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**DYADIC NEXUS OF INTERSTATE AND INTRASTATE  
CONFLICT PREVENTION**

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Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Politics and  
International Relations, University of Kent at Canterbury, in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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## ABSTRACT

It seems a logical assumption that as the nexus between interstate and intrastate conflict is inherently linked in a larger strategic calculus, so too should be the theoretical and conceptual foundations, and practical application, of apposite conflict prevention efforts. This thesis examines conflict prevention efforts towards each of the three phases of the Macedonian case, with those phases identified as the pre-Kosovo phase, Kosovo Intervention phase and post-Kosovo phase. It analyzes the dyadic nexus between interstate and intrastate conflict prevention as it relates to a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity as regards implementation of conflict prevention efforts by the international community. A strategy of simultaneity and connectivity is characterized as the process of advocating and pursuing policies to inhibit or mitigate the occurrence of interstate and intrastate conflict that are associated and conjoined in a concurrent and synchronous manner. This study finds evidence of support for the hypothesis of a direct correlation between the application of international community efforts targeted toward a nexus of interstate and intrastate conflict prevention, through a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity, and the success or failure of those efforts.

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## ACRONYMS

AFSOUTH	Allied Forces South
ANSOM	Anti-Facist Assembly of National Liberation of Macedonia
ARM	Army of the Republic of Macedonia
ASZ	Air Safety Zone
AVNOJ	Anti-Facist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia
CARDS	Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Democratization and Stabilization
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
CICP	Center for International Crime Prevention
CIVPOL	Civilian Police Monitors
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSO	Committee of Senior Officials
DM	Deutsche Mark
DPA	Democratic Party of Albanians
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General
€	Euro
EC	European Community
ECMM	European Community Monitoring Mission
EF	Extraction Force
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy
EU	European Union
FES	Friedrich Ebert Foundation
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
FTO	Field Training Officer
GSZ	Ground Safety Zone
HEP	Humanitarian Evacuation Program
HTP	Humanitarian Transfers Program
ICFY	International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFOR	Implementation Force
IMF	International Monetary Fund

<b>JIAS</b>	<b>Joint Interim Administrative Structure</b>
<b>JNA</b>	<b>Yugoslav National Army</b>
<b>KDOM</b>	<b>Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission</b>
<b>KFOR</b>	<b>Kosovo Force</b>
<b>KLA</b>	<b>Kosovo Liberation Army</b>
<b>KPC</b>	<b>Kosovo Protection Corps</b>
<b>KPS</b>	<b>Kosovo Police Service</b>
<b>KTC</b>	<b>Kosovo Transitional Council</b>
<b>KVCC</b>	<b>Kosovo Verification Coordination Center</b>
<b>KVM</b>	<b>Kosovo Verification Mission</b>
<b>LDB</b>	<b>United Democratic Movement</b>
<b>LDK</b>	<b>League for a Democratic Kosovo</b>
<b>LP</b>	<b>Liberal Party</b>
<b>LPK</b>	<b>Levisja Popullare e Kosoves</b>
<b>MTA</b>	<b>Military Technical Agreement</b>
<b>MNB</b>	<b>Multi-National Brigade</b>
<b>NAC</b>	<b>North Atlantic Council</b>
<b>NATO</b>	<b>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</b>
<b>NCCC</b>	<b>NATO Cooperation and Coordination Center</b>
<b>NCH</b>	<b>NATO Clearing House</b>
<b>NDP</b>	<b>Peoples Democratic Party</b>
<b>NGO</b>	<b>Non-Governmental Organization</b>
<b>NLA</b>	<b>National Liberation Army</b>
<b>NLAOO</b>	<b>Northern Limit of the Area Of Operations</b>
<b>NORDBAT</b>	<b>Nordic Battalion</b>
<b>OSCE</b>	<b>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</b>
<b>PDP</b>	<b>Party for Democratic Prosperity</b>
<b>PfP</b>	<b>Partnership for Peace</b>
<b>PPDK</b>	<b>Peoples Democratic Party of Kosovo</b>
<b>SAA</b>	<b>Stabilization and Association Agreement</b>
<b>SC</b>	<b>Security Council</b>
<b>SCG</b>	<b>Search for Common Ground</b>
<b>SDAM</b>	<b>Socialist Democratic Alliance of Macedonia</b>

<b>SDSM</b>	<b>Social Democratic Union of Macedonia</b>
<b>SFOR</b>	<b>Stabilization Force</b>
<b>SNC</b>	<b>Serb National Council (Kosovo)</b>
<b>SP</b>	<b>Socialist Party</b>
<b>SRS</b>	<b>Special Representative of the Secretary-General</b>
<b>TFF</b>	<b>Task Force Fox</b>
<b>TFH</b>	<b>Task Force Harvest</b>
<b>UCK</b>	<b>Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosoves (See KLA)</b>
<b>UCK</b>	<b>Ushtria Clirimtare Kombetare (See NLA)</b>
<b>UCPMB</b>	<b>Liberation Army of Presevo, Medveda and Bujanovac</b>
<b>UN</b>	<b>United Nations</b>
<b>UNCRO</b>	<b>United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation</b>
<b>UNESCO</b>	<b>United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization</b>
<b>UNHCR</b>	<b>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</b>
<b>UNICEF</b>	<b>United Nations Children's Fund</b>
<b>UNMIK</b>	<b>United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo</b>
<b>UNMO</b>	<b>United Nations Military Observer</b>
<b>UNPA</b>	<b>United Nations Protected Area</b>
<b>UNPF</b>	<b>United Nations Peace Force</b>
<b>UNPREDEP</b>	<b>United Nations Preventive Deployment Force</b>
<b>UNPROFOR</b>	<b>United Nations Protection Force</b>
<b>UNTAES</b>	<b>United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium</b>
<b>US</b>	<b>United States</b>
<b>VMRO</b>	<b>Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization</b>
<b>VMRO-DPMNE</b>	<b>VMRO-Democratic Party of Macedonian National Unity</b>

## MAP

Figure A.1: Map of Macedonia and Region<sup>1</sup>.



<sup>1</sup> Source: Map adapted from *The World Factbook 2004*, Central Intelligence Agency, <http://www.cia.gov/publications/factbook/geos/mk.html>.

## **Chapter 1: Terminological and Methodological Perspectives**

### **1.1. Introduction**

The deliberation of conflict has been with us ever since the writings of Plato, Aristotle, Thucydides, Machiavelli, Augustine, Aquinas, Grotius, Hobbes, Kant, and abundant other great minds over the centuries. However, it is only in the twentieth century the study of conflict has become a field in its own right (Schellenberg 1996, 1). With the conclusion of the Cold War came diverse perspectives regarding the future as it pertained to peace, conflict, and the world at large. Fukuyama (1989, 6) proclaimed the world had reached the “end of history as such: that is, the endpoint of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government”. In a similar vein, Mueller argued, “war among developed countries has gradually moved toward terminal disrepute because of its perceived repulsiveness and futility” (1989, 20) and that “war may be a social affliction, but in important respects it is also a social affectation that can be shrugged off” (1989, 29). Huntington queried what he termed the “endism” arguments of Fukuyama and Mueller in their failure to address reality as a consequence of two innate fallacies. Endism “overemphasizes the predictability of history and the permanence of the moment, and tends to ignore the weakness and irrationality of human nature” (1989). At the converse end of the spectrum was Mearsheimer (1990, 45) who, in pure realist tradition, reasoned the prospect of major crises, even wars, in Europe was likely to increase dramatically as the Cold War receded into history. Regardless of myriad prophecies, the fact remains that the post-Cold War era continues to be fraught with wars and endemic violence.

Within the sphere of political science and international relations the post-Cold War age seems to have brought into vogue another specialist field for academic endeavor, research, and debate, that being conflict prevention. The basis of conflict prevention ideals date from the height of the Cold War, and is intertwined with deterrence theory. The genesis of this specialist field came in June 1960 when Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld coined the term “preventive diplomacy” in his United Nations Annual Report, referring to United Nations efforts aimed at keeping newly arising local disputes out of bloc differences that could evolve into

wider confrontations between the two superpowers (United Nations General Assembly 1960, 4). Thirty-two years later, in October 1992, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali broadened and publicized the term by devoting a chapter to preventive diplomacy in his "Agenda for Peace" report (Lund 1996, 4). While Hammarskjöld concentrated on preventing possible conflict between the two superpowers, and not preventing conflict altogether, Boutros-Ghali focused his policies on the post Cold-War aspirations of preventing disputes from escalating to armed conflict and spreading to other countries or regions. This came simultaneously with the realization that the conclusion of the Cold War was not going to result in the era of peace and global harmony that had been hoped for and envisaged. Instead, the world witnessed an increase in conflicts and humanitarian crises, and a shift in focus from interstate wars and ideologically oriented civil movements toward a more multifaceted range of conflicts and catastrophes, encompassing such phenomena as intrastate conflict, ethnopolitical conflict, genocide and gross human rights violations, refugee flows and internal displacement, state failure, political instability, arms flows, food crises, and environmental conflict (Davies and Gurr 1998, 1). With this increase and shift came failed and/or costly attempts at conflict resolution and peacekeeping in places such as Angola, Liberia, Somalia, Bosnia, Chechnya, Rwanda, Nogorno-Karabakh, and the Congo, as well as apparent successes in the Baltics and Macedonia (Jentleson 2000, 4). The natural progression was to a newfound emphasis on conflict prevention, preventive diplomacy, and early warning rather than conflict resolution.

Whereas there have been prominent cases where conflict prevention has failed, there have also been cases of acclaimed success. However, a specific preventive case might be termed a success in relation to the level and dimension to which it was applied, but fail in prevention of conflict in the long run. As Miall (2001, 2) comments, "non-occurrence of violence in a particular time period clearly cannot predict future non-occurrence". Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, (1999, 127) have broken success into the phases of light and deep prevention, where light prevention is targeted towards the proximate causes of conflict and deep prevention is projected towards the more latent, or underlying, causes of conflict. Success within light prevention is defined as the aversion of armed conflict, while failure is described as armed conflict. For deep prevention, success is peaceful change and

failure is a conflict-prone situation. Consequently, it is possible to avert armed conflict through light prevention, thereby achieving success, but enter or remain in a conflict prone situation, thus failing through deep prevention. Is any conflict ever really solved or prevented, or is success in conflict prevention merely a transitory period amid other conflicts and stages? This question is particularly valid in light of the multidimensional and multilevel aspects of conflict prevention. Though simplistic at best, this assists in illustrating the difficulty of defining success respective of temporal periods and relative to the dimension and level of conflict prevention efforts.

One of the most acclaimed cases of success to date has been that of Macedonia (Ackermann 2000; Burg 1998; Jentleson 1996, 2000; Lund 1999). However, there are some who assert the Macedonian case was not as comprehensive of a success as others have claimed. For instance, Ackermann (2000, 179) writes of conflict prevention success in Macedonia until the destabilizing effects of the Kosovo conflict. Leatherman et al., (1999, 176-177) also refer to the idea of success until problems escalate to the level where international resources and capabilities are no longer a match for the dimensions and complexities of the problems. Most literature on conflict prevention in Macedonia, however, was written prior to the Kosovo intervention; and what has been written afterwards has concentrated predominantly on Kosovo as the primary focus, with Macedonia as a peripheral element. It is as if conflict prevention in Macedonia was declared a success at a certain point in time and any failings thereafter were deemed a result of the tertiary effects of Kosovo. Yet, the ethnic conflict of 2001 indicates results other than complete success in the Macedonian case.

The central and overarching question this study addresses is why do some conflict prevention efforts succeed where others fail? Within that context, the specific question examined is what is the relationship, if any, concerning the appliance of interstate and intrastate conflict prevention fundamentals, as they relate to overall success.

This study takes a two-level approach to conflict prevention, that of interstate and that of intrastate. The first independent variable is the level of interstate conflict prevention efforts, defined as the degree to which the international community advocates and pursues policies to inhibit or mitigate the occurrence of interstate

conflict. These policies come from a “toolbox” of possible conflict prevention actions designed to promote effective international regimes, stable and viable countries, and create a secure environment by providing the necessary security for government to function.

On the other hand, the second independent variable is the level of intrastate conflict prevention efforts, defined as the degree to which the international community advocates and pursues actions designed to inhibit or mitigate the occurrence of intrastate conflict. Also coming from the conflict prevention “toolbox” of possible actions, these efforts are designed to promote and establish political systems characterized by representative government, open economies with social safety nets enabling socioeconomic and humanitarian needs to be met, and egalitarian justice systems. In both instances the international community is defined as states and/or collective groupings of states such as the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). While Non-Governmental Organization involvement is a significant component of the conflict prevention process, decisions at the international level regarding sanctions, actions, and will are ultimately determined at the level of the state, or collective combinations of states.

The confluence of these two variables determines this study’s dependent variable: the level of conflict prevention effectiveness, defined as the degree to which the international community has created an environment for conflict to be prevented by advocating and pursuing actions designed to inhibit or mitigate the occurrence of interstate and intrastate conflict through a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity. It will be argued that it is this critical and very delicate nexus between interstate and intrastate conflict prevention that is ultimately responsible for success or failure. In the remainder of this chapter, I elaborate on conceptual, definitional, and methodological aspects that provide the context and framing for this study, and present the ensuing structure of the analysis.

### *Viability and Efficacy*

Conflict prevention is essential and applicable in theory but nearly always the prevention comes too late, especially since there are no international or supranational

mechanisms available to oblige opposing parties to separate (Rotberg 1996, 264). At least this is one of the more frequent critiques of conflict prevention efforts, if and when they are finally attempted. Brown and Rosecrance (1999, 226-228) offer three mainstream arguments for inaction in that the interests of international powers are not engaged by conflicts in far-off lands, it is difficult to predict where conflicts will break out, and the international community lacks the capacity to engage in large numbers of conflict prevention efforts. Three counterarguments are then swiftly provided where local conflicts almost always have important regional ramifications, timely warning of impending conflict is usually available, and while it is true the international community cannot become involved in all and sundry conflict, it does not follow that prevention efforts cannot occur anywhere at all. In view of the counterarguments, five domestic political considerations, or fears, are proposed that inhibit international power involvement. The domestic political inhibitors to action are: international actions will lack public support, economic cost will be too high, military operations will result in casualties, open-ended commitments in far-off lands should be avoided, and basic fear of failure for obvious domestic political purposes. Each of these inhibitors, though, may likewise be considered unfounded with respect to conflict prevention.

While linkage of domestic political factors to foreign policy decision-making persists, prudence should be employed to ensure this linkage does not subsume conflict prevention decisions. In the end, timely implementation of conflict prevention efforts will most likely be a comparatively low-cost, low-risk undertaking (Brown and Rosecrance 1999, 229). Brown and Rosecrance (1999) conduct a cost-effective analysis of conflict prevention, as opposed to conflict, utilizing three dissimilar methodological approaches, by investigating Bosnia, Rwanda, Somalia, Haiti, Kuwait, Macedonia, Slovakia, Cambodia, and El Salvador. They conclude that in every case conflict prevention is more cost effective methodologically, and quite persuasive politically.

The Aspen Institute (1996) hosted an international conference on conflict prevention strategies, which drew scholars and leaders from 22 countries. The focal point for the Institute was the question of how conditions can be created in which the naturally occurring competition for power, resources, and prestige within and between societies can be kept peaceful and prevented from plunging into a spiral of

violence. In-depth discussion and analysis of conflict in the post-Cold War period, the key challenges and key players in conflict prevention, and key recommended actions brought unanimous and resounding support to the viability and efficacy of conflict prevention.

While the skeptical view is that governments are guided by domestic political considerations and will therefore only pay lip service to conflict prevention, except when their self-determined vital interests are threatened, a more optimistic view is that leaders and the public will understand conflict prevention is in the common national interest. Here, a common national interest must take into account moral concerns, increasing interdependence, the greater cost in terms of the number of dead, the scale of international effort ultimately required, and harm to international principle resulting from delaying actions until an emergency develops. The emerging consensus from the Aspen Institute Conference on Conflict Prevention was that conflict prevention must be given high priority on the international agenda, including individual states, the G-7, the UN Secretary General, the UN Security Council and the UN system as a whole, and international financial institutions (Aspen Institute 1996, 9). Without such responses, the cost of actions necessary to react effectively to conflicts after they develop is likely to be a good deal greater in terms of both the ultimate financial burden and the international instability that will prove inimical to the interests of the international collective good.

In May of 1994, the Carnegie Corporation of New York established the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict with the task at hand of addressing the looming threats to world peace and to advance new ideas for the prevention and resolution of deadly conflict. The Commission consisted of 16 international leaders and scholars with widespread experience and groundbreaking accomplishments in conflict prevention, and an international advisory council of 42 eminent practitioners and academics. They spent three years examining the principal causes of deadly ethnic, nationalist, and religious conflicts within and between states and the circumstances that foster their outbreak. Their task, with respect to a long term, global perspective of violent conflict, was to ascertain the viable and efficacious requirements of a system for preventing mass violence and to identify the ways in which such a system could be implemented.

The Commission readily admitted that preventing the world's deadly conflicts would be a highly complex undertaking requiring a concerted effort by a wide range of actors. Conflict prevention will never be an unproblematic, naturally occurring, or inexpensive prescription for the blight of mass violence; however, with concerted early action and deliberate operational steps, prevention is possible. Similarly, the costs are miniscule compared to the cost of conflict and the rebuilding and psychological healing in its aftermath (Carnegie Commission 1997, 9). The Commission is steadfast in its belief that preventing deadly conflict serves the most vital human interest, that of survival, and any effort to promote the norms of tolerance, and social equity is valuable in its own right. However, bear in mind that in addition to the moral value of conflict prevention lays the practicality of peace and cooperation breeding security and prosperity.

The final evaluation of conflict prevention, in the view of the Commission, is that although war, domination, and conflict have been recurrent features of human history, mass violence and/or deadly conflict does not, thus should not, have to be a fact of life. War, mass violence, and deadly conflict usually result from initial deliberate political calculations and decisions and are not inevitable (Carnegie Commission 1997, 3). Bearing in mind that those of the realist and neorealist perspective would vehemently counter the previous conclusion of the Carnegie Commission, the predominance of conflict prevention theory is in agreement that conflict is not inevitable and may be prevented.

Jentleson (2000a, 6) feels the bona fide question of the viability of conflict prevention is rooted in the broader debate over the principal sources of post-Cold War conflicts, principally ethnic conflicts. In essence, this is the methodological deliberation concerning primordialism versus instrumentalism. If the primordialist hypothesis were undeniable, then it would indeed be problematical to retain much optimism in conflict prevention. However, as Lake and Rothchild (1998, 5) reason, the primordialist methodology "founders on its inability to explain the emergence of new and transformed identities or account for the long periods in which either ethnicity is not a salient political characteristic or relations between ethnic groups are comparatively peaceful". Jentleson (2000a, 7) is of the opinion the dominant dynamic is not the playing out of historical determinism, but rather the consequences of calculations by parties to the conflict of the purposes served by political violence.

By focusing the analysis on forces and factors that intensify and activate the dispositions as shaped by history, into actions and policies reflecting conscious and deliberate choices for conflict, conflict prevention thereby becomes a viable means.

Other basic critiques of conflict prevention addressed by Jentleson (2000a, 8-10) revolve around the basic perception of high risk and low interest. Based on the threat of contagion or diffusion, and the fact that inaction in point of fact has its own associated costs with respect to compelling the cessation of violence and rebuilding devastated societies, reality dictates the high risk-low interest perception needs to be inverted. A further point made regarding interests is that world powers have a world order interest that goes beyond strict national security interests.

Jentleson (2000a) conducted a multi-case comparative analysis of Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh, the Baltics (Estonia and Latvia), Ukraine, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Somalia, Rwanda, the Congo, and Korea (1993-94 nuclear crisis) in order to identify conflict prevention patterns, general conceptual formulations, middle-range theories and policy lessons. Jentleson's fundamental conclusion is that although more development, refinement, elaboration, modification, adaptation, and extension are needed, the core ideas of conflict prevention are compelling and sound (2000b, 348). He asserts one must act early to stop disputes from escalating, reduce tensions that could lead to war, and to deal with today's conflicts before they become tomorrow's crises.

Whereas each of the above deliberations addresses the issue from a different perspective, there is evident concurrence regarding the viability and efficacy of conflict prevention. Granted, much work is required in the form of forthcoming research in order to refine and validate hypotheses for future policy prescription, nevertheless there is evident agreement that conflict prevention is a promising endeavor. As Jentleson (1996, 315) concluded, while conflict prevention is possible, it is also both difficult and necessary. In that vein, the principal ambition of this work is to add to the theory refinement process by identifying and testing the criticality of a nexus between interstate and intrastate conflict prevention, implemented through a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity, as it relates to the successful application of conflict prevention efforts.

## **1.2. Terminological Delineation**

A major quandary concerning conflict prevention literature is the contemporary use of dissimilar terminology for a single concept, and likewise the use of analogous vocabulary in a diverse mode. The terminology perplexity is frequently dependent on the major field in which the author is resident. As Deutsch (1991, 26) explains, “The plethora of scholars writing about conflict from different disciplinary backgrounds and focusing on different types of disputes has given the study of conflict a fragmented appearance”. For instance, Nicholson (1991, 59) articulates that “conflict exists when two or more parties have opposed views about how some social situation should be organized”, and “conflict resolution is the process of facilitating a solution where the actors no longer feel the need to indulge in conflict activity and feel that the distribution of benefits in the social system is acceptable”. Burton (1997, 150) writes about conflict resolution and avoidance; Wallensteen (1991, 129-130) discusses conflict transformation, conflict resolution, and conflict termination; and Galtung (1996, 9) considers conflict transformation a component of peace studies.

Jabri (1996, 11) clarifies the difference between conflict research and peace research as “a dichotomy whereby the hard core of conflict research is rational actor decision-making, while the hard core of peace research looks to structures which perpetuate domination and dependency”. Schellenberg (1996, 10) refines this definition by explaining that “peace studies (or peace and conflict studies, or peace science) is frequently applied to the work of scholars who operate at the broader levels of conflict studies” such as “relations between national states”, while “those who work at the micro level often identify their field by the term conflict resolution”. Lund (1996, 40) then distinguishes between the “P” series (peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, preventive diplomacy, etc.) and the “C” series (conflict management, conflict termination, conflict mitigation, conflict prevention, etc.) by stating the “P” series is generally employed in discussions with the United Nations, while the “C” series is generally preferred in academic literature. Lund prefers the term preventive diplomacy, Leatherman et al. (1999, 99) prefer conflict prevention, and Ackermann (2000, 5) avows conflict prevention is more commonly known as preventive diplomacy. Meanwhile, more

specialized verbiage, such as ethno-political conflict (Gurr 2000, 65), has entered the academic discourse.

It is manifest that with all these clarifying definitions, clarity and understanding is emphatically not the resultant state. It is imperative for the purposes of this study to unambiguously define the terminology so as to preclude confusion in the manner in which said terminology will be employed. Agreeing with Lund, I confine my terms to the “C” series as the expressions preventive diplomacy, preventive deployment, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peace-keeping, and post-conflict peace-building were applied by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992) as the foundation of his “Agenda for Peace” report to the United Nations Security Council, and as an operational conduit for ensuing United Nations Peace Operations. Consequently, as related to this work, I define the terminology to be utilized in the following manner.

*Conflict* is a situation in which conflicting interests between two or more organized actors, not necessarily states, have led, or have a significant possibility of leading, to the threat or use of armed force (Lucarelli 1999). This includes traditional interstate conflict and the more contemporary intrastate, or ethno-political, conflict.

*Crisis Management* refers to efforts to manage tensions and disputes that are so intense as to have reached the level of confrontation, usually involving threats of force and its deployment, from breaking into armed violence (Lund 1996, 42).

*Conflict Management* is the action to limit and contain the diffusion, contagion or escalation of armed force or violence (Leatherman et al 1999, 99; Miall et al 1999, 21)

*Conflict Mitigation* conveys the utilization of a third party threat or use of force to impose a cessation of hostilities, not always with the consent of the conflicting parties (Crocker et al 2001, xxviii).

*Conflict Termination* refers to those efforts or actions designed to facilitate and maintain a cessation of armed hostilities (Lund and West 1997).

*Conflict Resolution* is the deterrence of armed hostilities re-emergence by disarmament, restoration of order, refugee repatriation (Boutros-Ghali 1992), and addressing the conditions that led to the dispute and building or strengthening the institutions and processes through which the parties interact (Lund and West 1997), including the (re)establishment of democratic institutions (Lucarelli 1999). The

ultimate objective is a self-supporting society, acceptable to all, without coercion of any form.

*Ethnic Groups* are people who share a distinctive and enduring collective identity based on a belief in common descent and on shared experiences and cultural traits (Gurr 2000, 5).

*Ethnopolitical Groups* are ethnic groups whose ethnicity has political consequences, resulting either in different treatment of group members or in political action on behalf of group interests (Gurr 2000, 5).

*Ethnopolitical Conflict* is conflict in which a national or minority group makes claims against the state or against other political actors (Gurr 2000, 65).

*Conflict Prevention* as a field can be conceived as a rich set of activities, all of which aim at preventing the development of conflict, and its management, mitigation, termination, and resolution when it does manifest itself (Lucarelli 1999). Ambiguity may exist, though, as the term conflict prevention may specifically address those actions aimed at preventing violence before it has broken out or become widespread, or those actions taken during the post-conflict phase to avoid its recurrence (Ackermann 2000, 29; Lund and West 1997). Consequently, attention to detail must be paramount when employing the term conflict prevention so as to properly distinguish contextual usage.


For the purposes of this study, unless specifically stated otherwise, the term conflict prevention, as it relates to a stage within the lifecycle of a conflict, shall refer to actions, policies, procedures or institutions utilized in vulnerable places and times to avoid the threat or use of armed force and related forms of coercion by states or groups, in order to settle the political disputes that can arise from the destabilizing effects of economic, social, political, and international change, targeted at preventing violence before it has broken out or become widespread (Ackermann 2000, 19; Lund 1996, 37). This can be accomplished by the international community advocating and pursuing policies to inhibit or mitigate the occurrence of violence in accordance with the articles of the Charter of the United Nations, including Chapter VI and Chapter VII, short of the use of offensive measures. While the threat or use of military force is deemed an adequate, and valuable, component of conflict prevention measures, it will be limited to preemptive or preventive deployment for the purpose of threat or coercion, or the conduct of humanitarian,

observation, protective, training or demilitarization operations. The concrete use of force shall be limited to instances of self-defensive purposes.

Figure 1.1 will furthermore assist in defining the above terminology as well as relating it to, and delineating, conflict prevention efforts within the lifecycle of a conflict. Relating to the stages of conflict depicted in figure 1.1 *Stable Peace* ranges from a high level of reciprocity and cooperation to a relationship of wary communication and limited cooperation, within an overall context of basic order or national stability. *Unstable Peace* is a situation in which tension and suspicion among parties run high but violence is either absent or sporadic. *Crisis* is tense confrontation between armed forces that are mobilized and ready to fight, and may engage in threats and occasional low-level skirmishes, but have not exerted any significant amount of force. *War* is sustained fighting between organized armed forces (Lund 1996, 39).

The concept of a conflict lifecycle, whereby conflict transits through stages, or phases, is an oversimplified and idealized generalization, which functions as a constructive heuristic, so long as the stages are not considered rigidly bounded and sequenced (Crocker et al 2001, xxviii; Kriesberg 1998, 339; and Lund 1996, 40). Each conflict and its constituent parts, which themselves may be lesser and more succinct disputes, will have its own distinct temporal and spatial dynamics dependent upon the parameters of that conflict. A conflict can often reverse sequence, reverting from a fragile settlement to further conflict, or it could stagnate for years situated precariously between latency and manifestation. It is also feasible that the social, economic, political or international environment can change, thereby negating the initial source of conflict. Moreover, what could possibly be considered a successful resolution to a conflict at present might become the genesis for conflict in the near future. In this sense, the stages of the conflict lifecycle allegory are deceptive as the ephemeral nature and mutability of a conflict disallow returning to the position of origin. Regardless, the lifecycle explanation is a practical instrument of understanding broad-spectrum conflict dynamics and categorizing conflict prevention applications.

**Figure 1.1: Lifecycle of Conflict and Conflict Prevention<sup>1</sup>.**



A further theme of terminological confusion revolves around the spread of conflict. As in the conflict prevention field, utilization of disparate terms for a single concept, and the use of comparable lexis in a dissimilar manner often confound the issue, particularly with respect to the terms contagion, diffusion, and escalation.

Contagion and diffusion are the two most oft confused, however their similarity in meaning and frequent overlap in occurrence facilitate that dilemma. Geller and Singer (1998, 131-132) define contagion of conflict to have occurred if the use of force by one actor increases the probability that another actor will use force in the future. Diffusion of conflict is said to occur if states bordering on a state already in

<sup>1</sup> Source: Adapted from figure 2.1 in Michael S. Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflict: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996, 38; and from figure 1 in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001, xxviii.

conflict become more likely to engage in conflict in subsequent years. The key defining difference is that diffusion requires a contiguous border. Gurr (1993, 133-134) supports this definition in his explanation of diffusion as the “spillover” processes by which conflict in one country directly affects political organization and action in adjoining counties. Contagion refers to the processes by which one group’s actions provide inspiration and strategic and tactical guidance for groups elsewhere; the diffusion of conflict is direct, contagion is indirect. To compound the situation, two other more commonplace terms are habitually employed to explicate the same intentions. The terms spillover and spread are often used as synonyms for diffusion and contagion respectively.

While the term escalation, as regards conflict, intuitively appears to be a straightforward concept, it is not to be quite that easy. Leatherman et al. (1999, 74-77) have divided the concept of escalation into vertical and horizontal dimensions. Vertical escalation refers to the increase in the intensity of the dispute in terms of the conflict behaviors and means used, whereas horizontal escalation expands the geographical scope of conflict and brings into the sphere of violent action new groups, communities or states. While the differentiation is logical, for the sake of simplicity horizontal escalation is in truth simply an alternative term for contagion and/or diffusion. Accordingly, as related to this study, I define the additional terminology to be employed in the following manner.

*Contagion* of conflict is the indirect processes by which one actor’s use of force provides inspiration and strategic and tactical guidance for actors elsewhere, increasing the probability that another actor will use force in the future.

*Diffusion* of conflict is the direct processes by which conflict in one country directly affects political organization and action in adjoining counties, increasing the likelihood to engage in subsequent conflict.

*Escalation* is the increase in the intensity of the dispute in terms of the conflict behaviors and means used.

Two additional terms, which are absolutely integral to the essence of this thesis, are those of simultaneity and connectivity. Whereas conflict was traditionally perceived as either interstate or intrastate, the fungible nature of contemporary conflict has a tendency to shift along a sliding scale between interstate and intrastate. Intrastate conflict easily permeates across existing state borders to form regional

conflict complexes; conversely, regional conflict dynamics can impact readily on the internal processes of neighboring states (Hampson, Wermester, and Malone 2002, 3). It is a logical assumption that as the nexus between interstate and intrastate conflict is inherently linked in a larger strategic calculus, so too should be the theoretical and conceptual foundations, and practical application, of apposite conflict prevention efforts in the form of a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity. For the purposes of this project, these terms are defined below.

*Simultaneity* refers to the process of advocating and pursuing policies to inhibit or mitigate the occurrence of interstate and intrastate conflict in a concurrent and synchronous manner.

*Connectivity* refers to the linkage and degree by which the processes of advocating and pursuing policies to inhibit or mitigate the occurrence of interstate and intrastate conflict are associated and conjoined.

The concepts of simultaneity and connectivity are integrally linked in myriad modes and do not create mutually exclusive categories. Together, these two terms form a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity, whereby the process of advocating and pursuing policies to inhibit or mitigate the occurrence of interstate and intrastate conflict are associated and conjoined in a concurrent and synchronous manner. In essence, this is the dependent variable upon which the premise of this study rests. A syllabus of relevant terms is presented in figure 1.2.

**Figure 1.2:** Summary of Relevant Terminology.

Term	Definition
Conflict	Situation in which conflicting interests between two or more organized actors, not necessarily states, have led, or have a significant possibility of leading, to the threat or use of armed force. This includes traditional interstate conflict and the more contemporary intrastate, or ethnopolitical, conflict.
Crisis Management	Efforts to manage tensions and disputes that are so intense as to have reached the level of confrontation, usually involving threats of force and its deployment, from breaking into armed violence.
Conflict Management	Action to limit and contain the diffusion, contagion or escalation of armed force or violence.
Conflict Mitigation	Utilization of a third party threat or use of force to impose a cessation of hostilities, not always with the consent of the conflicting parties.
Conflict Termination	Efforts or actions designed to facilitate and maintain a cessation of armed hostilities.
Conflict Resolution	Deterrence of armed hostilities re-emergence by disarmament, restoration of order, refugee repatriation, and addressing the conditions that led to the dispute and building or strengthening the institutions and processes through which the parties interact, including the (re)establishment of democratic institutions. Ultimate objective is a self-supporting society, acceptable to all, without coercion of any form.
Ethnic Groups	People who share a distinctive and enduring collective identity based on a belief in common descent and on shared experiences and cultural traits.
Ethnopolitical Groups	Ethnic groups whose ethnicity has political consequences, resulting either in different treatment of group members or in political action on behalf of group interests.
Ethnopolitical Conflict	Conflict in which a national or minority group makes claims against the state or against other political actors.
Conflict Prevention	Actions, policies, procedures or institutions utilized in vulnerable places and times to avoid the threat or use of armed force, and related forms of coercion, by states or groups, to settle the political disputes that can arise from the destabilizing effects of economic, social, political, and international change, aimed at preventing violence before it has broken out or become widespread. This can be accomplished by the international community advocating and pursuing policies to inhibit or mitigate the occurrence of violence in accordance with the articles of the United Nations Charter, Chapter VI and VII, short of the use of offensive measures.
Military Force	While the threat or use of military force is deemed an adequate, and valuable, component of conflict prevention measures, it shall be limited to preemptive or preventive deployment for the purpose of threat or coercion, or the conduct of humanitarian, observation, protective, training or demilitarization operations. The concrete use of force shall be limited to instances of self-defensive purposes.
Diffusion	Direct processes by which conflict in one country directly affects political organization and action in adjoining counties, increasing the likelihood to engage in subsequent conflict
Contagion	Indirect processes by which one actor's use of force provides inspiration and strategic and tactical guidance for actors elsewhere, increasing the probability that another actor will use force in the future.
Escalation	Increase in intensity of the dispute in terms of the conflict behaviors and means used.
Simultaneity	Process of advocating and pursuing policies to inhibit or mitigate the occurrence of interstate and intrastate conflict in a concurrent and synchronous manner.
Connectivity	Linkage and degree by which the process of advocating and pursuing policies to inhibit or mitigate the occurrence of interstate and intrastate conflict are associated and conjoined.
Strategy of Simultaneity and Connectivity	The process of advocating and pursuing policies to inhibit or mitigate the occurrence of interstate and intrastate conflict are associated and conjoined in a concurrent and synchronous manner.

### **1.3. Tools of Conflict Prevention**

Throughout the discourse of conflict prevention literature, myriad specific tools have been suggested for application as conflict prevention measures. Lund (1996, 203-205) classified many of them collectively into what he termed a “toolbox” of available policies and instruments. Jentleson (2000, 335) cites Lund’s toolbox, while Ackermann (2000, 169-170) developed her own. Figure 1.3 provides a compendium of conflict prevention policy tools and instruments that have been identified by researchers to date.

These tools can comprise projects, procedures, programs, policies or mechanisms as means for actors to target a conflict’s sources and manifestations, by manipulating various kinds of influence, and attempt prevention (CAI 1997, 56). Application of these tools may be in any combination dependent on the dynamics of the conflict, at any stage of the conflict dependent upon that specific tool’s intent, and may be performed by third parties as well as the parties of the conflict. Application of conflict prevention tools should commence with a diagnosis of the nature and stage of the particular conflict, which then serves as the basis for selection of appropriate policy tools. These tools should then be applied in proactive combinations tailored to the specific conditions and scope of the conflict, with coordinated multilateral state and regional strategies to allow for comparative advantage and burden sharing. The various tools fluctuate in the stage of the conflict when most effectively applied, the source of the conflict they address, and can be grouped according to different functional areas. While the stages of conflict have previously been covered in detail, the different functional areas within which the conflict prevention tools are categorized are official diplomacy, unofficial (non-governmental) diplomacy, military measures, economic and social measures, political development and governance measures, judicial and legal measures, and media and educational measures. Various conflict prevention policy tools are then targeted towards a principal source of conflict designated as structural, proximate or triggering.

**Figure 1.3: Compendium of Conflict Prevention Policy Tools and Instruments<sup>2</sup>.**

Policy Tool	Stage of Conflict	Source of Conflict Addressed	Functional Area
Adjudication	U	Triggering	Judicial
Alternative Defense Strategies	S, U	Proximate	Military
Agricultural Reform	S, U	Structural	Economic/Social
Arbitration	U	Triggering	Judicial
Arms Control Agreements	S, U	Proximate	Military
Arms Embargoes and Blockades	C, W	Triggering	Military
Arms Proliferation Control	S, U	Proximate	Military
Certification/Decertification	U, C	Proximate/Triggering	Official
Civic Education	S, U	Proximate	Media/Education
Civic Society Development	S, U	Proximate	Political
Civilian Fact-Finding Missions/Verification Teams	U, C	Triggering	Unofficial
Civilian Peace Monitors	U, C	Triggering	Unofficial
Coercive Diplomacy	C	Proximate	Official
Collective Security/Cooperation Arrangements	S, U	Proximate	Military
Conciliation	U, C	Triggering	Official
Conditionality	U, C, W	Triggering	Economic/Social
Confidence Building/Security Measures	U, C	Proximate	Military
Conflict Prevention and Management Centers	U, C	Proximate	Official
Conflict Resolution Training	S, U	Proximate/Triggering	Media/Education
Constitutional Reform	S, U	Structural	Political
Cultural Exchanges	S, U	Proximate	Unofficial
Crisis Management Procedures	C	Triggering	Official/Unofficial
Decentralization of Power	U, C	Proximate	Political
Demilitarized Zones	U, C	Proximate/Triggering	Military
Demobilization and Reintegration of Armed Forces	C	Proximate	Military
Development Assistance	S, U	Structural	Economic/Social
Diplomatic Sanctions	U, C, W	Proximate/Triggering	Political
Disarmament	U, C	Proximate	Military
Displaced Persons Repatriation/Resettlement	U, C	Triggering	Economic/Social
Economic Integration	S, U	Structural	Economic/Social
Economic Reform/Social Safety Nets	U, C	Structural	Economic/Social
Economic and Resource Cooperation	U, C	Structural	Economic/Social
Economic Sanctions	C	Proximate/Triggering	Economic/Social
Election Support and Monitoring	U, C	Proximate	Political
Election Reform	U, C	Structural	Political
Embarrassing Witnesses	U, C	Proximate	Unofficial
Employment Training	S, U	Proximate	Economic/Social
Exchange Visits	S, U	Proximate	Media/Education
Formal Education Programs	S	Proximate	Media/Education
Friends Groups	S	Proximate	Unofficial
Health Assistance	S, U, C	Proximate/Triggering	Economic/Social
Human Rights Promotion and Monitoring	S, U, C	Proximate	Political
Human Rights Institution-Building	S, U, C	Proximate	Political
Humanitarian Assistance	S, U, C, W	Structural	Economic/Social
Humanitarian Diplomacy	U, C	Triggering	Unofficial
Inter-Communal/Regional Trade	S, U, C	Structural	Economic/Social
International Appeal/Condemnation	U, C	Proximate/Triggering	Official
International Broadcasts	S, U, C, W	Proximate/Triggering	Media/Education
Joint Projects	S, U	Proximate	Economic/Social
Journalist Training	S, U	Proximate	Media/Education
Judicial Institution Support	S, U	Proximate	Judicial

<sup>2</sup> Source: Compiled from Appendix A in Michael S. Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996, 203-205; Table 2 in Alice Ackermann, *Making Peace Prevail: Preventing Violent Conflict in Macedonia*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University press, 2000, 169-170; and from Creative Associates International, *Preventing and Mitigating Violent Conflicts: An Abridged Practitioner's Guide*. Washington, D.C.: Creative Associates International, 1997, 56-61.

Judicial Reform	U, C	Proximate	Judicial
Law Enforcement Reform	U, C	Proximate/Triggering	Judicial
Limited Military Intervention	C, W	Triggering	Military
Media Professionalization	S, U	Proximate	Media/Education
Mediation	U, C, W	Triggering	Official/Unofficial
Military Aid	U, C, W	Proximate/Triggering	Military
Military to Military Programs	S, U	Proximate	Military
National Conferences	U, C	Proximate	Political
Negotiation	C, W	Triggering	Official/Unofficial
Non-Aggression Agreements	S, U	Proximate	Military
Non-Violent Campaign	S, U	Proximate	Unofficial
Peace Commission	C, W	Triggering	Unofficial
Peace Conference	C, W	Triggering	Official
Peace Education	S, U, C	Proximate/Triggering	Media/Education
Peace Enforcement	C, W	Triggering	Military
Peace-Keeping	U, C	Triggering	Military
Peace Radio/Television	S, U, C	Proximate/Triggering	Media/Education
Political Institution-Building	U, C	Proximate	Political
Political Party-Building	U, C	Proximate	Political
Power Sharing Arrangements	C	Proximate	Political
Preventive Deployment	U, C	Proximate	Military
Private Economic Investment	S, U	Structural	Economic/Social
Problem-Solving Workshop	S, U	Triggering	Unofficial
Professionalization/Modernization of Armed Forces	S, U, C	Proximate	Military
Protectorates	U, C	Proximate	Political
Public Official Training	U, C	Proximate	Political
Refugee Repatriation/Resettlement	U, C	Triggering	Economic/Social
Special Envoy	U, C, W	Triggering	Official
Threat or Projection of Force	C, W	Triggering	Military
Trusteeship	U, C	Proximate	Political
Visits by Eminent Individuals/Organizations	U, C	Triggering	Unofficial
War Crimes Tribunals/Commissions of Inquiry	C	Triggering	Judicial
Withdrawal of Recognition	C, W	Triggering	Official

Stage of Conflict: S – Stable Peace, U – Unstable Peace, C – Crisis, W - War

Structural sources of conflict may include legacies of colonial and/or Cold War policies, material resource deficiencies, poverty, socio-economic inequities and ethnic divisions. Conflict prevention policy tools designed to address structural sources are aimed to increase the aggregate, conserve and/or redistribute natural, economic and human resources such as land, water, infrastructure and technical skills, in order to improve material conditions. Proximate sources of conflict are the political and institutional factors that influence whether structural sources give rise to possible violence, and may encompass economic reform dislocations, ideologies, arms flows and military aid, internal militarization, competition for state power and the problems of political liberalization. Conflict prevention policy tools designed to address proximate sources are intended to reduce and restrain means of armed force or coercion that could be used to effect violence. Triggering sources of conflict are those actions or behaviors that could immediately lead to conflict, and the conflict

prevention policy tools designed to address these sources are targeted to directly regulate the conflicting parties' behavior, such as actions, speech, and interactions.

This compendium serves as tool in itself and does not preclude the application of a specific tool during a stage of conflict or toward an intended source of conflict other than annotated. Bear in mind these tools are intended to be overlapping and complementary in nature, and can be implemented through various organizational channels such as by actors outside the conflict area, by actors involved in the conflict and by local organizations.

### *Employment of Military Force*

Another concern relating to the possible and available tools for conflict prevention is that of inclusion of the threat or use of military force as an implement of conflict prevention. At first glance, the employment of military force as a means to prevent conflict seems counterintuitive. Burton (1997), Jabri (1996), and Galtung (1996) contend the use of military force has contributed to the legitimization of war within society, and stands as a foremost impediment to future peace. Conversely, the majority of contemporary conflict prevention literature appears to support the threat or use of military force.

Several scholars and practitioners advocate the use of force as a measure of conflict prevention. Crocker (2001, 234) believes there is a vast range of conflict prevention options, which include everything from doing nothing to sending in military forces; where a conflict situation may demand an immediate military response, akin to a police action, to uphold the law or maintain collective security. Leatherman et al. (1999, 105) consider actions ranging from a large-scale preventive war, through limited military options, to the establishment of deterrence and the balance of power as preventive actions; which can be taken to contain the causes and dynamics of conflicts to avoid their outbreak or escalation. J. Fishel (1998, 14), following Clausewitz' dictum, regards the use of military force as a political act designed to attain political objectives. Manwaring and K. Fishel (1998, 203-204) espouse the mandate for application of military force is to "aggressively take control of a contended area, stop any escalation of violence, enforce law and order, and impose an acceptable level of security and stability. Haass (1999, 51, 130) proposes the preventive uses of force are those that seek to either stop another state or party

from developing a military capability before it becomes threatening or to hobble or destroy it thereafter. In this respect, Haass supports use of military force in a preemptive attack, if necessary.

More prevalent, though, are those who uphold that the credible threat of the use of force, as opposed to the actual employment of military force, is the more integral component of conflict prevention. George (1991, 4-5; 1993, 79-80) is an avid proponent of what he calls “coercive diplomacy”, or “coercive persuasion”, whereby the term is restricted to defensive purposes in seeking to persuade an actor to cease aggressive actions rather than bludgeoning him into stopping. The credibility of a threat of military force is key to creation of the mind that cessation of aggressive actions is preferable to facing the consequences, however, coercive diplomacy is limited in that the actual use of military force indicates a failure in the coercive aspects of the strategy. Lund (1996, 148-149), applying his “stages of conflict”, is in favor of Chapter VII United Nations Peace Operations, coercive diplomacy, or “mediation with muscle” during the crisis stage, but reserves the concrete use of force until the stage of war. Nicolaides (1996, 40-41), in his framework for conflict prevention actions, also favors coercive diplomacy, delineated as the threat of force as a defensive strategy employed by policy-makers hoping to secure a peaceful resolution of a serious dispute. Miall et al., (1999, 113) limit acceptable military measures to preventive peacekeeping, arms embargoes enforcement, and demilitarization. Schellenberg (1996, 134) in examining the conditions when the threat or use of force may prove effective, points to the fact that while force can sometimes be used to resolve a conflict, at least temporarily, force often just makes the conflict less manageable. The Aspen Institute (1997, 37-45), in their Conference on International Peace and Security report, while including intervention with major combat forces as an option for conflict prevention, emphasized that options short of combat force engagement need to be developed, where preemptive deployment or presence was the task agreed upon as the optimal level to pursue, including humanitarian relief and protection measures.

Jentleson (2000a, 13; 2000b, 340-344) avows that excluding military force and other coercive measures from the realm of conflict prevention instruments and strategies is a fallacy, which lapses into the snare of positing force and diplomacy as antithetical. While force and diplomacy may well be adversative, they need not be.

Case studies have empirically shown that diplomatic components of conflict prevention need to be backed by a credible threat to use military force, in terms both of the will to take military action and the potency of the action threatened (Carnegie, 1997, 40; Jentleson 2000b, 341).

When Boutros-Ghali (1992) composed his “Agenda for Peace” statement, he acknowledged that under Article 42 of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council has the authority to take military action to maintain or restore international peace, however, these measures provided in Chapter VII, should only be used when all peaceful means have failed. Leatherman (1999, 105), while including preemptive military force under the auspices of conflict prevention, accedes that to resort to that level is admittance of failure of other preventive strategies.

Reverting back to figure 1.1 and the lifecycle of conflict and conflict prevention, the focus of this study will concentrate on conflict prevention as it relates to prevention of conflict during the unstable peace or crisis stages, prior to the outbreak of armed hostilities. Therefore, while the threat or use of military force is deemed an adequate, and valuable, component of conflict prevention measures, it will be limited to preemptive or preventive deployment for the purpose of threat or coercion, or the conduct of humanitarian, observation, protective, training or demilitarization operations. The concrete use of force will be limited to instances of self-defensive purposes. Referring back to figure 1.2, all tools encompassed under the functional area of the military adhere to this definition of the employment of military force.

#### **1.4. Methodological Framework**

##### *Multiple Level Analytic Framework*

International relations have evolved throughout time to the current system of states. A momentous shift was marked by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which concluded the Thirty Years War and commenced the quest, that persists today, in pursuit of a means for independent states, each sovereign over a given territory, to pursue their interests exclusive of mutual destruction or obliteration of the system of which each is a part (Lyons and Mastanduno 1995, 5).

The predominance of thought, concerning theoretical perspectives of international relations logically conveys an interstate focus, however, the characteristics and

sources of most contemporary conflicts since 1945 have become increasingly divorced from the Clausewitzian image. Holsti (1996) alleges the world has seen a shift to “wars of the third kind”. Institutionalized war was the first kind, typified by dynastic wars conducted by professional militaries and suffused with rules, norms, and etiquette. Total war came next. This was Napoleonic war, which introduced no great technology but the manpower and financial limitations of dynastic war were overcome by the 1792 “levee en masse” that transformed war from an undertaking by professionals to a mighty campaign of a nation in arms. Currently, the world is involved in “wars of the third kind”, in which “there are no fronts, no campaigns, no bases, no uniforms, no publicly displayed honors, no points d’appui, and no respect for territorial limits of states” (Holsti 1996, 36). Civilians not only become major targets of operations, but their transformation into a new type of individual becomes a major purpose of war. Succinctly stated, contemporary conflict since 1945 has occurred predominantly within states as opposed to between states (Ackermann 2000, 10; Aspen 1996, 1; Brown 1996, 3; Davies and Gurr 1998, 1; Holsti 1996, 14; Lake and Rothchild 1998, 3; Leatherman, DeMars, Gaffney, and Vaeyrynen 1999, 3; Saideman 2001, 3 SIPRI 1998, 1).

In light of this metamorphosis of the nature and conduct of war, a similar change in conventional methodology must transpire with respect to analysis of war occurrence, as well as analysis of the prevention of that occurrence. It is no longer conceivable to divide interstate from intrastate conflict as discrete components of analysis. Rather, simultaneous analysis of the interstate and intrastate aspects of conflict as a distinct and aggregate phenomenon is warranted.

Kenneth Waltz (1954) was the first to envisage three images, or levels, of war: that of war as a consequence of the nature and behavior of man, war as an outcome of the internal organization of states, and war as a consequence of international anarchy. The interrelatedness of the images was that “the third image describes the framework of world politics, but without the first and second images there can be no knowledge of the forces that determine policy; the first and second images describe the forces in world politics, but without the third image it is impossible to assess their importance or predict their results” (Waltz 1954, 238).

Since 1954 when Waltz framed his concept, scholars have analyzed conflict within the levels of analysis framework of the individual, the state and the

international system. The individual level focuses on human nature, predispositions, belief systems personalities and psychological processes. The state level includes governmental variables, such as political system structure and the nature of the policymaking process, and societal factors, such as economic system structure, the role of public opinion, economic and non-economic interest groups, ethnicity and nationalism, and political culture and ideology. The systemic level consists of the anarchic global structure, the number of major players in the system, military and economic power distribution, patterns of military alliances and international trade, and any other factors that constitute the global milieu communal to all states.

It is logically plausible, and in fact typically desirable, for analyses to conjoin different levels of analysis, because whether conflict or peace transpires is habitually ascertained by amalgam variables functioning at multiple levels of analysis. As long as the framework assumes that the actor in question is sufficiently organized that it has a decision-making body with the authority to act on behalf of the group, the levels of analysis framework can be applied to any actor (Levy 2001, 6). Levy proceeds to explicate congruency between analysis of interstate and intrastate analysis at all levels of the framework, signaling the possibility of connective and simultaneous issues. At the systemic level, with the unit of analysis shifted from states to ethnopolitical groups that seek security in an anarchic system, intrastate conflict can easily fit into the framework for analysis. The state, or societal, level has long generated considerable interest in intrastate, or ethnic, conflict. Ethnopolitical groups may affect intrastate conflict indirectly through their influence on state policies, or directly through their own military actions, since within intrastate wars ethnopolitical groups are themselves independent actors. Likewise, at the individual level cognitive processes, personalities, belief systems, misperceptions, and predispositions are equally as relevant in interstate as intrastate analysis. In sum, Levy (2001) recommends an egalitarian utilization of the levels of analysis framework for both interstate and intrastate conflict analysis, as well as incorporation of different levels; meaning that the evaluation of the validity of a certain theory is not necessarily congruent with the evaluation of the importance of that particular level of analysis.

This interconnected nature of analysis levels is not a novel concept and is furthermore corroborated by, among others: Allison's (1969) bureaucratic politics

model of foreign policy decision-making, Putnam's (1993), view of the politics of international relations as a two-level game, and by Tsebelis' (1990) concept of nested games. As the focus of this thesis is to analyze the criticality of a nexus between intrastate and interstate conflict prevention as it relates to a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity in application of conflict prevention efforts of the international community, elements of the systemic, state and individual levels of analysis must be conjoined.

### *Methodology*

This is a qualitative rather than quantitative analysis, and as such, does not utilize a large number of cases in order to find a statistically significant correlation between independent and dependent variables. In fact, although possible, it would be difficult to quantify variables such as interstate and intrastate conflict prevention efforts and retain requisite meaning. Rather than relegating certain conflict prevention actions to a numerical data point, it is more illuminating and explanatory to elucidate the complexity of these actions and their nexus, or lack thereof, in a qualitative manner. Lijphart (1971, 691-693) contends that case studies make a contribution to testing hypotheses and building theory. Campbell (1975, 178-193) shows that case studies are the basis of most comparative research and that much can be learned by making explicit the comparisons that are often implicitly built into case studies. Eckstein (1975, 113-123) agrees with this statement and the qualitative traditions, and argues that many analysts have greatly underestimated the value of case studies for hypothesis testing.

King, Keohane, and Verba (1994, 1-4) posit that while quantitative and qualitative research methods are very contrasted, their ultimate goal is essentially equivalent, to apply valid theoretical standards of inference. The differences between the quantitative and qualitative traditions are in truth only stylistic, where neither is superior to the other regardless of the area of study. The key is that both quantitative and qualitative research be scientific, in that scientific research embraces the four characteristics of being designed to: formulate descriptive or explanatory inferences based on empirical information; use explicit, codified, and replicable analytical methods; reach conclusions that remain uncertain and

falsifiable; and where the content of science is primarily the method and not the subject matter (King et al. 1994, 7-9).

This thesis employs the process tracing, within-case comparative method, where the selection of method is determined by the descriptive and explanatory objectives of the study. Congruence testing and statistical correlations are useful components of broader means of making causal inferences, but because covariations have important and well-known limitations as sources of causal inference, philosophers of science and social science methodologists have given increasing emphasis in the last two decades to causal mechanisms as a second basis for causal inference effects (Bennett and George 1997a, 2). Causal mechanisms are defined as the causal processes and intervening variables through which causal or explanatory variables produce causal effects. In case study methods, the identification of causal mechanisms through process tracing is a stronger methodological basis for causal inference than the estimation of covariation through congruence tests. Similarly, case study methods are superior at process tracing and identifying causal mechanisms, identifying omitted variables and measuring qualitative variables, and they also have advantages in the explanation of individual cases and of path-dependent processes (Bennett 1999, 3). The general method of process tracing is to generate and analyze data on the causal mechanisms, or processes, events, actions, expectations, and other intervening variables that link putative causes to observed effects.

Data collection and analysis for this thesis is guided by the method of structured, focused comparison (Bennett and George 1997). Comparative case studies can use within-case analysis of individual stages as well as case comparisons to assess and refine existing theories, and more generally, to develop empirical theory. The method of doing so is structured in that the same general questions are asked of each case, or stage of a case, in order to guide data collection, thereby making possible systematic comparison of findings across cases or stages. The method is focused in that it deals only with certain aspects of the cases or stages; that is, a selective theoretical focus guides the analysis. The important mechanism of formulating a set of standardized, general questions to ask of each case, or stage, will be of value only if those questions are grounded in, and adequately reflect, the theoretical perspective of the study. Likewise, a selective focus for the study will be inadequate by itself

unless coupled with an appropriate set of standardized general questions.

Consequently, the method requires both structure and focus.

This combination of process-tracing, within-case comparative method with the use of structured, focused comparison will achieve integration of empirically rich historical narrative with rigorous theoretical investigation (Manners 2000, 12). Here, the general method of process-tracing used to engender and evaluate information on the causal mechanisms, processes, events, actions, expectations, and other intervening variables that link putative causes to observed effects will serve to determine and isolate those specific aspects of the case to be focused upon as dictated by the methodology of structured, focused comparison.

As such, this study will focus on the critical conflict prevention efforts applied by the international community towards Macedonia from independence in 1991 until the writing of this thesis in 2004. Within that temporal period three discrete phases can be patently differentiated: the pre-Kosovo phase, the Kosovo Intervention phase and the post-Kosovo phase. The pre-Kosovo phase incorporates the temporal period from independence in 1991 until the end of the United Nations mandate in 1999. During this period conflict prevention efforts were predominantly administered by the United Nations, although experiencing several transitional stages throughout the phase. The Kosovo intervention phase addresses conflict prevention efforts in Macedonia from the end of the United Nations mandate, through the NATO air campaign and conflict resolution, until adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1345 in March of 2001. Throughout this phase, while minimal conflict prevention efforts did continue within Macedonia, the international focus had become Kosovo with Macedonia assuming a peripheral or tangential significance. The post-Kosovo phase attends to conflict prevention efforts from the adoption on UN Security Council Resolution 1345 until the summer of 2004. It was the approval of UN Security Council Resolution 1345 that marked the return of international community conflict prevention efforts targeted specifically towards Macedonia.

After identification of the critical conflict prevention efforts applied by the international community, analysis will be conducted to determine if each of those efforts focused solely on intrastate conflict prevention, interstate conflict prevention or there was a logical and concerted effort to connect those efforts in a nexus of intrastate and interstate conflict prevention as related to a strategy of simultaneity

and connectivity. The primary sources of data will be from public communications, official governmental or organizational documents and statements, broadcast transcripts, and historical documentation.

As this project seeks to draw out the complexities of the case of conflict prevention in Macedonia, the narrative, descriptive and explanatory objectives of this undertaking determine the selection of method. One of the foremost advantages of the case study is that it can facilitate detection of certain factors as significant that otherwise may have been overlooked in the casual observations necessary for a statistical, or large-n comparative, analysis. Additionally, the comprehensive case study has the capacity to exemplify causal means as opposed to merely demonstrating statistical correlation. Consequently, the most appropriate methodological approach for this thesis is a qualitative process tracing, within-case comparative method, utilizing structured, focused comparison, aimed at hypothesis generating, or theory developing, causal inference.

### *Counterfactual Analysis*

An inherent complexity in any evaluative analysis of a case from an historical point of view is the dilemma of counterfactual analysis. Assessment of conflict prevention efficacy suffers from the methodological predicament of having to prophesy what might, or might not, have transpired if a different course of action had, or had not, been taken at a precise point in time. Thus, in a normative sense, counterfactual analysis in conflict prevention must envisage initial conflict prevention where it failed to arise and, imagine conflict occurrence where it did not materialize. Notwithstanding the attendant methodological difficulties, counterfactual analysis, when carefully grounded in a coherent structure, can play a central role in international relations evaluation (Bueno de Mesquita 1996, 211). Counterfactuals can be seen as supplements and/or substitutes for direct empirical analysis and can alert us to the possible operation of dynamics and pathways that we would otherwise be prone to ignore (Kiser and Levi 1996, 188; Jervis 1996, 310). Tetlock and Belkin (1996, 6) succinctly explicate counterfactual analysis validation in their statement that “counterfactual analysis is unavoidable in any field in which researchers want to draw cause-effect conclusions but cannot perform controlled

experiments in which they randomly assign subjects to treatment conditions that differ only in the presence or absence of the hypothesized cause<sup>3</sup>”.

Accordingly, it has been established that all historical causal presumption ultimately rests on counterfactual claims about what would or might or could have happened in hypothetical worlds to which scholars have no direct empirical access (Tetlock and Lebow 2001, 829). The key to counterfactual analysis is to both establish the theoretical basis for the logic of the alternative hypothesized path, and to support it empirically as strongly as possible (Jentleson 1996, 297; 2000a, 19). An interrelated component is that the focal point of nearly all historical and empirical analysis is on what really did transpire, not on what might have happened. Nonetheless what actually comes to pass is frequently, conceivably always, the consequence of expectations about what would have happened had another course of action been chosen (Bueno de Mesquita 1996, 212; Jervis 1976; 1996, 314; Weingast 1996, 230).

While not desiring to devolve into an exhaustive treatise on rational choice or game theory, it is useful to show game theory is a body of thinking that encourages the systematic examination of counterfactuals in that game theory suggests we cannot comprehend what transpired in reality without understanding what did not happen, but might have happened under other circumstances. What game theory brings to bear on counterfactual adjudication, as related to conflict prevention efforts, is its emphasis on decision points where the causal mechanism is

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<sup>3</sup> Tetlock and Belkin advance six normative criteria for judging ideal counterfactual arguments that appear to command substantial cross-disciplinary support (where “ideal” means most likely to contribute to the ultimate social science goals of logically consistent, reasonably comprehensive and parsimonious, and rigorously testable explanations that integrate the idiographic and nomothetic). Clarity specifies and circumscribes the independent and dependent variables (the hypothesized antecedent and consequent). The key is to manipulate the hypothesized antecedent with due consideration for the complexities created by interconnectedness so as not to generate ripple effects that modify the values taken on by other potential causes in the historical matrix. Logical consistency, or cotenability, specifies connecting principles that link the antecedent with the consequent that are cotenable with each other and with the antecedent. These connecting principles stipulate, within reasonable limits, everything else that would have to be true to sustain the counterfactual. Historical consistency (minimal rewrite rule) specifies antecedents that require altering as few “well-established” historical facts as possible. Theoretical consistency articulates connecting principles that are consistent with “well-established” theoretical generalizations relevant to the hypothesized antecedent-consequent link. Statistical consistency articulates connecting principles that are consistent with “well-established” statistical generalizations relevant to the hypothesized antecedent-consequent link. Finally, projectability teases out testable implications of the connecting principles and determines which of those hypotheses are consistent with additional real-world observations. *Counterfactual Thought Experiments In World Politics: Logical, Methodological, and Psychological Perspectives*. Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin. 1996. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Pgs 6-31.

unobservable<sup>4</sup>. From a methodological perspective, this presents a hurdle to surmount. The only feasible analytic method to ascertain what the intended recipient of a conflict prevention action perceived is to know what the cognitive process was upon receipt. Thus, the issue of counterfactual analysis complexity in an evaluative case analysis substantiates the process-tracing, within-case comparative method.

### *Case Selection*

Controlled comparison requires identification of at least two cases that are similar in every detail but one. When this requirement can be met, the comparison is controlled and provides the functional equivalent of an experiment. Variation in but one variable permits the employment of experimental logic in making causal inference regarding the impact that variable has on the outcome dependent variable. Unfortunately, it is exceedingly difficult, if not nearly impossible to meet the requirements for controlled comparison in the complex and heterogeneous world of conflict prevention. As alluded to previously, no two conflicts are alike as each has its own unique components, causes and actors. Consequently, this study utilizes the within-case method of comparison towards each of the three phases of the Macedonian case of conflict prevention efforts. In this way, structure is retained in that the basic causes, components and actors remain as rigid as possible.

Macedonia represents the clearest example of the international community explicitly implementing conflict prevention efforts in response to fears of future conflict. As such, it is additionally one of the most well documented examples of conflict prevention efforts. Nearly every author who has broached the subject of

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<sup>4</sup> Game theory provides a useful way to structure counterfactual arguments in that the solution to extensive form games requires explicit attentiveness to counterfactuals in at least two ways: the solutions or predictions depend on what is expected to happen “off the equilibrium path”, and games often have more than one equilibrium solution, each of which represents a plausible state of the relevant world. The central means of solving non-cooperative games, the Nash equilibrium, depends on each player choosing a strategy, or complete plan of action, such that no unilateral defection from that strategy can make the player expect to be better off. This means that in choosing a strategy, each player must think about the expected consequences of selecting another plan of action. What would happen under these alternative, unchosen plans of action represents counterfactual expectations. The assumptions of rationality, expected utility maximization, and the criteria for locating the Nash equilibria (and its refinements) provide the basis by which the analyst connects the independent variables to the dependent variables. It should be noted that game theoretic evaluation of actions in light of off the equilibrium path counterfactual expectations satisfies the criteria suggested by Tetlock and Belkin. *Counterfactuals and International Affairs: Some Insights from Game Theory.*” Bruce Bueno de Mesquita. 1996. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Pg 217.

conflict prevention in recent times has incorporated the case of Macedonia in one respect or another. Most writings regard Macedonia as the prime example of successful efforts, but this is due to the fact that nearly all documentation on conflict prevention in Macedonia ceases at the commencement of intervention in Kosovo. However, the civil and ethnic conflict that erupted in the summer of 2001 indicates results other than success.

Macedonia has also become one of the longer standing international community efforts, commencing in 1991 and still currently in effect. As a result, the case of Macedonia can now be separated into phases, providing three distinct stages of conflict prevention efforts. This allows within-case comparison similar to a cross-case comparison, although providing more structure in holding the dependent variables constant. Consequently, the within-case study of the three stages of the case of conflict prevention in Macedonia will be self sufficient as a theory developing, causal inference research project.

### *Relevance*

The significance of this thesis is its focus on conflict prevention and the implementation of apposite efforts by the international community to inhibit, mitigate or prevent impending or future conflict between states or groups within a state. As conflict between sovereign states has not yet been eradicated, and ethnic and nationalistic malcontent persist, conflict prevention as a field and a normative mechanism will continue to be paramount to peace. This is particularly essential in light of the fact that academic and governmental agreement has not yet been achieved in determining the most effectual methods of employing conflict prevention efforts.

Furthermore, this study fills the void between two existent bodies of literature on conflict prevention. For most of the twentieth century, both the academic and policy communities had focused on the twin issues of interstate security and intrastate affairs separately. While the academic community began to examine and espouse a nexus between interstate and intrastate conflict as early as the 1980s, this data is only now commencing to be acknowledged, and integrated within the policy community. The 1990s is when the international community, including both the academic and policy sectors, responded to the ostensible increase in intrastate crises, and conflict

prevention literature emerged at the intersection of theory and practice. However, conflict prevention literature and methodology to date seem not to have fully integrated the standing theoretical implications of a nexus between intrastate and interstate conflict in any applied form.

This thesis also advances conflict prevention theory by proposing a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity as regards implementation of conflict prevention efforts by the international community, whereby the process of advocating and pursuing policies to inhibit or mitigate the occurrence of interstate and intrastate conflict are associated and conjoined in a concurrent and synchronous manner. In the contemporary global environment, conflict in one state often spreads or has repercussions in a neighboring state. Furthermore, a state adjacent to a state engaged in conflict is simultaneously at risk from both interstate and intrastate conflict. Whereas conflict was traditionally perceived as either interstate or intrastate, the fungible nature of contemporary conflict has a tendency to shift along a sliding scale between interstate and intrastate. Intrastate conflict easily permeates across existing state borders to form regional conflict complexes; conversely, regional conflict dynamics can impact readily on the internal processes of neighboring states. It appears a logical assumption that as the nexus between interstate and intrastate conflict is inherently linked in a larger strategic calculus, so too should be the theoretical and conceptual foundations, and practical application, of apposite conflict prevention efforts in the form of a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity.

Additionally, this study adds to conflict prevention literature in that it utilizes the case study of conflict prevention efforts in Macedonia from the inception of conflict prevention efforts in 1991 until the present, by separating the Macedonian case into the three discrete phases of pre-Kosovo, Kosovo intervention and post-Kosovo. Most literature on conflict prevention in Macedonia was written prior to the Kosovo intervention, and what has been written afterwards has concentrated predominantly on Kosovo as the primary focus, with Macedonia as a peripheral element. It is as if conflict prevention in Macedonia was declared a success at a certain point in time and any failings thereafter were deemed a result of tertiary effects of Kosovo. However, conflict prevention efforts in Macedonia continued throughout the Kosovo intervention, and continue today, but little has been written on these latter efforts and their relative success or failure.

### *Organization of the Project*

This composition is organized into seven chapters. This chapter introduced conflict prevention as a field in its own right, as well as the evident academic concurrence regarding the viability and efficacy of conflict prevention. A discussion of the terminology perplexity then ensued, and a refined delineation of the relevant terminology within the field was presented through clarification of previously ambiguous usage in the form of a syllabus of relevant terminology. A heuristic of the cycle of conflict and conflict prevention was offered to conceptualize the stages and processes of conflict as they apply towards the applicable tools of conflict prevention available to the international community. Levels of analysis were discussed explicating the utility of a multiple level analysis towards conflict as a whole, incorporating both intrastate and interstate conflict. A methodological framework was then furnished, articulating the analytical advantage of utilizing the process tracing, within-case comparative method of analysis, coupled with structured, focused comparison data collection. Several clarifying factors were provided regarding the case selection rationale, and finally, the relevance of this thesis was explicated as related to an original contribution to knowledge and/or understanding in the field of international relations.

Chapter 2 provides a conceptual investigation of the theoretical aspects of mainstream conflict prevention literature to date, so as to impart a suitable context and framing for this study. Derived from the existing literature is an examination and synthesis of the fundamental factors deemed requisite for the occurrence of successful conflict prevention. Critical to the essence of this study, an analysis of the theoretical and conceptual plausibility of a nexus between interstate and intrastate conflict is conducted, relating this analysis to the level of incorporation within conflict prevention application as it pertains to a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity.

Chapter 3 delineates the historical milieu of Macedonia, and the surrounding Balkan region, concentrating on those aspects of history, geography, religion, and ethnicity that impact contemporary deliberations regarding contentious issues. Paramount to the application of conflict prevention efforts in a country or region is thorough comprehension of the related contentious issues, and in the case of Macedonia these issues are intricately intertwined with history. This chapter is not

intended to be an exclusively comprehensive historical essay, imparting all historical facts from the time of Philip II of Macedon until contemporary times. Instead, germane events and facts will be culled out of the more than two millennia of Balkan history that can be related to current conflictive claims and/or actions. Thus, a historical base is provided, which should increase impartiality throughout the remainder of this study.

Chapter 4 examines conflict prevention efforts targeted towards Macedonia in the pre-Kosovo phase. This phase incorporates the temporal period from independence in 1991 until the end of the United Nations mandate in 1999, during which conflict prevention efforts were clearly led by the United Nations. This chapter progresses from the initial conflict prevention efforts of the United Nations in the region, through the establishment of a UN presence in Macedonia, the authorization of a broadened political mandate for the mission, transition to a fully independent mandate, and finally the termination of UN presence on the eve of the Kosovo conflict in 1999.

Chapter 5 analyzes the Kosovo intervention phase, addressing conflict prevention efforts in Macedonia from the end of the United Nations mandate, through the NATO air campaign and conflict resolution, until adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1345 in March of 2001. Throughout this phase, while minimal conflict prevention efforts continued within Macedonia, the international focus had become Kosovo with Macedonia assuming a peripheral or tangential significance. This international focal shift was amalgamated with a change in architecture from a UN led effort to that of a token OSCE presence, coupled with a joint UN and NATO presence in Kosovo.

Chapter 6 addresses conflict prevention efforts during the post-Kosovo phase, which attends to conflict prevention efforts from the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1345 in March of 2001 until the writing of this thesis in 2004. It was the approval of adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1345 that marked the return of international community conflict prevention efforts targeted specifically towards Macedonia. As a result of the Framework Agreement of 13 August 2001, the EU, OSCE and NATO were all to have integrated and overlapping roles in the re-establishment of conflict prevention efforts targeted toward Macedonia from 2001 forward.

Chapter 7 summarizes the findings and correlates them to the criticality of the interstate and intrastate conflict prevention nexus as it relates to a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity as a determining factor of conflict prevention success. Finally, the limitations of this study are addressed, possible future areas of related research are identified, and potential policy implications are proposed.

## **Chapter 2: Major Theoretical Perceptions on Conflict Prevention**

### **2.1. Introduction**

Since the early Nineties, there has been a substantial and rapid increase in the academic debate regarding conflict prevention. As in any academic field, controversy exists over its viability and efficacy. Those, who are advocates, agree on the strategic value of conflict prevention, and that preventive diplomacy, early warning and early action are central tenets upon which the generic paradigm is based. Though there are several models delineating and prescribing the most effectual methods of implementation, all agree the conceptual essence is to take action early so as to avoid disputes from escalating into unmanageable levels of violence.

The literature regarding conflict prevention analyzes what measures or actions should be taken by whom, and at what stage, to inhibit or mitigate violence intensification and effect or maintain peace. Within the field of conflict prevention there exists two primary sectors of deliberation. There are those who focus on preventing interstate conflict, as clashes between sovereign states have not yet been eradicated; and those who concentrate on preventing intrastate conflict, as ethnic and nationalistic malcontent appear to be on the rise in recent years. Some have addressed the transnational spread of conflict, but predominantly do so from either the interstate or intrastate perspective in that one or the other type of conflict has the propensity to cross national borders. Yet what of a sovereign state that faces an interstate threat, while concurrently dealing with civil and ethnic intrastate peril? While a nexus between the fundamental doctrines of interstate and intrastate conflict prevention seems obvious, there is a void of literature and theory regarding any simultaneity or connectivity of the two with regard to conflict prevention.

The balance of this chapter provides a conceptual investigation of the theoretical aspects of mainstream conflict prevention literature to date, so as to impart a suitable context and framing for this study. An abstract will also be generated of the factors deemed requisite for successful conflict prevention to occur, derived from the presented literature. Whereas the conflict prevention literature contends that synergistic intervention in the form of execution and leadership is critical to conflict

prevention success, this chapter develops the hypothesis of the criticality of a synergistic strategy of simultaneity and connectivity towards both intrastate and interstate conflict prevention efforts.

## **2.2. Conflict Prevention Literature**

The Carnegie Commission conducted from 1994 to 1997 what amounts to the most overarching and holistic analysis of conflict and conflict prevention to date. The threat of violent conflict between states from the traditional preoccupation of states to defend, maintain or extend interests and power remains in the contemporary world. Yet, given the number and extent of states presently in the throes of profound political, social and economic transition, the notable absence of instances of interstate war is notable. This absence of interstate conflict is even more noteworthy in light of the fact that most of the recurring motivation for conventional interstate conflict, such as disputes over territory and boundaries, profitable natural resources, and national honor are nonetheless prevalent today (Carnegie 1997, 26). However, as interstate conflict seems to diminish, intrastate conflict appears to be proliferating.

Significant sources of conflict may be found in the competition to fill power vacuums during times of transition. Other contributing consequential factors for conflict may be economic factors such as: resource depletion, rising unemployment, failed fiscal or monetary policies, problematic regional relationships, systematic cultural discrimination, political or economic repression, illegitimate governmental institutions, and corrupt or collapsed regimes. Politicians, demagogues and criminal elements alike, as a means to achieve their objectives may straightforwardly exploit these events. The circumstances that give rise to violent conflict can usually be anticipated, and successful preventive efforts will hence depend on impeding and reversing the extension of such conditions.

To move policies of prevention toward greater pragmatic effect, the Commission identified four broad objectives (Carnegie 1997, 37). First, promote effective international regimes for arms control and disarmament, for economic cooperation, for rule making and dispute resolution, and for dialogue and cooperative problem solving. Second, promote stable and viable countries, which are thriving states with political systems characterized by representative government, the rule of law, open economies with social safety nets, and robust civil societies. Third, create barriers to

the spread of conflict between and within societies by means such as the suffocation of violence through various forms of sanctions, preventive deployment of military resources when necessary, and the provision of humanitarian assistance. Finally, create a safe and secure environment in the aftermath of conflict by providing the necessary security for government to function, establishing mechanisms for reconciliation, enabling essential socioeconomic and humanitarian needs to be met, establishing an effective and legitimate political and judicial system, and regenerating economic activity. These component strategies fall within two all-encompassing categories, that of operational prevention consisting of applicable measures in the face of immediate crisis, and structural prevention comprising measures to ensure crises do not arise in the first place, or if they do, that they do not recur.

Operational prevention focuses on strategies and tactics undertaken when violence appears imminent and relies on early engagement deliberately designed to facilitate creation of conditions in which responsible leaders can resolve the problems giving rise to a crisis (Carnegie 1997, 39). The integral rudiments of the need for leadership, a coherent political-military approach, adequate resources, and a restoration plan, were identified to form a framework for operational prevention that enhances the conjecture of successful prevention. These measures fall into the four broad groups of early warning and response; preventive diplomacy; economic measures, sanctions and incentives; and the use of force. Although necessary, these steps may not be sufficient to ward off impending violence, but can provide critical spatial and temporal political opportunities to pursue other complementary means.

While operational prevention consists of strategies that face an imminent crisis, structural prevention comprises strategies to address the root causes of violent conflict that ensure crises do not arise in the first place, and include: emplacing international legal systems, dispute resolution mechanisms, and cooperative arrangements; meeting people's basic economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian needs; and rebuilding societies that have been shattered by war or other major crises (Carnegie 1997, 69). Structural prevention strategies encompass both the development by governments acting cooperatively, and the development by individual states, of mechanisms to ensure security, well-being and egalitarian justice.

In sum, the Carnegie Commission emphasizes that any successful regime of conflict prevention must be multifaceted and designed for the long term. Operational and structural prevention strategies must be combined and synergistic in their efforts to resolve the underlying root causes of violence and provide a comprehensive and balanced approach to alleviate the pressures that trigger violent conflict, and incorporate all levels of available agencies and actors such as states, international organizations, NGOs, religious leaders, the scientific community, educational institutions, the media, the business community, and most importantly, the people (Carnegie 1997). Unfortunately, one of the remaining dilemmas is that of access to conduct conflict prevention efforts if the conflict is occurring within a sovereign state that does not seek assistance, such as the case of Kosovo. Additionally, it can be argued that structural prevention is actually judgmental in that one person's norms are not another's. Moreover, although the Commission addressed conflicts both within and between states, each was addressed as a discrete entity thereby negating the concept of connective issues.

Janie Leatherman, William DeMars, Patrick D. Gaffney and Raimo Vaeyrynen (1999) represent another fairly comprehensive analysis of conflict and conflict prevention in the literature pool. Leatherman et al. (1999, 46), differentiate between the social and material background and the escalatory dynamics of conflict. Background factors are a necessary but not sufficient condition for the outbreak of violence, while conflict dynamics can be sufficient, but not usually necessary conditions for escalation. Both background conditions and violence dynamics are equally applicable towards the four basic types of conflict, which are structural, material, institutional, and identity conflicts. Structural conflicts are where tensions stem from such conditions as social hierarchies and cleavages, or territorial divisions, resulting in the marginalization of some groups and privileging of others along class, ethnic, or gender lines. Material conflicts are when scarcity and allocation of resources, and demographic and environmental pressures lead to adverse effects that shape politics and potentially lead to violence. In institutional conflicts the political struggle mobilizes the ideological values and material interests of the people to fight for control of the state, the resources it commands, and in that way, hegemony and autonomy within society. And finally, in identity conflicts violence is embedded in the socio-economic and cultural cleavages of society, but

reproduced in the perception of threats to the individual and group core values and belief system leading to the resort to force to defend or augment them (Leatherman et al. 1999, 46).

After a conceptual analysis supported by case studies of Burundi and Macedonia, Leatherman et al., drew four conclusions, or prescriptions, framed as interim insights leading towards fruitful methods of conflict prevention. Each conclusion is expressed as a hypothesis for discovering the causal processes by which conflict either escalates or is prevented, and also as a criterion for designing and evaluating policies for early warning and conflict prevention. By pairing hypotheses with criteria, explicit commitments of conflict prevention are thereby proposed in the form of the hypothesis of multidimensionality, the hypothesis of political access, the hypothesis of synergy, and the hypothesis of political interest (Leatherman et al. 1999, 182-217).

The hypothesis of multidimensionality states that conflict and its prevention are multidimensional and multilevel in their causal structure, incorporating structural, cultural and institutional dimensions, as well as national elite, intergovernmental and international levels. In effective early warning and conflict prevention policy, international actors should “cover the bases” through a division of labor that puts them in a position to monitor and influence all important dimensions and levels of a society. If any critical segment is omitted, the effort is likely to fail.

Conflict and its escalation can be understood analytically as growing out of three dimensions. Structural cleavages entail the broad social distinctions demarcated by categories such as economic class, racial group, and urban/rural division; and the way the distribution of wealth and privilege is mapped onto these distinctions. Structural cleavages are not necessarily static, but remain stable for long periods. Culture is a real, though elusive and dynamic, variable in generating conflict. Cultural difference does not necessarily lead to cultural tension or outright conflict, but is a fertile field for the politically ambitious, particularly when cultural divisions coincide with economic cleavages or carry memories of past victimization. The legitimacy and effectiveness of political institutions are critical factors influencing whether structural cleavages or cultural differences generate conflict escalation. Institutional legitimacy can be threatened when state administrative capacity erodes or during a fragile transition from authoritarian to democratic institutions. The

critical actors who escalate or prevent conflict are national elites, intergovernmental actors and international actors, the most important of which are national elites for it is they who ultimately choose to escalate a conflict or move towards resolution. Within the hypothesis of multidimensionality, the criterion of comprehensiveness is paramount, as all three categories of actors can act on all three dimensions of the conflict.

The hypothesis of political access states that information to warn the international community of an impending conflict is produced in a political process through which multiple actors negotiate with local political elites for access to sensitive areas and populations. The criterion of engagement is the normative commitment for political access, where effective early warning presupposes that international actors have already gained access to the conflict through negotiated engagement with one or more of the conflict parties. Hence, theoretical models that would conceptualize early warning as disengaged from direct involvement with a society and its leaders are misleading. International actors who understand the partiality of their own information, and their need to learn from and coordinate strategies with other actors engaged in conflict prevention, seek to overcome these limitations by forming network relationships with other actors.

The hypothesis of synergy states that conflict prevention is policy artifice that sets in motion simultaneous peace processes in multiple levels and dimensions of a society. The combination generates synergies across the levels and dimensions until peace develops a life of its own. Peace entrepreneurs not only invent processes for each dimension and subgroup of society, they also actively deter or neutralize the negative synergies created by conflict entrepreneurs or by the inadvertent effects of international intervention. Actors engaged in conflict prevention cultivate networks as a source of power, which engage significant sectors of a society, correct negative synergies and enhance positive ones through the criterion of decentralized coordination, and maximize effectiveness of limited resources and political will. The challenge of conflict prevention is to maximize the positive synergy between the tactics of independent actors through consensual rather than authoritative coordination.

The hypothesis of political interest states that the political will and material resources available for conflict prevention, and even the threshold of violence that

defines the early warning task, differ from case to case and reflect the perception of interests by major powers and leading regional states. These interests are not fixed or given, but emerge from fluid coalitions of political leaders, bureaucrats, public opinion, mass movements, NGOs and other actors. The criterion of coalition building is achieved by actors committed to effective conflict prevention continuously building supportive coalitions by mobilizing constituencies, shaping perceptions and generating policy options. Discovering the political will for preventive action is a task done one conflict at a time. Each coalition is built individually, and its members will not necessarily cooperate on the next conflict or country. One of the possible difficulties with the hypothesis of political interest is that it does not take into consideration the possibility of intervention fatigue.

Leatherman et al. (1999, 217) conclude by cautioning that the performance of each of these tasks is a necessary but not sufficient condition for successful conflict prevention. The sufficient condition is that international and domestic actors somehow find a way to make peace by matching the reality of the particular society with the available policy tools and coalition partners. Throughout this analysis, the entire focal point was only on intrastate crises.

Lund (1996) was the first to analyze conflict and conflict prevention with the goal of determining a more normative model of conflict prevention tools to be utilized in prevention of possible future conflicts, based on a systemic assessment of those actions that helped prevent conflicts in the past as well as those that failed. The primary focus of his research was to ascertain if conflict prevention efforts actually made a difference, or did the non-escalation of a conflict have little to do with deliberate prevention efforts. Of the various issues related to why an emerging dispute may not always lead to armed conflict, some factors are subject to human manipulation and are thus targets for conflict prevention, while other factors are more structural, or systemic, and are less predisposed to deliberate human manipulation. Lund (1996, 84) cautions that while underrating human prevention efforts may lead to the inference of conflict being an ingrained human trait, overestimation of human agency can lead to unrealistic policy recommendations and hopes.

By conducting a similar systems cross-case analysis of conflicts in Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia, Macedonia, Albania, Hungary, Estonia, Zaire, Congo, Haiti, Peru,

and Guatemala, Lund assessed the causal relationship of hypothesized manipulable factors as they related to the diverging outcomes of conflict or prevention. Lund deduced that five manipulable factors were often present in the circumstances where nascent political disputes were handled through peaceful means and were largely absent in those disputes that resulted in the use of armed force. Three of the factors functioned external to the dispute itself, pertaining to third parties, while two factors were indigenous to the dispute, thereby indicating where third parties could employ additional influence. The five factors identified were third party timing, multifaceted action, support from major players, moderate leadership, and state autonomy.

Third party timing is critical in that “peaceful outcomes are more likely to the extent that third parties apply unequivocal pressures on the parties to engage in mutual processes and institutions aimed at peaceful settlement of differences before one or the other party mobilizes its political constituency or deploys armed force or coercion to achieve concrete gains” (Lund 1996, 86). The degree of stimulus that third parties must bring to bear is relative to the scale and stage of development of the violence or coercive power being targeted, whereby measures applied early in a conflict before these factors intensify require less pressure and cost than do measures applied later.

Multifaceted action refers to a variety of actions and instruments to address the various facets of a dispute, such as economic or political incentives or sanctions, institution building assistance, alleviating distrust, promoting reconciliation, establishing negotiation or mediation channels, and formulating settlements. A premium is accordingly placed on close coordination and cooperation among the third parties partaking in preventive actions; and where cooperation and unity of purpose among third parties is meager, or absent, conflict prevention effectiveness is compromised. In other words, one of the measures of the adequacy of preventive interventions is their richness of breadth. Consequently, third party action may be greatly facilitated by the presence of a unifying actor or force to provide overarching strategy and orchestration.

Support from major players is key, given that conflict prevention efforts are more effective when major powers, regional powers, and neighboring states agree to support or tolerate those efforts and do not undermine them by overt or covert

support for one or another party to the dispute. The participation of the United States and regional organizations further enhances the possibilities for success (Lund 1996, 95), provided access is available. Whereas major players can facilitate through the economic or diplomatic influence they may hold in a given region, competing interests can weaken the efficacy of conflict prevention efforts. Here, regional organizations can assist. Not only can regional organizations serve to advance conflict prevention efforts and allay suspicions of major power parochial interests, but they can additionally function as a deconfliction point or unifying force.

Moderate leadership refers to the fact that “peaceful outcomes are more likely when the leaders of the parties to the dispute are moderate in their words, actions and policies, make conciliatory gestures, and seek bilateral or multilateral negotiations and bargaining to resolve the issues in dispute”. The level of tension and propensity for use of violence can be significantly amplified with intemperate and incendiary public ultimatums, threats and divisive rhetoric; when partisan rhetoric is translated into legislation or policy that clearly favors one group or faction at the expense of the other; or force is used by the police or military against political opponents. Conversely, the chances of successful conflict prevention are appreciably enhanced where leaders demonstrate greater restraint and exhibit an inclination to submit matters to negotiation and international organizations.

State autonomy can be vital since “conflict prevention is more effective to the extent that the state directly affected by a dispute is autonomous from one or another of the disputants”. An autonomous state encompasses the requisite procedures and institutions for impartial negotiation, where the military and security forces serve the constitutional order and are independent of partisan aims. Successful conflict prevention is more probable when the parties to the dispute negotiate within some previously established set of norms and procedures. It should be noted, however, that an autonomous state is not synonymous with a democratic state, only that state institutions be effectively governed by established conventions and norms.

Lund (1996, 200) concludes that, based on his similar systems cross-case analysis, these five manipulable and salient factors are integral to successful conflict prevention, and that in light of both the threats and constraints confronting the global system of nations today, an intensified, systematic, and relatively low cost effort to

create a collective, strategic approach to multilateral conflict prevention is paramount for the future. As such, his work is of a much more prescriptive nature, while keeping in line with the theoretical temperament of the preceding studies, and is applicable to both interstate and intrastate conflict, albeit independently. Finally, his normative intent was encapsulated by the development of a “toolbox” of policies and instruments from which to draw for application of conflict prevention efforts, which served as a base for the development of figure 1.3 in the preceding chapter.

In his multi-case comparative analysis, introduced in the previous chapter, Jentleson (2000a; 2000b) followed suit with the objective of creating a normative model of conflict prevention efforts and actions that could be used to thwart contentious political issues from developing into conflict. After empirically and analytically supporting his contention that conflict prevention is not just a gallant concept, but also a viable real world strategy, requisites for conflict prevention application were defined. Ultimately, four major requisites were delineated: early warning, diplomatic strategies, major international actors, and credible military force (Jentleson 2000b, 334-344).

Early warning, an integral component of conflict prevention for the equivalent rationale as explicated by Lund, was not deemed to be the specific quandary, as the United Nations, national governments, and NGOs all had a number of early warning mechanisms in place. What constituted the early warning dilemma was the requirement to close the warning-response gap (Jentleson 2000b, 335; George and Holl 2000, 21-36). While the information was available early on in the dispute, the problem was determined to be limited political incentives, and in some instances political disincentives, to responding with early action. Jentleson underscored the need for a more systematic and analytic capacity for developing policy responses.

Diplomatic strategies, citing Lund’s “toolbox” were determined to fall within seven general spheres (Jentleson 2000b, 335-338). The first factor was the significance of mixed strategies, amalgamating both coercive measures and inducements. Second was that the terms of negotiation allow all sides to derive gains from cooperation and be able to illustrate those gains to their domestic constituencies. Third was the major role played by special envoys and other lead diplomats as negotiators and mediators. Fourth was that the requisite action be taken early on in the dispute. Fifth was that economic sanctions be imposed

comprehensively and decisively, and enforced tightly, rather than imposed partially and incrementally with limited effort at enforcement. Sixth was the influential lure of membership in major international and regional organizations. And finally, that no one international actor is singularly vital to conflict prevention; many have important roles to play across the range of cases, while the same actor can play varying roles in different cases.

Major international actors are required to lend credibility to the conflict prevention efforts as well as leadership in the multilateral environment. The United States' role continues to be essential, particularly as it relates to multilateral leadership. Western European powers also have a critical leadership role, whether as individual states or collectively as the European Union. The United Nations brings two profound assets to conflict prevention; that of collective legitimation, and that of its network of agencies. Regional multilateral organizations provide a more topical ability to address the concerns of contagion, diffusion and escalation. NGOs can additionally play key roles and often achieve what governments cannot, albeit not always in an explicitly coordinated fashion. While all these actors can have a crucial role in conflict prevention efforts, the role of leadership must be underscored, as therein lies the focal point for creation of a synergy of actors and actions.

Credible military force is the last of Jentleson's requisites for conflict prevention. The impartial threat of credible military force is essential both in terms of deterrence and reassurance. Deterrence refers to the credibility of the international community to respond coercively to the purposive nature of the conflict parties, while reassurance ascribes to the protection that only international actors can provide as related to the security dilemma and commitment problem. Impartial refers not to impartiality between belligerents, but impartiality in executing the decisions of the United Nations Security Council, or other prevailing organizations, in fair, firm and symmetrical enforcement of consequences. Similarly, credible refers not to whether the threat of military force can be made, but to whether the threat is believed by the intended recipients.

Jentleson (2000b, 334) concludes that, based on his multi-case comparative analysis, these four requisites are fundamental to successful conflict prevention, in the sense that they provide sufficient generality to constitute the parameters of a strategy, but are also flexible enough to be adapted for specific application on a case-

by-case basis. Similar to Lund, Jentleson's work is applicable to both interstate and intrastate conflict, although discretely.

Ackermann (2000), utilizing the normative conclusions of Lund's research as a foundation, conducted an empirical single-case study of conflict prevention efforts in Macedonia up to the point of commencement of the Kosovo crisis in order to identify the concrete conditions under which conflict could be prevented. By applying the normative aspects of conflict prevention research to a specific case, Ackermann developed an analytical framework, which described the various actors, methods, and approaches that appeared to be necessary for successful conflict prevention. Developed hypotheses were then evaluated in a cross-case analysis of conflicts in Hungary, Slovakia, Estonia, Russia, Bosnia, Croatia, and Rwanda. Lastly, she identified four general, and in many ways intertwined, necessary factors: timely involvement; support of major international actors; coordinated, varied, and multifaceted intervention; and moderate behavior of domestic leaders.

Timely involvement of third parties is vital as preventive actions must occur in the early or formative stages of conflict when there is no, or only sporadic, violence and when contending parties have not yet mobilized to use force. This is critical in cases where violent conflict has the propensity for spillover across borders.

Support of major international actors, particularly either the United States or an international or regional institution was determined to be vital to the initiation and continuation of conflict prevention measures. Due to the hesitancy of the international community to become involved in the internal affairs of states, in order to muster the political will for initiation of conflict prevention measures, a dominant international actor must either initiate or be supportive when domestic players request third party involvement as well as go through the due process of the United Nations Security Council. Also emphasized is the role of individuals representing international and/or regional organizations and their leadership and personal commitment to the conflict prevention effort.

Coordinated, varied, and multifaceted intervention actions, instruments and strategies are needed to prevent incipient conflict. Official and unofficial actors must employ a number of instruments, from preventive deployment, to the use of good offices and mediation, to grassroots activities designed to induce behavioral changes among members of the competing parties. Concurrently, where mandates

overlap, such as those of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the United Nations, actors need to coordinate and complement prevention actions. Furthermore, utilization of leadership who is familiar with the region, and has a strong personal belief in conflict prevention is indispensable.

Moderate behavior of domestic leaders, though not requisite for conflict prevention actions, increases the potential for success. Moderate behavior may denote an array of possibilities: from abstention of the pursuit of nationalist, exclusionary agendas, from the use of hate rhetoric, from the falsification and misuse of historical events, symbols, and myths, and from extreme expressions of victimization; to a willing openness to political accommodation and power sharing, such as governmental coalitions, parliamentary proportionality, or some degree of local or regional autonomy. Equally critical is the ability of political leaders to convince their constituency that such accommodative measures work to the benefit of all segments of society.

In sum, Ackermann (2000, 162) contends that conflict prevention does not come automatically, effortlessly, or through good will alone, but entails the conscious implementation of preventive measures, on the part of myriad actors, and on many different, overlapping levels. At the same time, however, Ackermann cautions that intrinsic psychological factors may inhibit peaceful outcomes, conflict prevention is an on-going process and is never entirely complete, and that it is vital not to have exaggerated expectations. Though her study addressed both the interstate and intrastate aspects of conflict, it was done so with the two being separate entities.

While the literature is not replete with abundant normative models for conflict prevention, it should be evident that the models presented are compatible, complementary, and synergistic in approaches. While the semantics may be dissimilar, each approach prescribes a multifaceted and multilevel methodology, from all available actors, to address the proximate and latent aspects of conflict. These approaches also underpin the leaders as critical nodes, whom have the ultimate decision as to whether to pursue conflictual or peaceful paths.

Figure 2.1 recapitulates the theoretical and normative aspects of available conflict prevention literature as they relate to those factors deemed requisite for successful application. The Carnegie Commission, and Leatherman, et al., collectively develop the empirical and theoretical foundation for application of the more normative works

of Lund, Jentleson, and Ackermann. From the theoretical perspective, the social and material background, and the escalatory dynamics of conflict, as delineated by Leatherman, et al., correlate and complement the structural and operational components of the Carnegie Commission respectively. The social and material background dynamics, and structural prevention, both address long-term, bottom-up strategies, while escalatory dynamics and operational prevention adopt short-term, top-down strategies.

**Figure 2.1:** Factors for Successful Conflict Prevention.

Author	Factors of Successful Conflict Prevention
Carnegie Commission	Early Warning and Response Preventive Diplomacy Economic Measures, Sanctions and Incentives Use of force
Leatherman, et al.	Hypothesis of Multidimensionality Hypothesis of Political Access Hypothesis of Synergy Hypothesis of Political Interest
Lund	Third Party Timing Multifaceted Action Support from Major Players Moderate Leadership State Autonomy
Jentleson	Early Warning Diplomatic Strategies Major International Actors Credible Military Force
Ackermann	Timely involvement Support of Major Actors Coordinated, Varied and Multifaceted Intervention Moderate Behavior of Domestic Leaders

From a more normative perspective, the conceptual framework of Lund, Jentleson, and Ackermann are also complementary in scope. The third party timing of Lund, early warning of Jentleson, and timely involvement of Ackermann, all refer to the ability to detect the early or formative stages of conflict, but even more crucially, to exploit this knowledge into policy responses early on in the dispute prior to mobilization of either party. Consequently, the aspects of early warning and early response are inextricably intertwined. The multifaceted action of Lund, diplomatic strategies of Jentleson, and coordinated, varied and multifaceted intervention of Ackermann all submit to the requisite of conflict prevention efforts being multifaceted in approach and multilevel in action. Additionally, all three authors agree on the importance of support from major international actors.

However, what all the authors' normative prescriptions fail to address is any type of synergy or nexus of interstate and intrastate conflict prevention measures in application. For the purposes of this study, early warning and response, support of major international actors, multifaceted and multilevel action, and synergistic intervention will be addressed. While all are necessary, but not sufficient, synergistic intervention is the most critical, combining both the synergy of execution and leadership, as well as a synergy of simultaneity and connectivity towards both the interstate and intrastate aspects of a conflict.

## **2.2. Simultaneity and Connectivity**

As formerly affirmed, resident within the sphere of conflict prevention exist two major sectors of deliberation. There are those who focus on preventing interstate conflict, as clashes between sovereign states have not yet been eradicated; and those who concentrate on preventing intrastate conflict, as ethnic and nationalistic malcontent seems to be the current trend. Although there has been some recent academic discourse on the subject of transnational conflict, in essence this term describes the spread of conflict across international borders either through contagion, diffusion or escalation and in itself does not represent a discrete category of conflict. However, the primary focal point of this study is of a sovereign state that faces an interstate threat, while concurrently dealing with civil and ethnic intrastate peril. While the coincidence between the fundamental doctrine of interstate and intrastate conflict prevention is palpable, and probable, there is a veritable void of literature and theory regarding any simultaneity or connectivity of the two.

The concept of a nexus between interstate and intrastate war is not novel, and has been considerably analyzed within the discipline of war and conflict studies at the systemic level. Geller and Singer (1998) provide an explanation of war in international politics grounded on data based, empirical research, which classifies and synthesizes the research findings of over 500 quantitative analyses of war at the analytic levels of the state, dyad, region, and international system. Within this context, the possibility of contagion or diffusion of international conflict, whether in the form of war or less serious modes of dispute is evaluated. In dealing with the spread of conflict across national boundaries, conflict may be treated as both cause and effect. At the state level, the issue involves the spread of internal violence,

while at the interstate level it involves the spread of war (Geller and Singer 1998, 106).

Geller and Singer (1998, 106-108) investigate six studies with reference to contagion/diffusion as related to war prone regions. Bremer (1982) researches regional patterns of coercive interstate behavior from 1900 to 1976 and observes compelling evidence that coercive behavior is contagious intra-regionally, but there is little evidence of inter-regional coercive contagion. Faber, Houweling, and Siccama (1984) examine the temporal and spatial distances between wars from 1816 to 1980, where temporal distance is defined as the time-lapse between successive wars and spatial distance is defined as the geographical distance between successive war localities. Their results suggest the location and timing of previous conflicts have positive and significant effects on subsequent war location and timing regionally, but are not contagious across space. In a succeeding and more meticulous study, Houweling and Siccama (1985) corroborate these same findings. Starr and Most (1983, 1985) conduct two studies containing the factor of borders in examination of contagion/diffusion processes from 1960 to 1972. Their results indicate that nations with wars on their borders have a higher probability of engaging in war in a subsequent temporal period than do nations without border wars. Kirby and Ward (1987) conduct a spatial analysis of conflict from 1948 to 1978, and observe that hostile interactions between states are significantly affected by existing conflicts within bordering states. Reflecting on these studies, Geller and Singer (1998, 107) contend that conflict or war contagion/diffusion processes operate at the regional level and border contact increases the probability of war contagion.

Subsequently, Geller and Singer (1998, 122-123) examined the possible relationship between the frequency of civil wars and the frequency of international disputes and wars, specifically whether the amount of system-level interstate conflict is affected by the amount of state-level civil war or revolution in the international system. Maoz (1989) analyzes the correlation between the number of revolutionary state formations and/or transformations and the incidence of interstate disputes from 1815 to 1976, and determines his hypothesis, that the number of interstate conflicts in the system will increase when a large number of states are experiencing regime changes, is statistically supported. Hoole and Huang (1989), in an analogous study of the limited temporal period of 1947 to 1980, determine that changes in the

amount of system-level interstate war are significantly affected by changes in the amount of civil war occurring in the interstate system. These studies, relating state-level attributes to system-level patterns of conflict, indicate positive associations between the number of civil and revolutionary wars and the incidence of interstate conflict, whereby interstate and intrastate conflict are part of an interactive global process (Geller and Singer 1998, 123-125).

Most and Starr (1980) research the possible diffusion of new war participations during the 1946 to 1965 temporal period, whereby the war diffusion hypothesis concerns the possibility that the occurrence of one new war participation will alter the probability of subsequent occurrences. The analysis focuses on the four diffusion-related processes of positive reinforcement, negative reinforcement, positive spatial diffusion, and negative spatial diffusion. Positive and negative reinforcement is an intrastate process, in which there are possible linkages between a state's own war experiences at one time and at some subsequent time. Decision makers in any state are confronted by an "operational milieu" that comprises risks and opportunities. This operational milieu, and its perceived risks and opportunities, may modify through time causing decision makers to reassess their situations as they relate to particular policies in response to those perceived risks and opportunities. Positive and negative spatial diffusion is an interstate process, wherein if wars tend to diffuse, the process is most likely to operate among those states that share high levels of interaction through geographic proximity, operationalized as shared borders. The analytic results of this study exhibited strong statistical evidence in support of the warring border state, positive spatial diffusion hypothesis (Most and Starr 1980, 944).

Employing further refined variables and the expanded temporal period of 1816 to 1965, Siverson and Starr (1990) apply borders and alliances as indicators of opportunity and willingness, respectively, to test the war diffusion hypothesis. Previously, two discrete lines of investigation had been followed on the diffusion of war, that of borders as interaction opportunities and that of alliances as indicators of mutual willingness. Whereas opportunity represents macro level environmental and structural factor potential, willingness is related at the micro level to decision maker's calculations of advantage and disadvantage, cost and benefit, and considered on both the conscious and unconscious levels. Siverson and Starr (1990,

49) contend that opportunity and willingness are integrally linked in myriad modes, and do not create mutually exclusive categories. Their findings suggest that the probability of war diffusion is substantially increased as opportunities and willingness increase, and particularly when such geographic and political factors are combined.

Neither is the concept of a nexus involving interstate and intrastate conflict novel within the sphere of internal or ethnic conflict at the state level. Brown (1996) examines intrastate conflict in an attempt to explicate how internal conflict commences, how it involves neighboring states, and what distant powers and international organizations can do about it. Brown defines internal conflict as violent or potentially violent political disputes whose origins can be traced to domestic rather than systemic factors, and where armed violence takes place or threatens to take place primarily within the borders of a single state.

The central premise of Brown's reasoning is that, although neighboring states and developments in neighboring countries rarely trigger all-out civil wars, almost all conflicts involve neighboring states in one way or another, and the vast majority of internal conflicts have important regional implications for regional stability. Conventional wisdom regarding regional dimensions of intrastate conflict relies profoundly on rudimentary analogies to diseases, fires, floods, and other forces of nature, whereby conflicts are said to spill over. Brown (1996, 24) maintains this manner of thinking about regional dimensions of intrastate conflict is both simplistic and mechanistic. It is simplistic because it perceives conflict transitioning in only one direction, from the site where the conflict initiated to neighboring states, which are characterized as passive and innocent victims. It is mechanistic since it views events occurring in an uncontrolled and uncontrollable fashion; problems are blamed on forces of nature, or conflict itself, rather than on the acts and decisions of leaders, decision-makers and governments. By distinguishing between the effects of intrastate conflict on neighboring states and on the actions that neighboring states take with respect to intrastate conflict, Brown endeavors to advance analytical clarity of the regional dynamics of intrastate conflict.

The effects of intrastate conflicts on neighboring states fall into five main categories: refugee problems, economic problems, military problems, instability problems, and war (Brown 1996, 591-600). At a minimum, refugees place a

profound economic burden on recipient countries, the vast majority of whom have acute resource constraints themselves. Additionally, refugees have the capability of generating grave security problems, as combatants often merge with refugee populations and utilize refugee camps as areas for rest, recuperation, recruitment and reorganization. Refugees entering a neighboring state where large numbers of ethnic brethren reside, may also initiate their compatriots to become more radicalized, thereby leading to increased domestic political turmoil within that state.

The positive economic relations that neighboring states often have can be disrupted through intrastate conflict, damaging regional interests in a significant manner. An intrastate conflict on the border of another state can have extensive effects on trade, transportation, communication, manufacturing, finance, and raw material access. Moreover, if world powers become apprehensive with reference to regional stability as a whole, foreign investment can be reduced or terminated.

Military problems for neighboring states as a result of intrastate conflict can occur by means of four possible methods. First, a neighboring state's territory can be used for transshipment of arms and supplies to insurgents within the conflict state. Second, the territory of bordering states can act as an operations base or safe-haven for insurgent groups. Third, insurgent groups can conduct attacks within the adjoining state, either to strike at their adversaries indirectly or invite regional and international attention to their cause. Finally, exploitation of neighboring state territory for arms and supplies transshipment, operational bases or safe-haven areas can easily set in motion hot-pursuit operations and interdiction campaigns.

Political instability within a neighboring state can be generated by intrastate conflict in several ways, such as economic costs leading towards an increase in civil strife and/or weakening the host government, or refugees inciting disruption and turmoil. However, these causes usually serve to exacerbate existing stability dilemmas as opposed to creating new ones. Intrastate conflict is most likely to spark instability in bordering states when ethnic groups straddle formal state boundaries; divided ethnic groups are particularly effective conflict transmitters.

The final category of effects of intrastate conflicts on neighboring states is that of war. Hot pursuit operations and interdiction campaigns can instigate intrastate conflict leading to interstate conflict when one government is trying to root out insurgents in a neighboring state, and the bordering state in question seeks to defend

its territory and sovereignty. Intrastate conflict can also lead conflicting parties to adopt increasingly radicalized and belligerent platforms. This aggressive nationalism can develop and become directed not just at internal rivals, but external actors, and adjacent states are the most likely targets of intensifying nationalistic crusades. An additional possibility of intrastate conflict effecting interstate conflict is that of diversionary war, where leaders beset by internal challenges lash out against bordering states to divert attention from domestic troubles.

The actions that neighboring states take with respect to intrastate conflict also fall into five major categories: humanitarian intervention, defensive intervention, protective intervention, opportunistic intervention, and opportunistic war. In this context, it should be noted that the term “intervention” should be thought of generally, encompassing diplomatic initiatives, economic assistance or sanctions, military assistance, or military action. In addition, interventions are oft complex in that they involve a breadth of activities and actions, and states usually act for a variety of reasons, in which the true motivation is frequently concealed behind diplomatic smokescreens.

Humanitarian interventions are often supported by neighboring states in an attempt to assuage the tremendous humanitarian suffering habitually caused by intrastate conflict. In some instances, regional powers take humanitarian action aimed at relieving distress and restoring stability within the region. As altruistic and benign as humanitarian interventions may seem, a regional power rarely launches a purely altruistic initiative, as there typically exists a self-serving agenda of some nature.

Defensive interventions are often embarked upon by neighboring states to bring trans-border problems to an end, to keep conflict from spreading, or to bring a war to its end. In such cases as these, the motivations of the bordering state are usually justified as being self-defense oriented, and can range from an actual invasion, to the dispatch of peacekeeping forces to a specific location.

Protective interventions are actions by the neighboring state, whose design is to protect or assist ethnic brethren involved in the conflict across their border. In this instance, the bordering state customarily undertakes proceedings that cannot be depicted as solely defensive from an international legal stance, even if the interveners continually maintain they are merely defending their brethren.

Opportunistic interventions are acts by the bordering state intended to exploit internal turmoil elsewhere, advance their political, economic and military interests, and improve their regional strategic position. Regional rivals often support insurgents in neighboring countries, substituting insurgent proxies for direct interstate conflict, in the hopes that the rival neighboring state will remain preoccupied with domestic affairs and weaken over time, or more ambitiously that the neighboring state government will be forced to the precipice of failure. Support activities include financial assistance; weapons and communications equipment; manpower, training and leadership; logistical assistance; and operational bases and safe-havens. The converse side of opportunistic interventions holds that neighboring states may intervene to sustain a friendly neighboring government and assist in keeping communally problematic insurgents contained.

The final category of actions that neighboring states can take with respect to intrastate conflict is opportunistic invasions. Intrastate conflict creates a window of opportunity for a rival bordering state to exploit the transitory weakness and invade. The distinction between an opportunistic intervention and an opportunistic invasion is essentially a matter of degree and form: in the former, bordering states assist insurgent forces and engage in proxy wars while trying to retain an innocent public pretense; in the latter, they initiate full-scale military offensives via their indigenous forces and effect a less plausible pretense about their intentions.

Although neighboring states can be the innocent victims of intrastate conflict, they are habitually active contributors to violence, escalation, and regional instability (Brown 1996, 600). Conventional wisdom regarding the regional dynamics of intrastate conflict; that conflict merely “spills over” from one location to another in a unidirectional manner that is no-fault and beyond control, is misleading. The spread of conflict is bi-directional, both from the originating point and from neighboring states, and is often the product of deliberate decisions taken by leaders and governments. In précis, few if any intrastate conflicts are hermetically sealed, and the vast majority have important regional dimensions and implications.

Citing Brown’s work as a foundation, Lake and Rothchild (1998) further probe the question of how, why, and when do intrastate conflicts spread across national borders. Lake and Rothchild (1998, 4) reason that intrastate conflict is not caused directly by intergroup differences, ancient hatreds and centuries old feuds; the

stresses of modern life within a global economy; nor were ethnic passions, long contained by repressive communist regimes, simply uncorked by the end of the Cold War. Rather, intrastate conflict is most commonly caused by collective fears of the future, propagated through information failures, problems of credible commitment, and the security dilemma. Regarding the actual spread of intrastate conflict, Lake and Rothchild distinguish between diffusion, which occurs when conflict in one area alters the likelihood of conflict elsewhere, and escalation, which occurs when additional, foreign participants enter an otherwise intrastate conflict.

Diffusion of intrastate conflict across state borders can occur in four fashions, which are not necessarily exclusive and may all occur simultaneously (Lake and Rothchild 1998, 25-32). First, intrastate conflict may actually be contagious, in the full sense of this overused term, in that refugee flows from a neighboring state can alter that state's own ethnic composition. Similarly, changes in the ethnic balance of power can occur with the fragmentation of federal states, without the actual migration of peoples across state borders. Second, groups in one state, witnessing ethnic mobilization or political success by ethnic groups in another state, may foster their own political agitation and make significantly greater demands upon their state government. Correspondingly, intrastate conflict elsewhere may cause groups to revise their beliefs about the possible demands of other groups in their own state. Third, intrastate conflict in other states, may lead groups to update their beliefs about the efficacy of the political safeguards contained in their own existing contracts. For instance, if international events suggest that the leverage wielded by minority groups is less effective than previously believed, the majority may become more emboldened. Finally, intrastate conflict abroad may lead groups to modernize their values about the costs of protest or, ultimately, violence and their probability of success, thereby creating the perception that valued ends can be obtained through coercion.

Whereas diffusion occurs in part through information flows that condition the beliefs of ethnic actors elsewhere, escalation occurs through the more traditional routes of other interstate conflicts, such as alliances, spillovers, irredentism, diversions, and internal weaknesses. Escalation of intrastate conflict into interstate conflict can occur in five methods, similar to those explicated by Brown, and also not necessarily mutually exclusive. First, Ethnic ties and antagonisms frequently

motivate states to become involved in an intrastate conflict elsewhere, when like ethnic groups in one state are propelled by feelings of solidarity with their ethnic kin in another state. This typically occurs between neighbors where ethnic groups span national boundaries. Second, ethnic combatants in one state may use the territory of a second state for staging areas, retreats, etc. This can result in recriminations between the two affected states and, in the case of hot pursuit operations, direct border clashes that may spiral out of control. Third, ethnic mobilization often contains within it an irredentist dimension, as ethnic leaders demand the reunification of an often mythical, but nonetheless politically salient, ethnic homeland. This is typically defined as the largest area of territory ever controlled, or believed to have been controlled, by that ethnic group. Fourth, ethnicity provides an effective foundation for diversionary wars, stimulated by political leaders beset by domestic opposition and seeking to incite interstate conflict as a rallying point for support of their continued rule. Lastly, aggressor states within the region may consider states with significant internal conflict to be an easy target for takeover.

After a succinct evaluation of the concepts of ethnicity and ethnic groups, the sources of intrastate conflict, and characterization of the differentiation concerning diffusion and escalation, Lake and Rothchild (1998, 339-344) draw five preliminary conclusions about the possible proliferation of intrastate conflict across state borders. Firstly, intrastate conflict, and its spread across state boundaries, is the product of strategic interactions between and within groups. In all conflict, both individuals and groups select strategies based upon their expectations of the actions of others, where the outcome is the consequence of the selected strategies. Within groups, ethnic activists or political entrepreneurs seek self-aggrandizement by polarizing society and outbidding moderate politicians within their community, in quest of enhancing their position both within the group and in the larger social and political systems. Between groups, violence arises from information failures, problems of credible commitment, or the security dilemma, and most prevalently from an implacable amalgamation of all three strategic dilemmas. Intrastate conflict spreads in much the same way as it arises domestically, by diffusing or escalating as outlined above.

Secondly, intrastate conflict does diffuse abroad, but largely to states that already contain the seeds of discord, or to groups that can identify with the conflicting

parties. Direct diffusion stimulated by refugees, armed insurgents, and other trans-border spillovers is a valid and realistic apprehension, however, strong, robust states able to cope with strategic dilemmas are generally able to contain the trans-border spillovers produced by their weaker neighbors. States that are already at risk of intrastate violence are most likely to be affected detrimentally. Indirect diffusion of intrastate conflict is considerably more subtle and problematical to distinguish, and may furthermore prove, in the long run, more essential and challenging to manage. Indirect diffusion is driven primarily by ideas and knowledge, both of which can traverse borders with little effort and proliferate extensively, being potentially universal in extent and sphere of influence. Nevertheless, diffusion does have limits. When political conflict is defined in universalistic terms and when political tactics are readily transportable to other locales, conflict is more likely to diffuse. Conversely, when conflicts are defined in particularistic terms and employ tactics specific to a time and place, diffusion is less liable to transpire.

Third, intrastate conflict does escalate and bring in third parties. At the aggregate level, intrastate conflict is noticeably prone to escalation, with solid evidence that ethnic alliances extending over borders are apt to engender higher levels of conflict between states. Yet, ethnic alliances do not inevitably effect collaborative efforts among groups, but depend on the larger strategic context in which group leaders calculate their political strategies. Additionally, escalation of intrastate conflict is self-limiting, as unlike ideological conflicts, which have universal allure and can escalate to incorporate virtually all states, ethnic conflict ultimately exhausts the quantity of states with substantial ethnic kin.

Fourth, even if the international spread of intrastate conflict is limited, it is sensitive to the strategies of all relevant actors, including third parties. As a strategic process, intrastate conflict and its international expansion are the products of strategies chosen by all groups, states, and international organizations; and any modification in the strategies of these actors, therefore, can have extensive and frequently unforeseen consequences. To the extent that implementation of ethnic contracts within multiethnic societies depends implicitly or explicitly on noncoercive interventions, any decline in international vigilance may generate a further sequence of intrastate conflict. Affirming triumph against ethnic hatred and violence and

diminishing the promotion of stable ethnic relations may, in fact, exacerbate latent ethnic fears.

Finally, intrastate conflict is not unique. Lake and Rothchild (1998, 343-344) assert that many of the theories developed or utilized in their analysis have their roots in the study of interstate conflict, and nearly all are built upon the general theories of human behavior that have been applied throughout the social sciences. Although ethnic conflict may be a uniquely vicious and even perverse form of conflict, it is intently interconnected to other modes of conflict and can be examined with many of the same theoretical tools and conceptual foundations.

Gurr (1993, 133-134; 2001, 178-180), while primarily focused on the intrinsic sources of ethnicpolitical conflict, does address international diffusion and contagion of intrastate conflict. Diffusion is defined as the processes by which conflict in one state directly affects political organization and action in adjoining states. Contagion, alternatively, refers to the processes by which one group's actions provide inspiration and strategic and tactical guidance for groups elsewhere: diffusion of conflict is direct; contagion is indirect. Lake and Rothchild's concept of direct and indirect diffusion are congruent with this distinction. Ultimately, Gurr (2001, 179-180) discerns three general propositions in relation to diffusion and contagion of intrastate conflict. First, an ethnopolitical group's incentives for political action are increased by successful mobilization and political action by similar groups elsewhere. Second, a group's capabilities for political action are increased by political and material support from segments of the group elsewhere, especially from segments that are mobilized. Third, a group's opportunities for rebellion are increased by the number of segments of the group in adjoining countries and by their proximity to open conflict.

The above theoretical discussion visibly indicates a nexus involving intrastate and interstate conflict, which has been significantly investigated and documented, at various levels of analysis within the realm of conflict studies. The distinction between interstate and intrastate conflict has itself begun to blur (Levy 2001, 3), and security between states has become increasingly dependent upon security within states (Holsti 1996, 15). In the contemporary global environment, conflict in one state often spreads or has repercussions in a neighboring state (Peck 1996, 70). Furthermore, a state adjacent to a state engaged in conflict is simultaneously at risk

from both interstate and intrastate conflict (Wallensteen 2002, 226). Whereas conflict was traditionally perceived as either interstate or intrastate, the fungible nature of contemporary conflict has a tendency to shift along a sliding scale between interstate and intrastate. Intrastate conflict easily permeates across existing state borders to form regional conflict complexes; conversely, regional conflict dynamics can impact readily on the internal processes of neighboring states (Hampson, Wermester, and Malone 2002, 3). It appears a logical assumption that as the nexus between interstate and intrastate conflict is inherently linked in a larger strategic calculus, so too should be the theoretical and conceptual foundations, and practical application, of apposite conflict prevention efforts in the form of a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity.

The Carnegie Commission, which is arguably the single most important research and policy analysis enterprise to influence the conflict prevention agenda (O'Neil and Tschirgi 2002, 275); while examining the principal causes of ethnic, nationalistic and religious conflicts, both within and between states, contained a mere two short paragraphs regarding any conjunction in relation to simultaneity and connectivity of interstate and intrastate conflict. The extent of dialogue was to acknowledge the possibility of spillover effects of an intrastate conflict (Carnegie 1997, 27), and that this possibility would most likely occur in areas where ethnic groups straddle interstate boundaries (Carnegie 1997, 101). An additionally salient point was the lack of differentiation between application of intrastate or interstate conflict prevention recommendations, other than those recommendations that were applicable to both types of conflict.

Leatherman et al. (1999, 73-121), devote two chapters to deal with the mechanisms of conflict intensification and the differentiation between vertical and horizontal escalation. Vertical escalation is defined as an increase in the intensity of the dispute in terms of the conflict behaviors and means used, while horizontal escalation is an expansion of the geographical scope of conflict and brings into the sphere of violence new groups, communities, or states, as well as increasing the number and size of issues and actors' goals. While conceding the fact that historically states have become regularly involved in intrastate conflicts in neighboring countries, and averting the spillover of conflict in regional contexts is an important task, the only reference of avoidance methodology is, "the prevention and limitation

of violence requires neighboring states and other third parties not be permitted to assist the opposing parties” (Leatherman et al. 1999, 102). As the focus of their work is specifically conflict prevention in intrastate crises, avoidance of vertical escalation within the state is the prime application, with no further elaboration or analysis of the nexus between interstate and intrastate conflict or simultaneity and connectivity with regards to conflict prevention.

Lund (1996) and Jentleson (2000) are similarly vague in their approaches, or lack thereof, as regards the subject of simultaneity and connectivity. Although Lund (1996, 48) does state that both interstate and intrastate conflict fall within his definition for conflict prevention, and that intrastate conflict may occur within or across state boundaries, no allowance is made for simultaneity and connectivity of conflict prevention actions or efforts. Jentleson (2000, 15) alludes to the correlation of interstate and intrastate conflicts in his case selection when he states that the cases were selected as a crosscut sample, both geographically and with respect to, “inter- and intrastate terms, albeit with the necessary fluidity in setting these parameters and allowing for mixed cases”. However, throughout the analysis, and ensuing development of his normative requisites for conflict prevention, there is a patent lack of partition of these “mixed cases” as anything but a discrete conflict, which unfortunately diffused across state borders.

Ackermann (2000) is the first author to broach the subject of simultaneity and connectivity of conflict prevention actions or efforts in normative substance. Ackermann opines that within the field of conflict studies, in what some scholars describe as the internationalization of communal violence and others as the disappearance of the distinction between internal and external conflicts, interstate and intrastate conflicts have become even more closely linked (Ackermann 2000, 14-15). Based on this view, one of Ackermann’s stated major objectives is to explore the conditions under which conflict prevention can be successful, “especially where a more complex pattern of conflict has emerged, one in which interstate and intrastate levels of conflict have become closely intertwined, and where external and internal conflicts must be dealt with at the same time to arrive at a peaceful outcome” (Ackermann 2000, 5-6). Nevertheless, her analytical framework and developed conflict prevention factors, while focusing on the various actors, methods, and approaches necessary for successful conflict prevention, did not specifically

explicate any execution methodology regarding simultaneity and connectivity in function towards both the interstate and intrastate aspects of conflict.

For most of the twentieth century, both the academic and policy communities had focused on the twin issues of interstate security and intrastate affairs separately. While the academic community began to examine and espouse a nexus between interstate and intrastate conflict as early as the 1980s, this data is only now commencing to be acknowledged, and integrated within the policy community. The 1990s is when the international community, including both the academic and policy sectors, responded to the ostensible increase in intrastate crises, and conflict prevention literature emerged at the intersection of theory and practice (O'Neil and Tschirgi 2002, 276). However, conflict prevention literature and methodology to date seem not to have fully integrated the standing theoretical implications of a nexus between intrastate and interstate conflict in any applied form, which is the foremost aspiration of this work.

## Chapter 3: The Macedonian Historical Milieu

### 3.1. Introduction

To provide the requisite conditions for analysis, it is necessary to delineate the historical milieu of Macedonia, and the surrounding Balkan region, concentrating on those aspects of history, geography, religion, and ethnicity that impact contemporary deliberations regarding contentious issues. Paramount to the application of conflict prevention efforts in a country or region is a thorough comprehension of the contentious issues, and in the case of Macedonia these are intricately intertwined with history. Accordingly, the definitional, historical and contemporary aspects of Macedonia shall be addressed so as to provide an apposite background for subsequent analysis of conflict prevention efforts.

Macedonia is a small landlocked country situated in the center of the Balkan Peninsula. Today it consists of 25,333 square kilometers of territory, with a population of approximately 2.1 million people. It is a mountainous country positioned where the southern Dinaric Ranges and eastern Albanian Alps meet the northern protrusions of the Pindos Mountains, with the Vardar River system bisecting the country from north to south. As such, Macedonia serves, and has historically served, as the primary transportation corridor from Western and Central Europe to Southern Europe and the Aegean Sea. The Republic of Macedonia<sup>1</sup> is a relatively young state, having declared its independence from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 8 September 1991, and adopted its constitution on 17 November 1991. Of the four former Yugoslav republics to gain their independence, Macedonia was the only one to achieve that goal without a shot being fired. However, to understand contemporary Macedonia one must understand its past, for within the Balkan region history is a fundamental aspect of the present.

The Balkan Peninsula, and by default Macedonia, is one of the most ethnically, linguistically and religiously complex areas of the world, resulting in a long history

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<sup>1</sup> By resolution A/RES/47/225 of 8 April 1993, as a result of a dispute with Greece over the constitutional name, the Republic of Macedonia, the newly independent state was admitted to the United Nations under the provisional name of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. United Nations. 2003. *United Nations Member States*. <http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html> (2003, April 11). While resolution of the name dispute is officially still being negotiated, for the sake of brevity I shall refer to the country simply as Macedonia.

of age old contestations and disputes (Cowan 2000; Danforth 1995; Hupchick 2002; Hupchick and Cox 2001; Poulton 1991, 2000; Talevski 1998; Williams 2000). In fact, the history of the Balkans extends over two millennia, and involves the interplay of three civilizations, five empires, three major religions, ten modern nation-states, and some fourteen major ethnic groups (Hupchick and Cox 2001, vii). From this historical complexity befall the three primary perspectives of defining Macedonia: geographically, ethnically, and civilizationally.

### **3.2. Definitional Aspects**

#### *Geographical Definitions.*

Currently, the term Macedonia may refer to an ancient kingdom, a historically established geographic region, the largest and most northern region of Greece, what used to be the most southern republic within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the newly independent state of Macedonia. While the last three definitions of Macedonia are the most contemporary, they are themselves based upon historical and geographical reference and interpretation.

As an ancient land, the earliest settlers were small groups of Illyrians, Paeonians, Thracians, and Dacians (Poulton 2000, 13), and immediately to the south were the Greeks. At this time, Macedonia was a kingdom consisting of sparsely populated and geographically dispersed villages. Although historians have determined there was a lineage of 22 preceding rulers, due to limited and fragmented sources it is impossible to get a thorough and wholly reliable picture of the Macedonian Kingdom and way of life prior to Philip II (Errington 1990). However, it was Philip II, reigning from 359-336 B.C., and his son Alexander III, more commonly known as "Alexander the Great", reigning from 336-323 B.C., who brought Macedonia to historical prominence. Under Philip II, Macedonia became a formidable military power, incorporating Illyrian and Thracian villages and peoples, as well as the northern Greek city-states, under one kingdom. This kingdom included present day Kosovo, Albania, Macedonia and Thrace, and enjoyed a relatively peaceful political relationship with the remaining Greek city-states. Under Alexander the Great, the political affiliation with the Greek city-states dissipated rapidly as within a span of 13 years Alexander extended the kingdom to an empire by conquering the lands

from the Adriatic Sea to the Indus River. At its height, the Macedonian Empire was a vast geographic area that included most of present day Albania, Macedonia, Kosovo, Greece, Bulgaria, Turkey, Syria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and a small portion of India (Fox 2001). After the death of Alexander the Great in 323 B.C., the Macedonian Empire divided into three separate components: Macedonia, Syria, and Egypt, with the Macedonian segment relapsing back to a kingdom combined from Illyrians, Thracians, and Greeks, and similar in size and location to the Macedonian Kingdom under the reign of Philip II. Rather than the far reaches of the Empire at its apogee, it is predominantly this geographic area that is referred to in relation to the ancient Kingdom of Macedonia.

As a historically established geographic region, Macedonia refers to an area marked by nature over the course of several millennia, and bounded to the north by the Skopska Crna Gora and Shar Planina Mountains; in the east by the Rila and Rhodope Mountains and the Mesta and Nestos Rivers; to the south by the Aegean Sea; and to the west by the lakes of Ohrid and Prespa (Danforth 1995, 44; Magocsi 1998, 3; Poulton 1991, 46). The geographic region of Macedonia has been tenaciously contested and the source of several wars, from the emergence of nationalistic claims upon this land to its partition in 1913. First at the Treaty of London and subsequently at the Treaty of Bucharest, geographic Macedonia was partitioned among Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece, with these three portions of Macedonia also being commonly referred to as Vardar, Pirin and Aegean Macedonia respectively.

A combination of the historical definitions of Macedonia as an ancient kingdom and as a geographic region serves as a backdrop for the other three more contemporary definitions. First, Macedonia defined as the most northern and largest region of Greece was a result of Greece receiving the Aegean portion of Macedonia in the partition of 1913, which nearly increased the landmass of Greece twofold. The present region of Greece referred to as Macedonia includes 13 provinces and the Monastic Republic of Mount Athos. This area provides Greece with critical agricultural zones delineated by fertile river valleys and an extensive coastal plain (Curtis 1995); as well as Greece's second largest port and city, Thessaloniki, which is located between the Chalkidiki Peninsula and the mouth of the Vardar River.

Second, Macedonia defined as the most southern republic within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was also a result of the partition of 1913, where the size of Serbia was nearly doubled by receiving the Vardar portion of Macedonia. After World War I, the first Yugoslavia was formed with the announcement on 1 December 1918 of the founding of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, which was later renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. However, with Macedonians constituting the largest minority within Serbia, discontent was prevalent within Vardar Macedonia, which continued throughout the interwar period. After World War II, and the dissolution of the monarchy and establishment of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 29 November 1945, the regime recognized Macedonia as a separate Republic. From this time until the Macedonian declaration of Independence from Yugoslavia, in 1991, Macedonia represented the most southern republic of Yugoslavia.

Finally, the last definitional aspect of the Term Macedonia is as the newly independent and sovereign state of Macedonia. However, since independence was only declared on 8 September 1991, this is a relatively new term chronologically; which seems to suffer from being overshadowed by the longer standing historical and geographic definitions, as well as historical claims upon the land, language and people by neighboring states.

### *Ethnic Definitions.*

The austere and divisive geography of the Balkan Peninsula performed a noteworthy function in determining the existence of its inhabitants. Typically mountainous terrain fragmented settlement, and limited natural resources necessitated group cohesion for survival, resulting in acute competitiveness between ethnic cultures. All Balkan peoples have traditionally exhibited one common characteristic: a sense of passionate, tenacious pride (Hupchick 2002). While diverse ethnic groups at present constitute the Balkans, the peninsula's population of approximately 69.3 million people, excluding European Turkey, is predominantly comprised of three principal groups: ancient peoples, South Slavs, and Turks.

Ancient peoples are those who can trace their ancestry at least back to classical antiquity. The ancestors of these people spoke Indo-European languages, and the most familiar among them are the Greeks. Notwithstanding the fifth through

seventh century invasions of the Slavs, and settlement of their mainland possessions, the Greeks today occupy basically the same territories as they did in antiquity. Admittedly, however, it was not until the mid-twentieth century that this fact came to fruition through a long struggle for reconquest of their former lands.

The Albanians are the second largest faction of ancient peoples in the Balkans, and current estimates are that somewhere between one quarter and one third of the Macedonian population are Albanian. Albanians speak a distinctive language thought to have descended from ancient Illyrian, which would afford them an ethnic heritage equaling that of the Greeks, and placing them as contemporaries of the Basques as being among the oldest existing non-Greek ethnic groups in all of Western Europe. In Antiquity the Illyrians dominated a large swath of the western Balkans situated north of the Greeks, which included present day Albania, Northwestern Greece, Montenegro, part of Serbia, most of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and western Macedonia. Later, the Roman, Goth, Avar and Slavic invasions, pushed the Illyrians into the mountainous regions inhabited by today's Albanians, where they evolved as a mostly tribalized, pastoral society thereby facilitating resistance of later latinization.

The third and final faction of ancient peoples in the Balkans are the Romanians, who speak a Latin based language that is alleged to have derived from the Roman occupation of Dacia during the second and third centuries. Dacia once included the present day territories of Romania and the Danubian Plain in northern Bulgaria. Closely related to the Romanians are the Vlachs, also a Latin based language speaking people. Although alluded to by a variety of names, the Romanians customarily refer to themselves as Aromani. While the question of the ethnic origins of the Romanians versus the Vlachs has not yet been definitively settled, one of the more predominant anthropological theories is that modern day Romanians descended from those Latin speaking ancient peoples living north of the Danube, and the Vlachs descended from those inhabiting the area south of the Danube (Poulton 2000). During the migration of the South Slavs into the area during the fifth through seventh centuries, the Vlachs took to the high mountains where they subsisted as scattered small groups of transhumant herdsmen; in so doing preserving their Latin based Romanian dialect. The name of the Romanian region of Wallachia

means “land of the Vlachs”, and at present the Vlachs represent a minority people throughout the Balkans and, 2.2 percent of the Macedonian population.

The second principal group inhabiting the Balkans is that of the South Slavs, divided today between seven major groups: Bosnians, Bulgarians, Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Serbs, and Slovenes. The South Slavs constitute one of the three primary branches of the Slavic speaking family of peoples in Europe, the other two being the West and the East Slavs. The South Slavs arrived in Eastern Europe from their native soil hypothesized to have been positioned somewhere in the environs of the great Pripet Marshes, which straddle the border dividing present day Ukraine and Belarus. It seems their movement was linked in large part to the invasions between the fifth and seventh centuries of nomadic peoples from the east, and the two most common routes were either along the western or eastern flanks of the Carpathian Mountains. It is unclear whether at first the Slavs were allies of, or refugees from, the Asiatic invaders, but later they transitioned into the aggressors themselves. Slavic raids south of the Danube into the East Roman Empire took on massive proportions beginning in the 520s, and during the next half-century they penetrated the East Roman provinces of Thracia, Macedonia, Epirus, Thessalia, and by 578, as far south as Achaia on the Peloponnesian Peninsula (Magocsi 1998). The Slavic presence in the Balkan Peninsula was to intensify even further after the arrival of the Avars, also in 578, a nomadic people of Mongolian or Turco-Tartar origin, who developed a rather symbiotic relationship with the Slavs. Whether as vassals or allies, the Slavs fought side by side with the Avars during their campaigns against the Byzantine Empire. The primary difference, however, was that while the Avars returned to the Pannonian Plain after each campaign, the sedentary minded Slavs remained, resulting in Slavic expansion into large parts of the Balkans. Today Slavic descendants solidly inhabit virtually all of the northwestern, central and southeastern regions of the Balkans, while within Macedonia, the Slavic portion of the population is estimated to be 66.6 percent Macedonian and 2.1 percent Serb.

The third and last principal group of inhabitants of the Balkans is the Turks. Although presently they numerically represent the smallest group at a little over one million, roughly 2 percent, they have played a role in shaping the history of the Balkans far beyond their numbers. On the southeastern perimeter of the Avar territory, an influential new state was formed with the arrival in 679 of the Bulgurs

along the lower Danube, who represented several Turkic tribes originating from the basin of the lower Volga River. The Bulgurs were able to exercise dominating influence over seven Slavic tribes already dwelling adjacent the Danube, and subsequent to military victories against the Byzantine Empire and the Avars, to establish in 681 the First Bulgarian Khanate. The Turkic Bulgurs gradually amalgamated with the more numerous Slavic population, and the conversion of the Turkic Bulgur ruling elite to Orthodox Christianity in the mid-ninth century facilitated the rapid and total ethnic assimilation. Within a hundred years of the Bulgarian conversion, most traces of their Turkic origins had dissipated, except for their name, and the Bulgarian Empire became a Slavic state. Moreover, the Ottoman Turks' five hundred year rule over most of the Balkans established numerous scattered enclaves of Turkish speaking peoples. Present day estimates are that approximately 4.0 percent of the Macedonian population is Turkish.

#### *Civilizational Definitions.*

Civilization is a complex culture shared by a network of ethnic groups spread over a large geographic area that demonstrate a shared sense of a distinctive and enduring collective identity based on a belief in common descent and on shared experiences, cultural traits and language. Every civilized society incorporates a number of constituent ethnic societies that are unified by a common religious belief, philosophy, or both. To understand the Balkans, one must comprehend the cultural forces that have functioned in the region, and historically, the Balkans have witnessed the interactions of three civilizations: Orthodox Eastern European, Western European, and Islamic.

Perhaps, the existence of two European civilizations sounds peculiar to some, yet when westerners speak of Europe in cultural terms they generally employ selected suppositions, founded upon either the historical, or economic, developmental phases that transpired in Western Europe. The historical developmental phases are typically referred to as the Dark Ages, the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Counter-Reformation, the Scientific Revolution, the Enlightenment, and the rise of modern liberal democracy, nationalism and the nation-state. Conversely, the economic developmental phases are characteristically the progression from slaveholding, through feudalism, and mercantilism, to the industrial revolution and market

capitalism. The Eastern European peoples' historical experiences do not coincide with the Western phases as their heritage is bound directly to the Byzantine Empire. The crucial divergence is that the eastern half of the Roman Empire never experienced a Dark Ages or Renaissance similar to that in the west, as they endured the decline and fall of the west by a thousand years and the society of the classical world never disappeared. The close affiliation of church and state in Byzantine society disallowed materialization of a Western style Reformation and Counter-Reformation, whereas the theocratic society imposed on the Byzantine Balkans by centuries of Ottoman Islamic rule hindered a secular Scientific Revolution or Enlightenment (Hupchick 2002).

The Eastern and Western European civilizations share in common important cultural traditions such as the classical Greco-Roman heritage, barbarian (non-Roman) ancestors and Christianity. The cultural variation inherent in Greco-Roman traditions, however, is what rationalizes their developing as two discrete civilized societies. The east promoted the classical Greek propensities for a mystical, ritualistic, idealist, and symbolic sense of reality, while the west accepted the Roman penchant for a practical, legalistic, and pragmatic approach. Those distinctions were initially consigned in the forms of Christianity each developed: Orthodoxy in the east and Catholicism in the west. The Eastern and Western European civilizations are oft likened to siblings where they share a basically similar genetic composition but diverge in character, while the Islamic civilization is their cultural cousin, sharing a good quantity of their Judeo-Christian and Hellenic traditions, but embracing crucially different Arabic and Mesopotamian characteristics. Islam regards itself as the divinely ordained corrective for deficiencies that crept into Judaism and Christianity.

When Emperor Diocletian divided the Roman Empire into two administrative halves to stabilize the imperial progression and to better defend the empire's widespread borders against foreign enemies, he did so along imperceptible lines marking and institutionalizing the human cultural divide in the northwestern corner of the Balkan Peninsula separating the Greek east and the Latin west. Historically, the cultural fault line dividing the Western and Eastern European civilizations in the Balkans runs from Transylvania in Romania, through Serbia's Vojvodina province, along the Slavonian border region separating Croatia and Serbia, including all of

Bosnia and Herzegovina, to the Dalmatian and Montenegrin border and to northern Albania along the Adriatic Sea. A second fault line separates the Eastern European and Islamic civilizations concurrent with the border of Turkey with Bulgaria and Greece (Hupchick and Cox 2001). The Islamic Ottoman conquest and five centuries of Ottoman rule additionally formed a wide-ranging arced belt penetrating northwestward through Bulgaria, northern Greece, Macedonia, Albania and Kosovo, eventually intersecting the East-West European fault line in Bosnia and Herzegovina and northern Albania. Consequently, the fault lines of the three Balkan civilizations all converge in Bosnia and Herzegovina and northern Albania, while numerous other states, such as Bulgaria, Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia and Romania, all straddle the fault lines of two civilizations. Today approximately 64 percent of the Balkan inhabitants are Orthodox Christians, constituting clear majorities in the populations of Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia, Romania, and Serbia and Montenegro, while in Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina they represent the largest religious minority. Conversely, the largest religious minority in Bulgaria, Greece Macedonia and Serbia is Islamic. Within Macedonia specifically, 67 percent of the population is Orthodox while 30 percent is Islamic.

Christianity is the seminal factor in identifying Europe (Curtis 1992; Hupchick and Cox 2001; Magocsi 1998). In fact, as regularly employed at present, the term Europe did not appear until the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries as prior to that time the traditional term was Christendom. Relatively late coming ethnic migrations to geographical Europe, such as the Bulgars, Czechs, Hungarians, Poles, and Russians were forced to choose between conversion to Christianity or risk possible annihilation. The borders of Europe became, and remain, synonymous with mainstream Christian culture. Within the Balkans, the historically seminal civilized culture is Orthodox European, and this fact, not ethnicity nor geography, is what definitively places the Balkans in Europe. However, being situated along the East European and Islamic fault lines has meant civilizational friction has been long-lived and frequent. Throughout history almost every region of the Balkans has served as a cultural flashpoint at least once, with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia proving the most recent. Within Macedonia and the Balkans, culture, civilization and religion are nearly synonymous.

### **3.3. Historical Aspects.**

In 168 B.C., Rome conquered the Macedonia of Philip II and Alexander the Great. The most significant legacy Rome brought to Macedonia and the Balkans was to separate the Byzantine and Roman spheres into the Eastern and Western Roman Empires, respectively, between 395 and 410 (Curtis 1992; Hupchick and Cox 2001; Magocsi 1998; Poulton 2000). This created a cultural chasm that would divide East from West, Eastern Orthodox from Roman Catholic, Latin speaking cultures from Greek speaking cultures, and placing Macedonia as a border region between the two. With the deposition in 476 of the last Roman Emperor in the west it was only the Byzantine half in the east that survived. In the early ninth century, though, the Macedonian region fell to the Bulgarian Empire, which reached its height of political influence during the reign of Emperor Samuil from 976-1014. Under Emperor Samuil, the First Bulgarian Empire expanded their territories from the Black Sea to the Adriatic, and transferred the capital southwestward to the religious and cultural center of Ohrid. In 1014, however, Basil II reclaimed the lands for the Byzantine Empire.

It was during this time, in the mid ninth century, when the Bulgarian Empire dispatched two Greek missionary brothers on a mission to convert the Moravians to Christianity, and thereby save them from Frank Suzerainty. These two brothers were Constantine and Methodios, later to be known as Saints Cyril and Methodios. Born in Thessaloniki, they were familiar with the Slavic dialect and developed a Slavic alphabet, which was recognized by the Pope for liturgical purposes and then utilized to teach Orthodox Christianity. Two of their disciples, Klement and Naum, were to continue the Orthodox Missions from Ohrid, where they established a center to train youths for the clergy, translate the entire Orthodox liturgical text and ultimately lay the foundation for the Slavic literary culture. It was also during this period when in 1054 the formerly unified European Christian Church was torn into the two halves of western Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox during the Great Schism. Although initially it was merely an ecclesiastical division marginally affecting the populations, that situation changed drastically during the Crusades.

In 1282 Milutin, the Serbian King took Skopje from Byzantium and by the end of the century had established hegemony over the majority of the Balkans. The apogee of the Serbian Empire came under Stefan Dusan, when in 1346 in Skopje, he

proclaimed himself Emperor of the Serbs, Greeks, Bulgarians and Albanians. Immediately after his death in 1355, the Serbian Empire began its descent until the Era of Ottoman domination.

#### *Era of Ottoman Domination.*

The term Ottoman is a Western corruption of the Turkish name of the original tribal leader Osman I. He governed the Seljuk principality closest to Byzantium and Europe in the northwest corner of Anatolia and engaged in unremitting battle against the Christians in an attempt to expand Islamic territories. Ottoman forces first entered Europe in 1345 and realized the Balkan Christian states had been weakened by decades of internecine wars. The gradual Ottoman conquest continued, and in 1389 at Kosovo Polje, they defeated the Serbs, which afforded total control of Macedonia and the Balkans. Ottoman domination was to continue in the Balkans until the first Balkan war of 1912.

The Ottoman Empire ruled Macedonia for five centuries, which resulted in the arrival of many Turkish speaking peoples, as well as Islam. Inevitably, there were many in the Balkans who adopted the religion of the new rulers, within Macedonia particularly the Albanians and small sections of the Slavic speaking people. In the Western sense, Islam is more than a religion as it encompasses a total way of life, a model for society, a culture and a civilization; in essence, it is the state (Hupchick 2002; Poulton 2000). The Ottomans were non-assimilative and multi-national as there was no differentiation by language or race. There was differentiation by religion, however. The requirement for high office in the empire was first to be a Muslim, and second to know the Ottoman language, which was a mixture of Turkish, Arabic and Persian, and reflected the importance in Islamic society of men of the sword, men of the pen and men of religion. While people of other religions, such as Christians and Jews, were tolerated, they were not seen as first class citizens. Whereas certain avenues of advancement were closed to non-Muslims, others like commerce were open since Islamic society tended to think of it with disregard. Additionally, non-Muslims were forbidden to carry arms, ride horses or enlist in the army.

The Ottoman state was an Islamic one, with the population divided by religious affiliation and based on separation of the groups through the institutional structure of

the millet system. As noted previously, all Muslims were officially recognized as equal first class citizens in the Muslim millet. As a result of Mehmed II's pertinent legislation in 1453, non-Muslims were organized into three separate millets, in order of priority to the state: the Orthodox Christians, headed by the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople; the Jews, headed by an elected representative of the Rabbinical Council in Istanbul; and the Armenian Christians, headed by the Armenian Patriarch of Istanbul, who also represented the empire's Roman Catholic subjects (Hupchick 2002). It should be noted, however, while the Jewish millet had a head and functioned well from 1453 on; it was not officially recognized until 1839 (Sugar 1996, 44). Within the millet, the leader had wide jurisdiction and was capable of determining the hierarchy, internal structure and educational system. The millet also permitted the subject Christian peoples to retain their separate identities and cultures rooted in their respective churches. More importantly, it allowed many of the Christian groups to retain a sense of a former glorious history of when they ruled a specific region, which with the national awakenings of the nineteenth century they once more claimed. Thus, the national awakenings, which came with the first crumbling of the Ottoman Empire, were to reach their zenith in the Balkans and in the struggle for Macedonia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

### *The Macedonian Question*

The six decades following the end of the Napoleonic era, and the Congress of Vienna in 1815, were marked by three significant developments in the Balkans: the genesis of nationalist movements and the creation of independent states; intervention in the region by Europe's Great Powers, particularly Austria, Russia, Great Britain and France; and attempted internal reform within the Ottoman Empire. As the Western European concept of nationalism expanded into the Balkan region, each nationalist group structured their internal agendas in support of territorial expansion at the expense of the contracting Ottoman Empire, often in direct competition with other nationalist factions. The Ottomans, cognizant of the fact that the proliferation of nationalism presaged catastrophe for the empire, made efforts at reform to stabilize their situation and adapt to Western pressures. However, both the nationalist movements and Ottoman reforms became pawns in the imperialist

policies of the European Great Powers, of which control of the Balkan Peninsula performed a strategically essential function (Hupchick 2002).

Serbia was the first to achieve successful political change by transforming a local uprising begun in 1804 in the Belgrade region into a nationalist movement in 1815. In 1829, as part of the Russo-Turkish Treaty of Edirne (Adrianople), Serbia was declared an autonomous Ottoman province. Greece was even more successful than the Serbs, with the Greek nationalist push for independence commencing in 1821, sparked by Alexander Ypsilantis and the Philike Hetairia (Society of Friends). In 1830, the London Protocol declared Greece an independent monarchical state under the protection of Great Britain, Russia and France (Jelavich 1997).

The rise in Bulgarian national consciousness was later to start and more gradual to propagate. Originating in 1835 when the first modern Bulgarian secular school was founded, the Bulgarian quest for autonomy would not be achieved until 1878. Its struggle for independence, however, would have significant repercussions for the future as a result of the question regarding the Bulgarian church. Until now, under the Ottoman millet system the Orthodox Christians were subordinate to the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople, who was furthermore responsible for the Orthodox Christian education system as well as the language of that system. As such, the language of education for all Orthodox was Greek. Once Greece gained its independence, however, the divide between the Ottomans and the Greeks expanded, thereby creating the opportunity for the Bulgarians to pressure the Ottomans to establish a Bulgarian school. The academic curricula within the newly founded secular school consisted mostly of Western European publications in translation, and by the mid-nineteenth century a large Bulgarian populace was committed to a nationalist agenda targeted towards both political independence from the Ottomans and religious independence from the Greeks. In 1860, Bulgarian Merchants announced that Bulgarians would no longer recognize the Greek Patriarchate and demanded the creation of a separate Bulgarian Orthodox church. After a decade-long bitter struggle, and political pressure from Russian Ambassador Nicholas Ignatiev, Ottoman Sultan Abdualaziz instituted in 1870 the reform measure of recognizing an independent Bulgarian church. The church was to be headed by an Exarch in Istanbul, with jurisdiction over large tracts of Bulgaria, Thrace, and Macedonia, and the ability to acquire further territory if two thirds of the inhabitants

voted in favor (Hupchick and Cox 2001). One of the first acts of the Exarch was to establish Bulgarian Orthodox Bishoprics in Skopje and Ohrid. Although the new Bulgarian church was subordinate to the secular leadership of the nationalists, its residual cultural influence assured that adherence to a particular rite was central to defining one's national identity. To this day, Greek, Serbian, and Bulgarian nationalists insist that it is only possible to claim membership of the nation if one adheres to the Orthodox rite. The establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate prepared the ground for one of the most intractable nationalist disputes in Balkan history, the Macedonian question (Glenny 2002, 116).

The Treaty of San Stefano, which ended the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, was the genesis of the Macedonian question (Barker 1999; Glenny 1996; Hupchick and Cox 2001; Magosci 1998; Williams 2000), although it would dominate nationalist political affairs in the Balkans through the end of the Balkan Wars in 1913, and beyond. As Russian forces were finally in sight of Istanbul itself and it seemed only a matter of time until Russia would finally realize its dream of acquiring the Ottoman capital and access to the Mediterranean, the British dispatched a fleet to the Bosphorous Straits with orders to intervene should Istanbul appear doomed. Deciding not to fight Great Britain for the city, the Russians halted and negotiated bilaterally with the Ottomans the Treaty of San Stefano on 3 March 1878. The treaty's terms redrew the Balkan borders by granting Serbia, Montenegro and Romania full independence, but the most significant provision was for the creation of large Bulgarian state, including nearly all of Macedonia and the central Balkans. This new state, now the largest and potentially the strongest in the region, was designed to be under Russian control with the Russian Army in occupation for two years. Not only were the other Balkan states dismayed with this settlement, but the European Great Powers, particularly Great Britain and Austria-Hungary, found it impossible to accept. After a period of fervent political negotiation, Russia agreed to submit the treaty to revision by the Great Powers at a congress to be held in Berlin.

Even prior to the initiation of the congress the Balkan states found themselves in a vulnerable state of affairs. The decisions that would affect the Balkan states were being made in Berlin, Vienna, London, and St. Petersburg by their patron Great Powers. Even Russia, who realized the Great Powers were united in their opposition of Russian dominance in the eastern Balkans, could only hope to retain as much of

its gains as possible. The Ottomans went to Berlin merely to observe. After intense negotiation, on 13 July 1878 the Congress' dictate was made public, abrogating the agreements made at San Stefano. Most of the non-Bulgarian provisions were upheld, with Serbia, Montenegro and Romania retaining independence, Russia maintaining its acquisition of Bessarabia, Romania gaining its slice of Dobrudzha, and Greece not being referenced but watching Cyprus being granted to Great Britain. To the consternation of Serbia and Montenegro, Austria-Hungary was permitted to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina and station troops in the neighboring Sanjak of Novi Pazar, an Ottoman province separating Serbia from Montenegro. It was the Bulgarian stipulations of San Stefano, which had necessitated the Congress of Berlin in the first place, that underwent drastic modification. The large Bulgarian state, which had roughly corresponded to the territory of the Bulgarian Exarchate established in 1870, was dismantled and carved into four sections in order to deprive Russia of its strategic advantages. Bulgaria proper, an area north of the Balkan Mountains, but including Sofia was established as a Bulgarian Tributary Principality. Eastern Rumelia, the area south of the Balkan Mountains was to be a semi-autonomous province under a Christian governor. Western Thrace was returned to direct Ottoman control, thereby denying Bulgarian access to the Aegean Sea, and the entire region of Macedonia was likewise returned to direct Ottoman control. The final outcome of the Congress of Berlin was the single most important agreement for the Balkan states during the nineteenth century (Jelavich 1997), allowing the nationalist ambitions of all Balkan Peoples in the decades afterwards to collide violently, with the Western imposed terms serving as the fundamental driving force in the peninsula's subsequent divisive events. From this point forward the Balkans were dominated by the Macedonian question, a conflict between Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria over possession of the Macedonian territories, of which all of the young states had aspirations that were denied by the Congress of Berlin.

Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria all were of the opinion they had been wronged by the Congress of Berlin, and scholars and politicians from each country began to develop and foster nationalistic claims that Macedonia "rightfully" belonged to their respective country. Whether based on ethnic, religious or historical claims, none of the countries were content with the status quo, and all sought territorial expansion into Macedonia for three primary reasons: it would enlarge the state and incorporate

more nationals within it; the acquisition of the Vardar and Struma valleys, and the railroads through them, would have great economic advantages; and whoever controlled Macedonia would be the strongest power on the peninsula. The last two decades of the nineteenth century saw political maneuvering from each country to better their position and claims. Much of this political manipulation was through the organization of competing national societies such as the Bulgarian Cyril and Methodius Society, the Serb Society of St. Sava, and the Greek Ethnike Hetairia. In 1893, the extremist organization known as the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization was formed (VMRO), whose primary objective was to overthrow Ottoman rule and establish an autonomous Macedonia. Its main rival became the Macedonian Supreme Committee, also known as the External Organization, whose principal aim was the Bulgarian annexation of Macedonia. Macedonia became a region of sabotage, terrorist tactics and uprisings conducted by these two organizations, as well as by Greek and Serbian infiltrators. Such revolutionary measures culminated with the VMRO organized Ilinden uprising of 2 August 1903, which seized the vilayet of Monastir and established the Krushevo Republic that lasted for about 10 days before Ottoman forces responded to quell the uprising<sup>2</sup>. In 1908, Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina outright, which Bulgaria used as political cover to unilaterally declare its independence. By 1912, all the protagonists in the struggle for Macedonia realized that before any nationalist solutions could be realized, Ottoman presence had to be eradicated. Consequently Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia, along with prodding from Russia, put aside their antagonisms long enough to form the Balkan League as an anti-Ottoman alliance aimed at expelling the Ottomans from Europe and resulting in the Balkan Wars.

### *Twentieth Century Balkans*

Prior to the onset of the First Balkan War, several separate alliances of mutual defense were signed. All contained secret clauses regarding the distribution of any future spoils of war with respect to the Macedonian lands. Bulgaria and Serbia had

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<sup>2</sup> A "vilayet" refers to one of the chief administrative divisions or provinces of the Ottoman Empire, formerly termed "eyalet", and comprised of subdivisions designated as a "Sanjak". *Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354-1804*. Peter F. Sugar. 1996. London, UK: University of Washington Press. Pgs 41-42.

an agreement, as did Bulgaria and Greece, and Serbia and Bulgaria together had a separate agreement with Montenegro. On 8 October 1912, Montenegro commenced hostilities against the Ottoman Empire, soon to be joined by her allies. The Serbs and Bulgarians advanced from the north while the Greeks advanced from the south, all attempting to seize their perceived prized possessions in the region. By April of 1913, the Balkan League had pushed the Ottomans almost completely out of Europe and held the lands from the Adriatic to near Istanbul. Again, the Great Powers intervened and imposed the Treaty of London on 30 May 1913. Both Austria-Hungary and Italy were determined to prevent Serbia from gaining a port on the Adriatic, and consequently declared an independent Albania to accomplish this purpose. Greece and Serbia, thwarted in their plans to annex the western Balkan territories, demanded compensation elsewhere and received it in Macedonia, at the expense of the Bulgarians. The Treaty of London proved unsatisfactory to all the Balkan states, but especially to Bulgaria, which felt it deserved Macedonia. Consequently on 29 June 1913, the Second Balkan War commenced when Bulgaria attacked Greek and Serbian positions. Montenegro, Romania, and the Ottomans rapidly joined Serbia and Greece in an anti-Bulgarian alliance and crushed Bulgaria within a month. The Treaty of Bucharest concluded the Second Balkan War on 10 August 1913, and settled the division of Albanian and Macedonian lands. The Ottomans received eastern Thrace; Greece received southern Macedonia and the Epirus region, and retained western Thrace; Serbia received northern Macedonia; and Bulgaria received only a small section of Macedonia in the Struma valley. Additionally, the borders of independent Albania were demarcated, which left many Albanians in Western Macedonia and Kosovo outside the new state. The Treaty of Bucharest is of great significance for the Balkan states since, with minor adjustments, the borders set at this time have remained fixed until today (Jelavich 1997).

During World War I, Greece and Serbia supported the Western Allies, while Bulgaria supported the Central Powers. By the time World War I was in its last months the idea of an independent South Slav state was promulgated, which called for: a union of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in one nation with a single democratic, constitutional parliamentary system; and equal recognition of the Latin and Cyrillic alphabets, the three national names and flags, and the predominant religions. On 1

December 1918, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was declared an independent state, which included Macedonia, but referred to as South Serbia. Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria all embarked at this time on nationalization missions to purge their countries of minorities through forced assimilation, and Macedonia, still consisting of a medley of ethnic groups underwent repressive “Serbianization” policies. In January 1929, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was formally renamed Yugoslavia (Land of the South Slavs) and increasingly became a Serb dominated state, which caused friction among the other nationalities. During World War II when the Bulgarians moved in to control the region, most of the Slavs in Macedonia welcomed the Bulgarians as liberators after the oppressive years of Serbian rule, however this too was short lived. Throughout World War II Yugoslavia remained an area of intense guerilla operations, and by the end of the war, the Partisans under Josef Broz Tito had become the dominant force, as well as recognized by the Allies. At the close of World War II Yugoslavia was restored, but in the political vision of its wartime hero and Communist leader Marshal Tito.

Marshal Tito advocated Macedonia as an integral component of the post-war Yugoslavia, and the second congress of the Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ), held at Jajce on 29 November 1943, granted Macedonia equal status to that of the other five entities: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Then, on 2 August 1944, the anniversary of the Ilinden uprising, Tito organized the first Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation of Macedonia (ASNOM) at the St. Pchinski monastery, which affirmed that Macedonia was a federal state within the Yugoslav Federation. On 7 March 1945, a single provisional Yugoslav government took office with Tito as prime minister and war minister, and on 29 November 1945 the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was established. The constitution of the new Yugoslavia called for a federation of six republics under a strong central government. In effect, Tito had created separate republics in Macedonia and Montenegro, and the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo in an effort to prevent Serb domination of the new state (Glenny 1996; 1998; Williams 2000).

Tito’s recognition of the Macedonian nationality and creation of a separate republic within the Yugoslav federation served to set apart Macedonians from Bulgarians and Serbs, which was a fundamental tenet of his Yugoslav nation

building program. As such, Tito encouraged Macedonia to develop a separate national identity, and within Macedonia the new authorities quickly set about consolidating their position. The new Macedonian literary language was based on a central Vardar dialect from the Bitola-Veles region so as to remove it linguistically as far as possible from Bulgarian and Serbian. A separate Macedonian Cyrillic alphabet and orthography was devised to differentiate it from Bulgarian, and “Bulgarianisms” were replaced by folk substitutes. Led by Skopje linguist Blaze Koneski, and given international recognition in 1952 by Harvard Slavic Professor Horace Lunt, the new Macedonian literary language provided sufficient ethnic validity for national identity development (Hupchick 2002, 430). Bulgarians and others opposed to the existence of a separate Macedonian language, however, are swift to highlight that the new Macedonian language shares nearly all the same distinct characteristics which separates Bulgarian from other Slavic languages: lack of cases, the post-positivist definite article, replacement of the infinitive form, and preservation of the simple verbal forms for the past and imperfect tenses.

In addition to a new language, the new republic also needed to commission new history textbooks for utilization in the educational system, as well as assert their religious culture. The history books drew strong criticism from Bulgaria as many of the Macedonian historical heroes, such as Emperor Samuil, Dame Gruev and Gotse Delchev, are similarly claimed by Bulgaria (Poulton 1991, 49; 2000, 118). Meanwhile, the Serbs resisted the establishment of the autocephalous Macedonian Orthodox Church and revival in 1958 of the ancient archdiocese of Ohrid. That all of these events occurred or had a historical basis is certain, but that they were solely belonging to a Macedonian nation is still being debated today. However, the extent to which Tito succeeded in developing a separate Macedonian national identity would be tested during the breakup of Yugoslavia.

The dissolution of Yugoslavia has been well documented and is continuing to produce a steady stream of books, all advancing contending explanations for the wars of secession that followed. The multiplicity of such potential contentions are: Serb Aggression and President Slobodan Milosevic were causal elements, “ancient hatreds” unleashed by the lifting of social rule were the root cause, war was brought on by a rise in ethnic nationalism, destabilization was caused due to the Great Powers attempting to reestablish their post-Cold War Balkan influence, and that

competing claims for self-determination within an artificially constructed federation were the ultimate cause. Regardless, in March and April of 1990, Slovenia and Croatia held their first multiparty elections in nearly fifty years. During early 1991, Macedonia's new president, Kiro Gligorov, and the president of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic, made concerted efforts to find a solution to the crisis within a decentralized and reorganized Yugoslav federation. However, Gligorov and Izetbegovic made it unambiguous that if Slovenia and Croatia decided to renounce the federation, Macedonia and Bosnia would do the same, as they held the opinion that independence was preferable to remaining within a rump Yugoslavia, dominated by Serbia. On 25 June 1991, Slovenia and Croatia simultaneously declared their independence from Yugoslavia, and on 8 September of the same year, a referendum for independence was held in Macedonia. Of the 72 percent of eligible voters who went to the polls, 99 percent of those voted for independence. It should be noted, however, that ethnic Albanians and Serbs boycotted the referendum.

On 17 September 1991, the Macedonian National Assembly adopted a declaration of independence; on the 17th of November, a new constitution was accepted; and on 19 December, the National Assembly delivered a declaration calling for recognition. However, despite the recommendation of the European Community's (EC) Badinter Commission in January 1992 that Macedonia be recognized by EC member states, Greek opposition caused an initial rejection. Greek opposition was based on a political dispute over Macedonia's proposed name, constitution and flag, stating they indicated irredentist ambitions. To alleviate Greek concerns, Macedonia amended its constitution on 6 January 1992, and was finally admitted into the United Nations as its 181st member on 8 April, albeit under the provisional name of the "former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" in light of Greek objections.

Figure 3.1 imparts a timeline of the key events in Macedonian history from antiquity to their formal acceptance into the community of United Nations.

**Figure 3.1:** Chronology of Key Historical Events in Macedonia<sup>3</sup>.

Date(s)	Event
359-336 B.C.	Ancient Kingdom of Macedonia ruled by Philip II.
336-323 B.C.	Ancient Macedonian Empire ruled by Alexander III (Alexander the Great).
168 B.C.	Rome conquers Macedonia.
395	Establishment of East and West Roman Empires.
610-641	East Roman Empire becomes Greek Monarchy under Heraclius I, henceforth referred to as Byzantine Empire.
846-852	First Bulgarian Empire gains control of Macedonia, under Khan Malamir-Presyan.
863	Cyril and Methodius appointed by Boris I to spread Orthodoxy.
886	Clement and Naum establish Orthodox mission in Ohrid.
1014	Byzantine Empire reclaims lands when Basil II defeats Emperor Samuil.
1054	Unified European Christian Church torn into the two halves of western Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox during the Great Schism.
1282	Milutin, the Serbian King takes Skopje from Byzantium.
1346	Apogee of Serbian Empire. Stefan Dusan proclaims himself Emperor of the Serbs, Greeks, Bulgarians and Albanians.
1389	Ottomans defeat Serbs at Kosovo Polje, and assume total control of the Balkans.
1870	Establishment of Bulgarian Exarchate, with bishoprics in Skopje and Ohrid.
1878	Treaty of San Stefano and Congress of Berlin.
1893	Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization formed (VMRO).
1895	Macedonian Supreme Committee (AKA External Organization) formed in Sofia.
1903	Ilinden Uprising established the Krushevo Republic.
1908	Young Turk Revolution.
1912-1913	First Balkan War and Treaty of London; Ottoman Empire pushed from Europe.
1913	Second Balkan War and Treaty of Bucharest; Macedonia divided between victors.
1914-1918	First World War.
1918	Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes declared an independent state.
1929	Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes renamed Yugoslavia (Land of the South Slavs).
1941	German occupation of Yugoslavia; Bulgaria annexes most of Macedonia.
1943	Anti-Axis Partisan warfare begins in Macedonia, controlled by Tito.
1944	ASNOM affirms Macedonia is a federal state within the Yugoslav Federation.
1945	Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is established.
1948	Break between Tito and Cominform.
1990	Multi-party elections held in Macedonia.
1991 – Jan	Kiro Gligorav elected President.
1991 – Jun 25	Slovenia and Croatia simultaneously declare their independence.
1991 – Sep 8	Referendum held in favor of Macedonian independence.
1991 – Sep 17	Macedonian National Assembly adopts declaration of independence.
1991 – Nov 17	New Macedonian Constitution accepted.
1991 – Dec 19	National Assembly delivers declaration calling for recognition.
1992 – Apr 8	Macedonia admitted into the United Nations as its 181st member under the provisional name of the “former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”.

<sup>3</sup> Source: Compiled from Dennis P. Hupchick and Harold E. Cox. 2001. *The Palgrave Concise Historical Atlas of The Balkans*. Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Publishers Ltd; Paul R. Magocsi. 1998. *Historical Atlas of East Central Europe*. London, UK: University of Washington Press; and James Pettifer. 1999. *The New Macedonian Question*. London, UK: MacMillan Press Ltd.

Figure 3.2 is presented as a synopsis of the key historical chronology as related to the establishment of the Balkan national states.

**Figure 3.2: Establishment of the Balkan National States<sup>4</sup>.**

Country	Nationalist Movement Initiated	Autonomy Achieved	Independence Achieved	Initial Form of Government	Current Form of Government
Greece	1821	1830 London Protocol	1830 London Protocol	Constitutional Monarchy	Parliamentary Democracy
Serbia	1804	1829 Treaty of Edirne	1878 Treaty of San Stefano	Constitutional Monarchy	Parliamentary Democracy
Bulgaria	1835	1878 Treaty of San Stefano	1908 Declaration of Tsar Ferdinand I	Constitutional Principality	Parliamentary Democracy
Albania	1878	1913 Treaty of London	1913 Treaty of Bucharest	Constitutional Principality	Parliamentary Democracy
Macedonia	1903	1991 National Referendum	1991 National Referendum	Parliamentary Democracy	Parliamentary Democracy

Via an amalgamation of the facts contained within these two figures, an historical foundation is constructed upon which contemporary consequence can be evaluated.

### 3.4. Contemporary Aspects.

In one sense, Macedonia throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century was no different from its four contiguous neighboring regions: Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria, and Albania, in that all these peoples were struggling to extricate themselves from Ottoman rule. Nevertheless, there were two distinctive dissimilarities. Firstly, within Macedonia, there was basically no homogeneous population consisting of a dominant group from which a new state could be formed. There was a majority in the cultural sense of the existence of more peoples of Slavonic origin than of any other group, but only within a complex mélange of Turks, Greeks, Albanians, Vlachs

<sup>4</sup> Source: Compiled from Charles and Barbara Jelavich. 1997. *The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804-1920*. London, UK: The University of Washington Press; Dennis P. Hupchick. 2002. *The Balkans: From Constantinople to Communism*. Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Publishers Ltd; Dennis P. Hupchick and Harold E. Cox. 2001. *The Palgrave Concise Historical Atlas of The Balkans*. Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Publishers Ltd; and Paul R. Magocsi. 1998. *Historical Atlas of East Central Europe*. London, UK: University of Washington Press.

and Gypsies existing in conjunction with the Slavonic majority; moreover, that majority was itself subdivided between Serbian, Bulgarian and Macedonian elements (Pettifer 1999, 16). Secondly, while Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria, and Albania all had historical and geographical claims to the Macedonian lands, they also had a European Great Power who, for diverse political incentives, sought to promote their Balkan ally's case and champion their cause. The majority of these convictions has not altered over time and remains justifiable in the present day; consequently Macedonia declared independence wedged between four regional neighbors with their own claims upon the identical land and people, thereby perpetuating the fear of the "four wolves". To ethnic Macedonian nationalists, 8 September 1991 was the culmination of their quest for a sovereign state, however within the Balkan Peninsula, it served to rekindle the flames that surrounded the old Macedonian Question, and bring it to the forefront once again. As a result, Macedonia entered independence exposed to threats from her neighbors, and overshadowed by regional instability.

Historically, Bulgaria has been the country with the most unequivocal intentions on Macedonian Territory. Bulgaria was the first country to recognize Macedonia as an independent state, while simultaneously explicitly denying recognition of Macedonia as an independent nation (Roudometof 2000). From the time when the Treaty of San Stefano originally incorporated all Macedonian areas within the Bulgarian state, the Bulgarian belief has been that Macedonia and all Macedonians are rightfully Bulgarian. Likewise, there cannot exist any Macedonian language as it is in reality Bulgarian. In line with this viewpoint, Bulgaria has consistently opposed the designation of medieval and contemporary historical figures as Macedonian.

In Serbia, Macedonia continued to be thought of as a Serb component. Ever since the Congress of Berlin, Serbians regarded Macedonia as South Serbia, and that it was only granted republic status by the creativity and good graces of Tito. In other words, from the Serbian perspective, Macedonia was an artificial state they themselves had created, and, consequently, the new Yugoslavia refused to ratify the border between Macedonia and Serbia. Another item of discontent between Serbia and Macedonia was that the Serbian Orthodox hierarchy had never recognized the existence of the Macedonian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. For that matter, no other Orthodox hierarchies had recognized the Macedonian Church either. Although

the Serbian Orthodox Church has begrudgingly accepted that buildings erected since 1967 are property of the Macedonian Church, it contends that any churches or monasteries dating from before that time are, in fact, property of the Serbian Church.

Greece responded to the Macedonian declaration of independence the most vehemently, and perhaps the most unexpectedly. In direct opposition to the Badinter Commission recommendation that Macedonia be recognized, Greece successfully pressed the EC to deny recognition, thereby blocking Macedonia's eligibility for International Monetary Fund loans or other aid. The grounds of Greek hostility to Macedonia's recognition were based upon opposition to the name and representative symbols. At the heart of much of the Greek rhetoric was a view of ancient history as national patrimony that underpins rights to exclusive ownership of symbols and territory in the present (Brown 2000). The primary Greek objection was to the name Macedonia, which was also the name of the most northern Greek province, while the secondary objection related to the Star of Vergina as a symbol on the new Macedonian Flag. The Greek perspective was both the name Macedonia and the Star of Vergina were based on the history of Alexander the Great and the Kingdom of Macedonia, and since Alexander was considered to be Greek, so too was all related to his heritage. Furthermore, since these symbols of antiquity were of Greek heritage, any modern claims upon their ownership demonstrated irredentist claims upon Greek territories. This concern was further exacerbated by the Macedonian utilization of the White Tower, a Greek Landmark in Thessaloniki, on Macedonian currency, as well as a stipulation in the Macedonian constitution referring to the republic's concern with the situation and rights of Macedonian people residing in neighboring countries and émigrés from Macedonia.

Albania also raised concerns regarding the independence of Macedonia, particularly with regard to the large Albanian minority residing in northern and western Macedonia. One of the fears perpetuated by the media was the Albanian desire for a greater Albania encompassing Albania proper, western and northern Macedonia and the Serbian province of Kosovo, thus uniting all Albanians who were separated under the treaty of London in 1913. The Albanian dilemma, however, had more of a potentially explosive threat domestically. With more than a third of the Macedonian population being comprised of Albanians and demanding better rights; the country sharing its western border with the country of Albania, who has its own

stability challenges, and its northern border with the Serb province of Kosovo, who is an advocate of independence for itself; domestic ethnic stability was of paramount concern. Consequently, Macedonia gained its independence with four competing claims upon its people and land posing external threats, and a domestic ethnic dilemma that held the distinct possibility of internal violence at any moment. These circumstances were set amid the overall regional sense of instability, as conflict had already commenced between Serbia, and Slovenia and Croatia, with the distinct possibility of further conflict as the dissolution of Yugoslavia progressed.

The fundamental dogma of Macedonian historiography, explicitly, that there was an incessant survival of a self-conscious Slavic Macedonian entity since the settlement of the Slavs in the fifth through seventh centuries to the present day, is not historically supported. That Saints Cyril, Methodius, Clement and Naum, Emperor Samuil, Gotse Delchev, and every other historical figures originating from these lands prior to the nineteenth century possessed a conscious and purely Macedonian identity, is likewise not historically supported. The strength of the Macedonian position is predominantly founded on a corporeal political reality attested by all independent observers: at present the majority of the Macedonian population is resolutely convinced that it forms a Macedonian nation, and speaks a Macedonian language (Drezov 1999). Adjacent to this fact, the pronouncements of Greeks, Bulgarians and Serbs, that this self-recognition is somehow erroneous bear little credence, as self-recognition by definition means only what those people desire. In the nineteenth century, the Greeks changed their self-recognition and language from Romaika to Hellenika, asserting their ancient Greek legacy over the Byzantine period. The Rumanians changed their self-recognition to Romanian, and their alphabet from Cyrillic to Latin to assert a more explicit link with ancient Rome. Both nations attempted respective re-Hellenization and re-Latinization of their present nation based upon the past. Against this background, the Macedonians can hardly be considered an artificial nation, yet the reality of the contemporaneous Macedonian identity in no way makes it a reality in previous times. Despite all their differentiation, one element is mutual for all Balkan elucidations of the Macedonian identity, be they Greek, Bulgarian Serbian, or Macedonian: none of them concedes the significance of historical transformation.

This chapter was not intended to be an exclusively comprehensive historical essay, imparting all historical facts from the time of Philip II of Macedon until contemporary times. Indeed, library shelves are already filled with volumes on the subject. Instead, germane events and facts were culled out of the more than two millennia of history throughout the Balkan region in order to provide a foundation of knowledge from which impartial judgments could be made regarding conflictive claims and/or actions. For quite often, within the Balkans, history itself can be used as a tool of conflict when subjected to nationalistic interpretations.

## **Chapter 4: Phase I: Pre-Kosovo**

### **4.1. Introduction**

Macedonia is one of six former republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. During the supremacy of Josip Broz Tito, Macedonians were accorded the prominence of constituent nation, language, and culture equal to that of the other Yugoslav republics. In 1991 Macedonia became one of four former Yugoslav republics, joining Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, to declare its independence. Most notably, however, Macedonia was the only one of the four to achieve independence without bloodshed, violence, or even a shot being fired. Having obtained its independence, nevertheless, Macedonia faced various interstate and intrastate challenges.

Surmounting interstate challenges was obviously correlated to the preservation of independence and existence as a sovereign state. As alluded to in the previous chapter, Macedonia declared independence wedged between four regional neighbors with their own claims upon the identical land and people. Bulgaria was the first country to recognize Macedonia as an independent state, while concurrently and unequivocally denying recognition of an independent Macedonian language and nation. From the time when the Treaty of San Stefano originally incorporated all Macedonian areas within the Bulgarian state, the Bulgarian belief has been that Macedonia and all Macedonians are rightfully Bulgarian.

From the Serbian perspective, Macedonia has been regarded as South Serbia ever since the Congress of Berlin. Given that Macedonia was, in fact, an artificial state created by Tito, the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia refused to ratify the border between Macedonia and Serbia as it as well was considered artificial. Though the Macedonian leadership had offered the Yugoslav Army ample time to withdraw from the area, hostilities between Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina instilled a potent sense of trepidation among the Macedonian populace.

The primary Greek objection was based upon opposition to the name and representative symbols. The Greek point of view was both the name Macedonia and the Star of Vergina were based on the history of Alexander the Great and the Kingdom of Macedonia, and since Alexander was considered to be Greek, so too was all related to his heritage. Furthermore, since these symbols of antiquity were of

Greek heritage, any modern claims upon their ownership were demonstrative of irredentist claims upon Greek territories.

Albania also raised concerns regarding the independence of Macedonia, particularly with respect to the status and treatment of the large Albanian minority residing in northern and western Macedonia. One of the fears perpetuated by the media was the Albanian desire for a greater Albania encompassing Albania proper, western and northern Macedonia and the Serbian province of Kosovo, thus uniting all Albanians who were separated under the treaty of London in 1913. The Albanian dilemma, however, had more of a potentially explosive intrastate threat.

As a result, Macedonia entered independence exposed to interstate threats from her neighbors, and overshadowed by regional instability. In response, the initial foreign policy promulgated by President Gligorov was based on a principle of equidistance, where good and friendly relations were to be developed with all while precluding the development of a special relationship with any. Given Macedonia's geographic position in the southern Balkans, this task would require a tactful venture in harmonizing diplomacy.

From an intrastate perspective, three primary challenges confronted Macedonia: the need for democratic transformation, the socioeconomic situation, and interethnic tensions. Each of these challenges was interrelated in nature and fundamental to the construct of a functioning independent and sovereign state. Similarly, these intrastate challenges were interconnected to the aforementioned interstate challenges. In the long term, each challenge required resolution to ensure the country's future as a full fledged member of the Euro-Atlantic community.

### *Challenge of Democratic Transformation*

The Constitution, adopted on 17 November 1991, established a hybrid presidential-parliamentary political system, where legislative power was vested in a unicameral 120 seat "Sobranje" (National Assembly). Though the National Assembly can be dissolved by the government and early elections called, members of the National Assembly are directly elected for a four-year term. Currently, 85 members are elected in single seat districts and 35 members are elected by proportional representation. The president is the head of state and, per se, represents Macedonia in international affairs and is the Commander in Chief of the Armed

Forces. He is directly elected for a five-year term and is limited to two terms. The president has limited powers such as nomination of candidates and appointment of certain officials. The president may also veto legislation adopted by the National Assembly, but a two thirds majority can override the veto. Executive power is vested in a government composed of the prime minister and other cabinet ministers. Once a prime minister is nominated by the president, the government must be confirmed in an investiture vote by a majority of all members of the National Assembly. Likewise, the prime minister, individual ministers, or government in its entirety may be required to resign by a majority vote of no confidence of all members of the National Assembly.

One of the most discernible elements of the Macedonian political landscape is the division of political parties based on ethnic lines. Nearly every ethnic group organizes various corresponding political parties, while few, if any, people cross ethnic lines to become members of another political party. Consequently, most Macedonian political parties gave priority to ethnic interests, thereby providing impetus to nationalistic division. From 1946 until 1990, Macedonia, as a constituent republic of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, had a single party system authorizing only the Communist Party to form the government. In 1990, the one party system was abolished, thereby initiating a substantial increase in political parties (Georgieva and Konechni 1998, 192-193). Roughly 20 political parties were represented in the first multi-party elections in 1991, but only a small number managed to win parliamentary seats. By the time the second elections took place in 1994, there were over 60 political parties registered in Macedonia. With the abolition of the one party system, three primary political camps formed in Macedonia; the post-communists, ethnic Albanian nationalists and ethnic Macedonian nationalists (Sokalski 2003, 66-67).

The post-communists were split into the three main smaller parties of the Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia (SDAM), the Liberal Party (LP) and the Socialist Party (SP), although they would merge into the Alliance of Democratic Forces in Macedonia (SDSM) in 1994. This party advocated contemporary principles of social-democracy based on economic and social efficiency, and ethnic principles of European humanism, social justice and human dignity, with the aim being to transform Macedonia into a democratic and developed country.

Ethnic Albanian nationalists were divided chiefly into two smaller parties: the Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP) and the People's Democratic Party (NDP). The PDP started building its image by expressing a certain degree of mistrust for, and phobia against, the state and its institutions. Although the PDP is the largest party of Albanians in Macedonia, the importance of the NDP should not in the slightest be undervalued. The NDP is a purely national party almost solely concerned with political issues concerning ethnic Albanian's national demands and the status of Albanians in Macedonia as a constitutive people.

Ethnic Macedonian nationalists established themselves as the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE). With its ideological and political tenacity as a national party, VMRO-DPMNE resolved the most essential tasks of the party were defining the republic of Macedonia's international status; removing dangerous pro-Yugoslav, as well as communist, pockets in Macedonia; defining the status of relations with the Albanian minority; and consolidating the country's economy. The overarching goal of VMRO-DPMNE was the struggle to re-establish the pride and dignity of the Macedonian people and state.

In November and December of 1990 Macedonia held its first multi-party elections, where the outcome was: VMRO-DPMNE, 38 seats; SDAM, 31 seats; PDP/NDP, 23 seats; LP, 17 seats; SP, 4 seats; independent candidates, 3 seats; Party of Yugoslavs in Macedonia, 2 seats; coalition of LP/SP, 1 seat; and a coalition of LP/SP/ Young Democratic Progressive Party, 1 seat. (Georgieva and Konechni 1998, 192-193). Ironically, although VMRO-DPMNE won the election, it did not have a majority and could not form a coalition government with any other parties. Faced with parliamentary paralysis, President Gligorov convinced the people to accept a non-party parliament, coupled with a coalition cabinet of "experts" from the SDAM, PDP/NDP and LP Parties. Thus, a new group of young administrators emerged, most of who were in their 40s or 50s, were professors or lecturers at the University in Skopje, and were selected primarily for their academic merit and organizational skills. Among them were Branko Crvenkovski, the future prime minister; Ljubomir Frckovski, the future minister of foreign affairs and internal affairs; Jane Miliovski, future minister of finance and deputy prime minister; Vlado Popovski, future minister of defense and justice; Blagoj Handziski, future minister of defense and

foreign affairs, and Lazar Kitanoski, future minister of defense and member of parliament (Sokalski 2003, 66-67). Each of these individuals contributed in their own manner to the government and growth of the newly independent Macedonia.

For many other young officials the concrete action of governing afforded on the job training resulting in both political successes and failures. Additionally, the fragmented and ethnically divided political parties created rivalries and political polarization. Unfortunately, this political setting, coupled with Balkan culture, created an environment where adopting positions largely for the sake of contradicting or embarrassing their opponents often took precedence over adopting positions in the interests of democratic and/or economic progress. Thus depicts the intrastate challenge of democratic transformation for Macedonia at the time of independence and shortly thereafter.

### *Socioeconomic Challenge*

As the poorest republic in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Macedonia faced economic obstacles from the moment of independence. Industry in its entirety was inefficient, unprofitable and badly structured (Koller 2001, 30). Low levels of technology predominated, such as: oil refining by distillation only; production of basic fuels; mining and manufacturing processes resulting in the extraction and production of coal as well as metallic chromium, lead, zinc, and ferro-nickel; and light industry producing basic textiles, wood products, and tobacco. Agriculture provided 12 percent of Macedonia's Gross Domestic Product and met the basic need for food. Principal crops were rice, tobacco, wheat, corn, and millet; also grown were cotton, sesame, mulberry leaves, citrus fruit, and vegetables. Interestingly enough, Macedonia was, and still is, one of the seven legal cultivators of the opium poppy for the world pharmaceutical industry, including some exports to Europe and the United States. Agricultural production, however, was highly labor intensive, and the land was fatigued from uncontrolled cultivation of the soil and erosion. As the economy depended on outside sources for all of its oil, gas, modern machinery and parts; raw materials and spare parts constituted the largest segment of imports. In 1990 Macedonia contributed less than 6 percent of the gross social product of Yugoslavia, while it comprised 9 percent of the

population and 10 percent of the territory of Yugoslavia (Reuter 1999, 38-39). Per capita income in 1990 was assessed at 2,200 US dollars.

Macedonia had to endure several of the same tribulations as other East European countries going through the transition from a centrally-planned to a market economy, and from a socialist/communist to an open democratic political system. Unique to Macedonia, however, was that the enterprise sector operated according to the Yugoslav system of "market socialism", in which the productive sector was dominated by large firms in heavy industries, many of which were integrated with firms located in other Yugoslav republics. These large, state-owned, loss-making enterprises had to not only be privatized, but additionally had to become independent of the Yugoslav federated system. Moreover, as a newly independent country, Macedonia had to face the supplementary difficulty of having to create institutions to perform national functions previously undertaken by the federal government in Belgrade, such as: foreign affairs, defense, treasury, customs, central banking, etc.

Macedonia's economy was further restricted by its geographical location. As a result of the mountainous terrain to the east and west, the natural trade routes were to the north and south. Primary port access was in Thessaloniki, Greece, and the predominance of economic trade was conducted with Greece, Bulgaria, Albania, and the other republics within Yugoslavia; which accounted for 60 percent of its markets prior to its dissolution, and which also served as a conduit to other East, Central and West European markets. Economic viability would require ties be enlarged or reformed with its neighbors: Serbia, Albania, Greece, and Bulgaria; however, continued interstate threats and political turmoil, both internally and in the region as a whole, prevented any prompt readjustments of trade patterns. Furthermore, Macedonia's geographical isolation, technological backwardness, and political instability placed it far down the list of countries of interest to Western investors.

Macedonia would have to struggle with economic transition in a particularly hostile environment. The country would have to deal with the effects of compliance with the United Nations-mandated sanctions against Serbia, and difficulties in relations with Greece would culminate in imposition of a trade embargo in February 1994. The Greek embargo would block access to the port of Thessaloniki, and Greek markets, that had provided an important route for imports and exports to and from third country markets. Recognition of Macedonia by the European Community

would be delayed by Greek political opposition, thereby hindering the establishment of normal relations with the World Bank and International Monetary fund until late spring of 1993. Consequently, the process of transition of the Macedonian economy began with a 2-3 year delay behind most other transitioning countries of Eastern Europe.

These events threatened the economic stability of the country and exacerbated the tensions associated with the economic and political changes engendered in the move to independence. Dealing with ethnic tensions in a region rife with ethnic conflicts would only serve to complicate further the situation. As a result, the intrastate political and economic transition and development of the newly independent Macedonia were integrally connected, and both subject to the interstate instability and threats to the country.

### *Interethnic Challenge*

The interethnic dilemma also posed an intrastate challenge to the newly independent Macedonia. The populace of Macedonia is primarily divided between an ethnic Macedonian majority and an ethnic Albanian minority, where the ethnic Albanian minority is predominantly concentrated in the northwest region of the country. In the communities of Tetovo and Gostivar the ethnic Albanians constitute an absolute majority, in Kicevo and Debar a relative majority, and in Kumanovo and Struga a strong minority (Reuter 1999, 35). In addition, there is a sizeable share of Skopje, which is heavily Albanian. Consequently, these communities compose a compact and joined section of the country that borders Albania to the west and Kosovo to the north.

According to a 1991 census, of the total population of 2,033,964, ethnic Macedonians comprised 1,328,187, or 67 percent; and ethnic Albanians included 441,987, or 21.7 percent. In a subsequent census conducted in 1994, of the total population of 1,936,877, ethnic Macedonians consisted of 1,288,330, or 66.5 percent; whereas ethnic Albanians were represented by 442,914, or 22.9 percent of the population. The disparity in total population figures is accounted for by the altered criteria of the census. In the 1991 census, citizens living or working overseas for more than one year were counted, while only citizens living abroad for less than

one year were accounted for in the 1994 census (Johnstone 2001). However, these censuses proved to be the source of added debate and divergence.

In the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, a regular census was customarily held in the first year of each decade. Accordingly, from April 1st through the 15th, of 1991, a census was conducted amid circumstances of imminent political dissolution. Prior to compilation and release of the data, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia declared independence; and war had broken out in Croatia and Bosnia. As a result, the census was executed in an atmosphere of insecurity, suspicion and acrimony. Ethnic Albanians boycotted the census; on the pretext they would be deliberately undercounted, thus obliging the census officials to establish estimates of the Albanian population on the basis of previous polls and other scientific statistical parameters.

Albanian political leaders complained this census, which they had deliberately boycotted, did them an injustice in that ethnic Albanians really accounted for up to 40% of the population. Germany, historically a guardian of Albanian national interests in the Balkans, and particularly in opposition to the Serbs, supported these complaints. Out of sensitivity to Albanian claims, Ambassador Geert-Hinrich Ahrens, head of the Working Group for Human Rights and Minorities within the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia, called for an unanticipated census to be held in Macedonia under supervision of the "international community." Thus, in 1994 a second census was conducted and paid for essentially by the European Union on Macedonian territory; an unusual intervention in the internal affairs of a recently "independent" state.

Prior to the conduct of the 1994 census there was prolonged debate over the wording of the census law; predominantly regarding the issue of language and the fact that article 35 of the census law provided for bilingual forms in Albanian, Turkish, Romani, Vlah, and Serbian in addition to Macedonian (Friedman 1996, 92). Those chosen to oversee the census were selected by European organizations and were officially referred to as the "Group of Experts"; however, their fields of expertise were not inclusive of erudition relevant to Macedonia specifically nor the Balkans regionally. Just as the census was to commence, there was a serious threat of Albanian members of parliament calling for a boycott of the census based on these irregularities. Thus, while the "Group of Experts" was convinced they were

merely conducting an objective mechanical and statistical exercise, they were in fact immersed in the center of an intrastate political issue. In sum, while the 1994 census was a statistical success it was a political failure; whereas it served to legitimate the basic statistics of the 1991 census, it did nothing to resolve the political issues leading up to the conduct of the census. Aside from the political debate regarding the exact percentage of the ethnic Albanian minority in Macedonia, there were other principal areas of grievance from the ethnic Albanian community. These areas of grievance could be classified as constitutional status and cultural, representational and educational rights.

The issue of constitutional status is thoroughly allied to the political debate regarding the number of ethnic Albanians in Macedonia, and is focused on the Albanian demand for recognition as a constituent nation. The constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia defined the Republic of Macedonia as “the national state of the Macedonian people, and the state of the Albanian and Turkish nationalities in it, based on the sovereignty of the people”. The constitution further acknowledged members of other groups who lived in the republic enjoyed legal equality and had the same rights and obligations as Macedonians, Albanians and Turks (Burg 1996, 34). Hence, while Macedonia was defined as both a national, or ethnic, state, and a civic one, the Yugoslav era constitutional distinction between nations (Macedonian) and nationalities (Albanians and Turks) related to an obvious disparity in political status.

Subsequent to independence, the preamble of the Macedonian constitution defined the state as the “national state of the Macedonian people” based on “historical, cultural, spiritual and statehood heritage of the Macedonian people and their struggle over centuries for national and social freedom, as well as for the creation of their own state”. As well, the constitution grants “full equality as citizens and permanent coexistence with the Macedonian people” to Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, Romanians and other nationalities, in that order. The prime ethnic Albanian accusation was this distinction between nation and nationality preserved the separation maintained under the Yugoslav era by signifying inferior political status of the second faction. As a result, ethnic Albanians boycotted the referendum on independence in 1991 and held their own referendum on territorial autonomy on January 11 and 12 of 1992, where 74 percent favored autonomy. The Macedonian

slant of this referendum, aside from its declared illegality, was an unambiguous indication from ethnic Albanians of their lack of a developed sense of identity with the Macedonian state and their disinclination to coexist in a collective state. The Albanian discernment of this issue was they wanted to express sincere opposition to their status as recognized in the constitution and demand to be recognized as a constituent nation within the newly independent Republic of Macedonia.

Cultural rights were in addition a foremost distress of ethnic Albanians. Article 7 of the constitution delineated Macedonian as the official state language, although mitigated by the proviso that nationalities may utilize their own language as an official language in local affairs where they constitute a majority or a considerable number of the inhabitants. Articles 8 and 48 of the constitution established the freedom to express one's national identity as well as the right to establish institutions through which to do so. Ethnic Albanians saw this as insufficient and demanded the officially recognized right to use the Albanian language freely, as well as an increase in utilization of Albanian in broadcast programs on the Macedonian national television channel. As with the demand for recognition as a constituent nation, the cultural rights issue represented an Albanian desire for equal status within the republic between Macedonians and Albanians.

Representational rights were perceived as a contentious point as ethnic Albanians sought greater representation in the government, armed forces and police. In 1991 ethnic Albanians comprised only three percent of police officers, three percent of state employees, and seven percent of military personnel. Ethnic Macedonians were swift to highlight that since 1990 four to five ethnic Albanians had been appointed to cabinet positions; and not only had formation of Albanian political parties been allowable, but they had furthermore been included in the ruling government. This area of ethnic disagreement served as a political field of debate and confrontation prior to, throughout, and subsequent to independence.

Educational rights issues were closely linked to the issues of cultural and representational rights in that the right to primary and secondary education in one's own language is also granted by Articles 8 and 48 of the constitution. However, while primary and secondary education was available in Albanian, university education was obtainable only in Macedonian. Article 9 of the constitution stipulated that higher education was to be carried out in Macedonian, though classes

may be conducted in the languages of nationalities in the departments of elementary and secondary educational pedagogy, at teachers colleges and in certain other subjects in order to preserve and develop cultural and national identity (Burg 1996, 63-64). While ethnic Macedonians considered this a concessional act in accordance with articles 8 and 48, ethnic Albanians judged this law an exceedingly restrictive action that failed to address their demands for university level education in the Albanian language. The ethnic Albanian University of Pristina, in Kosovo, had provided a major source of higher education for ethnic Albanians in Macedonia; however, Serbian authorities closed the university in 1990, which significantly increased the demand for an Albanian university within Macedonia.

The issue of Kosovo serves to network ethnic Albanian minority grievances in opposition to the government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, commencing before Macedonian independence, to protest endeavors critical of the Macedonian government following sovereignty. Autonomist agitation among Kosovar ethnic Albanians has been prominent since 1968, when moderate demands were first voiced for the granting of republic status for Kosovo and the establishment of an Albanian language university. The more radical demands, however, were for secession from Yugoslavia and union with Albania. Large scale demonstrations erupted in Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro, resulting in the opening of the ethnic Albanian University of Pristina; and Kosovo being declared an autonomous region, albeit still part of Serbia, responsible only to the federal government.

As a result of the early 1970s devolution of power to the republics and provinces within federal Yugoslavia, a fundamentally ethnic Albanian leadership emerged in Kosovo, thereby producing an ethnodemographic regional shift from ethnically varied to primarily Albanian. Within the now predominantly ethnic Albanian province, the University of Pristina served as the engine of Albanian nationalism, facilitated by mounting discontent with the social and economic underdevelopment of the province. One must bear in mind that until 1991, and the independence of Macedonia, the border between Kosovo and Macedonia was merely an administrative line affording unrestricted travel between the two regions. Therefore, the majority of Macedonia's educated Albanians attended the University of Pristina, as opposed to attending University in Skopje, and was therefore connected with the intelligentsia of Kosovo (Perry 2000, 274).

With the death of Tito in 1980 ethnic Albanian nationalism increased in intensity, which led to a further sequence of nationalist demonstrations in 1981 seeking either republic status within the Yugoslav federation or outright unification with Albania. These protests were suppressed with a brusque demonstration of force, further alienating the ethnic Albanian population. During the 1980s, Serbian nationalism grew while ethnic Serbian and ethnic Albanian relations continued to deteriorate within Kosovo. In 1989 a series of constitutional amendments, followed by a new constitution in 1990, ultimately eliminated autonomy of the provinces within Yugoslavia. This prompted 115 ethnic Albanian members of the provincial parliament to declare independence for Kosovo; thereby provoking a rigorous rejoinder by Serbian authorities, who terminated the provincial parliament and government, closed the University of Pristina and increased political repression.

Within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Republic of Macedonia had long served as an escape mechanism for ethnic Albanians from Kosovo fleeing repression. Sizable quantities of Kosovar Albanians who have traversed Macedonia on their flight from political repression have remained to settle within Macedonia. Thus, the linkage of political, cultural, and nationalist convictions between ethnic Albanians from Kosovo and Macedonia is readily evident. Throughout this same interval, Macedonian national identity was emergent as well; fortified by a Yugoslav government that advocated Macedonian language, culture and nationality. What materialized during the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the ensuing Macedonian independence, was an increase in reciprocated aversion as ethnic Macedonians perceived an Albanian threat to their emerging sovereign state and ethnic Albanians feared again being second class citizens.

While ethnic Albanians in Macedonia at the time of independence endeavored to express their heartfelt opposition to their status as recognized in the constitution, and demanded to be recognized as a constituent nation within the newly independent Republic of Macedonia, ethnic Macedonians regarded the actions of ethnic Albanians as a clear indication of rejection of the will to develop a sense of identity with the Macedonian state and their disinclination to coexist in a collective state. The fragmented and ethnically divided political parties, and their rivalries, further intensified political polarization; which in turn deepened the reluctance of developed western nations to seek direct investment opportunities. The three primary intrastate



challenges confronting Macedonia at independence, the need for democratic transformation, the socioeconomic situation, and interethnic tensions, were interrelated in nature and fundamental to the construct of a functioning independent and sovereign state. Economic viability of the new nation required ties be enlarged or reformed with its neighbors Serbia, Albania, Greece, and Bulgaria; however, continued interstate threats and political turmoil, both internally and in the region as a whole, prevented any prompt readjustments of trade patterns. Concurrently, fears within the international community mounted regarding the possibility of interstate conflict such as had already occurred between Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia.

These events threatened the stability of the country and exacerbated the tensions associated with the economic and political changes engendered in the move to independence. Dealing with ethnic tensions in a region rife with ethnic conflicts would only serve to further complicate the situation. In sum, the intrastate ethnic, political and economic transition, and development of the newly independent Macedonia were integrally connected; and all were subject to the interstate threats to the country and overall regional instability.

#### **4.2. Initial Conflict Prevention Efforts**

When Macedonia declared independence, as a result of the referendum of 8 September of 1991, the most significant threat was that of an interstate nature. Conflict had already commenced as a consequence of the Slovenian and Croatian declarations of independence on 25 June 1991. Although the conflict in Slovenia was short-lived, the Croatian conflict was to become much more protracted. As the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) attempted to militarily avert dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation; the international community became involved attempting to halt the conflict, while additionally endeavoring to preclude its diffusion or escalation.

United Nations involvement in the situation began on 25 September of 1991 with approval of Security Council (SC) Resolution 713 (1991a), which immediately implemented a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia. On 23 November, Cyrus Vance, recently appointed as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for Yugoslavia, chaired a meeting in Geneva between the presidents of Croatia and

Serbia, the defense secretary of Yugoslavia and Lord Carrington, the European Community mediator, where an agreement was reached on an immediate cease-fire. Moreover, all factions implied solid support for a UN Peacekeeping force. On 27 November, Security Council Resolution 721 (1991b) endorsed the SRSG's statement that deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation could not be envisaged without, *inter alia*, full compliance by all parties with the agreement signed in Geneva; and undertook to examine recommendations for establishment of a UN peacekeeping operation. Then on 15 December, the Security Council stated in Resolution 724 (1991c) that while the conditions for establishing a peacekeeping operation still did not exist; they would endorse the Secretary-General's offer to send to Yugoslavia a small group of personnel, including military personnel, to carry forward preparations for possible deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation. Additionally, a UN Military Liaison Mission of 50 officers was dispatched to monitor the cease-fire. This Military Liaison Mission was subsequently increased in strength to a total of 75 officers on 7 February of 1992 by Security Council Resolution 740 (1992a). On 21 February, the Security Council, in Resolution 743 (1992b) decided to establish a United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Yugoslavia for an initial period of one year, and requested immediate deployment of those elements of the force that could assist in developing an implementation plan for the earliest possible full force deployment. The general mission of UNPROFOR was as an interim arrangement to create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis. Finally, on 7 April, with Resolution 749 (1992c) the Security Council decided to authorize the earliest possible full deployment of UNPROFOR. Whereas initial deployment of UNPROFOR was to three United Nations Protected Areas (UNPA) in Croatia (Eastern Slavonia, Western Slavonia and Krajina), there were to be three following expansions to the mandate in Croatia in 1992.

Following Bosnia and Herzegovina's declaration of independence, on 3 March 1992; Bosnian Serbs, supported by neighboring Serbia and Montenegro, responded with armed resistance and atrocious acts of ethnic cleansing aimed at partitioning the republic along ethnic lines and joining Serb-held areas to form a "greater Serbia". Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council imposed comprehensive sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and

Montenegro) on 30 May 1992, through Security Council Resolution 757 (1992c). The sanctions prohibited the import or export of all commodities or products originating in Serbia and Montenegro, the sale or supply of any commodities or products to any person or body in Serbia and Montenegro, and the denial of any financial or economic resources. Between the imposed sanctions and the turmoil caused by armed conflict, this situation was to have profound impact upon the Macedonian economy as the other republics within Yugoslavia accounted for 60 percent of its markets prior to dissolution, and also served as a conduit to other East, Central and West European markets.

On 8 June 1992, the Security Council, through Resolution 758 (1992d), decided to enlarge the mandate and strength of UNPROFOR to create the immediate and necessary conditions for unimpeded delivery of humanitarian supplies to Sarajevo, and other destinations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the establishment of a security zone encompassing Sarajevo and its airport. Additionally authorized was the deployment of military observers in Sarajevo to supervise the withdrawal of anti-aircraft weapons around the city. On 13 August the Security Council, distressed by the current circumstances in Sarajevo that restricted UNPROFOR's efforts to create these conditions, adopted Resolution 770 (1992e); calling on States to take nationally, or through regional agencies or arrangements, all measures necessary to facilitate, in coordination with the United Nations, the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and wherever needed in other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In supplementary deliberations, though, it was determined that task should be entrusted to UNPROFOR. As a result, the Secretary-General submitted a report to the Security Council on 10 September recommending the expansion of UNPROFOR's mandate and strength in Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to support efforts by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to deliver humanitarian relief throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina; and in particular to provide protection, at UNHCR's request, where and when UNHCR considered such protection necessary (United Nations 1996, 5). In addition, UNPROFOR could be used to protect convoys of released civilian detainees if the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) so requested and if the Force Commander agreed that the request was practicable. As a result, UNPROFOR would be deployed in four or five new zones. By means of resolution 776 (1992f), adopted on 14 September 1992, the

Security Council approved the Secretary-General's report and authorized the enlargement of UNPROFOR's mandate and strength in Bosnia and Herzegovina for these purposes. Furthermore, a separate Bosnia and Herzegovina Command was established within UNPROFOR to implement the resolution, thereby creating two separate commands under the overall command of UNPROFOR Headquarters in Zagreb. There were to be two more increases in the mandate and strength of UNPROFOR in Bosnia during 1992. Interestingly enough, in December of 1991, Bosnia's president, Alija Izetbegovic, had requested that UN peacekeepers be deployed to his country in a preventive function. This request, however, was denied by the UN on the basis that it was not customary procedure to deploy peacekeepers to an area prior to the instigation of hostilities (Ackermann 2000, 3).

While these events were occurring, the Macedonian government was enthusiastic about the UN mediation and establishment of UNPROFOR and publicly stated their support. However, within the international community disquiet was spreading concerning the possibility of Serbian intervention in Macedonia as well. When conflict erupted in Croatia, international warnings of similar actions in Bosnia and/or Macedonia became prevalent, and once armed conflict diffused to Bosnia these warnings expanded to a pervasive state for Macedonia. The situation was further exacerbated by the withdrawal of JNA forces from Macedonian soil. Although the peaceful withdrawal of JNA forces was a tribute to the diplomatic and political acumen of President Gligorov, Macedonia was now virtually defenseless as the JNA removed all heavy weaponry, aircraft and border-monitoring equipment, leaving the Macedonian Armed Forces (ARM) lightly armed and poorly equipped. In fact, the JNA executed such an extensive and rapid equipment withdrawal that holes in the cement were left where forklifts and cranes had been used to rip vehicle maintenance equipment from the floors. Once the JNA had withdrawn this military equipment, some was sent to support units fighting in Croatia and Bosnia; however, much was positioned in Kosovo just across the border from Macedonia. This fact lent further credence to the fears of a future Serbian incursion into Macedonia.

In light of these early warnings and fears, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), renamed the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) during the Budapest Summit of 5 to 6 December 1994, intensified their focus on the threats to Macedonia and the region. Owing to

the CSCE's evolving and increasing diligence on development as the primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management in the region; missions of long duration were deployed to Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina, in Serbia and Montenegro on 8 September 1992. The determination to establish a CSCE Monitoring Mission in Macedonia was taken in mid-1992 in the context of efforts to extend the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) to the neighboring countries of Serbia and Montenegro to help avoid the diffusion of conflict. The decision to specifically explore with authorities in Skopje the possibility of a mission under CSCE auspices was taken at the 15th Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) Meeting on 14 August 1992. Subsequently, the CSCE sent an assessment team to Macedonia from 10 to 14 September and formally approved deployment of the mission at the 16th CSO Meeting on 18 September 1992 (OSCE 2003). The initial mission, designated the "Spillover Monitoring Mission to Skopje" out of deference to Greek objections to the utilization of the term Macedonia, deployed on 22 September with a staff of four. The primary objectives of the Macedonian mission were to monitor developments along the borders of Macedonia with Serbia, and in other areas of the country, which may suffer from diffusion of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia; in order to promote respect for territorial integrity and the maintenance of peace and to help prevent possible conflict in the region (CSCE 1993). Specifically, the mandate of the Mission was to: engage in talks with governmental authorities; establish contacts with political parties and other organizations, and with ordinary citizens; conduct trips to assess the level of stability and the possibility of conflict; and if conflict should occur, establish facts to avoid further deterioration of the situation.

In view of his apprehension concerning interstate threats in general, possible diffusion of conflict from elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia in particular, and post-independence insufficiency of military capability; on 11 November 1992, President Gligorov conveyed to the Secretary-General a request for the deployment of United Nations observers in Macedonia. The aforesaid deployment was also recommended by Mr. Vance and Lord Owen, Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY). Thus, the Secretary-General (1992g), on 23 November, sent a letter to the president of the Security Council relaying President Gligorov's request. With Security Council (1992h)

approval, the Secretary-General dispatched to Skopje, from 28 November to 3 December, a fourteen member group of military, police and civilian personnel from UNPROFOR Headquarters in Zagreb to assess the situation and prepare a report appraising the utility of a possible larger deployment of UNPROFOR to Macedonia.

This exploratory group had three chief issues to examine: the comprehensive state of affairs leading to the request for UN presence; Macedonian authorities' overall goals for a UN presence; and the preferred timing of a deployment, if approved. The primary fear cited was of ethnic Albanian refugees from Kosovo fleeing into Macedonia, which coupled with Serbian territorial ambitions, would lead to an interstate Serbian attack on Macedonia. This would then have the propensity of drawing other regional states, such as Albania, Bulgaria, Turkey and Greece into the conflict. Two supplementary benefits of a UN deployed force on Macedonian soil, although not specifically stated, were enhancement of the legitimacy of the nation's sovereignty and independence, and an increase in the country's international diplomatic recognition (Williams 2000, 44).

On 9 December, the Secretary-General (1992i) submitted to the Council a report in which he recommended an expansion of the mandate and strength of UNPROFOR to establish a United Nations presence on Macedonia's 182 kilometer border with Albania and 240 kilometer border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). The Secretary-General recommended the enlargement of UNPROFOR comprise an estimated battalion of up to 700 troops, 35 military observers, 26 civilian police monitors, 10 civil affairs staff, 45 administrative staff and local interpreters. This contingent would operate under UNPROFOR's "Macedonia Command", with headquarters in Skopje, and subordinate to UNPROFOR Headquarters in Zagreb. He denoted that the force's mandate would be essentially preventive and consist of two foremost objectives. The first was "To monitor the border areas and report to the Secretary-General, through the Force Commander, any developments which could pose a threat to Macedonia". The second was "By its presence, to deter such threats from any source, as well as help prevent clashes that could otherwise occur between external elements and Macedonian forces, thus helping to strengthen security and confidence in Macedonia". The Security Council, by resolution 795 (1992) of 11 December, approved the Secretary-General's report and authorized establishment of

UNPROFOR's presence in Macedonia, additionally requiring notification of the governments of Albania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). A further critical component of Resolution 795 was the urging of the UNPROFOR presence in Macedonia to coordinate closely with the CSCE mission already established.

After approximately four decades of UN peacekeeping forces being utilized to divide rival factions of hostilities so as to prevent resumption of conflict, thus was authorized and deployed the first purely preventive UN peacekeeping force in history. Whereas traditional peacekeeping efforts were a result of international community failure to prevent conflict; the deployment of UNPROFOR to Macedonia represented a major shift regarding international policy, perspective and emphasis toward conflict prevention. As such, the UNPROFOR mission in Macedonia was on never before tread territory and would go through an evolutionary process of transformation as it executed its mandate. A critical element of conflict prevention efforts is to be receptive to the ever varying intrastate and interstate indicators of the situation, and flexible and proactive enough to adapt the mandate to those changing circumstances. In retrospect, the UN mission in Macedonia can be separated into three key operational segments (Sokalski 2003, 100). The first segment, from December 1992 to March 1994, was as a subordinate command of UNPROFOR; the second segment, from April 1994 to March 1995, was marked by the broadening of the political mandate; and the third segment, from April 1995 to February 1999, was as a separate and independent mission. Each segment of the overall mission was to be a progressive shift from the last.

The principal justification for authorization of UNPROFOR deployment was primarily from an interstate focus as a result of the overt threat to Macedonia from adjacent states, and exacerbated by regional instability. However, from an intrastate perspective, the three primary challenges that confronted Macedonia: the need for democratic transformation, the socioeconomic situation, and interethnic tensions; were interrelated in nature and fundamental to the construct of a functioning independent and sovereign state. Similarly, these intrastate challenges were interconnected with the aforementioned interstate threat. As fears within the international community mounted regarding the possibility of interstate conflict, such as had already occurred between Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia, so too did intrastate ethnic fears mount within Macedonia regarding the future functioning of

the country as a result of interstate actions. Likewise, various interstate threats were subject to increase as a result of intrastate ethnic tension. Overall, the intrastate ethnic, political and economic transition, and development of the newly independent Macedonia were integrally connected; and all were subject to interstate threats to the country and overall regional instability.

#### **4.3. UNPROFOR: December 1992 to March 1994**

Owing to the gravity of the situation in Macedonia, the ensuing deployment of UNPROFOR was expeditious. Within a few days after the approval of Resolution 795, two civil affairs officers, a senior military observer, and a senior administrative official had arrived as an advance party to coordinate the further deployment of UNPROFOR forces. On 15 December 1992, the UN formally requested Sweden to contribute troops to the mission. Surprisingly, favorable responses were received from not only Sweden, but Norway, Finland, and Denmark as well. Sweden, Norway and Finland offered to provide the necessary personnel to form a joint Nordic Battalion, to become known as NORDBAT; and Denmark, who already had troops serving under UNPROFOR in Zagreb, proposed supplying troops for the headquarters staff. In the interim, Canada, with forces already deployed to Bosnia, decided to volunteer a company on a temporary basis to provide time for NORDBAT to deploy in full. The Canadian troops arrived on 7 January 1993, established their headquarters at Kumanovo, and set up five observation posts along the Serbian and Macedonian border. On 25 January 1993, Brigadier General Saermark-Thomsen assumed command of UNPROFOR forces in Macedonia. The Nordic Battalion, comprising 434 soldiers and organized into three rifle companies, received their equipment in Skopje from 11 to 15 February and were declared operational on 19 February 1993; whereupon the Canadian company redeployed back to Sarajevo. Also on 19 February, the Security Council adopted Resolution 807 (1993a), which extended the mandate of UNPROFOR for an interim period until 30 March 1993.

NORDBAT quickly established themselves within the area of operation. The headquarters element, Camp Arctic Circle, was established in Cojlja, about 18 kilometers east of Skopje; the Finnish company was based in Tetovo; the Swedish company in Kumanovo; and the Norwegian company in Djorce Petrov, just outside

of Skopje (Williams 2000, 51). The area of responsibility encompassed from Debar, on the western border with Albania, northward to the Albanian border with Serbia; and then eastward along the entire northern border with Serbia to the Bulgarian border. This was an expansive distance to cover for one battalion, not to mention the logistical difficulties of supplying the dispersed observation posts. In February, NORDBAT had established 10 permanent observation posts, in addition to 13 temporary posts; and had 18 permanent observation posts operational by May of 1993. In addition to NORDBAT operations, 19 military observers were positioned along the northern border, headquartered in Skopje; and along the western border, south of Debar, and based in Ohrid. The 24 Civilian Police Monitors (CIVPOL) were dispersed and headquartered similarly to the latter.

During this time, the mandate of UNPROFOR was extended on 30 March by Security Council Resolution 815 (1993b) for another interim period terminating 30 June 1993. A major political development came on 7 April 1993, when the Security Council finally recommended to the General Assembly, through Resolution 817 (1993c), that Macedonia be admitted to membership in the United Nations; albeit it with the provisional name "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" based on Greek objections. Whether the presence of a United Nations deployed force actually enhanced the legitimacy of the nation's sovereignty and increased in the country's international diplomatic recognition to the point where it facilitated UN membership cannot be determined precisely, but it certainly did not hinder the process. Finally, a further key event in this period was the Security Council strengthening of sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro through Resolution 820 (1993d) on 17 April 1993. The most critical aspect of this resolution for Macedonia was to prohibit the transport of all commodities and products across the land borders of the FRY. While this measure was targeted toward limiting the escalation of conflict in Croatia and Bosnia, the effect upon Macedonia would be devastating as the primary economic trade route was now blocked. Moreover, through informal arrangements between the UN, the CSCE and the EC, it had been agreed that UNPROFOR would monitor traffic at selected road and railway crossings on the Macedonia and Serbia border; a task with which UNPROFOR was not comfortable.

By this time NORDBAT was up to full strength, in accordance with the UNPROFOR mandate, and effectively executing its mission. Consequently, an

increase in the size of the force had not been considered. Regardless, on 10 June 1993, US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, announced the United States would offer a reinforced company of 300 soldiers to augment the UNPROFOR force in Macedonia. The announcement was made during a NATO foreign ministers conference in Athens, amid discussions of the possible further diffusion of conflict in the former Yugoslavia, and cited both the symbolic and tangible significance of the offer. While UNPROFOR headquarters in Macedonia felt the current NORDBAT contingent was adequate, the Macedonian government was stoutly in preference of US troops joining the mission. The Serbian government, on the other hand, was equally in opposition to the prospect. On 16 June, the Secretary-General (1993e) notified the Security Council of the US offer, and on 18 June 1993, the Security Council implemented Resolution 842 (1993f) expanding the size of UNPROFOR accordingly and authorizing the deployment of US personnel. Whereas the first US troops of the advance party arrived on 18 June, the main body did not land until 7 through 12 July 1993. As the United States transported their troops and equipment from Germany to Skopje via heavy C-141 and C-5 aircraft, public interest within Macedonia peaked, particularly since the size of these aircraft required most arrivals to occur at night when normal Skopje airport operations were at a minimum. Consequently, UNPROFOR headquarters in Skopje issued regular press reports regarding the incoming flights. This function served to generate goodwill in the form of open communication, as well as to publicly announce the newly added troops were deploying with credible force. The US forces, named Task Force Able Sentry, set up their headquarters at Petrovec Airport, just outside Skopje, and assumed the mission of observing and reporting along the Macedonian and Serbian border thereby allowing NORDBAT to concentrate on the Macedonian borders between Kosovo and Albania.

Occurring also on 18 June, the Security Council adopted Resolution 845 (1993g), which urged Macedonia and Greece to continue their cooperation, under the auspices of the Secretary-General, with the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia to arrive at a speedy settlement of their differences. As it stood at the time, the two countries had made little progress in coming to any mutual agreement regarding the name of the new Macedonian state, or anything else.

On 30 June, the Security Council extended the mandate of UNPROFOR, when Resolution 847 (1993h) was adopted, for an additional interim period terminating on 30 September 1993. On 20 September 1993, the Secretary-General recommended the Security Council extend the mandate of UNPROFOR for a period of six months. The Secretary-General also stated that should UNPROFOR's mandate be extended, he would give "favorable consideration" to a suggestion by the President of Croatia that the Force be separated into three distinctive components: UNPROFOR Croatia, UNPROFOR Bosnia and Herzegovina, and UNPROFOR Macedonia; while retaining its integrated military, logistical and administrative structure under the command of one SRSB and one theatre Force Commander. In the interim, the Security Council was informed by the Croatian Government, on 24 September, that if the mandate of UNPROFOR was not amended to promote energetic implementation of the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, Croatia would be forced to request UNPROFOR leave the country not later than 30 November 1993 (United Nations 1996, 16). Two interim extensions of UNPROFOR's mandate ensued; one for a 24-hour period on 30 September, through Security Council Resolution 869 (1993i); and the other for an additional four days on 1 October, through Security Council resolution 870 (1993j). Finally, on 4 October 1993, after intensive consultations the Security Council, by its resolution 871 (1993k), extended the mandate of the Force for a period of six months, through 31 March 1994. Resolution 871 also officially noted the Secretary-General's intent to establish three subordinate commands within UNPROFOR, while retaining the existing dispositions in all other respects for the direction and conduct of the United Nations operation in the former Yugoslavia.

On the economic front, Macedonia was feeling the effects of sanctions against the FRY. Although UNPROFOR forces had no mandate to stop and search vehicles transiting the border, their task to observe and report revealed substantial traffic, which indicated massive sanctions violations. Smuggling had become a lucrative proposition given the county's high unemployment rate and economic downturn. Smuggling often occurred off the roadways as well, since the mountainous terrain and porous border facilitated smuggling via foot and donkey. The Macedonian government had always maintained that in order to strictly enforce the UN sanctions the international community would need to provide economic assistance to the state.

In light of the negligible economic assistance provided, Macedonian authorities implicitly condoned violations of the sanctions as a matter of economic and political survival. As a result, the Macedonian government came under pressure from the international community to tighten their control of sanctions violations. President Gligorov, on 30 September, took the opportunity of Macedonia's first participation as a member of the UN, in the General Assembly's Annual Session, to address that forum regarding the effects of UN sanctions against the FRY upon Macedonia. Gligorov explicated that Macedonian compliance with the UN sanctions solely in that year had reduced its gross national product by 50 percent, which had severe repercussions upon democratic and economic development. He went on to elaborate on the possibility of increased social tensions, exacerbated by a weak or collapsed economy, leading to an intrastate crisis in the region. Finally, in his summation he officially requested international community economic assistance under Article 50 of the UN Charter. In spite of repetitive statements from the Secretary-general supporting and seeking economic assistance, the international community was never to overwhelmingly rally to this cause.

Greece vehemently opposed Macedonian membership to the UN, and attempted to block it, but only succeeded in Macedonian membership being approved under the provisional name. Also in early 1993, Macedonia succeeded in gaining membership in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) under their provisional name. On 16 December 1993, despite Greek protests, Denmark, Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy and the Netherlands formally recognized Macedonia and established full diplomatic relations; followed by the United States, Russia and Australia in early 1994. Faced with these changes in the diplomatic field, on 17 February 1994, the Greek government imposed a strict new trade embargo banning the movement of goods between Greece and Macedonia, in either direction, except for food, medicine and humanitarian assistance. The embargo was imposed on Greek claims that adoption of the Greek name "Macedonia" for the state, the Greek symbol of the Star of Vergina for its flag, and certain articles in its constitution were indicative of irredentist designs against Greece. Consequently, for the embargo to cease, the flag and certain articles of its constitution had to be modified; whereas the name issue could be determined in later negotiations. The embargo immediately reduced Macedonia's export earnings by 85 percent, while food supplies were dropped by 40

percent (Roudometof 1996, 260). The Greek embargo against Macedonia elicited strong criticism from the press and the international community at large, and the European Commission unsuccessfully challenged the embargo's legitimacy in the European Court. The end result, however, was that now Macedonia had an effective economic blockade on both its northern and southern borders, its two primary trade routes.

In a report submitted to the Security Council on 16 March 1994, the Secretary-General recommended renewal of UNPROFOR's mandate for a supplementary 12 months beyond 31 March 1994. The report contained the outcome of a thorough review of the role and functioning of UNPROFOR. At the same time, the conflict in Croatia and Bosnia was continuing to escalate. On 31 March 1994, the Security Council, through Resolution 908 (1994a), extended the mandate of UNPROFOR for an additional six-month period terminating on 30 September 1994 and decided, as an initial step, to increase UNPROFOR's strength by 3,500 troops. Then on 27 April 1994, by adopting Resolution 914 (1994b), the Security Council authorized an increase in the strength of UNPROFOR of up to 6,550 additional troops, 150 military observers and 275 civilian police monitors, in addition to the reinforcement already approved in Resolution 908. It should be noted, however, that none of these strength increases were targeted toward UNPROFOR in Macedonia. On 22 April 1994, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) authorized the use of air strikes against Bosnian Serb military targets around Gorazde if the Bosnian Serbs did not end their attacks against the safe area immediately, pull their forces back three kilometers from the city, and allow United Nations forces and humanitarian relief convoys freedom of movement.

In that same 16 March 1994 report, the Secretary-General stated that although the military situation in Macedonia remained relatively calm and stable, there had been an increase in the frequency of contact between patrols from the FRY and Macedonia along their common border. UNPROFOR successfully arbitrated numerous tense border encounters, achieving the withdrawal of military elements from both sides. During these events, as was typically the case, UNPROFOR maintained close coordination with other international bodies, including the ICFY and the CSCE.

The Secretary-General also observed that the most serious difficulties experienced by Macedonia were economic. Social stability had become threatened by increasing unemployment and a declining economy; predominantly as a result of effects of the economic blockade imposed by Greece and of the United Nations sanctions against the FRY, formerly Macedonia's two most important trading partners. Internal political tensions between Macedonians and ethnic Albanians had intensified as well. On 31 March 1994, in light of the complexities of the nexus of interstate and intrastate factors as a causative agent for economic and political uncertainty, and rising social tensions; the Security Council, in Resolution 908 (1994a), encouraged the Secretary-General's Special Representative, in cooperation with the authorities of Macedonia, to use his good offices as appropriate to contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability in that Republic. This was to be a critical event for the overall mission of UNPROFOR in Macedonia with respect to a broadened mandate and implementation of that mandate, as well as for the evolution of conflict prevention efforts in the country.

From the establishment of UNPROFOR on 11 December 1992, to the approval of the SRSB to utilize his good offices in March 1994, the primary mission of UNPROFOR was to monitor the border and report any developments that could pose a threat to the country; and deter, by their presence, such threats or clashes between Macedonian and external forces. As such, the focus of the mission was predominantly of an interstate nature, and primarily targeted toward the triggering and proximate sources of conflict. Granted, the international community was aware of intrastate tensions, as evidenced by UN insistence of inclusion of United Nations Military Observer (UNMO) and CIVPOL personnel. However, it was through the reports of these UNMO and CIVPOL personnel that the severity of the intrastate threat was identified and brought to the attention of the UN and the international community.

These reports further succeeded in identifying the complexities of the nexus of interstate and intrastate factors as a causative agent for economic and political uncertainty, and rising social tensions. Thus, in an adaptive and evolutionary step the utilization of the good offices of the SRSB was approved and implemented. One must bear in mind the UNPROFOR mission in Macedonia was the first purely preventive UN peacekeeping force in history, and a major departure from traditional

UN peacekeeping operations where conflict had already commenced. Consequently, there was no available precedent set as for how to implement and proceed with a preventive mission such as UNPROFOR in Macedonia. Initially deployed to prevent the diffusion of interstate conflict to the newly independent Macedonia, it soon became evident that although UNPROFOR was successfully executing their mission in this regard, there existed a simultaneous threat of diffusion and/or contagion of intrastate conflict across borders that was not being addressed by UNPROFOR forces. This intrastate threat posed both the possibility of diffusion from Kosovo, as well as contagion from Kosovo, Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia.

The identification of the necessity of an intrastate mandate to compliment the interstate mandate, and approval of the SRSG to utilize his good offices, were to adjust the mandate so as to include structural sources of conflict. By incorporating the structural sources of conflict within the mandate already addressing the triggering and proximate sources of conflict, international community conflict prevention efforts were to expand and integrate the degree of multifaceted and multilevel action, thereby creating synergy of intervention. This willful transition on the part of the international community signifies the genesis and true essence of a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity in conflict prevention efforts.

#### **4.4. The Broadened Political Mandate: April 1994 to March 1995**

While the decision of Security Council Resolution 908 (1994a) to encourage the SRSG, in cooperation with the authorities of Macedonia, to use his good offices as appropriate to contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability in that Republic was to become an integral component of the overall mandate, the initial reaction from the Macedonian government was not enthusiastic. In fact, it was viewed as a mechanism of interference into the internal affairs of the state. However, the government acquiesced by considering it a minor irritating component of the overarching mission that provided the desired interstate security and political legitimization. The Albanian ethnic minority, on the other hand, welcomed the good offices mandate as a vehicle to broker their desire for greater equality within the state.

Officially, the term “good offices’ represents an instrument of peaceful settlement of disputes between states, or other parties, whereby a third party tries to bring the

conflicting parties into an agreement (Sokalski 2003, 102). In practicality, though, good offices is an informal and freely structured mechanism that is largely dependent on the creativity of the individual attempting to apply the measure. The specific verbiage contained in Resolution 908 was shrewdly composed so as to specify both a quantity of freedom and an extent of restriction. Where the phrase “as appropriate” lent the freedom of interpretation for the SRSG to determine the most germane application of good offices, the phrase “in cooperation with the authorities of Macedonia” held the SRSG to the reality that coordination and consent of the host government was paramount. This latter fact assisted the Macedonian authorities in later coming to accept and better understand the good offices addition to the mandate.

The SRSG had an immense task before him, as by March of 1994 the total strength of UNPROFOR consisted of 30,655 military personnel and 3,328 civilian personnel (Williams 2000,112). As such, the SRSG decided to delegate the authority of the good offices mandate to Hugo Anson, and deploy him to Skopje. Anson, with experience from previous UN peacekeeping missions, and with the World Trade Organization, determined the good offices mandate should be applied in a proactive, but guarded manner. One of the prime factors in Anson’s determination was his belief the UN should not approach the Macedonian intrastate situation as an “ethnic tinderbox” as that approach could, in fact, become a self-fulfilling prophecy. In this regard, the good offices mandate would seek to encourage the government and major political parties to search for centrist political solutions to intrastate problems; make specific proposals to increase international assistance; and provide a conduit to the local and international media regarding the political and economic situation, and the efforts of the UN in that regard. From April 1994 to March 1995, the good offices mandate was to involve UNPROFOR in two key proceedings in Macedonia: monitoring the 1994 presidential and parliamentary elections, and interceding in the University of Tetovo crisis.

On 8 September 1994, the speaker of the National Assembly, Stojan Andov, announced the first and second rounds of parliamentary and presidential elections would occur on 16 and 30 October. These elections were to be the first held since independence. Immediately, the opposition party contested the elections being held on the first possible constitutional date as a means by the ruling government to limit

the time available for the opposition party to effectively organize and campaign. As the numerous political parties maneuvered for position and engaged in mergers and alliances, the election campaign's intensity and animosity mounted. Early on, VMRO-DPMNE commenced a campaign based on nationalism and the threat to the Macedonian nation from Albanian extremists typified by the campaign slogan of "Macedonia is for Macedonians". In order to calm emotions, create an overall better political climate, and attempt to remove ethnicity from the campaigns; Hugo Anson enjoined all Macedonian political parties to sign a declaration committing the party leaders to ensuring the elections were free, fair and in the spirit of interethnic cooperation. The declaration was ultimately signed by 12 political parties, including two of the five major parties (SDSM and LP), but was noticeably not signed by VMRO-DPMNE and PDP. The declaration was an important and creative initiative that served to exemplify UNPROFOR's willingness to contribute, demonstrated what type of actions could be incorporated within the good offices mandate, and tested the consistency and gravity of some of the major political subjects that had surfaced during the campaign.

The PDP, the largest ethnic Albanian party, had supported the declaration, but chose not to sign it for ancillary reasons. During the coordination of the declaration, the PDP was considering boycotting the elections on the grounds the Macedonian government was excluding 145 thousand ethnic Albanians from voting as they were not legal citizens. Anson held a number of meetings with the government and ethnic Albanian leaders, as well as coordinating with the CSCE and ICFY, and in the end achieved an agreement. The government determined that ethnic Albanians, who had the right to citizenship, but lacked official documentation, would be permitted to vote and, consequently, the PDP withdrew its threat to boycott three days prior to the first round elections. The intervention on the part of Anson in this regard functioned as another ingenious and opportune utilization of the good offices mandate, which resulted in an important political agreement.

In the first round of elections, the popular Kiro Gligorov was easily elected to another term as president; however, only ten members of parliament were elected by a majority. In response, the two main opposition parties alleged the first round elections were manipulated and thereby fraudulent, and VMRO-DPMNE, along with the Democratic Party, threatened to boycott the second round unless the irregularities

were corrected. Observers from the CSCE and Council of Europe, who monitored the first round, stated the election had generally been well conducted. As a result, the boycott took place and in the second round the ruling Alliance for Macedonia (SDSM) won the majority of parliamentary seats. At this point, the two opposition parties who boycotted the elections, and now found themselves excluded from the ruling government, attempted to engage the good offices mandate of UNPROFOR to act as a communications link between the current parliament and their parties. This, however, would prove a bridge to far, and would in effect operate to undermine the democratic process; hence UNPROFOR astutely avoided this potential pitfall.

The demand for an Albanian language university in Macedonia had increased after the closing of the University of Pristina in 1990, and was a major point of contention between ethnic Albanians and the government. From a group of Albanian academicians, a Council for the Foundation of an Albanian University was formed under the leadership of Fadil Sulejmani, Murtezani Ismaili, and Agni Dika; which declared on 4 June 1994 their intent to establish the University of Tetovo. The Council stated the primary rationale of the university was to provide training to teachers responsible for education in Albanian primary and secondary schools as the curriculum at the Pedagogical Faculty in Skopje was inadequate, not conducted in Albanian, and few ethnic Albanians were admitted. Moreover, the university in Tetovo was supported by all Albanian political parties and the Albanian press. While some of the support was sincerely grounded in the desire for greater educational opportunities in Albanian, at least an equal share of support was a result of the university being exploited as a political symbol of equality for the Albanian parties. On 25 October 1994, the Council tendered a formal application to the government for permission to establish the university within the framework of the state's educational system. Unfortunately, this application was submitted between the first and second rounds of elections and, consequently, did not constitute the immediate priority of the politicians. In November, the Ministry of Education finally responded and stated the University in Tetovo had no legal grounds. Sulejmani, a former professor at the University of Pristina was undeterred and publicly planned the opening of the university for 17 December 1994.

On 12 December, five days before the planned opening, the government declared the establishment of the University of Tetovo unconstitutional and illegal. While the

ethnic Albanian community cited several constitutional articles that provided for the right to education, the right to establish universities and the right to education in their native language; the government cited the law which restricted the establishment of universities to public organizations. The discrepancy was the Albanians were citing the new constitution, and the government was citing the 1985 Law on Professional Education that had not been changed since independence. The police raided the university on 14 December, confiscated documents, and sealed the doors. On 17 December, when the university organizers and students arrived to officially open the university they were prevented from entering by riot police. Unbeknownst to the government, however, the university organizers had held the actual opening ceremony secretly at the PDP building in Tetovo hours earlier. The Council continued to plan the initiation of classes, but on 31 January 1995, the Skopje District Court rejected the application for registration of the university. On 15 February, nonetheless, approximately two thousand ethnic Albanians held a rally to commemorate the commencement of official classes at the university. Finally, on 17 February 1995, police interceded to end the instruction that was occurring. In the ensuing violent confrontation one ethnic Albanian was killed and 28 people, including nine police officers, were wounded. Sulejmani was summarily arrested along with four of his counterparts.

Throughout the University of Tetovo incident, UNPROFOR was at a severe disadvantage as any statements supporting either side would be inflammatory. To lend support to the government would alienate the ethnic Albanian minority, and to give credence to the assertions of the ethnic Albanians would ostracize the current administration and all ethnic Macedonians. Ultimately, UNPROFOR chose to remain strictly neutral on the matter and act as an unbiased negotiator to the best of its ability. The official position of UNPROFOR on the matter was therefore explicated as acceding to the fact that ethnic minority groups held the equivalent entitlement to pursue better educational opportunities as did the ethnic majority, albeit to pursue these opportunities within the legal bounds of their obligation to the state. Additionally, UNPROFOR maintained any project that may possibly lead to separation as opposed to further integration was obviously in the best interests of neither ethnic group, nor the state as a whole. Again, Hugo Anson employed his good offices mandate and hosted a number of discussions between government

officials and ethnic Albanian leaders to urge compromise. A continual undertone evident in each and every one of Anson's meetings was to think of themselves first and foremost as citizens and only afterwards as members of an ethnic group (Williams 2000,124).

Shortly after the Tetovo incident, the SRSG from Zagreb, Yasushi Akashi, chose to visit Skopje. On 7 March 1995, Akashi met with President Gligorov, and various members of government; and emphasized the significance of resolving political and ethnic divergences through dialogue, tolerance, conciliation and moderation. The occurrence of the Tetovo incident indicated a manifest deterioration of ethnic relations in Macedonia, and increased suspicions of an impending larger ethnic confrontation within the country. Akashi's visit, almost immediately after the Tetovo incident, served as a figurative message of the UN's interest in a stable Macedonia; as well as an aide memoire that the Security Council had authorized the SRSG to use his good offices to contribute to the maintenance and stability of the state. The issue of an Albanian language university in Tetovo was not finished, however, for it would continue to act as a political point of disagreement in the future.

The utilization of the good offices mandate with regard to the crisis in Tetovo was a critical measure that was at least partially responsible for regulating the extent of intrastate ethnic conflict at that time. Without the appendage of the good offices mandate to the overall UNPROFOR mandate in Macedonia, this event could have easily erupted into a more violent and self-destructive affair for the new republic. If that had occurred, UNPROFOR personnel in country, whose previous mandate limited them to focusing on external threats only, would have been precluded from reacting or assisting. Consequently, while the military forces of UNPROFOR monitored the borders for interstate aggression, the good offices mandate allowed engagement to stave off an intrastate conflict. As previously indicated, if violent intrastate ethnic conflict were allowed to ignite within Macedonia, there existed a fervent risk of conflict diffusion across state borders and escalation into interstate conflict. Therefore, the UN treatment of the Tetovo crisis represents a concurrent and conjoined implementation of conflict prevention efforts exemplifying a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity.

While the presidential and parliamentary elections were occurring and the Tetovo scenario was unfolding, additional events continued to transpire with respect to the overall UNPROFOR mandate and the country as a whole. On 17 September 1994, the Secretary-General submitted a report to the Security Council pursuant to Resolution 908 (1994c); which highlighted recent developments in the area that affected the environment in which UNPROFOR, the largest peacekeeping mission in the history of the UN, had to operate. Of particular note was the increase in frequency of encounters between patrols of the FRY and Macedonia along their common border. Although the majority had been non-confrontational, the incidence of these encounters was expected to recur with increasing frequency based upon the continued non-recognition of the border by the FRY. Due to the threat to stability arising from this unresolved border issue, the Secretary-General recommended the establishment of an international border commission.

The most serious difficulties encountered by Macedonia, however, were economic. The Secretary-General asserted in his report that social stability had been endangered by rising unemployment and a declining economy resulting from the effects of the economic blockade imposed by Greece, as well as from the UN sanctions against the FRY, which sequentially had fostered an increase in political tensions between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians. In light of this evident complex interrelation of interstate and intrastate factors contributing to rising social tensions, economic and political uncertainty, and the authorization by Resolution 908 for the SRSG to utilize his good offices as appropriate to contribute to the peace and stability of Macedonia, the focus of UNPROFOR's political work had been on strengthening mutual understanding and dialogue among political parties and on monitoring human rights. Concurrently, UNPROFOR's military component had successfully mediated several tense border encounters, achieving the withdrawal of soldiers on both sides. In addition, during the execution of both the political and military elements of the inclusive mission, UNPROFOR continued to maintain close coordination with other international bodies, particularly the CSCE and ICFY. Ultimately, the Secretary-General concluded that due to the vulnerable interrelation of interstate and intrastate threats to the country, and in relation to the overall context of regional instability deriving from the conflict in Croatia and Bosnia, that the UNPROFOR mandate be extended for an additional six months. On 30 September

1994, the Security Council adopted Resolution 947 (1994d), which extended UNPROFOR's mandate for an additional period terminating on 31 March 1995.

On 22 March 1995, the Secretary-General submitted his report pursuant to Resolution 947 (1995a), highlighting the fact that following incidents in the area of the disputed border between the FRY and Macedonia in the summer of 1994, UNPROFOR negotiated a military administrative boundary that determines the Northern Limit of the Area Of Operations (NLAOO) of UNPROFOR troops. Though neither government conceded the NLAOO as a valid interstate border, both countries utilized it for the reporting and management of border crossing incidents; however, the potential for confrontation continued to persist in the absence of a mutually recognized international border. The report further reinforced the position that as a result of UN Sanctions against the FRY and the Greek imposed interstate trade embargo; the fragile state of the country's economy continues to exacerbate the intrastate political, social and interethnic dilemmas.

In all probability, the aspect of the report with utmost consequence, however, concerned the governments of Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia all expressing their desire for the United Nations forces in their respective countries to be separate from UNPROFOR. Croatia was the most vociferous; avowing the retention of UNPROFOR in its present form, and with its present mandate, would not enjoy the consent of the Croatian government. Therefore, in order to be responsive to their requests, but not compromise the economy and efficiency of an integrated UN peacekeeping force in theater; the Secretary-General proposed UNPROFOR be replaced by three separate but interlinked peacekeeping operations: United Nations Peace Force-One (UNPF)-1 in Croatia, UNPF-2 in Bosnia and UNPF-3 in Macedonia. Each of the three missions would be lead by a civilian Chief of Mission at the assistant secretary-general level, and would have its own military commander; however, in view of the interlinked nature of the threat and in order to avoid replication of existing organization, inclusive command and control of the three operations would be exercised by the SRSG and a Theater Force Commander from the headquarters in Zagreb.

Noting the report of the Secretary-General of 22 March, the Security Council passed Resolutions 981 (1995b), 982 (1995c) and 983 (1995d) on 31 March 1995. Resolution 981, in light of the cease-fire agreement of 29 March 1994 and the

current expiration date of the UNPROFOR mandate on 31 March 1995; established the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation (UNCRO) in Croatia, with an adjusted mandate. Resolution 982, considering the cessation of hostilities in Bosnia, extended the UNPROFOR mandate within Bosnia and Herzegovina for an additional eight months in order to facilitate an overall settlement of the conflict, and additionally authorized any UNPROFOR assets or personnel whose continued presence was not required by UNCRO to redeploy to UNPROFOR in Bosnia. Resolution 983, based on the threat of interstate and intrastate developments that could undermine confidence and stability in Macedonia, decided that UNPROFOR within Macedonia would from that point on be known as the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP). The exact UNPROFOR mandate for Macedonia was transferred verbatim to UNPREDEP, as well as extended for a period terminating on 30 November 1995.

From the approval for the SRSG to utilize his good offices on 31 March 1994 to the decision that UNPROFOR within Macedonia would from that point on be known as UNPREDEP on 31 March 1995, the broadened political mandate created a qualitative dimension that facilitated expansion of traditional peacekeeping techniques and was to develop into a fundamental element of the inclusive mandate. The declaration committing the party leaders to ensuring the elections were free, fair and in the spirit of interethnic cooperation was an important and creative initiative that served to exemplify UNPROFOR's willingness to contribute; and demonstrated explicit actions that could be incorporated within the good offices mandate. The intervention on the part of Hugo Anson, which effected the PDP withdrawing its threat to boycott three days prior to the first round elections functioned as another resourceful and apt utilization of the good offices mandate that resulted in an important political agreement thereby strengthening democratic principles. By astutely avoiding the potential pitfall of acting as a communications link between the current parliament and the two opposition parties who boycotted the elections, UNPROFOR preserved and reinforced the democratic process as well as set defined limits on "appropriate" utilization of the good offices mandate.

With regard to the University of Tetovo incident, Anson again employed his good offices mandate and hosted negotiations between government officials and ethnic Albanian leaders to urge compromise; and for ethnic Macedonians and ethnic

Albanians alike to think of themselves first and foremost as citizens and only afterwards as members of an ethnic group. The SRSG from Zagreb, Yasushi Akashi's visit, soon after the Tetovo incident, served to fortify the UN's interest in a stable Macedonia, as well as reinforce that the Security Council had authorized the SRSG to use his good offices to contribute to the maintenance and stability of the state. The utilization of the good offices mandate with respect to the crisis in Tetovo was a crucial undertaking that was at least partially accountable for moderation of the potential extent of intrastate ethnic conflict at that time. Without the good offices mandate this incident could have erupted into a more violent and self-destructive affair for the country.

While the military forces of UNPROFOR monitored the borders for interstate aggression, the good offices mandate allowed engagement to stave off an intrastate conflict. Whereas UNPROFOR's political effort had focused on strengthening mutual understanding and dialogue among political parties and on monitoring human rights; UNPROFOR's military component had in tandem mediated several tense border encounters, achieving the withdrawal of soldiers on both sides of the disputed border. If violent intrastate ethnic conflict were allowed to ignite within Macedonia, there existed a fervent risk of conflict diffusion across state borders and escalation into interstate conflict. Likewise, a military presence on the borders was requisite to prevention of more serious border incursions that could have escalated into violent interstate conflict, which consecutively could have further exacerbated intrastate tensions.

In light of the manifest multifaceted nexus of interstate and intrastate factors as a causative agent for rising social tensions, and economic and political uncertainty; the authorization for the SRSG to utilize his good offices as appropriate to contribute to the peace and stability of Macedonia served to assimilate the structural sources of conflict within the mandate that already encompassed the triggering and proximate sources of conflict. In so doing, conflict prevention efforts on the part of the international community were to simultaneously target the triggering, proximate and structural sources of conflict in Macedonia, in a connected endeavor of multifaceted and multilevel action exhibiting a synergy of intervention. These efforts represent a synchronized and fused execution of international community interstate and

intrastate conflict prevention actions exemplifying a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity.

#### **4.5. UNPREDEP: April 1995 to February 1999**

The latter half of 1995 brought several significant proceedings that were to affect both Macedonia and the future of UNPREDEP. On 13 September 1995, at United Nations Headquarters in New York, the foreign ministers of Macedonia and Greece signed a wide-ranging interim accord addressing friendly relations; confidence-building measures; human and cultural rights; international and regional institutions; treaty relations; and economic, commercial, environmental and legal issues. The accord, mediated by Cyrus Vance as the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, conveyed that each country would respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the other and confirmed their common existing frontier as an enduring and inviolable border. Additionally, the signing of the accord effectively terminated the embargo and allowed for unimpeded movement of people and goods between the two countries. In exchange, Macedonia agreed to cease to use in any manner the symbol that was currently on its national flag, and declare its constitution did not constitute any claim to territory not within its existing borders nor provide the basis for interference in the internal affairs of another state to protect the rights of Macedonians (United Nations 1995). Following the accord signing, Macedonia was admitted to the OSCE, the Council of Europe, NATO's Partnership for Peace initiative, and the United States established full diplomatic relations with Macedonia. Thus, a major interstate threat was removed, which likewise was expected to positively ameliorate certain intrastate tensions through improvement of the economic sector and membership in major international organizations.

On 18 March of 1994, the Bosniak and Croat factions of Bosnia and Herzegovina agreed to form a federation by signing a federation constitution, thereby allowing a reprioritization and concentration of forces against Serb elements. Throughout the summer and fall of 1995 the conflict in Bosnia intensified, which brought more acute measures from NATO in the form of air strikes against Serb positions and spurred the US administration to launch a forceful peace initiative led by Richard Holbrooke (1998). Finally, after extended and intense negotiations the General Framework Agreement was initialed on 21 November 1995, in Dayton, Ohio, thus

ending the Bosnian conflict. As a result of the Dayton Accords, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1021 (1995e), that lifted the sanctions on military equipment and weapons; and Resolution 1022 (1995f), which immediately suspended all other comprehensive sanctions that had been imposed against the FRY. Whereas the signing of the interim accord with Greece removed the embargo against Macedonia's southern border, the lifting of the sanctions against the FRY opened its northern border.

The Secretary-general issued his report pursuant to Resolution 983 (1995g) on 23 November 1995, a few weeks after the car bomb assassination attempt on President Gligorov failed on 5 October 1995, a crime which to this day has not been solved. In his report the Secretary-general cited positive steps taken by the Macedonian government to meet Albanian community concerns, which included: release of the prisoners related to the University of Tetovo incident, establishment of a four-year teaching curriculum in the Albanian language at the Pedagogical Faculty in Skopje, a ten percent quota on ethnic minorities to attend institutions of higher learning, and appointment of the first Albanian general officer in the Army. Additionally, since all neighboring countries, except the FRY, had now officially recognized Macedonia as a sovereign state; the imminent military threat to the country had abated considerably. UNPREDEP was referred to as having had contributed greatly to creating a more stable environment and facilitating these positive achievements. However, it was also noted that intrastate differences and tensions remained a threat to the country's stability. Consequently, the Secretary-General recommended extending the UNPREDEP mandate, albeit with modifications. The modification, derived from projected adjustments to the mandates of UNCRO and UNPROFOR as a result of the Dayton Accords, was to establish UNPREDEP on a fully independent footing and reporting directly to New York. On 30 November 1995, the mandate for UNPREDEP was extended for a period terminating on 30 May 1996, when the Security Council approved resolution 1027 (1995i); however, the resolution contained no reference to the issue of an independent status.

The next couple of months brought considerable changes in the mandates of both UNCRO and UNPROFOR that would ultimately lead to alteration of UNPREDEP's mandate. Security Council resolution 1025 (1995h), of 30 November 1995, in light of the Basic Agreement on the region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western

Sirmium, signed on 12 November 1995, between Croatia and Serbia, and in order to allow for the future establishment of a transitional administration and peacekeeping force in Croatia; terminated the mandate of UNCRO effective 15 January 1996. On 15 January 1996, by way of Security Council resolution 1037 (1996a), UNCRO was replaced by the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES), which was to have a Transitional Administrator exclusive of UNPROFOR headquarters in Zagreb. With respect to UNPROFOR, noting the signing of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, specifically the requirements contained in Annex 1-A; the Security Council adopted Resolution 1031 (1995j) on 15 December 1995, which authorized the establishment of a multinational Implementation Force (IFOR). The official transfer of authority from UNPROFOR to IFOR occurred on 20 December 1995, which simultaneously terminated the mandate of UNPROFOR. While the Force Commander of UNPROFOR was to become the Deputy Commander IFOR, there was a stipulation that he retain his UNPROFOR authority during the transition so as to continue to exercise operational control over UNPROFOR elements that would not transfer to IFOR. As a result of these actions, by 15 January 1996, UNPREDEP was the only remaining element of UNPROFOR; and was technically still under operational control of the Force Commander in Zagreb, who was in actuality the Deputy Commander for IFOR.

On 30 January 1996, the Secretary-General again urged, through his report pursuant to Resolution 1027 (1995i), that UNPREDEP transition into a fully independent status as soon as practicable. Finally, on 13 February 1996, the Security Council approved Resolution 1046 (1996c) thereby creating UNPREDEP as a fully independent mission, with its own SRSG and Force Commander, and reporting directly to UN headquarters in New York. Furthermore, the addition of 50 personnel was authorized to provide for continued engineering capability. It was at this time that UNPREDEP was at its peak. It operated 24 permanent and 33 temporary observation posts along the 422 kilometer Macedonian border with the FRY and Albania, the political affairs component had expanded and diversified to effectively monitor and promote reconciliation among various political and ethnic groups, CIVPOL was playing an indispensable role in areas populated by ethnic minorities, and the public affairs unit was active in raising public awareness regarding

UNPREDEP's unique role. Moreover, UNPREDEP was coordinating and working in a complimentary fashion with the ICFY and OSCE, as well as various NGOs. From the inception of UNPROFOR in Macedonia until this point in time, the focus had shifted from exclusive concentration on interstate threats to a simultaneous and connected focus on interstate and intrastate threats through the addition to the mandate of the use of good offices. With the cessation of hostilities elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia the interstate threat seemed to be diminished, however, many of the existing intrastate tensions had not been fully abated nor the danger of fragmentation averted. In view of this situation, the newly appointed SRSG and former Chief of Staff for UNPREDEP, Henryk J. Sokalski, decided to place even more emphasis on the intrastate aspects of the conflict prevention mission.

Sokalski (2003, 153) acted on the presumption that for early prevention to be effective, the multidimensional root causes of conflict need to be identified and addressed and that conflict prevention and sustainable development are mutually reinforcing. The ensuing developmental aspect of the UNPREDEP mission was termed by Sokalski (1999, 4) as "the human dimension", and was closely aligned with what most refer to as peace-building. This function of the UNPREDEP mission fell within the good offices mandate, but advanced it further by commencing a major confidence-building measure, between Macedonia and UNPREDEP, in the form of a set of catalytic activities funded by seed contributions from extra-budgetary sources. It was designed and executed to demonstrate to Macedonia's concerned institutions how to resort to and utilize duly approved international standards, and the experience gained in their implementation, by countries transitioning to civil society and in pursuit of their own national policies and social integration programs. As such, UNPREDEP resorted to various forms of structural and operational conflict prevention measures, predominantly related to social development and crime prevention, and concentrated on relaying the message that state and society were two complimentary forces. Implementation was in the form of small-scale projects that either the government, local authorities, or NGOs could undertake; and in concert with other coordinating agencies, such as: the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Search for Common Ground (SCG), the Center for International Crime Prevention (CICP), the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES), Catholic Relief Services (CRS), SOS Children's Villages,

and the Open Society Institute. In this manner the projects could continue after the eventual termination of UNPREDEP. The attention devoted to the peace-building aspect augmented significantly the multiplier effect generated by development of the other conflict prevention efforts, thereby creating an overall unity of effort for the mission as a whole.

On 30 May 1996, the Security Council extended UNPREDEP's mandate, with Resolution 1058 (1996c), for a period terminating on 30 November 1996. Noting the agreement signed between Macedonia and the FRY on 8 April 1996, the Security Council agreed that the security situation in Macedonia had improved; but recognized it was still too early to be confident that regional stability had been established. However, in light of the positive developments, the question arose whether UNPREDEP could execute its mandate with fewer resources. The real issue was whether the current volume of patrolling and the number of observation posts was absolutely necessary. Recalling that originally only one infantry battalion with an approximate strength of 700 troops was recommended, debate had surfaced as to whether further improvements in the country and region during the impending months might make it possible to reduce the size of UNPREDEP. As a result, in Resolution 1082 (1996d), the Security Council, on 27 November 1996, decided to extend the mandate of UNPREDEP for a period terminating on 31 May 1997, with a reduction of its military component by 300 personnel by 30 April, and with a view to concluding the mandate when circumstances permitted.

While UNPREDEP was preparing to reduce its strength, however, regional stability began to deteriorate. In Serbia, on the heels of a contentious mayoral election in Belgrade, the Serbian Orthodox Church condemned President Milosevic for bringing the Serbian Nation to economic disaster and suppressing political and religious freedoms, and in so doing sparking civic protests. Additionally, in Kosovo, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) had come to international attention and was increasing its attacks on Serbs within Kosovo. January of 1997, witnessed the collapse of the Bulgarian economy and ensuing antigovernment protests and strikes, resulting in the Bulgarian government declaring a state of emergency. In Albania, the pyramid scheme collapsed plunging the country into chaos and anarchy. The state of affairs in Albania caused several foreign embassies to evacuate their personnel, and Albanian refugees were fleeing to Greece and Italy. Macedonia, as

well, was concerned regarding a possible influx of refugees, and when the Albanian government declared a state of emergency the Macedonian Armed Forces were placed on alert. The situation deteriorated sharply on 13 March when seven Albanian border police attempted to illegally flee across the border at Kjafsan when their watch tower was seized by rebels, resulting in gunfire between them and the Macedonian border guards (Williams 2000, 165). Within a few short months, what had become a fairly stable interstate environment for Macedonia had become even more unstable than when UNPROFOR had first arrived on the scene.

Macedonia immediately closed all border crossings with Albania and UNPREDEP observation posts were put on alert. Furthermore, UNPREDEP manned three temporary observation posts on the Albanian border and dispatched Force Protection Teams supported by armored personnel carriers. This swift military response by UNPREDEP demonstrated the utility of maintaining a strong military component of UNPREDEP and continuing with a focus on possible interstate threat. Taking into consideration these actions and the increased instability, the Security Council passed Resolution 1105 (1997a) on 9 April 1997, suspending the reduction of the military component of UNPREDEP until the end of its current mandate. On 12 May, the Secretary-General (1997b) submitted a report detailing the social unrest in Bulgaria and the FRY, as well as the collapsed state institutions and disintegrated social structures in Albania. Domestically within Macedonia, the report discussed positive steps in the democratic process, but highlighted remaining ethnic tensions and unrest, possibly due to the increase in ethnic conflict in neighboring Kosovo. These developments demonstrated that stability in the region was indeed still fragile. Based on the Secretary-general's recommendation, on 28 May 1997 the Security Council adopted Resolution 1110 (1997c) extending the UNPREDEP mandate until 30 November 1997, and reinstating the reduction of 300 troops commencing on 1 October 1997.

Even though, the mandate had been extended, there was still pressure within the Security Council to terminate UNPREDEP as soon as possible. Russia had voted for the extension, but did so solely due to the complications brought forth by Albania. Otherwise, Russia was of the opinion the mandate originally provided for UNPREDEP, namely prevent the diffusion of conflict from the former Yugoslavia, had been successfully implemented and completed. As the end of the mandate

approached, options were being considered as to how best to execute a phased exit. On 20 November 1997, the Secretary-General (1997d) reported the reduction of 300 troops would be completed by 30 November, and the number of observation posts would be decreased to eight, but compensated by increased patrolling along the border. Based on the uncertainty of the presidential elections in Serbia, the increased violence in Kosovo, and the slow progress in implementing the Dayton Accords; the report underscored the unpredictability of, and dangers inherent in, developments outside the control of Macedonia. The effects of interethnic tensions on long-term stability remained a concern, while fears of ethnic Albanian refugees from Kosovo exacerbated this concern. Regardless of these apprehensions, the future of UNPREDEP was questionable. After Security Council Resolution 1140 (1997e) extended the mandate for four days on 28 November; Resolution 1142 (1997f) was adopted on 4 December 1997, which extended UNPREDEP's mandate for a supposed final period until 31 August 1998, with the withdrawal of the military component immediately thereafter.

The conflict in Kosovo erupted in earnest in February 1998 when President Milosevic ordered army and police units to commence a crackdown on KLA elements. In response, the Permanent Council of the OSCE, in a special session on the Kosovo crisis on 11 March 1998, decided in Decision 218 (OSCE 1998) to temporarily enhance the monitoring capabilities of the OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje. This temporary enhancement was to allow for adequate observation of the borders with Kosovo and the FRY, and prevention of possible crisis spillover effects. On 31 March 1998, the Security Council followed suit by adopting Resolution 1160 (1998a), which condemned the use of force by both Serbian and KLA forces; imposed sanctions against military equipment, weapons and training; and invited the OSCE to keep the Secretary-General informed on the situation in Kosovo. The Secretary-General (1998b) echoed the concerns of the OSCE and the Security Council in his Report Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1142, on 1 of June 1998, with comments regarding the peace and stability in Macedonia continuing to depend largely on developments in other parts of the region. Recent developments in Kosovo had highlighted the danger of renewed violence in the area and the serious repercussions such violence could have upon both the interstate and intrastate security of Macedonia. Moreover, the

continuing regional uncertainties could exacerbate current ethnic tensions within Macedonia. Consequently, on 21 July 1998, the Security Council approved Resolution 1186 (1998c) increasing the strength of UNPREDEP by 300 military personnel, and extending the mandate for a period terminating on 28 February 1999. More importantly, this resolution also authorized a modification in the mandate by including the tasks of monitoring and reporting on illicit arms flows and other activities prohibited under Resolution 1160. This marked a significant addition to the mandate and once again focused UNPREDEP on interstate issues.

The situation in Kosovo continued to deteriorate through the summer of 1998, resulting in increased actions by the international community, all of which would impact on Macedonia in some fashion. Shortly after OSCE Decision 218 and Security Council Resolution 1160, the Contact Group decided to enter into the realm of Kosovo. The Contact Group, established in the spring of 1994 as a coordination forum for crisis management efforts related to Bosnia, consisted of the United States, Russia, France, the United Kingdom and Germany, with Italy joining in 1996. On 6 July 1998, the Contact Group announced the formation of the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM), which was to be a peaceful mission where diplomatic members of the Contact Group would observe and report on the general freedom of movement throughout Kosovo as part of their daily duties. On 23 September 1998, the Security Council passed Resolution 1199 (1998d) welcoming the establishment of KDOM, noting the numbers of persons displaced and without shelter, expressing alarm at the impending human catastrophe in Kosovo, affirming that deterioration of the situation in Kosovo constituted a threat to peace and stability in the entire region, and called for a cease-fire by both parties to the conflict.

On 13 October 1998, following a deterioration of the situation, the NAC authorized activation orders for air strikes against Serb positions. This move was designed to support diplomatic efforts to make the Milosevic regime withdraw forces from Kosovo, cooperate in bringing an end to the violence, and facilitate the return of refugees to their homes. At the last moment, following further diplomatic initiatives including visits to Belgrade by NATO's Secretary General Solana; US Envoys Richard Holbrooke and Christopher Hill; the Chairman of NATO's Military Committee, General Naumann; and the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Clark; President Milosevic agreed to comply and the air strikes were called

off (NATO 2004b). Moreover, it was determined that a Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) would be instituted to verify compliance of all parties with Resolution 1199. The OSCE was to observe compliance on the ground, and NATO would conduct aerial surveillance. NATO concluded their agreement with the FRY Ministry of Defense on 15 October 1998, and the OSCE signed their agreement with the FRY Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 16 October. On 24 October 1998, the Security Council approved Resolution 1203 (1998e), endorsing both components of the KVM and affirming that in the event of an emergency, action may be necessary to ensure their safety and freedom of movement.

The Macedonian government was fully aware of the intent of some of the permanent members of the Security Council to terminate UNPREDEP in the near future, and based on the threat from Kosovo was inclined to encourage NATO to launch a presence in the country as a replacement. The rationalization was that NATO forces on Macedonian soil would deter any possible incursion into the country, as well as increase their international status in concert with the possibility of future NATO membership. Consequently, the Macedonian administration agreed to allow NATO to establish the Kosovo Verification Coordination Center (KVCC) on its soil. The KVCC was a multinational NATO headquarters, which served as the primary liaison between the OSCE ground verification and NATO air verification missions. It coordinated NATO unarmed air verification flights, provided a base for operations by unmanned aerial vehicles, and coordinated NATO requests for use of Macedonian airspace. The first personnel arrived in Skopje on 19 October 1998 and the KVCC was formally inaugurated on 26 November 1998, with its headquarters in Kumanovo (KVCC 2004). The KVCC consisted of approximately 150 personnel from a variety of NATO nations: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom and the United States.

The OSCE portion of the KVM was to consist of two thousand unarmed personnel from OSCE participating states. While their safety and security was the primary responsibility of the FRY, a contingency operation was put into place as well. In support of the OSCE KVM mission, the NAC approved a NATO special military task force on 4 December 1998, to assist with the emergency evacuation of members of the KVM if renewed conflict should put them at risk. The NATO Extraction Force (EF), named Determined Guarantor, was activated on 10

December, likewise in Kumanovo; and initially comprised 1,500 personnel from Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom; all under French leadership (NATO 2004a). The KVCC closely coordinated with the EF and constituted a vital information link for the effectiveness of the Extraction Force mission.

As a result of international community involvement in Kosovo, Macedonia likewise became involved due to its geographic proximity. Macedonia now had a UN mission and NATO forces stationed on its territory. The UN was present in the form of UNPREDEP and had the mission to prevent the diffusion of conflict from interstate sources as well as from intrastate sources. NATO was present in coordination with efforts to stave off conflict in a neighboring country that, if escalated, could likewise diffuse to Macedonia. On 12 February 1999, the Secretary-General (1999a) submitted his report pursuant to Resolution 1186, stating completion of the increase in UNPREDEP's strength by 300 personnel had occurred in early January, and the quantity of observation posts had been increased from eight to sixteen. It was noted, although the mandate had been extended to include monitoring and reporting on illicit arms flows and other activities prohibited under Resolution 1160, that it does not have authority to interdict or inspect cross-border traffic. In addition to the ongoing coordination with the OSCE, UNPREDEP also established a working relationship with the KVCC and EF. The report further commented on strengthened bilateral relations with Macedonia's neighbors, particularly Albania and Greece, and the positive domestic political development of peaceful parliamentary elections in October and November of 1998; but concentrated on the serious interstate and intrastate repercussions that continued conflict in Kosovo could have on Macedonia. Based upon the success of UNPREDEP to date, the danger of diffusion of the Kosovo conflict, the still unstable situation in Albania, the increased tension between Macedonia and the FRY regarding the stationing of NATO forces on Macedonian soil, and the lack of progress in the demarcation of the border with the FRY, the Secretary-General recommended a further extension of the UNPREDEP mandate until 31 August 1999.

The peaceful elections referred to in the Secretary-General's report took place on 18 October and 2 November 1998, and resulted in a landslide victory for VMRO-DPMNE who formed a coalition government on 19 November with the DPA. The

two parties that now formed the government, both of which were nationalist parties, now had the task of leading Macedonia in unison through dangerous times. The primary emphasis of their campaigns had been to strengthen the economy after years of decline, regardless of the fact that the decline was predominantly a result of interstate factors. In early February 1999, the new government was enticed by the offer of two billion dollars in investment and aid to establish diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Unfortunately, the political intricacies of this venture were to cause immediate and long-term ramifications for Macedonia. China, a permanent member of the Security Council, considered Taiwan a breakaway province and immediately severed diplomatic ties and halted all bilateral agreements with Macedonia. When on 25 February 1999, the Security Council met to vote on the extension of the UNPREDEP mandate; China stated that in light of the original mandate, the improved relations with its neighbors, and increased domestic stability, the mandate had been accomplished successfully. Meanwhile, Russia campaigned for a change in the mandate thereby making the monitoring mission in relation to Kosovo, and Resolution 1160, the primary function of UNPREDEP. At the end of the meeting, the vote was thirteen in favor, one abstention by Russia and one veto by China. While China has never admitted any relationship between the recognition of Taiwan by Macedonia and the veto of the extension for UNPREDEP, most observers have deduced a direct causal relationship. Regardless of the reasoning, the veto by China resulted in the mandate for UNPREDEP terminating at the stroke of midnight on 28 February 1999.

From the decision that UNPROFOR within Macedonia would officially transition to UNPREDEP on 31 March 1995, until the termination of the UNPREDEP mandate on 28 February 1999, the interstate threat was to vacillate in intensity and shift between specific threats to regional stability. While the signing of the interim accord between Greece and Macedonia effectively eliminated the major interstate threat from the south, the inability to attain agreement on demarcation of the border between the FRY and Macedonia, as well as the ethnic tension in Kosovo, retained the interstate threat from the north at a persistent degree. To the east and west, the crash of the Bulgarian economy and ensuing social unrest, and the collapsed state institutions and disintegrated social structures in Albania, respectively, were instruments of fluctuation for the interstate risk of instability diffusion. Aside from

the monitoring, reporting and patrolling of the borders, UNPREDEP also liaised with the General Staff of the FRY and with relevant ministries in Albania. The UNPREDEP presence on along the borders was initially intended as a forewarning against any overt military incursion, nevertheless, it appended the collateral advantage of deterring cross-border smuggling and passage of illegal immigrants. In all cases, however, the existence of UNPREDEP executing its mandate on the borders of Macedonia with respect to interstate threats served not only as a deterrent, but also provided a calming and stabilizing effect within the interior of the country.

In sequence, this permitted engagement within the broadened mandate of good offices, which created a qualitative dimension that facilitated expansion of traditional peacekeeping techniques into conflict resolution; and thereby contributed to the promotion of dialogue, restraint and practical compromise between dissimilar segments of society. Altogether, the mandate of UNPREDEP required interface with diverse aspects of Macedonia's interstate and intrastate circumstances ranging from preventive deployment and patrolling to early warning, fact-finding, monitoring and reporting, good offices, confidence-building measures, and social and developmental projects. Without the interstate focus of the conflict prevention efforts of this mission, the intrastate aspects would not have been possible; whereas without the intrastate focus the interstate efforts would have been in vain.

Conflict prevention efforts on the part of the international community simultaneously pursued the triggering, proximate and structural sources of conflict in Macedonia in an increasingly connected undertaking of multifaceted and multilevel action demonstrative of an intervention synergy. The critical element that emerges is the necessity for the entirety of these multifaceted and multilevel conflict prevention tools to be utilized, toward both interstate and intrastate components of conflict prevention, in a simultaneous and connective method; which is the embodiment of a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity within conflict prevention.

#### **4.6. Conclusions**

After approximately four decades of UN peacekeeping forces being utilized to divide rival factions of hostilities so as to prevent resumption of conflict, thus was authorized and deployed the first purely preventive UN peacekeeping force in history. Whereas traditional peacekeeping efforts were a result of international

community failure to prevent conflict, the deployment of UNPROFOR to Macedonia represented a major shift regarding international policy, perspective and emphasis toward conflict prevention. As opposed to being deployed between two states to prevent the recurrence of conflict, UNPROFOR was to be deployed within a state; with that state's consent and upon their request, to prevent the possible outbreak of conflict. The conditions upon UN authorization of the mission were a fusion of interstate and intrastate threats to peace and stability, both within the country and within the region. Macedonia acquired independence exposed to interstate threats from all four bordering states, and overshadowed by regional instability in the form of violent conflict in the former Yugoslavia. From an intrastate perspective, three primary challenges confronted the country: the need for democratic transformation, the socioeconomic situation, and interethnic tensions. The intrastate challenges were all integrally connected, and subject to, the interstate threats to the country; as well as overall regional instability.

The principal justification for authorization of UNPROFOR deployment was primarily from an interstate focus as a result of the overt threat to Macedonia from adjacent states, and exacerbated by regional instability. As fears within the international community mounted regarding the possibility of interstate conflict such as had already occurred between Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia, so too, did intrastate ethnic fears mount within Macedonia regarding the future functioning of the country. Likewise, various interstate threats were subject to increase as a result of intrastate ethnic tension.

From the establishment of UNPROFOR on 11 December 1992 to the approval of the SRSG to utilize his good offices in March 1994, the primary mission of UNPROFOR was to monitor the border and report any developments that could pose a threat to the country; and deter, by their presence, such threats or clashes between Macedonian and external forces. As such, the focus of the mission was predominantly of an interstate nature, and primarily targeted toward the triggering and proximate sources of conflict. Granted, the international community was aware of intrastate tensions, as evidenced by UN insistence of inclusion of UNMO and CIVPOL personnel. However, it was through the reports of these UNMO and CIVPOL personnel that the severity of the intrastate threat was identified and brought to the attention of the UN and the international community.

These reports further succeeded in identifying the complexities of the nexus of interstate and intrastate factors as a causative agent for economic and political uncertainty, and rising social tensions. Thus, in an adaptive and evolutionary step the utilization of the good offices of the SRSG was approved and implemented. Initially deployed to prevent the diffusion of interstate conflict to the newly independent Macedonia, it soon became evident that although UNPROFOR was successfully executing their mission in this regard, there existed a simultaneous threat of diffusion and/or contagion of intrastate conflict across borders that was not being addressed by UNPROFOR forces. This intrastate threat posed both the possibility of diffusion from Kosovo, as well as contagion from Kosovo, Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia.

The identification of the necessity of an intrastate mandate to compliment the interstate mandate, and approval of the SRSG to utilize his good offices, were to adjust the mandate so as to include structural sources of conflict. By incorporating the structural sources of conflict within the mandate already addressing the triggering and proximate sources of conflict, international community conflict prevention efforts were to expand and integrate the degree of multifaceted and multilevel action, thereby creating synergy of intervention. This willful transition on the part of the international community signifies the genesis and true essence of a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity in conflict prevention efforts.

From the approval for the SRSG to utilize his good offices on 31 March 1994, to the decision that UNPROFOR within Macedonia would from that point on be known as UNPREDEP on 31 March 1995, the broadened political mandate created a qualitative dimension that facilitated expansion of traditional peacekeeping techniques and was to develop into a fundamental element of the inclusive mandate. The declaration committing the party leaders to ensuring the elections were free, fair and in the spirit of interethnic cooperation was an important and creative initiative that served to exemplify UNPROFOR's willingness to contribute, and demonstrated explicit actions that could be incorporated within the good offices mandate. The intervention on the part of Hugo Anson, which effected the PDP withdrawing its threat to boycott three days prior to the first round elections functioned as another resourceful and apt utilization of the good offices mandate that resulted in an important political agreement thereby strengthening democratic principles. By

astutely avoiding the potential pitfall of acting as a communications link between the current parliament and the two opposition parties who boycotted the elections, UNPROFOR preserved and reinforced the democratic process as well as set defined limits on “appropriate” utilization of the good offices mandate.

With regard to the University of Tetovo incident, Anson again employed his good offices mandate and hosted negotiations between government officials and ethnic Albanian leaders to urge compromise; and for ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians alike to think of themselves first and foremost as citizens and only afterwards as members of an ethnic group. The SRSG from Zagreb, Yasushi Akashi’s visit, soon after the Tetovo incident, served to fortify the UN’s interest in a stable Macedonia, as well as reinforce that the Security Council had authorized the SRSG to use his good offices to contribute to the maintenance and stability of the state. The utilization of the good offices mandate with respect to the crisis in Tetovo was a crucial undertaking that was at least partially accountable for moderation of the potential extent of intrastate ethnic conflict at that time. Without the good offices mandate this incident could have erupted into a more violent and self-destructive affair for the country.

While the military forces of UNPROFOR monitored the borders for interstate aggression, the good offices mandate allowed engagement to stave off an intrastate conflict. Whereas UNPROFOR’s political effort had focused on strengthening mutual understanding and dialogue among political parties and on monitoring human rights; UNPROFOR’s military component had in tandem mediated several tense border encounters, achieving the withdrawal of soldiers on both sides of the disputed border. If violent intrastate ethnic conflict were allowed to ignite within Macedonia, there existed a fervent risk of conflict diffusion across state borders and escalation into interstate conflict. Likewise, a military presence on the borders was requisite to prevention of more serious border incursions that could have escalated into violent interstate conflict, which consecutively could have further exacerbated intrastate tensions.

In light of the manifest multifaceted nexus of interstate and intrastate factors as a causative agent for rising social tensions, and economic and political uncertainty; the authorization for the SRSG to utilize his good offices as appropriate to contribute to the peace and stability of Macedonia served to assimilate the structural sources of

conflict within the mandate that already encompassed the triggering and proximate sources of conflict. In so doing, conflict prevention efforts on the part of the international community were to simultaneously target the triggering, proximate and structural sources of conflict in Macedonia, in a connected endeavor of multifaceted and multilevel action exhibiting a synergy of intervention. These efforts represent a synchronized and fused execution of international community interstate and intrastate conflict prevention actions exemplifying a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity.

From the decision that UNPROFOR within Macedonia would officially transition to UNPREDEP on 31 March 1995 until the termination of the UNPREDEP mandate on 28 February 1999, the interstate threat was to vacillate in intensity and shift between specific threats to regional stability. While the signing of the interim accord between Greece and Macedonia effectively eliminated the major interstate threat from the south; the inability to attain agreement on demarcation of the border between the FRY and Macedonia, as well as the ethnic tension in Kosovo, retained the interstate threat from the north at a persistent degree. To the east and west, the crash of the Bulgarian economy and ensuing social unrest, and the collapsed state institutions and disintegrated social structures in Albania, respectively, were instruments of fluctuation for the interstate risk of instability diffusion. Aside from the monitoring, reporting and patrolling of the borders, UNPREDEP also liaised with the General Staff of the FRY and with relevant ministries in Albania. The UNPREDEP presence on along the borders was initially intended as a forewarning against any overt military incursion, nevertheless, it appended the collateral advantage of deterring cross-border smuggling and passage of illegal immigrants. In all cases, however, the existence of UNPREDEP executing its mandate on the borders of Macedonia, with respect to interstate threats, served not only as a deterrent, but also provided a calming and stabilizing effect within the interior of the country.

In sequence, this permitted engagement within the broadened mandate of good offices, which created a qualitative dimension that facilitated expansion of traditional peacekeeping techniques into peace-building; and thereby contributed to the promotion of dialogue, restraint and practical compromise between dissimilar segments of society. Altogether, the mandate of UNPREDEP required interface

with diverse aspects of Macedonia's interstate and intrastate circumstances ranging from preventive deployment and patrolling to early warning, fact-finding, monitoring and reporting, good offices, confidence-building measures, and social and developmental projects. Without the interstate focus of the conflict prevention efforts of this mission the intrastate aspects would not have been possible, whereas without the intrastate efforts the interstate focus would have been in vain.

Conflict prevention efforts on the part of the international community simultaneously pursued the triggering, proximate and structural sources of conflict in Macedonia in an increasingly connected undertaking of multifaceted and multilevel action demonstrative of an intervention synergy. The critical element that emerges is the necessity for the entirety of these multifaceted and multilevel conflict prevention tools to be utilized, toward both interstate and intrastate components of conflict prevention, in a simultaneous and connective method; which is the embodiment of a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity within conflict prevention.

In sum, this chapter indicates an evolutionary process transpired with respect to conflict prevention. At initiation of international community conflict prevention actions toward Macedonia, it is clear that early warning and response and support of major international actors were present. However, it was not until identification of the necessity of an intrastate mandate to compliment the interstate mandate, and approval of the SRSG to utilize his good offices, that the mandate was adjusted so as to include structural sources of conflict. By incorporating the structural sources of conflict within the mandate already addressing the triggering and proximate sources of conflict, international community conflict prevention efforts were to expand and integrate the degree of multifaceted and multilevel action, thereby creating synergy of intervention. This willful transition on the part of the international community signifies the genesis and true essence of a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity in conflict prevention efforts. In light of the manifest multifaceted nexus of interstate and intrastate factors as a causative agent for rising social tensions, and economic and political uncertainty; the SRSG assimilated the structural sources of conflict within the mandate that already encompassed the triggering and proximate sources of conflict. In so doing, conflict prevention efforts on the part of the international community were to simultaneously target the triggering, proximate and structural sources of conflict in Macedonia, in a connected endeavor of multifaceted

and multilevel action exhibiting a synergy of intervention. In essence, all four factors of conflict prevention were utilized to address all three sources of conflict, thus representing a synchronized and fused execution of international community conflict prevention actions exemplifying a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity. The international community continued to simultaneously pursue the triggering, proximate and structural sources of conflict in Macedonia in an increasingly connected undertaking of multifaceted and multilevel action demonstrative of an intervention synergy. The critical element that emerges is the necessity for the entirety of these multifaceted and multilevel conflict prevention tools to be utilized, toward both interstate and intrastate components of conflict prevention, in a simultaneous and connective method; which is the embodiment of a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity within conflict prevention.

To assert that UNPROFOR and UNPREDEP were solely responsible for avoidance of either interstate or intrastate violent conflict in Macedonia would be presumptuous as an amalgamation of variables were present; however, it would be similarly presuming to aver the conflict prevention efforts of the international community in the form of UNPROFOR and UNPREDEP did not play a critical function. One of the more important aspects of this developmental transition, though, is the evidenced ability of the international community to continually assess and adapt the requisite mix of conflict prevention tools to the ever-changing environment of the task at hand. The following table, Figure 4.1, provides a chronological summary of the relevant international community involvement regarding conflict prevention efforts in Macedonia from independence through termination of the UNPREDEP mandate.

**Figure 4.1: Chronology of Relevant International Community Involvement: Phase I.**

Date	Focus	Inception
1991, Sep 25	UN imposition of military sanctions against FRY	UN SC Res 713
1992, Feb 21	Establishment of UNPROFOR	UN SC Res 743
1992, May 30	UN imposition of comprehensive sanctions against FRY	UN SC Res 757
1992, Sep 18	CSCE establishes Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje	CSCE Decision
1992, Nov 23	Letter from Sec-Gen to Security Council relaying President Gligorov's request for UN Observers	UN Doc S/24851
1992, Nov 25	Security Council approves request for UN observers	UN Doc S/24852
1992, Dec 9	Report on possible deployment of UNPROFOR to Macedonia	UN Doc S/24923
1992, Dec 11	Security Council approval to establish UNPROFOR in Macedonia	UN SC Res 795
1993, Jan 2	Interim deployment of Canadian contingent	UN SC Res 795
1993, Feb 19	UNPROFOR mandate extended for 6 weeks	UN SC Res 807
1993, Mar 30	UNPROFOR mandate extended for 3 months	UN SC Res 815
1993, Apr 7	Security Council recommends Macedonia be admitted to UN	UN SC Res 817
1993, Apr 17	UN strengthening of sanctions against FRY	UN SC Res 820
1993, Jun 16	Sec-Gen notifies Security Council of US troop offer	UN Doc S/2594
1993, Jun 18	Security Council acceptance of US troop offer	UN SC Res 842
1993, Jun 18	Security Council urges Greece and Macedonia to continue to work towards agreement	UN SC Res 845
1993, Jun 30	UNPROFOR mandate extended for 3 months	UN SC Res 847
1993, Sep 30	President Gligorov addresses General Assembly regarding the effect of sanctions	Macedonian Government request
1993, Sep 30	UNPROFOR mandate extended for 1 day	UN SC Res 869
1993, Oct 1	UNPROFOR mandate extended for 4 days	UN SC Res 870
1993, Oct 4	UNPROFOR mandate extended for 6 months; Notice of Sec-Gen's intent to establish 3 separate UNPROFOR commands	UN SC Res 871
1994, Feb 17	Imposition of Greek Embargo	Greek Government
1994, Mar 16	Sec-Gen informs Security Council of UNPROFOR-Macedonia mandate shortcomings – no internal mandate	UN Doc S/1994/300
1994, Mar 31	UNPROFOR mandate extended for 6 months; Approval for SRSG to use "good offices"	UN SC Res 908
1994, Sep 17	Sec-Gen recommends International Border Commission	UN Doc S/1994/1067
1994, Sep 30	UNPROFOR mandate extended for 6 months	UN SC Res 947
1995, Mar 22	Sec-Gen reports Macedonia faces a complex network of intrastate and interstate threats	UN Doc S/1995/222
1995, Mar 31	UNPROFOR-Croatia mandate terminated; UNCRO established	UN SC Res 981
1995, Mar 31	UNPROFOR-Macedonia officially transitions to UNPREDEP; initial mandate is for 8 months	UN SC Res 983
1995, Sep 13	Macedonia and Greece sign Interim Accord	UN Doc S/1995/794
1995, Nov 22	UN military sanctions against FRY lifted	UN SC Res 1021
1995, Nov 22	UN comprehensive sanctions against FRY lifted	UN SC Res 1022
1995, Nov 23	Sec-Gen reports on positive Macedonian concessions to Albanian minority	UN Doc S/1995/987
1995, Nov 30	UNCRO mandate termination date set	UN SC Res 1025
1995, Nov 30	UNPREDEP mandate extended for 6 months	UN SC Res 1027
1995, Dec 15	UNPROFOR-Bosnia mandate terminated; IFOR established	UN SC Res 1031
1996, Jan 15	UNCRO mandate terminated; UNTAES established	UN SC Res 1037
1996, Jan 30	Sec-Gen reports Macedonia's admission to regional organizations facilitates pluralist society	UN Doc S/1996/65
1996, Feb 13	UNPREDEP is declared an independent mission and strength is increased by 50 personnel	UN SC Res 1046
1996, Mar 22	Sec-Gen issues guidance on SRSG's responsibilities	UN Doc E/AC.51/1996/3

1996, Apr 17	Sec-Gen reiterates guidance on SRSG's mandate	UN Doc S/1996/373
1996, May 30	UNPREDEP mandate extended for 6 months	UN SC Res 1058
1996, Sep 30	Sec-Gen reports chance of spillover of northern conflict to Macedonia is unlikely	UN Doc S/1996/819
1996, Nov 27	UNPREDEP mandate extended for 6 months; troop strength to be reduced by 300	UN SC Res 1082
1997, Apr 9	Security Council suspends UNPREDEP strength reduction	UN SC Res 1105
1997, May 12	Sec Gen reports on threats to regional stability	UN Doc S/1997/365
1997, May 28	UNPREDEP mandate extended for 6 months; troop strength to be reduced by 300	UN SC Res 1110
1997, Jul 14	Sec-Gen issues guidance on SRSG's responsibilities	UN Doc A/51/950/1997
1997, Nov 20	Sec-Gen reports on unpredictability of events in Macedonia	UN Doc S/1997/911
1997, Nov 28	UNPREDEP mandate extended for 4 days	UN SC Res 1140
1997, Dec 4	UNPREDEP mandate extended for 9 months	UN SC Res 1142
1998, Mar 11	OSCE enhances Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje; calls for FRY to halt violence in Kosovo and fully cooperate	OSCE Decision 218
1998, Mar 31	UN imposition of military sanctions against FRY; invitation for OSCE to inform Sec-Gen on Kosovo situation	UN SC Res 1160
1998, Jun 1	Sec-Gen reports on threat to Macedonia of Kosovo refugees	UN Doc S/1998/454
1998, Jul 6	Contact Group establishes KDOM	Contact Group
1998, Jul 21	UNPREDEP mandate extended for 6 months; Troop strength increased by 300; Authorization to report on smuggling	UN SC Res 1186
1998, Sep 23	UN demands all parties cease hostilities and enable international monitoring in Kosovo; Endorses KDOM	UN SC Res 1199
1998, Oct 15	OSCE declares preparedness to embark upon verification activities in Kosovo within framework of UN SC Res 1199	OSCE Decision 259
1998, Oct 24	UN endorses OSCE KVM; Authorizes NATO Extraction Force in Macedonia	UN SC Res 1203
1998, Oct 25	OSCE establishes KVM	OSCE Decision 263
1998, Nov 26	NATO establishes KVCC	NAC Decision
1998, Dec 4	NATO Extraction Force (Determined Guarantor) established	NAC Decision
1999, Jan 29	Macedonian Foreign Affairs Minister requests UNPREDEP extension	UN Doc S/1999/108
1999, Feb 12	Sec-Gen reports that Kosovo could have serious repercussions in Macedonia; Recommends UNPREDEP extension	UN Doc S/1999/161
1999, Feb 25	China vetoes extension of UNPREDEP	UN Press Release SC/6648

## **Chapter 5: Phase II: Kosovo Intervention**

### **5.1. Introduction**

On 29 January 1999, the Macedonian Foreign Affairs Minister submitted to the Secretary-General his government's rationale for extension of UNPREDEP's mandate for an additional six months, with its existing composition and structure. In particular, Macedonia expressed concern over the danger of diffusion of the conflict in Kosovo; the increase in tensions on the Albanian-Yugoslav border; the still unstable situation in Albania, which had burdened Macedonia's efforts to prevent arms trafficking to Kosovo; and the lack of progress in demarcation of the country's border with the FRY.

On 12 February 1999, the Secretary-General (1999a) submitted his report pursuant to Resolution 1186. The report stated the increase in UNPREDEP's strength by 300 personnel had been completed in early January, and the quantity of observation posts had been increased from eight to sixteen. It was also noted the mandate had been extended to include monitoring and reporting on illicit arms flows and other activities prohibited under Resolution 1160. Increasing concern was expressed that the spread of violence and the nature of the attacks in Kosovo could lead to a situation of all-out civil war, which might have unpredictable repercussions for the entire region. Accordingly, it was a matter of satisfaction, the Secretary-General stated, that thus far Macedonia had not been adversely affected by the Kosovo conflict. However, the potentially serious repercussions that continued violence in Kosovo could have upon the interstate and intrastate security of the country must not be ignored given the large proportion of ethnic Albanians in the Macedonian population. Consequently, the Secretary-General had recommended UNPREDEP be extended for another six-month period, through 31 August 1999, as taken up in draft resolution S/1999/201 that was considered on 25 February 1999.

China exercised its veto in the Security Council (1999b) to prevent extension of the UNPREDEP mandate in Macedonia on 25 February 1999. Numerous delegations of Member States articulated distress regarding China's veto, predominantly pertaining to possible diffusion of conflict from Kosovo across the border with Macedonia. UNPREDEP's host Government, Macedonia, noted in the Council that UNPREDEP was discharging its mandate in an exemplary manner;

amid a regional situation that continued to be very difficult, dangerous and unpredictable; and the possibility of a new bloody war in the Balkans was real. The United States judged the continued role of UNPREDEP as indispensable, particularly during such a sensitive period of valid security threats. The President of the Security Council, the Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations, voiced opinion on behalf of his nation that UNPREDEP's continued presence in Macedonia was essential at this critical juncture of regional instability. Germany, on behalf of the European Union, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Cyprus, Iceland and Norway, expressed the Union's support, and attachment of great importance, to the role of UNPREDEP as a stabilizing and peace-promoting element in the geo-political context of the region. The European Union saw the value of UNPREDEP not only in its military component and its border monitoring, but also in its civilian efforts to promote understanding among the different ethnic groups in Macedonia. Secretary-General Kofi Annan said in a statement after the Council vote that a new approach would have to be adopted by the Government of Macedonia and its neighbors, in consultation with regional organizations.

UNPREDEP had contributed successfully to the prevention of diffusion or contagion of conflict elsewhere in the region to Macedonia. By promoting dialogue among various political forces and ethnic communities, and utilizing its good offices, UNPREDEP had a stabilizing effect within the country, which further reduced tensions that could have clearly increased as a direct result of the continued crisis in Kosovo. However, considering the persistent regional threats, a suitable replacement would have to fill the newfound conflict prevention void created in the wake of UNPREDEP termination. In essence, based upon the current interstate and intrastate threats to peace and stability within Macedonia, the termination of conflict prevention efforts of the international community in the form of UNPREDEP could not have come at a more inopportune time.

Ever since Macedonia declared its independence, the two primary goals to which the country aspired were membership in NATO and in the European Union. President Gligorov, Prime Minister Crvenkovski and Minister of Defense Kitanoski (1998) had all proclaimed the sincere desire of Macedonia to join Partnership for Peace (PfP) and become a member of NATO, in full compliance with NATO norms

and standards, so as to contribute to the building of a Euro-Atlantic Community of shared values. The Macedonian leadership saw NATO as one of the crucial columns in the modern European security architecture and considered its membership in NATO as a permanent obligation for which there was broad political and social consensus. The Macedonian government was fully aware of the intent of some of the permanent members of the Security Council to terminate UNPREDEP, and based on aspirations toward NATO membership and the threat from Kosovo, the Macedonian leadership was inclined to encourage NATO to launch a presence in the country. The rationalization was that NATO forces on Macedonian soil would deter any possible incursion into the country, as well as increase their international status in concert with the possibility of future NATO membership. Additionally, to proceed from a UN presence targeted toward conflict prevention to a NATO presence in which Macedonia would be an active participant, was deemed by the Macedonian leadership as a sign of positive progression.

As a result, the Macedonian administration agreed to allow NATO to establish the Kosovo Verification Coordination Center and the NATO Extraction Force on its soil. As discussed in the previous chapter, the KVCC was a multinational NATO headquarters, which served as the primary liaison between the OSCE ground verification and NATO air verification missions. In support of the OSCE KVM mission, the NAC approved a NATO special military task force on 4 December 1998, to assist with the emergency evacuation of members of the KVM if renewed conflict should put them at risk. The NATO Extraction Force, named Determined Guarantor, was activated on 10 December and initially comprised 1,500 personnel from Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom; all under French leadership. Consequently, prior to the termination of UNPREDEP there were already nearly two thousand NATO troops in Macedonia, under the NATO flag, in support of Kosovo operations.

As much as Macedonia desired a NATO presence in country, NATO also wanted a presence in Macedonia. Since 1990, and the fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO had been in the process of redefining itself from an organization principally concerned with collective defense to one concerned with collective security as well as collective defense (Aybet 2000, 2001; Butler 2000; Leurdijk 2003, NATO 2003). NATO's defense posture transformation and political reconstitution had progressed

from the Comprehensive Concept in 1989, to the London Declaration of July 1990, to approval of the New Strategic Concept in November 1991, and by June of 1992 had defined its future *raison d'être* by endorsing the principle of its participation in peacekeeping, specifically by making available its assets to the CSCE/OSCE. In December 1992, NATO confirmed their preparedness to support, on a case by case basis, peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council. This confirmation was in actuality only substantiating what was already occurring, as on 16 July 1992, NATO's involvement in the Yugoslav crisis commenced when NATO ships entered the Adriatic to monitor compliance with Security Council Resolution 757. As the UN became increasingly more involved with the Yugoslav conflicts, so too did NATO's role intensify from sea, to air, and finally land support operations. NATO's scope of operations was also to transition from support of peacekeeping operations, to combat operations in support of peace enforcement, and ultimately to tasks related to post-conflict peace building. In essence, NATO had established its collective security role by becoming a military subcontractor for the UN.

As the critical stages of the Kosovo crisis were unfolding, though, the relationship between the UN and NATO was to alter yet again. As the UN strengthened its position regarding the impending crisis in Kosovo by approval of Security Council Resolutions 1160 and 1199, NATO had concurrently increased its rhetoric regarding the level of military preparedness for air operations against FRY forces. However, as it later became evident a Security Council resolution authorizing NATO use of force in Kosovo would be vetoed rather than passed, NATO was suddenly faced with a credibility dilemma. As a result, NATO reverted back to the collective defense function by authorizing out of region, non-Article 5, operations outside the framework of Chapter VIII. Accordingly, the geo-strategic location of Macedonia became paramount to NATO success in executing an air campaign against the FRY, as well as serving as a pre-positioning base for a follow-on NATO force in Kosovo. Thus, as Macedonia desired a NATO presence in country, NATO reciprocally sought a presence in Macedonia. This mutual aspiration, however, was to become a source of political acrimony in the future.

While the predominance of international community focus regarding Macedonia was directed at the termination of UNPREDEP and ensuing expansion of NATO forces, note should be made of the OSCE, which continued to execute the conflict

prevention efforts of the Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje. Unfortunately the size of the OSCE mission precluded any overly encompassing efforts. The OSCE mission in Skopje began with a staff of four personnel in 1992, and OSCE Decision 218 to temporarily enhance the mission in 1998 increased the total number of staff personnel to eight. The mission did, however, remain and continue to engage with the Macedonian leadership as well as the ethnic communities, which helped to perpetuate those conflict prevention efforts commenced by the OSCE and UNPREDEP aimed at creating the conditions necessary for peace and stability within the country. In spite of the OSCE mission's limited size, it did continue to serve as a stabilizing source through the troubling times ahead.

## **5.2. Kosovo Intervention**

### *Origins of the Conflict.*

While some claim the genesis of the Kosovo conflict dates back hundreds of years and is the result of ancient hatreds, the origins of the crisis leading up to the NATO intervention of 1999 must be understood in terms of a new wave of nationalism arising in the 1970's and 1980's (Independent Commission on Kosovo 2000). Since the incorporation of Kosovo within Serbia as a result of the Balkan Wars, the general tone of mutual intolerance between Serbs and Kosovar Albanians has vacillated from harsh repression to near autonomy. Following World War II, Kosovar Albanians underwent a period of repression as Tito had just separated from Moscow in 1948, and was circumspect regarding Kosovar Albanians sympathizing with Albanian president and loyal Stalinist, Enver Hoxha. Autonomist agitation among Kosovar Albanians rose in 1968, when moderate demands were first voiced for the granting of republic status for Kosovo and the establishment of an Albanian language university. Demonstrations ensued in Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro, resulting in the opening of the ethnic Albanian University of Pristina; and Kosovo being declared an autonomous province in 1974. While an autonomous province had its own administration, assembly, judiciary and the right of veto in the Serbian and Federal Parliaments, it did not have the right to secede from the federation nor was considered a bearer of Yugoslav sovereignty. The fundamental differentiation was the Kosovar Albanians, like the Hungarians in Vojvodina, were

considered a nationality as opposed to a nation since both their nations existed elsewhere in the form of the countries of Albania and Hungary.

With granting Kosovo autonomous province status in the 1974 constitution, Tito had embarked on a policy of ethno-national devolution that would permit a high level of Albanization within Kosovo (Dannreuther 2001, 16). While this policy was to result in relatively successful management of the interethnic tensions between the Albanian majority and Serbian minority populations within Kosovo from 1974 until Tito's death in 1980, it also would form the basis for greater nationalistic sentiment from both sides after his death. From the Serb perspective, the fact that Kosovo and Vojvodina could merge to outvote Serbia in federal bodies, coupled with the demographic reduction of the Serb minority from approximately 27 percent of the population of Kosovo to ten percent in the 1980s, led to the conviction that Serbia's rightful influence and power as the largest constituent nation within the federation had been emasculated. From the Kosovar Albanian perspective, the existence of an autonomous province facilitated creation of a Kosovar Albanian identity; while the fact that an autonomous province was not of an equivalent status as a republic and was precluded from seceding from the federation, created the desire for greater autonomy and independence. Thus, Kosovo was to become a crucial facet in the post-Tito evolution of an assertive Serbian nationalist movement.

As a result of the early 1970s ethno-national devolution of power to the republics and provinces within federal Yugoslavia, a fundamentally ethnic Albanian leadership emerged in Kosovo, thereby producing an ethnodemographic regional shift from ethnically varied to primarily Albanian. Within the now predominantly ethnic Albanian province, the University of Pristina served as the engine of Albanian nationalism, facilitated by mounting discontent with the social and economic underdevelopment of the province. With the death of Tito in 1980, ethnic Albanian nationalism increased in intensity, which led to a further sequence of nationalist demonstrations in 1981 seeking either republic status within the Yugoslav federation or outright unification with Albania. These protests were suppressed with a brutal demonstration of force, further alienating the ethnic Albanian population.

During the 1980s, Serbian nationalism grew while ethnic Serbian and Albanian relations continued to deteriorate within Kosovo. Kosovo had always been the poorest region of Yugoslavia, and despite the highest levels of public investment for

underdeveloped regions within Yugoslavia, the gap between Kosovo and the remainder of Yugoslavia continued to widen. While discontent with the social and economic underdevelopment of the province continued to increase among the Kosovar Albanian community, so too did the resentment of Serbia and the other northern republics toward utilization of federal tax monies to support Kosovo. It was Slobodan Milosevic, the little-known protégé of Ivan Stambolic, president of the Serbian republic, who capitalized on the increasing Serbian nationalist predilection so as to ensure his political ascendance. In April of 1987, when riot police in the province of Kosovo beat back thousands of Serbs as they swarmed a political meeting hall, Milosevic stood on a nearby balcony and declared, "No one has the right to beat you, no one will ever beat you again." This speech was to transform into a battle cry for Serbians, the largest nationality within Yugoslavia. Five months later Milosevic deposed Stambolic, once his friend and mentor. In 1989, Milosevic assumed the presidency of Yugoslavia, and in a series of constitutional amendments, followed by a new constitution in 1990, ultimately eliminated autonomy of the provinces within Yugoslavia. This prompted ethnic Albanian members of the provincial parliament to declare independence for Kosovo; thereby provoking a rigorous rejoinder by Serbian authorities, who terminated the provincial parliament and government, closed the University of Pristina and increased political repression.

Milosevic's apparent goal was to create a Serb-dominated Yugoslavia, with himself as leader. This demonstration of Serb domination and discrimination toward Kosovo, coupled with the dissolution of communism throughout Eastern Europe, contributed to the emergence of competing nationalisms in opposition to Serbia (Dannreuther 2001, 17). In 1991, Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia declared independence, followed by Bosnia in 1992. After losing a short conflict with Slovenia, Milosevic's attempts to retain control over Yugoslav areas with large Serbian minorities resulted in protracted conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia. Surprisingly, though, Kosovo did not erupt into conflict during this period, which was predominantly a result of internal politics within Kosovo.

After the Kosovo Provincial Parliament was dissolved by Milosevic on 5 July 1990, the delegates of that provincial parliament continued to meet privately to develop a parallel state apparatus. This unusual political maneuver resulted in a shadow government for Kosovo as well as an informal economy, which received

substantial funding from the Kosovar Albanian Diaspora that had emigrated to Western Europe and the United States. In September of 1991, a self-organized referendum on independence took place, with 87 percent of eligible voters participating and 99 percent of those voting in favor of independence for Kosovo. This was followed in May of 1992 by elections for a new republican government and assembly. Utilizing private homes as polling stations, the League for a Democratic Kosovo (LDK) was elected by an overwhelming majority of 96 of 100 single constituency seats (Independent Commission on Kosovo 2000, 45). The LDK leader, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova was elected president of the Republic of Kosovo at the same time. While this parallel government was not accepted officially by the international community, it did perform a major function within Kosovo with respect to governance of the Kosovar Albanian majority. Rugova set about leading Kosovo in a tactical and principled non-violent movement seeking Kosovo independence from Serbia. This movement was grounded in Rugova's personal belief in a Gandhian form of non-violent resistance, and coupled with the reality that Milosevic and the Serbs needed only a justification to engage Kosovo in violent conflict as had already been exemplified in Croatia and Bosnia.

The establishment of a parallel system within Kosovo was funded utilizing remittances from a "recommended" three percent tax on incomes of the Kosovo Albanian Diaspora, as well as from contributions from Albanian families and businesses within Kosovo. Rugova distributed these funds to the municipal councils to be utilized for education, health care, culture, science, sports agriculture and social assistance. This idea of a parallel system was deeply influenced by the notions of autonomy and self-organization developed among Central European intellectuals and Polish Solidarity. Additionally, Kosovar Albanians wished to show the international community they were more developed than the barbaric stereotype they believed the Serbs exemplified. As at least one third of the Kosovar Albanian population had traveled outside of Kosovo to predominantly Western Europe and Albania, there also grew a more general inclination toward independence and Europeanization as opposed to uniting with less developed Albania proper. Rugova's ultimate goal in this non-violent form of resistance was to garner the support of the international community, who, he hoped, would eventually recognize the legitimacy of the Kosovar right to self-determination. While the establishment

and administration of this parallel system, in the face of Serb repression, was an achievement in itself, it was never to attain the desired goal.

The international community, while aware of the situation in Kosovo, was preoccupied with the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia. As a result, the international community did not respond to the evidence of “good behavior” on the part of the Kosovar Albanians in the expected manner. Just as Kosovar Albanians were losing patience with Rugova’s strategy of non-violent resistance, and were becoming fatigued from the exertion to uphold the parallel system under such complex conditions, the Dayton Agreement was signed. Although the signing of the Dayton Agreement, achieved in Dayton on 21 November of 1995, and signed in Paris on 14 December of 1995, ended conflict in the remainder of the former Yugoslavia, it was to serve as a catalyst for more violent actions within Kosovo (Dannreuther 2001, 18; Heinbecker 2004, 539; Independent Commission on Kosovo 2000, 50; Mertus 1999, 6; O’Neill 2002, 22; Troebst 1998, 19). The Dayton Agreement mentioned Kosovo only once, and that was in connection with preconditions for lifting the sanctions against the FRY related to full diplomatic recognition of the FRY, full membership of the FRY in international organizations and institutions, and release of contested FRY assets. The result of this blatant omission of Kosovo in the Dayton Agreement was an almost instantaneous split of the united front of political parties in Kosovo. The conclusions drawn from rival parties to Rugova’s LDK regarding Dayton was the attention of the international community can only be gained through violence. Leading Kosovar intellectuals, such as Adem Demaci and Rexhap Qosja, began to openly criticize Rugova’s strategy of non-violent resistance, while underground groups began to call for a more aggressive and violent campaign.

#### *From Non-Violent Resistance to Violent Conflict.*

The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), the English transliteration of the Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosoves (UCK), grew out of a Marxist-Leninist-Enverist party formed in the Albanian Diaspora in the early 1980s called the Levisja Popullare e Kosoves (LPK) (Independent Commission on Kosovo 2000, 51). Hashim Thaci, a former university student movement leader, joined forces with leaders of the LPK to found the armed movement that became the KLA in 1993. Expelled from the University of Pristina by Serb forces Thaci went to the Drenica Valley region of Kosovo to

promote resistance among Kosovar Albanians. After being sentenced in absentia to 22 years in prison for terrorist offences, he fled to Switzerland, where he attended graduate school and received a Masters Degree in International relations from the University of Zürich. He returned to Kosovo in 1998 to fight with the KLA.

The KLA slowly grew as small, often squabbling, groups gradually coalesced (O'Neill 2002, 22). Starting in 1993, a few KLA members received military training in secret camps in northern Albania. KLA members then began harassing attacks against Serb police posts, which led to the killing of a Serb policeman in 1995, but it was not until 1996 that KLA members claimed responsibility for these attacks. In the eyes of the international community, however, due to the KLA's small size, modest equipment, lack of training and lack of popular support, the KLA was not viewed as a serious threat. This was to change in 1997. It was January of 1997 that witnessed the collapse of the pyramid scheme in Albania, resulting in uncontained rioting. The Albanian government fell, and the country descended into anarchy and a near civil war in which some 2,000 people were killed. Moreover, many in the army and police force had deserted, and one million weapons had been looted from the armories (Jarvis 2000). This sudden proliferation of available weapons in the region was to alter the character and intensity of the KLA resistance.

The first KLA member to be killed is believed to have been Adrian Krasniqi, during a raid on a Serb police post in western Kosovo in October of 1997. By late 1997, the Drenica Valley region of Kosovo had become a breeding ground of KLA activity. Serb police forces were aware of a KLA activist by the name of Adem Jashari, from the village of Donji Prekaz in the Drenica Valley, who had received military training in Albania. The Serb Police had attempted to arrest Jashari twice, but were repelled each time, thereby elevating Jashari to hero status within his village and the region. Activity increased in the Drenica Valley with several high profile KLA attacks against Serb Police, which were reciprocated with a Serb ambush on KLA forces on 28 February 1998, leaving several from each side dead. On 5 March 1998, the Serb police tried again to arrest Jashari, this time utilizing artillery and other heavy weapons. While the Serb forces succeeded in killing Adem Jashari, the attack also resulted in 58 casualties, which included 18 women and 10 children. From this point forward, the possibility of a peaceful settlement between Serb and Kosovar forces was no longer possible. In effect, the Serb forces had

greatly increased KLA recruitment and cause, as well as finally bringing greater international community attention.

By early 1998, the increasing level of violence in Kosovo finally forced the international community to focus on the potentially explosive situation, whereas until now only NGOs had been active in the region. The United States assumed a leading role by dispatching Robert Gelbard, the special representative for implementation of the Dayton Agreement, to Belgrade on 23 February 1998. While Gelbard urged Milosevic to use restraint in dealing with the KLA, he also officially labeled the KLA a terrorist group. The unintended consequence of this statement was to effectively give Serb forces the authority to deal with the KLA in a manner befitting terrorists. Serb forces embarked upon an offensive against KLA forces a week after Gelbard's visit, of which the Jashari attack was a component.

Responding to the excessively brutal Serb actions, the United States dropped the terrorist group linkage to the KLA, and condemned the Serb violence. Other prominent states and institutions condemned the Serb aggression as well, including the Contact Group. On 31 March 1998, the Security Council acted by adopting Resolution 1160 (1998a), which condemned the use of force by both Serbian and KLA forces; imposed sanctions against military equipment, weapons and training; and invited the OSCE, who had just passed Decision 218 (OSCE 1998) on 11 March, to keep the Secretary-General informed on the situation in Kosovo.

The KLA continued to increase their attacks on Serb police posts thereby provoking swift, and often disproportionate Serb reprisals, with both sides sporadically targeting civilians. The spreading violence within Kosovo, coupled with increasing international pressure against Serb forces, served to legitimize Milosevic's position domestically. During the summer of 1998, Milosevic commenced a large scale operation to crush the KLA insurgency and recapture the Drenica Valley region. This campaign was aimed at not only eradicating KLA activities, but was intended to achieve this by directly targeting the Albanian majority population in rural areas, thus causing the first significant exodus of Kosovar Albanian refugees. These increases in military activity and violence against civilians led to the first consideration by NATO of military intervention in June of 1998.

Throughout the summer of 1998 the level of violence in Kosovo increased, resulting in amplified actions by the international community. On 23 September 1998, the Security Council passed Resolution 1199 (1998d) welcoming the establishment of KDOM, noting the numbers of persons displaced and without shelter, expressing alarm at the impending human catastrophe in Kosovo, affirming that deterioration of the situation in Kosovo constituted a threat to peace and stability in the entire region, and called for a cease-fire by both parties to the conflict. On 13 October 1998, following further deterioration of the situation, the NAC authorized activation orders for air strikes against Serb positions. This move was designed to support diplomatic efforts to make the Milosevic regime withdraw forces from Kosovo, cooperate in bringing an end to the violence, and facilitate the return of refugees to their homes. At the last moment, following further diplomatic initiatives including visits to Belgrade by NATO's Secretary General Solana; US Envoys Richard Holbrooke and Christopher Hill; the Chairman of NATO's Military Committee, General Naumann; and the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Clark; President Milosevic agreed to comply and the air strikes were called off (NATO 2004b). Moreover, it was determined the KVM would be instituted to verify compliance of all parties with Resolution 1199. The OSCE was to observe compliance on the ground, and NATO would conduct aerial surveillance. NATO concluded their agreement with the FRY Ministry of Defense on 15 October 1998, and the OSCE signed their agreement with the FRY Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 16 October. On 24 October 1998, the Security Council approved Resolution 1203 (1998e), endorsing both components of the KVM and affirming that in the event of an emergency, action may be necessary to ensure their safety and freedom of movement.

Although Milosevic's forces initially observed the terms of the cease-fire, the presence of the KDOM and KVM had little effect on KLA forces, who utilized the opportunity to reconstitute and resume military action. In December of 1998, as could be expected, Serb forces retaliated. On 15 January of 1999, the brutal Serb massacre of 45 Kosovars in the village of Racak came to the attention of the international community. Led by the United States, the Contact Group was determined that any further diplomatic attempts at reconciliation of the Kosovo crisis had to be backed by the explicit and credible threat of force. On 29 January 1999,

the Contact Group agreed to host peace talks at Rambouillet, France, where Serbs and ethnic Albanians would be coerced to sign a prepared peace settlement.

On 6 February, peace talks opened at Rambouillet, sponsored by France and Britain and led by the United States, the EU, and Russian negotiators. The overarching goal was to establish a durable and fair interim agreement that would create a peaceful political framework for Kosovo while deferring the question of Kosovo's status for several years. Both the Serb and Kosovar delegations were warned this diplomatic effort was backed by the threat of military action by NATO. The Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, drafted on behalf of the Contact Group by United States Ambassador to Macedonia, Christopher Hill, proposed establishing a system of democratic self-government for Kosovo while upholding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY. It also invited NATO to deploy a military force to ensure compliance and provide a secure environment, allowing NATO free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the FRY. From the outset Serb representatives were adverse to the deployment of NATO forces on Serbian soil, while Kosovar representatives were opposed to maintenance of the territorial integrity of the FRY as opposed to independence. Finally, after almost three weeks of negotiations, the Kosovars relented to conditionally accept the draft accord, which would grant wide autonomy for Kosovo and revisit the issue of independence after three years. However, this acceptance was subject to a two week delay. The Serb delegation, conversely, continued to oppose the agreement.

On 15 March 1999 the peace talks resumed in Rambouillet, with the Kosovar delegation finally signing the interim agreement on 18 March. The Serb delegation, with continued opposition, refused to sign; and the Rambouillet peace talks were officially closed on 19 March 1999, under the threat of NATO air strikes. At this point, Serbian military and police forces increased the intensity of their attacks, and on 20 March, the OSCE KVM withdrew from Kosovo to Macedonia. On 22 March, US Ambassador Richard Holbrooke flew to Belgrade, in a final attempt to persuade President Milosevic to halt the violent attacks on the Kosovar Albanians or face imminent NATO air strikes. Milosevic refused to comply, and on 23 March the NATO order was given to commence air strikes. Ultimately, NATO initiated the air campaign, termed Operation Allied Force, on 24 March 1999.

NATO commenced Operation Allied Force with the expectation that Milosevic would capitulate after only a few days of subjection to the NATO air campaign, and would seek to restart peace talks thereafter. As a result of this expectation, NATO had only planned sufficient targets, munitions, and support elements for a short campaign, as well as only planned for minimal numbers of resultant refugees and displaced persons. NATO's expectations, however, were not to be met as Milosevic initiated a vicious campaign against the Kosovar Albanian population. Although Serb military and police forces claimed to be attacking only KLA enclaves, the Serb campaign resulted in one of terror and compelled expulsion aimed at forcing most, if not all, of the Kosovar Albanians from the territory of Kosovo.

On 6 May 1999, the G-8 Foreign Ministers, at a meeting in Bonn, Germany, adopted a proposal for the "immediate and verifiable" end to violence and repression in Kosovo and the withdrawal of military, police and paramilitary forces (UN Security Council 1999c). This proposal was presented to the FRY leadership by Martti Ahtisaari, the President of Finland and representing the EU, and Victor Chernomyrdin of Russia; and was finally accepted by the Serbian and FRY governments on 2 June 1999 (UN Security Council 1999e). In light of the FRY acceptance of the general principles on a political solution to the Kosovo Crisis, the OSCE passed Decision 296 on 8 June 1999 (OSCE 1999a), which effectively terminated the KVM and established an OSCE Task Force for Kosovo to plan for future engagement as part of the impending new international presence. A Military Technical Agreement (MTA) was concluded between NATO (1999) and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the evening of 9 June 1999. The agreement was signed by Lt. General Sir Michael Jackson, on behalf of NATO, and by Colonel General Svetozar Marjanovic of the Yugoslav Army and Lieutenant General Obrad Stevanovic of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, on behalf of the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Republic of Serbia respectively. This agreement reaffirmed the political agreement of 2 June, set the terms for withdrawal of the FRY forces, and allowed for deployment of the International Security Force (KFOR), all in accordance with a pending UN Security Council resolution. On 10 June 1999, after an air campaign lasting 78 days, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana announced he had instructed General Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, temporarily to suspend NATO's air operations against

Yugoslavia. This decision was taken after consultations with the North Atlantic Council and confirmation from General Clark that the full withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo had begun. Also on 10 June the UN Security Council (1999f) passed Resolution 1244, announcing the Security Council's decision to deploy international civil and security presences in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices. Thus the war between NATO and the FRY officially ended, and a new period of international presence was to commence in Kosovo. Both the physical intervention itself, inclusive of the military buildup, and the ensuing international presence in Kosovo were to have profound effects upon Macedonia.

*Macedonian Effects from Kosovo Intervention.*

As previously discussed, while Macedonia desired a NATO presence in country, NATO reciprocally sought a presence in Macedonia. This mutual ambition, however, was to become less reciprocal as time progressed. Whereas the Macedonian focus was to deter any possible incursion into the country, in addition to increasing their international status in concert with the possibility of future NATO membership; the predominance of NATO and international community focus regarding Macedonia was directed toward the geo-strategic location of Macedonia as a critical component to NATO success in the air campaign against the FRY, as well as serving as a pre-positioning base for a follow-on NATO force in Kosovo. In other words, while Macedonia was considering what was in the best interests for Macedonia, NATO was seeking to utilize Macedonia in the best interests of NATO with respect to Kosovo and the FRY. Consequently, although the desire for a NATO presence in Macedonia was reciprocal, the goals of each entity were divergent.

The first physical evidence that a NATO presence was not effusively supported by all elements of Macedonian society came on 25 March 1999, one day after the air campaign commenced in Kosovo. Members of the Serb minority sympathetic to the FRY organized a demonstration to express their anger at NATO presence, and marched to the Hotel Aleksandar Palace, which was housing officials from the OSCE KVM who had evacuated Kosovo on 20 March. The demonstrators, carrying anti-war banners and waving the flags of Yugoslavia and pre-independence Macedonia, were protesting NATO air attacks on Serbian targets. After damaging a number of OSCE vehicles, the group of more than two thousand protestors marched

to the US Embassy, where the demonstration turned into a riot. There, the protesters occupied the US Embassy compound and, armed with rocks and Molotov cocktails, set fire to 19 diplomatic vehicles and caused major damage to the exterior of the Embassy. The protesters did not gain entry into the Embassy, and were eventually dispersed by the police.

Anti-NATO sentiment was to increase shortly thereafter as a result of the arrival of numerous Kosovar Albanian refugees. When Milosevic initiated his campaign against the Kosovar Albanian population targeted toward compelled expulsion of most, if not all, of the Kosovar Albanians from the territory of Kosovo, a sudden and unexpected deluge of refugees flooded into Albania and Macedonia. UNHCR estimates indicate approximately 344,500 refugees entered Macedonia during the 78 day NATO campaign, thereby creating an immediate humanitarian crisis (UNHCR 1999, 348). The Macedonian government had always been concerned about the prospect of a large refugee influx and the possible destabilizing effect it could have within the country. Relatively small numbers of refugees had been regularly admitted to Macedonia until 31 March when entry processing requirements at the primary crossing point of Blace were drastically slowed in a government effort to stem the impending tide of refugees. The immediate result of this action was tens of thousands of refugees trapped in muddy fields at the Blace border crossing. They could not return to from where the Serb forces had expelled them, nor could they enter Macedonia until they had been properly processed by the Macedonian government.

The Macedonian government received harsh criticism from NATO, UNHCR and the international community at large. From the Macedonian perspective, the refugee crisis was a matter of national security. Sudden acceptance of substantial numbers of Albanian refugees could have grave effects upon the delicate ethnic balance and political issues within the country. At the time, there was no way of knowing if the refugees would return to Kosovo once admitted. Additionally, as the flow of refugees was a direct result of the commencement of the NATO air campaign the Macedonian leadership was of the opinion that NATO and the international community bore some responsibility for sharing the economic and social burden that would accompany the acceptance of refugees. On 4 April 1999, the Macedonian government's fears were somewhat allayed by assurances of rapid assistance from

NATO, UNHCR and the international community. As a result, NATO was to assist in the construction of refugee camps; the UNHCR to implement two innovative policies to assist with transfer of refugees out of Macedonia, and the international community had promised economic aid.

NATO forces initially constructed the tented refugee camps of Stenkovec I and II, Radusa and Nepostreno, and were later to add camps at Cegrane, Senokos, Bojane and Blace; while various NGOs installed water and sanitation facilities, and provided health care (UNHCR-EPAU 2000, 67). While the UNHCR was initially opposed to NATO forces constructing the refugee camps, in the end it was the only possibility due to the factors of a required immediate response and NATO forces already pre-positioned in country. Meanwhile, the UNHCR implemented the Humanitarian Evacuation Program (HEP) and the Humanitarian Transfers Program (HTP). The HEP was a program where refugees admitted to Macedonia would be processed and flown to a third country who had volunteered to accept various numbers of refugees, while the HTP would transfer refugees from camps in Macedonia to other camps in Albania. Both programs were voluntary in nature and designed to alleviate the burden on Macedonia thereby allowing redress of the acute blockage of refugees at the border. In all, roughly 96,000 refugees were transported to third countries under the HEP, and 1,382 were transferred to Albania via the HTP, leaving 247,118 refugees in country at the zenith. Of these, 110,800 were in refugee camps, with the remainder cohabited with host Albanian families. Additionally, there were estimates of up to 8,000 unregistered refugees. On 14 May of 1999, the UN Security Council (1999d) adopted Resolution 1239, which expressed grave concern at the humanitarian crisis in and around Kosovo as a result of the enormous influx of refugees into Macedonia and Albania.

Critical to the conduct of the NATO mission was full support of Macedonia. From the construction and operation of refugee camps, to the loss of Macedonian airspace and closing of the Skopje International Airport to civilian traffic, to granting permission to preposition 18,500 NATO soldiers as a follow-on peacekeeping force, Macedonia was indeed a crucial component of NATO's efforts. Macedonian support for the interstate efforts of NATO, however, was to lead to intrastate effects. These effects can be predominantly categorized into the four focal components of economic, social, political, and environmental. Understandably, these

categorizations are by no means definitive in nature, as a singular effect can have a corresponding, or a second order, effect in another or several other categories.

The effect most easily discernable is economic impact; where the slowly recovering Macedonian economy was dealt an acute setback through the influx of refugees, disruption to international trade in goods and services, closing of transportation routes through the FRY, damage to consumer and investor confidence, and reductions in access to international capital markets. In addition to bringing trade with, and through, the FRY to a halt, the military campaign inflicted considerable damage on the transport and storage infrastructure in the FRY that would affect future trade endeavors as well. The cessation of all economic relations with the FRY not only caused the loss of Macedonia's largest trade partner, but also brought about the inability to utilize critical transit routes through the FRY to other European markets (World Bank 2000). In an export dependent economy, the consequences were a clear example of the domino effect. The lack of transit routes led to the cancellation of European and American contracts for Macedonian exports, causing factories to be closed and the workers unemployed, which led to the pullout of foreign investment due to real, or perceived, instability of the country. This situation was then exacerbated by those newly unemployed persons becoming dependent on the state for social welfare.

Moreover, while the international community eventually reimbursed Macedonia for a portion of refugee related expenditures, the sum received was considerably less than what was originally professed to be forthcoming. An alternative factor to consider is that the refugees cohabiting with host families were an additional drain on that family's resources. These families then had to resort to social welfare in order to finance their own basic requirements, asserting that these refugees were in point of fact a drain on state finances rather than being incorporated within international relief efforts. The refugees themselves were an ancillary economic outflow. The Macedonian government partially financed construction and maintenance of the refugee camps, as well as provided the 18,000 paid policemen to provide security for the refugees (Kljusev 1999b).

A further key consumption of Macedonian resources stemmed from a military source. With instability and violence approaching the Serbian and Albanian Borders, coupled with the cessation of all UNPREDEP activities, the Ministry of

Defense was obliged to deploy its minimal defense forces to underwrite border security. This was essential to force the refugees to utilize established border crossing sites so as to accurately account for and register their entry, and to interdict and deter weapons smuggling intended to arm the KLA with weapons transported from Albania through Macedonia. The outcome was that by May of 1999, the Ministry of Defense had already expended its entire budget for 1999, simply to fund the deployment of its military to make safe its own borders. All told, estimates show the Kosovo crisis cost the Macedonian government in the region of 1.5 billion dollars (Kljusev 1999a). It is also projected that use of the road network by the cumbersome NATO military vehicles resulted in 106.9 million dollars of damage requiring reparation that was never received.

Kosovo intervention effects were manifest within the Macedonian social sector as well. Foremost, is the onset of the refugees, which as previously discussed impacted both the economy and society. Nearly 20,000 refugees elected to remain in Macedonia, aggravating the already present discord between the Macedonian majority and Albanian minority (US Committee for Refugees 1999). The predominance of these refugees decided to remain purely because they had naught to return to in Kosovo, and were better off with their host family. Moreover, there was anxiety and apprehension within the Albanian minority resident in Macedonia throughout the crisis. On the one hand, Albanians could choose to support KLA aspirations, which would result in not being deemed devoted to Macedonia. On the other hand, they could choose not to champion the KLA cause, and thereby be considered dedicated to Macedonia and less than loyal to their brother Albanians. Either way, it was a difficult quandary. What appears to have taken place was the Albanian minority in Macedonia supported NATO and the air strikes, but gave limited and guarded support for the KLA and the aim of independence for Kosovo (Pierre 1999). Thus despite their ethnic connection, the Albanian minority purposefully tempered their espousal for KLA ambitions with the intention of stability within Macedonia. A plausible causative agent for this sentiment would be that the good offices mandate of the SRSG, coupled with the political efforts of UNPREDEP had facilitated the strengthening of mutual understanding and dialogue among political and ethnic parties. Had these efforts of UNPREDEP not preceded

the Kosovo crisis, the situation in Macedonia most likely would have been much less stable, and possibly inflammatory.

A supplementary social consequence not connected with ethnicity, was the wide-ranging consciousness by the populace that they were not in fact masters of their own destiny. Regardless of what they desire or imagine, Macedonia was at the mercy of international events. What was worse was the sentiment in general that the international community was essentially not primarily concerned with the welfare of Macedonia, other than in verbiage. In fact, Macedonians came to believe their country was viewed merely as a pawn that would be played as necessary to facilitate international engagement in Kosovo.

Although a tangible causative correlation is more problematical to ascertain in the political realm, there are certain possible corollaries that oblige examination. Since Macedonian independence in 1991, until elections in the fall of 1998, the SDSM, which was noted for close cooperation with the United States and NATO had been in power. Major opposition parties such as the VMRO-DPMNE and the DPA were considered by Washington to be “nationalist” and “extreme”. In November 1998, VMRO-DPMNE won the plebiscite and opted to form a coalition with DPA. Their electoral victory was seen as a public censure of those marked ties of SDSM to the U.S. and NATO. Another chief dynamic in the elections was the economy. VMRO-DPMNE promised the economic reform that SDSM had not been able to produce. In the end, ironically, the new government permitted NATO to preposition forces and utilize the entire infrastructure of the country. These were trying times for the Macedonian government, and the predominance of the Western powers presumed the government would not survive in tact. Paradoxically, contemporary opinions are the unlikely coalition of the “nationalistic” Macedonian and Albanian parties is what constituted the quintessence of political stability during the crisis. Again, had it not been for the previous efforts of UNPREDEP in the realm of good offices and mutual political and ethnic understanding, this unique ethnically oriented coalition government might not have been possible.

The concluding component is the one least likely to come to mind and is consequently often overlooked, that being the environment. However, it is equally pertinent to the Macedonian development of a generally anti-NATO position. There were several assertions regarding environmental damage to Macedonian land, air,

and ecosystems as a consequence of Kosovo intervention, however, the exact cause, or extent of damage, will not be known until further research and analysis are completed. One environmental effect is extensive bombing released large amounts of hazardous, toxic, carcinogenic, and radioactive substances in Yugoslavia, which entered Macedonia via air and the Lepenec River (Dokovska 1999a). The polluted river water then contaminates the underground water sources through aquifers (BBC 2000). A further threat to the underground water supply was severe strain placed on fresh water and sewage facilities as a result of hastily constructed refugee camps. In some cases, the amount of human waste simply exceeded sewage capacity and was buried instead. This was also true for medical waste, including human body parts, until Great Britain donated an incinerator with a large enough capacity that the medical waste could be incinerated at the Skopje Army Hospital under agreement between the Ministry of Defense and NATO, (Dokovska 1999b).

Two other environmental effects are unequivocally linked to NATO. One is that along with NATO forces and the OSCE KVM, came thousands of heavy vehicles, including tanks and armored personnel carriers. These vehicles deployed to Macedonia in a tactical manner, requiring maintenance to be performed in the field, quite literally. The outcome is large amounts of petrol and other substances have been dumped on Macedonian lands. The other environmental consequence is much more blatant. NATO was accused, and later admitted, to dumping excess explosives into two lakes from helicopters. After being confronted with witnesses, spokesmen from NATO admitted helicopters ejected unexploded ordnance into Lake Prespa and Lake Dolnolipkovsko (Dokovska 1999c). Lake Dolnolipkovsko is in northern Macedonia and is a reservoir used for drinking water, and Lake Prespa is in southern Macedonia and feeds, via underground aquifers, Lake Ohrid, which is protected by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). While culpability has been established, suitable methods of restitution have still not yet been agreed upon by Macedonia and NATO.

#### *Kosovo Intervention Précis.*

By promoting dialogue among various political forces and ethnic communities, and utilizing its good offices, UNPREDEP had a stabilizing effect within Macedonia, which further reduced intrastate tensions that could have clearly

increased as a direct result of the continued crisis in Kosovo. Similarly, the presence of UNPREDEP forces along the Albanian and FRY borders acted as a powerful interstate element of security, which allowed and facilitated UNPREDEP's intrastate engagement. However, regardless of the positive effects UNPREDEP had within Macedonia, the mission was terminated prematurely. Considering the persistent regional threats, and particularly the imminent interstate threat imposed by Kosovo, the international community should have been more concerned with the conflict prevention and security vacuum created in the wake of UNPREDEP termination. The sudden removal of UNPREDEP forces along the Macedonian border with Albania and the FRY left Macedonia considerably more vulnerable to interstate threat.

In the absence of international concern, the Macedonian leadership saw NATO as the appropriate presence to fill that vacuum. As previously discussed, while Macedonia desired a NATO presence in country, NATO reciprocally sought a presence in Macedonia. However, while the Macedonian focus was to deter any possible incursion into the country, as well as increase their international status in concert with the possibility of future NATO membership; the predominance of NATO and international community focus regarding Macedonia was directed toward the geo-strategic location of Macedonia as a critical component to NATO success in the air campaign against the FRY, as well as serving as a pre-positioning base for a follow-on NATO force in Kosovo. As a result, the number of NATO troops on Macedonian soil had risen from nearly two thousand at the termination of UNPREDEP to 18,500 at the cessation of the NATO air campaign; a period of just over three months. It was precisely because of this large NATO presence the international community did not concern itself with discussions of a formal conflict prevention mandate of any type in Macedonia, with the noted exception of the OSCE. As a result of OSCE Decision 218, the OSCE mission in Skopje still had eight personnel in country to execute its mission with respect to Macedonia. The mission did remain and continue to engage the Macedonian leadership as well as the ethnic communities, which helped to perpetuate those conflict prevention efforts commenced by the OSCE and UNPREDEP aimed at creating the intrastate conditions necessary for peace and stability.

Although the international community had grave concerns regarding intrastate stability within Macedonia during execution of the Kosovo intervention, none of the nightmare scenarios came to fruition. Despite their ethnic connection, the Albanian minority purposefully tempered their espousal for KLA ambitions with the intention of stability within Macedonia. Additionally, the unlikely coalition of the “nationalistic” Macedonian and Albanian parties is what constituted the quintessence of political stability during the crisis at the governmental level. This is not to say, however, that interethnic tensions within the country were no longer present. The Kosovo crisis saw continued, and increased, interethnic tension in Macedonia, however, the previous efforts of UNPREDEP toward strengthening mutual understanding and dialogue among political and ethnic parties helped abate the possibility of any rapid escalation of escalation of these tensions into overt conflict. Furthermore, any immediate threat to Macedonia’s intrastate stability was defused by the NATO victory and rapid return of over 90 percent of Kosovar Albanian refugees.

As a consequence of the intervention in Kosovo, in the form of an air campaign, ethnic Macedonian support for NATO had waned, while support from ethnic Albanians increased. However, NATO still represented the critical component of international community presence sought by the Macedonian government, with the primary rationalization for this presence remaining to deter any possible incursion into the country, as well as increase Macedonian international status in concert with the possibility of future NATO membership. Likewise, NATO continued to desire a presence in Macedonia, although the principal function had now altered. With the signing of the MTA and approval of Security Council Resolution 1244, NATO’s interest in Macedonia was to switch from a pre-positioning platform to a logistical base for KFOR operations. Moreover, NATO and the international community were convinced with Kosovo becoming a UN/NATO protectorate, an interstate threat to Macedonia no longer existed; and the intrastate threat was likewise diminished as the “crisis stage” had now passed. Of particular note, though, is that although the desire for a NATO presence in Macedonia continued to be reciprocal, the goals of each entity remained divergent.

### **5.3. KFOR, UNMIK and Macedonia.**

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999f), adopted on 10 June 1999, officially authorized the deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices, of international civil and security presences, with appropriate equipment and personnel as required. The resolution contained two pertinent annexes: the “Statement by the Chairman on the Conclusion of the Meeting of the G-8 Foreign Ministers held at the Petersberg Centre on 6 May 1999”, regarding the general principles on the political solution to the Kosovo crisis; and the “principles set forth in points 1 to 9 of the paper presented in Belgrade on 2 June 1999, and the FRY’s agreement to that paper”. By its adoption, resolution 1244 further legitimized these two documents as well as the MTA that was agreed upon on 9 June 1999. Specifically, Resolution 1244 authorized two separate components of the overall international presence in Kosovo. First, was authorization that the international security presence, with substantial NATO participation, must be deployed under unified command and control to establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons and refugees. Second, was authorization for the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant international organizations, to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration in Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo could enjoy substantial autonomy within the FRY, and which would provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions. Additionally, the resolution demanded that both components cooperate fully in their deployment.

#### *KFOR.*

The primary responsibilities of KFOR, as delineated in Resolution 1244, were to: deter renewed hostilities, and ensure the withdrawal of FRY forces in accordance with the MTA; demilitarize the KLA; establish a secure environment; ensure public safety and order; supervise demining; support and coordinate closely with the international civil presence; ensure protection and freedom of movement for itself and the international civil presence; and conduct border monitoring duties as required. KFOR then summarized these responsibilities into an overall mission objective of, “to establish and maintain a secure environment in Kosovo, including

public safety and order; to monitor, verify and when necessary, enforce compliance with the agreements that ended the conflict; and to provide assistance to the UN Mission in Kosovo” (KFOR 2002). Noticeably absent from the KFOR mission objective is any mention of border monitoring duties as it was considered a smaller component of establishing and maintaining a secure environment.

KFOR was composed of military forces of various sizes from over 30 nations, and grouped into five multinational brigades<sup>1</sup>. These five multinational brigades were then responsible for a geographic sector of Kosovo, with a lead nation assuming command of that multinational brigade (MNB). As a result, France was the lead nation for MNB North, Germany for MNB South, Italy for MNB West, the United Kingdom for MNB Central, and the United States for MNB East. All MNBs fell directly under the the force commander, who was in turn responsible to NATO’s regional command, Allied Forces South (AFSOUTH), in Naples Italy, and ultimately to NATO headquarters in Brussels, Belgium. The decision to specifically not place KFOR under the command of the UN was made as a result of NATO’s “lessons learned” from Bosnia and Croatia. In those conflicts, NATO had determined their forces under UN command had suffered due to an inability to react, and had corrected that error when UNPROFOR transitioned to IFOR/SFOR. In fact, NATO was vehement on the matter and argued strenuously that it was happy to cooperate with whatever civilian administration emerged but that it would never come under its control (O’Neill 2002, 37). Consequently, NATO persuaded the UN that a separate force in Kosovo would have far greater operational flexibility (Conflict, Security & Development Group 2003, 29). During deliberations of how to structure the relationship between KFOR and UNMIK, the focus was so intense on how to improve upon the failures of Bosnia and Croatia, the evident success of the unified structure in Macedonia was never considered or mentioned.

KFOR entered Kosovo on 12 June 1999, and assumed its mission based on a timetable laid out in the MTA delineating a phased withdrawal of FRY forces and

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<sup>1</sup> Contributing nations to the overall KFOR presence were: Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States. KFOR Online Homepage, *KFOR Headquarters*, <http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/about.htm>. (2003, 8, April).

Serbian police by 20 June 1999, with the goal of preventing a security vacuum between the withdrawing military and police forces and arriving KFOR elements. The MTA established two buffer zone areas termed the Air Safety Zone (ASZ) and the Ground Safety Zone (GSZ). The ASZ was defined as a 25 kilometer zone that extended beyond the Kosovo province border into the rest of FRY territory, and included the airspace above that zone. The GSZ was defined as a 5 kilometer zone that extended beyond the Kosovo province border into the rest of FRY territory (MTA 1999). By the terms of the MTA, under no circumstances could any forces of the FRY or Republic of Serbia enter into, reenter, or remain within the territory of Kosovo or the GSZ and ASZ without the prior consent of the KFOR Commander; with the exception of local police. Moreover, the MTA specified KFOR would provide appropriate control of the borders of the FRY in Kosovo with Albania and Macedonia until the arrival of the civilian mission of the UN.

The withdrawal of FRY and Serb forces was completed by 20 June 1999, as required, and was to prove the easiest task KFOR. What was to prove the most challenging aspect of KFOR's mandate was establishing a secure environment and public safety and order (Conflict, Security & Development Group 2003, 30). The first reason for this was inadequate force numbers. While 18,500 NATO troops had been pre-positioned in Macedonia, the overall Structure of KFOR called for 50,000 troops. As a result, KFOR was undermanned in Kosovo, primarily due to slow nation response in sending troops and limited logistical networks to transport the troops as well as their accompanying equipment. The second reason KFOR was to encounter difficulties establishing a secure environment and public safety and order was purely because they were not trained for this function. These personnel were combat troops who were only supposed to "temporarily" accomplish these tasks until arrival of the UN civilian mission. In light of this fact, while the NATO Rules of Engagement (ROE) were very clear for combat situations, they were extremely vague in the realm of how to properly establish a secure environment and public safety and order. As a result, the third reason was contributing nations would interpret their mandates differently, which led to inconsistencies in national forces implementing basic police actions. The fourth reason, related to the third, was each MNB would establish different procedures within their area of responsibility. A fifth reason was certain nations had placed restrictions on their contributed forces.

The most obvious example of this dilemma is the US forces insistence on force protection, which precluded US personnel from engaging in many activities requiring only one or two soldiers, i.e., basic police patrols. A sixth reason was due to the Force Commander not being able to direct the movement of troops within Kosovo, when needed (Nardulli, Perry, Pirnie, Gordon and McGinn 2002, 106). In spite of lessons learned in previous peacekeeping missions, some nations still refused to relinquish command to a multinational force commander. Consequently, forces on the ground in Kosovo would receive an order from the force commander and then send it to their nation's capitals for authorization. A foremost illustration of this dilemma came when violence flared in the divided city of Mitrovica, within the French MNB area. When the commander of KFOR directed US forces to deploy elements to support French elements, the US force commander replied the Pentagon had told him not to deploy his troops there (O'Neill 2002, 43). Finally, the seventh reason KFOR was to encounter difficulty establishing a secure environment and public safety and order was simply because they were preoccupied with other priority tasks such as ensuring FRY or Serb forces did not reattack, and demilitarizing the KLA.

Although the initial goal was to prevent a security vacuum between the withdrawing military and police forces and arriving KFOR elements, this goal was not to be effectively achieved. One explanation for this was there were almost no local police who remained, as the predominance of police activities were performed by FRY and local Serb personnel. As a result, KFOR elements were overwhelmed by the enormity of the task. In addition to this, KFOR was not prepared for the rapidity in which the situation was to alter, where the victims became the aggressors. Within the first few months after cessation of the air campaign, over 800,000 Albanian refugees streamed back into areas that were now only inhabited by Serb minorities (O'Neill 2002, 44). Revenge was a prominent and popular thought among Kosovar Albanians and the Serb minority soon became the minority group in need of police protection. This was a difficult concept for many KFOR personnel as until that time their primary mission was to protect the Kosovar Albanians from Serb forces. This dilemma was exacerbated by the undue deference KFOR paid to former KLA members and leaders (Conflict, Security & Development Group 2003, 31). After all, only days before, the KLA had served as NATO's surrogate ground force.

What resulted from this situation of inadequate force numbers, competing mission priorities, and lack of training and preparedness on the part of KFOR was precisely what they had hoped to avoid; a security vacuum, in which a widespread increase in individual and organized crime occurred. On 12 July 1999, the Secretary General issued a report to the Security Council (1999h) highlighting that the security problem in Kosovo; exemplified by recent high profile killings, abductions, looting, arson and forced expropriation of housing; was largely a result of the absence of law and order institutions and agencies. While KFOR was responsible for maintaining both public safety and civil law and order, its ability to do so was limited as it was still in the process of building up its forces. Add to this the fact that establishing a secure environment and public safety and order was clearly not KFOR's priority at the time. While the FRY and Serb forces withdrew in accordance with the MTA, KFOR was preoccupied with the possibility they could reengage at any time. This was to remain the priority concern of KFOR for quite some time. The secondary mission was to demilitarize the KLA, which was estimated to be approximately 28 thousand at its peak (Conflict, Security & Development Group 2003, 40).

On 20 June 1999, an accord, entitled "Undertaking the Demilitarization and Transformation of the KLA", was signed by KLA Commander in Chief, Hashim Thaci, and KFOR Commander, Lieutenant General Mike Jackson. This agreement provided for a KLA cease-fire, disengagement from zones of conflict, and subsequent demilitarization and reintegration into civil society, all to occur within 90 days. The agreement in addition stated "all KLA forces in Kosovo and neighboring countries will observe the provisions of this undertaking" (Accord between KFOR and the KLA 1999), which confirmed the many reports of KLA factions prevalent in northern Albania and northwestern Macedonia. In the very next line, the agreement stated KLA forces would "freeze military movement in either direction across international borders" thereby legally allowing those KLA personnel currently outside Kosovo to remain there and not be subject to demilitarization. KFOR elements established weapons collection and storage points throughout the province, and while the initial weapons turn-in rate languished at the start, the numbers did appreciably proliferate as the deadline approached. By late September over ten thousand weapons had been collected (Rezun 2001, 83). On 20 September 1999, the KFOR Commander, Lieutenant General Jackson, declared KFOR had completed

demilitarization of the KLA. (Nardulli, et al. 2002, 104). When 28 thousand members of an armed force surrender 10 thousand weapons, simple math supports claims the declaration of demilitarization of the KLA was merely a symbolic gesture, particularly in light of the fact that roughly one million weapons had been looted from armories when the Albanian government collapsed in 1997 and were prevalent in the immediate geographic area.

Item 25 of the “Undertaking the Demilitarization and Transformation of the KLA” accord additionally contained guidance regarding “transformation” of the KLA once demilitarization had been completed. It stated since the KLA intended to abide by UN Security Council Resolution 1244, the international community should “take due and full account of the contribution of the KLA during the Kosovo crisis and accordingly give due consideration to”: allowing “members to participate in the administration and police forces of Kosovo, enjoying special consideration in view of the expertise they have developed”; and “the formation of an Army in Kosovo on the lines of the US National Guard” (Accord between KFOR and the KLA 1999). As explicated by the Secretary-General (1999i), in his September 1999 report on UNMIK, this concept was designed to contribute to the demilitarization of the KLA by offering individual members to participate in a disciplined, professional and multi-ethnic civilian emergency corps. The design was to allow for ten percent of the corps to consist of ethnic minorities, where KFOR would provide daily supervision, and the UNMIK civil administration component would maintain responsibility for overall civil emergency management. Accordingly, on 20 September 1999, the KFOR Commander’s declaration that demilitarization of the KLA had been completed was accompanied by the signing of UNMIK Regulation 1999/8, authorizing establishment of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) (UNSC 1999j). The KPC consisted of three thousand active and two thousand reserve members, and would be utilized exclusively for civil emergencies as opposed to having any role in law enforcement or the maintenance of law and order. Since the KPC was predominantly composed of former KLA members, the SRSG appointed General Agim Ceku, former chief of Staff of the KLA, as Commander of the KPC. Participating in the signing ceremony were NATO Supreme Allied Commander General Wesley Clark, KFOR Commander Lieutenant General Jackson, UNMIK SRSG Bernard Kouchner, KLA Commander Hashim Thaci and General Ceku. As

could be expected, while the creation of a follow-on KLA in the form of the KPC was not only condoned but proclaimed as successful demilitarization of the KLA by the UN and NATO; others in the international community, particularly the FRY, Serb, and Macedonian governments expressed sincere reservations about what they perceived as perpetuation of, and reward to, an organization that at the outset at least partly fomented the Kosovo conflict.

### *UNMIK.*

On 12 June 1999, the Secretary-General issued a report pursuant to Resolution 1244 (1999g), which presented a preliminary operational concept for the overall organization of the civil presence that would be known as the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The primary responsibilities of UNMIK, as delineated in Resolution 1244, were to: perform basic civilian administrative functions; promote establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo; facilitate a political process to determine Kosovo's future status; coordinate humanitarian and disaster relief efforts; support reconstruction of key infrastructure; maintain civil law and order; promote human rights; and assure the safe and unimpeded return of all displaced persons and refugees to their homes.

The structure of UNMIK was determined based on the need for coherence and optimal effectiveness on the ground that could be executed in an integrated manner and with a clear chain of command. This resulted in UNMIK being headed by an SRSG, with four Deputy SRSGs (DSRSG), each responsible for one major component of the mission. Each component, later to become more commonly known as a pillar, was then assigned to an agency, which would take the lead role in that particular area of operations. Consequently, Pillar I encompassed the interim civil administration, including the police and judiciary, and was assigned to the UN Secretariat. Pillar II comprised humanitarian affairs, with the UNHCR as the lead agency. Pillar III covered institution-building, including democratization, elections and human rights, and came under the leadership of the OSCE. Pillar IV included reconstruction, for which the EU was responsible.

The primary purpose in this structure was to ensure the institutional capacities of the agencies cooperating with the United Nations were pooled for optimal effectiveness, as well as to mirror KFOR's multinational brigade structure. The

SRSB was granted overall authority to manage the mission and coordinate the activities of all UN agencies and other international organizations operating as part of UNMIK. Nevertheless, to facilitate a coordinated approach it was expected that the agency with overall responsibility for a particular component would draw upon the capacities and expertise of other organizations on the ground and coordinate their work to maximum advantage. It was the hope of the Secretary-General, this structure would avoid the bureaucratic coordination problems encountered in the UN mission in Bosnia. For on the civil segment, the primary lesson learned from Bosnia was to avoid the hydra-headed structure at all costs in any future missions (O'Neill 2002, 37). In addition to the four pillar mission structure, the SRSB was to be supported by a Chief of Staff and separate offices for political advice, legal advice, relations with the mass media, and military liaison.

Interestingly enough, the OSCE had completed much pre-mission planning in the months prior to Resolution 1244, and key member states had given the UN Secretariat the impression the OSCE would be the preferred lead organization for any follow-on mission in Kosovo. However, the EU and the OSCE were ruled out by the US and Russia, respectively, and the G-8 determined the mission lead would be given to the UN (Conflict, Security & Development Group 2003, 23). Accordingly, the OSCE (1999b) on 1 July 1999, approved Decision 305, which terminated the Transitional OSCE Task Force for Kosovo, established by OSCE Decision 296 on 8 June 1999; and established the OSCE Mission in Kosovo, defining its mission as related to Pillar III of the overarching UNMIK plan.

UNMIK entered Kosovo on 13 June 1999, one day after KFOR, when the advance team arrived in Pristina from Skopje; where it had been originally assembled in preparation for deployment. The immediate tasks at hand were to establish operations and conduct confidence-building measures aimed at restraining Kosovar Albanians and reassuring Kosovar Serbs. UNMIK, like KFOR, however, was not without challenges to its organizational effectiveness. The pillar structure adopted by UNMIK was intended to cede a measure of autonomy to participating agencies; nevertheless, it became a hindrance to effective cross-pillar cooperation. In essence, for any decision to be made regarding a mission aspect that necessitated cross-pillar coordination, the issue had to be elevated to the SRSB level. This then further negated the overall mission effectiveness of the office of the SRSB, who was

not only responsible for daily leadership and direction of UNMIK as a whole, but was furthermore solely responsible for facilitating a political process designed to determine the future political status of Kosovo.

Moreover, UNMIK chose to mirror KFOR's five zone structure, and selected five regional administrators to serve as a supervisory link between the civil administration department and the 30 municipal administrators (Conflict, Security & Development Group 2003, 26). What resulted was a structure with neither centralized nor decentralized authority. As the regional administrators had no formal authority over their colleagues within the same pillar, collegial goodwill emerged as the only viable method of cooperation and coordination, which was not always the resultant situation. Additionally, there were no legitimate local counterparts for these UNMIK regional administrators, which tended to lead many to question their relevance.

There were interagency problems encountered as well that stemmed directly from the parochial nature of administrative regulations particular to each agency or organization. For instance, both the EU and OSCE were responsible for their own pillar of the overall mission, but fell under UN leadership. However, in the execution of their duties both the EU and OSCE were prohibited from utilizing UN assets such as vehicles or other equipment and resources. Although administrative in nature, these issues affected early inter-organizational good will and cooperation, as well as detracted from initial progress and achievement of an overall integrated mission.

Although each pillar was responsible for a critical component of the overarching mission, one of the initial priorities of UNMIK was the police and judiciary element of the interim civil administration. This was a function of the integral linkage to KFOR's mandate of establishing a secure environment and public safety and order. As delineated by the Secretary-General (1999h), KFOR was only responsible for ensuring public safety and order until the international civil presence could assume responsibility. Until that responsibility was transferred, UNMIK would only advise KFOR on policing matters; but once UNMIK finally assumed responsibility for law and order within Kosovo, KFOR would only support police efforts as required. The eventual goal, however, was to create an indigenous police force capable of providing a secure environment and public safety and order for all

of Kosovo. Consequently, UNMIK's law and order strategy consisted of two primary goals: provision of interim law enforcement services, and the rapid development of a credible, professional and impartial Kosovo Police Service (KPS). Achievement of these goals was to encompass three separate elements of law enforcement, through three distinct phases of development, and require efforts on the part of two separate organizations from two different pillars of UNMIK's structure.

All law enforcement activities were to be commanded by an UNMIK Police Commissioner, who reported to the SRSG through the DSRSG for civil administration, and had responsibility for all three elements of law enforcement activities: civilian police, special police and the border police. The civilian police, to be comprised of 1,800 officers, were assigned normal police duties; the special police, to consist of ten units of 115 officers each, were charged with public order functions such as crowd control, area security and physical protection of UNMIK facilities; and the border police, to include 205 officers, were allocated the duties of ensuring compliance with immigration laws and other border requirements. As already discussed, in the first phase KFOR was responsible for ensuring public safety and order, through all three elements of law enforcement activities, until UNMIK had sufficient personnel to assume responsibility. In the second phase, UNMIK would assume responsibility for all three law enforcement elements of law and order from KFOR. In the third phase, once properly trained local police were available in sufficient strength, UNMIK would fully transfer all law enforcement responsibility to the KPS. While all of these elements and phases of law and order were to fall under the jurisdiction of the interim civil administration pillar, and consequently the UN Secretariat, the development of a professional KPS was to come under the authority of the OSCE and UNMIK's institution-building component.

The OSCE received the mandate to develop and deliver democratically oriented basic police training to approximately 3,500 locally recruited students, as well as develop supervisory and management police training for roughly seven hundred members of the KPS to attend at a later date (UNMIK 2002). The police school was established in Vucitrn, the traditional site of police training in Kosovo, and included instruction on crime investigation, defense tactics, legal affairs, patrol duties, use of firearms, first aid, conflict intervention, handling of refugees, forensics, evidence

control, and traffic control. All of these courses were taught through the overarching strategy of democratic policing, in which loyalty towards the democratic legal order was the primary focus (OSCE 2004). After the nine-week initial training course, the prospective police officer was then assigned to an UNMIK Field Training Officer (FTO) for 19 weeks of on the job training in the field and an additional 80 hours of advanced classroom training. After completion of the three phases of training, the officer was then eligible for certification and independent assignment.

The KPS is one of the only two institutions, along with the fire department, that is truly multi-ethnic. In the first class, of the 176 students, 17 were minorities and 20 percent were women; in the second class, of the 178 students, there were 28 Kosovar Serbs, 14 other minorities, and 17 percent women; and this multi-ethnic focus was to continue. However, as with the KPC, the KPS was to serve as an element of the strategy to transition the KLA to civil society. Originally, the KLA urged for the entire KPS to be composed of former KLA members as was the case in the KPC, but both the UN and KFOR opposed this idea as being antithetical to the multi-ethnic goal of democratic oriented policing. Finally, an agreement was reached between UNMIK and the KLA where former KLA members would constitute fifty percent of the KPS (O'Neill 2002, 111). While no official written documentation can be found to back this assertion, the quota was nevertheless applied to the first 15 classes (Conflict, Security & Development Group 2003, 39). Generally, the OSCE was successful in establishment of the KPS School, which effectively produced locally recruited trained police officers for a multi-ethnic force. UNMIK, though, was to encounter much more complexity in fulfilling their police mandate.

The first major hurdle UNMIK faced in establishing local police forces was the fact that Kosovo was basically a province without any police, infrastructure or any commonly established applicable policies. Previously, all police duties and laws were promulgated by FRY or Serb officials, and they had all evacuated the area in accordance with UNSC Resolution 1244. In light of the lack of guidance regarding applicable law within Kosovo, many UNMIK police simply resorted to the laws they were familiar with from their country of origin. This, of course, resulted in several incongruous methods of law enforcement. By the time UNMIK officials prescribed applicable Kosovo criminal law and procedure for UNMIK police, and the Department of Judicial Affairs prepared written guidance to be used in police

training, it was September of 2000 (O'Neill 2002, 109). In addition, to the blatant lack of any local police or established law in the absence of FRY or Serb oversight, there was no established judicial system yet to enforce any laws or police actions.

UNMIK also encountered severe delays in fielding the mission's international police component. While the first unarmed international police officers arrived on 27 June 1999, they were actually on secondment from the UN mission in Bosnia; and the first UNMIK police patrol alongside KFOR personnel did not take place until 9 August. The Secretary-General (1999i) reported on 16 September that 1,100 international civilian police officers had arrive to date, and were concentrating resources on the city of Pristina, and its surrounding region, where one third of the crimes reported in Kosovo occurred. In addition to these police officers, 82 border police had been deployed to cover the entire border with Albania and Macedonia, where their principal function was to conduct vehicle checks and passport control. Even at this early juncture, though, with the relative open border areas between Kosovo and Albania and Macedonia, coupled with the manifest increase in organized crime and smuggling, it was evident a more significant quantity of border police than originally envisaged would be necessitated. Therefore, the Secretary-General recommended an increase of border police from the original 205 to a new total of 364. As of 13 December 1999, the Secretary-General (1999j) had requested an increase in the total international police component from 3,314 to 4,718. However, the fundamental quandary remained sluggish arrivals as thus far only 1,817 UNMIK police had arrived within the mission area, including 149 border police, and none of the 10 special police units had yet arrived. The dilemma of inadequate international police personnel was to continue with only 77 percent of the total authorized strength having arrived by 6 June of 2000, 85 percent by 18 September 2000, and 90 percent by 15 December 2000; more than 18 months after UNMIK first entered Kosovo (Secretary-General 2000b; 2000c; 2000d).

Of the UNMIK primary responsibilities delineated in Resolution 1244, several focused on development of governmental structures such as: perform basic civilian administrative functions, promote establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, and facilitate a political process to determine Kosovo's future status. Execution of these responsibilities, however, was to be a complicated matter due to the ambiguity of Resolution 1244 (1999f), which stated there was to be

“a political process toward the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account the Rambouillet Accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY”. Thus, while it was clear Kosovo was to have an autonomous self-government, it was not clear that Kosovo would have self-determination with the option of full independence (Groom and Taylor 2000, 303). What had united all Kosovar Albanians, regardless of their political loyalties, was full independence from Serbia and the FRY, however, as most Security Council members opposed any change in borders resulting from armed conflict, Resolution 1244 did not mention independence (O’Neill 2002, 30). As a result, this ambiguity regarding the future of Kosovo was to complicate UNMIK’s tasks in the political realm.

In this light, UNMIK (1999a) announced on 16 July 1999, the establishment of the Kosovo Transitional Council (KTC), which would meet on a weekly basis under the leadership of the SRSG and bring together all major political parties and ethnic groups. The KTC was designed to provide Kosovo residents an opportunity to have direct input into the UNMIK decision-making process and achieve consensus on a broad range of issues related to civil administration, institution-building and essential services, thereby creating a climate where participation in democratic processes was the norm. As such, the KTC was to act as an initial measure toward the creation of a framework of wider and more inclusive democratic structures. On 15 December 1999, UNMIK (1999b) announced the signing of an agreement where the three political leaders of Kosovo agreed to share the provisional management of Kosovo with UNMIK, until elections in 2000, through the establishment of the Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS). The three Kosovo Albanian political leaders that had emerged in the initial months after implementation of Resolution 1244 were: Hashim Thaci of the Peoples Democratic Party of Kosovo (PPDK), Ibrahim Rugova of the LDK, and Rexhep Qosja of the United Democratic Movement (LDB). In addition to the three Kosovo Albanian political parties, a Kosovo Serb National Council (SNC) was established on 18 October 1999, headed by Bishop Artemije, who was to officially name the fourth political member of the JIAS at a later date. Within the overall JIAS, the KTC was to remain the highest level consultative body in Kosovo and be enlarged to better reflect the pluralistic nature of Kosovo’s population.

Political parties within Kosovo continued to jockey for public support in preparation for the upcoming elections in the fall of 2000, which resulted in a further proliferation of parties. In his 6 June 2000 report, the Secretary-General (2000b) highlighted the fact that an increased number of political parties had grown out of former KLA members, and roughly thirty parties had now attained the minimum four thousand signatures of support required to register and certify a party. Municipal elections were held on 28 October 2000, and the Secretary-General (2000d) announced his SRSG had certified the results on 7 November. A total of 913,179 Kosovo residents were eligible to vote for 5,500 candidates competing for 920 seats in 30 municipal assemblies. Voter turnout was substantial, with 79 percent of voters casting their ballots. Kosovar Serbs did not participate, however, and consequently, the results in the three municipalities representing Serb Majorities were not certified. In the 27 remaining municipalities, the LDK won 58 percent of the vote and 21 municipalities, and the PPK won 27 percent of the vote and six municipalities. In light of the prominence of many former KLA members throughout Kosovo, and their role in NATO's intervention in Kosovo, the election results came as a shock to former KLA leader Hashim Thaci and the PPK. The overwhelming victory of the LDK and Ibrahim Rugova, the moderate politician who was against violence, was a blow to Thaci and the continued goal of independence.

Thus, in accordance with UN Resolution 1244 both the international civil and security presence had been structured and assigned relative responsibilities based on perceived improvements upon previous UN missions in Bosnia and Croatia. This framework was to be more complicated in actuality than originally envisioned, however, as it involved an alliance between the UN Secretariat, an independent UN body, and two regional bodies on the part of UNMIK; together with a military presence that included a strong contribution from NATO (Groom and Taylor 2000, 304). While KFOR executed its mission in accordance with NATO direction, UNMIK implemented its mission as directed by the Secretary-General, with the connectivity between the civil and security elements consisting of a military liaison office directly under the leadership of the SRSG. While the structure of KFOR and UNMIK were based on perceived improvements from the previous missions in Croatia and Bosnia, both were beset by their own communications, administrative and logistical hindrances to effective and integrated execution. As the focus was

solely on rebuilding a post-conflict society within Kosovo, advances were observable; however, many aspects of KFOR's and UNMIK's efforts and successes were to have profound effects upon neighboring Macedonia.

*Macedonia.*

During deliberations of how to structure the relationship between KFOR and UNMIK, the focus was so intense on how to improve upon the failures of Bosnia and Croatia, the evident success of the unified structure of UNPREDEP in Macedonia was never considered or mentioned. Neither were the possible or probable effects any actions in Kosovo might have upon Macedonia. Even though the MTA specified KFOR would provide appropriate control of the borders of the FRY, in Kosovo, with Albania and Macedonia until the arrival of the civilian police mission of the UN, noticeably absent from the KFOR mission objective statement was any mention of border monitoring duties. This was due to the fact it was considered a smaller component of establishing and maintaining a secure environment. As already explicated, however, KFOR was to encounter difficulty establishing a secure environment and public safety and order within Kosovo. The primary reason for this was due to KFOR's preoccupation with other priority tasks such as ensuring FRY or Serb forces did not reattack, and demilitarizing the KLA.

When KFOR assumed its mission on 12 June 1999, Kosovo was basically a province without any police, infrastructure or any commonly established applicable policies. While the FRY and Serb forces withdrew in accordance with the MTA, KFOR was preoccupied with the possibility they could reengage at any time, and this was to remain the priority concern of KFOR for several months. The secondary mission was to demilitarize the KLA. Consequently, establishing a secure environment and public safety and order within Kosovo, at best, fell a distant third in precedence; exacerbated by the fact that though KFOR was responsible for maintaining both public safety and civil law and order, its ability to do so was limited as it was still in the process of building up its forces. In priority, what efforts KFOR did execute towards establishing a secure environment and public safety and order within Kosovo were concentrated toward the city of Pristina, and its surrounding region, where one third of the crimes reported in Kosovo occurred; then toward the remainder of the interior of Kosovo, and finally toward the borders.

Whereas the immediate concern of KFOR was the possibility of FRY and Serb forces attacking after their withdrawal from Kosovo, the creation of the ASZ and GSZ were designed to mitigate that possibility. On the ground, the MTA mandated GSZ created a five kilometer buffer zone along the 402 kilometer border between Kosovo and the FRY. This buffer zone extended beyond the Kosovo province border into the rest of FRY territory, and by the terms of the MTA, under no circumstances could any forces of the FRY or Republic of Serbia enter into, reenter, or remain within the territory of Kosovo or the GSZ and ASZ without the prior consent of the KFOR Commander. The goal in the creation of the GSZ was twofold: to avoid any possible accidents between KFOR and FRY forces, for otherwise they would be face to face along the border; and help deter a FRY attack on Kosovo (Conflict, Security & Development Group 2003, 101). The result was basically a section of land void of military forces of any kind, and patrolled by limited police with light arms only. In the U.S. sector, this buffer zone was to be larger yet as U.S. forces concern with force protection had mandated a four kilometer buffer zone on the Kosovo side of the border. As such, along the southeastern border between Kosovo and Serbia, there was a nine kilometer zone virtually without any security forces.

Along the Albanian and Macedonian borders, even though the MTA specified KFOR would provide appropriate control of the borders of the FRY in Kosovo with Albania and Macedonia until the arrival of the civilian mission of the UN, KFOR had little reason to suspect a threat. After all, Albania and Macedonia were willing partners in the NATO coalition, and it wasn't until later the organized crime threat was identified. UNMIK also encountered severe delays in fielding the mission's international police component. By November 22 of 1999, civilian police had only been made available to man four border crossing stations along the 508 kilometer Kosovo border with Albania and Macedonia (Nardulli, et al. 2002, 107). Adding to the perception of no threat emanating from Macedonia was the fact that both KFOR and UNMIK were utilizing Macedonia as a base for rear operations in support of the Kosovo mission.

KFOR had established a secondary headquarters in the Gazella shoe factory, located in Skopje and commonly referred to as KFOR Rear. The primary mission of this unit, commanded by a Major General, was reception, staging, onward movement

and integration of KFOR contingents moving through the “Communications Zone”; as well as the primary point of contact for respective National Support Elements. Of the participating nations in Kosovo, 17 had their National Support Elements located in Skopje. In support of the Kosovo mission KFOR estimated as many as one thousand vehicles a day could cross the border carrying troops, food and supplies (KFOR 2002). UNMIK as well had a liaison office in Skopje in order to coordinate with the National Support Elements and the Macedonian authorities. As such, the border between Kosovo and Macedonia was considered by KFOR and UNMIK to be of minimal consequence as it was within the area of operations.

KFOR’s demilitarization and transformation of the KLA was executed in rapid fashion and deemed a success by both KFOR and UNMIK, as within 90 days the KLA had been declared demilitarized as a result of surrendering 10 thousand weapons and being reintegrated into civil society through the creation of the KPC and KPS. However, demilitarization and reintegration of the KLA was more of a symbolic rather than comprehensive feat for three reasons. First, the agreement between KLA Commander in Chief, Hashim Thaci, and KFOR Commander, Lieutenant General Mike Jackson, stated “all KLA forces in Kosovo and neighboring countries will observe the provisions of this undertaking” (Accord between KFOR and the KLA 1999), which confirmed the many reports of KLA factions operating in northern Albania and northwestern Macedonia. The agreement went on to state KLA forces would “freeze military movement in either direction across international borders” thereby legally allowing those KLA personnel currently outside Kosovo to remain there and not be subject to demilitarization. Secondly, the turn in and collection of weapons was far from all-inclusive. As previously explicated, in light of the fact that roughly one million weapons had been looted from armories when the Albanian government collapsed in 1997 and were readily available in the immediate geographic area, the surrender of 10 thousand weapons from a 28 thousand member armed force does not constitute demilitarization. Finally, reintegration into civil society of former KLA members was to consist of: three thousand active and two thousand reserve members of the KPC, for a total of five thousand; fifty percent of the KPS through the first 15 courses, equaling 1,426 personnel of the 2,851 trained through December 2000; and 13 thousand who had at least signed up for vocational training through the International Organization for

Migration (Conflict, Security & Development Group 2003, 39-44). These best possible scenario statistics indicate, assuming none of these individuals retained any KLA contacts, 8,374 former KLA members were not reintegrated into civil society, and weapons availability remained prevalent.

Consequently, as of December 2000, there were unknown numbers of KLA members not subject to demilitarization or reintegration into civil society present in northern Albania and northwestern Macedonia, 8,374 unaccounted for KLA members in Kosovo, untold numbers of available weapons in the area, and relatively open and unprotected borders between Kosovo and Macedonia and Albania. Also, the recent electoral victory of the moderate LDK, and Ibrahim Rugova, came as quite a disappointment, and source of disenchantment, to the former KLA members and politicians who continued to support independence. Moreover, UNMIK and KFOR suffered from the perception the former KLA did not constitute a continuing threat to Kosovo, or a threat at all toward Macedonia. KFOR and UNMIK's mandate and total focus was on conflict resolution and post-conflict peace-building within Kosovo, and did not include Macedonia other than as a rear area logistical supply base.

Others in the international community, however, particularly the FRY, Serb, and Macedonian governments expressed sincere reservations about what they perceived as perpetuation of, and reward to, an organization that at the outset at least partly fomented the Kosovo conflict. The Macedonian government continued to highlight the impending threat of the former KLA personnel and ideologies, from both interstate and intrastate sources; however, the international community at large was concerned only with the intrastate context of Kosovo. Ever since termination of UNPREDEP, Macedonia was considered a successful case of conflict prevention, with no current threat, and was accordingly left with an OSCE contingent of eight personnel to continue those successful conflict prevention efforts. In so doing, the strategy of simultaneity and connectivity of interstate and intrastate conflict prevention efforts within Macedonia had ceased at the same time UNPREDEP was terminated. This situation was exacerbated by the fact that while contained within the overall conflict prevention mandate for Kosovo there was an interstate mandate as well as intrastate, both KFOR and UNMIK were incapable of executing that mandate even if they had perceived it as integral to the overall concept.

Additionally, the conflict resolution and post-conflict peace-building efforts within Kosovo suffered from the structure of UNMIK and KFOR, thereby precluding a synchronized and multifaceted approach. These faults in the conflict prevention efforts of the international community in both Kosovo and Macedonia, exemplified by the lack of a multifaceted approach toward both interstate and intrastate components of conflict prevention in a simultaneous and connective method, were to manifest themselves in renewed conflict.

#### **5.4. Macedonian Conflict Genesis.**

##### *Regional Conflict Resurgence.*

In southern Serbia, the three provinces of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac also contained approximately 80 thousand resident ethnic Albanians, constituting them the majority population in Presevo and Bujanovac. After World War II these areas were excluded from Kosovo due to strategic reasons relating to Serbia's north-south trade corridor, but ethnic Albanians continued to refer to this area as Eastern Kosovo. This area bordered the U.S. MNB area of Kosovo, and Macedonia, which meant porous and minimally protected borders to the south with Macedonia; and as a result of the five kilometer GSZ in Serbia and the four kilometer U.S. force protection standoff in Kosovo, a nine kilometer safe haven zone with no effective military or police patrols existed between Serbia and Kosovo. At about the same time as KFOR was concentrating on the increased violence in the Mitrovica region, conflict began to materialize in this region. After the deaths of two Albanian men on 26 January 2000, the Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac emerged under the Albanian name of Ushtria Clirimtare Presheve, Medveja e Bujanovec (UCPMB). The uniforms, tactics and procedures of the UCPMB mirrored those of the supposed demilitarized KLA, and it was evident from the outset the UCPMB had connections with the local KPC sector 6, led by former KLA member Shaban Shala and based in Gnjilane (Conflict, Security & Development Group 2003, 102).

The emergence of the UCPMB had its roots in an internal political struggle within Kosovo, where the older generation moderate parties such as Rugova's LDK and the more radical parties of former KLA members diverged in ideology (Troebst

2001a, 3). The trigger was the increasing violence in the Mitrovica region, the predominantly Serb stronghold of northern Kosovo. As Mitrovica became more divided by KFOR forces, the more radical ethnic Albanians of the UCPMB devised the ideology of executing a trade of the "Eastern Kosovo" area of the Presevo Valley for the northern Kosovo area of Zvecan, Leposaviq and the northern sector of Mitrovica. The idea was to signal to the Serbs that if they could partition Kosovo and gain the Serb inhabited northern area around Mitrovica, then ethnic Albanians could likewise do the same in the Presevo Valley.

From January of 2000 until the spring of 2001, a low level conflict occurred between the UCPMB and Serb police within the GSZ. While the UCPMB appeared to be a collection of relatively small and disorganized groups, they encountered no difficulties moving back and forth across borders. This was due in part to the structure of UNMIK and KFOR precluding any synchronized and multifaceted approach. In fact, as of February of 2000, UNMIK claimed ignorance of such activities, while KFOR refused to discuss the topic, implying they had full knowledge (Conflict, Security & Development Group 2003, 103). Understandably, this was the cause of much friction between UNMIK and KFOR headquarters, especially since the commander of KFOR and the SRSG were meeting daily at this time. However, a meeting does not necessarily result in information being shared or passed. A further impediment stemmed from the NATO attitude and belief the KLA had been demilitarized and was their former ally in the Kosovo campaign. Indeed, NATO leadership initially opined that these attacks upon Serb police elements in the GSZ were a ruse staged by Slobodan Milosevic. Additionally complicating the situation was the U.S. commitment to force protection and the four kilometer standoff from the Kosovo border, which provided nine kilometers of safe haven for UCPMB operations. The border of Kosovo and Serbia with Macedonia provided safe haven areas as well since the FRY and Macedonia had not yet concluded any agreement on demarcation of the border, thus also providing broad strips of no-man's land up to one kilometer wide. This fact had been exacerbated since the departure of UNPREDEP forces. The departure of UNPREDEP created a complete vacuum along the Macedonian and FRY border as the Macedonian border police did not assume UNPREDEP's old infrastructure and as a result could not advance as far north as the NLAOO, or UN Patrol Line, that had been agreed upon by the FRY and

the UN. Consequently, these areas along the FRY and Macedonian border had been exploited by the KLA, and now the UCPMB, ever since termination of the UNPREDEP mission.

Under U.S. pressure, Hashim Thaci affirmed on 24 March 2000 that the UCPMB had formally renounced its armed struggle against Serbia, and would fight for liberation of the Presevo Valley through political means in the future. While this did result in a temporary decrease of violent attacks on the part of the UCPMB, it also served to confirm connectivity between Thaci's PSDK party and the UCPMB. The intensity of UCPMB operations was to increase again in late 2000, though, as a result of four events (Troebst 2001a, 6). First, on 25 July of 2000, the Macedonian Parliament adopted a new law regarding higher education, which would allow the establishment of a private, internationally funded, tri-lingual "Southeast European University" in Tetovo. This event was a major political step towards granting ethnic Albanians in Macedonia more rights and also solving the University of Tetovo problem that had been a political sore point since 1995. Second, was the diplomatic, political and strategic change that accompanied the ouster of Slobodan Milosevic on 5 October 2000. This event resulted in the UCPMB loss of Slobodan Milosevic as a common transatlantic enemy, and allowed the international community to restore political communication channels with Belgrade, through the new western leaning Deputy Prime Minister, Nebojsa Covic. Third, was the shock of the 28 October 2000 elections where the moderate LDK party of Ibrahim Rugova posted an overwhelming victory over Hashim Thaci and his PSDK party. Finally, the electoral victory of U.S. President Bush also had an effect. Bush's election effectively removed Washington as an active player in Balkan politics, as the direct line from the KLA to the Department of State was cut. All of these events contributed to an intensification of UCPMB actions within the GSZ and the Presevo Valley, where the UCPMB attempted to force all FRY and Serb police elements out of the GSZ.

On 17 February 2000, The UCPMB executed a successful missile attack on a bus carrying Serbian civilians, killing seven, and a day later three Serbian policemen were killed when they hit a mine laid by UCPMB insurgents. Meanwhile relations between the international community and Belgrade had improved considerably, which led to Nebojsa Covic appealing to NATO to allow FRY and Serb security forces to re-enter the GSZ. When Peter Feith, the Secretary-General appointed

Special Representative to facilitate discussion between Belgrade and the ethnic Albanian community, failed to alter the UCPMB's determination, NATO reconsidered the Covic Plan. On 8 March 2001, the NAC agreed to a phased and conditioned relaxation of the GSZ restrictions, thereby allowing FRY and Serb security forces to redeploy in the buffer zone, up to the Kosovo border (Carp 2002, 2). The GSZ redeployment was to commence on 14 March and be completed on 31 May 2001. The effect of agreement on the Covic plan was immediate, and on 12 March 2000, the UCPMB signed a NATO negotiated cease-fire with Belgrade and vowed to renounce the use of force by the next day. One of the primary elements contributing to cessation of hostilities was the KFOR offer of amnesty for those UCPMB members who turned in their weapons to KFOR and signed a pledge not to again take up arms. By the last day of the amnesty program, over 450 UCPMB personnel had availed themselves of the program and returned to Kosovo. NATO consented to allowing FRY and Serb security forces to return to the GSZ area as a result of four principal incentives: NATO simply wanted to end the insurrection, the desire to provide tangible political rewards to the FRY government for their part in the overthrow of Milosevic, the military necessity to cut off the illegal flow of weapons through the GSZ, and NATO now had to redirect any available forces toward a new conflict taking place in northwestern Macedonia.

#### *Macedonian Conflict Genesis.*

The conflict in the Presevo Valley area was quickly overshadowed by the emergence of armed conflict in neighboring Macedonia. The Ushtria Clirimtare Kombetare, referred to in English as the National Liberation Army (NLA), surfaced on 22 January of 2001 when they attacked a police station in the village of Tearce, near Tetovo, resulting in the death of one policeman (Troebst 2001b, 2). The NLA was headed by Ali Ahmeti, who was born and raised in the village of Zajas, near the town of Kicevo in western Macedonia, which is predominantly inhabited by ethnic Albanians. He studied at the University of Pristina, in Kosovo, and was a student radical, combining Albanian nationalism and Marxism-Leninism. He was imprisoned for several months and was also an active participant in the 1981 uprising of Albanian students in Pristina. Then he fled to Switzerland, where he

remained politically active until he returned to Kosovo in 1999 in the capacity of a KLA logistician. An immense influence on Ahmeti was his uncle, Fazli Veliu, a former schoolteacher from the same village of Zajas. While in Pristina, Ahmeti joined a small political party called the LPK, which his uncle had been instrumental in founding, and was the antecedent of the KLA (Ash 2001, 3-4). In essence, Ahmeti's background is almost identical to that of Hashim Thaci, which is why it is not surprising the Albanian initials of the National Liberation Army in Macedonia and those of the Kosovo Liberation Army are both "UCK". Many of the principal leaders of the NLA were KLA veterans. Much to the embarrassment of KFOR and UNMIK, the Chief of Staff of the NLA, Gezim Ostremi, had been the second in command of the KPC until he deserted his post to assume his position in the NLA. Consequently, it is also not surprising that between ten and twenty percent of the entire KPC were "on leave" during the Macedonian conflict and believed to be fighting for the NLA (Conflict, Security & Development Group 2003, 106). This would be congruent with Ahmeti's claim that 80 percent of NLA fighters were indigenous to Macedonia. It is additionally assumed most of the weaponry utilized by the NLA had Kosovo connections.

Some observers believe NLA actions developed from ethnic Albanian extremists frustrated when elections in Kosovo resulted in a moderate LDK victory (Liotta and Jebb 2002, 99). The Macedonian government claimed the NLA was merely a new name for the KLA, and their emergence in Macedonia was a direct result of UNMIK and KFOR failing to effectively seal the border between Kosovo and Macedonia (Daftary 2001, 6). Other observers were convinced the origins of the Macedonian conflict stemmed from the struggle among various ethnic Albanian groups for domination of the territory and criminal enterprises of the region (Pearson 2002, 4). Kim (2001, 1-2) provides the most encompassing view by citing several factors accounting for materialization of the NLA: the increasing radicalism of disparate ethnic Albanian militant groups operating in Kosovo, Serbia and Macedonia, linked to organized crime and regional smuggling; the unresolved status of Kosovo and limited progress in realizing Kosovar self-government; the international embrace of post-Milosevic Yugoslavia and Serbia; the Albanian militant groups' desire to elicit a heavy-handed Serb or Macedonian response so as to garner Western sympathy and

support; unaccounted for KLA members and weapons; the existence of the GSZ; and the border agreement between the FRY and Macedonia.

The NLA, however, was very explicit in what they proclaimed as their goals, which were equal status and rights for Albanian Macedonians; recognition as a constituent nation of Macedonia, acceptance of Albanian as an official language in Parliament and public administration; the right of higher education in Albanian; proportionate representation in the bureaucracy, the courts and the police; and more devolution of power to local governments (Ash 2001, 5). From the view of the NLA, they were only seeking that which the ethnic Albanian politicians in Macedonia had been seeking since independence, although neither of the two major ethnic Albanian political parties claimed any affiliation with the NLA. In an interview by Timothy Garton Ash (2001), Ahmeti was asked if he thought Albanian Macedonians would have been ready to fight for their rights in 1998. No, he said, "because of the situation in Kosovo." However, after the international community intervened in Kosovo and, as most Albanian Macedonians saw it, the KLA had "won" as a result, there were enough people ready to heed the call to arms in Macedonia. Ahmeti stated he had drawn two main conclusions from the Kosovo war: first, you could win more by a few months of armed struggle than ethnic Albanian politicians had achieved in nearly a decade of peaceful politics; and second, that you could do this only if you got the West involved.

The conflict slowly escalated, and on 12 February 2001, the NLA took control of Tanusevci; a small village situated along the Macedonian and Kosovo border, which reportedly served as a KLA base in 1999 (Daftary 2001, 3; Pearson 2002, 2; Troebst 2001b, 3). A combination of Macedonian special police and military units deployed to the area, and a prolonged urban guerilla warfare scenario unfolded with almost daily skirmishes occurring from Tetovo north to the Kosovo border. On 1 March 2001, the United States Department of State issued a Travel Warning advising avoidance of the area of Tetovo and due north of Skopje due to armed clashes between Macedonian security forces and NLA forces, and reports of the roads being mined as well. The conflict intensity increased, causing a new refugee and displaced persons crisis, with refugees now fleeing towards Kosovo, and begetting with it the notice of the international community. On 7 March 2001, the President of the UN Security Council (2001a) issued a statement strongly condemning the recent

violence by ethnic Albanian armed extremists in the north of Macedonia. He called upon the political leaders of Macedonia, Kosovo and the FRY to isolate the forces responsible for the violence and shoulder their responsibility for peace and stability in the region, and welcomed dialogue between Macedonia and KFOR on practical steps to address the immediate security situation and to prevent crossing of the border by extremists. This statement was followed by similar statements by NATO (2001a) on 8 March and the EU (2001) on 9 March. On 13 March, the UN Secretary-General (2001b) issued a report on UNMIK, where he cited a further complication in the security situation for UNMIK involved the tensions created by the armed ethnic Albanians operating inside Macedonia.

Macedonian government officials, however, continued their insistence the NLA was a terrorist organization with no domestic legitimacy, and its operations within Macedonia were a direct result of the international community failing to effectively seal the border between Macedonia and Kosovo. The international community on the other hand, while also refusing to accept the legitimacy of the NLA as a voice for the grievances of the ethnic Albanian community of Macedonia, nevertheless held the position the actual grievances were legitimate and the solution to the crisis lay in addressing these concerns through political dialogue (Daftary 2001, 6). On 20 March 2001, the two main ethnic Albanian political parties, the DPA led by Arben Xhaferi and the PDP led by Imer Imeri, signed a declaration that, although expressed sympathy for the NLA's demands for Albanian equity and urged the Macedonian government to speed up reform, condemned the use of force by the NLA in pursuit of political objectives (Kim 2001, 6). With the two primary ethnic Albanian political parties claiming no affiliation with the NLA, the Macedonian government decided upon strong military action to destroy the NLA, and issued a 24 hour deadline to the NLA to surrender their weapons and/or depart the country. In response, the NLA declared a unilateral ceasefire, stated it did not wish to threaten the territorial integrity of the country, and called for dialogue on the rights of ethnic Albanians. This request for dialogue from the NLA, though, was to be refused by the Macedonian government on the grounds the NLA was a terrorist organization and not a legitimate political entity.

Facing an imminent crisis, 21 March 2001, was to bring three events on behalf of the international community that would raise the level of awareness and activity in

the new Macedonian conflict. First, NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson (2001b) issued a statement reiterating his condemnation of extremist groups operating in Macedonia, and promised to strengthen cooperation with the government of Macedonia by dispatching Ambassador Hans-Joerg Eiff to supplement the NATO Liaison Office in Skopje. NATO emphasized this measure was in full cooperation with other organizations such as the EU, OSCE and UN, thereby indicating international community determination to support stability in the region. Second, was the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE (2001a) announcement that Ambassador Robert Frowick, former head of the OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje and former Chief of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, was to act as his Personal Representative for the situation in Macedonia. The OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Romanian Foreign Minister Mircea Geoana, also underlined the OSCE was prepared to participate together with other international organizations in a coordinated effort to settle the crisis in northern Macedonia. Finally, the UN Security Council (2001c) adopted Resolution 1345, welcoming the international efforts of UNMIK, KFOR, EU, OSCE, NATO, and the Macedonian government to prevent the escalation of ethnic tensions in the area, while condemning the extremist violence taking place. The Security Council noted the support of violence from ethnic Albanian extremists outside Macedonia, and called on ethnic Albanian leaders in the FRY, Kosovo and Macedonia to condemn such violence and use their influence to secure peace; as well as calling on KFOR to further strengthen its efforts to prevent unauthorized movement and illegal arms shipments across borders in the region in accordance with UN Security Council Resolutions 1160 and 1244. Thus, the adoption of Resolution 1345 represented the return of the international community to conflict prevention efforts in Macedonia, targeted toward the simultaneous and connected aspects of both interstate and intrastate conflict prevention in a multifaceted and synchronized approach.

## **5.5. Conclusions.**

On 29 January 1999, Macedonia expressed concern over the danger of diffusion of the conflict in Kosovo and requested the UNPREDEP mission be extended. On 12 February 1999, the Secretary-General (1999a) submitted his report pursuant to Resolution 1186, articulating increasing trepidation regarding the potentially serious repercussions that continued violence in Kosovo could have upon the interstate and intrastate security of Macedonia given the large proportion of ethnic Albanians in the Macedonian population. When China exercised its veto in the Security Council (1999b) to prevent extension of the UNPREDEP mandate in Macedonia on 25 February 1999, numerous delegations of Member States articulated distress regarding possible diffusion of conflict to Macedonia from across the border in Kosovo. Macedonia, the United States, the UN Secretary-General, the President of the UN Security Council, and the European Union, all noted the indispensable role performed by UNPREDEP, and stated its continued presence was essential at this critical juncture of regional instability as a stabilizing and peace-promoting element in the geo-political context of the region; not only in its military component and its border monitoring, but also in its civilian efforts to promote understanding among the different ethnic groups in Macedonia. These Member States unitarily agreed UNPREDEP had, by promoting dialogue among various political forces and ethnic communities, and utilizing its good offices, a stabilizing effect within the country; which further reduced tensions that could have clearly increased as a direct result of the continued crisis in Kosovo, and thereby contributed successfully to the prevention of diffusion or contagion of conflict elsewhere in the region to Macedonia. As explicated above, at the time of UNPREDEP's termination the international community was completely aware and conscious of the enduring interstate and intrastate threats to peace and stability within Macedonia.

Considering the persistent regional threats, a suitable replacement would have to fill the void of conflict prevention efforts created in the wake of the UNPREDEP termination, however, the international community was predisposed with the impending conflict in Kosovo. The Macedonian leadership was inclined to encourage NATO to launch a presence in the country as the immediate solution, with the rationalization that NATO forces on Macedonian soil would deter any possible incursion into the country. As a result, the Macedonian administration agreed to

allow NATO to establish the KVCC and the NATO Extraction Force on its soil. As much as Macedonia desired a NATO presence in country, NATO also wanted a presence in Macedonia as part of its process of redefining itself from an organization principally concerned with collective defense to one concerned with collective security as well; and its transition from support of conflict termination operations, to combat operations in support of conflict mitigation, and ultimately to tasks related to conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction. However, as the critical stages of the Kosovo crisis were unfolding, NATO was forced to revert back to the collective defense function by authorizing out of region, non-Article 5, operations outside the framework of Chapter VIII, as a result of a lack of UN Security Council support for NATO use of force in Kosovo. Accordingly, the geo-strategic location of Macedonia became paramount to NATO success in executing an air campaign against the FRY, as well as serving as a pre-positioning base for a follow-on NATO force in Kosovo.

As a result of the reciprocal desire for a NATO presence in country, prior to the termination of UNPREDEP there were nearly two thousand NATO troops in Macedonia under the NATO flag, in support of Kosovo operations. The NATO and Macedonian rationalizations for a NATO presence in Macedonia were divergent in cause but mutually reinforcing in that while NATO gained a geo-strategic base of operations for Kosovo, the mere presence of NATO would achieve the Macedonian aspirations of preventing any possible interstate incursion. The result, however, was that both were focused wholly on the interstate threat, albeit from different perspectives, while any intrastate conflict prevention efforts were to be left to an OSCE contingent of eight personnel. While the international community at large, including the OSCE, was focusing on the evolving conflict in Kosovo, that involvement was partially justified by the desire to prevent interstate conflict diffusion from Kosovo to Macedonia. The OSCE contingent of eight personnel was likewise focusing efforts toward the possible interstate diffusion of conflict to Macedonia as evidenced by the name of the mission remaining the “OSCE spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje”. Consequently, the only international community organization with a valid conflict prevention mandate to remain in Macedonia was also focused on interstate aspects of conflict prevention; thereby minimizing any

concentration on intrastate efforts, and negating a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity toward interstate and intrastate conflict prevention efforts.

The number of NATO troops on Macedonian soil rose from nearly two thousand at the termination of UNPREDEP to 18,500 at the cessation of the NATO air campaign, a period of just over three months, as a result of the pre-positioning of troops to take part in KFOR operations in Kosovo. It was precisely because of this large NATO presence the international community did not concern itself with discussions of a formal conflict prevention mandate of any type in Macedonia, with the noted exception of the OSCE. Although the international community had grave concerns regarding intrastate stability within Macedonia during execution of the Kosovo intervention, none of the nightmare scenarios came to fruition. Despite their ethnic connection, the Albanian minority purposefully tempered their espousal for KLA ambitions with the intention of stability within Macedonia. Additionally, the unlikely coalition of the “nationalistic” Macedonian and Albanian parties is what constituted the quintessence of political stability during the crisis at the governmental level. This is not to say, however, that interethnic tensions within the country were no longer present. The Kosovo crisis saw continued, and increased, interethnic tension in Macedonia, however, the previous efforts of UNPREDEP toward strengthening mutual understanding and dialogue among political and ethnic parties helped abate the possibility of any rapid escalation of these tensions into overt conflict. Furthermore, it was thought any immediate threat to Macedonia’s intrastate stability was defused by the NATO victory and rapid return of over 90 percent of Kosovar Albanian refugees. However, the negation of any intrastate conflict prevention focus by the international community in Macedonia was to slowly erode the previous success of UNPREDEP.

As a consequence of the intervention in Kosovo, in the form of an air campaign, ethnic Macedonian support for NATO had waned, while support from ethnic Albanians increased. However, NATO still represented the critical component of international community presence sought by the Macedonian government, and with the signing of the MTA and approval of Security Council Resolution 1244, NATO’s interest in Macedonia was to switch from a pre-positioning platform to a logistical base for KFOR operations. Moreover, NATO and the international community were convinced with Kosovo becoming a UN/NATO protectorate, an interstate threat to

Macedonia no longer existed; and the intrastate threat was likewise diminished as the “crisis stage” had now passed.

During deliberations of how to structure the relationship between KFOR and UNMIK, the focus was so intense on how to improve upon the failures of Bosnia and Croatia, the evident success of the unified structure of UNPREDEP in Macedonia was never considered or mentioned. Neither were the possible or probable effects any actions in Kosovo might have upon Macedonia. Although mandated to control of the borders of the FRY, in Kosovo, with Albania and Macedonia until the arrival of the civilian police mission of the UN, what efforts KFOR did execute concerning establishment of a secure environment and public safety and order within Kosovo were concentrated toward the intrastate areas of Pristina and its surrounding region, then toward the remainder of the interior of Kosovo, and finally toward the borders. Consequently, execution of the interstate border component of its mission fell a distant third in priority to KFOR.

This preoccupation with the intrastate components of the Kosovo mission, to the detriment of the interstate mission was exacerbated by the creation of the GSZ. The result was basically a section of land void of military forces of any kind, and patrolled by limited police with light arms only. In the U.S. sector, this buffer zone was to be larger yet as U.S. forces concern with force protection had mandated a four kilometer buffer zone on the Kosovo side of the border. As such, along the southeastern border between Kosovo and Serbia, there was a nine kilometer zone virtually without any security forces. Additionally, KFOR had little reason to suspect a threat. After all, Albania and Macedonia were willing partners in the NATO coalition, and it wasn't until later the organized crime threat was identified. UNMIK also encountered severe delays in fielding the mission's international police component. Adding to the perception of no threat emanating from Macedonia was the fact that both KFOR and UNMIK were utilizing Macedonia as a base for rear operations in support of the Kosovo mission. As such, the border between Kosovo and Macedonia was considered by KFOR and UNMIK to be of minimal consequence as it was within the area of operations. A further complicating factor was the establishment of Kosovo as a UN protectorate meant there were no agreements in place between KFOR, UNMIK and Macedonia regarding cooperative border policing. The lack of a legally defined mechanism for cooperative

engagement along the border only exacerbated the lack of a definitive interstate separation of conflict prevention efforts between Kosovo and Macedonia.

KFOR's demilitarization and transformation of the KLA was executed in rapid fashion and deemed a success by KFOR and UNMIK, however, demilitarization and reintegration of the KLA was more of a symbolic rather than comprehensive feat for three reasons. First, the agreement between the KLA and KFOR stated "all KLA forces in Kosovo and neighboring countries will observe the provisions of this undertaking", which confirmed the many reports of KLA factions operating in northern Albania and northwestern Macedonia. The agreement went on to state KLA forces would "freeze military movement in either direction across international borders" thereby legally allowing those KLA personnel currently outside Kosovo to remain there and not be subject to demilitarization. Secondly, the turn in and collection of weapons was far from all-inclusive. Finally, reintegration into civil society of former KLA members was also far from all encompassing. Consequently, as of December 2000, there were unknown numbers of KLA members who were not subject to demilitarization or reintegration into civil society present in northern Albania and northwestern Macedonia, thousands of unaccounted for members of the KLA in Kosovo, untold numbers of available weapons in the area, and relatively open and unprotected borders between Kosovo and Macedonia and Albania. Moreover, UNMIK and KFOR suffered from the perception the former KLA did not constitute a continuing threat to Kosovo, or a threat at all toward Macedonia. KFOR and UNMIK's mandate and total focus was on conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction within Kosovo, and did not include Macedonia other than as a rear area logistical supply base. While KFOR and UNMIK concentrated on the intrastate aspects of Kosovo, all of these factors represented an interstate threat to Macedonia.

Others in the international community, however, particularly the FRY, Serb, and Macedonian governments expressed sincere reservations about what they perceived as perpetuation of, and reward to, an organization that at the outset at least partly fomented the Kosovo conflict. The Macedonian government continued to highlight the impending threat of the former KLA personnel and ideologies, from both interstate and intrastate sources; however, the international community at large was concerned only with the intrastate context of Kosovo. Ever since termination of UNPREDEP, Macedonia was considered a successful case of conflict prevention,

with no current threat, and was accordingly left with a minimal OSCE contingent to continue conflict prevention efforts. In so doing, the strategy of simultaneity and connectivity of interstate and intrastate conflict prevention efforts within Macedonia had ceased at the same time UNPREDEP was terminated. This situation was exacerbated by the fact that while contained within the overall conflict prevention mandate for Kosovo there was an interstate mandate as well as intrastate, both KFOR and UNMIK were incapable of executing the interstate mandate even if they had perceived it as integral to the overall concept. Additionally, the conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction efforts within Kosovo suffered from the administratively dysfunctional structure of UNMIK and KFOR, thereby precluding a synchronized and multifaceted approach. These faults in the conflict prevention efforts of the international community in both Kosovo and Macedonia, exemplified by the lack of a multifaceted and multilevel approach toward both interstate and intrastate components of conflict prevention in a simultaneous and connective method, were to manifest themselves in renewed conflict.

The two main conclusions drawn from the Kosovo war by Ali Ahmeti were that first, you could win more by a few months of armed struggle than ethnic Albanian politicians had achieved in nearly a decade of peaceful politics; and second, that you could do this only if you got the West involved. These conclusions of Ahmeti represent lucid examples of conflict contagion, and coupled with geographic proximity laid the foundation for conflict diffusion. As a result, Ahmeti and the NLA deliberately chose violence in their pursuit of political gains for the Albanian minority in Macedonia. However, the NLA could not have commenced and sustained operations without the porous border situation created by KFOR and UNMIK. The preoccupation of the international community in Kosovo upon the intrastate aspects of conflict resolution, without regard to the interstate relationship to Macedonia and the region, created the possibility for conflict to emerge in Macedonia. This was coupled with the lack of any major intrastate focus within Macedonia, which facilitated the dissipation of previous successes from UNPREDEP.

In sum, this chapter explicates the strategy of simultaneity and connectivity as related to a nexus of interstate and intrastate conflict prevention efforts toward Macedonia ceased with the termination of UNPREDEP. Based upon the reactions

and statements of the international community at the time of the UNPREDEP mandate termination, early warning was clearly present and readily available. However, the international community as a whole failed to react. Even though, China vetoed the proposal to extend the UNPREDEP mandate, there was sufficient support of major international actors, particularly at the regional level, that some echelon of conflict prevention action could have been instituted for Macedonia. Unfortunately, the international community chose not to react, other than allowing the OSCE interstate contingent of eight to remain. Within Macedonia, this meant the entirety of conflict prevention measures on behalf of the international community consisted of one organization, with eight personnel and an interstate mandate targeted only at the triggering and proximate sources of conflict. As a result, the lack of inclusion of the structural sources of conflict, coupled with the lack of multifaceted and multilevel action, culminated with the absence of any type of intervention synergy.

The situation in Macedonia was exacerbated by the conflict prevention efforts in Kosovo. While the mandate for conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction in Kosovo included both interstate and intrastate aspects, the efforts of UNMIK and KFOR were neither synchronized nor fused within Kosovo due to structural flaws and planning errors, which precluded achieving simultaneity and connectivity. The lack of preparedness and limited numbers of troops in Kosovo impeded utilization of the entirety of multifaceted tools, toward both interstate and intrastate components of conflict prevention, in a simultaneous and connective method thereby negating a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity in conflict prevention efforts aimed at Kosovo. Neither was there any rational connectivity of the conflict prevention efforts of the international community to the situation in Macedonia.

The end result of the international community involvement in Kosovo was the negation of interstate conflict prevention efforts designed to prevent conflict diffusion to Macedonia. This was facilitated by the international community not heading the early warnings at the termination of UNPREDEP and not establishing any conflict prevention efforts targeted specifically toward Macedonia to continue the successful efforts of UNPREDEP or compliment those actions ongoing in Kosovo. Consequently, the absence of a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity regarding a nexus of interstate and intrastate conflict prevention efforts toward either

**Kosovo or Macedonia fostered and enabled conflict diffusion and contagion to Macedonia.**

**The following table, Figure 5.1, provides a chronological summary of the relevant international community involvement regarding conflict prevention efforts in Macedonia from the termination of the UNPREDEP mandate through adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1345.**

**Figure 5.1: Chronology of Relevant International Community Involvement: Phase II**

Date	Focus	Source
1999, Feb 25	China vetoes extension of UNPREDEP	UN SC vote
1999, Mar 19	Rambouillet negotiations adjourn	Contact Group
1999, Mar 24	NATO commences air operations against FRY	NAC Decision
1999, May 6	G-8 Foreign Ministers adopt General Principles on Political Solution to the Kosovo Crisis	G-8 Statement and UN Doc S/1999/516
1999, May 12	Kosovo refugees represent too large a burden for Macedonia	OSCE Press Release
1999, May 14	UN expresses grave concern at the humanitarian catastrophe in and around Kosovo	UN SC Res 1239
1999, Jun 2	FRY accepts General Principles on Political Solution to the Kosovo Crisis	UN Doc S/1999/649
1999, Jun 8	OSCE declares KVM will terminate on 9 June, and a Transitional Task Force for Kosovo will be established	OSCE Decision 296
1999, Jun 9	Military-Technical Agreement (MTA) signed between NATO and governments of FRY and Serbia	MTA Document
1999, Jun 10	NATO terminates air operations against FRY	NAC Decision
1999, Jun 10	UN decides to deploy, under UN auspices, international civil and security presences in Kosovo; UNMIK and KFOR	UN SC Res 1244
1999, Jul 1	Transitional OSCE Task Force for Kosovo will cease to exist, and OSCE Mission in Kosovo is established	OSCE Decision 305
1999, Nov 30	SC President states UNPREDEP prevented conflict spillover	UN Doc S/PRST/1999/34
2000, Jun 6	UN acknowledges emergence of UCPMB	UN Doc S/2000/538
2000, Sep 8	UN cites continuance of low-intensity conflict in Presevo Valley, between UCPMB and Serb security forces	UN Doc S/2000/878
2000, Dec 15	Escalation of conflict between UCPMB and Serb security forces; KFOR responds to constrain freedom of movement	UN Doc S/2000/1196
2001, Jan 8	FRY and Macedonia announce border demarcation agreement	Mak faks News Agency
2001, Feb 23	FRY and Macedonian presidents sign border agreement	Tanjug News Agency
2001, Mar 2	NATO condemns violent incidents occurring in the border area of Macedonia	NATO Press Release (2001) 032
2001, Mar 7	SC Pres Statement condemning insurgent activity and urging MK restraint	UN Doc S/PRST/2001/7
2001, Mar 8	NATO authorizes phased and controlled return of FRY and Serb security forces into GSZ; NATO states commitment to security of Macedonia	NATO Press Release (2001) 035
2001, Mar 9	EU Presidential Statement condemning insurgent activity	EU Pres Release 6924/01 (Presse 101)
2001, Mar 13	UN cites UCPMB recruiting activities and complication of armed ethnic Albanians in Macedonia	UN Doc S/2001/218
2001, Mar 21	Macedonian Government prepares for strong military response and issues 24 hour deadline for NLA to surrender weapons and/or depart the country	Macedonian Government Statement
2001, Mar 21	NATO condemns violence in Macedonia, approves further support measures, and dispatches Ambassador Hans-Joerg Eiff to supplement the NATO Liaison Office in Skopje.	NATO Press Release (2001) 041
2001, Mar 21	OSCE announces Ambassador Robert Frowick as Personal Representative for the situation in Macedonia	OSCE Press Release
2001, Mar 21	UN strongly condemns violence in Macedonia, notes outside Albanian extremist support, and welcomes international efforts of UNMIK, KFOR, EU, OSCE, NATO	UN SC Res 1345

## **Chapter 6: Phase III: Post-Kosovo**

### **6.1. Introduction**

When conflict in Macedonia finally emerged, the international community was essentially unaware of the severity of the situation due primarily to a willful determination to view the country as the region's lone multiethnic success story among the scattered remnants of the former Yugoslavia's nationalist wars (Pearson 2002, 13). As a result of UNPREDEP's achievements, Macedonia had been held up as a model of successful conflict prevention, although an imperfect one, of interethnic coexistence and democratic rule, with active participation of the Albanian community in political institutions (Kim 2001, 1). At least that is the direction it was headed when UNPREDEP was terminated. As a result, this was the image the international community believed and propagated. However, one of the fundamental questions in the field of conflict prevention is exactly when does one declare success and disengage? In the case of Macedonia, although headed in the right direction, it had not yet arrived at the desired level of self-sufficiency. While the international community had moved on and was focused on Kosovo, ethnic tensions continued to simmer in Macedonia. In spite of evident progress made by the Macedonian government regarding concerns of the Albanian minority, the slow pace of that progress acted as fertile ground for the NLA. The minimal size of the OSCE element left behind and charged with the conflict prevention mission in Macedonia, albeit from an interstate focused mandate, was insufficient to mount a viable strategy of simultaneity and connectivity for both interstate and intrastate threats. This, coupled with the similar inability of KFOR and UNMIK to contain ethnic Albanian insurgents within Kosovo, led to the state of conflict Macedonia was encountering.

Facing an imminent crisis, 21 March 2001, resulted in three events on behalf of the international community that would raise the level of awareness and activity in the Macedonian conflict. First, NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson (2001b) issued a statement reiterating his condemnation of extremist groups operating in Macedonia, and promised to strengthen cooperation with the government of Macedonia by dispatching Ambassador Hans-Joerg Eiff to supplement the NATO Liaison Office in Skopje. Second, the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE (2001a) announced that Ambassador Robert Frowick, former head of the OSCE Spillover

Monitor Mission to Skopje and former Chief of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, was to act as his Personal Representative for the situation in Macedonia. Finally, the UN Security Council (2001c) adopted Resolution 1345 condemning the extremist violence taking place. The Security Council noted the support of violence from ethnic Albanian extremists outside Macedonia, and called on ethnic Albanian leaders in the FRY, Kosovo and Macedonia to condemn such violence and use their influence to secure peace; as well as calling on KFOR to further strengthen its efforts to prevent unauthorized movement and illegal arms shipments across borders in the region in accordance with UN Security Council Resolutions 1160 and 1244. NATO emphasized their measure was in full cooperation with other organizations such as the EU, OSCE and UN, thereby indicating integrated international community determination to support stability in the region. The OSCE also underlined they were prepared to participate together with other international organizations in a coordinated effort to settle the crisis in northern Macedonia. The Security Council welcomed the international efforts of UNMIK, KFOR, EU, OSCE, NATO, and the Macedonian government to prevent the escalation of ethnic tensions in the area. Thus, the adoption of Resolution 1345 represented the return of the international community to conflict prevention efforts in Macedonia, targeted toward the simultaneous and connected aspects of both interstate and intrastate conflict prevention in a multifaceted and synchronized approach. Immediately thereafter, on 22 March 2001, the OSCE (2001b) announced approval of decision 405 that would increase the size of the mission in Skopje to 16 personnel, with a view to strengthen their capabilities to monitor developments along the border and report.

The international community, while refusing to accept the legitimacy of the NLA as a voice for grievances of the ethnic Albanian community in Macedonia, nonetheless held the position the actual grievances were legitimate and the solution to the crisis lay in addressing these concerns through political dialogue (Daftary 2001, 6). Macedonian government officials, however, continued their insistence the NLA was a terrorist organization with no domestic legitimacy, and its operations within Macedonia were a direct result of the international community failing to effectively seal the border between Macedonia and Kosovo. The Macedonian government decided upon strong military action to defeat the NLA, and on 21 March

2001, issued a 24 hour deadline to the NLA to surrender their weapons and/or depart the country. In response, the NLA declared a unilateral ceasefire, stated it did not wish to threaten the territorial integrity of the country, and called for dialogue on the rights of ethnic Albanians. This request for dialogue from the NLA, however, was refused on the grounds the NLA was a terrorist organization, and hence not a legitimate political entity, and the Macedonian government ordered a full scale military offensive on 25 March.

## **6.2. Macedonian Conflict**

### *Continuation of Conflict.*

Surprisingly, the Army of the Republic of Macedonia (ARM) encountered minimal organized resistance at first, and succeeded in regaining control of some of the smaller villages in the Tetovo area. This was in large part due to the commencement of political dialogue in Skopje. The international community had long emphasized a political rather than military solution was required to solve the conflict, and supported inclusion of all political parties as opposed to only those currently represented in the government. On 2 April 2001, President Trajkovski convened the first meeting of representatives of all Macedonian political parties to address the interethnic issues at hand (Kim 2001, 8). Although the NLA demanded it be included in the negotiations, the Macedonian leadership adamantly refused on the grounds it would only negotiate with legitimate political parties. At the fifth round of meetings, President Trajkovski announced agreement on several minor issues, namely, to postpone the census, encourage refugees and displaced persons to return home, and to assist in reconstruction of the homes destroyed in the conflict. But, on 28 April the conflict was to enter a new stage.

On 28 April 2001, NLA forces used mortars to ambush a Macedonian mine clearing unit and police convoy in the village of Vejce, near Tetovo, killing eight and wounding three (Daftary 2001, 9; Kim 2001, 7; Troebst 2001b, 4). The burial of the victims sparked vengeful riots by ethnic Macedonians against ethnic Albanian owned shops and bars in Bitola, a city in southern Macedonia from where four of the victims originated. In response, the Macedonian government imposed curfews in Bitola, Tetovo and Kumanovo, and several times announced it was considering

declaring a state of war so as to leverage greater means of combating the NLA. It was at this time the NLA proclaimed a liberated area around the villages of Lipkovo, Slupcane and Vaksince, an area east of Tetovo and near Kumanovo, and much closer to the capital city of Skopje. On 3 May, the ARM launched another offensive to oust the NLA from this area, utilizing heavy artillery, tanks and attack helicopters.

In light of the escalation of conflict on the part of both the NLA and the ARM, and the onset of retaliatory ethnic violence on the part of ethnic Macedonian civilians, the international community increased their pressure for formation of a more inclusive coalition government. Under immense international community pressure, all parties agreed to form a national unity government, and on 13 May 2001, parliament overwhelmingly approved the action by a vote of 104 to 1. Hence, the ruling government was now a coalition of all major political parties in country: VMRO-DPMNE, SDSM, DPA, LP, and PDP; however, unity was not the outcome. The Albanian parties diverged on how best to proceed, although both were advocates of amnesty for, and discussions with, the NLA. The Macedonian parties were divided even further. Prime Minister Ljubco Georgievski and Minister of the Interior Ljube Boskovski, both of VMRO-DPMNE, were convinced of the necessity of a strong military offensive to end the conflict; while Branko Crvenkovski, of the SDSM, favored a much more moderate approach. To exacerbate the situation further, Prime Minister Georgievski was prone to issuing inflammatory statements against the ethnic Albanian parties and against the international community, who he held responsible for allowing the conflict to take root. Furthermore, neither of the Albanian parties would unequivocally condemn the NLA. Unfortunately, except for the attempts of President Trajkovski to stabilize the situation and devise a peace plan, most politicians and political parties seemed more concerned with how to use the conflict for their political advantage in the next elections as opposed to how to use their political leverage to end the conflict. While the political entities squabbled, the conflict escalated further.

During the end of May the ARM commenced another offensive, which the NLA not only countered but used to advance their position. Between 8 and 10 June 2001, the NLA occupied the village of Aracinovo, a suburb of Skopje. This was a major event in the conflict as from Aracinovo the capital city of Skopje was now within mortar range of the NLA; as well were the only international road and rail links

connecting Athens to Belgrade; the only refinery in country; and Petrovec airport, which not only was the largest international airport in Macedonia, but also served as the logistical hub of all KFOR supplies bound for Kosovo (Troebst 2001, 5). With the threat of urban warfare looming, both sides signed a cease-fire on 11 June. However, political dialogue proved futile and the ARM commenced bombardment of Aracinovo on 22 June 2001. In an attempt to stave off further collateral damage to the Skopje suburb, prevent an all out major battle that might irreparably polarize the two ethnic communities of Macedonia, and avoid a military versus political end to the conflict, EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, arranged another cease-fire that included terms for evacuation of NLA forces from Aracinovo under international supervision (Kim 2001, 7). On 25 June 2001, elements of KFOR evacuated between three and four hundred armed NLA members from Aracinovo to the vicinity of Lipkovo. The fact that NATO evacuated the NLA, complete with all of their weaponry, from Aracinovo was to cause harsh criticism and violent protestation from the ethnic Macedonian community. This was to be a political turning point for the international community (Rapporteur 2001, 9).

On the other side of the border, in Kosovo, KFOR and UNMIK were also making attempts to deflect the severe criticism of their inability to secure the border between Kosovo and Macedonia. The first concrete achievement on the part of KFOR was the deployment of Task Force Viking, 400 British and Norwegian soldiers, on 29 March 2001, to augment the Polish and Ukrainian elements charged with border monitoring duties. These troops were equipped with surveillance capabilities in order to assist in the mountainous terrain, and established communications links with the ARM across the border in an effort to synchronize activities. In an effort to better coordinate activities of the border component of KFOR with Macedonian efforts, NATO established the NATO Cooperation and Coordination Center (NCCC) on 23 April 2001. This NATO element was located in Skopje with KFOR Rear, but had the specific mission of facilitating the timely exchange of information and data between KFOR and Macedonian military and civilian authorities. As a subcomponent of the NCCC, the NATO Clearing House (NCH) was instituted as a means to coordinate with nations on offers of bilateral support and military cooperation that originated from NATO and PfP nations. To compliment the military aspect of the border mission, UNMIK announced on 24 May 2001 the

release of UNMIK (2001) Regulation 2001/10, on the prohibition of unauthorized border/boundary crossings. This regulation effectively stated any person who crosses a border or boundary of Kosovo at any location other than an authorized crossing point commits a criminal offense and shall be liable upon conviction to a fine of 500 DM or 30 days' imprisonment. For anyone convicted of crossing with a weapon, ammunition or military clothing, supplies or equipment, the sentence can increase up to 5,000 DM or one year imprisonment. Combined, these represented the first coordinated actions of UNMIK and KFOR aimed specifically at hindering interstate diffusion of conflict and isolating it either solely within Kosovo or Macedonia.

Until now, the in country efforts of Ambassador Eiff and Ambassador Frowick, representing NATO and the OSCE respectively, coupled with the shuttle diplomacy of Javier Solana and Lord Robertson, on behalf of the EU and NATO respectively, had accomplished little other than prevention of the declaration of a state of war and formation of the national unity government. The international community was determined to invest more resources to ending the conflict in Macedonia. During the last week of June 2001, the EU and the United States each nominated a special representative to facilitate talks in Skopje; the EU nominated former French Defense Minister Francois Leotard and the United States nominated Ambassador James Pardew. Additionally, the OSCE announced former High Commissioner for National Minorities, Max Van der Stoep would replace Ambassador Frowick, and NATO dispatched Special Representative Peter Feith. Although Hans-Joerg Eiff would remain NATO's Ambassador to Macedonia, Mr. Feith was to assume the role of NATO envoy concentrating solely on the crisis.

Meanwhile, President Trajkovski presented to parliament on 8 June, a strategy that included partial amnesty, disarmament of the NLA and reconstruction of destroyed houses. The government adopted the plan on 12 June, and on 14 June of 2001, President Trajkovski formally requested NATO's assistance in disarming the NLA if a political solution was reached. President Trajkovski then commenced discussions within the government on 15 June, which primarily concerned possible changes to the Macedonian constitution so as to alleviate the ethnic Albanian community's concerns. On 20 June, however, the discussions were declared completely deadlocked. Also on 20 June 2001, the NAC issued a statement

responding to President Trajkovski's request for NATO assistance with demilitarization of the NLA. NATO (2001c) agreed to provide troops to supervise the disarming of the NLA predicated on four conditions: a peace agreement signed by the main parliamentary leaders; a status of forces agreement with Macedonia on conditions of NATO troop deployment; an agreed plan for weapons collection, including an explicit agreement by the NLA to disarm; and an enduring cease-fire. On 5 July 2001, NATO succeeded in negotiating a cease-fire, thereby opening the way for a revitalized and augmented international community presence to revive the stalled political negotiations.

### *Political Negotiation.*

On 7 July 2001, EU envoy Leotard and US envoy Pardew presented a single framework document to the negotiating parties that was to be the basis for further negotiation. This document was an extensive proposal drafted by domestic legal experts with assistance from French constitutional law expert Robert Badinter (Daftery 2001, 13; Kim 2001, 9). The first round of negotiations commenced on 9 July, in Skopje, and included the four largest Macedonian political parties (VMRO-DPMNE, SDSM, DPA and PDP); the EU, US, and OSCE special representatives; with NATO envoy Feith responsible for liaising with the NLA. The proposed document was harshly criticized by the Albanian parties and a counterproposal was prepared demanding ethnic Albanians be made a constituent people, Albanian language be equal Macedonian, the post of vice president be filled with an ethnic Albanian and have veto power, and transference of local police control to municipal authorities. Basically, these demands were a component of the DPA's political platform from the previous election. In response, international mediators met separately with the Albanian parties and prepared a revised document where the Albanian parties conceded the post of vice president and the constituent people demands. The second draft was presented to the Macedonian parties on 18 July, and likewise received a stout rejection. Prime Minister Georgievski stated acceptance of Albanian as an official language would lead to "language federalization" and condemned the "cowboy-like methods" of the international community mediators. In protest, Lord Robertson and Javier Solana canceled a trip to Skopje scheduled for

19 July, and the situation deteriorated elsewhere in the country with several cease-fire violations on both sides.

After Ambassador Feith negotiated yet another cease-fire on 25 July, Lord Robertson and Javier Solana met with the four primary political parties on 26 and 27 July, culminating with an announcement that political negotiations would resume. Although originally planned to resume in Tetovo, security concerns caused a shift to the southern resort town of Ohrid, where on 28 July 2001, the talks recommenced. The first breakthrough came on 1 August, when the parties agreed Albanian would be considered an official language at the local level in areas where Albanians comprised at least 20 percent of the population. The next advance arrived on 5 August, when the parties agreed on increasing Albanian representation in the police, while maintaining the police force under control of the central government. Ultimately, announcement was made on 8 August that a final agreement had been unofficially initialed, and would be officially signed in Skopje on 13 August 2001.

The period just prior to the official signing of the Ohrid Agreement, however, was to experience some of the most intense fighting of the conflict (Daftary 2001, 14; Kim 2001, 8; Rappoteur 2001, 10). On 7 August, five Albanians were killed during a police raid in Skopje, where a cache of weapons was also seized. In apparent retaliation, 18 Macedonian security forces were killed between 8 and 10 August in two separate attacks near Skopje and Tetovo. On 12 August, Macedonian security forces killed at least five more Albanians. During this period of intense fighting ARM forces utilized attack helicopters and attack aircraft to drop bombs on suspected NLA held villages. Under heavy international community pressure, a unilateral cease-fire was declared by the government on the evening of 12 August, enabling a low-key official signing of the Ohrid Agreement on 13 August 2001. Sporadic violence continued to be reported, however, until 19 August, when Ali Ahmeti announced the NLA would honor the peace accord and surrender their weapons under NATO supervision. In exchange, President Trajkovski pledged amnesty to the NLA, excluding those suspected of war crimes. In total, the seven-month conflict resulted in the deaths of 82 members of the Macedonian Security forces, 16 civilians, 2 members of the OSCE, and approximately 200 ethnic Albanians (Pearson 2002, 9). UNHCR estimated the conflict created over 100 thousand refugees and displaced persons, with over 70 thousand fleeing to Kosovo.

In light of the Ohrid Agreement signing, the President of the UN Security Council (2001d) issued a statement on 13 August 2001, welcoming the signing of the agreement, calling for full implementation Resolution 1345, and welcoming the concerted efforts of the EU, OSCE, and NATO in support of the agreement.

Unfortunately, after nearly a decade of peace in an independent Macedonia the outbreak of armed ethnic conflict cost Macedonia its status of a model state and example of conflict prevention success. This was due to, in part, to international community abandonment of a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity as related to interstate and intrastate conflict prevention efforts, as well as a failure to recognize conflict prevention labors to date had not yet been nurtured to maturity. The reinstatement of security forces into the GSZ, coupled with the increased efforts of KFOR to secure the border between Kosovo and Macedonia finally constituted partial execution of the interstate component of KFOR's mission as delineated in Resolution 1244 and the MTA. Although this interstate component of the KFOR and UNMIK mission technically related to an action internal to Kosovo, the functional quality of the mission was to negate the possibility of conflict diffusion from Kosovo to Macedonia, and later vice versa. The initial failure of KFOR or UNMIK to execute this task was a large contributor to the diffusion and contagion of conflict to Macedonia; however, once focus on the interstate aspect was increased, it assisted in isolating the Macedonian conflict so the intrastate efforts of the international community negotiators could conclude a peace agreement.

### **6.3. Framework Agreement.**

Although commonly referred to as the Ohrid Agreement, in deference to the town in which it was initially agreed upon, the official title of the document is "The Framework Agreement of 13 August 2001", hereinafter referred to as the Framework Agreement. Reactions to the signing of the Framework Agreement varied within Macedonia. Prime Minister Georgievski, and the more nationalist political leaders, accused the international community of supporting Albanian terrorists and sought to distance themselves from the terms of the agreement, which they alleged was signed under international pressure (Daftary 2001, 24; Kim 2001, 10). The other less nationalistic Macedonian political parties and leaders, such as the SDSM, generally reacted positively and refrained from criticizing the agreement.

The Albanian political parties were in the main pleased with the agreement, but far from ecstatic. This was basically a result of relative deprivation, where rather than appreciate the positive gains that had been made, they chose to contemplate what ultimately could have been gained but was not. President Trajkovski was probably the most supportive, and concurrently realistic, regarding the agreement. He described the Framework Agreement as a path chosen by the legitimately elected leaders of both Macedonian and Albanian citizens, but his central line of reasoning was it was the only alternative to full-scale civil war. The NLA, though not formally included in the negotiations, did have indirect involvement through the NATO liaison connection as well as through unofficial ties with the Albanian political parties; and, in the end, Ali Ahmeti did admit to being pleased with the final outcome. Support for the agreement throughout the Macedonian population was likewise divided based upon ethnicity. The international community, however, was unanimous in its support of the Framework Agreement; although, given the mixed reactions cited above, concern over the proposed implementation timetable lingered.

The Framework Agreement specifically required that parliament pass constitutional amendments and legislation implementing a revised law on local self-government within 45 days of the signing. This passage was then linked to international community support further necessitated by the agreement. This was to prove difficult as a two-thirds majority of the 120 seat parliament was required to ratify any constitutional amendments or legislative modifications, and the opposed political party, VMRO-DPMNE, held 47 seats. Another complicating fact was the original agreement was in English and had to be translated. Regardless, the Macedonian parliament commenced debate on the Framework Agreement on 31 August 2001. Stojan Andov, the Speaker of the Parliament, also happened to oppose the reforms and would periodically engage in delay tactics. On 6 September, the parliament gave initial endorsement of the agreement by a vote of 91 out of 112 members present, which paved the way for further consideration regarding proposed changes. While this was a step in the right direction, a final vote was still required by 27 September, however, numerous contentious issues were to delay the final vote. First, some members of the parliament urged for consideration of a public referendum. Second, a primary concern from the Albanian side was the status of granting amnesty to former members of the NLA. While President Trajkovski

pledged amnesty in August, this was not formally an item within the Framework Agreement. Thirdly, the Macedonian side insisted in reopening the issue of constitutional wording related to the Macedonian people versus the Macedonian citizens. It took several visits to Skopje by Lord Robertson and Chief Solana to finally revive the stalled parliamentary process. Eventually, albeit past the specified deadline, the constitution was amended on 16 November 2001, the law of local self-government was adopted on 22 January 2002, and the amnesty law was emplaced on 26 February.

Regardless of the mixed reactions to the signing, and the political delay in adopting the requisite amendments and legislation, the Framework Agreement was the document that brought the Macedonian conflict to a close. The Framework Agreement consists of ten sections, one of which contains three pertinent annexes, drafted to provide an agreed framework for securing the future of Macedonia's democracy and permitting the development of closer and more integrated relations with the Euro-Atlantic community, and to promote the peaceful and harmonious development of civil society while respecting the ethnic identity and interests of all Macedonian citizens (Framework Agreement 2001, 1). The nine sections of the agreement, not dealing with annexes, can be abridged into five primary endeavor areas (Rapporteur 2001, 10-11). First, the Constitution will be amended to delete reference to the role of the Slav Macedonians as a constituent people, and to explicitly recognize the multiethnic nature of Macedonian society. Second, the agreement will introduce a system of "double majority" into parliament and the local public institutions, so that any vote will also call for a majority among the representatives of the "minority" population groups. Albanian will be used in a more widespread fashion and will become the official language of those regions in which Albanian speakers represent more than 20% of the population. Legislation will be drafted in both languages, so that Albanian will also become a language of parliament. Third, changes will be introduced into the civil service, Constitutional Court and police services to guarantee the proportional representation of different communities within Macedonia. Local government will be developed and its powers strengthened, particularly in regions where a minority group exceeds 20% of the local population. Fourth, the Macedonian government undertakes to finance and contribute to development of the use of the Albanian language for higher education,

in addition to primary and secondary education, in areas where Albanian speakers account for at least 20% of the population. Finally, a population census under international supervision is to be held by the end of 2001 in order to establish the precise ethnic breakdown of the Macedonian population. Furthermore, all religions, including Islam, will enjoy the same status.

Section 9 of the Framework Agreement contains the three annexes. Annex A delineates the requisite amendments to the preamble and articles 7, 8, 19, 48, 56, 69, 77, 78, 84, 86, 104, 109, 114, 115, and 131 of the constitution. Annex B demarcates the necessary legislative modifications, as well as the specified time limits. Annex C, though, is the most critical component of the Framework Agreement as it relates to the international community's role in conflict prevention efforts, and as such defines implementation and confidence-building measures. Annex C, entitled International Support, states "The Parties invite the international community to facilitate, monitor and assist in the implementation of the provisions of the Framework Agreement and its annexes". Specifically, it requests the Council of Europe, OSCE, and other international organizations supervise and observe the impending census and elections; the UNHCR, European Commission and World Bank to assist in refugee return, rehabilitation and reconstruction; the international community as a whole to assist in development of decentralized government; the OSCE, EU and United States to support and assist with implementation of non-discrimination and equitable representation practices related to training and assistance programs for police; and the OSCE to assist in programs for multiethnic culture, education and use of languages.

The Macedonian conflict inflicted immense damage upon the social fabric of Macedonia, and erased any positive gains previously made by the conflict prevention efforts of UNPROFOR and UNPREDEP. In seven months Macedonia went from a model of conflict prevention success to a country in need of international community conflict prevention efforts in the form of conflict resolution. The Framework Agreement was the document that would form the basis for all future intrastate conflict prevention efforts in Macedonia. This document, drafted by the international community and agreed upon by the Macedonian political leaders, bound the international community to assist in myriad long-term confidence-building measures of a magnitude that would dwarf the earlier good offices mandate

of the UN. The practical implementation of these reforms was highly delicate and complex, given the far-reaching changes they entailed; and the process of reform, conducive to internal stability and economic development thereby providing hope of a fresh start for Macedonia, could not succeed without European and Euro-Atlantic involvement both in economic terms and in terms of security. The primary international community group of actors involved in the Framework Agreement implementation was to be NATO, the EU and the OSCE. Originally, the United States was to be included among the primary group of actors, but after the events of 11 September 2001, the global priorities of the US were to shift.

#### **6.4. NATO**

##### *Operation Essential Harvest/Task Force Essential Harvest.*

As previously discussed, on 20 June 2001, the NAC issued a statement responding to President Trajkovski's request for NATO assistance with demilitarization of the NLA. NATO (2001c) agreed to provide troops to supervise the disarming of the NLA predicated on four conditions: a peace agreement signed by the main parliamentary leaders; a status of forces agreement with Macedonia on conditions of NATO troop deployment; an agreed plan for weapons collection, including an explicit agreement by the NLA to disarm; and an enduring cease-fire. This proposed mission was designated Operation Essential Harvest. With the signing of the Framework Agreement, NATO determined sufficient progress had been made and decided to build upon positive momentum by announcing on 15 August 2001, the NAC had authorized deployment of Task Force Harvest (TFH) headquarters and communications assets. The mission of TFH was to collect arms and ammunition voluntarily turned over by ethnic Albanian insurgents and thereby assist in building confidence in the broader peace process. The fundamental tasks of TFH were: collection of weapons and ammunition from the NLA, transportation and disposal of capitulated weapons, and transportation and destruction of surrendered ammunition (NATO 2001d). The operation was to be of limited duration and conducted in three phases. Phase one included preparation, pre-deployment and deployment; phase two comprised weapons and ammunition collection, disposal/destruction of those items, and was not to exceed 30 days in length; and

phase three was the redeployment of all personnel. The NLA had agreed to the weapons collection plan, as well as provided a list of weapons and ammunition they planned on surrendering so as to comply with one of their confidence-building measure obligations. By agreement, it was the NLA's responsibility to de-mine weapons caches and bring any hidden weapons to the collection sites. TFH's only mandate was to collect weapons that were voluntarily turned in by the armed extremists.

Operation Essential Harvest was officially launched on 22 August and effectively commenced on 27 August 2001 (NATO 2003b, 2). It was comprised of approximately 3,500 troops from 11 countries and charged with collecting 3,300 weapons<sup>1</sup>. The operation initiated amid disagreement between Macedonian authorities and NATO regarding the number of weapons the NLA was required to surrender. While NATO set the number at 3,300, the Macedonian government set the figure at least three times higher. The ensuing discussions caused ethnic Macedonians to again accuse NATO troops of supporting ethnic Albanians, which was probably a factor in the incident which cost one British soldier his life. On the evening of 26 August 2001, a group of Macedonian youths threw a piece of concrete at a NATO vehicle, which shattered the windscreen and struck the TFH soldier on the head, killing him (BBC 2001). On 29 August 2001, Lord Robertson addressed the Macedonian parliament regarding the weapons issue and stated it was not the quantity of weapons surrendered that mattered, but rather the clear political signal provided by surrendering a weapon that was previously used for political ends (NATO 2001e). It was NATO's opinion that voluntary disarmament should be looked at as a confidence-building measure. As was the case in Kosovo, disarmament was to be primarily a symbolic rather than comprehensive affair.

Collection sites were established within the NLA's operational areas. As agreed to with Macedonian authorities, collected weapons were destroyed at the collection point, and ammunition was transported to the Krivolak training range, in the central

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<sup>1</sup> Contributing nations to Operation Essential Harvest were: Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States. Furthermore, several NATO nations deployed additional forces in support of their operational elements. NATO, AFSOUTH Operations, *Operation Essential Harvest*, <http://www.afsouth.nato.int/operations/skopje/harvest.htm> (2002e, 18, Dec)

region of the country, where it was destroyed taking into account the potential environmental impact. Ammunition unsafe to move, however, was destroyed at the collection points. Operation Essential Harvest ended on 26 September 2001, with 3,210 assault rifles, 483 machine guns, 161 mortars/anti-tank weapons, 17 air defense weapon systems, and 4 tanks/armored personnel carriers collected and destroyed (NATO 2001f, 2).

Concurrent with NATO's intrastate execution of Operation Essential Harvest, KFOR continued to increase their focus on the interstate aspect of their mission. By this time KFOR had dedicated 19 companies, comprised of 2,500 soldiers to border monitoring duties, supported by sophisticated technologies such as electronic surveillance, infrared and thermal vision devices, and helicopter support. As reported in the 2 October, Secretary-General's (2001f) report on UNMIK, since 4 June 2001, KFOR had detained more than 1,200 individuals under the provisions of UNMIK Regulation 2001/10, on the prohibition of unauthorized border/boundary crossings. Additionally, since 31 May 2001, KFOR had seized over 1,100 rifles and pistols, close to 1,700 grenades, nearly 1,100 anti-tank weapons and about 170,000 rounds of ammunition. These results were a function of KFOR increasing their emphasis on the interstate component of their mission, as well as more KPS personnel finally completing training and the KPS becoming a more professional and effective organization. These interstate efforts of KFOR contributed significantly to the isolation of the NLA in Macedonia.

NATO (2001f), declared Operation Essential Harvest a success upon its termination. It was noted violence had dramatically declined within Macedonia and a true commitment was being shown to end the fighting for good. While the mandate of Operation Essential Harvest was explicitly related to the voluntary collection of weapons, and did not entail any responsibility to ensure a safe and secure environment, the mere presence of a sizeable quantity of NATO troops implicitly had a calming and reassuring effect throughout the country. Although merely a component of the overall Framework Agreement, successful conclusion of the mission was deemed an important and essential step in the inclusive peace process. The operation also paved the way for a further NATO deployment in Macedonia, this time in order to protect the OSCE and EU civilian monitors charged

with supervising application of the political and institutional arrangements contained in the Framework Agreement.

*Operation Amber Fox/Task Force Fox.*

From the start of Operation Essential Harvest, many observers expressed concerns over a potential security vacuum that would result after departure of the 3,500 NATO troops (Kim 2001, 13; Rapporteur 2110 16). The ethnic Albanian community desired an extended NATO military presence be maintained in the former conflict area out of fear of reprisals by extremist ethnic Macedonians following the departure of TFH. The ethnic Macedonian community also favored an extended military presence, but preferred the EU or UN have direct political control over that presence in order to play down the role of NATO, considered to be pro-Albanian due to its intervention in Kosovo. This option was not accepted by EU member states, which were of the opinion that European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) structures could not become operational on such short notice. Shortly afterward, the UN adopted Security Council (2001e) Resolution 1371, on 26 September 2001, reinforcing its commitment to Resolution 1345, and endorsing efforts of member states to establish a multinational security presence in country. Consequently, a NATO-led option garnered the most international community support, and on 19 September 2001, President Trajkovski requested a “light” NATO presence subsequent to termination of Operation Essential Harvest. The NAC, on 26 September, therefore agreed to the principle of deploying a new mission, entitled Operation Amber Fox.

The mission officially started on 27 September 2001, with an initial three-month mandate, and was comprised of 1,000 troops. In actuality, however, the mission only entailed the deployment of 700 troops as the remaining 300 were to come from KFOR Rear soldiers already present in Skopje. While Germany provided the bulk of the mission, Denmark, France, Italy and the Netherlands also contributed forces. Operation Amber Fox was mandated to contribute to protection of the international monitors from the EU and OSCE, who were charged with overseeing implementation of the Framework Agreement. One of the principal tasks of the EU and OSCE was to accompany the return of refugees from both the Albanian and

Macedonian communities, as there was still estimated to be approximately 76,000 refugees returning to Macedonia.

Even though Operation Amber Fox had an initial mandate of three months, many thought it should stay in place longer, depending on the period of time needed to reform the Macedonian security forces in order to comply with the quota of ethnic Albanians stipulated in the Framework Agreement. Consequently, Operation Amber Fox was subsequently extended on 7 December 2001 (NATO 2001g), for an additional three months; on 18 February 2002 (NATO 2002a), for an additional three months; on 21 May 2002 (NATO 2002b), for an additional four months; and on 11 October 2002 (NATO 2002c), for an additional period of time ending on 15 December 2002. In total, Operation Amber Fox maintained a presence in Macedonia for nearly 15 months.

During the time Task Force Fox (TFF) was executing its mission, the Macedonian government expressed dissatisfaction with attempting to negotiate the labyrinth-like headquarters elements of NATO located in Skopje. KFOR Rear, who also had operational control over TFF, actually reported to the KFOR Commander in Pristina, Kosovo; while the NCCC reported to AFSOUTH headquarters in Naples, Italy; and the NATO Ambassador to Macedonia and Senior Military Representative reported to NATO headquarters in Brussels, Belgium. Likewise, NATO was also searching for ways to streamline operations and reduce manpower and costs. Consequently, in early April of 2002, the NATO Headquarters Skopje was created, thereby consolidating KFOR Rear, Operation Amber Fox, the NCCC and the NATO Senior Military Representative. The NATO Ambassador to Macedonia retained his direct link to Brussels. The mission of this new headquarters was to command all NATO forces in Macedonia, coordinate with the national support elements, cooperate with the Macedonian Ministry of Defense, and to support KFOR. This was a major political step in relations between Macedonia and NATO, as all NATO forces in Macedonia now fell under one headquarters, and were all in primary support to Macedonia as opposed to being assigned to KFOR, with an additional duty of supporting operations in Macedonia. This concrete separation of Kosovo and Macedonia from being one area of military operations greatly aided in eradicating the treatment of the Macedonia state and the province of Kosovo as one

operational entity, and enhanced the idea of Macedonia as a sovereign nation with a defined interstate border.

In addition to transformation of the NATO headquarters structure, progress was also made in the cooperative relationship between Kosovo and Macedonia. On 18 March 2001, the Security Council (2002a) reported the SRSG for Kosovo met with President Trajkovski and agreed to establish a Joint Expert Committee to address the practical situation on the ground resulting from the border demarcation agreement between the FRY and Macedonia. On 28 March an agreement was also reached on exchange of information to combat organized crime and terrorism. Although previous agreements had been in place between Macedonia and the FRY, the establishment of Kosovo as a UN protectorate meant these agreements were not valid between Macedonia and KFOR, resulting in no legally defined mechanism for cooperative engagement along the border. The restructuring of the NATO headquarters in Skopje, and the agreements with KFOR and UNMIK on border demarcation and police cooperation, helped reestablish and redefine the interstate delineation of conflict prevention efforts between Kosovo and Macedonia.

By December of 2002, the security situation had progressed to the point where Operation Amber Fox was no longer required. At the conclusion of the mission, NATO (2003c) affirmed Operation Amber Fox was a remarkable example of how joint efforts of the International Community and Macedonian authorities resulted in bringing the country from the brink of civil war back on the track of further democratization and improvement of human rights through a process of dialog and reconciliation. While acknowledging that Operation Amber Fox could be successfully terminated, the NAC felt there was a requirement for a follow-on international military presence in the country so that risks of destabilization were minimized. In response to a request from President Trajkovski, the NAC agreed to continue supporting Macedonia with a new mission.

#### *Operation Allied Harmony.*

In order to demonstrate its commitment and support, NATO by invitation of the Government of Macedonia commenced a new mission, called Operation Allied Harmony, on 16 December 2002. Due to the greatly improved security environment in the country a special task force was no longer needed, resulting in the executive

command of the new NATO mission being given to the recently formed NATO Headquarters Skopje. The forces were reduced from 700 soldiers to about 450, and the initial mandate was to expire on 31 March 2003.

Operation Allied Harmony consisted of both operational and advisory tasks along with other supportive activities as appropriate. The operational aspect of the mission comprised two components. First, liaison and monitoring operations focused on the former crisis areas were conducted in order to maintain links with authorities, forces, local leaders, local population and international community organizations. Second, was to demonstrate NATO's continued presence and commitment to facilitating the reconciliation process in order to promote stability by deterring the resurgence of ethnically motivated violence. The advisory facet of the mission encompassed four functions. First, was to provide military advice to the country's authorities and defense security sector reform activities. Second, was to provide military advice to, and exchange information with, Macedonian authorities, KFOR and Albanian authorities on border security, smuggling interdiction and other matters as appropriate. Third, was to provide military advice, when necessary and appropriate, to Macedonian leaders to help coordinate bilateral and NATO offers of military training and resources. Finally, the last of the advisory functions was to provide military advice on organizational and training requirements.

The overall goal of Operation Allied Harmony was to capitalize on the success of Operation Essential Harvest and Operation Amber Fox to assist the Macedonian government in taking ownership of security throughout the country (NATO 2002d). As such, NATO agreed to review the modalities of its continued presence in February of 2003. As a result of this review of the current security environment in Macedonia, and based on a request from President Trajkovski to retain a presence, and agreement between NATO and the EU, a mutual decision was made to terminate the NATO operation and have the EU assume the next phase of the Framework Agreement implementation. Accordingly, Operation Allied Harmony concluded on 31 March 2003, when the operational portion of the mission was effectively handed over to the EU. Through NATO (2003d) Headquarters Skopje, however, NATO was to retain the advisory role in the country so as to continue to assist in Macedonian development of security sector reform and adaptation to NATO standards.

### *NATO Synopsis.*

With the combined efforts of the International Community an end to the armed conflict was attained with the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, thereby providing more rights to the ethnic Albanian population. NATO started its first mission in Macedonia on 26 August 2001, with Operation Essential Harvest. The aim of the mission was to collect weapons that were voluntarily handed over from NLA insurgents. NATO renewed its support and commitment to Macedonia by continuing its presence with a subsequent mission named Operation Amber Fox, launched on 26 September 2001. The mandate of Operation Amber Fox was to provide additional security to international community monitors in the crisis areas, while Macedonian authorities maintained primary security responsibility. Further democratization and improvement in human rights through the process of dialogue and reconciliation progressed significantly, and as a result of the vastly improved security environment in the country, the Macedonian leadership and NATO decided to bring the mission to an end on 15 December 2002. By invitation of the Government of Macedonia, on 16 December 2002, NATO commenced a third mission, termed Operation Allied Harmony. Based on the enhanced security environment, a special task force was no longer needed and therefore the executive command of the new NATO mission was given to NATO Headquarters Skopje. The objective of Operation Allied Harmony was to provide operational, advisory and other supportive activities to assist Macedonia with normalization of modernization and democratization processes, and to contribute to the overall international community aim to bring confidence and stability to the country and region. On 31 March 2002, NATO relinquished the operational component of Allied Harmony to the EU.

While the mandate of Operation Essential Harvest was explicitly related to the voluntary collection of weapons, and did not entail any responsibility to ensure a safe and secure environment, the mere presence of a sizeable quantity of NATO troops, with a specific Macedonian mandate, implicitly had a calming and reassuring effect throughout the country. Although merely a component of the overall Framework Agreement, successful conclusion of the mission was deemed an important and essential step in the inclusive peace process. Operation Amber Fox, initially predicated on the grounds of international community monitor protection,

however, had the supplementary benefit of furthering the credibility of the EU and OSCE observers. Thus, Operation Amber Fox signified a further vital and progressive step in the inclusive peace process. Operation Allied Harmony capitalized on the success of Operation Essential Harvest and Operation Amber Fox to assist the Macedonian government in taking ownership of security throughout the country.

The execution of all three NATO operations, taken as a whole, represents a synchronized and successive progression to restore security, and ultimately have the host nation assume responsibility for that security. Concurrent with NATO's intrastate execution of Operations Essential Harvest, Amber Fox and Allied Harmony, KFOR continued to increase their focus on the interstate aspect of their mission. These KFOR efforts contributed significantly to the isolation of the NLA in Macedonia, and the ability of NATO to effectively execute their missions. Additionally, restructuring of the NATO headquarters in Skopje, and the agreements with KFOR and UNMIK on border demarcation and police cooperation, helped reestablish and redefine the interstate delineation of conflict prevention efforts between Kosovo and Macedonia, also facilitating the ability of NATO to effectively execute their intrastate missions. NATO's efforts, however, only represented the security portion of the overall plan targeted toward the proximate and triggering sources of conflict, thereby allowing other members of the international community to implement their intrastate and interstate components of the Framework Agreement.

## **6.5. European Union**

Involvement of the EU in Macedonia did not commence with assumption of the security mission at the cessation of Operation Allied Harmony, but had been ongoing for quite some time. In fact, between 1992 and 2000 Macedonia received some €475 million of EC assistance (EU 2004). On 9 April 2001, following the successful conclusion of negotiations at the Zagreb Summit of 24 November 2000, Macedonia became the first country of the region to sign a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA). As a signatory, Macedonia would gradually take on board the core obligations of membership, start aligning its legal and economic framework with that of the EU, strengthen cooperation with its neighbors and cooperate with the

EU on a number of issues. An Interim Agreement covering the trade and trade-related aspects of the SAA has been in effect since 1 June 2001, and provides near-total free access to the EU-market. Through the Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Democratization and Stabilization (CARDS) Program, the EU additionally allocated Macedonia a budget of €173 million for the period 2001-2004, to support the country's efforts towards European Integration. The CARDS Program is a financial instrument firmly inserted into a well defined political context, the stabilization and association process, designed to favor the gradual integration of the countries of Southeast Europe into the structures of the European Union. Central to this strategy is the SAA. The primary objectives of EU assistance to Macedonia are to support achievements to date in the field of democracy by strengthening the institutional and administrative capacity of the state and of the actors of civil society; to assist the government at the central and local levels to facilitate the process of economic and social transformation towards a market economy; to bring Macedonia closer to EU standards and principles, and to assist the country in the framework of the Stabilization and Association Process; and to support the country in its efforts to give full implementation to the Framework Agreement. As a distinct component of the overall EU program of support to Macedonia, and to progressively harmonize its support to the Framework Agreement implementation, the EU (2003a) decided to conduct a military operation to follow the NATO led Operation Allied Harmony.

#### *Operation Concordia.*

The handover of authority from NATO to EU officials on 31 March 2003, indicated unprecedented coordination and cooperation between the two vital organizations, and consequently, one of NATO's most senior leaders, German Navy Admiral Rainer Feist, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, was appointed as Operational Commander thereby filling a pivotal role between the EU and NATO. The development of the NATO-EU strategic partnership and the agreements for EU access to NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led operations, the so-called "Berlin Plus" arrangements, were crucial in enabling the EU to take over NATO's mission. Admiral Feist (NATO 2003d) commented, upon inauguration of the new EU mission, that coordination, harmonization and mutual support between EU activities in Macedonia and the ongoing NATO operations Kosovo, would be essential to all

future planning. Thus, through agreement and coordination between the EU, NATO and Macedonia, the EU embarked upon its first military mission, code-named Operation Concordia.

The operation was anticipated to be six months in duration, total 350 personnel from 13 EU Member States and 14 non-EU countries (EU 2003b), and was intended to complement and reinforce the EU's extensive and ongoing efforts to bring greater stability to the country<sup>2</sup>. The core aim of Operation Concordia was to contribute to a secure environment to allow the Macedonian government to implement the Framework Agreement, while the specific mission was to monitor the situation and show a visible international presence. In other words, the mission of Operation Concordia was fundamentally the same as the operational component of Operation Allied Harmony. On 4 July 2003, President Trajkovski invited the EU to extend Operation Concordia until 15 December 2003, and on 29 July of 2003, the EU (2003c) approved this action. Throughout the year-long execution of the EU's Operation Concordia, the mission directly assisted the international community's policy of confidence building through their visible presence in the former crisis areas. Hence, due to the increased level of stability and security, the Macedonian government invited the EU to assume a more enhanced role in policing support. Consequently, the EU (2003d) decided to terminate Operation Concordia on 15 December 2003, and replace it with a new mission. During the ceremony marking the end of Operation Concordia, EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana (EU 2003e), remarked the process towards stabilization and normalization had reached a point in Macedonia where an international military presence for security was no longer necessary as the main threat to stability was no longer armed conflict but criminality, and as such the emphasis of support should be police and not military.

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<sup>2</sup> Military personnel from thirteen EU Member States (Ireland and Denmark did not participate) and from fourteen non-EU countries (all ten Central and Eastern European accession countries, Norway, Iceland, Turkey and Canada) were involved in the operation. *EU Military Operation in former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)*. <http://ue.eu.int/arym/index.asp?lang=EN>. (2003, August 4).

### *Operation Proxima.*

The EU, established Mission Proxima on 15 December 2003. The mandate of the mission was for a period of one year, and included the services of 200 personnel, to monitor, mentor and advise Macedonia's police thus helping to fight organized crime as well as promoting European policing standards. Specifically, Mission Proxima was designed to support: the consolidation of law and order, including the fight against crime; the practical implementation and comprehensive reform of the Ministry of Interior, including the police; the operational transition toward, and creation of, a border police as part of a wider EU effort to promote integrated border management; and the local police in building confidence within the population and the enhancing cooperation with neighboring states in the field of policing (EU 2003f). As such, Mission Proxima is a partnership with the Ministry of Interior and other relevant authorities, to contribute toward police reforms required within the implementation of the Framework Agreement.

### *European Union Synopsis.*

The European Union's contribution was based on a broad approach with activities to address the entire spectrum of rule of law aspects, including institution building programs and police activities that were mutually supportive and reinforcing. These specific activities related to the rule of law were further supported by the European Community's CARDS Program and contributed to the overall peace implementation, as well as to a more stable environment in which the Macedonian government and international community could implement the Framework Agreement. Operation Concordia and Mission Proxima must be considered separate but mutually reinforcing operations, which were equally separate but mutually reinforcing to those operations executed by NATO. Additionally, these missions targeted primarily toward the structural sources of conflict were executed in full coordination and synchronization with other institution-building projects, as well as the OSCE and national bilateral programs. The simultaneous focus of EU efforts toward enhancing the overall effectiveness of internal police actions, along with the further development of the border police to promote integrated border management, reflects a simultaneous and connected methodology toward both intrastate and interstate aspects of the mission.

## **6.6. OSCE**

The original mandate of the CSCE/OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje called on the mission to monitor developments along the borders with Serbia in order to preserve territorial integrity; promote the maintenance of peace, stability and security; and help prevent possible conflict diffusion in the region (OSCE 2004b). On 22 March 2001, the OSCE (2001b), noting an upsurge of violent actions by ethnic Albanian armed groups in the northern border regions of Macedonia, decided to increase the size of the Mission by eight personnel to a total of 16. The additional staff members were to concentrate particularly in the border area, with a view to strengthening the capabilities of the mission to monitor developments along the border and report. On 7 June 2001, as the internal crisis in Macedonia was escalating, the OSCE (2001c) decided to additionally augment the size of the Mission by ten personnel, to a total of 26, and under the same justification and mandate. Following the seven-month conflict, the Framework Agreement outlined steps to be taken to ensure the functioning of democratic structures, the advancement toward Euro-Atlantic institutions and the development of a civil society respecting ethnic identity. The implementation of these objectives was clarified primarily in the three annexes of the agreement, and according to Annex C the OSCE was invited to assist in a number of specific task areas in addition to the original mandate. These areas included: redeployment of police to the former crisis areas; assistance to the government to increase representation of non-majority communities in public administration, military and public enterprises; strengthening of local self-government institutions; projects in the area of rule of law; projects in the area of media development; and continuing support for the engagement of the High Commissioner on National Minorities in the field of education (Framework Agreement 2001; OSCE 2004c).

After a request from the Macedonian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ilinka Mitreva, on 6 September 2001, the OSCE (2001d) decided to further increase the size of the Mission by 25 personnel to a total of 51. These additional personnel were to monitor and report regularly on the security situation in Macedonia, including: the situation in the northern border areas including illicit arms trafficking; the humanitarian situation, including the return of refugees and internally displaced persons and trafficking in human beings; the situation in sensitive places with communities not

in the majority; and cases of incidents and recurrence of hostilities. They were not, however, to monitor the arms collection process or conduct operations aimed exclusively at observing compliance with the ceasefire, as that fell within the spectrum of NATO operations.

Finally, on 28 September 2001, the OSCE (2001e) decided again to further increase the number of mission personnel based on guidance from Annex C of the Framework Agreement. The Permanent Council authorized an additional 72 confidence-building monitors, 60 police advisors, 17 police trainers and 10 administrators to deal with support matters. The additional confidence-building monitors were to operate under the original interstate oriented mandate, while the police advisors were deployed to the sensitive areas concurrently with the phased redeployment of the national police. Their role was to assist in ensuring a phased and coordinated redeployment by the national police. The police trainers were to assist in implementation of the Police Academy project. In accordance with Annex C, this increase in personnel added a specific intrastate component to the mandate of the OSCE mission.

By mid 2004, the OSCE (2004b) mission in Skopje had transformed into five separate, but integrated, units operating under a single headquarters structure. The Confidence-Building Unit contributes to the maintenance of stability and security in the country and to the building of general confidence amongst the population by regularly reporting on issues impacting the security situation, as well as humanitarian and development needs, return of refugees and internally displaced persons, and trafficking in human beings. The Public Administration Reform Department promotes decentralization as a key to strengthening democracy, where the inclusion of local government reform in the Framework Agreement provided new momentum to the transformation process. The Rule of Law Unit supports the government's efforts to strengthen the rule of law in the country by bolstering domestic institutions and mechanisms with a view toward long-term structural change. The Police Development Unit assists the government in police training and institutional reform by striving to increase citizens' trust and confidence in law enforcement, and to develop the institutional foundation upon which a community-based multiethnic police service can be built. The Media Development Unit works to make assistance to the local media a priority of the international community by

increasing its assistance for non-majority language media. These five units are integrated within the overall OSCE mission, while the OSCE headquarters element then ensures coordination and integration with the EU, UN, NATO and other international organizations operating within the country.

#### *OSCE Synopsis.*

As a result of the OSCE Permanent Council decisions, between 7 June and 28 September of 2001, the size of the OSCE mission in Skopje increased from 8 personnel to a total of 210; while the mandate evolved from one dealing solely with the interstate focus of monitoring, to a combined interstate and intrastate tripartite focus of monitoring, police training and development, and other political activities related to the implementation of the Framework Agreement such as media reform, rule of law and election monitoring. Additionally, OSCE mission activities were integrated and coordinated with other active organizations in the country, primarily the UN, EU and NATO, as well as with Macedonian government officials. Thus, the OSCE mandate evolved to incorporate triggering, proximate and structural sources of conflict, and was implemented in a multifaceted and multilevel fashion representative of a synergy of intervention.

#### **6.7. Conclusions.**

When conflict in Macedonia finally emerged, the international community was essentially caught ignorant of the severity of the situation due primarily to a willful determination to view the country as the region's lone multiethnic success story among the scattered remnants of the former Yugoslavia's nationalist wars (Pearson 2002, 13). As a result of UNPREDEP's achievements, Macedonia had been held up as a model of successful conflict prevention, although an imperfect one, of interethnic coexistence and democratic rule, with active participation of the Albanian community in political institutions (Kim 2001, 1). As a result, this was the image the international community believed and propagated. While the international community was focused on Kosovo, ethnic tensions continued to fester in Macedonia. In spite of evident progress made by the Macedonian government regarding concerns of the Albanian minority, the slow pace of that progress acted as fertile ground for the NLA. The minimal size of the OSCE element left behind and

charged with the conflict prevention mission in Macedonia, albeit from an interstate focused mandate, was insufficient to mount a viable strategy of simultaneity and connectivity for both interstate and intrastate threats. This, coupled with the similar inability of KFOR and UNMIK to contain ethnic Albanian insurgents within Kosovo by executing the interstate component of their mission, facilitated the state of conflict Macedonia was encountering. After nearly a decade of peace in an independent Macedonia, the outbreak of armed ethnic conflict cost Macedonia its status of a model state and example of conflict prevention success. This was due in part to the lack of inclusion of the structural sources of conflict, coupled with the lack of multifaceted and multilevel action, and culminated with the absence of any type of intervention synergy. As a result, the international community abandoned a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity as related to interstate and intrastate conflict prevention efforts, as well as a failed to recognize conflict prevention labors to date had not yet been nurtured to maturity. The situation in Macedonia was then exacerbated by the conflict prevention efforts in Kosovo.

Facing an imminent crisis, 21 March 2001, resulted in three events on behalf of the international community that would raise the level of awareness and activity in the new Macedonian conflict: NATO issued a statement reiterating condemnation of extremist groups operating in Macedonia, and promised to dispatch Ambassador Hans-Joerg Eiff to supplement the NATO Liaison Office in Skopje; the OSCE announced Ambassador Robert Frowick, was to act as the Personal Representative for the situation in Macedonia; and the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1345. NATO emphasized their measure was in full cooperation with other organizations such as the EU, OSCE and UN, thereby indicating integrated international community determination to support stability in the region. The OSCE also underlined they were prepared to participate together with other international organizations in a coordinated effort to settle the crisis in northern Macedonia. The Security Council welcomed the international efforts of UNMIK, KFOR, EU, OSCE, NATO, and the Macedonian government to prevent the escalation of ethnic tensions in the area. Thus, the adoption of Resolution 1345 represented the return of the international community to conflict prevention efforts in Macedonia, targeted toward the simultaneous and connected aspects of both interstate and intrastate conflict prevention in a multifaceted and synchronized approach.

The reinstatement of security forces into the GSZ, coupled with the increased efforts of KFOR to secure the border between Kosovo and Macedonia finally constituted partial execution of the interstate component of KFOR's mission as delineated in Resolution 1244 and the MTA. Although this interstate component of the KFOR and UNMIK mission technically related to an action internal to Kosovo, the functional quality of the mission was to negate the possibility of conflict diffusion from Kosovo to Macedonia, and later vice versa. The initial failure of KFOR or UNMIK to execute this task was a large contributor to contagion and diffusion of conflict to Macedonia; however, once focus on the interstate aspect was increased, it assisted in isolating the Macedonian conflict so the intrastate efforts of the international community negotiators could conclude a peace agreement.

The Macedonian conflict inflicted immense damage upon the social fabric of Macedonia, and erased any positive gains previously made by the conflict prevention efforts of UNPROFOR and UNPREDEP. In seven months Macedonia went from a model of conflict prevention success to a country in need of international community conflict prevention efforts in the form of conflict resolution. The Framework Agreement was the document that would form the basis for all future intrastate conflict prevention efforts in Macedonia. This document, drafted by the international community and agreed upon by the Macedonian political leaders, bound the international community to assist in myriad long-term confidence-building measures of a magnitude that would dwarf the earlier good offices mandate of the UN. The practical implementation of these reforms was highly delicate and complex, given the far-reaching changes they entailed; and the process of reform, conducive to internal stability and economic development and thereby providing hope of a fresh start for Macedonia, could not succeed without European and Euro-Atlantic involvement both in economic terms and in terms of security. As such, the Framework Agreement represented the international community's return to a conflict prevention mandate with all four factors of successful conflict prevention addressing all three sources of conflict. The primary international community group of actors involved in the Framework Agreement implementation was to be NATO, the EU and the OSCE. Originally, the United States was to be included among the primary group of actors, but after the events of 11 September 2001, the global priorities of the US were to shift.

The execution of all three NATO operations, taken as a whole, represents a synchronized and successive progression to restore security, and ultimately have the host nation assume responsibility for that security. Concurrent with NATO's intrastate execution of Operations Essential Harvest, Amber Fox and Allied Harmony, KFOR continued to increase their focus on the interstate aspect of their mission. These KFOR efforts contributed significantly to the isolation of the NLA in Macedonia, and the ability of NATO to effectively execute their missions. Additionally, the restructuring of the NATO headquarters in Skopje, and the agreements with KFOR and UNMIK on border demarcation and police cooperation, helped reestablish and redefine the interstate delineation of conflict prevention efforts between Kosovo and Macedonia, also facilitating the ability of NATO to effectively execute their intrastate missions. NATO's efforts, however, only represented the security portion of the overall plan thereby allowing other members of the international community to implement their intrastate components of the Framework Agreement.

The European Union's contribution was based on a broad approach with activities to address the entire spectrum of rule of law aspects, including institution building programs and police activities that should be mutually supportive and reinforcing. These specific activities related to the rule of law were further supported by the European Community's CARDS Program and contributed to the overall peace implementation, as well as to a more stable environment in which the Macedonian government and international community could implement the Framework Agreement. Operation Concordia and Mission Proxima must be considered separate but mutually reinforcing operations, which were equally separate but mutually reinforcing to those operations executed by NATO. Additionally, these missions were executed in full coordination and synchronization with other institution building projects, as well as the OSCE and national bilateral programs. The simultaneous focus of EU efforts toward enhancing the overall effectiveness of internal police actions, along with the further development of the border police to promote integrated border management, reflects a simultaneous and connected methodology toward both intrastate and interstate aspects of the mission.

As a result of OSCE Permanent Council decisions, between 7 June and 28 September of 2001, the size of the OSCE mission in Skopje increased from 8

personnel to a total of 210; while the mandate evolved from one dealing solely with the interstate focus of monitoring, to a combined interstate and intrastate tripartite focus of monitoring, police training and development, and other political activities related to the implementation of the Framework Agreement such as media reform, rule of law and election monitoring. Additionally, OSCE mission activities were integrated and coordinated with other active organizations in the country, primarily the UN, EU and NATO, as well as with Macedonian government officials. Thus, the OSCE mandate developed to incorporate triggering, proximate and structural sources of conflict, and was implemented in a multifaceted and multilevel fashion representative of a synergy of intervention.

In sum, this chapter examines the reestablishment of the international community in conflict prevention in Macedonia, targeted toward the simultaneous and connected aspects of both interstate and intrastate conflict prevention in a multifaceted and multilevel approach representative of a synergy of intervention. The execution of all three NATO intrastate operations in Macedonia, concurrent with KFOR's, increase on the interstate aspect of their Kosovo mission represents a synchronized and successive progression to reestablish and redefine the interstate delineation of conflict prevention efforts between Kosovo and Macedonia. The simultaneous focus of EU efforts toward enhancing the overall effectiveness of internal police actions, along with the further development of the border police to promote integrated border management, as well reflects a simultaneous and connected methodology toward both intrastate and interstate aspects of the mission. The OSCE mission mandate evolution from one dealing solely with the interstate focus of monitoring, to a combined interstate and intrastate tripartite focus of monitoring, police training and development, and other political activities equally embodies a concurrent and linked methodology toward both intrastate and interstate facets of conflict prevention. In total, the combined actions of the international community in Macedonia from the adoption of Resolution 1345 until the present; exemplify a simultaneous, multifaceted and multilevel utilization of the full spectrum of conflict prevention tools toward the triggering, proximate and structural sources of conflict in a synergistic strategy of simultaneity and connectivity as related to a nexus of interstate and intrastate conflict prevention efforts. Consequently, the reinstatement of a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity regarding a nexus of interstate and

intrastate conflict prevention efforts toward Macedonia generated the requisite conditions for successful peace implementation and conflict prevention.

The following table, Figure 6.1, provides a chronological summary of the relevant international community involvement regarding conflict prevention efforts in Macedonia from the Adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1345 through the writing of this dissertation in 2004.

**Figure 6.1: Chronology of Relevant International Community Involvement: Phase III**

Date	Focus	Source
2001, Mar 21	UN strongly condemns violence in Macedonia and southern FRY, and notes outside Albanian extremist support	UN SC Res 1345
2001, Mar 22	OSCE strengthens Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje	OSCE Decision 405
2001, May 13	National Unity Government Formed	Macedonian Government
2001, May 24	UNMIK promulgates prohibition on unauthorized border/boundary crossings	UNMIK Reg 2001/10
2001, June 7	OSCE further enhances Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje	OSCE Decision 414
2001, June 14	Macedonia requests NATO assistance in disarming NLA	Macedonian Government
2001, June 20	NATO agrees to assist in NLA disarmament, with conditions	NATO Statement
2001, July 9	First round of negotiations commence in Skopje	EU/US sponsorship
2001, July 28	Second round of negotiations commence in Ohrid	EU/US sponsorship
2001, Aug 13	Ohrid Agreement signed	Ohrid Agreement
2001, Aug 22	NATO commences Operation Essential Harvest	NAC Decision
2001, Sep 6	OSCE further enhances Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje	OSCE Decision 437
2001, Sep 10	UN terminates prohibitions against sale or supply of weapons to Yugoslavia, and dissolves SC Committee on Kosovo	UN SC Res 1367
2001, Sep 23	NATO terminates Operation Essential Harvest	NAC Decision
2001, Sep 23	NATO commences Operation Amber Fox	NAC Decision
2001, Sep 26	UN reinforces SC Res 1345	UN SC Res 1371
2001, Sep 28	OSCE quadruples Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje, and broadens mandate	OSCE Decision 439
2002, Dec 15	NATO terminates Operation Amber Fox	NAC Decision
2002, Dec 16	NATO commences Operation Allied Harmony	NAC Decision
2003, Mar 31	NATO terminates Operation Allied Harmony	NAC Decision
2003, Mar 31	EU launches Operation Concordia	EC Decision 2003/92/CFSP
2003, Dec 15	EU terminates Operation Concordia	EC Decision 2003/681/CFSP
2003, Dec 15	EU commences Operation Proxima	EC Decision 2003/681/CFSP

## **Chapter 7: Conclusions, Limitations and Theoretical Implications**

### **7.1. Introduction**

The central and overarching question this thesis addressed is why some conflict prevention efforts succeed where others fail? Within that context, the specific question examined was what is the relationship, if any, concerning the appliance of interstate and intrastate conflict prevention fundamentals, as they relate to overall success. This study took a two-level approach to conflict prevention, that of interstate and that of intrastate. The first independent variable was the level of interstate conflict prevention efforts, defined as the degree to which the international community advocates and pursues policies to inhibit or mitigate the occurrence of interstate conflict. These interstate efforts were based on conflict prevention actions designed to promote effective international regimes, stable and viable countries, and create a secure environment by providing the necessary security for government to function. The second independent variable was the level of intrastate conflict prevention efforts, defined as the degree to which the international community advocates and pursues actions designed to inhibit or mitigate the occurrence of intrastate conflict. These intrastate efforts were based on conflict prevention actions designed to promote and establish political systems characterized by representative government, open economies with social safety nets enabling socioeconomic and humanitarian needs to be met, and egalitarian justice systems. The confluence of these two variables determined this study's dependent variable: the level of conflict prevention effectiveness, defined as the degree to which the international community created an environment for conflict to be prevented by advocating and pursuing actions designed to inhibit or mitigate the occurrence of interstate and intrastate conflict through a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity.

Whereas conflict was traditionally perceived as either interstate or intrastate, the fungible nature of contemporary conflict has a tendency to shift along a sliding scale between interstate and intrastate. Intrastate conflict easily permeates across existing state borders to form regional conflict complexes; conversely, regional conflict dynamics can impact readily on the internal processes of neighboring states. I proposed a logical assumption that as the nexus between interstate and intrastate

conflict is inherently linked in a larger strategic calculus, so too should be the theoretical and conceptual foundations, and practical application, of apposite conflict prevention efforts in the form of a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity. Simultaneity was defined as the process of advocating and pursuing policies to inhibit or mitigate the occurrence of interstate and intrastate conflict in a concurrent and synchronous manner, while connectivity was defined as the linkage and degree by which the processes of advocating and pursuing policies to inhibit or mitigate the occurrence of interstate and intrastate conflict are associated and conjoined. The concepts of simultaneity and connectivity are integrally linked in myriad modes and do not create mutually exclusive categories. Together, these two terms form a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity, whereby the process of advocating and pursuing policies to inhibit or mitigate the occurrence of interstate and intrastate conflict are associated and conjoined in a concurrent and synchronous manner. It was argued that it is this critical and very delicate nexus between interstate and intrastate conflict prevention efforts on the part of the international community that is ultimately responsible for success or failure.

As such, this hypothesis was tested on the critical conflict prevention efforts applied by the international community towards Macedonia from independence in 1991 until the present. Within that temporal interval three discrete phases were patently differentiated: the pre-Kosovo phase, the Kosovo Intervention phase and the post-Kosovo phase. The pre-Kosovo phase incorporated the temporal period from independence in 1991 until the end of the United Nations mandate in 1999. During this period conflict prevention efforts were predominantly administered by the United Nations, although experiencing several transitional stages throughout the phase. The Kosovo intervention phase addressed conflict prevention efforts in Macedonia from the end of the United Nations mandate, through the NATO air campaign and conflict resolution stage, until adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1345 in March of 2001. Throughout this phase, while minimal conflict prevention efforts continued within Macedonia, the international focus had become Kosovo with Macedonia assuming a peripheral or tangential significance. The post-Kosovo phase attended to conflict prevention efforts from the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1345 until the writing of this thesis in 2004. It was the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1345 that marked the return of

international community conflict prevention efforts targeted specifically towards Macedonia. Thus, the Macedonian case of conflict prevention was selected as it allowed within-case comparison similar to a cross-case comparison, although providing more structure in holding the dependent variable constant.

## **7.2. Summary of Findings**

The central argument of this thesis was the existence of a critical and very delicate nexus between interstate and intrastate conflict prevention efforts on the part of the international community that is ultimately responsible for success or failure. As such, a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity, whereby the process of advocating and pursuing policies to inhibit or mitigate the occurrence of interstate and intrastate conflict are associated and conjoined in a concurrent and synchronous manner, must be adopted and applied as a condition for successful conflict prevention. The negation of this nexus of interstate or intrastate conflict prevention efforts can result in the precondition for the outbreak or resumption of conflict. In the first and third phases of the Macedonian case, there exists a synchronized and fused execution of multifaceted international community conflict prevention efforts exemplifying a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity, resulting in successful conflict prevention. In the second phase, the obverse occurs where the absence of a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity regarding a nexus of interstate and intrastate conflict prevention efforts fostered and enabled conflict diffusion and contagion to Macedonia. Hence, there appears to be direct correlation between the application of international community efforts targeted toward a nexus of interstate and intrastate conflict prevention through a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity, and the success or failure of those efforts.

### *Phase I.*

Whereas traditional peacekeeping efforts were a result of international community failure to prevent conflict, the deployment of UNPROFOR to Macedonia represented a major shift regarding international policy, perspective and emphasis toward conflict prevention. As opposed to being deployed between two states to prevent the recurrence of conflict, UNPROFOR was deployed within a state; with that state's consent and upon their request, to prevent the possible outbreak of

conflict. The conditions upon UN authorization of the mission were a fusion of interstate and intrastate threats to peace and stability, both within the country and within the region. Macedonia acquired independence exposed to interstate threats from all four bordering states, and overshadowed by regional instability in the form of violent conflict in the former Yugoslavia. From an intrastate perspective, three primary challenges confronted the country: the need for democratic transformation, the socioeconomic situation, and interethnic tensions. The intrastate challenges were all integrally connected, and subject to, the interstate threats to the country; as well as overall regional instability.

The principal justification for authorization of UNPROFOR deployment was primarily from an interstate focus as a result of the overt threat to Macedonia from adjacent states, and exacerbated by regional instability. As fears within the international community mounted regarding the possibility of interstate conflict such as had already occurred between Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia, so too, did intrastate ethnic fears mount within Macedonia regarding the future functioning of the country. Likewise, various interstate threats were subject to increase as a result of intrastate ethnic tension.

From the establishment of UNPROFOR on 11 December 1992 to the approval of the SRSG to utilize his good offices in March 1994, the primary mission of UNPROFOR was to monitor the border and report any developments that could pose a threat to the country; and deter, by their presence, such threats or clashes between Macedonian and external forces. As such, the focus of the mission was predominantly of an interstate nature, and primarily targeted toward the triggering and proximate sources of conflict. However, it was through the reports of UNMO and CIVPOL personnel that the severity of the intrastate threat was identified and brought to the attention of the UN and the international community.

These reports further succeeded in identifying the complexities of the nexus of interstate and intrastate factors as a causative agent for economic and political uncertainty, and rising social tensions. Initially deployed to prevent the diffusion of interstate conflict to the newly independent Macedonia, it soon became evident that, although UNPROFOR was successfully executing their mission in this regard, there existed a simultaneous threat of diffusion and/or contagion of intrastate conflict not being addressed by UNPROFOR forces. This intrastate threat posed both the

possibility of diffusion from Kosovo, as well as contagion from Kosovo, Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia. Thus, in an adaptive and evolutionary step the utilization of the good offices of the SRSG was approved and implemented.

The identification of the necessity of an intrastate mandate to compliment the interstate mandate, and approval of the SRSG to utilize his good offices, were to adjust the mandate so as to include structural sources of conflict. By incorporating the structural sources of conflict within the mandate already addressing the triggering and proximate sources of conflict, international community conflict prevention efforts were to expand and integrate the degree of multifaceted and multilevel action, thereby creating synergy of intervention. This willful transition on the part of the international community signifies the genesis and true essence of a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity toward interstate and intrastate conflict prevention efforts.

From the approval for the SRSG to utilize his good offices on 31 March 1994, to the decision that UNPROFOR within Macedonia would from that point on be known as UNPREDEP on 31 March 1995, the broadened political mandate created a qualitative dimension that facilitated expansion of traditional conflict prevention techniques; and was to develop into a fundamental element of the inclusive mandate. While the military forces of UNPROFOR monitored the borders for interstate aggression, the good offices mandate allowed engagement to prevent intrastate conflict. Whereas UNPROFOR's political effort had focused on strengthening mutual understanding and dialogue among political parties and on monitoring human rights; UNPROFOR's military component had in tandem mediated several tense border encounters, achieving the withdrawal of soldiers on both sides of the disputed border. If violent intrastate ethnic conflict were allowed to ignite within Macedonia, there existed a fervent risk of conflict diffusion across state borders and escalation into interstate conflict. Likewise, a military presence on the borders was requisite to prevention of more serious border incursions that could have escalated into violent interstate conflict, which consecutively could have further exacerbated intrastate tensions.

In light of the manifest multifaceted nexus of interstate and intrastate factors as a causative agent for rising social tensions, and economic and political uncertainty; the authorization for the SRSG to utilize his good offices as appropriate to contribute to

the peace and stability of Macedonia served to assimilate the structural sources of conflict within the mandate that already encompassed the triggering and proximate sources of conflict. In so doing, conflict prevention efforts on the part of the international community were to simultaneously target the triggering, proximate and structural sources of conflict in Macedonia, in a connected endeavor of multifaceted and multilevel action exhibiting a synergy of intervention. These efforts represent a synchronized and fused execution of international community interstate and intrastate conflict prevention actions exemplifying a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity.

From the decision that UNPROFOR within Macedonia would officially transition to UNPREDEP on 31 March 1995, until the termination of the UNPREDEP mandate on 28 February 1999, the interstate threat was to vacillate in intensity and shift between specific threats to regional stability. The UNPREDEP presence on along the borders was initially intended as a forewarning against any overt military incursion, nevertheless, it appended the collateral advantage of deterring cross-border smuggling and passage of illegal immigrants. In all cases, however, the existence of UNPREDEP executing its mandate on the borders of Macedonia, with respect to interstate threats, served not only as a deterrent, but also provided a calming and stabilizing effect within the interior of the country. In sequence, this permitted engagement within the broadened mandate of good offices, which facilitated extension of traditional conflict prevention techniques into conflict resolution; and thereby contributed to the promotion of dialogue, restraint and practical compromise between dissimilar segments of society. Altogether, the mandate of UNPREDEP required interface with diverse aspects of Macedonia's interstate and intrastate circumstances ranging from preventive deployment and patrolling to early warning, fact-finding, monitoring and reporting, good offices, confidence-building measures, and social and developmental projects. Without the interstate focus of the conflict prevention efforts of this mission the intrastate aspects would not have been possible, whereas without the intrastate efforts the interstate focus would have been in vain.

Conflict prevention efforts on the part of the international community simultaneously pursued the triggering, proximate and structural sources of conflict in Macedonia in an increasingly connected undertaking of multifaceted and multilevel

action demonstrative of an intervention synergy. The critical element that emerges is the necessity for the entirety of these multifaceted and multilevel conflict prevention tools to be utilized, toward both interstate and intrastate components of conflict prevention, in a simultaneous and connective method; which is the embodiment of a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity within conflict prevention.

In sum, this phase explicates an evolutionary process transpired with respect to conflict prevention. At initiation of international community conflict prevention actions toward Macedonia, it is clear that early warning and response and support of major international actors were present. However, it was not until identification of the necessity of an intrastate mandate to compliment the interstate mandate, and approval of the SRSG to utilize his good offices, that the mandate was adjusted so as to include structural sources of conflict. By incorporating the structural sources of conflict within the mandate already addressing the triggering and proximate sources of conflict, international community conflict prevention efforts were to expand and integrate the degree of multifaceted and multilevel action, thereby creating synergy of intervention. This willful transition on the part of the international community signifies the genesis and true essence of a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity in conflict prevention efforts. In light of the manifest multifaceted nexus of interstate and intrastate factors as a causative agent for rising social tensions, and economic and political uncertainty; the SRSG further assimilated the structural sources of conflict within the existing mandate encompassing the triggering and proximate sources of conflict. In so doing, conflict prevention efforts on the part of the international community were to simultaneously target the triggering, proximate and structural sources of conflict in Macedonia, in a connected endeavor of multifaceted and multilevel action exhibiting a synergy of intervention. In essence, all four factors of conflict prevention were utilized to address all three sources of conflict, thus representing a synchronized and fused execution of international community interstate and intrastate conflict prevention actions exemplifying a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity. The international community continued to simultaneously pursue the triggering, proximate and structural sources of conflict in Macedonia in an increasingly connected undertaking of multifaceted and multilevel action demonstrative of an intervention synergy. The critical element that emerges is the necessity for the entirety of these multifaceted and multilevel conflict prevention

tools to be utilized, toward both interstate and intrastate components of conflict prevention, in a simultaneous and connective method; which is the embodiment of a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity within conflict prevention.

### *Phase II.*

At the time of UNPREDEP's termination the international community was completely aware and conscious of the enduring interstate and intrastate threats to peace and stability within Macedonia, however, the international community was predisposed with the impending conflict in Kosovo. The Macedonian leadership was inclined to encourage NATO to launch a presence in the country as the immediate solution, with the rationalization that NATO forces on Macedonian soil would deter any possible incursion into the country. As much as Macedonia desired a NATO presence in country, NATO also wanted a presence in Macedonia as the geo-strategic location of Macedonia became paramount to NATO success in executing an air campaign against the FRY, as well as serving as a pre-positioning base for a follow-on NATO force in Kosovo.

NATO and Macedonian rationalizations for a NATO presence in Macedonia were divergent in cause but mutually reinforcing in that while NATO gained a geo-strategic base of operations for Kosovo, the mere presence of NATO would achieve the Macedonian aspirations of preventing any possible interstate incursion. The result, however, was that both were focused wholly on the interstate threat, albeit from different perspectives, while any intrastate conflict prevention efforts were left to a minimal OSCE contingent. While the international community at large, including the OSCE, was focusing on the evolving conflict in Kosovo, that involvement was partially justified by the desire to prevent interstate conflict diffusion from Kosovo to Macedonia. Consequently, the only international community organization with a valid conflict prevention mandate to remain in Macedonia was also focused on interstate aspects of conflict prevention; thereby minimizing any concentration on intrastate efforts, and negating a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity toward interstate and intrastate conflict prevention efforts.

The number of NATO troops on Macedonian soil rose from nearly two thousand at the termination of UNPREDEP to 18,500 at the cessation of the NATO air

campaign, a period of just over three months, as a result of the pre-positioning of troops to take part in KFOR operations in Kosovo. It was precisely because of this large NATO presence the international community did not concern itself with discussions of a formal conflict prevention mandate of any type in Macedonia, with the noted exception of the OSCE. Although the international community had grave concerns regarding intrastate stability within Macedonia during execution of the Kosovo intervention, none of the nightmare scenarios came to fruition. This is not to say, however, that interethnic tensions within the country were no longer present. The Kosovo crisis saw continued, and increased, interethnic tension in Macedonia, however, the previous efforts of UNPREDEP toward strengthening mutual understanding and dialogue among political and ethnic parties helped abate the possibility of any rapid escalation of these tensions into overt conflict. Furthermore, it was thought any immediate threat to Macedonia's intrastate stability was defused by the NATO victory and rapid return of over 90 percent of Kosovar Albanian refugees. However, the negation of any intrastate conflict prevention focus by the international community in Macedonia was to slowly erode the previous success of UNPREDEP. Moreover, NATO and the international community were convinced with Kosovo becoming a UN/NATO protectorate, an interstate threat to Macedonia no longer existed; and the intrastate threat was likewise diminished as the "crisis stage" had now passed.

Although mandated to control of the borders of the FRY, in Kosovo, with Albania and Macedonia until the arrival of the civilian police mission of the UN, what efforts KFOR did execute concerning establishment of a secure environment and public safety and order within Kosovo were concentrated toward the intrastate areas of Pristina and its surrounding region, then toward the remainder of the interior of Kosovo, and finally toward the borders. Consequently, execution of the interstate border component of its mission fell a distant third in priority to KFOR. This preoccupation with the intrastate components of the Kosovo mission, to the detriment of the interstate mission was exacerbated by the creation of the GSZ, and in the U.S. sector, the mandated four kilometer buffer zone on the Kosovo side of the border. As such, along the southeastern border between Kosovo and Serbia, there was a nine kilometer zone virtually without any security forces. Additionally, KFOR had little reason to suspect a threat. After all, Albania and Macedonia were

willing partners in the NATO coalition, and it wasn't until later the organized crime threat was identified. Adding to the perception of no threat emanating from Macedonia was the fact that both KFOR and UNMIK were utilizing Macedonia as a base for rear operations in support of the Kosovo mission. As such, the border between Kosovo and Macedonia was considered by KFOR and UNMIK to be of minimal consequence as it was within the area of operations. A further complicating factor was the establishment of Kosovo as a UN protectorate meant there were no agreements in place between KFOR, UNMIK and Macedonia regarding cooperative border policing. The absence of a legally defined mechanism for cooperative engagement along the border only exacerbated the lack of a definitive interstate separation of conflict prevention efforts between Kosovo and Macedonia.

KFOR's demilitarization and transformation of the KLA was executed in rapid fashion and deemed a success by KFOR and UNMIK, however, it was more of a symbolic rather than comprehensive feat. Consequently, as of December 2000, there were unknown numbers of KLA members who were not subject to demilitarization or reintegration into civil society present in northern Albania and northwestern Macedonia, thousands of unaccounted for members of the KLA in Kosovo, untold numbers of available weapons in the area, and relatively open and unprotected borders between Kosovo and Macedonia and Albania. Moreover, UNMIK and KFOR suffered from the perception the former KLA did not constitute a continuing threat to Kosovo, or a threat at all toward Macedonia. KFOR and UNMIK's mandate and total focus was on conflict resolution within Kosovo, and did not include Macedonia other than as a rear area logistical supply base. While KFOR and UNMIK concentrated on the intrastate aspects of Kosovo, all of these factors represented an interstate threat to Macedonia.

The Macedonian government continued to highlight the impending threat of the former KLA personnel and ideologies, from both interstate and intrastate sources; however, the international community at large was concerned only with the intrastate context of Kosovo. Ever since termination of UNPREDEP, Macedonia was considered a successful case of conflict prevention, with no current threat, and was accordingly left with a minimal OSCE contingent to continue conflict prevention efforts. In so doing, the strategy of simultaneity and connectivity of interstate and intrastate conflict prevention efforts within Macedonia had ceased at the same time

UNPREDEP was terminated. This situation was exacerbated by the fact that while contained within the overall conflict resolution mandate for Kosovo there was an interstate mandate as well as intrastate, both KFOR and UNMIK were incapable of executing the interstate mandate even if they had perceived it as integral to the overall concept. Additionally, conflict resolution efforts within Kosovo suffered from the administratively dysfunctional structure of UNMIK and KFOR, thereby precluding a synchronized and multifaceted approach. These faults in the conflict prevention efforts of the international community in both Kosovo and Macedonia, exemplified by the lack of a multifaceted approach toward both interstate and intrastate components of conflict prevention in a simultaneous and connective method, were to manifest themselves in renewed conflict.

The two main conclusions drawn from the Kosovo war by Ali Ahmeti were that first, you could win more by a few months of armed struggle than ethnic Albanian politicians had achieved in nearly a decade of peaceful politics; and second, that you could do this only if you got the West involved. These conclusions of Ahmeti represent lucid examples of conflict contagion, and coupled with geographic proximity laid the foundation for conflict diffusion. As a result, Ahmeti and the NLA deliberately chose violence in their pursuit of political gains for the Albanian minority in Macedonia. However, the NLA could not have commenced and sustained operations without the porous border situation created by KFOR and UNMIK. The preoccupation of the international community in Kosovo upon the intrastate aspects of conflict resolution, without regard to the interstate relationship to Macedonia and the region, created the possibility for conflict to emerge in Macedonia. This was coupled with the lack of any major intrastate focus within Macedonia, which facilitated the dissipation of previous successes from UNPREDEP.

When conflict in Macedonia finally emerged, the international community was essentially caught ignorant of the severity of the situation due primarily to a willful determination to view the country as the region's lone multiethnic success story among the scattered remnants of the former Yugoslavia's nationalist wars. As a result of UNPREDEP's achievements, Macedonia had been held up as a model of successful conflict prevention, although an imperfect one, of interethnic coexistence and democratic rule, with active participation of the Albanian community in political

institutions. As a result, this was the image the international community believed and propagated. While the international community was focused on Kosovo, ethnic tensions continued to worsen in Macedonia. In spite of evident progress made by the Macedonian government regarding concerns of the Albanian minority, the slow pace of that progress acted as fertile ground for the NLA. The minimal size of the OSCE element left behind and charged with the conflict prevention mission in Macedonia, albeit from an interstate focused mandate, was insufficient to mount a viable strategy of simultaneity and connectivity for both interstate and intrastate threats. This, coupled with the similar inability of KFOR and UNMIK to contain ethnic Albanian insurgents within Kosovo by executing the interstate component of their mission, facilitated the state of conflict Macedonia encountered. After nearly a decade of peace in an independent Macedonia, the outbreak of armed ethnic conflict cost Macedonia its status of a model state and example of conflict prevention success. This was due to, in part, to international community abandonment of a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity as related to interstate and intrastate conflict prevention efforts, as well as a failure to recognize conflict prevention labors to date had not yet been nurtured to maturity.

In sum, this phase explicates the strategy of simultaneity and connectivity as related to a nexus of interstate and intrastate conflict prevention efforts toward Macedonia ceased with the termination of UNPREDEP. Based upon the reactions and statements of the international community at the time of the UNPREDEP mandate termination, early warning was clearly present and readily available. However, the international community as a whole failed to react. Even though, China vetoed the proposal to extend the UNPREDEP mandate, there was sufficient support of major international actors, particularly at the regional level, that some echelon of conflict prevention action could have been instituted for Macedonia. Unfortunately, the international community chose not to react, other than allowing the OSCE interstate contingent of eight to remain. Within Macedonia, this meant the entirety of conflict prevention measures on behalf of the international community consisted of one organization, with eight personnel and an interstate mandate targeted only at the triggering and proximate sources of interstate conflict. As a result, the lack of inclusion of any intrastate mandate and the failure to address the

structural sources of conflict, coupled with the lack of multifaceted and multilevel action, culminated with the absence of any type of intervention synergy.

The situation in Macedonia was exacerbated by the conflict prevention efforts in Kosovo. While the mandate for conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction in Kosovo included both interstate and intrastate aspects, the efforts of UNMIK and KFOR were neither synchronized nor fused within Kosovo due to structural flaws and planning errors, which precluded achieving simultaneity and connectivity. The lack of preparedness and limited numbers of troops in Kosovo impeded utilization of the entirety of multifaceted tools, toward both interstate and intrastate components of conflict prevention, in a simultaneous and connective method thereby negating a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity in conflict prevention efforts aimed at Kosovo. Neither was there any rational connectivity of conflict prevention efforts of the international community to the situation in Macedonia.

The end result of the international community involvement in Kosovo was the negation of interstate conflict prevention efforts designed to prevent conflict diffusion to Macedonia. This was facilitated by the international community not heeding the early warnings at the termination of UNPREDEP and not establishing any conflict prevention efforts targeted specifically toward Macedonia to continue the successful efforts of UNPREDEP or compliment those actions ongoing in Kosovo. Macedonia was simply left with a minimal OSCE mission that only had an interstate mandate. Consequently, the absence of a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity regarding a nexus of interstate and intrastate conflict prevention efforts toward Macedonia fostered and enabled conflict diffusion and contagion to Macedonia. Additionally, a similar absence of a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity toward the interstate and intrastate aspects of conflict prevention efforts in Kosovo further facilitated the diffusion and contagion of conflict to Macedonia

### *Phase III.*

On 21 March 2001, three events resulted on behalf of the international community that would raise the level of awareness and activity in the Macedonian conflict: NATO issued a statement reiterating condemnation of extremist groups operating in Macedonia, and promised to dispatch Ambassador Hans-Joerg Eiff to supplement the NATO Liaison Office in Skopje; the OSCE announced Ambassador

Robert Frowick, was to act as the Personal Representative for the situation in Macedonia; and the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1345. NATO emphasized their measure was in full cooperation with other organizations such as the EU, OSCE and UN, thereby indicating integrated international community determination to support stability in the region. The OSCE also underlined they were prepared to participate together with other international organizations in a coordinated effort to settle the crisis in northern Macedonia. The Security Council welcomed the international efforts of UNMIK, KFOR, EU, OSCE, NATO, and the Macedonian government to prevent the escalation of ethnic tensions in the area. Thus, the adoption of Resolution 1345 represented the return of the international community to conflict prevention efforts in Macedonia, targeted toward the simultaneous and connected aspects of a nexus of interstate and intrastate conflict prevention in a multifaceted and synchronized approach.

The reinstatement of security forces into the GSZ, together with the increased efforts of KFOR to secure the border between Kosovo and Macedonia finally constituted partial execution of the interstate component of KFOR's mission as delineated in Resolution 1244 and the MTA. Although this interstate component of the KFOR and UNMIK mission technically related to an action internal to Kosovo, the functional quality of the mission was to negate the possibility of conflict diffusion from Kosovo to Macedonia, and later vice versa. The initial failure of KFOR or UNMIK to execute this task was a large contributor to the diffusion and contagion of conflict to Macedonia; however, once focus on the interstate aspect was increased, it assisted in isolating the Macedonian conflict so the intrastate efforts of the international community negotiators could conclude a peace agreement.

The Framework Agreement was the document that would form the basis for all future intrastate conflict prevention efforts in Macedonia. This document, drafted by the international community and agreed upon by the Macedonian political leaders, bound the international community to assist in myriad long-term confidence-building measures of a magnitude that would dwarf the earlier good offices mandate of the UN. The practical implementation of these reforms was highly delicate and complex, given the far-reaching changes they entailed; and the process of reform, conducive to internal stability and economic development and thereby providing hope of a fresh start for Macedonia, could not succeed without European and Euro-

Atlantic involvement both in economic and security terms. The primary international community group of actors involved in the Framework Agreement implementation was to be NATO, the EU and the OSCE.

The execution of all three NATO operations, taken as a whole, represents a synchronized and successive progression to restore security, and ultimately have the host nation assume responsibility for that security. Concurrent with NATO's intrastate execution of Operations Essential Harvest, Amber Fox and Allied Harmony, KFOR continued to increase their focus on the interstate aspect of their mission. These KFOR efforts contributed significantly to the isolation of the NLA in Macedonia, and the ability of NATO to effectively execute their missions. Additionally, the restructuring of the NATO headquarters in Skopje, and the agreements with KFOR and UNMIK on border demarcation and police cooperation, helped reestablish and redefine the interstate delineation of conflict prevention efforts between Kosovo and Macedonia, also facilitating the ability of NATO to effectively execute their intrastate missions. NATO's efforts, however, only represented the security portion of the overall plan thereby allowing other members of the international community to implement their intrastate components of the Framework Agreement.

The European Union's contribution was based on a broad approach with activities to address the entire spectrum of rule of law aspects, including institution building programs and police activities that were mutually supportive and reinforcing. These specific activities related to the rule of law were further supported by the European Community's CARDS Program and contributed to the overall peace implementation, as well as to a more stable environment in which the Macedonian government and international community could implement the Framework Agreement. Operation Concordia and Mission Proxima must be considered separate, but mutually reinforcing operations that were equally separate, but mutually reinforcing to those operations executed by NATO. Additionally, these missions were executed in full coordination and synchronization with other institution building projects, as well as the OSCE and national bilateral programs. The simultaneous focus of EU efforts toward enhancing the overall effectiveness of internal police actions, along with the further development of the border police to

promote integrated border management, reflected a simultaneous and connected methodology toward both intrastate and interstate aspects of the mission.

As a result of OSCE Permanent Council decisions, between 7 June and 28 September of 2001, the size of the OSCE mission in Skopje increased from 8 personnel to a total of 210; while the mandate evolved from one dealing solely with the interstate focus of monitoring, to a combined interstate and intrastate tripartite focus of monitoring, police training and development, and other political activities related to the implementation of the Framework Agreement such as media reform, rule of law and election monitoring. Additionally, OSCE mission activities were integrated and coordinated with other active organizations in the country, primarily the UN, EU and NATO, as well as with Macedonian government officials.

All told, this phase explains the reestablishment of the international community in conflict prevention in Macedonia, targeted toward the simultaneous and connected aspects of both interstate and intrastate conflict prevention in a multifaceted and multilevel approach representative of a synergy of intervention. The execution of all three NATO intrastate operations in Macedonia, concurrent with KFOR's, increase on the interstate aspect of their Kosovo mission represents a synchronized and successive progression to reestablish and redefine the interstate delineation of conflict prevention efforts between Kosovo and Macedonia. The simultaneous focus of EU efforts toward enhancing the overall effectiveness of internal police actions, along with the further development of the border police to promote integrated border management, as well reflects a simultaneous and connected methodology toward both intrastate and interstate aspects of the mission. The OSCE mission mandate evolution from one dealing solely with the interstate focus of monitoring, to a combined interstate and intrastate tripartite focus of monitoring, police training and development, and other political activities equally embodies a concurrent and linked methodology toward both intrastate and interstate facets of conflict prevention. In total, the combined actions of the international community in Macedonia from the adoption of Resolution 1345 until the present; exemplify a simultaneous, multifaceted and multilevel utilization of the full spectrum of conflict prevention tools toward the triggering, proximate and structural sources of conflict in a synergistic strategy of simultaneity and connectivity as related to a nexus of interstate and intrastate conflict prevention efforts. Consequently, the restoration of

a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity regarding a nexus of interstate and intrastate conflict prevention efforts toward Macedonia generated the requisite conditions for successful peace implementation and conflict prevention.

The following table, Figure 7.1, summarizes the findings of the three phases of international community conflict prevention efforts targeted toward Macedonia.

**Figure 7.1: Summary of Findings**

Phase	Interstate Efforts	Intrastate Efforts	Nexus	Outcome
Phase I	Yes	Yes	Yes	Successful Conflict Prevention
Phase II	Yes	No	No	Outbreak of armed Conflict
Phase III	Yes	Yes	Yes	Successful Conflict Resolution/Prevention

Collectively, the within-case study of the three phases of international community conflict prevention efforts toward Macedonia shows significant support for the hypothesis. In short, when a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity is adopted and applied, whereby the process of advocating and pursuing policies to inhibit or mitigate the occurrence of interstate and intrastate conflict are associated and conjoined in a concurrent and synchronous manner, that strategy serves as a condition for successful conflict prevention. However, the negation of this nexus of interstate or intrastate conflict prevention efforts can result in a precondition for the outbreak or resumption of conflict. Therefore, as related to the level of conflict prevention effectiveness, defined as the degree to which the international community created an environment for conflict to be prevented by advocating and pursuing actions designed to inhibit or mitigate the occurrence of interstate and intrastate conflict through a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity, there is direct correlation between the application of international community efforts targeted toward a dyadic nexus of interstate and intrastate conflict prevention and the success or failure of those efforts.

### **7.3. Limitations and Prospects for Further Research.**

The principal ambition of this work was to add to the conflict prevention theory refinement process by identifying and testing the criticality of a nexus between interstate and intrastate conflict prevention, implemented through a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity, as it related to the successful application of conflict prevention efforts. Whereas the above deliberations have found significant support for the hypothesis, all studies are inherently limited by constraints of magnitude, aspect and time, and this study is no exception. As such, this study is limited by certain factors, which I will attempt to further illuminate.

First, is the nature and scope of the study itself. As previously stated, the case of Macedonia was selected as a representative case in international community conflict prevention efforts based on the length, phased evolution and generally accepted success of those efforts. However, as a single case study it is possible the external validity of this study is limited by this fact. In an effort to avoid theory over-determination, analogous case studies should be conducted so as to confirm, challenge or extend the supported hypothesis of this study. Similar in-depth analysis of international community conflict prevention efforts in Croatia, Bosnia or Kosovo would be valuable due to the interrelatedness of the conflicts and conflict prevention efforts.

A second issue is the geographic scope of the study, with Macedonia being located within Europe. As such, the international community was in essence coterminous with the West, and accordingly had well developed regional organizations such as the EU, OSCE and NATO available to implement conflict prevention efforts. Additionally, other geographic areas may present alternate root causes of conflict that could lead to dissimilar conflict dynamics. As explicated previously, each conflict is unique and so too are the conflict prevention efforts related to that conflict. Further studies should be performed on conflict prevention efforts conducted in various other geographic areas of the world, such as the Middle East, Africa and Asia, that incorporate different international community organizations and conflict dynamics. As a result, expanding the geographic scope of this study could increase the level of confidence in the findings of this study.

A third factor is the utilization of states and the international community as the principal actors. As was seen, the Albanian Diaspora played an important role in

supporting ethnic Albanian armed groups, both from an economic and ideological perspective. It is possible diasporas have a different level of nationalistic fervor due to the fact they are somewhat removed in proximity to the actual conflict, which could cause the ethnic group in conflict to overestimate their political position within the conflict. Likewise, myriad NGOs are involved in the conflict prevention process. Perhaps a detailed examination should be conducted regarding the goals and available mechanisms of engagement of NGOs to determine their level of contribution to the overall international community efforts.

The final issue is that of the small-n structure of this study. A possible avenue for future research would be to test the role of a nexus of interstate and intrastate conflict prevention efforts through a quantitative, large-n study. While it would be difficult to quantify the nature of conflict prevention success, particularly related to any direct correlation as the temporal spectrum expands, it would be useful to examine the relationship between a nexus of interstate and intrastate conflict prevention efforts and whether that potential conflict did or did not evolve into conflict at various temporal intervals. Granted, many possibilities exist for forthcoming research that might refine and validate this hypothesis within the field of conflict prevention; nevertheless there is sufficient support for the hypothesis of a dyadic nexus of interstate and intrastate conflict prevention so as to examine future policy prescription.

#### **7.4. Policy Implications**

This thesis has important policy implications for the international community involved with conflict prevention efforts. As the hypothesis in Chapter 1 posits, and the examination of the three phases of the Macedonian case strongly indicates, the dyadic nexus of interstate and intrastate international community conflict prevention efforts plays a crucial role in the success or failure of those efforts. Early warning and response, support of major international actors, multifaceted and multilevel action, and synergistic intervention are necessary but not sufficient components for successful conflict prevention. However, through the implementation of a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity as regards the dyadic nexus of interstate and intrastate conflict prevention efforts, the international community can enhance their prospects for success. Without an interstate mandate for conflict prevention, the

intrastate efforts have little chance to succeed. The interstate mandate provides the vital security environment, much like an incubator, for the intrastate conflict prevention actions to take root and develop. However, without an intrastate mandate, the interstate efforts are hollow in that defense of the borders of a sovereign nation do not establish political systems characterized by representative government, open economies with social safety nets enabling socioeconomic and humanitarian needs to be met, and egalitarian justice systems. Without these elements being developed, the country can be neither stable nor viable. Consequently, the interstate and intrastate elements of conflict prevention efforts must be inextricably intertwined into a dyadic nexus.

However, the impact of the international community is mitigated by certain factors. First, is the fact that the international community and policy sectors have not yet comprehended the significance and magnitude of the dyadic nexus of interstate and intrastate conflict prevention. Lessons learned from previous conflict prevention missions, both successful and unsuccessful, have not been sufficiently analyzed, recorded or incorporated into current practice. In fact, the current quagmire the United States is encountering in the post-conflict reconstruction stage of Iraq suffers from an absence of a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity regarding interstate and intrastate conflict prevention. Until such time that an interstate component is added to the overarching scheme, insurgents utilizing the open borders of Iraq will continue to undermine any intrastate advances. Unfortunately, the international community continues to discern interstate and intrastate conflict as two discrete typologies of conflict.

Likewise, the academic community has not yet completely embraced the notion of a dyadic nexus of interstate and intrastate conflict prevention. As stated previously, while the academic community began to examine and espouse a nexus between interstate and intrastate conflict as early as the 1980s, this data is only now commencing to be acknowledged, and integrated within the policy community. Consequently, academic literature and methodology to date have not fully integrated the standing theoretical implications of a nexus between intrastate and interstate conflict into any normative literature within the field of conflict prevention.

Second, the dichotomy of military and civil aspects of conflict prevention missions presents challenges to be overcome. Traditionally, military and civil

organizations plan for missions in a different manner. Military organizations tend to plan for potential missions in advance, with contingency options; while civil organizations often wait until their respective decision-making bodies have approved the mission mandate. This results in a lack of prior strategic coordination. Based upon the level of military-civil interrelatedness of mission aspects and interaction required in execution, strategic coordination between military and civil components of a proposed conflict prevention mission must be increased. Similarly, coordination at the operational level of the locality of the mission suffers from coordination hindrances. This has been exhibited both within the military and civil components of a conflict prevention mission and between the military and civil components. For instance NATO suffers from a lack of willingness of certain nations to relinquish operational control of their forces to command by other nations, while civil organizations such as the EU and OSCE suffer from the parochial interests of stove piped chains of command. Additionally, in the case of UNMIK and KFOR in Kosovo, the bifurcation of the overall mission into two discrete mandates led to the inability to properly coordinate actions within the province. In order for a true nexus of interstate and intrastate conflict prevention efforts to occur, these challenges must be surmounted.

Another area of concern related to policy is the dangerous precedent that has been set in the political arena. As evidenced by Ali Ahmeti's admission that he deliberately chose violence in Macedonia based upon his perception that violence on the part of the KLA was rewarded by the international community, a precedent may have been set that condones violence as opposed to preventing it. This is compounded by the creation of temporary protectorates, such as the situation in Kosovo where the province remains part of Serbia, but is currently under UN administration. Consequently, one of the root causes of the Kosovo conflict has still not been effectively addressed, namely that of independence for Kosovo, which may have important consequences on other countries in the region when a determination is finally made.

Understanding these problems and the overall findings of this thesis will have an important impact on future policy. By fully integrating the theoretical implications of a dyadic nexus between intrastate and interstate conflict prevention within the standing conflict prevention literature and methodology, the ability of the

international community to engage in more successful efforts targeted toward future conflict prevention will be enhanced.

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