This Liber Amicorum for Wim van Oorschot is published at the occasion of his retirement as Professor of Social Policy at the Centre for Sociological Research, KU Leuven (Belgium). It is a collection of chapters written by his former and current students and colleagues. The different chapters cover a broad array of societally relevant topics but are all -each in their own unique way- related to Wim van Oorschot's academic oeuvre. The first part of the book reflects on Wim's remarkable career and his contributions to the social policy discipline. In the second part, different types of social policies, as well as their causes and consequences are analysed. The third part focuses on popular attitudes towards such social policies. Taken together, the book demonstrates the impressive width and depth of Wim's academic work, which will continue to inspire many researchers in the years to come.

Edited by:
Tijs Laenen
Bart Meuleman
Adeline Otto
Femke Roosma
Wim Van Lancker
Leading Social Policy Analysis from the Front
Essays in Honour of Wim van Oorschot
This *liber amicorum* for Wim van Oorschot is published at the occasion of his retirement as Professor of Social Policy at the Centre for Sociological Research of the KU Leuven (Belgium) as per 1 October 2020.
Leading Social Policy Analysis from the Front
Essays in Honour of Wim van Oorschot

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Contents

Contributors ix
Acknowledgements xxi

Part I Introduction

1. Leading Social Policy Analysis from the Front
   Tijs Laenen, Bart Meuleman, Adeline Otto, Femke Roosma
   and Wim Van Lancker 3

Part II The academic career of Wim van Oorschot

2. How to be a Great Academic
   Heejung Chung 11
   of Wim van Oorschot
   Minna van Gerven 21
4. Wim van Oorschot and the Early Years of ESPAnet
   Jochen Clasen and Jon Kvist 29

Part III Social policies, their causes and consequences

5. The Welfare Regime Debate Revisited: Some
   Epistemological and Methodological Observations
   Wil Arts 41
6. Revisiting the ‘Dependent Variable Problem’: Wim’s
   Contribution to a Long-Lasting Debate
   Kenneth Nelson 57
7. The Declining Poverty Reducing Capacity of Social
   Security: Base or Superstructure?
   Bea Cantillon 71
8. Social Work and Social Policy: Two Sides of the Same Coin?  
   Koen Hermans  
   81

9. Why do the Elderly Fail to Realize their Social Rights in Belgium? And What can we do About it?  
   Joy Schols and Hans Peeters  
   93

10. Harmonising Social Security Financing  
    Paul Schoukens and Danny Pieters  
    105

11. Flex Well: Balancing Labour Market Flexibility, Security and Wellbeing  
    Sonja Bekker and Ioana Pop  
    117

12. Entering the Labour Market Dualism Dilemma: a ‘Macro-Micro-Macro’ Perspective to Investigate Social Divides in European Labour Markets  
    Valeria Pulignano and Nadja Doerflinger  
    127

    Wim Van Lancker and Ine Van Hoyweghen  
    139

    Ruud JA Muffels  
    151

15. The Dark Side of the Welfare State: the Universal Basic Income between Citizenship and Social Justice  
    Dick Houtman  
    169

16. Culture as a Variable in the Analysis of Welfare State Institutions  
    Birgit Pfau-Effinger  
    181

Part IV Popular attitudes towards social policies

17. Wim van Oorschot, the Politics of Deservingness and the Cultural Turn in Social Sciences  
    Peter Taylor-Gooby  
    195
   Christian Staerklé .......................... 203

   Tjis Laenen and Femke Roosma ............ 217

20. Unpacking CARIN: Four Questions on the Study of Perceptions of Deservingness to Social Benefits
   Giuliano Bonoli .............................. 233

   Wouter De Tavernier and Veerle Draulans ... 243

22. From Who Deserves to What Deserves. Post-Material Encounters with Other-Than-Human Subjects
   Karin Hannes .................................. 253

23. Does the Concept of Deservingness Apply to Migrant Settlement?
   David De Coninck, Gray Swicegood and Koen Matthijs .... 263

24. Deservingness and Diversity: Deservingness Opinions among Majority and Minority Groups in Belgium
   Bart Meuleman ............................... 275

25. Welfare Chauvinism across the Political Spectrum
   Tim Reeskens and Tom van der Meer ........ 289

26. The Roots and Electoral Consequences of Welfare Populism
   Koen Abts and Peter Achterberg .......... 301

27. Determinants of Attitudes towards Eco-Social Policies: Theoretical Reflections
   Adeline Otto and Dimitri Gugushvili ...... 319

28. Homeownership and Social Policy Preferences
   Thomas Lux and Steffen Man ................ 333
   John Gelissen  
   347

30. On Solidarity in Europe: Evidence from the 2017 European Values Study  
   Loek Halman and Inge Sieben  
   363

31. Solidarity: a Reflection on Concept and Practices  
   Antoon Vandevelde  
   379

Part V Epilogue

32. A Privileged Career  
   Wim van Oorschot  
   393
Contributors

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Leading Social Policy Analysis from the Front

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Contributors

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Leading Social Policy Analysis from the Front

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Leading Social Policy Analysis from the Front

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Leading Social Policy Analysis from the Front

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Acknowledgements

As the editors, we are grateful to everyone who helped us to realize this Liber Amicorum in honour of Wim van Oorschot. First and foremost, we wish to thank all of the authors for their thought-provoking chapters that will stimulate many lively discussions in the years to come, and for their commitment in responding to our editorial comments. We are also tremendously grateful to Kees Boos, for taking care of the layout editing with an unparalleled eye for detail. Credit is also due to Marina Franckx, for trying to organize Wim’s retirement ceremony in the midst of a pandemic. And last but certainly not least, we want to thank Wim himself. With this book, we pay tribute to his impressive achievements over the years. We are extremely grateful for the many insights he has given us and for the privilege to work with him. Hopefully, this book can be the basis for continued discussions. We wish Wim the very best in this new stage of his career.

Tijs Laenen, Bart Meuleman, Adeline Otto, Femke Roosma and Wim Van Lancker
Part I

Introduction
1. Leading Social Policy Analysis from the Front

Tijs Laenen, Bart Menuleman, Adeline Otto, Femke Roosma and Wim Van Lancker

This Liber Amicorum is a tribute to the manifold contributions Wim van Oorschot made to the field of Social Policy. At the occasion of Wim’s retirement, 45 colleagues eagerly accepted the challenge to write a chapter explaining how Wim influenced their way of thinking and working.

Describing the influence and career of an academic giant of Wim’s caliber is for sure no easy task. To characterize Wim’s role as a scientist, colleague and friend, it is compelling to resort to cycling terminology (which is quite fitting for the avid cyclist Wim is). Wim clearly stands out as a leader in the peloton, who guides his team with great vision and strategy. Yet, he is not the team leader who wants to be served by a handful of domestiques. Instead, he takes the lead in the paceline, reducing wind resistance for his team members. Wim is more concerned about the success of the team than about his personal achievements. In the finale of a race, he is not afraid of leading out, so that a teammate can finish the sprint. Whenever he is triggered by a scientific problem, he becomes a true baroudeur, who goes à bloc on a breakaway and paves the road for the rest of the pack. In short, Wim is a colleague hors catégorie.

This book is organized in three main parts, each referring to a particular area of influence, and ends with an epilogue by Wim. Notwithstanding the tremendous importance of Wim’s writings, the book starts by shedding light on his outstanding service to the
Leading Social Policy Analysis from the Fron

academic community (Part II, The academic career of Wim van Oorschot). Wim has shown great dedication in mentoring and socializing several generations of social policy analysts. On top of passing on scientific knowledge, he continuously showed future generations of researchers how to be productive, balanced and generous academics (Chung, Chapter 2; van Gerven, Chapter 3). Yet as a policy analyst, he understood very well that there is an institutional dimension to changing academic practice. Without any doubt, Wim’s most impactful contribution in this regard is his pioneering role as co-founder of ESPAnet (Clasen and Kvist, Chapter 4) and the important role he played in various other scientific co-operative networks, such as the European Social Survey (ESS) and the European Data Center for Work and Welfare (EDAC). Wim also left an important mark as a teacher. He won several ‘best teacher’ awards, and both in Tilburg and in Leuven he was cherished and revered by his students and by his colleagues.

The remainder of the chapters in Part III and IV engage with the wide array of theoretical and empirical contributions Wim has made to the field of social policy analysis. Broadly speaking, Wim’s scientific work can be categorized in two interrelated subdomains, namely the study of welfare institutions and the analysis of public attitudes towards welfare. Part III (Social policies, their causes and consequences) highlights the lessons Wim has taught us regarding the character of European social policies; processes of policy formation; and the consequences these policies have for the economic conditions and wellbeing of populations. A key contribution of Wim has been his suggestion to study benefit recipiency as a central dependent variable in comparative welfare analysis, rather than merely relying on social expenditure or social rights data (Nelson, Chapter 6). The attention for benefit recipiency was already present in Wim’s PhD thesis (entitled Realizing rights), in which he shows that the issue of benefit non-take-up should be understood as a multi-level problem, taking
factors at the level of claimants, administrators as well as policy makers into account (Schols and Peeters, Chapter 9). His theoretical, multilevel model of non-take-up remains hugely influential to date. Moreover, attention for the bottom-up implementation of policies by street-level bureaucrats has created interesting opportunities to bridge the fields of social policy and social work (Hermans, Chapter 8). Focusing on benefit recipiency – arguably the dimension of social policy that shapes the everyday experience of citizens most strongly – has shown to be an insightful approach in addition to the popular welfare regime paradigm (Arts, Chapter 5).

Characteristic for the ‘van Oorschot-approach’ is that, besides structural contexts and the emergence of new social risks (Cantillon, Chapter 7), cultural ideas are conceived as an important driver of policy change (Pfau-Effinger, Chapter 16). Such a cultural analysis of the welfare state warrants a multi-level approach that pays attention to the interplay between micro (individual) and macro (institutional) factors (Pulignano and Doerflinger, Chapter 12). From this vantage point, Wim has been among the pioneers studying trends such as increased welfare targeting and means-testing, the Europeanisation of social policy (Schoukens and Pieters, Chapter 10), or increasing labour market flexibility (Bekker and Pop, Chapter 11). The importance of this work is evidenced by the fact that the concepts Wim developed over the years are well-suited to understand new evolutions, such as the use of automated decision-making processes in social policy (Van Lancker and Van Hoyweghen, Chapter 13) or universal basic income (Muffels, Chapter 14; Houtman, Chapter 15).

Part IV, *Popular attitudes towards social policies*, deals with a second focal point in Wim’s research: the normative beliefs, cultural values and preferences citizens have with respect to welfare policies and their target groups. By meticulously studying notions of solidarity (for a conceptual clarification, see Vandeveldt, Chapter 31) and the legitimacy of welfare arrangements, Wim
Leading Social Policy Analysis from the Front

contributed to a veritable cultural turn in social policy (Taylor-Gooby, Chapter 17; Staerklé, Chapter 18). Among many contributions, Wim’s theory of welfare deservingness is the one that has resonated most powerfully in the field. This framework stipulates that citizens employ five criteria – Control, Attitude, Reciprocity, Attitude and Need – as heuristics to decide who should get what and why (Bonoli, Chapter 20). The key concepts in Wim’s deservingness theory show relevant linkages to processes of stereotyping (De Tavernier and Drulans, Chapter 21) and explain why certain welfare arrangements are more popular than others. Yet, various chapters in this book illustrate that this efficient and versatile framework offers levers to understand attitudes towards migration (De Coninck, Swicegood and Matthijs, Chapter 23; Reeskens and Van der Meer, Chapter 25), diversity (Meuleman, Chapter 24), eco-social policies (Otto and Gugushvili, Chapter 27) and perhaps even other-than-human subjects (Hannes, Chapter 22).

However, his work on deservingness is by no means Wim’s only contribution to the literature on welfare attitudes. Wim systematically elaborated the idea that individuals’ welfare attitudes are multi-dimensional (Laenen and Roosma, Chapter 19), in the sense that they, for example, can support the goals of the welfare state, but take a more critical stance towards the concrete implementation or the beneficiaries (see Abts and Achterberg, Chapter 26, for an elaboration of the notion of welfare populism). The various dimensions are, to a certain extent, rooted in social structural positions (Lux and Mau, Chapter 28) and ideological worldviews. Besides focusing exclusively on individual differences, Wim’s work contains a strong comparative component, studying welfare attitudes cross-nationally (Halman and Sieben, Chapter 30) and across welfare regimes (Gelissen, Chapter 29).

Taken together, the book demonstrates the impressive width and depth of Wim’s academic work, which will continue to inspire many researchers in the years to come.
NOTE

1. Readers who are less familiar with the glossary of cycling can look up the italicized words on https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Glossary_of_cycling (accessed 14 January 2021).
Part II

The academic career of
Wim van Oorschot
2. How to be a Great Academic

Heejung Chung

2.1 Introduction

When I was asked to write up a short essay celebrating Wim’s academic career and the influences he had on myself as well as the rest of academia, I didn’t hesitate one second to ask whether I can write about how Wim lived as an academic rather than what he wrote as an academic.

Don’t get me wrong. Wim’s work has had a great deal of influence on my work throughout my career. This started from even when I had no clue about who he was. One of my first academic papers that was published was on the Dutch welfare state (Chung and Kim, 2003). In the piece, I cite Wim’s work (for example, van Oorschot, 2001a, 2001b) on the Dutch miracle and flexicurity policies a number of times. Mind you, these weren’t even published papers – rather conference papers I found on the internet as a junior scholar in Korea. I had a binder full of Wim van Oorschot’s papers before I met Wim.

Furthermore, Wim’s work on deservingness criteria (van Oorschot, 2006), as well as his work on crowding in crowding out of social capital (van Oorschot and Arts, 2005), have been some of the key theoretical underpinnings in many of my work (for example, Chung, 2018, 2019; Chung et al., 2018, 2019). These are also included as some of the key articles I make all of my undergraduate and postgraduate students read during my welfare state lectures. We of course have written many papers together, especially focusing on employment insecurity in Europe especially

### 2.2 Toxic academic life

However, again despite the great deal of influence his work has had in shaping my academic endeavours, what I would like to celebrate and share is the influence he has had in how I define a successful academic life. Academia is well known to be one of the most competitive labour markets in our societies. A recent study by the Times Higher Education (THE) (Bothwell, 2018) has noted how academia is a great example of long-hours work culture, where work devotion (Blair-Loy, 2009) is not only prevalent but expected. Two third of all surveyed stated that they work at least 9 hours a day, that they work on the weekends, and one out of three said they only had one holiday away from home in the past year. In addition to that, 9 per cent did not take any holidays in the past year. Of those who did take holidays, most of them still looked at and answered emails during their ‘time off’.

This has huge consequences on academics’ ability to balance work with leisure and family life, which again has a damaging impact on their mental and physical well-being. The same THE survey has noted that almost 2/3rds of all academics surveyed said that their work-life balance was worse than that of their friends. The relationships of academics – not only with their partner but also their children – suffer due to their workload. Many also noted the fact that they were not able to have children because of their fear that children will have a devastating impact on their careers – and for many, any prospect of a job in academia. Obviously this results in serious consequences for academic’s mental well-being. One recent survey found that 43 per cent of academic staff exhibited some symptoms of mental disorder, which is about twice the prevalence compared to that of
the general population (Gorczynski et al., 2017). When looking at post-graduates, the prevalence of anxiety or depression is almost 6 times as high in the general population (Evans et al., 2018). Actually, amongst academics many claim it is almost inevitable to go through a period of depression during your PhD years. This is compounded by the fact that many academics and supervisors expect their students to follow this culture of long-hours work – that everyone puts in a 70 hour week and that no serious academic would work 9 to 5. This type of culture is also followed by the harsh criticism of academia – rather than providing constructive criticism especially to our early career researchers, we tend to put people down. And if they can’t handle it, they are not apt to take part in academia. This is so prevalent that there are Facebook groups and Twitter handles that are themed based on the ‘Reviewer 2’ culture.

2.3 Wim van Oorschot's way of life

Wim van Oorschot, and the way in which he leads his life is quite of an anti-thesis to all of this madness that is the so-called ‘ideal academic’ culture – similar to the ideal worker culture of Acker (1990) and Williams (1999). The culture defines an ideal academic as someone who does not have any other responsibilities outside of research (teaching and admin), and prioritises work above everything else in their lives. Wim went against this trend by working shorter but productive hours, taking exercise seriously/almost religiously, prioritising family time/life, and having a serious hobby. This in fact is the exact secret combination to increase one’s productivity as mentioned by others (Pang, 2016). I am writing this secret solution of Wim’s in the hope that it can encourage the current early career researchers (that is, those who are just starting off their lives in academia) and others to lead a successful academic life.2
2.4 Work shorter hours and take breaks

Wim works between 8am and 4pm every day. I am not sure when he started working according to this schedule. Some say it is because he was raised in a farm where everyone rises early, others say this is because he spent some time in Denmark (Aalborg) where everyone worked this schedule and somehow it stuck. Whatever the reason, he worked these hours with a 30 minute break for lunch every day. Unlike the other professoriate at Tilburg University (and elsewhere really) who ate their lunch in front of their computers, Wim always took time off for lunch to have his boterham (bread with cheese) and a piece of fruit. This lunch time was mostly shared with PhD students in the department, his and others, where we shared stories of our lives, rather than talk shop. During my time working with him at Tilburg, I don’t think I have ever seen him work after 4pm. What is more, when working with him, unlike some other professors who expect students/post-docs to work throughout the weekend to finish up projects/papers, there was an unwritten agreement that weekends are not there to ‘quickly finish some paper up’. Weekends were for family and rest. Many Monday lunches were times where Wim shared his story about having his children over the weekend (the story of his son bringing a load of laundry over from university every weekend still makes me smile), and how he went for another 100km cycling tour. Despite all of this, as you may know Wim is and has been one of the most influential and prolific academics in the field of social policy.

2.5 Taking exercise seriously and have a serious hobby

Another important part of Wim’s daily schedule is that he wakes up very early to squeeze in an hour of swimming (when in the Netherlands), or cycling (when in Leuven) every morning. This he
takes quite seriously, almost religiously and with great pride. He and Peter Taylor-Gooby (another well-known avid cyclist and social policy scholar) used to compete not on their research, but on how much they cycled in the past years, how fast they can go, and whether or not they finished some sort of long cycling tour that was famous for being difficult and how fast they made it. His passion for cycling was not watered down despite the cycling injury he had circa 2010 where he broke, what I remember as, his hip or thigh bones. What was remarkable, or possibly in retrospect completely expected, was how fast he recovered. I remember visiting him at home quite soon after his accident (of ramming into a safety pole – oh the irony – whilst cycling at an incredibly high speed during his cycling tours). He was ‘running around’ on his crutches, mentioning how his physiotherapist was impressed with the speed of his recovery – being the ‘top of class’.

Obviously there are some drawbacks to his one hour sports a day and waking up early regime. Wim sleeps very early – I mean like 9pm early. One of the things I have never done with Wim, despite knowing him for about 15 years now, is to go out drinking with him. With the exception of the glass of wine during conference receptions, I don’t think I have had the pleasure of going to a pub/bar with Wim after a conference dinner. What is more, he never stays late at conference dinners or workshop/project/board meeting dinners. Maybe this is known to others as well, but he does what is called a ‘French Exit’ – where you leave a party without anyone noticing. I’ve never been able to say goodbye to him during a dinner, since he leaves so quietly and early.

In addition to sports, I know Wim had taken up singing quite seriously and sang (and still does so I am told!) in a choir for a long time – with performances. Later on after turning 60, his love has moved on to sailing which he would talk about with great joy.
2.6 Importance of family

Another important thing to note about Wim is how much he treasures his family and the time he spends with them. I remember him very often talking about his sons and daughter, what they were doing with great pride. Guido made his webpage, his daughter Irene was doing a really important anthropological study about judges’ decision-making et cetera. I know he made sure to spend dedicated time with his kids and his wife, and made sure to be there for them. What is more, unlike many other academics – especially supervisors, who would not want to hear about family given that they may become a distraction\(^5\) – Wim always made a point about asking about my family, how my daughter was doing, and he really enjoyed getting updates on how she grew up. Even now, as a grandfather the first thing he will do when you meet him is to share the photos of his beloved grandson, with whom he spends a day a week caring for. As a gender scholar of work-life balance, I know how important the attitudes of senior managers are in shaping organisational culture (van Breeschoten, 2019), as well as the importance of embedding work-life balance issues in our work conversations (Kelly et al., 2014). In this sense, Wim has been a great role model for having family in the centre of our work conversations and showing how important it is to value the time with them.

2.7 Give time and hope to young scholars

On top of this, as is the case with those who do practice such academic life, Wim takes the development and encouragement of early career scholars very seriously. This means that he not only gives you the time of day, which unfortunately many ‘big name stars’ would not, but generally takes notice and makes a point of encouraging and giving feedback to early career researchers.
Furthermore, he gives you truly insightful comments/feedback. Most importantly, he gives you the encouragement to move forward in your career. He was the principal of the first ESPAnet doctoral summer school, in which he took the role of mentoring young scholars seriously. He never threw his weight around or misused his position of power or authority, treated us (young scholars) as equals worthy of a debate, and was open for discussion, a true discussion. Through this experience, many of those who had the opportunity to work with and learn from him have flourished into key scholars all over Europe.

For me personally, Wim not only offered me PhD funding circa 2006, which I unfortunately could not take, he gave me a post-doc position straight after my PhD. What is more, without Wim, I would have left academia for good soon after my PhD. In 2010, a year after my PhD, and having had so many rejections (papers, grants, and jobs) while my peers were doing great, I was about to give up on writing papers or looking for a job in academia. However, Wim was optimistic about my future. He told me not to take rejections seriously, it happens to everyone – even him! – and one should just move on. Furthermore, he told me that he sees great potential in me as an academic/researcher. I told him he probably is a better expert in these things than I am, and followed his advice. I think I can thankfully say that he was right, I was wrong. This is just one story, but I am sure there will be many more like this, where Wim gave someone the right amount of encouragement/feedback/joint collaborative project that shaped their future careers.

One final thing to note is about Wim’s encouragement of women into the field. Wim has promoted many young female scholars into the field of European social policy. As many of you may be aware, most of his PhDs were women, as were/are many of his post-docs. What is more, many of the things I’ve noted in this essay – shorter working hours, enabling better work-life balance, encouraging the discussion around family within work
conversations – are all key factors in ensuring more gender diversity into the workplace (Goldin, 2014; Cha and Weeden, 2014). I know he took notice of gender early on when this was not an issue many raised – again the number of high-flying female academics that trained under him in some function or another is a good example of this.

In sum, Wim has had a significant impact in academia not only as an internationally renowned scholar who has shaped the field that is comparative social policy, but also as a great scholar who has shown many (including myself) how to be a great academic. He has, during his whole academic life, encouraged the development of a good/constructive work environment which is inclusive and sustainable. I am sure he won’t disappear anytime soon from the field, and through many of us, his work and his way of life/work will live on for even longer. I for one have been greatly shaped by the way he has carried out his academic life and am trying to continue on his tradition of living a good academic life whilst encouraging others to follow. Thank you Wim, for showing us that you can both be a nice balanced person whilst achieving greatness in the field.

NOTES

2. I further hope that this may change the minds of those established scholars to reflect on what kind of culture we truly want to establish.
3. This is contrary to my experience with the other Wim (Van Lancker), who I don’t think I’ve ever NOT had a late nigh drink at a pub till mid night every conference/workshop we’ve attended together.
4. Unlike ’Brexit’ where you bang on about leaving forever and 4 years on you still haven't left.
5. One famous feminist scholar used to tell her female PhDs and post-docs that ‘you either write books or you make babies’. I won’t tell you who this is.

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Minna van Gerven

Those are my principles. If you don’t like them I have others (Croucho Marx, 1890–1977).

With this phenomenal quote Wim van Oorschot and Jochen Clasen (2002) started their article titled ‘Changing principles in European social security’ in the European Journal of Social Security. This article soon became the life-line and source of inspiration for my PhD project that aimed at extending their research to cover a longitudinal socio-legal analysis of the changing principles of the three European welfare regimes (van Gerven, 2008). This, and many other articles written by Wim, have extended the scholarly understanding of welfare state change and brought academic work further by encouraging to study change rather than inertia as the past generations of welfare state development had done. Wim has made several contributions to the field of social policy research. In this short essay, I will highlight three of these achievements.

First, Wim has made a major contribution to the development of social policy research as an academic discipline. There is abundant discussion whether social policy qualifies as an academic discipline or not. Although this discussion is likely not to be settled soon, the crux of the social policy scholarly work is that it provides highly relevant knowledge of how and to what extent societies respond to social needs and contribute to welfare and wellbeing. In this area, sociological theories have an undisputed value to social policy scholarship as they zoom in on the ‘social’ in the public institutions, systems, and outcomes. Wim is a
sociologist with a sheer fascination to study and understand social change. During his impressive career, he has studied in a wide range of publications how welfare states evolve and how social relations underpinning welfare states develop (Clasen, Kvist and van Oorschot, 2001; Dropping, Hvinden and van Oorschot, 2000; van der Waal, de Koster and van Oorschot, 2013; van Oorschot, 2000, 2002a, 2002b, 2009; van Oorschot and Abrahamson, 2003; van Oorschot and Boos, 1999; van Oorschot and Hvinden, 2000; just to name a few). This sociological imagination of Wim has been a great merit to social policy scholarship and particularly understanding the societal rooting of welfare state institutions. Wim’s numerous studies show how welfare states and social policies do not evolve due to their (neo)institutional properties, but also due to change of values, norms and attitudes of the society.

In the article that I started this essay with, Wim followed Deutch (1975) and distinguished three different principles underlying the European social security: need, equality and equity (Clasen and van Oorschot, 2002: 91). These inherent principles are directly forming the social policy arrangements of the state. Following the need principle, state intervention is seemed to be legitimate if other actors (individual/household, society or market) fail to satisfy the needs of citizens. Therefore societies, characterized by the need principle, make intensive use of needs- and means-tested systems in determining the eligibility of beneficiaries. The state-solidarity in such a model is limited to a selected group of citizens. The principle of equality follows a different logic than the need principle, as it strives to provide universal coverage and distributes according to an egalitarian criterion. The principle of equity is based on the reciprocal relation between state and receiver of social security. The schemes cover those with specified status (worker, contributor et cetera). This social contract is the essence of the post-war social insurance schemes, particularly in the Bismarckian insurance system.
On the Social Policy Research and the Principles of Wim van Oorschot

tradition. The students of social policy are sure to recognize some similarities of this holy trinity of redistributive justice principles to other popular typologies used to analyse the welfare regimes as Esping-Andersen did in 1990 or other typologies of welfare systems. Wim’s contribution to this debate, and what he developed further in several other publications later, is to convey the message that welfare state provision is organized around inherent normative principles, which define the input and outputs for social policy systems and the political landscape where these reforms are negotiated, legislated and implemented. It reminds us about the fact that social policies are highly normative and culturally constructed. From this perspective it may not be such a surprise that the development of welfare states does not always follow the classic economic or rational choice models, as economists often assume. Rather it encourages more sociological imagination to extend the social policy discipline to understand change and its direction.

Wim has conducted a remarkable amount of work, together with his many PhD students and junior scholars, to show how social policies are designed around such norms, values and strongly related to public attitudes. Wim’s work on deservingness perceptions (for example, Jeene, van Oorschot and Uunk, 2013; van Oorschot, 2000, 2006; van Oorschot, 2008; van Oorschot, Roosma, Meuleman and Reeskens, 2017), and how some groups enjoy a higher level of perceived deservingness than others, reminds us about the complexity of social policy institutions, and the various interests that are central in welfare state developments. Relatedly, together with Dorota Lepianka, Wim has done eminent work on understanding popular poverty attributions (Lepianka, Gelissen and van Oorschot, 2010; Lepianka, van Oorschot and Gelissen, 2009). This work illustrates clearly how social policy is tightly bound by popular beliefs and attitudes and the difference of poverty attributions among the European countries and between world regions. For me personally, Wim’s work on the
Leading Social Policy Analysis from the Front

shift from collective solidarity to selectivity and targeting (Clasen et al., 2001; van Oorschot, 2009; van Oorschot and Abrahamson, 2003) has been central for understanding the welfare state change in the Netherlands and has inspired me and many researchers to further analyze various phenomena of social security, such as activation and non-take-up. Wim’s work does not only allow a better understanding of social policy developments in the past, his academic sophistication gives important insights about what to expect about social policy reforms in the future, as the main themes of the ESPAnet 2021 conference organized by Wim in Leuven will demonstrate. Wim’s work on welfare deservingness and solidarity are invaluable in the studies that view modern developments of automatization and digitalization of welfare that will challenge the decision-making of deservingness and may lead to conflicts in solidarity, high non-take-up and blind spots in benefit receipt. This and all, makes Wim’s work pioneering and full of guiding principles for the discipline of social policy.

Second, Wim has made an enormous contribution as academic supervisor and promotor of junior scholars. I was among the first PhD students Wim supervised at Tilburg University. I think I am not wrong to claim that we both learned a lot during this long path to my PhD. The life of a PhD student is full of highs and lows, and good supervision is crucial to survive this period. I have learned from Wim a lot about the meticulous principles of supervision and he has had a great impact on me in what kind of PhD supervisor I am today. I will always be grateful for Wim for connecting me with the social policy researchers around the world. It is evident that Wim has been central to the careers of all his (PhD) students. Many of Wim’s former PhD students are now occupying important positions in social policy research and policymaking in the Netherlands and beyond. Moreover, he is ‘force majeure’ as teacher and lecturer for many cohorts of sociology students. I have heard many stories of students changing their majors to sociology after hearing Wim lecturing.
Wim’s contribution to social policy in the Netherlands is eminent and ever growing. It is a sign of a great academic, when he directly or indirectly has inspired practically all social policy students in this small country as Wim has done. And since a few years, this also applies to Belgium, but of course, to all Europe. It is the principles of a great supervisor that matter.

Third, through the establishment of ESPAnet, the Network of European Social Policy Analysis, Wim together with Jochen Clasen and others, has institutionalized social policy in the European research community and fueled it to the active flourishing society that it is today. ESPAnet was founded in 2002 to offer a platform and venue for social policy scholarship to exchange knowledge and discuss and develop the discipline of social policy. Before ESPAnet was born, social policy scholars were lacking events to come together and exchange their views on social policy research. It was the wisdom of the first ESPAnet chairs and Wim’s personal dedication to discipline that has led to an active research community of social policy scholars that now exists already two decades. Wim held the pre-ESPAnet conference in Tilburg in 2002, which is now known as the moment when this success story called ‘ESPAnet’ started. Working in the first secretariat of the network, I had an excellent view on the initiation of ESPAnet and how Wim and Jochen firmly steered the network towards a great future. Over the last decades, ESPAnet society has witnessed an enormous growth in members, events and outcomes the network is fostering. The intense collaboration with the Journal of European Social Policy is a good example of the achievements of ESPAnet, as are the active national ESPAnet societies in various European countries as well as European regions. The annual conferences of ESPAnet have become the yearly highlight of the social policy research community and they remain to highlight the initial principles of ESPAnet that echoes Wim’s words: to provide a platform and venue of high-quality
Leading Social Policy Analysis from the Front

social policy research and to support the junior researchers in their progress.

This dedication to the discipline and to new generations of researchers, are very much credited to Wim van Oorschot, a man with multiple principles in science, supervision and social policy society.

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4. Wim van Oorschot and the Early Years of ESPAnet

Jochen Clasen and Jon Kvist

4.1 Introduction

Wim van Oorschot is honorary president of ESPAnet, the European Network for Social Policy Analysis, and acted as its co-chair between 2003 and 2008. We assume that most social policy researchers (above a certain age) will be aware of this. What is perhaps less well known is Wim’s role in debates and initiatives that led to the eventual creation of ESPAnet. In this contribution we would like to rectify this. We briefly revisit social policy arenas as they existed before ESPAnet. We then reflect on the origin of the network, its aims and mission, as well as various activities which, from the start, went well beyond the annual conference. As will be demonstrated, Wim’s input into the early shaping of ESPAnet has been pivotal.1

4.2 The context of social policy debates in Europe of the 1990s

At the risk of overly generalising, social policy scholarship and debates in the 1990s were shaped by Gösta Esping-Andersen’s notion of welfare state regimes (1990), and Paul Pierson’s theories of welfare reform (1994). While there was no single organisational and multi-disciplinary context for regular scholarly exchange in Europe, several international social policy arenas existed. For example the research stream 19 (RC19) of the International
Sociological Association (ISA) on Poverty, Social Welfare and Social Policy had for more than two decades been the place where comparative welfare state researchers met independently of their background in sociology, economics or political science. At the occasion of its annual conferences, vivid exchanges took place and discussions were based on the assumption that all conference participants had read all conference papers in advance. This was one inspiration for the later adoption of the ESPAnet ‘golden rules’ (see below).

Two other arenas for social policy exchange in Europe deserve to be mentioned. Organised by Maurizio Ferrera and Martin Rhodes, the Welfare State Forum at the European University Institute in Florence brought numerous social policy scholars together for conferences, workshops and weekly meetings over a period of 12 months (1998/1999). Another, yet a very different context for exchange, was provided by the European Commission, which funded two thematically relevant social policy networks with participating researchers meeting once or twice annually to discuss ongoing work: the so-called Cost-Action 13 (Changing Labour Markets, 1999–2003) and the Cost-Action 15 (Reforming Social Protection Systems in Europe, 2000–2004). Wim van Oorschot was an active participant of both. Indeed, most scholars who later became members of the first ESPAnet board also played a role in one or both of these EU sponsored programmes.

Last but not least, and now superseded by the research network on the ‘Sociology of Social Policy and Social Welfare’, the ‘permanent’ research network on social policy was part of the annual conference of the European Sociological Association (ESA). Probably most important for the eventual creation of ESPAnet was the 5th ESA conference in Helsinki in August 2001. As part of the conference, members of the network engaged in a lively discussion which culminated in the suggestion of organising a regular conference entirely dedicated to social policy – and
attended not only by sociologists. There were several sceptical voices expressing doubt about the viability of this idea. This was mainly because there were already opportunities for social policy researchers to regularly meet at international level, for example those mentioned above, and also more specialised associations which had started in the 1990s (such as FISS, the Foundation for International Studies on Social Security). However, others believed that there would be strong demand for an annual conference at European level. Wim did not only belong to the latter group but offered to devote resources to and organise such an event at Tilburg University in the following year. Later entitled ‘Social Values, Social Policies’, it was in the wake of this conference that a group of invited researchers decided to set up a European social policy network which, given its multi-disciplinary nature, should be separate from ESA.

4.3 The ‘zero’ conference in Tilburg 2002 as launch pad for ESPAnet

In January 2002, Jon Kvist organised an international research seminar on flexicurity at the SFI in Copenhagen. This event was used by the two authors of this text as an opportunity to talk with Wim about the upcoming conference in Tilburg. It was hoped that the occasion would possibly serve as a platform for a yet-to-be-defined regular network of European social policy researchers. The three of us decided to invite a group of about twenty international researchers from across Europe to a meeting preceding the start of the Tilburg conference in August 2002. Our assumption was that those selected would not only be interested in setting up a regular forum of scholarly exchange on social policy, but also be prepared to actively contribute to this aim. In addition to Wim hosting the Tilburg conference, Jon volunteered
leading social policy analysis from the front

to organise what would become the network’s first conference, and Jochen a doctoral workshop.

The Tilburg conference in August 2002 subsequently became known as the ‘zero’ conference, as this was where the network was founded and its broad contours and early activities were decided upon. Rather than an association with fee-paying institutional or individual membership, there was broad agreement within the group of invited scholars to set up an international social policy network with open (non-fee paying) membership. The network was to be interdisciplinary in nature and revolve around an annual conference, but also organise other activities (see below). There was no immediate consensus on its name, until Wim’s proposal of ESPAnet (European Social Policy Analysis network) was adopted. Jon’s offer to organise the inaugural conference in Copenhagen in 2003 was gratefully accepted, and Wim and Jochen volunteered to act as the network’s co-chairs.

At the Tilburg meeting, the first ESPAnet board membership was decided upon. From the start, its composition was to be guided by core principles, such as aiming for gender balance, geographical representation and disciplinary diversity. Crucially, all board members committed themselves to finding the resources for and staging one ESPAnet activity during their (maximum) six years on the board (see below). The board discussed and decided on the ‘mission’ (or terms of reference) of the network, which were drafted by Mary Daly, Jane Lewis and Jochen Clasen in September 2002. Most generally, these included the aims of facilitating exchange and cooperation among social policy scholars in Europe and to provide a forum for and network of communication for the development of European social policy analysis. More specifically, ESPAnet was to adopt a broad multi-disciplinary orientation, a commitment to promoting young (early career) scholars and advancing comparative social policy research. Finally, although not set up as an association but as an open network, it was decided that ESPAnet needed a ‘home’, as it
should have an internet presence, its own email distribution list and a central location for relevant information and exchange. Once again, it was Wim who took the initiative in this respect, instituting an ESPAnet secretariat at the University of Tilburg, run by Minna van Gerven, who was one of his PhD researchers at the time.

4.4 2003: the first ESPAnet conference in Copenhagen

Jon Kvist organised and hosted the inaugural conference of ESPAnet in November 2003 (entitled ‘Changing European Societies – the role of Social Policy’) at the SFI in Copenhagen. There was overwhelming interest in the event, providing clear evidence that there was indeed a considerable appetite amongst social policy scholars for a regular forum for exchange and debate. In total, 230 paper proposals competed for 100 paper slots. Within 18 thematic streams, 32 sessions were organised, each with typically three presented papers and a varying number of contributed (or reserve) papers. A total of more than 230 scholars from European countries and beyond participated. These numbers suggested that ESPAnet had the potential to become a primary vehicle for international social policy exchange.

Learning from Copenhagen, the board decided that subsequent annual conferences should be guided by certain principles (or golden ESPAnet conference rules). First, in order to strengthen the quality of cross-national and supra-national research, each conference should offer at least one stream on comparative methodology and another on EU social policy. Initially, there was also the aim to run a regular stream addressing historical aspects of social policy. While the first two themes have remained prominent features in following annual conferences, the third seems to have been somewhat neglected.
The second principle was openness. Conference themes, stream convenors, and also papers should be found via open calls. This commitment to openness was also manifested in the rejection of streams run by, and largely for, members of existing research networks or research projects. Already in the beginning, the annual ESPAnet conferences aimed to be an accessible forum, allowing any individual scholars to offer and present papers in any stream, rather than a vehicle for research groups and their members presenting work in progress exclusively to each other.

Two more rules related to opportunities for early career researchers and a strict deadline for paper submission. The promotion of early career social policy researchers was one of the early aims adopted by the network. This was to be reflected in annual ESPAnet conferences, with stream organisers being encouraged to offer, if feasible, at least one paper slot to junior scholars. A key reason for prioritising young scholars was to reinvigorate the field of international social policy research and debate, a goal which the first ESPAnet board considered important in order to raise the status and also quality of existing and future European social policy research.

Finally, a conference rule which has been implemented to varying degree by conference organisers, is the rejection of papers which failed to be submitted by a certain deadline. Common nowadays, but less so at the time, the idea was that conference participants should be given the opportunity to read papers well in advance, as this would improve the chance of better informed and thus higher quality discussions. The corollary is that accepted papers which were not shared by a given date would be replaced in the programme with papers that had been accepted as contributed papers. In principle, this also meant that all sessions had a full set of papers to be discussed and that as many participants as possible adopted an active part in the conference. We believe that this rule, while perhaps not always implemented
as intended in the early 2000s, is one of the reasons why ESPAnet conferences remain popular today.

Finally, aiming for a good geographical spread, including hosting conferences in Central and Eastern European countries, has been another explicit network aim. Coming together regularly at the annual conference, the ESPAnet board members decided on the location of not only the subsequent but the next three or four annual conferences. Indeed, by 2019, ESPAnet conferences have been staged at 17 venues in 15 different countries, including three locations in CEECs (Budapest, 2010; Poznan, 2013 and Vilnius, 2018).

### 4.5 Other network activities

From the start, Wim emphasised that ESPAnet should not only organise annual conferences but also other scholarly activities such as young (later doctoral) workshops, summer schools, as well as thematic (or ‘expert’) workshops. As ESPAnet operates without institutional funding or membership fees, the assumption was that board members would be prepared to ‘organise’ at least one of those activities. In fact, one of the key principles was that board members would commit to host (and find funding for) at least one ESPAnet event during their time on the board.

All three activities were launched in ESPAnet’s first year of operation and, once again, Wim led from the front, hosting the first thematic seminar, on ‘welfare and the social bond’, at the University of Tilburg in March 2003. Bringing together PhD students with established scholars, Jochen organised the first doctoral workshop at the University of Stirling in May 2003 (Social Policy in a Changing Europe) and Yuri Kazepov hosted the first ESPAnet summer school (on the ‘local dimensions of social exclusion in Europe’) at the University of Urbino in July/August 2003.
Another activity was a competition for the doctoral researcher prize, awarded to the best paper presented by a PhD student in any of the above-mentioned events during a particular year. To this purpose, ESPAnet linked up with the *Journal of European Social Policy* (JESP). The first (2003) winner was Ingela Naumann for her paper on ‘Child care and feminism in West Germany and Sweden’ (published in JESP, 15 (1), 2005). Since then, ESPAnet and JESP board members have continued to join up as judges for the annual doctoral researcher prize competition. More generally, over the years, JESP has become all but ESPAnet’s ‘house journal’, manifested also in one dedicated ESPAnet board membership place on the JESP editorial board, and vice-versa.

The quick and early success of ESPAnet was evidenced also by the network’s role in promoting the exchange of social policy research and scholarship not only across but also within individual European countries. After the success of early annual conferences, individual scholars approached the ESPAnet board about helping with the setting up of domestic social policy networks. Anxious not to compete and potentially undermine already existing national associations (for example in the UK or Finland), the ESPAnet board eventually agreed to assist countries where there was a clear demand for the development of a national ESPAnet association. Especially Trudie Knijn (Wim’s successor as the network’s chair) was instrumental in supporting domestic groups and in clarifying the relationship between ESPAnet and national associations. Running their own conferences and workshops, there are now more than ten active national ESPAnet associations across Europe.

### 4.6 Conclusion

Not even twenty years old, ESPAnet has established itself very quickly as a much-valued forum of international social policy
debate in Europe. And although it would perhaps be too strong to claim that no network at all would have emerged without Wim, we are certain that without his invaluable input it is highly unlikely it would have developed as quickly and successfully as it did – and it would not have been called ESPAnet! Thus, for those of us who appreciate the network’s role in the promotion of European social policy scholarship and exchange, Wim’s key contribution to the emergence of ESPAnet and the path it pursued cannot be overstated.

NOTES

1. As a warning, this short essay is an attempt of remembering events which occurred about two decades ago and our recollection might not always stand up against rigorous empirical testing. As somebody who knows a thing or two about opinions and perceptions, we hope Wim may find it in himself to forgive us.

2. In addition to the two co-chairs, the first ESPAnet board included Giuliano Bonoli, Mary Daly, Ana Guillen, Valeria Fargion, Olli Kangas, Yuri Kazepov, Zinka Kolaric, Jon Kvist, Stephan Lessenich, Jane Lewis, Philip Manow, August Osterle, Bruno Palier, Joakim Palme, Axel West Pedersen and Alan Walker.

3. CEE countries (CEECs) are EU member states which were part of the former Eastern bloc. The following countries are included: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia

4. Information on early, subsequent and current ESPAnet activities can be found here: https://blogg.hioa.no/espanet/ (accessed 23 March 2020).

REFERENCES


Part III

Social policies,  
their causes and consequences
5 The Welfare Regime Debate
Revisited: Some Epistemological and Methodological Observations

Wil Arts

5.1 Introduction

In the late 1990’s Tilburg University’s Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences was in dire straits. The consequences were several rounds of reorganization and budget cuts. The department of social security studies was shut down and the sociological department was first decimated and then reconstructed. From the point of view of sociological research this development proved a blessing in disguise. From inside the faculty several high profile social security researchers, such as Ruud Muffels and Wim van Oorschot, were transferred to the sociology department just as specialists in the methodology of international comparative research, such as Loek Halman and Ruud Luijkx. From outside came Matthijs Kalmijn, a prolific researcher. The new constellation of the sociology department generated considerable benefits in terms of synergy in the field of comparative cross-national research. Several important books (for example, Ter Meulen, Arts and Muffels, 2001; Goul Andersen, Clasen, van Oorschot, Halvorsen, 2002; Arts, Hagenaars and Halman, 2003, Halman, Luijkx and van Zundert, 2005) and a great number of articles in international journals (for example, Kalmijn, 2002; Luijkx, Róbert and De Graaf, 2002; van Oorschot and Abrahamson, 2003; Muffels and Fouarge, 2004; van Oorschot, Arts and Halman, 2005; Halman and Draulans, 2006) were the
result. As chairman of the sociology department I counted my blessings.

One of the topics of the new comparative research programme pertained to the question of whether welfare state typologies and their underlying theories had explanatory and/or heuristic value for understanding people’s attitudes and actions. By asking this question several Tilburg sociologists (for example, Goodin, Heady, Muffels and Dirven, 1999; Arts and Gelissen, 2001, 2002; van Oorschot, 2003, 2007) got involved in the debate about welfare state regime types that has been going on since the publication of Esping-Andersen’s *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (1990). Twice John Gelissen and I tried to draw up the balance sheet of this debate (Arts and Gelissen, 2002, 2010). Already a year after our last instalment two new important critical surveys of Esping Andersen’s seminal work and the debate that it evoked, were published (Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser, 2011; Powel and Barrientos, 2011). Many new contributions followed in the years to come. It is perhaps a good time, now Wim van Oorschot is retiring, to take once again a glance at the welfare regime debate. After all even in his Leuven period, freed from the shackles of the Tilburg programme, he kept working with welfare state regime typologies (for example, Roosma, Gelissen, van Oorschot, 2013, 2016; van der Waal, de Koster, van Oorschot, 2013; Laenen, Rossetti, van Oorschot, 2019). I will focus my essay on only a few epistemological and methodological issues that popped up in the debate.

### 5.2 A modern classic

In *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* Esping-Andersen treated the welfare state as a societal type sui generis, that is, a novel phenomenon in the history of capitalist societies. He was of the opinion that the existing theoretical models of this phenomenon
were inadequate. Therefore sociological reconceptualization and re-theorization was needed. He also believed that only comparative empirical research would adequately disclose the fundamental properties that unite or divide welfare states. He argued that there is neither such a thing as ‘the’ welfare state nor are there only ‘unique’ welfare states. What he assumed and found was a clustering of welfare states into three highly diverse regime-types, each organized around its own discrete logic of organization, stratification, and societal integration. He labelled them respectively conservative, liberal, and social democratic. He also found that welfare states that more or less closely approximate the liberal ideal type can be found in Anglo-Saxon countries, the social-democratic ideal type in Scandinavian countries and the conservative type in continental Europe. Some countries, such as the Netherlands and Switzerland, proved to be hybrid cases.

In 2015 a special issue of the *Journal of European Social Policy* (JESP) was published with the title ‘25 years of The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism’. In their introductory article to this issue the editors (Emmenegger et al., 2015) remarked that Three Worlds in the meantime has become a classic. They argue that this is evidenced by a large and increasing number of references to the book. Looking at citations (by way of Google Scholar) they found a remarkable pattern of growing interest reaching a breath-taking 1600 citations in 2013 alone. While writing this essay I repeated their search and looked at the cumulative number of citations at that moment in time (Google Scholar, accessed 4 July 2019). The result was a stunning 34436 citations since 1990. If we compare this score with modern classics in sociology this is higher than for example, Talcott Parsons got with *The Social System* (26645), Robert King Merton with *Social Theory and Social Structure* (31285) or George Casper Homans with *Social Behavior* (14066). In political science Paul Kennedy with *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers* got 8788 references and Robert Putnam with *Bowling Alone* 20368.
Only John Rawls got more citations with *A Theory of Justice* (81486).

Emmenegger et al. (2015) found that the JESP was the academic journal with the most references to the Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism between 1991 and 2013, one-third of all JESP articles over this period of time and even 50 per cent in 2013. A content analysis of these articles indicated that this book has obtained a paradigmatic status and that its claims are often taken for granted rather than challenged.

5.3 Paradigm or research programme?

This conclusion was elaborated in the same issue by van Kersbergen and Vis (2015). They avowed that it is difficult to overstate the importance of The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism and its many innovations. They also argued, however, that the recent welfare regime literature that takes Esping-Andersen’s paradigmatic study as starting point or key reference has started to show signs of doing normal science in the sense of Thomas Kuhn’s *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962). Many welfare state researchers problematize, theorize and do research within Esping-Andersen’s explanatory framework. They slowly accumulate details in accord with the paradigm without questioning or challenging the underlying assumptions. This is, according to van Kersbergen and Vis, not helpful for asking interesting new explanatory questions about the worlds of welfare capitalism. Esping-Andersen’s three worlds’ typology and its underlying theory is therefore at risk of becoming an unproductive intellectual straightjacket.

There are, however, several problems with using Kuhn’s perspective as van Kersbergen and Vis do. First, Kuhn has been called an epistemological subjectivist, irrationalist and relativist by several philosophers of science (Stegmüller, 1979: 132) and even
an epistemological nihilist (Quine, 1969: 87–88). Kuhn asserts that the question of which paradigm is accepted by a particular scientific community is a question of politics and propaganda and not of surplus value in terms of epistemological criteria. Secondly, Kuhn is much more positive about knowledge accumulation by way of practicing normal science than van Kersbergen and Vis are. Their position sooner resembles the views of critical rationalists as Popper (1970) and Watkins (1970) who criticize Kuhn for his irrationality. Lastly, Kuhn used his theory for explaining events in the history of the natural sciences. He has always been very reluctant to apply his theory to the social sciences that are in his view preparadigmatic.

Van Kersbergen and Vis refer in another part of their article approvingly to the work of the methodologist Gerring (2001). In my opinion they would be well advised to take his judgement seriously also with regard to Kuhn’s work. Especially where Gerring (2001: 15) refers to Kuhn’s belief that in underdeveloped, preparadigmatic sciences there is no such thing as normal science. Work in these sciences stems according to Kuhn from the diverse impulses of myriad methods, frameworks, and subfields, each with its own more or less specialized vocabulary and parochial sensibility. It is explicitly constructed to be not only applicable to the natural sciences, but also to the underdeveloped social sciences. Gerring advises to use Lakatos’ (1970, 1971) methodology of scientific research programmes instead. Lakatos is in agreement with Kuhn that philosophy of science without history of science is empty, but makes an additional point aimed against Kuhn by declaring that history of science without philosophy of science is blind. According to his methodology a scientific research programme consists of methodological rules: some tell us what paths of research to avoid (negative heuristic), and others what paths to pursue (positive heuristic). All scientific research programmes may be characterized by their hard core. The negative heuristic of the programme forbids us to try to refute this
hard core. Instead we must articulate auxiliary hypotheses that form a protective belt around this hard core and we must direct severe tests to these hypotheses. The positive heuristic gives indications about the best form and content of the auxiliary hypotheses. Anomalies lead to changes in the protective belt and not in the hard core. A research programme is successful if this process leads to progressive problem shifts and not successful if it leads to degenerative shifts. It is however difficult to answer the question of whether a particular research programme is in a progressive or a degenerative phase. Criticism of a programme is a long and often frustrating process and one must treat budding programmes leniently. Van Kersbergen and Vis have done some preliminary work that leads to the impression that the three-worlds paradigm is in a degenerative phase, but they have to do much more work to actually prove this.

5.4 Ideal types, real types and cases

In their article van Kersbergen and Vis (2015) critically address still another issue: the confusion in the welfare regime literature between ideal types, real types and cases. Van Kersbergen made this point earlier in his contribution to the Routledge Handbook of the Welfare State (2013). He argued that Esping-Andersen himself in his landmark study was already confusing his typological method with the ideal type approach and cases with types. These are in his opinion different breeds of study designed for different purposes, each using a different methodological approach. Van Kersbergen and Vis elaborate on this idea as follows. Ideal types are, according to them, theoretical constructs whereas typologies are empirical classificatory devices that reduce observed complexity by cataloguing empirical cases as meaningful representatives of some relevant dimensions. In an ideal-typical analysis the question of ‘goodness of fit’ is the crucial one. Do specific empirical cases
correspondent more or less or not at all with certain ideal types? In a typological analysis, however, ‘goodness of fit’ plays no part. Empirical cases always find a place in the classificatory device. Cases with similar or identical scores on theoretically relevant empirical dimensions (variables) are classified as belonging to the same type. A little bit earlier Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser (2011) and Rice (2013) made more or less the same point. All these critics agree on the usefulness of the ideal-typical method but disagree and have their doubts about how the participants in the welfare regimes debate use the typological method.

To understand this discord one has to realize that the welfare regime debate is part of a long sociological tradition rooted in deductive reasoning and the use of ideal types. Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser (2011) refer to Max Weber for the locus classicus of this tradition and cite his programmatic statement that for an adolescent science as sociology, combining the construction of ideal types with building formal theory is the proper way of analysing and mastering the complexity of social life. What did Weber actually say about this combination? He especially elaborated on it in *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (1921 [1972]) and more in detail in *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenscha

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47
orienting statements that offer guidance to the construction of hypotheses. Weber writes that there are parallels between ideal types in the social sciences and certain idealizations in physics and economics (confer Lind, 1993). Just as in these sciences empirical evidence can be used to calibrate the degree of approximation of a case type with the ideal type.

In his analysis of typological methods in the natural and the social sciences Hempel (1965: 171) came long ago to the following still valid conclusion about the usefulness of ideal types:

‘(...) ideal types can serve their purpose only if they are interpreted as theoretical systems, i.e., by (a) specifying a list of characteristics with which the theory is to deal, (b) formulating a set of hypotheses in terms of those characteristics, (c) giving those characteristics an empirical interpretation, which assigns to the theory a specific domain of application, and (d), as a long-range objective, incorporating the theoretical system, as a special case, into a more comprehensive theory’.

If you take this conclusion as a sound advice it is especially in the theoretical sphere that still a lot of work has to be done in the welfare regime modelling business.

It is a little ironic, conclude Powell and Barrientos (2011) in their audit of the modelling business, that Esping-Andersen’s work aiming to lay bare the theoretical substance of welfare states has led to a largely a-theoretical debate. In their opinion much investment has gone into the wrong place by producing different (theoretically informed) typologies and (purely empirical) taxonomies instead of driving the debate in the direction intended by Esping-Andersen, that is, identifying ‘ideal types’ as a necessary prelude to further theorization. Aspalter (2011, 2019a, b) has arrived at the same kind of conclusion by stating that despite the numerous discussions and reviews of Esping-Andersen’s welfare regime typology, the most vital element of his theory, its ideal-typical approach has received the least attention. What did get
attention was the categorization of his cases, (that is, 18 OECD countries) in real-typical terms ranging from prototypes to hybrids. Others followed in his footsteps by constructing comparative typologies that commonly seek to classify empirical cases, sometimes rather inductively. Comparing these real types delivered a very detailed picture that proved to be, however, much more sensitive to short-term, local and programme-level changes than the theoretically grounded ideal types. In a rejoinder to his critics Esping-Andersen (1999) admitted that one of the problematic characteristics of his typology is that it is inherently static. It provides only a snapshot of welfare capitalism at one point in time (that is, 1980) and handles the three worlds of welfare capitalism as if they are frozen landscapes. Therefore, his typology does not easily capture mutations or the birth of new species. It is only valid as long as history stands still, which it has not. Since 1980 a proliferation of ideal types, real types and cases has taken place (Aspalter, 2019b), but the original regimes and cases have been quite resilient (Arts, 2013: 14).

In the welfare regime debate at least two radical solutions to the aforementioned problems are proposed. One is suggested by Rice (2013) who contends that the welfare regime concept should be stripped of its historical-geographical connotations and should be transformed from an empirical typology into an ideal-typical framework. Such a framework should take the emergence of different welfare cultures and welfare institutions in Europe as a starting point, but distilling from these religiously and geographically rooted traditions three ideal-typical dimensions: 1) welfare culture, referring to fundamental ideas about the individual and the state, 2) welfare institutions, referring to laws, regulations and actor networks occupied with the provision of welfare, and 3) social-structural effects of welfare policies. The resulting framework is a cube, or in methodological terms, a three-dimensional property space. Such an ideal-typical three-dimensional welfare regime framework has according to her
Leading Social Policy Analysis from the Front

several advantages: 1) It is not limited to Western welfare states but can also be used to analyse social policy developments in other parts of the world; 2) it can be applied not only to welfare states as seemingly monolithic entities, but also to welfare regions/localities and welfare programmes; 3) welfare states, sub-states and programmes need not be regarded as congruent across all three ideal-typical dimensions; 4) each of the ideal-typical dimensions can be organized into two juxtaposed axes: conservatism versus liberalism or socially conservative versus socially transformative effects on the one hand, and solidarism versus residualism or economically conservative versus economically transformative effects on the other hand. Because the conservatism-liberalism and solidarism-residualism axes are explicitly understood as spectra or continua rather than boxes it offers an elegant solution to the problem that in empirical reality, welfare states or systems often appear as hybrid cases of Esping-Andersen’s fixated welfare regime categories.

Whereas Rice (2013) maintains that categories of a typology need not necessarily be mutually exclusive, van Kersbergen and Vis (2015) insist that they should. A typology that intends to catalogue existing cases or real types as meaningful representatives of some theoretically relevant dimensions, should not only be exhaustive but also mutually exclusive, that is, an empirical case must be assigned to one type only. In order to be an analytically useful empirical classificatory device it should be meaningful, reliable and efficient in reducing complexity. Van Kersbergen and Vis proclaim that turning to developing theoretically informed ideal types and starting to examine to what degree welfare states correspond to these ideal types, as for example Rice does, would clearly be a step forward, because it clarifies the typology/ideal type confusion and it introduces a more explicit theoretical starting point. However, this would not move us beyond the normal science of the welfare modelling business. Really innovative and revolutionary would be to develop explanatory
typologies that move beyond purely classificatory exercises. For such explanatory typologies to work, the existence of pre-existing theory is crucial. Therefore, van Kersbergen en Vis suggest that the field should rethink the theoretically interesting question about what the current and most relevant theoretical substance of the welfare state is. What is it that, ultimately, we are – or should be – interested in? They are of the opinion that we focus on the socially relevant outcomes that welfare regimes produce, because these fundamentally affect people’s interests, capabilities, life chances, and life cycles. We should study the welfare state’s role in producing or moderating inequality, poverty, stratification, mobility, education, employment et cetera, and not the goodness of fit of all kinds of typologies.

5.5 Conclusion and discussion

The welfare regime debate has been going on for 30 years, but it is still not clear what the balance is. On the credit side entries can be recorded such as Esping-Andersen’s success in incorporating in his theory feminists’ critique about his neglect of the family and the different positions of men and women in formal and informal work. Another positive entry is that an at first sight competing theory-cum-typology regarding production regimes, that asserts that the welfare state is shaped by how the production in societies is organized, at closer inspection appeared to be compatible. Still another positive point is the great number of research projects that have been initiated to elaborate on and test Esping-Andersen’s ideas and the affluence of publications that are offshoots of these projects. On the debit side, however, are items as the lack of investment in theory construction and the confusion of the methodology of ideal types, real types and the categorization of cases. One can differ in opinion about the virtues and vices of normal science (that is, the slow accumulation
of knowledge), but what is definitely missing is one or more competing research programmes.

Van Kersbergen and Vis (2015) ended their article by citing a, not so often quoted, passage in Esping-Andersen’s Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990: 141) that says:

‘(...) be it contemporary Scandinavia, Western Europe, or even North America, the welfare state is becoming deeply embedded in the everyday experience of virtually every citizen. Our personal life is structured by the welfare state, and so is the entire economy. Given the magnitude and the centrality of the welfare state, it is unlikely that we shall understand much of contemporary society unless it becomes part of our model’.

They express the wish that this key observation of Esping-Andersen will inspire welfare state research for the next 25 years. One could with good reason argue that this is exactly what Wim van Oorschot has done in the past decades. In an impressive number of articles in refereed international journals he has written about how welfare state institutions have influenced people’s everyday life and how people’s actions and moral sentiments have had an impact on these institutions in turn. These articles are most of the time written with colleagues and/or PhD students. Now he is retiring it is up to his former PhD students to hold high the torch of welfare state research by following in his footsteps.

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The Welfare Regime Debate Revisited

Leading Social Policy Analysis from the Front


6. Revisiting the ‘Dependent Variable Problem’: Wim’s Contribution to a Long-Lasting Debate

Kenneth Nelson

6.1 Introduction

Quantitative comparative analyses require data, and working with data involves conceptualisation and measurement. The pros and cons of different types of data for analysing the development of welfare states and social policy are extensively discussed in research. Two important shifts in this debate can be identified. The first was the move from analyses based on social expenditures to social rights in the late 1980s. The second is more recent (and ongoing), and marks a transition from social rights to benefit recipiency. Whereas prominent scholars such as Korpi (1989) and Esping-Andersen (1990) were important promotors of the social rights perspective in comparative welfare state research, Wim is pioneering the analysis of benefit recipiency. I write this in present tense as I believe (and hope) Wim will continue this line of research.

I first met Wim when I was a Phd student at Stockholm University in the late 1990s. Wim was already an established scholar. I remember that he always treated us students with great respect, expressing a genuine interest for the work that we did (or planned to do). For me, this was important. I was very impressed with Wim’s work on deservingness, conditionality, and non-take-up of social benefits, which he carried out around this time. Later on, it inspired me to study how countries had organised their
means-tested social assistance programmes. Today, almost two decades later, Wim’s research is once again attracting my unreserved attention. With great interest, I have followed his recent work on using socio-economic surveys (such as EU-SILC) to analyse the number of benefit recipients and the amount of income that they receive. By utilising this new source of social policy data, it is not an understatement to say that Wim has revitalised the debate about the ‘dependent variable problem’ in comparative welfare state research.

What can we learn from Wim’s analyses of benefit recipiency? I would like to bring out three key advancements of research: the theoretical positioning of benefit recipiency as a mediating variable at the micro-level linking social rights and social expenditures at the macro level, the discovery of new trade-offs in social policymaking, and the emphasis on the complementariness between different types of social policy data.

Below, I will briefly present Wim’s work on each of these topics, and discuss how it contributes to existing research. Three studies by Wim and his collaborators have been essential for this chapter. The first study is published in the *European Journal of Social Security* as a single authored article (van Oorschot, 2013). The second study is a CEPS working paper written together with Anne Reinstadler (van Oorschot and Reinstadler, 2013). The third study is co-authored with Adeline Otto, and published in the *Journal of European Social Policy* (Otto and van Oorschot, 2019).

### 6.2 Linking social rights and expenditure data

Before Wim started to work with survey-based benefit recipiency data, state-of-the-art in quantitative welfare state research was to use social expenditures, or to follow a rights-based approach in the conceptualisation and measurement of welfare states and social policy. The advantages and disadvantages of social
Revisiting the ‘Dependent Variable Problem’

expenditure and social rights data have been extensively discussed in the literature. As this is not the place to delve deeply into this debate, I refer those who are interested to Wim’s main arguments and his critical perspective in the studies mentioned above. In this section, I will merely raise a few issues that motivate us to devote more time analysing benefit recipiency data. Much of this discussion is centred on Wim’s approach of positioning benefit recipiency data as the missing individual-level link that binds together social rights and social expenditures at the country level.

Social expenditure is still the most commonly used data source in comparative welfare state research, probably because data from the national accounts are easy to access and regularly updated by several international organisations for a large number of countries. However, it is only a crude approximation of welfare effort. Besides being heavily influenced by changes in business cycles and demographic trends, problems appear in the classification of social protection into different programme types. Social spending is also affected by the tax claw-back of transfer income (Ferrarini and Nelson, 2003; Adema and Ladaïque, 2005) and whether administration costs are included or not (De Deken and Kittel, 2007).

Social rights data focus on legislative structures, with indicators being based on eligibility criteria, entitlement levels, and rules of financing. The social rights perspective was introduced to research as a means to analyse the role of distributional conflict for the development of social citizenship (Korpi, 2010).1 Inspiration came from Marshall’s (1950) ideas about the rights and duties associated with the expansion of welfare states in the post-World War II period. Nowadays, social rights data are not only used to analyse driving forces, like the role of workers mobilisation or globalisation for welfare state development. They are also extensively used in analyses of outcomes, such as poverty (Nelson, 2003; Bäckman, 2009; Bäckman and Ferrarini; 2010; Alm et al., 2020) and mortality (Ferrarini and Norström, 2010; Palme and
Norström, 2010; Nelson and Fritzell, 2014). The social rights perspective gets us closer to the policymaking process, but it does not consider how benefits are actually used. It is precisely here where benefit recipiency data come into play.

Most discussions on the conceptualisation and measurement of welfare states and social policy centre on content validity (that is, the extent to which data provide a complete description of the true nature of the welfare state). Wim approaches the validity question from another (and to my mind more fruitful) angle, asking how different types of data on the welfare state and social policies are theoretically related. I have borrowed Figure 6.1 from one of Wim’s studies above.

![Figure 6.1 The relationship between social rights, benefit recipiency and social spending](source)

The figure shows how Wim portrays the relationships between data on social rights, benefit recipients, and social expenditures.
Revisiting the ‘Dependent Variable Problem’

According to this theoretical (or conceptual) framework, the number of benefit recipients, and the amount of money they receive from the welfare state, is the result of eligibility criteria and entitlement levels (as codified in social rights data) being applied to a population in need. Social expenditure in the national accounts simply reflects the number of people in receipt of a benefit, multiplied by the amount of money that is distributed through the system.

Wim’s positioning of benefit recipiency between social rights and social expenditures may seem trivial. However, in its simplicity, the implications of these macro-micro and micro-macro level links are far-reaching, not only for theory-building but also for the possibilities of research to provide meaningful policy recommendations. What matters for people is probably not spending per se, but the extent to which economic risks during the life course are protected by the state, especially those associated with old age, sickness, disability, work accidents, and employment.

Data on benefit recipients provide a direct estimate of how those rights of economic compensation are exercised in real life, which may differ from the ways in which social policies are codified in legislative frameworks. The extent to which the separation of social spending into rights and benefit recipients changes our understanding of the fundamental factors driving welfare state development is an important topic for future research that has attracted scholarly attention only in the last year or so. According to some new preliminary results, dominant economic (de-industrialisation), sociological (left partisan politics), and political science (constitutional veto points) explanations for the development of welfare states seem to have limited applicability as the analysis shifts from social rights (or expenditures) to benefit receipts, at least in the area of unemployment (Otto, 2020).
6.3 Trade-offs in social policymaking

Trade-offs are unavoidable in social policymaking, and as researchers, it is important to identify and specify them correctly, as well as to analyse the multifaceted consequences of different policy choices. Several of these trade-offs are described in the literature, such as the inverse relationship between target efficiency and the effectiveness of social transfers to reduce poverty (Nelson, 2004), or the disincentive effects of generous social benefits on labour supply (Katz and Meier, 1990). Other important trade-offs are left to discover. The one between access rates and benefit amounts raised by Wim is a recent example.

Data on the receipt of social benefits based on socio-economic surveys can be analysed in different ways. Compared to administrative data, socio-economic surveys do not only contain information about the receipt of a social benefit, but also how much income each individual (or household) actually have from the welfare state. Based on this information, we can construct two variables: the access rate and the transfer share. The access rate shows the portion of the target population that receives a social benefit. The transfer share shows the size of benefits as a fraction of the total income in the target population. The calculation of access rates and transfer shares differ somewhat depending on whether the receipt of benefits and transfer incomes are analysed at individual, household, or country level (Otto, 2018).

I have borrowed also Figure 6.2 from one of Wim’s studies above. It is a scatterplot of access rates and transfer shares (originally denoted ‘amount of benefits’ by Wim) in the working age population of European countries. The access rate is the share of people in active ages that are in receipt of a social benefit. The transfer share is the ratio between transfer income and total income in the working age population (measured at the individual level but aggregated to country averages in Figure 6.2).
Revisiting the ‘Dependent Variable Problem’

The number of benefit recipients are adjusted to the size of the non-employed population in active ages. Thus, the country differences revealed by the data are not due to the size of the needy population (that is, those not in employment). The analysis included the following programmes: social assistance, unemployment benefits, sickness and disability benefits, old age benefits, and survivors’ benefits. Data for 2003–2008 were pooled. The solid horizontal and vertical lines show the axis means, whereas the dotted vertical line indicates the tipping point, above which the proportion of people in the working age population that receives a benefit is larger than the proportion of people who are non-employed.

Source: van Oorschot (2013).

Figure 6.2 Access rates and transfer shares in 27 European countries, 2003–2008
The trade-off between access rates and transfer shares is clearly visible in the data. In countries where many people receive benefits, the size of transfer income tends to be low. Conversely, countries with a low number of recipients are more likely to have higher benefits. As pointed out by Wim, this trade-off between access and levels of transfer income is not only empirically intriguing but also theoretically interesting. The scattering of countries along the two dimensions does not mirror the old distinction between universalism and selectivity in social policymaking (Titmuss, 1968). Nor does it fully support previous categorisations of countries into different model system types (Esping-Andersen, 1990).

The Nordic welfare states, with universalism as one of their essential trademarks, are scattered in the lower right corner with high access rates, but relatively meagre benefits. It should be noted that income replacement in some of the Nordic countries has eroded extensively in recent decades, in part because of an insufficient indexing of earnings-ceilings for benefit purposes in major social insurance schemes (Bäckman and Nelson, 2017).

At the opposite corner of the diagonal, we would expect to find welfare states with strong traits of selectivity (that is, means-tested benefits targeting the poor), such as Ireland and the United Kingdom. Instead, we find in this corner the Southern European countries, with their dualistic approach to social policy. Comparatively generous benefits are here provided to a small group of labour market insiders, leaving those outside the labour market less protected (Ferrera, 1996). The Eastern European countries do not form a separate cluster, as suggested elsewhere (Cerami, 2006; Fenger, 2007). Instead, the Eastern European countries (except for Poland) resemble the countries of continental Europe, with average levels on both dimensions of access and transfer shares.

Despite providing new input to the ongoing (and never-ending) discussion about welfare state regimes, Wim’s approach to analyse
Revisiting the ‘Dependent Variable Problem’

access rates and transfer shares from socio-economic surveys is useful in assessments of policy change and crisis packages. For example, in a follow-up study, Wim and his colleague Adeline show that several European governments tried to keep budgetary control during the global financial crisis (beginning in 2007/2008), either by combining broader benefit access with lower benefits, or the other way around (Otto and van Oorschot (2019).

6.4 Complementarities in data

For many years, scholars competed to have the best data for the comparative analysis of welfare states and social policy, particularly in the area of cash benefits. Luckily, this trench warfare is now changing in favour of a more fertile debate focusing on the complementarities between different types of social policy data. Wim was not the first scholar to advocate such a shift in perspective (see Green-Pedersen, 2007; Kühner, 2007; De Deeken and Clasen, 2011), but his contribution is nonetheless noteworthy.

To illustrate the complementary character of social rights and benefit recipient data, Wim posed three essential questions (slightly revised below) for any analysis of the quality of social protection:

- Which needs are covered?
- Do people in need have access to the support that is offered?
- Does the available support match established needs among those with access?

Wim concluded that social rights data are indispensable in addressing the first question, while benefit recipient data is crucial for addressing the latter two questions. I agree with Wim that a more complete analysis of social protection needs to answer
multiple questions utilising different types of data. An example based on my own experience of working with social rights data may help to clarify this point.

In the fall of 2009, we submitted a report to the Swedish Government in association with its second presidency of the European Union (Palme, et al., 2009). The purpose of this report was to map systematically the social protection systems in the European Union. Based on social rights data, we discovered that social insurance net replacement rates in several Eastern European countries were on par with or even higher than those of the old EU member states. Had the Eastern European countries already caught up on social policy developments in Western Europe?

To investigate this further, we turned to social expenditure data. Much to our surprise, despite comparatively generous benefit levels, the Eastern European countries spent considerably less money on social insurance (even when adjusted for differences in the size of the needy population). Our tentative conclusion was that eligibility criteria and labour market structures in Eastern European countries seriously restricted the extent to which people had access to social insurance. Wim’s approach to analyse benefit recipiency data based on survey data (such as EU-SILC), would undoubtedly helped us substantiate this claim empirically, as well as provided better guidance for effective policy reform (Nelson and Nieuwenhuis, 2019).

6.5 Discussion

The conceptualisation and measurement of welfare states and social policy will continue to be a prominent issue in comparative welfare state research. Not only because it is such a fun topic to work with, but also because it affects the research questions that we are able to address, and the findings that we discover.
Revisiting the ‘Dependent Variable Problem’

Academic research evolves slowly, but sometimes significant shifts appear that redefine how we approach our topics. Quite late in his successful career, Wim started to address the ‘dependent variable problem’ in welfare state research, drawing upon what we had learned so far and contributing new insights.

Will Wim’s contribution to the ‘dependent variable debate’ change how we pursue quantitative welfare state analyses? It is far too early to start counting citations. Nevertheless, there are other means to establish impact in the social sciences. One alternative is to think more carefully about how you will approach your own research, when you have gained knowledge by Wim’s work on survey-based recipiency data. Personally, I believe that it will be difficult in the future to base my empirical analyses solely on social rights data (yes, I am a former student of Walter Korpi and trained in the Stockholm school of comparative social policy), without at least considering how the results will turn out using micro-level data on the benefit recipients themselves. I see no apparent reason why other scholars should think differently.

NOTES

1. The dominating theoretical paradigm on welfare state development up to the 1990s used structural functionalist explanations describing social policies mainly as products of industrialisation and economic development (Wilensky, 1975).

2. Other examples of outcomes for which social rights data have been used is material deprivation (Nelson, 2012), subjective health (Ferrarini et al., 2014), unemployment (Sjöberg, 2000), job insecurity and subjective well-being (Sjöberg, 2010), employment commitment (Esser, 2005), gender equality (Korpi, 2000; Korpi et al., 2013), fertility (Ferrarini, 2006; Billingsley and Ferrarini, 2014), and trust (Birnbaum et al., 2017).

3. A google scholar search of ‘welfare state regimes’ yields around 1600000 hits, and roughly 20000 hits for 2018 alone.

4. Net replacement rates show the extent to which benefits replace earned income in periods of work incapacity. These indicators are usually based on model family analyses techniques (Bradshaw et al., 1993), in which
entitlements are calculated for stylized households based on national legislation.

REFERENCES


Revisiting the ‘Dependent Variable Problem’


7. The Declining Poverty Reducing Capacity of Social Security: Base or Superstructure?

Bea Cantillon

‘It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness’ (Karl Marx, 1859 [1993]).

7.1 Introduction

The study of deservingness perceptions, to which Wim van Oorschot made an important contribution (van Oorschot, 2000, 2006), leads to the notion that the generosity of social protection is related to public opinions, legitimacy, and ideas about deservingness. In particular, it suggests that a narrowing of the legitimacy base of social redistribution is the cause of the declining poverty reducing capacity of social security schemes in many contemporary welfare states. Van Oorschot writes:

‘That is, in neo-liberal and communitarian thinking about welfare, which is popular among policy elites at European and national levels, individual responsibility of citizens is strongly stressed. Citizens are nowadays even more expected to be active and to provide for themselves. This is a message which in our view may quite easily form a basis for the general idea that apparently those who are in need do not take up their responsibility well, and can therefore be blamed for their neediness. If people are blamed, they do not deserve support, and there is no need for a comprehensive welfare state’ (van Oorschot et al., 2008: 284).
But is it true that the change in general ideas about deservingness is transforming the welfare state? Or is it rather the change in the structure of needs and the systemic impact of changes on the modus operandi of the welfare state that affects public opinions? Does the base of economic and social production determine the superstructure of ideas and power, or vice versa?

In this homage to van Oorschot’s seminal work, I posit that the reduction of the poverty alleviating capacity of welfare states is linked to structural changes in economic and social production. This makes it structurally more difficult for social welfare states to function. Changing views on deservingness may have reinforced these trends. The engine of welfare state reform lies, however, in social and economic transformations.

### 7.2 The transformation of social and economic production

Since the second half of the 1970s, developed welfare states have sailed into choppy waters. At least in three areas that are important for their functioning, there have been trends that contrast with those observed in the post-war period of the flourishing welfare state. As a consequence of changing employment and family structures and the decoupling of productivity and (low) wage growth, the distribution of jobs among individuals and households has become more unequal while pressure on minimum incomes has increased.

Everywhere, to a greater or lesser extent, the significant rise of employment benefited the low-skilled only marginally. As a consequence, in the new era of the welfare state, full (or nearly full) employment for more highly educated individuals has been accompanied by structural under-employment among people with low levels of education. There is, moreover, ample evidence for the deterioration of the working conditions among low skilled workers, especially in countries where employment levels are high.
Precarious, uncertain and unpredictable work increased in a large majority of OECD countries. Clearly, the skewed distribution of jobs among individuals and the flexibilisation of employment contrast with full employment (among men) and the relative job security that characterised the three decades following World War II.

In many countries, the unequal growth in employment resulted in an increasingly skewed distribution of jobs across households, driven by forces of modernisation and complex changes in family structure, such as the increase in the number of small households as a consequence of individualisation and the emergence of two-earner households combined with assortative mating (Corluy and Vandenbroucke, 2014). Since the 1990s, in some countries, a significant increase in the share of work-rich households was accompanied by an increase in the number of work-poor households, while in others the increase of work-rich households was much stronger than the decrease of work-poor households. This polarisation contrasts with the widespread availability of jobs among households in the post-war era when the single breadwinner model largely prevailed.

Over the past decades, productivity growth has decoupled from real wage growth. Although there are important cross-national differences, this trend seems to be universal. It is likely driven by technological innovation (the replacement of labour by machines, computers and robots) and globalisation (the relocation of labour). Further, this trend was reinforced by work-centred welfare state reform, in particular policies of wage moderation and labour cost reductions, which have been considered necessary to cope with growing global competition. Importantly, we also observe a decoupling in the pace of growth of minimum wages on the one hand and average wages on the other hand. This is a third important contrast with the three decades following World War II, which were characterised by constant increases in the wage share.
As a result, the structure of needs has changed dramatically, the distribution of jobs among individuals and households has become more unequal while downward pressure on low wages and social benefits have decreased the capacity of the welfare state to protect the workers at the bottom end of the labour market and the jobless households (Cantillon et al., 2019).

7.3 A systemic stress on the welfare state

From my perspective, social security balances van Oorschot's deservingness criteria: 1) as an insurance system, social security entails reciprocity: contributions must be paid (through work) in order to be entitled to protection in the event of a social risk; 2) social risks refer in principle to situations of need which are linked to events beneficiaries could not control; and 3) social security systems are deployed as a means not just of damage compensation but also damage prevention and repair. In doing so, they have an impact on attitudes.

Social security is fuelled by self-interest, solidarity and the human ability to empathise. It reduces poverty through mechanisms of horizontal and vertical solidarity on the one hand and by prevention and repair of social risks on the other. The principal toolset of social insurance is modelled after the 'piggy bank' principle of private insurance (Barr, 2001). However, the actuarial logic is complemented (to varying degrees) with the principles of horizontal and vertical solidarity. Higher incomes and lower-risk groups pay more than is strictly necessary from an insurance point of view. This is done in order to enable decent protection for low incomes and for people with 'bad risks', for which insurance coverage would be too expensive.

Coming back to my central argument, I posit that fundamental changes in the employment and family structure and the decoupling of productivity and (low) wage growth have affected
The Declining Poverty Reducing Capacity of Social Security

the poverty reducing capacity of social security systems in a systemic way.

As noted above, vital to the social security paradigm is the notion of horizontal redistribution from the healthy to the sick, from the employed to the unemployed, from the young to the old, et cetera. This insurance technique presupposes: a) a large spread of risks across the population; b) non-predictability; and c) risks that are not too strongly exposed to moral hazard. When risks are predictable, too much concentrated among certain groups in society and/or easily malleable, it becomes more difficult for social security to serve as a piggy bank. This is typically the case for many of the so called ‘new social risks’ such as divorce, the work-family balance, in-work poverty and long-term unemployment. Divorce is obviously liable to moral hazard, the uptake of parental leave or working part-time are a subject of choice, while in the post-industrial economy long-term unemployment is a highly asymmetric and predictable risk to which the insurance paradigm is unable to formulate an adequate answer.

Moreover, it can also be argued that, on a systemic level, the poverty-reducing impact of horizontal redistribution has declined. The extent to which universal horizontal distributive mechanisms reduce poverty depends on the ex-post distribution of social risks or, put differently, on the connection between risks and needs. For example, because low-income groups face higher risks of illness or unemployment than higher-income groups, the horizontal solidarity implied in these social insurance systems also effects vertical redistribution from rich to poor. Entitlements aimed at balancing work and care stand on the other side of the continuum because the take-up of parental leave is typically higher in two-earner households. Therefore, the coverage of new social risks such as benefits aimed at balancing work and family responsibilities tend to diminish the poverty reducing capacity of overall social security spending (Cantillon, 2019).
The link between poverty prevention/activation and poverty reduction, finally, depends on: a) the approach taken (for example, a too strong focus on keeping benefits low in order to make work pay can induce poverty); and b) the success ratio of activation measures, particularly in terms of reducing the number of jobless households. Because unemployment among the low skilled remains relatively high in most countries (even though employment levels have reached very high levels), the tension between decommodification – adequate income protection for the jobless – on the one hand and recommodification – activation and the fight against unemployment traps – on the other hand remains inevitably high on the political agenda and in public discourse. This is the case, despite the fact that the disappointing growth of employment among low skilled persons strongly points to limits of activation and prevention strategies deployed by tax-benefit systems (Cantillon et al., 2019).

7.4 The glass ceiling

The effectiveness of vertical redistributive mechanisms in reducing poverty depends on: a) the take up of benefits; b) whether or not unemployment traps present themselves; and c) the adequacy of protection levels for the most needy households. It can be argued that, as a consequence of downward pressures on low wages and persistent under-employment of the low skilled, social security systems now face tensions in their attempt to: (1) provide adequate incomes to families with children, while simultaneously (2) make work pay and (3) keep social spending in check. These tensions can be conceptualised as a ‘social trilemma’, or a three-way trade-off between adequacy of incomes, welfare state effort, and financial incentive to work. The ability of welfare states to balance each of those three objectives is constrained by the level of gross wages relative to median incomes. Accordingly, in order
The Declining Poverty Reducing Capacity of Social Security

to compensate for stagnation or decline of low gross wages welfare states should work harder while using other instruments than social security (for example tax credits).

Within the ‘fabric of the welfare state’, there is a hierarchy of incomes. In general terms, the disposable income of low-wage earners should be higher than the minimum incomes of jobless people. Given the inadequacy of the wage floor in many countries, it has become increasingly difficult for welfare states to guarantee adequate income protection for low-wage earners and work-poor households while preserving (or increasing) financial work incentives (Cantillon et al., 2020). Thus, wages at the bottom of the earnings distribution act as a ‘glass ceiling’ over the adequacy of minimum incomes. When low wages stagnate or decline relative to median incomes, it becomes increasingly difficult for minimum incomes to lift non-working households towards or above the poverty threshold. This is especially a problem for lone-parent families, because they rely on one single income while double incomes have become the societal norm, pushing up median household incomes.

So, at a systemic level, social security currently faces structural constraints on the improvement of income protection and on its poverty reducing capacity. First, so called new social risks are typically more predictable, more concentrated among certain groups in society and/or are more malleable than the old industrial risks. Therefore, it has become more difficult for social security to serve as a piggy bank. Second, the coverage of new social risks such as benefits aimed at balancing work and family gives way for new Matthew effects and tends to diminish the poverty reducing ability of social security spending. Hence, the tension between horizontal and vertical redistribution has increased. Third, social protection is in the stranglehold of the fight against unemployment traps. The inherent tension between solidarity and subsidiarity has thus become structurally greater (Cantillon, 2019). Subsidiarity presupposes more people at work,
solidarity higher social benefits. However, these two are difficult to reconcile: work must remain attractive, wages at the bottom fall short, while higher minimum wages threaten the employment opportunities of people with low productivity. The only outcome is that governments intervene and subsidise low-productivity jobs.

7.5 Conclusion: running harder

How did welfare states respond to these constraints? Overall, the empirical evidence suggests that retrenchment has not been the general rule. On the contrary, many welfare states started to work harder in order to compensate for new social risks and the sluggish growth of low wages (Cantillon et al., 2019). In contradiction to popular beliefs, there is no evidence of a universal decrease of the generosity of social protection, at least not in the past two decades. Instead, there is evidence that many nations increased their relative spending efforts, while the literature also points to many examples of policy changes having in themselves poverty-reducing effects. In other words, many welfare states responded to major social, economic and demographic changes by doing more in different ways. This included shifting the focus from ‘protection’ towards ‘activation’, by supporting low wages, by subsidising low productivity work and by increasing the progressivity of social spending. However, in an overwhelming number of cases, this was far from sufficient to keep poverty among the working age population in check, especially not among jobless households.

So conceived, it is the changing base of economic and social production that explains the declining poverty reducing capacity of contemporary welfare states and not (or at least not primarily) a narrowing of the legitimacy base of social redistribution. More pronounced perceptions of deservingness are more likely themselves the result of the social and economic transformations
that have created new needs, and jeopardize the social protection of those unable to participate in the post-industrial, individualised two-earner society.

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8. Social Work and Social Policy: Two Sides of the Same Coin?

Koen Hermans

8.1 Introduction

It’s not an easy task to write a chapter for a book to celebrate the emeritus of one of the giants of social policy research in Europe. Wim van Oorschot is such a giant without a doubt. He always seemed to be ahead of new developments in the field, and laid out the lines of the social policy research agenda. There are plenty of examples, such as the legitimacy of the welfare state, deservingness, welfare chauvinism, and the relation between social capital and the welfare state. Of course, I can make use of specific scientific parameters to identify his main so-called objective academic contributions, but for me, it is his dynamic model to understand and analyse the non-take-up of social benefits. The main reason is that this model is simple and encompassing at the same time. The dynamic model is based on a fundamental critique of the idea that non-take-up arises from (wrong) choices made by the benefit claimant. On the contrary, van Oorschot (1995; 1996) shows that non-take-up is the result of a multilevel process in which also characteristics of the scheme itself (such as the degree of the selectivity and the conditions of the benefit), and the administrative level (such as the quality and quantity of information provision, the complexity of the application procedure and the behaviour of bureaucrats) play an important role. Developed more than 30 years ago, it is still the starting
Leading Social Policy Analysis from the Front

point for many empirical studies and, it nicely links the academic fields of social work and social policy.

8.2 Non-take-up caused by the implementation of social policies

I started working at KU Leuven on the same day as Jos Berghman, to study the activation of social assistance users. We were both members of the social policy team and Jos Berghman gave me Wim van Oorschot’s PhD dissertation ‘Realising rights’ (1995). This book had a huge impact on my thinking about social policy, since it showed convincingly that policy makers and administrators are responsible for the problem of non-take-up and not only clients. But the book demonstrates also another core quality of Wim van Oorschot, namely the formulation of strong, telling titles. If you read his publication list, it is striking how attractive these titles are.

In that period of my research career, I studied implementation practices from a policy perspective, as Wim van Oorschot still does. I was strongly influenced by the work of Lipsky (1980), which Wim teaches until today in his course on social policy. Lipsky was only one of those implementation researchers at the end of the 1970s in which I immersed myself (see also Prottas (1979), Kagan (1978), Mashaw (1978)). And also, the Dutch implementation studies grounded in Lipsky’s theory were very inspiring (such as Knegt (1987), Engbersen (1990) and van der Veen (1990)). Remarkably, these studies already paid a lot of attention to how street-level bureaucrats made use of deservingness criteria to deal with the tension between quality and quantity, or between ‘doing a lot for the few’ and ‘doing less for many clients’.

In public administration handbooks, these studies were categorised as a ‘bottom-up perspective of policy implementation’
In contrast, the top-down perspective starts from a policy decision by governmental (often central government) officials and then asks to what extent the actions of implementing officials and target groups are consistent with (the objectives and procedures outlined in) that policy decision, and to what extent the objectives are attained over time, that is, to what extent were the impacts consistent with the objectives, and what are the principal factors affecting policy outputs and impacts, both those relevant to the official policy as well as other politically significant ones? The top-down implementation approach distinguishes between five factors that explain the success or failure of implementation: (1) clear and consistent goals, (2) a logical causal theory that links the goals with the necessary actions to be taken, (3) a clear hierarchy of authority, (4) clear rules established at the top, and (5) resources/capacity to carry out the commands from the top. The bottom-up implementation approach is convinced that street-level bureaucrats are the key to successful implementation. Implementation occurs only when those who are primarily affected are actively involved in the planning and execution of these programs (O'Toole, 2000: 470). Instead of focusing on the implementation of a specific legal decision, bottom-up researchers start from the street-level bureaucrats and try to understand what is going on in practice, what they are doing and why. They are convinced that street-level workers need discretion in the implementation process.

In my PhD, I combined the street-level bureaucracy approach with neo-institutionalism to identify those factors that contribute to a paradigm shift from delivering benefits to activating clients (Hermans, 2005). The federal government of Belgium had decided in 1999 that social assistance clients needed to be activated, but this policy direction left a lot of discretion to the local level. In my qualitative analysis, I pointed to the importance of what I named ‘champions of change’. These were mainly social workers who were convinced of an emancipatory approach to activation and
who contributed strongly to organisational change. Only years later, I realised that I did not fully understand the role of social workers in policy change. At the same time, I also paid a lot of attention to these factors on different levels that contribute to the granting of benefits (such as deservingness), or in other words, to the take up of social benefits.

8.3 From social policy to social work

In 2005, the KU Leuven started a Master’s programme in social work. Given the topic of my PhD, I was asked to teach in this programme. Quickly, under the influence of Jos Berghman, we changed the name to Master in social work and social policy. We were convinced that the surplus value of our Master's programme was the focus on the linkages between social policy and social work. During the following years, I immersed myself in the social work literature. I discovered that the street level bureaucracy literature was also used in social work research. However, it became more and more clear that social work researchers used it differently. In addition, I realised that the bottom-up perspective on the implementation of social policy that I used in my PhD had important limitations. The bottom-up approach still runs the risk to narrow its focus on the implementation of specific policies without paying attention to the complex mixture of policies and measures that they have to implement and to the complex environment in which social workers operate. In 2016, Urban Nothdurfter visited our research centre (financed by the Jos Berghman Welfare Stipend, which was organised by Wim van Oorschot). We decided to execute a literature review on the question how three different disciplines (social policy, public administration and social work) make use of the theory of street-level bureaucracies.
Our review confirmed that Lipsky’s street-level bureaucracy approach became a central point of reference in the fields of public management, social policy and social work (Nothdurfter and Hermans, 2018). In all three fields, numerous studies inform an ongoing and increasingly nuanced debate on implementation and delivery processes, on the role of frontline workers and managers and on their use of discretion in street-level organisations. At the same time, the dialogue and the mutual exchange between the different fields and perspectives still seem rather limited. With a few exceptions of ‘border-crossing’ authors, both receptions of, and contributions between, the three fields remain below their potential.

The theoretical and empirical developments within public management and social policy literature have yielded two outstanding insights. The first is the explicit consideration of the negative effects of discretion, not only in terms of implementation hurdles, but also in terms of negative outcomes for service users, such as non-take-up. Brodkin and Maimundar (2010) write about ‘procedural discretion’, referring to the informal practices of street-level workers to increase the cost of benefit claiming for vulnerable groups. They also link these micro-practices to broader organisational and, by extension, macro-level priorities, such as reducing the number of welfare claimants. These negative effects of the use of discretion can be linked to factors on the meso- or macro-level, such as the tightening of budgets and the different ways that street-level workers define and operationalise their role and their view on the deservingness of clients (Djuve and Kavli, 2015). In general, the social policy perspective is interested in the role of the street-level implementation in relation to policy outcomes. This is probably shown best in regard to the street-level delivery of activation policies that can be more or less supportive and enabling, or disciplining and punitive (Altreiter and Leibetseder, 2015; van Berkel and van der Aa, 2012).
Within the social work literature, some authors, such as Evans (2015), Scourfield (2015) and Carson et al. (2015), have contributed to the conceptual refinement of the street-level perspective by including the notion of professionalism, pointing out that professional commitment is not just serving self-interest but is also an important factor for the use of discretion and that it can, therefore, make a difference in dealing with the dilemmas of street-level practice. At the same time, the available studies remain rather vague about how professionalism comes into play. In addition, social work studies point to the need and even the necessity of discretion to make a person-centred approach possible. The possible negative effects of the misuse of discretion get less attention. This conceptualisation of discretion is less linked with rules and the gaps between rules and concrete situations of clients, but is shaped by the literature on professions. For instance, Freidson (2001) conceptualises discretion as the gap between the knowledge base of the professional and the specific person with which the professional works. Thus, the social work studies suggest that street-level bureaucrats such as social workers use their professional expertise to shape policies in practice. But how does this expertise change the aims of policies, and what if policy measures are contradictory to the professional values? In conclusion, discretion is evaluated in both disciplines variously and even conflictingly.

8.4 Social work as an object of study or as a specific discipline?

We defined social work studies as those studies that were published in social work journals (Nothdurfter and Hermans, 2018). But even then, the question remains whether and why this is social work research. The International Federation of Social Workers is responsible for the global definition of social work.
Remarkably, in the last version of 2014, social work is not only regarded as a profession but also as an academic discipline. This is a quite ambiguous standpoint; but it reflects the growing amount of countries in which social work is an academic program at the university. At the same time, this academisation of social work is not fulfilled yet, since in many countries (such as the Netherlands and Norway) there are no academic degrees in social work.

If social work considers itself as a specific academic discipline, then there needs to be a common view on the object of study, the knowledge base and the research methods (Shaw, 2007). Concerning the object of study, the evident answer is social work practice. Instead of using policy goals as a starting point, social work research starts from the analysis of social work practice to understand what is happening on the street-level, not a specific policy measure or policy program. Social work scholars study how social workers act as professionals, how they develop a working alliance with social work users (Steens et al., 2018), how they mobilise their expertise to realise their professional goals, how their practice is shaped by human rights (Vandekinderen et al., 2019), how they account for their practice to various stakeholders (van der Trier et al., 2020), how they implement policy measures, how they develop new practices and how they try to influence policy makers. This implies a radicalisation of the bottom-up approach to implementation.

For instance, in Belgium there is growing interest during the last 15 years in non-take-up at the policy level as well in social work practice. Flemish community workers have developed their own approach to the fight against ‘under-protection’ (Eeman et al., 2013). They prefer this term instead of non-take-up, because it stresses more the public responsibility than non-take-up does. Under-protection is also broader than non-take-up, since it is also more critical towards current social rights. Under-protection also refers to the question to which extent the existing social rights and benefits are sufficient to realise human dignity.
Community workers have implemented six strategies that must contribute to the fight against non-take-up: more information, automatic rights application, outreaching, qualitative social services, integrated social services and informal practices at the neighbourhood level. Some of these strategies were already identified in the dynamic model of benefit receipt by Wim van Oorschot (1995; 1996), some of them are relatively new. Especially, community workers developed a neighbourhood-oriented approach (called 'De Stek') that tries to bring vulnerable groups together by organising low-threshold social activities in local centres. These activities also serve to restore their trust in social services. Community workers use these neighbourhood centres to bring social rights to them. At the same time, these social workers organise participatory practices so that people in poverty can raise their voice about their experiences and can have a direct dialogue with policy makers. This neighbourhood approach is recently financed by the Flemish Minister of Social Welfare. This example shows how social work develops innovative strategies to combat non-take-up that can influence social policies. In other words, social work practice and social work research can and should feed back into social policy research and legislators’ perspectives. This is a truly bottom-up perspective. But of course, the question remains to what extent these practices effectively diminish non-take-up of social rights and to what extent these practices can be upscaled. Thus, social work research should also make use of social policy research to disentangle the effectiveness of such strategies.

8.5 Social work and social policy, two sides of a coin?

Studying these intersections between social work and social policy is one of our central research lines at the Centre for Sociological Research at KU Leuven. The dynamic model of benefit receipt
continues to inspire us to consider non-take-up of social benefits as litmus test of the effectiveness of social policies. The model also brings into light the role of implementation processes and of implementers to explain non-take-up. However, it fits more into a top-down perspective of implementation that starts from specific policy measures or policy programs. A social work perspective motivates us to look deeper into social work practice from a truly bottom-up perspective. It directs our attention to the question how social workers are acting on a daily basis, how they mobilise their professional expertise, how they develop innovative practices, how they give feedback to legislators and how they try to influence the policy agenda by translating private troubles into public issues. But at the same time, social work research has to keep in mind essential lessons from social policy studies, namely the latent and possibly perverse effects of their implementation strategies on the realisation of social rights and the need of an international-comparative approach to disentangle the complex interaction between social work and social policy. Thus, social work and social policy seem to study the same practices, but from a different perspective, or, in other words, both disciplines are two sides of the same coin.

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9. Why do the Elderly Fail to Realize their Social Rights in Belgium? And What can we do About it?

Joy Schols and Hans Peeters

9.1 Introduction

As is well known by social policy scholars, claimants can ‘slip through the net’, in the sense that they do not receive the benefits they are entitled to. This phenomenon is referred to as non-take-up or non-use. Research on the factors causing non-take-up was already initiated in the 1960s, but it was only with Wim’s work during the mid-1990s that a multilevel framework to analyse non-take-up was put forward. In his influential book Realizing Rights (1995) Wim synthesized the prevailing theories, indicated their shortcomings and introduced a new framework, which he continued to develop in later publications (for example van Oorschot, 1996). Contrary to the then popular theories, in the multilevel framework it was emphasized that not only claimants but also policy makers and administrators could be responsible for non-take-up (van Oorschot, 1995).

In a nutshell, Wim argued that the reasons for non-take-up are located at three levels: the level of the benefit scheme, the level of the administration and the client level (van Oorschot; 1991, 1996). These three levels however cannot be viewed separately from one another. As Wim’s studies have shown, non-take-up is usually not caused by one specific factor on one particular level but is instead the result of interacting factors at different levels (van Oorschot; 1995, 1996). To give but one example, non-take-up can be the
result of a lack of knowledge (level of the client), which can be influenced by a poor provision of information by administrators (level of the administration).

Ever since the introduction of the multilevel framework, it is a widely accepted theory in non-take-up research (for example Behrendt, 2000; Matsaganis et al., 2010). Hence, we have also based our own research on this multilevel framework. More precisely, our qualitative research on non-take-up of the Income Guarantee for the Elderly, which was conducted in 2016, uses the multilevel framework to present and interpret our results in a comprehensible way. The Income Guarantee is a Belgian means-tested social assistance benefit that serves as the most important safety net for elderly who have been unable to build up sufficient pension rights. People over 65 years old who fall under a set income threshold are granted the benefit (usually as a surplus on the public pension) by the Federal Pensions Service.

To investigate non-take-up of the Income Guarantee, we conducted interviews with multiple administrators, given their unique insights in both the legislative pitfalls and the difficulties experienced by claimants during the application process. During these semistructured interviews, we first asked civil servants about their experiences with the causes of non-take-up. Next, we invited them to formulate recommendations on how to reduce future non-take-up. These causes and recommendations are summarised in the following two sections.1 On the basis of a new interview with one of our original respondents, the third section shows that our research findings are still relevant today.

### 9.2 What are the causes of non-take-up of the Income Guarantee?

Fully in line with the multilevel framework, our investigation identified multiple interrelated causes for non-take-up. These
causes are located at the level of the benefit scheme, the administration and the client. Our investigation first identified three features of the benefit scheme that play an important role in non-take-up of the Income Guarantee.

a. The target group of the automatic investigation – The means-test is automatically organised on the initiative of the Federal Pensions Service at the moment the legal retirement age is reached. This automatically initiated means-test is henceforth referred to as the automatic investigation. In practice, this automatic investigation consists of sending declaration forms to those elderly who might be entitled to receive the Income Guarantee. The problem identified by the respondents is that not all individuals who might be entitled will automatically receive the declaration forms. The reason is that the automatic investigation is only initiated for three target groups: individuals with a calculated public pension benefit that falls under a set income threshold, individuals who receive an allowance for the disabled and individuals claiming a subsistence benefit. As a result, some individuals ‘slip through the net’ of the automatic investigation. Housewives, for instance, who have never worked are very likely to be entitled to receive the Income Guarantee but they have to submit an application on their own initiative. Many respondents doubt that individuals who have not built up any pension rights find their way to the pension administration or the municipality to apply for the Income Guarantee.

Who slips through the net? The ones we do not know here (...)[at the Federal Pensions Service].

b. The timing of the automatic investigation – A second problem of the automatic investigation arises when individuals are not entitled to receive the benefit when the means-test is conducted but become entitled at a later stage in their lives. According to the civil servants that were interviewed, this situation is quite common.
For one, an individuals’ income might not fall under the set income threshold at the legal retirement age due to a recent property sale or the availability of plenty of savings. The financial situation of elderly people however can change rapidly and they might become entitled to the benefit only a few years later. In the case of entitlement for the Income Guarantee at a later stage than the initial means-test, claimants must submit an application at the municipality or directly at the Federal Pensions Service on their own initiative. The interviewed civil servants repeatedly state that elderly are more than often unable to file this application. Lack of knowledge of the benefit scheme and the age of the target group are determining factors here. Hence, this cause for non.Take-up is strongly intertwined with various factors on the client level.

If you are 65 years old and you have recently sold your house (…) then you have to remember at 75 years old 'Oh, I have to go to the municipality to apply for it'.

c. Residency requirements – Having a legal address is a frequently used requirement to receive Belgian state support. In the absence of a legal address, a reference address is considered a legal substitute. A reference address is usually provided by a private person, mostly a friend or family member. In case of homelessness, the Public Centres of Social Welfare are also qualified to provide a reference address. This address is used for administrative correspondence with the claimant and allows individuals without an official residency to claim certain social benefits. The Income Guarantee is only granted to those individuals with a legal Belgian address or a reference address with the Public Centres of Social Welfare. In contrast to other benefits, a reference address provided by a private person is thus not sufficient to receive the Income Guarantee. As a result of this legislative condition, the respondents argue that not all homeless people receive the Income Guarantee because the Public Centres of Social Welfare are not always able or willing to provide a reference address. These situations of non.Take-up are striking because the homeless
Why do the Elderly Fail to Realize their Social Rights in Belgium?

are strongly dependent on the benefit to escape their precarious situation.

If you don't have it [a reference address with the Public Centres of Social Welfare] then you don't exist (…) for nobody.

Apart from the three causes at the level of the benefit scheme, the respondents identify two main causes at the level of the administration.

a. Complex declaration forms – The respondents paid special attention to the complex declaration forms used to organise the means-test. At the legal retirement age, the Federal Pensions Service organizes the means-test by automatically sending declaration forms to those elderly who might be entitled to receive the benefit, i.e. those individuals with low public pension benefits, disability benefits or subsistence benefits. The elderly, in turn, are required to declare all their income sources using these declaration forms. The interviewed administrators argue that the forms used to examine the financial situation of claimants are too complicated. Proper knowledge of the social legislation is required to be able to understand the used jargon. Many elderly lack this knowledge (confer client level factor) and as a result, plenty of claimants fail to properly complete these forms. Even more striking is that some elderly do not attempt to fill in these forms out of doubt or incapacity.

It is literally impossible (…). It is just not clear. The children are often the ones that fill in the declaration forms but the elderly that are alone easily slip through the net.

b. Poor provision of information – Poor communication and giving insufficient information to the elderly is often mentioned to be an important factor causing non-take-up. Most respondents argue that the elderly have too little knowledge of the benefit scheme and that the administration fails to reach them. Social security agencies like the Federal Pensions Service have taken resource to

97
digital technologies to provide information to claimants and many elderly are thus far not familiar with these technologies.

*I am 42 years old, I grew up without a computer (...). Let alone the 65–75 year olds. I don’t think those people are going to visit the website [of the Federal Pensions Service]. So how are they reached?*

Personal face-to-face communication with administrators, on the contrary, has proven to be of great value for the take-up of Income Guarantee. Appointments at the regional offices of the Federal Pensions Service and information days held at municipalities outside the main regional offices are of great importance for the elderly. Availability of these personal appointments is however scarce since the Federal Pensions Service is understaffed and overwhelmed by claimants seeking assistance.

Finally, in addition to the causes at the level of the benefit scheme and the administration, the respondents recognized three client level factors causing non-take-up of the Income Guarantee.

a. *Stigma* – Stigmatization for one, is a factor named to be responsible for non-take-up. This is not surprising. A means-test is in fact organised with the aim to prove one is poor enough to receive state support. Some respondents had witnessed certain instances where individuals refused to apply for the Income Guarantee because they do not want to be considered poor.

*They have to ask for it [for financial help]; [They feel] ashamed.*

b. *Lack of knowledge* – A lack of sufficient knowledge of the scheme is another well-known cause for non-take-up that also applies to the Income Guarantee. Our research provided evidence that some elderly deliberately not apply for the Income Guarantee due to incorrect perceptions of eligibility.
Why do the Elderly Fail to Realize their Social Rights in Belgium?

It is very likely that those who need to know about the scheme, don’t. Those who don’t know their rights are not going to apply for the Income Guarantee. It is a pity but it is what it is.

Strong interactions with causes on different levels are present. The respondents explain that the knowledge gap of elderly is at least partially caused by a poor provision of information by administrators. Information is nowadays distributed online which is making matters worse for the elderly (cf. administration level factor).

c. Physical barrier – The existence of a physical barrier was highlighted by the respondents as a cause for non-take-up that specifically applies to the target group of the Income Guarantee. People over 65 years old can experience physical barriers when they need assistance with filling in the declaration forms or with submitting the application. Civil servants explain that when elderly people are physically unable to pay a visit to the administration of the Federal Pensions Service, the Public Centres of Social Welfare or the municipality, such assistance cannot always be guaranteed.

I tried my best. I asked the administrators of the municipality if they could visit the person at home to submit the application for the Income Guarantee but such home visits are not organised here.

9.3 What are the recommendations of civil servants to reduce non-take-up of the Income Guarantee?

Besides identifying several causes for non-take-up, the interviewed civil servants made many recommendations. The three most important are mentioned here.

a. Automatic investigation every 5 of 10 years – If non-take-up is discovered by civil servants, it mainly concerns individuals who become entitled to the benefit after the initial means-test has taken place. Respondents thus note that the one-off means-test,
which is automatically conducted by the Federal Pensions Service at the legal retirement age, is merely a snapshot. The respondents advise to repeat the means-test periodically (for example every five or ten years) in order to prevent non-take-up.

b. Adjusting the declaration forms – The second recommendation is to simplify the used declaration forms. The idea is that the jargon, the words and phrases, should be adjusted so that they better fit the target group. However, simplifying the jargon is only a first step. The respondents also propose to fully adjust the declaration forms by using all electronic data available in such a way that only those incomes sources from which no data is available should be declared. This latter recommendation is feasible. After all, the administrators of the Federal Pensions Service already check the information of completed questionnaires with the available register data.

c. Clear communication and cooperation with the Public Centres of Social Welfare – Third, respondents argue for a better provision of information for the elderly. According to civil servants, the elderly can be reached in two ways. First, the accessibility of the Federal Pensions Service can be improved by increasing staff capacity, in particular for face-to-face appointments and information days held at municipalities outside the regional offices. Second, the respondents refer to the important role of social workers of the Public Centres of Social Welfare in combating non-take-up. Social workers are viewed as important partners since they often assist claimants in the application process. More so, the respondents indicate that social workers, unlike the staff of the Federal Pensions Service, are better suited to track down non-users because social workers provide more accessible services within the municipality and have personal knowledge of those living in precarious situations. Creating a better cooperation between these two bodies is therefore much recommended.
9.4 Current developments

We reached out to one of our respondents of the Federal Pensions Service to find out whether the three recommendations made in 2016 are still relevant today. In sum, we can conclude that over the last few years the Federal Pensions Service has actively worked on its service to reduce non-take-up. To that end, the administration has simplified the used declaration forms. These new declaration forms will be put in practice any time now. To increase the provision of information and the cooperation with the Public Centres of Social Welfare, an analysis is currently being made with the aim to improve the provision of information. However, not all recommendations have been dealt with. The Federal Pensions Service is currently unable to periodically repeat the automatic investigation due to a lack of capacity and means.

9.5 Conclusion

Our research into the causes of non-take-up of the Belgian Income Guarantee for the Elderly once again indicated the importance of Wim’s multilevel framework. In line with the framework, our research identified different interrelated causes for non-take-up at the level of the benefit scheme, the administration and the clients. To recapitulate one of our findings: some elderly fail to receive the benefits they are entitled to because they lack the necessary knowledge to complete the complex application forms that are used by administrators when organising the means-test.

As a result of identifying the reasons for non-take-up, the administrators were able to formulate valuable recommendations to reduce future non-take-up. The Federal Pensions Service has already taken action to put some of these recommendations into practice. More reform is, however, needed to prevent non-take-
up. To guide this reform ‘small-scale’ research like ours is insufficient. Fortunately, in 2016, the TAKE-project was launched by the University of Antwerp and partners with the aim of conducting a ‘large-scale’ research on non-take-up of Belgian means-tested social benefits. While we await the final results of this research project, we are pleased to see that Wim’s multilevel framework has also taken centre stage in this project (see Van Mechelen and Janssens, 2017). This once again proves that Wim’s work on non-take-up is of great importance: it aims to improve our social policies by enabling all citizens to realize their rights.

NOTE

1. This contribution is a shortened version of an article published in a Belgian journal (see Schols et al. (2018a) for the Dutch version and Schols et al. (2018b) for the French version), and is based on a masters’ thesis research (see Schols, 2016). Please note that only a limited number of research results are reported in this article. For a more extensive discussion of the literature used, the original quotes, the research results and the research design, one can consult the abovementioned references.

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10. Harmonising Social Security Financing

Paul Schoukens and Danny Pieters

10.1 Introduction

Our cooperation with Wim van Oorschot goes back to 1985 at Tilburg University. In what was a new sub-faculty of ‘social security sciences’ back then, two young researchers met: one has a social policy background, Wim van Oorschot. The other one, Danny Pieters, is a lawyer. Under the leadership of the much missed Jos Berghman, they approach the phenomenon of social security in a multi- and interdisciplinary way. At the beginning of the 1990s, Danny Pieters returns to the KU Leuven where he starts cooperating intensively with Paul Schoukens. Both are lawyers studying social security primarily in a comparative fashion. However, at the same time, they are aware that in order to fully grasp the fundamental fabrics of social security, there must be close interaction with other disciplines. This interaction and cooperation materialised initially with Jos Berghman and later again with Wim van Oorschot, when they joined the Faculty of Social Sciences at the KU Leuven.

Selecting a topic to pay tribute to Wim van Oorschot is quite a challenge as he has been prominently present in many research fields that touch upon social security research and education. We chose to single out a research topic that reflects our cooperation in Tilburg and later in Leuven: the need for further harmonisation in social security in Europe. Harmonisation was intensively debated back in the late 1980s with the establishment of the fully
integrated European Community-market – better known as ‘Europe 92’. Today, with the adoption of the European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR) in 2017, the harmonisation of social security once again is the centre of attention. The process of monitoring the performance of member states used to be mainly financial and economic in nature, addressing social security largely as an expense and less as a contributor to stability and social cohesion. The EU’s ambition with the EPSR was to give the monitoring process a more social character. As a consequence, the discussion concerning the extent to which more harmonisation is needed in social security (law) reappeared.

In this contribution, we plead for more (legal) harmonisation concentrating primarily on the financing of social security. We suggest to create a European ‘bandwidth’ within which the national financing of social security has to take place (a social security fork) while at the same time the national systems are still monitored at a European level through soft-law and/or by using open policy monitoring instruments. With the introduction of such a European financing fork, a clear link will, however, have to be forged between the need for social security harmonisation and the need to safeguard fair competition in the EU. Or, in other words, the European internal market will need some clear rules on the national financing of social security, at least if we want to avoid social security becoming too strong an element in the fight to cut production costs (social dumping).

10.2 The feasibility of harmonising social security

Ever since the establishment of the European Union (EU) economists, social policy experts and lawyers have studied the feasibility and opportunity of harmonising social security systems of the member states.
The question first emerged at the very beginning of the European Communities. At that time, the main emphasis in the discussion was on the enormous diversity of the systems then in place (Pieters, 1989). Due to the fact that this diversity found its origin in the different national cultural and economic factors that determined the development of (national) social security systems, it was considered better not to intervene at the supranational European level (by setting minimum standards or establishing EU-level social rights). It was feared that such supranational intervention could upset the political, cultural and social equilibrium underlying the social security systems, which in turn might lead to the undermining of these systems (Pieters, 1991).

Aside from the large differences in the determining economic and cultural factors, the debate also turned against the harmonisation of social security for yet another reason: the harmonisation of the national social security systems was not considered necessary for giving companies equal competition opportunities in a single market. Indeed, it was suggested that setting European social security standards would risk disturbing competition in the market. Social security is only one element in the (wage) cost of work. Singling out only this particular element and regulating it at European level was feared to reduce the level playing field for companies and, more generally, states to offset social costs. This is because the cost of labour is also determined by other factors such as fiscal policies, social stability, the level of the infrastructure etc. In other words, fair competition within a single market did not require the harmonisation of national social security systems (Pieters, 1991). Additionally, it was argued that if the social security burdens (among others) threaten the national economy of a member state, then this state was still free to strengthen the competitiveness of its businesses by adjusting its exchange rate.

On the realisation of a ‘fully integrated market’ (1 January 1993), the discussion on increased harmonisation reappeared in
full strength. The discussion focused on the question of whether such a fully integrated market could be achieved while there was a wide diversity of social security systems in place. However, compared to the first discussion at the beginning of the European Communities back in the 1960s, there was now the fear as well as the hope that most of the elements that influence the cost of labour would start to converge as a result of the integrated market. For instance, considerable efforts were to be made to raise the level of infrastructure and education in the least developed regions of the Community to a fixed Community standard. Moreover, the Monetary Union that followed in the aftermath of the internal market further reduced the margins of levelling out (too high) labour costs (for example through a devaluation of the national currency) as member states lost considerable freedom in running their (national) monetary policy. Given all this, we considered it necessary to intervene in the field of social security and called for the establishment of some harmonisation at EU level (Pieters, 1991).

Apart from launching the credo that the EU is characterised by its social model (European Commission, 1994), no concrete (legal) action was, however, taken to give this model any real European substance. In the meantime, infrastructure improved considerably, fiscal and budgetary policies were brought under close European scrutiny, health and safety at the workplace became subject to EU standards, Erasmus and other EU programmes created a ‘Europe of study’ etc. Nevertheless, no measures harmonising social security emerged. Not even the Monetary Union established between the Euro countries called for the harmonisation of social security systems. By the turn of the millennium, harmonisation was again forgotten. Furthermore, the treaty articles were even adapted in order to ban in reality any kind of legal harmonisation in the field of social security (Korda and Schoukens, 2006).

Since the 2008 (global) financial crisis, interest in the harmonisation of social security once again gathered nevertheless
momentum. Hopes were high that this could be a turning point leading to a stronger (and more legal) social Europe (Schoukens and Beke Smets, 2014). Apart from rather isolated initiatives to harmonise specific social risks or otherwise intervening in these (such as the idea of a European unemployment benefit scheme, see Pieters, 2019), European attention gradually started, however, to focus on social security in the national budgets. To guarantee financial equilibrium, the EU increasingly showed interest in having more financial control over social security expenses.

10.3 International law harmonising the financing of social security

A harmonisation of social security is needed to ensure that competition, essential to the EU’s internal market, is organised in a fair way. However, when we look at the legal achievements in the strict field of social security harmonisation, we see that not much (legal) attention has been paid to the cost element or more broadly to the financing of social security. A similar restricted interest in the financing side is to be discerned when we look at the ILO and the Council of Europe, the main institutions – up to now – to have developed social security harmonisation instruments.

Their harmonisation instruments focus on the level and conditions of the benefits to be granted. It is in fact significant to observe that the harmonisation instruments of the ILO and the Council of Europe do not focus on (the harmonisation of) social charges. Possibly the only impact of these instruments relates to the distribution of employer and employee contributions in the field of social security.

In article 71 of ILO Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention № 102, we read that:

- establishing the way of financing social security should avoid hardship to persons of small means and should take into
account the economic situation of the state and of the classes of persons protected;
- the employee contributions should not exceed 50 per cent of the total of financial resources allocated to the concerned group of persons;
- the state guarantees that enough means will be available to cover the costs of the benefits guaranteed. Moreover, the necessary actuarial studies and calculations concerning the financial equilibrium should be made, periodically and whenever before the way of financing the benefits is to be changed.

Apart from being restricted in number, these provisions seem to be somewhat outdated in their goals. Establishing that the employee contributions cannot exceed the employer contributions (plus state subventions) is a rather peculiar norm as it starts from the false presupposition that there is a natural distinction between employee and employer contributions. As employers are normally liable for withholding the contributions of their employees, the socio-economic reality nowadays starts more from the reality of a total work contribution (employee plus employer contribution, plus part of the fiscal budget that goes to the financing of social security). Consequently, employees think in terms of the net wage (nominal wage minus the employee contribution and taxes): that is what they receive in the end. Employers think in terms of the total costs it takes to employ a person (nominal wage plus the employer’s contribution). Moreover, the norm does not consider at all the (income or wage) taxes on the income paid by the socially insured persons. In the end, this part of taxation will, however, constitute a considerable part of the total financing of social security.

Further, establishing that one has to take into account the economic situation of the state as well as the small means that contributing persons may possess provides little legal basis to
Harmonising Social Security Financing

have the ILO provisions monitored, controlled or even sanctioned. The same goes for concerns regarding the actuarial studies and calculations that are to be made. From a legal point of view, the provision that the state is responsible for providing the benefits that are promised, might be more important as it makes clear that a state can never disengage from its responsibility to pay the legally established entitlements (benefit). So, even if a social security benefit is to be paid by private actors (for example private social insurance or funds), the moment the benefit is considered to belong to statutory social security, the state has to guarantee these benefits.

10.4 The hidden ‘social’ model of the EU

So far, EU harmonising norms have to a large extent remained invisible as far as social security is concerned. However, in the aftermath of the 2008 financial-economic crisis, the EU slowly started to pay more attention to (the cost of) social security in its monitoring of the fiscal and budgetary policies of the member states. Over the years and across the various member states, we see a pattern occurring in the way the EU addresses social security. Specifically in the area of social security, the EU has made the following recommendations (Schoukens, 2016: 56):

- to have or to keep a unified social security system;
- to reform the family benefits (from income replacement to more services);
- to introduce additional targeting in social security schemes;
- to link life expectancy to the retirement age;
- to restrict the unemployment benefits (in duration and in amount);
- to apply more stringent conditions in the invalidity/disability benefits;
- to harmonise the pensionable age between men and woman;
to reform the national health care system (giving more attention to adequacy and quality);
- to reduce the burden on social security contributions on labour;
- to loosen the indexation of social security benefits from wage indexation;
- to keep benefits adequate (among others through private savings and occupational pensions);
- to reduce the share of undeclared work and;
- to combat poverty and social exclusion.

One recommendation directly addresses the reduction of the burden of social security costs on labour, but in the end most of the recommendations ultimately aim to reduce the costs of social security. The EU is increasingly addressing social security as a cost factor in the overall budget that should be well managed and maintained in order not to jeopardise the financial sustainability of the system and of the country. This overall attention to the budgetary and fiscal impact of social security systems is reflected in the formulation of the recommendations listed above. Recommendations having a social objective such as combating social exclusion and keeping an adequate level of social protection are vague in their formulation and are thus hard to monitor in terms of their impact. By contrast, social recommendations with financial or fiscal impact are more detailed and can eventually be used to sanction member states (Schoukens and Beke Smets, 2014). Hence, we concluded in earlier research that

‘national social security systems are primordially monitored on their economic and financial soundness. The social objectives and social security parameters are simply not concrete enough to speak of a true social model, leave aside the legal tools to make the social model sufficiently effective. We are far from the original ideas of the EU social model as launched by the EU-Commission at the beginning of the 1990s’ (Schoukens, 2016: 44).
10.5 Conclusion: a call for a closer cooperation between lawyers, economists and social policy experts

Although the need for harmonisation measures has been felt from the very beginning of the European Union, legal scholars have mainly focused on the social benefit side, be it with little impact. The financial side of social security has been the focus of the monitoring of the systems at European level in practice. Perhaps the time has come for the financial side to become the object of legal harmonising measures in order to deal with the concerns regarding the wide diversity of national social security schemes already raised in the first days of what has become the European Union. In other words, rather than trying to overcome the differences in the benefit side of social security, why don’t we try to develop harmonising standards with regard to the financing of the national social security schemes? This would optimally respect the national competence to define a state’s social security system and take into account the concern about the socio-economic and financial impact of social security upon national budgets. At the same time, this idea directly addresses the main arguments that from the very beginning the European Community called for the harmonisation of social security: avoiding unfair competition through social security and combating social dumping.

Developing harmonising standards with regard to the financing of social security could, in our opinion, best be done by defining a ‘fork’ or a ‘bandwidth’ within which social security contributions and government subsidies to the social security systems would need to be situated. We are convinced that such an approach is not only feasible but also expedient. However, it would require substantive research in which social scientists, economists and lawyers must combine their findings to provide concrete figures.

The basic idea is to set a minimum and maximum percentage for social security contributions levied upon the real wages/professional incomes and a minimum and maximum percentage
for the costs of social security to be financed out of the public budget. These minimums and maximums constitute the ‘fork’ or ‘bandwidth’ within which national social security systems can determine how social security benefits are designed. It is obvious that, in doing so, the possibilities to use social security arrangements to falsify competition between (enterprises of) member states would be considerably reduced. At the same time, the fork would guarantee that each member state allocates an adequate amount of the workers’ incomes and of the state budget to social security, thus countering a rush to the bottom.

Before this idea can be tested, quite a lot of ‘development’ research has yet to be done. What social security schemes are to be taken into account? In an initial approach, we mainly suggest to concentrate on the contributory social insurance schemes. These are the schemes that today fall under the EU social security coordination regulations. Non-contributory social benefit schemes would not be considered in this initial step. This means that for social assistance and specific non-contributory benefits member states would enjoy exclusive competences in the decision about how they wish to finance them. For other social security benefits, we suggest they should be financed by the fork-levy. By contrast, the cost compensating schemes, health care and family allowances, should be excluded as these have little to do with the social charges on labour. This aspect would need further examination.

As far as the fork for social contributions is concerned, we propose not to make any distinction between employer and employee contributions as this is a totally artificial distinction. What matters in the end is the overall social security cost for the employer and what net income the worker receives for his/her work. We would set the fork for the total amount of the contributions without considering specific social risk schemes separately. All kinds of special tariffs for specific groups or statuses would have to be incorporated in the final totals of the
eventually set (maximum) level of the fork. This could end up being a rather complex but, in our opinion, possible exercise. A fork for the social security contributions levied on the income from work (wages, professional income of the self-employed) would also require a clear definition of what ‘income from work’ is and, at the end of the day, of what ‘work’ is. A new danger for distorting internal market competition could otherwise indeed result from the emerging of new patterns of work: gig work, platform work, et cetera (Schoukens and Barrio, 2017).

Regardless of these technical details, the question of course remains as to whether it will be feasible to define minima and maxima of social security contributions for all EU member states. Here too, research on the current financing of the national social security schemes would be needed: what is the share of social contributions? What is the share of state subsidising? Simple questions as they may seem, they are very complex to answer.

Obviously, for this contribution we restricted ourselves to launching some ideas, and we are aware that by doing so we may be raising many more questions than answers. What should be kept in mind though is that these questions cannot be answered by lawyers alone; nor by social policy experts alone; nor by economists alone. To find comprehensive and integrated answers, they will have to be addressed jointly, in a multidisciplinary approach, and in a spirit of cooperation between colleagues – aspects that strongly reflect the research approach which Wim van Oorschot practices and upholds in daily life. We can only hope that it will inspire many others to apply this approach in their research, and more concretely to chalk out the research pathways along which the harmonisation of social security in Europe will eventually take place.
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11. Flex Well: Balancing Labour Market Flexibility, Security and Wellbeing

Sonja Bekker and Ioana Pop

11.1 Introduction

Finding a balance between labour market flexibility and security has been a major topic for some decades, both in academic research and in policy-making (van Oorschot, 2004; Wilthagen and Tros, 2004; European Commission, 2007; Chung, 2012; Bekker and Mailand, 2018). This balance between flexibility and security is far from static. The pendulum keeps swinging from encouraging flexibility to guaranteeing a certain level of security. Decades ago, in a context of structurally high unemployment rates and companies struggling to compete on international markets, European debates mainly addressed ways to make the labour market more flexible (European Commission, 1993). Getting rid of rigidity would support companies in their response to rapidly changing economic demands, while workers could benefit from more flexibility as well. However, the concern for workers’ security did not disappear. Boos et al. (2001) addressed this issue in a report to the European Commission. Later on, in 2007, the European Commission developed the common principles of flexicurity, stimulating an actively designed balance between flexibility and security. Flexibility and security were key issues studied by the researchers of the interdisciplinary labour market institute ReflecT of Tilburg Law School, addressing labour market dynamics, flexicurity and social cohesion. The departments of HR-studies, Economics and Sociology contributed to ReflecT as
well, and Wim van Oorschot brought in his expertise from a sociological perspective. As of 2015, after a severe economic and social crisis, the EU has started to tackle the negative effects of flexibility for vulnerable groups more actively. For example, the European Commission recommends countries to fight labour market segmentation and to help people make a transition into more stable jobs (Bekker, 2018). In particular, the European Pillar of Social Rights (2017) aims at fair working conditions for all, including flexible workers, self-employed and platform workers in the digital economy.

Also in Dutch labour market discussions, the pendulum regularly swings from flexibility to security. The report for the European Commission, to which van Oorschot contributed, does not only give a detailed overview of Dutch labour market regulations (Boos et al., 2001). It also stresses the role of the social security system to protect workers, both in or out of employment. The report ends with a list of rather critical comments. The authors speak of a ‘participation neurosis’ in the Netherlands whereby policymakers focus on getting people in a job while neglecting job quality, ignoring the limits of ‘employability’ and ‘trainability’ of people, and overlooking the strong interference with private lives (Boos et al., 2001: 43). They also see tensions between the government encouraging flexible employment on the one hand and expecting beneficiaries to flow into full-time jobs on the other hand.

In a follow-up, van Oorschot (2004) reviews the growing flexibility in the Netherlands, combined with the trend of a more ‘activating welfare state’. At that time, the Dutch welfare state was referred to as the Dutch miracle because it was considered to be successful in activating the unemployed and in giving protection to flexible and part-time workers. Van Oorschot (2004) critically assesses this ‘miracle’ and concludes that Dutch activation measures are not a large success. Several groups of unemployed do not benefit from activation. Additionally, some of these
measures even lead to perceived social isolation and a feeling of uselessness among unemployed and disabled people. At the same time, and in spite of some favourable changes in labour law, the social security for flex-workers remains insufficient.

Since van Oorschot’s study, flexibility and security have remained part of Dutch labour market debates and the country continues its search for a balance between flexibility and security, implementing laws such as the Act Work and Security (Wet werk en zekerheid 2015) and the Act Act Labour Market in Balance (Wet arbeidsmarkt in balans, 2020). The latter aims to bridge the gap between ‘flex’ and ‘permanent’ by stipulating that people who have had three consecutive fixed-term contracts over the period of three years have to be offered a permanent contract. The final conclusions of the Dutch Committee Regulation of Work (Commissie Regulering van Werk / Commissie Bortslap, January 2020) underline that current rules still do not match the challenges of working anno 2020. Groups of workers struggle with having insecure and low-quality work for a longer period of time. This not only poses a threat to the Dutch social cohesion but also to the economy, as it affects the availability of skilled people in a negative way. The Committee therefore suggests an integral redesign of the rules on labour, social security, taxation and the ability to engage in learning and upskilling throughout the life course.

The remainder of this chapter deals with the current state and trends in Dutch labour market flexibility, adding two relevant perspectives: that of labour market dynamics and that of workers’ well-being. The chapter first follows different generations that have flown into the Dutch labour market after having finished their school or studies. It shows which transitions starters make in their first six years in the Dutch labour market, and whether there are differences between generations. Second, it looks at the self-reported wellbeing of early career workers who have been in flexible jobs for long periods of time.
11.2 Generations on an ever more flexible labour market: which transitions do they make?

As outlined above, flexibilisation is typical for the Dutch labour market. However, in other European countries the ‘typical’ employment relationship has decreased as well (Eurofound, 2017). Young people enter a very dynamic labour market, and less and less people have permanent employment contracts. In our research (Bekker and Pop, 2020; van Deurzen and Bekker, 2018), we used data from ‘het Arbeidsaanbodpanel’ (Labour Force Panel; SCP, 2016). More specifically, we analysed the waves 1985 to 2014 to follow ‘starters’ in the labour market during the first six years of their careers. The guiding research questions were: can young people still expect stable jobs? What are the differences between the generations entering the labour market in the 1990s and early 2000s (which van Oorschot studied) and current generations? What are actually the typical labour market trajectories of starters? Do systems of labour law and social security help people to make transitions into more-stable employment?

In order to see which trajectories different generations of early career workers take in the labour market, we followed them during the first six years after their education finished. Figure 11.1 distinguishes four different statuses: typical (permanent or open-ended employment contract), atypical (temporary work or self-employment), jobseeker (unemployment or looking for a job), and inactivity. The latter means not having and not looking for a job. During the investigated period between 1985 and 2014, the use of temporary contracts has increased. However, not only do we find that the labour market has become more flexible. It has also become more turbulent (Bekker and Pop, 2020), that is, young people change more often to a different kind of labour contract. They have a chain of different employment statuses. For example, in the past they switched only once from temporary to permanent...
employment, but young people nowadays more often switch between labour market statuses: from temporary employment to unemployed, back to temporary employment, to permanent and back to temporary work.

From the generation who entered the labour market between 1985 and 1999, 39 per cent found a permanent starting job. An equal number entered the labour market with an atypical type of contract. After six years, a whopping 79 per cent of all starters had made the step to a permanent contract (Figure 11.1).

![Graph showing distribution of labour market status of starters](image)

Source: Arbeidsaanbodpanel SCP, own edit, see: Bekker and van Deurzen, 2019.

*Figure 11.1 Distribution of labour market status of starters on the labour market, by educational level (in percentage)*
In the period 2000 to 2007, we saw 37 per cent starting with a flexible contract, but only 24 per cent started in a permanent employment. In this period, there was also high unemployment among starters. After six years, 66 per cent of the starters still had a flexible labour market status. Hence, in this period already, the permanent contract was not the final stage for the majority of starters. The youngest generation we followed shows an even greater flexibility. This generation started participating in the labour market between 2008 and 2014, mostly in atypical contracts (56 per cent). After six years, from this generation, 86 per cent were still in flexible jobs. The majority of young people’s labour market trajectories no longer ended with permanent contracts. On the contrary, a large part keeps hopping between temporary contracts, while an increasing group starts working as self-employed. Whereas the permanent employment contract was still the norm before 2000, nowadays it seems to be more of an exception than a regularity.

These results make van Oorschot’s (2004) original call to give sufficient social security to flex workers ever more important. Social security for flex workers would not only mean access to income support when making a transition to a next temporary job. It could also support people in finding new suitable employment, for instance actively bringing them into contact with new employers, thus building bridges between jobs (Borghouts and Freese, 2017).

Additionally, Figure 11.2 shows that less stable labour market status is not equally distributed among groups. In particular, groups with lower levels of education have been flowing into an ever more flexible labour market. Flexibilisation might facilitate their access to a job. However, at the same time, it means only having access to fixed-term employment and no options to get permanent employment contracts. Hence, low-skilled have a hard time in obtaining a stable career and a stable income.
11.3 The impact of long-term flexible work on health

If the Dutch labour market offers atypical employment to early career workers for a longer period, what does this mean in terms of their wellbeing? Using the same dataset as previously, since 2000, we can measure how workers in atypical employment rate their health. We have done this for young people who entered the labour market in the period between 2002 and 2008. We look at the effect of the cumulation of atypical employment spells on health. Because nowadays it is quite normal to enter the labour market with an atypical employment contract, this is not immediately a negative thing. We reason that it is the unfulfilled expectation of transitioning into secure employment that could become a stressor with negative effects on health. Table 11.1 shows that especially for men, accumulation of atypical labour contracts relates to experiencing worse health (van Deurzen and Bekker, 2019). We do not find this relationship for women. The
Leading Social Policy Analysis from the Front

dataset does not allow to derive an explanation for this. It could be that the Dutch society still endorses the single earner breadwinner model, and attaining a secure work arrangement could matter more to men than to women. Alternatively, these results could reflect the specific life stage traversed by the early career workers, that is, of starting a family. If so, and given that they are still primary caretakers for small children, women are more likely to consider the flexibility of atypical employment as a positive feature that allows them to combine work and care. This does not have to mean that long periods in flexible working contracts have no negative effects for young women. We have only tested the effect on self-rated health but have no information on other effects, for instance on mental illness.

Table 11.1 Results of the fixed effects models for the dependent variable of self-rated health

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3w</th>
<th>Model 3m</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.17 (0.03)</td>
<td>3.17 (0.03)</td>
<td>3.06 (0.04)</td>
<td>3.32 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative atypical employment</td>
<td>-0.03 (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.09 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.04)</td>
<td>-0.09 (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* with women (men ref.)</td>
<td>0.11 (0.06)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N respondents</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N observations</td>
<td>1181</td>
<td>1181</td>
<td>637</td>
<td>544</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Effects (with associate standard errors). Bold effects are statistically significant for p < 0.05. w stands for the women subsample; m stands for the male subsample. * interaction with cumulative atypical employment variable.

11.4 Conclusion

Van Oorschot (2004) rightfully addressed the need to provide decent social security to people with flexible jobs. Looking at the ever-growing labour market flexibility, which for some groups
even turns into turbulent and chaotic labour markets, his call to provide social security remains highly relevant. In addition to this, van Oorschot’s critique (2004) of policies that activate (young) people into unstable jobs without a long-term perspective for a stable income or career remains important in current labour markets. Especially the low-skilled seem to have to cope with the prospect of predominant flexibility, without much perspective of getting an open-ended employment contract.

It is good to discuss the effects of flexible employment for employees, including the effects for young people. In this discussion, it also needs to be weighted to what extent we can offer Dutch young people a perspective on permanent employment, or help them in their steps from temporary to temporary jobs. It means answering questions such as if and how a flexible or even turbulent labour market may be combined with a perspective on a career and a stable income. If a permanent contract no longer is a realistic perspective, we need to find inclusivity in different areas, such as social security. In this respect, it is very welcome that the Committee Regulation of Work (2020) calls for an integral redesign of the Dutch rules regarding work, including labour law, social security, taxation and access to learning throughout the life course. This seems a necessity to make sure that ‘chaos’ and ‘turbulence’ on the labour market no longer lead to exclusion, long-term insecurity and bad health. This is even more important for people with primary education as highest acquired level. Social security systems should thus make sure that people in-between different employment statuses get enough income support. Partly, this is also needed for people who do have a job but still cannot make ends meet. Yet, other types of support have to be developed as well, including support in making the transition from job to job, thus building bridges to future and eventually more-secure employment.
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12. Entering the Labour Market Dualism Dilemma: a ‘Macro-Micro-Macro’ Perspective to Investigate Social Divides in European Labour Markets

Valeria Pulignano and Nadja Doerflinger

I like friends who have independent minds because they tend to make you see problems from all angles (Nelson Mandela, 1975).

12.1 The labour market dualism dilemma

Labour market dualisation between a secure and an insecure labour force has become a striking feature of a number of European labour markets. Scholars disagree on whether the weakening of labour market and collective bargaining institutions increase uncertainty for all workers or whether dualisation results from these institutions which aim to protect the security of labour market insiders at the expense of outsiders (Rueda, 2007). Furthermore, the link between dualism and unemployment in macro-level research on labour markets has been highlighted. In particular, within a well-protected (or rigid) labour market, employers would be reluctant to employ workers on secure standard employment contracts to keep a certain level of flexibility (see the ‘insider-outsider’ debate for example Lindbeck and Snower, 1988). As Colin Crouch points out ‘if standard
employment is itself precarious, no one will need to occupy a particular precarious niche’ (Crouch, 2019: 85).

In this vein, the rather ‘static’ argument on dualism and employment protection has been challenged. Several studies illustrate that firms embedded in labour market institutional settings increasingly employ workers outside the frame of the standard employment contract (for example, Rubery et al., 2018; Pulignano et al., 2016). Specifically, employers can minimise the impact of employment protection legislation by hiring workers with lower protection levels who usually are on temporary employment contacts (Vosko, 2010; Stone and Arthurs, 2013), ‘on-call’ (such as in the gig economy) (Wood et al., 2019) or ‘zero-hours’ contracts (Gasparri et al., 2019). Employing workers on non-standard contracts often contributes to removing them from union jurisdiction (Doellgast et al., 2018). In addition, those workers may not enjoy the same (macro-level) protections as those employed on standard employment contracts.

This brief discussion has two essential implications. First, studying dualism only at the macro level can be too narrow since factors at both the firm and industry/sector levels equally account for changes towards more unequal labour market outcomes (Becher et al., 2012; Pulignano and Keune, 2015). Second, standard and non-standard forms of employment are heterogeneous. There is within-group variation in work outcomes, for example, linked to different forms of work within both broad groups (that is, temporary, part-time, zero-hours contracts as different forms of non-standard employment).

This is why current studies in welfare, employment and labour market research have increasingly addressed the need to move beyond ‘methodological nationalism’ (Häusermann and Schwander, 2010; Eichhorst and Marx, 2015; Pulignano, 2018), and to develop an integrative analytical framework when examining inequality, dualism and precariousness in European labour markets. The challenge to develop such a framework in a
sound theoretical and empirical way constituted the basis of the collaboration with our KU Leuven colleague Wim van Oorschot, which started in 2014.

The core of this intellectual challenge was to move away from a pure macro-level institutional analysis of labour market dualism, and thus, to find a way to combine macro- and micro-level structures, behaviours and social interests when examining labour market dualism. The combination of different analytical levels was essential because of a simple principle of industrial relations, that is, institutions regulate employment at different levels (that is, European, national, (inter-)sector, company, workplace). Therefore, macro-level (national) institutional effects may be reproduced at lower levels. For example, working conditions in the private and public sector of a country usually differ with regard to individual dismissal regulation, remuneration systems, and employee representation rights. Moreover, the increase of employers’ discretionary power (Baccaro and Howell, 2017) potentially enhances organisations’ control upon working conditions (for example, wages and working time) everywhere. However, distinctive national and sector-based industrial relations and welfare institutions (for example, trade unions, collective bargaining, social benefits) still retain capacity to monitor and mediate diverse degrees of compliance and/or exit to labour market regulation (Meardi, 2018). Thus, the major question informing our collaboration was: how can we link macro (institutional) and micro (individual) levels of analysis when studying labour market dualism?

12.2 Studying labour market dualism from a macro-micro-macro approach: the social divides perspective

Labour markets, industrial (employment) relations and welfare arrangements are a coherent entity. However, these fields still
largely remain empirically separated within current scholarly work. The pioneering work we developed with Wim van Oorschot deserves to be mentioned as one of the few expectations. Wim’s insightful input regarding the use of a macro-micro-macro perspective to investigate social divides in European labour markets entailed to offer a novel theoretical and empirical perspective to study labour market dualism.

We define social divides as differences or inequalities in working conditions, job quality and social rights of different groups of workers (distinguished by gender, age, education level, nationality and type of employment contract). Two interrelated analytical considerations have underpinned our research rationale. First, the impact of macro-level social structures depends to an important extent on micro-level social actions (Marx, 2012). Thus, we aimed to demonstrate that macro-level social structures as well as micro-level strategies and social processes concur together to enhance or inhibit social divides. Second, macro-level institutions provide direction to the way social actors act at the micro-level, but they do not determine their actions (Pulignano and Keune, 2015). These considerations highlight the necessity to bridge different (that is, macro-micro) levels of social analysis; and we were convinced of the usefulness for studying labour market dualism.

In the 1970s–1980s, the debate on the emergence of labour market dualism focused on the micro-level, examining the impact of individuals’ behaviour and social actors’ preferences on segmentation within firms. Accordingly, the differential treatment between a protected ‘core’ (primary or internal labour market) and a less protected ‘peripheral’ (secondary or external labour market) workforce was considered as a function of the firm’s economic, political and social resources (Doeringer and Piore, 1971; Berger and Piore 1980). Over time, this micro-analytical perspective was gradually abandoned and in recent years the dualisation debate has largely focused on the macro-level. Accordingly, social divides are
conceived as the result of structural policy shifts. This is because micro-level actors are expected to act according to macro-level institutional logics (Emmenegger et al., 2012; Palier and Thelen, 2010). Dualisation thus denotes a ‘political process by which policies increasingly differentiate rights, benefits and services provided to different categories of recipients’ (Emmenegger et al., 2012: 207–208).

In accordance, scholars have investigated various macro-level institutions and mechanisms leading to the creation of outsiders, that is, (1) governments’ social policy reforms in the 2000s with limited redistributive capacities (Gilbert, 2002); (2) dismissal protection legislation, unions’ institutional involvement and labour market policies which have exacerbated or limited insider-outsider differences (Davidsson and Emmenegger, 2013); (3) social and migration policy reforms and eroding collective industrial relations institutions which are believed to increase insider-outsider divides (Emmenegger and Careja, 2012; Arrowsmith and Pulignano, 2013). Hence, neither the micro-level mechanisms easing or preventing social divides nor their interaction with macro-level structures have been sufficiently addressed. This left the question of how social divides are produced in European labour markets largely unexplored.

Our research ideas aimed to integrate a micro-level perspective with a macro-level focus to enhance the theoretical explanatory potential of the macro-level contextual variables in shaping social divides. Following sociological theory on methodological individualism, we argued that linking the macro and micro levels was crucial since micro-variables alone cannot explain macro-level outcomes and vice versa. As Coleman (1990) argues, macro-micro links are the ‘micro foundations’ of macro-level outcomes.

We were convinced that our research idea on developing a macro-micro-macro analytical framework for studying labour market dualism is relevant for sociological theory, as the latter advocates a dynamic approach to the study of labour markets.
This is because internal and external competitive pressures deriving from firms’ strategies mutually interact to shape individuals’ behaviours, and this concurs to shape workers’ labour market positions (Grimshaw and Rubery, 1998). Such considerations informed our central research question, that is, ‘How are social divides produced in contemporary European labour markets?’ However, an essential question remained, that is, How can social divides be empirically investigated from a macro-micro-macro perspective? or How can the macro-micro-macro perspective be put in action?

12.3 Exploring empirically the macro-micro-macro link

To bridge different (that is, macro-micro) levels of social analysis and to explore the macro-micro-macro-link, we considered a sequential mixed-methods research design as the best way to address the different aspects of our research problem. We have envisaged three steps: first, uncovering social divides between different groups of workers at the micro-level; second, explaining those divides by measuring the impact of macro-level institutions; third, explaining the uncovered divides by studying processes and mechanisms taking place at the level of organisations embedded in sectors. Again, Wim’s inputs (complemented by ideas from our KU Leuven colleague Bart Meuleman) were crucial, particularly regarding the first step.

We decided to measure social divides based on latent class analysis (LCA) as an innovative method for uncovering different labour market segments. This was, however, only possible for divides regarding job quality (based on European Working Conditions Survey data) and working conditions (based on European Labour Force Survey data). Due to the lack of comparative European datasets providing information on differences in entitlements to social benefits for certain social risks (that is, unemployment, sickness, disability, old age, care need)
and on the amounts of such entitlements, we could not include the social rights dimension in this step. We have considered using the European Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). However, as it contains only data on the actual benefit receipt and not the entitlement to those benefits, using EU-SILC was not an option. After in-depth discussions, we decided to integrate the social rights dimension at the micro-level through qualitative interviews on workers’ social rights and entitlements provided through ‘occupational welfare’ (Natali and Pavolini, 2014). The inclusion of the occupational welfare dimension is important as employers have become important providers of ‘market-driven’ social benefits at company- and sector-levels (Goodin and Rein, 2001). Related provisions may include non-wage benefits (that is, fringe benefits) and are provided to employees through collective agreements.

Integrating the occupational welfare dimension in the study of social divides is relevant as occupational welfare programmes may potentially reinforce social divides (Seeleib-Kaiser et al., 2012) for three reasons. First, private social protection can constitute a functional equivalent of public social protection for some but not for all occupational groups, which potentially results in a bifurcation of welfare. Second, occupational welfare programmes are based on a strong connection between the characteristics of the employment contract and access to benefit entitlements. In post-industrial societies, labour conditions between (contractual) groups of workers are increasingly differentiated, which could lead to fostering social divides. Third, institutional changes of public welfare may lead to social divides resulting from the abandonment of the universalistic ambition of modern social policy programmes (Streeck and Thelen, 2005).
12.4 Conclusion

The research ideas developed around the concept of social divides received funding from KU Leuven (C14/16/015) and the Flemish Research Council FWO (G071716N). Both projects attracted attention from the scientific community and contributed to advancing knowledge in the field of employment studies and labour sociology. Several articles have already been published, while others are under review or in preparation.

The conceptual framework presenting the macro-micro-macro framework and its implications for the study of social divides in labour markets was the first paper to be published (Pulignano and Doerflinger, 2018). Two interrelated papers focusing on the first step of the approach – that is, uncovering social divides – have been published recently (Lukac et al., 2019, with a methodological-empirical focus; Doerflinger et al., 2020, with a theoretical-empirical focus). Both papers identify five distinct segments in European labour markets, demonstrating that there is more variation than assumed by binary dualisation approaches. They also highlight the intersection between workers’ socio-demographic backgrounds and belonging to certain labour market segments. Another recently accepted article (Frans et al., 2019) revealed that occupational welfare provision can indeed lead to labour market segmentation between different groups of workers based on a comparative study of the chemical and food industries in Belgium and Germany. It particularly highlights the importance of power relations, social actors’ strategies and characteristics of collective bargaining systems as important variables in explaining segmentation outcomes.

These first publications demonstrate the usefulness and the power of the macro-micro-macro framework for the study of labour market dualism. Due to the attention our work has received so far, we are convinced that it will become an important building block of future research and scholarly inquiry. It is also
our contention that it will offer scope for future research across the themes of labour, employment and welfare and social policy, thereby further developing Wim’s original ideas and insightful contribution to studying social divides in European labour markets. THANKS Wim!

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Entering the Labour Market Dualism Dilemma


Wim Van Lancker and Ine Van Hoyweghen

13.1 Introduction

Wim van Oorschot is a great scholar and a generous colleague. He is a leading expert in several fields of welfare state research which many chapters in this book testify. But he is also on top of new developments and always willing to share his thoughts and ideas with others. In this chapter, we want to discuss one new development that Wim focused upon early in his work, and which he encouraged us to further develop in our own work: digitalisation and the organisation of solidarity in the welfare state.

Digitalisation refers to the widespread use of digital technologies to automate or support human decision-making processes. It includes ‘Big Data’ analytics, machine learning algorithms and artificial intelligence. Well-known examples exist in the fields of insurance, profiling, human resources, journalism, credit scoring systems, the criminal justice system, and in a range of online and social media applications. Such automated decision-making (ADM) processes are increasingly deployed in the public realm of the welfare state. It brings together different types of information such as large-scale public administration databases or behavioural information drawn from social media. These are churned by algorithms to detect patterns and aid the allocation of benefits or the provision of services in modern welfare states. In this contribution, we discuss the potential consequences of
digitalisation for the organisation of solidarity in two domains: social security and healthcare.

Digital technologies and the combination of large datasets are increasingly used to allow for a more precise or targeted delivery of public services and goods. Targeting refers to the allocation of goods and services on the basis of a set of pre-defined criteria: who should get what and why? (van Oorschot, 2000). Targeting healthcare interventions on the basis of individual lifestyle characteristics and needs is expected to make healthcare provision more effective on the one hand and to spare people and societies the side-effects and costs of interventions from which they would not benefit on the other hand. Similarly, targeting income protection benefits to people on the basis of ADM processes is supposed to be a more efficient spending of public resources as benefits are limited to those who actually need them. As such, digital technologies allegedly enable an unprecedented level of precision in the delivery of goods and services. This holds great promise of avoiding one of the biggest dysfunctions of targeting: administrative complexity and the problem of non-take-up.

In his seminal 2002 book chapter on targeting income benefits, Wim took a sceptical stance towards the promise of targeting welfare: ‘[It] generally implies lower benefits, stronger and more intrusive controls over personal circumstances and activities, more complex obstacles to the realization of rights, fewer opportunities to become better-off and a greater chance of needy citizens being seen (and treated) as second-rate people’ (2002: 187). As we will discuss in this contribution, these words turned out to be quite prophetic. Instead of making targeting more effective, the use of digital technologies in social security and in healthcare runs a great risk of aggravating these dysfunctions.
13.2 Targeting social security benefits

It is quite obvious that social security systems should be effective in actually reaching those citizens who are entitled to benefits and services. Being entitled to a benefit without actually receiving it, or without even being able to apply for it, is not an effective system of solidarity; it is a mere paper reality at the expense of the most vulnerable. Unfortunately, the welfare state is rife with problems of non-take-up (NTU) of social rights and benefits. Despite the fact that already in the 1980s NTU has been designated ‘one of the most serious problems facing social security systems’ (Fry and Stark, 1987), it is still pervasive across welfare states. In particular for means-tested benefits, it is estimated that NTU frequently affects more than half of the eligible population (Eurofound, 2015).

More than two decades ago, Wim put forward a powerful critique of the majority of studies at the time that tried to explain non-take-up (NTU) by focusing solely on the individual claimant level (van Oorschot, 1996). One of Wim’s key insights was that the role of social professionals in public administration is important to understand the occurrence of NTU. In a variety of settings, professionals, social workers or civil servants have to decide upon or carry out an increasingly complex set of rules, guidelines, and instructions. This is called discretion and refers to some leeway in their decision-making. Because legislation can never be tailored to every specific circumstance or situation, discretion means that professionals can and will exert their power to treat clients or customers differently and choose a particular course of action in accordance to their own, subjective judgement. Be it a teacher who decides upon grade retention, a human resource professional who has to decide upon whether to invite a job candidate or not, or a social worker who has to judge whether a client was searching hard enough for a job. Previous research has shown that the use of discretion by social professionals
responsible for checking eligibility to social assistance benefits leads to inequality in treatment, to delays in the process, and to mistakes in the final decisions. Importantly, a substantial share of the variation in decision-making can be explained by characteristics of social professionals, including their welfare state attitudes and their perception of clients’ deservingness. The study of deservingness perceptions is another area where Wim’s work has been hugely influential (we refer to many of the chapters in this book). In any case, sometimes people do not get what they are entitled to because the professionals judging them are prejudiced (De Wilde and Marchal, 2019).

Enter automated decision-making (ADM). Public administrations increasingly rely on big datasets which include interlinked social security and labour market information of citizens. Algorithms, then, are the tools used to churn these datasets to identify potential beneficiaries, prioritise benefits claimants or service users, predict fraudulent behaviour, or assess compliance with eligibility conditions. ADM is promising in avoiding the errors humans unavoidably make: algorithms are not prejudiced with regard to deservingness criteria and treat everyone on the same footing, automated processes running on big datasets are usually cheaper than humans ploughing through case files, and it shows great potential to proactively identify potential beneficiaries and grant social rights automatically, which should lead to much higher take-up rates. These are promising features of digitalisation indeed.

Scepticism is nevertheless warranted because digitalisation can also be fraught with pitfalls. The use of algorithms churning big data can compound the effect of simple errors. Automated decisions can be biased and perpetuate prejudice because the models are based on skewed or low-quality data. Additionally, grave concern has been voiced about a lack of transparency and accountability in automated decisions.
In 2018, it was announced that Amazon would abandon its automated programme to automatically screen résumés and rate applicants for its available jobs. It turned out that the algorithm was biased against women, reflecting gender inequalities in the field of IT, tech and engineering. Trained by biased data, the programme learned that men were better suited for tech jobs and, as a consequence, were more likely to end up on top of short lists. Despite its aura of neutrality and objectivity, ADM tools are only as good as the data they are fed with. While the Amazon example might seem innocent, applied to social security the consequences of bias could be devastating. For instance, algorithms that are deployed on big databases to predict child abuse will disproportionally target minorities and low-income families because that was the prejudice that crept into human decision-making before. If the content of underlying databases are a reflection of deservingness perceptions of civil servants, algorithms will tend to reproduce these biases. Particularly problematic here is the scale of things. While case managers can have prejudices that lead to unequal treatment of particular clients, ADM risks compounding errors affecting thousands of beneficiaries at once. In her book on automation practices in the US, Virginia Eubanks (2018) documents how the systematic replacement of case workers by automated processes in the welfare administration in Indiana has led to a dramatic reduction of beneficiaries due to the combination of deliberate policies to save money, technological failures, inability to hold private contractors accountable, and the lack of human oversight to intervene in the process or rectify computer errors.

The problem not only lies with data quality. It also lies in the very nature of social security which often relies on human judgement that cannot easily be quantified or programmed. Michael Lipsky once famously wrote that ‘the nature of service provision calls for human judgement that cannot be programmed and for which machines cannot substitute’ (2010: 161). Although
human discretion inevitably can lead to misjudgement, it can also lead to empathy, care, and the possibility to bend the rules to the benefit of vulnerable people. Moreover, replacing human decision-making by automated processes might also increase NTU because many vulnerable people lack the digital savviness to deal with online application systems. Life experiences are complex and automated systems, even if they are top notch, may not always be able to cope with these complexities. In a recent study, Millar and Whiteford (2019) document how fully-automated systems in the UK (Universal Credit) and Australia (CentreLink), designed to match data on incomes, family composition and employment in real time in order to predict benefit payments, are extremely error-prone. As a result, the number of alleged overpayments rose strongly. Many families had to repay large amounts of debts, which disproportionately affected families with irregular incomes and pushed them deep into the abyss.

Finally, the lack of transparency and accountability is a problem deeply engrained in automated decision-making. Usually, social professionals dealing with clients and benefit recipients are not those who have designed the algorithm nor have access to the black box of automated-decision-making. It is hard to challenge decisions and benefit refusals if it is not clear what criteria influenced the decision. This is particularly the case where administrators and social professionals themselves are no longer aware of the logic of the decision-making process.

An important part of the theoretical framework developed by Wim to explain NTU is that it is the result of a multilevel process in which different actors are simultaneously involved: claimant behaviour is influenced by the behaviour of administrators and by the design of the benefit scheme (van Oorschot, 1996). It is striking how useful this framework remains until today and how neatly new developments such as the digitalisation of the welfare state can be fitted in it.
13.3 Targeting healthcare

In healthcare, digital technologies have made it possible to capture ever wider aspects of people’s bodies and behaviours to stratify them into more-granular and more-dynamic groups according to their ‘personalised’ health profile. The notion of ‘Precision Medicine’ marks the shift towards a type of medicine that empowers patients by being more participatory and personalised than biomedicine has been in the past. The imperative of Personalised and Precision Medicine is that no two patients should be treated exactly the same, and each should be given diagnosis, treatment and monitoring that is tailored to their specific, individual characteristics. These practices of targeting, in the form of stratification or predictive profiling, do not place people in stable diagnostic or therapeutic groups where they then remain for a long time. Instead, they create new group categories on the basis of molecular and other characteristics that may be short lived. For example, breast cancer screening is no longer reserved for the broad category of women above a certain age. Instead, women who carry a particular molecular characteristic – for example one of the BRCA gene mutations that increase the risk of breast and ovarian cancer considerably – are invited for screening from a much younger age, in smaller intervals, and they have access to special screening services in certain healthcare systems. Furthermore, when a woman is diagnosed with breast cancer, the choice of treatment that she will receive is often influenced by the size of the tumour, the stage of the cancer, and the woman’s personal status and preferences (for example, menopausal status, age, would she prefer breast-conserving surgery, if possible?), but also by the tumour’s molecular subtype including hormone receptor status and other genomic markers. This means that the old categories of gender and age are now operating in combination with molecular and other categories
pertaining to treatment response, familial, lifestyle-related, or genetic risk factors to shape the care pathway.

Against the backdrop of these developments, there are concerns that the focus on personalised targeting and individual differences will have a corrosive effect on solidarity in healthcare. The process of dynamically stratifying people into (ever smaller) groups and using these ‘personalised’ classifications not only for treatment and other clinical purposes but to determine different levels or kinds of contributions that people need to make to the financing of the system is seen as breaking up the idea of risk and income solidarity that have characterised many welfare state institutions. For example, what happens when resources and services are scarce, and access to them will be limited to those who have the highest predicted benefit? In other words, what if those that are excluded are not merely women who will not benefit from an intervention, but those that are predicted to benefit less than others? This is the realm of silent rationing (Prainsack and Van Hoyweghen, 2020): The categories and practices of stratification are becoming harder to trace, and are sometimes made invisible. The affected people have no control over (at least some of) the categories that are used for stratification. Often, they do not even know. Do often not even know that a certain type of information is used. This, of course, applies also to clinical decision-making in traditional contexts in which patients do often not know what information is used to put them into different diagnostic, prognostic or therapeutic groups. When decisions on stratification are made by humans, however, these humans can be asked to explain and be held accountable. Such explicable and accountability is much more difficult when decision-makers are machines (Marelli et al, 2020). Moreover, when categories of stratification are dynamic and the association between people and categories are fluid, it becomes practically impossible for people to address biases that have implications on fairness and equity; let alone to recognise themselves as being part
of a social ‘group’, imagining themselves as being discriminated against (Moor and Lury 2018).

Further, as soon as behavioural information such as activity levels or sleeping patterns is used, it is only a small step to moralising these behaviours (Meyers and Van Hoyweghen, 2018). For example, let us assume that two patients compete for a place in the same clinical trial. Both have the same predicted benefit based on factors such as their cancer type and stage, their overall health status, their genetic predisposition. One of them is then found to lead a more sedentary lifestyle and sleeps irregularly. In this situation, it could appear perfectly ‘rational’ to exclude the person with the unhealthy lifestyle and give the precious place to the other person. In this manner, the use of behavioural information to stratify patients into groups for diagnosis and treatment can introduce individual responsibility into healthcare stratification through the back door. Such logic is particularly pervasive when political discourses strongly emphasise the strains on healthcare budgets. The real threat to solidarity is a public discourse that emphasises differences in costs and risks between people and suggests that these differences fall within the realm of personal responsibility, such as unhealthy lifestyle ‘choices’, or others who are considered as ‘free riders’ in another way (Hendrickx and Van Hoyweghen, 2018). These people, so it is argued, have removed themselves from the realm of those who ‘deserve’ our solidarity. Again, Wim’s work on deservingness criteria for solidarity is seminal here to address. This morally charged debate about perceived ‘deservingness’ constitutes the ground of political efforts to assign responsibilities between the state, tax payers, insurers and individuals in welfare states. Digital technologies such as predictive profiling in healthcare tend to mobilise new ‘categories of worth’ of potential beneficiaries of healthcare that are presented as the result of individuals’ personal choice (Meyers and Van Hoyweghen, 2018).
Taking the argument a step further, behaviour would no longer need to be openly labelled as ‘irresponsible’ in order to be seen problematic. Instead, seemingly innocuous behavioural characteristics such as preferences for certain types of foods or exercise habits, if found to be associated with worse disease outcomes than other characteristics, would acquire the role of ‘objective’ evidence upon which people are excluded from certain services. Given that those living in economic and social deprivation have, on average, worse health conditions, it is possible that characteristics that are prevalent in this group could become markers of worse health outcomes. The institutional danger here is that we are ‘editing out’ social justice considerations from our welfare state institutional arrangements (Prainsack and Van Hoyweghen, 2020). This situation is, however, not only rendered invisible by the air of objectivity that digital data-driven analyses often entail, but also by the fluid nature of data-driven risk stratification. If a correlation is found between two factors, then acting upon this correlation is seen as following the data and as not taking a political decision (Van Hoyweghen, 2014). Especially where behavioural aspects underpin such stratification, risk becomes a matter of personal responsibility. Through these mechanisms, practices of silent rationing would introduce social justice issues on top of the health disparities that we are already observing in many societies. Silent rationing threatens solidarity not by attacking it head-on, but by quietly taking it apart into small pieces (Prainsack and Van Hoyweghen, 2020).

13.4 Conclusion

Impact in academia is usually gauged on the basis of metrics such as h-indices or number of citations. And although Wim scores particularly well on these metrics, his true impact perhaps is that his theoretical as well as his empirical work remains highly
relevant to understand new societal developments and guide new research questions.

How digitalisation affects the organisation of solidarity in welfare states is one of these fields where his academic legacy is long-lived. In this chapter, we touched upon some of the promises and pitfalls that are associated with the digitalisation of the welfare state, drawing on the examples of social security and healthcare. This deserves, of course, further scrutiny and more empirical research. We hope this chapter inspires more researchers to take on these questions in the same way as Wim van Oorschot always did throughout his career: critically, but always with great rigour.

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Ruud J.A. Muffels

14.1 Preface on Wim’s career

For almost 15 years, between 1985 and 1999, Tilburg University was accommodating the multidisciplinary Department of Social Security. This department was headed by professor Jos Berghman and Wim van Oorschot was one of the first assistant professors. Already at that time, Wim was publishing on the same issues as he still is: non-take-up (1991), deservingness (2000), poverty (2000, with Halman), social capital and solidarity (2005, with Arts) and welfare state issues in general such as means-tested minimum income and basic income schemes (Roosma and van Oorschot, 2020). Long before he published his most cited article on deservingness in 2000, he published in 1991 his first article on non-take-up of social security in the prominent Journal of European Social Policy, of which he later became one of the editors.

For a period of 14 years, Wim and I worked together on welfare state issues but from different disciplinary angles. He is a sociologist, whereas I am an economist. Wim worked hard and his career developed swiftly with a steep gradient. After he moved to Leuven to become the successor of the former head of the Department in Tilburg, Jos Berghman, he proceeded to build up an even more impressive second career. Over these last 30 years, Wim not only stuck to the same research topics but also continued to be an excellent researcher and teacher – one that is
very clear in what he says (and for that and many other reasons is loved by his students), very well documented, with a broad and in-depth overview of the literature, very well organized and very productive. In his entire work, he shows to be engaged with and concerned about the position of the weakest in society. This is clearly reflected in the topics he covered and covers but also in what drives and motivates him as an intellectual and as a person.

The way the weakest in the labor market are treated in welfare provisions is also the subject of this contribution. In what follows, I discuss the findings of a unique random control trial (RCT) experiment in five Dutch municipalities, which aimed at comparing the effectiveness of current ‘workfare’ policies with a more lenient way of supporting people on social assistance. The latter is based on rendering trust and autonomy to people on the one hand and more intensive mediation and tailored support to the welfare recipient on the other. The main research question of the study was what social policy intervention works better with regard to both people’s employability and wellbeing. Pre-selected outcome measures focused both on outflow to paid work but also on improving the wellbeing, health, capabilities (opportunities), social integration and self-management capacities of the people participating in the RCT.

In the next section, I will briefly outline the design and aims of these five trust experiments in the Dutch social welfare system and the relationship with ‘social investment’ policies (Hemerijck, 2017). First, the theoretical ideas underpinning the various treatments are set out and the conceptual model for the research is explained. Then, I briefly report the main results of these two-year lasting trust experiments and discuss them with reference to some of Wim’s publications. Finally, I briefly reflect upon the lessons for social policy that can be learned from these findings.
14.2 Brief sketch of the Dutch trust experiments

In autumn 2017, ten municipalities started a unique two-year RCT experiment on the basis of the Participation Act. Six of them made use of the experimentation article 83 in this act allowing municipalities to implement a two-year lasting experiment. The other four municipalities made use of other existing law to launch similar experiments. The only difference between the two approaches is that the experiments based on article 83 of the Participation Act are allowed to provide for extra earnings releases during the experimenting period while the others are not. The reason for the experimenting was, among other things, the need to improve the effectiveness of social assistance due to budget constraints that applied after the Participation Act came into force on 1 January 2015.

The total number of participants in these ten experiments was 5000. With this, the ten Dutch RCT-experiments were one of the biggest experiments in social security ever conducted worldwide, even slightly larger than the basic income experiments in the US or Canada in the 1970s. 40 per cent or 2068 of the 5000 participants took part in the five experiments that Tilburg University was studying and that are discussed in more detail in this contribution.

The aims of the experiments
The experiments aimed to investigate what works better: the ‘stick and carrot’ approach in the current system (‘the hard hand’) which involves many benefit conditions and strict controls, or an approach which is based on putting trust in peoples’ intentions, paying tribute to their intrinsic motivation, giving more autonomy and freedom of choice, intensive mediation and support and rewarding people’s initiative in finding work by more-generous earnings release conditions (‘the soft hand’; see also Kremer et al., 2017).
The content of the treatments

Apart from the standard treatment in which people are subject to the existing more or less strict application and re-integration obligations (the 'stick and carrot' of workfare approach), there were three different treatments which were rather differently implemented in the five participating cities:

1. The self-management or exemption group. The idea for this group is that beneficiaries need to learn how to self-manage their re-entry into work. The participants are exempted from the existing application and re-integration obligations. In Tilburg, they got an additional work bonus when they found full-time work.

2. The earnings release group (only possible for experiments based on article 83 of the Participation Act). In case they found paid work, the additional earnings of participants in this group were taxed at a rate of 50 per cent instead of 75 or 100 per cent in the standard case (but up to a maximum of about €200 per month only, the income ceiling of which was not changed). They were to some extent exempted from the application and re-integration obligations except for the city of Wageningen where they got the standard treatment.

3. The tailor-made supervision group. Participants in this group got extra support through tailor-made supervision and intensive mediation. They had more-frequent contact with their caseworker (five to six times a year) and the treatment of the client was demand-driven instead of supply-driven, meaning that participants could decide on the content of the treatment to a large extent.

In Tilburg, the self-management and the intensive mediation conditions were not single treatments but combined with the extra earnings release option plus an extra work bonus that was granted by the municipality to people who found full-time work.
Welfare conditionality

Access to welfare benefits was not unconditional in these experiments. Instead, reciprocity was assumed: in return for the wavering of the liabilities, participants had to be committed to and put effort into the treatment to make it a success. In some cities, they also signed an agreement in which rights and duties were stipulated. With this, the welfare experiments aligned with the ‘deservingness criteria’ which according to Wim’s findings provide an important explanation for popular support for welfare benefits targeted to people most deserving or in need such as the poor, the disabled and the elderly (van Oorschot, 2006). The job search obligations were, however, less strict than in the regular treatment, that is strongly based on workfare principles (the use of benefit sanctions if the strict job search requirements are not met [the ‘stick’] combined with benefits at some distance of the minimum wage to provide financial incentives [the ‘carrot’] when people move quickly into paid work). It was assumed that this will allegedly put less stress on people and allow them to search for better job matches and sustainable employment. The idea of rewarding instead of sanctioning was reflected in the reduced deduction or withdrawal rate of extra earnings. The municipalities expected that the more relaxed and rewarding way of treatment (reduced conditionality) would improve the motivation, health and wellbeing of the participants in the RCT.

14.3 Theoretical framework

The theoretical framework of the experiments was formed by a combination of behavioral economic and social-psychological insights. In particular, the following four insights have stood at the basis of the experiment.

The first insight concerns the influence of poverty on the ‘mindset’ or mental state of people. Research shows that (financial)
scarcity and stress due to poverty reduce people's cognitive resources (Mani et al., 2013). If financial scarcity and fulfilling social assistance obligations take up a large part of people's cognitive resources, there is little room for important and cognitively challenging tasks, such as retraining for another job, maintaining the social network or actively looking for paid work (Groot et al., 2019).

The second insight comes from behavioral economics. It deals with the principles and values which are embedded in the labor market and social security institutions and the way in which they influence the behavior of beneficiaries in the form of, for example, search behavior. Underlying values include reciprocity ('tit for tat') and trust. Reciprocity means that individuals reward good treatment or the receipt of trust (an investment in social relationships) by, for example, making an extra effort (positive reciprocity) while doing the opposite if they are treated badly or treated on the basis of mistrust (negative reciprocity) (Fehr and Schmidt, 2003). Findings from experimental economy also show that, in exchange for the trust they receive, people are extra motivated and do their best for their task, thus rewarding those who trust them (Groot et al., 2019). So, trust is believed to lead to feelings of positive reciprocity and therefore to sustained commitment and increased productivity (Bohnet et al., 2001).

The third insight comes from psychological motivation theory, suggesting that extrinsic stimuli can crowd out intrinsic motivation (Frey and Jegen, 2001). Intrinsic motivation can be enhanced by offering an activity as a choice rather than a means of control (Groot et al., 2019). Self-determination theory (Deci and Ryan, 1985) states that intrinsically motivated people demonstrate greater effectiveness and persistence in their behavior and improved wellbeing. This means that giving confidence to people creates a sense of self-management, which in turn has an effect on job-seeking behavior and sustainable employment.
The fourth and last insight is about capacitating people and providing ‘freedom of choice’. It stems from Sen’s ‘capability theory’. Within this theory, capabilities are the options people have or are offered to be or do the things they have reasons to value most for their own lives. This way, people have or are given opportunities or options that enhance their wellbeing (Sen, 1999, 2004). Both the exemption/self-management as well as the tailored support treatment learn people to be or become self-reliant and might therefore render people freedom of action and choice while increasing their capability set (set of opportunities).

Social investment policy

The fourth insight which builds on Sen’s capacitating approach aligns very well with the idea of ‘social investment’. In an earlier paper, me and some colleagues argued that the experiments might promote an upcoming shift from ‘workfare’-oriented policies, which is still rather dominant in the Netherlands, to ‘social investment’ policy approaches (Groot et al., 2019). The idea was that the experiments put particular social values more upfront, such as personal autonomy (capacitating people by providing ‘free choice’ options) and trust (activating people by putting trust in their self-management capacities). For that reason, the five local experiments discussed here were labelled ‘trust experiments’. We expected that notably the tailored support treatment will also have positive effects on ‘procedural justice’ (tailored support will help to avoid administrative mistakes) and reduce ‘non-take-up’ (tailored support will inform participants on their rights and opportunities), issues on which Wim showed particular interest and published in the past (van Oorschot, 1991).

According to Sen, conversion factors convert the available personal resources such as knowledge, skills and social networks into individual choices or capabilities. In Wim’s contributions to the literature, many references can be found, though implicitly, to personal (welfare state values, opinions and principles) as well as
Figure 14.1 Sen's capability model and RCT-experiments, based on Sen's capability theory (reworked from Muffels et al., 2020; derived from van der Klink et al., 2016)
contextual conversion factors (on procedural justice, non-take-up, universality, targeting) (Oorschot, 1991, 2004). In Figure 14.1, the personal and contextual conversion factors are partly shaped by the design and content of the experimental treatments.

14.4 Research outcomes

The research consisted of a product and a process evaluation. The product evaluation was aimed at determining whether or not each of the various treatments perform better than the comparison group. The ‘primary’ outcome measure is outflow into full-time employment (that is, working more than 27 hours a week). The ‘secondary’ or non-work outcome measures are: subjective wellbeing (SWB), subjective health (SH), mental health (MH), perceived capabilities (CAP), social trust (SRUST), self-efficacy in finding work (SEFF), social networking (SNETW) and income and deprivation poverty reduction (IPR; DPR). See Appendix 14A.1 for an overview of the exact operationalizations. The work outcome measure is assessed using the local administrative data on outflow whereas the results on the non-work outcome measures are based on three client surveys. The process evaluation is aimed at examining how the experiment was implemented in the municipality and how the treatments were realized. To this end, focus group interviews were held every eight months with the caseworkers and the project leader(s). Additionally, three online surveys were filled in by the caseworkers (Sanders et al., 2020).

Product evaluation findings: outflow to work and non-work outcomes

The experiments were implemented between 1 October 2017 and the end of 2019. The data used for examining the employment effects are the local administrative data covering the period up to 1 October 2019. Tilburg started a few months later in December 2017. The observation time span ranged therefore between 22 to 24 months, which is rather short to observe behavioral changes.
Table 14.1 Outcomes of product evaluation of five Dutch trust experiments

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Leading Social Policy Analysis from the Front
Table 14.1 (continued)

Notes: Acronyms: EMP = Employment; SWB = subjective wellbeing; SH = subjective health; MH = mental health; CAP = capabilities; SRUST = social trust; SEFF = self-efficacy; SNETW = social networks; IPR = income poverty reduction; DPR = deprivation poverty reduction; NI = new inflow; SB = stock of beneficiaries.

Effects: +/- positive/negative significant effect (p < 0.10); 0 = no effect.

Models: LR = logistic regression with calculated % difference with comparison group; PSM (ATE) = propensity score matching with calculated average treatment effect for the treated and non-treated in % difference of the treatments with the comparison group; OLS = Ordinary Least Squares.

Controls: Models are estimated with controls at start of experiment for age, age squared, gender, born in foreign country, highest education level, number of times in welfare, log of welfare spell duration; housing situation (renter, owner; in living; other); family situation (single elderly, single person, multiple person households).

Table 14.1 summarizes the results on the various outcome measures. We started with estimating logistic regression models (LR) for calculating the employment probabilities across the various treatments, controlling for a number of covariates in the models (see note in Table 14.1). Surprisingly, the results largely contradict our expectations. Based on the literature, we contended positive employment effects of the experimental treatments. Instead, we found either insignificant effects or, in the case of Tilburg, even negative effects. We only found a positive and significant employment effect for the self-management group in the city of Apeldoorn for people very shortly in welfare benefit receipt (NI = new inflow) and for the extra support treatment for people who were already longer in welfare (SB = the stock of beneficiaries).

However, further analyses of the data in which we compared the employment outcomes of the RTC participants with a second comparison group of non-participants on welfare benefits (reference group) showed that the control group performed better than this comparison group of non-participants. In Tilburg, this was even the case at the start and after controlling for...
composition differences (through logistic regression and matching methods). It also showed that the treatment groups performed better than the reference group with on average 5 to 13 per cent positive and significant differences in the various cities (ATE effects). Because the treatment groups and the reference group are likely to be selective, it is necessary to control for self-selection of participants into these groups (notably by benefit duration, educational level, foreign background). The information in the three caseworker surveys provided further evidence on the change of the control treatment during the experiment. Already at the start of the experiment the control group apparently behaved very differently in Tilburg (but apparently also in other cities) compared to the treatment and reference group due to experiment effects (see Muffels et al., 2020; de Boer et al, 2020). It requires further scrutiny to find out to what extent behavioral effects by participants and caseworkers might indeed explain the absence of the contended effects on outflow to paid work.

Concerning the non-work outcomes, the results of the treatment groups compared to the control group are slightly more in line with our expectations. Although most of the effects are non-significant, in various cities some outcome measures are positive and significant. Most positive effects are found in Tilburg with the extra support group on self-efficacy; on subjective wellbeing, freedom of choice or capabilities and on subjective health. Finally, in three cities (Tilburg, Wageningen and Apeldoorn), we found positive effects of the self-management and the extra support treatments on reducing income (IPR) or deprivation poverty (DPR). Over time, we found some positive changes of these treatments such as on social trust. However, we need to stress that these non-work outcome measures tend not to change easily. For wellbeing, we even speak of a lifetime set-point, suggesting that only very serious events like the death of a child or a partner might change it (Headey et al., 2010). The same holds for social trust or mental health because these are rather stable
Dutch Local Trust Experiments

attributes of people. Moreover, the effects might easily cancel each other out within a particular treatment group because there is no one-size-fits-all approach and each person needs a specially tailored treatment. Eventually, because of the small numbers in each city, there might be a power problem for finding significant effects as might have been the case in Wageningen and Oss notably (see Muffels et al., 2020).

**Process evaluation**

Eventually, the process evaluation showed that the effects on the quality of service provision might be substantial. Caseworkers were very enthusiastic about the intensive support treatment which was by most of them considered to be a very successful treatment because there was now more time and space for having an open communication with people on welfare benefits and for giving attention and tailored support. The caseworkers saw their relationship with the people improved and judge the outcomes for them to be very positive. They all assigned a very high, positive score to the experiment (on a scale from 0 to 10 they gave an 8 or 9) after two years of experimenting. In their view, it takes a long time to build up a trust relationship with the people but, once it is achieved, they tend to become more cooperative and willing to act. This becomes apparent in the significant steps made by the participants in their view on the ‘participation ladder’.

### 14.5 Lessons for policymaking and conclusions

The lessons for social policy that can be learned from the experiments are especially that a treatment with more personal attention and tailored support to the most disadvantaged people improves the quality of service delivery while it improves at the same time the job satisfaction of the caseworkers. The ideas embedded in ‘social investment’ approaches might pay off also with a view to improve the employment chances of the most
disadvantaged people on welfare benefits. This mainly concerns those with already long periods of benefit receipt and refers to enhancing their social participation, social trust, subjective wellbeing and health. It needs, however, time before the fruits of these efforts can be reaped.

A lot of issues about which Wim has published during his academic career such as procedural (in)justice, non-take-up, problematic debt, (un)deservingness, (in)formal solidarity and poverty might at least be partly re-considered if the implementation of welfare practices would become more tuned with the new theoretical insights from the welfare state literature that are sketched above. Survey research as well as these field experiments give us also invaluable insights into the ‘black box’ of service delivery and implementation. A ‘human centred’ social investment approach that is based on values such as trust, respect and autonomy and that is more aligned with current theoretical insights on influencing behavior (nudging) and (intrinsically) motivating people might be better equipped to achieve an effective, fair and efficient welfare system. A welfare system to which Wim made such novel and rich scientific contributions with his research.

NOTES

1. The Participation Act replaced on 1 January 2015 the Social Assistance Act. The aim was to get more people more swiftly into paid work and to decentralize the implementation to the municipalities.

2. The administrative records of the municipality contain information on the reason of exit out of welfare. We included people who exited as employee in regular or subsidized work or as a self-employed person.
REFERENCES


Appendix 14A.1
Operationalization of non-work outcome measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey questions</th>
<th>All measures are normalized on 0–10 scale.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subjective wellbeing (SWB)</td>
<td>Average score on life satisfaction (0–10), meaning of life (0–10) and happiness (0–5).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjective health (SH)</td>
<td>Subjective health question (1 = very bad to 5 = excellent).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental health (MH)</td>
<td>Mental health scale based on 5 items and 5-points Likert scale: never = 1 to 5 = always. Items: nervous; sad-down, gloomy-depressed; calm-peaceful; happy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunities-Capabilities (CAP)</td>
<td>Based on two questions and 7 items: item is considered important; available in own situation (Likert scale 1 = never to 5 = always). Items: to do things qualified for; learn new things; co-decide; set own targets; have good contacts; a decent income; contribute to the life of others. Capability index: weighted sum of items, weighted with level of importance ranging from 1 to 5 and normalised on 0–10 scale.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social trust (STRUST)</td>
<td>ESS survey question on how much trust people put in others on 0–10 scale.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-efficacy (SEFF)</td>
<td>Based on 4 statements and 5-points Likert scale 1 = completely disagree to 5 = completely agree. Items: find work when I put effort; confident to find work in future; can make good impression when apply; job fits well to my education/skills.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social networking (SNETW)</td>
<td>Frequency of monthly contacts with family, friends, neighbours, ranging from 0 to 4 times a month.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 14A1.1 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey questions</th>
<th>All measures are normalized on 0–10 scale.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Income poverty reduction (IPR)</td>
<td>Based on question on financial situation ranging from: have to make debts, dissave, just make ends meet, saving a bit of money, can save money. Reduced probability of living in income poverty (% of people with debts or disavings).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deprivation poverty reduction (DPR)</td>
<td>Based on two questions on necessity of item and whether one can afford it on 5 out of 14 selected items derived from EU-SILC deprivation list. 5 items: once a day fruit/vegetables; once a day a meal with meat, poultry or fish; replace worn-out furniture; replace worn clothes; repair damaged equipment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Obtaining a sufficient income without having to work, without showing the willingness to work or demonstrating that one is not (or no longer) able to work, is fundamentally opposing the foundations of the common welfare systems that are in place nowadays (Roosma and van Oorschot, 2020: 191).

15.1 Introduction

Wim has built a successful academic career on research into the legitimacy of the welfare state, more specifically into the criteria deemed just for granting rights to social security. In a recent article with Femke Roosma (2020), he has extended this research into an exploration of public support for a universal basic income, understood by the two authors as a ‘radical alternative’ for currently existing welfare systems. In what follows, I argue that to explain such support precisely its ‘radicalness’ necessitates a theoretical framework that goes beyond issues of social justice. My argument is that even though the notions of social justice and citizenship have often been lumped together, the two do not coexist harmoniously, let alone coincide. More than that: they are ultimately incompatible, because social justice has a dark side that makes it an enemy of citizenship.
15.2 Citizenship and social justice

Much of the literature about social policy and the welfare state overlooks the crucial difference between citizenship-based social rights and entitlements based on considerations of social justice. Citizenship rights apply to all citizens equally and are as such unconditional, whether they are civil, political or social rights (Marshall, 1950). Civil liberties and political rights, both firmly rooted in the Enlightenment heritage, are intimately intertwined with modern ideals of liberty and democracy. They are freedoms acknowledged by the modern liberal state to protect citizens against the state. Examples are freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, freedom of expression, freedom of speech, the right to privacy, freedom of assembly, freedom of press, the right to vote and the right to run for office. These rights have been historically decisive in the development of modern Western democracies, as can be seen from their centrality in documents like the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (France, 1789), the United States Bill of Rights (1791), and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations, 1948). What characterises these rights is that they are granted to all citizens equally and unconditionally, so without the need to qualify for them by meeting other requirements than being a citizen.

The same applies to citizenship-based social rights, which in effect evade the awkward distributive question ‘Who should get what, and why?’ (van Oorschot, 2000). For these rights are not derived from a framework of social justice (or distributive justice, if one prefers), ‘the most valuable general definition of [which] is that which brings out its distributive character most plainly: justice is suum cuique, to each his due’ (Miller, 1976: 10, emphasis in original). So unlike citizenship, social justice is not unconditional, does not treat citizens equally, and is not about protecting citizen’s freedom vis-à-vis the state. The two in effect deal strikingly different with the principle of equality. Whereas citizenship
defines all citizens as equal, social justice proposes substantive criteria to define who will be treated equally or unequally. In other words, unlike citizenship, social justice is about the legitimisation of unequal distributions: it does not set itself the task of treating citizens equally.

This is why criteria deemed necessary for a just distribution have traditionally been central to social justice research, which has become the hard core of Wim’s research from the second half of the 1990s onwards, after a start with research into non-take-up of social security benefits (van Oorschot, 1994). Wim’s recent research foregrounds the so-called ‘CARIN’ criteria that qualify people for welfare deservingness in the eyes of the public at large: 1) not being personally responsible for one’s needy situation (Control); 2) displaying gratefulness for support received (Attitude); 3) having contributed financially to the welfare system and/or trying hard to find a job (Reciprocity); 4) being seen as an in-group member by the public at large (Identity); and 5) being in need (Need) (van Oorschot, 2000; van Oorschot et al., 2017).

Like most other students of the welfare state, Wim in effect construes the latter’s legitimacy in the distributive terms of social justice. This creates a blind spot for a different set of issues that plagues the legitimacy of the welfare state, that is, its implications for liberty and freedom. These are not issues of social justice but of citizenship, that is, of citizens’ liberty vis-à-vis the state. Indeed, social justice and citizenship need to be distinguished carefully, because loss of freedom is the price that needs to be paid for social justice.

15.3 Why the quest for social justice undermines liberty

A widespread yet one-sided conception of the welfare state as a benevolent rights-granting redistributive machine masks its disciplinary role in forcing people into social conformity and
sacrifice of their personal liberty (for example Macarov, 1980; Piven and Cloward, 1971). While this ugly face of the welfare state is typically taken for granted as far as the poor laws of the past are concerned, it is often neglected in case of the contemporary welfare state. Yet, four of the five CARIN-criteria foregrounded by Wim (for example in van Oorschot et al., 2017) make social rights conditional upon conformity to state-imposed behavioral standards. The criteria of control, attitude, reciprocity and identity all demand that people identify with the bourgeois mainstream and stay away from lifestyles and identities deviating from it.

The fifth CARIN criterion (need) in principle justifies social assistance irrespective of meeting demands of conformity. It differs sharply from the four other criteria, because the needy are not necessarily those who merit support on the basis of identity or past or current lifestyle. Yet, the principle of need curbs people’s freedom, too, albeit in a different manner. Whereas the other distributive criteria force people into social conformity, it rather forces them to open up their private lives for inspection by the state to check and monitor their deservingness. Those concerned need to prove that they do actually belong to the needy category singled out for support and they also need to comply with administrative controls aimed at verifying the accuracy of the provided information. This is a logical and inevitable corollary of the quest for social justice, because any discrepancy between administrative records that justify social rights and actually lived reality entails fraud or abuse that disturbs the just distribution aimed for. These administrative controls inevitably raise privacy issues, as in the case of so-called ’toothbrush counters’ who check one’s relationship status through home visits.

The quest for social justice, to sum up, not only limits the lifestyle choices people can legitimately make but also puts their privacy at stake. Because precisely issues like these are central to citizenship-based freedoms, social justice does not exist harmoniously with citizenship. It rather stands in its way. While
The Dark Side of the Welfare State

this dark side of social justice has all too often been neglected in literature about the welfare state, Dutch sociologist Abram de Swaan correctly points out in his book *In Care of the State* (1988) that a perfectly just distribution necessitates a police state. While this may sound like an exaggeration, the massive recent derailment of the Dutch system of supplementary income provision for childcare comes disturbingly close to it.

The crisis was caused by the tax authority’s unresponsive and authoritarian handling of citizens’ obligation to provide it with information about their private situation and of the need to check the accuracy of the provided information. Due to a combination of misunderstandings by insufficiently informed citizens and a state bureaucracy keen to ruthlessly weed out fraud and abuse, the system got completely out of control. Many Dutch parents faced administrative decisions to stop their supplementary payments and to summon them to pay back what they had already received. This often amounted to tens of thousands of euros, and in some instances more than a hundred thousand. The course of events plunged many families into the miseries of sky-high debts, forced house sales, and divorces and broken families, with some of the victims accusing the state of having effectively destroyed their lives. The affair reached a provisional low in May 2020, when the Ministry of Finance filed a lawsuit against the tax authority, an organisation that falls under its own authority. While this is obviously an extreme case, it illustrates how the quest for social justice, through the bureaucratic need for verified information it entails, easily demolishes people’s freedom by subordinating them to an unresponsive, authoritarian, and inhumane bureaucratic state. This is the dark side of social justice: it produces bureaucratic formalisation, strengthens the tendency of the state to control and discipline citizens, and as such threatens and undermines the civic liberties that lie at the heart of citizenship.

The implication for social justice research is that a rejection of a justice criterion by the public does not necessarily mean that it is
deemed unjust, simply because its application is not necessarily evaluated on the basis of a framework of social justice. It may also be rejected because of the fallout of its application for the freedom of citizens vis-à-vis the state, which entails an evaluation on the basis of a framework of citizenship. Indeed, research bears out that rejecting social justice on the basis of considerations of citizenship is not at all uncommon.

15.4 Public evaluation of a universal basic income

A study of popular ideas about the just distribution of health care (Bernts, 1988) does not leave much to the imagination. Its central question is how people evaluate proposals of making the right to health care conditional upon efforts to avoid unhealthy lifestyles (for example, smoking, excessive drinking, abstaining from sports). The study finds that forging such a link may be rejected on two different grounds. The first is informed by considerations of social justice, with respondents arguing that health and illness are not in the first place caused by self-chosen lifestyles but rather by factors that lie beyond personal control, such as one's genetic makeup, environmental issues in one's living environment, class-based inequalities affecting one's living conditions, etcetera. This coincides with traditional social-democratic justifications of providing social security for the unemployed, according to which unemployment is caused by economic downturns and crises, and hence by the whims of capitalism rather than by personal deficiencies like lack of thrift and motivation.

Whereas this first argument against linking the right to health care to (un)healthy lifestyles derives from a framework of social justice, the second one rather argues that the establishment of such a link necessitates extensive state control of citizens’ lifestyles, which is deemed unacceptable in a free society. This is an argument derived from a framework of citizenship, which does
not reject the proposals at stake as necessarily unjust in distributive terms, but as having unacceptable implications for citizens’ freedom vis-à-vis the state. The implication is that public rejections of particular distributive criteria do not necessarily entail evaluations of social justice.

My own PhD research about judgments on the rights and obligations of the unemployed demonstrates a similar interplay of frameworks of social justice and citizenship (Houtman, 1994, 1997). The study addresses how the public at large balances the right to social security and the obligation to work in cases of work refusal by unemployed persons, with special attention to the explanation of variations in these evaluations. It concludes that these variations are indeed informed by frameworks of social justice as well as citizenship that coincide neither theoretically nor empirically. More specifically, those who emphasise the rights rather than the obligations of the unemployed prove to do so for two different reasons – not only because they favour state-led economic redistribution between the rich and the poor (that is, a framework of social justice), but also because they reject authoritarianism and insist on the protection of individual liberty (that is, a framework of citizenship).

This brings us to the recent article by Wim and Femke Roosma (2020) already referred to in the introduction. It addresses public support for a universal basic income in 23 European countries, including Scandinavian (for example, Norway, Sweden, Finland), Southern-European (for example, Italy, Portugal, Spain), Western-European (for example, Belgium, France, Great Britain, the Netherlands) and Central-European ones (for example, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland). A basic income is introduced to the respondents as 1) being universal (that is, paid to everyone, irrespective of whether one works or not), 2) guaranteeing everyone a minimum standard of living, 3) replacing many other social benefits, and 4) paid from tax revenues (Roosma and van
Oorschot, 2020: 192) and respondents have been asked whether they are (strongly) in favour or (strongly) against it.

The quotation at the start of this chapter (Roosma and van Oorschot, 2020: 191) rightly underscores how radical an alternative to existing systems of social security the universal basic income actually is. In terms of my analysis above, this radicalness resides in the shift away from a framework of social justice with all the coercion and control this entails towards a framework of citizenship that privileges civil liberty and protection against state bureaucracy. While this is indeed the central argument of Western-European proponents of a universal basic income, the principal findings of Roosma and van Oorschot (2020) paint a remarkably different picture.

For what they find is that a universal basic income receives most support in Lithuania, Russia and Hungary (70 to 80 per cent in favour), least in Sweden, Switzerland and Norway (less than 40 per cent in favour), with support moreover being strongest among the economically deprived and those favouring economic redistribution. This largely coincides with the findings of Wim’s studies of social justice and deservingness and does indeed lead the authors to conclude that apparently ‘it is not the universal character or its unconditionality that makes a [universal basic income] so attractive to a large share of the European population, but the fact that it provides (poor) people with a guaranteed minimum income’ (2020: 203). Theoretically speaking, it indeed makes much sense that the universal basic income finds most support in the less affluent European countries without extensive welfare states.

Yet, these findings are also somewhat artificial, because the framework of citizenship and liberty that underlies Western-European pleas for a universal basic income (that is, the framework that accounts for its ‘radicalism’ as an alternative system) hardly plays any role at all in this study. And of course, if an empirical study excludes a theory, it can neither confirm nor
reject it: a study informed by Theory A (here: a theory about social justice, referred to by Wim as ‘deservingness theory’) can only confirm or refute this Theory A and not a Theory B that has been excluded from the research in the first place (here: a theory about citizenship and liberty).

15.5 Conclusion

With the benefit of hindsight, T.H. Marshall’s (1950) classical account of the unfolding of citizenship rights, from civil to political and ultimately social ones as provided by the welfare state, entails not much more than a rosy social-democratic dream reflecting postwar optimism. For granting notable exceptions like the British National Health Service or old-age state pensions, welfare state reforms in the postwar period have tended to be informed by quests for social justice rather than ambitions to extend the rights of citizenship.

The optimistic Marshallian account has done much to obscure the crucial differences between the frameworks of citizenship and social justice. The two do not coincide and are ultimately incompatible, because the quest for social justice stands in the way of citizens’ liberties. Indeed, until today, the principal arguments against a universal basic income are consistently derived from frameworks of social justice, irrespective of whether they come from the political left (‘The poor and needy should not be fobbed of with a basic income that is also given to the rich’) or the political right (‘An income ought to be a reward for work done’). The other way around, precisely the desire to end the surveillance, control and sanctioning that social justice calls for constitutes the central argument for the introduction of a universal basic income.

This opens up wonderful opportunities for further comparative research into the support for a universal basic income in Western Europe and Central/Eastern Europe. For while such support is
informed by a framework of social justice in Central/Eastern Europe, as shown by Roosma and van Oorschot (2019), it is likely to be informed first of all by a framework of citizenship and liberty in Western Europe, pretty much the home ground of proposals for a universal basic income. To put the same in the terms of political sociology: while a universal basic income is supported in Central/Eastern Europe by the ‘old left’ (socialism and communism as carried by the economically underprivileged) as part of a quest for social justice, in Western Europe it is more likely to be supported by the ‘new left’, that is, well-educated cultural elites that support parties like the Greens in foregrounding personal freedom, tolerance of diversity, and cultural inclusion as issues of citizenship (Houtman, 2003).

REFERENCES

The Dark Side of the Welfare State


16. Culture as a Variable in the Analysis of Welfare State Institutions

Birgit Pfau-Effinger

16.1 Introduction

An increasing number of theoretical contributions and empirical studies show that incorporating cultural factors into the explanatory framework for the development of social policies can improve our understanding of the causes of social policy development. Wim van Oorschot has made an important contribution to this debate. When co-editing the volume *Culture and Welfare State* (van Oorschot, Opielka and Pfau-Effinger, 2008), we intensively discussed theoretical issues about this relationship. I have experienced this collaboration as very inspiring and fruitful. This chapter gives an overview of the discussion about the relationship of culture and welfare states, and it shows how the scientific work of Wim van Oorschot has contributed to this research. It also introduces some theoretical reflections about the possibility to extend the theoretical framework for the analysis of the ways in which cultural change can influence welfare state change.

16.2 The role of culture in the politics of social policy

In anthropological thinking of the early 19th century, it was common to use a broad approach to ‘culture’ that included the whole complex of habits, language and artefacts of a society, meaning the society’s ‘tradition’ (for example Smelser, 1992). This
concept of culture was rather static and so broad that it overlapped with the concept of ‘society’. Therefore, it was substituted by new and more-narrow concepts that focus on cultural values, models and belief systems (or ‘worldviews’) about the ideals concerning the ‘good’ society and morally good behaviour and that can differ in the context of time and space (Alexander, 1990; Archer, 1995; Lepsius, 1990).

Baldock (1999: 458) has suggested that research about the relationship between culture and welfare states tries to find answers to the question: ‘To what extent are a country’s social policies the product of its culture’? There is a lot of theorising and empirical research that emphasise the causal role of culture in the development of social policies (Béland, 2005, 2009; Campbell and Petersen, 2015; Danielson and Stryker, 2015; Fleckenstein, 2011; Schneider and Ingram, 2007; Kaufmann, 2015; van Oorschot et al., 2008; Pfau-Effinger, 2005; Somers and Block 2005; Steensland, 2006).

One main focus is on the ways in which cultural ideas influence the political process. Daniel Béland (2009) has introduced a theoretical approach that shows how cultural ideas, besides cognitive ideas, can influence the decision-making in the different stages of the political process, during the agenda-setting period, in the assumptions that affect the content of new policies, and in the construction of reform imperatives. On these different levels, they ‘impact the ways policy actors perceive their interests and the environment in which they mobilize’ (Béland, 2009: 701).

Another main focus is on public attitudes towards the welfare state. These are a main basis of policy-making, since political elites in democratic welfare states need support from the population in order to legitimise their policies. There is much research about ‘attitudes’ or ‘public opinion’ related to welfare state policies (Danielson and Stryker, 2015). However, it is not always clear how attitudes towards social policies are related to cultural ideas.
With his theorising and research on deservingness (van Oorschot, 2006), Wim has made an important contribution to the theorising and research about public attitudes towards social policies, their cultural basis and their relationship with welfare state policies, in part with co-authors. On the basis of deservingness theory, Wim has studied people’s attitudes about people’s deservingness for receiving welfare benefits. A main argument in his theorising and research is that people’s image about the moral character of benefit recipients is an important cultural variable that influences their attitudes and perceptions (van Oorschot, 2006, 2010; van Oorschot et al., 2012). In his research about public perceptions of overuse and underuse of social benefits in 25 countries, he has shown that cultural ideas contribute to the explanation of cross-national differences in critical attitudes toward the welfare state (Roosma et al., 2014). With his research, Wim shows that change in the cultural basis of the evaluation of deservingness was an important basis of welfare state change in the last decades.

However, change in welfare state institutions does not necessarily lead to welfare state change. There is a broad debate about the conditions under which the political elites react with policy change to change in public opinion. Brooks and Manza (2007) found three conditional factors: whether public opinion appears to be strong and stable, whether the issue is of importance for the public, and whether the political elites consider public opinion as relevant in comparison to other policy options. Further, Newman and Jacobs (2010) show that, in case public opinion is unclear or ambivalent, the chance for political elites to push through their own interests or their own cultural ideas against public opinion is particularly high. There are also some other causal mechanisms by which public opinion and the cultural ideas behind them can lead to policy change (Danielson and Stryker, 2015):
The political elites may use popular cultural ideas as a resource for the legitimation of their policies if they want to push through specific interests with a policy reform.

Another mechanism is the redefinition of popular cultural values by the political elites (Steensland, 2006).

According to the approach of ‘Discursive Institutionalism’ of Schmidt (2008), the political elites may broaden the support for the cultural basis of their policies by establishing political and public discourses to legitimise their policies.

Public discourses may also be exploited by political elites in order to alter values and models in the population in such a way that unpopular political measures gain acceptance (Seeleib-Kaiser and Toivinen, 2011).

Policy change may also be based on a redefinition of cultural ideas that are relevant in the population by the political elites (Danielson and Stryker, 2015).

So far, the main focus in the debate about the ways in which culture contributes to the development of welfare state policies is on the ways in which the political elites deal with public opinion and cultural ideas.

16.3 Suggestion for a broadening of the theoretical framework

In this section, I will discuss two theoretical issues that are important for the further development of the theoretical framework for the relationship between culture and welfare state change. These include theoretical reflections about an adequate theoretical concept of ‘culture’ and ‘institutions’ and of their relationship, and theoretical reflections about the ways in which new cultural ideas in the population can enter the political arena.
16.3.1 Theorising 'culture' and 'institutions', and their relationship

I argue that it is important to use an adequate theoretical concept of 'culture' and (welfare state) 'institutions' and their relationship in order to be able to analyse the ways in which culture can influence welfare state change.

The relationship between culture and institutions is a contested issue in welfare state research. Political scientists often neglect the role of culture in social policy change with the argument that it is not possible to distinguish analytically between culture and institutions, because culture does not exist independent from institutions (for an overview see Pfau-Effinger, 2005). However, such approaches often lack a clear and coherent definition of 'culture' and 'institutions'. There is another strand of theorising that is based on Weber’s work (1989) and includes the work of Sociologists like Alexander (1990), Lepsius (1990) and Archer (1995). In this theoretical discourse, the approach to the relationship between culture and institutions is based on the assumption that culture and institutions develop relatively independent from each other. This strand of theorizing offers an adequate basis for the analysis of the relationship and the dynamics of change in the relationship between culture and institutions.

The concept of ‘culture’ on which this essay is based are connected to this strand of theorising. I define 'culture' as a system of collective ideas related to the ideal of a 'good' society and morally good behaviour. The cultural ideas comprise cultural values, cultural models and belief systems. Cultural ideas can be coherent or contradictory, contested between social groups and actors, and they are changeable. Culture at the macro level of society frames the cultural ideas of individuals and organisations, but it does not determine them (Pfau-Effinger, 2005, 2008). It can be assumed that the prevailing cultural ideas restrict the ways in
Leading Social Policy Analysis from the Front

which the relevant political actors perceive socio-economic change and their problem definition.

My proposal for the definition of 'institution', which is based on common concepts of 'institution' in neo-institutionalism, corresponds with this definition of culture. According to this definition, institutions provide incentives and restrictions for action. These rules must be implemented (institutionalised) and legitimate. The compliance with the rules is reinforced with sanctions (Streeck and Thelen, 2005: 12). Institutions rest on norms which determine what kind of behaviour is expected within the boundaries set by the institution (Hall, 1993; Lepsius, 1990). These norms are often based on specific cultural ideas. Besides cultural ideas, also interests of political actors and of the groups which they represent as well as power relations are relevant for change in social policy institutions.

It is important to consider that culture and institutions can develop relatively independent from each other and with varying levels of dynamism in time. The reason is that cultural ideas enter the basic norms of an institution mainly only at the point of time when it is established or when it experiences fundamental change. Even if the main cultural ideas of political actors and in the society around the respective institution change fundamentally, this does not necessarily lead to change in the norms of the institution. On the other hand, it is also possible that a fundamental change of an institution takes places that is based on the introduction of new cultural ideas into the norms of this institution, even if the traditional cultural ideas in the population related to this institution persist.

16.3.2 The role of social actors in the relationship between culture and welfare state change

So far, the main focus of theorising and research about the relationship of culture and welfare state change is on the
Culture as a Variable in the Analysis of Welfare State Institutions

development and explanation of public attitudes on one hand, and
on the ways in which the political elites adapt and deal with public
opinion and cultural ideas in the political process on the other.
There is relatively little theorising and research about the various
ways in which new cultural ideas in the population can enter the
political arena, and about the role of actors outside the political
arena in these processes.

There are diverse types of actors outside the political arena (I
use the term ‘social actors’ for them) who can introduce and push
forward cultural change in the population and introduce new
cultural ideas into the political arena. A common typology of
social actors includes the distinction between individual, collective
and corporative actors. Individual actors are intentionally acting
subjects; collective actors comprise groups of individual actors
who are visible as a unity on the basis of their coordinated action,
and corporative actors include organisations ‘who on the basis of
their inner hierarchical steering structure act like individual actors
through persons who are appointed to represent them’ [my
translation] (Huininik and Schröder, 2019: 16). These actors are
embedded in the institutional and cultural societal context (March,
1994) and in the social structures of the respective society. It
should be considered, however, that their behavior is not
determined by the societal context.

Particularly, also social movements may introduce new cultural
ideas and under certain conditions be able to broaden public
support for these ideas over time. This is particularly also possible
if the common cultural ideas are contradictory (Archer, 1995).
The introduction and support of the idea of ‘gender equality’ by
the feminist movement of the 1960s and 1970s is a good example
(Pfau-Effinger, 2004). Such new ideas may influence welfare state
policies on the basis of different processes in which social actors
in the society outside the political arena are involved:
Leading Social Policy Analysis from the Front

- First, social actors outside the political field may aim to introduce new cultural ideas into politics of the welfare state. On the basis of public discourses, these actors may try to introduce innovative cultural ideas in welfare state policies (see also Schmidt, 2008). Within such discourses, contradictions and conflicts with regard to the cultural values and models are resolved or strengthened; they can contribute to increase the chances for the introduction of new policies or to stabilise old policies (see also Kaufmann, 1991). The result largely depends on the potential of these social actors to mobilise broader parts of the population for the support of these cultural ideas in order to exert pressure on the political elites.

- Second, social actors outside the political field who support new ideas may enter the political field as political actors in political parties and may try to find support for them in the political field. There are different positions of entry in the centre or at the margin of the policy field. The result largely depends on the potential of these social actors to convince broader parts of the political elites of the relevance of these cultural ideas.

There might be more different types of processes which are also relevant and which should be explored in the future.

16.4 Conclusion

In the last two decades, the number of theoretical contributions and empirical studies that emphasise the causal force of cultural factors in social policy development has been growing. The main aim of this chapter was to discuss how cultural ideas can contribute to welfare state change and to demonstrate how Wim van Oorschot with his scientific work has contributed to the theorising and research in this field. It also introduced some
reflections about the possibility to introduce a more precise theoretical conceptualisation about culture, institutions and their relationship. Also, it suggests to include more systematically the role of social actors outside the political arena and the various ways in which new cultural ideas in the population can enter the political arena.

REFERENCES


Part IV

Popular attitudes towards social policies
17. Wim van Oorschot, the Politics of Deservingness and the Cultural Turn in Social Sciences

Peter Taylor-Gooby

17.1 Introduction

I knew Wim van Oorschot as a friend and collaborator through Espanet and on various research projects over a considerable period. I benefited from his commitment to collegial work and his calm and always rational advice on a number of occasions, most recently in relation to the Norface Welfsoc: Our Children’s Europe programme in which he participated (www.welfsoc.eu). Looking back, I have become aware that he is someone who exerts a steady and positive influence, seemingly by osmosis, without apparently exerting effort or direction, but more by a large number of apparently minor interventions that add up to something much larger. Looking back over his impressive CV (18 books, more than 100 articles in top-rated journals, 28 major research grants, more than 150 scholarly presentations, and a very considerable number of graduate students and post-doctoral researchers supervised), I can see that that is also what he has done with his path-breaking insights into deservingness and his development of deservingness theory. He originally graduated in Horticultural Science. Slow growth, expansion and massive fruitfulness for a substantial period distinguishes many of the trees with which he originally worked.

Wim made three signal contributions to social policy research:
He established and developed the growth of a pool of young researchers, first at Tilburg University and then at Leuven University, developing cross-national work on social policy attitudes, poverty and employment.

He constructed a new approach to deservingness attitudes to social welfare, resting on five key criteria. He then went on to explore this in considerable theoretical and practical detail. The importance of this approach, building on previous work, is that it sets parameters to the factors that underlie deservingness judgements, and it points to ways forward in improving the willingness of national populations in accepting support for vulnerable outgroups and in welcoming immigrants in European countries.

He also opened the way to new theoretical approaches in this field of study. Social policy studies are multi- and interdisciplinary, drawing on political science, sociology, psychology, law, economics and other approaches. Issues of deservingness offer opportunities to build links between these approaches and to develop social policy theory.

Many of the contributors to this volume have benefited, as developing scholars, from Wim’s encouragement and can discuss this area more closely than I can. I will focus on the second and third aspects mentioned above.

### 17.2 Wim’s deservingness approach and policy feedback

Wim used a range of national and particularly international attitude survey data to point to the importance of five separate factors associated with deservingness judgements. These are:

1. **Control**: poor people’s control over their neediness, or their responsibility for it: the less control, the more deserving.
2. **Need**: the greater the level of need, the more deserving.
3. **Identity**: the identity of the poor, that is, their proximity to the rich or their ‘pleasantness’: the closer to ‘us’, the more deserving.

4. **Attitude**: poor people’s attitude towards support, or their docility or gratefulness: the more compliant, the more deserving.

5. **Reciprocity**: the degree of reciprocation by the poor, or having earned support: the more reciprocation, the more deserving (van Oorschot, 2000).

In his analysis Wim points to ‘three different sets of variables which can be used to explain patterns of answers to attitude survey questions: socioeconomic and demographic characteristics; opinions on and perceptions of social security and the welfare state; and basic values and attitudes’ (ibid). The third of these leads to an important policy implication. Politicians and policy makers typically take people’s policy attitudes as a given. They then either design policy to fit assumed attitudes and so seek popularity, or take a stance, based on principles or judgements about economic feasibility and show leadership in a particular direction irrespective of people’s attitudes and desires. Wim’s theory implies that welfare state institutions, in other words, policy itself feeds back to influence attitudes (van Oorschot and Meuleman, 2014; Uunk and van Oorschot, 2017). The relationship between the policies pursued and judgements of deservingness is a dialectic one. It is not possible to say simply that in a democracy the government should do what people want and that is all there is to say. What government does will influence what people want. A move in a particular direction will tend to shift attitudes that fit with it further in that direction and thus enhance support for that policy.

This point is of particular relevance in current debates about the deservingness of immigrants. European countries need high levels of immigration if they are to retain their population size and
age balance. Because birth rates have fallen populations are ageing and in fact along the northern Mediterranean fringe (notably Spain, Italy and Greece) they are actually shrinking.

One important issue is that in popular politics this argument is set against concerns about immigration partly for practical reasons, to do with competition in the labour and housing markets, and partly for ideological reasons to do with deservingness. Immigrants who are not refugees are seen as having a high degree of control over their need; they may not be seen as exhibiting genuine neediness; they are often seen as culturally different, not speaking the host country’s language or pursuing the lifestyle commonly perceived as normal (for example in gender relations); they may not be docile or compliant; and they may be seen as a burden rather than a benefit, offering little in the way of reciprocity.

A policy programme that emphasizes these factors goes with the grain of attitudes that undermine the deservingness of newcomers and strengthens these attitudes. Such a programme might, for example, sort immigrants into a majority of ‘economic’ migrants, seeking jobs and better living standards, and a minority of refugees, driven through fear of war, persecution or famine in their own country, and therefore needy and having little control. It might fail to address cultural difference through language, education and other measures. It might fail to accept and emphasize the economic value of immigrants by, for example, preventing them from getting access to education, training and jobs. On the other hand, a programme that pursues the converse direction, most importantly allowing good access to work and arguing for and demonstrating the reciprocal benefits to the host country of new younger workers and citizens offers the opportunity to gradually build support for the deservingness of immigrants over time and step by step shift public attitudes.

From a policy point of view this shows what European governments who recognise the dilemmas of an ageing population
must do in order to make progress. Wim’s insights open the way to consider policy in this light and to carry out longitudinal studies that take policy shifts into account and attempt to unpick the chicken and egg problem of how far deservingness attitudes influence policy directions and how far policy operates to influence attitudes the other way about. As data sources such as Eurobarometer and particularly the European Social Survey (a study which Wim championed, supported and used, and also encouraged colleagues to use) build up over time, the potential for such longer-term studies becomes greater, taking the study of the development of deservingness attitudes even further.

This is one illustration of the value of the framework which identifies the five-fold roots of deservingness. Others can be found in relation to other policy fields (studying particular needs such as social care, retirement pensions, housing poverty and unemployment), in more detailed small group social psychology and in the increasingly divided politics of many European countries. Current political struggles often involve differences in deservingness attitudes between different social groups.

One powerful mechanism that emerges here is the way in which differences in judgements of deservingness between policy-makers and many in the population may lead to mistrust of politicians seen as part of a distant and unsympathetic political elite, which ignores the views of ordinary people.

The third area on which I want to comment follows on from the discussion of the relevance of accounts of deservingness to policy and to political trust. It concerns the development of social policy theory. There are at least three issues here: first, the interaction between the three sets of explanatory variables noted above and causal arguments as developed in different disciplines; secondly, the demonstration that the kinds of data typically taken seriously in one discipline can be of value in theory development in another discipline; and thirdly, the fact that deservingness theory has benefited enormously from the massive expansion of
structured social survey research in recent years and the widespread availability of data which can be fruitfully analysed. Here I will focus on one issue – the cultural turn in social science and how Wim’s work contributes in this area.

17.3 Wim and the cultural turn in social sciences

One feature of the development of social science during the past forty years has been what is sometimes described as the ‘cultural turn’. This refers to the recognition of the importance of cultural factors alongside material issues (class power, economic interest, political institutions, and social structures) in influencing people’s behaviour. These insights have led to rich areas of work which are continuing to expand especially in sociology. These include feminist approaches, the sociology of the body, identity politics, and, joined up with the emerging tradition of analysis of group behaviour, increasing interest in culture and attitudes in social psychology.

The stress on culture originated in sociology as scholars grappled with the problem of balancing the evidence that social structures strongly influence outcomes (for example, the children of working class people tend to get working class jobs unless there is a massive social structural change which radically expands the proportion of middle class jobs) and the equally compelling evidence that individuals experience themselves as more or less rational and emotional agents making choices because they wish to do so and not because they occupy a particular class position (for example, Groh, 2019; Giddens, 1984). Essentially sociologists became more interested in the way individual behaviour could be understood in cultural terms in relation especially to consumption, values, identity and attitudes.

This approach has also made major contributions in other disciplines. In political science, practitioners seek to discover the
origins of political identity, of racism or environmentalism and how they function in political movements and the interdisciplinary application of deservingness theory advances this work. In psychology, researchers note the importance of group effects on behaviour. More recently in economics, the neo-classical rational actor paradigm is increasingly eroded by evidence of the irrationality or rather non-rationality of the choices that people often in fact make and cultural factors are an important candidate in influencing peoples’ choices (Hargreaves Heap et al., 1992).

Deservingness theory rests on strong evidence about the nature of attitudes to culturally identified groups of those perceived as ‘others’ and the availability of a large and growing body of attitude data conveniently available for research. This approach offers another way of investigating the importance of culture across social science disciplines, and of linking disciplines. Identity emerges directly as relevant to deservingness in a way that varies between social groups, by age and education level and ethnicity. Reciprocity and grateful attitudes as indicated in immediate interpersonal behaviour are also operationalised as variables possessing cultural aspects and available in the survey data for analysis in relation to structural socio-demographic variables. This allows researchers to develop understanding of culture and social structural location in this field too.

Attention to culture provides explanations of why the structural reciprocity arguments in favour of immigration (that developed Europe needs more immigrants because its population is ageing and dying) often fail to engage with anti-immigrant movements. The rejection of immigrants is not based on reason but on attitudes rooted in group culture, to do with identity. Emotion and, a social scientist might say, culture are upstream of reason (van Oorschot et al., 2017).

Similarly the demonstration that adequate benefits plus investment, training and access to jobs offer an effective way to tackle unemployment and integrate young people into society fails
to connect with responses that are to do with judgements and perceptions that the jobless are lazy (and thus have control over their need) and are ungrateful. Culture is a powerful way of explaining developments and divisions in both these areas and deservingness theory offers a good way of pursuing this (Laenen et al., 2020).

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Christian Staerkle

18.1 Introduction

In this essay, I wish to honour Wim van Oorschot’s contribution to a cultural analysis of welfare attitudes, and show its connections with my own research. In the first part, I will describe some commonalities between Wim’s cultural approach to welfare sociology and various theories in social psychology. In the second part, I will illustrate these linkages by integrating Wim’s five deservingness criteria in our own Social Order Representations Model.

18.2 Conditional solidarity and the cultural approach to welfare attitudes

The first text I found (in English) by Wim dates back to 1989 (van Oorschot and Schell, 1989) and is entitled ‘On the role of means-testing: Its functions and dysfunctions: Recent developments in European social security systems’. In this chapter, Wim discusses the social implications of a political shift from universally oriented insurance to selective social assistance during the 1980s, taking Thatcher’s UK as a case in point. He lays out three perverse effects of means-testing, namely its contribution to the creation of a poverty trap (and thus the perpetuation of social injustice), the increasing
non take-up of benefits (due to a feeling of social degradation and the motivation to avoid being perceived a potential fraud), as well as the rampant stigmatisation of welfare beneficiaries. ‘Now, for everyone who is of the opinion that the broader aims of social policy should be to do away with poverty and social injustice, and to integrate all groups and classes into society on the basis of equality, these three general effects of means-testing constitute severe dysfunctions of the instrument.’ (van Oorschot and Schell, 1989: 6). His critical stance towards means-tested policies and, more generally, selective social policies could hardly be clearer. He advocates that social policies should aim for social integration and greater equality, and he powerfully condemns the perverse effects of allegedly efficient and just (neo-liberal) policies in which only those ‘who really need it’ receive benefits. The consistency of Wim’s thinking about these issues is impressive. This early text indeed lays out many of the topics to which Wim would devote his career during the next three decades.

Over the years, Wim has developed his ongoing concern with the conditionality of social solidarity within a broader framework of a ‘cultural’ analysis of social policies and welfare attitudes. In 2007 he outlined four principles of a cultural approach to social policies (van Oorschot, 2007); principles that quite strikingly share important aspects with research in social psychology concerned with prejudice, social inequality and deservingness. They have also shaped my own research on welfare attitudes and beyond.

The first principle concerns the importance of shared normative images of target groups and beneficiaries in the formation of welfare attitudes. This focus on representations of groups as drivers of welfare attitudes can easily be related to longstanding research on stereotyping, stigmatisation, and discrimination (see Dovidio et al., 2013; Sibley and Barlow, 2016). Stigmatising judgements of welfare beneficiaries may, for example, allow individuals to compare favourably ‘downward’ along the social ladder, eventually yielding the benefit of enhancing self-esteem (Wood, 1989) or
creating a positive social identity (Tajfel, 1978). Stigmatising images of welfare beneficiaries further contribute to justify an unfair and unequal social system by providing legitimacy to the ethos of self-reliance and competition at the heart of contemporary societies (for example, Jost and Banaji, 1994; Jost and Major, 2001). The importance of negative stereotypes associated with target groups has further been demonstrated by Gilens (1999) who has shown the key role of anti-Black prejudice in explaining deep and widespread opposition to welfare in the United States.

A second feature highlighted by Wim in his outline of a cultural approach to social policies concerns perceptions of the causes of poverty. Here again, an enduring research tradition has studied ‘attribution’ processes that examine how people attribute responsibility to their own and others’ behaviours (Petigrew, 1979; Weiner, 1995). The individual-blaming culture of poverty that has spread in the wake of the rise of neo-liberal and neo-conservative ideologies has produced ‘welfare dependency beliefs’ (Likki and Staerklé, 2015; Staerklé et al., 2020) that attribute the causes of poverty to the moral failings of individuals in need themselves.

A third principle of the cultural approach concerns the impact of cultural diversity and migration on welfare legitimacy. The relationship between cultural diversity and welfare legitimacy involves intergroup processes of identification, categorisation and differentiation (Tajfel, 1978) that shape perceived entitlement of members of ethnocultural ingroups and outgroups (Green and Staerklé, 2013). Ingroup identification, for example, increases ingroup favouritism, thereby demonstrating a link between social identities and judgements of distributive justice (Wenzel, 2000). Welfare chauvinism, in turn, describes the tendency to allocate welfare resources primarily to members of one’s own ethnic group (Mewes and Mau, 2012) and constitutes a key issue linking welfare policies to right-wing populist ideologies (Greve, 2019).
The fourth principle underscores the role of national and other cultural contexts in the development of specific national welfare regime types, and, by extension, of welfare attitudes by national citizens. Collective norms, values, and ideologies have been shown not only to shape national welfare regimes, but also a country’s identity content (‘who we are’ and ‘what we stand for’), thereby providing guiding principles for the allocation of welfare resources within a country. These sociocultural and historical conditions also account, at least to some extent, for cross-national differences in welfare attitudes (Svallfors, 2012; van Oorschot, 2006). Following a general trend in social psychology towards contextualist approaches, our own research has also sought to gain a better understanding of the interplay between cultural contexts and psychological processes (Likki and Staerklé, 2015; Sarrasin et al., 2012; Staerklé et al., 2010; Thurre et al., 2020).

18.3 A constructivist, normative approach to welfare attitudes

Wim’s and his colleagues’ ongoing work on deservingness and entitlement (van Oorschot et al., 2017) seems to have derived both from his initial, critical focus on conditional solidarity as well as from his cultural approach to welfare attitudes. If anything, Wim’s work has taught us that the cultural approach is indispensable to provide answers to the ‘basic moral welfare question’ that has always been at the centre of his work, namely ‘Who should get what, and why?’ (van Oorschot, 2007: 130). Wim’s insistence that citizens form their attitudes towards welfare policies within a symbolic environment of cultural values and shared norms has also influenced my own approach to welfare attitudes.

Importantly, Wim also pointed out that such a cultural approach does not necessarily imply that people would be
deterministically and passively ‘influenced’ by external values and norms from which they cannot escape as members of cultural groups. Rather, in a stronger view of the cultural approach, individuals actively participate in the co-creation of their normative environment, as they pick up, discuss, negotiate and disseminate positions and opinions in their daily lives. Following Clarke (2004), van Oorschot (2007) suggests that in this constructivist ‘culture as practice’ approach ‘culture is manipulated, produced and reproduced actively by people in their daily lives. This social construction of reality is subjected to relations of power: some people or groups are more powerful in manifesting and enforcing their reality, than others.’ (van Oorschot, 2007: 137). There is little doubt that many would see an approach focused on meaning-giving and discourse as being epistemologically, theoretically and methodologically at odds with more ‘positivist’ approaches through which welfare attitudes have typically been analysed (including weaker forms of the cultural approach). Not so Wim: ‘In my view the difference between the “property” and “practice” approaches to studying the relationships between culture and social policy should not be exaggerated. […], both approaches are not in competition, but are complementary to each other.’ (van Oorschot, 2007: 137).

18.4 Deservingness in the social order representations model

I concur with Wim’s pragmatic stance that differences between approaches ‘should not be exaggerated’, but rather combined into a more comprehensive approach of a cultural, constructivist and normative view on social policies and welfare attitudes. In the remainder of this essay, I wish to illustrate such an undertaking by sketching out a link between Wim’s work on deservingness and our own Social Order Representations Model (SORM).
The SORM represents an attempt to conceptualise welfare attitudes in a comprehensive, normative approach (see Staerklé, 2009; Staerklé et al., 2012). The model is based on the premise that individuals' thinking and positioning towards the welfare state derives from broad and general ideas about what an 'ideal society' should look like, as revealed by its political priorities and its broad ideological orientations. Correspondingly, conceptions of an ideal society also define its main challenges and threats. In other words, we suggest that people hold lay theories of social order that are expressed in organized and systematic views about key divisions between members of a society. Such views about social cleavages may ultimately determine ‘who deserves what and why’. We therefore believe that this perspective may also help to reach a better understanding of different criteria and cognitive processes underlying perceived deservingness.

The model puts forward four archetypal representations of social order, termed Moral Order, Free Market, Social Diversity, and Structural Inequality (see Table 18.1). They are structured as a function of two bipolar dimensions that determine how individuals construe and represent key divisions in society. The first dimension distinguishes social divisions based on perceived normative conformity of individual behaviour with commonly accepted norms and values (‘Normative differentiation’) from divisions based on (ascribed) group membership (‘Categorical differentiation’). The second criterion distinguishes divisions based on cultural and moral dimensions (‘Shared identity’) from divisions based on material and status-related dimensions (‘Social position’). The crossing of these two dimensions generates the four representations of social order.

Each conception of social order is defined by a generic social division, reflecting the two dimensions described above. Moral Order yields a division between norm-conforming, morally upright, and ‘good’ people on one side, and immoral, norm-transgressing, ‘bad’ people on the other. Free Market implies a division between
hard-working, productive, and responsible ‘winners’, who are opposed to lazy, scrounging, and irresponsible ‘losers’. Arguably, though, the difference between these two normative conceptions may easily be blurred as neo-liberal free market values are increasingly imbued with a moral dimension derived from the ethos of competitiveness and the moral duty of self-reliance (Amable, 2011).

The two categorical conceptions, in turn, reflect views on social order in which divisions between social groups and categories (as opposed to individuals) organise social order. In *Social Diversity*, (mostly ethnic and cultural) groups are opposed to each other in a competitive intergroup relationship characterised by ingroup identification, ingroup favouritism and, possibly, outgroup discrimination (see Brewer, 2017). In *Structural inequality*, the intergroup relation is defined by structural inequality and social class cleavages, yielding a generic division opposing dominant and privileged groups to subordinate and disadvantaged groups.

**Table 18.1 The Social Order Representations Model (SORM) and its relationship to van Oorschot’s deservingness criteria**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social order conception</th>
<th>Shared identity</th>
<th>Social position</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morality</td>
<td>Normative differentiation</td>
<td>Free Market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core division</td>
<td>'Good' and 'Bad'</td>
<td>'Winners' and 'Losers'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulatory principle</td>
<td>Conformity</td>
<td>Individual responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deservingness criteria</td>
<td>'Attitude', 'Control'</td>
<td>'Reciprocity', 'Control'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social order conception</td>
<td>Categorical differentiation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>Structural Inequality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core division</td>
<td>Ingroup vs. outgroup</td>
<td>Dominant vs. subordinate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulatory principle</td>
<td>Intergroup differentiation</td>
<td>Inequality regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deservingness criteria</td>
<td>'Identity'</td>
<td>'Level of need'</td>
</tr>
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</table>
These four basic forms of social divisions are evaluative (one group is more positively evaluated than the other) and imply hierarchical relationships in terms of power and social status. In most instances, one group or social category has greater (decision) power, more resources, higher social status, superior prestige, or a better reputation, compared to the opposite group of the division. This is why these representations of social divisions are relevant for the study of deservingness. We would expect that the more positively a group is evaluated compared to the antagonistic group, the more likely it is to be seen as deserving. The reasons for perceived deservingness, however, depend on the conception of social order.

This is where the deservingness research by Wim and his colleagues comes into play. In various studies, five central deservingness criteria are used (van Oorschot, 2000): 'attitude' (needy people who are likeable, grateful, compliant and conforming to our standards are more deserving); 'control over neediness' (people who are personally responsible for their hardship are less deserving); 'reciprocity' (needy people who have contributed to our group before are more deserving); 'identity' (needy people who are closer to ‘us’, according to ethno-national criteria, are more deserving); and 'level of need' (people in greater need are more deserving).

These five criteria match the four conceptions of social order reasonably well. **Attitude** corresponds to the **Moral Order** conception in which individuals expect conformity with established norms in order to be deserving (thereby linking this conception with the ideological beliefs of traditionalism, conservatism and authoritarianism). **Reciprocity** is implied by the **Free Market** conception in which individuals are expected to be self-reliant and engaging in reciprocal social exchange in order to be deserving (thereby linking this conception with economic individualism). **Identity** is part of the **Social Diversity** conception in which individuals affiliate with and support (similar) members of
their own groups (thereby linking it to ingroup favouritism). 

*Control over neediness* fits both conceptions of normative differentiation (*Moral Order* and *Free Market*). Indeed, being personally responsible for one’s needs has a moral dimension as it implies ‘wrong choices’ and a moral failing (such as an unhealthy lifestyle) as well as an economic dimension of not being able or unwilling to materially support oneself (Joffe and Staerklé, 2007).

*Level of need*, finally, can be seen as an acknowledgement that for subordinate categories such as jobless people and single mothers (see van Oorschot, 2000), the need is real and legitimate. It therefore fits with the *Structural Inequality* conception.

This model can also be linked to the four guiding principles of Wim’s cultural approach outlined above. Stereotypical images of antagonistic groups are a central component of the model, attributions of responsibility for poverty are an important component of conceptions of social order, cultural diversity is captured by the social diversity conception, and the strong contextual and national contingence of the four conceptions is acknowledged.

Deservingness judgements are thus part of the wider social fabric where people judge and evaluate groups in light of their position and their function in the (desired) social order. Groups considered useful for the desired social order are likely perceived as deserving. Conversely, groups that challenge or threaten the principles underlying a given social order are likely considered as undeserving. Deservingness judgements are therefore not only judgements of groups as such, but also judgements of the legitimacy of the hierarchy between groups, either contesting or justifying it. Perceived deservingness of a group thus reflects the perceiver’s motivation to legitimise or to reinforce a given social division underlying social order (through high deservingness of the positively evaluated group and low deservingness of the negatively evaluated group), or on the contrary, to contest and reduce the cleavage (through relatively high deservingness of the
negatively evaluated groups). Deservingness judgements thereby contribute to justify or to contest different forms of social inequality.

The *Social Order Representations Model* is inspired by work in political theory suggesting that politics is primarily a struggle over meanings associated with antagonistic social groups and categories (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). Many social policies are designed to regulate differences between antagonistic social categories (for example, young versus old; women versus men; employed versus unemployed). It seems therefore plausible that deservingness judgements are the outcome of social and cognitive processes of differentiation between social categories (Tajfel, 1978) and are thus based on collective representations of *differences* between individuals and groups.

### 18.5 Conclusion

To conclude, I wish to emphasise two major perspectives that transcend Wim’s work and that have impregnated my own research. First, his firm conviction that human thought and behaviour, and more specifically our thinking about welfare arrangements, needs to be understood and analysed on the basis of a conception of ‘homo sociologicus’ (as opposed to ‘homo economicus’). In this cultural, normative and constructivist view, ‘individuals are seen as essentially social beings, who act in accordance with their affections for others and internalized cultural norms and values’ (van Oorschot and Komter, 1998: 18). This perspective resonates with social representations theory (Moscovici, 1961/2008) that is the foundation of my own work on welfare attitudes and political legitimacy (Staerklé, 2015).

The second inspiring perspective concerns Wim’s unwavering conception of the interdependence between social inclusion and social exclusion. In 1998, van Oorschot and Komter wrote that
as a general rule, the more inclusive solidarity is, the more pronounced the group’s confines will be and the stronger the exclusion of “the others”.’ (van Oorschot and Komter, 1998: 20).

Such a statement reflects a social psychological (intergroup) logic underlying solidarity and welfare in which the two basic psychological processes of social categorisation and differentiation play a key role. It also encapsulates the paradox of inclusive and exclusive effects of solidarity, and emphasizes not only the perverse effects of inclusion, but also the ambiguity of solidarity and the roots of stigmatization of welfare beneficiaries.

In sum, Wim has taught us that social attitudes need to be understood and analysed as a function of the interplay between the cultural, historical and political contexts in which they arise on the one hand, and the social conditions in which citizens form their opinions on the other. I hope to have shown in this contribution that much of Wim’s research resonates with a social psychological perspective. Come to think of it, it could well be that Wim is actually a social psychologist in disguise.

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Leading Social Policy Analysis from the Front


Social Psychological Aspects of a Cultural Approach to Welfare Attitudes


Tijs Laenen and Femke Roosma

19.1 Introduction

In the year 1979 the world was in crisis. Only a few years after the ‘first oil shock’, the global economy was rattled once more by the rapidly rising oil prices. At the time, Wim van Oorschot was working as a young consultant at the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture. Little did he know back then that the oil crises would have a major impact on its future career as a sociological scholar. In addition to exacerbating the longer-term pressures on the financial sustainability of welfare states, the economic uncertainty brought about by the oil shocks intensified concerns about their social legitimacy. It is mainly on this latter issue – welfare state legitimacy – that Wim has spent most of his career.

In the 1970s and 1980s, there was widespread belief that a ‘welfare backlash’ was inevitable: the economically hard times would make citizens both ideologically and materially opposed to high-spending welfare states, and tax revolts would soon follow (Murray, 1984; Wilensky, 1975). To test these assumptions, scholars started measuring popular support for the welfare state, using national and cross-national public opinion surveys. One of the most consistent conclusions of these early studies was that the
welfare state is widely and persistently supported by large sections of the general population in almost all countries (Coughlin, 1980; Roller, 1995; Taylor-Gooby, 1985). However, according to some, these studies might have painted a ‘too rosy picture’ of welfare state legitimacy, because they only asked questions to which people easily agree, without much critical reflection (Ervasti, 1998: 288). For example, a common procedure to measure welfare legitimacy was to ask whether the government should spend more on various social benefits and services, to which most people readily say ‘yes’ if they are not reminded of the fact that more spending usually implies higher taxes.

Wim van Oorschot was one of the first to recognize that also critical welfare attitudes should be probed in order to get a more accurate (and perhaps less rosy) picture of the social legitimacy of the welfare state. He is a firm believer of the idea that welfare state legitimacy is a multidimensional concept, and should be measured accordingly (van Oorschot and Meuleman, 2012b). Of course, the idea to study welfare state legitimacy from a multidimensional perspective was not a new one (see, for example, Cnaan, 1989; Sihvo and Uusitalo, 1995; Svallfors, 1991). Wim’s main contribution in this regard is that he took the idea several steps further than all others, by initiating and supervising a 4-year PhD project that was fully focused on the topic of the multidimensionality of welfare state legitimacy (Roosma, 2016). In short, Wim and his former PhD candidate Femke Roosma argue that in order to answer the all-important question whether a given welfare state is socially legitimate, one should explore popular attitudes towards all of its dimensions – which include its goals, range, degree, redistribution design, implementation and outcomes – and subsequently study how different groups of people combine attitudes towards these dimensions (Roosma, Gelissen and van Oorschot, 2013).

However, having an eye for the multidimensionality of welfare state legitimacy is arguably only one of the many contributions
Wim has made to the broader welfare attitudes literature. Another important contribution is his seminal work on welfare deservingness (van Oorschot, 2000, 2006; van Oorschot et al., 2017). Although the concept of deservingness already featured prominently in some prior (mainly American) welfare attitudes studies (for example, Cook, 1979; Gilens, 1999; Will, 1993), Wim deserves full credit for turning it into a structured theoretical framework, by distinguishing five criteria underlying popular attitudes towards the deservingness of different target groups (control, attitude, reciprocity, identity and need). Initially, these CARIN criteria were used to explain why the general public considers some groups (such as the old and the sick) as more deserving than others (such as unemployed people and immigrants). Over the years, however, the CARIN model has been applied by many others as a source of inspiration to build different types of theoretical propositions and perform empirical analyses (for example, Buss, 2019; Hrast et al., 2018; Kallio and Kouvo, 2015; Kootstra, 2016; Larsen, 2008). Most notably, Wim supervised two different 4-year PhD projects that both brought greater conceptual clarification and empirical examination to the deservingness framework, each in their own unique way. The first, by Marjolein Jeene (2015), focused mainly on studying the individual and contextual determinants of people’s deservingness opinions. The second PhD project, by Tijs Laenen (2020), added a specific focus on the complex interplay between popular deservingness opinions and welfare state policies.

Importantly for this essay, Wim’s work on deservingness implies that people tend to have very diverging opinions towards different target groups of the welfare state. It is very clear, for example, that they do not think the same way about the elderly as they do about the unemployed, which are usually viewed more negatively in terms of their deservingness (van Oorschot, 2006). Accordingly, one should try to avoid using generalized measures of welfare state legitimacy, capturing public support for the
welfare state as a whole. Although the use of such generalized measures is quite common in the welfare attitudes literature (Svallfors, 2012), it has also been criticized for neglecting the immense internal complexity and heterogeneity characteristic of real-world welfare states (Jordan, 2013). In this view, the welfare state is not seen as a single entity but as an aggregate of a broader range of differently targeted benefits and services, about which people are likely to have independent opinions (Taylor-Gooby, 1985). To capture this, one should ideally measure popular opinions towards all of the welfare state's different provisions targeted at different social groups (or at least the most important ones) when studying its social legitimacy (Cnaan, 1989).

Remarkably, Wim did not always differentiate between provisions for various target groups in his work on the multidimensionality of welfare state legitimacy, in which he mainly examined popular attitudes towards the entire welfare state (generally referred to as ‘social benefits and services’). A case in point are his analyses of what people think about the economic, moral and social consequences of the welfare state (van Oorschot, 2010; van Oorschot et al., 2012), in which he does not pay attention to the possibility that such popular perceptions might vary across policy domains targeted at different social groups. It seems plausible, for example, that people are much more negative about unemployment benefits than they are about old-age pensions when it comes to moral consequences, given the oft-cited assumption that unemployment protection, if too generous and unconditional, is detrimental to the job search activities and work willingness of the unemployed. With regard to economic consequences, it might be that pensions are judged more negatively, as they usually take up a considerably larger share of the public budget than unemployment benefits (Laenen, 2020), and might thus be perceived as more expensive and worse for the economy. Another example in which the studies on multidimensionality of welfare state legitimacy do not take into
account differentiating opinions towards policies directed at different target groups is the study into the preferred role and perceived performance of the welfare state, co-authored with Femke Roosma and John Gelissen (see Roosma et al., 2014). In this study, combinations of attitudes towards the role of government in providing different types of benefits and services and the evaluation of these benefits and services are analyzed in sum scales, thereby seemingly ignoring the fact that attitudes towards for instance the preferred role of the welfare state are more supportive regarding health care provisions than they are regarding governments’ responsibility to provide jobs for everyone who want one.

In the essay, we aim to merge Wim’s two main contributions to the welfare attitudes literature in one analytical framework, which asserts that in order to fully grasp the social legitimacy of a welfare state, one should study popular attitudes towards its various provisions directed at different target groups (for example, unemployment benefits and social assistance), and within these provisions, towards its different dimensions (for example, redistribution design and intended and unintended outcomes). We hope this framework will serve as a valuable roadmap for future researchers interested in charting the social legitimacy of any given welfare state.

### 19.2 An analytical model to study welfare state legitimacy

In Figure 19.1 we present a schematic overview of our analytical model to study welfare state legitimacy, combining Wim’s two major contributions to the welfare attitudes literature.

On the vertical axis, we refer to the multidimensional framework of Roosma et al. (2013). This framework departs from four conditions of welfare state legitimacy (Roosma, 2016; Rothstein, 1998): 

*Substantive justice, redistributive justice, procedural justice, and procedural coherence.*
justice and just outcomes. The condition of substantive justice demands that people consider the goals of the welfare state and its specific welfare provisions as just and fair. Redistributional justice requires that people perceive a just distribution of burdens (in terms of taxes and contributions) and benefits. Procedural justice refers to an efficient and effective implementation of welfare provisions; people must perceive their implementation as fair, simple and cheap. Just outcomes require that the outcomes are in line with the intentions of the policy goals. Based on these four conditions, Roosma et al. (2013) distinguished the following dimensions of welfare support, by which welfare state legitimacy should be assessed: the goals of the welfare state, the range of welfare provisions provided, the degree of government activity in terms of spending or investments (substantive justice); redistributional design (who contributes and who benefits and under what conditions?) (redistributional justice); efficiency of the implementation (is implementation cheap and simple?) and effectiveness of the implementation (do those who deserve benefits actually receive them and is misuse prevented?) (procedural justice); intended and unintended outcomes of the welfare efforts in terms of both policy outcomes and consequences (just outcomes) (Roosma et al., 2013).

For each differently targeted welfare provision (horizontal axis), we can assess its legitimacy referring to the eight welfare dimensions (vertical axis), with one adaptation. The range dimension in the multidimensional model cannot be directly applied to the assessment of specific welfare provisions, because this dimension inventories in which policy areas the welfare state should be involved. It thus refers directly to the welfare state as a whole, instead of a specific provision within the welfare state. We therefore suggest to rather assess whether people believe it should be the welfare state who provides this benefit or service, or another actor such as the market, civil society or families. In this way we refer to the welfare mix, a dimension that was also
distinguished by Roosma et al. (2013), but kept out of the multidimensional analysis, as it assessed legitimacy of redistribution beyond the scope of the welfare state. With this small adaptation we apply our analytical model to an example in which we compare two benefit types in the next section.

**WELFARE STATE LEGITIMACY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Welfare state provision A</th>
<th>Welfare state provision Z</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(e.g. unemployment benefit)</td>
<td>(e.g. social assistance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare state dimension A</td>
<td>Welfare state dimension A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e.g. goals)</td>
<td>(e.g. goals)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare state dimension Z</td>
<td>Welfare state dimension Z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e.g. consequences)</td>
<td>(e.g. consequences)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 19.1 An analytical model to study welfare state legitimacy*

**19.3 Application of the analytical model: unemployment benefits and social assistance**

To illustrate the usefulness of our analytical model, Table 19.1 provides a comparison between two different welfare provisions: unemployment benefits and social assistance benefits. Unemployment benefits are typically targeted at able-bodied workers that have earned the right to compensation of income loss during periods of unemployment through the social security contributions they paid prior to becoming unemployed. In most
unemployment schemes, benefits are restricted to those who are not responsible for their joblessness (for example, by resigning for a legally accepted reason) and demonstrate sufficient willingness to work (for example, by participating in training activities). Social assistance benefits are targeted at low-income people through the use of means-testing, to ensure that these people reach a socially acceptable standard of living. Social assistance schemes may also include other categories than the able-bodied and working-aged unemployed, such as low-wage workers (for example, in low-skilled, part-time jobs) or elderly people (for example, elderly migrants who do not qualify for old-age pensions).

Importantly, these two differently targeted welfare provisions are likely to differ on the various dimensions of the multidimensional framework of welfare legitimacy. In Table 19.1, we present for each dimension the main question(s) that could measure the legitimacy of the two provisions. Although it can be expected that there are important differences between the social legitimacy of unemployment benefits and social assistance, these are often not analyzed in detail, especially not in comparative perspective, because such detailed data are generally lacking. Here, we just briefly outline some of the main findings of previous empirical research, which leaves still many questions unanswered.

The goals and range dimensions show differences between the two provisions: where the unemployment benefit provides income security for those who become unemployed, the social assistance provision has a broader aim to prevent poverty and guarantee a minimum income. We know from previous studies that public support for the latter goal is very high (Arts and Gelissen, 2001; Forsé and Parodi, 2009; Pfeifer, 2009). Most people also believe that the government should be responsible for providing benefits and services for the unemployed. However, support for this provision is often lower than support to provide for instance health care or old age pensions (Laenen, 2020; Roosma et al., 2014).
How to Study Welfare State Legitimacy

Table 19.1 An application of the analytical model of welfare state legitimacy, for two examples of social provisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Welfare dimensions</th>
<th>Welfare provisions</th>
<th>Social assistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goals</strong></td>
<td>Is the goal of providing income security after becoming unemployed just?</td>
<td>Is the goal of preventing people to live below the poverty line just?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range/welfare mix</td>
<td>Should the welfare state provide/coordinate unemployment benefits?</td>
<td>Should the welfare state provide/coordinate social assistance benefits?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree</td>
<td>The level of unemployment benefit/expenses is too high or too low? Are government investments in job activation too high or too low?</td>
<td>The level of social assistance benefit/expenses is too high or too low? Are government investments in job activation too high or too low?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redistributional design</td>
<td>Are contributions and benefits distributed fairly and under fair conditions?</td>
<td>Are contributions and benefits distributed fairly and under fair conditions?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Contributions from employees and employers.</td>
<td>* Contributions from taxpayers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Benefits for the able-bodied unemployed of working age.</td>
<td>* Benefits for various low-income categories.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Benefit level is related to previous wage.</td>
<td>* Benefit is means-tested and level is related to household size.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Recipients have to be available for work and be actively engaged in seeking new employment.</td>
<td>* Recipients have an obligation to actively look for paid employment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>Are access and procedures easy? Are the administrative costs low?</td>
<td>Are access and procedures easy? Are the administrative costs low?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td>Do deserving people receive the benefit? Is there no misuse by employers or undeserving employees?</td>
<td>Do deserving people receive the benefit? Is there no misuse by undeserving people?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 19.1 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Welfare dimensions</th>
<th>Welfare provisions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intended outcomes</strong></td>
<td><strong>Unemployment benefit</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Is the benefit sufficient to provide income security for the unemployed?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unintended outcomes</strong></td>
<td>Does the benefit cause negative moral consequences (such as dependency, inactivity and moral hazard) or negative economic effects (such as adverse work incentives or higher labour costs)?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When we look at the redistributional design, social assistance schemes have characteristics that usually lead to less support. The strict eligibility criteria of means-testing can lead to stigma as it unveils that its claimants are not able to provide a sufficient income themselves, which undermines the much-valued ethic of self-responsibility (van Oorschot, 2002). And because of the fact that social assistance benefits are usually paid for by (progressive) income taxes, the deservingness criterion of reciprocity is violated as well: social assistance is mostly funded by higher-income earners, but only paid out to low-income recipients. Unemployment benefits instead, are (partially) paid for by employees themselves through their social security contributions and are most often related to previous wages. These tend to be more favorable markers of welfare deservingness in the eyes of the public. When it comes to the implementation of unemployment and social assistance benefits, there is little (recent) data that distinguishes between both types of benefits. ‘The unemployed’ in general are associated with ‘being lazy’ and with welfare abuse (Larsen, 2002; Roosma et al, 2016), but no clear differentiation is
made between those relying on unemployment benefits and those relying on social assistance. We know however that means-tested benefits are more often associated with welfare abuse and bureaucracy (Goul Andersen, 1999; Rothstein, 2001). There are also doubts about the effectiveness of means-testing to tackle poverty, among academics (Gugushvili and Laenen, 2019; Korpi and Palme, 1998) as well as among the general public (Rossetti et al., 2020). Regarding the outcomes of unemployment benefits and social assistance, we see in general that people are relatively satisfied about the poverty-reducing capacity of the welfare state. People are generally more critical, however, about the standard of living of the unemployed in their country (van Oorschot and Meuleman, 2012a).

19.4 Discussion

Our analytical model of welfare state legitimacy, in which all dimensions and provisions of the welfare state are considered, leads to a detailed assessment and more fine-grained knowledge of popular support for the welfare state and its differently targeted social provisions. This permits us to better compare support for different welfare states and different types of social provision. It also allows policymakers to evaluate strong and weak points in the social legitimacy of the specific welfare policies actually in place, instead of only providing more-general accounts of support for the whole system of benefits and services.

We do note that this requires that people are to some extent informed about the specific details of different social provisions. Survey respondents might not always be aware of the specificities of social policy arrangements. Asking questions about these provisions without informing respondents could lead to non-attitudes or assessments based on false assumptions. Therefore, we argue to inform respondents well in survey questions and to
also assess respondents’ prior knowledge of social provisions in quantitative surveys.

However, we argue even more for qualitative studies in the field of welfare attitudes, because the reasoning underlying such attitudes is often more complex than simply stating answers in fixed-response categories. Wim van Oorschot, who spent a long time in his career analyzing quantitative data, at the end of his career got convinced of the need of a ‘qualitative turn’ in studying the social legitimacy of the welfare state (see, for example, Laenen, Rossetti and van Oorschot, 2019). Together with him, we believe that it is necessary to lift the veil of the statistics, and to further explore the underlying reasoning behind the numbers. Our analytical model, which is based on the two main pillars of Wim’s work on welfare legitimacy, could be a useful framework to explore popular thinking about social welfare on a deeper level.

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How to Study Welfare State Legitimacy


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20. Unpacking CARIN: Four Questions on the Study of Perceptions of Deservingness to Social Benefits

Giuliano Bonoli

20.1 Introduction

The study of perceptions of deservingness is an important component of current scholarship on the welfare state and its public acceptability, especially at times when the legitimacy of redistributive mechanisms is being questioned. Public opinion data allows us to map these perceptions and presents a number of puzzles. Why are some groups systematically considered as being more deserving than other ones? What mechanisms determine whether a person is considered deserving or not? Wim van Oorschot has made an immense contribution to this debate in several papers published since his seminal article entitled *Who should get what and why?* (van Oorschot, 2000).

In this article Wim identified five factors that seem to determine the way people feel about providing social benefits to individuals: Control, Attitude, Reciprocity, Identity and Need. These are conveniently summed up by the acronym ‘CARIN’ (van Oorschot et al., 2017). CARIN has proved an immensely helpful framework for studying perceptions of deservingness. In fact, strongly inspired by Wim van Oorschot’s work, a large corpus of literature has developed over the past twenty years. Thanks to the scholars who have contributed to this strand of literature, we now
have a fairly good understanding of what determines people’s perceptions of deservingness to social welfare benefits (see among other: van Oorschot, 2006; Larsen, 2008; Reeskens and van Oorschot, 2012; Kootstra, 2016; Reeskens and van der Meer, 2019). However, this is my main contention in this chapter, some questions remain unanswered in the current literature. In the rest of the chapter, I first briefly summarise the CARIN framework. This is followed by a discussion of four open questions that in my view have yet to be answered satisfactorily. I conclude by arguing that we need to continue working along the lines indicated in the seminal work by Wim van Oorschot on deservingness perceptions.

20.2 CARIN and the study of deservingness perceptions

A substantial corpus of literature exists in relation to popular perceptions of deservingness. Early studies on social policies already noted that both in legislation and among the general public, some needy people were considered more deserving of state (or collective) help than others. This is the case of, for example, the disabled and the old and much less of able-bodied working age individuals. De Swaan developed a somewhat larger framework based on three elements: disability, proximity and docility (de Swaan, 1988). According to him, the three criteria are applied in the order above: first disability, then if so, proximity and finally docility. To be considered as deserving, a needy person must fulfil the three.

These approaches were systematised in an article by Wim van Oorschot (2000) which has significantly influenced research on perceptions of deservingness in subsequent years. He identified five criteria that individuals use to decide the level of deservingness to welfare benefits: Control, Attitude, Reciprocity, Identity and Need, known as the CARIN criteria (van Oorschot,
2000; van Oorschot et al., 2017). The criteria can be defined in the following terms:

- **Control**: Is the person in a situation of need because of some event he or she could not control (for example, disability, old age) or because of an event he or she could have had some control over (unemployment, low income)?
- **Attitude**: Is the needy person friendly and thankful to the state and/or the contributors to the welfare state, or does he or she have an attitude of entitlement and carelessness?
- **Reciprocity**: Has the person in need done something for society before asking for help, such as paid contribution or taxes?
- **Identity**: Is the recipient of the benefit ‘similar’ to the giver, in terms of ethnic, professional, regional or other identity?
- **Need**: Is the beneficiary really in need?

The list, put forward in 2000, is still widely used by those who study perceptions of deservingness of social benefits and has not been substantially amended or complemented by other scholars. However, as hinted above, a number of questions relating to the study of deservingness perceptions remain unanswered. Four such questions are discussed next.

### 20.3 Question #1: Does CARIN really cover everything and are its components sufficiently distinctive?

As mentioned above, the CARIN criteria are widely accepted, suggesting that they cover rather well the various dimensions of deservingness perceptions. However, like in any categorisation effort, we can ask two questions referring to comprehensiveness and coherence. First, with regard to comprehensiveness, we can ask if CARIN covers everything. Are there some factors that may impact on perception of deservingness that are not covered in the
CARIN framework? The second question refers to internal coherence and more specifically to whether or not the five constituting elements of CARIN are sufficiently distinctive to justify their separation on the classification.

With regard to the first question, it may be hypothesised that other factors, not covered or only partly covered by CARIN could play a role as determinants of deservingness perceptions. For example:

- **Alternatives**: Does the needy person have alternatives other than asking for help? Possibly this factor is covered by control and need, but may gain from being examined separately.
- **Effort to reduce need**: Is the person doing what can be reasonably expected from him/her to reduce need, that is, earn money? For example, find a job, be active in the gig economy, or become self-employed? In the literature above ‘effort to reduce need’ is considered as a component of reciprocity but this may be problematic.

With regard to the second question, in many studies using the CARIN framework, reciprocity is used both to refer to the payment of taxes and/or contribution prior to claiming welfare AND in relation to re-integration efforts. These two components of the reciprocity criterion seem in reality rather different. First, they take place at different points in time: before need arises or after need has arisen. Second, they probably refer to two different moral principles:

- In the case of the payment of contributions, reference is made to reciprocity in a strict sense. ‘You have contributed in the past, so now you deserve help’.
- In the case of effort to reduce need, instead, reference is made to some sort of ‘conditional altruism’. ‘I will help you
only if you do whatever it takes to be self-sufficient and in spite of that you do not manage’.

It may be the case that ‘alternatives’ and especially ‘effort to reduce need’ may gain from being examined separately from reciprocity/control/need because they can be very different from the reciprocity involved in paying social insurance contributions. These two criteria might acquire some additional salience with the emergence of new technologies that are transforming the way work is being performed (for example, gig economy) and particularly the emergence of new forms of work that allow access to income streams to individuals who, for example, because of low human capital, tend to be excluded from standard employment.

20.4 Question #2: Is there a ranking of the five factors?

Using survey data from the Netherlands, van Oorschot (2000) found that all factors matter, that is, he finds statistically significant differences between the perceived deservingness of different potential welfare clients located at opposite extreme on the dimensions implied by the CARIN criteria (actually, he has no data on attitude, so only tests ‘CRIN’). In this analysis, control is by far the most important factor, followed by identity and reciprocity. However, the differences could be very dependent on the formulations used in the questions. For example, on control, one variable, the contrast between: ‘not able to work’ and not ‘willing to work’ drives the effect. For identity, it is illegal immigrants. Therefore, it may be the case that this ranking tells us more about how the criteria have been operationalised than about a hierarchy of the criteria themselves.

The same problem is found also in other studies which attempt to identify a ranking or hierarchy of the factors (for example
Reeskens and van der Meer, 2019). In reality, we lack a metric that would allow us to compare the impact of the various factors. Differences in coefficients are as likely to depend on variation in question formulation as they are to reflect different levels of importance attributed to the five criteria by respondents. The lack of a common metric means that the relative importance of the five criteria cannot be ranked per se.

20.5 Question # 3: Does CARIN apply to services as well as to cash benefits?

Research on deservingness within the CARIN framework refers to help provided in the form of income transfers or cash benefits. However, increasingly, Western welfare states are reconfigured towards the provision of services such as active labour market policies, childcare, and services for the elderly. The literature on deservingness has not focused so much on this form of redistribution, which can have an important impact on people’s life chances. One exception is a vignette-study by Heuer and Zimmermann (2020): based on qualitative methods (focus group) they find that CARIN reflects pretty well the way in which focus group participants think about deservingness except in relation to a criterion that they call ‘social investment’. Some needy persons are considered deserving not so much of income transfers but of investment in their human capital. The authors treat social investment as a new criterion that implies ‘potentiality’ in contrast to the CARIN criteria that are based on ‘conditionality’. Investment is invoked as a justification for support for two person-vignettes: a low-income earner and an immigrant. The reasoning that respondents make goes something like this: ‘if we invest now in their training, they will eventually cost less’.

But is the treatment of ‘social investment’ as a deservingness criterion appropriate? Or should it be considered on a different
conceptual level? The CARIN criteria are about motivation for altruism, for giving. Social investment is not necessarily altruistic, as it can be motivated by self-interest (pay less in the future). Second, while CARIN is about cash transfers, social investment is about the provision of enabling services, and here too there may be some essential differences in relation to, for example, the scope for cheating.

Given the importance that social investment as a policy orientation acquired over the last few years, it seems essential to include social investment interventions in the study of deservingness. How to do that is still an open question. Conceptually, social investment does not fit into the same category as the deservingness principles that constitute the CARIN framework. The study of deservingness, thus, should be adapted in other ways to be able to accommodate perceptions of deservingness in relation to social investment interventions.

20.6 Question # 4: What is the theory behind CARIN?

The CARIN criteria have been essentially identified on the basis of empirical analysis, and little advance has been made in the search of a theory that could explain why it is these five factors that matter and not other ones. One exception is the work by Petersen who, although not applying the CARIN framework directly, has put forward a theory-based interpretation of perception of deservingness, called ‘deservingness heuristic’. Petersen’s theory is based on evolutionary psychology and on the idea that humans have developed rules that help them decide with whom they should share resources and with whom they should not. In Petersen’s view, humans are programmed to share resources with reciprocators and not to share them with cheaters, that is, individuals who are likely to take advantage of the givers (see Petersen et al., 2010, 2012; Aaroe and Petersen, 2014).
These attitudes have allowed groups of humans to protect themselves from free-riders and keep resources within the group. Empirical work by Petersen and colleagues suggest that deservingness perceptions are deeply engrained in people’s minds, and are not fundamentally affected by differences in institutions. One of their main pieces of evidence is a Denmark – US comparison showing that a reciprocator is deemed more deserving than a cheater in either of the two countries, which are as different as possible in relation to most welfare state related issues (Aaroe and Petersen, 2014).

20.7 Conclusion

CARIN has been an immensely helpful framework for the study of deservingness perceptions. It has allowed many researchers to systematise the results of their empirical analyses in a rather coherent way. However, the fact that CARIN is essentially empirically driven limits the extent to which our knowledge of deservingness perceptions can move further forward. In addition, the study of deservingness perceptions has some unanswered puzzles, such as the ranking of the criteria or how to integrate social investment. In spite of the fact that much has been written on the determinants of deservingness perception, more research is needed to understand the drivers of public acceptability of modern welfare states. This question is more important than ever as we are witnessing the emergence of multicultural societies throughout Europe, a development that is putting strains on welfare states and on the extent to which they are accepted by the general public. Further research along the lines of Wim’s work could contribute to a better understanding of the mechanisms that are at play and to the development of social institutions that are suitable for a multicultural society.
Unpacking CARIN: Four Questions

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21. Is CARIN Alive and Well?
Revisiting the Relationship between Stereotypes and Identity as the Foundations of Welfare Deservingness

Wouter De Tavernier and Veerle Draulans

21.1 Introduction

One of Wim van Oorschot’s main contributions to the field of welfare state studies is his work on welfare state legitimacy – that is, public support for certain social policies. In particular, his name has become synonymous with deservingness: the extent to which certain individuals are considered ‘deserving’ of public support, for instance through welfare benefits (van Oorschot, 2000, 2006).

Deservingness perceptions are largely affected by two aspects: the institutional design of a benefit and the public image of its target group (Laenen et al., 2019; van Oorschot and Roosma 2017). The latter means that perceptions of deservingness are based on stereotypes about (possible) benefit recipients: a negative collective image of a certain social group means it is less favourably judged in terms of (some of) the deservingness criteria, thereby lowering public support for benefits targeting this particular group. The stereotypes about a group affecting its deservingness refer in particular to five perceived characteristics of the members of this group, which are known as ‘deservingness criteria’ or ‘CARIN criteria’ and which are a set of ‘rules’ people
use to determine who is ‘deserving’ of public support and who is not (van Oorschot, 2000, 2006).

The more control an individual is perceived to have over one’s situation, the less inclined people will be to argue that this individual should be entitled to a benefit. van Oorschot (2000) finds that control is particularly important for deservingness, confirming earlier research. For instance, Will (1993: 330) found that ‘Those who try to improve their lot in life and still fall short are shown much higher levels of generosity than those who appear not to try.’ Attitude refers in particular to the level of gratefulness of the benefit recipient, with more grateful individuals being perceived as more deserving of the benefit. Reciprocity affects deservingness in the sense that people are more inclined to support benefits for individuals who are perceived as having contributed before (or will do so later on). Identity is about whether one can identify oneself with the recipient: one is more inclined to support benefits for individuals one can relate to, individuals that resemble oneself. Finally, need refers to the extent to which the individual requires a benefit to foresee in one’s subsistence, with more needy individuals being seen as more deserving.

Stereotypes are considered to be one of the foundations of deservingness, as the latter strongly relies on perceptions and opinions about individuals or groups. However, the link with the social-psychological literature on stereotypes is rarely made explicit in writings on deservingness – a rare exception being a footnote in van Oorschot (2006). Bridging the gap between both literatures, we argue in this contribution that this link is not as straightforward as might have been assumed. In doing so, it will become clear that the role of ‘identity’ is not as clear-cut as it is presented in the deservingness literature. In the following, we briefly present the concepts of stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination, and discuss the role of proximity for their development. Then, we discuss the nature of identity in relation to
the other four CARIN criteria and deservingness itself. Finally, the chapter presents some new roads for future research springing from linking both strands of literature.

21.2 Identity criterion: the odd one out

All deservingness criteria have in common that individuals use them as guiding principles in deciding who should receive more or less support. However, while the other four deservingness criteria deal with assumptions about who benefit recipients are and how they behave (Are they needy? Do they try? Are they grateful? Did they contribute?), identity refers to social or geographical proximity or distance between contributors and welfare recipients. Distance can be understood in terms of socio-economic status (Carriero and Filandri, 2019), unemployment (Uunk and van Oorschot, 2019) or migration status (Meuleman et al., 2020). Moreover, while identity is conceptualised as one of the deservingness criteria and therefore a consequence of stereotypes in the deservingness literature, the literature on stereotypes describes it as a cause of stereotypes. To shed light on the causal relationship, we build the argument from the basics: what are stereotypes?

21.2.1 Stereotypes

Prejudice refers to positive or negative attitudes individuals hold towards a social group, creating or maintaining hierarchical status relations between groups (Dovidio et al., 2010: 7). The concept encompasses affective, cognitive and behavioural aspects (Maio et al., 2010: 264–266). In a narrow understanding of the concept, prejudice only refers to the affective aspect, while stereotyping and discrimination refer to the cognitive and behavioural aspects, respectively. McGarty and colleagues (2002: 5) define the term stereotype as ‘any impression of groups held by anybody’ and individuals do so ‘regardless of whether the accuracy of that belief
is disputed.’ Hence, they contain supposed ‘knowledge’ about a group. Stereotypes can be descriptive, expressing how groups are or how likely their members are supposed to behave in a certain way, or prescriptive, expressing how they ought to be (Glick and Rudman, 2010: 337). Stereotyping can be described as ‘complexity reduction’ or ‘energy saving devices’ (McGarty et al., 2002: 35), by means of categorisation and minimising detailed information or individuality. Discrimination, finally, is ‘behavior that creates, maintains, or reinforces advantage for some groups and their members over other groups and their members’ (Dovidio et al., 2010: 10). Deservingness essentially is a form of discrimination: it is about deciding which groups should be treated better than others. Though not the same, prejudice, stereotypes and discrimination are tied to one another. For instance, stereotypes serve to rationalise and justify prejudice and discrimination (McGarty, 2002: 25; Crandall et al., 2011).

21.2.2 Proximity

According to the contact hypothesis (Allport, 1954), an individual’s feelings toward (prejudice) and views of (stereotypes) a certain social group become more positive as the individual has more contact with individuals belonging to this specific group. It is not just contact that causes individuals to alter their views in a positive direction, but the quality of contact appears to be particularly important (Drury et al., 2016; Hale, 1998). Stereotypes are mainly applied in contexts where little information is available about the other person, situations in which this ‘Other’ is anonymous. In other words, stereotyping depends on proximity – or distance – and thus on the identity dimension. As such, identity is not simply a deservingness criterion like all the other four (control, attitude, reciprocity, need). Instead, it precedes the stereotypes from which the other deservingness criteria are derived.
However, if identity precedes stereotypes, and hence deservingness criteria, then how can it affect deservingness opinions when other deservingness criteria are controlled for? It is possible that the effects identified for identity in the deservingness literature rather reflect prejudice – in the narrow, affective sense – towards other social groups. This makes the concept very different in nature from the other deservingness criteria as they are about stereotypes. Following this rationale, identity as a concept in the deservingness literature in fact should be split into two: an indirect and a direct component. On the one hand, (the lack of) identification with a certain social group triggers stereotypes to be used against this group, stereotypes that are reflected in the scores the social group receives on the deservingness criteria of control, attitude, reciprocity and need. On the other, it could affect deservingness more directly though prejudice. That suggests the causal model presented in Figure 21.1.

![Figure 21.1 Identity, stereotypes and deservingness](image)

As a meta-analysis of racial discrimination found that the impact of emotional prejudice on discrimination is twice as big as that of stereotypes (Talaska et al., 2008), the impact of prejudice on deservingness could be substantial.
21.3 A new research agenda

Linking deservingness more explicitly to the literature on stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination would extend the research agenda well beyond the position of identity and prejudice in the causal diagram. By bringing in insights from the psychological literature, new questions emerge. More specifically, we suggest two paths for future research.

First, according to the Stereotype Content Model (Fiske et al., 2002), stereotypes as an instrument of categorisation can be boiled down to two dimensions: warmth and competence. While older people are seen as warm but incompetent (classified as ‘paternalistic prejudice’), poor people and ‘welfare recipients’ are seen as lacking both warmth and competence (‘contemptuous prejudice’). Disabled people are considered as equally incompetent but placed a bit lower than older people on the warmth scale. This order corresponds to the one found by van Oorschot (2006) in deservingness of these groups all across Europe: older people are most deserving, followed by the disabled, and unemployed people follow at a distance. Potentially, this difference in warmth could explain the finding that older people are the most deserving social group across Europe (van Oorschot, 2006). Moreover, there seems to be an overlap between the concepts of warmth and competence in the psychological literature, and attitude and control in the deservingness literature, that could be the subject of further exploration.4

Second, the stereotype literature could also add to our understanding of how policies affect deservingness (for example Laenen, 2018). Social policies institutionalise social differences, establishing distance between social groups. This is not only the case for stratification of social classes (Esping-Andersen, 1990) but for instance also of age groups through the institutionalisation of the life course and its tri-partition into education, work and retirement (Kohli, 1978). Due to the importance of contact for
stereotypes, the welfare state has therefore been seen as a source of stereotyping and prejudice, in particular towards older individuals (De Tavernier et al., 2019; Hagestad and Uhlenberg, 2005). As such, stereotypes can serve as a policy feedback mechanism: when policies such as pensions separate older people from other social groups in society, this can strengthen views of older people as being incapable of earning an income and therefore deserving of a social benefit. On the other hand, as the share of older people in society increases, they are perceived less as a particularly needy group and are faced with similar deservingness levels as younger people (Naumann et al., 2020).

21.4 Conclusion

So, is CARIN alive and well? From the literature, this question can be answered with a resounding yes: 'She is alive and well, as she inhabits our hearts and thus shapes our minds' (Castells, 2010: xviii). However, if we take the deservingness criteria out of their theoretical vacuum and build them into the literature on stereotypes, a whole new research agenda emerges allowing for a deeper understanding of welfare state legitimacy.

From the theoretical argument made, it appears that identity might play a much more central role than has been assumed so far. As illustrated in Figure 21.1, rather than being one of the five deservingness criteria theorised by Wim van Oorschot as being on equal footing, identity might precede the others by triggering the stereotyping the other criteria are derived from. The direct effect established between identity and deservingness would then rather reflect the affection an individual holds towards a certain social group, that is, prejudice. Hence, maybe the acronym ‘IS-CARIN’ would more accurately reflect the causal mechanism at play: it acknowledges that identity (I) causally precedes the CARIN criteria through triggering stereotyping (S), yet that there is an
effect of identity on deservingness independent of the other criteria through prejudice (the I remaining in CARIN). In this model, deservingness is a specific form of discrimination.

Furthermore, we also briefly illustrated two other ways in which the stereotypes literature could enrich our understanding of deservingness. First, perceived warmth and competence of individuals belonging to specific social groups could potentially go a long way in explaining whether or not these people are perceived as deserving support of society. Second, stereotypes could be a supplementary policy feedback mechanism through which stereotypes legitimise existing forms of discrimination and social policies create their own support. In order to test these ideas, surveys analysing deservingness should also include measures of stereotyping and prejudice towards the social groups whose deservingness is being assessed. Hence, more than providing answers, this contribution aims to be the start of a new research agenda on deservingness by approaching it from a perspective of prejudice, stereotypes and discrimination.

NOTES

1. For a state-of-the-art of the literature on welfare state legitimacy, see van Oorschot and Roosma (2017).
2. Note that, unlike identity, the other four deservingness criteria are descriptive stereotypes.
3. Fiske et al. (2002) do not define the concept of welfare recipients, but it is likely to refer to unemployment benefit and/or social assistance recipients.
4. Also the study by Menec and Perry (1995) could be very relevant here. They link the perceived control individuals with specific ‘stigmas’ (for example, unemployment, obesity and heart disease) have over their situation, with the willingness to help those individuals, through attribution theory.
5. Technically, it would be more correct to replace the last I in ‘IS-CARIN’ by a P, as it reflects the idea that it is not identity itself, but rather the prejudice it triggers, that would affect perceptions of deservingness. However, that would leave us with the somewhat unfortunate and less scientifically sounding acronym ‘IS-PRANC’.

250
REFERENCES


I don’t think there is anything accidental in meeting some-thing or some-one. As researchers, we naturally develop an interest in things, people and how both influence each other. Social scientists study phenomena. These phenomena do not seem to have a tactile dimension, at least not at first sight. We have developed a jargon to speak about structures, cultures and systems, so that we can enlighten each other on new concepts invented to make sense out of the world, more particularly our place in it. We speak about facts, figures, and systems, in the case of Wim van Oorschot the welfare system. We share data with likeminded persons, in some occasions also with those who hold a different viewpoint. Conversations with a purpose we call them. This purpose can be of a scientific or an economic-political nature. Such conversations, Wim and I almost had none. If this has any reason at all, it is because in the years that we shared a common workspace I have appreciated Wim as a ‘presence’ rather than a person. The good thing about being a ‘presence’ in someone’s life is that when you are absent it immediately introduces an emptiness. A ‘presence’ fills a space in silence. One only comes to appreciate a ‘presence’ when its absence is not met with indifference or relief. There is something infinite in a ‘presence’. What this means is potentially better explained through a visual modality than in language (Figure 22.1).
When two ideas or arguments are presented as extreme poles of the same phenomenon, a ‘presence’ does not necessarily focus on one or the other side of the continuum. In this case, it would only lose itself in a quarrel about an issue that, in most cases, is a simple problem that becomes complicated due to a process of binary thinking. This binary thinking is ‘everywhere’. It has been particularly strong in our own department and in our personal work sphere. It is also there when we look into topics such as who deserves to be supported through the welfare system. Thinking about ‘who’ implies an ‘us’ and a ‘them’, so it seems. Usually the ‘us’ refers to the ones who consider themselves and their own thinking patterns as the norm. With ‘them’ they refer to groups of people or profiles that differ from this norm. In a social welfare context, ‘them’ tends to refers to those potentially in need. Consequently, we put ‘them’ on the demand side of the social welfare system and ‘us’ on the supply side. This is how we choose to look at a phenomenon like the welfare system in relation to deservingness. A general lack of resources invites us into making choices about how to invest them. It is the policymaker who decides on who gets what. He or she may choose to do so in line
From Who Deserves to What Deserves

with public opinion, an area that Wim has carefully studied in his academic career. Tracing his studies back over the years, I noticed that people’s opinion about who deserves has not changed too much. Surely, there are differences related to the perspective taken; an economic or a social justice one. But overall, those who were privileged beneficiaries ten years ago keep their place in the ranking; the elderly, the disabled or diseased and to a certain extent the unemployed (Laenen and Meuleman, 2017; Meuleman et. al., 2018), the latter more outspoken in times of economic recession. Humans seem to have a natural tendency to assign advantages to people close to what they will most likely become one day; old, either with or without diseases or disabilities, and unemployed. Solidarity, in most cases, is limited to those who are ‘like us’, and this seems to be universal.

Common courtesy requires me to mention that there are, of course, one million ‘situations’ in which humans have proven to successfully bond with people who are different or in need, at least in a real life context. I cannot stress enough that acting upon such people in a real life context is quite different from sharing information about thoughts and opinions in a survey context, from behind our desk, pretty much similar to how some researchers gather and analyze data, from behind their desk. Perhaps it is because we prefer to speak about solidarity mechanisms more than to actually live our principles in practice. Or we might be too limited or discouraged from within our scientifically inspired environment to actually act upon others. I guess this is because bonding needs a physical ‘presence’, something or some-one that you run into; an encounter of bodies with or without a predefined purpose. The most interesting encounters are usually the non-intentional ones, the type of informally guided nodding acquaintances. Wim and I had many of those over the years. I remember this one particular moment where I actually did meet Wim [or rather succeeded in connecting the dots between his work and some of the questions that sit on my scientific radar]. It was in the
presence of two other colleagues and a student. The line of inquiry on deservingness suddenly began to spark my interest when the rights of animals became a subject of discussion during a master thesis defense in June 2019. The student pleaded for an extension of the human rights declaration and emphasized the important role of social welfare workers in creating a momentum for the animal rights movement. The societal shift she promoted towards positive change was in line with the core principles of empowerment and liberation that underpins the social work profession. Her argument was focused on enhancing the wellbeing of animals. It was not a surprising conclusion, given the nature of the social welfare profession. However, it was the introduction of the element ‘nature’ itself that opened up an interesting new perspective. It moved my focus from who deserves to what deserves support on this planet; a what that according to the student deserved a right to be defended and legally represented. From animal rights over Mount Taranaki, Te Urewera national park and the Whanganui river in New Zealand to the complete ecosystem of the Himalayan mountains in North India; in the last couple of years the idea that nature deserves better has moved from being a statement initially proposed by Christopher Stone in a lawsuit as early as 1972 (Sierra Club v Morton, 1972) to a statement integrated in the law system. Legal rights are now assigned to many natural objects in our living environment, which suggest that our research relation with ‘things’ will become more relevant under the impulse of sustainability discourses and ecologically inspired movements worldwide, not necessarily with the intention to enforce a status of full personhood on non-human elements but rather to seek recognition for the rights of ‘others’ (Colwell et al., 2017; Morris and Ruru, 2010).

It is precisely at this cross-road between the human and the non-human that our ways of approaching the concept deservingness is challenged, up to the point where conventional
social-political, economic and behavioral theories fall short in providing accurate answers to the many questions we are asked to deal with. How should we best relate to these not all human ‘others’ with whom we geographically share common ground? Are there valid reasons to assume that non-human entities deserve to be considered as a relevant category of beneficiaries of a welfare system in our questionnaires? Can a river be sick, stressed, disabled or enabled? Does it deserve to be treated, at what cost? Who represents rivers, mountains or animals? Which rights do we allow them to have? How do we secure these rights and what should be done if these rights are violated? How do we balance the negative effects of polluted rivers on the health of many with economic advantages of the companies located at our water fronts? What is more important; health or employment, which creates the ability to pay for health care?

As much as we applaud the movement to protect animals, natural resources and to restore ecological systems, we are increasingly aware of the tensions this creates, particularly on a political-economic level. To put it simple, broadening the focus from who deserves to what deserves might ‘get in the way’ of those pulling the political, economic strings. Humanism has its own prospects. However, the crisis related to the corona virus outbreak in the year 2020 has sparked people’s interest into how to restore the balance with our natural environment, as it became clear that human interference in nature was one of the triggers for the COVID-19 virus outbreak (Afelt et al., 2018). Several activists have issued a call to start focusing on the bigger issue related to mankind’s survival. ‘Our planet deserves to be saved!’ ‘Future generations will benefit from our collective effort and investment!’ However, what does a fishing embargo to ‘save the fish population’ mean for those who earn a living through fishing, even when restoring the fish population to achieve a healthier ecosystem is beneficial for them in the long term? What does this all imply for the social welfare worker guiding people through the
complexities of daily life struggle, trying to secure a chance for them to earn a living in line with these people’s competences?

As researchers, we inventory opinions, compare, contrast, and where necessary calculate. We search for meaning in numbers and grand narratives, more often than not from a distant perspective. The social workers we train operate in real life, on the ground floor or on a policy level, doing the same thing: that is, to inventory, compare, and contrast. Their ‘presence’ on-site teaches us what our absence in the field often cannot, namely that from a perspective of hope, it is always better to move on, than to hold on to what you are, what others think you are or to the disadvantaged place you occupy in society. Have we been responsive enough to the dynamics of identity formation and the type of relationships through which they are shaped in our own scientific work? To be able to measure we categorize, or at least this is how we are trained to measure, particularly in a survey context. We tend to use binary logic to describe respondents based on race, sex, social status and other identity characteristics. These categories have been quite stable over time. Ironically, this is often the one thing people in need are desperately trying to escape; to be boxed in as a category, to occupy a thick box that they do not necessarily choose to relate to. But we ‘hold on’ to our thick box logic. It characterizes our Western, cultural and philosophical thought pattern. And we often do so for other than theoretical reasons: traditions, pragmatics, operationalization conventions, a concern about quality in relation to standards of practice and generalizability, or simply a lack of inspiration about how to measure dynamics and identities in a permanent status of becoming. Our standard forms of representation are increasingly being subjected to critiques from amongst others cis- and creative genders (Butler, 2004; Wallach Scott, 2010), those who think and work from a decolonialization perspective (Hendricks et al., 2019; Yanow, 2015) and those who oppose anthropocentrism in the context of destructive forms of speciesm (Braidotti, 2016, Trzak,
These studies invite us into rethinking difference and transformation in non-negative terms. They encourage us to move away from the Same/Other binary logic or at least to avoid a situation in which target groups are gender-ed, race-d or specie-d: female/male, white/black, human/non-human.

Identities, according to Braidotti (2011), are always in the process of becoming. This process is not exclusive to the mots and butterflies we see evolve from a cocoon and a caterpillar into the beautiful creatures they are. Human subjective identity is flexible. The boundaries within which we move from one status to another, one category to another are not fixed in time or space. We are sometimes more of the one and less of the other. This introduces an important challenge to consider, namely, how does one capture a process of becoming or a metamorphosis that progresses as a representational modus in a measurement instrument? A process of a metamorphosis usually is a painful endeavor, in which we have to give up what we were to become something else. With human enhancement technologies we enter yet another exiting area of being that will challenge our thick box logic. Until recently, technology has mainly functioned as a means to facilitate humans. It serves us, from an instrumental point of view. We are now seeing a generation of people starting to design themselves, using implants to extent the range of their senses, for example, to listen to the sound of colors or to capture vibrations of earth and moon through the soles of their feet. They connect their nerve system with an external computer or device. Increasingly, we move into an area where we all will become makers. It allows us to build a better or a different version of ourselves, by choice rather than from a disadvantage perspective. Humans are ‘becoming’ machine, hereby escaping all types of categories humanism has previously provided us with, so it seems. I am chasing these cyborgs merely out of curiosity. At the same time I imagine a new generation of experts in deservingness research breaking their head over the same type of questions Wim
has answered over the years: Who deserves? What deserves? Under which conditions? Is there a difference between humans, more-than-humans and non-humans in what we expect them to contribute to our welfare state? When does one become a machine that does no longer fit our category of ‘human’ or when does one become a machine that is declared eligible to pay taxes or deserves to be taken care of? Most importantly, when will we, as researchers, have to let go to what we are familiar with ourselves in terms of trying to make sense out of the social world?

I also look forward to the day when such discussions can be held and we will start to challenge the idea of how we represent things, humans or others, in our surveys and in our conceptualization, comparison, contrasting and calculating exercises. On that day, I would happily applaud the many social workers I have had the pleasure to work with, for refusing the idea of categorization and for promoting a paradigm of hope; for holding on to the idea that there is an opportunity for every human to ‘become’ a better version of themselves. I issue a challenge to all survey specialists to rethink categorization from the perspective of becoming and to develop analytical means to study identities in flux. The cyborg revolution will be a good starting point. It requires us to relate to ‘some-thing’ that escapes all our existing categories. Their ‘presence’ brings us back where we started (Figure 22.1); the sign of infinity that simultaneously deceives and enlightens us, depending on the angle from which we are looking at it. ‘What might make us “post human” is in fact that which makes us (merely!) “human”, amplified perhaps; but the same collection of traits, characteristics, and measures of moral value as we have ever aspired to possess as markers of our humanity’ (Lawrence, 2017: 172). Consequently, all binary categories are simply extremes of one and the same phenomenon. The Likert scales we favor in our research would make more sense if the two extreme poles on each end of the spectrum would fold into each other. Most phenomena, things, events, the relation
between future, past and present are of an entangled rather than a linear nature. They are permanently being reworked, hereby escaping the correlational and causality logic we impose on them. What I intend to say is that this might mean that our responsibility to questions of social justice has to be reworked as well. The question ‘who or what deserves’ is therefore not simply one about who gets more or less or how to best discriminate between groups of radically exteriorized ‘others’ in need. It is about taking up the responsibility to respond to new configurations and new types of subjectivities. The cyborg’s presence issues a gentle invitation to start reshaping our scientific toolbox. The cyborg displays no signs of bitterness, regrets or negativity caused by too much past in its life. It does not display signals of unease, anxiety or tensions either, as these are things that belong to persons with too much of a future left. The cyborg is at the very point where present, past and future meet and where the potential for transformation sits. If we consider society as something dynamic that escapes categorization, then the very idea that patterns remain stable should be problematized. The foundational categorical thinking that constraints and prevents us from seeing some-thing or some-one from a different perspective then becomes a matter of concern.

In the prospect of further debate, I wish to end with a statement from the last part of the Four Quartets from T.S. Eliot (1943) in the poem Little Gidding:

INFINITY?

‘We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.’
— T.S. Eliot, Four Quartets.
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23. Does the Concept of Deservingness Apply to Migrant Settlement?

David De Coninck, Gray Swiegood and Koen Matthijs

23.1 Introduction

European integration efforts have come under increased scrutiny following the entry of large numbers of migrants in 2014–2016 (d’Haenens et al., 2019). Dealing with this diverse group of economic migrants, refugees, asylum seekers, and transmigrants, is one of the major issues facing Europe today. If the sheer number of migrants is challenging, their integration into (local) society is even more so. Several European politicians and media have used the terminology of ‘economic migrants’ to cast doubt on the legitimacy of their claims to protection (Crawley and Skleparis, 2018). Thus, public opinion may today be more restrictive in terms of which migrants should be allowed to settle in their country than in the past. The increased emphasis on the legitimacy of migrants may stimulate feelings of (un)deservingness among the public towards migrant settlement in the destination country (De Coninck, 2020).

In the field of social policy, van Oorschot and colleagues have made important contributions to the literature on welfare deservingness, focusing on the differential support among the public for welfare provisions for different social groups based on the so-called CARIN criteria: control, attitude, reciprocity, identity, and need (Jeene et al., 2011; Jensen and Pedersen, 2016; van Oorschot, 2000, 2006). We argue that this model can be usefully extended to
the investigation of the public’s conditional support towards the settlement of migrants in their country.

Our goal is to obtain greater insight into the public’s conditional attitudes towards migrants, using the CARIN criteria and deservingness framework as a point of departure. This approach highlights challenges and opportunities for policymakers who struggle to meet their responsibilities to protect refugees while simultaneously respecting public attitudes on this salient and divisive issue (Bansak et al., 2016).

23.2 From welfare deservingness to settlement deservingness

The adult population’s attitudes regarding the distribution of welfare benefits are influenced by a simple question: are the recipients of social benefits deserving or not? Scholars of deservingness have investigated the differential support among the adult population for welfare provisions for different groups (for example, immigrants, the elderly, the sick and disabled) (Jensen and Pedersen, 2016). To understand how these attitudes are shaped, van Oorschot (2000) draws attention to both institutional and cultural factors. Prior research indicates that public support depends on the perception of a welfare scheme’s financial burden on the population, which in turn relates to the possible number of claimants (Hills, 2002). The economic conditions of a region are a key contextual factor. Regions with poor economic conditions experience greater competition for scarce economic resources ‘such as well-paid jobs, jobs that are secure, affordable housing, or welfare-state resources’ (Billiet et al., 2014: 136), which may increase the degree to which migrants are perceived as a financial burden. Although country- and regional-level indicators contextualize the broad integration climate, the integration of migrants almost exclusively takes place
at the local level. Doomernik and Ardon (2018) found that most recent migrants settle in urban areas to seek employment and housing or to reconnect with family and friends. Deservingness will therefore be a framework that mostly applies to a local context, as perceptions of (small) communities or individuals are more likely to stimulate the successful settlement and integration of migrants in a local context than country-wide indications of deservingness perceptions.

From the cultural domain, van Oorschot (2000; 2006) developed five basic deservingness criteria: control, attitude, reciprocity, identity, and need (van Oorschot et al., 2017). Need postulates that those with higher needs are met with more sympathy, while control predicts that those who are perceived to be in control of (or responsible for) their situation, will be met with less sympathy. The identity condition implies that deservingness increases as the cultural distance between those in need and the native population decreases. Those who are considered ‘one of us’, will be perceived as more deserving. According to the attitude criterion, individuals who are thankful for the support they receive will also be perceived as more deserving. Finally, the reciprocity criterion states that deservingness depends on the extent to which the support has been ‘earned’, for example, by contributing to a country’s welfare by their labour market activity (Reeskens and van der Meer, 2019; van Oorschot, 2002, 2006).

Although this framework has been widely used in the evaluation of the deservingness of welfare recipiency, it is clearly relevant to understanding attitudes towards the settlement of migrants. Refugees or asylum seekers in need of protection have been dismissed as ‘economic migrants’ by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban and former Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico, amongst others (Crawley and Skleparis, 2018). One purpose of this social construct is to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate migrants, and to demarcate ‘the population’ from ‘the other’ (Foucault et al., 2007). The use of such categorizations may be
related to specific actions such as discrimination, because ‘language, thought, and actions are inextricably linked’ (Hardy, 2003: 19). Studies have shown that the way in which refugees are represented in media and politics is related to attitudes about how they should be treated (De Coninck, 2020). The emphasis on the (il)legitimacy of particular ‘types’ of migrants based on criteria such as religion and ethnicity may result in feelings of (un)deservingness towards them. Currently, no approach exists that provides a satisfactory answer to the question: does the public believe that migrants deserve to settle in a country? We hypothesize that the mechanisms shaping perceptions of welfare deservingness among the public also apply to this question – albeit with some modification. In this sense we are positing a framework

![Basic Settlement Deservingness Model](image)

Note: Ma = position migrant group on ‘negative-positive’ dimension of a deservingness criterion (Laenen, Rossetti and van Oorschot, 2019).

Figure 23.1  The basic settlement deservingness model
Does the Concept of Deservingness Apply to Migrant Settlement?

of settlement deservingness (Figure 23.1). Although cultural and institutional factors that explain deservingness hold a central position in this model, differences by gender, age structure, religious denomination, and socioeconomic status may be expected based on previous differences in intergroup attitudes and deservingness perceptions (De Coninck, 2020; Reesrens and van Oorschot, 2012).

23.3 Re-interpreting the CARIN criteria

How do the CARIN criteria apply to settlement deservingness perceptions towards different ‘types’ of migrants? And what is meant by ‘type’ of migrant? Social constructs such as ‘(economic) migrant’, ‘refugee’, ‘asylum seeker’, and ‘transmigrant’ have been used to categorize migrants for many decades, but this practice has become increasingly politicized since the refugee crisis in an effort to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate migrants (Foucault et al., 2007; Crawley and Skleparis, 2018). Following the signing of the Refugee Convention in 1951, a refugee is legally defined as ‘someone who has been forced to flee his or her country because of persecution, war, or violence. A refugee has a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group’ (United Nations, 1951: 14). Migrants are defined as individuals ‘who decide to move, based on their free will, for reasons of personal convenience, and without the intervention of an external compelling reason such as war or a natural disaster’ (UNESCO, 2017: para. 3).

These definitions and categories are somewhat arbitrary. They do not incorporate the complex realities of migrant motives and movements across time, cultures, and countries. Nevertheless, their use clearly has important legal and social consequences for those involved. People make a distinction between migrants in
Leading Social Policy Analysis from the Front

terms of both perceived control over the neediness of support, and the level of need. When we consider the control criterion, studies indicate that certain migrants, like refugees, tend to receive more sympathy than others (for example economic migrants), as refugees’ motives to migrate are largely outside of their control (Crawley and Skleparis, 2018; De Coninck, 2020). This directly ties into the need criterion because refugees are also perceived as in greater need of the protection they receive than other migrant groups (De Coninck, 2020). It is important to note that there are subcategories of migrants that are not discussed here, such as climate refugees and transmigrants, for whom perceived control and type of need are even more difficult to determine.

Migrants with less perceived cultural distance from the majority population are more likely to be considered as deserving than others (Reeskens and van der Meer, 2019) – in line with the identity criterion –, but what factors are important in defining ‘us’ versus ‘others’? Ethnicity and religion have received attention, but additional axes involving language and country of birth are also possible. These factors are consequential for the particular substantive composition of two distinctive dimensions of (national) identity: ethnic national identity (focusing on ethno-cultural characteristics such as religion and language) and civic national identity (related to citizenship and allegiance to political institutions) (Kunovich, 2009). Wright (2011) proposes an alternative way of interpreting national identity: whether a criterion is ascribed, or whether it can be achieved. For example, nativity and ancestry are characterized as ascribed criteria, whereas learning a country’s official language is achievable (Wright, 2011). This ascription-achievement-dichotomy offers an alternate lens on how the in-group (the majority population) believes the out-group (migrants) fits into the national identity (Wright, 2011). Previous studies indicate that the importance of attributed to achievable (or civic) aspects outweighs that of ascribed (or ethnic) ones in most European countries. However, ascribed aspects (for example
country of birth) do seem to gain more traction in specific countries between 1995 and 2003: adult respondents from Germany, Austria, Ireland, Norway, and Spain consider country of birth to be an increasingly important marker of nationhood, while those attitudes did not shift significantly among respondents from Sweden and the United Kingdom (Wright, 2011). A potential explanation ‘could be the way that diversity is treated through policy regimes in the domains of multiculturalism, immigrant incorporation, and even welfare redistribution’ (Wright, 2011: 855). Citizens of some countries may have become relatively more ascriptive than one would expect, in part because of their country’s ‘unparalleled emphasis on immigrant multiculturalism, which some have argued increases the salience of intergroup distinctions, and may be identity-threatening from the standpoint of majority-members’ (Wright, 2011: 855).

Van Oorschot (2006) found that those who are likeable, grateful, and perceived to be conforming to the dominant standards of society are considered more deserving. The migrant’s acculturation strategy is therefore crucial. Berry (1980) identifies four types of acculturation strategies: assimilation, integration, separation, and marginalization. Assimilation is the strategy in which migrants want to adopt the majority group culture, while the heritage culture is considered less important. Integration indicates that migrants feel that contact with the majority culture is important, but they also aim to maintain their original culture. When migrants use the separation strategy, they do not seek contact with the majority culture, but instead focus on maintaining their original culture. Migrants who do not want to associate themselves with either the dominant culture or their original culture follow the marginalization strategy (Berry, 1980). Not surprisingly, assimilation is the strategy that is evaluated most positively by the native public (Verkuyten, 2005). Those who choose the assimilation strategy will likely be considered as the most deserving given their preference for adaptation to the host
culture and willingness to ‘reject’ the heritage culture, which highlights their attitude of conformity.

The final cultural criterion of settlement deservingness is the perceived degree of reciprocity. In the context of settlement deservingness, it is difficult to argue that those in need have previously contributed to society, since they are recent arrivals from a different country or region. However, Reeskens and van Oorschot (2012) found that people’s welfare deservingness preferences towards immigrants are also ‘conditional upon reciprocity’, indicating that individuals believe immigrants should have access to social rights if they work and pay taxes first. This means that rather than reflecting on people’s deservingness preferences based on past reciprocity, the perception of future reciprocity may be more relevant in this regard: will migrants who settle in the host country be able to contribute to society in the future? Their current situation sometimes prevents them from doing so upon arrival, but certain characteristics or skills could affect the public’s perception of how this reciprocity may evolve in the future. For example, learning the official language is a vital step for employment, educational enrolment, and successful everyday interaction in the public sphere. This requisite is also related to the attitude criterion. Not learning (or not wanting to learn) the official language of the host country can easily be taken as a sign that someone is unwilling to integrate or assimilate. The presence of educational attainment and relevant work skills will also affect the perceived degree of (potential) reciprocity. These have not been an integral part in the study of deservingness so far, which is somewhat surprising as both are – particularly in North America and Western Europe – key aspects in determining whether or not an individual can contribute to society in a meaningful way (Amit and Chachashvili-Bolotin, 2018).
23.4 Conclusion

In this essay, we have argued that the welfare deservingness framework developed by van Oorschot (2002, 2006) has a direct applicability to settlement deservingness and that this approach can provide new insights into the conditional attitudes of the population towards the settlement of migrants. This is especially important in light of the European refugee crisis and the increased emphasis by certain media and political actors on the (il)legitimacy or (un)deservingness of types of migrants.

Although some of the CARIN criteria are conceptualized somewhat differently for settlement deservingness, this conceptualization enriches deservingness literature by illustrating its wider application. For the study of intergroup relations, this model can help conceptualize intergroup attitudes with greater nuance. The criterion that most closely aligns with deservingness is that of national identity, which deals with the ‘normative boundaries that demarcate inclusion in versus exclusion from the national in-group’ (Wright, 2011: 838). Although the way in which these concepts are measured is the subject of much debate among national identity scholars (Wright, 2011), it is clear that nation-building and in-group belonging are key to this framework. The inclusion of ethnic and civic aspects to explain national identity attitudes in individuals aligns with deservingness, but the focus on answering the question of who belongs to the national in-group is different. Migrants do not necessarily have to be perceived as belonging to the national in-group in order to be perceived as deserving of settling in the country. Furthermore, the perceived control and need of migrants are seldom addressed in the national identity literature, but they do play a vital role in the deservingness approach.

Our effort to develop this explanatory framework is concurrent with survey research in several European countries designed to empirically test the validity of the deservingness approach. In a
study of attitudes regarding the (welfare) deservingness of migrants, Kootstra (2016) found that the native population employs a double standard in deservingness preferences, based on characteristics which are similar to those we had laid out here. Adult respondents from Britain and the Netherlands evaluated ethnic minority claimants who exhibited ‘unfavorable’ behavior or characteristics (for example, failing to look for work, contributing little to the welfare system or being born in a city) as less deserving than natives who exhibited the same behaviors. However, ethnic minority claimants who did not exhibit such a profile were considered as deserving as natives. Such findings strengthen our hypothesis that the population distinguishes between groups of migrants based on specific characteristics, thereby complicating the successful integration/inclusion of this group into local society.

This essay fits in the ongoing debate on how to improve the integration of migrants. As mentioned, it illuminates challenges and opportunities for policymakers who struggle to meet their legal responsibilities to protect refugees, while simultaneously respecting public attitudes on this wedge issue. The public’s growing anti-Muslim bias and preference for migrants who can speak the language of the host country (Bansak et al., 2016; d’Haenens et al., 2019) points to a mounting challenge for solving the current crisis and successfully protecting and integrating migrants, given that most of them currently originate from Muslim-majority countries and may lack the desired language skills. Since asylum cannot be granted based on (a lack of) religion or ethnicity, policy makers must find alternative ways to harmonize both conflicting obligations. If the goal is to alleviate the social tensions of the current refugee crisis and generate greater acceptance of migrants, European policymakers have an opportunity to highlight migrants’ deservingness and vulnerability as well as their economic contributions to their destination societies (Bansak et al., 2016).
REFERENCES


24. Deservingness and Diversity: Deservingness Opinions among Majority and Minority Groups in Belgium

Bart Meuleman

24.1 Introduction

While Wim is renowned for various key contributions to sociology and social policy, it is his work on deservingness that has generated most academic impact. Observing that policies throughout history (from early poor laws to contemporary welfare states) apply various logics of targeting, Wim hypothesized that also ‘ordinary citizens’ target their solidarity. Public opinion separates the deserving from the undeserving, thereby relying on five deservingness criteria: Control, Attitude, Reciprocity, Identity and Need (van Oorschot, 2000). By means of various survey-based empirical studies, Wim convincingly showed that these criteria structure popular support for particular policy measures (van Oorschot, 2000, 2006; Jeene, van Oorschot and Uunk, 2013) and that preferences for particular criteria are responsive to institutional, economic and cultural contexts (Jeene, van Oorschot and Uunk, 2014; van Oorschot and Meuleman, 2014; Laenen, Rossetti and van Oorschot, 2019).

The wide appeal of the five deservingness criteria (later rebranded as the CARIN criteria; van Oorschot et al., 2017) can be explained by the theoretical parsimony and wide applicability of this approach. The CARIN criteria are essentially basic
principles of social justice that people apply to justify the conditionality of solidarity with particular social categories (Meuleman et al., 2020). As such, this framework is very helpful for understanding a wide array of social relations and distributional issues – from classical social policy questions to emerging debates on climate change or migration (for examples, see van Oorschot et al., 2017, and elsewhere in this volume).

24.2 Deservingness in diverse societies

In this contribution, I want to highlight one particular research line that is consistently present in Wim’s oeuvre and that has influenced my own research profoundly, namely the link between deservingness and ethnic diversity. Wim has repeatedly investigated – theoretically as well as empirically – the role of deservingness considerations in societies that are becoming increasingly diverse as a result of migration. This broader theme can be approached from various angles and inspires a host of relevant research questions. And for many of these questions, important lessons can be learned from Wim’s work.

A first type of questions regards how majority citizens perceive the deservingness of ethnic minority groups and newcomers in society. Wim’s deservingness theory speaks directly to this issue by including identity as a CARIN criterion. For contemporary collective arrangements, the boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’ are primarily grafted onto national identities, rather than on local, religious, age or class groupings (van Oorschot, 2000: 37–38). The introduction of (national) identity as a redistributive argument is an example of how Wim extended the classical trinity of social justice (equality, merit and need) to be able to understand solidarity in globalizing societies. And the relevance of the identity criterion is beyond dispute, as many empirical studies show. Wim’s first systematic analysis of deservingness opinions showed
Deservingness and Diversity

that illegal immigrants, asylum seekers and ethnic minorities figured at the bottom of the deservingness ranking in the Netherlands during the mid 1990s (van Oorschot, 2000). Concern for the wellbeing of immigrants is consistently and outspokenly lower than concern for the elderly across Europe, and the lower concern for immigrants is especially found among the lower socio-economic strata and countries with low welfare spending (van Oorschot and Uunk, 2007). The logic of identity is a constitutive element in the rapidly growing ‘welfare chauvinism’ literature that scrutinizes the reach of the solidarity circle: Do citizens have a preference for restricting the resources of the welfare state to their ‘own’ group, and why is this the case? Wim contributed significantly to this literature, showing that welfare chauvinistic views vary in prevalence across welfare regimes (van der Waal et al., 2013) and are rooted in need-based reasoning (Reeskens and van Oorschot, 2012). Seeing immigrants as undeserving is furthermore strongly related to fears about ‘welfare magnetism’, that is, generous social protection attracts migration flows (van Oorschot, 2010). Wim’s extensive research provides a detailed and nuanced picture of the majority group’s deservingness opinions vis-à-vis minorities. On the one hand, the idea that minorities are undeserving is quite widespread among European populations, especially among the lower strata. Yet on the other hand, a diverse population (van Oorschot and Uunk, 2007) as well as higher levels of income equality (van der Waal et al., 2013) are contextual elements that can temper these perceptions of undeservingness.

In a second set of possible questions, minorities become the subject rather than the object of deservingness opinions: What do ethnic minorities and immigrants think about solidarity and redistribution? Also here, Wim provided important cues. Analysis of European Social Survey data shows that persons with an immigration background have a slightly stronger preference for government intervention compared to natives. Yet, this majority-
minority gap can be largely explained by differential composition in socio-economic terms. At the country level, immigrants’ preferences regarding the role of government correlate strongly with the average native citizen, suggesting processes of cultural integration (Reeskens and van Oorschot, 2015). Although welfare-related beliefs of minorities are highly relevant for the sustainability of social protection, the available literature is quite sparse (this is mainly due to limited data availability). While we do have information on rather generic dimensions of welfare attitudes – such as preferences for the role of government or egalitarianism (Schmidt-Catran and Careja, 2017; Galle et al., 2020) – very little is known directly on minorities’ deservingness opinions.

In this chapter, I attempt to address this shortcoming by presenting empirical material from the Belgian National Elections Study (BNES; Abts et al., 2015). The BNES 2014 was hugely inspired by Wim’s work and brings together various research lines that shed new light on the issue at hand. First, we developed an instrument measuring the CARIN criteria in a more direct manner, that is as basic principles rather than through reference to target groups (see Meuleman et al., 2020). This instrument was fielded in 2014 among a probability-based sample of more than 1800 Belgian voters. Second, we also included large part3 of this instrument in the Belgian Ethnic Minority Elections Study (BEMES; Swyngedouw et al., 2015) that we organized simultaneously among almost 900 Belgians from Turkish and Moroccan background living in Antwerp and Liège. The combination of both datasets makes it possible to answer a multitude of research question, such as: (1) Do minority groups distinguish similar criteria/principles in their deservingness assessments? (2) Do majority and minority Belgians give the same importance to the different criteria? (3) Do the criteria have similar causes and consequences in both groups?
24.3 Deservingness opinions of Turkish and Moroccan Belgians

Table 24.1 displays 12 statements (5-point agree-disagree scales) used to measure support for the principles of Control, Reciprocity, Identity and Need (for a more detailed account of this instrument, see Meuleman et al., 2020). Rather than focusing on individual questions, I use these items to construct latent variables representing the principles. Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) shows that the selected items function as sufficiently valid and reliable indicators and the same factor structure is retrieved in both groups. Clearly, Turkish and Moroccan communities in Belgium adopt a pattern of deservingness logics similar to the majority group. In the particular case of identity – operationalized here in terms of the distinction between migrants and natives – this is a surprising finding. The principle that access to social protection should be restricted for newcomers stands out as a separate dimension in the attitudinal structure of the minority respondents as well (although not a very popular one – see later). What is more, the measurement parameters (loadings and intercepts) turn out to be equivalent across groups, meaning that this instrument is appropriate to make score comparisons across both groups.4

A comparison of latent means (see Table 24.1) yields an interesting pattern. Compared to natives, Turkish and Moroccan Belgians put significantly less emphasis on the criteria of control, reciprocity and – especially – identity. Regarding three out of four criteria, the minority groups studied here are less conditional in their solidarity. This can probably be understood from the observation that some of these criteria are often used to exclude persons with an immigrant background (many have been born outside the country and thus have less complete track records of contributions, for example).
Table 24.1 Question wording, percentage agreement and CFA results for the deservingness principles items

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principle</th>
<th>Majority population (N = 1403)</th>
<th>Turkish and Morrocan Belgians (N = 875)</th>
<th>Sign. diff. %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>completely agree</td>
<td>factor loading</td>
<td>completely agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>People who fall ill because of an unhealthy lifestyle deserve as much support as people whose sickness is beyond their control.</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>-0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>People who fall into poverty because of their own mistakes should be entitled to a social assistance benefit.</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>-0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social security should be reserved for those who have contributed to collective prosperity.</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>It is not fair that people receive social benefits to which they have not contributed.</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Only people who work should be entitled to government social services.</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>People who have worked and contributed in the past deserve better social services than people who have contributed little or nothing.</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>When granting social benefits, people who have been born here should get priority over people who have not been born here.</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reciprocity</td>
<td>Someone who doesn’t adapt to the Belgian way of life has no right to social services.</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Migrants should first have a job before gaining access to social services.</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 24.1 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Need</th>
<th>Majority population (N = 1403)</th>
<th>Turkish and Moroccan Belgians (N = 875)</th>
<th>Sign. diff. %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(completely) agree % factor loading</td>
<td>(completely) agree % factor loading</td>
<td>agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social security should only be available to those who truly live in poverty.</td>
<td>13.7 0.61</td>
<td>21.2 0.55</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People with sufficient financial reserves shouldn’t receive social benefits.</td>
<td>23.6 0.65</td>
<td>24.2 0.67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only people in dire need may receive social benefits.</td>
<td>20.5 0.85</td>
<td>25.2 0.83</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

Latent means

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Need</th>
<th>Latent means</th>
<th>Latent means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.412 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reciprocity</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.167 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.503 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.081</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Inter-factor correlations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Need</th>
<th>C R I N</th>
<th>C R I N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reciprocity</td>
<td>0.41 1.00</td>
<td>0.29 1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>0.43 0.71 1.00</td>
<td>0.27 0.55 1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need</td>
<td>0.10 0.39 0.26 1.00</td>
<td>-0.02 0.33 0.07 1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. The data are weighted for age, gender and education. The CFA results presented here come from a multigroup (majority vs. minority) four-factor model. To ensure cross-group comparability, equality constraints are imposed on all factor loadings and intercepts (except for the second identity item). The fit indices for this model are: Chi² = 364.65, Df = 110, RMSEA = 0.045, CFI = 0.960, TLI = 0.952.
For the need factor, however, the means do not differ significantly between the majority and minority group. This could indicate that Turkish and Moroccan Belgians identify themselves stronger as persons in need. Finally, in both groups we observe quite similar patterns of positive correlations between the different deservingness criteria (although the correlations are stronger among the natives). This indicates that there is no trade-off between criteria: Persons that employ one particular criterion to make solidarity conditional are also more likely to mobilize the other criteria (and especially the link between reciprocity and identity is strong). This pattern of intercorrelations legitimizes Wim’s practice of combining support for the different criteria into a single index of conditionality (van Oorschot, 2000, 2006).

### 24.4 Causes and consequences of deservingness opinions

In the deservingness framework, the CARIN criteria play a pivotal role between social structure and policy support. People’s deservingness opinions are informed by individual and contextual characteristics and form, in turn, the basis on which persons decide to endorse particular policy arrangements (van Oorschot and Roosma, 2017). Table 24.2 shows the results of a two-group structural equation model (SEM) testing the intermediary role of the deservingness principles. The approach is very similar to the analysis of Meuleman et al. (2020) but includes minority respondents as well.

Table 24.2a displays the effects of various individual predictors of support for the criteria of control, reciprocity, identity and need. Among both groups, we see similar effects of socioeconomic status, although they are often less outspoken (and sometimes insignificant) among the minorities. Generally speaking, the higher educated have lower scores for the criteria, indicating that they are less conditional in their deservingness assessments.
Table 24.2  Results of a two-group SEM with the deservingness principles mediating between social structure and specific forms of policy support

a. Effects of social structure on deservingness principles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Majority population</th>
<th>Turkish and Moroccan Belgians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Reciprocity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male (ref. cat.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.139*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None or lower secondary</td>
<td>0.205</td>
<td>0.242*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower secondary</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher secondary (ref. cat.)</td>
<td>-0.226**</td>
<td>-0.362***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Benefit recipiency</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-0.188*</td>
<td>-0.319***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No (ref. cat.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Region</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flanders (ref. cat.)</td>
<td>-0.176*</td>
<td>-0.263*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francophone Belgium</td>
<td>0.297***</td>
<td>0.331***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group relative deprivation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explained variance</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2 (continued)

b. Effects of deservingness principles of specific forms of policy support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Majority population</th>
<th>Turkish and Moroccan Belgians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Policy effort in favour of...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>elderly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>-0.130*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reciprocity</td>
<td>-0.117*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>0.206***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need</td>
<td>-0.139***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explained variance</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Entries are standardized regression parameters (semi-standardized for dummy predictors). * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. The data are weighted for age, gender and education. Effects that are insignificant in both groups are omitted from the model. The fit indices for this model are: Chi² = 1000.37, Df = 534, RMSEA = 0.028, CFI = 0.936, TLI = 0.918.
The exception here is the control criterion, where no educational gradient is found. Benefit recipients put less emphasis on control, reciprocity and identity (although differences are often insignificant for the minorities). Yet this is not the case for the need criterion, that is equally popular among those with and without social benefits. Benefit recipients are thus relatively more supportive of conditioning on the basis of need than on other criteria (which is not surprising, as they largely overlap with the group of needy). The strongest predictor is relative deprivation (measured as an index of three items, see Van Hootegem et al., 2018): those who feel that their social group is unrightfully disadvantaged compared to other groups put more emphasis on control, reciprocity and identity (but not need). This reaction of deprived respondents can be read as a way to correct the deprivation by excluding unrightful competitors.

Table 24.2b shows how deservingness criteria influence support for government policies benefiting four specific target groups, namely the elderly, sick, unemployed and ethnic minorities. Some of these effects are consistent across both groups. An emphasis on reciprocity lowers support for policies favoring the unemployed (who are in the public discourse often blamed for not reciprocating). People who endorse the logic of identity are less supportive of government intervention that benefit ethnic minorities – this is the case for the majority and minority group alike. In the majority sample, those who emphasize the identity criterion are more supportive of government intervention favoring the elderly and the sick, which fits the logic of welfare chauvinism. Among native as well as Turkish and Moroccan Belgians, support for public pensions and healthcare are partially rooted in respectively control- and reciprocity-based thinking (which is harder to understand from deservingness theory). Besides these similarities, the majority group shows a number of additional significant effects, indicating that policy support is more firmly rooted in deservingness considerations for this group.
24.5 Conclusions

This data exploration only provides preliminary conclusions regarding deservingness opinions among ethnic minority groups. Yet the results presented here show that the deservingness opinions of Turkish and Moroccan Belgians are structured along the very same criteria as the native group (although the levels of support for particular criteria differ). The deservingness criteria play a mediating role between social structural variables and policy support among minority groups as well, even if the relationships are generally weaker and less clear-cut than for the majority group. If anything, the results show that Wim’s deservingness criteria provide a very fruitful framework to approach welfare-related opinions of ethnic minority groups. In the foreseeable future, the work of Wim will continue to inspire scholars in this field, and I sincerely hope that he will find the time to enrich the academic debates with his insights.

NOTES

1. I got to know Wim when I started working as a postdoc under his supervision on the HumVIB Eurocores project ‘Welfare Attitudes in a Changing Europe’. At that point, I recently completed my PhD thesis on anti-immigration attitudes and was very happy to turn away from this topic and eager to dive into a new study object. It took me quite a while before I realized that precisely the work of Wim would stimulate me to continue working on diversity and broaden my perspectives.

2. Wim values transparent research. Yet due to a lack of space I feel myself obliged to refer to external sources for detailed information on this data collection (much against our own recommendations, see Damian et al., 2019).

3. The items measuring the attitude criterion were by accident dropped out of the BEMES questionnaire. So out of necessity, the CARIN framework is reduced to the CRIN criteria here. This once more illustrates how much there is to learn from Wim – with his hyper-organized way of working, this would most certainly never have happened to him.
4. There is one exception to measurement equivalence: For the second item of the identity factor, the intercept and loading differ across groups, indicating that the item is interpreted differently. This is understandable, given the contents of the item: it refers to cultural adaptation rather than more objective criteria (like being born in the country or having a job).

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25. Welfare Chauvinism across the Political Spectrum

Tim Reeskens and Tom van der Meer

25.1 Experimenting on welfare deservingness

It goes without saying that Wim’s most seminal contribution to the social science scholarship is making the empirical study of welfare deservingness more popular, as summarized quite well by the title of his most cited journal article ‘Who should get what, and why’ (van Oorschot, 2000). The theoretical rigor undergirding the five deservingness-criteria, which he later has been calling the CARIN-criteria (van Oorschot et al., 2017), was outstanding and received little pushback since. By contrast, even though the empirical evidence that showed that the elderly are perceived as the most deserving because they rank highest on all five CARIN-criteria, while the unemployed, but foremost immigrants are perceived as least deserving because they fall short on the same set of criteria, was convincing, over the years incremental empirical refinements have been proposed.

Own research (Reeskens and van der Meer, 2017), published in Wim’s co-authored volume on welfare deservingness, showed the necessity to consider experimental research to get a better grip on the five CARIN-criteria that explain welfare deservingness. Our argument was that traditional social surveys, which Wim relied on repeatedly to explain why some groups are perceived as more deserving of welfare than others (for example, van Oorschot, 2006; van Oorschot and Uunk, 2007; Jeene, van Oorschot and Uunk, 2014), are unable to completely pull apart the five CARIN-
criteria. Immigrants, perceived as most undeserving of welfare provision, are for instance not a homogenous group. The implication is that assessing their perceived deservingness foregoes the fact that immigrants are not a homogenous group; there are immigrants with favorable as well as unfavorable deservingness criteria. Immigrants often accumulate disadvantages (the criterion of need) while evidently, they are culturally most distant (the identity-criterion), and they often failed making continuous contributions to the welfare state (low on reciprocity).

Inspired by Wim’s research on perceived welfare deservingness, we showed that even if immigrants combine favorable criteria, like having been laid off because of a company reorganization to indicate no control over their unemployed situation or doing voluntary work as an example for reciprocity, they are never able to fully close the gap with natives (Reeskens and van der Meer, 2019). By this, we have given new insights into welfare chauvinism, that is, the idea that natives favor welfare redistribution but not with non-natives (van der Waal et al., 2010; Kitschelt, 1997; Reeskens and van Oorschot, 2012), and contributed to a better understanding of Wim’s CARIN-criteria applied to the perceived deservingness of immigrants by studying variation among them, while they previously have been treated as a rather homogenous group. Still, the outcomes of our study can be deepened further, as we have not touched upon the question whether welfare chauvinism is widespread across large chunks of the population, or whether these opinions reflect political ideology. Put differently, is the perceived deservingness gap between natives and immigrants more common among voters of monocultural parties, or alternatively, does the electorate of multicultural parties favor natives over immigrants, too?
25.2 Theorizing the ideological divide

In this short essay honoring Wim’s work, it will be repetitive to call the five CARIN-criteria by name; control, attitude, reciprocity, identity and need are by now in everyone’s social policy repertoire. In previous work, we already indicated the pervasiveness of identity as a criterion that defines perceived welfare deservingness (Reeskens and van der Meer, 2019). Nevertheless, Wim’s work also indicated that people would grant immigrants equal access to the welfare state, but only conditionally, particularly upon having made contributions to the welfare state or after having acquired citizenship (Reeskens and van Oorschot, 2012). The preferred conditionality of perceptions of immigrants’ access to welfare inspired us to set up a survey experiment in which favorable criteria (like making contributions to the welfare state) could be tested more clearly, something quite novel in this field.

Political science research had earlier incorporated survey experiments to study what immigrant attributes make them more likely to be, by public opinion, welcomed to the US (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). Although the study shows that higher educated immigrants in high status jobs who master the English language are preferred most, of greatest importance is what the authors refer to as ‘the hidden immigrant consensus’ (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). The attributes that make immigrants more likely to be granted access to the US follow the same rank order for the Democratic as for the Republican electorate.

The structuring influence of political preference on attitudes goes back to ‘The American Voter’ (Campbell et al., 1960), according to which partisanship serves as a ‘perceptual screen through which the individual tends to see what is favorable to his partisan orientation’ (Campbell et al., 1960: 133). The Dutch political landscape is, however, more complex than the American distinction between Democrats and Republicans. Additionally, while political scientists distinguish between political left and right
Leading Social Policy Analysis from the Front

(compare Lipset, 1959), working with Wim revealed his distaste against this crude continuum. In his empirical studies, he unraveled this scale into the economic and the cultural axis (see van Oorschot et al., 2012), with the former pointing to either favoring state intervention or alternatively laissez faire politics, while the latter separates those favoring multiculturalism from those favoring monoculturalism.

In proposing expectations, these orthogonal axes are of primordial importance. On the one hand, it can be argued that differences on the economic axis will translate into clear redistributive policy preferences. Those who are in favor of state intervention (at the political left) will be of the opinion that welfare claimants should receive appropriate welfare provision, while those at the right would think that welfare claimants should rely on alternative resources (for example, personal accounts, friends and family, private insurances, or charity) instead of on government. On the other hand, the cultural axis will be more determining for the perceived deservingness of immigrants. We assume that the electorates of monocultural parties (at the right) would like to exclude immigrant welfare claimants from access to welfare because of the relative importance opposition to immigration has to them; on the opposite, those aligning to multicultural parties (on the left) are expected to perceive immigrants as (almost) equally deserving of welfare compared to native welfare claimants.

In proposing these expectations, we should not be blind to Wim’s contribution to the study of the ‘new liberal’ or ‘progressive dilemma’, too (compare Reeskens and van Oorschot, 2014; see also Goodheart, 2004). The argument is that it is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile generous welfare provision for all with inclusive orientations towards immigrants. Particular parties at the left, who favor both, would therefore suffer disproportionately for taking this position (see also Koopmans, 2010). If this dilemma holds among public opinion, we should
also diagnose welfare chauvinism among voters of parties that favor multiculturalism. Put differently, also voters of such parties would favor natives’ access to welfare provision over immigrants’ access.

### 25.3 Setting up the experiment

Although Wim is an expert on survey research, as he designed several over the course of his academic career, survey experiments are rather novel to him, with the exception of important contributions in the most recent welfare attitudes module of the European Social Survey 2016. Therefore, to design an experiment with great detail, we used Wim’s insights into the CARIN-criteria, and got further inspired by related studies on immigrant prejudice (for example Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014) to make illogical combinations (for example a political refugee from Poland) impossible. More information on the empirical set-up of our study, fielded in the Netherlands in 2014, can be found in Reeskens and van der Meer (2017, 2019).

In our study, we asked whether a fictitious unemployed welfare claimant with a number of characteristics should receive (a) more than 70 per cent of his latest income, 70 per cent, less than 70 per cent, or should receive no unemployment provision whatsoever. Because we wanted to identify the importance of the identity-criterion relative to other relevant deservingness criteria, we were first and foremost interested in cultural distance. We distinguished between a fictitious native-born welfare claimant (Daan), a European welfare claimant (Riza from Kosovo), a welfare claimant from a former Dutch colony (Aaron from Surinam), a welfare claimant from a country with a history of labor migration to the Netherlands (Mohammed from Morocco) and welfare claimants from a most culturally distant Muslim country (Mullah from Afghanistan). That our endeavor was not unproblematic
either was presented in conference discussions later: colleagues pointed to the Muslim composition of Kosovo, and that Mullah is not a name but a title.

In addition to the identity-criterion, the four other criteria – albeit less relevant for this present study – also entered our experiment. For control we looked at the reason for unemployment, as well as the reason for initial migration. We distinguished between actively looking for a new job and not looking as proxies for favorable attitudes. For reciprocity, we extended actively looking for a new job with doing voluntary work (that is, doing something in return for the community), as well as whether or not the welfare claimant had a consistent labor market trajectory. Also, we looked at the age of the fictitious welfare claimant, as Wim’s research continuously hints about the fact that the elderly are perceived as most deserving because they already made their duties to society. Need, last but not least, was unraveled in two elements, namely whether the claimant had a high or low salary, and whether he was childless, had two or had four children. Yet, these four remaining criteria are not part of this essay; the relative importance can be checked in two publications (Reeskens and van der Meer, 2017, 2019).

Because we are mostly interested in whether the gap between the perceived deservingness of native welfare claimant Daan and of the native immigrant (whether that is Riza, Aron, Mohammed or Mullah) is equal across the political spectrum, we need to distinguish between the political parties the Dutch can align to. Here we first discern the Socialist Party (SP), which is the economically most leftwing party but rather ambivalent on cultural issues. The social-democratic Labor Party (PvdA) is somewhat more moderate than ambivalent in both respects. In the middle of the political spectrum, we consider the liberal party D66, which is economically rightwing, but progressive on cultural and ethical issues. Next, we consider the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), which is rather rightwing, in terms of economics,
culture and particularly ethics. Further to the right, we find the Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD), which is more outspoken rightwing on economic and cultural issues, but not on ethical issues. Finally, the Freedom Party (PVV) is conventionally positioned at the right of the Dutch party system due to its outspoken anti-immigrant discourse, although it is rather ambivalent in terms of its social policy agenda. Not all political parties that dominate the political spectrum nowadays have been considered in this experiment. Parties like Thierry Baudet’s Forum for Democracy, or the ecological party Green Left were left out because they respectively did not exist yet or were too small back then.

### 25.4 The outcomes

We present the findings of our study in a straightforward bar chart, for the reason that randomization of all attributes over vignettes, and the random assignment of vignettes to respondents allows simple statistical analyses (see Figure 25.1). Important to emphasize is that across the board (because all other criteria are randomized), immigrant welfare claimants receive lower levels of solidarity than native welfare claimants; findings that we already discussed in earlier publications and that align with Wim’s studies on welfare deservingness (van Oorschot, 2000; van Oorschot, 2006; Reeskens and van Oorschot, 2012). Noticeable is that generally, people also do not categorically want to exclude immigrant welfare claimants from unemployment provision. That only applies to a minority of the native population.

However, there is large variation across the electorates in welfare chauvinism (the differential access to welfare for natives and immigrants). The biggest distinction made is among the party members of Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom. We see that 70 per cent of Wilders’ electorate would grant unemployed Daan 70 per
cent or more welfare provision of his latest income. In case this unemployed person is of foreign origin, this drops to 40 per cent. This means that there is a deservingness gap of 30 percentage points between natives and foreign-born people.

No other party electorate reports equally sizeable deservingness gaps. However, the left-wing SP, Christian-Democratic CDA, and conservative VVD voters report similar deservingness gaps of approximately 15 percentage points; nevertheless, the starting points are different. As a left-wing party, solidarity is on average rather high among the electorate of the SP. Almost 90 per cent perceives a native unemployed person as deserving of 70 per cent of his latest income. The gap of slightly more than 15 percentage points with immigrants implies that still a lion’s share of the SP-electorate perceives immigrants as deserving of a generous unemployment provision. Lower levels of solidarity are present among the conservative electorates of the CDA and VVD, where respectively approximately 75 and 65 per cent of the electorates want to grant immigrants 70 per cent or less of the latest income. With a deservingness gap of 15 percentage points, this means that half of the VVD voters who received the immigrant vignette thinks the depicted immigrant should receive 70 per cent or more.

Most egalitarian are voters of the social-democratic PvdA and the left-liberal D66, with deservingness gaps close to five percentage points. While voters of PvdA are generally in favor of a generous welfare state, they also favor immigrants to have an equal amount of welfare provision. Similarly, albeit the economically more conservative voters of D66 are slightly less in favor of state intervention, they still do not make major distinctions between native claimants and those of foreign origin. Yet, for the electorates of both parties, it needs to be said that there is somewhat more variation among support for the most generous position, namely granting welfare claimants more than 70 per cent of the latest income. Therefore, claiming that even among the
voters of the most progressive parties, no distinction is being made between natives and immigrants therefore does not hold.

Figure 25.1 Perceived welfare deservingness of native and immigrant welfare claimants along electoral lines

25.5 To conclude

In this essay, we wanted to celebrate Wim’s scholarship by showing recent evidence on the perceived deservingness of natives and immigrants across the political spectrum. Using Wim’s CARIN-criteria, earlier studies have shown the relevance of identity as an important criterion for why immigrants are perceived as less deserving of welfare provision than native welfare claimants. However, less is clear about the extent to which such welfare chauvinist views exist among different parts of the electorate. In some of his studies, Wim preferred to unravel political left-right ideology into its economic and cultural axis. The importance of separating both dimensions is of particular
importance because of the peculiar Dutch party constellation where the economic and cultural axis do not always coincide.

More precisely, we show that the economic and cultural axis work independently. On the one hand, voters of economically left-wing parties are also most in favor of generous welfare provision. On the other hand, we show that the cultural axis predicts solidarity with immigrants, as less solidarity is given by voters of monocultural parties. The result is that the largest welfare chauvinism is common among the voters of the right-wing Party for Freedom (PVV), followed by the economically most left-wing, albeit somewhat monocultural Socialist Party (SP) voters. Less chauvinistic are voters of the social-democratic PvdA and the left-liberal D66, although they also have a slightly greater preference for unemployed claimants of Dutch than of foreign origin.

The findings speak to Wim’s work. First, it shows that not everyone is equally favorable of granting immigrants unrestricted access to the welfare state. Rather, granting such access to welfare provision is conditional upon individual ideological dispositions. Embracing monocultural parties translates into perceiving welfare claimants as rather undeserving of welfare. Second, at the micro-level, our study also nuances the ‘new liberal’ or ‘progressive dilemma’, as electorates of the left-wing parties do not show the most outspoken chauvinist positions, rather the opposite. While some chauvinism is present among the SP-voters, inclusive orientations are found among voters of the PvdA and the left-liberal D66. The negative interpretation reads that welfare chauvinism is present across the political spectrum, even among the electorate of social-democratic and progressive parties, albeit at different levels. The positive interpretation reads that these voters are less likely to distinguish between welfare claimants by their native or foreign origin. This is relevant and remarkable in the light of ongoing discussions about the sustainability of welfare state solidarity in the age of migration.
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26. The Roots and Electoral Consequences of Welfare Populism

Koen Abts and Peter Achterberg

26.1 Introduction

Wim van Oorschot has devoted much of his professional career to the analysis of social policy and how people think about the welfare state. Even though his research agenda has been, and undoubtedly remains to be, extremely diverse and productive, Wim has never really engaged with the political and electoral dimension of social policy and the welfare state, and to be more specific, with populism and populist voting behavior that now marks so many political cultures in the West.

Of course, given the political nature of the object of his research, Wim has always had an eye for the importance of political background. In one of his most-cited papers analyzing European preferences for welfare deservingness, political stance is included. Yet, the study reveals that political stance does not relate particularly strong to welfare preferences (van Oorschot, 2006). In a more recent paper on welfare chauvinism, Reeskens and van Oorschot (2012: 126) recognize that ‘welfare chauvinism is a reflection of related political and cultural ideologies’, and decide to include authoritarianism in the analysis. Yet, an analysis of how welfare chauvinism is related to voting behavior is beyond the scope of the paper (see also van der Waal et al., 2013). Also, throughout his career, Wim has been sensitive to the idea that legitimacy of welfare policies is needed, and that if people increasingly see negative aspects of such policies – failing...
administratively, benefitting undeserving people, making people lazy – in the long run, such policies are unsustainable (van Oorschot, 2010; van Oorschot and Meuleman, 2012; Roosma et al., 2013, 2014).

These critical responses to social policies among the general public that have been center stage in much of Wim’s work have also been reasons for populist parties to start criticizing social policies. These parties seem to be very critical about the unconditional and universal nature of welfare benefits; about giving benefits to (undeserving) immigrants; about the economic and moral consequences of the welfare state (Abts and Kochuyt, 2013; de Koster et al., 2013; Van Hootegem et al., 2018). Hence, Wim’s research agenda is clearly focused on the same issues that may motivate people to vote in a particular, populist way.

So, in this chapter, we investigate which types of subgroups in regard to welfare worldviews can be empirically distinguished in the general population, and whether or not a subgroup of welfare populists is present. In particular, we will explore which respondents embrace populist constellations of welfare attitudes – that is, supporting redistribution and at the same time being very critical of the universal and unconditional welfare state and its moral and economic consequences. Besides, we also investigate to what extent welfare populism is related to voting behavior. As a homage to Wim’s last country of employment, we focus our attention on the Flemish population.

26.2 The logic of welfare populism

Although Kitschelt (1995) suggested that Populist Radical Right Parties (PRRPs) are combining authoritarian appeal with a neoliberal pro-market position, most scholars argue that most PRRPs are neither right nor left. This is because PRRPs subscribe to both neoliberal and statist views on the state versus market
divide, and share a typical welfare agenda that: (1) advocates social closure based on the deservingness criterion of identity (welfare chauvinism); (2) proposes a selective distribution of welfare based on criteria of reciprocity and control (welfare producerism); and (3) criticizes existing welfare arrangements through the prism of a vertical antagonism between the people and the establishment (Abts et al., 2017). In general, we argue that PRRPs converge around a ‘welfare populist’ position that essentially entails support for social redistribution and extensive welfare entitlements, but simultaneously excludes non-natives from welfare provisions, or gives them only limited access, and strongly criticizes the actual functioning of the welfare state because of its unintended economic and moral consequences (Derks, 2006; de Koster et al., 2013; Abts et al., 2017).

From a sociological perspective, all welfare ideologies – including welfare populism – are taking a particular position in regard to the three main dimensions of the welfare state: agency and scope; redistribution design; and implementation and outcome (Roosma et al., 2013). First, agency and scope refers to the questions of whether the state or market needs to take care of distribution, and how much the welfare state should redistribute and in which domains. This dimension refers actually to the so-called distributional conflict opposing a redistributive and collectivist left-wing pole to a neoliberal right-wing pole prioritizing limited state intervention and self-regulation of the markets. Second, the redistribution design captures questions about how collective welfare should be fairly distributed in terms of ‘who should get what, why and under which conditions’. Relying on heuristics of deservingness (van Oorschot, 2000, 2006), different criteria (control, need, identity, reciprocity and attitude) are applied to determine whether or not some groups or individuals should be granted social rights. Third, the implementation and outcome dimension pertains to the questions of how efficiently and effectively welfare arrangements perform...
both in terms of social redistribution and avoiding free riding behavior, where the legitimacy of the welfare state is conditional on the appropriate delivery of welfare services and on the absence of unintended economic and moral consequences (van Oorschot, 2010).

Taking these three dimensions into account, welfare populism is in favor of state intervention and social redistribution, but simultaneously formulates harsh institutional criticisms and hence demands a strong recalibration of the welfare state where the access to welfare benefits and services is not universal, but selective, conditional and restricted to their own people. Moving away from a universal leftist and neoliberal rightist framing of state intervention and welfare state, the position of welfare conditionality is based on identity and reciprocity – prioritizing the allocation of welfare resources to natives (welfare chauvinism), and to those who have contributed and are productive (welfare producerism). In this sense, the call for equality no longer takes the form of an inclusive and universalistic egalitarianism, but restricts social redistribution to the ordinary hard-working and responsible people who are cheated by the actual welfare state (Derks, 2006). In addition, welfare populism articulates an institutional critique on the implementation and outcomes of welfare arrangements. In particular, it argues that the malfunctioning welfare state does not help the common hard working people and those really in need, but benefits disproportionally those who are not (full) member of the ethnic community as well as free-riding and abusing welfare scroungers who do not contribute (enough) to the collective welfare, or are responsible for their own misery (Abts and Kochuyt, 2013; de Koster et al., 2013).
26.3 Welfare populism, social structure and voting behavior

Using data from the Belgian National Election Study 2010, we try to answer two research questions. First, employing a person-centered approach based on Latent Class Analysis, we investigate which types of subgroups in regard to welfare worldviews can be empirically distinguished in the Flemish population, and whether or not a subgroup of welfare populists is present. Our hypothesis is that there is a subgroup of welfare populists whose worldview is characterized by a combination of egalitarianism, exclusive solidarity and a radical welfare state critique focusing on its unintended negative economic and moral consequences. Second, we try to disentangle how the welfare profiles – particularly welfare populism – are structurally and electorally stratified.

According to the self-interest argument and realistic conflict theory, individuals in more precarious positions – that is, the low educated and working class – are assumed to be more prone to embrace egalitarianism and government intervention (Achterberg and Houtman, 2009; Achterberg et al., 2011; van der Waal et al., 2010), but may also be more likely to develop so-called welfare chauvinism (Mewes and Mau, 2012; Abts and Kochuyt, 2013) as well as welfare state criticism (van Oorschot, 2010; van Oorschot and Meuleman, 2012; van Oorschot et al., 2012; Van Hootegem et al., 2018). Besides, the relatively high-skilled population of the middle class is also bifurcated: the socio-cultural specialists are more likely to advocate universalist state interventionism as precondition of institutionalized individualism; while managers are more likely to support a producerist social policy promoting opportunity rather than equality as well as adhering to an ethics of individual responsibility based on conditional reciprocity (Abts and Kochuyt, 2013).

In terms of electoral behavior in the Flemish party system, we argue that voters of the populist radical right party (Vlaams
Belang) are most likely to be welfare populist, although their position towards government intervention is not clear since this party is combining a neoliberal economic agenda with a populist welfare agenda. Political conflicts on social redistribution are dominated by the traditional left-right cleavage opposing the social democratic left party (sp.a) with its position of universal egalitarianism and strong interventionism, and its collectivist conception of the welfare state as universal and unconditional as possible; to the liberal right party (Open VLD) supporting less social redistribution, non-intervention, free market, privatization, individual responsibility and welfare retrenchment. Christian democracy (CD&V) positioned itself in the middle, trying to provide social harmony, rather than to redistribute as such, resulting in social closure strongly based on reciprocity, contribution and status retention. Finally, the Flemish nationalist party (N-VA) highlights the virtues of the market and opts for limited state intervention as it preaches firm austerity, more flexible working conditions and lower taxes. The nationalist party is also re-articulating the left-right conflict in terms of the distinction between productive and unproductive classes that is, in turn, explicitly communitarianized (Abts et al., 2019). In our exploratory analysis, we want to investigate how our welfare profiles are linked to voting for these parties (as parties are emanating particular welfare ideologies).

26.4 Data and methods

To investigate the research questions, data from the Belgian National Election Study 2010 (BNES) is used. In order to measure our welfare profiles, the dataset includes items referring to four welfare-related attitudes, all measured by multiple Likert-type items (five-point agree-disagree answer scale). First, the dimension of agency and scope is operationalized by the
constructs of egalitarianism and neoliberalism. *Egalitarianism* is measured by three items referring to the necessity to reduce class differences in society \((q88_2)\), maintenance of the differences between high and low incomes \((q88_3)\), and government intervention to decrease the income differences \((q88_4)\). *Neoliberalism* is also operationalized by three items: society would be better off when the government would intervene less in the economy \((q89_1)\); regulations for entrepreneurs should be reduced \((q89_2)\); and the labor market should be more flexible \((q89_3)\). Second, the dimension of the redistribution design is operationalized in terms of welfare conditionality based on identity and contribution. The construct of *welfare chauvinism* is measured by items referring to the conditionality of welfare benefits: social welfare benefits need to be reserved to those who contributed to the collective welfare \((q119_1)\); and be reserved for only our own people \((q119_2)\). Finally, the implementation and outcome dimension refers to *welfare state criticism*, which is measured by means of items referring to both unintended economic and moral consequences of the welfare state: too expensive compared to its accomplishments \((q120_1)\); makes people lazy and irresponsible \((q120_2)\); and welfare state functions should be left to the free market \((q120_3)\). The measurement quality and dimensionality of the items is tested by means of Confirmatory Factor Analysis \((X^2 = 148.345; \text{df} = 38; \text{RMSEA} = 0.049; \text{CFI} = 0.981; \text{TLI} = 0.973)\) (see Appendix 26A.1).

**Independent variables.** Social-structural position is measured by means of four variables, namely *gender* (1 for men and 0 for women);* age (64+ years as reference category); *educational level* (low; middle-low; middle-high; high); *occupational status* is based on the EGP social class scheme (4 classes).

**Statistical modelling.** To estimate the welfare profiles, we make use of Latent Class Analysis (LCA). This approach identifies subgroups of individuals with a specific ideological worldview based on the particular way attitudes are connected with each
other. Particularly, LCA empirically constructs a typology of welfare ideologies by uncovering how preferences toward egalitarianism, neoliberalism, welfare chauvinism and welfare state criticism are linked to each other. After identifying the different latent classes, we regress (the most likely) class membership on structural characteristics and on voting behaviour in a multinomial regression model.

### 26.5 A typology of four welfare profiles

The four-class solution is the most parsimonious model with the lowest BIC and an entropy equal to 0.75. Table 26.1 displays the conditional probabilities and the class sizes of each of the four classes. Our LCA typology confirms that there is indeed a welfare populist class among the Flemish population. This welfare populism class (22 per cent) is outspokenly egalitarian, but has a very particularistic and conditional interpretation of equality, since welfare benefits need to be reserved for fellow citizens who have contributed and/or belong to our ‘own people’. This interpretation of equality is also embedded in a strong anti-establishment habitus referring to both a skeptical stance towards government intervention in the economy and an outspoken criticism on the functioning and consequences of the actual welfare state, as it is considered to be too expensive and to make people lazy and irresponsible. The second class is the best-fitting profile for 29 per cent of the respondents. This cluster reflects a position of egalitarianism and moderate conditionality of welfare benefits, but in contrast to the welfare populism class, a neutral opinion in regard to government regulation and the functioning of the actual welfare state. We call this class conservative particularism. The third class contains 19 per cent of the Flemish population. This so-called neoliberal class does not want further social redistribution and opposes a government that actively intervenes
The Roots and Electoral Consequences of Welfare Populism

Table 26.1 Class sizes and conditional probabilities of the four-class solution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Latent Classes</th>
<th>Welfare populists</th>
<th>Conservative particularism</th>
<th>Neo liberalism</th>
<th>Progressive universalism</th>
<th>Overall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Class size in %</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Answer categories</td>
<td>Conditional item probabilities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Egalitarianism**

Q88_2C: ‘class differences should be reduced’
- Disagree (completely): 0.09, 0.03, 0.39, 0.05, 0.12
- Disagree nor agree: 0.06, 0.23, 0.48, 0.08, 0.19
- Agree (completely): 0.85, 0.75, 0.14, 0.86, 0.69

Q88_3C: ‘differences between high and low incomes should be maintained’
- Disagree (completely): 0.82, 0.72, 0.05, 0.85, 0.66
- Disagree nor agree: 0.05, 0.26, 0.56, 0.11, 0.22
- Agree (completely): 0.13, 0.03, 0.40, 0.04, 0.12

Q88_4C: ‘the government should intervene to decrease income differences’
- Disagree (completely): 0.15, 0.08, 0.70, 0.14, 0.23
- Disagree nor agree: 0.13, 0.33, 0.30, 0.15, 0.22
- Agree (completely): 0.72, 0.59, 0.02, 0.72, 0.55

**Neoliberalism**

Q89_1C: ‘the government should interfere less with economy’
- Disagree (completely): 0.13, 0.19, 0.25, 0.70, 0.35
- Disagree nor agree: 0.06, 0.72, 0.40, 0.23, 0.36
- Agree (completely): 0.81, 0.10, 0.36, 0.07, 0.30

Q89_2C: ‘regulations for entrepreneurs should be reduced’
- Disagree (completely): 0.12, 0.18, 0.25, 0.72, 0.35
- Disagree nor agree: 0.11, 0.70, 0.30, 0.18, 0.34
- Agree (completely): 0.76, 0.12, 0.46, 0.09, 0.32

Q89_3C: ‘labor market should be flexible: employers should be able to hire and fire easily’
- Disagree (completely): 0.28, 0.29, 0.24, 0.68, 0.40
- Disagree nor agree: 0.13, 0.50, 0.26, 0.15, 0.27
- Agree (completely): 0.58, 0.22, 0.50, 0.17, 0.33

**Welfare chauvinism**

Q119_1C: ‘only those who contributed to collective welfare should benefit from social security’
- Disagree (completely): 0.11, 0.08, 0.23, 0.41, 0.21
- Disagree nor agree: 0.09, 0.30, 0.20, 0.16, 0.19
- Agree (completely): 0.81, 0.63, 0.58, 0.43, 0.60
Table 26.1 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Latent Classes</th>
<th>Welfare populists</th>
<th>Conservative particularism</th>
<th>Neo liberalism</th>
<th>Progressive universalism</th>
<th>Overall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Class size in %</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Answer categories</td>
<td>Conditional item probabilities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Welfare chauvinism (continued)

Q119_2C: ‘social security should be reserved for our own people only’
- Disagree (completely): 0.18, 0.13, 0.27, 0.59, 0.31
- Disagree nor agree: 0.12, 0.38, 0.30, 0.15, 0.24
- Agree (completely): 0.70, 0.50, 0.44, 0.26, 0.46

Q119_3C: ‘all groups in society should be able to benefit from social security’
- Disagree (completely): 0.42, 0.24, 0.34, 0.18, 0.28
- Disagree nor agree: 0.17, 0.47, 0.22, 0.14, 0.25
- Agree (completely): 0.41, 0.30, 0.45, 0.68, 0.47

Welfare state critique

Q120_1C: ‘the welfare state is too expensive compared to what it delivers’
- Disagree (completely): 0.23, 0.25, 0.28, 0.66, 0.38
- Disagree nor agree: 0.13, 0.56, 0.37, 0.19, 0.32
- Agree (completely): 0.64, 0.20, 0.35, 0.15, 0.31

Q120_2C: ‘the welfare state makes people lazy and irresponsible’
- Disagree (completely): 0.25, 0.32, 0.32, 0.71, 0.43
- Disagree nor agree: 0.22, 0.52, 0.29, 0.18, 0.31
- Agree (completely): 0.53, 0.17, 0.39, 0.11, 0.27

Q120_3C: ‘tasks of welfare state should be left to the free market’
- Disagree (completely): 0.53, 0.54, 0.61, 0.96, 0.68
- Disagree nor agree: 0.21, 0.44, 0.28, 0.03, 0.23
- Agree (completely): 0.26, 0.02, 0.11, 0.02, 0.09

Notes: AIC = 25194.541; BIC = 25694.245; LRT-test = 381.903; Entropy = 0.754.

to decrease income differences in society. These respondents also oppose strong government regulation in the economy and labor market, while asking for more welfare conditionality, thereby resulting in an ambivalent position to the welfare state. The fourth class – labeled as progressive universalism – compromises the largest subgroup (31 per cent) and has a profile that is dissimilar.
to the other three classes, that is, a combination of a strong preference for egalitarianism, universal welfare provisions and government intervention combined with a positive attitude towards actual welfare state performance.

26.6 The social and electoral stratification of welfare populism

How are these welfare profiles related to structural characteristics and voting behavior? Because the dependent variable is categorical, we make use of a multinomial logistic regression analysis. In our approach, we determine whether a particular predictor has a significant effect on our LCA typology (see $L^2/df$) and report the parameters of the executed multinomial logistic regression. Although logits and the odds ratios are reported in most studies, we present net-percentages controlling for all other predictors in the model (Kaufman and Schervish, 1986: 722–730).

Table 26.2 reports the conditional probabilities to belong to the different LCA classes for each response category of the independent variable. The effect can be interpreted by evaluating the deviation of the conditional probability compared to the overall probability in the sample.

Gender, education, occupation and age have an effect on the four welfare profiles (see Table 26.2). To begin with, the results confirm the hypothesis that individuals in more precarious positions – that is, the low educated and (un)skilled workers – are more likely to combine a strong criticism on the welfare state with a very particularistic and conditional interpretation of equality. Having a lower educational level for instance increases the likelihood to have a welfare populist profile, while it decreases the likelihood to have a progressive universalist profile. People with a low educational level and (un)skilled workers as well as those who are 65+ years old are overrepresented in the welfare populist class.
Besides being more likely to belong to the welfare populist class, the unskilled and skilled workers as well as non-active people are also more prone to adhere to a conservative particularist profile. Being self-employed and young, on the contrary, increases the probability of being in the neoliberal class, while skilled and unskilled workers are almost absent in this profile.

Table 26.2  Conditional probabilities (row net-percentages) to belong to a welfare profile (estimated based on a multinomial logistic regression)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Welfare populists</th>
<th>Conservative particularist</th>
<th>Neoliberals</th>
<th>Progressive Universalists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proportion in population</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sex (L^2 = 15.01; df = 3; L^2/= 5.00</strong>)**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education (L^2 = 24.62; df = 9; L^2/= 2.74</strong>)**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low level</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate low level</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate high level</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High level</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Occupation (L^2 = 89.50; df = 15; L^2/= 5.97</strong>)**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers/professionals</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-manual employees</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled workers</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled workers</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired/non-active</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age (L^2 = 41.62; df = 15; L^2/= 2.77</strong>)**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18–24</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25–34</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35–44</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45–54</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55–64</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Naegelkerke R^2 = 0.21; AIC = 2924.46.
These results indicate an interesting duality among the working class: they want more redistribution, but at the same time ask more conditional solidarity without nevertheless taking a neoliberal stance. Finally, in line with the expectations, in the progressive universalist class we find more highly educated people, managers and non-manual employees, while self-employed, low educated and young people are less likely to be progressive leftist. Overall we can conclude that structural characteristics are important to explain the differences in welfare worldviews: individuals in lower social class positions have a more pronounced welfare populist worldview, while they are less likely to have a progressive universalist worldview. People in higher positions, in contrast, are more often progressive universalists.

As expected, there is also a strong relationship between welfare profile and voting behavior. Table 26.3 shows the internal heterogeneity of the different party electorates. While the conservative particularists (40 per cent) are overrepresented among the Christian-democratic party electorate, individuals with a neoliberal worldview constitute a small minority among those who vote for CD&V (13 per cent). For the liberal party Open VLD it is exactly this subgroup with a neoliberal socio-economic profile who are strongly represented among its electorate (40 per cent). Here it are especially the progressive universalists who are significantly underrepresented (16 per cent). In line with our expectations, the welfare populists (39 per cent) are strongly overrepresented among the electorate of the radical right party Vlaams Belang, while the progressive universalists are much scarcer among its voters. In regard to the leftist parties, both the social-democratic sp.a and the green party Groen especially gain electoral support from people with a progressive universalist profile. Logically, both parties are nevertheless far less likely to attract voters with a welfare populist and neoliberal profile. Finally, the Flemish-nationalist party N-VA – which became the largest party in the Flemish party system in 2010 with 28 per cent
of the votes – is able to attract all different welfare profiles proportionally. In essence, the internal composition of the N-VA party electorate in regard to the socio-economic worldviews reflects the distribution of the general population.

Summarized, at the level of party electorates, we observe a reorganization of the right in the Flemish party system based on welfare opinions: radical right (welfare populism); liberal party (neoliberals) and Christian-democrats (particularistic conservatism) as opposed to the progressive universalism of the left, while the right-wing nationalist party N-VA is attracting both welfare populists, neoliberals and particularistic conservatives. Although there is certainly not a one-on-one link and all welfare profiles are to some degree represented among the different electoral constituencies, it is clear that the different welfare profiles in part divide the political spectrum.

Table 26.3  Conditional probabilities to vote for a political party (column net-percentages) (estimated based on a multinomial logistic regression) (controlled for gender, education, occupation, age)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Welfare profiles (LCA typology)</th>
<th>CD&amp;V</th>
<th>N-VA</th>
<th>Open VLD</th>
<th>Sp.a</th>
<th>VB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Welfare populists</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative particularists</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neoliberals</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive universalists</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Welfare profiles (LCA typology)</th>
<th>Groen</th>
<th>Other party</th>
<th>Blame and invalid</th>
<th>General population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Welfare populists</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative particularists</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neoliberals</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive universalists</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:  \( R^2 = 0.28 \) (only structural characteristics), \( R^2 = 0.36 \) (structural characteristics + socio-economic worldview typology).
26.7 Conclusion

This chapter highlights three major findings. First, there is ample evidence of welfare populism in Flanders. About 22 per cent of the people are very egalitarian, but combine such egalitarianism with both anti-establishment attitudes and very reserved opinions about whom should actually profit from economic redistribution provided by the welfare state. Second, we found this – rather ‘remarkable’ – populist combination of opinions to be prevalent among the lower educated and people within (lower-ranked) working class positions. Third, welfare populist views are reason for people to vote for radical right-wing parties. These findings shed light on two discussions.

The first is the discussion about the idea that people in lower stratified positions should be seen as a progressive force (for example, Lipset, 1981; Nieuwbeerta, 1996; Achterberg, 2006). While much research effort is devoted to finding non-economic reasons for people in such positions to be conservative (for example, anti-immigration attitudes, authoritarianism, and the like), it is now apparent that also within the economic domain, people in lower stratified positions can embrace rightist opinions and can have conservative policy preferences about welfare institutions, economic redistribution and the like (see also Houtman et al., 2009; Abts and Kochuyt, 2013). Secondly, for close followers of the work of Wim van Oorschot, these findings about the intricacies of welfare attitudes might not come as a surprise. Central to much of Wim’s work have been issues related to such welfare populist opinions. Yet, the analysis presented above kind of closes the argument, and shows how welfare populism has vast electoral consequences. The reasons why Wim has never ventured into the realm of voting behavior will be a subject of debate and speculation for years. Perhaps he never came around doing it. Perhaps his identity as a sociologist of social policy never triggered him to venture in this field of political
sociology. Yet, the analysis above does show that Wim’s work has wider relevance. And it will remain relevant long past the date he started enjoying his well-deserved pension benefits!

REFERENCES


The Roots and Electoral Consequences of Welfare Populism


Appendix 26A.1
Standardized Factor Loadings of Measurement Model (CFA)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observed variables</th>
<th>Egalitarianism</th>
<th>Neoliberalism</th>
<th>Chauvinism</th>
<th>WS criticism</th>
<th>R²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q88_2</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q88_3</td>
<td>-0.83</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q88_4</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q89_1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q89_2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q89_3</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q119_1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q119_2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q120_1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q120_2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q120_3</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Correlations between factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Egalitarianism</th>
<th>Neoliberalism</th>
<th>Chauvinism</th>
<th>WS criticism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egalitarianism</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neoliberalism</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chauvinism</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WS criticism</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: $X^2 = 148.345; df = 38; RMSEA = 0.049; CFI = 0.981; TLI = 0.973.$
27. Determinants of Attitudes towards Eco-Social Policies: Theoretical Reflections

Adeline Otto and Dimitri Gagushvili

27.1 Introduction

As not only global warming itself, but also some of the policies addressing it, are expected to disproportionally affect vulnerable people, several scholars (Degryse and Pochet, 2009; Gough, 2017) argue that the transition to low-carbon societies will have to be accompanied by strengthened traditional social policies as well as so-called eco-social policies. In the light of current discussions about the legitimacy of redistributive social benefits, this is, nevertheless, likely to give rise to yet another societal and political debate on what risks should be socialised, who should be helped during the transition to low-carbon societies and why.

Welfare attitudes literature has traditionally focused on self-interest and ideological preferences as two important determinants of welfare opinions. In addition, having closely worked with Wim for several years and being greatly inspired by his seminal contribution to welfare opinion research, we know that popular support for specific social policies also depends on how deserving the recipients of various social benefits are perceived to be by the wider public (van Oorschot, 2000, 2006). Given the social aspect of eco-social policies, it is intuitive that self-interest, ideology and perceptions of welfare deservingness will also be relevant in relation to the new policies. However, the theoretical approaches have been developed and tested on the basis of income support...
benefits and services targeted at groups experiencing traditional social risks such as old age, sickness and unemployment. We argue that social risks triggered by climate change are very different in nature, which makes it more difficult to predict how the public will react to specific eco-social policies. Hence, we call for critical rethinking and empirical investigation of present ideas about the determinants of public support with regard to eco-social policies.

The current chapter is structured as follows. First, we elaborate on direct and indirect social risks resulting from climate change, and the groups that are most exposed to these risks. In the second step, we explain what eco-social policies as response to these risks are and what factors are expected to influence their popular support. Third, we critically review these determinants from a theoretical point of view. In the last section, we sum up the main points and identify a set of overarching research questions that need to be addressed as part of the broad research agenda concerning the legitimacy of eco-social policies.

27.2 Climate change and social risks

The welfare state is often considered as a social risk management mechanism (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Gough, 2017). Old age, sickness, work injury and unemployment are considered traditional or first-generation social risks, which emerged after industrialisation and urbanisation processes in Western economies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Second-generation social risks result from post-WWII developments such as deindustrialisation, globalisation, changing demographic structures and the proliferation of non-standard employment patterns. They refer to the challenges of having to balance paid work and family responsibilities, and becoming frail while lacking family support. With regard to employment, the challenge includes lacking the
skills necessary to gain access to an adequately paid and secure job (Bonoli, 2005; Taylor-Gooby, 2004).

With regard to climate change, Johansson and colleagues suggest that the issue might require a reconceptualisation of social risks ‘in a manner that goes beyond the work-welfare nexus and the post-industrial welfare state’ (2016: 96–97). Depending on the projected rise in global temperature and the location, the direct risks from climate change include floods, droughts, heavy storms and rainfalls, heatwaves, water stress, wildfires, and deforestation. These, in turn, will affect people’s health, living and working environment, their employment and economic prosperity, with low-income groups in both affluent and developing countries experiencing the greatest likelihood or predisposition to be adversely affected, while also having less ability to respond to disturbances (Gough, 2017; IPCC, 2014).

Indirect social risks are generated by some of the policies addressing global warming. For example, several scholars highlight the regressive effects that various climate policies may entail (Gough, 2017; Markkanen and Anger-Kraavi, 2019; Zachmann et al., 2018). This means that the groups most affected by but least responsible for contributing to global warming – often vulnerable and lower-income households – may pay disproportionally more for the reduction of emissions through higher energy bills or could contribute disproportionally high proportions of their income to the financing of climate change adaptation or mitigation policies (for example, carbon taxes, subsided retro-fitting of private homes and installation of solar panels). In the context of what can be termed ‘third generation eco-social risks’, some authors even speak of a new eco-poverty or eco-exclusion (Fitzpatrick, 2011). However, it is important to note that the risks stemming from global warming are not limited to low-income groups; they can also adversely affect people on middle-income, especially those exposed to traditional social risks.
Many of the risks described above are not entirely new and most of the developed welfare states have been addressing them to varying degrees and with different policy instruments. However, as the scope of these measures increases in line with the severity of global warming, they will add extra stress to existing budgetary constraints and aggravate distributional conflicts in welfare states, thus triggering new legitimacy discussions about which risks should be socialised, who should qualify for what type of support and why. Additionally, in contrast to old and new social risks, social risks emerging from climate change are diffused, multifaceted, more complex and far less visible in the short-term (Gough et al., 2008). As a consequence, it is much harder to clearly identify the specific social categories affected. In the remainder of this contribution, we refer to the ‘eco-socially vulnerable’ as the main risk group. Under this term, we imply people whose living and working environment and financial circumstances expose them to a higher risk of being particularly affected by climate change on the one hand, and (regressive) climate policies on the other.

27.3 The challenge of gaining public support for eco-social policies

Institutional and individual capacity and resilience are essential when trying to understand whether and to what extent the impacts of climate change translate into social risks. Hence, several scholars (Johansson et al., 2016; Koch and Mont, 2016; Schaffrin, 2014) discuss the need to increase this capacity and resilience, with some of them (Degryse and Pochet, 2009; Gough, 2017) calling for traditional as well as new eco-social policies to limit the increase of, and even reduce, existing social inequalities in the transition to low-carbon societies. Eco-social policies can take different forms. For example, support for the retro-fitting of
Determinants of Attitudes towards Eco-Social Policies

energy-efficient housing improvements, CO₂-neutral social housing, support for small-scale energy cooperatives, social employment in the circular economy, quality public transport infrastructure in low-income neighbourhoods, a (social) climate tax shift, taxing high-carbon luxuries as well as social or rising block tariffs, smart metering and energy saving advice for low-income households.

According to Schaffrin (2014), governments’ efforts to implement traditional as well as eco-social policies for the eco-socially vulnerable will depend not only on the specific risk, but also on the country context, especially with regard to present levels of social need and existing social policies. Other contextual aspects that could influence the support for eco-social policies include the affluence of the country (Franzen and Meyer, 2010; Inglehart, 1995), the extent to which it is expected to be affected by climate change (Inglehart, 1995; McCright et al., 2016) and underlying redistributive justice principle in welfare regimes (Clasen and van Oorschot, 2002).

While some countries may be better positioned than others to embark on an eco-social agenda, the extent to which governments will complement traditional welfare measures with new eco-social policies is nevertheless likely to be influenced by public opinion about the appropriateness of these measures. In this respect, it is intuitive that traditional divisions in welfare preferences – reflecting self-interest, ideological predisposition and perceived welfare deservingness – will reassert themselves. However, with the new eco-social risks going beyond the work-welfare nexus, it seems appropriate to reconsider how far existing theories can help us to obtain an insight into the potential support basis for eco-social policies. We turn to this issue in the next section.
27.4 Self-interest, ideology and deservingness perceptions: to what extent can they help understand public support for eco-social policies?

In terms of self-interest, scholars investigating support for public social policies posit that people with a low income, a precarious labour market situation or other disadvantages are more in favour of redistribution through social transfers and services than the better-off (Svallfors, 1997; van Oorschot and Meuleman, 2012). By contrast, socioeconomic divisions in ecological policy preferences work in the opposite direction: because of less awareness of global warming hazards and higher concern for satisfying immediate needs, low-income groups are less in favour of climate policies than high-income groups (Franzen and Meyer, 2010). In the face of opposing divisions in relation to the two aspects of eco-social policies, we expect that the decisive factor will be whether the new policies complement existing social policies or will be used as an alternative. The latter includes, for example, subsidies for retro-fitting dwellings at the expense of reduced social cash transfers. If there is no trade-off, the eco-socially vulnerable have no reason to oppose eco-social measures, as they can only benefit from them. In other cases, they may, however, prefer traditional financial support to address their immediate needs.

With regard to normative and ideological factors influencing welfare and climate policy legitimacy, existing literature suggests that individuals’ support for public welfare policies usually reflects strong social justice principles and ideas of egalitarianism (Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003; Hasenfeld and Rafferty, 1989), while support for climate policies is less associated with concerns for differences in living standards and only partly linked to social justice issues (Clayton, 2018; Kvaløy et al., 2012; Otto and Gugushvili, 2020). Understanding support for eco-social policies is likely to require examining the type of policy, how it is framed
Determinants of Attitudes towards Eco-Social Policies

and what other policies it is flanked by. The more that eco-social policies are perceived as purely compensatory by nature, the less likely they will attract the support of those who care little about egalitarianism and the ability of low-income groups to make the transition to a low-carbon society. Conversely, the more these policies focus purely on dealing with climate change without addressing (new) inequalities, the harder it may be to gain support from those who care about social justice.

Further, deservingness perceptions play an important role in terms of supporting social benefits for specific societal groups. According to van Oorschot (2000), perceptions about the deservingness of welfare benefit recipients are a function of five criteria used by the general public: control, attitude, reciprocity, identity and need (the so-called CARIN criteria). While undeniably a very useful heuristic tool concerning traditional, first-generation and second-generation social risks, welfare deservingness theory also needs to be reconsidered in relation to third-generation eco-social risks. This is particularly true for the need, control, reciprocity, and identity criteria.

With regard to the need criterion, the public may mainly consider two different forms: first, the inability to meet the extra costs (irrespective of the amount) caused by global warming and some climate policies; and second, the actual volume of additional spending required. Most social scientists would agree that, relatively speaking, the lower-income groups tend to face the highest need in terms of additional climate risk-related expenses taking a disproportionately large proportion of their income. However, this may not necessarily be true in relation to all low-income groups and all types of extra expenses. For example, fuel taxes are likely to disproportionately affect low-income drivers living in rural areas (or on the outskirts of big cities), but not in urban areas where people on low incomes mainly use public transport. If the majority of the public views the need in absolute (the amount of extra costs incurred) rather than relative terms
(what proportion of income the extra costs account for), the eco-
socially vulnerable will not necessarily score high on the need
criterion. However, the perception of need might also depend on
the exact type of risk. Where climate change makes whole areas
uninhabitable, this easily relates to both the inability to meet extra
expenses and the actual amount of extra spending, and it is likely
to give rise to yet two more types of needs: infrastructure and
medical assistance. Based on existing research (Jensen and
Petersen, 2017), victims of random events like climate change-
related loss of housing and ill-health can be expected to be seen as
deserving as long as help is not limited to a societal group that is
perceived as particularly low-deserving (for example unauthorised
economic migrants).

In terms of the control criterion, current social risks to some
extent allow the question of whether benefit recipients are or were
responsible for their situation of neediness. For example, could
they have taken a low paid and less pleasant job or invested more
time in vocational training? However, it becomes much more
difficult to hold low-income groups responsible for living in
more-polluted or more-flood-exposed areas, for not being able to
finance the installation of solar panels or afford retro-fitting a
house to save energy, for not having access to use public transport
or for being unable to cycle or run a more fuel-efficient car when
commuting from rural areas to work in cities. Where eco-social
benefits take the form of compensation for income, energy
poverty or social housing, this might nevertheless be different.
Here, existing stereotypes are very likely to play an important role,
with those on low incomes being blamed for their situation and
with cooperation and gratefulness being decisive factors in
support for the receipt of benefits. In this context, the attitude
criterion in terms of the gratefulness of the benefit recipient might
play an important role, with more grateful individuals being
perceived as more deserving of the benefit. However, as in
relation to traditional beneficiaries of the welfare state, this
criterion will be rather difficult to measure in the case of the eco-socially vulnerable.

Concerning the reciprocity criterion, people appear to be more inclined to support benefits for individuals who are perceived as having contributed before the social risk occurred or intend to do so in exchange for their benefit. The question that could be asked here is to what extent this criterion applies to the social risks emerging from climate change or climate policies. Should people have paid into a climate insurance or just transition fund in order to qualify for support? What would contributions look like after a risk occurred? Does contributing before and after alter the support for eco-social policies (see the chapter by Bonoli in this volume)? One expected outcome could be that the more these benefits resemble a form of compensation, the more individuals might judge the eco-socially vulnerable on the basis of what they do in return for the benefit. For example, where unemployment is the result of ‘brown industry’ decline, benefit recipients might be expected to be willing to retrain for employment in other sectors.

Further, given the complexity of social risks emerging from climate change or particular climate policies, it is much more difficult to describe or clearly define who exactly the eco-socially vulnerable are (Gough et al., 2008). Therefore, concerning the identity criterion, it might be hard to analyse individuals’ deservingness perceptions based on the extent to which they can identify with or feel close to the potential benefit recipient. Our supposition is that where eco-social policies have a strong compensatory character and are meant to satisfy basic needs, we will find that the deservingness of the eco-socially vulnerable is comparable with the low-level deservingness of the unemployed, migrants and poor people in general (van Oorschot, 2006). This could be related to the stereotypes associated with particular policies (see the contribution by De Tavernier and Draulans in this volume), with marginalised groups being perceived as lazy, taking less responsibility and being less self-reliant.
Moreover, there is also a need to consider compensation as a potential additional deservingness criterion. This criterion has largely escaped the attention of welfare deservingness researchers for the simple reason that advanced welfare states have not (or at least have not been thought to have) inflicted relevant harm on specific social groups for which compensation would be needed. With the increase in global warming, this assumption is changing and welfare opinion research needs to take stock of the developments. At this point, it is hard to speculate how important this criterion will be compared to the other criteria. However, as the discussion above shows, it will certainly matter whether eco-social policies are seen as compensation for damage or as compensation for the inability to cope with eco-social risks. In the former case, the perceived deservingness is likely to be high whereas in the latter, the eco-socially vulnerable will probably be viewed as equally low-deserving as people receiving means-tested social assistance.

27.5 Conclusion: the need for new research

Throughout the current chapter, we have argued that the need for eco-social policies is likely to become more pressing in the coming years, as the eco-social risks caused by global warming and some of the policies aimed at it intensify. There are multiple factors that will influence the extent to which these measures are endorsed by governments in advanced welfare states. While not necessarily the most decisive aspect, public opinion is likely to play a role in shaping the ambition of a government’s eco-social agenda. The existing welfare attitudes literature provides some useful insights into potential divisions in preferences regarding eco-social measures. However, as we have demonstrated, this body of literature may need to be reconsidered in relation to the qualitatively different third-generation eco-social risks. As a
Determinants of Attitudes towards Eco-Social Policies

starting point for narrowing this knowledge gap, we propose a set of broad research questions. These include the following:

1. How deserving are the eco-socially vulnerable in comparison with the traditional beneficiaries of developed welfare states (that is, the elderly, families with children, the unemployed, single parents, social assistance recipients and migrants)?
2. Do people explicitly or implicitly use the CARIN criteria in relation to the eco-socially disadvantaged, and if so, what is the relative importance of each of the five criteria?
3. What other criteria do people refer to when evaluating the welfare deservingness of beneficiaries of eco-social policies? Do people consider compensation as a distinctive deservingness criterion?
4. Do people feel that eco-social policies should be unconditional or do they expect the beneficiaries to reciprocate, for example, by demonstrating eco-friendly behaviour, such as limiting their use of electricity and fuel?
5. If faced with a trade-off between traditional welfare and new eco-social policies, what preferences do people have and how do they justify them?
6. To what extent does public support for these policies influence their design and implementation in national contexts?
7. Cross cutting each of these questions: what are the divisions between the main socio-economic groups and their values, and ideological and social justice preferences?
8. Also cross cutting each of these questions: how are the perceptions influenced by the country context (for example, affluence, exposure to the adverse effects of the climate change, type of welfare regime)?

To help answer these questions, we recommend using various methodological approaches. Given that at present one can only hypothesise how the traditional divisions and welfare
Leading Social Policy Analysis from the Front

deservingness criteria will play out in relation to eco-social policies, at the initial stage priority should be given to exploratory analyses by means of qualitative research. The empirical evidence generated from these qualitative studies can in turn be used to guide both traditional large-scale surveys and factorial vignette studies.

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Determinants of Attitudes towards Eco-Social Policies


331
28. Homeownership and Social Policy Preferences

Thomas Lux and Steffen Mau

28.1 Introduction

In the early 1980s, Ralf Dahrendorf, a key figure in social liberalism, formulated his thesis on the ‘end of social democracy’ (1983, own translation): The social-democratic project – not just as a party programme but as a programme defining an entire epoch – had been realised across the board in Western societies during the 20th century. Nowadays, our social consensus aims to establish social equity, comprehensive access to social welfare as well as co-determination. Never before in human history has the majority of the population had this many opportunities to lead prosperous lives equipped with a range of possibilities. At the end of the century, Dahrendorf wrote (1983: 16, own translation) that ‘we are all (almost) social democrats’. Today, more than 30 years later, doubts are justified as to whether the idea of an unchallenged, irreversible triumph of social democracy is indeed valid. Although the welfare state is still viewed positively by the majority (van Oorschot et al., 2012), these sentiments have been challenged and attacked by neoliberal ideas. Faith in the capabilities of the free market and in the supremacy of competition has embedded itself within many Western societies, underpinning key political strategies in the reorganisation of a wide variety of fields, including social policy, the labour market as well as the education sector (Amable, 2011). This raises the question of why ‘in the rich countries of the West, the long turn
to neoliberalism encountered remarkably weak resistance’ (Streeck, 2014: 31). Furthermore, why was there an increasing tendency towards agreement and even an active willingness among a broad range of social strata to support the neoliberal reform agenda?

In addressing these questions, ideological and cultural factors can be identified which have increased the popularity of market solutions, not just among economic and political elites but also among ordinary citizens. In this contribution, we point to additional structural factors underpinning the susceptibility of the population to market-oriented approaches. We posit that society’s commitment to the social equity model waned partially as a result of the widespread increase in wealth and assets during the long period of post-war prosperity, thus leading to a greater affinity for market approaches. Expanding on Mau (2015), we argue that the middle classes in particular lost their ties to the social democratic model of social equity due to extensive collective gains in wealth and upward social mobility. Therefore, the success of the neoliberal turn cannot exclusively be understood as a result of widespread ‘false consciousness’. Rather, it can also be interpreted as a consequence of the transformation of social interests.

This proposition rests on the assumption that a long-term socio-structural change affecting attitudes and orientations has taken place. This assumption cannot be verified directly, though, since the data required for a long time-series analysis is not available. The proposition is, however, underpinned by a micro-model of attitude change that can be verified empirically. This model assumes that a changing or growing asset portfolio can lead to changing preferences concerning welfare state benefits. Put succinctly, we thus hypothesise that an increase in assets, whether in the form of stocks and shares, residential property, inheritance or other types of wealth, would contribute to people relying less on state-managed social security and more on market-oriented investment strategies. We will examine this hypothesis using data
from the German Socio-Economic Panel and by looking at the relationship between property acquisition and the attribution of responsibility for financial security in old age.

28.2 Attitudes towards the welfare state and the affluent majority class

The social democratic theory of democratic capitalism assumed for a long time that economic inequalities could be limited by the wide distribution of political co-determination rights. The argument was that in a majoritarian democracy, ‘there will be a ‘natural’ tendency in all segments of the population, and in particular the less privileged ones, to make active use of the political resources that are granted to them as political rights’ (Offe, 2012). In a responsive political system, there should be a democratic demand for welfare policy interventions. Research has focused extensively on the issue of political support for welfare state institutions and their legitimacy (Mau, 2003; Taylor-Gooby, 2008; Svarfors, 2006; van Oorschot et al., 2012). In this context, Wim van Oorschot (2000, 2006) was among the key scholars suggesting that welfare legitimacy also depends on people’s deservingness perceptions of needy groups, with elderly people as well as sick and disabled people usually seen as much more deserving than unemployed people and immigrants. Yet, in the overall evaluation of welfare state consequences, the public of most Western countries thinks that the positive social consequences outweigh the negative ones (van Oorschot et al., 2012). Another important contribution has been made by the thesis of legitimacy through beneficiaries or ‘beneficial involvement’, which posits that the available basket of interconnected welfare state benefits acts to bind interests while creating potential sources of support. At least until the mid-1990s, it appears that the more extensive and comprehensive the
activities of the welfare state were, the more positive the attitude profile of the population, with the groups that benefited most having particularly supportive attitudes (for example, Coughlin, 1980; Goodin and Le Grand, 1987; Kluegel and Miyano, 1995).

According to these findings, there is limited cause for concern in relation to the social model. However, past developments challenge this notion. The welfare state has been subject to considerable pressure, not just as a result of fiscal problems but also due to increasing levels of dissatisfaction and a lack of active support. The neoliberal project resonated to a certain degree on a societal level and appealed to a significant proportion of the population (Prasad, 2006). Crouch (2013: 23) summed up this change in attitudes and political concepts with an ironic remark stating ‘We Are All (Partly) Neoliberals Now’. Since the late 1980s, it is fair to say that in most Western European countries there has been a certain level of support for political projects that promise tax cuts, that increase tolerance for social inequalities, that aim to shrink the state and that seek to increasingly subject public service providers to competition (Mau, 2015). Even left-wing and social democratic parties in Europe showed sympathy for neoliberal reform ideas and actively helped to implement them, not least because they believed that their constituents would accept this (Mudge, 2008).

These considerations beg the question of why populations were so receptive to, or at least passively accepting of, market-strengthening reforms. Furthermore, why did those who profited strongly from the available basket of social policy benefits allow themselves to be swayed by rampant state scepticism? One answer given in the literature is that neoliberalism is a highly accomplished ideological programme that succeeds in encouraging individuals to act against their own structural interests. This is the (classical) theory of false consciousness as triggered by ideological hegemony, which posits that ‘middle class and poor people are being diverted, largely by design, from
looking after their own economic interests into caring about other concerns’ (Milanović, 2016: 202). Above all else, this line of argumentation shifts a state of ideological delusion to centre stage.

Although such arguments are quite plausible, they are only part of the explanation. The success of the neoliberal turn can also be seen as a consequence of transforming interests. Widespread gains in wealth, collective upward social mobility, the growth of a materially saturated middle class as well as processes of individualisation and pluralisation have changed the social foundation on which societal demands for social equity are based (Mau, 2015). While these developments have benefited large parts of the population, especially the middle classes (Mau, 2012), they have also led to a loosening of the commitment of some sections of the population to the interventionist project. More pointedly, this thesis implies that precisely because the large majority class profited substantially from the collective gains made during the social democratic era they have become alienated from it. The better off they became, the more receptive they were to moves towards economic liberalisation and processes of financialisation.

An important indicator of this change are shifts in income and investment portfolios. At the risk of oversimplifying, one may conceptualise the middle class in the early social democratic era as a class that almost exclusively drew its income from work and relied on collective social security provided by the state, while today the middle class also satisfies status interests by means of capital income, life insurance, private savings and family asset transfers (Mau, 2015). It has been argued that wealth – when available – increasingly assumes a ‘security function’ for the middle class (Korom, 2017). This does not change them all into rentier capitalists, yet many among them were and are involved in accumulating, expanding and passing on assets as well as partaking in investment-focused market behaviour. Thus, many of these individuals find themselves occupying the threshold between the middle and the ‘affluent classes’ (Veblen, 1899 [2009]) and are
directly involved in financialisation processes, for instance, through the expansion of private retirement saving, (credit-financed) property ownership and shares in investment funds.

Although the literature refers to differences in attitudes between different socio-structural groups (Jæger, 2006; Svallfors, 2006), as yet there are hardly any systematic references to questions of financialisation, asset accumulation and capital ownership. Approaches to the investigation of attitude differences that use classical variables to describe status, such as occupation, income and education, dominate. Previous studies have shown that it is primarily the lower classes who strongly affirm the welfare state while the upper classes, although not rejecting it outright, are more reserved (Svallfors, 2006). Furthermore, there are associations between these status variables and opinions regarding the principles that ought to determine the orientation of the welfare state:

‘Equity is relatively more preferred among the “haves” in society, i.e., people with higher income and educational degrees, while a redistribution based on need is especially favoured by “have-nots”, i.e., people with lower educational level, with lower income, people on benefit and the longer-term unemployed’ (Reeskens and van Oorschot, 2013: 1191).

Although these approaches have delivered important insights, aspects such as asset accumulation, investment and retirement provision strategies as well as familial management of existing resources, all of which underwent significant changes over time, are currently overlooked.

Given this background, we intend to examine the relationship between homeownership and attitudes towards social policy. With this, we investigate alternative determinants of welfare attitudes that go beyond the 'conventional' socioeconomic characteristics. For the vast majority of the population, homeownership is the most important financial asset. Over the past 30 to 40 years in
Europe, there has been a general increase in homeownership (Doling and Ford, 2007). In Germany, a country with a comparatively low rate, homeownership increased from 38.8 to 46 per cent between 1993 and 2010 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2011: 294, 2012: 155). We suspect that homeowners and purchasers (even after controlling for the influence of other important factors) will have a closer affinity to the market and a more sceptical attitude towards the state than people who rent. In terms of welfare state preferences, we refer to the preferred type of provision for old-age financial security because the ownership or purchase of property – as a form of private provision or insurance – should have an effect in this area. We chose the years 1997 to 2002 for our investigation period. During this period, the neoliberalisation of German society accelerated, thus making it particularly relevant to our question. This acceleration can be seen, for instance, in the intensification of discussions regarding the introduction and strengthening of private pension insurance (Nullmeier, 2003).

28.3 Data

For our analysis, we use the balanced longitudinal sample of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) for the years 1997 to 2002 (Haisken-DeNew and Frick, 2005). In 1997 and 2002, the GSOEP participants were asked who, in their opinion, should be responsible for financial security in old age (possible answers: only the state, mainly the state, both state and private individuals, mostly private individuals, only private individuals). With regard to homeownership status, we distinguish between households that were (1) renting their place of residence from 1997 to 2002, or (2) owners of their place of residence from 1997 to 2002, or (3) renting in 1997 and then, between 1998 and 2001, becoming owners of their place of residence (and staying that way). In
addition, we include age, gender, family status, residential area, education status and net equivalised income as control variables.

28.4 Results

Our results show that, over time, the proportion of respondents who ascribe responsibility for financial security in old age in Germany exclusively or primarily to the state has decreased. While 43.1 per cent of respondents held this view in 1997, only 39.5 per cent did so in 2002. At the same time, the proportion of respondents who consider both the state and private individuals to be responsible increased from 48.5 to 53.4 per cent. In this respect, we are actually dealing with a trend towards market or private solutions in the field of old-age financial provision. However, this does not imply a strengthened preference for radical market solutions. The percentage of respondents who consider private individuals to be mainly or solely responsible has not increased, but rather has decreased slightly (from 8.4 to 7.1 per cent).

Looking at the preferences for state or individual responsibility in the relevant groups (in 2002), our expectations are confirmed: Property buyers and owners attribute responsibility for financial old-age provision to the state far less frequently than tenants (37.8 and 34.4 per cent versus 44.9 per cent). They also favour mixed responsibility more frequently (54.8 and 56.3 per cent versus 50.3 per cent) and they prefer radical market solutions more often (7.4 and 9.2 per cent versus 4.8 per cent). These differences are also reflected in linear regression models after controlling for age, gender, marital status, housing region, education, and net equivalised income (see Table 28.1). In 2002, respondents who purchased property between 1997 and 2001 had a significantly stronger preference for private responsibility for old-age financial provision than those who were tenants during the whole
investigation period. The same holds true for respondents who were homeowners during the whole investigation period.

Table 28.1 Preferences for state or individual responsibility for financial provision in old age in Germany in 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Homeowner status (ref: permanent tenant)</th>
<th>Gross effect</th>
<th>Controlled effect</th>
<th>Conditional change model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Permanent owner</td>
<td>0.161**</td>
<td>0.124**</td>
<td>0.093**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property buyer</td>
<td>0.141**</td>
<td>0.073+</td>
<td>0.063+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control variables</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preference in 1997</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.233**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.451**</td>
<td>2.348**</td>
<td>1.788**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of cases</td>
<td>7988</td>
<td>7988</td>
<td>7988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0.099</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: $P$-values in brackets. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.

Where the preference for state or private responsibility in 1997 is included in the regression model as an independent variable, the coefficients can be interpreted as group differences in changes of preferences over time (given a comparable starting level for the preferences in 1997) (Finkel, 1995). The results of this model show that people who buy residential property and those who are homeowners throughout the entire investigation period tend significantly more strongly towards private responsibility over time than people who continuously rented.

28.5 Conclusion

We started by presenting possible arguments to explain why large segments of the population acquiesced to neoliberalism rather
than acting as a bulwark against it. The success of the post-war economic and growth model alone means that many households today can no longer be regarded as purely dependent on employment. At the end of a long period of prosperity, many households in the mid- and upper-middle classes have accumulated significant assets that they utilise, invest in and extend, thereby contributing to status reproduction. Therefore, it does not suffice to deduce the attitudes of these groups towards state welfare provision purely from their role as employees or social benefit recipients. Instead, questions of asset accumulation, financialisation and private strategies for financial provision also have to be considered. Given this background, we conducted an illustrative analysis examining whether the macro-level interrelations between collective resource accumulation on the one hand and a weaker (welfare) statist orientation on the other hand come into play when we take a closer look at the question of buying residential property. Our results do not only show that, at the start of the new century, homeowners had a weaker statist orientation than people who rent, but also that the general trend towards market solutions was stronger among property owners and buyers.

All of this certainly does not imply that broad swathes of the population have entirely abandoned their belief in the role of the state as a corrective and compensatory authority. That is not the case. However, collective upward social mobility and its concomitant market interests have created enhanced opportunities for replacing the once professed ‘politics against the markets’ (Esping-Andersen, 1985) of the social democratic project with the ‘politics for the markets’ of the neoliberal project. It can be assumed that the growth in wealth and privatised pension provisions were a precondition for growing reservations about the redistributive ambitions of the state. However, it should be clarified that we have only examined one determining factor among many and that we cannot derive any monocausal
Homeownership and Social Policy Preferences

explanation from it which excludes other factors such as ideological or cultural change towards a greater market orientation. With regard to the interplay of factors, our findings suggest that socio-structural changes are at least a marginal condition for social groups becoming responsive to certain ideological changes. In this sense, a shift in attitudes towards convictions of market affinity would depend on the interaction of socio-structural and ideological transformations.

NOTES

1. Both groups come disproportionately frequently from middle and upper income groups.
2. Additionally calculated ordinal regression models yield very similar results.

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Homeownership and Social Policy Preferences


John Gelissen

29.1 Introduction

In Wim van Oorschot’s academic work, the quest for understanding how the sociological notion of solidarity shows its different faces in welfare beliefs of the Dutch and European publics, and in social policy of European nations, has been a consistent impetus for his empirical research endeavors. When I was working on my PhD project on the explanation of cross-national differences in welfare attitudes, to me, one of the most lucent definitions on this topic was van Oorschot’s definition of solidarity:

‘a sociological concept referring to a situation in which individuals contribute to the common interest of the collectivity they are a member of, even if this runs against their direct self-interest.’ (van Oorschot, 2000, 2014).

This definition was particularly important for my subsequent research because van Oorschot showed how the various reasons why people support welfare could be derived from sociological theories on social solidarity (van Oorschot, 1999). Such theories allow inferring why and under what conditions individuals are
willing to contribute to the common good even if doing so would go against their personal interests. In particular, van Oorschot identified four different reasons for solidary behavior, based on the work of several key sociological theorists.

First, from Mayhew (1971), he identified the importance of emotional ties and identification. For example, people may feel solidary with groups such as their family because of affection and identification, but they may also cherish feelings of belonging and identification with other social groups such as ethnic groups, religious communities, regional populations, or even nations.

Durkheim (1893 [1964]) and Parsons (1951) pointed him to the importance of culturally-based beliefs that stress the moral obligation in individuals to contribute to the common good. Here, the fact that group members share some fundamental cultural characteristics can promote feelings of responsibility and support for the collective.

Hechter (1992), Weber (1921 [1978]), and Durkheim stressed that solidarity could also result from rational calculation grounded in self-interest, highlighting that ‘warm feelings’ are not always sufficient for solidarity to occur. Here, one may think of people who pay premiums to a collective health care scheme because they value high-quality health care while anticipating they may need it in the future should they fall ill.

Finally, Parsons and Hechter emphasized the importance of institutional role obligations and enforcement because the possibility of free-riding behavior demands control of contributory obligations, and, if necessary, sanctioning in the case of individuals not honoring their obligations vis-à-vis the collective. In other words, for some individuals, not contributing to the common good is a meaningful or rational action alternative and for these individuals, enforcement of compliance to contribute to the common good – that is, enforced solidarity – is necessary.
These insights from van Oorschot’s work allowed me to theoretically embed my empirical research on welfare attitudes in a rich sociological tradition of theorizing about social solidarity. In his empirical research on welfare attitudes, van Oorschot has explicitly addressed the first three reasons for contributing to the common good – identification, moral convictions, and self-interest (for example van Oorschot, 2000). Here I want to add to this work by theoretically and empirically focusing on the aspect of enforced solidarity in welfare states. Although sociological theory stresses the importance of control and sanctioning mechanisms for promoting solidarity – especially in circumstances when other solidarity-promoting mechanisms are absent – welfare attitudes research has not extensively studied this aspect until now. This lack of attention is surprising because the extent to which people accept dodging the payment of necessary taxes and premiums to uphold welfare state provisions can be seen as an indicator of the legitimacy of the welfare state. Besides, differences in levels of acceptance of taxes and premiums evasion between countries may also relate to differences in the effectiveness of the operation of the welfare state institutions of these countries to enforce compliance. In the remainder of this contribution, I will address some of these issues by answering the following questions:

1. How tolerant are European citizens about behaviors that seek to evade tax and premium contributions that are necessary to finance (welfare) state efforts?
2. Do public perceptions about (a) the stringency of control for enforcing contributing to the common good, (b) sanctioning of evasion, and (c) risk of being detected relate directly to such tolerance beliefs?
3. Do welfare regime differences explain differences in tolerance levels towards tax and premiums evasion?
29.2 Hypotheses

The literature on compliance with the law stresses that social control mechanisms and credible risks of sanctions aim to persuade rational-choice individuals that – while otherwise worthwhile – illegitimate behavior is not worth taking the risk (Jackson et al., 2012: 1051). Jackson and colleagues propose the instrumental compliance mechanism, which holds that an individual responds in a self-interested way to institutional demands to gain a reward, or avoid sanctioning, or both. The better the institutional compliance mechanisms are developed, and, equally important, the more citizens perceive these compliance mechanisms as working adequately through procedural fairness, effectiveness and representing the communities’ moral values, the higher the legitimacy of such a system and the higher the willingness to support such institutions by complying to its arrangements (Sunshine and Tyler, 2003).

Also, Hechter (1987) contends that the better formal control and sanctioning mechanisms are in place within a group, and the members of the group perceive these as such, the higher the level of group solidarity will be (Hechter, 1987). From this we derive the first hypothesis (H1a), which proposes that people who perceive (a) strong control for enforcing compliance to pay taxes and premiums, (b) strict sanctioning, and (c) high risk of being detected will generally be less tolerant towards tax and premiums evasion than people who believe that such institutional deterrence mechanisms are less well developed.

However, an alternative hypothesis could also be formulated that expects an opposite effect of perceived quality of control and sanctioning on the tolerance towards tax and premiums evasion. Most people abide by the law and meet tax and premium payment obligations not only because of the fear of sanctioning and self-interest but also because of normative compliance (based on a felt moral obligation, commitment) or compliance based on habit or
routine (Bottoms, 2001). However, even though the majority of the group members may strongly endorse such compliance motivations, they may perceive the working of the institutional arrangements for control and sanctioning as failing, which is also expressed in a low level of public tolerance for tax and premiums evasion. On the other hand, people may perceive control and sanctioning actually as too strict, which may promote public tolerance about tax and premiums evasion. Formulated alternatively: if people perceive too weak control and sanctioning, they may actually want some improvement of these deterrence mechanisms, as expressed by a low level of support for tax and premiums evasion, whereas when deterrence mechanisms are perceived as too strict, the level of support for tax and premiums evasion may actually be high (H1b).

Because control and sanctioning arrangements are institutional characteristics of welfare states which presumably differ between welfare regimes, I further expect that tolerance levels towards evasive behaviors will also differ between regimes (H2): in comparison to Social-democratic welfare states, citizens who live in countries that belong to other types of welfare regimes (Liberal, Conservative, Hybrid, Mediterranean, Baltic and Post-communist welfare regimes) are more tolerant towards tax and premium evasion. Social-democratic welfare states have the highest social expenditure levels in Europe and presumably demand strong levels of solidarity from its citizens, which results in low levels of tolerance about tax and premiums evasive behaviors. In less developed welfare states institutional enforcement to contribute to the common good may be less strongly developed, which will result in higher levels of tolerance in these countries.
29.3 Data, operational definitions, and method

*Data* – The special Eurobarometer 402 (Wave EB79.2) was fielded in April-May 2013. This survey included a module on undeclared work and legitimacy of tax and premiums evasive behavior. Data of the following 28 countries are analyzed: France, Belgium, The Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Denmark, Ireland, Great Britain, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Finland, Sweden, Austria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia. Sample sizes for most countries were around N = 1000, but smaller for Luxemburg, Malta and Cyprus (around N = 500), and larger for Germany (N = 1499) and Great Britain (N = 1306).

*Operational definitions* – To measure the dependent variable tolerance towards tax or premiums evasion I use the following question: ‘Now I would like to know how you assess various behaviors. For each of them, please tell me to what extent you find it acceptable or not (1 = absolutely unacceptable; 10 = absolutely acceptable). Examples of statements in the original 6-item battery are: ‘Someone receives welfare payments without entitlement’; ‘A private person is hired by a private household for work and he or she does not report the payment received in return to tax or social security institutions although it should be reported’; ‘A firm hires a private person and all or a part of the salary paid to him or her is not officially registered’. For each respondent we calculated the average score across the six items. Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was 0.869.

*Welfare regime types* – Countries are assigned to a welfare regime type as follows: Liberal: Great Britain, Ireland; Social-democratic: Sweden, Denmark, Finland; Hybrid: Belgium, the Netherlands; Conservative: France, Germany, Luxemburg, Austria; Mediterranean: Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece. Baltic: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania; Post-communist: Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia; other: Malta, Cyprus. For the Western European countries I base this classification on own work and for the Eastern European countries on Fenger (2007).

Perceptions of lack of control and lack of sanctions – Respondents were asked what reasons people have for doing undeclared work. We constructed two dummy variables, one for the situation when people indicated lack of control by authorities as a first or second reason, and one for the situation when people indicated that sanctions are too weak.

Risk perception of being detected when doing undeclared work – Respondents were asked the following question: ‘People who work without declaring the income risk that tax or social security institutions find out and issue supplementary tax bills and perhaps fines. How would you describe the risk of being detected in (OUR COUNTRY)? (1) Very high – (4) Very small.’ Scoring of this variable was reversed and the category ‘Very small risk’ is the reference category.

Self-report of ever having done undeclared work – This is a dummy variable with categories (0) no, and (1) yes. Note that this variable is most likely biased due to eliciting socially desirable answers, leading to an underestimate of the occurrence of having done undeclared work.

Socio-demographics – Educational attainment was measured at the age in which a respondent completed full-time education, with those still studying being assigned their current age. People’s financial situation was measured by the following question: ‘During the last twelve months, would you say you had difficulties to pay your bills at the end of the month? (1) Most of the time (2) From time to time (3) Almost never/never.’ People’s occupation is indicated by three dummy variables: (1) self-employed (ref.) (2) employed (3) not working. Finally, I include the respondent’s age and his or her sex (0 = males; 1 = females).
Methods – I estimate random intercept regression models to estimate the effects of individual characteristics and regime dummies on the tolerance towards tax and premiums evasion. Level-1 and Level-2 R-squared values according to Snijders and Bosker (1999) are reported for each model to see how each set of variables adds to the explanatory power of the models.

29.4 Results

Figure 29.1 shows the differences in average tolerance towards tax and premiums evasion across the 28 European countries.

Figure 29.1 Mean tolerance towards tax and premiums evasion for 28 European countries (range: 0–10)
We see, first of all, that across all the countries tolerance towards evasive behavior is relatively low. However, despite of these overall low levels of tolerance, some interesting patterns can be distinguished. Levels of tolerance are almost lowest in the Social-democratic welfare states Denmark, Finland, and Sweden, as well as in Great Britain, which is the prototype of a European liberal welfare state. On the more tolerant side of the spectrum we see that two former USSR-type welfare states show the highest level of tolerance, followed by a group of Post-communist European type of welfare states such as Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Poland. In the middle of the distribution we find a mixture of countries from Conservative, Hybrid, Mediterranean and Post-communist regimes. We also note the somewhat surprising higher tolerance level in the Netherlands, whereas citizens of Greece and Spain appear to be somewhat less tolerant towards tax and premiums evasion. Presumably, because citizens in latter countries have recently been confronted with very stringent policy interventions due to severe governmental budget deficits, people are of the opinion that everyone should share the burden by paying taxes and premiums.

Next, Table 29.1 shows the results of four sequential multilevel models in which differences in individual tolerance towards tax and premiums evasion are explained. Model 1 allows us to estimate the extent to which differences in tolerance scores are attributable to between-country differences. The intraclass correlation for this model equals 0.101, which indicates that 10 per cent of differences in tolerance scores is attributable to between-country differences. Next, Model 2 partially reproduces the findings from the visual inspection of Figure 29.1. We see that in comparison to citizens of Social-democratic welfare regimes, citizens of Baltic welfare states are on average much more tolerant towards tax and premium evasion. Also citizens of Hybrid and Post-communist welfare states are on average more tolerant concerning evasive behavior.
**Table 29.1** Multilevel regression of tolerance towards tax and premiums evasion on welfare regime types, perceptions of solidarity enforcement, and social-demographic variables (unstandardized regression coefficients)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>0.458</td>
<td>0.541*</td>
<td>0.363</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>0.456*</td>
<td>0.490*</td>
<td>0.269</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hybrid</td>
<td>0.865***</td>
<td>0.850**</td>
<td>0.756**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>0.449*</td>
<td>0.450*</td>
<td>0.323</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltic</td>
<td>1.506***</td>
<td>1.364***</td>
<td>1.191***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-communist</td>
<td>0.807***</td>
<td>0.793***</td>
<td>0.618**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>-0.187</td>
<td>-0.065</td>
<td>-0.269</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak control (0 = no; 1 = yes)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.292***</td>
<td>-0.268***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak sanctions (0 = no; 1 = yes)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.261***</td>
<td>-0.254***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception of risk: very small</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly small</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly high</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>-0.284***</td>
<td>-0.301***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Done undeclared work (0 = no; 1 = yes)</td>
<td>1.282***</td>
<td>1.151***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (0 = male; 1 = female)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.135***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.011***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.007**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problems paying bills: most of the time</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From time to time</td>
<td>0.075*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almost never/never</td>
<td>-0.150***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment status: employed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ref.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>0.092*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not working</td>
<td>0.066**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>2.420***</td>
<td>1.818***</td>
<td>1.855***</td>
<td>2.694***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared level-1</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>0.118</td>
<td>0.135</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared level-2</td>
<td>0.718</td>
<td>0.699</td>
<td>0.703</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N level-1</td>
<td>24625</td>
<td>24625</td>
<td>22331</td>
<td>21535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N level-2</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Small, although significant differences also exist between the citizens of the Mediterranean and Conservative welfare states on the one hand, and citizens of the Social-democratic welfare states on the other, with somewhat higher levels of tolerance in the former countries. The welfare regime classification explains about 7 per cent of the variance in individual tolerance differences, and 72 per cent of the variance in between-country differences in tolerance. The pattern of differences between welfare regimes aligns with hypothesis 2, but it remains to be seen whether these differences remain once we control for compositional differences.

Model 3 adjusts the average tolerance scores for the countries for individual-level differences (that is, compositional differences) in perceptions about the stringency of control for enforcement of compliance, sanctioning of evasion, and risk of being detected. These effects are also controlled for whether or not a person has reported that he or she has done undeclared work. We now see that some effects of the regime dummy variables either weaken (Hybrid, Baltic, and Post-communist regimes) or become stronger (Liberal and Mediterranean regimes). Except for the dummies for Malta and Cyprus, all regime dummy variables are significantly different from the Social-democratic regime. We find positive evidence for hypothesis 1b, because the findings indicate that individuals who perceive weak control and weak sanctions show lower levels of tolerance than those who do not, controlling for differences in perceived risk of detection and performance of undeclared work. In comparison to those who perceive a very small risk of detection, those who perceive a high risk of detection are on average less tolerant towards evasive behavior. We also see that individuals who report that they have done undeclared work are more tolerant towards evasive behavior than those who refrained from doing so. Adding the individual-level variables now increases the individual-level explained variance with 4.5 per cent. Level-2 explained variance decreases slightly, which is presumably the result of the fact that one or more of the added individual-
level variables show no between-country variation in average scores.

The final Model 4 additionally adjusts for compositional differences due to socio-demographic characteristics. Once these characteristics are controlled for, there remain only significant differences between the Social-democratic regime type on the one hand, and the Hybrid, Baltic and Post-communist type on the other hand, with the latter regimes showing on average higher levels of tolerance towards evasive behavior, a pattern that is still partly in accordance with hypothesis 2. Effects of perceptions of control and sanction levels, of having done undeclared work, and the difference between those who anticipate little risk of detection and those who assess a large risk of detection change only slightly once we control for the social-demographic characteristics of respondents. Women are less tolerant about evasive behavior than men, and with increasing age and education, tolerance becomes lower. In comparison to people who have problems footing the bill most of the time, those who (almost) never have financial problems are less tolerant. Finally, self-employed persons and persons who are not working show higher average levels of tolerance of tax and premium evasive behavior than employed persons.

29.5 Welfare regimes, enforcement perceptions, and public tolerance towards tax and premiums evasion: conclusions

Wim van Oorschot’s theoretical analysis of sociological principles for promoting solidarity and the application of these principles to empirical welfare research provides students of welfare attitudes with a solid conceptual framework for studying the motivational foundations of public views on welfare legitimacy. In this contribution, I zoomed in on one of these motivational factors,
‘It’s Only Cheating if You Get Caught’

namely, institutional role obligation and enforcement. To this end, I explored cross-national differences in public beliefs about the legitimacy of behaviors that potentially undermine welfare solidarity, and I related it to public perceptions about control and sanctioning of illegitimate welfare behavior and the degree to which different types of welfare states demand contributing to the common good.

I have found that tolerance towards tax and premiums evasive behaviors is generally low across European welfare states, which can be seen as good news, as maintaining a modern welfare state requires considerable tax revenues or premium contributions by its citizens. The generally low levels of tolerance for illegitimate welfare behaviors also suggest that the institutional deterrence mechanisms that Western European and Eastern European welfare states have developed or are currently developing to enforce solidarity are to a large extent considered as legitimate by their citizens. However, important differences in levels of tolerance exist between countries. To some extent these differences could be explained by welfare regime type: As expected, the citizens of Social-democratic welfare states are least tolerant of illegitimate behaviors, whereas Eastern European welfare states show higher levels of tolerance. However, compositional differences were also important for explaining variation in tolerance levels. Interestingly, individuals who perceive limited control and weak sanctioning are less tolerant about solidarity-undermining behaviors. Presumably, this finding reflects people’s awareness that welfare solidarity requires some enforcement.

Reliable estimation of the extent of illegitimate welfare behaviors poses a challenge to empirical welfare research in its own right. We also lack encompassing cross-national comparative information about the institutional arrangements for enforcing welfare solidarity and their effectiveness (Jorens et al., 2015). Once such data become available, we can open the black box of
Leading Social Policy Analysis from the Front

regime types and more systematically assess the importance of the extent of illegitimate behavior and of such solidarity-enforcing arrangements that undergird the legitimacy of the welfare state. Wim van Oorschot’s theoretical and empirical contributions to the study of welfare legitimacy are invaluable for this future research.

NOTE

1. According to Al Bundy, Married… with Children, 1993.

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30. On Solidarity in Europe: Evidence from the 2017 European Values Study

Loek Halman and Inge Sieben

30.1 Introduction

Wim van Oorschot has a ‘weakness for the odd and peculiar’ (van Oorschot, 1994: 7). With this argument, he justified and defended his doctoral thesis on non-take-up of social security benefits. In our view, Wim’s ‘weakness’ is broader. It concerns not only the odd and peculiar, but also issues of social security in general and solidarity in particular. Looking at his scientific career it seems safe to conclude that solidarity is a recurring theme in his publications and teaching activities. Therefore, we address the topic of solidarity in this Liber Amicorum.

30.2 Background

During the preparatory phase for the third wave of the European Values Study (EVS) to be fielded in 1999, scholars working on the new questionnaire expressed a strong wish to include the issue of solidarity. This topic was not handled in the first two waves of the EVS project and it was considered a serious omission that in a European project on values, solidarity – being one of the founding values of the European Union – was missing. It was therefore decided to include measurements of solidarity in the third EVS wave.
Not having an expert on this topic on board in EVS, it was more or less obvious to approach Wim for advice, as he was (and is) a renowned scholar on welfare state issues and solidarity. The fact that he worked in the same faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences at Tilburg University, although in another department (Department of Social Security) was convenient. In addition, he already developed a tool for measuring attitudes on social welfare in the Netherlands in another Dutch project on values: the SOCON project, a collaborative survey project with Nijmegen University on social and cultural developments in the Netherlands.\(^1\) The items in that project, proposed by Wim, addressed people’s expectations on the future use of benefits, attitudes towards misuse of social provisions, attitudes towards causes of poverty, and attitudes towards rights and duties of beneficiaries (Eisinga, 1999: 39–40, and 269–277).

The EVS asked for different measures of public opinion, not so much on the welfare state and issues of the use and misuse of social provisions (topics that relate strongly to Wim’s dissertation), but with a more direct link to solidarity.

### 30.3 On solidarity

Most European welfare states with their system of social protection are grounded on the idea of solidarity, or ‘the basic understanding that everyone is assumed to make a fair financial contribution to a collectively organized insurance system that guarantees equal access [to social security provisions]’ (Ter Meulen et al., 2001: 1). The modern welfare state, social security, and solidarity thus are closely linked concepts. This also appears in the way solidarity is conceived by those who consider solidarity as ‘the preparedness to share one’s own resources with others, be that directly by donating money or time in support of others or indirectly by supporting the state to reallocate and redistribute
some of the funds gathered through taxes or contributions’ (Stjerno quoted by Lahusen and Grasso, 2018: 4). Hence, solidarity refers not only to financial contributions, but can also be linked to volunteering, membership and support of voluntary associations. This is very much in line with what Wim considers solidarity to be. For him, solidarity implies more than the degree to which people are willing to support and pay for social expenditures. In his lemma on solidarity in the Encyclopedia of Quality of Life and Well-Being Research (van Oorschot, 2014), he describes solidarity as ‘a sociological concept referring to a situation in which individuals contribute to the common interest of the collectivity they are a member of, even if this runs against their direct self-interest’.

Solidarity thus is about the willingness of people to contribute to collective interest, and not (only) to their own well-being. It refers to the preparedness to contribute to the common good and to let collective interests prevail. Solidarity can be defined as a state of relations between individuals and groups which makes it possible that collective interests are served. Essential is that people experience a common fate because they feel a mutual sense of belonging and responsibility or because they share utility, meaning that people need each other for the realization of their life opportunities (van Oorschot, 2002: 34).

Conceived in this way, people’s degree of solidarity with individuals and groups of individuals depends upon the extent to which these individuals and groups are considered to be deserving of solidarity. As van Oorschot and Komter (1998: 11) state: ‘solidaristic behavior boils down to acting in the interest of the group and its members’. Group-boundedness and reciprocity are important features in this respect. Solidarity ‘is tied to an (imagined) community or group, whose members are expected to support each other in order to fulfill the mutual rights and obligations associated with group membership’ (Lahusen and Grasso, 2018: 4). Support depends, more than upon the type of
contribution, upon the extent to which certain (groups of) individuals are perceived to be deserving. It is well-established that solidarity with various groups is differentiated and conditioned by the expected neediness of (groups of) individuals which is strongly influenced by patterns of mutual empathy and identification, and moral convictions and perceived duties.

These differentiations and conditions are specified in a theory of deservingness (van Oorschot, 2000). According to this theory, there are five criteria to assess the deservingness of (groups of) individuals and the decision to support them:

1. **Control:** the extent to which individuals are perceived to have control over their lives and can be considered to be personally responsible for their own situation. If individuals need support in circumstances that can be ‘blamed’ on their own behavior or choices, they are more responsible, and, hence, less deserving.

2. **Attitude:** deservingness depends on the attitude of people in need towards support; grateful, compliant and conforming individuals are regarded as more deserving.

3. **Reciprocity:** individuals who have contributed to the group earlier or who are likely to contribute in the future deserve to be supported.

4. **Identity:** the degree to which one can identify with the needy people; individuals who are more like us and who are close to us are regarded as more deserving than individuals who are dissimilar and at a greater distance.

5. **Need:** the level of necessity of support may differ between (groups of) individuals; the higher the need, the more individuals are considered to be deserving of solidarity.

These CARIN deservingness criteria (van Oorschot et al., 2017) were used as a starting point for developing a measurement on solidarity in the EVS surveys.
30.4 Measuring solidarity in Europe

In the EVS, opinions on solidarity are measured in two dimensions. The first dimension indicates social spatial solidarity, and is mainly linked to the fourth criterion (identity) of the deservingness theory outlined above. As we saw earlier, the degree of solidarity in a social system is a function of the willingness of the individual members of that system to contribute to the common good. That is, solidarity depends on the degree to which individuals can and will contribute to encourage the interests of the collectivity. A prerequisite for concrete contributions, that is, of actual solidaristic behavior, is that individuals feel a personal responsibility for the conditions and interests of the collectivity and its members. Solidarity thus seems to refer, first of all, to the relations between the members of a collectivity, and not to relationships outside of it. Solidarity therefore is at the same time including (for in-group members) and excluding (for out-group members). A first important issue when studying solidarity thus is: what do people regard as their collectivities, as the groups to which they feel they belong? Or, in other words, who do they regard as in-group members, and who as out-group members? Since individuals are members of different collectivities, a second issue is how strong their bond with specific collectivities is. The literature in this respect suggests a universal relation between proximity and intensity of solidarity: the more socially and/or geographically close (a group of) individuals are to us, the higher the intensity of solidarity we display. These ideas are picked up in the EVS question: ‘To what extent do you feel concerned about the living conditions of … (a) People in your neighbourhood; (b) The people of the region you live in; (c) Your fellow countrymen; (d) Europeans; and (e) All humans all over the world.’ The answer categories range from 1 ‘very much’ to 5 ‘not at all’. Please note that for our analyses in the next section, we recoded these categories so that a higher score implies greater solidarity.
The second dimension assesses the *deservingness of needy groups* in society, and refers to all CARIN criteria outlined in the deservingness theory. In contemporary European societies, several distinct groups are the subject of socio-economic and socio-cultural policies, such as the poor, the elderly, migrants, etc. Due to space constraints, only four needy groups were discerned in the EVS question: ‘To what extent do you feel concerned about the living conditions of … (a) elderly people in [COUNTRY]; (b) unemployed people in [COUNTRY]; (c) immigrants in [COUNTRY]; and (d) sick and disabled people in [COUNTRY]’. Again, the original answer categories range from 1 ‘very much’ to 5 ‘not at all’ and we recoded them in reverse order: a higher score now implies greater deservingness.

Both questions have been included in the EVS surveys since 1999 and were analyzed by scholars, including Wim and the first author of this contribution. For example, in close collaboration with Aafke Komter and Dick Houtman, a report was written for the Dutch Ministry of Health, Wellbeing and Sport about Dutch solidarity with deprived persons and Europeans (van Oorschot, Komter, Houtman and Halman, 2001). Together with Wil Arts, a chapter on solidarity among Europeans with people of basic target groups of welfare policies, that is, the socio-economically weaker and (potentially) neediest social groups was published (Arts, Halman and van Oorschot, 2003). In this contribution, we will analyze these items in the most recent EVS wave to investigate solidarity and deservingness in contemporary Europe and to explore whether there are important new developments in Europeans’ opinions on this topic.

### 30.5 Solidarity in contemporary Europe

We confine our empirical study in this contribution to some descriptive analyses of the findings from the latest EVS survey in
On Solidarity in Europe

2017. As the fieldwork of this wave has not been completed yet (at the time of writing), we employ the second pre-release of the dataset (EVS, 2018), including thirty European countries. More information about the data and the European Values Study can be found at www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu.

30.5.1 Social spatial solidarity

The first dimension concerned social spatial solidarity. The expectation was that solidarity would be less with geographically and socially distant groups and stronger with groups of individuals who are more nearby. As Figure 30.1 shows, this idea is not exactly confirmed in all countries: the rank orders are not in all countries reflecting the idea that individuals who are more nearby deserve more support than individuals who are more at a distance. In some countries, Georgia and Norway for instance, more people are concerned with their fellow countrymen than with individuals in their neighbourhood or region. In most countries, people appear less concerned with Europe than with the world as a whole. Only in Austria, Denmark and Hungary, the patterns are as expected: people in these countries show more concern with other Europeans than with human kind. All in all, the figure seems to reveal that a strong European identity has not yet developed and that most Europeans are more inclined to be solidary with people who are more nearby, in the neighbourhood, region or nation. In this respect, it may be not so unexpected that Russians and Azerbaijani are least solidary with other Europeans. However, the figures do not reveal that inhabitants of the first member states of the EU are more concerned with fellow Europeans than people in countries that entered the EU more recently, or who are not a member of the EU at all, such as Switzerland and Norway. In fact, the Swiss and Norwegians express higher levels of concern for Europeans than the Dutch or the French.
Figure 30.1  Social spatial solidarity
30.5.2 Deservingness of needy groups

The second dimension of solidarity in EVS referred to the deservingness of specific needy groups in society: the elderly, the unemployed, immigrants, and sick and disabled people. Figure 30.2 shows that here the rank orders are more or less consistent with what Wim observed earlier (van Oorschot, 2008). They follow the expected pattern based on the five CARIN criteria of the deservingness theory. Solidarity is highest with groups of elderly and sick and disabled people, who are more likely to meet these criteria. Solidarity with the unemployed and with (especially) immigrants is at a lower level. This once again substantiates Wim’s conclusion ‘that the underlying logic of deservingness has deep roots’ (van Oorschot, 2008: 279). The rank orders of solidarity with these different social groups is remarkably stable over the countries. In all countries, individuals feel quite equally concerned about the living conditions of the elderly and sick and disabled people.

When comparing countries, Wim noted a typical pattern for Central and Eastern Europe where the distance between immigrants and the other groups is relatively large, whereas the distance between the other groups is relatively small (van Oorschot, 2008). We find more or less similar results, although less pronounced. Today, many Western European countries also display a wider difference between immigrants and unemployed on the one hand and elderly and sick and disabled on the other, and the differences between unemployed and immigrants are wider than between elderly, and sick and disabled. Looking more in detail at the most deserving needy group, we see that although solidarity with elderly is generally high in Europe, it is not so much the case in The Netherlands, Hungary and Estonia where less than half of the respondents appears to be concerned with elderly in their country. People in Georgia appear to be very solidary with the older people in their country; here the percentage
Figure 30.2  Solidarity with needy groups
On Solidarity in Europe

amounts to more than 90 per cent. Germans are almost equally concerned about their elderly, closely followed by people in Albania, Spain and Austria. It is not so easy to explain this by welfare state arrangements or pension systems, because these countries differ widely in pension schemes and elderly care provisions. Future research might explore these country differences in more detail, providing more severe tests of not only structural, but also cultural explanations.

30.5.3 Conditionality

According to Wim (van Oorschot, 2008), it is far from clear whether people differentiate between the deservingness of certain groups of needy people and why that should be the case. In other words, to what extent does the degree to which one is solidary depend upon or is conditioned by the characteristics of the needy groups? He explored this conditionality by analyzing if and how certain personal characteristics were associated with different levels of conditionality. To measure this conditionality, we follow Wim and take ‘the sum of absolute differences between respondents’ answers to the [...] question. People who were equally concerned about the living conditions of all four groups (either at a high or at a low level) had a zero score on conditionality. The conditionality score of people whose solidarity differed for the groups concerned was some figure above zero. The higher the score, the more conditional the people, that is, the more they differentiated among the needy groups’ (van Oorschot, 2008: 276). Figure 30.3 shows that conditionality appears highest in Czech Republic, closely followed by Azerbaijan, Bulgaria and Russia, whereas it is lowest in Estonia, Switzerland, Sweden, Armenia and Norway. A clear pattern, as distinguished by van Oorschot (2008) between the four major regions in Europe (North, East, West, South) does not seem to appear. It, again, is rather difficult to interpret the pattern.
Figure 30.3  Conditionality
There seems to be more heterogeneity in conditionality within regions in contemporary Europe than before, but we need more advanced models to assess this in more detail.

### 30.6 Conclusions

In this contribution, we explored two dimensions of solidarity measured in the EVS, which Wim helped to develop: a social spatial dimension and a dimension on the deservingness of different needy groups in society. The results of the latest EVS data collection in 2017 confirm more or less the ideas of the deservingness theory. Solidarity is indeed different to specific groups in society, and appears to be conditioned by the kind of needy groups. We also revealed important differences between countries. Addressing cross-national and national varieties in people’s levels of solidarity with different social spatial and needy groups is one of the tasks for future researchers.

If we follow Wim in his passion for ‘a weakness for the odd and peculiar’, we would like to point out our finding that solidarity overall is at a high level in Europe. The idea that solidarity is waning, already brought up by Wim, together with Aafke Komter, in 1998, has its roots in the individualization of societies. However, van Oorscht and Komter (1998) found no evidence for this: there are no strong theoretical arguments nor empirical evidence to assume a decline in solidarity. Our descriptive analyses on EVS 2017 lead to a similar conclusion: Solidarity still is high. But the question remains: why?

**NOTES**

2. In 1999, the EVS questionnaire included some more items related to solidarity, for example on the reasons for solidaristic behavior. These items were no longer included in the subsequent waves.

3. In 1999 and 2008, an additional item was added to this list: ‘Your immediate family’. This item was dropped in the 2017 wave, because almost all respondents indicated to be concerned about their immediate family.

4. In 2008, children in poor families was added; this item was again dropped in 2017.

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On Solidarity in Europe


31. Solidarity: a Reflection on Concept and Practices

Antoon Vandevelde

31.1 Introduction

Throughout his career, Wim van Oorschot has argued for a more egalitarian society and for the preservation and expansion of generous systems of social security. On European campuses this is not so controversial. When I explain in class the ethical principles that underpin our social security system, I never meet any opposition or discontent from our Belgian students. However, when I explain the same things to US-students, this often ends in heated debates including comments like this: ‘Do you mean that everybody should be obliged to pay for health insurance? And what if I do not care? I am young. The risk that I get serious health problems is relatively small. What if I prefer to save privately for the case of bad health, injury or bad luck? What if I choose to take some risk?’ I do not think that there is more altruism in Europe than in the United States. However, these feelings are channeled through totally different institutions and give rise to very different intuitions in both contexts.

In this essay, I want to explore the notion of solidarity. Once upon a time, this was the third value of the French revolution: next to freedom and equality, there was fraternity. I will start with my personal definition of the concept of solidarity, I will justify this definition by comparing it to alternatives and I will defend the necessity of strong forms of solidarity in our current society.
31.2 A conceptual clarification

I define solidarity as the willingness to share with people we do not know personally, but whom we consider to be equal to ourselves on the basis of some common feature allowing identification. Solidarity refers to an actual or virtual community. We are children under the same God, brothers and sisters belonging to the same family, or members of the same nation, or victims of the same type of exploitation or oppression, fighting the same struggle against injustice. These are the most evident communities in which solidarity develops. According to Karl Marx, the solidarity of the working classes was based on the common position of wage labourers within capitalist structures (Marx and Engels, 1848 [1969]). Marx was well aware of the fact that this was not evident, but he was convinced that in the long run this objective basis of solidarity would translate into subjective solidarity and into participation to class action: ‘Die Klasse an sich’ would become a ‘Klasse für sich’.

Solidarity is directed towards anonymous others, people like me, different in many respects but equal in at least one respect that matters highly. For example, the claim of a right to work united underclasses during the French revolutions of 1830 and 1848. Typically, this notion of solidarity beyond the boundaries of family and clans developed during social struggles in the 19th century, at times of demographic explosion yielding the development of big towns, big factories, huge bureaucracies and the first malls. Baudelaire was the poet of the birth of mass society with its typical anonymity, and Walter Benjamin (1983) has illustrated it abundantly in his *Passagen-Arbeit*. Sociologists like Tönnies, Durkheim and Mauss have theorised a notion that developed in a predominantly urban context, often as a correction of rough individualism and harsh capitalism. In doing so, they referred to forms of sociality that have existed in premodern societies and whose fading away they regret. However, I want to restrict the concept of solidarity to the specific type of
Solidarity: a Reflection on Concept and Practices

community that can exist between people who do not know each other personally, as it arose with the birth of mass society in 19th century industrialising countries. This is also the context in which the term itself has been coined. One can make conceptual distinctions in a different way, but I think it is better to use more precise ‘thin’ concepts, rather than ‘fat’ ones embodying all possible types of social bonds.

Solidarity is different from loyalty. This applies in two dimensions. First of all, we are loyal towards our friends. Hence, loyalty is particularistic. It is often directed towards persons with whom we have (or imagine to have) a personal relationship. Second, loyalty does not necessarily imply equality as is the case with solidarity as I define it here. It also applies to relationships of hierarchical subordination. We can be loyal to our boss or to our subordinates. This means, we trust them and we will not betray or abandon them. We do not develop feelings of solidarity towards God nor towards our pets. Solidarity with superiors is possible when both inferiors and superiors are rendered equal, for instance by a common threat. Think, for example, of a firm threatened by bankruptcy. Sometimes, employees and employers will then join the same movement of resistance against banks wanting to cut credit lines. In general, however, people feel love, fear, admiration or humility towards their superiors, and they display a (somewhat condescending) compassionate attitude towards pets and servants. Clearly, this is a different constellation than the moral feelings connected to solidarity. Nevertheless, there is one point in which solidarity and loyalty converge: in principle both stances exclude envy. We love our friends, admire our superiors, and when we fight a common struggle we tend to forget our jealousy.

Solidarity is founded on the ability to see similarities and to identify with others on the basis of more or less abstract features we share with them. Hence, solidarity presupposes some communality: common interests, ideas, values, descent or structural position. Historical evidence suggests that it is easier to
develop solidarity on the basis of particularistic criteria. As we have seen in post-World War II Eastern Europe, nationalism has often been more powerful than communism in mobilising social energy. Recently, identity struggles seem to have marginalised social democracy. Indeed, solidarity is less evident with the criterion of identification becoming more abstract and more universal, the most abstract criterion of course being our common humanity. It seems to be easier to mobilise people on the basis of ascriptive criteria like family, descent, ethnicity, clan or nation than on the basis of chosen objectives. But then again, the chosen membership of a club or an association can be more inspiring towards solidarity than more-anonymous social settings. It seems to be natural that we care more about our children, relatives and friends than about people at a greater distance, but of course we know how inhumane and dangerous situations can get when even the idea of common humanity is narrowed down to the community of ‘people like us’.

Solidarity can be triggered by forward looking or by backward looking criteria. It can be developed on the basis of adherence to a common project, such as, for example, the desire for a classless society, or it can arise from the common indignation about past injustices. Probably, again, the latter motivation is more powerful than the former. Hence, communist and populist leaders tend to instrumentalise nationalist feelings and the resentment about the victims of past oppression to strengthen their appeal to the general public. Of course, the social psychology of mass movements is highly complex and dependent on circumstances. Many people become anxious, parochial and pessimistic as they feel threatened by the influx of refugees and migrants. Solidarity within the in-group then develops together with distrust in outsiders. And common plans for the future are more mobilising in an optimistic society that believes in the possibility of human progress than in a society that is predominantly turned towards the past.
31.3 Who are ‘we’?

There is a simple test permitting to assess solidarity: ask people who exactly they mean when they are talking about ‘us’. Of course, the distinction between ‘them’ and ‘us’ depends largely on the context of action. The identity of most people is layered and circumstances determine what layer gets mobilised. In this respect, we find a puzzling analysis in a book published in 2004 by the American economist Alberto Alesina, together with Edward Glaeser: *Fighting Poverty in the US and Europe: a World of Difference*. The authors ask the question of the origin and causes of the difference between the American and the European welfare state, the latter being more generous than the former. After all, European migrants determined the basic structures of the US. How come that people with more or less the same religious and cultural background founded a different type of society characterised by a minor degree of socially organised solidarity? Alesina and Glaeser (2004) investigate various hypotheses. In the end, they conclude that there is only one plausible explanation. In most European societies, poor people did belong to the same race and spoke the same language as the middle income class and rich people. The poor were considered to be ‘people of us’, vulgar and stupid sometimes but waiting for emancipation, social and cultural elevation. By contrast, in the US, the underclass was black. They did not belong to the circle of concern of the white majority. Of course, cosmopolitanism – and even national citizenship – become void if the rich abandon the poor to their bad fate and if they refuse to contribute financially to the education, the health care and the social security of the destitute. What was missing in the US was a community of fate between the wealthy and the poor.

During the first decades after the Second World War, Europe has largely been able to avoid this societal segmentation. However, recently, things have started to change. Increasingly, in Europe, the underclass is of foreign descent and has different
religion, identifying becomes less evident, and here also, we witness a widening gap between insiders and outsiders. Now that it becomes fashionable to proclaim the failure of multiculturalism, a restriction of strong forms of solidarity to 'our own people' is not far away anymore. For a long time, we were convinced that cultural heterogeneity would soon fade away in the second generation of migrants and that their contribution to the creation of wealth in our countries would be sufficient to integrate them in our communities, but probably we have been too optimistic. Anyway, the claim of universal solidarity based on our common humanity as we find it in many national and international human rights bills is empty as long as we do not aim at institutions that permit people to escape the worst forms of destitution.

In the 1960s and 1970s, the problem of the definition of the relevant community for redistribution and for the realisation of justice has been neglected by ethicists and political philosophers. Take the famous three principles of justice defended by John Rawls (1971): a maximal set of equal human rights, equal opportunities and the difference principle. In the actual world, human rights only have a meaning where they have been translated into civil rights. People need citizenship in order to fully enjoy the respect due to humanity and to be able to benefit from the principle of equal opportunity for people with equal talents in the labour market. And finally, consider the famous difference principle. Inequalities can be justified if and only if they are to the maximal advantage of the worst off. But who are the worst off? Do we refer to the global poor? Or do we limit our scope to our fellow citizens? And what about legal and illegal foreigners present on the national territory? Rawls' Theory of Justice published in 1971, revitalised normative political philosophy. It stimulated a tremendous quantity of literature on the concept of justice, but it took some time – until the years 2000 – to understand that the
question of the scope of solidarity was as important as the precise definition of what justice means.

31.4 Solidarity, egoism and altruism

A long time ago, extreme proponents of market liberalism have argued that the wealthy should favour poverty relief or a negative income tax, not for ethical reasons, but for their own security and because the view of beggars in the streets is extremely unpleasant. Clearly, this was meant as a justification of philanthropy or of a minimal form of redistribution on a purely egoist basis. However, this kind of motivation falls outside my definition of solidarity. What lacks here is a community of fate, a commitment to people we consider under some important respects as equals. After all, personal security could also be guaranteed by severe repression or by the deportation of all beggars outside the centre of our towns. Solidarity involves a willingness to share and is therefore more than self-interested redistribution.

An interesting question is whether a social insurance scheme presupposes solidarity. This seems to be the case when people in poor areas start up systems of mutual assistance. In Africa, for instance, there are innumerable small-scale initiatives of people pooling savings for the funding of funerals and other unexpected big expenditures. Sometimes, participants have in turn a right to draw from the common fund for small investments. What has been called ‘des tontines’ is often organised at street level or around a pub. This makes the enforcement of the rules of the game rather easy because of the omnipresence of social pressure. Nevertheless, in this case, the anonymity condition that I outlined earlier as a key criterion of solidarity is not fulfilled.

When insurances develop into a more encompassing system, risks are pooled among people who no longer know each other personally. Insurances organise transfers from lucky to unlucky
people on the basis of the sensible pursuit of self-interest. Those who are not hit by the risk for which they insured are lucky, but this also means they become net contributors to the system. They have paid a premium without getting money in return. Those who are unlucky become net receivers of money. Of course, this system is only sustainable as long as individual risks are not predictable. Only general statistic information is to be available for all actors on the insurance market. In a strict insurance logic, those who are a priori known to have more chance to be hit by the risk will have to pay higher premiums or will be refused as a client by insurance companies. Transfers only take place between people whose risk is a priori considered to be the same. Now, is this solidarity? I assume it is not. Certainly, it is not altruism. One pays insurance premiums out of self-interest, not in order to help others. One wants a benefit or an allowance in case one loses his or her regular income, or in case that he or she is confronted with huge unforeseen expenditures. But again, what lacks is a community feeling. Premium payers are totally indifferent towards the fate of the co-insured. Sometimes, the transfers organised by a pure insurance system are called a thin form of solidarity, but certainly it does not fall under the definition I propose in this text.

And yet: (strong) solidarity, or solidarity as I defined it above, can be integrated into an insurance system. This is possible for two reasons. First, we speak about income solidarity in the case where some categories of people are covered by an insurance system for which they did not pay the (full) actuarial premium. And, second, we speak about risk solidarity if people who we know to be more vulnerable to a certain risk are integrated into the insurance without having to pay an additional premium. Of course, this increases the burden on the wealthy and the middle income classes. As such, this arrangement can no longer be sustained by pure self-interest. Why would we permit poor outsiders to be covered by an insurance system they cannot afford? The idea here is that any contributor could have been in
the situation of any recipient. One could have been so poor that one is unable to insure against the most basic risks. This is an example of ethics mobilising imagination. Maybe we could invoke here the idea of life-course solidarity based on enlightened self-interest: I do not need any solidarity now, but I could need it later on in my life. Eventually, we could invoke the principle of mutual help here: if someone is in a very bad situation and another person can help him or her with relatively few costs and risks for her or himself, this person has a strong ethical obligation to do so. Here, solidarity in the strong sense of the term as I defined it above is necessary. The fate of the person in need does not let the contributing person indifferent.

Also, strong and weak solidarity entertain a different relation to reciprocity. Weak forms of solidarity presuppose actual reciprocity, whereas strong solidarity refers to something like the Rawlsian veil of ignorance: I am highly skilled and I am convinced that I will never have an unemployment problem. Despite this, I contribute to the unemployment insurance scheme. If I am a sensible person, I know that I could have been in a more vulnerable situation or that, once upon a time, my children could be less lucky than I am. Or, on a more sophisticated level, I beware of the temptation of what ancient Greeks called *hubris*, the idea that I am invulnerable to bad fate. We know that so many wealthy and powerful people wrongly overestimate their capacities and suppose that they are akin to the gods. Probably, the participation of many highly skilled people in such a scheme is not wholehearted but imposed. Hence, the importance of a pedagogy that explains to all members of society, and especially the young generations, the rationale of the European system of social security.
31.5 Solidarity and democracy

In Western European societies, actual social security systems are a blend of insurance and solidarity. They have a twofold function. They are a safeguard against bad luck and they preserve the poorest (members of society) from the worst hardship. The former goal is especially important for middle income classes, the latter for the poorest. What balance we should strike between both goals is an eminent matter for political debate and democratic decision-making. When democracy is purely defined by majority voting, the interests of the middle income classes will probably prevail. Mostly, the poor form a minority and when there is no compulsory voting like in Belgium, they tend to vote less than middle class people. As Amartya Sen (2000) has convincingly shown, in a deliberative democracy with a lively public debate there is a chance that the voice of the poor or of their representatives is better heard. Here, scandals, images of extreme destitution and bad luck highlighted by mass media can easily mobilise the imagination and stimulate solidarity.

Some philosophers advocating a responsibility-sensitive conception of justice argue that solidarity is only possible and sustainable when free ridership or opportunism are minimised and even excluded. Actually, this is true, but it concerns more the implementation of solidarity within society than its very definition. One should be wary of self-fulfilling prophecies. When the stakes are set too high, then solidarity becomes impossible. If we require general compliance for engaging in solidarity, then this could mean that we are hypocritical and that we do not want at all to engage in any particular form of solidarity. However, for public policy purposes it is important to know that most people are strongly influenced in their preferences and actions by what (they think) their peers do and think. The more people participate in a solidarity project, the more others will feel obliged to join them because they are willing to do their share of the effort. If the
general feeling is, however, that others do not or will not comply, they tend to opt out themselves. A public policy that is successful in urging compliance to social obligations also increases the perceived legitimacy of solidarity.

All this is utterly important because we know that in the following years we will need solidarity on an unprecedented scale. In most wealthy countries, real income will increase only slowly – except if we are willing to accept mass immigration. We should not expect economic growth of more than 1 per cent per year. However, the growing old age dependency rate, the increasing cost of new types of health care, the increasing number of migrants and refugees that will knock on our door and in whose education we will have to invest in the short term, and climate action: all this means that we will have to devote most of the increase of personal income to objectives strongly inspired by the notion of solidarity as I have spelled it out in this contribution. If we refuse to do so, we will find ourselves in a harsh type of society that is at odds with the best of our ethical traditions.

NOTES

1. I present here my personal ideas on the subject which I have developed more extensively in my book on Het Geweld van Geld, Lannoo Campus, 2017.
2. For an extensive analysis of Marx’ position, see Bude (2019: 57–76).
3. Frank Vandenbroucke (2020) argues that solidarity is only possible when bad luck is due to circumstances and not to one’s own fault. In reality, it is hard to make this distinction in any detail. This issue has been subject to a harsh controversy in the literature on luck egalitarianism, initiated by Elisabeth Andersen (1999: 283–337).
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Part V

Epilogue
Earlier this year the group of PhD-students of the Centre for Sociological Research at KU Leuven asked me to have a conference call (yes, covid times) with them to talk about my career as a professional in academia. They were interested in how things were ‘in the old days’, what was changed since then, how I had coped with these changes, and how I experienced things as they are nowadays, that is, in the present academic world.

It was certainly not the intention of the young colleagues, but at the time I found the request a bit odd. What old days, and why me? But then it reminded me of the fact that, indeed, I had many years of academic work behind me and therefore should not be surprised that younger colleagues saw me as one of ‘the oldies’ who perhaps could say something interesting (or funny) about the history of their academic world. Even more, the request reminded me of the fact that within a few months I would retire. A fact that occasionally crossed my mind, but I never paid much attention to it, since work kept me busy with other things. The request for the conference call made me more directly aware of it.

Some time after the call took place I was again vividly and undeniably reminded of my ‘pensionable age’ when over a nice diner the staff of my Social Policy and Social Work Team informed me that they and other close colleagues had prepared a Liber Amicorum at the occasion of my retirement. It was a complete surprise for me, but an extremely pleasant one. I had hoped for a Liber, of course. There is no need to deny that. But when I found out that it was actually produced, with contributions
from so many beloved colleagues from all over Europe, I was truly impressed and deeply thankful.

However, paraphrasing what economists usually contend, there is no such thing as a free dinner. In this case they were right, the message of the Liber came with an invite: would I be willing to also contribute a bit by way of an epilogue? The contents of it would entirely be at my own choice and liking, and no long text was expected (a kind way of warning me not to get too enthusiastic and irresponsibly challenge the total word count of the book?). They had chosen the right moment, since in the nice atmosphere of the diner, and surrounded by the expectant faces of my colleagues, I felt I could not refuse. Also, would it not be my last chance to say something nice, and perhaps interesting, before I would retire and fade away into oblivion? So, I said yes, but started wondering immediately what my short epilogue would be about.

Since my Leuven colleagues have proven to be fully capable themselves of entering new directions and frontiers of research, I did not feel challenged so much to give a last farewell by way of sketching out lines for future research. Also, a final, more distant reflection on my academic work of the past did not seem warranted. In my perception, in the choice of my research subjects and questions, I have not been driven by a grander theory or schema of things, nor did I have an ultimate, singular scientific goal in mind. On the face of it, I would say that I just focused on different issues and questions that interested me at the time. Although the causes, manifestations and consequences of social inequality have always been my major curiosity (and the basic motive to take up the study of sociology whilst being employed as a horticultural consultant at the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture), I would find it difficult to say why I was alternately interested in such specific phenomena as non-take-up, disability policies, labour market policies, benefit recipiency, and deservingness attitudes. On second thought, however, were I forced to admit to a
common thread in my work, I would try and save my skin by saying ‘solidarity’. I have studied solidarity as it is organized through the welfare institutions and policies in our European societies, and solidarity as a societal value on which these institutions are created and maintained. A focus on solidarity is not peculiar for those with a curiosity for social inequality, since is not solidarity the fundamental weapon in the combat against social inequality?

So, if not sketching lines for future research, and if a reflection on a common thread in the trajectory of my research only leads to the conclusion that I was driven by a basic curiosity, not by a grand theory or an ultimate goal, what would then be the content of the epilogue that I promised to my dinner companions?

After some thought I realized that the young colleagues of the Centre for Sociological Research had given me a hint with their conference call. Apparently, early career researchers are interested in how academia was back then, in what had changed, and how things compare to the situation they are in now. Could I not focus my epilogue on this? I immediately sympathized with the idea, since it linked up with the attention I have had throughout my career for the position of young colleagues in the field. So yes, I could.

For assuring its substantive development and future academic and social significance it is absolutely vital for each field of study, in this case comparative social policy, that young scholars are introduced and welcomed to it in a way that motivates and inspires them. This is mainly the reason why I tried to contribute to this where possible, for example by organizing (always in cooperation with other colleagues) workshops, seminars, stipends and summer schools for early career researchers, in the context (and funding opportunities!) of EU COST Actions, EU Networks of Excellence, ESPAnet, EDAC, the Departments of Social Security Studies and Sociology of Tilburg University, and the Social Policy and Social Work Team at KU Leuven. But my
attention for the position of young colleagues has not only been out of concern for the future of our field of study. There is also a more personal touch to it as I see how they have to operate in a much more complex and demanding academic environment compared to when I was a young scholar. In comparison to their situation I feel that I have had an extremely advantaged career start. Let me briefly explain this.

After my graduation in Sociology at Tilburg University in 1984 I was appointed as Universitair Docent (Assistant Professor) with full tenure right from the start. This was not exceptional back then, it happened to many starting academics. At the time I did not have a PhD, not even a single publication, just a Master’s degree (but with a cum laude, I have to admit that). There was no formal expectation of completing a PhD in the future. It was clear that it was better to write a PhD-thesis if one had the ambition of ever becoming a professor, but whether or not to do it was left to the personal discretion and ambition of the Docent. Compare that to the situation nowadays, where an appointment as Universitair Docent depends on having completed a PhD, having published a series of articles in international peer-reviewed journals, having gone through a series of post-doc positions, and having been successful in the acquisition of research funds. Even then the competition is stiff, since with the strong internationalization of academia in the past few decades competitors come from all over the world.

Once in the job, the fact that in my ‘old days’ there was no strong pressure, formal or informal, to write a PhD-thesis is in my view also an advantageous factor, compared to the time and output pressures that are exerted upon PhD-students nowadays. Myself, at least, it gave the peace of mind that I would be free to follow my own research ideas and inclinations, allowing me not to panic so much when I recognized I was on a dead-end street, when the collection of data took more time than expected, when the necessary funding was not immediately available, when a
A Privileged Career

journal editor kept on waiting with sending their decision on a paper submission, et cetera. I experienced this more relaxed attitude to the PhD-thesis I as a sign of academic freedom, granted to me at a degree higher than what is allowed or possible nowadays for PhD students (as well as for colleagues in more senior academic positions!).

What also made academic life much easier compared to now, is that in the early years of my career at Tilburg University (as elsewhere) there were no formal demands as to what kind of publications, nor how much of them, one should produce each year (talking about academic freedom…). Of course, those who produced more tended to have a higher academic status, but there was little or no pressure for others to have a substantial output. But entering the 1990s, this changed rapidly. The ‘publish or perish culture’ that we knew from the US soon became a reality in Dutch academia. Before, academics were left free to choose to publish either in Dutch or in English, in journals with either a more professional, policy or academic orientation, in national or international journals, to publish journal articles, book chapters, edited volumes or monographs, et cetera. There was no central registration of such output and colleagues knew little (but gossiped quite a bit) about each other’s productivity and contribution to science.

This all changed more or less overnight, certainly in the context of Dutch social sciences in which I was working. It would take a study in itself to understand and explain what drove the change, but I assume it was a combination of a growing population of researchers increasing the demand for and competition in funding, in a period of a general retrenchment of the Dutch welfare state. But also of a neo-liberalism related emphasis on competition and individual responsibility, as well as of New Public Management types of idea about steering professionals by setting fixed budgets and quantified targets. Within a few years’ time the yearly output of individual academics was quantified and counted. At Tilburg
University, where I was working at the time, a point system was introduced in which some types of publications were given a higher number of points than other types. The highest number was given to international, peer reviewed articles in high impact journals. Less points were given for books, chapters in books, and to all publications in Dutch. Each year one’s output was measured with the point system, made public within the department (to stimulate those who lagged behind?), and at faculty level one’s personal score was translated into a percentage of working time one was allowed to spend on research or should spend on teaching. I remember that scores in the highest regions allowed research time of 70 per cent, with lower scores allowing for 50 per cent and 20 per cent. For me personally, in the beginning, the output quantification system felt advantageous. I cannot deny that I sensed a kind of recognition now that it was clear to all in the department and faculty that I was actually quite productive. I found it rather pleasant that my academic status was now less depending on ‘gossip in the corridors’, among members of ‘old boys networks’, but instead based on ‘facts’ (in parenthesis since the system had a uni-dimensional, quantitative conception of what could be counted as evidence of academic production and merit).

However, soon the system showed to have a series of unintended (though not unforeseeable) effects on the work of academics, and on the scientific and social outcomes of Dutch social sciences in general. I will not go into these here, but just mention a little anecdote to illustrate what was going on. In those years I happened to be the editor of the Dutch Tijdschrift Sociale Wetenschappen (Journal of Social Sciences). Within a few years after the introduction of the output measurement system we had to close down the journal because of a lack of submissions. The reason being that in the point system one could not earn output points with publications in Dutch. Suddenly then, Dutch policy makers, interest groups, and the general public had no direct access any more to the fruits of Dutch social sciences. Of course,
in the meantime some of the sharpest problems of the particular point system that I described have been remedied, but I am sure that by now all social scientists in Europe recognize this trend towards quantification of their output, and of increasing output demands. Acknowledging that academic freedom cannot mean freedom to be unproductive, the more general problem is of course, how to evaluate the productivity of researchers, as well as how to evaluate and value academic work more broadly. This issue has turned into a science itself, but most national and EU research councils still regard simple quantitative information about a researcher's publications as the most important indicator of their academic status and rigor. So, the advice we tend to give to early career researchers is indeed: publish as much as possible, in peer-reviewed international journals. A totally different message as I was given in my early days.

It is not only that I feel advantaged concerning the start of my career, I have always felt particularly privileged as well that throughout my career I could benefit from the European Union (EU) introducing its measures for stimulating EU wide academic networking and cooperation, in research as well as education. In the early days of my career I visited a number of Annual Conferences of the British Social Policy Association (SPA), because in the Netherlands there was, and still is, no such thing as an academic social policy curriculum, nor was or is there a national association in the field. At the SPA conferences I experienced what it felt like being a few days among people with whom one can share expertise and passion. Each time I came home with loads of new thoughts and inspiration for future work (and with a larger network). For me, it was especially the EU COST Actions and Networks of Excellence (NoE) that I took part in that gave me the opportunities to be in such kind of inspirational contexts, but then in an EU wide setting. The COST and NoE meetings we had over the years created a highly inspiring context of cooperation with impassioned colleagues.
from all over Europe, leading amongst others to the establishment of ESPAnet. Of course, these possibilities offered by the EU still exist, and are available to early career researchers nowadays, but ‘back then’ I think we all felt like being pioneers in a new and exciting world of EU comparative research, making us, certainly me, feel privileged to be part of it.

There is of course much more to tell after a career of 36 years in academia, and anecdotes abound, but there is a thin line between being a respected elderly colleague and ‘that old bore’. So, let me end my short contribution here by expressing my deeply felt belief that any researcher can only be as good as the colleagues one is surrounded with. There are the colleagues whose previous research findings and theories have been the source of inspiration and thinking of one’s own work. ‘Standing on the shoulders of giants’, as Isaac Newton said on his death bed, may be a bit of an exaggeration in social sciences, but it reflects well the gist of the argument. And there are the more immediate colleagues with whom one cooperates and has cooperated throughout the years. Individual curiosity and ambition will help, of course, but it is only in working together with others that research ideas can be implemented and lead to scientific progress.

That I have been allowed to cooperate in all these years with so many excellent, inspiring and pleasant colleagues (young and old, academic and admin) is perhaps the most important reason why I feel I had a privileged career.

Finally, Carla, throughout our life together your love and support have been the true foundations of my work.