results clearly contradict some previously published data. Also, none of the hypotheses that can be found in the literature (see chapter 2) could adequately explain our findings. Some hypotheses were derived to explain the negative effect: The effect of identification on deprivation was proposed to be *moderated* by 'motives', and the effect of deprivation on identification was proposed to be moderated by 'action preferences'. It was also considered whether the negative effect of identification on deprivation is *mediated* by motives and/or comparison preferences. Data from studies 3 and 4 found no support for a moderation by motives, and no support was found for a mediation effect. Thus, a longitudinal study (no 5) was designed in order to shed some light on the processes.

Finally, referring back to the summarising heuristic model of figure 2, the only two variables that have not been addressed so far are permeability and stability. Recall that one of the central predictions of SIT is that impermeability of group boundaries, as well as illegitimacy and instability of the social stratifications, should make previously incomparable groups valid targets of comparison interest. Thus, these variables were included in study 5, and their impact on CI was tested.

CHAPTER 6

Study 5: A Longitudinal Survey of Ethnic Minority Members in the UK

Introduction

Study 5 introduced very few novel hypotheses (only the effects of permeability and stability had not been assessed before). Rather, the aim was to test some of the hypotheses outlined for previous studies with a different analytical strategy, i.e. with a longitudinal dataset, collected from ethnic minority members in the UK. As mentioned elsewhere, there is a growing awareness in the research community of the importance of assessing identity and related processes longitudinally (Deaux, 1993). The reader is referred back to earlier chapters for a more detailed discussion of the hypotheses, which will be outlined here only briefly. Of particular interest was to demonstrate causality (or otherwise) for some of the effects the previous studies had focussed on. More specifically, the objective was to demonstrate that specific RD relative to an object would *causally* and negatively affect interest in comparing with this object (self-protection hypothesis). Further, the study was designed to show that comparisons people engage in would *causally* affect feelings of overall RD (RDT hypothesis). Another point of interest was to illuminate the relationship between identification and deprivation (which had been found to be negative in the previous studies), and the intention was to assess whether identification would *causally* affect RD and/or *vice versa*. The moderation/mediation hypotheses outlined for studies 3 and 4 were also tested, as well as some of the other hypotheses outlined for previous studies.

H1. In line with the Crocker & Major argument and the results of studies 1 and 2, it was hypothesised that intragroup and temporal GMRD would be lower than GMRD relative to all other targets for the minority participants of study 5.

H2. In line with the Crocker & Major argument, it was expected that intragroup and temporal CI would be higher than the CI in all other objects.

H3. In line with the Crocker & Major argument and the findings of studies 3 and 4, it was hypothesised that overall the minority respondents of study 5 would be more motivated by 'enhancement' than by 'equity own'.

H4. It was expected that ‘enhancement’ motives would causally and positively affect interest in (gratifying) intragroup and temporal comparisons among the minority participants, and that ‘equity own’ motives would causally and positively affect interest in comparing with majority members.

H5. In line with RDT, it was predicted that comparisons people do (or not) engage in causally affect feelings of overall RD. More specifically, since minority members in general were assumed to be likely to not feel deprived vis-à-vis temporal and intragroup targets, and that they are likely to feel deprived vis-à-vis majority members, it was proposed that intragroup and temporal CI would negatively impact on feelings of overall RD, and that majority CI would positively impact on feelings of overall RD.

H6. It was expected to replicate the overall negative correlation between identification and deprivation found in previous studies (main effect). Study 5 aimed to explore the causal direction of this link, i.e. to test whether identification would causally affect deprivation, and/or whether deprivation would causally affect identification. As outlined for studies 3 and 4, both those causal directions are plausible. Further, two moderation hypotheses had been proposed: That the effect of identification on deprivation would be moderated by ‘motives’, and that the effect of deprivation on identification would be moderated by ‘action preferences’. Study 5 aimed to test the first of those moderation hypotheses. It was predicted that identification would *causally and negatively* impact on RD when ‘enhancement’ motives are strong, and that it would *causally and positively* impact on RD when ‘equity own’ motives are strong.

H7. As outlined for studies 3 and 4, an alternative hypothesis was tested, i.e. that the effect of identification on deprivation is *mediated* by either ‘motives’ and/or ‘comparison preferences’. It was proposed that high identifiers are either/and more motivated by enhancement, less motivated by equity, more interested in (gratifying) intragroup comparisons, and/or more interested in temporal comparisons. It was proposed that these mediating factors would lead to overall lower feelings of deprivation for high identifiers.

H8. In line with the ‘self-protection’ hypothesis, it was proposed that comparisons with objects relative to which one is deprived are avoided. Thus, overall, a negative effect of RD relative to a target on CI in this target was expected (main effect). However, as outlined for studies 3 and 4, it was predicted that this overall main effect would be moderated by motives: It was predicted that specific RD would negatively

impact on CI only or especially when ‘enhancement’ motives are high, and that it would instead positively impact on CI under conditions where ‘equity own’ motives are high.

H9. It was proposed that identification causally affects interest in comparing with various targets. As outlined for studies 3 and 4, it was proposed that the effects found in previous studies would be replicated, i.e. that identification would increase interest in gratifying intragroup and temporal comparisons. In line with SIT, it was further predicted that identification would increase intergroup CI, i.e. comparisons with majority members. Moreover, as outlined for studies 3 and 4, it was tested whether the effect of identification on CI is moderated by ‘motives’: It was tested whether identification would increase intragroup and temporal CI only if ‘enhancement’ motives are present, and that it would increase intergroup CI only if ‘equity own’ motives are present.

H10. Further, as outlined in chapter 2, SIT predicts that impermeability of group boundaries and instability of the social stratifications renders previously incomparable groups (e.g. the privileged majority for members of disadvantaged groups) comparable. This prediction was tested by study 5. Also, the impact of both minority identification *and* majority identification were assessed. Some have proposed that it is important to consider the possibility that people might be simultaneously identified with different groups (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Gonzalez & Brown, 2003). Such a dual identification is particularly important in settings such as the present one (Verkuyten & Brug, 2001). Hence, the influence of both minority and majority identification were assessed simultaneously in the present study.

H11. A final aim of study 5 concerned the effect of deprivation on personal self-esteem. It was expected to replicate the negative effect of deprivation on self-esteem found in study 1, but in addition to demonstrate causality for this effect, capitalising on the longitudinal design of the present study.

Method

Participants

At time point 1, 221 secondary school students (aged 17 - 21; 173 females, 46 males, with 2 failing to indicate their sex) filled out questionnaires during class time. Data were collected in a London suburb in which the ethnic make-up is very mixed. Based on self-

classifications, 53 of the participants identified themselves as Pakistanis, 43 as Black African/Black British/Afro-Caribbean, 33 as Bengali, 33 as Indian/other Asian, 25 as non-white British³³, 12 as white British, and 22 as belonging to a wide variety of other groups. Since the number of non-minority participants (i.e. white British students) was so small, these participants were excluded from further analyses, rather than analysed separately, leaving a total sample of 209. Most of the minority members (81%) were born in the UK. Of those minority members that were not born in the UK, the vast majority (95%) had been living in the UK for longer than 3 years. About 50% of minority members indicated that English was their first language, with most of the rest speaking Urdu, Bengali, Gujarati, Turkish, or Punjabi. 62% of the entire sample indicated being Muslim, and 20% indicated being Christian.

For 118 participants (100 females, 18 males), data collected at time point 1 and point 2 could successfully be matched. Out of this sample, 28 identified themselves as Pakistani, 23 as Black, 15 as Bengali, 20 as Indian/other Asian, 14 as non-white British, 6 as white British, and 12 belonging to a number of other ethnic minorities. 90 were born in the UK, 6 in Bangladesh, and the remainder in a wide variety of places. All of those that had not been born in the UK had been living there for at least three years. 64 spoke English as their first language, 11 Urdu, 11 Bengali, 9 Gujarati, 6 Punjabi, 5 Turkish, and the rest spoke a variety of other languages as their native tongue. 26 were Christian, 71 Muslim, 5 Hindu, 3 Sikh, 12 non-confessionals, and 1 was Buddhist.

Procedure

Questionnaires were administered twice, with a time lag of two weeks. This time period was chosen on purpose. One of the most difficult issues in longitudinal research is to choose a good time period between waves. The time lag should match the hypothesised period of time which it takes the IV to cause an effect in the DV (Blossfeld, 1999). Usually, and as was the case here, psychological theories are not precise enough to help with this issue. However, one of the most important issues of the present study was to assess the impact of CI on RD, and vice versa. Since it was hypothesised that effects in both directions would be fairly rapid, i.e. not take several months to manifest themselves, it was assumed that a relatively short lag of just two weeks would be most

³³ It should be noted that the category 'non-white British' is analytically not very helpful. However, it was included following a request of the head teacher of the school.

beneficial for yielding the expected effects. Before filling out the questionnaires at time 1, the students were given the usual explanations about how to respond to Likert scales etc. Upon completion of the questionnaire at time point 2, students were thoroughly debriefed, and feedback about the results of the study was given to the teachers and students that had been involved with the study.

Measures

The questionnaires administered at the two points in time were identical, and included the following measures:

Ingroup *identification* was assessed with four items very similar to the ones used in the other studies, yielding a Cronbach's alpha (α) of .86 at time 1, and a test-retest reliability of .75.

Comparison interest was assessed using a similar procedure to the one described for the previous studies. Using the same two items per target as in studies 3 and 4, assessed were participants '*intragroup CI*' (i.e. 'comparisons with members of your own group', $\alpha = .68$ at time 1, and $\alpha_{\text{test-retest}} = .54$), '*origin CI*' (i.e. 'comparisons with people in the country where you and/or your parents are from', $\alpha = .62$ at time 1, and $\alpha_{\text{test-retest}} = .55$), '*(other) minority CI*' (i.e. 'with members of other minority groups – not your own minority group – in England', $\alpha = .71$ at time 1, and $\alpha_{\text{test-retest}} = .43$), '*majority CI*' ('with white British people', $\alpha = .68$ at time 1, and $\alpha_{\text{test-retest}} = .52$), '*temporal CI*' ('with your situation in the past', $\alpha = .70$ at time 1, and $\alpha_{\text{test-retest}} = .45$), '*American CI*' ('with people in North America', $\alpha = .66$ at time 1, and $\alpha_{\text{test-retest}} = .53$), and '*developing world CI*' ('with people in the developing world', $\alpha = .70$ at time 1, and $\alpha_{\text{test-retest}} = .57$). The order of these items was randomised for each participant.

Additionally, CI was assessed via a *Categorical comparison choice* item. Participants were asked which one of the following seven options they would find *most* important to compare with if they were allowed to choose only one: 'White British people', the 'own situation in the past', 'people in the country where you and/or your parents are from', 'members of your own group', 'North Americans', 'People in the developing world', 'members of other minority groups (not your own) in England'. These options were randomly spaced across the space, as to not favour any of the choices due to a prominent spatial location. 70 participants chose the same categorical item at point 1 and 2, $\chi^2(25) = 169.26, p < .001$.

Next, *specific (group membership) deprivation relative to each of the targets* was assessed. Participants presented with the same items as described for the CI questions. However, rather than having only a single item measure for each specific deprivation target as utilised in the previous studies, this time specific deprivation was assessed more thoroughly. Following Tropp and Wright (1999), for each of the objects, participants answered a) how they were actually doing compared to it (1 = much better to 5 = much worse, after scale reversal), and b) how angry or satisfied they were when comparing their situation to it (1 = very satisfied to 5 = very angry, after scale reversal). It had been planned to combine these two items for each target, in order to obtain a more reliable index of specific deprivation. However, the pairwise inter-item correlations were rather low (with a maximum of $r = .35$ for the temporal target). Therefore, the cognitive and affective items were not combined, resulting in the following 1-item specific deprivation indices: ‘*cognitive intragroup GMRD*’ ($\alpha_{\text{test-retest}} = .61$), ‘*affective intragroup GMRD*’ ($\alpha_{\text{test-retest}} = .45$), ‘*cognitive origin GMRD*’ ($\alpha_{\text{test-retest}} = .55$), ‘*affective origin GMRD*’ ($\alpha_{\text{test-retest}} = .35$), ‘*cognitive (other) minority GMRD*’ ($\alpha_{\text{test-retest}} = .51$), ‘*affective (other) minority GMRD*’ ($\alpha_{\text{test-retest}} = .37$), ‘*cognitive majority GMRD*’ ($\alpha_{\text{test-retest}} = .71$), ‘*affective majority GMRD*’ ($\alpha_{\text{test-retest}} = .63$), ‘*cognitive temporal GMRD*’ ($\alpha_{\text{test-retest}} = .52$), ‘*affective temporal GMRD*’ ($\alpha_{\text{test-retest}} = .54$), ‘*cognitive American GMRD*’ ($\alpha_{\text{test-retest}} = .51$), ‘*affective American GMRD*’ ($\alpha_{\text{test-retest}} = .49$), ‘*cognitive developing world GMRD*’ ($\alpha_{\text{test-retest}} = .27$), and ‘*affective developing world GMRD*’ ($\alpha_{\text{test-retest}} = .45$).

In order to make possible the more thorough assessment of specific deprivation items, the *overall group membership relative deprivation (GMRD)* and *overall group relative deprivation (GRD)* scales had been shortened compared to study 3. Participants indicated a) how well off they thought their family was (1 = very to 5 = not at all, after scale reversal), and b) how satisfied they were with their situation (1 = very to 5 = not at all, after scale reversal). They answered the same question thinking about their whole group in England, rather than only their immediate family. Indices for *overall GMRD* and *overall GRD* were formed as described for study 3, and the reliabilities were .85 ($\alpha_{\text{test-retest}} = .75$) and .69 ($\alpha_{\text{test-retest}} = .58$), respectively.

Motives were assessed using an extended version of the *alternative general motive scale* used in the study 4. The following items assessed *system blame/equity motives* (1 = disagree to 5 = agree): ‘Members of my group are treated unfairly and have it harder than others’, ‘members of my group have to fight harder than others in order to

get what they deserve', 'I want people to know that members of my group are treated unfairly', 'people should realise that members of my group get less than they deserve', and 'members of my group should become more active and fight for their rights' ($\alpha = .83$ at time 1, $\alpha_{\text{test-retest}} = .58$).³⁴ In order to assess *enhancement motives*, students answered the following items, using the same response format: 'I want to emphasise things that are good about my group', 'I want to see that my group is doing well', 'I want to feel good about my group', and 'I always listen carefully when someone says something good about my group' ($\alpha = .70$ at time 1, $\alpha_{\text{test-retest}} = .62$).

Two items measured perceived *permeability* (1 = disagree to 5 = agree): 'It is easy for members of minority groups to be considered British', and 'it is easy for members of minority groups to be fully accepted in Britain' ($\alpha = .69$ at time 1, $\alpha_{\text{test-retest}} = .45$).

A single item measure assessed perceived *stability* (1 = agree to 5 = disagree, after scale reversal): 'It might change a great deal in the future how members of my group are doing compared to members of other groups in England' ($\alpha_{\text{test-retest}} = .39$).³⁵

British identification was measured with the following two items (1 = not at all to 5 = very much): 'Do you feel British', and 'Do you try to live the British way of live' ($\alpha = .65$ at time 1, $\alpha_{\text{test-retest}} = .73$).³⁶

To measure *personal self-esteem*, five items were adapted from Rosenberg & Simmons (1972). Example items are 'I like myself', and 'I am able to do things as well as most other people' (1 = low self-esteem, 5 = high self-esteem, $\alpha = .88$ at time 1, $\alpha_{\text{test-retest}} = .72$). Finally, the usual *demographic variables* as described above were assessed.

³⁴ While system blame and equity motives had originally been conceived off as two separate constructs, it was found that the items were not only highly correlated but also loaded on one factor in a factor analysis. Therefore, all items were combined into one scale. Note also that again one (reverse-coded) item was excluded from the final scale in order to improve reliability.

³⁵ Apart from permeability and stability, SIT also discusses legitimacy as an important structural factor. However, since the assessment of illegitimacy is an integral component of the concept of deprivation (see chapter 2), this last factor was not separately assessed.

³⁶ The fact that the test-retest reliability is higher than the reliability at time 1 can be explained by the fact that the test-retest reliability is based on a restricted sample (i.e. only those participants which could successfully be matched).

Results³⁷

The presentation of results is structured thematically, rather than in separate sections for the cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses.³⁸ For each heading – where applicable – first the cross-sectional results of wave 1 and then the longitudinal results will be discussed. This structure was chosen to facilitate joint consideration of all the evidence available for any one hypothesis. The analyses that deal with *mean levels* are based on the whole dataset of time point 1. I.e., it was decided to analyse the dataset for all participants included at point 1, rather than to restrict the analyses to those cases that could successfully be matched for time 1 and 2, because the latter strategy would have meant too high an attrition rate. For the analyses that deal with *associations* between variables, I was faced with a difficult decision, i.e. whether to base the cross-sectional wave 1 analyses on the whole dataset of time 1, or on the restricted dataset (i.e. only those participants that were successfully matched). The obvious advantage of using the whole dataset is that the *N* for this sample was approximately twice as big, guaranteeing more power for picking up significant effects (this was also an important consideration given that some of the analyses presented below have quite a large number of predictors). However, using the whole sample had one important drawback: In order to infer that two variables are correlated with each other, or even that there might be a causal effect, typically both the cross-sectional and longitudinal relationships need to be significant. In order to infer that both cross-sectional and longitudinal relationships are significant, or to come to derive sensible interpretation where this is not the case, obviously the cross-sectional and the longitudinal analyses need to be based on the same

³⁷ A number of other analyses were also conducted that are not reported below, the most important of which shall be briefly summarised here. Firstly, analyses revealed a good correspondence between *Categorical and Interval Comparison Choices*. The *two motives* were moderately and positively correlated. It should also be mentioned that due to a certain overlap between students attending different classes, some students were encountered not only for a second, but also for a third time when collecting the wave 2 data. This happened for $N = 20$, and those students were asked to complete a different, more *qualitative questionnaire*. Students were presented with the same five categorical comparison options as described above, and were asked to indicate which of these objects was most and least important to them when thinking or talking about their economic situation. They were asked to provide an explanation of their choice. Further, students were asked to indicate how well off they and their families were, and how satisfied (or otherwise) they were. Again, students were asked to explain their responses in writing. Given that the *N* was small, it was decided not to report this additional data in detail. However, the following points should be noted: Responses generally underlined the importance of ethnic group categories. Students' explanations for their comparison choices (most chose the intragroup target) mainly emphasised the importance of similarity on related attributes, and psychological closeness/a feeling of connectedness. In assessing their economic situation, students' responses demonstrated the importance of both social and temporal comparisons.

³⁸ I am indebted to Thomas Kessler and Kerstin Eisenbeiss (Friedrich-Schiller University Jena) for their advice on the analyses of longitudinal datasets.


dataset. Therefore, for some of the analyses reported below, it was decided to present *three* sets of results: One based on the entire sample of wave 1, one based on the sample of wave 1 restricted to successfully ‘matched’ participants only, and one for the longitudinal analyses. Results will be discussed under the following headings:

- i) Descriptive analyses and group differences
- ii) Comparison Interest and Specific Deprivation relative to different targets (speaking to H1 and H2)
- iii) General comparison motives (speaking to H3)
- iv) Predicting overall Deprivation (GMRD & GRD) from CI, motives, and identification (H5 and H6)
- v) Is the (negative) effect of identification on deprivation mediated by motives (enhancement, equity own) or by CI (intragroup, temporal), (H7)?
- vi) Predicting CI from motives, specific deprivation, and identification (H4, H8, H9)
- vii) Predicting majority CI from ‘minority identification’, ‘British identification’, ‘stability’, and ‘permeability (H10)
- viii) The relationship between self-esteem and deprivation (H11)

Finally, before turning to the first set of results, some general issues regarding the analysis of longitudinal data shall be briefly discussed (for more detailed discussions, see Cook & Campbell, 1979; Finkel, 1995; Kessler & Greenberg, 1981). The general logic of causal analysis with longitudinal data is based on the premise that the cause, by definition, always has to occur before the effect. Thus, if two (or more) variables are measured in the same participants at two (or more) points in time, causality might be inferred (see figure 3).

Figure 3

The logic of longitudinal analyses



If, as hypothesised, the IV has a causal effect on the DV, we would expect to find the two variables to be correlated both at time 1 and time 2. In addition, we would expect to find a significant lagged effect of the IV at time 1 on the DV at time 2 and not vice versa. Indeed, early theorising focussed on the competition between the IV1-DV2 and DV1-IV2 correlations. Cross-lagged panel analysis (CLPC) was conducted to test for significant *differences* between the two correlations (Kenny, 1973). The aim was to test for the causal directions of effects and to show that the IV at point 1 causally affects the DV at time 2, and not vice versa. A further and more important aim was to reject spuriousness, i.e. to reject the hypothesis that the correlations between the two variables are due to some third (unmeasured) factor (see e.g. Crano & Mellon, 1978). Under conditions of spuriousness, both lagged correlations would be significant, and showing that one lagged correlation is more significant than the other was taken as evidence against spuriousness. However, CLPCs have since come under severe criticism (Rogosa, 1980). It has been pointed out that comparing the significance of the two lagged correlations is only a valid procedure if several important assumptions are met. The most important ones are Stationarity (a necessary but not sufficient condition for this is that the causal structures for the two variables must not change over time, i.e. the IV1-DV1 and IV2-DV2 correlations must not differ from each other) and Homogeneous Stability (a necessary but not sufficient condition for this is that the autocorrelations for both variables are the same, c.f. also Crano, Kenny, & Campbell, 1972). Most of the time, these conditions are either not met or not testable. This problem has already been alluded to in chapter 4, where it was pointed out that the tests for significant differences between RD and CI under different 'order' conditions should be treated with caution. Because of these problems, CLPC analysis has given way to the use of Cross-lagged regression analysis. In cross-lagged regression, the DV at point 2 is predicted by the IV at point 1, controlling for the DV at point 1. The interest is not in finding significant *differences* between correlations or regression weights, but to interpret the regression weight for IV1 *in its own right*. It is tested whether the regression weight for IV1 is significant, i.e. whether IV1 can explain variance in DV2 when controlling for the stability of the DV. Of course, if two variables are assessed, both variables might be longitudinally predicted from each other (always controlling for the stability of the respective DV). If both variables yield significant beta weights, bi-causality may be inferred (without, of course, being able to reject the possibility of spuriousness). A consultation of figure 3 illustrates why it is important to control for the stability of the

DV, i.e. for the DV at time 1. Suppose the hypothesis that the IV causes the DV is wrong, and that in fact the variable labelled IV in figure 3 is the 'true' DV, and that the variable labelled DV is the 'true' IV. Under these conditions, a lagged correlational effect of (what is labelled in the figure) IV1 on DV2 might be found, but it would be wrong to infer causality, since this effect might be *mediated* by DV1. Let us assume for a moment that the 'true' underlying process is such a mediation mechanism. Recall (or refer back to chapter 5) that Kenny's conditions for mediation were that a) the mediator (DV1 in figure 3) has to predict the IV (IV1 in figure 3), b) that the IV (IV1 in figure 3) has to predict the DV (DV2 in figure 3), and c) that the effect of the IV on the DV (the effect of IV1 on DV2 in the figure) must disappear when the mediator is included in the model. By inference, if the potential mediator (DV1 in the figure) is included when predicting DV2 from IV1, and IV1 nonetheless has a significant effect, it can be concluded that *no* mediation is present, and that IV1 truly has a causal effect on DV2. Therefore, for all models pertaining to longitudinal analyses in the present thesis, the DV at time 1 was included in a first step in the regression model. Interpretations were then based on whether the regression weights of the proposed causal variables were still significant. Non-significant beta weights meant that no support was found for a causal effect. One final statistical point should be made, however. Including the DV at time 1 in the regressions means employing low powered tests, specifically when stabilities of the DVs are high (because then little variance is left in the DV at time 2 to be explained). Given that the time lag of the present study was for theoretical reasons chosen to be quite short, high stabilities were to be expected. Given the logic of hypothesis testing, significant results mean that the null hypothesis (H_0) can safely be rejected. Non-significant results, however, never prove H_0 *true*, but only mean that it cannot be rejected (i.e. that the possibility that it *might* be true cannot be discounted). Given the probability of conducting a beta error (assuming H_0 when really H_1 is true) with low powered tests, this is important to keep in mind.

Descriptive analyses and group differences

Those participants excluded from the longitudinal analyses (because their data at time 1 and 2 could not be matched successfully) did not differ significantly from those included on key variables like age, group membership, sex, etc., speaking to attrition probably having been random.

Overall, respondents (at time 1, full sample) were more identified with their minority group than with being British, $F(1, 205) = 98.61, p < .001, Ms = 3.88, 2.84$. Identification with both groups was not correlated, $r = -.09, ns$. A repeated measures analysis was conducted with 'group' (categories: Non-white British, Bangladeshi, Blacks, Pakistani, Asian/Indian, other minorities) as a between subjects factor and GMRD and GRD as levels of a repeated measures factor. This yielded a main effect for 'group', $F(5, 198) = 2.55, p < .03$. The two factors did not interact. Means are displayed in table 26. Pairwise comparisons revealed that Pakistanis felt least deprived, and Bengalis most. Recalling the grim situation of Pakistanis as documented by the official statistics (see chapter 1), this finding was maybe a bit surprising. Further analyses also yielded significant effects for 'group' on minority identity strength ($F(5, 193) = 5.85, p < .001$), British identity strength ($F(5, 193) = 2.42, p < .04$), and strength of the enhancement motive ($F(5, 193) = 3.29, p < .007$). Means for all these are displayed in table 26. Finally, those not born in Britain felt marginally more deprived than those born in Britain, $F(1, 197) = 3.22, p < .07, Ms = 2.95, 2.76$. No other between-group differences were found.

Table 26

Differences between minority groups

Group	Overall deprivation (i.e. main effect for group collapsing across GMRD & GRD)	Ingroup identification	British identification	Enhancement motive
Asian/Indian	2.65 ab	4.19 a	3.06 a	4.32 ab
Pakistanis	2.58 b	4.13 a	2.94 a	4.28 ab
Black	2.86 ab	4.04 ab	2.55 a	4.43 a
Other minorities	2.68 ab	3.93 abc	2.39 a	4.15 ab
Non-white British	3.00 ab	3.45 bc	3.20 a	3.90 b
Bangladesh/Bengali	3.10 a	3.27 c	2.82 a	4.01 ab

Note. Subscripts denote significant differences by Bonferroni adjusted pairwise comparisons. High values indicate high deprivation, identification, and enhancement motives.

Comparison Interest and specific Deprivation relative to different targets

This analysis tested whether intragroup and temporal comparisons would be more important than other types of comparisons (H1), and whether the participants of this study (recall that all were minority members) would feel least deprived vis-à-vis the intragroup and temporal targets (H2). Since this analysis focussed on mean difference,

they are based on the entire dataset at wave 1. Three repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted, testing for a) significant differences in the interest in comparing with various objects, and b) significant differences in levels of perceived cognitive deprivation relative to various objects, and c) significant differences in levels of perceived affective deprivation relative to various objects. The analysis for comparison interest yielded a significant result, $F(4.99, 998.15) = 59.63, p < .001, MSE = 0.85$; as did the analysis for cognitive deprivation, $F = 54.51, p < .001, MSE = 0.46$, and the analysis for affective deprivation, $F = 12.36, p < .001, MSE = 0.55$. Means are displayed in table 27.

Table 27

Mean comparison interest and specific deprivation relative to different targets

CI targets	CI	Cognitive Deprivation	Affective Deprivation
Intragroup	2.82 ab (1.17)	2.38 c (0.80)	2.74 a (0.92)
Origin	2.76 ab (1.19)	1.83 a (0.84)	2.62 a (1.14)
Temporal	2.98 a (1.21)	2.08 b (0.94)	2.59 a (1.04)
Majority members	2.16 c (1.08)	2.75 d (0.94)	3.05 bc (0.96)
developing world	2.67 b (1.27)	1.76 a (0.93)	2.77 ab (1.16)
Members of (other) minorities	2.21 c (1.02)	2.54 c (0.77)	2.93 bc (0.91)
Americans	1.69 d (0.92)	2.56 c (0.99)	3.08 c (0.95)
Marginals	2.47	2.27	2.83

Note. High values indicated high CI and deprivation. Subscripts denote significant differences between means according to post-hoc pairwise comparisons per column at $p < .05$. Standard deviations in parentheses.

Further, responses to the categorical CI question yielded the following distribution of preferences (in percent): 27.8% of participants chose the temporal referent, 22.0 chose intragroup, 17.2 chose developing world, 16.3 chose people in the country of origin, 6.2 chose majority members, and 3.3 chose members of (other) minority groups. Thus, the interval CI scales and the categorical choice yielded very similar results, both reflecting a major interest in 'intragroup' and 'temporal' comparisons, followed by 'origin' and 'developing world' comparisons, and very little interest in comparisons with either 'majority members' or 'members of other minorities'.

Thus, as for the minority respondents in study 4, participants were most interested to compare with members of their ingroup, country of origin, and their own past. Participants felt least cognitively deprived relative to people in the third world and

in the country of origin; and they felt least affectively deprived relative to ingroup members, people in the country of origin, and their own past. Thus, it looks like there might be a correspondence between CI and RD in line with the ‘self-protection’ predictions. However, the pattern for affective RD is more in line with the prediction than the pattern for cognitive RD. Nonetheless, it must be noted that patterns of mean levels are not a strong test of the ‘self-protection’ hypothesis. Therefore, as before, regression and correlation analyses were carried out subsequently to test the hypothesis more closely.

General Comparison Motives

This analysis tested H3, i.e. the prediction that overall participants would be more interested in ‘enhancement’ than ‘equity own’. Since they focussed on comparisons of means, analyses were based on the whole dataset of wave 1. A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with the ‘enhancement’ and ‘system blame/equity own’ motives as levels of the repeated measures factor (recall that motives had been assessed with measurement approach 2 only in this study). This yielded a significant effect, $F(1, 199) = 115.17, p < .001, MSE = 0.35$. As expected, ‘enhancement’ motives were stronger than ‘equity own’ motives, $M_s = 4.21, 3.56$.

Predicting overall Deprivation (GMRD & GRD) from CI, Motives, and Identification

This analysis tested whether – as predicted by RDT - comparisons would affect feelings of deprivation (H5). Further, in line with the findings of the previous studies, a negative effect of identification on deprivation was expected, and it was tested whether this effect would be moderated by motives: H6 had proposed that identification would have a positive effect on RD if equity motives are strong, and that it would have a negative effect on RD if enhancement motives are strong. 2-way interaction terms were built to test for this. In addition, it was considered whether the moderating forces of equity and enhancement motives might have to work together in order to produce the hypothesised effect. It was tested whether identification would impact negatively on RD only if simultaneously enhancement is high *and* equity is low, and it was tested whether identification would impact positively on RD only if simultaneously equity is high *and* enhancement is low. 3-way interaction terms were built to test for this. Results will be

presented first for a) cross-sectional analyses on the entire sample of wave 1, b) cross-sectional analyses on the restricted sample of wave 1, and c) longitudinal analyses.

For the wave 1 data, and separately for the complete and restricted dataset, respectively, two regression analyses were conducted, one predicting GMRD and the other one predicting GRD. For both models, the following predictors were used: In a first step, CI in ingroup members, the past, and majority members were entered. Identification, 'equity own' and 'enhancement motives' were also entered in the first step. In a second step, the two-way interactions between the two motives and identification, respectively, were entered. In a third step, the three way interaction between identification and both motives was entered. For the longitudinal analyses, the models were identical, only this time predictors at time 1 were used to predict the GMRD and GRD at time 2. In addition, the stabilities of the DVs were controlled for by entering GMRD and GRD at time 1, respectively, as predictors in a first step in the regression model. Results for all analyses are displayed in table 28. Note that non-significant betas for interaction terms are omitted from the table. Those cells are left blank, in order to make it easier for the reader to concentrate on the essential information.³⁹

³⁹ One of the aims of this analysis was to see whether GMRD and GRD would be affected by CI in different objects. In order to not overload the analysis, it was decided to concentrate only on the most important CI objects (intragroup, temporal, and majority). However, another regression was conducted too, predicting GMRD and GRD, respectively, from ALL CI objects. For the cross-sectional data, the only effect that was found in addition to the ones reported above was that intragroup CI negatively predicted GMRD. A further important aim was to shed some light on the link between identification and deprivation. Since no lagged main effects were found for identification above, some alternative models were tested, predicting only deprivation from identification and vice versa (this was tried even though collinearity was not a problem in the analyses reported above). However, no lagged effects were found in these (simpler) models either.

Table 28

Predicting overall deprivation (GMRD & GRD) from CI, motives, and identification

		Cross-sectional analyses, Whole dataset		Cross-sectional, 'matched' cases only		Longitudinal Analyses	
		GMRD N = 201	GRD N = 199	GMRD N = 110	GRD N = 110	GMRD N = 110	GRD N = 110
Overall Model	R^2 for DV at time 1	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	.53 ***	.12 ***
	R^2 for individual β s (for the LA, this is ΔR^2)	.16 ***	.13 ***	.09	.16 ***	.02	.02
	ΔR^2 for 2-way IAs	.006	.005	.01	.04	.02	.02
	ΔR^2 for 3-way IA	.001	.03 **	.02	.001	.001	.002
β s	DV at point 1	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	.73 ***	.35 ***
	Intragroup CI	-.03	.09	-.12	.06	-.13	-.03
	Temporal CI	-.17 *	-.17 *	-.06	-.11	.02	-.03
	Majority CI	.006	.10	.03	.12	.09	-.02
	Enhancement	-.27 ***	.03	-.08	.03	-.07	-.06
	Equity own	-.03	.22 **	-.09	.16 ●	-.002	.11
	Identification	-.06	-.25 ***	-.14	-.35 ***	.13	-.02
IA of ident with...	Enhancement						
	Equity own				-1.21 *	.82 *	.99 ●
IA of ident with...	Equity own * Enhancement		2.95 *				

Note. 'ident' = identification, 'IA' = interaction, 'LA' = longitudinal analyses. ● $p < .09$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Considering first the results for the complete time 1 dataset, both models were significant. Temporal CI, identification, and both motives yielded significant results. One of the three way interactions (out of a total of 6 tested interaction terms) was significant, i.e. identification* equity own * enhancement in predicting GRD. Focussing now on the restricted time 1 dataset, as expected, the loss of N and resulting loss of power meant that some previously significant effects disappeared. Again, one out of the 6 interactions was significant. Surprisingly, this was a different one than the one found for the complete dataset. This time, the identification*equity interaction was significant in predicting GRD. Focussing now on the longitudinal analyses, as expected, the stabilities of the DV were rather high, 'wiping out' most of the effects that had remained significant for the restricted time 1 dataset. Only the identification*equity interaction remained (marginally) significant. In addition, this analysis found a *new*

significant interaction of identification*equity in predicting GMRD. No support was found for causal effects of any of the individual predictors.

In sum, no evidence was found for H5 that comparisons *causally* affect RD. However, effects across all three sets of analyses were in the predicted direction, with beta weights for intragroup and temporal CI being generally negative, and beta weights for majority CI being positive. No support was found for H6 that identification *causally* affects RD. However, as for the studies before, again significant *negative* effects were found in the cross-sectional analyses. In order to test whether the significant 2-way interactions found were in the direction as predicted by H6, the samples were median split into those high and low on the motives, respectively. Then, the analyses were re-run separately for these sub-samples, and the betas for identification were compared. In order to interpret the 3-way interaction, the analysis focussed on those sub-samples that were of direct relevance to the hypothesis: Those that were ‘high on enhancement *and* low on equity’ were compared to those that were ‘high on equity *and* low on enhancement’. Results are displayed in table 29.

Table 29

Significant interactions between motives and identification when predicting RD

Sample	DV	3-way interaction: Equity own * Enhancement * identification		Effect as expected?
		β for Equity low/ Enhancement high	β for Equity high/ Enhancement low	
Cross-sectional, Whole dataset	GRD	.06 (29)	-.46 ** (45)	No
		2-way interactions: Equity own * identification		
		β for Equity low	β for Equity high	
Cross-sectional, restricted dataset	GRD	-.15 (47)	-.46 ** (63)	No
Longitudinal	GRD	-.16 (47)	.09 (63)	Approximately
	GMRD	-.006 (47)	.18 • (63)	Yes


Note. • $p < .09$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. Cell *Ns* in parentheses. Note that the *Ns* for the analyses based on the whole dataset are smaller than the ones for analyses based on the restricted dataset. This is because the former analyses only focus on participants that fall into two of four possible quadrants (i.e. high on one motive *and* low on the other, or vice versa), whereas the latter focus on all participants (based on median split).

Remember that according to H6 identification was expected to have a positive effect on RD if equity motives are strong (or, to put it another way, the effect was expected to be *more* positive under 'equity high' than under 'equity low' conditions), and a negative effect if enhancement motives are strong (or, the effect was expected to be *more* negative under 'enhancement high' than under 'enhancement low' conditions). The 3-way interaction was hypothesised as showing that identification would have a positive effect only if simultaneously equity is high and enhancement is low, and that it would have a negative effect only if simultaneously equity is low and enhancement is high. As can be seen in table 29, the pattern of neither of the two significant interaction terms for the cross-sectional analyses was in the predicted direction. However, the pattern for the longitudinal prediction of GMRD was in the right direction, and the pattern for the longitudinal prediction of GRD was approximately in the right direction. For the latter, the effect of identification on RD was not significantly positive in the 'equity high' condition, but it was at least not as negative as in the 'equity low' condition. In sum, what can be inferred from these results?

First of all, it is not very surprising that the 3-way interaction found in the cross-sectional data was not replicated in the other two datasets, because those latter tests had considerably less statistical power. However, it is surprising that some interaction terms were significant in the longitudinal analyses but not in the cross-sectional analyses. It is also surprising that the longitudinal interactions were closer to the predicted direction than the cross-sectional ones. In order to interpret these findings, some further statistical reflections are necessitated. As outlined above, if an IV (be it an interaction term or otherwise) has an effect on a DV, we would not only expect to find a lagged effect, but the two variables would also be expected to correlate cross-sectionally. This would be expected even if some time lag is required for the IV to manifest its effect on the DV, provided that both IV and DV are relatively stable traits. Consider figure 4.

Figure 4

Explaining differences between longitudinal and cross-sectional findings



If for no other reason, IV1 would be expected to not only correlate with DV2 but also with DV1, because there should be a causal effect of prior levels of the IV even farther back in time (labelled IV0 in the figure). For instance, imagine that being bullied (IV) causes anger (DV). Also, it is reasonable to assume that most victims are exposed to bullying on a relatively permanent basis (i.e. bullying would not be inferred on the basis of a one-off incident), and that subsequent anger should therefore also be relatively stable. We would expect being bullied at time 1 to causally predict anger at time 2. However, we would also expect it to correlate with anger at time 1, even if some time lag is required for bullying to impact on anger. This is because most people who are bullied at time 1 will also have been bullied before (time 0 in the figure). Being bullied at time 0 should therefore be correlated with being bullied at time 1 and anger at time 1. Therefore, being bullied at time 1 and anger at time 1 should also be correlated (a correlation caused by the third variable 'being bullied' time 0). Now, what is going on when the IV1-DV2 correlation is significant, but the IV1-DV1 correlation is not? For instance, this could be caused by some exterior effect (labelled E in the figure), which impacted on the IV some time between measurement points 1 and 2. For instance, imagine that we assess feelings of being bullied at time 1 in a sample of people who have never previously thought about their situation in these terms. They have attributed others' negative behaviour internally, and experienced guilt rather than anger. However, in filling out the questionnaire, people start seeing their situation in a different light, and start thinking of themselves as victims. While in this example it would be quite possible for 'seeing oneself as a victim of bullying' and 'anger' not to be correlated cross-sectionally, by the time the wave 2 data is collected the new self-perceptions have had time to do their work, and being bullied at time 1 might well correlate with anger at

time 2. Thus, in this example, the exterior effect E is effectively the data collection itself. Similar processes might have caused the present results. If, for instance, the participants had not been high on an 'equity own' motive before data collection, but filling out the questionnaire has made this motive salient, this might explain why 'equity' did not significantly interact with identification at time 1, but a significant effect was found on RD two weeks later (at a time when the newly salient motive had time to manifest its effect). Of course, such an explanation would not only be theoretically not very satisfying, but would also raise ethical questions about the psychological processes the study might have caused in the participants. A simpler, and ethically less concerning, explanation would be to put the positive interactions found in the longitudinal data down to chance (but, 2/6 interactions were significant in the longitudinal data; by chance alone we would expect to find only 0.3 significant interactions at $p < .05$).

Is the effect of Identification on Deprivation mediated by Motives (enhancement, equity own) or by CI (intragroup, temporal)?

Next, H7 was tested, which had predicted that the negative effect of identification on RD might be mediated by either a preference for gratifying intragroup or temporal comparisons, or by a higher endorsement of the 'enhancement' motive or a lesser endorsement of the 'equity own' motive. Recall that Kenny proposes three necessary conditions for mediation: a) the mediator has to predict the IV, b) the DV has to predict the IV, and c) when both IV and mediator are used simultaneously to predict the DV, the mediator must still be significant, and the effect of the IV must be significantly reduced. Analyses were carried out on a) the complete wave 1 dataset, b) the restricted wave 1 dataset, and c) the longitudinal dataset. Before presenting the data, a few words should be said about the testing of mediation analyses in longitudinal data. Firstly, whilst the IV must necessarily be measured at time 1 and the DV must necessarily be measured at time 2, there are no theoretical grounds on which to decide whether the mediator should be measured at time 1 or 2. Therefore, mediation effects for all proposed mediators (intragroup CI, temporal CI, equity own, enhancement) were tested using indicators for the mediators from both time 1 and time 2, respectively. Further, in order to infer mediation from longitudinal data, not only should Kenny's conditions be met, but subsequent (cross-lagged regression) analyses have to ascertain that there are

no causal effects in the reverse directions (e.g. from the hypothesised DV on the mediator). It had been endeavoured to test this; however the issue proved obsolete, as none of the tests for the restricted time 1 dataset or the longitudinal dataset met the three necessary conditions specified above. Results for all analyses are presented in table 30. The table should be read as follows: The top quarter tests Kenny's first condition, i.e. significances of correlations between identification at time 1 and potential mediators. The next section tests Kenny's second condition, i.e. whether identification at time 1 significantly predicts the DV (i.e. RD, note that for the cross-sectional analyses these were measured at time 1, and for the longitudinal analyses these were time 2 measures). I only proceeded to test for condition 3 for those analyses for which the first two conditions were met. Where the first two conditions were met, the DV was predicted from both the IV and the potential moderator. Results of these tests are presented in the lower half of the table. It should be noted that each cell in the lower half pertains to a regression model. However, for brevity's sake, only the crucial information for each regression is presented, i.e. the beta weight for identification for those models where the mediator was still significant. As is apparent from the table, none of the mediation analyses based on the restricted time 1 dataset or the longitudinal data yielded support for the mediation hypothesis. However, in the analyses based on the complete wave 1 data, there were 3 cases where the beta for identification was reduced when including the mediator (and where the other Kenny conditions were also met). For these, it was tested whether the decrease in the IV-DV link was significant. This was done following a procedure outlined by Kenny (<http://nw3.nai.net/%7Edakenny/mediate.htm>). For each of the tests, a *z*-value was calculated. Given that *z*s of 1.96 or bigger are significant at $p < .05$ two-tailed, two reductions were significant: Both 'temporal CI' and the 'enhancement' motive significantly mediated the effect of identification on GMRD in the analyses based on the complete wave 1 dataset. However, given that table 30 presents a total of 32 mediation analyses, and given that no evidence for mediation was yielded by the previous studies, these results should not be over-emphasised.

Table 30

Is the (negative) effect of identification on deprivation mediated by motives or CI?

	Cross-sectional, full sample	Cross-sectional, restricted sample	Longitudinal	
			Mediator at time 1	Mediator at time 2
1. condition: Pairwise correlations between identification and potential mediators (motives, CI)				
Enhancement	.42 ***	.41 ***	.41 ***	.35 ***
Equity own	.11	.001	.001	.03
CI intragroup	.32 ***	.32 ***	.32 ***	.10
CI temporal	.29 ***	.16 ●	.16 ●	.08
2. condition: Pairwise correlations between identification and DV (deprivation)				
GMRD	-.24 ***	-.19 *	-.07	
GRD	-.23 ***	-.32 ***	-.18*	
βs for IV when predicting GMRD, whilst including mediator...				
Enhancement	-.11 ($z = -3.66$)	Mediator was <i>ns</i>	2. condition not met	
Equity own	1. condition not met	1. condition not met		
CI intragroup	-.19 ** ($z = -1.93$)	Mediator was <i>ns</i>		
CI temporal	-.17 * ($z = 2.53$)	Mediator was <i>ns</i>		
βs for IV when predicting GRD, whilst including mediator...				
Enhancement	1. condition not met, and/or mediator was <i>ns</i> in third step	1. condition not met, and/or mediator was <i>ns</i> in third step	1. condition not met, and/or mediator was <i>ns</i> in third step	
Equity own				
CI intragroup				
CI temporal				

Note. ● $p < .09$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. z -values for the test of significant reductions are displayed in parentheses.

Predicting CI from Motives, specific Deprivation, and Identification

Next, some models were built predicting CI in different objects from motives, specific deprivation, identification, as well as various interaction terms. These models tested H8, i.e. the self-protection hypothesis that deprivation relative to a target should decrease the interest in comparing with it. Thus, the deprivation index entered was always specific deprivation vis-à-vis the target of interest. It was also tested whether this effect would be moderated by motives (i.e. whether deprivation would only have a negative effect on CI for those participants high on ‘enhancement’, and whether it would in contrast have a positive effect on CI for those participants high on ‘equity own’). Interaction terms were built to test for the motive*deprivation interactions. The models also aimed to test H9, i.e. the prediction that identification would lead to an increase in intragroup and temporal CI for those participants high on an enhancement motive, and that it would

lead to a increase in majority CI for those participants high on an equity motive. Interaction terms were built to test for the motive*identification interactions. Finally, the models also aimed to test for main effects of motives on CI, as proposed by H4. It was predicted that 'enhancement' would increase intragroup and temporal CI, and that 'equity' would increase majority CI. In short, the models are identical to the ones presented for studies 3 and 4 above, with the exception that this time specific cognitive and affective deprivation indices vis-à-vis each object were entered separately in the regression, and that separate interaction terms were built for both. Analyses were carried out for a) the complete wave 1 dataset, b) the restricted wave 2 dataset, and c) the longitudinal dataset. In order to not over-burden the reader with too much information, only results for the most important comparison objects will be presented, i.e. regressions predicting the intragroup, temporal, and majority CI. In order to make it easier for the reader to jointly consider all evidence available for each CI target, three tables will be presented, i.e. one for each CI target, and each including the results from the three datasets, respectively. Results predicting the intragroup target are displayed in table 31, results for the temporal target are displayed in table 32, and results for the majority CI are displayed in table 33. Regression weights for non-significant interaction terms are not presented, in order to make it easier to concentrate on the important bits of information.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Some further analyses were also carried out. Reported above are the ones that are most economical and that yielded the most consistent patterns. However, some others shall be briefly mentioned. To explore the negative impact of RD (both cognitive & affective) on CI, pairwise correlations were calculated for ALL CI targets of the study. For the complete wave 1 dataset, aff and cog RD both had negative impact on temporal CI, aff and cog RD had a negative impact on developing world CI, aff RD negatively impacted on intragroup CI, and aff and cog RD negatively impacted on origin CI. All other pairwise correlations were non-significant. Predicting CI longitudinally for ALL objects (always controlling for the DV at time 1), the following were significant: aff RD for temporal CI, cog RD for intragroup CI, and aff and cog RD for majority CI (the latter two effects were positive). Some other models were also tested. E.g., identification was regressed from ALL CI objects; effects were tested predicting the other CI objects not reported above; motive biases were tested as moderators; and models that only included specific RD and *one* of the potential moderators at a time were tested, excluding other IVs and potential moderators.

Table 31

Predicting intragroup CI from motives, deprivation, and identification

Sample		Cross-sectional, Whole dataset <i>N</i> = 192	Cross-sectional, 'matched' cases only <i>N</i> = 111	Longitudinal analyses <i>N</i> = 105
Overall Model	R^2 for DV at time 1	n/a	n/a	.27 ***
	R^2 for individual β s (for the LA, this is ΔR^2)	.18 ***	.21 ***	.06 ●
	ΔR^2 for IAs	.02	.01	.06
β s	DV at time 1	n/a	n/a	.52 ***
	Enhancement	.02	.08	.17 ●
	Equity own	.08	.01	.02
	Specific cog RD	-.03	.04	-.17 *
	Specific aff RD	-.19 ***	-.24 *	-.001
	Ident	.31 ***	.32 ***	-.14
IAs	Cog RD * Enh	All <i>ns</i>		
	Cog RD * Eq			
	Aff RD * Enh			
	Aff RD * Eq			
	Ident * Enh			
	Ident * Eq			

Note. 'cog RD' = specific cognitive RD vis-à-vis intragroup targets, 'aff RD' = specific affective RD vis-à-vis intragroup targets, 'ident' = identification, 'enh' = enhancement, 'eq' = equity, 'IA' = interaction, 'LA' = Longitudinal Analysis. ● $p < .09$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

As is apparent from table 31, the data yielded some support for H8, i.e. that deprivation vis-à-vis an object negatively impacts on interest in comparing with this object. Cross-sectionally, affective (but not cognitive) deprivation was significant. Longitudinally, cognitive (but not affective) deprivation was significant. No support was found that the effect of RD on CI is moderated by motives. Some support was found for H9, in that identification positively predicted CI in the cross-sectional analyses. However, causality could not be demonstrated, as this effect disappeared in the longitudinal analyses. No evidence was found that the effect of identification on CI is moderated by motives. Finally, some support was found for H4, in that 'enhancement' positively predicted intragroup CI. However, this effect was only found for the longitudinal analysis, but not cross-sectionally (for a theoretical discussion of such a pattern of results, see above). Hence, although it is difficult to conclude with *certainty* that enhancement causally

impacts on intragroup CI since the cross-sectional results were not significant, the results at least point in this direction. Besides, they also underline the importance of conducting longitudinal research, as such designs might pick up effects that go unnoticed in cross-sectional work.

Table 32

Predicting temporal CI from motives, deprivation, and identification

Sample		Cross-sectional, Whole dataset <i>N</i> = 194	Cross-sectional, 'matched' cases only <i>N</i> = 114	Longitudinal analyses <i>N</i> = 108
Overall Model	R^2 for DV at time 1	n/a	n/a	.19 ***
	R^2 for individual β s (for the LA, this is ΔR^2)	.20 ***	.14 **	.07 ●
	ΔR^2 for IAs	.01	.06	.04
β s	DV at time 1	n/a	n/a	.44 ***
	Enhancement	.04	.05	.14
	Equity own	.02	-.001	-.08
	Specific cog RD	-.08	-.13	-.02
	Specific aff RD	-.26 ***	-.26 **	-.24 *
	Ident	.24 ***	.15	-.07
IAs	Cog RD * Enh	All <i>ns</i>		
	Cog RD * Eq			
	Aff RD * Enh			
	Aff RD * Eq			
	Ident * Enh			
	Ident * Eq			

Note. 'cog RD' = specific cognitive RD vis-à-vis temporal target, 'aff RD' = specific affective RD vis-à-vis temporal target, 'ident' = identification, 'enh' = enhancement, 'eq' = equity, 'IA' = interaction, 'LA' = Longitudinal Analysis. ● $p < .09$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

As is apparent from table 32, some support was found for H8, in that affective deprivation vis-à-vis the temporal target negatively impacted on temporal CI. This was true both cross-sectionally and longitudinally. However, no support was found for the hypothesis that the effect of RD on CI is moderated by motives. Some support was found for H9, in that identification positively predicted temporal CI. However, this effect was only found for the analyses based on the complete dataset at time 1, and disappeared for the other analyses. Thus, causality could not be ascertained regarding

the link between identification and CI. Further, the effect of identification on temporal CI was not moderated by motives. Finally, no support was found for H4: enhancement did not positively predict temporal CI for any of the models.

Table 33

Predicting majority CI from motives, deprivation, and identification

Sample		Cross-sectional, Whole dataset <i>N</i> = 200	Cross-sectional, 'matched' cases only <i>N</i> = 115	Longitudinal analyses <i>N</i> = 109
Overall Model	R^2 for DV at time 1	n/a	n/a	.28 ***
	R^2 for individual β s (for the LA, this is ΔR^2)	.05 ●	.07	.12 **
	ΔR^2 for IAs	.01	.03	.01
β s	DV at time 1	n/a	n/a	.52 ***
	Enhancement	.02	.008	-.04
	Equity own	.11	.14	.16 *
	Specific cog RD	.07	.18	.10
	Specific aff RD	-.03	-.11	.26 **
	Ident	.17 *	.13	-.02
IAs	Cog RD * Enh	All <i>ns</i>		
	Cog RD * Eq			
	Aff RD * Enh			
	Aff RD * Eq			
	Ident * Enh			
	Ident * Eq			

Note. 'cog RD' = specific cognitive RD vis-à-vis majority targets, 'aff RD' = specific affective RD vis-à-vis majority targets, 'ident' = identification, 'enh' = enhancement, 'eq' = equity, 'IA' = interaction, 'LA' = Longitudinal Analysis. ● $p < .09$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

As is apparent from table 33, no support was found for H8 that RD vis-à-vis an object might lower interest in comparing with it. Affective RD *positively* predicted CI in the longitudinal analyses, and the effect was therefore not in the predicted direction. Moreover, no significant effects were found on the cross-sectional data. Further, no effects were found for cognitive RD longitudinally, and no support was found for the prediction that the effect is moderated by motives. Some support was found for H9, in that identification is positively related to majority CI. This result is in line with what would be expected on the basis of SIT. However, causality could not be demonstrated,

since the effect was only significant in the analyses based on the entire wave 1 dataset. Also, no evidence was found that the effect of identification on CI is moderated by motives. Finally, some support was found for H4, in that 'equity' positively predicted majority CI. However, this effect was only found longitudinally, but not cross-sectionally.

In sum, some support was found for H8, which had predicted that RD relative to an object decreases interest in comparing with it. Support was yielded when predicting intragroup and temporal CI, while the effect on majority CI was actually positive (and not negative, as had been hypothesised). Further, longitudinal analyses ascertained that the causal direction does indeed work from RD to CI. Overall, it seemed that affective RD might be a more powerful predictor than cognitive RD. Since study 5 was the first study that had included an affective measure of RD relative to specific targets, this might indicate that previous studies might have yielded more support for H8 had they included such a measure. No evidence was found that the effect of RD on CI is moderated by motives.

Some support was found for H9: Identification was positively related to intragroup, temporal, and majority CI. Whereas the first two effects replicate findings from previous studies, the last effect is in line with SIT predictions. The full *N* of the wave 1 data was needed to pick up this effect (at least for the latter two CI targets), and no evidence for causality was found, since identification did not have any effects in any of the longitudinal analyses. Moreover, no support was found for the prediction that the effect of identification on CI is moderated by motives.

Finally, weak evidence was found for a main effect of motives on CI (H4). 'Enhancement' caused an increase in intragroup CI (but not temporal CI), and 'Equity' caused an increase in majority CI. Interestingly, all evidence was yielded by the longitudinal analyses, but not by the cross-sectional ones. While it is difficult to conclude with certainty what this might mean (since we would expect predictors which have longitudinal effects also to have cross-sectional effects), the pattern of results further underlines the importance of longitudinal research.

Predicting majority CI from 'minority Identification', 'British Identification', 'Stability', and 'Permeability'

Next, majority CI was predicted from permeability and stability, to test the SIT prediction that these variables would have a negative impact (H10). 'Minority identification' and 'British identification' were also included as predictors. Note that although one of the models reported above predicted majority CI, a separate model was built. This was because the sample size, at least for the longitudinal analyses, was not big enough to include the predictors of interest here in the already extensive models reported above. Analyses were carried out for a) the complete wave 1 dataset, b) the restricted wave 1 dataset, and c) the longitudinal dataset. Results are displayed in table 34.

Table 34

Predicting majority CI from minority identification, British identification, stability, and impermeability

		Cross-sectional, Whole dataset <i>N</i> = 200	Cross-sectional, 'matched' cases only <i>N</i> = 114	Longitudinal analysis <i>N</i> = 114
Overall Model	R^2 for DV at time 1	n/a	n/a	.26 ***
	R^2 for individual β s (for the LA, this is ΔR^2)	.09 ***	.06	.02
β s	DV at time 1	n/a	n/a	.51 ***
	Minority identification	.20 **	.14	-.07
	British identification	.23 **	.15	.02
	Stability	-.01	.02	.09
	Impermeability	-.004	-.09	.08

Note. • $p < .09$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

As apparent from the table, neither stability nor permeability of group boundaries significantly affected interest in comparing with the majority. Identification with both

the minority and the majority positively predicted CI, although this result was only found for the complete wave 1 analyses. In sum, little support was found for H10.⁴¹

The relationship between Self-esteem and Deprivation

Finally, another objective was to demonstrate that the effect of deprivation on self-esteem is causal. Self-esteem was regressed from GMRD, GRD, and their interaction. This analysis was carried out for a) the complete wave 1 dataset, b) the restricted wave 1 dataset, and c) the longitudinal dataset. For the analyses based on the complete wave 1 dataset, this yielded (at step 1) an R^2 of .06, $p < .002$. The beta for GMRD was significant, $-.26$, $p < .001$. Thus, as expected and in line with previous results, the higher the GMRD, the lower the self-esteem. For the analyses based on the restricted wave 1 dataset, this yielded $R^2 = .11$, $p < .001$. The beta for GMRD was significant, $-.33$, $p < .001$. For the longitudinal analysis (i.e. predicting self-esteem at time 2 from GMRD and GRD at time 1, controlling for self-esteem at time 1), the R^2 at step 2 (i.e. after partialling out DV effects at time 1) was .004, *ns*. Both betas for deprivation were *ns*, $-.05$, *ns* for GRD, and $-.03$, *ns* for GMRD. Thus, even though the negative correlation between deprivation and self-esteem of study 1 was replicated here, the attempt to demonstrate causality for this effect was not successful.

Discussion

In the following, the most important findings of study 5 will be briefly summarised. Broadly speaking, in line with H1, it was found that intragroup and temporal GMRD was lower than GMRD vis-à-vis the other targets. However, this pattern was clearer for affective deprivation than for cognitive deprivation. In line with H2, it was found that intragroup and temporal CI was higher than CI in the other targets (although origin CI was also high). In line with H3, it was found that, overall, participants endorsed the 'enhancement' motive more than the 'equity own' motive.

⁴¹ Note that the same model was also used to predict intragroup and temporal CI, respectively. These analyses were exploratory. Surprisingly, although the SIT prediction for stability and permeability impacting on majority CI was not supported (see above), in these analyses, significant effects were found: Impermeability positively predicted both intragroup and temporal CI, and stability positively predicted temporal CI. None of the interactions were significant (neither for these nor for the analyses reported above).

H4 had proposed that enhancement should causally lead to high intragroup and temporal CI, and that equity concerns causally lead to high intergroup CI (i.e. comparing with members of the majority). Evidence was found for enhancement positively influencing intragroup CI, and for equity positively influencing intergroup CI. However, no support was found for the prediction regarding temporal CI. Also, only the longitudinal analyses yielded this support, while the cross-sectional correlations were not significant. As outlined above, the most likely explanation for this state of affairs is that although H4 is right, neither enhancement nor equity motives were very salient for the participants at the time of collecting the wave 1 data. However, answering the questionnaire made both motives salient, which allowed them to have an impact on CI at time 2 in the predicted direction.

H5 had predicted (according to RDT) that intragroup and temporal CI would causally and negatively affect feeling of overall deprivation, and that majority CI would have a causal positive effect. The attempt of demonstrating causality failed, as none of the lagged effects was significant. However, regression weights (both cross-sectionally and longitudinally) were generally in the predicted direction.

H6 had predicted that identification and deprivation would be negatively related. Furthermore, it had been predicted that the causal effect of identification on deprivation would be moderated by 'motives'. Cross-sectional results generally replicated the negative correlation between identification and deprivation, but lagged effects were not significant. Thus, a causal main effect of identification on deprivation was not found. Further, it had been predicted that the effect of identification on deprivation would be moderated by motives. Significant cross-sectional interaction terms were not in the predicted direction, but significant longitudinal interaction terms were; a state of affairs that clearly poses some interpretational problems. Since lagged moderation effects provided at least some glimpse of the expected moderation effects, the lack of support from the cross-sectional data was not taken as an indication that the moderation hypothesis should be abandoned altogether.

H7 had posed an alternative hypothesis to H6, and had hypothesised that the effect of identification on deprivation would be mediated by either 'motives' and/or comparison preferences. Support for this was found when predicting GMRD, but not when predicting GRD. Further, support was only yielded cross-sectionally, but not longitudinally.

H8 had suggested that RD relative to an object would have a causal negative effect on CI with this object overall. Also, it had been expected that the effect of RD on CI would be moderated by motives. No support for the moderation hypothesis was obtained. Some support for the proposed main effects was found for the intragroup and temporal targets, whereas the effect for the intergroup/majority target was actually in the opposite direction. However, causality could generally be demonstrated, with effects being significant both cross-sectionally and longitudinally. Further, it seems that the affective deprivation index might be a more powerful construct than the cognitive deprivation index for picking up the expected effects.

H9 had predicted that identification would causally affect CI. Furthermore, it was proposed that the effect of identification is moderated by 'motives'. No support for the moderation hypothesis was found. Although identification positively correlated with intragroup, temporal, and majority CI cross-sectionally, the longitudinal effects were not significant. Thus, study 5 failed at demonstrating the proposed causal order.

H10 had predicted – in line with SIT – that impermeability and instability should render previously incomparable groups comparable, i.e. should positively impact on majority CI. No support for this was found. However, but minority identification and identification with the British were positively related to majority CI (again, however, these effects were only significant cross-sectionally).

Finally, H11 had predicted that deprivation has a causal negative effect on self-esteem. Although the negative correlation between the two variables found in study 1 was replicated, the attempt to demonstrate causality was not successful.

Joint discussion, studies 1 – 5. Before moving on to the experimental part of this thesis, the evidence and most important results obtained in the five field studies shall briefly be summarised (again, it might be helpful to refer back to figure 2). Firstly, support was found for the prediction that both minority members and majority members would compare more with ingroup members and temporal targets than with intergroup targets. Secondly, support was found for the prediction that minority members would feel least deprived vis-à-vis ingroup members and temporal targets (although results were not unequivocal, i.e. the pattern for minority members of study 4 was different). Thirdly, correlational analyses which tested more directly whether the intragroup comparison preference would be driven by self-protective motives, i.e. whether RD

relative to a target negatively affects CI in this target, yielded only very weak evidence. Neither the 'order' manipulation, nor employing a more reliable measurement for CI, assisted in finding very clear and strong evidence for the proposed negative effect, and it could not be demonstrated that the effect is moderated through 'motives'.

Fourthly, evidence for the RDT prediction that feelings of overall RD depend on comparisons people engage in was similarly weak. Fifth, considering now the proposed antecedents of CI, support was found for similarity and contact positively affecting CI. Little support (at least for minority participants) was found for acculturation strategies positively affecting CI, and no support was found for impermeability and instability positively influencing majority CI. Sixth, although some evidence was yielded that the enhancement motive was generally stronger than the equity motive, the effects of motives on CI were far from unequivocal. Seventh, no support was found for the SIT prediction that identification leads to more intergroup CI; the present data found either no link between identification and CI, or instead found a positive correlation with intragroup and temporal CI. Further, the link between identification and CI was not moderated by motives. Eighth, support was found for RD being linked negatively to self-esteem and life-satisfaction. Ninth, although study 1 found the proposed negative effect of GMRD on 'importance' (as would be expected according to the self-protection hypothesis), the effect of GRD was actually positive and therefore opposite to the expected direction (this issue will be attended to further in study 6). Tenth, all studies yielded some evidence for identification and deprivation being negatively linked, clearly contradicting some previously published results (see chapter 2). However, evidence that that negative association can be explained by a moderation or mediation effect was weak.

In sum, results obtained for studies 1 to 5 were far from conclusive. However, it should be acknowledged that the mechanisms the present work set out to explore are rather complex, and hence might be difficult to assess in field settings which necessarily contain a range of uncontrollable and uncontrolled interfering factors and variables. Also, causality is exceptionally difficult to demonstrate with survey data, even if longitudinal designs are employed. Also, it has been pointed out that moderation effects (such as the ones proposed here) are extremely difficult to detect using survey data (McClelland & Judd, 1993). In spite of this, given that the present work was interested in exploring comparison and deprivation and the associated psychological mechanisms

in naturalistic ethnic minority settings, it had been decided to 'give it a shot', since an experimental approach to investigate these issues using ethnic minority samples was neither practical nor did it appear ethical. However, in light of the inconclusive findings, it was decided to next switch to an experimental design, and to use a more powerful analytical tool, in trying to explore some of the mechanisms further.

CHAPTER 7

Studies 6 & 7: Manipulating Comparisons and Deprivation

Studies 6 and 7 were designed to assess, with a different methodological tool, some of the issues already addressed in previous studies. Particularly, study 6 manipulated 'deprivation', in order to assess the impact of this manipulation on the intragroup comparison bias and 'importance' of being well-off. Thus, study 6 returned to some of the issues addressed above in attempting to demonstrate causality and moderation for certain effects. In a similar vein, study 7 manipulated 'deprivation' and 'comparison interest'.

However, choosing an experimental design to look at the issues of interest in ethnic minority samples posed severe ethical problems. It was found unethical to experimentally manipulate adolescents' sense of personal or group deprivation, and even the strength of their identification. During data collection for the survey studies, it had become clear that all issues around ethnicity were very sensitive, both in the UK and the German settings, to an extent that students and teachers often did not feel at ease about even *asking* students about their group membership, and about acknowledging that different ethnic groups existed. People in the field often felt slightly reluctant to admit that they were aware of different group memberships, and were keen to portray themselves, for instance, as comparing with other 'people' (i.e. being colour blind), rather than comparing with 'Germans', 'Turks', 'ingroup members', etc. Because of these sensitivities, it was found impossible to introduce any kinds of experimental manipulations in these settings, even had the students been thoroughly debriefed immediately upon completion of the research. Such manipulations seemed only ethical with slightly older and therefore less 'vulnerable' participants, in order to minimise potentially questionable effects of the manipulations. Therefore, all experiments were conducted with university students in controlled settings, which allowed for thorough and immediate debriefings directly upon completion of the research.

However, even with these older students, it was felt that the experiments should focus on a group other than 'ethnicity'. The group 'nationality' was chosen for studies 6 and 7, for several reasons. First of all, comments from research participants during the data collection for the survey studies gave reason to believe that issues around 'national

groups' were perceived as slightly less sensitive than issues around 'ethnic groups'. Secondly, national and ethnic groups are similar on a number of theoretically important dimensions, making for a reasonable degree of comparability between ethnic and national groups, and allowing some (careful) inferences from results obtained from the studies to mechanisms present in the ethnic minority field settings. For instance, both ethnic minorities and citizens of different countries are frequently exposed to information (media, official statistics, information about the economy) about how their ingroup is doing compared to various outgroups. Indices of economic well-being are of high relevance in both settings, and in both settings are frequently explained through either internal attributions (lacking work-ethics, laziness) or external attributions (institutionalised discrimination, embargos, geo-political economic import and export strategies of superior or economically more powerful nations). A third reason for choosing 'national groups' was that they were thought to be one category for which perceived deprivation would be reasonably manipulable. This was of great concern, since it was assumed that people generally have quite firm beliefs about how they themselves and their group are doing, and that usually people are exposed to a wealth of information regarding this question. For instance, it would probably be quite impossible to make people from the South-East of England believe that they are more deprived than people in the North of England, just as it would be difficult to make Bavarians believe that they are more deprived than the inhabitants of Brandenburg. In contrast, it was felt that perceived comparative wealth of different countries would be relatively more amenable to experimental manipulation. Participants for both studies 6 and 7 were young Italian university students. Studies were conducted in Italy mainly for convenience reasons and ease of access to participants, but also because people with local expertise were adamant that Italian students generally would not have too strong a preconceived idea about how they are doing compared to students in other (European) countries. Thus, the intergroup context used was 'Italian students' (ingroup) vis-à-vis students in other European countries.

Of course, the author is aware of the theoretical and interpretative problems of extrapolating any conclusions from experimental data focussing on other groups than ethnicity and generalising the findings to ethnic minority settings. Still, as outlined above, it was felt that such an 'interpretative leap' was necessitated by an attempt to protect ethical procedures (the latter being found more important than absolute theoretical cleanliness). Further, even though it is acknowledged that generalisations

across different social groups of mechanisms found should be treated with care, it is nevertheless argued that these generalisations should not be deemed inappropriate *per se*, but that they might be valuable under certain conditions (which were felt to be met here). First of all, there are no theoretical grounds on which the predictions outlined above are expected to hold true only for ethnic minority members. In contrast, for instance the processes proposed by RDT were theorised to hold true for all people and groups, the processes proposed by SIT are supposed to be generic, and the arguments put forth by stigma theory are also thought to be applicable to all low status groups (e.g. Crocker & Major, 1989). Secondly, as outlined above, one can assume that many of the mechanisms around perceived deprivation prevalent in ethnic minority settings are similar to the ones in settings with economically inferior national groups.

Study 6

Introduction

This experiment was designed to assess the impact of deprivation on CI and to follow up some of the patterns found particularly in study 1, i.e. the effect of RD on 'importance', 'identification', and 'self-esteem'. Further, the experiment aimed to add a new dimension, by attempting to look simultaneously at intergroup and intragroup RD.

Recall that study 1 had found a negative link between GMRD and the 'importance' attached to being well-off, and that it had found a positive link between GRD and 'importance'. This result was puzzling, and the present experiment was designed to explain it. Following a similar line of thinking as outlined above regarding the moderating effects of 'motives', it was proposed that, if the link between deprivation (both GMRD and GRD) is positive sometimes and negative at other times, this would indicate some moderation by a third variable. Variables that have been discussed particularly in the interpersonal comparison literature are 'perceived controllability' and 'attributions' about the comparison outcome to either the self or external forces (Weiner, 1980). It was proposed that a possible moderating variable would be 'attribution patterns', i.e. attribution of the negative comparison outcome (i.e. relative deprivation) to either the 'self' or the 'system'. Under conditions where respondents feel personally responsible for their relative deprivation, awareness of RD might be ego-threatening. Consequently, the importance of being well off would be played down, as a

self-protective strategy (leading to a negative impact of RD on 'importance'). In contrast, under conditions where respondents do not feel personally responsible for the deprivation, but instead attribute this deprivation to an 'unfair system' and to discrimination, awareness of RD would be less ego-threatening. Such an attribution pattern would make likely an increased desire to point out and emphasise the importance of the discrimination and social injustices, in an attempt to redress them and to push for social change (leading to a positive effect of RD on importance). Possibly, study 1 respondents had attributed GMRD predominantly to the 'self', and GRD predominantly to social injustices and the 'system' being unfair, leading to a negative effect of GMRD on importance and to a positive effect of GRD on importance. Thus, 'self- vs. system blame' was included in study 6, to test for potential moderation effects.

However, an alternative explanation of the positive effect of GRD on importance was seen to be mediation, rather than moderation. Conceivably, GRD necessarily and causally leads to higher system blame, which in turn leads to enhanced 'importance'. This alternative hypothesis was also tested. Furthermore, study 6 focussed again on the negative effects of RD on identification and self-esteem, which had been demonstrated in study 1. It was hypothesised that RD would have a causal negative effect on self-esteem. Also, it was explored whether a causal effect of RD on identification could be demonstrated. No specific hypotheses were held about the valence of such an effect, the aim was primarily to demonstrate causality, since study 5 had failed to demonstrate a causal effect of identification on deprivation. Study 6 aimed to illuminate the deprivation-identification link by testing the *other* causal direction, i.e. by testing whether deprivation causally impacts on identification.

However, as mentioned above, study 6 also aimed at adding a new dimension, by simultaneously taking into consideration the effects of intra- and intergroup RD. Recall that the self-protective hypothesis proposes that minority members would avoid comparisons with relatively deprived majority members, and would instead favour intragroup comparisons with (on average less advantaged, or compared to the self even disadvantaged) ingroup members. However, some evidence can be found in the literature that this proposed mechanism is slightly more complex. Smith, Spears, and Hamstra (1999) propose that the intragroup comparison bias, i.e. the tendency to prefer intra- over intergroup comparisons, should be particularly strong for those group members that are disadvantaged relative to outgroup members, but not relative to ingroup members. This should be expected because self-protective effects of an

intragroup comparison bias should only exist for those people that are not disadvantaged relative to ingroup members. While study 6 aimed to test this prediction, it also made an additional prediction, turning the logic of the Smith et al. argument on its head: For those people who are deprived relative to ingroup members but not relative to outgroup members (i.e., whose group is not *group* deprived), an intergroup comparison bias was expected, i.e. a preference of intergroup over intragroup comparisons. Again, for those people, such an intergroup bias would be most instrumental for self-protective and enhancing purposes. In sum, the above reasoning led to the following hypotheses:

H1. It was predicted that the effect of RD on ‘importance’ would be moderated by ‘attribution patterns’. A negative effect was expected for those participants high on ‘self blame’, and a positive effect was expected for those participants high on ‘system blame’. Alternatively, a mediation hypothesis was tested, i.e. that RD causally and positively affects system blame, which in turn (positively) affects ‘importance’.

H2. It was predicted that an intragroup comparison bias (i.e. a preference of intra- over intergroup comparisons) would be found for those participants that were low on deprivation relative to ingroup members and high on deprivation relative to outgroup members. In a similar vein, it was predicted that an intergroup comparison bias (i.e. a preference for inter- over intragroup comparisons) would be found for those participants that were high on deprivation relative to ingroup members and low on deprivation relative to outgroup members.

H3. It was predicted that deprivation would causally and negatively affect self-esteem.

H4. An effect of deprivation on identification was expected, although no pre-conceived ideas were held as to the valence of this effect.

Method

The study employed a 2(personal deprivation high vs. low)*2(group deprivation high vs. low) design.

Participants

Seventy-six Italian psychology students (66 female, 10 male, mean age 24.84) participated in this experiment during a lecture. One participant had to be excluded, because she was not Italian.

Procedure

Participants were given an article that had allegedly been published in an English newspaper. They read both the 'original' version of the article and a translation into Italian. The article was intended to make them feel either deprived or gratified relative to other Italian students, through providing information about the average Italian student being either very well off or not being well off at all. If students believed that their economic situation would put them well below the national average, they would feel more deprived than if they believed that their economic situation was pretty average or above average. Half the students were told that only 20% of Italian students had a car, that only 1 out of 10 had ever travelled to another continent, and that most Italian students 'have to economise a lot and that they cannot afford most things they desire' (low personal deprivation condition). The other half were told that almost 70% of Italian students had a car, that one in three has travelled to another continent, and that most Italian students are reported as feeling that they 'do not have to economise at all and that they can afford most things they desire' (high personal deprivation condition).

Furthermore, it was intended to make students feel either group deprived or not group deprived by manipulating the information provided about students in the (at the time of the experiment) wealthiest European countries, i.e. England, France and Germany. Whilst half of the students were told that Italian students are a lot less well off than students in other European countries (Italian students are less likely than students in the wealthiest European countries to own a car or to have travelled to another continent), the other half were told that Italian students are doing about the same as students in other European countries (the number of car owners amongst students in the wealthiest European countries is only slightly above the number in Italy, and the number of students that have travelled to another continent is basically the same). In order to maintain orthogonality of the two experimental factors, group deprivation was manipulated relative to the figures the students had been given about

Italy/ about their situation relative to ingroup members. I.e., students in both the low personal deprivation condition and the high personal deprivation condition were told that in other European countries, either 20% more students had a car (high group deprivation condition), or only 5% more students had a car (low group deprivation condition) etc. Thus, the 20% and 5% surplus was not a constant value, but always meant 20% or 5% more than the figures participants had been given about Italy. The wording of the fake articles had been carefully checked and discussed with people with local knowledge, to assure plausibility and comparability across experimental conditions. For the exact wording of the four articles, see appendix 5. After reading the articles, the students filled out questionnaires containing the dependent measures. Upon conclusion of the study, participants were thoroughly debriefed.

Measures

To measure *overall GMRD*, students indicated how well off they felt personally (1 = not at all well off to 5 = very well off). They also indicated how angry or satisfied they are with their situation (1 = very angry to 5 = very satisfied). Those two items formed a reliable scale, $\alpha = .73$. Next, *intragroup GMRD* was assessed: students indicated how well off they felt 'compared to other Italian students', and *majority GMRD* was assessed by students' indicating how well off they felt 'compared to students in other European countries' (1 = much worse to 5 = much better). All scales were reversed, so that high values corresponded with high GMRD.

To measure *overall GRD*, students respond to the following items: 'Is the situation of Italian students worse than that of students in other European countries?', 'Do Italian students have it harder than students in other European countries?' (1 = not at all to 5 = very much), 'How angry or satisfied are you about the situation of Italian students?' (Reverse coded: 1 = very satisfied to 5 = very angry). Cronbach's alpha for these 3 items was .68.

To measure *Importance*, students were asked about the importance they assigned to three domains that were supposed to be indicative of people's economic situation: generally being well off, owning a car, and travelling abroad (1 = not at all important to 5 = very important). Those last two domains had been mentioned in the articles as reflecting student's economic situation. (The 3 items were not combined into a scale, because they did not correlate very well with each other, $\alpha = .28$).

Student's ingroup *identification* was measured on a five-item scale similar to the one employed in earlier studies (high values indicating high identification, $\alpha = .81$).

Self-esteem was measured on a five-item scale similar to the ones employed in earlier studies (high values indicated high self-esteem, $\alpha = .64$).

Next, *Self vs. System blame* were assessed, i.e. it was measured whether students thought that the 'system' was responsible for their economic situation (on both the personal and the group level) or whether they thought that they were responsible for their situation themselves. For the *personal level*, students were presented the following text:

'Sometimes, how people are doing in life is entirely up to them. For instance, they can be assiduous or lazy and they will get whatever they deserve. Other times, people cannot really control their chances, for instance if they are discriminated against or if the system works against them.'

For the *group level*, they were presented the following text:

'In some countries, people are richer on average than in others. Sometimes, this is due to the people. For instance, people in rich countries may work more, while people in poorer countries may be less dutiful. Other times, it is not really due to the people. For instance, richer countries may have an economic strangle-hold over poorer countries, some countries may suffer more from the Brussels bureaucracy, or countries might be discriminated against in several other ways.'

After reading each of the texts, students indicated whether they thought it was up to them to influence how they are doing, both personally and as a group (1 = not at all up to me/us to 5 = entirely up to me/us) and who they thought was responsible for how they are doing, both personally and as a group (1 = not at all my/our responsibility to 5 = entirely my/our responsibility). Thus, high values on this measure indicate high self-blame, and low values on this measure indicate high system blame. The variable labelled *personal level system blame* below pertains to the extent participants thought that they themselves or the system is responsible for how they are *personally* doing, and the variable *group level system blame* pertains to the extent participants endorsed these two attributions to explain the economic situation of their *ingroup as a whole*. The correlation between the two items was .59 for the personal level and .76 for the group level system blame.

Comparison Interest was measured with the following items: ‘How interesting did you find it to read how the average Italian student is doing’ (*intragroup CI*) and ‘How interesting did you find it to read how Italian students are doing compared to students in other European countries’ (*majority/intergroup CI*, 1= not at all interesting to 5 = very interesting for both items). Finally, students gave some demographic information.

Results⁴²

Results will be presented in the following order: i) Manipulation checks, ii) Deprivation affecting ‘importance’, and moderation/mediation through system blame (speaking to H1), iii) Deprivation affecting CI (H2), iv) Deprivation affecting ‘self-esteem’ (H3), and v) Deprivation affecting ‘identification’ (H4).

Manipulation checks and descriptives

Means were 3.20 for overall GMRD, 3.08 for overall GRD, and 3.91 for identification. Participants tended toward self-blame rather than system blame, $M_s = 4.00$ for the personal and 3.73 for the group level. Also, 37% of participants had a car, and 45% had travelled to another continent. This shows that the deprivation manipulation was adequate in that about half the students would have felt deprived relative to the national average, and the other half of the students would have felt gratified (e.g. 20% car owners vs. 70% car owners, with the real figure being 37%).

A MANOVA was conducted with the two experimental conditions as IVs and overall GRD and intragroup GMRD as DVs. This analysis yielded a significant multivariate effect of the ‘group deprivation’ factor, $F(2, 69) = 6.06, p < 0.004$, but not of the ‘personal deprivation’ factor, $F(2, 69) = 0.34, ns$. The effect of ‘group deprivation’ was observed for GRD only, $F(1, 70) = 11.82, p < 0.001$. As expected, those participants in the high group deprivation condition were higher on GRD than those in the low group deprivation condition ($M_s = 3.40, 2.81$). Thus, while GRD was successfully manipulated, there was no evidence that the manipulation managed to affect the perceived standing of the self vis-à-vis other ingroup members.

⁴² A number of analyses were performed that will not be elaborated on below. Most importantly, identification was not correlated with either intragroup CI or intergroup CI.

Deprivation affecting 'Importance', and moderation through System Blame

To test H1, a repeated measures ANOVA was carried out with the 3 'importance' items as repeated measures factor and the two experimental conditions as between subjects factors. This yielded an (uninteresting) main effect for 'importance', $F(1.57, 111.45) = 27.71, p < 0.001$ (showing that participants found it most important to travel, followed by generally being well off, followed by owning a car), and the expected significant main effect for the 'group deprivation' condition, $F(1, 71) = 15.86, p < 0.001$. No effect was found for the 'personal deprivation' factor.⁴³ The mean 'importance' score for the participants in the 'high group deprivation' condition was 4.69; the mean score for those in the 'low group deprivation' condition was 3.66. Thus, as in study 1, those students that felt highly group deprived attached more importance to material goods and economic conditions than those that do not feel group deprived.

This positive effect could be explained by two mechanisms, i.e. moderation or mediation through blame attribution patterns: According to the moderation hypothesis outlined above, a positive effect of GRD on 'importance' was expected when system blame is high (in contrast, a negative effect of GRD on importance was expected when self blame is most prevalent). However, the effect could also be explained by mediation: Possibly, high GRD lead to high system blame, which in turn lead to high 'importance'. These two options were tested in a next step.

Test for moderation. A repeated measures ANOVA with all three 'importance' items as levels of a repeated measures factor and 'group deprivation condition' and the median split 'group level system blame' as between subjects factors was conducted. This analysis yielded the predicted interaction between 'deprivation' and 'system blame', $F(1, 71) = 6.01, p < 0.02$. For the pattern of means, see table 35.

Simple effects analysis revealed that there was a significant effect of 'deprivation' among the 'high system blame' participants, $F(1, 71) = 20.11, p < 0.001$: 'deprived' participants assigned more importance than less 'deprived' participants. In contrast, for those in the 'low system blame' condition, deprivation had little effect on 'importance', $F(1, 71) = 1.45, ns$.

⁴³ This factor did not have any significant effects either if the median split manipulation check was used instead of the experimental manipulation.

Table 35

Effect of 'deprivation' and 'system blame' on 'importance'

	Group Deprivation		Difference
	High	Low	
System blame			
High	4.24 (.13) a	3.45 (.12) b	.79
Low	4.10 (.11) a	3.90 (.13) a	.20

Note. Standard deviations in parentheses. Subscripts denote significant differences (row-wise) according to simple main effects analysis.

Test for mediation. One way of testing mediation – e.g. that the effect of A on C is mediated by B - with an experimental design is the two-study approach, which shows that the manipulation of A causally affects B, and that subsequently the manipulation of B causally affects C (Smith, 1982). I followed this logic for the test of mediation here (i.e. analytically, even though strictly speaking I did not conduct *two* experiments). In order to demonstrate with the two-study approach that the effect of GRD on 'importance' is mediated by system blame, to begin with it is necessary to show in a first step that GRD (IV) causally influences system blame (mediator). The two experimental factors were used as between subjects factors in a repeated measures design where 'system blame' on the personal and on the group level were entered as levels of the repeated measures factor. This yielded three significant main effects only, $F(1, 71) = 5.66, p < .02, MSE = 0.36$ for the repeated measures factor, $F(1, 71) = 4.72, p < .04$ for 'personal deprivation', and $F(1, 71) = 5.76, p < .02$ for 'group deprivation'. The effect for the repeated measures factor was such that participants attributed more system blame on the group than on the personal level ($M_s = 3.75, 3.99$). Means for the other two main effects are displayed in table 36.

Evidence was found that both experimental factors affected attribution patterns, with both group and personal deprivation leading to higher overall attributions to the self. As is evident, the pattern was therefore in the opposite direction than would be proposed by the mediation hypothesis; and the hypothesis was dismissed.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ Another approach that is frequently used to test for mediation is ANCOVA, whereby one seeks to show that the effect of some IV on the DV is reduced after the inclusion of the mediator in the analysis as a covariate. When predicting 'importance' from GRD, adding group level system blame did not substantially reduce the effect of GRD (without covariate: $F = 16.18, p < .001$; with covariate: $F = 14.12, p < .001$), and the pattern of mean 'importance' between conditions remained the same.

Table 36

Effect of 'group deprivation' and 'personal deprivation' on 'system blame'

PD factor	GD factor				Marginals
	High		Low		
	PLB	GLB	PLB	GLB	
High	4.13 (.45)	4.03 (.56)	3.94 (.42)	3.78 (.52)	3.97
Low	3.97 (.66)	3.71 (.63)	3.89 (.43)	3.50 (.71)	3.77
Marginals	3.96		3.78		

Note. PLB = Personal level blame, GLB = Group level blame. High values indicate high self blame, and low values indicate high system blame. Standard deviations in parentheses.

Deprivation affecting CI

To test H2, a repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with *intragroup CI* and *intergroup CI* as two levels of a repeated measures factor and the two experimental deprivation factors as between subjects factor. This revealed a main effect for CI, $F(1, 71) = 11.39, p < .001, MSE = 0.13$, and a marginally significant three-way interaction, $F(1, 71) = 3.86, p < .06$. The main effect for CI showed that intergroup CI was higher than intragroup CI ($M_s = 4.17, 3.97$). Cell means for the interaction are displayed in table 37.

Table 37

Personal and group deprivation affecting CI

		<i>N</i>	Intragroup CI	Intergroup CI	Difference
PD high	GD high	19	4.05 (0.91) a	4.32 (0.75) b	-.27
	GD low	18	3.94 (1.11) a	4.11 (0.96) a	-.17
PD low	GD high	19	4.21 (1.03) a	4.21 (0.98) a	0.00
	GD low	18	3.68 (1.00) a	4.05 (0.71) b	-.37

Note. Standard deviations in parentheses. Subscripts denote significant differences (row-wise) according to simple main effects analyses. Negative difference scores reflect more Intergroup CI.

To recap, it had been expected that participants would be particularly interested in intragroup comparisons (and not intergroup comparisons) when personal deprivation is low and group deprivation is high. This pattern is reflected in the difference scores: The overall main effect for CI (i.e. that participants were more interested in intergroup than

in intragroup CI overall) disappeared in this condition. In contrast, it had been expected that participants would be particularly interested in intergroup (and not intragroup) comparisons when group deprivation is low and personal deprivation is high. This prediction was not supported, with the difference score being less negative in this condition than in either the 'PD high / GD high' or the 'PD low / GD low' conditions. One possibility why the predicted pattern was not found might again be that the effect of PD and GD on CI is moderated by 'system blame'. However, unfortunately the sample size was not big enough to allow for the inclusion of any additional system blame factors in the design (the median split on the system blame scores resulted in some cells with only 1 or 2 participants). When using a regression approach to test for moderation by system blame (regressing the difference between intragroup and intergroup CI from the two experimental conditions, as well as personal and group level system blame, as well as all two- and three-way interactions), no significant effects were found (apart from the ones that the ANOVA approach reported above yielded also).

Deprivation affecting Self-esteem

To test H3, an ANOVA was conducted with the two experimental conditions as between subjects factors and self-esteem as dependent variable. This yielded only a main effect for 'group deprivation', $F(1, 71) = 5.22, p < .03, MSE = 0.33$. However, the effect was in the 'wrong' direction, with those in the high deprivation condition having *higher* self-esteem than those in the low deprivation condition ($M_s = 4.26, 3.96$).

Deprivation affecting Identification

To test H4, an ANOVA was conducted with the two experimental conditions as between subjects factors and identification as dependent variable. This analysis did not yield any significant effects ($F(1, 72) = 0.77, ns, MSE = 0.61$ for group deprivation, $F(1, 72) = 0.07, ns$ for personal deprivation, $F(1, 72) = 1.06, ns$ for the interaction). Note that no significant effects were found either when system blame was included in the analysis. Also, identification did not significantly correlate with either overall GRD or overall GMRD.

Discussion

To briefly sum up the main results, H1 was supported, in that the effect of group deprivation on 'importance' was moderated by 'system blame': People in the high deprivation condition only emphasised the importance of being well off if they were high on system blame. Thus, the positive effect of RD on importance was probably due to participants' strategic calculations, i.e. their desire to point out the need to redress social injustices. No mediation effect through 'system blame' was found. Unfortunately, no main or moderation effects could be demonstrated for the 'personal deprivation' factor, probably due to the fact that the manipulation of PD might not have been successful (as indicated by the manipulation check). It seems that it was easier to manipulate students' ideas about the standing of their national group relative to other national groups than it was to manipulate students' ideas about their personal standing relative to other Italian students. Possibly, participants had access to fuller information, and had more fixed pre-conceived ideas, about their personal economic situation than about the economic situation of Italian students in general.

Further, in retrospect, the operationalisation of 'attribution patterns' was problematic: Measures of attribution were double-barrelled, in that high scores on the attribution scales simultaneously indicated low system blame *and* high personal blame, and in that low scores on the scales simultaneously indicated high personal blame *and* low system blame. However, personal and system blame do not necessarily have to be inversely related: It is conceivable that some participants would simultaneously think that they themselves *and* the 'system' have a great impact on their economic standing, or conversely that they themselves *and* the system have a low impact (e.g. if people favour metaphysical attributions to fate or God). It occurs that the double-barrelled items yielded some interpretative problems: For instance, the main effect of the GD factor on 'importance' showed that high GD leads to more 'importance'. According to the moderation hypothesis (H1), such a positive overall effect would be expected if *overall* participants' are high on system blame. However, inspection of the mean level for group level attributions revealed an overall tendency of participants toward self-blame, rather than system blame (the mean was 3.74 on a 5-point scale, i.e. clearly above the midpoint and toward the 'personal' endpoint of the scale). It is likely that this contradiction was caused by the attribution items being double-barrel, and that participants overall had high personal attributions *and* high system attributions (rather

than low system attributions). However, with the measure artificially forcing an inverse relationship between personal and system attributions, such a pattern could not possibly have been reflected in the data for methodological reasons.

Some support for H2 was found, which had predicted that intragroup CI would be particularly high for low PD/ high GD participants and that intergroup CI would be particularly high for high PD/ low GD participants. In line with the prediction, the overall main effect for a preference of intergroup over intragroup comparisons was wiped out in the low PD/ high GD condition (however, the effect was not strong enough to *reverse* the effect; rather, it only yielded a zero difference between the CI indices). No evidence was found for the other prediction, i.e. that the intergroup comparison bias would be *strongest* in the high PD/ low GD condition. Various factors might have contributed to the results not being stronger: Firstly, the 1-item measure ('how interested were you to read about...') for intragroup and intergroup CI, respectively, might have been too crude to pick up existing effects. Moreover, the survey studies presented in previous chapters have successfully demonstrated that CI is influenced by various factors other than RD (e.g. similarity, contact, motives). Possibly, stronger effects would have been found if those other factors had been measured or controlled for. However, practical constraints regarding the length of the questionnaire had prevented the inclusion of such control variables.

Finally, no support was found for the predicted effect of deprivation on self-esteem (H3), with the effect that was found actually being opposite to the predicted direction. And last but not least, no support was found for H4, which had predicted an effect of deprivation on identification. This null-effect might have been due to problems in the design of the study, with the effectiveness of at least the PD factor being questionable. Alternatively, since previous studies had consistently demonstrated a negative correlation between the two variables, this result might speak to the causal direction actually flowing from identification to deprivation, rather than vice-versa. I will now turn to the next study, which was designed to further illuminate the impact of deprivation on CI. The aim was to yield stronger support for RD influencing CI than had been yielded in the present study. In addition, the next study also aimed to test the opposite causal direction, i.e. to demonstrate a causal effect of CI on RD.

Study 7

Introduction

Study 7 was designed to test in an experimental setting some of the hypotheses already outlined for the survey studies, to see whether stronger support would be found using such a more controlled set-up. The first aim was to see whether perceived deprivation affects and can shift comparison interest in various potential comparison targets, as was predicted by the self-protection hypothesis. It was assumed that people would be less interested in comparing with objects relative to which they are badly off, because people do not like to engage with and elaborate on things that make them feel bad. Further, study 7 re-tested the hypothesis that the effect of deprivation on CI would be moderated by 'motives': The negative effect outlined above was expected to be particularly strong for those participants high on 'enhancement', and low on 'equity own', respectively. A further aim was to see whether comparison interest in different targets would causally influence feelings of overall perceived deprivation, as predicted by RDT. It was assumed that people who compare more with targets relative to which they are worse off would feel more deprived overall - both on a personal and on a group level - than people who do not engage in these upward comparisons. Finally, study 7 again aimed to assess the causal direction of the deprivation-identification association. It was intended to explore whether causality could be demonstrated in at least *one* of the two possible directions, i.e. flowing from deprivation to identification. The hypotheses, which have been outlined in detail in previous chapters, can briefly be summarised as follows:

H1. Perceived deprivation relative to a target will causally and negatively affect interest in comparing with this target (self-protection hypothesis).

H2. The effect of deprivation relative to a target on CI for this target (as outlined in H1) is moderated by 'motives': The negative effect will be particularly strong for those participants high on 'enhancement' and low on 'equity own', respectively.

H3. It was predicted that CI would causally influence feelings of overall RD, such that high interest in comparing with an upward target would increase feelings of RD (RDT prediction). In other words, taking H1 and H3 together, the aim of this research was to test a hypothesis of bi-causality: It was assumed that specific deprivation affects comparisons, but also that comparisons affect overall deprivation.

H4. It was explored whether deprivation would causally affect identification. No specific expectations were held as to the valence of this link.

Method

Two factors were manipulated for this study: Comparison Interest in a particular upward target (high vs. low), and Perceived Deprivation relative to this target (high vs. low). However, rather than crossing these factors orthogonally, either one *or* the other was manipulated, and the effect on the other one was measured (i.e. swapping around IV and DV in order to demonstrate reciprocal causality). Half the sample was exposed to one manipulation, and half to the other. Thus, study 7 adopted a 2-experiment design (1 factor with two levels each per experiment, with a reversal in the main IV and DV between the experiments).

Participants

A total of 111 Sardinian psychology students participated in this study (88 female, 20 male, 3 missing, mean age = 25.28) during a lecture.

Procedure

Half the participants read a fake article that claimed either that Italian students (ingroup) are deprived compared to English students (e.g. 55% of Italian students as having access to a car, compared to 80% of students in England), or that they are not deprived (e.g. 55% of Italian students as having access to a car, compared to 30% in England). The other half read a fake article claiming that comparisons between the economic situation of students in England and Italy are valid and informative (e.g. countries as similar enough on a number of important dimensions to each other so that comparisons can be interpreted in a valid, meaningful way), or not at all valid (because allegedly the two countries differed too much on related attributes). For the precise wording of the fake articles, which had been carefully designed and tested to assure comparability between conditions, see appendix 5. The aim of the articles was to manipulate either the students' feelings of relative (group level) deprivation (high vs. low), or the students' interest in comparing with English students (high vs. low). After reading the fake

articles, all students answered a questionnaire that contained the same items. However, the order of the CI and RD items was swapped around, depending on the experimental condition: Students for whom RD had been manipulated answered the CI items first, and students for whom CI had been manipulated answered the RD items first. Upon completion of the studies, students were thoroughly debriefed.

Measures

Overall group membership deprivation (*Overall GMRD*) was measured with the following two items: 'When you think about your economic situation and standard of living, how well off do you feel generally' (1 = not at all to 7 = very), and 'how angry or satisfied are you with your situation in general' (1 = very angry to 7 = very satisfied, inter-item correlation $r = .68$).⁴⁵

Overall group deprivation (*Overall GRD*) was measured with the same two items, but this time students were invited to think about the situation and standard of living of 'Italian students in general' ($r = .67$).

Personal deprivation compared to majority members (*Majority GMRD*) was measured with the following items: 'How well off do you feel personally compared to English students' (1 = not at all to 7 = very), and 'how angry or satisfied are you when you compare your personal situation to that of English students' (1 = very angry to 7 = very satisfied, $\alpha = .88$).

Group deprivation compared to majority members (*Majority GRD*) was measured with the same two items, but this time students were invited to compare the situation of 'Italian students in general' to that of English students. However, the two items did not correlate very well ($r = .22$). Thus, instead of combining them into a common index, it was decided to leave them separate, one item being an indicator for *cognitive majority GRD*, the other being an indicator for *affective majority GRD*.

Personal deprivation compared to ingroup members (*Intragroup GMRD*) was measured with the same two items, but this time asking students to compare their personal situation to that of other Italian students ($r = .88$).

⁴⁵ Note that for the survey studies, 5-point scales had been used, in order to avoid cognitively overloading the participants. However, longer scales are generally more powerful, as they maximise potential variation of responses, which in turn maximises the power of statistical testing. Therefore, it was decided to use 7-point scales with the (older) samples employed in the experiments.

Personal deprivation compared to the past (*Temporal GMRD*) was measured using the same two items, but this time asking students to compare their personal situation to their personal situation in the past ($r = .67$).

Group deprivation compared to the past (*Temporal GRD*) was measured with the same two items, but this time students were invited to compare the situation of 'Italian students in general' to that of Italian students in the past ($\alpha = .76$). All deprivation items were reversed, so that high values equalled high RD.

Overall interest in comparing with English students (*General majority CI*) was measured with one item: 'How interesting would you find it to learn more about the situation of English students' (1 = not at all to 7 = very much).

Interest in comparing the personal situation with that of majority members (*Majority GMCI*) was measured by one item 'how important is it for you to know how you are doing compared to English students'.

Interest in comparing the situation of the ingroup with that of the majority (*Majority GCI*) was measured by the item 'how important is it for you to know how Italian students in general are doing compared to English students'.

Interest in comparing the personal situation to that of ingroup members (*Intragroup GMCI*) was measured by two items: 'How interesting would you find it to learn more about the situation of Italian students' and 'how important is it for you to know how you personally are doing compared to other Italian students' ($\alpha = .74$).

Interest in comparing the personal situation to that in the past (*Temporal GMCI*) was measured by the item 'how important is it for you to know how you are doing personally compared to your past'.

Interest in comparing the situation of the ingroup with that in the past (*Temporal GCI*) was measured by the item 'how important is it for you to know how Italian students in general are doing now compared to the past'. All CI items were measured on 7-point scales (1 = not at all to 7 = very much).

Comparison motives were assessed with the following items: 1) 'I think it is important to point out that the situation of Italian students relative to that of English students is unfair', 2) 'I always listen carefully when someone says something positive about Italy or Italian students', 3) 'I believe that everyone is doing as well or as poorly as they deserve', and 4) 'I don't like it when someone says bad things about Italy or Italian students' (for all of these, 1 = disagree to 7 = agree). Items 1 and 3 (reverse scored) had been designed to measure 'equity', and items 2 and 4 had been designed to

measure 'enhancement'. However, both inter-item correlations were too low to combine them into one index. Thus, item 1 was used as an index of equity, and item 2 was used as an index of enhancement.

Group *identification* was measured with a five-item scale similar to the ones employed in the previous studies (1 = low identification to 7 = high identification, $\alpha = .85$). Finally, students indicated some demographic information.

Results⁴⁶

Results will be presented in the following order: i) Manipulation checks, ii) Did the 'deprivation' manipulation affect comparison interest? (H1), iii) Do deprivation and motives interact in their effect on comparison interest? (H2), iv) Did the 'comparison interest' manipulation affect overall perceived deprivation? (H3), v) the relationship between deprivation and identification (H4).

Manipulation checks and descriptives

Mean level deprivation. Repeated measures ANOVA with all specific deprivation indices entered as levels of a repeated measures factor yielded a significant main effect, $F(5, 550) = 53.03$, $p < .001$, $MSE = 0.98$. Generally, deprivation relative to English students was higher than deprivation relative to Italian students or the past. More specifically, means were 4.23 for *majority GMRD*, 4.12 for *affective majority GRD*, 3.72 for *cognitive majority GRD*, 3.47 for *intragroup GMRD*, 2.73 for *temporal GMRD*, and 2.60 for *temporal GRD*. This analysis verifies the assumption that overall English students are seen as an upward CI target for Italian students, validating conclusions that can be drawn from the manipulation of CI in English students increasing levels of overall RD.

⁴⁶ A number of other analyses had been carried out also but are not reported above. For instance, motives were not affected by the deprivation manipulation. Overall, participants were more motivated by enhancement than by equity ($M_s = 4.75, 2.75$). Pairwise correlations between specific RD and CI were negative. However, only the r_s for the temporal targets reached significance. Repeated measures analyses with all specific CI items yielded a significant effect: as usual, and for both the GMCI and GCI indices, interest in intragroup and temporal CI was higher than interest in intergroup CI. Identification was regressed from the five specific CI targets. The overall model was *ns*, the β for temporal GMCI was significant, $\beta = .24$, $p < .03$.

Manipulation check: Deprivation. For those participants for whom deprivation had been manipulated, a repeated measures analysis was conducted, with the experimental factor as between subjects, and majority GMRD, cognitive majority GRD, and affective majority GRD, as three levels of the repeated measures factor. This did not yield a significant main effect for the experimental factor, $F(1, 51) = 1.19$, ns , $MSE = 2.43$, but it did yield a significant interaction, $F(2, 102) = 9.99$, $p < .001$, $MSE = 0.80$. Cell means are displayed in table 38.

Table 38

Manipulation check: deprivation

Experimental condition	Manipulation check: Deprivation vis-à-vis English (majority)			Marginals
	GMRD	Cognitive GRD	Affective GRD	
Deprivation high	4.34 (1.31) a	3.12 (1.28) a	4.38 (1.06) a	3.95
Deprivation Low	3.55 (1.03) b	3.74 (1.26) b	3.74 (0.98) b	3.68

Note. Standard deviations in parentheses. Subscripts denote significant differences with Bonferroni adjusted pairwise comparisons (column-wise).

As is apparent from the table, the manipulation of cognitive GRD was not successful (with the pattern actually being opposite to the expected direction). However, the other two types of deprivation were successfully manipulated. Also, looking at the marginals and the overall effect, the trend is in the right direction (with those in the 'high deprivation' condition showing higher levels of perceived deprivation overall). Statistically speaking, one reason why no main effect for the experimental factor was found appears to be the high MSE for the between subjects factor. Thus, although not working brilliantly, it is concluded that deprivation was successfully manipulated to at least some degree.

Manipulation check: Comparison interest. For those participants for whom CI had been manipulated, a repeated measures analysis was conducted, with the experimental factor as between subjects, and general majority CI, majority GMCI, and majority GCI, as three levels of the repeated measures factor. This did not yield a significant main effect for the experimental factor, $F(1, 56) = .29$, ns , $MSE = 4.24$, and no significant interaction. Although the manipulation did not yield any significant

effects, looking at the marginals, at least the trends were in the right direction (with those in the high CI condition indeed expressing more interest in comparing with English students overall). The biggest effect was obtained for the ‘general majority CI’ index, but even this failed to reach significance. Cell means are displayed in table 39.

Table 39

Manipulation check: comparison interest

Experimental condition	Manipulation check: CI in English (majority)			Marginals
	General	GMCI	GCI	
CI high	6.11 (1.26)	5.54 (1.26)	5.50 (1.11)	5.72
CI low	5.70 (1.29)	5.47 (1.43)	5.47 (1.41)	5.55

Note. Standard deviations in parentheses.

Did the ‘Deprivation’ manipulation affect Comparison Interest?

In order to test H1, a repeated measures analysis was conducted, with the experimental deprivation factor as between subjects, and general majority CI, majority GMCI, and majority GCI, as three levels of the repeated measures factor. This yielded a significant main effect for the experimental factor, $F(1, 51) = 3.59, p < .05$ one-tailed, $MSE = 5.89$, and no significant interaction. Cell means are displayed in table 40.

Table 40

Did the ‘deprivation’ manipulation affect comparison interest?

Experimental condition	CI in English			Marginals
	General	GMCI	GCI	
Deprivation high	4.58 (1.70)	4.04 (1.73)	4.31 (1.62)	4.31
Deprivation Low	5.00 (1.44)	4.96 (1.63)	5.15 (1.46)	5.04

Note. Standard deviations in parentheses.

As is apparent from the table, the expected effect was observed (both looking at the marginals and overall effect, and at the individual CI indices). Generally, those who were in the ‘high deprivation’ condition were less interested in comparing with English students. However, it has to be acknowledged that the main effect was only significant if tested one-tailed (which is a defensible procedure, given that very clear a-priori

hypotheses as to the direction of the effect had been held). Nonetheless, this is an indication that the expected effect is not overly strong.

Do Deprivation and Motives interact in their effect on Comparison Interest?

H2 had predicted that the effect of deprivation on comparison interest might be moderated by motives. A repeated measures analysis was carried out with the three indices for comparing with the majority (general majority CI, majority GMCI, and majority GCI) as levels of the repeated measures factor, the experimental ‘deprivation’ factor as between subjects, and in addition the median split enhancement and equity motives as further between subjects factors, respectively. Two analyses were carried out, one including ‘enhancement’ and the other ‘equity’, because the *N* was not big enough to allow for inclusion of both motive factors simultaneously.

The median split enhancement factor did not yield any significant results, and it did not interact significantly with the other factors ($F(1, 48) = .16, ns, MSE = 6.09$). Recall that it had been expected that majority CI would be particularly low for those participants that were in the high deprivation/high enhancement condition. To put it another way, a negative effect of deprivation on CI was expected under high enhancement conditions, but not under low enhancement conditions. Observing the difference scores in table 41, it appears that the pattern of means was in the right direction (with the difference score being more negative in the high enhancement condition), even though the interaction failed to reach significance.

Table 41

The effect of deprivation and enhancement motives on CI

Enhancement	Deprivation		Difference
	High	Low	
High	4.45 (.43)	5.41 (.48)	-.96
Low	4.20 (.37)	4.82 (.35)	-.62

Note. Standard deviations in parentheses.

Repeating the same analysis with the median split equity factor, ‘equity’ did not significantly interaction with ‘deprivation’ in the effect on CI either, $F(1, 48) = 1.79, ns, MSE = 5.59$. However, it did have a main effect on CI, $F(1, 48) = 4.26, p < .05, MSE = 5.59$. Recall that it had been expected that majority CI should be particularly

high for those that are in the high deprivation/high equity condition. Or, to put it another way, deprivation was expected to positively correlate with majority CI under high equity conditions, but not under low equity conditions. The pattern of means is displayed in table 42.

Table 42

The effect of deprivation and equity motives on CI

	Deprivation		Marginals	Difference
Equity	High	Low		
High	5.33 (1.52)	5.22 (.46)	5.28	.11
Low	3.93 (.31)	4.92 (.33)	4.43	-.99

Note. Standard deviations in parentheses.

As is apparent from the table, even though the interaction failed to reach significance, the pattern of mean differences is in the right direction (with a positive difference for 'equity high', and a negative difference for 'equity low'). Furthermore, the main effect shows that those in the high equity condition were more interested in comparing with majority members overall than those in the low equity condition.⁴⁷

Did the 'Comparison Interest' manipulation affect overall perceived Deprivation?

To see whether comparison interest in an upward comparison object does affect overall perceived deprivation (both on a personal and on a group level, H3), an ANOVA was conducted with comparison-condition as between-subjects factor and general group and personal deprivation as two levels of a within subjects factor (note that these are the overall indices, not the target specific ones). This analysis yielded a marginally significant effect for comparison condition, $F(1, 56) = 2.35$, $p < 0.07$, one-tailed, $MSE = 1.72$, and no significant interaction.⁴⁸ As apparent from table 43, the pattern of means was in the expected direction.

As expected, the pattern of means showed that those that had been lead to have a high comparison interest in the English show higher levels of overall deprivation.

⁴⁷ Moderation was also tested using a regression approach, i.e. predicting overall interest in comparing with the majority from the experimental condition, enhancement, equity, and their interactions. This analysis yielded nothing in addition to the results reported above.

⁴⁸ The effect did not reach significance when combining all specific and general deprivation items either.

However, the pattern was not quite strong enough to reach significance. Additionally, since the mean difference between conditions was bigger for the GMRD index, a post-hoc analysis was conducted with comparison-condition as factor and only GMRD as dependent variable. This yielded a significant result, $t(56) = 1.94, p < 0.03$, one-tailed.

Table 43

Did the 'comparison interest' manipulation affect overall perceived deprivation?

Experimental condition	Deprivation		Marginals
	Overall GMRD	Overall GRD	
CI high	3.80 (1.18)	4.23 (1.21)	4.02
CI low	3.18 (1.26)	4.11 (0.98)	3.65

Note. Standard deviations in parentheses.

The relationship between Deprivation and Identification

A t-test was conducted to see whether the deprivation manipulation had an effect on identification (H4). This was not the case, $t(50) = -1.34, ns$. However, the trend in the pattern of means was such that those in the low deprivation condition were more strongly identified than those in the high deprivation condition, $M_s = 6.00$ and 5.65 , respectively. This pattern of a negative link between deprivation and identification was confirmed by regression analyses: When regressing identification from overall personal and overall group deprivation, the model was significant, $R^2 = .09, p < .004$. Only the beta for personal deprivation was marginally significant, $\beta = -.34, p < .002$.

Discussion

To briefly summarise the main results of the study, there was weak evidence for the 'deprivation' and 'comparison interest' manipulations being successful (with 'deprivation' significantly affecting at least some of the CI indices, and 'comparison interest' not yielding any significant results, but the pattern of means being in the right direction). As predicted by the self-protective hypothesis H1, high deprivation was shown to negatively affect comparison interest. However, probably as a result of the manipulation having rather weak effects, the effect was only significant when a one-tailed test was employed. Nonetheless, apart from some findings of study 5, this was the strongest evidence obtain so far for RD causally (and negatively) affecting CI.

Furthermore, a glimmer of evidence was yielded that the effect of RD on CI might be moderated by motives (H2): Even though neither the interaction with 'enhancement' nor the interaction with 'equity' was significant, the pattern of means was in the expected direction in both cases.

Some evidence was found for H3, which had predicted that comparison interest causally affects feelings of overall deprivation. Those participants who had been lead to have high CI with an upward target (i.e. the English) felt more deprived overall. However, again the effect was not very strong, again probably as a consequence of the manipulation of CI having rather weak effects.

No support was found for H4, which had predicted an effect of RD on identification. However, again the overall relationship between deprivation and identification was found to be negative, replicating the results from the ethnic minority surveys.

Joint discussion, studies 6-7. Now jointly considering evidence from studies 6 and 7, manipulation checks revealed that for both studies the effectiveness of the manipulations was somewhat questionable. In spite of this, both studies yielded some interesting results: Study 6 showed that the effect of RD on 'importance' is indeed moderated by 'system blame/ attribution patterns'. Some evidence was found for the prediction that an intragroup comparison bias would be particularly prevalent for participants who were low on intragroup RD and high on intergroup RD; and therefore the causal effect of RD on CI might indeed be dependent upon not only a person's standing relative to outgroup members, but also relative to ingroup members (Smith et al.'s 1999 hypothesis). No experimental evidence was found for deprivation negatively affecting self-esteem, or for deprivation affecting identification.

Study 7 was also successful in demonstrating a (negative) causal effect of RD on CI - as should be expected according to the self-protective hypothesis - although this effect was not significantly moderated by 'motives'. Moreover, study 7 also yielded some evidence that CI in upward targets has a positive causal effect on overall perceived deprivation, i.e. leads to higher levels of overall RD (which is in line with RDT predictions). However, the effect - as hardly surprising in light of the weak effects of the manipulations - was not very strong. Finally study 7 was not successful in

demonstrating a *causal* effect of RD on identification (although the negative association between the two variables found in earlier studies was replicated).⁴⁹

⁴⁹ Two more experiments were conducted, to test the bi-causal effects between identification and deprivation, as well as the moderation of this relationship through 'motives' and 'action preferences'. However, because results were inconclusive, and for brevity's sake, these will not be described here.

CHAPTER 8

Discussion and Conclusion

Before moving on to a discussion of the implications of the findings, it might be helpful to jointly consider the evidence from all studies regarding the central issues the present work focussed on. The main gist of the findings (given that such an all-comprising, broad summary cannot do justice to all the refined nuances of the data) of the present research can be summarised as follows (see table 44, please see the notes to the table on the next page):

Table 44

Summary of the main findings for each of the major hypotheses

	Hypothesis	Study						
		1 UK, survey, min	2 D, survey, min/maj	3 D, survey, maj	4 D, survey, min/maj	5 UK, longit. survey, min	6 Italy, exper- iment	7 Italy, exper- iment
1	Intragr & temp CI highest	Ev	Ev	Ev	Ev	Ev		
2	Intragr & temp GMRD lowest	Ev	Ev		No ev	Ev		
3	RDT: causal eff of CI on RD	Weak ev	Weak ev	Weak ev	Very weak ev	Weak ev, no longit ev		Weak ev, also causal
4	Self-protection: Neg eff of RD on CI	Weak ev	Weak ev (from regress- ions)	No ev, no mod	Weak ev, no mod	Weak ev, also longit, no mod	Ev, also ev for Smith et al. 1999	Weak ev, but no mod
5	r (ID, RD)	r neg	r neg	r neg, no mod, no med	r neg, no mod, no med	r neg, weak ev of longit mod eff of id, weak med ev	No ev, i.e. no causal eff of RD	r neg, (no causal eff of RD, regressio n but not manipul sig)
6	Eff of ID on CI (SIT: pos eff on intergr CI)	No ev, all <i>ns</i>	r pos for temp, intragr CI	r pos for intragr CI, no mod	r pos for intragr CI, no mod	r pos for intragr, temp, inter, no mod, no longit	No ev, all <i>ns</i>	r pos for temp
7	Eff of Similarity on CI		Ev					
8	Eff of Contact on CI		Ev					

	Hypothesis	1 UK, survey, min	2 D, survey, min/maj	3 D, survey, maj	4 D, survey, min/maj	5 UK, longit. survey, min	6 Italy, experi- ment	7 Italy, experi- ment
9	Eff of Acculturation on CI		Ev for maj					
10	Eff of Motives on CI			Ev (a)	Ev (a)	Ev (a)		
11	Eff of Permeability/ Stability on CI					No ev		
12	Eff of RD on self-esteem (neg)	Ev				Ev, but not longit	No ev	
13	Eff of RD on life-satisfaction (neg)	Ev						
14	Eff of RD on importance (& mod by system blame)	Ev for main					Ev for main, Ev for mod, no ev for med	
15	Overall: Enhancement motive is strongest			Ev	Ev	Ev		Ev

Note. Blank cells indicate that the study did not speak to this question. 'D' = Germany, 'Ev' = evidence, 'Neg' = negative, 'Pos' = positive, 'Min' = minority participants, 'Maj' = majority participants, 'intragr' = intragroup, 'temp' = temporal, 'inter' = intergroup, 'longit' = longitudinally, 'eff' = effect, 'ID' = identification, 'Main' = main effect, 'Mod' = moderation, 'med' = mediation, 'manipul' = manipulation, 'sig' = significant. (a) = support, but pattern inconsistent

In the following, I will briefly discuss first the evidence for all the hypotheses that were clearly supported or not supported, followed by a discussion of the hypotheses that yielded more complicated patterns of results. First of all, as is evident from the second row of table 44, there was clear support that for minority members intragroup and temporal GMRD was lower than GMRD vis-à-vis other objects. This has three implications: First of all, the pattern is generally in line with the self-protection argument, i.e. that comparisons with those two targets will be more popular, because they are more gratifying. Secondly, this result speaks to the fact that there likely is some significant correspondence between *perceived* deprivation relative to a comparison target and *objective* deprivation relative to it: Minority members are more likely to be *objectively* deprived relative to majority members than relative to ingroup members, and they also *perceive* their situation in those terms. Thirdly, the fact that deprivation

relative to the temporal target was consistently low for both minority and majority members might be understood as evidence for McFarland and Alvaro's hypothesis that temporal comparisons are particularly amenable to self-gratifying distortions. In spite of the fact that there is reason to assume that the objective situation for at least the German participants had deteriorated over the last few years (given recent economic problems in Germany), most participants nonetheless reported feeling *better* off than they used to be. The second and third implications obviously contradict each other, one arguing that the data can be understood as evidence for a good correspondence between objective and perceived deprivation, and the other arguing that the data can be understood as evidence for perceived deprivation being the product of intra-individual cognitive distortions, rather than objective conditions. Future research is needed which measures objective deprivation (using 'hard' economic indices) as well as subjective perceptions, preferably over a longer period of time. Such research could help to disentangle when, and for which objects, perceived deprivation follows from objective conditions, intrapsychological mechanisms, or a mixture thereof.

There was also some evidence for Smith et al.'s (1999) hypothesis, i.e. that a preference for intragroup over intergroup comparisons (intragroup comparison bias) is dependent on the standing of the comparison subject relative to *both* ingroup and outgroup members (c.f. row 4, study 6). To my knowledge, this is the first time that this effect has been demonstrated empirically; as the original authors of this hypothesis did not find overly strong support for their prediction in their minimal group/laboratory based data. However, due to the manipulations of study 6 only being of questionable effectiveness, effects found in the present work were not tremendously strong either. Future research might usefully attempt to replicate the finding, employing a more powerful experimental manipulation. Nonetheless, the present finding can be read as an indicator that future RD research would do well in simultaneously focussing on both intragroup and intergroup processes, comparisons, and comparative status, and to abandon the long-established conventional division of labour between researchers, whereby some focus only on one, and some focus only on the other.

Some support was found that similarity (row 7) and contact (row 8) influence comparison choices, although the impact of the two variables seems to be differentially strong, depending on the comparison subject (i.e. who engages in the comparison) and the comparison object. Further research could usefully illuminate this differential pattern, and establish *why* similarity is a stronger predictor than contact in some

circumstances, and *vice versa*. Still, in spite of the differential pattern, the present results illustrate two interesting points: First of all, recall from chapter 2 that the importance of ‘similarity’ and ‘contact’ had been stressed particularly in the interpersonal literature. The present findings underline that the mechanisms outlined in that literature can be successfully applied to intergroup contexts also. Secondly, recall that the role of similarity was far from unequivocal (with this variable having been proposed as an IV, DV, and moderator, respectively, by different theorists). While the present findings do not allow to rule out that similarity might come into play as either DV or moderator sometimes, they at least underscores that similarity might often be sensibly conceived of as an IV.

Little support was found for acculturation strategies being systematically linked to comparisons for minority participants (row 9), although the expected pattern of results was yielded for majority participants. Hence, little evidence was found that anything could be gained by future research combining impulses from the acculturation theory and comparison literature. In this instance, maintaining the conventional distinction between the two research traditions seems quite sensible.

No support was found for the SIT-based prediction that ‘permeability’ and ‘stability’ impact on comparison choices (row 11). Although it has to be acknowledged that only one of the present studies investigated the impact of those two variables, and although measures for those constructs were 1- or 2-item only, and therefore prone to unreliability, this finding is worrying, because the hypothesis is quite central to SIT. I am unaware of any other research that has investigated the SIT-prediction that permeability and stability will influence comparisons, and – in the light of the present null-results – more research is needed urgently in order to further test this issue.

The prediction that RD negatively impacts on self-esteem was largely supported (row 12), even though results were not entirely unequivocal. The latter might be explained by the fact that RD might not only have the adverse effects as predicted by RDT, but also positive effects as predicted by neighbourhood resource theories (Lopez-Turley, 2002). Future research might usefully focus on juxtapositioning their respective usefulness, and establish under which conditions one or the other might be a more powerful explanatory tool. Support was also found for the prediction that RD negatively impacts on life-satisfaction (row 13), although the present work only yielded correlational evidence, and future research might usefully focus on demonstrating the causality of this effect. Nonetheless, taken together, this research has yielded some

evidence that RD does not only impact on outcome variables like prejudice and support for collective action, but also on indices of psychological well-being. This further underscores that perceived deprivation might be an important variable for practitioners and those interested in interventions in ethnic minority settings. I will come back to this issue further down.

Support was found for the SIT/stigma prediction that people might adjust the 'importance' of an unfavourable dimension in self-serving ways (row 14). RD did not only causally affect 'importance', but this effect was, as expected, moderated by 'system blame'. This finding validates one of the predictions of one of the central social psychological theories on intergroup relations, namely SIT, in that it underscores the existence and importance of creative identity management strategies. At the same time, the findings suggest that the theory might be refined, and that some value could be added by also considering the moderating effects of attribution patterns, which are at best cursorily attended to in SIT. This is particularly noteworthy since – as mentioned above - others have previously failed to statistically explain the endorsement of creative strategies (Mummendey et al., 1999).

Finally, support was found for participants being stronger on the 'enhancement' than on the 'equity own' motive overall (row 15), demonstrating that responses were not overly affected by social desirability effects (it had initially been a concern that participants would be reluctant to admit to an 'enhancement' motive, and that it would therefore turn out difficult to demonstrate a high endorsement of this motive). Further, this finding is in line with (i.e. a necessary but not sufficient condition for the correctness of) the proposed moderation hypothesis to explain the negative correlation between deprivation and identification that emerged across studies: Recall that it had been proposed that such a negative correlation would be evident if enhancement motives are strong, but not if equity motives are strong. I will consider this last point in more detail below.

In the following, I will discuss evidence for some of the other hypotheses that was either more complicated, or that has more wide-reaching implications. In turn, the following issues will be considered: i) The preference for intragroup and temporal over intergroup comparisons, ii) the weak evidence for the RDT prediction that comparisons inform feelings of deprivation, iii) the weak evidence for the self-protection hypothesis that comparisons with threatening, upward targets are avoided, iv) the consistently

negative association between deprivation and identification, v) the lack of support for the SIT prediction that identification increases intergroup comparison interest, and vi) the ‘messy’ pattern of results yielded in support of the hypothesis that ‘motives’ inform comparison choices. Before turning to these issues, however, some brief reflections on the nature of statistical hypothesis testing might be useful. Generally, of course null- or weak results do not prove an hypothesis ‘wrong’; it is quite possible that the tests employed were simply too low-powered to pick up existing effects, or that the null-results fall within the inevitable ‘margin of error’. However, some of the null- or weak patterns yielded by the present work were pretty *consistent across* studies, indicating that they might indeed be a fair reflection of the ‘true’ state of affairs, rather than being down to error variance. If those patterns are ‘real’, then they might have some quite fundamental implications for some of the major social psychological theories. Thus, although one should be cautious of making too strong an inference from null-results, and although it should be stressed that further research has to replicate some of the findings of the present research in order to ascertain their ‘correctness’, the findings might speak to the need for some wide-reaching revisions of some existing theories. In the following, it will be discussed what those revisions might be.

The preference for intragroup and temporal over intergroup comparisons. Across the studies, evidence was yielded that generally participants preferred intragroup and temporal over intergroup comparisons, especially with majority members for minority participants (row 1).⁵⁰ This finding, which is in line with results yielded elsewhere (Deaux, Reid, Mizrahi, & Cotting, 1999), is interesting, especially in light of the fact that one of the major social psychological theories, i.e. Social Identity Theory, focuses almost exclusively on *intergroup* comparisons. The present data suggest that in order to capture the psychological realities of people who are assessing their economic situation and who are evaluating their social identities (no matter whether they do so in an ‘objective’, evaluative way as proposed by Festinger, or in a ‘subjective’, enhancing way as stressed by SIT), we need to shift our focus away from the primacy of intergroup comparisons as originally proposed by SIT. Some theorists have already stressed the importance of intragroup comparisons and processes (Tyler, DeGoey, & Smith, 2001),

⁵⁰ In addition, studies 3, 4, and 5 yielded evidence that comparisons with people in the third world were also popular for majority members, and that comparisons with people in the country of origin are also very important for minority members. However, ethnic minority members *did not* compare with members of the majority in order to evaluate their economic situation, and majority members did not compare with members of ethnic minorities.

and the present data substantiate their concern. Future theorising should aim for an integration and joint consideration of intergroup *and* intragroup comparisons and processes, and in this way might be better equipped to capture, describe, and model the psychology and inner life of ethnic minority and majority members.

The weak evidence for the RDT prediction that comparisons inform feelings of deprivation. Across studies, evidence of comparisons influencing feelings of RD was weak (row 3). Given not only the centrality of this hypothesis to RDT, but also its 'intuitive validity', this finding is more than just a bit puzzling. Although most of the present studies yielded at least *some* support for comparisons being influential, in all cases this support was far from strong. To be fair, the present research is not the only approach that had trouble demonstrating a causal effect of comparisons: Buunk and Ybema (1995) found no evidence for a longitudinal effect of the frequency of downward comparisons on self-evaluations among disabled people, and Buunk, Zurriaga, Gonzalez-Roma, & Subirats (2003) found only very weak longitudinal effects of comparison behaviour on RD among nurses. Others have also failed to demonstrate strong effects of comparisons on various outcome measures such as deprivation and self-assessed quality of life (Crosby, Meuhrer, & Loewenstein, 1986; Ross, Eyman, & Kishchuck, 1986). This has led to some theorists suggesting that feelings of RD might be less dependent on comparisons than RDT originally proposed, and that a number of other factors might be influential. Goethals and Klein (2000) argue that rather than basing their assessments on objective comparisons, people might actively *construct nonexistent* social data to compare with; people might have a tendency to both fabricate and ignore social reality (Goethals, 1986). Similarly, Wood and Taylor (1991) state: 'People may bend and shape the comparison process into a variety of forms... indeed, social comparison often may be a process of constructing social information rather than of passively receiving it'. Crosby (1982) explains the fact that even in those instances where women do compare themselves with men (rather than with other women) those comparisons still do not seem to impact on variables like job satisfaction and deprivation as follows: 'This hints at a form of selective perception or perhaps selective processing... it is as if the high-prestige woman worker looks at but does not see her situation'. Implicit in many of these ideas is the assumption that people will fabricate or ignore, jump on or refuse to process, information in *self-serving* ways. As we have seen above, the RDT- and Self-protection-hypotheses contradict each other in fundamental

ways, which might possibly have led to the empirical evidence for both hypotheses being rather weak. Unfortunately, the present work was not successful in teasing the two processes apart (neither with the 'order' manipulation, nor with the longitudinal design, or the moderation hypothesis, although study 7 was somewhat successful in separating out the two effects, with one experiment focussing on the RDT prediction, and the other on the self-protection prediction). Future studies should aim to follow up on this issue, and aim to separate out the effects of the two processes. Quite possibly, stronger effects of comparisons on RD might be found if self-protection mechanisms are partialled out and controlled for.

Alternatively, it might be true that even when controlling for self-protection the effects of social comparisons on deprivation might not be the only, or even the most, important ones. For example, Heine, Lehman, Peng, and Greenholtz (2002) speculate that people might sometimes rely more on introspection and comparisons with internal standards when assessing themselves than on implicit or explicit comparisons with others. In other words, the is - ought discrepancy or factual world - ideal world discrepancy might be a much more powerful predictor of feelings of overall and affective RD than any self - other discrepancy. In a similar vein, I would like to propose that some other factors might be important, such as pre-conceived ideas, fixed mental images/schemata, or information derived from sources other than actual comparisons, such as the media, communication with friends/important others, etc. Firstly, people's ideas about how they are doing might be rather rigid under certain circumstances. People might somehow acquire a mental image of how they are doing, which might be somewhat resistant to change and hard to alter even through the exposure to a large quantity of (diagnostic and persuasive) contradictory comparison information. Secondly, people's assessment of their situation might be informed by messages people are exposed to through the media or important others. For example, even if social comparisons show for a certain person that he or she is gratified, engaging in these comparisons will have no noticeable effect on perceived deprivation/gratification if the effect is overridden by a social persuasion effect (e.g., if at the same time important peers keep emphasising that the individual is deprived). In sum, future research should focus not only on the effects of social comparisons on RD, but also on the effects of self-protection strategies, internal standards, preconceived ideas/schemata, and social persuasion. The integration of these different aspects should establish their differential importance, as well as moderating factors/conditions under which one factor might

dominate over the others. Such research might lead to valuable further insights, and might ultimately result in a useful expansion and refinement of RDT.

The weak evidence for the self-protection hypothesis that comparisons with threatening, upward targets being avoided. Evidence for the self-protection hypothesis that people avoid comparisons with threatening, upward targets, was consistent but weak (row 4).⁵¹ Neither the 'order' manipulation nor a more reliable CI index strengthened the results. Further, the effect could not be shown to be moderated by 'motives'. These findings were particularly puzzling since clear evidence was yielded, both in this and previous data (e.g. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, 2001, 2002), that often people who are objectively deprived do not perceive themselves in these terms. Thus, the question remains: How can this be? While it seems premature to dismiss the idea of self-protection, no doubt there is some need to explain why effects were not stronger. Even given the weak results, the 'moderation by motives' hypothesis still seems promising. First of all, it has been pointed out that moderation is extremely difficult to detect in survey data (McClelland & Judd, 1993), which might explain why studies 3-5 did not find stronger evidence for the proposed moderation. However, disappointingly, study 7 did not yield any support for the moderation hypothesis either. Then again, the effectiveness of the deprivation manipulation in this study was somewhat questionable. Therefore, it is recommended that future research should continue to focus on the moderation hypothesis, and aim to yield support using experimental designs with strong manipulations. Further, while study 7 did not manipulate 'motives' as such but only measured them, future research might endeavour to manipulate this variable directly. Recently, some researchers have devised interesting methods for manipulating 'motives', and demonstrated that this variable moderates the effects between ingroup status and identification (Roccas, in press). Such a paradigm might be usefully adopted to explore the issues around deprivation and comparisons also. Further, future studies might benefit from controlling for various other variables in order to strengthen the effects of RD on CI. For instance, the present research has shown that CI is influenced by, among others, similarity, contact, and 'motives'.

⁵¹ The correlations between specific RD and CI only reached significance for the intragroup and temporal target in studies 1-5, but not for the other targets (only one negative beta was found for RD on CI in majority members for minority participants of study 4, while study 5 actually yielded a *positive* effect for this target).

The consistently negative association between deprivation and identification.

Very consistent evidence was yielded for the association between deprivation and identification being negative. However, neither the proposed moderation, nor the mediation hypotheses were successful in satisfactorily explaining the differences between patterns yielded in the present work and previously published findings (row 5). Also, no clear evidence was yielded in support of the causal association between the two variables being in either one or the other direction. However, again it seems premature to dismiss the proposed moderation hypotheses, especially since none of the hypotheses that can be found in the literature (c.f. chapter 2) are fit to explain the pattern of results yielded by the present work. With regards to the proposed moderation by 'motive', the same as already outlined above holds: Since moderation is difficult to detect in survey data, an experimental approach should next be adopted to demonstrate the proposed effects. Importantly, the experiment might employ stronger manipulations than study 7 had achieved, and it might endeavour to manipulate 'motives' also. Further, note that it had not only been proposed that the effect of identification on deprivation is moderated by 'motives', but that it had also been proposed that the effect of deprivation on identification is moderated by 'action preferences' (c.f. chapter 5). This latter hypothesis has gone unattended to so far, and putting it to the test might prove an interesting and fruitful endeavour. Further, future research might consider some moderators other than 'motives' or 'action preferences', like for instance 'system blame' (which has already been demonstrated to moderate the effect of RD on 'importance'), or perceived 'permeability' of the group boundaries. For instance, Abrams et al. (1999) have demonstrated that 'perceived control' moderates the effect of anticipated RD on identification in Hong Kong. Conceivably, 'perceived control' might be an effective moderator of not only the effect of anticipated RD but also of *actual* RD, and not only in Asia, but also for ethnic minority and majority members in Europe.

The lack of support for the SIT prediction that identification increases intergroup comparison interest. No support was found for the SIT-based prediction that identification should cause more intergroup CI (because high identifiers will be more motivated to maintain or achieve a positive social (group) identity, which is acquired mainly through favourable intergroup comparisons, according to SIT). Instead, it was consistently found that identification was either unrelated to CI, or – in line with some predictions by Levine and Moreland (1987) – instead related to intragroup and temporal

CI (row 6). Which factors can explain that not more support was found for SIT? First of all, it is possible that there are social norms that prevent people from openly admitting that they attain a positive social identity through comparisons with others who are worse off. So, possibly, even though high identifiers engaged in and were more interested in intergroup comparisons, they were reluctant to admit this. However, data obtained elsewhere indicates that such a state of affairs is unlikely: In one experiment, where half the participants were led to believe that their comparison choices (both upward and downward) were entirely public (high social desirability condition) and half were led to believe that their comparisons choices were entirely private (low social desirability condition), the social desirability manipulation did not have any effects whatsoever on comparison choices (Brown & Zagefka, 2001). Another explanation for the lack of support for the SIT prediction would be that, at least for some of the minority participants, there *were* no intergroup comparisons available with downward objects that would have allowed for a positive social identity to be established. However, given the ubiquity of self-protection strategies (i.e. that people have a propensity to even distort social reality in such a way that they come to believe that they themselves and their groups are better than others, see above), and given that for all minority participant groups it is quite easy to think of outgroups that are further down the social hierarchy according to objective indices and statistics (e.g. asylum seekers and refugees), this explanation does not seem very likely either. So, if these two explanations can be dismissed, the current data might provide some evidence that the SIT prediction should be re-thought. Identification might be associated with more intragroup and temporal comparisons, i.e. with an enhanced *intragroup* focus, rather than with more intergroup comparisons and a stronger intergroup focus. If this was true, this would mean that high identifiers – at least under certain conditions – will care *less* about outgroups (not more); i.e. outgroups might occur on their ‘mental radar’ less than for low identifiers. In other words, it is conceivable that under certain circumstances high identifiers will be so preoccupied with their ingroup that they will actually be *less* competitive than low identifiers (although, since not being competitive is usually seen as being a desirable trait, it should by the same token be acknowledged that high identifiers in their lower concern for and with other groups might also be less open minded). In any case, the data yielded by the present work clearly question some of the fundamental assumptions of SIT, and pose some important questions that should be followed up in future research.

The 'messy' pattern of results yielded in support of the hypothesis that 'motives' inform comparison choices. Although studies 3-5 all yielded some evidence that 'motives' impact on comparison choices (see row 10), the patterns were far from straightforward. While repeated measures analyses of studies 3 and 4 showed that people compare with intragroup and temporal targets more for enhancement reasons and with intergroup targets more for equity reasons, regression analyses (minority members of study 4) on the same data showed that enhancement might also lead to intergroup comparisons, and that equity concerns might also lead to intragroup and temporal comparisons. Also, although study 5 yielded a lagged effect of enhancement on intragroup CI, the cross-sectional analyses were not significant. In sum, these results suggest that rather than to dismiss the hypothesis, it might be necessary to refine it. It has been pointed out previously that there is no 1:1 correspondence between comparison direction and affective consequence (Buunk et al., 1990; Major et al., 1991), and accordingly there might not be a 1:1 correspondence between motives and choice of comparison direction/ comparison object either. Future research should consider the conditions under which intragroup and temporal comparisons are not enhancing, or guided by an 'enhancement' motive, as well as the conditions under which 'equity' is not the driver of intergroup comparisons. Hypotheses might usefully be inspired by the existing literature. For instance, thinking back to chapter 2, the likelihood to become like the comparison object, and the psychological closeness to the object, might influence whether downward intragroup (or temporal) comparisons are enhancing or not (e.g. Tesser, Millar, & Moore, 1988). Similarly, whether or not equity concerns lead to intergroup comparisons might well be dependent on whether the comparison subject is 'resigned' or optimistic; in other words: The perceived likelihood that the conditions and social stratifications might change could well be moderating factors. Future research might usefully explore the workings of such moderating conditions, as well as attend to some other motives that might affect comparison choices and that have not been the focus of the present research, such as 'depreciation' (Levine & Moreland, 1987), 'self-consistency' (Fiske & Taylor, 1991), or the establishment of closeness and a common bond (Locke & Nekich, 2000). To give just one example, people might be motivated to compare with others who they want to affiliate with and feel close to. If this was an important factor, whether or not a minority member compares with majority members would not depend so much on the relative

comparative status, but more on whether the minority member wants to feel closer to or instead increase the psychological distance to the comparison object.

No doubt, the current research has some weaknesses that should be acknowledged, and that future studies would do well to avoid. First of all, some of the experimental manipulations were not overly strong. Future research could benefit from devising somewhat more powerful manipulations. Secondly, as discussed above, for obvious reasons caution is indicated when extrapolating and generalising the results of the experimental studies (which had used national groups) to ethnic groups. Even though the fact that – as outlined in chapter 7 - national and ethnic groups are comparable on a number of important dimensions speaks to such generalisations possibly having some validity, future research should replicate the experimental studies with ethnic minority and majority groups (provided that an ethically defensible way can be found to do so; recall that ethical concerns were the major reason why the experiments were not conducted on ethnic minority participants in the present work). Thirdly, the present research focussed on adolescents and young adults. Even though this does not pose a problem as such, and even though clear evidence was yielded both in the present and in previous research that participants of this age have clear concepts about their economic situation and constructs like racial discrimination (e.g. Liebkind & Jasinskaja-Lahti, 2000a), one should be cautious about generalising the mechanisms uncovered to older people. Even though I am not aware of any theoretical reasons why the mechanisms the present work explored should not work in the same way for adolescents and adults, the possibility of such a divergence would need to be refuted before one could make strong claims that the psychological processes are applicable to all age groups. Also, it is possible that data collected in this age group contains more 'error variance' than data from older participants, due to teenagers getting bored and unmotivated more easily (or at least due to them being more inclined than adults to act according to these feelings). Fourthly, practical constraints meant that some of the constructs could only be assessed by 1- or 2-item scales, which are prone to being unreliable. Further, one of the constructs of study 6 was assessed with a double-barrelled item, resulting in some interpretational uncertainty. If possible, future research should aim to employ longer scales and better measurement instruments than was feasible in the present research. Fifth, even though the present research simultaneously focussed on a range of different comparisons, and certainly on more different

comparison types than a lot of previous research, several other potentially interesting comparison objects were not attended to. For instance, future research might usefully be extended to include temporal past comparisons on the group level, temporal future comparisons, or comparisons with some 'ideal'. Sixth, some of the predictions, especially those investigating the RDT prediction that comparisons influence feelings of overall RD, were based on some assumptions that are – in principle – testable, and that should be tested by future research. For instance, it was expected that for minority members 'majority CI' would have a positive effect on both 'GMRD' and 'GRD'. This prediction was based on the reasoning that *overall* minority members are likely to be deprived relative to majority members, that they will consequently feel this way, and that this would result in an overall (i.e. across participants) correlation between CI and GMRD. However, it is possible and even likely that my samples also included some very wealthy minority participants who did not report 'majority GMRD'. Those participants who are and feel gratified vis-à-vis majority members would manifest a *negative* correlation between majority CI and overall RD, leading to an overall *weaker* positive effect of CI on RD in the overall sample. Even though the socioeconomic background of my samples indicated that the amount of such highly gratified minority participants in the present work was truly negligible, future research might aim to take into consideration both the objective standing relative to an object and the comparison interest in this object when predicting feelings of overall RD. Finally, it should be noted that the present work relied only on a fraction of methodologies available in the social sciences. Since the choice of methodology defines the range and nature of insights that can possibly be yielded, an obvious means of extending the scope of the present work would be to add some different methodological approaches. For instance, the explanations that minority members would give in interviews for their comparison choices and for their assessment of their economic situation seem highly interesting issues worthy of further investigation.

When I started this research, one of my major concerns was to investigate whether or not ignorance is bliss for ethnic minority members. To my mind, this entailed to first of all investigate whether or not members of minorities that can be described as deprived *are* ignorant, i.e. oblivious to their deprivation (and, as we have seen, this is the case). Secondly, another objective was to investigate which factors *cause* this ignorance, i.e. how comparison preferences are linked to perceived

deprivation, and which factors in turn influence comparison preferences. Thirdly, I intended to investigate the consequences of this ignorance (or otherwise), i.e. most noticeably the effects of perceived deprivation on psychological well-being (e.g. self-esteem, lifesatisfaction) and collective action/protest. An initial assumption was that the effects of 'ignorance' on psychological well-being would be desirable (i.e. a positive effect of unawareness of deprivation on self-esteem and related variables), and that the effects on collective action would be undesirable (i.e. a negative effect of unawareness of deprivation on preparedness to act and initiate social change). Even though it is recognised that the question of which effects on action preparedness and well-being are desirable and which are not is ultimately a political and not an academic one, it was hoped that some psychological data on the magnitude of these respective effects would help to weigh them up against one another, and would generate some support that could substantiate the validity of certain (political) arguments. As it happened, the patterns of results generated by the first studies were more complicated than anticipated and, in expending efforts on trying to answer some complex questions raised by the first studies, this research never quite made it to attending to collective action also. Although – as we have seen in chapter 2 - there is of course a large body of literature on the effects of deprivation on collective action, very few of these studies have been conducted with ethnic minority and majority members in a European setting, and even fewer have simultaneously focussed on the effects of RD on both collective action and psychological well-being. Therefore, this last issue remains not only a theoretically important one, but also one with important practical implications.

In some ways, the present program of research seems to pose more questions than it answers. However, I do not see this necessarily as a problem, as the posing of novel questions is just as important for the advancement of science and knowledge as the developing of answers. Or, as Haslam and McGarty (2001) say regarding the importance of the creation of uncertainty in the social sciences: 'The Gods of knowledge will never be appeased simply by offerings of impeccably harvested experimental results'. It would be fortunate for me if Haslam and McGarty were right, because impeccably harvested experimental results cannot be offered by this work. However, it is hoped that among the 'mess' and error variance that humans outside of sterile laboratories tend to produce, some interesting patterns of data have emerged, patterns that others will agree are worthy issues for future research.

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Appendix 1:

Questionnaire for study 1.

Please note that the order of the comparison interest items was randomised per Latin square method. Thus, there were five versions of this questionnaire.

Please also note that in this and some of the following questionnaires, some measures were included that either did not yield any interesting results or that are not central to the theoretical argument of this thesis, and that are consequently not discussed above.

Study on how you see yourself and your group

Dear student,

On the following pages you will find some questions about how you see yourself, your group and other people and groups. We are interested in your personal opinion. It is not important what other people would answer, but only how you yourself feel about it. It is important that you answer honestly. There are no right or wrong answers. You do not have to give your name, so no one will find out what your answers were.

Who am I?

1. _____

2. _____

3. _____

4. _____

5. _____

6. _____

7. _____

Which group do you belong to?

In this country there are a lot of people from different countries, cultures, religions or ethnic groups. We would like to know how you see yourself. Please look at all the groups below and choose the one group you feel you belong to most. Please tick the circle beside that group. Even if you feel that you belong to more than one of the groups below, please **only choose one**. Choose the one that is most important to you. Please choose carefully and keep your choice in mind; it will be important later on.

Indian	<input type="radio"/>
Pakistani	<input type="radio"/>
Somali	<input type="radio"/>
Afghani	<input type="radio"/>
Afro-Caribbean	<input type="radio"/>
Kosovan	<input type="radio"/>
Sikh	<input type="radio"/>
English	<input type="radio"/>
White English	<input type="radio"/>
If you belong to a group which is not listed above, please write it down here _____	

Over the page, you will see some questions about your group. When answering these questions, please **always** think about the group you belong to, the one you have just chosen here.

Now we have some questions about how you feel about **yourself and your group**. When reading the term 'my group', please think of the group you chose a moment ago. For some people, that might be 'English', for others 'Sikh', for others 'Somali' and so on. Please circle a number for every question. Please make sure you answer every question.

1. It is important to me to belong to my group.

disagree	1	2	3	4	5	agree
----------	---	---	---	---	---	-------

2. I do not have much in common with other members of my group.

disagree	1	2	3	4	5	agree
----------	---	---	---	---	---	-------

3. I see myself as a member of my group.

disagree	1	2	3	4	5	agree
----------	---	---	---	---	---	-------

4. On the whole, I feel good about my group.

disagree	1	2	3	4	5	agree
----------	---	---	---	---	---	-------

5. I feel I cannot be proud of my group.

disagree	1	2	3	4	5	agree
----------	---	---	---	---	---	-------

6. I am glad to be a member of my group.

disagree	1	2	3	4	5	agree
----------	---	---	---	---	---	-------

1. On the whole, I have a positive view of myself.

disagree	1	2	3	4	5	agree
----------	---	---	---	---	---	-------

2. I feel I do not have much to be proud of.

disagree	1	2	3	4	5	agree
----------	---	---	---	---	---	-------

3. I am able to do things as well as most other people.

disagree	1	2	3	4	5	agree
----------	---	---	---	---	---	-------

4. At times, I think I am not good at all.

disagree	1	2	3	4	5	agree
----------	---	---	---	---	---	-------

5. Most of the time, I feel pretty good about myself.

disagree	1	2	3	4	5	agree
----------	---	---	---	---	---	-------

1. The conditions of my life are excellent.

disagree	1	2	3	4	5	agree
----------	---	---	---	---	---	-------

2. I am satisfied with my life.

disagree	1	2	3	4	5	agree
----------	---	---	---	---	---	-------

3. So far, I have received most of the important things I want in life.

disagree	1	2	3	4	5	agree
----------	---	---	---	---	---	-------

Now, please wait quietly.

In the following, we would like those students who said earlier that they are 'English' or 'White English' to continue with the questions on page 9.

All others should continue with the questions on page 5.

Please do not continue until you are told to.

Questions only for students who did NOT choose the ‘English’ or ‘White English’ group label earlier

Now, we would like you to think about success in life.

As you know, some people have it hard in life and others have it easy.

Some people find good jobs easily and have a lot of money. They live in nice houses and can buy many things, while others cannot do that.

Now, please think about the situation of **you and your family**.

How **“well-off”** are you?

not at all well off	1	2	3	4	5	very well off
---------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---------------

Generally, how angry or satisfied are you about your situation?

very angry	1	2	3	4	5	very satisfied
------------	---	---	---	---	---	----------------

If you want to know how **“well-off”** you and your family are, how important is it for you to compare with each of the following in order to see how well you are doing?

With your own situation in the **past**

not at all important	1	2	3	4	5	very important
----------------------	---	---	---	---	---	----------------

With **English** people

not at all important	1	2	3	4	5	very important
----------------------	---	---	---	---	---	----------------

With members of your **own group**

not at all important	1	2	3	4	5	very important
----------------------	---	---	---	---	---	----------------

With people who belong to **another minority group** in England (not your own)

not at all important	1	2	3	4	5	very important
----------------------	---	---	---	---	---	----------------

With other people that are important to you, and it **does not matter which group** they belong to

not at all important	1	2	3	4	5	very important
----------------------	---	---	---	---	---	----------------

If you want to know how “**well-off**” you are, who would be **most important** for you to compare with? Please look at the boxes below and choose the one that is most important to you.

Tick the box you want to choose like this:

Please choose just one box.

Own situation in the past	English people	Members of your own group	People who belong to another minority group in England	Other people that are important to you, and it does not matter which group they belong to
---------------------------	----------------	---------------------------	--	---

Please keep thinking about your situation and the situation of your family. How well are you actually doing, compared to each of the following:

Compared to your own situation in the **past**

much worse	1	2	3	4	5	much better
------------	---	---	---	---	---	-------------

Compared to **English** people

much worse	1	2	3	4	5	much better
------------	---	---	---	---	---	-------------

Compared to members of your **own group**

much worse	1	2	3	4	5	much better
------------	---	---	---	---	---	-------------

Compared to people who belong to **another minority group** in England

much worse	1	2	3	4	5	much better
------------	---	---	---	---	---	-------------

On average, compared to other people that are important to you, and it **does not matter which group** they belong to

much worse	1	2	3	4	5	much better
------------	---	---	---	---	---	-------------

Now, please think about the situation of **your group** in general (the group you chose earlier).

1. The situation of my group is worse than that of English people.

disagree	1	2	3	4	5	agree
----------	---	---	---	---	---	-------

2. Members of my group have it harder than English people.

disagree	1	2	3	4	5	agree
----------	---	---	---	---	---	-------

3. Generally, how angry or satisfied are you about the situation of your group?

very angry	1	2	3	4	5	very satisfied
------------	---	---	---	---	---	----------------

Being “well-off” might be important to you, or you might think that other things are much more important in life. So, how important is it to you to be well off?

not at all	1	2	3	4	5	very
------------	---	---	---	---	---	------

In the beginning you chose just one group you belong to.

Which one was that? _____

But you might feel you belong to more than one group.

So, how much do you feel you belong to the English group?

not at all	1	2	3	4	5	very much
------------	---	---	---	---	---	-----------

Is there any other group you feel you belong to?

Yes

No

If yes, which group is that? Please write that group down here: _____

How much do you feel you belong to that group?

not at all	1	2	3	4	5	very much
------------	---	---	---	---	---	-----------

Now, we would like to ask you to answer the last few questions.

Your age	_____
Your sex (boy/girl)	_____
In which country were you born?	_____
If you were not born in England , how long have you been living here?	Less than 1 year <input type="radio"/> 1 - 3 years <input type="radio"/> Longer than 3 years <input type="radio"/>
Which group does your father belong to?	_____
Which group does your mother belong to?	_____
Your father's job/occupation	_____
Your mother's job/occupation	_____

What language do you **mainly** use at home? (Name only one): _____

Do you use this language in school?

Yes <input type="radio"/>	No <input type="radio"/>
<p>If yes, answer here. Tick the right circle (more than one if you want to)</p> <p>What do you mainly use your language for in school?</p> <p>Talking to friends <input type="radio"/></p> <p>Learning and understanding school subjects <input type="radio"/></p>	<p>If no, answer here. Tick the right circle (more than one if you want to)</p> <p>Why do you not use your language in school?</p> <p>No one else speaks it <input type="radio"/></p> <p>Other students would laugh at me <input type="radio"/></p> <p>The teachers do not allow it <input type="radio"/></p> <p>No chance is offered in class to speak it <input type="radio"/></p> <p>I do not speak it well <input type="radio"/></p> <p>I do not like using it <input type="radio"/></p>

If you have any suggestions or comments, please write them down here:

This is the end of the part for the students who did not choose the 'English' or 'White English' group label.

Thank you very much for helping us in our research!

Please close your booklet and wait quietly for the others to finish.

Questions only for students who chose the ‘English’ or ‘White English’ group label earlier

Now, we would like you to think about success in life.

As you know, some people have it hard in life and others have it easy.

Some people find good jobs easily and have a lot of money. They live in nice houses and can buy many things, while others cannot do that.

Now, please think about the situation of **you and your family**.

How **“well-off”** are you?

not at all well off	1	2	3	4	5	very well off
---------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---------------

Generally, how angry or satisfied are you about your situation?

very angry	1	2	3	4	5	very satisfied
------------	---	---	---	---	---	----------------

If you want to know how **“well-off”** you and your family are, how important is it for you to compare with each of the following in order to see how well you are doing?

With your own situation in the **past**

not at all important	1	2	3	4	5	very important
----------------------	---	---	---	---	---	----------------

With other **English** people

not at all important	1	2	3	4	5	very important
----------------------	---	---	---	---	---	----------------

With members of **other groups** in England

not at all important	1	2	3	4	5	very important
----------------------	---	---	---	---	---	----------------

With other people that are important to you, and it **does not matter which group** they belong to

not at all important	1	2	3	4	5	very important
----------------------	---	---	---	---	---	----------------

If you want to know how “**well-off**” you are, who would be **most important** for you to compare with? Please look at the boxes below and choose the one that is most important to you.

Tick the box you want to choose like this: .

Please choose just one box.

Own situation in the past	Other English people	Members of other groups in England	Other people that are important to you, and it does not matter which group they belong to
---------------------------	----------------------	------------------------------------	---

Please keep thinking about your situation and the situation of your family. Now, how well are you actually doing, compared to each of the following:

Compared to your own situation in the **past**

much worse	1	2	3	4	5	much better
------------	---	---	---	---	---	-------------

Compared to other **English** people

much worse	1	2	3	4	5	much better
------------	---	---	---	---	---	-------------

Compared to members of **other groups** in England

much worse	1	2	3	4	5	much better
------------	---	---	---	---	---	-------------

On average, compared to other people that are important to you, and it **does not matter which group** they belong to

much worse	1	2	3	4	5	much better
------------	---	---	---	---	---	-------------

Now, please think about the situation of **English people** in general.

1. The situation of English people is worse than that of other groups in England.

disagree	1	2	3	4	5	agree
----------	---	---	---	---	---	-------

2. English people have it harder than members of other groups in England.

disagree	1	2	3	4	5	agree
----------	---	---	---	---	---	-------

3. Generally, how angry or satisfied are you about the situation of English people?

very angry	1	2	3	4	5	very satisfied
------------	---	---	---	---	---	----------------

Being “well-off” might be important to you, or you might think that other things are much more important in life. So, how important is it to you to be well off?

not at all	1	2	3	4	5	very
------------	---	---	---	---	---	------

In the beginning you said you are 'English' or 'White English'.

But you might feel you belong to more than one group.

Do you feel you belong to any other group as well? Please tick the right circle.

Yes

No

If yes, which group is that? Please write that group down here: _____

How much do you feel you belong to that group?

not at all	1	2	3	4	5	very much
------------	---	---	---	---	---	-----------

Now, we would like to ask you to answer the last few questions.

Your age	_____
Your sex (boy/girl)	_____
In which country were you born?	_____
If you were not born in England , how long have you been living here?	Less than 1 year <input type="radio"/> 1 - 3 years <input type="radio"/> Longer than 3 years <input type="radio"/>
Which group does your father belong to?	_____
Which group does your mother belong to?	_____
Your father's job/occupation	_____
Your mother's job/occupation	_____

What language do you **mainly** use at home? (Name only one): _____

Do you use this language in school?

Yes <input type="radio"/>	No <input type="radio"/>
<p>If yes, answer here. Tick the right circle (more than one if you want to)</p> <p>What do you mainly use your language for in school?</p> <p>Talking to friends <input type="radio"/></p> <p>Learning and understanding school subjects <input type="radio"/></p>	<p>If no, answer here. Tick the right circle (more than one if you want to)</p> <p>Why do you not use your language in school?</p> <p>No one else speaks it <input type="radio"/></p> <p>Other students would laugh at me <input type="radio"/></p> <p>The teachers do not allow it <input type="radio"/></p> <p>No chance is offered in class to speak it <input type="radio"/></p> <p>I do not speak it well <input type="radio"/></p> <p>I do not like using it <input type="radio"/></p>

If you have any suggestions or comments, please write them down here:

This is the end of the part for the students who chose the ‘English’ or ‘White English’ group label.

Thank you very much for helping us in our research!

Please close your booklet and wait quietly for the others to finish.

Appendix 2:

Questionnaire for study 2.

Please note that the order of the comparison interest items was randomised. Four different orders existed. Further, half the participants answered the deprivation questions first, and the other half answered the comparison interest items first. Thus, in total, There were eight different versions of this questionnaire.

Lieber Schüler, liebe Schülerin!

Auf den folgenden Seiten wirst du ein paar Fragen zu verschiedenen Themen finden. Uns interessiert deine eigene Meinung.

Bitte kreise bei jeder Frage die Zahl ein, die deine Meinung am besten wiedergibt.

Beispiel:

Wie ist das Wetter heute?

besonders schlecht	1	2	3	4	5	besonders gut
--------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---------------

Kreise die **1** ein, wenn das Wetter besonders schlecht ist.

Kreise die **5** ein, wenn das Wetter besonders gut ist.

Kreise die **3** ein, wenn das Wetter mittelmäßig ist, so, wie es hier gemacht ist.

Kreise die **4** ein, wenn das Wetter recht gut, aber nicht besonders gut ist.

Kreise die **2** ein, wenn das Wetter recht schlecht, aber nicht besonders schlecht ist.

- ❖ Nur deine Meinung ist wichtig!
Es ist egal, was deine Freunde antworten würden.
Es ist sehr wichtig, dass du ehrlich antwortest.
Es gibt keine richtigen oder falschen Antworten.
- ❖ Es wird niemand erfahren, wie du geantwortet hast!
Du musst nirgendwo deinen Namen nennen.

Bevor wir anfangen, würden wir gerne noch etwas wissen.

In Deutschland gibt es viele verschiedene Gruppen.

Zu welcher Gruppe gehörst du?

Schau dir alle Gruppen in dem Kasten genau an und mache ein Kreuz hinter der Gruppe, zu der du gehörst. Mache nur ein Kreuz!

Deutsche	0
Türken	0
Aussiedler	0
Italiener	0
Polen	0
Albaner	0
<p>Wenn du zu einer Gruppe gehörst, die nicht hier steht, schreibe den Namen deiner Gruppe hier hin: _____</p>	

Bei allen Fragen über „deine Gruppe“ denke immer an die Gruppe, die du hier gewählt hast. Das ist „deine Gruppe“.

Wenn du darüber nachdenkst, **wer du bist**, siehst du dich als ein Mitglied deiner Gruppe?

auf keinen Fall	1	2	3	4	5	auf jeden Fall
-----------------	---	---	---	---	---	----------------

Gefällt es dir, ein Mitglied deiner Gruppe zu sein?

auf keinen Fall	1	2	3	4	5	auf jeden Fall
-----------------	---	---	---	---	---	----------------

Würdest du lieber zu einer anderen Gruppe gehören?

auf keinen Fall	1	2	3	4	5	auf jeden Fall
-----------------	---	---	---	---	---	----------------

Denke für einen Moment darüber nach, wie es dir und deiner Familie geht.
 Einige Menschen haben es gut im Leben, und andere haben es schwer.
 Einige Menschen haben eine gute Arbeit und viel Geld. Sie leben in großen Häusern
 und können sich alles kaufen, was sie wollen.
 Anderen Menschen geht es nicht so gut und sie können das nicht machen.

Wenn man wissen will, wie es einem geht, denkt man oft darüber nach, wie es
 anderen Menschen um einen herum geht.

Wenn du wissen willst, wie es dir und deiner Familie geht, woran denkst du dann?
 Mit wem vergleichst du dich?

Ist es wichtig für dich...

...wie es dir und deiner Familie **früher** ging?

gar nicht wichtig	1	2	3	4	5	sehr wichtig
-------------------	---	---	---	---	---	--------------

...wie es **verschiedenen Gruppen in Deutschland** geht, und zwar

wie es **Deutschen** in Deutschland geht?

gar nicht wichtig	1	2	3	4	5	sehr wichtig
-------------------	---	---	---	---	---	--------------

wie es **Türken** in Deutschland geht?

gar nicht wichtig	1	2	3	4	5	sehr wichtig
-------------------	---	---	---	---	---	--------------

wie es **Aussiedlern** in Deutschland geht?

gar nicht wichtig	1	2	3	4	5	sehr wichtig
-------------------	---	---	---	---	---	--------------

...wie es **Menschen in anderen Ländern** geht, und zwar

wie es **Amerikanern** geht?

gar nicht wichtig	1	2	3	4	5	sehr wichtig
-------------------	---	---	---	---	---	--------------

wie es **Franzosen** geht?

gar nicht wichtig	1	2	3	4	5	sehr wichtig
-------------------	---	---	---	---	---	--------------

**Diese Frage ist nur für Schüler, die
nicht Deutsch, nicht Türkisch und keine Aussiedler sind:**

Wenn du wissen willst, wie es dir und deiner Familie geht,
 woran denkst du dann?

Ist es wichtig für dich, wie es Euch geht im Vergleich zu

Mitgliedern deiner eigenen Gruppe?

gar nicht wichtig	1	2	3	4	5	sehr wichtig
-------------------	---	---	---	---	---	--------------

Wie geht es dir und deiner Familie im Vergleich zu...

...im Vergleich zu Eurer Situation **früher**?

viel schlechter	1	2	3	4	5	viel besser
-----------------	---	---	---	---	---	-------------

...im Vergleich zu **verschiedenen Gruppen in Deutschland**, und zwar

im Vergleich zu **Deutschen**?

viel schlechter	1	2	3	4	5	viel besser
-----------------	---	---	---	---	---	-------------

im Vergleich zu **Türken**?

viel schlechter	1	2	3	4	5	viel besser
-----------------	---	---	---	---	---	-------------

im Vergleich zu **Aussiedlern**?

viel schlechter	1	2	3	4	5	viel besser
-----------------	---	---	---	---	---	-------------

...im Vergleich zu **Menschen in anderen Ländern**, und zwar

im Vergleich zu **Amerikanern**?

viel schlechter	1	2	3	4	5	viel besser
-----------------	---	---	---	---	---	-------------

im Vergleich zu **Franzosen**?

viel schlechter	1	2	3	4	5	viel besser
-----------------	---	---	---	---	---	-------------

**Diese Frage ist nur für Schüler, die
nicht Deutsch, nicht Türkisch und keine Aussiedler sind:**

Wie geht es dir und deiner Familie im Vergleich zu
Mitgliedern deiner eigenen Gruppe?

viel schlechter	1	2	3	4	5	viel besser
-----------------	---	---	---	---	---	-------------

In dem Kasten hier siehst du viele verschiedene Gruppen, die es in Deutschland gibt.

Deutsche	
Aussiedler	Polen
Italiener	
Albaner	Türken
Spanier	
Asylbewerber	

In dem Kasten hier siehst du viele verschiedene Gruppen, die es außerhalb von Deutschland gibt.

Türken in der Türkei	
Amerikaner	Polen
Franzosen	
Holländer	
Engländer	Russen
Griechen	

Wenn du wissen willst, wie es dir und deiner Familie geht, welche von all diesen Gruppen ist dann am wichtigsten für dich im Vergleich?

Wähle nur einen Kasten, und schreibe eine **1** neben die Gruppe, die dir am wichtigsten ist.

Denke weiter an dich und deine Familie.

Wie geht es dir und deiner Familie grundsätzlich?

sehr schlecht	1	2	3	4	5	sehr gut
---------------	---	---	---	---	---	----------

Wie zufrieden bist du mit der Situation von dir und deiner Familie?

sehr unzufrieden	1	2	3	4	5	sehr zufrieden
------------------	---	---	---	---	---	----------------

Nun denke an deine ganze Gruppe (in Deutschland), das heisst die Gruppe, die du am Anfang angekreuzt hast.

Wie geht es deiner Gruppe grundsätzlich?

sehr schlecht	1	2	3	4	5	sehr gut
---------------	---	---	---	---	---	----------

Wie zufrieden bist du mit der Situation deiner Gruppe?

sehr unzufrieden	1	2	3	4	5	sehr zufrieden
------------------	---	---	---	---	---	----------------

Nun denke an deine Zukunft.

Was glaubst du, wie wird es dir in der Zukunft gehen?

sehr schlecht	1	2	3	4	5	sehr gut
---------------	---	---	---	---	---	----------

Was glaubst du, wie zufrieden wirst du in Zukunft sein?

sehr unzufrieden	1	2	3	4	5	sehr zufrieden
------------------	---	---	---	---	---	----------------

Wie viel hast du im Alltag zu tun mit...

...mit Deutschen

sehr wenig	1	2	3	4	5	sehr viel
------------	---	---	---	---	---	-----------

...mit Türken

sehr wenig	1	2	3	4	5	sehr viel
------------	---	---	---	---	---	-----------

...mit Aussiedlern

sehr wenig	1	2	3	4	5	sehr viel
------------	---	---	---	---	---	-----------

...mit Amerikanern

sehr wenig	1	2	3	4	5	sehr viel
------------	---	---	---	---	---	-----------

...mit Franzosen

sehr wenig	1	2	3	4	5	sehr viel
------------	---	---	---	---	---	-----------

**Diese Frage ist nur für Schüler, die
nicht Deutsch, nicht Türkisch und keine Aussiedler sind:**

Wie viel hast Du im Alltag zu tun mit **Mitgliedern deiner eigenen Gruppe?**

sehr wenig	1	2	3	4	5	sehr viel
------------	---	---	---	---	---	-----------

Mit wem hast du viel gemeinsam? Wem bist du ähnlich?

Deutschen

gar nicht ähnlich	1	2	3	4	5	sehr ähnlich
-------------------	---	---	---	---	---	--------------

Türken

gar nicht ähnlich	1	2	3	4	5	sehr ähnlich
-------------------	---	---	---	---	---	--------------

Aussiedlern

gar nicht ähnlich	1	2	3	4	5	sehr ähnlich
-------------------	---	---	---	---	---	--------------

Amerikanern

gar nicht ähnlich	1	2	3	4	5	sehr ähnlich
-------------------	---	---	---	---	---	--------------

Franzosen

gar nicht ähnlich	1	2	3	4	5	sehr ähnlich
-------------------	---	---	---	---	---	--------------

**Diese Frage ist nur für Schüler, die
nicht Deutsch, nicht Türkisch und keine Aussiedler sind:**

Wie ähnlich bist du **Mitgliedern deiner eigenen Gruppe?**

gar nicht ähnlich	1	2	3	4	5	sehr ähnlich
-------------------	---	---	---	---	---	--------------

Einige der nächsten Fragen beschäftigen sich mit Kultur. Zur Kultur einer Gruppe gehören: Sprache, Religion, typisches Essen und Kleidung, bestimmte Werte und Meinungen....


Zum Beispiel sind die Kleider in verschiedenen Kulturen unterschiedlich:



Auch die Sprache und die Schrift unterscheiden sich:



Außerdem gibt es in einigen Kulturen Moscheen, in anderen gibt es Kirchen oder Tempel:



Das waren nur Beispiele. Die Kultur der Deutschen und die Kultur von anderen Gruppen in Deutschland können sich noch in vielen anderen Punkten unterscheiden. Familien, die aus anderen Ländern nach Deutschland kommen, können die deutschen Lebensweise und Kultur übernehmen oder ihre eigene Lebensweise und Kultur behalten.

Was denkst du zu nicht-deutschen Gruppen in Deutschland?

(Wenn du anfangs angekreuzt hast, dass du nicht deutsch bist, denke bei den Fragen auf dieser Seite besonders an DEINE EIGENE GRUPPE!)

Findest du, dass nicht-deutsche Gruppen in Deutschland...

...ihre Kultur behalten sollen?

auf keinen Fall	1	2	3	4	5	auf jeden Fall
-----------------	---	---	---	---	---	----------------

...ihre Religion, Sprache und Kleidung behalten sollen?

auf keinen Fall	1	2	3	4	5	auf jeden Fall
-----------------	---	---	---	---	---	----------------

...ihre alte Lebensweise behalten sollen?

auf keinen Fall	1	2	3	4	5	auf jeden Fall
-----------------	---	---	---	---	---	----------------

Findest du es wichtig, dass Mitglieder nicht-deutscher Gruppen in Deutschland...

... auch deutsche Freunde haben?

gar nicht wichtig	1	2	3	4	5	sehr wichtig
-------------------	---	---	---	---	---	--------------

...auch nach der Schule Zeit mit Deutschen verbringen?

gar nicht wichtig	1	2	3	4	5	sehr wichtig
-------------------	---	---	---	---	---	--------------

Bei den nächsten Fragen musst du manchmal etwas schreiben,
manchmal nur ankreuzen:

Wie alt bist du?	_____ Jahre
Bist du.....	ein Junge <input type="radio"/> ein Mädchen <input type="radio"/>
In welchem Land bist du geboren ?	
Wenn du nicht in Deutschland geboren bist: Wie lange lebst du schon in Deutschland?	kürzer als 1 ^{1/2} Jahre <input type="radio"/> 1 ^{1/2} – 3 Jahre <input type="radio"/> länger als 3 Jahre <input type="radio"/>
Welche Staatsangehörigkeit hast du? (unter Umständen mehrere)	die russische <input type="radio"/> die deutsche <input type="radio"/> die türkische <input type="radio"/> eine andere: _____
Aus welchem Land kommt dein Vater?	Deutschland <input type="radio"/> Türkei <input type="radio"/> Russland <input type="radio"/> anderes Land: _____
Aus welchem Land kommt deine Mutter?	Deutschland <input type="radio"/> Türkei <input type="radio"/> Russland <input type="radio"/> anderes Land: _____

Wenn du irgendwelche Anmerkungen, Fragen oder Vorschläge zu diesem Fragebogen hast, schreibe sie bitte hier auf:

Vielen Dank für deine Hilfe!

Appendix 3:

Materials for studies 3 and 4:

- Pilot questionnaire for the comparison interest scale
- Questionnaire for study 3
- Questionnaire for study 4

Pilot questionnaire for the comparison interest scale

Which group do you belong to?

Please look at all the groups below and tick the group which is yours.

Only tick one group!

Indian	<input type="radio"/>
Pakistani	<input type="radio"/>
Somali	<input type="radio"/>
Asian	<input type="radio"/>
Afro-Caribbean	<input type="radio"/>
Kosovan	<input type="radio"/>
Sikh	<input type="radio"/>
English	<input type="radio"/>
White English	<input type="radio"/>
If you belong to a group which is not listed above, please write it down here _____	

Some people have it good in life and others have it less good.
 Some people find good jobs easily and have a lot of money.
 They live in nice houses and can buy many things, while others cannot do that.

Now, please think about the situation of you and your family.
 When one thinks or talks about how well one is off, one also quite often considers or mentions how others are doing.

How important for you are comparisons with...

	not at all	2	3	4	very much
...your situation in the past	1	2	3	4	5
...members of your own group	1	2	3	4	5
...English people	1	2	3	4	5
...Asylum seekers	1	2	3	4	5
...Americans	1	2	3	4	5
...people in other European countries (other than England)	1	2	3	4	5
...people in the third world	1	2	3	4	5
...Afro-Caribbeans	1	2	3	4	5
...Asians	1	2	3	4	5

How often do you compare with...

	not at all	2	3	4	very much
...your situation in the past	1	2	3	4	5
...members of your own group	1	2	3	4	5
...English people	1	2	3	4	5
...Asylum seekers	1	2	3	4	5
...Americans	1	2	3	4	5
...people in other European countries (other than England)	1	2	3	4	5
...people in the third world	1	2	3	4	5
...Afro-Caribbeans	1	2	3	4	5
...Asians	1	2	3	4	5

How curious would you be to find out about the situation of...

	not at all				very much
...your situation in the past	1	2	3	4	5
...members of your own group	1	2	3	4	5
...English people	1	2	3	4	5
...Asylum seekers	1	2	3	4	5
...Americans	1	2	3	4	5
...people in other European countries (other than England)	1	2	3	4	5
...people in the third world	1	2	3	4	5
...Afro-Caribbeans	1	2	3	4	5
...Asians	1	2	3	4	5

Questionnaire for study 3

Note that the comparison interest items were randomised with Latin square method. There were seven different orders.

Note that the motive questions were randomised with Latin square method. There were four different orders. Thus, there were 28 different versions of this questionnaire.

Lieber Schüler, liebe Schülerin!

Auf den folgenden Seiten wirst du ein paar Fragen zu verschiedenen Themen finden. Uns interessiert deine eigene Meinung.

Bitte kreise bei jeder Frage die Zahl ein, die deine Meinung am besten wiedergibt.

Beispiel:

Wie ist das Wetter heute?

besonders schlecht	1	2	3	4	5	besonders gut
--------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---------------

Kreise die **1** ein, wenn das Wetter besonders schlecht ist.

Kreise die **5** ein, wenn das Wetter besonders gut ist.

Kreise die **3** ein, wenn das Wetter mittelmäßig ist, so, wie es hier gemacht ist.

Kreise die **4** ein, wenn das Wetter recht gut, aber nicht besonders gut ist.

Kreise die **2** ein, wenn das Wetter recht schlecht, aber nicht besonders schlecht ist.

❖ Nur deine Meinung ist wichtig!

Es ist egal, was deine Freunde antworten würden.

Es ist sehr wichtig, dass du ehrlich antwortest.

Es gibt keine richtigen oder falschen Antworten.

❖ Es wird niemand erfahren, wie du geantwortet hast!

Du musst nirgendwo deinen Namen nennen.

In Deutschland gibt es viele verschiedene Gruppen. Zu welcher Gruppe gehörst du?

Schau dir alle Gruppen in dem Kasten genau an und mache ein Kreuz hinter der Gruppe, zu der du am meisten gehörst. Auch, wenn du zu mehreren Gruppen gehörst, mache nur ein Kreuz! Wähle die Gruppe, die am wichtigsten für dich ist.

Deutsche	0
Türken	0
Aussiedler	0
Amerikaner	0

Wenn du zu einer Gruppe gehörst, die nicht hier steht, schreibe den Namen deiner Gruppe hier hin: _____

Bei allen Fragen über „deine Gruppe“ denke immer an die Gruppe, die du hier gewählt hast. Das ist „deine Gruppe“.

Wenn du darüber nachdenkst, wer du bist, siehst du dich als ein Mitglied deiner Gruppe?

gar nicht	1	2	3	4	5	sehr
-----------	---	---	---	---	---	------

Gefällt es dir, ein Mitglied deiner Gruppe zu sein?

gar nicht	1	2	3	4	5	sehr
-----------	---	---	---	---	---	------

Ist es wichtig für dich, ein Mitglied deiner Gruppe zu sein?

gar nicht	1	2	3	4	5	sehr
-----------	---	---	---	---	---	------

Bist du froh, ein Mitglied deiner Gruppe zu sein?

gar nicht	1	2	3	4	5	sehr
-----------	---	---	---	---	---	------

**Einigen Menschen geht es gut im Leben, und anderen geht es nicht so gut.
Einige Menschen haben eine gute Arbeit und viel Geld.
Sie leben in großen Häusern und können sich alles kaufen, was sie wollen.
Anderen Menschen geht es nicht so gut und sie können das nicht machen.**

Was für Vergleiche machst du, wenn du über die Situation von Dir und Deiner Familie nachdenkst oder redest?

Wie wichtig ist es für dich, Euch zu vergleichen...

	gar nicht wichtig					sehr wichtig
	1	2	3	4	5	
...mit Deutschen	1	2	3	4	5	
...mit Eurer Situation früher	1	2	3	4	5	
...mit Aussiedlern	1	2	3	4	5	
...mit Türken in Deutschland	1	2	3	4	5	
...mit Asylbewerbern	1	2	3	4	5	
...mit Amerikanern	1	2	3	4	5	
...mit Menschen in der dritten Welt	1	2	3	4	5	

Wie oft vergleichst du Euch...

	gar nicht oft					sehr oft
	1	2	3	4	5	
...mit Deutschen	1	2	3	4	5	
...mit Eurer Situation früher	1	2	3	4	5	
...mit Aussiedlern	1	2	3	4	5	
...mit Türken in Deutschland	1	2	3	4	5	
...mit Asylbewerbern	1	2	3	4	5	
...mit Amerikanern	1	2	3	4	5	
...mit Menschen in der dritten Welt	1	2	3	4	5	

Diese Fragen sind nur für Schüler, die NICHT DEUTSCH sind:

Denke daran: ‚Deine Gruppe‘ ist die Gruppe, die du vorne gewählt hast!

Wie wichtig ist es für dich, Euch zu vergleichen mit Mitgliedern deiner eigenen Gruppe?

gar nicht wichtig	1	2	3	4	5	sehr wichtig
-------------------	---	---	---	---	---	--------------

Wie oft vergleichst du Euch mit Mitgliedern deiner eigenen Gruppe?

gar nicht oft	1	2	3	4	5	sehr oft
---------------	---	---	---	---	---	----------

Wie wichtig ist es für dich, Euch zu vergleichen mit Menschen in dem Land, aus dem du und/oder deine Eltern kommen?

gar nicht wichtig	1	2	3	4	5	sehr wichtig
-------------------	---	---	---	---	---	--------------

Wie oft vergleichst du Euch mit Menschen in dem Land, aus dem du und/oder deine Eltern kommen?

gar nicht oft	1	2	3	4	5	sehr oft
---------------	---	---	---	---	---	----------

Wenn du darüber nachdenkst oder redest, wie es Dir und Deiner Familie geht, was ist dann am wichtigsten für dich im Vergleich? Schreibe eine Sache auf, die für dich am wichtigsten ist. Das kann eines der Dinge sein, nach denen wir schon gefragt haben, oder etwas ganz Neues. Schreibe **nur eine** Sache auf, ohne lange nachzudenken!

Am wichtigsten ist mir, unsere Situation zu vergleichen mit _____

Denke jetzt bitte noch einmal über deine Antworten nach.

Warum sind einige Vergleiche wichtiger für dich als andere,

wenn du über die Situation von dir und deiner Familie nachdenkst oder redest?

Es gibt viele gute Gründe, warum Menschen sich vergleichen. Keiner dieser Gründe ist schlecht.

Denke daran, dass keiner deine Antworten sehen wird!

	stimmt nie					stimmt immer				
Ich interessiere mich für Vergleiche, die mir helfen, unsere Situation so genau und so richtig wie möglich einzuschätzen	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
Ich interessiere mich für Vergleiche, die mir helfen, mich gut zu fühlen	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
Ich interessiere mich für Vergleiche, die zeigen, dass <u>wir</u> (und andere Mitglieder unserer Gruppe) ungerecht behandelt werden und wir weniger kriegen, als uns zusteht	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
Ich interessiere mich für Vergleiche, die zeigen, dass Mitglieder <u>anderer</u> Gruppen ungerecht behandelt werden und weniger kriegen, als ihnen zusteht	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5

Wenn du drüber nachdenkst oder redest, wie es Dir und Deiner Familie geht, warum vergleichst du Euch dann **mit früher**?

	stimmt nicht					stimmt				
Damit ich unsere Situation heute so genau und so richtig wie möglich einschätzen kann	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
Weil ich mich dann gut fühle	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
Um zu zeigen, dass <u>wir</u> (ich und meine Familie) ungerecht behandelt werden und wir weniger kriegen, als uns zusteht	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5

Diese Fragen sind nur für Schüler, die DEUTSCH sind.

Nur DEUTSCHE Schüler sollen diesen Kasten beantworten.

Alle anderen Schüler sollen den Kasten auf der nächsten Seite beantworten.

Wenn du darüber nachdenkst oder redest, wie es Dir und Deiner Familie geht, warum vergleichst du Euch dann **mit anderen Deutschen**?

	stimmt nicht		stimmt		
Damit ich unsere Situation so genau und so richtig wie möglich einschätzen kann	1	2	3	4	5
Weil ich mich dann gut fühle	1	2	3	4	5
Um zu zeigen, dass <u>wir</u> (ich und meine Familie) ungerecht behandelt werden und wir weniger kriegen, als uns zusteht	1	2	3	4	5
Um zu zeigen, dass <u>andere</u> Deutsche ungerecht behandelt werden und weniger kriegen, als ihnen zusteht	1	2	3	4	5

Wenn du drüber nachdenkst oder redest, wie es Dir und Deiner Familie geht, warum vergleichst du Euch dann **mit Mitgliedern anderer Gruppen** in Deutschland (zum Beispiel mit Türken, Aussiedlern, Asylbewerbern)?

	stimmt nicht		stimmt		
Damit ich unsere Situation so genau und so richtig wie möglich einschätzen kann	1	2	3	4	5
Weil ich mich dann gut fühle	1	2	3	4	5
Um zu zeigen, dass <u>wir</u> (meine Familie und andere Deutsche) ungerecht behandelt werden und wir weniger kriegen, als uns zusteht	1	2	3	4	5
Um zu zeigen, dass Mitglieder <u>anderer</u> Gruppen ungerecht behandelt werden und weniger kriegen, als ihnen zusteht	1	2	3	4	5

Diese Fragen sind nur für Schüler, die NICHT DEUTSCH sind:
Nur NICHT-DEUTSCHE Schüler sollen diesen Kasten beantworten.
Alle deutschen Schüler sollen auf der nächsten Seite weitermachen.

Wenn du darüber nachdenkst oder redest, wie es Dir und Deiner Familie geht, warum vergleichst du Euch dann **mit anderen Mitgliedern deiner Gruppe** in Deutschland?

	stimmt nicht		stimmt		
Damit ich unsere Situation so genau und so richtig wie möglich einschätzen kann	1	2	3	4	5
Weil ich mich dann gut fühle	1	2	3	4	5
Um zu zeigen, dass <u>wir</u> (ich und meine Familie) ungerecht behandelt werden und wir weniger kriegen, als uns zusteht	1	2	3	4	5
Um zu zeigen, dass <u>andere</u> Mitglieder unserer Gruppe ungerecht behandelt werden und weniger kriegen, als ihnen zusteht	1	2	3	4	5

Wenn du drüber nachdenkst oder redest, wie es Dir und Deiner Familie geht, warum vergleichst du Euch dann **mit Deutschen**?

	stimmt nicht		stimmt		
Damit ich unsere Situation so genau und so richtig wie möglich einschätzen kann	1	2	3	4	5
Weil ich mich dann gut fühle	1	2	3	4	5
Um zu zeigen, dass <u>wir</u> (meine Familie und andere Mitglieder meiner Gruppe) ungerecht behandelt werden und wir weniger kriegen, als uns zusteht	1	2	3	4	5
Um zu zeigen, dass <u>Deutsche</u> ungerecht behandelt werden und weniger kriegen, als ihnen zusteht	1	2	3	4	5

Wie geht es dir und deiner Familie im Vergleich zu...

	viel schlechter				viel besser
...Deutschen	1	2	3	4	5
...früher	1	2	3	4	5
...Aussiedlern	1	2	3	4	5
...Türken in Deutschland	1	2	3	4	5
...Asylbewerbern	1	2	3	4	5
...Amerikanern	1	2	3	4	5
...Menschen in der dritten Welt	1	2	3	4	5

Diese Fragen sind nur für Schüler, die NICHT DEUTSCH sind:

Wie geht es dir und deiner Familie im Vergleich zu Mitgliedern deiner eigenen Gruppe?

viel schlechter	1	2	3	4	5	viel besser
-----------------	---	---	---	---	---	-------------

Wie geht es dir und deiner Familie im Vergleich zu Menschen in dem Land, aus dem du und/oder deine Eltern kommen?

viel schlechter	1	2	3	4	5	viel besser
-----------------	---	---	---	---	---	-------------

Denke weiter an Dich und Deine Familie.

Insgesamt gesehen, Wie geht es Dir und deiner Familie?

sehr schlecht	1	2	3	4	5	sehr gut
---------------	---	---	---	---	---	----------

Wie zufrieden bist du mit der Situation dir und deiner Familie?

sehr unzufrieden	1	2	3	4	5	sehr zufrieden
------------------	---	---	---	---	---	----------------

Wie traurig bist du, wenn du über Eure Situation nachdenkst?

gar nicht traurig	1	2	3	4	5	sehr traurig
-------------------	---	---	---	---	---	--------------

Wie sauer bist du, wenn du über Eure Situation nachdenkst?

gar nicht sauer	1	2	3	4	5	sehr sauer
-----------------	---	---	---	---	---	------------

Nun denke an deine ganze Gruppe (in Deutschland), das heisst die Gruppe, die du am Anfang angekreuzt hast.

Insgesamt gesehen, Wie geht es deiner Gruppe?

sehr schlecht	1	2	3	4	5	sehr gut
---------------	---	---	---	---	---	----------

Wie zufrieden bist du mit der Situation deiner Gruppe?

sehr unzufrieden	1	2	3	4	5	sehr zufrieden
------------------	---	---	---	---	---	----------------

Wie traurig bist du, wenn du über die Situation deiner Gruppe nachdenkst?

gar nicht traurig	1	2	3	4	5	sehr traurig
-------------------	---	---	---	---	---	--------------

Wie sauer bist du, wenn du über die Situation deiner Gruppe nachdenkst?

gar nicht sauer	1	2	3	4	5	sehr sauer
-----------------	---	---	---	---	---	------------

Bei den nächsten Fragen musst du manchmal etwas schreiben,
manchmal nur ankreuzen:

Wie alt bist du?	_____ Jahre
Bist du.....	ein Junge <input type="checkbox"/> ein Mädchen <input type="checkbox"/>
In welchem Land bist du geboren ?	
Wenn du nicht in Deutschland geboren bist: Wie lange lebst du schon in Deutschland?	<input type="checkbox"/> kürzer als 1 ^{1/2} Jahre <input type="checkbox"/> 1 ^{1/2} – 3 Jahre <input type="checkbox"/> länger als 3 Jahre
Welche Staatsangehörigkeit hast du? (unter Umständen mehrere)	<input type="checkbox"/> die russische <input type="checkbox"/> die deutsche <input type="checkbox"/> die türkische <input type="checkbox"/> eine andere: _____
Aus welchem Land kommt dein Vater?	<input type="checkbox"/> Deutschland <input type="checkbox"/> Türkei <input type="checkbox"/> Russland <input type="checkbox"/> anderes Land: _____
Aus welchem Land kommt deine Mutter?	<input type="checkbox"/> Deutschland <input type="checkbox"/> Türkei <input type="checkbox"/> Russland <input type="checkbox"/> anderes Land: _____

Wenn du irgendwelche Anmerkungen, Fragen oder Vorschläge zu diesem Fragebogen hast, schreibe sie bitte hier auf:

Vielen Dank für deine Hilfe!

Questionnaire for study 4

Note that the comparison interest items were randomised with Latin square method. There were seven different orders.

Note that the motive questions were randomised with Latin square method. There were four different orders.

Note that the specific motive questions were a between subjects factor. Reproduced is a questionnaire for the „intragroup“ condition. Questions for the „temporal“ and „intergroup“ conditions are attached at the back of the questionnaire. In total, there were 84 different versions of this questionnaire.

Lieber Schüler, liebe Schülerin!

Auf den folgenden Seiten wirst du ein paar Fragen zu verschiedenen Themen finden. Uns interessiert deine eigene Meinung.

Bitte kreise bei jeder Frage die Zahl ein, die deine Meinung am besten wiedergibt.

Beispiel:

Wie ist das Wetter heute?

besonders schlecht	1	2	3	4	5	besonders gut
--------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---------------

Kreise die **1** ein, wenn das Wetter besonders schlecht ist.

Kreise die **5** ein, wenn das Wetter besonders gut ist.

Kreise die **3** ein, wenn das Wetter mittelmäßig ist, so, wie es hier gemacht ist.

Kreise die **4** ein, wenn das Wetter recht gut, aber nicht besonders gut ist.

Kreise die **2** ein, wenn das Wetter recht schlecht, aber nicht besonders schlecht ist.

❖ Nur deine Meinung ist wichtig!

Es ist egal, was deine Freunde antworten würden.

Es ist sehr wichtig, dass du ehrlich antwortest.

Es gibt keine richtigen oder falschen Antworten.

❖ Es wird niemand erfahren, wie du geantwortet hast!

Du musst nirgendwo deinen Namen nennen.

In Deutschland gibt es viele verschiedene Gruppen. Es gibt Menschen aus verschiedenen Ländern, mit verschiedenen Sprachen, Lebensweisen, Kulturen, Hautfarben, Religionen... Zu welcher Gruppe gehörest du? Schau dir alle Gruppen in dem Kasten genau an und mache ein Kreuz hinter der Gruppe, zu der du gehörst. Einige von euch gehören vielleicht zu mehreren der Gruppen. Wähle aber auf jeden Fall nur eine Gruppe, und mache nur ein Kreuz! Wähle die Gruppe, die dir am wichtigsten ist und zu der du am meisten gehörest.

Deutsche	0
Türken	0
Libanesen	0
Bosnien-Herzegoviner	0
Marokkaner	0
Kurden	0
Spanier	0
Aussiedler	0
Amerikaner	0

Wenn du zu einer Gruppe gehörst, die nicht hier steht, schreibe den Namen deiner Gruppe hier hin: _____

Bei allen Fragen über „deine Gruppe“ denke immer an die Gruppe, die du hier gewählt hast. Das ist „deine Gruppe“.

	gar nicht					sehr
Wenn du darüber nachdenkst, wer du bist, siehst du dich als ein Mitglied deiner Gruppe?	1	2	3	4	5	
Gefällt es dir, ein Mitglied deiner Gruppe zu sein?	1	2	3	4	5	
Ist es wichtig für dich, ein Mitglied deiner Gruppe zu sein?	1	2	3	4	5	
Bist du froh, ein Mitglied deiner Gruppe zu sein?	1	2	3	4	5	

**Einigen Menschen geht es gut im Leben, und anderen geht es nicht so gut.
Einige Menschen haben eine gute Arbeit und viel Geld.
Sie leben in großen Häusern und können sich alles kaufen, was sie wollen.
Anderen Menschen geht es nicht so gut und sie können das nicht machen.
Was für Vergleiche machst du, wenn du über die Situation von dir und deiner
Familie nachdenkst oder redest?**

Wie wichtig ist es für dich, euch zu vergleichen...

	gar nicht wichtig					sehr wichtig
...mit Deutschen	1	2	3	4	5	
...mit Eurer Situation früher	1	2	3	4	5	
...mit Aussiedlern	1	2	3	4	5	
...mit Türken in Deutschland	1	2	3	4	5	
...mit Asylbewerbern	1	2	3	4	5	
...mit Amerikanern	1	2	3	4	5	
...mit Menschen in der dritten Welt	1	2	3	4	5	

Wie oft vergleichst du euch...

	gar nicht oft					sehr oft
...mit Deutschen	1	2	3	4	5	
...mit Eurer Situation früher	1	2	3	4	5	
...mit Aussiedlern	1	2	3	4	5	
...mit Türken in Deutschland	1	2	3	4	5	
...mit Asylbewerbern	1	2	3	4	5	
...mit Amerikanern	1	2	3	4	5	
...mit Menschen in der dritten Welt	1	2	3	4	5	

**Welche Gruppe hast du vorne angekreuzt? Dieser Kasten ist nur für Schüler, die etwas anderes als ‚deutsch‘ angekreuzt haben.
Alle Schüler, die ‚deutsch‘ angekreuzt haben, sollen auf der nächsten Seite weitermachen. Alle anderen sollen zuerst die Fragen in diesem Kasten beantworten.**

Wie wichtig ist es für dich, euch zu vergleichen mit Mitgliedern deiner eigenen Gruppe?

gar nicht wichtig	1	2	3	4	5	sehr wichtig
-------------------	---	---	---	---	---	--------------

Wie oft vergleichst du euch mit Mitgliedern deiner eigenen Gruppe?

gar nicht oft	1	2	3	4	5	sehr oft
---------------	---	---	---	---	---	----------

Wie wichtig ist es für dich, Euch zu vergleichen mit Menschen in dem Land, aus dem du und/oder deine Eltern kommen?

gar nicht wichtig	1	2	3	4	5	sehr wichtig
-------------------	---	---	---	---	---	--------------

Wie oft vergleichst du euch mit Menschen in dem Land, aus dem du und/oder deine Eltern kommen?

gar nicht oft	1	2	3	4	5	sehr oft
---------------	---	---	---	---	---	----------

Wenn du darüber nachdenkst oder redest, wie es dir und deiner Familie geht, was ist dann am Wichtigsten für dich im Vergleich? Schreibe eine Sache auf, die für dich am wichtigsten ist. Das kann eines der Dinge sein, nach denen wir schon gefragt haben, oder etwas ganz Neues. Schreibe **nur eine** Sache auf, ohne lange nachzudenken!

Am wichtigsten ist mir,
unsere Situation zu vergleichen mit der Situation von _____

Wie geht es dir und deiner Familie im Vergleich zu...

	viel schlechter					viel besser				
...Deutschen	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
...früher	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
...Aussiedlern	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
...Türken in Deutschland	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
...Asylbewerbern	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
...Amerikanern	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
...Menschen in der dritten Welt	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5

Welche Gruppe hast du vorne angekreuzt?

Dieser Kasten ist nur für Schüler, die etwas anderes als ‚deutsch‘ angekreuzt haben. Alle Schüler, die ‚deutsch‘ angekreuzt haben, sollen unter dem Kasten weitermachen. Alle anderen sollen zuerst die Fragen in diesem Kasten beantworten.

Wie geht es dir und deiner Familie im Vergleich zu Mitgliedern deiner eigenen Gruppe?

viel schlechter 1 2 3 4 5 viel besser

Wie geht es dir und deiner Familie im Vergleich zu Menschen in dem Land, aus dem du und/oder deine Eltern kommen?

viel schlechter 1 2 3 4 5 viel besser

Denke weiter an dich und deine Familie.

Insgesamt gesehen, Wie geht es dir und deiner Familie?

sehr schlecht 1 2 3 4 5 sehr gut

Wie zufrieden bist du mit der Situation dir und deiner Familie?

sehr unzufrieden 1 2 3 4 5 sehr zufrieden

Wie traurig bist du, wenn du über eure Situation nachdenkst?

gar nicht traurig 1 2 3 4 5 sehr traurig

Wie sauer bist du, wenn du über eure Situation nachdenkst?

gar nicht sauer 1 2 3 4 5 sehr sauer

Nun denke an deine ganze Gruppe in Deutschland, das heisst die Gruppe, die du vorne angekreuzt hast.

Insgesamt gesehen, Wie geht es deiner Gruppe?

sehr schlecht	1	2	3	4	5	sehr gut
---------------	---	---	---	---	---	----------

Wie zufrieden bist du mit der Situation deiner Gruppe?

sehr unzufrieden	1	2	3	4	5	sehr zufrieden
------------------	---	---	---	---	---	----------------

Wie traurig bist du, wenn du über die Situation deiner Gruppe nachdenkst?

gar nicht traurig	1	2	3	4	5	sehr traurig
-------------------	---	---	---	---	---	--------------

Wie sauer bist du, wenn du über die Situation deiner Gruppe nachdenkst?

gar nicht sauer	1	2	3	4	5	sehr sauer
-----------------	---	---	---	---	---	------------

Denke jetzt bitte noch einmal über deine Antworten nach.

Warum sind einige Vergleiche wichtiger für dich als andere, wenn du über die Situation von dir und deiner Familie nachdenkst oder redest? Es gibt viele gute Gründe, warum Menschen sich vergleichen. Keiner dieser Gründe ist schlecht. Denke daran, dass keiner deine Antworten sehen wird! Es ist wichtig, dass du ehrlich antwortest.

	stimmt nie					stimmt immer				
Ich interessiere mich für Vergleiche, die mir helfen, unsere Situation so genau und so richtig wie möglich einzuschätzen	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
Ich interessiere mich für Vergleiche, die mir helfen, mich gut zu fühlen	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
Ich interessiere mich für Vergleiche, die zeigen, dass <u>wir</u> (und andere Mitglieder unserer Gruppe) ungerecht behandelt werden und wir weniger kriegen, als uns zusteht	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
Ich interessiere mich für Vergleiche, die zeigen, dass Mitglieder <u>anderer</u> Gruppen ungerecht behandelt werden und weniger kriegen, als ihnen zusteht	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5

<u>Wie sehr stimmen diese Sätze?</u>	stimmt gar nicht			stimmt sehr	
	1	2	3	4	5
Mitglieder meiner Gruppe werden ungerecht behandelt und haben es schwerer als andere	1	2	3	4	5
Mitglieder meiner Gruppe müssen mehr Kämpfen, um das zu kriegen, was ihnen zusteht	1	2	3	4	5
Wenn es Mitgliedern meiner Gruppe nicht so gut geht, ist es meistens ihre eigenen Schuld (weil sie sich nicht genug anstrengen)	1	2	3	4	5
Ich möchte, dass Leute endlich merken, dass viele Mitglieder meiner Gruppe ungerecht behandelt werden	1	2	3	4	5
Den Leuten muss klar werden, dass die meisten Mitglieder meiner Gruppe nicht das kriegen, was ihnen zusteht	1	2	3	4	5
Ich höre immer gut zu, wenn jemand etwas Gutes über meine Gruppe sagt	1	2	3	4	5
Ich mag es nicht, schlechte Dinge über meine Gruppe zu Hören	1	2	3	4	5

Wenn du darüber nachdenkst oder redest, wie es dir und deiner Familie geht, vergleichst du euch bestimmt manchmal **mit anderen Mitgliedern deiner Gruppe** in Deutschland. Warum?

	stimmt nicht			stimmt	
	1	2	3	4	5
Damit ich unsere Situation so genau und so richtig wie möglich einschätzen kann	1	2	3	4	5
Weil ich mich dann gut fühle	1	2	3	4	5
Um zu zeigen, dass <u>wir</u> (ich und meine Familie) ungerecht behandelt werden und wir weniger kriegen, als uns zusteht	1	2	3	4	5
Um zu zeigen, dass <u>andere</u> Mitglieder unserer Gruppe ungerecht behandelt werden und weniger kriegen, als ihnen zusteht	1	2	3	4	5

Bitte mache auf der nächsten Seite weiter.

Bei den nächsten Fragen musst du manchmal etwas schreiben, manchmal nur ankreuzen:

Wie alt bist du?	_____ Jahre
Bist du.....	<input type="checkbox"/> ein Junge <input type="checkbox"/> ein Mädchen
In welchem Land bist du geboren ?	
Wenn du nicht in Deutschland geboren bist: Wie lange lebst du schon in Deutschland?	<input type="checkbox"/> kürzer als 1 ^{1/2} Jahre <input type="checkbox"/> 1 ^{1/2} – 3 Jahre <input type="checkbox"/> länger als 3 Jahre
Welche Staatsangehörigkeit hast du? (unter Umständen mehrere)	<input type="checkbox"/> die deutsche <input type="checkbox"/> die türkische <input type="checkbox"/> libanesische <input type="checkbox"/> eine andere, und zwar: _____
Aus welchem Land kommt dein Vater?	<input type="checkbox"/> Deutschland <input type="checkbox"/> Türkei <input type="checkbox"/> Libanon <input type="checkbox"/> anderes Land, und zwar: _____
Aus welchem Land kommt deine Mutter?	<input type="checkbox"/> Deutschland <input type="checkbox"/> Türkei <input type="checkbox"/> Libanon <input type="checkbox"/> anderes Land, und zwar: _____
Was ist deine Muttersprache?	<input type="checkbox"/> Deutsch <input type="checkbox"/> Türkisch <input type="checkbox"/> Arabisch <input type="checkbox"/> eine andere Sprache, und zwar: _____
Wenn du träumst ist das meistens in...	<input type="checkbox"/> Deutsch <input type="checkbox"/> Türkisch <input type="checkbox"/> Arabisch <input type="checkbox"/> eine andere Sprache, und zwar: _____

Dieser Kasten ist nur für Schüler, die nicht Deutsch als Muttersprache haben.

Wie oft sprichst du in der Schule deine eigene Muttersprache?

gar nicht oft	1	2	3	4	5	sehr oft
---------------	---	---	---	---	---	----------

Wie schwierig findest du es, Deutsch zu sprechen?

gar nicht schwierig	1	2	3	4	5	sehr schwierig
---------------------	---	---	---	---	---	----------------

Wie wichtig finden deine Eltern es, dass du gut Deutsch sprechen lernst?

gar nicht wichtig	1	2	3	4	5	sehr wichtig
-------------------	---	---	---	---	---	--------------

Wie wichtig finden deine Eltern es, dass du deine Muttersprache gut sprichst?

gar nicht wichtig	1	2	3	4	5	sehr wichtig
-------------------	---	---	---	---	---	--------------

Wenn du in der Schule deine eigene Sprache sprichst, warum tust du das?
(Du kannst mehr als ein Kreuz machen, wenn du möchtest):

- Weil das einfacher ist
- Weil ich Deutsch nicht mag
- Weil bestimmte Leute nicht verstehen sollen, was ich sage

Was würdest du am liebsten machen, um dein Deutsch zu verbessern?

- Bücher lesen
- Selber schreiben (Tagebuch, Briefe)
- Zeitung lesen

Wenn du irgendwelche Anmerkungen, Fragen oder Vorschläge zu diesem Fragebogen hast,
schreibe sie bitte hier auf:

Vielen Dank für deine Hilfe!

The “temporal” condition

Wenn du drüber nachdenkst oder redest, wie es dir und deiner Familie geht, warum vergleichst du euch dann **mit früher**?

	stimmt nicht		stimmt		
Damit ich unsere Situation heute so genau und so richtig wie möglich einschätzen kann	1	2	3	4	5
Weil ich mich dann gut fühle	1	2	3	4	5
Um zu zeigen, dass <u>wir</u> (ich und meine Familie) ungerecht behandelt werden und wir jetzt weniger kriegen, als uns zusteht	1	2	3	4	5
Um zu zeigen, dass <u>wir</u> (ich und meine Familie) früher ungerecht behandelt wurden und weniger gekriegt haben, als uns zustand	1	2	3	4	5

The „intergroup“ condition

Welche Gruppe hast du vorne angekreuzt? Hast du ‚deutsch‘ angekreuzt oder etwas anderes?

Alle Schüler, die etwas anderes als ‚deutsch‘ angekreuzt haben, sollen den ersten Kasten beantworten.

Alle Schüler, die ‚deutsch‘ angekreuzt haben, sollen den zweiten Kasten beantworten.

Kasten 1:

Diese Fragen sind nur für Schüler, die NICHT ‚deutsch‘ angekreuzt haben.

Wenn du darüber nachdenkst oder redest, wie es dir und deiner Familie geht, vergleichst du euch bestimmt manchmal **mit Deutschen**. Warum?

	stimmt nicht		stimmt		
Damit ich unsere Situation so genau und so richtig wie möglich einschätzen kann	1	2	3	4	5
Weil ich mich dann gut fühle	1	2	3	4	5
Um zu zeigen, dass <u>wir</u> (meine Familie und andere Mitglieder meiner Gruppe) ungerecht behandelt werden und wir weniger kriegen, als uns zusteht	1	2	3	4	5
Um zu zeigen, dass <u>Deutsche</u> ungerecht behandelt werden und weniger kriegen, als ihnen zusteht	1	2	3	4	5

Kasten 2:

Diese Fragen sind nur für Schüler, die ‚deutsch‘ angekreuzt haben.

Wenn du darüber nachdenkst oder redest, wie es dir und deiner Familie geht, vergleichst du euch bestimmt manchmal **mit Mitgliedern anderer Gruppen** in Deutschland (zum Beispiel mit Türken, Aussiedlern, Asylbewerbern). Warum?

	stimmt nicht		stimmt		
Damit ich unsere Situation so genau und so richtig wie möglich einschätzen kann	1	2	3	4	5
Weil ich mich dann gut fühle	1	2	3	4	5
Um zu zeigen, dass <u>wir</u> (meine Familie und andere Deutsche) ungerecht behandelt werden und wir weniger kriegen, als uns zusteht	1	2	3	4	5
Um zu zeigen, dass Mitglieder <u>anderer</u> Gruppen ungerecht behandelt werden und weniger kriegen, als ihnen zusteht	1	2	3	4	5

Appendix 4:

Questionnaire for study 5

Note that the comparison interest items were randomised. Thus, there were seven different versions of this questionnaire.

Study on how you see yourself and your group

On the following pages you will find some questions about different things.

We are interested in your personal opinion.

Please circle a number for every question.

Circle the number that reflects your opinion best.

Example:

How is the weather today?

very bad	1	2	3	4	5	very good
----------	---	---	---	---	---	-----------

Circle the **1** if the weather is really very bad.

Circle the **5** if the weather is really very good.

Circle the **3** – like it was done here - if the weather is average, that means neither good nor bad.

Circle the **4** if the weather is pretty good, but not very good.

Circle the **2** if the weather is pretty bad, but not very bad.

- ☺ It does not matter what other people would answer, it only matters how you yourself see things.
- ☺ It is important that you answer honestly.
- ☺ There are no right or wrong answers.
- ☺ You do not have to give your name, so no one will find out what your answers were.

Please fill in today's date: ____/____/____

Which group do you belong to?

In this country there are a lot of different groups: There are people from different countries, cultures, religions, or ethnic groups. We would like to know which group you belong to. Please look at all the groups below and choose the one group you belong to most.

Some people might feel that they belong to more than one group.

However, **you should only choose one group**. Choose the one group you feel most strongly about, that is the group you belong to most! Tick the circle for that group.

Indian	<input type="radio"/>
Black African	<input type="radio"/>
Afro Caribbean	<input type="radio"/>
Pakistani	<input type="radio"/>
Turkish	<input type="radio"/>
Kurdish	<input type="radio"/>
Greek	<input type="radio"/>
White British	<input type="radio"/>
Non-white British	<input type="radio"/>
If the group which you belong to the most is not listed above, please write it down here _____	

Important: Whenever we ask you a question about your group, think about the group you have chosen here. That is 'your group'!

	not at all true			very true	
It is important to me to belong to my group	1	2	3	4	5
I see myself as a member of my group	1	2	3	4	5
I feel good about my group	1	2	3	4	5
I am glad to be a member of my group	1	2	3	4	5

Some of the questions below are very similar. Nevertheless, please answer them all.
 Note also: Some questions talk about 'members of minority groups in England'. Everyone who did NOT choose the group 'white British' before is member of a minority group.

**As you know, some people are quite rich, and others are rather poor.
 Some people have good jobs and a lot of money.
 They live in nice houses and can buy many things.
 Others are not doing so well and cannot do that.**

**Think about how well-off you and your family are.
 Who do you compare with when you think or talk about your situation?**

How important is it for you to compare...

	not at all important			very important	
...with members of your own group	1	2	3	4	5
...with people in the country where you and/or your parents are from	1	2	3	4	5
...with members of other minority groups (not your own) in England (if you chose 'white British' before, think of members of <u>all</u> minority groups in England)	1	2	3	4	5
...with white British people	1	2	3	4	5
...with your own situation in the past	1	2	3	4	5
...with North Americans	1	2	3	4	5
...with people in the developing world	1	2	3	4	5

How often do you compare...

	not at all often			very often	
...with members of your own group	1	2	3	4	5
...with people in the country where you and/or your parents are from	1	2	3	4	5
...with members of other minority groups (not your own) in England (if you chose 'white British' before, think of members of <u>all</u> minority groups in England)	1	2	3	4	5
...with white British people	1	2	3	4	5
...with your own situation in the past	1	2	3	4	5
...with North Americans	1	2	3	4	5
...with people in the developing world	1	2	3	4	5

Who would be **most important** for you to compare with?

Look carefully at all the things below.

Then choose the one that is most important to you and tick the box (like this:).

Choose only one box!

White British
people

Your own situation
in the past

People in the country where you
and/or your parents are from

North Americans

Members of
your own
group

People in the
developing
world

Members of other minority groups
(not your own) in England
(if you chose 'white British' before,
think of members of all minority
groups in England)

Keep thinking about the situation of you and your family.

How are you actually doing compared to...

	much worse				much better
...white British people	1	2	3	4	5
...your own situation in the past	1	2	3	4	5
...North Americans	1	2	3	4	5
...people in the developing world	1	2	3	4	5
...members of your own group	1	2	3	4	5
...people in the country where you and/or your parents are from	1	2	3	4	5
... members of other minority groups (not your own) in England (if you chose 'white British' before, think of members of <u>all</u> minority groups in England)	1	2	3	4	5

Keep thinking about the situation of you and your family.

How does it make you feel to compare your situation to...

	very angry				very satisfied
...white British people	1	2	3	4	5
...your own situation in the past	1	2	3	4	5
...North Americans	1	2	3	4	5
...people in the developing world	1	2	3	4	5
...members of your own group	1	2	3	4	5
...people in the country where you and/or your parents are from	1	2	3	4	5
... members of other minority groups (not your own) in England (if you chose 'white British' before, think of members of <u>all</u> minority groups in England)	1	2	3	4	5

Keep thinking about the situation of you and your family.

	not at all				very
Overall, how well-off are you?	1	2	3	4	5
Overall, how satisfied are you with your situation?	1	2	3	4	5

Now think about the situation of your whole group in England (the group you chose before).

	not at all				very
Overall, how well-off is your group?	1	2	3	4	5
Overall, how satisfied are you with the situation of your group?	1	2	3	4	5

**For the next questions, it is important that you are honest.
Remember that no one will see your answers!**

How much do you agree?

Members of my group are treated unfairly and have it harder than others

disagree	1	2	3	4	5	agree
----------	---	---	---	---	---	-------

Members of my group have to fight more than others in order to get what they deserve

disagree	1	2	3	4	5	agree
----------	---	---	---	---	---	-------

If members of my group are not doing so well it is their own fault
(because they are not making enough of an effort)

disagree	1	2	3	4	5	agree
----------	---	---	---	---	---	-------

I want people to know that members of my group are treated unfairly

disagree	1	2	3	4	5	agree
----------	---	---	---	---	---	-------

People should realise that most members of my group get less than they deserve

disagree	1	2	3	4	5	agree
----------	---	---	---	---	---	-------

Members of my group should become more active and fight for their rights

disagree	1	2	3	4	5	agree
----------	---	---	---	---	---	-------

I want to emphasise things that are good about my group

disagree	1	2	3	4	5	agree
----------	---	---	---	---	---	-------

I want to see that my group is doing well

disagree	1	2	3	4	5	agree
----------	---	---	---	---	---	-------

I want to feel good about my group

disagree	1	2	3	4	5	agree
----------	---	---	---	---	---	-------

I always listen carefully when someone says something good about my group

disagree	1	2	3	4	5	agree
----------	---	---	---	---	---	-------

When someone says something bad about my group, I switch off and don't listen

disagree	1	2	3	4	5	agree
----------	---	---	---	---	---	-------

It is easy for members of minority groups to be considered British

disagree	1	2	3	4	5	agree
----------	---	---	---	---	---	-------

It is easy for members of minority groups to be fully accepted in Britain

disagree	1	2	3	4	5	agree
----------	---	---	---	---	---	-------

It might change a great deal in the future how members of my group are doing compared to members of other groups in England

disagree	1	2	3	4	5	agree
----------	---	---	---	---	---	-------

Do you feel British?

not at all	1	2	3	4	5	very much
------------	---	---	---	---	---	-----------

Do you try to live the British way of life?

not at all	1	2	3	4	5	very much
------------	---	---	---	---	---	-----------

Think about yourself.

	not at all				very
I feel good about myself	1	2	3	4	5
I am able to do most things as well as other people	1	2	3	4	5
I have much I can be proud of	1	2	3	4	5
I like myself	1	2	3	4	5
At times, I think I am not good at all	1	2	3	4	5

Here and on the next page, you will see the last few questions.

Please answer them all, because they are very important.

Your date of birth (Date/ Month/ Year)	___/___/_____
Your sex (boy/girl)	boy <input type="radio"/> girl <input type="radio"/>
In which country were you born?	_____

If you were not born in Britain , how long have you been living here?	Less than 1 year <input type="radio"/> 1 - 3 years <input type="radio"/> Longer than 3 years <input type="radio"/>
Which group does your father belong to?	_____
Which group does your mother belong to?	_____
Your first language	<input type="radio"/> English <input type="radio"/> Arabic <input type="radio"/> Turkish <input type="radio"/> other, and that is _____
Your religion	<input type="radio"/> Christian <input type="radio"/> Muslim <input type="radio"/> Hindu <input type="radio"/> other, and that is _____
Your shoe size	_____
The first letter of your mother's first name	_____
In which class did you fill out this questionnaire (e.g. philosophy, psychology)?	_____

If you have any questions or comments, please write them down here:

Thank you very much for your help!

Appendix 5:

Materials for studies 6 and 7:

- The four articles (experimental manipulations) for study 6
- Questionnaire for study 6
- The four articles (experimental manipulations) for study 7
- The questionnaire for the 'comparison interest' manipulation, study 7
- The questionnaire for the 'deprivation' manipulation, study 7

Article study 6: Personal deprivation low, Group deprivation low

Is Student Life Fun? A European Comparison

Students, just like everyone else, or maybe more than everyone else, enjoy having a good time. However, a good time is more easily had if money is at hand. A recent survey conducted by the European Union yielded some interesting data on a typical student's standard of living. Can the average student afford a car? Can he afford to travel abroad? How much money does a student have to eat out and buy trendy clothes? According to the survey, the answer the answer does not really vary a lot between European countries any more, as living standards for students are becoming more and more similar in different European countries. Take for instance Spain

The average Italian student is not doing particularly well these days and suffers from a pretty impoverished lifestyle. Only 20 % of Italian students have a car, and less than one out of ten has travelled to another continent like the USA, Australia or Asia. Overall, most Italian students are reported as feeling that they have to economise a lot and that they cannot afford most

things they desire.

Surprisingly, these figures do not place Italy below most other European countries. For instance in the wealthiest European countries, i.e. England, France and Germany, only 25 % of students are proud car owners, and only one out of 10 has travelled to another continent. These figures indicate that the traditionally 'economically weaker' countries like Italy and Spain are fast on the rise...

Gli studenti, come tutti gli altri o ancora di piu' degli altri, apprezzano i momenti di svago e divertimento. Tuttavia, il divertimento e' piu' accessibile se i soldi sono a portata di mano. Una recente indagine condotta dalla Comunita' Europea ha rilevato dati interessanti riguardo lo standard di vita di uno studente tipo. Uno studente medio puo' possedere una macchina? Puo' viaggiare all'estero? Quanti soldi ha uno studente per mangiare fuori e comperare vestiti di marca? In base alla ricerca condotta, la risposta a queste domande non varia piu' molto fra i vari Paesi europei poiche' gli standard di benessere degli studenti si stanno uniformando sempre di piu' nei diversi paesi europei. Per esempio la Spagna...

Lo studente medio italiano ha uno basso standard di vita e soffre di una scarsa agiatezza. Solo il 20% degli studenti italiani possiede una macchina propria, e meno di uno su dieci ha compiuto viaggi in un altro continente, come USA, Australia, o Asia. Complessivamente, la maggior parte degli studenti italiani ha dichiarato di sentire il bisogno di dover risparmiare e di non potersi permettere la maggior parte delle cose che desidera.

Inaspettatamente, questi dati non collocano l'Italia al disotto della media europea. Per esempio nei Paesi piu' ricchi come Inghilterra, Francia, Germania solo il 25% degli studenti sono orgogliosamente proprietari di una macchina e solo uno su dieci ha viaggiato in un altro continente. Questi dati indicano che i Paesi tradizionalmente "economicamente deboli" come Italia e Spagna stanno crescendo velocemente.

Article study 6: Personal deprivation low, Group deprivation high

Is Student Life Fun? A European Comparison

Students, just like everyone else, or maybe more than everyone else, enjoy having a good time. However, a good time is more easily had if money is at hand. A recent survey conducted by the European Union yielded some interesting data on a typical student's standard of living. Can the average student afford a car? Can he afford to travel abroad? How much money does a student have to eat out and buy trendy clothes? According to the survey, the answer very much depends on the European country the focus is on, as living standards for students are still very different in different European countries. Take for instance Spain

The average Italian student is not doing particularly well these days and suffers from a pretty impoverished lifestyle. Only 20 % of Italian students have a car, and less than one out of ten has travelled to another continent like the USA, Australia or Asia. Overall, most Italian students are reported as feeling that they have to economise a lot and that they cannot afford most

things they desire.

Not surprisingly, these figures place Italy below most other European countries. For instance in the wealthiest European countries, i.e. England, France and Germany, almost 40 % of students are proud car owners, and seven out of 10 have travelled to another continent. These figures indicate that the traditionally 'economically weaker' countries like Italy and Spain still have a long way to go...

Gli studenti, come tutti gli altri o ancora di piu' degli altri, apprezzano i momenti di svago e divertimento. Tuttavia, il divertimento e' piu' accessibile se i soldi sono a portata di mano. Una recente indagine condotta dalla Comunita' Europea ha rilevato dati interessanti riguardo lo standard di vita di uno studente tipo. Uno studente medio puo' possedere una macchina? Puo' viaggiare all'estero? Quanti soldi ha uno studente per mangiare fuori e comperare vestiti di marca? In base alla ricerca condotta, la risposta a queste domande dipende in gran parte dalla nazione in questione, poiche' gli standard di vita degli studenti sono ancora molto diversi nelle varie nazioni europee. Per esempio la Spagna...

Lo studente medio italiano ha un basso standard di vita e soffre di una scarsa agiatezza. Solo il 20% degli studenti italiani possiede una macchina propria e meno di uno su dieci ha compiuto viaggi in altri continenti come USA, Australia o Asia. Complessivamente, la maggior parte degli studenti italiani ha dichiarato di sentire il bisogno di risparmiare enormemente e di non potersi permettere la maggior parte delle cose che desidera.

Come prevedibile, questi dati collocano l'Italia al di sotto della media europea. Per esempio nei Paesi piu' ricchi come Inghilterra, Francia, Germania quasi il 40% degli studenti sono orgogliosamente proprietari di una macchina e sette su dieci hanno viaggiato in un altro continente. Questi dati indicano che i Paesi tradizionalmente "economicamente deboli" come Italia e Spagna hanno ancora molta strada da fare.

Article study 6: Personal deprivation high, Group deprivation low

Is Student Life Fun? A European Comparison

Students, just like everyone else, or maybe more than everyone else, enjoy having a good time. However, a good time is more easily had if money is at hand. A recent survey conducted by the European Union yielded some interesting data on a typical student's standard of living. Can the average student afford a car? Can he afford to travel abroad? How much money does a student have to eat out and buy trendy clothes? According to the survey, the answer does not really vary a lot between European countries any more, as living standards for students are becoming more and more similar in different European countries. Take for instance Spain

The average Italian student is doing very well these days and enjoys a pretty comfortable lifestyle. Almost 70 % of Italian students have a car, and almost one in three has travelled to another continent like the USA, Australia or Asia. Overall, most Italian students are reported as feeling that they do not have to economise at all and that they can afford

most things they desire.

Surprisingly, these figures do not place Italy below most other European countries. For instance in the wealthiest European countries, i.e. England, France and Germany, 75 % of students are proud car owners, and one in three has travelled to another continent. These figures indicate that the traditionally 'economically weaker' countries like Italy and Spain are fast on the rise...

Gli studenti, come tutti gli altri o ancora di piu' degli altri, apprezzano i momenti di svago e divertimento. Tuttavia, il divertimento e' piu' accessibile se i soldi sono a portata di mano. Una recente indagine condotta dalla Comunita' Europea ha rilevato dati interessanti riguardo lo standard di vita di uno studente tipo. Uno studente medio puo' possedere una macchina? Puo' viaggiare all'estero? Quanti soldi ha uno studente per mangiare fuori e comperare vestiti di marca? In base alla ricerca condotta, la risposta a queste domande non varia piu' molto fra i vari Paesi europei poiche' gli standard di benessere degli studenti si stanno uniformando sempre di piu' nelle diverse Nazioni europee. Per esempio la Spagna...

Lo studente medio italiano ha un alto standard di vita e gode di una generale agiatezza. Quasi il 70% degli studenti italiani possiede una macchina propria, e circa uno su tre ha compiuto viaggi in un altro continente, come USA, Australia, o Asia. Complessivamente, la maggior parte degli studenti italiani ha dichiarato di non sentire il bisogno di dover risparmiare e di potersi permettere la maggior parte delle cose che desidera.

Inaspettatamente, questi dati non collocano l'Italia al di sotto della media europea. Per esempio nei Paesi piu' ricchi come Inghilterra, Francia, Germania quasi il 75% degli studenti sono orgogliosamente proprietari di una macchina e uno su tre ha viaggiato in un altro continente. Questi dati indicano che i Paesi tradizionalmente "economicamente deboli" come Italia e Spagna stanno crescendo velocemente.

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Students, just like everyone else, or maybe more than everyone else, enjoy having a good time. However, a good time is more easily had if money is at hand. A recent survey conducted by the European Union yielded some interesting data on a typical student's standard of living. Can the average student afford a car? Can he afford to travel abroad? How much money does a student have to eat out and buy trendy clothes? According to the survey, the answer very much depends on the European country the focus is on, as living standards for students are still very different in different European countries. Take for instance Spain.

The average Italian student is doing very well these days and enjoys a pretty comfortable lifestyle. Almost 70% of Italian students have a car, and almost one in three has travelled to another continent like the USA, Australia or Asia. Overall, most Italian students are reported as feeling that they do not have to economise at all and that they can afford most things they desire.

Maybe as expected, these figures, although promising, still place Italy below most other European countries. For instance in the wealthiest European countries, i.e. England, France and Germany, almost 90% of students are proud car owners, and near enough everyone has travelled to another continent. These figures indicate that the traditionally 'economically weaker' countries like Italy and Spain still have a long way to go...

Gli studenti, come tutti gli altri o ancora di più degli altri, apprezzano i momenti di svago e divertimento. Tuttavia, il divertimento è più accessibile se i soldi sono a portata di mano. Una recente indagine condotta dalla Comunità Europea ha rilevato dati interessanti riguardo lo standard di vita di uno studente tipo. Uno studente medio può possedere una macchina? Può viaggiare all'estero? Quanti soldi ha uno studente per mangiare fuori e comperare vestiti di marca? In base alla ricerca condotta, la risposta a queste domande dipende in gran parte dalla nazione in questione, poiché gli standard di vita degli studenti sono ancora molto diversi nelle varie nazioni europee. Per esempio la Spagna...

Lo studente medio italiano ha un alto standard di vita e gode di una generale agiatezza. Quasi il 70% degli studenti italiani possiede una macchina propria, e circa uno su tre ha compiuto viaggi in un altro continente, come USA, Australia, o Asia. Complessivamente, la maggior parte degli studenti italiani ha dichiarato di non sentire il bisogno di dover risparmiare e di potersi permettere la maggior parte delle cose che desidera.

Come forse ci si aspettava, questi dati, sebbene promettenti collocano ancora l'Italia al di sotto della media europea. Per esempio, nelle nazioni più ricche come Inghilterra, Francia e Germania, quasi il 90% degli studenti sono orgogliosamente proprietari di una macchina e la quasi totalità ha viaggiato in un altro continente. Questi dati indicano che i Paesi tradizionalmente "economicamente deboli" come Italia e Spagna hanno ancora molta strada da fare.

Questionnaire study 6

Saremmo interessati a vedere cosa provi riguardo i seguenti punti.

Come valuti la **tua disponibilita' economica**?

molto scarsa	1	2	3	4	5	abbondante
--------------	---	---	---	---	---	------------

Generalmente, quanto arrabbiato o soddisfatto sei rispetto alla tua situazione?

molto arrabbiato	1	2	3	4	5	molto soddisfatto
------------------	---	---	---	---	---	-------------------

Come valuti la tua disponibilita' economica in confronto a quella degli altri studenti italiani?

pessima	1	2	3	4	5	ottima
---------	---	---	---	---	---	--------

Come valuti la tua disponibilita' economica in confronto a quella degli studenti di altre Nazioni europee?

pessima	1	2	3	4	5	ottima
---------	---	---	---	---	---	--------

Per favore, ora pensa alla situazione degli **studenti italiani**.

La situazione degli studenti italiani e' peggiore di quella degli studenti in altre Nazioni europee?

no, per niente	1	2	3	4	5	si, decisamente
----------------	---	---	---	---	---	-----------------

Gli studenti italiani hanno vita piu' difficile rispetto agli altri studenti europei?

no, per niente	1	2	3	4	5	si, decisamente
----------------	---	---	---	---	---	-----------------

Quanto arrabbiato o soddisfatto sei riguardo alla situazione degli studenti italiani?

molto arrabbiato	1	2	3	4	5	molto soddisfatto
------------------	---	---	---	---	---	-------------------

Avere una buona disponibilita' economica potrebbe essere molto importante per te, oppure potresti pensare che altre cose sono piu' importanti nella vita.

Quanto e' importante per te avere una buona disponibilita' economica?

per niente importante	1	2	3	4	5	molto importante
-----------------------	---	---	---	---	---	------------------

Quanto consideri importante possedere una macchina?

per niente importante	1	2	3	4	5	molto importante
-----------------------	---	---	---	---	---	------------------

Quanto consideri importante viaggiare all'estero?

per niente importante	1	2	3	4	5	molto importante
-----------------------	---	---	---	---	---	------------------

1. E' importante per me essere italiano.

Per niente d'accordo	1	2	3	4	5	Completamente d'accordo
----------------------	---	---	---	---	---	-------------------------

2. Io non ho molto in comune con gli altri italiani.

Per niente d'accordo	1	2	3	4	5	Completamente d'accordo
----------------------	---	---	---	---	---	-------------------------

3. Mi considero un italiano.

Per niente d'accordo	1	2	3	4	5	Completamente d'accordo
----------------------	---	---	---	---	---	-------------------------

4. Mi fa piacere essere italiano.

Per niente d'accordo	1	2	3	4	5	Completamente d'accordo
----------------------	---	---	---	---	---	-------------------------

5. Sono felice di essere italiano.

Per niente d'accordo	1	2	3	4	5	Completamente d'accordo
----------------------	---	---	---	---	---	-------------------------

1. Complessivamente, ho un'immagine positiva di me stesso.

Per niente d'accordo	1	2	3	4	5	Completamente d'accordo
----------------------	---	---	---	---	---	-------------------------

2. Sento che non ho molto di cui essere orgoglioso.

Per niente d'accordo	1	2	3	4	5	Completamente d'accordo
----------------------	---	---	---	---	---	-------------------------

3. Sono capace di fare le cose bene quanto gli altri.

Per niente d'accordo	1	2	3	4	5	Completamente d'accordo
----------------------	---	---	---	---	---	-------------------------

4. A volte penso di non essere affatto capace.

Per niente d'accordo	1	2	3	4	5	Completamente d'accordo
----------------------	---	---	---	---	---	-------------------------

5. La maggior parte delle volte, sono piuttosto soddisfatto di me.

Per niente d'accordo	1	2	3	4	5	Completamente d'accordo
----------------------	---	---	---	---	---	-------------------------

A volte, la vita delle persone dipende esclusivamente dalle loro scelte. Per esempio, possono essere molto attive o pigre e di conseguenza avranno quello che si meritano. Altre volte, pero', le persone non possono decidere autonomamente; per esempio quando sono discriminate o quando il sistema e' contro di loro.

Pensa a come ti senti rispetto a quanto sopra.

Pensi che dipenda da te come gestire la tua vita?

non dipende per niente da me	1	2	3	4	5	dipende interamente da me
---------------------------------	---	---	---	---	---	------------------------------

Chi e' responsabile per come sta andando?

non e' per niente una mia responsabilita'	1	2	3	4	5	sono interamente responsabile
--	---	---	---	---	---	----------------------------------

In alcuni Paesi, le persone sono piu' ricche in media che in altri. Qualche volta questo dipende dalle persone. Per esempio, puo' darsi che gli abitanti di Nazioni piu' ricche lavorino di piu', mentre quelli di nazioni piu' povere potrebbero essere meno volenterosi. Altre volte, non dipende completamente dalle persone. Per esempio, le nazioni piu' ricche potrebbero avere un'economia di dominanza sulle piu' povere, alcuni Paesi potrebbero essere penalizzati dalle scelte politiche di Bruxelles, o alcune nazioni potrebbero essere discriminate in diversi altri modi.

Pensa a qual'e' il benessere economico degli italiani in confronto agli altri Paesi europei.

Dipende dagli italiani determinare la propria situazione economica?

non dipende per niente da noi	1	2	3	4	5	dipende interamente da noi
----------------------------------	---	---	---	---	---	-------------------------------

Chi e' responsabile per l'attuale situazione italiana?

non e' per niente una nostra responsabilita'	1	2	3	4	5	e' interamente una nostra responsabilita'
---	---	---	---	---	---	--

Rifletti sull'articolo letto ancora una volta.

Quanto interessante hai trovato leggere un'articolo sulla disponibilita' economica di uno studente medio italiano?

per niente interessante	1	2	3	4	5	molto interessante
-------------------------	---	---	---	---	---	--------------------

Quanto interessante e' stato leggere un articolo riguardo il confronto tra studenti italiani e quelli di altri Paesi europei?

per niente interessante	1	2	3	4	5	molto interessante
-------------------------	---	---	---	---	---	--------------------

Per favore, indica di seguito:

Eta' (l'anno piu' vicino): _____

Sesso (M/F): _____

Nazionalita': _____

Possiedi una macchina? (si/no): _____

Hai mai compiuto viaggi in un altro continente? (si/no): _____

Se hai qualche suggerimento o commento, per favore scrivili nello spazio qui sotto:

Article study 7: comparison interest high

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Is Student Life Fun? An Inter-Nation Comparison

Students, just like everyone else, or maybe more than everyone else, enjoy having a good time. However, a good time is more easily had if money is at hand. A recent survey conducted by the statistical unit of UNESCO yielded some interesting data on a typical student's standard of living in a variety of countries. Can the average student afford a car? Can he afford to travel abroad? How much money does a student have to eat out and buy trendy clothes? According to the survey, the answer naturally depends on the country the focus is on.

However, one should be careful to compare only like and like, and not all comparisons between countries are valid and informative. Take for instance Turkey and Greece.

The story is different, however, when comparing countries like England and Italy. The standing of these two countries relative to each other can be interpreted in a valid, meaningful way, because they are similar to each other on most important dimensions, the survey emphasises. For instance, not only is the average age of students entering university very similar in Italy and England, but - due to the increasing harmonisation of degree programs in Europe - the average length of degree programs has also become very similar, thus making results obtained from this particular inter-nation comparison meaningful and useful.

The results of the 2001 research assessment exercise should be celebrated, says **Howard New**



An additional factor that makes the England-Italy comparison particularly useful is the fact that the two countries are both members of the EU. Thus, direct comparisons of income levels between the countries are straight-forward and unproblematic, since a common frame of reference and base for assessment is present in this situation.

Gli studenti, come tutti gli altri o ancora di piu' degli altri, apprezzano i momenti di svago e divertimento. Tuttavia, il divertimento è piu' accessibile se i soldi sono a portata di mano. Una recente indagine condotta dal dipartimento statistico dell'UNESCO ha rivelato dati interessanti riguardo allo standard di vita di uno studente tipico in vari paesi. Uno studente medio può possedere una macchina? Può viaggiare all'estero? Quanti soldi ha uno studente per mangiare fuori e comprare vestiti alla moda? Secondo la ricerca, la risposta dipende dal paese su cui si concentra l'attenzione.

Tuttavia, si dovrebbe fare attenzione e confrontare solo simili e simili e tenere presente che non tutti i confronti tra paesi sono validi ed informativi. Pensate per esempio alla Grecia ed alla Turchia.....

Tuttavia, la questione è diversa quando si confrontano paesi come l'Italia e l'Inghilterra. La posizione di questi due paesi in relazione l'uno all'altro, può essere interpretata in una maniera valida e significativa poichè sono simili sotto molti aspetti, come viene sottolineato dalle ricerche. Per esempio, l'età dello studente medio che inizia l'università è molto simile, anche- dovuto al fatto che i corsi di laurea in Europa sono sempre più in armonia fra di loro- la lunghezza media dei corsi di laurea è diventata molto simile, questo fa sì che i risultati ottenuti da questo confronto inter-nazionale siano utili e significativi. Un'altro fattore che rende il confronto Italia-Inghilterra particolarmente utile è il fatto che entrambi i paesi sono membri dell'UE. Perciò il confronto diretto dei livelli di entrate fra i due paesi sono semplici e senza problemi, poichè in questa circostanza esiste una struttura di referenza ed una base per la valutazione.

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However, one should be careful to compare only like and like, and not all comparisons between countries are valid and informative. Take for instance Turkey and Greece.

A similar story holds true when comparing countries like England and Italy. The standing of these two countries relative to each other cannot be interpreted in a valid, meaningful way, because they differ on several important dimensions, the survey emphasises. For instance, not only does the average age of students entering university differ substantially between Italy and England, but the average length of degree programs also differs a great deal, making it difficult to obtain meaningful information from this particular inter-nation comparison.

The results of the 2001 research assessment exercise should be celebrated, says **Howard Newt**



An additional factor that makes the England-Italy comparison particularly problematic is the fact that the two countries have different currencies (the Euro in Italy and the Pound in England). Economists frequently point out that direct comparisons of income levels between countries with different currencies are problematic, since a common frame of reference and base for assessment is lacking in those situations.

Gli studenti, come tutti gli altri o ancora di piu' degli altri, apprezzano i momenti di svago e divertimento. Tuttavia, il divertimento è piu' accessibile se i soldi sono a portata di mano. Una recente indagine condotta dal dipartimento statistico dell'UNESCO ha rivelato dati interessanti riguardo allo standard di vita di uno studente tipico in vari paesi. Uno studente medio può possedere una macchina? Può viaggiare all'estero? Quanti soldi ha uno studente per mangiare fuori e comprare vestiti alla moda? Secondo la ricerca, la risposta dipende dal paese su cui si concentra l'attenzione.

Tuttavia, si dovrebbe fare attenzione e confrontare solo simili e simili e tenere presente che non tutti i confronti tra paesi sono validi ed informativi. Pensate per esempio alla Grecia ed alla Turchia.....

Ed è la stessa cosa quando si confrontano paesi come l'Inghilterra e l'Italia. La posizione di questi due paesi, l'uno in relazione all'altro, non può essere interpretata in un modo valido e significativo, poichè sono diversi a vari livelli come viene sottolineato dalle ricerche. Per esempio, non è solo la grande differenza di età fra gli studenti italiani e inglesi che iniziano l'università, ma anche la lunghezza media dei corsi di laurea è molto diversa; ciò può causare dei problemi nell'ottenere informazioni rilevanti per il confronto fra le nazioni. Un'altro fattore che rende problematico il confronto è che l'Inghilterra e l'Italia hanno delle valute diverse (L'Euro in Italia e la Sterlina in Inghilterra). Gli economisti spesso ribadiscono che il confronto fra i livelli di entrate tra paesi con valute diverse è problematico, poichè mancano una struttura di riferimento comune ed una base per la valutazione in tali circostanze.

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According to the survey, the answer naturally depends on the country the focus is on, as living standards for students are still very different in different countries. Take for instance Turkey or Greece.

A similar story holds true when looking at countries like England and Italy. The average Italian student is doing reasonably well these days and enjoys quite a comfortable lifestyle. About 55 % of Italian students have access to a car, and almost one in three has travelled to another continent like the USA, Australia or Asia. Overall, most Italian students are reported as feeling that they do not have to economise unreasonably, and that they can afford the most important things that they desire. However, these figures, although promising, still place Italy below some other countries, like for instance England.

The results of the 2001 research assessment exercise should be celebrated, says **Howard New**



In England, one of the wealthiest countries in Europe, almost 80 % of students have access to a car, and nearly everyone has travelled to another continent. These figures indicate that traditionally 'economically weaker' countries like Italy still have a long way to go.

Gli studenti, come tutti gli altri o ancora di piu' degli altri, apprezzano i momenti di svago e divertimento. Tuttavia, il divertimento è piu' accessibile se i soldi sono a portata di mano. Una recente indagine condotta dal dipartimento statistico dell'UNESCO ha rivelato dati interessanti riguardo allo standard di vita di uno studente tipico in vari paesi. Uno studente medio può possedere una macchina? Può viaggiare all'estero? Quanti soldi ha uno studente per mangiare fuori e comprare vestiti alla moda? Secondo la ricerca, la risposta dipende dal paese su cui si concentra l'attenzione.

Secondo la ricerca, la risposta dipende dal paese su cui si concentra l'attenzione, poichè lo standard di vita degli studenti sono ancora molto diversi in paesi diversi. Pensate per esempio alla Grecia ed alla Turchia.....

Una storia simile può essere valida nel contesto di due paesi come l'Inghilterra e l'Italia. Lo studente italiano medio se la cava abbastanza bene al giorno d'oggi ed ha uno stile di vita abbastanza comodo. Circa il 55% degli studenti italiani ha un'auto a loro disposizione, e quasi uno su tre ha visitato un altro continente tipo USA, Australia o Asia. La maggior parte degli studenti italiani si sentono che non devono fare delle strepitose economie e possono permettersi le cose principali che desiderano. Tuttavia, sebbene queste cifre siano promettenti, l'Italia si trova ad un livello inferiore rispetto ad altri paesi, come l'Inghilterra per esempio. In Inghilterra, uno dei paesi più benestanti in Europa, quasi l'80% degli studenti ha un'auto a loro disposizione e quasi tutti hanno visitato un altro continente. Queste cifre dimostrano che paesi tradizionalmente "economicamente deboli" come l'Italia, hanno ancora molta strada da fare.....

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The results of the 2001 research assessment exercise should be celebrated, says **Howard Newt**



In England, where the cost of living is considerably higher than in most other European countries, only 30 % of students have access to a car, and not very many have travelled to another continent. These figures indicate that traditionally 'economically weaker' countries like Italy are fast on the rise.

Gli studenti, come tutti gli altri o ancora di piu' degli altri, apprezzano i momenti di svago e divertimento. Tuttavia, il divertimento è piu' accessibile se i soldi sono a portata di mano. Una recente indagine condotta dal dipartimento statistico dell'UNESCO ha rivelato dati interessanti riguardo allo standard di vita di uno studente tipico in vari paesi. Uno studente medio può possedere una macchina? Può viaggiare all'estero? Quanti soldi ha uno studente per mangiare fuori e comprare vestiti alla moda? Secondo la ricerca, la risposta dipende dal paese su cui si concentra l'attenzione.

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The questionnaire for the 'comparison interest' manipulation, study 7

Ora noi vorremmo farti alcune domande. Per favore rispondi onestamente e spontaneamente, ovvero non pensare per troppo tempo a una sola domanda. Per alcune domande ti può sembrare di non sapere la risposta corretta. Comunque non ci sono risposte giuste o sbagliate, devi solo indicare cosa provi rispetto a certe cose. È importante che tu risponda a tutte le domande. Se non sei sicuro su una domanda puoi cercare di fare una congettura approssimativa.

Quando pensi alla tua situazione economica e al tuo standard di vita, come pensi che sia?

molto scarsa	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	abbondante
--------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	------------

Ti consideri soddisfatto o insoddisfatto della tua condizione in generale?

molto insoddisfatto	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	molto soddisfatto
---------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	-------------------

Quando pensi alla situazione economica e agli standard di vita degli studenti italiani in generale, come senti la loro condizione?

molto scarsa	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	abbondante
--------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	------------

Sei soddisfatto o insoddisfatto della situazione degli studenti italiani in generale?

molto insoddisfatto	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	molto soddisfatto
---------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	-------------------

Quando confronti la tua situazione personale a quella degli studenti inglesi, come pensi che la tua sia?

pessima	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	ottima
---------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	--------

Sei soddisfatto o insoddisfatto quando paragoni la tua condizione personale a quella degli studenti inglesi?

molto insoddisfatto	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	molto soddisfatto
---------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	-------------------

Quando confronti la condizione degli studenti italiani in generale a quella degli studenti inglesi, come pensi che la loro sia?

pessima	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	ottima
---------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	--------

Ti consideri soddisfatto o insoddisfatto quando paragoni la condizione degli studenti italiani a quella degli studenti inglesi?

molto insoddisfatto	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	molto soddisfatto
---------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	-------------------

Come ti senti personalmente in confronto con gli altri studenti italiani?

molto insoddisfatto	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	molto soddisfatto
---------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	-------------------

Sei soddisfatto o insoddisfatto quando paragoni la tua situazione personale a quella degli altri studenti italiani?

molto insoddisfatto	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	molto soddisfatto
---------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	-------------------

Come ti senti personalmente se fai un paragone col tuo passato?

molto insoddisfatto	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	molto soddisfatto
---------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	-------------------

Sei soddisfatto o insoddisfatto quando paragoni la tua condizione personale di oggi a quella del tuo passato?

molto insoddisfatto	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	molto soddisfatto
---------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	-------------------

Come pensi che gli studenti italiani stiano oggi rispetto al passato?

molto peggio	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	molto meglio
--------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	--------------

Come ti senti quando confronti la situazione attuale degli studenti italiani a quella del passato?

molto insoddisfatto	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	molto soddisfatto
---------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	-------------------

	per niente d' accordo				d' accordo			
Penso che sia importante indicare che la situazione degli studenti italiani rispetto a quella degli studenti inglesi sia ingiusta	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Ascolto sempre attentamente quando qualcuno dice cose positive sull' Italia o sugli studenti italiani	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Credo che ognuno abbia la condizione che merita	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Non mi piace quando qualcuno dice cose negative sull' Italia e sugli studenti italiani	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	

	per niente d' accordo				d' accordo			
E' importante per me essere italiano	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Io non ho molto in comune con gli altri italiani	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Mi considero un italiano	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Mi fa piacere essere italiano	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Sono felice di essere italiano	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	

Quanto sarebbe interessante per te imparare di più sulla situazione degli studenti inglesi?

per niente interessante	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	molto interessante
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Quanto è importante per te sapere come stai in confronto con gli studenti inglesi?

non molto importante	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	molto importante
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Quanto è importante per te sapere come gli studenti italiani stanno in generale in confronto con gli studenti inglesi?

non molto importante	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	molto importante
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Quanto sarebbe interessante per te imparare di più sulla situazione degli altri studenti italiani?

per niente interessante	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	molto interessante
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Quanto è importante per te sapere come stai in confronto con gli altri studenti italiani?

non molto importante	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	molto importante
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Quanto sarebbe interessante per te imparare di più sulla condizione degli studenti italiani del passato?

per niente interessante	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	molto interessante
-------------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	--------------------

Quanto è importante per te sapere come stai personalmente in confronto con il tuo passato?

non molto importante	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	molto importante
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Quanto è importante per te sapere come gli studenti italiani stanno in generale in confronto con il passato?

non molto importante	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	molto importante
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Per favore, indica di seguito:

Eta' (l'anno piu' vicino): _____

Sesso (M/F): _____

Nazionalita': _____

Se hai qualche suggerimento o commento, per favore scrivili nello spazio qui sotto:

The questionnaire for the 'deprivation' manipulation, study 7

Ora noi vorremmo farti alcune domande. Per favore rispondi onestamente e spontaneamente, ovvero non pensare per troppo tempo a una sola domanda. Per alcune domande ti può sembrare di non sapere la risposta corretta. Comunque non ci sono risposte giuste o sbagliate, devi solo indicare cosa provi rispetto a certe cose. È importante che tu risponda a tutte le domande. Se non sei sicuro su una domanda puoi cercare di fare una congettura approssimativa.

Quanto sarebbe interessante per te imparare di più sulla situazione degli studenti inglesi?

per niente interessante	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	molto interessante
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Quanto è importante per te sapere come stai in confronto con gli studenti inglesi?

non molto importante	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	molto importante
----------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	------------------

Quanto è importante per te sapere come gli studenti italiani stanno in generale in confronto con gli studenti inglesi?

non molto importante	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	molto importante
----------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	------------------

Quanto sarebbe interessante per te imparare di più sulla situazione degli altri studenti italiani?

per niente interessante	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	molto interessante
-------------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	--------------------

Quanto è importante per te sapere come stai in confronto con gli altri studenti italiani?

non molto importante	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	molto importante
----------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	------------------

Quanto sarebbe interessante per te imparare di più sulla condizione degli studenti italiani del passato?

per niente interessante	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	molto interessante
-------------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	--------------------

Quanto è importante per te sapere come stai personalmente in confronto con il tuo passato?

non molto importante	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	molto importante
----------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	------------------

Quanto è importante per te sapere come gli studenti italiani stanno in generale in confronto con il passato?

non molto importante	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	molto importante
----------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	------------------

	per niente d' accordo			d' accordo			
Penso che sia importante indicare che la situazione degli studenti italiani rispetto a quella degli studenti inglesi sia ingiusta	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
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Credo che ognuno abbia la condizione che merita	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Non mi piace quando qualcuno dice cose negative sull' Italia e sugli studenti italiani	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

	per niente d' accordo			d' accordo			
E' importante per me essere italiano	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Io non ho molto in comune con gli altri italiani	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Mi considero un italiano	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Mi fa piacere essere italiano	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Sono felice di essere italiano	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Quando pensi alla tua situazione economica e al tuo standard di vita, come pensi che sia?

molto scarsa	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	abbondante
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Ti consideri soddisfatto o insoddisfatto della tua condizione in generale?

molto insoddisfatto	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	molto soddisfatto
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Quando pensi alla situazione economica e agli standard di vita degli studenti italiani in generale, come senti la loro condizione?

molto scarsa	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	abbondante
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Sei soddisfatto o insoddisfatto della situazione degli studenti italiani in generale?

molto insoddisfatto	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	molto soddisfatto
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Quando confronti la tua situazione personale a quella degli studenti inglesi, come pensi che la tua sia?

pessima	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	ottima
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Sei soddisfatto o insoddisfatto quando paragoni la tua condizione personale a quella degli studenti inglesi?

molto insoddisfatto	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	molto soddisfatto
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Quando confronti la condizione degli studenti italiani in generale a quella degli studenti inglesi, come pensi che la loro sia?

pessima	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	ottima
---------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	--------

Ti consideri soddisfatto o insoddisfatto quando paragoni la condizione degli studenti italiani a quella degli studenti inglesi?

molto insoddisfatto	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	molto soddisfatto
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Come ti senti personalmente in confronto con gli altri studenti italiani?

molto insoddisfatto	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	molto soddisfatto
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Sei soddisfatto o insoddisfatto quando paragoni la tua situazione personale a quella degli altri studenti italiani?

molto insoddisfatto	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	molto soddisfatto
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Come ti senti personalmente se fai un paragone col tuo passato?

molto insoddisfatto	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	molto soddisfatto
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Sei soddisfatto o insoddisfatto quando paragoni la tua condizione personale di oggi a quella del tuo passato?

molto insoddisfatto	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	molto soddisfatto
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Come pensi che gli studenti italiani stiano oggi rispetto al passato?

molto peggio	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	molto meglio
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Come ti senti quando confronti la situazione attuale degli studenti italiani a quella del passato?

molto insoddisfatto	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	molto soddisfatto
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Per favore, indica di seguito:

Eta' (l'anno piu' vicino): _____

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