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FORCED MIGRATION DISENTANGLED - HOW DO ARMED CONFLICTS LEAD TO

DISPLACEMENT?

A Thesis Submitted to the School of Politics and International Relations University of Kent

In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations

> by DUYGU OZALTIN

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Dedicated to all people who have been persecuted because of their political thoughts and conscience.

Also dedicated to my children Derin and Demir for your endless love, patience, support and understanding.

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FORCED MIGRATION DISENTANGLED - HOW DO ARMED CONFLICTS

LEAD TO DISPLACEMENT?

Abstract

In this dissertation, I investigate the factors behind variances in forced migration flows and try to develop a deeper understanding of the causal relationship between political violence and forced displacement by building comprehensive models, which account for political, social and economic factors. I theorize that the degree to which civilians are targeted during episodes of political violence directly affects the number of forced migration flows, leading to an original methodological approach based on a large-n, a country survey and semi-structured interview analyses. The results from a global analysis for the period of 1970-2016 bring a neglected association between terrorism and forced displacement into spotlight, while I do not find evidence in support of the increasingly popular 'economic refugee' argument. The large-n analysis also confirms that rising intensity of violence and declining civil and political liberties are powerful drivers of forced migration. In addition, a survey study of migration intentions in post-Saddam Iraq confirms the ambiguous effect of economic status on the process of shaping migration intentions. The survey analysis also shows that migration intentions do not cede with prospects of an ending conflict. Findings from Iraq further indicate that potential refugees are generally well educated contrary to popular assumptions about forced migrants. Concluding the study with interviews of refugees in the UK provides an opportunity to further interrogate the reasons behind remaining while other leave and demonstrates the impact of individual agency in the decision making process. The interviews show that exposure to political violence leads to almost identical experiences and impacts on the participants despite their various backgrounds, which led them to their ultimate decision of leaving. When asked about economic reasons that may have contributed to their decision to move, none of the participants found such factors to be relevant. On the contrary, most participants in this study held relatively better economic and social status in their country of origin.

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION: RETHINKING THE FORCED MIGRATION PUZZLE

1.1 Research Question

Why do people flee? One mother has an answer to this complicated question with plain words, reminding that sometimes the simplest answer may indeed be the right one:

No one would be crazy enough to walk for three hours in the night but we had to – we were hungry. We had to cross through areas with mines.

Iraqi mother Iqbal Qalaf walked across a minefield at night with her children in search of food and safety near Kirkuk (Otten, 2016). Although she states that her action was 'crazy', it was in effect a rational choice based on a simple probability calculation: if they stayed the family was going to starve, but if they fled, there was a probability that they could survive. What is undeniably more complex is trying to mitigate the so-called 'refugee crises' once large waves of forced migration happen. This project proposes to analyse the main factors that cause variations in the number of people that flee as a result of violence targeting civilian because it is not possible to manage or even prevent forced migration flows if we cannot understand the main reasons behind them. Specifically, it seeks an answer to the following question of what causes variations in the number of people that flee within or beyond the borders of their countries by particularly looking at intensity of violence, level of democracy and civil liberties and socioeconomic circumstances in the home countries. The area Iqbal Qalaf and her children passed by is not only significant because of the minefields, but also as a unique place of analysis of forced migration movements: it is public knowledge that an estimated 150,000 people died in March 2003 (Iraq Family Health Survey Study Group, 2006) when Iraq was invaded; however, empty refugee camps had to be dismantled within six months of the fall of the Iraqi regime. On the other hand, when sectarian violence climbed in 2006-2007, over 1.5 million people left their homes in Iraq (Chatty and Marfleet, 2013, p.52). What we do not know is what caused the difference of flight volumes under seemingly similar circumstances, which this study aims to analyse. Such knowledge would not only contribute to theoretical development, but also could prevent the embarrassment of empty or inadequate refugee camps in the future.

Although Iraq is a recent example, forced migration is arguably one of the main issues facing humankind since its existence. However, it has only gained serious attention since the 1990s when the number of forced migrants has become comparable to a large state's population.¹ As of 2018, there are 71 million forcibly displaced people in the world of which 41 million are displaced within their own countries and 26 million are refugees (UNHCR Global Trends, 2018, p.2). The growth of the forced migrant population is equally striking considering that there was a total of only 23 million forced migrants in 1993 (UNHCR Global Trends, 2014). What is also concerning is the rising number of refugee mortalities: the International Organisation for Migration (2016) reports that at least 10,000 migrants and refugees have perished in the Mediterranean since 2013. This makes forced migrant deaths comparable to other types of political

¹ For some scholars such as Chimni (2008, p.14) this was due to the 'function of the anxieties and concerns of Western States'.

violence caused fatalities. For instance, there were about the same number of intra-state armed conflict casualties in 2013 in Asia (Bosetti and Einsiedel, 2015).

Since loss of life related to forced migration has reached a level comparable to death tolls of intra-state armed conflicts, it should also be considered as one of the major issues in International Relations. This reality also becomes apparent at a time when we are often reminded that inter-state wars are less frequent (only two of the 52 conflicts in 2018 were between states, (Pettersson et al., 2019, p.590) and less deadly in the post-Cold War world (Jones and Stedman, 2017). However, there is more to these statistics: contemporary armed conflicts lead to more civilian casualties than military (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2018). It is also important to consider that the gap between the most and least peaceful regions globally is widening with majority of the number of armed conflicts in Africa, Asia and the Middle East (in descending order) (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2017, p.25) and one of the 'indicators that have deteriorated the most are the number of refugees and IDPs' (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2015)².

There is one clear message of these recent trends: we have to ask more questions about what triggers or stops large numbers of people to leave their homes when they are targets of violent conflicts and which of these factors matter more than the others because previous literature only partially explains this phenomenon. Academic research continues to focus on impact of forced migration with the underlying assumption that the causes are already well known. However, this is a grave error since

 $^{^2}$ Institute for Economics & Peace (2017, p.2) reported that 25,673 people were killed in terrorist attacks in 2016, up from an average of 2,000 a year only 10 years ago although the trend of terrorism related deaths is downward since its peak in 2014 (fallen by 22 per cent).

it is mainly based on the axiom of 'violence causes people to flee', which falls short of accounting for the fact that majority of people in deadly conflict zones actually do remain in their homes. Consequently, previous research explains why some people leave in response to deadly armed conflicts, but fails to explain what causes variations in the number of people that leave under seemingly similar circumstances at a given location and time.

This gap in literature deserves attention particularly for two reasons: firstly, without a deeper understanding of the causal relationship between political violence and forced displacement, literature's focus on post-migration inevitably lies on weak theoretical foundation. Secondly, by focusing on the impact of forced migration, literature often corners itself into a game of catch up by analysing cases after they occur. This vicious circle is sustained by a tendency to skip the earlier phases of displacement including migration intentions and the following decision to flee or stay. This is evident in the high number of case studies that dominate the field, which inherently suffer from selection bias in two ways: first by only including people that have already made the choice to leave their homes and second by limiting the analysis to those that have moved across borders. However, dynamics of displacement requires a matching vigour from literature not only in terms of advancing sophisticated research tools, but also by improving theoretical thinking that can rise to the challenge of explaining the main factors behind forced displacement, albeit without limitations to case studies and refugee movements. This is no easy task considering that 'expertise on migration is largely fragmented along disciplinary boundaries' leading to many theories covering only a certain aspect of forced migration (Bijak, 2016, p.2). Also, there are additional challenges of uncertainties about conceptualization, sheer number of push and pull factors, data availability and quality. However, these uncertainties can largely be attributed to the fact that the factors behind the journey of forcibly displaced populations remain an under-researched, geography and time-limited theme in International Relations to a great extent, as many scholars have pointed out (e.g. Stein and Tomasi, 1981; BenEzer and Zetter, 2015; Chatty and Marfleet, 2013; Hugo et al., 2018). Refugee studies in particular, 'lacks a consistent vocabulary and a grounded theoretical framework' (Mason, 1999). Although it is undeniable that there has been some progress since Mason's (1999) admission as discussed in the next Chapter (Literature), research on the one fundamental question that needs the first and foremost attention is largely missing from contemporary studies of forced migration in International Relations and that question begins with 'why'.

It does not only suffice to ask 'why', it matters in what context we ask this question. Going back to the Iraqi case, for example, what were the reasons behind the large number of people that fled during the sectarian conflict even though intensity of violence was low? Why did some people choose to remain under the same circumstances? By taking such questions as a starting point, this study aims to identify the main factors that determine the volume of forced migration populations by analysing the relationship between violence against civilians and forced displacement.

In trying to determine the main causes, I analyse the forced migration issue within the boundaries of International Relations, but those boundaries are made of dashed lines to allow flow of information from other disciplines. It is only possible to answer the question of forced migration with such an open-minded approach that does not confine itself to a single discipline even though this runs the risk 'that research effort is dissipated or duplicated, with important parallels, contrasts and policy lessons missed' (Boyle et al., 1998, p.206). Forced migration is not a special case that is exempt from these challenges, however, interdisciplinary approach is essential since 'migration is an existential shift, which affects every part of human life. No single discipline can adequately describe and analyse this experience on its own' (Castles, 2003, p.22). Since 'forced migration studies is interdisciplinary by definition' (Clark-Kazak, 2016, p.287) with wide range of push and pull factors embedded in several fields of academia, disentangling forced migration would require a dedicated team of experts from numerous fields including but not limited to history, anthropology, psychology, sociology, economics, geography, statistics, computer science, law, medicine and security studies in addition to political science and international relations (Borkert, 2018, p.63). This dissertation's scope attempts to obtain one of the major pieces without which the rest of the jigsaw puzzle cannot be completed by experts in other fields: the factors that determine the volume of violence-induced forced migrant populations.

What are the distinguishing features of this dissertation then? First, it analyses the relationship between violence against civilians and forced displacement by including economic, social and demographic factors instead of limiting the research to conflict data unlike most of its predecessors. This provides more room for theoretical development and hypothesis testing as proven in the interrogation of the reverse causality between terrorism and forced migration, an avenue of research that had not been explored before in spite of ample evidence of terrorism-induced displacement such as the migrants in Lake Chad who were driven away by Boko Haram (Mukhtar et al., 2018; Oginni et al., 2018). Second, it merges socioeconomic, political and demographic factors in one dataset rather than building models on each of these factors

separately with limited data sets. Doing so, allows seeing the forced migration puzzle from the perspective of International Relations, albeit with benefiting from other disciplines rather trying to solve it with intermittent pieces. Thirdly, unlike the majority of previous research that utilizes case studies or a few that prefer large-n studies, this project follows a synthetic approach that combines both models in explaining a phenomenon as complex as forced migration. Therefore, first it presents a global outlook from 1970-2016 followed by a post-Saddam analysis of migration intentions in Iraq. Finally, semi-qualitative interviews with refugees complement the large-n and case study by directly giving voice to the decision-makers: forced migrants.

1.2 Defining Forced Migrants

Many key concepts of forced migration are contested from the definition of forced migrant to the categorization of forced versus voluntary. Notably, even the most straightforward definitions cannot be shielded from interrogation because how one defines forced migrants and related concepts have consequences. For instance, if taken literally, describing migration as forced implies lack of choice; it also implies that destination countries should accept such migrants. Similarly, economic migrant implies that migration is 'entirely voluntary' (Bartram et al., 2014, p.70).

Forced migration can be defined as displacement arising from violent conflicts, persecution or threat of such circumstances.³ However, "'forced migration' concept can obscure how some people who migrate in this mode exercise a key form of agency" (Bartram, 2015, p.439) because a narrow look at the concept implies a compulsory

³ Forced displacement can also be due to man-made disasters such as nuclear war or natural disasters such as famine, which are all outside the scope of this study and therefore were omitted from the definition.

reaction or a decision where no choice is available other than fleeing origin of violence or persecution. Nevertheless, a closer observation of decision-making reveals that the agency is always there even when a person is caught in the line of fire during an ethnic massacre and flees from the conflict (interviews in this research support this argument). Decision to migrate in such instances is not about having no other choice, it is about insisting on exercising one's rights to a life with freedom and liberties and rejecting options that would subject a person to violation of those rights. Therefore, 'forced migration' term is useful to separate this phenomenon from other types of migration such as climate or labour migration, however, its 'forcedness' should not be confined to the dictionary definition of 'compelled by force' as it embeds individual agency; this is the approach taken in this study (Merriam-Webster, 2020).

Forced migrants or peoples of concern, according to the UN, mainly consist of refugees, internally displaced people (IDPs) and asylum seekers. A forced migrant is a displaced person following a violent conflict, persecution or threat of either situation⁴. If the displacement occurs within the borders of the state of origin, then such migrants are commonly referred as IDPs and if a displaced person crosses borders to flee a life threatening conditions, then they are called refugees. The UN defines a refugee as 'a person who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country' according to the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol (UNHCR Protecting Refugees) and defines IDPs as people 'displaced in

⁴ For the purpose of this research, migrants who are displaced due to reasons other than political violence are out of the scope here.

their own country as a result of conflict or human rights violations' (Global Protection Cluster (GPC), 2010, p.1). However, as Shacknove (1985, p.274) states, legal definitions of forced migrants, particularly refugees, does not make conceptually defining them a simple matter: make it overly inclusive and you would run the risk of finding it morally questionable if refugees gain privilege over the citizens of the host state; make it too narrow and you could contribute to denial of protection of displaced people around the world (Cherem, 2016). An example is Africa's expanded refugee definition, which has been subject to controversial interpretations and applications (Wood, 2019). Such consequences are not unique to the policy world; theoretical thinking and development is built around these definitions. Each definition implies an assumption, which forms the basis of any theoretical framework in forced migration: does the refugee have to cross borders to gain access to international community's protection? Is there a theoretical justification behind legal definition of refugees versus only descriptive definition of IDPs? Or are refugees 'the side effect of the creation of separate sovereign states' as Haddad (2003, p.297) argues? Is the use of 'economic refugee' scientifically sound or is that a political term? These are only a few examples of many questions that would impact the basis of any theoretical framework. The purpose here is not to make strong claims about which definition is 'best', but to be clear about what each of these terms means within the scope of this project.

I adopt the UN definitions of forced migrants since the UN data is the source for the dependent variable (number of forced migrants by country of origin) of this project. However, there are two important points to note here as well: firstly, as Forsythe (2001) points out, 'to try to pretend that responding to refugee needs is a humanitarian and therefore non-political task is to limit those trying to help refugees to care and maintenance'. Thus, it would be naive to argue that the UN is apolitical and that there is no bias in the UNHCR data, particularly considering that the modern refugee system was created in the late 1940s mainly to rehome people persecuted by communist regimes (Betts and Collier, 2017). How the UN categorizes migrants continues to attract debate as legal scholars criticize the UNHCR's migrant status determination procedure. For instance, Kagan (2006) questions excluding asylum seekers with otherwise valid claims from protection in countries like Egypt where the agreement with the UNHCR ruled out any permanent refuge for the asylum seekers. Additionally, Hyndman (2000, p.147) points out, the introduction and use of 'IDP' legally in the 1990s was around the time when the UNHCR was under international pressure for countries with forced migration problems to 'manage displacement' within their borders and limit the movement of fleeing people beyond their borders as much as possible.

The decision to include IDPs in this project was not an easy one, not only because of the difficulties of accessing accurate numbers of their populations, but also due to their status in comparison to the refugees. Refugee law does not directly apply to IDPs because 'unlike refugees who require a special legal status as result of being outside their country and without its protection, IDPs remain entitled to all the rights and guarantees as citizens and other habitual residents of a particular State' (GPC, 2010, p.8). However, this puts IDPs in a significant disadvantage compared to refugees since they do not have the legal protection of international law.

This is especially problematic considering that the very legal system they are left to rely on for their security – the legal system in their country of origin – has already failed and could not prevent the circumstances that led their decision to leave their homes.

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This level of protection problem leads to a dilemma in forced migration analysis: if the refugees and IDPs populations are added together as 'people of concern', they are all assumed to be in equal circumstances and the situation of IDPs are undermined as their presence almost fades under the same umbrella. On the other hand, separating studies between the two groups may produce misleading results. For instance, interpreting regression output based only on refugees undermines a significant per cent of the total forced migrants since IDPs make about 63% of forcibly displaced population globally. This project builds models that run with both combined and separate populations of refugees and IDPs to provide an opportunity to compare both.

Before concluding this section, I must also note that this project did not materialize without awareness of the 'politics of the labels' and problematic categorization of the concepts defined here (Bloch and Dona, 2018, p.3). However, this project would not have been possible if it joined the debate about blurriness of such categories because the complexity of conceptualization of this phenomenon cannot be squeezed into a few words in the introduction of this dissertation or even in a chapter. These debates about conceptualization are not likely to end in the near future. On the contrary, they are more likely to intensify as the literature develops further, but it is important to recognize that conceptualization is only one of many issues that cannot wait for attention in regards to forced displacement. However, within the scope of this project, the focus remains on putting the pieces of the forced migration puzzle together.

1.3 Overview Of Literature

Forced migration has increasingly become one of the main areas of focus for political action, policymaking and humanitarian practice and it has developed significantly over

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the last decades mainly due to findings in conflict resolution literature. Among the significant findings are those of Moore and Shellman (2004) who build on previous work of Davenport et al. (2003) by including violence exerted by both states and their dissidents. Additionally, Steele (2009) examines the decision-making process of displaced people when they are collectively targeted; Balcells and Kalyvas (2014) find that irregular conflicts generate more harm on civilians and 'tend to be won by incumbents'; and Blattman and Miguel (2010) argue that conflicts that extend to an entire country have a different structure than conflicts with a small regional scope, leading to variations in displacement. The reversed causality between violence and forced migration has been gaining more attention, too: Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006) argue that refugees increase 'risk of conflict in host and neighbouring countries' and Milton et al. (2013) examine how refugees increase transnational terrorism.

Some scholars also benefit from a multidisciplinary approach by utilizing geographic information systems. For instance, Fotherginham et al. (2002) utilize geographically weighted regression analysis, and Ward and Gleditsch (2019) present a regression model that can account for spatially clustered data. Rüegger and Bohnet (2018) include spatial factors as one of the major pull elements in their analysis of flight patterns of refugees. Additionally, Melander and Öberg (2007) find that location of conflict is more effective than the intensity of violence that causes people to flee.

Despite these recent studies, there is not enough research including both refugees and IDPs on what causes variations in the number of forced migrants in relation to type and intensity of violence along with social, economic and non-violent political factors. Consequently, there are some dominating approaches in studies of forced migration

that have not been thoroughly analysed. The first is treating violence induced force migration as a completely separate phenomenon than other types of migration. This is problematic for couple of reasons: an analysis of how violence against civilians causes people to flee should not be alienated from migration studies that concentrate on other types of disasters, particularly considering the benefits of interdisciplinary approach (Ioncev and Moskovskij gosudarstvennyj universitet im. M.V. Lomonosova, 2002). On the other hand, it is even more problematic if the two types of migration are conflated since consequences of doing so can reach beyond the academic world. For example, sometimes states mix the meaning of asylum seekers and economic migrants (Cenciarelli et al., 2017) to avoid their legal obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention (UN General Assembly, 1951) leading to 'more labels and fewer refugees' as Zetter (2007, p.172) put it.

More importantly, the division between 'voluntary' versus 'forced' movement is too simplistic (Coluccello and Massey, 2015). As Crawley and Skleparis (2018) argue, this is particularly the case for the theoretical distinction between the voluntary economic migration and refugee migration. Such an approach overlooks the fact that conflicts can generate devastating economic circumstances and force people to flee. For instance, the collapse of both the political and the economic system created 'economic refugees' in Albania in the post-1990 period (King et al., 2005). Another example is the 350,000 Bulgarian Turks that fled to Turkey in 1989 as they refused assimilation policies of the Bulgarian Communist Party; they had also faced economic and social challenges as they went through cultural exclusion (Dişbudak and Purkis, 2016). However, to conclude that these examples reflect blurriness between voluntary and forced displacement implies ambiguity, which casts a cloud over a potential empirical research. Instead, considering migrants have become increasingly mobile in modern times, it is possible to argue that there are 'intersections' between drivers of forced migration and identifying where they are may hold the key to understanding causes of it (Duda-Mikulin, 2018).

Secondly, forced migration literature is also dominated by case studies of refugees. This is concerning not only because it invites selections bias, but also because it overlooks IDPs (Bloch and Dona, 2018, p.34; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al., 2014). However, some states target their civilian residents (who then become displaced within its borders) because they have incentives to do so (Valentino et al., 2004). There is even evidence that some actors intentionally increase level of violence until they displace enough civilians to gain control of a territory (Steele, 2011). Therefore, any forced migration model without IDPs would be incomplete (Moore and Shellman, 2006).

Thirdly, until recently most studies with large-n or individual analysis did not explore beyond the general axiom that violence causes forced migration (Davenport et al., 2003; Schmeidl, 1997). However, people may react differently to various types and levels of violence and it is not possible to have a realistic research framework by just relying on conflict and mobility data. Surprisingly, there have not been studies of global scale that have refreshed and furthered findings from the early 2000s with consideration for economic, demographic and social drivers of forced migration. Instead, literature continues to offer a fragmented view of this complicated phenomenon As Braithwaite et al. (2019, p.7) admit, 'scholars have tended to tackle these questions individually, which means that their evaluation occurs in isolation'. For instance, although Adhikari (2013, 2012) acknowledges the impact of conflict on weakening economic infrastructure and argues that economic hardship may contribute to forced migration, his research is only on civil wars (and Nepal) despite the fact that other types of deadly conflicts such as one-sided violence can be drivers of forced displacement, too. Bayar and Aral (2019, p.2) also develop previous literature since their findings 'indicate that violent conflicts, authoritarian regimes and poverty are the primary causes of forced migration', but their findings are limited to large-scale migration (and to Africa). Arguably, the most comprehensive recent global study comes from a European Commission Report (Migali and Scipioni, 2018), which confirms that migration intentions become stronger indications to migrate when potential migrants are better prepared, but as the report admits, it does not offer specific findings about forced migrants. Such findings confirm not only how fragmented forced migration literature is, but also how push and pull factors 'operate differently across contexts, interacting with each other to shape the ever changing structural space' in which people decide to migrate or not (Van Hear et al., 2018, p.927).

Based on these weaknesses in literature, this thesis fills the gap as follows: unlike majority of previous studies, it does not only focus on refugees as it also includes IDPs and asylum seekers; this eliminates selection bias and prevents further defragmentation of the forced migration puzzle. It also does not limit the study to conflict data by including social, economic and demographic drivers and non-violent political data. In doing so, it presents not only a global analysis of causes of forced displacement between 1970-2016, but also a close look at migration intentions based on a survey of a country with protracted forced migration. Addition of interviews with forced migrants around the world also furthers previous findings in literature by providing an opportunity to obtain answers to questions raised by large-n studies including the one in this project

such as why some family members remain behind while others leave and whether timing of mobility depends on intensity and type of violence or socioeconomic factors. Additionally, the thesis does not try to draw strict lines between forced and voluntary migration by considering that economic and political drivers may intersect in the decision making process. By mending these chronic issues in literature, the thesis aims to fill the gap about what causes variations in the number of people that flee at a given time and place following deadly political conflicts. It particularly aims to develop understanding of how much social and economic factors weigh in and whether varying levels of intensity and type of violence is significant when conflict data is observed controlling for social and economic drivers. While seeking these answers, the dissertation's ultimate goal is to build a theoretical framework that can detail the causal mechanism between political violence and forced migration by building on previous studies and encourage further studies by bridging multidisciplines, including individual agency and not letting strict categorizations overshadow theoretical thinking. With this goal in mind, I also aim to 'dispel some of the myths and apprehensions' about forced migration such as 'forced migrants are generally poorly educated' and 'many forced migrants are economic refugees in disguise' (Salehyan, 2019, p. 146).

1.4 The Theory

While forced migration is arguably too diverse to explain with one major theory, Lee's version of Ravenstein's (1889, 1885) 'Laws' should be acknowledged as one of the most influential theories in the field including this project. Lee's (1966) neoclassical approach in this theory is based on push and pull factors and utilizes principles of utility maximisation and rational choice. Push factors such as poverty, political instability and religious intolerance induce people to move out of their current locations while pull

factors such as democratic governance, economic prosperity and job opportunities induce people to move to a new location. The main weakness of the push-pull models in spite of its popularity is that it does not assign relative weights to the different factors affecting migration decisions, leading to criticisms about its 'simplicity' (Van Hear et al., 2018). However, push-pull models are still helpful to understand how individuals' decision making vary and as this study shows, a simple theoretical model has the power to shed light on complicated questions about causes of forced migration.

The thesis theorizes that the degree to which civilians are targeted during political violence directly affects the number of forced migration flows. The major building block for the theoretical framework is that all types of migration and displacement are based on rational choice. However, if the decision to flee or stay is a calculation of costs and benefits, does the theoretical framework also explain behaviours such as trying to cross the Mediterranean in boats knowing that there is a significant probability of dying? The theory is built on the assumption that in every possible situation -including cases such as highly risky boat trips across long distances- options do exist and that individuals rationally make a choice be it consciously or subconsciously. Nevertheless, as Hirshleifer (1985) admits, this is not to say that good method always leads to a good result.

As Lee (1966) suggested, we can never exactly specify the factors that makes a person move or stay, we can identify a few important ones and note the average or general action of a group; this is the second main assumption of the thesis. Following previous literature, this study revisits the causal relationship between intensity and type of violence. While these causal mechanisms are already proven, they are more detailed

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here by asking whether civil war or terrorism related deaths significantly impact the number of forced migrants. Non-violent political drivers are also part of the theoretical framework since the decision to flee is not necessarily driven by physical political violence. While civil and political liberties are also commonly discussed factors in literature, previous theoretical models do not provide the flexibility to bridge them to social, demographic and economic variables. In particular, ambiguities in the causal relationship between economic factors and forced migration are further interrogated here controlling for political, social and demographic drivers of forced migration such as level of freedom, unemployment and urban centres. This interrogation does not necessarily build around the idea that there is a direct causal relationship between political, social, economic and demographic factors and forced displacement. For instance, unemployment may not immediately push someone away, but a rise in unemployment is generally considered a sign of poor overall economic performance and people may experience the consequences of a negative trend in economy in the longer term (e.g. one year) and may decide to move.

Although Lee's (1966) theoretical approach forgives eliminating any 'marginal' or 'irrational' individuals (Haug, 2008; Massey et al., 1993; Schelling, 2006) from an aggregate level theoretical model of forced displacement, this study acknowledges importance of individual agency in the decision to flee or not, in line with the development of the literature over the last decades. Thus, understanding the forced migration puzzle calls for a theoretical framework that encompasses more than one level of analysis to answer which factors are stronger drivers; which coexist and which interact or intersect with each other. Therefore, the study begins with a macro level analysis (of a global scale) whose findings connect to meso and individual level

analysis (with a survey of Iraq and semi-structured interviews). The ultimate goal is to build a theoretical framework, which can enable movement between levels of analysis, help to identify past trends and develop a more detailed understanding of the causal relationship between political violence and migration.

1.5 Methodology

Armed conflict, political violence and persecution are generally accepted as the main reasons of displacement (Davenport et al., 2003; Melander and Öberg, 2006; Moore and Shellman, 2004; Schmeidl, 1997; Vogt et al., 2015), however, since there are not sufficient studies that thoroughly analyse this causality, the dissertation's goal is to fill this gap in literature by using a mixed-method approach with both a large-n, a case study and interviews with refugees. Unlike the decision of including IDPs, utilizing both quantitative and qualitative mixed methods through a single case study, multiple regression analysis and interviews was not a difficult one. This is the case particularly for three reasons. Firstly, mixed methods is the only path that is compatible with the theoretical framework outlined here with a combination of primary and secondary data and more than one level of analysis. As Schmidt (2007) and Bakewell (2008, p.441) argue, 'research questions must determine the methodology; otherwise, there is a danger that focusing on a particular set of methodologies... may limit the research questions we can ask'.

Secondly, mixed methods in this study performs as a diagnostic tool with: 1) macroanalysis of global data between 1970-2016; 2) analysis of migration intentions of post-Saddam Bagdad to complement and develop the findings from the macro-analysis; and 3) interrogate ambiguous impact of socioeconomic drivers and further understanding of why some people remain while others flee through qualitative interviews with refugees. This is unlike previous literature, which tends to focus often on case studies and less often on large-n studies. Consequently, previous studies focusing on one method create a gap in literature by answering some questions around what drives forced migration, but leaving just as many unanswered. This dissertation eliminates that gap by having all three parts of the research complement each other with synergy, 'so that the end result is bigger than the sum of its parts' (Toshkov, 2016, p.11).

Thirdly, as Ryan and D'Angelo (2018, p.149) point out, 'different combinations of quantitative, qualitative and visual methods do not just provide richer sets of data and insights, but can allow us to better connect conceptualisations'. Therefore, mixed methods is not simply mixing qualitative and quantitative research, it is bridging the two to reach meaningful findings without the limitation of relying on a single method and by 'maximizing' the benefits from both methods (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al., 2014, p.14). While the quantitative analysis helps to visualize trends in forced displacement globally, the particular value adding qualitative analysis lies in a) 'assessing variables that are less susceptible to quantitative analysis such as perceptions of security' (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al., 2012, p.9), b) explaining why some migrants fled while other members of their family stayed and whether there was a particular trigger for them to act on their intention to migrate. Any discrepancy between the outputs of the two methods requires either revisiting the quality and robustness of data and the way it's handled throughout the study or even re-evaluating the research question and the causal mechanism this study has attempted to build. Therefore, regardless of the degree of similarity between the results of each of the methods, they provide an opportunity to

interpret the results from an integrative perspective since there is no hidden benefit in approaching the research methods in a study as if they are in a zero-sum competition.

1.6 Summary Of Findings

I analyse the main drivers of forced migration with a theoretical framework that combines methods in a novel way: I reach generalizable findings by merging several datasets for a global study of political and socioeconomic factors. I then take an indepth look into these findings with a country survey of Iraq and semi-structured interviews in an attempt to answer why people flee. The main findings show the overall contributions of this study as follows.

The presence of a deadly armed conflict including civil wars, one-sided violence and terrorism increases forced migration outflows beyond borders. For IDPs, terrorism-related fatalities are singled out as the only significant driver in relation to intensity of violence. This is a new finding pointing to the importance of looking at terrorism not only as a result of push factors that drive people to extreme violence, but also as a driver of displacement along with other types of political violence such as civil wars and one-sided violence. However, it is the level of intensity and not the type of violence that push people away.

Declining civil and political liberties are also powerful drivers of forced migration. However, witnessing versus personally experience political violence equally impact the decision to flee and data suggests that there are cases when witnessing persecution can even be a more powerful driver if the persecuted person is a close relative or friend.

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An interesting finding drawn from migration intentions is that people who intend to migrate can be well educated contrary to the popular assumption that forced migrants have a low-educated profile in general. The analysis of migration intentions to another country has also shown that prospects of an end to the conflict do not suffice to change their mind since potential migrants may also be looking for a place where their families can enjoy the quality of life they had before the conflict. The study has also shown that relative needs can be just as important as absolute needs in the decision to flee even under life threatening circumstances.

Last but not least, economic factors such as poverty, GDP per capita growth and employment do not decisively have a direct impact on the decision to flee. While there is limited evidence that interaction of GDP per capita growth and political drivers may cause people to leave, an in-depth interrogation of economic motivations does not lead to any evidence in support of the argument that some refugees may be economically driven. Although some people may lack the necessary resources to move and therefore are unable to flee from their homes, there is also evidence that remaining behind cannot be only tied to political and economic reasons as some people's cultural connections to their homeland runs so deep that they would not consider leaving unlike some of their friends and relatives. Some people also cannot leave even though they want to because they conclude that their physical strength or in some cases health problems prevent them from a risky migration journey, which often times involves more than one country, involvement of smugglers and interruptions to their travel as local conflict threats interfere with their plans to reach their ultimate destination.

1.7 Outline Of The Thesis

The thesis is divided into eight chapters. After this Introduction, Chapter 2 discusses existing literature in relation to the research question, focusing on the reasons of forced migration and how this dissertation can contribute to the gaps in literature. Therefore, the concentration will be on two factors that are also the main drivers of this research: first is the causal relationship between varying intensity levels of violence and the number of people that flee. The second is the relationship between the level of democracy and civil liberties and generation of forced migrants. By doing so, the dissertation aims to go beyond the general 'violence causes people to flee' axiom and measure the effects of variances of violence with variances in the volume of forced migrant populations.

Chapter 3 explains theoretical development from the perspective of International Relations, followed by importance of conceptualization of forced displacement and analysis of main theories that have shaped the literature to this day. It also introduces the theoretical model and hypotheses following a discussion of challenges of previous studies' challenges in building a theoretical framework in this topic.

Chapter 4 discusses the methodology of the thesis. First, this chapter will revisit the research question and evaluate the data needed to answer the research question on the basis of the theoretical discussion. Second, this chapter will also describe in detail the methods of data collection and analysis including challenges and problems related to combining data sets from different sources and access to primary data regarding forced migrants. Finally, the chapter will discuss the ethical issues that relate to the handling and utilization of data.

Chapter 5 builds regression models based on annual country-based global data, which is obtained by merging several datasets. While the main indicators of intensity of violence and freedom (of civil and political liberties) are tested as independent variables, several control variables related to social, economic and demographic factors are also used in the regression models.

Chapter 6 presents a case study based on a country survey of Iraqis in the post-Saddam period by focusing on migration intentions. It analyses odds of migration both internally and outside Iraq and compares the preferences of each group of migrants in terms of their response to the protracted ethnic conflict and prospects of future peace. In doing so, the design of the survey also provides an opportunity to gain understanding of the reasons of not leaving Iraq. Chapter 6 also aims to shed light on the ambiguity of socioeconomic factors identified earlier in Chapter 5 and further details the push-pull factors of forced displacement.

Chapter 7 introduces twelve semi-structured interviews representing refugees and asylum seekers from eight states (Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Iraq, Mauritius, Sudan, Sri Lanka, Syria and Zimbabwe) in the Middle East and Africa to provide in depth analysis of the research question at the individual level. Narrative analysis of the interviews reveals first account of the motivations behind the decision to flee. However, interviews also include questions about why some relatives and close friends of the participants remained behind in their home countries. Themes around security and whether migrants were socially and officially supported throughout their journey help to compare the experiences of the participants in terms of their response to violent political conflicts. Finally, the Chapter fills in the blanks about the power of economic indicators, which produced mixed results in Chapter 5 and 6.

Lastly, the Conclusion Chapter summarises the findings in the thesis and discusses their theoretical and policy implications. The final chapter has two main goals. First, it brings the empirical findings together and answers the research question listed in Chapter 1. In doing so, it presents the most important independent variables in order. Second, it goes back to the conceptual and theoretical discussions in Chapter 1, 2 and 3 and evaluates the contributions of the findings to existing literature. Finally, the Conclusion also includes a discussion of potential improvements to the forced migration studies in International Relations and directions for further research emphasizing the importance of identifying forced migration trends in finding pathways between academic studies and policy-making.

CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW

An shorter version of this Chapter was previously published as part of a journal article (Ozaltin et al., 2019)

2.1 Introduction: A Growing Field With Fragmented Findings

Forced migration literature has developed at a relatively slow pace compared to migration studies although the field has come a long way since being described by Harrel-Bond (1988) as being at an 'embryonic stage' (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al., 2014, p.86). There are few reasons of this lag: one argument is that forced migration has been 'intimately connected with policy developments' (Black, 2001, p.58), put it bluntly by Chimni (2008, p.11), 'refugee studies, like forced migration studies, has served the geopolitics if hegemonic states'.⁵ As Bakewell (2008, p.433) argues, the research scope consequently narrows because reliance on policy relevance 'tends to obscure and render invisible some population groups, causal relationships and questions that are methodologically difficult to capture'. Policy irrelevant research on the other hand provides an opportunity 'to see beyond the policy categories and thus produce new knowledge about people and processes overlooked by policymakers' (Brun et al., 2016, p.288).

Unavailability of data and the lack of broader theoretical tools across disciplines were other important factors in delaying the establishment of the field. However, both improvement in data collection and widening of applied research methods have expanded what used to be a niche topic. More significant is the literature's expansion from refugee studies to forced displacement. This arguably hints that the field is not

⁵ Being policy relevant tends to be particularly important when social scientists do field work in humanitarian situations (Jacobsen and Landau, 2003).

just expanding the quantity of policy relevant research, but also increasing the quality of academically sound studies. It is possible to pinpoint the beginning of a formal study of forced migration to Stein and Tomasi's (1981) recognition of the need for a more systematic analysis although there are earlier studies on refugee camps resulting from both World Wars, as well as studies by International Refugee Organization before the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees joined the research efforts (Black, 2001). Although the field has significantly expanded over the last two decades, Stein and Tomasi (1981, p.6) summarized why this progress was initially slow:

The scholarly inattention to refugee problems is understandable as refugee research does not fit neatly into distinct categories and is not a ready-made field of study. It lacks standard texts, a theoretical structure, a systematic body of data, and even a firm definition of the subject or the field. Generally, there has been a failure to learn from experience and to add to the cumulative body of knowledge [...] We seek to provoke new thinking and promote a comprehensive, historical, interdisciplinary and comparative perspective, which focuses on the consistencies and patterns in the refugee experience.

2.2 Previous Findings

In spite of increasing interest in the relationship between political violence and forced migration, the literature of this multidisciplinary field is yet to become a full-fledged discipline. To overcome this challenge, the literature has to mend three weaknesses in particular. First are the fragmented findings in various academic fields that are yet to lead to the establishment of a literature comparable to other sub-fields of International

Relations such as conflict resolution. As Massey et al. (2005, p.17) admit, forced migration is based on a 'fragmented set of theories that have developed largely in isolation from one another, sometimes but not always segmented by disciplinary boundaries'. The progress of this theoretical development is in line with what is happening in practice as Filippo Grandi, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, describes 'current approaches to peace-making as fragmented, addressing only symptoms rather than root causes' (UN Security Council, 2019). Therefore, this fragmentation is not some flaw in literature that can be eradicated by further research because it is a reflection of developments both in theory and policy making as well as root causes that vary from safety to social and economic factors (Abel et al., 2019; Bartram et al., 2014; Carling and Collins, 2018; Lindstrom, 2005; Moore and Shellman, 2004; Schmeidl, 1997; Thorburn, 1996; Van Hear et al., 2018).

What further complicates this is the wide ranging literature across various academic disciplines "that does not explicitly identify itself as within 'refugee studies,' but which still deals substantively with refugees as its subject" (Black, 2001, p.58). Since the variety of drivers of forced migration requires expertise from multi-disciplines, it is not possible to exit this vicious circle without omitting important pieces of the puzzle. The solution lies in conscious effort across disciplines and scholars. More dialogue within the academia can lead to meaningful connections between disparate developments in literature as opposed to presenting findings in 'isolated pockets' (Betts, 2009, p.15). However, there are increasing numbers of workshops and conferences that bring together scholars from multidisciplines to achieve this goal as recognized in journals (e.g. Ahouga, 2018; Betts, 2010; Landau, 2007; Nassari, 2008; Turk, 2003; Wilde, 2001). In line of this approach, I have presented parts of this dissertation in

multidisciplinary conferences such as the Global Refugees panel in the 2019 ASN Convention attended by economics, legal, political scientists and international relations experts.

Second issue in literature is the dominance of refugee case studies. On the positive side, as admitted by Johnson (2017), 'scholarship in IR tends to marry rich empirical case studies with a strong theoretical and conceptual focus'. However, case studies are limited because of a lack of data and/or difficulty obtaining data in the conflict-prone zones that typically produce forced displacement (Bohra-Mishra and Massey, 2011; Fassin and Pandolfi, 2010; Randell, 2017). Moreover, 'scholars choose case studies for specific reasons' and constraints in conflict zones often times increase with the urgency 'to immediately carry out a study, leading to an imbalance of research interests' and an increase in the risk of 'prioritising the researchers' interests over the wellbeing of those researched' (Krause, 2017, p.7). Therefore, case studies do not only inherently suffer from selection bias, but also raise ethical questions of research conducted in zones of conflict. Focus on case studies is also highly problematic because it often times overlooks internally displaced people (IDP) by only including refugees. Even the most informative and influential studies follow this trend including those that have inspired and helped to develop this dissertation (e.g. Crépeau's (2006) analysis of class in forced migration, Betts' (2013) argument of 'survival migration', Shellman and Stewart's (2007) attempt at an early warning system of forced migrants and Chatty and Monsour's (2011) analysis of protracted displacement have all refugee case studies). This inevitably leads to a strict categorization of forced migration movements; those outside existing categories tend to disappear (Martin et al., 2014).

Most refugee case studies include a further limitation: focus on the reverse causality between conflict and refugees instead of the main gap in the literature: what main drivers of forced displacement are and how much they impact variance of the number of forced migrants. In particular, Loescher and Milner (2005) argue that continuous refugee movements are a source of on-going conflict and instability, complicating peace processes and weakening socioeconomic development. Additionally, Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006) argue that refugees increase 'risk of conflict in host and neighbouring countries'. Bohnet et al. (2018) focus on the role of IDPs, but only to highlight their effect in spatial diffusion of conflict and Fisk (2019) finds that the form of refugee settlement impacts communal conflict. However, meticulous analysis by Rüegger (2018, p.54) deviates from previous studies and the popular perception that 'depicts forced migrant inflows as inherently harmful' and finds that refugees may contribute to instability only if their destination already suffers from political instability, particularly due to ethnic marginalization of some local groups. Additionally, Böhmelt et al. (2019, p.85) show that 'there is no automatic link' between high number of refugees in a host country 'and higher likelihood of political violence'. Most recently, Gineste and Savun (2019, p.143) introduced a new data set of refugeerelated violence, but they do admit that their 'dataset suffers from a number of limitations' although they do not list leaving IDPs out of their analysis as one of them. Focus on consequences of forced migration based on conflict data is a natural outcome of the post-9/11 era, where the relationship between migration and security inevitably attracts more scrutiny with the 'social construction of migration as a high level security issue' (Lazaridis and Wadia, 2015, p.91). The terrorist attacks triggered research efforts in response to 'increasing anti-immigrant sentiments' and social in the public globally (Schüller, 2016, p.632). Moreover, academic interest in securitizing and then

desecuritizing migration has gained pace in the post-9/11 period (Albahari, 2016; Chebel d'Appollonia, 2017; Estévez, 2012; Jones, 2016; Puggioni, 2016) following 'a reinforcement of the securitization of migration policies that had developed from the 1980s' (Haas et al., 2020, p.198). Nevertheless, why is it necessary to further interrogate the relationship between political violence and forced migration as outcome instead of focusing on the consequences of forced migration? The idea that forced migration studies should extend beyond armed conflict indicators is not new. Snyder (1978) emphasized the need for alternative methodological strategies as early as in the 70s. The ultimate purpose of trying to explore the depths of this causal relationship beyond the impact of conflict data is to understand what causes variations in forced displacement volumes. This gives an opportunity to identify trends and manage expectations about forced displacement movements in the future by shedding light on likely development of future migration.

2.3 Missing Pieces Of The Puzzle

Understanding causality between political violence and forced displacement is part of the limitations faced by forecasting models (Groen, 2018; Groen et al., 2019; Nair et al., 2019) and theoretical improvement in this area can lead to more effective early warning models that can prevent being 'caught off-guard' as in the case of 2015-2016 'refugee surge in Europe' (Carammia and Dumont, 2018, p.1). Even in the event that such alert systems do not prove successful in forecasting future forced displacement events, they can provide more accurate scenarios based on an improved understanding of the drivers; this is essential for policy makers and all organizations to prepare economically, socially and politically before large volumes of displacement happen. In sum, without a better understanding of early phases of migration when migration intentions and the decision to migrate are shaped, it is not possible to achieve significant theoretical (and policy relevant) developments in the later phases of mobility (Maitland, 2018).

Recent literature has also increasingly paid attention to the relationship between terrorism and forced displacement: Milton et al. (2013) examine how refugees increase transnational terrorism while Choi and Salehyan (2013) identify an association between hosting refugees and rising terrorism. Bove and Böhmelt (2016, p.584) conclude that 'immigrants are an important vehicle for the diffusion of terrorism from one country to another'. Interestingly, prior studies have not flipped this causality to interrogate whether terrorism could be a driver of forced displacement, too. Perhaps two exceptions that come close are White's (2017) study that highlights impact of terrorism in forced displacement in Africa and the Middle East and Hosseini's (2018) discussion of how Ezidi women fled from ISIS violence in Iraq. However, White (2017)'s analysis is limited to ISIS, Al-Qaeda and Boko Haram and Hosseini (2018) does not particularly separate terrorism and focuses on overall political violence. Nevertheless, White's (2017) and Hosseini's (2018) work are encouraging to further analysis in this area as they demonstrate that it is one of the important drivers of forced displacement, which clearly begs for more research. Therefore, terrorism related deaths is one of the independent variables in this study and its inclusion stems from personal curiosity as well as inspiration from their work.

Overall, all these analyses provide fragments of the causal relationship between violence and forced migration by selectively concentrating on impact of mainly refugee movements. This thesis aims to fill the gap left by these studies by including

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both refugees and IDPs and by analysing drivers of forced migration with a global outlook (with the support of a large-n study, a country survey and qualitative interview analyses). There is an increasing number of studies that support the need to divert attention to this gap, highlighting the importance of IDPs, such as Valentiono et al.'s (2004) findings about some states targeting civilians because they have incentives to do so. Empirical analysis also shows that some actors intentionally increase level of violence until they displace enough civilians to gain control of a territory (Steele, 2011). Therefore, any forced migration model without IDP would be incomplete (Moore and Shellman, 2006) and can only solve part of the puzzle albeit with selection bias. Of course, this logic also applies to asylum seekers as they are also an essential part of the forced migration puzzle (Hoare et al., 2017); yet, only few studies (e.g. Conlon, 2011; Zimmermann, 2010) examine them. Alternatively, including case studies on all forced migrants (refugees, IDPs and asylum seekers) provides an opportunity to observe and further interrogate findings from previous studies as this dissertation demonstrates through mixed methods analysis.

Disentangling forced migration is no easy task even if all these weaknesses (fragmented findings through multidisciplines, dominance of refugee cases and focus on the impact instead of the causes) are overcome, but recent literature demonstrates progress and confirms that forced migration is too complex to explain with one major theory (Vezzoli et al., 2017) (as the theory chapter discusses in detail). What is now commonly referred as 'drivers' of forced migration are based on push and pull factors introduced earlier in literature (Etling et al., 2018; Lee, 1966; Ravenstein, 1889, 1885). In a nutshell, push factors, such as poverty, political instability and religious intolerance, induce people to move out of their current location, whilst pull factors,

such as democratic governance, economic prosperity and job opportunities, attract them to a new one.

Forced migration literature certainly benefits from recent findings in conflict resolution literature, particularly where its scope expands from modelling conflict as an outcome to one of the drivers of forced displacement: Moore and Shellman (2004) build on previous work of Davenport et al. (2003) by including violence exerted by both states and their dissidents as driver of forced migration; Steele (2009) examines the decision-making process of displaced people when they are collectively targeted; Blattman and Miguel (2010) argue that conflicts that extend to an entire country have a different structure than conflicts with a small regional scope, leading to variations in displacement.

In a step forward, Schon (2019, 2015) probes the reasons behind variations in forced displacement flows during conflict (although he focuses exclusively on violence data) and shows the impact of motivation and opportunity in the timing of flight. Additionally, Brück et al. (2018, p.1) find that 'episodes of escalating conflict, rather than accumulated violence' push people away. Most recently, Conte and Migali (2019) analyse the relationship between organized crime and asylum applications in Europe and conclude that future research on drivers of forced migration should consider intensity of all violence types in addition to economic, cultural and political factors.

Although there is a general expectation for political violence (mainly armed conflicts or persecution) to be the number one push factor, not everyone leaves (Davenport et al., 2003; Melander and Öberg, 2006; Moore and Shellman, 2004; Schmeidl, 1997;

Zolberg et al., 1992). Understanding why some people leave while others choose to stay is the key that can improve our understanding of which drivers are more powerful under given circumstances. However, people may react differently to various types of violence and there has been more recognition in recent years of the fact that flight is a selective process and is only one of the survival options for forced migrants. In particular, Lozano-Gracia et al. (2010) find that violence is a push factor 'together with the absence of institutions and dissatisfaction with the provision of the basic needs', however, their research is limited to Columbia. Although trying to identify which motivations beyond conflict may impact the decision to flee may seem like a very difficult task, as Van Hear et al. (2018, p.927) admit, 'the challenge is to establish when and why some drivers are more important than others, which combinations are more potent than others, and which are more susceptible to change through external intervention'. That is why simply identifying the relationship between political violence and forced migration is not satisfactory and considering other variables are necessary in developing theoretical frameworks (Adhikari, 2013).

A closer look at the social socioeconomic circumstances in addition to (non-violent and violence related) political variables may explain why some choose to leave an area of conflict while others stay. Socioeconomic factors include economic status based on work experience, occupation, income level and education (Borjas, 1990; Ibáñez and Vélez, 2008; Ruiz and Vargas-Silva, 2013). Real or potential changes in socioeconomic status are an obvious push factor, but they can also act as a pull factor, with individuals deciding to move based on where they are likely to have better opportunities. By focusing on the socioeconomic factors in addition to political variables, the purpose in this study is to answer whether some seemingly conflict induced forced migration actually stems from economic reasons and impact variations in migration movements.

Previous studies analysing the relationship between socioeconomic factors and forced displacement have multiple limitations. For one thing, they, too, concentrate on refugees already in exile (Betts, 2016; McAuliffe and Jayasuriya, 2016) and ignore potential refugees or internally displaced persons (IDPs). For another, similar to the conflict induced migration studies, they focus on the consequences of displacement (Becker and Ferrara, 2019; Collier, 2013; Cortes, 2004; Jacobsen and Landau, 2003) and not on the initial process of decision-making. They also overlook those who stay behind, missing an opportunity to compare forced migrants with non-migrants. The availability of modern research techniques has greatly aided researchers-but it has not led to consensus. On the one hand, several large-n analyses find a relationship between forced migration and the level of economic development and poverty in the origin and destination (Adhikari, 2012; Moore and Shellman, 2007), and Zetter et al. (2013) say the underlying factors of conflict-induced migration are often a combination of political and economic factors. Additionally, Neumayer's (2005a) 'bogus refugees' thesis supports the popular perception of asylum seekers as mainly economically driven; economic circumstances in the origin country are argued to be important predictors of the volume of asylum seekers coming to Western Europe.⁶ Some studies (Moore and Shellman, 2007; Schmeidl, 1997) show countries with higher levels of economic development generate fewer refugees (again implying that refugee movement is economically driven), even during conflicts, whilst Tsourapas

⁶ Zimmerman (2011) questions the generally accepted narrow definitions of refugees and notes the resulting conclusions about refugees as either genuine or 'bogus'.

(2019) argues that refugees have become a source of revenue for some 'refugee rentier' host states such as Turkey.

On the other hand, other studies do not find a significant connection between GNP or GDP per capita and forced displacement (Davenport et al., 2003; Khawaja et al., 2011; Melander and Öberg, 2007). Could this discrepancy be due to the limitations of largen studies? Stanley (1987) carried time-series analysis of El Salvador migration to the USA and found that it was political violence and not economic motivations that pushed Salvadorans away. In a more recent study, Byrne (2016) suggests looking at aggregate data at a lower level and focuses on Syrian refugees fleeing to Jordan; she concludes that economic conditions in the destination country are not as 'consequential' as conditions in the country of origin.

Considering these contradictory results, it seems wise to look more closely at how socioeconomic variables contribute to the migration decision, particularly considering the academic and policy worlds tend to overvalue the latter. In fact, it is not uncommon for states to mix the meaning of asylum seekers and economic migrants (Cenciarelli et al., 2017) with the assumption that economic factors are dominant to avoid their legal obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention (UN General Assembly, 1951). Such actions lead to "more labels and fewer refugees" as Zetter (2007) puts it, and the stigmatization of refugees in political rhetoric and media (Goodman et al., 2017) counters scientific evidence that economic variables are not the most significant drivers of the intention to migrate. Brück et al. (2018) find employment rate in the destination country the only significant economic variable. Recent work by Duda-Mikulin (2018) shows that as migrants are becoming more

mobile, their various motivations to migrate are increasingly inseparable and require an approach that captures the dynamism of decision making by considering the "intersection" of motivations.

Meanwhile, Collyer (2005) challenges the traditional social networks approaches to migration by showing how undocumented migrants use networks different than official migrants by relying more on new information introduced by smugglers and less on family ties due to strict migration controls, which is also relevant for forced migrants as Chapter 7 demonstrates. Koser (2008) 'follows the money' for migrants smuggled to the UK and explains how the financing of such illegal activities work. However, smugglers are not the only organised criminals intertwined to the forced migration puzzle. Contreras (2014) gives the examples of ghost towns created by deadly drug related violence under weak governance when Mexicans flee to the US in fear for their security and refutes the argument that migration out of Mexico is economically driven; and Cantor (2014) points out the role of gangs, drug cartels and transporters in forced displacement in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico, where political violence is not necessarily separate from organized crime due to corrupt governments.

Finally, there are increasing number of studies that acknowledge the importance of individual agency in migrant decision making led by qualitative interviews in particular, which also inspire the third part (and Chapter 7) of this project following the large-n and the Iraq survey analysis. Some of these studies provide in-depth analysis of the impact of various types of violence: Brinkman (2000) analyses refugees' (from south-eastern Angola who now live in Namibia) response to torture, mutilation and

massive killing and gives insights about the way migrants process political violence although his purpose is to investigate the causes of violence.

Other studies develop understanding of how individuals make their own choices during or following political violence. Iacopino et al. (2001) detail the extent of violence exerted on Albanian displacement from Kosovo and point out that one must look beyond the number of related deaths to fully account for the war crimes and understand the impact of violence, highlighting the importance of similar studies. Hovil (2007) shows how refugees are able to take control of their lives in contrast to their depiction as passive victims based on interviews with Liberian refugees. Engel and Ibáñez (2007, p.360) conduct a household survey and conclude that economic factors play a role in migration decisions 'even in a context of violence but that the impact of economic incentives is less strong where violence levels are high'. Tete (2012) concludes that refugees should be actively involved in tackling the displacement related issues. Additionally, Häkli et al. (2017) interview asylum seekers in Cairo, host of the largest UNHCR operations in North Africa and the Middle East, and point to how internalization of 'refugeness' may transfer from the individuals to collective actions even in the form of activism. Mallett and Hagen Zanker (2018) interview Eritrean and Syrian refugees and asylum seekers in their analysis of the challenges for individual agency during forced migration journeys and highlight the needs for future studies that can fill the gap on their trajectories. Lastly, Schon (2019, p.12) argues 'that violence fits within broader considerations of motivation and opportunity to migrate' and uses Syrian refugee interviews in Turkey to demonstrate how witnessing higher intensity of violence and having opportunity to travel decreases the time to migrate.

Unlike these studies, the interviews conducted for this dissertation covers a wider geography from South Asia to Africa and the Middle East and focuses on common themes that emerge from their narratives instead of limiting research to a particular location or geographic group; the large-n study expands the geographical scope to the entire globe. The aim here is to reach to more generalizable findings about the causal relationship between political violence and the decision to flee.

2.4 Conclusion

This Chapter highlighted main weaknesses in forced migration studies while presenting the current state of the literature along with the relevant gaps for this study: scattered interdisciplinary findings that are yet to be organized under the umbrella of forced migration studies; domination of the field by refugee case studies and focus on the consequences of forced displacement before disentangling driving motivations behind it. It also explained why it is essential to understand which drivers weigh more than the others when people are exposed to political violence although violence (Moore and Shellman, 2007, 2006; Steele, 2009; Weiner, 1995) and socioeconomic circumstances (Crépeau, 2006; Davenport et al., 2003; Neumayer, 2005b; Schmeidl, 1997) are generally accepted as the main push/pull factors of violence induced forced migration.

In sum, literature's focus on impact of forced migration is built on weak foundations with inadequate understanding of the drivers of forced migration, invisibility of IDPs in most research and overemphasis on refugee case studies, which introduces selection bias to an already complex puzzle. Prior studies clearly lead to more questions than consensus about many important concepts required to solve the puzzle

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such as who a refugee is, whether economic drivers are significant and there is causality between terrorism and forced displacement. These are the gaps this dissertation intends to fill while asking what the main drivers of forced migration are. The following chapters detail how the research is carried out to fulfil this goal by explaining the theoretical framework, followed by methodology and large-n study, survey of post-Saddam Bagdad and semi-qualitative interviews with refugees, in order.

CHAPTER 3 THEORIZING FORCED MIGRATION

3.1 Introduction: Development of Forced Migration Theory

It seems obvious that, in a context of violence, emergency and danger, refugees are simply compelled to leave their home in hurry and move towards the first safe haven they encounter. The consequences for theory and empirical research are that the regularities necessary for theorization are lacking (McLeman and Gemenne, 2018, p.21).

Theory is the heart of any doctoral thesis although the only consensus among social scientists about building a theoretical framework may be that 'various frameworks that have been proposed for organizing (causal) explanations all display significant problems' (Daigneault and Béland, 2015, p.384). While forced migration is no exception to this verdict, McLeman and Gemenne (2018) are putting their fingers on a particularly important issue: forced migration is largely missing in theoretical review book and papers because the common assumption is that people are 'obliged' to move in response to political violence and this 'obligation' results from 'unpredictable occurrences" such as 'civil war and abrupt regime changes' (McLeman and Gemenne, 2018, p.21; Zolberg, 1983, p.25). However, as this dissertation defends, people do have a choice and their decision-making can be explained by causal mechanisms making theorization possible. It is therefore crucial to dedicate a chapter to theory particularly for two reasons: firstly, one may ask what would be the purpose of asking 'why' in the context of Political Science or International Relations when we already know that 'violence causes forced migration' (Apodaca, 1998; Davenport et al., 2003; Melander and Öberg, 2006; Moore and Shellman, 2004; Schmeidl, 1997; Schmid and Programma Interdisciplinair Onderzoek naar Oorzaken van Mensenrechtenschendingen, 1996; Weiner, 1995). To be content with this axiom is simply parsimony taken too far because it does not explain variances of forced migration volumes or why seemingly similar types of violence generates different results at various locations and times.

For a deeper analysis of the relationship between violence and forced migration, the way forward goes through analysing the earlier phase of forced migration when decision to flee forms before focusing on displacement outcomes. Focusing on the latter assumes that causes of conflict-induced forced displacement are already well known, but this is a problematic assumption for a dynamic phenomenon. As Amin et al. (2016, p.8) admit, 'protracted conflicts, unequal burden sharing, climate change, globalization, and shifting policies regarding immigration, asylum, work and development are changing the nature of forced displacements'. This means that prior knowledge about drivers of forced migration has to be in constant review and development. In effect, without this piece, the puzzle becomes politically charged; as Horst (2018, p.445) asks, 'why is it that when we talk about forced migration [...], we do not talk about the violent conflict that refugees flee?' As this critique suggests, avoiding the origin of drivers can serve political interests, but it cannot be justified scientifically. Simply put, it is not possible to contribute to theoretical development without including the causal mechanism between deadly conflicts and displacement.

Since forced migration is relatively understudied in academia, it is necessary to revisit and utilize well-established theories of migration before attempting to contribute to theoretical development. Discussion of relevant theories also helps to demonstrate the value of theoretical contribution in the context of International Relations. After all, while there are numerous social sciences concentrating on various aspects of forced migration, why International Relations should also pay more attention to its causes is an argument that has to be justified before any empirical analysis is presented. If forced migration is as important as this study claims, why has International Relations been lagging behind other social sciences such as geography and history in tackling this issue?

The answer lies in the development of mainstream International Relations and what plays central role in it, particularly from the perspective of the dominating realist and neo-realist approaches: the emphasis on the performance of states. 'Forced migration is, by definition, indicative of a break-down in the nation-state system' (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al., 2014, p.2), however, migration did not rise to the level of international or 'high politics', which affected relations between states, until the end of the Cold War (Brettell, 2014). While this explains International Relations' lack of interest in the topic until 1990s, it does not mean that any forced migration issue at the time was insignificant. It rather reveals that issues related to forced migrants were not one of the major factors that could change the balance of power between the East and the West at the time.

It is also not surprising that International Relations' increasing attention on migration in the post-Cold War era initially was limited to economic migration rather than forced migration. It is during this period that states had begun to experience the effects of immigration policies, which they mainly pursued to boost their industrial labour capacity. Economic, social and cultural consequences of immigrant workers came under scrutiny from the 1970s whereas forced migration remained outside agendas of national security until recently with growing awareness that it is a transnational issue (Freeman, 1979; Miller, 1981).

How state affairs effect causes of forced migration or how forced migration affects politics in return, both require theorizing about states and international affairs; that is why the puzzle of forcibly displaced people is relevant to International Relations and the number of migrants is not just some statistic that concerns only less than one per cent of world population (UNHCR Global Trends, 2015).

3.2 Overview Of Major Theories

Finding a general theory of migration with universal validity and applicability is the perpetual dream of those working on migration research. To the ambitious this has become an obsession; to the more realistic it has remained a fond hope (Jong, 1981, p.305).

If forced migration is simply 'defined by movement that takes place under significant structural constraints that result from an existential threat' (Betts, 2009, p.5), is it possible to construct a 'grand theory' of forced migration? Such a grand theory would have to be able to provide explanations to all questions about forced migration including its causes and effects at the aggregate and individual level and successfully bridge them. An ideal model with 'grand theory' would also have to use consistent assumptions, eliminating the flexibility essential to deal with differences that inevitably form across time, space and societies. It is therefore no surprise that 'there is no agreement in the scholarly community about how to theorize uprooting and refugees' (Schmidt, 2019, p.9).

Having various migration theories, on the other hand, allows research to develop without such constraints leading to the conclusion that a 'grand theory' of forced migration is bound to remain a myth. Therefore, there may be different paths in the search for an ideal theoretical framework. However, despite the lack of a unified theory, dialogue across disciplines is also necessary to avoid 'narrow fields of inquiry and the danger of constantly reinventing wheels' (Brettell and Hollifield, 2008, p.2). An interdisciplinary approach can unite isolated studies of forced migration and provide a more comprehensive look at the issue since 'the whole is clearly a greater sum, even if some perspectives are missing' (Favell, 2014, p.318). Exploring causes of forced migration provides an opportunity for academics to trade and share knowledge before moving the discussion to relatively more controversial issues such as how to deal with 'refugee crises' and whether refugees are a national security threat.

Before discussing theories of migration that are relevant to this project, it is essential to explain why this study does not draw theoretical boundaries between so called voluntary and forced migration studies. The answer lies in many cases that fall into the grey area between the two. For example, King (Martiniello and Rath, 2010, p.116) asks if 'a young Filipina woman sent by her family to work as a domestic helper in Rome... is a voluntary or forced migrant'. Also, how should one categorize Syrians who do not legally fall under the refugee status, but still flee from the instability and violence close to their homes; are they voluntary or forced migrant? Since the line between volition and coercion is not always straightforward, it does not make sense theoretically to define types of migration in a restricted way, either. What this means for International Relations is that previous assumptions in literature such as describing forced migrants

as having 'no choice but to migrate' are erroneous (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al., 2014, p.188). For instance, assuming people can choose when and where to move under even the most dangerous circumstances allows exploration of individual level of analysis.

On the other hand, the assumption that people are 'forced' to flee underestimates each individual's unique intellectual capacity under life-threatening circumstances and lower them to the level of 'stimulus-response mechanisms' as (Davenport et al., 2003, p.30) put it. A theory built under such an assumption is bound to crumble since it cannot explain why some people stay while others leave when they find themselves in the same or similar situation. Precisely, voices of refugees, asylum seekers and IDPs should not fall on deaf ears meaning that a theoretical framework overlooking their agency would be impossible to defend.

This study will nevertheless follow literature and refer to refugees, asylum seekers and IDPs as forced migrants although the phrase clearly does not do justice to people who make a very difficult decision under potentially fatal circumstances for two reasons. The first reason of following the general discourse is to avoid confusion when referring or making comparisons to related previous literature or empirical information. The second reason is practicality: it is helpful to keep the distinction between general types of (voluntary) migration and the so-called forced migration for macro level analysis.

Before discussing the most appropriate level of analysis for this project, interrogation of major theories and approaches is essential. There are mainly three types of migration theories: micro, macro and meso-level (connecting micro and macro) theories. Haug (2008, p.590) briefly summarizes them as follows: 'The migration decision-making of individual actors (micro-level) is embedded in social contexts (meso-level) and is based on underlying macro-structural conditions'. Considering the data limitations for building meso-level theoretical frameworks (Coleman, 1988; Esser, 1993; Haug, 2008), this study begins with considering forced migration process at the individual (micro) level since this is where decision-making starts.

It then moves to the macro level by taking aggregate decisions of forced migrants in each country based on the assumption that all else constant people flee from their homes when they feel their life is in danger (Davenport et al., 2003). In determining which independent variables should be included in the analysis, both push and pull factors are considered. Based on this direction the research takes, it is necessary to discuss what is meant by rational choice and push-pull factors in this study before explaining the theoretical framework.

3.2.1 Rational Choice Approach

Is fleeing from one's home a choice when faced with deadly violence? The initial thought may be that a person has no choice but to run away after following media coverage of refugees in dire conditions and seeing countless number of sunk boats carrying potential refugees off the coast of the Mediterranean. Such a perspective may serve to improve humanitarian causes since the forced migration discourse is shaped around policy and operational concerns rather than what makes scientific sense. However, whether fleeing is a choice or not is crucial for forced migration analysis in the context of International Relations. Are we to conclude that the father of a child that drowned on a boat to Greece was irrational by sending his child or that he had no choice but to send him? If that is the case, why did some children end up on the boat, some

stayed at home, and some are in refugee camps across the Syria border? It is possible to find the answer under the assumption that individuals are rational and act with selfinterest.

While rational choice leads to the first main assumption of this study, the approach is not uncontested just like major schools of thoughts in International Relations (Carlsnaes, 2010; Elster, 1993; Keohane, 2002; MacDonald, 2003; Quackenbush, 2004). It is important to be aware of its limitations, however, joining the debate between various mainstream International Relations theories and approaches is not one of the purposes of this study. Nevertheless, the position this project takes is that limitations of rational approach encourage efforts to improve it rather than simply rejecting it.

Before discussing its limitations, it is important to clarify what rational choice means for conflict-induced forced migration and note a few points that justify 'borrowing' it from economics to the study of forced migrants. Simply put, rationalism is based on the notion that 'people try to do the best they can in their circumstances' based on incentives (Hodgson, p.95) and how they decide what is 'best' depends on a cost-benefit calculation of their options. According to this logic, firstly, assuming that people are rational and pursue self-interest does not mean they would not choose to cooperate with others. It just means that people will not do so against their own interest; and although 'interest' is a term often associated with finance, it may actually include safety, power and civil and political liberties. Those that prefer to move with their relatives or neighbours decide to do so when it is in their own interest. When people move on their own, however, that does not automatically point to putting their well being before others'. For instance, some migrants reluctantly separate from their parents, siblings or children if they have reason to believe that other family members would not survive the risky migration journey due to their ill health (there is evidence of such circumstances in the Interviews Chapter (8).

Secondly, just because people are assumed to think rationally, that does not mean that they always make the right choices as if life decisions can be simplified with mathematical computations. Instead, people weigh the cost and benefits of staying or fleeing based on the information they have. However, this is where economic roots of the rational choice theory becomes an issue: in a perfect market equilibrium, 'information is presumed to flow like water-faster than water' (Alexander, 2012, p.170; Fox, 2009, p.191); but that is of course far from the complex reality of displacement. Even if potential migrants had almost perfect information, they cannot know for sure what their life is exactly going to be like in their new location. Will they have access to basic resources to survive; will they then have access to jobs, education, security and health benefits? While the answers of these questions may determine someone's decision to flee, that decision is an educated guess at most based on probability of finding food, jobs, security, etc. Forced migrants may have to process large amounts of information, but they may have access to limited information due to material or personal reasons and often times information may be costly.

Although access to information is a point of critique in rational choice approach, Baláž et al. (2016) argue that migrants substitute missing information with average data for their destination choice, for example, and they can also process partial negative or positive information and they may come to logical conclusions about the missing piece of information. For instance, if they learn that typhoid vaccination is common in

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Turkey, but not in Syria, they may believe that moving to Syria would have significant health risks. Additionally, Ryo (2013, p.587) finds that there is a positive relationship between the cost of migration and intention to migrate because people who are 'serious about migrating are more likely to engage in information gathering about practicalities of migrating (such as smuggling fees) which might lead them to higher, and perhaps more accurate, cost estimates'.

Another critique of rational choice is its dominantly numerical language, which becomes 'too technical' in some cases (Carlsnaes, 2010). However, overcoming this potential flaw is in the skilful hands of the researcher since there is a fine line between mastering complicated technical aspects of research and trading scientific contribution and substance with unnecessary mathematical obscurity. A second critique is also one of its strengths: rational choice makes simplifying assumptions. For instance, when assessing people's decision to flee, a common assumption is that they all have access to perfect information about potential opportunities, alternative locations (if there is more than one) and costs and benefits of their decision; this is useful in terms of building a theoretical framework since it is generally accepted that a parsimonious theory is also a good theory. However, introducing an assumption such as fixed information prevents the researcher from asking questions about if and how different levels of information would have effected people's decision to stay or go. Therefore, it is important to remember not to 'turn Ockham's Razor into Ockham's chainsaw' (Koleva and Haidt, 2012) and apply the rules of parsimony sensibly, which is challenging yet possible to achieve, again depending on the researcher's skills as well as availability of data.


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Under the assumptions of rational approach, benefit-cost analysis determines the outcome of the decision-making process. Benefit-cost models are typically associated with economics and in the case of forced migration, they are commonly associated with economics of refugees and analyse how migrants, displaced or voluntary, affect the economies of the country they have moved to (Zetter 2012; Damelang and Haas, 2012; Weinstein, 2002). While neo-classical economics analyses 'employment conditions between countries and on migration costs, it generally conceives of movement as an individual decision for income maximization' (Massey et al., 1993, p.432). New economics of migration, in contrast, views decision to migrate as a household decision and not an individual one with the aim to maximize income and minimize risks to family (Inglis et al., 2020; Nzima et al., 2017; Portes, 2019).

Both neo-classical and 'new economics' approaches have some assumptions that can be useful to build a theoretical framework for forced migration. In particular, based on rational choice, it is possible to argue 'potential migrants estimate the costs and benefits of moving to alternative international locations and migrate to where the expected discounted net returns are greatest over some time horizon' (Borjas, 1990, p.434). The difference in the case of forced migration is the variety and higher weight of indicators such as intensity or type of violence that add to the 'net returns' in addition to economic benefits. In sum, 'rational behaviour is action calculated on the basis of the rules of logic and other norms of validity. However, owing to chance, good method may not always lead to good result' (Hirshleifer, 1985, p.59).

3.2.2 Push And Pull Theories

Push and pull theories of migration originate from a theory of migration which assumed that a balance of positive and negative factors 'must be enough to overcome the natural inertia which always exists' (Richmond, 1993, p.7). The original theory belongs to Everett S. Lee (1966) who differentiated between (push) factors associated with the location of the origin and (pull) factors associated with the destination area. Although Lee (1966) does not explore forced migration in any detail other than opposing to its 'divorce' from other types of migration and a short reference to refugees in World War II, the following factors can typically be drawn for forced migration based on his definitions of push and pull factors.



While Lee's (1966) theory makes several assumptions, below are particularly relevant to this project:

- 1. There is no distinction between internal and external migration and no restriction between voluntary and involuntary migration.
- 2. While we can never exactly specify the factors that make a person move or stay, we can identify a few important ones and note the average or general action of a group.

Among the handful large-n studies in literature (with the exception of Davenport et al., 2003; Jenkins and Schmeidl, 1995; Melander and Öberg, 2007; Moore and Shellman, 2006; Rüegger and Bohnet, 2018; Salehyan, 2007; Schmeidl, 1997; Schmid and Programma Interdisciplinair Onderzoek Oorzaken naar van Mensenrechtenschendingen, 1996), most 'suffer from... an emphasis on "push" factors' (Davenport et al., 2003, p.29) and ignore or underestimate the pull-factors. While there has been limited efforts to balance the two, there is even less scrutiny on the factors that make some people stay in their original location. However, a theoretical framework on forced migration should be able to capture all the elements of this phenomenon's dynamic nature including the often forgotten: people that stay and people that are internally displaced. Therefore, by theorizing that the extent to which civilians are targeted in deadly conflicts determines the volume of forced migrants, this study aims to leave no piece of the puzzle invisible. The theoretical framework includes all (refugees and internal) forced migrants, pays attention to individual agency by interrogating why some people fled while others remained and expands the scope to social, economic and political drivers.

3.3 Main Concepts Revisited: Impact Of Time

Concepts such as lagged variables and time-series often come up in academic articles and dataset presentations of migration studies. Curiously, there is very little, if any, explanation of why they are important and what these concepts mean for forced migration research although it is not possible to conceptualize a theoretical framework of forced migration without them. Even though it may not be possible to reflect the precise impact of time for every empirical case, it is essential to discuss its relevance theoretically. Simple logic allows assuming that what happened in the past influences what happens in the future, keeping all else constant. To be precise, contrary to some literature, which argues that forced displacement is a spontaneous act unlike immigration (Wong, 2015), I posit that forced mobility results from a complex decision making process that causes a delay between action (drivers) and consequence (of moving or staying). If this decision was based on an impulse, then everyone would be expected to flee, but in reality many more people choose to stay behind. The delay may be due to reasons such as gathering information about travel arrangements, budgeting or personal health reasons that prevent from taking a very risky journey. For example, van Dalen and Henkins (2008, p.1) find that 'the potential emigrants who have not yet emigrated are in poorer health'. Economic drivers, such as change in unemployment typically have a delayed effect, too (Baltagi, 2008; Coen et al., 1969; De Jong and Gardner, 2014; Greenwood, 1970). It is reasonable to assume that some one who lost a job would initially be looking for employment in his or her hometown even in a job market condensed under the pressure of on going conflict; as the qualitative interviews in this study demonstrate (in Chapter 8), there is no evidence to the contrary. Similarly, people are not likely to make the decision to leave their homes the moment there is a violent conflict nearby.

Another assumption about the tricky issue of handling time is that there will be an increase in the volume of forced migrants at a constant rate in time. Of course, in reality, the rate of the number of forced migrants is not likely to increase at a perfectly constant rate. It is more likely that while initially there is some displacement, over time, the rate of growth in the volume of forced migrants changes. There may be patterns or periods

when net migration is no longer positive and the variances are irregular. So, even if we were theoretically able to visualize variances in the relationship between time and magnitude of forced migrants (by graphs), this would be an analytical tool at best, which does not necessarily lead to justifiable generalizations. Therefore, the relationship between time and forced migration should be taken as indicative rather than deterministic (Bandyopadhyaya, 1993). As such, while it is reasonable to consider delayed impact of economic indicators in particular, there is no definitive guidance to set how long this delay tends to be. Over time, replication of this study and other similar studies with refreshed data would help to understand more specific details about trends of forced migration and adjust the assumptions about impact of time in the decision to flee as necessary.

3.4 Modelling Forced Migration⁷

As a weakly established field within International Relations, with several gaps in literature and varying approaches from each social science, how should forced migration be modelled? As Molho (2013, p.526) admits, 'the literature derives from a number of different disciplines the various strands of which are rarely bound together into an integrated treatment, and often proceed with little or no exchange of reference'. The first step to overcome the 'fragmentation of academic effort' (Robinson, 1998, p.206) for this particular project is to define the research question precise enough to guide the theoretical framework, yet sophisticated enough to benefit from various disciplines and approaches rather than roam about different theories. Therefore, the

⁷ Parts of this section (in regards to the theoretical framework of the case study) draw on previously published article (Ozaltin et al., 2019).

main purpose of the theoretical framework here is to understand main (root and proximate) causes of variations in the volumes of forced migration populations.

Although there is recognition that there is a wide range of possible causes of forced migration, there have been efforts to come up with a more structural approach to be able to identify trends led by Clark (1989), who defined root and proximate causes and intervening factors in forced displacement. Root causes are 'underlying conditions, which generate continuous social friction' such as persistent oppression, 'ethnic or religious cleavages, weak state building, corruption or economic underdevelopment' (Apodaca, 1998, p.81; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al., 2014, p.319). Proximate drivers are related to root causes but they have a more direct role in the causal relationship with forced displacement such as violent conflicts, human rights violations including persecution (Van Hear et al., 2018, p.931). Finally, intervening factors such as expected reception in the asylum countries and physical or political obstacles to international flight have relatively less impact as causes of forced migration (Schmeidl, 1997). Davenport et al. (2003) deviate from this approach by emphasizing the importance of individual decision-making. What combination and level of these factors lead to mass volumes of displacement is an on going debate. However, it forms the puzzle for this study and inspires the theory that the extent to which civilians are targeted by root, proximate and intervening causes determines the volume of forced migration movements.


The second step is to determine the level of analysis: micro level theories are valuable to understand the individual process of staying or fleeing while meso theories focus on systems and networks that connect states by a complex system of links, although often-

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times data is not available or inadequate for empirical analysis of meso theories (Erf et al., 1995). Finally, macro level analysis focuses on analysis of push and pull factors of forced migration usually in a given country or area. An aggregate-level theoretical model implies that the sum of individual decisions of cost-benefit results in a macro outcome (Haug, 2008; Massey et al., 1993; Schelling, 2006); and by looking at the decisions at the aggregate level, a group average is obtained eliminating any 'marginal' or 'irrational' individuals (Haug, 2008; Massey et al., 1993; Schelling, 2006). A macro approach is suitable to analyse causes of forced migration because it is important to have a 'top-down' approach rather than the commonly used 'bottom-up' approach based on the controversial argument that 'it is often the choices of states and political actors that determine outcomes for the displaced' (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al., 2014, p.2).

Despite its limitation of only analysing aggregate data, a macro analysis is helpful for a comprehensive look at the forced migration puzzle, so that it breaks the barriers of isolated case studies or existing literature's general focus on refugees and civil wars. This approach underlies the causal mechanism, which is the next step of building the theoretical framework. Studies of violence-induced forced migration can be divided into two groups according to the direction of their causal mechanism: some studies analyse how forced migrants can be a source of conflict in their destination or if 'refugees are an important source of conflict diffusion' (Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006). Others (such as Adhikari, 2012; Bakewell, 2008; Balcells and Steele, 2016, 2016; Betts, 2009; Bohnet et al., 2018; Davenport et al., 2003; Jenkins and Schmeidl, 1995; Melander and Öberg, 2007, 2006; Rüegger and Bohnet, 2018; Schmeidl, 1997; Schmidt, 2019; Steele, 2011, 2009), including this project, reverse this causal mechanism and analyse how political violence causes variations in the flight waves. Once root and proximate causes of forced migration variations are determined, a third approach may be to analyse the possibility of a reciprocal relationship between the two. Therefore, the study begins with a macro level analysis (of a global scale) whereby its findings bridge into individual-level analysis (with a case study of Iraq and qualitative interviews) and sheds light on the power of agency in the decision to flee. Below Diagram 1 illustrates the causal mechanism of this project.

Diagram 1: The Causal Mechanism of Forced Migration



Potential migrants go through a complex decision making process before they decide to take a risky journey away from their home, be it within or beyond the borders of their home country. Since origins of cost-benefit analysis is traced back to welfare economics in the 19th century (Pearce, 1983), naturally, it is commonly associated with economic gains. However, it can be used to include to a wide range of benefits and costs in addition to material means such as living in a country with civil and political liberties versus living under the threat persecution, which can push/pull forced migrants.

As Diagram one shows, push factors such as political repression, persecution and civil war may push people away and may be processed as costs, while pull factors such as democratic rights, feeling of security and prospects of a better quality of life may be seen as benefits for individuals. After careful consideration and gathering relevant information (such as financial means for travel and relocation, required travel documents or obtaining networks for irregular movement), potential migrants may decide to stay in their homes if they conclude that the costs of moving exceed the benefits. Exceeding costs may be due to issues such as not having enough money for a long journey, but it may also be health or family related and include tough decisions such as leaving close family or even dependents behind. In that case, migrants face a strong probability of physical suffering (or death) caused by persecution, torture or other politically motivated attacks.

If benefits of moving exceed costs, then migration intention forms, which prompts potential migrants to look for possible locations. At this point, in spite of the aspiration to move, there may not be an opportunity to do so, which would inevitably lead to

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remaining at home and endure strong probability of suffering and even death. However, remaining potential migrants would have the option to move either internally within their own country or to another one. Migrants would then choose to relocate to the place that offers the best opportunity in terms of their cost-benefit analysis. This process may end if the migrants are satisfied in their first place of asylum as long as they are content that their benefits exceed the costs, but if they conclude otherwise, the relocation process would continue until they are satisfied.

Main causes of forced migration for those that choose to flee can be summarized in the following diagram 2. As discussed in Literature Review (in Chapter 2), political violence, social and economic factors are all drivers of forced displacement. Increasing number of deaths in armed conflicts is likely to drive more people away. However, there is not consensus on the explanatory power of economic variables and not all types of violence have been analysed along with social and economic drivers previously.

Therefore, diagram 2 summarizes the causal mechanism between root and proximate drivers and forced displacement, but it also presents the main puzzle since interactions between political, economic and social drivers are not clear: do economic factors simply work as an accelerator during violent political conflicts or do they have a more direct effect? Do all types of violence drive people away? Do trends vary significantly between the IDPs and refugees? Based on the strong possibility that there is some level of interaction between social, economic and political factors, the theoretical framework can only prove useful by including both root and proximate causes shown in the diagram below, leading to the following hypotheses:




Diagram 2: Causes of Forced Migration (Root and Proximate Drivers)

*H*₁: *The higher the intensity of violence, the higher the number of forced migrants.*

The hypothesis is based on the idea that as more people lose their lives in armed conflicts, the perceived threat felt by potential migrants increase, too (Melander and Öberg, 2007), pushing them to move away from the threat. While overall violence intensity is a commonly used predictor in literature, the impact of direct versus indirect violence (targeting others close the forced migrants) and type of violence (e.g. verbal and physical abuse, torture, imprisonment) are not and need more attention. In particular, it is curious why some people choose to stay in their homes despite experiences of direct or indirect violence. Proximity to the centre of violence can also affect the number of people that flee. For instance, Melander and Öberg (2007)

conclude that how much urban centres are affected by violent conflict has a significant effect on the variation of forced migrant numbers. However, their analysis (along with previous studies) does not include all main types of violent events such as terrorism. A theoretical framework about causes of forced migration would be incomplete without taking all these aspects of violence into consideration.

There are also non-violent political factors that may impact people's decision to flee. In particular, there is a general agreement that strength of political institutions and freedom in a country impacts this decision. However, there is no certainty about how socioeconomic factors may impact this relationship since previous studies (Davenport et al., 2003; Khawaja et al., 2011; Melander and Öberg, 2007; Schmeidl, 1997; Stanley, 1987) have not shown declining economic prosperity as one of the main drivers of forced migration. Would people be more likely to put up with an oppressive regime provided that they have favourable economic opportunities? This leads to the second hypothesis, which tests the relationship between freedom of political and civil liberties and the decision to flee based on the expectation that weak democratic regimes and institutions push people away to seek destinations with political freedom and rights:

H₂: The higher the political freedoms, the lower the volume of forced migrants generated by a country.

Political freedom, defined as 'the absence of coercion by others and by the government', (Ashby, 2010, p.51), is known to increase economic freedom (Barkley and McMillan, 1994, p.393). More importantly, political freedom is a very valuable good, which responds to the 'intrinsic human capacity to make autonomous decisions about available

options' (Bauder, 2018, p.7). If individuals' free will is under oppression, they are likely to move to places where they can exercise their political and civil liberties. We know from previous literature that this is a proven causal relationship when it comes to overall international migration (Geddes, 2016), however, whether this relationship is significant in the case of forced displacement needs probing and is the focus of the second hypothesis. While the large-n study approaches this hypothesis from a global perspective, the case study of Iraq and interviews with refugees and asylum seekers in the UK attempt to fill in the blanks left by the aggregate level data utilized in the large-n study.

Unlike voluntary migration, the study also hypothesizes that close family ties increases the odds of migration because of concerns about the security of family members. While married people are less likely to migrate because of the higher costs of relocating the whole family, according to the voluntary migration literature (Cooke, 2008; Mincer, 1978; Mueller, 1982), this may not be the case in the case of forced migration, as the cost of leaving part of the family behind may be higher than moving together: they may have to face a life-threatening situation, and/or they may not be able to unite for an extended period because they are living in a conflict zone. These considerations lead to the following hypothesis:

H₃: There is a positive relationship between the decision to flee and having a family.

The next hypothesis focuses on income level assuming that low income in the area of origin can act as a push factor, while higher levels of income can cause people to remain

in their homes, even under the threat or memories of violence. Specifically, higher income implies better economic opportunities (Adhikari, 2012), leading to economic freedom and suggesting that economic opportunity is likely to have a major role in micro-level decision-making. Economic freedom is commonly described as 'the freedom to benefit from the fruit of one's labour through voluntary exchange while allowing this same right to others' (Ashby, 2010, p.51). Economic hardship may be push factor, making locations with relatively better economic freedom attractive to potential migrants. This leads to the following hypothesis:

*H*₄: *Prospects of economic freedom in the intended destination drives people to flee.*

Respondents with permanent jobs will be less likely to move; however, if their career perspectives are considerably below their education level, they may still seek an alternative location to build wealth, leading to a better future. The literature concentrates on the education level of refugees and potential issues it may create in the destination country (Dryden-Peterson, 2016; Hartog and Zorlu, 2009; Vally and Spreen, 2012), with less effort made to understand the relationship between the level of education in a country with on-going armed conflict and the intention to migrate. The common approach relies on the assumption that potential refugees and internally displaced people are not well educated in general, thereby suggesting better education waves leading to the following hypothesis:

H₅: The higher the levels of educational qualifications during political unrest, the more people are likely to migrate, in manner much like voluntary economic migration.

Additionally, there is the question of whether positive expectations about the end of the conflict will decrease the odds of migration. Specifically, the expectation is that respondents who think the conflict is likely to stop within the next three years are less likely to migrate than respondents who think it will continue. Where individual agency plays into the decision-making of leaving or staying is not entirely clear.

Analysing impact and interaction of economic and political freedom as drivers of forced displacement is also essential to understand why majority of people remain instead of fleeing from their homes. This is often the case even for outliers such as Syria, which generated 6.7 million refugees as of 2018 (UNHCR Global Trends, 2018), yet its population before the civil war was 21 million. Why most people remain is a part of the forced migration puzzle, which cannot be answered if the theoretical framework is limited to the idea that violent conflict is the only main factor affecting migration decisions. However, the fact that majority of people do remain in their original locations is a testament to the need for a nuanced choice-centred approach as Adhikari (2013, 2012) argues. What this means is that there are either other powerful drivers than political violence or other factors that are interacting with it.

What are the conditions that allow some people to cope with the situation they are in while others choose to flee then? Here, analysing individual responses can 'add significant value to our understanding of the causes of displacement' (Adhikari, 2013,

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p.88) because 'poor governance, political instability and the failure to protect human rights' (typically counted causes of forced migration) clearly do not answer why some individuals decide to endure these circumstances (Zetter, 2014, p.21). This is where rational choice approach particularly shows its strength since it helps to reflect individual agency and can be expanded to include the complex interactions between main drivers of forced displacement beyond the 'matter of either/or' of leaving (Crépeau et al., 2006, p.83). By having more specific individual data, it is possible to reach more decisive findings and have the opportunity to eliminate ambiguities about previous findings in literature about the impact of drivers other than political violence.

3.5 Conclusion

Solving the puzzle of forced migration clearly calls for a theoretical framework that encompasses more than one level of analysis to answer, which factors are stronger drivers, which coexist and which interact or intersect with each other. These are the questions that will help to develop theories of forced migration one step ahead of where it is today. In doing so, does this study build a theoretical framework that can lead to identifying and assessing power of each driver of forced displacement? It is certainly not the aim of this study to do so as it would not benefit theoretical development (which could also potentially contribute to policy development). The probability of achieving such a goal is not higher than coming up with a grand theory of forced migration. As Hirshleifer (1985), De Wet (2006, 20) and Evers et al. (2011, 199) quote a UNHCR (1993, p.1) document in support of a similar research path, 'there are as many reasons for moving as there are migrants'.

The most important challenge is rather the question of how forced migration trends can be identified. Therefore, what this framework provides instead is a path to a deeper understanding of main causes of forced migration during deadly armed conflicts based on the theory that *the extent to which civilians are targeted during political violence causes variations in the expected number of forced migration flows*. Clearly, the theoretical framework of such a complicated phenomenon cannot be sufficiently supported by a single research method as the following Chapter explains.

CHAPTER 4 A MIXED METHODS STUDY OF CAUSES OF FORCED MIGRATION

Our individual methods may be flawed, but fortunately, the flaws are not identical. A diversity of imperfection allows us to combine methods... to compensate for their particular faults and imperfections (Tashakkori and Teddlie, p. 40, 1998).

4.1 Introduction: Using Mixed Methods To Examine Decision Making

This chapter discusses the methodology in answering the research question and it offers clarification of the process taken in analysing forced migration flows. It also describes the procedures employed for interviews of refugees and the estimation of the effects of predictors in both the large-n study and the case study of Iraq. In doing so, it maps out the data needed to answer the research questions outlined in Chapter 1 first for the large-n study and finally for the interviews. The third section describes the methods of data analyses. The fourth section discusses data quality and the final section discusses research ethics. Chapter 1 formulated the specific research question as restated below:

What causes variations in the number of people that flee following deadly armed conflicts?

4.2 Revisiting Research Questions And Identifying The Data Needed To Answer The Questions

As stated in Chapter 1, the main research question of the thesis can be formulated as follows based on the theory that the extent to which civilians are targeted in an armed conflict causes variation in the expected number of forced migration flows: what causes variations in the volume of displaced populations that flee within or outside the borders of their countries during armed conflicts? Is it intensity of violence or threat to freedom that weighs more in the decision-making? The focus of the research question is on two particular categories of displaced people: refugees and internally displaced people. The first is to understand the reasons that push or pull migrants beyond the borders of their homeland versus staying in their origin and the second is to examine the factors that cause migrants to move within their country only. Examining these processes requires a flexible model that allows to look at these two groups separately so that one is not 'invisible' (particularly the internally displaced people), but also not isolated from each other because it is possible for a displaced person to also move within these two groups.

Additionally, the methodology should not be limited to one single country or nationstate since this is a global phenomenon. Finally, tackling forced displacement entails mastering more than a single-type of research method or scientific discipline as discussed earlier in Chapter 1. A mixed methods design of a large-n study, a case study and semi-structured interviews meets these requirements: first, a global analysis of forced displacement examines the impact of intensity of violence and freedom level in the decision to flee or stay; second, migration intentions are analysed with case study of post-Saddam Iraq; finally, qualitative interviews give voice to the second largest forced migrant group (after IDPs): refugees.

Before detailing the methodology of this project, it necessary to explain what I mean with mixed methods since there is 'lack of conceptual clarity' in the literature (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2010, 1998) about its definition. It is also common for research methods books to have only one—if any—and relatively brief chapter on mixed methods (e.g. Bryman, 2016; Creswell, 2014; Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). The simple definition of mixed methods is combining both quantitative and qualitative research methods, it is still essential to explain why this project chooses to follow this approach so that the methodology is not mistaken for what Datta (1994, p.59) called 'mixed-up models'.

The main reasons of using mixed methods approach in this study are not different than others that have also opted for the same methods.⁸ First of all, good research is not about choosing a positivist versus constructivist approach, more words over numbers or a large-n study instead of a case study. A good research is open to address the research question with any methodological tool available. This is not to say that methodology is any less important, however, availability of methods should not limit or shape the research question since all methods have limitations. Therefore, the most important benefit that comes with mixed methods is the freedom to 'think outside the box', away from the boundaries of a monomethod or a specific discipline. This approach becomes particularly useful for projects that view the research question as a puzzle—such as this study of forced migration—as opposed to dividing the puzzle into even more pieces just to ensure that a single chosen method can 'fit' the research. Consequently, the second benefit is the potential for further discovery in the wider universe this approach creates. Finally, mixed methods minimize the inevitable shortcomings of quantitative and qualitative methods, but does it not have shortcomings itself? Creswell (2005, p.270) puts 'the changing and expanding definitions of mixed

⁸ According to Greene et al. (1989) there are five purposes for using mixed methods: triangulation, complementarity, initiation, development and expansion.

methods research' to the top his 'controversies' specific to these methods. However, as Greene (2008, p.20) argues, it is actually 'a good thing' that 'this domain remains unsettled': 'For unsettling the settled, challenging the taken-for-granted, offering a discordant voice in an otherwise harmonious choir—these represent the grand potential of mixed methods social inquiry'.

Supporting the view that the distinction between quantitative and qualitative research is abstract (along with Denzin and Lincoln, 2005 and Allwood, 2012), this project uses a global time-series analysis, a case study and refugee interviews as discussed in the following section to benefit from all these advantages while remaining aware of each method's limitations.

4.3 Data Analysis

4.3.1 Large-N Study

The main purpose of the large-n study is to be able to identify trends of forced displacement movements by analysing time-series data globally between 1970-2016. Although there have been previous studies of forced migration based on time-series data (e.g. Schmeidl, 1997; Moore and Shellman, 2004), there is no data set that includes all of the variables that might be relevant to the study of forced migration, such as political (violence related), social, economic and demographic variables. Without such a data set, a researcher has to skip back and forth from one piece of data to another and that is problematic for two reasons: first is the risk of oversight of the big puzzle while trying to make sense of the pieces; second is the incompatibility issues between different data sets. Although it is not possible to include every factor for every individual, it is possible to identify main factors that go beyond an oversimplified look

at the relationship between armed conflicts and the decision to flee or stay, however, such a detailed analysis requires several datasets to be merged and it is this approach that shapes the large-n study of this project.

4.3.1.1 The Universe Of Cases And Case Selection

The large-n study includes 193 states listed by the UNHCR for the 1970-2016 period.⁹ This time frame is not a random choice; missing data of forcibly displaced people in UNHCR records decreases significantly from the 1970s, which makes meaningful regression analysis possible. Including all the states (listed in the 'peoples of concern' of the UNHCR) instead of concentrating on a specific group of states or regions provides an opportunity to identify trends and make comparisons, but it also prevents selection bias by including states that do not produce any forced migrants in a given year in the universe of cases, too.

The UNHCR data is matched with deadly armed conflict data from UCDP. Any cases that have generated forced migrants related to reasons other than deadly political violence (e.g. famines, natural disasters or unintentional human-made disasters such as a nuclear leak) remain outside the scope of this study. However, there are also cases that generated significant number of forced migrants without matching battle fatalities in the same period of migration; these are included in the universe of cases because of their likely association with deadly armed conflicts and listed in Appendix D. The annual data by country is also inclusive of the years with no forced migrants to avoid selection bias; this approach also provides an opportunity to analyse the reasons behind

⁹ For the purpose of avoiding selection bias, the annual data of displaced people by country does not exclude years with no forced migrants.

why some people stay while others leave when they are faced with deadly political violence.

While observations that are due to natural disasters are explained, they are not excluded because even though they may not immediately and directly cause forced displacement, natural disasters may 'disrupt a state's provision of public goods' and also 'provide opportunities for rebel groups' (Bohnet et al., 2018, p.33), leading to circumstances that push people away. Furthermore, what is generally considered environmental disaster may also turn out to be a political phenomenon, too. For instance, Turton (2003, p.9) points to Sen's (2010) findings about people starving in a famine because of their 'insufficient entitlement to food, a political issue, not because there is insufficient food available'. To sum up, the link between natural disasters and political violence-induced forced migration may not always be significant, but it cannot be overlooked, either; therefore, they are included in the universe of cases and explicitly marked.

4.3.1.2 Operationalization Of Variables

The selection of the variables in this study are based on the following criteria: 1) relevance of the variable to the theory and to the conceptualization of forced migration in this study; 2) relevance and contribution of the variable to existing literature.

For the purpose of identifying relevant determinants of forced migration, the large-n study investigates not only the effect of relevant independent variables, but also the impacts of other controlling factors that have some explanatory power in this relationship. Although it is not possible to identify all reasons of decision-making, the goal here is to focus on the major drivers, therefore, the dataset includes variables from

various datasets including forced migration and armed conflicts and control variables including freedom ratings and socio-economic variables as shown in Table 4.3.1.2. The table shows that some of the variables are logarithmically transformed to make patterns in the data more interpretable and to reduce the effect of outliers.¹⁰ Employment is lagged t-1 year based on the rationale that unemployment is likely to have a delayed effect on the decision to flee considering it is a sign of worsening economic standards.

Variables	Operationalization	Source
Dependent variable:	Number of net displaced people	UNHCR
Net displaced		
Country	Country code	COW
Total deaths (i)	No. of all deaths in an armed conflict	UCDP
Civilian deaths (i)	No. of all civilian deaths in an armed conflict	UCDP
Terrorism deaths (i)	No. of all deaths due to a terror attack	GTD
Freedom	Not free=0; partially free=1; free=2	Freedom
		House
Religious oppression	%100 - % largest religion	ARDA
Ethnic dispersion	%100 - % largest ethnicity	EPR
GDP per capita	Growth in total GDP/ country	World Bank
growth	population	
Unemployment (ii)	% of unemployed in total labour force	World Bank
Poverty ratio	Poverty head count ratio (% of population)	World Bank
Pop. (urban/rural) (i)	Total number of people living in rural/urban	World Bank

i: variables were logarithmically transformed

ii: variables were lagged.

4.3.1.3 Dependent Variable

The dependent variable (DV) is the number of net displaced people by country of origin

and year and is based on the UNHCR's 'peoples of concern' data (including IDPs) for

¹⁰ The DV, net number of forced migrants was not logged since it is a count variable and previous research (e.g. O'Hara and Kotze, 2010) finds that such transformations perform poorly. Besides, zero-inflated negative binomial regression is a particularly proper model for count data, which makes transformation of the count variable unnecessary.

1970 and 2016. The DV was calculated by subtracting the sum of displaced people each year from the previous year. This is to ensure that migrant numbers are not inflated because the UNHCR reports the number of migrants by country of origin in a given year, which means that the following year will also include the previous year's number of displaced people.

The focus on the net number of displaced people on a global scale prevents selection bias that is inherent in case or regional studies.¹¹ Attention on the country of origin is also important to understand the initial stage of decision-making, which is the focus of this project. It is also not possible to answer the research question (of what drivers of forced migration are and how they affect forced migrant volumes) without having a DV that counts the number of net migrants by country and year globally; the DV makes it possible to discuss historical trends and odds of migration under given controlling variables.

While the UN has been collecting the forced migrants data in consultation with each government for decades, presenting and utilizing forced displacement data cannot be isolated from reliability and validity issues discussed in Chapter 4: unit of analysis is country-year, although some forced migrants may rather identify themselves according to their region of origin; definition of a refugee is a disputed matter in the literature; and while the UN collects official data from governments around the world, there are also an unknown number of unaccounted forced migrants. Nevertheless, the UNHCR

¹¹ This is not to undermine the importance of case studies. On the contrary, while large-n studies can only provide average effect of independent variables (IVs), case studies can analyse their effect deeper.

data has the advantage of including refugees, internally displaced people and asylum seekers as opposed to some other data sets.¹²

The number of net displaced people by country is a count DV variable. Count variables 'indicate the number of times a particular event occurs to each case, usually within some domain of observation such as a given time period, population size, or geographical area' (Orme and Combs-Orme, 2009, p.189). It will become evident that this is the right choice when building the models as demonstrated later in this Chapter since a count DV cannot be negative or fractional. This assumption is based on the idea that the DV is counting the number of people who obviously cannot be negative or physically divided. However, it is also important to discuss why this method may lead to excessive zeros in the DV and what this implies for the models.

There may be two different reasons for the response variable to have zeros: it may either be due to the truncation of negative values or (although less likely) it may be the case that the number of people resulting from subtracting the sum of displaced people each year from the previous year is zero. The models will have to be able to account for these different reasons of having excessive zeros in the DV. They will also have to be able to distinguish between missing data and zero in the response variable since none of the zeros in the DV should be considered as missing data.

Although previous research has found temporal dependences in forced migration data from one year to the other, Melander and Öberg (2006, p.129) find 'that the accumulated

¹² Other options for relevant datasets either also were based on the UN data or only reported a specific forced migrant category: Migration Policy Institute reports refugees and asylums seekers; U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants focuses on refugees; OECD does not include IDPs, either. Therefore, the UNHCR is the logical choice for the DV data.

stock of forced migrants decreases rather than increasing the probability of new migration' and 'forced migrant flows abate rather than soar over time'. Considering the previous findings, I first run the models by controlling for the time delay forced migrants would experience in the decision to leave and then without controlling for it. However, comparing the results, I have decided not to lag the (DV) the net number of forced migrants because of the following reasons: 1) lagging the DV inflated the coefficients of some of the independent variables although their significance did not vary from one model to another and this introduces a research bias; 2) some previous studies (e.g. Brandt et al., 2000, p.825) provide evidence that lagging a DV in a count model is problematic because it only works when there is time series 'with exponential growth rates and no dynamics' (increase in number, at a constantly growing rate), which clearly contradicts the dynamism of forced migration.

4.3.1.4 Independent Variables

Below is the introduction of independent variables of political violence and social and economic control variables. A complete list of operationalization of variables is available in Table 1.

Political violence

'Political violence involves a heterogeneous repertoire of actions oriented at inflicting physical, psychological, and symbolic damage to individuals and/or property with the intention of influencing various audiences for affecting or resisting political, social, and/or cultural change' (Della Porta et al., 2015, p.1). Correlations between mobility and political violence have been the most discussed aspect of forced migration as the most visible drivers of forced displacement. In this study, political violence is used to

refer to armed conflicts with deadly consequences including, non-state conflict, onesided violence and terrorism. The conflict data is from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)/PRIO Georeferenced Event data set, which records an event as armed conflict if it is 'an incident where armed force was used by an organized actor against another organized actor, or against civilians', resulting in at least '25 battle related deaths at a specific location and a specific date' (Croicu and Sundberg, 2017, p.9). The data set defines armed force as 'use of arms in order to promote the parties' general position in the conflict, resulting in deaths' (Croicu and Sundberg, 2017, p.9).¹³

The UCDP does not 'classify any type of violence' as terrorism; instead it evaluates events according to their targets. Therefore, its one-sided violence category 'often overlaps' with lethal terrorism events.¹⁴ However, it is not possible to fully analyse the relationship between terrorism and forced displacement movements without looking at terrorism related deaths independently.¹⁵ The Global Terrorism Dataset compensates for this missing piece. Models are run separately for total battle deaths (from UCDP), civilian deaths (from UCDP) and terrorism related deaths (from GTD) for each migrant category (total/refugee and asylum seekers/IDPs); so no one event appears twice in one model.

The GTD is suitable for this study with its similarity to the UCDP/PRIO data set in terms of its 'event-based' approach; and the data can easily be filtered by the

¹³ Although the UCDP/PRIO data set is dyadic, it also provides 'the country in which the event takes place', which makes reconciliation with the rest of the data in this project possible since country is the unit of analysis here (Croicu and Sundberg, 2017, p.6).

¹⁴ Uppsala Universitet Department of Peace and Conflict Research. Available at https://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/faq/#How_does_terrorism_fit_into_the_UCDP_s_categ ories_of_organized_violence (accessed 13 July 2018).

¹⁵ Although the Global Peace Index recorded slight improvements in peace in 2016, it also reported that the terrorism impact indicator had the largest deterioration with 60 per cent of countries having higher levels of terrorism than a decade ago.

corresponding state of each 'event' location; it includes terrorist events around the world from 1970; and it provides casualties for each event with no minimum threshold.¹⁶

Intensity of violence

Total deaths

The models use three variables to test the impact of intensity of violence: total deaths, civilian deaths and terrorism related deaths. Separating civilian and terrorism related fatalities from the overall intensity of violence detail their impact on volume of forced migration. The expectation for all three is the same: increases in intensity of violence correspond to increases in the number of forced migrants. First of these variables, total deaths, is the sum of the best estimate of deaths sustained by side a (deaths_a) and the best estimate of deaths sustained by side b (deaths_b) in conflict according to UCDP/PRIO.¹⁷

Civilian deaths

Civilian deaths, also from the UCDP/PRIO dataset, are 'the best estimate of dead civilians' in a conflict 'event' (Croicu and Sundberg, 2017, p.7). Civilian deaths are the

¹⁶ Close examination of the fatalities data from PRIO, GTD and the UNCHR reveals discrepancies. There are cases with net migration in a given year from a state, but no matching fatalities in PRIO or GTD data as listed in Appendix D. There are three explanations for this discrepancy: one is that these migration cases are not a consequence of armed-conflict but natural disasters such as famine, draught, earthquakes and hurricanes. To check if this is the case I compared the data to the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) supported Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT). Another explanation is robustness of the data. Finally, there is missing data since not all conflict data is available before 1990. The reason for going through this process instead of including only the list of countries with armed-conflict fatalities matching the UN list of forced migrants is to prevent selection bias in the research.

¹⁷ Side a or side b is always equal to 0 for one-sided violence events although this becomes irrelevant for the total deaths variable created for this project since it sums both sides.

focus among all types of fatalities in testing the effect of intensity of violence because majority of forced migrants are civilians.

Terrorism deaths

Terrorism related deaths were obtained by using GTD's 'nkill' variable, which 'is the number of total confirmed fatalities for' each 'incident' including 'all victims and attackers who died as a direct result of the incident' (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2017, p.48). Total civilian deaths were calculated by summing all terrorism related casualties by year and country.

Freedom

Earlier literature includes democracy level as one of the non-violent factors affecting forced migration (Davenport et al., 2003; Melander and Öberg, 2004; Schmeidl, 1997) because it is reasonable to expect people to be more likely to leave when their political and civil freedom is limited under an oppressive regime. The variable for freedom in this study is from Freedom House because the organization conceptualizes and measures freedom by including both political and civil liberties in its rating for each country (Freedom House, 2020). An alternative would be POLITY Project's data, which is also commonly utilized by researchers. However, POLITY Project usually correlates with violence data, which would inflate the coefficients in this study since there is already a political violence variable (intensity of violence). Additionally, unlike Freedom House, 'POLITY Project's measurements of democracy and autocracy are rather executive-heavy' (Sen, 2010) and leads to the problematic methodology of measuring democracy without civil liberties. Since this study's focus is on forcibly

displaced people who are often stripped off both their democratic and civil rights, Freedom House data becomes the natural choice.

Freedom House groups its observations into three: 'free', 'partly free' and 'not free' states. A country receives two ratings, one for political and the other for civil liberties. Each rating is made up of scores resulting from a list of questions.¹⁸ The average of the Political Rights and Civil Liberties scores determines whether a country is 'free' or not. If countries are 'free' this score is between 1 and 2.5; 'partly free' between 3 and 5.0' and 'not free' between 5.5 and 7. How much a state scores depends on '10 political rights indicators and 15 civil liberties indicators, which take the form of questions; a score of 0 represents the smallest degree of freedom and 4 the greatest degree of freedom'.¹⁹ I expect level of freedom to be directly associated with the decision to stay or leave during armed conflicts. I have recoded the three groups as below to give them numerical values:

not free = 0 partly free = 1 free = 2

Social and economic variables

The focus in forced migration studies generally remains on trigger events such as civil wars. Existing social and economic conditions are often ignored or underestimated because they may not be as visible, particularly when they do not directly or

¹⁸ See https://freedomhouse.org/report/methodology-freedom-world-2018 for the list of questions and corresponding scores.

¹⁹ For a list of indicators, see Freedom House: Methodology (2018) at https://freedomhouse.org/report/methodology-freedom-world-2018.

independently impact forced migration flows. Including such variables in research is challenging because there are more non-violent factors of forced migration than a regression table can count; however, it is possible to focus on the main social and economic drivers such as ethnic and religious divisions or troublesome economic conditions in a society. Without these non-violent controlling factors, it is also difficult to explain why some people prefer to remain (instead of migrating). The following factors have previously been discussed in relevant literature (though in a relatively limited capacity) and are revisited as follows.

Ethnic diversity

Although previous research discusses the impact of certain ethnic groups in host states (Krcmaric, 2014) and expulsion of ethnic minorities (Chatty, 2013), here the focus is on a less explored aspect: whether ethnic concentration plays a role in the decision to flee with the expectation that ethnically divided countries are more likely to generate forced migrants. Moore and Shellman (2004) previously did not find impact of ethnic composition of a state significant as a driver of forced displacement, however, their focus was on civil wars, whereas this project's focus is not limited to a certain type of armed conflict.

The ethnic diversity variable is based on the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) Dataset (Vogt et al., 2015), which annually reports size and share of ethnic population by country including the 1970-2016 period.²⁰ I also follow Constant et al.'s (2013) logic, which focuses on ethnic concentration, defined as the size of the ethnic groups relative

²⁰ EPR includes countries with a population of at least 250,000 and where ethnicity has been politicized.

to the population of each country. Obtaining this data for the EPR, I then subtract the largest percentage of ethnic group from 100 per cent.²¹ This is based on the expectation that an ethnically divided state is more likely to experience political violence, which may then lead to forced displacement. EPR also provides 'power status' of each ethnic group in a country, which is particularly useful to understand the dynamics of ethnicity in a society where power of an ethnic group does not necessarily correspond to the size of its population.

Religious diversity

Although the literature has not specifically focused on the relationship between religious diversity and forced migration (compared to its focus on ethnic conflicts), it is a control variable here based on recent findings. For example, research by Kolbe and Henne (2014, p. 665) found that 'state-driven religious repression, in particular religious bans, tends to increase forced migration'. Moreover, as Toft (2012, p.5) points out, 'religiously-inspired violence' is known to be more deadly than other types of violence and therefore directly relates to the research question of this study.

Similar to the logic of ethnic concentration, I argue that a religiously divided society is more likely to experience tensions and possibly oppression of one or more of the religious groups. I measure religious diversity by subtracting the percentage of the largest religion in a country from 1 (100 per cent); this measurement does not necessarily correspond to the power of a particular religious group since there are cases such as Iraq before 2003 and current Syria where a smaller religious group suppresses

²¹ On theoretical and methodological issues about how to measure politicized ethnic relations, see McDoom and Gisselquist (2016); they define four particular 'sensitivity' challenges related to choice of measure, categorization, time and space.

the larger one, however, similar to ethnic concentration, it shows whether a state is religiously divided or not. The World Religion Dataset provides global ratio of all religions by country and although the latest report is from 2010 and is not a crosssectional time series data like the conflict data.

GDP per capita growth

Can poor economic circumstances be a push factor for people during deadly armed conflicts? One of the main economic indicators is gross domestic product per capita, defined as 'the aggregate of production divided by the population size' (UN Statistics Division, 2019).²² GDP per capita is widely used in forced migration literature, but mainly to assess the impact – not the cause – of forced displacement.²³ However, GDP per capita growth is a stronger indicator than GDP alone because a high GDP does not necessarily mean good standard of living: a country with a high GDP and an overwhelmingly large population would result in a low GDP per capita and create a rather unfavourable distribution of income among its citizens, potentially pushing people away and how this relationship folds during armed conflicts is what interests this study.

The GDP per capita growth was calculated by using the GDP per capita data from the Databank (World Bank), which provides access to time series data and allows creating customized reports. However, it is explored as part of interactions terms instead of an

²² The growth in per capita GDP is derived as the percentage change in GDP divided by the population.

 $^{^{23}}$ During the few times it was included as a driver of forced migration, it led to conflicting findings as discussed in Chapter 2, which makes it an important variable to revisit.

IV since it was not significant in any of the models. The remainder of economic variables explained below also come from the same Databank.

Unemployment

Change in GDP per capita by itself is not adequate to conclude whether economic indicators drive forced displacement because it emphasizes economic output regardless of growing output's costs to society such as income disparity. However, one cannot think of income disparity without also considering unemployment, the percentage of total labour force (modelled on International Labour Organisation (ILO) estimate) in a country. What interests this study is whether unemployment plays a major role in increasing the number of forced migrants during armed conflicts.²⁴

Population (of country, urban, rural, in slums)

The UN (2014) estimates that 70 per cent of the global population will be living in urban areas by 2050 and although inter-state and civil wars have been declining over the last decades, urban areas have increasingly become centres of other types of armed conflict (IISS, 2017). This trend makes population density relevant for causes of forced migration in the urban areas with armed conflict. Melander and Öberg (2006, p.139) explain this rationale as following: 'the number of people affected by the violence, and hence the number of people who might feel threatened enough to flee, ought to increase the larger the area affected by the fighting and the more urban centres are affected'. To explore this relationship, I use the World Bank's time series population data as it provides specific types of population such as those living in urban versus rural

²⁴ A recent study by Betts and Collier (2017) recommends creation of more Special Economic Zones' (SEZs) as one of the ways to tackle the global 'refugee problem' assuming that providing jobs is the main basic need of refugees.

areas and population living in slums. For instance, I expect people living in urban areas to be in more (economically) vulnerable situations, potentially, pushing people to areas with better standards of living.

4.3.1.5 Choosing The Appropriate Regression Models

Finding the determinants of forced migration during deadly armed conflicts requires not only the impact of political violence as independent variables, but also effect of social and economic control variables. As the presentation of all the variables in the previous section demonstrates, this requires merging several datasets since there is not a single dataset that includes all relevant variables. All the datasets are merged by reconciling by country names based on COW codes. After merging datasets, I first examine all the variables one by one, then sort the data by time and year and set it for time series panel data before starting any analysis.

Although ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions cannot work with cross sectional time series data, I verify violation of the following OLS regression assumptions and which type of regression is suitable becomes clear during this process (Beck and Katz, 1995; Baum, 2001): the DV is the net number of displaced, which can be considered as count data. There are several evidences for violation of OLS regression assumptions: count data are highly non-normal and are not typically well estimated by OLS regression; scatter plots of the variables show non-linear relationships between the independent variables and the dependent variable; there are some outliers such as Columbia and Syria; there is some heteroscedasticity; and although normality of residuals is not a requirement of multiple regression, OLS requires that the residuals

(errors) should be approximately normally distributed whereas in the models constructed here, the residuals are not normally distributed.

Finally, I also define the data as 'panel' and (Lagram-Multiplier) test for serial autocorrelation (serial autocorrelation is defined only for a time series) in the data to see if the assumption of independence of observations (i.e. independence of residuals) is violated.²⁵ Presence of serial correlation is important to test because it causes the standard errors of the coefficients to be smaller than they actually are and higher R-squared (Hamilton, 1994; Wooldridge, 2002). The null for the Lagram-Multiplier test is no serial autocorrelation and I strongly reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation (p=0.000).²⁶ Since the data is clearly cross-sectional time series, OLS regression would not be appropriate anyway, but these violations of OLS assumptions also confirm that another type of regression should be used and examination of data lead to the following:

The DV, net displaced people, is a count variable since it is tracking the number of people that have been forcibly displaced and therefore cannot be any other number than an integer. For count DVs the regression typically used is Poisson (Agresti, 2013). However, visualization through histograms show that the data is also over dispersed, which renders the assumption that variance is equal to the mean (for Poisson distribution of count data). An alternative is negative binomial regression since it allows the variance to differ from the mean (UCLA IDRE, 2011).

²⁵ Serial autocorrelation tests apply to panels with long time series (over 20-30 years) and therefore are the right choice for the data in this project.

²⁶ This means clustering of data is not going to be a problem. The test result also produces the note 'country unbalanced', which refers to the fact that some countries do not have data for some years, but this is already a known characteristic of the data and it does not prevent running models with it.

The regressions also have to be able to deal with the excessive zeroes in the DV and differentiate between the two types of zeros (in the DV): 1) number of zeros resulting from truncating net number of displaced people; 2) cases where there is actually zero net displaced people for a given country and year. Zero-inflated negative binomial regression (ZINB) becomes the logical choice since it includes an auxiliary logistic regression model specified in the 'inflate' option that determines whether the observed count is zero in addition to the standard negative binomial regression model (Hilbe, 2011).²⁷

I test whether a count data model or a zero-inflated count data model is appropriate to confirm my logical decision through AIC and BIC values: the ZINB model has smaller AIC and BIC values; therefore it fits the data better than the standard negative binomial regression model.

The empirical testing of hypotheses stated in chapter 4 for the large-n study uses the UNHCR data of refugees, IDPs and asylum seekers as the dependent variable.²⁸

²⁷ Since the zero-inflated negative binomial regression is a special type of negative binomial regression, I would perform a likelihood ratio test to compare them (by taking twice the positive difference in the log-likelihoods) by the vuong test in Stata. However, Stata announced that the vuong test is not appropriate for testing zero inflation since Wilson (2015) has found that this test is inappropriate for non-nested models.

²⁸ Official definitions of main forced migrant categories are as follows: refugees are 'recognized under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, persons recognized under the 1969 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, those recognized in accordance with the UNHCR Statute, individuals granted complementary forms of protection and those enjoying temporary protection...Asylum-seekers are individuals who have sought international protection and whose claims for refugee status have not yet been determined. Internally displaced persons are persons or groups of persons who have been forced to leave their home or place of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights, or natural or man-made disasters, and who have not crossed an international border' (UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2015, p.4).

However, these numbers reflect the number of migrants by country of origin in a given year, which means that the following year will also include the previous year's number of displaced people requiring a net calculation of forced migrants. I calculate the net migration by subtracting the sum of displaced people each year from the previous year, but this creates an obvious difficulty for a regression model: it is possible to obtain negative values of migration (Dorigo and Tobler, 1983). Truncating the negative totals to '0', following previous literature (Melander et al., 2006; Moore and Shellman, 2004), overcomes this problem. While the restriction of only including integers is slightly disappointing because flows are undercounted, it is a simple solution. More importantly, it works better than the alternative of 'net migration stock' (Davenport et al., 2003) of 'taking the difference between the number of forced migrants hosted and the number of forced migrants displaced' (Melander et al., 2006) because using 'net migration stock' would underestimate net migration in instances where the hosted and displaced numbers are very close to each other.

4.3.1.6 Collating Secondary Data For The Large-n Study

There are some unsurprising disadvantages of using secondary data. One of them is what Breznau (2016, p.313) explains as 'secondary observer effect' where secondary data observers 'produce similar but not identical results' because there is not a 'random sample of researchers performing replications' of the studies and we cannot know the size of this 'effect'. Additionally, Barnett et al. (2016) points to procedural bias in secondary data analysis, which relates to incapacity of the secondary researcher to resolve missing data or overcome coding bias of the primary researcher. While this is a valid critique, some missing data is inevitable in any study, particularly if it involves decades of time-series data. Sometimes there may also be ethical reasons of missing data. For example, the UNHCR reports that some of the missing data in its forced displacement reports is due to keeping forced migrant's privacy (Marbach, 2018).

4.3.1.7 Limitations

The findings in the large-n study are based on secondary data originating from governments (through the UN) as well as research institutions that share their data publicly. However, there are two particular issues to keep in mind. Firstly, there is less information available regarding the IDPs, which is further complicated by the fact that an unknown (but estimated to be in millions) number of IDPs are not on the record. After all, the decision to designate the UN's refugee agency (UNHCR) also as its IDP agency only happened in the 1990s upon the breakdown of Yugoslavia (Hathaway, 2007, p.357). However, as discussed in in the previous chapters, inclusion of IDPs is necessary to avoid overemphasis of crossing of national boundaries and selection bias. Secondly, calculations of main economic indicators by governments are not always accurate, which is a common issue. One recent example is Chile, which announced in May 2019 that there was a 'possible manipulation of inflation figures for at least two months in 2018' (Sherwood, 2019).

Despite these limitations, using several datasets from these institutions provides an opportunity to analyse drivers of forced migration beyond the simple conclusion that armed conflicts cause people to migrate. However, this process is not flawless, either. In particular, this is the case for the UNHCR's naming convention; it does not always follow historical developments (e.g. there is no record of forced migrants originating from East or West Germany). There is also the question about the cases of significant numbers forced migrants reported by the UN with no corresponding records of violent

conflicts. Having 'country' as the unit of analysis also adds a limitation: while I can group states by region, I cannot group them by other geographic entities or by ethnic groups, for example. It is also important to note that significant amount of data related to displaced people are obtained through or with the aid of government agencies.²⁹

4.3.2 Survey Study Of Iraq

The large-n study aims to identify patterns or trends in forced migration movements. However, the large-n data is inevitably the sum of all individuals, but these statistics do not reflect the opinions and experiences of the decision makers of migration and inevitably silence them instead. Including a study based on a survey of Iraqis reflects individual choices that the large-n study cannot explain. In particular, the survey provides an opportunity to observe migration intentions and understand why some people intend to stay while others leave. It also provides new insight to the complicated relationship between political violence and mobility by the analysis that end of conflict does not automatically lead to intention to stay.

4.3.2.1 Data Collation And analysis

Iraq, particularly the Baghdad region, is a unique place for a case study of forced migration, as it is one of the rare countries that both produces and attracts forced migrants internally and beyond its borders in addition to being a zone of protracted conflicts fed by ethnic cleavages.³⁰ The case study is based on a survey conducted in 2015 with the support of a British Academy grant and is available to include in this

²⁹ In spite of the limitations, using large data sets are ideal for an early-career researcher since they 'enable researchers to study the precursors of atypical patterns' and 'specialized subpopulations' (Greenhoot and Dowsett, 2012).

³⁰ UNHCR (Global Trends, 2018) defines protracted displacements as those with 25,000 or more refugees of the same nationality, in exile in a particular country for five consecutive years.

study with the permission of Professor Neophytos Loizides.³¹ A local NGO, the Institute of Youth Development directed by Dr. Essam Assad lecturer in the College of Political Sciences at the University of Al-Nahrain, carried out the survey, which was designed with the contributions of Dr. Djordje Stefanovic and translated by Dr. Farah Shakir.³²

The data used in this project was collected in a survey conducted in Baghdad from May to August 2015. Baghdad had been chosen because it receives displaced and internal migrant people from different ethnic, religious and sectarian Iraqi groups. Moreover, Baghdad was the arena of the sectarian violence that erupted between 2006-2008, which would have left a tremendous impact on its residents' political and social opinions. The data includes 513 displaced and internal forced migrant people and 441 people who may have witnessed some cases of displacement and forced migration, but they were not displaced or internal migrants.

The first sample included 263 displaced people after the events of Mosul in 2014 and 250 forced migrants due to sectarian violence after 2006, which was distributed evenly among the Shi'as and Sunnis. The first sample was tested using the purposive and accidental approaches and it was selected from two main areas in Karkh District (Western side of Baghdad), which included two of the main camps of the Sunni population, and from two areas in Rusafa District (Eastern side of Baghdad) where the

³¹ Professor Loizides is the recipient of a Mid-Career Fellowship by the British Academy entitled The Way Home: Peaceful Return of Victims of Forced Displacement MD140005.

³² Dr. Djordje Stefanovic is Senior Lecturer at the University of Adelaide and Dr. Farah Shakir is a former PhD student at the University of Kent and author of the Iraqi Federation, 2019, Routledge.

camps for the Shi'a and Christian people were located. The second sample was distributed in 19 areas, in Baghdad – 10 areas in Karkh and 9 areas in Rusafa.

The interviews for the survey were conducted in Arabic. After the data collection has been completed, the results were entered anonymously into an SPSS file and original copies of the questionnaires were destroyed. The method of conducting the interviews was through face-to-face meetings at the homes of the participants. For purposive approach, since the tradition and customs in Iraq put the responsibility of taking decision in the hands of the head of the family, the survey was conducted with the head of the family, whether it was a male or female, as well as the son or the daughter whom their age was closest to the person conducting the interview. For the accidental approach, respondents were selected from residents of random roads within various neighbourhoods.

The size of the sample population is large enough to analyse odds of migration, but also small enough to closely examine individual or group responses. For instance, it is possible to compare the social and demographic background of participants with intention to remain in Baghdad to participants that intend to leave Bagdad in the near future. Therefore, I first look at odds ratios of migration of both potential refugees and internally displaced people.

While the main goal remains to identify the main factors of decision to leave or stay during armed conflicts, I also test whether socioeconomic and social capital variables can be important causes of forced migration as well, by building models with binary independent variables such as being married and having permanent employment and the intention to migrate as the dependent variable, also a binary variable. I convert the data to an excel file and upload it to Stata to obtain the odds ratios as well as the pseudo R^2 (McFadden's)³³ and measure goodness of fit of each model by using Stata's classification tables. Then, I further analyse any unexpected findings from the odds ratios by comparing individual responses such as participants that generally have a positive attitude versus those that are relatively pessimist.

Iraq's condition as a protracted conflict zone makes it challenging to reach out to its displaced population and related government resources, so using a survey completed by a local NGO is advantageous considering the limited time and resources of a PhD project. Nevertheless, the survey produces collective results and they are mainly quantitative. However, individuals are at the heart of the forced migration puzzle since they are the decision makers of migrating (or staying); therefore, it is essential to have their voices heard throughout this project leading to the next part of the study: interviews.

³³ Stata automatically reports McFadden's r squared, which has 'relative independence of the base rate of the binary outcome variable' compared to other pseudo r squares (Menard, 2000).

Table 4.3.2.1

Variable Descriptions and Expected Effects

Variable	Description*	Expected Association with Intention to Migrate
Dependent Variable		6
Migrate	Whether the respondent intends to migrate in or outside Iraq within 3 years.	
Socioeconomic Variables	,	
Age	Age in 2015	Young respondents more likely to migrate
Married	Married or any other civil status	Married more likely to migrate
Employment	Permanent or Temp/Pension/Benefits	Permanently employed less likely to migrate
Income Level	Below or above average national income (annual)	Below average income more likely to migrate
Ethnicity	Sunni or Shi'ite/Muslim/Christian	Sunnis more likely to migrate
Education	Below or above secondary school diploma	Better educated less likely to migrate
Political Violence	ľ	
Conflict End	'In your opinion, how likely it is that the armed conflict will stop within the next 3 years?'	Optimistic about end of armed conflict less likely to migrate
Support for Negotiations	'Inter-ethnic conflicts in Iraq could be resolved through negotiations'	Supporters of negotiations are less likely to migrate
Shi'ite Militia	'In general, who has been responsible for the post-2003 violence in Iraq?'	Disapproving Shi'a militia more likely to migrate
Social Capital	······································	
Community	'How do you feel about the following groups? (Sunni, Shi'a, Kurd, Turkman, Yazidi, Christian) Could you accept one of them as a close neighbour?'	Positive feelings about community decreases the likelihood of migration
Trust in Iraq's future	'After everything that happened, I think we can live together with all Iraqi religious and ethnic groups, but the trust is lost.'	High level of trust in Iraq's future decreases the likelihood of migration
Duty to keep Iraq united	'Iraqis have a duty to keep their country united.'	Patriots are less likely to migrate
Feelings towards displaced	'Displaced persons make me insecure'	Negative feelings about displacement decreases the likelihood of migration

* All responses were self-reported.

4.3.2.2 Limitations

It would be both ethically and scientifically problematic to conclude that the outcome of the survey is representative of other similar cases in other parts of the world.³⁴ In particular, the data's main shortcoming relates to the lack of detailed violence data due to limitations of sampling: since respondents with a history of witnessing physical injury, imprisonment, torture or other types of violence also report experiencing direct violence; I am not able to test potential differences between experiencing direct and indirect violence. However, having these variables can prove useful since I refer to the previously tested hypothesis that political violence is a major factor that pushes potential migrants away throughout the study and I cannot assume that every type and level of political violence is going to produce refugees and internally displaced people. Based on the theory that 'witnesses as well as victims are subject to the dialectic of trauma' (Herman, 1998, p.2) and that violence 'can create a 'trans generational' trauma (Weingarten, 2004), it would be ideal to test the effect of witnessing versus indirect violence on the individual decision to flee.

4.3.3 Interviews

Final part of the study centres on the decision-makers by obtaining their first hand migration experiences. The interviews provide opportunities to ask questions about variances in individual decision-making, which is not possible in the large-n and survey studies. The global study develops previous analysis about power of political, social and economic factors (particularly about type of violence and interaction between political and economic drivers) and the survey analysis provides a detailed analysis of

³⁴ The material in the rest of the 'Case Study of Iraq' section draws on a previously published article (Ozaltin et al., 2019).

the causal mechanism between the drivers identified by both the large-n study and the survey. However, it is not until questions about what triggers people to move or discourage them from leaving are directly asked to forced migrants that some of the ambiguities around the impact of socioeconomic factors are further probed. In particular, conducting face to face interviews with refugees presents the opportunity to ask directly whether their economic conditions played an important role in their decision to leave and why some or all of their close family and friends chose to remain.

4.3.3.1 Data Collection And Analysis

The study draws on semi-structured interviews with 12 adults – 4 women and 8 men – who currently reside in the UK as asylum seekers or refugees: participants consist of individuals who made their own way to the UK (asylum seekers) or they were identified outside the UK and brought by the assistance of the UN or the UK government (refugees). By having semi-structured interviews, the project aims to prevent standardization of individuals and present greater interest in the interviewee's views rather than reflecting the researcher's concerns (Harrell-Bond, 1988; Harrison, 2009; Tashakkori and Creswell, 2007).

With this goal in mind, the questions particularly concentrate on three areas (detailed in Appendix H):

 Reasons of leaving original country of residence (e.g. concerns with the overall security situation/receiving personal threats/ordered to leave by authorities/escaped major economic hardships/no access to basic services/damaged house)

- Reasons of choosing the current country of residence/neighbourhood (e.g. closeness to social network/settled by government authorities/close to original home/employment/security)
- Experience of direct violence as a result of being targeted by armed actions of other groups (e.g. torture, physical harm, verbal abuse, imprisonment) and witnessing violence

The number of participants was determined by following current standards for saturation in the sample sizes for qualitative studies.³⁵ With the flexibility of semistructured interviews, questions could be asked in a slightly different order and wording depending on the participant's replies allowing room to pursue topics of particular interest to the interviewees.³⁶ However, in general, participants were first asked demographic information followed by questions about the circumstances that brought them to the UK. Questions were then asked about the type and level of violence they were exposed to, how they made the journey to the UK and how their life post-migration compared to pre-migration with particular focus on their socioeconomic standing.

In preparation for the interviews, ethical considerations were reviewed by referring to academic and non-academic sources such as Albeanu's (2016) and Clark-Kazak's

³⁵ Although scholars such as Morgan et al. (2002) and Francis et al. (2010) found that most 5-6 interviews are sufficient for most themes, Guest et al. (2006) found that 6-12 interviews are needed to reach 70-92% saturation; and most recently Namey et al. (2016) found that 5-11 interviewees result in 80% saturation. Therefore, this study uses 12 participants to gather adequate data, which proved useful (even after 5-6 interviews, it was possible to identify a trend among the participants in regards to the research questions).

³⁶ For instance, a question may broadly ask if the participant experienced violence by being targeted by an armed group, but the participant may want to provide further information and discuss how he or she was part of a group that was targeted collectively and that the decision to move was significantly affected by the decisions of other members of the same social group.

(2017). Additionally, ethical approval from the University of Kent was obtained prior to contacting potential participants. 10 Interviews were conducted in Northeast and Southeast England and 2 were completed virtually (through Skype/WhatsApp) between October 2018 and May 2019 (specific locations are purposefully omitted here to protect the privacy and security of the organizations that assist refugees). 4 of the interviewees were recruited through personal contacts, however, one of the contacts provided access to an organization in South East England, which is referred here as the Project and became the source of the remaining participants. The Project has been set up to assist and advise refugees and asylum seekers over twenty years ago, similar to many other organizations in the UK.³⁷ In addition to the support it receives from its Borough Council, the Project is also supported by various local organizations and individuals on a voluntary basis. It runs a drop in session one day a week in a community hall and it was these weekly sessions that provided the opportunity to meet many forced migrants who have been through the legal process of migration, some of whom volunteered to participate in this study.

The interviews were conducted directly by me without assistance with the exception of the participant from Sudan who lacked sufficient command of English. The participation criteria required interviewees to be aged 18 years old or older, be English speakers, UK residents and self-reporting status as current or past refugee/asylum applicant due to political violence in home country.

³⁷ The name of the Project is not revealed here to protect privacy of the forced migrants there; the Project continuously attracts new migrants, but there are also regulars who visit the Community Centre every week. Some of these migrants are refugees or asylum seekers who 'have gone underground', as commonly referred by the Project volunteers, meaning their migration application has been rejected, but they have not left the country and lead their lives off the record (none of the participants in this study belong to the undocumented migrant category since I have not met any undocumented migrants that fulfilled the above participant criteria).

The 12 participants are from Congo, Eritrea, Iraq, Mauritius, Sri Lanka, Sudan and Syria. Among these states, Iraq and Eritrea are among the top 5 with the largest number of asylum applications to the UK. However, it is worth noting that the UK is home to only 7 per cent of the total number of asylum applications to the European Union (EU) (UNHCR UK, 2019). Age of interviewees ranged from 26 to 75. Six of the participants have higher education including two PhDs and have had work experience prior to their arrival to the UK including professional positions of a former policeman, university lecturer and assistant to an ambassador. Six of the participants had commenced or completed further education courses after their arrival to the UK. However, most participants had also been taking English lessons soon after they moved to the UK, which are often times available for free by refugee organizations. The length of time that participants have been living in the UK ranges from 1 to 20 years and the length of time for a decision to be made on their case to live in the UK ranges from 6 months to 10 years.

Information about the study was shared privately with each participant through e-mail or by handing out a copy of the information sheet (available in Appendix A). Each participant also read and signed a consent form prior to the interview (available in Appendix B). Names of participants are pseudonyms, which were randomly selected and have no connection to the participants or their backgrounds. Participants were also informed that recordings of the interviews and signed documents were to be terminated upon completion of this project and that their actual names would not be released as part of this study or any future publication based on this study. Participants were also informed of security measures in place to protect the documents and recordings. No incentives were provided for participation. Two interviewees declined to be recorded; therefore, data for these interviews were collected by hand-written notes.

Demographic Characteristics of the Participants			
Gender	67% male; 33% female		
Ethnicity	59% Black (African); 25% Arab; 8%		
	Kurdish; 8% Indo-Mauritian, 8% Sri		
	Lankan (Tamil)		
Mean age	40		
Country of origin	Congo, Eritrea, Iraq, Mauritius, Sudan, Sri		
	Lanka, Syria, Zimbabwe		
Migration status	89% refugee/asylum; 11% rejected		
Total (N)	12		

Table 4.3.3.1 presents participants' demographic characteristics below.

The twelve cases were not intended to be representative of the entire refugee population either in the UK or globally, but were sampled to further understanding of causes of forced migration in response to armed conflicts. In particular, the goal was to identify the main triggers of migration and to understand how much intensity of violence and socioeconomic factors weighed in that decision making process.

The interviews were studied by using narrative analysis and as Frank (2009, p.248) noted, 'narrative analysis begins with an attitude towards stories'. In doing so, my power as the researcher contrasts with the two conventional viewpoints that Maclean (2013, p.67) refers to as 'God' versus 'native'. I did not try to detach myself from the participants for the sake of obtaining pure objectivity; on the contrary, I admitted that I am a migrant myself to more than one participant without trying to pretend that I am a 'native'. The honest confession that I am not an 'insider', but a researcher trying to empathize with what the participants have gone through in their migration journey visibly made the participants more comfortable and led them be more open and forthcoming. Overall, narrative analysis of the interviews is based on the understanding

that 'we too are story tellers... In this sense, the story is always co-authored, either directly in the process of an interviewer eliciting an account or indirectly' (Mishler, 1995, p.117).

4.4 Ethical Considerations

This project utilizes secondary data for both large-n and case studies and primary data for the semi-structural interviews. Although there is a general tendency to emphasize ethical considerations for primary data and perceive secondary data as a preferred option to relieve the researcher from the burden of applying for ethical approval, it is important to note that the process of research requires ethical considerations from its beginning to the end regardless of the type of data utilized: it starts with the initial design of the study and the research question, which should aim to contribute to the literature and public good while considering any potential harm it can cause albeit indirectly or unintentionally by the researcher. It then continues until the communication of findings, which should ensure transparency, replicability and (public) availability of the research data and results.

Large-n study

The large-n study uses several data sets that are all publicly available online. What can be considered as the foundation of this part of the study is the UNHCR data of 'people's of concern' including, but not limited to refugees, IDPs and asylum seekers globally, which makes up the dependent variable of this study. The UNHCR has an established Ethics Office since 2008 to ensure staff members 'perform their functions, consistent with the highest standards of integrity and foster a culture of ethics, respect, transparency and accountability' (Framework for Cooperation, 2010, p.40). Its fulltime statistician staff prepares annual displaced people's data with the cooperation of relevant national administrative bodies while abiding by the organization's Code of Conduct (UNHCR, 2004).

Case Study of Iraq

The data collection procedure of the survey ensured respondents' voluntary participation and informed consent. The surveyor read the consent form to each participant, which the participant could keep for his or her own purposes after the completion of the survey. These principles guaranteed that all respondents chose to participate in the survey with their own free will and that they were fully informed regarding the procedures of the research project and any potential risks. The method of conducting the interviews was through face-to-face meetings at the homes of the participants. While this meant that the participant was not always alone with the interviewer, it had the typical benefits of face-to-face meetings: it ensured accuracy of demographic information such as gender and age; it kept the participant focused and free from (particularly technological) distractions or interruptions. As a researcher, I find it beneficial that I had no contact with the respondents and involvement with any step of the survey process as this prevents any personal engagement with the data while analysing it.

This research finds the survey useful to understand forced displacement based in Iraq and highlights the importance of continuing similar studies in Iraq and other countries that experience the phenomenon. However, I am conscious of the fact that it would be highly problematic if a non-researcher or policymaker represented the totality of a refugee population's experience based on the findings of the survey.

Interviews

Ethical considerations regarding the interviews have been implemented with the guidance and approval of University of Kent's School Research Ethics and Governance (REAG) in May 2018, several months before approaching any potential participants. This part of the project does not qualify for any external ethics committee review or approval. However, there are some points that require particular attention (as also declared during the ethics review process at the University): firstly, the semi-structured interviews involve discussion and collection of data that is highly sensitive. This includes protecting the privacy of the identities of the interviewees. While maintaining the anonymity of the participants would be the general expectation in any PhD study, it is extremely important to do so in any studies involving people who have been subject to traumatic events and potentially experienced or witnessed violence in any form (physical or verbal). Revealing identities of such individuals could also potentially put their lives in danger if they are targets of the current government in their original location, for example. Secondly, the discussion may refer to these traumatic experiences with questions such as 'have you personally witnessed or experienced violence during the armed-conflict' to test the significance of changing intensity of political violence in the decision to remain or flee controlling for other (socioeconomic) factors. Sensitive topics could also come up during the question about reasons of leaving the original country of residence.

4.5 Limitations Of The Study

Reliability and validity are two of the most important rules of research ethics. Reliability requires that replication of this project produces identical results with the overall findings of this project. However, just because the models in the project are reliable, are they also valid? There are two potential issues that any similar research could face in this matter: firstly, in the large-n study, the undocumented displaced people are inevitably excluded from this study although they are just as important (and even more so in some cases considering that their reason of not going 'on the record' is a consequence of various life threatening circumstances such as human trafficking and fear of being returned to one's country where on-going conflict or ethnic cleansing takes place). Confronting such realities of forced migration while trying to explain its causal mechanism is one of the main challenges of this research. However, it is important to consider that the UNHCR's statistical database has been able to capture the majority of forced migrants and therefore the organization continuously has been able to offer historical trends of the phenomenon, which have also been helpful to predict similar population movements. It is also in the best interest of the literature to maintain continuous efforts in developing theory and support that with data as much as possible as opposed to unrealistically waiting around for the 'perfect' record of forced migrants globally.

The second potential issue is in the case study: while the survey questions meet the criteria of face validity in terms of directly reflecting the causal mechanism between the intention to migrate and the reasons behind it, there is the possibility that responses to the survey are not entirely truthful, particularly when the respondents were not alone during the interviews. There is also the potential of bias in the responses according to how respondents perceived the interviewer in terms of his or her gender, ethnicity or religious affiliation for example. Nevertheless, all of these concerns are not specific to this project; they are relevant to any study that utilizes surveys or interviewing

techniques. Also, previous research supports face-to-face interviews particularly if it includes many sensitive questions (Bryman, 2016).

Finally, there are some reliability and validity issues to consider about the qualitative interviews. Reliability becomes a concern particularly when the interviews are not recorded. In this project, 10 of the interviews were recorded and notes were taken for the two participants that did not give their consent for recoding. In terms of validity, the first issue to consider would normally be the choice of questions. However, in this case, the questions mainly relate to the previous parts of the study and are used not only for the purpose of triangulation, but also for improving the findings of the large-n and case studies. From the perspective of the researcher, it is also helpful that the interviews were completed towards the end of the project considering that asking the right questions require a substantive knowledge about the topic.

Even when a researcher asks the right questions, he or she may not always get the right or truthful answers. This may not necessarily be due to the participants 'playing' the researcher, but it may be the case that they do not recall the events accurately. Mosley (2013, p.21) points out to research in psychology by Loftus and Palmer (1996) and Wells and Olson (2003), which found out that eye witness accounts are often times unreliable. However, it is possible for the researcher to detect if any part of the interview is not consistent with the rest as a way to deal with such a problem. This is why it is no accident that there are repetitions of some questions (phrased differently) in addition to reviewing the scripts.

4.6 Conclusion: Putting The Puzzle Pieces Together

Most research designs are either concerned with the 'why' of a phenomenon or understanding causal mechanisms between certain events and their outcome. This study bridges the two: first, by a deeper interrogation of the causal relationship between deadly armed conflicts and forced migration volumes beginning with a large-n study; second, by analysing a case of study that features this causal mechanism and generating responses to the questions that the large-n study was not able to decisively answer; and finally, by filling in the remaining blanks with semi-structured interviews, which provide insights by building on the previous findings of the project and connecting them to stories of forced migrants. As Weller and Barnes (Weller and Barnes, 2014, p.142-144) suggest, 'good (pathway) analysis builds on the existing theory, empirical knowledge, and the large-n scholarship systematically by assessing the gaps in our understanding of the structure of the X1/Y relationship' with the goal of selecting 'cases that present interesting puzzles' and 'exploring the unobserved links between X1 and Y'. As this Chapter attempted to demonstrate, the complex puzzle of forced migration requires an in-depth analysis of the commonly accepted relationship between political violence and forced displacement, which can best be untangled through mixed methods.

CHAPTER 5 RETHINKING DETERMINANTS OF FORCED MIGRATION

ON A GLOBAL SCALE

5.1 Determinants Of Political Violence-Induced Forced Migration

The purpose of this chapter is to determine the trend setting causes of forced migration following deadly armed conflicts including one-sided violence and terrorism through global cross-sectional time series data during 1970-2016. The chapter first introduces the political violence, social and economic variables as indicator or controlling variables; then, tests their impact on the volume of forced migration flows, and concludes with a summary of the findings.

Chapter 3 explained the reasons of not drawing strict boundaries between forced and voluntary migration: a migrant can be driven away from his/her home by factors that may fall into both categories. It is up to researchers to determine the weight of the various drivers of forced migration; and this is only possible by expanding the research beyond indicators that directly relate to armed conflict (by including political, social and economic indicators); how else can the choice to stay versus leave be explained under exposure to similar circumstances of armed conflicts? Previous research including variables other than conflict data is not encouraging as discussed in the literature review. However, if researchers 'steer clear of asking difficult questions – such as how important are economic motivations and social networks in the mass movement of refugees – they will tend to confirm and legitimize the assumptions made by powerful actors, such as states' (Bakewell, 2008, p.438; Greenhill, 2010). What should concern academic enquiry, including this study, is how we can develop a better understanding of the drivers of forced migration. With this goal in mind, the focus in this chapter is on global time-series data at the state level from 1970-2016. Admittedly,

this level of analysis is restrictive (by not including sub-national data for example), and country-year unit of analysis only works under the assumption that various groups within states do not diverge in response to drivers of forced migration. However, it also has benefits: since it is the most widely used format (including all datasets used in this project), it allows for consistency among various datasets and this consistency makes merging of the datasets possible without manipulation.

Another defining boundary of the research is its focus on deadly armed conflicts. An armed conflict 'concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state', leads to at least 25 fatalities in a given year (Melander, 2015, p.3) and intensity of violence is determined by the number of fatalities in a given location and year (Gleditsch et al. 2002). Melander's (2015) definition is useful not only because it is inclusive of all types of politically motivated violence, but also because the low threshold minimizes the probability of overlooking smaller conflicts. Additionally, the number of deaths is often used to measure the level of violence in conflict analysis (Pearce, 2005).

While conflicts of all types may harm individuals psychologically, economically and socially, deadly armed conflicts violate the most fundamental human right: the right to live. Therefore, although overall organized violence is in decline, that does not mean that importance of armed conflicts lessens: there were 90,000 deaths in 2017 across all forms of organized violence, and non-state based conflicts (and related deaths) continued to increase during the same year (Pettersson and Eck, 2018). Considering the causal relationship between deadly political violence and forced migration, armed conflicts inevitably become part of the forced migration puzzle.

Chapter 3 also introduced the theory for internally displaced people, refugees and asylum seekers: the degree to which civilians are targeted during political violence directly affects the number of forced migration flows. I conceptualize all civilians of a country as potential targets (and potential internally displaced people, refugees or asylum seekers) during armed conflict and expect them to make a rational choice between fleeing or staying; the models reflect this emphasis on civilian lives with separate variables for civilian fatalities. Within this general framework, there are also various political and socio-economic controlling factors, some of which have lagged or prolonged impact on the net number of forcibly displaced. For instance, unemployment may not immediately push someone away, but a rise in unemployment is generally considered a sign of poor overall economic performance and people may experience the consequences of a negative trend in economy in the longer term (e.g. one year) and may decide to move.

Table 5.1.1 shows the large number of observations used in the models. It makes more sense to include the means instead of the medians since the data is not symmetric and there are outliers such as Syria. The standard deviations point to a more normal spread out data for intensity of violence (log total death, log od terrorism related death and log of civilian deaths), log of urban population, ethnic concentration, freedom and religious concentration compared to the greater spread in the remaining variables. It is not surprising to see a high mean and standard deviation for the net displaced people considering that the mean is an average for the entire set of forced migrants between 1970-2016 by country and the data points that the net migrants are spread out over a wide range of values from zero to over 12 million.

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Net displaced	5,794	106594.30	544517.30	0	1.20E+07
Log of total death	1,184	4.40	2.23	0	10.80
Log of terror. death	2,348	2.66	2.11	0	9.48
Log of death civ.	1,156	3.68	2.21	0	13.12
Gdp per cap.growth	7,282	1.96	6.27	-65	141.64
Poverty ratio	670	29.59	17.03	0.60	83.30
Unemploymentt.1	3,683	8.26	6.23	.05	59.5
Log of urban pop.	8,759	14.39	2.28	7.38	20.45
Ethnic diversity	7,471	0.32	0.26	0	0.92
Freedom	8,039	1.10	0.83	0	2.00
Religious diversity	5,666	0.20	0.16	0.00	0.67

Table 5.1.1 Descriptive statistics of the variables for total number of forcibly displaced people

5.2 Findings

The main assumption underlying the models was that people do have a choice to stay or flee during armed conflicts; and however stressful or even life threatening it may be, their decision is calculated based on their opportunities (or lack of). While intensity of violence continues to be a major push factor, how much some socio-economic variables (below) impact the decision to flee is not always clear. The models support the economic motivation argument only to some extent. The detailed results are presented in Tables 5.2.1 - 5.2.5 and are based on the following hypotheses:

*H*₁: *The higher the intensity of conflict, the higher the number of forced migrants.*

Melander and Öberg (2007) already discussed the significance of the relationship between intensity of conflict and number of forced migrants, however, in this study, I include terrorism related and civilian deaths as separate variables, which provides an opportunity to analyse this relationship in more detail. Additional data (up to 2016) also expands the time frame of previous studies.

H₂: The lower the level of political freedom in a country, the higher the number of forced migrants it generates.

The second hypothesis tests the relationship between political and civil liberties and the decision to flee based on the expectation that weak democratic regimes and institutions along with state oppression on freedom of thought push people away.

Regressions³⁸

Existing theory of forced migration suggests that people tend to flee their homes when the benefits of leaving outweigh the costs of staying at their place of origin (Adhikari, 2012). However, testing the hypotheses presented here helps to refresh and improve previous large-n findings, which can then lead to the path to further analysis at the individual level in the subsequent chapters. Therefore, the following regressions help to identify trends of forced displacement movements with global time-series data between 1970-2016 based on the theoretical framework that holds all forced migrants (including refugees, IDPs and asylum seekers) as indispensible parts of the forced migration puzzle contrary to the majority of studies that include refugees only.

The findings are based on zero inflated binomial regressions (ZINB), which are ideal for modelling with a count of the net number of forced migrants with excessive zeros

³⁸ ***: Significant at 0.01 %, ** significant at 0.05 %*: significant at 0.10 % per cent. Count regression reports incidence rate ratios (IRR) and inflation regression reports coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses.

and for the over dispersed data, with a variance larger than the mean (UCLA IDRE, 2011). The ZINB tables below first present the count regressions followed by the inflation regressions for each category of forced migrants³⁹. The independent variables are the same in both count and inflation regressions in all models under the assumption that any of the independent variables may directly lead to zero counts. The expected count is essentially the combination of the two processes. The models all follow the same statistical processes and present the analysis of all forced migrants in three groups by forced migrant type (all forced migrants, refugees, and IDPs in order). Under each group, the first model includes all battle deaths, while the second includes civilian deaths and the last model separates terrorism related deaths for an in-depth look at the impact of forced displacement drivers on civilians.

The count regressions report the incidence rate ratios (IRR), which is obtained by exponentiating the negative binomial regression coefficient because it provides an easier interpretation of the results since it treats the DV of net displaced people as a rate ('the number of events per time or space'⁴⁰) and represents the change in net forcibly displaced people given a unit change in the independent variable, holding all other variables constant.⁴¹ I also ran separate regressions (where data is available) for total

³⁹ Zero-inflated negative binomial regression (ZINB) becomes the logical choice since it includes an auxiliary logistic regression model specified in the 'inflate' option that determines whether the observed count is zero in addition to the standard negative binomial regression model.

⁴⁰See UCLA Institute for Digital Research and Education for more details. Available at https://stats.idre.ucla.edu/stata/output/negative-binomial-regression/.

⁴¹ For example, in the first model of regression 5.2.1 total battle deaths variable has a logistic coefficient of 0.39. A one-unit change in this positive coefficient decreases the odds of not migrating by $\exp(\beta)$. Then, the odds of not migrating are decreased by $\exp(0.39) = 1.48$, in other words about 48%. Stata (and other similar softwares) automate this calculation for each predictor. An IRR of 1.0 indicates no change in the expected count of forced migrants, an IRR greater than 1.0 indicates an increase in the expected count, and an IRR lower than 1.0 indicates a decrease in the expected count. See Melander and Öberg (2007) for more on IRR.

number of deaths, civilian deaths and terrorism deaths to be able to distinguish the potential impact of each type of fatality. The focus on the type of deaths and the impact of violence on civilians in particular is supported by the main theory behind the overall research as Chapter 3 explained: *the extent to which civilians are targeted during political violence causes variations in the expected number of forced migration flows.*

5.2.1 Refugees, IDPs And Asylum Seekers, ZINB, Robust

The first group of analyses include all forced migrants (refugees, asylum seekers and IDPs) to provide an overall understanding of the impact of political and socioeconomic drivers on the number of net displaced people. The models are run with robust standard errors to avoid heteroscedasticity since it could lead to biased standard errors.⁴² Intensity of violence is detailed by building three models including total number of battle fatalities, civilian deaths and terrorism related deaths in order with terrorism related deaths separated from civilian deaths in the final model for a closer look since previous studies have not done so.

⁴² Stata computes robust standard errors with a simple command.

Dependent variable:	Total battle	Civilian	Terrorism
Net forcibly displaced	deaths	deaths	deaths
Intensity of violence	1.48***		
	(0.10)		
		1.16**	
		(0.09)	
			1.53***
			(0.07)
Freedom	0.34***	0.27***	0.21***
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.05)
Ethnic diversity	0.30**	0.44	0.13***
	(0.20)	(0.38)	(0.07)
Religious diversity	0.05***	0.03***	0.10***
	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.07)
Unemployment_L1	1.08**	1.11***	1.07***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)
Urban population	0.90	0.93	0.81***
	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Alpha	3.74	4.27	4.79
Wald chi-square	124.55	67.01	248.03
Prob > chi2	0.00	0.00	0.00
Log (pseudo)likelihood	-4362.83	-4062.53	-6673.324
Observations	510	463	925
Nonzero observations	325	304	526

Number of forced migrants (count regressions)

Table 5.2.1 consists of 3 count (negative binomial) models for total number of forced migrants (including migrants, IDPs and asylum seekers). Each regression has the total net number of refugees, IDPs and asylum seekers as the DV and political violence variables (intensity of violence based on the total number of battle deaths, freedom, religious and ethnic diversity) and economic variables (unemployment and urban population) as the IVs. Coefficients in the table are replaced by IRRs for easier interpretation instead of logs of expected counts. Standard errors are in parenthesis under each IRR.

Model 1 - Table 5.2.1 - Total Battle Deaths

The model has 510 observations and 325 nonzero observations. The p value shows that the model is significant. Total battle deaths, freedom, ethnic and religious diversity and unemployment are predictors of positive counts, i.e. the number of net migrants. Urban population is not significant.

As expected, intensity of violence is a powerful driver and people choose to leave their homes as civil and political liberties decline. Precisely, a one unit increase in intensity of violence based on the total battle deaths increases the rate ratio of the number of expected net migrants by a factor of 1.48 (i.e. 48%) holding all other variables constant. A one unit increase in freedom decreases the rate ratio of the number of expected net migrants by a factor of 0.34 (i.e. 66%) holding all other variables constant. However, a one unit increase in unemployment increases the rate ratio of the number of expected net migrants by a factor of 1.08 (i.e. 8%) holding all other variables constant, which shows that unemployment has some push power, albeit a relatively small one.

Contrary to my expectations, ethnic and religious diversity do not push people away. A one unit increase in ethnic diversity decreases the rate ratio of the number of expected net migrants by a factor of 0.30 (i.e. 70%) holding all other variables constant and a one unit increase in the religious diversity decreases the rate ratio of the number of expected net migrants by a factor of 0.05 (i.e. 95%) holding all other variables. The results show that ethnic or religious diversity do not automatically lead to the decision to flee, and require further interrogation at the individual level as supported by O'Brien's (2018) recent work, which explains that ethnic responses vary depending on whether individuals consider themselves as targets or not based on ethno-nationalist policies.

Additionally, Kolbe and Henne (2014) conclude that particular religious bans lead to state oppression and tend to increase forced migration, which again calls for a more detailed analysis than the aggregate data can provide.

Model 2 - Table 5.2.1 - Civilian Deaths

The model has 463 observations and 304 nonzero observations. The p value shows that the model is significant. Civilian deaths, freedom, religious diversity and unemployment are predictors of positive counts, i.e. the number of net migrants. Ethnic diversity and urban population are not significant.

Focusing specifically on civilian deaths places the analysis at the core of the thesis since the study theorizes that the degree to which civilians are targeted causes variations in the number of forced migrants. As expected, intensity of violence and declining freedom are drivers of forced displacement in this model, too. Precisely, a one unit increase in intensity of violence based on civilian deaths increases the rate ratio of the number of expected net migrants by a factor of 1.16 (i.e. 16%) holding all other variables constant and a one unit increase in freedom decreases the rate ratio of the number of expected net migrants by a factor of 0.27 (i.e. 73%) holding all other variables constant.

Religious diversity and unemployment produce similar results to the first model: a one unit increase in religious diversity decreases the rate ratio of the number of expected net migrants by a factor of 0.03 (i.e. 97%) holding all other variables constant and a one unit increase in unemployment increases the rate ratio of the number of expected net migrants by a factor of 1.11 (i.e. 11%) holding all other variables constant.

Model 3 - Table 5.2.1 - Terrorism Related Deaths

The model has 925 observations and 526 nonzero observations. The p value shows that the model is significant. The alpha coefficient is not zero indicating that the data is over dispersed and the model is better estimated using a negative binomial regression instead of an Poisson regression model. Terrorism related deaths, freedom, ethnic and religious diversity, unemployment and urban population are all predictors of positive counts, i.e. the number of net migrants.

While the civil fatalities follow a similar trend to the overall forced migrants, controlling for terrorism related deaths in the intensity of violence leads to all significant variables in the final model with the addition of urban population. However, contrary to my expectations, population in urban areas do not increase the expected number of forced migrants. Specifically, a one-unit increase in urban population decreases the rate ratio of the number expected net migrants by a factor of 0.81 (i.e. 19%) holding other variables constant. Although previous literature (Melander and Oberg, 2006) has shown that conflict in urban centres lead to an increase in the number of people affected and therefore the number of people that flee, literature also shows evidence that security measures such as the presence of police can even impact possibility of fleeing from villages (Czaika and Kis-Katos, 2009). Additionally, Ibáñez and Vélez (2008, p. 661) point to the difference in the impact of violence in rural versus urban areas and explain that rural populations 'endure armed confrontations' and 'massacres' whereas urban areas may have to deal with more with 'soaring homicide rates' by giving examples from periods of civil conflict in Columbia. Similar security considerations and problems may interfere with the decision to flee in urban centres in general. Finally, the models presented here, cannot take distance to travel into account since that requires individual data at the global level. However, although previous literature has shown that locations with larger populations tend to produce higher numbers of migrants, distance to travel from the original location to the destination also affects the outcome with shorter distance increasing the likelihood of migration (Iqbal, 2007).

The remaining results do not considerably differ from the previous models: a one-unit increase in terrorism related deaths increase the rate ratio of the number of expected net migrants by a factor of 1.53 (i.e. 53%) holding all other variables constant. A one-unit increase in the level of freedom decreases the rate ratio of the number of expected net migrants by a factor of 0.21 (i.e. 79%) holding all other variables constant. A one unit increase in the ethnic diversity decreases the rate ratio of the number of expected net migrants by a factor of 0.13 (i.e. 87%) holding all other variables constant. A one unit increase in the religious diversity decreases the rate ratio of the number of expected net migrants by a factor of 0.10 (i.e. 90%) holding all other variables constant. A one unit increase in unemployment increases the rate ratio of the number of expected net migrants by a factor of 0.10 (i.e. 90%) holding all other variables constant. A one-unit increase in unemployment increases the rate ratio of the number of expected net migrants by a factor of 0.10 (i.e. 90%) holding all other variables constant. A one-unit increase in unemployment increases the rate ratio of the number expected net migrants by a factor of 1.07 (i.e. 7%) holding other variables constant.

5.2.2 Refugees, IDPs And Asylum Seekers, ZINB, Robust

The inflation regressions (which model the excess zeros) are run in tandem with the count regressions and produce the following results for the three models by (type of battle deaths) intensity of violence.⁴³ The research question focuses on which drivers cause variations in the number of people that flee, which naturally requires counting

⁴³ The inflation regressions are presented separately from the count regressions to avoid confusion (although Stata generates the count and inflation models at the same time and combines them in one table).

the number of migrants each year by country. However, as the previous chapter (4) explained, any realistic theoretical model has to include the impact of excessive zeros in the likelihood of displacement, too. Below are the odds of migration for the total number of forced migrants (refugees, IDPs and asylum seekers) with the binary outcome of migrating or not.

Dependent variable: Net forcibly displaced	Total battle deaths	Civilian deaths	Terrorism deaths
Intensity of violence	-0.15***		
	(0.05)		
		-0.19***	
		(0.06)	
			-0.09**
			(0.04)
Freedom	0.07	0.19	0.36***
	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.11)
Ethnic diversity	2.07***	1.16**	0.62*
	(0.52)	(0.57)	(0.37)
Religious diversity	-0.86	0.31	-0.05
	(0.88)	(0.86)	(0.60)
Unemployment_L1	0.04**	0.05***	0.02*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Urban population	-0.04	-0.05	-0.05
	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.05)
Alpha	3.74	4.27	4.79
Wald chi-square	122.1	67.01	248.03
Prob > chi2	0.00	0.00	0.00
(Pseudo) likelihood	-4362.83	-4062.53	-6673.324
Observations	510	463	925
Nonzero observations	325	304	526

Probability of zero forced migrants (inflation regressions)

Table 5.2.2. consists of 3 logit (inflation) regressions for total number of forced migrants (including migrants, IDPs and asylum seekers). Standard errors are reported in parenthesis under each raw coefficient.

Model 1 - Table 5.2.2 - Total battle deaths

The model has 510 observations and 325 nonzero observations. The p value shows that the model is significant. Total battle deaths, ethnic diversity and unemployment are significant as predictors of excessive zeros. Freedom, religious diversity and urban population are not significant.

Intensity of violence is decisively a strong factor in the decision to flee as the findings show that the higher the intensity of violence due to battle deaths, the more likely to have people migrating i.e. the odds of being an excessive zero would decrease by a factor of $\exp(-0.15)=0.86$ for every additional battle death. While the odds of migration based on ethnic diversity is consistent with the count regression results, unemployment produces a result to the contrary. The different results regarding unemployment hint that the relationship between employment and the decision to flee may be more nuanced than what the theory has predicted so far, which calls for further analysis. Precisely, the odds of being an excessive zero would increase by a factor of $\exp(2.07)=7.96$ for each additional unit of increase in ethnic diversity whereas the odds of being an excessive zero would increase in unemployment holding other variables constant.

Model 2 - Table 5.2.2 - Civilian Deaths

The model has 463 observations and 304 nonzero observations. The p value shows that the model is significant. Focusing on the civilian fatalities leads to very similar results produced by the first model with all the forced migrants. Civilian deaths, ethnic diversity and unemployment are significant as predictors of excessive zeroes. Freedom, religious diversity and urban population are not significant.

Model 3 - Table 5.2.2 - Terrorism Related Deaths

The model has 925 observations and 526 nonzero observations. The p value shows that the model is significant. Terrorism related deaths, freedom, ethnic diversity and unemployment are significant as predictors of excessive zeros. Religious diversity and urban population are not significant. Thus, the focus on terrorism related deaths produces similar results to the previous models with the exception of civil and political liberties (freedom): the higher the level of freedom, the less likely to have people migrating as expected. In other words, the odds of being an excessive zero would increase by a factor of exp(0.36)=1.43 for additional unit of increase in freedom.

Looking at the statistically significant variables in the regressions with political violence variables, intensity of violence and freedom have consistent effect. A similar consistency is by and large present once economic and social variables are added. However, there are some changes, too: unemployment is consistently significant in both regressions although its IRRs are relatively low. Ethnic diversity is significant in almost all cases. Religious diversity is significant as a driver of the migration flows, but not significant in the inflation regressions.

5.2.3 Refugees, IDPs And Asylum Seekers, ZINB, Robust

Gross domestic product per capita growth, defined as the change in 'the aggregate of production divided by the population size' (UN Data, 2019), is not statistically significant and therefore not part of the models up to this point. ⁴⁴ However, lack of

⁴⁴ GDP per capita was previously dropped from the models because it is not significant independently. Although there is some evidence in literature that supports this finding as discussed in Chapter 2, the relationship between GDP and the decision to flee continues to be

evidence in support of a direct causal relationship between GDP per capita growth and forced displacement does not eliminate the possibility of a conditional impact based on its interaction with another variable (Coulton and Chow, 1993). Similarly, the unexpected negative relationship between religious diversity and number of forced migrants is questionable and requires further investigation. The following table interrogates these possibilities for total number of net forced migrants (refugees, asylum seekers and IDPs).

Dependent variable:	Total battle	Civilian	Terrorism
Net forcibly displaced	deaths	deaths	deaths
Intensity of violence	0.40***	0.15**	0.41***
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Gdp per capita growth #			
religious diversity	-0.26**	-0.29**	-0.09***
	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.14)
Gdp per capita growth # total			
death	0.01*	0.00	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Unemployment_Lag1	0.06**	0.09***	0.07***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Urban population	-0.09	-0.09	-0.21***
	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Ethnic dispersion	-1.39**	-1.19	-2.15***
	(0.67)	(0.87)	(0.55)
Freedom	-1.19***	-1.54***	-1.57***
	(0.22)	(0.32)	(0.23)
Alpha	3.74	4.28	4.82
Wald chi-square	167.53	83.73	249.54
Prob > chi2	0.00	0.00	0.00
Log (pseudo) likelihood	-4298.45	-3978.31	-6528.93
Observations	505	456	910
Nonzero observations	321	298	516

Number of forced migrants (count regressions) and IRRs with interaction terms

part of academic debates due to mixed results and needs closer attention here as part of an interaction term, too.

Since the main interest is the impact of independent variables on the volume of migration flows, the focus here is on interaction terms on the count side of the ZINBs. The table has raw coefficients and standard errors are in parenthesis under each coefficient.

The interaction terms include the main effects, which show the effect of one of the IVs on the DV regardless of the effects of all other IVs, meaning the models will hold the main effects constant in calculating the interaction coefficients. In this instance, both interaction terms are significant. However, since all the variables in interaction terms are continuous, the direction of the significance may vary.

5.2.4 Refugees, ZINB, Robust

In this section, I implement the original three models only on refugees to provide a more detailed understanding of the impact of political and socioeconomic drivers on refugees specifically and produce results that may help to compare refugees to the rest of the forced migrants.

Dependent variable:	Total battle	Civilian	Terrorism
Net forcibly displaced	deaths	deaths	deaths
Intensity of violence	1.68***		
	(0.12)		
		1.46***	
		(0.09)	
			1.47***
			(0.11)
Freedom	0.35***	0.32***	0.20***
	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Ethnic diversity	0.01***	0.17***	0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.09)	(0.02)
Religious diversity	0.57	0.41	0.11*
	(0.670	(0.30)	(0.14)
Unemployment_L1	1.04	N/A*	1.09***
	(0.03)	N/A*	(0.03)
Urban population	0.90	0.80***	0.96
	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.10)
Alpha	5.00	4.77	12.03
Wald chi-square	112.82	141.46	148.14
Prob > chi2	0.00	0.00	0.00
Log (pseudo)likelihood	-2996.15	-6859.44	-4725.061
Observations	510	1064	926
Nonzero observations	296	629	502

Number of refugees (count regressions) including IRRs

Table 5.2.4. consists of 3 count (negative binomial) regressions for refugees. Coefficients in the table are replaced by IRRs for easier interpretation instead of logs of expected counts (for interpretation with logs of expected counts see Appendix A). Standard errors are in parenthesis under each IRR.

Model 1 - Table 5.2.4 - Total Battle Deaths

The model has 510 observations and 296 nonzero observations. The p value shows that the model is significant. Total battle deaths, freedom and ethnic diversity are predictors of positive counts, i.e. the number of net migrants. In comparison to the overall net number of forced migrants, intensity of violence and freedom remain strong drivers and ethnic diversity, too, is significant. Precisely, a one unit increase in intensity of violence based on the total battle deaths increases the rate ratio for the number of expected net refugees by a factor of 1.68 holding all other variables constant. A one unit increase in the level of freedom decreases the rate ratio for the number of expected net refugees by a factor of 0.35 holding all other variables constant. A one unit increase in the ethnic diversity decreases the rate ratio of the number of expected net refugees by a factor of 0.35 holding all other variables constant. A one unit increase in the ethnic diversity decreases the rate ratio of the number of expected net refugees by a factor of 0.01 holding all other variables constant, contrary to the expectations. However, there are a few differences in the remaining indicators: religious diversity and unemployment are not significant for refugees in this model.

Model 2 - Table 5.2.4 - Civilian Deaths

The model has 1064 observations and 629 nonzero observations. The p value shows that the model is significant. This model deviates from the same model for the total number of net forced migrants to some extent with significant ethnic diversity and urban population as drivers of forced displacement. Specifically, a one unit increase in intensity of violence based on civilian deaths increases the rate ratio of the number of expected net refugees by a factor of 1.46 holding all other variables constant. A one unit increase in freedom decreases the rate ratio of the number of expected net refugees by a factor of 0.32 holding all other variables constant. A one unit increase in the ethnic diversity decreases the rate ratio of the number of expected net refugees by a factor of 0.17 holding all other variables constant. A one unit increase in urban population decreases the rate ratio of the number of expected net refugees by a factor of 0.80 holding all other variables constant, contrary to the expectations. Religious diversity is

not significant and the model runs without unemployment (due to insufficient data). Overall, the results point to the power of rise in intensity of violence, decline in civil and political liberties and urban centres as drivers of forced displacement for refugees although they do not provide a decisive result for economic variables.

Model 3 - Table 5.2.4 - Terrorism Related Deaths

The model has 926 observations and 502 nonzero observations. The p value shows that the model is significant. Terrorism related deaths, freedom, ethnic and religious diversity and unemployment are predictors of positive counts, which is in line with the results for the total number of net forced migrants whereas urban population is not significant. Specifically, a one unit increase in intensity of violence based on terrorism related deaths increases the rate ratio of the number of expected net refugees by a factor of 1.47 holding all other variables constant. A one unit increase in freedom decreases the rate ratio of the number of expected net refugees by a factor of 0.20 holding all other variables constant. A one unit increase in ethnic diversity decreases the rate ratio of the number of expected net refugees by a factor of 0.03 holding other variables constant. A one unit increase in religious diversity decreases the rate ratio of the number of expected net refugees by a factor of 0.11 holding other variables constant. A one unit of increase in unemployment increases the rate ratio of the number of expected net refugees by a factor of 1.09 holding other variables constant. Based on these findings, it is clear that both violent and non-violent political factors produce refugees when controlling for terrorism related intensity of violence, however, a comparison of all three models lead to mixed results for socioeconomic variables.

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5.2.5 IDPs, ZINB, Robust

In the final part of the large-n study, shifting the focus to IDPs provides an opportunity to both learn more about drivers of internal displacement and compare them to the findings about refugees. However, it is obvious from the missing data provided to the UNHCR that monitoring internal displacement 'remains largely overlooked in national strategies' and this inevitably reflects on the following findings (Cazabat, 2018, p.27).

Dependent variable:	Total battle	Civilian	Terrorism
Net forcibly displaced	deaths	deaths	deaths
Intensity of violence	1.05		
	(0.05)		
		0.95	
		(0.09)	
			1.09*
			(0.05)
Freedom	1.21	1.30	1.14
	(0.30)	(0.40)	(0.35)
Ethnic diversity	4.17**	4.68*	2.94
-	(2.72)	(3.07)	(3.58)
Religious diversity	0.01***	0.02***	0.01*
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Unemployment_L1	1.02	1.03	1.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Urban population	1.30*	1.30	1.35*
	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.21)
Alpha	0.82	0.89	0.91
Wald chi-square	52.17	52.59	85.97
Prob > chi2	0.00	0.00	0.00
Log (pseudo)likelihood	-1287.12	-1067.50	-1197.855
Observations	146	131	195
Nonzero observations	83	68	76

Number of IDPs (count regressions) including IRRs

Table 5.2.5 consists of 3 count (negative binomial) regressions for IDPs. Standard errors are in parenthesis under each IRR.

Model 1 - Table 5.2.5 - Total Battle Deaths

The model has 146 observations and 83 nonzero observations. The p value shows that the model is significant. As expected, population density is a factor in internal displacement. Specifically, a one unit increase in urban population increases the rate ratio of the number of expected IDPs by a factor of 1.30 (i.e. 30%) holding all other variables constant. Contrary to the refugee models, ethnic and religious diversity increases the odds of internal displacement. Specifically, a one-unit increase in ethnic diversity increases the rate ratio of the number of expected IDPs by a factor or 4.17 (i.e. 317%) holding other variables constant and a one-unit increase in religious diversity decreases the rate ratio of the number of expected IDPs by a factor of 0.01 (i.e. 99%) holding other variables constant. A more detailed analysis of why ethnic and religious diversity may drive people to move internally is included in the next chapter (of country survey of Iraq).

Model 2 - Table 5.2.5 - Civilian Deaths

The model has 131 observations and 68 nonzero observations. Ethnic and religious diversity are predictors of positive counts, i.e. the number of net migrants. Civilian deaths, freedom, urban population and unemployment are not significant. Controlling for civilian fatalities does not lead to particularly different results than the first model with all forced migrants wit ethnic and religious diversity driving people away. Precisely, a one-unit increase in ethnic diversity increases the rate ratio of the number of expected IDPs by a factor of 4.68 (i.e. 368%) holding other variables constant and a one-unit increase in religious diversity decreases the rate ratio of the number of expected IDPs by a factor 0.02 (i.e. 98%) holding other variables constant.

Model 3 - Table 5.2.5 - Terrorism Related Deaths

The model has 195 observations and 76 nonzero observations. The p value shows that the model is significant. Intensity of violence, religious diversity and urban population are predictors of positive counts, i.e. the number of net IDPs. Freedom, ethnic diversity and unemployment are not significant.

Controlling for terrorism related fatalities is decisively a driver for both refugees and IDPs and it is noteworthy that intensity of violence is consistently significant in the third model for both refugees and IDPs. Specifically, a one-unit increase in intensity of violence based terrorism related deaths increases the rate ratio of the number of expected IDPs by a factor of 1.09 (i.e. 9%) holding other variables constant. Religious diversity also is in line with the findings for the refugees model: a one-unit increase in religious diversity decreases the rate ratio of the number of expected IDPs by a factor of 0.01 (i.e. 99%) holding other variables constant.

Socioeconomic variables continue to present mixed results: while urban population was not significant for refugees in the third model, it is significant for IDPs whereas unemployment is not significant for IDPs. Specifically, a one unit increase in urban population increases the rate ratio of the number of expected IDPs by a factor of 1.35 (i.e. 35%) holding all other variables constant.

5.3 Conclusion

What causes variations in the number of people that flee? Do factors other than political violence significantly pull or drive people away? Chapter 5 sought to answer these questions based on global data of forcibly displaced people for the period of 1970-2016.

The above results advance previous knowledge about the causal relationship between political violence and forced displacement firstly by introducing terrorism related deaths as a powerful driver, which suggests that future research would benefit from focusing on this reverse causality in addition to analysing forced migration as one of the drivers of deadly terrorist attacks.

Since the main concern is on civilian deaths in this project, it is also notable that the intensity of violence leading to civilian loss is a strong indicator for forced displacement holding other variables constant. Findings also back the second hypothesis, which tests the relationship between freedom and number of forced migrants. As expected, freedom (political and civil liberties) is a strong indicator almost in all of the models with the exception of IDP models.

Additionally, the findings confirm the effect of *intensity of violence* as well as nonviolent political factors in the decision to flee. However, the impact of socio-economic factors is not exactly clear. Although unemployment is statistically significant in most models, its relatively small coefficients make it weak against other main drivers such as *intensity of violence* and *freedom*. *Growth in per capita GDP* and *poverty ratio* were dropped because they are not statistically significant, however, interaction terms with *GDP per capita growth* is significant in some cases. On the one hand, in spite of the questions raised by these findings, the results clearly do not support the 'economic' refugee thesis, either. On the other hand, this conclusion does not suggest that economic factors do not play an important role in the decision to flee. It rather highlights the need for future research including sub-national data to determine where socioeconomic interests intersect other drivers of displacement during deadly armed-conflicts, as opposed to looking at the forced migration phenomenon only through the myopic lens of conflict data versus financial indicators.

CHAPTER 6 SURVEY OF IRAQ: FORCED MIGRATION INTENTIONS IN POST-SADDAM BAGHDAD⁴⁵

6.1 Introduction: Linking Migration Intentions To Drivers Of Displacement

Although forced migration literature is dominated by case studies, empirical analysis of migration intentions in times of deadly political conflicts is rare as discussed in detail in Chapter 2. However, it is not possible to understand drivers of forced migration if this initial phase of the decision making process is overlooked. This Chapter analyses migration intentions based on a 2015 survey conducted in the Baghdad region with the goal of developing a deeper analysis of the causal relationship between political violence and forced migration. In doing so, it aims to answer the following questions raised during the large-n study in particular: 1) Impact of economic variables were not conclusive in the large-n study, but the question of whether people flee mainly because of the dangers and harms of deadly armed conflicts, or whether poverty and unemployment impact their decision, begs for answers; 2) Why do some people stay while others leave? In fact, majority of the people do remain, yet the focus remains (unsurprisingly, in line with political agendas) on leavers even though both decisions are equally important to understand causes of forced migration. This chapter focuses on intentions to migrate of both potential IDPs and refugees, providing an opportunity to compare their odds of migration.

6.2 The Iraqi Context

Iraq, particularly the Baghdad region, is a unique place to conduct research in, as it is one of the rare countries that both produces and attracts forced migrants internally and

⁴⁵ Parts of this chapter have been previously published in a journal article (Ozaltin et al., 2019).

beyond its borders, in addition to being a zone of protracted conflicts fed by ethnic cleavages.⁴⁶ Therefore, the survey provides an opportunity to assess the findings (from Chapter 5) at a state level and to further detail the causal mechanism between political violence and displacement by examining migration intentions. In particular, does the interaction between intensity of violence and GDP per capita growth signal the importance of economic drivers even though the ambiguity of the rest of the economic factors cast a doubt on the power of this interaction? If so, then this finding would refute Carling and Collins' (2018, p.913) argument that revising the drivers of migration 'requires relinquishing the primacy of economic rationality that has long held and almost sacred place in theories of migration'. Additionally, although intensity of violence is clearly a significant driver, does that mean that the prospects of the end to the conflict reverse the intention to flee? This Chapter aims to find answers to these questions as part of the larger puzzle by disentangling the survey of Iraq.

From the formation of the modern Iraqi state in 1921 up to the overthrow of Saddam's regime in 2003, the Iraqi society has seen several waves of forced migration and internal displacement. The first significant forced displacement was mainly due to the policy of 'Arabization' forcing Assyrians, Kurds and Turkmen from their homes in oil-rich Kirkuk and turning over their confiscated land to Arabs in the 1930s. Forced displacement continued to be a near-constant feature of state policy in Iraq since then, particularly from the 1970s when Saddam Hussein's Ba'th government repeatedly used it as a political tool against the multi-ethnic Kirkuk. During the eight-year Iran-Iraq

⁴⁶ UNHCR (2016) defines protracted displacements as those with 25,000 or more refugees of the same nationality in exile in a particular country for five consecutive years.

War, which began in 1980, there was widespread flight and deportation of Shi'a to Iran and Syria (Al Khalidi et al., 2007; Marr, 2012). The regime also targeted Kurds, Turkmen and Assyrian minorities, internally displacing about 1 million people while others crossed the borders to Turkey and Iran, before moving on to Europe (Fawcett and Tanner, 2002, p.9).

Unsuccessful Ba'athist efforts to seek consolation in Kuwait following the nonvictorious Iran-Iraq War led to the defeat in Gulf War and the financial embargo, which weakened the regime and encouraged Kurds and Shi'a to revolt. However, when the USA did not keep its promise to back up the rebellion, Iraq's government forces countered uprising by both groups leading to 1.5 million Kurds to cross the Iranian border while about 500,000 Kurds 'found themselves trapped on the northern border as Turkey barred them entry' (Thibos, 2014, p.3). The UN estimates the total number of refugees produced by Iraq during 1990-2002 as one and a half million (UNHCR, 2003a, p.1; UNHCR 2003b, p.5). The Second Gulf War resulted in the return migration of about two million Arab labourers to Egypt and Sudan (Sirkeci, 2005, p.198). More than half a million Iraqis repatriated in the period 2003-2011 (UNHCR, 2012, p.17). New displacements occurred in 2017: over half a million people became newly displaced within the country, although internally displaced migrants decreased by about one million during the same year (UNHCR, 2017, p.34). By the end of 2017, the total number of the internally displaced exceeded 2.6 million people (IDMC, 2018). In short, displacement was a feature of Iraqi society throughout the 20th century.

6.3 Findings

Odds ratios of the intention to migrate of both potential refugees and internally displaced people are based on three models with political violence, socioeconomic, and social capital related binary predictors and the intention to migrate as the binary dependent variable. The models are built around the theory that the extent to which civilians are targeted during political violence causes variations in the expected number of forced migration flows. The findings reflect migration intentions of residents of Bagdad in the post-Saddam period in three models for both potential refugees (Table 1) and IDPs (Table 2). The first model in each table shows odds of migration based on socioeconomic factors such as income, education level and employment status. The second model adds political factors such as impact of end of conflict on the intention to migrate and the third model adds social capital related drivers such as the effect of positive feelings about community diversity in the decision making process. The following results show the importance of choice-centred approach (as discussed in Chapter 3) in terms of understanding how positive or negative attitudes of potential migrants impact intentions to migrate in spite of possible improvements in political, economic and social circumstances.

Table 6.3.1

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Socioeconomic			
Age	.928***	.915***	.918***
0-	(.014)	(.014)	(.015)
Married	1.143	.861	.889
	(.267)	(0.215)	(.227)
Employed	.687	.588*	.602*
	(.183)	(.166)	(.173)
Income	1.205	1.481*	1.488*
	(.260)	(.340)	(.344)
Sunni	1.461	1.343	1.298
	(.464)	(.450)	(.441)
Education	2.884***	2.916***	2.892***
	(.656)	(.691)	(.698)
Political Violence			
Conflict End		2.932***	2.765***
		(.668)	(.641)
Negotiation		0.591**	.616*
		(.141)	(.156)
Shi'ite Militia		1.958***	2.050***
		(.456)	(.486)
Social Capital			
Community			1.046
			(.083)
Trust in Iraq's Future			1.323
			(.322)
United			1.071
			(.341)
Displacement			.579**
			(.136)
Constant	3.901***	3.272**	2.326
	(1.843)	(1.734)	(1.665)
McFadden's R ²	10.4%	16.8%	17.8%
Number of respondents	441	441	441

Odds Ratios for Logistic Regression of Forced Migration from Iraq

Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

Table 6.3.2

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Socioeconomic			
Age	.984	.976*	.975*
	(.012)	(.013)	(.013)
Married	.885	.666*	.681
	(.200)	(.164)	(.171)
Employed	.965	.937	.974
	(.250)	(.255)	(.272)
Income	.638**	.733	.713
	(.132)	(.159)	(.158)
Sunni	2.135**	2.021**	1.900*
	(.654)	(.653)	(.625)
Education	1.465*	1.401	1.285
	(.321)	(.321)	(.301)
Political Violence			
Conflict End		3.253***	3.137***
		(.713)	(.706)
Negotiation		.647*	.652*
		(.149)	(.159)
Shi'ite Militia		1.608**	1.712**
		(.358)	(.395)
Social Capital			
Community			.899
			(.0701)
Trust in Iraq's Future			1.878***
			(.450)
United			.845
			(.260)
Displacement			.629**
			(.144)
Constant	1.039	0.732	1.283
	(.447)	(0.356)	(.879)
McFadden's R ²	3.3%	10.1%	12.2%
Number of respondents	441	441	441

Odds Ratios for Logistic Regression of Forced Migration Within Iraq

Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

Table	6.3.3
luoic	0.5.5

Comparing inten	tion to/not migrate	of potential re	fugees and IDPs Overall	
		Intend to migrate	Do not intend to migrate	
Religious composition	Shia	61%	71%	
	Sunni	15%	9%	
	Muslim (other)	18%	17%	
	Christian	6%	4%	
Median Age	Christian	30	32	
Gender Composition	Male	89%	96%	
Composition	Female	11%	4%	
Permanent Job	i onnuio	23%	28%	
Well educated		61%	42%	
Married		51%	54%	
Have children		41%	47%	
		(potential) Refugees		
		Intend to Do not intend to		
		migrate	migrate	
Religious composition	Shia	26%	69%	
	Sunni	18%	10%	
	Muslim (other)	7%	17%	
	Christian	32%	5%	
Median Age		29	34	
Gender Composition	Male	90%	94%	
······	Female	10%	6%	
Permanent Job		23%	28%	
Well educated		63%	43%	
Married		46%	50%	
Have children		35%	57%	
		(pc	otential) IDPs	
		Intend to migrate	Do not intend to migrate	
Religious composition	Shia	60%	70%	
5 F	Sunni	17%	9%	
	Muslim (other)	17%	17%	
	Christian	6%	5%	
Median Age		31	32	
Gender Composition	Male	91%	93%	
	Female	9%	7%	
Permanent Job	i ciliulo	27%	25%	
Well educated		57%	47%	
			54%	
Married		49%	74%	

Odds of Migration Outside Iraq (Potential Refugees)

Socioeconomic Factors

The first model (in Table 6.3.1) explores the relationship between intention to migrate outside Iraq and several socioeconomic variables, including employment type, ethnicity and education level. The survey indicates that about half of the respondents with the intention to leave are married; all have children, and the annual earnings of 58 per cent are below Iraq's gross national income per capita (World Bank, 2015). This profile suggests that economic circumstances and worries about the future of younger generations play a role in their intention to move from their homes.⁴⁷

The theory chapter (3) had introduced three related hypotheses based on economic variables. The first hypothesis proposed that low income can act as a push factor, while higher levels of income can cause people to remain in their homes, even under the threat or memories of violence. The second hypothesis stated that economic stability is a major pull factor. This is operationalized by looking at the types of jobs respondents hold. According to this logic, respondents with permanent jobs will be less likely to move; however, if their career perspectives are considerably below their education level, they may still seek an alternative location to build wealth, leading to a better future.

However, hypotheses on the power of employment and income do not find support in the first model, which shows the effect of socioeconomic factors on the odds of migration (Table 6.3.1). Contrary to my expectations, having permanent employment

⁴⁷ The World Bank includes Iraq in upper-middle income countries with its 2015 GNI per capita as \$5960. Values calculated based on 1 USD = 1095.97 IQD in 31/12/2015. Below 6 million IQD was categorized as low income (World Bank, 2015).

and below national average income are not statistically significant. Although age is statistically significant, considering that the average age of all respondents is 34 and the majority (85 per cent) are younger than 45, this result is not particularly indicative.

Political Violence and Forced Displacement

Exploring the bi-variate effect of directly experiencing or witnessing violence confirms the general axiom that 'violence causes people to leave', as there is a statistically significant relationship between various types of violence and the intention to move within or beyond the borders of Iraq in three years. However, only 42 per cent of respondents with personal experience of violence (verbal abuse, physical injury, imprisonment, torture) intend to migrate within three years, indicating that on-going conflict pushes people away, but it is not the sole factor. Nearly half of all respondents with a history of personal or indirect violence favour migrating outside Iraq, even though they think the conflict is likely to stop within the next three years. What pushes these likely migrants away if they expect to find themselves in a conflict-free environment in the near future? Clearly, there is need to look beyond political and conflict indicators.

The second model (in Table 6.3.1) adds three variables related to political violence and includes socioeconomic variables: belief that the conflict is likely to end in three years, negotiations can resolve inter-ethnic conflicts and the Shi'ite militia is to blame for post-2003 violence in Iraq. While the statistical significance of age, being married, Sunni and well-educated remains unchanged, having permanent employment and low income are significant in the second model. Holding other variables constant, the permanently employed are about six times more likely to stay than to migrate, while

respondents with below national average income are 1.5 times more likely to migrate, thus supporting the hypotheses on employment and income. All of the political violence related predictors are strong predictors: respondents who hold the Shi'ite militia responsible for post-2003 violence in Iraq are two times more likely to migrate than those who do not, net of other factors. Each unit of increase in support of negotiations' ability to resolve inter-ethnic conflict cuts the probability of migration by more than half, holding other variables constant.

Although optimism about the end of the conflict is statistically significant, it fails to pull potential refugees to stay in their origin. The fact that it is positively associated with the intention to migrate, holding other variables constant, is puzzling and is one of the focus areas of inquiry in the next part of this study, which builds on individual experiences of forced displacement, including questions on the safety of family members left behind. However, the respondents in the Iraq survey might also have a more optimistic approach to life in general (making them more optimistic about overcoming difficulties in the diaspora or at home). Finally, the intention to migrate may be explained by the fact that the end of a conflict does not immediately lead to opportunities to reach a desired standard of living.

Social Capital

The third model adds four social capital variables: positive feelings about community diversity, trust in Iraq's future, duty to keep the country united and negative feelings about displaced people in general. None of the social capital variables is significant, with the exception of negative feelings towards forcibly displaced people: respondents who feel insecure around displaced people are about six times more likely to remain in

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their origin, holding other factors constant. Contrary to expectations, there is no significant evidence of patriotism in the decision to remain in Iraq, as 'Iraqis have a duty to keep Iraq united' is not a significant predictor. There is very little difference between the third and the previous models in terms of the strength and significance of socioeconomic variables.

Odds of Migration Inside Iraq (Potential Internally Displaced)

Socioeconomic Factors

The same three models are also applied to respondents who indicate an intention to move in Iraq within the next three years from the time the survey was conducted (Table 6.3.2). In the first model, civil status and type of employment are not statistically significant, similar to the model with refugees. Unlike the refugee model, age is not statistically significant, and Sunni identification and income level are. Respondents whose income is below national average are six times more likely to remain in their current location, net of other factors; it is possible that 'poorer' respondents may feel their opportunities are limited elsewhere within Iraq, hence their decision to remain in their hometown. As expected, Sunnis are 2.1 times more likely to migrate than Shi'ite and other Muslim or non-Muslim groups, holding other factors constant.

While the percentage of well-educated respondents who plan to move in Iraq is lower than the percentage of potential refugees (57 vs. 63 per cent), education is still statistically significant in the first model: well-educated respondents are 1.5 times more likely to migrate within Iraq, net of other factors.

Political violence and forced displacement

In the second model of potential internally displaced people, socioeconomic predictors vary in significance and strength compared to the previous model: age and civil status are statistically significant, while income level and education are not. Considering that the average age of the respondents is below 40, I pay more attention to the remaining variables. Each unit of increase in married respondents decreases the probability of migration by more than half, holding other variables constant. Sunnis are two times more likely to migrate within Iraq, net of other factors.

In contrast, the political violence variables are not all that different in terms of significance and strength: respondents who hold the Shi'ite militia responsible for post-2003 violence in Iraq are 1.6 times more likely to migrate than those who do not, holding other factors constant. Each unit of increase in support for negotiations to resolve inter-ethnic conflict cuts the probability of migration by more than half, net of other factors. Belief that the armed conflicts are likely to end in Iraq within three years is a strong predictor in this model, too: these particular respondents are 3.3 times more likely to migrate within Iraq, provided all remaining variables remain the same.

Social Capital

In the third model of potential internal displacement, the significance and strength of socioeconomic and political violence predictors do not considerably change from the second model, except for civil status: here, being married is no longer statistically significant. However, this model shows some interesting differences from the third model for potential refugees. In the model for potential internally displaced people, trusting in Iraq's future is statistically significant. Respondents who trust in Iraq's

future and respondents with negative feelings towards displaced people are statistically significant, whereas 'duty to keep Iraq united' is not. This helps to differentiate optimism from patriotism: based on this finding, the conclusion is that patriotism does not play a key role in the decision-making process of intention to move within Iraq, but the optimistic outlook about the country's future does. Contrary to expectations, increased trust in Iraq's future increases the odds of migration approximately 1.9 times, suggesting optimism about Iraq's future might also lead to optimism about the prospects of relocation within the country.

6.4 Discussion Of Findings

While not all demographic variables play a substantive and significant role in the migration decision, findings of this case study provide insights about the indecisive findings of the large-n study regarding the questionable impact of the social and economic drivers. Findings in the second and third model support the hypothesis that being permanently employed and having below national average income are significant predictors of the decision to migrate outside Iraq. The results show that permanently employed people are less likely to leave their homes than people with other types of employment, whereas respondents whose income falls below the national average are more likely to move. These results indicate that potential refugees value economic security and stability, as well as material gains. The situation of internally displaced people cannot be resolved until more aid is received to rebuild the infrastructure, and potential forced migrants in Iraq are aware that this is not likely to be a short process.

The most outstanding result of socioeconomic variables for future refugees is that of education levels; respondents who intend to migrate are also well educated in general.

Additionally, contrary to expectations, about half of the respondents who think it is likely the armed conflict will stop within the next three years also intend to leave Iraq within the same time frame. This profile suggests these respondents might have a more optimistic approach to life in general, including potential opportunities abroad. It is equally possible that forced migrants are not just looking for conflict to end; they may also be looking for a place where their families can enjoy the quality of life they had before the conflict, highlighting two points about forced migration. First, relative needs can be just as important as absolute needs in the decision to flee even under life threatening circumstances. Second, the decision to flee is not impulsive; it is a calculated and 'educated' decision.

Sunni identity is significant for respondents who intend to migrate within Iraq but not for respondents who intend to move outside the country. However, predictors of political violence are just as significant for potential internally displaced people as they are for potential refugees, albeit with minor differences. In particular, among respondents who are optimistic about the conflict's end in the third model, those who are potentially internally displaced are 3.1 times more likely to move and those who represent potential refugees are 2.8 more likely to migrate. In addition, respondents who blame the Shi'ite militia are 1.7 times more likely to move within Iraq and 2.1 times more likely to migrate outside Iraq, net of other factors.

Interestingly, only about half of all respondents with a history of violence say they intend to leave Baghdad within three years. More than half (52 per cent) of those in favour of staying think all Iraqis can still live together. Although they admit 'trust is lost', they still think that 'inter-ethnic conflicts in Iraq could be resolved through

negotiations', and this decreases the odds of migration. Attempting to differentiate optimism and patriotism in these responses by including socioeconomic, political violence, and social capital variables in the final model does not lead to clear support for the patriotism argument, as 'duty to keep Iraq united' is not statistically significant in any of the models. Therefore revisiting education, one of the strongest variables in the study, helps to gain a better understanding of the profile of respondents who intend to stay in their place of origin. Among those in favour of leaving their homes, 42 per cent have secondary school and above level education; only 25 per cent have university or higher-level education. This is not to suggest that less educated people tend to be more patriotic; rather, lower levels of education may indicate a weaker understanding of events in political unrest and encourage optimism. For example, although 52 per cent of the respondents who have been exposed to violence think Iraqis can still live together, fewer than half of the 52 per cent agree that 'inter-ethnic conflicts in Iraq could be resolved through negotiations'. Given these contradictory responses, it is not possible to include patriotism as one of the main drivers of people's decisions to remain in their homes despite their exposure to some type and degree of violence.

A deeper interrogation of the decision-making process of migration during violent ethnic conflicts is limited by the unavailability of data. A main shortcoming is the lack of detailed violence data due to limitations of sampling: since respondents with a history of witnessing physical injury, imprisonment, torture or other types of violence also report experiencing direct violence, I was not able to test for potential differences between experiencing direct and indirect violence. However, having these variables can still prove useful; although political violence is known to be a major factor that pushes people away, we cannot assume that every type and level of political violence will produce refugees and internally displaced people. Based on the theory that 'witnesses as well as victims are subject to the dialectic of trauma' (Herman 1998, p. 2) and violence 'can create a 'transgenerational' trauma (Weingarten 2004), it would be ideal to test the effect of witnessing versus indirect violence on the individual decision to flee. Another limitation stemming from the unavailability of the data is the lack of a follow up survey on the reasons for the intention to migrate within or outside Iraq.

6.5 Conclusion

Displacement is not new in Iraq; it is not simply the consequence of the 2003 conflict or the subsequent sectarian violence. As Ferris (2008, p.x) argues, displacement is not an accidental outcome of conflict. Understanding the historical context leads to additional insights into the effects of socioeconomic factors in the decision of individuals to move or stay in their ancestral homelands.

The Iraqi survey sheds light on one of the darkest periods in the country's history by providing information on the circumstances that push/pull people to leave/stay when faced with political violence and ethnic conflict. While the data confirm previous findings in similar cases about the relationship between political violence and forced migration (García, 2006; Engel and Ibáñez, 2007; Czaika and Kis-Katos, 2009; Holmes and De Piñeres, 2011; Zetter et al., 2013; Balcells and Steele, 2016; Bohnet et al., 2018), this case study shows the ambiguous effect of economic status on the process of shaping migration intentions; in addition, the basic yet useful socioeconomic profile of the public in the post-Saddam period indicates potential forced migrants are generally well educated (unlike common assumptions) and represent families with children. The survey's main strength is that it provides an opportunity to analyse Iraqis who intend to

remain in their origin and potential migrants, thus adding to the literature. People who intend to stay in their area of origin and are not migrating to other countries are not 'invisible' in this study; their presence prevents an overemphasis on the push factors that produce refugees. The ambiguity in some of these findings, which are mainly due to data availability, raise more questions about the unexplored links between drivers of forced migration and the decision to flee, particularly about the impact of socioeconomic factors and why some people intend to leave while others stay. The next Chapter of semi-structured interviews aims to diminish these by focusing on individual decision making of forced migrants.

CHAPTER 7 'BORN INTO CONFLICT' AND LIVING 'UNDIGNIFIED':

REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS IN THE UK

7.1 Introduction: A Qualitative Analysis Of The Decision To Flee

In June 2020, the UNHCR reported the world refugee population to be 26 million, asylum seekers as 4.2 million and estimated the number of stateless people as 4.2 million (UNHCR Figures at a Glance, 2020). Embedded in these numbers are also those that have been through the legal process of refugee or asylum applications and have been either rejected or waiting for a prolonged decision.⁴⁸ As the large-n study in Chapter 5 has shown, these official numbers provide an opportunity to identify and compare main determinants of forced migration, but they are only available at the state level.

In this chapter, I turn the focus to the actual decision makers through interviews with asylum seekers and refugees living in the UK in an attempt to fill the blanks remaining from the large-n and country survey analyses. The research conducted thus far in this dissertation confirmed (in chapter 5) that intensity of violence is a powerful driver. Upon closer look, this led to the finding that terrorism is no exception among other types of deadly political conflicts such as one-sided violence and civil wars that push people away, but left the question of why some people did not choose to leave unanswered. I also sought to clarify the role of socioeconomic factors in the context of on going violence (since previous literature is not conclusive in this matter), however, the findings did not provide evidence that socioeconomic factors are significant except

⁴⁸ The UNHCR defines refugee-like situation as 'the category of people in a refugee-like situation is descriptive in nature and includes groups of people who are outside their country of origin and who face protection risks similar to those of refugees, but for whom refugee status has, for practical or other reasons, not been ascertained' (UNHCR Glossary).

when GDP per capita growth is in interaction with some of the other factors, most notably the intensity of violence. Even then, significance of GDP per capita growth is not entirely clear since both GDP and number of forced migrants can take unaccountable set of values (as continuous variables).

Since the results called for more in depth analysis, I then focused on Iraq's survey of migration intentions in the previous chapter (6) and further interrogated the relationship between socioeconomic drivers and the decision to flee. While this provided the opportunity to add to the literature about why some people may choose to remain in their homes, the results related to the socioeconomic drivers were ambiguous with the exception of education, which is also a conflicted finding in international migration literature (Brown, 2017; Hagen-Zanker, 2016). Additionally, hypotheses at the core of this thesis about why people flee are based on simple causal mechanisms to avoid complicated explanations for an already intricate phenomenon. However, 'motivations of individuals are complex' and 'economic conditions may interact with violence in a number of ways' (Stanley, 1987, p.133), which can only be revealed by individual analysis. For example, what makes a mother leave her baby behind? Why do migrants travel thousands of km without food and water at the back of lorries instead of moving to a neighbouring country? How do they pick their destination; is it security or economic prosperity that motivates them? How does intensity and type of violence impact their decision?

In the final part of the research, I seek answers to these questions while I also aim to fill the gap in literature since research in this area with narrative analysis has been very limited (Idemudia et al., 2013; Jannesari et al., 2019) beyond studies that focus on

psychological impact of the migration process (e.g. Dietrich et al., 2019; Dowling et al., 2019; Rowley et al., 2019) although there has some research about narratives of asylum seekers (Baldini, 2019; Eastmond, 2007; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al., 2014a; Jannesari et al., 2019; Korac, 2003). Guided by the choice-centred approach (see chapter 3) I recruited twelve volunteer refugees and asylum seekers from eight countries through personal contacts and a multi-agency support and advice project for refugees living in the UK. The following section presents the results of these semi-structured face-to-face interviews through two themes that emerged during the process about their social circumstances and the types of social support available to them.

7.2 Findings: 'The Country I Grew Up Is Like A Nightmare To Me'

The following results from the semi-structured interviews with 12 adult refugees in the UK are based on responses to questions regarding the type and level of violence the interviewees were exposed to, how they made the journey to the UK and how their life post-migration compared to pre-migration with particular focus on their socioeconomic standing. The interviews followed the standards for saturation in the sample sizes for qualitative studies and snowballing method for participant recruitment. Although challenges of recruitment limited the participant network to a few locations in the UK, the demographic and geographic diversity of the participants prevent concerns about representativeness with the exception of gender (only 4 participants are female as opposed to about half of the refugee population globally (UNHCR, 2001)).

High intensity of violence was the main driver of migration expressed by all interviewed in line with previous research (e.g. Davenport et al., 2003; Moore and Shellman, 2004; Schmeidl, 1997). Type of political violence, be it physical or

psychological, did not cause variations in the decision to flee; they were both equally effective. Similarly, interviewees in general did not differentiate between witnessing violence and individually experiencing it; they both caused pain and fear to the participants to the point of driving them away from their homes especially when people close to them were targeted. However, 11 participants out of 12 were all targeted collectively due to their political ideology or ethnicity and 9 out of 11 participants began their migration journey alone, leaving their community and the option of collective displacement, which could have a perverse effect if their communities were associated with armed groups (Steele, 2009).

A common theme formed among the participants, which coincidentally divides them into two even groups according to their migration experience: first is the group that moved through official channels (meaning that they received assistance through legitimate means such as help from the UN, a government/non-governmental organisation or individual volunteers); I name this group as the 'socially supported migrants' because they received some kind of official assistance and peer support. This support positively affected their migration experience in contrast to the second group.

The second group consists of trafficked or smuggled migrants (made an entry to the UK through unofficial channels, but somehow made their way to the legal migration process upon arrival). I refer to the second group as 'isolated movers' due to the fact that all the participants were making the journey on their own and without any legitimate assistance. The second group's migration experience was relatively more traumatic with further exposure to abuse and violence during their journey. Having the two groups in the participant pool gives an opportunity to observe the drivers of forced

migration in more detail.⁴⁹ The cases presented in this section could be said to represent 12 unparalleled lives if they did not intersect at one detrimental point: the impact of political violence in the decision to flee and the trauma that continues to affect their lives.

While the previous chapter (6) included social capital in its analysis of migration intentions, here, the refugee interviews provide an opportunity to discuss varying levels of social support at the individual level. The importance of the two themes around social support are not unique to this study and is relevant to the overall understanding of the forced migration puzzle (Castles, 2003; Stewart et al., 2008). Van Hear (2006, p.129) argues that 'only those who are endowed with certain volumes of capital in certain compositions or proportions, or who can convert other forms of capital into the required forms in the required compositions, can undertake international migration'. Wood (2008) also agrees that social networks are transformable according to people's needs and can help potential migrants to deal with the circumstances created by deadly conflict, which can explain why some people choose to leave while others stay (Adhikari, 2012). The following findings support these views if we consider that the access to illegitimate channels such as smugglers replaces the social support from family and friends in obtaining the means to migrate or to remain.

Socially supported forced migrants

⁴⁹ The purpose here is not to label or categorize migrants, but have the research benefit from a commonality that naturally occurred among the participants. Here, I refrain from referring to the migration process as legal or illegal because as the findings will show in the remainder of this section, most cases are not black and white. For example, even in some cases where a legal organization was involved, travel documents were provided illegally. Here, my position as a researcher is not to judge whether legal processes should include fraud documentation in humanitarian operations, but to focus on which factors contribute and drive the migration process.

Bisimwa, Odyn and Dira are all Tutsis from the Democratic Republic of Congo and met as refugees in the UK. Bisimwa is the first participant in the study and he is no ordinary person: he is already a published writer, a PhD student, a consultant to asylum cases and a father to two kids. He greets me with a warm hug even though it is our first meeting, but this gentle, soft-spoken man was once a child soldier. He does not refrain from talking about the time he was forced to fight as a child about twenty years ago and how he had to watch many people die including close relatives. 'I was born into conflict', he says, just like his parents and grandparents as members of the minority Tutsi.

Odyn, another Tutsi from South Kivu, was also a child when he and his family were caught in the middle of the conflict. Odyn obtained his Bachelors in Economics and Management in Rwanda; he also recently completed a Masters in Finance in the UK since he was born into a well-educated family that has been able to afford good education for their children wherever they lived. Bisimwa and Odyn share similar thoughts and sentiments about the ethnic conflict in Congo, which represent an awareness among the participants in the study overall: interference of foreign powers during ethnic conflicts in the developing world brings an anger and resentment to the local people that does not diminish over time. Bisimwa discusses how 'it is not all about political issues that have never been resolved' as he adds:

"Other countries in the region have been... manipulating ethnicity issues (in Congo) and they mobilize the majority against the minority, which is us..." (Bisimwa, 2018)

Listening to the facts through the eyes of the local people provides an invaluable opportunity to understand the impact of the conflicts on their migration decision since they provide 'particularly good window to human experiences' and 'the nuances of narratives' can hold the clue to further understand the impact of drivers of displacement (Jannesari et al., 2019, p.2). This is what makes listening to Bisimwa and Odyn special when they both explain how this 'manipulation' goes back to the European powers' recognition of Leopold's claim to the Congo basin during Berlin Conference in 1884, followed by the establishment of the Congo Free State the next year. While Bisimwa likens the suffering of the Tutsis to that of the Jews during the World War II, Odyn points to the European powers that decided the problematic borders of Central Africa.

Domestically, they are both aware that it is not just 'bad governance' and corruption that makes Congolese suffer; there is also the resource curse. Odyn is convinced that international organisations would favour getting Congo's vast natural resources as cheap as possible at the expense of lasting peace. However, he admits that he has only become aware of the external factors interfering with the on going conflict in Congo after he left the country mainly because many Tutsis live in isolation; most do not even have access to media (or social media). Pointing to my iPhone, he adds:

"Did you know, without the minerals in our country, you wouldn't have this cell phone? But people are starving in my country." (Odyn, 2018)

This is the only moment in the research when a participant refers to poverty even though all are openly asked to what extent economic circumstances in their home countries may have effected their decision to flee. Odyn's stark comments highlight why the absence of a significant direct causal relationship between poverty and forced displacement (as chapter 4 has shown) is not satisfactory to conclude this research, but a reason to pursue further analysis instead. Poverty can still be a piece of the forced migration puzzle, whose impact may not as visible as political violence since it may be intertwined with other factors when it is related to natural resources in developing countries, for example (Arellano-Yanguas, 2008; Brass, 2008; Englebert and Ron, 2004; Johnmary Ani and Ojakorotu, 2018). As Haas et al. (2020) argue, while globalisation and industrialization helped to reform institutions in the developing world, these processes also destroyed social and economic order, particularly when they combined with the colonial past and contributed to politically motivated fight and consequently migration.

Post-colonial countries such as Uganda, DRC, and Nigeria particularly struggle with what some refer to as the natural resource curse when the locals do not directly benefit from valuable mining industry and suffer from the bloody fights triggered by local and international beneficiaries of mineral trade (Johnmary Ani and Ojakorotu, 2018; Krieger et al., 2020; Ogwang et al., 2019). Therefore, poverty trap is not always just a result of armed conflicts that push people away (Di Tella et al., 2010), it is also a by-product of the post-colonial period, which ignites conflict (McEwan, 2009). This complicated and vicious cycle points out that the increasingly popular discourse of the so-called economic refugees, "connected to a longer history of marking out 'deserving' and 'undeserving' population groups" (Young, 2018, p.38) is superficial and falls short in assessing the depth of the underlying issues related to economic factors that may impact the decision to flee (Ghoshal and Crowley, 1983; Klinck, 2009).

However, Odyn claims (as do the rest of the participants) that his decision to migrate has no economic drivers. 'You don't understand', he says, when pressed on the issue of economic drivers. 'It is about danger... how to survive when people are getting killed' (Odyn, 2018). Similarly, Bisimwa argues that economic hardship is something he has become more aware of in the UK, but not when he was in the middle of conflict about twenty years ago, echoing the words of the other participants on this matter (Bisimwa, 2018).

The decision to flee was not ad hoc for most participants, and not simple for any. For Congolese, the deep connection they feel towards their land made the decision harder. 'There is a cultural belief of what is a home', Bisimwa (2018) says and he argues, that belief supersedes all other concerns including material ones. He gives his mother as an example as he explains how he 'begged' her to come to the UK for her safety because she still lived under the threat of militias in Rwanda a few years ago, but instead, she chose to go back to Congo. His brother also declined Bisimwa's help because of his unbreakable ties to the country. There is a spiritual part of that cultural belief for Congolese, too (Bisimwa, 2018). According to their religion,

"Memories are very powerful and continue to live even after a person passes away and that itself would make me go nowhere (if his life was not in danger) out of respect for the loved ones." (Bisimwa, 2018)

The decision to move to the UK was not instant for Odyn, either, and the UK was not the first country he moved. Odyn first went to a refugee camp in Gatumba in Burundi. There he survived an attack by DRC against the UNHCR camp where in two hours more than 160 people were killed.⁵⁰ This was such a traumatizing experience that he and his family of nine did not want to spend any more time in camps and spent some time in the cities before moving to Rwanda and then finally to the UK with the assistance of British Refugee Council. Trauma of the Gatumba massacre continues for Odyn as he admits, 'sometimes you say, it'd be better if we were killed as well' (Odyn, 2018).

All the participants in the study have dealt with similar trauma and such depressing thoughts, which is very common among forced migrants. Alpak et al. (2015) found that 75 per cent of Syrian refugees suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder, for example, and Steel et al. (2017) found that 89 per cent of their sample reported at least one traumatic event such as witnessing violence, death or disappearance of family and bodily injury prior to moving. However, stress and trauma caused by exposure to political violence did not decrease resilience of any of the participants in this study when the time came to flee to another country and to go through the long asylum process.⁵¹ Tabor and Milfont (2011) explain this outcome of trauma-induced stress in the pre-migration phase through a coping framework, which allows potential migrants to appraise their stress (Lazarus and Folkman, 1999). According to their argument, with the risks and uncertainty of the planned migration journey, migrants already expect some level of stress and can overcome it, particularly if they are supported socially (Adelman, 1988).

⁵⁰ Odyn is referring to August 13, 2004, when 'members of the National Forces of Liberation (Forces nationales de libération, FNL) targeted mostly Banyamulenge refugees – Congolese Tutsi from the province of South Kivu, in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo – based on their ethnicity. The FNL, a predominantly Hutu Burundian rebel movement, shot and burned' the Tutsis, 'while sparing refugees from other ethnic groups and Burundians living in another part of the camp in Gatumba' (Human Rights Watch, 2019).

⁵¹ In fact, they are all aware of the prolonged mental impact of surviving armed conflicts and forced migration and have been receiving proper healthcare in the UK for it.

Unlike Odyn and Bisimwa, Dira, another Tutsi from Bukavu, had to leave in the middle of one night with her two children, leaving her husband, a World Bank consultant, behind. Her husband, who had been increasingly involved in politics, was in detention at the time. Dira (2018) was an Assistant to the Head of the Mission in Ugandan Embassy in Congo for ten years. The family already had tourist visas and passports because they had planned to visit the UK for holidays. Even though Dira had been considering leaving the country due to ethnic persecution she witnessed, when the opportunity to flee arose, Dira was not prepared. She had been delaying their departure since she had previously thought that they were 'protected' because of her husband's 'status' at the World Bank. However, most members of her family were already arrested before being sent to exile in Rwanda and then establishing themselves as refugees in Nairobi. Dira's fears for her children's safety increased once her friends began to 'disappear' one by one and her husband was arrested. Her husband was eventually able to flee to Brazzaville after months of persecution and torture under detention in Congo by bribing the authorities and waits to be reunited with his family.

Unlike Dira and Odyn, Bisimwa (2018) had no travel documents when approached by some Swiss volunteers who told him that 'his life was in danger' and convinced him to leave Congo. However, he was still able to move to the UK through official channels. The volunteers who advised him to leave also helped Bisimwa to bribe officials to get a visa and obtained a fake passport for him to travel to the UK. He summarizes how he finally made the decision in one sentence: "People dreamed about being a doctor or being a pilot, for me, I dreamed about being safe." (Bisimwa, 2018)

In regards to the asylum process, participants generally have bitter experiences although most are relatively content and some are happy once their settlement case is finalized and they are granted visas. Asked about the migration process and if they have regrets about pursuing it in the first place, Bisimwa (2018) admits he was 'undignified' during the time he was detained in the UK and felt like his 'identity was being denied' particularly during the interview process for asylum, claiming he was not allowed to put the facts on record when it didn't suit the interviewers. When he was later moved to a temporary housing in South East England with about fifty other refugee men, he admits that he was exposed to verbal abuse and racism by the locals in town such as being called a rapist and the townspeople tried to avoid him and this refugee friends. However, once he obtained a visa and therefore permission to work, he was able to overturn his life into a success story with an exemplary career.

Odyn (2018) is also happy in the UK because he feels safe even though he still misses home, but he is resigned: 'when you miss what you want, you accept what you have', he says. They had spent about seven years in Rwanda without any assistance about basic needs prior to making the UK their final destination, but culturally there were many similarities including language back in Rwanda. However, when they moved to the UK, even though all basic needs were provided, they found themselves in culture shock, as they did not even speak English at the time. After several years, he now feels welcome in England and is happy about the hospitality. However, if conflict ended, he believes he could do better in Congo than elsewhere simply because it is his true home. Moving with other family members clearly impacts the decision to flee, but family is just as important post-migration, too. Dira moved mainly to protect her children but is devastated that her family is still not united since her husband's asylum case is not finalized. In comparison, Odyn had no choice but to move with his family since he was a child at the time. When I ask him how important it was to be with his family during their flight, he responds by saying 'for us, in Africa, family is everything' (Odyn, 2018).

How about the decision to move to the UK versus other countries for socially supported migrants, perhaps particularly the ones that are geographically closer to the original destination? All participants made it clear that the decision is often not up to the forced migrants. Once the official application is made, the UNHCR makes the choice for them even though in rare instances migrants are asked if they have any preferences. Applicants have the right to apply to up to three countries, one at a time; if all three countries reject their case, the UNHCR closes it permanently. For example, Odyn's family's application to the USA and Finland were rejected and the UK was their last hope. However, they would have preferred France or Belgium as francophones had they been given a choice.

The time it takes to finalize asylum cases vary significantly particularly if there is an appeal and reapplication process involved. The pool of participants in this study demonstrates this variance and forms a comparable representation to the overall applicants to the UK where the total number of pending asylum cases has seen an increasing trend over the last years; pending cases from 2006 to 2018 is 29,016 (Sturge, 2019). Dira's application is one of many examples of this long process. Because of her

successful career and straightforward case, she thought that her family would be granted asylum immediately but the process took five years.

Participants find the restrictions that come with seeking asylum challenging. Not being allowed to drive a car or work in particular tends to take a toll in the long term as the backlog of cases increases in the UK. For immigrants such as Dira (2018) who used to have a job at an embassy, this meant adjustment to a lower social status and led her become clinically depressed. Nevertheless, the government provides asylum seekers with basic needs such as a council home and education for kids, which the participants including Dira welcome as positive aspects of moving to the UK. However, challenges are not over even when forced migrants are granted 'leave to remain' in the UK. Dira's several job applications have been unsuccessful since she has been granted asylum. She disappointedly comments on her stalled career:

"Is it because I'm not from here? Is it because of my background? You ask yourself these questions." (Dira, 2018)

Forty year-old Shona is another well-educated asylum seeker and is from Zimbabwe. She is currently a part-time private carer and a Masters student of social work. Although she had fled to the UK with her partner and friends, she now lives alone. Back home she was a political activist and realized it was no longer safe for her to remain in Zimbabwe following the presidential elections in 2002 as she witnessed members of the opposition being targeted by the Zimbabwean government. She not only witnessed some people being beaten and tortured, but also her friends 'disappearing' and likely dead as she has not been able to obtain any information about their fate. Even though she had initially preferred to flee to South Africa, she didn't know how to claim asylum there and had no relatives in that part of the continent. In the end, she chose to come to the UK because she had relatives here to accommodate her (Shona, 2019).

Shona's case demonstrates how even a planned escape through official channels can become unpredictable for forced migrants. For Shona, the main problems started after she safely travelled to the UK. She confesses that until she left Zimbabwe and started the asylum process, she was not aware of its true meaning; she thought she could go back to Zimbabwe in the near future. Instead, it took eight years for her case to close, and as of 2018, she does not find it safe to travel back to Zimbabwe (one of her friends going to Zimbabwe was questioned about Shona's whereabouts at the border). She admits her disappointment about the asylum process: 'you are now taking an identity that people have imposed on you', she says reflecting on her first interview for asylum (Shona, 2019).

Shona did not only lose her chance of uniting with her friends and family in the near future, but also her economic independence when she applied for asylum in the UK. She was an established business woman in Zimbabwe, selling car parts, but the eight years she had to wait for a response to her asylum application took a psychological toll on her since she was not allowed to work and could not even afford basic goods. However, looking back, she does not regret her decision to flee Zimbabwe because she believes her life was in serious danger, but she thinks the hardest part of becoming an asylum seeker has been physical distance from her loved ones in Zimbabwe. Shona (2019) admits that in time this physical distance turns into a personal distance as she finds that they don't have much in common anymore, 'completely leading separate

lives'. The lowest point she felt was when her father passed away and she could not attend his funeral. When asked if she sees herself as a survivor or victim, Shona gives a similar response to those of the other participants: thinking of herself as a survivor is more 'liberating' than thinking herself as a victim because identifying as a victim is 'disempowering'. Although 'refugee hood has provided victimology' (Demetriou, 2018, p.62), overall the findings suggest that looking beyond the lens of victimology is essential; the participants moved to the UK because they have chosen to do so whereas a victim is generally characterized by helplessness (Strobl, 2004).

Ibrahim, a seventy-five year old Sudanese, is the oldest and most educated participant in the study as a professor of economics who also holds a law degree. With a contagious smile and calmness he begins to tell his story of several years of exposure to political violence. Like most of the participants, Ibrahim has also been a political activist since his youth. He left Sudan for the first time as a refugee in 1974 and fled to Yemen. Four years later, he went to Hungary and completed his Masters and PhD. He then went back to Sudan for a year, but then had to flee to Algeria until 1987 when he thought he would be safe again in Sudan after the revolution with his wife and three kids. However, after the coup d'état in 1989, it became clear once more that he was not going to be safe as a political activist (Ibrahim, 2019).

Ibrahim admits that he witnessed some of his colleagues die and he was exposed to physical and psychological torture, too. However, what worried and hurt him more than his individual suffering was that his loved ones were targeted to get to him. Soon after he spent a year in prison due to his political activities and 'deprived of all opportunities' of ever getting a job in Sudan, he moved to the UK in 2004 as an asylum seeker, followed by his family one year later. Unlike the majority of the participants he obtained a refugee visa within a year of his application. When asked whether this speedy response to his case has anything to do with his professional credentials, he assures that it is simply because he had proper documentation, which fulfils the main eligibility criteria of Home Office:

"To stay in the UK as a refugee you must be unable to live safely in any part of your own country because you fear persecution there' (Government UK, 2019).

Unlike the rest of the participants in the first group Ibrahim chose to move to the UK specifically, and he decisively gives two reasons: firstly because there was no language barrier for him and his well-educated family and secondly, the medical facilities in the UK are very good (since he has been dealing with health problems for a long time). However, it was not his health problems that prevented him from obtaining a job as a lecturer in the UK, he claims. Ibrahim thinks that having degrees from foreign universities is a disadvantage, so he briefly enrolled at a Masters program at Sussex University when he first came to the UK, but the financial burden of tuition was too high for him and his family, so he quit the program.

While Ibrahim is pleased with the medical care he received in the UK, he would rather be in Sudan if could. He misses Sudan very much and this makes him unhappy, but admits that he cannot go back because he would be arrested again immediately at the border; otherwise, he would 'go today before tomorrow', he says with a big smile (Ibrahim, 2019). When asked about how his economic status in Sudan compared to his current well-being and whether economic circumstances could ever impact his decision to flee or to go back, Ibrahim brushes off the idea:

"All the time, I always prepared myself to lead a simple life... I don't care about wealth because I have a cause (in life)." (Ibrahim, 2019)

To this day, Ibrahim tries to continue his activities despite his poor health; he attends forums and gives speeches, writes articles and sponsors other political activists. Ibrahim is a living example that refutes Nyers' (2006) argument that separates a refugee from political life even though the social support he has as a refugee in the UK does not cover or promote such activities.

The last participant that has gone through official support channels to flee to the UK is Rahul. Rahul moved to the UK from Mauritius, an island commonly known as a paradise for tourists although it has significant problems of alcohol and opiates abuse as well as poverty and corruption.⁵² Rahul (2019) used to be a drug dealer who was also involved in opiates production. The extended periods of exposure to opium led to his addiction, which continues to this day. In addition to addiction, he has also been battling with depression lately. He is under weight and looks and sounds fragile. His health problems have prevented him from working regularly, however, he has occasionally held a few odd jobs and is also a skilful calligrapher. One has to show extra effort to hear his weak voice as he begins to talk about the dark side of Mauritius, which dramatically contrasts with the posters on tourism agency windows. However, contrary

⁵² The United Nations World Drug Report (2010) stated that Mauritius had the highest prevalence of opiate use (1.9 per cent) in Africa.

to its popular image, Mauritius has a long history of organized crime, which dates from the 19th century when colonial and local institutions struggled with the pressures of the judicial system and labour system (including slavery) (Price, 2008).

Rahul explains how corruption and crime were a lot worse in Mauritius at the time he fled, about twenty years ago. When asked about what triggered his decision to flee, he describes the physical and psychological abuse he had to endure even in the presence of a judge at a time when corruption led to intertwined relations between politics and drugs mafia. 'I nearly died' he says, when he was tortured once (Rahul, 2019). Because his life was in constant danger and there was no way to safely leave the mafia that forced him to work, he used all the money that was left in his pocket to get a promotion plane ticket to the UK. He already had a valid passport and followed his sister's advice to go the UK with a tourist visa; however, he did not have any information about the legal process immigrants had to go through. As his health deteriorated within the first year of his arrival to the UK, he had to be hospitalized. At the hospital, a British visitor to another patient became aware of his situation and volunteered to help him out. Rahul thinks that this meeting changed his life as he obtained information about asylum applications and realized he had a very strong case. Nevertheless, it took him ten years to obtain a refugee visa.

Rahul finds his life in the UK better in every aspect including the economic stability he has. Like all the previous participants in this group, he had access to officials that worked in the non-profit sector for refugees and this led to a relatively trouble-free journey to the UK. 'The country I grew up is like a nightmare to me', he admits reflecting on his days in Mauritius (Rahul, 2019). His memories of his hometown

mainly inflict fear and depression; therefore, he would never considering going back and is happy to call the UK his home. However, unlike most forced migrants, the distance and time away from Mauritius seem to work to his benefit when it comes to relations with his relatives. Although Rahul's mother passed away two years ago, he still has a brother in Mauritius and a sister in France and they sometimes come to visit him as their relations improved over time (they used to be distant at the time he worked as a drug dealer and they did not have contact for several years after he left Mauritius) (Rahul, 2019).

Isolated movers

The second group of participants not only made their migration journeys alone, but also did not have any official or social support system prior to their journey. Having no access to adequate information or means to travel officially, they turned to illegal organizations that provide travel documents and help them cross the borders. Such are migrants that fall into the hands of the human traffickers and smugglers, which get paid anywhere from \$2000 to \$10,000 per migrant based on their point of origin and destination (United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, 2019)⁵³. Depending on their payment arrangements, trafficked or smuggled migrants are often exposed to abuse and exploitation, so what makes them take the well-known risks? Below are the findings from participants from Sudan, Eritrea, Sri Lanka, Syria and Iraq.

⁵³ Although there is not an international consensus on the definitions of trafficking and smuggling, there are definitions that are relevant to migration related trafficking and smuggling: 'Trafficking in persons means the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, either by the threat or use of abduction, force, fraud, deception or coercion, or by the giving or receiving of unlawful payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having the control over another person'. 'Smuggling of migrants shall mean the intentional procurement for profit for illegal entry of a person into and/or illegal residence in a State of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident' (Article 2, 1999).

Amani, a young Darfuri, paid smugglers for a journey that initially moved him from Sudan to Libya, then to Italy by boat followed by a journey at the back of a truck to France and finally to the UK about a year ago. This is one of the most popular routes used by smugglers as many Darfuris prefer to migrate to the UK because of its historical ties to Sudan (Jaspars and Buchanan-Smith, 2018). Although Amani (2019) admits that the journey was very dangerous, he was able to survive it without getting into any serious trouble. However, he is not naive and realizes that he was simply fortunate not to experience psychological, physical or sexual abuse during the journey. This is why he thinks that it would be too dangerous for his mother and sister to follow his steps; they remain in Sudan.

Upon arrival to the UK, Amani immediately went to a police station and declared his current status. He has been waiting to hear from the Home Office ever since. Although he is not allowed to work, so far Amani is happy with the way he has been treated in the UK, particularly with the basic needs provided by the Home Office and the local council's help for providing a flat. The idea of returning to Sudan is far away from his thoughts even though he misses his mother and sister since he is aware that the political and economic challenges are not going to disappear in the short-term (Amani, 2019).

Amani is very cheerful, gentle and overall has a positive attitude. He is one of the few participants who do not discuss the role of stress, anxiety and depression in their lives. However, it is worth noting how Amani's circumstances have striking contrasts to that of some of the other participants: he is one of the youngest participants and has hopes and dreams for a future in the UK. For instance, he has a primary school diploma, but he wants to continue his education and go to university. He also has no dependents and is not politically active (which means, his name is unlikely to be on a list sought by the Sudanese government). This is not to say that Amani has been a stranger to trauma. On the contrary, trauma of ethnic conflict is what pushed him away from Darfur, he admits. His uncle died during the ethnic conflict, which made him realize that it could be his life on the line any day and that is what triggered this decision to leave Sudan (Amani, 2019).

Prodded about the economic circumstances that may have played a role in his decision to flee, Amani (2019) admits that he comes from a poor family. His family has been struggling financially especially after his father passed away couple of years ago. However, he claims that economic well-being is not his priority and what pushed him away from Sudan was simply the political unrest and the threat it posed on his personal security.

Ryta is another 27 year old, curiously observing the interview with Amani from a distance. She eagerly accepts to participate once the session with Amani comes to an end. The two seem to be friends and I ask if they knew each other before and took part of the journey to the UK together because Ryta followed the same route as Amani once she left Eritrea. However, she says that is by coincidence and they have only recently met in England (Ryta, 2019).

Ryta fled to the UK by herself leaving her husband (currently in prison) and baby behind. She admits that she left her home because of political unrest after she got into trouble with the police and spent some time in prison as a political activist. She struggles to find the right words when asked why she was in prison. 'Politics' she says again and again and is not pushed for details with the understanding that whatever she went through during that time was traumatic enough for her to flee without her baby (Ryta, 2019).

Ryta (2019) shakes her head decidedly and says 'no' when she is asked whether she wants to go back to Eritrea in the future. This fear is what drove her away from her home and it is the same fear that prevents her from having any contact with her family in Eritrea. Consequently, Ryta is in the dark about even her baby's well-being. Although she admits to living in poor economic conditions in Eritrea, she finds that unimportant in her decision to flee and there is no indication to suggest otherwise. Ryta's application to remain in the UK as a refugee is pending. In the meantime she concentrates on improving her English through free courses offered at a nearby community centre (Ryta, 2019).

Yonas defines himself as a mixed race Eritrean. He does not know-his father would not say – why his father and himself, an only child, moved from Eritrea to Sudan one night. If Yonas has any ideas about his father's involvement in politics, he keeps them to himself. What he admits to knowing is that his upper middle class parents decided to leave him in Sudan to live with his uncle and for his secondary education fearing his life was in danger in Eritrea in light of religious oppression and increasing criminal behaviour where they lived. However, Yonas (2019) describes his uncle as 'the most irresponsible person' as he did not take care of Yonas and it was not long before he found himself on the streets in Sudan. He describes himself as a good student with high career aspirations before his uncle betrayed him and his family. In Sudan, he was eventually able to save enough money to pay smugglers that brought him to the UK by working in various jobs. Yonas, now a 37 year-old adult, has recently applied to a university for a degree in Maths and is looking forward to a future in the UK, which he sees as his home now (Yonas, 2019).

Karima is another migrant who used smugglers to move out of her home country. She and her family were leading an affluent life in Homs where her husband owned a truck factory. However during the conflict she and her family were initially displaced in Syria for two years when their house was burned down and 'they lost everything' (Karima, 2019). Her husband was in prison at the time for a 'political crime' and she feared for the safety of her two daughters, but they had no travel documents, so she paid smugglers to first take them to Lebanon where they stayed for five years and Karima's husband was able to join them when he got out of prison (Karima, 2019). It is common for forced migrants to lose their citizenship rights while fleeing from conflict since they have to leave identity documents behind or 'abandon locations where they are registered to vote' (Bratton, 2016, p.440); this inevitably provides opportunities for human smugglers.

While in Lebanon, the family received UN assistance and it was through them that they were able to migrate to the UK and they were almost immediately granted refugee status upon their arrival. However, similar to the majority of the participants that received UN assistance, they did not come to the UK by choice. Instead, they were informed that they would be moving to the UK. Karima's parents and one of her brothers, who has serious health problems, remain in Syria, but the rest of her relatives also fled to various Western European countries due to the war. She keeps in regular touch with her parents and although she is unable to provide financial support to them, her brother in Denmark, who is employed, sends them money. She has no desire or intention to go back to Syria

under any circumstances except to see her family because 'she has nothing and no one else left there' (Karima, 2019). Although she has tried to bring her family to the UK, a legal migration is not possible as the officials in the UK told her, they could only help her family if they could move out of Syria themselves first. This leaves her family no choice but to use smugglers to leave Syria, but her parents are not warm to the idea particularly considering her brother's ailing health.

Karima did not speak any English and did not know anyone when they moved to the UK, which she initially found very difficult to cope with. Economically, their circumstances have been much worse than what they used to be in Syria where her husband was a wealthy factory owner. Now, he cannot work because his English is quite poor and they live on benefits. Their living circumstances only recently improved. Upon arrival to the UK, the family had been first placed in a flat, same as other refugees, but they were recently moved to a council house in South East England, which Karima is happy about. However, unlike most asylum seekers or refugees who have to wait several years before obtaining official immigrant status, having her visa immediately granted has allowed her to integrate to the British life faster; she goes to school and is allowed to look for a job. Therefore, her story strongly contrasts to other participants such as Lewend who suffered from pre and post-migration trauma with on going physical and psychological abuse as he waits for his case to be finalized.

Lewend, a Kurd from Iraq, was a member of one of the security organisations similar to Asayish. One day, he was checking IDs on a bus and caught and arrested a man on the terrorist list. Lewend (2019) believes that the 'terrorist' had connections within the organisation he worked and ordered his assassination as he was beaten very badly a few weeks after this incident. He has suffered brain damage as a result of the beating, which has left him with a blurry memory and other mental health issues. This was the last blow for him to flee from Iraq after he had received anonymous threats and his best friend died under what he thought were suspicious circumstances. He paid smugglers to take him to Turkey; however, he cannot remember how he exactly came to the UK in a lorry from Turkey.

Although Lewend's (2019) memory has holes about his migration journey, he talks about 'terrible things' happening when the Turkish forces caught sight of the group of Kurdish migrants crossing the border to Turkey and vaguely remembers travelling without water or food for such a long time at the back of a lorry to the UK that the health officials initially treating him said he was lucky to be alive. He vaguely remembers the Red Cross helping him at that point. However, his trauma did not end there, as he was abused and tortured and finally stabbed in the flat where he was initially settled. He abruptly shows the scars from stabbing on his stomach and confesses the trauma of it all became so unbearable that he attempted suicide once. Could he have been safer in Iraq? His manager had advised him to leave the country after the beating he survived and Lewend is convinced that he would have been targeted until he died had he stayed any longer in Iraq.

Although he has a refugee visa, Lewend has on going difficulties mainly because of his mental health issues, but also because of being homeless and without a job. He is all alone and terribly misses his mother in Iraq. He admits:

"Me very very miss my mom. Me, most time I cry because I need my mom." (Lewend, 2019)

Lewend's mother fled to Syria then to Iran and then back to Iraq, but Lewend is hopeful that he can bring her to the UK as his dependent. He is currently living off of benefits of mental disability. In spite of all the challenges, however, he still dreams of going to university one day.

Further education is also on Ray's mind, a young Sri Lankan from Colombo, who has been in the UK for eight years. After completing his GCSEs in Sri Lanka, Ray's father decided to send him to the UK for higher education on a student visa when he was eighteen so that he could be safe from the ethnic conflict back home. Ray thought of the UK student visa as a preliminary step for permanent migration. Soon after arriving the UK, he made some 'Asian friends' who spoke his language, Tamil, and advised seeking asylum in France instead of the UK (Ray, 2019). They convinced Ray that he would not be able to get asylum in the UK and would be deported to Sri Lanka instead. Ray claims he was not suspicious when they did not ask for any money for helping him out because they were his friends.

Ray (2019) decided to cross over to Dover with his new 'friends' and got arrested by the UK police along with them. He spent six months in the Young Offenders Institute and was sentenced to one year by the Institute's court for attempting to cross the border with a forged passport. He claims he was not aware that he was travelling with a fake passport since the men travelling with him had his original passport, but provided the fake one to the police instead. Little did he know at the time of his arrest that the men arranging his travel were members of an international smuggling gang. After serving the first six months in prison Ray had a visitor from the Home Office and he was taken to the Immigration Centre for a meeting with the police who were seeking further information about the gang leader in the UK and asked him to identify some of its members in return for helping with his asylum case. Ray accepted the offer and identified the gang member correctly in court, however, he claims that the police did not keep its promise and revealed his identity in court to the gang members, which to this day jeopardizes his security and he lives in fear of his life.

In 2013, Ray's asylum case was denied by the Home Office on the basis that it would be safe for him to go back to Sri Lanka. Ray appealed and the court rejected his case again in 2016 citing the same reason. After another appeal, a judge approved his case and this time it was appealed by the Home Office. At the time of the interview, Ray was still waiting for the final outcome of his asylum application.

Pursuit of security

A third recurrent theme among all of the participants of both socially supported migrants and isolated movers is pursuit of security. How does the research come to this conclusion although 'security' is not a frequently used word among participants? Before answering this question, it is essential to explain what the interpretation of security is for the participants.

Although Buzan (2007, p.18) defines security as 'pursuit of freedom from threats', it is commonly accepted that security is a subjective concept. Therefore, the focus here is on 'felt insecurity' among the participants and how varying levels of it impact their decision making. 'Felt security' is a term coined by Sroufe and Waters (1977) and later expanded by Bowlby (2008) based on the idea that 'a sense of security contributes to self-construction and affect regulation by allowing a person to benefit from the protection, support, comfort, and relief provided by' others when faced with stressful events (Simpson and Rholes, 2015, p.236). A sense of security comes back when a person is able to alleviate negative psychological reactions to such an event. Huddy, et al. (2007, p.132) point to empirical evidence (e.g. Ferraro, 1996; Sattler et al., 2000) that threats with potential harm from violent conflicts is one the factors that may 'increase one's sense of vulnerability and motivates action designed to minimize personal risk'.

In the case of forced migrants, it is possible to argue that the decision to flee is in response to a perceived threat of physical or non-physical violence and a feeling of insecurity. Participants' statements strongly support this argument. For example, Dira states:

"I thought I was protected... safe... because of my husband, because of his job at the World Bank..." (Dira, 2018)

Similarly, Rahul (2019) decisively rejects the idea of going back to Mauritius while explaining how calling the UK 'home' makes him feel safe; Ray (2019) makes it clear that he feels safer in a prison in the UK than he would feel in Sri Lanka with fear or further persecution or even death in the hands of an international smuggling mafia; Lewend (2019) left with fear of assassination by the politicized security forces and does not even consider going back to Iraq even though he admits being very home sick and missing his mother; feeling insecure in Syria pushed Karima (2019) to seek refuge in Lebanon (before her migration to the UK) where she fought with very trying circumstances, but it was watching her house burned down during the Civil War along with any proof of citizenship that made her feel insecure and not the challenging steps to refugee hood after; Odyn (2018) hesitates to call the UK 'home', but does not think twice about admitting this is where he feels safe.

It is important to note that none of the participants matched feeling of security and safety with access to economic resources or wealth. Instead, they emphasized the powerful impact of physical and psychological violence they were both exposed to and witnessed in their decision to leave their original homes. This response is not exceptional in literature. For example, Mansvelt et al. (2014, p.1666) found that those with the lowest levels of economic resources did not express higher levels of insecurity, but instead drew upon life experiences of managing and making do to construct a trajectory of security'. This attitude is also confirmed in participants' responses to questions about returning to their home countries since most admitted that they would be worse off economically if they returned. Instead, requirement for return for all the participants depended on regaining a feeling of security from politically motivated persecution or violence. As Dira admits:

"At first, I thought I could go back after a while... But after they asked about me to my friends at the airport, I know that I cannot." (Dira, 2019)

7.3 Conclusion

Overall, the findings revealed that exposure to political violence is the main driver of forced migration, which also supports previous findings of the large-n study and the case study of Iraq. Although interviewees came from eight different countries and have different personal backgrounds, they all clearly pointed to some type and level of political violence that drew them away from their home. Despite their various backgrounds, exposure to political violence led to almost identical experiences and impacts on the participants, which led them to their ultimate decision of leaving.

While not all participants personally experienced physical harm (which is a question I did not elaborate or probe further than stated in the list of Interview Questions considering the sensitivity of the matter), they all admitted to witnessing it, sometimes directed to their close relatives. However, witnessing versus directly being exposed to violence did not cause variations in the decision to flee. It was not the type of violence that pushed them away; it was the intensity, brutality and in some cases the obvious imminence of it.

When asked about economic reasons that may have contributed to their decision to move, none of the participants found such factors to be relevant. On the contrary, most participants in this study held relatively better economic and social status in their country of origin, which enabled Yonas, Amani, Ryta, Karima, Lewend and Ray to afford the long journey to the UK by paying large amounts of money to smugglers, in particular. The relatively less impact of economic circumstances is also evident in the majority of people that remain behind. While some people may lack the necessary resources to move, for some, it is 'the culture that keeps them' and 'supersedes the want' as Bisimwa put into words. Participants also argued that they did not consider their economic situation much since they found their lives were in danger and that took priority of any other potential factor that pushed them away. Most participants also admitted to their longing for their home countries and when asked the condition for their return, almost all pointed to the end of political turmoil and human rights violations in their country of origin. Ray stated, 'this is what I call home because I have to. I have no other choice'.

Interviews also revealed that refugees or asylum seekers did not choose which country to move in most cases. Most ended up coming to the UK because they were not given any other state as an option by whichever channels (official or illegal) they pursued their long journey. This was because the UK was considered to be the only state that the forced migrants stood a chance of gaining a legal migrant status.

CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION - DISENTANGLING THE CAUSES OF FORCED MIGRATION

8.1 Summary Of Findings

In this chapter I will summarize the findings and elaborate on the contribution of this research to the forced migration puzzle. I will also highlight the limitations of this study and challenges that await future research.

This study has sought to answer which factors drive forced migration and causes variations in forced migrant volumes during deadly political conflicts by focusing on violent and non-violent political, economic and social motivations. As presented in the introductory chapter, I have attempted to identify and compare the main drivers of forced displacement by reviewing the literature and fragmented theories of migration. Considering their insights I offered a comprehensive theoretical framework and modelling of forced migration in Chapter 3 that connects the individual and aggregate levels of analysis and helps to develop a more detailed understanding of the causal relationship between political violence and migration. Applying a mixed methods approach, I analysed the forced migration phenomenon through a global study of forced migrants, a case study based on a survey of Iraq and interviews with forced migrants in the UK. First, the large-n study posed the question of what caused variations in the number of people that flee around the world from 1970-2016. Here, I also brought a neglected causal relationship between terrorism and forced displacement and tested its significance. Second, the case study detailed the axiom that violent conflicts cause people to flee by looking closer at socioeconomic factors based on a post-Saddam survey in Bagdad. This part of the study provided an opportunity to also ask why some people remain, too. Third, the interviews with refugees and asylum seekers in the UK

answered questions raised by the large-n and case studies, placing the actual decision makers in the centre of the research.

Chapter 2 presented the reasons behind the relatively slow progress of forced migration literature identified as: close connection with policy relevance and developments, issues related to data and lack of broader theoretical tools across disciplines until recently. It then pointed to two particular challenges that inevitably weaken the literature so far. First is the fragmentation of findings in various academic fields that are yet to lead to the establishment of a literature comparable to other sub-fields of International Relations. Second is the dominance of refugee case studies, which introduces selection bias not only by choosing cases that have already produced refugees but by also excluding IDPs who in fact outnumber the refugees significantly around the world. Third is the attention on consequences of forced migration based on conflict data, which provides a limited analysis of forced migration from a security perspective. In sum, chapter 2 reviewed what the literature has achieved so far in terms of explaining the impact of political and socioeconomic causes of forced migration. Previous literature clearly established that political violence is a decisive driver of forced migration, however, it has not provided a comprehensive picture of the overall puzzle.

The thesis addresses the gaps in literature as follows: first by clearly focusing on the question of what causes variations in the number of people that flee when exposed to political violence; second by avoiding selection bias as it includes all forced migrants (refugees, asylum seekers and IDPs) and not limiting the project to a single case study, level of analysis or group of migrants. Accordingly, the contributions to the literature

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are multifold: the global large-n study aimed to reach generalizable conclusions that are not just limited to refugees regarding both political and socioeconomic drivers of forced displacement whereas the literature is dominated by refugee studies. Additionally, both the large-n and the country survey analysis adds to what we know about forced migrant decision-making by comparing findings between refugees and IDPs. In particular, impact of terrorism is consistently significant throughout the models for IDPs while refugees, whereas political and civil liberties are significant for refugees. Furthermore, while previous literature only looked at terrorism as a consequence of forced migration, this study questioned terrorism's impact as a driver and has shown that this neglected relationship needs more attention.

Unlike previous literature, the study also sought to understand why migration intentions do not dissipate by prospects of ending conflicts and why some people have left while others (particularly close relatives and friends) remained. An equally important contribution is also the interrogation of the 'economic' refugee narrative, which had already taken its place in literature particularly since the 1980s (e.g. Gineste and Savun, 2019; Smyser, 1985; Tsamenyi, 1983), however, findings from the global large-n study, the country survey of Iraq and refugee interviews do not lead to evidence in support of this argument.

Chapter 3 began with refuting the assumption that people are obliged to move in response to political violence. It then explained that rational choice approach helps to assess the drivers of forced displacement since the decision making is a result of weighing costs and benefits of moving under all circumstances including imminent threat of deadly conflicts. The chapter went to present the continuing relevance of push

and pull theories in spite of some critiques of rational choice approach. This led to the argument that an ideal theoretical framework would embed both aggregate and individual level decision-making to answer which factors are stronger drivers, which coexist and which interact or intersect with each other. Therefore, I compared micro, meso and macro theories before explaining the challenges of trying to compare various drivers against each other. I also emphasized that an ideal theoretical framework should include people that remain in their homeland and not be limited to those that leave.

Chapter 3 also discussed why theoretical boundaries between so called voluntary and forced migration studies should not be rigid since the line between volition and coercion is not always straightforward and that interpretation of empirical findings should reflect this approach. It also explained the importance of including individual agency within the theoretical framework despite the misleading 'forced' emphasis in literature, which underestimates individual intellectual capacity and lowers people to the level of 'stimulus-response mechanisms' (Davenport et al., 2003, p.30). A theory built under such an assumption cannot explain why some people stay while others leave when people are exposed to political violence. Therefore, I argued that voices of refugees, asylum seekers and IDPs form an essential piece of the forced migration puzzle and a theoretical framework overlooking their agency would be impossible to defend.

I also critiqued the simplicity of the common axiom that violence causes people to flee because it fails to explain why some people do not choose to leave while others do when faced with deadly political conflicts. I pointed out that we cannot be content with prior theoretical knowledge because forced migration is an on going and changing phenomenon so theoretical development has to match that dynamism. In doing so, I interrogated the idea of a general theory of forced migration and argued that it is not possible to rely on a general theory, but that is not a reason to be pessimistic because the alternative of consulting a number of theories is more beneficial: dialogue across disciplines improves theoretical thinking in the field and offers the flexibility to deal with the complexities of the phenomenon.

Chapter 4 explained the rationale behind the mixed methods approach in the thesis while revisiting the research question and identifying the required data. It also discussed the reasoning behind the focus on two particular categories of displaced people: refugees and internally displaced people. The first was to understand the reasons that push or pull migrants internally versus beyond the borders of their homeland. Such an analysis required a flexible model that did not treat any migrant group as 'invisible' (particularly the internally displaced people), but also took into account the possibility that a displaced person could move within these two groups. The quantitative and qualitative methods were embedded to complement each other through a global time-series analysis, a case study of post-Saddam Iraq and semi-structured interviews with refugees and asylum seekers in the UK.

The chapter also discussed the importance of not limiting the entire study to a specific case or cases or only to a large-n study since forced migration is a global phenomenon. It would equally be problematic to silence forced migrants in a study that claims to explain their motivations behind the decision to flee or stay. Therefore, the thesis also benefits from the flexibility of mixed methods in terms of including direct accounts of forced migrant stories, a country survey and a global time-series analysis within the same framework.

Chapter 5 considered the causes of forced migration followed by deadly armed conflicts through a global cross-sectional time series data analysis from 1970-2016 with models based on refugees, internally displaced people and asylum seekers. By turning focus to socio-economic factors in addition to political violence and non-violent political indicators, it identified the main drivers of forced migration by answering what causes variations in the number of people that flee within or beyond the borders of their home states. It first found that freedom (of political rights and civil liberties) and intensity of violence remain the main drivers of forced displacement. In particular, intensity of violence is significant for IDPs when the deaths are terrorism related in the model including economic variables whereas all types of intensity of violence are consistently powerful indicators in the refugee models.

Whilst it is not surprising to confirm explanatory power of intensity of violence, the results also show that intensity of violence based on terrorism-related deaths is a significant driver in all count models holding all other variables constant (with the exception of Model 2 of IDPs with interaction terms). Secondly, the analysis found that socioeconomic factors do not decisively have an impact on the decision to flee. Although unemployment is statistically significant, results point to a minuscule impact in the expected number of net forced migrants. Mixed results include interactions terms with GDP per capita growth and intensity of violence, which are significant for refugees but not for IDPs. Thus, the results also do not offer support for the increasingly popular argument that refugee crises are enhanced or even caused by poverty and that numerous forced migrants are economic refugees in disguise.

Chapter 5 then offers three primary contributions to the academic debate on causes of forced migration. First, unlike the majority of studies suffering from selection bias and concentration on refugees, Chapter 5 presents models of total number of forced migrants as well as analysing refugees and internally displaced migrants separately. Second, findings point out that terrorism related fatalities are a push factor for increase in the number of forced migrants. Although there are recent studies analysing impact of forced migration on terrorism, the relatively unexplored reverse causality between terrorism and forced displacement is clearly a new but curious avenue to explore. Third, inclusion of socioeconomic factors as control variables overcomes the myopia of explaining the phenomenon only through armed conflict indicators.

Using a country survey analysis of migration intentions in post-Saddam Baghdad in Chapter 6 confirmed that predictors of political violence are just as significant for potential IDPs as they are for potential refugees. Looking at odds of migration for both categories, it also further analysed the impact of social and economic drivers of forced displacement during deadly political conflicts. This provided an opportunity to interrogate the ambiguous results of the large-n study regarding the impact of employment on the decision to flee, thereby hypothesizing that being permanently employed and having below national average income are significant predictors of the decision to migrate outside Iraq. The findings confirmed that permanently employed people are less likely to leave than people with other types of employment, but those whose income fall below the national average are more likely to migrate leading to the conclusion that potential forced migrants value economic security, stability and material gains. However, notably, 52% of the respondents exposed to violence thought Iraqis could still live together and only about half of all respondents with experience of violence admitted their intention to leave Baghdad within three years.

Surprisingly, about half of the respondents who think the armed conflict will stop within the next three years also intended to leave Iraq within the same timeframe. Considering that respondents who intend to leave the country are well-educated (63% have a secondary education and above), the results highlighted that end of a conflict does not necessarily put an immediate stop to refugee movement. Potential refugees may also be looking to regain the quality of life they had before the conflict by moving to a place that can provide it. These findings confirm that the decision to flee is a calculation of benefits and losses indeed even under the most life threatening circumstances. However, they also show that relative needs can be just as important as absolute needs in this decision making process.

These findings in Chapter 6 contribute to literature by expanding the theoretical framework from trying to separate political violence related and socioeconomic motivations to how they co-exist and weigh in the decision making process. It also improves the findings of Chapter 5 by showing that understanding the historical context develops insights into the effects of social and economic factors in the migration decision following exposure to political violence. Additionally, Chapter 6 arrives to a conclusion contrary to popular conception of refugee profile: potential refugees are generally well-educated and consequently the decision to leave or stay is not impulsive but 'educated'. While this finding is based on post-Saddam Iraq, future research can further analyse this finding by other case studies. Finally, this part of the study avoids selection bias twice unlike most literature: first by including odds of internal

displacement in addition to odds of refugee movement and second by paying attention to the pull-push factors of both leaving and staying.

Lastly, Chapter 7 centred on an individual level analysis of forced migrants based on the main assumption underlying this study that the choice of 'fight or flight' is a rational one and cannot be fully understood without human agency. The narrative analysis of semi-structured interviews with refugees and asylum seekers in the UK overcame the inevitable handicap of silencing forced migrants in the large-n study and provided an opportunity to ask the questions that previous parts of this study raised but could not answer based on aggregate level data.

Chapter 7 confirmed the earlier findings of the large-n study and the case study if Iraq. However, it detailed the impact of political violence beyond the simple axiom that it causes people to flee by having questions about intensity and type of violence and the experience of direct versus indirect violence. Participants, aged between 26 and 75, represented eight states from the Middle East and Africa and had very different backgrounds, however, their descriptions of exposure to violence and how that effected their decision to flee was almost identical. All participants declared high intensity of political violence as the main push factor. Whether they experienced direct violence or witnessed it did not cause variations in their decision to leave. Type of violence (from psychological torture to physical abuse) was also not a determinant in their decision; they all became powerful determinants of the decision to flee. However, most participants were particularly affected by seeing their close family and friends 'disappearing', being detained, threatened or getting killed during to ethnic conflict while one participant who had experience of torture and imprisonment admitted that the threat his loved ones received because of his political activism 'hurt the most'. Nevertheless, all participants agreed that what pushed them away was not the type of violence but it was the intensity, and brutality of it.

Although all the participants decisively declared political violence as the main driver for their decision to flee, one of the goals of Chapter 5 was to determine whether this motive intersected with socioeconomic ones at the time of their decision making contrary to studies that aim to neatly separate the two. All participants strongly rejected that their social or economic status impacted their decision. In fact, 10 out 12 participants were financially better off in their country of origin. Of the 2 participants that were worse off in their home countries, one came from a wealthy family that 'lost everything' during the civil war in Syria. Therefore, the findings of Chapter 7 does not support the increasingly popular perception of economically driven refugees; instead it provides evidence for conflict-driven economic factors, which begs for further research in future studies. The implication of these findings for literature is that observation of a direct causal relationship between economic factors of forced displacement is not particularly helpful to understand the overall forced migration phenomenon and future studies should focus more on expanding the literature about the causal relationship between economic results of conflict and forced migration.

Chapter 7 also contributed to the literature by analysing the reasons behind the decision to remain in addition to leaving since most participants had been alone during their migration journey leaving close family and friends behind. Those that had migrated through smugglers identified the danger and risks of such journeys as the main reason for their relatives and friends to remain. Although none of the participants confessed to receiving harm during their migration, they were convinced that their loved ones were not 'strong enough' to survive through it. Some participants also had relatives with serious health issues, which made such a journey impossible. Only two participants admitted that they failed to convince their loved ones to come with them because of the strength of their cultural bond they felt towards their country and the idea of 'home' resonated with it.

Chapter 7 also explained how decisions made by each participant affected their journey, highlighting the differences between those that chose to move through official channels versus that paid smugglers to come to the UK. While all participants confirmed that decision to move was neither quick nor unplanned, they also highlighted that they willingly and knowingly took the risks and did not agree with being identified as victims in this process. This finding supports the main assumption of this study that decision to flee is a rational choice even under the most life threatening circumstances and arguing otherwise makes forced migrants 'disempowered' as articulated by one of the participants. Contrary to popular perception, potential migrants do choose whether they move or not, but often times do not have a choice about where they move to. As the findings show, the UN informs most migrants of their destination country and potential migrants often do not have a say where they can move to. In case of the migrants that move through unofficial means, their destination choice is in the hands of the smugglers most of the time.

The point of departure for this study is the insufficient theoretical attention to the causes of forced displacement following political violence. I proposed to investigate the drivers of forced migration with a theoretical framework that was never been tried before: by putting political, social and economic factors into empirical test through merging of several data sets for a global study, analysing migration intentions with a country survey of Iraq, and studying impact of individual agency through semistructured interviews, I attempted to provide an overall picture of the forced migration puzzle while trying to answer why people flee. The summary of the main findings demonstrate the overall contributions of this study:

1) Political violence, including terrorism, increases the number of people that flee. Impact of terrorism related to intensity of violence is particularly present for IDPs. This new finding carries terrorism to the same league with other types of political violence including civil wars and one-sided violence. However, the interviews with refugees have shown that it is the intensity and not the type of violence that push people away. Additionally, the findings from the survey of Iraq has shown that even when 'trust is lost' in a community, potential migrants do not necessarily lose hope to live together in peace. In the case of Iraq, they think that 'inter-ethnic conflicts could be resolved through negotiations', and this decreases the odds of migration.

2) The higher the level of political and civil liberties in a country, the less people are likely to flee to other countries. This confirms the hypothesis that weak democratic regimes and institutions along with state oppression push people away from their countries. This is not a surprising finding, however, clearly, including political factors such as freedom of thought is just as important as including armed conflict data in forced displacement analysis. 3) Contrary to popular assumptions, migration intentions are high among the welleducated in Iraq. Also interesting is the finding that migration intentions in Iraq do not change with the prospects of an end of the conflict. This shows that potential migrants may not be willing to trade off the quality of life that they had before the conflict simply with the end of violence. It also points out that relatives can also play a role in the decision to flee in addition to access to basic needs such as shelter, clean water and healthy food.

4) Economic factors such as poverty, GDP per capita growth and employment do not decisively and directly drive people away. Although there is some evidence that interaction of political drivers and change in GDP per capita may act as a push factor, this study does not find evidence in support of the argument that some forced migrants are economic refugees in disguise. Similarly, the reason to remain in a deadly conflict zone is not directly and mainly tied to personal finances or even political reasons; cultural connections to homeland and the physical challenges of a dangerous migration journey deter some potential migrants from the decision to move.

It is evident from the summary of the findings that the theoretical framework has helped to add to existing knowledge and that it also provided a useful direction about methodology since all three parts of the study interconnect while they also 'compensate for their particular faults and imperfections' (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998, p.40): the interviews show that questions about why people leave or stay during deadly armed conflicts cannot be answered without first person narrative analysis. However, it was through the large-n study that the outstanding questions were raised in the first place. Time-series analysis showed the development of historical trends of forced migration and provided an opportunity to test the impact of previously identified (e.g. intensity of violence) and unidentified (terrorism) drivers of this global phenomenon. The survey analysis complemented the findings of the large-n study while raising further questions that could be answered through the interviews.

Since the time of the research for this dissertation began, the unprecedented number of forced migrants has continued to increase globally with on going and new conflicts such as the Syrian Civil War and the Venezuelan displacement due to political turmoil along with hyperinflation and food shortage. Although more than two thirds of refugees come from just five countries (Syria, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Myanmar and Somalia) and countries in developed regions host only 16 per cent of refugees, the question of how to manage forced migration movement is likely to be on the agenda of most states for the foreseeable future. This is because the number of forced migrants moving to a country does not necessarily correlate with how much attention it receives from policy makers. For example, despite migrants and asylum seekers decreasing to pre-2015 at the borders of the European Union, the issue of migration continues to be a political weapon to insert fear before elections instead of focusing to produce effective policies. Limited information about forced migration and migrants not only lead to populist efforts to succeed, but also prevent proper management of migration movements. Regardless of where one stands in terms of this controversial topic, studies such as this dissertation should not be scarce because it is not possible to manage forced migration movements before disentangling this phenomenon by separating it from popular myths and filling the gaps in literature about what causes variations in forced migration movements in the first place.

8.2 Limitations Of The Study

In the course of the analyses of this research, I encountered some limitations that were neither unforeseen nor uncommon for studies of forced displacement. One of the most important of all was about addressing the main drivers of forced displacement. Although I selected the variables based on which have been previously tested and which have been neglected in literature, to quote UNHCR (1993, p.1) again, 'there are as many reasons for moving as there are migrants'. Therefore, it is simply impossible to include all causes of forced migration in one study but I do need to have a threshold of significance to analyse the most common drivers of forced displacement instead of trying to present possibly millions of reasons, however, this does not mean that factors that have not proven statistically significant here (such as poverty) are irrelevant or unimportant.

Secondly, all scholars' ability to test theoretical models is inevitably limited by data availability. For example, the data on IDPs is limited and its accuracy is questionable since local and national record keeping of IDPs is still in need of standardization and lack of technical and financial means to do so even if they may have the political will. Consequently, the quality of the IDP data is questionable. However, the UNHCR record-keeping raises questions about robustness and data quality, too, not just due to missing data (particularly from the 1970s), but also because of the way data was recorded in some cases without following historical state formations and dissolutions about states such as Germany, Czech Republic and Yugoslavia. This is particularly a concern for this study considering that there were significant population movements with the end of the Cold War. The economic data also raises questions since many less developed countries provide relatively limited data to the World Bank. This may be contributing to the ambiguity over the impact of some of the economic variables and there are also questions about accuracy of calculation of the main economic indicators such as inflation.

Another limitation of the data is apparent in the selection of unit of analysis and estimation of seasonal data in the time-series analysis. Since global data is commonly recorded by state on an annual basis, it is not possible to replicate the large-n study with sub-national territories, for example. Similarly, the annual time series is not ideal for a dynamic phenomenon such as forced displacement; ideally monthly or even daily data can provide more accurate and in-depth information about mobility. However, maintenance and collection of big data is not possible within the scope of a PhD dissertation and the collection and management of such data requires innovative methods and new technologies that are still in trial stages such as the projects tested by the UN Global Pulse and UNCHR Innovation Service.⁵⁴

While this dissertation's scope mainly concerns the country of origin, geographical proximity to the epicentre of violence can provide further insights about odds of migration or why some people have chosen to move while others stayed. However, it is not possible to conduct such a study on a global scale since it would require individual locations in addition to precise coordinates of deadly conflict events.⁵⁵ Obtaining accurate data of whereabouts of individuals at the time of a violent event is also challenging. Even if geographic location data is accurately collected with the assistance

⁵⁴ See https://www.unhcr.org/innovation/ for details.

⁵⁵ Conflict location data is available. For example, see PRIO Armed Conflict Location and Event Data at https://www.prio.org/Data/Armed-Conflict/Armed-Conflict-Location-and-Event-Data/. The study by Czaika and Kis-Catos (2009) comes close to this type of analysis where they look at village level data in terms of change population and related geographic movement patters during civil conflict in Indonesia.

of geographic information systems, mobile computing technologies and digital and social media, it would be problematic to analyse it against static socioeconomic measurements since most of these measurements are kept annually whereas some individuals may be exposed to violent events more than once within a year (Curry et al., 2019; Kaiser et al., 2003; Leurs and Smets, 2018).⁵⁶ However, as data collection and management advances, I expect this issue to be eliminated in the future.

Data limitation also impacted the survey analysis of Iraq since the survey raised more questions and there was not an opportunity to conduct a follow-up survey at the time of this research, however, this limitation was offset to some extent by including individuals as the unit of analysis in the interviews. By doing so, the perspective of the overall study had an opportunity to expand and include answers to why some people left while other flee and whether economic well-being played an important factor in their decision-making. However, individual data has its own limitations, too. Since recruitment was a challenge, it was not possible to randomize the participants; I met all of them through someone I knew (mostly through the previous participant) although interviewees are representative of a wide geography and social backgrounds.

8.3 Recommendations And Avenues For Future Research

Considering all data related issues, it is challenging to make robust and universal conclusions about determinants of forced migration. However, issues summarized here emphasize the importance of academic contribution to understanding the forced migration phenomenon and should not discourage future research. On the contrary, this

⁵⁶ Bohra-Mishra and Massey (2011) had a similar problem when they analysed individual decision-making during the civil war in Nepal, though they went along with their research with static economic variables.

research makes it clear that a successful theoretical framework of this puzzle leads to empirical testing with more than one method and one level of analysis. As such, the findings should inspire future research particularly in less explored areas such as the causality between terrorism and forced displacement and also focus where there are not clear answers about the impact of some economic variables such as employment by including IDPs along with refugees.

In particular, further analysis of the long neglected causal relationship between terrorism and forced displacement would develop an understanding of the short and long-term impact of being exposed to this particular type of extreme violence. This is important because high intensity of violence led by terrorism may not only impact the decision to flee, but also may play a role in future decision making and behaviours once displacement occurs. There are several studies (e.g. Bove and Böhmelt, 2016; Braithwaite et al., 2019; Choi and Salehyan, 2013; Eybergen and Andresen, 2020; Götsch, 2016; Milton et al., 2013) analysing the reverse causality between forced migrants and terrorism that question a link between being a refugee and recruitment to terrorist organizations. Their methods could be replicated with comparative case studies and in-depth interviews and surveys that investigate terrorism as a driver of forced displacement.

Although push-pull theories have a long history, the discussion about how they may be improved is not over by any means. On the contrary, future research would benefit from studies that specifically focus on interactions and intersections of drivers of forced migration and the pull-push factors that are still in play once the conflict ends. Additionally, what Klaus and Pachocka (2019) call 'push-back' factors, the increasingly tighter measures of the Global North to prevent refugees from entering their territory, may prompt a revision of the push-pull approaches. All of these are avenues for future research and can become a dissertation of its own.

The efforts of theoretical development should focus on deepening the understanding of drivers of forced migration especially in terms of eliminating the 'disjuncture' between empirical reality and false assumptions such as the 'claims that those making the journey are mostly not refugees but so called economic migrants' (McMahon and Sigona, 2018, p.498) and that armed conflict generally has a direct effect on migration (Abel et al., 2019). In sum, data related issues should not overshadow the gaps in the literature and future improvements in data collection and management should not lead to a trade-off between empirical findings and vaguely specified theoretical mechanisms.

Finally, as I write the conclusion chapter, a global pandemic has transformed daily lives of most if not all people around the world and this will undoubtedly effect existing and potential forced migrants, forced migration policies along with on going and future academic works. One concern to address in future research is the exploitation of COVID-19 "as a further justification for the pathologisation of perceived 'others' as forms of social contagion" (Della Rosa and Goldstein, 2020, p.1). This 'othering' can erode the power of drivers of forced displacement if it is used to blame potential refugees in particular as possible carriers of a deadly disease and to legitimize rejection of any responsibilities towards them. Namer et al. (2020, p.195) argue how 'infrahumanization' of forced migrants is already happening in the current environment by treating 'them' as 'less human' than 'us'. They point to example cases from European health systems, which are 'characterized by discriminatory' discourses such as stigmatizing of refugees and migrants as spreaders of COVID-19 to the host community. Duclos and Palmer (2020) point to how some policy responses to COVID-19 may induce further forced displacements, thereby making these policies an additional driver of forced migration.⁵⁷ They identify emptying of refugee camps and reduction in peace keeping efforts as possible drivers of further displacement and contribution to conflicts. The deepening economic and social divide during the pandemic is likely to have a similar effect on IDPs and may result in secondary displacement (Orendain and Djalante, 2020, Riggirozzi and Cintra, 2020). Therefore, future studies that focus on causes on forced migration should take these recent developments into account.

⁵⁷ There is already developing evidence to displacement triggered by Covid related factors. Singh and Parking (2020) wrote about how millions of migrant workers in India trekked back to their villages, which they had left mostly due to poverty and lack of jobs.

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Appendix A - Regression Tables

5.3.1 Refugees, IDPs and asylum seekers, ZINB, robust Number of forced migrants (count regressions) with political violence IVs and Incident Rate Ratios (IRR)

Dependent variable: Net forcibly displaced	Total battle deaths	Civilian deaths	Terrorism deaths
Intensity of violence	1.44***		
•	(0.06)		
		1.27***	
		(0.06)	
			1.32***
			(0.04)
Freedom	0.39***	0.46***	0.29***
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.04)
Ethnic diversity	1.26	1.51	2.57***
	(0.32)	(0.39)	(0.69)
Religious diversity	0.20***	0.07***	0.46
	(0.10)	(0.03)	(0.24)
Alpha	2.84	3.15	4.17
Wald chi-square	185.17	219.95	251.14
Prob > chi2	0.00	0.00	0.00
(Pseudo) likelihood	-10381.09	-10354.73	-13865.69
Observations	1130	1099	1744
Nonzero observations	733	734	1035

Table 5.3.1 consists of 3 count (negative binomial) regressions for total number of forced migrants (including migrants, IDPs and asylum seekers). Each regression has the total net number of refugees, IDPs and asylum seekers as the DV and political violence variables (intensity of violence based on the total number of battle deaths, freedom, religious and ethnic diversity) as the IVs. The model is run with robust standard errors to avoid heteroscedasticity leading to a log of pseudo maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). Coefficients in the table are replaced by IRRs for easier interpretation (than logs of expected counts. See Appendix E for interpretation with raw coefficients). Standard errors are in parenthesis under each IRR.

Model 1 - Table 5.3.1 - Total Battle Deaths

The model has 1130 observations and 733 nonzero observations. The p-value shows that the model is significant. The alpha coefficient is not zero indicating that the data is over dispersed and the model is better estimated using a negative binomial regression instead of a Poisson regression model. Total battle deaths, freedom and religious diversity are predictors of positive counts, i.e. the number of net migrants. Ethnic diversity is not significant.

A one unit increase in intensity of violence based on the total battle deaths increases the rate ratio of the number of expected net migrants by a factor of 1.44 (i.e. 44%), holding all other variables constant.

A one-unit increase in freedom decreases the rate ratio of the number of expected net migrants by a factor of 0.39 (i.e. 61%), holding all other variables constant.

A one unit increase in religious diversity increases the rate ratio of the number of expected net migrants by a factor of 0.2 (i.e. 80%), holding all other variables constant.

Model 2 - Table 5.3.1 - Civilian Deaths

The model has 1099 observations and 734 nonzero observations. The p-value shows that the model is significant. The alpha coefficient is not zero indicating that the data is over dispersed and the model is better estimated using a negative binomial regression instead of a Poisson regression model. Civilian deaths, freedom and religious diversity are predictors of positive counts, i.e. the number of net migrants. Ethnic diversity is not significant.

A one unit increase in civilian deaths increases the rate ratio of the number of expected net migrants by a factor of 1.27 (i.e. 27%), holding all other variables constant.

A one unit increase in freedom decreases the rate ratio of the number of expected net migrants by a factor of 0.46 (i.e. 54%), holding all other variables constant.

A one unit increase in the religious diversity increases the rate ratio of the number of expected net migrants by a factor of 0.07 (i.e. 93%) holding all other variables constant.

Model 3 - Table 5.3.1 - Terrorism Related Deaths

The model has 1744 and 1035 nonzero observations. The p-value shows that the model is significant. The alpha coefficient is not zero indicating that the data is over dispersed and the model is better estimated using a negative binomial regression instead of a Poisson regression model. Terrorism related deaths, freedom and ethnic diversity are predictors of positive counts, i.e. the number of net migrants. Religious diversity is not significant.

A one-unit increase in intensity of violence based on terrorism related deaths increases the rate ratio of the number of expected net migrants by a factor of 1.32 (i.e. 32%), holding all other variables constant.

A one unit increase in freedom decreases the rate ratio of the number of expected net migrants by a factor of 0.29 (i.e.71%), holding all other variables constant.

A one unit increase in the ethnic diversity increases the rate ratio of the number of expected net migrants by a factor of 2.57 (i.e. 157%), holding all other variables constant.

5.3.2 Refugees, IDPs and asylum seekers, ZINB, robust

Probability of zero forced migrants (inflation regressions) with political violence	
IVs	

Dependent variable:	Total battle	Civilian	Terrorism
Net forcibly displaced	deaths	deaths	deaths
Intensity of violence	-0.19***		
	(0.03)		
		-0.18***	
		(0.03)	
			-0.12***
			(0.03)
Freedom	0.26***	0.34***	0.45***
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.08)
Ethnic diversity	1.50***	1.25***	0.54**
	(0.29)	(0.230	(0.30)
Religious diversity	-1.15**	-0.02	0.21
	(0.48)	(0.45)	(0.45)
Alpha	2.84	3.15	4.17
Wald chi-square	185.17	219.95	251.14
Prob > chi2	0.00	0.00	0.00
(Pseudo) likelihood	-10381.09	-10354.73	-13865.69
Observations	1130	1099	1744
Nonzero observations	733	734	1035

Table 5.3.2 consists of 3 logit (inflation) regressions for total number of forced migrants (including migrants, IDPs and asylum seekers); the inflation regressions show the probability a country belongs to the group of countries that have a zero probability of producing forced migrants in a given year. Each regression has the total net number of refugees, IDPs and asylum seekers as the DV and political violence variables (intensity of violence based on the total number of battle deaths, freedom, religious and ethnic diversity) as the IVs. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis under each coefficient.

A negative coefficient means that the variable increases the probability that the relevant country produces at least one forced migrant in a given year.

Model 1 - Table 5.3.2 - Total battle deaths

The model has 1130 observations and 733 nonzero observations. The p value shows that the model is significant. The alpha coefficient is not zero indicating that the data is over dispersed and the model is better estimated using a negative binomial regression instead of a Poisson regression model. Total battle deaths, freedom, ethnic diversity and religious diversity are all significant as predictors of excessive zeros.

The odds of being an excessive zero would decrease by a factor of exp(0.19)=0.83 for every additional battle death holding other variables constant. Put it plainly, the higher the intensity of violence due to battle deaths, the more likely to have people migrating.

The odds of being an excessive zero would increase by a factor of exp(0.26)=1.30 for additional unit of increase in freedom holding other variables constant. In other words, the higher the level of freedom the more likely that the zero would be due to not migrating, which means that the higher the level of freedom, the less likely to have people migrating.

The odds of being an excessive zero would increase by a factor of exp(1.50)=4.50 for each additional unit of increase in ethnic diversity holding other variables constant although it is not possible to immediately reach conclusions from this findings considering ethnic diversity is not a significant factor in the corresponding count regression (1). The odds of being an excessive zero would decrease by a factor of exp(-1.15)=0.32 for each additional unit of increase in religious diversity holding other variables constant. This means that the more religious diversity, the more likely to have people migrating.

Model 2 - Table 5.3.2 - Civilian Deaths

The model has 1099 observations and 734 nonzero observations. The p value shows that the model is significant. The alpha coefficient is not 0 indicating that the data is over dispersed and the model is better estimated using a negative binomial regression instead of a Poisson regression model. Civilian deaths, freedom and ethnic diversity are significant as predictors of excessive zeros. Religious diversity is not significant.

The odds of being an excessive zero would decrease by a factor of exp(-0.18)=0.84 for every additional civilian death holding other variables constant. Put it plainly, the higher the intensity of violence due to civilian deaths, the more likely to have people migrating.

The odds of being an excessive zero would increase by a factor of exp(0.34)=1.41 for additional unit of increase in freedom holding other variables constant. In other words, the higher the level of freedom the more likely that the zero would be due to not migrating, which means that the higher the level of freedom, the less likely to have people migrating.

The odds of being an excessive zero would increase by a factor of exp(1.25)=3.49 for each additional unit of increase in ethnic diversity holding other variables constant, which means that the more ethnic diversity the more likely that the zero would not be due to migrating.

Model 3 - Table 5.3.2 - Terrorism Related Deaths

The model has 1744 observations and 1035 nonzero observations. The p value shows that the model is significant. The alpha coefficient is not 0 indicating that the data is over dispersed and the model is better estimated using a negative binomial regression instead of a Poisson regression model. Terrorism related deaths, freedom and ethnic diversity are significant as predictors of excessive zeros. Religious diversity is not significant.

The odds of being an excessive zero would decrease by a factor of exp(-0.12)=0.89 for every additional terrorism related death holding other variables constant. Put it plainly, the higher the intensity of violence due to terrorism related deaths, the more likely to have people migrating.

The odds of being an excessive zero would increase by a factor of exp(0.45)=1.57 for additional unit of increase in freedom holding other variables constant. In other words, the higher the level of freedom the more likely that the zero would be due to not migrating, which means that the higher the level of freedom, the less likely to have people migrating.

The odds of being an excessive zero would increase by a factor of exp(0.54)=1.24 for each additional unit of increase in ethnic diversity holding other variables constant, meaning that the more ethnic diversity, the less people are likely to migrate.

5.3.6 Refugees, robust

Dependent variable: Net forcibly displaced	Total battle deaths	Civilian deaths	Terrorism deaths
Intensity of violence	1.49***		
•	(0.08)		
		1.47***	
		(0.09)	
			1.30***
			(0.07)
Freedom	0.28***	0.28***	0.18***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Ethnic diversity	0.45	0.23***	1.32
	(0.22)	(0.12)	(0.69)
Religious diversity	2.18	0.50	0.48
	(1.34)	(0.35)	(0.40)
Alpha	4.84	4.87	8.20
Wald chi-square	148.40	148.22	125.41
Log (pseudo) likelihood	-7122.786	-7067.022	-10205.4
Prob > chi2	0.00	0.00	0.00
Observations	1136	1105	1748
Nonzero observations	648	644	998

Number of refugees (count regressions) with political violence IVs and IRRs

Table 5.3.6 consists of 3 count (negative binomial) regressions for refugees. Each regression has the total net number of refugees as the DV and political violence variables (intensity of violence based on the total number of battle deaths, freedom, religious and ethnic diversity) as the IVs. Coefficients in the table are replaced by IRRs for easier interpretation instead of logs of expected counts (for interpretation with logs of expected counts see Appendix E). Standard errors are in parenthesis under each IRR.

Model 1 - Table 5.3.6 - Total Battle Deaths

The model has 1136 observations and 648 nonzero observations (for which the net number of forced migrants is not equal to zero). The p value for the chi-square is a test that all of the estimated coefficients in the model are equal to zero and shows that the model is significant. The alpha coefficient is not zero indicating that the data is over dispersed and the model is better estimated using a negative binomial regression instead of a Poisson regression model. Total battle deaths and freedom are predictors of positive counts, i.e. the number of net refugees. Ethnic and religious diversity are not significant.

A one unit increase in the total battle deaths increases the rate ratio of the number of expected net refugees by a factor of 1.49 (i.e. 49%) holding all other variables constant.

A one-unit increase in the level of freedom decreases the rate ratio of the number of expected net refugees by a factor of 0.28 (i.e. 72%) holding all other variables constant.

Model 2 - Table 5.3.6 - Civilian Deaths

The model has 1105 observations and 644 nonzero observations. The p value shows that the model is significant. The alpha coefficient is not zero indicating that the data is over dispersed and the model is better estimated using a negative binomial regression instead of a Poisson regression model.

Civilian deaths, freedom and ethnic diversity are predictors of positive counts, i.e. the number of net refugees. Religious diversity is not significant.

A one unit increase in civilian deaths increases the rate ratio of the number of expected net refugees by a factor of 1.47 (i.e. 47%) holding all other variables constant.

A one unit increase in freedom decreases the rate ratio of the number of the expected net refugees by a factor of 0.28 (72%) holding all other variables constant.

A one unit increase in the ethnic diversity decreases the rate ratio of the number of the expected net refugees by a factor of 0.23 (77%) holding all other variables constant.

Model 3 - Table 5.3.6 - Terrorism Related Deaths

The model has 1748 observations and 998 nonzero observations. The p value shows that the model is significant. The alpha coefficient is not zero indicating that the data is over dispersed and the model is better estimated using a negative binomial regression instead of a Poisson regression model.

Terrorism related deaths, freedom and ethnic diversity are predictors of positive counts, i.e. the number of net refugees. Religious diversity is not significant.

A one unit increase in terrorism related deaths increases the rate ratio of the number of expected net refugees by a factor of 1.30 (i.e. 30%) holding all other variables constant.

A one unit increase in freedom decreases the rate ratio of the number of expected net refugees by a factor of 0.18 (i.e. 82%) holding all other variables constant.

A one unit increase in the ethnic diversity increases the rate ratio of the number of expected net refugees by a factor of 1.32 (i.e. 32%) holding all other variables constant.⁵⁸

⁵⁸ Please see Appendix A for additional tables for inflation regressions of refugees and IDPs.

5.3.8 Refugees, ZINB, robust

Number of net ref	fugees (count	regressions)	including	economic	IVs	with	raw
coefficients and int	eractions						

Dependent variable: Net forcibly displaced	Total battle deaths	Civilian deaths	Terrorism deaths
Intensity of violence	0.46***	0.37***	0.49***
,	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Gdppercapitagrowth_L1#			
religious dispersion	0.26	0.01	-0.16
	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.15)
Gdppercapitagrowth_L1#			
logtotaldth	0.04***	0.05***	-0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Unemployment_Lag1	0.01	0.03	0.05**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Urban population	-0.07	0.03	0.17*
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.09)
Ethnic dispersion	-3.63***	-3.26***	-2.84***
	(0.87)	(0.98)	(0.64)
Freedom	-0.97***	-1.21***	-1.44***
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.25)
Alpha	4.64	5.32	11.44
Wald chi-square	124.91	121.49	166.65
Prob > chi2	0.00	0.00	0.00
Log (pseudo) likelihood	4.64	5.32	11.44
Observations	505	456	911
Nonzero observations	293	276	492

Table 5.3.8 has raw coefficients and standard errors are in parenthesis under each coefficient. The interaction terms include the main effects. For refugees the GDP per capita growth and intensity of violence interaction term is significant.

5.3.9 IDPs, ZINB, robust

Number of IDPs (count regressions) with political violence IVs and IRRs

Dependent variable: Net forcibly displaced	Total battle deaths	Civilian deaths	Terrorism deaths
Intensity of violence	1.12***		
5	(0.05)		
	× ,	1.05	
		(0.05)	
			1.20***
			(0.04)
Freedom	1.27	1.15	1.03
	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.20)
Ethnic diversity	2.53***	1.81*	2.31**
	(0.75)	(0.65)	(0.78)
Religious diversity	0.14***	0.13***	0.20***
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.10)
Alpha	1.17	1.27	1.22
Wald chi-square	46.05	33.85	59.32
Prob > chi2	0.00	0.00	0.00
Log (pseudo) likelihood	-3244.276	-3142.486	-2925.188
Observations	368	365	398
Nonzero observations	207	200	185

Table 5.3.9 consists of 3 count (negative binomial) regressions for IDPs. Each regression has the total net number of IDPs as the DV and political violence variables (intensity of violence based on the total number of battle deaths, freedom, religious and ethnic diversity) as the IVs. Coefficients in the table are replaced by IRRs for easier interpretation instead of logs of expected counts (for interpretation with logs of expected counts see Appendix A). Standard errors are in parenthesis under each IRR.

Model 1 - Table 5.3.9 - Total Battle Deaths

The model has 368 observations and 207 nonzero observations. The p value shows that the model is significant. The alpha coefficient is not zero indicating that the data is over dispersed and the model is better estimated using a negative binomial regression instead of a Poisson regression model. Total battle deaths, ethnic and religious diversity are predictors of positive counts, i.e. the number of net IDPs. Freedom is not significant.

A one unit increase in intensity of violence based on total battle deaths increases the rate ratio of the number of expected IDPs by a factor of 1.12 (i.e. 12%) holding all other variables constant.

A one unit increase in ethnic diversity increases the rate ratio of the number of expected IDPs by a factor of 2.53 (i.e. 153%) holding all other variables constant.

A one unit increase in religious diversity decreases the rate ratio of the number of expected IDPs by a factor of 0.14 (i.e. 86%) holding all other variables constant.

Model 2 - Table 5.3.9 - Civilian Deaths

The model has 365 observations and 200 nonzero observations. The p value shows that the model is significant. The alpha coefficient is not zero indicating that the data is over dispersed and the model is better estimated using a negative binomial regression instead of a Poisson regression model. Religious and ethnic diversity are predictors of positive counts, i.e. the number of net IDPs. Civilian deaths and freedom are not significant.

A one-unit increase in ethnic diversity increases the rate ratio of the number of expected net IDPs by a factor of 1.81 (i.e. 81%) holding other variables constant.

A one unit increase in religious diversity decreases the rate ratio of the number of expected net IDPs by a factor of 0.13 (i.e. 87%) holding all other variables constant.

Model 3 - Table 5.3.9 - Terrorism Related Deaths

The model has 398 observations and 185 nonzero observations. The p value shows that the model is significant. The alpha coefficient is not zero indicating that the data is over dispersed and the model is better estimated using a negative binomial regression instead of a Poisson regression model. Terrorism related deaths, religious and ethnic diversity are predictors of positive counts, i.e. the number of net IDPs. Freedom is not significant.

A one unit increase in intensity of violence based on terrorism related deaths increases the rate ratio of the number of expected IDPs by a factor of 1.20 (i.e. 20%) holding all other variables constant.

A one unit increase in religious diversity decreases the rate ratio of the number of expected IDPs by a factor of 0.20 (i.e. 80 %) holding all other variables constant.

A one unit increase in the ethnic diversity increases the rate ratio of the number of expected net migrants by a factor of 2.31 (i.e. 131%) holding all other variables constant.

5.3.12 Refugees, ZINB, robust

Dependent variable: Net forcibly displaced	Total battle deaths	Civilian deaths	Terrorism deaths	
Intensity of violence	-0.06*			
j	(0.03)			
	~ /	-0.10***		
		(0.03)		
			-0.09***	
			(0.04)	
Freedom	-0.10	-0.20	-0.02	
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.15)	
Ethnic diversity	-0.26	0.04	-0.12	
	(0.32)	(0.33)	(0.40)	
Religious diversity	-0.39	-0.94**	-1.15**	
	(0.52)	(0.50)	(0.62)	
Alpha	4.84	4.87	8.20	
Wald chi-square	148.4	148.22	125.41	
Prob > chi2	0.00	0.00	0.00	
Log (pseudo)likelihood	-7122.786	-7067.022	-10205.4	
Observations	1136	1105	1748	
Nonzero observations	648	644	998	

Probability of zero refugees (inflation regressions) with political violence IVs

Table 5.3.12 consists of 3 logit (inflation) regressions for refugees. This portion of the output refers to the logistic model predicting whether a country has zero probability of producing forced migrants in a particular year. Thus, it presents the impact of the political violence measures on the probability that a country produced zero forced migrants. In other words, the inflation regressions predict the existence of excess zeros, the zeroes that were due to reasons other than not migrating. Each regression has the total net number of refugees as the DV and political violence variables (intensity of violence based on the total number of battle deaths, freedom, religious and ethnic diversity) as the IVs. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis under each raw coefficient.

Model 1 - Table 5.3.12 - Total battle deaths

The inflation model has 1136 observations and 648 nonzero observations. The p value shows that the model is significant. The alpha coefficient is not zero indicating that the data is over dispersed and the model is better estimated using a negative binomial regression instead of a Poisson regression model. 'A negative sign in the inflation equation means that the variable increases the risk the country belongs to the population of countries that may produce at least one forced migrant' (Melander and Oberg, 2007, 166). Total battle deaths variable is significant as predictor of excessive zeros. Freedom, ethnic and religious diversity are not significant.

The odds of being an excessive zero would decrease by a factor of exp(-0.06)=0.95 for every additional battle death. Put it plainly, the higher the intensity of violence due to battle deaths, the more likely to have people migrating (or the less likely to have no forced migrants in a given year and country).

Model 2 - Table 5.3.12 - Civilian Deaths

The model has 1105 observations and 644 nonzero observations. The p value shows that the model is significant. The alpha coefficient is not zero indicating that the data is over dispersed and the model is better estimated using a negative binomial regression instead of a Poisson regression model.

Civilian deaths and religious diversity are significant as predictors of excessive zeros. Freedom and ethnic diversity are not significant. The odds of being an excessive zero would decrease by a factor of exp(-0.10)=0.90 for every additional civilian death. Put it plainly, the higher the intensity of violence due to civilian deaths, the more likely to have people migrating.

The odds of being an excessive zero would decrease by a factor of exp(-0.94)=0.39 for each additional unit of increase in religious diversity, which means that the more religious diversity the less likely to have no forced migrants in a given country and year.

Model 3 - Table 5.3.12 - Terrorism Related Deaths

The model has 1748 observations and 998 nonzero observations. The p value shows that the model is significant. The alpha coefficient is not 0 indicating that the data is over dispersed and the model is better estimated using a negative binomial regression instead of a Poisson regression model. Terrorism related deaths and religious diversity are significant as predictors of excessive zeros. Freedom and ethnic diversity are not significant.

The odds of being an excessive zero would decrease by a factor of exp(0.09)=0.92 for every additional terrorism related death. Put it plainly, the higher the intensity of violence due to terrorism related deaths, the more likely to have people migrating.

The odds of being an excessive zero would decrease by a factor of exp(-1.15)=0.32 for each additional unit of increase in religious diversity, meaning that the more religious diversity, the less likely to have no forced migrants in a given country and year.

5.3.13 Refugees, ZINB, robust

Dependent variable: Net forcibly displaced	Total battle deaths	Civilian deaths	Terrorism deaths	
Intensity of violence	0.00	acams		
intensity of violence	(0.05)			
		-0.10***		
		(0.04)		
			-1.48	
			(1.07)	
Freedom	0.05	-0.18	0.66	
	(0.21)	(0.13)	(0.88)	
Ethnic diversity	-0.60	-0.05	-61.03**	
	(0.78)	(0.34)	(25.10)	
Religious diversity	-0.91	-1.17**	-60.36**	
	(1.02)	(0.53)	(25.60)	
Unemployment_L1	0.00	N/A	-0.18	
	(0.02)	N/A	(0.18)	
Urban population	-0.23***	-0.12**	1.93*	
	(0.08)	(0.05)	(1.16)	
Alpha	5.00	4.77	12.03	
Wald chi-square	112.82	141.46	148.14	
Prob > chi2	0.00	0.00	0.00	
Log (pseudo)likelihood	-2996.15	-6859.44	-4725.061	
Observations	510	1064	926	
Nonzero observations	296	629	502	

Probability of zero forced migrants (inflation regressions) including economic IVs

Table 5.3.13 consists of 3 logit (inflation) regressions for refugees. This portion of the output refers to the logistic model predicting whether a country has zero probability of producing forced migrants in a particular year. Each regression has the total net number of refugees as the DV and political violence variables (intensity of violence based on the total number of battle deaths, freedom, religious and ethnic diversity) and economic variables (unemployment and urban population) as the IVs. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis under each coefficient.

Model 1 - Table 5.3.13 - Total battle deaths

The model has 510 observations and 296 nonzero observations. The p value shows that the model is significant. The alpha coefficient is not zero indicating that the data is over dispersed and the model is better estimated using a negative binomial regression instead of a Poisson regression model.

Urban population is the only significant variable as predictor of excessive zeros in this model. The odds of being an excessive zero would decrease by a factor of exp(-0.23)=0.79 for each additional unit of increase in urban population. Simply put, the higher the urban population, the less likely to have people not migrating in a given year and country.

Model 2 - Table 5.3.13 - Civilian Deaths

The model has 1064 observations and 629 nonzero observations. The p value shows that the model is significant. The alpha coefficient is not zero indicating that the data is over dispersed and the model is better estimated using a negative binomial regression instead of a Poisson regression model. Civilian deaths, urban population and religious diversity are significant predictors of excessive zeros. Freedom, ethnic diversity and unemployment are not significant.

The odds of being an excessive zero would decrease by a factor of exp(-0.10)=0.90 for every additional civilian death. Put it plainly, the higher the intensity of violence due to civilian deaths, the more likely to have people migrating.

The odds of being an excessive zero would decrease by a factor of exp(-0.12)=0.88 for every additional unit of increase in urban population. In other words, the higher the urban population, the less likely to have people migrating, contrary to the expectations.

The odds of being an excessive zero would decrease by a factor of exp(-1.17)=0.31 for each additional unit of increase in religious diversity, which means that the more religious diversity the more likely that the zero would not be due to migrating.

Model 3 - Table 5.3.13 - Terrorism Related Deaths

The model has 926 observations and 502 nonzero observations. The p value shows that the model is significant. The alpha coefficient is not zero indicating that the data is over dispersed and the model is better estimated using a negative binomial regression instead of a Poisson regression model.

The odds of being an excessive zero would decrease by exp(-61.03)=3.11409E-27 for each additional unit of increase in ethnic diversity, meaning that the more ethnic diversity, the more people are likely to migrate.

The odds of being an excessive zero would decrease by exp(-60.36)=6.09713E-27 for each additional unit of increase in religious diversity, meaning that the more religious diversity, the more people are likely to migrate.

The odds of being an excessive zero would increase by exp(1.93)=6.90 for each additional unit of increase in urban population. Simply put, the higher the urban population, the more likely to have people migrating.

Looking at the statistically significant variables in the regressions with political violence variables, intensity of violence has consistent effect. Increasing levels of freedom has a negative impact on the number of forced migrants and freedom is significant in all count regressions. Addition of social and economic variables results in varying results between the count and inflation processes in terms of significant of the IVs, but intensity of violence, freedom and ethnic diversity are decisively significant in the count regressions.

5.3.14 IDPs, ZINB, robust

Probability of zero IDPs (inflation regressions) with political violence IVs

Dependent variable: Net forcibly displaced	Total battle deaths	Civilian deaths	Terrorism deaths	
Intensity of violence	-0.31***			
-	(0.06)			
		-0.29***		
		(0.06)		
			-0.30***	
			(0.05)	
Freedom	0.28	0.25	0.39**	
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.18)	
Ethnic diversity	-1.15**	-1.43***	-1.62***	
	(0.47)	(0.48)	(0.46)	
Religious diversity	0.79	1.06	0.00	
	(0.79)	(0.73)	(0.74)	
Alpha	1.17	1.27	1.22	
Wald chi-square	46.05	33.85	59.32	
Prob > chi2	0.00	0.00	0.00	
Log (pseudo) likelihood	-3244.276	-3142.486	-2925.188	
Observations	368	365	398	
Nonzero observations	207	200	185	

Table 5.3.14 consists of 3 logit (inflation) regressions for IDPs. Each regression has the total net number of IDPs as the DV and political violence variables (intensity of violence based on the total number of battle deaths, freedom, religious and ethnic diversity) as the IVs. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis under each coefficient.

Model 1 - Table 5.3.14 - Total battle deaths

The model has 368 observations and 207 nonzero observations. The p value shows that the model is significant. The alpha coefficient is not zero indicating that the data is over dispersed and the model is better estimated using a negative binomial regression instead of a Poisson regression model. Total battle deaths and ethnic diversity variables are significant as predictor of excessive zeros. Freedom and religious diversity are not significant.

The odds of being an excessive zero would decrease by a factor of exp(-0.31)=0.73 for every additional battle death holding other variables constant. Put it plainly, the higher the intensity of violence due to battle deaths, the more likely to have people migrating.

The odds of being an excessive zero would decrease by a factor of exp(1.15)=0.32 for every additional unit increase in ethnic diversity. In other words, the more ethnic diversity, the more likely to have people migrating.

Model 2 - Table 5.3.14 - Civilian Deaths

The model has 365 observations and 200 nonzero observations. The p value shows that the model is significant. The alpha coefficient is not zero indicating that the data is over dispersed and the model is better estimated using a negative binomial regression instead of an Poisson regression model. Civilian deaths and ethnic diversity are significant as predictors of excessive zeros. Freedom and religious diversity are not significant.

The odds of being an excessive zero would decrease by a factor of exp(-0.29)=0.75 for every additional civilian death holding other variables constant. Put it plainly, the higher the intensity of violence due to civilian deaths, the more likely to have people migrating.

The odds of being an excessive zero would decrease by a factor of exp(-1.43)=0.24 for each additional unit of increase in ethnic diversity holding other variables constant,

which means that the more ethnic diversity the more likely that the zero would not be due to migrating.

Model 3 - Table 5.3.14 - Terrorism Related Deaths

The model has 398 observations and 185 nonzero observations. The p value shows that the model is significant. The alpha coefficient is not zero indicating that the data is over dispersed and the model is better estimated using a negative binomial regression instead of an Poisson regression model. Terrorism related deaths, freedom and ethnic diversity are significant as predictors of excessive zeros. Religious diversity is not significant.

The odds of being an excessive zero would decrease by a factor of exp(0.30)=1.47 for every additional terrorism related death holding other variables constant. Put it plainly, the higher the intensity of violence due to terrorism related deaths, the more likely to have people migrating.

The odds of being an excessive zero would increase by a factor of exp(0.39)=1.47 for every additional unit of increase in freedom holding other variables constant. In other words, the higher the freedom, less likely for people to migrate.

The odds of being an excessive zero would decrease by a factor of exp(-1.62)=0.20 for every additional unit increase in ethnic diversity holding other variables constant. Simply put, the higher the ethnic diversity, the more likely for people to migrate.

5.3.15 IDPs, ZINB, robust

Probability of zero	IDPs (inflation	regressions)	including e	conomic IVs

Dependent variable: Net forcibly displaced	Total battle deaths	Civilian deaths	Terrorism deaths	
Intensity of violence	-0.29***			
	(0.10)			
		-0.32***		
		(0.11)		
			-0.48***	
			(0.10)	
Freedom	-0.16	-0.21	0.14	
	(0.32)	(0.35)	(0.28)	
Ethnic diversity	0.59	0.29	0.78	
	(1.00)	(1.03)	(0.88)	
Religious diversity	4.52***	4.26*	2.16*	
	(1.68)	(1.65)	(1.24)	
Unemployment_L1	-0.07**	-0.08*	-0.06**	
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	
Urban population	0.19	0.11	0.24**	
	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.13)	
Alpha	0.82	0.89	0.91	
Wald chi-square	52.17	52.59	85.97	
Prob > chi2	0.00	0.00	0.00	
Log (pseudo)likelihood	-1287.12	-1067.50	-1197.855	
Observations	146	131	195	
Nonzero observations	83	68	76	

Table 5.3.15 consists of 3 logit (inflation) regressions for IDPs. Each regression has the total net IDPs as the DV and political violence variables (intensity of violence based on the total number of battle deaths, freedom, religious and ethnic diversity) and economic variables (unemployment and urban population) as the IVs. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis under each coefficient.

Model 1 - Table 5.3.15 - Total battle deaths

The model has 146 observations and 83 nonzero observations. The p value shows that the model is significant. The alpha coefficient is not zero indicating that the data is over dispersed and the model is better estimated using a negative binomial regression instead of an Poisson regression model. Total battle deaths, religious diversity and unemployment are significant predictors of excessive zeros. Freedom, ethnic diversity and urban population are not significant.

The odds of being an excessive zero would decrease by a factor of exp(0.29)=0.75 for each additional unit of increase in intensity of violence based on total battle deaths. Simply put, the higher the intensity of violence based on total battle deaths, the more likely to have people migrating.

The odds of being an excessive zero would increase by a factor of exp(4.52)=91.91 for each additional unit of increase in religious diversity, contrary to expectations

The odds of being an excessive zero would decrease by a factor of exp(-0.07)=0.93 for each additional unit of increase in unemployment. Simply put, the higher the unemployment, the more likely to have people migrating.

Model 2 - Table 5.3.15 - Civilian Deaths

The model has 131 observations and 68 nonzero observations. The p value shows that the model is significant. The alpha coefficient is not zero indicating that the data is over dispersed and the model is better estimated using a negative binomial regression instead of an Poisson regression model. Civilian deaths, religious diversity and unemployment are significant predictors of excessive zeros. Freedom, ethnic diversity and urban population are not significant. The odds of being an excessive zero would decrease by a factor of exp(-0.32)=0.73 for every additional civilian death. Put it plainly, the higher the intensity of violence with civilian deaths, the more likely to have people migrating.

The odds of being an excessive zero would increase by a factor of exp(4.26)=70.56 for every additional unit of increase in religious diversity, contrary to expectations.

The odds of being an excessive zero would decrease by a factor of exp(-0.08)=0.92 for every additional unit of increase in unemployment. The higher the unemployment, the more likely to have people migrating.

Model 3 - Table 5.3.15 - Terrorism Related Deaths


The model has 195 observations and 76 nonzero observations. The p value shows that the model is significant. The alpha coefficient is not zero indicating that the data is over dispersed and the model is better estimated using a negative binomial regression instead of an Poisson regression model. Terrorism related deaths, religious diversity, unemployment and urban population are variables as predictor of excessive zeros in this model. Freedom and ethnic diversity are not significant.

The odds of being an excessive zero would decrease by a factor of exp(-0.48)=0.62 for every additional terrorism related death holding other variables constant. Put it plainly, the higher the intensity of violence due to terrorism related deaths, the more likely to have people migrating. The odds of being an excessive zero would increase by a factor of exp(2.16)=8.68 for every additional unit of increase in religious diversity, contrary to expectations.

The odds of being an excessive zero would decrease by a factor of exp(-0.06)=0.94 for every additional unit of increase in unemployment. Simply put, the higher the unemployment, the more likely to have people migrating.

The odds of being excessive zero would increase by a factor of exp(0.24)=1.28 for every additional unit of increase in urban population, contrary to expectations.

Looking at the statistically significant variables in the regressions with political violence variables, intensity of violence and ethnic diversity have consistent effect almost in all models. Addition of social and economic variables results in varying results between the count and inflation processes in terms of significance of the IVs, but religious diversity has a significant impact in both processes.



Appendix B - Total Net Displacement By Regions 1970-2016

Saint Vincent and the Afghanistan **Dominican Republic** Liberia Grenadines Albania East Timor Libya Samoa Ecuador Lithuania San Marino Algeria Sao Tome and Luxembourg Andorra Egypt Principe Angola El Salvador Macedonia Saudi Arabia Antigua & Barbuda Equatorial Guinea Madagascar Senegal Serbia and Kosovo Argentina Eritrea Malawi Seychelles Armenia Estonia Malaysia Australia Ethiopia Maldives Sierra Leone Federated States of Micronesia Mali Singapore Austria Malta Slovakia Azerbaijan Fiji Bahamas Finland Marshall Islands Slovenia Solomon Islands Bahrain France Mauritania Bangladesh Gabon Mauritius Somalia Mexico South Africa Barbados Gambia Belarus Moldova South Korea Georgia Belgium Germany Monaco South Sudan Belize Ghana Mongolia Spain Benin Greece Montenegro Sri Lanka Bhutan Grenada Morocco Sudan Bolivia Guatemala Mozambique Suriname Bosnia and Herzegovina Guinea Myanmar Swaziland Botswana Guinea-Bissau Namibia Sweden Brazil Guyana Switzerland Nauru Brunei Haiti Nepal Syria Bulgaria Honduras Netherlands Tajikistan Burkina Faso Hungary New Zealand Tanzania Burundi Iceland Nicaragua Thailand Cambodia India Niger Togo Cameroon Indonesia Nigeria Tonga Trinidad and Tobago Iran North Korea Canada Cape Verde Iraq Norway Tunisia Central African Ireland Turkey Republic Oman Turkmenistan Chad Israel Pakistan Chile Tuvalu Italy Palau China Ivory Coast Palestinian Uganda Colombia Jamaica Ukraine Panama Comoros Japan Papua New Guinea United Arab Emirates Jordan United Kingdom Congo Paraguay United States of Costa Rica Kazakhstan Peru America Philippines Croatia Kenya Uruguay Cuba Kiribati Poland Uzbekistan Portugal Vanuatu Cyprus Kuwait **Czech Republic** Kyrgyzstan Qatar Venezuela Democratic Republic of the Congo Laos Romania Vietnam Yemen Denmark Latvia Russia Djibouti Lebanon Rwanda Zambia Dominica Lesotho Saint Lucia Zimbabwe

Appendix C - List Of Countries

Appendix D - List Of Cases With More Than 10,000 Forced Migrants With No

Corresponding Conflict Event In The Data

	Country	
Code	name	Description
40	Cuba	After the collapse of the USSR, particularly after 1995, there were about 650,000 Cuban migrants to the United States until 2015. While some were regular migrants from low-skilled or unskilled labour force, there were also significant number of migrants who fled to the United States without travel documents or visco.
40	Cuba	documents or visas.
		Haiti has experienced political instability throughout its history. More recently an earthquake in 2010 followed by a cholera epidemic caused
41	Haiti	displacement.
		Increase in Mexican refugees follows stricter visa and security procedures
70	Mexico	by the USA in the aftermath of 9/11.
		High levels of homicide and generalized violence' continue to generate
90	Guatemala	displacement after the end of the Civil War in 1996.
		There is more than one type of major driver that push people out of
		Honduras: Honduras is struggling with an extremely high homicide rate
		due gang or criminal organization activity. Honduras is also experiencing
91	Honduras	prolonged drought effects due to the El Nino weather phenomenon and chronic malnutrition problem among children.
71	Hondulas	On going civil unrest, external interventions, and a long history of social
92	El Salvador	inequalities have continuously pushed people away from El Salvador.
93	Nicaragua	Many Nicaraguans left due to the authoritarian Sandinistas.
75	Ttieuruguu	In addition to political persecution and censure and pressure on free media
		and political opposition, on going economic issues all combined to drive
101	Venezuela	many Venezuelans away in 2016.
130	Ecuador	A destructive earthquake in 2016 cause mass displacement.
		After the coup in 1973, President Pinochet began a witch hunt of the
		followers of the previous President Allende and began arresting, torturing
		and executing them. During 1973-1976 of Olof Palme years, Sweden
155	Chile	opened its doors to political migrants from Chile.
200	D 1 1	Similar to other post-Soviet eastern bloc countries, Polish fled after the fall
290	Poland	of the USSR. While The UNHRC continued to record Serbia and Kosovo as one state, it
341	Montenegro	began to record Montenegro as a separate state in 2006. This aligns with the historical developments since Montenegro declared independence in 2006 and decided to split from Serbia. The rise in refugee numbers may be attributed to this geopolitical change.
		There was unrest and violent demonstrations in Macedonia in 1997 after
343	Macedonia	the elections, which likely triggered displacement.
344	Croatia	Ethnic conflicts drove various groups of migrants to leave Croatia, including Serbs and members of other ethnic groups as well as Croats during and soon after the break up of Yugoslavia. Additionally, Croatia has also become a transit country for forced migrants trying to move to Western Europe.
		While Bosnia continued to generate refugees particularly after a war broke
		out with Serbia following the independence referendum in 1992, Bosnia
	Bosnia and	has also become a popular transit route for refugees and asylum seekers
346	Herzegovina	attempting to reach Western European countries, similar to Croatia.
		Slovenia was inevitably part of the big refugee crisis as Yugoslavia began
349	Slovenia	to disintegrate in 1991. Serbia has since become a transit route in addition to generating refugees following the break up of Yugoslavia.
347	Slovenia	According to the UNHCR, Cypriot refugees in the 1990s migrated to
352	Cyprus	Canada and Australia. While there is no specific trigger event during this
552	~Jprus	canada and Hastania. (The alter is no specific algor event during this

		period, it is not unusual for such migration to occur during protracted
		conflicts. Moldova's society is divided between being pro-Russia and pro-Western
		and does not have political stability. This is in addition to being one of the
		poorest countries in the region. Moldova is also on the escape route to
		Western Europe not only for its own citizens, but also for those that use
359	Moldova	Moldova as a transit country.
		Many fled Romania following the dissolution of the USSR. Additionally,
		in the 1990s, Romania became both a source and a transit country for human trafficking from Moldova, Ukraine and Russia to the Balkans and
360	Romania	the Mediterranean.
500	Romania	Half a million Jews were let out of the Soviet Union between 1970 and
		1990 with Israeli visas though some of them chose to become refugees in
365	Russia	other countries.
		In the 2000s the government's increasingly oppressive and even violent
		treatment of its civilians pushed people away. The movement out Ukraine
		can be explained by the fact that the oppression particularly escalated when
369	Ukraine	the government attempted to build closer economic ties to Russia 2013 and Russia's invasion of the Crimean Peninsula the following year.
509		In 1998, about 5% of Armenians went to Russia as refugees. They were
		mainly ethnic Armenians though some are assumed to have moved as
		partners through marriage with a Russian. Costly border war with
		Azerbaijan combined with impoverishment pushed the Armenians away
371	Armenia	during this time.
270	Caaraia	There is on going Georgian displacement due to conflicts with Russia and
372	Georgia	Abkhazia.While there is on going forced and voluntary migration between Armenia,
		Azerbaijan and Georgia and Russia, which have been challenging to track
		for these countries, there has been improvements in record keeping of such
		movements with the introduction of the State Department in Armenia for
		instance. However, the displacement numbers should be viewed
		considering that there is a vague record keeping of regular and forced
373	Azerbaijan	migrants.
		Guinea-Bissau experienced political and military turmoil prior to and after declaring independence in 1974, similar to other African countries gaining
	Guinea-	independence around the same time, which explains the drive behind the
404	Bissau	migration.
		Under Macías Nguema's dictatorship, there was widespread resentment
		against the oppressive regime, which targeted intellectuals and opposition
	Equatorial	in general. Many of the opposition were persecuted, imprisoned, executed
411	Guinea	or forced to exile in 1977.
432	Mali	Regional instability, combined with ethnic conflicts in Mali have driven people away since 1960s to this day.
+32	141411	Due to on going ethnic conflict (among Bambara, Peulh, Soninke, and
		Wolof groups) between 1989 and 1992, Mauritanians fled and many were
435	Mauritania	forced to surrender their national ID documents.
		Forced displacement followed the First Ivorian Civil War, which lasted
437	Ivory Coast	from 2002 until 2007.
		Guinea's militia participated in a coup attempt in 1976. One-party regime
		was unable to deal with ethnic divisions. By December 1978, the government imprisoned or in exiled as many as 800,000 Guineans to
438	Guinea	France or neighbouring African states.
150	Sumu	Liberia has a protracted refugee problem due to its civil war and the on
		going unrest in the aftermath of it. Additionally, impact of significant
		outbreaks of Ebola cannot be underestimated among the drivers of
450	Liberia	displacement.
		Although the eleven year-long civil war in Sierra Leone ended in 2004, the
		conditions took years to improve in the country, therefore, it is not unexpected to see further displacement within the first few years of the end
451	Sierra Leone	of the war.
	Siena Leone	

		Conflict between the government and opposition parties led to
		displacement in the 1990s, while deadly violence after the 1998 elections
461	Togo	caused more people to flee from Togo in the following years.
		Chad's is a mixed migration case: in addition to pulling refugees from
		Nigeria, the Central African Republic and Sudan is because of political and socio-economic problems, it is also a transit route between these countries.
		Additionally, the country has over 50,000 IDPs generated by political
483	Chad	tension in Chad, which is also a push factor for out migration.
105	Democratic	On going civil war and various conflicts in DRC have caused civilians'
	Republic of	displacement over the decades. However, the period of violence up to 1989
490	the Congo	is not part of the fatalities data.
		The Ugandan Government oppressed and forcibly displaced
		Banyarwandas during the early 1980s. This policy goes back to 1969 when
		Ugandan leader Milton Obote ordered the registration of all "people of
500	Uganda	Rwandan origin", which opened the way to their expulsion.
		The long standing ethnic conflict between the Hutu and Tutsi has caused
		more than 200,000 Burundians to lose their lives since the early 1970s, which escalated to a civil war between 1993-2005. During this time many
		Burundians had to flee to other countries but fatalities data begins from
516	Burundi	1989.
		Although the majority of Rwanda refugees became refugees during
		the 1994 genocide, there were Tutsi and Hutu refugees due to previous
517	Rwanda	conflicts and political instability.
		Through the late 1980 to early 1990s, Somalians fled due to the civil wars.
		Political instability continued in South and Central Somalia even after
520	Somalia	Somalia declared its independence in 1998.
500		Although there is no record of civilian deaths during 1995-1996, several
522	Djibouti	hundred Ethiopians were expelled during this period by the government.
		Although famine and drought pushed Eritreans away in the 1980s, it is important to note that during the on going wars at the time attacks on
		villages 'poisoned wells' and 'deliberately targeted livestock' (Sorenson, 3,
530	Ethiopia	1991).
	•	On going human rights violations under the dictatorship of Eritrea have
		pushed away Eritreans to other countries throughout its post-colonial
531	Eritrea	history.
		Angola generates forced migrants not only because of intercommunal
		conflicts, but also because of severe food security issues and contagious diagonal of the provide the provided of the provided
		disease outbreaks. It is not clear how one can distinguish which migrants moved because of the conflicts and which moved because of other health
		related issues. However, a number of the migrants likely moved because
		of both types of drivers. A case study of Angola in future studies may be
540	Angola	useful to clarify drivers of Angolan refugees.
		Zimbabweans left their country because of Mugabe's repressive
		governance for four decades who served as the Primer Minister during
552	Zimbabwe	1980-1987 and the President during 1987-2017.
		Malawi targeted Jehovah's Witnesses and applied severe persecution
553	Malawi	towards them Malawi in 1970s causing refugee movement.
		The Sudanese Civil War lasted from 1955-1972, then again from 1983-2005. Genocide through the decades has continued to push civilians out of
625	Sudan	Sudan.
025	Jugali	There were many Sunni refugees who opposed the Saddam Hussein
		regime, in addition to the Shia fleeing persecution in the 1980s. With the
		beginning of the Iraqi War, forced displacement significantly increased
645	Iraq	from the 1990s.
		At the time these data were gathered, there was not up to date data on civil
		war related deaths in Syria due to the difficulties of validity and reliability
652	Syria	concerns of the organizations that collected the relevant data.
670	Vomor	The massive movement of Yemenis from the south to the north was mainly
679	Yemen	caused by the political and sectarian divisions between the two countries.

700	Afghanistan	The Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989) led to millions of IDPs and refugees.
		Tajikistan is home to various types of migration including human trafficking or smuggling and drug trafficking particularly around its
702	Tajikistan	Afghan border.
		Uzbek refugees have fled from the country's oppressive regime since the
		collapse of the USSR (although gradually decreasing in numbers).
		Collecting data about human rights violations in Uzbekistan is challenging
704	Uzbekistan	due to restrictions applied by the government.
		The Chernobyl nuclear accident caused major displacement in April 1986.
		Additionally, when Moscow appointed a Russian as the new Party leader
		in December 1986, there were protests by the Kazakhs leading to further
		displacement over the course of the next two years, as the ethnic problems
705	Kazakhstan	existed in the absence of Soviet willingness to contribute towards any resolution.
705	Kazaklistali	Large numbers of Chinese fled across the Shenzhen border from the 1950s
		to the 70s in an effort get away from the communist regime and reach Hong
		Kong. Since the illegal migrants was documented in secret archives, there
		is still lack of statistics about exactly how many people moved and how
710	China	many died during this period.
		The local district authorities backed by the military, forced Lhotshampas
		villagers to leave Bhutan in the early 1990s, threatening them with
		persecution in response the protests against the government and demands
		of democracy by the Lhotshampas. By the end of 1992, more than 80,000
7.0	D1 /	Lhotshampas fled to Nepal. During this period, there were deadly clashes
760	Bhutan	with the government forces, but there are no record of fatalities in the data.
780	Sri Lanka	Although the Civil War in Sri Lanka ended in 2009, human rights abuses
780	SII Läikä	continued in the following years, possibly leading to further displacement.Although the earthquake cause refugee movement in 2015, that is not the
		only cause of forced displacement of Nepalese since large number of
790	Nepal	Nepalese were also displaced in 2014 due to political instability.
		Although the US invasion in 1970 triggered 130,000 refugees followed
		by mass deportations in late 70s, record of Cambodia fatalities begin in
		1989. However, there were mass killings in Cambodia during this period
811	Cambodia	in the hands of Pol Pot's government.
		The Indochina War during 1959-1975 caused displacement about a
010	T	quarter of the entire population, however, fatalities data go back as far as
812	Laos	1989 only.
		Vietnamese refugee movement was initially triggered by the fall of Saigon in 1975. In the following decades Vietnamese continued to flee from the
816	Vietnam	communist regime.
010	, ionium	There was a typhoon disaster in 1977, which may have contributed to the
840	Philippines	displacement.
-	11	While the territory of Irian Jaya (West Papua) was formally transferred
		from the Netherlands to Indonesia on May 1, 1963, government troops
		launched a military offensive resulting in refugees fleeing into Papua New
		Guinea through the next three decades although fatalities data begins from
850	Indonesia	1989.
		After Suharto resigned in May 1998, combination of economic problems
		and political changes and opposition to the government, army and migrants fed further unrest. There was a referendum on East Timor's future on
		August 31st. 98.5% of the population voted and 78.3% voted to leave the
		Indonesian Republic. This outcome infuriated paramilitaries and their
		Indonesian Army commanders and they embarked on a military operation
		to force large numbers of its population to Indonesian West Timor and
		other regions of the Indonesian archipelago. Although supporters of the
		independence movement have been targeted and murdered during this
		time, there is no record of civilian fatalities in the datasets for 1999. In
860	East Timor	2006, there was further escalation violent conflicts between the army,

		police, rebel soldiers and urban youth, but the fatality data does not reflect this, either.
	Serbia and	Refugees from Serbia and Kosovo can be explained by the Yugoslavia Wars, particularly by The Kosovo War, which was an armed conflict in Kosovo that started in late February 1998 and lasted until 11 June 1999. Although Kosovo has become a republic in 1990, the UN has recorded the forced migrants under 'Serbia and Kosovo' for the duration of this study (1970-2016). This categorization causes a discrepancy with other datasets
1001	Kosovo	that separately record Serbia and Kosovo.
1004	Palestinian	On going Israeli-Palestinian conflict produces refugees.

Appendix E - Survey Questions

Good morning/day. My name is I am working for Youth Development Institution based in Baghdad. We are conducting an international research project about conflict experience in Iraq. We will be interviewing adults of all ages. We will read you the consent form, which you could keep for your own purposes after the completion of this survey.

Thank you for agreeing to participate in this research. Your responses will only be used for statistical analysis and remain anonymous and confidential. The survey is entirely confidential and it will be stored securely until inputted and destroyed.

Interviewer generated data

ID - questionnaire ID

p-6: Settlement Name___

- p-7: Village/neighbourhood name_____
- p-8 : Settlement Type (apply all that is relevant)
 - 1 rural
 - 2-urban
 - 3-refugee/displaced persons' camp or accommodation centre
 - 4—informal settlement/unfinished building
 - 5—religious building
 - 6—other Please indicate_____

Note: the survey agency should somehow define the difference consistently

p 9: Governorate where the survey is taking place

- 1 Karbala
- 2 Al-Najaf
- 3 Babil
- 4—Baghdad

A. General Categorization

A1. Did you have to leave your village or neighbourhood due to violence or threat of violence in Iraq post-2003? (1-Yes, 2-No)

A2. Did one or both of your parents have to leave their place of residence due to violence or threat of violence in Iraq post-2003? (1-Yes, 2-No)

If they agreed with at least one of A1, A2, -> Displaced Person

Please complete all sections

If they did NOT agree with even one of A1, A2 -> Never Displaced

Please complete only section H and I

H. Conflict Experience and Socio-Political Attitudes

Sunni versus shia decision

Personal thoughts on some questions

Those under violence and not wanting to go, are they the positive thinkers? People who want to stay: due to patriotic reasons?

H1. Did you personally experience any of the following as a result of armed actions of other groups? Please list all that apply

- 1 Verbal abuse: yes/no
- 2-Physical injury: yes/no
- 3 –Imprisonment: yes/no
- 4 Torture: yes/no
- 5- Other (state)____
- 6 None of the above
- 9-NR –

H2. Did you personally witness any of the following as a result of armed actions of other groups? Please list all that apply

- 1 Verbal abuse: yes/no
- 2-Physical injury: yes/no
- 3 –Imprisonment: yes/no
- 4 Torture: yes/no
- 5- Other (state)___
- 6 None of the above
- 9-NR –

H3. Who were the perpetrators of the armed actions you experienced? Please list all that apply

- 1—The Americans
- 2—The Iraqi Army / police
- 3—Militias
- 4—Al-Qaeda
- 5—ISIS
- 6—Other
- 7—DK
- 8—NR

H4. Did any close family member experience any of the following during the post-2003 conflict as a result of armed actions of other groups? Please list all that apply.

- 1- Verbal abuse (who?_____)
- 2- Loss of major property
- 3 –Imprisonment
- 4- Torture
- 5—Physical injury
- 6-Missing person
- 8 DK
- 9 –NR

H5. [If yes to any options in H1-H4]: Did you personally know before any of the people who mistreated you or your family?

1- None 2 – Some 3 – Majority 4 – All 9-NR

H6. Did anyone close to you lose his/her life during the conflict? Please list all that apply.

1 -Yes – go to H7 2- No – go to H9 8- DK– go to H9 9 - NR – go to H9

H7 [If H6 is positive] Could you please tell us who?

H8. How did they lose their life? (for each person in H7)

H9. In general, who has been responsible for the post-2003 violence in Iraq? (Please list all that apply) Please rank according to importance

	Very	Somewha	Little	Not	(Don't
	Importa	t	Important	Important	know)
	nt	Important			
H9a. The Americans	1	2	3	4	8
H9b. The Iraqi government	1	2	3	4	8
H9c. Al-Qaeda	1	2	3	4	8
H9d. ISI/ISIS	1	2	3	4	8
H9e. Shia militia	1	2	3	4	8
H9f. Sunni militia					
H9h. The Saddam Hussein regime	1	2	3	4	8
H9i- Neighbouring states	1	2	3	4	8
H9j- Iraq's own history	1	2	3	4	8
H9k. Iran	1	2	3	4	8

	Certainly yes	Probabl y yes	Not sure	Probabl y No	Certainly No	DK
Sunni	1	2	3	4	5	9
Shia	1	2	3	4	5	9
Kurd	1	2	3	4	5	9
Turkman	1	2	3	4	5	9
Yazidi	1	2	3	4	5	9
Christian	1	2	3	4	5	9

H10. How do you feel about the following groups? Could you accept one of them as a close neighbours?

H11. How do you feel about the following groups? Could you accept one of them as a spouse?

	Certainly	Probabl	Not	Probabl y No	Certainly No	DK
	yes	y yes	sure	y NO	INO	
Sunni	1	2	3	4	5	9
Shia	1	2	3	4	5	9
Kurd	1	2	3	4	5	9
Turkman	1	2	3	4	5	9
Yazidi	1	2	3	4	5	9
Christian	1	2	3	4	5	9

	Very negative	Mostly negative	no effect	Mostly positive	Very positive	NR	DK
1. Central government	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
2. local government / regional government	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
3. international NGOs	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
4. local NGOs	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
5. political parties	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
6. associations of displaced or returnees	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
7. religious organizations	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
8. American coalition forces	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
9. Militias	1	2	3	4	5	8	9

H12. In your view, what was the effect of the following institutions on the relationships among the different Iraqi sectarian and ethnic groups?

Some other institution was the most helpful – which one?

H13. In your opinion why do Iraqi people join militia groups? (*Scale: 1-* Strongly Disagree; 2- Disagree; 3-Not sure; 4-Agree; 5-Strongly Agree; 9 – NR)

- 1 In order to improve security in their local community_____
- 2 In order to receive payment____
- 3—for personal gain_____
- 4—to protect Iraq____
- 5—for revenge___
- 6-other (please state____)
- 9 NR

H14. How would you define your relationship (if any) with militias? Please list all that apply

1 – I have been a member of a militia group _____

2 – I have family members who are members of a militia group

3—I have friends who are members of a militia group _____

4—Members of my community are members of a militia group _____

5—I have had no personal dealing with militia groups _____

9 - NR

H15. What do you think should be done with those people who personally harmed you or members of your sectarian /ethnic group during the conflict[§] (*Scale: 1-* Strongly Disagree; 2- Disagree; 3-Not sure; 4-Agree; 5-Strongly Agree; 9 - NR

1—They should receive amnesty (no punishment) if that brings lasting peace

2—They should beg for forgiveness to their victims and victims' families and then they should be forgiven____

3— They should have a fair trial and if found guilty they should be harshly punished _____

4—War criminals should pay financial compensation to their victims_____

5 – The state should pay financial compensation to victims_____

H16. Please tell me, which one of the following statements do you agree with?

1 -In order to resolve the conflicts, we should leave injustices that happened in the past alone.

2 -In order to resolve the conflicts, we should right the injustices that happened in the past.

- 8 DK
- 9 NR

H17. To what extent do you agree with the following statement: "Iraqis have a duty to keep their country united."

1- strongly agree
 2- agree
 3- disagree
 4- strongly disagree
 8 - DK
 9- NR

H18.How would you evaluate the following statements?

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Not sure	Agree	Strongly Agree	NR
1.Inter-ethnic conflicts in Iraq could be resolved through negotiations	1	2	3	4	5	9
2. For the war to end, Shia, Sunnis, and Kurds should form their own independent states	1	2	3	4	5	9
3. Sunnis were not treated fairly by the Baghdad government since 2003	1	2	3	4	5	9
4. Current conflict will escalate in regional Shia-Sunni war	1	2	3	4	5	9
5. Iraq and Iran should foster a closer relationship	1	2	3	4	5	9
6. Iraq and Turkey should foster a closer relationship	1	2	3	4	5	9
7. For inter-ethnic conflict to be resolved, all sides need to admit their mistakes.	1	2	3	4	5	9
8. Al-Qaeda and ISIS poses a major threat to Iraq	1	2	3	4	5	9
9. Shia militia pose a major threat to Iraq	1	2	3	4	5	9
10. The Baath Party should continue to be banned from politics	1	2	3	4	5	9
11. I feel sorry for all innocent victims of the conflict, regardless of their ethnicity.	1	2	3	4	5	9
12. Iraq should be a federation	1	2	3	4	5	9
13. Iraq should become more centralized	1	2	3	4	5	9

14. Iraq should become an Islamic State	1	2	3	4	5	9
15. Local militias in our governorate have improved my security	1	2	3	4	5	9
16. Local militias in our governorate are under control by the government	1	2	3	4	5	9
17. If there was a referendum today on the 2005 constitution, I would have vote for it	1	2	3	4	5	9
18. Iran improving its relationship with the West is also good for Iraq	1	2	3	4	5	9
19. Baghdad should become a federal province within Iraq	1	2	3	4	5	9

H19. Would you agree with the following statement: "After everything that happened, I think we can live together with all Iraqi religious and ethnic groups, but the trust is lost."

- 1 -strongly agree
 2- somewhat agree
- 3- undecided
- 4- somewhat disagree
- 5-strongly disagree
- 9- NR

H20. Would you agree with the following statement: "After everything that happened, I think we cannot live together with other Iraqi religious and ethnic groups anymore."

1 -strongly agree
 2- somewhat agree
 3- undecided
 4- somewhat disagree
 5-strongly disagree
 9- NR

H21. In your opinion, how likely it is that the armed conflict will stop within the next 3 years?

- 1 very likely
- 2- somewhat likely
- 3 somewhat unlikely
- 4 very unlikely
- 8 DK

9-NR

- **H22.** How likely it is for you to migrate within Iraq in the next 3 years?
 - 1 very likely
 - 2---somewhat likely
 - 3 somewhat unlikely
 - 4 very unlikely
 - 5—where_____
 - 8 DK
 - 9-NR
- H23. How likely it is for you to migrate outside Iraq in the next 3 years?
 - 1-very likely
 - 2- somewhat likely
 - 3 somewhat unlikely
 - $4-very \ unlikely$
 - 5—which country_____
 - 8 DK
 - 9-NR

ASK ONLY NON-DISPLACED PERSONS

H24.How we	ould you ev	aluate the t	following	statements?
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	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Not sure	Agree	Strongly Agree	NR
1. Displaced persons should receive more financial support from the government	1	2	3	4	5	9
2. The presence of displaced persons in our area makes it less likely for me to find a job	1	2	3	4	5	9
3. Displaced persons make me insecure	1	2	3	4	5	9
4. Displaced persons should be located in other areas of Iraq or abroad	1	2	3	4	5	9

EXPERIMENT: ASK ONLY NON-DISPLACED PERSONS (150 Sunnis and 150 Shia only)

Please read this to all participants:

You are a citizen of Iraq whose population has been historically divided primarily into majority Shia and minority non-Shia. In 2005, the Iraqi constitution has attempted to maintain peaceful relations between its various ethnic, linguistic and religious groups. The current government intends to re-write the Iraqi constitution. A special committee appointed for this purpose is asked to consult the citizens of Iraq as to their preferred future political system. For the most part, the majority Shia Iraqis have argued for a more unified central government voted by the majority. They argue that decisions must be made by strong governments acting in a decisive matter on all issues. According to the majority Shia, for the country to overcome its problems of division, war and underdevelopment, decisions should be made efficiently, without delays, and be free of vetoes. On the contrary, the minority non-Shia have argued for a shared provisional and central government rule in which the central government should consult the governorates to ensure broader consensus and facilitate the implementation of decisions. This would allow the predominantly non-Shia provinces more freedom in the decision-making process. According to the minority non-Shia, for the local authorities to restore peace and promote development, it is important that everyone feels included in decision-making.

Please read this to the first 75 Shia: You are one of the majority Shia and want the government to make decisions efficiently with as few constraints as possible. Given that the majority of the citizens including you opted for this option, the constitutional committee decides in accord with what the majority Shia wants and announces that all governorate councils should be abolished.

Please read this to the second 75 Shia: You are one of the majority Shia and you would like the government to make decisions efficiently with as few constraints as possible. Given the different views on the issue, the constitutional committee decides that each governorate is free to choose whether to be ruled only by the central government as most majority Shia including you argue, or opt for a shared provisional and central government rule as the minority non-Shia argue. This way, if they wanted, the non-Shia provinces can opt for extra authorities to be given to their provisional councils, while the majority Shia can choose to be governed exclusively by the central government.

Please read this to the first 75 non-Shia: You are one of the minority non-Shia and want your provisional councils to have additional authorities. Given that the majority of the citizens opted against this option, the constitutional committee decides in accord with what the majority Shia want and announces that all governorate councils should be abolished.

Please read this to the second 75 non-Shia: You are one of the minority non-Shia and want your governorates to have additional authorities. Given the different views on the issue, the constitutional committee decides that each province is free to choose whether to be ruled only by the central government as most majority Shia argue or opt for a shared provisional and central government rule as the minority non-Shia including you argue. This way, if they wanted, the minority non-Shia governorates

can opt for extra authorities to be given to their governorate councils while the majority Shia can choose to be governed exclusively by the central government. **H.25** We want to make sure that you understood the content accurately. Were you included in the majority group (Shia) or the minority group (non-Shia)?

- O majority Shia group (1)
- O minority non-Shia group (2)

H.26 Did the constitutional committee include or disregard your preferences in their final decision on Iraq's future political system?

- **O** My preferences were disregarded. (1)
- **O** My preferences were included. (2)

H.27 Please choose one of the five options ranging from 'not at all' to 'very much'. Rate the extent to which you perceive the constitutional committee's final decision to be...

	not at all (1)	not much (2)	somewhat (3)	much (4)	very much (5)
1. unfair towards the citizens of Iraq	0	0	0	0	0
2. unfair towards the majority Shia	0	0	0	0	0
3. unfair towards the minority non-Shia	0	0	0	0	0

H.28 Please choose one of the five options ranging from 'not at all' to 'very much'. Rate the extent to which the constitutional committee's final decision on Iraq's political system makes you feel...

	not at all (1)	not much (2)	somewhat (3)	much (4)	very much (5)
1. scorned	0	0	0	0	0
2. ridiculed	0	0	0	0	0
3. insignificant	0	0	0	0	o
4. put down	0	0	0	0	0
5. discounted	0	0	0	0	0

	not at all (1)	not much (2)	somewhat (3)	much (4)	very much (5)
1. angry	0	0	0	0	0
2. annoyed	0	0	0	0	0
3. hostile	0	0	0	0	0
4. indignant	0	0	0	0	0
5. resentful	0	0	0	0	0
6. outraged	0	0	0	0	0
7. furious	0	0	0	0	0
8. offended	0	0	0	0	0

H.29 Please choose one of the five options ranging from 'not at all' to 'very much'. To what extent do you feel about the committee's final decision on Iraq's political system?

	strongly disagree (1)	disagree (2)	somewhat disagree (3)	neither agree nor disagree (4)	somewhat agree (5)	agree (6)	strongly agree (7)
1. I would participate in a future demonstration to change the committee's final decision on Iraq's political system.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2. I would abstain from voting until committee changes its decision.	Q	0	Q	0	0	0	0
3. I would support militia groups aiming to change the committee's decision.	Q	0	Q	0	0	0	0

Please choose one of the seven options ranging from 'strongly disagree' to 'strongly agree'. To what extent do you agree with the following items?

I. <u>Demographics</u>

I1. Municipality of current permanent residence _____

I2. Which sectarian / ethnic group do you consider yourself a part of? _____ (list

as many as you wish)

I3. Year of Birth

I4. Gender (don't ask fill later)

I5. Are you currently (read out and code one answer only):

1 Married

- 2. Divorced
- 3. Separated
- 4.Widowed
- 5. Single

I6.Do you have any children? (Code 0 if no, and respective number if yes):

I7. Language spoken at home: _____

I8. Do what extent do you consider yourself a religious person?

- 1-very religious
- 2- somewhat religious
- 3-not religious
- 4 unsure
- 8 DK
- 9 NR

I9. What is the highest educational level that you have attained? [NOTE: if respondent indicates to be a student, code highest level s/he expects to complete]

- 1 No formal education
- 2 Incomplete primary school
- 3 Complete primary school
- 4 Incomplete middle school
- 5 Complete middle school
- 6 Incomplete secondary / vocational
- 7 Complete secondary / vocational
- 8 University education
- 9 Higher degree

I10. Yearly Income

Up to 1 m	1-2m	2-3 m	3-4 m	4-5m	5-6	6-7	7-8	DK/NA
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

I11. Current home infrastructure

a) sewage (1-Yes, 2-No)

b) clean water supply (1-Yes, 2-No)

c) fixed phone line (1-Yes, 2-No)

d) electricity (1-Yes, 2-No)

I12 Profession before displacement

I13 Profession after displacement

I14 Class position before and after displacement (interviewer, don't ask all options but

ask respondents to confirm one of the classifications below)

1- Higher-grade governmental employees

2- Lower-grade governmental employees

3-Private sector employees

4-Artisans - skilled manual labour

5-Semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers (not in agriculture, etc.)

6-Agricultural and other workers same, this should be land owner, or farmer on someone else land distinguish

7– unemployed

8 – retired

9 – housewife

10 - student

11 – disabled

I15.Current sources of income for household (apply all that apply)

- 1 permanent employment
- 2-temporary employment
- 3-international aid
- 4 agriculture
- 5 family members (current household)
- 6 state pension
- 7 pension for fallen soldiers
- 8-widow's pension
- 9 benefit for missing persons
- 10- irregular work
- 11- remittances from abroad
- 12—government compensations/other support

13- cash assistance from religious organizations

14– Something else? _____(please state)

I16. Which newspaper do you usually read?_____

I17. Which party did you vote in the most recent parliamentary elections?

I18. Which party would you vote if there were parliamentary elections tomorrow?

I19. Interest to participate in further research regarding displacement.

Contact Details for all respondent (it is a necessary information for our quality controls) Name Surname

Telephone 1

Telephone 2

OBSERVATIONS BY THE INTERVIEWER

I20. Respondent's interest (Code how interested the respondent was during the interview):

1 Respondent was very interested.

2 Respondent was somewhat interested.

3 Respondent was not interested.

I21. Respondent's comprehension

- 1. Respondent understood the questionnaire well
- 2. Respondent had some difficulties
- 3. Respondent faced major difficulties

I22. Interview Privacy (Code whether the interview took place in privacy or not):

1 There were no other people around who could follow the interview.

2 There were are other people around who could follow the interview.

Appendix F - Participant Information Sheet

Study title

Force migration disentangled: how do armed conflicts lead to variations in displacement?

Brief summary

Unprecedented number of forcibly displaced people and the controversy around the so called 'refugee crises' require a fresh review of the proven relationship between political violence and forced migration. This research project identifies the causes of forced migration followed by deadly armed conflicts including one-sided violence and terrorism through three methods: first is a global analysis from 1970-2016 with models based on refugees, internally displaced people and asylum seekers; second is case study of Iraq based on a country survey. The third method consists of interviews with refugees/asylum seekers, which you are invited to participate on a voluntary basis.

Purpose of interviews

Interviews are the most important part of this research project since they are with forced migrants who are the decision-makers of moving or staying during armed conflicts and therefore at the heart of the forced displacement phenomenon. This is important for two reasons: firstly, there are not adequate academic studies that give voice to forced migrants. Secondly, global studies or country surveys are based on secondary sources and cannot provide the insights, information, feelings, perceptions and opinions of forced migrants in detail if at all.

What would taking part involve?

You may take part in this study by attending a one-on-one interview with the researcher, Duygu Ozaltin, who will present an informed consent form following this Information Sheet should you wish to participate.

Below are the only requirements to participate:

- You either were/have been in refugee/detainee/asylum seeker/internally displaced person status **or** have applied for asylum/refugee status but have not been granted any type of immigrant status;
- You are at least 18 years old at the time of the interview (you cannot participate otherwise even if you may have consent of your parent/guardian);
- You are currently a resident of the European Union (including the United Kingdom).

What will happen to the results of this study?

The results will be presented in a PhD dissertation and may be published in an academic journal or book and all personal information of interviewees will be kept

anonymous in any publications or presentations of the research findings including the above.

Appendix G - Informed Consent

Researcher:

My name is Duygu Ozaltin, and I am a PhD student at the University of Kent's School of Politics and International Relations. I am inviting you to participate in a research study. Involvement in the study is voluntary, so you may choose to participate or not. I am now going to explain the study to you. Please feel free to ask any questions that you may have about the research; I will be happy to explain anything in greater detail.

I am interested in learning more about the relationship between political violence and forced displacement. You will be asked to participate in an interview about your experience as a forced migrant. This will take approximately 45 minutes of your time. All information will be kept confidential. When the interview is transcribed, your name will be anonymous and only I will have access to the audio recording. The recording will be password protected and it will be erased when the study is complete. This also means that your name will not appear anywhere and no one except me will know about your specific answers. I will assign a number to your responses, and only I will have the key to indicate which number belongs to which participant. In any articles I write or any presentations that I make, I will use a made-up name for you, and I will not reveal details or I will change details about where you work, where you live, any personal information about you, and so forth.

The benefit of this research is that you will be helping me to understand causes of political violence induced forced migration and the decision making process of forced migrants. This information should help me analyse the reasons behind variations in the forced migration waves. There are no expected risks to you for participating in this study. If you do not wish to continue, you have the right to withdraw from the study, without penalty, at any time.

<u>Participant</u> - All of my questions and concerns about this study have been addressed. I choose, voluntarily, to participate in this research project. I certify that I am at least 18 years of age and reside in the EU.

print name of participant	
signature of participant	date
print name of investigator	
signature of investigator	date

Appendix H - Interview Questions

(Digitally recorded with the consent of the interviewees)

Interview Number: Interview date: Interview place (current country of residence):

FORCED MIGRANTS

Introduction

Full explanation about my research supported by a brief written summary (provided before the interview). Outline and emphasise informed consent and confidentiality/anonymity (confidential first /false name terms etc.). Ask if recording is OK.

Background Questions

- 1) Can we start by asking your name?
- 2) How old are you?
- 3) How would you describe your ethnicity?
- 4) Do you practice any religion?
- 5) Which is your country and city of origin?
- 6) Do you currently have a job? What is your title and role?
- 7) What was your job in your home country?
- 8) How long have you lived in your country of origin? How long have you lived in your current country of residence?
- 9) Have you lived in other countries before you settled here?

Questions About Causes of Displacement

- 10) What drove you to make the decision to leave your home country?
- 11) What would you identify as the biggest problem in terms of your day-to-day life there that affected your decision to leave?
- 12) How would you describe your economic situation before the armed conflict

versus after the start of the armed conflict in your home country?

- 13) How would you describe your social situation before the armed conflict versus after the start of the armed conflict in your home country?
- 14) How would you describe your political attitude/ideology before the armed conflict versus after the start of the armed conflict in your home country?
- 15) How about now?
- 16) Why did you choose your current country of residence?
- 17) Were you allowed to choose where to reside in this country? If yes, why did you choose this particular neighbourhood?
- 18) Did you leave alone? If not, did you leave with your family? How much did your decision to leave depend on theirs?
- 19) Did others, apart from your family, leave with you? If yes, do you know their reasons of leaving?
- 20) Have you ever had to leave your country before you came here? If yes, please describe the events and circumstances of your previous move.
- 21) If the participant is a first-time refugee: what do you think would have happened if you had chosen to stay in your country before moving here?
- 22) Do you have close family/relatives/friends remaining back home? If yes, do you know where they are now? Please tell me about your on-going responsibilities, if any, you have for them.
- 23) Have you ever witnessed violent action by an armed group towards civilians in your community before you migrated? (e.g. verbal abuse, torture, beating, imprisonment) If yes, how much did that experience affect your decision to leave?

- 24) Have you personally been targeted by an armed group in your community (e.g. verbal abuse, torture, beating, imprisonment) before you migrated? If yes, how much did that experience affect your decision to leave?
- 25) If the answer for Q.21 or Q.22 is 'yes': did you personally know any of the members of the armed group that targeted you or people in your social network?

Looking back

- 26) Can you compare the living circumstances between the time you left your home and received refugee status to the circumstances before you fled?
- 27) Did you ever regret leaving your home during that period? Do you ever regret leaving your home nowadays?
- 28) Would you make the same decision of leaving if you could go back in time? Why/Why not?
- 29) Would you describe yourself as a survivor or as a victim? Why/Why not?
- 30) What do you think of your (original) home country?
- 31) What do you think of your current country? What do you find better/worse compared to your home country?

Looking Forward

- 32) Would you like to remain in your current neighbourhood as long as you remain in this country? Why/Why not?
- 33) What would you identify as the biggest problem in terms of your day-to-day life here?
- 34) Under what circumstances would you be willing to go back to your (original) home?
- 35) Is there anything we've not mentioned in relation to this research that you want to bring to my attention/discuss?

Thank you for taking the time to talk to me. Do you want to ask me any questions?

Appendix I - List of organizations contacted for interviews:

Name	Response
Action for Refugees in Lewisham	No response
AVID Detention	No response
Caritas Social Action Network (London)	Rejected - no reason provided
Citizens UK	No response
City of Sanctuary	No response
ICCO Cooperation – rejected	Rejected - no reason provided
InterVolve	Our values and policies forbid
	interviews with our beneficiaries
Jesuit Refugee Services UK - rejected	Do not have the capacity to facilitate
	interviews with the refugees we
	work with for thesis projects
Kent County Council Social Services	No response
Kent Kindness	We do not have the capacity to assist
KRAN	No response
Kent Refugee Help	No response
Lewisham Refugee and Migrant Network	No response
Meena	Research exhaustion
Migrant Help UK	Due to the high number of requests
	we receive and our limited capacity,
	we will not be able to assist with you
	research.
Migrants Organize	No response
RAMFEL	No response
Refuaid	We just don't have the capacity to
	arrange the interviews
Refugee Action	We do not have the means to be able
	to support the project
Refugee Council	No response
Refugee Info Bus	No response
Refugee Youth Service	No response
Samphire - rejected	Rejected - no reason provided
Solidarity Now	Research fatigue
South London Refugee Association	No response
The Bike Project	We are only a small charity and do
	not have the resources to assist
The Young Lives Foundation	No response
Time Together	No response
UNHCR UK	We are a small team and office here
	in London and regrettably we don't
	work directly with forcibly displaced
	adults

Although random sampling is the preferred method of recruiting interviewees, it proved very challenging due to the unwillingness of refugee organizations, which could allow me to access potential participants. These organizations acted as adamant gate keepers on the basis of one or more of the following reasons: suffering from research exhaustion, not having sufficient resources or capacity to respond to my request of contacting their members and protecting privacy of forced migrants. A complete list of these organizations and their rejection reason is listed above.

Due to the increasing attention on the issues related to forced migration, it is not surprising to hear that organizations working with forcibly displaced people are overwhelmed by university research requests. It is important to empathize with the circumstances and challenges these organizations face; they are often-times understaffed, rely on volunteers and limited resources. It is also the researcher's responsibility to ensure respectful and ethical treatment to all involved in these organizations along with the participants. Finally, considering it may take a long time before academic studies produce results, it is not difficult to understand why such organizations may be disappointed when they do not immediately see tangible results or in some cases no results at all if the researchers do not kindly share the findings. However, organizations claiming to be working for the benefit of forced migrants should be transparent just like any other legal organization or charity. Opening access to the forced migrants they work would reveal their working methods, organizational structure and management. Lack of transparency and even secrecy in these matters inevitably leads to doubts about the true purpose of some of these organizations and questions about whether they treat forced migrants as their customers or beneficiaries.

Therefore, there is clearly need for future studies, focusing on the role and impact of such organizations in the well being of the forced migrant community.