

Kent Academic Repository

Full text document (pdf)

Citation for published version

Chatterjee, Indradeb, Macdonald, Angus S., Tapadar, Pradip and Thomas, R. Guy (2021) When is utilitarian welfare higher under insurance risk pooling? *Insurance: Mathematics and Economics* . pp. 1-13. ISSN 0167-6687.

DOI

<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.insmatheco.2021.08.006>

Link to record in KAR

<https://kar.kent.ac.uk/88286/>

Document Version

Author's Accepted Manuscript

Copyright & reuse

Content in the Kent Academic Repository is made available for research purposes. Unless otherwise stated all content is protected by copyright and in the absence of an open licence (eg Creative Commons), permissions for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher, author or other copyright holder.

Versions of research

The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version.

Users are advised to check <http://kar.kent.ac.uk> for the status of the paper. **Users should always cite the published version of record.**

Enquiries

For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact:

researchsupport@kent.ac.uk

If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down information provided at <http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html>

WHEN IS UTILITARIAN WELFARE HIGHER UNDER INSURANCE RISK POOLING?

BY INDRADEB CHATTERJEE[†], ANGUS S. MACDONALD[‡], PRADIP TAPADAR[†] AND R.
GUY THOMAS[†]

ABSTRACT

This paper considers the effect of bans on insurance risk classification on utilitarian social welfare. We consider two regimes: full risk classification, where insurers charge the actuarially fair premium for each risk, and pooling, where risk classification is banned and for institutional or regulatory reasons, insurers do not attempt to separate risk classes, but charge a common premium for all risks. For iso-elastic insurance demand, we derive sufficient conditions on higher and lower risks' demand elasticities which ensure that utilitarian social welfare is higher under pooling than under full risk classification. Using the concept of arc elasticity of demand, we extend the results to a form applicable to more general demand functions. Empirical evidence suggests that the required elasticity conditions for social welfare to be increased by a ban may be realistic for some insurance markets.

KEYWORDS

Social welfare; relative utilitarianism; insurance risk classification; insurance risk pooling; elasticity of demand; arc elasticity of demand.

CONTACT ADDRESS

[†]School of Mathematics, Statistics and Actuarial Science, University of Kent, Canterbury, CT2 7FS, UK.

[‡]Department of Actuarial Mathematics and Statistics, and the Maxwell Institute for Mathematical Sciences, Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh EH14 4AS, UK.

Corresponding author: Pradip Tapadar, P.Tapadar@kent.ac.uk.

1. INTRODUCTION

Restrictions on insurance risk classification are common in life insurance and other personal insurance markets. Examples include the ban on gender classification in the European Union, and restrictions in many countries on insurers' use of genetic test results. Such restrictions are usually perceived by economists as having negative effects on efficiency. But because restrictions also make high risks better off and low risks worse off, they also have equity (distributional) effects. Therefore depending on distributional

preferences expressed in the social welfare function, restrictions might either increase or decrease social welfare.

The social welfare function used in this paper assumes cardinal and interpersonally comparable utilities, and assigns equal weights to the utilities of all individuals. This equal-weights approach is based on the Harsanyi (1955) ‘veil of ignorance’ argument: that is, behind the (hypothetical) veil of ignorance, where one does not know what position in society (e.g. higher risk or lower risk) one occupies, the appropriate probability to assign to being any individual is $1/N$, where N is the number of individuals in society. Alternative risk classification regimes can then be compared by comparing expected utility in each regime for the (hypothetical) individual utility-maximiser behind the veil of ignorance.

We use this approach to evaluate two risk classification regimes: full risk classification, where insurers charge the actuarially fair premium for full cover for each risk, and pooling, where risk classification is banned and so insurers charge a common premium for full cover for all risks. We assume that insurers compete only on price; for institutional or regulatory reasons, they do not offer partial cover, nor menus of contracts offering different levels of cover priced at different rates. In this sense, our approach follows the tradition of Akerlof (1970) rather than Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976).

Under the pooling regime, it is intuitive that the equilibrium price – the pooled price at which insurers break even – will depend on demand elasticities of lower and higher risks. Another intuition is that pooling implies a redistribution from lower risks towards higher risks. The welfare outcome will depend on how we evaluate the trade-off between the gains and losses of the two types. This paper connects and builds on these intuitions, by establishing sufficient conditions on demand elasticities to ensure higher social welfare under pooling compared with full risk classification. The conditions encompass many plausible combinations of higher and lower risks’ demand elasticities.

1.1 LITERATURE REVIEW

The closest precedent to the present paper is Hoy (2006), which shows that when potential losses are fixed and the fraction of high risks in the population is sufficiently small, then a ban on risk classification will increase utilitarian welfare. Polborn et al. (2006) obtain a similar result in a dynamic model of life insurance, where the quantum of insurance which an individual can purchase is not fixed, but is subject to a cap.¹ Another strand of literature (e.g. Crocker and Snow (1986), Rothschild (2011)) argues that contract-specific taxes or partial social insurance are a Pareto-superior means to implement any welfare improvements achieved by a ban. Notwithstanding this argument, bans remain of interest because for reasons of political feasibility or administrative convenience, they are invariably the preferred means in practice.

¹‘Dynamic model’ here denotes an initial period in which the individual is uninformed about her risk level and insurance needs, then a second period where she receives information about both, and finally a third period when she is exposed to risk; she may buy insurance in either the first or second periods.

A principal departure of this paper from all those just cited is that rather than assuming all individuals have the same utility function, we assume a distribution of utility functions (not necessarily all risk-averse) across individuals who have the same probabilities of loss. This assumption leads to qualitatively different results from simpler models, through two mechanisms. First, utility functions determine individuals’ insurance purchasing decisions, which determine the insurance demand curve and hence the equilibrium price of insurance when all risks are pooled. Second, utility functions determine the expected utilities which individuals assign to their outcomes *given* an insurance price. Our measure of social welfare is expected utility *given* the distributions of loss probabilities and preferences in society, but evaluated *behind* a hypothetical veil of ignorance which screens off knowledge of the decision maker’s own loss probability and preferences.

This paper is also related to Hao et al. (2018) which proposes ‘loss coverage’, defined as expected losses compensated by insurance for the whole population, as a criterion for risk classification schemes, and points out that loss coverage has the advantage that it depends only on observables (whereas utilitarian social welfare depends on unobservable utility functions). Subsequently, Hao et al. (2019) showed that for iso-elastic insurance demand with elasticity the same for higher and lower risks, loss coverage can be used as a proxy measure for social welfare, because it always gives the same ranking of different risk classification schemes. But for other demand specifications, the ‘common ranking’ property of loss coverage and social welfare may not hold (e.g. as shown for one specification in the PhD thesis of Hao (2017)). The present paper therefore focuses on direct evaluation of social welfare, and derives sufficient conditions on demand elasticities for social welfare to be higher under pooling than under full risk classification.

1.2 PREVIEW OF RESULTS

Our detailed results (summarised in Section 6.1) must await detailed model set-up. But we can preview one recurring condition: “demand elasticity less than 1”. For iso-elastic demand the same for higher and lower risks, this condition is both necessary and sufficient for pooling to improve social welfare compared with full risk classification. For more general demand specifications, “demand elasticity less than 1” for at least the lower risks is one of several (collectively sufficient) conditions, where the other conditions relate to *comparative* elasticities of lower and higher risks.

For utilitarian government policymakers, a key message from these results is that the optimal policy depends critically on detailed information about demand elasticities for different risks, with a particular focus on whether elasticities are less than 1. We cite some evidence from previous empirical studies that elasticities may indeed often be less than 1. But this evidence is limited, and lacking in the detail on comparative elasticities required by our more general results. For full application of our findings, further empirical

investigation of demand elasticities is needed.

1.3 OUTLINE OF THE PAPER

The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents our models of insurance demand and market equilibrium. Section 3 establishes demand elasticity conditions for social welfare to be higher under pooling than under full risk classification, given iso-elastic demand the same for all risk-groups. Section 4 then considers different iso-elastic demand elasticities for different risk-groups. Section 5 uses the construct of ‘arc elasticity of demand’ to extend the results in Section 4 in a form applicable to more general demand functions. Section 6 summarises the results, and reviews some empirical data and complementary results from other authors. Section 7 discusses how our main assumptions drive our results, and outlines an extension for intermediate risk classification regimes between our two polar cases. Section 8 gives conclusions.

2. MODEL SET-UP

In this section, we develop a framework to evaluate utilitarian social welfare under different risk classification regimes. In Section 2.1, starting from individual insurance purchasing decisions, we develop insurance demand for a single risk-group as a function of premium. In Section 2.2, demand from different risk-groups constitutes an insurance market, where perfect competition yields different equilibria under different risk classification regimes. Finally in Section 2.3, we formulate utilitarian social welfare for a given market equilibrium.

2.1 INSURANCE DEMAND FOR A SINGLE RISK-GROUP

Typical theories of insurance demand assume that all individuals know their own probabilities of loss and have a common utility function. Given an offered premium, individuals with the same probabilities of loss then all make the same purchasing decision. This does not correspond well to the observable reality of many insurance markets, where individuals who appear to have similar probabilities of loss often make different decisions, and substantial fractions of the population do not purchase insurance at all.² This section gives a theory of insurance demand which accommodates the possibility that not all individuals with the same probabilities of loss make the same decision. Key assumptions which distinguish our model from other common models are highlighted at the points where the need for each assumption arises.

²For example, in life insurance, the Life Insurance Market Research Association (LIMRA) states that 57% of US households have some individual life insurance (LIMRA (2019)). The American Council of Life Insurers states that 138m individual policies were in force in 2018 (American Council of Life Insurers (2019, p66)); the US adult population (aged 18 years and over) at 1 July 2019 as estimated by the US Census Bureau was 255m.

First we consider demand from the perspective of a single individual. Suppose that an individual has wealth W and risks losing an amount L . The individual is offered insurance against the potential loss amount L at premium π (per unit of loss), i.e. for a payment of πL .

Assumption 1 (Non-satiation). *The individual's utility function $u(w)$, is increasing as a function of wealth, w , and differentiable, so that $u'(w) > 0$. The individual knows his own utility function.*

Note that in Assumption 1, no restriction is placed on the second derivative $u''(w)$, which may have either sign; we do not require that all individuals are risk-averse (i.e. $u''(w) < 0$). We will show later that this departure from typical models generates the partial take-up of insurance in our demand function.

Assumption 2 (Full-cover contracts). *Insurance is offered in a full-cover contract which is standardised across all insurers, who compete only on price. Insurers do not offer partial cover or other contract menus.*

We justify Assumption 2 by noting that separation via contract menus is not possible in some important markets, such as life insurance, which have non-exclusive contracting. It is also often not salient to practitioners in other markets where restrictions on risk classification apply.³

The individual will choose to buy insurance if:

$$u(W - \pi L) > (1 - \mu) u(W) + \mu u(W - L) \quad (2.1)$$

Since certainty-equivalent decisions do not depend on the origin and scale of a utility function, it is convenient to define a normalised utility function as follows:

$$u_s(w) = \frac{u(w) - u(W - L)}{u(W) - u(W - L)}, \quad \text{for } (W - L) \leq w \leq W. \quad (2.2)$$

This normalisation ensures that $u_s(W - L) = 0$ and $u_s(W) = 1$, so that for all individuals, the normalised utilities at the 'end-points' are the same. It also preserves the curvatures of

³Economists often postulate that insurers use menus of deductibles or other contract features as screening devices to separate high and low risks (e.g. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)). But most actuarial pricing textbooks make no reference to this concept (e.g. Gray and Pitts (2012), Friedland (2013), Parodi (2014)), and instead interpret deductibles as a device to limit moral hazard and the administrative costs of handling small claims.

utility functions, and hence individual risk preferences and insurance purchasing behaviour remain unchanged. For now, the normalisation is just a matter of convenience, but we shall later state it as an assumption in Section 2.3, where it will be needed for our measure of social welfare.

Applying this normalisation (Equation 2.2) to Equation 2.1, the criterion becomes:

$$u_s(W - \pi L) > (1 - \mu). \quad (2.3)$$

From this point onwards, we use ‘utility’ to mean the normalised utility, $u_s(w)$, unless the context requires otherwise.

Next we consider demand from the perspective of an insurer. The insurer observes a group of individuals comprising a *risk-group*, who all have the same probability of loss. The insurer knows the common probability of loss μ for all members of the risk-group. The individuals are, however, heterogeneous in terms of their utility functions, which the insurer cannot observe.

Assumption 3 (Heterogeneous utility functions). *Utility functions are heterogeneous across individuals, and unobservable by insurers.*

Hence for any risk-group, the insurer observes μ , π and possibly each individual’s W and L , but not their utility functions. So from the insurer’s perspective, given a premium π , the utility of insurance of an individual chosen at random from this risk-group, $u_s(W - \pi L)$, is unobservable and we denote it by the random variable: U_I (the subscript I indicates *insurance*), which depends on W , L and π .

So the insurer can at most observe the proportion of individuals who choose to buy insurance at a given premium π . We call this a (proportional) demand function and define it as:

$$d(\pi) = \text{P}[U_I > (1 - \mu)]. \quad (2.4)$$

Clearly, $0 \leq d(\pi) \leq 1$ and $d(\pi)$ is non-increasing in π (for a given value of μ) as increasing π decreases the utility of insurance for all individuals.

A related concept, the (point price) elasticity of insurance demand, is defined as:

$$\epsilon(\pi) = -\frac{\partial \log d(\pi)}{\partial \log \pi} \quad (2.5)$$

which implies that demand can also be expressed as

$$d(\pi) = \tau \exp \left[-\int_{\mu}^{\pi} \epsilon(s) d \log s \right] \quad (2.6)$$

where $\tau = d(\mu)$ is the *fair-premium demand* for insurance.

2.2 INSURANCE MARKET EQUILIBRIUM WITH n RISK-GROUPS

Suppose a population consists of n distinct risk-groups with probabilities of loss given by $\mu_1, \mu_2, \dots, \mu_n$. For convenience, we assume $0 < \mu_1 < \mu_2 < \dots < \mu_n < 1$. Let the proportion of the population belonging to risk-group i be p_i , for $i = 1, 2, \dots, n$.

Now let the occurrence of a loss event for an individual chosen at random from the whole population be represented by the indicator random variable, X , taking the value of 1 if a loss event occurs; and 0 otherwise. Then X , conditional on risk-group i , is a Bernoulli random variable with parameter μ_i .

Suppose insurers charge premiums (per unit of loss) $\pi_1, \pi_2, \dots, \pi_n$ for the risk-groups $i = 1, 2, \dots, n$, respectively. For brevity, we use the notation $\underline{\pi} = (\pi_1, \pi_2, \dots, \pi_n)$ to denote the premium regime under consideration. Define Π to be the premium which would be chargeable to an individual chosen at random from the population, if that individual purchased insurance. Then Π , conditional on risk-group i , takes the value π_i .

From insurers' perspective, the insurance purchasing decision of an individual chosen at random from the whole population can be represented by the indicator random variable Q , taking the value of 1 if insurance is purchased; and 0 otherwise. Then Q , conditional on risk-group i , is a Bernoulli random variable with parameter $d_i(\pi_i)$, where $d_i(\pi_i)$ is the demand for insurance within risk-group i at premium π_i (based on the model developed in Section 2.1). Then for an individual chosen at random from the population, the expected premium income is $E[Q\Pi L]$ and the expected insurance claim is $E[QXL]$.

We then need an assumption about the nature of insurance market competition and equilibrium, which we state as follows.

Assumption 4 (Competitive equilibrium). *Risk-neutral insurers have a common technology to classify diversifiable risks, with zero transaction costs. Competition between insurers leads to zero expected profits in equilibrium.*

Assumption 4 implies the following *equilibrium condition* under the premium regime $\underline{\pi}$, where $\rho(\underline{\pi})$ is the expected profit:

$$\rho(\underline{\pi}) = E[Q\Pi L] - E[QXL] = 0. \quad (2.7)$$

2.3 SOCIAL WELFARE

We define social welfare, $S(\underline{\pi})$, for a particular premium regime $\underline{\pi}$, as the expected utility of an individual selected at random from the entire population, i.e.:

$$S(\underline{\pi}) = E[QU_I + (1 - Q)[(1 - X)U_W + XU_{W-L}]], \quad (2.8)$$

where U_W and U_{W-L} are random variables denoting the utilities at individuals' initial wealth, W , and at their wealth after loss event, $(W - L)$, respectively. In Equation 2.8,

the ‘ Q ’ term is the random utility if insurance is purchased, and the ‘ $(1 - Q)$ ’ term is the random utility if insurance is not purchased.

In Section 2.1 we noted that certainty-equivalent decisions do not depend on the origins and scales of utility functions, and therefore the insurance decision for all individuals could be framed using normalised utility functions, irrespective of their different individual non-normalised utility functions. This was not a model requirement, but just a convenient normalisation.

However, this argument cannot be directly extended to Equation 2.8, because the utilitarian concept of social welfare does depend on the actual magnitudes of individuals’ utilities at different levels of wealth. But without any normalisation, Equation 2.8 is susceptible to being dominated by a ‘utility monster’ who derives more utility from a given level of wealth than all other individuals combined (see Bailey (1997), Nozick (1974)). This makes it unsuitable for policy purposes. So in our measure of social welfare, we use the normalised utilities in Equation 2.2, as stated in the following assumption.

Assumption 5 (Relative utilitarianism). *Social welfare is expected normalised utility for an individual selected at random from the population. The normalisation uses $u_s(W) = 1$ and $u_s(W - L) = 0$, while preserving the shape of individual risk preferences at intermediate amounts of wealth.*

This “expectation of 0–1 normalised utilities” definition of social welfare can also be justified as the unique solution of (a slightly weakened version of) the Arrow (1963) axioms for a social welfare function (as shown in Dhillon and Mertens (1999), who call our approach “relative utilitarianism”).⁴

Using Assumption 5, Equation 2.8 simplifies to:

$$S(\underline{\pi}) = E [Q U_I + (1 - Q)(1 - X)]. \quad (2.9)$$

For many insurances, insurance premiums are typically relatively small compared to an individual’s wealth.⁵ We assume that the premium πL is ‘small’ in the following technical sense.

Assumption 6 (Small premiums). *All individuals’ utility functions are such that for small premium amounts πL (compared to initial wealth W), the second and higher-order terms in the Taylor series of expansion of $u_s(W - \pi L)$ can be ignored as negligible.*

⁴There is nothing sacrosanct about this particular normalisation, but it has been used many times in the economics literature (for some recent examples see Segal (2000), Sobel (2001), Pivato (2008)), and seems well suited to the insurance context.

⁵There are some notable exceptions, such as health or life insurance at higher ages, or life insurance with a savings element, and our analysis will not apply in these cases.

It is important to highlight here that we are not suggesting that the curvatures of individuals' utility functions are unimportant in general. Assumption 6 only requires that for small premium amounts πL , the utility function $u_s(w)$ over the short interval $(W - \pi L, W)$ can be approximated by a straight line.

To illustrate the effect of Assumption 6, Figure 1 shows normalised utility functions over the range $(W - L, W)$ for four hypothetical individuals with different risk preferences. The straight diagonal line from $u_s(W - L)$ to $u_s(W)$ through point C represents a risk-neutral individual. The concave curves through points A and B each represent risk-averse individuals and the convex curve through point D represents a risk-loving individual.⁶ The role of utility functions' slopes and curvatures, over the range $(W - L, W - \pi L)$ to portray individual risk preferences, is evident in the four distinctive curves and also in the relative differences in the values of $u_s(W - \pi L)$. Assumption 6 says that, for small πL , each individual's utility curve over the short interval $(W - \pi L, W)$ can be approximated by a straight line.




Figure 1: Intuition for $\gamma = L u'_s(W)$ as an index of risk preferences .

⁶Although 'risk-loving' or 'risk-seeking' are the usual stylised descriptions, it might be more appropriate to characterise this phenomenon as 'risk-neglecting'.

From Equation 2.3, an individual's decision rule for purchasing insurance is:

$$u_s(W - \pi L) > (1 - \mu). \quad (2.10)$$

Using Assumption 6, the left-hand side of Equation 2.10 can be evaluated as:

$$u_s(W - \pi L) \approx u_s(W) - \pi L u'_s(W) = 1 - \pi L u'_s(W), \quad \text{as } u_s(W) = 1. \quad (2.11)$$

Using the approximation in Equation 2.11, the individual's decision rule in Equation 2.10 becomes:

$$L u'_s(W) < \frac{\mu}{\pi}. \quad (2.12)$$

Now, if we define $\gamma = L u'_s(W)$, then for a given individual, the decision rule can be written as:

$$\gamma < \frac{\mu}{\pi}. \quad (2.13)$$

The quantity $\gamma = L u'_s(W)$ can be interpreted as a *risk preferences index*, in the sense illustrated in Figure 1. The straight diagonal line, representing a risk-neutral individual, has a slope of $1/L$, giving the index $\gamma = L u'_s(W) = 1$. The concave curves through points A and B representing risk-averse individuals have lower slopes $u'_s(W)$ than for the straight diagonal line, and hence the index $\gamma = L u'_s(W) < 1$ for risk-averse individuals. For the convex curve through point D , representing a risk-loving individual, an analogous geometric intuition confirms $\gamma = L u'_s(W) > 1$. Provided that Assumption 6 holds, the index $\gamma = L u'_s(W)$ is then sufficient to characterise an individual's risk preferences at wealth $(W - \pi L)$.

As an example, consider the special case of power utility function $u_s(w) = w^\gamma$, with $W = L = 1$. The parameter γ fully characterises an individual's risk preferences. For this particular example, Assumption 6 implies that for small premium π :

$$u_s(1 - \pi) = (1 - \pi)^\gamma \approx 1 - \pi \gamma, \quad \text{as } u_s(1) = 1 \text{ and } u'_s(1) = \gamma. \quad (2.14)$$

And for this specific power utility example, the decision rule then becomes:

$$u_s(1 - \pi) > (1 - \mu) \Leftrightarrow (1 - \pi \gamma) > (1 - \mu) \Leftrightarrow \gamma < \frac{\mu}{\pi}, \quad (2.15)$$

reproducing the same general decision rule as obtained in Equation 2.13.

Note that in accordance with the decision rule in Equation 2.10, insurance is purchased if $u_s(W - \pi L) > (1 - \mu)$: so in this illustration, A purchases, B is indifferent, and C and D do not purchase. The variation across individuals in utility functions drives the partial take-up of insurance (i.e. $d(\pi) < 1$) in our model.

Since insurers cannot observe individuals' utility functions (Assumption 3), γ is not observable and appears to be sampled randomly from some underlying random variable

Γ with distribution function $F_\Gamma(\gamma)$. Following on from Equation 2.13, the (proportional) insurance demand function in Equation 2.4 can be expressed as:

$$d(\pi) = \text{P}[U_I > (1 - \mu)] = \text{P}\left[\Gamma < \frac{\mu}{\pi}\right]. \quad (2.16)$$

By applying Taylor series approximation as in Equation 2.11, the expression for social welfare in Equation 2.9 can now be approximated by:

$$S(\underline{\pi}) \approx \text{E}[Q(1 - \Pi\Gamma) + (1 - Q)(1 - X)], \quad (2.17)$$

$$= \text{E}[Q(X - \Pi\Gamma)] + K, \quad (2.18)$$

where $K = \text{E}[1 - X]$ does not depend on the premium regime under consideration.

The development to this point accommodates the possibility that potential loss amounts L vary across individuals. But to obviate the need to model this variation in this paper, we make our next assumption:

Assumption 7 (Fixed potential loss amount). *For all individuals, the potential loss amount L is the same constant.*

Under this assumption, the equilibrium condition $\rho(\underline{\pi}) = 0$ from Equation 2.7 simplifies to:

$$\text{E}[Q\Pi] - \text{E}[QX] = 0. \quad (2.19)$$

To progress to a parameterised version of Equation 2.19, we need to assume that there is no moral hazard. Technically:

Assumption 8 (No moral hazard). *Conditional on a given risk-group, Q and X are independent.*

Given this assumption, conditioning over the different risk-groups and then taking conditional expectation, the equilibrium condition in Equation 2.19 yields:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{E}[Q\Pi - QX] &= 0 \\ \Leftrightarrow \sum_{i=1}^n \text{P}[\text{Risk-group } i] [\text{E}[Q\Pi \mid \text{Risk-group } i] - \text{E}[QX \mid \text{Risk-group } i]] &= 0 \end{aligned} \quad (2.20)$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \sum_{i=1}^n p_i [\pi_i \text{E}[Q \mid \text{Risk-group } i] - \text{E}[Q \mid \text{Risk-group } i] \text{E}[X \mid \text{Risk-group } i]] = 0 \quad (2.21)$$

(as $\Pi = \pi_i$ for risk-group i ; and Q and X are independent given a risk-group),

$$\Leftrightarrow \sum_{i=1}^n p_i d_i(\pi_i) (\pi_i - \mu_i) = 0, \quad (2.22)$$

as given a risk-group i , Q and X are Bernoulli random variables with parameters $d_i(\pi_i)$ and μ_i respectively. Equation 2.22 is intuitively appealing as it can be interpreted as the demand-weighted average profits generated by different risk-groups.

By inspection, $\underline{\pi} = \underline{\mu} = (\mu_1, \mu_2, \dots, \mu_n)$ is a solution to Equation 2.22, and we will refer to this as the *full risk classification* regime.

At the other end of the spectrum is the *pooling* regime where risk-classification is banned and all risk-groups are charged the same premium $\pi_i = \pi_0$ for $i = 1, 2, \dots, n$. Since the insurance demand in our model is a continuous function of premium, there exists at least one premium π_0 where $\mu_1 \leq \pi_0 \leq \mu_n$ and $\rho(\pi_0) = 0$.⁷

Our final assumption is not a strict requirement, but is made for presentational convenience:

Assumption 9 (No full demand). *No risk-group is fully insured under any risk classification regimes.*

It is possible that an entire risk-group is insured, if the premium charged is sufficiently small; any further reduction in premium will then have no effect on demand from that risk-group. This special case can also be analysed using the same framework. However for ease of exposition, we present our findings based on Assumption 9 in the main text, and cover the case of full take-up for some risk-groups in Appendix F.

3. ISO-ELASTIC INSURANCE DEMAND

In this section, we apply the framework created in Section 2 using the example of iso-elastic demand.

A tractable insurance demand function for a risk-group i is:

$$d_i(\pi_i) = \tau_i \left(\frac{\mu_i}{\pi_i} \right)^{\lambda_i}, \quad (\text{subject to a cap of 1}), \quad (3.1)$$

which produces a constant demand elasticity:

$$\epsilon(\pi_i) = -\frac{\partial \log(d_i(\pi_i))}{\partial \log \pi_i} = \lambda_i. \quad (3.2)$$

⁷For notational convenience, we specify only one argument for multivariate functions if all arguments are equal, e.g. we write $\rho(\pi)$ for $\rho(\pi, \pi, \dots, \pi)$.

The parameter τ_i can be interpreted as the *fair-premium demand*, that is the demand when an actuarially fair premium is charged.

The above iso-elastic insurance demand can be constructed within our model set-up as follows. Consider an individual from risk-group i , with initial wealth W , who risks losing an amount L . Suppose her risk preferences are driven by a power utility function:

$$u_s(w) = \left[\frac{w - (W - L)}{L} \right]^\gamma, \quad (3.3)$$

so that $u_s(W) = 1$ and $u_s(W - L) = 0$. This particular form of utility function leads to:

$$u'_s(w) = \frac{\gamma}{L} \left[\frac{w - (W - L)}{L} \right]^{\gamma-1}, \text{ and so consequently:} \quad (3.4)$$

$$L u'_s(W) = \gamma. \quad (3.5)$$

So under the framework of power utility functions, the *risk preferences index*, $L u'_s(W)$, defined in Section 2.3, can be interpreted as the underlying parameter, γ , of the power utility function.

As outlined in Section 2.3, γ is sampled randomly from some underlying random variable Γ_i with distribution function $F_{\Gamma_i}(\gamma)$, and the demand for insurance for risk-group i at a given premium π_i is then:

$$d_i(\pi_i) = \text{P} \left[\Gamma_i < \frac{\mu_i}{\pi_i} \right]. \quad (3.6)$$

The demand for insurance for risk-group i takes the form of iso-elastic demand given in Equation 3.1 if Γ_i has the following distribution:

$$F_{\Gamma_i}(\gamma) = \text{P} [\Gamma_i \leq \gamma] = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } \gamma < 0 \\ \tau_i \gamma^{\lambda_i} & \text{if } 0 \leq \gamma \leq (1/\tau_i)^{1/\lambda_i} \\ 1 & \text{if } \gamma > (1/\tau_i)^{1/\lambda_i}, \end{cases} \quad (3.7)$$

where τ_i and λ_i are positive parameters. λ_i controls the shape of the distribution function and τ_i controls the range over which Γ_i takes its values.⁸

Using the specific form of iso-elastic demand, the analytical form of social welfare given in Equation 2.18 for a particular premium regime $\underline{\pi}$, is provided in Lemma 1 (proof in Appendix A).

⁸This is a generalised version of the Kumaraswamy distribution, which in its standard form takes values only over $[0,1]$ (Kumaraswamy (1980)). Note that $\tau_i = \lambda_i = 1$ leads to a uniform distribution.

Lemma 1. *Suppose there are n risk-groups with risks $\mu_1 < \mu_2 < \dots < \mu_n$ with iso-elastic demand elasticities $\lambda_1, \lambda_2, \dots, \lambda_n$ respectively, then for a given premium regime $\underline{\pi}$, the expression for social welfare is given by:*

$$S(\underline{\pi}) = \sum_{i=1}^n p_i \tau_i \frac{1}{(\lambda_i + 1)} \left(\frac{\mu_i}{\pi_i} \right)^{\lambda_i + 1} \pi_i + K, \quad (3.8)$$

where the premium regime $\underline{\pi}$ satisfies the equilibrium condition:

$$\sum_{i=1}^n p_i \tau_i \left(\frac{\mu_i}{\pi_i} \right)^{\lambda_i} (\pi_i - \mu_i) = 0, \quad (3.9)$$

and the constant K does not depend on the premium regime under consideration.

Lemma 1 provides the basis for comparing any two premium regimes. Specifically, we focus on comparing the pooling regime against the full risk classification regime.

Under pooling, it is sometimes notationally convenient to express the equilibrium condition and social welfare in terms of the *risk-premium ratios*: $v_i = \mu_i/\pi_0$. A risk-premium ratio of $v_i < 1$ indicates that the i -th risk-group pay more than their fair actuarial premium, and conversely for $v_i > 1$. Using this notation, the pooling equilibrium in Equation 3.9 becomes:

$$\sum_{i=1}^n \alpha_i v_i^{\lambda_i + 1} = \sum_{i=1}^n \alpha_i v_i^{\lambda_i}, \quad (3.10)$$

$$\text{or, equivalently: } \sum_{i: v_i > 1} \alpha_i [v_i^{\lambda_i + 1} - v_i^{\lambda_i}] = \sum_{i: v_i \leq 1} \alpha_i [v_i^{\lambda_i} - v_i^{\lambda_i + 1}], \quad (3.11)$$

where $\alpha_i = \frac{p_i \tau_i}{\sum_{j=1}^n p_j \tau_j}$ and the social welfare condition Equation 3.8 can be expressed as:

$$S(\pi_0) \underset{\leq}{\geq} S(\underline{\mu}) \Leftrightarrow \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{\alpha_i v_i^{\lambda_i + 1}}{\lambda_i + 1} \underset{\leq}{\geq} \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{\alpha_i v_i}{\lambda_i + 1}, \quad (3.12)$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \sum_{i: v_i > 1} \frac{\alpha_i}{\lambda_i + 1} [v_i^{\lambda_i + 1} - v_i] \underset{\leq}{\geq} \sum_{i: v_i \leq 1} \frac{\alpha_i}{\lambda_i + 1} [v_i - v_i^{\lambda_i + 1}]. \quad (3.13)$$

Equation 3.11 says that under the pooling equilibrium, losses from the high risk-groups are exactly offset by the profits from the low risk-groups. And Equation 3.13 can

⁹We use the notation $\underset{\leq}{\geq}$ in the following sense: $A \underset{\leq}{\geq} B \Rightarrow C \underset{\leq}{\geq} D$ is shorthand for $A > B \Rightarrow C > D$ and $A = B \Rightarrow C = D$ and $A < B \Rightarrow C < D$. A similar interpretation applies for the notation $\underset{\geq}{\leq}$.

be interpreted as the comparison between the (aggregate) utility gains by the high risk-groups (from pooling as compared against full risk classification) against the (aggregate) utility losses of the low risk-groups.

We can now derive the conditions for which social welfare under pooling is higher than that under full risk classification. In the first instance, we make the simplest assumption that all risk-groups have the same positive constant demand elasticity λ . Under this assumption, we obtain the following result (proof in Appendix B) :

Theorem 1. *Suppose there are n risk-groups with risks $\mu_1 < \mu_2 < \dots < \mu_n$ with the same positive constant demand elasticity λ for all risk-groups. Then:*

$$\lambda \begin{matrix} \leq \\ \geq \end{matrix} 1 \Rightarrow S(\pi_0) \begin{matrix} \geq \\ \leq \end{matrix} S(\underline{\mu}). \quad (3.14)$$




Figure 2: Illustration of Theorem 1: Social welfare under pooling is higher than under full risk classification for $\lambda < 1$.

Basis: $(\mu_1, \mu_2) = (0.01, 0.04)$ and $(\alpha_1, \alpha_2) = (0.8, 0.2)$. Similar pattern for any population structure and relative risk.

Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of Theorem 1, showing the ratio of $(S(\pi_0) - K)$ to $(S(\underline{\mu}) - K)$ as a function of constant demand elasticity λ for two risk-

groups with risks $(\mu_1, \mu_2) = (0.01, 0.04)$ and $(\alpha_1, \alpha_2) = (0.8, 0.2)$. Recall from Equation 3.8, in the expression for $S(\underline{\pi})$, K is a constant which does not depend on the premium regime $\underline{\pi}$. So the ratio of $(S(\pi_0) - K)$ to $(S(\underline{\mu}) - K)$ focuses solely on the effect of changes in premium regimes.

It can be clearly seen that $\lambda = 1 \Rightarrow S(\pi_0) = S(\underline{\mu})$, while $\lambda < 1 \Rightarrow S(\pi_0) > S(\underline{\mu})$ and vice versa, as postulated in Theorem 1.

4. DIFFERENT ISO-ELASTIC DEMAND ELASTICITIES FOR DIFFERENT RISK-GROUPS

Theorem 1 assumes the same constant iso-elastic demand elasticity for all individuals. However, different risk-groups may have different sensitivities to price changes. In particular, for higher risk consumers, insurance premiums may represent a larger part of their total budget constraint, and so the effect of a small percentage change in price on their insurance demand might be larger. In this section, for ease of exposition, we first consider two risk-groups with iso-elastic demand, but with different demand elasticities. We then generalise our result to more than two risk-groups.

Typical insurance underwriting processes often classify a majority of insurance risks as *standard* (or low risks in the terminology of this paper), with the remaining risks rated higher based on their individual characteristics. The empirical evidence (cited in Table 1 in Section 6.1) suggests that the more numerous low risk-group's demand elasticity may often be less than 1. But, as noted above, the high risk-group's demand elasticity is likely to be higher than that the low risk-group, and may often exceed 1. This pattern motivates Theorem 2 (proof in Appendix C).

Theorem 2.1 states a sufficient condition on λ_1 and λ_2 for social welfare to be higher under pooling than under full risk classification, for any population structures and underlying risks. Theorem 2.2 then extends it for some of the ranges of λ_2 not covered in Theorem 2.1, but this involves introduction of additional conditions.

Theorem 2. Suppose there are two risk-groups with risks $\mu_1 < \mu_2$ with positive constant demand elasticities λ_1 and λ_2 respectively.

2.1. For any population structure:

$$\lambda_1 \leq 1 \text{ and } \lambda_1 \leq \lambda_2 \leq \frac{1}{\lambda_1} \Rightarrow S(\pi_0) \geq S(\underline{\mu}). \quad (4.1)$$

2.2. For any population structure there exists a threshold premium π^* such that:

$$\lambda_1 \leq 1 \text{ and } \lambda_2 > \frac{1}{\lambda_1} \text{ and } \pi_0 \geq \pi^* \Rightarrow S(\pi_0) \geq S(\underline{\mu}). \quad (4.2)$$




Figure 3: Illustration of Theorem 2: Social welfare under pooling is higher than under full risk classification in green area, for *all* population structures and relative risks. See text for interpretation of solid red and dashed blue boundary curves.

Theorem 2 is illustrated in Figure 3, where $(\mu_1, \mu_2) = (0.01, 0.04)$ and the x and y axes represent the lower and higher demand elasticities λ_1 and λ_2 . The two curves emanating from the origin show the boundary at which $S(\pi_0) = S(\underline{\mu})$ for two possible population structures. The bold red curve demarcates the boundary for a moderate population structure, $(\alpha_1, \alpha_2) = (0.8, 0.2)$; the dashed blue curve is the boundary for an extreme population structure with very few high risks, $(\alpha_1, \alpha_2) = (0.99, 0.01)$. Social welfare under pooling is higher than under full risk classification on the left of the boundary curves, and lower on the right. The sufficient conditions in Theorem 2.1 specify that in the green shaded region where $\lambda_1 \leq 1$ and $\lambda_1 \leq \lambda_2 \leq 1/\lambda_1$, social welfare under pooling is *always* higher than that under full risk classification, *irrespective* of the population structure (and also the risks μ_1 and μ_2).

To understand the patterns in Figure 3, first note that moving from full risk classification to pooling always leads to (i) a beneficial *increase* in both the *number* of high risks insured, and the *per capita* utility of insured high risks and (ii) a detrimental *decrease* in both the *number* of low risks insured, and the *per capita* utility of each insured low risk. An initial intuition is that pooling will tend to “work well” when lower risks’ elasticity is low compared with higher risks’ elasticity, i.e. towards the left of Figure 3.

As we move leftwards in the graph with λ_2 fixed, λ_1 eventually becomes *sufficiently low* compared with λ_2 , so that pooling “works well” and effect (i) dominates. As we move upwards in the graph with λ_1 fixed (where $\lambda_1 \leq 1$), λ_2 eventually becomes *sufficiently high* compared with λ_1 , so that pooling again “works well” and effect (i) dominates. This explains the position of the red curve.

However, if the high risk-group is small and has high demand elasticities, it may not have the required capacity to absorb all the aggregate utility losses of the low risk-group. This “capacity limit” on effect (ii) for a small high risk-group is illustrated by the curvature of the dashed blue line for $\alpha_1 = 0.99$ (a very small fraction of high risks) back towards the vertical axis for $\lambda_2 > 1$ (high elasticities of the high risks). The green curve represents a limiting value of this “capacity limit” on effect (ii). To the left of this limit (i.e. inside the green shaded area specified by Theorem 2.1), effect (i) is guaranteed to dominate, for *any* population structure and risks.

Note that the conditions in Theorem 2.1 are sufficient, but *not* necessary. This non-necessity is illustrated by the white and dotted regions adjacent to the green shaded region, but to the left of the red boundary curve, where $S(\pi_0) > S(\underline{\mu})$ for the population structure $\alpha_1 = 0.8$ even though the conditions of Theorem 2.1 are not satisfied. Where the conditions of Theorem 2.1 are not satisfied, social welfare may still be higher under pooling than under full risk classification, but this might require additional conditions. For the region $\lambda_1 \leq 1$ and $\lambda_2 > 1/\lambda_1$ (dotted in Figure 3), Theorem 2.2 identifies the additional condition in the form of the equilibrium premium π_0 needing to exceed a threshold premium π^* for social welfare under pooling to be higher.

An implication of Theorem 2.2 is that the high risk group needs to be of a large

enough size to pull the equilibrium premium above the threshold. This can be interpreted as the need for the high risk-group to be of a reasonably large size to absorb the impact of aggregate utility losses for the low risk-group. The dashed blue boundary line for an extreme population structure with very few high risks, $\alpha_1 = 0.99$, curves back into the dotted region, indicating that the condition $\pi_0 \geq \pi^*$ may not always be satisfied. In contrast, for a moderate population structure with $\alpha_1 = 0.8$, the bold red boundary curves back into the dotted region only at much higher values of λ_2 (not shown in the figure).

Theorem 2 can be generalised for more than two risk-groups with iso-elastic demand for all risk-groups. While generalising our results to more than two risk-groups, under pooling it will be convenient to classify the different risk-groups into two broad categories:

- ‘lower’ risk-groups, for whom pooled premium is higher than fair premium, i.e. $\mu_i \leq \pi_0$;
- ‘higher’ risk-groups, for whom pooled premium is lower than fair premium, i.e. $\mu_i > \pi_0$.

For these two broad categories, we define the following:

- $\lambda_{lo}^{min} = \min \{\lambda_i : \mu_i \leq \pi_0\}$, i.e. minimum demand elasticity for lower risk-groups;
- $\lambda_{lo}^{max} = \max \{\lambda_i : \mu_i \leq \pi_0\}$, i.e. maximum demand elasticity for lower risk-groups;
- $\lambda_{hi}^{min} = \min \{\lambda_i : \mu_i > \pi_0\}$, i.e. minimum demand elasticity for higher risk-groups;
- $\lambda_{hi}^{max} = \max \{\lambda_i : \mu_i > \pi_0\}$, i.e. maximum demand elasticity for higher risk-groups.

For the case of two risk-groups, we simply have: $\lambda_{lo}^{min} = \lambda_{lo}^{max} = \lambda_1$ and $\lambda_{hi}^{min} = \lambda_{hi}^{max} = \lambda_2$.

Using these notations, we present our general result (for proof see Appendix C):

Theorem 3. *Suppose there are n risk-groups with risks $\mu_1 < \mu_2 < \dots < \mu_n$ with iso-elastic demand elasticities $\lambda_1, \lambda_2, \dots, \lambda_n$ respectively.*

3.1. *For any underlying population structures:*

$$\lambda_{lo}^{max} \leq 1 \text{ and } \lambda_{hi}^{max} \leq 1 \text{ and } \lambda_{lo}^{max} \leq \lambda_{hi}^{min} \Rightarrow S(\pi_0) \geq S(\underline{\mu}). \quad (4.3)$$

3.2. *For any underlying population structures:*

$$\lambda_{lo}^{max} \leq 1 \text{ and } \lambda_{hi}^{min} \geq 1 \text{ and } \lambda_{hi}^{max} \leq \frac{1}{\lambda_{lo}^{max}} \Rightarrow S(\pi_0) \geq S(\underline{\mu}). \quad (4.4)$$

3.3. *There exists a threshold premium π^* such that:*

$$\lambda_{lo}^{max} \leq 1 \text{ and } \lambda_{hi}^{min} > \frac{1}{\lambda_{lo}^{min}} \text{ and } \pi_0 \geq \pi^* \Rightarrow S(\pi_0) \geq S(\underline{\mu}). \quad (4.5)$$

It is easy to see that Theorem 2.1 can be obtained as a special case of Theorems 3.1 and 3.2; while Theorem 2.2 is a special case of Theorem 3.3.

5. GENERAL DEMAND FUNCTIONS

So far, we have only considered constant demand elasticities, either for all individuals in the population, or for all individuals belonging to a particular risk-group. Iso-elastic demand functions are easy to understand and are also analytically convenient. However, they may also be criticised as being unrealistic. In this section, we use the concept of *arc elasticity of demand* to extend the results in Section 4 to a form applicable to more general demand functions.

The formulation of iso-elastic demand arose from the particular choice of distribution function in Equation 3.7 for the random variable Γ_i (denoting the risk preferences index) for risk-group i . However, the framework developed in Section 2 is general and can be applied to any distribution for the risk preferences index. In this section, we will just assume that Γ_i is a positive continuous random variable¹⁰ with a distribution function:

$$F_{\Gamma_i}(\gamma) = P[\Gamma_i \leq \gamma]. \quad (5.1)$$

¹⁰The derivations in this section can also be suitably adapted for any positive discrete random variable.

Under this general framework, social welfare for a given premium regime $\underline{\pi}$ is given by Lemma 2 (for proof see Appendix D).

Lemma 2. *Suppose there are n risk-groups with risks $\mu_1 < \mu_2 < \dots < \mu_n$ and any general demand functions. Then for a given premium regime $\underline{\pi}$, for which no risk-group is fully insured, the expression for social welfare is given by:*

$$S(\underline{\pi}) = \sum_{i=1}^n p_i G_i \left(\frac{\mu_i}{\pi_i} \right) \pi_i + K, \quad \text{where} \quad G_i(g) = \int_0^g P[\Gamma_i < \gamma] d\gamma, \quad (5.2)$$

where the premium regime $\underline{\pi}$ satisfies the equilibrium condition:

$$\sum_{i=1}^n p_i d_i(\pi_i) (\pi_i - \mu_i) = 0, \quad (5.3)$$

and the constant K does not depend on the premium regime under consideration.

Comparing social welfare under pooling to that under full risk classification gives:

$$S(\pi_0) - S(\underline{\mu}) = \sum_{i=1}^n p_i G_i \left(\frac{\mu_i}{\pi_0} \right) \pi_0 - \sum_{i=1}^n p_i G_i \left(\frac{\mu_i}{\mu_i} \right) \mu_i, \quad (5.4)$$

where the equilibrium premium π_0 satisfies:

$$\sum_{i=1}^n p_i d_i(\pi_0) (\pi_0 - \mu_i) = 0. \quad (5.5)$$

Using the notations involving risk-premium ratios, $v_i = \mu_i/\pi_0$, we get:

$$S(\pi_0) \geq S(\underline{\mu}) \Leftrightarrow \sum_{i=1}^n p_i [G_i(v_i) - v_i G_i(1)] \geq 0. \quad (5.6)$$

To make analytical progress with the general relationship in Equation 5.6, we need to establish a connection between general demand elasticity functions, $\epsilon_i(\cdot)$, and general distribution functions for the risk preferences index, $F_{\Gamma_i}(\cdot)$. The link arises from Equations 2.6 and 2.16, reproduced below with appropriate adaptation for risk-group i :

$$d_i(\pi) = \tau_i \exp \left[- \int_{\mu_i}^{\pi} \epsilon_i(s) d \log s \right], \quad (5.7)$$

$$d_i(\pi) = \text{P} \left[\Gamma_i < \frac{\mu_i}{\pi} \right] = \text{P} [\Gamma_i \leq v], \quad \text{where } v = \frac{\mu_i}{\pi}. \quad (5.8)$$

Note the distinction between v_i (earlier in the paper) and v for risk-group i : v_i is the risk-premium ratio at the equilibrium premium π_0 , whereas v is the risk-premium ratio as a function of premium π .

We now need the concept of *arc elasticity of demand* (Vázquez (1995)), defined as:

$$\lambda_i(v) = \frac{\int_{\mu_i}^{\pi} \epsilon_i(s) d \log s}{\int_{\mu_i}^{\pi} d \log s}, \quad \text{for } i = 1, 2, \dots, n, \quad (5.9)$$

which can be interpreted as the weighted average of (point) elasticity for risk-group i , $\epsilon_i(s)$, over the arc of the demand curve from premium μ_i to premium π , where the weights are the log premiums.

Using the concept of arc elasticity of demand, Equation 5.8 can be written as:

$$d_i(\pi) = \text{P} [\Gamma_i \leq v] = \tau_i \exp \left[-\lambda_i(v) \int_{\mu_i}^{\pi} d \log s \right] = \tau_i \left(\frac{\mu_i}{\pi} \right)^{\lambda_i(v)} = \tau_i v^{\lambda_i(v)}, \quad (5.10)$$

and the equilibrium condition in Equation 5.5 as:

$$\sum_{i=1}^n p_i \tau_i v_i^{\lambda_i(v_i)+1} = \sum_{i=1}^n p_i \tau_i v_i^{\lambda_i(v_i)}, \quad \text{as } d_i(\pi_0) = \tau_i v_i^{\lambda_i(v_i)}. \quad (5.11)$$

Now consider a *hypothetical* population with the same probabilities of loss, i.e. $\mu_1 < \mu_2 < \dots < \mu_n$, as in the actual population. But suppose that in the hypothetical population, demand for insurance is iso-elastic with constant elasticity parameters set at values $\lambda_1(v_1), \lambda_2(v_2), \dots, \lambda_n(v_n)$ respectively. Then all the results obtained in Section 4 are applicable for the hypothetical population with iso-elastic demand. This creates an avenue for extending the results for iso-elastic demand to general demand functions.

Specifically, if the relevant conditions of iso-elastic demand functions given in Theorem 3 of Section 4 apply for the hypothetical population, we know that pooling increases social welfare as compared to full risk classification. In that case, Equation 3.13 implies that for the hypothetical population:

$$\sum_{i=1}^n p_i \frac{\tau_i}{\lambda_i(v_i) + 1} \left[v_i^{\lambda_i(v_i)+1} - v_i \right] \geq 0. \quad (5.12)$$

However, insurance demand of the *actual* population is not necessarily iso-elastic. But, interestingly, by construction, the equilibrium condition in Equation 5.11 is the same for both the hypothetical population and the actual population, i.e. the pooled equilibrium premium, π_0 , will be the same under both set-ups.

Now for the higher risk-groups, i.e. for those risk-groups for which $\mu_i > \pi_0$, it is shown in Lemma 4 in Appendix E that if the demand elasticity, $\epsilon_i(\pi)$, is either increasing or iso-elastic as a function of premium π , then:

$$G_i(v_i) - v_i G_i(1) \geq \frac{\tau_i}{\lambda_i(v_i) + 1} \left[v_i^{\lambda_i(v_i)+1} - v_i \right]. \quad (5.13)$$

In other words: for the higher risk-groups, under the assumption of increasing or iso-elastic demand elasticities, the increase in social welfare in the actual population when we move to pooling is *higher* than that in the hypothetical population.

Conversely, for the lower risk-groups, i.e. for those risk-groups for which $\mu_i \leq \pi_0$, it is shown in Lemma 5 in Appendix E that if the demand elasticity, $\epsilon_i(\pi)$, is either decreasing or iso-elastic as a function of premium π , then:

$$v_i G_i(1) - G_i(v_i) \leq \frac{\tau_i}{\lambda_i(v_i) + 1} \left[v_i - v_i^{\lambda_i(v_i)+1} \right]. \quad (5.14)$$

In other words: for the lower risk-groups, under the assumption of decreasing or iso-elastic demand elasticities, the fall in social welfare in the actual population when we move to pooling is *lower* than that in the hypothetical population.

Putting Equations 5.13 and 5.14 together, we get the following expression for the increase in social welfare in the actual population when we move to pooling:

$$\sum_{i=1}^n p_i [G_i(v_i) - v_i G_i(1)] \quad (5.15)$$

$$= \sum_{\mu_i > \pi_0} p_i [G_i(v_i) - v_i G_i(1)] - \sum_{\mu_i \leq \pi_0} p_i [v_i G_i(1) - G_i(v_i)], \quad (5.16)$$

$$\geq \sum_{\mu_i > \pi_0} p_i \frac{\tau_i}{\lambda_i(v_i) + 1} \left[v_i^{\lambda_i(v_i)+1} - v_i \right] - \sum_{\mu_i \leq \pi_0} p_i \frac{\tau_i}{\lambda_i(v_i) + 1} \left[v_i - v_i^{\lambda_i(v_i)+1} \right], \quad (5.17)$$

$$= \sum_{i=1}^n p_i \frac{\tau_i}{\lambda_i(v_i) + 1} \left[v_i^{\lambda_i(v_i)+1} - v_i \right]. \quad (5.18)$$

This implies that if the actual population is such that the hypothetical population satisfies the relevant conditions of iso-elastic demand functions given in Theorem 3.1 of Section 4, then pooling gives higher social welfare than full risk classification in the actual population. The following theorem outlines the required conditions in the actual population.

Theorem 4. *Suppose there are n risk-groups with risks $\mu_1 < \mu_2 < \dots < \mu_n$. If the insurance demand elasticities have the following properties over their respective ranges from μ_i to the pooled premium π_0 :*

- (i) for each lower risk-group, demand elasticity is either decreasing or iso-elastic as a function of premium;*
- (ii) for each higher risk-group, demand elasticity is either increasing or iso-elastic as a function of premium;*
- (iii) risk-groups with higher risks have higher arc elasticities of demand; and*
- (iv) demand elasticities do not exceed 1*

then pooling increases social welfare as compared against full risk classification.

Theorem 4 thus partly relaxes the iso-elasticity condition on higher risk-groups in Theorem 3.1. Specifically, condition (ii) allows higher risk-groups to have either iso-elastic *or increasing* demand elasticities (as a function of premium), *provided that* they also have higher *arc elasticities* than all lower risk-groups (condition (iii)) and their demand elasticities do not exceed 1 (condition (iv)).

Technically, Theorem 4 also partly relaxes the iso-elasticity condition on lower risk-groups. Specifically, condition (i) allows lower risk-groups to have either iso-elastic *or decreasing* demand elasticities (as a function of premium). However, as discussed previously, demand elasticities are more likely to be increasing as a function of premium. So, for all practical purposes, condition (i) amounts to a restriction to iso-elastic demand functions.

We emphasise that the conditions presented in Theorem 4 are sufficient, but *not* necessary. In fact, experimentation using simple functions reveals that pooling can sometimes increase social welfare even where lower risk-groups have increasing demand elasticity (as a function of premium), as long as the marginal increase in their demand elasticities does not exceed a certain threshold which depends on the high risk-groups' demand elasticities. However, we do not include these results here as they are not generic and apply to specific analytic forms of demand elasticity functions.

6. DISCUSSION

6.1 SUMMARY AND EMPIRICAL COMPARISONS

The results obtained in this paper give sufficient conditions for social welfare to be higher under pooling than under full risk classification. They can be summarised as follows.

- (a) Theorem 1 for iso-elastic demand (common elasticity for all risk-groups) requires only that the common demand elasticity is less than 1.
- (b) Theorem 2 (2 risk-groups) and Theorem 3 (n risk-groups) for iso-elastic demand (different elasticities for different risk-groups) require that all higher risk-groups' demand elasticities are higher than all lower risk-groups' demand elasticities, *and* all demand elasticities are less than 1. They also provide sufficient conditions when higher risk-groups' demand elasticities exceed 1, as long as all lower risk-groups' demand elasticities are less than 1.
- (c) Theorem 4 then uses the concept of arc elasticity of demand to extend the results in a form applicable to more general demand functions.

The conditions above are stringent because they are sufficient for *any* population structures and relative risks. But the conditions are *not* necessary, and where they are not fully satisfied, social welfare under pooling may still be higher than under risk-differentiated premiums for some combinations of population structures and demand elasticities.

Given that the conditions all relate to demand elasticities, an obvious question is: what elasticities do we typically observe? Table 1 shows some relevant empirical estimates. It can be seen that most estimates are of magnitude significantly less than 1. This is at least suggestive of the possibility that social welfare in some insurance markets could be higher under pooling than under full risk classification.

Table 1: Estimates of demand elasticity for various insurance markets.

Market & country	Demand elasticities ^a	Authors
Term life insurance, USA	0.66	Viswanathan et al. (2006)
Yearly renewable term life, USA	0.4 to 0.5	Pauly et al. (2003)
Whole life insurance, USA	0.71 to 0.92	Babbel (1985)
Health insurance, USA	0 to 0.2	Chernew et al. (1997), Blumberg et al. (2001), Buchmueller and Ohri (2006)
Health insurance, Australia	0.35 to 0.50	Butler (1999)
Farm crop insurance, USA	0.32 to 0.73	Goodwin (1993)

^aEstimates in empirical papers are generally given as negative values, but we have presented the absolute values here for consistency with the definition of demand elasticity used in this paper.

The estimates in Table 1 are made in various contexts, some of which may not correspond closely to the set-up in this paper. However, we wish to emphasise that they all appear to be *product* elasticities, not *brand* elasticities. Product elasticity is the response

of *market* demand to a small change in *market* price. Brand elasticity is response of *one insurer's* demand to a (unilateral) small change in *one insurer's* price. Product elasticity is the relevant parameter for our analysis. Intuitively, in a competitive market, brand elasticity is likely to be many times higher than product elasticity.

Brand elasticities are of more immediate interest for competitive strategy, and so more likely to be estimated by insurers, but they are not informative for our analysis. More detailed empirical work on product elasticities, separately for different markets and risk-groups, is needed for policymakers to implement our results.

6.2 COMPARISON WITH LOSS COVERAGE




Figure 4: Elasticity conditions for pooling to beat full risk classification are more stringent for social welfare criterion (green area on left panel) than for loss coverage criterion (green area on right panel).

The results for social welfare can be compared with the analogous results for loss coverage in Hao et al. (2018). As a reminder, loss coverage is defined as expected losses compensated by insurance for the whole population; this has the practical advantage that it depends only on observables (whereas social welfare depends on unobservable utility functions).

The comparison is illustrated in Figure 4. The dotted area where pooling is sure to increase loss coverage (but increases social welfare only subject to further conditions) arises because the loss coverage criterion focuses on compensation of losses for the population as a whole, and places no weight on the premium cross-subsidies implied by pooling; on the other hand, social welfare takes account of the premium cross-subsidies. For moderate dispersion of elasticities (and hence utility functions), taking account of premium cross-subsidies typically does not change the ranking of pooling versus full risk classification. But with large dispersion of elasticities (and hence utility functions) – in particular, $\lambda_2 \gg \lambda_1$, that is where high risks have much higher demand elasticities than low risks – then pooling may be beneficial in terms of loss coverage, but not in terms of social welfare. However, $\lambda_2 \gg \lambda_1$ is probably an unrealistic parameterisation; for more realistic parameters (e.g. all elasticities not much more than 1), loss coverage and social welfare usually give the same ranking of pooling versus full risk classification. This is shown by the similar positions of the red boundary curve, inside the unit square, in the left and right panels of Figure 4.

6.3 COMPARISON WITH OTHER AUTHORS

The results can also be compared with those of Hoy (2006), who finds that utilitarian welfare is increased by pooling, provided only that the fraction of high risks is sufficiently small. Hoy (2006) assumes a utility function which is uniformly risk-averse for the whole population; this leads all individuals to buy insurance under either pooling or full risk classification, albeit the pooling contract provides only partial insurance.¹¹ When pooling is mandated, there is (i) a loss in efficiency because the pooling contract offers only partial insurance, and (ii) a redistribution from low risks (previously better off, because they paid lower premiums) to high risks. Behind the veil of ignorance, effect (i) reduces welfare, but effect (ii) increases welfare. For a sufficiently small high-risk fraction, effect (ii) dominates (i.e. for a risk-averse utility function, expected utility behind the veil of ignorance is always increased by a sufficiently small redistribution towards the previously worse off).

In contrast, we allow for a distribution of utility functions in the population, such that not all individuals will purchase insurance at an actuarially fair price. In our model, if we pool a very small high-risk population with high elasticity with a large low-risk population with low elasticity, many of the high risks who now choose to participate at the (cheap to them) pooled price have low risk aversion, so their gain in utility from participating is relatively small. On the other hand, the low-elasticity lower risks' loss in utility (from either leaving the market or paying the (expensive to them) pooled price) is relatively large. Therefore overall, pooling might not be advantageous, even with a very small high-risk fraction. Looking back at Figure 3, this is represented by the curvature

¹¹The partial-cover pooling contract is that predicted by the anticipatory (E2) equilibrium concept in Wilson (1977).

of the dashed blue boundary for $\alpha_1 = 0.99$ (i.e. very few high risks) back towards the vertical axis for $\lambda_2 \gg \lambda_1$.

But this feature in our model probably has little practical significance, because $\lambda_2 \gg \lambda_1$ is not a realistic parameterisation. For more typical parameter values (e.g. $\lambda_1 < \lambda_2 < 1$), the relative position of the dashed blue and solid red curves in Figure 3 suggests that reducing the size of the high risk-group makes pooling slightly more likely to be beneficial (in the sense that pooling gives higher social welfare for a slightly wider range of (λ_1, λ_2) parameter values). This is more in accordance with (albeit not the same as) Hoy’s result.

7. LIMITATIONS AND EXTENSIONS

7.1 ASSUMPTIONS

This sub-section discusses how some of our more distinctive assumptions affect our results.

The assumptions listed in Section 2 may appear numerous, but this is partly because we have explicitly flagged points which are often left implicit. By way of comparison, Hao et al. (2018) uses *all* the same assumptions, except for two differences: (i) the policy metric is loss coverage, not social welfare, and hence (ii) assumptions about utility functions are not strictly necessary (they provide a micro-foundation or “back story” for insurance demand, but are not needed for the policy metric). Hoy (2006) uses the same social welfare policy metric as the present paper and states fewer explicit assumptions, partly because some of the set-up (although not the policy analysis) is a restricted version of our model (e.g. only 2 risk-groups, uniform risk-averse utility, so everyone buys insurance), and partly because some assumptions (e.g. no moral hazard) are left implicit.

7.1.1 *Heterogenous utility functions (Assumption 3)*

We assume a distribution of utility functions in the population. Individuals with lower risk aversion will not buy insurance at an actuarially fair price, but may still buy if offered a lower price. This assumption means that whatever the risk classification regime, not everyone buys insurance. This in turn creates the possibility that changing the risk classification arrangements (from pooling to full risk classification, or vice versa) can change the take-up of insurance in a way which increases social welfare (i.e. expected utility behind the veil of ignorance).

The more common assumption of universal and uniform risk aversion means that whatever the risk classification regime, everyone buys insurance. This in turn means that changes in risk classification arrangements cannot change the take-up of insurance, but only the prices charged to different risk-groups, and so limits the scope for increases in social welfare. It does not correspond well to the observed reality of voluntary insurance markets, where coverage is invariably less than 100%.

7.1.2 *Competitive Equilibrium (Assumption 4)*

We assume risk-neutral insurers who use a common technology to classify diversifiable risks, with zero transaction costs. Competition then leads to zero expected profits in equilibrium. Premium loadings (common to all insurers) for risk, transaction costs and profits would complicate our results, but seem unlikely to change their general character.

Common risk classification technology is a more fundamental point than absence of loadings, because it means that insurers cannot use risk classification innovations to gain market share or increase profits (e.g. by identifying low or high risks mis-classified by other insurers). Much risk classification activity in the real world appears to be of this insurer v. insurer type, which we call ‘competitive adverse selection’, in contrast to the more commonly theorised customer v. insurer type, which we call ‘informational adverse selection’ (Thomas (2017)).¹²

Competitive adverse selection motivates any single insurer to pursue risk classification activity for reasons not captured by our model. But this activity is largely zero-sum between insurers (one risk-neutral insurer’s gain is another risk-neutral insurer’s loss), and therefore of limited relevance to public policy. This justifies the abstraction from competitive adverse selection in our model, despite its commercial importance for a single insurer.

7.1.3 *Small Premiums (Assumption 6)*

The assumption that premiums are ‘small’ relative to initial wealth allows the certainty-equivalent decision criterion in Equation 2.10 (reproduced below):

$$u_s(W - \pi L) > (1 - \mu) \tag{2.10}$$

to be re-stated in terms of the risk preferences index γ and the risk-premium ratio μ/π in Equation 2.13 (reproduced below):

$$\gamma < \frac{\mu}{\pi}. \tag{2.13}$$

This in turn facilitates a link from a population distribution for the risk preferences index γ to demand as a function of the risk-premium ratio μ/π , which seems an intuitive form for demand. The ‘small’ premiums assumption also facilitates simplification of the general expression for social welfare in Equation 2.9 to the shorter form in Equation 2.18.

Graphically, ‘small’ premiums say that the individual utility functions in Figure 1 can be approximated as a straight line over the interval $(W - \pi L, W)$. Strictly, the issue is the degree of curvature, rather than the size of the premium: larger premiums could still yield

¹²To illustrate this distinction, consider innovations such as classification by smoking status, postcodes or credit status. Innovations like these are driven primarily by insurers seeking to gain advantage over other insurers, not by customers exploiting information hidden from insurers.

a good approximation, if the utility functions happen to have little curvature over this range. If premiums are not ‘small’ in this sense, the link from individual utility functions to demand will still exist, but not in the tractable form used in this paper. Premiums are indeed ‘small’ relative to wealth for most types of insurance, but with some exceptions (e.g. health or life insurance at higher ages, or life insurance with a savings element).

7.2 PARTIAL RISK CLASSIFICATION

We have focused on two extreme premium regimes, pooling and full risk classification. A more common scenario in practice is partial risk classification, where risk classification may be banned for some risk categories (e.g. gender), but not for others (e.g. smoking status). These scenarios can be compared with the polar cases by identifying and comparing against all the possible intermediate groupings of the risk-groups permitted by any regulatory ban. A full analysis of partial risk classification would require some extensions of our model.

First, we need to systematically enumerate and analyse all possible partial risk classifications permitted under a given regulatory regime. For two risk-groups, only the polar risk classification regimes are possible. For three risk-groups, in addition to the two polar regimes, three partial risk classification regimes are possible, by grouping two of the risk-groups together while leaving out the third; this gives a total of five possible regimes. The number of possible regimes grows super-exponentially with the number of risk-groups. In combinatorial mathematics, this is equivalent to counting all possible partitions of a n -member set, and is known as the Bell number, B_n (for more details on Bell numbers see Sándor and Crstici (2004)). For six risk groups, the Bell number is $B_6 = 203$, and for ten risk groups, $B_{10} = 115,975$, which suggests that analysis of partial risk classification with a realistic number of risk-groups might require a more numerical approach.

Second, we need additional criteria to identify equilibrium premium regimes which are politically acceptable, rather than just possible (in the sense of giving zero profits). For three risk-groups, with say low, medium and high risks, grouping the low and high risk-groups at one premium, and the medium risks at another premium, is a possible equilibrium; but if it leads to a situation where low risks are charged a higher premium than medium risks, this might be politically unacceptable. Other examples of politically unacceptable equilibria might include those which lack face validity (e.g. combine risk-groups having no apparent similarities), or which disadvantage socially protected classes (e.g. combine a low risk-group identified by disability with a high risk-group identified by participation in dangerous sports).

Third, any possible equilibrium also needs to be robust to permitted unilateral deviations. It should not be possible for one insurer, operating within the same regulatory framework, to profitably destabilise the equilibrium by offering a different premium regime.

Preliminary investigations show that for three risk-groups, if iso-elastic demand elas-

ticities for all risk-groups are less than 1, and lower risk-groups have lower demand elasticities and premiums than higher risk-groups, then pooling gives higher social welfare than *any* partial risk classification regime. This is in the same spirit as the other results presented in this paper. However, as discussed above, full analysis of partial risk classification would require significant extensions of our model, so we leave this for future research.

8. CONCLUSIONS

This paper has evaluated the welfare effects of bans on risk classification, in circumstances where institutional or regulatory factors lead insurers to pool all risks at a common price. Such bans have both efficiency and equity effects. Depending on the distribution of utility functions in the population, utilitarian social welfare can increase or decrease.

The distribution of utility functions in the population influences social welfare through two mechanisms. First, utility functions determine individuals' insurance purchasing decisions, which determine the insurance demand curve and hence the equilibrium price of insurance when all risks are pooled. Second, utility functions determine the utilities which individuals assign to their outcomes *given* an equilibrium pooled price.

Because the distribution of utility functions and the insurance demand function are mutually implicative, the distribution of utility functions across the population is completely characterised by demand elasticities. Hence in this paper, demand elasticity functions have been used to specify both demand and (implicitly) the distribution of utility functions in the population.

This paper has stated sufficient conditions on demand elasticities of higher and lower risks which ensure that social welfare will be higher under pooling than under fully risk-differentiated premiums. The conditions were stated first for iso-elastic demand with a single elasticity parameter; then for iso-elastic demand with different elasticity parameters for different risk-groups; and then generalised in a form applicable to other demand functions using the concept of arc elasticity. The conditions for higher social welfare under pooling encompass many plausible combinations of higher and lower risks' demand elasticities, particularly in scenarios where all demand elasticities are less than 1.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Indradeb Chatterjee thanks Radfall Charitable Trust for research funding.

REFERENCES

G.A. Akerlof. The market for lemons: quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84:488–500, 1970.

- American Council of Life Insurers. 2019 life insurers factbook, October 2019. <http://www.acli.org> (accessed 27 January 2019).
- K.J. Arrow. Social choice and individual values. John Wiley & Sons, 1963.
- D. Babbel. The price elasticity of demand for whole life insurance. Journal of Finance, 40(1): 225–239, 1985.
- J.W. Bailey. Utilitarianism, institutions and justice. Oxford University Press, 1997.
- L. Blumberg, L. Nichold, and J. Banthin. Worker decisions to purchase health insurance. International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics, 1:305–325, 2001.
- T.C. Buchmueller and S. Ohri. Health insurance take-up by the near-elderly. Health Services Research, 41:2054–2073, 2006.
- J.R. Butler. Estimating elasticities of demand for private health insurance in australia. Working Paper No. 43. National Centre for Epidemiology and Population Health ,Australian National University, Canberra, 1999.
- M. Chernew, K. Frick, and C. McLaughlin. The demand for health insurance coverage by low-income workers: Can reduced premiums achieve full coverage? Health Services Research, 32: 453–470, 1997.
- K. Crocker and A. Snow. The efficiency effects of categorical discrimination in the insurance industry. Journal of Political Economy, 94:321–344, 1986.
- Z. Cvetkovski. Inequalities: Theorems, Techniques and Selected Problems. Springer, 2012.
- A. Dhillon and J-F. Mertens. Relative utilitarianism. Econometrica, 67:471–498, 1999.
- J. Friedland. Fundamentals of general insurance actuarial analysis. Society of Actuaries, 2013.
- B.K. Goodwin. An empirical analysis of the demand for multiple peril crop insurance. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 75(2):424–434, 1993.
- R.J Gray and S. Pitts. Risk modelling in general insurance. Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- M. Hao. Insurance loss coverage under restricted risk classification. PhD thesis, University of Kent, 2017.
- M. Hao, A.S. Macdonald, P. Tapadar, and R.G. Thomas. Insurance loss coverage and demand elasticities. Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, 79:15–25, 2018. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.insmatheco.2017.12.002>.

- M. Hao, A.S. Macdonald, P. Tapadar, and R.G. Thomas. Insurance loss coverage and social welfare. Scandinavian Actuarial Journal, 2019:113–128, 2019. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03461238.2018.1513865>.
- G.H. Hardy, J. E. Littlewood, and G. Pólya. Inequalities. Cambridge University Press, 1988.
- J.C. Harsanyi. Cardinal welfare, individualistic ethics, and interpersonal comparisons of utility. Journal of Political Economy, 63:309–321, 1955.
- M. Hoy. Risk classification and social welfare. Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, 31:245–269, 2006.
- P. Kumaraswamy. A generalized probability density function for double-bounded random processes. Journal of Hydrology, 46:79–88, 1980.
- LIMRA. Facts about life 2019, September 2019. <http://www.limra.com> (accessed 27 January 2020).
- R. Nozick. Anarchy, state and utopia. Basic Books, N.Y., 1974.
- P. Parodi. Pricing in general insurance. Chapman and Hall, 2014.
- M.V. Pauly, K.H. Withers, K.S. Viswanathan, J. Lemaire, J.C. Hershey, K. Armstrong, and D.A. Asch. Price elasticity of demand for term life insurance and adverse selection. NBER Working Paper (9925), 2003.
- M. Pivato. Twofold optimality of the relative utilitarian bargaining solution. Social Choice and Welfare, 32:79–92, 2008.
- M.K. Polborn, M. Hoy, and A. Sadanand. Advantageous effects of regulatory adverse selection in the life insurance market. The Economic Journal, 116:327–354, 2006.
- C. Rothschild. The efficiency of categorical discrimination in insurance markets. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 78:267–285, 2011.
- M. Rothschild and J. Stiglitz. Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets: an essay on the economics of imperfect information. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90(4):630–649, 1976.
- J. Sándor and B. Crstici. Handbook of Number Theory II. Springer Netherlands, Dordrecht, 2004. ISBN 978-1-4020-2547-1. doi: 10.1007/1-4020-2547-5_5. URL https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-2547-5_5.
- U. Segal. Let’s agree that all dictatorships are equally bad. Journal of Political Economy, 108: 569–589, 2000.
- J. Sobel. Manipulation of preferences and relative utilitarianism. Games and Economic Behavior, 37:196–215, 2001.

- R.G. Thomas. Loss Coverage: Why Insurance Works Better With Some Adverse Selection. Cambridge University Press, 2017.
- A. Vázquez. A note on arc elasticity of demand. Estudios Económicos, 10(2):221–228, 1995.
- K.S. Viswanathan, J. Lemaire, K. K. Withers, K. Armstrong, A. Baumritter, J. Hershey, M. Pauly, and D.A. Asch. Adverse selection in term life insurance purchasing due to the brca 1/2 genetic test and elastic demand. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 74:65–86, 2006.
- C. Wilson. A model for insurance with incomplete information. Journal of Economic Theory, 16:167–207, 1977.

APPENDICES

A. EXPRESSIONS FOR SOCIAL WELFARE UNDER ISO-ELASTIC DEMAND

Lemma 1. *Suppose there are n risk-groups with risks $\mu_1 < \mu_2 < \dots < \mu_n$ with iso-elastic demand elasticities $\lambda_1, \lambda_2, \dots, \lambda_n$ respectively, then for a given premium regime $\underline{\pi}$, the expression for social welfare is given by:*

$$S(\underline{\pi}) = \sum_{i=1}^n p_i \tau_i \frac{1}{(\lambda_i + 1)} \left(\frac{\mu_i}{\pi_i} \right)^{\lambda_i + 1} \pi_i + K, \quad (3.8)$$

where the premium regime $\underline{\pi}$ satisfies the equilibrium condition:

$$\sum_{i=1}^n p_i \tau_i \left(\frac{\mu_i}{\pi_i} \right)^{\lambda_i} (\pi_i - \mu_i) = 0, \quad (3.9)$$

and the constant K does not depend on the premium regime under consideration.

Proof. The equilibrium condition follows directly by inserting the specific expression for iso-elastic insurance demand in Equation 2.22.

Now recall that, given a risk-group i , insurance is purchased when $\Gamma_i < \mu_i/\pi_i$ (a subscript i in Γ_i is used to denote the random variable specific to risk-group i). Hence:

$$[Q \mid \text{Risk-group } i] = I \left[\Gamma_i < \frac{\mu_i}{\pi_i} \right] \Rightarrow E[Q \mid \text{Risk-group } i] = P \left[\Gamma_i < \frac{\mu_i}{\pi_i} \right] = d_i(\pi_i), \quad (A.1)$$

where $I(\cdot)$ is the indicator function.

Using the expression for social welfare as given in Equation 2.18 we have:

$$S(\underline{\pi}) = E[Q(X - \Pi\Gamma)] + K = E[QX] - E[Q\Pi\Gamma] + K. \quad (A.2)$$

Evaluating each of these terms separately:

$$E[QX] = \sum_{i=1}^n P[\text{Risk-group } i] E[QX \mid \text{Risk-group } i] \quad (A.3)$$

$$= \sum_{i=1}^n p_i E[Q \mid \text{Risk-group } i] E[X \mid \text{Risk-group } i], \quad \text{using Assumption 8,} \quad (A.4)$$

$$= \sum_{i=1}^n p_i d_i(\pi_i) \mu_i, \quad (A.5)$$

$$= \sum_{i=1}^n p_i \tau_i \left(\frac{\mu_i}{\pi_i} \right)^{\lambda_i} \mu_i, \quad (\text{A.6})$$

$$= \sum_{i=1}^n p_i \tau_i \left(\frac{\mu_i}{\pi_i} \right)^{\lambda_i+1} \pi_i, \quad (\text{A.7})$$

and:

$$E [Q \Pi \Gamma] = \sum_{i=1}^n P[\text{Risk-group } i] E [Q \Pi \Gamma \mid \text{Risk-group } i] \quad (\text{A.8})$$

$$= \sum_{i=1}^n p_i E \left[I \left[\Gamma_i < \frac{\mu_i}{\pi_i} \right] \Gamma_i \right] \pi_i, \quad (\text{A.9})$$

$$= \sum_{i=1}^n p_i \left[\int_0^{\frac{\mu_i}{\pi_i}} \gamma \tau_i \lambda_i \gamma^{\lambda_i-1} d\gamma \right] \pi_i, \quad \text{using the distribution of } \Gamma_i \text{ in Equation 3.7,} \quad (\text{A.10})$$

$$= \sum_{i=1}^n p_i \tau_i \frac{\lambda_i}{(\lambda_i + 1)} \left(\frac{\mu_i}{\pi_i} \right)^{\lambda_i+1} \pi_i. \quad (\text{A.11})$$

Putting these together, we have:

$$S(\underline{\pi}) = \sum_{i=1}^n p_i \tau_i \frac{1}{(\lambda_i + 1)} \left(\frac{\mu_i}{\pi_i} \right)^{\lambda_i+1} \pi_i + K, \quad (\text{A.12})$$

where $K = E[1 - X]$ does not depend on the premium regime under consideration. \square

B. SAME ISO-ELASTIC DEMAND ELASTICITY AND SOCIAL WELFARE

Theorem 1. *Suppose there are n risk-groups with risks $\mu_1 < \mu_2 < \dots < \mu_n$ with the same positive constant demand elasticity λ for all risk-groups. Then:*

$$\lambda \begin{matrix} \leq \\ \geq \end{matrix} 1 \Rightarrow S(\pi_0) \begin{matrix} \geq \\ \leq \end{matrix} S(\underline{\mu}). \quad (3.14)$$

Proof. Using the construction involving risk-premium ratios, $v_i = \mu_i/\pi_0$, we observe that, under the assumption of the same constant demand elasticity, λ , for all risk-groups, the equilibrium condition in Equation 3.10 simply becomes:

$$\sum_{i=1}^n \alpha_i v_i^{\lambda+1} = \sum_{i=1}^n \alpha_i v_i^\lambda. \quad (B.1)$$

And the condition comparing social welfare under pooling against that under the full risk classification regime in Equation 3.12 simplifies to:

$$S(\pi_0) \begin{matrix} \geq \\ \leq \end{matrix} S(\underline{\mu}) \Leftrightarrow \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{\alpha_i v_i^{\lambda+1}}{\lambda+1} \begin{matrix} \geq \\ \leq \end{matrix} \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{\alpha_i v_i}{\lambda+1} \Leftrightarrow \sum_{i=1}^n \alpha_i v_i^{\lambda+1} \begin{matrix} \geq \\ \leq \end{matrix} \sum_{i=1}^n \alpha_i v_i. \quad (B.2)$$

We will consider the three cases $\lambda = 1$, $0 < \lambda < 1$ and $\lambda > 1$ separately:

Case: $\lambda = 1$: Due to the equilibrium condition in Equation B.1, for $\lambda = 1$:

$$\sum_{i=1}^n \alpha_i v_i^{\lambda+1} = \sum_{i=1}^n \alpha_i v_i^\lambda = \sum_{i=1}^n \alpha_i v_i \Rightarrow S(\pi_0) = S(\underline{\mu}). \quad (B.3)$$

Case: $0 < \lambda < 1$: (Weighted) Hölder's inequality (Hardy et al. (1988); Cvetkovski (2012)) states:

(Weighted) Hölder's inequality. *Let $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_n; b_1, b_2, \dots, b_n; m_1, m_2, \dots, m_n$ be three sequences of positive real numbers and If $p, q > 1$ be such that $1/p + 1/q = 1$, Then:*

$$\left(\sum_{i=1}^n m_i a_i^p \right)^{1/p} \left(\sum_{i=1}^n m_i b_i^q \right)^{1/q} \geq \sum_{i=1}^n m_i a_i b_i. \quad (B.4)$$

Equality occurs if and only if $\frac{a_1^p}{b_1^q} = \frac{a_2^p}{b_2^q} = \dots = \frac{a_n^p}{b_n^q}$.

Setting $1/p = \lambda$, $1/q = 1 - \lambda$, $a_i = v_i^{\lambda^2}$, $b_i = v_i^{1-\lambda^2}$ and $m_i = \alpha_i$; and noting that the ratios, $a_i^p/b_i^q = 1/v_i$, are not constant (unless all $v_i = 1$), (weighted) Hölder's inequality gives:

$$\left[\sum_{i=1}^n \alpha_i \left(v_i^{\lambda^2} \right)^{\frac{1}{\lambda}} \right]^{\lambda} \left[\sum_{i=1}^n \alpha_i \left(v_i^{1-\lambda^2} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\lambda}} \right]^{1-\lambda} > \sum_{i=1}^n \alpha_i v_i^{\lambda^2} v_i^{1-\lambda^2}, \quad (\text{B.5})$$

$$\Rightarrow \left[\sum_{i=1}^n \alpha_i v_i^{\lambda} \right]^{\lambda} \left[\sum_{i=1}^n \alpha_i v_i^{1+\lambda} \right]^{1-\lambda} > \sum_{i=1}^n \alpha_i v_i, \quad (\text{B.6})$$

$$\Rightarrow \sum_{i=1}^n \alpha_i v_i^{1+\lambda} > \sum_{i=1}^n \alpha_i v_i, \quad \text{by the equilibrium condition in Equation B.1,} \quad (\text{B.7})$$

$$\Rightarrow S(\pi_0) > S(\underline{\mu}), \quad \text{by the social welfare condition in Equation B.2.} \quad (\text{B.8})$$

Case: $\lambda > 1$: Young's inequality (Hardy et al. (1988); Cvetkovski (2012)) states that:

Young's inequality. For $a, b > 0$ and $p, q > 1$ such that $1/p + 1/q = 1$:

$$ab \leq \frac{a^p}{p} + \frac{b^q}{q}. \quad (\text{B.9})$$

Equality occurs if and only if $a^p = b^q$.

Setting $p = \lambda$, $q = \frac{\lambda}{\lambda-1}$, $a = v_i^{\frac{1}{\lambda}}$, $b = v_i^{\lambda-\frac{1}{\lambda}}$ and noting that $a^p \neq b^q$ unless $v_i = 1$, Young's inequality gives:

$$v_i^{\frac{1}{\lambda}} v_i^{\lambda-\frac{1}{\lambda}} < \frac{1}{\lambda} v_i^{\frac{1}{\lambda} \lambda} + \frac{\lambda-1}{\lambda} v_i^{(\lambda-\frac{1}{\lambda}) \frac{\lambda}{\lambda-1}}, \quad (\text{B.10})$$

$$\Rightarrow v_i^{\lambda} < \frac{1}{\lambda} v_i + \frac{\lambda-1}{\lambda} v_i^{\lambda+1}, \quad (\text{B.11})$$

$$\Rightarrow \sum_{i=1}^n \alpha_i v_i^{\lambda} < \frac{1}{\lambda} \sum_{i=1}^n \alpha_i v_i + \frac{\lambda-1}{\lambda} \sum_{i=1}^n \alpha_i v_i^{\lambda+1}, \quad (\text{B.12})$$

$$\Rightarrow \sum_{i=1}^n \alpha_i v_i^{\lambda+1} < \sum_{i=1}^n \alpha_i v_i, \quad \text{by the equilibrium condition in Equation B.1,} \quad (\text{B.13})$$

$$\Rightarrow S(\pi_0) < S(\underline{\mu}), \quad \text{by the social welfare condition in Equation B.2.} \quad (\text{B.14})$$

□

C. DIFFERENT ISO-ELASTIC DEMAND ELASTICITIES AND SOCIAL WELFARE

In this section, we prove Theorem 3. As discussed in Section 4, Theorem 2 is a special case of Theorem 3.

Theorem 3. *Suppose there are n risk-groups with risks $\mu_1 < \mu_2 < \dots < \mu_n$ with iso-elastic demand elasticities $\lambda_1, \lambda_2, \dots, \lambda_n$ respectively.*

3.1. *For any underlying population structures:*

$$\lambda_{lo}^{max} \leq 1 \text{ and } \lambda_{hi}^{max} \leq 1 \text{ and } \lambda_{lo}^{max} \leq \lambda_{hi}^{min} \Rightarrow S(\pi_0) \geq S(\underline{\mu}). \quad (4.3)$$

3.2. *For any underlying population structures:*

$$\lambda_{lo}^{max} \leq 1 \text{ and } \lambda_{hi}^{min} \geq 1 \text{ and } \lambda_{hi}^{max} \leq \frac{1}{\lambda_{lo}^{max}} \Rightarrow S(\pi_0) \geq S(\underline{\mu}). \quad (4.4)$$

3.3. *There exists a threshold premium π^* such that:*

$$\lambda_{lo}^{max} \leq 1 \text{ and } \lambda_{hi}^{min} > \frac{1}{\lambda_{lo}^{min}} \text{ and } \pi_0 \geq \pi^* \Rightarrow S(\pi_0) \geq S(\underline{\mu}). \quad (4.5)$$

Proof. (of Theorem 3.1) The proof is presented in the following steps:

Step 1: If $a > 0$ and $0 < b \leq 1$, then since Arithmetic Mean \geq Geometric Mean:

$$(1-b)a^{b+1} + ba^b \geq a^{(b+1)(1-b)} \times a^{b^2} = a \Rightarrow \left(\frac{a^{b+1} - a}{b} \right) \geq (a^{b+1} - a^b). \quad (\text{C.1})$$

Step 2: As $v_i > 0$ and $0 < \lambda_i \leq 1$ for all risk-groups, using Step 1, we get:

$$\sum_{i=1}^n \alpha_i \frac{v_i^{\lambda_i+1} - v_i}{\lambda_i} \geq \sum_{i=1}^n \alpha_i (v_i^{\lambda_i+1} - v_i^{\lambda_i}) = \sum_{i=1}^n \alpha_i v_i^{\lambda_i+1} - \sum_{i=1}^n \alpha_i v_i^{\lambda_i} = 0, \quad (\text{C.2})$$

by equilibrium condition in Equation 3.10.

Step 3: Using Step 2, and separating out the terms involving $v_i > 1$ from $v_i \leq 1$ we get:

$$\sum_{i: v_i > 1} \alpha_i \frac{v_i^{\lambda_i+1} - v_i}{\lambda_i} \geq \sum_{i: v_i \leq 1} \alpha_i \frac{v_i - v_i^{\lambda_i+1}}{\lambda_i} \geq 0. \quad (\text{C.3})$$

Step 4: As $0 < x \leq y \Rightarrow \frac{x}{x+1} \leq \frac{y}{y+1}$, if $0 < v_j \leq 1 \leq v_k$, for some j and k , then

$$\lambda_j \leq \lambda_{lo}^{max} \leq \lambda_{hi}^{min} \leq \lambda_k \Rightarrow \frac{\lambda_j}{\lambda_j + 1} \leq \frac{\lambda_{lo}^{max}}{\lambda_{lo}^{max} + 1} \leq \frac{\lambda_{hi}^{min}}{\lambda_{hi}^{min} + 1} \leq \frac{\lambda_k}{\lambda_k + 1}. \quad (\text{C.4})$$

Step 5: Using Steps 3 and 4, we get:

$$\sum_{i: v_i > 1} \frac{\alpha_i}{\lambda_i + 1} [v_i^{\lambda_i+1} - v_i] = \sum_{i: v_i > 1} \alpha_i \frac{\lambda_i}{\lambda_i + 1} \frac{v_i^{\lambda_i+1} - v_i}{\lambda_i}, \quad (\text{C.5})$$

$$\geq \frac{\lambda_{hi}^{min}}{\lambda_{hi}^{min} + 1} \sum_{i: v_i > 1} \alpha_i \frac{v_i^{\lambda_i+1} - v_i}{\lambda_i}, \quad (\text{C.6})$$

$$\geq \frac{\lambda_{lo}^{max}}{\lambda_{lo}^{max} + 1} \sum_{i: v_i \leq 1} \alpha_i \frac{v_i - v_i^{\lambda_i+1}}{\lambda_i}, \quad (\text{C.7})$$

$$\geq \sum_{i: v_i \leq 1} \alpha_i \frac{\lambda_i}{\lambda_i + 1} \frac{v_i - v_i^{\lambda_i+1}}{\lambda_i}, \quad (\text{C.8})$$

$$= \sum_{i: v_i \leq 1} \frac{\alpha_i}{\lambda_i + 1} [v_i - v_i^{\lambda_i+1}] \quad (\text{C.9})$$

Hence by Equation 3.13, $S(\pi_0) \geq S(\mu)$. □

Proof. (of Theorem 3.2) The proof is presented in the following steps:

Step 1: Let $0 < a \leq 1$, $b \geq a$ such that $ab \leq 1$ and function $g(v)$ be defined as:

$$g(v) = (b - a)v^a + (a + 1)v^{a-1} - (b + 1), \text{ for } v > 0. \quad (\text{C.10})$$

If $a = 1$, then $b = 1$ (as $b \geq a$ and $ab \leq 1$), in which case: $g(v) = 0$ for $v > 0$.

If $0 < a < 1$ i.e. $(a - 1) < 0$, $\lim_{v \rightarrow 0^+} g(v) = +\infty$, $g(1) = 0$ and:

$$g'(v) = (b - a) a v^{a-2} \left[v - \frac{1 - a^2}{ab - a^2} \right] < 0, \text{ for } 0 < v < 1 \text{ as } ab \leq 1. \quad (\text{C.11})$$

So $g(v)$ is a non-negative decreasing function over $0 < v \leq 1$. Hence $g(v) \geq 0$ for $0 < v \leq 1$.

Step 2: For $v_i \leq 1$, set $a = \lambda_i$ and $b = \lambda_{hi}^{max} \Rightarrow ab = \lambda_i \lambda_{hi}^{max} \leq \lambda_{lo}^{max} \lambda_{hi}^{max} \leq 1$. By Step 1:

$$(\lambda_{hi}^{max} - \lambda_i)v_i^{\lambda_i} + (\lambda_i + 1)v_i^{\lambda_i-1} - (\lambda_{hi}^{max} + 1) \geq 0. \quad (\text{C.12})$$

Rearranging and multiplying by $\alpha_i v_i$ on both sides, we get:

$$\frac{\alpha_i}{\lambda_{hi}^{max} + 1} \left[v_i^{\lambda_i} - v_i^{\lambda_i+1} \right] \geq \frac{\alpha_i}{\lambda_i + 1} \left[v_i - v_i^{\lambda_i+1} \right]. \quad (\text{C.13})$$

As this holds for all $v_i \leq 1$, summing over all such risk-groups leads to:

$$\frac{1}{\lambda_{hi}^{max} + 1} \sum_{i: v_i \leq 1} \alpha_i \left[v_i^{\lambda_i} - v_i^{\lambda_i+1} \right] \geq \sum_{i: v_i \leq 1} \frac{\alpha_i}{\lambda_i + 1} \left[v_i - v_i^{\lambda_i+1} \right]. \quad (\text{C.14})$$

Step 3: For all risk-groups with $v_i > 1$, $\lambda_i \geq 1$ (since $\lambda_{hi}^{min} \geq 1$). So:

$$\sum_{i: v_i > 1} \frac{\alpha_i}{\lambda_i + 1} \left[v_i^{\lambda_i+1} - v_i \right] \geq \frac{1}{\lambda_{hi}^{max} + 1} \sum_{i: v_i > 1} \alpha_i \left[v_i^{\lambda_i+1} - v_i \right], \text{ as } \lambda_{hi}^{max} \geq \lambda_i \quad (\text{C.15})$$

$$\geq \frac{1}{\lambda_{hi}^{max} + 1} \sum_{i: v_i > 1} \alpha_i \left[v_i^{\lambda_i+1} - v_i^{\lambda_i} \right], \text{ as } v_i > 1 \text{ and } \lambda_i \geq 1 \quad (\text{C.16})$$

$$= \frac{1}{\lambda_{hi}^{max} + 1} \sum_{i: v_i \leq 1} \alpha_i \left[v_i^{\lambda_i} - v_i^{\lambda_i+1} \right], \text{ by Equation 3.11.} \quad (\text{C.17})$$

Step 4: Combining Steps 2 and 3, we get:

$$\sum_{i: v_i > 1} \frac{\alpha_i}{\lambda_i + 1} \left[v_i^{\lambda_i+1} - v_i \right] \geq \frac{1}{\lambda_{hi}^{max} + 1} \sum_{i: v_i \leq 1} \alpha_i \left[v_i^{\lambda_i} - v_i^{\lambda_i+1} \right] \geq \sum_{i: v_i \leq 1} \frac{\alpha_i}{\lambda_i + 1} \left[v_i - v_i^{\lambda_i+1} \right], \quad (\text{C.18})$$

Hence by Equation 3.13, $S(\pi_0) \geq S(\mu)$. \square

Proof. (of Theorem 3.3) The proof is presented in the following steps:

Step 1: Let $0 < a \leq 1$, $b > a$ such that $ab > 1$ and function $h(v)$ be defined as:

$$h(v) = (b - a)v^b - (b + 1)v^{b-1} + (a + 1), \text{ for } v > 0. \quad (\text{C.19})$$

$\lim_{v \rightarrow 0^+} h(v) = a + 1 > 1$, $\lim_{v \rightarrow +\infty} h(v) = +\infty$, $h(1) = 0$ and:

$$h'(v) = (b - a) b v^{b-2} \left[v - \frac{b^2 - 1}{b^2 - ab} \right] \Rightarrow h'(v_m) = 0 \Rightarrow v_m = \frac{b^2 - 1}{b^2 - ab} > 1. \quad (\text{C.20})$$

$h''(v_m) > 0 \Rightarrow v_m$ is minimum. So there exists a $v^* > 1$ such that, $h(v) \leq 0$ for $1 < v \leq v^*$.

Step 2: For all $v_i > 1$, there exists a v_i^* such that for $1 < v_i \leq v_i^*$,

$$\sum_{i: v_i > 1} \frac{\alpha_i}{\lambda_i + 1} \left[v_i^{\lambda_i + 1} - v_i \right] \geq \frac{1}{\lambda_{lo}^{min} + 1} \sum_{i: v_i > 1} \alpha_i \left[v_i^{\lambda_i + 1} - v_i^{\lambda_i} \right]. \quad (\text{C.21})$$

To prove this, set $a = \lambda_{lo}^{min}$ and $b = \lambda_i$, so $ab = \lambda_i \lambda_{lo}^{min} \geq \lambda_{hi}^{min} \lambda_{lo}^{min} > 1$. So, by Step 1:

$$(\lambda_i - \lambda_{lo}^{min})v_i^{\lambda_i} - (\lambda_i + 1)v_i^{\lambda_i - 1} + (\lambda_{lo}^{min} + 1) \leq 0. \quad (\text{C.22})$$

Rearranging and multiplying by $\alpha_i v_i$ on both sides, we get:

$$\frac{\alpha_i}{\lambda_i + 1} \left[v_i^{\lambda_i + 1} - v_i \right] \geq \frac{\alpha_i}{\lambda_{lo}^{min} + 1} \left[v_i^{\lambda_i + 1} - v_i^{\lambda_i} \right]. \quad (\text{C.23})$$

As this holds for all $v_i > 1$, summing over all such risk-groups leads to Equation C.21.

Step 3: Based on all risk-groups for which $v_i \leq 1$:

$$\sum_{i: v_i \leq 1} \frac{\alpha_i}{\lambda_i + 1} \left[v_i - v_i^{\lambda_i + 1} \right] \leq \frac{1}{\lambda_{lo}^{min} + 1} \sum_{i: v_i \leq 1} \alpha_i \left[v_i - v_i^{\lambda_i + 1} \right], \text{ as } \lambda_{lo}^{min} \leq \lambda_i \quad (\text{C.24})$$

$$\leq \frac{1}{\lambda_{lo}^{min} + 1} \sum_{i: v_i \leq 1} \alpha_i \left[v_i^{\lambda_i} - v_i^{\lambda_i + 1} \right], \text{ as } v_i \leq 1 \text{ and } \lambda_i \leq 1 \quad (\text{C.25})$$

$$= \frac{1}{\lambda_{lo}^{min} + 1} \sum_{i: v_i > 1} \alpha_i \left[v_i^{\lambda_i + 1} - v_i^{\lambda_i} \right], \text{ by Equation 3.11.} \quad (\text{C.26})$$

Step 4: Combining Steps 2 and 3, we get

$$\sum_{i: v_i > 1} \frac{\alpha_i}{\lambda_i + 1} \left[v_i^{\lambda_i + 1} - v_i \right] \geq \frac{1}{\lambda_{lo}^{min} + 1} \sum_{i: v_i > 1} \alpha_i \left[v_i^{\lambda_i + 1} - v_i^{\lambda_i} \right] \geq \sum_{i: v_i \leq 1} \frac{\alpha_i}{\lambda_i + 1} \left[v_i - v_i^{\lambda_i + 1} \right], \quad (\text{C.27})$$

for $1 < v_i \leq v_i^*$ for all $v_i > 1$.

As $v_i = \mu_i / \pi_0$, $v_i \leq v_i^* \Rightarrow \pi_0 \geq \mu_i / v_i^*$ for all risk-groups for which $v_i > 1$. So if we define $\pi^* = \max_{i: v_i > 1} (\mu_i / v_i^*)$, then $\pi_0 \geq \pi^* \Rightarrow S(\pi_0) \geq S(\mu)$ by Equation 3.13. \square

D. EXPRESSION FOR SOCIAL WELFARE UNDER GENERAL INSURANCE DEMAND

Lemma 2. *Suppose there are n risk-groups with risks $\mu_1 < \mu_2 < \dots < \mu_n$ and any general demand functions. Then for a given premium regime $\underline{\pi}$, for which no risk-group is fully insured, the expression for social welfare is given by:*

$$S(\underline{\pi}) = \sum_{i=1}^n p_i G_i \left(\frac{\mu_i}{\pi_i} \right) \pi_i + K, \quad \text{where} \quad G_i(g) = \int_0^g P[\Gamma_i < \gamma] d\gamma, \quad (5.2)$$

where the premium regime $\underline{\pi}$ satisfies the equilibrium condition:

$$\sum_{i=1}^n p_i d_i(\pi_i) (\pi_i - \mu_i) = 0, \quad (5.3)$$

and the constant K does not depend on the premium regime under consideration.

Proof. Recall that, given a risk-group i , insurance is purchased when $\Gamma_i < \mu_i/\pi_i$. Hence:

$$[Q \mid \text{Risk-group } i] = I \left[\Gamma_i < \frac{\mu_i}{\pi_i} \right] \Rightarrow E[Q \mid \text{Risk-group } i] = P \left[\Gamma_i < \frac{\mu_i}{\pi_i} \right] = d_i(\pi_i). \quad (D.1)$$

Using the expression for social welfare as given in Equation 2.18 we have:

$$S(\underline{\pi}) = E[Q(X - \Pi\Gamma)] + K, \quad (D.2)$$

$$= E[QX] - E[Q\Pi\Gamma] + K, \quad (D.3)$$

$$= E[Q\Pi] - E[Q\Pi\Gamma] + K, \quad \text{as under equilibrium: } E[QX] = E[Q\Pi] \quad (D.4)$$

$$= E[(1 - \Gamma)Q\Pi] + K, \quad (D.5)$$

$$= \sum_{i=1}^n p_i E \left[(1 - \Gamma_i) I \left[\Gamma_i \leq \frac{\mu_i}{\pi_i} \right] \right] \pi_i + K. \quad (D.6)$$

Now using Lemma 3:

$$S(\underline{\pi}) = \sum_{i=1}^n p_i \left[\left(1 - \frac{\mu_i}{\pi_i} \right) P \left[\Gamma_i \leq \frac{\mu_i}{\pi_i} \right] + \int_0^{\frac{\mu_i}{\pi_i}} P[\Gamma_i \leq \gamma] d\gamma \right] \pi_i + K, \quad (D.7)$$

$$= \sum_{i=1}^n p_i \left(1 - \frac{\mu_i}{\pi_i} \right) P \left[\Gamma_i \leq \frac{\mu_i}{\pi_i} \right] \pi_i + \sum_{i=1}^n p_i \int_0^{\frac{\mu_i}{\pi_i}} P[\Gamma_i \leq \gamma] d\gamma \pi_i + K, \quad (D.8)$$

$$= \sum_{i=1}^n p_i d_i(\pi_i) (\pi_i - \mu_i) + \sum_{i=1}^n p_i G_i \left(\frac{\mu_i}{\pi_i} \right) \pi_i + K, \quad \text{as } P \left[\Gamma_i \leq \frac{\mu_i}{\pi_i} \right] = d_i(\pi_i), \quad (D.9)$$

$$= \sum_{i=1}^n p_i G_i \left(\frac{\mu_i}{\pi_i} \right) \pi_i + K, \quad \text{as in equilibrium: } \sum_{i=1}^n p_i d_i(\pi_i) (\pi_i - \mu_i) = 0. \quad (D.10)$$

as required. \square

Lemma 3. For a positive continuous random variable, X :

$$(i) \quad E[X] = \int_0^\infty P[X > y] dy;$$

$$(ii) \quad E[X I[X \leq c]] = cP[X \leq c] - \int_0^c P[X \leq y] dy;$$

$$(iii) \quad E[(1 - X) I[X \leq c]] = (1 - c)P[X \leq c] + \int_0^c P[X \leq y] dy.$$

Proof. Assuming the density function of X is given by $p(x)$

(i)

$$\begin{aligned} E[X] &= \int_0^\infty x p(x) dx = \int_0^\infty \left[\int_0^x dy \right] p(x) dx = \int_0^\infty \left[\int_y^\infty p(x) dx \right] dy \\ &= \int_0^\infty P[X > y] dy. \end{aligned} \quad (D.11)$$

(ii)

$$E[X I[X \leq c]] = \int_0^c x p(x) dx, \quad (D.12)$$

$$= \int_0^c \left[\int_0^x dy \right] p(x) dx, \quad (D.13)$$

$$= \int_0^c \left[\int_y^c p(x) dx \right] dy, \quad \text{by interchanging integrals,} \quad (D.14)$$

$$= \int_0^c P[y < X \leq c] dy, \quad (D.15)$$

$$= \int_0^c [P[X \leq c] - P[X \leq y]] dy, \quad (D.16)$$

$$= cP[X \leq c] - \int_0^c P[X \leq y] dy. \quad (D.17)$$

(iii)

$$E[(1 - X) I[X \leq c]] = E[I[X \leq c]] - E[X I[X \leq c]], \quad (D.18)$$

$$= P[X \leq c] - \left[cP[X \leq c] - \int_0^c P[X \leq y] dy \right], \quad (D.19)$$

$$= (1 - c)P[X \leq c] + \int_0^c P[X \leq y] dy \quad (D.20)$$

□

E. DERIVATIONS FOR GENERAL DEMAND ELASTICITIES

First note that if demand elasticity is an increasing function of premium π , then it is a decreasing function of $v = \mu_i/\pi$; and hence a weighted average such as arc elasticity $\lambda_i(v)$ is also decreasing function of v . The inverse statements (i.e. with increasing replaced by decreasing and vice versa) also hold.

Lemma 4. *If for a risk-group i , $\mu_i > \pi_0$ (i.e. $v_i > 1$) and the demand elasticity, $\epsilon_i(\pi)$, is an increasing function of premium π , then:*

$$G_i(v_i) - v_i G_i(1) \geq \frac{\tau_i}{\lambda_i(v_i) + 1} \left[v_i^{\lambda_i(v_i)+1} - v_i \right]. \quad (\text{E.1})$$

Proof. Firstly:

$$G_i(v_i) - G_i(1) = \int_1^{v_i} P[\Gamma_i \leq v] dv, \quad (\text{E.2})$$

$$= \int_1^{v_i} \tau_i v^{\lambda_i(v)} dv, \text{ by Equation 5.10,} \quad (\text{E.3})$$

$$\geq \int_1^{v_i} \tau_i v^{\lambda_i(v_i)} dv, \text{ as } \lambda_i(v) \text{ is a decreasing function,} \quad (\text{E.4})$$

$$= \frac{\tau_i}{\lambda_i(v_i) + 1} \left[v_i^{\lambda_i(v_i)+1} - 1 \right]. \quad (\text{E.5})$$

And,

$$(v_i - 1)G_i(1) = (v_i - 1) \int_0^1 P[\Gamma_i \leq v] dv, \quad (\text{E.6})$$

$$= (v_i - 1) \int_0^1 \tau_i v^{\lambda_i(v)} dv, \text{ by Equation 5.10,} \quad (\text{E.7})$$

$$\leq (v_i - 1) \int_0^1 \tau_i v^{\lambda_i(v_i)} dv, \text{ as } v < 1 \Rightarrow v^{\lambda_i(v)} \leq v^{\lambda_i(v_i)}, \quad (\text{E.8})$$

$$= \frac{(v_i - 1)\tau_i}{\lambda_i(v_i) + 1}. \quad (\text{E.9})$$

Hence:

$$G_i(v_i) - v_i G_i(1) = [G_i(v_i) - G_i(1)] - [(v_i - 1)G_i(1)] \geq \frac{\tau_i}{\lambda_i(v_i) + 1} \left[v_i^{\lambda_i(v_i)+1} - v_i \right], \quad (\text{E.10})$$

as required. \square

Lemma 5. *If for a risk-group i , $\mu_i \leq \pi_0$ (i.e. $v_i \leq 1$) and the demand elasticity, $\epsilon_i(\pi)$, is a decreasing function of premium π , then:*

$$v_i G_i(1) - G_i(v_i) \leq \frac{\tau_i}{\lambda_i(v_i) + 1} \left[v_i - v_i^{\lambda_i(v_i)+1} \right]. \quad (\text{E.11})$$

Proof. Firstly:

$$v_i [G_i(1) - G_i(v_i)] = v_i \int_{v_i}^1 P[\Gamma_i \leq v] dv, \quad (\text{E.12})$$

$$= v_i \int_{v_i}^1 \tau_i v^{\lambda_i(v)} dv, \text{ by Equation 5.10,} \quad (\text{E.13})$$

$$\leq v_i \int_{v_i}^1 \tau_i v^{\lambda_i(v_i)} dv, \text{ as } v < 1 \Rightarrow v^{\lambda_i(v)} \leq v^{\lambda_i(v_i)}, \quad (\text{E.14})$$

$$= \frac{v_i \tau_i}{\lambda_i(v_i) + 1} \left[1 - v_i^{\lambda_i(v_i)+1} \right]. \quad (\text{E.15})$$

And

$$(1 - v_i) G_i(v_i) = (1 - v_i) \int_0^{v_i} P[\Gamma_i \leq v] dv, \quad (\text{E.16})$$

$$= (1 - v_i) \int_0^{v_i} \tau_i v^{\lambda_i(v)} dv, \text{ by Equation 5.10,} \quad (\text{E.17})$$

$$\geq (1 - v_i) \int_0^{v_i} \tau_i v^{\lambda_i(v_i)} dv, \text{ as } \lambda_i(v) \text{ is an increasing function,} \quad (\text{E.18})$$

$$= \frac{(1 - v_i) \tau_i}{\lambda_i(v_i) + 1} \left[v_i^{\lambda_i(v_i)+1} \right]. \quad (\text{E.19})$$

Hence, as required:

$$v_i G_i(1) - G_i(v_i) = v_i [G_i(1) - G_i(v_i)] - (1 - v_i) G_i(v_i) \leq \frac{\tau_i}{\lambda_i(v_i) + 1} \left[v_i - v_i^{\lambda_i(v_i)+1} \right]. \quad (\text{E.20})$$

□

F. SOCIAL WELFARE WHEN HIGHER RISKS ARE FULLY INSURED UNDER POOLING

In the main text of the paper, we have explicitly assumed that no risk-groups are fully insured under any premium regime. However, for sufficiently small pooled equilibrium premium, it is possible that all individuals purchase insurance, in some higher risk-groups.

If there are more than two risk-groups, the analysis of implications of full insurance would require consideration of many possible combinations. For ease of exposition, while analysing the case of full take-up of insurance, we will only consider two risk-groups, where the high risk-group is fully insured under pooling. We assume that fair-premium demand $\tau_i < 1$ for all risk-groups, which is consistent with most empirical evidence. (The special case of $\tau_i = 1$ can also be analysed using the same techniques.)

Assuming $\tau_i < 1$, social welfare under full risk classification follows from Lemma 1:

$$S(\underline{\mu}) = p_1 \tau_1 \frac{1}{(\lambda_1 + 1)} \mu_1 + p_2 \tau_2 \frac{1}{(\lambda_2 + 1)} \mu_2 + K. \quad (\text{F.1})$$

For pooling we obtain the following lower bound for social welfare:

Lemma 6. *Suppose there are two risk-groups with risks $\mu_1 < \mu_2$ with positive constant demand elasticities λ_1 and λ_2 respectively. If the high risk-group is fully insured under pooling, then social welfare under pooled premium $S(\pi_0)$ satisfies:*

$$S(\pi_0) \geq p_1 \tau_1 \frac{1}{(\lambda_1 + 1)} \left(\frac{\mu_1}{\pi_0} \right)^{\lambda_1 + 1} \pi_0 + p_2 \frac{1}{(\lambda_2 + 1)} \mu_2 + K, \quad (\text{F.2})$$

where the pooled premium π_0 satisfies the equilibrium condition:

$$p_1 \tau_1 \left(\frac{\mu_1}{\pi_1} \right)^{\lambda_1} (\pi_0 - \mu_1) + p_2 (\pi_0 - \mu_2) = 0, \quad (\text{F.3})$$

and the constant K does not depend on the premium regime under consideration.

Proof. The equilibrium condition follows from Equation 2.22, by inserting the specific expression for iso-elastic insurance demand for low risk-group and noting that proportional demand for high risk-group is 1 under pooling.

Using the general expression for social welfare given in Equation 2.18, we have:

$$S(\pi_0) = E[Q X - Q \Pi \Gamma] + K, \quad (\text{F.4})$$

$$= \sum_{i=1}^2 E[Q X - Q \Pi \Gamma \mid \text{Risk-group } i] p_i + K. \quad (\text{F.5})$$

As not all low risks will purchase insurance, the same steps in Lemma 1 will give:

$$E[Q X - Q \Pi \Gamma \mid \text{Risk-group } 1] = p_1 \tau_1 \frac{1}{(\lambda_1 + 1)} \left(\frac{\mu_1}{\pi_0} \right)^{\lambda_1 + 1} \pi_0. \quad (\text{F.6})$$

But all high risks buy insurance under pooling, i.e. $[Q \mid \text{Risk-group 2}] = 1$. So:

$$\mathbb{E}[QX - Q\Pi\Gamma \mid \text{Risk-group 2}] = \mathbb{E}[X \mid \text{Risk-group 2}] - \mathbb{E}[\Pi\Gamma \mid \text{Risk-group 2}], \quad (\text{F.7})$$

$$= \mu_2 - \mathbb{E}[\Gamma \mid \text{Risk-group 2}] \pi_0, \quad (\text{F.8})$$

$$= \mu_2 - \int_0^{\left(\frac{1}{\tau_2}\right)^{\frac{1}{\lambda_2}}} \gamma \tau_2 \lambda_2 \gamma^{\lambda_2-1} d\gamma \pi_0, \quad (\text{F.9})$$

$$= \mu_2 - \frac{\lambda_2}{(\lambda_2 + 1)} \left(\frac{1}{\tau_2}\right)^{\frac{1}{\lambda_2}} \pi_0, \quad (\text{F.10})$$

$$\geq \frac{1}{(\lambda_2 + 1)} \mu_2, \quad \text{since } \tau_2 \left(\frac{\mu_2}{\pi_0}\right)^{\lambda_2} \geq 1 \Rightarrow \left(\frac{1}{\tau_2}\right)^{\frac{1}{\lambda_2}} \pi_0 \leq \mu_2. \quad (\text{F.11})$$

Using Equations F.6 and F.11 in Equation F.5 gives the required relationship in Equation F.2. \square

Equation F.2 of Lemma 6 implies that, when high risks are fully insured under pooling (but partially insured under full risk classification), social welfare under pooling exceeds that under full risk classification, i.e. $S(\pi_0) \geq S(\underline{\mu})$ if:

$$p_1 \tau_1 \frac{1}{(\lambda_1 + 1)} \left(\frac{\mu_1}{\pi_0}\right)^{\lambda_1+1} \pi_0 + p_2 \frac{1}{(\lambda_2 + 1)} \mu_2 \geq p_1 \tau_1 \frac{1}{(\lambda_1 + 1)} \mu_1 + p_2 \tau_2 \frac{1}{(\lambda_2 + 1)} \mu_2, \quad (\text{F.12})$$

$$\Leftrightarrow p_1 \tau_1 \frac{1}{(\lambda_1 + 1)} v_1^{\lambda_1+1} + p_2 \frac{1}{(\lambda_2 + 1)} v_2 \geq p_1 \tau_1 \frac{1}{(\lambda_1 + 1)} v_1 + p_2 \tau_2 \frac{1}{(\lambda_2 + 1)} v_2, \quad (\text{F.13})$$

using the notations involving risk-premium ratios: v_1 and v_2 . And Equation F.3 becomes:

$$p_1 \tau_1 v_1^{\lambda_1} (1 - v_1) + p_2 (1 - v_2) = 0 \quad (\text{F.14})$$

We can then state the sufficient condition on λ_1 and λ_2 , for social welfare to be higher under pooling than under full risk classification for any population structures and underlying risks, when high risks are fully insured under pooling.

Theorem 5. *Suppose there are two risk-groups with risks $\mu_1 < \mu_2$ with positive constant demand elasticities λ_1 and λ_2 respectively. If high risks are fully insured under pooling while low risks are not, and neither risk-group is fully insured under full risk classification, then:*

$$\lambda_1 \leq 1 \text{ and } \lambda_2 \leq \left(1 + \frac{1}{\lambda_1}\right) (1 - \tau_2) - 1 \Rightarrow S(\pi_0) \geq S(\underline{\mu}). \quad (\text{F.15})$$

Proof. The proof is presented in the following steps:

Step 1: The equilibrium condition in Equation F.14 leads to:

$$p_2 v_2 = p_1 \tau_1 \left(v_1^{\lambda_1} - v_1^{\lambda_1+1} \right) + p_2. \quad (\text{F.16})$$

Step 2: Using Equation F.16 in the social welfare condition in Equation F.13 gives:

$$S(\pi_0) \geq S(\underline{\mu}) \quad (\text{F.17})$$

$$\text{if } p_1 \tau_1 \frac{1}{(\lambda_1 + 1)} v_1^{\lambda_1+1} + p_2 \frac{1}{(\lambda_2 + 1)} v_2 \geq p_1 \tau_1 \frac{1}{(\lambda_1 + 1)} v_1 + p_2 \tau_2 \frac{1}{(\lambda_2 + 1)} v_2, \quad (\text{F.18})$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{i.e. if } p_1 \tau_1 \frac{1}{(\lambda_1 + 1)} v_1^{\lambda_1+1} + p_1 \tau_1 \frac{1}{(\lambda_2 + 1)} \left(v_1^{\lambda_1} - v_1^{\lambda_1+1} \right) + p_2 \frac{1}{(\lambda_2 + 1)} \\ \geq p_1 \tau_1 \frac{1}{(\lambda_1 + 1)} v_1 + p_1 \tau_1 \frac{\tau_2}{(\lambda_2 + 1)} \left(v_1^{\lambda_1} - v_1^{\lambda_1+1} \right) + p_2 \frac{\tau_2}{(\lambda_2 + 1)}, \end{aligned} \quad (\text{F.19})$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{i.e. if } p_1 \tau_1 \frac{1}{(\lambda_1 + 1)} v_1^{\lambda_1+1} + p_1 \tau_1 \frac{1}{(\lambda_2 + 1)} \left(v_1^{\lambda_1} - v_1^{\lambda_1+1} \right) \\ \geq p_1 \tau_1 \frac{1}{(\lambda_1 + 1)} v_1 + p_1 \tau_1 \frac{\tau_2}{(\lambda_2 + 1)} \left(v_1^{\lambda_1} - v_1^{\lambda_1+1} \right), \quad \text{as } \tau_2 < 1, \end{aligned} \quad (\text{F.20})$$

$$\text{i.e. if } \frac{(1 - \tau_2)}{(\lambda_2 + 1)} \geq \frac{1}{(\lambda_1 + 1)} \frac{(v_1 - v_1^{\lambda_1+1})}{(v_1^{\lambda_1} - v_1^{\lambda_1+1})}. \quad (\text{F.21})$$

Step 3: As $0 < \lambda_1 \leq 1$ and $0 < v_1 < 1$, using Arithmetic Mean \geq Geometric Mean:

$$(1 - \lambda_1) v_1^{\lambda_1+1} + \lambda_1 v_1^{\lambda_1} \geq v_1 \Rightarrow \frac{\lambda_1}{(\lambda_1 + 1)} \geq \frac{1}{(\lambda_1 + 1)} \frac{(v_1 - v_1^{\lambda_1+1})}{(v_1^{\lambda_1} - v_1^{\lambda_1+1})}. \quad (\text{F.22})$$

Step 4: Finally:

$$\lambda_2 \leq \left(1 + \frac{1}{\lambda_1} \right) (1 - \tau_2) - 1 \Rightarrow \frac{(1 - \tau_2)}{(\lambda_2 + 1)} \geq \frac{\lambda_1}{(\lambda_1 + 1)}, \quad (\text{F.23})$$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{(1 - \tau_2)}{(\lambda_2 + 1)} \geq \frac{1}{(\lambda_1 + 1)} \frac{(v_1 - v_1^{\lambda_1+1})}{(v_1^{\lambda_1} - v_1^{\lambda_1+1})}, \quad \text{by Step 3,} \quad (\text{F.24})$$

$$\Rightarrow S(\pi_0) \geq S(\underline{\mu}), \quad \text{by Step 2.} \quad (\text{F.25})$$

□

Figure 5 provides a graphical representation of Theorem 5, where the fair-premium demand is 50% for both low and high risk-groups. Social welfare is guaranteed to be higher under pooling for all population structures and risks in the shaded region to the left of the bold green curve.

For specific population structures and risk parameters, the region where social welfare is higher under pooling is a much larger area than the shaded region in Figure 5. For example,




Figure 5: Curve demarcating the regions where social welfare under pooling is greater than under full risk-differentiation where $(\mu_1, \mu_2) = (0.01, 0.04)$, fair-premium demand is 50% for both risk-groups and high risks are fully insured under pooling.

social welfare is guaranteed to be higher under pooling in the region to the left of the blue dot-dashed line for $p_1 = 0.99$ and $(\mu_1, \mu_2) = (0.01, 0.04)$. Similarly, the region to the left of the red dashed line represents the region where social welfare is guaranteed to be higher under pooling for $p_1 = 0.9$ and $(\mu_1, \mu_2) = (0.01, 0.04)$. The region where social welfare is guaranteed to be higher under pooling increases with the size of the higher risk-group, because larger high risk-group's gain in welfare from pooling has greater capacity to offset the lower risk-group's loss in welfare from pooling.