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**European Governments' Questionable Response:
An Investigation into the Effects of Anti-Refugee Policies
on Extremism in Europe**

A thesis submitted for the Degree of Master of Arts by Research in the
Division of Human and Social Sciences at the University of Kent

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Abstract

In light of the European migrant crisis, questions have been raised over the manner in which European countries have responded to the increase in refugees requiring settlement into the host state; with an upsurge in restrictive policies being witnessed. However, there is a lack of research into the effects of such policies. Therefore, this thesis tests the relationship between anti-refugee policies and extremism. This is achieved by analysing the effects of obstructive refugee policies (data for which provided by the Immigration Policies in Comparison dataset) on three levels of extremism: least violent, far-right vote share; intermediate-level, intentional homicide; most violent (gold standard of violent extremism), terror incidents. The study employs both a quantitative and qualitative approach, utilising a large-n study of the 24 OECD European states; which is followed by a comparative case study of a pro-refugee city in Mechelen (Belgium) and an evidently anti-refugee city in Cottbus (Germany). The principal findings are that, of the three levels of extremism, the strongest relationships were identified between anti-refugee policies and support for far-right parties. Additionally, the thesis provides evidence to suggest that there is a convincing causal link between effective and persistent refugee integration policies with a decrease in extremism. Implications of which are, that there is just indication that European governments should endeavour to employ further inclusive policies, aimed at their foreign inhabitants, in order to decrease the risk of extremism.

Table of Contents

1. Chapter 1: Introduction	1
2. Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework	5
i. Defining the Key Terms	5
ii. The Existing Literature	9
a. The Causes of Violent Extremism and Terrorism	9
b. The Effects of Refugee Policies on Extremism	14
3. Chapter 3: Methodology and Research Design	22
i. Variables and Measurement	22
ii. Methods	29
iii. Limitations and Challenges	32
4. Chapter 4: Empirical Results and Analysis	34
i. Quantitative Study	34
a. Bivariate Analysis	35
i. Far-Right Vote Share	37
ii. Total Intentional Homicides	39
iii. Number of Terrorist Incidents	41
iv. Overview of the Bivariate Analysis Findings	43
b. Multivariate Regression Analysis	45
i. Far-Right Vote Share	45
ii. Total Intentional Homicides	50
iii. Number of Terrorist Incidents	55
iv. Overview of the Multivariate Analysis Findings	59
ii. Comparative Case Study	61
a. Pro-Refugee City: Mechelen, Belgium	61

b. Anti-Refugee City: Cottbus, Germany	65
c. Overview of the In-Depth Case Studies.....	69
5. Chapter 5: Conclusion.....	70
6. Bibliography.....	75
7. Appendix.....	87

List of Tables and Figures

Tables:

Table 1: Studies which have Examined the Causes of Violent Extremism and Terrorism.....	11
Table 2: Studies which have Examined the Effects of Refugee Policies on Extremism.....	17
Table 3: A Description of the Study’s Dependent and Independent Variables	27
Table 4: Bivariate Analysis of the Three Extremism Predictor Variables on the Five Indicators Variables of Refugee Policy	36
Table 5: Bivariate Analysis of the Three Extremism Predictor Variables on the Two ‘Wildcard’ Refugee Policy Area Variables	37
Table 6: Bivariate Analysis of the Number of Terror Incidents on Investigation’s Five Covariates Variables/ Traditionally-Perceived causes of Terrorism	43
Table 7: Multiple Regression of Far-Right Voter Share.....	46
Table 8: Multiple Regression of Total Intentional Homicides	51
Table 9: Multiple Regression of Number of Terrorist Incidents	56

Figures:

Figure 1: Timeline of Important Policies which have Accounted for the Mechelen’s Integration Success.....	63
Figure 2: Line-Graph of Recorded Cases of ‘Extremist’ Crime in Mechelen Post-Implementation of ‘Pro-Refugee’ Policies	64
Figure 3: Protest Groups against Immigrants in Cottbus.....	66

Chapter 1

Introduction

The world is witnessing a spate of refugee crises. All parts of the globe have recently experienced the phenomenon – with presently, far-flung locations such as Venezuela, South Sudan and Myanmar all feeling the effects. As of mid-2020 globally, over 80 million people have been forcibly displaced by climate change, persecution, conflict, violence, or human rights violations – that equates to roughly 1 in every 98 people around the world is either an asylum-seeker, internally displaced or a refugee – more than at any point in history (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2020). A question that has arisen, both in the political sphere and among academics alike, is whether this surge of refugees will be followed with an increase in terrorism activity? However, queries such as these are not a new occurrence, with discussions revolving around impacts of flows of international migration and refuge on both national and international security being of interest to many scholars since the end of the Cold War. For instance, investigations have related to: the security risks for hosting (and source) countries (Weiner, 1992) their consequences for national identity (Stivachis, 2008) and their effect on the risk of civil war (Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006; Buhaug and Gleditsch, 2008). Moreover, there has been reference in some academic sources that an increase in refugees will lead to an increase in terrorism activity (see Ekey, 2008); however, the reasons for which are often too simplified – i.e. that terrorists take advantage of refugee flows and the confusion within state immigration organisations that follows (Brady, 2017) – or simply left for further investigation.

Repeatedly overlooked is the environment in which refugees are entering into a country; and to what extent a nation which openly conveys an ‘anti-refugee’ sentiment – thus, ostracising large swathes of refugee populations and, conceivably, resulting in mass frustration among such groups – perhaps then increasing the likelihood of radicalisation taking place amongst their refugee populaces? This paper shall endeavour to tackle this question; thus, addressing the current gap in the literature.

The continent which has been identified as the epicentre of this current refugee crisis is Europe. For instance, it has been stated that globally, between the years 2014-2020 there were a reported 40,183 who died (Missingmigrants.iom.int, 2020). However, it is Europe where the

majority of these deaths have occurred. In particular, the crossing of the Mediterranean alone has accounted for over half the number of reported global migrant deaths over the time period – with 21,171 fatalities occurring (Ibid.). Reason for which is that Europe has experienced an extreme escalation in numbers of asylum seekers and economic migrants alike, post-2015 - due to factors such as the conflicts within the Middle East, most notably the Syrian civil war, and global warming linked drought and poverty within Africa; which has required people to undertake the perilous journey to Europe in search of a better life.

The European refugee crisis, however, is much deeper than sheer numbers or unimaginable human suffering. It is a crisis of conflicting narratives for some of the greatest social challenges - from issues of human rights, xenophobia, sexism and economic protectionism, to terrorism and climate change - which have been exemplified by the national and international responses to refugees. For instance, in reaction to the increase of individuals attempting to gain sanctitude within Europe, there has been a rise in ‘anti-refugee policies’ employed by a number of European governments and local institutions. For example, Hungary’s ‘zero refugee’ strategy - which aims to discourage refugees from remaining in the country, even if they’ve already obtained legal status, by preventing people from obtaining asylum in Hungary through increasing bureaucratic hurdles (Bayer, 2016) – and Italy’s ‘Salvini’s anti-migrant security decree’, which abolishes humanitarian protection status for migrants (Salvini’s Anti-Migrant Security Decree Becomes Law in Italy, 2018). The argument presented in favour of such types of policies is conveyed by Hungary’s right-wing Prime Minister Viktor Orban, whom has slammed EU policies towards the refugee crisis and made a number of unsubstantiated claims; i.e. that the increased migration of people into the continent will turn out to be the “Trojan horse of terrorism” (Brunsden, 2017). One danger of such policies is that they undermine, or are even in place of, the nation’s integration policies; which in the case of large amounts of displaced of people entering a country - the effectiveness, and speed of implementation, of the host states’ integration policies is critical if the nation is going to succeed in decreasing the likelihood of extremism occurring in the country (Sude et al., 2015).

Moreover, the governments demonstrate, along with these ‘anti-refugee’ policies, clear anti-refugee rhetoric, used to gain support for the aforementioned policies – playing on, and boosting, the pre-existed public fear that immigrants come at the expense of the economic and personal welfare of the native population, which economists (Powell, 2015) and social

scientists (Randhal, 2016) alike, generally find these fears are mistaken. Once again, Viktor Orban exhibits such rhetoric, when he declared that all migrants are terrorists (Mortimer, 2015) – the damage of which is that it establishes an anti-refugee political culture throughout that country. I argue that this would result in the potential alienation of vast swathes of individuals; which in turn increases the risk refugees becoming disenfranchised and thus, open to radicalisation. However, there has been little research into the possible causal links between such anti-refugee rhetorics and policies, with increased extremism as a result (Randahl, 2016). Understanding on causes of extremism has been shaped by seminal work, such as Martha Crenshaw’s revolutionary paper *The Causes of Terrorism* (Crenshaw, 1981), which have often conveyed that there are overlapping variables at play when depicting causes of extremism and terrorism. Factors repeatedly discussed have been: economic deprivation (Krieger and Meierrieks, 2010; Kis-Katos et al., 2011; Odorfer, 2015), lack of access to opportunity (Freytag et al., 2011) and high levels of youth unemployment (Caruso and Schneider, 2011).

However, a frequent empirical omission in these papers’ research design is an examination – or control for – high levels of migration entering the host state and what the effect of which might have on extremism occurring. Additionally, the vast majority of investigations into the causes of extremism are hampered as there is commonly a sole focus within on violent Islamic extremism – i.e. as is the case in John D. Johnson’s paper (2011). The issue with this, especially in a study on the effects of refugee intake, is that there are other forms of ideologies just as likely to partake in extremism in reaction to an increase of refugees entering the country. For example, it is conceivable that right-wing nationalists are likely to react badly to a large influx of refugees entering their nation.

A number of articles, such as the work by A.C. Forrester, B. Powell and A. Nowrasteh et al. (2019) and Bove and Böhmelt (2016), examine the transmission of terrorism from terror-prone countries of origin to destination countries through the migration of people from such states, and find that there is no significant relationship between the increased influx of refugees into Europe and an increase in terrorism. However, this focus on a refugee’s origin does not adequately aide our understanding of current events; i.e. it does not address whether it is the environment that they enter into, once they have arrived into a host state, which drives some to be radicalised and thus, partake in extremist activity, rather than where they originate from.

Moreover, papers which have had a focus on refugee-aimed policies, and their effectiveness, are outdated and examine cases which are incapable of aiding our task of how to

tackle the refugee integration issue within Europe. For example, Sude, Stebbins & Weiland's 2015 paper is hampered by analysing historical cases of manage refugee situations tactics - such as the displacement of Rohingya Muslims from Myanmar into Bangladesh in 1975–1978 – which effects the generalizability of their findings to help understand today's events in Europe. Thus, this paper aims to address these gaps in the field, and the problems outlined above, by conducting a quantitative and qualitative study investigating the connection between anti-refugee policies and the likelihood of extremism increasing in the host state, within Europe – as it is likely that such policies will act as a barrier to successful integration of the large amounts of refugees entering the continent. This is because so far in the literature there has been a focus on studying the refugees themselves; and what affect they have in destabilising an area, possibly even increasing terrorism activity within a nation. However, currently there is no academic tool box to get the full picture of what is happening today – i.e. to help understand what the effects are of refugees entering in an anti-refugee environment? Consequently, this paper will endeavour to enhance the literature's current knowledge on the topic by producing findings which have come as a result of an examination of relevant cases (Europe), and following an investigation which is not primarily focused on one form of extremism.

This thesis shall proceed in several sections. The following chapter is separated into two parts. The first of which looks to define the study's key terms of extremism and what makes a refugee. Within the second, there is a two-part, in-depth review of the existing literature; one analysing the causes of violent extremism (terrorism), and another which examines the effect of refugee policy on different forms of extremism. The third chapter illustrates the thesis' methodology, depicting the statistical processes selected to analyse the data; along with, a description of the investigation's variables and data sources. The fourth chapter, conveys analysis of the study's results presented in three parts: the first examining a bivariate investigation, the second being a discussion of multiple multivariate regressions; and finally, a comparative report into two in-depth case studies. The final, fifth chapter presents the thesis' concluding remarks; which conveys possible areas for further research.

Chapter 2

Theoretical Framework

The following chapter will provide a general overview of the differing perceptions of the causes of violent extremism, along with a synopsis of studies focusing on the relationship between policies on refugee intake and violent extremism. Firstly, however, the chapter shall focus on operationalising the key concepts in the study. Initially, the thesis will make the distinction between an ‘economic migrant’ and a ‘refugee’ – seeing as the terms are often used in conjunction by political elites, which can confuse as to who should be permitted into a country and often ‘economic migrant’ is used as a term for ‘refugee’ when discussing a case to argue for less intake. This is of great importance as this study’s primary interest is in ‘refugees’; thus, it is crucial to differentiate between the two terms. Furthermore, the section shall look at the definitional difficulties of ‘extremism’; especially when attempting to label someone - or an event - as having extremist intentions.

The second section of the chapter will examine the existing literature concerning the differing causes of extremism and studies which have assessed the effects of refugee policies. Specifically, the author will analyse the literature which explores the effects refugee intake has on terrorism – as terrorism is a key component of violent extremism, often considered the highest tier of extremism – and, at time of writing, has the most complete research on. The ensuing literature review will aim to provide evidence of aspects where the previous studies could have been improved on and important features that have not been taken into consideration. Thus, the section will exemplify where this investigation will be able to add to the existing knowledge on the topic.

2.1. Defining the Key Terms

In order to provide a significant answer to whether a policy aimed (specifically negatively) at refugees, and moreover the resistance shown by a government to their admittance, increases the likelihood of violent extremism occurring in the host state - it is imperative to clearly define what is understood to be a ‘refugee’ in the analysis. Therefore, it is important to make a distinction between what a ‘refugee’ and an ‘economic migrant’, as the two are often confused, leading to a misconception of the intentions of the people seeking protection shall. The result of which is that, a harsher policy is either formulated based on this

misunderstanding; or need for such a restrictive policy is displayed to the electorate on this basis. For the purpose of this paper, a ‘refugee’ will be defined as a person who is “fleeing armed conflict or persecution” (UNHCR, 2016); taken from the United Nations Refugee Agency – reasoning for which being that they are a global organisation at the forefront of refugee action. However, an ‘economic migrant’ is understood as someone that moves from one country to another to advance their economic and professional prospects (Semmelroggen, 2015); subsequently, the effects of policies aiming to address this type of demographic flow shall not be considered for investigation in this study, as the primary interest of the paper is identifying possible implications of anti-refugee policies.

There are a number of reasons as to why it is important to make the distinction between the two terms; for instance, it can often be perceived that some political elites’ rhetoric on refugee intake is typified by the use of words such as ‘migrant’ and ‘security threat’ (International Rescue Committee, 2017) in an endeavour to portray refugees as something they are not – a risk to the residing population, both economically and physically. By manipulating the narrative on refugee intake, into one of danger and fear, the politicians aim to attain legitimacy for their anti-refugee policies. The tactic of gaining public support for restricting the amount of refugee entry, through anti-refugee discourse, is evident in the case of Hungary’s right-wing prime minister Viktor Orbán; whom stated that “every single migrant poses a public security and terror risk” (the Guardian, 2016). By using the term ‘migrant’ this helps to mislead the audience into considering that all those looking to gain entry into Hungary have economic, rather than asylum, objectives. However, most crucially, the danger of confusing the two terms – i.e. by labelling someone a ‘migrant’, when they should be considered a ‘refugee’ - is that you are at risk of taking away their rights to protection; as refugees are defined and protected in international law in the 1951 Convention, which outlines the basic rights which countries should afford to refugees – with one of the most fundamental principles stated in international law being that “refugees should not be expelled or returned to situations where their life and freedom would be under threat” (UNHCR, 2016). Therefore, by assuming that someone is, by definition, a ‘migrant’ (rather than refugee) then a nation’s government has the legitimate authority to reject their admittance into their country – even if there are compelling grounds for asylum – which could act as a cause for grievance against the host state, and potentially, lead to said refugee being at a greater risk of being radicalised. As found by Anita Perešin (of the RAN Centre of Excellence), who conveyed that “those who are denied asylum are even more vulnerable [to being radicalised] due to their status, expectation of repatriation and the uncertain future in the countries they are returned to” (Perešin, 2019, p.2).

There are many difficulties when attempting to define what constitutes as an ‘act of extremism’. For instance, concepts - such as ‘extremism’ or terrorism’ - are renowned for being difficult to universally agree upon a definition for, this is due to the terms being politically and emotionally charged – with critically both the European Union and the United Nations not having an official definition. For example, the difficulties when endeavouring to formulate an accepted understanding of ‘extremism’ is evident with United Kingdom’s government definition, which has come into question over the past few years. Its definition of extremism being “the vocal or active opposition to our fundamental values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and the mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs” (BBC News, 2016) – however, there has been a suggestion that such an understanding is not an effective tool to combat extremism. This is because, as proposed by the Joint Committee on Human Rights in 2016, the definition (highlighted above) was unable to be a useable legal definition of extremism within the UK – as it was incapable of making a clear distinction between extremism and religious conservatism. The importance of which is, as explained by Committee chairwoman Harriet Harman, there is a fine line between someone utilising their freedom of speech and someone vocally opposing core British values; with ministers urged to "tread carefully" when trying to define extremism as it risked undermining relations with Muslim communities (Ibid.). In other words, an issue in trying to formulate a legally binding definition of extremism, is how to reconcile the values of different religious or cultural groups (ones that may be innately more conservative than what might be seen as the wider culture of the host country) with wider ‘national values’ in a diverse and accepting environment. This problem is especially pertinent when considering that a legal definition would necessarily lead to some form of prosecution towards those accused of extremism. Thus, it is easy to see how a definition that places national values at its core might feel oppressive to minorities that may have legitimate concerns about the compatibility of national values with their own, whilst also having no desires to reshape national principles. This problem is evident in the case of Europe (the study’s case in question) which is notably a very multi-cultural group of nations; however, this status has increased dramatically in recent years – with a huge influx of displaced people, most of whom coming from the Middle East and Africa region, entering the continent following the refugee crisis (Henley, 2018) – placing more pressure on the contest between the host states’ national core values and their new residents’ ideals.

Moreover, there are a number of issues faced when endeavouring to establish a definition of ‘violent extremism’, which is relevant and valuable for the investigation. For

instance, most commonly used understandings of violent extremism make some reference to acts of terrorism – such as “violent extremism refers to the activity of individuals or groups conducting acts by any means to express views which justify or glorify terrorist violence” (Defining extremism/radicalisation and types of extremism, 2019). Although, perhaps the clearest indicator of extremism, the thesis does not want to be contained to collecting data on just terrorism activity. Findings on lower tiers of extremism - i.e. absolute pacifism, which is a form of extremism that is not linked to a terrorist act (Terrorism vs. Extremism: Are they linked?, 2016) – being key to the paper’s success, as it will provide additional analyse from the previous works that have primarily examined terrorist data. Furthermore, the author was keen also to avoid implementing a definition which gives a high attention to ‘Islamic extremism’ – a form of Islam which advocates vocal or active opposition to values such as “democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs” (Casciani, 2014). Therefore, I have endeavoured to widen the paper’s potential analytical scope by finding a definition which incorporates all types of extremism. In attempt to capture not just the potential increase in extremism by the incoming refugees, but also through the incumbent citizens who oppose the influx of refugees. In particular, this is in the aim to be able to account for instances of far-right extremism – as this is prevalent in the case of extremist acts which are in response to refugee intake – i.e. according to a report by Deutsche Welle, in 2018, there were a reported 1,775 crimes directly targeting refugees in Germany, with 1,736 of them being committed by far-right groups (Wires, 2019).

With there being no universally accepted (and legal) definition of ‘extremism’, and in an attempt to account for all forms of extremism, the author has decided to implement the understanding provided by United States Agency for International Development (USAID) – an agency which is primarily responsible for administering civilian foreign aid and development assistance. The USAID proclaims that ‘Violent Extremism’ is to be considered as “advocating, engaging in, preparing, or otherwise supporting ideologically motivated or justified violence to further social, economic or political objectives” (Glazzard and Zeuthen, 2016). This definition has been chosen to be the paper’s understanding of the key concept due to the following factors: chiefly, it does not single out or mention Islamic extremism – thus, providing scope to incorporate all forms of extremism in the paper’s analysis. Moreover, it references the ‘engaging’ in violence – i.e. acts of terrorism – this is important, and somewhat unique to this understanding, as commonly other definitions purposely try to differentiate between ‘extremism’ and ‘terrorism’ by not referencing the act of participating in a violent act.

However, the author believes it key that the paper's definition for 'violent extremism' to include a reference to partaking in violence as it will allow data on the highest tier of extremism – terrorism – to be considered. Nevertheless, it is important to note the chosen definition's limitations. For instance, it can be argued that the understanding is too broad and does not distinguish whether violent extremism is something can be carried out by non-state actors and, in conflict situations, how can we differentiate violent extremists from other, more legitimate conflict actors i.e. a nation's security forces(Ibid.)? Moreover, the source of the definition should be taken into account when discussing the understanding's potential flaws. Although the USAID is supposedly an independent agency of the United States federal government - which means that it is an agency that exists outside the federal executive departments and are independent of presidential control – there have been claims against the USAID that it has often been serving different administrations' agenda. Thus, it can be argued that the definition is at risk of being affected by bias.

2.2 The Existing Literature

The following literature review has been divided into two parts; the first, analysing the studies that highlight factors which have a causal relationship with violent extremism; while the second part, examines the work already completed on the possible connection between government policies and extremism. It is important to note that within *Table 1* there are studies depicted which primary focus has been to uncover causes of terrorism. Due to, as discussed in the previous section, acts of terrorism being considered as potentially the least debatable form of extremism – thus are important to analyse under the 'violent extremism umbrella' – and, moreover, such studies are often referenced in previous works studying extremism.

The existing literature, concentrating on the causes of violent extremism and terrorism, is wide-ranging in their findings; while often featuring, and testing, similar variables. The purpose of reviewing studies focused on the causes of violent extremism, is that the author will be able to identify overlapping variables, which have been analysed in previous works, and then question whether they should be applied to this investigation's theoretical causal mechanism.

Our current knowledge on the causes of terrorism and violent extremism originate, arguably, from Martha Crenshaw - and her revolutionary paper *The Causes of Terrorism* - in 1981 (Crenshaw, 1981); however, the catalyst for the large increase in interest and academic investigation into the matter came following the 9/11 terrorist attack in 2001. This was due to

the attack exposing the need for a greater understanding of the issue, in order to help prevent future attacks. *Table 1* below, exhibits some of the key findings from a selection of contemporary studies. Several studies find that economic deprivation, which is a common explanatory factor, is negatively correlated to the onset of terrorism (see Krieger and Meierrieks, 2010; Kis-Katos et al., 2011; Odorfer, 2015). However, there is no explanation within the reports to whether economic deprivation also has a negative relationship with lower tiers of violent extremism – i.e. being vocally intolerant of other religions or political processes – thus, leaving scope for this paper to uncover any correlation between the two.

Moreover, as Piazza (2011) and Hassan (2012) suggest, that the real economic push factor, towards radicalisation and terrorism, is economic discrimination – rather than economic deprivation – where countries featuring minority groups are more likely to experience acts of terror, especially domestic forms, in reaction to the economic opportunity disparity. The review has produced a number of factors which are often important, and possibly overlooked, when studying the root causes of the more violent forms extremism; for instance, a nation's fractionalization, the state's level of fragility, and a large population – usually when coupled with increased urbanisation, which acts as a radicalising incubator for potential extremists - have been found to be significant (Kurrild-Klitgaard et al., 2006; Tikuisis, 2009, Gassebner and Luechinger, 2011).

Socio-economics, a theme often considered, is found robustly associated with terrorist activity; furthermore, states which have poor levels of opportunities to trade openly are a greater risk of experiencing violent extremism (Freytag et al., 2011). I shall benefit from the findings of Caruso and Schneider (2011); as the study solely examines Western European countries. The advantage of which is that the cases observed within the report overlap with those going to be analysed in this paper - although this investigation will be observing states from across all Europe - therefore, the author must take into account the factors identified to be significant by Caruso and Schneider, i.e. youth unemployment, when undertaking this investigation. When examining *table 1* it is evident that there are multiple areas where the current literature could be added upon, to improve the knowledge on the matter. For instance, there are limited reliable studies into violent extremism causation, with more attention given to uncovering the causes for the onset of terrorism; furthermore, of the work which primarily focuses on extremism the results are often unable to be generalized to a wider population – i.e. Hassan's paper which, due to the small sample size (just 15) the argument presented cannot be generalized to all al-Shabab members. Additionally, as exemplified in Johnson's piece in 2011, regularly in studies focused on violent extremism causation the analyse is primarily focused on

one type of extremism – in Johnson’s case that is Islamic – which, as discussed in the previous section, is detrimental to obtaining crucial data on other prominent types i.e. far-right extremism.

Table 1: Studies which have Examined the Causes of Violent Extremism and Terrorism

STUDY	CONTEXT	CASES & TIME FRAME	VARIABLES TESTED	MAIN FINDINGS
JOHNSON (2011)	This study considers the grievances of Islamist extremists and presents an overview of the root causes of Islamist extremism.		Historical grievances, globalization, authoritarian Muslim governments, non-Muslim Western rule in Islamic lands, U.S. policies.	Not any one root cause. The presence of U.S. military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan is perceived by extremists as an attack on the Muslim world Importance of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
KURRILD- KLITGAARD, JUSTESEN & KLEMMENSEN (2006)	Test the relationship of economic and political freedom to the occurrence of transnational terrorism.	Between 97 and 121 cases examined for the period 1996-2002.	GDP per capita, Economic Inequality, Deprivation, Modernization, Economic Openness/Trade, Religious Composition.	Disproved assumptions that transnational terrorism is unrelated to inequality, economic growth, education, poverty. A society's fractionalization has mixed importance. Religious composition has no or little association with attracting or producing transnational terrorism.

<p>ODORFER (2015)</p>	<p>Relative deprivation, weak state capacity, and denial of basic needs are the three root causes of radicalization looked at in this paper.</p>	<p>Age, state capacity, basic needs accessibility, education, gender, geography.</p>	<p>The educated help create an environment permissive to violence, while the uneducated are more likely to perpetuate the violence. Men more likely to become radicalised than women. Those under 40 more likely to be radicalised.</p>
<p>KRIEGER & MEIERRIEKS (2010)</p>	<p>Focus on the origins and targets of transnational terrorism.</p>	<p>Economic Deprivation, Socio-economic and Demographic Strain, Political Instability, Identity and Culture Clash.</p>	<p>Transnational terrorism is more likely to emerge in highly populated, non-democratic and instable countries.</p> <p>Little evidence indicates that poor economic conditions alone cause terrorism.</p>
<p>FREYTAG, J.KRÜGER, MEIERRIEKS & SCHNEIDER (2011)</p>	<p>That poor socio-economic conditions (that reflect low opportunity costs of terrorism) are conducive to terrorism.</p>	<p>110 countries between 1971 and 2007.</p> <p>Democracy, Regime stability, Government size, Population size, Civil & International war, Religion, Military spending.</p>	<p>A country's socio-economic situation are robustly associated with terrorist activity.</p> <p>Higher levels of consumption, trade openness and investment are almost always negatively correlated with terrorist activity.</p>

GASSEBNER & LUECHINGER (2011)	Focus on location, victim, and perpetrator,	Economic freedom, large population shares of young people, GDP per capita, population, guerrilla wars, OECD membership, political proximity to the United States, religious/ethnic tension, infant mortality rates, physical integrity rights.	Terrorist activity is not robustly associated with the degree of democracy. Population, military expenditures, internal and internationalized internal wars, guerrilla wars, strikes, government fractionalization, urbanization, foreign portfolio investments, OECD membership, political proximity to the United States & religious/ethnic tensions are positively associated with the occurrence of terrorism.	
HASSAN (2012)	This study specifies the driving factors that attract youth to al-Shabab.	Included focus group discussions with 15 former al-Shabab members between the ages of 19 and 27.	Unemployment levels, Education levels, recruitment process, importance of religious leaders, feelings of injustice.	Push factors were poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, discrimination, and political/economical marginalization.
PIAZZA (2011)	Examines the relationship between poverty and terrorism.	Sample of 172 countries from 1970-2006.	Income per capita, Human Development Index, Income Inequality, Large Populations, Political Participation.	Countries featuring minority group economic discrimination are significantly more likely to experience domestic terrorist attacks.

TIKUISIS (2009)	Investigates claims of a non-significant relationship between weak (failed and failing) states and terrorism.	Utilises available terrorism data and state classification from stable to weak using a failed state index (FSI).	FSI sub-indicators involving: People Displacement, Group Grievance, Economic development and Security Apparatus.	Finds that almost 50% of weak states experienced fatal terrorist attacks corresponding to a significant odds ratio exceeding 3:1 compared with other states. Which increased to almost 5:1 when states were selected according to specific FSI sub-indicators.
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*Empty fields indicate that the information was not provided.

The second part of the literature review concentrates on studies which examine the effects between policies and extremism. The most prominent works which can assist the paper have been depicted in *Table 2* below. As previously mentioned, the need for a greater understanding on the matter in question has increased dramatically in recent years. This is in light of the large influx of refugees which flooded into Europe following the refugee crisis and the need to analyse the effects of the, often negative, policy reaction by governments – i.e. Hungary’s ‘zero refugee’ strategy (Bayer, 2016). The newfound importance can be reflected in the more noticeable studies, shown in the table, being published in recent years. The objective of this section of the literature review is to identify common themes and findings which could be of interest to investigate further; and crucially, to detect where this paper can enhance on the current knowledge provided by these studies.

Many of the studies listed provide the author with potential variables, or at least covariates to control for, which should be examined in this investigation. For instance, works by Masterson & Yassenov (2018) and Amuedo-Dorantes, Bansak & Pozo (2018), both place importance on crime rates as an indicator to whether policies aimed at refugees had been successful or not – therefore, could be implemented as a factor to analyse. However, it would be questionable as to how to discern between what crimes are extremist in nature or not, which is key, as it is a driver for potential policy direction – a possible limitation of the studies. Furthermore, another factor to examine is the use of labels within government refugee policies

(Berry, et al., 2016), this shall be in an attempt to uncover whether there is a relationship between government agenda-setting (through use of negative refugee labels) and refugees failing to assimilate into the host state – which is a common pathway towards radicalisation. Moreover, an area of interest for this study, shall be lower forms of extremism, such as political participation – with particular attention given to extremist party vote share. Seeing as spikes in extremist voting behaviour can be used as evidence of members of minority groups becoming disenfranchised with, and alienated from, the incumbent political system; thus, providing added risk of radicalisation manifestation. In addition, there is a greater likelihood when ethnic groups feel ostracised from the party-political system that there will be a rejection of the current system in the form of non-electoral participation; as depicted by Martin (2016), who proclaims that perceptions of Islamophobia are correlated to increased dissatisfaction from the political system amongst the British Muslim population. The risk of such happenings, is that there is conceivable cause of concern that such feelings of alienation from - and rejection of - current systems can lead to increased violent forms of non-electoral participation in attempt to show the marginalised groups' negation.

A seminal piece in radicalisation causation is Sude, Stebbins & Weiland's 2015 paper on analysing historical cases of tactics used to manage refugee situations. By examining historical cases, such as the displacement of Rohingya Muslims from Myanmar into Bangladesh in 1975–1978, to identify root causes of violent extremism the authors were able to detect that loss of personal opportunities and lack of integrated programs were key causal factors which aided the radicalisation process. These findings gave weight to the opinion that the most important policy to evaluate, when examining the relationship between governmental refugee policies and violent extremism, is a government's integration policy. Critical to this investigation is the inclusion of data on all types of extremism; therefore, the conclusions made by Sola (2018) must be taken into consideration, especially when developing this paper's hypotheses on the topic. Sola finds that, in Germany, there is a positive correlation between concerns about immigration and increased support for right-wing populist parties – thus, indicating vindication for my desire to analyse all forms of extremism, not just the preconceived most obvious i.e. Islamic extremism. Moreover, a strength of my research being that I examine both Islamist and right-wing extremism in conjuncture.

However, crucially, an area identified where the thesis can improve on the current knowledge is through exhibiting the potential effects that the context in which a refugee enters a country has on the likelihood that they could become radicalised – which is the first stage on

the process of becoming an extremist. This will be achieved through use of testing unique independent variables – such as a country’s ‘openness to refugees’, which will be demonstrated by a number of certain factors: for example, the ease to which a refugee can obtain legal assistance and job opportunities in the country they are entering. Moreover, as demonstrated within this literature review, there is a distinct lack of existing work on policies targeting refugees and the possible effect on the threat of extremist activity. A possible reason for why this research area is still in its infancy is that “international relations scholars have only recently considered the security implications of international migration” (Choi and Salehyan, 2013, p. 56). However, with forced migration clearly beginning to have a substantial effect on European states, and the security concerns that follow a sharp and large influx of people, the European refugee crisis must be seen as a catalyst for more academic attention to be given to the issue. Therefore, this an area where this study shall aim to enhance the current knowledge on the matter.

Presently, there is a distinct lack of evidence of the possible causal effects the environment, in which a refugee enters into, has on the likelihood they are to assimilate into their host state – and therefore, the probability they are to become extremist. This is a mistake, with not a sufficient amount of work being completed into the possibilities of reducing the risk of radicalisation, for the large displaced populations, by establishing a more open and accepting environment for them before they enter the state. The theory being, that a nation which ranks highly in openness towards refugees will experience less extremism as a result; due to their being less refugee grievances (which is depicted in multiple works, discussed in the previous section, as a key cause of extremism) thus, decreasing the need for refugees to show their frustration through extremist acts. Currently, the only index focused on attitudes towards refugees is Amnesty International’s ‘Refugees Welcome Index’ (2016); however, it is interested in, and yields data on, public opinion regarding refugees – therefore, it does not produce information on governments’ willingness to integrate and allow refugees into their nations. The importance of having an index which ranks a government’s openness towards refugees, is that by establishing which states are more likely to welcome refugees quickly and efficiently, refugees and asylum seekers can be allocated to the countries which are most likely to integrate them – which, as demonstrated throughout the literature (see, Amaral, et al., 2018; Sude, et al., 2015), is a key tactic to preventing radicalisation.

Table 2: Studies which have Examined the Effects of Refugee Policies on Extremism

STUDY	CONTEXT	CASES & TIME FRAME	VARIABLES TESTED	MAIN FINDINGS
SOLA (2018)	Investigates the effects of the refugee crisis, and the related government's asylum policy, on concerns about immigration of the German population.	Utilizes individual level data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), interviewing 12,000 households and nearly 30,000 individuals.	Dependent Variable is a dummy variable for individuals who are very concerned about immigration into Germany. Immigration, asylum applications.	Concerns about immigration are positively correlated with political support for the new right-wing populist party – Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). Finds no causal effect of concerns on political preferences in the short term.
MASTERSON & YASENOV (2018)	Provides evidence on the effects of refugee resettlement on crime, leveraging a natural experiment in the United States.	Analysis focuses on the county-year level in the United States. Using data from the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) database for the period 2010-2017. Covers 6,296 county-year observations.	Crime rates in a given year per 100,000 county population. Levels of refugees, refugee resettlement trends.	Despite a 65.6% drop in refugee resettlement, there is no discernible effect on county-level crime rates. These null effects are consistent across all types of crime. Results suggest that crime rates would have been similar had refugee arrivals continued at previous levels.
AMUEDO-DORANTES, BANSKAK, POZO (2018)	Examines the variation in the geographic and temporal distribution of refugees across U.S. counties to ascertain if there	Unit of analysis is country – the United States. Utilises the economic model of crime participation proposed by	Crime rates - dependent variable is the number of arrests per 1,000 people in county and year.	Refugees do not seem to have a significant impact on local crime rates. Refugees which are matched to sponsoring agencies, are able to provide them with services to

	is a link between refugee settlements and local crime rates or terrorist events in the United States.	Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973). Crime at the county level are gathered from the ICPSR’s Uniform Crime Reporting Program Data between the time 2006-2014.	Terrorism incidents, economic environment - employment rates, per capita income, per capita housing construction.	facilitate their integration into the job market.
F. L. AMARAL, ATAKILT WOLDETSADIK, ARMENTA (2018)	The study aimed to provide an overview of the situations of refugees and non-citizens in host countries, as well as to summarize policies and legislation regarding refugees.	The study explored cases in seven countries, which have links to Syrian refugees, including Turkey, Germany, the United Kingdom (U.K.), Greece, Italy, Canada and Australia. Cross-national survey data from the European Social Survey and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees – 2016-17.	Attitudes, labour market integration, economic activities: performing paid work, engaging in educational activities, unemployed levels.	Multiple E.U. countries' populations believe that refugees' presence could increase terrorism and take jobs and social benefits away from residents. Turkish government is increasingly pressed to provide adequate jobs, infrastructure, transportation, schooling, security, and other public services to the refugees. The criteria countries set regarding noncitizen employment also affect refugees’ abilities to access employment.
BERRY, GARCIA-BLANCO, MOORE (2016)	This report provides insights into country’s press culture during a period of agenda-setting	5 European nations: Spain, Italy, Germany, Sweden and the UK. Sample of around 300 news	Labels used to describe refugees and migrants, population	Large amounts of articles featured some information on the country of origin of refugee and migrants. Governing parties, or coalitions, tended to

	for the refugee and migrant crisis.	stories per country to give an overall total of 1500 news articles. Between 2013-2015.	flows, countries of origins.	dominate political sourcing, with the key challenger coming from the anti-immigration right.
MARTIN (2017)	The paper assesses the relationship between political alienation and political participation. Moreover, examines Islamophobia and disapproval of the British military involvement in Afghanistan.	Utilises the 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study to look at the political attitudes of Muslims in Britain.	Political Alienation, Voter Turnout, Political Efficacy, Satisfaction with Democracy, Trust in Politicians.	Finds that observations of Islamophobia are connected to greater political alienation, to a greater likelihood of non-electoral participation and to a lower likelihood of voting amongst British Muslims. Moreover, that there is robust evidence that British Muslims are more likely to construe discrimination they experience as motivated by their religion.
SUDE, STEBBINS, WEILANT (2015)	The study aimed to identify the way refugee situations are managed and how these tactics are likely to contribute to radicalization.	9 historical situations in which populations fled violent conflict or repression— in South Asia, East Africa, Central Africa, and the Middle East. 1975-2000s.	Overcrowding, hunger, poverty, local crime rates, violence/terrorist incidents.	Conditions that are most likely to contribute to radicalization are: actions of the receiving country and its citizens (i.e. their policies), the refugees' loss of personal opportunities and lack of integrated programs.
REFUGEES WELCOME INDEX (2016)	The index ranks 27 countries, across all continents, based on their people's willingness to let	27,000 people participated in the global survey in 2016.		80% of respondents would accept people fleeing war or persecution in their country. 1 in 10 would let refugees stay in their home, 3 in 10 in their neighbourhood.

refugees live in
their countries,
towns,
neighbourhoods
and homes.

China, Germany, UK top
index measuring acceptance
of refugees – while Russia
is ranked last.

*Empty fields indicate that the information was not provided.

To summarise, the results of the review illustrate that there is a need for greater research into, not only, the effects of refugee policies on the likelihood of violent extremism increasing; but also, that more work is needed on causes of extremism. The overriding conclusions from previous studies finds that there is a causal link between a government's unsuccessful integration policy and an increase in radicalisation within the state; especially when in combination with other key covariates, such as economic grievances and crime rates. However, the studies, and their conclusions, often seem to be ungeneralizable – due to the small amount of cases examined.

Crucially, this paper shall add to the current knowledge on the topic due to its unique independent variable – the context in which refugees are entering a host state. In other words, this study will be interested in uncovering what the relationship is between a nation which is evidently accepting of refugees and the likelihood of those refugees then becoming radicalised (the first stage of the extremist process); and vice versa, when looking at state's which clearly present more barriers for refugees to becoming integrated into their society. A country's openness towards refugees will be demonstrated through a number of factors; such as, the ease at which a refugee is able to obtain legal assistance and the effort exhibited by nations to assimilate refugees into their society – i.e. ability to gain employment and free movement around the host state. I shall elaborate on this in the following methodology section.

Following the research undertaken to assemble the literature review, four hypotheses were developed: firstly, that *a state whose government employs 'anti-refugee policies' is more likely to have a greater share of its population voting in favour of a far-right party*. The prediction develops upon the findings of Sola – that there is a positive relationship between concerns about immigration and increased support for right-wing populist parties - by adding more cases and insights. Additionally, that it is probable that governments who are visibly

resistant to refugees are more likely to establish a culture in their country which allows right-wing extremism to prosper. The study's second hypothesis is that *a state's government which employs 'anti-refugee policies' is at a greater risk of experiencing violent extremism*. This hypothesis was formulated after taking into account that there was a similar finding in the majority of the previous investigations i.e. see Sude, Stebbins & Weiland (2015) - it is expected that a nation which has implemented a relatively unsuccessful refugee integration policy (or worse, placed barriers in front of refugee asylum) will experience a relatively larger amount of violent extremism, in comparison to states which have been more successful in assimilating refugees into the country. Thirdly, it is predicted that *a state whose government employs 'anti-refugee policies', is at greater risk of experiencing an increase 'Intentional Homicide'*. This prediction was devised as to examine a 'half-way house' between the first two hypotheses. An examination of a 'middle-form' of extremism. Taking into account the importance of crime rates, as an indicator of extremism, placed by Amuedo-Dorantes, Bansak, Pozo (2018). It is expected that a nation which promotes hostility towards refugees shall experience an increased in targeted homicides as a result of frustration being built and security threatened. The fourth, and final, hypothesis shall test whether *anti-refugee restrictive policies should be considered as a predictor variable, in conjuncture with traditional causes of extremism*. The need for examination into the importance of 'anti-refugee policies', in comparison with other traditional factors, has come as result of it being a relatively new phenomenon which has been regularly overlooked in the current literature.

Chapter 3

Methodology and Research Design

The following chapter will depict the paper's research design and my reasoning for employing certain variables. Furthermore, the section will clarify the methods to which the investigation's data was compiled and where it originated from; along with, will illustrate the statistical processes used to test my hypotheses.

In order to test my hypotheses, I employ both a mixed-method approach – The analysis is split into two sections, a quantitative and qualitative one. The mixed-method approach was considered due to its suitability in aiding answer my research question; along with its ability to allow the paper's results to have maximum internal and external validity. The importance of which, is that when attempting to answer such a significant research question; regarding the implications of a government's refugee policy on extremism within its nation (as this investigation is attempting to) the results of which may impact both policy and public opinion – therefore, it is imperative that the findings are high in generalisability, while being capable of depicting the potential causal mechanisms that are at play. This chapter shall begin with a presentation of the variables utilised in this research; followed by a discussion on the methods used to test the hypotheses.

3.1 Variables and Measurement

The thesis will focus specifically on Europe – an area overlooked by a number of reports interested in the effects of policy of refugee assimilation. Europe requires more attention due to it being a pathway case and a host to an increasing number of refugees. Therefore, by having the investigation's cases be all the European states, the objective is to provide data on nations which are highly relevant in the current refugee intake debate. Furthermore, by examining Europe the results have a greater ability of being generalizable – an important objective of a study which hopes to provide indication of possible policy suggestions/amendments – which will set apart this research from previous works. Justification for Europe being a case which has the capabilities to provide generalizable results, is that - due to the continent containing multiple different political cultures - in recent times, countries within Europe have provided ample cases of differing tactics on how to deal with the added pressures of accepting large numbers of refugees, i.e. as seen through their diverse and opposing policies towards the

displaced populations, as shown by Hungary and Germany for instance. Thus, meaning that Europe provides the study with a large sample size of significant results to be examined. Making Europe, not only a highly relevant case to study, but one which will allow the thesis' to produce outcomes that have a greater likelihood of being generalizable. This is due, to the nature of the political make-up of the continent offering multiple different incidents of refugee intake and integration policies, which have seen different levels of success, to be analysed.

The first section of the paper's investigation is a quantitative cross-sectional study. The quantitative analysis contains data incorporated from the IMPIC dataset - Immigration Policies in Comparison - (Immigration Policies in Comparison, n.d.) on European countries' restrictiveness refugee policies. The rationale for utilising the IMPIC dataset was that it provided the most complete array of data on the key independent variable in question, 'receptive refugee policies' while offering data from a wide range of European countries. However, the dataset contains limitations, with a couple of drawbacks having to be taken into consideration when analysing the results. Firstly, the data supplied is limited as it goes up until 2010; the result of which is that my time frame is 1989-2010 – in particular, it means the results of the paper shall not include data post-European refugee crisis, which is the fundamental catalyst for why this research is necessary. Furthermore, there is no data readily available from all 44 European countries; the consequence of this is that the investigation's finding's generalisability will be hampered somewhat – nevertheless, I do not believe that this shall be too severe as there is data on 24 OECD European players (such as Germany, France, Italy, Hungary etc.). Arguably, the most striking of the countries absent from the investigation is Russia, due to its prominence on the global political stage; however, due to a lack of accessible data regarding Russia's asylum/refugee policies, it has been removed from the paper's dataset¹.

From the data provided by the IMPIC dataset, on the 24 OECD European countries, I have created my own key extremism indicator variable - *'a government's average receptiveness level towards refugees, per year'* – which is the investigation's independent

¹ The full list of the omitted European nations are as follows: Albania, Andorra, Belarus, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Latvia, Lichtenstein, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Romania, Russia, San Marino, Serbia, Slovenia, and Ukraine.

variable. This was achieved by aggregating all the data on different ‘receptiveness factors’; such as: ‘in order to gain refugee status does country ‘x’ require a certain level of language skill?’ and ‘was illegal residence considered a criminal or an administrative offense?’. However, as there were too many pieces of data within my key indicator variable - which resulted in muddled findings unable to uncover any relationships; I was required to split the variables (which make up the ‘*receptiveness average*’ value) into separate groups, omitting factors such as, ‘*family reunification*’ and ‘*co-ethnics*’. The new variables produced are as follows: ‘*Average Eligibility for Asylum and Refugees*’, ‘*Average conditions for entry for asylum and refugees*’, ‘*Average Security of status for Asylum seekers and Refugees*’, ‘*Average rights associated with Asylum Seekers and Refugees*’, ‘*Average for Immigration Policy*’. These factors were chosen, as they were the different areas examined within the ‘Asylum & Refugee’ section of the IMPIC dataset; however, I created the ‘Average for Immigration Policy’ variable (by aggregating all the results of the other four refugee policy areas) as to give a generalised overview of what is occurring ‘generally’ when discussing impacts of refugee policies.

The new extremism predictor variables/groups shall then be tested against more commonly regarded extremism forecasters – for example, a nation’s: population density, regime durability, and gross domestic product (GDP)- in order to identify whether it can be regarded as a factor of importance when analysing extremism occurrences. Additionally, the thesis includes analysis of two single-issue policies – which I have dubbed ‘wildcard variables’ – these are: ‘*Detention*’ and ‘*Illegal Residence*’. The rationale behind including these policies in the study’s analysis, is that they are two of particular interest in the anti-refugee debate; often it being evident that such policy areas are weaponised by governments to deter refugee admittance. For example, in 2018, France adopted a flawed detention policy which failed to ban detention of migrant children; despite rulings of six European Court of Human Rights deeming that such detention by France violated their rights (European Union, 2018). Therefore, it is of importance to see the impact such policies may have on extremism within the host state.

In order to operationalise the dependent variable – *extremism* – I decided it important to develop my own understanding of what constitutes an observed act of extremism. The reasoning for which is that - as previously mentioned - there is no universally accepted (and legal) definition of ‘extremism’, resulting in it often being seen in the literature that investigations either focus on ‘violent acts of extremism’ or ones that do not involve direct physical violence (i.e. cyberterrorism). However, I felt it imperative that this paper was capable of identifying potential causes of both violent and non-violent forms of extremism. The

argument for which being that understanding the roots of ‘soft-forms’ of extremism is of equal importance as more violent forms (i.e. terrorist acts, such as suicide bombings); as they are the most well-trodden paths into becoming radicalised – which is the route to more violent acts. Therefore, the investigation incorporates three different variables to demonstrate ‘extremism’: ‘*number of terrorist incidents*’, ‘*total intentional homicides*’ & ‘*far-right vote share*’.

Justification for the three variables are as follows; quite simply, the ‘gold standard’ observed extremist act would be an act of terrorism – therefore, it would be of great detriment to the study to omit such incidents. It was thus of great importance to find reliable and helpful data on the factor; consequently, the data employed in the investigation is from LaFree and Dugan’s Global Terrorism Database (GTD). This database was chosen as the preferential dataset as it contains a comprehensive overview of every terrorist incident across the world (from 1970 through to 2016) which, crucially for my analysis, combines both domestic and transnational forms of violent extremism. This is a feature which will help improve my study, and an area I will be able to contribute to the previous literature; as by incorporating data on both domestic and transnational (which has not always been the case for other papers i.e. Milton, Spencer and Findley, 2013), I will be able to include incidents of domestic forms of terror which have been caused by social unrest following the pressures caused by refugee intake – i.e. the German far-right terrorist organisation, the Freital Group, who have attempted multiple murder and bomb attacks on refugee shelters and politicians (Aljazeera.com, 2018). Such incidents would be forgotten by an analysis restricted to just transnational forms of terrorism².

Within the analysis, the evidence to exhibit a ‘soft’ form of extremism will come from examining the variable ‘*Far-Right Vote Share*’. There are a number of benefits of deploying this variable; for instance, by researching election data it allows to identify trends of public opinion - i.e. by observing the far-right vote share, it aids uncover potential influences for certain restrictive policy decisions that have been made. Moreover, there is readily available

² However, the GTD’s limitations should still be noted; for example, it excludes state-terrorism, a form of extremism which has been prominent throughout history. However, this may not be such a concern for this study – seeing as people would not expect there to be a connection between refugee intake and state-terrorism.

and easy to access data on election data for the paper's time frame and identified cases. The data for which has been sourced from the 'ParlGov' website – which “is a data infrastructure for political science and contains information for all EU and most OECD democracies (37 countries)” (ParlGov, 2020); additionally, the database combines approximately 1700 parties, 990 elections (9300 results), and 1600 cabinets (ibid.). Due to its ability to clearly depict which were the 'far-right' parties - in a particular election – and show the change in vote share, from one election to another, it was the complete data source for the analysis.

The third variable used to depict 'extremism' is '*total intentional homicides*'. This factor was utilised to demonstrate a stage of extremism which is more moderate than committing a terrorist act; while being more aggressive than voting for a far-right party. Additionally, it was selected due to the importance placed on crime rates an indicator of extremism in the literature (i.e. Amuedo-Dorantes, Bansak, Pozo, 2018). It was deemed important to include a more middle-ground depiction of 'extremism' – although it would be easily argued that the variable is closer to a violent exhibition of radicalism, rather than the perceived passive act of voting – as the project aims to give findings for the varied stages of extremism. In order to obtain the necessary crime data, I employed the 'European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal justice statistics' database (Aebi, 2010). The European Sourcebook Group is a group of experts that produces on a regular basis the European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics - the first European Sourcebook project started in 1996, when the Council of Europe established a committee to prepare a compendium of crime and criminal justice data for its member states. The European Sourcebook includes both statistical data and information on the statistical rules and the definitions behind these figures. The variable which I employ, from the dataset, is *TIIHO* - Intentional homicide (including attempts): intentional killing of a person. The variable includes data on: assault leading to death, euthanasia and infanticide. This database was the ideal source for my 'intentional homicide' variable as it had the required data for all the countries being investigated; while complying with the time frame. Furthermore, another benefit of using the Sourcebook – and justification for the link between 'extremism' and '*total intentional homicides*' – is that within its understanding of 'intentional homicides' it includes attacks on members of a public office; which would fall under the bracket of a 'violent-extremist act' as in cases they can be understood as an attempt to influence political decisions.

Additionally, the analysis uses 6 control variables. The covariates were selected due to their prominence in the violent extremism literature, where they were found to be key indicator variables (see Kurrild-Klitgaard et al., 2006 & Freytag et al., 2011). The covariates implemented are as follows: A country's 'regime characteristics' in terms of its level of institutional democracy (Polity2) and the 'regime characteristics' in terms of its level of institutional democracy' (Durable) – taken from the Polity IV database (PolityProject, n.d.). Also, a state's 'population' (logpop) & a state's 'GDP per capita' (logGDP) – taken from World Bank Development Indicators (World Development Indicators | DataBank, n.d.). The reasoning for my selection are as follows: GDP per capita has been designated as my economic development variable as several recent studies have found that states, especially developing countries, are at a greater risk of terrorism if they suffer from poor socio-economic conditions and low expectations about future economic scenarios (see Piazza, 2011 and Caruso & Schneider, 2011). Whereas, population was chosen as past investigations often found that there is a correlation between a largely populated and dense nation with an increased risk of terrorism (i.e. see Gassebner & Luechinger, 2011 for a greater explanation as to why a large population affects the probability of terrorism). For instance, the literature review also revealed that demographic strains aid terror groups to preserve themselves and grow; as more populous nations are better for harbouring terror organisations and provides more potential targets (Krieger & Meierrieks, 2010). Finally, a state's 'level of state fragility' (sfi) – taken from the Centre for Systemic Peace (Marshall and Marshall 2017).

For more information on the dependent and independent variables examined in this study see *Table 3* (see **Appendix** for information on the variable's descriptive statistics).

Table 3: A Description of the Study's Dependent and Independent Variables

Variables		Description
Dependent Variables	Number of Terrorist Incidents	The 'gold standard' of an extremist act and the thesis' most-violent form of extremism. Examples of which: suicide bombings, hostage taking, mass shooting. Data acquired from the GTD.
	Total Number of Intentional Homicides (T11HO)	The study's 'moderate' form of extremism. For instance, this includes targeted assassinations. Data employed

<p>Independent Variables - all data acquired from Immigration Policies in Comparison dataset (IMPIC)</p>	<p>Far-Right Vote Share</p>	<p>from the European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics Database.</p>
	<p>Average Eligibility for Asylum and Refugees</p>	<p>The thesis' 'softest' form of extremism. Utilises election data provided by the 'ParlGov' website. By examining far-right vote share it aides the study to uncover potential influences for certain obstructive policy decisions.</p>
	<p>Average conditions for entry for asylum and refugees (place of application)</p>	<p>Encapsulates policy areas such as: Whether there is existence of humanitarian protection and resettlement agreements provided by the host state. Moreover, is there are biased quota system in place, regarding who is admitted asylum.</p>
	<p>Average Security of status for Asylum seekers and Refugees</p>	<p>Encapsulates policy areas such as: Whether the original place of application is taken into consideration for potential asylum applications.</p>
	<p>Average rights associated with Asylum Seekers and Refugees</p>	<p>Encapsulates policy areas such as: Whether a refugee's permit to reside in the host state is permanent or able to be renewed, if there is a legal right to appeal process in place; and what is the refugee's status once the crisis is resolved in their original place of application.</p>
	<p>Average for Immigration Policy</p>	<p>Encapsulates policy areas such as: Whether the refugee (once granted admittance) enjoys freedom of movement around the state, can receive benefits from the state and are able to gain (self)employment.</p> <p>This is the thesis' key independent variable. It is an aggregate of all the refugee policy data. Thus, the findings resulting from the variable are generalizable.</p>

Detention	Were Asylum Seekers detained while and/or after their claims were being processed?
Illegal Residence	Were there harsher punishments for those found to be residing illegally?

3.2 Methods

In order to test my hypotheses, I performed a series of cross-sectional, bivariate, and multiple regression analysis, with ‘country’ as the unit of analysis; and a longitudinal mixed model analyses of variance. The advantages of conducting a cross-sectional study are that I am able to prove/disprove assumptions and am capable of testing multiple variables at a time; whereas, running a longitudinal study allowed me to determine variable patterns and trends over time. Furthermore, by conducting a longitudinal study, and by observing the trends – and how they come to be – another benefit was that it gave my results a higher level of validity.

Additionally, to assess my hypotheses, I have run a series of regression analyses. An advantage of conducting such analyses, is that the results produced by regression analyses are able to be used to infer potential correlations between the independent and dependent variables. I conducted both a bivariate and a multiple regression analysis, to demonstrate a progression in my research – as my investigation starts with a bivariate/correlation study which helps define the nature between my independent variables and my three dependent variables for the cases in question. My investigation continues by performing a series of multiple regression analyses, this type of regression was beneficial as it allowed for me to measure all (or just some) of the variables in conjuncture – which helped account for factors that influence the likelihood of the different stages of extremism. Crucially, by controlling all but one independent variable, I was able to track the effect that one variable had on extremism (i.e. that residing illegally within the host state had a more significant relationship with terrorist incidents than harsher policies regarding potential refugees or asylum seekers ‘Security of Status’) and thus, clearly understand the possible correlations between the different factors – which helped me to efficiently and effectively test my hypotheses.

Following the quantitative study, the investigation proceeds into its second section which took a comparative case study approach. The central tenet of the approach is the “need

to explore an event or phenomenon in-depth and in its natural context” (Crowe et al., 2011). It is for this reason sometimes referred to as a “naturalistic” design; which is in contrast to an “experimental” design (which is demonstrated in the first section of the investigation) in which the researcher seeks to exert control over and manipulate the variable(s) of interest (Ibid.). The ambition of including an in-depth case study is to increase the internal validity of the paper’s findings. This is achieved due to the fact that the case study approach lends itself to developing, or refining a theory – attained by capturing information on more explanatory ‘how’, ‘what’ and ‘why’ questions (Ibid.). Crucially, the in-depth case study approach can benefit the study by providing additional insights into what gaps exist in its delivery, or why one, implementation strategy might be chosen over another – which is clearly vital when looking to understand the causal mechanisms at play, and effects, of ‘anti-refugee’ policies.

Vital for the success of an in-depth case study is an effective case selection. Done well, case selection can boost the external validity of the investigation, giving increased confidence that the paper’s results will hold true beyond this particular study. Moreover, a successful case selection can also help the internal validity of my research, making me more confident that the conclusions hold true within the confines of the analysis (Case Selection, 2016). For the purpose of this investigation, I found it critical to look for two comparable cases – thus, aimed to find cities (as shall be examining at a local-government level) which have similarities in terms of culture, population size, and temporal variance, in order to try control for outside variables. Therefore, it can be seen that I implemented a most different system design. Furthermore, I was required to uncover two cases that differ, as dramatically as possible, in regard to their policies, and attitudes, towards refugees. Consequently, I came to the conclusion to inspect the cases of Mechelen, in Belgium, along with Cottbus – which is located in Germany.

Mechelen shall be the study’s examination of a ‘pro-refugee’ city; whereas, Cottbus will help look at the effects of a government which exudes ‘anti-refugee’ policies. Mechelen was decided to be the ‘pro-refugee’ case due to a number of factors. Firstly, its mayor, Bart Somers, was voted World Mayor 2016 for his work in welcoming and integrating immigrants – with one in two inhabitants were not born in Belgium and the city spans around 138 nationalities (Dudman, 2017). Furthermore, it was the only Belgian city to request refugees in 2015 in response to the influx, taking in 200 – the city’s new ‘pro-refugee’ stance is so surprising due to the fact when Mr. Somers was elected, in 2001, over 30 percent of people voted for an extreme right-wing political party (Whybrow, 2018). There were a number of

ways in which the city developed into a more inclusive and receptive city towards refugees – such as, improved integration policies aimed at helping their new arrivals assimilate into society – these policies shall be examined in more detail in the following chapter. Crucially, Mechelen can be seen as the ideal case for investigation for this study as the city can boast to not having one Mechelen youth to travel to Syria to fight in the conflict there, despite 20 percent of his constituents coming from Muslim backgrounds (Ibid.).

In comparison, Cottbus – which is located just 75 miles southeast from Berlin – can be regarded as the ideal ‘anti-refugee’ city case due to the trailing factors. Violent crime in Cottbus between locals and refugees has become a familiar occurrence, with perpetrators on both sides of the conflict (Sunday Telegraph, 2018). The problem has been exacerbated by the city’s long-standing problems due to its right-wing scene. For example, in the early 1990s, neo-Nazis blockaded an asylum-seeker shelter for three nights before police could get control of the situation (Deutsche Welle, no date). More recently, in 2018, the anti-immigration organization “Zukunft Heimat” (Future Homeland) rallied some 1,500 people onto Cottbus’ streets for a demonstration. The group was originally founded in nearby Spreewald to protest against a refugee shelter (Ibid.). However, the greatest justification that Cottbus is the correct case for examination, is that there has been a recent shift in policy towards refugees – becoming increasingly more restrictive for refugees and asylum seekers – in January of 2018, in response to a violent attack on a group of refugees, the Cottbus Mayor Holger Kelch and Brandenburg Interior Minister Karl-Heinz Schroeter announced that no more refugees would be arriving from the asylum-seeker reception centre in nearby Eisenhüttenstadt (ibid.). The results of which shall be discussed in the next chapter.

In order to test my hypotheses, I shall be utilizing the process-tracing research method to analyse the data found. The analysis features a most similar systems design due to its “ability to eliminate a large number of potentially relevant explanatory variables from further analysis” (Anckar, 2008, p.400). The process tracing-method is based around a set of formal tests. These are designed to assess causation – which is “applied to all the different possible explanations for how a particular change might have come about in order to confirm some and/or eliminate others” (INTRAC, n.d.). There are three analytical benefits to utilising the process-tracing method. First, it aides to uncover causal mechanisms, by exposing “the underlying causal logics of the theory to closer logical scrutiny than if they are black-boxed [which] provides a useful framework for developing better theories of the consequences of delegation in terms of agency costs” (Reykers and Beach, 2017).

Secondly, tracing a theorized mechanism enables the study to make stronger claims about a causal relationship between X and Y than we can with correlational-type data. Finally, and crucially for this investigation, “theories that detail causes, outcomes and the causal mechanisms linking them [which reflects this study well] are typically quite contextually sensitive, which means that different mechanisms can link the same cause and outcome in different contexts” (Ibid.). However, process-tracing is capable of strengthening our understanding of causal mechanisms; thus, is able to provide stronger empirical evidence of how – and under which – conditions certain variables can result in agency costs. This will be vital in my attempt to decipher which causal mechanisms are truly the ones influencing the paper’s dependent variable. In order to facilitate this qualitative analysis, it was important to gather reliable data. There were multiple data sources acquired for the study, which is necessary as rich and varied sources are required for process tracing (“Process Tracing,” 2013); for instance, election figures, interviews and archival documents were all used in conjuncture to efficiently perform the analysis. Furthermore, statistical data – chiefly municipal crime data – was used to gauge the effects of the policies employed by the two cities. The crime statistics for Cottbus was provided by ‘City administration Cottbus: Citizen Service Department Statistics and Elections’ (2018); however, I found it particularly troublesome to find reliable and useful data on crime rates against immigrants over a measurable period of time for Mechelen. I therefore, got into contact with the Bart Somers’ administration in Belgium (the mayor of Mechelen) who were able to send me the required data – ‘Police Crime Statistics for the Municipality of Mechelen’ (2020).

3.3 Limitations and Challenges

The characteristics of the study have changed and evolved as the research developed. Initially, it was going to be an examination of 43 European states, which included quantitative and qualitative data, during the time period 1989-2013. The ambition was to take information on all these countries’ refugee policies and create my own index – creating a value for each nation’s ‘receptiveness towards refugee per year’. However, this was not feasible from a time standpoint; moreover, I would have struggled to have legitimised the values I would have given each nation. Therefore, the quantitative analysis developed into containing data incorporated from the IMPIC dataset.

Moreover, the study’s quantitative analysis time frame – as previously mentioned – is not what is required to directly explain the effects of the most recent ‘anti-refugee’ policies.

Policies, such as Viktor Orban's 'Zero Refugee Strategy', will not be included in the data to be analysed. This hampers the study, as the thesis' research question was influenced by the rise of anti-refugee policies post-the European Refugee Crisis – which is not able to be covered by the time frame. Furthermore, due to time restraints, I was unable to conduct a more comprehensive qualitative study. I had the ambition to conduct a series of interviews with relevant policy-makers/influencers; however, this rendered impossible – leaving my project without any primary data.

Another limitation of my paper is that the results, although higher in external validity than previous works, will be difficult to become universally generalizable. Due to the findings being rather European-centric and thus, due to the vast differences in political cultures, will be challenging to explain events in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Far East for example. Moreover, when examining trends of government policies over time, I must make sure that I account for the changes in government (in a particular state) over time. For instance, results for a particular country may be skewed either way by a change in government which looks more favourably – or negatively – towards refugees, and thus I need to be aware that these findings may not accurately represent the nation over the time frame.

Finally, my research design would have benefitted from being able to have a more 'middle-ground' extremism variable. I was required to examine 'total intentional homicides' as the 'middle' stage of extremism; however, as mentioned, it can be easily argued that it is a much more leaning toward the 'violent-end' of the extremism scale. Therefore, if the research was to be conducted again, I would suggest incorporating a variable which inspects 'online-extremism'. This would examine such acts as spreading extremist propaganda online and joining/getting involved in extremist groups online. I would suggest that this is a more intermediate-level of extremism. Unfortunately, when investigating the prospect of utilizing such a variable, I was unable to gain access to data on 'online-extremism' for the cases in question.

Chapter 4

Empirical Results and Analysis

The following chapter will present the thesis's results and shall endeavour to give reasons for the findings. The chapter is split into two core sections: the first examining the results of the paper's quantitative analysis study; followed by an in-depth comparative case study of Mechelen and Cottbus. Within these segments, there shall be further subsections; in particular, when considering the large-N qualitative study of the majority of European governments. The subsections in question will be as follows: the first defines the relationship between my dependent variable (extremism – operationalized by the three stages of extremism: 'Far-Right Vote Share', 'Total Intentional Homicide' & 'Terrorist Incidents') and each of my seven predictor variables (the study's independent variables that represent differing anti-refugee policy areas). This was achieved by running a series of basic bivariate analyses. Whereas, the second subsection, shall examine the specific effects my independent variables have on my dependent by running a series of controlled multivariate regressions. The aim of this is to test my investigation's numerous hypotheses.

The following section shall look to identify what causal mechanisms are at play by looking (and testing) the findings unearthed by the qualitative investigation. The section shall be qualitative in nature – by utilising a process-tracing method of analysis – with the aim of testing the project's research question: 'Does employing an increasingly restrictive policy towards refugees increase the risk of extremism occurring in the host state?'

4.1 Quantitative Study: Analysing the Effects of European State's National Restrictive Policies towards Refugees on Extremism in the Host State

As previously mentioned, in order to effectively address the paper's hypotheses – and allow the investigation's finding to obtain maximum external validity/generalisability – the project includes a qualitative Large-N Study. The analysis makes use of data provided by the IMPIC on state policies on the level of restrictiveness towards refugees, and asylum seekers, looking to enter the 24 OECD European states. The time frame of the study is from 1989-2010, due to the lack of available data on the key independent variables (restrictive refugee policies) post-2010. The analysis shall convey five variables, which have been operationalized to represent five different policy areas that affect refugee assimilation into their host communities.

The variables produced are as follows: ‘Average Eligibility for Asylum Seekers and Refugees’, ‘Average Conditions for Entry for Asylum Seekers and Refugees’, ‘Average Security of Status for Asylum Seekers and Refugees’, ‘Average Rights Associated with Asylum Seekers and Refugees’, ‘Average for Immigration Policy’. These factors shall be considered the examination’s key independent variables; which shall subsequently, be tested against more commonly regarded extremism forecasters. The analysis’ key dependent variable – ‘Extremism’ – has been conceptualised into three differing variances of extreme behaviour which will be tested in equal measure. For the benefit of transparency, these are as follows: ‘Number of ‘Number of Terrorist Incidents’, ‘Total Intentional Homicides’ & ‘Far-Right Vote Share’. Once again, these different variables shall be tested, against the paper’s key predictor variables, in attempt to identify which (if any) ‘stage’ of extremism is affected most by a change in policy of restrictiveness towards refugees. For a more detailed discussion on and reasoning for, the study’s qualitative study please refer to *Chapter 3*. Moreover, the section shall analyse the findings of the investigation’s analysis involving the ‘wildcard’ refugee policy variables – which are the two-identified refugee policy of note, which have been hypothesised to be impacted greater by a change in the degree of restrictiveness. The two policies in question are: 1. ‘Detention’ - were Asylum Seekers detained while and/or after their claims were being processed? 2. ‘Illegal Residence’ - were there harsher punishments for those found to be residing illegally?

4.1.1 Bivariate Analysis

To examine the findings displayed in *Table 4*, the following discussion shall be split into three parts – one for each Extremism predictor variables, beginning with the least severe form of extremism, in ‘Far-Right Vote Share’, and ending with the most violent form in ‘Number of Terrorist Incidents’. Moreover, within these sections, the results of the bivariate analysis between the study’s dependent variables and ‘wildcard’ variables, which can be seen in *Table 5*, shall be considered.

Table 4: Bivariate Analysis of the Three Extremism Predictor Variables on the Five Indicators Variables of Refugee Policy

		Average Eligibility for Asylum Seekers and Refugees	Average Conditions for Entry for Asylum Seekers and Refugees	Average Security of Status for Asylum Seekers and Refugees	Average Rights Associated with Asylum Seekers and Refugees	Average for Immigration Policy
Number of Terrorist Incidents	Pearson Correlations	.027	.041	-.089	-.004	-.053
	Sig.(2-tailed)	.552	.380	.052	.924	.245
Total Intentional Homicides	Pearson Correlations	-.031	.123	-.101	-.058	-.142
	Sig.(2-tailed)	.570	.028	.066	.293	.423
Far-Right Vote Share	Pearson Correlations	.115	.194	.302	.259	.423
	Sig.(2-tailed)	.012	.000	.000	.000	.000

Table 5: Bivariate Analysis of the Three Extremism Predictor Variables on the Two ‘Wildcard’ Refugee Policy Area Variables

		Detention – Were Asylum Seekers detained while and/or after their claims were being processed?	Illegal Residence - Were there harsher punishments for those found to be residing illegally?
Number of Terrorist Incidents	Pearson Correlations	.093	.172
	Sig.(2-tailed)	.043	.000
Total Intentional Homicides	Pearson Correlations	.105	-.165
	Sig.(2-tailed)	.056	.003
Far-Right Vote Share	Pearson Correlations	-.221	.303
	Sig.(2-tailed)	.000	.000

4.1.2 *Far-Right Vote Share*

The findings show that all of the independent variables have to some degree, a significant statistical relationship with ‘Far-Right Vote Share’ – with all the p-value’s displaying a score of <0.05. ‘Far-Right Vote Share’ was the only variable, of the three extremism dependent variables to result in all its correlations conveying in a statistically significant relationship with the five independent variables. The result of the outcomes being

statistically significant, is that I can say with confidence that what they suggest are reliable and provides me with greater confidence when testing my hypotheses. The analysis finds that there is a moderate positive correlation between an increase in 'Far-Right Vote Share' and 'Average for Immigration Policy' – scoring correlation coefficient of .423. This is a key finding for the project; with the 'Average for Immigration Policy' variable being an aggregate of all the refugee policies in the data, it allows me to propose that there is evidence to support my hypothesis – that *a state whose government employs 'anti-refugee policies' is more likely to have a greater share of its population voting in favour of a far-right party*. It is not difficult to comprehend that this might be the case; moreover, it could be the case that in fact the hypothesis could be flipped to better understand the situation. For example, that it is the nation's demographic that influences the state's policy direction towards refugees – for instance, it is theoretically plausible to expect to see a state's government, which has a gaining proportion of its electorate that supports far-right nationalist movements, to pander to this section of the population by enacting restrictive refugee policies. However, this would require research to be answered.

The further four predictor variables were all found to have a 'slight' positive correlation – having correlation coefficient values ranging from .115 (Average Eligibility for Asylum seekers and Refugees) to .302 (Average security of status for Asylum seekers and refugees). Once again, giving credence to the argument that we have confidence in suggesting that there is a positive relationship between an increase in more restrictive 'anti-refugee' policies and an increase in far-right vote share; and therefore, the 'lowest' (as according to the paper's understanding) form of extremism.

Finally, as depicted, in *Table 5*, there is a difference in the type of relationship when examining the two 'wildcard' policy areas. In conjuncture with the previous findings, when testing the connection between 'Far-Right Vote Share' and 'Illegal Residence' I find that there is a 'slight' positive correlation – as demonstrated by the .303 Pearson Correlation value. This is an understandable result, once again, it is predictable that a government which employs harsher punishments for those found to be residing illegally would obtain its mandate to do so from an electorate which is greater support for tighter immigration control and aims to promote national interests. However, in comparison to not only the 'Illegal Residence' finding – but also all the previous outcomes discussed above – when examining the correlation between 'Detention' (that while being processed for potential asylum, refugees were detained) and 'Far-Right Vote Share' the data proposes that there is a 'slight' negative relationship between the

two (-.221). This result suggests that when a government employs a policy, or selection of, which promotes detaining potential asylum seekers decreases the vote share of the parties on the far-right. An implication of which is that it contradicts the previous claim of mine, that in general, it can be deemed the hypothesis – *a state whose government employs ‘anti-refugee policies’ is more likely to have a greater share of its population voting in favour of a far-right party* – as credible. Clearly, this result goes against the train of thought depicted beforehand – that government mandate over implementing such policy is derived from public opinion.

A conceivable reason for which, is that it is often regarded that someone who is normally more moderate may vote for an ‘extreme’ party (like a British National Party or Germany’s ‘Alternative for Germany’) as a protest vote against what they feel is a government not promoting or defending their interests – in this case, would be more restrictive refugee policies (Van der Brug, Wouter & Fennema, Meindert, 2006). However, the theory continues by explaining that once this policy area has been altered, in favour of the protest vote, then those more moderate – who were voting in favour of a ‘far-right’ party on the basis of one or two policies – would go back to voting for a more traditionally middle-ground party. Such findings and reasoning is supported by the work by Sola (2018), which finds no causal effect between single-concerns (i.e. on the government’s stance on ‘Detention’) on political preferences in the short term.

4.1.3 Total Intentional Homicides

In comparison to the results discussed in the previous section (*1.1.1 Far-Right Vote Share*), the findings in this segment are more mixed – both in statistical significance and correlation type. Out of the seven variables tested, in *Tables 4 & 5*, only two of the independent variables came back with significant values; those being ‘Average Conditions for entry for Asylum Seekers and Refugees’ and ‘Illegal Residence’ – with Sig. (2-tailed) scores of .028 and .003 respectively. The consequence of which is that it cannot be suggested, with any certainty, the outcomes displayed of the further five variables can be used to assess the research’s hypotheses. Additionally, it is apparent (even with the indifferent significance scores) that there are multiple causal mechanisms at play when examining the relationships between the independent variables and ‘Total Intentional Homicides’. Due to notion that, unlike with ‘Far-Right Vote Share’ where primarily there were positive correlations between the variables, the data suggests there is a more equal split between negative and positive correlations – meaning it is not possible to have one overarching understanding of what is transpiring.

However, as declared beforehand, we are unable to trust the results of five of the independent variables; therefore, in an attempt to assess my hypothesis – that *a state whose government which employs 'anti-refugee policies', is at greater risk of experiencing an increase 'Intentional Homicide'* – I shall examine the two reliable factors. Firstly, 'Average Conditions for entry for Asylum Seekers and Refugees', demonstrates a correlation coefficient value of .123; thus, is seen to have a 'slight' positive relationship with 'Total Intentional Homicide'. This finding is one that provides an indication in favour of my hypothesis. An understanding could be that intentional homicide – which comprises of assault leading to death, euthanasia and infanticide (and attempts of all) – can be understood in this instance to be attacks, or at least attempted, on public servants (who deal with the entry of refugees and asylum seekers), policymakers or even on the refugees themselves from disgruntled nationalists – as what occurred in Cottbus in 2018 (Deutsche Welle ([www. Dw.com](http://www.Dw.com)), no date). Therefore, the suggestion being that if there is frustration with the government's policy on conditions for entry for refugees – especially from those trying to gain entry, believing that there are being unnecessary barriers being placed in front of them – then this irritation may escalate to a point where there are violent outbreaks witnessed; thus, giving credibility to why we see a positive correlation between 'Average Conditions for entry for Asylum Seekers and Refugees' and 'Total Intentional Homicides'. However, as is often the case when simply analysing correlations, we are incapable of making definitive explanations with the findings (due to there being no testing of other, potentially more influential, factors at play) which is the situation in this instance.

In contrast, when investigating the relationship concerning 'Illegal Residence' and 'Total Intentional Homicides, I find that there is a 'slight' negative correlation between the two – the data presenting a correlation coefficient of -.165. This result brings into doubt the hypothesis discussed. Reason for which being, you would anticipate that with an increase in 'strictness' in policy, regarding being found to be residing illegally in the host state, then (by following the previous justification) there would be an increase in aggression towards policymakers/enforcers on the bases of growing frustration. However, this result indicates the complete opposite. A tentative explanation for this finding, I must stress that this is provisional justification and would need further investigation, is that with potential illegal residents incarcerated or deported in a greater number, then there would be a reduction in 'Intentional Homicides' – as a proportion of those extradited may be violent in nature and thus, by being off the streets, it reduces the risk of this more 'moderate' form of extremism. This train of

thought corresponds with the policymakers who have inspired this research, i.e. Viktor Orban and/or Matteo Salvini –with the latter, in 2018, telling illegal migrants to “get ready to pack your bags” (Ellyatt, 2018). Salvini announced that he was intensifying the country’s detention/deportation policy that year, aiming to remove over 500,000 illegal residents – which would be a rise from nearly 6,000 people in 2016 and 6,500 in 2017 (Ellyatt, 2018). The negative correlation found between ‘Illegal Residence’ and ‘Intentional Homicide’ can also be supported by the findings of Amuedo-Dorantes, Bansak, Pozo (2018) – who find that refugees do not seem to have a significant impact on local crime rates – and the discoveries made by Masterson & Yasenov (2018), who explain that, despite a 65.6% drop in refugee resettlement, there is no discernible effect on county-level crime rates. These null effects are consistent across all types of crime. Their results suggest that crime rates would have been similar had refugee arrivals continued at previous levels.

4.1.4 Number of Terrorist Incidents

Arguably, the variable of most interest – due to its status of being the ‘gold standard’ of extremism – can be seen, by incorporating a bivariate analysis, that it cannot be simply stated that an increase in restrictive refugee policies would lead to a decreased likelihood of that nation suffering from terrorism – as leading European ministers, such as Prime Minister Orban and former Italian Interior Minister Matteo Salvini, would have us to believe. Once again, the findings were hampered by a lack of statistical significance – with only two of the five independent variables falling under the principle .05 value: both the ‘wildcard’ variables scoring .043 and .000 respectively. Therefore, ‘Detention’ and ‘Illegal Residence’ are the variables that can reliably attempt to answer my hypotheses. Initially, the data gathered allows us to uncover that there is evidence to suggest that *a state’s government which employs ‘anti-refugee policies’ is at a greater risk of experiencing violent extremism*. Indication for which, can be observed by looking at the variables correlation coefficient values; ‘Detention’ scored .093, whereas, ‘Illegal residence’ resulted in a value of .172 (as can be seen in *Table 5*). Both of the coefficient scores demonstrated only ‘slight’ positive correlations between ‘restrictive immigration policies’ and terrorism (the paper’s most violent form of extremism); nonetheless, there is still a relationship between the two – albeit slight. Significance of which, is that – as discussed in the study’s literature review – there has been a lack of research on (and importance given to) the effects of restrictive policies towards refugees on terrorism, and these findings give credence to the notion that there is need for further exploration into the area. The argument

presented by Sude, Stebbins, Weiland (2015); where they argue conditions that are most likely to contribute to radicalization are: actions of the receiving country and its citizens (i.e. their policies) where the refugees lose personal opportunities – can be made for why we may see a positive relationship between having more restrictive policies and an increase in terror incidents. Due to the disenfranchised refugees, in the face of opportunity barriers and perceived persecution, are at greater risk of being radicalised – which is the most well-trodden path to becoming active in the more violent practices of extremism.

Additionally, the bivariate study of the relationship between ‘Number of Terrorist Incidents’ and the predictor variables, gives the opportunity to test my hypothesis: that *anti-refugee restrictive policies should be considered as a predictor variable, in conjuncture with traditional causes of extremism*. As shown in *Table 6*, where the correlation coefficients of the more commonly perceived causes of extremism (and the investigation’s covariates) can be seen. With this information, I was able to test whether the relationships between these covariates and terror incidents match or differ from those with restrictive refugee policies. From the onset, it was evident that, potentially, there was credibility to why these factors are given more weight in the literature – as all their results, bar ‘Regime Durability’ (.090), were found to be statistically significant; in comparison to the investigation’s seven refugee policy variables tested, where only two were found to be significant.

Moreover, *Table 6* illustrates that there is indeed a difference in the level of correlation explained by the ‘traditionally perceived causes’ and the paper’s key explanatory variables. The factor uncovered to be the most correlated with Terrorism was ‘Population’, achieving a correlation coefficient of .437. This is not an unexpected result, considering the findings of previous studies (see: Kurrild-Klitgaard et al., 2006; Gassebner and Luechinger, 2011); which found that the larger a nation’s population the more likely it would suffer from terrorism. Therefore, my ‘Population’ findings are in conjuncture with earlier works on the matter. Whereas, even when selecting the restrictive refugee policy variable which had the largest correlation coefficient, ‘Illegal Residence’, its score of .172 was inferior to all of the ‘traditional’ factors which found a positive correlation, bar a nation’s GDP (.041). However, this does not mean I should disregard my hypothesis; as my investigation’s outcomes – even if marginally smaller – does identify that especially in the case of ‘Detention’ and ‘Illegal Residence’, some constricting policies have a ‘slight’ positive correlation with terror incidents – the same level as a state’s ‘GDP’ and ‘Fragility Level’. Therefore, these results convey, that

when tested without holding other variables constant, ‘Anti-Refugee’ policies do slightly correlate with an increase in terrorism.

Table 6: Bivariate Analysis of the Number of Terror Incidents on Investigation’s Five Covariates Variables/ Traditionally-Perceived causes of Terrorism

		Population	GDP (USD Billion)	Regime Level of Institutional Democracy (Polity2)	Regime Durability (Durable)	Level of State Fragility (SFI)
Number of Terrorist Incidents	Pearson Correlations	.437	.041	.212	-.098	.288
	Sig.(2-tailed)	.000	.000	.041	.090	.000

4.1.5 Overview of the Bivariate Analysis Findings

Overall, after conducting a series of bivariate analyses it was found that we can consider there to be a connection between ‘Anti-Refugee’ policies and the three ‘stages’ of extremism. However, the relationships uncovered were not particularly strong, the vast majority found to have a ‘weak’ correlation – only finding one, statistically significant, moderate positive correlation (‘Average Immigration Policy’ on ‘Far-Right Vote Share’, .423) and there were no observed highly positive, nor negative, relationships identified. Moreover, it was discovered that it was with the study’s least violent form of extremism – ‘Far-Right Vote Share’ – where the analysis’ findings were most valuable, due to all the results being capable to be utilised in discussion of the paper’s hypotheses, as they were all of statistical significance. From which it was identified that there is evidence to support the hypothesis – *that a state whose government*

employs 'anti-refugee policies' is more likely to have a greater share of its population voting in favour of a far-right party. Similar findings were presented by Van der Brug, Wouter & Fennema, Meindert (2006); a nation's demographic structure influences the state's policy direction towards refugees – thus, if the state has a gaining proportion of its electorate supporting far-right movements, it is more likely to pander to this section of the population by enacting constricting refugee policies.

However, not all the correlations between the anti-refugee policy variables and 'Far-Right Vote Share' were positive. By testing the relationship between 'Detention' and FR vote share, the analysis produced a correlation coefficient of $-.221$; this represented a negative relationship between the two – which was not expected nor hypothesised. While observing the connection concerning 'Illegal Residence' and 'Average Conditions for Entry', it was found that there is a 'slight' negative correlation between the two – $-.165$. This result was a surprise and brought into doubt the hypothesis discussed: *a state whose government which employs 'anti-refugee policies', is at greater risk of experiencing an increase 'Intentional Homicide'*. The result indicates the opposite to what would be anticipated; that with an increase in 'strictness' in policy, there would be an increase in hostility towards policymakers/enforcers on the bases of growing frustration. A provisional explanation provided was that with potential illegal residents incarcerated or deported in a greater number, then there would be a reduction in 'Intentional Homicides' – as a proportion of those extradited may be violent in nature and thus, reducing the risk of this 'moderate' form of extremism.

Crucially, by testing the study's most violent form of extremism, terror incidents, I was able to decipher whether the paper's unique explanatory variables (restrictive refugee policies) were comparable with previously conceived predictors of terrorism. It was found that when selecting the refugee policy variable which had the largest relationship with terrorism incidents, 'Illegal Residence', its score of $.172$ was inferior to the majority of the 'traditional' factors. Also, in comparison, the factor uncovered to be the most correlated with Terrorism was 'Population', achieving a correlation coefficient of $.437$. The results gave credence to the argument that 'Anti-Refugee' policies should not be given the same weight as the 'traditional' predictor variables often found in the literature. However, I would disagree, as my analysis' outcomes do detect that, some restricting refugee policies have a 'slight' positive correlation with terror incidents – the same level as a state's 'GDP' and 'Fragility Level'. Thus, I would argue the need for further investigation before 'Anti-Refugee policies' are disregarded as an explanatory variable for terror incidents.

4.2 Multivariate Regression Analysis

The findings of the first section (*1.0 Bivariate Analysis*), that a selection of the anti-refugee predictor variables is seen to correlate (to differing degrees) with the three stages of extremism; are not capable of telling the whole story. Hence, to enhance my findings, it was vital that I established what the variables' interrelated correlations were when the other covariates are controlled for. Therefore, in order to test my first hypothesis – that *a state's government which employs 'anti-refugee policies' is at a greater risk of experiencing violent extremism* – I employed a multiple regression analysis, which examined all variables between the years 1989-2010. Once again, the section shall be structured as follows: split into three parts – one for each Extremism predictor variable, beginning with 'Far-Right Vote Share' – the least severe form of extremism, followed by an analysis of 'Total Intentional Homicides', and ending with the most violent form in 'Number of Terrorist Incidents'. Concluded, with an overview of the findings at the end of the segment.

4.2.1 Far-Right Vote Share

In order to test the hypothesis formulated in Chapter 2 (*'Theoretical Framework'*) – *a state whose government employs 'anti-refugee policies' is more likely to have a greater share of its population voting in favour of a far-right party* – I employ a linear regression model. This allows me to test the effect of the study's predictor variables – while controlling for the highlighted, commonly perceived, causes of extremism variables. The results of the regression model are presented in *Table 7*.

Table 7: Multiple Regression of Far-Right Vote Share

Model	Standardized Coefficients Beta	Coefficients Std. Error	Sig
(Constant)		17.548	.000
Average for Immigration Policy	.327***	11.168	.000
Average Eligibility for Asylum Seekers and Refugees	-.005	3.518	.951
Average Conditions for Entry for Asylum Seekers and Refugees	-.005	2.995	.929
Average Security of Status for Asylum Seekers and Refugees	.150	2.995	.027
Average Rights Associated with Asylum Seekers and Refugees	-.231***	4.976	.001
Illegal Residence	.264***	2.124	.000
Detention	.007	2.777	.911
Regime Level of Institutional Democracy (Polity2)	-.068	1.186	.460
Regime Durability (Durable)	.239***	.019	.000
Level of State Fragility (SFI)	-.160	.437	.088

GDP (USD Billion)	-.585***	2.641	.000
Population	.257*	2.714	.080

Sig: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The model achieved an R-squared of .384, which indicates that 38.4% of variance in the study's dependent variable, 'Far-Right Vote Share', is explained by the model. Consequently, I can state that the model was able to account for a fair amount of the variance. Four of the seven predictor variables were found to have statistically significant results – ranging from .000 to .027. These extremely significant p-values allow me to utilise these findings when assessing my hypothesis; moreover, means the variables exhibit a high-level of magnitude significance; thus, we are capable of drawing inferences from the results. Additionally, these findings are capable of rejecting the null hypothesis that there's no relationship between an increase in restrictive policies towards a refugee's and an increase in far-right vote share in the host state.

When examining the study's core explanatory variable, and its unique contribution, – 'Average for Immigration Policy' (which is an aggregate of all the refugee policies in the IMPIC dataset) – there is clear evidence to suggest a sizeable positive shift in 'Far-Right Vote Share' rising. The model predicts that a country with more 'Less Receptive Immigration Policies' there will be a positive effect on vote share for right wing parties, with .33. Crucially, this was the highest result of all the statistically significant findings. Therefore, conveying that it was the variable which had the greatest effect on 'Far-Right Vote Share'. With the result being significant $p<.000$, it means it can be used to assess the thesis' hypothesis; clearly, the data demonstrates sustenance for the argument that without a universal governmental shift in attitude towards refugees – determined by a how restrictive the policies towards them are – we can expect to see a rise in the political right.

However, understanding for such an outcome is troublesome. The expected finding would be for the far-right vote share to decrease following the successful implementation of policies that restricted refugee's rights. Due to those who previously used their vote as a protest against the government for not supporting such issues, would now use their vote in support of the incumbent government as to now protect their interests – thus, driving down the vote share

of the more extreme, and outsider, far-right party. An example of which, was following the 2017 general election when UKIP's vote share fell to around 2%, from the 12.6% they received in 2015 – where they attained around 4 million votes (Booth and Walker, 2017). The explanation for which, was that the issue that UKIP ran on, and gained monumental support for, was no longer required – for the United Kingdom to leave the European Union, as the country had already voted to leave in 2016. Labour and the Conservatives were the victors from this result – obtaining much of UKIP's vote share. Therefore, I am left to give a speculative response as to why this result has come to be. A potential explanation would be that the results are influenced by if the far-right party is the incumbent party in government – i.e. The Freedom Party (FPÖ), in Austria, became the only far-right party in power in Western Europe when it joined a coalition as a junior partner with conservative Chancellor Sebastian Kurz in 2017 (BBC News, 2019) – thus, meaning that their majority vote share increases after they have successfully implemented further restrictive policies.

Moreover, the model displays that 'Average Security of Status for Asylum Seekers and Refugees' and, one of the study's wildcard individual immigration policy variables, 'Illegal Residence' convey results that give credence to the notion that the study's lowest-form of extremism increases, once harsher anti-refugee policies are implemented. Both of the factors obtained required p-value scores - .027 and .000, respectively – thus, affirming their suitability to be considered in the analysis of the hypothesis. The model predicts a country which experiences an increase in 'Security of Status' – i.e. a country which has harsher policies that threaten a potential refugee/asylum seekers 'Security of Status' (for instance, whether a refugee/asylum seeker have the right to appeal if request denied and/or was it possible to renew a temporary residence permit and/or apply for a permanent residence permit) – then the 'Far-Right Vote Share' will increase – illustrated by the factor's standardized coefficient score of .150.

Whereas, similarly, when examining the unique contribution of 'Illegal Residence' it provides further support for the theory promoted that there is a link between furthered restrictiveness on refugees and an upsurge in nationalist backing. The variable obtained a standardized coefficient of .26; thus, the model proclaims that with an increase of severer punishments for those found to be residing illegally in the host state (i.e. immediate deportation) then we would expect to see a growth in 'Far-Right Vote Share'. A conceivable explanation for the observed outcome, as depicted when conducting the bivariate analysis, is that a nation's demographic influences the state's policy direction towards refugees.

Consequently, if the state has a gaining proportion of its electorate supporting far-right movements, it is more likely to pander to this section of the population by legislating increasingly restrictive refugee policies. Moreover, an explanation which is theoretically more palatable, is that the ‘increased’ stricter policies implemented by the serving government do not satisfy the interests – or go ‘far’ enough – in the view of anti-immigrant supporters. Thus, the argument presented is that – for example – if someone who usually votes for a more conservative party (who is in government) and they are disappointed with the immigration policies employed, then there is enhanced motive to back a far-right party which would more effectively represent their interests.

The model exhibits that 3 of the 4 predictors are positive and demonstrate results which support the study’s hypothesis; however, ‘Average Rights Associated with Asylum Seekers and Refugees’ displays an outcome which is in contrast to its counterparts. The variable’s standardized coefficient was -.23. Consequently, it can be suggested that a country with a rise in ‘Rights’ – i.e. a country which has stricter policies regarding potential refugees or asylum seekers’ rights (i.e. did a refugee/asylum seeker have the right to move freely within the country and/or did asylum seekers have the right to undertake paid work and/or become self-employed?) – the model predicts that the far-right vote share will decrease; while holding all other predictor variables constant. Moreover, the factor’s standardized coefficient score of -.23, meant it was the predictor variable which had the most negative relationship with the dependent variable. This result was significant ($p < .027$); thus, can be used assuredly, to evaluate the above-mentioned hypothesis. The model’s findings authorise me to promote, that after analysing when policies, such as a refugees’ ability to obtain the same level of benefits as the incumbent citizens, increases in severity; then the vote share of the far-right is likely to fall. Therefore, the result does not support my hypothesis. Although this finding is not as I expected, it is not inconceivable as to why this has resulted. For instance, it could be expected that the far-right vote share would decrease as a result of the incumbent government implementing more restrictive policies – reflecting the interests of those who would potentially vote for such extreme parties. Thus, would be logical to believe that in such a case, people would then vote for the current administration – rather than risk taking votes away from them leading to a victory for a more liberal/sympathetic political party.

Lastly, there were understandings to be taken from statistically significant findings of two of the study’s covariates. Both ‘Regime Durability (Durable)’ and a nation’s ‘GDP’ were

discovered to show p-values that permit them to be significant and thus of use - .000 and .000 respectively. The model predicts that, when holding the other variables constant, increasing the two aforementioned factors we are likely to see both a rise in 'Far-Right Vote Share', and also a reduction. When examining 'Regime Durability' – which tracks the rate of regime change in a country, which if escalated could lead to a lack of stable political institutions (Monty G. Marshall & Ted Robert Gurr, 2020, p.17) – the data suggests we would expect to see an increase in far-right support if there is an increase in institutional democracy – with its standardized correlation totalling .24. This result does not surprise, as if there is an upsurge in instability you would presume a potential increase in support for an extreme party while the nation is in the midst of a power struggle. However, in contrast, a state's 'GDP (USD Billion)' achieves a standardized coefficient of -.59 – which is the largest effect (both positive or negative) detected by the model. Thus, the model predicts that when a nation's population grows it would be seen that support for far-right parties would decrease. This is a surprising result; seeing as in Europe, there has been a long-term trend in rising nationalist parties, discernibly in Western Europe since the 1980s (Bieber, 2018). With Western European states being the nations in the continent with the largest populations, such as France and the United Kingdom, I would expect to see that an increase in their populations would increase the trend in rising nationalist support, not decrease as the model suggests.

4.2.2 Total Intentional Homicide

In order to test the hypothesis formulated in Chapter 2 – *a state whose government which employs 'anti-refugee policies', is at greater risk of experiencing an increase 'Intentional Homicide* – I, once again, employ a linear regression model. This allows me to test the effect of the study's predictor variables – while controlling for the highlighted, commonly perceived causes of extremism variables. The results of the regression model are presented in *Table 8*.

Table 8: Multiple Regression of Total Intentional Homicides

Model	Standardized Coefficients		Sig
	Beta	Coefficients Std. Error	
(Constant)		1082.100	.000
Average for Immigration Policy	.110*	697.216	.053
Average Eligibility for Asylum Seekers and Refugees	-.298***	209.524	.000
Average Conditions for Entry for Asylum Seekers and Refugees	.181***	176.616	.000
Average Security of Status for Asylum Seekers and Refugees	.171***	410.376	.000
Average Rights Associated with Asylum Seekers and Refugees	-.023	300.169	.620
Illegal Residence	-.051	130.460	.205
Detention	-.115***	172.389	.007
Regime Level of Institutional Democracy (Polity2)	-.147**	73.592	.016
Regime Durability (Durable)	-.222***	1.406	.000
Level of State Fragility (SFI)	-.269***	28.884	.000

GDP (USD Billion)	.587***	176.986	.000
Population	.262**	198.480	.013

Sig: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The model achieved an R-squared of .729, which indicates that 72.9% of variance in the study's dependent variable, 'Total Intentional Homicide', is explained by the model. Consequently, we can state that the model was able to account for a large amount of the variance. As found in the analysis of 'Far-Right Vote Share', four of the seven predictor variables were found to have statistically significant results – ranging from .000 to .007. These extremely significant p-values allow me to utilise these findings when assessing my hypothesis; moreover, means the variables exhibit a high-level of magnitude significance; thus, being capable of drawing inferences from the results. Additionally, these findings are capable of rejecting the null hypothesis that there's no relationship between an increase in restrictive policies towards a refugee's and an increase in attempted (and successful) intentional homicide in the host state.

The results of 'Average Eligibility for Asylum Seekers and Refugees' does not support the thesis' hypothesis, that intentional homicides would increase following a rise in anti-refugee policies. The model portrays that 'Average Eligibility' scored -.30 as its standardized coefficient value – which was the largest effect displayed in the model. Thus, the data suggests that a nation with an increase in 'Eligibility' – i.e. a country which has harsher policies regarding potential refugees or asylum seekers nationality being considered before entrance and/or whether there is a quota system in place – there will be a decrease intentional homicides per year. With the results being extremely significant $p<.000$, it means they can be used to assess the thesis' hypothesis; clearly, the data demonstrates evidence that further enforcing restrictive 'eligibility' policies do not increase intentional homicides, but radically decreases instances of homicides in the host state per year.

The reasoning for the model's finding is a conceivable one, as previously mentioned in section 1.1.2 *Total Intentional Homicide*, refugees are prohibited from gaining admittance to the host state in a larger number, then there would be a reduction in attempted (and successful) homicides – as a portion of those restricted may be violent in nature and consequently, by not

entering the host state's society, it reduces the risk of this more 'moderate' form of extremism. However, it is important to note that this would be an expected result if you were to restrict the majority of demographics into another society – that a proportion of the people would be violently minded and therefore, by restricting them at source would reduce violence in their final destination.

The model finds evidence in favour of the thesis' hypothesis when examining the results of 'Average Conditions for Entry for Asylum Seekers and Refugees' and 'Average Security of Status for Asylum Seekers and Refugees'. Both of the predictor variables demonstrated a positive effect on an increase in intentional homicides in the host state, when the policy areas were further restrictive. This was evident by their respective standardized coefficient values of .18 and .17 – both very similar in level of effect; however, 'Average Conditions' was found to have the greatest positive effect on 'Intentional Homicide' out of the predictor variables. Both the results were extremely significant $p < .000$. The data exhibits evidence that further enforcing restrictive 'conditions for entry' and 'security of status' policies do have an effect in an increase intentional homicides in the host state per year.

Rationale as to why a country which has harsher 'Conditions for Entry' policies (i.e. an applicant's place of application is taken into account when deciding upon granting a request) would see an increase in homicides is as follows. For instance, frustrations can develop from increasing barriers being put into the way of people looking to secure safety for them and their families. For example, it is understandable that as a result of increasing obstructions to an applicant (i.e. a change in entry conditions, such as a boosted base-language level required) which leads to them failing to gain asylum into the host state would lead to frustration, which would intensify into violent actions – as depicted by the frustration-aggression theory (Breuer and Elson, 2017) understanding taken from the re-formulated hypothesis of Neal Miller and Robert Sears in 1941. The theory conveys a psychological explanation of aggressive behaviour as stemming from the frustration of goals. Moreover, studies also point to a more intra-group form of violence that could occur as a result of harsher entry requirements for refugees; for example, it is found that there is "potential for domestic violence among refugee and asylum seeker women, especially their vulnerability arising from a lack of family and community support" (Aspinall, Peter J, and Charles Watters, 2010, p.28); which would be intensified if, for instance, only a chosen selection of that support was able to gain admittance into the host state, due to conforming with the conditions of entry that the state has in place.

Additionally, when examining why furthering the restrictiveness of ‘Security of Status’ policies (i.e. did a refugee/asylum seeker have the right to appeal if request denied and/or was it possible to renew a temporary residence permit and/or apply for a permanent residence permit) it is conceivable that reasoning for this would be highly similar to those discussed previously. Therefore, as deliberated in the causes of violence literature, people who have been provoked by others may be particularly aggressive (Stangor, 2014); consequently, it is expected that having one’s security taken away from them, once potentially settled and away from perceived harm, would be seen as an act of provocation and lead to violence against those thought to have wronged them.

The final predictor in need of discussion is ‘Detention’. As with ‘Average of Eligibility’, the analysis finds that when Asylum Seekers were exceedingly detained while and/or after their claims were being processed, then the rate of intentional homicides was reduced. This was evident by the variable’s standardized coefficient score of $-.115$. Once again, due to the variable obtaining a utilisable p-value ($p < .007$), the finding can be used to provide indication against the study’s expectation that furthered anti-refugee policies would increase the amount of intentional homicide incidents.

An explanation as to why we see a negative effect between an increase in restrictive in detention policies and an increase in the rate of intentional homicides attempted, and successfully carried out, is similar in nature to that depicted in the discussion on ‘Average of Eligibility’. The theory is that if there is more stringent processing procedure for people looking to enter the host state – which includes detaining them for longer in order to give ample time to determine if they should be allowed admittance into the nation, as often given as justification for extended detention times for potential asylum seekers – then if the process is carried out effectively it is conceivable you would see a reduction in intentional homicides. This would be as a result of found violent criminals being uncovered, during the detention process, and subsequently extradited before they were given the opportunity to gain entrance and potentially attempt to commit homicidal acts.

Lastly, there were understandings to be taken from all of the study’s covariates. The model depicted that all covariates p-values were significant, varying from $.000$ to $.016$. The model predicts that, when holding the other variables constant, by increasing the factors: ‘Regime Level of Institutional Democracy’, ‘Regime Durability’ and ‘Level of State Fragility’,

we are likely to see a decrease in ‘Intentional Homicides’. Evidence for which being their respective negative standardized coefficient values of $-.15$, $-.22$ & $-.27$.

The notion that an increase in the level of ‘Institutional Democracy’ would lead to a reduction in attempted homicides is logical; as the literature conveys that “strong democracies and strong autocracies tend to have the lowest homicide rates” (Piccone, 2017, p.1). However, the results of both ‘Regime Durability’ and ‘Level of State Fragility’ – with an increase in either conceivably effecting the other negatively – finding that they have a decreasing effect on the rate of intentional homicides greatly surprises me. The incomprehension is due to current research suggesting that “nations undergoing transitions ... experience the highest homicide rates” (Ibid.); whereas, the data presented by the model contradicts that train of thought.

The final two covariates – a state’s ‘GDP (USD Billion)’ and a state’s ‘Population’ – both convey that if they were to be increased then it is predicted the rate of intentional homicides within the host state would also grow. A nation’s GDP attained a standardized coefficient of $.59$ – is the largest effect (both positive or negative) detected by the model. This result is in conjuncture with the current literature on the matter – with the Crisis States Research Centre finding “a consistently positive and statistically significant correlation between growth in GDP per capita and rates of social violence” (Fox and Hoelscher, 2010, p.12). Additionally, the study’s finding that when there is an increase in the population of the host state then there is a rise in the rate of the ‘Intentional Homicides’, is highly in conjunction with conducted research. The model identifies that ‘Population’ achieved a positive standardized coefficient value of $.26$ – a smaller effect than that attained by ‘GDP’, nonetheless there is an apparent influence on show – which is in agreement with James Nolan’s finding, in his paper *Establishing the statistical relationship between population size and UCR crime rate: Its impact and implications*, that “although the impact of population size on crime rate may appear relatively small, it can be statistically significant” (Nolan, 2004).

4.2.3 Number of Terrorist Incidents

In order to test the hypothesis formulated in Chapter 2 – *a state’s government which employs ‘anti-refugee policies’ is at a greater risk of experiencing violent extremism* – I, once again, employ a linear regression model. This allows me to test the effect of the study’s predictor variables – while controlling for the emphasised, commonly perceived, causes of extremism variables. The results of the regression model are presented in *Table 9*.

Table 9: Multiple Regression of Number of Terrorist Incidents

Model	Standardized Coefficients		Sig
	Beta	Coefficients Std. Error	
(Constant)		42.845	.028
Average for Immigration Policy	-.254***	27.046	.003
Average Eligibility for Asylum Seekers and Refugees	.358***	8.167	.000
Average Conditions for Entry for Asylum Seekers and Refugees	-.040	6.793	.519
Average Security of Status for Asylum Seekers and Refugees	-.053	15.627	.451
Average Rights Associated with Asylum Seekers and Refugees	.040	11.803	.572
Illegal Residence	.070	5.167	.261
Detention	-.037	6.690	.560
Regime Level of Institutional Democracy (Polity2)	.049	2.907	.611
Regime Durability (Durable)	-.083	.046	.222
Level of State Fragility (SFI)	.322***	1.070	.001

GDP (USD Billion)	.045	6.348	.770
Population	.313*	6.523	.038

Sig: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The model achieved an R-squared of .274, which indicates that 27.4% of variance in the study's dependent variable, 'Number of Terrorist Incidents', is explained by the model. Consequently, we can state that the model was able to account for a slight amount of the variance. Only two of the seven predictor variables were found to have statistically significant results – 'Average Immigration' (.003) and 'Average Eligibility' (.000). The variables exhibit a high-level of magnitude significance; thus, we are capable of drawing inferences from the results. Moreover, these findings are capable of rejecting the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between an increase in restrictive policies towards refugees and an increase in attempted (and successful) terror attacks in the host state.

The results of 'Average for Immigration Policy' do not support the thesis' hypothesis, that incidents of terror would increase following a rise in anti-refugee policies. The model portrays that 'Average Immigration Policy' – which is the study's key predictor variable, due to the fact it is an aggregate of all the data IMPIC provides, giving its findings a high level of generalisability ($\beta = -.25^{***}$). This was largest negative effect displayed in the model. Thus, the data proposes that a nation with an increase in less receptive immigration policies will expect to experience a decrease terrorist incidents per year. With the results being extremely significant $p < .003$, it means they can be used to assess the thesis' hypothesis; clearly, demonstrating that further enforcing constricting immigration policies do not increase terror attacks, but decreases terrorist incidents in the host state per year.

Clearly, on the surface, this result provides validation for the anti-refugee/immigration rhetoric that was the catalyst for this research; however, although it must not be dismissed, the finding is in need of explanation. The current literature finds that the number of terror attacks increases with the number of foreigners living in a host country (Dreher, Gassebner and Schaudt, 2017); thus, it is highly conceivable that my model's conveyed negative effect can be simply explained due to the notion that an increase in more restrictive immigration policies will limit the amount of 'foreigners' entering the host state, which understandably should result

in a reduction of terror incidents. The theory being that a proportion (even if only an exceedingly small amount) of those who would have gained admittance would be radical, who would subsequently commit a terror attack – so by restricting at source will reduce this risk, as demonstrated by the study’s finding. However, it is important to note that any argument in favour of restricting refugee entry purely on such an outcome, should be tempered by findings such as that migrants are not more likely to become terrorists than the locals of the country in which they were living (Ibid.). Therefore, giving rise to necessary future research undertaken examining the role played by anti-refugee policy increase and the effect on far-right terrorism.

In contrast to the findings just discussed, the results of ‘Average Eligibility for Asylum Seekers and Refugees’ do support the thesis’ hypothesis, that incidents of terror would increase following a rise in anti-refugee policies. The model depicts that ‘Average Eligibility’ attained a standardized coefficient value of .39. This was largest positive effect exhibited by the model. Consequently, the data suggests that a state with an increase in ‘Eligibility’ – i.e. a country which has stricter policies regarding potential refugees claiming asylum if they were arriving through countries deemed ‘safe third countries’ – will experience an escalation in terrorist incidents per year. With the result being particularly significant $p < .000$, it gives confidence that the finding can be utilised to evaluate the thesis’ hypothesis. Undoubtedly, determining that added implementing of restricting ‘Eligibility’ policies would increase terror attacks in the host state per year.

It is reasonable to question why the analysis has found a difference in effect between the overriding, aggregate variable in ‘Average Immigration’, and the single-issue policy area variable in ‘Average Eligibility’. Reasoning is that, by implementing constraining and targeted policies, which are aimed at particular demographics or nationalities, research shows that terrorist incidents are likely to increase – “results show that bans on Muslim immigration would be more likely to increase the risk of terror than make the domestic population safer” (Ibid.). Therefore, the model’s finding suggest that the UK is going to be at an enhanced risk of experiencing terrorism due to the government implementing a number of additional criteria when determining whether to grant refugee status – not just the standard criteria contained in article 1 of the Refugee Convention and Protocol. For example, the Secretary of State grants an application for asylum if he/she is satisfied that by refusing their application would result in them being required to go to a country in which his life or freedom would threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group (Refugee Law and Policy: United Kingdom, no date).

Finally, there were findings to be taken from statistically significant results of two of the thesis' covariates. Both a state's 'Level of Fragility' and a nation's 'Population' were determined to show significant p-values - .001 and .038 respectively. The model predicts that, when holding the other variables constant, increasing the two aforementioned factors we are likely to see both a rise in terror incidents. A state's 'Level of Fragility' attained a standardized correlation core of .32. This result is in complete conjuncture with the field's current knowledge. For instance, Peter Tikuisis finds there are several quantifiable relationships between state fragility and terrorism exist – with almost 50% of weak states experiencing fatal terrorist attacks corresponding to a significant odds ratio exceeding 3:1 compared with other states (Tikuisis, 2009). Additionally, a country's 'Population' obtaining a positive standardized coefficient of .313. Again, this is unsurprising. It is a common root cause of terrorism in the literature – with multiple studies finding that terrorism thrives in specific regions with high growth rates of population, due to its potential to generate income inequality and relative deprivation of people (Kurrild-Klitgaard et al., 2006; Gassebner and Luechinger, 2011). However, an area where there is possible interest in this study's result is that it shows an effect when specifically looking at the relationship between population size and terrorism onset in only European countries. This is of interest as geospatial analysis reveals that countries with a “high association between fatalities for terrorist incidents and population growth are mainly in Sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa, Middle East, East and South Asia” (Coccia, 2018); thus, asking a question as to whether Europe should be added to the list?

4.2.4 Overview of the Multivariate Analysis Findings

Overall, after conducting a series of multivariate analyses it was found that in the main we can consider there to be a positive effect between an increase in 'Anti-Refugee' policies and an upsurge in extremism. When examining the three models' statistically significant results, it was discovered that there was a ratio of 2:1 of positive to negative effects. Moreover, it was with the study's least violent form of extremism – 'Far-Right Vote Share' – where the most positive results were revealed; thus, conveying that this was the form that is effected the greatest by a severer shift in refugee policy. From which it was identified that there is evidence to support the hypothesis – that *a state whose government employs 'anti-refugee policies' is more likely to have a greater share of its population voting in favour of a far-right party.*

Crucially, the study's key predictor variable – 'Average for Immigration Policy' – was seen significant for two of the dependent variables. The information gaged from these results are important, as the factor encapsulates all the data provided by IMPIC; thus, the findings resulting from the variable are generalizable. There was a positive effect shown between 'Average Immigration Policy' and far-right vote share. This was a troubling result as the expected finding would be for the far-right vote share to decrease following the successful implementation of policies that restricted refugee's rights. However, the second significant 'Average Immigration Policy' finding, was arguably the most revealing result of the section. It was observed that there is a negative effect between an increase in restrictive refugee policies and a rise in the rate of terror attacks. Consequently, providing validation against the thesis' hypothesis – *a state's government which employs 'anti-refugee policies' is at a greater risk of experiencing violent extremism* – and gives the potential to legitimise the nationalist/anti-refugee rhetoric seen in recent times across some of the European political elite. However, as discussed, this result must be understood in context and should not be used as reason to intensify polices aimed at particular demographics as it could have damaging consequences. Specifically, this was exposed when investigating the relationship between 'Average Eligibility for Asylum Seekers and Refugees' and 'Number of Terrorist Incidents'. It was revealed that when a policy regarding a potential refugee's eligibility for admittance into the host state is made more restrictive, i.e. deeming that applicants from a particular nation are not to be accepted, then there was an evident positive effect on the rate of terror attacks experienced.

Finally, when studying 'Average Conditions for Entry for Asylum Seekers and Refugees' we see further indication to support the frustration-aggression theory (Breuer and Elson, 2017). The variable obtained a standardized coefficient value of .18 between itself and the rate of 'Intentional Homicide'. Demonstrating that further enforcing restrictive 'conditions for entry' policies do have a positive effect on an increase intentional homicides in the host state per year. The rationale for which lies in the frustration-aggression theory. For instance, it is plausible that as a result of increasing obstructions to an applicant – i.e. a change in their entry conditions, such as an advanced base-language level required – leads to them failing to gain asylum, resulting in frustration, that intensifies, developing into violent actions.

4.3 Comparative Case Study

In effort to gain further understandings from the findings of the multivariate analysis, the thesis implements a comparative case study to uncover the potential causal mechanisms at play, and provide the study's results with added internal validity. In order to achieve this, I employ the qualitative approach of process tracing; examining the cases of the 'pro refugee' city (one which looks to promote unity and integration between locals and its foreign residents), in Mechelen, and the 'anti-refugee' city – one which aims to deter admittance of refugees into the city through obstructive policies and an increased threat to their security – of Cottbus. The first stage is to develop hypothesised causal mechanisms from the findings of the previous section. My first expectation is that, if there are policies aimed at reducing immigration as a whole then I anticipate that the rate of violent crime will decrease; whereas, if there are policies targeted at particular demographics (i.e. refugees, certain nationalities/religions) then I expect that the level of crime will increase in the city as a result. Secondly, I anticipate that a city which openly employs 'anti-refugee' policies will subsequently see an upsurge in support for far-right parties.

4.3.1 Pro-Refugee City: Mechelen, Belgium

Belgium has been at the forefront of the discussion on the links between migration flows to Europe bringing foreign fighters and terror suspects. The 'French-Belgian Network' of foreign fighters emphasized the impact of migration routes affecting the region – the network has been accredited for instigating the Belgian Verviers plot in January 2015, the 13 November 2015 Paris attacks and two attacks in Brussels in March 2016. With the exception of two of the Stade de France suicide bombers, and the explosives expert Ahmad Alkhalid, all of the Paris accomplices and all five attackers in the Belgian plots were European citizens (Crone, 2017, p.26) – many of whom ventured to the Middle East to fight in the Syrian conflict, returned to Europe to commit the attacks. Importantly, none were refugees – all held European passports. Belgium's plight with 'foreign fighters' is exemplified by the finding that, compared to all the other EU states, the country contributed the most fighters in relation to its population – 41 fighters per million people – moreover, it had the lowest percent of those fighters return to the nation (18%), in contrast to the 50% who returned to Denmark (Escritt, 2016).

However, this is what exemplifies the uniqueness of Mechelen; with 8 % of the foreign fighters (between 3900 and 4200) who joined ISIS out of the EU originating from the region

Antwerp-Brussels – the province in which Mechelen is found – Mechelen can boast to having none of its citizens leaving the city to fight in the Middle East (Somers, 2017). This success can be attributed in large part to the pragmatic politics pursued by its mayor, Bart Somers. He managed to “foster a climate of trust by investing in the creation of safe urban neighbourhoods while also battling segregation and bringing the city’s residents together” (Heimer, Münch and Strier, 2018, p.15). The result of which is that Mechelen is today one of the most popular and diverse cities in Belgium. Yet this has not always been the case. In fact, Mechelen was plagued for several years by its reputation of being an unsafe city featuring the highest crime rate in Belgium; and was dubbed “little Chicago” for its littered streets, social conflict and segregation (ibid.).

To overcome these issues, Somers and his administration introduced a number of initiatives (as depicted in *fig. 1*) that looked to create an environment in which entering refugees could assimilate into the Mechelen society efficiently. Additionally, the policies aimed to also help the incumbent citizens surmount the challenges which came with the changes that were made to the city to in order to facilitate the arrival of the refugees. This was achieved by fostering intercultural friendships, an example of a successful measure which enhanced the city’s social cohesion was Mechelen’s “Samen Inburgeren” (Integrating Together), which was a buddy scheme program that paired long-term residents with refugees (Project Samen Inburgeren, no date). The city provided a structure for participants to meet over a six-month period. The pairs would partake in events such as one-on-one discussions, ‘speed dating’ and were provided with vouchers for museum tickets. By 2017, the program has “helped 257 intercultural friendships take root ... with immigrants themselves have since taken on coaching roles and are now showing other newcomers the city” (Heimer, Münch and Strier, 2018, p.18).

In further attempt to counter segregation, in 2014 (in partnership with the NGO of the same name) Mechelen launched “School in Zicht” (Sights on School). The objective was to support and encourage parents (especially those who would be categorised as middle-class) to send their children to the neighbourhood ‘Concentratiescholen’ – schools where there is a higher percentage of children from immigrant or socioeconomically disadvantaged families. As a result, the city promotes “strengthened language acquisition skills among migrant children through measures such as summer holiday camps where kids can have fun while learning Dutch” (Ibid.). Learning the incumbent language is key to avoiding radicalisation, findings uncover that “education and training in theology was also found to be successful in preventing religious violent extremism” (Christmann, 2012, p.39) – in particular it is found that there is a

heightened relationship between Muslim women and an improvement in their level of language being a cause for the likelihood of extremism to decrease (Ibid, p.40).

Moreover, community relations were increased when the Mechelen police force hired two diversity managers; whom were tasked with tackling diversity issues with the police force and cooperating with civil society organizations – for example the Rojlm youth centre, which targets 11-25 year olds with a migration background, while looking to promote awareness of different cultures, while battling discrimination and racism (Regionaal Open Jeugdcentrum Mechelen, no date). Furthermore, the diversity managers were directed to increase the number of police recruits with a migrant background – as of 2017, 7% of the force was from a migrant background (Heimer, Münch and Strier, 2018, p.19) – with a visible presence on the police force, refugees have a perceived approach-point for grievances they may have.

Finally, in 2017, the Somer’s administration launched a new housing project titled “Ploanmakers” (Ibid.). It involves recruiting up to ten tenants – dubbed “Ploanmakers” – living in a culturally and socially diverse area (with a high percentage of subsidized housing) who endorse social cohesion among the population and organise community activities. Also, the chosen citizens act as bridge-builders, mediators and help their fellow residents to improve their language skills. In return for their efforts, ‘Ploanmakers’ are granted lower rent for three years (Ibid.).




Figure 1: Timeline of Important Policies which have Accounted for the Mechelen’s Integration Success

There is data to suggest, that following the successful implementation of ‘pro-refugee’ policies, the city has experienced a decrease in extremism. When examining all types of crime that occurred in Mechelen between the years 2011-2019 – a time frame which will reflect any

effect of the policies discussed above – I selected the four which demonstrated closest an ‘extremist act’, as has been understood throughout the study. The results of which are conveyed in *fig 2*. The first finding of note, an indicator of success for the policies administered by Somer, is that all of the four crime areas (even if only marginally in some cases) decreased over the time period. Moreover, when studying the cases of weapons and explosives recorded – ‘explosives’ being an area closely associated with extremism – there was a significant reduction (over 50%) from before the employment of the policies in 2011 with 244 cases to 107 in 2019 (Police Crime Statistics for the Municipality of Mechelen, 2020, p.4). However, it is important to note that, although it has been seen to decrease slightly since 2011, ‘Crime against Government Authorities’ has fluctuated during the period post-implementation; which implies that the policies did not have a clear positive effect on the decrease of crime of this type. This is of significance, as crime against governmental officials was a core factor in how ‘intentional homicide’ was understood to qualify as being an extremist act – as conveyed in the study’s qualitative analysis. Therefore, with there not being a clear reduction I cannot entirely link the results of the two analyses. However, it is important to stress that this is the exception, with there being reductions in other fields.




Figure 2: Line-Graph of Recorded Cases of ‘Extremist’ Crime in Mechelen Post-Implementation of ‘Pro-Refugee’ Policies – Data for which is available in the Police Crime Statistics for the Municipality of Mechelen (2020)

Overall, there is substantial evidence to suggest that Somer's administration's positive policies towards refugees, aimed at integrating foreign-arrivals into the city's culture, was instrumental in Mechelen's success at avoiding an increase in extremism following the upsurge in refugee influxes. The rival causal sequence was taken into consideration, being that the city would have still experienced a reduction of crime due to other factors – i.e. the improvement in unemployment rate – not necessarily the 'pro-refugee' policies that were utilised. However, although there is no exact way of totally disproving this, I find no convincing evidence to argue in favour of it.

4.3.2 Anti-Refugee City: Cottbus, Germany

Historically, Germany has shown instances of openness towards foreigners. From issuing the Edict of Potsdam Frederick Wilhelm in 1685, which allowed Huguenots to settle in Prussia, to encouraging "economic immigrants" also from the Poland, to resettle into the country to aide with the progressing industrialization in the nineteenth century (Kruk, 2018, p.279). However, following reunification, the German populace showed symptoms of hostility towards immigrants; as a consequence of the transformation in the population structure, which then contained a high level of people with a migration background (i.e. people from Turkey who had come to Germany as part of employee contracts) in East and West Germany following the conclusion of the Second World War (Ibid.).

These tensions had been, in the most part, suppressed by the nation's culture of hospitality; though, this notion was put under strain following the implementation of Chancellor Angela Merkel's 'Open-Door Policy' in 2015 (Pinkerton, 2019, p.128). This saw Merkel welcome near one million migrants and refugees as part of what she had "christened Germany's "Willkommenskultur," or culture of welcoming" (McAuley and Noack, 2018). The policy was seen as a hark back to Germany's openness towards, and reliance upon, immigrants "as potential workers, as potential contributors to the German economic and welfare system ... the federal government in Germany has long recognized the contribution of migration in avoiding a skilled labour shortage in the context of an ageing population and declining birth rate" (Pinkerton, 2019, p.136). However, the radical policy – the most extreme of all refugee intake policies seen from a European state following the continent's refugee crisis – divided the nation, contributing to Germany politically shifting to the right and gave space to the rise of the far-right party AfD (Alternative for Germany). Moreover, as a response to this surge in public support for tighter immigration controls, Merkel revoked on some of the values which

were touted as the catalyst for the ‘Open-Door Policy’; with Michaela Streibelt, a Berlin-based lawyer and human rights activist depicting that “In the last few years, though, she has contributed to a complete erosion of refugee rights, with tougher integration rules, longer stays in shelters and a border control system controlled by repressive governments” (Sharma, 2018).

No German city could be seen to have taken as much of a disliking to Merkel’s willingness to accept migrants and refugees as that of Cottbus. The city has had a history of neo-Nazism, with around 300 neo-Nazis living amongst the approximately 100,000 residents of the city (Kruk, 2018, p.282). However, Cottbus has seen a rise in anti-immigration protest groups post-2014 – listed in *fig 3*. – which vented fear that the acceptance of a large number of migrants (predominantly Muslims) would “contribute to the weakening of security through increased terrorist threats and the problem of preserving German identity” (Ibid.).

Organisation	Leader	Main Activities
<i>PEGIDA</i>	Lutz Bachmann	Participation in demonstrations
<i>Alternative for Germany (AfD)</i>	Marianne Spring-Räumschüssel	Party activity, meetings with voters, contact via the Internet
<i>Identitarian movement (Identitären Bewegung)</i>	Robert Timm	Actions against immigrants “Defend Europe”
<i>“Future Homeland”</i>	Hans-Christoph Berndt	Participation in demonstrations

Figure 3: Protest Groups against Immigrants in Cottbus

The distribution of near 4,000 refugees into Cottbus, as a result of Merkel’s open-door policy, fuelled anti-immigrant sentiment among locals leading to the city witnessing a switch in policy towards the refugees from the city’s local governors. For example, in 2015 the small municipality south of Berlin, had taken steps in trying to set up their new arrivals with skills training and integration classes. The Cottbus Chamber of Crafts began setting up such classes, which offered training, i.e. introductory-level trade skills courses such as metalwork, to twelve participants every six months (Davis, 2017). However, although the chamber’s programme provided the partakers with skills and vital networking opportunities to land an apprenticeship, success rates were low; only “four graduates of the program ... received a job placement, even

though the chamber works with some 900 companies in the region with the capacity to take on trainees” (Ibid.). Moreover, the refugee participants themselves were not totally impressed with the program; with one (Ali) being disillusioned by the only sector he had to train in was metalwork – stating “I want to go into business,”. “I don’t think I’ll be able to use these skills later in life” (Ibid.). Additionally, after Ali completed his first state-administered German-language class, the job centre informed him that he needed to enrol in the Chamber’s program or else face deductions in the monthly allowance that he receives from the German government (Ibid.). As spoken about in the literature, frustrations and tensions are understandably raised when opportunities are reduced like this and people feel forced into situations to their disliking – thus, can be damaging to Ali’s opportunities to integrate effectively, if he is dissatisfied with the German authorities’ handling of him.

Unfortunately, all good feeling shown towards to the city’s new arrivals (demonstrated by programmes such as the Chamber’s skill training courses) ceased in 2018. This is an unsurprising result of the fact that Cottbus has continuously suffered from a lack of social cohesion, and apparent, historical distrust of outsiders. From the very start of the year outbreaks of violence between locals and the refugees were commonplace; i.e. on January 1, a group of young Germans broke into a building housing refugees and committed a racist attack, beating up several Afghans. Whereas, on January 17, a refugee from Syria slashed the face of a 16-year-old local (Buck, 2018). In response to the violent crime, Cottbus Mayor Holger Kelch and Brandenburg Interior Minister Karl-Heinz Schroeter announced that no more refugees would be arriving from the asylum-seeker reception centre in nearby Eisenhüttenstadt (Deutsche Welle, 2018). Where there was little done about the violence led from the far-right, the banning on all further refugees was indication of quick and drastic action to stop further refugees into the city. There is no clearer evidence of an ‘anti-refugee’ policy.

The result of the city’s clear anti-refugee sentiment was an increase in ‘extremism’. To begin with, there has been a steep increase in support for far-right parties in Cottbus. Vote share increase of the AfD of 26.8% in 2017 Bundestag election which is an increase of over 19.9% from the election in 2013 (The Federal Returning Officer, no date). Moreover, in the 2019 German state elections (the most recent election data that can be used which involved Cottbus) we can once again see a sizeable rise in support for the AfD. When examining the results for Brandenburg (the state in which Cottbus is situated) the far-right party attained 23.5% of popular vote – making it the second most popular party in the state – which is a swing of 11.3% from the previous election in 2014 (SPD gewinnt Brandenburg-Wahl knapp vor der AfD,

2019). This is a result which is in conjuncture of the findings in the quantitative analysis on the relationship between an increase in anti-refugee policies and a subsequent rise in support for far-right groups.

Critically, there is evidence to suggest that following the policy to ban further refugees in the city there was an increase in violent-extremism. Indication for which, is when examining the statistics for crime in Cottbus around the time of the banning of refugees at the beginning of 2018 – found at ‘City administration Cottbus: Citizen Service Department Statistics and Elections (2018)’ – there was demonstration that there was an effect on violent crime in the city. For instance, ‘mayhem’ (which is a crime that encompasses any type of mutilation, disfigurement, or crippling act done using any instrument) the cases recorded increased from 885 in 2017 to 1022 observed by the end of 2018 (Ibid. p.169). Moreover, ‘threat’ (which is the crime of intentionally or knowingly putting another person in fear of bodily injury) increased partially over the same period from 200 cases to 211 (Ibid. p.169). Such findings are in conjuncture with the notion presented in the study’s quantitative analysis that there will be an increase in ‘extremism’ if a refugee’s security of status is threatened – which was apparent when Cottbus banned further arrivals. However, there was not the rise in ‘violent crime’ or ‘street crime’, that I expected to see. Implications of which, is that it is not always customary that these types of crimes should be associated with refugee communities, as often transpires in public opinion.

When evaluating the data presented, in order to evaluate the theory that extremism would follow in Cottbus due to it being overtly opposing refugees, I come to a noncommittal conclusion. In contrast to the case of Mechelen, where there was substantial and convincing evidence to argue that it was the ‘pro-refugee policies’ which resulted in the town being affected by less ‘extremism’ and radicalisation, I am unable to have the same certainties when discussing the findings from Cottbus. This is due to the indicators not being as strong as those viewed in the case of Mechelen; but nonetheless, they are strong enough. Nevertheless, there is a possible argument to be made in favour of a causal link between the impacts of the state-wide ‘open-door policy’, employed by Angela Merkel, and an increase in tension leading to violence in the city.

4.3.3 Overview of the In-Depth Case Studies

The in-depth case studies of Mechelen and Cottbus provided the study with informative revelations. To begin with, the outcomes of Cottbus reveal that I am not able to simply determine that there is a causal link between a city being overtly anti-refugee and there be an increase in extremism as a result. That is not to say that there was not an increase witnessed, as occurred with the upsurge of mayhem in Cottbus following the decision to ban refugee admittance; however, there are other factors – such as historical distrust of outsiders and lack of social cohesion – which cannot be discounted when evaluating what was the reason for the tension to intensify into aggression. Thus, I cannot determine with certainty that it was the local governments immigration policy which was the catalyst for the observed increase in ‘extremism’. However, following the process tracing of policy shift towards refugees in Mechelen, there was clear evidence to suggest that proceeding the Somer’s administration’s concerted efforts to integrate the city’s new arrivals into the society – while breaking down social and employment barriers – this led to a reduction of radicalisation (and consequently extremism) as observed with none of the citizens of Mechelen travelling to the Middle East to fight. Made even more impressive, when noted that Belgium had the highest percent of people leave to fight, per-head, of any European nation.

Overall, the in-depth case studies conveyed that there is persuasive indication that anti-refugee governmental policies are a relevant variable in need of consideration when discussing extremism causation. Moreover, there was evidence to propose that there is a convincing causal link between efficient and sustained refugee integration policies – along with a ‘pro-refugee’ rhetoric displayed by the administration in power – with a decrease in extremism.

Chapter 5

Conclusions

This thesis contributes to, and extends, the current literature on the effects of increased anti-refugee policies on extremism occurrence in the host state. The study finds that there is a relationship between increasing restrictive policies towards refugees and an increase in the rate of extremism; however, the results identified that there was not a universal level of effect across the three different levels of extremism (utilised in the thesis to operationalise extremism), often finding that there was the strongest correlation between an increase in support for far-right parties when the host state employed anti-refugee sentiment.

In order to address the aims and objectives of the study, I employed three separate analyses: two quantitative methods, a bivariate and multivariate analyses; along with, a qualitative, in-depth comparative case study. The results of the three separate analyses came to differing conclusions. The bivariate analysis, found that the majority of the ‘anti-refugee’ variables attained a ‘slight’ correlation with the three stages of extremism examined. There was one exception, ‘Average Immigration Policy’ obtained a moderate positive correlation on a growth of ‘Far-Right Vote Share’. Moreover, it was learned that it was with the study’s least violent form of extremism (‘Far-Right Vote Share’) where the analysis’ findings were most valuable, due to all the results being capable to be utilised in discussion of the paper’s hypotheses, as they were all of statistical significance. From which it was identified that there is evidence to support the thesis’ hypothesis that *a state whose government employs ‘anti-refugee policies’ is more likely to have a greater share of its population voting in favour of a far-right party*. The study’s multivariate analysis revealed that, in the main it can be considered that there is a positive effect between an increase in ‘anti-refugee’ policies and a rise in extremism. When scrutinising the three models’ statistically significant results, it was uncovered that there was a ratio of 2:1 of positive to negative effects. Once again, it was with ‘Far-Right Vote Share’ where the most positive results were shown; thus, conveying that this was the form that is effected the greatest by a severer shift in refugee policy. However, it is important to note, when analysing the effect of study’s key independent variable (‘Average Immigration Policy’) on its ‘gold standard’ dependent variable – ‘Number of Terror Incidents’ – it was revealed that there is a negative effect between an increase in restrictive refugee policies and a rise in the rate of terror attacks. Consequently, providing potential legitimisation

to the nationalist/anti-refugee rhetoric seen in recent times from some of the European political elite. However, as conversed, this result must be understood in context and should not be used as reason to intensify policies aimed at particular demographics as it could have damaging consequences.

The thesis' qualitative analysis section, which employed the process tracing method to uncover the causal mechanisms at play in a 'pro' and 'anti' refugee city, revealed that the refugee/immigration policy-direction implemented by local governments, is an important variable which is accountable for the rate of extremism in the area. Crucially, it was identified that there was evidence – displayed through Mechelen's transformation from a fragmented nationalist city to one which now promotes openness and inclusion – to propose that there is a convincing causal link between efficient and sustained refugee integration policies with a decrease in extremism.

The significance and contribution the results (mentioned above) makes to the current knowledge on the subject is meaningful. The thesis provided further understanding into, not only, the effects of refugee policies on the likelihood of violent extremism increasing; but also, identified its position as a causal factor of extremism – when compared to the traditionally perceived causes. Moreover, the study's cases of interest (Europe and an in-depth examination of Germany and Belgium) provided data on nations which are highly relevant in the current refugee intake debate; this is in variance to previous investigations, which have explored the role of refugee policy in the likes of Asia, Africa and the United States. Additionally, the thesis added to the knowledge already in place on the importance of a successful implementation integration policies (Sude, Stebbins & Weiland, 2015) – as observed during the analysis of the different approaches taken to assimilate Mechelen's new arrivals into its society by Somer and his administration. Furthermore, the study provided indication of where the 'Frustration-Aggression Theory' can be applied to understand how an increase in obstructive refugee policies can have a positive effect on violent extremism occurring in the host state; in particular, the role it plays in an observed rise in intentional homicides. Fundamentally, the thesis contributes to the current knowledge on the topic due to its unique independent variable – the context in which refugees are entering a host state. Previous studies overlooked the relationship between a nation which is evidently unaccepting of refugees and the likelihood of those refugees then becoming radicalised. The results of my analysis detect that, there is credence to the argument that 'restrictive refugee/immigration policies' should be considered as an explanatory variable of violent extremism; alongside the commonly perceived, causal variables

typically conveyed in the literature. Findings such as, ‘Detention’ and ‘Illegal Residence’ obtaining a ‘slight’ positive correlation with terror incidents – the same level as a state’s ‘GDP’ and ‘Fragility Level’ (conventionally perceived causes of terrorism) – provides indication that ‘anti-refugee’ policies cannot be overlooked from future considerations on causes of extremism.

It is important to note that the study is not without limitations. Firstly, the study’s quantitative analysis time frame – 1989-2010 (due to limited data post-2010) – is not capable of directly explaining the effects of the most recent ‘anti-refugee’ policies. Effects of policies, such as Viktor Orban’s ‘Zero Refugee Strategy’ and ‘Stop Soros’, were thus, not able to be observed in the data which was analysed. This is a shame as the investigation’s research question was influenced by the rise of anti-refugee policies post-the European Refugee Crisis – which is not able to be covered by the time frame. Another drawback of the thesis’ quantitative analysis is that there was no data readily available from all 44 European countries; the consequence of which was that the investigation’s findings’ generalisability is somewhat hampered. However, I believe I was able to overcome this issue by maintain that there was data on all 24 OECD European states (such as Germany, France, Italy, Hungary etc.). When examining the study’s case selection another limitation is identified, that the results – although higher in external validity than previous works – will be difficult to become universally generalizable. This is as result of the findings being European-centric, means there are challenges to explain events in parts of the world such as the Middle and Far East for example, due to the differences in political cultures. Finally, my thesis would have benefitted from being able to have a more ‘middle-ground’ extremism variable. I was required to examine ‘Total Intentional Homicides’ as the ‘middle’ stage of extremism; however, it can be easily argued that it is a much more leaning toward the ‘violent-end’ of the extremism scale.

The discussion on the study’s challenges leads me to where I would suggest future investigations could add to my research. For instance, if the research was to be conducted again, I would suggest incorporating a variable which inspects ‘online-extremism’. This would aid the examination acts such as the spreading extremist propaganda online, and joining/getting involved in extremist groups online. I would suggest that this is a more intermediate-level of extremism – rather than ‘intentional homicides’ which was utilised in my thesis. Unfortunately, I was unable to gain access to data on ‘online-extremism’ for the cases in question; thus, was incapable of utilizing such a variable. Furthermore, I believe that a future investigation into the

topic would benefit from a more comprehensive qualitative study, which I was unable to achieve due to time restraints. The ambition would be to conduct a series of interviews with relevant policy-makers/influencers; this would allow the research to gain valuable primary data. Significantly, any future research should look to incorporate more contemporary data (once available), this will then be able to show the impacts of the policies which were the catalyst for this research.

Following the contribution of the thesis, future research should look to answer questions like: Is there a difference in effect of ‘anti-refugee policies’ on different types of extremism i.e. Islamic or far-right extremism? The benefit of having greater knowledge on this, is that policymakers will be able to amend certain policies, if their nation has a higher chance of extremism occurrence due to a large amount of certain demographic. Additionally, it would be of interest to examine the role of rhetoric. This would be an investigation into the accountability politicians and key decision-makers should take when expressing opinion on foreign arrivals. In particular, to see if the rhetoric conveyed by produces a ripple-down effect, establishing a national culture where anti-refugee rhetoric is accepted; and in some part encouraged. Finally, future work would profit from producing an index which provides a ranking of the most welcoming governments towards refugees. Currently, the only index focused on attitudes towards refugees is Amnesty International’s ‘Refugees Welcome Index’ (2016); however, it is interested in, and yields data on, public opinion regarding refugees – therefore, it does not produce information on governments’ willingness to integrate and allow refugees into their nations. The importance of having an index which ranks a government’s openness towards refugees, is that by establishing which states are more likely to welcome refugees quickly and efficiently, refugees and asylum seekers can be allocated to the countries which are most likely to integrate them – which, as demonstrated throughout the literature (see, Amaral, et al., 2018; Sude, et al., 2015), is a key tactic to preventing radicalisation. These questions of future research discussed, if conducted, would be an extension on from the findings of this thesis, and would aide explanation of some of the results observed.

In final conclusion, the study has contributed to the field by providing evidence to suggest that there is a convincing causal link between efficient and sustained refugee integration policies with a decrease in extremism; thus, suggesting that governments should strive to incorporate more inclusive policies, aimed at their foreign arrivals, in order to decrease the risk of extremism transpiring. It is my hope that this thesis’ findings will help convince

those who look to reject refugees seeking asylum in their countries - on the basis of fear that they will experience an increase in extremism - find the outcomes of this study convincing and thus, demonstrate more compassion and understanding when faced with deciding what direction their refugee policy should take.

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Appendix

The Study's Variables' Descriptive Statistics

Table 1: The Study's Independent Variables and Their Key Descriptive Statistics

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Average Eligibility for Asylum and Refugees	521	.000000000	1.000000000	.250903711	.163655745
Average conditions for entry for asylum and refugees (place of application)	495	.00	1.00	.4141	.23314
Average Security of status for Asylum seekers and Refugees	521	.125000000	1.000000000	.424160268	.172815641
Average rights associated with Asylum Seekers and Refugees	521	0.22222223	1.000000000	.323331203	.212581157
Average for Immigration Policy	521	.303075403	.907500029	.428469197	.104621691

Table 2: The Study's Dependent Variables and Their Key Descriptive Statistics

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Number of Terrorist Incidents	476	0	404	15.16	39.530
Total Number of Intentional Homicides (T11HO)	334	-5	4523	722.31	953.427
Far-Right Vote Share	474	.600000000	44.20000000	12.4571730	11.6057324

Table 3: The Study's Covariates and Their Key Descriptive Statistics

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Regime Level of Institutional Democracy (Polity2)	481	4	10	9.48	1.176
Level of Institutional Democracy (Durable)	481	0	162	47.22	36.633
Level of State Fragility (SFI)	352	0	12	1.38	2.651
GDP (USD Billion)	492	4.3737E+9	3.752E+12	5.252E+11	7.128E+11
Population	499	252852	82534176	22276566.3	24736955.1