

NICHOLAS WOTTON: DEAN AND DIPLOMAT

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Abstract

This study is an account of the life and career of Dr. Nicholas Wotton, a sixteenth-century cleric and diplomat. Primarily remembered for his work in the latter category, his career made him at the least a supporting figure in many of the significant events of his century.

There are essentially three subdivisions within this biography; the first two chapters trace the rise of the Wotton family from relative obscurity to a position of national prominence. The middle segment reconstructs Dr. Wotton's critical years of service to his country, the 1540's and 1550's, re-examining from his unique perspective many well-rehearsed historical events. The final chapters address the questions of a character assessment, Wotton's achievements and his position within a study of the diplomatic history of sixteenth-century England.

The sixteenth century witnessed increased implementation of modern concepts of international diplomacy; thus, a review of the diplomatic papers of the time is relevant not only to this century but also creates a foundation from which to study later diplomatic developments. Nicholas Wotton, though only one of many sixteenth-century English diplomats on whom little previous research has been done, is a good example with which to begin, for in his life and career is reflected the sense of transformation from the Medieval to the modern which equally describes his century.

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Note and Acknowledgement

The reader may wish to know from the outset that I have considered it expedient to modernize the spelling in all English quotations extracted from manuscripts. I have, on the other hand, attempted to transcribe extracts in foreign languages just as they appear in the original text.

There are many people who have assisted me in various ways in the preparation of this work, and I would wish to reassure each of them that their efforts have been recognized and appreciated. I wish especially to thank my supervisor, Dr. David Potter, for his guidance, assistance and patience throughout the many drafts which this dissertation has taken. Through his extensive knowledge of the available sources, I have not only rediscovered Dr. Nicholas Wotton, but I have also greatly increased my general knowledge of the diplomatic history of the sixteenth century.

Introduction

Biography is the historical medium to which the majority of us relate most readily, and the colourful and lively character of the sixteenth century has motivated many students of history to strive to view this age through the eyes of its architects. Inevitably, and quite correctly for this period, the primary emphasis is to be found on the sovereign rulers, their chief ministers and ecclesiastical leaders, but without detracting from the importance of this personal element, it is also to be recognized that the modern student can only assess this element through its surviving manifestations--its art and architecture, traditions which link modern institutions with those of the sixteenth century such as Parliament and the church and, of particular value, the written word. It is of course upon this last source that the present biography is dependent for its attempted recreation of a minor but not irrelevant Tudor character who was certainly shaped by and gave some measure to the shaping of developments in this century.

Nicholas Wotton, Dean and diplomat, was the most prominent sixteenth-century member of his family, and by the time that he achieved recognition, the obscure and humble origins of the family had been overcome by several generations of distinction. His great-grandfather had risen to an outstanding position among the citizenry of London, and his grandfather had established the family among the lesser gentry of Kent. His father and brother had been knighted for their services to the crown, and his sisters Margaret and Mary had contracted excellent marriages. Just as Professor Elton has applied the description of revolutionary to the Tudor changes in English government,¹ one might expand this description to say that Nicholas Wotton

¹G. R. Elton, The Tudor Revolution in Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953), pp. 1-7.

himself was born into a world which was on the eve of a revolution in its thoughts on education, geographical knowledge and religion, and his choice of a career meant that he was destined to be influenced by these changes. Even so, he lived a life in keeping with the pattern of distinctions set by his ancestors.

In comparing him with five of his colleagues who shared similar political fortunes, one finds some differences. William Paget, William Cecil and Ralph Sadler had all served with Wotton on diplomatic assignments, while William Petre had been his secretarial colleague under Edward VI. With Thomas Smith, the relationship was less close, but the careers were not dissimilar. It would appear that Wotton was approximately ten years older than most of his colleagues, and since he was over forty when he embarked on his diplomatic career, one can conclude that he took a more circuitous route to governmental service, albeit a very traditional one. Similarly, only with Cecil and Petre can one say that the family histories ran a parallel course, and even so, the Wotton family had been established longer. The Pagets and Sadlers of the sixteenth century stood at the point of ambitions where the Wottons had been at the beginning of the previous century. Thomas Smith's family is the exception in that Thomas appears to have been the only member to attain prominence, and he, like Wotton, had begun his career on a note of academic prominence.¹ All six men shared a determination to survive the political battles which raged around them, and they were successful in varying degrees in doing so. The Wotton family, then, although more established than many who came to form a kind of Tudor civil service, adapted

¹In constructing this comparison, the following works have been consulted: A. J. Slavin, Politics and Profit: a Study of Sir Ralph Sadler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), pp. 1-20; S. R. Gammon, Statesman and Schemer: William, First Lord Paget, Tudor Minister (Newton Abbot: David and Charles, 1973), pp. 13-16; F. G. Emmison, Tudor Secretary, Sir William Petre at Court and at Home (London: Longmans, 1961), pp. 1-10; Conyers Read, Mr. Secretary Cecil and Queen Elizabeth (London: Jonathan Cape, 1962), pp. 17-20; Mary Dewar, Sir Thomas Smith (London: Athlone Press, 1964), pp. 9-11.

traditional paths to lead them into the modern avenues of power.

By examining Wotton's many diplomatic embassies, as well as his services at home, it is intended that this study should preserve some part of the personal element behind the information on several major sixteenth-century events which are generally handed on and reduced to textbook historical facts. The marriage alliance with Cleves and the ensuing developments in England including Henry's swift rejection of Anne and her unusually amiable compliance with the divorce are documented sufficiently, but the repercussions in Cleves, which in turn affected France and the Empire, are less well-known. Not until one reads Wotton's correspondence reflecting his sense of isolation and despair can one also know the frustration suffered by those whose job it was to maintain the actual framework of the policies laid down by the King. Wotton's embassy to Charles V in the 1540's provides a clear perspective from which to view both the human and logistical problems of sixteenth-century diplomacy. One detects throughout these despatches the human reactions of pride, anger, struggle and occasional humour; but there is also to be found the real difficulty of physical complications--distance, poor weather conditions, bad roads which impeded communications and the hardship of shortages produced by a state of war. From these ordeals, Nicholas Wotton emerged an experienced diplomat, and the reader of his correspondence from this period derives enlightenment on the state of Imperial affairs, as well as those of England. If his Imperial embassy can be viewed as illustrative of active diplomacy, then his two missions to the French court might similarly be seen as diplomacy frustrated. English possession of Boulogne and Calais ensured an atmosphere of insincerity and hostility, and genuine attempts to bridge the differences encountered further barriers attributable to French escapades into intrigue against the English government. The alliance structure of the century also contributed to this frustration, for French support of Scotland had always undermined basic English

security, while England's alignment with the Empire had produced some of the suspicion which pervaded Anglo-French negotiations. The final product of these years, the Treaty of Cateau Cambrésis, has been dissected sufficiently for its provisions and implications, but reading the letters of the men who hammered out this agreement yields an added dimension to understanding the delicacy and determination which brought these commissioners eventually to that famous conclusion.

In the chapters relating to Wotton's governmental service in England, it is more difficult to project his character into the events in which he was a participant. He so easily and often became absorbed into a majority consensus. In this he was not unique, and perhaps this in itself lends further confirmation to the classification of many minor mid-Tudor statesmen as early civil servants with no desire to use their offices to further personal ideologies.

There are references throughout the work to clerical rewards bestowed on Nicholas Wotton, particularly the office of first Dean of Canterbury Cathedral after the Reformation. Regrettably, in this sphere where one might hope to find traces of his influence and individuality, these are lacking. Part of the difficulty may rest with the deficiency of surviving evidence, but one can conclude from later evidence and general character information that it is unlikely that he would have willingly exercised leadership in ecclesiastical affairs.

The final chapter in this study assesses Wotton's career at its various levels--the cleric, the councillor, the diplomat. This career had spanned a period of extraordinary change, and in it, one sees reflected the history of the sixteenth century.

Previous studies of Nicholas Wotton's life have been confined to collective biographies of churchmen and statesmen and have not drawn heavily on the volumes of state papers available. The present study, which is the

first full-length biography of this diplomat, has attempted to supplement this deficiency by reviewing the evidence in greater detail and by reproducing some of the more relevant extracts from it necessary to examine more closely the life of one whose contributions to his own age and country merit record.

Chapter I

The Wottons of Boughton Malherbe

Any account of the Wotton family's rise to prominence in royal service begins in the middle years of the reign of Henry IV when Nicholas Wotton, (d. 1448), a member of the draper's guild of London became mayor of that city. He again held this position in the early years of the following reign.¹ Later illustrations will show that such an important public official, albeit on the local level, inevitably often found his duties defined and circumscribed by the policies of the central government in Westminster. The necessity for interaction between the two was especially vital at this point, since both of Wotton's mayoral terms occurred during a period of sporadic conflict with France and unrest at home attributable to dynastic struggles which, though they reached their peak with Richard II's deposition, continued to have repercussions many years afterwards. This unstable political climate, combined with the economic fluctuations which characterized the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, provides a valuable key to understanding the rise and fall of many new families which chose to follow the path to government service. This is especially true if one remembers the interest in and acceptance of merchant wealth by the English aristocracy, as well as the aspiration by this merchant class to invest its gains in land, the firm foundation of fifteenth-century society and economy. Public service could do much to enhance further the image of the merchant

¹Reginald Sharpe, Calendar of the Letterbooks of the City of London, Letterbook F (London: J. E. Francis, 1904), pp. 291-293.

seeking gentry status. Such was the case with the Wottons of Boughton Malberbe.

The first Nicholas Wotton does not appear to have accepted the mayoralty devoid of knowledge and experience in the realm of public service, for he had been a member of a royal commission in 1406 which had reviewed debts owed to the crown and had sought out cases of corruption.¹ It was probably in the capacity of alderman that Wotton had served on this commission, for the trend over the preceding century had been toward the incorporation of towns which were governed by local oligarchies. Such oligarchies were generally formed from the town's guild leaders who styled themselves aldermen. As governors of an incorporated city, these men could exercise considerable authority by virtue of the benefits of incorporation: possession of a common seal, the right to hold land, the right of perpetual succession and the position to sue and be sued as a body.² Of Wotton's first term as mayor, nothing is known, but it must have closely paralleled the second one to which he was elected in October of 1415. He was sworn into office on the feast of Saints Simon and Jude, the 28th, and on the following day, he walked in procession to Westminster Abbey where a Mass was celebrated in thanksgiving for the victory at the Battle of Agincourt. This constituted a major break with tradition, for mayors customarily rode in procession to the Abbey; but in light of this recent national triumph, the role of the humble pilgrim was considered more appropriate. The new mayor was then presented to the Barons of the Exchequer.³

¹Calendar of the Patent Rolls Henry IV (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1907-1936), III, p. 154. (This source is cited hereafter as Pat. Cal.)

²Colin Platt, The English Medieval Town (London: Sekler and Warburg, 1976), p. 144.

³Henry Riley, Memorials of London Life in the 13th, 14th and 15th Centuries (London: Longmans, 1868), pp. 620-622.

Wotton's duties as mayor of London were far-reaching: financial, judicial, administrative. As a prominent citizen of the realm, he was expected to contribute to grants raised for the King's foreign travels such as arose in the spring of 1416 when Wotton contributed two hundred pounds, and with good fortune he could hope that such a loan would not be translated into a gift; royal repayment might be forthcoming.¹ The judicial spectrum provided a more challenging field of activities. On one occasion, Mayor Wotton and the aldermen were asked to hear a case in which certain unskilled barbers of London had been charged with practising surgery. These men had refused to allow the masters of their guild to question them, and there was fear that their unsuspecting clients would come to grave harm.² City governors were also petitioned in Wotton's mayoralty to hear a charge against Benedict Wullman and Thomas Bekering who had spread the claim that Richard II was alive and had returned to England. The two men were charged with treason for attempting to deprive Henry V of his rightful inheritance.³ Finally, there were the regular appointments of the mayor and others to commissions of oyer and terminer either to hear appeals which had been made to the royal audience or to adjudicate crimes committed in London.⁴

The routine matters of administration which occupied much of the mayor's time often involved him in the settlement of areas in which public and private interests might clash. In February of 1416, it was left to him to "remove the King's hand and meddle no further " in an inn in St. Andrew's parish.⁵ The following May, he was appointed to a commission in

¹Pat. Cal. Henry V, II, p. 234.

²Riley, Memorials of London Life, p. 608.

³Ibid., p. 638.

⁴Pat. Cal. Henry V, II, p. 82.

⁵Calendar of the Close Rolls Henry V (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1932-1963), I, p. 262. (This source is cited hereafter as Close Cal.)

charge of settling the dower of Philippa, widow of the late Duke of York.¹ Such a matter was not an uncommon occurrence. A piece of administrative business which must have come to Wotton's attention in office, as it certainly did in his later life, was the settlement of estates left to the mayor and aldermen. It most often seems to have involved London merchants who turned over all of their goods and chattels in England and abroad, and the logical conclusion is that the mayor and aldermen were then required to dispense with all claims and debts against this property.²

During Wotton's mayoralty there appears to be only one recorded occasion of a meeting between him and Henry V. The city of London had granted a loan of ten thousand marks to the King for which he had surrendered a jewelled collar as collateral. In May of 1416, Mayor Wotton met the King to return this collar before the loan had actually been repaid.³ This must have been one of the more pleasant meetings of royal and local government.

The end of his mayoral term by no means signalled an end to Wotton's public career, for it is known that he was one of the two sheriffs of London in the following year. When the decree was issued in October of 1416 for the election of a new mayor, it appears that Wotton, in a state of transition from mayor to sheriff, participated in a dual capacity. The aldermen and prominent commons of the city, who numbered the two sheriffs among them, were summoned for the purpose of the election. On this the Feast of the translation of Edward the Confessor, a solemn Mass of the Holy Spirit was offered, after which the commons nominated as candidates two from their number. One was Richard Whittington who had already served

¹Ibid., p. 308.

²Ibid., II, pp. 193-194.

³Pat. Cal. Henry V, II, pp. 47-48.

once in this leading municipal capacity. The mayor and aldermen retired, sought "divine inspiration from the Holy Spirit," and the selection fell to Whittington. It was then declared that henceforth this day and the practice of celebrating this Mass would be established as the proper procedure to be followed in the election of the mayor.¹

By this point, one can say that the one-time draper had become a well-known figure in London political circles. Before looking at the steps which Nicholas Wotton took to improve his private fortune in order that it might properly reflect his new public circumstances, there is an interesting event which merits mention early in the Wotton story for the information which it yields about the family's background. In 1418, the former mayor experienced an altercation with one William Foucher, a man whose scrapes with the law eventually brought him to the sentence of being hanged, drawn and quartered. On this particular occasion in July, Foucher had called Wotton, "Nicholas Wyttless." He further proclaimed, "If he then had possessed no more now than he had had when he came to the city, he would have made an end of him." For this, Foucher was fined five hundred marks in the hope of ensuring his future good behaviour.² From this incident, one can conjecture that the Wottons had probably initially come to the capital in impoverished circumstances seeking their fortune.

At approximately the same time that Nicholas Wotton had emerged politically, he had also taken an important step toward furthering his social aspirations. This was his marriage to Joane Corbye, sole heir of Robert Corbye, a Kentish landowner of middling rank. The Corbys of Whithurst had increased their fortunes in the latter half of the fourteenth century

¹Riley, Memorials of London Life, p. 565.

²Ibid., p. 663.

when Richard II had alienated the manor of Thornham to Robert, and even earlier, Thomas de Dene had alienated the manor of Bocton Malherbe (now Boughton Malherbe), the centre-piece of the Corbye then Wotton family acquisitions.¹ This manor is described in detail in the Domesday Book of Kent,² and it had passed in the reign of John into the hands of Robert Malherbe from whom the second part of the name is derived in order to distinguish it from other Boughtons in Kent.³ In the modern village of Boughton Malherbe near Maidstone, one can find evidence in the remains of the west wing of the magnificent sixteenth-century Wotton home to suggest that a comfortable dwelling had existed on the estate in the time of the Lord Mayor.⁴ There is little evidence however to suggest that he spent much time there until the very final years of his life.

Although the date of Nicholas's marriage to Joane is not known, it must have been about 1407, for in February of 1408, a deed of transfer was exchanged between Nicholas Wotton and Stephen Swift of Egerton, apparently the chief administrator of the Corbye lands, and in it, he relinquished the claim to all land, rent and service.⁵ Five years later, Nicholas granted a concession to his mother-in-law, Alice Corbye, to set aside a chamber for her use, as well as to permit her access to the church and woods of Boughton Malherbe.⁶ It is possible that by this time Nicholas

¹Edward Hasted, History of Kent (Canterbury: Bristow, 1797-1801), I, p. 57; V, pp. 563 and 566. (This source is cited hereafter by the surname of the author.)


²Lambert L. Larking, The Domesday Book of Kent (London: J. M. Toovey, 1869), p. 104.

³J. Glover, The Place-Names of Kent (London: Batsford, 1976), p. 25.

⁴G. Eland, Thomas Wotton's Letterbook 1574-1586 (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 1.

⁵Close Cal. Henry IV, III, p. 362.

⁶Close Cal. Henry V, I, pp. 72-73.



has been widowed, for from a 1450 challenge to his will in which his adult sons are mentioned, one learns that these sons were the progeny of a second marriage.

One might well imagine that with such a country estate awaiting him, Mayor Wotton would have happily retired and called an end to his public service. Such was not the case. He continued to act in such positions as escheator of London and was an active alderman in the city until the early 1430's. Reference has already been made to his participation in the settlement of merchant estates, and he also continued to serve on commissions of oyer and terminer. On the first of June, 1426, an appeal was made to the King's audience stemming from a charge in the Admiralty Court over a robbery committed aboard one of His Majesty's ships, and Wotton served on the investigating commission.¹ As escheator, Wotton was called upon at the end of 1430 to administer the oath of fealty to abbots throughout London. The mandate had ordered the escheator in each county and in London to deliver the temporalities of each abbey to its abbot and in exchange to take his oath of fealty, as well as that of his tenants.² At approximately the same time, he had been given an even less agreeable assignment as part of a London committee charged with the compilation of a roster of citizens financially capable of contributing to a subsidy for the King. This duty was the direct result of a previous Parliamentary regulation.³

Late in the decade, this former mayor had participated in a commission for reassessing the customs on wool, the findings of which were approved by the King, who had ordered these new rates to be made effective in 1439.⁴

¹Pat. Cal. Henry VI, I, p. 343.

²Ibid, II, pp. 102-103.

³Ibid., p. 134.

⁴Close Cal. Henry VI, III, p. 307.

In this same year, Wotton had apparently made the decision to retire from government service and to spend his remaining years in Kent. The only remaining recorded action in which this earliest Wotton is to be found relates to a "matter touching the King's peace" in 1439. He was impanelled for this consideration by the sheriff of Kent in Rochester but refused to serve, claiming the privilege of exemption from such duties granted to former Lord Mayors. A confirmation of this came early in 1447 when Wotton was given an exemption for life from service on assizes, juries, recognitions, attainments, grand assizes or inquisitions and from being made justice of the peace, knight, mayor, bailiff, escheator, sheriff, constable, reeve, collector of the taxes or comptroller of the tenths, fifteenths, taxes, tallages, quoters or other subsidies or other offices, commissioners or ministers of the King.¹

He died in 1448 leaving his second wife Margaret a widow with two sons--Nicholas and Richard. In 1450, Margaret remarried, and there was considerable doubt and difficulty cast upon Mayor Wotton's will concerning the fate of his lands in Kent, although from subsequent family history, it can be known that the dispute was settled in such a way as not to prejudice the children.²

Of the second Nicholas Wotton, we know relatively little. There is no evidence to suggest that he took any interest in either local or national politics, discreetly avoiding marked involvement in the civil disorders of his time. He enjoyed the advantages of a second generation landholder and spent much of his time on the affairs of his estates, particularly Boughton Malherbe. Through his marriage to Elizabeth Bamburgh of

¹Pat. Cal. Henry VI, III, p. 260; V, p. 31.

²Close Cal. Henry VI, V, pp. 195-196.

Paddlesworth near Snodland, more land was added to the family holdings. The Bamburghs appear to have been family friends from the London circle of the Lord Mayor, and the two families charted much the same social course. The second Nicholas Wotton can be credited then with establishing the family among the Kentish gentry, but despite his expansion of the Wotton holdings in the county, Boughton Malherbe remained home. He and his wife lie buried in the parish church of St. Nicholas in the modern village. They had had seven daughters and three sons, the most famous of whom is Robert.¹

Robert succeeded his father to the Wotton lands, but he also followed in his grandfather's footsteps by reviving the family's participation in the service of the crown. Born in 1464, little is known of his early years, although from later evidence, one can assume that he had received the standard level of education common to members of the aspiring gentry. In his later life, he kept a chronicle (largely written in Latin but with scattered English and French references) of both personal and national events of significance. Although this source is neither extensive nor thorough, it is useful in compiling an account of Robert's emergence into county and royal service and reflects his awareness of history as it unfolded in his own time--an interest which would later be shared by his son Nicholas.²

Robert owed his initial recognition to the influence of John Morton, Archbishop of Canterbury. It is not known precisely how or when these two men met, but it is not unreasonable to conclude that by this time, the Wotton family was sufficiently established among Kentish landowners to bring them into contact with the Archbishop in the natural course of their corresponding social activities.³ Robert chose county government as his

¹Hasted, IV, p. 473.

²B. L., Add. MSS. 38692, fos. 51-52.

³Ibid., f. 51v.

starting mark, and he and the Archbishop served together on a commission for keeping the peace in Kent in 1489.¹ Because the reign of Henry VII was extensively dominated by the needs of peace and defence, one should not be surprised to find these same priorities reflected in Robert's early career. In 1490, the sheriff of Kent, along with several prominent citizens including Wotton, was commissioned to "array the fencible men" of the county and to place beacons as warnings to the populace of the advance of the King's enemies. Further trouble involving Scotland and Berwick in 1496 brought these responsibilities for mustering and arraying the Kentish force directly to Robert's charge.² The first segment of his chronicle is also reflective of this preoccupation. He described Perkin Warbeck's attempted landing in Kent, his subsequent flight to Scotland and Ireland and his eventual capture on his re-entry into England. Similarly, Wotton recorded the threat to the government from Edmond de la Pole and the royal pardon later received by him. Undoubtedly, as sheriff of Kent in 1499, Robert would have been more aware than most of such developments.³ He had achieved this prominent local position by following the traditional steppingstones of commissioner of the peace and justice of the peace, but his greatest asset had been the friendship of John Morton.

From the earliest point in his career, Robert had become involved in the judicial proceedings of the county. He was frequently a member of the commissions appointed to "deliver the gaol" of either Maidstone or Canterbury Castle. This was a judicial manoeuvre to bring to justice those persons who had been imprisoned between meetings of the assize courts by means

¹Ibid., f. 51v.

²Pat. Cal. Henry VII, I, p. 322; II, p. 67.

³B.L., Add. MSS. 38692, f. 51.

of a quarter session.¹ Such experience in local administration, along with his role to hold the county loyal to the King in this turbulent decade, contributed much to recommending him further to Morton, his avenue to even more prestigious royal service.

From the chronicle it is learned that Wotton received his first major promotion when he was made deputy lieutenant of Guisnes on the first of November, 1504:

Ego Robertus Wotton entered at Guisnes as deputy lieutenant unto Sir Nicholas Vaux, knight, lieutenant of the Castle of Guisnes at the Feast of All Saints anno Domini 1504, taking for my wages the first year 40 pounds sterling whereupon I found ij men in the ordinary besides myself, but the second and other years I had 50 pounds sterling. I tarried there in wages unto the vj day of April anno 1508.²

His superior, Mr. Vaux, later became another influential family friend, for his sister had married into the leading Kentish family of Guildford. This position of deputy lieutenant was relinquished in 1508 for an appointment to the "office and place of the chief porter of the town of Calais," a position to be held at the King's pleasure. It was given the briefest of mentions in the chronicle, "I Robert Wotton departed from Guisnes and was made porter of Calais at April, anno 1508."³ The privileges of this office were confirmed, including the appointment and removal of all other porters under him and the receipt of two pence a day yearly from those so appointed. Henry VIII reappointed him to this position in 1510, and from this point on, his career was totally devoted to the administration of Calais at its various levels.⁴ For his part, Robert had had to arrange for an assurance

¹Pat. Cal. Henry VII, II, pp. 358 and 397.

²B.L., Add. MSS. 38692, f. 52.

³Ibid., f. 52.

⁴Pat. Cal. Henry VII, III, p. 564; James Gairdner, Letters and Papers, Foreign and Domestic, of the Reign of Henry VIII (London: Longman and H.M. Stationery Office, 1862-1932), I, Grants for April of 1510, p. 276. (This source is cited hereafter as L.&P.)

to be given to the King of his "true allegiance" in this office. At the time of the 1508 appointment, Edward Guildford had put up a recognizance of two hundred pounds ensuring Wotton's loyal service and obedience to return to the King and Council when summoned. Upon Robert's arrival in Calais in April, he himself had had to honour a writ of dedimus potestatem by which he was required to appear before three members of the Calais council and agree to a one thousand pound recognizance ensuring the observation of the same conditions.¹

As chief porter of Calais, a member of the Calais council and later as comptroller of the Pale, (a position to which he was appointed in 1519), Robert found himself involved in a multiplicity of demands from Westminster. Purely administrative matters required much attention. The royal lands had to be cared for; the royal titles to these had often to be defended against challenging claims. A slightly different kind of land dispute found its way into the hands of the Calais council when the holdings of a certain couple, Richard and Joan Helperby, came into question as the result of the absence of a definite heir.² Another administrative matter, the need to supply the town with the staples of food and fuel, was always a difficulty not far from the surface, but it was sharply brought to the attention of the Westminster government in 1520 when King Henry was preparing to journey to the Continent for the famous meeting at the Field of the Cloth of Gold. The Calais administrators had had to inform Wolsey that they could meet the requirements for horses but were acutely short of the supplies required for His Majesty's entertainment.³ In 1522, this problem twice forced itself upon

¹Close Cal. Henry VII, II, p. 319.

²Order to the Calais Council, October of 1519, L.&P., III, i, p. 172, no. 462.

³Ibid., Calais Council to Wolsey, 18 April 1520, p. 265, no. 747.

the attention of both Calais and London. In March, a shipload of wine bound for Calais was seized by pirates; just three months later, cargoes of wood and food were confiscated by France. Strained relations between the two nations had developed into outright hostilities in that year, and the Calais council, proclaiming a very limited supply of only fifteen days' sufficiency, had expressed fear for the safety of the territory.¹ This same conflict had brought Robert Wotton into still another area of employment; he and William Lord Sandys were appointed to investigate the losses claimed by Englishmen in Guisnes against France.²

Throughout its history as an English possession, Calais was always at the front of international consideration; notice has already been taken of its ideal situation as a geographical point from which to launch international consultation, but more often it was a point for Continental confrontation. When a Breton ship took refuge here on the claim that inclement weather conditions had forced the crew in, the English government immediately suspected designs by France on the Pale. The French threat to the territory's vital supplies by the seizure of English merchant ships, as has been cited, was also always a potential ground for conflict. English merchantmen were driven to requesting a military escort, and the Calais council pleaded with the King to grant this.³ Not all provocations emanated from France however. In May of 1522, the council reported to Wolsey that the Emperor had demanded that two Englishmen being held in the prison of Guisnes Castle should be handed over to Imperial authorities for trial on charges

¹Ibid., Calais Council to Wolsey, 17 March 1522, p. 902, no. 2109; Calais Council to King Henry, 20 June 1522, p. 991, no. 2334.

²Ibid., III, ii, Commission, 21 September 1523, pp. 1394-1395, no. 3352.

³Ibid., II, ii, Calais Council to Wolsey, 1 August 1517, p. 1127, no. 3549.

of having violated the recently-concluded Treaty of Windsor.¹

One of the most sensitive international affairs in which Robert Wotton acted by virtue of his Calais office was the collection of the annual pension paid by the French King to Henry VII and Henry VIII. Wotton's first such commission came in the middle of June, 1508, and he was generally one of approximately six men delegated to oversee this exchange. According to the treaty of 1492, the French King was to pay twenty-five thousand crowns annually to the English sovereign, but the payments were actually given twice a year in the spring and autumn. The first amount was for just under fourteen thousand crowns, and from a later record it can be established that the Calais collectors were empowered to deduct their salaries from this sum.² Although Robert did not record directly his feelings on such international transactions, a curious French proverb occurs at this point in his chronicle, and one might well wonder whether it contains at least a hint of his personal reflections on this rather incongruous state of affairs, "Il nest nul petit ennemy. Et on ne peult auoir trop grant amy."³

A detailed assessment of Robert Wotton's record as a Calais administrator is irrelevant here, but from the evidence which remains, one is left with the impression that he was an efficient and devoted royal servant. In addition, he would genuinely appear to have enjoyed this branch of Tudor government, for he spent the last twenty years of his life almost solidly in the territory and in its governance. If imitation can be used as a measure for success and personal fulfilment, then one might well look to the career of Robert's son Edward as one patterned on and inspired by his

¹Ibid., III, i, Calais Council to Wolsey, 1 May 1522, pp. 943-944, no. 2217.

²B.L., Add. MSS. 38692, f. 52; L.&P., I, Grants for December of 1511, p. 495.

³B.L., Add. MSS. 38692, f. 52.

father's years of service in this remnant of England's Continental empire. The two careers parallel each other in so many ways.

As for the personal progress of the Wottons under Robert, one can say that he continued their steady social climb, and indeed it was in his own lifetime that the Wottons began to emerge in a distinctly aristocratic milieu. This had been achieved partially through his own marriage but more particularly through the marriages of his children. Robert had married Anne Belknap, daughter of Sir Henry, and she had inherited from her brothers the manors of Okemore and St. Mary Cray.¹ Robert chronicled with keen interest the birth of each of their children to the detailed point of recording the hour of birth in several instances.² The most significant of all of his marriage arrangements was that of his daughter Margaret to Thomas Grey, Marquis of Dorset, a marriage which was obviously a source of immense prestige to Wotton. He recorded the event in his chronicle with great pride:

That my daughter Margaret was married at the Black Friars in London in mine old Lady Guildford's lodgings, sister to Mr. Vaux, unto the Lord Marquis Dorset, the 30th day of May, Monday, in the year of Our Lord God 1513 et anno regis Henrici VIII quarto.³


Definitely a step in the right social direction, this marriage linked the Wottons with a family whose sixteenth-century close court connections reached to the inner circle of the royal family itself. This must have been one of the greatest assets to the careers of Edward and Nicholas.

Notes of royal significance did not escape chronicler Wotton, especially those which had occurred at the turn of the century. A brief reference is made to the journey to Calais by way of Dover which Henry VII

¹Hasted, I, p. 140.

²B.L., Add. MSS. 38692, f. 51r.

³Ibid., fos. 52-53.



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and his queen, along with a large retinue, had taken to meet Archduke Philip. Wotton also recorded the sorrowful events which beset the royal couple upon their return to England--the death of their infant son Edmond and the deaths of both the Archbishop of York and the Archbishop of Canterbury, Wotton's friend and patron. The arrival of Catherine of Aragon and her subsequent marriage to Prince Arthur merited only a passing reference in the chronicle.¹

Of Robert's final days, little is known. At the end of July, 1524, he had returned to Guisnes, possibly to resume his work for the commission investigating claims against France. He became ill with a "fervent fever," and the medical consensus was that English air might prove the cure. The lieutenant of Guisnes duly reported this situation to Wolsey and requested licence for Wotton's return home immediately, for death seemed imminent. Apparently these steps were taken too late, and he died shortly thereafter and was buried in Calais.² He had achieved his goal of a successful career in the King's service.

New social and political aspirations had been set into motion for the Wotton family by Nicholas Wotton, Lord Mayor of London. This successful fifteenth-century merchant had begun the climb by becoming involved in the most important local affairs in the kingdom and by serving in a number of civic capacities there. Simultaneously, he had set his mind on joining the growing number of merchant gentlemen by contracting a marriage which would unite his wealth and her land. Although contented enough himself to continue to lead primarily a London existence until his last years, the plan was that the next generation should extricate itself from these origins and work to establish the family reputation in more genteel

¹Ibid., fos. 51-52.

²Fitzwilliam to Wolsey, 8 August 1524, L.&P., IV, i, p. 249, no. 569.

circumstances. This is in fact precisely what transpired.

As has been noted, little is known of the second generation, but judging from the evidence of later generations, it can be concluded that the second Nicholas Wotton, building on the recognition which had been gained by his father's wealth, had further progressed along this new social course to the point where he was able to offer his son the possibility of acceptance and advancement based upon recognized gentry status. If the guide-books are to be believed, it was also probably this second Nicholas Wotton who began work on the grand mansion which was home for the sixteenth-century generations of Wottons and to which Queen Elizabeth was once invited.

Inevitably of course, it is to Robert that one must look for the formative influences on Nicholas Wotton, dean and diplomat. Having begun his own life in advantageous circumstances, Robert used his career to increase the opportunities which he in turn could offer to his sons. Living among the Kentish upper class had given him his entry into royal service, and having once achieved this position, provided that one had performed his duties acceptably and successfully, it was reasonable to expect this avenue to remain open. Robert's local involvement was also sufficient to benefit his family's progress, as might be witnessed by the marriage of one of his daughters into the prominent Guildford family. His Continental service in Calais may well prove to have been his most direct advantage for Nicholas's career. Such a position must have made it easier for this younger son, with a talent for languages and an interest in scholarly pursuits, to have access to the masters of the new learning and the treasures of the Continent.

In the generation of Robert's sons, one can say that the pattern had come full circle but in a slightly altered form: from London to a Kentish manor, from Boughton Malherbe to Calais, from Calais back to London. In the careers of Edward and Nicholas, there are elements of the preceding generations. Instead of the local affairs of London, they had become

involved in national government, but some of the disputes which they as Privy Councillors were asked to resolve seem but an extension of the cases referred to the Lord Mayor and his aldermen. The brothers further shared participation in the affairs of Kent; Edward followed his father into local administration, and Nicholas had several links to the spiritual life of the county. Just as Edward also mirrored his father's career in the administration of Calais, one might also see that Nicholas, in his father's footsteps, sought to expand his horizons by seeking royal employment across the seas.

Such were the foundations on which Nicholas Wotton built his career. At the outset, one should note that the vantage point from which he began was certainly one of benefit. How this career developed and prospered will be outlined in detail in the remaining chapters.

Chapter II

Edward and Nicholas: The Two Careers

Certain trends in politics, religion and landownership in Kent in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries contributed to the creation of a climate in which a family like the Wottons could hope to prosper. To view these patterns successfully, one must look to the western segment of the county, the part in which the Wotton holdings lay, for the eastern territory was overwhelmingly under ecclesiastical control. Although one does find several examples in the county of truly large estates such as those of the Guildford and later Cobham families, the dominant pattern in Kent was of a greater number of minor gentry with much smaller landholdings. In addition to including Nicholas Wotton's own family in this category, there are also the names of many whose careers would intersect his at various points--John Baker, Thomas Wyatt and Thomas Cheyney.¹ Kent, like most of England in the fifteenth century, had known its share of factional struggles, and the Tudors did not find an easy path to re-establishing royal authority in the county. Peter Clark has suggested that the breakthrough in crown-county relations occurred when Wolsey shifted the royal link from a reliance on the great magnate families like the Guildfords and Nevilles to the landed men below them or to actual foreigners to the area, the Boleyns of Hever, for example.² While it would appear that Cromwell depended on much the same system, he sought a basis for this alliance in religious commitment through clerics like Cranmer and laymen like Wyatt. Edward Wotton can also be numbered

¹Peter Clark, English Provincial Society from the Reformation to the Revolution (Hassocks: Harvester Press, 1977), pp. 4-6.

²Ibid., pp. 16-17.

within this network, for unlike his more noted brother, he has left clues to his religious sentiment. In the mid 1530's, it was written to Cromwell that Edward Wotton was known to read Protestant tracts and had offered his services to the King's minister. Similarly, in his will, Edward affirmed his commitment to the reformed ideas in religion by such statements as his belief that his soul would be received into the elect.¹ Although Clark has provided ample evidence to support this crown-county structure, he has also rightly cautioned against a concept of a closed alliance, for royal patronage was extended alike to those within and without this chain.²

In terms of religion, Kent had long had a tradition of anticlericalism, and the lower Medway and weald had been a major Lollard centre. A substantial number of urban areas in this part of the county had attracted many artisans, the group among which Lollardy had found its greatest commitment. Not surprisingly then, this same area had proved more receptive than many to the ideas of Luther, but this time, the support had emanated from the lesser gentry and some of the clergy. Although there was a brief conservative religious reaction after Wolsey's fall, the prevailing trend was in favour of the Reformation. By the end of the 1530's, the anticlerical tradition, somewhat stable economic conditions and this previously-mentioned political network between local and central government had combined to make Kent a safe area for government policy.³

This was the setting into which Edward Wotton stepped in 1524 when at the age of thirty-five he had succeeded to his father's lands and reputation. The paths to prominence which he and his brother Nicholas pursued in their respective careers stand firmly rooted in the traditional guidelines of patronage and ability which had been the recognized ladder of success

¹Ibid., pp. 49-53 and 74.

²Ibid., pp. 53-56.

³Ibid., pp. 30-31 and 49.

for centuries. The careers of the brothers ran parallel and intersected on several occasions for almost three decades after their father's death, and there is evidence to suggest that the brothers enjoyed a close relationship. One can base such a supposition on the evidence that Edward had made the family papers readily available to Nicholas in the latter's pursuit of a keen interest in family history, and secondly, Edward's eldest son Thomas was heir to both in spirit and fortune and appears to have been favourably looked on by his father and uncle.¹ A portion of this chapter will be dedicated to Edward's life in order to demonstrate and to contrast the paths open to elder and younger sons, but it is also hoped that this will further serve to place the Wottons of Boughton Malherbe in the context of careers which had been followed by many of their contemporaries aspiring to an improved social, economic and political position. It has already been noted that both brothers had benefited from the foundations laid by their ancestors, and in their turn, Edward and Nicholas too contributed to the family's steady rise to royal favour.

Practically nothing is known of Edward's youth. Born in 1489, eldest son of Robert, it was his destiny to live in his father's shadow until coming into his own inheritance, but in 1516, it is known that he was created a "knight of the body."² This would indicate that he had gained introduction into court circles, probably through Archbishop Warham, and was generally occupying his time in pursuits which would benefit a later career. In 1524, he became a magistrate in Kent, and from that date also, one can mark his

¹William Turnbull, Calendar of State Papers, Foreign Series, of the Reign of Mary, 1553-1558 (London: Longmans, 1861-1871), Wotton to Petre, 23 February 1554, pp. 61-62. In this letter, Wotton expressed concern for those of his kinsmen implicated in Wyatt's rebellion, and he commented that he would especially feel betrayed if his young nephew Thomas had been involved. (Because this source is available for several reigns, it is cited hereafter as Foreign Cal. together with the appropriate monarch.)

²Grants for 1516, L.&P., II, i, p. 871, no. 2735.

emergence as the head of the Wotton family. Over the next decade and a half, Edward often served on commissions for keeping the peace in the county, and he was twice sheriff, 1529 and 1535.¹ The King's decision to knight Edward in 1528 appears to have interrupted this pattern of county judicial service, for Henry Guildford in May of that year had considered it necessary to write of this matter to Wolsey requesting that Wotton, along with John Cromer who was described as one willing to serve the King and Wolsey, should be reinstated in such commissions.² The matter was settled to Guildford's satisfaction.

Edward's employment in the 1530's can be defined almost exclusively in terms of county administration, and the year 1536 provides the best illustration of the variety of his occupations. In September, county officials issued an order for the regulation of practices within the cloth trade, and Wotton's name headed the list of signatures. They had set forth such requirements as a two-year apprenticeship and had established a method of arbitrating management-employee disputes.³ In the following month, during the uprising in the north, Edward was required to supply the King with fifty men to aid in the suppression of the rebellion and was also one of the Kentish gentry empowered to "enforce" a watch between eight in the evening and five in the morning.⁴ In the midst of such a busy public career, one can find only the occasional trace of family involvement. On 23 August 1531, for example, apparently after a property settlement of a deceased brother-in-law, ready plate and money was delivered to Edward to use for the maintenance of his orphaned Rudstone nephews.⁵

¹A. Winnifrith, Biographies of Men of Kent and Kentishmen (Folkestone: Parsons, 1913), p. 512.

²Henry Guildford to Wolsey, 17 May 1528, L.&P., IV, i, p. 1881, no. 4276.

³Ibid., Weavers in Kent, September of 1536, XI, p. 210, no. 520.

⁴Ibid., Northern Rebellion, October of 1536, pp. 232-234, no. 580.

⁵Ibid., _____ to Edward Wotton, 23 August 1531, V, p. 190, no. 380.

There were times in this decade when Wotton found himself under the attention of national figures. One pleasant such occasion was his invitation to be present in the Great Hall of Westminster at the coronation banquet for Anne Boleyn.¹ Another such occasion was far removed from pleasure and pomp. A conflict over the appointment to the stewardship of the Abbey of Malling developed in 1535. Edward had been led to believe by the abbess that she had favoured his appointment to this position, but Cromwell had written to him in February requesting him to relinquish this claim in favour of Thomas Wyatt, who had been recommended by the King. There was nothing that Wotton could do but to remit the patent in question, although he left no doubt as to his resentment that the abbess had broken her commitment to him and had questioned his ability for the office.² An almost martyred attitude emerges from this correspondence.

The zenith of Edward's career occurred in the 1540's, when, like his father, he was sent as a crown representative to Calais. At the time of the appointment of Lord Maltravers as Deputy there, Wotton had been selected as his assistant. From the King's letter announcing these appointments, it is learned that the position of treasurer of the Pale had been abolished but was in 1540 under consideration for re-establishment. Henry indicated his intention to nominate Wotton to the reconstituted office but requested silence on this matter for the moment.³ In the meantime, Edward travelled to Calais and was quickly initiated into the employment which would occupy the next eight years of his life. This can be roughly catalogued under two descriptions: the administration of provincial affairs and constant observation of the border with France, particularly of incidents which could be

¹Ibid., Coronation of Anne Boleyn, 1536, VI, p. 246, no. 562.

²Ibid., Edward Wotton to Cromwell, 27 February 1535, VIII, p. 113, no. 275; Edward Wotton to Cromwell, 6 March 1535, p. 140, no. 349.

³Ibid., Henry VIII to Sussex and Gage, July of 1540, XV, p. 412, no. 833.

misconstrued by either side as provocation to renew hostilities. In the first instance, Edward was expected to oversee the payments for supplies for the territory and to make such necessary purchases as wagons and ordnance.¹ When England and France were at war later in the decade, his duties were expanded to encompass payment of soldiers in Calais and maintain a knowledge of foreigners in the territory.² As a prominent member of the Calais council, he could also expect to be considered for such tasks as the settlement of property claims among Calais residents and assuming responsibility for Guisnes Castle in December of 1540, following the death of the captain there.³ An example of this latter duty is the dispute over the Banister property which occupied much of Wotton's attention during his first months in Calais. The widow Banister had died without leaving a settlement of her house and goods, and because her son was in prison, the original instruction from the Privy Council to Maltravers and Wotton was that the property should be given to her son-in-law. The imprisoned son filed a claim for his inheritance, and after a reappraisal, the Privy Council reversed its decision and recommended that a division of the property between the two was in order.⁴

There was certainly ample need to maintain close surveillance on incidents occurring along the border with France, and there was no shortage of potential threats to the amity which was in existence at the time of Edward's appointment. In September of 1540, a farm belonging to the French King

¹Ibid., Privy Council to Maltravers, 2 November 1540, XVI, p. 100, no. 226; Privy Council to Maltravers, November of 1540, p. 127, no. 303.

²J. R. Dasent, Acts of the Privy Council of England (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1890-1964), I, p. 234. (This source is hereafter cited as A.P.C.).

³Henry VIII to the Calais Council, 7 December 1540, L.&P., XVI, p. 149, no. 315.

⁴Ibid., Privy Council to Maltravers and Wotton, 11 October 1540, p. 66, no. 140; Wotton and Maltravers to the Privy Council, 4 November 1540, p. 102, no. 234; Privy Council to Wotton and Maltravers, 8 November 1540, p. 108, no. 249.

was destroyed, and the Calais council considered it necessary to report this immediately to their own King.¹ Border tensions in the following month prompted a party of four councillors, including Wotton, to journey to Cowsbridge to observe the state of affairs. In their subsequent report to Henry, Maltravers mentioned that the group had been assailed by a bow-shot from the French side of the bridge.² Matters must have deteriorated further, for on the 15th of November, Wotton spoke of his concern over a break in the amity.³ This, however, did not occur, but the Cowswade triangle remained a volatile area between England and France.

In November of 1540, Edward officially became treasurer of Calais, but it was not without obstacle. Maltravers had written to the King of these difficulties on the 13th, when he informed his sovereign that Wotton had not and could not take the oath until the patent (which the Deputy claimed was in the hands of Wriothsesley) had been signed by the King. Describing the treasurer as a man of "wisdom, experience and goodwill," Maltravers reminded Henry that neither Wotton nor his servants could be paid until the royal signature had been affixed to the patent, and it was the Deputy's opinion that this was making their lives unnecessarily complicated.⁴ Henry acted promptly to correct this difficulty.⁵

It is interesting to note at this point that Edward's ability in the administration of Kent in the late 1530's had undoubtedly increased his reputation with the King, and his appointment in Calais was a logical step

¹Ibid., Calais Council to Henry VIII, September of 1540, XVI, p. 9, no. 29.

²Ibid., Maltravers to Henry VIII, 25 October 1540, p. 87, no. 197.

³Ibid., Edward Wotton to the Calais Surveyor, 15 November 1540, pp. 113-114, no. 267.

⁴Ibid., Maltravers to Henry VIII, 13 November 1540, p. 111, no. 262.

⁵Ibid., Privy Council to Edward Wotton, 20 November 1540, p. 120, no. 283.

in the progress of his career. It has already been indicated that this was an appointment to an apparently reconstituted office of treasurer of Calais. Not dissimilar are the fortunes of his clerical brother at this juncture. Nicholas's diplomacy in Cleves was also an accepted pattern in the career of a younger son and churchman, and like his elder brother, he received the King's favour in the form of a reconstituted office--the deanery of Christ Church Canterbury.

One can be reasonably certain that Edward remained in Calais and involved in its administration until the death of Henry VIII; after that point, however, his life and career lapsed almost totally into obscurity. There is no record of any appointment of him to the Henrician Privy Council, but he was one of the King's executors selected for Edward VI. This had ensured for him a place initially in the Edwardian government, and he appears to have remained on its fringe until his death in 1551. Henry's decision to include Edward among the executors is an excellent illustration of the ample ground still remaining for speculation surrounding the motives which determined the King's selection. In this particular case, two conjectures can be offered. It is possible that Henry wished to have a representative of England's overseas possessions numbered among the advisors left to his son. Edward's ability in administration and his diligence in the cause of the crown well may have made him the natural choice from among his Calais colleagues. It is equally feasible to suggest that Henry had based this decision on Edward's reformed religious convictions, for he would have been an addition to the Protestant element without introducing further tension which would have been carried by a more well-known, more outspoken Protestant. In any event, Edward's role in government between 1547-1551 is a minor one. Dr. Hoak has charted Wotton's attendance at Privy Council meetings throughout these years. His first appearance at such a meeting did not come until February of 1548, and later in the same

year, it would seem that he was dismissed by the Protector. In January of 1549, Somerset recalled him to the council board to participate in the ordering of the arrest of Thomas Seymour.¹ Shortly thereafter, Paget had suggested in one of his advices to Somerset that Edward Wotton, together with Walter Mildmay, be appointed to oversee the financial affairs of the realm.² No action appears to have been taken on this suggestion.

It is known that Edward joined with the majority of the Privy Council, including his brother, in the 1549 autumn coup against Somerset, but subsequent to the account of this event, nothing further is known of his activities. As with his father and brother, one can say of Edward Wotton that he had displayed ability and diligence in his service to his country. Unlike his brother, Edward took a definite stand in the religious tumult which characterized his century. He had successfully maintained the family's reputation in Kent and Calais and had with his brother extended their fortunes to include the London circles of national power. On his death in 1551, Boughton Malherbe passed into the hands of his son Thomas, who chose to pursue only the local aspect of his father's career. Thus it was with Edward and Nicholas's generation that the Wotton family attained its greatest claim to prominence until the seventeenth century. At this point, it is necessary to shift the focus to the first half of Nicholas Wotton's life, for of the two brothers, it is his career which spanned and incorporated some of the most outstanding events relevant to English history in the first two thirds of the sixteenth century.

At the time of Robert Wotton's death in 1524, his son Nicholas had already been established in a career and had also found recognition among the Humanist scholars of the day. Nothing definite is known of his life between the date of his birth, 11 May 1497, and his institution to the

¹Dale Hoak, The King's Council in the Reign of Edward VI (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 46 and 50.

²Ibid., p. 183.

rectory of Boughton Malherbe in 1517 on the death of Christopher Porter. This was his first appointment, and predictably, his father was his patron.¹ Thomas Fuller, the seventeenth-century historian, has preserved the tradition which associates Nicholas's university education with Oxford, but there is not an official record of his attendance there.² In September of 1518, Wotton received a second living, that of the vicarage of Sutton Valence upon the death of Nicholas Hillington.³ It must have been about this same time that he became a part of the Humanist circle in Canterbury under the leadership of the abbot of St. Augustine's John Foch, alias Essex.⁴ One can justifiably speculate that this was the first step in diverting his priorities away from pastoral duties, for in the early years of the 1520's, he travelled to the Continent, specifically to Paris and Louvain, where he came to the attention of the Humanist scholar, Jean Luis Vives.⁵ It may well have been from one of these universities that he received the degree of doctor of civil and canon law. In 1523, he accompanied Vives to England where the latter had been engaged to deliver a series of lectures at Oxford.⁶

At approximately this same time, John Twyne credits Wotton with participation in a lengthy academic discussion with Abbot Foch and another Augustinian on ancient English history. Printed in 1590, this discussion could conceivably have been merely an invention of Twyne's imagination, and the selection of Wotton as one of the participants may simply have been

¹Lambeth Palace Archives, Archbishop Warham's Register, f. 364.

²Thomas Fuller, Worthies of England (London: F.G.W.L. and W.G., 1662), pp. 77-78.

³Warham's Register, f. 366.

⁴Clark, English Provincial Society, p. 29.

⁵John Twyne, De Rebus Albioniciis (London: 1590), p. 6.

⁶Ibid., p. 6.

a case of random choice of one promising young scholar associated with the decade of the 1520's and the area surrounding Canterbury. Twyne has chosen to record this commentary in the Classical style of an informal conversation among the three friends, the abbot leading the discussion while the two younger men periodically interjected questions or favourable statements of support to his argument. In the introduction, special note was taken of young Wotton's sharp wit and knowledge of all subjects,¹ and as the commentary progresses, one is left with the impression of a group widely read in the Classical authors and amply familiar with the prominent Humanist views of their contemporaries. References to the works of Aristotle, Pliny, Tacitus, Ptolemy, Ceasar, Cicero and Vergil are liberally scattered throughout the text, while Geoffrey of Monmouth, Erasmus and Vives are frequently cited as contrasting modern sources on England's ancient culture.

Several themes can be traced throughout the discussion--the derivation of place-names, the importance of geographical factors in history and the variety of legends which have survived through the ages. Much time was devoted to the theories on the derivation of the name "Briton," and Geoffrey of Monmouth was taken to task for perpetuating the belief that the name had emanated from a Trojan leader, Brutus, who had come to the country at the time of the fall of Troy. Though never coming to an explanation themselves, the three interlocutors are agreed that Brutus is but a legend and that Englishmen can more likely trace their descent from the Phoenicians and the people of the Isle of Rhodes rather than the Trojans. Other legends are also interspersed throughout--the gigantic size of the ancient fathers; their much darker complexions and the assertion that perhaps pervades every age, i.e., these ancient Englishmen had lived a simpler, braver existence

¹Ibid., pp. 4-5.

than did their corrupt sixteenth-century descendants. It should be said for Wotton that he did caution his friends that time has a way of distorting memory.¹ Geography too was a major theme of the conversation, for the friends were convinced that England had not always been an island; hence, the greater ease with which Continental tribes had found their way into the area, bringing with them a culture on the benefits of which these sixteenth-century scholars were divided.

Wotton's own part in this conversation reveals a character already much in the mould of that one which emerged as the later statesman. Reference to his practical and cautious warning that time distorts memory has been noted. His general tone with the abbot is certainly one of deference, and there is no evidence of radical thought. When such topics as the ancient reliance upon magic and demonic incantations arose, Wotton was the one to interject a statement on the current church position against such "sinful" behaviour.² One other point raised by Wotton and of relevance to his later career indicated an interest (possibly a shift in interest) toward the government of these ancient people. It was he who asked the abbot to discourse on this, and though relatively little information is actually given to him, one is left wondering whether this question may have stemmed from thoughts which were turning in favour of service to his own government.³

Twyne's discourse, De Rebus Albioniciis, is of importance to the historian for the view of history which it allows us to see through sixteenth-century eyes. Using George Huppert's work on the subject, The Idea of Perfect History, one can conclude that De Rebus Albioniciis contains elements of the school of historical thought propounded by the later sixteenth-century French historians, La Popeliniere and Pasquier, who subscribed

¹Ibid., p. 107.

²Ibid., p. 84.

³Ibid., p. 53.

to the concept of history as the inevitable progress from savagery to civilization.¹ The awareness of history reflected in this commentary is certainly in character with Wotton's overall scholarly interests.

From a later letter of Wotton's, it can be established that he travelled to Italy about the middle of the 1520's. Part of his time was spent in Perugia, but he was also in Rome during the 1527 sack of that city by the Imperial troops of Charles V.² Professor Pollard has conjectured from this particular evidence that Wotton may have studied for his final university degree in Perugia,³ but considering that Wotton was almost thirty at the time that he journeyed to Italy, it would seem likely that he would have obtained this qualification earlier, especially since Paris or Louvain would have afforded him such an opportunity. It is not known precisely when he returned to England, but it must have been about 1528, and from that point, one can effectively date the beginning of a transition from full-time clerical and academic associations to associations which would culminate in a career dedicated to his nation's diplomacy.

According to a twentieth-century author, Wotton joined the service of Cuthbert Tunstall, Bishop of London, aided probably through the good offices of Archbishop Warham.⁴ In such a capacity, it is possible that he would have been present at the Black Friars for the court sessions on the divorce proceedings between King Henry and Queen Catherine. If this was indeed the case, he would have witnessed the famous opening scene before the Archbishop, all other bishops and the Papal Legate Campeggio in which

¹George Huppert, The Idea of Perfect History (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1970), pp. 162-168.

²Nicholas Wotton to Cromwell, 27 April 1540, L.&P., XV, pp. 258-259, no. 581.

³A. F. Pollard's biographical sketch of Nicholas Wotton's life in the Dictionary of National Biography (London: Smith, Elder, and Co., 1900) LXIII, pp. 57-58.

⁴Winnifrith, Biographies of Men of Kent, pp. 516-517.

Catherine directly implored the King to tell her in what way she had displeased him. When no answer was forthcoming, the Queen departed the room renouncing the court's authority.¹ A few years after these events, Wotton was asked to write a letter of testimonial for Richard Watkins and William Claiburn, two notaries who were compiling a record of these events. Whether their account was to be the official record or merely a copy of the proceedings is not clear, but Wotton's letter, attached to this record originally, is a letter of reference testifying to the ability of these two men and granting a renewal of their notarial credentials. To Wotton's own story, the heading of this letter contributed the information that in the early 1530's, Nicholas Wotton was the official principal of the Consistory Court of London.²

The year 1530 witnessed some changes in Wotton's ecclesiastical commitments in Kent. In May, he had resigned his position in Sutton Valence, but on the 26th of October, he accepted the benefice of Ivychurch. This last appointment can definitely be ascribed to the patronage of Warham.³ These changes were however minor when considered with an assignment which Wotton had undertaken in that same year--an assignment which can be classified as his first taste of diplomatic service. At the request of Edward Foxe, Wotton had been sent to France to ascertain the opinions of French universities on the King's "great matter." He wrote to Foxe on the 29th of June that the opinions of the professors with whom he had spoken at the university in Paris had concurred with the decision of the divorce and the right of remarriage for both parties. These scholars had promised to

¹John Stowe, Annals of England (London: Thorn and Adams, 1615), pp. 541-542.

²Cambridge University Library, Ms. Cantab. Dd.XIII, 26, Letter of Testimonial, 1 October 1533.

³Warham's Register, fos. 402-403.

put their opinions in writing later, and it was probably intended that Wotton should convey these back to England.¹ Nothing further is known of this first venture into royal service.

Finding the place in the King's service which was eventually to be his life's career was neither an easy nor an immediate accomplishment for Wotton. After his employment in France in 1530, there is practically no record of his activities until the Convocation of 1536, although it is possible to speculate again that his work with the Consistory Court was his primary occupation in the years between 1530-1536. To the 1536 session of Convocation, Henry had sent a set of instructions on religious education for the common people. The King had begun with a designation of the sources from which such instruction should be taken: the Scriptures, the three church creeds and the first four general church councils in which it had been established that education was part of the pastoral duty. The Sacraments of Baptism and Confession were confirmed as necessary to salvation. Infant baptism was upheld on the grounds of necessity to eliminate original sin and to obtain The Holy Ghost, and the three elements of penance were retained--confession, contrition and amendment of life through external charitable works to which sincere faith had been joined. Where possible, confession to a priest was necessary. The King emphasized that good works alone were not sufficient but must be accompanied by inward holiness, for justification was defined as remission of sin and striving for a perfect imitation of Christ. Transubstantiation was definitely affirmed, and Henry gave his approval to the continued use of outward ceremony so long as the superstitious element was removed. Images, holy water, candles, vestments, ashes, palms, and the like were held to be meet, for they raised

¹Nicholas Wotton to Edward Foxe, 29 June 1530, L.&P., IV, iii, p. 2913, no. 6481. This letter appears to be the oldest surviving correspondence from Nicholas Wotton.

the minds of the people. Finally, the King sanctioned Masses for the dead and reserved to himself the right to decrease the number of saints' days, for while the people were to be encouraged to continue to seek the intercession of these Heavenly patrons, they must be instructed to know that they could not expect from saints that which God alone could give. Nicholas Wotton's signature occurs among the list which was appended to the concurrence of Convocation to these still very Catholic instructions.¹

A curious employment came Wotton's way in this same year, 1536, and not much is known of it. He acted as one of two proctors for Anne Boleyn in the divorce proceedings between King Henry and his second wife. At these hearings, though summoned, neither royal party appeared in person. Wotton and John Bardour represented the Queen, and Dr. Richard Sampson acted in the King's interest. Fuller seems to be the oldest extant source for this information, and he recorded the judgment of the Archbishop's court as one of annulling the marriage without assigning any cause in the matter. It was the firm opinion of this seventeenth-century historian that the Queen was completely innocent of the charges of adultery, and his innuendo is that her judges shared this belief. The King however had had to press for a divorce in order to declare their issue illegitimate, and Fuller believed that Henry had contrived the death sentence only after obtaining the consent of Parliament and Convocation to the divorce. Paul Friedmann, one of Anne's biographers, has speculated that Henry, following his earlier precedent with Catherine, had himself appointed Wotton and Bardour to represent the Queen.² In any event, one can be certain that Wotton would have discharged his duties in such a detached fashion that no unfavourable link

¹Bishop Gilbert Burnet, The History of the Reformation of the Church of England (London: T.H., 1679), pp. 215-217.

²Thomas Fuller, The Church History of Britain (London: W. Tegg, 1868), pp. 207-208; Paul Friedmann, Anne Boleyn A Chapter of English History: 1527-1536 (London: Macmillan, 1884), p. 289.

could have been tied to his reputation. This was certainly the result, for he went on to serve Henry in more important capacities later in the decade.

Unlike the rest of his life, the decade of the 1530's for Wotton was a period of substantial religious involvement. Not only had he subscribed the 1536 Articles of Religion put forward by the King, but he had also participated in the preparation of the 1537 religious tract entitled "The Godly and Pious Institution of a Christian Man." It was more familiarly named "The Bishops' Book." The need for such a religious statement had arisen from the conflicting viewpoints which were prevalent at this mid-point of the fourth decade in the sixteenth century. Reginald Pole had written a tract in defence of Papal supremacy, which had prompted Henry to appoint a commission of Cranmer and others to compose a counter-argument. In addition to forming the basis for the Articles of Religion, the concepts advanced found further expression in "The Bishops' Book." The bishops and divines had declared that Papal supremacy had been derived from the authority of a Roman emperor, not from Christ. Any bishop's authority was confined to his own diocese as had been stated in one of the eight church councils and reaffirmed by each succeeding pope. Further evidence cited was that the early popes had never claimed such supremacy for the Bishop of Rome.¹ Bishop Stephen Gardiner led the conservative force of four in defence of the Papacy, but in the end, all succumbed to the opinion that such was heretical doctrine. The concept was restated to read that ecclesiastical authority existed in a kingdom through the consent of the prince and his people. The prince reserved the right to withdraw his consent; thus, Papal authority could not represent a dictate from Christ. The book also extended an imprimatur to The Lord's Prayer, The Ave Maria, the Ten Commandments, the seven Sacraments and the Creed in accordance with

¹ John Strype, Memorials of Archbishop Cranmer (Oxford: University Press, 1848), I, p. 91.

Catholic tradition. Not until the reign of Edward VI was there an official rejection of the doctrine of Transubstantiation and the use of religious images--two commitments which emerged from this decade unscathed. It had been the hope of the authors of "The Godly and Pious Institution of a Christian Man" that King Henry would give an official stamp of royal approval to their work, perhaps by supplying a preface himself, but this was not forthcoming; instead, the book bears only a list of the names of the leading bishops and divines, Nicholas Wotton among them, who had compiled the work.¹ It is worthy of note however that the work must have received Henry's general approval and enjoyed his favour for many years, for four copies were despatched to ambassador Wotton with the Emperor in the spring of 1544. It was suggested at that time that one or two of these might be presented to Granvelle in order to prove that the teachings of Christ were preserved in the realm of England.²

During the progress of the 1536 session of Convocation, Wotton had one other opportunity to leave his mark on the religious discussions which so dominated his age. It was at this meeting of English church leaders that the question of the validity of all seven Sacraments was submitted for thorough review. Based upon the course that the opinions on this subject took, one can assume that these men had proceeded according to the traditional Catholic definition of a Sacrament as an outward sign instituted by Christ to give grace. Working from this assumption, it is possible to see where doubts may have arisen concerning certain of the traditionally accepted Sacraments, particularly that of Confirmation, the one on which Wotton's judgment remains. The three questions put before him and his colleagues were: is this Sacrament of the New Testament and instituted by Christ,

¹Ibid., pp. 106-113.

²Privy Council to Wotton, 6 March 1544, State Papers of Henry VIII (P.R.O.), IX, p. 615. (This source is cited hereafter by the abbreviation, St.P.).

what is the outward sign and invisible grace conferred, and what promises be made that the said grace shall be received.¹ Wotton's response conformed with accepted Catholic doctrine:

To the first part of the first question, I say that Confirmation is a Sacrament of the New Testament. To the second part I say, that either it is instituted by Christ, or else not, inspired the apostles by The Holy Ghost. To the second question I say, that the outward sign of Confirmation is the touching and marking of the forehead by the hand of the minister to that Sacrament deputed. And the invisible grace is a corroboration, or a strengthening and encouraging of him that receiveth the said Sacrament, to resist his ghostly enemy; and the more willingly and boldly to confess the name and the cross of Christ. The third question dependeth upon the first and second.²

In 1538, Wotton received an appointment about which practically nothing is known. He was made one of the chaplains to Henry VIII.³ One should take precaution against an overemphasis of the importance of this office, for a monarch had several chaplains, and certainly the role of patronage was as much to credit this promotion as that of spiritual wisdom. What one might surmise from this honour received by Wotton is that he had already demonstrated his flexibility of conscience; thus far, he had managed to remain in the good graces of Henry, Cromwell and Cranmer. It is difficult to place a precise definition on the duties of a chaplain to the King, but judging from the only extant letter from Wotton in which reference is made to this office, there emerges a function which might not immediately suggest itself by the title of the office. It would appear that a chaplain could be expected to act as his sovereign's eyes and ears to observe the implementation of his orders among his clergy. While accompanying Anne of Cleves to England in mid-December of 1539, Wotton wrote to Henry of a seditious sermon which had been preached in Calais. He did include an

¹B.L., Cot. MSS. Cleopt., E. V, f. 73.

²Ibid., f. 88.

³J. M. Calper, Lives of the Deans of Canterbury (Canterbury: Cross and Jackman, 1900), p. 3.

assurance that the minister had not demeaned the royal dignity.¹

Wotton also found himself in 1538 recruited into Henry's reorganization of the judicial and economic functions within the church. The intent of the 1533 bill relating to dispensations had been to accomplish these with greater speed and less cost than appeals to Rome. England, Wales, Calais, Guisnes and eventually Boulogne were definitely encompassed in this move, although there remained a question about Ireland.² In 1535, the King created Cromwell his vicar-general with responsibility for reforming church economy,³ and the officer specifically designated to meet requests for dispensations, the commissary of faculties, was placed with Cromwell's service. The first man appointed specifically for this office was Nicholas Wotton in 1538. He continued to hold this position throughout the period of the first two registers--1534-1540 and 1543-1549. The absence of a register between 1540-1543 can probably be accounted for either by Wotton's absence during part of this period on diplomatic business, before the system of a surrogate had been devised, or more probably by the disappearance of the vicar-general from politics.⁴ At some unknown point, as was to happen with so many of Wotton's internal commitments, a deputy was appointed to transact business in his name. James Rokeby and William Coke, auditors of the Court of Augmentation, assumed this responsibility.⁵

One example of the kind of business with which the Faculty Office might be confronted was a request for a dispensation to obtain a divorce. On one occasion, Stephen Gardiner was given the authority to grant such a

¹Wotton and Southampton to Henry VIII, 13 December 1539, St.P., VIII, p. 212.

²D. S. Chambers, The Faculty Office Registers 1534-1549 (Oxford: University Press, 1966), p. XXIX.

³A. G. Dickens, The English Reformation (London: Batsford Press, 1966), pp. 120-122.

⁴Chambers, The Faculty Office Registers, pp. XXVI and XXXII.

⁵Ibid., p. XXVI.

dispensation, and the cost was forty shillings.¹ The holder of the office himself benefited from this position, for Nicholas Wotton needed a dispensation to hold the deaneries of Canterbury and York simultaneously.²

Duties such as those which had claimed Dr. Wotton's time in the 1530's plus his appointment to the King's spiritual council and the Faculty Office undoubtedly presented him with the close court contacts necessary to alter the course of his career. To his education one can probably attribute the inspiration which led him to seek a career outside the pastoral church function, but with his traditional background, this institution had been seen as the tool for realizing his goals. True it is that sixteenth-century diplomacy witnessed the increased use of secular diplomats, but such a path was uncertain, and the Wotton family was not known for its willingness to take risks. With his father in Calais, the young Nicholas must have had ample opportunity to travel on the Continent and to study there. Every indication is that he found inspiration and enjoyment there, and it requires little effort to imagine that a diplomatic career would have held great appeal for him. Having once used his clerical career to manoeuvre himself to a position from which he had access to those with greatest court influence, it was a small move to sidestep the church for diplomacy.

This is precisely what happened in 1539 when Wotton received his first major diplomatic assignment to assist in the marriage negotiations with Cleves. From this point on to the end of his life, the church was relegated to secondary importance in his career. There would be other ecclesiastical rewards for Wotton, notably the deaneries of Canterbury and York, but most church historians lament the negligence which characterized his administration of these offices. The revised statutes for Canterbury Cathedral under

¹Ibid., p. 222.

²Ibid., p. XXXVII.

Charles I bear this out and speak louder than any contemporary document.

The Stuart deans were required to take an oath calling upon God to witness their affirmation that:

To the best of my power I will well and faithfully rule and govern in this church according to the ordinances and statutes of the same, and that all its goods, lands, tenements, rents, possessions, its rights, liberties and privileges and all other things movable (their reasonable use excepted) and immovable, and all other interests of the same church, I will well and profitably guard, defend and protect.¹

As for the duties of the dean, these statutes required him to see that services were celebrated according to the statutes, that sermons were preached on the designated days and that, "considering that nothing is as effective as a vigilant eye of the governor," the dean must reside for at least ninety days a year (twenty-one of them to be consecutive) in Canterbury.² All of the abuses at which these statutes were directed can be found in the charges of negligence levelled against Dean Wotton.

The impact of this decade on Wotton's career is strictly a matter for speculation since his correspondence rarely looks back to events which helped to shape his attitudes. Perhaps its greatest contribution was the introduction which it gave him to many of the prominent people at court--individuals who were willing to risk combining politics and religion. Thus he came to know such opposites as Stephen Gardiner and Thomas Cranmer. It is likely that it was also during this interval that he met many of those with whom he would later serve on diplomatic missions or within the various Privy Councils--William Petre and the Seymour brothers, for example. The opportunity to observe such men in this turbulent decade constituted an important part of Wotton's political education and must have influenced the later judgments which he made of these various characters. As Wotton's

¹Canterbury Cathedral Archives, Statutes of Canterbury Cathedral, pp. 7-9. (This general history of the statutes of the Cathedral was written anonymously this century for the dean and chapter.)

²Ibid., pp. 9-11 and 19.

own story unfolds, one is left with the belief that he never really pieced together the intricate domestic pattern in which these figures interacted and was thus much better off in the foreign service of England than he would ever have been in internal politics. It is doubtful that he could have been as effective in this sphere, and his cautious middle path would certainly have encountered greater obstacles.

The reverse side of the coin in this decade also generally worked to Wotton's advantage, i.e., court officials judged him favourably as an able and reliable government servant. He could thus write candidly to Dr. Bellasis, one of Cromwell's servants, for assistance and feel certain of receiving it. This was the occasion when it was under consideration to make Wotton a bishop:

For the passion of God, if it be possible yet, assay as far as you may to convey this bishopric from me....If I might avoid it without displeasure I would never meddle therein, and there are enough meet for it that will not refuse it.

The letter was signed, "Yours to his little power, Nicholas Wotton. Add whatsoever you will more to it, so you add not bishop."¹ From this earnest plea, one is left to conclude that Wotton considered the position of dean sufficiently high reward for any service which he might render. A bishopric would apparently have been considered too much of a risk in public and personal terms in this ecclesiastically uncertain period, and Wotton was unwilling to jeopardize a safe career in this way. Just as Wotton was able to look to Dr. Bellasis for help in this early letter, so too in the Marian years, he could turn to William Petre for assistance in various matters.

It must be admitted that it is unlikely that these years contributed substantially to Wotton's approach to diplomacy. That would be developed later through actual diplomatic experience, time and a different set of contacts, viz., his foreign hosts and colleagues. It can be argued that

¹Wotton to Dr. Bellasis, November of 1539, L.&P., XIV, p. 178, no. 501.

his inclination to caution received confirmation by what he observed in his work during the 1530's, but this cautious tendency is more evident in Wotton's relations with his own government than in those with foreign governments. In a concise statement, diplomacy suited Nicholas Wotton's personality ideally.

There are only two occasions on which it is known that the paths of the two brothers crossed. The first was the reception for Anne of Cleves in Dover when Edward represented one of the welcoming party and Nicholas, one of the new Queen's English escorts across the Continent. More will be said of these arrangements later, but this meeting is in sharp contrast with the second occasion on which the brothers were together. This was the early autumn meetings in 1549 in London of the part of the Privy Council plotting the overthrow of Somerset. A serious commitment for both brothers, it was Nicholas who profited most. There is little evidence to suggest that Edward ever showed much interest in Northumberland's administration. One can attribute this to illness, for he was within two years of his death; it is simply not known. There is at least one other event over which the brothers' careers found common ground; this was the English Continental position after 1546. Edward's presence in and knowledge of Calais would certainly have rendered his advice on such matters as boundary limits of profound importance to the Edwardian government. While Edward could then contribute to the formulation of decisions affecting the Continental possessions, Nicholas, for his part as ambassador in France, was responsible for conveying and implementing these decisions at the opposite court and for observing threats to such agreements. Beyond these events, nothing is known of the ways in which these two traditional careers acted upon the lives of these two family members who were very much men of their time.

To consider the careers of Edward and Nicholas together inevitably subjects Edward to suffer by comparison with his more famous brother. As the

eldest son, particularly the eldest in a family which was still climbing the political and social ladder, his scope of occupation was largely predetermined. In so many ways, Edward's career mirrors that of his father, and his son Thomas in his turn chose to imitate the same pattern. Thus Edward will always be remembered more in the annals of Kent and Calais more than in those of England and Europe, even though he was a Henrician executor and an Edwardian councillor. Nicholas, on the other hand, had to a great extent to carve out his own career. His initial choice of a tool for this purpose, the church, was certainly a traditional one, but it offered a wider opportunity for individual achievement and progress. Diplomacy was one of the major areas open to its members, and in electing to seek such employment, Nicholas had expanded his horizons beyond Kent, Calais and even England and toward the events which were affecting all of sixteenth-century Europe. Given his nature, this was a wise choice, and he readily settled into the life of a career diplomat. If he had anticipated that such a life would facilitate a continued link with his academic interests, he must have been somewhat disappointed; there simply was not enough time to pursue both to their greatest potential. Only during his French embassies does it appear that he pursued one of his scholarly interests, genealogy. In addition to tracing French royal lineage and his own, he charted those of several English families, Luxembourg and Boulogne. Also among these writings is a sample of sketches of crowns and armorials, a hint of yet another interest, heraldry.¹

The years of 1539-1540 represent a turning point in the lives of the two brothers. Edward's appointment to Calais and Nicholas's embassy to Cleves signified that both had attained parity with the level of royal favour earned by their father. Through their continued diligence and ability, they retained this position, Nicholas having done so under all but

¹B.L., Add. MSS. 38692, f. 137.

the first Tudor. Undoubtedly Robert would have applauded his youngest son's dexterity in this extremely sensitive political climate, and through his diplomacy, Nicholas not only increased his family's favourable reputation in England but also made their name known to the most eminent figures of the age. He had spent the first forty years of his life in a relatively minor position which in a less revolutionary period would have guaranteed him at best a place in local history. When he embarked on a more public career in 1539, he was truly a product of the designated path to prominence. The focus should now be shifted to the first step of this public career, his mission to the Duke of Cleves.

Chapter III

The Mission to Cleves

The death of Jane Seymour in 1537 had left Henry VIII once again eligible for marriage, and it was not long before he turned his attention to the serious search for a suitable queen. His own eligibility, combined with that of his three unmarried children, particularly Princesses Mary and Elizabeth, provided grounds for complex marriage manoeuvres over the following two years. Many prospects were suggested to the King. If he wished again to link his family with Habsburg fortunes, there was a most advantageous match to be made with the young and attractive dowager duchess of Milan, niece of the Emperor. In addition to the strong psychological ties to this most important duchy which had so often proved irresistible and vital to both French and Imperial ambitions, Christina of Milan also held a claim to the crown of Denmark through her deposed father Christian II. Henry enthusiastically favoured this proposal, but the lady involved had shown considerably less interest. Her feelings might not have carried so much weight with her uncle had it not been for Henry's insistence upon two other specifications: he must be included in any treaty between Charles and Francis I, and the Emperor should renounce the authority of the impending General Council. This latter suggestion was particularly unacceptable to Charles who viewed it as direct encouragement of Protestantism, the very movement he considered it his Christian duty to eradicate as a most vicious heresy. A less glamorous Habsburg-Tudor alliance was the proposed marriage for the King of Hungary to Princess Elizabeth. This too lacked attraction for the Emperor, since the daughter

of Anne Boleyn was considered illegitimate by the nephew of Catherine of Aragon.¹

On the other hand, France also offered Henry bright marriage prospects such as the daughter of the Duke of Guise, Mary, who later married James V of Scotland. By the summer of 1538, the King was considering no fewer than five French candidates. His moves were given increased importance by the fact that France and the Empire were once again in conflict, and the same stipulations went forth from England to France: England must be included in any treaty with the Emperor, and Francis should attempt at least to obstruct the General Council.² Such a prospective alliance carried a price for Henry also, for it appears that he had had to indicate his commitment to the French King to join in the support of the Duke of Julich in his seizure of the territory of Gueldres. This was the beginning of the dispute between Charles V and the Duke of Cleves, who claimed Julich and Gueldres by right of inheritance.³

All of Henry's grand schemes came to an abrupt halt when in this same year, through Papal mediation, Charles and Francis came to an agreement upon a truce in the city of Nice. Here too they had proclaimed a joint attack on Protestantism, and at the beginning of the following year, in Toledo, they agreed (in theory) not to treat separately with England.⁴ England subsequently experienced one of its periodic outbreaks of fear of a Catholic crusade, and although such a project was high on the agenda of the Papacy, the Emperor, far from welcoming such a challenge, was

¹J. J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), pp. 357-359.

²Ibid., pp. 359-360.

³A. Hulshof, Oorkonde Aangande de Betrekkingen der Gelderische Vorsten tot Frankrijk (Arnhem: 1912), Instructions, 15 June 1538, pp. 185-187, no. 80.

⁴L. Cardauns, Von Nizza bis Crépy (Rome: 1923), pp. 3-5.

determined to counter this. The German Lutherans and Turkish infidel were more than enough to challenge his dwindling treasury and divided government.¹

The circumstances of international peace in Europe were sufficient to remind Henry that he was numbered among the Protestant camp, and though thinking of himself in clearly different terms, he took the decision to seek Protestant allies and a non-papist queen. As early as February of 1531, a league of eight German Protestant princes and eleven German cities had been formed in Schmalkalden on the border between Hesse and Saxony, the two leading members of this confederation, the Schmalkaldic League. Their stated purpose was to come to the assistance of one another should they be attacked for their religious stance on questions of doctrine.² Henry reluctantly sought alliance with these princes, but the course was made easier when his chief minister, Cromwell, found among these German rulers a man who had attempted to placate and maintain relations with both the Emperor and the League, John of Cleves. He and his son William, who succeeded him in February of 1539, did not see the necessity of accepting the Reformation as part of any defensive agreement.³ John's eldest daughter, Sybilla, had married John Frederick of Saxony, but despite this close family tie, the loyal support of Cleves for the Schmalkaldic League was always to remain suspect. This duchy was not without its other conflicting entanglements and was to prove the thorn in the Imperial crown between 1538 and 1543.

As the childless Charles Duke of Gueldres lay near to death in 1538, two rival claims for his territory existed. John of Cleves expressed his

¹Ibid., pp. 243-246.

²Karl Brandi, The Emperor Charles V (London: Jonathan Cape, 1963), pp. 300-301.

³Albert Müller, Die Beziehungen Heinrichs VIII zu Anna von Kleve (Calw: 1907), p. 17. (This source is cited hereafter by the name of the author.)

claim through his wife Mary, sister to the dying Duke, but the French King had also put forward his rights according to a 1534 treaty by which the Duke had agreed to render allegiance to France, and this had been confirmed in 1535 by officials of the duchy. Such an arrangement had infuriated the Emperor who in 1536 had forced Gueldres to repudiate the treaty. Not to be subdued so easily, the Duke of Gueldres had simply reversed his decision once again in August of 1537, but this time he had not counted on opposition from the stände or estate faction. Early the next year, they forced through a new arrangement. The duchy would go to the young son of the Duke of Cleves, William. The French, primarily interested in any settlement which would obstruct Habsburg power, had accepted this arrangement until they concluded the peace at Nice, when the Imperial title to Gueldres was recognized.¹

When William became Duke in 1539, he could then claim through family inheritance the titles to Cleves, Julich, Gueldres and Berg. Such a consolidated German state was of definite concern and threat to Charles V, and conflict became inevitable. Henry then had ample reason for caution toward Cromwell's suggested marriage alliance with Cleves.

The negotiations which eventually culminated in the Cleves alliance had begun as a dual diplomatic initiative, one commission to Christopher Mont with the Schmalkaldic League in Saxony and the other assignment to Carne, Wotton and Berde to journey to Cleves. In February of 1539, Mont was offering the League an alliance with England against the Emperor and the Pope, should either attempt to impose a religious settlement. The German confederation, possessing its own reservations about England, had

¹G. Bers, Die Allianz von Frankreich-Kleve während des Geldrischen Krieges (Cologne: Urkunden und Korrespondenzen, 1969), pp. 18-20. (This source is cited hereafter by the name of the author.)

replied with a qualified interest in Henry's offer and had requested permission to send a delegation to England to discuss the alliance further. This was granted, and although much talk of agreement was voiced about both courts, such a union was condemned to early failure largely because of events over the next year, namely the failure of Henry and Anne's marriage, the collapse of the Franco-Imperial peace and a conservative religious reaction in England.¹ This last point was precisely the doubt behind the 1539 Schmalkaldic request to send a delegation to discuss a league at greater length with Henry. The German Protestants were not impressed with the English Reformation record and wished to see more progress in that direction, a step more palatable to Cromwell than to the King. It was generally known that for his part, Henry continued to think of Luther as a heretic, and the Protestants needed committed allies. In addition to this, before the Cleves negotiations had reached a conclusion, the Nice accord had weakened, and there was reason to believe that Henry was seriously considering the possibility that an alliance with France would be of greater benefit than one with the German Protestants.²

In the meantime, the other half of the diplomatic effort was enjoying more immediate, though not uninhibited, success in Cleves. On 10 March 1539, the following instructions were issued to the English ambassadors: they should express the King's interest in a defensive league against the Emperor and the Pope, suggest a marriage alliance either through the Duke to an English noble lady or through the King to one of the Duke's sisters and inquire about the Duke's attitudes on the Pope, the Reformation, the Emperor and the Schmalkaldic League.³ The commissioners

¹Albert Müller, pp. 24-26.

²Ibid., p. 27.

³Henry VIII to Carne, Berde and Wotton, 10 March 1539, L.&P., XIV, i, p. 191, no. 489.

arrived on the 15th and were quickly initiated into the diplomatic waiting game. One of the first serious conferences occurred early in May, and a report of it was filed on May 3rd. Originally summoned to an audience with the Duke, Wotton and Berde found themselves in consultation with his chancellor, Dr. Olesleger. The chancellor accounted for the Duke's absence with the information that he had been required to attend a funeral in Saxony, and Olesleger further spoke of William's thoughts on sending his key advisors to negotiate with Charles over Gueldres. Turning to English affairs, Dr. Olesleger promised to obtain the portraits of William's sisters, Anne and Amelie, as the King had requested. He further advised the ambassadors that they should request Henry to write more specifically on the format and conditions to be followed in the preparation of this marriage alliance and defensive league. National pride was provoked, and the ambassadors responded to the challenge adequately. It would, they argued, be "more convenient" if the marriage and league proposals originated with Cleves, for such a league was "to the honour of Cleves." The emphatic statement of the English position on the question was then imparted, "For His Majesty did not use to desire of other men that thing that other men rather ought for a great benefit to desire of His Majesty."¹ The chancellor offered his apology and did assure the ambassadors that Duke William was sincere and would send a commission to England as soon as possible.

Wotton and Berde had concluded their report with the information that they had shown Olesleger that England was aware of a previous marriage contract involving the Lady Anne and wished to know the current state of its validity. The ambassadors had expressed their belief that the Duke of Lorraine, to whose son Anne had been pledged, would be more than willing to repay any dowery to Cleves in order to free his son for

¹B.L., Cot. MSS. Vit. B, XXI, f. 180.

a more advantageous marriage to a daughter of Francis I. There might be cause for concern with the Emperor whom the ambassadors believed had had knowledge of the English intent. Charles might well attempt to sabotage these efforts by concluding an agreement with Cleves in which Duke William's claim to Gueldres would be recognized in exchange for a yet undetermined sum of money.¹

The early summer of 1539 witnessed conflict and hesitation on both sides. The Duke of Saxony had expressed to his brother-in-law in Cleves his doubts about the marriage because of Henry's previous reputation and, more critically, because of political and religious developments in England. Internally, Cleves was still on a collision course with the Emperor over Gueldres. In England, in June, Cromwell had instructed William Petre to join Wotton in Cleves to obtain copies of all agreements affecting Anne, and if the officials in Cleves attempted to redirect the negotiations by suggesting Anne's younger sister Amelie, the English commissioners should reply tactfully that while Henry felt certain to like the sisters equally well, the age factor made Anne more suitable.² Petre's embassy never came to fruition. Attention at the English court had been temporarily diverted by plots to overthrow Cromwell, and Bishop Stephen Gardiner, recently returned from France, was the force behind the planned coup. Animosity was nothing new between these two men, and with the passage of the Six Articles of Religion in 1539 by Parliament and Convocation, a major conservative victory, Gardiner saw an opportunity to challenge Cromwell on the latter's weakest point--his general affinity with more radical elements of the Reformation. When Robert Barnes preached what

¹Wotton and Berde to Cromwell, 3 May 1539, L.&P., XIV, i, pp. 428-433, no. 920.

²Ibid., Cromwell's Instructions to Petre, June of 1539, pp. 537-538, no. 1193.

Gardiner considered to be a radical sermon, the bishop launched his attack more as an offensive against Barnes' patron, Cromwell, than against the cleric himself. By no means lacking his own political devices, Cromwell employed a recently-issued proclamation against branding another as a heretic without providing substantial proof to have Gardiner deleted from the Privy Council in August.¹ Such a move was made much easier by the fact that the general European scene had altered to favour Cromwell's foreign policy of a Protestant alliance. Gardiner was once again then out of royal favour.

A most important piece of correspondence from Cleves reached the King in August. Written on the 11th, it assured Henry that his wish to have portraits of Anne and Amelie had at last been accomplished by his servant Hans Holbein. "He hath expressed their images very lively," Wotton wrote and then proceeded to provide his own verbal description, gathered mostly through court gossip, relating to Anne:

All report her to be of lowly and gentle condition by the which she hath so much won her mother's favour that she is very loath to suffer her to depart from her. She occupieth her time mostly with a needle.... Nor yet she cannot sing nor play upon any instrument, for they take it here in Germany for a rebuke and an occasion of lightness that great ladies should be learned or have any knowledge of music. Her wit is good and she will no doubt learn English soon when she puts her mind to it. I could never hear that she is inclined to the good cheer of this country and marvel it were if she should seeing that her brother in whom it were somewhat more tolerable doth so well abstain from it.²

After the divorce, statements to the effect that Cromwell had misled the King, (perhaps even misled him in descriptions of Anne), were issued to justify Henry's action, but this letter from Wotton addressed to the King would indicate that he had received a balanced picture from his ambassador.

¹J. A. Muller, Stephen Gardiner and the Tudor Reaction (New York: Macmillan, 1926), pp. 84-87.

²B.L., Cot. MSS. Vit. B, XXI, f. 186.

One could argue that perhaps Cromwell had withheld this report from the King, but such an argument is at best doubtful. Cromwell realized that his position was derived from the King's authority and was dependent upon it. In addition to this, Henry's character was not such as to allow him to be forced into something with which he had not concurred. The King later claimed to have been misled on information surrounding Anne's previous marriage contract with Francis of Lorraine but never on descriptions of her provided to him.

On this same day, the 11th of August, Dr. Wotton acknowledged with gratitude as reward for his services the position of Archdeacon of Gloucester. Many such appointments would be offered him throughout his lifetime, and this early letter of appreciation reflects the humble acceptance of a novice to royal diplomatic service:

... Seeing that it doth please Your Grace so thankfully to accept and so abundantly to reward this my poor service not having respect to any great learning, wit, knowledge nor yet dexterity in handling such high and princely affairs the which things I know right well be not in me.¹

Later, as we have seen, Wotton was to do his best to avoid appointment to a bishopric,² and in Elizabeth's reign was rumoured to have refused the Archbishopric of Canterbury on grounds of unworthiness.³ Unworthy he may have been, but reluctance, especially reluctance to accept a clerical office which would have required him to take more public religious stands in such a critical time, is more likely to have been the force which guided his thinking. Now however, in 1539, he was enjoying the first fruits of diplomatic success, and middle-rank benefices were still welcome to him.

¹Ibid., f. 204.

²Wotton to Dr. Bellasis, 11 November 1539, L.&P., XIV, ii, p. 178, no. 501.

³W. P. Haugaard, Elizabeth and the English Reformation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), pp. 33-35.

In September, the long-promised Cleves delegation arrived in England to draft the contract. Wotton, now on his own in Cleves, found himself on the perimeter of these negotiations, although on the 26th of this month, Henry had written to the Duke desiring further credence for Wotton. A similar letter was carried shortly thereafter to John Frederick in Saxony, and the new ambassador occupied his time in acquainting himself with the intricacies of the ambassadorial life which was to govern the majority of his adult years.¹

Negotiations for the marriage went forward in London, and very soon the commissioners were confronting the not-uncommon sixteenth-century legal difficulties of previous marriage contracts. In 1527, Duke John had arranged for his daughter Anne, age twelve, to marry Francis, age ten, the son of the Duke of Lorraine. Intervening events had altered the arrangement, and the English had now to question whether this contract might not still be binding. Arguments hinged on the effect of the contract as de praesenti or de futuro, and the Cleves interpretation favoured the latter. Their reasoning was established on the youth of the parties involved and the fact that no claim had ever been made against this agreement. It seemed logical to conclude that it was now null and void. Although the English delegates accepted these points eventually, this ambiguity served Henry well in just a few months' time when he sought to annul his marriage to Anne.²

The treaty of marriage, which was signed in London on 4 October 1539, is a model of the specificity which was considered necessary to such royal arrangements. Its first article proclaimed that the commissioners of the respective countries had concluded a marriage between King Henry and the

¹Henry VIII to William of Cleves, 26 September 1539, L.&P., XIV, ii, p. 67, no. 221; Henry VIII to John Frederick of Saxony, 25 October 1539, p. 134, no. 387.

²Albert Müller, p. 31.

Lady Anne. The next three articles dealt with the practical problem of transport for the bride. Within the following two months, the Duke was to endeavour to obtain a safe conduct for his sister to travel to Calais; it must be accomplished at his own expense. If a safe conduct could not be obtained, an unlikely circumstance, Duke William must convey Anne by sea at his own expense. Once in Calais, the lady was to be received by the English King's ambassadors, conveyed to England, and there she would be publicly married to the King.

Articles five and six tackled the extremely sensitive subject of the dowry. The Duke's commissioners had agreed to a "dote" of one hundred thousand gold florins, forty thousand to be given on the day of the marriage and the remainder to be surrendered within the first year. From the beginning, this point had troubled William, for he had expressed his inability to meet such a sum and had suggested a reduction to twenty-five thousand florins, the amount which Sybilla, Anne's elder sister, had been granted at her marriage. King Henry had instructed his ambassador to remind the Duke that he was "more interested in virtue than in money," and in a generous frame of mind, Henry had further declared that he did not actually expect to receive any of the money, provided that Anne arrives safely in England. On the 6th of October, he produced a written statement to this effect for the benefit of Cleves and promised a receipt for the whole amount upon Anne's arrival.¹ According to the treaty, the English King also promised her a dower in lands worth twenty thousand florins of the Rhein as long as she remained in England. If, after his death, she had no living children and elected to return to Cleves, she would enjoy a pension of fifteen thousand florins payable twice yearly for life. It was left to the discretion of his heirs either to continue

¹Ibid., p. 39.

this pension or to redeem it for one hundred and fifty thousand florins. Articles seven to nine were designed to ensure Anne's German inheritance. The penultimate article returned to more immediate needs; William promised to keep Henry informed of his sister's arrangements in order that the King might have adequate time in which to prepare for her reception in England. The treaty's final article holds the only key to Henry's more wide ranging expectations for this marriage alliance. The King, the Duke of Cleves and the Duke of Saxony promised to confirm this treaty by letters patent to be mutually delivered within six weeks.¹

Originally sceptical of Anglo-Cleves dialogue, John Frederick had advised his brother-in-law against such a union. He had cited Henry's previous reputation and the English religious and political climate, but in the end, the necessity of defence had won the day in all courts. The German commissioners, headed by Chancellor Olesleger of Cleves and Vice-Chancellor Burchart of Saxony, had thus considered their efforts successful in overcoming the English questions about Anne's previous contract and in calming the fears of the dowager duchess of Cleves, who had expressed concern about the reputation of the man her daughter was to marry. It is probably true that the throne of England was sufficient sedative to achieve the latter effect. Richard Berde had been able to carry the news of her capitulation along with those Holbein portraits.² Saxony then had found it possible to leave the conference in October consoled over the state of the Reformation in England by the King's apologetic statement on the recently-enacted articles of religion, which he soon hoped to abolish.³ A conservative Parliamentary statute, these articles had confirmed the doctrine of Transubstantiation, clerical celibacy,

¹Treaty of Alliance, 6 October 1539, L.&P., XIV, ii, pp. 108-109. no. 286.

²Albert Müller, p. 26.

³Ibid., pp. 33-35 and 41-42.

permanency of religious vows, the sufficiency of the Eucharist in only one form for the laity, the benefit of private Masses and auricular confession.¹ The German commissioners left England in a mood of contentment and cheer over the prospects which should accrue from this alliance.

What was the English attitude on the conclusion of these negotiations? Henry had encouraged an anti-Imperial league, and with Charles and Francis now at peace, it had become necessary to commit himself beyond encouragement and to move into more direct involvement. Political and military circumstances had diminished the importance of the legal technicalities of previous contract. The benefits of the alliance for the English however were slightly overshadowed by the nagging doubt which quickly set in. On 8 November 1539, Cromwell wrote to Wotton demanding to know why he had not written since the departure of the Cleves commissioners from England and ordered him to report immediately on the mood in Cleves regarding the recently-concluded marriage treaty.² It is difficult to account for the ambassador's silence in this period, but judging by a later letter, it is known that Wotton found serious impediments in obtaining information from the court and in gaining access to couriers. Through the ambassador, Cromwell also strongly recommended to England's new allies that none should conclude any agreement with the Pope, the Emperor or France which could be damaging to any of the others.³ This could not have held great appeal for Duke William, who all along had continued to hope for and to work for a peace settlement with Charles in their disputed claim to Gueldres.

With the marriage negotiations achieved, the Lady Anne took leave of her mother and brother in December and began her journey to the land over

¹Statutes at Large (London: C. E. Strahan, 1786), X, pp. 125-134.

²Cromwell to Wotton, 8 November 1539, L.&P., XIV, ii, p. 172, no. 480.

³Albert Müller, p. 42.

which she so briefly reigned as Henry's queen but in which she chose to spend the remaining years of her life. Dr. Wotton made the journey with her and did not neglect his ambassadorial duties as they travelled. He despatched to Cromwell a list of those Germans accompanying Anne either as wedding guests or members of her household, made mention of their good entertainment at the home of an Englishman in Bruges and the fact that Anne was being taught to play cards, and Wotton further instructed Cromwell on the German custom of morgengave, a piece of information which could prove useful to the King to get his marriage off to the right start. According to this tradition, a husband was expected to give his wife a gift on the morning after their wedding; Henry should also consider giving a jewel to each of Anne's ladies-in-waiting.¹ About the middle of December, the ambassador wrote a similar general report to his sovereign from Calais. While awaiting a break in the weather to permit passage to England, the company had been entertained at every point with banqueting and jousting. Englishmen teaching Anne to play at English card games had observed the grace with which she conducted herself.²

The party eventually arrived in Dover, a port through which so many sixteenth-century royal visitors passed, and they were warmly welcomed by an English committee under the supervision of the Duchess of Suffolk and including Edward Wotton.³ Not to be outdone by the subjects across the channel, Henry's English subjects also provided festivities of banqueting and music for their new queen. The King busied himself with special preparations for a reception in London, although it is now known that he once

¹Wotton to Cromwell, 4 December 1539, L.&P., XIV, ii, pp. 231-232, no. 634.

²Ibid., Wotton and Southampton to Henry VIII, 13 December 1539, p. 246, no. 677.

³Chronicles of Calais (London: Camden Society, 1846), p. 172.

travelled incognito to catch a glimpse of his bride and was not impressed.¹
 They were married in January.

The articles for a defensive league were less easily settled than were those of the marriage treaty. As early as the 26th of October, Henry was seeking the Duke's advice on "a device for the increase of the amity," and a ratified copy of the articles for the defensive agreement with this new proposal was forwarded in February from England to Wotton, who had returned to Cleves in January as ambassador resident to learn from William that he was attempting another settlement of Gueldres with Charles.² The "device" in question concerned the English proposal that England and Cleves should enjoy the privileges of arming and recruiting in each other's territory. Wotton had been unable to present this suggestion immediately to the Duke, who had been away at the time of Wotton's return to the duchy. On 27 February 1540, the two men met, and William warmly welcomed Wotton back:

As for me, he said, that howbeit, that whomsoever Your Highness had sent to him should have been made welcomed to him, yet Your Highness could have sent none to him that should have been better welcomed.³

When a decision on the "device" was finally announced, it became clear to Henry that William could not bring himself to alter his policy in favour of such a public commitment. The Emperor would certainly have become totally alienated by the recruitment clause. The simple state of affairs was that Cleves sought to have the best of both worlds; William needed an ally like England in the event of an Imperial show of armed force over Gueldres, yet the Duke did not wish to risk placing himself in

¹Albert Müller, p. 59.

²Cromwell to Wotton, 26 October 1539, L.&P., XIV, ii, p. 137, no. 394.

³Wotton to Henry VIII, 27 February 1540, St.P., VIII, p. 270.

the enemy camp against Charles. William appeared willing enough to allow such aid for England but preferred to remain officially ignorant of its occurrence.¹

The English King, who had been trying to force William's hand in a declaration against the Emperor, was naturally disappointed, despite the Duke's suggestion that a "less dangerous" wording of the article might prevent any misconstruction and render it more acceptable.² The article was never included in the defensive treaty, but by this time, the spring of 1540, English foreign policy was undergoing a shift in direction and would undergo even greater changes in the months ahead. Wotton's task was not made easier by this, and a letter from him to Cromwell in March established the tone for the rest of the mission, a growing sense of isolation. Intelligence was hard to gather, and opportunities for post were scarce:

And in this country be no ambassadors with whom I might have conference whereby I might learn somewhat. So that here there is only the Duke himself and a few of the Privy Council that have certain knowledge of any such matters, and except one of them be disposed to tell me everything, I cannot likely come to the knowledge of such matter. And, as far as I can conjecture, these men have the less mind to open any secret thing unto me, for because they perceive I have no ciphers to write in, and fear lest my letters be intercepted, and thereby such things disclosed, as they would not have known; or else they would that their ambassador should be the first, that should advise the King's Highness of all their matters.³

From a letter in the following month, it is known that Henry had corrected this problem of cipher, but Wotton continued to complain that the information given to him was so general as to render it useless. He attributed the blame to William's inexperience and bad advisers.⁴

¹Albert Müller, pp. 59-60.

²Wotton to Henry VIII, 7 March 1540, L.&P., XV, pp. 124-125, no. 309.

³Wotton to Cromwell, 21 March 1540, St.P., VIII, pp. 284-287.

⁴Ibid., Wotton to Henry VIII, 15 April 1540, pp. 312-315.

Events in England contributed further to Wotton's difficulties. In the first instance, Henry had swiftly suffered rejection by the Schmalkaldic Protestants whose emphasis on religion was in sharp contrast to the King's greater interest in political and military requirements. The League had clearly informed Henry that any alliance against the Emperor must involve all of its members, not just one or two, as Henry had attempted in Cleves.¹ Even with his principal ally, Cleves, Henry now found difficulties developing. Wotton's suspicion of being excluded from the Duke's confidence was confirmed when, in April, he was informed at short notice of an arranged meeting between William and Charles. The Emperor's brother Ferdinand was the intermediary and had promised to obtain a safe conduct for William. Wotton's initial offer to accompany the Duke was dismissed, for William had not informed either England or Saxony of this conference. Here again we have evidence of his double-handed policy. Apparently, William made a rapid reassessment, for Dr. Wotton received through Chancellor Olesleger word that his presence was requested en route to this Imperial parley.² This reversal of decision can probably be attributed to the accusations of bad faith exchanged by the allies.

From the Imperial court, Wotton was able to keep the English government in touch with developments over Gueldres. The Duke of Brunswick and the Imperial vice-chancellor had advised Cleves officials that their most advantageous course would be to surrender Gueldres and to enjoy Charles' friendship. Rejection of such advice must have been difficult for William, particularly since the conference was held in the city of Ghent which had just been subjected to the Imperial wrath and had been deprived of its liberties, but reject it he did. His counter-proposal was that he should

¹Albert Müller, pp. 61-62.

²Wotton to Henry VIII, 9 April 1540, L.&P., XV, pp. 203-204, no. 482; Wotton to Cromwell, 9 April 1540, pp. 204-205, no. 483.

retain the duchy until his death, at which time the Imperial claims must be recognized by all, a suggestion unacceptable to Charles. Discussions became even more complicated when a third party falsely stated that William, backed by the alliance with England and Saxony, had claimed no need to capitulate to the Emperor. At this point, the presence of the English ambassador became a source of embarrassment, and Olesleger requested Wotton not to come to the ducal residence, though in parting, he confided to the ambassador that William felt threatened and would return to Cleves as soon as it was expedient to do so.¹

Wotton, throughout the course of these events, appears to have believed in the Duke's sincerity regarding his good intentions toward England. The problem was that fear of the Emperor had become the overriding factor behind William's manoeuvres. Two pieces of correspondence should serve to substantiate Wotton's confidence in the Duke. In June, Henry "marvelled" at the delay in his ambassador's despatches and gently recommended that he should take care to eliminate such delay. This was especially necessary since Dr. Harst, the Cleves ambassador in England, was so ill-informed about his country's affairs. Wotton must go to the Duke, apologize for Henry's delayed advice on Gueldres but explain that postal difficulties and Dr. Harst's lack of information had impeded him and extend Henry's expressed wish to advise William on all matters if he would but "open his mind" to him.² Speedy action was forthcoming. Wotton obtained an audience of the Duke, who apologized for his ambassador's inadequate liaison work and spoke to the English ambassador of a new court development. Since his marriage proposal to Christina of Milan had been thwarted by the Gueldres confrontation, his ambassador to France had offered to initiate a similar proposal for a French princess. If King Henry

¹Ibid., Wotton to Henry VIII, 30 April 1540, pp. 266-267, no. 594.

²Ibid., Henry VIII to Wotton, June of 1540, pp. 349-350, no. 735.

thought well of this, he might consider writing to Francis on William's behalf.¹ More will be said later on the Franco-Cleves amity which proved a divisive factor with England, but William's latest request came at a time when the subject of marriage was a most sensitive and inconvenient one to be raised between the allies. It became necessary however in a very different context.

It is now generally accepted that Henry was not enthusiastic about his marriage from his very first meeting with Anne, but all outward appearances in the early months of the marriage suggested that all was well with the King and Queen. Anne and Harst had been puzzled over the absence of plans for her coronation, but they had attributed this to a conjecture about growing resentment toward the Queen's German attendants, and in June, these were subsequently dismissed.² By that time, common knowledge had recognized that the spring rumour of Henry's new romantic interest, Catherine Howard, was the primary cause of His Majesty's domestic discontent.³ It was not long after the wedding that Henry had admitted to Cromwell that he had not consummated the marriage, one of the grounds which was to be used in his case for an annulment. The other, a more devious but more necessary argument, was that 1527 contract between Anne and Francis of Lorraine. As Professor Scarisbrick has written, "the first was probably true but more difficult to prove; the second was probably false but more easily contested."⁴ With hindsight it can be credibly argued that the English ambassadors had not insisted sufficiently upon absolute proof and resolution of this point over the contract at the time

¹Ibid., Foreign Intelligence Memorandum, June of 1540, pp. 367-369, no. 781.

²Albert Müller, pp. 66-67.

³L.B. Smith, A Tudor Tragedy (London: Jonathan Cape, 1961), p. 113.

⁴Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, pp. 371-372.

of the marriage negotiations, but in fairness, it must be said that they were correct in their expectations and believed the justification offered by Cleves in its interpretation of the contract; furthermore, they had no cause to suspect Cleves of doubledealing. Similarly, Cleves saw no need for deception. If Henry had been seriously troubled by the question of previous marital commitment, (and he certainly had had previous experience with legal technicalities within marriage contracts and had also had knowledge of Anne's contract with Francis), it would have been his direct responsibility to press for a more diligent settlement of this doubt beforehand.

One complication which immediately arose when England initiated its challenge to the validity now of both contracts was that Cleves could not locate all of the documents relating to the 1527 agreement. So much time had elapsed, and Lorraine had never pressed a claim against it that it appeared in 1540 that some of the relevant material was missing. The document which reached England in the spring was that same controversial statement which had clouded the original negotiations. Was it de praesenti or de futuro? We are often reminded by diplomatic circles that in diplomacy there can be no perfect agreement, and every document contains at least one faulty clause; this is definitely the case in this 1527 contract. Scholars today find parts of it almost incomprehensible and can only offer suppositions as to the meaning. The best example is the German word hylich which must have had some relations to time in its sense of here and now. To the diplomats confronting this important obstacle in 1540, the language was so ambiguous and awkward as to render no interpretation uncontradictable. The central question at every turn was whether or not the contract had been intended to take effect as binding on the parties immediately or at some future date. The English had contended that the burden of proof for the invalidity of the agreement rested with Cleves which had not sufficiently achieved such proof.¹

¹Albert Müller, pp. 70-73.

The minister responsible for this unhappy marriage, Thomas Cromwell, shared an equally unhappy fate. This was just the kind of event for which his enemies, chiefly religious conservatives like Gardiner and Norfolk, had been waiting. The King's rejection of his minister came swiftly. In April of 1540, he had created Cromwell Earl of Essex; by the end of July, Cromwell had been executed for heresy. It was his enemies who attributed his demise to the Cleves marriage; the bill of attainder cited nothing of the kind but rather had indicted him on such charges usurping the royal authority in his appointments of commissions without the royal assent and, more importantly, conspiring with heretics. The heresy with which Cromwell was branded was not Lutheranism but Sacramentarianism, which proclaimed that every man is a minister of the Gospel and can therefore administer the Sacraments. It also denied Transubstantiation. His opponents had claimed to possess correspondence between Cromwell and radical heretics, but like the 1527 marriage documents from Cleves, these could not be produced at the crucial moment. It was probably this charge of heresy however which had most provoked the King.¹

The fall of Cromwell was indifferently received in Cleves where its significance to foreign policy was not completely perceived because Harst had failed to understand and thus to inform his government about the factional differences in England. The divorce proceedings continued to be the major preoccupation for William and his court. Henry had persuaded Parliament to request him to refer his case for annulment to Convocation, and this body, summoned in haste, met from July 6th to the 9th with their final resolution finding in favour of the King's cause.² "The Lady Anne

¹ Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, pp. 373-380.

² Judgment of Convocation, July of 1540, St.P., VIII, pp. 629-634.

of Cleves," as she was now to be styled, had concurred with the decision and had agreed to remain a "sister and servant to the King." The French ambassador reported a short time later that Anne had received even greater support from the English people than had Queen Catherine.¹ Government propaganda had explained the decision by declaring that Anne had not been free to marry the King and so could not remain his queen, but Henry's hasty marriage to Catherine Howard did much to check any belief in his sincerity which might have been engendered by these authoritative statements. Of course, these declarations laid the blame for the King's unhappy situation upon the deposed and attainted Cromwell.² While the evidence is lacking to prove the royal opinion was in concurrence with this assessment, there is a document relating to the divorce which indicates that the King believed himself misled by his ambassadors' words on Anne's previous contract.³ Amazingly, the chief ambassador, Dr. Wotton, did not suffer recrimination. More than a statement on Wotton's ability or favour with the King, this represents an example of the mere necessity to put the best interpretation on the King's regrettable action, but in fairness to Henry, he must have viewed Wotton's overall performance in this instance as the best any ambassador could have done in such difficult circumstances.

The immediate demand on Henry's attention was the explanation owed to Duke William in this delicate matter. A special envoy, Bishop John Clerk of Bath, was despatched to join Wotton in observing the official reaction to the news of the annulment, which was carried by the nephew of Chancellor Olesleger. If the Duke accepted the decision amicably but desired some profit for himself, the ambassadors were instructed not to disappoint him

¹Albert Müller, p. 89.

²Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, pp. 377-380.

³The Divorce of Henry VIII and Anne of Cleves, 7 July 1540, L.&P., XV, p. 421, no. 850.

in this but rather to offer to inform their sovereign of such. If, on the other hand, the news was badly received, the Bishop of Bath was simply to say that he had not come to discuss his King's justification for the action but merely to assure William that Henry continued to desire his friendship. He could then take leave of the Duke, while Wotton was to remain as ambassador resident.¹ The main emphasis was to be on the preservation of the amity.

According to the ambassadors' own report home on the 11th of August, they had somehow managed to misconstrue their instructions. They had had an audience with the Duke, who was not "cheered" by the news of the annulment, and they had mentioned Henry's three major objectives: continued friendship, preservation of the alliance and a gratuity from the King to the Duke--the "beneficial condition" to which Henry had referred in his instructions. Their letter began by taking note of events in England:

Whereas we perceive, first by the same, at length, the wise substance and political handling of your great matter, and Your Majesty's just and honourable proceedings with the good and lucky success which hath followed in the fulfilling of that Your Highness hath desired, and that upon such sure and substantial grounds, with such a contentation and conformity in the Lady Anne to the same, we cannot but greatly rejoice therein.

As for the reception of Henry's news, the Duke had stated that he was certain that Anne had not been bound to Francis of Lorraine and was sorry that Convocation had found to the contrary, but he was willing to continue the amity between their nations. Asked if he would recognize the annulment, Dr. Olesleger, speaking for William, had responded:

The Duke could not better declare himself to be contented, than to leave the ordering of the whole matter to Your Highness, and to declare that he desireth nothing more than the continuance of the amity betwixt you begun, the which he intendeth in no means to break.

¹Ibid., Henry VIII to Wotton and Clerk, 24 July 1540, pp. 540-541, no. 908.

Because the ambassadors had interpreted this as a lack of consent, they advised their sovereign that he was not bound to compensate William but might do so in the interest of peace. They then gave as their reason for having disclosed the "beneficial condition" the need to content William, for they had interpreted their commission as one to negotiate "on degrees within the overture," not "the overture by degrees."¹

A royal reprimand that they had misinterpreted the part of their instructions on the timing to be followed for the revelation of this "beneficial condition," as Henry had termed his offer, was drafted, for Henry had been provoked by the premature disclosure of the English strategy. The reprimand was probably prompted more by the embarrassment of having had William informed of the lengths to which the English King was prepared to go in order to procure the Duke's compliance had it become necessary to compel Anne to accept the decisions of Parliament and Convocation.² As it turned out, all was unnecessary.

Olesleger had also expressed a query which might as aptly be made by a modern student of the period. He "wondered" at Anne's continuing in England; would the King "suffer" her to return home? Wotton and Clerk assured him that she had chosen to remain in England.³ It has already been noted that by the terms of the marriage treaty, she was provided a handsome pension, and it was to Henry's advantage to entice Anne to remain out of the public eye. This undoubtedly had its own appeal for the shy lady, who, had she returned to Cleves, might well again have found herself a marriage pawn. In England, she could enjoy some degree of independence,

¹Wotton and Clerk to Henry VIII, 11 August 1540, St.P., VIII, pp. 417-422.

²Albert Müller, p. 82.

³Wotton and Clerk to Henry VIII, 11 August 1540, L.&P., XV, p. 588, no. 970.

and her welfare until her death was ensured by the subsequent governments of Edward and Mary.

By 1540, the truce of Nice was showing signs of strain, and Henry found himself pursuing a dual and conflicting course of direction, court- ing French and Imperial favour. The fall of Cromwell had ushered in a Council of pro-Imperial advisers and the short-lived favour shown to France quickly lost its value. This became even more vital after the divorce, when England did not wish to appear party to the strengthened Franco-Cleves amity. These two governments had enjoyed sporadic good relations, but Cleves had retained certain suspicions of the good intentions of the French. Even as their Duke travelled to the French court in the autumn of 1540 to conclude a new alliance, rumour had it that he was being detained against his will until France could secure its claim on Gueldres. Other stories had claimed that the French were using William's absence to recruit for their own forces.¹ Marriage links between the two had been in the diplomatic cards for months and were eventually incorporated into the autumn treaty of alliance.

Wotton in Cleves and Wallop in France had been instructed to use their positions to pretend affection for these negotiations while actually acquiring information for the English government. Edward Carne, who had received a special commission to join Wallop in France in July, put the French on to the English trend of thought when he sarcastically asserted the hope that Duke William would be more careful in reviewing his former marriage contract with Christina of Milan before marrying Jeanne of Navarre than he had been with the agreement between Anne and Francis. The French King bluntly stated that he had already formed his opinion on the Cleves-Milan contract as de futuro, and when Carne attempted further speech,

¹Bers, p. 32.

he was silenced by the royal sigh, "Il l'envoie."¹ From that point, England was excluded from the confidence of both governments.

England and Cleves had not suffered an open separation but rather a gradual chilling in diplomatic relations. The divorce had made this inevitable. Dr. Wotton, feeling rejected by court circles in Cleves, had infrequent correspondence with home, which prompted Henry to command him to be "more diligent."² The ambassador was reduced to reporting rumours of gathering mercenaries, conflicts within the Imperial diets and purported plans by Charles for Gueldres. When William visited his mother in Dusseldorf in April of 1541 and took that opportunity to escape into France for his wedding to Jeanne without notice of the English ambassador, Wotton was completely unaware of these developments. A week later, all doubt was removed, and the marriage which he had thought had been "despaired of" was the intelligence which he had now to communicate to the King.³ In May, Dr. Olesleger had refused an invitation to dine with Wotton, and a June letter again contained complaints that everything was kept from him and that he was not treated as cordially as had once been the case.⁴

After the Duke's marriage and return to Cleves, Wotton received his recall. Things were no better for Dr. Harst in England. After the divorce, he was reduced for all practical purposes to an agent of Cleves solely responsible for acting in Anne's interest to ensure her well-being. When Catherine Howard had lost favour, he made an unsuccessful attempt to revive a sentiment that Anne should be reinstated, and he was recalled shortly

¹Albert Müller, p. 85.

²Henry VIII to Wotton, 3 October 1540, L.&P., XVI, pp. 58-59, no. 116; Wotton to Henry VIII, 28 November 1540, p. 124, no. 296.

³Ibid., Wotton to Henry VIII, 22 April 1541, p. 362, no. 748.

⁴Ibid., Wotton to Henry VIII, 25 May 1541, p. 409, no. 862; Wotton to Henry VIII, 13 June 1541, pp. 438-439, no. 902.

thereafter in 1543.¹ For each country, it was undoubtedly a relief to see the other's ambassador depart. Wotton had certainly become an unwelcomed presence in Cleves, and Harst was an embarrassing reminder to both of false friendship and alliance.

How did Wotton fare with his first diplomatic assignment? It was basically an unhappy experience for him, for he had spent the major portion of his time as an isolated foreigner in futile pursuit of information ever demanded by his home court. It is interesting to speculate on Henry's reason for selecting Wotton for this post, and speculation is all that is available to one. Of course, by 1539, Wotton would have become known to the King through his family contacts and church-related engagements: Convocation, appointment as one of the King's chaplains and commissary of faculties. No doubt his preference for other employment would have become known during the course of this work to those with greater court influence, Cranmer perhaps. One cannot call this mission a failure, for the original intent had been to negotiate a marriage and an alliance, and that had been accomplished. If Henry did not follow through with the policies necessary to support these achievements, Wotton could not have hoped to escape the diplomatic disappointment certain to ensue. Even this had its compensation for one who appears to have shown a preference for a diplomatic career. Cleves was his baptism of fire. Here he confronted for the first time the problems of uncertain wages at a distance from home, exclusion from the confidence of the host government in the face of demands for intelligence from the home government, learned that waiting was an important part of this game of nations and coped with royal reproaches for negligence in duty and misinterpretation of instructions at a time when slow communications meant that one might have to risk moves which could be out of accords with current home strategies.

¹Albert Müller, pp. 90-91; L.B. Smith, A Tudor Tragedy, p. 152.

The King must have judged Wotton's performance on balance as deserving of merit, for there were rewards in the clerical sphere for his efforts in diplomacy. The position of Archdeacon of Gloucester has already been mentioned, but his crowning reward came in April of 1541 when King Henry nominated him to the position of first dean of the reconstituted cathedral of Christchurch in Canterbury.¹ Well-remembered today for that title, first dean of Canterbury Cathedral, he spent a negligible amount of time in the city and but with a few exceptions took little interest in the affairs of the chapter and archdiocese. There was, for example, a plot within the chapter encouraged by Gardiner and directed against Cranmer. The Catholic majority within the twelve prebendaries were encouraged to write the King and Council letters critical of the religious statements expounded by their Protestant colleagues. Suspicion and hostility characterized the mood of the chapter, and the whole affair came to an end with a public apology and capitulation by the Catholics in 1543, when Cranmer, who had kept discreetly subservient throughout, returned to prominent royal favour.² All of this developed and erupted between the time of Wotton's recall from Cleves in the summer of 1541 and his despatch to the Queen Regent in the spring of 1543, yet there is no trace of his knowledge or influence in any respect in this chapter development. It must simply be accepted as one of those regrettable silences within his life, for it might have shed light

¹ Canterbury Cathedral, 8 April 1541, L.&P., XVI, p. 380, no. 5g. Letters Patent reconstituting the late monastery of Christchurch, Canterbury, as the cathedral and metropolitan church of Thomas Archbishop of Canterbury and his successors, with one dean and twelve priest prebendaries. Nic. Wotton, LLD, to be the first dean; Ric. Throneden alias Lestede, S.T.P., first priest prebendary; Arthur Sentleger, second; Ric. Champyon, S.T.P., third; Ric. Parkehurst, fourth; Nic. Ridley, S.T.P., fifth; John Menes, sixth; Hugh Glatyer, seventh; W. Hadleigh alias Hunte, eighth; W. Sandwiche alias Gardyner, ninth; John Warham alias Mylles, tenth; John Chelynden alias Danyell, eleventh; John Baptist de Cassia, D.C.L., twelfth; the said dean and prebendaries to be the chapter.

² Jaspar Ridley, Nicholas Ridley: a Biography (London: Longmans, 1957), pp. 84-86.

on his own religious thoughts. The only part of this gap which can be accounted for is the months January to March of 1542 when he participated in a session of Convocation which considered questions of marriage for the clergy on various levels, simony and reformation of the English translation of the Bible. This last issue, particularly St. Paul's epistle to the Corinthians, was delegated to a commission which included the Dean.¹ Beyond this, one must consign this brief gap to the realm of conjecture.

¹Record of Convocation, 1542, L.&P., XVII, pp. 78-79, no. 176.

Chapter IV

The Imperial Alliance

If Cleves constituted Wotton's baptism of fire, then his embassies to the Imperial courts--first to the Queen Regent in the Low Countries and then to Charles V--might well be categorized as his professional education for the most sensitive and critical aspects of diplomatic service. The three most vital of these areas were the maintenance of vital commercial interests in the course of war, the complicated task of preserving diplomatic relations with an ally whom the English genuinely believed had deserted them in order to obtain a unilateral peace with their common enemy and the limitations of one's commission to act for his sovereign, a matter much exacerbated by distance from home and slow communications. This combined mission for Dr. Wotton also serves as a good illustration of two common sixteenth-century diplomatic practices. First, it appears that often a mission was committed to the charge of two men one of whom would have already gained eminence either through recognition in foreign or domestic service or by virtue of a privileged relationship to the king. In this particular embassy to the Regent, although Wotton had served the King well in Cleves, it was Thomas Seymour who provided leadership for the delegation because of his family's importance at court. The other member, in this case Wotton, was generally the diplomatic expert or one aspiring to this career. Secondly, one can observe on several occasions the use of special ambassadors who were sent to aid the ambassador resident in particularly difficult circumstances. Such persons had as their chief advantage more immediate knowledge of affairs and opinions within the home court.

The year 1542 witnessed an end to all pretence that the peace of 1538 was still operative. A conflagration in all of the general areas of

conflict can be traced throughout Europe. The Emperor was confronted by all elements of traditional opposition. The Turk had once again attacked in 1541, and in this same year, the French had sought to re-establish their alliance with the Sultan. In the process, their two ambassadors for this purpose were assassinated as they travelled through the duchy of Milan. The assassinations alone were sufficient to ensure a deterioration in relations, but the place in which they occurred and the events within Milan that year made conflict virtually certain. By the terms of the 1538 Nice agreement, Milan was to have been administered by Charles V until a final settlement could be reached, but in 1540, he had unilaterally conferred it upon his son Philip, a direct challenge to France. The French amity toward Turkey had always provoked the Emperor who saw it as his Christian duty to challenge the power of the infidel at every point. In addition to this, Turkish incursions into Christian east Europe constituted a definite threat to the Habsburg possessions, and the Ottoman navy rivalled that of Charles for control of the Mediterranean. This was especially vital in its effect on the Emperor's access to the cities of Italy which supplied him with necessary men and money.¹

As for the English in 1542, peace seemed far from a reality, and the Scots were determined on a collision course. In the first weeks of the year, Henry VIII was still smouldering under the insult dealt him by James V, when the latter had not yet appeared for an arranged meeting in York at the end of the previous year. Negotiations were attempted unsuccessfully. Henry immediately turned his attention to schemes for the eventual unification of the two kingdoms either through crowning himself in the event of the death of the infant Mary Queen of Scots or through a marriage of this child to his son Edward. Professor Scarisbrick has argued that this

¹Jean Ursu, La Politique Orientale de François I (Paris: 1908), pp. 118-132.

is just one example of Henry's unwise policy toward Scotland and a secure unification of the British Isles, for the King had only wanted to keep Scotland in a disorganized state in order that he might attack their chief ally, France, with less hindrance. In so moving, he had only succeeded in creating a strong pro-French faction under Cardinal Beaton, who was responsible for thwarting Henry's Anglo-Scottish marriage designs.¹ These Scottish troubles served as the necessary stimulus for the English King to abandon his friendly approaches to both major European powers and to focus his efforts on establishing an Imperial alliance. Although this goal was eventually realized, the conflict with Scotland was to plague the alliance throughout its most crucial years.

Charles V chose the collapse of his 1542 peace initiative with Cleves as the immediate and necessary cause for a new declaration of war against France, for it was here that circumstances became interrelated. French support of Cleves meant that now France could be declared not only an enemy of the Empire but also of the church of Rome; furthermore, the Turkish alliance awarded the French the additional infamy of a threat to Christendom. At the heart of the dispute with Cleves can be found the claims of the Low Countries to the very territory which Duke William had seized. The Queen Regent and her brother the Emperor were determined to have matters put straight, and thus it was Mary who made the initial diplomatic approach to England in June of 1542 suggesting an alliance and the despatch of English ambassadors to the Regent's court. King Henry's response struck a note of injured pride, for he favoured acceptance of this alliance with Mary, but it was not to be extended to Charles unless the latter would recognize the English King's religious title. This Charles would not do, but the problem was surmounted when he agreed that Henry might style himself in any

¹Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, pp. 424-426 and 434-438.

fashion desired, but to the Emperor, he would remain "the King of England, etc."¹

The Treaty of Alliance, signed on 11 February 1543, was dedicated to the settlement of outstanding land claims against France and the abolition of the Franco-Turkish friendship. It was also mutually beneficial in an economic respect for the allies, for the Empire, especially drought-stricken Spain, needed to explore every commercial outlet, and the Imperial city of Antwerp had already become the processing centre for the unfinished cloth of England, as well as being a major European trade link.²

Four clauses of the treaty hold the vital key to the relevance of this alliance. Article six had stated that if an invasion be made upon England and Ireland, the Isles of Wight, Jersey, Guernsey and Man, the territory of Guisnes, the towns and marches of Calais and Berwick or upon the Imperial holdings of Spain, Brabant, Flanders, Holland, Zeeland, Hainault, Artois, Limburg, Luxembourg, Namur, Friesland, Mechlin and Utrecht, the "authors and supporters" of such invasion should be reputed common enemies, and the subjects or either prince should be forbidden intercourse with them. A trade dispute which later arose between the allies over Guernsey will show the importance of designating each territory. Item eighteen issued a clear ultimatum to the French, for, as soon as it was convenient, the resident ambassador of each prince to the French King, together with special ambassadors sent for that purpose, must require Francis to meet the demands of abandoning his Turkish alliance and satisfying the land claims of Henry and Charles. One must turn to the twentieth clause to learn the specifics, viz., if the French King did not agree to these covenants within ten days, the princes were jointly to intimate war to him, the English King challenging the realm of France and the duchies

¹Brandi, Charles V, pp. 479-482.

²Ibid., pp. 479-481.

of Normandy, Aquitaine and Guienne and the Emperor challenging the duchy of Burgundy and the towns and territories of Corbie, Abbeville, Amiens, Braye, Peronne and St. Quentin. If these claims appear unrealistically excessive, and they certainly were in the case of the English, the nineteenth stipulation made provision: if the French King desired to treat of peace, the allies should not treat with him separately but rather communicate to each other his proposals and their answers, and no agreement should be concluded until the claims of both had been satisfied, i.e., Burgundy and the previously-mentioned towns and territories claimed by the Emperor must be delivered to him, and the King of England must receive payment of the arrears of his pension from France and (in pledge for the future uninterrupted payment of this pension) the county of Ponthieu with the town of Boulogne and the territories of Montreuil, Ardres and Therouenne.¹ This was the article which condemned the alliance to inaction once Charles had concluded a separate peace before Henry had been satisfied. The constant explanation proffered for this Imperial move was that England had been the first to negate the treaty by failing to meet the arranged strategy for a joint attack on Paris. These arguments will be more closely examined later in this chapter.

In April of 1543, the Imperial ambassador to England, Eustace Chapuys, had conveyed the request of the government in the Low Countries to have a resident embassy from England. Accordingly, Nicholas Wotton and Thomas Seymour were appointed to fill this post "being persons His Majesty specially trusteth," and they were sent forth with the necessary credentials and instructions that they should declare His Majesty's desire for amity, his appointment of themselves as ambassadors resident with the Regent and his request that they should be given audience from time to time. While

¹Cecil's contemporary translation of the Anglo-Imperial Treaty of Alliance, 11 February 1543, S.P. 1/176, fos. 10-33.

Seymour contributed prestige to the mission, Wotton, having demonstrated in Cleves both his ability in and preference for diplomatic rather than ecclesiastical service to the King, was probably given this appointment as further training and a test of his capability for such a career. There was a second and more immediate part to the original instructions issued to the ambassadors as they left England:

They shall say unto her, that whereas the Emperor's said ambassador hath lately much pressed His Majesty to condescend to the assailing of the enemy this present year, declaring by many arguments, how propice the time is now for the same, which pretermitted and respite given to him until another year that he may in the meanseason ... furnish himself with men and money, which as he sayeth, he now lacketh, the enterprise against him would be the more difficile; offering thereupon to His Majesty at his arbitre to make their main invasions in this year, at such places as His Majesty should think most convenient, or to annoy him with some smaller force, or if His Majesty should be percase occupied in some other place, would not employ any of his people that way this summer, that if it might like His Majesty to give the Emperor any contribution whatsoever it were, he would assail him this year in such sort as he should gather no force against the next year.

Thirdly, the ambassadors must insist that if Henry undertook such an enterprise this year, he must be certain that order had been given and provision had been made for supplying his troops on the Continent. Finally, Wotton and Seymour were instructed to use "wit and dexterity" to learn and convey all intelligence about the court.¹

This last point was soon to become necessary as the rumblings of a commercial dispute arose between England and the Low Countries. In May, the Council sent information to Wotton that the Queen Regent had imposed a one percent export duty, and although she acknowledged such to be against the league, she had requested English merchants to pay it in order to prevent accusations of special favour but also to aid the common war effort.²

¹Instructions to Wotton and Seymour, April of 1543, S.P. 1/177, fos. 159-166.

²Council to Wotton, 16 May 1543, L.&P., XVIII, 1, p. 324, no. 559.

On the same day that this letter was sent, the ambassadors were writing home of an interview which they had had with members of the Queen's council who had declared on her behalf that, "She was glad to perceive that Your Highness was so willing to go through with the war against France this year, and therefore if we would declare unto them what number of carts Your Highness would have, they would then appoint us where and of whom you should be served of them."¹ The English commissioners, who had apparently had word from home indicating a need for caution in any further military moves, felt obliged to respond to this offer by saying, "There be a good time past since yet Your Highness hath heard no more of it all this while and that therefore you requireth that the Queen should well consider these things, whether they be possible this year or not, the season being so far past."²

Throughout June, Mary and Henry exchanged technicalities through their ambassadors on questions of the impost and the military aid required of England. On the impost, the King wrote to Seymour and Wotton on the 12th to say that it could not be the Queen who so pressed them in this matter but rather a minister who knew not the value of the amity between the Emperor and himself.³ The ambassadors could only report:

As concerning the impost, she repeated the great necessity that the country is in and how small a thing it is and in a manner as she called it, imperceptible, for the merchants' parts and yet it should be somewhat toward the Emperor's intolerable charge and that it should be without prejudice to the merchants' privileges, for they should have sufficient writings to declare the same, and that for the amity that is betwixt the Emperor and Your Highness she thought you would have been content to have showed him this pleasure and so she trusted yet you would be.⁴

¹Wotton and Seymour to Henry VIII, 16 May 1543, S.P. 1/178, f. 48.

²*Ibid.*, fos. 48-49.

³Henry VIII to Seymour and Wotton, 12 June 1543, *L.&P.*, XVIII, 1, p. 396, no. 690.

⁴Wotton and Seymour to Henry VIII, 20 June 1543, S.P. 1/179, f. 48.

The English ambassadors had promised Mary that they would report her argument home but not gladly, for the precedent which it might establish was not wise. President Schore, president of the Regent's council, had continued to speak about this matter on Mary's behalf, "The Queen had seemed to Your Highness to have this impost paid not as a duty, but as of your goodwill toward the Emperor and her." Schore further indicated that he had had communications from Chapuys who had stated that, "Your Highness's Council hath showed him that the merchants had made an offer to give the Queen of their benevolence a certain sum that should be as good and better than the impost." To this revelation, Seymour and Wotton could only answer that the merchants would do nothing without the King's consent.¹ On the following day, news reached them that the Regent had decided to allow the merchants to leave the Low Countries with their goods without paying the impost in the hope that this act of good faith would move the King to permit her the benevolence mentioned by Chapuys.² Difficulties did not cease immediately in this commercial conflict within the alliance, but the Council wrote to Seymour and Wotton on the 26th of June that the King had approved their handling of this affair, and:

For as much as the said Regent hath showed herself conformable to the satisfaction of His Majesty's desire in that behalf, we have so travailled by His Majesty's commandment, with our merchants, that they for their part on the other side are content to give unto her not by way of duty, but only through a benevolence, and a declaration of their good affections toward the Emperor and the Low Countries, a thousand pounds Flemish.³

On the second matter, military aid from England, the Regent on the 6th of June had made humble appeal to the English King through his ambassadors whom she had asked for assistance in the form of troops rather

¹Ibid., f. 48.

²Ibid., Wotton and Seymour to Henry VIII, June of 1543, f. 66.

³Council to Wotton and Seymour, 26 June 1543, St.P., IX, p. 430.

than money. She acknowledged that the league had stipulated aid only in the case of actual invasion, but she had had good intelligence that the French forces were in threateningly close range.¹ By the 20th, her request had become more urgent as the French army lay at Maroilles. The ambassadors recorded their conversation with her:

Wherefore she being now in great perplexity and fear lest the enemy should do some great hurt ere the Emperor comes, desires to have Your Highness's help and assistance according to the league. As for the place where her men should meet with yours and what number they should be, seeing that the enemy had already invaded whereby she was driven to divide her men into diverse places for the defence of the country, she could make no certain answer thereupon and that should be as the occasion and time would best serve for their purpose, but when your men should come, they should join with the great master Mons. du Roeulx, governor of Artois, and then by common council and consent either keep the field or lie in such places as they should jointly think themselves best able to do and to be most expedient for them.²

At midnight on the 23rd of June, Wotton and Seymour had been busily preparing a despatch with an important request:

This day the Lady Regent sent for us and declared unto us the danger that the country is in every day more and more, for that the enemy entereth further and further into the country taking towns and destroying the country, and therefore eftsoons she requireth Your Highness not only now to have your aid but also to have it as soon as it is possible, and that it would please you to let her have certain knowledge with speed what number and what manner of men Your Highness intendeth to send and when she shall look for them.³

Within a matter of days, by the end of June, Mary had received through the ambassadors the King's commitment to send troops, but these English forces were to remain under English command, and Seymour was ordered to join these men, leaving the mission entirely in Wotton's hands.⁴ On this occasion, Wotton wrote to his sovereign of Seymour:

¹Seymour and Wotton to Henry VIII, 6 June 1543, L.&P., XVIII, i, p. 382, no. 658.

²Wotton and Seymour to Henry VIII, 20 June 1543, S.P. 1/179, fos. 47-48.

³Ibid., Wotton and Seymour to Henry VIII, 23 June 1543, f. 114.

⁴Ibid., Henry VIII to Wotton and Seymour, June of 1543, f. 118.

Whose departure here must needs be most discomfortable to me having respect to my private commodity only, and not to Your Highness's pleasure, for that burden of the which hitherto I have supported the lesser part, now by his departure resteth wholly in my neck, the which to sustain I know and knowledge myself most insufficient, nevertheless, seeing it pleaseth Your Majesty otherwise to arrange, I shall so use myself as I trust Your Highness shall perceive no lack of goodwill and diligence; would God I were as well able to say of wit and knowledge.¹

At this point, July of 1543, the allies were in serious difficulty, and the expected joint campaign against France did not materialize. Henry had been temporarily diverted by civil war in Scotland, and Charles was also once more heavily engaged in confrontation with the Duke of Cleves, who finally capitulated to the Emperor in September. In their peace settlement, Charles had recognized William in his rightful lands but recovered Gueldres for himself and forced William, who had never completely cast his lot in with his Protestant neighbours, to abandon both his Protestant and French allies.² Wotton, writing of this event on the 9th of September, commented that he had been amazed that France had not demonstrated greater support for Cleves, for in so doing, they might have accomplished more damage to the Emperor. Now they had to face the full onslaught of the Imperial military might.³ This observation demonstrates Wotton's limited knowledge of Imperial affairs on which to base an assessment, for from the intercepted Longueval despatches, it can be established that circumstances were to the contrary.⁴

¹Wotton to Henry VIII, 6 July 1543, f. 166.

²Brandi, Charles V, p. 503.

³Wotton to Henry VIII, 9 September 1543, L.&P., XVIII, ii, p. 83, no. 162.

⁴Nicholas de Bossut, Sieur de Longueval, was the French agent in Cleves. Although Wotton had known of the intercepted correspondence from the French King to this agent in August, he was unaware of the information periodically leaked to the Imperial court concerning various aid, including financial, extended to Cleves by France.

Before this happy victory for the allies in Cleves however, the Low Countries had had to suffer through a summer of grave invasions. In such an extensive empire as that inherited by Charles V, it was expedient for him to delegate his authority to members of his family to govern its various parts, while retaining the ultimate power himself. In this manner, his personal rule could be transformed into practical government. His aunt and sister, Margaret then Mary, had performed this function for him in the Low Countries, and it was Mary who faced these dangers and threats in 1543. She suffers by comparison with her aunt who is characterized as being flexible, tactful, good-natured; but perhaps Mary's more authoritarian, strong, unyielding nature stood her in better stead to face such opposition.¹ After all, in the early stages, she could not look to her brother who was otherwise occupied in Germany, and it took diligence and persistence to force her English ally to forward the required aid to her. She encountered attacks from both sides--France and Cleves. On the 16th of July, Dr. Wotton wrote of the battle raging in the countryside and recorded the fact that many peasants in fear had fled their homes and come into Brussels. Despite this, the Regent wished to assure Henry that her country could support the allied army.²

The sole attempt at humour in these trying times seems to have come when Wotton, discussing with his colleagues the camaraderie between the Pope and the Turkish commander Barbarossa, had wryly remarked that this was to be expected:

I told them that they are the more to blame so to do, (for it standeth with all reason that the Turk and the Bishop of Rome, being both of one mind and purpose and both going about one

¹Jane de Iongh, Mary of Hungary (London: Faber and Faber, 1959), pp. 202-203.

²Wotton to Henry VIII, 16 July 1543, L.&P., XVIII, i, pp. 491-492, no. 898.

thing, that is to destroy the Christian faith, should love like brethren and help each other), the which my saying maketh them grin rather than laugh.¹

Here is a rare glimpse into the personality of Dr. Wotton.

From the end of July and throughout August, Wotton's despatches home are filled with news of military manoeuvres and secret intelligence. On the 29th of July, he reported that a Frenchman had been captured and through torture had disclosed a planned rendezvous between France and Cleves at Luyks, a strategy against which the Regent swiftly moved.² Just over a week later, the ambassador was exchanging advice with his Imperial contacts on the most advantageous method of conduct for the war; the Emperor, he thought, should concentrate on the complete subjugation of Cleves before launching an attack on France.³ At the end of August, the ambassador sent two despatches of profound importance to his government. The first reported a siege at Nice by Barbarossa who was attempting to annihilate the Duke of Savoy for France. The second, on the 30th of August, informed the King that President Schore had told Wotton that a Scottish prior had been stopped and held for questioning. He had claimed to know that the arranged meeting between English and Scottish officials would not succeed, for the Scots had no intention of attending; furthermore, the English proponents within the Scottish council would most likely be executed before Christmas.⁴

As has already been noted, the September correspondence is dominated by the negotiations surrounding the peace with Cleves, and Wotton's last

¹Ibid., Wotton to Henry VIII, 21 July 1543, p. 502, no. 931.

²Ibid., Wotton to Henry VIII, 29 July 1543, pp. 520-521, no. 969.

³Ibid., Wotton to Henry VIII, 8 August 1543, XVIII, ii, pp. 9-10, no. 20.

⁴Ibid., Wotton to Henry VIII, 27 August 1543, p. 42, no. 86; Wotton to Henry VIII, 30 August 1543, pp. 48-49, no. 97.

six weeks at the Regent's court reveal nothing extraordinary, merely battle reports and Imperial attempts to raise funds to sustain the war. New technology in warfare had made combat a slower and more expensive undertaking. The size of armies had increased as had the use of the siege, the most effective weapon of which often proved to be hunger and disease. Whereas formerly pike warfare had been the method used by all, this had now been replaced by a greater dependence on firearms, especially the harquebus. In its turn, this had produced the need for more professionally-trained soldiers, the infamous landsknechte. These mercenaries naturally tended to go where pay was best.¹

The 24th of November 1543 was the date on which Henry issued his instructions for a change in embassy for Wotton. Writing to both the Emperor and the Regent, the King announced his recall of Bishop Bonner and Francis Bryan from the Imperial court, their place to be taken by Dr. Wotton. The new ambassador to the Low Countries was to be Dr. Richard Layton, Dean of York. Of Wotton, Henry wrote on this occasion that, "He is a good servant, a man of ability and inclined to preserve the friendship" between the two countries.² To Wotton, Henry sent a set of detailed instructions. He must first take leave of the Regent and advise her of the coming of the new resident ambassador. The subsequent steps required him to go immediately to the Imperial court where he was to hold discussions with Bonner and Bryan in order to learn firsthand and at some length the state of the Emperor's affairs. The three were then instructed to seek a joint audience at which the Bishop of London was first to announce his and Bryan's recall

¹Charles Oman, A History of the Art of War in the Sixteenth Century (London: Methuen, 1937), pp. 80-81 and 217.

²Henry VIII to Charles V and Mary of Hungary, 24 November 1543, Calendar of the Letters, Despatches and State Papers Relating to the Negotiations between England and Spain (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1862-1954), VI, ii, pp. 524-525, nos. 261 and 262. (This source is cited hereafter as Span. Cal.)

and Wotton's appointment. After that point, Wotton became the spokesman conveying Henry's hearty commendations and delivering his letters in which he requested Charles to give to Wotton from time to time "favourable audience" as the amity required so that matters affecting their two peoples might be readily resolved. Bryan was delegated to conclude the audience by urging the Emperor to declare Scotland a common enemy and by emphasizing King Henry's wish for a joint invasion into France. The remainder of this communication related solely to Wotton. As soon as it was convenient to do so after the departure of Bonner and Bryan, Wotton should again press Charles on the questions of the joint invasion and the declaration against Scotland "for the advancement of their affairs and the annoyance of their common enemy." He might further remind the Emperor:

It is covenanted and agreed betwixt His Majesty and the Emperor by treaty that neither of them shall conclude, agree or treat any peace or truce with the French King or any other their common enemy without knowledge or consent of the other as more plainly shall appear to you in the fourteenth chapter of the said treaty.

Finally, the King stipulated that Wotton, throughout his period of residency with the Emperor, had to continue to raise the matter of the "outrage and spoil committed on our merchants at Antwerp."¹

Wotton took leave of the Regent in Valenciennes at the end of November and made the journey to the Imperial court which was then at Brussels. The transfer of embassy entailed a certain amount of financial difficulty and paperwork for the ambassador. Early in December, Wotton had written to Paget, his major link with the English court, to arrange his new diets, for expenses were greater at the Imperial court. This took several months to settle, for Edward North, in charge of such payments, had refused to transfer Wotton's salary automatically.² In the end, it was necessary to

¹B.L., Harl. MSS. 289, fos. 158-159.

²Wotton to Paget, 5 December 1543, L.&P., XVIII, ii, p. 250, no. 458; Wotton to Paget, 23 February 1544, XIX, i, pp. 68-69, no. 128.

involve the King in this dispute. Similarly, before Bryan could depart Charles's court, he had had to make arrangements to leave his cipher and a copy of the Anglo-Imperial treaty of alliance with Wotton.¹ Such minor problems however quickly gave way to more threatening difficulties.

Two problems unique to this mission, one at the outset and the other in the final year, tested Wotton's preparation and ability for handling such a major assignment as ambassador resident to England's most powerful ally. Given its relative position in sixteenth-century power politics, one is left with the impression that Wotton emerged at the conclusion of the embassy as a recognized diplomat. Returning to an examination of these two problems, the first has already been mentioned--the declaration against Scotland. It was not until the end of December 1543 that Wotton had an opportunity to speak to the Emperor (who had been ill) again on this question, and because, as was so often to be the case, he was referred to Charles's chief minister, Granvelle, Wotton was unable to file a report before the 3rd of January. At the meeting with Granvelle, the minister had said that Henry must first declare war on the Scots and the Emperor would then follow suit, since he had no real grievances against that country. When Wotton responded that a state of war was already in effect, Granvelle had insisted on an authorized statement of this.²

Coincidentally, the Emperor wrote on that same day to his ambassador in London, and from this communication, one derives more information of the previous interview. The Emperor's initial comment was that he found Wotton less easily satisfied than his predecessor Bryan and that the new ambassador had insisted upon three points: the English request for five hundred harquebusses to which Charles had argued his own dire need of the same,

¹Ibid., Bonner, Bryan and Wotton to Henry VIII, 5 December 1543, XVIII, ii, pp. 249-250, no. 457.

²Ibid., Wotton to Henry VIII, 3 January 1544, XIX, i, pp. 2-3, no. 4.

the request for Imperial influence with the Regent to remove that disputed one percent duty about which Charles had agreed to speak with his sister and the declaration against Scotland, although Charles told Chapuys that Bryan had left the impression that there was yet hope for a settlement.¹

On the following day, the Privy Council instructed the English ambassador:

You must remember also, in your next conference with the Emperor or Mons. de Granvelle, to move the same that the Scots may be proclaimed common enemies, except only such as shall be certified by the King's Majesty's safe conduct to be friends to His Highness and the Emperor, and to serve His Majesty when they be in Scotland. Herein you must somewhat press them not only for that the treaty requireth the same, but also because the expedite and earnest setting forth of the said proclamation shall be a very great benefit and advancement to the common affair.²

The Scottish matter again came to the fore in February, and the English council informed Dr. Wotton:

You shall further understand that the Emperor's ambassador, by commission from the Lady Regent, hath in the matter of the declaration of the Scots for enemies, made this answer, that the Scots should be so declared by the Emperor, in case the King's Majesty would likewise declare the Duke of Holstein, King of Denmark, for enemy, alleging that the said Duke of Holstein hath invaded the Emperor's countries, by reason whereof he should be by treaty taken for common enemy.

To this the Council replied that it appeared as though the Emperor sought a delay in the treaty, adding:

If the Duke of Holstein was so to be declared, they should first have satisfied the King's Majesty's request; and then, observing such order in authentic signification as the King's Majesty now doth, to make request thereof accordingly; but to use it for a delay of that that should be done out of hand, that is not well.

To add force to their argument, the councillors contended that a declaration against Holstein could seriously impair the naval effort of the war, since Anglo-Danish commerce centered on sea materials.³ In this, the

¹Charles V to Chapuys, 3 January 1544, Span. Cal., VII, pp. 3-5, no. 3.

²Council to Wotton, 4 January 1544, St.P., IX, p. 579.

³Ibid., Council to Wotton, 4 February 1544, pp. 593-594.

English had sufficient justification; nevertheless, the practical result was only to produce a stalemate on this point, for Frederick IV of Denmark was deemed an unlawful ruler by Charles V.

All was not despair between the allies, for on 18 February 1544, Chapuys was able to send an encouraging note home. He had spoken with Henry on the previous day in order to communicate the Emperor's retort to a certain cardinal conveying papal displeasure over the Imperial alliance with England. Charles had observed that the papacy should not object, for at least Christianity was maintained in England, whereas France (for whom the Pope was displaying favour) had not only Protestant allies but also the Turk. Charles's threat to take action if the Pope should provide even one armed man to France further gladdened the English King, who took in good part the Emperor's refusal of the harquebusses. To his master, Chapuys reported that it appeared as though matters between England and Scotland prospered, although he thought that the Privy Council would have had him believe otherwise.¹ The Emperor, who had seen Wotton about the same time and on similar matters, had requested on the 23rd of February Chapuys's earnest assessment on whether the English really needed the declaration, for he would give it.²

A new dimension, Holstein, had thus been introduced into the alliance. While Charles was sincere in his hostility toward Denmark, the King of which he would not recognize because of his pro-French tendencies, Henry was equally correct in assuming that Charles was attempting to use this to delay any action on the Scottish request. Early in March, Chapuys received a despatch in response to his apparent suggestion that the English

¹Chapuys to Charles V, 18 February 1544, Span. Cal., VII, pp. 50-51, no. 39.

²Ibid., Charles V to Chapuys, 23 February 1544, pp. 58-60, no. 42.

should be satisfied in this matter. The ambassador was urged however to continue to press the Council for a declaration against Holstein before the Emperor would move to declare Scotland a common enemy, for as was revealed, Scotland and the Low Countries had enjoyed a "prosperous" alliance over the past century.¹ While the preference was clearly to preserve this, the ultimate decision must not be to the discontent of the English or the jeopardy of the offensive against France.

For their part, the English appear to have begun to have second thoughts about their insistence upon an Imperial declaration. Wotton, writing from Speyer, had offered his opinion of this on the 4th of March when he reminded Paget that according to the treaty, neither prince could declare peace or conclude a truce with a common enemy without the other's consent. It might be wise to bring the Scottish matter to some favourable conclusion without the Emperor, who, once having acceded to the English demand, might veto any solution of this conflict in the fear that it would give Henry an unexpectedly strong position in their war effort.² The ambassador left it to Paget's discretion as to whether or not this argument should be advanced to their colleagues.

The overall tone of the correspondence continued in much the same pattern as before. The Privy Council reported to Wotton an audience which they had had with Chapuys in order that their ambassador might know their discussions. The Emperor was still requested to make the declaration against Scotland, and if Charles desired, Henry would offer to mediate his dispute with the Duke of Holstein:

Nevertheless, that, if his said good brother the Emperor notwithstanding the aforesaid considerations, will all gates press His Majesty by treaty to declare the King of Denmark for enemy, His Majesty will be contented to satisfy his desire in the same, being required by his letters to the same.

¹Ibid., Charles V to Chapuys, 5 March 1544, pp. 67-70, no. 46.

²Wotton to Paget, 4 March 1544, L.&P., XIX, i, p. 96, no. 161.

King Henry had heard rumours of a truce between Denmark and the Empire and so found it strange that Charles had continued to request a declaration against the same. The Council had put one additional point to Chapuys:

Furthermore, whereas His Majesty prayed him to move the Emperor to consider that the Turk, the French King, the Bishop of Rome, the Venetians, the Genoese, the Scots, being knit together, some in open and some in secret amity, it shall be expedient for them two to have as few of the rest of the states of Christendom to be against them as they may.¹

One final point should be made about these declarations against Scotland and Denmark, and it is the point on which the two sovereigns allowed these discussions to reach a conclusion. Henry had suggested that he would be willing to grant the Imperial request if he were allowed time in which to remove his subjects from Denmark and to settle English interests there. Seizing on this, the Emperor in April indicated that he would reciprocate with a declaration against Scotland if permitted these same stipulations. The declarations were issued in May.²

The second of the unique difficulties in this mission was the strategy toward France throughout. As has been noted, the original strategy had sought a joint invasion in 1543, but intervening circumstances had made this impossible. At the beginning of June of 1544, Paget arrived in Speyer on a special embassy to the Emperor, and he and Wotton in a joint audience on the following day had declared four major points: first, the traditional greetings exchanged between monarchs; next, the English success in their Scottish campaign; thirdly, an explanation against a French device of trickery, namely, that the French King had sent Henry a gift of wine and then had used the English King's note of appreciation to imply a greater content; and finally, to review the state of their persons and affairs.

¹Council to Wotton, 6 March 1544, St.P., IX, pp. 613-617.

²Ibid., p. 614; Council to Wotton, 13 April 1544, L.&P., XIX, i, pp. 209-210, no. 313.

Henry had once again been suffering with the leg disability which periodically made strenuous riding impossible. He had thus suggested a plan in which neither he nor Charles would personally go to France; rather, each would send a lieutenant with thirty thousand troops, for he was aware that Charles too was periodically troubled by gout. To this, the Emperor had indelicately replied that as for himself, being ten years younger than Henry, he was in good health and only troubled by gout in winter. As for Henry's plan, Charles admitted that it had been wisely conceived, but he was unable to concur. How could he, he asked, explain to his subjects that he allowed them to go into danger while protecting himself? More to the point, Henry might find it possible to appoint a single lieutenant over his men, but the Imperial army with its multinational composition could only be commanded and controlled by the Emperor himself. One further consideration was that the March on Paris had been intended to subdue it, not to plunder it. To all of these arguments, Paget could only reiterate the English concern that the allies might not be successful in reaching the French capital before winter. The Emperor sent word that it was perfectly acceptable to him, should Henry elect to send his troops under a lieutenant to join Charles, not a likely possibility for a man of Henry's pride.¹

Pride had prompted Blaise de Montluc, a French military commander, to observe of this allied campaign:

La France bien unie ne peut estre conquise sans perdre une douzaine de batailles, veu la belle noblesse qu'il y a, et les places fortes qui s'y trouvent. Et croi que plusieurs se trompent de dire, que Paris prins, la France seroyt perdue. C'est à la verité le tresor de ce royaume, et un sac inestimable: car les plus gros du royaume y apportent tout, et croi qu'au monde il n'y a une telle ville. On dit qu'il n'y a escu qui ne doive dix sols de rente une fois l'année. Mais il y a tant d'autres villes et places en ce royaume, qui seroient bastantes pour faire perdre trente armées; de sorte qu'il seroyt aisé ce rallier, et leur oster celle-là, avant qu'ils en eussent

¹Paget and Wotton to Henry VIII, 2 June 1544, L.&P., XIX, i, pp. 391-392, no. 619.

conquis d'autres si le conquerant ne vouloit despeupler
son royaume pour repeupler sa conquete.¹

The fundamental impossibility of the Anglo-Imperial scheme is encapsulated in these remarks.

Underlying all of this discussion of strategy by the allies was a basic difference in approach. Charles had hoped for a direct march on the French capital, but Henry, always conscious of maintaining his line of supply, had preferred a campaign first in Picardy to ensure this line. To this end, he had sent his army under Norfolk and Suffolk with instructions to the former to take either Montreuil or Ardres. This difference in strategy had produced the first definite break in the alliance. When Henry arrived on the Continent in July, he joined Suffolk for a two-month campaign at the end of which he achieved the capture of Boulogne. In the meantime, the Imperial armies had been enjoying success with the surrender of Luxembourg by France. On this event, Wotton commented upon the state of the retreating army that they appeared as "haggard and hungry as I am sure we will look when we come out of France."² Granvelle had also passed on to the ambassador information that the Emperor had received a request from the Duke of Lorraine for a safe conduct for his uncle, the cardinal, and the general interpretation put on this was that such a move constituted a peace overture by France.³

The French King early in August had begun to explore peace possibilities, the first approach being made to the Emperor, but a letter to Henry shortly followed. Through their ambassadors, the allies first confirmed these approaches and then exchanged communications on the terms which they considered necessary for peace.

¹Jean Roucher, Mémoires de Blaise de Montluc (Paris: 1786), Tome XXII, p. 302.

²Wotton to Paget, 11 June 1544, L.&P., XIX, i, p. 423, no. 678.

³Charles V to Chapuys, 27 June 1544, Span. Cal., VII, p. 219, no. 134.

Because Charles had been the first recipient of this French initiative, his was also the first answer on behalf of the allies to French Admiral d'Annebault. On 31 August 1544, he issued this ultimatum: the French must abandon their Turkish alliance and agree to join in the war against the Sultan; with this, the French concurred. Secondly, France must restore all towns, districts and provinces taken from Charles, a demand on which the French agreed to treat. The last demand was that the allies of the Empire, chiefly England and Savoy, must also be satisfied. The admiral replied that the English had not yet agreed to discussions, and France must await an answer before returning to this problem.¹

By this time, it had become increasingly urgent for Charles to have peace with his old enemy, for German religious unrest had once again erupted. He had sent his articles of peace to Henry and now eagerly awaited a reciprocal document. This arrived early in September. From the outset of Henry's communication to Wotton, it can be seen that the English King was resentful of the manner in which his ally had thus far proceeded in the peace negotiations, for the Imperial peace articles had arrived in England unsigned and were only signed by the Imperial ambassadors later on the understanding that they did so without commission; Wotton was instructed to follow suit.² Henry, according to Chapuys, was also displaying his sensitive nature in his bitterness over the feeling that Francis had sent a more high-ranking delegation to the Imperial court, viz., Admiral d'Annebault and the Cardinal of Lorraine.³ When the English demands were finally submitted, they presented France with the following alternative: either Francis must pay Henry a pension of one hundred thousand crowns annually

¹Wotton to Henry VIII, 31 August 1544, L.&P., XIX, ii, pp. 66-67, no. 162.

²Ibid., Henry VIII to Wotton, September of 1544, pp. 92-94, no. 180.

³Chapuys to Charles V, 3 September 1544, Span. Cal., VIII, pp. 313-317 and 324, no. 193.

including this in arrears for eleven years to cover the expenses incurred in the English war effort against France and Scotland or restore to him the realm of France and the duchies of Normandy, Aquitaine and Guienne which Henry claimed by right of inheritance. To the English, this represented no more than what had been stated in the treaty of alliance; to their ally and France, it seemed extraordinary and harsh.¹

The Imperial forces, Wotton among them, continued on the move, and on 6 September 1544, the ambassador had written home that the negotiators had parted over Charles's refusal to conclude anything without Henry. The French had claimed that they had sent a special embassy to England, and the Emperor had promptly despatched the Bishop of Arras to assist in the English side of these negotiations.² Meanwhile, Chapuys and de Courrières had written to the Regent in the Low Countries that Henry had said that it would be impossible for him to move his army any further into France this year, the season being so far advanced.³ With this information in mind, one must consider Karl Brandi's statement that Arras had actually been sent to England to issue an impossible proposal to Henry: either he must join in an immediate assault on Paris or allow Charles to conclude a separate peace.⁴ Such a suggestion is highly probable. Negotiations resumed between Charles's and Francis's commissioners, and by the 17th, Granvelle had informed Wotton that an acceptable peace had been concluded which the Emperor would like to sign, but he would await word from Henry through Arras who was expected shortly.

¹Henry VIII to Wotton, September of 1544, L.&P., XIX, ii, pp. 92-94, no. 180.

²Ibid., Wotton to Henry VIII, 6 September 1544, pp. 104-105, no. 193.

³Chapuys and de Courrières to Mary of Hungary, 16 September 1544, Span. Cal., VII, pp. 336-337, no. 198.

⁴Brandi, Charles V, p. 519.

Wotton recorded in a letter to his sovereign just a few days later, (after peace had been concluded at Crépy between France and the Empire), exactly what had been said to him over this trying week at the Imperial court:

The viceroy said that all the burden of the wars lay on the Emperor's shoulders, for the French King had assembled all his power against him, and had left none against Your Majesty; and your army did not march forward, as was agreed when he was with Your Majesty, so that the Emperor had not succour or comfort of your army.

Wotton challenged this last point by arguing that the frontiers of Picardy were the best-defended in France and had thus impeded his sovereign from going forward. The ambassador had had a personal audience with Charles on the 18th of September during which:

The Emperor answered me, that, though the Frenchmen did earnestly press him for an answer, yea, and in all haste would have him swear the peace that day, yet he would neither swear nor promise them any such thing until he knew your pleasure by Mons. d'Arras.

This same report continued with an account of an interview which Wotton had with Charles after the Treaty of Crepy had been signed, and the Emperor had said:

... That in agreeing with the French King he had more respect to the commonwealth of all Christendom, than to his own private commodity, and was glad to know how Your Majesty would be satisfied for your part of the French King; and that although he did agree with the French King, yet it was reserving the league and amity betwixt Your Highness and him.

At length the ambassador concluded his report with some information revealed by Granvelle which enlightens us on Charles's real reasons for this separate peace. After reinforcing his master's argument that France had not only abandoned the Turkish alliance but also had agreed to aid in an attack upon this threat to all Christendom, Granvelle remarked:

... That he had showed me before in what necessity the Emperor was for lack of money to pay his soldiers, who for lack of payment grudged all they did apace and were prone enough to sedition.

The minister continued:

The King's Highness hath showed my son of Arras that he will seek to agree with the French King's commissioners that are with him, reserving ever the treaty and amity betwixt the Emperor and His Majesty, and advised also the Emperor to do the like here with these men that treat with him.¹

Amidst all the future discussion on blame laid by each side at the feet of the other, it is well to remember this brief insight into the true state of Imperial affairs. The English would continue to charge that Charles, having advanced too far into French territory in an uncertain time of year, had been forced to conclude peace and had thus defied the treaty article requiring that all parties must first be satisfied in their demands. While denying both segments of this argument, the Imperial court insisted that Henry had been the first to abrogate the treaty by not following through with the requirement for a campaign against Paris. In fact, money was to prove a decisive factor in bringing first Charles and later Henry to a recognition of peace, but, in 1544, Charles also found himself facing the dual concrete adversaries of a shortage of supplies and bad weather conditions, the latter factor often commented on by Wotton in his July correspondence.

Peace between Charles and Francis had left Henry in an extremely vulnerable position, and Wotton echoed this sentiment in a letter to Paget. He also mentioned to his friend and colleague that in his view, although the Imperial court now abounded with Frenchmen, "The amity is too fervent to last."² Henry had once said to Charles that with so many of the states of Christendom either in secret or open alliance against them, they would do well to consider before declaring any further enemies. This advice had now to be taken to heart by the English, who faced the French alone.

¹Wotton to Henry, 20 September 1544, St.P., X, pp. 78-79.

²Wotton to Paget, 20 September 1544, L.&P., XIX, ii, pp. 138-139, no. 268; Wotton to Paget, 24 September 1544, p. 154, no. 290.

Although the alliance then had to all intents and purposes collapsed, relations were maintained, albeit in an antagonistic atmosphere. The allies battled each other over Charles's separate peace and what obligations he still owed to England.

An important conference occurred in October between Charles and Wotton as a result of a special message sent by Henry to his ambassador to approach the Emperor or his ministers again on this unsatisfactory peace. Charles once again denied that peace had been forced upon him and that England had been neglected in the consideration of that peace. As for his treaty obligations to England, these were continuing to be fulfilled by such measures of aid as allowing shipments of victuals to Henry's army but not to the French; yet, despite Henry's outcry that his subjects in Boulogne were being harassed and the fortifications there disturbed, Charles did not interpret his responsibilities to extend to a new declaration against France. Indeed, the whole question of Boulogne was the sticking point between England and France. Wotton wrote that the Emperor had insisted that:

The Frenchmen made a very great matter of Boulogne and would not forego it by any means. He said also that the French King had submitted himself to arbitrament only in the first controversies betwixt Your Majesty and the said French King and not in the matter of Boulogne, which is a new controversy.

Wotton could not dispute this argument and so contended that France should not contest Boulogne in the face of Henry's rightful claims in France.¹

Here was a clear case for a special embassy to assist the resident ambassador, and Henry selected two of his most eminent advisors for the task, Bishop Stephen Gardiner and Edward Seymour. In one of their first letters back to England, they spoke of an audience at which these two questions which were to dominate Anglo-Imperial relations throughout the

¹Wotton to Henry VIII, 10 October 1544, St.P., X, pp. 109-110.

remainder of Wotton's embassy had been raised in detail: which party had first failed to meet treaty obligations and what aid was the Emperor bound by treaty to continue to supply to England. In their letter to Henry, the ambassadors had suggested that he should send to Charles a specific statement on the invasion of English territory by France,¹ and this was done on 14 November 1544, when it was declared that France had invaded both Guisnes and Calais.² On the 17th, the three diplomats wrote of an important disclosure which had been made in their latest audience with the Emperor, and this was that a general article stating that England must be satisfied had been written into the original settlement with France before Arras had returned from England carrying that rather ill-defined suggestion from Henry that each should seek agreement with the French delegates at their respective courts, reserving the amity. The English had interpreted this suggestion as agreement separately but signature jointly. Not so with the Imperial officials. When reminded by Wotton that he had been given a copy of the requirements necessary to satisfy Henry long before that, Charles had curtly replied that these had been unacceptable to France. He then placed a ten-week ban on all further discussion of a new declaration against France but promised at the end of that period to fulfil his treaty obligations to England.³

On 27 January 1545, Wotton sought an audience in order to raise three specific points: the declaration against France now that the ten-week period had elapsed, an end to the embargo on English merchants and their

¹Wotton, Gardiner and Hertford to Henry VIII, 9 November 1544, L.&P., XIX, ii, pp. 350-352, no. 583.

²Henry VIII to Charles V, 14 November 1544, Span. Cal., VII, pp. 443-444, no. 248.

³Wotton, Gardiner and Hertford to Henry VIII, 17 November 1544, L.&P., XIX, ii, pp. 376-377, no. 627; Wotton, Gardiner and Hertford to Henry VIII, 24 November 1544, pp. 385-388, no. 654.

goods and safe conducts for German and Italian soldiers whom Henry wished to incorporate into his army. To the first, Charles replied that he had despatched a representative to England to settle this matter with the King. As for the merchants' question, he looked first to find some reciprocity from England. On the final point, the Emperor emphasized his desire not to give France any provocation for renewing of hostilities.¹ Feeling provoked himself, Henry sent to Wotton a set of instructions on several matters which he was to read aloud to Charles, not his council, and neither surrendering a copy of these articles nor making anyone else privy to them. After declaring Henry's gladness in perceiving Charles's intention to preserve the league between them, Wotton was to say that many of the Emperor's friends considered his recent peace with France to be prejudicial to them and inexpedient for the Empire. It further appeared to the English that Arras had misinterpreted their position, and as for French aid against the Turk, there were already rumours that the French were seeking technicalities by which they could opt out of this requirement. It was generally accepted moreover that the Dauphin was not partial to this peace with the Empire. Henry then instructed his ambassador to ask Charles to take in good part the candour with which the English King mentioned certain "discourtesies" and to redress the same; of course, the questions of merchant arrests and safe conducts for soldiers were primary among these. Wotton's parting point should be:

... That this peace so disagreeable to most people can with his honour be annulled, for the French have broken it already having contrary to the articles of our comprehension since attacked us in dominions for which our good brother is bound to repute and declare them enemies.²

Charles became even more intransigent and declared to Wotton and later

¹Charles V to Chapuys and van der Delft, 27 January 1545, Span. Cal., VIII, p. 26, no. 8.

²Henry VIII to Charles V, February of 1545, L.&P., XX, i, pp. 66-68, no. 146.



Paget in February that his ambassador in London had already spoken to the English government about his reason for opposing any new declaration of war against France. Paget interjected, "Sire, though unworthy, I am one of the ministers of his Council and commonly privy to things that pass there, yet never heard I your ambassador make any reason why you should not declare yourself." An angry Emperor responded, "By St. Mary, there is good reason. Why should I declare myself enemy to him, to whom the King my good brother hath given me his consent to be a friend?"¹ The declaration was never to be given, but some reciprocity on both sides was shown in the merchants' dispute, and the Emperor agreed to "wink at" the passing of Italian soldiers through his territory on their way to England but was unable to do the same for German ones since the Diet had refused any concession allowing them to serve in another army.²

By March, the English had faced the reality of the situation in which the Imperial court had chosen to emphasize the amity over the treaty and would therefore not comply with the English designs against France. Although new disputes continued to arise between Henry and Charles, notably one over shipping to France in which the English attempted to ensure that no military material was getting through, the diplomatic focus shifted from war to peace. The Emperor offered his services as mediator. An Imperial memorandum on this initiative has survived from 20 March 1545. It acknowledged that both Kings had accepted this attempt at mediation, but Boulogne was once again the impasse. Henry had told Charles that he had long ago sent his demands through Wotton before Arras's visit, and as for Boulogne, he intended to keep it. Asked whether he would modify his

¹Wotton and Paget to Henry VIII, 28 February 1545, St.P., X, pp. 312-314.

²Wotton to Henry VIII, 20 February 1545, L.&P., XX, i, pp. 98-100, no. 229.

master's demands, Paget, continuing to assist Wotton in Brussels, had replied that he lacked commission to do so but did not doubt that Henry would agree to the Emperor's modifying them as long as he retained Boulogne. Charles's next move was to suggest a truce, and while again asserting the inadequacy of their powers, the English ambassadors gave their private support and promised to encourage Henry in that direction. To the French ambassador, Charles also strongly recommended this truce on the grounds that this conflict was seriously damaging all Christendom. Since the English were apparently ready to fight to the death for Boulogne, the French would be wise to consider whether they in fact had sufficient strength to mount a successful counter-offensive. Talk of an invasion of England was one thing, but success in such an action was dubious, and the French army would be greatly weakened by it. A most cunning argument based on foresight was then put before the French. Their King was in better health than Henry and had a healthy and mature heir, whereas England was almost certain to pass into the hands of a minor soon. Why not forego Boulogne until then, when it could probably be recovered with a minimum of pressure. Finally, the French must consider that the English continued to demand from the Emperor a new declaration of war against France, and this he preferred not to have to give.¹ He was still being confronted periodically with new arguments such as the one for a dangerous precedent being established in accepting an ambassador's word, such as that in the case of Arras on Henry's opinion toward Charles's peace settlement with France, if such word was more acceptable than that of another sovereign.²

To such new pressures, the Emperor constantly replied that he would fulfil his treaty obligations, but the allies viewed this as being

¹Memorandum, 20 March 1545, Span. Cal., VIII, pp. 65-69, no. 31.

²Council to Wotton, 4 May 1545, L.&P., XX, i, pp. 338-339, no. 652.

accomplished in different ways. While Henry pressed for aid through military intervention, Charles had early established the logic that he was meeting his obligations by such measures as permitting victuals to be shipped to England but not France.

Van der Delft succeeded Chapuys in June of 1545 as ambassador resident in England. The guidelines given to him provide us with a thorough insight into Imperial strategy. He was to emphasize that his government was determined not to allow infractions of its treaty commitments to either side nor to give either France or England cause for alleging treaty violations. He must neither tacitly nor expressly acknowledge that Henry had fulfilled his part of the treaty of alliance but rather argue that the Emperor had concluded peace with Henry's total knowledge and consent. The ambassador was also instructed to convey in strong terms that if Charles provided the aid required by treaty, Henry could not expect any further assistance or a suspension of trade with France. Van der Delft was reminded that although the treaty with England had required the Emperor to come to Henry's aid should the latter suffer invasion of his realm, the current French offensive was solely to recover Boulogne, and they had always agreed to treat of peace if Boulogne could be restored. If Henry expected aid in the form of troops, he must be prepared to redress the ill treatment and violence suffered in his service by the Emperor's subjects, and the subjects of the same must have their ships and goods restored to them. Because of rumours of Henry's overtures to the German Protestant princes, he must also agree to abandon such plans unless Charles's consent could be given. The last statement of the memorandum is most revealing; van der Delft was "to temporize" for as long as possible without actually committing the Emperor to any aid.¹

Henry, for his part, had diverted his strategy to a positive approach

¹Instructions to van der Delft, 13 June 1545, Span. Cal., VIII, pp. 125-129, no. 64.

in late June, when he instructed Wotton to undertake the subject from a new point, viz., that Henry, although recognizing that the treaty required aid of the Emperor only in the case of actual invasion of English territory, had had information to suggest such an imminent development. He was certain that Charles would rather provide aid beforehand than when it was too late. Almost comically, he added that Charles might wish to give a promise of aid to be delivered when Wotton had advised him of the actual invasion.¹

Wotton's last months with the Emperor, spent mostly in Worms where the Diet was in session, witnessed no substantial progress toward the settlement of differences which had strained the alliance to its limits. In August, while awaiting his replacement, Thirlby, Wotton for one final time placed before the Emperor the position of the English that even if both parties had been satisfied and so had concluded peace with France, yet upon a new invasion, as had occurred in July on the Isle of Wight, both were bound to declare the invader a common enemy.² The Emperor remained unconvinced, and the alliance remained inoperative insofar as the English were concerned.

Such were the two key issues according to which the Anglo-Imperial alliance operated in the years 1543-1545, but they were by no means the only ones which posed problems for the resident diplomats at each court. In the midst of some of the toughest manoeuvres over the Scottish matter in the spring of 1544, Wotton, in Speyer with the Emperor for a meeting of the Diet, received from Henry what on the face of it appeared to be a simple and straightforward request to be conveyed to an ally. It was a request to hire a captain and one thousand horsemen. By the time that this incident was terminated, one can trace through the documents an excellent example of the insoluble problem common to all sixteenth-century diplomats

¹ Paget to Wotton, 23 June 1545, L.&P., XX, i, pp. 489-490, no. 1013.

² Wotton to Henry VIII, 14 August 1545, St.P., X, p. 566.

of knowing the exact extent of one's commission, and the lesson which Wotton learned from it was one never to be forgotten. The Emperor's access to captains with their bands of mercenary soldiers was better than that of anyone else in Europe, and when Wotton conveyed his sovereign's request to obtain such additional aid, Charles was quick to respond. He informed Chapuys on 12 April 1544 that he had chosen Francis van Sickingen "a very able one whom we ourselves have thought to retain but will pass him first to England."¹ The problem arose when this captain demanded security in the form of two thousand florins that he would be paid from the day that he entered the English King's service until the day that he departed it. Wotton had recognized that his commission did not extend to the acceptance of such terms, but Charles had assured him that this was both customary and necessary in order to placate these temperamental warriors, and a delay could be disastrous. The whole transaction caused Wotton much anxiety, but in the end, he capitulated. It was left to the Privy Council to express Henry's dislike of Sickingen and disapproval of the ambassador's handling of this matter:

Whereunto His Majesty hath willed us to signify unto you, that whereas by your communication with Sickingen, expressed in your first letter, it appeareth that the man hath little affection to serve His Majesty, as well for that he demandeth of His Highness other conditions of assurance for the payment of his wages, than hath ever been heretofore demanded of His Majesty, and that also the said captain hath answered he never had assurance of the French King because the same used to pay his men of war their wages well, His Majesty not liking the behaviour of the man for sundry respects mentioned in your said letter, and taking also to heart that he sheweth himself to mistrust more his payment than the French King's, expressing in a manner that the said French King is as meet to be trusted without assurance, as His Majesty with assurance, cannot fantasy the man, nor is content to accept him to his service thinking that, for as much as there be few captains or princes in Almain or in Christendom but hath, among other their good opinions of His Majesty, a special credence in His Highness for the observance of that he promiseth, it cannot be chosen, but that this fellow's mistrust of His Highness's payment proceedeth of a very French heart.

¹Charles V to Chapuys, 12 April 1544, Span. Cal., VII, pp. 91-93, no. 64.

As for the question of paying the security, the Council only said that the King thought that if Wotton had paid any of it, "You have been too liberal of his purse, without his consent, and have passed your commission; where-with His Majesty would not have been miscontent, if it had been employed upon an honest man." Furthermore, the King felt that the Emperor should have attempted to have any money given to van Sickingen recovered but agreed that he would rather lose the entire sum if Charles's honour should be "touched unfavourably."¹

Wotton sought assistance from Charles and his ministers to have this money repaid but to no avail. Van Sickingen had already paid it out as partial wages to others to prepare themselves so that there was no possibility of regaining this loss. Along with this news, Wotton expressed his apology for the whole mishandling of this affair:

And as for mine own self and my proceeding in this matter of the Captain van Sickingen, albeit that by the beginning of it may appear of what mind I myself was, and what I did and would have done in it, and albeit also that I was greatly importuned by the Emperor and his council in it, as I have largely written before unto Your Highness, being by them borne in hand (the which to me, having little knowledge and experience in all things, especially in such matters, they might easily persuade) that, if I tarried an answer from Your Highness and went not straight forth through with the said captain, that thereby Your Highness should be unprovided of a thousand horsemen at that time you should have most need of them, the sequel thereof should turn to the prejudice of Your Highness; and yet these things notwithstanding, I can nor will go about to excuse myself herein, but knowledge not only mine oversight but plainly my fault in it. And therefore, as God Himself heareth no man's petition sooner nor more favourably than theirs, that repose their whole affiance in his goodness, and for their offences directly call upon Him for mercy, as from whom chiefly and only it must proceed, so likewise I trust Your Highness (who, by that most eminent office and supreme dignity that you are called unto, doth nearest approach and most resemble to God in this world) will not be discontented that I directly sue unto Your Highness, most humbly and instantly for forgiveness of any fault in the in the said matter by me committed; trusting hereby to be taught to beware another time of the incurring of the like.²

¹Council to Wotton, 19 April 1544, St.P., IX, p. 656.

²Ibid., Wotton to Henry VIII, 7 May 1544, p. 657.

Paget wrote to Wotton a week later that the King, "perceiving by the same what trouble you were in for the matter of Sickingen had even pity of you and notwithstanding I told him I had already as by his commandment written unto you for your contentation." He went on to reassure the ambassador, "His Majesty taketh the thing in very good part. Thus you see, as you wrote, what it is to serve a good master."¹

This question surrounding commission was but one of the likely difficulties which any ambassador could expect to encounter. Another was commercial disputes between merchants of his own country and those of foreign governments. Wotton had already confronted this on his mission to the Regent, but these demands again made a claim on his time almost from the outset of his embassy to Charles. In January of 1544, the Regent despatched a candid letter to Chapuys in which one can clearly detect disenchantment growing between the English and Imperial camps. The first grievance which she designated was that English merchants were attempting to escape payment of both export and import duties which had been levied in this time of war as a measure of obtaining revenue to aid the Low Countries, which, in turn, would be of assistance to England. The decision had been taken nevertheless to relinquish the tax on English merchants exporting goods from the Low Countries but not on imports. The government there was left wondering whether Dr. Wotton might have had some personal interest in this matter, a highly unlikely circumstance. She followed up this complaint with a more puzzling revelation that England had protested over the Imperial arrest of two French ships off the Guernsey coast, claiming that this island was neutral and therefore not off limits to trade with France; yet she had always thought that it had been specifically designated as an English possession, which, according to the treaty, the Emperor was bound to defend. Could it

¹Paget to Wotton, 14 May 1544, S.P. 1/187, f. 123.

be, Mary wondered, that Henry sought privileges which he was quick to deny to his ally?¹

The other period of the mission during which commercial matters assumed a place of priority was that ten-week interval in which Charles had refused to discuss the strategy toward France. In this interim, during which both sides for the most part observed the ban, Henry had sought either to buy or to borrow some equipped gallies from the Emperor against a suspected attack on Boulogne by France in the coming summer, but Charles had given a negative answer. To add insult to this injury, both parties became embroiled in disputes over the arrest of each other's ships and goods, and some of the Emperor's subjects added the claim of harassment by Henry's troops.² England had feared that the Imperial trade with France after the Treaty of Crepy represented at least inadvertent support of the French war effort and thus believed itself justified in these seizures. Charles saw his only means of redress as a response in kind. Worthy of note is the fact that the ambassadors on both sides advised in favour of some form of reciprocity and not allowing this issue to grow out of perspective. Chapuys and van der Delft had written to Charles on 25 February 1545 that the King and Council had shown diligence and goodwill in redressing the arrests, and the ambassadors considered it wise for their government to initiate some form of restitution. Three days later, Paget and Wotton proposed to Henry:

We believe, sire, that if Your Majesty had known as much before, as I have learned since my coming hither, (howsoever Your Majesty may have intended to have sent me for any other purpose), Your Majesty would not have pressed so much upon the arrests, no more would others of Your Highness's Council; but the merchants will have ever one knack of merchants.

¹Mary of Hungary to Chapuys, 10 January 1544, Span. Cal., VIII, pp. 8-10, no. 9.

²Council to Wotton, 17 December 1544, L.&P., XIX, ii, p. 450, no. 752; Wotton and Carne to Henry VIII, 6 January 1545, p. 15, no. 30.

Probably insinuating that merchants would always look after their own interests, the English ambassadors suggested the establishment of a kind of court of arbitration.¹ Such disputes recur throughout the sixteenth century, and they occupied much of the time of a resident ambassador.

Although the overwhelming sense to emerge from the correspondence of this period is one which suggests that the alliance was fraught with tension and struggle, it should also be noted that there was a very visible sense in which the amity was manifested. Unlike his mission to Cleves when he was often relegated to a nominal ally and later in France when he represented a potential enemy, Wotton, during this embassy with the Emperor, often accompanied the Imperial party as it travelled to meet various Diets or in the course of Charles's military campaigns. The ambassador found himself in the midst of some of the heaviest fighting. In mid-July of 1544, Wotton travelled on campaign with the Emperor to the "unhappy camp at St. Dizier" from where he wrote a report which amply illustrates how difficult it was, even for those at the scene of the conflict, to know always what was transpiring:

That self day in the evening was a great alarm in our army; there were a great number of footmen come out of the town. And by the way that they took, it was thought that they would have fled away and forsaken the town. And the camp was in arms to follow them, and the Emperor among them. Whereupon the said footmen retired into the town again, without hurt. Others said that the coming out of the said footmen was but to amuse the army about them: to the intent that in the meanseason two horsemen might escape, and get into the woods, which are not far from the town to bear word to the French King of the state of their affairs, the which horsemen I suppose be escaped.²

St. Dizier was the site of a major offensive, and in the first encounter, the Imperial troops were beaten back. Wotton observed on this occasion,

¹Chapuys and van der Delft to Charles V, 25 February 1545, Span. Cal., VIII, pp. 37-38, no. 16; Paget and Wotton to Henry VIII, 28 February 1545, St.P., X, pp. 317-318.

²Wotton to Henry VIII, 15 July 1544, S.P. 1/187, f. 39v.

"The assault continued two or three hours wherein the Frenchmen have showed themselves not only men of courage but also of good experience."¹

Through a letter to Paget in early July, it can be established that Wotton had been travelling with the Imperial army but approximately two days' distance behind. As they moved into French territory however, the ambassador expressed the belief that this policy was unwise.² Because of the lengthy siege at St. Dizier which followed shortly thereafter, it is not known what changes in the routine were considered, and although he continued on the move with the Imperial forces until peace was proclaimed, Wotton became more imprecise in his citations of the places from which he was writing. From his correspondence, the inference drawn is that his segment of the Imperial party was not kept informed of the exact location or intentions of the military leadership. During his early and final months with Charles, the English ambassador also frequently travelled to the Imperial Diet cities like Worms and Speyer from where he sent relevant despatches home, but again, he often journeyed to these some days after Charles had set out for the meeting.

From the correspondence which remains, one cannot obtain an irrefutable answer to the question of the Emperor's opinion of Wotton or vice versa, but from this mission and a subsequent embassy in 1551, one is inclined toward the description of a cordial, professional respect. In response to Henry's notice of Wotton's recall and Thirlby's assignment, Charles generously wrote, "The former has always been welcomed with us and has discharged his duties honestly and diligently."³ Wotton said of his final audience with the Emperor in Brussels:

¹Ibid., f. 40.

²Wotton to Paget, 5 July 1544, L.&P., XIX, i, p. 531, no. 852.

³Charles V to Henry VIII, 31 August 1545, Span. Cal., VIII, p. 241, no. 129.

It pleased him to say to me, Dr. Wotton, that I had so used myself in the office, as he was very well contented; nevertheless, seeing that it is Your Majesty's pleasure to revoke me and to use my services at home, he was also therewith well¹ pleased and gave me leave to depart when I should think meet.

This mission of Dr. Wotton's to the Emperor is an excellent model for a study of sixteenth-century diplomacy in action, for through the correspondence of Henry VIII and the despatches of Charles V, one can easily outline the shifts in opinion and alteration of circumstances which shaped the policies at each court. One can clearly sense the force of dynastic ambition and rivalry, and in our own mechanized, accelerated age, some of the diplomatic tactics and procedures adopted in the sixteenth century may seem slow and naive, but they were also practical for this century. A powerful figure like Charles V could stall for time and thus circumvent undesirable decisions simply by placing a ban on a particular item under discussion. Even more intriguing, given the Emperor's character, is a ploy which he used to postpone an answer to Wotton for several weeks on this same question of a new declaration against France. He had told the ambassador that he was awaiting some vital information on a related question put to his ambassadors in London. The English ambassador duly reported this excuse for his own lack of progress with the Emperor to the Council; in its turn, this group let it be known to the Imperial ambassadors that they were impeding matters. A bewildered Chapuys and van der Delft wrote to their Imperial master that they had spent much time looking through their correspondence but could find no unanswered questions.²

English foreign policy in these years more than adequately demonstrates the frustrating position of a minor sixteenth-century European power dependent upon one of the two major European states. The English were often

¹Wotton and Thirlby to Henry VIII, 31 August 1545, St.P., X, p. 586.

²Chapuys and van der Delft to Charles V, 5 February 1545, Span. Cal., VIII, p. 31, no. 9.

correct in their interpretations of the obligations of the alliance and justified in their arguments with their ally, but the reality was that there was little that they could do to redress the balance against them. Wotton recognized this reality, worked within its boundaries and thus, on the whole, found this embassy more in conformity with his diplomatic expectations than any of his other missions. While one cannot ascribe success to the policies which Henry attempted to implement with the Emperor in these years, 1543-1545, one can say that his resident ambassador emerged from this assignment with a knowledge of the fine points of diplomacy and a sense of experience necessary to perform as resident at the court of England's most powerful threat, France.

Chapter V

The False Peace: 1546-1549

Henry VIII had recalled Dr. Wotton from the Imperial court ostensibly to have the use of his services at home, but there is little evidence to suggest that this was indeed the case. From a later letter written from Guisnes during the negotiation of the Treaty of Campe, one learns that Wotton had spent this eight-month interval between diplomatic assignments in part battling ill health.¹ During this time, the French had landed on the Isle of Wight and were threatening the English coast as their answer to England's capture and retention of Boulogne. As had been the circumstances in 1544 with the Franco-Imperial peace, both sides, especially England, were feeling the financial pressure of war and were thus ready in 1546 to negotiate a peace. It is at this point that Nicholas Wotton reemerged into English diplomacy. It would, in fact, appear that he was summoned to join the English peace delegation primarily for the service which he could render as a legal expert, and the only remaining trace of his work is in the preparation of the Latin draft of the treaty articles.²

Throughout April of 1546, the Privy Council had been busily arranging matters for him and his colleagues to embark on their embassy to France; carts, horses and passports had to be provided. One of Wotton's most important appointments occurred on the 7th of April and was designed not only to demonstrate the King's favour toward him but also to increase his prestige for the presentation of the King's negotiations with France. This

¹Wotton to Petre, 29 May 1546, L.&P., XXI, i, p. 468, no. 953.

²D. L. Potter, "Diplomacy in the Mid-Sixteenth Century: England and France 1536-1550." Diss. (Cambridge: 1973), p. 143.

promotion was his appointment to the Privy Council:

This day was the said Mr. Dr. Wotton at after dinner sworn before the residue of the Council then present to be one of His Majesty's Privy Councillors taking the oath thereunto accustomed which was ministered unto him by the Lord Chancellor, and thereupon he was sat down at the council board.¹

His companions as commissioners for these negotiations with the French King were Edward Seymour, Earl of Hertford; John Dudley, Viscount Lisle; and William Paget, secretary of state and one well-known to Dr. Wotton.

On the 27th or April, the commission received its instructions from Henry who demanded his pension, the payment of the arrears of the same, compensation for expenses incurred in the course of the war and retention of Boulogne, although this last point was not to be presented as an insurmountable obstacle to peace. He was willing to restore it for a million crowns and a guarantee that the whole county of Guisnes (including Ardres) should remain his and his heirs.² Accordingly, on the 6th of May, Lisle, Paget and Wotton, who were to handle the negotiations while Hertford represented a continuing military presence, met their French counterparts (led by d'Annebault and secretary Bochetel) at Campe between Guisnes and Ardres to broach the subjects of the pension, an eight-million crown indemnity and Boulogne. The French reacted with their own instructions--restitution of Boulogne and the comprehension of Scotland in any agreement. After all, they had argued, Boulogne had been the reason for continuing the war after the Franco-Imperial peace. The English had then disclosed the device by which France could recover Boulogne upon the payment of an indemnity and the guarantee of the county of Guisnes to English possession. As for this indemnity, the French commissioners bluntly countered that the war had cost them twice as much, and it had been Henry who had initially broken

¹A.P.C., I, p. 371.

²Henry VIII to Hertford, Lisle, Paget and Wotton, 27 April 1546, L.&P., XXI, 1, pp. 338-339, no. 685.

the amity. Seeing that the indemnity was going to prove an impasse, the English delegation lowered it to six million crowns; still the French protested and wished to know the lowest figure which Henry would accept. Nothing less than three million crowns was the answer.¹

It is in the King's subsequent letter to his commissioners that the framework for the eventual settlement of Boulogne emerged. He expressed surprise that the French, for all their uproar over Boulogne, were unwilling to pay more for its recovery. He indicated that he would have been willing to cancel all debts and the pension in order to keep it, but recognizing that this would probably not constitute a substantial basis from which to negotiate the necessary peace, the English King suggested a price of two million crowns and a final settlement of the boundaries between Boulogne and Guisnes. Other issues, minute but divisive, had also arisen in these weeks leading up to the signing of the Treaty of Campe and threatened the negotiations. There was the question of the partitioning of the Boulonnais so that Henry might hold a part of it as a form of collateral to ensure the payment of the two million crowns plus whatever should be fixed as the arrears of the pension owed him. Closely connected with this query was the French attempt to alter the agreement so that they might recover the whole of the county at any time within the eight-year period set aside for that purpose. A point on which negotiations might have been severed was the request by France to allow the original inhabitants of the lands in the English sector of the Boulonnais to return before 1554. While Henry had this article struck from the treaty, he had also given the French King to understand that it would be his "quiet pleasure" to do so. The chief English concerns were to reach an agreement on the boundaries between

¹Ibid., Lisle, Paget and Wotton to Henry VIII, 6 May 1546, pp. 373-375, no. 749.

Guisnes and the Boulonnais and to comprehend the Emperor.¹

A letter from the English King to his commissioners on 26 May 1546 indicated an interesting shift in his attitude toward further fortifications in Boulogne. Having previously urged a ban on such, Henry had revealed on this date that he no longer wished to be bound to this but added that negotiations must not be allowed to break down over this point.² In fact, this issue was never to be settled amicably.

The Treaty of Campe, signed on 7 June 1546, began by stating that neither prince nor his subjects would invade the territory now owned by the other, nor aid anyone else, spiritual or temporal, in such invasions. Commerce was restored between the countries, and it was agreed that neither prince would aid or protect subjects of the other who had been convicted or in future might be convicted of lèse majesté but rather deliver such offenders within twenty days after receiving letters of request to do so. This point would become critical in Anglo-French relations during the reign of Mary when the issue of English rebels in France threatened the very foundations of the Marian government. Of course, the major clauses of the treaty were designed to ensure payment of the pension to Henry and his heirs, to prohibit the building of new fortifications by either side in the Boulonnais and to partition the county in such a way that England held the town and port with all land north of the river Liane which flowed into the sea at Boulogne and to hold the same until Michaelmas of 1554, by which time France was required to have paid all debts and indemnities. The Emperor was comprehended by both England and France, but the French also stipulated the comprehension of the Scots against whom the English were not to make war without a new occasion. Ratification by both princes was

¹Ibid., Henry VIII to Lisle, Paget and Wotton, 9 May 1546, p. 384, no. 775.

²Potter, "Diplomacy in the Mid-Sixteenth Century," pp. 139-161.

required within forty days.¹

As early as the 25th of May, Henry had anticipated an imminent conclusion of peace and had sent his instructions that, upon this accomplishment, Paget should return to England, and Lisle and Wotton should journey to the French court to present Henry's acceptance of the treaty and his request to have Dr. Wotton accepted as ambassador resident there. Coincidentally, Paget had written on the previous day to recommend Wotton for this position, believing:

... For which office Mr. Wotton were meet at the beginning though he tarried there the shorter while, both because he has a personage of peace and for that also, being a sober discreet man beaten now in these matters and not over hasty in practices, the Frenchmen, who no doubt will straight be in hand with new devices, may with his demureness and temperance be put off the better.²

Wotton requested Petre to obtain leave for him to return home first in order to settle some personal affairs and to prepare himself more sufficiently for this mission so that he might bring greater credit to his sovereign. Permission was given.³ In July, he and his counterpart in England, Odet de Selve, embarked on an embassy on which the odds were heavily against success. So many potentially explosive issues had been left unresolved or resentfully solved by the Treaty of Campe that all parties realized that the peace was at best tenuous, and another confrontation could not be far off.

Chief among the sources of conflict were the thorny problems of a Boulogne which could not be recovered before 1554, challenges by each side to the other that intelligence indicated construction of new fortifications

¹Thomas Rymer, Foedera Conventiones, Literae et cujuscunque Generis Acta Publica, inter Reges Angliae (London: A. and J. Churchill, 1704-1717), XV, pp. 93-99. (This source is hereafter cited as Rymer.)

²Henry VIII to Lisle, Paget and Wotton, 25 May 1546, L.&P., XXI, i, p. 446, no. 913; Potter, "Diplomacy in the Mid-Sixteenth Century," p. 157.

³Wotton to Petre, 29 May 1546, L.&P., XXI, i, p. 468, no. 953.

in contravention of the treaty and new disputes over the interpretation of the boundaries within the Boulonnais. Peripheral issues were also once again to flare--the payment of the pension in Edward's reign, the exchange of prisoners after the war and the bonds of previous alliances--the Anglo-Imperial and the Franco-Scottish. It was on this last point that the French ambassador had been instructed to concentrate his attention, for Francis I had realized that disputes between Scotland and England had not been settled, and he wished to know if Henry would remain more deferential to his old ally, Charles V.¹

Odet de Selve arrived early in July and wrote home on the 4th of his audience with the King who had proclaimed his desire for amity and informed the French ambassador that a delegation of Lord Admiral Lisle, the Bishop of Durham and Dr. Wotton was on its way to France.² Wotton and Lisle at the end of the month recorded a similar amicable reception at the French court, Francis having embraced Wotton and declaring his joy that Henry had selected him as ambassador resident, but the month did not pass without signs of discontent. On the 25th, Henry had complained to de Selve about the mistreatment of English prisoners still being held in France and declared that Francis could not hope for improved conditions for French prisoners in England unless some correction was attempted. Lisle was approached on the 30th of July by the French Admiral seeking an English opinion on whether the early restitution of Boulogne might be suggested. He was advised against initiating the topic; despite such advice, however, d'Annebault travelled to England in August to sound out the Council on this proposal but received instead only statements of grievances being felt by

¹Germain Lefebvre-Pontalis, Correspondance Politique de Odet de Selve, 1546-1549 (Paris: 1786), pp. XIV-XVI. (This source is cited hereafter as Correspondance Politique.)

²Ibid., de Selve to Francis I, 4 July 1546, p. 5.

England, specifically, the charge that the French were fortifying le Portel in contravention of the treaty, and there were new disputes over the location of the source of the river Liane forming the boundary between the French and English sectors of the Boulonnais.¹

Both courts experienced an escalation in conflict over fortifications in September. On the 14th, Henry had told de Selve that he could not and would not tolerate new fortifications in Boulogne and that if anyone had a right to construct these, it was he, since he had no hostages or the like to ensure payment for Boulogne. De Selve had countered that France had a right to continue constructions begun before the treaty.² A few days later, Wotton wrote to Henry that the Admiral still had not come to discuss the fortifications at le Portel and the question over the river boundary, but this was soon corrected when d'Annebault came to inform the English ambassador that work at le Portel had been halted; however, a commission must be appointed to settle the boundary differences. The newest French concern was over the assembling of men in England for Boulogne. Would Henry, d'Annebault wondered, disband these on learning of recent events at le Portel? Wotton believed that the Admiral feared that such a gathering portended war preparations.³ Negotiations dragged on, and Wotton quickly identified a major contributing factor to the lack of progress. The English commission was more extensive than that of the French, something which he believed had been intentionally devised.⁴ De Selve expressed this mutual distrust in a more forthright manner when he declared his need for an

¹Lisle and Wotton to Henry VIII, 30 July 1546, *L.&P.*, XXI, i, pp. 670-671, no. 1365; de Selve to Francis I, 25 July 1546, p. 662, no. 1343.

²*Ibid.*, de Selve to Francis I, 14 September 1546, XXI, ii, p. 37, no. 89.

³*Ibid.*, Wotton to Henry VIII, 17 September 1546, pp. 46-47, no. 117.

⁴*Ibid.*, Wotton to Henry VIII, 29 September 1546, pp. 77-79, no. 189.

increase in salary, stating that living among people who by nature despised France, his meagre circumstances served only to render further his business and himself so contemptible that no one would take any great heed of anything coming from him.¹

While the English correspondence over the next few months continued to reflect the controversies over fortifications and boundaries, de Selve's attention was diverted more to Scottish affairs. Preparations suggested war, yet the English court resounded with rumours of peace delegations. In January of 1547, commissioners were exchanged between England and France to conclude a settlement on the limits of the Boulonnais and to draw up a defensive league between the nations. De Selve and Baron de la Garde represented France; Henry appointed Lord John Russell, John Dudley, Thomas Seymour and William Paget. It was not long until the negotiations were disrupted by the death of the English King, although these were not abandoned.

Not an unexpected event, the death of the King on 27 January 1547 had left the governance of the realm in a precarious state, and his demise was kept top secret for three days. B. L. Beer has argued that the will from which the Edwardian government evolved was probably never intended as Henry's final draft of this document, but it left the young King a country in the hands of a conciliar government of sixteen executors and twelve assistant executors.² Not the wisest choice in the sixteenth century, L. B. Smith has explained that Henry had rendered this instrument even less effective by providing neither operational guidelines nor even a procedure for

¹Ibid., de Selve to d'Annebault, 30 September 1546, p. 80, no. 193.

²B. L. Beer, Northumberland (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1973), pp. 43-45 and 56-60. The sixteen executors were Cranmer, Wriothesley, St. John, Edward Seymour, John Dudley, Cuthbert Tunstall, John Russell, Anthony Brown, Chief Justice Bromley, Edward Montague, Edward North, William Paget, Anthony Denny, William Herbert, Edward Wotton and Nicholas Wotton.

replacing itself, although he had invested the executors with equal power.¹ The process by which Somerset emerged as Protector is as ambiguous to us as it was to his contemporaries, but he had been considered Henry's chief adviser in the closing days of the reign and was numbered among the four most prominent men in the kingdom by the Imperial ambassador, van der Delft. This ambassador foresaw that Edward Seymour and John Dudley would wield the power and enjoy the privilege, while Paget and Wriothesley managed the affairs of state. Most of the diplomatic community, however, credited Somerset's pre-eminence to his physical custody of Edward VI.² Dr. Hoak, in his presentation of these events, has shed light on the emergence of Somerset at the expense of his chief rival on the Council, Wriothesley, who had spoken against the January decision to name a protector. The patent by which this decision was given legitimacy was not issued until March, by which time, Somerset had established sufficient control within the Council.³

The most important foreign pressure facing the new regime was the negotiations in hand for the settlement of the controversies which had plagued the Anglo-French peace from its beginning. The two levels of discussions resumed--local officials taking up the border disputes, while the more prominent figures, led once again by Russell and de Selve, worked for a defensive league, which, it was hoped, might serve to counter French overtures to a new German Protestant alliance, the Hilfgesuch. On his deathbed, Henry had agreed to such a league, but his son's government had now to confirm it. Treaties on these two areas were produced in March.⁴ The agreement on

¹L. B. Smith, Henry VIII: the Mask of Royalty (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971), p. 269.

²Beer, Northumberland, pp. 54-55.

³Hoak, The King's Council in the Reign of Edward VI, pp. 234-239.

⁴Potter, "Diplomacy in the Mid-Sixteenth Century," pp. 161-163.

Boulogne recognized French claims that fortifications at Mont St. Etienne had been started before the Treaty of Campe and so should have been allowed to continue. Similar claims by England for Bullenberg and Blancnez were upheld. It was further agreed that the Liane river flowing under Pont de Brique would be considered the boundary line up to its source, which was determined to be the point at which the stream nearest to the church at Quesques flowed into the river. The pact known as the defensive league opened with the declaration that in order to preserve and establish the bond of peace and amity which had been forged by Francis I and Henry VIII, the two delegations had agreed on a Treaty of Perpetual Peace. The following terms had been reached: the two Kings would render assistance to each other and defend each other's territories held at the time of the Treaty of Campe, and this they would do in case of invasion of the other's territory or attempt at it, war or injury or harm inflicted upon each other's persons or subjects--such action to be taken against anyone whatsoever, even those to whom they should be joined by bond of blood and treaty. Mutual assistance was to take the form of supplying men, material and horses, as well as ships to be equipped with the necessary weapons and arms to be financed by the party which was under attack and receiving the assistance. The provider could extend further aid, if he deemed it beneficial, and the recipient was protected by the clause stating that he should pay for the assistance at the rate and level of prices existing at the time of receipt. It was finally concluded that in the event of an attack upon one, the other would not assist the aggressor either directly or indirectly with counsel, favour, money, supplies or services of his subjects; neither he nor his subjects would lead or subsidize external forces nor make use of such to benefit the aggressor, even if bound to do so by treaty or blood. Despite this talk of going beyond the bonds of kinship and friendship, much of the force

was removed when the Anglo-Imperial and the Franco-Scottish alliances were reserved.¹

The instability of this feigned friendship was not lost on political realists of the decade. Wotton sensed this uncertainty as can be established in a letter to Lord Cobham:

... Like as I see yet no great likelihood of any breach with these men: so would I wish that your sons and other that are here were at home (to be out of all doubt) for a while till it may evidently appear which way the wind will blow. Nevertheless if I perceive any such likelihood at my departure hence I will take your sons with me if I may be suffered so to do.²

In fact, this mood pervaded the entire mission.

On 11 March 1547, the instrument by which Somerset officially became Lord Protector was accepted by the Council. Three days later, they wrote to Wotton touching matters relevant to France. They thanked him for his "good and wise proceedings" over the past months and continued:

... Praying you likewise as you have done hitherto to continue and take pains there for a small time, for ere it be long we intend to send for you and to send one thither that shall succeed to you in the room of ambassador there.

This did not happen, but the Council did inform the ambassador of a measure adopted to "remove the scruple" persistently raised by France concerning the validity of actions taken during Edward's minority; the young King, along with the Protector, would sign his own correspondence. Wotton was further informed that although the French commissioner, Baron de la Garde, had had reservations about remaining in England after Henry's death, the Council had persuaded him that negotiations could and should go forward.³

A curious triangle of letters was despatched on 1 April 1547. The Council forwarded copies of the proposed treaties to Wotton, along with his

¹Rymer, XV, pp. 135-142.

²Wotton to Lord Cobham, 26 February 1547, Harl. 283, f. 373.

³The Council to Wotton, 14 March 1547, S.P. 68/1, fos. 132-133.

appointment as the King's commissioner to receive the French King's oath for the observation of the defensive league.¹ De Selve confirmed this créance special for Wotton on the same date and also reported that the English ambassador had sent news to the Council concerning the movement of French troops toward Scotland.² Wotton too wrote home on the first to convey the news of the death of King Francis on the previous day:

The French King departed to God yesterday about noon, the which thing certain of the Council not only with words but much more with tears running down their cheeks apace told a servant of mine whom I had sent to the court for certain knowledge of it; my said servant saw also the Lady Margaret, the French King's daughter, and Madame Destampes, and all the rest of the dames come forth from the castle of Rambuilliers where the King had died weeping and making a great moan.³

This event cast lengthening shadows over the fate of both treaties under consideration and French involvement in Scotland. As for the first, ratification was never given, for the new King, Henry II, less inclined toward peace, was under the influence of the Guise faction, relatives of Mary Queen of Scots to whom he shortly betrothed his son.⁴ In addition, the Constable, Anne de Montmorency, a protagonist for better Franco-Imperial relations, had been reinstated at court. Observing these changes on the 6th of April, Wotton reflected little hope for true amity between France and England.⁵ While Scotland became an increased threat to English security, Boulogne became an impossible thorn in the path to peace.

The question of what would become of the treaty efforts loomed large

¹The Council to Wotton, 1 April 1547, Foreign Cal., p. 10, no. 48.

²De Selve to Francis I, 1 April 1547, Correspondance Politique, p. 124.

³Wotton to the Council, 1 April 1547, S.P. 68/1, f. 231.

⁴W. K. Jordan, Edward VI: the Young King (London: Allen and Unwin, 1968), pp. 235-237.

⁵P. F. Tytler, England under the Reigns of Edward VI and Mary (London: Richard Bentley, 1839), Wotton to the Council, 6 April 1547, I, pp. 35-42. (This source is hereafter cited as Tytler.)

in English concerns, but they waited a few days before moving the question, in the hope that the French might first reveal through a special messenger the mind of their new King. On the 12th, the Council decided to act:

Now seeing the time passeth very fast away within the which the treaties last concluded should be ratified, sworn and confirmed and as yet we neither have heard of any other matter nor yet of any special messenger coming, and for as much as by the death of the said French King your commission for residing as ambassador there is determined, His Highness mindeth that you shall continue for a time as His Majesty's ambassador resident with the King that now is in like sort as you did before.

After instructing Wotton to convey lengthy condolences from Edward to the new French King, the Council continued on the pressing need for swift action if the treaties were to be ratified within the specified time limit:

Whereas certain treaties now of late concluded betwixt certain commissioners of His Majesty and others of the said French King that dead is wherein among other things is mentioned that the same should be ratified and confirmed by either prince within forty days following the date of the said treaties, and likewise an oath taken for the performance of the same in the presence of such commissioners as should be sufficiently authorized for the demanding of the said oath, ratification and confirmation, His Majesty understanding by the said French King's ambassador resident here that his master, that now is, is no less desirous to go through and perfect all such things as be contained in the several treaties that his said father was to enter, the same hath in respect thereof with the advice and consent aforesaid appointed you to be His Highness's commissioner for that purpose.¹

The correspondence of May reflects generally bitter feelings in both courts. Wotton wrote to Paget on the 16th that he had heard through a servant of the Duke of Saxony that the French Council was rent with division--that faction under the Duke of Guise favouring closer Scottish involvement, while that of the Constable sought closer Imperial ties. Neither was favourably inclined toward England, but Wotton wrote off talk of renewed war.² The French were continuing to hold out false hope to the English for ratification of the treaties and had even despatched their ambassador in Scotland,

¹The Council to Wotton, 12 April 1547, S.P. 68/1, fos. 48-52.

²Wotton to Paget, 16 May 1547, Tytler, I, pp. 58-59.

Henri Cleutin Sieur d'Oysel, to London, at the end of May ostensibly to oversee Scottish interests in any implementation of these agreements.¹ Discord, however, continued, and the French ambassador in London added fuel to the fire in his interviews with Somerset when he chose to avoid direct answers to questions concerning his sovereign's decision on the ratification, and Somerset expressed to him English indignation at not having been sent a special ambassador to announce the death of Francis I nor new credentials for de Selve himself. On this last point, the ambassador correctly replied that this was not part of French diplomatic custom. Just a few days later, he provided ammunition to his countrymen, who were already disinclined toward England, when he commented that if the fortifications underway by England in Boulogne were as strong as rumoured, he felt grave misgivings about any future surrender of Boulogne for any amount of money.²

There then occurs in Wotton's correspondence a ten-month gap which can probably best be attributed to the loss of the material. Through scant references in the correspondence of others, it is known that he continued in residence at the French court battling the same wearisome difficulties.³ Throughout the summer, both sides charged violations of the Treaty of Cambray. The French were most resentful over what they contended were illegal fortifications being erected by Englishmen in Boulogne and a new grievance, England's refusal to comprehend Scotland in the treaties still under consideration.⁴ De Selve reported Somerset's countercharge that Scotland had

¹Marguerite Wood, Balcarres Papers, 1538-1557 (Edinburgh: Scottish Historical Society, 1923), d'Oysel to the Queen Dowager, 29 May 1547, I, p. 159.

²De Selve to the Constable, 9 May 1547, Correspondance Politique, p. 143.

³Ibid., de Selve to Henry II, 15 June 1547, p. 150.

⁴Van der Delft to Charles V, 17 June 1547, Span. Cal., IX, p. 106. (In the Spanish Calendar in volumes IX to XII, the letters do not appear to be numbered.)

done nothing but provoke England and the Emperor since the signing of the Treaty of Campe:

... Quy sont que en ceste compréhension il y a ugne restriction par laquelle il ne doibt point estre préjudicie aulx traictés que les deux princes contrahentz ont, ce qui s'entend tant des traictés faictz avec l'Empereur que des traictés faictz avec les Escossoys, or dict il que les Escossoys sont en guerre avec l'Empereur et prennent journellement ce qu'ilz peuvent sur ses subjectz, et que par les traictés que les Angloys ont avec le dict sieur Empereur ilz ne peuvent faire paix avec les Escossoys sans luy, oultre que par la dicte compréhension et dict que les Angloys ne feront guerre aulx Escossoys sy ce nest en cas de nouvelle occasion donnée, lequel cas dict le dict Protecteur estre advenu et la dict occasion avoyr este donnée plusque souffisante comme il seroyt prest de veriffier toutes les foys qu'il ce trouveroyt juges neustres devant lesquelz cela peust estre terminé.

To this de Selve replied:

La dicte restriction n'entendoyt point des traictés faictz avec l'Empereur, et quand ainsy seroyt que l'Empereur avoyt tousjours eu paix avec les Escossoys et n'avoyt eu guerre a eulx que pour l'adherence qu'il avoyt eue avec les roys d'Angleterre duquel ayant entendu la paix avec le feu roy et que les Escossoys y estoient comprinz il n'avoyt pensé des l'heure plus avoyr de guerre à eulx.¹

Talk of war and preparations for it abounded at each court, but

de Selve added this assessment of the English position:

... Quy faict croyre que quelque menace qu'ilz facent ilz ne feront paz sy tost entreprinse ny du coste d'Escosse ny ailleurs, sy ce nest pour déffendre et par contraincte.²

They simply lacked the manpower to fight unless forced. When France threatened in August to withdraw the pension and the indemnity for Boulogne, the traditional solution was proposed--a commission--which was to meet in February and on which Dr. Wotton was to serve.³ In September, Wotton put forward a scheme for the mutual restitution of ships and prisoners, and

¹De Selve to the Constable, 7 July 1547, Correspondance Politique, p. 156.

²Ibid., de Selve to Henry II, 17 August 1547, p. 184.

³St. Mauris to the Queen Regent, 3 October 1547, Span. Cal., IX, pp. 522-523.

because France needed a respite from armed hostility, the Conseil Privé approved the plan in October.¹

This conciliatory mood did not last long. Correspondence for the autumn and at the outset of 1548 set the tone for Anglo-French relations over the next year. In the continuing disputes over the mutual harassment of each other's shipping, Wotton and the Constable once again clashed. Montmorency bluntly proclaimed that England could have war or peace, whichever it meant to have, but France would not tolerate interference with its subjects. The ambassador retorted that England was only responding to French provocation. Henry II too joined in this verbal sabre-rattling with his provocative remark that these disputes could be settled either by commissioners or by the sword; either way, he would be ready.² De Selve found the English government less adamant but not without determination. Somerset recounted for Wotton one such interview with the French ambassador:

... At his coming to us for so much as all his complaints was of the ships taken we made answer that if any other private men of England have taken any French ships, it is not of our commandment nor by no public authority, but if they have done anything, it might well be, for so much as their having their ships taken, their goods stayed and sold with you and made complaint and pursuit to you for it, can have no redress nor justice at your hands. And so when they come to us, we say that there is peace betwixt you and us, and that they should pursue that cause there at the law in France, and declare it to you, Mons. l'Ambassador, or to our ambassador there to have more furtherance. ... And upon this it may be, that some of them have essayed to take again for their relief and revenge, but public authority of us, they have none. ... It is no marvel though sometimes the servant passeth his commission but yet that is not our commandment. ... We for our part are content if he will do the like to appoint commissioners, for the mutual recompense and arrears of injuries and in the meanseason we are content for our part and do this much (if your master will do the same) we shall send our letters down to all the ports and give commandment that all such goods as is taken of the Frenchmen by the King Majesty's subjects shall be stayed, and such of that as cannot tarry, to be sold to

¹Potter, "Diplomacy in the Mid-Sixteenth Century," pp. 174-175.

²St. Mauris to the Queen Regent, 13 February 1548, Span. Cal., IX, p. 548.

the most advantage and the money to be reserved ... to be re-¹
stored again according as the same commissioners shall judge.

It was vital for Somerset to have peace with France while attempting to settle differences with Scotland, but Wotton often took the opportunity to warn his government of the bad faith of its Continental neighbour. French troops were being moved to Brittany from which either to proceed to the aid of the Scots or to launch an attack on Boulogne in which were many subjects ready and willing to betray the territory to France.² Scotland was the major concern, however, as has already been mentioned, and as early as August of 1547, Somerset had accepted the French request to put the question of the early restitution of Boulogne to a commission in February. In this month, he reiterated his decision to de Selve; Warwick, Paget and Wotton were to be Edward's commissioners.

When Wotton's correspondence resumes in March of 1548, one finds a slightly disgruntled ambassador writing to Petre that he had trusted to have been recalled sooner, but currently, he was in need of a copy of the last form of ratification used between England and France so that it might serve as a model for the present agreements still being considered. Poor trade relations only served as further aggravation to those working within the tense climate produced by the two basic grievances, and the abundant rumours were duly handed on to the respective governments for judicious contemplation.

Three letters, all in March, will capture the mood of the year--mistrust. On the question of offences committed against merchants and their goods, Wotton wrote on the 7th:

The Constable sent to me his secretary, a man in good estimation with him, with a letter of credence saying that by

¹Somerset to Wotton, 15 October 1548, Harl. 249, fos. 19r-20v.

²Jordan, The Young King, p. 280.

the last letter that I sent to the Constable it seemed that I mistook the answer that the Constable had made me, for he said that the Constable did not mean that they would refuse justice to our men that complained, but the King would send down into Normandy to be informed of the truth of my complaint, and that if any wrong had been done unto him that complained, it should be reformed.

The secretary's subsequent remarks arguing for English reciprocal action prompted Wotton to answer:

I said unto him that in very deed justice ought to be administered indifferently on both sides and that I would not fail to certify your lordships as well of their merchants' complaints which the Constable had sent unto me as also of the answer that he had brought me from him. And that for your lordships' part I doubted not but that you would administer justice according unto right and equality. Marry, he said that poor merchants causes ought to be despatched with diligence for the staying of their ships and goods was their undoing.

The secretary took leave of a sceptical ambassador, "And yet I cannot well trust to have any good answer herein unless they hear that your lordships have done first somewhat for their subjects that complain likewise." The letter closed with ill tidings brought to the ambassador by his spy at the court:

Harpax¹ showeth me that the French ambassador d'Oysel, who was despatched a good while ago to go into Scotland, is yet in Brittany and saith² that a French painter named, as I remember it, Nicholas² who was some time in England hath delivered to the French King the pictures of all the havens in England, and that these men, to land their men that go into Scotland, should not shrink to land them in some haven of ours so it be not too far off from the Scots, but like as that may be true so can I not even very well believe it, for that were so direct against the treaty that it could by no colour be excused.³

The atmosphere at the court grew more hostile, and French officials

¹Tytler believed Harpax to be a Scotsman named Montgomery.

²Nicholas must have been Nicholas de Nicolay who published La Navigation du Roy d'Escoce (Paris: 1583) and a pamphlet on the war in Boulogne, (Paris: 1550).

³Wotton to the Council, 7 March 1548, S.P. 68/2, fos. 329-342. (There appears to have been a mistake in the foliation for this volume, so that folio 342 just cited should probably have been 332.)

took great pains to uphold their Scottish allies to the English ambassador. He found his own credibility in question, especially when it clashed with military propaganda being issued by Henry II:

... And these tidings are taken to be so true and so great that men stand half in doubt whether they may believe the tidings that I tell them of my Lord Grey and my Lord Wharton's proceedings in Scotland. And albeit that I tell them that my letters received from your lordships being so fresh and fresher than theirs by the which they pretend to be advertised of their news, can be, and yet in my said letters not one word making mention of any such thing being so notable and great as that should be, I said that they were not likely to be true, nor I could not believe them; yet forbecause the King and the chief of his Council tell their news for true, the more faith is given to that.

The Imperial ambassador contributed further information to Wotton on the anti-English rumours about Paris:

They say here at the court that the King being such a great prince as he is may not suffer the old friends of France to be oppressed by us and alienated from them and especially now at his first coming to the crown, nor will he not suffer it by no means to be written in books and chronicles that the Scots who had ever been so faithful friends to France and whom his ancestors had ever defended from us should in his reign be lost and of friends made enemies to them. He saith also that he heareth that these men have some secret enterprise upon Boulogne and our fortifications thereabout which they will execute when all our men and minds shall be busy and occupied in Scotland.¹ And as it seemeth by him, he believeth this to be true.

A letter to Somerset near the end of March contained very revealing intelligence gathered by a Southampton merchant at the request of the Lord Protector. Inexperienced in the ways of espionage, this merchant had sought his ambassador's assistance in conveying the information back to England:

He saith that his friends and acquaintances look for war with us and that it is told him for a certainty that the French King will show himself very earnest to help the Scots to the intent to fear Your Grace thereby trusting by that means to bring the matter so about that Your Grace will be content that the French King, suffering the marriage betwixt the King's Highness and the Scottish Queen to take effect, Boulogne, Calais and all that we hold on this side shall be delivered to the French King. He saith that he perceiveth by honest men of this country that they

¹Ibid., Wotton to the Council, 18 March 1548, fos. 363-364.

fear much the wars with us and are very loath and sorry that any such should be and that in¹ case there be any, Scotland only shall be the cause of it.

Events in 1549 were to demonstrate that such intelligence was not far off the mark from the reality of French attitudes and aspirations.

Troubled waters were once again stirred in April. Wotton reported to the Council the continued seizure of English ships, and one of his messengers had seen hundreds of French troops en route to Brittany. He wrote more extensively to Petre on this conversation with Harpax to whom he had refused further payment unless repaid with more information. The result was success. Relevant to shipping matters, the spy warned the ambassador against French merchants who claimed that injustices had been done to them by Englishmen on the way to Scotland, for these Frenchmen were actually using this as a device by which to gain time in England where they might travel and learn much while awaiting a settlement. He also cautioned Wotton about a servant of the French King, a certain Berteville,² who, Harpax, thought, was then travelling in England and who should be encouraged to remain there, for he could do much harm during a war if permitted to return to France.³ The enmity toward England felt by Queen Catherine de Medici was again attested to by this informant who reminded Wotton that her family had claims in Boulogne, and she wished to see this territory quickly and completely restored to France. Her kinsman, the military commander Pietro Strozzi, was heavily involved in launching the French initiative in Scotland.⁴ In such adverse circumstances, matters could only become worse between the

¹Ibid., Wotton to the Council, 27 March 1548, fos. 387-389.

²Berteville, an inveterate intriguer, is to be found in much of the correspondence of the period and appears, at times, to have offered his services to both sides.

³Wotton to the Council, 16 April 1548, Foreign Cal., p. 20, no. 84.

⁴Wotton to Petre, 16 April 1548, Tytler, I, pp. 91-96.

two governments already at confrontation point. Another one of these consultations was reported to the Council on the 20th. Harpax had dined the previous evening with Montluc, who had said that if he were in command of the French navy, it would have already been despatched to England. Montluc had just returned from a special embassy to France's other troublesome ally, the Sultan, an ill omen for European affairs. There was also a rumour from a "good source" that Mons. de Châtillon (Gaspard de Coligny) was contemplating a move against Boulogne.¹

The ambassadors in both countries often found themselves summoned before the majesterium of the realm solely to receive its complaints. De Selve recorded such an instance at the beginning of May of 1548 when Somerset had confronted him with the intelligence of French troop movements toward Scotland. The ambassador simply denied all knowledge of any such activity. Approximately three weeks later, it was Wotton's turn to find himself in a similar position. A French merchant in Bordeaux had filed a complaint against English interference, and the French government wished to know what redress he might expect. The English ambassador produced on this occasion the other tool common to his profession--a denial of sufficient commission to handle the charge.² Such claims and counterclaims were the essential fibre of routine Anglo-French diplomatic relations throughout 1548. At this point, however, it may be well to note that, of course, as was to be expected, each ambassador also participated in much of the day to day life of the court. He might be invited to special dinners for visiting dignitaries, be expected to attend such ceremonies as weddings and christenings, and, in Wotton's case, it was noted with special interest by the Mantuan ambassador, he observed Lent with the rest of the court, "Lo ambasciatore

¹Wotton to the Council, 20 April 1548, Foreign Cal., pp. 21-22, no. 87.

²De Selve to Henry II, 1 May 1548, Correspondance Politique, p. 338; Wotton to Petre, 25 May 1548, Foreign Cal., pp. 23-24, no. 97.

d'Inghilterre, ambasciatore di un tanto re, et oltre Lutheranissimo et nel suo paese et per tutto, fa la quaresima."¹

The summer brought renewed conflict over fortifications in Boulogne, and Somerset sent word that England would demolish the new fortifications on which work had been begun if Henry would likewise raze the one which had been built at the harbour. De Selve reminded the Protector that France was only bound to halt construction and not to destroy.² By Autumn, the Imperial ambassador had observed growing obstinacy on both sides. While revealing that his government would strictly observe its obligations to the letter of the law, especially in view of Edward's minority, Wotton had resentfully commented that he hoped the Scots would refuse to fight for France when the need arose, their young Queen having been gone so long. He was to live to see and to participate in the drafting of a treaty which had come about largely as the result of just such a situation. The French King, the Imperial ambassador believed, might have easily exerted himself just a little more to obtain a better understanding with England, but Henry had let it be known in no uncertain terms that he could not abandon his country's traditional ally; and as for the question of sovereignty, that was a matter to be determined between England and Scotland.³ It was in just such a spirit that Somerset forwarded to Wotton documentary and ancient evidence to present to the doubting French court as proof positive for English supremacy over Scotland. English officials had prepared an extensive review of the relevant documents and had requested de Selve to review and to report on the material to his sovereign, an invitation which the ambassador had chosen to reject on the grounds of insufficient commission. Thus it

¹Lucien Romier, Origines Politiques des Guerres de Religion (Paris: 1913-1914), Corregiani to the Duke of Mantua, 12 March 1548, p. 197.

²De Selve to Henry II, 1 July 1548, Correspondance Politique, p. 396.

³St. Mauris to Charles V, 12 October 1548, Span. Cal., IX, p. 305.

was that the Council wrote extensively to Wotton to convey to the French King their case for sovereignty not, as they emphasized:

... For that we minded hereby to make him or any other man judge of His Majesty's right, but for the goodwill we bear to the continuance of the amity we thought expedient to give knowledge unto him as unto the King's Majesty's good brother of the very truth of this matter to the intent that he might thereby both inform himself of the just quarrel of His Majesty to the said sovereignty and also being informed may (as in reason and honour we think he ought to do) forbear from henceforth to aid His Majesty's rebels in their unjust quarrel.¹

Thus 1548 ended at the same point on which it had begun. Scottish affairs occupied much of Somerset's energy and attention; he saw as his primary duty the solution of problems produced by sharing an island with a foreign government rather than preserving the overseas conquests of Henry VIII. To achieve this end, he contemplated at several moments during the year the premature surrender of Boulogne to the French who represented the major obstacle to a firm settlement with Scotland. Discussions never accomplished material success in this, for the French in October pressed their advantage too far; they demanded not only Boulogne but also Calais, and this latter dominion was considered by Somerset to be rightful English territory.² Although the Protector had hoped that such a bribe as Boulogne would entice France sufficiently and give him a free hand with Scotland, such was not to be his good fortune. Events of the next year saw the tide turn strongly against him in both foreign and domestic policies.

William Paget enjoyed a special advisory role to the Lord Protector and in this capacity often despatched memoranda containing his personal opinion on the state of the realm. In several such reports in 1549, he

¹The Council to Wotton, 30 December 1548, Calig. B. VII, fos. 347r-347v; J. Bain, Calendar of the State Papers Relating to Scotland and Mary, Queen of Scots (Edinburgh: H. M. Register House, 1898), I, p. 170, no. 339.

²M. L. Bush, The Government Policies of Protector Somerset (London: Edward Arnold, 1975), pp. 2-10.

apologized for his preoccupation with the gloomy circumstances pressing in from all sides; nevertheless, he urged Somerset to maintain closer surveillance on French activities either through Wotton or special agents. He succinctly summarized the precarious position of the country: war with Scotland, pending difficulties with France, a tenuous ally in the Emperor and a shortage of money. The last two difficulties promised easier solution than the first. Somerset should strive to gain time with Charles V, feigning friendship and arguing that the English religious changes were but in form and fashion of service, something which had long been acceptable throughout Christendom. To increase revenue, the Protector should obtain from the current Parliament higher taxes to be collected by men of strength throughout the country; remaining church treasures should also be confiscated.¹

Wotton's letters home in February confirmed the bleak picture which Paget had painted. Near the beginning of the month just after the attempted coup by Thomas Seymour, the English ambassador had reported his suspicions of French compliance in this plot, for it had been anticipated that Thomas would make peace with the Scots and terminate the Imperial alliance. By the closing days of the month, the ambassador had learned of a Franco-Scottish strategy directed against Berwick with the aid of two thousand French troops due to arrive in March.²

The peace was momentarily shattered in April of 1549. The French subsequently explained their harassment of English subjects in English territory as necessary retaliation for England's destruction of the church and lime kiln in Boulogne. Later in the month, they also attacked Bullenberg,

¹B. L. Beer, Letters of William Lord Paget of Beaudesert, 1547-1563 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1973), Paget to Somerset, 2 February 1549, pp. 22-25.

²St. Mauris to Charles V, 5 February 1549, Span. Cal., IX, p. 236; Wotton to Petre, 23 February 1549, Tytler, I, pp. 156-161.

after which the English redistributed their garrison around Boulogne ready for a confrontation which did not come.¹ When these issues arose in Council, however, the following considerations were advanced:

The French have no treaty with you but under pretence of a treaty live in such a broken friendship with you that your honour cannot be continued, for they pay not your pension. They make war upon your subjects by land and sea, they aid your open enemies the Scots.

The question then put forward was what avenues lay open to the government--force, diplomacy to obtain redress or continued uncertainty. Further consideration must be given to the facts that:

They have lived three years in peace whereby undoubtedly they waxen rich. They have now to do in wars with no other prince. Their own people be more esquaried for the wars than they have been in times past. They are stronger by sea than they are wont to be. They know our misery and condemn us.²

The only hopeful sign of the year came in May when Renard reported that Wotton had confirmed rumours of a truce and the appointment of new commissioners. At this point, most officials were discounting the possibility of war in 1549.³

While both sides spoke of peace, belligerent activities and military propaganda were much in evidence. Renard filed a most enlightening report of the hostilities at the French court. On Whitsunday, Wotton had complained to Henry about a light cavalry attack on Englishmen at Ardres and that twenty-five French ships had entered Boulogne harbour and had attacked vessels already there. The King denied all knowledge of it, said that he was recalling his cavalry from the area and chided the English ambassador that his country had first provoked France. Shortly after this confrontation, when dining with the Duke of Guise, Wotton received yet another challenge

¹St. Mauris to Charles V, April of 1549, Span. Cal., IX, pp. 366 and 371.

²Letters of William Paget, Paget to Somerset, 17 April 1549, pp. 31-32.

³Renard to Charles V, 2 May 1549, Span. Cal., IX, p. 380.

that England complained so fiercely in order to divert attention from further fortifications and in order to cover up a secret mission by Paget to the Emperor to contrive something against France. Renard believed that Paget's mission had indeed introduced an element of fear and caution into French manoeuvres, for an attack on England might precipitate a declaration of war from the Emperor.¹ Wotton's letter home at the end of June also supplies evidence for the general lack of sincere endeavours toward peace and amity. When informed that the French commissioners to work for the conservation of the amity and a peaceful settlement of the boundaries would be Châtillon, du Mortier and de la Rochepot, Wotton broadly hinted that these men were not impartial judges.² As for the French suspicions of Paget's embassy, they were well-founded. As was so often the outward objectives of such missions, Paget had been instructed to initiate proposals for a marriage alliance and a strengthened defensive league. The root of the mission lay deeper:

A second cause of my coming, I said, was to communicate unto him the state of the King's affairs with the Scots our common enemy and also the French, his dissembled friends and our secret enemies.

Charles V was neither eager nor ready to accept any extension of his foreign commitments, for his own family was seriously divided at this point over the very basic destiny of the Habsburg fortunes. Granvelle spoke encouraging but futile words to the English ambassador:

Look well to your things and keep them out of their hands this year, and doubt ye not that the next year, God shall send you some assistance that shall help you and give them enough to busy themselves in as I trust you shall shortly perceive.³

Paget's final interview was with the Bishop of Arras who advanced this

¹Ibid., Renard to Charles V, 12 June 1549, pp. 389-390.

²Wotton to Somerset, 27 June 1549, Foreign Cal., p. 40, no. 173.

³Beer, Letters of William Paget, Paget to Somerset, 24 June 1549, p. 37.

justification to the English delegation on their request to have Boulogne included within the designated English territories which, according to the 1543 Anglo-Imperial treaty of alliance, Charles was bound to defend:

As to the comprehension of Boulogne, you must know that we have a treaty with the French as well as with you which the Emperor cannot without some touch of his honour break without some just ground. And albeit His Majesty would be loath to see the King his good brother forgo either that piece or any other iota of his right, yet can he not enter this defence unless he would break with France out of hand which in respect of his other affairs he cannot yet do.

Unhappy with this answer, Paget replied (off the record) to Arras, "Whereas you stick so much upon your honour in breaking your treaty with the French, I remember Mons. Granvelle, your father, at my being with him, did not let to say that he had his sleeve full of quarrels against the French whenever the Emperor list to break with them"¹

August on both sides of the Channel was a chaotic month. Somerset's government had to cope with Kett's peasant rebellion, which meant that its attention was partially diverted from French affairs. Paget was thus prompted to send another memorandum to his friend. In it, he recognized that many, who had initially applauded the capture of Boulogne and invasion into Scotland as major victories, had subsequently come to view these as burdens because of the charges and inconveniences accruing from them. The current domestic unrest, Paget argued, required the Protector to temporize for as long as possible on these while attempting to quell internal rebellion by force and terror if necessary.² Without domestic calm restored, other victories would be but Pyrrhic. It was most unfortunate for Wotton that his government was so disrupted at this time, for serious difficulties developed for him at the beginning of the month. On 8 August 1549, Renard despatched a ciphered note to the Emperor recounting the arrest of the

¹Ibid., Paget and Hoby to Somerset, 12 July 1549, p. 58.

²Ibid., Paget and Hoby to Somerset, 24 July 1549, pp. 69-73.

English ambassador three days earlier in Poissy. The Constable, who only days before had spoken amiably with Wotton, had on this date sent out a band of archers to arrest him and one of his messengers who was travelling to England. In this manner, Montmorency had attempted to prevent the English government from learning the state of affairs. Renard also believed that Wotton was being held as a kind of pawn to be exchanged in case de Selve had not yet made his escape from England after delivering a formal declaration of war on the 8th. The French had reason to fear retaliation, for during Kett's rebellion, they had advanced upon Boulogne. Renard commented that the diplomatic community was scandalized and added sarcastically, "Thus the French turn their fair words into deeds."¹ Regrettably, nothing of Wotton's correspondence from this month has survived, but his arrest was undoubtedly a contributing factor to his future anti-French bias.

On the last day of August, the Council settled to the task of writing to their ambassador in France of the recent domestic disorders and also to inform him that French incursions into English territory had not escaped their notice. They had taken these infractions of the treaty immediately as a declaration of war:

We cannot omit to advertise you that the French King by means of this dangerous business at home hath taken courage to invade the King's Majesty's possessions of the other side of the seas, and albeit it was so foreseen as order was taken for his incumbering in the field, yet the outrageousness of the people was such with ourselves as attending first to pacify things at home, as reason requireth, we could not in time provide for things abroad.

The Council prayed that God might assist Edward in repaying Henry's manifold breaches of the peace.² Accordingly, England issued its own declaration of war in September of 1549 and recalled Dr. Wotton from the French

¹Renard to Charles V, 8 August 1549, Span. Cal., IX, p. 428; Potter, "Diplomacy in the Mid-Sixteenth Century," p. 209.

²The Council to Wotton, 31 August 1549, S.P. 68/4, fos. 1061-1062.

court. Proclaiming Edward's constant efforts to achieve peace with his neighbours throughout Christendom, the declaration reminded the French of the commission appointed by Henry VIII and Francis I to settle differences remaining between their two countries. It then continued:

The French King that now is, always insatiably desirous of tumult, wars and effusion of Christian blood and especially bearing a deadly hatred and malice against the King's Majesty in the realm of England seeking matters of variance and occasions of pique and quarrel whereby he might be filled with blood and wars, first refused his father's agreement, and although the Treaty of Perpetual Peace made at the end of the last wars doth most plainly set forth the limits and agreements of his said father, yet he, cavilling now on this point not able to find any just ground to work on, suddenly took the Castle of ... from His Majesty.¹

There then followed a list of other provocative moves--the seizure of the dunette at Boulogne during which the deputy and watchman had been killed, fortifications in Boulogne against the treaty, the stealing away from Edward of Mary Queen of Scots and the thefts and murders committed upon Englishmen by French ministers and subjects. On this last point, Henry was credited with the statement that for every French sheep stolen, twenty English ones should be taken; for every Frenchman killed, forty English lives should be forfeited. The English left no doubt as to their opinion of this sense of justice; it was the "answer of a Turk and a tyrant, not a Christian prince":

... On consideration of all which things rehearsed the King's Majesty by the advice of his most entirely beloved uncle, the Lord Protector, and the rest of his Council doth intimate and declare the said French King and all his subjects to be enemy to himself and therefore willeth and commandeth all his loving subjects so to repute, accept and take herein the French King and all his subjects, adherents and allies taking part against the realm of England and giveth full liberty and license to all manner of persons to prosecute and pursue them or any of them.²

What was the position of each state likely to become involved in this war

¹Ibid., fos. 1117-1118.

²Ibid., fos. 1118-1120 and 1127.

in 1549--England, the Empire of Charles V, Scotland and France? England was at its weakest point in the century. With a minor as King and a government by Council increasingly at odds with the Lord Protector, success in war was a distant prospect. There was already military conflict with Scotland so that war with France would have inevitably produced an over-extension of English military capability--a sure ingredient for failure. For the better part of three years then, the English had deemed it necessary to confine their actions to verbal protests in the face of blatant French violations of the treaty, to agree to commission after commission for the settlement of disputes long after both sides had lost faith in such solutions and to tolerate the haughty attitudes of the French King and Constable on such subjects as aid to the Scots and Edward's pension. When war erupted, a major reason for its short duration, approximately six weeks, was this very weakness which brought domestic as well as foreign ramifications. Reference has already been made to the difficulties besetting Charles V. He and his brother Ferdinand were locked in a struggle over the future of the Imperial title itself. Charles had hoped that his son Philip would succeed him in all of his possessions, but Philip was unpopular with the German electors, who had expressed a preference for Ferdinand as the lesser of two Habsburg evils. The Queen Regent of the Low Countries found herself in the role of mediator between her two brothers, and the following year, Charles was forced to recognize his brother as heir to the Empire. Although this did not sever the family unity which had been considered the cornerstone of their government, the system had been weakened by the internal feuds. External conflict was the last thing they needed. The key to understanding the Scottish position lies in the person of d'Oysel, French ambassador there throughout these troubled years. It was generally noted throughout Europe that he wielded an unequalled amount of influence in the country to which he had been assigned, and together with Mary of Lorraine,

Queen Regent of the country, he assumed the role of governor more than that of ambassador.¹ Scotland became a satellite of France. The French manoeuvred from the strongest vantage of the four. Although he had his own brand of conciliar division, Henry II was determined from the outset to restore the balance which had been depreciated in the Treaty of Campe. This necessitated a certain amount of risk, but he moved his diplomatic pawns skillfully enough to win his major objectives by 1550. This is not to imply that he was without difficulties. He was confronted by an Anglo-Imperial alliance of firmer stance than he had expected, and Scotland, though his most valuable pawn, was also a financial burden.²

W. K. Jordan has described English foreign policy in 1549 as warweary,³ and one could credibly view the whole of Wotton's first French mission from this perspective. The insincerity and superficiality of the facade of amity masked the underlying reality of suspicion and ambition. Charges only led to countercharges. Both personally and professionally, this mission was Dr. Wotton's least successful. From the earliest stages, he appears to have been loath to continue as ambassador resident, but the government at home was less able than usual to weigh such considerations in its decisions. Unlike his years with the Emperor, these years are noticeably lacking in the special embassies necessary to keep Wotton in touch with English court opinion, something which would have been even more vital considering the domestic circumstances. He was probably as effective as anyone could have been, given the same situation, but it was undoubtedly with relief that he received his letters of recall in September of 1549.

¹A. I. Cameron, The Scottish Correspondence of Mary of Lorraine (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1927), p. 326.

²W. K. Jordan, The Young King, p. 296.

³Ibid., p. 295.

Nicholas Wotton's cipher, 1546-49

a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r	s	t	u	w	x	y	z
o	..	∞	f	+	h	f	n	θ	∞	∞	∞	£	δ	z	z	β	k	π	∞	z	k		
1		∞	r	g	£	£	m	s	λ			δ	∞	q		o	£	H	z	+	ψ		
7				3	∅	∞		∞					2										

th ch
C)

words

if - Z
and - V
they - A
for - V

names

England - h

nuls

∞ ∞

Source - contemporary decipher
of Wotton to Protector
and Council 22 April 1548

Chapter VI

The Northumberland Years

When England and France suspended diplomatic relations in 1549, Nicholas Wotton returned home to an equally unsettled state of affairs. There was not only the threat of imminent war with France but also the dual adverse factors of reverses in the Scottish campaign and internal rebellion. Government administration was certain to be affected, and the Imperial ambassador noted in September that the Council had become sharply divided. Never strongly inclined to seek consultation, Protector Somerset had by then become resentful even of Paget's advice; he became suspicious at the mere observation of two other councillors in conversation.¹ There was indeed reason to fear the unknown, for in the course of the summer uprisings in the West Country and Norfolk, Somerset had alienated some of the most powerful magnates, as well as his successor to the leadership of the Council, John Dudley, Earl of Warwick. The latter had triumphantly returned with his troops to London in September after the suppression of Kett's Rebellion in Norfolk. When the Protector ordered all troops to leave the capital and to return to their assigned regiments, he had no means of enforcing the order, and it was not obeyed.²

By the 3rd of October, what was to become known as the London council (to distinguish it from the remainder of the Privy Council which was with the King at Hampton Court and Windsor) had met twice to plot the overthrow of Somerset. This body, by far the majority of His Majesty's Privy Council,

¹Beer, Northumberland, pp. 87-88.

²Jordan, The Young King, pp. 506-507.

exhibited a character reflective of men from every level of Tudor government and every religious persuasion. Numbered among their ranks eventually came to be councillors representing the most powerful magnates, John Russell and William Herbert; the more politically-involved members of the nobility, John Dudley, Earl of Warwick and Henry Fitzalan, Earl of Arundel; household servants, Richard Southwell and Edmond Peckham; and government administrators, Chief Justice Montague, Edward Wotton of the Calais administration, ambassador Nicholas Wotton and William Petre, who among other positions was a member of Parliament. They ranged from the conservative Catholic Southwell to the Protestant Richard Riche, with many Henrician Catholics in-between. The common denominator was opposition to the Lord Protector whose abrasive personality and refusal to take advice had made him unpopular and unacceptable. Archbishop Cranmer and the two secretaries, William Paget and Thomas Smith, were with the King and Somerset. They would have been the most likely part of the Privy Council to have to travel constantly with the royal party. William Petre had also initially been with them, but he had been despatched on the 6th to the London council to assess matters there and appears to have elected to remain with them.¹

About this same time, on the 8th, the councillors in London received an even greater addition when joined by Russell and Herbert. These lords had written to the Protector of their concern over the growing disorder and their hope that Edward had not been put in fear:

We are out of doubt the devil hath not so enchanted nor abused their wits as they would consent to anything prejudicial or hurtful to the King's royal person upon whose surety and preservation, as they well know, the state of the realm doth depend.²

A very active London council, meeting almost daily at Ely Place,

¹Ibid., pp. 506-508.

²Troubles Connected with the Prayerbook of 1549 (London: Camden Society, 1888), Russell and Herbert to Somerset, 8 October 1549, p. 91.

Warwick's London home, drafted a letter to the Council at Windsor on the 7th of October. In it, they proclaimed that had Somerset "accepted their advice, listened to reason and acknowledged himself subject," they would have sought redress amicably, but his scandalous distortion of their intentions had forced them to this point:

Consider, my lords, for God's sake, we heartily pray you, that we be almost the whole Council, men that have been to be much bounden by sundry benefits to forget our duties to the King's Majesty for whom we do that we do and will gladly spend our lives for his surety.¹

They followed this up with a proclamation against the Protector whose "pride, covetousness and ambition" had brought about his downfall. The causes cited for this coup against him were neglecting the defences of Boulogne, his slander against the rest of the Council and the abuse of his office to achieve his, not the King's purposes. The proclamation ended with a declaration that the London council sought only to preserve the King and Kingdom; hence, all commands, letters and proclamations originating with the Protector were to be considered invalid. To test their strength, the councillors in London ordered all county officials not to levy troops unless the request had been authorized by them, and these local officials were to continue to go about their usual business taking no heed of commands issued by Somerset.²

The London council had quickly won the support of the capital. They sent Nicholas Wotton and Thomas Cheyney to assure the Imperial ambassador of their legitimacy, and Arundel and Peckham were appointed to secure the Tower. Steps were also taken to bring this coup to a swift conclusion. On the 7th, the London councillors wrote to Edward thanking him for sending William Petre to them and declaring that they had retained him for the better management of His Majesty's affairs. They also desired to reassure

¹Ibid., London council to the Council at Windsor, 7 October 1549, pp. 86-88.

²Ibid., Proclamation against Somerset, 8 October 1549, pp. 95-101; London council to the county officials, 8 October 1549, pp. 92-93.

their young King of their loyalty. On this same day, they requested Paget and Cranmer to act with them to achieve an end to this divided government and begged their colleagues not to believe them to be traitors.¹

By the 9th, with fears growing that Somerset would attempt to take Edward out of the realm, the London council, with the public support of the London mayor and aldermen behind them, declared that if the Protector were sincere, then he should immediately submit himself to Henry's will and Edward's laws, send away the troops gathered at Windsor Castle and permit them, His Majesty's Privy Council, to come again into his presence.² Not expecting a positive reaction, these councillors, on the 10th, announced their intention to arrest the Duke. They travelled to Windsor where he was being held. Once installed there, they immediately settled to business; the Duke and his staff were questioned, charged as instruments of bad government and sent to the Tower until further notice. Thomas Smith, one of the condemned, was replaced by Nicholas Wotton as one of the two principal secretaries of state.³ Business quickly returned to normal--payment of pensions, warrants for military stores and munitions for Calais.

The Protector had fallen because his foreign and domestic policies had failed. The new government now had to turn its attention to the war against France and the urgent difficulties of domestic finance. B. L. Beer has argued that the light fine given to Somerset, although never collected, demonstrated the intention of those now in power only to break the Duke's authority, not to end his political career. Subsequent events bear this out. Also, it has been stated that Somerset never considered Warwick to be his sole challenger but rather the whole of the English nobility by the spring of 1549. Van der Delft believed that the government in mid-October was

¹A.P.C., II, pp. 335-336.

²Ibid., pp. 337-340.

³Ibid., p. 344.

controlled not by Warwick alone but acting in concert with Arundel, St. John and Southampton. Hoak has further proposed that Warwick feared that the complete destruction of Somerset could only lead to a Wriothesley supremacy, which threatened all who ascribed more radical religious thought.¹ It would in fact appear that the Council in these early days attempted to act as a body.

Nicholas Wotton throughout the coup was an active supporter of the London faction of the Council. He was present for most of the London and Windsor meetings and signed the proclamation against the Protector. There are several possible explanations for his reason for casting his lot with this group. The first is a conjecture based on his personality. Given his conservative nature, although one must remember that he was absent from the realm throughout the Duke's regime, Wotton would probably have been in disagreement with the stand taken against the landowners on the issue of enclosure, just as this same conservative nature would have made him wary of anyone, other than a king, who accumulated such authority as Somerset had attempted to do. Secondly, given his firsthand knowledge of the French government's attitudes on Boulogne, as well as references in his letters to the opinions of French citizens who feared that Scotland would drag their country into another unwelcomed conflict with England, it seems very likely that he would have condemned the Protector's handling of foreign affairs, especially where Scotland and Boulogne had been concerned. The third possible explanation, a very remote one in view of Wotton's extremely cautious character, is a distant bond of kinship through marriage. Wotton was a close kinsman of the Marquis of Dorset, as we have seen; moreover, he was also distantly related to Warwick, who had inherited his Lisle title from his mother, daughter of Margaret Wotton's brother-in-law John Grey, Viscount Lisle. Wotton's approach to public service would not have been likely to assign much relevance to such a factor. Consanguineous ties, like religion, were to be restricted to the private segment of life, for the difficulties

¹Beer, Northumberland, pp. 91-96; Hoak, The King's Council, pp. 231-258.

arising from incorporating these into one's public stance constituted an unnecessary risk.

The war with France, occurring at the most disadvantageous time of year, was the first major problem to which Warwick turned his attention, and he was determined to have a settlement. Van der Delft acknowledged as much in December when he had written that the English government had not sent a new commander to Boulogne and that it had withheld requested supplies of men and war materials. In so doing, Warwick had made an unpopular but realistic decision. Although it had been rumoured that Wotton would be among the English peace commissioners, the final delegation included Russell, Paget, Petre and Mason.¹ Their original terms for peace had included the return of Mary Queen of Scots and the fulfilment by France of all previous treaties with England. Soon however, Paget was confronted with the realities of power and wrote home:

The French will have Boulogne by fair means or foul and be tributaries to you no longer. They will acknowledge no debt but will consider making a reasonable payment after Boulogne has been handed over to them.

His previous talks had achieved nothing but to convince him that peace must be had on any terms; Henry II possessed the unquestionable asset of greater strength. Paget closed with the request to know what sum should be asked for Boulogne and added the information that Henry was once again denying his obligation to pay a pension to the English King.² The final settlement was reached in March, and this is the way in which Paget broke the news to his government:

We have agreed upon a peace although not with so good conditions as we could have wished, yet within the limits of our instructions and somewhat better in some things, and might peradventure been much better in many things if peace and war had been so indifferent to us.³

¹Ibid., p. 101.

²Beer, Paget's Letters, Paget to Warwick, 22 February 1550, p. 94.

³Ibid., Paget to Warwick, 15 March 1550, p. 98.

This reasoning, that England would have emerged from these negotiations with more favourable conditions if the commissioners had been negotiating from a position of greater strength, was intended to soften the blow of the humiliating terms to which they had had to agree. Boulogne had been returned for the reduced sum of four hundred thousand crowns, half to be paid in March on the signing of the treaty, and the remainder to be given by the following August. In addition, the English had had to agree to withdraw from the territory within six weeks and to raze their remaining fortifications in Scotland.¹

Returning to events in England, the members of Warwick's Council were certainly finding involvement within the government. Dr. Wotton and William Petre had been appointed as a kind of foreign relations committee to negotiate foreign claims against English nationals; for the next two and a half years, they heard such grievances from the French and Imperial ambassadors. In January, for example, there occurred a sharp exchange between van der Delft and the Council, which appeared to be in a state of turmoil. The ambassador had come to complain that a French vessel on its way to the Empire had been seized by England. Wotton spoke on the government's behalf when he informed the ambassador that this was a case for the Admiralty, now headed by Warwick. Van der Delft replied that he had never known an encouraging decision to come from that court, which prompted Wotton to respond that English subjects, as he could testify from experience, had suffered more at the hands of the Emperor than was the reverse. A shouting match then erupted during which several councillors kept reiterating loudly that this was a case for the Admiralty. Because the uproar among the councillors lapsed casually into English, a somewhat confused ambassador observed the heated atmosphere until one of Wotton's colleagues shouted to him to

¹Beer, Northumberland, p. 102; Statement of the Receipt of Four Hundred Thousand Crowns, 1550, Foreign Cal., (Calais Papers), p. 355.

repeat their decision to van der Delft, a decision which he still found unacceptable. Calm was restored, and Wotton and the ambassador took up the case of a detained Imperial messenger, a matter settled much more amiably.¹

Warwick's pursuit of pro-French policies quickly left its mark on Anglo-Imperial relations. After many attempts to avoid Imperial questioning, the court found itself once again confronted with van der Delft on 8 March 1550. Upon his arrival, several councillors fled the chamber, leaving a small core, including Wotton, to answer the mounting challenges. Wotton again became the spokesman. There was first the question concerning Somerset's marriage negotiations for the Princess Mary, about which Wotton could only reply that since these had been undertaken without the knowledge of the rest, they could not be certain whether the marriage intentions had been directed to the Prince of Portugal, a prospect still considered worthy, or to the unlanded brother of the Portuguese King, an unsuitable match. The dispute over the English seizure of certain ships carrying sugar and alum was declared to have been settled when evidence was discovered showing the origin of these goods to be French. A new territory conflict had arisen over English constructions on land between Calais and Gravelines. Wotton assured the ambassador that two commissioners were en route to Charles V to settle this conflict.² Occasionally, Wotton's foreign obligations extended beyond complaints. He was asked to inform van der Delft in January of the initial peace moves between England and France and of their conclusion of the final arrangements in April.³

When power reverted to the Henrician executors in 1549, there was a

¹Hoak, The King's Council in the Reign of Edward VI, p. 31; van der Delft to Charles V, 31 January 1550, Span. Cal., X, pp. 17-20.

²van der Delft to Charles V, 8 March 1550, Span. Cal., X, pp. 39-40.

³Ibid., van der Delft to Charles V, 18 January 1550, p. 12; van der Delft to Charles V, 12 April 1550, pp. 60-61.

deadlock between liberals and conservatives on the Council; Cranmer, Russell, Warwick, Herbert and Edward Wotton definitely tended to favour further reforms in church affairs, while Tunstall, Paget, Wriothsesley, St. John and Nicholas Wotton fitted a more conservative mould. Edward North and Chief Justice Montague stood somewhere in-between. This could have become an obstructive division for the government, and this has caused Dr. Hoak to argue that Warwick in the winter of 1549-1550 purged the Council of the more adamant conservatives. Their support, obtained on the pretext of a reversal in religious trends, had served its purpose, the overthrow of Somerset. Warwick feared the potential alliance of these councillors with Mary, who might become regent and thus represented a rival.¹ Those conservatives who remained after 1550 had clearly demonstrated that their religious views were such private aspects of their lives as not to impinge on their political activities. Nicholas Wotton came under this category.

Throughout his year as secretary, Wotton took an active role in this office, as well as that of councillor. It may have been for his benefit that the advice of a former secretary, William Paget, was enlisted:

All letters should be received by the secretary and brought to the council board at the house of meeting unless he shall see that they require a very hasty expedition in which case he shall resort to the highest of the Council then attendant, and he, the said highest, if he shall think so needful, to assemble the Council at what time soever it shall be.

A further duty:

The secretary shall see to the keeping of all letters, minutes of letters to and from the King and Council, instructions and such other writings as shall be treated upon by the Council. The clerk having charge of the council book shall daily enter all orders and determinations by the Council, all warrants for money, the substance of all letters requiring answer, and the next day following at the first meeting, presenting the same by the secretary, (who shall first consider whether these entries be made accordingly).²

¹Hoak, The King's Council in The Reign of Edward VI, pp. 84, 244-246 and 252.

²Beer, Paget's Letters, Advice to the King's Council, 23 March 1550, pp. 99-100.

A study of the Privy Council attendance records for this year, October of 1549 to September of 1550, yields the information that Wotton was very regularly present. Although the overwhelming majority of the year's business was of a routine nature, he was in attendance at two significant meetings, the first, of national note and the second, of more personal relevance. On the 10th of April, the Duke of Somerset was once again sworn of His Majesty's Privy Council. Just over a week later, John Mason, who was preparing to leave for France to succeed to the post of ambassador resident which had remained vacant since Wotton's departure, took the council oath. Wotton was also present on a summer day when a special passport allowing movement was issued to one who had recently suffered from the plague, and he was there at the council board on the day in September when William Cecil was appointed to succeed him as secretary, a position which he appears to have relinquished happily.¹

By no means did this signify disfavour or voluntary exile from government. Wotton continued to attend council meetings on a fairly regular basis, and he felt sufficiently accepted to speak out against closer French relations at the expense of the Anglo-Imperial alliance. He reminded the government that English possession of Calais would always remain an obstacle to sincere Anglo-French amity.² Two privileges extended to Wotton will further illustrate the deference shown to him by the Northumberland government. In March of 1550, he, his family and guests were licensed to eat meat and milk products in Lent and on other fast days. Just three weeks after being replaced as secretary, in a continuing display of similar favour, he was given a fifty-year lease on farmland to the annual value of one hundred pounds and was given an exemption from the Parliamentary statute which

¹A.P.C., II, pp. 427 and 433; III, pp. 101 and 117.

²W. K. Jordan, Edward VI: the Threshold of Power (London: Allen and Unwin, 1970), pp. 125-126.

forbade the clergy from purchasing merchandise to be used in the production of further profit.¹

Dr. Wotton in 1551 embarked on a slightly less active but more varied career of service to the Edwardian regime. For the only time in his long career, he became actively involved in ecclesiastical business. The Privy Council had ushered in the year with the creation of two church commissions, one to hear cases of heresy and the other to review English ecclesiastical law.² Wotton was considered one of the councillors competent to act in either capacity, but his first assignment was to the commission inquiring into heresy, which had been instructed to bring to justice those who persisted in unorthodox beliefs and to examine those who were in opposition to The Book of Common Prayer. His colleagues included Archbishop Cranmer, several other bishops, William Petre and William Cecil, and the chief unnamed object of this inquisition was the Free-will sect of Kent and Essex. These early separatists had refused to communicate according to the established church and had rejected other of its doctrines and rites. Their conventicles of Christmas 1550 had served as the immediate cause for this Privy Council action against them, and members of this sect, along with all others who did not administer the Sacraments according to The Book of Common Prayer, were to be brought before this committee for correction and punishment.³ It was also about this time that Wotton, together with ten others, was appointed to keep the Great Seal during the illness of the Lord Chancellor.⁴

¹Pat. Cal. Edward VI, III, pp. 305 and 316.

²Hoak, The King's Council in the Reign of Edward VI, p. 216.

³J. Martin, Sixteenth Century Journal, October of 1976, "English Protestant Separatism at Its Beginnings: Henry Hart and the Free-will Men," pp. 66-68.

⁴Calendar of the Salisbury Manuscripts Preserved at Hatfield House (London: Historical Manuscripts Commission, 1883-1976), Appointment of Eleven Councillors to Keep the Great Seal, 1551, I, p. 94, no. 377. (This source is cited hereafter as Hatfield Cal.)

Near the end of March, more suitable employment was found for Dr. Wotton when it was agreed by the Privy Council that he should be despatched to Charles V on a special embassy to negotiate several sensitive points which had arisen between England and the Empire. About this time and probably as a direct result of this decision, Wotton returned to the council board after an absence of several months. His instructions encompassed wide-ranging disputes. There were first the Imperial protests over the treatment of the Princess Mary in religious matters. It was considered prudent to defuse this issue as far as possible, for war with the Empire could endanger the English wool trade, and Catholic sympathy in the realm for Mary was a genuine threat to the Edwardian government. A second grievance was England's own religious protest to Charles when the English ambassador in the Low Countries was not permitted the service and Eucharist as these were administered in England. Two side issues had also more recently developed, the English need for gunpowder and, the reason which probably more than any other actually hastened Wotton's departure, a request from Charles to have England's ambassador to his court revoked. Richard Morison had become engaged in a heated religious disputation with the Emperor, and when Charles had attempted to dismiss any further discussion, Morison had persisted in the argument, most unbecoming behaviour to one in his office. The Council had quickly apologized for the ambassador's conduct, emphasized that he had spoken without authority or instruction and informed the Imperial court that Wotton, who knew better how to deal with princes, was on his way to sort out these problems.¹

Sentiment toward the Emperor was less than sincere, and even as Wotton took his leave of England in the spring of 1551, Warwick was concentrating his energy on improved relations with France. Now that the issue of

¹Scheyfve to Charles V, 6 April 1551, Span. Cal., X, pp. 255-257.

Boulogne had been removed, there was much talk of an amity cemented with a marriage alliance. No longer were there rival claims to Mary Queen of Scots, and this newest arrangement proposed a marriage between Edward VI and Princess Elizabeth, daughter of Henry II. This plan found expression in the July Treaty of Angers. Again a humiliating document for the English, they had had to reduce their demands for a dowry of a quarter of a million crowns to two hundred thousand, with the additional stipulation that should the French King die before the marriage, the Princess would have no dowry.¹ The Imperial ambassador in France, writing home of such matters, also included the warning to his master that he had heard of Dr. Wotton's forthcoming embassy and wished Charles to know that the said Englishman was of a "testy and intriguing nature or humour," a disposition which the ambassador attributed in part to Wotton's ill treatment in France.²

To Morison's great relief, Wotton arrived at the city of Augsburg in late June. While the ambassador resident kept the court in England informed of routine details, he left the controversies to Wotton, writing that, "He is the one who can do better by greater affairs."³ The unhappy ambassador expressed the hope that he would soon receive his despatch, and Wotton, his abode; while this did not in fact happen, Morison did enjoy a brief respite from the pressures of his office when, at Dr. Wotton's suggestion, he took some time to travel and left matters in the hands of one experienced in Imperial diplomacy. This is a rare example of the human touch of sympathy which must have been welcomed to one who found himself a foreigner in a hostile court.

The most comprehensive account of the first meeting between Charles

¹Beer, Northumberland, pp. 113-114.

²Renard to Charles V, 12 May 1551, Span. Cal., X, p. 294.

³Morison to the Council, 30 June 1551, Foreign Cal., p. 135, no. 392.

and Wotton on this embassy is provided by the Emperor himself. Dr. Wotton had arrived on the 29th of June only with letters of credence, not those necessary for a resident ambassador. His presentation had begun with an apology for the bad conduct shown by Morison and a request to know whether the Emperor still wished a new ambassador from England. His second request was for the English ambassador in the Low Countries to be allowed a minister and the service of the church in England. He had argued that this was a traditional rite extended to ambassadors. Relevant to the matter of the Princess Mary's religious liberty, he had argued that the King and Council had made their religious decision based upon the good of the nation and therefore considered it appropriate to press the Princess for acceptance, especially since her refusal could produce scandal and disturbance throughout the realm. Wotton's final request had been for the supply of gunpowder. Having listened to this discourse, the Emperor had then replied that he had never felt greater friendship for England than now and had only refused their previous requests for munitions on the grounds that since the country was not at war, his own kingdom might have greater need of it. The implication was that the situation had not changed. As for Morison, Charles admitted that he had been much angered by the ambassador's boldness in such suggestions as that he should invalidate the Donation of Constantine and appropriate to himself the temporal holdings of the Pope. On the request for the English ambassador in the Low Countries, Wotton seems to have been left with the impression that he should be someone who could live within the laws of that country, for the Emperor clearly recognized that the Council itself was extremely divided over just what constituted Anglican principles of religion. In the context of this discussion, the Emperor had managed to work in his own censure of religious events in England when he had declared that he, the least virtuous of all princes, had not altered Christian principles to suit his own interests. To this, Wotton had

readily replied that the principles had not been changed; rather, the ceremonials had been reinstated in their earliest Christian form. Regarding Mary's religious freedom, the Emperor promised to have the Bishop of Arras show to Wotton letters from Paget guaranteeing this right which should be hers, for, Charles argued, Mary was asking for a long-established rite, as opposed to the recently instituted one adhered to by only some of Edward's councillors.¹

The English account is a more concise version of the interview but leaves little doubt as to the lack of progress. It has already been stated that Charles was still pondering Morison's matter and that he had given a negative indication on the petition for the English ambassador in the Low Countries. The gunpowder request had been referred to Arras, who had insisted that a Turkish threat was imminent; therefore, the Emperor's need was greater. Wotton's strongest emphasis in his report was on the discussion surrounding Mary's insistence on retaining the Mass. He wanted to leave a favourable impression with her cousin on her treatment while simultaneously upholding the Protestant authority in England. He recounted the audience this way, beginning with Charles's argument:

My cousin the Princess is evil-handled among you, her servants plucked from her and she still cried upon to leave Mass, to forsake her religion in which her mother, her grandmother and all our family hath lived and died in the said Sacrament. Is it not enough that my aunt, her mother, was evil entreated by the King that dead is but my cousin must be now ordered by councillors?

Wotton responded:

As for my Lady Mary, though she had a king to her father and hath a king to her brother and be a kin princess to Your Majesty, yet, said I, we have in England but one king and the king hath but one law to rule all his subjects by. My Lady Mary being no king must content herself to be subject to it.²

¹Charles V to Scheyfve, 30 June 1551, Span. Cal., X, pp. 310-317.

²Wotton to the Council, 30 June 1551, S.P. 68/7, f. 730.

Although the English ambassadors with Charles were experiencing an unprofitable time at his court, things were no better for the Imperial ambassador in London. Franco-Imperial relations had been steadily deteriorating, and Jehan Scheyfve had striven without success to obtain from the English government a commitment to honour the treaty of mutual defence. Remembering that Warwick at this time was focusing his efforts on France, it is not surprising that the best answer given to the Imperial ambassador was that Edward would seek to play a role as mediator.¹ Charles warned Scheyfve to be prepared to answer a French propaganda ploy, viz., that the Emperor was either plotting to support a rival claimant to the English throne or that he would jeopardize English security by permitting the Ottoman navy to come into English waters before moving against this enemy.² It seems difficult to believe that England would have given credibility to either possibility. What became clearer to Warwick's government was that with almost certain resumption of hostilities between Charles and Henry, it could now afford to apply pressure and move against Mary's Catholic household.³

On 25 August 1551, Wotton and Morison wrote to the Council acknowledging the command issued to them. Morison was to remain and was probably the author of the statement in this joint communication, "The one is as glad to go as the other is sorry to stay."⁴ Wotton filed a report of his final audience on the first of September, and it reflects the negative note on which this mission had ended. There is however an interesting account of the religious discussion which had arisen over the question of the use of the English Eucharistic rite in the Low Countries, albeit on a private basis.

¹Jordan, The Threshold of Power, p. 164.

²Charles V to Scheyfve, 30 July 1551, Span. Cal., X, pp. 336-337.

³Jordan, The Threshold of Power, p. 261.

⁴Wotton and Morison to the Council, 25 August 1551, Foreign Cal., pp. 162-163, no. 430.

Charles, not averse to religious debate conducted in a courteous fashion, appears to have taken Wotton's argument in this spirit and challenged the ambassador with his own logic applied to this request:

His answer was that he, knowing in his conscience that the Communion used as it is in England is not good but contrary to the order used by all the church of so many hundred years, he should offend God if he permitted it, and that therefore he may not do it. And where I called it inequality, he said that if it were inequality indeed, yet if the King his good brother were the greatest king of all the world and he the Emperor the poorest man of all the world, he would not agree to such an equality, howbeit he said it was no equality. But if he should agree to suffer it, then should he agree to a greater inequality for his part, for that this you requireth is a novelty (as he called it) and such a thing as God should be offended if I should consent unto it, and as for me, I require no new thing at all but that that ever hath been used amongst Christian princes and ever hath been taken for good. This therefore were a great inequality if I should be fain to grant a thing that is new, never used, never heard of before, and such a thing as is not good, for to have that thing that hath been these thousand years used amongst all Christian princes without any requisition at all but only used and suffered forbecause it is good and every Christian man bound to use it.

Wotton replied with obvious forethought:

As for that which the King my master requireth, though you take it to be new, yet in England it is known to be otherwise, for in England we have been of that self opinion that you are of and have thought the Mass to have been so ancient a thing and as holy a thing as Your Majesty doth, but now so having searched diligently for it and have found very plainly that the use of the Communion which we have in England is the old and ancient use of Christ's church even as they used from the Apostles' time, and the Mass as it is used is but a modern form altered and changed by man's devices from the first institution of it, and this being such, Sire, neither doth the King my master require any novel or unlawful thing but that that is good and holy, for else should it not have been used in the primitive church.

Charles was determined to have the final word:

What truth can appear unto you that doth not appear to a great number of men of other countries which are as learned as you are, or what truth can appear to you that all the church of Christ could not see all this while? As for me, I will live and die in that faith and truth I have once received which I know to be good, and therefore I intend to suffer none other.¹

¹Wotton to the Council, 1 September 1551, S.P. 68/8, fos. 1045-1046.

As Wotton leisurely returned from the Imperial court, momentous events were transpiring in England. Although one cannot know the extent to which Somerset plotted against Warwick's supremacy in government, it would be unrealistic to assume that he had passively accepted the events of October 1549. When he was again arrested in October of 1551, the Council unanimously supported Warwick (now Duke of Northumberland) in this move. Somerset was convicted of a felony, but not treason, and the King refused him a pardon. There is insufficient evidence to show categorically that Northumberland was the force behind this decision, but what does seem certain is that had Northumberland chosen to exercise his authority to save the former Protector, there would have been no individual on the Council powerful enough to counter him. Because he did not so choose, implicit guilt has remained attached to his reputation in this episode.¹ Wotton had not yet returned to the council board when the second overthrow of Somerset occurred. He returned five days after the Duke's arrest, and for the remainder of the year, Wotton was actively attendant at council meetings. He was there when a decision was taken to use torture on prisoners in the Tower, and he served on such council commissions as the one appointed to inquire into the reason behind the arrest of one Christopher Levins.²

The work which had kept Dr. Wotton occupied throughout 1551, his ecclesiastical commissions and diplomatic negotiations, had made it possible for him to write to the Vice-Dean and chapter in Canterbury in December to suggest that they consider renting his tenements there. There were two stipulations; the tenant must be someone reliable and able to pay, and a clause should be inserted guaranteeing the availability of the dwelling should Wotton himself have need of it at any time.³ This illustrates the very

¹Beer, Northumberland, pp. 118-122.

²A.P.C., III, pp. 403 and 454.

³Wotton to the Vice-Dean and Chapter, 11 December 1551, Canterbury Letters (Canterbury Cathedral Archives), Letter 31.

practical side of his nature, but it also adds to the supposition that he had no reason to feel disfavoured or threatened by Northumberland's administration. It is useful to remember this when considering Wotton's sparse activities of the following year.

A brief summary of the general state of foreign affairs as the year 1551 approached an end is necessary. Anglo-Imperial relations continued in an extremely cool atmosphere. The Princess Mary's religious freedom increasingly became the central issue, and the Council became more adamant in its refusal to hear arguments in her favour. Franco-Imperial cooperation also underwent a major decline in this year and came to the brink of war. Only Anglo-French amity had prospered in 1551, and it had been built upon an unsound foundation and was not to last long.

In many ways, Wotton's employment in 1552 closely paralleled that which had occupied him in the previous year. It is certain that throughout most of the year, he continued to act as a primary member of the foreign relations committee of the Privy Council, and he remained in attendance at council meetings, although much less frequently present. He is listed as having attended approximately forty sessions, but because these are well-distributed throughout the year, one must guard against the assumption that he was more involved in the actual day-to-day administration of government than was in fact the case. Whether this distribution was by arrangement or accident, (and the former is a distinct possibility), Wotton was able to maintain a close enough link with the government to retain a foothold in the circles of power while reserving a safe distance between himself and the increasingly radical religious tendencies of the Northumberland regime. Having said this, one must take account of his consideration in this year for service on the ecclesiastical committee charged with the study, compilation and reformation of church law in England. Plans for such a review

had periodically come under discussion since 1533, and in the third year of Edward's reign, Parliament had recommended the establishment of a commission for this purpose within three years. By 1551, it had been determined that thirty-two men should constitute the committee, only half of which were to represent the clergy. Dr. Wotton's name does not appear on either the first royal or Council lists, but he is among those commissioned by the Letters Patent of February, 1552; it would have seemed strange indeed if the Dean of the focal church in England, Christchurch in Canterbury, had been omitted. In any case, he was not an active member of the commission, and despite the review and reform contributed by this group, the document produced, Reformatio Legum Ecclesiasticarum, was considered unacceptable in Edward's reign and was finally rejected by default in Elizabeth's early years.¹

It has already been indicated that Wotton remained one of the chief advisers on foreign affairs, and his attention was certainly concentrated on this demand in March of 1552. First, he was present for a Council debate on shipping disputes with France, and the Council seems to have decided on a gesture of goodwill in the release of a captured French vessel. There was also the matter of protests from the Imperial ambassador about certain taxes which were considered to be new duties levied upon merchants. The first of these was a four-pence duty on each person entering through Dover, but the English had argued that this was merely an amalgamation of what had been two separate fees collected in Dover for the state and St. Martin's Abbey. The Imperial line of defence relied on the absence of this provision from the Bourbourg commercial conventions. Similarly, the ambassador complained about the fee collected by customs officials for writing declarations and receipts. The greatest point of irritation to the

¹Pat. Cal. Edward VI, IV, p. 354; Edward Cardwell, Reformatio Legum Ecclesiasticarum (London: Clarendon Press, 1832), pp. XXX-XXXII.

merchants was the lightage fee, which was collected for the use of English lighters to transfer cargoes from the large foreign vessels to the mainland. Foreign merchants argued that they had no option but to employ these, for the English government had refused to issue authorization of any alternative.¹

Of course, the Council used Dr. Wotton's services in more minor developments also. He was asked to review the articles made between Somerset and the "strangers" (foreigners) in Glastonbury with a view to altering or abolishing these agreements if necessary.² Wotton and Cecil, among others, were appointed to answer a request from the merchants of the steelyard who wished to increase their trade in lead and cloth,³ and Wotton was present when the Council considered it necessary to warn the ambassador in Scotland to take greater care in sealing his letters thoroughly.⁴

With the spring came the increased threat of war between France and the Empire. Preoccupied with the arrangements for the Council of Trent, Charles's attention had been diverted from affairs in Germany where a second Protestant league had arisen and allied with France. In exchange for monetary and material assistance from Henry, this league, although not possessing the authority to do so, had given to him the vicariate of the bishoprics of Toul, Metz and Verdun. In addition to this violation of his rights, the Emperor was also confronted with an invasion of the Tyrol by this same confederation, and the Sultan had not failed to seize this moment as ideal for resuming his conflict with the Emperor. Thus the

¹A.P.C., IV, p. 5; Scheyfve to Mary of Hungary, 28 March 1552, Span. Cal., X, pp. 485-488.

²A.P.C., III, p. 490.

³Ibid., IV, p. 41.

⁴Bishop John Strype, Ecclesiastical Memorials (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1822), II, i, p. 520.

overwhelmingly favourable position which had existed for Charles in 1547 had gradually been reclaimed from him.¹ As with the war of the 1540's, it was the Queen Regent of the Low Countries who first tested English political opinion for aid, but as early as May of 1552 when a state of war existed on the Continent, the English government would only promise to preserve the amity. By July, the Council had given the Imperial ambassador a promise to review England's treaty obligations, and this may well have been the matter to which Wotton made reference in a letter to Cecil in which is mentioned advice given to the Council on an unspecified issue. It might also have been the issue behind an amusing note exchanged between these two in which Wotton suggested that his labour to obtain an answer to letters from the Council could be well rewarded with a deer from Eltham Park or a fat goose or duck.² If he had hoped to escape the unwelcomed assignment of delivering his government's decision to ambassador Scheyfve, it was not to be his good fortune. The ambassador recorded the conversation of the 31st of July in which King Edward through his messengers had asked to be excused from the aid requested, for his expenses in the last war had been so excessive. He acknowledged that Charles was a peace-loving prince, like himself, and this prompted him to believe that his best service would come in the form of mediation. Scheyfve countered that the aid now requested was but for a sum of money which the King could and should afford, for the defence of the Low Countries was to the direct benefit and welfare of England. The "insatiable ambition of France" must not be forgotten. The English delegates concluded

¹Oman, A History of the Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, p. 214.

²Scheyfve and de Courrieres to Mary of Hungary, 19 May 1552, Span. Cal., X, pp. 526-527; Samuel Haynes, A Collection of State Papers Relating to France in the Reigns of Henry VIII, Edward VI, Mary and Elizabeth (London: William Bowyer, 1740), Wotton to Cecil and Petre, 20 July 1552, I, pp. 123-124. (This source is cited hereafter as Haynes.)

the conference on the note that aid could only be rendered in case of actual invasion of Imperial territory.¹

From one of Wotton's subsequent letters to Cecil at the beginning of August, it is known that he journeyed to Canterbury to await further instruction on government business but apparently did not receive any for the better part of the next two months.² Before leaving London, he had been with the Council when the lieutenant of the Tower had been ordered to pay greater heed to the needs of the Duchess of Somerset there and to use the money appropriated for that purpose. He had also been at the board when funds were appropriated for a summer progress for the King.³ This event may account for Wotton's two-month silence, when he was probably enjoying one of his rare visits in Canterbury.

At some point in September with a definite escalation in hostilities between England and France, a commission was appointed to attempt a settlement of the conflicts, which mainly related to shipping matters. Wotton, Petre and Thomas Smith were the English delegates. When the French heard the English grievances, their initial reaction was to declare that their commission was insufficient for negotiation and to send home for further instructions. The delegates met again in October, and one of the French commissioners told Wotton, Petre and Smith that the seizure of certain English vessels was justified, but these ships would be released as a sign of favour. The English bluntly retorted that they sought no favours, only justice, and that as for the French complaint of French citizens being held in England, these men were pirates, not merchants. The Imperial ambassador dutifully

¹ Scheyfve to Mary of Hungary, 3 August 1552, Span. Cal., X, pp. 557-560.

² Hatfield Cal., Wotton to Cecil, 1 August 1552, p. 98, no. 392.

³ A.P.C., IV, pp. 68 and 90.

reported this conflict home with the opinion that the English people and merchants had been acutely upset by recent developments with France.¹ By this time also, late 1552, Wotton had returned to the Council and was busy with foreign affairs in other respects. There were frequent conferences with the French and Imperial ambassadors, and several requests, such as the French one for an English escort past the Burgundian fortress at Gravelines, found their way into Wotton's charge.²

In the closing months of the year, religion once again figured prominently in Dr. Wotton's engagements. In October, a second commission to inquire into heresy had been appointed, and he was numbered among its members. In November, he was present at a council meeting when a letter was drafted to Cranmer concerning the new Prayer Book which had been submitted for council approval. The draft of the articles which were to be contained in it was returned to the Archbishop with suggested improvements.³

Beer has contended that the Northumberland government had begun the year in an unpopular position, but by the end of 1552, support for it had increased, largely because of the threat of war with France. It was generally believed that Calais was in imminent danger, and with Charles V sustaining reverses in his war effort, Northumberland had decided to veer away from his former pro-French stance and to reavow the English commitment to the Imperial alliance.⁴ The mood of Europe for the rest of the decade had thus been created in this year. While Charles and Henry battled out the traditional Habsburg-Valois rivalry, mainly in the territories of Italy, both pursued strong foreign policies toward England. Charles, and later

¹Strype, Ecclesiastical Memorials, II, i, p. 575; Scheyfve to Charles V, 14 October 1552, Span. Cal., X, p. 578.

²Hatfield Cal., Wotton to Cecil, 10 October 1552, p. 100, no. 398.

³Pat. Cal. Edward VI, IV, p. 355; A.P.C., IV, p. 173.

⁴Beer, Northumberland, pp. 138-139.

his son Philip, strove desperately hard to gain an English entry into the war on the Imperial side, arguing that a strengthened France only increased the threat to the English crown. Henry II, not really expecting England to join forces with him to combat Habsburg ambitions, tended to concentrate his efforts on at least attempting to neutralize English strategy. For its part, England was simply still not in a strong enough position to contemplate manoeuvres on the Continent. This would become even more evident in 1553, and it was a reality which must have been unquestioned by all who served in the administration of the government at the time.

The opening months of 1553 signalled the calm before the storm both in the sense of forthcoming English national events and in Wotton's professional life. Before the autumn, the English people would have suffered the loss of their young King, whose lively intellect had held such bright promise for the future. They would have lived through the brief and baffling nine-day reign of Lady Jane Grey, and the nation then emerged back on the road which Henry VIII had mapped out for the succession in his will. Dr. Wotton had begun the year in relative obscurity, but at the accession of Mary, he found himself in the perfect position to play a central role in some of the roughest tides which swept over Anglo-French relations in the sixteenth century.

Edward's government had offered its services as mediator between France and the Empire as early as May of 1552, and by the spring of the following year, the machinery for this purpose had been set into motion. The first step taken had been to enlarge the English embassy at the two respective courts by despatching ambassadors especially appointed to oversee the mediation interests. Hoby and Thirlby were sent to join Morison at the Imperial court, and Wotton and Thomas Challoner departed for France. It appears that the ambassadors to Charles were also initially instructed to negotiate secretly a defensive league with the German Protestant princes, but this was swiftly abandoned when it was realized that progress toward peace could be

seriously obstructed if these secondary negotiations were discovered.¹ The appointments were made in March, and William Pickering, resident ambassador in France, wrote from there on the 6th of April to acknowledge notification of his colleagues' coming assistance.² Wotton and Challoner, travelling around the middle of April, filed a reported on military intelligence gathered along the way, but of greater importance was their comment to their government that they had found the garrisons at Boulogne and Montreuil to be exceedingly small. This must have been intended to relieve any anxiety over imminent French designs on Calais.³

The embassy in Poissy soon recognized that Henry was not particularly interested in having its intermediary services, and the demand which Henry put forward seriously called into question his desire for peace. Nothing short of the return of all Imperial conquests in Italy during this war would satisfy him.⁴ English worries were further compounded by merchant complaints about English pirates, including the infamous Killigrew brothers. It was not clear to the ambassadors whether or not the resident ambassador among them had commission to apprehend them.⁵ In the midst of all of this, they received the further disturbing news that the French King had despatched one of his chief officials, secretary of state, Claude de Laubespine, to England to see Edward, who was said to be gravely ill.⁶ Although there was some suspicion of de Laubespine's true motive, the ambassadors recently arrived

¹Strype, Ecclesiastical Memorials, II, ii, p. 403.

²Pickering to the Council, 6 April 1553, Foreign Cal., p. 260, no. 648.

³Hatfield Cal., Wotton and Challoner to Cecil, 15 April 1553, p. 118, no. 440.

⁴Jordan, The Threshold of Power, p. 177.

⁵Wotton, Challoner and Pickering to the Council, 16 May 1553, Foreign Cal., p. 280, no. 682.

⁶Ibid., Wotton, Challoner and Pickering to the Council, 23 June 1553, p. 289, no. 699.

from England must have known that they had good reason to believe that their young sovereign was as seriously ill as claimed. In the meantime, the French continued to press their advantage. They wanted the Emperor to make the first gesture of peace. Among their persistent demands were the restoration of the duchy of Milan and the realms of Naples and Sicily, a liberation of Siena from the control of either power and Navarre to be restored to its rightful king. This haughty attitude soon suffered a blow with the death of Maurice, Duke of Saxony, an important defector from the Imperial camp.¹

Despite these impossible proposals, the Council had instructed the ambassadors to continue their discussions in France in an attempt to find possible openings for genuine negotiations within the French position. Hoby, Thirlby and Morison were similarly instructed but were also asked not to disclose the original French terms to Charles. The English commissioners in France received correspondence from their colleagues with the Emperor and from the Council urging them to press Henry for more reasonable terms; after all, such excessive demands were not unexpected, but no one took them at face value.² Nevertheless, by the end of June, the French were demonstrating little sign of a softening in their position. They boasted of French courage against the Emperor and spread the rumour of the death of the Prince of Spain. On 24 June 1553, Scheyfve wrote to Charles that an official announcement had been made concerning Edward's illness, a sign which the ambassador interpreted as preparation of the English people for the death of their King. At this point, Scheyfve knew of Northumberland's designs against the accession of Mary, but he confidently assured the Emperor that the nation and Council were solidly behind the Princess.³

¹ Strype, Ecclesiastical Memorials, II, ii, p. 93.

² Ibid., pp. 98-99.

³ Scheyfve to Charles V, 24 June 1553, Span. Cal., XI, pp. 65-66.

July began on a desolate note. The King was dying and so too was the hope for the peace negotiations. Two despatches were written on the first by the Council. The first, to the ambassadors with the Emperor, merely asked to know their assessment of the prospects for progress, for if there was as little hope with them as there was in France, Thirlby and Morison were to return, leaving Hoby as ambassador resident. To the commissioners in France, the Council sent instructions for Pickering and Wotton to take leave of Henry and for Challoner to present his credentials as resident.¹ Events at home over the next month were to negate these instructions.

It is now generally believed that Northumberland's designs on the crown to alter the succession in favour of his daughter-in-law, Lady Jane Grey, were more an eleventh-hour concept than any long-range scheme. If in so doing, his primary interest was either in his own political salvation or in the preservation of Protestantism, he chose the weakest alternative. Perhaps there could have been none other, for while one might suggest an alliance with Elizabeth, there is little evidence to suggest that she would have placed his interests before the will of Henry VIII.² Jordan's thesis which places greater responsibility for the alteration with Edward, if taken to its logical conclusion, would lead one to believe that all other events of this year should be reinterpreted accordingly. The intent of the alteration was certainly to Edward's liking, but if one is to assign such a decisive move to the young and ailing King, one should also look for a similar display of strong will in other areas, and the evidence does not support this. In addition, the decision turned too conveniently in Northumberland's favour, and unless one is to assume an absolute supremacy by the Duke over the King, the alternative, according to this theory, is that Edward, for all his

¹Strype, Ecclesiastical Memorials, II, ii, pp. 102-103.

²Beer, Northumberland, pp. 154-156.

precociousness, acted unwisely against the interest of his own family in bypassing an obvious successor in Elizabeth.¹

When Edward died on the 6th of July, his death was kept secret and an order for Mary's arrest issued. The Council, household and justices had been made to swear allegiance by Edward to the alteration as long before as the 21st of June, but when Mary, who had left her residence before Northumberland's proclamation for her arrest, in turn issued her own call for the Council to proclaim her their rightful sovereign, there were speedy and mass desertions from Northumberland's ranks. The Imperial ambassador was proved correct in his assessment of the overwhelming support for Mary in the Council and country. The Duke was soon arrested, along with his son and daughter-in-law.

Once again, Dr. Wotton was fortunate enough to be away from the wrong place at the right time. He had left England before Northumberland's schemes came to light, and despite the notice of his and Pickering's recall at the outset of July, before it could have been implemented, domestic events had considerably altered the perspective from which these instructions had been issued. On the last day of July, Mary wrote to the three commissioners still with the French King that they should continue to act as her ambassadors until she could send a special messenger with further instructions for them.²

The Northumberland years had given Nicholas Wotton an opportunity to experience firsthand the reverse side of the coin of foreign policy. Instead of the ambassador roaming the corridors of power in futile pursuit of definite answers to unwelcomed questions, he became the government spokesman dispensing unwelcomed answers to definite questions. This role however was

¹ Jordan, The Threshold of Power, p. 514.

² Mary to Wotton, Challoner and Pickering, 31 July 1553, Foreign Cal. Mary, p. 2, no. 3.

soon relinquished for his second embassy to France, which marks the high point in his diplomatic career.

Chapter VII

The Second French Embassy

On 12 August 1553, the Marian Privy Council despatched Anthony St. Leger to France with letters of recall for Pickering and Challoner and the credentials for resident ambassador for Dr. Wotton.¹ As had been the case with his first mission to the French court, this four-year assignment had originated in less than favourable circumstances and culminated in revocation accompanying a declaration of war between England and France. In the interim, one can trace two prominent threads outlining Anglo-French relations between 1553 and 1557; these were conspiracy and conciliation. Both derived from the renewal of the Franco-Imperial contest. Eager to prevent the Emperor's cousin adding English pressure against France, Henry II had sought to keep Mary concerned and occupied with the internal security of England; it was to his advantage to encourage rebellion both within England itself and within the rebellious element among Marian exiles in France. In these attempts, he was greatly aided by his ambassador in London, Antoine de Noailles. Their encouragement ranged from such grand promises as of men and supplies to be given at some always later, unspecified date to small gifts of money or the occasional piece of potentially military equipment such as ships. In this manner, while it was possible to implicate French support of the Marian revolts, it was difficult to check such activities. Henry could always react with an air of injured innocence and counter with his own complaints against the English government. When it became known that Mary was seriously considering a proposal of marriage from Prince

¹J. G. Nichols, The Chronicle of Queen Jane and of Two Years of Queen Mary (London: Camden Society, 1850), p. 175.

Philip of Spain, the French were driven to the offensive in fomenting rebellion.

Curiously, though, it was assumed in all camps that England was a suitable mediator between France and the Habsburgs. Northumberland had made the initial approaches, and Mary was swift to emphasize her desire to continue in this role, Spanish marriage or not. One might well question the sincerity of both combatants, as well as of the partisan papacy at varying times, and this certainly took its toll on English mediation endeavours, but the Marian government genuinely viewed mediation as one of its highest priorities. In the final result however, conspiracy defeated conciliation.

I

Conspiracy

Suspicion and a developing sense of national pride contributed substantially to creating an atmosphere in which conspiracy thrived. French suspicion of Mary's reliance on Charles V was well-founded. Through correspondence between the Emperor and his ambassador in England, Simon Renard, it can early be established that Wotton's correspondence was regularly disclosed to the ambassador, and the Emperor confidently assumed that it would and should continue to be so.¹ There is also in this correspondence an indication of Mary's willingness to exclude her English councillors in favour of Habsburg family advice in the opening stages of the marriage negotiations.² As early as October, Charles had expressed his suspicions of Elizabeth's loyalty and warned Mary not to hesitate to confine her half-sister in the Tower, should necessity warrant it.³ Against this background,

¹Charles V to Renard, 10 October 1553, Span. Cal., XI, p. 280.

²Ibid., Renard to Charles, 23 October 1553, p. 313.

³Ibid., Charles V to Renard, 24 December 1553, p. 456.

one must consider the revelations in December of 1553 of the progress already achieved toward the marriage of Philip and Mary.

Correspondence from Wotton between August and December of this year is very sparse, a fact which can probably best be explained by reiterating that much of it appears to have found its way into Imperial hands and does not survive. For this reason, one cannot know precisely when the ambassador first broached an official discussion of the Spanish marriage with the French, but Renard reported on the 8th of December that the Queen had suggested that a letter should be sent to Wotton with details of the marriage negotiations in order that he might "temporize in a courtly manner" with Henry on this subject.¹ There were already internal signs of discontent with Mary's marriage and religious proposals, and she was eager to check any source of foreign animosity. Documents do survive to permit a comparison of the ways in which the three governments involved recounted Wotton's December audience during which the main topic of conversation had been the Queen's marriage to Philip.

The English ambassador had approached a glum Henry II on the 18th, as the King was recovering from a cold, and Wotton had attempted to reassure the French King of Mary's determination to preserve the amity as she had promised; it was to the benefit of her own realm to do so. The King remained sceptical but resolute:

If the Queen my good sister shall marry with him that is our chief enemy, and even during this wartime, although I know it is not my part to appoint her where nor with whom nor which she shall marry: yet it must needs be a grief unto me to consider what advantage mine enemies will think thereby to have upon me. And yet whatsoever they think thereof, I have hitherto defended my country from mine enemies, and with God's grace so shall I do hereafter.

He went on to enlighten Wotton on what pressures would be brought to bear on Mary, once married, to do her husband's will. The ambassador responded:

¹Ibid., Renard to Charles V, 8 December 1553, p. 417.

Whereupon I said unto the King, that indeed I took it to be true that a man might obtain much of his wife. But yet like as that was true, so I took it again that a wife of wit and discretion might do as much with her husband. And therefore the Queen my mistress having determined and promised to enter no war with you for any husband's sake she might have: being endowed of God with so much wisdom as she is, I doubted not, should be well able to obtain so reasonable a thing of her husband.

As proof, he cited Mary's previous demonstrations of strong will not to be swayed in matters of conscience and honour.¹

A more candid exchange had followed with the Constable. "I do much lament the state of your country," he had said to Wotton and commented that certainly the ambassador, as one well-travelled, knew the fate of countries which fell into Habsburg hands--total subjugation. He spoke further of the underlying fear of his government: once Philip became King, there would be no one in the government willing to speak out against his wishes, viz., a declaration of war by England against France. On the first point, Wotton cited Flanders as a good example of a country with Habsburg links but retaining its own identity; perhaps, he added, Montmorency lacked confidence in England's ability to look after its own interests. As for the Constable's other challenge, Wotton reminded him that the crown had passed to Mary alone and that her Privy Council was bound by duty and conscience to advise her sincerely in all matters. Not only did French officialdom remain unconvinced, Wotton noted also that it was generally accepted that the Spanish marriage was a certainty, and war, an increased probability.²

Renard faithfully reproduced this account for his master, adding that Henry had declared that he had spoken so candidly from a sense of pity, not fear; Wotton had replied that Mary had instructed him to make this

¹Wotton to the Council, 23 December 1553, S.P. 69/2, fos. 122-123.

²Ibid., fos. 124-126.

declaration to the French King in a spirit of friendship, not duty.¹ The French government lost no time in despatching a special messenger to their ambassador in England to inform him of what had transpired. From this account, it appears, probably correctly, that the French had had to initiate the subject with Wotton. The information sent to Noailles closely parallels Wotton's own account, but the greatest emphasis had been placed on the Constable's statement that despite Mary's firm intention to preserve the amity, for the welfare of her own kingdom came first, the French remained dubious; secondly, there was already reason to believe that Philip was amassing troops for the subjugation of England. The ambassador was instructed to use this last argument, the threat to English independence, in his discussions with the Queen and Council, as well as to learn every possible detail of the marriage contract and whether or not there was any evidence of preparations for war being made in England.²

With discontent rife at home and growing abroad, the atmosphere was right for the first rebellion of Mary's reign--Wyatt's rebellion. Thomas Wyatt, a member of the Kentish gentry whose family seat was at Allington Castle, had summoned his neighbours on 19 January 1554 to begin raising an alarm throughout the western part of the county; they were to preach the message that the Queen was in imminent danger from bad advisers, and all should join in a nationwide effort to save her. The government in London was slow to react, for while it seems to have been anticipating widespread revolt, its focus had been concentrated on the West Country. By the 25th, Wyatt had begun his march toward London, gathering supporters along the way. He had begun with approximately five hundred and sixty followers, among whom

¹Renard to Charles V, 29 December 1553, Span. Cal., XI, pp. 467-470.

²René de Vertot, Ambassades de Messieurs de Noailles en Angleterre (Leyden: 1769), Instructions, 21 December 1553, II, pp. 324-329. (This source is cited hereafter as Vertot.)

were Wotton's two nephews, Robert Rudstone and William Cromer. The government, acting in an inept and unorganized fashion, found itself literally confronted with the rebels (now numbering about three thousand, approximately one third of whom were properly armed) at the gates of the capital.¹ The Queen, taking matters into her own hands in a manner which did credit to any Tudor, went to the Guildhall from where she addressed her people on the true intentions of Wyatt and on her own resolution. She spoke of his traitorous designs against her and the English people, particularly those in London, and she assured her subjects that the Spanish marriage, against which Wyatt had pretended his greatest quarrel, was not an inevitable reality and had been contemplated solely as a beneficial measure in the interest of all of her people, not as a measure for her personal comfort.² After the delivery of this speech, the rebellion began to lose strength and was soon suppressed.

Wyatt had failed, as Dr. Loades has asserted, more by chance than through any organized counter-offensive. The support which he had received had been of a negative nature, i.e., people had refused to come out against him rather than to stand with him.³ It was soon learned that his intentions had been more sinister than simply attempting to stir resentment against the Spanish marriage. He had hoped to drive Mary from the throne and to replace her with Elizabeth. The Princess's knowledge and complicity is so obscure as to reduce it to the realm of speculation, but the role of the French, as agent provocateur, was unquestioned at the time, even if the evidence was insubstantial. There exists a letter from the French ambassador in Scotland,

¹D. M. Loades, Two Tudor Conspiracies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), pp. 51-67.

²John Hooker, Holinshed's Chronicle (London: J. Johnson & Co., 1808), IV, pp. 16-17.

³Loades, Two Tudor Conspiracies, pp. 74-80.

d'Oysel, to King Henry on the 4th of January informing him that many in England, including Wyatt and Peter Carew, were opposed to the marriage and ready to act against it.¹ On the 24th, Noailles despatched a letter to the King in which he indicated knowledge of Elizabeth's movement during this critical period and stated that the government had been taken by surprise in this uprising. He added a postscript of caution:

Toutes choses, graces à Dieu, sont en bon chemin. Vous suppliant très humblement commander qu'il ne soit faict à nul des Anglois aulcunes deffences, et que pareillement on ne courre sur leurs terres, mais au contraire leur faire offrir par les vostres, soubz main, tout plaisir et bon traictement.²

The position of the Imperial ambassador at this time is uncertain, but according to Noailles, Charles's servants had most to fear.³

Wotton, for his part, was apparently oblivious to the developing storm, despite involvement by members of his own family. His time had been occupied with a commission from William Petre to research a genealogy for Philip and Mary in order to define their degree of affinity, and he acknowledged Petre's receipt of this chart in a note on the 26th of January reflecting a combination of humour and despair:

I thank you much for the promotion, whereunto you have promoted me by your last letter. But I am sorry you forgot to send me my title and name, whereby I should be called. Whether it be Yellow Cross, or Green Mantle, or Obscurentius, or such other, for that would have set me well further ... and have made me welcomed here, at the least among my fellows the heralds.

As for the genealogical knowledge sought, Wotton humorously berated his lack of ability in this area, "Qui nihil scit, de nullo dubitat." Applying this same sentiment to his own sense of isolation, (apparently having had no recent communication from the Council), Wotton wryly admonished his

¹d'Oysel to Henry II, 4 January 1554, Vertot, III, pp. 15-16.

²Ibid., Noailles to Henry II, 24 January 1554, pp. 45-46.

³Ibid., Noailles to Henry II, 24 January 1554, p. 46.

colleague, "Forbecause I shall be sure never to hear no news from you my masters out of England, I intend therefore to send you some news from here." Written in such vein, it is the postscript which appears to preserve the true mood of Dr. Wotton:

Perceiving how I am fallen into this sickness, upon so little occasion to my knowledge, I am half in despair, to be able to do the Queen's Highness any service here for this cause, and also for that because of this marriage I think it will be very hard to avoid the war betwixt us and France, the war continuing betwixt the Emperor and France: I have the less desire to continue here. And therefore if you see any good occasion of my revocation, I pray you omit it not and by the next I pray you to signify unto me, whether you see any hope of my revocation or not. And in case you do, about what time.¹

Confrontation over Wyatt's rebellion shifted from England to France in February, and Wotton was at the centre of it. Noailles also found himself thrust to the fore in the course of this dispute and paid a high price for his government's involvement. Although he had gone to the Guildhall on the first of February to join the crowds in order to send home a firsthand report of Mary's speech, he was soon subjected to diplomatic humiliations in a number of ways, and his despatches took on a different character:

Je me deliberey en cape de veoir de quel visaige elle et sa compaignie y alloient que je congneus estre aussy triste et desplorée qu'il se peult penser.²

His diplomatic packets were intercepted, his servants harassed, and his requests for passports for Frenchmen travelling to Scotland were denied.³ Despite the English government's denial, his fears that diplomatic correspondence seized from his house at the time of the rebellion had been given to Renard were confirmed in the despatches of the Imperial ambassador.⁴

On the 10th of February, Wotton was granted an audience by King Henry,

¹Wotton to Petre, 26 January 1554, S.P. 69/3, fos. 46-47.

²Noailles to Henry II, 1 February 1554, Vertot, III, pp. 50-51.

³*Ibid.*, Noailles to Henry II, 10 February 1554, pp. 59-60.

⁴Renard to Charles V, 5 February 1554, *Span. Cal.*, XII, p. 77.

and the ambassador hinted at the English suspicions:

I said I trusted assuredly that he would never give ear to such a sort of men. And much less give them succour or aid to maintain their rebellion against Your Highness, for that, quod I, were no friend's part, but a very enemy's part. And in case any like insurrection should chance in your countries, or in Scotland, you would not think the Queen's Highness were your friend, if she did succour and aid them against you.

Wotton, knowing Carew and some of his followers to be in Rouen, confronted the King with this intelligence, but no further news was forthcoming.

Henry, who had long been anxious for Mary to renew the existing treaties between England and France, a request continually dismissed by the Queen with the excuse that her verbal promise to honour them was sufficient, now had the opportunity to taunt the English Queen with her own words. Just as she had argued the sufficiency of her royal word, Henry reasoned to Wotton, the English government must now accept his word that he had not and would not aid those in rebellion, nor had he any knowledge of their whereabouts.¹

Mary persisted in her attempts to have Carew and his companions extradited, reminding Noailles that the English government had honoured this treaty commitment very recently in the return of certain French pirates, a fact which the ambassador appears to have confirmed to Henry with the suggestion that it might much benefit relations if Carew and his followers were arrested.² Wotton was also urged to pursue all available means to gain information about the rebels and their schemes. He was also occupied with the disturbing revelations of the involvement in the recent uprising by his two nephews and brother-in-law, Gawain Carew. In a most anxious plea to Petre, Wotton spoke of his embarrassment and requested his friend's assistance in obtaining Mary's mercy for his sister, his niece who was married to Rudstone and for his nephew Cromer, who, he believed, had been misled

¹Wotton to Queen Mary, 12 February 1554, S.P. 69/3, fos. 72-74.

²Noailles to Henry II, 17 February 1554, Vertot, III, pp. 72-73.

either by Rudstone or Wyatt. His petitions found favour with the Queen, and his relatives were pardoned and restored to their property.¹

Wyatt's Rebellion had shaken the Marian government and had revealed the diminished support enjoyed by the Marian regime since the Queen's initial challenge to the nobility and commons to proclaim her rightful inheritance in preference to Lady Jane Grey. The uprising had also brought out into the open the suspicion and division which wracked the Marian Council throughout the reign. When unity and strength were so desperately needed for the fundamental preservation of the internal security of the realm, Bishop Stephen Gardiner and William Paget had led the Council into the paths of factionalism and weakness. Former friends, these two statesmen had clashed on several issues by 1553, and the Spanish marriage proved to be their first round in Mary's reign. Their personal differences soon emerged as divisive factors within the Council, for Gardiner was initially opposed to the marriage, although he eventually came to realize the wider, beneficial implications which such a union could have for his own concept of the reorganized church. In fact, sometime between late 1553 and his death in 1555, he composed a treatise for Philip outlining the previous developments in English history which might serve as guidelines to the new Prince.²

Although the Council had written to Wotton that the Queen had ordered the navy, all men and horses to be put in readiness to act within an hour's notice and that the ambassador was to explain these measures to the French court as strictly internal precautions, France had little to fear. England was in no position to challenge France militarily and had to tolerate French intrigues against English security. Henry received encouragement in such

¹Wotton to Petre, 23 February 1554, S.P. 69/3, f. 101; Loades, Two Tudor Conspiracies, pp. 119-120.

²P. S. Donaldson, A Machiavellian Treatise by Stephen Gardiner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 2-4.

designs from Mary of Lorraine and d'Oysel; their argument advanced was that the most devastating result would be war--a situation for which most believed England to be insufficiently prepared--so that should war result, the French could look upon it as an opportunity to recover Calais.¹

A definite chill gripped relations between London and Paris. The French protested in vain about the treatment of their ambassador at the English court, while Wotton, to no avail, continued to press for the arrest of the increased number of rebels in France. The French weakened their position by declaring to Wotton that even if Carew had been seen, it was unlikely that he would have been questioned about his activities since Englishmen enjoyed uninhibited travel in France.² Realizing that his pleas for assistance would continue to go unnoticed, the English ambassador adopted a policy of encouraging and recommending the rebels to sue for pardon. In this manner, he explained to the Queen, he sought to create disaffection among this group and to stir feelings of mistrust toward the French King.³ So it was that he enthusiastically petitioned for pardon on behalf of Edward Randall, who later betrayed his sponsor by offering his services once again to Henry II. Wotton's policy then achieved very limited success, for the seed of suspicion had been sown in the rebel community; however, while this may have served to retard plots, they continued to develop and survive. Wotton had failed to realize that many of these men, some of whom were prominent citizens, were capable of acting as double agents or transferring their loyalties without obvious motive. The ambassador also later hinted at the obstacle of restricted finances which impeded his attempts to infiltrate the seditious English element abroad.⁴

¹E. H. Harbison, Rival Ambassadors at the Court of Queen Mary (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940), p. 153.

²Loades, Two Tudor Conspiracies, pp. 155-160.

³Wotton to Queen Mary, 29 April 1554, S.P. 69/4, fos. 63-67.

⁴Harbison, Rival Ambassadors, pp. 230-232.

Each court found the behaviour of the other in strange contrast to the amity professed. Noailles suffered several months of reprisals but took consolation for himself and his government in recording the ubiquitous rumours which were circulating in England. First, there was the information put out that Mary had become so paranoid as to increase her personal bodyguard and to require a search of the palace twice each night. It was then rumoured that she had ordered a census to be conducted ostensibly to assess the strength of her armed forces but in reality to learn who had what weapons and to confiscate these. Finally, Noailles had heard that the Queen and Council, in fear of the numbers deserting to France, had spread the rumour that Henry had been positioning troops on the border with Calais and Guisnes in preparation for an attack and that he had also been inciting the Scots.¹ In such a charged atmosphere, it is not surprising that matters came to a disagreeable confrontation between Wotton and Montmorency over dinner on 22 March 1554. Following the instructions sent to him in Paris, the ambassador had once more protested over the lack of cooperation in the apprehension of Carew. The Constable had responded with a rehearsal of the abuses heaped upon Noailles, whose character he staunchly defended. He appeared to have acknowledged a degree of complicity by the ambassador but simultaneously recommended that if the English government genuinely valued the state of peace with France, it would not insist on the humiliation of a public apology.² Noailles himself had realized that relations had reached a breaking point and suggested that Henry might at least make some pretence of arresting Carew.³

New areas of conflict arose. Both ambassadors had been feeling

¹Noailles's Instructions to de La Marque, 4 March 1554, Vertot, III, pp. 97-101.

²Wotton to Queen Mary, 31 March 1554, Tytler, II, pp. 352-362.

³Harbison, Rival Ambassadors, pp. 163-164.

unwelcomed and useless at their respective posts, and both had been accused of inappropriate conduct. Early in April, Noailles had challenged one of the Council's inquiries about the rebel arrests with the statement that since Mary had refused a new ratification of the Anglo-French amity, the French King was free of former treaty obligations. Although realizing that this comment had been uttered probably only in anger, Paget and Gardiner seized this opportunity to request a written confirmation of the ambassador's words, for it would have negated the clause in the marriage treaty requiring Philip to honour the Anglo-French accord. Montmorency and Henry had both conceded that the ambassador had spoken in haste and incorrectly.¹ Wotton was not permitted to enjoy any illusions of diplomatic triumph over his colleague however, for Montmorency had a complaint of his own:

Here the Constable began to lay to my charge that I had not used myself in this office as I ought to have done for that I had counselled divers Englishmen who serve the King here that they should go home and serve him no longer and that they could not be Your Highness's friends serving here. And that I had sent of my men abroad into the country to search and espy things which he said was not the office of an ambassador to do, and that although ambassadors were privileged, yet abusing their privileges they did lose them; and might be punished for it, and therefore advised me to do that thing which I was sent for and not to meddle with such other matters.

While denying these charges, Wotton was moved to express certain reservations to the Queen, "Wherefore seeing that they have conceived such an opinion of me here now I cannot see that I shall be able to do Your Highness any service here any longer."²

The English had discovered the additional problem of the betrayal of their correspondence. Before William Pickering's defection from the conspirators' camp, Wotton had suggested to Petre that it might be wise to devise a new cipher key, since Pickering, Wotton's predecessor as ambassador

¹Ibid., p. 180.

²Wotton to Queen Mary, 17 April 1554, S.P. 69/4, fos. 19-20.

resident in France, possessed knowledge of the current one. It was Pickering however who shortly thereafter came to Wotton with the information that the leak stemmed from a Franco-Imperial chain:

He hath learned in a good place that all the secrets which Your Highness doth communicate to the Emperor's ambassador are advertised straightways by means of a corrupt secretary of the said Emperor's ambassador who declareth it to the ambassador of France, and I believe this advertisement to be true.¹

Throughout the late spring and summer of 1554, two realities confronted all parties, the Franco-Imperial conflict in Flanders and the Anglo-Spanish marriage. Though the French continued to emphasize their commitment to the amity with England, rumours persisted that English rebels were still in hope of French support for various ventures, including one to attack in Essex or Sussex in the name of Mary Queen of Scots; this in turn could have encouraged a Scottish raid on Berwick or Newcastle.² Following Mary's marriage to Philip on the 25th of July, the French saw their options reduced essentially to two alternatives. They could encourage English dissidents both within England and abroad; this scheme, of particular appeal to Noailles, concentrated on recalling Carew from Venice, supplying him with the necessary aid to lead a rebellion, taking advantage of the increased malice toward Spain in England and placing Elizabeth on the throne. This would have effectively countered the Habsburg encirclement of France. The Constable did not agree but rather preferred to press for a peace treaty confirming the acquisitions and favourable position which France had gained thus far through war. By a constant stream of manoeuvres to keep the English Queen viewing herself as the most favoured mediator, England could at least be kept out of the war, allowing Henry a strengthened hand with which to consolidate his improved Continental position.³ This plan found greater

¹ *Ibid.*, Wotton to Queen Mary, 29 April 1554, f. 65.

² Renard to Charles V, 6 May 1554, *Span. Cal.*, XII, p. 240.

³ Harbison, *Rival Ambassadors*, pp. 228-230.

acceptance with the King, although English rebels coming to France continued to find encouragement.

Although Anglo-French diplomacy took a public turn for the better during the remainder of 1554 and 1555, there was always an undercurrent of suspicion and conspiracy. A spy in the pay of the Constable had disclosed to Wotton that he had been hired to gather intelligence in England and Calais, for the French were especially eager to learn whether the administrators in Calais and Guisnes were likely to be changed soon and whether Mary was aiding the Emperor militarily. This spy also informed the ambassador that three thousand French troops had been despatched to Scotland.¹ Compromising the English possessions on the Continent increasingly became the threat from conspirators, the most notorious of which was the group organized by Henry Dudley. A cousin of the Duke of Northumberland, Henry had been sent by the Duke to seek French support for his alteration of the succession in case the Emperor should take steps to ensure Mary's challenge. By July of 1555, Noailles had had news that many within the nobility and lower classes were contemplating a rebellion some time that year.² Mary's religious policies appear to have been the catalyst for this uprising, for many of the reformists could have accepted her Catholic marriage alliance and reunion with Rome but not her Parliamentary manoeuvres to reimburse church revenues with the reinstatement of the first fruits and tenths nor the confiscation of lands held by rebels in exile. Noailles, in close communication with the Parliamentary opposition, advised acceptance of this annates bill in order that this revenue would not become available for Philip's military purposes, but the second measure, the confiscation of rebel lands, was rejected as

¹Wotton to the Council, 12 December 1554, Foreign Cal., p. 144, no. 300; Wotton to the Council, 24 December 1554, p. 146, no. 307.

²Noailles to the Constable, 27 July 1555, Vertot, V, p. 44.

incompatible with previous laws which protected exiles from the loss of their lands without a fair trial.¹

The French government initially reacted unfavourably to Noailles's involvement in another conspiracy, but by November, when his servant Berteville had made contact with Edward Randall, the conspirators held out bright prospects too tempting to be rejected out of hand. Dudley had claimed that his friend Richard Uvedale, governor of the Isle of Wight, would surrender this possession to France and that the same could be accomplished in Guisnes if Henry would supply men and money to this effort to depose Mary in favour of Elizabeth.² During the truce negotiations in January and February of 1556, Henry had ordered Noailles to keep the conspirators under cover but also still believing in possible French assistance. Dudley, apparently succumbing to this scheme, was not totally convinced of Henry's reliability. In these same months, he activated an alternative, i.e., the bribery of an Exchequer official to steal fifty thousand pounds in bullion, which was to be shipped to Dieppe where the French King had given the rebels permission to establish a mint. Dudley was also occupied in recruiting mercenaries.³

The conspiracy itself was to have begun with an uprising in the West Country. On 11 March 1556, still lacking definite ratification of the truce, Montmorency indicated to Noailles that Henry intended to support the rebels. Almost simultaneously however, the plot was divulged to Cardinal Pole by Thomas White. Henry Dudley and Christopher Ashton had already departed for the Continent, but many of their subordinates were swiftly arrested.⁴ A letter from Renard suggests that Wotton had provided his government with information on French involvement in and support of Dudley's conspiracy,

¹Loades, Two Tudor Conspiracies, pp. 180-184.

²Harbison, Rival Ambassadors, p. 279.

³Loades, Two Tudor Conspiracies, pp. 184-188.

⁴Harbison, Rival Ambassadors, pp. 285-286.

but no such document survives.¹ Wotton did maintain close surveillance on Dudley and his cohorts throughout the duration of this embassy. He reported Dudley and Ashton's arrival at the French court in April and their receipt of fifteen hundred pounds with a promise of more to come later. He also wrote of their general activities:

These men bring with them a copy of the King your father's last will which they show here and pretend that Your Highness having done contrary to the said will hath forfeited the crown and the right thereto and that therefore they may rebel against Your Highness.²

Again, Dr. Loades provides us with the most complete assessment of the four explanations for Dudley's failure: discounting the need for popular revolt and relying too heavily on the gentry, a lack of financial support, too many privy to the scheme and the mistaken assumption that Mary's closest advisers would desert her with relatively little assurance of success.³

Keeping a vigilant eye on these conspirators, who never completely relinquished hope of French support, was a major preoccupation of Wotton's final year at the French court. Again in October of 1556, he warned the Queen that Dudley and his followers enjoyed royal favour and that certain among them were rumoured to be journeying toward Calais. In November, the ambassador wrote of what he had been able to learn about this mission and of possible new disclosures:

And it please Your Highness the twelfth of this month I received letters from a subject of Your Majesty's being in Rouen whereby I was advertised that if I would send a servant of mine thither there should be declared to him matters of great importance, whereupon I sent straight thither my secretary commanding him that if he found the matter weighty that he should ride straight thence in post to Your Highness with it. And further of that matter as yet I know not. That self day in the evening I received letters from a gentleman named Christopher Chydley

¹Renard to Charles V, 13 June 1556, Span. Cal., XIII, p. 270.

²Wotton to Queen Mary, 12 April 1556, S.P. 69/8, f. 148.

³Loades, Two Tudor Conspiracies, pp. 197-198.

wherein he writeth that certain conspiracies are wrought against Your Highness and your pieces of Calais, Guisnes and Hammes which the French King and Constable are made believe to be victualled but for twenty days and that Dudley and other the rebels which have little regard to their duty to their country have promised the French King to deliver it up to his hands and that there are men of war mustered at Rouen to go toward the borders of Calais and that, as he sayeth, to the intent to take Calais, and also that the Constable's secretary was come thither to Rouen which was thought very strange and that so was it likewise thought of the gifts which Dudley and his fellows have had of the French King. Now having received these letters and yet no other certainty by neither of both, yet have I thought good to despatch another in diligence with these letters to Calais partly to warn them again there to take good heed and also that Your Highness may be advertised of it, for it seemeth that this matter is of importance and would with all speed be looked to.¹

Such was but one of the ways in which Wotton served his government, and although it had been suggested in September by the Council that he should be recalled, (to be replaced by Thomas Martin, it is learned in a later letter), Philip seems to have been the force which persuaded the Council to the contrary.²

The King's decision proved to be a wise move in England's interest, for a plot involving Calais was developing, and Wotton was able to provide valuable intelligence to his government. He learned of the royal favour and relevant position granted to the key conspirator, Nicholas Denisot, a young scholar already known to Wotton and many Englishmen as the former tutor to the children of the Duke of Somerset. Scholarship was the guise under which he travelled to Calais in the autumn of 1556 to assume further tutorial employment, and Wotton's suspicion was quickly aroused. It seemed strange that a young man with such a promising academic reputation should elect to leave his family and relinquish the many opportunities available to him in

¹Wotton to Queen Mary, 12 November 1556, S.P. 69/9, f. 136.

²Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the Reigns of Edward VI, Mary and Elizabeth (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1856-1872), Council to King Philip, 16 September 1556, p. 87, no. 31; King Philip to the Council, 30 September 1556, p. 87, no. 34. (This source is cited hereafter as Dom. Cal.)

Paris for a single option in a foreign territory, and the English ambassador was particularly concerned about Denisot's skills in cartography. This ability was a major factor in Denisot's selection for this assignment, and although he narrowly escaped from Calais, he was successful in providing the French government with a detailed plan of the city and its fortifications.¹ Wotton's several reports on the progress of this conspiracy illustrate not only his vigilance but also his potential for effectiveness in espionage. There is reason to argue that he lacked a firm grasp of this aspect of diplomacy, but the Denisot incident reveals that by 1557, Wotton had learned much about the ways in which agents worked. Given more time, it seems probable that he would have turned this experience to England's greater advantage.

The year in which England and France abandoned all pretence of amity, 1557, witnessed much less talk of peace and much more preparation for war. Conspiracy thrived. One of Wotton's informants, although possibly a double agent, imparted startling revelations about a conspiracy against the Queen in January, and Wotton elected to inform Petre, rather than Mary, of this in order not to trouble Her Majesty, especially since the ambassador questioned the credibility of his source and thought it possible that the rumours could have emanated from the French court in an attempt to dissuade Mary from further military aid to Philip. Lant, the agent, had been careful to distinguish this plot as one against Mary personally and not against the government of the realm. Religion, he claimed, was the motive, and many of Mary's closest and strongest advisers were privy to it. Dudley was not involved, and the ultimate goal was the execution of the Queen. If the plot ever actually existed, (and this possibility seems remote), it introduced a more threatening and dangerous note than had hitherto been heard,

¹Clément Jugé, *Nicholas Denisot du Mans: Essai sur sa Vie et ses Oeuvres* (Le Mans: 1907), pp. 112-118.

for it relied exclusively on English internal support.¹

One final conspiracy, which contributed to the declaration of war, came to Wotton's knowledge in April of 1557. He had heard that the Admiral of France was planning an attack on Guisnes and that Thomas Stafford, long ensconced at the French court and one of Dudley's associates, had departed France on a diversionary mission to seize and fortify a castle somewhere in England--Hull, Plymouth, Scarborough--Wotton knew not which. Again he expressed anxiety for the English Continental possessions and prayed that they had been well garrisoned.² Approximately two weeks before his letter of recall was despatched from London, Wotton was still receiving information about threats to England's internal security, and this time, he urged his government to look to the defences at Berwick.³ Scarborough however was the site on which Stafford launched his successful attack, although it was quickly retaken. By this point however, English patience with French intrigues had worn thin, and the possibility for peace had almost totally vanished.

II

Mary the Mediator

Pickering, Challoner and St. Leger had brought news to Mary on their return from the French court in 1553 that Henry II had requested her mediation in his dispute with Charles V. Around the middle of September, the Queen wrote to Wotton instructing him to ascertain whether this was still the case and what were the conditions.⁴ Renard had already communicated these moves to his master through the Bishop of Arras to whom the ambassador had suggested that Wotton should be urged to learn the reason or

¹Wotton to Petre, 21 January 1557, S.P. 69/10, fos. 25-26.

²Wotton to Petre, 14 April 1557, Foreign Cal., pp. 293-295, no. 588.

³Ibid., Wotton to Boxall and Bourne, 11 May 1557, p. 305, no. 605.

⁴Ibid., Queen Mary to Wotton, September of 1553, p. 11, no. 34.

weakness behind the French request.¹ Wotton's first correspondence on the subject recorded the conversation which he had had with Cardinal de Tournon in which Mary's offer had been conveyed and also during which Wotton had learned that France considered the Emperor's initial demands to be unreasonable. These had included the restoration of all Luxembourg and Piedmont, the restitution of all Imperial towns taken in this war, relinquishing the protection of Parma and Siena to Charles and an agreement never again to aid secretly or openly the German Protestant princes.² While Mary was testing the climate for mediation, the Pope had also been moving in that direction and had sent Cardinal Pole as his special legate to both parties to begin discussions. The Queen, for her part, had not only asked Wotton to sound out the French but had also herself raised the matter with Renard, who had expressed the Emperor's acceptance of English mediation if the French terms and sincerity could be determined.³ From the letter which Charles wrote to Renard on the 11th of October, it appears that the French government had suggested to Wotton that a truce should first be arranged, but the English ambassador had argued that efforts should be concentrated on direct negotiation of a peace. This answer had greatly pleased the Imperial camp, and Charles, writing in a manner which suggested that he was already coming to consider England as a Habsburg appendage, recommended that Mary should instruct Wotton to press Henry to disclose his further peace proposals; for if the original Imperial demands seemed unreasonable, the French stipulation, that all matters settled by previous treaties should be renegotiated, was impossible.⁴

¹Renard to the Bishop of Arras, 9 September 1553, Span. Cal., XI, p. 229.

²Wotton to the Council, 20 September 1553, Foreign Cal., pp. 12-13, no. 41.

³Renard to Charles V, 9 October 1553, Span. Cal., XI, p. 278.

⁴Ibid., Charles V to Renard, 10 October 1553, p. 280.

Sensitivity on both sides made conciliation a task for real diplomatic skill and tact. It was not long before Henry II had condemned de Tournon's move by announcing that the superior military position of France had pre-empted any need for peace; however, he would condescend to this for the good of Christendom. Wotton had interpreted this pronouncement as an attempt to rally the spirits of a warweary nation.¹ In fact, the effect of this declaration was to leave the next move on the board to France. This might have come more immediately but for the news of Mary's marriage proposal from Philip. Many at the French court believed that this prospect seriously challenged the Queen's impartiality. While the official line remained open to English mediation, a less hopeful attitude generally prevailed, as can be seen in Wotton's December audiences with the King and Constable on the Spanish marriage. Both had claimed to have considered the Emperor's demands several times without finding any means of resolution or acceptance.²

The year 1554 did not lend itself to peace prospects in any quarter. War continued between France and the Empire and spread from the essentially Italian campaigns to northern Europe. As for Anglo-French amity, this was the year which witnessed the greatest disruption in the form of verbal confrontation over French intrigues in England's domestic affairs. Following the revelations surrounding Wyatt's Rebellion, the diplomatic correspondence on both sides is overwhelmingly preoccupied with the results--the recriminations suffered, the Continental ramblings of the rebels and their double dealings with Wotton and each other and intelligence concerning new threats to England and its possessions. At the outset of the year, before the uprising in Kent, the Constable had praised Mary's mediation offer, but

¹Ibid., Renard to Charles V, 19 October 1553, pp. 303-304.

²Instructions, 21 December 1553, Vertot, II, p. 331.

Renard early sensed a lack of promise and progress when the Council had refused to discuss French terms with him. It was the ambassador's opinion however that there was an element within the Council which feared that a truce or peace would only serve to increase the threat of French schemes in England to sabotage the Spanish marriage.¹ In April, Wotton conferred with Pole on the progress of the peace negotiations, but the reluctant cardinal revealed little. He did say that both sides were eager for peace and agreed on Mary's mediation, but major differences remained. Wotton was left with the impression that Pole had been concentrating his energies on the establishment of a truce, at which point Mary could then be introduced as the intermediary.²

According to a June despatch from Renard to the Emperor, Wotton had written that the Constable had voiced French pessimism about peace when he had equated Mary with the Emperor and said that a settlement could only be reached by force of arms.³ Noailles did not attend Mary's marriage, feeling uncomfortable in these circumstances, but also due to his wife's ill health. It should be remembered however that he had shown interest in the development of the marriage treaty and had requested and received permission to witness its signing.⁴ Concerned about its foreign implications, Noailles had learned that England was not to be expected to join in the war against France. If there were no children from this marriage, Philip's claims in England were terminated at the time of Mary's death, but if there were children, they should inherit Burgundy and the Low Countries, as well as England. If Philip's brother Don Carlos died without heir, then

¹Renard to Charles V, 18 January 1554, Span. Cal., XII, p. 30.

²Wotton to Queen Mary, 17 April 1554, S.P. 69/4, f. 18.

³Renard to Charles V, June of 1554, Span. Cal., XII, p. 282.

⁴Council to Wotton, 25 July 1554, Foreign Cal., pp. 106-107, no. 241.

any children of the English marriage would also inherit Spain and its vast possessions.¹

After the marriage had been accomplished and the French had accepted it as a reality with which they would have to live, thoughts on peace again began to creep into the discussions among the three parties. England desperately hoped to avoid war because both externally and internally, peace was necessary to re-establish the country on the path from which it had diverged over the past two decades. Gardiner and Paget, the reorganizers of church and state respectively, recognized this. Montmorency urged the Noailles brothers to approach Gardiner for assistance in suggesting that Philip and Mary issue a new offer of mediation, for the French were becoming concerned over Imperial gains in northern Europe. Philip however was unsettled by the French victories in Italy. An unlikely and somewhat prejudiced mediator came forward in December of 1554; this was Vincenzo Parpaglia of Savoy, a duchy in French hands at this point. Because of this, it was generally expected that his efforts would be directed toward achieving a peace favourable to France.² Pole and Noailles, neither being disposed toward Imperial or Spanish interests, were quick to consider Parpaglia's suggested meeting, but Gardiner, no friend of France, threw the negotiations into confusion by proposing a change in venue from Calais to London; Parpaglia had just managed to obtain agreement on Calais. E. H. Harbison has well summarized the situation at the end of 1554 as a classic case of too many negotiators and not enough substantial negotiation.³ Thus, the year ended in the same desolate state in which it had begun. Franco-Imperial relations were no further advanced toward genuine peace negotiations; if anything, prospects were less bright. Anglo-French accord had

¹Rymer, XV, pp. 177-181.

²Harbison, Rival Ambassadors, pp. 231-239.

³Ibid., p. 241.

undergone a severe test and had emerged from it far from unscathed.

Both Wotton and Noailles opened their correspondence of the new year with discussions on peace manoeuvres. Noailles, who worked harmoniously with Pole, reported that the cardinal had expressed the hope that both Henry and the Emperor would send delegates to a neutral country for a conference with himself acting as a neutral observer. The ambassador's initial response was that while England itself would probably not be acceptable, Calais or Ardres might be ideal.¹ As for Charles, it took some persuasion from his son to obtain the Emperor's agreement to send representatives to any conference, for the French victory in Piedmont was not a point likely to be easily conceded. Reflecting on this, Wotton encouraged his government with the observation that the French court was astir with talk of peace.² The whole of 1555 was in fact devoted to this pursuit. Throughout much of the spring, the parties wavered over questions of time, place and delegations. The stronger military position of France at this juncture meant that the Imperial camp was more likely to employ such stalling tactics, especially as Charles awaited the birth of Philip and Mary's heir. Noailles confidently wrote in March that the superiority of France together with Henry's desire for peace, should be sufficient to define any conclusion reached in the favour of France. Henry should be able to obtain not only an honourable treaty but also excellent conditions.³ The reality however was much less promising than that picture painted by French officials.

When the conference convened at La Marque in May of 1555, both sides felt able to accept England's mediation only because Mary had elected to

¹Noailles to the Constable, 2 February 1555, Vertot, IV, pp. 104-106.

²Wotton to the Council, 27 February 1555, Foreign Cal., pp. 151-152, no. 316.

³Noailles's Notes, 15 March 1555, Vertot, IV, p. 240.

send a team of mediators, Gardiner and Pole, instead of a single mediator. The French pinned their hopes on the cardinal, while the Emperor communicated solely through Gardiner. This first round of discussions was not successful, but a combination of public opinion, financial necessity and Anglo-Papal pressure had forced both combatants to keep their rendezvous. While Charles had overestimated Henry's desire for peace at any cost, the French King had mistakenly assumed that the Emperor's declining health would necessitate some form of agreement.¹ The English mediators began on an unproductive course when they rejected the practical French request for a pre-established agenda and soon found themselves confronted with volumes of material from both sides supporting their respective claims. It was not long also before a second error in judgment was made by Gardiner and Pole. They insisted that all communications must be channelled through them; the two sides must not talk directly. This inevitably led to England becoming a judge rather than the impartial observer promised by Pole.²

As Gardiner emerged as the dominant figure in the negotiations and his pro-Imperial bias became pronounced, the French delegates suggested that the dispute should be referred to the Pope or a council. The general European situation favoured France. By this time, July of 1555, hope for Mary's expected child had been abandoned. Charles was once again besieged by religious dissidents in Germany, and the new Pope, Paul IV, was definitely a French partisan. Noailles rehearsed this assessment for the Constable and suggested:

S'il plaist audict Seigneur d'y entendre en la façon que je luy escrips, il en pourra reussir quelques plus gracieulx moyens pour le bien de ses affaires.³

¹ Harbison, Rival Ambassadors, pp. 243-244.

² Ibid., pp. 244-247.

³ Noailles to the Constable, 27 July 1555, Vertot, V, p. 44; Harbison, Rival Ambassadors, pp. 247-250.

As negotiations lapsed throughout August and September the general feeling grew that France was to blame for the failure at La Marque, yet the French delegation had parted on the note that a truce would be necessary for any future discussions and that Mary's mediation would continue to be welcomed. The Queen did agree to make one further attempt but emphasized that her impartiality could not last forever.¹ Wotton reported that the French, hearing of Philip's second effort to persuade his father to negotiate later in the autumn of 1555, had expressed their desire and hope for peace; nevertheless, the ambassador informed his government that Henry continued his preparations for war.² The King, urged on by the Guise faction at court, decided once again to enter Italian affairs. This came at a critical moment, for Charles V was preparing to abdicate, which meant the implementation of the division of the Habsburg patrimony. Montmorency recognized and feared that the Franco-Papal alliance, (neither part of which enjoyed deep-rooted support in England), could supply just the factor needed to produce an English entry into the war on the side of the enemy, now led by Philip of Spain.³

All parties found themselves embroiled in domestic controversies at the year's end so that the peace negotiations were at a stalemate. The Guise and Montmorency factions struggled for control of the French court and foreign policy, while Philip faced his own brand of factionalism in the contest between Renard and Granvelle. The Marian government was beset with new difficulties brought about by the death of Chancellor Gardiner and the legislation which the Queen considered necessary to force through Parliament in order to complete the reunion with Rome. Wotton throughout this

¹ Harbison, Rival Ambassadors, pp. 251-252.

² Wotton to Petre and Bourne, 13 and 14 September 1555, Foreign Cal., p. 184, no. 413.

³ Harbison, Rival Ambassadors, pp. 261-263.

year remained on the perimeter of the nerve centre of England's conciliation moves which dominated Anglo-French relations; nevertheless, the role which he performed was of importance. Besides continuing to serve as the channel for discussing commercial disputes and for spying on the rebels, he was also able to keep his government informed of the military situation as seen from his post with particular emphasis on the French moves toward Italy and the Ottoman Empire, although sometimes this only involved rumour.

On 26 January 1556, Mary wrote to Wotton in Blois that the Pope had formally requested her services as mediator, and she sent to her ambassador the credentials necessary to open discussions with the French King.¹ In the meantime, the French insistence upon a truce had been recognized, and one was being arranged in the hope that a suspension of arms would allow all parties to meet and put forward their respective grievances to be resolved through mediation.

By the terms of the Truce of Vaucelles, France kept Piedmont and Savoy, while Spain retained its influence in the rest of Italy. From the outset, the truce was beset with conflict. The French government insisted that it must be ratified, and Paul IV could have proclaimed this truce a peace, as was the papal custom, had he so chosen; but he resented the Habsburg yoke, for his own family background had been dominated by French influences.² Nevertheless, the initial reaction to the truce, at least by the English Queen, was one of joy and expectation:

So do we assuredly trust that God Who hath been the author of
so Godly a beginning will through His help and furtherance
bring the same to such good order and perfection as may be to
His glory and the general weal of Christendom, which for our
part, we shall be most glad to further according to our old

¹Queen Mary to Wotton, 26 January 1556, Foreign Cal., p. 206, no. 460.

²Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), II, pp. 937-939.

determination if we may be any means understand how we may
anywise advance the same.¹

The truce was indeed a shaky one. Wotton reported in April that he had heard that the Pope and the Imperial ambassador had fallen into a disagreement, and the pontiff had had his adversary "thrust out" of the papal presence just after the celebration of Mass. When the ambassador had attempted to leave the city of Rome, the gatekeeper would not open the gates so that the Imperial company had had to force its way out.² Similar incidents had continued to occur, and Wotton himself had witnessed one such in Paris in July between Renard and Cardinal Caraffa. After a dinner in celebration of the baptism of the French King's daughter, the cardinal had asked all ambassadors present to join him in the chapel for discussions on the subsequent moves to be undertaken to convert the current truce into a peace. He and Philip's ambassador were soon at odds, and the meeting adjourned without progress.³ In addition to these, a plot against Rome had been discovered, and Renard spoke to Wotton about further intelligence which indicated that France was collecting troops to go toward Flanders and from there to attempt something against Bourbourg or Gravelines. The English ambassador warned his government to look to the safety of Guisnes.⁴ In such an atmosphere, few were surprised to learn in September that the Duke of Alva had crossed into the papal states. The French, if they were to be effective, had to move swiftly, and this they did in October when troops were sent to the aid of their papal ally.⁵ The Truce of Vaucelles had collapsed.

¹Queen Mary to Wotton, 26 February 1556, S.P. 69/8, f. 60.

²Ibid., Wotton to Queen Mary, 12 April 1556, fos. 148-149.

³Wotton to the Council, 13 July 1556, Foreign Cal., pp. 239-241, no. 520.

⁴Ibid., Wotton to Queen Mary, 4 August 1556, pp. 243-245, no. 523.

⁵Harbison, Rival Ambassadors, p. 306.

With the resumption of war, peace manoeuvres became more difficult to initiate because of two factors. The Pope's pro-French hand had now been revealed and tested; therefore, his offers of mediation were immediately suspect. Mary, although not discredited, had by 1556 to be viewed from a different perspective, the wife of the leading figure in opposition to France; previously, Charles had held this leading position, but in this year, his son, though not succeeding to his father's Holy Roman Empire, had inherited his military challenges. Mary had already given the French their first warning that her impartiality had limits, and their actions in continuing to promote conspiracies against her demonstrated an outright disregard for the dangers therein.

The truce in the north was not broken until January of 1557 when Henry feared a rapprochement between Alva and Paul IV. Although at this point, Philip was working diligently to bring England into the war and Mary was taking stock of men and material available to her, the Privy Council continued to reject these pressures, while appearing to support Philip by continuing to appropriate money and supplies for him. It is known now however that the peace party within the Council was beginning to disintegrate, and some of the powerful lords, who believed that they had more to gain by joining the struggle, were increasingly eager to abandon the pretended amity.¹ Mary's advisers, never known for their unanimity, became even more unmanageable, and the Queen suggested that Philip should return to England in order to achieve a more effective response to his requests. This he did in March, and through Noailles's contact on the Council, George Brooke, one can trace the ensuing manipulation of that body. The Queen advanced her arguments for a declaration of war, and Brooke was selected to draft the Council's reply. In it, they cited several counterarguments: the unfavourable economic

¹Ibid., pp. 313-319.

conditions in England, the traditional problem of supplying English troops engaged on the Continent, a lack of public support and no definite provocation from France.¹ This had obviously been written before Stafford's raid on Scarborough near the end of April, which eventually achieved what Mary's threats of death and loss of property had been unable to do throughout the month. It would appear that the Council determined upon a declaration of war at the beginning of May, although it was not despatched until almost six weeks later. On 29 May 1557, Wotton's letter of recall was sent, and he took his leave of the French court in Rheims on the 7th of June before the herald had actually delivered the proclamation of war.² Not long after this, in August, when Wotton had returned to England and to his place at the council board, it was acknowledged that Scotland too had broken the peace.³

In England's many mediation initiatives throughout the reign, Dr. Wotton performed a subordinate role, but it is important to keep the central peace moves in mind when reviewing his second embassy to France, for these directly affected the ease and success with which he accomplished the daily employment of an ambassador resident. At those times when France and the Empire paid only lip service to peace discussions but were more genuinely preoccupied with the progress of the war, England found itself relegated in French eyes to little more than a potential enemy. The year 1554 is an excellent example of this, and Wotton felt the restrictions which this placed on his services to his sovereign. Conversely, in the autumn of 1555, when serious attempts at peace were underway, Wotton found the diplomatic path much smoother. The King and Constable seemed less hostile, and a merchant matter was settled amicably and swiftly. It is also known that Henry was

¹Ibid., pp. 319-326.

²Philip and Mary to Wotton, 29 May 1557, Foreign Cal., p. 312, no. 620.

³A.P.C., VI, p. 139.

working to keep the developing Dudley conspiracy under check. It has already been mentioned that at one point the Queen had considered recalling Wotton and replacing him with Thomas Martin, but Philip had successfully countermanded this. According to the Venetian ambassador in London at this time, Mary was considering the major step of recalling most of her ambassadors and relying on Philip's diplomatic servants for representation in Europe. In general, if this policy was seriously considered, one would have to note that it was slowly and only partially implemented.¹ In the final analysis, in Wotton's particular case, Philip's move was a wise one, for when the truce was proclaimed in 1556, he had appointed Simon Renard to represent him with Henry. This arrangement was less than popular, for Wotton, with all his prejudice against France, appears to have been less abrasive and more acceptable in the eyes of the French. He was also at least a known entity at the French court--an advantage over Martin. To have allowed Renard to represent both Philip and Mary would probably only have served to bring about war more quickly between England and France.

III

The Mission in Perspective

Conspiracy and conciliation were the primary issues in Anglo-French relations during Mary's reign, but much of Dr. Wotton's time inevitably had to be directed toward the settlement of the less sensational but equally vital area of England's commercial interests. There are numerous instances of directives sent to the ambassador to appeal to the King and Constable on behalf of individual or groups of English merchants; in fact, one of the Council's first instructions to Wotton after Mary's accession was of this nature. On this occasion, Wotton replied candidly that he would do his best

¹D. M. Loades, The Reign of Mary Tudor: Politics, Government and Religion in England, 1553-1558 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), p. 262.

for them but thought some of their suppositions incorrect and their demands extreme.¹

In this sphere of his employment, Wotton exhibited forcefulness and diligence. This can best be illustrated by tracing the 1555 Council directive to Wotton to take up the suit of English merchants against the city of Rouen. On the 27th of February, he wrote of this trouble to Montmorency. The officials of Rouen had been harassing English merchants with what was claimed to be a recently-obtained licence by which all merchandise must be first presented at the city hall, the bills related to the purchase of this merchandise submitted, an oath administered by these officials as testimony of the validity of these documents and a bond given to ensure the future submission of proper certification showing that these goods had been distributed and sold strictly within one's own country. If a merchant protested, he could be fined and the fine collected, even if a petition of appeal had been filed. Wotton argued that this decree had emanated solely from the authority of counsel taken by Rouen officials without consulting any of the numerous merchants in the area. If such consultation seemed an unreasonable demand, the ambassador, in Poissy at the time, believed that at least he might have been consulted. He equated this decree with intolerable servitude and reminded the Constable that the King had ordered that English merchants should not be subjected to such treatment and that this decree had been issued without the knowledge and consent of French royal authorities. Furthermore, Wotton persisted, such commercial interference was in direct contravention of the last treaty, an agreement which the ambassador was confident the Constable wished to see maintained. The ambassador apologized for the inconvenience which this difficulty had produced for all:

Mais pour aultant que lesdicts pauvres gens n'ont aultre
refuge en leur besoing qu'à moy, et que je suis commandé

¹Wotton to the Council, 2 September 1553, Foreign Cal., pp. 9-10, no. 29.

de les assister en leurs affaires, je ne puis faire aultrement
sinon de vous en donner la fascherie, aussy de laquelle je
voudrais que nous fussions delivrés tous d'eulx.

On the 6th of March, the matter was brought before Henry and his council again and appears to have been settled to England's satisfaction.¹ The diplomatic principle of linkage should not be ruled out here, for this settlement corresponded with the planning of the first round of serious peace negotiations. Conversely, one can cite an unfavourable decision in May of 1557 concerning the seizure of goods in France belonging to a group of naturalized English merchants. This corresponded with a low point in Anglo-French amity.²

The other major commerce-related difficulty which Wotton confronted throughout the reign was piracy. This was a problem common to all nations in the sixteenth century, and Wotton often received complaints from the French on acts of piracy committed by Englishmen. Occasionally, the pirates in question could be branded as common outlaws. The most notorious English pirate band of the decade was led by the Killigrew brothers, and this proved an especially complex problem for these brothers had also associated themselves with the Dudley rebels. When the Imperial ambassador and the Constable complained to Wotton about the Killigrews, he wryly responded that since they were well-known as bandits, he could only marvel that the French government had made it possible for them to put out to sea armed. A secondary issue soon developed from this move when England captured the "Sacrette," the Killigrews' French-supplied ship, the return of which France demanded. The English ambassador argued that since the French had made this vessel available to the Killigrews, the French government should likewise be responsible for the damages perpetrated by this means and that England

¹Wotton to the Constable, 27 February 1555, Vertot, IV, pp. 208-214;
to Wotton, 4 March 1555, p. 223.

²Wotton to the Council, 14 May 1557, Foreign Cal., p. 305, no. 606.

should be allowed to keep the ship as part of the compensation for the damages suffered. The matter was soon removed from the ambassador's charge when a special commission was appointed to consider the disputed possession of this ship.¹ Here again, the success in counteracting piracy was significantly defined within the general state of foreign relations.

Other matters were routinely brought to the ambassador's attention by his government, and his assistance enlisted. A major theft in England could prompt a letter to Wotton to be observant of any stolen goods turning up for sale in France. Such a case occurred in December of 1553.² Similarly, especially as relations deteriorated in late 1556 and early 1557, both sides exchanged complaints over the seizure of merchant ships.³ This was a common difficulty faced by merchants of the period.

It was in Mary's reign that Wotton became involved in a venture which reflects something of his wide ranging interests not only in antiquity but also in the more modern developments of his time. On 26 February 1555, a patent was issued for the incorporation of a body of men, including Dr. Wotton, to be known as "The Merchant Adventurers of England." The first governorship was given to Sebastian Cabot, and their stated purpose was set forth as "the discovery and exploration of parts unknown for the glory of God and the increased good and prosperity of England."⁴ This company, eventually to be known as the Russia Company, was the direct product of the exploration attempted by Chancellor and Willoughby to discover a northeast passage. Although unsuccessful in this purpose, these two adventurers,

¹Ibid., Wotton to Petre, 13 July 1556, pp. 236-237, no. 519; Wotton to the Council, 8 October 1556, pp. 261-263, no. 543.

²Wotton to the Council, 23 December 1553, S.P. 69/2, fos. 127-128.

³Wotton to the Council, 12 December 1556, Foreign Cal., p. 280, no. 566.

⁴Pat. Cal. Mary, II, pp. 55-56.

sponsored by the merchants of London, can be credited with the opening of Russia to western trade. They captured the imagination of their sponsors, who were rewarded with the charter for the Merchant Adventurers by which they were not only commissioned to place England among those powers engaged in exploration but also to enjoy a monopoly on Russian trade. In exchange for English cloth, these merchants sought furs, wood and naval stores. The commercial aspect was probably of little interest to Dr. Wotton, and the company's form of organization, a regulated company, would lead one to conclude that his contribution had probably been one of capital for the discovery aspect.¹ Although nothing further is known of Wotton's interest in this company, one can surmise that he would have championed endeavours to expand knowledge of his world.

The reign of Mary is remembered more for its religious reaction than for its foreign policy, and one might well query the position of Dean Wotton in religious affairs during this swift transition. Strype has stated that he acted as Archbishop of Canterbury in the interim between the fall of Cranmer and the appointment of Pole, citing as evidence appointments to vacate ecclesiastical benefices.² There is little extant evidence to support this, but if he indeed did assume this responsibility, remembering that he was away in France during these months, one would have to conclude that the actual management of archepiscopal business was transacted by deputies. Much the same can be said of the administration of affairs within the chapter in Canterbury. It would seem that in this interim, Wotton was concerned about developments in Canterbury and attempted to maintain at least an observant glance in the direction of the see. When he had learned of the passage of the Parliamentary statute authorizing Mary to remake the Cathedral

¹E. Lipson, An Economic History of England (London: Black, 1961), II, pp. 195 and 326-327.

²Strype, Memorials of Archbishop Cranmer, III, p. 63.

statutes, he wrote to Petre:

And whereas by the act of Parliament, the Queen's Highness shall make the statutes of the newly-erected cathedral churches, I do fear lest my fellows of Christchurch will now in mine absence seek the means to have certain statutes devised and confirmed, which shall take away divers rights, pre-eminences and commodities given to the dean already, by the foundation and erection of our church, passed under the Great Seal already, as they have gone about to do heretofore in mine absence in the King's service: therefore I pray you, if so be that there shall be suitors to the Queen's Highness for any such matter, that you will find the means that I may be first advertised of it, and see the book. And that I may be heard for mine interest in it. Which I trust is no unreasonable request.¹

Based upon previous correspondence, one senses that Petre must have been in general agreement with his colleague's request and also of the opinion that Wotton's influence within the chapter remained sufficient to benefit a petition from the secretary. On 10 November 1554, Wotton acknowledged Petre's nominee for the position of auditor of Christchurch and agreed to consider earnestly recommending the candidate but informed the secretary candidly that it was his opinion that the occupant of this office should reside in Canterbury.²

As was to be the case throughout Wotton's career, his religious inclinations at this juncture remain so obscure that one cannot decide categorically on his true persuasion. There is no reason to believe that he had not adapted himself acceptably from Edwardian Protestantism to Marian Catholicism. At the time that his recall was under discussion in 1556, besides writing to Petre that Dr. Martin would be most welcomed to the embassy, Wotton also included the following thought:

I am now so broken through age since my coming hither, that you shall not know me when you see me. And therefore it is time for me to get into a corner, take me to my beads, and to remember that we have not here permanentem civitatem, and

¹Irene Churchill, The Administrative Machinery of the Archbishopric of Canterbury (London: S.P.C.K., 1933), I, p. 162; Wotton to Petre, 10 August 1554, S.P. 69/5, f. 14v.

²Wotton to Petre, 10 November 1554, Foreign Cal., p. 138, no. 292.

therefore to put on my boots, to prepare myself to go to the other place where we look to rest.¹

The only other item of religious significance to appear for Wotton in Mary's reign is that he is listed as one of those present for a Council meeting on 27 February 1558, when the problem of persistent heretics and how to convert them was under debate.²

Wotton certainly retained the confidence of both the Queen and King throughout the reign, but one of the difficulties in maintaining the fluid, public religious stance which several like Wotton attempted to adopt was that it left one vulnerable to suspicion from both sides. There is a hint of this in Mary's consideration of Wotton's recall in 1556, although Renard was probably behind it. The whole episode stemmed from the general atmosphere of hostility which existed in England after the Truce of Vaucelles when Mary, Pole and the Council blamed one another for the unsuccessful role which England had thus far played in mediation attempts.³ Wotton had just become an irrelevant pawn in these condemnations, and in any case, he was not affected by it. Again in Elizabeth's reign however, this balancing act in religion provoked the Protestant element at court. In the course of mapping out the strategy toward Scotland in 1560, Wotton had suggested to Cecil that one of the points on which the Queen might have to offer some form of concession was the insistence that the Scottish religious settlement must mirror that of England. Supporters of the new faith were not impressed with this vacillation on such a critical issue.⁴

Wotton's second embassy to France marks the high point in his

¹Ibid., Wotton to Petre, 8 October 1556, p. 264, no. 544.

²A.P.C., VI, p. 275.

³Ibid., Wotton to Petre, 8 October 1556, p. 264, no. 544.

⁴Wallace MacCaffrey, The Shaping of the Elizabethan Regime (London: Jonathan Cape, 1969), p. 64.

diplomatic career. The resident ambassador in this post during these years, 1553-1557, had to be someone held in confidence by the Queen; in addition to this, he had to be one of demonstrated ability and experience in diplomacy. With the single exception of the Imperial court, the French post was the most sensitive and important embassy to be filled in Mary's reign. Because it was the aim of the English government to preserve peace in an atmosphere of war, it was necessary that the English ambassador to France must possess the combination of a wide-ranging knowledge of European affairs, especially some knowledge of the Imperial court, enough force of character to preserve the independent image of England after the Spanish marriage alliance, an adequate knowledge of English domestic politics, and knowledge of the country of France and the French language were certain to be assets in any account. To say that Dr. Wotton was the only or even the obvious choice is simply incorrect, but he did offer these qualifications, along with the added advantage of already being in France in a diplomatic capacity at the time of the accession of Mary.

Inasmuch as Mary trusted any of her councillors, one can say that she had confidence in Wotton. As Dean of Canterbury and York during the Protestant Edwardian years, and, even more to the point, as one who had served at home during Northumberland's administration, he might well have come under royal suspicion in the early months. Such was not the case, for the political reality was that Mary could not have hoped to rule if she had dismissed all whose loyalty could be called into question on this factor alone. One is left with the impression that Wotton successfully convinced the Queen of his loyal service, worked diligently in her interest during his mission to France and returned home in complete favour to join the ranks of her Privy Council.

The qualification of extensive knowledge of European affairs was certainly an area in which Wotton could be recommended. Unlike many of his

colleagues, he had been in continuous royal service for the previous decade, much of it in diplomatic employment. He had spent sufficient time with the Queen Regent of the Low Countries to acquaint himself with this practical and energetic lady, as well as with many of her closest advisers.

Through his two missions to the Imperial court, he had come to know and understand something of the mind and character of Charles V and of his most trusted minister, Granvelle. At this court also, it appears that Wotton had met several of the German princes both Protestant and Catholic, as well as Charles's successor to the Holy Roman Empire, his brother Ferdinand.

From Wotton's first embassy to France, a most unsatisfactory diplomatic experience, he brought to the second assignment knowledge of the factionalism which gripped the French court, an established working relationship with Constable Anne de Montmorency and an uncompromising recognition of the tension which lay just below the surface of Anglo-French amity, i.e., the English Continental possessions. It was also during his first French mission that he had met Simon Renard with whom he was forced to work in 1556 and did so in his usual deferential manner, although there was little admiration between these two. On a more minor but not irrelevant level, it is known that Wotton in his youth had travelled in Italy, and this, combined with his later diplomatic journeys, provided him with a concrete knowledge of European geography, a useful asset in times of war and peace.

Wotton's force of character is more difficult to assess in preserving England's independent image. His correspondence with Petre, as already cited, leads one to believe that he had not totally convinced himself that England would remain outside the Habsburg yoke, but he never betrayed this doubt at the French court. The staunch defence which he made to Henry of Mary's unswerving determination to preserve the amity and the even more blunt fashion with which he challenged Montmorency's doubts on the subject are adequate illustrations of the point. Here it might be beneficial to

reiterate that Wotton's previous mission to France had given him an opportunity to learn much about the country of France itself, a fact which could be helpful to his government in settling such problems as boundary disputes, and merchant complaints. Added to this, Wotton numbered French among his linguistic accomplishments, and these factors certainly facilitated his duties as ambassador resident.

The ambassador's greatest weakness lay in his insufficient knowledge of English domestic political affairs, for the overwhelming majority of his career had been devoted to England's foreign policy. This deficiency, combined with the recognized problem of slow communications, probably made him appear less well-informed than might have been the case with one more experienced in domestic policies and politics; however, it does seem that there was negligence in communication on the Council's part, a point at which Wotton sarcastically hinted to Petre. Had Wotton been more familiar with the English political scene, he might have also been more effective in dispensing his recommendations for pardon to the rebels and in handling his spy network. In the first instance, he had begun by recommending all who sued for pardon and only solved his dilemma of insincere petitioners by deferring all final decisions on recommendations to the Council. As has already been indicated, the prominence of many Marian exiles and rebels, along with the facility with which they shifted from spy to informant, left the cautious Dr. Wotton in a somewhat confused and indecisive state. One with a greater knowledge of these individuals would probably have assessed their moves and motives more swiftly and accurately.

Of all of Wotton's resident embassies, this second mission to France is the one which he treated most in a professional diplomatic manner. Although there is the letter to Petre in which the ambassador looks forward to his recall, one is struck by the absence of this note from his correspondence; so many sixteenth-century diplomats, Wotton included, frequently

lamented their assignments and begged for recall. Present in this second French assignment were all of the traditional components of diplomacy--war and peace, espionage and rebellion, commercial and dynastic interests. Reference has already been made to the limited success achieved by Wotton in the category of espionage and rebellion. Regarding commercial and dynastic interests, the most appropriate descriptive phrase for his employment in this area is diligence and persistence. He found success in the settlement of many commercial disputes and was certainly accurate and persistent in his warnings to his government concerning French designs on Calais and other English Continental holdings. The loss of Calais must have come as particularly bitter news to him, especially when one remembers his family's association with the Pale. The field of war and peace was shaped by forces beyond the ambassadorial level. One can only repeat for this mission what was said of the first French embassy; political realists, of which Wotton was one, foresaw almost from the outset of the reign that war, the final instrument of diplomacy, could only be deferred between England and France. When it came however, the cost proved greater than anyone had expected.

There is limited information on Wotton's activities during the year and a half which he spent in England between the time of his recall from France and the date of his appointment to the English peace delegation. It can be established that he resumed attendance at Council meetings, although only on an infrequent basis, and lacking any extant correspondence with the Chapter for this period, one is left to ponder the possibility that he may actually have spent part of this time with his clerical colleagues in Canterbury. For the most part, this interval of his life appears to have passed quietly, but worthy of note is an unsigned letter from one at the court (possibly his secretary) in which is mentioned a dispute between Wotton and Exchequer officials:

... These shall be to signify unto you that my Lord's Grace hath received your letters of the xvith of the present and touching the matter moved unto you by the officers of the Exchequer, His Grace having resolved and thinketh verily even as ye write that their molestation is unwise and that ye ought not to pay any such sums of money as they demand. Nevertheless, His Grace thinketh good by my said Lord Chancellor and Lord of Ely's advices that ye do appoint an attorney to answer for you this sum in the Exchequer and His Grace will as opportunity shall serve speak to my Lord Treasurer and Sir John Baker and with them take such order both for you and other, that from henceforth ye shall no more be molested for such causes.¹

The outcome of this dispute is unknown, and when the account of Dr.

Wotton's career resumes, he is to be found in his more familiar capacity of one of England's representatives on the Continent.

¹Anonymous to Nicholas Wotton, 22 April 1558, Canterbury Letters, I, letter 99.

Chapter VIII

From Le Cateau to Edinburgh

I

The Treaty of Necessity

Dr. Wotton had left the French court on 7 June 1557, and for the second time in his life, he found himself dismantling an embassy which had been unable to avert war with France and travelling home to rejoin a government absorbed in military preparations. As had been the case four years earlier when he and Challoner had made their way to Henry's court via Calais, he very probably travelled back to England by way of this same territory. Much of the last mission had been punctuated with concern for the English overseas possessions, and judging by Wotton's correspondence over many years with Petre and Cecil, it seems more than likely that he had embarked for England under clouds of pessimism and grave misgivings over the future of England's position in this territory. He had long recognized that Calais, as long as it was held by England, would remain a challenge to the honour of France--a challenge not likely to go untested. There were similarities between the confrontation over Calais in the late 1550's and Boulogne in the previous decade, but there was also one vital distinction. As Calais represented a challenge to the honour and unity of France, it was equally a point of dynastic principle with the English. The Tudors claimed sovereignty over it by right of inheritance, not by right of conquest, as had been the situation in Boulogne. The Wotton family had been part of the representation of this Tudor presence in the Pale since the latter years of Henry VII.

As one reads the Calais correspondence for the first week of 1558, the

dual themes of urgency and despair emerge. On the night of the first of January, Lord Thomas Wentworth wrote from Calais to Mary that there had been skirmishes all day, as numbers of French troops collected to launch a second assault on Newnham Bridge; the attack was expected that night. The Deputy further wrote of the wagons of supplies and munitions reaching French troops from Boulogne, and he pleaded with his sovereign for some immediate aid for his own forces. On the following evening, he could only report that the attack had not yet materialized beyond the level of further skirmishes. The Queen despatched the Earl of Rutland with her advice to Wentworth in Calais and Grey in Guisnes; it came too late. Lord Grey had written to Mary on the 4th that the fortress had been captured, and nothing now lay in the path to halt the French advance on Calais. From the Imperial ranks at Gravelines, a company was sent under Mons. de Buzzincourt on the 8th to the aid of Grey, but there was no illusion that this measure would be the salvation of Calais, for the town had already fallen. Its ancient and poorly-fortified castle had contributed to the fall. Although the captain at Gravelines wrote to Mary urging that men and supplies from England must be sent immediately if the effort was to have any success, the story of England's Continental possessions was at an end.¹ When Calais fell, an outcry of treason echoed from every corner. Edward Carne had written to the Queen from Rome on the 28th, "The evil news of the delivery of Calais arrived on the 18th." His first reaction had been disbelief at the "abominable treason," and after receiving confirmation of it on the 26th of January, his suggestion had been that those responsible for this disaster should be brought to trial. He had heard it rumoured that the betrayal of Calais had been contrived between the

¹A. F. Pollard, Tudor Tracts (New York: Cooper Square Inc., 1964), pp. 290-293.

English officials there and the French in order to jeopardize the Imperial peace prospects.¹

Wotton had been absent from Council meetings throughout most of January when Calais would have figured prominently in discussions. It is impossible to believe however that he would have been at all surprised to learn of its loss, and in any case, the government would have been well-acquainted with his views favouring strengthened garrisons in all of England's possessions. Viewing the situation from extant evidence, it does appear that there was negligence in the form of delay in this matter, and while many of the period may have questioned the value of such a possession as Calais, most, including Wotton, would also have believed in the need for a link between England and the Continent. Isolationism was not a desirable state of affairs.

The fall of Calais by no means accomplished a lull in the general fighting; neither did it affect either a serious rally in French morale to hope for a speedy and more favourable conclusion or a noticeable decline in the English spirit of combat. The Council continued to approve regularly the supplies of men and material, as can be seen by the example of the meeting which Wotton attended in early February, and he was also periodically requested to have his secretary, John Somers, to decipher intercepted French packets.² These were routine and expected military developments. The reality however was that all of the combatants were being forced to the recognition that the continuation of the war would only drain further each of their countries in many respects. In May of 1558, the Bishop of Arras and the Cardinal of Lorraine met to test the climate for peace prospects, and no doubt, each side found in the other a reciprocal concern over the financial and religious strain which the war had placed on each government. The

¹Edward Carne to Queen Mary, 28 January 1558, Foreign Cal., pp. 361-362, no. 727.

²A.P.C., VI, pp. 260-261 and 277.

most immediate pressure on both governments was the financial one, for each had been forced to declare bankruptcy by 1557. There were other factors too with which each had to reckon, the most threatening being heresy. Willing enough to countenance Protestantism in order to subvert other governments, Henry II by 1558 was facing grave religious challenges at home, challenges which undermined the basic authority on which sixteenth-century monarchs sought to rule. France was facing one additional problem, and it was a difficulty which was increasingly inflicting its presence on French political life; this was the factional struggles at court. The staunchly Catholic Guise family battled for control of French policy with their more moderate rival, Constable de Montmorency within whose family were members favourably inclined toward reformist thought. The Constable had been returned to the dominant position at court on Henry's accession, but with his capture at the battle of St. Quentin in 1557, the balance shifted irretrievably to the Guise opposition.

All of these problems, factional, financial and religious, were no strangers to English political life, and the undesirable circumstances of successive reigns of a minor followed by an unpopular and fanatical woman had done nothing to remedy the instability of political circumstances in England. Dr. Loades has described Mary's mentality as "limited, conventional and obstinate," and her treatment of heretics and the large exile Protestant community demonstrates the negative effect which this mentality created for her policies.¹ Many of her advisers, including Paget, became totally alienated from the ranks of her Council until the closing days of the reign. War, an expensive undertaking for any sixteenth-century government, was made even more so for England by the fact of having to transport and supply troops overseas. After the fall of Calais, the English faced

¹D. M. Loades, The Reign of Mary Tudor, p. 115.

another difficulty in the form of criticism from their chief ally, Spain, that they were half-hearted in their attempts to recover it. Clearly, peace was needed by all.

The first round of peace negotiations did not get underway until October of 1558. From Spanish correspondence however, it is learned that Wotton was commissioned about the middle of September to travel to the Continent to conduct talks with the Hanseatic League on commercial disputes. It appears that somewhat as the result of once again being conveniently located, the charge of peace commissioner also fell to him. He, as well as the other members of England's peace delegation, was not Philip's first choice for this employment. The King had requested Mary to send a more prestigious delegation consisting of Lord Chancellor Heath, Lord Treasurer Paulet, Lord Admiral Clinton and John Boxall, one of the two secretaries. The Queen had written to Wotton in her commissioning of him that the Chancellor could not be spared, and the other three were in ill health.¹ The Council had sought advice from Paget on other matters about this time, and in his reply, the former secretary wrote the following of the commissioning of Wotton:

And for as much as it is your pleasure, that I should write my opinion to you concerning both these same things and also what else I thought was to be moved, I think the Queen's Majesty hath made good choice of the commissioners and devised well for the sending over of the commission to Master Wotton who being himself a wise man and shall have there what help he will as regards advice and consent of the King's majesty's commissioners, may if the matter requireth such haste as may not tarry the coming over of the rest of the Queen's commissioners proceed according to his commission now to be sent over unto him.²

The Earl of Arundel and the Bishop of Ely joined Wotton to form the initial English representation.

The delegates converged on the abbey of Cercamp at Artois, and Wotton,

¹Queen Mary to Wotton, 28 September 1558, Foreign Cal., p. 395, no. 828.

²B. L. Beer, Paget's Letters, Paget to the Council, September of 1558, p. 123.

as he journeyed to meet his colleagues, sent a letter ahead expressing the hope that they had brought with them copies of the relevant previous treaties; such correspondence reflects the professionalism which Wotton by this point demonstrated in his capacity as negotiator. Arundel and Ely had not done so, and Wotton quickly despatched a request to Boxall for these.¹

Calais had almost immediately emerged as the point of impasse, and Wotton wished specifically to have at hand the previous treaty on Boulogne. The Spanish delegation, under the leadership of Arras, was placed in the role of mediator between England and France. Wotton and Ely were asked to meet the Bishops of Orleans and Limoges, and both sides presented their respective claims to Calais. The French had argued that England had first declared war and had thus forfeited the rights they now claimed under previous treaties. The counterargument followed the line that France had first provoked England by attacking English possessions in Edward's reign when England and Scotland were at war; the French had used as their pretext the assistance of an ally, but the 1546 Treaty of Perpetual Peace had specifically stated that France would remain detached from Anglo-Scottish disputes. Even barring these considerations, the English delegates cited numerous other provocations including the arrears of the pension owed to the English sovereign by France and the many French intrigues against Queen Mary. Arras expressed his opinion to Philip that the English had a strong case, but French obstinacy could prove destructive to the complete peace settlement; France had agreed to have Philip's guidance in all other disputes with England, if a favourable solution to Calais could be found. The minister advised the King that the English Council's advice should be secretly sought in order that any future

¹Wotton to Arundel and Ely, 10 October 1558, Foreign Cal., p. 398, no. 835; Wotton to Boxall, 14 October 1558, p. 398, no. 836.

blame for the turn of the settlement could not be laid solely to the charge of Spain.¹

The English commissioners also reported home on these first meetings and conveyed the intransigence of France. Recognizing that Calais had initially been taken by conquest, Wotton, Arundel and Ely had also pointed out that it had been paid for by Edward III--a claim which France rejected. On the question of any debt owed by France to England, the French delegates had put forward the view that such debt had been cancelled by the seizure of Boulogne in the reign of Henry VIII. They had then expressed the candid opinion that further discussion with their English counterparts was a waste of time. The English commission offered its government one further possible solution: Parliament should be asked to decide the next step to be taken in this matter of Calais. At this point, the meetings were adjourned, although there was not a breakdown in the negotiations. The English commissioners in fact reported that they had retired to confer with King Philip, who was on the verge of departure for Brussels to learn the truth concerning the rumour of the death of Charles V. Before leaving, the King had suggested that Ely alone should return to the discussions as a sign of England's firm stance on this issue of Calais.² In the meantime, the Council had instructed the three to continue the talks as long as possible but not to deviate from their original instructions. Parliament would be asked for counsel on Calais. Although the Spanish had indicated willingness to work for the best settlement of England's affairs, there were signs of growing strain on the alliance. The English commissioners were instructed by their government to remind their ally that Mary had entered the conflict for the benefit of Spain, and that

¹Commissioners to King Philip, 25 and 27 October 1558, Span. Cal., XIII, pp. 420-421, nos. 486 and 488.

²Wotton, Arundel and Ely to the Council, 4 November 1558, Foreign Cal., p. 405, no. 853.

with so many other restitutions of land being achieved by these negotiations, it would appear very strange indeed to the rest of the world that Calais remained in French hands. Should further ammunition be needed, the danger to the safety of the Low Countries which would ensue from French possession of Calais was always a profound reserve argument.¹ Despite all of this evidence, a note of reality was finding its way into the English position under the disguise that much might have to be endured for the sake of the unity of Christendom. A continuance of the war was the only alternative, and none could afford that.

The negotiations were disrupted in late November by the death of Mary Tudor. The Queen had died on the 17th, but her death was not unexpected. The letters exchanged between the commissioners and the Council throughout October and November often referred to the Queen's weakened condition, although she had appeared to rally in early November. Each party to the peace had to reassess its position at the accession of Elizabeth. The direct Habsburg link with England had vanished, and while Philip initially showed himself amiable to the interests of his dead wife's half-sister, it was not long before Elizabeth realized that he would not delay indefinitely his peace settlement with Henry II. The French King believed that he had most to gain by Mary's demise, and he immediately proclaimed his daughter-in-law, Mary Queen of Scots, the rightful queen of England. Although this claim was not immediately or effectively settled, Henry recognized the danger in flaunting such a challenge excessively, which was not likely to go unnoticed by Philip II. There was still the remote possibility of a marriage between Philip and Elizabeth, a prospect which Henry had to contemplate, and as has already often been stated, each side had to weigh the reality of renewed warfare against any tenuous idealistic expectations.

¹Ibid., The Council to the Commissioners, 4 November 1558, p. 406, no. 856.

The new Queen moved swiftly to ensure that the negotiations would continue; she sent a new commission to Wotton and Ely and replaced Arundel with William Howard.¹ She also forwarded detailed instructions for future discussions: restitution of Calais with its marches and stores of ordnance, the establishment of boundaries as they had been in January of 1558, payment of the debt and arrears amounting to two and a half million crowns, reservation of all Channel Islands to the possession of the English monarch, the assent to comprehend Scotland only when the French had razed the fortifications at Eyemouth, agreement on a clause forbidding Scotland from any further aid to Irish rebels, and all treaties between England and the House of Burgundy must be reserved. Calais headed this list and was Elizabeth's main objective; she had authorized her commissioners to cancel all debts and arrears in order to entice France to surrender it and had concluded that, should time and distance necessitate it, they might use their discretion in settling any other point, as long as they obtained the restitution of Calais.² Shortly after the receipt of these instructions, the conference at Cercamp had adjourned with an agreement to extend the suspension of arms. Wotton wrote to his friend and colleague, Cecil, that he had never been so weary of any place as he was of Cercamp with the single possible exception of Rome during the sack. He also humorously remarked on the French advanced knowledge of several royal deaths which had recently occurred, "But as I said, if the French had no more ears than St. Peter left to Malchus, though they were as long as Midas's ears: it were much to be wondered how they should have knowledge of all such matters."³

With a suspension of arms until the first of February, Elizabeth used

¹Commission for Wotton and Ely, 23 November 1558, Foreign Cal. Elizabeth, p. 9, no. 22.

²Ibid., Instructions, 23 November 1558, pp. 10-11, no. 23.

³Wotton to Cecil, 12 December 1558, S.P. 70/1, f. 63v.

the time to renew and strengthen her alliance with Philip, for peace with France would not be easily obtained in the face of the strong resentment and suspicion which existed between it and England. The commissioners had urged the Queen to honour Philip's request for a renewal of the treaties and had advised her also that while a cancellation of all debts and arrears might be desirable to recover Calais, she should move cautiously in case such a manoeuvre brought into question a cancellation of her title to France. On 6 January 1559, the English commissioners recapitulated the state of the peace articles for their sovereign and requested her further instruction, for they were doubtful about many of these articles. One such was this question about the effect of the cancellation of the debt, but there were others. The second and third articles challenged the Anglo-Imperial alliance when activated against France; it was suggested that this challenge might be best handled by the device of "fair words." The French further wished to insert a clause making new customs retroactive, but this was not a usual practice, and the commissioners requested guidance on how firm their own opposing stance should be. Then there were doubts about the exchange of hostages, the commission to negotiate with Scotland and the English clause reserving all Channel Islands, to which France was certain to object.¹

As the delegates prepared to remove from Cercamp to the new site of Le Cateau-en-Cambr sis, Wotton and Ely wrote for permission to do likewise and requested that a man of greater prominence be sent to lead their delegation. It was at this point that Lord Howard joined them. The general feeling was that the French were growing impatient to have a settlement, and the English were eager to avert a repetition of the developments of 1544, when the Emperor had concluded peace without them. Negotiations resumed

¹Wotton and Ely to Queen Elizabeth, 6 January 1559, S.P. 70/2, fos. 14-15.

early in February, and Arras once again led the Spanish commission, which also included such prominent figures as William of Orange and the Duke of Alva. The French representation encompassed both Anne de Montmorency and Charles de Guise, Cardinal of Lorraine.

The English commissioners were given separate lodgings from their counterparts; and, from the outset, it was clear that France and Spain had substantially concluded their differences and that the English matter was the real delay to peace. The French exploited this situation in an attempt to create suspicion between the allies, but this move proved a failure. Finally, all sides came together, with the Duchess of Lorraine acting as hostess. She sat at the head of the table with the English and French delegations to either side and the Spanish commissioners opposite her. The English spoke first, arguing that the French had had no claim on Calais for the past two centuries; furthermore, the present Queen had neither entered war against them nor lost Calais to them. No conclusion, they continued, could be reached without reserving England's Burgundian alliance and ensuring the complete satisfaction of Spain. All then sat in discouraged silence until the Constable suggested settling every matter except Calais, which could either be referred to a special commission or a prolonged truce established in order to continue the present discussions. When the English representatives declared that they lacked commission to accept either proposal but suggested writing home, the session ended with the French pronouncement that all was "but labour lost."¹

As the commissioners then stood chatting informally, Howard and Montmorency fell into conversation. The two conveyed to each other the affection in which each sovereign held the other, but both also agreed that Calais was equally held in deep affection. Montmorency again attempted to

¹Ibid., Commissioners to Queen Elizabeth, 14 February 1559, fos. 120-124r.

introduce suspicion between England and Spain when he confided to Howard that Philip had suggested that in the interim, Calais might be placed in Spanish hands. On Monday, the 13th of February, according to Alva, the proposal which England had fought desperately to avoid came from France, a separate peace with Spain. This suggestion was rejected however.

As marriage alliances had proved the face saving device by which France had relinquished its role in Italy, it was also hoped that this form of appeasement might be successfully employed in the English matter. Resting upon the betrothal of children yet unborn, it truly reflected the desperate struggle of dynastic pride. Initiated by France, it was proposed that Francis and Mary's eldest daughter should marry Elizabeth's eldest son and have Calais as her dowry; Elizabeth's eldest daughter would marry the new Dauphin by which would be cancelled all debts, arrears and the English claim to France. A second but less palatable suggestion was simultaneously offered, i.e., Calais should remain with France for eight years while a committee of impartial judges decided its ownership. Wotton, Howard and Ely had received these suggestions without comment beyond agreement to convey them to their government, but in their communication, they emphasized that although such plans would require either approximately sixteen or eight years respectively to be fulfilled, England's state of preparedness for war must be carefully considered as the only alternative. The new Queen, they advised, needed time and peace in which to consolidate her own realm.¹ This lengthy but candid report probably contributed much to convincing the new regime that its recalcitrant position could no longer be afforded.

On the 19th of February, the Queen responded to the request for further instructions. An enlargement of the authority of her representatives was essential. She began by advising them to seek the Spanish inclination

¹Ibid., fos. 124v-129.

toward continuing the war until Calais could either be recovered or restored. If a favourable answer was forthcoming, then the French were to be informed that the English were as "peremptory" to keep Calais as the French were to deny it to them. On the other hand, if Philip was not so inclined, the commissioners were advised to attempt persuasion by way of the argument based on the safety of the Low Countries; however, failing this, the Duke of Alva should be asked to initiate some conciliatory solution. Seeking to cover all circumstances, Elizabeth proceeded to provide her delegates with two alternatives to be suggested to the Duke, should he be at a loss, but he was to initiate them as his own. The first and preferred solution was that France should keep Guisnes, while England was to have the town and port of Calais. If such a division still proved unacceptable, then the second alternative could be revealed. According to this, the French would continue to hold Calais for some period of time, anywhere between five and eight years, until properly recompensed by England; this was the scheme eventually adopted so that Calais remained nominally English but actually French. The need for peace had replaced Calais as Elizabeth's foremost objective, and she was extremely eager to have some "device for the appeasement of this inconvenience in the matter of Calais." One last point had to be emphasized to Alva. The English labour would have been in vain if an agreement with Scotland could not also be reached, for herein lay the primary source of recent troubles. The French must be made to realize that their fortifications at Eyemouth had to be razed and their previous treaty obligations observed. The instructions ended on the solemn note that the Queen had imparted as much of her mind as it was possible to do at such a distance, and owing to time and distance, she entrusted the future negotiations to the "wisdom and discretion" of her commissioners; they were empowered to alter any word, phrase or part of these instructions. The realm, she said, had suffered so

much through war that peace was her greatest desire.¹

A sharp rebuke delivered to these same ambassadors by Elizabeth in March illustrates more than adequately the sensitivity which Calais wrought in the Queen. When the question of her pension was raised, the French delegates, according to MacCaffrey, broached a legal technicality in complete seriousness. Since they disputed Elizabeth's title and supported that of Mary of Scotland, to whom should the pension be paid? The English Queen certainly left no doubt as to her view of French legal ploys nor her commissioners' approach to answering such manoeuvres:

Whatsoever our adversaries, or whatsoever our friends' ministers may be pleased to use speech hereof, we cannot well take it that our servants and subjects shall either suffer others thus to speak without due reprehension or misliking, or should make doubt of it, and adventure by letters to require our pleasure in it, which might have been performed by any of you, that neither we may nor ever will permit any over whom we have rule or may have, to make doubt, question or treaty of this matter. Ye must content yourselves to hear thus much, for true it is we like not the matter as it is handled.²

As provoked as the Queen was over this incident, she had to recognize that English popular opinion and that of her Council had been heavily consolidated behind the move for peace on the best conditions possible under the circumstances. To attempt to play off France against Spain in the hope of achieving better conditions for England, as was Elizabeth's way on many such occasions, was simply not feasible this time. In a way, France had been attempting its own modified version of this in its moves to create suspicion between England and Spain, but Philip's determination to have peace had checked such strategies. So it was that the final draft was hammered out in March, and at the beginning of the next month, all sides came together to conclude the treaty of necessity.

¹Ibid., Queen Elizabeth to the Commissioners, 19 February 1559, fos. 135-137.

²Queen Elizabeth to the Commissioners, 7 March 1559, Foreign Cal., p. 164, no. 391.

The Treaty of Cateau Cambrésis was actually a double treaty, the Anglo-French document signed on 2 April 1559 and the Franco-Spanish agreement of the following day, by which France relinquished its hold in Italy but retained Metz, Toul and Verdun--the seizure of which had been the provocation for the latest war. The document signed on the 2nd consisted of two agreements also, one with Scotland and the other with France. Within the Scottish agreement were the usual clauses of a declaration of peace, an expressed intent by each to observe the territorial integrity of the other and a promise not to aid the enemies or fugitive subjects of the other. The core of this segment of the treaty lay in two main articles; England had obtained the promise of the demolition of the fortifications at Eyemouth, and it was recognized and agreed that many claims had been left unsettled by each because of insufficient information on the part of their ambassadors, but it was agreed to refer these disputes within two months to a commission for resolution. This accord proved the least satisfactory segment of the Treaty of Cateau Cambrésis. The unresolved matters provided leverage for further conflict among England, Scotland and France. It would require another treaty and greatly altered French political circumstances to accomplish the peace envisaged at Le Cateau.

Similarly, the agreement between England and France had begun with the same traditional clauses; in addition however, there was an expressed clause in this treaty providing for an oath of observation to be taken by Elizabeth and Henry, and the liberty of trade between their kingdoms was also guaranteed. Of course, the remainder of this portion of the treaty is organized around the provisions respecting Calais. Elizabeth's alternative of the 19th of February had emerged in a somewhat altered form; the French King was to enjoy peaceable possession of Calais, Ruysbank, Mark, Oye, Hammes, Sandgate and Guisnes for a period of eight years, at the end of which time the territories should be restored to England. The English also demanded

the restoration of the artillery at Calais. There then followed a series of articles designed to ensure what was considered inevitably to be the more realistic course of events in Calais. The French King was required to find seven or eight merchants who would bond themselves to the Queen of England for the sum of five hundred thousand crowns as surety that Calais would be surrendered. Until these merchants could be found, Henry was to submit hostages for this purpose. It was further provided that during this eight-year interval, Elizabeth, Henry and Francis and Mary of Scotland should suffer in this matter of Calais, should one attempt hostility against the other. If such a conflict was provoked by the French parties, then Calais must be relinquished immediately; if this was not done, then the five hundred thousand crowns must be forfeited immediately. If Elizabeth had instigated the confrontation, then the French parties were forthwith freed from all promises and bonds respecting Calais.¹ A few years later, this provision was in fact tested, but because, as was so often the case, definite responsibility for the violation could not be assigned, England lost both the hope of a restoration of its Continental possessions and the five hundred thousand crowns.

The commissioners had returned home promptly after the conclusion of these negotiations, and on 6 May 1559, the Queen appointed Wotton, Howard and Throckmorton as her envoys to the French King to receive his ratification of the treaty. Throckmorton was to remain as ambassador resident.² Wotton had set out immediately, for the treaty had stipulated that ratification must be accomplished within sixty days, but he was forced to tarry a week in Canterbury while recovering from a cold.³ A slight last-minute complication threatened the future of the treaty. When the French embassy

¹Rymer, XV, pp. 513-516.

²Queen Elizabeth to Howard, Wotton and Throckmorton, 6 May 1559, Foreign Cal., pp. 240-241, no. 619.

³Ibid., Wotton to Cecil, 14 May 1559, pp. 252-253, no. 675.

under the leadership of François de Montmorency arrived and required the oath of Elizabeth for the performance of the treaty, it was duly given; however, they also insisted on an oath to the accord with Scotland. This had not been expressly stated in the articles, and the Queen was hesitant. Her Council advised her compliance, and she had given it on the promise by the French representatives that Mary and Francis would be similarly committed. Elizabeth despatched post-haste a commission to Wotton, Howard and Throckmorton to require such an oath of the Scottish sovereigns.¹

If anyone can be said to have been victorious in this 'peace, this questionable victory must be accredited to Spain. Spanish domination in Italy had been restored and confirmed, but the powerful Holy Roman Emperor who had begun the war was dead by the end of it and had seen his Empire divided. His son ruled a very different empire with Spain as its focus, the Atlantic as its roadway and vast overseas possessions as its promise of a solution to many of Philip's problems, not the least of which was financial. An increase of heresy in Spain itself was another problem demanding his immediate attention. As for Henry II after Le Cateau, he had had to forgo French influence in Italy, for he too had to confront the more urgent domestic difficulties of finance and heresy. He did not live to achieve success in these, for he died in July during the celebration of the marriage alliances proclaimed between France and Spain at Le Cateau. His heirs were three young sons, none of whom enjoyed good health, and France embarked upon an unstable period characterized by factionalism which produced civil war and religious strife. The bright spot for France in 1559, though, was the recovery of Calais.

The English had left the conference at Le Cateau with nothing but promises and a graceful means for withdrawal. Although there were to be those who would argue that the loss of Calais was actually a blessing, (for it had

¹Ibid., Queen Elizabeth to Howard, Wotton and Throckmorton, 26 May 1559, pp. 280-281, no. 757.

become a serious financial drain on the government), neither Mary nor Elizabeth would have found comfort in this logic. Discounting the previously-mentioned rebuke to her delegates by Elizabeth as a demonstration to remind them of her royal authority and to vent some royal indignation, she undoubtedly recognized that her representatives had done all that could have been expected of anyone, and in them, she had had her interests well served with diligence and sincerity. Although Lord Howard had been sent to lend prestige to the delegation, it is through the guidance of the Queen and Council back home that the negotiations were actually shaped. At Le Cateau itself, the efforts of Wotton and Ely would have contributed more than those of Howard, whose interest had lain more in the military sphere. Based upon Wotton's preoccupation with diplomacy over the previous two decades, with both of the major European powers and therefore his more intimate knowledge of the persons and disputes involved, his hand would appear to have been the guiding one at the conference within the English commission. As his second embassy to France can be said to have marked the high point in his career as a resident ambassador, it can similarly be argued that at Le Cateau the junior partner of the diplomatic embassies of the late 1530's and early 1540's became the trusted servant of the crown, no longer apologizing for a lack of "wit and discretion."

II

The Scottish Settlement

Elizabeth had clearly identified the major source of her foreign troubles when she had written to her peace commissioners that peace with France would be futile if Scotland was not also brought into the agreement. She had inherited a volatile situation on her northern border, but the talks at Le Cateau had not produced a concrete settlement. With the accession of Francis II to the French throne came the accompanying rise to the power behind the throne of the Guise family, confirmed opponents of England.

Although Mary of Lorraine had governed in Scotland for her absent daughter who was being prepared for her role as queen consort of France, developments in Scotland were not turning completely to the favour of France. The two factors of Protestantism and increased nationalism contributed to the sense of alienation felt by many for the Catholic, foreign government in their land. The presence of French troops on Scottish soil was unpopular and of considerable expense to the native population, but when friction developed between these forces and the Scots on occasions when military payment was delayed, this tension became a real threat. In 1555, an act had to be introduced forbidding ill speech of the Queen Dowager and other French citizens. This did not however remove the cause of the discontent; in addition to the military contribution which Scotland had to appropriate for the support of these French troops, the Scots were also expected to finance the Queen Dowager and her French retinue, as well as to contribute to the maintenance of their young Queen's French household. Scottish disenchantment over such matters occurred at a most disadvantageous moment for Henry II, and he determined to hasten the marriage between his son and Mary. In a secret agreement, Mary had bequeathed her realm to France even if there were no children from her marriage to Francis. By the terms of the open agreement, French citizens were given native privileges in Scotland, but during the negotiation of this final open marriage treaty, four of the eight Scottish commissioners died in suspicious circumstances, suggesting that they may have learned something of the clandestine designs underway. The marriage was solemnized in April of 1558, and Mary of Lorraine, in an attempt to placate growing opposition, pretended to welcome some reformist thought.¹

Henry and the dowager Scottish Queen had seen benefit in encouraging Protestantism when a Catholic England might be threatened, but with the

¹Gordon Donaldson, Scotland: James V to James VII (Edinburgh: Scottish Historical Society, 1965), pp. 86-90; J. E. Neale, Queen Elizabeth (London: Jonathan Cape, 1934), p. 94.

accession of Elizabeth and the signing of the Treaty of Cateau Cambrésis, the assets from such a policy were removed. Repression resumed, and Protestant mobs responded with several months of rampaging churches. Gordon Donaldson has seen Elizabeth's reinstatement of the Prayer Book as one source of encouragement to them, and by mid-summer, with Edinburgh in Protestant hands, the Regent had been forced to agree not to have Mass in the capital and not to reintroduce garrisons there. These agreements had been violated by September of 1559 on the strength that her daughter, Her Most Christian Majesty of France, would have the power of this title to crush Protestant forces. The Scottish lords however were convinced otherwise and proceeded, without authority, to divest Mary of Lorraine of her regency powers.¹

All of this was viewed with keen interest and concern by the Elizabethan government, and by November, when the tide began to turn against the Protestants, clandestine aid began finding its way across the border.² Not everyone in the new regime approved the course which this issue was taking, but Cecil laid before the Queen and his colleagues his thoughts on the French connection behind these new difficulties and the position into which these were forcing England. They were all aware, he argued, that France had attempted a separate peace with Spain at Le Cateau, that the French were working even at that moment to obtain from the Pope a declaration of illegitimacy against Elizabeth and that the French King and Queen had continued to use the royal style and arms of England. The question before the Council became one of English military intervention, a view favoured by Cecil and the Duke of Norfolk. Only Arundel spoke in open opposition, but Mason, Petre, Wotton, Winchester and Bacon expressed reservations. Bacon spoke for their

¹Donaldson, Scotland: James V To James VII, pp. 92-94.

²Council to Sadler and Crofts, 14 November 1559, Scot. Cal., pp. 264-265, no. 574.

sentiments when he reminded the enthusiastic Cecil (supported by the military and new members of the Council) that England was impoverished, that there was much religious discontent internally and that Elizabeth was without allies; France not only had the advantage of easier access to German mercenaries but also could count on papal support and would probably find a ready and attentive ear in Philip II whose Spanish subjects had received ill treatment in England during Mary's reign.¹ These reservations came from men who had experienced prolonged embassies abroad during which they had the opportunity to observe the interaction of nations, and one can understand the fear and jeopardy which they anticipated arising from a decision which would have effectively isolated England from even tacit support by either of the major powers. Queen Elizabeth shared their caution but managed to placate and stall Cecil by conceding the need for intervention but doing nothing to appropriate the money and materials necessary for such a venture. Her own position was not so secure as to permit her the move of countenancing rebellion against another crowned head.

Debate on Scotland continued in the Council through the autumn of 1559, and after much deliberation and a direct request from the Queen to have their advice on the next step to be taken, her advisers responded on the 24th of December. Rehearsing the French misuse of the English royal title and arms, they nevertheless discouraged Elizabeth from any direct exploit in Scotland which could provoke the latter's formidable ally; at risk for France in such a confrontation were men and money, while England staked not only these but also the very crown of the realm. Elizabeth should make such foreign preparations as new alliances with the German Protestant princes and Denmark in order to have increased sources of men and money, improve the intelligence-gathering system in France and move to neutralize King Philip. Domestically, they advised her to call up four thousand footmen and six

¹MacCaffrey, The Shaping of the Elizabethan Regime, pp. 59-63.

hundred horsemen for border duty, send more munitions to Berwick and Newcastle and ensure a supply of food in each of these fortified cities for at least three months. For her own protection, they recommended an increased bodyguard and expressed their regret over having to put forward such grave proposals, but the options were few.¹ Wotton and others continued to question the practical reality that such measures could in themselves be sufficient provocation for France, but the Queen again elected to remain indecisive at the end of December. Mary and Francis had continued to display the English royal arms with those of Scotland and France and had been crowned, according to French tradition, king and queen of France, Ireland and England. Protests continued from London, but Elizabeth found herself more occupied in diverting and confusing the issue by playing off Mary of Lorraine and the Earl of Arran, next in line for the Scottish throne.

The new year opened with a continuation of the reverses against the Protestants who were seeking support from Elizabeth. This state of affairs contributed most to the Queen's decision to extend the offer of a league to the Scottish nobility. According to the Treaty of Berwick, signed in February of 1560, the league was established to defend and maintain the ancient liberties and freedom of Scotland. The matter of religion went unmentioned, and the Scottish lords remained bound to their allegiance to Francis and Mary as long as their liberties were not infringed. Elizabeth further agreed to commit English land and sea forces to aid the Scots in expelling the French, and the Scottish lords promised mutual assistance to England, should France attempt an invasion of the English realm.² English troops arrived in the Scottish capital in March, and the Regent sought refuge in Edinburgh Castle. Lord Grey had wished to launch an attack on the

¹The Council to Queen Elizabeth, 24 December 1559, Foreign Cal., pp. 220-223, no. 483.

²Rosalind Marshall, Mary of Guise (London: Collins, 1977), pp. 245-246.

Castle, but Elizabeth had ordered him not to do so but rather to await naval assistance to be used in the besieging of the fortifications at Leith. In the meantime, Mary, still resolute but ill, had met Howard and Crofts and had agreed to mediation.¹ Faced with internal conflict within Scotland and France, the French government also recognized that it must sue for peace. A delegation under the leadership of the Bishop of Valence was despatched for the purpose of these negotiations, and its first assignment was an intermediate stop at the English court to reassure the Queen of French amity. This provided the English Council with an opportunity to take the measure at firsthand of these commissioners. A curious interview followed. On the 21st of March, the Council learned of and dispensed with the peculiar line of attack to be adopted on the question of Mary's assumption of the arms and title of England. The bishop had argued that the Queen had displayed these as a sign of honour for the kinship which existed between her and Elizabeth and that she had used the title only as a device to provoke Mary Tudor during the war. An amazed and undoubtedly somewhat amused Council responded that the first proposal might be easily remedied by displaying some variation of the arms, and the second was no longer applicable since a state of war did not exist.²

The English military preparations at this point were not so promising as to permit a dismissal of the French peace suit, and in April, with the Queen becoming more wary of Cecil's plans, the secretary wrote to Dr. Wotton requesting his opinion on Scottish affairs. The reply was more conservative than Cecil had anticipated, and many of the new and more radical councillors were alienated by it.³ Wotton's discourse on Scotland exhibited his usual

¹Ibid., pp. 247-251.

²The Council to Throckmorton, 21 March 1560, Foreign Cal., pp. 465-466, no. 883.

³MacCaffrey, The Shaping of the Elizabethan Regime, pp. 64-65.

caution and the diplomatic skill gained over a period of years as an observer of power plays. He advised the Queen to reconsider her military preparations, for now that Philip had decided to assist France against Scotland, England could not hope to triumph over both major European powers. If an explanation was demanded by the Scots for what appeared to be a violation of the league, Elizabeth could cite the Scottish failure to contribute sufficiently in the field to their own defence. Such reasoning is but a slight deviation from the arguments so often heard by Wotton from Charles V about Henry VIII in 1545. Religion, Wotton advised, had probably been the issue behind Philip's decision to enter the conflict, and Elizabeth would do well to seek an agreement by which Protestants would at least be permitted to practice their religion "quietly," especially if the Scottish nobility and France had reached some conclusion on this point. This was the suggestion which cost Wotton much support in the Council. On the question of the continued French presence in Scotland, the advice was that England should attempt to reach some settlement with the Scots on the smallest number of troops acceptable, but if the nobles elected to allow a token presence, Elizabeth should accept this; otherwise, it would appear that England alone was in open conflict with France. Related to this question, Wotton counselled his government to review the Queen's military commitment to Scotland under the terms of the league, for if she was only bound to defend them against France, she might then reasonably insist upon their greater contribution to their own defence; however, if the commitment extended to defence against Spain, earnest consideration would have to be given to the commercial interests in the Low Countries and the effect that this would have upon these.¹

On the same day, 11 April 1560, in a personal memorandum to Cecil, Wotton expanded his advice to encompass the European theatre. King Philip

¹Wotton's Discourse on Scotland, 11 April 1560, S.P. 52/3, fos. 78-80.

should be warned that aid to France against Scotland endangered the safety of England which, in turn, could jeopardize the Low Countries. The former ambassador followed this up with the recommendation of a couple of diplomatic ploys. A rumour might easily be raised in the Low Countries suggesting that the English Queen was seriously considering a withdrawal from Scotland. Secondly, a bogus letter with an attached draft in false cipher might be sent to Throckmorton in France and Grey in Spain stating that the English government had learned that Spanish intervention in Scotland was actually going to be directed toward the assistance of the Scots against the French. The bearer of these cunning letters should arrange to fall into French hands.¹

There is no evidence to suggest that these last two proposals were ever activated, and Philip was more than adequately aware of the anomalous position in which he found himself. France had been his and his father's chief enemy; yet, the Spanish King genuinely seems to have emerged from Le Cateau with a determination to counter all attacks on Christendom as he interpreted it. On the other hand, his family had retained close links with England for centuries, and the commercial interests of England and the Low Countries always served as a sharp reminder to both parties that more was at stake than the surface tensions which had provoked a specific conflict. The Spanish King's attention was soon diverted by domestic troubles, and France pressed the suit for peace in Scotland again. In Scotland, the recalcitrant Queen Dowager lay dying, and her nobles were anxious to have a settlement quickly. Realizing the shift of circumstances in her favour, the English Queen became more enthusiastic about the prospects now lying within the realm of possibility.

She was greatly aided in this by the lack of progress achieved by Valence throughout April and much of May. The Protestant demand for the

¹Ibid., Wotton to Cecil, 11 April 1560, fos. 80-81.

demolition of the fortifications at Leith, which had been erected on the instructions of d'Oysel, was the initial obstacle to agreement, and the Scottish lords devised means to intercept all communication to and from the fortress, as well as maintaining constant surveillance on the bishop.¹ When Mary's capitulation on this issue was finally accomplished, an even more serious impasse emerged. This was her insistence until her death in June that her adopted country should turn away from the recent league with England in favour of its ancient alliance with France.² Rumours of new taxation for further fortifications and the appointment of Frenchmen to key Scottish offices served only to add complications to the attempts at negotiation, and there were daily skirmishes around Leith.³

On 25 May 1560, Elizabeth appointed five commissioners to negotiate the Scottish and French disputes with Mary and Francis; they were Cecil, Wotton, Henry Percy, Peter Carew and Ralph Sadler.⁴ Her instructions of the following day clearly indicated that Cecil was to head the commission, and not all of the members were to be with him. The delegation was divided in order to cover several possibilities. Cecil and Wotton were to travel to Newcastle to confer with Valence and his party by the 5th of June; if the Scottish nobility then agreed to a change in venue, this was to be permitted. The remainder of the delegation was sent to Leith to await possible conference either with Cecil and Wotton or with their counterparts on the French commission; if such a need materialized, a place other than this sensitive military town was to be chosen for the consultations.

¹G. Dickenson, Journal of Leith (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1942), pp. 125-131.

²Marshall, Mary of Guise, pp. 259-261.

³Dickenson, Journal of Leith, pp. 135-137 and 151-153.

⁴Commission to Cecil, Wotton, Percy, Carew and Sadler, 25 May 1560, Scot. Cal., p. 413, no. 800.

Anticipating a demand by France to consult with the Regent, the Queen instructed Wotton and Cecil to concur. Such an event transpired in early June, necessitating a change in the site of the main negotiations to Edinburgh. The instructions continued that in order to counteract suspicion, a removal of the troops of both England and France should be suggested, but if France insisted on maintaining a small contingent, the matter was to be deferred to the wishes of the Scots. Finally, the commissioners were to insist once again that if the fortifications at Eyemouth had not yet been razed, it must be done forthwith. Elizabeth was most determined that the Scottish nobility should see her in the role of an honest and staunch ally. Her commissioners were to reveal to them all parts of her instructions touching Scottish matters, (using discretion, however). If the French refused to treat with England on the governance of Scotland, then the commissioners were to offer their advice to the Scottish nobility and desist from any further interference. The most vital issue between England and Scotland during these negotiations was the preservation of their league, and Wotton and Cecil were instructed to use all diligence to obtain a recognition of this. Failing to do so, they must attempt a contract between Elizabeth and her nobility on the one part and Mary and Francis with their Scottish nobles on the other, preserving the liberty of Scotland in the absence of Mary from "strangers not born in Scotland or England." Should this be completely rejected, the English commissioners were to suspend the talks and to notify the Queen immediately.¹

Concerning the Anglo-French disputes to be settled, Elizabeth charged a violation of the Treaty of Cateau Cambr sis and demanded to have it reconfirmed and Calais restored to her, but she added that this last point must not be pressed if there was general agreement on all other matters.

¹Ibid., Instructions, 26 May 1560, pp. 413-414, no. 803.

Furthermore, there must be an agreement by Mary to cease using the English royal style and arms. The final advice offered by Elizabeth to her representatives was on the matter of religion. If it appeared that Scotland could not obtain freedom to have the Protestant rite, Wotton and Cecil should suggest that the penalty of law be suspended against all who practised this persuasion without hindrance to the public tranquillity until the end of the next Scottish Parliament. Lacking agreement between Scotland and France on this, the English commission was to refuse any conclusion with France.¹

From this basic but specific set of instructions, the delegation worked for a settlement. Matters did not go smoothly; the English were extremely suspicious of the physical movements within the French delegation and insisted upon elaborate escorts and arrangements when the talks were transferred from Newcastle to Edinburgh about the 10th of June. The French representatives suffered a loss about this same time with the death of the Queen Regent, and the negotiations seemed threatened. The Queen sent word that her commissioners were to agree to a break in the talks, if the French insisted on this at Mary's death, but they were to demonstrate their displeasure at what England considered to be merely a delaying tactic by informing Norfolk to expel all of the Frenchmen that he could. If the French opted instead to summon other members of their delegation to join Valence, Wotton and Cecil were to object, but they might suggest that an addition of Scottish advisers to the delegation would be acceptable, provided that the Scottish nobility concurred.² The negotiations did in fact drag on slowly, and Cecil, in an apology for a hasty note, complained

¹Ibid., p. 415.

²Ibid., The Council to Cecil and Wotton, 15 June 1560, pp. 424-425, no. 817.

to the Queen of his overburdened state in these discussions, for, he wrote, "Dr. Wotton, though very wise, loves quiet."¹

"We can get nothing but with wracking and straining, and we have inwards, they always will steal it away in penning and writing," was how Wotton and Cecil assessed the progress of their efforts on 19 June 1560.² They submitted a set of articles for their sovereign's approval, and she responded to these on the 24th. She was impressed with the provision concerning the "defacing of emblems throughout France" bearing her arms, but she added that a demand for compensation should be inserted; this took the form of five hundred thousand crowns and the restoration of Calais. This latter point held increased appeal for Elizabeth and produced within her position toward France and Scotland something of a volte face. Neale has argued that this in turn necessitated a revolution in Cecil's position from enthusiasm to restraint. The Queen also again emphasized her desire to have some form of her league with Scotland preserved, and she reflected the general mood of suspicion in her suggestion regarding the disengagement and departure of French troops; they were to be allowed to travel home by way of England but only in companies numbering no more than forty and carrying only the weapons of swords and daggers. She further desired to strengthen her garrison at Berwick with two thousand of her "tallest and best" soldiers as a positive encouragement to the Scottish lords.³

July opened on a very discouraged note for all concerned in the negotiations. Cecil and Wotton reported with regret that after somewhat high hopes for a peace settlement, their expectations had been shattered. The two points on which compromise seemed unattainable were the

¹Ibid., Cecil to Queen Elizabeth, 19 June 1560, pp. 426-427, no. 821.

²Wotton and Cecil to Queen Elizabeth, 19 June 1560, Haynes, p. 327.

³Queen Elizabeth to Cecil and Wotton, 24 June 1560, S.P. 52/4, fos. 45-46; Neale, Queen Elizabeth, pp. 103-104.

Anglo-Scottish league and the insistence on Mary's "defacing" of the English arms from all French displays of the same. Feeling devoid of any further hope, Cecil decided to approach the bishop (the most flexible member of the French team) with "fair words" in an attempt to bridge the gap and get both sides talking again. He was successful, and the timing was critical.¹ The English government had had word of some three thousand Spanish troops being prepared for Scotland, and no one saw benefit in this prospect. Similarly, about this same time, Elizabeth had drafted a letter of instruction to Wotton and Cecil to press for her specified compensation for the misuse of her title and arms--five hundred thousand crowns and Calais. Had these instructions reached the negotiators before a definite conclusion was in hand, (and the Queen had specified in her letter that if a conclusion seemed at hand, it should go forward), the English commissioners would have been bound to become less flexible in their position, and the peace would probably not have materialized.²

When agreement was finally reached on the 6th of July, the concessions given to Elizabeth were considerably less than she had hoped; on the other hand, the French had conceded more than what they might have, had they been negotiating from a position of greater strength. The Treaty of Edinburgh was only made possible from the English standpoint by ignoring completely the issues of religion and the Anglo-Scottish league. Like the Treaty of Cateau Cambr sis, this accord had two parts: the Anglo-French and the Franco-Scottish. The Scots had achieved with English assistance the removal of French military influence except for a contingent of one hundred and twenty men at Inchkeith and Dunbar; in addition to this, Mary had confirmed the summons for a new Parliament and had agreed to a new plan for

¹Cecil and Wotton to Queen Elizabeth, 2 July 1560, Scot. Cal., p. 439, no. 841.

²Queen Elizabeth to Wotton and Cecil, 3 July 1560, Foreign Cal., p. 184n.

structuring a regency council by which from twenty-four names, she would select seven or eight, and the estates, five or six. The Anglo-French section can be described as an extension of Cateau Cambrésis where the consequences for England from the Franco-Scottish link had been left in an unsettled state of resolution. The Edinburgh agreement confidently presented itself as the means for ending disputes between the French sovereigns and Elizabeth and proclaimed that the Treaty of Cateau Cambrésis and the concord established therein should remain in force and be reaffirmed. It was agreed that all French land and sea forces (except those at Inchkeith and Dunbar) were to begin an immediate withdrawal, and all military preparations were ceased. The English suspicions of French failure to raze the fortifications at Eyemouth were confirmed, and an article was inserted for the immediate implementation of this provision of Cateau Cambrésis; however, the French now attached a condition: Eyemouth would be dismantled only if English fortifications at Leith were also demolished. The French King and Queen had finally been brought to agree to abstain from using the style and arms of the English Queen and to prohibit their subjects from so doing; in this article was contained the implicit recognition by Mary of Elizabeth's title and right. It was not Calais or even the five hundred thousand crowns, but it was a psychological victory which must have been welcomed by the new regime. The matter of compensation was deferred to a later commission which was to meet in London; a provision for Philip's arbitration in this matter was made just in case the commissioners should become deadlocked.¹

Just a couple of days after the signing of the treaty, Cecil and Wotton observed to the Queen that for all of the talk concerning a lack of munitions and food, the Frenchmen leaving Scotland certainly appeared

¹Rymer, XV, pp. 593-597.

well-armed and far from starvation. In this same communication, they reiterated the points of concession from France in an attempt to convince themselves and Elizabeth of a major diplomatic triumph, but their closing remarks betrayed an underlying concern; they had expressed the belief that the honour of the French sovereigns had also been preserved.¹ There was certainly not an atmosphere of trust subsequent to the treaty, as can be seen in the Council's instructions to Admiral Winter to steer well clear of French waters when returning from Scotland with the English fleet.²

Donaldson has argued that the struggle in Scotland between 1559 and 1560 was defined more by propaganda than by bloodshed, and the peace terms support his interpretation. When French troops had arrived with their families in August of 1559, much fear was aroused in the native population by the speculation that Frenchmen were seeking to supplant the indigenous Scots. Similarly, the rumour that already high taxation would be increased still further to support this greater French military presence served only to stir more resentment.³ As it had so long been in the interest of France to encourage Scottish dissidence against England, the roles were now reversed, and Elizabeth seized the opportunity to begin securing the gateway through which much disturbance had come into the English realm. By the Treaty of Edinburgh, she achieved limited success in her first initiative, but the death of Francis II at the year's end and the subsequent return to Scotland by Mary obscured even this limited achievement. Many troubled years lay ahead for this policy.

The Treaties of Cateau Cambr sis and Edinburgh were, for Dr. Wotton,

¹Wotton and Cecil to Queen Elizabeth, 8 July 1560, Foreign Cal., pp. 179-182, no. 315.

²Ibid., The Council to Cecil and Wotton, 10 July 1560, pp. 186-187, no. 324.

³Donaldson, Scotland: James V to James VII, pp. 100-101.

the zenith in a lifelong career of diplomatic service. Although the English delegation had come away from the conference at Le Cateau with little more than promises and a salvation of national dignity, one must remember the position from which Howard, Wotton and Ely were negotiating. Caught between the two major powers who were determined to have peace for the necessity of their own countries, England's hopes could not afford to be rigid, and Elizabeth quickly realized this political truth. Had she remained obstinately committed to the recovery of Calais at any cost, the most probable result would have been to recreate an atmosphere similar to that which had existed in 1545-1546--war between France and England and an ineffectual alliance between England and the Habsburgs. The Treaty of Edinburgh sought to redress the disputes left unsettled by Cateau Cambrésis, and although one cannot term it a decisive victory for English aims, it had provided the new Elizabethan regime with a brief respite in which to direct its attention toward the settlement of internal policies. The weakened position of France had made this possible, and even when Mary returned to Scotland in 1561, Elizabeth could derive comfort from the knowledge that the Dowager French Queen resumed her Scottish life without a firm commitment of support from a stable France.

In Dr. Wotton, Elizabeth found a statesman who combined the qualities of experience and caution tempered by a profound sense of political realism. Although the treaties of 1559 and 1560 do not represent the termination of his diplomatic career, they are the point at which one can best observe the traits and methods of work acquired during his many embassies abroad. The note of caution which so often found its way into the correspondence returning from Cercamp and Le Cateau reminding the Queen to weigh the state of England's readiness for war was undoubtedly provided by Wotton. He had been in the direct line of fire from the repercussions of the Treaty of Crépy and knew firsthand the problems which would ensue if

England was left alone to face one of the two major powers. His caution to the Queen in Scottish matters has already been discussed at length, and although the burden of this mission does appear to have fallen to Cecil, Elizabeth's appointment of Wotton as his deputy indicates the value which the Queen placed on Wotton's caution as a check on her secretary's enthusiasm and limited diplomatic experience. Much of Wotton's experience had been shaped and derived from his almost constant struggle to represent England's interests with either one or the other of the major powers. He had learned well their methods of finding obscure technicalities in treaties, the vulnerable points of opponents, something of the true sentiment felt toward England by other nations and the value of psychology in diplomacy, as witnessed by the device for surrendering Calais and the 1560 victory by which France recognized Elizabeth's English title. The most prominent characteristic which emerges before the reader of Wotton's correspondence however throughout his career, but especially during this interval, is that of political realism. The fate of Calais, he had long recognized, would only be determined by force of arms, and it is doubtful that he ever really expected it to be settled in England's favour. Once retaken by France, Calais could best be forgotten by a device of appeasement based on the healing hand of time. Not dissimilar, although he and Cecil were in direct opposition on this point, Wotton probably hoped that this same remedy would see the Scottish religious dispute to a satisfactory resolution. The difficulty here was that the political reality in Scotland was not as clear, at least to Wotton, as that which had existed on the Continent, but he had interpreted them in the same reality. Such political realism had in fact enabled him to serve four Tudor sovereigns, and he continued to function actively in the Elizabethan regime until his death in 1567.

Chapter IX

The Elder Statesman

At the time of the accession of Elizabeth, Dr. Wotton was one of the elder statesmen of the realm, and although his services had been employed in the conclusion of the Treaties of Cateau Cambrésis and Edinburgh, the greater part of his work for this last Tudor sovereign was reminiscent of his occupation in the final years of Edward VI. The emphasis for him had shifted from the foreign to the domestic sphere, and during the course of the first five years of the reign, he devoted his attention to commercial matters, minor religious developments and once again became one of the Privy Councillors delegated to address matters of foreign policy.¹ Elizabeth's decision to retain his services was in keeping with her general policy of retaining many in the civil service element of her sister's Council.

Because the registers of council transactions are missing for the period of May of 1559 to May 1562, there is difficulty in accounting for Wotton's occupation after the conclusion of the Treaty of Edinburgh. It can be established that one of his early assignments was this appointment to act in the capacity as part of the foreign relations committee of the Council. In so doing, he was often called upon to meet the representatives from the diplomatic community in England to hear their grievances; the French and Spanish ambassadors required most attention. In October of 1560, for example, the Queen instructed Wotton to convey to the French

¹Hoak, in The King's Council in the Reign of Edward VI, has ascribed this role to Wotton during Northumberland's administration, and from the foreign correspondence of these early Elizabethan years, one can assume a similar set of circumstances.

ambassador her displeasure over activities which were in direct violation of the recently-concluded agreements with France. Not only were Francis and Mary still refusing to ratify the Treaty of Edinburgh, but English merchants were also once again experiencing interference with their shipping.¹ Relations with England's former ally, Spain, were also rapidly deteriorating. The Spanish ambassador had complained to Wotton and Mason about acts of piracy committed by Englishmen against Spanish ships, and less than a year later, Cecil was charging this same ambassador with statements designed to incite sentiment against Elizabeth, viz., that the Queen had always supported the heretical element in Scotland and that Mary Queen of Scots enjoyed greater popularity and support in England than did Elizabeth.²

Commercial matters frequently found their way into Wotton's charge. Undoubtedly, his previous experience with trade negotiations made him an obvious choice for Elizabeth's representative to a conference with the Hanse in 1561 on the renewal of their commercial accords.³ In that same year, he and Peter Osbourne were commissioned to confer with John Steynbergh and Thomas Thurland for the establishment of a corporation to work the mines of England.⁴ One final example, although occurring somewhat later in the reign, will serve to illustrate the variety of commercial interests requiring national attention. In November of 1564, with Dr. Wotton in attendance, the Council drafted a letter to the customs officials in Dover and Sandwich instructing them to sell some illegally-imported Dutch merchandise at the best price obtainable for it.⁵ The often mentioned

¹Queen Elizabeth to Wotton, 16 October 1560, Foreign Cal., pp. 356-357, no. 637.

²Ibid., Wotton and Mason to Cecil, 19 July 1561, pp. 191-193, no. 324; Statement by Venturini, 28 April 1562, p. 641, no. 1073n.

³Ibid., Commission, 15 May 1561, p. 110, no. 196.

⁴Wotton and Osbourne to Cecil, 16 July 1561, Dom. Cal., p. 180, no. 18.

⁵A.P.C., VII, p. 159.

problems of international shipping disputes and piracy are also interspersed throughout these commercial concerns.

Not uncharacteristically, Wotton's participation in religious developments in these early Elizabethan years is typically obscure. A tradition has survived suggesting that he had been offered the Archbishopric of Canterbury as Pole's successor, but W. P. Haugaard has probably correctly relegated this tradition to contemporary court rumour handed on chiefly through the Spanish and Venetian ambassadors. It should be remembered that at the time that this important decision would have been in the making, Wotton was completely immersed in the negotiations at Le Cateau, and no one could predict the duration of this occupation.¹ It also seems highly unlikely simply on the basis that Wotton had spent his life's career attempting to avoid such promotions, and his contemporaries certainly realized as much. With such an attitude, there could have been no benefit for Elizabeth in his appointment. There is a second issue which modern scholars have noted on Wotton's religious activities in Elizabeth's reign, and this is his noticeable absence from the 1563 meeting of Convocation--a meeting of profound significance to the Elizabethan religious settlement. This question is less easily resolved than the first. It is fair to assume that Wotton would not have been in general agreement with the trends in religious policies which the new government was advocating, but considering the two relevant factors that he was in England in 1563 and that he did continue to serve Elizabeth in important capacities throughout this year and until his death in 1567, he must have drawn on his diplomatic wits to steer himself past this sensitive occasion. It seems most likely that he would have relied upon the combined excuses of health and age to abstain from this winter Convocation. Not actually a man in poor health, it is learned from

¹W. P. Haugaard, Elizabeth and the English Reformation, pp. 33-35.

letters before and after this date that he did suffer periodic bouts of catarrh and gout. A younger man might well have jeopardized or forfeited his career by such a noticeable abstention, but one can feel fairly certain that by 1563, the Dean of Canterbury and York would have been graciously excused on relatively minor apologies, and many of the more radical members of the clergy may have openly welcomed his absence.

The previous discussion is not intended to suggest that Wotton totally exempted himself from religious affairs, but his participation was confined to the more minor developments. In May of 1561, a commission, including Dr. Wotton, was appointed to consider a request from a papal nuncio to come to England for discussions with Elizabeth on sending a representative to the Council of Trent. The recommendation which this group conveyed to the Council was that such a visit should be rejected. Any important communication from Rome could be transmitted through Philip's ambassador in London.¹ The Council noted the Spanish ambassador's anger at having received this answer in a written reply from Elizabeth's advisers and not from the Queen's own lips.² In late 1564, Wotton was present for a Council meeting which sent a letter of instruction to the Lord President of Wales touching the procedure for dispensing with "hearers and sayers of Mass."³ Through these examples, one might conclude that Wotton found such group commitment more in conformity with his view of politics and religion, i.e., the prince should determine religious policy, and his advisers should reflect it.

These last years of Wotton's life and the first of Elizabeth's reign represent the easiest point at which to trace his interaction with the chapter in Canterbury. In addition to letters of recommendation and

¹Commission, 1 May 1561, Foreign Cal., p. 94, no. 162; Report of the Commission, 5 May 1561, p. 99, no. 172.

²Ibid., The Council to Throckmorton, 7 May 1561, p. 103, no. 186.

³A.P.C., VII, p. 150.

letters of concurrence with chapter nominations of candidates to fill vacant benefices within the gift of the chapter, a variety of other administrative matters were despatched through the Dean's correspondence. Admissions to the King's School posed a conflict on one occasion:

Whereas of late I named three scholars to be received into our school of the which John Horden was one, I perceive now that there were not three rooms void, forbecause one of the three before named was admitted. Wherein appeareth a fault in the schoolmaster, for Mr. Vice-Dean by the schoolmaster's information certified me that they were all three receipted which now appeareth not to be so, and yet in case the said Horden be found sufficient upon examination, I would he should be put in Coleman's room: which either he shall not hereafter occupy, or else if he should have occasion to occupy it, I will provide another room for him.¹

Internal chapter disputes could also find a hearing with Wotton, but his guidance in such conflicts lacked strength:

Some of the petty canons have complained unto me, that the number of them being commoners is so small that the charge thereof is too great unto them. Wherefore I pray you to consider their complaint, and see whether you can devise some way to help it. I thought, that the order taken by us, at my last being there, would have well helpen the matter: if that order be not observed, then were it well done to cause it to be observed: if it be observed, and yet all that will not serve: then must some other help be devised for it: which I pray you to consider, and to certify me of your device in it.²

Finally, there is the occasional example of Wotton's patronage in Canterbury being requested by one at court:

By this letter herein enclosed you shall well perceive what Mr. Secretary requireth of us. I do not well remember in what case that parish standeth: but for as much as besides this letter, Mr. Secretary hath been an earnest suitor to me for it himself, therefore if it may be granted him, I would wish his request was satisfied. And so I pray you to do, if conveniently it may be done. I shall not need to put you in remembrance how much we are all bound to Mr. Secretary and therefore how glad we ought to be to embrace any occasion

¹Wotton to the Vice-Dean and Chapter, 12 February 1562, Canterbury Letters (Canterbury Cathedral Archives), I, letter 34.

²*Ibid.*, Wotton to the Vice-Dean and Chapter, 18 December 1562, letter 39.

offered us, to show ourselves thankful and grateful unto him, and specially in this matter, which he so earnestly desireth to take effect, as by his letter may appear. Wherefore I pray you to consider it accordingly.¹

Mr. Secretary is, of course, William Cecil, and in this letter, one clearly sees Wotton's desire to please a colleague at the court who was well versed in the power of patronage. Having considerably less influence himself, Wotton was not unwilling to exercise it to benefit petitions which reached him from friends in high places. A 1560 letter from Robert Dudley will further support this point:

... Whereas I do understand that you Mr. ..., cousin Wotton and divers others of your chapter are right well affected (wherein I am glad) unto my friend Mr. Lovelace, your solicitor, to bestow upon him also the office of your liberties being now void, this may be to desire you and them of your house the rather for my sake to stand his good friend therein to have the same stewardship as Sir Thomas Moyle late had it ... with his other office, whom I would gratify gladly with a greater pleasure than the accomplishment of this request and yet which I doubt not to obtain at your hands herein, I shall be right glad to requite it as shall lie again in my small power. And what friendship I shall find at your hands herein for him, my request is that I may have thereof from you again understanding; accordingly that he may know from me that he hath some part of benefit for my sake which I would were greater for him.²

With only a sample remaining of what must have been a larger collection of correspondence between Dean Wotton and the chapter, it is not easy to know the success with which he fulfilled court petitions, but knowledgeable and powerful men of the time, Cecil and Dudley among others, believed that his word held significance with his clerical colleagues, and the modern student may use that trust as one measure of Wotton's patronage. It has already been shown that Wotton spent most of his time away from Canterbury and that he felt his position threatened by certain moves within the chapter; nevertheless, his acceptance among his secular colleagues created a

¹Ibid., Wotton to the Vice-Dean and Chapter, 23 November 1562, letter 37.

²Robert Dudley to the Dean and Chapter, 19 November 1560, Christchurch Letters (Canterbury Cathedral Archives), III, no. 9.

bridge of confidence by which such requests could be transmitted. The general impression created by this Cathedral correspondence is one of interest in but not intense concern for chapter affairs. The Vice-Dean and chapter continued to execute the business necessary to Cathedral administration.

There are two major foreign incidents in the first decade of Elizabeth's reign with which Wotton is associated. The first is of more indirect consequence to this former ambassador, but his diplomatic employment of the 1550's made it inevitable that he would become involved on the perimeter of it. This was the English incursion into France in 1562. The second event encompassed very direct participation by Wotton, and it represented his ultimate overseas mission and his final service to his country. This was his assignment to negotiate with King Philip's commissioners a new trade agreement between England and the Low Countries. Attention must first be given to the difficulties with France.

Adequate reference has already been made in previous chapters to the factional struggles at the French court under Henry II, but after his death in 1559, these assumed a more sinister aspect based on religious conflict. While the favoured Guise faction upheld the traditional Catholic authority, the Protestant cause found its champions among the former Montmorency courtiers, now led by the Prince of Condé. The division was made worse by the succession of minors to the French throne, and a state of civil disorder was the certainty on which events turned.

The English involvement did not materialize until 1562. That year had opened with plans to arrange a meeting between Elizabeth and Mary Queen of Scots, but a massacre of Protestants in Vassy had initiated a new round of fighting in France and had forced Elizabeth's councillors to a reassessment of the planned meeting. Meeting in full and agreeing unanimously,

according to Neale, the English Queen's advisers advanced three arguments for the cancellation of the rendezvous: first, such meetings generally signified firm amity between the sovereigns, which was not the case here; secondly, Mary had been guilty of bad faith in her refusal to ratify the Treaty of Edinburgh; and finally, this meeting would suggest abandonment of the French Huguenots by Elizabeth--a grave move indeed for one recognized to be the leading Protestant. Despite such advise, the Queen ordered that arrangements should go forward, for an uneasy truce appeared to be taking hold in France. By July, this illusion was shattered, and the meeting was postponed.¹

Elizabeth despatched troops under Ambrose Dudley to France with instructions to seize Le Havre (Newhaven to the English) and to hold it until Calais had been restored. This was the price to which Condé had had to agree in order to obtain English assistance, and Dudley arrived in October to carry out his mission successfully.² Dr. Wotton and John Mason were selected to convey the news of this incursion to the French ambassador in London, Paul de Foix. The English delegation had emphasized the Queen's action as intercession to protect the rights of a fellow sovereign; their declaration concluded with an expression of this intent:

Hearing of so many cruel repressions of his subjects which must needs be to her said brother very displeasing when he should come to years of more judgment, she thought convenient to do that in her might lie to defend them from further oppressions of such as seem to desire nothing more than the overrunning of them, which she did the rather for that the fire being kindled so near unto her might easily be blown over to some part of her estate. And finally he was prayed to take the Queen's intention to be to continue in peace, and to mean no worse to her good brother, than she did to herself, for whom and to those use she meant to keep the tower of Newhaven without any kind of hostility to be shown

¹Neale, Queen Elizabeth, pp. 117-119.

²MacCaffrey, The Shaping of the Elizabethan Regime, pp. 95-96; Neale, Queen Elizabeth, pp. 120-122.

on her part, unless by violence attempted by such as she took to be both enemies to the crown of France and to her, she should be driven to do that was requisite to be done.¹

The French ambassador utterly rejected this curious English logic. To argue the strategy on the need of self-defence depended upon a premise of having been attacked; such was not the state in 1562. Turning to Elizabeth's claim of assistance to the French King, de Foix reminded Wotton and Mason that Elizabeth had never conveyed such an offer to Charles nor had he ever requested it from her. To seize his territory and aid his rebellious subjects was a strange way indeed of manifesting amity and assistance.²

There was a general escalation in the fighting in Normandy in the autumn. In addition to military defeats, the Huguenots also suffered a loss of confidence from many of their countrymen who had condemned the betrayal of French territory to England, and Condé failed to convince them to the contrary.³ In November, the King of Navarre died, and in the following month, Condé was captured. Coligny, Montmorency's nephew, assumed a dominant part in the Huguenot leadership, but the assassination of the Catholic leader, the Duke of Guise, in February meant that both sides were in a weakened condition. Turning this disadvantage to her favour, the French Regent brought both sides together in March to conclude the Peace of Amboise--a truce solely designed to construct a unified front against the common invader, England.⁴ Accusations of betrayal and perjury were exchanged between Condé and Cecil.⁵ While Charles IX requested Elizabeth to leave Le Havre now that

¹Wotton and Mason to Cecil, 14 October 1562, S.P. 70/42, f. 194.

²Report from the French Ambassador, 19 October 1562, Foreign Cal., p. 377, no. 878.

³Neale, Queen Elizabeth, pp. 120-122.

⁴Baron Alfonse de Ruble, Le Traité de Cateau-Cambrésis (Paris: 1889), pp. 171-173. (This source is cited hereafter by the author's name.)

⁵Ibid., pp. 173-175.

peace had been restored, Thomas Smith, England's ambassador in France, requested Wotton's opinion on the English position in Calais in light of events since the signing of Cateau Cambresis.¹ A June conference between de Foix and several English councillors, including Wotton, put the impossible circumstances in perspective for both parties. The first French objection was that England had no right to claim Calais before 1567, but the English were quick to remind de Foix that any abrogation of the treaty (and there was more than sufficient evidence to suggest this) invalidated this stipulation; the abuse of Elizabeth's title and arms was but one such violation. When the French ambassador countered with the argument that the Treaty of Edinburgh had reaffirmed Cateau Cambresis and thus England could not use such grounds against France, the English simply argued that this latter treaty had received even less observance than the first. Finally, de Foix had argued that Elizabeth was actually more interested in retaining Le Havre than in recovering Calais, but the English delegates resorted to the old line of defence that Calais was English by right of inheritance and that Le Havre had not been taken by force.²

With such determination on both sides, it is not surprising that few statesmen of the time believed war could be averted. Queen Catherine mobilized her forces, while Ambrose Dudley attempted to prepare his troops in Le Havre for the inevitable siege. When fighting began on 6 July 1563, he despatched a candid report on his unfavourable position: insufficient munitions, not enough food, captains who were inexperienced in siege warfare and a severe epidemic of the plague.³ On the 28th of the month, Dudley surrendered the town, for in addition to the previously-cited difficulties, he had also been without aid from the English navy. It arrived

¹Smith to Cecil, 27 February 1563, Foreign Cal., p. 159, no. 356.

²Ibid., The Queen's Demand for Calais, 3 June 1563, pp. 383-385, no. 840.

³de Ruble, pp. 178-180.

on the 30th, just in time to take the wounded and dying back to England. They carried the plague with them across the Channel, and while France rejoiced in a national victory according to which Catherine could now challenge Elizabeth's claims to Calais under the provisions of Cateau Cambrésis, Elizabeth and her advisers were left to ponder the humiliating results.¹

The terms of peace were not easily concluded. The first difficulty which arose was over the composition of the delegations; the English opinion favoured a representation of two for each side, but Catherine had already appointed three. As this dispute developed throughout the late summer and autumn of 1563, Wotton was several times suggested as a candidate for the commission. Smith had proposed that if Wotton, "the meetest man in England," was allowed to join him in France with sufficient authorization, they could adequately serve the Queen's interests.² It was Nicholas Throckmorton however who was despatched, but he was soon arrested in Normandy on the charge of inciting religious dissidents. In September, Smith suffered a similar fate but was soon released.³ In a memorandum of the 26th of October, it was strongly suggested that the English government must demand Throckmorton's release in order that he might either act as Elizabeth's commissioner or return home; if the latter condition was the only acceptable alternative to France, Wotton or Mason should be despatched to join Smith.⁴ Smith and Throckmorton were united shortly thereafter, but negotiations dragged on until April of 1564.

The point at which the negotiators always separated was the question of who had first violated Cateau Cambrésis. With a unified France behind

¹Ibid., pp. 182-185.

²Smith to Cecil, 18 October 1563, Foreign Cal., p. 458, no. 1020.

³de Ruble, pp. 185-188.

⁴Memorial on French Matters, 26 October 1563, Foreign Cal., pp. 572-573, no. 1343.

her, although only temporarily, Catherine could and did press the terms in her favour. The long-standing rivalry between Throckmorton and Smith contributed further damage to the English cause, and on the 11th of April, they agreed to the Regent's terms of a meagre payment of one hundred and twenty thousand crowns for Calais. Both parties retreated into the intrigues of internal politics, but both must also bear partial responsibility for the shambles which had been made of the peace concluded at Le Cateau.¹

II

The Final Mission

On several occasions, attention has been drawn to the emphasis placed by sixteenth-century statesmen on the commercial link between England and the Low Countries, and reference has also already been made to the diminished amity between Elizabeth and Philip after the signing of the Treaty of Cateau Cambrésis. In the decade of the 1560's, these two factors clashed and demanded resolution. Wotton had had limited experience in direct trade negotiations, but of course, one of his ambassadorial functions, which had frequently required attention, was that of spokesman for English economic interests abroad. It was probably thought that such experience would render him a good general adviser to any commission appointed to negotiate this conflict. Not only would he have had firsthand knowledge of the difficulties faced by English merchants on the Continent, but he would also have been able to temper this with firsthand insight on the wider foreign policy implications stemming from any commercial decision, as well as on the general sentiment of foreign governments toward English commercial interests. When the commissioners were chosen, his colleagues for the assignment were Walter Haddon and Anthony Brown, Viscount Montague. Together they accepted the commission to renegotiate England's commercial agreements

¹de Ruble, pp. 188-192.

with the Habsburg dynasty.

Before discussing the controversies which necessitated this colloquy, the perspective from which these issues developed should be established. Throughout the thirteenth and much of the fourteenth centuries, England's overseas trade had been concentrated heavily in the hands of foreign merchants or the English Merchants of the Staple, a society which established itself on the Continent and retained a certain amount of English commodities, chiefly wool, in its staple town in order to expedite international commerce. The nucleus of a rival society began forming in the fourteenth century when a small group of English merchants had engaged in Continental trade outside the monopoly of the Staplers; hence, the Merchant Adventurers.¹ The need for closer organization was forced upon them when, in the fourteenth century, the staple town was transferred from the Continent back to England, leaving no official body to oversee the interests of English merchants. By the time the staple was re-established on the Continent in the fifteenth century, the Merchant Adventurers had made significant inroads into what had formerly been the territory of the Staplers and were enjoying even greater success. This was largely attributable to the Merchants' emphasis which replaced wool with unfinished cloth as the chief staple item, one which was increasingly in demand from the Low Countries. Even when the staple had once again to be moved from Antwerp to Calais in 1505 because of conflict between England and Burgundy, the Merchants received royal assurances for their interests, and the group was granted its first royal charter. Although the ancient Society of the Staplers was still in existence and the crown attempted to support and control both organizations, the Merchant Adventurers prevailed over their rival by the reign of

¹E. M. Carus Wilson, Economic History Review 1932, "The Origins and Early Development of the Merchant Adventurers' Organization in London," IV, pp. 147-148.

Edward VI and became a real monopoly under Elizabeth.¹

It was in this reign that serious difficulties developed for English merchants in the Low Countries, their major Continental base. Here was the perfect market for England's unwrought cloth and raw materials, both of which were vital to the economy of the Low Countries in which these products were refined into manufactured wares to be traded all over Europe. Recognizing the importance of this link, each side had over the years granted privileges to the merchants of the other, but despite this recognition, a fear of growing mercantilism in the interest of each crown had arisen by 1560. A suspension of the special privileges was considered, but the Merchant Adventurers objected. There were however new areas of complaint from the Dutch merchants--new duties imposed, prohibitions against dealing in certain commodities and a requirement to find surety upon their arrival in England to guarantee that cash received here would be employed on the purchase of English wares. Threats of retaliatory measures were exchanged, and in 1564, Elizabeth placed a general embargo on all goods coming from the Low Countries. Of course, this suspension of trade had forced the Merchant Adventurers to move their base from Antwerp (whither they had moved after the fall of Calais) to the German town of Emden. Realizing the negative effect of this, Antwerp merchants invited their English counterparts to join them in an appeal to Elizabeth and Philip to put aside their differences until a conference could be called to discuss the grievances; this was the series of meetings between 1565 and 1566 at which Dr. Wotton was present.²

On 11 March 1565, Elizabeth issued her instructions to her envoys. The disputes to be considered can roughly be divided into four categories:

¹W. E. Lingelbach, The Merchant Adventurers of England (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1902), pp. XXII-XXXI.

²Lipson, An Economic History of England, pp. 198-200.

poundage, the customs on cloth, duties collected in London and on the Thames and laws considered to be in contravention of the agreements made and confirmed in 1496 between Henry VII and Philip of Burgundy. Elizabeth argued that poundage had been established at the rate of twelve pence in the pound during the reign of Richard II and had been collected ever since, not suspended as a special privilege by Henry VII as Philip's commissioner d'Assonville was attempting to argue. He had also charged the Queen with having increased this amount, a charge which Elizabeth instructed her commissioners to deny with the proclamation that their sovereign would certainly be justified in an increase. On the second controversy, the customs on cloth, the Queen advised her representatives to take it up in a "friendly manner," for it was but a minor disagreement. She charged that the customs being placed on woolen cloth coming from England left her with less profit than that which had accrued from this same source to her predecessors, especially when considering the price of refined cloth coming from the Low Countries. Some adjustment should be made. On the duties collected in London and on the Thames, Wotton, Haddon and Montague were again instructed to deny the claim that these had been increased, although they were to acknowledge that "boyage," a fee collected from owners of vessels and not from the merchants, had been increased. In the final category of objections, laws passed in contravention of previous accords, a variety of exports and imports were to be reviewed--fish, hides, wood and various metals.¹

With this last category particularly in mind, the Queen concluded her instructions with some procedural advice:

Wherefore it is thought good that in these causes and all other like, ye do observe this rule, not to bring in question by your answers, or rather treating, anything but such only as thereof they shall make complaint particular.²

¹Instructions to Wotton, Haddon and Montague, 11 March 1565, S.P. 70/77, fos. 49-53.

²Ibid., f. 53.

A general denial, especially on these legal interpretations, was thought preferable to arguing specific points:

Nevertheless, if they shall mislike of that general kind of answer that they will not otherwise be content, you shall then consider upon a sufficient memorial and collection made, which you shall have to prove the most number of things, pretended by them to be innovated, to have indeed been lawful at the time of the treaty by ancient laws and statutes of the realm, which as need shall require, you may allege unto them, according to their several natures and quotations, if otherwise you shall see they cannot be satisfied, ... if they shall make any doubt of the validity of any of those laws, you shall offer to them full to profess of the same, that the authentic records thereof shall be showed to their ambassador here, upon their motion and signification to be made to Her Majesty of their doubt.

In concluding this declaration, the ambassadors were instructed to comment casually that if English merchants were not welcome in the Low Countries, there were many other places eager to have English trade.¹

The commissioners took leave of the court shortly thereafter, and there exists an amusing note from Wotton to Cecil recounting the former's journey to Dunkirk to meet Montague:

It was two or three hours after, ere I landed. And the night being then dark and I without guide, as lusty a footman as I am, I am sure that of those two miles I made afoot six miles ere I came to Dunkirk the which journey I assure you, was more painful to me than you can well believe. And my gouty toes and feet are the worse for it. The next day when the master of my ship came for his money, I told my men that I would by no means speak with him, for fear lest I should forget his name. For I imputed all the fault to him.²

Such difficulties foretold the troubles of the long summer of negotiations ahead. Relatively little progress was made, and by the autumn, it was generally believed that a suspension of the talks for a specified period was in the best interest of all. Accordingly, Elizabeth issued such a proclamation on the 16th of October, the meetings to be resumed on the 15th of March.³

¹ Ibid., fos. 53-54.

² Wotton to Cecil, 21 March 1565, S.P. 70/77, f. 87.

³ B.L., Cot. MSS., Galba C, I, f. 222.

Poor weather conditions in the spring of 1566 necessitated a delay in the resumption of the parley, and when Elizabeth informed her commissioners of the month's postponement, she also sent them their new instructions. Through its content, one derives the impression that the progress achieved in the previous session was indeed minimal and that new grievances had been added. Still unresolved were the questions of poundage, the customs on cloth and the legislation against exporting tin, leather and lead, although the ambassadors were empowered to grant some concessions in this last matter. Concessions were also suggested for the complaint against "employments" (sureties), thus making it possible for the English commissioners to agree to abolish these, if this issue should prove the impasse to a general conclusion. One further point was yielded; Since Englishmen in the Low Countries were exempt from the duty on fresh fish, the Queen agreed to have some similar provision approved by Parliament for Philip's merchants. The areas of new conflict ranged widely: the English use of foreign vessels to transport their cargoes, a book of ordinances being used throughout the Low Countries to harass English merchants with articles and clauses clearly in contravention of the 1496 treaty and the English demand that their manufactured goods, including finished cloth, must be permitted into the Low Countries for sale, since the reverse was accepted in England. Elizabeth's final directive was that if, after implementing her instructions to stand firm on their original answers in some matters and to accept amendment in others, Philip's delegates opted to disband the negotiations, Wotton, Haddon and Montague were not to agree to any such proposal without consulting her further and notifying their ambassador in Spain in order that he might clear the Queen of any responsibility for the failure of this colloquy.¹

It appears that both sides resumed discussions with little expectation of agreement. On the 10th of June, the commissioners wrote as much

¹Instructions to Wotton, Haddon and Montague, 15 March 1566, S.P. 70/84, fos. 47-57.

to Cecil and asked either to have further instructions or the order from the Queen for their departure.¹ Just a week later, in an atmosphere heavy with rumours of an impending prorogation, the English delegates wrote, "We are well agreed here but in our principal matters."² Elizabeth was determined to have poundage and the impost on cloth, but the government of the Low Countries was equally adamant in its refusal. In such a stalemate, there was no solution but prorogation, and when the religious disorders of the following year erupted in the Low Countries, all hope for agreement was shattered. As has been noted, the staple had once again to be moved, and the economic link which for centuries had anchored the Anglo-Burgundian friendship was severed.

Wotton's final correspondence on the subject is an appropriate echo of the sentiment on which this mission ended, a lack of expectation but not complete despair. He wrote to Cecil:

Though these other commissioners by their words kept themselves more aloof, yet was I not in despair, but that some good agreement might have ensued upon the principal matters. Specially for that some who took it upon them to understand some part of their mind affirmed that at the last they would accept our offers. And indeed there were such, as there was good cause why they should so do, whatsoever hath moved them to refuse them at this time. Who can tell, whether the old proverb may be verified in them, he that will not when he may, etc. But seeing that we could not agree upon the principals, there is a prorogation concluded, not until any certain day but to such a time, as seemeth will be longer than hence to October. And surely if King Philip make haste to make any declaration of his mind in this matter, (so as his subjects be well used in England, and the accord made betwixt Her Majesty and the Regent for the appointment of this diet, be well kept, and piracies repressed and redressed) it shall be much against mine expectation.³

Wotton's last mission is unique among his assignments in that its exclusive emphasis was on economic rather than general foreign policy

¹Ibid., Commissioners to the Council, 10 June 1566, fos. 260-261.

²Ibid., Commissioners to Cecil, 17 June 1566, f. 310.

³Ibid., Wotton to Cecil, 24 June 1566, f. 340.

interests. It was not a success, but blame cannot be attributed to the negotiators involved. The development of European states in the sixteenth century had brought with it a tendency toward more distinct economic interests, and inevitably, diplomacy had to reflect this. The English commissioners could afford to leave Bruges in a cautious but hopeful spirit because with a divided House of Habsburg and a disordered House of Valois, their country's prospects for emerging from the shadow of these two powers were much improved.

Chapter X

A Scholar and His Friends

The scholarly pursuits of the youthful Dr. Wotton have been mentioned in a previous chapter, and although his diplomatic career left him less time to continue these interests uninterrupted, he did not totally abandon such pursuits. In fact, one can say that he was afforded an enriched opportunity to follow up two such areas, history and genealogy, by virtue of his office. Occasionally, the information which he acquired was the direct result of a particular diplomatic assignment and its unique circumstances, but more often, the acquisitions reflected broad personal, family or national interests. An examination of this aspect of Wotton's life also allows one to speculate on some of his friendships, other than his English court contacts whom one might describe as his friends by professional necessity. Similarly, it should be noted that with his clerical colleagues, there appears to have been a deliberate attempt at separation; it is noticeable that there exists no correspondence between Wotton and either of Mary's chancellors, Gardiner or Heath. Neither can one trace any written exchanges with such leading ecclesiastical figures as Cranmer and Pole. Recognizing that this negative evidence might simply represent a case for chance survival of documents, it is also possible that this constitutes a statement of further support for the suggestion that Wotton had spent much of his career distancing himself from the clergy and clerical affairs in England. Of course, there were instances when his position as dean necessitated his participation, most often in a nominal capacity. With his fellow diplomats, there are only rare references to individual meetings, although it was not unusual for the entire diplomatic representation at a court to be brought

together in the course of court life.

Over the duration of at least one decade, the mid-1540's to the mid-1550's, Wotton collected a variety of writings which captured his interests--genealogical charts, excerpts from chronicles and history-related memorabilia. By examining his sources for this information, one can learn something of a group of acquaintances of whom it could be said that they constituted Wotton's chosen companions. These were men who shared his intellectual interests, in short, several prominent English heralds, together with one of their noted Imperial colleagues, Hanon, and a Frenchman, Jean Le Feron, from whom Wotton obtained much of his chronicled accounts of English and French history. The two English heralds from whom he derived most were Lancaster and York, particularly Lancaster. Fulk ap Howel's career as Lancaster Herald is in sharp contrast with Wotton's own cautious and correct tale of success. Howel had been created Lancaster Herald in 1537 and remained in favour until 1543. For some unknown reason, he fell from grace in that year and was not to receive vindication until 1549; however, in 1551, he was arrested on a charge of counterfeiting heraldic seals and was executed later that year.¹ The information which he contributed to Wotton was primarily genealogical knowledge on the English and Scottish nobility.² Of York Herald, one can be less certain. It may have been Martin Maroffe who had been with the English army in 1544 in France and at the Imperial court in 1546, but equally likely is his successor to the title in 1553,

¹W. H. Godfrey, College of Arms Final Monograph of the London Survey Committee (London: 1963), p. 133.

²In the British Library are two volumes of manuscripts, Additional Manuscripts 38692 and Harleian Manuscripts 902, which contain notes in Wotton's own hand, as well as manuscripts in a secretary's hand. Headed "lutetia" and probably begun in Paris in the late 1540's, the entries in these volumes are catalogued according to references which must have applied to Wotton's own library, q.H.a.n.N.H., for example. However, in most instances, Wotton also provides the source from which an entry has been taken, and one example of material taken from Lancaster Herald can be found in the Wentworth genealogy, Add. MSS. 38692, f. 109v.

Bartholomew Butler, who had served as a diplomat and courier. York Herald was instrumental in Wotton's efforts to reconstruct his own genealogy.¹ Since heralds, like diplomats, were part of the machinery of international relations, it is not difficult to imagine Wotton's ideal circumstances for realizing his own leisure interests in the midst of his professional duties.

There were other sources for his material also. It appears that his search for his own family's history had, on at least one occasion, prompted him to explore the Canterbury archives for clues on the Wottons in the eastern half of the county, particularly John Wotton of Adisham.² His kinsmen also contributed material necessary for compiling the family portrait. His brother Edward had made the immediate family papers available to Nicholas,³ while the Medley family, relatives of his sister Margaret's first husband, also gave him access to information on their part of the story.⁴ John Guildford is another example of a kinsman who assisted Wotton in this project.

One other source of information for this collection of jottings was his ambassadorial colleagues. His countryman, Peter Vannes, who had spent much time in Italy, provided him with notes on various European royal families, and Castelnau, the French ambassador to England in the 1530's, gave him the Zapolyai genealogy.⁵ From such varied sources, then, Wotton compiled two volumes of extracts, the common denominator of which is the element of historical significance.

¹Godfrey, College of Arms Final Monograph, pp. 185-186. For examples of information provided by York Herald, one might consult Add. MSS. 38692, fos. 39v and 58v, the Bamburgh and Belknap genealogies.

²B. L., Add. MSS. 38692, f. 58v; notes "ex chartis de Adisham de Cantuar."

³Ibid., f. 51r, documents on the Belknap genealogy; fos. 51v-57, Robert Wotton's chronicle; f. 58r, notes on the Guildford family.

⁴Ibid., f. 58v; notes "ex relatu George Medley."

⁵Ibid., fos. 64v and 120v.

It will have undoubtedly been noticed that genealogy represented a substantial segment of these volumes, and one of the first impressions to emerge is that the Wotton family alliances were of significant interest to Nicholas. The importance of the links to the Grey, Lisle and Guildford families merited attention early in the collection, but less influential relations were not overlooked. The Bamburghs are one such example, but even more so is the case of his mother's family, the Belknaps.¹ Along with these genealogies of his own family, Wotton studied those of several prominent English nobles: the Courtenays, the Percies, the Staffords--all found a place in this miscellany.

The interest did not stop with the English nobility, and as Wotton spent more of his time abroad, particularly in France, he seems to have become increasingly preoccupied with the histories and genealogies of the great noble and princely families of France and the Low Countries. Here, his mentor and general source of information was the noted French antiquarian, Jean Le Feron, whose numerous works in the 1550's must have quickly come to Wotton's attention, concerning as they did, both princely history and a study of the great offices of state.² Wotton obtained the greater portion of his notes from Le Feron, and his copy provides a useful insight into aspects of Le Feron's works which have not otherwise survived. Most notable here was Wotton's copy of notes and writings by Le Feron on the Luxembourg-Ligny family, once counts of St. Pol, whose claims were now represented by the Bourbons. Wotton copied a long discourse on the Luxembourg family with a dedicatory letter to Charles de Luxembourg, Count of Brienne,

¹Ibid., f. 9r, the Lisle family; fos. 47-50, the Grey family; f. 58r, the Guildford family; fos. 39v and 58v, the Bamburgh and Belknap families.

²Some of Le Feron's works which must have been of great interest to Wotton include Catalogue des Nobles Admiraulx de France, (Paris: 1555); Catalogue des Grands Maistres de France (Paris: 1555); and le Symbol Armorial des Armories de France èt d'Escoce et de Lorraine, (Paris: 1555).

and throughout his notes, Wotton returned to this theme.¹ Also from Le Feron, he obtained notes on the House of Dreux, descendants of the House of Boulogne,² notes on the practices and customs of the Parlement of Paris, copies of treaties relating to Brittany and a copy of the "Chronica Nolana," a French chronicle of the reign of Henry IV.³ It seems fitting to conclude that Wotton's acquaintance with Le Feron was one of the most fruitful scholarly activities of his life.

The pursuit of the Boulogne genealogy, already cited as an example of the way in which an intellectual interest benefited a diplomatic assignment, gave Wotton a profound understanding of the various hereditary rights in the county and yielded one further clue to understanding the French Queen's animosity toward England. A footnote to this particular genealogy occurred in 1557 when a nobleman from Boulogne escorted Wotton to Calais and was presented by the ambassador with a copy of the genealogy of the counts of Boulogne as a gift of appreciation.⁴

The obvious genealogies, those of the reigning houses of Europe, are numbered among Wotton's collection also. He preserved notes on the three French dynasties up to that of his own time, and one can also find a Habsburg pedigree among these papers.⁵ The inclusion of a genealogy of the Saxon kings lends credence to the previously-cited evidence for Wotton's special emphasis on Anglo-Saxon history and his desire to preserve it. Later English kings were also incorporated into the general national sketch, although within this group, it appears that Wotton had chosen to focus his

¹B.L., Add. MSS. 38692, fos. 67r-72r.

²Ibid., f. 211.

³B.L., Harl. MSS. 902, fos. 46v, 150-157 and 169.

⁴B.L., Add. MSS. 38692, f. 165.

⁵B.L., Add. MSS. 38692, fos. 103-107; Harl. MSS. 902, fos. 166-169.

attention on the Plantagenets. In fact, he built up a general history of the English kings from earliest times down to the end of the thirteenth century, interspersing these notes in spare pages between manuscripts which he had made of other documents. Finally, the Scottish kings found a place among this collection.¹

The other major component of these volumes is the excerpts from chronicles. Robert Wotton's chronicle was useful for his son's knowledge of immediate family and national history, and it was Nicholas who actually transcribed his father's writings. Within these excerpts also, one finds additional support for Nicholas's interest in Anglo-Saxon history, viz., "the popular chronicle of English history, the 'Brut' down to the reign of Edward I." Further extracts from books on some of the earliest tribes which inhabited Britain have also been included.² The more well-known accounts of these same events which had been compiled by such noted scholars as Bede and Geoffrey of Monmouth were appealed to in the course of Wotton's research into this subject, and he has filed his notes from these sources within these volumes.³ Le Feron, who shared Wotton's historical preference, was the source for many chronicled accounts from both England and France, and in the case of Plantagenet history, Wotton supplemented Le Feron's accounts with notes of his own on the period. It is noticeable that unlike his father, Nicholas chose not to record events of his own life or even of his own generation, but given that his priorities lay in the realm of diplomacy in an age in which caution featured heavily, one should not consider this choice out of character.

The remainder of the collection genuinely seems to have been a

¹B.L., Add. MSS. 38692, f. 34; Harl. MSS. 902, fos. 48-63v, 75, 136-137 and 157.

²B.L., Harl. MSS. 902, fos. 1-11v.

³Ibid., fos. 14r-46v.

miscellany of items which had impressed Wotton as noteworthy. There are, for example, several sections dedicated to events of the fifteenth century--the administration of France by the Duke of Bedford, the revenues collected over that regency, and much documentation is given to the disputed claims to Sicily, particularly the claim by Charles VIII.¹ Similarly, there are instances of groups of people who captured Wotton's attention. He compiled an extensive roster of the companions of William the Conqueror in 1066, and he also recorded the names of many who had been captured in the Anglo-French hostilities of the 1520's, with many of whom he had personally spoken in the course of his research into the question.² During August of 1549, when conflict again characterized relations between the two kingdoms, Wotton prepared a list of the French generals and the numbers of men under their command.³ Undoubtedly intended originally for his government's use, this information, it would seem, was never despatched. One possible explanation for this is Wotton's arrest in that same month.

Scattered throughout this primarily historical material are compositions which must simply have appealed to the intellect of Wotton--Latin poetry, sketches of armorials and crowns, Abelard's memorial inscription.⁴ Finally, his excerpts from the Sibille Prophecy merits note. Purportedly written in 1382, it contained several prophecies which Wotton was to see fulfilled in his own generation: peace between England and France followed by a universal uprising in France against the princes and nobles, religious upheaval in the church and the succession to the throne of France of a French captain of royal

¹B.L., Add. MSS. 38692, fos. 199-200; Harl. MSS. 902, fos. 108-133v.

²B.L., Add. MSS. 38692, f. 86; Harl. MSS. 902, f. 13v.

³B.L., Harl. MSS. 902, f. 73.

⁴B.L., Add. MSS. 38692, fos. 137 and 139-141; Harl. MSS. 902, f. 82.

lineage; this last prediction, which suggests Henry IV, came to pass not many years after Wotton's death. The text begins:

Les vers de la terre du pays de Gaule se leveront encontre les princes et vniversel rebellion se fera contre eulx et sera grand rebellion et occision des princes et des barons que ce sera pitye a veoir, et la maistr... de Gaule sera en grand peril destre despouillée, mais les quatomens dicelle la deffendront de main forte. Le lyeppart viendra en Gaule et le receuront les Normans. Paix se fera entre le Roy de Gaule et le Roy de la Grand Bretagne. Le Roy de Gaule sera destruict et chace et son lignaige occis. Vng iouuencel Capitaine quy aura le front plain et vng nes daigle et cestuy sera Roy de Gaule et viendra de droicte lignée issus des Rois de Gaule. Et leglise perira et sera en aduventure destre de toutz pointtz desertée mais Dieu quy est tout puissant y pourvoyra. Et alors souffrira bien a ceulx de leglise dauoir leur vie ... seulement, et pour certain iustice faudra. Vng empereur quy sera appelle Charles, et sera des parties dorient, de la droicte lignée de Gaule, sy suvinguera ¹ les Roxmains et reformera les saintes eglises et religions...

The uncanny similarity of some of the events predicted here to events of the French religious wars is immediately noticeable.

The purpose behind Wotton's collection of such varied information is a question on which one can only speculate. It may be as simple as a collector of all compositions which held his attention, but it would not seem an overstatement of the case to suggest that he may have contemplated writing a history of late Medieval England and France, with a preface on the relevance of pre-Medieval English history. Remembering his early reputation for scholarship, authorship would not have been out of the realm of possibility or expectation; however, as diplomacy superseded academics in Wotton's life, such hopes must in turn have been replaced by the realization that scholarly pursuits must become an avocation, albeit an appropriate accompaniment to his diplomatic vocation.

It seems fitting to conclude this chapter with Wotton's own statement on his view of education in general. In a 1563 dinner conversation with Cecil and Petre, among others, Wotton found himself in the midst of a

¹B.L., Harl. 902, fos. 12-13.

discussion on the contemporary approach to education. While Cecil, the host, spoke in favour of making the process of learning attractive to young people, Petre offered the view that this might only lead to leniency and depreciating standards. Wotton, according to Roger Ascham who has recorded this conversation, inclined toward Cecil's view, and Ascham has described the Dean as a "man mild of nature with soft voice and few words." To the assembled company, Wotton said:

In mine opinion, the schoolhouse should be indeed, as it is called by name, the house of play and pleasure, and not of fear and bondage; and as I do remember, so saith Socrates in one place of Plato. And therefore if a rod carry the fear of a sword, it is no marvel if those that be fearful of nature, choose rather to forsake the play, than to stand always within the fear of a sword in a fond man's handling.¹

¹Rev. Dr. Giles, The Whole Works of Roger Ascham (London: 1864), III, pp. 79-80.

Chapter XI

A Career in Perspective

Dr. Wotton's final correspondence from Bruge indicated that his state of health was declining, and he was nearer to death than perhaps he realized:

This matter being now done, I intend, God willing, to go to the spa. And yet for as much as Dr. Vauldaura, a physician, brother-in-law to Vives and one of mine old acquaintances at Louvain and Paris, doth dissuade me from using the said water: I intend to use the counsel of such physicians as dwell about that place, and are practised daily and are long time there. And either by their advice to use it or not to use it.¹

On 26 January 1567, he died in London leaving no will, many friends and a legacy to history of one who had turned the powerful tides of the sixteenth century in his favour. He lies buried in Trinity Chapel in Canterbury Cathedral, near the tomb of King Henry IV, and a description of his funeral procession has been recorded in some detail:

First, two conductors with black statues, then the poor two and two, then the King's scholars, then the choir, then the masters, then gentlemen having black gowns two and two, then the preacher, then Lancaster Herald, then Norroy King-of-Arms, then the corpse borne by six of his servants in black coats, viz., and at every corner of the corpse a gentlemen in a black gown with his hood on then my Lord Cobham chief mourner, then the other four mourners two and two viz., Master Wotton, Master Medley, Master Cromer, Master Rudstone, then the mayor and aldermen of the town, then gentlemen having no black, then yoemen having black, then all other his friends.²

His possessions were inherited by his favourite nephew, Thomas, and it was this kinsman who erected the grand monument in the Cathedral which marks the first dean's final resting place.

¹Wotton to Cecil, 24 June 1566, S.P. 70/84, f. 340.

²B.L., Harl. MSS. 6064, f. 83.

To assess a career of the length and gravity as that of Nicholas Wotton is an awesome task, but if Lloyd, the seventeenth-century biographer is to be believed, Wotton himself has made the undertaking easier by outlining the criteria on which such a judgment should be based. Although the doubtful origin of the manuscript from which Lloyd obtained these maxims leads one to question the authority of some of these statements, there is no reason to suspect him of having invented the advice which he claimed Dr. Wotton had left to his colleagues, and the statements are in conformity with the character which has emerged from the state papers of the period.

To the clergy: understand well the common and canon law, as well as the divine, so by the first to know their right as by the second to inform themselves and others of their duty. To statesmen: travail in history. To ambassadors: 1, a good purse; 2, a noble and sober train; 3, constant correspondence and observation; 4, a happy medley of debonairness and complacency, reserve and gravity: the one discovers others while the other conceals you; 5, resolution: I made often as if I would fight when they knew that my calling only allowed me to speak; 6, civility. To Privy Councillors: always to speak last and be the masters of others' strength before they display their own.¹

It now only remains to test Wotton's career against his own set of standards.

He had begun his career as a cleric, but almost from the outset, he had exhibited reluctance to confine himself to the limitations of the clerical life; however, it did provide a younger son with advantageous means to fulfil wider ambitions, and of course, through his family and family connections in Kent, Wotton received his initial appointments and recognition. Even when he had attained his goal as one of Henry's ambassadors, clerical rewards remained the most appropriate form of recognition. The Archdeacon of Gloucester of 1540 became the first Dean of Canterbury Cathedral in 1541, and in 1544, tradition was overturned when Wotton was also created Dean of York. It has already been said that his interest in Canterbury was negligible, and his awareness of affairs in York was even less. He was installed

¹D. Lloyd, State Worthies (London: Thomas Milbourn, 1670), p. 110.

by proxy, appointed two successive archdeacons of Nottingham to act as his permanent deputies, Cuthbert Marshall and Robert Pursglove, and appears never to have visited the archdiocese.¹ From the records, one can gather that Wotton's predecessor, Richard Layton, also a diplomat, was no better; thus, visitations were frequently critical of the state of the chapter: neglect of services, disrepair of the Minster and the prebendaries' preoccupation with hunting and hawking and "haunting alehouses."² Similar accusations by Matthew Parker shortly after Wotton's death are implied for the conduct in Canterbury, when this Archbishop wrote that not one tenth of the plate and ornaments was left which had been there at the time of Wotton's coming.³ Consequently, one is left believing that Wotton fell short of the sense of duty which should have been intended by his advice to the clergy; duty to the world's sovereign authority superseded spiritual stewardship. Of course, he was far from unique in this attitude.

As for Wotton's religious influence on others of his generation, it should be viewed from a dual perspective--political and ecclesiastical, represented by his participation in Council and Convocation; obscurity must again be emphasized as the dominant impression which emerges from the scant evidence. Earlier, it was shown that he had attended a Council meeting at which instructions were drafted for dealing with the "hearers and sayers of Mass," and information relating to his appointment to two Edwardian commissions on heresy has also already been noted; yet, one must simultaneously remember that he had attended a Marian Privy Council discussion on persistent heretics and has left no records of any objection to the policies pursued in this reign. His position as Dean of both archdioceses in England

¹Actbook of the Dean and Chapter of York, 1543-1558 (York Minster Archives), fos. 8-10 and 22.

²Ibid., fos. 36 and 46-47.

³Parker to Cecil, 12 August 1567, Dom. Cal., p. 297, no. 47.

would certainly have given him the right to be included in any important religious dialogue, but it is difficult to imagine his insistence upon such a right. It is unlikely that he took the lead in any such discussions, but one can be fairly certain that he would have willingly implemented the will of the majority.

There is still much work to be done on Convocation and its methods of proceeding in the sixteenth century, but if one can assume that the pattern established over the previous two centuries continued to be observed, it is possible to make two generalizations about Wotton's participation. He was present for the sessions of the latter half of the 1530's when doctrinal questions were under consideration and can be found among the majority opinion on these. Secondly, Wotton's name is listed among the signatures on several documents approved by Convocation at times when he was definitely not in England, for example, the 1540 sanction of the divorce of Henry VIII and Anne of Cleves and the 1547 approval of marriage for the clergy.¹ This leads to the conclusion that it was still possible, as it had been in pre-Reformation days, to send a representative to vote by proxy.² This would have become especially important for Wotton after 1541, for the Deans of Canterbury and York were leading members of the lower house and thus certain to be looked to for participation on critical ecclesiastical matters. As with religious decisions taken in Council, it can again be emphasized that the majority consensus would have found a servant in Nicholas Wotton. Collective commitment rather than individual witness held greater merit in Wotton's view of contemporary church affairs. Undoubtedly not without convictions of his own, (for a completely indifferent figure does not describe

¹The Divorce of Henry VIII and Anne of Cleves, July of 1540, St.P., VIII, pp. 629-634; Strype, Ecclesiastical Memorials, I, p. 134.

²D. B. Weske, Convocation of the Clergy (London: S.P.C.K., 1937), p. 130.

the character which has evolved from this study), Wotton found no paradox in divorcing his private and public religious practices. It may be as simple as a question of a man in advance of his own time, and like many in the ecumenical movement of the twentieth century, he may personally have interpreted Christianity according to the tenets which unite, not the dogma which divides. It would, of course, have been unorthodox for him to express this in any public stance; hence, the ease with which he upheld Edwardian Protestantism and the conscientiousness with which he kept papal officials in France informed of Mary's progress toward reunion with Rome.

Neither a Thomas More nor a Nicholas Ridley, Nicholas Wotton charted his ecclesiastical path so warily that it is impossible to ascertain categorically his private religious sentiment. The tradition down the centuries has been to associate him more with the religious conservative rather than the staunchly reformist element of his generation, and this judgment is confirmed by the evidence reviewed in the preparation of this study. However, it should be emphasized that it is a conservatism defined in relation to the more radical Protestant thought of the day, for the indication of his approval of a married clergy and the anxiety shown in a letter to Petre in Mary's reign that he feared changes in the Reformation statutes of the Cathedral do not argue for strong orthodox conviction. Conversely, it must be remembered that he had attempted to distance himself from Northumberland's religious policies and that he had absented himself from Elizabeth's 1563 Convocation.

Amazingly enough, diplomacy, the real interest of his life, rarely brought him into direct religious confrontation. His government's correlation of religion and politics did influence the development of Wotton's career, for example, his first appointment to Cleves and his 1551 mission to Charles V, but only twice did theological considerations figure prominently in his diplomatic instructions. These occasions were his 1551

embassy to the Emperor and the 1560 Franco-Scottish negotiations. If one is to assess his performance in these instances, and the 1551 embassy is the better example, the general feeling is that Wotton exhibited much of the growing spirit of national pride which had been developing in England and throughout Europe over the century. Charles V might express this through his physical restraints on the papacy, while France had its Turkish alliance to symbolize its independence and power. Perhaps this left England with only spiritual defiance to exert its independence from the institution which had integrated Medieval Europe. In concluding this assessment of Wotton and the church, then, one would have to say that this represents the least successful area of his public career. It had been used as the steppingstone to diplomacy and had benefited him socially and economically later, but he had had no intention of bridging politics and theology as was so often attempted in a very personal way by many of his contemporaries, and his neglect of spiritual leadership can only add further liability to this account. Lloyd has come reasonably close to accuracy when he described the Dean as a "Protestant statesman and a Popish Christian."¹

For efficiency and logic, the advice to statesmen and councillors shall be considered together, separating diplomacy from statecraft for that purpose. "To travail in history," as Wotton admonished his fellow statesmen to do, indicated his own emphasis on a consciousness of the past. Note has already been taken of his interest in ancient English history and of genealogy on various levels, but it would appear that the root of such interests lay deeper than the antiquarian's fascination; for Wotton, such knowledge held positive value for understanding the present realities with which he and his colleagues were confronted. Just one example is the dispute over Boulogne in the late 1540's when Wotton, having some knowledge of the genealogies of

¹Lloyd, State Worthies, p. 110.

several prominent families with claims there, was reminded of the de Medici claim. Here was a further piece in the puzzle of the French Queen's animosity toward England. This keen interest in the past and awareness of it was just one factor which contributed to his success in diplomacy, for knowledge of the underlying influences on a given problem must have facilitated the grasp of it by those seeking available solutions. Like his father, Nicholas Wotton had no difficulty in maintaining an interest in the affairs past and present of his country, and it is no wonder that he encouraged his colleagues in this same direction.

To seek always to be the last to speak at a Council meeting is advice which one can well imagine Dr. Wotton implementing in his own attendance. The exact procedures within these sessions is not known, but this advice would imply no established order for speaking. He could thus argue that it was better to speak last in order to have mastered the line of approach being adopted in any particular consideration. This is definitely in keeping with his cautious character, and it was the ideal method for ensuring one's membership in the camp of the majority. The only known exception to this rule in his career was his reservations toward Cecil's Scottish interventionist policies, yet, even in this, he was not alone; a number of prominent councillors expressed a similar opinion. Only Arundel had stood in open opposition, and although Wotton's advice on the subject indicates strong reservations, it is not likely that he would have followed Arundel into such obvious isolation on an important issue. Again, one of Lloyd's statements on Wotton's attitude toward Calais in the preparation of the Treaty of Cateau Cambresis will help to explain further his view against staking all on one cause; according to Lloyd, Wotton believed that no nation had constant interests.¹ Except for his year as secretary, Wotton can

¹Ibid., p. 109.

never be designated as an active councillor, and he was certainly not part of the inner circle on which the real functions of the Privy Council devolved.

In assessing Wotton's diplomatic performance, we not only have his own advice on which to judge him but also the criteria set forth in a contemporary treatise on the subject by a diplomat of some experience, Etienne Dolet. Diplomacy had developed from necessity, not high principles, and in the sixteenth century, there was still no consensus on the definitions of the various classifications of diplomats. Not everyone was agreed on the conduct to ascribe to this position either; for some, virtue held the key to success, but for others, like the more practical Dolet, "to stick at virtue" was a luxury which the ambassador could not afford. He must have one good spy, and bribery must not be an obstacle.¹ Dolet further described the qualifications and duties of an ambassador. The ideal age was middle age, for the young were inexperienced and audacious, and the elderly were feeble and uncertain in memory. One's place in the social hierarchy should not affect the consideration of him for such diplomatic employment, for worth and ability were the true marks of nobility, and Dolet welcomed the new tendency toward selecting secular, as well as ecclesiastical, candidates. Finally, the ambassador should be physically able in every respect, have a gift of speech which was ready, eloquent and capable of being adjusted to the occasion, and he should avoid all vices.² With such requirements, Wotton's character is certainly in conformity, and it is logical to assume that he would have echoed Dolet's sentiment on every point of these.

The duties of an ambassador began before his departure from the home court. He must be given clear and frank instructions from his prince and

¹B. Behrens, English Historical Review 1936 "Treatises Written on the Ambassador in the Fifteenth and Early Sixteenth Centuries," pp. 616-620.

²Etienne Dolet, American Journal of International Law 1933 "On the Functions of an Ambassador," pp. 82-84.

must also have a good understanding of the purpose of the mission. While this was extremely practical advice for the special-purpose embassies which had characterized the majority of diplomatic assignments, it was less feasible for the resident embassies which increasingly became the dominant feature of sixteenth-century diplomacy. Such missions were regularly beset with difficulties produced by the ambiguity of the written word on which solely the ambassador might have to rely.¹ Once at the foreign court, the ambassador was advised by Dolet to put his own house and servants in order. This is precisely what Wotton had in mind by his designation of a noble and sober train. Each member of the retinue had to recognize some responsibility for representing his sovereign's abroad. Similarly, like Wotton, Dolet recognized the ambassador's need for a good purse in order to dispense "liberality and generosity" which were the means through which he could hope to retain a spy and to gain information about the court. Virtually every ambassador of the period complained of insufficient funds, and Wotton's salary at the high point in his career, the second French embassy and the negotiations at Le Cateau, was no more than four pounds a day.² Such limited financial resources were certain to impede such functions as surveillance, intelligence-gathering and even courier charges.

Another duty of the ambassador was to steer a steady and careful course within what Wotton called a happy medley between debonairness and complacency on the one hand and gravity and reserve on the other. Dolet had expressed this in a slightly different manner by designating the ambassador's three assistants who should engineer this manoeuvre with him--an uncommunicative secretary, at least one congenial and extrovert servant and a close court contact outside his own entourage to keep him informed

¹Ibid., pp. 85 and 88.

²Ibid., p. 87; Exchequer Accounts, E. 405/124, f. 29.

of all developments.¹ This is the area about which least is known of Wotton's performance, but as has already been mentioned in the chapter on the second French mission, his mastery of the machinery for espionage was at times insufficient. From references throughout his letters, his servants would appear to have well served their function as liaison with the popular opinion, while his secretary, John Somers, remained the confidential agent through whom the most sensitive messages could be transmitted.

Of course, the ultimate purpose of the ambassador was to represent his prince's dignity and interests at the foreign court. Dolet cautioned the diplomat not to commit himself beyond discussions until his sovereign could be consulted, but if time was lacking and an urgent conclusion was in the interest of his prince, then he should act in order not to lose the advantage.² How comforting this would have been to Wotton during the van Sickingen incident is difficult to say, but it does illustrate the practicality with which one had to temper such advice in this period.

Wotton's advice to ambassadors to maintain constant correspondence and observation reveals something of his own thoughts on the functions of an ambassador, specifically a resident ambassador. In the early part of his career, he had been admonished for negligence in this sphere and thus had learned through personal experience the value of this aspect of his work for the absent prince. Of course, this is not to imply that Wotton placed his primary emphasis on this purpose, for he would have recognized as his chief function the overseeing of his sovereign's interests. Such interests however would have been ill served by one disregarding the necessity of constant correspondence and observation.

Also in conformity with the diplomatic thinking of his time was Wotton's

¹Dolet, p. 86.

²Ibid., p. 88.

concept of civility as a necessary attribute for diplomats. In addition to representing suitable behaviour for this sensitive office, it was also of positive advantage to his government. Judging by the furore created in 1551 over Morison's conduct toward the Emperor and Wotton's subsequent despatch to calm the tense atmosphere, it can be concluded that he had by that time already demonstrated his capability in this area. It has already been seen that his diplomatic approach had earned the approval of Charles V, whose son Philip also appears to have shared his father's judgment of Wotton. His cautious judgment made him acutely aware of the boundaries in any given situation. However, the price of civility need not be strength. Immediately, Wotton's own resolution comes to mind, "I made often as if I would fight when they knew that my calling only allowed me to speak." During his second French embassy, particularly his clashes with Constable de Montmorency, one can best observe this resolution in action, but facts bear out the priority of the second clause of this declaration. He may have expressed the forcefulness which he was feeling at a given moment, but he never allowed it to overrule the traits of caution and realism on which he knew his career must depend.

This assessment of Wotton's diplomacy might well be concluded by reiterating Lloyd's observation on Wotton's attitude toward the necessity of relinquishing Calais in 1559 rather than pressing for it as an ancient English interest; no nation in the international theatre could afford the high price exacted from the insistence upon constant interests. It is probably correct to say that Wotton was coming to accept this by that date, but it had not always been within his concepts of diplomacy. One has only to remember his opinion against Northumberland's pro-French policy at the expense of the Anglo-Imperial alliance and his many warnings to his various governments to remember the commercial link between England and the Low Countries. By 1559 however, certain accepted entities with which Wotton

had learned to work were undergoing change, notably, relations between Scotland and France and the alterations within the Habsburg dominions--a strengthened Spain and the Low Countries in which religious dissent would shortly produce major changes.

Insights into Wotton's personality are scattered throughout the correspondence of the period, and it is from these that a conjectured description might be drawn. In the actual style of his correspondence, one can see two patterns emerging: a formal, basically concise report to his sovereign and a more informal, witty approach with his friends at court. By comparison with the reports of the Spanish and Venetian ambassadors of the time, one notices the absence of minor detail on European affairs in Wotton's letters, a fact which Henry VIII did not fail to note, and there is some improvement of this deficiency by Mary's reign. While such trivialities were not essential knowledge, our sixteenth-century ancestors were not unlike us in their curiosity about the personal lives of their colleagues and rulers, and the ambassador fulfilled something of the role of the twentieth-century gossip columnists.

It was often the case that on a day which found Wotton filing a report to his sovereign, he also despatched a letter to his major link with the court in England; Paget had served in this capacity for most of the 1540's and was replaced by Petre in the 1550's. To a lesser extent, Cecil assumed this position in Elizabeth's reign. It is from these letters that one glimpses a man interested in folklore, a sense of sarcastic humour, scant references of personal relevance and the occasional candid assessment of a situation. Self-deprecating wit comes across in his 1554 letter to Petre about the genealogical chart, and a ready humour emerges from his unfortunate wanderings in the vicinity of Dunkirk on his way to the 1565 negotiations. Also from this last piece of correspondence, one learns that Wotton considered himself a fit hiker, and the implication is that he enjoyed it.

As for his interest in folklore, the best example is in a 1544 letter to Paget in which was mentioned the ancient wives' tale that if it rained on the third day of July, it would rain for the next forty days; "foolish but often true" was Wotton's conclusion.¹

The candid diplomatic assessments are few and far between, a regrettable but not surprising aspect of this cautious character. In his 1551 comment to Cecil that Calais would always remain a barrier to sincere Anglo-French amity, Wotton described the French as "our trusty and well-beloved, I dare not say right well-beloved friends," and he expressed the opinion that they would miss no opportunity to quarrel with England.² In 1566, he turned his critical judgment on Philip of Spain of whom he wrote that he had little expectation that this monarch would take any speedy action to expedite the settlement of trade difficulties between England and the Low Countries.³ From such personal details, one is left with the impression that while Wotton was not the ideal companion for all, neither was he uncongenial.

One should also look at his contemporaries' judgment of him. There are two levels from which one can observe such opinion, and the conclusions derived can be inferred from material already cited. The view of Wotton by contemporary princes is perhaps the more interesting but also the more speculative of these two levels. With hindsight, one can feel reasonably certain of the sincerity with which Henry VIII wrote to Charles V in late 1543 of Wotton's ability and good service, and it only remains to reiterate an opinion expressed earlier that the Emperor found confirmation of this in Wotton's embassies at his court and reacted accordingly with respect and cordiality. Toward Henry II, the French King with whom Wotton had most

¹Wotton to Paget, 31 July 1544, L.&P., XIX, i, pp. 610-611, no. 1027.

²Haynes, Wotton to Cecil, January of 1551, pp. 112-113.

³Wotton to Cecil, 24 June 1566, S.P. 70/84, f. 340.

contact, there remains an impression of strained formality. This is probably attributable more to the circumstances in which the two kingdoms found themselves rather than to any clash of personality, although the French King's character contributed little to easing any tension. It is unfortunate that there is no record of either Mary's or Elizabeth's opinion of this diplomatic servant, but judging again by his employment in these reigns, it is known that he won their royal approval. In him, his Tudor masters recognized something of the same cautious streak which had guided many of their own moves. What does clearly emerge is that Wotton, though hesitant to involve himself in the forefront of English domestic developments, was a staunch advocate of English policies abroad.

The other contemporary perspective from which Wotton can be viewed is that of his peers. It appears that, almost unanimously, his English colleagues held him in high esteem. Morison had described him as the more capable member of their delegation to Charles V in 1551, and Paget had expressed complete confidence in Wotton's ability to represent England's interests single-handed in the 1559 peace negotiations. Cecil commented upon his wisdom, and Smith and Throckmorton considered him the ablest assistant they could have in their sensitive negotiations with France in 1563-1564. The notable exception to this domestic chorus of praise was Stephen Gardiner, but little is known of the long-term sentiment between the Bishop and the Dean. A letter from Paget to Petre in 1544 stated that Gardiner was attempting to discredit Wotton with the Emperor by withholding certain intelligence from England.¹ Beyond this, nothing is known, but it is not difficult to imagine the potential for tension between these two men with such vastly different approaches, especially in religion. Not unexpectedly, foreign opinion was less complimentary in its assessment of Dr. Wotton.

¹J. A. Muller, Stephen Gardiner and the Tudor Reaction, p. 302.

Renard found him "testy and intriguing," and although Wotton and Montmorency had established a tolerable working relationship, there was a constant undercurrent of hostility which occasionally manifested itself in such outward signs as the 1554 charge by the Constable that the ambassador had conducted himself inappropriately. One favourable foreign opinion was expressed by a colleague, Navagero of Venice when he sought Wotton in order to learn the truth of plans for the 1544 summer Anglo-Imperial campaign, "Je suis allé trouver l'ambassadeur Anglais homme des plus aimables et des plus lettres, qui est fort mon ami, pour tâcher de savoir de lui la vérité."¹ From such glimpses, one can imagine a mixed reception to announcements of Wotton's assignments.

Why did Wotton elect to persist in this diplomatic career? It was definitely not profitable financially for him, and there were many occupational hazards--isolation at the foreign court, difficult travel conditions, the ever-present danger of misconstruing instructions from home. The answer is not immediately evident. Many ambassadors, Wotton included, frequently lamented an assignment once ensconced in it, but in addition to being an available career for a younger son, Wotton, according to the general impression created, seems genuinely to have enjoyed this occupation. He certainly found it infinitely more appealing to him than the ecclesiastical options available, especially in such uncertain fortunes as the sixteenth century offered to the clergy. Besides this, the Continental travel and education which had been given to him in his youth must have stimulated in Wotton, as it had done in so many of his Humanist contemporaries, a desire for a career and way of life which would continue to permit him to avail himself of new sources of scholarship. While this aspiration does not appear to have found complete fulfilment in his career, there was time to compile

¹J. F. Lembey and A. Rozet, L'Invasion de France et le Siège de St. Dizier en 1544 (Paris: 1910), p. 429.

genealogies and chronicles, and there is the occasional offer to purchase books for English friends, a reflection of this continued interest in scholarship.¹ His limitations on such pursuits is a statement more on his sense of priority than on his ability, for in his youth, his erudition had brought him to the notice of some of the most prominent scholars of the age. Diplomacy was a demanding taskmaster, and Wotton chose to place his emphasis here.

The three most appropriate descriptions for Wotton the diplomat are able, diligent and dedicated. His measure of success is less easily condensed, for it seems only proper that one should attempt to measure this success according to the judgments of his own time, not those of the present century, but the barrier of distance is not easily overcome. European political realities of the sixteenth century were so inconstant that what might appear as success and advantage in one year could by the next year constitute a liability or failure. One has only to look back to the Cleves alliance of 1539, Northumberland's overtures to France in 1551 or the Treaty of Edinburgh in 1560 to find adequate examples. Against such a background and with the knowledge that Wotton was called on until his death to represent England's diplomatic interests, one must conclude that his contemporaries awarded him the accolade of success. If there must be a judgment of history and if it is true that history is a stern judge, then Wotton must count himself fortunate in this adjudication. Not remembered as an outstanding Tudor figure, he is remembered favourably by the majority of his colleagues and by historians who were near contemporaries. Nicholas Wotton, Dean and diplomat, scholar and statesman, should be remembered not for his uniqueness but rather for the skill with which he employed traditional tools to chart a successful course along a historical path, the sixteenth century,

¹F. G. Emmison, Tudor Secretary: Sir William Petre at Court and at Home (London: Longmans, 1961), pp. 220-221.

which had called into question the traditional basis of such vital institutions as religion, education and diplomacy itself. He, along with such others as Petre and Paulet, belonged to a band of royal servants whose skill and adaptability made them essential to the different regimes of their century.

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Appendix I

Wotton's Diets

One of the complaints frequently voiced by sixteenth-century diplomats was that of inadequate funds. Nicholas Wotton was no exception, and although his secretary and couriers received independent payment from the national treasury, another expense, generous hospitality to foreign hosts in order to present one's own government favourably, must have constituted a major financial demand. Not unexpectedly, one finds difficulty in determining the procedure followed for the payment of spies, but it is reasonable to conclude that this necessity was covered by special appropriations recorded under general categories. There is, for example, in 1547 an instance when Dr. Wotton received one hundred pounds for "expenses and diligent service."¹

Wotton generally received payment for his services quarterly, and his diets were frequently appropriated in advance of the quarter. As a novice in Cleves, he was allotted twenty shillings a day, while his colleagues at the Imperial and French courts received forty and fifty shillings respectively.² As Henry's ambassador with Charles V, Wotton's salary was increased to forty shillings,³ and at the French court in Mary's reign, he received sixty-six shillings a day.⁴ In his final years of service, Wotton could expect to receive approximately four pounds a day.⁵

¹E. 315/256, f. 83r.

²Grants, L.&P., XIV, ii, no. 718, p. 306.

³Grants, L.&P., XX, i, no. 557, p. 267.

⁴E. 405/121, f. 109v.

⁵E. 405/124, f. 29v.

A search of the relevant financial documents provides the student not only with information on Wotton's salary and expenditures, but it also permits construction of at least a partial list of the men who served him in his work, as well as of those who served the English government as professional couriers. In the latter category, Francis Pitcher and William Geffrey are most frequently mentioned, and it is not unusual to find instances in which one or the other was entrusted with classified business. Near the end of June in 1549, Geffrey was charged with the delivery of nine pounds and ten shillings to Wotton to repay the latter for expenses incurred in "certain secret affairs."¹ In a list of Wotton's own servants, one would have to include John Somer, Henry King, John Cooke, John Garsia and Thomas Cicill; most of these men remain in obscurity, although Somer has already been mentioned as Wotton's secretary, and Henry King appears to have been one of his most trusted and frequently employed servants. He was, for example, "despatched into the parts beyond the seas for certain of the King's Majesty's affairs of great importance" during April of 1549,² a time when Anglo-French relations stood at the breaking point. This whole subject of diets for ambassadors and their staffs represented one of the chief occupational hazards, for it not only affected the physical comfort of those involved but might also manifest itself in the actual accomplishment of the functions of the office.

¹E. 315/258, f. 78v.

²Ibid., f. 76v.

Appendix II
Canterbury Letters I
Letter 31

To my Loving Brethren the Vice-Dean and Chapter of Christchurch in
Canterbury:

After hearty recommendations. If you can let out our tenements in
Canterbury, so as we shall be discharged of reparations, receiving no less
rent, than we have had hitherto, with such clauses of re-entry and other,
as shall be thought convenient: I am content you so let them. Marry, you
must ever take heed, that you let them to such as are able, and will pay
well, or else to have sufficient bonds for their payment. Mr. Gaynsford
who occupyeth the farm of the parsonage of Easttrye under Mr. Auger, re-
quireth to have the copy of the composition betwixt us and the vicar, reck-
oning that the vicar doth him wrong divers ways. If you think it meet to
deliver it him, and that it be in my study amongst the other writings, my
steward shall open my study for you, and seek it out, praying you to depute
three of the chapter at the least to be present at the taking out and lay-
ing in of that, that you intend to occupy. And thus fare ye heartily well.

From London. the xj of December 1551.

Your Lover and Friend.

N. Wotton

Letter 32

To my Loving Brethren the Vice-Dean and Chapter of Christchurch in
Canterbury:

After hearty recommendations. I am glad you have offered Mr. Auchar to put your matter in compromise, which if he refuse or forslow to do: the world shall well perceive that we neither refuse the law, nor none (other) indifferent way, nor intend to use no extremity, but seek to have controversies friendly and charitably compounded and ended.

Mr. Christopher Roper writeth to me that he is our farmer of the parsonage of Preston, and requireth to have a new lease in it. And forbecause I remember not how that matter standeth: I pray you to certify me of it somewhat largely, so as I may make him some reasonable answer thereupon. And thus I wish you heartily well to fare.

Written at Melun. the v of May 1555.

Your Lover and Friend.

N. Wotton

Letter 33

To my Loving Brethren the Vice-Dean and Chapter of Christchurch in
Canterbury:

After hearty recommendations. I have received yours of the 27th of the last. And having talked with Sir Richard Hill I am content he be presented to the vicarage of Asheburnham and that his presentation be sealed by you. And whereas my cousin William Darell writeth unto me, that the vicarage of Warnham in Sussex is likewise of longtime vacant, and at our collation, and that one Sir David Spenser is content now to accept it: if you agree to the same, I shall likewise be content he be presented to it, and that his presentation likewise be sealed. So that none other thing be sealed by you but these two presentations only. The said Sir Richard maketh himself so poor, that I ween you might do an alms deed, to give him the sealing of his presentation wherein nevertheless you shall do as you shall think good. And thus I wish you heartily well to fare.

Written at Richmond. the third of August 1557.

Your Lover and Friend.

N. Wotton

Letter 34

To my Loving Brethren the Vice-Dean and Chapter of Christchurch in
Canterbury:

After hearty recommendations. Whereas of late I named three scholars to be received into our school: of the which John Horden was one, I perceive now that there were not three rooms void, forbecause one of the three before named was admitted. Wherein appeareth a fault in the schoolmaster, for Mr. Vice-Dean by the schoolmaster's information certified me that they were all three receipted which now appeareth not to be so. And yet in case the said Horden be found sufficient upon examination, I would he should be put in Colemane's room: which either he shall not hereafter occupy, or else if he should have occasion to occupy it, I will provide another room for him. And thus I wish you heartily well to fare.

From London. the xij of February 1563.

Your Lover and Friend.

N. Wotton

Letter 35

To my Loving Brethren the Vice-Dean and Chapter of Christchurch in
Canterbury:

After hearty recommendations. This bearer Norris hath been here to receive orders. And forbecause my Lord's Grace neither giveth none himself, nor no man is here that is ready to do it for him, he is fain to return home as he came, having spent his money and done no good. True it is that I understand, that tomorrow come seven night, one shall receive orders by my Lord of Canterbury's appointment. But this man is not able to bear the charges of tarrying here so long, no nor of his return homeward. I have sent of my men with him from place to place to see what could be done in it but before the day above named, nothing can be done. Whereof I thought meet to certify you. And thus I wish you heartily well to fare.

From London. the 27th of February Anno 1563.

Your Lover and Friend.

N. Wotton

Letter 36

To our Loving Friends the Senior Prebendary and Other the Chapter of
Christchurch in Canterbury:

After hearty recommendations. Whereas Sir John Armerer late parson of
St. Dennis of that church in London is departed to God: and thereby the
presentation of that benefice now vacant pertaineth unto us: we think it
shall be very well bestowed upon Mr. Beacon our Vice-Dean. And therefore
if you agree to the same, we are contented he be presented unto it, and
that the presentation be made and sealed accordingly. And thus we wish you
heartily well to fare.

From London. the 19th of March 1563.

Your Lovers and Friends.

N. Wotton, Hugh Turnbull and Alexander Noll

Letter 37

To my Loving Brethren the Vice-Dean and Chapter of Christchurch in
Canterbury:

After hearty recommendations. By this letter herein enclosed you shall well perceive what Mr. Secretary requireth of us. I do not well remember in what case that farm standeth: but for as much as besides this letter, Mr. Secretary hath been an earnest suitor to me for it himself, therefore if it may be granted him, I would wish his requests were satisfied. And so I pray you to do, if conveniently it may be done. I shall not need to put you in remembrance how much we are all bound to Mr. Secretary and therefore how glad we ought to be to embrace any occasion offered us, to show ourselves thankful and grateful unto him, and specially in this matter, which he so earnestly desireth to take effect, as by his letter may appear. Wherefore, I pray you to consider it accordingly. And thus heartily fare ye well.

From London. the 23rd of November 1562.

Your Lover and Friend.

N. Wotton

Letter 38

To my Loving Brethren the Vice-Dean and Chapter of Christchurch in
Canterbury:

After hearty recommendations. I have received your letters bearing date the 26th of November, wherein I do perceive you have granted your good-wills that the presentation of the vicarage of Ticehurst be confirmed to John Wharton: and that also you are content my Lord of Canterbury four grants as the auditor's office to his brother-in-law, the beadlewick of Croydon to Mr. Higham, another of Ford Park to Nicholas Runcowne, and the parsonage of Beauxfiled to one Robert Prickett, be confirmed likewise under chapter seal.

For as much as the said John Wharton appeareth unto you to be such a meet man and so commended unto you, I am content he have the said presentation confirmed him under chapter seal, as also that my Lord of Canterbury's four grants be likewise confirmed. And thus most heartily fare you well.

From London. 1 December 1562.

Your Lover and Friend.

N. Wotton

Letter 39

To my Loving Brethren the Vice-Dean and Chapter of Christchurch in
Canterbury:

After hearty recommendations. Some of the petty canons have complained unto me, that the number of them being commoners is so small, that the charges thereof is too great unto them. Wherefore I pray you to consider their complaint, and see whether you can devise some way to help it. I thought, that the order taken by us, at my last being there, would have well helpen the matter: if that order be not observed, then were it well done to cause it to be observed: if it be observed, and yet all that will not serve: then must some other help be devised for it: which I pray you to consider, and to certify me of your devices in it. And thus most heartily fare you well.

From London. the 18th of December 1562.

Your Lover and Friend.

N. Wotton

Letter 40

To my Loving Brethren the Vice-Dean and Chapter of Christchurch in
Canterbury:

After hearty recommendations. Whereas the chapter granted of late to
Stephen Thornhurst, the renewing of his lease of Wincheap Medes: I do con-
sent and allow the same and am content it be sealed at your next sealing
accordingly. Where he hath promised the chapter twenty pounds for a fine,
he requireth your favour that he may pay it at the Annunciation of Our Lady
next coming wherein if we may conveniently, I would wish we did gratify him.

If the parsonage of St. Leonard in Eastcheap be in our gift: I under-
stand it is void. And thus fare you heartily well.

From London. the 26th of December 1562.

Your Lover and Friend.

N. Wotton

Letter 41

To my Loving Brethren the Vice-Dean and Chapter of Christchurch in
Canterbury:

After hearty recommendations. As I was riding through Newington:
this letter herein enclosed was delivered me by one of Newington. I know
no cause why our farmer should detain any part of the goods therein men-
tioned seeing it is evident that it was no wreck and therefore it were well
bestowed upon him, if he were imprisoned and punished for it as the judge
of the Admiralty threateneth to do if he has sufficient authority to do it.
You shall therefore do well to consider the matter together, and finding it
reasonable (as I suppose you will) that all be restored to the owners you
shall do well to give such commandment to our farmer to do it as it be
obeyed or else he is like to ... of it whereby we are like to have some
trouble too. And thus I wish you all, heartily well to fare.

From Gravesend. this 5 July 1563. four hours before the eclipse.

Your Loving Friend.

N. Wotton

Letter 42

To my Loving Brethren the Vice-Dean and Chapter of Christchurch in
Canterbury:

After hearty recommendations. Perceiving by a letter received from
Mr. Hyde that my Lord's Grace intendeth to visit us very shortly: lest it
should not be my chance to be there at that time, I have given order, that
the keys as well of the common chest, as other requisite for that purpose,
shall be delivered to Mr. Butler, if perchance you shall have any need of
them which I trust you shall not for that in my Lord's first visitation,
all manner writings and muniments necessary for the visitation, were seen.
And thus most heartily fare you well.

From London. the 12th day of July 1563.

Your Lover and Friend.

N. Wotton

Letter 43

To my Loving Brethren the Vice-Dean and Chapter of Christchurch in
Canterbury:

After hearty recommendations. By this letter herein enclosed directed to you ... you shall well perceive what thing Mr. Secretary very earnestly requireth of us the like by another letter Mr. Sackville hath required of me. And seeing that this lease is in all points as beneficial for the bishop's successor, as it hath been heretofore, there is the less cause why you should stick to pass it as is required specially as such mean request of whom we have and may receive daily so many pleasures and the rather I think we ought to grant it, lest Mr. Secretary (who doth not used to trouble us neither with so many, nor with such requests, as some other of ... heretofore have done) take occasion to conceive ... can obtain no request at our hands, though they are of no very great importance. For my part I am well contented it be confirmed, you consenting to the same and also require you to show yourselves conformable to these great men's requests.

I do not forget our matter with Mr. ... and search hath been made and yet nothing found: but yet further search shall be made. And thus most heartily fare you well.

From London. the 14th of July 1563.

Your Lover and Friend.

N. Wotton

Letter 44

To my Loving Brethren the Vice-Dean and Chapter of Christchurch in
Canterbury:

After hearty recommendations. This letter herein enclosed directed unto us, I received from my Lord Treasurer by Master Cartwrecke by the contents whereof, you shall well perceive, what his request is. The said Mr. Cartwrecke said he would be at Canterbury for that matter, when I shall be there. And as for me, I must be at Dover (God willing) the last of this month. So that I will, if I may, be at Canterbury five or six days before.

Unless the books and writings be all sort out, and laid together in some armoury beneath in the treasury house, you shall have much ado, to keep him from going up and searching with you, for the said books and writings. Which I think not very convenient he should do. I would wish therefore that Mr. Butler, who hath taken pains, and knoweth best where to find out all kind of writings, with one or two more, were appointed straightforward to make out the said search, and to gather all the writings that shall serve for the purpose required, together: to be ready as aforesaid. And I have written to Brimstane to deliver the key of the place where our writings are, either to Mr. Butler, or such as you shall appoint to make the said search. And thus most heartily fare you well.

From London. the 13th day of February 1565.

Your Lover and Friend.

N. Wotton

Letter 45

To my Loving Brethren the Vice-Dean and Chapter of Christchurch in
Canterbury:

After hearty recommendations. You shall receive a letter written to me from Mr. Richard Baker, and look what answer you shall agree upon together, I am content to agree unto it and of your minds herein I pray you to certify him with convenient speed.

Also Mr. Philip Shout, requireth the very self, for his matter betwixt him and us for that he hath bought both the lease and the lands, for the which my cousin Thomas Iseley's widow not long ago, complained that we did withhold part of her right from her. And forbecause Mr. Shout tarryeth here purposely for this matter, I pray you to send me your answer as soon as conveniently may be. I have communicated this matter to Mr. Hyde and by him to Mr. Lovelace, and I suppose that they have written their advice to some of you herein, and for your better information. And thus most heartily fare you well.

From London. the 7th of May 1565.

Your Lover and Friend.

N. Wotton

Letter 46

To my Loving Brethren Mr. Vice-Dean and in his absence the Senior Prebendary and the Chapter of Christchurch in Canterbury:

After hearty recommendations. This day came to me Mr. Incent, my Lord of Canterbury's register, and showed me that where there is a caveat put in by us for the vicarage of ... whereunto Mr. Mordant maketh claim to have right to, there is now a clerk come to him with a presentation of the said Mr. Mordant, and that therefore he came to certify me thereof and indeed it were the two scholars or ministers who were of late at Canterbury for that matter. I required Mr. Incent to stay a while til you might be certified of it for that we pretended the presentation to be ours by the King's gift and that Mr. Lovelace would be here at the beginning of the term, who being instructed in that matter, would either show cause why Mordant's presentation should not be received: or if otherwise no cause why we should stay it, then the presentation might be received. And so Mr. Incent promised to do. Afterward I talked with him that was presented, and the other that was with him at Canterbury, and they said that the vicarage was of such small value, that Mr. Mordant cared little who had it, so it were an honest man and that he thought that if this man did not receive it, none other would easily be gotten to take it. And that therefore it had been void more than a year. If that be true, quod Mr. Incent, then is it fallen in lapse. Yea marry, quod he that was presented, and therefore the Bishop of London ought to give it. Nay, quod Mr. Incent, if it hath been void more than a year, then my Lord of Canterbury might give it. Marry indeed, quod I, if it be devolved by lapse, and that it be conferred to any meet man jure de voluto, our chapter shall have no cause to complain thereof: but if this presentation of Mr. Mordant's should be admitted, then we should have cause to complain. So that if Mr. Incent keep promise, this presentation of Mr. Mordant's shall not be received, til his right and ours be considered. Marry, if there be found any

devolution: then peradventure, it will be given by that means. Wherefore you shall do well to show Mr. Lovelace, what you think meet to be done at his coming up hither to the term, in that matter for seeing there is one content to have it, it were ill done that for our contentation it should remain still vacant. And thus I wish you most heartily well to fare.

From London. the 24th day of September 1564.

Your Lover and Friend.

N. Wotton

Letter 47

To my Loving Brethren the Vice-Dean and Chapter of Christchurch in
Canterbury:

After hearty recommendations. Understanding by your letter, of certain things done by you at the last general chapter, I have appointed that my key of the common chest shall be delivered you, for to seal these writings following: that is to say the confirmation of a reversion of the parsonage of Brabourne to Mr. George Fogg and of the patent granted by my Lord's Grace, to George Denham of the keeping of Lambeth and of the patent granted by my said Lord to Robert Harleston and John Martin of the beadlewick of Chislet. And also the presentation of our vicarage of Preston to Gervais Linche. And the beadlewick of Godmersham to Richard Bollinge, in such sort as is now used to our other beadies. And thus I wish you most heartily well to fare.

From Bruges. the 22nd of June 1565.

Your Lover and Friend.

N. Wotton

Letter 49

Anonymous to Nicholas Wotton

My duty promised, these shall be to signify unto you that my Lord's Grace hath received your letters of the vth of the present and touching the matter moved unto you by the officers of the Exchequer, His Grace having resolved and thinketh verily even as ye write that their molestation is unwise and that you ought not to pay any such sums of money as they demand. Nevertheless, His Grace thinketh good by my said Lord Chancellor and Lord of Ely's advices that ye do appoint an attorney to answer for you this sum in the Exchequer and His Grace will as opportunity shall serve speak to my Lord Treasurer and Sir John Baker and with them take such order both for you and other, that from henceforth ye shall no more be molested for such causes. This much His Grace hath willed me to write unto you in his behalf which we would have written anyway if we had not been otherwise busied in despatching of letters to Italy. Thus I betake you to Almighty God who ever preserve you to His honour and your heart's desire.

From the Court at Greenwich the xxj of April 1558.

Letter 50

To the Right Honourable Mr. Dr. Wotton one of the Queen's Majesty's most.
honourable Privy Councillors and Dean of Christchurch in Canterbury:

Right honourable, my duty of recommendations most humbly conveyed as
appertaineth unto you, it may like the same to be advertised I have re-
ceived Your Honour's letter and do perceive by the same that certain of the
chapter have (of small goodwill they have unto me) made complaint unto you
of my misdemeanour in the office of the stewardship of the liberties, which
plaint of them being but one party (I trust) Your Honour will not esteem to
be true until you have also heard the answer of me the other party in that
behalf, wherefore I would if I might be so bold as to require so much of
Your Honour that you will take so much pains with the chapter as to come
hither unto my poor house (where I would be very glad to see you) and at
your coming I will not only make mine account as appertaineth but also an-
swer before you unto all such things as the chapter will or can object
against me. My duty were rather to come and attend on Your Honour there
but the truth is I am not able. And as for surrendering the office or
any other thing that you shall think expedient to burden by me, Your Honour
at your coming shall find me conformable as unto reason shall ... appertain.
This I most humbly require at Your Honour's hands even in the way of char-
ity, for your coming I trust shall ease me of much of my pains wherewith I
am not a little disquieted as knoweth Almighty God who have you in His
merciful keeping.

Herein witnessed the xxijth of August 1560.

Yours to Command.

Thomas Moyle.

Christchurch Letters II .

Letter 151

To my Loving Brethren the Vice-Dean and Chapter of Christchurch in
Canterbury:

After hearty recommendations. Perceiving by your letter, that at the last general chapter, at my Lord of Canterbury's request you thought good, that an indentured tripartite betwixt my said Lord's Grace, and Bennett College of Cambridge, and the vicar of Rochdale, for a grammar school there to be erected, should be confirmed: for as much as you there understand the race better than I do: and that I trust you have well considered of it, seeing you like it so well I am content likewise, that it be so confirmed and for that purpose I have given order for my key for the sealing of it, to be delivered, when it shall be required. And thus I wish you most heartily well to fare.

From Bruges. the 9th of August 1565.

Your Lover and Friend.

N. Wotton

Christchurch Letters III

Letter 8

To my Loving Brethren the Vice-Dean and Chapter of Christchurch in
Canterbury:

After hearty recommendations. I am sorry I cannot be so soon with you again, as it was meant I should have been, when I departed from you but howsoever it chance: it cannot be long, but I shall see you, God willing.

I am sorry for the loss of our usher remembering what difficulty we had to get him, the like whereof we shall have now again as I think. Mr. Twine writeth unto me of one John Shawe, who as he sayeth is fit and willing to do it. I pray you to take the pains, to know whether he be so indeed or not and in case you find him meet for it, for his learning and honesty, I am very well contented he have it. If you think him otherwise, then I would to God you could espy out some other man meet for it, but I fear that it will be hard to find any such, unless his wages be somewhat mended. And thus I wish you heartily well to fare.

From Poissy. the xvj of June 1553.

Your Lover and Friend.

N. Wotton

Letter 9

To the Right Honourable Dr. Wotton Dean of Christchurch in Canterbury and the Chapter of the same:

After my hearty commendations, whereas I do understand that you Mr. cousin Wotton and diverse others of your chapter are right well affected (wherein I am glad) unto my loving friend Mr. Lovelace, being already your solicitor, to bestow upon him also the office of your liberties being now void, this may be to desire you and them of your house the rather for my sake to stand his good friend therein to have the same stewardship as Sir Thomas Moyle late had it (living) (with) his other office, whom I would gratify gladly with a greater pleasure than the accomplishment of this request and yet which I doubt not to obtain at your hands herein I shall be right glad to requite it as shall lie again in my small power. And what friendship I shall find at your hands herein for him my request is that I may have thereof from you again understanding; accordingly that he may know from me that he hath some part of benefit for my sake which I would were greater for him.

From the Court at Westminster this present xixth November.¹

Your Loving Friend and Kinsman.

Robert Dudley.

¹Conjectured date, 1560.

British Library*

26 February 1547

Harl. 283

Wotton to Lord Cobham

fo. 373

My duty to your lordship remembered, like as I see yet no great likelihood of any breach with these men: so would I wish that your sons and other that are here were at home (to be out of all doubt) for a while till it may evidently appear which way the wind will blow. Nevertheless if I perceive any such likelihood at my departure hence I will take your sons with me if I may be suffered so to do. And thus Jesus preserve you long in health and prosperity.

Written at Paris the xxvjth of February 1546.

Your lordship's to command,

Nicholas Wotton

*The reader will notice square brackets throughout this series of letters; these signify conjectured reconstructions of mutilated words and phrases.

10 April 1547

Calig. E IV

Council to Wotton

fos. 190-191 draft

... also the answer the King and Constable also that be fled from their fort hath sithens the arrival of your letters been also declared to us the Protector by the ambassador resident [here on] Saturday the xiiijth of this instant, who hath said that he had received letters from [his master in] the which he was eftsoons commanded to require the discharge of their fugitives. And after he had spoken [these] words to persuade the matter he said in the end [he had] received at this time also letters from the Constable and by the same was required not only to declare unto us the Protector the g[oodwill] the said Constable had to the continuance of the [amity] for the good furtherance whereof he said he would [be] always ready and glad to do the best he could, but also to desire us to continue our good inclination [to] the same effect, with many other fair words. Whereunto w[e] made answer that we were very glad to understand by him the good inclination of the Constable to this amity, for the continuance whereof, as we had many times heretofore declared unto him, we have always and so will be ready to do that we may. And touching this matter of their rebels, we told him that we would do all that the Treaty bindeth us to do, marry, we told.

..... favour any the same be apprehended and delive[red] [on the] behalf of the King's Majesty would be also herein as in all other things to do everything [requi]red by the treaties, so we looked also that [His] Majesty should be used in like sort at the notwithstanding we told him that we would the Council and upon Monday send him a resolute [ans]wer. And this day, after consideration of the matter, we have sent Mr. Mason unto him with this answer: that [our] men shall this week be sent to Boulogne to be not doubting but they will proceed in like manner [with] our rebels and cause them to be sent also to

their fort [so] as of both sides they may be delivered accordingly. And where we have received a letter from Mr. Bridges from Boulogne of such effect as may appear unto you by the copy of the said letters which you shall receive herewith, we caused Mr. Mason to signify the same to the ambassador and to require him to write for redubb of those things, and for that intent, so also send unto you the copy of the means we think you to speak of it somewhat

March-November 1547

Calig. E III

Paget to Wotton
to speak to the
Scottish ambassador
in France

fo. 62

(Dunkeld)¹ You must say to him upon the goodwill you have to the [you] marvel how it cometh to pass that things ha[ve come to] [t]hese extremities for the King that dead is bore special [regard to him] and to the Bishop and so did and doth my Lord Protector here as can do most and the rather for that we God's word and that hearing how they had abandoned the doubting that (which is chanced) God would therefore sore. And here must you take occasion to set [forth the damage] they have sustained at our hands what damage of aid and friendship hath done them and what little [reward they are] to have for it. Remember the Bishop of Dunkeld (who hath been in Fr[ance to talk] of it) that the French set not by them longer than serveth for th[e moment] it doth appear in all ways to every Scotsman that hath been [there and may] appear plainly in a great matter. For the French King that is [dead] of the late King our master made a new league with us leaving the Sco[ts aside] knowing that by virtue of the first Treaty of Peace we [took them, the Scots,] for not comprehended and did refuse to receive the Scots [leaving them] in certain and insure comprehension that the French made then they promise the governor a dukedom in France but what effect length he is like to find to his great detriment. And you may say that the French King can give no duchy in France [longer than one] of life so as his son may pipe for it, but you think verily is knowledge God and His truth he would set some good way between doubt not but if

¹James Hamilton, Bishop of Dunkeld, was despatched as a special envoy to France in early 1547.

the governor and the bishop would come to appointment [we would] be not so far past but they must be redubbed. The governor and [the bishop and] their blood have as great credit and authority with us as eve[r they had] and be as well provided for, and were set forth the conjunction of our one language, the similitude of our natures the likelihood trial agreement, the pride of the French, the servitude they [bind] them, their wives and children in forever, the experience already [they have had] thereof; eftsoons repeating to them the state of the realm at this p[resent] continuing in enmity with us cannot but daily wax worse thus and by all other good ways you can, use a dexterity to move [the governor] and the bishop to join with us. Declare the good nature of my Lord [Protector] who undoubtedly will use them honourably how much it grieve [him to] make war upon them and how he lamenteth some time that for to themselves no honour to the realm nor profit to theirs but for the pleasure of others, willingly as it were they are contented to dishonoured and destroyed and thus I say you must devise to bring [them] to talk with us and to come to an accord and offer yourself to be a worker if they herein and of your proceedings herein advertise by your next letter a part and also who of the three they will desire for you. Whereupon further may be said and done as the case shall require.

Yours,

William Paget

P.S. He that calleth you nephew commendeth him to you and is your friend and so doth

15 November [1547?]

Calig. E IV

Wotton to Somerset

fo. 230

..... that she departed. She is
 A great man of this acquaintance that the King
 would not speak with men should not suspect that she were sent to
 the Emperor.

The King of Portugal's ambassador in this court had his ser-
 vants and spoiled of his stuff and ships in the way hitherward.
 And, hearing t[hat they] that committed the robbery are arrested in
 England, [he hath sent] one of his men thither to pursue and follow his
 where he hath desired me to write to Your Grace to r[ecom]mend
 him] for the better furtherance of his matter, albeit tha[t I told] him
 that his complaint appearing true and being jus[t, he should] not need to
 doubt but that Your Grace of your own mind [and goodwill] towards the King
 his master and the observation of justice, [would see] that reason and
 equity would require to be done in it. [But] he earnestly requireth me
 to write to Your Grace of it [and I could] not honestly to so honest a
 request (occupying that charge Your Grace hath appointed me to hear) say
 nay. I beseech Your Grace to send him your lawful favour. He I
 trust Your Grace will take it but in good part to ambassador would
 be glad to help the other; for I know well with myself what a great dis-
 pleasure it should be to me if the like chance had chanced unto me.

The Emperor's ambassador saith that he heareth that the French King
 sendeth shortly iiij thousand men into Scotland and that the ships are
 preparing for it. Mons. l'Admiral is sent for to the court, as I hear,
 for what intent I know not. If it be true that they send men into Scotland,
 I would doubt whether it were to sent thither for Pietro Strozzi's pro-
 ceedings there are not much commended.

22 July 1548

Calig. E IV

Council to Wotton

fos. 192-193 draft

[... The French ambassador hath] letters from his m[aster saying] that you had much pressed [him concerning the fortifi]cations newly begun about the and that you travailed earnestly to [the intent] that those fortifications were again but, said the ambassador, my master being [informed] that there was a fortification begun [newly there] hath commanded me to say that h[e hath not] commenced any new fortification [except that] begun before the treaty and that had done there none otherwise than h[e honourably] might. Marry, he said, that we in ... new holdings which we call a mole or a je[tty] contrary to the Treaty begun a new fort though we would have it called as yet by the view of Mons. le Constable and others that have seen it, it cannot be oth[er] accounted. And now of late, by setting ordnan[ce] upon it and appointing a watch and guard for the keeping of it, we ourselves make it appear to the world that it was a fortification. Nay, (said we), the placing of the ordnance maketh us more that this is a fort than if the ordnance were our men and for [the be]half of such the men appointed both for the often times told him plainly of mine that was never meant for a fortification, [that] it hath [no fa]shion of a fortification and that it was made for the amendment of the haven. Nay, said he, why [have] you made it higher towards us than towards [Bou]logne? Marry, said we, because we were compelled [for] safety of our ships to bring up the mole to that [hei]ght and, considering that we might spare somewhat the breadth in the top, we did make it of that [s]ide the thinner of the seas ward and indeed, there was at the beginning our mole when your camp lay before . Boulogne long before the conclusion of the peace unto which it was meant (leaving certain arches for passage of the water) the mole should have been joined as by a model yet thereof appeareth, but sithens for saving

of money, the making of those arches is deferred and the mole as you may for which, whatsoever is said to the contrary, must needs appear to any indifferent man's eye to be but a mole. But your doings, said he, be manifestly against the treaty, for ye said that there was a fortification that down towards the ... and enlargement of ... called for a fort. No, said we, your fortifications all Boulonnais over if you list as largely as you ... but this was the ... the King's Majesty's ... friendly finding told you of sundry injuries done to us, not by your private men but by your public officers, northwards and yet hear neither answer nor any credible. In good faith, said the [ambassador, I] have written of that matter but I have [received] no answer, but to return to your fortifications, [your] charges of building declare to the world th[at ye have no wi]ll to render it again. Yes, quod we, of our honour told you plainly our mind that a we mind to render it so as the money ... and as for the building, we make only for [the sure] keeping of it in the meantime. In all this tal[k] spake we no word that the French King told you ... be answered by him here touching the stay of fortifications of both sides. In the end, we told him: well, Mons. l'Ambassador, we have communed of matters of unkindness. I pray you, tell me if you and we were from friends, both of one country, if you have obtained some preferment for yourself and I, knowing thereof, should by labour afterwards obtain that benefit from you had you not a cause in this unkindness in me. What mean you thereby, quod the ambassador. We reported the tale again, but in case the the King's Majesty hath and shall unkindness there.

15 October 1548

Harl. 249

Somerset to Wotton

fos. 18-25

After our right hearty commendations. We have received your letters of and have well perceived^a your communication with the French King and his answers and the cardinal's thereunto in the which^b ye shall understand that you have done much to our contentation and for that and your achievements we give you our right hearty thanks.

Sithens which time of your communication the French ambassador hath been with us and declared^c that the King his master willed him to show

^aDeletion from the final draft, "the proceedings."

^bdel. "we do esteem."

^cdel. "that he had commission from his master to declare to the King's Majesty and us that his subjects hath suffered much spoils and wrongs at our hands and how they should demean themselves hereafter towards us, and to declare what his master thought of such spoils and robberies as the King's subjects hath done to his subjects. We appointed a day, when he came to the King's Majesty then at Oatland with the gentlemen of his privy chamber only, for fear of the plague, save that Mr. Smith one of the secretaries was there with the King and here when he should be sayed.

"His words were not much more nor otherwise: Sir, I am commanded by the King my master to declare unto you, that divers of his subjects, foreign merchants and others are daily spoiled and robbed upon the seas and other outrages done unto them by your subjects and that they have complained to your ministers and can have no redress. And therefore hath willed me to come to declare the same to Your Majesty to know whether this be done, of your knowledge and consent. And requireth to have reason and justice done and if Your Majesty will show reason he is ready to show the same. So that redress might be had of these continuing injuries or else he shall be constrained to do that thing to which Your Majesty shall not so well be pleased with: to this the King answered very willingly in French: Mons. l'Ambassador, you know that we do not well understand these affairs and can take upon us no knowledge of them. We have committed all that care and charge of our affairs to my Lord our uncle, to whom if you declare these things, he will give you an answer which shall be agreeant to reason: with this answer the ambassador, as it appeared very much abashed made courtesy and went his way and for so much as we expected to have heard of him by the first message and also the later promised at your communication with the French King and every day looked for the return of his secretary which was despatched at the same time that Blue Mantle was, his coming to us was longer deferred. Howbeit on Sunday the xijth of this month he was with us. And then, understanding his work and grievous complaints was of the ships taken of the which he said was a great number and required upon that restitution again."

unto us that his subjects were robbed and spoiled daily by the King's subjects and could have no redress and therefore would know if it were done by the King's Majesty's knowledge or no, and if the King's Majesty would do reason he was ready to do reason again or else he should be constrained to do other things which would not be pleasant unto us. And said further to us that he had commission to declare the same message to the King's Majesty, peradventure looking to have had us therein and some great order of the Council the matter or to see whether as the rumour was the King's Highness were dead. Whereupon we appointed no more to be there but only one of the secretaries and the gentlemen of the Privy Chamber. To the King's Majesty he declared as he did afore to us, and had answer of His Majesty that His Majesty did not well as he knew understand in these affairs but willed him to return to us and he should have reasonable answer.

At his coming to us for so much as all his complaints was of the ships taken we made answer that if any other private men of England have taken any French ships, it is not of our commandment nor by no public authority, but if they have done anything, it might well be, for so much as they having their ships taken, their goods stayed and sold with you and made complaint and pursuit to you for it, can have no redress nor justice at your hands, and so when they come to us, we say that there is peace betwixt you and us, and that they should pursue that cause there at the law in France, and declare it to you, Mons. l'Ambassador or to our ambassador there to have more furtherance .. their right at the law, so dismiss them murmuring that they had rather lost it, and that they have essayed there and can have no redress nor remedy. And upon this it may be, that some of them have essayed to take again for their relief and revenge, but public authority of us, they have none. And yet, (quod we), the King your master even by public authority and by his own commandment as both we know by Mons. de Roche letters and his own answers to our ambassador, hath given

authority and commandment to his subjects if one bullock be taken, of any of ours to take again xx; if one man be killed, to kill x1, which is far from any man of justice either requiring or doing. And Pietro Strozzi being lieutenant for the French King did not likewise both by the way and there take all manner of merchants and other ships of the King's Majesty's subjects whatsoever they were that he could get, burn the ships, take the men prisoners yea and put them to the galleys and make slaves of them. But as for those which the King's ships have taken we have given them in commandment to take all such ships as they can, going in to Scotland, or coming, or coming for the intent to the aid of our enemies there and if peradventure they have taken some other as you seem to complain to us, it is no marvel though sometimes the servant passeth his commission but yet that is not our commandment.^d Marry, if the King your master be minded to a quiet and an amity as you say^e we for our part are content if he will do the like to appoint commissioners, for the mutual recompense and redress of injuries. And in the mean season we are content for our part and do this much,^f we shall send our letters down to all the ports and give commandment that all such goods as is taken of the Frenchmen by the King's Majesty's subjects shall be stayed, and such of that as cannot tarry, to be sold to the most advantage and the money to be reserved, and all such other things as may tarry likewise to be reserved in sure hands, upon agreement of mutual restitution to be restored again according as the same commissioners shall judge. But all this will be but to heal a sore outwardly the which still

^ddel. "and little enough to detain till our injuries be recompensed, and if you command your men to take xx for one by land when you are strong power by the country then ye may be sure we will not release that we take upon the sea, till equal amends be made as well for injuries done by land as by sea."

^edel. "and order may be devised to be such an agreement as shall be agreeable, honourable for both the parties."

^fdel. "if your master will do the same."

shall rankle within,^g for so long, (quod we), as the King your master doth thus maintain the Scots being the King's Majesty's vassals and rebels against the King their sovereign lord, it were the greatest dishonour in the world if we would suffer it. Nor we promise you Mons. l'Ambassador we cannot endure it. And such things must needs chance betwixt us that we shall be enforced to have the war with you, though we were never so loath thereto.^h

When he spake to our ambassador, (quod we), that by the Treaty he might aid them, being comprehended in the Treaty. To that we said that by the Treaty heⁱ could not for they were therein comprised but according to the Treaty which was before so that if they did invade the realm of England with an army of men to a certain number^j they should not be comprised and that they anew did invade the realm here in England and also with a power about the number as was then declared to you Mons. l'Ambassador so

^gdel. "and to that if the King your master will appoint commissioners on his part we shall be content to do the same on the King's Majesty's behalf."

^hdel. "and where the King, (quod we), your master did say that where it was said unto him by our ambassador that it was greatly dishonourable to His Majesty to take away another prince's wife and to maintain the Scots subjects and rebels of another prince against their sovereign lord, that if the King his good brother were of his age, he would say that he did otherwise than doth ... him therein he knoweth what he would do, I shall tell you Mons. l'Ambassador that if the King's Majesty were at his full age he would attempt any such thing as the King your master hath done herein we would not be one that should counsel him to it for all the world. For we should think ourself charged in honour while we should live. And likewise if we had been of council to the King your master, we would have thought it our duty in honour and conscience to have exhorted him from the doing thereof so much as was possible. For it is both against God's law and the law of nature to berob another of his lawful espouse and wife. And what dishonour is it to maintain a rebel to another prince as if we should now maintain and aid the Gascons and Bretons in their rebellion against the King, your master, would not he think it a thing dishonourable to us, and contrary to the law of God, and a pernicious example and danger-our to all princes. And how think you he would take that at our hands? And yet he doth the same to us.

ⁱdel. "was rather bound to aid all against them."

^jdel. "the which acceptation of peace did never appear of their past,

that they cannot be comprised by the treaties.

Howbeit (quod we) at this time the King your master is not an aider but a principal doer; he giveth the money, he giveth the wages, he procureth and they be his men that maketh the assaults.

but immediately they entered, wasted and burned a great part of the King's Majesty's possessions on the borders. And invaded Ireland with an viij or ix thousand men, as was the same before the battle of Musselborough declared plainly to the French ambassador which came hither then so that the Treaty seemeth rather to bind the French King to aid us rather than them."

30 December 1548

Calig. B VII

Council to Wotton

fos. 346r-350v draft

After our most hearty commendations. Where we the Lord Protector in a former conference with the French ambassador (whereof we then advertised you) opening unto him the King's Majesty's just title to the sovereignty of the realm of Scotland did at the same time tell him that for the more plain proof thereof we would give order to have His Majesty's ancient records visited and after advertise him more fully, you shall understand that yesterday having a great number of very ancient and authentic writings in a readiness for that purpose we entered again communication with the said ambassador of that matter telling him according to our former promise we had caused our records to be searched, and because we meant to advertise his master by you of the said records we had therefore sent for him to show him the very originals so as his master might by him also understand the truth of these things. His answer was that being as he was a servant he might not exceed the limits of his commission, and because he had not received any such commandment from his master he would not take upon him the view or report of the said originals. If you will not see the originals, (quod we), ye may do as ye will. We have them here by the which it may well appear that above vj hundred years past and even from the beginning the Scottish Kings have upon commandment come to Parliaments in England, served in the wars, answered in matters of justice, and done and sworn homage and fealty to the Kings of England and so continued unto the reign of King Henry VIIth who also because the Scottish King then refused to do the like prepared to have made wars against him, but in the end marrying one of his daughters granted them truce for certain years; and of these homages and other services done by the sundry Kings of Scotland to the Kings of England from time to time we have many ancient writings under the seals of the Kings of Scotland, under the seals of the

cities, noblemen, bishops and abbots, under the seals of sundry Bishops of Rome and divers other ways, which as we could have been contented to show unto him if he would have seen the same. So having this much offered we minded to cause the King his master to be informed of the effect of the said writings, not for that we minded hereby to make him or any other man judge of His Majesty's right, but for the goodwill we bare to the continuance of the amity we thought expedient to give knowledge unto him as unto the King's Majesty's good brother of the very truth of this matter to the intent that he might thereby both inform himself of the just quarrel of His Majesty to the said sovereignty and also being informed may (as in reason and honour we think he ought to do) forbear from henceforth to aid His Majesty's rebels in their unjust quarrel. His answer was that his master had likewise willed the Scottish ambassador to write home for a like search of the records of that realm both for such matters as they had to answer our claim and for such also whereby they might prove their challenge to England. He travailed also by words to diminish the credit of our records, and after said his master had just cause in honour to aid them because they were his ancient friends and in league with his progenitors; and besides this because the young Queen was his very kinswoman. We told him again that we thought his master might not with his honour aid the King's Majesty's rebels contrary to his own treaty and here had we some talk of the comprehension of the Scots in the last treaty, and besides this we told him we thought it neither friendly nor very honourable for his master to take away his good brother's wife, and (quod we), as long as these Scottish matters shall hang thus we see not how our amity can well and certainly continue and therefore we meant to signify to his master the King's Majesty's title to the superiority of Scotland, of whom as we shall receive answer so must we provide further and doubt not but God will assist the justice of the King's Majesty's title. That should seem to mean

(said the ambassador) that you would enter the wars, and if you so do the King my master must and will I doubt not also provide accordingly; and it seemeth (said he) you have begun the wars already, for you imprison our men even as though they were enemies. No, Mons. l'Ambassador, (quod we), we say not that we will enter the wars and yet must we and will provide for the service of the King our master as occasion shall be ministered; and as for the handling of your men they have no cause to complain for we ourself have given order for the well using of them; and albeit you have been informed as you say yet all such reports be not true. In the end the ambassador said that he would both make report of that we had said to him touching the King's Majesty's title to the^a superiority of Scotland, and also in all things besides do the part of a good minister for continuance of the amity, and this was the effect of our talk which we thought good to signify unto you to be used as you shall see cause.

We do also send unto you herewith the copy of a book compiled by such as have had the view of the King's Majesty's records touching His Highness's title to the sovereignty of Scotland, and with the same the copy of sundry ancient writings all which we pray you to consider and after you shall have well considered them and fully informed yourself of the matters of the said book we require you to ask audience for the declaration thereof to the French King if he will hear the same or else to his Council, the originals whereof under seals and other authentic form be here and might have been seen by their ambassador if he had liked to have seen the same; and yet like as for the goodwill we bear to the continuance of the amity we have appointed you to make declaration thereof so if it shall like the French King to appoint any commissioner to see the originals of these records we will cause him to see the same for the full proof of all that we have presently committed to be declared by you.

^adel. "propriety and."

We have of late been very credibly advertised that young Fitsgarrett with our other English traitors late of the order of St. John was very late at St. Germain's at the court and do remain^a either there or about Paris and that there be rumours in those which have long continued that he should be aided with men and ships from the French King to pass to Ireland to stir some brawl or commotion in those parts whereby the Frenchmen may the more easily do their enterprises in Scotland. And albeit we be not certain whether any such thing be there resolved indeed or not yet thinking good to take that occasion away if it may be we have devised a letter to be written to the said Fitsgarrett from his mother of such effect as may appear by the copy thereof herewith sent unto you, which letters because we could not well devise ... to be delivered as you there may as well for that we cannot attain so certain knowledge of the place where the said Fitsgarrett remaineth as you may, nor yet being no traffic may so well send a special man from hence as you may spare someone of your servants we do heartily pray you to devise by your good policy for some secret and speedy mean of the delivery of the said letters and to instruct your messenger so as he may induce him to submit himself and to convey himself into England by all the best ways and means he may devise. We are moved to think that if your messenger may secretly speak with him alone and do use the matter wisely Fitsgarrett may be easily induced to accept this mean of offer and to submit himself, because a gentlemen named Young servant to the King's Majesty who was this last year in Italy had sundry times secretly conferred with the said Fitsgarrett, and if it had not been that the English traitor was always at hand with him he would even then upon the motion of the said Young only have submitted himself and conveyed himself away; and in those conferences the said Fitsgarrett did many times

^a del. "about Bordeaux."

lament his state and showed himself more desirous of his pardon and the King's Majesty's favour than of any other worldly thing besides.

You shall also understand that of late Sir Geffrey Pole is privately fled from here, but for what purpose or to what place we do not yet know. We have therefore thought good to pray you to inquire by all ways and means you may whether he be come into that realm or not; and if he be where he remaineth of whom and in what sort he is there entertained and as you shall find to advertise us. Thus giving you our most hearty thanks for your advertisements signified by your letters of the of this present we bid you etc.

Postscript. At such time as you shall open either to the French King or to his Council the matters touching the King's Majesty's title to Scotland we think good you do now and then as occasion shall serve use good and dulce words and declare our desire and good affection not only for the continuance of the amity but also for doing all things that may conduce either to the friendly continuance thereof or enlarging or increasing of the same.

30 March 1549

Calig. E IV

Council to Wotton

fos. 194-197 draft I

fos. 225-226 draft II

[The French ambassador came ...] to whom we did declare the doings of his master's men of war at Boulogne after such sort as we were and delivered to him an abstract the copy whereof we send unto you herein enclosed. Wherein you may as well perceive the complaints of our men as the answers to such objections or complaints as you know the two men that came said peradventure would make against our men to excuse themselves. Hereupon we declared further unto him that we must needs think us very strangely handled that they should on that manner not only prepare their men after the sort of war against the King's Majesty and give one of them a camisado as we perceive by the note, but also to send to Boulogne a drum and gentlemen to summon the ... after such a fashion as if the war at this present were fully opened betwixt both the realms, and therefore we said unto the said ambassador that we did not a little marvel at this handling which must needs detract from the amity and friendship which the King his master hath always pretended to bear towards the King's Highness; so we said and did signify the same unto him as his master's ambassador here and would signify it also unto you our ambassador there to the intent that we might know what was the King his master's intent and mind touching those matters and whether these things proceeded of any commandment from him or no, for we rather thought that the King his master was a king of honour and would not so without denouncing or warning enter the war with us, especially always by his ambassador saying unto us that he was minded to preserve the amity and friendship betwixt us and him. To this the said ambassador answered that surely those depredations, if they were true, which we declared unto him were done by his and men of war sore against his master's mind and without commission so to do, peradventure occasioned by our men's evil doings and provocations before. We said again that such

attempts and provocations upon their parts and thus again, contrary to the
 etc. betwixt themselves about the reveste¹ the Garden, Chatillon,²
 to summon one of the King's Majesty's pieces with a drum and gentlemen and
 such camisadees such robberies and pillages and so notably used now of late
 by the French as well in Boulonnais as in the King's old inheritance did so
 touch the King's Majesty in honour to endure them, especially of them. And
 therefore we were desirous to know whether this thing proceeded of his com-
 mandment or will or rather of his men of war alone to the intent we might
 provide an order ourselves accordingly. Howbeit, we said we thought them
 rather the doings of his men of war and such as would be glad to give the
 pique and set princes together, than to proceed from His Grace, whom we
 took to have more regard to his honour and to the keeping and entertaining
 of the amity than so suddenly without cause or denunciation to enter into
 a war with us. Of the which, as the end is always doubtful so we did not
 doubt but God should aid them who do not by injuries or wrongs seek the
 same. This was our discourse with the French ambassador to the
 which we pray you so soon as you can conveniently to go and make
 declaration to the same French King, using the same we doubt and
 you the perceive the resolute answer which the French King will
 make unto you herein.

Further, if he aim to have still the amity and friendship to endure
 with the King's Highness the which thing on the King our master's part hath
 not been attempted and gone about to be broken, that then he would give
 order and commandment to his men of war and other his subjects to otherwise
 order themselves toward the King's his master's men and subjects there and
 none otherwise but as the amity from both princes doth require. And so

¹Technical term of fortification, possibly equalling revetment.

²One of French fortifications.

doing, for our part we shall give order and have given already that no thing shall be done of our men otherwise than may stand with the said friendship. And what answer you shall receive herein, ye shall certify us again accordingly. Thus fare ye heartily well. From the xxxth of March 1549.

Sith this communication with the said ambassador it is further come to our knowledge by letters from Newhaven that the xxvjth of March the French have entered the marches there with standard displayed with v or vj hundred horses have robbed and spoiled the country and laid an ambush of iij hundred horsemen betwixt Newhaven and Blackness to have interrupted our men if they had

23 July 1549

Calig. E IV

Wotton to the Protector

fos. 227r-229v

..... more her then good down into
 Boulonnais of men of arms. But as yet he heareth of
 [the] French King's archers and that there go a so
 that he saith that they intend to do there some [enterprise and] that all
 the whole army shall meet together the [twelfth of next] month to march
 whither they shall be commanded. He saith also Rikrode is sent to set
 three thousand landsknechts he trusteth to have a plot of
 Bullenberg, and to show me [where the] fault is. He trusteth also to de-
 liver me a plot of [the camp] of Castillion, and will declare the means
 how it may be won.

There hath been also another Frenchman with me named who
 also desireth much to serve the King's Highness. He served [the Emperor]
 at St. Dizier against the French King and therefore lost [all] as he saith
 and is banished the court here. But yet he re[paireth] thither now and
 then and is well acquainted with all the [captains] and soldiers. He tel-
 leth me that he heard the French Ki[ng say] that he will employ his utter-
 most power to recover [Boulogne] again. He saith that they will overrun
 the English and that there is one that undertaketh to break the Downes and
 let in the sea and to drown all the country about Oye He
 saith that the French King taketh it that Mr. Compt[roller] treateth with
 the Emperor to deliver him Boulogne and therefore [the] French King will
 prevent that matter. He saith that if he w[ere in] England, he would show
 Your Grace divers spies that use Eng[land] and take wages of the French
 King, and namely one of Lubeck, named Lippe Betman, a merchant of the
 Stillyard who hath advertisements of the affairs of England and carryeth
 victuals and munitions to the Scots. He saith that an Italian hath prom-
 ised the French King to set the castle of Boulogne afire with certain

fires artificial. This Frenchman desireth much to go into England, for he will not serve here and will bring with him three score of good experimented soldiers.

 I said I would been with me also of late one born in man's son, who serveth here in France, and well entreated as he looked for, would fain serve be[tter master] and specially he would fain serve the King's Highness. [He sai]d he came to advertise me of such things as he knew, which [are] that the French King putteth in a readiness above five and twenty [th]ousand footmen gathered everywhere as secretly as can be done and, besides the horsemen that are in Picardy already, six hundred men of arms more and four or five bands of light horses, the captains whereof shall be Sipierre, Entragues, Tiligny and others. And also three or four thousand pioneers and above forty great pieces of ordnance with very great quantity of powder. And that every town is commanded to send horses and carts to a great number and victuals likewise. And that although the bruit goeth tha[t it] is to revictual Ardres, yet it is indeed to destroy the English Pale, to take Bullenberg, the which won they reckon Boulogne their ow[n]; and that the French King intendeth to be at the doing of it himself and will spare no loss of men for the obtaining of his purpose, so great desire he hath to have it. He saith also that all this army shall join together the twelfth of the next month. He saith that if he can learn anything else of importance, he will advertise me of [it]; and otherwise know I not this man, but I believe he mean[eth] well.

These are the advertisements that these men give me I wrote to Your Grace of late and sent my letter to Mr. Hoby [which] I trust you have received. I sent you therewith a copy of a letter sent out of Scotland which was delivered me also by Hippoli[to] Marino and was written

in Italian to his kinsman Jeronimo Marino. And as I wrote to Your Grace then, it is taken here for ce[rtain] of every man, of ambassadors and all, that the French King prepareth twenty thousand footmen, and at the least one thousand men of arms with a great number of pioneers, to be set upon Boulogne

 and that their purpose at nobody in a manner fear ...
 to be true, and that they with what they can in Boulonnais. And I think that move them the more to do it. First, for that they say that being now a commotion in England, which they have long look[ed for, you] cannot entend to the defence of Boulonnais, the other [is that they] suspect you will agree to deliver Boulogne to the Emperor the occasion serving them now so well, as they take it, not leave it. Wherefore it seemeth to me that all diligence [should be] made to provide for the defence of the King's pieces on thi[s side] and specially in Boulonnais. And in case the French King [lead the] enterprise himself, as it is likely he will, or at the least [come] very near unto it; it is to be thought that he will follow for- because it shall be the first act attempted by him since his [coming] to the crown wherein he will be loath to take a fall, and [forbecause] the loss of Boulogne grieveth him so much, and that the reco[very of it] should be such a great praise to him through the world.

The xiiijth of this present, they received Your Grace's letters of the xth of the same. The French King was then a hunting abroad as it were Howbeit, he was in very deed two or three leagues hence and [had his] Council with him. Sitting there in Council very earnestly the King was returned to Paris, the xvijth of this month. M[ons.] le Constable sent young Morette unto me saying that he sent him to And forbecause he had received letters out of England: to

know al[so if] I had received any, whereby I had any matter to communicate unto [him.] When I heard this errand I thought the Constable would have spoken with me and therefore I told Morette that I had received letters and would gladly speak with him; and so was I brought to him. I told him what errand Morette had done unto me, and then I declared unto him the effect of Your Grace's last letter. Whereunto he answered that it was true that such communication Your Grace had with their ambassador. And he said he would speak with the King and then should I have an answer. So went I the next Sunday to St. Germain's, where I dined with the Constable, the King being abroad a hunting. And there the Constable said to me that our commissioners were not yet come, nor they were not at the court, and therefore they could not well appoint no time for their commissioners

.....

.....

at his commandment to the last. When answer was brought the xth or xiith day of next month, and that I Your Grace. But, as well at this time as at the last time I spoke of this matter, he passed it so lightly over as though he [looked] not much upon the said meeting, or looked for none at all. Yet seeing [he] hath appointed a time, Your Grace can best consider what is therein to be on your part.

The French King taketh his journey towards Compiegne, and shortly afte[r that] it is thought goeth towards Boulonnais. But the Constable, as it is sai[d], goeth straight to the frontiers to set all things in an order.

There was of late a solemn procession made here, the causes whereof appear to Your Grace by a book printed thereof, which I send herewith.

Forbecause that I fear lest the passage for sending of letters will be stopped, if the Emperor would command his ambassador here to receive;

[if I] send my letters to Mr. Hoby, I might peradventure send the more surely.

Forbecause of this great rumour of war, no man almost dare come to me, so that from henceforth I shall learn little or nothing.

Mons. Dessey¹ is returned with great glory and triumph and, as I hear, hath brought with him six or seven ensigns taken from our men of late in an island which they call here l'Isle des Chevaux.

I understand that the league which these men boast to have made with the Switzers is not with all the cantons, but with eight only, though the ambassador of Scotland said the contrary as I wrote before.

There was with me of late one of the captains of the French King's gua[rd] of Switzers named Captain Laurence, who told me that for the go[od]-will he beareth to the King's Highness, to whom he would gladly do all service he could, the French King, his master's quarrels only excepted, would bring to me another man who could name me certain Itali[ans] and Frenchmen that could have caused to be coined a great number of false grotes which was a thing tending greatly to the King's Highness's prejudice. I thanked him for his goodwill and desired him to bring the man to me, and so he did the next day: who said that there w[ere]

 that the said
 though he had the charge to of the said merchants. But he said them and that the matter were not earnestly purs[ued]] of them, that then he were like to sustain great if I would write of this matter to Your Grace, and that command me to labour earnestly to the French King for [the apprehension] of them, then he would name them, and bring me to the and he thinketh it were well

¹Desse, French commander in Scotland.

done Your Grace did send some grotes which the said July hath brought into England might be seen here by the King and his Council, and they that have done it have declared it to divers men the French King would not be displeased with them for it, seeing it is English coin. He saith also that in case look to have them punished for it, the matter must be kept England, that the merchants, especially Italians here not if they do, then shall these men here, that have done it advertised of it and escape hence. I told him I would adv[ertise] Your Grace of it. And so may Your Grace weigh this matter as you think meet.

Hippolito Marino came to me this day himself and showed [me] he had not brought me the plot of Bullenberg for he could [not] get it but he showed me where the great danger of Bullenb[erg] lieth and how it may be remedied. He saith that on the side towards the wood, the fort of Bullenberg occupyeth not the whole hill, [so] there remaineth a spare void. And then is there a valley where the ene[my] might lie safe out of danger of the fort, and having a great number of pioneers: they will sappe as he calleth it or undermine through to the walls or under as they list. The remedy whereof, as he saith, is to make trenches from Bullenberg to the end of the hill on that side and to make some bulwark there, which shall beat the valley so that the enemy shall not be able to abide there. I asked him if the enemy did win that bulwark or trenches, whether that would not hurt Bullenberg. He said that never a wit. He said also that the inner fortification of Bullenberg, which he calleth the paradet is weak and made of ill matter and cannot resist six gunshots. Wherefore, he would have that

 the xvth of the next. Further he said that Boulogne. He saith also that they ten galleys only. This man in my [an]d

seemeth to be very willing to do the King's Highness ser[vice th]at he
can. And it is not without danger of his neck or sendeth to me.
And yet he sendeth as often as he may have He hath delivered
me the plot of Chastillon but I dare [not] send it the right way. For if
my letters were opened by the way it [would] cost the said Hippolito and
his kinsman both their lives. And [so] Jesu preserve Your Grace long in
health, honour and prosperity.

Written at Paris the xxijth of July 1549.

13 October 1562

Cot. Vesp. C. VII

Wotton to Thomas Challoner,

fo. 227

Ambassador at Madrid

Master Challoner, after hearty commendations. Hactenus fuimus spectatores aliene insame. Nunc quum partes proximus ardeat, et proinde res nostra agatur. We intend to be somewhat occupied partly to succour our afflicted neighbours, partly to meet with dangers not unlike to ensue unto us, if we sit still and do nothing but behold who hath the best game.¹ The whole matter I doubt not, shall at good length be signified unto you, and this bearer can satisfy you in divers of them, so that I shall not need to trouble you much therewith.

We look very shortly for a Parliament in quo et de argenti quod in militem alendum suppeditetur, et de negotio religionis precipue acturi videmur.

We judge the King where you are, to be wise and happy that can sit still in tanto rerum motu.

But who so ever is happy or not happy, I take you to be happy, qui nactus sis summum otium quod studiis tuis impendas, the which I trust you will so bestow, as the world shall receive no small fruit thereof.

You may perceive by this short writing, that I lack matter and therefore praying God to send you good success in all your proceedings there, I wish you right heartily well to fare.

From London the 13 of October 1562.

Your Lover and Friend.

N. Wotton.

¹This refers to the landing in Normandy under Ambrose Dudley.

28 July 1563

Lansdowne 7

Wotton to Cecil

fo. 62.

Sir, I thank you heartily for your letter of the xxvijth of this present which I received that day in the evening. And forbecause I had sent that day part of my men with a little stuff to Richmond, I thought good to follow thither myself, whither I came this day the xxviijth of this present. And seeing you have been so good to me, as to cause a chamber to be provided for me at Nonesuch, I could be well content to come thither, but the truth is that my geldings are not yet come nor I look not for them before Saturday, so that I have been but a mile. For this cause and for that I cannot come to you by water, I intend if you think so good and unless there be some cause, why it shall be requisite for me to be sooner at the court, to tarry here till Her Highness remove and to meet you at Oatland, God willing, if that be the next place where you shall rest any while. And thus Jesu preserve you long in health and prosperity.

Written at Richmond the xxviijth July 1563.

Your Honour's to Command.

N. Wotton.

Pierpont Morgan Library

27 October 1539

Rulers of England Series

Cromwell to Wotton

1539

Master Wotton, After my right hearty commendations. Albeit you have been heretofore sufficiently informed of the coming of this bearer Master Berde and likewise of the gentleman coming in company with him of the offices appointed unto them and generally of the presents sent by the same, yet the King's Majesty's pleasure was that with these few words I should eftsoons recommend them unto you, and therewithall advise you that wherein the articles lately sent by Nicholas Curroure there be expressed but two names, if you could induce the execution to extend also to the third that is to the Bishop of Rome the name to be named, it should be much to the King's Majesty's content. But as his pleasure is that you let not the whole for this one, considering the other twaine be of such sort as without them he can do nothing, so it is thought that if the one of the contrahentes the youngest be of no worse disposition than he is noted, they shall as easily agree to this as to the other for his colleague in this treaty as it is supposed will be rather induced to the rest by this mean thing in anywise stayed by the same. Use thereof your wisdom and dexterity herein to satisfy His Majesty accordingly. Thus fare you heartily well.

From Westminster the xxvijth of October.

Your loving assured Friend.

Thomas Cromwell.

28 May 1547

Rulers of England Series

Wotton to Guillaume Bochetel

1547

Monsieur, en suivant ce que monsieur le constable vous dict, la dernier fois que je me trouvoy à la court, je vous envoye par ce porteur vne mémoire, contenant les noms de ceulx quy encoires doibuent aulcunes sommes d'argent à Monsieur Wallop Capitaine du château de Guisnes pour leur rançons avec les sommes d'argent qu'il demande, et semblablement les noms de ceulx quy se sont obliges et ont respondu pour le payment desdictes sommes. Et sy da dadventure vous esties en doubte, sy ce quy est contenu en ladicte mémoire, est veritable ou non: ce porteur vous monstrera quelques lettres, par les quelles vous pourez estre assez informé de cela, desquelles lettres il vous delivrera aussy la copie. Vrai est, que pour la somme de cent cinquante escus, pour laquelle est responant Monsieur de Blerencourt: je nay pas icy les lettres obligatoires, mais led. Blerencourt ne le scauray nyer. Et s'il en faict difficulté, jenuoyeray querir les lettres par lesquelles il sest obligé. Ma requeste est que sy ceulx quy doibuent led. Argent, ne sont prestz à le payer incontient, veu qu'il y a sy long temps qu'il est deu: qu'on le face payer par Monsieur du Bies et on pourra retenir autant de leur gaiges comme cela monte. Et pource que entre ces escriptures, il y a vne lettre de Monsieur du Bies, en laquelle il dit, qu'il ne permectera point que six vingtz escuz de la somme due par le Capitaine Dampont, soient payes audict seigneur Wallop, son ne faict premierement raison à vne merchant, qu'il dist auoir este destrousse desnostres: pour vous aduertir de la verité de ceste affaire là: Mons. du Bies dist, que durant ces dernieres guerres, vne merchant de Dieppe (sy jay bien retenu) fur prins de nos gensau près de Tournehan. Et ainsy sur les terres de l'empereur quy fust contrainct de payer six vingtz escuz. Et pour cela led. Sieur du Bies veult retenir lesd. six vingtz escuz en ces mains. Mais en cela, sans doubte nulle Monsieur du Bies faict bien grant tort audict Sieur Wallop.

Car comme il dit, s'il est ainsy que ledict merchant ayt este prins: il nappert poinct portant, qu'il ayt este prins sur les terres de l'Empereur. Item quant ainsy seroyt, il nappert poinct que portant il ne seroit de bonne prince. Mais quant tout cecy seroyt notoire et confesse toutes fois Mons. Wallop dist que cecy ne luy touche de riens. Car ce n'a pas este luy ne ses gens, quy lont prins. Et pourtant que ce nest pas luy, à quy on sen doit prendre: et ainsy de vouloir retenir vne debt liquide pour vne chose non deu, ou au moins contencieuse, et encoires que plus est, pour le faict daultroy, que ne touche de riens a Mons. Wallop: cest chose trop in raisonnable. Et veu que Mons. de Vasse et le Capitaine Dampont, se sont obliges de payer lesdictes sommes, et que à leur requeste seulement Mons. Wallop a deliure les prisoniers: desquelz aultrement il s'eust bich faict payer, sans que Mons. du Bies luy eut peu Jouer de ce tour cy: je suis bien esbahy sy lesd. de Vasse et Dampont, ny pour commandement de Mons. du Bies, ny pour homme au monde, vouldroient faire chose quy fust contre leur honneur. Et ne n'est poinct audis, que ce seroit grandement leur honneur, que Mons. Wallop fut defraude de ce quy luy set deu, pour s'estre fye d'eulx, et auoir deliure ses prisoniers a leur requeste, et sur leur foy et promise. Monsieur pour ce qu'il me semble que la requeste de Mons. Wallop est honeste et raisonnable, et qu'il est bien mon amy, après que vous aurez entendu la verité de cest affaire cy, je vous pry de'en vouloir faire tel rapport à Mons. le Constable, que led. Sieur Wallop puisse entendre la bonne souvenance que Mons. le constable a encoires du luy (de quoy il se resiouyra grandement) et aussy que jay faict debuoir et office d'amy, et en sollicitant son affaire le mieulx que jay peu faire. En ce faisant me obligerez à vous faire seruice et plaisir, en ce que sera en moy de faire. Et atant je prieray Dieu vous auoir toujours en sa sainte garde.

(Escript Paris le xxviij de Mai 1547)

Par lentierement a vre commandement.

Nicholas Wotton.