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A Schizo-Revolutionary Labial Art-Politics

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An Art-Thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in Political and Social Thought
in the Department of Politics and International Relations
at the University of Kent

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Please note that *A Schizo-Revolutionary Labial Art-Politics* was submitted as an Art-Thesis. It was produced in the form of a sculpture and is meant to be experienced through its physical form. This digital copy contains only the text and does NOT represent the physical appearance of the Art-Thesis. A photograph of the Art-Thesis in its physical appearance is inserted below to accompany this digital copy:
**Description**

This *art-thesis* offers a response to the question of what can be done to challenge the hypermasculine institutionalisation of knowledge. The traditional idea of a thesis embodies the construction and dissemination of knowledge which, in the hypermasculine discipline of political theory, is built upon the saturation and repetition of patriarchal ideas. By creating the thesis as an artistic encounter, I develop a theoretically informed artistic practice that aims to challenge this traditional idea of the thesis. This art-thesis is an enfolded theory-practice that embodies a plurality of feminist arguments, both sculpturally and in terms of connective forms of argumentation. What has been produced here is a piece of scholarly writing *and* an art object, it is neither one nor the other but always both, together: an art-thesis. It is created to express a new sign of a feminine artistic problem of what a thesis may become. Making and submitting this art-thesis as an enfolded sculpture and thesis is my creative confrontation to the linear and binary textual apparatus of most academic writing and the mandatory format required of the presentation of theses. I would not be putting my proposal into practice if I argued for a *schizo-revolutionary labial art-politics* in a style that remains confined to the restrictive lines of the standard flat A4 pages contained within a traditional book-thesis. Creating the traditional academic thesis as a melting sculpture is a call for different forms of expression and apparatuses for academic writing.

By engaging in a feminist artistic practice of resistance, I explore a process of melting to convey a transformation of the mechanics of solids into the dynamics of fluids. This artistic process incorporates Irigaray’s idea that the ‘*mechanics of solids*’ is privileged by Western
phallogocentric culture and that it symbolises man’s isomorphic sexual imaginary, to the
detriment of the dynamics of fluids which concerns the features of a female sexual imaginary
(1985a, 106-7). The purpose of melting the traditional thesis follows Irigaray’s feminist
relationship to the canon of Western philosophy, which aims to problematise and reinvent it
by articulating and promoting a space for the feminine within it. This art-thesis does not
leave all elements of the standard thesis behind, it works with them to offer a feminist
reinvention of the standard hypermasculine thesis in relation to what it looks like in its
physical and argumentative structure, as well as the purely theoretical/discursive nature of a
thesis and how this is reported in practice. The submission of this non-standard thesis poses
a challenge to the traditional process of examination by inviting the examiners to consider a
thesis that does not follow the norms and expectations of a traditional hypermasculine
approach. Through a feminine reimagination of both physical and textual practices employed
in the hypermasculine discipline of political theory, I have melted the traditional thesis into
the dynamics of fluids in order to destabilise and alter the rigid masculine systems, structures
and content in which thesis-books are written and defended.

It is important to note that I do not claim to write the feminine, because I am not a language
specialist and this has already been done. I am nevertheless inspired by Irigaray who
challenges the standard thesis by exploring the potential of écriture feminine. In her
unfolding theory of the labial as the potential for a counter-discourse of plurality and
difference, Irigaray explains that it is from within the labial lips that women’s fluid mode of
discourse is produced (1985a, 24). As a visual artist, I aim to make visible ideas around this
labial language of plurality and difference and how women’s expression of fluidity might be
made in political theory. This art-thesis introduces a fluid artistic expression to problematise
and reinvent the masculine philosophical discourse in ways that explore a feminine
philosophy.

While the structure of this art-thesis is physically different, it is also intellectually different
to the extent that my argument for a feminine reimagination of practices employed in the
hypermasculine discipline of political theory is not analytical or synthetic in the traditional
hypermasculine senses of those terms, but is constituted within and across the drips. The
flowing structure of this argument can be melted together in different ways through the
reader’s selection of the different drips. This process of selection aims to produce a method
of flowing connectivity within and across the arguments made. This structure can be likened to the nomadic style of Deleuze and Guattari’s *A Thousand Plateaus*, in which the dated “plateaus” can be read in any order. According to Massumi’s foreword,

*A Thousand Plateaus* is conceived as an open system. It does not pretend to have the final word. The authors’ hope, however, is that elements of it will stay with a certain number of its readers and will weave into the melody of their everyday lives (2004, xiv).

The nomadic style of this art-thesis is an exploration into ways of thinking in an *open system*. In the drip, Ripple Effect, I explore this idea further in a feminist investigation into the closed system of hypermasculine knowledge production and propose opening it up through Le Doeuff’s suggested process of working in an open system, which involves philosophical thinking in relation to a multiplicity *outside* philosophy, including one’s own multiple geneses (2007, 171-2). This choice of nomadic style is not only an invitation to the reader to melt their readership, but to melt into the art-thesis too. Different in and of themselves, the drips function like fluid movements along a nomadic map. There is no specific order in which to read them, nor does this Delivery Note serve as instructions as to how to read them. The reader may find a DRIP within a drip that might lead them to another drip, or outside of the art-thesis to an entirely different connection altogether! The reader may simply wish to start with the drip positioned at the top left-hand corner, as this is how we have been taught to read thesis-books. Or, the reader may want to map a flight of resistance to the dominant order of reading. As an interruption to the implicit linearity and hierarchy underlying the reading process required in the mandatory thesis-book format, this melting art-thesis is an invitation to read with fluidity. In order to accept this invitation, the reader must accept the challenge to read a thesis that does not follow the norms and expectations of a traditional hypermasculine approach. By accepting this invitation, the reader can encounter the art-thesis, activate the sculpture by opening it up, and read the drips they gravitate toward. And, if the reader experiences the urge to move to another drip or to the outside, do so!

Although this nomadic narrative involves the risk of being incoherent, it enables connections to be made between conflicting thinkers and ideas in order to make new feminist ideas. Through a process of flowing connectivity, I have incorporated “incompatible” thinkers and ideas on a plane of proximity, not to produce a comparative analysis, but to incite a nomadic narrative that can render such conflicting encounters productive. I argue for the compatibility
of different ideas from these disparate thinkers because following and repeating the ideas of a single master would be a hypermasculine approach of working in a closed system. I am not suggesting we should stop employing the ideas of a single master, rather I propose they are (re)worked in a process that involves thinking about them in relation to many other things outside philosophy (Le Doeuff 2007, 171-2). This process introduces a plurality to thought which, according to Olkowski’s reading of Le Doeuff, creates a ‘polygenesis in which mastery fades away’ (2007, 90). This plurality is reflected in the art-thesis both sculpturally and in terms of its nomadic narrative. The plurality of feminist arguments contained in the different drips constitute a consistency which amounts to a schizo-revolutionary labial theory of knowledge production within a hypermasculine discipline. The importance of this strategy of producing knowledge in an open system is developed in the drip, Ripple Effect, as a process of learning to think à deux. I argue that (re)reading the mainstream political treatises à deux allows them to be read beyond the masculine discourse of philosophy towards a creative reading that enriches the reader, even to the point that the reader creatively reinvents the text. It is a feminist strategy insofar that the mainstream political treatises are (re)read in relation to the ‘feminine’. (Re)reading à deux enlivens women’s ways of knowing and restores the feminine into the text, making a difference to the same which sustains men’s knowledge as the ‘proper knowledge’. This process of thinking à deux can assert the positivity of feminine differences in thought in the love of others.

Although the synthesis of Irigaray’s project of sexual difference feminism and Deleuze and Guattari’s nomadic philosophy may not appear as original, their respective theories have made possible the construction of this method of nomadic flowing connectivity. This productive encounter is featured throughout the art-thesis. In the drip, Labial Drip, it features in the idea of the feminine nomad as a model of subjectivity that recognises the feminine within the process of becoming-woman. It is a model that agrees with Deleuze and Guattari to the extent that becoming-woman must be the starting point for molecular becoming (2004, 306), but aligns with the feminist projects of Braidotti (1994) and Lorraine (1999) which incorporate Irigaray’s theory of the feminine (1985a). Through a synthesis of Deleuze and Guattari’s and Irigaray’s two models of subjectivity, I argue that becoming-woman should be posited not as a becoming-other or -elsewhere, but as a process of becoming-other of the other, which supports the claim for a female subjectivity as part of the process of becoming-woman. The feminine nomad is posited as a revolutionary escape artist who can continually
escape from her “self” as defined by the patriarchal systems of representation, from within, to touch upon the intensities of the feminine only to return to herself and express her “self” in ‘an “other meaning’” (Irigaray 1985a, 29). This feminist process of becoming-woman is summarised as an open-ended, never finished, ever-flowing, ever-folding, labial revolution of learning, creation and becoming with others.

The productive encounter between Irigaray’s and Deleuze and Guattari’s different theories also features in the drip, Drizzle, in the form of a schizo-revolutionary labial theory of artistic practice. This drip explores the potential of a feminist aesthetics of resistance that can challenge the capitalist and patriarchal systems of representation and thoroughly incite the practice of becoming-woman. I argue that we can develop this feminist aesthetics of resistance through a synthesis of Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of schizo-revolutionary art (2013) and Irigaray’s concepts of the indifferentiated woman (1985b) and the labial lips (1985a). Such a synthesis has an enfolded purpose: 1) to formulate a new feminist and artistic theorisation of resistance; and 2) to propose a different feminist artistic practice of resistance. This enfolded approach produces not just political art nor an aesthetic approach within political theory, rather, an enfolded theory-practice of art and politics ‘without any possibility of distinguishing what is touching from what is touched’ (Irigaray 1985a, 26); a labial art-politics (Mackenzie and MacKenzie 2014, 77). The feminist artistic encounters that are produced will introduce a new influx of labial cosmic energy capable of forcing the psychic system open to new ideas of subjectivity and judgement. The new ideas evoked will produce a new enfolded process of thinking that is à deux, which will enable us to explore the emancipation of images of woman as well as female imagination, pleasure and expression.

Whatever order the reader selects the drips to read, this art-thesis is not finished. There is a strategic conclusion that does not determine an end-point, but rather becomes an invitation to continue this project of producing a schizo-revolutionary labial art-politics. This strategic conclusion can be found in the puddle, Condensation, which outlines an account of a feminist artistic pedagogy I have put into practice in collaboration with Heaney in recent years in order to offer a response to the question of what can be done to challenge the hypermasculine institutionalisation of knowledge. I argue that this pedagogical approach develops a feminine practice that can challenge aspects of patriarchy and capitalism within the academic
institution. In particular, the hypermasculine environment of the academic institution that produces a subjectivity which is aligned with the interests of patriarchy, and the corporate institutional processes that capture social spaces and create the conditions for the production of a capitalistic subjectivity. I argue that new feminist artistic encounters can be created by individuals who are in a position to intervene and change the refrain of learning from within the hypermasculine institutionalisation of knowledge. This pedagogical task is posited as a process that reinvents the environment of the institution and incites different experiences of the institution that could change the way individuals are produced. However, it is not to be read as instructions to enforce a particular course of action to confront aspects of patriarchy and capitalism within the academic institution. It is formed from our own response and outlined in this art-thesis in the hopes that it will encourage readers to carve out their own possible ideas for inventing new pedagogies that promote existential production with the aim to generate conditions for the empowerment of students and teachers. In the same vein, this art-thesis has been produced as an example of a schizo-revolutionary labial art-politics, but there are a number of different ways of experimenting to produce an enfolded practice of art and politics that are capable of disrupting and challenging the dominant patriarchal order. I will not outline a set of guidelines because it is important to understand that there are many responses to the question of what a schizo-revolutionary labial art-politics might become. Melting the traditional thesis became my response to this question. The droplets I hope this art-thesis makes will leave ripple effects within readers that might incite them to continue the creative task of melting the physical and textual practices employed in the hypermasculine discipline of political theory, in order to explore possibilities for female imagination, pleasure and expression through processes of learning with fluidity.

Following Braidotti’s pragmatic approach of practising nomadic feminism within the discipline of philosophy (2002, 7), I have situated myself as an ‘outsider within’ the hypermasculine discipline of political theory and academic institution. This feminist artistic reinvention of the standard hypermasculine thesis will enable us to rethink the way in which we produce, read, and examine theses. More particularly, it enables us to rethink the way in which we encounter, learn and teach knowledge. I make this claim explicit in the drip, Wave, where I propose an understanding of the process of learning as an artistic practice, in which the learner engages in a process of becoming-artist. I argue that an artistic approach aimed at experimentation can resist the traditional approach of instruction aimed at knowledge.
This traditional approach is problematic because it divides knowledge and experience by determining the process of learning as the transmission of pre-existing facts or “truths”. There is nothing new to be learnt when knowledge is acquired in terms of recognition or instruction. This understanding of learning constructs a dualism between mind and body, where the mind is prioritised as the theatre from which the thinking subject views and represents the world. The binary of mind/body not only engenders the opposition between disembodiment and embodiment, it also fuels the mapping for a series of other oppositions, the most relevant for this project being man and mind against woman and body. An artistic process of learning can transform the given processes of thought that is taught by rote learning and instead can bring about new ways of thinking through artistic encounters. I argue that an artistic experiential pedagogy leads to a process of learning from experience and becoming-artist, to the extent that the learner engages in an artistic practice of experimentation to make sense of her or his experience incited by an encounter, by translating it into art. I have submitted this art-thesis with the desire that it might incite in the reader processes of becoming-woman and becoming-artist.

This problematic binary of mind/body corresponds to Deleuze’s critique of the modern image of thought as representational. According to Deleuze, thought loses its creative force when it is conceived in terms of recognition (1994, 143). For Deleuze, “thought” is understood as that which is first of all non-representational thought (and therefore against most of the history of philosophy), and aesthetic rather than conceptual. I explore this creative potential of thought in the drip, Mist, by developing Deleuze’s proposal to understand thought as the expression of ideas. The tension of this drip however lies in the challenge of the modern image of thought that representationally aligns man and mind against woman and body, whilst resisting the pull towards establishing a dominant ‘woman-centered’ image of thought. By incorporating Braidotti’s creative processes of nomadic remembering and the virtual feminine, I argue that we can produce a female thought capable of de-programming thought out of its dominant mode and opening it up to feminine difference. I explore the potential for female thought as a practice of learning how to express the problems that reside within patriarchal ideas of women by asking questions of difference such as, “how much will she have changed?” “How will women have fought for justice?” “In what cases will women have been free?” “Who will have been free?”. These questions of difference will evoke processes of nomadic remembering which will engender processes
of thinking differently, not traditionally, of and about women. I argue that this process will produce a female thought because it engenders a process of individuation fuelled by the virtual feminine and becoming-other of the other.

In order to avoid recuperation within a dogmatic masculine image of thought, I argue that these questions of difference will be asked in feminist dwellings. In the drip, Ripple Effect, I develop Irigaray’s suggestion for a sexuate education (2008b) by arguing for the construction of feminist dwellings in modern political thought as a feminist approach to teaching and learning to think à deux, which thinks of two, for two. Through a synthesis of Irigaray’s proposal to build one’s dwelling using our bodies, imagination and intelligence (2008b, 235) and Ahmed’s description of feminist dwellings as assembled from materials such as citations (2017, 16), I propose that the process of thinking à deux is the activity of building a feminist dwelling. I would argue that when writing and sculpting this art-thesis, I engaged in a process of building a feminist dwelling in the discipline of political theory. Feminist dwellings cannot be constructed in the same way as the master’s house as that will reproduce the same structures and, as a result, will reproduce the same betrayal of thought. Therefore, this art-thesis had to be constructed through a feminine reimagination of both physical and textural practices employed in the hypermasculine discipline of political theory, with the aim to create a feminine difference. This artistic process of building a feminist dwelling can be understood as a feminist methodology of creating art within the patriarchal structures that condition our experience of learning in a hypermasculine discipline and academic institution. By enlivening the feminine within political theory through art, I argue that we can create feminine innovations capable of disrupting the social overcoding of the dominating phallic symbolic order, its judgemental, dogmatic, linear and binary system, and therefore overcome its patriarchal limits. In doing so, feminine innovations can be recognised, not as unworthy secondary knowledge, but as worthy contributions to political theory.

The nature of this proposal for a schizo-revolutionary labial art-politics can now be summarised as an ongoing, never-complete, ever-folding, ever-flowing learning process of creating and becoming with the feminine. This pedagogical proposal is a call to teachers and students of modern political thought to become feminist builders and create a space for feminine difference by teaching and learning from / in / within feminist dwellings. The
invitation to practise a schizo-revolutionary labial art-politics therefore shares the sentiment of an ‘optimistic, rolling-your-sleeves-up-and-getting-things-done feminism’ (Aune and Redfern 2010, xii). So, join this call to creatively confront the hypermasculine institutionalisation of knowledge; let’s roll our sleeves up and participate in this process of building feminist dwellings to melt the hypermasculine house down!

Thank you for your participation.
### Artist’s Acknowledgement

There are many people I would like to thank for inspiring, empowering, supporting, and enriching the process of writing and making this art-thesis. This art-thesis has been constructed with their support, and I am proud to call each of them participating-artists and co-creators. Although this art-thesis challenges the hypermasculine environment of the academic institution, I would like to acknowledge the empowering friendships, collaborations, networks, and solidarities that formed within that environment and which became a source of affirmation, learning, creativity and transformation. To start, I am immensely thankful to Iain MacKenzie and Anna Cutler for their encouragement and generosity throughout this project, and most of all for their stimulating teachings, conversations, and guidance. I am also extremely grateful to Stephen Zepke for all the insightful and empowering conversations, and for his critical but always constructive reading of my work. I feel very privileged to have spent some of this degree collaborating with Conor Heaney in processes of play, risk taking and creativity in our pedagogical project, *Learning, Exchange and Play* (LEP). I also thank Ben Cook for his creative collaboration with us in producing two experimental films on the LEP experience. I would like to thank a number of people who also sparked wonder, joy, and affirmation throughout this journey in and through academia: Jonjo Brady, Alice Colquhoun, Nicola Huxtable, Gerard McGill, Amelia Roberts, Stefan Rossbach, Erzsébet Strausz, the “badass theorists” Hannah Richter and Lina Soukara, and the *Joyful Nomads*, especially Patricia de Vries and Diana Teggi.

Ultimately, creating this art-thesis would not have been possible without the love and support of my family and close friends. I owe an immeasurable heartfelt thanks to my Mum and Dad for their unconditional love, patience and generosity, for raising me to become an independent and courageous woman who thinks for herself, and for empowering me to believe I can do it. To my niece and nephews for their joyful reminders of the importance to imagine, wonder and play. To my “slay” sisters, Tori and Lisa, for their many encouraging, empowering and motivational pep talks, for their guidance in teaching me how to slay all day every day, and for the knowledge that sisterhood is powerful. My brother-in-law, Chris, for his lessons in determination. My two nans and great aunt, Gloria, Jean, and Anne, who continue to build our uplifting matriarch. Auntie Lorraine and Uncle Martin for listening to
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Dedication

This art-thesis is dedicated to the memory of my Auntie Debbie, who finally escaped the cruel patriarchal world she lived in. May she rest in peace.

A schizo-revolutionary labial art-politics is devoted to the futures of Isla, Noah, Ralphie Joshua, and to all those surviving in hypermasculine environments; let's learn to make a feminine difference.

Reference Note:

To build feminist dwellings, we need to dismantle what has already been assembled; we need to ask what it is we are up against, what it is we are for, knowing full well that this we is not a foundation but what we are working toward. By working out what we are for, we are working out that we, that hopeful signifier of a feminist collectivity (Ahmed 2017, 2).

You are also enriched by one another; you should have little networks, assemblages, kindred spirits. So draw on the resources of the group! (Braidotti, 2014).

“we” are indeed in this together (Braidotti 2006, 93).

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**Labial Drip**

_Becoming-woman_, for Deleuze and Guattari, is a process of _becoming-other_, in which becoming-woman is the key to all other becomings (2004, 306). Although I agree that becoming-woman must be the starting point for molecular becoming, my argument for becoming-woman will align with the feminist projects of Braidotti (1994) and Lorraine (1999) which incorporate Irigaray’s theory of the _feminine_ (1985a). Through a synthesis of Deleuze and Guattari’s and Irigaray’s two models of subjectivity, I will propose the idea of the _feminine nomad_ as a model of subjectivity that recognises the feminine within the process of becoming-woman. I will argue that becoming-woman should be posited not as a becoming-other or elsewhere, but as a process of becoming-other of the other, which supports the claim for a female subjectivity as part of the process of becoming-woman. Building upon Riordan’s concept of the _labial machine_ (2011, 85), I will argue that the becoming-woman launched at the threshold of the labial machine explores the assertion of a female subjective identity and sexuality as well as possibilities for alternative subjectivities because it cuts and draws both molar and molecular lines of flights. The feminine nomad will be posited as a revolutionary escape artist who can continually escape from her “self” as defined by the patriarchal systems of representation, from within, to touch upon the intensities of the feminine only to return to herself and express her “self” in “an ‘other meaning’” (Irigaray 1985a, 29). This feminist process of becoming-woman will be summarised as an open-ended, never finished, ever-flowing, ever-folding, labial revolution of learning, creation and becoming with others.

Irigaray claims that the West is built on a _phallic_ economy, in which the phallus is the ultimate signifier that permeates all discourse and logos (1985a, 86). She explains that this dominant phallocentric model ‘shares the values promulgated by patriarchal society and culture’ to the extent that ‘the feminine occurs only within models and laws devised by male subjects. Which implies that there are not really two sexes, but only one’ (86). As Halsema explains, for Irigaray ‘the feminine cannot articulate itself as feminine within a phallocentric symbolic’ (2013, 28). Therefore, Irigaray proposes the creation of a feminine symbolic space that intervenes in the phallocentric symbolic system in order to explore different forms of expression that are not subjugated to the phallic signifier. Irigaray explores the _labial_ as the potential for a counter-discourse of plurality and difference that can produce alternative modes of thinking and being. In her proposal for a labial language of difference, Irigaray argues that women can reclaim morphology, that ‘has always in practice been used against them’ (Whitford 1991, 12), and
explore ways of articulating the feminine as ‘the other of the other, rather than “not-man”’ (Richardson 1998, 104). By inventing a language in which women can speak as women (1985a, 135), Irigaray argues that women can express themselves on their own terms and not those imposed by the dominant phallocentric model.

By working from within philosophical discourse, Irigaray intervenes in the masculine discourse of philosophy as a woman in order to create a space from which women can speak as women (1985a, 135; Whitford 1991, 13). She explains that ‘[i]f language does not give both sexes equivalent opportunities to speak and increase their self-esteem, it functions as a means of enabling one sex to subjugate the other’ (1994, xv). It is not only that ‘[w]omen have been physically and symbolically dispossessed’ of the discipline of philosophy (Braidotti 1994, 119), women have been physically and symbolically subjugated; ‘[a]nd yet that woman-thing speaks’ (Irigaray 1985a, 111). Irigaray explains that she does not speak through subjugation insofar as ‘[s]peaking [as] woman is not speaking of woman. It is not a matter of producing a discourse of which woman would be the object or the subject’ (135). Such a discourse, Irigaray explains, would (re)produce another ‘phallocratic model’ (128). Whitford says that Irigaray warns against entering the political arena as women because this is to risk the danger of ‘accepting the terms of the system currently in force,’ in which ‘women will become “men”’ (1991, 12). She explains that Irigaray’s aim is not to become part of the “boys club” by making philosophy more inclusive to the extent that ‘women become assimilated to the world of men and then have nothing to contribute as women’ (12). Irigaray’s project should not, however, be mistaken for that of creating a female version of philosophy or a “girls club”. Irigaray tells us that such a project can only attempt to

reverse the order of things, even supposing this to be possible, history would repeat itself in the long run, would revert to sameness: to phallocratism. It would leave room neither for women’s sexuality, nor for women’s imaginary, nor for women’s language to take (their) place (1985a, 33).

The aim of Irigaray’s feminist project of sexual difference can therefore be understood as a process of constructing a new and non-phallic model of difference. It is an approach of revealing philosophical discourse ‘as a discourse for and between men’ (Richardson 1998, 92) which paralyses her, stops her flow (Irigaray 1992, 18), and intervening in it in order to construct a space for the emergence of woman in philosophical discourse that can free her flow (Whitford 1991, 13). Braidotti describes Irigaray’s feminist approach as a methodology in which
she reads, or rather un-reads, the texts in terms of their representation of and relations to the “feminine”; it is a game of specular/speculative reflection of the inner logic of phallogocentric discourse. This game of strategic repetition of throwing back to the text what the text does to the “feminine” becomes a highly subversive practice of the critique of discourse (1994, 131).

Given her subversive approach, Jenkins says that Irigaray’s work cannot be read without constant reference to the “canon” of Western philosophy, but which nonetheless aims to subvert its premises to a degree that means her writing cannot be included “within” it (2014, 167).

That is to say, Irigaray’s work cannot be included ‘within’ the ‘canon’ because it is expressive of ‘an “other meaning”’ (Irigaray 1985a, 29). I understand that Irigaray’s contested relationship to the canon is due to the ‘feminine’ she promotes within it. Which is not to be understood as the feminine represented in models and images designed by and for men (Grosz 1989, xx), but as the other of the other. To this extent, I understand Irigaray’s work as expressive of ‘an “other meaning”’ insofar as it expresses the feminine as the other of the other. Irigaray builds this relationship to the canon through her feminist critique, which situates her work outside the canon yet creates a space for the feminine that intervenes within it. By articulating a feminine philosophy in terms of sexual difference, Irigaray creates a way for this canon to express ‘an “other meaning”’ (29). That is to say, she problematises and reinvents this masculine philosophical discourse to create a different discourse that expresses a feminine philosophy.

According to Joy, it is important to recognise that in describing this labial language as a counter-discourse, we resist regarding Irigaray’s proposal ‘as merely the female counterpart of the phallus’ (2013, 77). In agreement with Joy, Irigaray’s project needs to be acknowledged for ‘being far more ingenious than proposing any such simplistic reversal’ (77). What I argue is so ingenious about Irigaray’s project is quite simply her desire to promote the feminine as the other of the other, which offers possibilities for creating an alternative discourse and subjectivities that proceed from woman’s own sexually specific cartography. That being said, by focusing on a form specific to (biological) women, Whitford acknowledges the critiques of Irigaray’s work that demarcate it as essentialist, inaccessible, elitist, ignorant of other differences such as race, sexuality, disability, and class, and also of the contributions of other women; therefore, homogenous, and anti-feminist (1991, 4; for critiques Whitford acknowledged see Bowlby 1983, Cameron 1985, Jones 1986, Le Doeuff 2007, and Plaza
However, contrary to these critiques, I understand Irigaray’s work aims to build a positive sense of, and a pluralistic approach to, sexual difference. By focusing on woman’s morphology, I argue that Irigaray reclaims feminine difference from the patriarchal images and models that represent it as a negative by situating it as the source of women’s creativity. Braidotti describes this ‘assertion of the positivity of sexual difference’ as a ‘discursive strategy’ in which ‘women must speak the feminine – they must think it, write it, and represent it in their own terms’ (1994, 118). That is to say, this ‘feminine’ difference that Irigaray is promoting is ‘the other of the other’ (Richardson 1998, 104) insofar as it ‘is a woman-defined-feminine and as such it is still a blank, it is not yet there’ (Braidotti 1994, 131). By inviting women to create their feminine difference in their own terms, Irigaray’s feminist project of sexual difference does not adhere to the critiques described by Whitford that hypostasize ‘woman’ or reduce them to ‘a falsifying unity’ (1991, 4), but instead aims to engender feminine differences. It is in this sense, therefore, Whitford says that Irigaray ‘does not intend to tell us what “woman” is’ because this is a creative and inventive call for change that needs to be approached by women collectively (9-10).

That being said, Irigaray does state that ‘[w]hatever inequalities may exist among women, they all undergo, even without clearly realizing it, the same oppression, the same exploitation of their body, the denial of their desire’ (1985a, 164 my italics). This would seem to be problematic insofar as women experience different forms of oppression and exploitation. In an attempt to defend this generalisation, Irigaray argues that ‘men have organized a de facto rivalry among women’ to the extent that women ‘have been assigned and taught’ their ‘form of “social existence”’ by ‘the society of men’ (164). This rivalry among women is therefore constructed as a patriarchal model in which women are not only positioned within the gender dichotomy of masculine/feminine but also within a hierarchical scale of homosocial power relations between women. In re-presenting this reality, women unwittingly submit themselves to think and live through the patriarchal systems of representation. To this extent, the rivalry between women is a result of our patriarchal habits of thought that condition us to think in terms of identities as established categories. This rivalry among women, Irigaray argues, is in fact a consequence of the patriarchal social structure. Therefore, Irigaray’s generalisation can be understood as a call for women to collectively find ways to free themselves from this masculine imposed ‘social existence’.
In order to contest the homogenising critiques of her feminist project, as she is clearly wary about the danger of this patriarchal conditioning, Irigaray states that she prefers ‘to speak, in the plural, of women’s liberation movements’ because there are multiple groups and tendencies in women’s struggles today, and to reduce them to a single movement involves a risk of introducing phenomena of hierarchization, claims of orthodoxy, and so on (164).

Irigaray further recognises that the task to make a (feminine) difference is ‘obviously not simply an “individual” task’ (164). Whitford explains that one woman alone cannot ‘bring about change in the symbolic order’ (1991, 5). Irigaray argues that it is, rather, a task of the ‘multiple groups and tendencies in women’s struggles today’ to make (feminine) differences (1985a, 164). Irigaray proposes that this task not only involves women learning to love themselves but also, given men’s organised rivalry among women, learning to love each other in the step towards freeing themselves from this patriarchal ‘social existence’ (164).

I would add that the task of resisting patriarchal society does not only concern women, but men as well. According to Boothroyd, ‘it is not for women only to accomplish … but for men, too, to discover processes of identification which will lead to the withdrawal of their cultural Phallus’ in order to pass ‘a non-nihilistic ethical future for both women and men’ (1996, 67-77). Boothroyd suggests a task for men that is similar to the one proposed by Irigaray for women (1985a, 164), which involves ‘a new kind of responding to the other; a listening which works at forestalling the ongoing phallocratic appropriation of the thought of sexual difference’ (1996, 67). Given the focus on woman’s morphological difference in Irigaray’s feminist project, he explains that women have ‘a strategic advantage’ (67) in the ‘rethinking of sexual difference’ (77) and, therefore, towards freeing themselves from patriarchal social structures. I agree that woman’s morphological difference gives them an advantage to the extent that Riordan explains they are already connected to the intensities of the feminine through their own labial machines (2011, 85-7). Whereas this process will be different for men insofar that they are the majority subjects within patriarchal society and are assumed not to have any labial machines. That being said, Riordan posits that labial machines can be located on all bodies: on the face, female genitals, and cuts etc., therefore, every body has the potential to connect to the intensities of the feminine (85-7).
By employing the term *labial machine*, Riordan invokes the concept of an *abstract machine* from Deleuze and Guattari. According to Deleuze and Guattari, abstract machines are defined by the fourth aspect of assemblages, in other words, the cutting edges of decoding and deterritorialization. They draw these cutting edges. Therefore they make the territorial assemblage open onto something else, assemblages of another type, the molecular, the cosmic; they constitute becoming (2004, 562).

Riordan makes the connection between Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of an abstract machine and the labial lips through ‘Irigaray’s argument that the feminine is coded within masculine parameters in two contradictory but related ways – as lack and leak’ (2011, 83). Riordan argues that ‘[w]ithin this code, cutting would create lack and leak, tomb and womb simultaneously’ (83). To this extent, ‘[c]astration creates two edges. One borders a territory, the organism/subject, whilst the other borders the feminine’ (84). The labial machine, according to Riordan’s argument, cuts and ‘draws both molar and molecular lines’ creating a ‘becoming-woman via contagion with the microfeminine [that] need not subtract from woman, whose becoming-woman proceeds from her own sexually specific cartography’ (85). This process could provide feminists with the tools to enact Deleuze and Guattari’s discussion of feminist politics (see Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 304) as a ‘double-edged politics’, that is, a molar and molecular politics: to claim a female subjectivity as part of the process of becoming-woman (Riordan 2011, 85).

By connecting Boothroyd’s proposal for men to withdraw from their cultural Phallus, to Riordan’s argument that labial machines can be located on all bodies, I propose that men can also locate labial machines on their bodies. We must remember that like the labia, penises have folds too, of course, but are culturally striated in the symbolic world as the phallic. Therefore, in a process of withdrawing from their cultural Phallus, I argue that Boothroyd’s task of ‘rethinking of the masculine’ for men (1996, 68) can be a task of rethinking the masculine body in ways that can locate labial machines. Such a process could be understood as that which is described by Braidotti as ‘de-essentialized embodiment’ for majority subjects (1994, 171). By locating labial machines on their bodies, I propose that men can too connect to the intensities of the feminine that can promote possibilities of difference for subjectivity that can free themselves from patriarchal modes of being.
(DRIP: Transwomen, a hot debate in sexual difference feminism of late (see Greer 2016), I argue also have an advantageous starting point in rethinking sexual difference because they are connected to the intensities of the feminine through their own labial machines. The reason I employ feminine and masculine pronouns throughout this art-thesis instead of using “they” as a singular pronoun, is not because I disagree with transgender or gender non-conforming pronoun preferences, it is instead to avoid the “neutral” positioning of the subject that has always been presupposed as masculine throughout the history of Western philosophy of thought.)

With the aim to connect to the intensities of the feminine, it will be useful to turn to Irigaray’s investigation into fluids. Irigaray claims that women’s expression flows in a style that symbolises the female sexual imaginary, which she associates with a ‘mechanics’ of fluids (1985a, 106). By approximating the ‘properties of fluids’ (106), Irigaray describes women’s process of enunciating as ‘continuous, compressible, dilatable, viscous, conductible, diffusible … unending’ (111). Emphasising these as feminine features, Irigaray describes women’s mode of discourse as fluid in its difference to the dogmatic rigidness of the phallocentric symbolic order, which privileges the one (phallic) signifier (26). Irigaray explains that this phallocentric mode of discourse symbolises man’s isomorphic sexual imaginary to the extent that it privileges a ‘mechanics of solids’ (107), which emphasises the masculine features of ‘[p]roduction, property (propriété), order, form, unity, visibility, erection’ (1985c, 77). It is in this sense that his words have been able to fix themselves like bricks to form a wall against her expression, ‘paralysing her, stopping her flow’ (1992, 18). To this extent, Irigaray claims that ‘[s]olid mechanics and rationality have maintained a relationship of very long standing, one against which fluids have never stopped arguing’ (1985a, 113).

In her unfolding theory of the labial as the potential for a counter-discourse of plurality and difference, Irigaray explains that it is from within the labial lips that women’s fluid mode of discourse is produced (24). She says that the labial designates the ‘two’ labial lips, which are not to be understood as a complementary dyad, but rather as the embodiment of irreducible plurality and difference (28). By sacrificing no lip over the other, no one of her pleasures to another, she is able to identify herself with none of them in particular, but rather always an ever-folding becoming ‘of never being simply one’ (31). Each in ‘continuous contact’, Irigaray explains that the ‘self-caressing’ labial lips are in a ‘ceaseless exchange’ with each other, which is taking place ‘all the time’ (24-31). What is expressed between them has ‘an “other
“meaning” that makes her ‘whimsical, incomprehensible, agitated, capricious ... leaving “him” unable to discern the coherence of any meaning’ to the extent that she continuously enunciates involuntarily what she feels:

She steps ever so slightly aside from herself with a murmur, an exclamation, a whisper, a sentence left unfinished ... When she returns, it is to set off again from elsewhere. From another point of pleasure, or of pain (29).

Hence, Irigaray argues, it is useless to ask a woman to repeat herself in order to make sense of what she is saying, as when she does she would be repeating herself from another place in her mode of discourse:

They have returned within themselves... within the intimacy of that silent, multiple, diffuse touch. And if you ask them insistently what they are thinking about, they can only reply: Nothing. Everything (29).

This labial language of difference cannot be understood by the phallic symbolic order because it ‘sets off in all directions’ making her enunciate ‘contradictory words,’ that cause her to appear ‘somewhat mad from the standpoint of reason, inaudible for whoever listens to them with ready-made grids, with a fully elaborated code in hand’ (29). Such misunderstanding, Irigaray further explains, is what makes her

access to a signifying economy, to the coining of signifiers, to their exchange, … difficult or even impossible for her because she remains an outsider, herself (a) subject to their norms. She borrows signifiers but cannot make her mark, or re-mark upon them. Which all surely keeps her deficient, empty, lacking, in a way that could be labelled “psychotic”: a latent but not actual psychosis, for want of a practical signifying system (1985b, 71).

It is outside of the phallocentric symbolic space that we find the ‘psychotic’ (71) or ‘hysteric’ (61) trying to express her-self, her womanliness, and her pleasure. Women’s expression is therefore labelled hysterical because there is no female syntax appropriate to use. However, Irigaray suggests that it is her hysterical expression that provides the potential to express herself in a labial language of plurality and difference. Irigaray confesses that there is no simple way of providing instructions or an account of ‘speaking (as) woman’, because ‘it is spoken, but not in meta-language’ (144). But she does admit elsewhere that it is ‘possible to start to create it with everyday language’ (1993c, 49). To this extent, she argues that

It is still better to speak only in riddles, allusions, hints, parables. Even if asked to clarify a few points. Even if people plead that they just don’t understand. After all, they never have understood (1985b, 143).
By taking on this task, Irigaray challenges us to push the limits of exasperation,

[until the ear tunes into another music, the voice starts to sing again, the very gaze stops squinting over
the signs of auto-representation, and (re)production no longer inevitably amounts to the same and returns
to the same forms, with minor variations (143).

Therefore, in order to understand this feminine expression ‘[o]ne would have to listen with
another ear’ because her expression is fluid to the extent that it is

always in the process of weaving itself, of embracing itself with words, but also of getting rid of words
in order not to become fixed, congealed in them. For if “she” says something, it is not, it is already no
longer, identical with what she means. What she says is never identical with anything, moreover; rather,
it is contiguous. It touches (upon). And when it strays too far from that proximity, she breaks off and
starts over at “zero”: her body-sex (1985a, 29).

By speaking from a space of fluidity, Irigaray argues that woman can borrow rigid signifiers
from the phallocentric symbolic order and liquefy them into a flow of ‘contradictory words’ in
order to express ‘an “other meaning”’ (29). Still, she cannot ‘mark, or re-mark upon them’
(1985b, 71), and nor would she want to because that would only result in more dogmatic claims
to verity that would reproduce another ‘phallocratic model’ (1985a, 128). She can however
touch upon them in a process that keeps her open to other flows (29), or, I will argue, lines of
flight (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 305). What she expresses, therefore, can never be fixed
because her expression is in a continuous flow of touching upon. Moreover, it is a fluid
language that speaks from her morphological difference and so is expressed from a continuous
process of touching, within. To this extent, she cannot be asked to repeat herself because she
has already returned within herself. According to Braidotti, it is her morphological difference
that makes her ‘troublesome’ because she cannot be fixed (1994, 80). It is in this sense that I
argue that she can cause ‘runoffs’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 204); which is not to flee from
her flow of ‘contradictory words’, but to re-create or resist from within the dominant
phallocentric symbolic order by touching upon a different flow of ‘contradictory words’ that
expresses ‘an “other meaning”’ (Irigaray 1985a, 29). It is a process of enunciating feminine
difference in which its meaning expressed is the other of the other.

Speaking as woman does not, however, determine woman’s sexuality as the only conditions in
which we can express feminine difference. Following Riordan’s argument, everybody who
locates their own labial machines is forced to rethink their enfleshed bodies to the extent that
the connection to feminine intensities enables them to explore possibilities of difference for
subjectivity as well as discourse. Instead of thinking of subjects with labial machines as *not-men* because their enfleshed bodies present ‘the horror of nothing [no phallus] to see’ (26), I argue that subjects with labial machines can be thought of according to Braidotti’s term, as ‘not-one’ (1994, 171). Braidotti describes this subject who is *not-one* ‘as a subject that is split time and time again, over multiple axes of differentiation’ (171). Labial machines split the subject through its ‘two’ labial lips, which are not the same in themselves, but are different in that their folds are plural, have no center, and are different in and of themselves. The subject with a labial machine therefore cannot sacrifice one lip over the other, no one of her pleasures to another, and it is to this extent that Irigaray describes that she is able to identify herself with none of them in particular, but rather always an ever-folding becoming ‘of never being simply one’ (1985a, 31). Without knowing (never “knowing”), she is already ‘several,’ but these are identities that cannot be dispersed because the other within her is already becoming something else through her labial machine (31).

According to Riordan, this process of experiencing the intensities of the flesh can ‘transport the flesh toward that other place, simultaneously within and outside our enfleshed selves’ and because ‘intensities are virtual they are like waves, events wherein the flesh exceeds itself, escapes from itself. As in Francis Bacon’s de-formed heads, which escape the face in convulsive becoming-animal’ (2011, 80). Invoking Spinoza, Riordan claims that the enfleshed body is ‘no longer a question of form. It is a question of velocities’ (81). To this extent, I propose that everybody can find in their labial machines a movement of escape from their “self” as defined by patriarchal systems of representations, from within. That is to say, labial machines can cut across the territory of the body represented in patriarchal systems of representation, and open the flesh up to the feminine differences. Irigaray explains that there is no single model of female sexuality, there is no *one* in which our enfleshed selves can become, because it is through her sexual multiplicity that the/a woman is *indifferentiated* (1985b, 227). Neither open (undifferentiated) nor closed (differentiated), her morphology is determined as indeterminate (indifferentiated) (229). Lost in the movement of escape within a labial machine, the subject becomes indiscernible because she is in her ‘zone of … indifferentiation where one can no longer be distinguished from a woman, *an* animal, or *a* molecule…’ (Deleuze 1997b, 1). A labial machine can therefore be understood to incite a process of *becoming-woman*.

(DRIP: Employing the term *becoming-woman* invokes the work of Deleuze and Guattari, who introduced it in *A Thousand Plateaus* (2004). In forging a link between Irigaray’s feminist
processes of becoming and Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of becoming-woman, I situate my feminist project within the now well-established literature on feminist interpretations of Deleuze and Guattari’s singly and co-authored works (for an overview of, and contribution to this literature see the essays collected in Buchanan and Colebrook 2000). Typically this literature has focused on the conceptual compatibility of Irigaray’s project of sexual difference feminism and Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy of difference (for an understanding of the arguments for this alliance, I recommend reading Braidotti 1994, Colebrook 2000, Grosz 1994b, Lorraine 1999, Olkowski 2000, and Riordan 2011. For an overview of the arguments against it, see Goodchild 1996, and Ungelenk 2014.).

According to Riordan, men who escape from within their labial machines produce a ‘becoming-woman of man’ that forces them to rethink their enfleshed bodies as their labial machine ‘perverts his phallic flesh, opens it out, connects it to the intensities of a feminine’ (2011, 85). For women, Riordan says that labial machines ‘need not subtract from woman, whose becoming-woman proceeds from her own sexually specific cartography’ (85). Riordan explains that the *lips* of the labial machines (which can be located on every body) are the thresholds which can launch such becomings-woman, and it is to this extent that she describes them as ‘the intermezzo’ (86-7). Riordan draws upon Deleuze and Guattari to propose that men and women can escape their positions of duality through their labial machines, as Deleuze and Guattari argue that ‘[t]he only way to get out of the dualism machines is to be-between, to pass between, the intermezzo’ (2004, 305). Although I agree that the labial machine should be considered as the threshold for becomings-woman, my argument for becoming-woman begins to differ from Riordan’s at this point.

Riordan follows Deleuze and Guattari by saying that ‘all becomings proceed through, but by no means finish with, becoming-woman’ (2011, 87). For Deleuze and Guattari, becoming-woman is a process of *becoming-other*, in which becoming-woman is the key to all other becomings (2004, 306). Although I agree that becoming-woman must be the starting point for molecular becoming, there is an emphasis on leaving *woman* behind in the becomings outlined by Riordan, Deleuze and Guattari. In agreement with Jones, becoming-woman seems to be posited as just a ‘vector one moves through and leaves behind on the way to becoming-elsewhere’ (2011, 385). This seems at odds with Riordan’s initial argument that the labial machine cuts and ‘draws both molar and molecular lines’, producing a becoming-woman that keeps woman intact (2011, 85). In picking up Riordan’s initial argument, I argue that the
becoming-woman launched at the threshold of the labial machine explores the assertion of a female subjective identity and sexuality as well as possibilities for alternative subjectivities. I propose that becoming-woman should be posited not as a becoming-other or -elsewhere, but as a process of becoming-other of the other, which supports the claim for a female subjectivity as part of the process of becoming-woman. In order to further clarify the difference between these two arguments, I will posit the idea of the feminine nomad as the subjectivity that is produced through a process of becoming-other of the other.

For Deleuze and Guattari, the ‘life of the nomad is the intermezzo’ (2004, 419). They define nomads in terms of ‘movement’ insofar that the ‘nomad distributes himself in a smooth space; he occupies, inhabits, holds that space; that is his territorial principle’ (420-1). Yet, Deleuze and Guattari explain that ‘nomads have no points, paths, or land, even though they do by all appearances’, instead they ‘are there, on the land, wherever there forms a smooth space that gnaws, and tends to grow, in all directions’ (421). The movement of the nomad is therefore primary and non-hierarchal. Deleuze and Guattari describe this space on which the nomad roams as a ‘smooth space’ of the nomos, which derives from the combination of the Greek words nem, which means ‘to distribute’, and nemô, which translates as ‘pasture livestock’, to explain the unstructured movements of unguided animals on an unbounded pasture (420). They contrast this understanding of the nomos with another Greek word, logos, which is usually understood to mean ‘law’ and is used to depict a ‘striate space’ that is well-ordered and structured (408). In this contrast, Watson explains that Deleuze and Guattari posit that the nomads ‘operate in opposition to the State’, and are capable of producing ‘revolutionary innovation’, such as ‘following lines of flight’ and ‘forming war machines’ (2010, 174). This revolutionary ability is described by Conley as the nomad’s capability to create spaces through the trajectories of their passages that move from one territory to another and from given striations on the surface of the world to smooth and intensive areas, areas that are tantamount to the folds and creases of events that vibrate in the body, itself a place that can be affectively spatialised in infinite ways (2010, 262).

The life of the feminine nomad is the intermezzo of the lips of the labial machines. To the extent that the labial machine incites a becoming-other of the other, the becoming(s) occurs on the smooth space accessed by a labial machine. I posit this smooth space as the smooth labial space in order to connect Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of the smooth space to Irigaray’s description of women’s sexual multiplicity, which can only be accessed through touch (Irigaray
Building upon Deleuze and Guattari’s description of the nomad, I will unfold the feminine nomad as a she who distributes herself in her smooth labial space; she occupies, inhabits, holds that space; that is her territorial principle (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 420, my revision). I propose that the movement of the feminine nomad explores women’s sexual multiplicity, as described by Irigaray, by approaching her pleasure not as a ‘choice’ between ‘clitoral activity and vaginal passivity,’ but instead as a movement between the multiple different ‘caresses’ that can invoke ‘the hystericization of her entire body’ (Irigaray 1985a, 28).

Moving between her multiple sex organs avoids focusing on one sex organ that ends the process in one climax, and instead explores her body sex as ‘a thousand tiny sexes’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 235). I argue that this approach of the feminine nomad overturns the patriarchal approach that judges her body sex as ‘zero,’ because she ‘has sex organs more or less everywhere’ (Irigaray 1985a, 28).

According to Deleuze and Guattari, in order to create this ‘smooth space’ (2004, 421), we must destratify the territories of representation. The labial machine provides an escape from the patriarchal territories of representation because it presents ‘the horror of nothing to see’ (Irigaray 1985a, 26). By escaping the territories of representation through the labial machine, we can discover a destratified space that I have described elsewhere as ‘the smooth labial space of pure difference’ (Mackenzie and MacKenzie 2014, 74). I propose that this smooth labial space of pure difference can therefore serve as the basis for the critique of the well-ordered, rigid and static patriarchal logos of social formations. The process that ‘occurs’ on the smooth labial space of pure difference can be understood as ‘the becoming-imperceptible of women becoming-women’ insofar that it involves ‘the transformation from one territory to another’ (74). The new territory that is created, however, occurs on the enfleshed body to the extent that Deleuze and Guattari explain that ‘all progress is made by and in the striated space’ (2004, 536-7). I argue that the intensities of the feminine differences experienced on the smooth labial space of pure difference are introduced to the territorial assemblage of the enfleshed body, inciting a process that explores her morphology as definite and defined as difference. It is in this process that she marks her territory and expresses her morphological difference.

It is important to note that war machines can be appropriated by the state. Deleuze and Guattari explain the State’s war machine as that which ‘takes war for its object and forms a line of destruction prolongable to the limits of the universe’ (2004, 466). The feminine difference introduced by a labial machine is at risk of appropriation, from which she is (re-)submitted to
the patriarchal territories of representation. Insofar as the labial machine cuts and draws molar and molecular lines of flights, the assertion of a female subjective identity and sexuality runs the risk of forming a molar identity that can be appropriated by patriarchal models and images. However, I argue that inasmuch as the labial machine also cuts and draws molecular lines of flight, she has already escaped her molar identity to become-other of the other. That is to say, by expressing her morphological difference, she produces herself as indifferenciated because she is still indifferenctiated to the extent that her morphology is always in the process of becoming other (Irigaray 1985b, 227). What she becomes can never be “finished” because her expression is in a continuous process of touching within. She cannot be asked to repeat herself because she has already returned (to the indifferenciated) within herself. When asked who she is, or more precisely to explain her indifferenciation, she ‘can only reply: Nothing [(differenciated)]. Everything [(undifferentiated)]’ (Irigaray 1985a, 29). Therefore, I argue that she is always in a process of becoming-other of the other to the extent that she is indifferenciated and indifferenciated. To this extent, the indifferen/CIated woman is a line of flight (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 305). She does not, and cannot, belong to patriarchal territories of representation because she is enfolded; always moving between the intermezzo of her labial lips. I propose that her revolutionary ability can therefore be thought of as her ever-folding capacity to escape the patriarchal territories of representation and open her flesh up to the multiple possibilities of feminine differences from within her labial machine.

(DRIP: See the drip, Drizzle, for an understanding of the process of indifferen/CIation I posit as the indifferen/CIated organisation of the Cosmos. Although Deleuze employs these terms to describe the virtuality and actuality of an Idea, I use them to describe the approach of an artistic process that is a dynamic between the differenciated order and the undifferenciated chaos that has an organisation to it through a selection of the, in principle, infinite possibilities of the Cosmos.)

I have consolidated Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the nomad with Irigaray’s notion of the feminine because both concepts function in opposition to the logos of social formation in order to create alternative subjectivities. However, the critical reason for this consolidation is based upon Lorraine’s account of the ‘dilemmas raised for personal identity by the receptivity to dynamic becoming advocated by Irigaray and Deleuze,’ constituted by her argument that Deleuze ‘does not insist on recognition of the feminine other in the way that Irigaray does’ and
Irigaray ‘does not allow, perhaps, the same range of lines of flight as Deleuze’ (1999, 19). Lorraine goes on to say,

At the same time that Deleuze’s notion of becoming-imperceptible has revolutionary potential for those trapped in molar selves, the emphasis on the prepersonal forces running through individuals renders it difficult to acknowledge the constitutive power of personal others. Irigaray also wants to open up the subject to such becomings. But she is equally interested in establishing a new foundation for identity – one more adequate to contemporary times. If for Deleuze the problem is how to map out lines of flight from the molar identities we currently have, the problem for Irigaray is how to stabilize a molar identity that will allow us to live more ethically (163).

The dilemmas that Lorraine brings to the forefront of the two philosopher’s discussions of becoming does not entail an argument that prioritises one theory over the other. Rather, she suggests ‘a synthesis of the two that compensates for the weaknesses and brings out the strengths of each’ (164). In finding nothing in Deleuze’s work that is incompatible with this ‘mutual implication of lines of flight’, but rather much to support it, Lorraine proposes that this synthesis produces a model of subjectivity that recognises the feminine within the process of becoming-woman (164). She argues that this synthesis ‘allows a “personalized” approach to destratification, with important ethical and political implications’ (228).

Starting with what Lorraine deems as the weaknesses of Irigaray’s project from a Deleuzian perspective, she says ‘one might say that Irigaray’s project involves a deterritorialization from traditional molar identity, only to reterritorialize onto the oedipalized counterpart of traditional molar identity’ (163). According to Deleuze and Guattari’s discussion of feminist politics, it seems to be the case that they would warn against any processes of establishing a female personal identity:

> It is, of course, indispensable for women to conduct a molar politics, with a view to winning back their own organism, their own history, their own subjectivity … But it is dangerous to confine oneself to such a subject, which does not function without drying up a spring or stopping a flow (2004, 304).

For Deleuze and Guattari, establishing a female personal identity would therefore block becomings. However, my understanding of Irigaray’s project is not to establish a female oedipal identity as a claim to “know” the nature of woman (Irigaray 1985a, 135). It is not about creating an idea of the ‘feminine’ that limits thought to a presupposed image of the woman, *I think therefore I am a one, whole, unified individual female Being*. Rather, it is to establish a space from which to speak as woman, so that ‘one may attempt to provide a space for the “other” as feminine’ (135). I agree with Lorraine that Deleuze and Guattari need to delineate
more carefully between personal identity and oedipal identity, as they seem to imply that both are interchangeable (Lorraine 1999, 181).

In reading Deleuze’s theory of becomings with Irigaray’s notion of the feminine, Lorraine deems the weaknesses of Deleuze’s project by emphasising that the

images of a line of flight and the highly populated desert are oddly solipsistic. They suggest that it is through nomadic movement that one can retain one’s individuality; it is by leaving the molar identities of one’s self and others behind that one can preserve one’s own creative power (163).

Although Lorraine notes that ‘Deleuze nowhere advocates anything like being “yourself” or preserving one’s individuality’ (251), she is arguing that Deleuze’s notion of mapping does not acknowledge the feminine other and therefore the lines of flight followed cannot preserve her creativity. From a Deleuzian perspective, this does not seem to be a problem because the line of flight overcomes such personal identities and therefore does not need to acknowledge the feminine other or preserve her creativity in the process of becoming. However, Lorraine argues against this perspective by saying that ‘failing to map the terrain of sexual difference’ in the process of becoming-woman ‘carries the risk of the masculinist appropriation of feminine power which Irigaray is so concerned with circumventing’ (186). Lorraine claims that in failing to recognise sexual difference, Deleuze and Guattari appear to assume the masculine perspective that the standard for the major identity is the ‘man-standard’, which ‘thus becomes a kind of point of origin, or worse, a point of reference required for orienting the direction of deterritorializing lines of flight’ (186). To this extent, Lorraine proceeds to argue, Deleuze and Guattari appear to only concern themselves with a masculine sexuality, which she suggests will only propose a masculine kind of becoming that has ‘a masculine bias’ (186). She claims that their project to escape practices of self-representation and create alternative subjectivities fails because premising their notion of becoming-woman ‘on destratification from the man-standard … threatens to leave that man-standard intact’ (187). She goes on to say,

until or unless we are prepared to abandon personal identity, depersonalizing lines of flight can only evade the man-standard, leaving the contemporary economy of subjectivity intact rather than transforming it. Mapping a new kind of personal identity – an identity that is an open-ended process rather than a molar entity – could be more effective (188).

In turning to Irigaray, Lorraine argues that,
For Irigaray to follow a line of flight, she needs to overcome an aspect of the social field that renders her creativity invisible and that regularly steals her creative capacities in order to appropriate them for its own (142-3).

What Irigaray seeks to overcome is the patriarchal logos of social formations in order to follow a line of flight that will recognise and render visible her creativity in a process of becoming-woman. That is, women need to establish a stable form of subjectivity as part of the process of becoming-woman that seeks to create alternative subjectivities. To do this, Lorraine goes on to say, ‘Irigaray destratifies oedipalisation by mapping femininity onto the social field’ (187). In agreement with Lorraine’s synthesis of these two models of subjectivity, I argue that the concept of the feminine nomad can succeed in its attempts to escape territories of representation through labial machines, and create alternative subjectivities by introducing feminine differences into the territorial assemblage of the enfleshed body. I propose that the feminine nomad can pursue an Irigarayan kind of becoming that not only focuses on woman’s possibilities for transformation, but also concerns the possibilities for transformation of others. According to Lorraine,

Irigaray wants to incorporate the participatory communion of mutually constitutive creativity into her model of subjectivity. Her model posits a becoming-subject as a becoming in which two or more subjects emerge from encounter with the others transformed, a becoming in which a subject not only pursues her own line of flight but also attends to how her line of flight implicates and forms a web with the lines of flight of others (163-4).

The concept of the feminine nomad is a proposal for a feminist practice of becoming-woman that does not propose the abandonment of personal identity until we all have a personal identity that we can abandon. It is a feminist proposal for a becoming-other of the other which supports the assertion of a female personal identity as part of the process of creating alternative subjectivities that leave all territories of patriarchal representation behind.

(DRIP: In this critique of Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the nomad, it may be better to look at the figure of the ‘schizo’ from Anti-Oedipus (2013). In fact, in the following excerpt about the schizo, we can see how similar Deleuze and Guattari’s description of the schizo is to Irigaray’s description of the feminine other:

The schizo has his own system of co-ordinates for situating himself at his disposal, because, first of all, he has at his disposal his very own recording code, which does not coincide with the social code, or coincides with it only in order to parody it. The code of delirium or of desire proves to have an extraordinary fluidity. It might be said that the schizophrenic passes from one code to the other, that he deliberately scrambles all the codes, by quickly shifting from one to another, according to the questions
asked him, never giving the same explanation from one day to the next, never invoking the same
genealogy, never recording the same event in the same way. When he is more or less forced into it and
is not in a touchy mood, he may even accept the banal Oedipal code, so long as he can stuff it full of all
the disjunctions that this code was designed to eliminate (2013, 27).

Deleuze and Guattari posit the figure of the schizo because it is closest to ‘desire’ in its pure
state; the schizo escapes the Oedipal codes through his ‘deterritorialized flows’ of desire (85)
and is therefore capable of thinking ‘beyond the anthropomorphization of desire that society
imposes on this subject, and with which it represents its own sexuality’ (337). They focus on
‘desire’ more than ‘sexuality’ because they describe that desire is capable of ‘demolishing
entire social sectors’, whereas sexuality is present throughout these social sectors (139). The
sexuality they seek to demolish is based on the Oedipus complex, in favour of a nonhuman
sexuality that is concerned with ‘n sexes’ (337).

(drip: for an account of Deleuze and Guattari’s schizoanalysis, see the drip, Drizzle.)

Although I believe that Deleuze and Guattari’s proposal that the schizo has the potential to
demolish the phallic and capitalist signifiers, I agree with Lorraine that Deleuze and Guattari’s
proposal for a nonhuman sexuality does not take into account the possibility that women’s
desire could offer a process to challenge capitalism and destratify oedipalisation which would
be less dangerous for women who do not have a stable molar identity to leave behind (1999,
186-7). The reason that I will continue to employ the figure of the nomad rather than the figure
of the schizo for my proposal for a feminine nomad is because the concept of the nomad enables
me to apply Irigaray’s feminist project of obtaining a female personal identity by focusing on
the embodied experience of an individual, rather than Deleuze and Guattari’s proposal for a
nonhuman sexuality by employing the figure of the schizo that focuses on the schizophrenic’s
conceptual persona. According to Lorraine,

Whereas one could say that Deleuze is motivated by the fear of stagnancy and the death of desire of the
overly molarized subject (or, as Irigaray might put it, the entombed masculine subject who has lost his
body), Irigaray is motivated by the need to become a nomadic subject rather than a schizophrenic (or, as
Irigaray might put it, the need to integrate the corporeally loaded effects of femininity into a fully formed
feminine subjectivity) (125).

By mapping the feminine other into the social field, we will enable an alternative approach
toward subjectivity that will provide us with a different range of social identities liberated from
the patriarchal logos and capitalist form of social formations. According to Irigaray, women’s
desire is already ‘always something more and something else besides that one – sexual organ,
for example – that you give them, attribute to them’ (1985a, 29). Her description of women’s desire could be understood as already schizo-revolutionary because

it really involves a different economy more than anything else, one that upsets the linearity of a project, undermines the goal-object of a desire, diffuses the polarization toward a single pleasure, disconcerts fidelity to a single discourse … (29).

Feminine desire therefore already escapes the Oedipal codes that society imposes on women because the feminine other escapes the patriarchal and capitalist systems of representation. Instead of pursuing a process of deoedipalisation by demolishing entire social sectors and the territory of the individual, I propose that a nomadic process allied with Irigaray’s notion of feminine difference will enable us to map feminine differences into the social sectors and the territorial assemblage of the enfleshed body. The feminine nomad will unleash feminine flows that will destratisfy the capitalist production of subjectivity and oedipalisation to the extent that the feminine difference described by Irigaray is a new and non-phallic model of difference.)

(drip: Although I do not employ the figure of the schizo for my proposal for a feminine nomad in this drip, I do employ Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of *schizo-revolutionary art* (2013) in the drip, Drizzle, to form a synthesis with Irigaray’s concepts of the *indifferentiated woman* (1985b) and the *labial lips* (1985a). Such a synthesis is pursued to develop Zepke’s account of schizo-revolutionary artistic practice (2014) to posit an artistic process of escaping the patriarchal and capitalist systems of representation to open up new possibilities for thinking and being. I explore the potential of a *schizo-revolutionary labial theory of art* that I propose can provide a resistance to the representational image of thought that Braidotti describes is based on the phallogocentric system (1994, 101), and engender processes of transformation that can explore the emancipation of female imagination, pleasure and expression. According to Lorraine,

maybe it is to “art” that we need to turn for a model of how an embodied subject could go about finding creative solutions to the specific problems faced by those with physical as well as mental selves (1999, 217).

This labial formula for a schizo-revolutionary artistic process engenders new feminist artistic encounters capable of forcing us to think differently about women, for women, (men and others) becoming-women, and as women, (men and others) becoming-women. It is within this
schizo-revolutionary labial theory of artistic practice that we can therefore explore processes of becoming-woman which can engender feminine nomads.

Irigaray expresses her critique of Deleuze as follows;

I can imagine why Deleuze wanted to become a woman, but also an animal, to shake his traditional masculine identity. But I would like to stress that he adopted such an idea at the successful time of women’s liberation. I thus have some doubts about the intention of such a becoming feminine. Could it not happen to appropriate the success that women were gaining? Is it not then the same gesture as men made during our whole tradition? Why, in this time, have some distinguished thinkers suddenly wished for becoming women or feminists instead of trying to reach a neither neutral nor universal but masculine identity? The least one could say is that they have created a great confusion in relation to a budding culture in the feminine. It was not really respectful of the efforts of women to liberate themselves from the subjection to a culture in the masculine! (2008a, 79).

She argues that Deleuze’s proposal to abandon personal identity runs ‘the risk once more of taking back from women those as yet unterritorialized spaces where her desire might come into being’ (1985a, 141). Irigaray considers Deleuze’s proposal for sexual multiplicity as a ‘pleasure which constitutes a discovery for men, a supplement to enjoyment, in a fantasmatic “becoming-woman,” but which has long been familiar to women’ (141). By employing Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the body without organs, Irigaray describes it as already women’s ‘historical condition’ insofar as ‘women have long been assigned to the task of preserving “body-matter” and the “organless,” [therefore] doesn’t the “organless body” come to occupy the place of their own schism?’ (141). What Irigaray means is neatly summarised by Braidotti:

that the signifier woman be both the concept around which feminists have gathered in the recognition of a general practical identity, and that it be also the very concept that needs to be analysed critically and eventually deconstructed, is no contradiction, but rather a suitable description of the historical condition of women in postmodern late capitalism (1994, 118).

In considering the question: ‘do women rediscover their pleasure in this “economy” of the multiple?’, Irigaray articulates the answer that ‘women’s pleasure does not occur without [multiplicity]’, however, she argues that ‘a multiplicity that does not entail a rearticulation of the difference between the sexes [is] bound to block or take away something of woman’s pleasure’ (1985a, 140). She goes on to say that for women to carry out Deleuze’s proposal to turn their ‘body without organs’ into a “cause” of sexual pleasure, isn’t it necessary to have had a relation to language and to sex – to the organs – that women have never had?’ (141). Irigaray is suggesting that women must claim their sexual multiplicity and pleasure, which has
long been familiar to them but unable to be expressed within a masculine discourse, in order to territorialize a space where her desire might come into being. In accord with Irigaray’s critique, I believe that becoming-woman must entail the assertion of a female subjective identity and sexuality as part of the process for creating alternative subjectivities so as to not pursue a masculine line of becoming.

In explaining that Deleuze’s concepts are already familiar to women, Irigaray asserts that Deleuze’s concepts ‘still partly take the place of woman or the feminine’, and, as a result, are metaphors ‘for her/it, that men can use’ (140-1). Richardson defends Irigaray’s claim by further explaining that Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of becoming-woman can all too easily ‘be understood in the context of [the] image of women’s bodies’ (1998, 109). She says that

In using the term “woman” to signify a process of becoming deterritorialised they fit too easily into a tradition which views women as subject to dissolution and disintegration; unable to defend the boundaries of our bodies or the state (109).

That is to say, by claiming the concept of becoming-woman, Deleuze and Guattari signify that women are already non-subjects as not-men. Although this means that women have more options because their starting point is from the position of an empirical minority (Braidotti 2002, 85), it also means they have once again been subject to an ‘objectivization in discourse’ (Irigaray 1985b, 133). Subjectivity is thus denied to women again, as she becomes the object of his concept (133). By appropriating the woman in becoming-woman, Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of the nomad becomes ‘appropriated by the “masculine”’ (Irigaray 1985b, 133). Pereira argues that it is only when such feminine concepts are appropriated by male theorists in a masculine discourse that they are validated as ‘proper’ theory (2012, 296). This masculine appropriation, Code explains, locates and contains feminist theory to ‘limit the discussion, [and] control the work’s possible reception’ (1995, 10). Deleuze and Guattari’s failure to recognise sexual difference therefore results in what Richardson describes as a ‘language of the nomads or packs [that] take[s] the male subject as norm’ (1998, 109). As a consequence, it could be argued that women who claim to identify themselves as a “nomad” are re-objectivizing their own selves because they are identifying “as” a masculine subject’ (Irigaray 1985b, 133).

According to Braidotti’s feminist critique,
Deleuze’s theory of becoming is obviously determined by his location in an embodied male subject for whom the dissolution of identities based on the phallus results in by passing gender altogether, toward a multiple sexuality. This, however, may not be the option best suited to female embodied subjects. How can Deleuze fail to see that this neutralization of sexual differences can only damage the process of reclaiming a political subjectivity for women? (1994, 122).

Braidotti’s claim that Deleuze’s theory of becoming entails a neutralization of sexual differences is based on her argument that it ‘suggests a symmetry between the sexes, which results in attributing the same psychic, conceptual, and deconstructive itineraries to both’ (2011b, 253). Claiming a female specific subjectivity was never one of the intentions of Deleuze’s (and Guattari’s) project. However, I agree with Braidotti that they are ‘close enough to the feminist claim to the empowerment of alternative female subjectivity, but distant enough to solve it by avoidance’ (1994, 122). Braidotti claims that Deleuze and Guattari proceed in this ‘contradictory manner’ in which they are both aware and hesitant with regard to the feminist implication of becoming-woman (117). She explains that their ‘position of “yes, but …,”’ or “I know what you mean, but …,”’ is a ‘mode of denial’ that functions as a ‘structural and systematic indecision’ (118). This approach allows them to make a ‘wailful choice or judgment’ that is determined by their politics of location insofar as, Braidotti argues, when ‘doing philosophy, the moment inevitably comes when selection and priorities occur, and at that particular point sexual difference plays a major role’ (123). Their politics of location is clarified by Braidotti as having nothing ‘to do with biological but with sociosymbolic differences’, that is, it has been determined by the social field that is aligned with the interests of patriarchy (122). Deleuze and Guattari’s mode of indecision enables them to deny the ‘indispensable’ work of feminism by outlining its ‘dangerous’ limitation (2004, 304), and as a result, enact a blockage that paralyses her, stops ‘her flow’ (Irigaray 1992, 18). Braidotti’s and Lorraine’s feminist critiques are in alignment to the extent that they both argue that Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of becoming denies the possibilities of different sexualised becomings, and they both also turn to Irigaray’s theory of the feminine to inform their respective arguments for a feminist project of becoming.

In turning to Irigaray, Braidotti incorporates her line of argument to argue ‘that the dispersal of sexuality into a generalized “becoming” results in undermining the feminist claims to a redefinition of the female subject’ (1994, 116). From this feminist perspective, Braidotti says that she feels ‘quite unconvinced by [Deleuze and Guattari’s] call for the dissolution of sexed identities by neutralization of gender dichotomies, because I think that this road is historically
dangerous for women’ (116). In Irigaray’s defence of the feminine against Deleuze’s ‘hasty dismissal or deconstruction of the postmetaphysical subject’ (116), Braidotti argues that one cannot deconstruct a subjectivity one has never controlled. Self-determination is the first step of any program of deconstruction. I concluded that Deleuze gets caught in the contradiction of postulating a general “becoming-woman” that fails to take into account the historical and epistemological specificity of the female feminist standpoint. A theory of difference that fails to take into account sexual difference leaves me as a feminist critic in a state of sceptical perplexity (117).

By enlivening the feminine within Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of becoming-woman, we can transform its process that Lorraine claims is a ‘solipsistic’ task in which the philosophical problem of thinking beyond molar subjectivities and sexual identities ‘threatens to leave that man-standard intact’ (1999, 187); and instead posit a process that is a collective feminist task, in which Braidotti argues ‘the focus is more on the experience and the potential becoming of real-life women, in all of their diverse ways of understanding and inhabiting the subject position of “woman”’ (1994, 115). It is for this reason that Braidotti states that ‘it is unthinkable that the question of the deconstruction of phallogocentrism could be disconnected from the concrete changes taking place in women’s lives’ (115). Colebrook defends this feminist claim by asking this rhetorical

Just what are Deleuze and Guattari doing when they take Woolf and the women’s movement away from the concepts of identity, recognition, emancipation and the subject towards a new plane of becoming? (2000, 3).

Braidotti claims that

Deleuze [and Guattari] proceeds as if there were clear equivalence in the speaking positions of the two sexes, as if – all other differences notwithstanding – the masculine or feminine speaking positions shared, if not the starting point, the same point of exit from the phallogocentric mode (1994, 117-8).

However, she explains that if women proceed in Deleuze’s direction of becoming, without setting off on an equal footing, the task of ‘[u]ndoing [their] difference is not a task that can be dissolved easily without causing psychic and social damage’ (2011a, 40). To avoid this damage, Braidotti proposes instead the reassertion of ‘difference as the nomadic principle of non-one and not as a sexuate universal’, which she argues would produce a becoming-woman that ‘starts from the recognition of the dis-symmetry between the sexes’ and places an ‘emphasis on female specificity as the starting point for the process of redefining subjectivity’ (40-1).
For this process of becoming to recognise the feminine and resist becoming masculine, it is important to differentiate the appropriation of women’s constitutive creativity by the dominant subjects who operate with a ‘masculine bias’ (Lorraine 1999, 186) and the dominant subjects who desire connecting to the intensities of the feminine (Riordan 2011, 85). The operation of the dominant subjects with a ‘masculine bias’ dispels the feminine signifier so that they can preserve their own creative power by appropriating feminine creativity. Whereas, the dominant subjects who desire connecting to the intensities of the feminine, I argue, do not aim to dispel woman, but, rather, participate in the process of becoming-woman with her in order to preserve her creativity in the process of creating alternative subjectivities. I propose that attending to this becoming with the other is a process of recognising her, not as the other to man, but as the other of the other. By recognising her, the dominant subject is forced to think her difference, engendering a process of becoming-woman that starts with the recognition of the feminine. The location that is composed is, therefore, constructed together with woman. Connected to the intensities of the feminine in this way, the location constructed can be understood as an affirmation of her difference. This process of becoming-woman can resist becoming masculine because it affirms her feminine difference as a source of creativity and, therefore, preserves her creative power in the becoming. As a result, not one, but ‘two or more subjects emerge’ from this process of becoming, ‘transformed’ (Lorraine 1999, 163).

My proposal for the idea of a feminine nomad draws inspiration from Braidotti’s feminist argument for nomadic subjects, insofar as both propose the assertion of female personal identity as part of the process of creating alternative subjectivities that leave all territories of patriarchal representation behind. Although unlike my description of the feminine nomad, Braidotti does not describe her idea of nomadic subjects in a way that makes explicit the link to Irigaray’s theory of the labial lips. That is to say, I have argued that the feminine nomad’s process of becoming-woman is launched at the threshold of the lips of a labial machine, and entails two different processes of becoming for men and women that forces them to rethink their enfleshed bodies as the labial machine opens their flesh up to the possibilities of the feminine differences. That being said, my idea of the feminine nomad is developed from Braidotti’s ‘conceptually plausible notion’ that the process of becoming ‘may itself be sex-specific, sexually differentiated, and consequently take different forms according to different gendered positions’ (1994, 121). Braidotti posits a process of becoming that would not dissolve all sexual identities and subjectivities, but one that could engender possibilities of different
sexualised becomings. She describes this process of becoming-woman as ‘nomadic’ to the extent that ‘this emphasis on the difference that women embody provides positive foundational grounds for the redefinition of female subjectivity in all of its complexity’ (149). In other words, her feminist nomadism focuses on asserting the positivity of sexual difference so that woman can be freed

from the subjugated position of annexed “other” so as to make her expressive of a different difference, of pure difference, of an entirely new plane of becoming out of which differences can multiply and differ from each other (115).

From Braidotti’s perspective, we can find in Deleuze’s work ‘a great empathy with the feminist assumption that we have to start from the critique of phallocentrism’, but given that ‘woman is positioned dualistically—as the other—in this system, she is annexed to the phallus, albeit by negation’ (2011a, 37). Braidotti argues, and I agree, that ‘[i]n this sense, and in this sense only, can it be said that sexual difference is the primary axis of differentiation and therefore must be given priority’ (37).

In prioritising sexual difference, we must be wary not to produce a reversal of the hierarchical mode of differences. Such a concern has been expressed by many in critiques of the alliance between sexual difference feminism and Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy (Ungelenk 2014, 55; and Goodchild 1996, 177). In thinking that the sexual difference feminist task is to affirm a bifurcation of thought through the ‘concept of dual sexual difference’ (Ungelenk 2014, 66), most critics deem sexual difference feminism and Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy “incompatible”. However, given that Irigaray explicitly warns us that her feminist project of sexual difference is not to ‘reverse the order of things’ (1985a, 33), I agree with Braidotti that Irigaray ‘is the most obvious term of comparison for Deleuze [and Guattari]’ for escaping the dualisms and thinking difference (2002, 92). These critiques argue that Irigaray’s feminist project of sexual difference is too “essentialist” for an alliance with Deleuze and Guattari’s idea of difference, however, given Lorraine’s account of the ‘masculine perspective’ of their work (1999, 186), such an argument could be understood as a gesture that is itself Oedipalized. Although the introduction of Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy seemed to renew the threat against sexual difference feminism, I argue that both of their promising possibilities for difference is exactly what makes them compatible. According to Grosz, Deleuze and Irigaray are ‘most directly linked through the preeminence they grant to difference as force, to the force of difference, to the forces of differentiation and the differentiation of forces’ (2005, 172). It is
a difference understood not in terms of opposition, identity or comparability, but as ‘an ontological force’ that can provide ‘other ways of knowing, other ontologies and epistemologies that enable the subject’s relation to the world, to space and to time, to be conceptualized in different terms’ (172-3). I propose that it is in these promising possibilities of difference that we can render the “incompatible” encounters productive and (re)think both Deleuze and Guattari with feminism and sexual difference feminism with Deleuze and Guattari. In accord with Braidotti’s conclusion on the matter, ‘the whole discussion about the compatibility between Deleuze and feminist theory can be laid to rest at long last and a more pragmatic approach can be adopted’ (2002, 90).

The pragmatic approach adopted by Braidotti develops Deleuze and Guattari’s suggestion to start with becoming-woman by arguing the necessity of starting ‘from the recognition of the dissymmetry between the sexes and the emphasis on female specificity as the starting point for the process of redefining subjectivity’ (2011a, 41). It is not about creating a representation of woman or constructing a female oedipal identity to which we can imitate or transform oneself into (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 304). As I have discussed, both Irigaray and Deleuze and Guattari respectively agree on this (Irigaray 1985a, 135; Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 304). They each promote a subjectivity that offers possibilities of difference: for Irigaray this points to a female subjectivity as the other of the other (Richardson 1998, 104), for Deleuze and Guattari, this points towards a ‘molecular woman’ (2004, 304). Given that woman has never had a subjectivity to begin with, the process of ‘emitting particles that enter the relation of movement and rest, or the zone of proximity, of a micro femininity, in other words, that produce in us a molecular woman’ (304) has, in Irigaray’s words, ‘long been familiar to women’ (1985a, 141). Yet, Deleuze and Guattari failed to take this into account when suggesting ‘a micro femininity’, and therefore dismissed women’s potential for feminine differences. However, having brought together a composition of Deleuze and Guattari’s and Irigaray’s concepts, we can find a place for female subjectivity in Braidotti’s description of the feminine:

the “feminine” is neither one essentialized entity, nor an immediately accessible one: it is rather both an embodied and embedded location and a virtual reality. It is the effect of a project, a political and conceptual project of transcending the traditional (“Molar”) subject position of Woman. This transcendence, however, occurs through the flesh into embodied locations and not in a flight away from them (2011a, 43, my italics).

Braidotti posits the process of becoming-woman as a process of accounting for one’s politics of location which, as she explains, ‘is not a one-way street, but a multifaceted circuit’ to the
extent that each location is different (21). Braidotti further explains that this may entail a process of ‘claiming a fixed location’ for empirical minorities because, unlike majority subjects, minorities cannot account for a location they never had (42). I would add that constructing a location for the feminine nomad entails locating, or creating, a labial machine on one’s enfleshed body in order to initiate a becoming in the flesh. The differences between locating or creating a labial machine depends upon one’s politics of location, that is, if one already has ‘her own sexually specific cartography’ or if one has ‘phallic flesh’ (Riordan 2011, 85).

For women, Braidotti argues that the process of grounding one’s politics of location begins ‘from the recognition of herself as not-one; as a subject that is split time and time again, over multiple axes of differentiation’ (1994, 171). These multiple axes of differentiation are clarified by Braidotti in terms of three different phases that ‘spell out different structures of subjectivity but also different moments in the process of becoming-subject’ (158). In relation to the complexity of female subjectivity, they are introduced as the “difference between men and women,” “differences among women,” and “differences within each woman” (158). These three different phases are not to be taken as categorical distinctions in a paradigmatic model (158), but a nomadic map that corresponds to ‘different moments, … different locations in space, … [and] different practices’ (171). The nomadic subject that Braidotti proposes ‘is a figuration that emphasizes the need for action both at the level of identity, of subjectivity, and of differences among women’ (171). By focusing on the female bodily multifaceted complexities and multiple female feminist embodied voices, Braidotti explains that we can ‘pay attention to the level of identity, of unconscious identifications, and of desire’ in order ‘to conjugate those levels with willful political transformations’ (170). That is to say, with an explicitly feminine focus, we will be able to identify the steps, shifting locations and points of exit from our phallogocentric mode of thinking, acting and speaking and push us towards a mode of thought, being and expression that can open up possibilities of difference, or rather, feminine differences. It is a transformational process that, Braidotti explains, ‘can only be achieved through de-essentialized embodiment [if one is a majority subject] or strategically re-essentialized embodiment [if one is a minority subject]: by working through the multilayered structures of one’s embodied self’ (170). Which is, I suggest, in the creation of a labial machine if one is a majority subject or in its location if one is a minority subject. In working through the processes of becoming-woman which is launched at the threshold of the lips of a labial machine, the feminine nomad is constantly engaged in an ever-folding becoming ‘of never
being simply one’ (Irigaray 1985a, 31). She expresses herself in fluidity so that her becomings can touch upon a location only to move on from it ‘in order to not become fixed, congealed in them’ (29). According to Braidotti, such a movement of becoming maps ‘a zigzagging path’ through the multilayered structures of one’s politics of location (2011a, 35-41). I suggest that this mapping “zigzags” insofar that the becoming occurs in-between the two labial lips, drawing both molar and molecular lines that assert female subjective identity and sexuality as part of the process for creating alternative subjectivities. Braidotti proposes that her nomadic strategy of sexual difference ‘allows for the affirmation of alternative forms of feminist political subjectivity’ in which ‘feminists are the post-Woman women’ (1994, 169). Within these new feminist nomadic constructions, Braidotti explains that ‘[w]hat matters is to be able to name and to represent areas of transit between them; all that counts is the going, the process, the passing’ (170). I propose that this feminist nomadic process conveys the life of the feminine nomad that is the intermezzo, because she experiences the world by opening her flesh up to it through her labial machine.

The process of zigzagging a path through the multilayered structures of one’s politics of location, according to Braidotti,

requires as a preliminary method the working through of the stock of cumulated images, concepts, and representations of women, of female identity, such as they have been codified by the culture in which we live (169).

Such a method has been proposed by Irigaray in order to transform the social form specific to women. Irigaray argues that women should introduce ‘valid representations of themselves in actions, words, and images in all public spaces’ (1993c, 86) that can resist patriarchal representations. Irigaray criticises the ways in which patriarchal images tend ‘to portray men as respectable citizens, as civil and religious authority figures, and consider women to be sexual property at the disposal of men’ (1994, xvi). Portrayed as respectable authority figures, I argue that ‘the image of the masculine subjectivity sitting in sovereign judgement’ is enabled, entitling men to preside over women’s experience (Mackenzie and MacKenzie 2014, 72). As a result, Grosz explains that there has been no feminine space in ‘culture, in representation, exchange, ethics, politics, history, or writing … only the one sex and its counterpart’ (2005, 174). Therefore, the process of claiming a feminine location from which women can speak as women (Irigaray 1985a, 135), will enable women to speak, think, write, and represent the feminine on their own terms (Braidotti 1994, 117). In order to do this, women need social status.
within patriarchy so that they can develop their own interests and rights; to become-women as determined by their own direction of becoming, not one with a ‘masculine bias’ (Lorraine 1999, 186). Irigaray states:

My purpose in demanding these rights for women is to make them take responsibility for themselves socially, make them responsible adult citizens. It is up to them to protect their virginity, their motherhood, their bit of nature, their house, their images, languages, god(s) or goddess(es). It is therefore up to them to become subjects capable of sublimating their sexual drives, cultivating their sexuality, giving it rhythm, temporality, stakes. To do this women need rights (1994, 81).

The rights demanded by Irigaray are rights to human dignity, identity, motherhood, systems of exchange and representation in equal numbers (1993c, 86-9). Once these rights have been achieved, the next rights in the list will also follow: the legal encodification of rape, forced prostitution and pornography, a right to defend their own and their children’s lives, a right to equivalent exchange for men and women, and equal representation in civil and religious decision-making bodies (86-9). In promoting and progressing upon women’s social form in the way suggested by Irigaray, women can create a space in which women can speak as women (1985a, 135). From this space, women can explore different forms of expression that are free from the ‘hysteric’ restraints of the phallic signifier. In discovering herself away from the phallic signifier, I argue that women can consider what it means to think from within the labial, rather than from the position of the dominant phallic symbolic order, and can therefore explore different world-perspectives that would suit them in which they can develop new representations of themselves defined by themselves.

Irigaray cautions us against claiming an image of the feminine for women to submit themselves to in order to claim to “know” the nature of woman, or to claim that there is one, because such a claim allows ‘oneself to be caught up again in a system of “masculine” representations’ (1985a, 122). That being said, perhaps the risk of becoming-phallic is one women must take when promoting and progressing women’s social form within this patriarchal society in order to create a space to explore different representations of themselves that are defined by themselves. It seems that Braidotti is willing to take such a risk as she promises us that ‘[u]ntil we have worked through the multiple layers of signification of Woman – phallic as it may be – I am not willing to relinquish the signifier’ (1994, 171). Given the failure on the part of dominant subjects to recognise and support the other throughout Western history (Lerner 1987, 4), I am sympathetic to Braidotti’s argument that women must insist on the recognition of their signifier. That is not to say, however, that I am proposing that women must therefore become
phallic because we live in a patriarchal society. The risk of becoming-phallic can have disastrous results, as Braidotti points out in her example of Thatcher (2011a, 43; 2006, 45; and 2002, 85). In order to resist this risk of becoming-phallic within a phallogocentric culture that will always perceive women as his counterpart (Grosz 2005, 174), I argue that women becoming-woman must also follow the molecular lines drawn through their labial machines. This process of becoming-woman continuously recognises her as not-one. That is to say, by recognising her as one, whole, unified individual female Being, an image of woman is fixed as a molar identity which limits her forms of representation to a presupposed image. By recognising her as not-one, however, she is freed from a presupposed image which enables us to create new and different images.

(DRIP: For an example of these new images of women, I suggest looking at the reinvention of femininity offered in the feminist interventions of Pussy Riot. Braidotti neatly summarises this process of becoming-Pussy Riot as that which

works actively towards the transformation of the signs, the social practices and the embodied histories of white institutionalized femininity, of resisting citizenship, of human rights campaigning, feminist and gender politics and art practices (2015, 247-8).

By donning the Pussy Riot balaclava, I argue that we can locate a labial machine, which is produced from the cuts in the fabric around the wearer’s lips and eyes, in which we can perform deterritorializations of reterritorialized identities by expressing ourselves in a different feminine subjectivity.)

I propose that this feminist nomadic task can be understood as living the life of a feminine nomad that is the intermezzo, as she approaches the world in a movement that is an open-ended, never finished, ever-flowing, ever-folding, labial revolution of learning, creation and becoming with others. It is a process described by Grosz that is ‘without end, without definitive goal, without pregiven aims or objects’ (2005, 183) because, according to Irigaray, she does not allow herself ‘to be caught up again in a system of “masculine” representations’ (1985a, 122). I have argued that she risks her flesh in order to engage with the outside, from within. That is to say, she cuts a line of flight from the phallocentric order in order to escape from her “self” as defined by the patriarchal systems of representation. She evades the risk of becoming-phallic each time by making a feminine difference and affirming the positivity of that difference. The feminine nomad is a revolutionary escape artist; she can escape from her “self”,

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from within, to touch upon the intensities of the feminine only to return to herself and express her “self” in “an “other meaning”” (Irigaray 1985a, 29). She marks her new territories in the flesh by introducing feminine differences that incite becoming-other of the other. The feminine nomad is different, she is other of the other, and she is flowing.
Drizzle

Truth is necessary for those who are so distanced from their body that they have forgotten it. But their “truth” immobilizes us, turns us into statues, if we can’t loose its hold on us. If we can’t defuse its power by trying to say, right here and now, how we are moved (Irigaray 1985a, 214).

Irigaray’s quote in response to Lacan’s efforts to arrive at the truth of woman’s pleasure not through an appeal to real women, but to Bernini’s statue of Saint Theresa located in Rome (1982), neatly summarises how women have been submitted and fixed into images and models designed by and for men. In this drip, I will explore the potential of a feminist aesthetics of resistance that can challenge the capitalist and patriarchal systems of representation and thoroughly incite the practice of becoming-woman. I will argue that we can develop this feminist aesthetics of resistance through a synthesis of Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of schizo-revolutionary art (2013) and Irigaray’s concepts of the indifferenced woman (1985b) and the labial lips (1985a). Such a synthesis has an enfolded purpose: 1) to formulate a new feminist and artistic theorisation of resistance; and 2) to propose a different feminist artistic practice of resistance. This enfolded approach amounts to a schizo-revolutionary labial theory of artistic practice that produces not just political art nor an aesthetic approach within political theory, rather, an enfolded theory-practice of art and politics ‘without any possibility of distinguishing what is touching from what is touched’ (Irigaray 1985a, 26); a labial art-politics (Mackenzie and MacKenzie 2014, 77). The feminist artistic encounters that are produced will introduce a new influx of labial cosmic energy capable of forcing the psychic system open to new ideas of subjectivity and judgement. The new ideas evoked will produce a new enfolded process of thinking that is à deux, which will enable us to explore the emancipation of images of woman as well as female imagination, pleasure and expression.

In their critique of capitalism’s exploitation of desire, which is captured by the mechanisms of representation and Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari introduce schizoanalysis to liberate desire and open it up to different possibilities (2013, 311). To the extent that capitalism is always in flux, searching for new territories, it is understood by Deleuze and Guattari as a form of schizophrenia (282). However, they describe, ‘schizophrenia is not the identity of capitalism, but on the contrary its difference, its divergence, and its death’ (283). I understand Deleuze and Guattari’s proposal for schizoanalysis as an invitation for multiple ways to scramble the schizoic flows of capitalism through an artistic practice of experimentation (367). According
to Zepke, art has a revolutionary potential insofar as it is schizoanalytical because it can escape the dominant systems of representation and become something different (2014, 32).

(DRIP: In the puddle, Condensation, I employ Guattari’s work on aesthetic paradigms to explore art’s potential to create possibilities for new subjectivities through experimentation and creativity.)

In terms of how schizoanalysis can sit comfortably alongside my proposal for a feminist aesthetics of resistance, I will develop a labial formula for a schizo-revolutionary artistic process that engenders new feminist artistic encounters capable of forcing us to think differently about women, for women, (men and others) becoming-women, and as women, (men and others) becoming-women. According to Deleuze and Guattari, our identity is determined by the social field before we reduce it to the familial identities of an oedipal triangle (2013, 304). For Deleuze and Guattari, capitalism is schizophrenic insofar as it is a form of social formation that deterritorializes social identities and mutates them to provide a wide range of social identities: ‘[o]ur society produces schizos the same way it produces Prell shampoo or Ford cars, the only difference being that the schizos are not salable’ (282). Capitalism remains wedded to oedipalisation because these social identities requires personalizing in order to produce them as images of capital, “‘Mister Capital, Madame Earth,’” and their child the Worker’, with the purpose that these ‘familial determinations become the application of the social axiomatic’ (303). The nonconforming schizophrenic is therefore determined by capitalist society as a sick person confined into a clinical entity because, Deleuze and Guattari suggest, she or he risks

unleashing flows that would be dangerous for capitalist production and charged with revolutionary potential, so long as these flows are not co-opted or absorbed by the laws of the market (282-3).

These ‘deterritorialized flows’ of desire have the potential to demolish the phallic and capitalist signifiers (85). However, they are also capable of demolishing entire social sectors (139) and the territory of the individual (337). Which is a problem for Lorraine, with whom I agree, to the extent that it would be a dangerous process for women to pursue who do not have a stable molar identity to leave behind (1999, 186-7). In following Lorraine’s argument, there is another option that is presented in Irigaray’s feminist project of sexual difference which could offer a
process to challenge capitalism and destratisfy oedipalisation whilst being less dangerous for women.

For Irigaray, the production of social identities is determined by the social field that is already aligned with the interests of patriarchy. Her position differs to Deleuze and Guattari’s to the extent that capitalism, as a form of social formation, produces social identities in connection with the patriarchal logos of social formations (Irigaray 1985b, 121). Irigaray says that these two systems of oppression operate in close connection with each other, but are first of all patriarchal as they contribute to the cultural, political, economic and social oppression of women (1985a, 221). Instead of pursuing a process of demolishing entire social sectors and the territory of the individual, I find there is more potential in Irigaray’s project of mapping feminine differences into the social sectors and the territorial assemblage of the enfleshed body. But only insofar as we understand Irigaray’s notion of the feminine as a new and non-phallic model of difference. According to Irigaray, feminine desire is already ‘always something more and something else besides that one – sexual organ, for example – that you give them, attribute to them’ (29). Her description of women’s desire could be understood as already schizo-revolutionary because

it really involves a different economy more than anything else, one that upsets the linearity of a project, undermines the goal-object of a desire, diffuses the polarization toward a single pleasure, disconcerts fidelity to a single discourse … (29).

Feminine desire therefore already escapes the Oedipal codes that society imposes on women because the feminine other escapes the patriarchal and capitalist systems of representation. By mapping feminine differences into the social field, we will enable an alternative approach toward subjectivity that will provide us with a different range of social identities liberated from the patriarchal logos and, thus, capitalist form of social formations. I will develop this idea of feminine mapping as an artistic practice of experimentation. The feminist artistic encounters that will be produced will engender feminine flows capable of engendering alternative female subjectivities in a process of becoming-woman that can resist the patriarchal and capitalist systems of representation.

(DRIP: See the drip, Labial Drip, for a feminist proposal of becoming-woman which develops Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of becoming-woman to incorporate Irigaray’s theory of the feminine. Through a synthesis of Deleuze and Guattari’s and Irigaray’s two models of
subjectivity, I propose the idea of the feminine nomad as a model of subjectivity that recognises the feminine within the process of becoming-woman. This idea of the feminine nomad employs the figure of the nomad, rather than the figure of the schizo, because it enables me to apply Irigaray’s feminist project of obtaining a female personal identity by focusing on the embodied experience of a female subjectivity rather than Deleuze and Guattari’s proposal for a nonhuman sexuality through the schizophrenic’s conceptual persona. The reason I employ Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of schizo-revolutionary art in this drip is to develop a schizo-revolutionary labial theory of artistic practice that can escape patriarchal and capitalist systems of representation to explore processes of becoming-woman, which can engender feminine nomads.)

According to Deleuze, the art “object” is not a recognisable object. Rather, its primary aesthetic characteristic is that it is a fundamental encounter that ‘can only be sensed’ (1994, 139). With Guattari, Deleuze explains that the ‘percepts and affects’ preserved in an artistic encounter makes our experience of the art “object” distinct from our experience of empirical objects (1994, 164). According to Deleuze and Guattari, ‘[a]ffects are precisely these nonhuman becomings of man, just as percepts – including the town [perceived in Woolf’s Mrs Dalloway (2016b)] – are nonhuman landscapes of nature’ (169). In other words,

Percepts are like landscapes in which the human being as subject no longer exists and yet remains diffused throughout the landscape; affects are intensities that traverse individuals and go beyond ordinary emotions and sensations. Percepts and affects exceed lived experience and our recollections of that experience (Bogue 2010, 100).

Percepts and affects offer pre-personal sensations that challenge our tendency to interpret art through representation and recognition. According to Marks, ‘[t]hese are artistic forces that have been freed from the organising representation framework of perceiving individuals. Instead, they give us access to a pre-individual world of singularities’ (2010, 230). The artistic encounter therefore offers us an experience of a pre-individual world. This distinct experience is what Zepke calls a heterogeneous duration, which does not obey representational knowledge-claims, coherent narrative frames and/or linear temporalities (2008, 34). The art “object” can therefore be understood as an assemblage of sensory affects to the extent that our experience of it cannot be captured by our representational thought but our thought is forced into involuntary movements incited by what is sensed. Preserved within the artistic encounter, the percepts and affects condition the artistic experience and emit the problematic signs that perplexes the subject and forces the emergence of thought. The new ideas that are forced into
thought engender a different way of thinking and acting, as they are the real conditions of the subject’s experience in the world. It is not that art does this, it is rather that we call it art (what Deleuze and Guattari mean at least) if this happens. I have argued elsewhere that this ontological conception of art has the revolutionary potential to transform the normative ideas of subjectivity and judgment that are aligned with the interests of patriarchy and capitalism (Mackenzie and MacKenzie 2014, 70).

(DRIP: For the understanding of patriarchy I employ, see the drip, Labial Drip, in which I refer to Irigaray’s feminist critique to describe that the West is built on a phallic economy (1985a, 86). Irigaray posits that the phallus is the ultimate signifier that permeates all discourse and logos, constituting a phallocentric language and order that symbolically and physically subjugates women. Unable to articulate the feminine as feminine within this phallocentric symbolic order (Halsema 2013, 28), women have been submitted to representations that relate her to man but in ways that designate her exclusion and subordination. In measuring woman against man, we come to know these patriarchal images as those that represent woman as counterpart identities, the opposite to man, and male-others. As a consequence of this patriarchal system, according to Irigaray, women ‘have been assigned and taught’ their ‘form of “social existence”’ by ‘the society of men’ (1985a, 164). In order to explore different forms of expression that are not subjugated to the phallic signifier, Irigaray proposes the creation of a feminine symbolic space that intervenes in the phallocentric symbolic system. She explores the labial as the potential for a counter-discourse of plurality and difference that can produce different modes of thinking and being. By reclaiming woman’s morphological difference, Irigaray argues that women can discover themselves away from the phallic signifier and explore ways of articulating the feminine as feminine.)

(drip: For a working definition of capitalism, see the puddle, Condensation, in which I employ Guattari’s account of Integrated World Capitalism (IWC) to describe that capitalism has moved away from industrial sites of power towards structures of control (2000, 47). IWC is not only destroying the natural environment, it is also mentally manipulating subjects and their political, cultural and social relations. Guattari explains that these structures of control are exercised through ‘mass-media and telematic standardization, the conformism of fashion, the manipulation of opinion by advertising, surveys, etc.’ (35). The control these structures have is experienced in the production of a ‘capitalistic subjectivity’, which Guattari argues, ‘is manufactured to protect existence from any intrusion of events that might disturb or disrupt
public opinion’ (50). This capitalistic subjectivity is produced so that IWC can control the production of subjectivity in ‘the worlds of childhood, love, art, as well as everything associated with anxiety, madness, pain, death, or a feeling of being lost in the Cosmos’ (50).

In proclaiming the revolutionary potential of art, it is important to acknowledge immediately that artistic flows can be captured by patriarchal and capitalist systems of representation. There are always movements of reterritorialization that follow movements of deterritorialization in order to overcode any difference produced so as to (re-)submit it to the systems of representation and establish a territory once more. According to Deleuze and Guattari,

"Capitalism institutes or restores all sorts of residual and artificial, imaginary, or symbolic territorialities, thereby attempting, as best it can, to recede, to rechannel persons who have been defined in terms of abstract quantities. Everything returns or recurs: States, nations, families. … The more the capitalist machine deterritorializes, decoding and axiomatizing flows in order to extract surplus value from them, the more its ancillary apparatuses, such as government bureaucracies and the forces of law and order, do their utmost to reterritorialize, absorbing in the process a larger and larger share of surplus value (2013, 48-9)."

In other words, ‘[t]he merchant buys in a territory, deterritorializes products into commodities, and is reterritorialized on commercial circuits’ (1994, 68). The new territory that is established does not return to the original territory before its deterritorialization, but takes the deterritorialized elements and recombines them to enter into new relations (Patton 2010, 73). That is to say, movements of reterritorialization turn lines of flight into rigid lines to (re-)submit back into the systems of representation (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 226). To the extent that this ontological conception of the artistic encounter can resist being dominated, subordinated and appropriated by the patriarchal and capitalist systems of representation, I will argue that a feminist artistic practice can create lines of flights that can escape these dominant structures. For a hint as to how, we can look to the feminist interventions of the Guerrilla Girls that have recently been embraced by the art institutions that they seek to critique (see Adams 2009). The Guerrilla Girls are a prime example of how feminist practices are not situated outside of capitalism (or patriarchy), as they too can be subsumed through movements of reterritorialization. To the extent that the Guerrilla Girls can still present a legitimate critique of the art institution whilst exhibiting in them, there is merit in Guerrilla Girls’ Kahlo and Kollwitz’s argument that it enables them to reach a larger audience (2016) and to critique the art institutions direct on their walls (2010, 208). The Guerrilla Girl’s feminist critique is nonetheless embedded in these reterritorializations, and it is in these encounters that new lines
of flight can be incited. A particular example of a clear connecting line of flight can be found in the feminist interventions of Pussy Riot (Alyokhina 2017).

(DRIP: See the drip, Labial Drip, in which I employ Pussy Riot as an example of reinventing femininity. Inspired by the masked Guerrilla Girls, Pussy Riot also cover up their faces but instead of wearing gorilla masks, they don colourful balaclavas (Alyokhina 2017). I argue that the Pussy Riot balaclava locates a labial machine, produced from the cuts in the fabric around the wearer’s lips and eyes, in which we can perform deterritorializations of reterritorialized identities by expressing ourselves in a different feminine subjectivity.)

(drip: I believe that there is a critique to be made of the Guerrilla Girl’s signature gorilla mask relating to the Guerrilla Girl’s claim of being intersectional feminists, however such a task is outside the scope of this drip. The ethical implications of wearing a gorilla mask can be found in an interview with ex-Guerrilla Girl, Thomas, who expresses having felt uncomfortable wearing it as a woman of colour (2008).)

I will argue that by enlivening the feminine within the artistic process, art can release labial machines that move in processes of deterritorializations of the dominant structures and incite new ideas of female subjective identity and sexuality.

(DRIP: See the drip, Labial Drip, for an account of Riordan’s concept of the labial machine. I argue that the process of becoming-woman launched at the threshold of the labial machine explores the assertion of a female subjective identity and sexuality as well as possibilities for alternative subjectivities because it is cuts and draws both molar and molecular lines of flights.)

According to Deleuze and Guattari, when movements of deterritorialization take hold, machines are released that can open territorial assemblages to other assemblages (2004, 367). They describe this rupture ‘like a set of cutting edges that insert themselves into the assemblage undergoing deterritorialization, and draw variations and mutations of it’ (367). Within this rupturing process, these cutting edges create points of escape that connect the assemblage with the Cosmos, thereby opening it onto new possibilities. It is within this opening that the matters of expression that draw the territory, enter into a process of passage and relay (356-8), during which the components from the territorial assemblage and the Cosmos become ‘parts and pieces of one another’ (2013, 367). Within this movement of deterritorialization, Zepke
explains that the heterogeneous components express ‘a series of relations between a territory and its outside that ignores subject/object distinctions’ (2008, 35). The artist and territory become indiscernible in this process in which they are all parts and pieces of one another, because there is no longer representational knowledge-claims, coherent narrative frames and/or linear temporalities with which to discern subject – object relations or form – content distinctions (34). As Deleuze and Guattari say, ‘we no longer know what is art and what nature’ (1994, 185). If art is understood as an experience that cannot be captured by our representational thought, then it has the potential to create lines of flight that can resist the authoritative nature of the individual artist and the commodification of art.

Even though the artist makes the expression, Deleuze and Guattari explain that the artist’s expression is but a ‘chancy formation of a domain’ (2004, 349). The artist delineates a territory in order to work through their experience of territorialization. Within this movement of territoriality, Deleuze and Guattari claim that the art produced is ‘not the privilege of human beings’; rather the artist is a participant in the movement that produces a territorial mark (349). With the understanding that a subject does not become an artist by thinking of herself or himself as one, she or he becomes an artist with the heterogeneous components in the process in which they are all parts and pieces of one another. This phrase, ‘parts and pieces of one another’ taken from Deleuze and Guattari (2013, 367), is important as it describes the process of becoming an artist as a process of merging, in which the artist and the heterogeneous components become parts of one another whilst retaining pieces of their original form. To this extent, the subject engages in a process of becoming a co-creator and participating artist. I am borrowing these terms from Guattari and Zepke, who employ them in order to delegitimise the sense of authority that resides within the traditional idea of the artist. My engagement with Guattari’s and Zepke’s terms is for a similar purpose, albeit my intention is a feminist task of delegitimising the patriarchal idea of the artist (this patriarchal idea of the artist has been critiqued by Nochlin 1971, 150; Pollock 2003, xix; Ettinger 2004, 71; and Parker and Pollock 2013, xviii). Zepke explains that the subject becomes a participating artist when she or he administers a ‘shock’ when she or he is ‘forced to confront alterity in and as our lives’ (2008, 42). Zepke’s description of the artistic experience builds upon Deleuze’s notion of the encounter by explaining that the subject administers a ‘shock’ when being forced to think (42). Following Guattari, this shock is expressed by a ‘partial enunciation,’ which indicates the subject’s transformation from a passive spectator into a participating artist or ‘co-creator’ (1995, 14). In order to investigate
what the subject finds shocking within the artistic encounter, it will be useful to turn to Guattari’s description of ‘mutant’ percepts and affects (91).

Within the experience of the artistic encounter, mutant percepts and affects seize the spectator, making them part of the artistic process, and set the conditions for what can be sensed. In doing so, the artistic process becomes an experience of ‘affect as immanent evaluation, instead of judgment as transcendent value’ (Deleuze 1997a, 141). In this movement of deterritorialization, the affective evaluation also connects with the Cosmos through the points of escape, thereby enabling evaluation from the outside as well as from within. Through a partial access to the infinity of virtual possibilities of the Cosmos, the parts and pieces become lost with the cosmic forces in a movement of, what Cézanne calls, ‘iridescent chaos’ (2001, 114). Smith describes this ‘iridescent chaos’ as ‘a collapse of visual coordinates in a universal variation or interaction’ (1997, xxxv). He articulates Cézanne’s description of this movement as that of losing oneself in the landscape, without landmarks, to the point where one no longer sees forms or even matters, but only forces, densities, intensities: the forces of folding in a mountain, the forces of germination in an apple, the thermal and magnetic forces of a landscape (xxxv).

According to Deleuze and Guattari, these forces ‘are no longer those of the earth, … but the forces of an immaterial, nonformal, and energetic Cosmos’ (2004, 378). They explain, this time by employing the work of Klee, that the immanent experience of these forces is part of the artistic process:

the artist turns his or her attention to the microscopic, to crystals, molecules, atoms, and particles, not for scientific conformity, but for movement, for nothing but immanent movement; the artist tells him- or herself that this world has had different aspects, will have still others, and that there are already others on other planets; finally, the artist opens up to the Cosmos in order to harness forces in a “work” (372).

The immanent movement that can be evaluated is that which can be sensed, therefore the evaluation rests on the conditions enabled by the mutant percepts and affects. This immanent evaluation is described by Deleuze as a matter of ‘evaluating every being, every action and passion, even every value, in relation to the life which they involve’ (1997a, 141). According to Smith, ‘[a]ffects and percepts are thus the genetic and immanent elements constitutive of a life’ (1997, xxxv). The life constituted by the mutant percepts and affects envelops the subject, revealing a different experience of the world. This is what, then, makes the artistic experience with difference or otherness, a shocking encounter.
Evaluating every-thing related to the life constituted by the mutant percepts and affects does not mean that what is produced henceforth becomes all-knowing about that life. The access to the Cosmos is only partial, not complete, because there is still a partial connection to the territorial assemblage. This partial connection is important as it maintains our engagement in the world and is how we can engender change within it. There is a danger, however, of arbitrary selection. The cosmic forces that are available to enter into a process of passage and relay are content dependent upon the life constituted by the mutant percepts and affects. Given that this evaluation is of every-thing, not every available cosmic force can be selected because of the risk of forming a ‘black hole’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 368). Deleuze and Guattari explain that a ‘black hole’ can be formed under conditions of precocious or extremely sudden deterritorialization, and when … cosmic paths are blocked; the machine then produces “individual” group effects spinning in circles, … [expressing] nothing more than the resonance of the black hole in which they are trapped (368).

Therefore, I suggest the forces that can be selected are evaluated through experiencing their power to affect and be affected, in which this process of selection becomes a process described by Braidotti that ‘asserts the affirmative, joyful affects over and above the negative ones’ (2010, 307).

This mode of selection is not judgmental, because it is immanent to the process and cannot be captured by our representational thought. Moreover, it is not conceptual in which involves a determinative judgment, because we can never know in advance what new forces are selected nor can we predict the outcome of the regrouping. We can instead understand this process of selection as the ‘combats-between’ forces (Deleuze 1997b, 132). As Deleuze claims ‘it is combat that replaces judgment,’ and the ‘combat-between is the process through which a force enriches itself by seizing hold of other forces and joining itself to them in a new ensemble: a becoming’ (132). It entails an approach that selects the affirmative forces within the process of combat-between, which is taking place in the movement of iridescent chaos, to enter into the process of passage and relay. I will argue that this method of passage and relay consists of the ordering and disordering of the readymade; where new affirmative forces take the place of existing forces that have been evaluated as negative and will not bring anything new to the territorial assemblage. Through this affirmative process of reinventing a different readymade,
I propose that the expression of a territorial mark does not end the process, but rather enriches the artistic ensemble so as to incite a new artistic encounter(s) or becoming(s).

Guattari describes this artistic process as the ‘autonomisation of the components of unconscious subjectivity, and the subjective autonomisation relative to the aesthetic object’ (1995, 13). This ‘autonomisation’ can be understood as the effect of the artistic experience in which the artist is enveloped. Seized by the mutant percepts and affects, Guattari explains that they take “‘possession of the author’ to engender a certain mode of aesthetic enunciation’ (14). Engendered through affective evaluation, Deleuze says that this artistic process proceeds ‘as if the [artist’s] hand assumed an independence and began to be guided by other forces, making marks that no longer depend on either our will or our sight’ (2005, 71). A partial enunciation is therefore no longer specific to a semiotic register but can be expressed in other domains as enunciative substances of a machinic order (Guattari 1995, 24). Guattari describes these domains as extra-linguistic, non-human, biological, technological, aesthetic, etc. (24). To this extent, Deleuze explains that the marks produced ‘are irrational, involuntary, accidental, free, random. They are nonrepresentative, nonillustrative, nonnarrative’ (2005, 71). The shock that is expressed by a partial enunciation cannot be recognised as being administered from the subject because it becomes part of ‘the machinic assemblage of enunciation, [which] agglomerates these different partial enunciations and installs itself, as it were, before and alongside the subject-object relation’ (Guattari 1995, 24). Guattari does however describe this ‘machinic assemblage of enunciation’ as a ‘machinic subjectivity,’ which posits the mutant affects and percepts as pre-personal components that can make possible a becoming of artist and art (24). It is in this sense that Guattari describes art as an event that produces ‘mutant centres of subjectivation’ (1996, 200), from which new intensities are extorted and being is summoned to exist differently (1995, 96).

Zepke further describes this process as schizoanalytical, as it entails the ““art” of making something … escape from its “self”’ (2014, 32). This does not mean that the subject will die in a movement of deterritorialization, or that the work produced is no-thing. Instead, it is an artistic process of escaping dominant systems of representation: to make something escape from its ‘self’ as defined by normative models and images. That is to say, what can be created can escape ‘the gravity of its self-evidence’ and become something different (2008, 42). This schizoanalytical artistic practice is therefore a transformational process that can open up new possibilities for thinking and being. It is an artistic process that, according to Deleuze and
Guattari’s description of the schizophrenic process, can provide ‘the potential for revolution’ (2013, 388). Understanding artistic practice in this way will enable us to rethink what we mean by art generally speaking; or, more particularly, what we mean by art objects, the artist, and art practice. I argue for an understanding of art as an experience of the artistic process; the artist as the ‘artist-as-process’ (Cutler 2013, 356); and the artistic practice as ‘schizo-revolutionary’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2013, 420-1).

(DRIP: See Zepke (2014) for a description of schizo-revolutionary artistic practice.)

(drip: For further discussion of Cutler’s term, the ‘artist-as-process’, see the puddle, Condensation. In emphasising the potential that Guattari gives to the artist in The Three Ecologies as capable of transforming the normative ideas produced by a dominant mass-media subjectivity (2000), Cutler proposes her term to clarify that it is not the concept of an artist as a creative “self” that is at issue, rather that it is in the processes of creative construction that de-regulation can occur (2013a, 356).

That is to say, transformation occurs not through the artist wishing it into existence, but by participating in the artistic processes.)

However, before we frame the schizo-revolutionary artistic practice as a feminist artistic practice, we must specify exactly what is at stake within this experience of the schizo-revolutionary artistic process. I argue that this specification can be achieved by understanding schizo-revolutionary artistic process as the indifferent/ciated organisation of the Cosmos.

The term indifferent/ciated includes both the t and the c because, as I will explain, the artistic process becomes the dynamic between the undifferentiated chaos and the differenciated order. Although Deleuze employs these terms to describe the virtuality and actuality of an Idea, I will be using them to describe the approach of an artistic process of indifferent/ciation. According to Deleuze, ‘differentiation determines the virtual content of the Idea as problem, differenciation expresses the actualisation of this virtual and the constitution of solutions’ (1994, 209). He introduces ‘the complex notion of different/ciation’ to explain that difference contains two parts:
The r and the c here are the distinctive feature or the phonological relation of difference in person. Every object is double without it being the case that the two halves resemble one another, one being a virtual image and the other an actual image (209).

This virtual content is able to be actualised because the problem that resides within the Idea is determined (differentiated), however its actualisation cannot be exact because the problem might not be “solved”, and thereby remains undifferenced’ (280). It is in this sense that Deleuze claims that Ideas are ‘distinct-obscure’ (280). Deleuze says that the process of actualisation therefore always takes place by difference, divergence or differenciation … [which] breaks with resemblance as a process no less than it does with identity as a principle … In this sense, actualisation or differenciation is always a genuine creation (212).

This process of actualisation is not that of representing the Idea, because its virtual content cannot be represented, so it must be expressed in difference.

In the context of an artistic process of actualisation, it may be that there is a risk of the artistic process expressing difference through a differenciated order or an undifferenciated chaos. On the one hand, expressing difference through a differenciated order that proceeds by way of succession, as Deleuze describes: ‘one “before” and the other “after”. It is from this point of view that the second is said to resemble the first’ (1994, 124). This approach thereby risks subordinating any expression of difference to the Same. Such an approach would suppress the forces of the Cosmos and end the process. This would be an approach privileged by the artist-as-chooser and would result in a “finished” art object.

(DRIP: In describing this approach of reducing difference to the same, I am suggesting that the operation of the differenciated order is based upon Irigaray’s description of the logic of the Same (1985a, 74).)

On the other hand, expressing difference through an undifferenciated chaos proceeds by way of indetermination, producing an expression which is incomprehensible or schizophrenic. This approach differentiates by actualising a virtuality that is too complex, thereby subordinating any expression of difference to indifference. This approach is described by Deleuze and Guattari as one in which
one overdoes it, puts too much in, works with a jumble of lines and sounds; then instead of producing a cosmic machine capable of “rendering sonorous,” one lapses back to a machine of reproduction that ends up reproducing nothing but a scribble effacing all lines, a scramble effacing all sounds (2004, 379).

Such an approach threatens a sudden deterritorialization and the formation of a black hole, thus, blocking the cosmic paths. Instead, I will propose that it is a dynamic between the differenciated order and the undifferenciated chaos that has an organisation to it through a selection of the, in principle, infinite possibilities of the Cosmos. This artistic organisation works between the territory and the outside to organise the territorial assemblage as composed chaos (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 204). This approach will develop Zepke’s concept of the readymade by arguing that we need to bring the made out of the readymade; not in order to return to the artist-as-maker, but to posit that new existential territories are always ready-to-be-made. It is in this sense that the artistic process is indifferentiated because it involves a process of working in-between the virtuality and the actuality of the readymade.

The readymade described by Zepke is different to the readymade defined by Duchamp (1973). According to Duchamp, art was produced for ‘the service of the mind’ (1998, 274), to which any ordinary object could become a work of art if it is the artist’s conceptual choice or ‘nomination’ (1973, 32). Art, in this sense, becomes ‘complete anaesthesia’; where its affects (and aesthetics) are completely subtracted from art (141). Contrary to Duchamp’s claim is Zepke’s articulation of the readymade as ‘affectual’ (2008, 36). Through its aesthetic excess, Zepke describes this affectual readymade as a ‘war machine of a politics of sensation that Duchamp and Conceptual art’s “informational” readymades in fact counteract’ (36).

(DRIP: The concept war machine that Zepke is employing comes from Deleuze and Guattari. In their description, Deleuze and Guattari explain that their concept can be defined according to its two poles: when the war machine ‘takes war for its object and forms a line of destruction prolongable to the limits of the universe’, this is the case when it is appropriated by the State, and; when the war machine ‘has as its object not war but the drawing of a creative line of flight, the composition of a smooth space and of the movement of people in that space’, this is the case when it is directed against the State (2004, 466). I believe the concept of the war machine that Zepke is employing to describe the affectual readymade is the definition provided in the latter pole.)
The aesthetic excess of the affectual readymade provides the available materials from the territory with which to make an artistic encounter. Not in the sense that any of the territory’s available materials can be elevated to the status of art, as would be Duchamp’s version of the readymade. Rather, the territory’s materials are ready-to-be-made. In this sense, the territory is always a readymade.

To the extent that the selected cosmic forces cannot be represented but are experienced within the movement of iridescent chaos, the artistic problem becomes one of harnessing them in a territorial mark. By working with the territory as readymade, the cosmic forces can be preserved as percepts and affects through a process of material appropriation. It is through preserving the percepts and affects of the cosmic forces that we can introduce difference into the territorial assemblage in order to engender change within the world. Deleuze and Guattari explain this process of marking the territory with its available materials as borrowing weapons in order to yield vision or sensation (1994, 204). This artistic process raises the ‘lived perceptions to the percept and lived affections to the affect’ (170). They describe this operation as ‘the moment the artist connects material with forces of consistency or consolidation’ in order to form a synthesizer of ‘the molecular and the cosmic, material and force’ (2004, 379-80). The synthesizer is an assemblage that ‘unites disparate elements in the material, and transposes the parameters from one formula to another’, that is, it produces the process (378). Deleuze and Guattari warn that this gesture must be a sober one so as to avoid producing a scrambling and a black hole (379). They say,

> Your synthesis of disparate elements will be all the stronger if you proceed with a sober gesture, an act of consistency, capture, or extraction that works in a material that is not meagre but prodigiously simplified, creatively limited, selected (380).

It is not about using all the available materials in the territory, because this will overdo it and suppress the cosmic forces. Rather, it is about ‘sufficiently’ deterritorializing the material in order for it ‘to be molecularized and open onto something cosmic, instead of lapsing into a statistical heap’ (379). It is to this extent that Deleuze and Guattari claim that the synthesizer takes ‘the place of the ground in a priori synthetic judgment: its synthesis is of the molecular and the cosmic, material and force, not form and matter, Grund and territory’ (379). The material is only important insofar as it preserves the percepts and affects of the cosmic forces. In their description of the synthesizer, I believe Deleuze and Guattari are urging us to consider the synthesizer as a ‘force of the Cosmos’ which can ‘make thought travel’ (379). To this extent,
we could posit that the synthesizer is what makes the artistic encounter ‘something in the world that forces us to think’ (Deleuze 1994, 139).

By harnessing the cosmic forces in the territorial assemblage, Deleuze and Guattari explain that the cosmic forces become ‘directional components’ (2004, 344-5), which enrich the readymade by resolving the combat experienced in the movement of iridescent chaos, without suppressing the cosmic forces or ending the process of passage and relay. Consequently, the directional components are the force of the Cosmos that blows otherness through the system and opens up the virtuality of the readymade. This changes the direction in the ordering and disordering of the readymade which makes possible transformations from one territory to another. It is in this sense that Zepke claims that ‘the readymade is in constant contact with a multiplicity of possible futures’ (2008, 35). The process of marking delineates a new existential territory, producing an actualisation of the virtuality opened up in the readymade. I argue that it is when a territorial mark is made that the indifferent/ciated organisation moves from indifferentiated to indifferenciated, and it is only this expression that can incite a becoming of art and subject. That is to say, a territorial mark marks a transition from a virtual artistic organisation as indifferentiated, to an actualised artistic organisation as indifferenciated. In doing so, the territorial assemblage is (re)organised, in which the directional components transform into ‘dimensional components’ and become expressive (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 345). This transformative artistic process is what, according to O’Sullivan, produces art as ‘an event that actualises a set of virtualities and in so doing expresses a possible world’ (2006, 130).

However, this does not mean that the process is thereby complete. There is always a reterritorializing attack by patriarchal and capitalist systems of representation, which subsumes the artistic ensemble. It is therefore necessary to continue this artistic process as indifferent/ciated in order to endlessly renew the artistic organisation. The upshot is that the territorial mark is described by Guattari as a ‘double enunciation’ (1995, 55), which expresses a new existential territory and the virtuality of that affectual readymade. It is within the virtuality of the readymade that this artistic process can (re)connect to the infinite possibilities of the Cosmos and renew the artistic organisation. This double enunciation can therefore produce schisms within the artistic organisation in which, Deleuze and Guattari explain, some of the dimensional components can always give way to ‘components of passage’ that can incite new processes of passage and relay and with it, new possibilities of difference (2004, 345).
They claim that these particular dimensional components have remained ‘functional and transitory’ because they are ‘tied to a type of action (sexuality, aggressiveness, flight)’ (347). Their functions, when territorialized, acquire an autonomy that can suddenly draw a line of deterritorialization (354-9). These particular dimensional components can thus escape the movement of reterritorialization. I would add that these particular dimensional components are feminine because Deleuze and Guattari describe that they can enliven a process of deterritorialization in which components of passage and relay produce an ‘innovative opening of the territory onto the female’ (358). In making this argument, I will claim that this process of deterritorialization releases a labial machine by invoking Irigaray’s theory of the labial lips. As a result, a work of art is never “finished” because it is always in the process of escaping and becoming different. The nature of the indifferent/ciated artistic process can now be thought of as a mixed two-way process of working within the ordering and disordering of the readymade. To this extent, new existential territories can continually be constructed from the affectual readymade in a process of organising that Guattari says requires ‘an untiring renewal’ (1995, 56). Therefore, this indifferent/ciated artistic process can also be thought of as a process of working within the ordering and disordering of possible worlds. Accordingly, the value of what is produced in this indifferent/ciated artistic process will never be subsumed within capitalist and patriarchal structures because these have already been left behind in the (re)organisation of a new world with new systems of valorization. That is, in following Guattari’s proposal for new existential systems of value, what is created will be valued according to its ‘existential productions that cannot be determined simply in terms of abstract labour-time or by an expected capitalist profit’ (2000, 65).

I have described this artistic practice elsewhere as a methodology of ‘writing within, rather than about, the structures that condition our experience’ (Mackenzie and MacKenzie 2014, 71). With MacKenzie, I argued that this “art” can be thought of as learning the art of expressing ideas as problems (71). I propose that this methodology of expressing ideas as problems enables us a way of making sense of these ideas by preserving them as problems in artistic encounters. This methodology therefore becomes an artistic process of learning that can produce new processes of engaging with the ideas that structure our experience. I suggest that by transforming the way we experience and engage with the world, we also transform our way of thinking to engage with these ideas in art. However, artists face the reterritorializing habits of mind that, as Braidotti notes, aim to re-present reality to itself by equating the ideas to a pre-established normative model (1994, 101). Given the pervasiveness of patriarchal forms of
thought, this artistic process could be applied as a feminist methodology of creating within the patriarchal structures that condition our thought. Applied in this way, I argue that one of the tasks of feminist art as a practice of resistance is to learn how to think schizoanalytically (in order to think difference).

In order to explore the ways in which this schizo-revolutionary artistic process can be sustained as a form of feminist resistance that can engender becomings-woman, it is necessary to consider what it means to think from within the labial. By employing this expression within theory, we invoke the work of Irigaray.

(DRIP: For overviews of the connection between Irigaray’s explicitly feminist project and Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy of difference, see Braidotti 1994, Colebrook 2000, Grosz 1994b, Lorraine 1999, and Olkowski 2000. For more recent discussions see also Jenkins 2016, MacCormack 2010, Stark 2017, and Von Samsonow 2019. The differences between these accounts can be found in the authors’ development of the connection that articulate their individual proposed feminist projects. Braidotti proposes feminist nomadism which argues for a feminist nomadic subject that can ‘conjugate the multilayered, multicultural perspective, with responsibility for and accountability to their gender’ (1994, 32); Colebrook suggests a different way of asking the question of sexual difference; Grosz develops corporeal feminism to argue that the body marks a site for becomings (1994b, 167); Lorraine suggests a visceral philosophy which opens up new ways of thinking about subjectivity as an embodied, dynamic process, that overcomes mind/body dualisms (1999); Olkowski proposes the possibility of the ruin of representation, such as the representation of sexual difference (1999, 2); Jenkins develops the idea that desire is overlaid by energies of sexual difference, which are a ‘driving force behind the material manifestations of cultural production in practices as diverse as art or economy’ (2016, 4); MacCormack offers the idea of ‘becoming-vulva’ as a way of thinking the flesh (2010, 94); Stark introduces a new way to think about sexual difference by focusing on the figure of the girl in Deleuze and Guattari’s becoming-woman (2017, 4); and Von Samsonow proposes a ‘feminist counterpart’ to Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus through her project, Anti-Electra, which (also) focuses on the figure of the girl as the potential for another symbolic order (2019, xxiv).)

Arguing that the phallus is the ultimate signifier that permeates all discourse and logos (1985a, 86), Irigaray explores the labial as the potential for different forms of expression that can
produce alternative modes of thinking and being. It is important to note that Irigaray investigates the labial not ‘as merely the female counterpart of the phallus’ (Joy 2013, 77), but as a new and non-phallic model of difference. Irigaray claims ‘[i]t is not a matter of producing a discourse of which woman would be the object or the subject’ (1985a, 135), or creating representations of the feminine subject in order to “know” the nature of woman, or to claim that there is one. Instead it is an exploration for different forms of expression that can produce alternative modes of thinking and being that are not subjugated to the phallic signifier. The feminine in this model is not understood as man’s counterpart, opposite, and other, but as the other of the other (Richardson 1998, 104). Braidotti explains that Irigaray invests in the feminine as ‘the sole force that can break the eternal return of the Same and its classical Others’ (2011, 283). Therefore, in pursuing the argument that thinking from within the labial could break our reterritorializing habits of mind, I agree that it is in the feminine difference engendered by exploring the labial that we can resist the reterritorializing movements of the patriarchal and capitalist systems of representation.

It is important to note Riordan’s description that labial machines can be located on all bodies: on the face, female genitals, and cuts etc., and so everybody can connect to the intensities of the feminine (2011, 85-7). Therefore, a feminist artistic practice is not only for women, but for everybody to create new movements of flight that can escape the patriarchal and capitalist systems of representation. By employing the term labial machine, Riordan invokes the concept of an abstract machine from Deleuze and Guattari. To the extent that abstract machines are defined by ‘the cutting edges of decoding and deterritorialization. They draw these cutting edges’ (2004, 562), Riordan claims how labial machines are also defined by their two cutting edges in relation to castration (2011, 84). According to Riordan,

Irigaray’s argument that the feminine is coded within masculine parameters in two contradictory but related ways – as lack and leak. Within this code, cutting would create lack and leak, tomb and womb simultaneously (83).

In other words, the labial machine cuts and ‘draws both molar and molecular lines’ creating a ‘becoming-woman via contagion with the microfeminine [that] need not subtract from woman, whose becoming-woman proceeds from her own sexually specific cartography’ (85). The cutting edges of a labial machine insert themselves into the assemblage undergoing deterritorialization, drawing variations and mutations that produce this process of becoming-woman. I would add that labial machines produce openings of the territory into the female
because Deleuze and Guattari use the term ‘female’ when describing the operation that opens the territory onto the Cosmos (2004, 358).

By describing the opening of the territory onto the Cosmos as opening onto the female, we can now further liken the access of the labial machine to the access to the Cosmos by explaining that labial machines can only be partially accessed because they are partially hidden inside the body. Both provide a partial access to the, in principle, infinity of virtual possibilities of the Cosmos, or the, in principle, infinity of virtual possibilities of the female. Furthermore, the labial machine, like the Cosmos, provides an escape from the patriarchal and capitalist systems of representation because Irigaray explains that it presents ‘the horror of nothing to see’ (1985a, 26). By escaping the territories of representation, the labial machine offers an experience that can only be sensed. In this respect, I will return to Guattari’s description of ‘mutant’ percepts and affects in order to frame the ‘mutant’ as labial. Labial affects are nonhuman becomings of man because they offer a becoming-woman launched at the threshold of the labial machine, that explores the assertion of a female subjective identity and sexuality as well as possibilities for alternative subjectivities. Labial percepts are nonhuman landscapes of nature because they offer access to a ‘smooth labial space of pure difference’ (Mackenzie and MacKenzie 2014, 74). That is to say, by escaping the territories of representation, the labial machine accesses a destratified space: a smooth space. Deleuze and Guattari describe the ‘smooth space’ as ‘a space without borders or enclosure’, in which its ‘essential feature’ is its ‘variability, the polyvocality of directions’ (2004, 420-1). They also describe the smooth space as ‘a tactile space, or rather “haptic,” a sonorous much more than a visual space’ (421), which, I argue, is in tune with the smooth space accessed by a labial machine. To this extent, I propose that everybody can find in their labial machines a movement of escape from their “self” as defined by patriarchal and capitalist logos of social formations, from within. According to Guattari, the ‘the aesthetic paradigm’ is ‘the creation and composition of mutant percepts and affects’, which ‘has become the paradigm for every possible form of liberation’ (1995, 91). Therefore, in creating and composing labial percepts and affects, we will produce an aesthetic paradigm for women’s liberation from patriarchal and capitalist ideas of subjectivity and judgment. Accordingly, this labial theory of artistic process can provide a practical feminist application of Deleuze and Guattari’s formula for schizoanalysis.

To the extent that this movement of deterritorialization engenders an experience of being lost with the cosmic forces in ‘iridescent chaos’ (Cézanne 2001, 114), I argue that the labial
machine engenders an experience of being lost with the *labial cosmic forces*. Insofar that the labial cosmic forces are tied to her sexuality, I will now turn to Grosz to posit that the process of selection within a feminist artistic process can be understood as ‘sexual selection’ (2008, 33). According to Grosz, sexual selection produces and explores excesses ‘for no reason other than their possibilities for intensification, their appeal’ (33). Therefore, the cosmic forces that are available to select in this excess are found as ‘pleasurable and intensifying qualities that can be used to adorn both territory and body’ (102). This excess described by Grosz can be allied to the aesthetic excess described by Zepke (2008, 36), making the affectual readymade a labial machine that has as its object the cutting and drawing of creative molar and molecular lines of flight, the composition of a smooth labial space and of the movement of feminine nomads in that space (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 466, my revision). Furthermore, this excess can therefore be likened to the *disruptive excess* posited by Irigaray that follows a feminine fluid “style” that ‘resists and explodes every firmly established form, figure, idea or concept’ (1985a, 78-9). According to Irigaray, this style ‘of course, is not a style at all, according to the traditional way of looking at things’, because it ‘does not privilege sight; instead, it takes each figure back to its source, which is among other things tactile’ (78-9).

From Grosz, we can understand that the process of sexual selection becomes about selecting forces by experiencing their power to intensify pleasure. Given that the immanent evaluation is of every-thing related to the life constituted by the labial percepts and affects, not every labial cosmic force can be selected because of the risk of the experience being too intense. This could result in blocking the cosmic paths because, Grosz explains, it puts the ‘life [constituted by the labial percepts and affects] at risk for the sake of intensification, for the sake of sensation itself’ (2008, 63). In the event that the cosmic paths are blocked, the cosmic forces that have been selected will no longer be cosmic. By losing their cosmic difference, these forces become negative and will not bring anything new to the territorial assemblage. Such an approach risks the expression of a differentiated order, because it suppresses the possibility of difference offered by the labial cosmic forces for the sake of a pleasurable and intense climax that ends the process. According to Irigaray’s critique of the logic of the Same, I argue that this approach could also be thought of as phallocentric: not only does it subjugate the labial cosmic forces for the sake of the one climax, as a result it reproduces the same.

(DRIP: By italicising the *one*, I refer to the way Irigaray describes the male organ:}
The *one* of form, of the individual, of the (male) sexual organ, of the proper name, of the proper meaning … supplants, while separating and dividing, that contact of *at least two* (lips) which keeps woman in touch with herself, but without any possibility of distinguishing what is touching from what is touched (1985a, 26).

That is not to say, however, that the only way to experience the labial cosmic forces fully is to completely escape. This would enable the body and territory to escape the practice of representation defined by patriarchal and capitalist systems and be fully immersed with the life constituted by the labial percepts and affects, but this would ultimately risk the life of the subject and the art. Such an approach risks the expression of an undifferentiated chaos, because it would entail the creation of a black hole (of death) or artistic qualities that are incomprehensible (schizophrenic). The point of this feminist artistic process is not to abandon personal identity, not least until we all have a personal identity that we can abandon, but to assert a female personal identity as part of the process of creating alternative subjectivities that leave all territories of patriarchal and capitalist representation behind.

This process of sexual selection can instead be explored through a method of combats-between labial cosmic forces. In accord with Irigaray’s description of women’s sexual multiplicity, this approach to female pleasure does not entail a ‘choice’ between ‘clitoral activity and vaginal passivity,’ but instead moves between the multiple different ‘caresses’ that can invoke ‘the hystericization of her entire body’ (1985a, 28). This process of combats-between overturns the judgment that her body sex is ‘zero,’ because her ‘sex organs’ can be located ‘more or less everywhere’ (28). Moving between her multiple sex organs avoids focusing on one sex organ that ends the process in one climax, and instead explores her body sex as ‘a thousand tiny sexes’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 235) which can continue and enrich the process. I propose that we can understand this method of combats-between as *caresses-between* to incorporate Irigaray’s description of women’s sexual multiplicity into this artistic approach to female pleasure. The immanent evaluation, therefore, draws the affirmative labial cosmic forces together in a ‘close embrace’ of a combat of sexual energies (354), enriching the artistic ensemble to incite a new feminist artistic encounter(s) or becoming(s)-woman.

In harnessing the labial cosmic forces in the territorial assemblage, they become directional components that blows the otherness of labial cosmic energy through the system and opens up the virtuality of the readymade, which makes possible transformations from one territory to another in a becoming-woman. When the territorial assemblage is (re)organised, the directional components transform into dimensional components and become expressive of her sexual
multiplicity. This expression of female sexuality develops my argument that particular dimensional components are labial (still feminine) because they are tied to her sexual action. In making this development, I argue that these dimensional components function like labial machines that produce openings of the territory onto the female. Suggesting once more that this argument could explain why Deleuze and Guattari use the term ‘female’ when describing the operation that opens the territory onto the Cosmos (2004, 358).

As there is no single model of female sexuality, it is through her sexual multiplicity that the/a woman is indifferientiated (Irigaray 1985b, 227). Neither open (indifferientiated) nor closed (differenciated), her morphology is determined as indeterminate (indifferientiated) (229). Lost in the movement of escape within a labial machine, the subject and the territory become indiscernible because they are in her ‘zone of … indifferientation where one can no longer be distinguished from a woman, an animal, or a molecule… ’ (Deleuze 1997b, 1). It is in this space of pure difference that provides the momentary experience of woman, and it is from this experience that can incite a becoming-woman. That is to say, this experience related to the labial affects and percepts bears witness to her morphological difference. By experiencing the world from the viewpoint that does not have a representation because, as Braidotti says, women have ‘never managed to gain powers of discursive representation’ (2011, 232), thought is forced to think her feminine difference. I propose that a way of thinking through this process of becoming-woman is by embodying it in Irigaray’s idea of the ‘self-caressing’ labial lips (1985a, 24).

Labias are different in that their folds are plural, have no center, and are different in and of themselves. The ‘two lips’ of the labia are in fact ‘neither one nor two’ and this ‘keeps woman in touch with herself, but without any possibility of distinguishing what is touching from what is touched’ (26). It is taking place ‘all the time’ because the two lips are in ‘continuous contact’ (24). By sacrificing no lip over the other, no one of her pleasures to another, she is able to identify herself with none of them in particular, but rather always an ever-folding becoming ‘of never being simply one’ (31). Without knowing (never “knowing”), she is already ‘several,’ but these are identities that cannot be dispersed because the other within her is already becoming something else (31).

The lips are in a ceaseless exchange with each other, each expressing a continuous differential enactment of singularities that are enunciated involuntarily:
She steps ever so slightly aside from herself with a murmur, an exclamation, a whisper, a sentence left unfinished ... When she returns, it is to set off again from elsewhere. From another point of pleasure, or of pain (29).

The points of pleasure or pain that she sets off from are important, I argue, as they each indicate the incorporation of the methods of combats-between employed from Deleuze (1997b, 132) and caresses-between employed from Irigaray (1985a, 28) to explain the multiple possibilities of movement between and within female pleasure. Each singular expression is unable to be distinguished from which lip it was expressed, therefore what is enunciated can only be partial. That is not to say that two (or more) partial enunciations expressed together, as a unit, can make one whole (something that can be understood within the phallic symbolic order). For Irigaray claims, while they are ‘contiguous’, what they express is not the same (29). What is expressed between them has an enfolded meaning, ‘an “other meaning”’ (29) that expresses a difference. It is these enfolded partial enunciation(s) that make her ‘whimsical, incomprehensible, agitated, capricious ... leaving “him” unable to discern the coherence of any meaning’ (28-9). This labial language of difference cannot be understood by the phallic symbolic order, because it speaks from the smooth labial space that is outside of the patriarchal territories of representation. Instead, following Guattari’s description of artistic process, it can be understood as belonging to an enfolded ‘logic of non-discursive [sexual] intensities’ and ‘vectors of partial [female] subjectivity’ (1995, 22). To the extent that the labial lips are in touch with the infinite possibilities of the female, they can be thought of as already in touch with the infinite possibilities of the Cosmos. I propose that this cosmic difference is what makes feminine difference able to rise to the feminist problem posed by Braidotti as that of freeing “woman” from the subjugated position of annexed “other,” so as to make her expressive of a different difference, of pure difference, of an entirely new plane of becoming, out of which differences can multiply and differ from each other (1994, 115).

Understood in this way, it is through her self-caressing lips that she can set ‘off in all directions’ (Irigaray 1985a, 29) towards a ‘multiplicity of possible futures’ (Zepke 2008, 35).

The process of becoming occurs in the smooth labial space, but, as Deleuze and Guattari explain, ‘all progress is made by and in the striated space’ (2004, 536-7). The partial access of the labial machine is only partial because there is still a partial connection to the rest of the body. This can be described as the connection to the striated space as it is how we maintain an
engagement in the world and engender change within it. Deleuze and Guattari explain that the striated space is rendered homogeneous through its ‘parallel forces’ which striate ‘all of space in all of its directions’ by ‘formalizing all the other dimensions’ according to the ‘center of gravity’ (408). In other words, the directional components selected from the smooth labial space are transformed into expressive dimensional components in the striated space. This necessary operation preserves the labial affects and percepts of the labial cosmic forces into a feminist artistic encounter and introduces a labial cosmic difference into the territorial assemblage. It is when a territorial mark is made that her morphology transforms from indifferented to indifferenciated, and it is only this expression that can incite a becoming-woman. By expressing a labial cosmic difference, her morphology becomes definite and defined as difference. Her morphological difference is not, cannot, be understood by patriarchal forms of thought insofar as it is difference.

Although this is a necessary operation, Deleuze and Guattari warn us that it can run risks of closure or stoppage (536). They caution that

You may make a rupture, draw a line of flight, yet there is still a danger that you will reencounter organizations that restratify everything, formations that restore power to a signified, attributions that reconstitute a subject (10).

That is to say, parallel forces can work in accordance with patriarchal and capitalist structures to the extent that they discontinue the change of direction in the ordering and disordering of the readymade, by formalising the labial cosmic forces according to a center that is fixed upon the logic of capital and the phallic as ultimate signifiers. To this extent, any difference or progress produced from the smooth labial space will be reterritorialized in the triumph of phallogocentrism and the law of capital (411), thereby reproducing the female body in the territories of representation that, Grosz explains, judge and re-present her in models and images designed by and for men (1989, xx). Braidotti claims that this is the necessary structural operation of the phallogocentric system: to represent her difference as other, subjugated and pejorative (1994, 80).

However, Braidotti explains that what is ‘troublesome’ in the patriarchal and capitalist systems of representation is that ‘[s]he is morphologically dubious’ (80). There are always opportunities for openings on the striated space because, according to Irigaray, the ‘geography of her pleasure is far more diversified, more multiple in its differences, more complex, more subtle, than is
commonly imagined’ (1985a, 28). In agreement with Braidotti and Irigaray, I propose that these opportunities are produced as the territorialized function(s) of the labial dimensional components acquire an autonomy and enliven processes of deterritorializations which create openings, or in other words, smooth patches in the striated space. By following Deleuze and Guattari’s description of the resistance of the smooth space (2004, 411), it can be said that enlivening the feminine process releases labial machines that open the territory onto the female, in which the smooth labial space can reconquer the properties of contact that free it from the patriarchal and capitalist structures. In this movement of escape, she becomes lost in her zone of inddifferentiation, in which she experiences becoming woman again (and again…). Through a process of caressing-within, she is able to (re-)discover her labial cosmic difference and introduce it into a new assemblage. In a movement of territorialization, she reclaims her morphological difference by expressing it as affirmative, joyful, and empowering. This territorial mark not only expresses the indifferentiated woman as indifferenciated, that incites a becoming-woman, but it also delineates the transformation from one assemblage to another that can be described as ‘the becoming-imperceptible of women becoming-women’ (Mackenzie and MacKenzie 2014, 74). Her territorial mark therefore expresses an enfolded enunciation that, according to Braidotti, marks ‘a process of simultaneous exiting from the phallogocentric premises and of asserting and thus creating new territories’ (2002, 111). Accordingly, the process of becoming in the reimpacted smooth labial space becomes an enfolded becoming of (at least) two: the becoming-imperceptible of women becoming-women. As a result, the indifferenciated woman never emerges as one, whole, unified individual female Being, but always as plural: she is a feminine nomad. According to Lorraine’s description of Irigaray’s model of becoming, woman always emerges as ‘two or more subjects’, each of which are continuously ‘transformed’ (1999, 163). This is because, as Braidotti explains, she is always in a process of becoming that splits her ‘time and time again, over multiple axes of differentiation’ (1994, 171).

(DRIP: See Marshalore’s Trop(e)isme (1980, colour, 14min) for an example of a feminist artistic encounter that creates an opening onto the female, in which the smooth labial space reconquers the properties of contact that free it from the patriarchal and capitalist structures, and produces a movement of territorialization that reclaims her morphological difference. According to Tenhaaf,
The artist is again the subject, her face in profile appearing in the foreground of the screen for much of the tape, contorted in a succession of silent screams. Enacting a metaphor for accessing her inner rage, this subject puts her fingers into her vagina, framed very close, then takes them out covered in menstrual blood and smears the blood across her face. In this intense and cathartic moment that Deleuze and Guattari would characterize as a (schizophrenic) hiatus in the production of the real, excess finds an opening, surfacing as a wounding knowledge akin to the enlightening wound of the mystic. After this disturbing, taboo-breaking gesture, the artist takes a long drag on a cigarette, exhaling slowly with sensual satisfaction (2001, 384).

By creating art that escapes the patriarchal and capitalist systems of representation, the viewpoint therefore does not obey traditional representations of beauty. As described by Irigaray in her experience of women’s art:

Very often, when looking at women’s works of art, I have been saddened by the sense of anguish they express, an anguish so strong it approaches horror. Having wanted to contemplate beauty created by women, I would find myself faced instead with distress, suffering, irritation, sometimes ugliness. The experience of art, which I expected to offer a moment of happiness and repose, of compensation for the fragmentary nature of daily life, of unity and communication or communion, would become yet another source of pain, a burden. … The portrayal of suffering is, then, for women an act of truthfulness. It’s also akin to an individual and collective catharsis (1993c, 107-8).

I can now posit this artistic practice as a feminist methodology of creating within the patriarchal structures that condition our experience. In agreement with Olkowski, this feminist artistic practice of resistance reveals her libidinal energy as the source of her creativity and ethical relation to the world (Hiltmann 2007, 11). By exploring her libidinal cosmic energy through art, she can reinvent the representations of beauty and create new and different images of women that express her imagination, pleasure and expression. The indifferenced woman is still indifferenced, because her morphology is always in the process of becoming other. What she produces can never be “finished” because her expression is in a continuous process of touching within. Her territorial mark, therefore, is an expression of a point in the artistic process of becoming-woman that is always becoming (within). Moreover, it is an expression of a point in which she was/is able to (re-)discover herself away from the phallic signifier. Consequently, what she produces can never be owned because there is no patriarchal image that can recognise its enfolded meaning. She cannot be asked to repeat herself because she has already returned (to the indifferenced) within herself. When asked who she is, or more precisely to explain her indifferenciation, she ‘can only reply: Nothing [(differenciated)]. Everything [(indifferentiated)]’ (Irigaray 1985a, 29). Accordingly, the value of what she expresses will never be subsumed within capitalist and patriarchal structures because it is a line of flight that leaves them behind in the creation of ‘a possible world’ (O'Sullivan 2006, 130) with new systems of valorization. To this extent, the indifferent/ciated woman is a line of flight (Deleuze...
and Guattari 2004, 305). She does not, and cannot, belong to the models and images given to her by and for men because she is enfolded: she is both indifferented and indifferenciated; Nothing and Everything; finite and infinite; within and outside. She is different; she is other; she is sublime; she is becoming; she is nomadic; she is cosmic.

This labial formula for a schizo-revolutionary artistic process can therefore engender new feminist artistic encounters that can force us to think differently about women, for women, (men and others) becoming-women, and as women, (men and others) becoming-women. In working through what makes these feminist artistic encounters something in the world that forces us to think, I will use Irigaray’s phrase to describe the operation of connecting the territorial materials with the labial cosmic forces as ‘the meeting point of the properties of physical matter and an elaboration of sexualised subjective identity’ (1993b, 153). For Irigaray, her sexuate subjectivity is valid in her process of writing because, she argues,

I am a woman. I write with who I am. … how could I on the one hand be a woman, and on the other, a writer? … The whole of my body is sexuate (1993c, 53).

In expressing ourselves, we also express our sexuate subjectivities. This is the reason Irigaray argues for the ‘need … to work out an art of the sexual, a sexed culture’ (1993a, 3), that is, ‘an art of the sexual that respects the colors, the sounds, and the forms proper to each sex’ (1993b, 165). To create art capable of preserving the labial affects and percepts, I believe Irigaray provides us with a suggestion of making the connection to colour (1993c, 109, see also 1993b, 164). She says that

in breaking out of our formal prisons, our shackles, we may discover what flesh we have left. I think color is what’s left of life beyond forms, beyond truth or beliefs, beyond excepted joys and sorrows. Color also expresses our sexuate nature, that irreducible dimension of our incarnation … When all meaning is taken away from us, there remains color, colors, in particular those corresponding to our sex. Not the dullness of the neuter, the non-living or problematically living (stones, for example) but the colors that are ours owing to the fact that we are women (1993c, 109).

(DRIP: We are reminded of the menstrual blood in Marshalore’s Trop(e)isme (1980, colour, 14min), mentioned in the previous drip.)

In making this connection to colour as a way to preserve the labial affects and percepts, we almost echo Deleuze and Guattari:
Sensation is not realized in the material without the material passing completely into the sensation, into the percept or affect. All the material becomes expressive. It is the affect that is metallic, crystalline, stony and so on; and the sensation is not colored but, as Cézanne said, coloring (1994, 166-7).

Therefore, without wishing to be proscriptive about the nature of a schizo-revolutionary labial artistic practice, it could be argued that the operation of connecting the territorial materials with the labial cosmic forces involves that of colouring. Irigaray argues that it is within ‘such an art, [that] the hysteric should be able to regain her perceptions – her virginity, her gender – and keep hold of them’ (1993b, 164). This operation therefore forms a synthesizer that is a force of the labial cosmic difference, and to this extent can ‘make thought travel’ beyond the patriarchal forms of thought. Moreover, the preserved labial affects and percepts emit problematic signs that are outside the patriarchal images of thought because they bear the enfolded meaning that make feminist art an encounter with the labial cosmic difference.

By situating her morphological difference as the conditions for thinking differently, I argue that we can reclaim her morphological difference from the patriarchal mental processes that represent it as pejorative and instead affirm it as the source of her creative process of thought. That is to say, it is precisely because her expression cannot be understood by the phallic symbolic order that it has the potential to force thought to create the unknown, unthought and unsymbolised. The new ideas that are forced into thought can therefore open thought up to feminine differences that can engender new possibilities for thinking that is not subjugated to the phallic signifier. Moreover, these feminine ideas can help us to think difference in plurality insofar that what is thought will never be the Same, but a fluid process of thinking with her libidinal energy.

In order to engage with the enfolded meaning that make feminist art an encounter with the labial cosmic difference, a new enfolded mode of thinking is forced into thought that can think of two, for two. This enfolded process of thought provides us with a two-way enfolded basis for thinking the relationship between the indifferntiated and indifferenciated; the represented and representation; and the differenciated and undifferenciated. Instead of thinking of one, for one, as we have been programmed to think through a practice of self-representation provided by patriarchal and capitalist systems of representation, it is a mode of thought that Olkowski describes continually recognises one’s own boundaries but also surpasses them (Hiltmann 2007, 11). This processual and creative mode of thought forces thought to start from the outside, or as Olkowski explains, from a ‘plurality of outsides’ (90), because it operates outside
the ordinary scene of representations in thought. This enfolded mode of thought can break our reterritorializing habits of mind that seeks to recognises a fixed image of oneself to the extent that Olkowsk argues that it creates a ‘polygenesis in which mastery fades away’ (90). Thinking without an image forces the psychic system to become open to new ideas of subjectivity and judgment incited by the new influxes of labial cosmic energy from the encounter with their enfolded meaning. The ideas produced not only explore the emancipation of images of the woman as indifferenciated, but also explore the emancipation of the infinite possibilities of the female incorporeal in the female imagination, pleasure and expression. As a result, the new images emancipated within this thought are enfolded to the extent that it thinks of two, for two: indifferenciated and indifferenciated; Nothing and Everything; finite and infinite; within and outside. Thinking in this way allows us to experience the world through a perspective that is à deux, in which Olkowski explains that we can consider ourselves indifferenciated, unfinished, and always becoming (97-8).

(DRIP: I also explore this perspective in the drip, Ripple Effect, as a feminine method of thinking. I propose that a process of learning to think à deux enables us to open our closed system of thought to the feminine, not in order to submit her to the Same patriarchal images, but in ways that assert the positivity of her difference.)

Therefore, these feminist artistic encounters can transform ideas of subjectivity and judgment aligned with the interests of patriarchy and capitalism and create new enfolded modes of thought that are better suited to a life lived à deux. This feminist artistic practice of resistance can be understood as an artistic process of learning a labial formula for thinking schizoanalytically.

(DRIP: For an example of a feminist artistic encounter that offers the reader a perspective that is à deux, see Woolf’s story of Judith in A Room of One’s Own (2016a). In the drip, Mist, I employ this example to argue that when imagining Judith’s story, Woolf is building her feminist dwelling in literature as a feminist approach to writing and thinking à deux, to the extent that Woolf is nomadically remembering two different Shakespeares, for two different becomings.)

Even though this enfolded mode of thought can break our reterritorializing habits of mind, it is a process of resistance that is on-going, ever-folding and never-ending because movements of
reterritorialization will continue to attack both: the indifferenciated woman, so that she can be submitted to the patriarchal models and images (again), and; the enfolded processes of thought so that patriarchal forms of thought can find a mental solution to this enfolded problem. There is nonetheless always a feminist critique embedded in these reterritorializations because Irigaray explains that ‘no one single thing – no form, act, discourse, subject, masculine, feminine – can complete the development of woman’s desire’ (1985b, 229). That is to say, no amount of overcoding can diminish woman’s desire to express herself in a continuous process of touching within, and it is this feminine desire that incites us to continue a feminist artistic practice of resistance. According to Irigaray’s description of women’s desire, a feminist artistic process is already schizo-revolutionary because ‘her insatiable (hysterical) thirst for satisfaction’ (229) calls for an untiring renewal of her artistic organisation, and, as a consequence, produces her ‘endless becoming’ (1993c, 53).

The nature of a schizo-revolutionary labial theory of artistic practice can now be summarized as an on-going, never-complete, ever-folding, labial revolution of learning, creation and becoming. By enlivening the feminine within the artistic process, art can move in processes of deterritorializations of the capitalist and patriarchal systems of representation towards possibilities of becoming-woman. By exploring the emancipation of the female imagination, pleasure and expression through art, we can produce different ways of thinking and being that will allow us to experience the world through a perspective that is à deux. The feminist artistic encounters, processes and practices that are produced amount to neither a set object or subject, but rather, a labial art-politics (Mackenzie and MacKenzie 2014, 77): an enfolded practice of art and politics ‘without any possibility of distinguishing what is touching from what is touched’ (Irigaray 1985a, 26).
Ripple Effect

According to Coate, in order ‘to understand what is possible to think and who can think it’ we need to understand ‘how the curriculum is structured’ (2006, 408). Western modern political thought is saturated with patriarchal ideas, producing a curriculum that Abbott describes as ‘malestream’ (1991, 189). To the extent that we learn/teach this malestream curriculum, our thought is being trained in the patriarchal tradition. Therefore, it seems that modern political thought inhibits us from learning to think differently because it is still teaching us that ‘it is men who live and move in history’, as Lerner argues (1987, 201). Learner claims that ‘[w]omen have not only been educationally deprived throughout historical time in every known society, they have been excluded from theory-formation’ (5). As a result, the curriculum of Western modern political thought, as typically presented, includes more theories formed by men. In developing Haslanger’s claim that philosophy departments are ‘hypermasculine places’ (2008, 217), I will argue that the environment in which modern political thought is taught is also hypermasculine. With the purpose of resisting this patriarchal tradition, I will propose a feminine process of thinking that can be understood as learning/teaching from a perspective that is à deux, which thinks of two, for two. This proposal will build upon Irigaray’s suggestion for a sexuate education (2008b) by arguing for the construction of feminist dwellings in modern political thought as a feminist approach to teaching and learning to think differently.

The perpetual representation of “great” male political theorists produces a hierarchy of power relations in political theory, in which men are positioned as intellectually superior and are capable of producing what Pareira terms as ‘proper knowledge’, whereas women are positioned as intellectually inferior and can only produce secondary knowledge that is ‘less credible’ (2012, 286). According to this patriarchal logic, Pareira explains that the political treatises written by women or that express feminist ideas are ‘located partly within, and partly outside, the realm of proper knowledge’ (283). If these texts are included on the curriculum, Abbott claims that they are placed under ‘recommended texts,’ where they ‘tend to be lumped under the “gender” label and given a couple of lectures or a chapter in a book: “malestream” can then carry on as normal’ (1991, 189). It seems clear that insofar as ‘proper knowledge’ is written by “great” male political theorists, we learn and internalise the ideas that men are intellectually superior and women are intellectually inferior.
(DRIP: In the drip, Mist, I explore this process of internalisation as the effect of the patriarchal conditioning of thought enabled by a representational approach to thinking. By building upon Deleuze’s critique of the modern image of thought as representational, I develop a feminist critique that aligns with Grosz’s (1989) and Braidotti’s (1994) to argue that the image of thought is phallocentric. According to Grosz, this mode of thought submits women to models and images that have been defined by and for men based on patriarchal systems of representation (1989, xx).)

This process of internalisation, according to Haslanger, forms ‘schemas’ relating to those individuals or groups of people that influence an unconscious bias (2008, 212). It is to this extent that positive perceptions of men and negative perceptions of women are thereby institutionalised in academia.

By internalising the idea that men are intellectually superior, Flood argues that it is undeniably ‘easier for men to live up to the expectations attached to their statuses as “man” and “professor”’ (2011, 146). According to Rich’s outline of the assimilation process into Western culture (1983, 142), it could be argued that those who are male, white, cis, heterosexual, able-bodied, and middle-class will find assimilating into academia a lot smoother and quicker than those who are other. The reason for this could be because ‘[o]rthodox epistemology presupposes a standardized knower who is everyone and no one (yet whose experiences and assumptions are strikingly congruent with those of privileged White men)’ (Code 2006, 149). According to Deleuze and Guattari, the standard Western idea for the human has always been the face of the ‘White Man himself’ (2004, 196). Therefore, the white male academic is able to fit the idea of the ‘standardized knower’. In Western epistemologies of modernity that coalesce around ideals of objectivity, where the “neutral” approach of the ‘standardized knower’ is most valued, the white male academic assumes the ideal position of knowledge (Code 2006, 149). Therefore, according to Code, white men are able to

sustain the “myth of the neutral man,” presumed capable of representing everyone’s interests objectively, and of knowing women and other Others better than they know themselves. By contrast, women and other Others produce only partial, subjectivity interested knowledge (150).

This contrast further serves the idea that men are more capable of producing ‘proper knowledge’ than women. Code claims that this ‘ideal objectivity ... objectifies women’ to the extent that it works to ‘ensure the hegemony of “their” [men’s] knowledge while suppressing
“women’s ways of knowing” (147-8). Hearn and Kimmel build upon Code’s argument by explaining that ‘any book that does not have the word “women” in it is a book in “men’s studies” – but we call it “literature”, “history”, or “political science”’ (2006, 55). As a result of this patriarchal logic, men dominate the literature (Maliniak, Powers and Walter 2013, 917-9), professoriates (see Laube, Massoni, Sprague and Ferber 2007, 87; and Jenkins 2014, 163), and intellectual life (Ahmed 2017, 152).

Even though this patriarchal logic benefits men, it can also be diminishing for them. It is reasonable to assume that the representations of the “great” male political theorists in the curriculum engenders a desire to be part of the “boy’s club”. Consequently, it could be argued that some male academics aspire to produce ‘proper knowledge’ worthy of the label “great”. In line with this argument, Hearn and Kimmel have claimed that men work within two major sets of power relations within the academy: heterosocial and homosocial power relations (the power of men over women, or the privileging of men’s work over women’s, and the power of some men over other men, or the privileging of some men’s work over other men’s) (2006, 56). From this understanding of how power relations are measured within the academy, I will turn to Haslanger who argues that the philosophy departments in America ‘often are hypermasculine places’ (2008, 217) to posit that the environment in which modern political thought is taught is also hypermasculine. Haslanger describes this environment as ‘competitive, combative’, ‘highly judgmental, orientated toward individual accomplishment, individual intelligence, and agency,’ and ‘hostile to femininity’ (217). Drawing succour from Olkowski, I will describe that the production of knowledge in a hypermasculine environment takes place in a ‘closed conceptual system’, in which one’s own philosophy is predicated ‘on nothing but the continual rebuttal of previous [male] thinkers mak[ing] one’s own work a dead end’ (2007, 76). Olkowski goes on to say that working in a ‘closed conceptual system’ condemns academics to follow and repeat the ‘ideas of a single male master’ (90). I suggest that this method of producing knowledge is based upon Irigaray’s description of the logic of the Same, such that new work produced within this context becomes more of the Same (1985a, 74). In line with Irigaray’s critique, I argue that this method could also be thought of as phallocentric: not only does it subjugate women’s ways of knowing for the sake of “neutrality”, it reproduces the same which sustains men’s knowledge as the ‘proper knowledge’. I would further argue that producing such ‘proper knowledge’ and becoming “great” political theorists results in becoming the master of a phallocentric ‘closed conceptual system’. However desirable it is to be “great”, this method of producing knowledge betrays thought because learning in a ‘closed
conceptual system’ does not bring about the new, but, rather, ‘a dead end’ (Olkowski 2007, 76-7).

What arises as a result of learning within a closed system where nothing enters or leaves, according to Olkowski’s work on Freud, is the ego (85). This feeling of having to prove oneself as “great” drives some male academics to mark their name in the male lineage of political theory and philosophy. According to Braidotti, ‘the dominant subject is stuck with the burden of self-perpetuating Being and the flat repetition of existing patterns’ (2011a, 29). I suggest that this is because they are stuck in a ‘closed conceptual system’ stroking their egos. Following Olkowski’s argument, these flat repetitions uphold an ‘image of philosophy coloured by masculinism: a power of the ego-philosopher whose megalomania is based on a contrast with, and then endangered by, something Sartre thinks of as “feminine”’ (2007, 73). The production of knowledge in a hypermasculine environment therefore presents an indifference to the innovations from women and minorities (Jenkins 2014, 163). It does this by fixating on the approach of “neutrality”, however Jenkins argues that ‘perhaps this has something to do with a certain survival strategy that the [philosophy] discipline’s masculine guardians have pursued’ (163). Haslanger claims that this hypermasculine environment ‘keeps women out’ by making it ‘difficult for women to feel “at home”’ (2008, 211-7). Women can succeed within the hypermasculine discipline and academy, Haslanger explains, if they assimilate into the hypermasculine environment as much as one-who-is-other can. This hypermasculine survival strategy for women therefore requires them to sublimate ‘potentially important aspects of identity’ (217). Haslanger explains that this hypermasculine survival strategy makes it more unlikely for women to want to pursue work within a hypermasculine system that makes them ‘regularly feel “stupid”’ and/or causes them to quit because they ‘don’t have to put up with this mistreatment’ (212-8). While these analyses are largely drawn from investigations into philosophy as a discipline and philosophy departments as an institutional expression of that discipline, it is reasonable to assume that women encounter these hypermasculine conditions when entering and working within political theory. However, following Olkowski’s argument, I agree that the hypermasculine discipline is endangered by the feminine and propose that women can resist these hypermasculine conditions through feminine innovations.

(DRIP: See Labial Drip, where I carve out an understanding of this feminine as a new and non-phallic model of difference through Irigaray’s feminist project of sexual difference.)
It is important to note that I am not suggesting men should stop producing knowledge or not engage in learning, rather, I am calling for them, along with women, to engage in learning of a different kind that will open this ‘closed conceptual system’ in order to bring about the new. I argue that we can open our closed system of thought by thinking with feminine difference, not in order to submit her to the Same phallocentric ideas, but in ways that assert the positivity of her difference. In doing so, feminine innovations can be recognised, not as unworthy secondary knowledge, but as worthy contributions to political theory.

With the aim of developing a feminine process of thinking in political theory, I will formulate a proposal that argues for valid female representation in the curriculum of modern political thought that can create a space for feminine difference. This proposal for a feminine process of thinking is motivated by Irigaray’s contested relationship to the canon of Western philosophy, which aims to problematise and reinvent it by articulating and promoting a space for the feminine within it. Building upon Irigaray’s proposal for woman’s rights, I will argue for a feminine pragmatic approach that aims to introduce ‘valid representations’ of women in the ‘actions, words, and images’ in political theory (Irigaray 1993c, 86) in order for women to intervene as a woman in its masculine discourse (1985a, 135; see also Whitford 1991, 13).

According to Braidotti, by asserting the positivity of sexual difference Irigaray invites us to reclaim feminine difference from the patriarchal images and models that represent it as a negative by situating it as the source of women’s creativity in which ‘women must speak the feminine – they must think it, write it, and represent it in their own terms’ (1994, 118). The female representation introduced in this way will be valid insofar that it is expressed by women, for women.

This proposal for a feminine pragmatic approach may seem at odds with the argument I constructed in another drip, Mist, that aligns with Deleuze’s critique of the modern image of thought as representational. However, I agree with Irigaray (1993c, 86) and Braidotti (1994, 169) that introducing valid female representation could be strategic as part of the process towards changing our way of thinking. Both Irigaray and Braidotti suggest preliminary feminist strategies of claiming valid female representation in order to transform the social form specific to women. The aim of this proposal is not to make modern political thought more inclusive, Whitford describes Irigaray’s warning where ‘women become assimilated to the world of men and then have nothing to contribute as women’ (1991, 12). Nor is it to create a female version of modern political thought or a “girls club”; as Irigaray puts it, to ‘reverse the
order of things, even supposing this to be possible, history would repeat itself” and ‘revert to
sameness: to phallocratism. It would leave room neither for women’s sexuality, nor for
women’s imaginary, nor for women’s language to take (their) place’ (1985a, 33). Rather, it is
to assert the positivity of feminine difference within our process of thought which can, as neatly
summarised by Joy, introduce ‘measures that celebrate both women’s minds and bodies’ (2013,
71).

(See the drip, Labial Drip, in which I further explore Irigaray’s and Braidotti’s
suggestions of preliminary feminist strategies for claiming valid female representation as part
of the process of becoming-woman. Through a synthesis of Deleuze and Guattari’s and
Irigaray’s two models of subjectivity, I propose the idea of the feminine nomad as a model of
subjectivity that recognises the feminine within the process of becoming-woman, positing a
process of becoming-other of the other, not becoming-other or -elsewhere.)

It is important to remember that claiming valid female representation is only the preliminary
task. The difference is rather in the potential that this preliminary task brings. Unlike most
contemporary women writers who consider themselves feminists yet are politically positioned
as liberals of one sort or another who would accept and argue vigorously that once women’s
social form is promoted and progressed, women will be liberated, I follow Irigaray’s argument
that women will only be liberated to an equal status with men because the maximum individual
liberty achievable by women in a liberal democratic state would still mean that they remain
subordinate to the idea of Man. By claiming valid female representation within the curriculum,
women will have created a space within the hypermasculine discipline to make feminine
differences. This new task follows an Irigarayan approach to the extent that it aims to create a
space for ‘an “other meaning”’ that will enable the emergence of woman in the philosophical
discourse (Irigaray 1985a, 29; Whitford 1991, 13). She is not to be understood as the feminine
represented in models and images designed by and for men (Grosz 1989, xx), but as the other
of the other insofar as she is expressive of ‘an “other meaning”’. Irigaray creates a way for the
philosophy canon to express ‘an “other meaning”’ by problematising and reinventing its
masculine discourse to create a different discourse that expresses a feminine philosophy.
Through her articulation of philosophy in terms of sexual difference, Irigaray’s feminist
critique situates her work outside the canon yet creates a space for the feminine that intervenes
within it. This Irigarayan approach is described by Braidotti as that of reading, or rather, unread classical philosophical texts ‘in terms of their representation of and relations to the
“feminine”’ (1994, 131). The task of creating a space for the feminine in modern political thought can be furthered through the process of un-reading the mainstream political treatises in relation to the ‘feminine’. I argue that this feminist process can resist the patriarchal habits of thought as it involves becoming consciously aware of feminine differences, not in ways that consider it as other, but in ways that will think with the other.

Braidotti reads Irigaray’s feminist practice of critiquing the masculine discourse of philosophy as ‘a game of specular/speculative reflection of the inner logic of phallogocentric discourse’ (131). She goes on to say that ‘[t]his game of strategic repetition of throwing back to the text what the text does to the “feminine” becomes a highly subversive practice of the critique of discourse’ (131). This ‘strategic repetition’ does not, however, end here as a critique of the ‘malestream’. It is a strategy which brings about a repetition with difference to the extent that the political treatises are (re)read with the feminine. This strategy can be understood as a process of (re)reading through a perspective that is à deux.

(DRIP: I have employed the term à deux from Olkowski, who uses it in reference to Salomé’s theory of woman’s narcissism. Salomé posits the dual orientation of narcissism in her revision of the myth of Narcissus:

Bear in mind that the Narcissus of the legend gazed, not at a man-made mirror, but at the mirror of Nature. Perhaps it was not just himself that he beheld in the mirror, but himself as if he were still All: would he not otherwise have fled from the image instead of lingering before it? And does not melancholy dwell next to enchantment upon his face? Only the poet can make a whole picture of this unity of joy and sorrow, departure from self and absorption in self, devotion and self-assertion (1962, 9).

Olkowski says that because Narcissus did not see just himself, he thus ‘did not fall into self-love’ (2007, 96). To the extent that Narcissus also witnessed his surroundings, his love expanded the boundaries of his self and included others. This sense of connectedness describes for Salomé the conditions of women’s narcissism (1964, 118). Olkowski translates this narcissism into a

Love of others [that], rather than arising from the diminishment of our libidinal energies, arises out of an excess of love; not even self-love but simply “love belonging to ourselves” (Salomé [1962, 9]). It is that we have too much love rather than not enough (2007, 97).

Moreover, as Salomé claims that it is only in the cathexis of objects that the libido is manifested as something in itself (1962, 9), Olkowski says that ‘without the love of others, no self even
emerges … So out of this emergence of love, in which we make light of our boundaries, arises not only the self but friendship and ethics as well’ (2007, 97). In this love of others, the excess of love given does not exhaust the libido but enriches it (Salomé 1962, 10). For Salomé, this enrichment is experienced in connection with ‘object cathexis, value judgements, and the narcissistic transformations into artistic creativity’ (4). According to Schultz, ‘[t]he most excessive, most infantile ecstasy may turn into an actual object – perhaps a poem, perhaps an invention’ (1994, 190). This theory of narcissism therefore promotes women’s libidinal energy as the source of her creativity and ethical relation to others and the world (Hiltmann 2007, 11). For Salomé, loving beyond the self ‘allows the world to be experienced not from the vantage point of the omnipotent ego, but à deux’ (1962, 13). That is, instead of thinking of one, for one, by practicing self-representation, self-absorption, self-devotion and self-assertion, thinking à deux thinks of two, for two, by continually recognising one’s own boundaries and surpassing them in the love of others.)

I argue that (re)reading the political treatises à deux allows them to be read beyond the masculine discourse of philosophy towards a creative reading that enriches the reader, even to the point that the reader creatively reinvents the text. (Re)reading à deux enlivens women’s ways of knowing and restores the feminine into the text, making a difference to the same which sustains men’s knowledge as the ‘proper knowledge’. As a result, I propose that all those accusations that mark feminine or feminist knowledge as subjective, limited and ‘less credible’ (Pareira 2012, 286), are rethought à deux. This process of thinking à deux can assert the positivity of feminine differences in thought in the love of others.

It is important to note that (re)reading à deux is not a process of establishing a ‘proper knowledge’ of the feminine. Instead, it is about introducing feminine difference into thought which can free thought from its ‘closed conceptual system’ by opening it up to the outside. To the extent that Pareira claims feminist scholarship is considered as limited and ‘less credible’ because it is located ‘partly outside’ what is considered ‘proper knowledge’ (2012, 283-6), I believe that it is precisely this partial location that has the potential to open up the closed system of thought that Olkowski describes is produced by learning in ‘a dead end’ (2007, 76-7). (Re)reading à deux is a process of reading both parts that are located within and outside the realm of proper knowledge. According to Olkowski’s reading of Le Doeuff, ‘thought that starts from outside philosophy but from a plurality of outsides … makes possible a plurality of
starting points’, from which, thought creates a ‘polygenesis in which mastery fades away’ (2007, 90). Le Doeuff claims

the idea that a thought always begins elsewhere is of no interest unless that “elsewhere” allows us to introduce a plurality: the specific effort of one thought would then be to constitute one coherence (approximate at least) from an initial diversity (2007, 170).

For Le Doeuff, producing knowledge is not about bowing down to a single master or claiming that she knows the philosopher’s work better than she/he does, but a ‘reworking’ of the philosopher’s work which involves thinking about her/his work as well as drawing upon many other things, including one’s own multiple geneses (171-2). In relation to her critique of the ‘closed conceptual system’, Olkowski calls Le Doeuff’s suggested process of producing knowledge a process of working in an open system (2007, 76). She goes on to say,

Le Doeuff maintains that a multiple relation in philosophy to what is multiply outside philosophy makes possible the flows of new energy and information essential to the creation of a unique theoretical viewpoint (76).

(Re)reading in relation to feminine differences, therefore, creates openings in the closed system of thought which can free us from learning in ‘a dead end’ by learning through a process that thinks à deux. Learning to think à deux, I propose, can therefore make possible an ‘open system’ in thought. The psychic system is able to become ‘open to new flows of ideas, images and influences’ (91), which are incited by the new influxes of feminine difference from the outside. The new feminine ideas that emerge not only explore the emancipation of images of woman in political theory, but also explore the emancipation of women’s ways of knowing. I suggest that it is to this extent that the feminine is described by Braidotti as ‘the sole force that can break the eternal return of the Same and its classical Others’ (2011a, 283).

Learning from a perspective that is à deux is not the same as learning from a dualistic perspective. Learning to think à deux proceeds by learning to think of two, for two; it is a way of thinking positively of and about our differences. Whereas, learning to think dualistically proceeds through limiting binaries in which differences to the masculine norm are thought as negatives. With the aim of developing an understanding of learning à deux, I will incorporate Irigaray’s suggestion of a ‘civic education in difference’ (2008b, 204). Irigaray explains that such an education involves ‘our becoming conscious of our sexuate identity and that of the other – whether it is the same as ours or different from ours’ (204). It is important to distinguish
the purpose of this education from sex education. Irigaray clarifies this distinction by introducing the term ‘sexuate education’ in place of ‘sexual education’ (204). A sexuate education focuses on our sexuate identities and how our relationships with each other arise from our sexuate belonging (204). In ‘becoming conscious of our sexuate’ identities, Irigaray explains that we will create ‘[t]he most originally real and polyvalent relationship’ because our sexuate belonging ‘creates the first bridge between us: as children, adolescents, lovers or parents, but more generally as persons or citizens’ (204). Without this education, Irigaray claims that we ‘deprive ourselves of the most important source of relationships between us, and construct these [relationships] starting from artificial codes which annihilate real relational energy’ (204). Through a sexuate education, we will learn how to cultivate energy that arises from sexual and sexuate attraction ‘in order to allow for respectful and reciprocal relations, and the construction of a world fitting for the two being in relation with one another at each time’ (205). Irigaray claims that this cultivation of energy would develop ‘an alternative perspective’ from which ‘the regulation of energy would come from us, from the development of our desire, and would not be imposed on us by norms external to us’ (205). From such a perspective, she continues to argue, a new ‘culture’ can be constructed of ‘horizontal relations between different subjects’ (210), which can replace the current culture that is constructed of relations which reduce themselves ‘to a “dyad” or a pair of opposites’ (228).

In her proposal for a sexuate education, Irigaray explains that ‘[t]eaching cannot amount to imposing on the other our knowledge, our competence, including through a paternalistic or maternalistic generosity’ (234). Such an approach ‘is no longer appropriate to our times’ as ‘[i]t presupposes that only one world can amount to the universal truth, and it does not take into account that different worlds exist’ (231-2). Irigaray suggests that teaching does not have to only consist in ‘speaking, but in being capable of remaining silent too, of withdrawing in order to let the other be, become and discover his or her path, his or her language’ (234). She suggests learning this capability by ‘listening-to’, instead of ‘looking-at’, to the extent that listening does not amount to grasping something in order to integrate and order it into our own world, but to opening one’s own world to something or someone external and strange to it. Listening-to is a way of opening ourselves to the other and of welcoming this other, its truth and its world as different from us, from ours (232).
I would add that learning to speak to the other involves learning to listen to how the other wishes to be spoken to. It is in this sense I read that ‘[s]uch a gesture’, according to Irigaray, ‘leads the teacher to question his or her own thought and to maintain it alive and loving’ (233). To this extent, the teacher can open themselves to the other and welcome its difference instead of rejecting it as negative. Learning this capability of ‘listening-to’ is also suggested for the students, as Irigaray explains that ‘the past experience of the teacher has to be respected, but it has to be put at the service of a present relation between master and student’ (233). In order to build a mutually respectful teacher-student relationship, ‘the present time and the entry into presence of the two’ cannot be subjected ‘to the past’ (233). It is in this sense that Irigaray says that ‘[t]eaching requires us to be, and not only to have knowledge’ (234) to the extent that ‘listening-to’ each other

is not to simply listen to an abstract and presumed universal truth that we ought to share after our discussion, a truth that we could transform into universal mental images, but to listen to the way in which the other envisions and constructs their truth (232).

Irigaray is arguing that we should not learn to listen to the other in order to claim to “know” the nature of our sexuate difference in a ‘universal mental image’, or to claim that there is one. Rather, she is proposing that learning to listen to the other enables us to recognise that the other creates, and speaks, their own difference; a difference that we can learn to speak to. Irigaray’s suggestion of learning to ‘listen-to’ could be thought of as a process of learning to actively cultivate a certain passivity that enables us to be open to an encounter with / in / from difference. Moreover, learning this capability of ‘listening-to’ can be understood as learning to live our sexuate difference with each other, and not according to models and images imposed by the patriarchal systems of representation (203).

In emphasising the number two in learning à deux through Irigaray’s suggestion of a sexuate education, it is important to note Irigaray’s clarification that

the number two does not signify that I allude only to a traditional couple, nor to an intimate or affective relation. Being two is the way of emerging from this undifferentiated group of someones or somebodies to which our culture leads us, and in which we lose our singularity, our difference(s) and our relational desire and energy (205).

In agreement with Irigaray, learning à deux does not entail learning to tolerate differences in order to be respectful to each other as human beings, rather it entails learning to think positively of and about our differences so that we are respectful to each other’s subjectivity. According
to Irigaray, our sexuate identity does not only concern our ‘sex and a few bodily characteristics, but also [our] whole subjectivity’ (205). A sexuate education is therefore important because we know ‘almost nothing’ about ourselves (219). Learning to live our sexuate difference is described by Irigaray as learning to ‘use our body, our imagination and intelligence’ in order to ‘build a home in which to live’ (235). Irigaray’s descriptions of building one’s own home does not mean physical bricks and mortar, rather, it ‘concerns the all that we are’ (234). Put in this way, bodies, imagination and intelligence are territories in which we mark our domains. She describes the activity of ‘building one’s own home’ as the process of thinking to the extent that ‘[t]hinking has to secure the return to home, the dwelling within oneself for reposing, for a becoming of one’s own, for preparing future relations with the other, with the world’ (234-5). It is in this sense that Irigaray explains the ‘teacher has to build his or her own dwelling in order to help others to build their proper dwelling’ (235). In addition to Irigaray’s proposal, I argue that the teacher’s dwelling cannot be built as a master’s house. Such a construction would amount to what Richardson describes as ‘the (male) court house of reason’ (1998, 94). Building a master’s house, therefore, constructs the structures that make possible a ‘hypermasculine’ environment (Haslanger 2008, 217). By residing in the master’s house, the teacher would encourage others to build their own master’s house which will betray thought to the extent that the hypermasculine structures would engender a closed system of thought. Therefore, instead of building a hypermasculine master’s house, I suggest that the teacher’s dwelling can be built according to Ahmed’s blueprint for a feminist dwelling (2017, 241-2).

Through a synthesis of Irigaray’s proposal to build one’s dwelling and Ahmed’s description of feminist dwellings, I argue that these feminist dwellings are constructed in resistance to the hypermasculine master’s house. These feminist dwellings cannot, however, be constructed in the same way as the master’s house. Building a new feminist master’s house that opposes the hypermasculine will only presume a binary and dogmatic strategy of attack and defence which will reproduce the same structures and, as a result, will reproduce the same betrayal of thought. It is to this extent that Ahmed employs Lorde’s famous quote to warn us against using the master’s tools, because they ‘will never dismantle the master’s house’ (Lorde 1984, 112, quoted in Ahmed 2017, 160). Ahmed describes that these feminist dwellings are instead assembled from ‘lighter materials’ such as ‘[c]itations’ (16) from those who have contributed to the intellectual genealogy of feminism and antiracism, including work that has been too quickly (in my view) cast aside or left behind, work that lays out other paths, paths we can call desire lines, created by not following the official paths laid out by disciplines (15).
We can therefore say that the hypermasculine master’s house is constructed with bricks that represent ‘ideas of a single male master’ (Olkowski 2007, 90), in which its ‘timber frame’ follows and repeats the official paths laid out by the hypermasculine discipline (Ahmed 2017, 16). Ahmed claims that feminist dwellings are not ‘secure’ like the solid hypermasculine walls of the master’s house because ‘the walls move’ (268). This is because the lighter materials allow for other paths to be made whereas the hypermasculine bricks secure the official paths. Following this analogy, I will argue that following the official paths laid out by the hypermasculine discipline pursues a closed system of thought, however following other paths as suggested by Ahmed opens up this closed system of thought.

Although I disagree with Ahmed’s ‘strict citation policy’ in which she does not cite any ‘white men’ (15), I agree with this process of building with citations insofar that they are approached through a process of thinking à deux. In place of Ahmed’s strict citation policy, I propose employing Le Doeuff’s suggested process of producing knowledge in an open system to the extent that ideas of a single male master can be cited but only insofar that they are related to a multiplicity outside philosophy, including one’s own multiple geneses (Le Doeuff 2007, 171-2). Ahmed’s idea of citations as ‘feminist bricks’ or ‘feminist straw’ (2017, 16) can now connect to Irigaray’s claim to use our bodies, imagination and intelligence to build a home (2008b, 235). I propose that the process of thinking à deux is therefore the activity of building a feminist dwelling. Contrary to becoming a master of one’s own hypermasculine house, building a feminist dwelling creates a polygenesis in which one is open to the influx of feminine difference as well as to entering respectful and reciprocal relations with others. Building in this way not only creates other paths, it also makes possible new diversions in the official paths laid out by the hypermasculine discipline. It is in this sense that we can apply Richardson’s metaphor that ‘Irigaray’s intervention can be viewed as both “a brick thrown through the (male) court house of reason” and more’ (1998, 94). In agreement with Ahmed, this process of building feminist dwellings can ’bring the [hypermasculine] house down’ (2017, 159).

(DRIP: See the drip, Mist, for an example of a feminist dwelling built by Woolf. I argue that when imagining Judith’s story in A Room of One’s Own (2016a), Woolf is building her feminist dwelling in literature as a feminist approach to writing and thinking à deux, to the extent that Woolf is nomadically remembering two different Shakespeares, for two different becomings. Woolf’s process of bringing Judith to life is a process of learning to imagine the virtual
feminine within the malestream. Judith lives as an example of (re)reading with a feminine difference. I propose it is by asking questions in the feminist dwellings such as, “how much will she have changed?” “How will women have fought for justice?” “In what cases will women have been free?” “Who will have been free?”, that we will learn how to express the problems that reside within patriarchal ideas. These questions of difference will evoke processes of nomadic remembering that will engender processes of thinking differently, opening up our closed system of thought to feminine difference.}

By teaching in a feminist dwelling, Irigaray suggests that the teacher helps ‘others to build their [feminist] dwelling’ by encouraging her or his students to learn to think differently to the extent that the activity of thinking is transformed from ‘these games of for and against into another logic, a logic of coexistence in difference’ (2008b, 237). In order to learn and teach a logic of coexistence in difference, Irigaray explains that we ‘have to listen to those who talk, think and act according to another logic than our own’ (238). Not in order to imitate or identify with those who practice another logic, rather, Irigaray explains, it is a process of ‘listening-to’ in order to learn and teach ‘how to communicate in difference without destroying our own values, without destroying the other or ourselves’ (238). It is in this sense that Irigaray suggests we build our own homes so that we can protect ourselves in our differences, whilst being open to encountering other differences.

( DRIP: In the puddle, Condensation, I describe an artistic installation that was designed and exhibited within the hypermasculine environment of the academic institution as part of the collaborative artistic pedagogy I put into practice with Heaney, which is an ongoing campaign entitled Learning, Exchange and Play (LEP). Constructed as a large labial enclosed installation, Not One / To Be Two was built as an Irigarayan inspired dwelling to protect ourselves in our differences, whilst forming bonds with others.)

The nature of a sexuate education of building feminist dwellings can now be summarised as a feminist approach to teaching and learning to think differently. It is an approach that challenges teaching and learning in a closed system of thought, in which we are encouraged to build a secure master’s house for one. Teaching and learning à deux opens up our system of thought and encourages us to build a feminist dwelling for relations with others. Learning to live our sexuate difference will bring into question the ideas that men are intellectually superior and women are intellectually inferior insofar that, according to Irigaray, it is a task of ‘transforming
ourselves at every moment in order to respect and care about the subsistence and becoming of both myself and the other, that is, of two radically different subjects’ (238). The practice of transforming the way we experience the world, will also transform the way we engage with it. This pedagogical proposal is a call to teachers and students of modern political thought to become feminist builders and create a space for feminine difference by teaching and learning from / in / within feminist dwellings.
For Deleuze, “thought” is understood as that which is first of all non-representational thought, and aesthetic rather than conceptual. According to Deleuze, thought loses its creative force when it is conceived in terms of recognition (1994, 143). Thought is therefore betrayed in its modern image that rests upon the presumption of a subject that re-presents reality to him/herself according to the dominant models and images available. In this drip, I will argue that this dominant system of representation provides the conditions of possible experience which constitutes a gendered concept of subjectivity aligned with the interests of patriarchy. The tension of this drip will therefore lie in the challenge of this phallocentric mode of thought that representationally aligns man and mind against woman and body, whilst resisting the pull towards establishing a dominant ‘woman-centered’ image of thought. Developing upon Deleuze’s proposal to understand thought as the expression of ideas, I will explore the potential for female thought as a practice of learning how to express the problems that reside within ideas. Crucial to this practice is Braidotti’s creative processes of nomadic remembering and the virtual feminine. I will suggest that we will learn how to express the problems that reside within patriarchal ideas of women by asking questions of difference such as, “how much will she have changed?” “How will women have fought for justice?” “In what cases will women have been free?” “Who will have been free?”. These questions of difference will evoke processes of nomadic remembering which will engender processes of thinking differently, not traditionally, of and about women. I will argue that this process will produce a female thought because it engenders a process of individuation fuelled by the virtual feminine and becoming-other of the other, opening thought to feminine difference and de-programming it out of its dominant mode.

The history of Western philosophy of thought is full of presuppositions. In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze claims that these presuppositions constitute a traditional image of thought and provides us with the following definition:

By this I mean not only that we think according to a given method, but also that there is a more or less implicit, tacit or presupposed image of thought which determines our goals and our methods when we try to think (1994, xvi).

According to Lorraine, this traditional image of thought evolved from Plato’s theory of the forms to its modern image of representation, in which the “truth” of thought is measured against the originary ideals of the forms, subordinating any difference to identity and
resemblance (1999, 130). The modern image of thought was made explicit by Descartes in positing the pure self of ‘I think’, that is, the presumption ‘that everyone knows, independently of concepts, what is meant by self, thinking, and being’ (Deleuze 1994, 129). Deleuze critiques Descartes’ claim to avoid objective presuppositions by saying that he contains them in another subjective form, in opinions rather than concepts (129-30). The presumption that everybody knows what it means to think rests on the presupposition found in the idea of a common sense understood as an upright nature and a good will (131). According to this summary, Deleuze says that ‘[w]e may call this image of thought a dogmatic, orthodox or moral image’, because it cannot be regarded as a fact that thought possesses a good nature and a good will (131-2).

This modern image of thought is further developed by Kant in the form of recognition. Although Deleuze claimed that Kant ‘seemed equipped to overturn the Image of thought’, this was not made possible because ‘Kant did not want to renounce the implicit presuppositions’ (136). According to Deleuze’s reading of Kant, thought involves the unity of the faculties – imagination, reason and understanding – determined by a given common sense in the supposedly universal thinking subject, culminating in recognition which is expressed in the form of a recognisable object (134-7). Lorraine puts it in this way, ‘[w]hat is thinkable or perceivable is that which is recognizable; what is recognizable is that which can be referred to what is the same’ (1999, 130). This way of thinking is problematic because it rests upon the presumption of a subject that re-presents reality to him/herself. To this extent, thought is limited to a presupposed image of the world and of the subject. By thinking and living through systems of representation, the subject also thinks and lives to re-present him/herself according to the dominant models and images available. Rather than allowing for further creation, thought is betrayed in its will to know or recognise what is experienced. For Deleuze, this modern image of thought ‘both presupposes and betrays [thought]’ because thought loses its creative force when it is conceived in terms of recognition (1994, 143).

According to Colebrook, this process of re-presenting reality assumes that there are experiences and that these are given to one who thinks. It does not consider that the “I think” might be one effect among others in a “swarm” of experiences (2001, 73).

In considering what it means to think from within the modern image of thought, the thinking subject is continuously put at the centre of the world. It is through the thinking faculties that a subject knows he/she exists in the world. Accordingly, Deleuze claims that the ‘pure self of “I
think” thus appears to be a beginning only because it has referred all its presuppositions back to the empirical self” (1994, 129). Experiencing the world in this way posits the thinking subject as the main starting point of reference. The objects which are recognised reflect the subjective identity of the thinking subject because it is he/she who recognises them (133). This understanding constructs a dualism between mind and body to the extent that the modern image of thought prioritises mind as the theatre from which the thinking subject views and re-presents the world. Accordingly, Grosz claims

Dualism, in short, is responsible for the modern forms of elevation of consciousness … above corporeality. … [Consciousness is] positioned outside of the world, outside its body, outside of nature; it is also removed from direct contact with other minds and a sociocultural community. At its extreme, all that consciousness can be sure about is its own self-certain existence (1994b, 7).

The modern image of thought therefore creates the conditions for the production of the disembodied subject.

The binary of mind/body not only engenders the opposition between disembodiment and embodiment, it also fuels the mapping for a series of other oppositions. For Grosz, the most relevant opposition in this series associated with the mind/body binary is the ‘opposition between male and female, where man and mind, woman and body, become representationally aligned’ (1994b, 4). As a consequence, Grosz claims that the discipline of ‘philosophy has surreptitiously excluded femininity, and ultimately women, from its practices through its usually implicit coding of femininity with the unreason associated with the body’ (4). Following the evolution of the modern image of thought, it seems that the supposedly universal thinking subject is in fact male, and it is therefore man who is considered as endowed with thought that has an upright nature and a common sense. Grosz goes on to say

a corporeal “universal” has in fact functioned as a veiled representation and projection of a masculine which takes itself as the unquestioned norm, the ideal representative without any idea of the violence that this representational positioning does to its others—women, the “disabled,” cultural and racial minorities, different classes, homosexuals—who are reduced to the role of modifications or variations of the (implicitly white, male, youthful, heterosexual, middle-class) human body (188).

According to this dualist system of representation, man is the ideal representative of a thinking subject because it is presumed that he knows what it means to think, whereas others exist as a specular subjective identity of man because he is the main starting point of reference for all others. As argued by Braidotti,
Insofar as man, the male, is the main referent for thinking subjectivity, the standard-bearer of the Norm, the Law, the Logos, woman is dualistically, that is, oppositionally, positioned as the “other.” (1994, 114).

This dualist and specular system of representation articulates that of a phallocentric economy, in which the phallus is privileged and centred as the ultimate signifier and which therefore permeates all discourse and logos (Irigaray 1985a, 86). Grosz explains that phallocentrism ‘is a form of logocentrism in which the phallus takes on the function of the logos’ (xx).

Logocentrism, for Grosz, designates

the dominant form of metaphysics in Western thought. The logos, logic, reason, knowledge, represents a singular and unified conceptual order, one which seems to grasp the presence or immediacy of things. Logocentrism is a system of thought centred around the dominance of this singular logic of presence (xix).

She further explains that ‘Logocentric systems rely heavily on a logic of identity which is founded on the exclusion and binary polarisation of difference’ (xix). Therefore, according to this logic, Grosz’s claims that ‘[t]he term [phallocentrism] refers to the ways in which patriarchal systems of representation always submit women to models and images defined by and for men’ (xx). In measuring woman against man, we come to know these patriarchal images as those that represent woman as counterpart identities, the opposite to man, and male-others.

With our systematic thinking centred on phallocentric logic, Dawson explains that our mental processes and traditions of conceptualisation assume a binary, oppositional and antithesis nature (2008, 3). Such a dualistic mode of thought, according to Braidotti, supports ‘[c]lassical universalism, which conflates the masculine and the white with the universal [and non-white] and confines the feminine to a secondary position of difference’ (1994, 98). She goes on to say that ‘[r]adical feminists, especially Irigaray, argue that this dualistic mode creates binary differences only to ordain them in a hierarchical scale of power relations’ (98). According to Lloyd, this way of thinking produces, and is produced by, structures of sexual dominance that form our ideas and ideals of maleness and femaleness to reflect those ‘of superiority and inferiority, “norms” and “difference”, “positive” and “negative”, the “essential” and the “complementary”’ (2004, 104). These ideas and ideals of maleness and femaleness operate not as a straight-forwardly descriptive principle of classification, but as an expression of values. … What is valued—whether it be odd as against even numbers, “aggressive” as against “nurturing” skills and capacities, or Reason as against emotion—has been readily identified with maleness (104).
It is therefore no wonder that Lloyd claims ‘[r]ationality has been conceived as transcendence of the feminine; and the “feminine” itself has been partly constituted by its occurrence within this structure’ (105). The series of dichotomies that representationally align with a male/female opposition therefore become all too easily accepted within this dualistic mode of thought. As a result, these dichotomies ‘underwrite the symbolism that represents masculinity as a regulative character ideal, defined in stark contrast to and repudiation of “the feminine”’, as argued by Code (2006, 151). Some other typical examples of these dichotomies include the pre-Oedipal/Oedipal, pre-castrated/castrated, and premodern/modern, as noted by Bray and Colebrook (1998, 47); reason/emotion, objective/subjective, abstract/concrete (Code 2006, 151); active/passive, strong/weak, rational/irrational, divine/evil, to rule/be ruled (Lerner 1987, 209).

If it is man who represents the “universal” thinking subject, it begs the question how can woman know what it means to think for herself? At risk of reiterating the ‘chant of negativity’, challenged by Bray and Colebrook, that lists:

- representations are phallocentric and thus disembodied; reason is phallocentric; language is phallocentric; history is phallocentric; philosophy is phallocentric; science and technology are phallocentric; all cultural productions are phallocentric; and even “touching is phallic in this culture” (Grosz 1994a, 10) (Bray and Colebrook 1998, 48).

MacKenzie and I have claimed that the modern image of thought constitutes ‘the image of the masculine subjectivity sitting in sovereign judgement over experience’ (2014, 72). The reality that is lived and re-presented provides the conditions of possible experience which constitutes a gendered concept of subjectivity aligned with the interests of patriarchy. I suggest that our given modes of thinking and being are conditioned so that everybody is forced to think and act in and through a masculine world perspective. It is in this sense that I agree with Braidotti’s argument of ‘the dominant image of thought as the expression of a white, masculine, adult, heterosexual, urban-dwelling, property-owning subject’ (2011a, 6). This phallocentric mode of thinking is problematic insofar that it interrupts her becoming by fixing her in the same patriarchal representations that designates her difference as pejorative. As a result, this phallocentric mode of thought limits processes of thought that might explore the emancipation of female imagination, pleasure and expression. Lerner explains the effects that this patriarchal conditioning of thought in women has had, where:
Women have for millennia participated in the process of their own subordination because they have been psychologically shaped so as to internalize the idea of their own inferiority. The unawareness of their own history of struggle and achievement has been one of the major means of keeping women subordinate. The connectedness of women to familial structures made any development of female solidarity and group cohesiveness extremely problematic (1987, 218).

According to Lerner, by internalising the idea that women are inferior to men, women have unconsciously accepted their subordination to men in thoughtful silence. She goes on to describe this account in rather drastic terms: ‘we have participated, although unwittingly, in the rape of our minds’ (225). By not questioning the idea of their own inferiority, woman have been complicit in the subjection of their own minds. Moreover, in doing so, women (and men) have not only internalised the idea that women are inferior, they have also internalised the idea that men are superior. To this extent, this process of internalisation has simultaneously produced the “God-complex” in men, and a desire in women for a strong male leader (Braidotti 2017). Women have therefore been conditioned to think of themselves as the other to man, not as his equal but as his subordinate.

Lerner explains that once we become consciously aware of how ingrained the patriarchal mode of thought is in our mental processes, we can ‘exclude it … which always means a special effort’ (1987, 36). However, it is not so easy to become aware of our thought processes and to resist conforming to the dominant image of thought, because these processes of thought are so habitual. Her suggested ‘special effort’ should be understood instead as a processual practice of learning to question and respond to dominant habitual processes of thought that are patriarchal. It is with this development that I can agree with Lerner’s ‘special effort’ to work towards shifting the ways in which we think of and about women. Lerner argues that making this special effort is a ‘precondition for change’ (221), and suggests that it be enacted in the following two steps she outlines: 1) ‘we must, at least for a time, be woman-centered’, which ‘means ignoring all evidence of women’s marginality, because, even where women appear to be marginal, this is the result of patriarchal intervention’, and ‘when using methods and concepts from traditional systems of thought, it means using them from the vantage point of the centrality of women’ and; 2) ‘[w]e must, as far as possible, leave patriarchal thought behind’, which means:

[being sceptical toward every known system of thought; being critical of all assumptions, ordering values and definitions. Testing one’s statement by trusting our own, the female experience. Since such experience has usually been trivialized or ignored, it means overcoming the deep-seated resistance within ourselves toward accepting ourselves and our knowledge as valid. It means getting rid of great men in our heads and substituting for them ourselves, our sisters, our anonymous foremothers. Being critical toward our own
thought, which is, after all, thought trained in the patriarchal tradition. Finally, it means developing intellectual courage, the courage to stand alone, the courage to reach farther than our grasp, the courage to risk failure (228).

Although I am sympathetic to Lerner’s proposal to liberate our mental processes from the patriarchal mode of thought, she offers a female-centric “logic”, or at least a method, by proposing the use of masculine notions for producing a female thought that puts women at ‘the center’ (228). The only step Lerner does not include is how this ‘woman-centered’ process can resist what Braidotti describes as the ‘pull towards assimilation or integration into the Majority’ (2002, 85). That is to say, to employ Deleuze and Guattari’s terminology, how ‘the becoming-thought of the woman’ can resist becoming a dominant image of thought itself (2004, 417). I suggest that Lerner’s ‘woman-centered’ process can therefore risk producing a new form of logocentrism. According to Deleuze, ‘[i]t is not a question of opposing to the dogmatic image of thought another image borrowed’ (1994, 148), which is to say, we cannot simply oppose the phallocentric image of thought with a ‘woman-centered’ one. Instead, Deleuze suggests, it is a question of ‘remembering’ that a different possibility for thought is possible, ‘which can only be revealed as such can through the abolition of that image’ (148). Therefore, in following Lerner’s proposal to liberate our mental processes from the patriarchal mode of thought, I suggest that we can resist the pull towards establishing a dominant ‘woman-centered’ image of thought by exploring female thought in terms of Deleuze’s proposal for ‘a thought without image’ (167).

(DRIP: In the first chapter of A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze explores the idea of this new thought with Guattari in a vegetal model. They oppose the dogmatic image of thought, which they describe as arborescent, in favour for a rhizome-thought (2004, 17). Deleuze claims that the third chapter in Difference and Repetition

serves to introduce subsequent books [such as Proust and Signs] up to and including the research undertaken with Guattari where we invoked a vegetal model of thought: the rhizome in opposition to the tree, a rhizome-thought instead of an arborescent thought (1994, xvii).)

Deleuze argues that we can liberate thought from the images that imprison it by understanding thought, not through systems of representation, but as the expression of ideas. For Deleuze, an idea is not a solution to a problem but is its transformation. These ideas cannot be represented in thought but are nonetheless real because they are the real conditions of real experience (156-67). Instead of thinking through systems of representation in which we can re-present a reality
that we can claim to recognise or “know” according to the dominant patriarchal models and images, we can transform the way we experience the world by learning to think through the expression of ideas. Ideas are forced into thought when we encounter something unknown, that is, something not recognised by our image of thought because it does not have a representation for it. It is by experiencing this encounter that thought is forced into involuntary movements to create a new idea for it. It is helpful to consider Colebrook’s description of Deleuze’s account of ideas as ‘reflections of experience, formed from experience’ (2001, 80). Yet, these experiences are not given to one who thinks and these reflections are not re-presentations of the world. She claims that

Deleuze argues against mediation. He insists that it is not the case that there is a life or being which is then mediated or ordered by ideas; life is lived directly and immediately. We do not perceive a picture or idea of the sun, we experience sunlight itself. Indeed, far from our ideas ordering our world; the world itself produces ideas – or images – of which we are effects. … Put more concretely, we cannot use the subject and his ideas to explain the world or experience; we have to account for how the subject is formed from experience (80).

Experience is no longer understood as that of the thinking subject, it is impersonal and inhuman. The thinking subject is not positioned at the centre of the world, he/she is but ‘the effect of one particular series of experiential connections’ (81). To use Colebrook’s examples, different impersonal and inhuman experiences include ‘plants perceiving light, the muscles of the body experiencing strain, genes experiencing viral mutation’ (81). It is by experiencing material impressions on the body that the mind forms incorporeal ideas (81). Deleuze explains that ideas cannot be recognised or represented because representations do not capture the process in which they were formed. Ideas are formed as thought is forced into involuntary movements incited by what is sensed (1994, 139). By transforming the way we experience the world, we will also transform the way we engage with it. This process of engaging with the world can be understood as a process of becoming that, in earlier work I presented as a practice of learning how to express the problems that reside within ideas (Mackenzie and MacKenzie 2014).

According to Zepke, Deleuze provides a ‘post-Kantian image of thought’ (2017, 111). By focusing on Deleuze’s account of the three syntheses of time, in which Deleuze explains that Ideas emerge passively before being taken up and distorted in the active syntheses of representation (1994, 135-7), Zepke goes on to say that by
“reversing” this relationship [of the passive and active syntheses] and making the passive synthesis constitutive of reality (rather than representation condemning reality to be supersensible) Deleuze makes the disjunctive synthesis of the faculties in the ‘empty form of time’ the genesis of thought (as it is in Kant), but thought now creates reality (qua being) rather than simply representing it (118). 

This ‘empty form of time or third synthesis [of time]’ in Deleuze’s account (1994, 88), is described as ‘a disjunctive synthesis’ by Zepke because he explains that it ‘both divides and connects the passive and active syntheses, or more exactly, it connects by dividing’ (2017, 117). What this disjunctive synthesis connects by dividing is ‘the passive contractions of sensation (the event) and the pure past that contains them (memory) with the active syntheses of a conceptual self-consciousness (the act)’ (117). Thought is thereby moved into consciousness in and through the unconscious (Deleuze 1994, 114). This process of thought is separate to the active syntheses and is thus what takes thought on a violent involuntary movement that disrupts and disturbs the representational image of thought, because it is incited within the unconscious which goes beyond the active syntheses of consciousness. It is to this extent that Deleuze claims that the Idea expresses ‘that extra-propositional or sub-representative problematic instance: the presentation of the unconscious, not the representation of consciousness’ (192). Thought is no longer limited to a presupposed image of the world and of the subject, because it is generated passively. To this extent, the subject cannot think and live through re-presentations of experience, thinking must be created to conceive of what is sensed. The subject is thereby produced in the experience rather than presupposed. Ideas are not, therefore, fixed into a being from which the subject can begin to recognise an image of themselves (or others). In other words, Ideas evade any transcendental subjectivity and are instead expressed in a schizo-subject, and actualised as a psychotic-singularity. This understanding breaks the dualism between mind and body to the extent that the mind is no longer considered as the theatre from which the thinking subject views and re-presents the world, but as a ‘site’, among many on the body, where experience takes place because life is lived directly and immediately (Colebrook 2000, 80). 

Explaining it in this way, Deleuze attempts to redefine consciousness in terms of a multiplicity of layers of experience. According to Braidotti, Deleuze interprets the body in a Nietzschean manner, as ‘a play of forces, a surface of intensities; pure simulacra without originals’ (1994, 112). The subject thus becomes the result of what Deleuze terms ‘individuations’ (1994, xxi). Individuations are the complex relational interplay between material forces (whether bodily, social, or symbolic) and so, for Deleuze, the personal becomes an effect of those pre- or
impersonal forces (xxi). But furthermore, such ‘individuations’ are never ‘complete’; rather, we are engaged in a constant process of individuation.

(DRIP: See Simondon’s theory of individuation that inspired Deleuze’s revision of the subject, in which Simondon claims that an “individual” is never given in advance but continually produced in the course of an ongoing process without end (Iliadis 2013, 94-5).)

According to Braidotti’s account of Deleuze’s effort to move beyond the dogmatic image of thought, ‘Deleuze redefines philosophy as the nonreactive activity of thinking the present, the actual moment, so as to account adequately for change and changing conditions’ (1994, 112). Thought is produced in experience, and in its creation expresses an individuation. In other words, ‘thought is the actualisation of Ideas as the individuation of being itself’ (Zepke 2017, 123). The subject is produced in the process of individuation, but the Idea that is actualised is not of the individual but of a singular subject (of a schizo-subject). Deleuze describes that ‘[t]he individual distinguishes itself from [its individuation], but it does not distinguish itself, continuing rather to cohabit with that which divorces itself from it’ (1994, 152). It is in this sense that Deleuze and Guattari claims that we are always already several (2004, 3). It is not a case of acting schizophrenic, but of understanding our ‘self’ as a result ‘of these thousands of little witnesses which contemplate within us’ to the extent that ‘it is always a third party who says “me”’ (Deleuze 1994, 75). According to Zepke, ‘Ideas are, in this sense, the thoughts of a dissolved cogito’ (2017, 123). The actualisation of Ideas does not express images of the self (or others) in order to fix an identity to be recognised, but the self as a process of becoming. Therefore, a singular subject can be thought of as an ‘immanent identity’ (Deleuze 1994, 128), actualised in the Idea presented from the ‘system of the unconscious’ as an expression of difference (125). Deleuze’s description of how the subject is produced transforms the way we think of the self from the ‘pure self of “I think”’ (129) to the self as ‘itself a modification’ (79), and, to this extent, transforms the way in which we think of ourselves through distributions that are ‘nomadic rather than sedentary and fixed’ and different, as in, ‘individuating difference’ (269). Thinking the self in this way breaks the dominant habitual mental processes of thinking according to systems of representation, because the thinking subject is no longer the fixed starting point of reference. This development therefore displaces man as the ideal representative of a thinking subject and woman as the specular subjective identity of man. To this extent, my understanding of Deleuze’s argument challenges the modern image of thought that representationally aligns man and mind against woman and body. In doing so, it enables
us to explore a way of thinking and acting that is liberated from patriarchal images, opening us up to different world-perspectives and new ideas of subjectivity.

According to Braidotti’s account,

[Deleuze’s] work does not rest upon a dichotomous opposition of masculine and feminine subject positions but rather on a multiplicity of sexed subjectivities. The differences in degree between them mark different lines of becoming, in a web of rhizomatic connections (1994, 112).

Herein lies the potential for a multiplicity of alternative subjectivities to be created beyond the images and models designed by and for men. To break the habit of thinking and living through patriarchal systems of representation, in which the subject re-presents reality to him/herself according to the dominant models and images available, Deleuze posits the process of becoming as molecular. For Deleuze, the minority is always understood as an immanent outside of the majority, it propels the majority along a line of flight to become something else. Braidotti explains that

The minority marks a crossing or a trajectory; nothing happens at the center, for Deleuze: the heart of being is still, like the center of a nuclear reactor. But at the periphery there roam the youthful gangs of the new nomads: the horsemen and the horsewomen of the postapocalypse (113).

Although Braidotti admits this reading may differ to other readings of Deleuze, she emphasises the central and marginal positions of the majority and minority in order to argue their asymmetrical starting positions (2011a, 30). It is not about opposing to the majority position a minority position such as woman against man, because this would not undo the oppositional dialectics of the dualistic and specular systems of representation. Rather, minorities must also engage in a process of becoming in order to break out of the unitary identity imposed on them by the majority as “others” (30). This is the reason we cannot follow Lerner’s suggested ‘woman-centered’ process (1987, 228) to produce female thought because it is only through a process of individuation that thought can be forced into being and de-programmed out of its dominant mode. Braidotti claims that

Alternative figurations consequently are figural modes of expressing affirmative ideas, thus displacing the vision of consciousness away from the phallogocentric mode: rhizomes, becomings, lines of escape express the fundamentally Nietzschean nomadism of Deleuze (1994, 113).

Her quote is evocative as it suggests that the schizo is figural in the sense that it expresses what is problematic in the subject, what is trying to escape it. In other words, minority subjectivities
appear as majoritarian subjectivities escaping from themselves. It is in this sense that there is no becoming-man, ‘because man is majoritarian par excellence, whereas becomings are minoritarian; all becoming is a becoming-minoritarian’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 320). And becoming-woman is not about becoming a woman, understood as a molar entity defined by her form, but creating a ‘molecular woman’ (303-4). The molecular woman is the minoritarian subjectivity appeared as the majoritarian subjectivity of Woman, escaping from herself as “other”. According to Braidotti, what is ‘[c]rucial to this entire process of becoming-molecular is the question of memory’ (2011a, 30). In positing the minoritarian memory as ‘a creative force’ in its ‘close relationship to the imagination’ (32), Braidotti provides us with the tools to explore Deleuze’s proposal of a new thought as a female thought.

According to Braidotti,

[1]he Majority Subject holds the keys to the central memory of the system and has reduced to the rank of insignificant practices, the alternative or subjugated memories of the many minorities (31).

Minority subjects are submitted into representations provided by the majority memory that writes their history in relation to that of the majority. As these minority memories were forgotten by the majoritarian memory, they cannot be remembered and represented in thought and so, according to Braidotti, must be remembered ‘in relation to creative imagination’ (2011a, 34). She argues that these minority memories can be created in a process of ‘nomadic “remembering”’ (34). This nomadic and creative process ‘traces empowering transversal lines that cut across the staticity of sedimeted memory, activating it by de-programming it out of the dominant mode’ (2002, 116). In doing so, Braidotti explains that the Majority Subject is released from his central memory and its dominant representations into a process of ‘reinventing a self as other’ (2011a, 33). Consequently, this mode of nomadic remembering for the Majority Subject is considered as a process of ‘anti-memory’ because it ‘functions as a deterritorializing agency that dislodges the subject from his/her sense of unified and consolidated identity’ (31). The Majority Subject is no longer the starting point of reference in the process of remembering. According to Braidotti, minority subjects have ‘a head start’ in remembering nomadically to the extent that they have already experienced the exclusion and subordination from the majoritarian memory. But they still have to ‘activate their memories against the black hole of counteridentity claims as well as against the grain of the dominant vision of the subject’ (32). For women, remembering minoritarian memories does not mean
remembering themselves as “other” to man, but reinventing themselves. In following Braidotti’s account of becoming-woman that employs Irigaray’s feminist theory, women remember nomadically to reinvent themselves as the other of the other.

(DRIP: In the drip, Labial Drip, I develop Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of becoming-woman to align with Irigaray’s notion of the feminine to argue that becoming-woman should be posited not as a becoming-other or -elsewhere, but as a process of becoming-other of the other. I propose that this model of subjectivity produces a feminine nomad, which supports the claim for a female subjectivity as part of the process of becoming-woman.)

My understanding of this nomadic mode of remembering breaks dominant habitual mental processes of always referring back to a fixed representation of the empirical self, to a process of becoming other than what was before. Braidotti argues that nomadic “remembering” is not indexed on the authority of the past. It rather occurs in relation to creative imagination in the future anterior: “you will have changed,” “they will have fought for justice,” “we will have been free.” (34).

In this way, minoritarian memories can free the future of “woman” from any a priori determination written by the majority memory to the extent that what is remembered is not presupposed according to patriarchal representations. Braidotti’s phrases are expressive of problematic ideas that evoke questions such as: how much will you have changed? How will they have fought for justice? In what cases will we have been free? Who will have been free? Posed in this way, Braidotti evokes such ideas without directly determining them. Deleuze would describe these questions as ‘those of the accident, the event, the multiplicity – of difference – as opposed to that of the essence, or that of the One, or those of the contrary and the contradictory’ (1994, 188). These questions of difference do not seek to find a solution to ‘What is X?’, but rather seek to engender other questions (188). For instance, we gain nothing but fixed universal representations when we ask “what is Woman?”, but can explore the emancipation of female imagination, pleasure and expression when we ask “how much will she have changed?” “How will women have fought for justice?” “In what cases will women have been free?” “Who will have been free?”. The ideas that are evoked are expressive of a different way of thinking of and about women, as minoritarian subjectivities. This process of thinking can produce in us a molecular woman and therefore a process of becoming-woman. For Braidotti, this process of becoming-woman is understood as a feminist process of redefining
female subjectivity, a project she calls the ‘virtual feminine of sexual difference feminism’ (2011b, 103). She claims that the “feminine” in this project is

neither as an essentialized entity nor as an immediately accessible one; femininity is rather a virtual reality, in the sense that it is the effect of a political and conceptual project aimed at transcending the traditional subject position of Woman as other (111).

My understanding of Braidotti’s account is that the virtual feminine can be understood as the project of becoming other of the other as an effect of the process of thinking of and about female minoritarian subjectivities, which (will) have been evoked by nomadic remembering.

An example of this nomadic remembering can be found in Woolf’s A Room Of One’s Own, where Woolf imagines that Shakespeare had a sister called Judith who was also wonderfully and extraordinarily gifted (Woolf 2016a, 46). However, Woolf argues that Shakespeare was able to go to grammar school, went to London and became a successful actor. Whereas Judith was not sent to school, she ran away to London only to be laughed at by men at the stage door and told women could not be actresses, she then became pregnant by an actor-manager who took pity on her and so killed herself (46-7). Woolf stresses the contrast between Judith’s story and that of her brother’s to exemplify it as an effect of their sexual difference. Braidotti employs this example to describe the virtual feminine by claiming Judith as a

figuration of symbolic absence and misery functions simultaneously for Woolf as a source of empowerment and inspiration. Her empirical existence lies in the past, yet she is as present as ever in the force of the memory and the imagination that evokes her (2006, 184).

Woolf’s process of nomadically remembering Judith guides her writing and, thus, becoming-woman as she brings into existence a new feminist perspective and female minoritarian subjectivity. Remembering Judith enables Woolf to articulate a creative critique of the situation of women’s writing in the sixteenth century as well as reclaim women’s genius. Woolf goes on to say,

When … one reads of a witch being ducked, of a woman possessed by devils, of a wise woman selling herbs, or even of a very remarkable man who had a mother, then I think we are on the track of a lost novelist, a suppressed poet, of some mute and inglorious Jane Austin, some Emily Brontë who dashed her brains out on the moor or mopped and mowed about the highways crazed with the torture that her gift had put her to. Indeed, I would venture to guess that Anon, who wrote so many poems without signing them, was often a woman (2016a, 48).
The virtual feminine evoked in Judith brings about a different way of thinking of and about these women, who have been submitted into representations provided by the majority memory that writes their history in relation to that of the majority. I would even go so far as to say that thinking about these women as female minoritarian subjectivities engenders more questions that produce new ideas and minoritarian memories, fuelling the virtual feminine process and becoming-other of the other. For according to Braidotti, ‘[m]y memories splinter and proliferate accordingly, bringing in data that may or may not relate directly to my lived experience, but are integral to my consciousness’ (2011b, 110). This feminist process of remembering nomadically allows thought to create different realities of the past that did not exist before, but could have been, and are nevertheless ready to be activated in the present to propel dominant habitual mental processes towards change in the future.

In the drip, Ripple Effect, I develop Irigaray’s suggestion for a sexuate education (2008b) by arguing for the construction of feminist dwellings in modern political thought as a feminist approach to teaching and learning to think à deux, which thinks of two, for two. Through a synthesis of Irigaray’s proposal to build one’s dwelling using our bodies, imagination and intelligence (2008b, 235) and Ahmed’s description of feminist dwellings as assembled from materials such as citations (2017, 16), I propose that the process of thinking à deux is the activity of building a feminist dwelling. Within this flow between the two drips, I would argue that when imagining Judith’s story, Woolf is building her feminist dwelling in literature as a feminist approach to writing and thinking à deux, to the extent that Woolf is nomadically remembering two different Shakespeares, for two different becomings. In writing from within her feminist dwelling, it is not so ironic that Woolf’s novel is entitled, A Room of One’s Own. I suggest that we learn how to express the problems that reside within patriarchal ideas of women by asking questions of difference in the feminist dwellings such as, “how much will she have changed?” “How will women have fought for justice?” “In what cases will women have been free?” “Who will have been free?”. These questions of difference will evoke processes of nomadic remembering which will engender processes of thinking differently, not traditionally, of and about women. This process will produce a female thought because it engenders a process of individuation fuelled by the virtual feminine and becoming-other of the other, opening thought to feminine difference and de-programming it out of its dominant mode. These are the questions of difference that will be asked in the feminist dwellings in order to avoid recuperation within a dogmatic masculine image of thought. Therefore, we must ask them because, in the words of Woolf,
She lives in you and in me, and in many other women who are not here tonight, for they are washing up the dishes and putting the children to bed. But she lives; for great poets do not die; they are continuing presences; they need only the opportunity to walk among us in the flesh. This opportunity, as I think, it is now coming within your power to give her (2016a, 109-10).
Wave

There is an art to learning that takes thought on an involuntary journey. According to Deleuze, this process of learning is made possible through an encounter with signs (1994, 22). Deleuze says that an encounter produces problematic signs that ‘perplexes’ the learner and forces her or him to think (139-40). Through this perplexing experience, Deleuze explains that learning occurs ‘in the relation between a sign and a response’ (22). By developing a Deleuzian account of the process of learning, I will argue that the learner engages in a process of becoming-artist. Understanding the process of learning as an artistic practice, I will argue that an artistic approach aimed at experimentation can resist the traditional approach of instruction aimed at knowledge. When learning is understood in this way, the teacher also becomes an artist (Allan 2013, 55) and co-participates in the process of learning with the student by emitting signs that can be developed through art.

In his introduction to Difference and Repetition, Deleuze employs the example of learning to swim in the sea to convey his understanding of the process of learning (1994, 23). Learning to swim is a different experience for every learner as the body of water affects different bodies of swimmers in different ways. Enveloped within the body of water in the sea, the swimmer engages with the signs of the waves, such as the problem of an oncoming wave. The encounter of the wave is problematic to the extent that the swimmer does not yet know how to respond to it. Semetsky describes this process as ‘[n]ot-yet-knowing-how-to-swim,’ where she explains that the swimmer ‘struggles against the waves because she [or he] is facing the unknown and unthought’ (2013, 223). Confronted with the involuntary movement of the waves, the swimmer responds to its problematic signs through the movements of her or his body. According to Deleuze’s description of the process of learning, the swimmer learns by conjugating the distinctive points of [her or his body] with the singular points of the objective Idea [that is swimming] in order to form a problematic field. This conjugation determines for us a threshold of consciousness at which our real acts are adjusted to our perceptions of the real relations, thereby providing a solution to the problem [of swimming] (1994, 165).

We could say, in this context, that ‘the distinctive points of our bodies’ are the ‘subjective acts’, which are ‘carried out’ by the body of the swimmer in relation to ‘the singular points of the objective Idea’ confronted in ‘the objecticity of a problem’ that is swimming in a body of water (164-5). Performing these ‘subjective acts’ in the water engages the swimmer to adjust her or
his ‘real acts’ to her or his ‘perceptions of the real relations’ of the waves and, subsequently, learns how to swim (164-5). As a result, the learner may develop the problem of not-yet-knowing-how-to-swim into an Idea of swimming to the extent that the learner was forced to think of how to respond to the problematic signs produced in the encounter through their bodily movements.

(DRIP: Deleuze’s quote is important as it describes his understanding of “thought” as that which is first of all non-representational thought (against most of the history of philosophy), and aesthetic rather than conceptual. See the drip Mist for Deleuze’s account of the history of Western philosophy of thought and his proposal to understand thought not as conceived in terms of recognition, but as the expression of ideas.)

It is in this sense that Deleuze says “‘learning’ always takes place in and through the unconscious’ because the learner’s unconscious physical processes produce responses that allow for new knowledge to emerge at the ‘threshold of consciousness’ (165). At this conscious threshold, Cutler and MacKenzie claim that the learner acquires a ‘sense of having learnt something new’ through the ‘acquisition of new bodily habits’ (2011, 57). They explain that this process of becoming conscious of the act of learning ‘marks a change in one’s internal sense of oneself’, in which the learner can consider herself or himself as ‘being conscious and active learners, without undermining the transcendental priority of “passive” learning’ (57).

Cutler and MacKenzie argue that this development is still compatible with Deleuze’s account of the passive synthesis of habit in ways that do not compromise ‘Deleuze and Guattari’s critique of subjectivism’ (58). They argue that the process of learning does not stop when the learner becomes conscious she or he is learning because, they explain that ‘[k]nowledge is not the end of learning’ rather, it ‘emerges “as one learns”’ (68). That is to say, by becoming conscious that she or he is learning, the learner does not stop learning ‘in and through the unconscious’ (Deleuze 1994, 165). According to Semetsky, this learning process can be understood as a process of the ‘unconscious-becoming-conscious’ (2013, 230), because the learner becomes conscious of a process that remains unconscious. Learning can therefore be understood as an ongoing process to the extent that learning takes place in the unconscious. Cutler and MacKenzie propose that learning in this way ‘maintains learning as a transcendental condition of what it means to think’ (2011, 59). In other words, thought is produced from experience. The teacher can teach “learning”, but she or he cannot represent what that means in any specific instance.
Learning, therefore, is not a case of copying the teacher. For Deleuze, prioritising the knowledge of the teacher produces a hierarchy in the relationship between teacher and learner, in which the teacher is positioned as “master” and the learner as her or his “disciple”. Deleuze describes this relationship as an ‘infantile prejudice,’ in which ‘the master sets a problem, our task is to solve it, and the result is accredited true or false by a powerful authority’ (1994, 158). He critiques this dogmatic image of learning as that which subordinates learning to knowledge and ‘profoundly betrays what it means to think’ (167). Deleuze says, ‘the movements of the swimming instructor which we reproduce on the sand bear no relation to the movements of the wave,’ and to this extent, he argues that ‘[w]e learn nothing from those who say: “Do as I do”’ (23). According to Cutler and MacKenzie, the swimming instructor who instructs swimmers to copy their movements outside of the body of water employ a teaching method that ‘presumes that knowledge of swimming can be transmitted through the regulation of the learning process’ and ‘is premised upon the idea that every learner learns the same way’ (2011, 54). In return, the swimmer must re-present this method in order to show that they are “learning” (54). Cutler and MacKenzie argue that one cannot learn how to swim through this method because it teaches by way of ‘conscious conceptual construction’, in other words, representation, in which the learner can think she or he can swim, however, without engaging her or his body with the signs of the water, the learner cannot actualise an idea of swimming (55). The only way to know how to respond to the problematic signs of the wave is, quite simply, to dive in! According to Bogue,

Only when the swimmer’s body interacts with the waves of the sea can swimming begin, and it is the encounter between wave-signs and the responding body movements that does the teaching (2013, 22).

Therefore, in order to learn we have to do something with the signs in the body of water, and it is in this sense that I agree with Bogue’s description that ‘the signs themselves are the teachers’ (22). In this Deleuzian approach, Bogue explains that the swimming instructor is not positioned as the “master” who provides ‘apprentices with answers’, instead she or he is an ‘emitter of signs’ who ‘guides [apprentices] in the art of discovering problems, an art that can only be mastered by practising it’ (31). The teacher can teach “learning” by inviting the learners to dive in and experience the problematic signs themselves. In accord with Deleuze’s understanding of learning, the learner can now be understood as an ‘apprentice’, who is no longer positioned as the master’s “disciple” who seeks to know what her or his “master” knows, but who ‘constitutes and occupies practical or speculative problems as such’ (1994, 164), that
is, who learns by doing. As Deleuze says, ‘[o]ur only teachers are those who tell us to “do with me”, and are able to emit signs to be developed in heterogeneity rather than propose gestures for us to reproduce’ (23). The process of learning is described by Deleuze as a practical apprenticeship, which is not an education of the knowledge held and taught by the swimming instructor as “master”, but is an ‘education of the senses’ insofar that the apprentice learns through encounters that incite ‘an involuntary adventure’ that ‘affects the entire individual’ (165).

With this development, I suggest that the teacher can create the site of learning as an artistic experience by becoming an artist and emitting signs that can be developed through artistic encounters. By proposing learning through an artistic encounter, I argue that learners can co-participate in the artistic experience by becoming artists themselves and what they learn can become apparent in their artistic expression.

( DRIP: In the puddle, Condensation, I explore this idea of an artistic experiential pedagogy through the example of my own collaborative feminist artistic pedagogy.)

According to Allan’s following summary, I agree that ‘the arts have a potential reach that enables teachers to engage all students … to provoke altered forms of subjectivity and to promote a more affecting kind of education’ (2013, 37).


Allan explains that artistic encounters have the potential to take learners ‘out of the reach of the familiar and into new territories of experience’ (2013, 42). By describing the artistic experience in this way, we are reminded of Deleuze’s example of the experience of learning to swim in the unfamiliar waters of the sea. According to Deleuze and Guattari, the problematic signs that perplexes the learner and forces them to think are produced by the ‘percepts and affects’ preserved within an artistic encounter. Deleuze and Guattari explain that the ‘percepts and affects’ preserved in an artistic encounter makes our experience of the art “object” distinct from our experience of empirical objects (1994, 164). They offer pre-personal sensations that challenge our tendency to interpret art through representation and recognition.
In understanding the artistic encounter as an assemblage of sensory affects, the learner’s experience of it cannot be captured by representational thought but her or his thought is forced into involuntary movements incited by what is sensed. The new ideas that are forced into thought engender a different way of thinking and acting as they become the real conditions of the learner’s experience. It is not that art does this, it is rather that we call it art (what Deleuze and Guattari mean at least) if this happens. The artistic encounter incites a becoming by offering us an experience of a pre-individual world. With the purpose of developing an argument for an artistic experiential pedagogy, I will first outline the grounds for experiential learning through Semetsky’s development of Deleuze’s understanding of learning in experience, as edusemiotics (2013).

Although I will not explicitly employ Semetsky’s terminology of edusemiotics to pursue my argument for an artistic experiential pedagogy, Semetsky’s edusemiotics is worth outlining because our proposals align to the extent that we both articulate an experiential kind of learning to resist the traditional approach of instruction aimed at knowledge (Semetsky 2013, 215), which I propose through artistic processes (see Heaney and Mackenzie 2017, Heaney, Mackenzie and MacKenzie 2017, and Gaydon, Heaney, Mackenzie and MacKenzie 2019). With Deely, Semetsky describes this ‘educational semiotics’ as a pedagogy which ‘is not reducible to teaching “true” facts, but aims to enrich experience with meaning and significance’ (2017, 207-16). They argue that

Edusemiotics challenges the present status of education that continues to be haunted by the ghosts of the past: Cartesian substance dualism, analytic philosophy of language, and the scientific, objective method of modernity as the sole ground for educational research that tends to ignore human subjectivity with its gamut of experiences and purposes (209).

I agree with Deely and Semetsky’s attack on the present status of education that divides knowledge and experience, because the creative potential of learning is lost when the outcome
of research is already determined by the transmission of pre-existing facts or “truths”. There is nothing new to be learnt when knowledge is acquired in terms of recognition or instruction.

(DRIP: In the drip, Ripple Effect, I explore similar themes that critique the construction and dissemination of knowledge in political theory as the saturation and repetition of patriarchal ideas.)

Deely and Semetsky go so far as to claim that learning cannot be achieved in this form of education because it operates through a detached view of the world (214). Learning can be achieved, they argue instead, by constructing meaning from lived experience in the world (214). For them,

Experiential learning expands the walls of the traditional classroom and opens it to the greater social and natural world. … The realization of meanings in lived experience enriches this very experience with its existential dimension. Edusemiotics creates a novel open-ended foundation for knowledge which is always already of the nature of a process; thus subject to evolution, development and the intrusion of signs that need to be interpreted anew in the unpredictable circumstances of lived experience for which our old habits of thought and action may be unfit or counterproductive (216).

Deely and Semetsky’s pedagogical approach has the potential to engage learners to think through the expression of ideas by experiencing them, rather than positioning learners as passive receptors of pre-existing knowledge. That is to say, instead of understanding that the process of learning is guided by the will to know, it is posited as an exploration into the unknown. In this sense, the outcome of research cannot be pre-determined and so must be achieved through experimentation. As Deleuze and Guattari say,

you don’t know what you can make a rhizome with, you don’t know which subterranean stem is effectively going to make a rhizome, or enter a becoming, people your desert. So experiment (2004, 277)!

By venturing into the unknown, unfamiliar problems can arise that call for experimentation to produce new ideas. This leads to a process of learning from experience and becoming-other (Semetsky 2013, 219). Semetsky proposes that these learners are ‘nomads capable of overcoming the limits of being and tapping into multiple becomings’ (232). Moreover, Semetsky posits teachers within this mode of learning as edusemioticians, ‘capable of reading, interpreting and creating signs … whose function is to be clinicians of culture and inventors of new immanent modes of existence’ (232). To this extent, Semetsky outlines a proposal for the classroom to become ‘an informal learning site permeated with signs’ to represent ‘a milieu for
the transformational pragmatics of experience’ (215). I will suggest that this informal learning site can be created by organising the classroom as a space of artistic encounters.

According to Semetsky, learning in the face of the unknown and unthought engenders *a new image of (affective) thought*, which is semiotic because it operates by interpreting, or evaluating, experience (217-8). Learning in and from experiencing unfamiliar territory is, therefore, how we come to create and know new ideas. However, it is important to note that once we come to know them we can represent them but such representations do not capture the process in which they were formed. In order to capture the significance of the event experienced, Deleuze and Guattari explain that the learner creates *concepts* (1994, 5). They describe the process of concept creation as that of setting up and extracting the event in our experience (160). Within the context of Deleuze’s example of learning to swim, Semetsky describes this creative process as that in which the learner ‘has to invent a novel concept of what it means to swim in the midst of the very encounter’ (2013, 223). The learner engages in a practical process of learning whilst experiencing the encounter, and invents a concept with which to express the ‘unknown problematic’ she or he has encountered (223). It is a practical task to the extent that the learner experiences the significance of the event in practice, and makes sense of the difference that presents a shock to thought. By learning in and from experience, as Semetsky explains, the novel concepts ‘embody a singularity of experience’ because learning occurs “‘by grasping … signs” … in practice, within the experiential milieu’ (Deleuze 1994, 23, quoted in Semetsky 2013, 220-3). It is in this sense that Deleuze and Guattari say that the ‘concept speaks the event, not the essence or the thing’ (1994, 21). That is to say, it speaks the significance of the experience of the event so that the learner can make sense of it in order to express the problem that resides within the idea forced into thought in the encounter.

Learning to express a problem (Idea) in a new concept is a necessarily creative process because, according to Deleuze, ‘concepts involve two other dimensions, percepts and affects’ (1995, 137). This creative task of expressing a problem (Idea) in a new concept describes the task of philosophy as it is understood by Deleuze, which requires a ‘philosophical understanding, through concepts, [and] a nonphilosophical understanding, rooted in percepts and affects’ (139). Therefore, according to Deleuze, in order to express a new concept, ‘you need all three to get things moving’ (165). In creating a new triadic relationship, Semetsky explains that the new concept makes sense out of the experience because it is produced in its relationship with
percept and affect which makes this concept ‘filled with sense’ (2013, 220-1). Semetsky describes this ‘irreducible triad’ as that which comprises ‘a genuine sign of transformational pragmatics’ (219). This ‘genuine sign’ expresses what is sensed in the encounter by producing sense. According to Semetsky,

A sign filled with sense is produced under the proviso of transversal communication between the series of events operating along different planes or levels so that these planes become related: they form a multiplicity, a Janus-faced genuine sign functioning as a semiotic bridge between different planes even without actually passing from one to another (228).

Although incited by, and thus related to, an encounter with signs, expressing a new ‘genuine sign’ is not about reproducing the sign already encountered, because the problem produced has already transformed into an idea and is therefore operating along a different plane. The new sign therefore cannot be a representation of the sign already encountered because it bears a problem (idea) that ‘reveals and unfolds something new’ (Ayyar 2014, 16). That is to say, expressing a new sign produces a different sense, which can incite a different experience. Semetsky’s quote suggests that as ‘a Janus-faced genuine sign’, it can operate between different planes (2013, 228), such as those described by Deleuze and Guattari as the plane of immanence of philosophy, which thinks through concepts, and the plane of composition of art, which thinks through affects and percepts (1994, 66). Learning to express these signs can be thought of as an aesthetic activity of thinking to the extent that it involves inventing new triadic relationships between concepts, percepts and affects by passing into each plane (66). Learning to think aesthetically will enable us to learn to think differently because it may require the learner to ‘decisively modify what thinking means, draw up a new image of thought, and institute a new plane of immanence’ (66).

Although Semetsky does not describe edusemiotics as an artistic experiential learning, she does however describe, with Deely, that the process of engaging with and learning from signs brings a ‘dimension of art into the science of signs’ (2017, 216). To this extent, I will develop Semetsky’s proposal for experiential learning by arguing that the process of grasping signs in practice and developing them in the encounter is artistic; which not only confirms Semetsky and Deely’s description that engaging with and learning from signs brings an artistic dimension into the science of signs, it also produces art as part of the creative process. That is not to say that the art produced is born out of the concept invented, in which the learner creates conceptual art. According to Deleuze and Guattari, ‘[i]n the one [plane of composition] there is the constellation of a universe or affects and percepts; and in the other, constitutions of immanence
or concepts’ (1994, 66). The process of inventing concepts and creating art requires different approaches to the extent that ‘[a]rt thinks no less than philosophy, but it thinks through affects and percepts’ (66). However, Deleuze and Guattari explain that ‘[t]his does not mean that the two entities do not often pass into each other in a becoming that sweeps them both up in an intensity which co-determines them’, forming ‘alliances’ or ‘branchings and substitutions’ between the two planes, in which ‘the concept as such can be concept of the affect, just as the affect can be affect of the concept’ (66). In each case, the concept of the affect and the affect of the concept comprises a new genuine sign. The art produced, therefore, cannot amount to conceptual art that, according to Duchamp, seeks ‘complete anaesthesia’, that is, to subtract its affects (and aesthetics) from art (1973, 141), because it preserves the affect of the concept.

(DRIP: See Zepke for an excellent overview of Deleuze and Guattari’s critique of conceptual art and suggestions for possible trajectories for a Deleuze and Guattarian contemporary aesthetics (2006, 2008, 2014 and 2017).)

Rather, according to Deleuze and Guattari, it may create a new plane of immanence which is populated not by the creation of new concepts, but ‘with other instances, with other poetic, novelist, or even pictorial or musical entities’ (1994, 66-7). They employ a list of philosophers, including Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, as examples of thinkers who have created such planes of immanence (67). They describe these thinkers as

“half” philosophers but also much more than philosophers. … To be sure, they do not produce a synthesis of art and philosophy. They branch out and do not stop branching out. They are hybrid geniuses who neither erase nor cover over differences in kind but, on the contrary, use all the resources of their “athleticism” to install themselves within this very difference, like acrobats torn apart in a perpetual show of strength (67).

Given the examples of ‘hybrid geniuses’ employed by Deleuze and Guattari, it suggests creating such planes of immanence is not so easy and that the average learner might not reach it. However, Deleuze and Guattari’s brief acknowledgement that the two planes may traverse each other enables us to rethink the distinct processes of inventing concepts and creating art as a potential hybrid approach, that may transgress the distinction Deleuze and Guattari themselves tend to maintain between philosophical thought and artistic practice. This hybrid approach could be understood as that of creating affective concepts through an artistic experiential process of learning.
(DRIP: An example of art that might be produced in this hybrid process could amount to Zepke’s concept of the ‘affectual readymade’ (2008, 36). See the drip, Drizzle, in which I develop upon Zepke’s account of this readymade to propose that its aesthetic excess enables percepts and affects to be preserved, which enriches the artistic ensemble so as to incite a new artistic encounter(s) or becoming(s).)

By understanding the process of learning as an artistic practice, I will argue that the learner, when learning, engages in a process of becoming-artist. This concept will develop Allan’s description of the ‘teacher-becoming-artist’ (2013, 51) by arguing that both the teacher and the learners co-participate in the artistic experience by becoming artists. That is not to say that the learners copy the teacher’s artistic expression, rather, they engage in their own artistic processes of learning in order to make sense of the artistic experience incited by the artistic encounter offered by the teacher. With the purpose of developing the process of learning as an artistic process of learning to preserve the affective concept that expresses a new sign in art, I will turn to Proust who describes the process of producing signs as an artistic process of translation (2010, 232).

(DRIP: This art-thesis not only expresses the concept of what I think it means to become a learner- and teacher- becoming-artist, it also preserves the affect of the concept by expressing the traditional idea of a thesis as an artistic encounter. I invented this affective concept to express the problem I faced as a female student in the midst of experiencing what Richardson calls a ‘sad encounter’ with the construction and dissemination of knowledge in political theory as the saturation and repetition of patriarchal ideas (1998, 98). By carving out my own artistic process of learning, I infused the encountered political theory concepts with percepts and affects which enabled me to experience them in ways that creatively confronted the hypermasculine institutionalisation of knowledge. This art-thesis is created to express a new sign of a feminine artistic problem of what a thesis may become.)

For Proust, translating signs requires ‘an act of creation’ because they present ‘unknown symbols’, which he describes take ‘after the fashion of those hieroglyphic characters’ (2010, 232-3). Proust employed the metaphor of hieroglyphics in order to describe this process of translation:
I had the feeling that perhaps beneath these signs there lay something of a quite different kind which I must try to discover, some thought which they translated after the fashion of those hieroglyphic characters which at first one might suppose to represent only material objects. … if I tried to read them no one could help me with any rules, for to read them was an act of creation in which no one can do our work for us or even collaborate with us (232-3, my italics).

In Deleuzian terms, these thoughts are unknown because they are not recognised by our image of thought that does not have a representation for them. Therefore, they are forced into thought as hieroglyphic characters to the extent that hieroglyphics can express that which can only be sensed in the secret messages that underlie the signs. Deleuze explains that our ‘mistake is to suppose that the hieroglyphs represent “only material objects”’ (2000, 13) because this ‘something’ that forces us to think ‘is an object not of recognition but of a fundamental encounter’ (1994, 139). This ‘object’ cannot be recognised because it bears a sign that is ‘imperceptible’ (139). According to Deleuze, the hieroglyphs are not representations, but secret messages which they transmit as a sensuous impression in the material object (2000, 11). The ‘object of encounter’, therefore, points to something other than what the object itself represents; it points to its secret message that ‘can only be sensed’ (1994, 139-40). For example, the sea is the ‘object’ which bears the signs of a multiplicity of waves, the movements of which can only be experienced by diving in. I propose that it is this idea of the encounter described by Deleuze that the teacher can introduce as an artistic encounter to create the site of learning as an artistic experience for the learners, to which the learners, in their experience of this artistic encounter, engage in their own artistic processes of learning in order to make sense of its secret message.

According to Ayyar, when one encounters a sign,

they are actually seeing the effect of a set of rapid judgments that their mind has made from its unique perspective. These judgments are as subtle and hard to perceive as hieroglyphics nearly effaced from the walls of an ancient tomb. Art sinks in and reveals those delicate inscriptions (2014, 17).

This artistic process of translation, Ayyar explains, is ‘the true vocation of the artist’ because the message in the sign can only be found

in the unique perspective of its experiencer. And that unique perspective can be manifested only through artistic expression. Thus the meaning of a sign, its secret message, is revealed in how art may use it to show us our own way of seeing things (17).

Only the learner-becoming-artist can reveal what she or he experienced in the encounter with a sign by translating the thought it produced. The task of the learner-becoming-artist therefore
becomes that of learning to reveal the delicate inscriptions produced in thought, in the
encounter with a sign, through art. As Deleuze says,

Henceforth, the world revealed by art reacts on all the others and notably on the sensuous signs; it
integrates them, colors them with an aesthetic meaning, and imbues what was still opaque about them’

Through the encounter, as Deleuze explains, the learner experiences ‘the quality [that] no
longer appears as a property of the object that now possesses it, but as the sign of an altogether
different object that we must try to decipher’ (2000, 11). I posit that one of the tasks of the
learner-becoming-artist can be found in Proust’s description of the process of translating signs:

to interpret the given sensations as signs of so many laws and ideas, by trying to think – that is to say, to
draw forth from the shadow – what [she or he] had merely felt, by trying to convert it into its spiritual
equivalent (2010, 232).

According to Proust, the experience with these signs gives ‘an impression which is material
because it enters us through the senses but yet has a spiritual meaning which it is possible for
us to extract’ (232). The creative process of learning to express the problem that resides within
the idea forced into thought in the encounter can be understood as the artistic process of trying
to ‘draw forth’ the messages from the shadow of secrecy. According to Deleuze and Guattari,
through an artistic process of translation, the learner-becoming-artist can render ‘perceptible
the imperceptible’ signs produced in the encounter (1994, 182). In the example of learning to
swim, perhaps Deleuze’s book on Bacon might be more appropriate to use to the extent that
these imperceptible signs become ‘invisible forces’ that the learner-becoming-artist can render
visible through her or his bodily movements with the waves (2005, 40). In doing so, we learn
from Deleuze, the learner-becoming-artist comes to ‘understand that the sensuous signs [or
forces] already referred to an ideal essence that was incarnated in their material meaning’
(2000, 14). That is to say, the secret of the sign is its essence. The essence of the sea is its
heterogeneous movement of waves.

The artistic process of learning to make sense of experience is explained in Deleuze and
Guattari’s description of artistic practice:

the aim of art is to wrest the percept from perceptions of objects and the states of a perceiving subject, to
wrest the affect from affections as the transition from one state to another: to extract a bloc of sensations,
a pure being of sensations (1994, 167).
Deleuze explains that what is extracted from the object of encounter is not the materials or the object it represents, ‘but the unconscious themes, the involuntary archetypes in which the words, but also the colors and the sounds, assume their meaning and their life’ (2000, 47). It is the heterogeneous movements of the waves that give the sea its meaning and life. The essence of the sign is incarnated in these ‘unconscious themes’, and are those which ‘form a spiritualized substance’ (47). According to Deleuze, art has the ability to express these unconscious themes through a ‘veritable transmutation of substance’, in which ‘substance is spiritualized and physical surroundings dematerialized in order to refract essence, that is, the quality of an original world’ (47). For Deleuze, this artistic ‘treatment of substance is indissociable from “style.”’ (47). He argues that ‘in order to spiritualize substance and render it adequate to essence’ in a work of art, style ‘reproduces the unstable opposition, the original complication, the struggle and exchange of the primordial elements that constitute essence itself’ (48). That is to say, style translates essence through art by expressing it in a substance (words, colours, sounds, movements) that can recreate what Proust describes as ‘the primordial elements of nature’ (2010, 906). Deleuze explains that style substitutes ‘the determined conditions of an unconscious natural product’ for ‘the free conditions of an artistic production’ (2000, 155). Artistic style sets up a resonance between the object of encounter experienced and an artistic object of encounter in order to extract the secret message that can express what is sensed. As a result, the style of art can recapture ‘the quality of an original world’ in an artistic object of encounter (47). To use a well-known example that Deleuze employed in his book on Bacon (2005, 22), *Snow Storm – Steam-Boat of a Harbour’s Mouth Making Signals in Shallow Water, and going by the Lead. The Author was in this Storm on the Night the “Ariel” left Harwich* (1842), Turner’s style of painting captures the essence of the sea caught in a storm. His movement of brush strokes express the different movements of the rough waves, producing an artistic object of encounter that expresses and recaptures the original quality of the primordial elements of nature experienced. According to Deleuze, artistic style expresses ‘that continuous and refracted birth, that birth regained in substances adequate to essences, that birth which has become the metamorphosis of objects’ (2000, 48). Therefore, style raises lived perceptions and affections experienced in the encounter with signs, to the percept and affect in the creation of a work of art (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 170).

We must be wary of the importance we place on the learner-becoming-artist in this artistic process of harnessing the essence of the sign, for Deleuze explains that ‘[s]tyle is not the man, style is essence itself’ (2000, 48). That is to say, it is not the subject as writer, painter, musician
‘that explains essence’ (43), it is, rather, ‘the writer’s syntax, the musician’s modes and rhythms, the painter’s lines and colours’ that can express the unconscious themes that harness essence (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 170). Given that these words, marks, colours, and sounds cannot be expressed without a subject to express them, I agree with Ayyar’s argument that the expression of these unconscious themes invariably take ‘on the artist’s signature style, which is the artistic manifestation of the artist’s perspective’ (2014, 18). As a result, the artistic expression is produced in ‘personalised metaphors’ because only the artist can describe what is sensed by making connections or resemblances (17). In the context of learning to swim, the body of each swimmer is different to the next and so the body of water will affect different swimmers in different ways. To this extent, the swimmer’s bodily movements with the waves will be different for each swimmer, thereby, producing different personalised styles of swimming. However, although the artistic expression is produced by the artist, essence does not become the subject’s because it is distinguished from the subject’s existence (Deleuze 2000, 43). According to Deleuze, essence transcends ‘the states of subjectivity no less than the properties of the object’ to the extent that ‘it is irreducible’ both ‘to the object emitting it’ and ‘to the subject apprehending it’ (38). The essence will be lost if the learner designates that it belongs to the material object that now possesses it, or extracts it so it belongs to herself or himself as the subject who apprehended it (31). Therefore, it is expressed by the artist ‘as the essence not of the subject, but of Being, or of the region of Being that is revealed to the subject’ (43). That is to say, the subject is seized by essence to the extent that it ‘implicates, envelops, wraps itself up in the subject’ in order to reveal to her or him an ‘independent reality’, that is, a viewpoint that is ‘difference itself, the absolute internal difference’ (42-3).

If essence is understood as style, then it has the potential to transform the way the learner engages with the world. To this extent, Deleuze claims that essence ‘constitutes subjectivity’ (43). Which is to say, essence ‘is not only individual, but is individualizing’ because it ‘determines the substances in which it is incarnated’ by artistic style (48). No one other than the learner can express the essence revealed in her or his viewpoint, and it is to this extent that essence loses ‘nothing of its singularity’ because, Deleuze explains, the act of creation is ‘entirely determined by the point of view of essence’ (62). The learner’s viewpoint therefore ‘expresses an absolutely different world’ to another’s viewpoint (42). For swimmers learning to swim, their bodies not only enter the body of water in different ways, but the body of water affects their different bodies in different ways, producing different experiences and engagements with the sea. According to Proust,
Through art alone are we able to emerge from ourselves, to know what another person sees of a universe which is not the same as our own and of which, without art, the landscapes would remain as unknown to us as those that may exist on the moon. Thanks to art, instead of seeing one world only, our own, we see that world multiply itself and we have at our disposal as many worlds as there are original artists, worlds more different one from the other than those which revolve in infinite space, worlds which, centuries after the extinction of the fire from which their light first emanated, whether it is called Rembrandt or Vermeer, send us still each one its special radiance (2010, 254).

With the understanding that art has the potential to open our viewpoint to others, I propose that an artistic process of learning can incite different experiences of the world that can engender different perspectives. By experiencing the teacher-becoming-artist’s viewpoint expressed in the artistic encounter, the learner can experience how the teacher experiences the world. It is not about experiencing what it is like to be the teacher, it is to experience the world from this viewpoint itself (Deleuze 2000, 119). According to Guattari, it is an experience in which the spectator is able to ‘carry out a complex ontological crystallisation, an alterification of beings-there’ (1995, 96). For Deleuze, the essence of the sign of art individualizes subjectivity to the extent that it ‘surmounts the entire chain of individual association’, that is, it breaks with the artist that has expressed it to provide ‘a pure existence’ (2000, 119). Deleuze and Guattari claim that art exists in itself as ‘a being of sensation and nothing else’ (1994, 164). The artistic experience offered by the teacher-becoming-artist is able to offer the learner an encounter with difference which she or he experiences with her or his different viewpoint. This artistic experience is understood by Guattari as ‘a transference of subjectivation operating between the author and the contemplator of a work of art’ in which the spectator becomes a ‘co-creator’ with the author of the work or art (1995, 14). The transference can incite the learner to engage in her or his own artistic process with the aim to extract and preserve the affects and percepts in an altogether different art “object” to express her or his different viewpoint. To the extent that the essence of the artistic encounter experienced is recreated anew, its being of sensations will continue to exist and enjoy an eternity in the very moments afforded by the substances it is incarnated (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 166). Therefore, extracting and preserving the affects and percepts of the artistic encounter introduced by the teacher does not (re)produce the same artistic expression as the teacher’s, the learner’s artistic expression transforms the experience and brings about the new (see Cazeaux 2000, 615-7).

(DRIP: By preserving the percepts and affects of the melting watches in Dalí’s The Persistence of Memory (1931), I am able to express the difference experienced in his artistic encounter in an altogether new artistic object of encounter, Duration (2016). Although it has preserved these
percepts and affects, Duration is a being of sensation and exists for itself detached from association with an individual artist. Therefore, even though I made it, and was inspired by Dalí, the essence of the melting clock does not belong to me (or Dalí.).

According to Sousanis, by ‘looking from a different angle’ we are able to deprivilege our ‘absolute vantage point’ and open ourselves up to the world (2015, 36). He explains the danger of ‘a fixed viewpoint’ is that of facilitating ‘a single line of thought’ which can lead us to ‘a trap – where we see only what we’re looking for’ and are ‘blind to other possibilities’ (36). I argue that this danger can be experienced in the traditional pedagogical approaches of instruction aimed at knowledge. This approach traps learners as passive receptors of pre-existing knowledge to the extent that the only viewpoint they experience is guided by the will to know. To resist this danger, Sousanis urges us instead to consider joining ‘in dialogue’ different vantage points so that they exist ‘not merely side-by-side’ but ‘they intersect, engage, interact, combine, and inform one another’ (37). He describes this process like ‘the coming together of two eyes [which] produces stereoscopic vision’; the joining, interplay and overlap of these ‘outlooks held in mutual orbits’ can ‘facilitate the emergence of new perspectives’ (37). He argues that ‘our solitary standpoint is limited,’ and instead embraces ‘another’s viewpoint as essential to our own’ (38). I propose that an artistic approach can develop Sousanis’s argument for dialogue to the extent that the teacher-becoming-artist’s expression can offer the learner an experience of a different viewpoint, in which the learner can learn to see ‘through another’s eyes – from where they stand and [attend] to what they attend to’ (39). I argue that this artistic approach can avoid establishing a hierarchy in the relationship between teacher and learner, in which the teacher is positioned as “master” and the learner as her or his “disciple”, that is experienced in traditional pedagogical approaches, because they have both become co-participants in the event that is learning to think differently.

Since each learner’s viewpoint is different to each other’s, I further argue that participating in their own artistic processes of learning will enable learners to open their viewpoints to each other and experience the different perspectives of their fellow learners-becoming-artists. Sousanis explains that ‘expanding our understanding requires divergence of thought and diversity of thinkers’, which can produce a ‘kaleidoscopic’ perspective (39). Therefore, by experiencing the different viewpoints expressed in the artistic processes of learning, each learner can open her or his viewpoint to the multiple and experience the coming together of different outlooks which produces a multidimensional perspective. This co-creative process of
learning, in common, is how I suggest we carry out Sousanis’s argument for the development of ‘kaleidoscopic views’ (39). By learning to swim with other learners, the different personalised styles of swimming expressed in the sea may emit signs that can be grasped and developed with the waves, producing a multiplicity of different bodily movements with the waves, but which are influenced by each other’s movements. It is an artistic experiential pedagogy that can resist the rote learning employed in the traditional classroom, in favour of an experimental approach that can explore different personalised styles and engender different kaleidoscopic perspectives in each learner’s artistic process of learning.

(DRIP: In the drip, Drizzle, I explore artistic process as a schizoanalytical process that can open up new possibilities for thinking and being by developing Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of schizo-revolutionary art (2013, 420-1).)

The nature of learning with artistic encounters can now be summarised as an artistic process of learning to think difference and to experience the world through a kaleidoscopic perspective. It is a pedagogy which can transform the given processes of thought that is taught by rote learning and instead can bring about new ways of thinking through artistic encounters. In this proposal, the pedagogical task of the teacher becomes that which is neatly summarised by MacKenzie and Porter as making ‘an event of thought’ by constructing teaching as ‘an event or, what amounts to the same thing, an art-work!’ (2011, 141). Pedagogy practiced through artistic approaches, according to MacKenzie and Porter, will mean that teachers, and learners, ‘need to start thinking like artists, or better still, thinking along with artists’ (141).
This puddle will outline an account of a feminist artistic pedagogy I have put into practice in collaboration with Heaney in recent years in order to offer a response to the question of what can be done to challenge the hypermasculine institutionalisation of knowledge. I will argue that this pedagogical approach develops a feminine practice that can challenge aspects of patriarchy and capitalism within the academic institution. In particular, the hypermasculine environment of the academic institution that produces a subjectivity which is aligned with the interests of patriarchy, and the corporate institutional processes that capture social spaces and create the conditions for the production of a capitalistic subjectivity. It will be argued that new feminist artistic encounters can be created by individuals who are in a position to intervene and change the refrain of learning from within the hypermasculine institutionalisation of knowledge. The pedagogical task of creating new feminist artistic encounters within the academic institution will be posited as a process that reinvents the environment of the institution and incites different experiences of the institution that could change the way individuals are produced. This artistic process of (re)organising the space of the institution will take the academic space which is in the process of being reinvented and make it a hypothetical space-as-process. Which will be proposed as a space concerned only with the processes of creative construction involved when individuals, or artists-as-process (Cutler 2013a, 356), achieve autonomy from, but still maintain a relation to, the institution and reinvent the environment. Although this puddle will provide an example of a feminist artistic pedagogy, it is not to be read as instructions to enforce a particular course of action to confront these aspects of patriarchy and capitalism within the academic institution. This approach is formed from our own response and outlined in this puddle in the hopes that it will encourage or invite readers to carve out their own possible ideas for inventing new pedagogies. This puddle is an invitation to explore creative practices of learning that promote existential production with the aim to generate conditions for the empowerment of students and teachers.

In this exploration, I will turn to Cutler’s proposal to change the refrain of learning (2013b, 24). Cutler makes this proposal through her critique that learning in the art institution is discussed in primary relation to institutional critique (1). Through this perspective, education in the art institution is discussed in terms of its institutional position rather than as a practice in itself (13). Drawing upon Fraser’s definition of institutional critique, Cutler proposes to
use the very debate in which learning in the art institution is discussed to find ways to change
the refrain (41). According to Fraser, institutional critique is defined

as a methodology of critically reflexive site specificity … [that] engages sites above all as social sites,
structured sets of relations that are fundamentally social relations … it does not aim to affirm, expand
or reinforce a site or our relation to it, but to problematise and change it (2006b, 305-6).

Fraser’s use of terms relating to the social allows her to argue for the use of the term “us” as
implicated within the social relations in the “institution” (2005a, 123). With the purpose of
addressing Fraser’s “us” and how change can be engendered in the refrain of learning in the
art institution, Cutler employs Guattari’s work on The Three Ecologies (2000) and Deleuze
and Guattari’s concept of the refrain (2004). Given that Cutler’s framework is developed in
the context of an art institution where “learning” is often a team as well as a matter of practice,
the “us” she is accounting for are the learning teams and practices of learning in art
institutions. The purpose of employing Cutler’s work in this puddle is to apply the
poststructuralist framework she puts together to engender a different approach to learning in
the academic institution. The “us” I call upon within the context of the academic institution are
those who are implicated in transmitting the refrain of learning. I argue that the refrain of
learning in the academic institution prioritises the hypermasculine institutionalisation of
knowledge over feminine difference, and is transmitted through traditional pedagogical
approaches of instruction aimed at achieving knowledge. Cutler’s framework will be useful
to find ways of changing the refrain of learning in the academic institution from within the
hypermasculine institutionalisation of knowledge.

In building upon Cutler’s poststructuralist framework, I will incorporate Guattari’s proposal
for schizoanalysis. For Guattari, changing the refrain does not always discount the possibility
that it will become the new form of normalisation (1995, 16-7). In the context of changing the
refrain of learning in the academic institution, it is not a case of suggesting a new pedagogical
model or environment that is fairer and more inclusive, only for it to become the new dominant
refrain of learning. I argue that a schizoanalytical approach affords “us” the potential to create
new processes of learning in each class because it operates through practices of experimentation
(Guattari 2000, 34-5). A schizoanalytical approach can change the refrain of
learning through experimentation or improvisation, to not only produce new songs of learning
as proposed by Cutler (2013b, 47), but in ways that can avoid the lurch back into normalisation
(Guattari 1995, 79). I will argue that the new songs of learning produced through a
schizoanalytical approach explores existential productions that challenge production aligned with the interests of capitalism and patriarchy. This puddle will explore a way of changing the refrain of learning that prioritises the hypermasculine institutionalisation of knowledge through a schizo-revolutionary feminist artistic approach. What this amounts to, I propose, is a schizo-revolutionary feminist artistic pedagogy that engenders processes of learning through practices of experimentation.

(DRIP: This pedagogical approach is developed from the schizo-revolutionary labial theory of artistic practice proposed in the drip, Drizzle. Developing upon Zepke’s account of schizo-revolutionary artistic practice (2014), I posit a feminist artistic practice of resistance that can challenge the capitalist and patriarchal systems of representation and thoroughly incite the practice of becoming-woman.)

In order to explore why Cutler’s framing matters, I will now turn to her engagement with this poststructuralist framework to map how differences can be made through individual, social and institutional practices. According to Guattari, the three ecologies are constituted by ‘the environment, social relations and human subjectivity’ (2000, 28). He describes the interplay between these three ecological registers as an ecosophy (28). For Cutler,

Ecosophy usefully addresses the “us” and poses a direct challenge to the perpetuation of the institutional conditions described by Fraser through rethinking contradiction as a potential for re-assemblage and invoking an always-implied individual responsibility in relation to the social and the environment (2013b, 27).

In turning to the Guattarian concept of the subject, Cutler considers the always-implied “us” as the potential for the interruption and alteration of the refrain of learning (28). According to Genosko, the Guattarian subject

is not an individual, an individuated person, thinking and thus being … Rather, [it] is an entangled assemblage of many components, a collective (heterogeneous, multiple) articulation of such components before and beyond the individual; the individual is like a transit station for changes, crossings and switches (2009, 106).

Changing the refrain is not a simple matter of wishing it into existence however, new songs are learnt through a processual practice. Moreover, changing the refrain does not occur instantly with the creation of a new song. Deleuze and Guattari explain that the song needs time to establish itself as a refrain (2004, 343-4). Songs are not to be understood in terms of a finished
product, but in terms of a processual practice. As Deleuze and Guattari explain, the refrain is established through a process of repetition (343-4). Cutler describes the importance of repetition in Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the refrain because it ‘is used to maintain order as well as create difference’ (2013b, 35). Deleuze and Guattari explain that a process of repetition enables the refrain to delineate a territory and create its own ‘improvisation’ (2004, 343-4). My understanding of the individual’s potential to change the refrain is therefore understood in terms of her or his engagement in a processual practice.

According to Deleuze and Guattari,

Refraims could accordingly be classified as follows: (1) territorial refrains that seek, mark, assemble a territory; (2) territorialized function refrains that assume a special function in the assemblage … (3) the same, when they mark new assemblages, pass into new assemblages by means of deterriterialization – reterritorialization… (4) refrains that collect or gather forces, either at the heart of the territory, or in order to go outside it … They cease to be terrestrial, becoming cosmic (2004, 360).

The refrain begins from the act of material appropriation through which something is selected and its direction is changed, thereby establishing and expressing a territory. By employing examples from nature, such as birdsongs or the dance of the stickleback, Deleuze and Guattari explain that the point of this process of expression is to open the territory to admit a mate (procreation) or to access a necessary energy source (348-53). In these examples, animals are considered as artists and the territory is considered as a readymade (348-9). Based on the model of the readymade, this material appropriation also includes an expressive and aesthetic excess, which opens the territory onto the Cosmos and introduces difference into the territorial assemblage thereby producing new possibilities to express a different world (372).

(DRIP: See the drip, Drizzle, for a description of this model of the readymade which develops Zepke’s concept of the Guattarian affectual readymade (2008) by arguing that we need to bring the made out of the readymade; not in order to return to the artist-as-maker, but to posit that new existential territories are always ready-to-be-made.)

A difference is created in the refrain through an improvisation which occurs in the opening of the territory onto the Cosmos, through which the refrain joins ‘with the forces of the future, cosmic forces’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 343). By lurching forth and hazarding an improvisation with the cosmic forces, the refrain ventures from its established territory onto a different future (343-4). However, Cutler argues that in order for the improvisation to make a
difference, it must be made audible to others. She suggests that for the different song to be heard, it must extend beyond the subject to the social and environmental registers (2013a, 365). Cutler describes that the risk of the improvisation being unheard will result in it being a call in the dark without potential to connect or adhere and therefore it will fail to move beyond its own limits, changing only its own refrain and not moving between the ecosophic registers, but humming quietly to itself as a distanced voice. … These refrains will never be heard if not understood, and therefore the movement of meaning amongst subjects, what one might term the social relations, is required … to interrupt mass-transmission. To re-create the refrain is not simply to deconstruct the codes, conventions and significations therein, but to re-signify, re-codify and invent new signification – the act of creation as making a difference (365).

With the purpose of making a difference through social relations, the implicated “us” have the potential to interrupt and change the refrain by learning new songs in processes of responding to the dominant refrains. I agree with Cutler’s reasons for using Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the refrain in her proposal to change the refrain of learning, because the creation of ‘improvisations’ within the refrain brings about a different direction of learning. In applying this concept to the refrain of learning in academic institutions, I will argue that these ‘improvisations’ can change the direction of learning that is guided by the will to know to a different direction of learning which is creative. The “us” implicated in transmitting the refrain of learning in academic institutions have the pedagogical task of interrupting and changing the dominant hypermasculine refrain by learning and teaching new songs.

With the aim to produce new songs that prioritise the perspective of creative learning over the hypermasculine institutionalisation of knowledge, it is necessary to consider Cutler’s description of songs as artworks (2013b, 42). According to Cutler,

The practices of artists, curators and educationalists may look similar, in that all seek to challenge dominant refrains and form new “songs” in the form of new works, new models of exhibition and types of display or develop new insights with the public that break open territories. All of these creative acts can be considered to be, or to involve, learning (42).

In describing the creative process as a process of learning, Cutler describes the artist in the terms, ‘artist as learner’ (43). She also posits the idea of the ‘artist-as-process’ elsewhere to further clarify that learning occurs in the processes of changing the refrain (2013a, 356). Her use of the figure of the artist is not to focus on the subject who is an artist, but to develop Guattari’s argument for ways of operating like an artist:
I agree with Cutler’s argument that the artistic process should be understood as a process of learning because I claim that an artistic approach allows for experimentation, or improvisations, which resists the traditional approach of instruction aimed at knowledge and engenders new perspectives and experiences. In order to apply a schizoanalytical approach, I suggest swapping Cutler’s description of the artistic process as a process of learning with the understanding of the process of learning as an artistic practice. In making this swap, I propose a further development to Cutler’s idea of the ‘artist-as-process’ or ‘artist as learner’, by positing that learners, when learning, engage in a process of becoming-artists.

(DRIP: In the drip, Wave, I propose the idea of an artistic experiential pedagogy by developing a Deleuzian pedagogy that posits learning as an artistic experience incited by an artistic encounter. In this idea of an artistic experiential pedagogy, I argue that both the teacher and the learners co-participate in the process of learning by becoming artists.)

This schizoanalytical approach to an artistic practice of learning is constituted by Guattari’s proposal for ethico-aesthetic paradigms (1995, 10). Which, he argues, is to ‘be considered in terms of the production of subjectivity’ (11). In his critique of Integrated World Capitalism (IWC) and the institutionalisation of psychoanalysis, Guattari explains the dominant processes of capture and production of subjectivity. According to Guattari, IWC captures and mentally manipulates people through its structures of control at the level of the subject (2000, 47). He describes IWC in the following excerpt:

Post-industrial capitalism, which I prefer to describe as Integrated World Capitalism (IWC), tends increasingly to decentre its sites of power, moving away from structures producing goods and services towards structures producing signs, syntax and – in particular, through the control which it exercises over the media, advertising, opinion polls, etc. – subjectivity (47).

The control these structures have is experienced in the production of a ‘capitalistic subjectivity’, which Guattari argues, ‘is manufactured to protect existence from any intrusion of events that might disturb or disrupt public opinion’ (50). This capitalistic subjectivity is produced so that IWC can

manage the worlds of childhood, love, art, as well as everything associated with anxiety, madness, pain, death, or a feeling of being lost in the Cosmos … IWC forms massive subjective aggregates from the
most personal – one could even say infra-personal – existential givens, which it hooks up to ideas of race, nation, the professional workforce, competitive sports, a dominating masculinity [virilité], mass-media celebrity … Capitalistic subjectivity seeks to gain power by controlling and neutralizing the maximum number of existential refrains (50).

My understanding of Guattari’s proposal to liberate subjectivity from the control of IWC is to “take back control” and energise the refrain’s creative potential for improvisation.

Such a task is not easy given that dominant refrains become normalised. According to Cutler,

Dominant refrains are those that become habituated into our thinking as though the song were always there, natural, obvious, unquestionable. These become our own songs, the songs we are so used to hearing and singing that we think we have always sung them (2013b, 37).

In the dominant refrain of learning in the academic institution, the hypermasculine institutionalisation of knowledge is taken as normal, positing that patriarchal refrains have become our dominant habits of thought and modes of existence. With this problem in mind, we can turn to Guattari’s proposal for ecological praxes which can initiate processes of singularization. Kaiser provides a neat summary of what Guattari means by processes of singularization: ‘Singularization is the processual emergence of entities. It is … always a re-singularization: a response to and redirecting of standardized, entrenched habits towards new, different modes of living’ (2017, 155). Singularization is concerned with processes of (trans)formation of the subject, and is not to be confused with the individual that is already formed at the level of the molar (156). According to Guattari, processes of singularization operate according to an ‘eco-logic’ that is opposed to systems, structures and universal rules, and ‘is concerned only with the movement and intensity of evolutive processes’ (2000, 44). These processes, for Guattari, strive ‘to capture existence in the very act of this constitution, definition and deterritorialization’ (44). In order to “take back control” and energise the refrain’s creative potential for improvisation, the task becomes that of inciting processes of singularization to redirect dominant refrains towards new modes of existence.

Guattari argues that

Ecological praxes strive to scout out the potential vectors of subjectification and singularization at each partial existential locus. They generally seek something that runs counter to the “normal” order to things, a counter-repetition, an intensive given which invokes other intensities to form new existential configurations (45).
Guattari describes this forming of new existential configurations as a process of obtaining *existential Territories*. Guattari’s definition of existential Territory is explained by Watson as ‘the incorporated, embodied, singular self, which includes the body and its intensities’ (2013, 117). This process of obtaining existential Territories, in Guattari’s words, is one ‘of opening up processually from a praxis that enables it to be made “habitable” by a human project’ (2000, 53). In its search for a counter-repetition, this process has the potential to open up new possibilities of subjectivity that distances itself from the control of IWC and, I argue, patriarchy. Guattari explains that these new possibilities are obtained through processes of singularization which ‘activate isolated and repressed singularities that are just turning in circles’ (51). He proposes that processes of singularization can therefore produce alternative realities and refrains of existence. Through this praxis of distancing subjectivity from the control of IWC, Guattari argues that ‘[i]ndividuals must become both more united and increasingly different. The same is true for the resingularization of schools, town councils, urban planning, etc.’ (69). That is to say, individuals become more united in their resistance to the production of a capitalistic subjectivity, and different insofar that each will follow his or her own process of singularization.

Guattari proposes ecological praxes as a question of indicating ‘the lines of reconstruction of human praxis in the most varied domains’ (33). This process of seeking the reconstruction of human praxis entails

in each instance of looking into what would be the dispositives of the production of subjectivity, which tends towards an individual and/or collective resingularization, rather than that of mass-media manufacture, which is synonymous with distress and despair (33-4).

Guattari argues that the ecological process of reconstructing human praxis can be produced by ‘implementing effective practices of experimentation … on a microsocial level as on a larger institutional scale’ (34-5). We do not know how social practices should be reinvented, and Guattari is clear in not prescribing any suggestions (64), it is only by engaging in an ecological practice that we can encourage the organisation of, and direct, individual and collective ventures towards an ecology of resingularization (65). Locating existential refrains through experimentation is how we can engender new realities and different experiences of the world because these cannot be presupposed as they do not yet exist under the repression of a capitalistic subjectivity and, I argue, a subjectivity aligned with the interests of patriarchy. Although Guattari emphasises ‘that the work of locating these existential refrains is not the
sole province of literature and the arts’ (46), he posits the production of a new subjectivity as a creative process. He proposes aesthetic paradigms because these can create ‘new modalities of subjectivity in the same way that an artist creates new forms from the palette’ (1995, 7). According to Guattari, ‘art … engenders unprecedented, unforeseen and unthinkable qualities of being’ (106). I agree that an artistic approach can create possibilities for new subjectivities because it allows for experimentation and creativity.

Guattari posits the production of a new kind of subjectivity not in terms of a new personality, or a new system of belief or experience, but one that is based upon the psychotic: the schizo. Psychosis becomes the model for a revolutionary subjectivity rather than neurosis because, according to Guattari, ‘[w]ith neurosis, symptomatic matter continues to bathe in the environment of dominant significations while with psychosis the world of standardised Dasein loses its consistency’ (1995, 63). To this extent, Guattari goes on to say that ‘[p]sychosis thus not only haunts neurosis and perversion but also all the forms of normality’ (79). Guattari proposes schizoanalysis because of its ability to map the psyche to create a corresponding existential Territory. Watson describes these existential Territories as the ‘schizoanalytic counterpart to identity; a non-discursive, intensive, affective, proto-subjective incorporation’ (2013, 117). She explains that Guattari proposes schizoanalysis because of its ability to create a mapping through experimentation, in opposition to a tracing through representation (58). These schizoanalytical maps are described by Genosko as ‘non-representational maps of processes of singularization that are not amenable to capture in psychogenetic stages, personological constructs, or in terms of universal complexes’ (2013, 271). To take the example Guattari offers us in Chaosmosis of a patient who got stuck during treatment and, through schizoanalytic encouragement, expressed the sudden desire to take up driving again; Guattari claims that a ‘remark of this kind may remain unnoticed in a traditional conception of analysis’ (1995, 17-8). The importance of this particular example is its process of singularization that activates

a complex refrain, which will not only modify the immediate behaviour of the patient, but open up new fields of virtuality for him: the renewal of contact with long lost acquaintances, revisiting old haunts, regaining self-confidence… (18).

Guattari does not reject psychoanalysis but looks to reinterpret all its terms, and to revalue all its values. He describes this rethinking of psychiatric models as ‘less a question of taking stock of these practices in terms of their scientific veracity than according to their aesthetic-
existential effectiveness’ (2000, 56). For Deleuze and Guattari, a ‘schizophrenic out for a walk is a better model than a neurotic lying on the analyst’s couch. A breath of fresh air, a relationship with the outside world’ (2013, 12). Rather than applying the same structures of analysis again and again to different situations, schizoanalysis creates a new map for each analysis. This schizoanalytical approach is, therefore, necessarily creative because the schizoanalyst cannot predict the direction the experiment will take the analysis, but it is in the experiment that he or she can explore existential Territories. It is to this extent that Genosko says, for Guattari, ‘[t]he work of the schizoanalyst, ecosopher, and artist … converge in diagrams of transformation (becomings)’ (2013, 201). Guattari puts it like this: ‘the best cartographies of the psyche, or, if you like, the best psychoanalyses, [are] those of Goethe, Proust, Joyce, Artaud and Beckett, rather than Freud, Jung and Lacan’ (2000, 37). In other words, art is a kind of alternative therapy; a non-scientific form of mental treatment.

It is important to emphasise Guattari’s claim that these existential Territories can only produce a ‘partial subjectivity’ (56), not an individual. It is a partial subjectivity because, Guattari explains, the process of obtaining existential Territories is derived from a ‘pre-objectal and pre-personal logic of the sort that Freud has described as being a “primary process”’ (54). In psychoanalytic theory, primary processes are conceptualised as unconscious (91). Traditional forms of psychoanalysis posit that the expression of the unconscious in the imaginary, a phantasy, is read in terms of the primary processes. However, in the following quote, Guattari suggests swapping these terms out and reading the primary processes in terms of their imaginary phantasms:

These focal points of creative subjectification in their nascent state can only be accessed by the detour of a phantasmatic economy that is deployed in a random form. In short, no one is exempt from playing the game of the ecology of the imaginary! (57).

Guattari explains that this detour liberates singularities from a process that apprehends existence in an attempt to represent the unconscious, and instead explores processes of singularization through imaginary phantasms (57). This detour is necessarily aesthetic to the extent that,

In the particular case of the ecology of the phantasm, each attempt to locate it cartographically requires the drafting of an expressive framework that is both singular and, more precisely, singularized (54).
Initiating processes of singularization reveals different directions for existential refrains, which can only be explored through practices of experimentation because they do not yet exist. Artistic approaches can map processes of singularization because they allow for experimentation and creativity which means they can express the unexpected changes of direction. According to Guattari:

As in painting or literature, the concrete performance of these cartographies requires that they evolve and innovate, that they open up new futures, without their authors [auteurs] having prior recourse to assured theoretical principles or to the authority of a group, a school or an academy … Work in progress! An end to psychoanalytic, behaviourist or systematist catechisms (40).

The new futures opened up are the virtual existential Territories revealed in the subject. According to Guattari, these virtual existential Territories are accessible to the subject because they are ‘already there’ in the subject, however they have no authors because they are pre-personal and are only made available in the ‘existential event that brings them into play’ (45). It is not the artist herself or himself that can incite processes of reinventing ideas she or he has of herself or himself, rather, it is the artistic process of responding to the ‘existential event’ that can reinvent new ideas in the realm of mental ecology. In agreement with Guattari’s description of the revolutionary potential of artistic processes, I have argued elsewhere that art has the revolutionary potential to open up new possibilities for thinking and being that can transform normative ideas of subjectivity that are aligned with the interests of patriarchy and capitalism (Mackenzie and MacKenzie 2014, 70).

(DRIP: See the drip, Drizzle, in which I develop Zepke’s account of schizo-revolutionary artistic practice (2014) to posit an artistic process of escaping the patriarchal and capitalist systems of representation to open up new possibilities for thinking and being. I explore the potential of a schizo-revolutionary labial theory of art that I propose can provide a resistance to the representational image of thought that Braidotti describes is based on the phallogocentric system (1994, 101), and engender processes of transformation that can explore the emancipation of female imagination, pleasure and expression.)

Changing the refrain is not a simple matter of creating new artwork, it is in the processes of singularization that the artist creatively responds to the dominant refrains and makes a difference. This emphasis on process enables Cutler to argue that
the artist-as-process has ways of operating that identify dominant transmissions and in acts of creativity (also one of the ways of operating that “resemble” that of the artist) of imagining, of generating a new idea, of creating and making a difference, disrupting the forces of mass-transmission. The artist-as-process represents a re-singularisation of subjectification, one that is constant to itself and not to the “deathly refrain” of IWC (2013a, 356).

It is a process that involves learning what dominant refrains manipulate our mental processes and condition us to think through a normalised subjectivity by expressing a cartography of one’s psyche, and learning how to respond to these dominant refrains and engender a new song through processes of expression in the ecology of the phantasm (see Guattari 2000, 57). In following Guattari, Cutler explains that the artist does not know what new song he or she will come to articulate, it is in the creative process that the artist learns what to sing (2013a, 365).

In the context of the academic institution, I argue that the refrain of learning that prioritises the hypermasculine institutionalisation of knowledge engenders a production of subjectivity that is aligned with the interests of patriarchy. According to Haslanger, this hypermasculine process of mental manipulation forms ‘schemas’ relating to individuals or groups of people that influence an unconscious bias (2008, 212).

(DRIP: See the drip, Ripple Effect, for an argument that positive perceptions of men and negative perceptions of women are institutionalised in academia insofar that we learn that ‘proper’ knowledge is written by “great” male political theorists.)

In her experience of philosophy departments in America, Haslanger critiques philosophy departments as ‘hypermasculine places’ (217). She describes this environment as ‘competitive, combative’, ‘highly judgmental, orientated toward individual accomplishment, individual intelligence, and agency,’ and ‘hostile to femininity’ (217). The subjectivity that is produced is masculine insofar that this hypermasculine environment requires women to sublimate ‘potentially important aspects of identity’ in order to fit in (217). While Haslanger’s analysis is an investigation into philosophy as a discipline and philosophy departments as an institutional expression of that discipline, it is reasonable to assume that this hypermasculine environment is an effect of the hypermasculine institutionalisation of knowledge. Guattari suggests that to change our experience of the environment, the environment must be ‘in the process of being reinvented’ (2000, 68). I will apply Guattari’s suggestion to the hypermasculine environment of the academic institution by proposing that its environment
must be in a process of reinvention in order to change the way it produces subjectivity aligned with the interests of patriarchy.

Guattari’s proposal to change the experience of the environment of institutions is grounded in his work at the Clinique de La Borde (1995, 6). Guattari critiqued the psychotherapeutic practices and treatments of patients and argued for new institutional practices that could engender different experiences for both analysts and patients. According to Genosko, Guattari treated the institution as an object of analysis:

The idea of an institutional object captured, for Guattari, the massive conjugation of all of the effects on individuals and bureaucracies (patients, analysts, administrators), on theoretical concepts and analytic practices and goals, of the hospital setting (2000, 112).

In foregrounding these institutional effects, a shift of focus occurs in which individuals, bureaucracies, concepts, practices, and goals can achieve autonomy from, but still maintain a relation to, the institution. Guattari explains that this shift occurs in a new space, which he models on Winnicott’s idea of the potential space. Winnicott claims in his thesis that

The place where cultural experience is located is in the potential space between the individual and the environment (originally the object). The same can be said of playing. Cultural experience begins with creative living first manifested in play (2005, 135).

The potential space is an intermediate area of experiencing the space between the individual’s inner psychic reality and the external actual world the individual lives in (138). It is a ‘hypothetical area’ which exists between, but is not actual (144). It is in this interplay between that the individual experiences creative living (139). Winnicott goes on to say

how important it can be for the analyst to recognize the existence of this place, the only place where play can start, a place that is at the continuity-contiguity moment, where transitional phenomena originate (139).

For Winnicott, play is a transformative experience. He argues that from playing, the foundation for cultural experience is formed (143). According to Genosko, Guattari developed a sense of this potential space as the virtual, ‘a space in which becomings are truly creative – radically open and simply not what is now actual’ (2000, 115). Within this potential space, Genosko continues, Guattari proposes that new encounters can be created within the institution that are not determined by the institution (136). By creating new experiences of the institution within
the institution, the environment of the institution can be reinvented, therefore changing the way it produces individuals.

To the extent that cultivating a potential space within the institution may produce a process of reinventing the environment of the institution, I propose that the space which is in the process of being reinvented can be understood as a space-as-process. This idea of the space-as-process also aligns with Cutler’s concept of the ‘artist-as-process’ (2013a, 356) and extends it to include the environment of the institution. In accordance with Guattari’s foregrounding of institutional effects, the space-as-process concerns itself with the processes of creative construction involved when individuals, or artists-as-process, achieve autonomy (but still maintain a relation to the institution) and reinvent the environment. The space-as-process is an actualisation of the potential space within an institution. The new encounters that are created within this potential space, which are not determined by the institution, I suggest entails an artistic process of reorganising the space of the institution.

(DRIP: See the drip, Drizzle, for a description of artistic process as the artistic organisation of the territorial assemblage. It develops Zepke’s concept of the readymade (2008) by arguing that we need to bring the made out of the readymade; not in order to return to the artist-as-maker, but to posit that new existential territories are always ready-to-be-made.)

The reorganisation of the environment of the institution can be understood as the creation of new artistic encounters which can incite becomings in the space. The space-as-process can be understood as an ethical claim that individuals should intervene in the physical proceedings of the institution.

In order to produce these new encounters, Guattari calls upon individuals to form agency in their relation to the institution by creating and determining their own practices. He describes that he has

invoked ethical paradigms principally in order to underline the responsibility and necessary “engagement” required, not only of psychiatrists but also of those in the fields of education, health, culture, sport, the arts, the media and fashion, who are in a position to intervene in individual and collective physical proceedings (2000, 39).
In accordance with Guattari’s argument, I suggest that new feminist artistic encounters can be produced by individuals who are in a position to intervene and change the refrain of learning from within the hypermasculine environment of the academic institution. Creating these new encounters can be understood as a pedagogical task to the extent that those transmitting the refrain of learning can take responsibility to change it, and form agency in their relation to the academic institution by creating and determining their own pedagogical practices. I argue that practices of learning can be reinvented through an artistic pedagogical approach to the extent that it can implement Guattari’s suggested practices of experimentation. Like Guattari, I will not prescribe instructions for a feminist artistic pedagogy, because it can be actualised in a number of different ways and to suggest a readymade model would limit the very creative and experimental process that a feminist artistic practice of learning can engender. By implementing practices of experimentation in processes of learning, we can explore and organise, through art, individual and collective ventures towards an ecology of resingularization. Through the pedagogical task of creating new feminist artistic encounters within the academic institution, we can reinvent the hypermasculine environment of the institution and incite different experiences of the institution that could change the way individuals are produced.

By creating feminist artistic encounters within an academic institution and not an art institution which is built to house artistic encounters and their potential for different experiences, I argue that they become more disruptive to and able to change the normal experience of the academic institution. According to Zepke’s discussion of the American artist Adrian Piper:

Piper argues that for the catalytic event to have its full impact the viewer must be unaware that they are experiencing art, which is precisely the problem with galleries or museums, which “prepare the viewer to be catalysed, thus making actual catalysis impossible” ... Ironically, Piper suggests that we do not need a more “democratic” art but one that is less so. It is only when we are forced to confront alterity in and as our lives - and not as “information” or as a museum “experience” - that a sufficient “shock” can be administered that might provoke an affect that escapes the gravity of its self-evidence. It would be in this shock that art would call forth a new people, and it is only in this call that art can both be political and achieve its immanence with life (2008, 42).

It is in this ‘shock’ that the encounter of new songs cannot be presupposed, thereby forcing individuals to incite their own processes of learning in order to make sense of what they have experienced. Therefore, for artistic encounters to be capable of changing the environment of the institution, they must be shocking.
With the aim to explore how artistic encounters can be shocking, Zepke develops Piper’s suggestion by drawing a connection to his concept of the readymade to argue that

by placing art in the midst of life, by making it the vital mechanism of life’s own process of becoming, art provides not only the condition, but the criteria of any revolutionary politics (42).

I suggest that by placing art in the midst of the formal setting of an educational institution, art can provide a shocking experience to individuals because they are not expecting to encounter it. By making the academic institution an artistic organisation, or space-as-process, I propose that we can make art the vital mechanism of and in the process of learning to the extent that unexpected individuals are forced to incite their own processes of learning in order to make sense of the artistic encounter they have experienced. I propose that an artistic organisation of the academic space can therefore inform new experiences and social practices within the hypermasculine environment of the academic institution. With the purpose of exploring the implementation of a feminist artistic pedagogy in the hypermasculine environment of the academic institution, I will reflect on the collaborative artistic pedagogy I put into practice with Heaney. In order to practice a schizoanalytical artistic pedagogical approach capable of creating a difference to the hypermasculine institutionalisation of knowledge, we looked to make a feminine difference by creating feminist artistic encounters.

(DRIP: See Labial Drip, where I employ the term feminine difference to carve out an understanding of the feminine as a new and non-phallic model of difference through Irigaray’s feminist project of sexual difference.)

This pedagogy has been implemented in the form of three workplayshops, each entitled as iterations of Learning, Exchange and Play (LEP) (for the films of LEP, see Mackenzie 2015).

All of the workplayshops have featured a variety of artistic encounters and have been placed in the midst of the UK academic institutions of King’s College London (2015) and the University of Kent (2016) (we also constructed an LEP intervention at Warwick University (2016)). By reinventing the academic environments of the Anatomy Museum at King’s College London (LEPI), a university foyer at the University of Kent (LEPII), a conference room at the University of Kent (LEPIII), and a studio at Warwick University (LEP Intervention); LEP countered the normal experience of the academic institutions because it disrupted the everyday
workings of the academic institution by inviting individuals to participate in workplayshops. LEP is a disruption to the normalised processes of the academic institution that are aligned with the interests of patriarchy and, Heaney and I argue elsewhere, operate according to the market (2017, 38). By placing workplayshops in the midst of academic institutions that operate according to patriarchal and capitalist logic, LEP aims to create new institutional processes that promote existential productions rather than production that is determined by knowledge and capitalist profit. Heaney and I argue that the corporate processes of the academic institution are not only deteriorating conditions in teaching and learning, but also labour conditions in the tertiary education sector (49). We argue that these deteriorating conditions weaken the possibilities of solidarity, of collective organisation and therefore of key potential avenues through which such trends could be resisted and/or confronted in creative and dynamic ways. Such solidaristic possibilities are attacked through incentive structures of incessant competition, the potential exacerbation of gendered and racialised privilege and accelerating processes of precarisation (49).

Our purpose of LEP as an ongoing campaign against the normalised processes of the academic institution and its deteriorating pedagogical and labour conditions is to create experiments in commonisation (Heaney, Mackenzie and MacKenzie 2017, 41). MacKenzie, who joined our collaboration for LEPI, describes these experiments as that of ‘forging new forms of common experience, new forms of learning’ (41). By creating an opportunity for learning in common, I argue that the feminist artistic encounters in LEP can engender exercises in ‘bond formation’ in which creative acts of solidarity can incite new ways of experiencing and being in academic institutions (42).

We understand LEP as a necessary ongoing campaign, not only because the environment of the academic institution must be reinvented, but also because this campaign becomes a practice of learning itself. For Heaney and I, as the organisers, to construct a space of play and risk in order to encourage collaborative, creative, and experimental practices for participants to find and learn new songs to sing within the dominant refrain of learning, we have to also engage in collaborative processes of play, risk taking and creativity in order to experiment with producing encounters capable of inciting such processes of learning. Constructing LEP therefore becomes its own experiment in commonisation, through which, Heaney and I attempt processes of exchange that positions ourselves as: colearners, where we try to learn in common to articulate and sing songs which are coherent to our experiment; co-creators to co-create artistic encounters with the aim to transmit these songs in the hope that LEP participants will
experience the urge to engage with the artistic encounters in ways that allow them to follow their own processes of co-learning, experimentation and wonder; and coproducers of learning where we can also incite our own processes of learning with each other and other participants in the workplayshops.

(DRIP: For the full original definitions of these descriptions of artist’s positions in education, see Pringle 2013.)

Through our collaborative song of LEP, we intend to sing along with others who have contributed similar songs (such as The Dark Would), and sing to others to encourage and invite them to articulate their own possible songs that also seek to confront the normalised processes of the academic institution and its deteriorating pedagogical and labour conditions, and engender conditions for the empowerment of students and teachers.

(DRIP: The Dark Would was a two-day event held by the Institute of Advanced Teaching and Learning, IATL, at the University of Warwick in 2015, which explored innovative and experimental pedagogical approaches. This project reinvented the academic environment as a space both quite like but also very unlike the space we attempted to create with LEP.)

In our song for LEP, we propose a process of learning in which the purpose is not to judge or practice cynicism and disempower each other, but to cultivate hope and empower each other to explore, imagine and create different structures, practices and processes of the academic institution, in common.

With the purpose of exploring the different songs contributed in the practices of learning in LEP that may have made a difference to individual, social and institutional practices within the academic institution, I will focus on three specific experiences which include ‘Playtime I’ and ‘Playtime II’ featured in our most recent workplayshop, LEPIII (2016), and Not One / To Be Two, a large labial installation which has featured in all three workplayshops.

§1. LEPIII: Playtime I

The first experience was produced in ‘Playtime I’, the first section of LEPIII, which introduced artistic encounters that were created along the theme of ‘Worldly Signs’. Some of these included: ‘Employability Packs’, in which participants were given individual barcodes to wear
on their person throughout the first playtime, journals, where activities/tasks/communication was listed in the form of a ‘shopping list’ for participants to complete in order to unlock achievements and rewards, and ‘LEP Endowments’ for participants to spend on participating in artistic encounters, the amount of which varied to produce an effect of social hierarchy in the space; four workstations, each demanding different types of labour/tasks from participants that included consuming, judging, taking an LEP Exam, and shopping, recycling and restacking in the ‘L3P Convenience Store’; an incarceration station for the participants who failed to keep up with the cost of participating in the activities; an ‘Escape Public House’, which represented a bureaucratic waiting area/liminal space containing a bar and stalls; and a ‘Luxury Escape Lounge’, in which only privileged participants could enter and experience the luxury seating with a selection of subvertisements and The Daily Capitalist newspaper to read.

(DRIP: The Daily Capitalist was a one-off short, satirical “newspaper” that featured “real” and “satirical” articles that problematised the ways in which “ideology” or “truth” is coded into the seemingly neutral language of popular media. The featured articles were contributed by people who attended LEPIII, colleagues who were not able to attend, and participants who had attended previous workplayshops.)

(drip: We also collated another newspaper entitled creative communisation to feature in the second playtime of LEPIII, which was a creative confrontation to the work of The Daily Capitalist and encouraged suggestions of resistance to the epistemologically narrow, politically conservative, creatively stultifying and ontologically homogenising systems of neoliberalism and capitalism. We recommended that these suggestions of resistance took the form of macro- or micro- movements, hacking operations, policy ideas, desires, and dreams on the changes contributors wanted to see in the world. The submissions for creative communisation served as a basis for the co-creation of an LEP policy document/femifesto, which is an open document that is democratically co-produced by all those who wish to participate.)

LEPIII was the first workplayshop to feature these artistic encounters as an attempt to produce a completely different experience to the previous workplayshops. These artistic encounters played upon the dominant refrains of the academic institution by making visible and audible the normalised processes, with the intention of producing an entirely hypermasculine and marketised environment. This environment was overseen by three actors hired to play the parts of LEP Security Male 001, 002 and Female 003, who enforced the continual operation of
participation in the artistic encounters. By amplifying the subliminal songs that transmit the inequalities and injustices of the dominant refrains of the academic institution, ‘Playtime I’ aimed to create an atmosphere that was hierarchical, hypermasculine, hyper-competitive and anxiety provoking. For some of the participants, this was a shocking experience and they started to create acts of resistance. The first act of resistance was formed as an occupy movement in the space to disrupt the functioning of the hypermasculine and marketised environment. LEP Security Male 001, 002 and Female 003 managed to control these resisting participants at first by transporting them to the incarceration station. However, one of the resisting participants caused a revolt by pushing the shelving units over in the ‘L3P Convenience Store’ which incited other participants to join the “revolution”. LEP Security Female 003 played a pivotal feminist role in the revolution and was forcibly escorted out of the space by LEP Security Male 001 and 002. In response to the departure of LEP Security Female 003, the participants created and signed a petition for her release and threatened to go to the “People’s Court”.

Although it could be argued that for some participants, ‘Playtime I’ deepened the hierarchical, patriarchal, and competitive refrains in thought, it was clear that it caused a shock to the participants who created the acts of resistance. For these participants, their acts of resistance can be understood as responses to the dominant refrains of the academic institution amplified within the workplayshop. Without determining what difference the participant’s acts of resistance called for, it could be argued that the reinvention of the space through an occupy movement and a disordering of the shelving units in the ‘L3P Convenience Store’ enabled these participants to create new existential Territories by reorganising the territorial assemblage. Such that, even though these artistic encounters were created to make visible and audible the normalised processes of the academic institution, they produced shocking experiences for some that engendered processes of resingularization which sought existential productions. The participant’s acts of resistance can be understood as their own improvised songs which made visible and audible their own processes of learning to respond to the dominant refrains. Insofar that these acts of resistance invited others to join the “revolution”, the participants involved in resisting engaged in processes of co-learning with each other which resulted in collaboratively producing a petition. I suggest that this process of co-learning with each other was instigated by experiencing a shock in common, and this experiment in commonisation incited a creative process in which some of the participants became ‘co-creators’ (Guattari 1995, 14) to transmit alternative songs. Therefore, it could be argued that these artistic encounters that made visible
and audible the dominant refrains of the academic institution, encouraged the participants to think for themselves in re-creating shocks through acts of resistance that exposed these dominant refrains.

The pedagogy practiced in ‘Playtime I’ conveyed a strict authoritarian structure, which was enforced by the LEP Security Guards. LEP Security Male 001, 002 and Female 003 took on authoritative roles by determining the terms of engagement for the participants with the artistic encounters, with the intention to transmit a dominant refrain of learning and hinder the participants from learning to sing their own individual refrains. ‘Playtime I’ was organised according to a strict pedagogical structure in which the artistic encounters were designed with the aim to provide units of knowledge that conformed to a consensus outcome that the LEP Security Guards demanded the participants to know by the end of their experience. By offering activities/tasks for participants to complete in order to unlock achievements and rewards, ‘Playtime I’ sought to make visible and audible a mechanism of, what Heaney and I have termed elsewhere, perpetual pedagogical control that regulates pedagogical possibilities instead of creating conditions for the empowerment of students and teachers (2017, 38). ‘Playtime I’ was created to convey a hypercompetitive environment that aimed to regulate the participant’s possibilities of learning and create conditions for their disempowerment. To the extent that this pedagogical structure was resisted, it can be argued that those resisting did not support these conditions and took on the responsibility to challenge them. The question of what can be done to confront this mechanism of perpetual pedagogical control Heaney and I have suggested becomes ‘a pedagogical task to be participated in and explored for those interested in transforming them’, that is, a pedagogical task undertaken by individuals who are in a position to intervene and change the refrain of learning from within the academic institution (51). We have asked the question: ‘[h]ow may we mutually empower each other and support inclusive and open educational practices rather than submitting to the exclusionary logic of the market?’ (51). Without wishing to perpetuate our own mechanisms of control over other possible confrontations, I will turn to our own response to this question, which can be found in the artistic encounters in ‘Playtime II’.

The pedagogy practiced in ‘Playtime II’ contrasted the strict authoritarian structure of ‘Playtime I’ because Heaney and I removed ourselves and the LEP Security Guards from any position of authority and, instead, entered ‘Playtime II’ as participants. With the intention that the artistic encounters would do the teaching, ‘Playtime II’ was organised according to a
practice of experiential learning in which the participants were invited to start with the application and experimentation by engaging with the artistic encounters. By offering artistic encounters for participants to explore voluntarily and at their own pace, this artistic experiential pedagogy aimed to invite participants to navigate their own processes of learning. In doing so, we aimed to create a playtime that enabled participants to feel central to the pedagogical process and for their own experiments with the art provided to yield results we could not predict.

§2. LEPIII: Playtime II

The second experience was produced in ‘Playtime II’, the second playtime section of LEPIII, which featured artistic encounters that were constructed along the theme of ‘Signs of Art’. Some of these included: poetry, quotes and collective mind-maps on the wall which participants were invited to add to, edit, annotate, delete, etc.; a large labial installation named Not One / To Be Two, which participants were invited to crawl into and share eye-contact with another participant for an extended period; a hidden/curtained installation named Of Other Spaces, where participants were invited to put on headphones and watch from a select list of potentially challenging music videos; unnamed and undesccribed paintings were hung on the wall and participants were invited to title and describe them and stick these descriptions on the wall; a central area with canvasses, paints, toys and other tools scattered with only the injunction ‘Build the Revolution’ placed amidst them; a Communised Discussion / Drawing Game in which two participants interviewed each other in front of a camera using only the questions and discussion styles suggested, and were then invited to add in their own questions and discussion styles for future participants; and a Communised Drawing Game where three participants collaborated in a drawing method known as ‘exquisite’ or “rotating” corpse, in which they were asked to draw parts that contributed to the make-up of a “revolutionary figure”.

Although all of the workplayshops featured these artistic encounters, ‘Playtime II’ produced a different experience that we had not experienced in previous workplayshops. Perhaps a contributing factor was due to a noticeable lack of energy in the participation in the encounters, because ‘Playtime II’ filled the second half of the day-long workplayshop which followed the ‘Playtime I’ that aimed to create an atmosphere that was hierarchical, hypermasculine, hyper-competitive and anxiety provoking. That being said, we found that the different experience of the second playtime engendered a contrasting atmosphere that was calming and relaxing, in
which participants explored the artistic encounters at their own pace. Towards the end of this
playtime, the participants had gathered altogether in an organic process in the central area, at
the artistic encounter Build the Revolution, where they made art with the provided canvasses,
paints, toys and other tools. With a sense of the hypothetical, I suggest that this gathering of
participants becoming-artists cultivated a potential space as part of the LEP workplayshop. By
contributing new artistic encounters, the participants becoming-artists reorganised the
academic space further. This hypothesis posits LEP as a space-as-process to the extent that
their artistic organisation actualised the potential space cultivated in the academic space. It can
be argued that this reinvention of the academic environment produced a stark contrast to the
normal experience of the academic institution because, as participants becoming-artists, we
had created new institutional processes that promoted existential productions rather than
production that was determined by knowledge and/or capitalist profit. Moreover, by
reinventing the social practices within the academic institution through art, we reconstructed
the modality of our existence as a group within the academic institution that creatively resisted
the hypermasculine and corporate institutional processes that seek to separate us through
constant processes of examination and competition.

It is worth mentioning a significant improvisation that occurred during this gathering, which
was the contribution of an actual song. Colquhoun, who was hired to act the part of
LEP Security Female 003 in ‘Playtime I’, returned to ‘Playtime II’ as Alice (a character inspired
by Carroll’s Alice in Wonderland (1865)) and was invited to participate freely. Without
instructions, Alice was inspired to sing a song and asked the gathering of participants for
keywords that described their thoughts of their experience of the workplayshop (including
‘Playtime I’) before offering to perform. These keywords included: “exploitation”,
“incarceration”, “flight”, “anarchy”, “appropriation”, “learning”, “oppression”, “existence”,
“art”, “produce”, and “black is the new poetry”. Her lyrics articulated the exchanges we had
participated in throughout the workplayshop and reflected on the critiques we had expressed
about, and the new ideas we had developed for, our existence in academic institutions. By
making explicit her process of learning through singing, Alice transmitted an alternative song
to the academic processes of writing and publishing a critique of the academic institution.

(DRIP: I propose that by submitting an art-thesis, I am making explicit my own process of
learning and transmitting an alternative song to the academic processes of writing and
publishing a feminist critique of the hypermasculine institutionalisation of knowledge.)
It could therefore be argued that Alice’s experience of the workplayshop invited her to re-create the shocks that expose the dominant institutional processes through her own creative improvisation.

It may be contended that the differences that this ‘Playtime II’ made to the environment, social practices, and the modalities of group existence in the academic institution did not last longer than the day-long workplayshop. The normalised institutional processes can overcode any difference made in LEPIII to the extent that the new songs contributed are absorbed within the dominant refrain of learning. It would even be somewhat foolhardy to suggest that this day-long workplayshop was capable of affecting all the learners, let alone other teachers, various other staff, departments, colleagues in the academic institution and beyond. However, we can argue that it did engage all of the 14 participants who came from different departments at the University of Kent, one from the Department of Performing Arts at the University of Roehampton, one from the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick, and an independent academic from Vienna. Furthermore, since LEPIII, we have heard two new songs respectively sung by two previous LEP participants that also attempted to reinvent the environment, social practices, and the modalities of group existence in the academic institution through social and aesthetic processes.

(DRIP: These songs were sung in the form of workshops, and were entitled: Joyful Ontologies, which was hosted by the ‘Social Theory Centre’ and the ‘Warwick Politics and Performance Network’ at the University of Warwick (2016), in which Heaney and I were invited to construct an LEP Intervention; and Changing Classroom, which was organised by Jonjo Brady and implemented at the University of Kent (2016) and at Open School East (2018).)

In joining up these different songs, we can hear a multiplicity of different songs sung in academic institutions that find a coherency in terms of seeking existential productions through processes of resingularization, rather than in terms of knowledge and/or capitalist productivity. Constituted by songs that have been affected by each other in one way or another, it can be argued that this multiplicity of songs has the potential to also affect others in ways that could encourage them to develop and contribute their own songs. In agreement with Cutler’s suggestion that the contribution of small or large acts/songs can be effective (2013b, 59), LEPIII was our diligent contribution to sing to others with the purpose of encouraging and
inviting them to articulate their own possible songs to contribute to this multiplicity. If all the participants who have been affected by one of these songs takes on the responsibility to sing these new songs, or contribute their own songs, while being mindful of reproducing them as dominant transmissions; there will be new multiplicities of songs that could have the potential to interrupt and change the dominant refrain of learning in any and all academic institutions in a multiplicity of different ways.

§3. Not One / To Be Two
The third experience will focus on the art installation, Not One / To Be Two, which was created, and has featured in all the workplayshops, as a response to the marketised and hypermasculine environment of the academic institution. Not One / To Be Two is an enclosed art installation that is exhibited within the clinical and hierarchical spaces of the academic institution. These spaces not only express the corporate institutional processes that capture social spaces and create the conditions for the production of a capitalistic subjectivity, they also express the hypermasculine environment of the academic institution that produces a subjectivity which is aligned with the interests of patriarchy. With the aim to challenge these conditions, Not One / To Be Two was created as a feminist artistic encounter. It was inspired by Irigaray’s feminist approach to the canon of Western philosophy, which aims to problematise and reinvent it by articulating and promoting a space for the feminine within it through an exploration of the labial as the potential for a counter-discourse of plurality and difference. Not One / To Be Two is constructed as a large labial installation that aims to problematise and reinvent the hypermasculine environment of the academic institution by creating a feminine space within it. To the extent that it is constructed within the academic institution, it also aims to cause a disruption to the marketised environment of the academic institution by constructing an enclosed space within the corporate captured space. As an enclosed art installation, it could be argued that it is operating in a similar way to the hypermasculine and corporate institutional processes that capture social spaces. However, I argue that Not One / To Be Two captures social spaces in its enclosed space with the purpose of liberating it from its patriarchal and capitalist conditions.

(DRIP: In the drip Drizzle, I propose that feminist artistic encounters can release labial machines that open the territory onto the female. By following Deleuze and Guattari’s description of the resistance of the smooth space (2004, 411), I posit that this opening can be
understood as smooth patches of labial space which can reconquer the properties of contact that free it from the patriarchal and capitalist structures.)

Faced with an opening that symbolises the two labial lips, two participants are invited to crawl one by one through the opening into the dark inside. The inside space contrasts the cold clinical and hierarchical space of the academic institution outside, as it offers dim warm lighting and a soft inflatable ground. The two participants are asked to sit in the enclosed space and exchange eye contact for five to 10 minutes. Through this silent non-instrumentalised exercise, the engaged participants are encouraged to enact an unspoken exchange with one another. The purpose of this silent exchange is motivated by Irigaray’s suggestion that teaching does not have to only consist in ‘speaking, but in being capable of remaining silent too, of withdrawing in order to let the other be, become and discover his or her path, his or her language’ (2008b, 234).

(DRIP: For further information on Irigaray’s suggested approach to teaching, see the drip Ripple Effect, in which I incorporate her proposal for a sexuate education to develop an understanding of learning à deux. Irigaray’s proposal is for a sexuate education that, put simply, teaches us to be ‘respectful towards the other’ through the cultivation of our sexual energy (204). She suggests building dwellings so that we can protect ourselves in our differences, whilst being open to encountering other differences. Constructed as a large labial enclosed installation, Not One / To Be Two was built as an Irigarayan inspired dwelling to protect ourselves in our differences, whilst forming bonds with others.)

This silent exchange is encouraged as an experiment in bond formation, and is an attempt at inciting a common experience that counters the normal experience of the academic institution. The normalised corporate and hypermasculine processes of the academic institution seek to separate us through competition and examination and, according to Haslanger, requires women to sublimate ‘potentially important aspects of identity’ to fit in (2008, 217). For Not One / To Be Two, the incorporation of Irigaray’s feminist project gives Guattari’s description of processes of resingularization a different gloss that makes possible the argument that the participants become both more united in their common experience, and increasingly different in their cultivation of relational energy with one another (2000, 69). By offering a different experience, Not One / To Be Two was created with the intention to encourage participants to think against the normalised processes of the academic institution in order to engage in and
create new ways of experiencing and being in academic institutions, in common. The silent exchange produced in Not One / To Be Two is not a solution to the dominant refrain of learning in the academic institution, however it can be posited as an attempt at an interruption with the aim to initiate processes of resingularization of the academic space and of the subjectification of the participants involved.

By reinventing the environment of the academic institution, LEP achieves autonomy from, but still maintains a relation to, the institution. This autonomy of LEP allows the hypothesis to be made that LEP enables participants to form agency in their relation to the institution to the extent that participants are encouraged to determine their own creative processes of learning. By cultivating a potential space in LEP, practices of experimentation can take place that are not determined by the academic institution, but by the participants in LEP. The new improvisations that are sung in LEP are sung within the dominant refrain of learning in the academic institution. In our song for LEP, we propose a feminist artistic process of learning with the aim to change the hypermasculine institutionalisation of learning from within the academic institution. Moreover, our purpose of LEP is to propose a creative strategy to change the capitalist and patriarchal structures of the academic institution from within. I propose that it is by creating new encounters in the academic institution that we can cultivate different experiences of the academic institution. To the extent that the academic institution is not built to house artistic encounters and experiences, I argue that art is capable of reinventing the environment of the academic institution and of creating a shocking experience that counters the normal experience of the academic institution.

From our song in LEP, I propose the initiation of workplayshops or playtimes to take place in academic institutions in the hopes that they will create ‘potential spaces’ that might enable participants to find agency and take responsibility to determine and contribute their own songs to the process of changing the dominant refrain of learning. These workplayshops or playtimes may enable those, who are in a position to participate in the pedagogical task of challenging the mechanism of perpetual pedagogical control, to explore experiments in commonisation. Although I have provided examples of an artistic feminist pedagogy, I will not and do not wish to enforce a particular course of action as that would transmit a form of pedagogical control over which potential ways to confront the dominant refrain of learning. It is important to understand that one cannot presume that there would only be one response to the question of what a schizo-revolutionary artistic feminist pedagogy might look like because it can, in fact,
be actualised in a multiplicity of different ways. To this extent, I hope that the collaborative feminist artistic pedagogy carved out in this puddle will encourage or invite readers to carve out their own possible ideas for reinventing the hypermasculine and corporate environment of the academic institution.

This puddle can now be summarised as a call to those who are in a position to intervene and change the dominant refrain of learning in the academic institution, to take responsibility and explore how differences can be made within the present context of the academic institution by creating and determining their own pedagogical practices. I propose that learning to sing new songs within the dominant refrain of learning from within the academic institution, by changing it from within through improvisation, is a pedagogical task of exploring, imagining and creating different structures, practices and processes of the academic institution, in common. It is a process of learning to become artists to the extent that learning to articulate and contribute songs to change the dominant refrain requires creative acts to make a difference. I propose that by learning to become artists in common, the creative acts produced can constitute a multiplicity of songs that can produce possibilities of solidarity and collective organisation within the academic institutions; which can not only interrupt and change the dominant refrain of learning in any and all academic institutions in a multiplicity of different ways, but also engender new ways of experiencing and being in academic institutions. This puddle is an invitation to explore creative practices of learning that promote existential production with the aim to generate conditions for the empowerment of students and teachers.
## RETURNS NOTE

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## Description


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Thank you for your participation.