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Plato’s Bond of Love: Erōs as Participation in Beauty

The University of Edinburgh

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Thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Philosophy

2014
ABSTRACT

In his dialogues, Plato presents different ways in which to understand the relation between Forms and particulars. In the Symposium, we are presented with yet another, hitherto unidentified Form-particular relation: the relation is Love (Erôs), which binds together Form and particular in a generative manner, fulfilling all the metaphysical requirements of the individual’s qualification by participation. Love in relation to the beautiful motivates human action to desire for knowledge of the Form, resulting in the lover actively cultivating and bringing into being new beauty in the world, and in herself.

Chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis offer a survey of the arguments and examples Plato puts forward in the text of the corpus regarding the nature of Forms and the nature of participation, alongside a framework of the traditional interpretations of these two Platonic concepts in the literature. Chapter 3 turns to a close examination of Erôs in the Symposium, arguing that the love Plato presents in this dialogue is of a different sort than appetitive emotion. It is an aesthetic and intellectual attraction, capable of stimulating cognitive achievement. Erôs, however, does not stop there. The lover is led not only to contemplation of beauty, but to the generation of beauty, which is the subject of Chapter 4. The emotive-turn-to-cognitive relation of Erôs, I argue, is the clearest picture Plato paints of how possession of properties can be explained through participation in Forms. Erôs leads the lover to produce beauty in the world and in the soul, which explains how love in relation to the beautiful can lead to becoming beautiful. The object of love is the generation of beauty, the mortal mechanism of participation in the Form by which the lover herself becomes beautiful. Finally, Chapter 5 focusses on beauty itself and its role in moral education. Beauty, for Plato, is required for creative generation and can be understood as a uniquely powerful virtue of soul.
I hereby declare that this thesis has been composed by me (the candidate); and that the work of which it is a record is entirely my own, except where otherwise indicated by means of quotation, reference, and acknowledgement. The work has not been accepted in any previous application for any other degree or professional qualification.

Signed:                                           Date: 8\textsuperscript{th} April, 2014
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Material from this thesis has been presented in Ancient Olympia, Asilomar, Athens, Cambridge, Durham, Edmonton, Heraklion, Langley, London, Newcastle, Oxford, Pisa, San Francisco, and St Andrews; for BBC Scotland and educational media; and at numerous workshops and seminars in Edinburgh. I am grateful to the audiences and participants at all these events for invaluable questions and discussions. Special thanks are due to Sarah Broadie, Jamie Dow, Michael Griffin, Jay Kennedy, David Konstan, Alexander Nehamas, and Frisbee Sheffield. Catherine Rowett has been a continuous source of encouragement and inspiration. The Athens of the North lives up to its namesake in the much-loved reading groups of the Philosophy and Classics departments at Edinburgh. My fellow students have greatly challenged and cheered me, and I especially thank Jane Orton for countless hours of dialogue. I wish my own students could know how much they’ve changed my life.

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I should note that material from Chapter 5 has been published in Analytic Teaching and Philosophical Praxis, and is reproduced in the Appendix with permission from the publisher.

I humbly thank my family and friends—who were continually expected to listen to thoughts on the True, the Just, and the Beautiful—for their encouragement, their humour, and their patience. I am beholden to my sister, Kim, and my parents, Craig and Lynda Hosty, whose unwavering love and support has enabled me to flourish. My enduring gratitude goes to Brandon Ware, my greatest champion. The “great sea of beauty” I’ve witnessed in this endeavour counts among it such love as even the most oceanic of hearts re-reckons its ability to hold.
Only in beholding beauty is human life worth living.

ἐνταῦθα τοῦ βίου...
βιωτὸν ἀνθρώπῳ, θεωμένῳ αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν.

—Plato, Symposium, 211d
INTRODUCTION

It was the dinner party that became legend. Decades afterwards, the eager curious desperately gossiped to get a taste of what brought together the beautiful and powerful in one night of intoxicating conversation: Love.

Plato’s Symposium dialogue tells the story of that night, and this thesis is the work of but one more rapt lover listening at the door. In his dialogues, Plato uses all the philosophical, poetic, and rhetorical devices available to an author of peerless ingenuity in an attempt to articulate what was, for him, one of the most important concepts of moral reasoning: how the varied beauties we experience in life can all be said to be the same, can all be said to be ‘beautiful’. That is, he wanted to understand the precise nature of the relation between perfect, unqualified, absolute beauty itself, and the many, not-quite-so-beautiful mortal beauties. That relation has come to be called ‘participation’.

Of all the inspired flights of fancy, in all of Plato’s radical ontology, in all the dialogues, none has caused more consternation than the infamously “hoary problem of participation.”¹ The reason for the controversy is that Plato never explicitly describes that relation, despite its critical role in his philosophy. Over the dialogues, Plato presents a variety of different ways to understand the relation between unqualified

Forms and qualified particulars. In this thesis, I work closely with the Greek text of the dialogue to argue that the *Symposium* presents yet another, hitherto unidentified Form-particular relation: the relation is Love (Erôs), which binds together Form and particular in a generative manner, fulfilling all the metaphysical requirements of the individual’s qualification by participation. Love in relation to the beautiful motivates human action to desire for knowledge of beauty, resulting in the lover actively creating and *bringing into being* new beauty in the world, and in herself.

*Justification for this thesis*

The Theory of Forms is, arguably, Plato’s most enduring contribution to philosophy. The cornerstone of his metaphysics, it is absolutely indispensable to his epistemology, his ethics and political philosophy, and his aesthetics and value theory. Any serious study of Plato must come to grips with the Theory of Forms, and its attractiveness has made it a philosophic mainstay—as demonstrated by its pervasive influence in the broader Western cultural tradition. Yet, for all that, the theory has been haunted by a lingering concern even Plato himself acknowledged: a nagging shadow of uncertainty as to the mechanics of participation. That all and sundry beauties are beautiful simply because there is a corresponding absolute beauty to give them their name is an elegant solution to the penetrating questions of ‘what is this?’ and ‘why is this the way it is?’. But the problematic question that remains unsettled in the Theory of Forms is…how? *How*, precisely, do particulars *come to be related* to the Form of beauty?

For a number of Plato’s interpreters, the sceptics, his reluctance to describe the relation in any detail satisfactory to answer this question demonstrates a damning chink in the theory’s metaphysical and epistemological armour. If participation is simply a hollow name for a hollow concept, the Theory of Forms appears to imply a fundamental chasm between Two Worlds: the world of Forms and the world of particulars, separated categorically because no employable relation exists between them to bridge them.
The justification for this thesis is its attempt to offer a possible solution to the claim of a hollow participation relation. In what follows, I argue that Plato had a fully consistent hypothesis of how those two worlds might be bridged. While Plato’s metaphysics is much discussed in the literature, hardly any work has focussed primarily on the metaphysics of the Symposium. This is surprising, since it is in the Symposium that Plato offers his longest and most detailed description of the nature of a Form, the Form of beauty.² The focus on beauty is not unique to the Symposium, however. Beauty is the most discussed of all the Forms, being listed as an example by Plato even more than the Form of the good. My central finding is that the Symposium sets up a parallel between the eternal gods and mortal men on the one hand, and the eternal Forms and physical particulars on the other. Plato introduces a third entity into this parallel: Erôs, a divine daimon whose power and purpose is to bind each two together into a unity. I argue that this parallel is a novel way to understand how particulars can relate to Forms: they are bound by love, which motivates the creation of beauty and virtue.

The account we are presented with in the Symposium is therefore a project that makes a metaphysical argument for the link between emotions and moral education, via aesthetics. Leave it to Plato to build such a widely interdisciplinary theory of causation, but that is, in part, what makes the theory a distinctly human one. The Symposium offers an emotive understanding of the participation relation as personified Love, the bond between a beautiful soul and the Form of beauty itself. Accordingly, this thesis sets out to defend a view of human motivation that is fundamentally creative: an aesthetics of the transformative power of beauty.

*Intended readers*

As Socrates insists in the dialogue, love is the best co-worker with human nature to realise one’s potential. In the same way, I earnestly recommend to all those interested in the tragi-comedy of love, beauty’s uniquely powerful grip on the creative impulse,

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and an insightful perspective on ancient Attic religious and cultural practices to enjoy the Symposium’s inexhaustible fifty pages, rather than these two-hundred.

As beauty inspires creation of beauty, however, I was compelled to craft this thesis. I hope it might be of interest to those curious about Plato’s theory of love. In particular, I hope the following readers might find specific aspects of this thesis helpful. Readers are also encouraged to consult the brief overview of chapter contents at the end of this introduction.

Undergraduate and Postgraduate students: This thesis focusses on Plato’s metaphysics, aesthetics, and theory of love. Students working on related areas—including the role of emotions in moral activity and decision-making—may find my arguments concerning the nature of Platonic love, metaphysics in the Symposium, and the role of beauty in creativity in Chapters 3-5 of interest. Undergraduate students in philosophy, classics, and the history of political thought might also find useful the review surveys of the texts and literature in Chapters 1 (on the nature of Forms) and 2 (on the nature of participation), which provide an overview of all the relevant passages in Plato’s dialogues where references to these Platonic concepts occur.

Academics: This thesis provides a contemporary interpretation of the concept of participation in Plato’s metaphysics, a topic that has received increasing attention since its latest heyday in the mid-twentieth century. Accordingly, academics interested in the status of the literature up until 2013 may find the relevant chapters useful. In general, the thesis also offers a current status of the discipline on the topics of ancient emotions (see Chapter 3) and the Symposium dialogue. The occasion of the X Symposium Platonicum in Pisa, Italy in July 2013 on the topic of Plato’s Symposium—at which portions of this thesis were presented and discussed—demonstrates that the Symposium is a flourishing topic of contemporary ancient philosophy research.

Educators: Readers without any particular interest in philosophy as such may yet find the conclusions of this research project informative. One of the tangible
outcomes of this thesis, as set out in Chapter 5, §II, is its contribution to understanding the historical treatment of emotions and their relevance in contemporary education. This outcome has two applications: (1) to emphasise the role of emotions—especially love—in creative thinking and reasoning; and (2) to provide an analysis of the recent psychology and education scholarship on the ethical and pedagogical assumptions and challenges in understanding the process of engaging the emotions in moral education. This may be of interest to educators at any level of elementary through post-secondary school, but perhaps of particular relevance to K-12/secondary school levels, on which the majority of the literature on moral education focuses.

Health Sciences / Social and Public Health educators and practitioners: The social, political, and cultural forces that bear upon the experience of health and care is a matter of immediate interest and importance. A number of recent programmes have sought to investigate the areas of human psychology that play a role in determining health and illness within a social context. A crucial element of this psychology is the emotions: what makes us tick, how to handle emotions in a social environment, and how emotional health manifests in a variety of circumstances, including legal and political decision-making. Of interest to educators in these aspects of the health sciences, as well as to practitioners interested in the role of compassion and empathy as critical to care, is the treatment and understanding of emotions over time. As Chapter 3 provides a study of the history of the desiderative and erotic emotions, it offers useful material for lectures, seminars, or background reading on ‘the history of emotion’.

Outline of introduction

In the remainder of this introduction, I will present: (1) the aims and methodology of the thesis; (2) an orientation to the subject, providing an overview of Plato’s Symposium dialogue within ancient philosophy; (3) an orientation to the thesis, providing a statement of its key terminology, and an explanation of its limitations; and
finally, (4) a map of the thesis’ chapters, with a summary of what the reader can expect to find in each.

I. AIMS AND METHODOLOGY OF THE THESIS

The primary aim of this thesis is to demonstrate that the Symposium dialogue offers a unique contribution to Plato’s metaphysics. In particular, I suggest that we can find in Socrates’ speech a hitherto unnoticed description of the participation relation: love (Erôs) as Plato’s bond between the Form of beauty, and the many beautiful particulars. Through a close look at the origin of love presented by Diotima and recounted by Socrates, we see that Erôs, love personified, is not the god Socrates’ interlocutors at the symposium believed him to be. Rather, love is a daimon, intermediary between gods and men, whose especial power is to “fill up the interval [between them] so that the whole itself is bound together by it”, thereby enabling conversation and communion between the two. As the implications of this portrayal of love are expounded upon in the ensuing ‘ascent passage’ of the dialogue, Plato presents, I assert, a naturalistic account of the motivational power of love and its ability to lead not only to knowledge, but to the generation and creation of beauty in the soul. This, I argue, is participation.

A second aim of this thesis focusses on the object of love. A great deal of the literature on Plato’s moral psychology, and, in particular, the research focussing on Plato’s dialogues concerning erotic love—the Symposium and the Phaedrus—asserts that the object of love is beauty or goodness (taken to be either beautiful or good things, or their corresponding Forms). In this thesis, especially Chapter 3, §III, I provide evidence that the object of love, as described in the Symposium, is not beauty, but rather the creative generation of beauty. Here, I engage constructively with the work of David Halperin on aims of erôs compared with objects of erôs, and Gerasimos Santas on actual objects compared with intentional objects. My purpose is to understand the role of beauty in an emotional-cognitive context: when we love something, do we love it, its bundle of qualities (including beauty), some unique whole incorporating that

3 Symposium, 202e-203a.
beauty, or something else entirely? In examining this question, I analyse both the existing literature on objects of emotions and the specific account we get in the *Symposium*. I conclude that, as the brand of love Diotima has in mind is not the appetitive emotion of the *Phaedo*, but rather an intellectual emotion that does not seek possession of its object, its object is not beauty. Love is attracted to beauty, but its object is bringing to birth in beauty, here interpreted as creating or generating beauty.

A third aim of the thesis is to demonstrate the transformative power of beauty. To do this, I assess beauty both as what attracts and what is created in love’s activity. My result is that beauty can be understood as a virtue of soul. Beauty inspires the creation of beauty, and is therefore a *self-generation principle* whereby the lover designs and shapes herself. This is presented in my final chapter as a series of applications of my general Platonic theory of participation to the areas of moral education and aesthetic creativity.

Accordingly, what I set out to discover in the overall objective of this project is the role of love in the creation of beauty, including the moral virtue of beauty. What I found, and what I hope to convince my readers of over the course of this thesis, is that love is a naturalistic interpretation of Plato’s participation relation: love is the mechanism by which the Form of beauty is instantiated in beautiful particulars.

My methodology for this project is to examine the descriptions of participation elsewhere in the corpus, and compare it to what is presented in the *Symposium*. I focus in the main on Socrates’ speech. The reason for this is detailed in §III.b. of this introduction.

I also refer to a number of Plato’s other dialogues, in particular the *Republic*. My interpretation tends toward a synchronic understanding of the dialogues, to the extent that the language or content of some passages provides readers with clues that might enhance our insight into other passages. This is not to say that the theories expressed in one dialogue are entirely the same as those in another dialogue. In fact, it is precisely because Plato chose to present, for example, the Theory of Forms slightly differently in different dialogues that we can understand its wide-ranging aspects and implications. I acknowledge that issues of chronology might render comparison between the dialogues suspect, but see §III.b. of this introduction as regards that debate. Furthermore, my use
of other dialogues does not aim to provide sole support for any argument made in this thesis: I believe it can stand alone within the *Symposium*. However, as the metaphysics of the *Republic*—in particular the Line and Sun Similes—are much discussed and assessed in the literature, when a comparable point can be found outwith the *Symposium*, I alert the reader to these connections in the hope that dialogue between interpretations might enrich the reading of both. My reference to later philosophers, including Aristotle, is largely to demonstrate influence in the tradition.

The Greek text is cited according to Burnet’s 1903 edition. Translations of the *Symposium* follow Rowe’s 1998, and Benardete’s 1993, with some amendment. Where important to clarify the terms used—especially where the English translations vary between scholarship cited—I provide the Greek text as well as the English translation.

### II. ORIENTATION TO THE SUBJECT

The languages, literature, and cultures of the Ancient Graeco-Roman world comprise classical studies, in which ancient philosophy holds one foot, the other planted in the discipline of philosophy as its Western cornerstone. The political thought (here understood traditionally as including all philosophy that speaks to how humans ought to live as social creatures) which shaped and stemmed from those cultures has had an enduring, founding influence on how our society is run. It is embedded in the language we speak, the laws we follow, the religions we practice, and the social norms we have come to take as given. Studying ancient philosophy is thus not only a way to understand our past, and the way our world works, but offers us the tools to shape it further.

Fifth century B.C. Athens was the scientific and cultural centre of the ancient world. There, we find Plato, a noble young man who absorbed all that the learning of his day had to offer—and then enhanced it. His primary work was the composition of some two to three dozen books called dialogues, each of which follows a dramatic format—sometimes narrated—depicting conversations between a veritable who’s-who of ancient Athens, and almost always led by Plato’s teacher, the rogue street
philosopher, Socrates. The dialogues discuss an awesome range of ethical, pedagogical, political, theological, mathematical, and cosmological concepts. The profound, often humorous, and powerfully compelling treatment of philosophy’s most fundamental challenges have established Plato as, without doubt, the most influential thinker of Western civilisation. Accordingly, much better minds than mine have sought to introduce this great man and his intellect. I leave it to Emerson:

Among secular books, Plato only is entitled to Omar’s fanatical compliment to the Koran, when he said, “Burn the libraries; for their value is in this book.” These sentences contain the culture of nations; these are the corner-stone of schools; these are the fountain-head of literatures. A discipline it is in logic, arithmetic, taste, symmetry, poetry, language, rhetoric, ontology, morals or practical wisdom. There was never such range of speculation. Out of Plato come all things that are still written and debated among men of thought. Great havoc makes he among our originalities. We have reached the mountain from which all these drift boulders were detached. The Bible of the learned for twenty-two hundred years, every brisk young man who says in succession fine things to each reluctant generation—Boethius, Rabelais, Erasmus, Bruno, Locke, Rousseau, Alfieri, Coleridge—is some reader of Plato, translating into the vernacular, wittily, his good things. Even the men of grander proportion suffer some deduction from the misfortune (shall I say?) of coming after this exhausting generalizer. St. Augustine, Copernicus, Newton, Behmen, Swedenborg, Goethe, are likewise his debtors and must say after him. For it is fair to credit the broadest generalizer with all the particulars deducible from his thesis. Plato is philosophy, and philosophy, Plato… [A]s our Jewish Bible has implanted itself in the tabletalk and household life of every man and woman in the European and American nations, so the writings of Plato have preoccupied every school of learning, every lover of thought, every church, every poet—making it impossible to think, on certain levels, except through him.

Even in his praise of Plato does Emerson employ the Platonic relation of broad to particular, source to manifestation.

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4 Thirty-six dialogues and a collection of thirteen letters have been attributed to Plato, although the authenticity of between fifteen and nineteen of these has been contested, with varying degrees of consensus between scholars. On the extent of this debate, see John M. Cooper and D.S. Hutchinson, eds., Plato: Complete Works (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), v-vi.

5 Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Plato, or The Philosopher,” in Representative Men (Philadelphia, PA: David McKay Publisher, 1892), 41-42, 47.
The *Symposium* takes as its subject the question of love. After a layered opening frame, we hear an account of the tragic poet Agathon’s dinner party celebrating his first poetic victory the night before. His friends have all gathered, and they decide to take turns giving speeches in praise of Erôs. The dialogue is unique within the Platonic corpus in that, by the time we reach Diotima’s myth regarding the origin of love, it is a story (Diotima’s)-within-a-story (Socrates’)-within-a-story (Aristodemus’)-within-a-story (Apollodorus’). The reader learns “the truth about love” at a fifth remove. Plato has employed stories-within-stories before, but never to this degree: in the *Parmenides*, Cephalus tells how Antiphon recited Pythodorus’ story about the meeting between Socrates, Parmenides, and Zeno; and in the *Phaedo*, Echecrates hears from Phaedo the story of Socrates’ death, though in that case Phaedo had himself been present at the event. In the *Symposium*, the narrator is just as an outsider as the reader. In fact, the entire dialogue is recited to an unnamed companion. The dialogue thus draws in the reader, initiating her into love’s mysteries.

The *Symposium* draws on a wealth of socio-cultural themes and material both to set the stage for and contribute to Plato’s philosophy. Symposia such as the one held at Agathon’s house that night were a staple amongst Plato’s aristocratic company. They were a time for indulging the senses with good food, copious wine, performed music, and the beautiful bodies of bright young things. Symposia were also the place for...
educating young men in the social standards of the day, including how to regulate one’s erotic desires in the face of such enticements.\(^\text{10}\)

An important religious practice that has a significant presence in the *Symposium* dialogue is the Eleusinian Mysteries—the initiation ceremonies into the cult of Demeter and Persephone. The mysteries represent Persephone’s abduction into Hades’ underworld and her ‘ascent’ journey back to her mother, which is celebrated as a symbol of agrarian cycles and the ‘re-birth’ manifested in the passing of one generation to another.\(^\text{11}\) Diotima, who is introduced as a priestess and almost certainly as one who would have been involved in leading the initiates in such ceremonies, constructs her ‘ascent passage’ using the language of the mysteries.\(^\text{12}\) The language of procreation and birth can also be seen to underlie each of the dialogues’ speeches in interesting and complementary ways.\(^\text{13}\)

The *Symposium* has enjoyed a long tenure as one of Plato’s most beloved dialogues, not least because the accounts of love presented in the seven speeches at times so

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10 On the educational purposes of symposia, see Frisbee Sheffield’s recent survey in *Plato’s Symposium: The Ethics of Desire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 5 ns. 10 and 11.


acutely resonate with and poetically represent the human experience. I have in mind here, of course, Aristophanes’ speech (189c-193e), which, among other contributions, is the source of that captivating portrayal of the beloved as one’s ‘other half.’ In Socrates’ speech, Plato crafts an image of love that includes but also goes beyond sexual or appetitive desire to a motivating force that draws the lover outside herself to realise her potential and shape a life most worth living. The seductiveness of this idea has projected the influence of Plato’s theory of love and desire well beyond the boundaries of philosophy to impact significant areas of psychology and the arts. It is an inexhaustible dialogue.

III. ORIENTATION TO THE THESIS

I will now summarise some of the main terminology that will be used throughout this thesis, before going on to outline the thesis’ limitations.

III.a. Statement of terminology

The lower mysteries: Following the traditional reading of the dialogue, the lower mysteries refers to lines 208c-210e, Diotima’s description of those who have as their beloved a beautiful body and who give birth to human children (208c-209e), and those who “are pregnant in soul more than in body” and who give birth to beautiful speeches, laws, poems, and actions (209a-210e).

The higher mysteries: The higher mysteries refers to lines 210a-212a, and this is Diotima’s term for the path taken in the lover’s ascent from beautiful bodies to the Form of beauty and to the final creative generation.

The ascent passage: By this, I refer as well to Diotima’s summary of the lover’s ascent from particular beauties to the Form of beauty and to the final creative generation (210a-212a).

Metaphysical: I have used the term to highlight simply those aspects of Plato’s theory which speak to, demonstrate, or otherwise indicate an hypothesis made about the nature of reality and the ways its various pieces fit together. I will suggest that certain concepts (e.g., the Forms, the participation relation, the Two Worlds) are ‘metaphysical’ concepts, and arguments made about those concepts are ‘metaphysical’ arguments. As I have mentioned above, the Symposium provides some of Plato’s most explicit references to the Forms, which alone affords this dialogue the bona fides to offer a contribution to our understanding of Plato’s metaphysics.

Erōs: I have translated the Greek Ἔρως as ‘love’, with which I hope to get away without raising too many concerns. I gather many commentators follow Rowe in settling for ‘love’ as translation simply for lack of a more appropriate alternative. The Greek term is inextricable from sexual desire, but carries with it a broader semantic range than solely sexual desire. I have resisted in translating it as desire, however, for two reasons: (1) ἐπιθυμία holds that place, and even within Socrates’ speech does Plato use that term to describe desire in

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15 Rowe [Plato], 12. Beyond ἐπιθυμία, which I discuss below and which is widely considered to refer to desire in general, and τὰ ἄφροδιτα, which refers primarily to sex, there are five other words that can be translated ‘love’ in Classical Greek: ἰμέρος, πόθος, φιλία, στοργή, and ἀγάπη. ἰμέρος is a kind of longing for a the company of an absent friend; πόθος is a similar but distinctly erotic desire for one who is absent. Φιλία can be said of a peaceful relation between states, friendliness towards friends or even colleagues, and the love one may feel towards parents, children, best friends, or a spouse (though this last would be combined with sexual desire). Στοργή is typically reserved for love between parents and children, but see David Konstan, “Στοργή in Greek amatory epigrams,” in DIC MIHI, MVSA, VIRVM: Homenaje al profesor Antonio López Eire, Acta Salmanticensia: Estudios filológicos 326, eds. Francisco Cortés Gabaudin and Julián Víctor Méndez Dosuna (Salamanca, Spain: Universidad de Salamanca, 2010), 363-369, for notable exceptions. Ἀγάπη, as a type of love, is postclassical, making its entrance in the Christian texts and referring to the love God has for his creation and which we ought have towards fellow-man. In Classical Greek, the term can refer as well to relationships with a sexual component. Dover [Symposium], 1, notes “on an early Attic red-figure vase a woman lolling ‘topless’ on a bed and drinking wine is named Ἀγάπη.”

16 Rowe [Plato], 5; Paul W. Ludwig, Eros and Polis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 8-13; Dover [Symposium], 1-2.

17 Sheffield, 2.
general and as different to Ἐρως;\(^{18}\) (2) if the transformative, whole-life-altering, consuming relation Plato presents in Socrates’ speech is something different to love, then the English term love will, I fear, have been hollowed out entirely. Just as Socrates appropriated the symposium topic of Ἐρως to advance a philosophic theory of the best human life, as I argue in more detail in Chapter 3, so too perhaps did Plato widen the Greek term to embrace the complex of human emotion we attempt to impart by the word ‘love’.

The lover: Much of Socrates’ speech in the Symposium revolves around an imagined lover. In the first instance, any lover generally; and as we get into the ascent passage, of a particular philosophic lover pregnant in soul with the beauty of virtue she will generate. I have made any imagined lover female, and will refer to her in those terms. My primary reason to do this is ease of identification: by making the example lover female, I aim to reduce any confusion between the lover and Socrates, Plato, personified Erôs the daimon, or any of the dialogue’s other male characters. As I refer more to Socrates than Diotima during the former’s speech, this lover should not be confused with Diotima. Making the lover female, when Ἐρως is male, is supported by the fact that Plato does draw a distinction between love (the daimon/emotion) and lovers.\(^{19}\)

The beloved: As a critical part of my argument encompasses defending the object of love as not beauty, but the creative process of generating beauty, I run into some difficulty in identifying the other person involved with our lover. Engaging in a bit of an etymological indulgence, I commandeer the accusative Greek ἄμφι- element of the word-forming English be-stem to christen our beloved as not the genitive object of the lover’s aim, but rather that around which she flutters and in relation to which she expresses her love. That will not convince everyone, but it is the name for the lover’s intimate in this little story.


\(^{19}\) E.g., at Symposium, 206b.
**Generation:** By generation, I refer to the activity of “bringing to birth in beauty” (τῆς γεννήσεως καὶ τοῦ τόκου ἐν τῷ καλῶ) which Diotima insists at 206e is the object of love. As I argue, this can be interpreted as the creative activity of bringing about new beauty in the physical world, and in the human soul.

*A note on the speaker:* The ‘Socratic Problem’ arises out of the fact that, to our knowledge, Socrates never wrote anything, and Plato always put his words into the mouths of his characters. In this thesis, I will refer to Plato when I discuss those aspects of the dialogues that are clearly of the author’s construction: the order of the speeches, their language and rhetorical or literary devices, and the overall work of the dialogue or of any individual speech. I will ascribe to each speaker his or her words. As Diotima’s contribution to the dialogue is entirely recited by Socrates, I will mainly present those ideas as within Socrates’ speech to the other symposiasts, except where it is relevant to draw attention to the conversation between Diotima and Socrates. I follow most commentators in assuming that Diotima speaks for Plato.\(^{20}\)

**III.b. Limitations**

I shall want to bring to the reader’s attention that while this thesis makes passing reference to the *Symposium*’s frame dialogue and its other speakers—especially Agathon, with whose speech Socrates engages more than any other of the speeches—it will focus fairly consistently on Socrates’ speech. The reason for this is because it is in Socrates’ speech that the three following indicators are offered that suggest Plato was using Socrates as the mouthpiece for his philosophy, as is widely considered to be the case in the dialogues. (1) At 199b, Socrates responds to his interlocutors by saying his speech sets out to tell the truth about love (and, by implication, that the other speeches do not). Plato was often wont to challenge the moral and political assumptions of his day,

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and therefore a place in the dialogue where he says a character is engaging in something new and different is worth considering as being of Plato’s own. (2) It is in Socrates’ speech that Plato chooses to introduce Diotima, a priestess Socrates reveals has taught him everything he knows. (3) As noted above, Socrates’ speech contains the longest and most detailed description of a Form in the Platonic corpus. Whether or not Socrates’ speech can be taken to be reporting Plato’s own opinion, it is nevertheless a crucial contribution to Plato’s metaphysics and therefore deserves being taken seriously.

This thesis also avoids entirely any argument regarding developmentalism in Plato’s intellectual career, or chronology of the dialogue’s composition date, beyond what can be inferred from the several references to historical events at various points in the dialogue. Issues of space and focus aside, my reason for avoiding such discussions at this stage is based on a fundamental scepticism regarding stylometry: if we learn anything from the Symposium, it is that Plato had enormous ability to mimic different voices in his writing, and to employ those voices at will. I dare not date.

Third, I do focus more on the metaphysics of the dialogue, than on its epistemology. I refer to cognition of the beautiful in the lover’s educational ascent to the Form, but without making commitments to any particular epistemological reading of Plato. I will go so far as to say that we do have evidence in the Symposium that the many particular instances can point the philosopher in the direction of what is essential to all those particulars, that is, the specific nature of that Form as a one over the

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many. On this point, I follow Lear’s assessment that the *Phaedrus* and the *Symposium*—while both concerned with love and beauty—present mirrored foci: whilst the former offers more as to the intelligible nature of the Form, the latter grants greater insight into its *being*.

IV. OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS

Chapter 1 is a systematic survey of the arguments and metaphors presented in the text of the Platonic corpus that reveal various aspects of the nature of Forms. This framework aims to provide valuable insight into what sort of entities the Forms might be. The account of the Form of beauty offered in the *Symposium* will be seen to clarify a number of the inconsistencies that arise in attempts to synthesise the descriptions encountered elsewhere in the dialogues.

Chapter 2 takes a similar format to the first, this time focussing on the different explanations Plato puts forward in the dialogues regarding the nature of the participation relation. It follows with a framework of the existing interpretations of this relation in the literature.

Chapter 3 turns to a close examination of Erôs in the *Symposium*, arguing that the love Plato presents in this dialogue is of a different sort than appetitive emotion. It is an aesthetic and intellectual attraction, capable of stimulating cognitive achievement. Erôs, however, does not stop there. The lover is led not only to contemplation of beauty, but to the *generation* of beauty, which is the subject of Chapter 4.

In Chapter 4, I argue that the emotive-turn-to-cognitive relation of Erôs is the clearest picture Plato paints of how possession of properties can be explained through

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22 I take this to be an important feature of the initiate lover’s ascent in 210a-212a, a point that I examine in more detail in Chapter 4, §I.a.

participation in Forms. Erôs leads the lover to produce beauty in the world and in the soul, which explains how love in relation to the beautiful can lead to *becoming* beautiful. The object of love is the generation of beauty, the mortal mechanism of participation in the Form by which the lover herself becomes beautiful.

Chapter 5 closes this study by focussing on beauty itself. Beauty, for Plato, is required for creative generation and can be understood as a uniquely powerful virtue of soul. That the world is a world of the good and beautiful—that it is *this* world—must be the reason why, on Diotima’s account, generation and the beautiful are so fundamentally connected. I then detail two implications of this thesis. First, I connect this argument with recent developments regarding the role of the emotions—in particular, love—in moral education. Second, I consider the particular role of beauty in a creative educational environment capable of motivating the excellence to which Socrates’ speech in the *Symposium* exhorts its readers.
CHAPTER I:

The Nature of Forms

_Aim_: To provide a survey of the descriptions, arguments, and metaphors presented in the text of the Platonic corpus that reveal various aspects of the nature of Forms. The account offered in the Symposium can be seen to clarify a number of the inconsistencies that arise in attempts to synthesise the descriptions encountered elsewhere in the dialogues.

The Theory of Forms is one of Plato’s most enduring contributions to philosophy. The precise nature of the Forms, however, has been the subject of extensive debate. The trouble lies in the fact that, despite their presence—direct or indirect—in so many of his dialogues, Plato appears never to offer a comprehensive and final account of what exactly these entities are. Bigger remarks that, when considered seriously, Forms appear to be little more than sublimed versions of images, rescued by virtue of their presumed eternity from the ravages of time and incompleteness, the fate of the world of images which Becomes and never wholly is. [...] Forms reside in] a sort of etherealized Noah’s ark possessing the exemplary form of every natural type and kind.¹

Throughout the dialogues, Plato presents different ways in which to understand the Forms: a catalogue of similes, analogies, descriptions of characteristics, miscellaneous figures of speech, myths, and metaphors which hint at—with varying degrees of consistency—these most important and enigmatic of his characters. A review of these attempts to explain what type of entities the Forms might be will aim to draw out and organise what can be considered the nature of the Forms.

Accordingly, this chapter will first survey the most critical passages in the Platonic corpus that discuss the Forms—a prefatory step to any possible insight into understanding the relationship between Forms and particulars, which is a further goal of this thesis. Second, this chapter will argue that the account of the Form of beauty offered in the *Symposium* can be read to clarify a number of the inconsistencies that arise in attempts to synthesise the descriptions encountered elsewhere in the dialogues. Often overlooked in the contemporary literature when considering those dialogues which contribute much to the understanding of Platonic metaphysics, the *Symposium* in fact boasts the Forms’ longest continuous and uniquely detailed description, and is therefore one of the most important dialogues to consider when reviewing Plato’s Forms.2

I. MENO

The *Meno* is widely held to contain a preliminary Platonic use of the term εἶδος (idea or Form).3 The root of εἶδος is ‘to see’, and while this thesis will analyse, in subsequent chapters, the relation of Forms to aesthetic creativity, it must be uncontroversial to note that, throughout the dialogues, the most powerful and important analogies Plato uses to discuss his metaphysics are similarly accounts of the visual experience.4 It should then come as no surprise that the Form to which Plato refers most often is the Form of beauty.

In the dialogue to hand, following a comparison to “the nature (οὐσία) of bees” at 72a, Socrates suggests that the same is true of the various virtues: “Even if they are many and various, all of them have one and the same form (εἶδος) which makes them virtues, and it is right to look to this when one is asked to make clear what virtue is.”5

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2 Symposium, 210e-212a.
4 Republic 507a-509d being the example *par excellence.*
5 Meno, 72c. Cf., perhaps, the opening lines to Tolstoy’s *Anna Karenina.*
Health, he goes on to say, “has the same form everywhere”, and this concept of sameness is repeated in subsequent descriptions of the Form.⁶

Related to the quality of sameness is the fixed, secure nature of Forms, which provides a basis for knowledge. “True opinions,” Socrates claims, “are not willing to remain long, and they escape from a man’s mind, so that they are not worth much until one ties them down by [giving] an account of the reason why.”⁷ Forms have the function of providing a reason for particular phenomena. The dialogue ends with Socrates comparing Forms and particulars to Tiresias living among the dead, a “true reality compared, as it were, with shadows.”⁸ In the Meno, Forms are the particulars’ nature, the same for all variety, fixed and stable, and the true reality.

II. PHAEDO

Arguments regarding chronology and the intellectual development of Plato’s philosophy will be left aside for now,⁹ but as it is in the Phaedo that Socrates expresses a degree of tentativeness as to the specific details of his claim,¹⁰ our survey of the nature of Forms will continue with this dialogue. The discussion of the immortality of the soul in the Phaedo adds to the theory of Forms the idea that Forms are not only different to particulars, but separate from them. The analysis of the descriptions offered in the Phaedo will follow along the dialogue’s sequence of arguments for the soul’s immortality. As each argument is put forward by Socrates, the reader is presented with additional perspectives on Plato’s other immortal entities—the Forms—although a perspective by no means complete nor rid of controversy. An important factor to bear in mind is that the Forms are introduced, at least at the dramatic level, as part of the

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⁶ Meno, 72d, 72c, 73c.
⁷ Ibid., 97e-98a.
⁸ Ibid., 100a-b. Symposium 212a draws the same distinction between true reality and shadows.
⁹ On which, see §III.b. of the Introduction.
¹⁰ Phaedo, 100d.
aim to prove the immortality of the soul.\textsuperscript{11} How much this affects the advancement of a specific ‘theory’ of the Forms will require attention at each step of the argument as a whole.

\textit{II.a. Deadly asceticism (65c-67a)}

In the preliminary discussion, Socrates makes his famous statement concerning the philosopher’s practice of death—that is, that the philosopher should pay as little attention to the body as possible since it is the nurture of the soul that is most important. One of the primary activities of the soul, according to Socrates, is its “acquirement of pure knowledge”.\textsuperscript{12} As the senses are described as inaccurate,\textsuperscript{13} Socrates and his interlocutors agree that it is “in thought or reasoning (\textit{λογίζεσθαι}), then, if at all, that something of the realities becomes clear to it.”\textsuperscript{14} Socrates goes on to detail the objects of this reasoning:

Do we think there is such a thing as absolute justice…and absolute beauty and goodness?
Of course.
Well, did you ever see anything of the kind with your eyes?
Certainly not.
Or did you ever reach (ἐφήψω) them with any of the bodily senses? I am speaking of all such things, as size, heath, strength, and in short the essence or underlying quality (οὐσίας) of everything. Is their true nature (ἀληθέστατο) contemplated by means of the body? Is it not rather the case that he who prepares himself most carefully to understand the true essence of each thing that he examines would come nearest to the knowledge of it?…To search out the pure (εἰλικρινὲς), absolute essence of things…?
That is as true as true can be, Socrates.\textsuperscript{15}

The inaccuracy of the bodily organs hinders one from knowing such things absolutely, for which purpose one must “be free from the body and must behold the actual realities

\textsuperscript{12} \textit{Phaedo}, 65c.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 65b.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 65c.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 65d-66a.
with the eye of the soul alone (αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ θεατέον αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα).”

This freedom from the body requires that “we avoid, as far as possible, intercourse and communion (ὅμιλώμεν...μηδὲ κοινωνώμεν) with the body, except what is necessary, and are not filled (ἀναπιμπλώμεθα) with its nature.”

The terms used to describe this contamination reveal it is the same predicament against which the desired outcome is compared in the Republic, Symposium, Theaetetus, Apology, and elsewhere in the Phaedo.

What can be ascertained from this introductory discussion is that the object of knowledge—which will turn out to be the Forms—has something to do with the true, pure essence of the matter under investigation. One approaches these true essences with her mind, freed as much as possible from the distractions, desires, demands, and discrepancies of the flesh and the material world, and comes into a manner of contact with them. The verbs indicating the nature of this contact vary throughout these preliminary remarks, but most telling is ἐφήψω, “reach, grasp, or possess”. With this discussion of the soul and its need to become unentangled from the body asserted, Socrates moves into his arguments for the immortality of the soul. Divorcing knowledge from desire runs counter to the latter’s role in the Symposium and Phaedrus, of course.

II.b. The argument from recollection (72e-78b)

The second argument of the Phaedo, the argument from recollection, is the first to offer specific insight into the nature of the Forms. As the Forms are introduced here with an express relation to knowledge, and as this argument details the theory of

16 Phaedo, 66e.
17 Ibid., 67a.
18 Republic, 516e5; Symposium, 211e3; Theaetetus, 196e; Apology, 32c; Phaedo, 83d. See H.G. Liddell and R. Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, revised by H.S. Jones and R. McKenzie [henceforth, LSJ] (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940), s.v. ἀνάπλεος, A.II.
19 LSJ, s.v. ἐφήψω. Cf. Phaedrus, 253a; Laws, 728e, 915c; Symposium, 212a.
recollection, we can identify the thread comprising the inherent connection between Plato’s epistemology and metaphysics. Socrates introduces the Forms in this argument as follows:

We say there is such a thing as equality. I do not mean the instance of one piece of wood being equal to another, or one stone to another, or anything of that sort, but something beyond that—equality in the abstract (παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα ἕτερόν τι, αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον).

The knowledge one is able to gain of these abstract entities is different to the knowledge of their particular instances. This difference manifests itself both in the means of attaining that knowledge and in its object. Socrates first asserts that one attains knowledge of equality in the abstract:

from the things we were just speaking of...by seeing equal pieces of wood or stones or other things, [we] derive from them a knowledge of abstract equality, which is another thing. [...] It is impossible to gain this knowledge [that equal stones are not the equal itself] except by sight or touch or some other of the senses...Then it is through the senses that we must learn that all sensible objects strive after absolute equality and fall short of it.

What can Socrates mean that the knowledge of Forms and the knowledge of particulars “is not the same, but different”? Discussing the difference between knowledge of particulars and knowledge of Forms, Socrates uses the following example: “Knowledge of a man is different from knowledge of a lyre”. The intention of the distinction is that knowledge of one has a different content than knowledge of the other. Although knowledge of both may be possible, one is not to confuse knowledge of one for knowledge of the other. Knowledge of particulars is gained, perhaps exclusively, in perceiving through the senses precisely that they are not absolute essences. One knows these particulars are not the Form, in her consideration of “whether or not this

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20 *Phaedo*, 74a.
21 Ibid., 73c-d.
22 Ibid., 74b, 74c, 75a-b.
23 Ibid., 73d.
24 Ibid., 73d.
recollected”. The knower can recollect what the abstract essence of equality is, from the fallings short of the particular sticks and stones, and know the particulars in that they do so fall short. She knows what it is they strive towards, and in such, knows their good.

The most significant insight into the nature of the Forms gained in the argument from recollection is that equality in the abstract is different to particular instances of equality, in that the former never appears unequal, nor appears to be inequality. The equal never “appear[s] equal in one respect and unequal in another”. A Form will never appear to be the opposite of what it is. A second view to the nature of the Forms concerns their range. Introduced to the list of Forms are:

- the equal and the greater and the less and all such abstractions. For our present argument is no more concerned with the equal than with absolute beauty and the absolute good and the just and the holy, and, in short, with all those things which we stamp with the seal of ‘absolute’ in our dialectic process of questions and answers.

Third, following the course of Socrates’ argument for the immortality of the soul, it is put forward that the Forms exist in a place where the soul exists prior to birth, in order for the soul to come to know them. Fourth, Simmias offers an additional attribute of these abstractions relating to the nature of their existence. He asserts, “all such things, the beautiful, the good, and all the others of which you were speaking just now, have a most real existence (εἶναι ως οἷόν τε μάλιστα)”. In some sense, they are, to a high degree. Finally, the “other thing which had been forgotten” is “associated with the thing perceived (ὡ τοῦτο ἐπλησίαζεν) whether like it or unlike it (ἀνόμοιον ὃν ἦ ὧ ὃμοιον)”. The details of this association have yet to be discussed.

25 Phaedo, 74a.
26 Ibid., 74c.
27 Ibid., 74b.
28 Ibid., 75c-d.
29 Ibid., 77a.
30 Ibid., 76a.
II.c. The affinity argument (78b-84b)

The affinity argument builds upon the descriptions offered in the previous argument, and intimates further information regarding the Forms’ identity. In comparing the nature of the body with the nature of the soul, Socrates describes how “things which are always the same and unchanging are the uncompounded things and the things that are changing and never the same are the composite things”.31 He asks,

Is the absolute essence, which we in our dialectic process of question and answer call true being, always the same or is it liable to change? Absolute equality, absolute beauty, any absolute existence, true being—do they ever admit of any change (μεταβολὴν) whatsoever? Or does each absolute essence, since it is uniform (μονοειδὲς) and exists by itself, remain the same and never in any way admit of any change (ἄλλοίωσιν)?

It must necessarily remain the same, Socrates.32

This new statement that the Forms are uniform (μονοειδὲς) clarifies some of the comments made in the previous argument. The Forms do not only not admit their opposites, but they do not admit of any change or alteration “in any way at any time” or from any perspective.33 They are always the same; their existence holds. The reason given for the fact that particulars perceived by the senses do change, is their essential complexity.34 Compound things can be decomposed into their component parts, and thus lose the existence they have as a specific compound. Socrates goes on to assert that “the things which are always the same can be grasped (ἐπιλάβοιο) only by reason, and are invisible and not to be seen”.35

Socrates also refers to the fact that these entities are “intelligible and tangible to philosophy (νοητὸν δὲ καὶ φιλοσοφίᾳ αἵρετον)” as well.36 It is not explained whether their ability to be grasped only by reason is a result, cause, or coincidence of their being

31 Phaedo, 78c.
32 Ibid., 78d.
33 Silverman, 55.
34 Phaedo, 78c; Silverman, 56.
35 Phaedo, 79a.
36 Ibid., 81b.
always the same. Silverman identifies a connection between this activity of the mind and the nature of the Forms: “the repeated emphasis on the capacity of reason to concentrate on the single, selfsame, unchanging, and perspectiveless object intimates that the nature of the Forms will have to be integrated with the needs of the knowing soul.”

Socrates concludes the part of the affinity argument that deals with the Forms by stating that such beings as these belong to “the realm of the pure, the everlasting, the immortal, and the changeless”. What is truly uniform in this way cannot be dissolved and would indeed be everlasting in its indissolubility.

II.d. The argument from the Form of life (95a-107b)

The final argument of the Phaedo, the argument from the Form of life, and its preliminaries, is often considered “the locus classicus for the middle period Theory of Forms”. Given its place in the dialogue, and the remarks made by Socrates and his interlocutors during this argument, commentators tend to infer that Socrates found this final argument to be conclusive. His long pause at 95e marks the beginning of an interlude during which he asserts that any argument claiming that the soul is immortal rather than merely existing for a long time—perhaps before birth, and perhaps gaining knowledge of the abstract essences but ultimately perishing eventually—“is no small thing” and that “the task now before them is the cause of reason for generation and destruction as a whole”. This linking of the individual soul’s immortality with the overall reasons for the entirety of generation and decay is an intriguing step, and offers a new level of importance to the role of Forms in Plato. In the intellectual biography he offers during this interlude, Socrates includes an account of his belief that “if anyone

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37 Silverman, 57.
38 Phaedo, 79d.
39 Analysis of the relation between immortality and indissolubility will be carried out in Chapter 4, §V.
40 Silverman, 57.
42 Phaedo, 95e.
43 Silverman, 57. The phrase of γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς is mentioned elsewhere in Plato, e.g., Republic, 485b, 508d, 521c, 527b, 546a; Cratylus, 411c; Timaeus, 50c.
wishes to find the cause of the generation or destruction or existence of a particular thing, he must find out what sort of existence, or passive state of any kind, or activity, is best for it”. If this is to be believed, and Socrates is establishing a new aspect of the role of Forms in generation (and decay) one must pay attention to “the good, which must embrace and hold together all things”. Socrates states he does not have all the answers for the cause of how all things originate, but rather resorts to his “safe answer”, a method of hypothesis: the Forms’ capacity to explain why particulars are the way they are. He asserts:

if anything else is beautiful besides beauty itself, it is beautiful on account of nothing else than because it partakes of beauty itself. And I speak in the same way about everything else. Do you accept this sort of cause?...Nothing else makes it beautiful but the presence or communion (call it what you please) of absolute beauty. [...] There is] no other way by which anything can come into existence than by participating in the proper essence of each thing in which it participates.

The explanations offered in this part of the argument reveal a startling new aspect of the nature of the Forms. Not only are they uniform, unchangeable, and immortal, and in some way existing separately from the particulars that strive to be like them, but now Plato “assign[s] to Forms responsibility for the properties of particulars”. The study of what it is, according to Plato, to exist as a particular will be discussed in Chapter 2. For now, at least, the role of Forms as a whole has gained an immense function: being the cause of all the attributes of the perceptible world.

After Socrates concludes the first part of this argument there is a brief aside between the frame characters Phaedo and Echecrates, in which Plato first uses the phrase τῶν εἰδῶν to refer to the Forms in this dialogue: “As I remember it, after all this had been said, they had agreed that each of the abstract qualities (τῶν εἰδῶν) existed and that
other things which participate in these get their names from them”. It can be seen at this point, that, in the respect of introducing the Forms as part of the dialogue’s final and, following the received view, strongest argument, each of the previous discussions and arguments have built up to this one, enabling Socrates’ interlocutors (and readers) to become more and more “familiar” with these abstract entities.

In the following sentence of Phaedo’s, utilised for the transition between the aside and the resumption of the account, Plato introduces yet another new expression: that the abstract entities are in their respective particulars: “Socrates asked, ‘Now if you assent to this, do you not, when you say that Simmias is greater than Socrates and smaller than Phaedo, say that there is in Simmias (ἐν τῷ Σιμμίᾳ) both greatness and smallness?’” The use of the dative to locate the qualities discussed is maintained, along with possessives, from this point in the dialogue onward. The second interruption in the flow of this argument, made by the unnamed interlocutor fearful Socrates was completely dismissing his first argument regarding opposites, has attracted much attention as to its significance. Frede asserts the interruption is to give Plato an opportunity to clarify the lexical ambiguity between the formal property of a particular and that particular. Silverman asserts that it “indicates that Socrates is forging new metaphysical machinery in this section”.

What follows is the introduction to Socrates’ second, “sophisticated” answer. As Socrates had earlier expressed unabashed uncertainty regarding the details as to how one comes to participate in or be in communion with a Form, the Form-copies in the sophisticated answer could be seen as one possible description of how this participation can be said to take place. The sophisticated answer commences with the assertion that “Not only the abstract idea itself (αὐτὸ τὸ εἴδος) has a right to the same name through

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49 Phaedo, 102b.
50 Ibid., 100b.
51 Ibid., 102b. My italics.
52 Frede, 28.
53 Silverman, 60.
54 Phaedo, 105c.
55 Ibid., 100d.
all time, but also something else, which is not the Form, but which always, whenever it exists, has its form or shape (μορφήν).”56 A particular is P if “it is possessed by something which has P as its essential property”.57

The list of Forms discussed in the *Phaedo* is expanded in the last section of this final argument: the hot, the cold, the odd, the even, and the immortal are all established as Forms.58 A slightly more unusual addition to the list is the musical, offered alongside the just.59 Given that justice is discussed by Plato in the *Republic* as having parallels to harmony, perhaps this addition ought not raise too many concerns. On such a musical note, this assessment of the descriptions given of the Forms in Plato’s dialogues now turns to the *Republic*.

III. *REPUBLIC*

In the course of his discussion regarding justice, in the city and in the soul, Socrates and his interlocutors find themselves requiring a metaphysical groundwork upon which to base their judgements of the beautiful city. The investigations of Books V through VII seek out the “first principles…in order to make our ground secure”, in contrast with the miry bog of uncertainty.60 In particular, “the central books of the *Republic* are designed to illustrate the education which will produce a philosopher-ruler in order that she might best rule an ideal polis. She will rule on the basis of her knowledge of Forms.”61

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56 *Phaedo*, 103e.
57 Frede, 29
58 *Phaedo*, 103c, 104a-b, 105e.
59 Ibid., 105e.
61 Silverman, 66.
III.a. 449a-480a

Book V aims to show that the objects of knowledge, belief, and ignorance are distinct entities. The Forms are initially explained as the ones that correspond to the many instances which appear in the material and sensible world, the famous ‘one over many’:

Since beautiful is the opposite of ugly, they are two.
   Of course.
Since they are two, isn’t each also one?
   That is so as well.
The same argument also applies then to justice and injustice, good and bad, and all the Forms; each is itself one, but, by showing up everywhere in a community with actions, bodies, and one another, each is an apparitional many.

In the discussion at the end of Book V, the main distinction between the lovers of sights and the lover of wisdom is that the sightlovers “surely delight in the beautiful sounds and colours and shapes…but their thought is unable to see and delight in the nature of the beautiful itself” whereas the philosopher is one who is “able to approach the beautiful itself and see it by itself…[She] believes that there is beauty itself and is able to catch sight both of it and of what participates in it, and doesn’t believe that what participates is it itself.” Plato asserts the knowable to be those things that are “always the same in all respects.” The problem with the sightlovers’ conception of beautiful things is not that particular objects cannot be beautiful, but that, because they can also be ugly in some respect, time, location, or relation, they are not always unqualifiedly beautiful. Objects of belief, therefore, are mistaken as objects of knowledge when one takes “resemblances of F for the real F.”

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63 Republic, 475e-476a. See also 507b and 596a, in which Socrates calls this method their “customary procedure…to set down some one Form for each of the particular ‘manys’ to which we apply the same name.”
64 Ibid., 476b, 476d.
65 Ibid., 479e, 484b, 485b.
67 Ibid., 66.
account of this confusion in terms of degrees of reality, according to which “the intended contrast is between the Form, F, and instances of it which are reckoned less ‘pure’ F’s than it, because they are not exclusively F, but are F and not-F: their F nature is adulterated by contrary characters, so that we could only get a confused and uncertain idea of what it is to be F.”

The ability for the philosopher to have knowledge of the Forms is explained in terms of their ontological security. Socrates asserts, “What completely is, is completely knowable.” An additional insight into the nature of Forms is thus gained with the statement that they παντελῶς ὄν: the Forms are completely, entirely, or in all the possible ways it is for one to be. A particular, on the other hand, is “what participates in both—to be and not to be—and could not correctly be addressed as either purely and simply...we can justly address it as the object of opinion.” This complete being is perhaps explained a little further when Socrates argues that the lovers of sights deny that there is any such thing as the “beautiful in itself...an idea of the beautiful itself, which always stays the same in all respects.” Whether or not this is the entirety of what Plato had in mind by παντελῶς ὄν, it can nevertheless be gathered that a Form is forever the same in every way: it is perpetually what it is.

Now Socrates had just explained that rather than defining things by their shape or colour, “[w]ith a power I look only to this—on what it depends and what it accomplishes.” The fact that Forms are completely grounds knowledge, and enables the “power” that is knowledge to accomplish its ends. The statement that “knowledge is presumably dependent on what is, to know of what is that it is and how it is”, then, offers two further insights. First, that the complete being of the Forms is what enables knowledge to be possible. The second insight gained from the description of knowledge as being dependent on what is, is that by extension, knowledge of Forms enables

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68 Vlastos, 63.
69 Republic, 477a.
70 Ibid., 478e.
71 Ibid., 479a.
72 Ibid., 477d.
73 Ibid., 478a.
knowledge as a power to accomplish (ἀπεργάζεται) an end. This latter point is not expanded on any further in Book V, and it remains to be seen what can be accomplished with knowledge and what relation this “bringing to perfection”74 bears to the Form.

III. b. 484a-511e

Book VI offers a number of further descriptions of the Forms, maintains the idea that a Form is what is, and establishes much new content in the famous Sun Simile. The discussions in this Book also elaborate upon the differences between the lovers of sights and sounds and the true lover of wisdom. In an important step, “the foundation of the philosopher’s knowledge and character is the Form of the Good. It is the greatest object of study and in virtue of their relation to it just actions and everything else become useful and beneficial.”75 An examination of the ways the Forms are described by Socrates in Book VI will provide insight into the way in which having a certain relation to the Form makes particulars become good or beneficial.

Reinforcing the descriptions of the Forms made earlier in the Republic and also in the Phaedo, Plato makes ample use of “that which is” throughout Book VI.76 New to the discussion is the suggestion that the Form fits with, and can be coupled with, the part of the human soul which grasps it, and that the two are akin. Socrates asserts:

It is the nature of the real lover of learning to strive for what is; and he does not tarry by each of the many things opined to be but goes forward and does not lose the keenness of his passionate love nor cease from it before he grasps the nature itself of each thing which is with the part of the soul fit to grasp a thing of that sort; and it is the part akin to it that is fit. And once near it and coupled with what really is, having begotten intelligence and truth, he knows and lives truly, is nourished and so ceases from his labour pains, but not before.77

74 LSJ, s.v. ἀπεργάζομαι. A. It is interesting, at this point, to note that Plato uses the same term to describe, of a painter, the act of filling out a sketch with colour, or representing a subject in a finished work of art (see LSJ, above, A. 2.).
75 Silverman, 74.
76 Republic, 486d, 486e, 490a, 490b, 494a, 500b, 501d, 505d, 507b, 508d.
77 Ibid., 490b. My italics. Cf. Symposium, 211e-212a on the approximation to a Form offering relief from labour pains through “begetting”.

Plato does not explain in any satisfying detail here what this part of the soul is, or in what way it is “akin” to the Form. The intellect is assumed, which fits with the comparable passage of *Phaedo* 65e: the true nature of everything is contemplated “most perfectly [by he] who approaches each thing, so far as possible, with the reason alone”.

At the very outset of the Book, Socrates asserts that the philosophers “are those who are able to grasp what is always the same in all respects (οἱ τοῦ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντος δυνάμενοι ἐφάπτεσθαι), while those who are not able to do so but wander among what is many and varies in all ways are not philosophers.” This quality of being always the same in all respects is by now a stock phrase for Plato, a reiteration of the description given in *Republic* 479a, and *Phaedo* 78c. The Forms always hold. The phrase is taken up again in Book VI, that the philosopher “sees and contemplates the things of the eternal and unchanging order, and, [sees] that they neither wrong nor are wronged by one another, but all abide in harmony (κόσμῳ) as reason bids.” The fact that the Forms are secure in their being unchanging provides a suitable anchor for their truth, as well as their use in serving as patterns or standards of evaluation. Socrates states that “after looking off, as painters do, towards what is truest, and ever referring to it and contemplating it as precisely as possible [the philosopher will be able] to give laws about what is beautiful, just, and good.” It is a short step from unchanging (κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἄει ἔχοντα) to most true (ἀληθέστατον) when one considers the truth as unerring, always only reporting what is the case and never anything else.

The statement here that the contemplation of what is true, absolutely, enables one to draw up suitable laws for the city as regards not only what is true, but what is beautiful, just, and good, is Plato’s first explicit endorsement of the “political value of

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78 *Phaedo*, 65e.
79 *Republic*, 484b.
80 It is found as well in *Sophist* 248a, and *Timaeus* 41d, 82b.
81 *Republic*, 500c. Cf. Bloom’s alternative translation: “He sees and contemplates things that are set in a regular arrangement and are always in the same condition…things that remain all in order according to reason.”
82 Ibid., 484c-d.
the philosopher’s knowledge” of the Forms. This knowledge can be said to contribute to certain types of actions, and the formation of a certain types of character. Employing the same language to the simile at 484c-d, Socrates mentions how the philosopher-educator would aim to shape the city by using “the divine pattern”:

I suppose that in filling out their work, they would look away frequently in both directions, toward the just, beautiful, and moderate by nature and everything of the sort, and, again, toward what is in human beings; and thus, mixing and blending the practices as ingredients, they would produce the image of man, taking hints from exactly that phenomenon in human beings which Homer too called god-like and the image of god...And I suppose they would rub out one thing and draw in another again, until they made human dispositions as dear to the gods as they admit of being. [...] The drawing would at any rate be the most beautiful that way.

In both passages (484c-d and 501b-c), Socrates describes how looking to, knowledge of, or contemplation of the Forms of beauty, justice, goodness, and moderation enables the philosopher-king to create at least similarly beautiful, just, good, and moderate instantiations—the former “painter of regimes”, in the laws of the city; and the latter painter of men, in the souls and characters of men. The Forms can function as patterns for instruction and assimilation, through the knowledge gained of them in “ever” and “frequently” contemplating them as closely as possible.

The Sun Simile of 507b-509e offers much to the examination of the nature of Forms. Socrates begins,

We both assert that there are, and distinguish in speech, many beautiful things, many good things, and so on for each kind of thing...And we also assert that there is a beautiful itself, a good itself, and so on for all the things that we then set down as many. Now, again, we refer to each

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84 *Republic*, 500e.
85 Ibid., 501b-c. One might note that in the list of Forms referenced by name to be employed by both painters as patterns, the painter of men’s characters replaces goodness with moderation. Why the laws should be good but the men moderate—if the omission is intentional—remains to be seen. Cf. *Republic*, 501c9.
86 *Republic*, 501c.
87 Ibid., 484d1, 501b2.
as a single idea, assuming it to be a unity and calling it that which each really is.  

It is here again asserted that there is a Form for all things of which there are many. Forms can be seen as the name of the ‘kind’, or, more generally, the one for each many. Socrates continues that these Forms are neither seen nor visible, but known by the intellect; and the reverse holds for particulars. Drawing out the simile of sight and light to knowing and the intellect, Socrates asks Glaucon,

Which of the gods in heaven can you point to as the lord responsible for this, whose light makes our sight see in the most beautiful way, and makes the seen things seen?  
The sun.  
…Sight, then, [is] naturally related to this god in the following way…Neither sight itself, nor that in which it comes to be—what we call the eye—is the sun.  
Surely not.  
But I suppose it is the most sunlike of the organs of the senses.  
Yes, by far.  
Does it not get the power it has as a sort of overflow from the sun’s treasury?  
Most certainly.  
And the sun isn’t sight either, is it, but as being the cause thereof is beheld by vision?  
That’s so.  
Well then, say that the sun is the offspring of the good, an offspring the good begot in a proportion with itself: as the good is in the intelligible region with respect to intelligence and what is intellected, so the sun is in the visible region with respect to sight and what is seen. 

Socrates is here setting up the argument with which he will claim two of the Forms’ most essential roles in the teleological structure of the universe: their relation to truth, and their relation to being. The outcome of the simile is expressed clearly and precisely: the Form of the good is the source of intellectual light (truth) by which humans can

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88 Republic, 507b.  
89 Ibid., 507b.  
90 Ibid., 508a-c. Plato’s description here is clearly the inspiration for Venus’ morning salutation to the sun in Shakespeare’s “Venus and Adonis”: “O thou clear god, and patron of all light / From whom each lamp and shining star doth borrow / The beauteous influence that makes him bright” (ll. 860-862).
know and by which the objects of knowledge are known. This second role is as essential to Plato’s purpose in the Sun Simile as the first. The Form of the good offers not only the human intellect the exercise of intellectual sight, but it also offers “the power of being seen”\(^\text{91}\) to particulars, providing “the truth to the things known”.\(^\text{92}\) There is thus a crucial role for particulars in the simile: it is the particular that is “illumed by truth”\(^\text{93}\). The Form, therefore, is the cause of both knowledge (in the knower) and truth (in the particular known). As such, Socrates explains, the Form of the good can itself be known, “but, as beautiful as these two—knowledge and truth—are, it is something different from them and still more beautiful than they.”\(^\text{94}\)

Following the simile through, Socrates leads Glaucon to see that plants get not only their visibility from the sun, but their sustained existence as well. For the sun not only provides what is seen with the power of being seen, but also with generation, growth, and nourishment…Therefore, not only being known is present in the things known as a consequence of the good, but also existence and being are in the things known as a result of the good, although the good isn’t being—it is still beyond being, exceeding it in dignity and power.\(^\text{95}\)

In the same way that a plant gets its generation and continued existence from the sun by means of nourishment for growth, so the Form of the good provides nourishment for growth in the particulars that participate in it by providing what they need to exist, to be. The Form is thus “the author of their being and essence.”\(^\text{96}\) As Adam comments, “The Good has been shown to be the cause of Knowledge. Socrates now proceeds to show that it is also the cause of Being. In the philosophy of Plato, Knowledge is the epistemological counterpart of Being, Being the ontological counterpart of Knowledge.”\(^\text{97}\) Accordingly, the beauty present in a beautiful particular, as a thing known, gets its essence and existence from the Form. This passage in the Republic builds

\(^{91}\) Republic, 507e.
\(^{92}\) Ibid., 508e.
\(^{93}\) Ibid., 508d.
\(^{94}\) Ibid., 508e.
\(^{95}\) Ibid., 509b.
\(^{96}\) Ibid., 509c.
\(^{97}\) Adam, n. on 509b.
on what is presented in the Phaedo, in providing one way to understand how particulars are what they are by or through the Form. It further explains how the Forms, in particular the Form of the good, have more than a regulative role in the cosmos, but rather a generative role. I shall focus on this latter role in my interpretation of participation.

The final section of Book VI comprises the Divided Line example, from which several further features of the Forms can be gleaned. Socrates reiterates that the Forms can be seen, known, and grasped only by the mind (διανοίᾳ) and not the senses.98 More specifically, the mind grasps the Forms “with the power of dialectic”, “the instrument by which the mind (νοῦς) works”.99 The exact role dialectic takes in mentally grasping the Forms is not explained in detail, however Socrates does mention that such a process will use the hypotheses, foundations, or assumptions (ὑποθέσεις) as “steppingstones and springboards (ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὁρμάς) in order to reach that which requires no assumption and is at the starting point of all”.100 Socrates concludes with the summation that as the segments of the metaphysical side of the line, being dimensions of reality, participate in truth, so do the ascending segments of the epistemological side of the line participate in clarity (σαφηνείας).101 The Forms, then, are not only more true (in a related sense that they are more real) than their respective particulars and images, but are grasped with a more clear cognitive faculty. Earlier, Socrates described those who have merely opinion and not knowledge as having eyes which are “dimmed”102—in this understanding of the visual-cognitive faculty, it is the eyes that are said to be dimmed, rather than the light, as would be a more modern understanding of vision. Nevertheless, as it is the Form which provides that which illumines the object of knowledge, a more dim understanding can be said to reflect on the

99 Adam, n. on 511b.
100 Republic, 511b. Cf. Symposium, 211c.
101 Republic, 511d.
102 Ibid., 508c7, 508d8.
object. Rather than being “mixed with darkness”, the Forms higher up on the line are brighter in light, due to their proximity of the source of all light.

III.c. 514a-541b

Book VII of the Republic reinforces this notion of Forms being “brighter” and “clearer” than their corresponding particulars. Socrates reiterates the description of a Form as “what is” (further, the Form of the good is called “the brightest part of what is” and “the best in the things that are”, “what is always”, “the things themselves”, and “the idea of”). There is also additional description of the cognitive study of the Forms as the study of “being”. Included as examples are the Forms of the good, thin, soft, hard, large, small, thick, fast, slow, beautiful, and true, and also of the finger—the first non-qualitative Form mentioned in this way. New in Book VII is the account of a Form as being not only by itself, but “by itself in its own region”, just as the sun is in a different region than the earthly objects it illuminates. Socrates asserts that it is the intellect by which the philosopher may access this region: the Forms are to be “grasped by dialectic alone”. The Forms can thus be said to exist “in logical space”, and are accessible through that kind of contemplation which is “an imitation of the faculty of vision”. The power of dialectic reasoning enables the philosopher to see—with the eye of the mind—the true, good, and beautiful themselves.
Of particular interest in Book VII is the explanation of the Form of the good as a *cause* and as “the reason for the being of each thing”, providing truth and stability to what exists. Socrates asserts,

> In the knowable [realm], the final thing to be seen, and that with considerable effort, is the idea of the good; but once seen, it must be concluded that this is in fact the cause of all that is right and beautiful in everything—giving birth in the visible world to light and being sovereign; in the intelligible, itself sovereign, being the authentic source of truth and reason—and that the man who is going to act prudently in private or in public must see it.\(^{118}\)

Following the Sun Simile, it is established in Book VII that the Form of the good’s being responsible for truth and reason is also what causes rightness and beauty in the world. Plato is here offering a teleological account of metaphysics. In the *Phaedo*, the reader is witness to the young Socrates frustrated by Anaxagoras’ unfulfilled promise to provide a reason for the being of the world, and in the *Republic*, Socrates attempts to offer just such an account. The Form of the good is the end after which the world is shaped. The account is an unusual one—why the Form of the good? One answer is that while the Form of being could provide merely for existence—for a world of things which exist—it does not specify the contents of what exists: it could be this world or any other possible world, including a world of complete disarray, lacking any regularity or order whatsoever. The Form of the good enables it to be *this* particular world, a world of goodness, which exists. Two responsibilities can therefore be identified in Socrates’ claim that the Form is the cause of everything: besides simply giving particulars their existence, it is also the cause of their nature, the *specific* way in which they exist.

The training in dialectic advocated for the philosopher-kings involves a turning of the soul towards truth, which will illuminate the nature of earthly particulars as well. Socrates states of such an education,

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\(^{117}\) *Republic*, 534b.  
\(^{118}\) Ibid., 517c.
All this activity of the arts, which we went through, has the power to release and leads what is best in the soul up to the contemplation of what is best in the things that are. [...] And, lifting up the brilliant beams of their souls, they must be compelled to look toward that which provides light for everything. Once they see the good itself, they must be compelled, each in his turn, to use it as a pattern for ordering city, private men, and themselves for the rest of their lives.\textsuperscript{119}

This discussion repeats the conception of a Form as being able to be used as a pattern found in Book VI.\textsuperscript{120} Forms qua patterns are mentioned again in Book VII, following the consideration of astronomy as a course of study, in which the arrangement of heavenly bodies is to be used as a pattern for understanding parallel arrangements.\textsuperscript{121} The intriguing aspect of Forms functioning as patterns is that the specific purpose of a pattern is to create or bring into being something at least similar or analogous to that entity from which the pattern was constructed. Knowledge of the Forms, therefore, offers two distinct benefits to the philosopher-king being discussed at this stage in the dialogue. First, from knowledge of the Forms qua patterns it follows that one will have an understanding of their corresponding particulars. As Silverman asserts, “The fact that all the elements below the Forms are logically and explanatorily dependent on them ensures that she will have greater awareness of their behaviour and nature than the nonphilosopher.”\textsuperscript{122} This elucidates why the philosophers trained in this way are best suited to rule. Second, the philosopher who can not only understand the Forms as patterns but use them as patterns as well, will actually be able to bring about further justice, goodness, and beauty in the city, in its laws, and in its citizens.

\section*{IV. CRATYLUS}

The \textit{Cratylus} emphasises the Forms’ status as independent entities, untouched by the world of changing particulars. Socrates states that the Forms “have some fixed

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{119} \textit{Republic}, 532c, 540a.
\item \textsuperscript{120} Ibid., 500e, 484c-d.
\item \textsuperscript{121} Ibid., 529d.
\item \textsuperscript{122} Silverman, 78.
\end{itemize}
reality of their own, not in relation to us nor caused by us; they do not vary, swaying one way and another in accordance with our fancy, but exist of themselves in relation to their own reality imposed by nature.”123 This independence does not, however, keep them entirely inaccessible to humans: they can be looked to as patterns for creative output. Socrates gives as example the carpenters who look to “the absolute or real shuttle” when crafting one, and “so long as they reproduce the same ideal (ἰδέαν), though it be in different iron, still the instrument is as it should be.”124 Of note in this dialogue’s contribution to understanding the nature of Forms is its explicit reference to their accounting for particulars’ good. The carpenter looks to the Form in order to secure that “in each of his products he must embody what is naturally best for each…in accordance with its nature.”125

At the end of the dialogue, Socrates twice lists various Forms, tagging onto the lists a concluding expression that indicates something of their nature. In 439c-d, he lists “…absolute beauty, or good, or any other absolute existence (καὶ ἐν ἔκαστον τῶν ὄντων ὀὐτω)”

123 Cratylus, 386d-e.  
124 Ibid., 389b, 389e-390a.  
125 Ibid., 389c.  
126 Phaedrus, 247b.  
127 Ibid., 247b-d. 

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V. PHAEDRUS

The most explicit reference to the Forms in the Phaedrus comes when Socrates describes the soul’s journey to the “vault of heaven”, where it can catch a glimpse of the immortals.126 He states, “For the colourless, formless, and intangible truly existing essence, with which all true knowledge is concerned, holds this region and is visible only to the mind, the pilot of the soul.”127 Only in Symposium 211e are Forms also referred to as colourless. The specific Forms mentioned in the Phaedrus include justice,
moderation, beauty, and—interestingly—knowledge. Of this last example, Socrates clarifies that he means to refer to “not such knowledge as has a beginning and varies as it is associated with one or another of the things we call realities, but that which abides in the real eternal absolute”. 128

The Form of beauty is afforded especial status in this dialogue, being that which “shines most clearly through the clearest of our senses; for sight is the sharpest of the physical senses…beauty alone has this privilege”. 129 That beauty is a Form accessible through the senses appears in contrast with what Socrates has just said at 247d, yet it would be a stretch to read the passage at 250c-e as referring to anything other than the Form: sweetness is surely experienced through the senses, yet it is not the Form of sweetness that is tasted; beauty, however, is apparently actually perceived. The “exceptional position” of the Form of beauty is defended strongly by Hackforth, who even amends the text at 250b to “but with beauty it is otherwise.” 130

VI. PARMENIDES

The Parmenides’ most important contribution to understanding the Forms comes in its extensive consideration of the participation relation between Forms and particulars. This discussion will be reviewed in detail in Chapter 2, §II.b., but the dialogue does offer further material regarding the nature of Forms. First, several ‘new’ Forms can be added to the list of possible Forms: likeness and unlikeness, unity and multitude, rest and motion, greatness and smallness, and equality, 131 all of which are called qualities or states (πάθη) 132 and “intellectual conceptions”, 133 alongside the familiar Forms of the good, the beautiful, and the just. The young Socrates expresses his being very much troubled about Forms for such entities as man, fire, and water, and dismisses Forms of

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128 Phaedrus, 247d-e.
129 Ibid., 250c-e.
130 Reginald Hackforth, Plato’s Phaedrus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952), 93.
131 Parmenides, 128e-129a, 129b, 129e, 131c.
132 Ibid., 129c.
133 Ibid., 129e.
mud, dirt, and hair, although Parmenides says he will get over such scruples when he is older.\footnote{Parmenides, 130c-e.} Furthermore, the idea is floated by Parmenides about whether Forms exist “in” their respective particulars, and soundly rejected on the basis of the Form’s essential unity.\footnote{Ibid., 131a-e.} In this consideration, Forms for slavery and mastership, along with the slave and the master, are mentioned and presumably accepted as Forms.

VII. \textsc{Theaetetus}

Scholars are divided as to whether there is any explicit reference to the Forms in the \textit{Theaetetus}. Robinson argues that not only is the Theory of Forms “not conspicuous” in the dialogue, but that they are irrelevant to its subject.\footnote{Richard Robinson, “Forms and Errors in Plato’s Theaetetus,” \textit{The Philosophical Review} 59:1 (1950): 3, 18. But see Winifred F. Hicken, “Knowledge and Forms in Plato’s Theaetetus,” \textit{The Journal of Hellenic Studies} 77:1 (1957): 50.} He writes contra Cornford, who, in addition to Cherniss, proposes that the absence of traditional Form-language such as that found in the \textit{Phaedo} and \textit{Republic} is meant to show how any project on knowledge cannot get on without the Forms.\footnote{F.M. Cornford, \textit{Plato’s Theory of Knowledge} (London: Kegan Paul, 1935), 28, 101, 111; Harold F. Cherniss, “The Philosophical Economy of the Theory of Ideas,” \textit{American Journal of Philology} 57:4 (1936): 449-452.} More recently, Chappell acknowledges that while Plato does make reference to “species, such as the colour white (156e), ‘hot, hard, light, sweet’ (184e), the ugly and the beautiful (190d), and the number eleven (196aff.”), it is conceivable that the theory of Forms as defended elsewhere in Plato may be “in question” in the \textit{Theaetetus}.\footnote{Timothy Chappell, \textit{Reading Plato’s Theaetetus} (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2004), 23.} If the Forms do make an appearance in this dialogue, the above list can be taken in conjunction with the range of concepts that Socrates claims are common to the senses, including colours, sounds, and tastes, and
those accessible directly by the soul or intellect, such as “being and not-being, and likeness and unlikeness, and identity and difference, and also unity and plurality”.  

VIII. TIMAEUS

One of the most explicit and longest-running descriptions of the Forms can be found in the Timaeus. The passage in which it occurs is occupied by Plato introducing the concept of the Receptacle of Becoming, and to do this he must describe how the Receptacle relates to and differs from the entities he has already mentioned briefly—that is, the Forms and the Form-copies. It is in this differentiation, however, that we get an even clearer picture of the Forms than when he discussed them earlier in the dialogue. For in 29a, he notes that if the Creator is to create good in the world, he would have fixed his gaze on “that which is self-identical and uniform (πρὸς τὸ κατὰ ταύτα καὶ ὠσαύτως).” In the Receptacle passage, however, Socrates speaks of:

the self-identical Form, ungenerated and indestructible, neither receiving into itself any other from any quarter nor itself passing anywhither into another, invisible and in all ways imperceptible by sense, it being the object which it is the province of reason to contemplate; [this compared to] a second kind which is named after the former and similar thereto, an object perceptible by sense, generated, ever carried about, becoming in a place and out of it again, perishing, apprehensible by opinion with the aid of sensation…

Beyond reiterating the aspects of the Forms’ nature discussed in the other dialogues, this passage offers an interesting insight into what the Forms cannot do: they cannot pass into another place; which means they cannot of themselves generate instances of themselves in the perceptible world. An intermediary is needed, which, in the Timaeus, is the Receptacle: Mother of the generated world.

140 Timaeus, 29a.
141 Ibid., 51e-52a.
142 Ibid., 51a.
IX. PHILEBUS

A significant contribution of the Philebus is a discussion of the essential unity of a Form. Socrates details that “man is one, or ox is one, or beauty is one, or the good is one”.\(^{143}\) He acknowledges that this invites disagreement and controversy, but insists that the kind of unity he has in mind here is different to any kind of unity one might ascribe to physical particulars. The Forms’ unity is a “unity which is not the unity of one of the things which come into being and perish…[but rather] these unities, each of which is one, always the same, and admitting neither generation nor destruction, can nevertheless be permanently this one unity.”\(^{144}\)

The Forms’ unity is said to provide the basis for their being the object of knowledge. The truest kind of knowledge, Socrates claims, is “the knowledge which has to do with being, reality, and eternal immutability”.\(^{145}\) This is contrasted with the study of the sensible world, whose students “toil to discover, not eternal verities, but transient productions of the present, the future, or the past […] spending their lives in the study of the things of this world, how it came to be, how it does things, and how it has things done to it”.\(^{146}\) Lack of fixedness makes this study inferior.

The final piece of evidence we gain in this dialogue about the Forms is that they are not only one and eternal, but “eternally the same without change or mixture”.\(^{147}\) Mixture accounts for the change relegating particulars to a ‘secondary’ status as objects of study; it is thus implied that the oneness of a Form is an elemental oneness: Forms are not compounds, for mixture merits movement.

\(^{143}\) Philebus, 15a.
\(^{144}\) Ibid., 15a-b.
\(^{145}\) Ibid., 58a.
\(^{146}\) Ibid., 59a.
\(^{147}\) Ibid., 59c.
The Symposium has enjoyed a reputation as one of Plato’s most beloved dialogues. Its dramatic form, delightful imagery, and empathetic depiction of the human experience of love—both in relation to beautiful individuals and to wisdom—contribute to its prominence. These same features, however, have also brought about some measure of trivialisation, and its philosophic merits, especially the philosophic merits of the non-Socratic speeches, have at times been questioned. Nevertheless, it is in the Symposium that Plato delivers his longest and most detailed description of a Form, the Form of beauty. An examination of the metaphysical contributions of the ascent passage in the Symposium will provide valuable insight into the nature of Forms, and indeed clarify some of the omissions and inconsistencies found in the descriptions of Forms offered in other dialogues.

At the end of Socrates’ speech on love, he recounts Diotima’s description of the intellectual-erotic development of the lover of beauty. The ascent passage depicts a progression of love and knowledge, in which “the contemplation of the whole is simply a perfection of the original erotic attraction to a single person.” This lover, if successful, will be led by love to see that “the beauty that is in any body whatsoever is related (ἀδελφός) to that in another body.” From two she sees the beauty in many and indeed in all beautiful particulars as one and the same, and with further pursuit her eyes are eventually opened to the “vast open sea of the beautiful”, which she pursues with the initial, youthful passion.

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150 Symposium, 210a-b.

151 Ibid., 210d.
At this point, in reaching the source of the beauty she has previously come to know, the lover will be able to identify one particular beauty, the contemplation of which is the ultimate aim of the earlier study. This Form of beauty is thus the object of “the philosophic science”, and the knowledge gained from its study reveals the following about the Form:

Whoever has been educated up to this point in erotics, beholding successively and correctly the beautiful things, in now going to the perfect end of erotics shall suddenly glimpse something wonderfully beautiful in its nature—that very thing, Socrates, for whose sake alone all the prior labours were undertaken—something that is, first of all, always being and neither coming to be nor perishing, nor increasing nor passing away; and secondly, not beautiful in one respect and ugly in another, nor at one time so, and at another time not—either with respect to the beautiful or the ugly—not here beautiful and there ugly, as being beautiful to some and ugly to others; nor, in turn, will the beautiful be imagined by him as a kind of face or hands or anything else in which body shares, nor as any kind of speech nor any science, and not as being somewhere in something else (for example, in an animal, or in earth, or in heaven, or in anything else), but as it is alone by itself and with itself, always being of a single form. While all other beautiful things that share in it do so in such a way that while it neither becomes anything more or less, nor is affected at all, the rest do come to be and perish.

This passage sets out, with great clarity, that the Form is: not only the object of knowledge, but the overarching object of knowledge of the many particulars that bear a relation to it; eternal; unchanging; unqualifiedly what it is, ontologically, temporally, geographically, and interpersonally; an entity without physical or any other kind of shape; not in its corresponding participants; nor in anything at all; of an autonomous existence; always unalloyed and completely one; and always immutable.

The progression of knowledge based on experience with particulars but clarified through contemplation of the Form, echoes what is described in the *Phaedo*. Similarly, as in the *Republic*, the training in the beautiful that the beginning of the

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152 Symposium, 210d-e.
153 Ibid., 210e-211b.
154 Phaedo, 74b, 74c, 75a-b.
ascent passage depicts, is based on a series of cognitive engagements with both the object of love and the degree of love. Accordingly, "[t]he key to the successive stages of the Line and Cave is not just that there is a series of objects and corresponding mental faculties, but that each is connected to the one below it by further reflection upon objects and their attendant faculties."\textsuperscript{155} The ascent to contemplation of the Form of beauty in the \textit{Symposium} involves a remarkably similar process to the moves to the higher parts of the Line in the end of Line Simile in Book VI of the \textit{Republic}: "prompted by further reflection and looking at objects in a different light or way."\textsuperscript{156}

The Form’s “always being and neither coming to be nor perishing, nor increasing nor passing away”\textsuperscript{157} is without much controversy in comparison to the accounts of Forms given elsewhere in the corpus. The notion of being “unqualifiedly” what it is, however, has been subject to debate. The four clarifications given in lines 211a3-6 offer an elaboration of the exposition put forth in the argument from recollection in the \textit{Phaedo}. Diotima’s insistence that the Form is beautiful in all respects, at all times, in all locations, and to all who behold it reinforces and expands upon the notion that Forms are unqualifiedly what they are and are in no way not what they are. One of the differences between the objects of knowledge and the objects of opinion in Book V of the \textit{Republic} is that the latter appear “as what is and as what is not at the same time.”\textsuperscript{158} The fact that this temporal qualification is only mentioned once in the seven descriptions of the in-between nature of particulars leads Silverman to surmise that “talk of respects and times is something we add to the text…Typically either there is no qualification, or Plato is very hesitant to say how something can be and not be, just as he was guarded in speaking precisely about participation in the \textit{Phaedo}.”\textsuperscript{159} This qualification, however, is clearly not unique to this one part of the \textit{Republic}, but is also

\begin{flushleft}
155 Silverman, 76.
156 Ibid., 76-77.
157 \textit{Symposium}, 211a.
158 \textit{Republic}, 478d5.
159 Silverman, 70.
\end{flushleft}
given in the elaborate description of the Form of beauty in the *Symposium*’s ascent passage.\textsuperscript{160}

Socrates’ question to Cebes in the *Phaedo* regarding whether, “when you say that Simmias is greater than Socrates and smaller than Phaedo, [do you mean to] say that there is in Simmias (ἐν τῷ Σιμμίῳ) both greatness and smallness?”\textsuperscript{161} has prompted much controversy regarding the use of the dative “in” with reference to some aspect of the Form. This controversy has been fanned particularly with reference to ethics and the reasons of love. Vlastos’ seminal essay on the individual as an object of love continues to prompt debate as to whether or not Plato’s theory of love in the *Symposium* advocates a cold, cruel, and calculating emotion according to which true love is really only love of an abstract philosophical concept and nothing to do with what is “in” and a part of the individual.\textsuperscript{162} Soble discusses problems to be had with the reverse reading: are we to love our dearest friends only for the bundle of qualities found in them?\textsuperscript{163} Diotima’s description of the Form here makes it clear that Forms are not to be thought of as being “somewhere in something”,\textsuperscript{164} it is not the Form of beauty that is in a beautiful particular. What is, however, is not quite so clear—varying accounts of beautiful particulars’ precise relation to the Form will be evaluated in the following chapter.

The description of Forms being αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ μεθ᾽ αὑτοῦ μονοειδὲς ἀεὶ ὤν, draws a potential controversy with the final argument in the *Phaedo*. In the concluding, and complicated, pages of the argument from the Form of life, Socrates presents the difficult notion of Forms bearing a manner of dual-relation to certain other Forms. “Consider three: do you not think that it must always be called both by its own name and by that of the Odd, which is not the same as three? That is the nature of three, and

\textsuperscript{160} *Symposium*, 211a.

\textsuperscript{161} *Phaedo*, 102b. My italics.


\textsuperscript{163} Alan Soble, *The Structure of Love* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990), esp. 4-18, 45-67.

\textsuperscript{164} *Symposium*, 211a.
of five, and of half of all the numbers: each of them is odd, but it is not the Odd.”

The account of the Form of beauty being “all alone by itself...always being of a single form” can be read to challenge the idea of Forms having qualities of other, different Forms. This reading would interpret μονοειδὲς as maintaining ‘always beautiful and never not beautiful (that is, never other than beautiful)’ because it is nothing other than itself: by itself and in itself.

One of the most interesting insights gained in the Republic’s description of knowledge as being dependent on what is, is that, by extension, knowledge of Forms enables knowledge as a power to accomplish (ἀπεργάζεται) an end. This “bringing to perfection” as a proper aim of the power of knowledge is not expanded on any further in Book V. Socrates states in the following Book, however:

> It is the nature of the real lover of learning to strive for what is; and he does not tarry by each of the many things opined to be but goes forward and does not lose the keenness of his passionate love nor cease from it before he grasps the nature itself of each thing which is with the part of the soul fit to grasp a thing of that sort; and it is the part akin to it that is fit. And once near it and coupled with what really is, having begotten intelligence and truth, he knows and lives truly, is nourished and so ceases from his labour pains, but not before.

While Socrates does not explain in any satisfying detail what this part of the soul is in the Republic, a reading of the climax of the ascent passage of the Symposium makes clear its nature and activity. Diotima concludes:

> What then, do we believe happens to one, if he gets to see the beautiful itself, pure, clean, unmixed, and not infected with darkness, colours, or a lot of mortal foolishness, and can glimpse the divine beautiful itself as being of a single shape? Do you believe that life would prove to be a sorry sort of thing, when a human being gazes in the direction of the beautiful and beholds it with the instrument with which he must and is together with it? Don’t you realise that only here, in seeing in the way the beautiful is seeable, will he get to engender not phantom images of virtue—because he does not lay hold of a phantom—but true, because

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165 Phaedo, 104a-b.
166 Symposium, 211b.
167 Republic, 477d.
168 Ibid., 490b. My italics.
he lays hold of the true; and that once he has given birth to and
cherished true virtue, it lies within him to become dear to god and, as
much as possible for a human being, to become immortal as well?169

The similarity between these two passages is striking. What can be understood is that
the contemplative process involved in seeing the Forms with the eye of the mind is not
simply and solely a cognitive endeavour: the love of the beautiful is as erotic as it is
rational, maintaining the ties to erôs depicted earlier in the dialogue. The achievement
of knowledge can therefore be argued to have a distinctly generative, creative, or
nurturing aspect, in the production of true beauty and true virtue in the soul, as well as
in the wider world. The following chapters will examine the possibility of just such an
account in the Symposium, according to which the Form of beauty can indeed be said to
be the cause and reason for the being of all particular beauty, through an emotive,
cognitive, and creative interpretation of participation. It is to the relation of
participation that this thesis now turns.

169 Symposium, 211d-212a. My italics.
CHAPTER II:

The Nature of Participation

Aim: To offer a review of the various ways Plato describes the nature of the relation between Forms and particulars, as presented in the dialogues; followed by a survey analysis of the state of understanding of the term in the literature.

Plato was the first to use the term ‘participation’ philosophically: building up a simple concept into the binding mechanism of his epistemology and metaphysics. In light of the fact that this concept is, for him, an attempt to explain how Forms and particulars may have any relation to each other, and appears to comprise Plato’s understanding of causation, any attempt to characterise this relation must be directed to those dialogues that provide the clearest statements of that causation. Articulating the nature of participation is difficult, because in no dialogue do we get an explicit answer from Plato. In fact, the various discussions in the corpus at times appear to give conflicting accounts. We need to exercise caution, however, in order not to extrapolate beyond what is given in the dialogues: we must not ‘Platonise’ Plato.

The first task of this chapter, set out in Section I, is therefore to present, as objectively as possible, the different ways of describing the relation(s) between Forms and particulars Plato employs in the corpus. Following this, Section II will provide an over-arching review of the state of understanding of the term in the literature. The aim of this chapter is thusly to create a background framework for understanding the role participation is given in the dialogues, which can then be taken to ascertain where the Symposium’s contribution may be placed within that framework.

I. REVIEW OF PARTICIPATION IN THE PLATONIC CORPUS

I.a. Phaedo

The *Phaedo* offers the most oft-cited and well-known passages on the participation relation. Nevertheless, each of these four passages within the single dialogue speaks to a slightly different way of understanding that relation. First, at 74d-e, Socrates and Simmias are discussing how it might be possible for us to have any idea what absolute equality is, given that nothing in the physical world is absolutely equal. Using “equal” sticks as an example, Socrates asks,

Do they seem to us to be equal in the same sense as what is equal itself? Is there some deficiency in their being such as the equal, or is there not? [...] Someone, on seeing something, realises that that which he now sees wants to be like some other reality but falls short and cannot be like that other since it is inferior…

This description of the particulars in relation to Forms is based on deficiency and lack: what we might call two ‘equal’ sticks lack true equality. The same could be said, however, for any inaccurate identification. Dogs lack what it takes to be a cat, yet it would be incorrect to call dogs ‘deficient cats’. This is because there is no causal or explanatory relation between ‘being a dog’ and ‘being a cat’; however, on Plato’s account, there is such a relation between being equal and the Form of equality itself. As he considers this relation of deficient likeness over the next Stephanus page, it becomes clear that it is not because of the likeness or similarity to the equal itself that an equal stick is equal. Rather, the likeness follows from the ontological relation. Socrates recognises that this relation is manifested in the equal object’s wanting (βούλεται), striving for (δρέγεται), or yearning (προθυμεῖται) to be like the equal itself.

Second, at 76a, the objects of perception in the world are said to “consort with” or be “associated with by similarity or difference” the absolute objects of knowledge. Grube and Cooper here translate ἐπλησίαζεν as “related to”, but the term is perhaps

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1 Phaedo, 74d-e.
2 Ibid., 74d, 75b1, 75b7.
closer to sexual intimacy than familial relation.\(^4\)

A third passage, 100c-101c, is the longest and most explicit in the *Phaedo*. Here, Socrates asserts,

> If there is anything beautiful besides the beautiful itself, it is beautiful for no other reason than that it shares in (μετέχει) that beautiful. […] I simply, naïvely, and perhaps foolishly cling to this, that nothing else makes it beautiful other than the presence of, or the sharing in (εἴτε παρουσία εἴτε κοινωνία εἴτε), or however you may describe its relationship to that beautiful we mention, for I will not insist on the precise nature of the relationship, but that all beautiful things are beautiful by the beautiful (ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι τῷ καλῷ πάντα τὰ καλὰ γίγνεται καλά). That, I think, is the safest answer I can give myself or anyone else. And if I stick to this I think I shall never fall into error. This is the safe answer for me or anyone else to give, namely, that it is through beauty that beautiful things are made beautiful (ὅτι τῷ καλῷ τὰ καλὰ γίγνεται καλά). […] [By] sharing in the particular reality in which it shares (μετασχὸν τῆς ἰδίας οὐσίας ἑκάστου οὐδὲν οἴονται οὐδὲν μετάσχον)\(^5\)

The particular beauty is beautiful by or through the Form of the beautiful, and the manner in which this is accomplished is the presence of the Form, or—to take the term Socrates uses more frequently—the particulars’ sharing in the Form. This is Socrates’ ‘safe’ answer, and he is very clear he does not intend this to be anything more than the as-yet best way he can describe the relation.

Socrates, of course, even says that this manner of explanation is only a “second best”.\(^6\) The actually best explanation can be read as a distinct fourth way of understanding participation—albeit one Socrates in this dialogue cannot describe in as much detail as he can the other three. The best explanation, he surmises, is an account of that “power which causes things to be now placed as it is best for them to be placed… the good and ‘binding’ bind which holds together all things (δέον συνδεῖν καὶ συνέχειν οὐδὲν οἴονται).”\(^7\) He admits he has not yet met a teacher who could teach him the workings of that kind of cause, and so resorts to the safer answer that participation is somehow *by or through* the Form.

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\(^4\) *Phaedo*, 76a; LSJ, s.v. ἐπλησίαζεν.
\(^5\) *Phaedo*, 100c-101c.
\(^6\) Ibid., 99c-d.
\(^7\) Ibid., 99c.
I.b. Parmenides

The Parmenides uses two terms—the μετέχω of the Phaedo and μεταλαμβάνω—presumably interchangeably to discuss the relation of participation. Parmenides and Socrates are trying to understand what the relation could possibly be. Whilst a number of scholars come to the conclusion that Parmenides and Socrates never reach a consensus, the language of the participation passages is still useful to our aim. Lines 130e-131e take for granted that particulars do in one way or another partake (μεταλαμβάνοντα) of Forms, and the relation of participation is also given the name μετάληψις here. However, Parmenides puts forward objections to a variety of suggested ways this relation might be achieved in practice.

The most famous of these hypotheses is that participation is a kind of resemblance. Socrates suggests that Forms exist in nature as patterns (παράδειγματα), and the other things resemble (ἐοικέναι) them and are imitations (ὁμοιώματα) of them; their participation (μέθεξις) in ideas is assimilation (γίγνεσθαι) to them, and nothing else.9 Parmenides, however, holds that a resemblance relation is either unfathomable or unacceptable, as resemblance implies—and, indeed, necessitates—a likeness which would lead to an infinite regress. He concludes that “it is then not by likeness (ὁμοιότητι) that other things partake of ideas [and so] we must seek some other method of participation (μεταλαμβάνει).”10 The idea of Forms standing to particulars as pattern to imitation nevertheless occurs in several other dialogues, detailed below and in §II of this chapter.

By the latter half of the dialogue, Plato appears to have opted in favour of μετέχω

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9 Parmenides, 132d.

10 Ibid., 133a. My italics.
over μεταλαμβάνω as verb of choice to describe the relation. Parmenides refers to participation in time, existence, and being as coextensive, noting that “to be” is nothing else than “participation in existence together with present time, just as ‘was’ denotes participation in existence together with past time, and ‘will be’ similar participation together with future time.”

_I.c. Phaedrus_

The _Phaedrus_ also employs the idea of particular beauties being an image (ὁμοίωμα as in 250a, or ἐναργές as in 250d) or a likeness (ἐικασθέντος as in 250b) of the Form. In these passages, the ‘original’ of such images is in all examples something ‘seen’, a visual-cognitive experience by the soul in its mythical pre- and post-mordial journeys through the heavens. This language is echoed at 251a-b: “one who has seen much in heaven—when he sees a godlike face or bodily form that has captured (μεμιμημένον) beauty well...if he weren’t afraid people would think him completely mad, would even sacrifice to his boy as if he were the image of a god.”

Of note also in the _Phaedrus_ is a singling out of the Form of beauty as distinct from other Forms. Beauty is asserted to be the only Form one can experience with the senses. For “[j]ustice and moderation do not shine out through their images down here, and neither do the other objects of the soul’s admiration... [But beauty] we grasp it sparkling through the clearest of our senses. [...] [B]eauty alone has this privilege, to be the most clearly visible and the loveliest.”

_In this dialogue, the relation of participation is not spelled out in any detail. The descriptions of how the Form of beauty literally shines out through the particular beauty, however, indicates a possible visual likeness of Form to particular—at least in the case of the Form of beauty._

_I.d. Timaeus_

The _Timaeus_ offers a unique cosmological account of Forms, particulars, and their relation. Plato writes in this dialogue that particulars are similar in likeness to the

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11 _Parmenides_, 151e-152a.
12 _Phaedrus_, 250b, 250d-e.
Form, using the example of paradigm model to copy of that model. At 39e, he states that the particular world had "been wrought in the similitude (ὁμοιότητα) of that whereunto it was being likened...He completed by moulding it after the nature of the Model (παραδείγματος ἀποτυπούμενος φῶς)". Later, Plato writes of two kinds of entity, the “Model Form (παραδείγματος εἶδος), intelligible and ever uniformly existent, and the second as the model's copy (μίμημα δὲ παράδειγματος), subject to becoming and visible." At 51e-52a, we learn that the Forms and particulars are not only of different kinds, and that the latter are "similar to" the Forms, but that they are also "named after the Former".

The suggestion that Forms may commune with particulars, or other Forms, is an attempt to explain the apparent recurrence of the Forms, the relation of 'one over many'.

Μέθεξις is again referred to in passing at 486a. Regarding a soul’s nature being

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13 Timaeus, 39c.
14 Ibid., 48e-49a. He follows with a third, the Receptacle: “A third kind we did not at that time distinguish, considering that those two were sufficient; but now the argument seems to compel us to try to reveal by words a Form that is baffling and obscure. What essential property, then, are we to conceive it to possess? This in particular—that it should be the receptacle, and, as it were, the nurse of all Becoming.”
15 Ibid., 51c-52a.
16 Ibid., 77b.
17 Republic, 476a. See n. 30 in §II, in this chapter, and n. 106 in Chapter 4, §IIIb., for the controversial suggestion that Forms may participate in one another.
philosophic or not, Socrates notes, “[Y]ou mustn’t let its partaking (μετέχουσα) in illiberality get by you unnoticed.”

The *Republic* is another dialogue that makes use of the terminology of likeness and imitation in describing the relation between Forms and particulars. The Line Simile in Book VI places the images of particulars such as animals and artefacts in an analogous parallel to Forms such that as images are to particulars, so are those particulars to Forms. Images are said to be a likeness (ἔοικεν) of particulars and when Socrates then moves to the intelligible realm, he describes how the soul “uses as images (εἰκόσιν) those things that were previously imitated (μιμηθεῖσιν).” In Book X, speaking of painters and artists as imitators of reality, Plato writes, “In my opinion he would most sensibly be addressed as an imitator (μιμητὴς) of that of which these others are craftsmen. Now tell me this about the painter. In your opinion, does he in each case attempt to imitate (μιμεῖσθαι) the thing itself in nature…?” The complex ontological relationship of images to realities will be analysed in more detail in §II.c., below.

*I.f. Sophist*

The *Sophist* presents ways of understanding how certain Forms might be related to certain other Forms, occasionally using as examples the relation between particulars and Forms. The metaphysical argument of the *Sophist* cannot be discussed in detail during this review, but what can be taken from this dialogue is the terminology Plato uses when describing these various relations. From this can be gleaned contributing ideas of what the key terms refer to in general for Plato in this and other dialogues. The description the Stranger offers at 255e-256b regarding how ideas such as sameness, other, and being interrelate sheds light on the nature of the relation of participation:

[F]or each of them is other than the rest, not by reason of its own nature, but because it partakes (μετέχειν) of the idea of the other […] [I]t exists by reason of its participation (μετέχειν) in being. […] But yet we found it was the same, because all things partake (μετέχειν) of the

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18 *Republic*, 486a.

19 Ibid., 510a.

20 Ibid., 597e-598a.
same. […] When we call it the same, we do so because it partakes (μέθεξιν) of the same in relation to itself, and when we call it not the same, we do so on account of its participation (κοινωνίαν) in the other, by which it is separated from the same and becomes not that but other, so that it is correctly spoken of in turn as not the same.\footnote{Sophist, 255e-256b.}

It can be understood from this and similar passages in the \textit{Sophist}\footnote{E.g., ibid., 253d5-e2.} that participation may carry with it or enable properties’ inherence, or an equivalent ontological condition that is satisfied through participation.

Participation is also described in the \textit{Sophist} as a kind of mingling and permeation between two or more entities, for “the classes mingle (συμμείγνυται) with one another, and being and the other permeate all things (διὰ πάντων καὶ δι’ ἄλληλων διεληλυθότε), including each other; and the other, since it participates (μέθεξιν) in being, \textit{is}, by reason of this participation (μετέσχεν), \textit{yet is not} that in which it participates (μετειληφός), but other, and since it is other than being, must inevitably be not-being.”\footnote{Ibid., 259a-b.} The details of being and otherness left aside, the text is clear that μετέχειν is the word of choice to describe a property-bringing relation of participation.

\textit{I.g. Protagoras}

In Protagoras’ speech, he tells a tale of Prometheus’ entering the temple shared by Athena and Hephaestus in order to acquire their arts for man. He describes this feat as enabling man to be a “partaker (μετέσχε) of a divine portion, [such that] he, in the first place, by his nearness of kin (συγγένειαν) to deity, was the only creature that worshipped gods”.\footnote{Protagoras, 321e-322a.} Slightly different to the second account of participation in the \textit{Phaedo}, this line suggests that the term ‘participation’ can encompass a notion of proximity or possibly familial relation. Partaking of a divine portion yields nearness to the divine, resulting in the worship of that divinity—perhaps due to the knowledge of the gods gained in that close encounter?
I. Book IX of the Laws

Book IX of the Laws offers an interesting connection between terms of participation. The Athenian Stranger asserts, “Every just action, in so far as it shares in (κοινωνή) justice, practically in the same degree partakes (μετέχον) of beauty. […] It is agreed also—if our argument is to be consistent—that a passion which shares in (κοινωνή) justice, becomes, so far, beautiful.” 25 It is generally assumed that κοινωνεῖν and μετέχειν are to be understood interchangeably as, respectively, ‘to share in’ and ‘to participate in’. If this is the case, it is startling—in light of the Phaedrus’ claim to beauty’s uniqueness with regard to its manner of perceptibility, discussed above—to find that all just actions are also beautiful.

II. REVIEW OF PARTICIPATION IN THE LITERATURE

A number of verbal trends can be identified in the above texts, and three broad clusters of interpretation have emerged in the scholarly literature within attempts to flesh out the nature of the participation relation. In this section, I will first review the descriptive principles of the relation as described in the texts, and then analyse these interpretation clusters in order to provide a background framework for the understanding of participation which I argue Plato offers in the Symposium.

The language of the Phaedo, especially in 100a-102e, takes up two Greek terms—μέθεχις and μετέχειν—to refer to a specific type of partaking. These two related terms are the most frequent Plato uses to indicate the relation, and are what some scholars assert is Plato’s favoured terminology for the name of the relation between Forms and particulars. 26 The terms derive from the μετά- stem, often translated “in common with” or “in the midst of”, and, in compositional words, the more dynamic “in pursuit of”. 27 A suitable translation for the verb form would therefore be ‘to have in common

25 Laws, 859e.
with’ or ‘to be in relationship with’; and for the noun form, ‘a state of having in common with, or of being related to’, and, possibly by inference, ‘of dependence upon’. It is therefore a slightly different connotation to ‘partaking’ in the sense of owning a portion of a larger whole—such as, for example, taking up a part of a bench by sitting on it. This would not only indicate a limited quantity to be taken up, but also, as Parmenides explains in the eponymous dialogue at 131b-c, that the Form would be divided into those parts taken up by each participant, thereby losing its essential oneness. The temptation to think of μέθεχις as ownership ought perhaps be avoided.

The other common term employed in describing the relation is the community or communion (κοινωνία) of Forms and particulars, and between Forms. The possibility of Forms participating in each other will not be discussed in any great detail here. I will say that if Plato does admit of Forms communing with each other, it is almost certainly a substantially different mechanism than what must go on between Forms and particulars.28 When, in the Republic, Socrates speaks of the ἀλλήλων κοινωνία of Forms with each other, I read this as at least referring to such statements we find throughout the corpus as “the Good is beautiful”,29 though whether Forms are or have qualities such as beauty is a topic for a different time. Attempts to avoid this possibility, however, are rife and at times controversial.30 It is nevertheless clear from the Republic and Phaedo that a community or communion exists between Forms and particulars. The term can refer to partnerships and associations of varying kinds between individuals—including marital and sexual, as between lovers in the Symposium—and, also in the Symposium, between gods and men.31 Of note here is that communion implies that the Form is, at least initially, external to the particular with which it is in communion.

28 See also n. 106 in Chapter 4, §III.b.
29 James Adam, The Republic of Plato (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1902), ad loc. 476a. See also, e.g., Laws, 859e; Meno, 98e.
30 Take, e.g., the above ἀλλήλων κοινωνία at 476a: Charles Badham emends it to ἀλλῇ ἄλλων (see H.H. Berger, Ousia in de Dialogen van Plato: een terminologisch onderzoek (Leiden: Brill, 1961), 88, n. 1; and Ingram Bywater, “Two Passages in Plato’s Republic,” The Journal of Philology 5 (1874): 122, to ἀλλ’ ἄλλων; but cf. Paul Shorey, The Unity of Plato’s Thought (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1903), 162, n. 244, who argues against this trend with reference to the philosophic implications of such emendations.
31 LSJ, s.v. κοινωνία, A.I., A.II.; Symposium, 209c, 188c.
Plato also speaks of particulars being named after the Form.\textsuperscript{32} Allen acknowledges that sharing a name alone need not point to any actual connection (one can call any number of objects by the same name and be wrong about their having any such connection), but rather the repetition and specification of this phrasing in the \textit{Phaedo} indicates Plato has an especially intimate connection in mind: a “derivative designation” underscoring the particular’s dependence upon the Form for its individual existence.\textsuperscript{33}

Another noteworthy phrase from the above review is the presence of the Form in a given particular.\textsuperscript{34} This must be distinguished from the Form itself being in the particular, which Plato has Parmenides reject at 131a4-c7, and Diotima at \textit{Symposium} 211a, although Fine defends that Forms are, in fact, taken to be in particulars in the \textit{Phaedo}.\textsuperscript{35}

While not terms for the relation itself, these latter two descriptions do reveal the close association between Forms and particulars: close enough for the two to be epistemologically associated in name, and even ontologically associated. However, none of these terms and phrases—participation or sharing in, community, being named after, nor having the presence of—specify how or why the two are so related. As Brann, speaking of the terminology of the \textit{Parmenides} and \textit{Phaedo}, laments, they “do not reveal what the appearances can have in common with beings, or why they merit being named after beings, or how the beings can be present in them.”\textsuperscript{36} Accordingly, a number of interpretive solutions have been offered in the literature, in attempts to explain the nature of the participation relation. The following three interpretations represent the most widely accepted relations in which Forms stand to particulars.

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\textsuperscript{32} \textit{Phaedo}, 78e2, 103b, 103c; cf. \textit{Republic}, 596a7; \textit{Sophist}, 240a; \textit{Cratylus}, 439a.


\textsuperscript{34} \textit{Phaedo}, 100c-d.


II.a. Original to copy

The vast majority of views in the literature depict participation as that relation by which an image, imitation, or copy gains its existence through an original model or standard that serves as cause. Within this interpretive cluster arise two—in some respects overlapping—variations of this interpretation. Forms can be understood as (1) paradigm cases to standard instances. Patterson here employs as example the ancient architectural practice of paradigm columns built by a master architect to be copied as perfectly as possible by his masons. Plato uses a similar example in the Cratylus: “What has the carpenter in view when he makes a shuttle? Is it not something the nature of which is to weave?” This example captures well what Socrates appeared to hold as an important use of a Form: to employ the Form as a standard in judgements of approximation. While particular instances of beauty are only qualifiedly beautiful—that is, beautiful from one respect, or in one time, but not another—the Form of beauty is always unqualifiedly so. The closer or more accurate or correct (ὀρθός) the image copy is to the paradigm, the more excellent (or beautiful, or just, or courageous) the particular. The notion of proximity is conducive to the echelons of erôs in the Symposium, and accordingly functions well in moral and ethical approximations of human individual particulars to Forms. When considering artefacts, and inanimate natural objects, the received view is to ascribe the causal power—now read as an intentional power—to the creator of the artefact, who more or less succeeds in bringing about a close degree of approximation in the object.

The problem of “perfect particulars” arises in simple subjects such as weights and measures as quantities, where there appears to be no difference between Form and

38 Cratylus, 389a. See also Timaeus, 28b.
particular.\footnote{On which, see D.M. Armstrong, \textit{Nominalism and Realism: Volume 1: Universals and Scientific Realism} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 78-79; Sarah Broadie, \textit{Nature and Divinity in Plato's Timaeus} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 69-70, 74-75.} Take, for example, the geometrical forms (circles, triangles) or the measure of one metre. On some readings, the solution which helps save the paradigm case interpretation from this problem—that the original Form conceived of prior to the existence of the perfect particular is of a different \textit{kind}, variously construed, than the particulars—throws it into the path of self-exemplification or self-predication predicaments.\footnote{Patterson, 14-15.} So even if the space of the distance measured by one metre is of a different kind to the Form of one metre, on this reading, the latter must nevertheless be itself one metre in regress-inducing fashion. However, I would argue, it is far from clear that quantities such as these are explained through participation or that they are even objects at all.

A second branch of the Original to Copy interpretation understands Forms as (2) \textit{patterns towards which the particular strives}.\footnote{Advocates of this branch include Patterson; Bruce Thomas Lidsten, “Plato on Participation: An Examination of the Relation between Forms and Particulars” (MA diss., McMaster University, 1979), 82. Cf. Allan Silverman, \textit{The Dialectic of Essence: A Study of Plato’s Metaphysics} (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002), 52; and David Sedley, “Form-Particular Resemblance in Plato’s Phaedo,” \textit{Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society} 106:1 (2006): 324-326, 366, who argue against this view precisely because they take any such striving to be purely metaphorical. I address this objection in Chapter 4, §IV.} This view originates in the \textit{Parmenides}, when the young Socrates suggests as a way of explaining the Forms that they “are, as it were, patterns fixed in the nature of things (\textit{παραδείγματα ἐστάναι ἐν τῇ φύσει}). The other things are made in their image and are likenesses (\textit{ὁμοιώματα}).”\footnote{\textit{Parmenides}, trans. F.M. Cornford, in \textit{The Collected Dialogues of Plato}, eds. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961), 132d.} The language of striving to be like this pattern can be found most clearly in the \textit{Phaedo}.\footnote{\textit{Phaedo}, 74d, 75b1, 75b7.} On this reading, Forms can be taken as blueprint structures, laws of nature, formal aspects, or guiding forces.\footnote{Baron Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, “Platonic Natural Science in the Course of History,” \textit{Main Currents in Modern Thought} 29 (1972): 8, who explains the Forms as laws of nature “which describe the optimal functions” of the particular. For guiding forces, see Patterson, 16.} The major source of contention with this interpretation, however, is that it must provide a satisfactory account of how these internal directors contend with the soul as a guide for self-motion, an account absent from the dialogues in question.

\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{On, e.g., see John Drury, \textit{Nominalism and Realism: A Brief History} (London: Routledge, 2007), 103-104.} The paradigm case interpretation of participation is that the original Form conceived of prior to the existence of the perfect particular is of a different \textit{kind}, variously construed, than the particulars—throws it into the path of self-exemplification or self-predication predicaments.
\item \footnote{Patterson, 14-15.} For example, the geometrical forms (circles, triangles) or the measure of one metre. On some readings, the solution which helps save the paradigm case interpretation from this problem—that the original Form conceived of prior to the existence of the perfect particular is of a different \textit{kind}, variously construed, than the particulars—throws it into the path of self-exemplification or self-predication predicaments. So even if the space of the distance measured by one metre is of a different kind to the Form of one metre, on this reading, the latter must nevertheless be itself one metre in regress-inducing fashion. However, I would argue, it is far from clear that quantities such as these are explained through participation or that they are even objects at all.
\item \footnote{Advocates of this branch include Patterson; Bruce Thomas Lidsten, “Plato on Participation: An Examination of the Relation between Forms and Particulars” (MA diss., McMaster University, 1979), 82. Cf. Allan Silverman, \textit{The Dialectic of Essence: A Study of Plato’s Metaphysics} (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002), 52; and David Sedley, “Form-Particular Resemblance in Plato’s Phaedo,” \textit{Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society} 106:1 (2006): 324-326, 366, who argue against this view precisely because they take any such striving to be purely metaphorical. I address this objection in Chapter 4, §IV.} A second branch of the Original to Copy interpretation understands Forms as (2) \textit{patterns towards which the particular strives}. This view originates in the \textit{Parmenides}, when the young Socrates suggests as a way of explaining the Forms that they “are, as it were, patterns fixed in the nature of things (\textit{παραδείγματα ἐστάναι ἐν τῇ φύσει}). The other things are made in their image and are likenesses (\textit{ὁμοιώματα}).” The language of striving to be like this pattern can be found most clearly in the \textit{Phaedo}. On this reading, Forms can be taken as blueprint structures, laws of nature, formal aspects, or guiding forces. The major source of contention with this interpretation, however, is that it must provide a satisfactory account of how these internal directors contend with the soul as a guide for self-motion, an account absent from the dialogues in question.
\end{itemize}
The abstract structure or pattern that comprises a Form may delineate specifically the shape or blueprint of a thing in such a way that “a pattern or structure might be a separate, independent, abstract object embodied in or conformed to by things or motions in this world, but neither literally present to them nor guiding them in any sense from the inside.”

Defended in the literature, this view enables the Forms to be of a different type of, for example, beauty than particular beautiful objects, while still being able to be a standard for evaluation and assimilation-production, as in the case of the craftsman. This interpretation may have the virtue of avoiding difficulties relating to self-predication regresses. Patterson asserts,

> Notice that their use as standards would not be based on similarity to their embodiments with respect to being F. Classification and evaluation of participants would turn not on similarity in respect F to a standard instance, but on the extent to which some structure is realized in a worldly participant.

When conceived as a blueprint—or, following Broadie, a recipe—the Form would not have to be beautiful in the same way the many beautiful particulars are, and hence would not need to be categorised with them in lists of the Third Man Argument (TMA) sort. Participation on this branch would involve striving to realise this pattern in the sensible world. The difficulty, and the drawback, of this interpretation, however, is that it must yet explain what the similarity relation between the two types is. What does it mean other than similarity if it is the same structure that is realised in the many different instantiations?

### II.b. Contagion agent to phenomenon

A second interpretation of the participation relation is presented in the *Phaedo* and gains support in the *Parmenides*. Scaltsas considers the “contagion model of
“explanation”, which gets its basis from the aim of answering the question: ‘Why are things F?’ This model illustrates the relationship between Forms and particulars as that between a contagion source and the phenomenon that contracts a condition from the source. Socrates asserts in the *Phaedo*: “Nothing else makes it [a beautiful sensible] beautiful except that beautiful itself, whether by its presence or communion or whatever the manner and nature of the relation may be…it is by the beautiful that all things are beautiful.” The answer to the question (that a thing gets its F-ness *from* the Form) expresses a similar relation to the previous models of explanation. Where it differs is in the question asked. The two Original to Copy explanations describe merely the way in which the two were related, whereas the contagion model describes *how* they came to be related as well.

A virtue of this model is that it provides a possible answer to the TMA: as things cannot infect themselves, the Form does not become another entity of the same ontological type as a particular (an admission that begins the TMA’s infinite regress) even though both are beautiful and in some way share the property of being beautiful. Further, the contagion model is compatible with the useful features of the perfect exemplar or paradigm case. Scaltsas asserts, “As a perfect exemplar, the Form is the realisation of the necessary and sufficient condition for being *f*. Participation in a Form in this case is *resembling* the Form, which does secure that the thing possess what it takes to be *f*.” When this model is considered alongside the contagion model, it becomes clear that the latter can include the Form both as the origin of *f*-ness as well as its paradigm case. Scaltsas acknowledges that while both are clearly different, “the latitude is Plato’s, since he explicitly explores both…[when he] gives two versions of the TMA regress in the first part of the *Parmenides* (132a-b, 132d-133a)…” Where the contagion model comes into difficulty, however, is in presupposing identity to

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52 *Phaedo*, 100c-d.
53 Scaltsas, 73.
54 Ibid., 73.
secure attribute predication, without grounding identity in the first place.\textsuperscript{55} Where f-identity would have made the particular f subject to the TMA, it also is required as what follows from contracting a condition of f-ness from the Form.

\textit{II.c. Source to similar image}

Of importance to several aspects of the above interpretations is the idea that particulars are, in one way or another, similar to, images of, or imitative of the Forms.\textsuperscript{56} But can we take Plato at his word here? As Socrates learns from Parmenides, if particulars are like the Forms, then the Forms ought be like the particulars—a concession which, as noted earlier, can be taken to lead to the various regress of self-predication, self-exemplification, and Third Men.\textsuperscript{57} Plato very clearly acknowledges this in \textit{Parmenides} 132d, in which Parmenides says similarity is precisely not how Forms relate to particulars for the very reason that it would in fact shatter the essential unity of the Form in question. If Plato was aware of this difficulty, why then does the terminology of imitation and similarity crop up so frequently in the dialogues?

I propose that we might mistake his intention behind drawing attention to a particular being an imitation. There are, of course, two ways to think about similarity. First, as an indication of likeness read as closeness to each other. When the avant-garde vexillographer remarks that the flags of Luxembourg and the Netherlands are ‘similar’, she does so to emphasise their small degree of difference (and perhaps express some disdain). A second view of similarity, however, expresses an acknowledgment of underlying difference. So when the geography student makes the same remark, he might be expressing his angst regarding confusing the two in the exam for the reason that they are so alike. The root point of his concern, however, is that they are, \textit{in fact}, different. Confusing the two would be to get the question wrong because Luxembourg’s flag is \textit{not} that of the Netherlands. On this second view, noting a similarity is, at least in part, always to emphasise the contrast between two. If the two flags were actually the

\textsuperscript{55} Scaltsas, 89.
\textsuperscript{56} This is evident most clearly in \textit{Phaedrus} 250a, \textit{Phaedo} 74e, \textit{Timaeus} 39e, and, above all, \textit{Republic} 510b.
\textsuperscript{57} \textit{Parmenides}, 132d; \textit{Republic}, 597c, 597e. Fine [\textit{On Ideas}], 214, argues that the resemblance regress and the TMA are “logically the same argument.”
same—as those of Chad and Romania are—he would not say they are similar, but rather identical. Whether Plato speaks of a similarity between Form and particular, he is abundantly clear that the two are not identical. This may be the latent truth of Theaetetus’ insistence in the *Sophist* that an image fashioned in the likeness of an original is “[n]ot a true one by any means, but only one like the true.”

### II.d. Binding causal power

While each of these three descriptions above illuminates certain aspects of Plato’s theory of Forms and how they relate to their respective particulars, the question has endured largely on the basis of a lack of satisfaction: defendable interpretations might describe the relation but fall short of explaining how, precisely, the mechanism of participation works. As I argue in Chapter 4, a discussion in Book VI of the *Republic* offers a portrayal of the realm of the Forms that illuminates the relationship most compatibly with the *Symposium*. In the Sun Simile, Socrates demonstrates how plants get not only their visibility from the sun, but also their sustained existence. The Form functions as “the author of their being and essence” by providing what the particular needs in order to exist. Just as the original can be said to be the author and cause of being for a reflection mirrored, so does it bind the reflection to reality, to what is real, to what exists before it: the reflection cannot be without it. Similarly, the beauty of a beautiful particular obtains its essence and existence from the Form, and—crucially—from the particular’s participation in that Form. Participation can thus be understood as a causal bond. But how is this bond forged?

In his exhaustive treatment of participation, Bigger argues that participation names the relation “which accounts for the togetherness of elements of diverse ontological type in the essential unity of a single instance.” This interpretation takes into account the community alluded to in the *Phaedo*, *Republic*, and *Symposium*. While the second-best solution in the *Phaedo* was to explain that a beautiful particular is beautiful

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58 *Sophist*, 240b.
59 *Republic*, 509c. See also Adam, *Republic*, n. 8 ad loc.
because of the beautiful itself; and in the Sun Simile of the Republic, the Form of the
good nurtures and sustains the sensible world; the Symposium takes as its sole focus a
human togetherness that Plato turns into the motivating force of philosophy and the
source of all generation. The “greatest problem” of participation is to explain “how the
eidos drops down from the context of being to become entangled with non-being in a
new and world-making way—how there can be an eidos incarnate (Phaedrus 251a).”61
That bond of entanglement, I shall argue, is love.

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61 Brann, 36.
CHAPTER III:
Erôs in the Symposium

Argument: The love Plato presents in the Symposium is of a different sort than appetitive emotion. It is an aesthetic and intellectual attraction, which has as its object the generation of beauty.

The Symposium is no exception to Guthrie’s apt resolution that Plato did not write “sober treatises”; rather, he chose to impart his philosophy through dramatic, interpersonal dialogues “with a consuming interest not only in ideas but in people.”¹ It would be strange indeed, then, if his dialogue on erôs would prove an abandonment of the human elements of familial, interpersonal, and romantic love as normally construed. Plato has come under much scrutiny for the account of erôs he puts forward in the Symposium. In constructing a definition of love—a delineation of its ways and powers—Plato is true to form regarding his view that definitions are “essential to successful investigation”.² Keeping this focus will be imperative to being able to answer more complicated, second-order questions about love. Accordingly, this chapter sets out to “tell the truth about love”³ and unpack what Plato means by erôs.⁴

This chapter will first offer a textual analysis of Socrates’ speech, which will detail the nature of Platonic erôs in the Symposium. Second, the motivating force of erôs will be examined and found to have a distinctly cognitive nature: the love Plato presents in

³ Symposium, 199b.
⁴ In this thesis, I refer to both erôs the emotion, and Erôs the daimon. When speaking specifically of the latter, I will capitalise the proper noun.
the *Symposium* is of a different sort than appetitive emotion. It has an orientation to reality, and is an intellectual love. Third, this chapter will review a number of competing interpretations regarding the objects and aims of love, and present an argument as to what it is exactly that love is ‘of’: bringing to birth in beauty. Finally, the chapter locates the erôs of the *Symposium* within Plato’s theory of desire. Taking the object of love to be not beauty but the creation of beauty will provide a defence of the use of the English term ‘love’ as a suitable translation of the Greek ἔρος, taking into particular account the on-going debate instigated by Vlastos’ seminal critique of Platonic erôs as having little to do with interpersonal love as normally experienced.

By positing a cognitive reading of erôs, this chapter shall argue that erôs in relation to the beautiful requires an inexhaustible commitment to coming to know beauty itself, a commitment which is not only manifest in but requires the creation and nurture of beauty in the sensible world, and ultimately, in oneself through the cultivation of a beautiful soul. Far more than an encouragement to armchair reflection, Plato’s aim in the ascent passage of the *Symposium* is an inducement to a fruitful way of life, whereby the desire to possess is to be understood as a desire to bring forth.

**I. THE TRUTH ABOUT ERÔS**

I.a. Diotima and the origin of Love

A significant area of controversy in the literature regards the conative nature of erôs: is the love Plato has in mind desiderative, appropriative, and appetitive? Is it “the frenzy-thrill, the fever-pain” depicted by Euripides?\(^5\) Does it differ in kind from the sort

of emotion we feel towards food, money, or power? A textual analysis of Socrates’ speech will aim to place Platonic erôs within its intended sphere of emotion theory.

At the outset of his speech, Socrates asserts that erôs “is the love of something” and that it “desires this something” of which it is. The focus here on the object makes evident the complex relational quality love maintains: love cannot be fully understood apart from its object, because a specific type of relation is essential to its nature. In the transitional interlude between Socrates and Agathon, the two come to an agreement that “Erôs is love, first of all, of some things, and secondly, of whatever things the need for which is present to him.” As will be shown in more detail in §III, below, the precise nature of what love is “of” was a source of confusion for Agathon and the younger Socrates. The older Socrates, however, wishes to set the record straight about love and, after reducing Agathon to a similar state of lack as Erôs, Socrates lets him free and begins his speech.

Rather than give a monologue as the others had done, Socrates famously defers to a recitation of a series of conversations he had with a tutor of his, the priestess Diotima of Mantinea. Whether the woman who taught Socrates how to love is real or fictional is perhaps lost to history, and her inclusion in the dialogue has caused no end of speculation as to Plato’s purposes in choosing her as his primary mouthpiece in this dialogue. Contrary to his interlocutors’ previous speeches, Socrates asserts that Erôs is

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* Symposium, 200a. Desire, here is ἐπιθυμεῖ. Socrates’ question to Agathon on this point is reminiscent of his similar discussion with Menexenus at Lysis 218d regarding whether a friend is the friend of someone or not.
8 Symposium, 200e. My italics.
lacking in beauty, though is not necessarily ugly, and that it is for this reason that Erôs longs for, strives after, and cunningly plots to trap the beautiful wherever he can find it. The genealogy given by Diotima details the reasons for his character. “Conceived after a wild and debauched drinking party (a parodic heavenly counterpart to the all-too-human and yet self-controlled symposium reported in the dialogue),”10 Erôs was born of two quite different parents, Need and Resource. His mother, Penia, was the spirit of poverty and need. Literary accounts of Penia report her as intractable, conniving, and with a “wild tragic look in her eyes.”11 Despite her poverty, according to the historical Aristophanes, Penia was indeed clever, and you required “all your wits” to beat her in logical argument.12 His father, Poros, was the spirit of resource and the means required for the accomplishment of goals. Indeed, the word poros, with the privative prefix a, means not only the same thing as penia but the difficulty or perplexity that is provided by a contradiction in an argument. An aporia arises at the point in an argument when the interlocutor contradicts himself and must look for a solution but does not know quite how to do so. He is literally without resource.13 Plato mentions Poros’ mother, Metis, who was the goddess of good counsel, cunning, and planning, and maintains a maternal relation to the goddess of wisdom, Athena. From his father, Erôs received his proclivity for “weaving intrigues”, his love of wisdom, and his schemes to “trap the beautiful and the good.”14 In accordance with his lineage, then, Erôs’ neediness is cleverly and artfully employed, and, because of his being

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12 Plutus, 487.
14 Symposium, 203d.
conceived on Aphrodite’s birthday, he maintains a relationship with her. Erôs is not, however, in love with this divine mistress. He attends to and follows Aphrodite, but “his main attention is directed elsewhere”, as shall be evident given one further facet of his inheritance. For it is due to his parentage that Erôs is not a god, but a daimon: neither mortal nor immortal, Erôs is in between, and in the same manner possesses neither ignorance nor wisdom, as what is “supplied to him is always gradually flowing out.” Diotima completes the comparison by asserting Erôs to be therefore a philosopher, in love with wisdom as it is one of the most beautiful things to behold, and accordingly in between being wise and being ignorant. As Diotima’s story unfolds, the convictions of erôs explain the inner means of fulfilling those desires that lead one to action, and, even more so, to the creative life of philosophy.

Being a daimon, Erôs fills a gap between the mortal and the immortal. “Erôs is an intermediary. So also is Socrates, whose task it is to convey the wisdom of the priestess Diotima to the company at the party.” If this image is intentional, as I argue it is, it is a possible explanation as to why Plato, first of all, has Socrates introduce a new character to the dialogue, and, second, why she is a priestess—she has contact with the immortals. As Cicero writes of Socrates, he was “the first to bring philosophy down from the heavens and put it into the cities with people and to make it ask questions about life and about right and wrong.” The similarities between Socrates and the Erôs portrayed in the dialogue are well-documented: both are shoeless, poor, always fluttering around the beautiful (even “lying in ambush, as a habit”), clever and

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19 Symposium, 203d, 220b.
20 Ibid., 203c; Apology, 38a-b.
21 Symposium, 203d, 206d, 213b, 216d, 223a.
cunning,22 courageous,23 portrayed as a daimonic half-man, half-god,24 between beautiful and ugly,25 skilled in a kind of poison,26 and the archetypical philosopher—between being wise and being without understanding.27 Socrates even manages to be like a daimon in mediating between lover and beloved in “seeming to be a lover (ἐραστής) while really establishing himself as a beloved boy (παῖς) instead”,28 as Alcibiades wistfully complains.

Now Socrates, reciting his conversation with Diotima, continues with the discussion that mortal nature is conscious of its own transience. Once one dies she is very likely soon forgotten. The way to conquer this loss is through immortality, a manner in which “that which is departing and growing old leaves behind another young thing that is as it was.”29 It is in this way that the old shares in immortality through that which was generated and remains. Erôs, then, and its lovers, are completely consumed with the immortal—those who pursue erôs in some way seek their own immortality.30 Erôs longs for the immortality of his father, and because “he is by nature a lover in regard to the beautiful”, attends to Aphrodite and follows after the beautiful.31 His

22 Symposium, 203d, 213c.
23 Ibid., 203d, 212b, 219d.
24 Ibid., 202d-203a, 215b, 219c, 221d.
25 Ibid., 203c-d, 216a-217a.
26 Ibid., 203c1, 217e-218a.
27 Ibid., 203e-204b, 177d, 212b; Apology, 21d, cf. 21b; Meno, 80d. Given the above, one is reminded of Dante’s (La Vita Nuova, trans. Reynolds, Sonnet 9) description of personified Love:

As I rode forth one day not long ago,

Pensive about my journey and distressed,

I met Love, like a traveller, humbly dressed,

Coming along my path, forlorn and slow.

He might have been a monarch dispossessed.


29 Symposium, 208b.
30 Interestingly, in the Charmides, 156d, Socrates states that he received the idea of moderation, the great virtue of the Symposium as noted at 209a, from a doctor who was known for being able to make men immortal.
31 Symposium, 203c.
servitude to Aphrodite is explained by the fact that he was conceived during her birthday party—love and beauty enter the world together—but his longing after immortality and the beautiful comes from his parents. Socrates asserts that erôs is not the love of the beautiful,\textsuperscript{32} but that erôs is “love in relation to the beautiful”.\textsuperscript{33} The fact that Plato employs the accusative rather than the genitive case when explaining the relationship of Erôs to the beautiful is a significant, yet oft-ignored, issue which will be examined in more detail in §§III.a-b., below.

Although Erôs lacks and is in need of beauty, this is not what he actually desires. Socrates asks Diotima, “Of what use is erôs for human beings?”\textsuperscript{34} Diotima explains that this question can be answered by investigating “in what manner and in what activity would the earnestness and intensity of those who pursue the good be called erôs?”\textsuperscript{35} What in fact are they doing when they so act? She answers, “Their deed is bringing to birth in beauty both in terms of the body and in terms of the soul.”\textsuperscript{36} Everyone, she espouses, is at some point pregnant, and their nature desires to bring to birth. Erôs, then, is not of the beautiful, but of what it does to the lover: it releases her from labour pains and initiates her bringing to birth in beauty.\textsuperscript{37} Because conception and generation are in the business of “leaving behind another that is young to replace the old”,\textsuperscript{38} an engendering is the way in which human nature is capable of attaining immortality. This “engendering” is the result of a man and a woman being together.\textsuperscript{39} Bringing to birth in beauty is the expected result of the coming together of man and woman, man and virtue, and finally, man and Kallone.\textsuperscript{40} It is on this foundation of coupling that Diotima

\textsuperscript{32} Symposium, 201c5 (τῶν καλῶν), 206c2–4 (ἐστιν γὰρ οὐ τοῦ καλοῦ ὁ ἔρως, ὡς σοὶ οἴει).
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., 203c (ἀμα φύσει ἐραστὴς ὄν περὶ τὸ καλὸν), 204b3 (Ἐρως δ᾿ ἐστὶν ἔρως περὶ τὸ καλὸν). Cf. Dover [Symposium], 142 ad loc.
\textsuperscript{34} Symposium, 204c.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., 206a.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., 206b.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., 206c.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., 207d.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., 206c. There is nothing in the dialogue to indicate Plato thought philosophy was only possible for men, of course. While those pregnant in body hoping to produce human children must each be of different sexes, the second two levels’ description as being of male-female coupling is purely metaphorical.
\textsuperscript{40} “Μοῖρα οὖν καὶ Ἐιλείθυια ἡ Καλλονὴ ἐστὶ τῇ γενέσει”, Symposium, 206d. Kallone is a cult name of Artemis-Hecate (Seth Benardete, Plato’s Symposium, (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 37, n. 17). On the goddess, see Hermann Usener, Kleine Schriften, vol. 4, Arbeiten zur Religionsgeschichte
describes what is brought to birth by such lovers. In so doing, she constructs a series of levels of erotic activity, each below the next in dignity and difficulty: the so-called ladder of love.\textsuperscript{41}

\textit{I.b. The ladder of love}

The base level of erôs is that of the physical. “Pregnant in terms of their bodies”,\textsuperscript{42} these men and women look to each other for the satisfaction of their immortal desires through the only thing they know to be like it—the satisfaction of transitory, physical desires. These lovers toil to achieve for themselves “an immortal remembering of their virtue”: the child.\textsuperscript{43} Similar in stature and feature to his parents, this heir will provide for his progenitor the opportunity to further that name. This kind of erôs draws one to the beautiful body, and to the production of children. As a means to obtain immortality, two technical issues immediately draw attention to the insufficient and superficial nature of this manner of begetting. First, although one produces children, and can see the furtherance of her name for, perhaps, the next eighty years of her child’s life, it is either illogical or ignorant to suppose that the span of a genealogy will be in any degree eternal. The product of this begetting is only another mere human. A second difficulty is that it is not nature that establishes one’s heirs, but human law. Determining who is legally a part of which family is a matter for the Athenian courts.
An ordained marriage, not merely the begetting of children, discerns legitimate offspring from the illegitimate. 44 This lowest level of love is, then, concerned with the immediate and present, and produces that which lasts barely longer. As the lover’s primary erotic longings are fulfilled, the tangible result is that the drive required to ascend the ranks of erōs is exhausted. 45

Diotima next makes a specific distinction in kind (signalled by “Οἱ μὲν ὁὖν ἐγκύμονες κατὰ τὰ σῶματα…οἱ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ψυχήν”) between those pregnant in the body and those of the next level of erōs: those who are “pregnant in terms of the soul.” 46 She explains that what is appropriate for the soul is “prudence and the rest of virtue,” 47 namely, wisdom, courage, and justice. The lover now turns to the beautiful soul, and, full of desire to give birth in beauty thereof, spills over in and through exhortation and instruction. His offspring is tutored in the virtuous life. Diotima asserts that the one pregnant in soul will seek out as a partner not merely a beautiful body, but “if he meets a beautiful, generous, and naturally gifted soul, he cleaves strongly to the two (body and soul) together.” 48 The poets, the inventive craftsmen, and even the statesmen are included as examples of those who long for the satisfaction of generating these virtues through their seed of literary, material, and political work. To their students these lovers espouse their ideals of “what sort the good man must be and what he must practice,” 49 as part of their education in virtue. Whereas the physical body, being mortal, is seemingly irrational in the vain attempt to procreate eternally; the soul, as of an intangible nature, is a better fit for the discussion and production of prudence and justice. An interesting aspect of this second level of erōs is when Diotima explains that this kind of lover:

45 Neumann, 51.
46 Symposium, 208e-209a
47 Ibid., 209a.
48 Ibid., 209b.
49 Ibid., 209c.
gives birth to offspring with which he was long pregnant; and whether the [lover] is present or absent he holds the beautiful one in memory, and nurtures with him that which has been generated in common.\textsuperscript{50}

Two insights emerge. First, this lover was long pregnant—the brood birthed at the first satisfaction of erôs were premature. Underdeveloped, these products stand little chance for survival long enough to garner immortality through their eternal preservation; they mirror the state of their parents in that manner. Second, because the products of those pregnant in soul are not children, but poetry, cities, and laws—and the virtues they encourage—the erotic longing does not culminate in merely their birth, but in their nurture and nourishment as well. Socrates speaks of “their showing forth of many beautiful deeds… [engendering] every kind of virtue.”\textsuperscript{51} The idea of producing not just a family of immediate children, but a whole school of students, or city of law-abiding citizens, is both much more attractive and more satisfying. It is with this offer that Socrates seduces Glaucon and Alcibiades in the Republic—with the proposal of founding a city, wherein they can educate the populace according to their definitions of virtue, moderation, and justice.\textsuperscript{52} The principal characteristic of this second erotic echelon is its concern for the soul, at least in addition to, if not over, the concern for the body. This sentiment is echoed in Socrates’ persuasion in the Apology, for men not to care for the physical things of the city until they have learned to care for the nurture and improvement of the soul, through training in the beautiful.\textsuperscript{53}

Once one has brought to birth in the beauty of the soul, the rightly ordered lover will go on to see the beauty in “customs and laws (τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασι καὶ τοῖς νόμοις)” \textsuperscript{54}, and to understand how this beauty is related to the earlier beauties. As Russon states, “The reasons that make us responsible to one soul, then make us responsible for the well-being of all souls with whom we have dealings, and for that

\textsuperscript{50} Symposium, 209c.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 209c.
\textsuperscript{52} Republic, 368bff. This possibility continues to attract students of the Socratic school, as Nietzsche describes it, “most often in maieutic and educational influences on noble youths, with a view to eventually producing a genius.” The Birth of Tragedy, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1967), 97.
\textsuperscript{53} Apology, 36b-c.
\textsuperscript{54} Symposium, 210c3.
reason the next move up the ladder is the erôs for laws and customs, that is, the commitment to the ways in which many souls in community represent their interests and upon which they depend for well-being.”

The lovers of pursuits, laws, and customs in this respect may also do so because it is these very aspects of culture which nurture and provide for the development of beautiful citizens. This is most likely to occur “when laws have been established not haphazardly and as tradition or the powerful prescribe, but as knowledge dictates.”

After giving birth to poetry, and educating her students, the lover also realises the “beauty of the sciences” further for herself. “Sciences” here translates ἐπιστήμας, a term associated for Plato with wisdom, prudential knowledge, and the skills acquired when acquainted with an object of study. In studying the beauty of these sciences, the lover comes to recognise the beauty of becoming acquainted with wisdom. Now in contemplating these beautiful ideas that shape the soul and society, she will

no longer be content with the beauty in just one of these objects of knowledge…but with a permanent turn to the vast open sea of the beautiful, behold it and give birth—in ungrudging love of wisdom—to many beautiful and magnificent speeches and thoughts; until, there strengthened and increased, the lover may discern a certain single philosophic science, which has as its object [the immortal Form, beauty].

Socrates then reaches the highest level of erôs—the pinnacle and most noble of pursuits, that “for which the others are means, if one were to proceed correctly in them” and “for whose sake alone all the other prior labours were undertaken.”

Through philosophy, the virtuous soul reaches the end of the lessons for which the prior levels had trained and prepared it, “at last to know what is beauty itself.”

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57 Symposium, 210c.

58 Ibid., 210d-e.

59 Ibid., 210c.

60 Ibid., 211c.
Following the longest and most detailed description of a Form in the Platonic corpus,\textsuperscript{61} Diotima reveals that the goal of all love is the lesson of what makes the beloved beautiful in the first place. Here, she is placed to be able to discern how “[t]he beauty of boys, their souls, the practices that make them beautiful, even the knowledge on which those practices are based, and their objects is one and the same”.\textsuperscript{62} What transpires in this quest is the training of the soul in the truly beautiful. In beholding the beautiful, one gives birth in the love of wisdom, to many beautiful speeches and thoughts. Using the beautiful particulars she experiences on earth as “steps”, the lover can finally come to know what beauty truly is. It is here, Diotima asserts, in beholding the beautiful itself, that it is worth living.\textsuperscript{63} For only here, can one have togetherness with the beautiful, and engender true virtue, and cherish true virtue, and in doing this, become dear to the gods and inherit immortality as much as it is possible for a mortal being to do. Erôs is the best attendant to human nature for this inheritance. A comparable passage is found in \textit{Phaedrus} 248d3-5:

\begin{quote}
The best human life is that of a philosopher, a lover of beauty, or a man of culture and erotic desire.
\end{quote}

At this, Socrates concludes his speech, but before anyone can ask any questions, Alcibiades bursts into the party and drunkenly disrupts the discussion. The remainder of this chapter will aim to examine Socrates’ account of erôs.

\textit{I.c. Who loves whom?}

Considerable debate has arisen in the literature as to the roles of the lover, beloved, midwife, and issue that cluster around the beautiful in the ascent passage. An

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{61} \textit{Symposium}, 210e-212a.
  \item \textsuperscript{62} Nehamas ["Beauty"], 123.
  \item \textsuperscript{63} \textit{Symposium}, 211d1-2
  \item \textsuperscript{64} \textit{Phaedrus}, 248d3-5, trans. Paul Woodruff and Alexander Nehamas (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1995). In a later essay, Nehamas ["Beauty"], 129, asserts that their 1995 translation “suggest[s] Plato’s distinction here [was] exclusive, specifying three different modes of life—a view of which my present interpretation of the \textit{Symposium} is causing me to be less confident.”
\end{itemize}
investigation into the text will elucidate these roles more clearly, which, in their final image, reveal the cognitive metaphysics I argue that Plato sets out in the *Symposium*. The multiple layers of characterisation and description made throughout the dialogue are indeed rather dizzying: is Diotima’s description of the shoe-less, wandering, philosophizing erôs intended to be a portrayal of Socrates himself? Are beautiful youths meant to be impregnated with wisdom, taken as inducements to pregnancy, employed as midwives, or enjoyed as replicable products of some other mystic union? The confusion resulting from these various role-reversals is well-documented, but no clear consensus has as yet been achieved. The solutions that have been proposed tend to fall along three main lines. First, that the Form of beauty takes the role of the begetter, a position put forward by Pender; second, the account of Socrates as the lover who begets ideas in the minds of the beloved, as characterised by the influential interpretations of Neumann and Dover; and finally, Edmonds’ recent explanation which advances championing Socrates as the beautiful beloved who serves as midwife to a philosophic lover. These three competing interpretations of the roles played in the ascent passage provide valuable insight into the nature of Diotima’s intention, and must be evaluated if one is to understand the cognitive complexities of the dialogue.

**I.c.1. Philosopher loves the Form of beauty, beauty begets**

The first view of the roles of the ascent passage is expounded by Pender, who takes an unconventional reading of the text to assert,

> It is the Form of beauty, rather than the lover of beauty, that is pregnant at 212a, which means that in the course of Diotima’s speech the role of ‘beauty’ changes from that of presiding deity in childbirth to that of sexual partner and mother. […] Thus it is the Form that experiences the pregnancy, labour and birth of the soul-child, with the lover taking the role of the proud father.

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The view of beauty as begetter is, for Pender, the result of a structural requirement that Plato arranges in the text, and veils for a variety of reasons—notably because he realised the logical conclusion of such an arrangement is ultimately problematic. It is because of Plato’s obfuscation, argues Pender, that the startling conclusion of beauty as begetter has been overlooked in previous analyses of the text: Plato realised his view was wrong, and covered it up to prevent readers from finding the same problems with it that he did. According to this interpretation, Plato has constructed in Diotima’s speech a mirrored arrangement of four types of pregnancy, two physical and two spiritual. The first is the physical pregnancy of a female which results in the birth of a physical child; second, a male expectancy resulting in the issuance of physical seed through emission; third, mirrored on the second, a male expectancy resulting in the issuance of spiritual seed; and fourth, mirrored on the first, a spiritual pregnancy of a female which results in the birth of a spiritual child. Pender argues that the need to view Diotima’s speech as loaded with role reversals is unnecessary, as the traditional occurrence of pregnancy is simple enough to serve as a metaphor for all of Plato’s aims. Further, she argues the passage does not fall victim to the charge of “strange reversals”, if one allows male expectancy and travail to be included in the description Diotima gives of τίκτειν. This view gets its foundation from the reading of τόκος in 206c as referring to male emission of seed. As τίκτειν was used to refer to both the male sense of ‘begetting’ a child and the female activity of ‘bearing’ one, this is not unusual. Further, it can be supported by the commonly accepted understanding of pregnancy in ancient Greek culture, whereby begetting takes place at conception. Pender goes on to find textual support in 206e4, reading ἐν τῷ καλῷ in the traditional dative of location, completing the sexual imagery. Finally, an interpretation of ἔχοντα can find that “the one who has the beautiful” has a

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68 Pender, 86.
69 Dover [Symposium], 147.
literary history of familial and sexual connotation in the sense of ‘to have as a wife or lover’.  

At the base level of erôs, Pender finds male expectancy requiring female pregnancy and childbirth if a child is to have been created. The first two physical levels of erôs, then, result in physical female pregnancy and childbirth following from the physical male emission internal to the female counterpart. At the first spiritual level, “those pregnant in terms of their souls”, Pender asserts the male expectancy issues forth in begetting his “soul-seed in philosophy, which takes the place of the beloved in intercourse and assumes the female role.” This provides a unique reading of “the lover will…behold it [θεωρῶν, the beloved] and give birth in ungrudging philosophy to many beautiful speeches”. It is at this stage that poems and laws are created, as children resulting from the union of the male lover and the female philosophy. As support for the role of female pregnancy in intellectual childbirth, Pender cites the well-known midwife passage in Plato’s Theaetetus. Pender accounts for the apparent omission of any mention of female pregnancy at this point by attesting that Socrates’ male, largely homoerotic audience at the symposium would have had little interest in such matters, which would have come across as “out of place”. However, Plato’s interlocutors in the Theaetetus would be of the same social set, so this explanation falters. Finally, on this reading, the lover is together with the Form of beauty. Using a parallel passage from the Republic, Pender draws attention to the distinction between images of virtue and true virtue as indication of an additional character.

It is the nature of the real lover of learning to strive for what is; and he does not tarry by each of the many things opined to be but…grasps the nature itself of each thing which is…And once near it and coupled with what really is, having begotten intelligence and truth, he knows and lives truly, is nourished and ceases from his labour pains…

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71 Symposium, 206e1. See LSJ, s.v. ἔχω, A.I.4.
72 Symposium, 209a.
73 Pender, 81.
74 Bury, ad loc.
75 Symposium, 210d.
76 Theaetetus, 149b-151e; Pender, 79.
77 Pender, 79.
78 Republic, 490b.
Because at this stage the offspring of the union is not an image of virtue, but true virtue, Pender espouses that the change in partner is the cause for the change in the nature of the child: the lover must not be begetting spiritual seed at this point because a different partner would not result in different spiritual seed. A child must have been created. Pender concludes, “As spiritual children are procreated in this passage, then someone or something must have given birth to them. If we follow the analogy of physical pregnancy and birth, as I feel we must, then this someone or something must be their father’s sexual partner, which at this stage is nothing other than the Form of Beauty.”

Following the requirement of a female pregnancy and childbirth because of male issuance and the begetting of a child, Pender’s interpretation requires a female pregnancy, which under these conditions must be that of the Form.

Of course, this conclusion is incompatible with the description of the Form given by Diotima a few lines earlier: it is specifically an unchanging being, one that could not become pregnant as a result of the lover’s involvement with it. For Pender, this means that “the metaphor completely breaks down at this point”, resulting in Plato’s avoidance of mentioning the Form’s pregnancy in an attempt to manoeuvre himself out of the illogical corner into which Diotima’s speech has steered him. Considering, however, the conviction with which Pender earlier expressed Plato’s carefulness in crafting his metaphors, it is disturbing how easily she allows this apparently illogical conclusion to break down the interpretation. If Plato really did take such great pains to buttress the logical stability and validity of his metaphors, it seems this faulty conclusion should be investigated a little further before discarding the possibility that a rational account is given by Plato at all in the passage.

I.c.2. Philosopher loves a beautiful particular, begets in the mind of the beloved

A second view interprets the passage such that it is the lover who is pregnant, begetting ideas into the mind of the beautiful beloved. While this seems most plausible...
at the second stage in the ascent, an analysis of this interpretation demonstrates its inconsistencies with the text. Neumann espouses the rather ominous thesis that the lover’s “knowledge—even of absolute beauty—is a tool for gaining undying fame.”\(^{83}\) On this view, “the highest type of physical childbirth [is] the generation in others of moderation and justice…those intent on begetting these beauties wander around, seeking the beautiful in which they can do this.”\(^{84}\) Whilst the first level of erôs involves the desire to be relieved of travail in the production of physical children, at the second level of childbirth, the lover, in “taking this beauty in hand, he fathers in his (the beauty’s) soul the things which have been on his mind for a long time.”\(^{85}\) It is at this stage that Neumann finds Diotima culpable of the egoistic trickery of which Popper accuses Socrates in the \textit{Republic}.\(^{86}\) For if all souls desire to give birth—albeit on perhaps different levels—would not the lover’s use of the beloved beauty be stifling to the younger’s own longing to give birth?\(^{87}\) Following this potential threat with respect to Diotima’s sophistic endeavours, “the goal of her love is not the beautiful, but the acquisition of \textit{happiness} by giving birth in or through the beautiful.”\(^{88}\) Support for this interpretation is found by Neumann throughout Diotima’s speech. A detailed reading of the Penia and Poros encounter reveals that perhaps Erôs got a little of his cunning and trickery from his mother as well: Penia took advantage of Poros to attain her ends, and to secure for herself the things that she lacked—might Erôs use the beloved in a similar fashion?\(^{89}\) Further, Neumann understands Diotima’s intentions in the speech to imply that union with the beloved is never the aim of an erotic encounter. Accordingly, “Diotima’s erôs does not share the Aristophanic yearning for an ultimate union with its object, since that object is attractive solely as a medium in which the lover may give birth…Immortal glory is the highest goal of psychical reproduction.”\(^{90}\) The connection

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\(^{83}\) Neumann, 44.
\(^{84}\) Ibid., 39, 44, 47.
\(^{85}\) Ibid., 39.
\(^{87}\) Neumann, 40.
\(^{88}\) Ibid., 41. My italics.
\(^{89}\) Ibid., 50-51. Sheffield also comments on the significantly active role played by Penia in their garden tryst, 192.
\(^{90}\) Neumann, 47, 44.
between the erôs of the *Symposium* and that presented in the *Republic* is further tightened by Neumann through his conclusion that Diotima’s erotic educator seeks to extirpate this union of lover and beloved outright. By engendering the virtues of an empire that bind men together, erôs endeavours to enact a dictatorship under the guise of civic virtue and communal self-interest. Drawing the citizens under his influence together in this way encourages the beloveds to seek the common good rather than their own—that good which might distract their attention and remove them as a possible vehicle for the lover’s own aims.  

This second reading of the text concludes with the realisation that Diotima’s speech merely feigned interest in understanding of the Forms as espoused, perhaps more innocently, in other Platonic texts, but was truly an encomium to the nefarious and tyrannical erôs of the *Republic*, “the lover’s arrogant conviction that the whole external universe is to be employed solely as a means to his own happiness.” Of course, if this insight into his nature is true, Erôs has indeed acquired quite a bit of fame for his handiwork.

The argument that the erôs of Socrates’ speech culminates in “begetting in a beautiful medium”, is also Dover’s position, and both he and Neumann come to similar conclusions. At 206c5, Dover supports the use of the dative definite article found in the medieval manuscripts, but not the papyrus. He asserts, “It is not uncommon for the article to be absent from the first member of a pair of nouns but present with the second; cf. Arist. *Poetics*, 1449a1.” This common understanding serves Dover’s concession that one can at once read the passage as “giving birth in the many beautiful mediums” as well as “in beauty”. He uses this in order to make a smooth transition to the final stage in begetting in beauty in the abstract. This must not

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93. Dover [*Symposium*], 146, 148. Cf. Neumann, 47. Neumann goes further to describe the beautiful boy as a “vehicle”, 44. See also Reginald Hackforth, “Immortality in Plato’s *Symposium,*” *Classical Review* 64 (1950): 44.

94. Dover [*Symposium*], 93.

95. *Symposium*, 206c5; Dover [*Symposium*], 148.
be seen as an endorsement of Pender’s view of begetting as impregnating the Form. While both Dover and Pender acknowledge male emission as a type of expectancy, Dover avoids Pender’s conclusion that male expectancy “would not, on its own, result in the birth of a child.”96 The notion of erôs as being the driving force to impel lovers into begetting in the minds of beautiful beloveds their own offspring yields similar, negative conclusions for Dover as it does for Neumann. The latter asserts,

One can only conclude that this passive role [of the beloved] is not natural…In order to gain undying glory by fathering the moral virtues of a civilization, Diotima’s educator must do violence to the naturally pregnant, making them forget what she regards as their deepest desire. Her concept of physical reproduction is little more than indoctrination, however beautiful the rhetoric employed to describe it.97

This rhetoric would indeed be seen to be beautiful to those seeking to take advantage of a beloved: it is rhetoric that encourages unsuspecting young men voluntarily to submit to being used in this way. An assertion reached by both is the complaint dividing Platonic erôs from, among other things, Christian agape, and love more generally experienced and accepted in our post-Kantian society: that it does not love the beautiful bodies and beautiful particulars “for themselves”.98 Dover twice mentions Plato’s “having parted company with love” when Diotima reaches the higher mysteries, wherein (apparently acceptable) love for the beloved is “decisively rejected”.99 Dover views this as symptomatic of Plato’s endeavours more generally, introducing the dialogue with the biting reproof: “Plato writes not as a scholar or scientist but from first to last as an advocate, an heir to the tradition of didactic poetry, a nursling of Attic drama and a product, no less than the politicians and litigants which he criticised so ardently, of a culture which admired the art of the persuader.”100 Upon reaching the higher mysteries of erôs, Dover finds Diotima to have disassociated herself entirely from compassionate, human love, and spoken purely as an opportunist, careful not to betray

96 Pender, 73; Dover [Symposium], 147.
97 Neumann, 40-41.
98 Ibid., 44; Dover [Symposium], 155, 152.
99 Dover [Symposium], 152.
100 Ibid., viii.
her lack of experience—and potential disbelief—in the sentiments she so enticingly advocates.\(^{101}\)

This reading of the ascent passage as stifling indoctrination, however, overlooks three aspects of the intentions of erôs, which, I argue, indicate that exploitation of the beloved for personal gain is not its aim. First, I question whether it is really immortal fame for which erôs strives. Neumann, following Wilamowitz, faults Diotima’s “Ruhmbegierde”,\(^ {102}\) yet while it is true that Diotima concedes that what the lovers at the lowest level want is “an immortal remembrance of their virtue”,\(^ {103}\) this facet of desire is perhaps only symptomatic of the lower mysteries. By the second level of erôs, fame is only part of the equation, as that with which offspring might supply their progenitors, even incidentally, and not what prompted their engendering in the first place.\(^ {104}\) It is completely absent in the higher mysteries of the ascent passage. Just as lower level erôs is confused about the means to its end, these lovers of bodies might also misunderstand the nature of their strivings. Their believing beautiful bodies are the key to immortality resembles the sight-lovers of the Republic, who confuse particular instances of beauty and justice for the Forms.\(^ {105}\) Rowe takes issue with the fame accusation as well, asserting: “The claim that (literally) everyone does (literally) everything for the sake of fame and reputation sounds not just un-Socratic, and un-Platonic, but plainly false.”\(^ {106}\) Taking the lemma at 208e1 as an explanatory qualification to Diotima’s claim starting in 208d7, one can understand that the reason those at the lower mysteries seek out fame and a good reputation is because they believe it to be, in fact, good: they do it for the sake of the good, “because they love the immortal” (208e1). Diotima leaves room for such a concession. “Those who are pregnant in terms of their bodies…turn to women and are erotic in this way, furnishing for themselves through the procreation of children immortality, remembrance, and

\(^{101}\) Dover [Symposium], 155, 152, 159.


\(^{103}\) Symposium, 208d.

\(^{104}\) Ibid., 209d, cf. 209b.

\(^{105}\) Republic, 475d-476d.

\(^{106}\) Rowe [Plato], 189.
happiness (as they believe) for all future time.” They may think fame is the way to go, but as it plays no part whatsoever in the higher mysteries, they are likely incorrect about this too. For those pregnant of soul, true virtue is a much greater testament to the Form than fame, as it is what “is [most] appropriate for the soul to conceive and bear”, as Diotima asserts.

Second, at the highest level of erôs, it is not merely the generation of famous laws or scores of students that promises immortality for the lover of wisdom, but the ἔρασμανω of this engendering as well. This term, which encompasses nurturing, nourishing, and rearing up to be noble, fits in very clearly with the first kind of begetting: the feeding, instructing, and protecting of human children. With the second type of begetting, it is reasonably clear: making poems more beautiful and compelling, and laws more fitting and effective. But the third level of psychical progeny is more difficult: what does it mean to nurture true virtue? If it is in herself, this would possibly include defending one’s virtue against those who would want to corrupt her, and practicing virtue so it becomes stronger and more natural, through habituation. It might be objected at this point that if what the lover at the highest mysteries engenders is actually true, unqualified virtue, then it cannot be corrupted nor improved. Still, ἔρασμανω can also be translated as “cherish” in this context, which incorporates not just the nurturing of virtue, but attaching importance to it. This would be comparable to Socrates’ descriptions of the lovers of wisdom in the Republic whose thought not only comprehends the Form, but “delights” in it as well.

Third, the process does not have to be stifling to the beloved. If one follows the ἐραστής/ἐρώμενος motif in the dialogue—the pederastic-educational relationship of older male to adolescent boy—with its prevalence in ancient Greek culture, it is clear that the mutual relationship is based upon the instruction the younger gets from the older: their time will come later. Burnyeat expounds on this idea, asserting, “The

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107 Symposium, 208e. My italics.
108 Ibid., 209a.
109 LSJ, s.v. τρέφω, A.II.3.
110 Republic, 476b.
great lover in the spiritual sense is Socrates himself, as we learn from Alcibiades’ speech in his praise. It is Socrates whose talk with the young is rich with images of virtue (222a) and productive of improving effects (216b-217a), he therefore who is most fruitfully pregnant... [with] improving discourses.”¹¹² Those keen to identify role-reversals in the dialogue will enjoy the fact that the female Diotima has apparently taken the role of ἐραστής to a younger Socrates’ ἐρωμένος. As he asserts at the end of his recounting of Diotima’s discourse on love, Socrates has trained himself up to an exceptional level in these matters since then: he has perhaps not yet come to the final understanding, but is clearly encouraging others on the endeavour now.

_I.3. Philosopher loves a beautiful beloved, begets virtue in herself_

Edmonds offers a third reading of the roles played in the Symposium. Rather than viewing the beloved as the receptacle in which the virtue engendered by the lover will take form, Edmonds’ interpretation posits, “the entire process of procreation takes place within the lover: arousal, begetting, pregnancy, and parturition.”¹¹³ The lover is naturally pregnant, and is able to give birth under the care of the beautiful beloved who acts as midwife to her deliverance. Accordingly, “the lover does not beget his offspring upon the beloved, who then gives birth to them. It is the lover himself, already pregnant by virtue of his stage in life, who gives birth with the assistance of the beloved.”¹¹⁴ Taking hints from the role Socrates plays in the dialogue with respect to Alcibiades, Edmonds asserts that contrary to his resemblance to the portrayals of erôs offered, Socrates in fact acts as the beautiful beloved. Socrates’ avowal of his encouragement to the pursuit of, and training in, eros at the conclusion of his speech identifies his place as assistant to the birth of the philosophic lovers’ offspring.¹¹⁵

Departing strongly from Neumann and Dover’s characterisation of erôs as paradigm of selfish indoctrination, the argument of this interpretation is that Socrates’ company with the young lovers “serves as a stimulus for these youths to bring forth their own

¹¹² Burnyeat, 55.
¹¹³ Edmonds, 266.
¹¹⁴ Ibid., 266.
¹¹⁵ Symposium, 212a.
ideas...relieving them of the pains of their spiritual pregnancy and helping them actively pursue philosophy.”\textsuperscript{116} With beauty in the role of the midwife, this reading would lead to the conclusion that, ultimately, the Form serves as midwife. This concession is tacitly supported by Price, and gains strength from the poetic crowning of beauty as the goddess of childbirth and midwifery at 206d.\textsuperscript{117} An interesting turn in this reading is that, in the course of the dialogue, “Socrates is both the lover and the beloved, both the seeker of true philosophic beauty and the embodiment of it. Not only does he seek beauty in Alcibiades, but he possesses the beauty sought by Alcibiades.”\textsuperscript{118} That a person could be both lover and beloved at different times in her life is not unusual. Alcibiades himself asserts his enamoured frustration with Socrates’ appearing to him a devoted lover and pursuer and, at the same time, the coy and beautiful object of affection. That Plato depicts Socrates—the expert in erotics and very image of erôs—as balancing both roles is also indicative of the dual nature of the daimon.

\textit{L.c.4. Philosopher inspired by beauty, begets virtue in the world and in the soul}

While the readings of beauty as begetter, of lover as begetting into the minds of the beloved, and of lover as begetter engendering and nurturing virtue in herself each illuminate certain aspects of Plato’s discussion of erôs in the \textit{Symposium}, none present an entirely unproblematic depiction of the encounter. If it is “only in the contemplation of beauty that human life is worth living” and that it is at this point, in beholding the beautiful that it lies within the lover to come nearest a mortal can to the unchanging nature of the immortal, then one must consider what the engendering and cherishing of true virtue would be.\textsuperscript{119} A fourth possible reading of the ascent passage agrees with Neumann and Dover in identifying the lover as begetter, who is together with the beloved beauty, and begets virtue. However, instead of finding the engendered offspring in the minds of the beloved, the erôs most in accordance with wisdom would engender true excellence in the first instance within herself, but of likely benefit to others in her

\textsuperscript{116} Edmonds, 272, 262. My italics.
\textsuperscript{118} Edmonds, 277.
\textsuperscript{119} \textit{Symposium}, 211d-212a.
circle of influence nevertheless. While in the earlier stages of erôs, the joint nature of the action was a manifest aspect of the relation—both the younger beloved and the older lover found pleasure and satisfaction in learning about the beauty of the sciences. In the final stage, however, the beloved no longer aids in beholding some other, external beauty: the beloved is the Form, and the method is beholding it. Yet the goal is not to stop there, but rather to bring to birth in the lover’s soul. The notion of nurturing “together” (συνεκτρέφει) with the beloved from 209c is dropped, and θρεψαμένω of the offspring is the sole responsibility of the lover. This reading is supported by O’Brien, who argues,

[T]he friendship of the gods comes to one who begets true virtue, and elsewhere in Plato this friendship is a consequence of one’s own virtue. … [Euthyphro 11a, Republic 612e, 621c]. If these parallels have any force, the phrase τεκόντι δὲ ἀρετὴν ἀληθῆ refers primarily to the philosopher’s own virtue and not primarily (let alone exclusively) to the results of his good influence upon others.  

Rowe also takes note of this development regarding the absence of the particular beloved in the higher mysteries, although he does not hold the Form to be the beloved. Once the lover has come to an appreciation of beauty through beautiful bodies, and has now embarked on her ascent, there has been a switch: “since then, the source of beauty has all along been the things ‘contemplated’…and it is these things to which the lover’s attention has been directed, for the sake of the ‘offspring’ that they enable [her] to produce.”  

This offspring is the quality of true virtue within the lover, and comes to shape her actions and being, as she cherishes and nurtures this development. Now, Socrates concludes, erôs is the best guide for mortal lovers in their inheritance. This interpretation leads also to the conclusion that the Form, the author and cause of the particular beloveds’ beauty, was the object of contemplation in the lower mysteries as

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121 Rowe [Plato], 201.
well—although perhaps unknown to those lovers so contemplating. Support is lent to this conclusion by the fact that Plato is explicit in stating that it is the beloved’s beauty she finds attractive from at least the psychical level in the ascent: she “must believe that the beauty in souls is more honourable than that in the body…may be compelled to behold the beauty in pursuits and laws…may see the beauty that belongs to sciences.”

What exactly it is that the lover loves when she beholds a beloved will be examined more closely in the following section, yet it is evident at this point that Plato intends for the lover to have erôs regarding a beautiful beloved, and engender offspring of virtue in the sensible world and, in the best cases, in herself.

II. ERÔS IS DISTINCTLY COGNITIVE

Soble’s description of the structure, rationality, and morality of love within the erôs tradition provides possible insight into the relationship of the cognitive activity of love and the attraction to beauty and beautiful particulars. He asserts:

When x loves y, this can be explained as the result of y’s having, or x’s perceiving that y has, some set S of attractive, admirable, or valuable properties…These properties of y are the basis or ground of x’s love and hence, in the [erôs] view, something about the object of one’s personal love is a crucial part of the explanatory source of love.

According to Soble, erôs is thus “property-based” and “reason-dependent”; it is based upon the property or properties of the beloved, and one can state as a reason for why she loves the beloved the existence or perceived existence of the property in the beloved. It is therefore the (perceived) merit of the beloved that functions as both the cause and explanation of love. Soble further proposes the distinction between object-centric love, and subject-centric love. In the former, the grounding of love is in the objective qualities of the beloved, that is, “those that are y’s independently of y’s being evaluated by anyone, that are in some sense inherent in y, and whose presence in y is

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122 Symposium, 210b6, 210c4, 210c7. My italics.
124 Ibid., 4.
125 Ibid., 6.
publicly and empirically verifiable”, whereas in the latter, love is grounded in the appreciation of subjective properties, “those that are not inherent in y because their existence depends altogether on an evaluation by the perceiver.”

Although Soble does not make the comparison in his text, this framework is useful in determining the cognitive function of the erôs of the Symposium. Platonic erôs is meant to be object-centric: the lover loves the beloved because of the beauty she perceives the beloved possesses. Diotima declares, “So it is beautiful bodies rather than ugly ones to which he cleaves because he is pregnant; and if he finds a beautiful, generous, and naturally gifted soul, he cleaves strongly to the two (body and soul) together.” Now, in order for the lover to perceive that the beloved has beauty, the lover must be able to, at least in some small way, recognise beauty. She must be able to understand the beauty of particulars, even if she at this point will not understand their relation to the Forms. What is clear from the text is that one loves a beautiful boy because of his beautiful properties, as Soble would agree, which, if the lover is correct in identifying them in the beloved, are there because of the Form of beauty. The beauty of particulars is grounded in the Form of beauty, which functions as its cause. The beauty of the boy does not depend on the lover loving him, or believing him beautiful, but rather, it depends on the boy actually having beauty, which in turn depends on the Form. Love therefore depends on the Form, coupled with an at least initial recognition of the Form. Soble’s delineation of the cognitive process as it relates to encountering beauty in the sensible realm can thus provide a valuable method of understanding attraction to the beautiful as a deliberative function of love.

The human erôs of the Symposium can further be understood to be distinctly cognitive when one considers its role in persuading others to a certain form of life, the philosophic life of the mind. This persuasion is not unique to the Symposium, but of course plays a role in many of the Platonic dialogues, notably the Apology. In the Apology, Socrates presents his famed knowledge of ignorance: “For neither of us really

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126 Soble, 9.
127 Ibid., 9.
128 Symposium, 209c.
129 Ibid., 211b9.
knows anything beautiful or good, but this man thinks he knows something when he does not, whereas I, as I do not know anything, do not think I do either. I seem, then, to be wiser than this man in just this little thing: that what I do not know, I do not even think I know.”

In the Symposium, he boasts of his exceptional knowledge of erôs and its ways: “I claim to have expert knowledge of nothing but erotics.” The connection between these two is more than superficial, and does not express the contradiction found by a number of commentators. As presented in Diotima’s speech, Erôs is characterised by a lack, and is cognisant of this lack: he has knowledge of his own ignorance. Socrates’ knowledge of (his) erôs is knowledge of a lack, and the solution presented by Diotima is training in speeches regarding the beautiful with the aim of attaining that highest and most beautiful type of knowledge, the grasping of which becomes the best life imaginable. The exhortations to knowledge found in both dialogues then, culminate in an exhortation to what could be termed a ‘lifestyle choice’ that most makes life “worth living”.

Nehamas defines Platonic love as a belief about the object that one’s life “would be better if that object were a part of it”. The beauty in sensible objects, he asserts, constantly beckons one forward to get to know it more intimately. It is sometimes difficult to tell, however, in what way an attachment to the object will affect her. It is for this reason that the lover is led to study and come to know the object, so as to

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130 Apology, 21d, cf. 21b; Meno, 80d.
131 Symposium, 177d. Cf. Rowe [Plato], 136 ad loc. See also 212b where Socrates proclaims, “I assert that every real man must honour Erôs, as I myself honour erotics and train myself exceptionally in them”.
133 Symposium, 212a; Apology, 38a.
134 Bloom, 130.
135 Nehamas, “‘Only in the Contemplation of Beauty is Human Life Worth Living’ (Plato, Symposium, 211d)” [“Only”] (Katz Lecture in the Humanities, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington, 17 November, 2005).
know whether time spent with it will leave her better or worse. Nehamas then presents a compelling view regarding the interrelation of all beautiful particulars and their union with the philosophic life. As one becomes attracted to a beautiful particular, and pursues it with natural curiosity to learn more about it—‘What are its ways? Its divisions? Where did it come from and how does it move?’—she will find herself pursuing other beautiful particulars in ever-expanding circles of beauty. As one is beckoned forward by beauty to come to know one work or object, she will find she must learn about another, its context, its language, its history, and other similar beauties. Nehamas asserts,

To love something is always in part to try to understand what makes it beautiful, what drew me—and, as long as I love it—continues to draw me toward it. To understand what it is and to see how it will affect me and to see what it will be able to give me. The more I try to understand a particular object, the more I need to learn about the world in general. The deep and the broad are just facets of one another.

Speaking of his high regard and love for Proust’s *À la recherche du temps perdu*, Nehamas gives an example of how far exactly one beauty may take its lover in the pursuit of knowledge about it, a description worth quoting in full as it impresses upon the reader the interpersonal elements this account of love holds essential:

…I need to learn more about Proust generally, more about the social, cultural, and political situation in Paris between the end of the 19th-century and the beginning of the 20th; I need to improve my French, to understand more about the Dreyfus affair, about anti-Semitism, and homosexuality; I need to understand more about the history of the French novel, and the history of the novel more generally; I need to look at Vermeer, with whom Proust is very taken; I need to listen to Debussy’s music…It requires travelling, it requires meeting new people, it requires literally taking a different path through life, a path different than I would have taken had I not been interested and attracted in that particular way. It requires spending a part of my life in ways I would not even have imagined without having been led to them by Proust.

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136 These are the sorts of questions important to definition at *Republic*, 532d-e.
137 Nehamas [‘‘Only’’].
138 Ibid.
Indeed, falling in love is a risky business. When Diotima referred to “the greatest, all-beguiling, and treacherous erôs”, her assessment was not far from the truth. Being never at any point completely wise, the lover of beautiful particulars takes a risk every time she devotes part of her life to learning deeply about a beloved: she does not know where it will take her, and whether, in the end, she will come out having been shaped for the worse or the better. It is this vulnerability to the beloved, and willingness to change for it, which, I argue in following Nehamas, brings in a distinctly human element to Platonic erôs that absolutely identifies it with love of individuals. The extent of that debate, however, will take place in the final section of this chapter.

The ascent passage depicts exactly such a progression of love and knowledge, in which “the contemplation of the whole is simply a perfection of the original erotic attraction to a single person.” The lover makes her first foray into the erotic mysteries with the love of a single beautiful youth. This love is not at this point diminished in loving another beauty, but rather the lover finds in both something that is there to love—a common beauty between the two. At this point, she realises that “the beauty that is in any body whatsoever is related (ἀδελφός) to that in another body.”

The connection here is familial, the two beauties, literally, “sons of the same mother.” From two she sees the beauty in many and indeed in all beautiful particulars as one and the same, and with further pursuit her eyes are eventually opened to the “vast open sea of the beautiful”, which she pursues with the initial, youthful passion, now seasoned and matured to a higher level of understanding. It is in this way that the statement ‘This is beautiful’ is not a conclusion, but a commitment to coming to learn about those beautiful things of which one would say, ‘A city that has these at its centre is one of which I would want to be a part.’ The role of erôs in human cognition is in this way tied to its role in human morality, through an attraction to and desire to attain the best life.

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139 *Symposium*, 205d.
140 Bloom, 151. My italics.
141 *Symposium*, 210a-b.
142 LSJ, s.v. ἀδελφὸς, A.
143 *Symposium*, 210d.
There remains, however, the question of why. Why does Socrates insist the philosophic life—a life defined by constant, Tantalean-like searching—is the only life worth living? The received view of the Symposium holds that man’s only interaction with the Forms is a rational endeavour: understanding. Yet, as Plato explains at length in the Symposium, the appropriate response to a beautiful beloved is to behold it and give birth in beauty. “But why,” Dover asks, “does anyone embark on the road whose ultimate destination is the fusion of reason and desire in knowledge of the good? In the Symposium, Plato offers an account of the operative force, an ingredient in the structure of the universe, which propels us on that road. That force is erôs.”

It is erôs that drives the lover on the way of the philosophic life, erôs with his place as a follower after beauty, who enjoins her to pursue the beautiful wherever she can find it, and who uses this attraction to lead the lover on upwards to the more mature beauties and at last to know the Form of beauty itself. Working from his incompleteness and lack, erôs sets about through cognitive pursuits to seek the beautiful, in part for its use in bringing to birth the natural travail of the soul.

Yet there remains the vital and “mysterious” question of how man became pregnant in the first place. Diotima asserts vaguely that all men conceive and at some point their nature desires to give birth. At the conclusion of his speech, Socrates also mentions this desire is embedded in man’s “nature.” Is this just a given fact about the world for Plato? Possibly. Yet this natural travail is so central to the whole message of Diotima’s speech that it seems a bizarre detail to be left unexplained. The answer, perhaps, can be found with another question left vague: If Erôs is the one in the service of beauty, who lacks and desires after it, why does not Erôs just go about pursuing it on his own? What has man to do with the interests of a daimon? The solution lies just a few pages earlier, when Diotima explains the power and purpose of the daimon class:

Interpreting and ferrying to gods things from human beings and to human beings things from gods: the requests and sacrifices of human

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144 Dover [Symposium], 8.
145 Burnyeat, 55. See also Neumann, 39.
146 Symposium, 206c.
147 Ibid., 212b.
 beings, and the orders and exchanges-for-sacrifices of gods; for it is in
the middle of both and fills up the interval so that the whole itself has
been bound together by it. Through this proceeds all divination…and
initiatory rituals…and magic. For a god does not mingle with a human
being; but through this occurs the whole intercourse and conversation
of gods with human beings.148

Erôs fills a fundamental gap in the teleological structure of the world, the connection
between mortals and immortals, through his ferrying of entreaties and orders between
the two. Erôs attends to mortals when laden with the orders of the gods. Man receives
his natural travail as such a divine order, exactly as Socrates describes his Delphic
decree in the Apology: the command to know.149

In his essay, “On the God of Socrates”—a commentary on the Symposium—
Apuleius paints a portrait of the daimon class. The daimons are like the clouds, in
composition, “a mixture of both” earthly and heavenly, seen by some and not by others,
given the refraction of brightness, and which, “if they are teeming with the moisture of
water, they are depressed downward, as though for the purpose of bringing forth.”150 It
is for this reason that Socrates asserts at the very end of his speech, that for the
inheritance of immortality through creation of new beauty, “man could get no better
helper in this endeavour than Erôs.”151 Erôs has an orientation to reality. The lack we
acknowledge and experience navigates and binds together the two realms of the visible
and the intelligible. On a definition of knowledge as understanding the difference
between particulars and Forms, and not confusing the two, love in the Symposium is
distinctly cognitive in that the contemplation of the whole of beauty itself is a result of
the original erotic attachments one has to any and all beloved beauties—however dimly
they reflect the Form’s light.

148 Symposium, 202e-203a.
149 Apology, 28e.
151 Symposium, 212b.
III. OBJECTS AND AIMS OF ERÔS

III.a. Love is not of beauty, but of bringing to birth in beauty

It will be remembered that the framing characteristic of erôs that Socrates sought to convey at the outset of his speech is that love is “of something”. It will be remembered that the framing characteristic of erôs that Socrates sought to convey at the outset of his speech is that love is “of something”. Plato’s focus on the object reveals the complex relational quality essential to love. For love to have an object is simply part of its grounding logic, and the identification of this object is thus fundamental to any attempt to define love. It is commonly claimed that the object of love, in the Symposium, is beauty. I argue, however, that a close look at the Greek text demonstrates that beauty is decidedly not the object of love. The role of the accusative case throughout Socrates’ treatment of erôs is significant, yet has been all but ignored in the literature. Plato refers to love being “in relation to beauty” four distinct times in Socrates’ speech, and each time uses the accusative “περὶ τὸ καλὸν”

352 Symposium, 200a. Socrates’ question to Agathon on this point is reminiscent of his similar discussion with Menexenus at Lysis 218d regarding whether a friend is the friend of someone or not.
354 To my knowledge the only commentators to identify this distinction are White (“Love”), 153; and Rowe [Plato], 176 ad loc. 203c4; see also Rowe [“Socrates and Diotima”], 248, esp. n. 21. Both, however, follow the received view that the object of erôs is “some kind of permanent possession of the good” (Rowe [Plato], 184 ad loc. 206ε2-3, 206δ5), despite Diotima’s hesitancy in using the genitive with the good at 207a1, and despite the fact that the Form of the good is never mentioned in the Symposium.
rather than the unambiguously genitive “τῶν καλῶν” expected for the English translation “of the beautiful”. The proposition at 204d3 that “love is of beautiful things” is, as Rowe notes, qualified by her use of “ὡς σὺ φῄς.” Taken in the context of Diotima’s direct reference back to 201e5 at 204d3, “for I came pretty near, in speaking to her, to saying the same sort of thing that Agathon said to me now—that Erôs was a great god, and was the love of beautiful things (εἴη δὲ τῶν καλῶν)”, it is clear that the genitive there employed was for the purpose of detailing Socrates’ earlier mistaken opinion.

As Diotima never says the object of love is beauty, and as both Agathon and the younger Socrates are reprimanded for claiming it is, the case for beauty as the object of love appears to be growing thin. In fact, Diotima states quite plainly:

For erôs is not, Socrates, of the beautiful, as you believe. […] It is of engendering and bringing to birth in beauty.

Diotima’s insistence that there is a distinction between what love is “of” (its object), and what love is “in relation to” (what beckons or inspires), coupled with Plato’s care in emphasising this distinction in the text grammatically, signals that he is forging new territory here and proposing a definition of love quite different to that held by his contemporaries. An examination of the objects and aims of erôs will provide valuable insight into the nature of love, and what bringing to birth in beauty can mean.

155 Symposium, 203c4, 204b3, 206e1, 209b.
156 Rowe [Plato], 176.
157 Symposium, 206e.
III.b. No shifting goalposts: Socrates presents a consistent object of erôs

The starting point for this examination is the distinction in species drawn by Santas between what he calls “generic erôs” and “specific erôs” or “erôs proper”, according to which the former holds as its object the good, and the latter, the beautiful. Referencing Diotima’s controversial substitution of the good for the beautiful at 204d-205a6, Santas asserts:

We can understand Diotima’s questions by drawing a distinction between the object and the aim of erôs, parallel to the distinction Freud draws between the object and the aim of the sexual instinct: the object is that from which the attraction emanates or which the lover finds attractive; the aim is that towards which the instinct of erôs strives. Diotima gives the object in her questions, the beautiful in the first case, the good in the second, and she asks for the aim.159

In the case of generic erôs, the object is the good and its aim is possession of that good.160 Santas develops this theory from Diotima’s ποίησις interlude at 205b-d where she explains that whilst all makers (ποιητής) could be called poets, only those specific makers of lyrics and rhythms get the name of the whole. In the case of specific erôs, “it is the beautiful rather than the good that is the attracting object; and unlike the former case where possession of the good was the aim, here the aim is not to possess the beautiful but to generate offspring on it.”161 On this reading, erôs proper is taken to be a sub-species of generic erôs, with the egoistic desire for begetting beauty functioning as the means by which desirable immortality and, presumably, happiness can be gained—the aim of generic erôs. Santas asserts that Diotima “consistently argues that this desire for immortality is the cause (aition) of the desire to beget offspring on a beautiful object…Erôs proper is the desire for begetting offspring on a beautiful object by means of a body or soul for the sake of the lover’s own immortality.”162

This is in line with Santas’ influential theory of intentional versus actual objects of desire, according to which the intentional object of desire is that which one truly wants

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159 Santas [Plato], 31.
161 Santas [Plato], 35. See also Santas [“Plato’s Theory”], 72.
162 Santas [“Plato’s Theory”], 71-72. My italics.
and the actual object of desire is that towards which she is currently aiming. His oft-
cited example consists of someone wanting the pepper pot but mistaking for it the salt
pot. On Santas’ reading of desire, the intentional object is the truly-desired pepper and
the actual object is the salt pot for which she, in her confusion, reaches. Santas explains,
“The intentional object of generic eros is the good rather than the beautiful”.163 This
distinction, however, is not necessary in the Symposium: Plato has already made it clear,
through his genitive-accusative delineation, which would likely have been more obvious
to his ancient Greek readers, that the object of love (what it is “of”) is “bringing to
birth in beauty.”164 The intentional object of Platonic erôs is generation. It is also clear
from the text that the many beautiful beloveds—and, as their cause, the Form of
beauty—can be considered “the attracting object” as Santas and several other scholars
would have it,165 in the sense that it is what attracts and the lover is drawn to it. But
love’s aim and object are—at least in the Symposium—one and the same thing: bringing
to birth in beauty. On this reading, the object of erôs is never the Form of the beautiful,
in the grammatical sense of the direct object, nor Santas’ intended object.166 It is
possible Diotima would allow the beautiful beloved or the Form of beauty to fill the
role of Santas’ actual object: but, as in his example, only if the lover is mistaken about
what it is she truly wants! This mistaking beauty for the object of love is, I take it, what
is at fault with the lovers of bodies at 208e (note Diotima’s veiled derision in “ὡς
ὁἴονται”), who commit the same error as the Republic’s sight-lovers.167 Perhaps as well
do Aristophanes’ lovers who, in sex, “each plainly want something else. What it is, it is
incapable of saying” until what they really want—absolute, and not merely physical
union—is offered as an option.168

163 Santas [“Plato’s Theory”], 71.
164 Symposium, 206e5.
165 Santas [Plato], 31, 35; cf. Santas [“Plato’s Theory”], 72; Halperin [“Platonic Erôs”], 178; Neumann, 42-44;
White [“Love”], 152-155, [“Virtue”], 369-375.
166 This can, perhaps, speak to the confusion noted by Santas [“Plato’s Theory”], 72.
167 Republic, 475d-476d.
168 Symposium, 192c-e. Whether union with each other is, in the end, the object of erôs, will be examined in
the following chapter.
The confusion surrounding the object of erôs in the Symposium, and the associated oversight regarding the understanding of the English prepositions employed in translation, can perhaps be attributed to the same sort of confusion exhibited by these lovers in the lower mysteries of erôs (and knowledge) who mistake particulars for the Forms. This confusion has led to a trend in the literature to refer to a “shift” in the object of love or a “demotion” of the Form of beauty identified at one stage or another in the ascent. Obdrzalek, for example, argues:

Plato is quite clear that there is a shift in the object of erôs, and that the object of erôs, in the ascent, is beauty. Diotima states at 206e2-5 that erôs is not of beauty, but of birth in beauty, then claims at 207a3-4, 208b5-6, and 208c1 that erôs is of immortality. However, as I have emphasised, in the ascent, it is the vision of Beauty at which the lover’s erôs aims. When the Form is first introduced, it is described as the telos of the erotika (210e3-5) and that hou beneken all the earlier toils were (210e5-7).

Obdrzalek identifies in this shift “the problem of unity […] the fact that Plato does not appear to offer a consistent object of erôs”, and then goes on to argue that “this shifting in the objects of erôs is actually part of Diotima’s explanatory strategy.” According to this strategy, Socrates initially perceives the correct object (beauty) then goes through three other potential objects of erôs—the eternal possession of the good, giving birth in beauty in terms of the body and soul, and finally immortality—but then in the end “Diotima reveals to him that the proper object of erôs was beauty all along, but that the appropriate relation to it is one of selfless contemplation.” Obdrzalek views this as a way around the problem of unity, noting that any interpretation that does not identify a shift in the object of love will require an explanation as to how Plato means

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170 Obdrzalek, 440.

171 Ibid., 439.

172 Ibid., 437, 439.
to explain setting as the goal of all love an eternal possession no lover can never accomplish.

This “problem of satisfaction”\textsuperscript{173} will be addressed in Chapter 4, §V, however it is important to note a number of issues that arise in interpreting Plato as shifting his goalposts when it comes to the object of erôs. The first problem is literary: it is well-established that Plato, especially in the ‘Socratic’ dialogues, often employs the technique of having his interlocutors go through a number of possible definitions before they reach a conclusion (or aporia). However, in these cases, the rejected definitions are clearly dismissed—no such dismissal occurs in the treatment of the supposed object(s) of love in the Symposium: the dialogue flows naturally and these ‘conflicting’ objects are interspersed in a developmental fashion, as opposed to the expected suggestion-rejection method employed in other dialogues. The second problem is philosophical: Diotima’s description of beauty as “that very thing for whose sake alone all the prior labours were undertaken”\textsuperscript{174} is not at all the same thing as asserting beauty is the direct object of love. When I have a sip of tea, the direct object of my drinking (what it is that I drink; tea) is not the same thing as that for whose sake I undertake to drink. It is surely not for the tea’s sake. My love may very well be of something in particular but for the sake of something else. The difference here is between what love is of and what it is for: but Plato gives us no indication that he conflates the two. It furthermore seems fairly clear from the text—specifically, the repeated use of ἕνεκα and ἕνεκεν at 210a and 210e, respectively—that the prior labours referred to were to be understood as something akin to preparation or priming. The language of instruction, training, and ritual in this passage support this reading.

Osborne also identifies a shift in the object of love. She asserts, “We start with an analysis of love as desire, or more specifically the desire to possess some class of good things, which happen to be the property of certain individuals.”\textsuperscript{175} But, Osborne argues, while erôs at the lower levels may begin with this possession-based erôs,

\textsuperscript{173} Obdrzalek, 437.
\textsuperscript{174} Symposium, 210e3-5.
\textsuperscript{175} Osborne, 102.
this is modified...[in the begetting passage] where the emphasis changes from possessing the beautiful to gazing on beauty and goodness itself, while the need to possess is a need to possess immortality in order to gaze forever on the beautiful itself. [...] The ultimate aim of his love is not possession of good things but a vision of unfailing beauty.\textsuperscript{176}

Given Plato’s use of \textit{θεωμένῳ},\textsuperscript{177} it is clear that the visual aspect of erôs’ aim is of fundamental import—but this is not the goal of erôs entire. That there is no shift and that the original erôs Diotima endorses throughout her speech is always of bringing to birth in beauty is evident from two points. First, the terminology of possession is only employed in Socrates’ introductory interlude with Agathon, when discussing Erôs’ beauty or lack thereof. As soon as Diotima is introduced, Erôs’ need for beauty is explained as part of his genetic psychology but not his defining feature—possessing the beautiful is never Erôs’ ultimate aim. Second, at 206e, rather than “remark[ing] on the revision of the original analysis”\textsuperscript{178} (the shift from desiring to possess the beautiful to desiring to gaze on it), as Osborne argues, Diotima is correcting Socrates on this very point. She specifically tells Socrates he was \textit{wrong} to believe erôs was of the beautiful—of possessing it, or any other way in which the beautiful can be the object of love. The correction Diotima wants Socrates to understand is not that he was wrong that erôs is about possession, but that he was wrong to take the beautiful itself as the object of love.

\textit{III.c. Objects of love compared to objects of knowledge}

The parallel Plato makes between love and cognition will be of use here. A comparison can be made to the distinction drawn by Lloyd regarding \textit{thinking of} and \textit{thinking about}.\textsuperscript{179} Lloyd explains, “...while it may seem immediately evident that thinking about X entails something thought about X, it does not seem so immediately

\textsuperscript{176} Osborne, 102-103.
\textsuperscript{177} See LSJ, s.v. \textit{θεωμένῳ}, A.1., “gaze at”; A.2., “of the mind, contemplate”; A.2.b., “see clearly”.
\textsuperscript{178} Osborne, 102-103.
evident that thinking of X entails something thought about X.” One of the problems about non-discursive thought Lloyd identifies as making it “enigmatic” is “the puzzle of what led [the thinker] to do so”. Diotima’s ascent passage describes how, exactly, one is led to think of the Form: from one to two, two to many, effect to cause, specific to general, and general to definitive and essential. Held makes the claim here that “[w]e think about Beauty through propositions latent in the predicates Diotima presents” in 210e-211b. Thinking of beauty must either not involve transitional propositions from concept to concept, as Lloyd describes it, or else, I argue,—an option Held does not consider—it involves a kind of cognitive process or endeavour that has as its object other varieties of knowledge: non-propositional knowledge.

Chappell’s innovative discussion of “objective knowledge (OK)”, and its elucidation of what he calls “humane knowledge” is worth considering on this score as possible content for non-propositional knowledge. According to Chappell, objective knowledge sets out a framework within which the other, secondary varieties of [knowledge] such as PK [propositional knowledge], EK [experiential knowledge], and KH [knowledge how] have their various places. OK leads naturally to exploration of what is true about the thing, and so to OK about it; to sensory encounter with the thing, so to EK of it; to practical handling and exploration of it, so to KH about it. OK stands to them not as a collective name, but as a cause. Thinking of beauty, understood as cognitively obtaining objective knowledge of the Form, is perhaps what is meant by Diotima’s account of beholding beauty. It is not propositional knowledge, but—in a parallel way to the descent described in the Republic’s Divided Line Simile of 509d-513e—can aid propositional knowledge which, while being not the same thing nevertheless resembles it. This reading has two benefits over the purely propositional understandings of the aim and object of erôs. First, it solves the problem left open by Lloyd about “how the reflection and the intuition are

180 Lloyd, 273.
181 Ibid., 261.
182 Held, 163.
183 Timothy Chappell, “The Varieties of Knowledge” (paper presented at the University of Edinburgh, 28 October, 2011).
connected more than contingently.” Plotinus describes how when we think about an object, we “withdraw from it...we reflect and we attend to a ‘trace’ of it like a footprint or an after-image, which we can describe in words; the words will not describe the intuition but they will describe something which resembles it.” On this reading, when one thinks *about* beauty, she might—after some serious time spent in beholding it—have in her mind propositional statements such as those listed by Diotima in her description of the Form at 210e-211b or 211e. Thinking *of* beauty, however, actually “in beholding the beautiful itself...in seeing in the way the beautiful is seeable” is the activity of this objective knowledge. Resemble is a suitable word here, in terms of the degree to which particulars are like the Form: a continuum, rather than an unbridgeable difference in kind, grasped at different stages by different varieties of knowledge. This reading also solves the problem as to whether emotional models of non-propositional thought are rightly regarded as thought. Lloyd states that he did not “consider models of non-discursive thought which would assimilate it either to emotion or to sense perception and which sacrifice altogether its link with thought.” Thought that is of objective knowledge, at least as described in the *Symposium*, is fundamentally erotic, and thus emotional, without being very far at all from what can be normally regarded as thought. This more robust view of knowledge is then perhaps what Plato has in mind in a theory of understanding that is at once emotional, perceptual, cognitive, and action-guiding.

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184 Lloyd, 269.
185 Ibid., 269.
186 *Symposium*, 211d, 212a.
187 Lloyd, 268.
188 Objective knowledge in this sense, when compared to propositional knowledge, could perhaps be more closely associated with σοφία than ἐπιστήμη.
IV. IN DEFENCE OF LOVE

IV.a. Possessive lovers

The fact that Plato is at pains to establish that love is *of* something, has given rise in the literature to a rather negative conception of love as ‘possessive’—that the Platonic lover seeks to possess her beloved. When the beloved is held to be a person, claims of inhumanity and abuse arise; when the beloved is taken to be the Form, it seems an impossibility. If love is logically and fundamentally *of*, is it possessive? In the following, I will assess the main streams of misunderstanding in the text in order to argue that, yes, Platonic love is possessive, but this attribute of love is not vicious.

Halperin argues, “The purpose behind Diotima’s refusal to call erôs a desire for the beautiful *tout court* is to avoid the otherwise inescapable implication that erotic desire aims at the possession of beautiful things.”189 Rather, he states, Diotima “concludes that the ultimate aim of erôs is to achieve *eudaimonia* (204e-205a, 205d2), which she construes as the lover’s perpetual possession of the good (206a11-12, 207a2) […] and its ultimate object is the beautiful.”190 Santas takes a similar line in asserting that “[p]ossession of a beautiful object is rejected as an aim of the lover (206e); rather the role of the beautiful object is as the attracting object that releases the desire to beget…Beauty may be what elicits our desire but its acquisition is not the ultimate goal of the desire it arouses.”191 Neumann and White agree that beauty never serves as an object of erôs in the ascent, but only as a means to inducing labour.192 The common interpretation here as to what it is that can or ought be possessed is very different from possession of beauty or beautiful objects, but rather the good: with the beauty of good things functioning as an enticing advertisement for the prospect of happiness to follow.193 Despite the focus in the literature afforded Plato’s frustratingly casual replacement of beautiful things for good things during the example given at 204d-206b,

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189 Halperin [“Platonic Erôs”], 177.
190 Ibid., 179, 180.
191 Santas [“Plato’s Theory”], 72.
192 Neumann, 42-44; White [“Love”], 152-155, and [“Virtue”], 369-375.
193 Stendhal’s maxim “La beauté n’est que la promesse du bonheur” seems particularly apt at this point. *De l’Amour* (Boston, MA: Michel Levy Bros., 1857), 34, n. 1.
the *Form* of the good is never mentioned at all in Socrates’ speech. Any reference to a further purpose behind possession of the beautiful, must therefore take into account the passages at 201a (“the perfect revelations, for which the others are means…”), 210e (“that very thing, for whose sake alone the prior labours were undertaken…”), and 211c-d (“to end at that lesson, which is the lesson of nothing else than beauty itself…”) where Diotima identifies the final rung on the *scala amoris*. If the lover’s early erotic attempts were indeed for some further purpose, she is plain about what that ultimate goal involves: beholding beauty itself, being together with it, and, if possible, giving birth to and cherishing true virtue. This “perfect end (*τοῦ τέλους*)” of love says nothing about possession for means of obtaining the good, eudaimonia, or even happiness. To see the aim of love as possession of tools to be used, then, is largely incongruous with the text.

Obdrzalek provides an alternative account of the possession problem when she asserts that

[b]ecause Socrates focused on corporeal beauty, he thought that the appropriate relation to beauty was possession. […] Socrates’ focus on possession was, however, misconceived […]. In the ascent, this possession-based model of love becomes eclipsed by one focused on contemplation and admiration. The reason for this is that the Forms are not the sort of objects that can be possessed: it would be like saying you own all the prime numbers.

Engaging with Kraut’s argument that “Forms can be possessed in the sense that one can have an intellectual relation to them”, Obdrzalek concludes that this “stretches the sense of possession too far”, particularly given Diotima’s assertion at 211a that the Form will not appear to anyone as a λόγος or ἐπιστήμη “which implies a distinction between knowledge of the Form and the Form itself. […]A contemplative relationship differs sharply from a possessive one.” The distinction she draws between knowledge

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194 Chang, 433-434.
195 Symposium, 211b.
196 Obdrzalek, 431-432.
198 Obdrzalek, 432, n. 43.
of the Form and the Form itself holds, yet I am not convinced that it is as sharp as her argument requires. Her reading of θεωμένῳ as being “purely…receptive” and passive explains why she cannot see them as being the same. A close look at what this action entails for the lover, to be examined in detail in the next two chapters, will defend a much more complete reading θεωμένῳ, which is far from passive.

Barney asserts of Plato’s theory of erōs that it is “an impulse to attain some object: when we desire, as Socrates says, what we want is for the object of desire to become ours…” In her work on Plato’s moral psychology, she claims:

> The good is the object of our desire, which seeks, as Plato says in the *Meno*, ‘to possess or secure’ its object for oneself (77c7–8). But in coming to understand what really is good, we must also ascend to a more refined conception of what its ‘possession’ amounts to. To understand the real good is, among other things, to grasp that we benefit not from owning it, ruling it, eating it or wearing it, but simply being together with it (συνουσία); which, given the kind of thing the Forms are, can only mean contemplation of it in thought.

This “more refined conception” of possession comes closest to what I take to be Plato’s intention in the *Symposium*. That beholding the beautiful will entail cognitive contemplation cannot be denied. However, this does not make it the passive state Obdrzalek imagines or the purely cognitive one Barney intimates by “only” in the above quotation. It must involve more than simply sitting in Μετέορα, thinking about the Form, if it is this activity alone that can lead one to bringing about true virtue. The way in which love swept through the entirety of the young lover’s life in the ascent passage—from juvenile infatuation to earnest and beneficial relationships with soulmates, to cultural and political engagement, to both deep and broad study of the sciences, and a climactic realisation of what matters most in the world—requires that Platonic love be life-altering.

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199 Obdrzalek, 432, 435.
If possession is what Plato has in mind for the nature of the relationship the lover is to have with the ladder’s beauties, is it truly appropriative in an acquisitive way? Nehamas offers an insightful understanding, which fits with the view of both love and its object offered in this reading.

Possession, though, is not identical with ownership—or, if it is, it is ownership of a different kind: I may possess something as a detachable piece of property, losing which will not affect who I am, or as a genuine part of myself, which I cannot lose without undergoing a serious change of my own. […] ’Making it mine’ means to see it as no one else has seen it before. […] To the extent that being involved with it has changed my life, that book has come to possess me; to the extent that I have found something new and unusual in it, I have made it mine; and to the extent that I have become new and unusual myself. 202

The beholding of beauty Diotima’s exhortation implies involves such time and devotion as to effect such a change. The sort of possession that may be entailed by erôs involves a serious commitment to coming to know beauty itself, and making it one’s own to the extent that it has such an effect on one’s life. It is thus not possession or ownership of a kind that can be satisfied; it is not a conclusion, but a forward-looking engagement that promises a life most worth living.

**IV.b. Possession does not entail the exclusivist’s reading**

The establishment of Platonic love as an intellectual desire—more than a purely appetitive or appropriative one—enables it to avoid two crucial problems traditionally found in analyses of the theory of love offered in the *Symposium*. First, an examination of the exclusivist’s reading will form the background for an argument as to whether Plato’s theory of erôs as depicted in the *Symposium* can be rightly considered a theory of interpersonal, human love. Second, the problem of satisfaction will be considered, and will provide valuable insight into the nature of philosophic love as distinct from general desire in exactly that way: for the very reason that it is not the sort of activity that can be satisfied, erôs can be neither appetitive nor dispensable.

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202 Nehamas ["Beauty"], 119.
A significant portion of the literature devoted to Plato’s erôs concerns itself with a distinct controversy regarding Plato’s estimation of the value of those particulars “use[d]… as steps” in the ascent. Two views regarding love for individuals in Plato’s theory of love have become prominent in the latter half of the 20th century: the exclusive view, which holds that the “objects of aspiration [at the lower levels of the ascent, including beautiful souls] are not kept but are totally replaced by the new objects”, and the inclusive view, according to which “our erôs widens as we make progress from stage to stage; we do not abandon physical and aesthetic love for the love of spiritual beauty, nor do we jettison the latter in favour of the life of the sciences.” One particular point of contention is the possibility of love for human individuals, and whether in fact Plato’s theory of love in the Symposium is meant to encompass this branch of love at all.

The exclusive view has become strongly associated with a seminal essay by Vlastos, who argues that the type of love championed in the dialogue is not meant to—and indeed does not—admit of love for whole persons, but only the images of the Form present in them. Vlastos, and those who follow him, find fault with Plato’s theory of love thus understood for four reasons:

1) that erôs is impersonal and selfish, and that it does not do justice to those “essential ingredients of the highest type of interpersonal love”, namely, “kindness, tenderness, compassion, concern for the freedom, respect for the integrity of the beloved”;

2) that it is fixated on qualities, that it does not make allowances for love of individuals in their total package, the beautiful, the ugly, and the nondescript;

3) that even if these first two complaints can be assuaged, erôs cannot account for anything but sexual or romantic love, and thus excludes the love we would normally feel for friends and family; and,

4) that the erôs of the Symposium does not treat particulars as “ends in themselves”, taking steam from the Kantian notion of love for one’s own sake, and not for any further means.

203 Symposium, 211c.
These four arguments fuel the exclusivists’ view that if the theory encourages the dismissal of earlier loves, it must not allow for human love of human individuals. The thought of a theory of love that neglects these principles is disquieting indeed for the scope of influence it seems Plato would be wanting to effect. The majority of the other speeches presented in the Symposium deal exclusively with interpersonal love, and that Socrates’ speech would depart from this arrangement strikes an odd chord in the unity of the dialogue as a whole. It would further be curious for Socrates to ignore Eryximachus and Phaedrus’ proposed theme of the symposium. In order to investigate the merits of the exclusivist reading of the Symposium, these four problems will be put alongside Rowe’s inclusive reading. This examination will set the groundwork for an understanding of the specific role particulars play in the ascent passage of the Symposium.

Vlastos’ first critique is that the love praised by Plato does not cover the range of affectionate feelings one would normally experience and express when she loves. In particular, he is concerned that “the fashioner of this utopia has evidently failed to see that what love for our fellows requires of us is, above all, imaginative sympathy and concern for what they themselves think, feel, and want.” Rowe, however, asserts that the emphasis placed on the improvement of the individual’s soul and mind displays the highest form of care and concern. Diotima describes how once the lover has found a beloved with a beautiful soul she “must love and cherish him and engender and seek such speeches as will make the young better.” Vlastos himself asserted that “for Plato, as for Socrates before him, the supreme goal of all human endeavors is the improvement of the soul.” Viewed from Plato’s perspective, the relationship of lover to beloved in this sense would constitute a great amount of concern for what the beloved wants and needs, and will further help to develop those desires to encourage the beloved become the best he can be. Furthermore, I argue, this goal extended beyond individual responsibility to the state as well, to legislators and statesmen Plato

206 Vlastos [“Individual”], 32.
207 Rowe [Plato], 7.
208 Symposium, 210c.
209 Vlastos [“Individual”], 14.
could only dream would become the heads of education in his ideal regimes. As depicted in the *Laws*,

> For I lay it down that only that law is rightly enacted which aims, like an archer, at this and this alone: how beauty should come about in consequence of it, passing over every other consideration, be it wealth or anything else devoid of beauty and virtue...Unlike the majority of mankind, we do not regard mere safety and survival as matters of greatest value, but rather that men may become and be as virtuous as possible as long as they do survive.\(^{210}\)

The image presented in the *Symposium* further shows the effort with which a lover tries to enrich her beloved’s situation. The speeches she prepares in her nurturing of the beloved are no less than a bringing-to-birth, a psychical creation generated after especial seeking and inquiring after what might make the beloved a better human being.

The love proposed in the *Symposium* is not incompatible with compassion and “wish[ing] for another’s existence, preservation, and good”\(^{211}\) either. When Diotima describes how Alcestis died for the sake of her lover Admetus, and the mythical Codrus for his children, she admits their erôs for empire and questions their motivation had they not thought they would gain an immortal remembering of their virtuous acts. Rowe reminds the reader, however, that these martyrs were only of a second-tier erôs:

> While the agents in these cases may not be seen as doing things exclusively for the sake of others, there is nothing here to make us suppose that the (real) good desires will exclude reference to the good of others, and positive evidence that such a reference may in fact (at least sometimes) be included...Alcestis and company will ultimately turn out to be poor models: since they presumably have not encountered Beauty Itself, they cannot procreate ‘true virtue’...\(^{212}\)

Whilst Alcestis and Codrus failed to reach the higher mysteries, the text leaves no reason to assume a more maturely erotic lover would not exhibit the same great compassion and self-sacrifice to see her beloveds safe that they might go on to yet understand the true virtue of her actions.

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\(^{210}\) *Laws*, 705e-706a, 707d.

\(^{211}\) Vlastos [“Individual”), 33.

\(^{212}\) Rowe [*Plato*], 188, ad loc. 208d3-6.
A chronic characteristic of interpersonal love absolutely incompatible with Platonic erôs, however, is that of the love-sick puppy: believing the particular beauty on earth to be the only source of fulfilment in life, around which one’s whole conception of happiness is built. Plato’s admonition against obsessive devotion to a single beauty recalls the image Pausanias gives in his speech of the enthusiastic ἐραστής: “making his request by supplication and entreaty, swearing oaths, sleeping in doorways, willing to submit himself to forms of slavery to which no slave, even, would submit himself”.213 Vlastos warns against the sort of “pathetic fallacy” and slavish obsession lower-level lovers can find themselves having with a beloved, setting Plato’s commitment to the Form over romantic enslavement as his “sterling asset”: that his theory of love engenders a “freedom from the tyranny which even the unidealised love-object can exercise over a lover.”214 It was indeed the intensity and slavishness of the lover that she was first taught to disdain in the ascent: it was not the beloved, but the fixation on one thing that made the lover “a sorry sort of slave, worthless and petty.”215 Platonic erôs leaves room for all manner of affectionate concern and romantic devotion suitable to interpersonal love, especially as it relates to an encouragement towards moral improvement. It will not, however, stand for that helpless infatuation which blinds the lover to other aspects of a full life.

The second critique offered by the exclusive reading addresses the notion that what the lover loves in the ascent passage is not the beloved himself, but the beauty present in him. If this is the case, Platonic love must be fixed on qualities rather than individuals and thus cannot be healthy, human love. Vlastos laments,

What we are to love in persons is the ‘image’ of the Idea in them...The individual, in the uniqueness and integrity of his or her individuality, will never be the object of our love. This seems to me the cardinal flaw in Plato’s theory. It does not provide for love of whole persons, but only

213 Symposium, 183a; see also Theaetetus 172c-174a; and, on the symptoms of a similar lovesickness in Horace, Ode 1.13.5, R.G.M. Nisbet and Margaret Hubbard, A Commentary on Horace Odes, Book 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), 173.
214 Vlastos (“Individual”), 30.
215 Symposium, 210d; Rowe [Plato], 196-197, ad loc.
for love of that abstract version of persons which consists of the complex of their best qualities.\textsuperscript{216}

The critique here is that the beloveds are not being loved for themselves—which might include various shortcomings—but for their beauty. This is taken to be a shallow sort of love. Authentic love, argues Vlastos, should be for the whole person embodying a unique collection of virtues and flaws, not just a bundle of their best qualities, or their resemblance to some abstract ideal. In her essay on the conative attitude, Kamtekar argues that, according to Plato, when one desires something, she always really desires the Form:

As belief aims at the true, so desire aims at the good...as the doctrine of recollection attributes to us beliefs other than those we avow, in order to explain our cognitive behaviour, so the attribution to us of a standing want for the good explains some of our conative—and indeed cognitive—behaviour: not only what we try to get, but also what we are satisfied by, and finally, what we want to know, is best explained by our wanting the real good.\textsuperscript{217}

Such a reading is compatible with the exclusive view of Platonic erōs, in that if one loves beauty for the sake of the Form, and loves the beauty in a particular, she loves that beauty for the sake of the Form. This is not satisfactory for Vlastos, who finds it insufferably superficial. Irwin offers an understanding of the compatibility of knowledge with love that may be of use in satisfying both requirements: the need of the beloveds to feel they are being loved for their unique selves, and the goal of the ascent passage to hold the Form in a higher position of real value than the beautiful particular. He suggests, “When someone reaches the Form of Beauty he finds a reliable account of what beauty is...The correct account allows us to love the lower objects to the right extent, and for the right reasons, in so far as they are really beautiful.”\textsuperscript{218} Indeed, knowledge of the Form may enable the lover to love the beloved even more deeply. If knowledge is understood as an holistic understanding of a Form in relation to the many

\textsuperscript{216} Vlastos [“Individual”], 31.
particulars that partake in it, and what role both play in the teleological system, then the knowledge of the Form attained in the highest stages of the ascent will offer the lover a more accurate perception of her human beloved—certainly nothing that precludes her continuing to love the beloved, and in fact more likely the opposite. One is reminded of the final lines of Lovelace’s poem: “I could not love thee, dear, so much, lov’d I not Honour more.”

A third complaint is that, even if these first two problems can be overcome, it appears not to account for anything but sexual or romantic love, and not the love we claim to have for close friends or family. This argument gains support from Socrates’ initial interrogation of Agathon, during which Socrates asks the latter about Erôs and his object. Socrates asks,

Since you have explained fairly and magnificently all the rest about what sort he is, then tell me this as well about Erôs: is Erôs the sort that is of something or of nothing? I am not asking whether he is of a mother or of a father (for the question whether Erôs is love of mother or father would be laughable), but just as if I asked about this very word, father—is the father father of something or not?

The notion of erôs of parents being laughable is in line with the conventional views about erotic love in ancient Athens. However, what Plato goes on to do in the duration of Socrates’ speech is to create a neologism—a new theory of erôs that suits his philosophic treatment of human behaviour, moral psychology, and aesthetic creation. While in modern English, it would be quite natural to say one loves her parents, under the ancient Greek tradition, the conventionally appropriate feeling

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220 Symposium, 199c-d.
221 Dover [Symposium], 2-3.
would be closer to respect, admiration, and, possibly, gratitude. According to Plato’s new theory of erôs, erotic love can be thought of as a species of general love—characterised by a passionate and intense commitment to coming to know the beloved better. This passionate element shares certain features with desiderative or acquisitive emotion (and manifests itself as such when wrongly ordered: one’s wrongly-ordered love for a beloved might lead to her taking advantage of a friend; or one’s wrongly-ordered love for a beautiful soul might lead to her wanting sexually the beautiful body attached to it), but this is simply confusing acquisitive or hedonistic desire with true love.

Furthermore, it is not unusual to develop or even to seek out a friend-like relationship with one’s parents or adult children. They could then be counted under two categories: biological family, and friend, when the latter is an individual with whom one would still have the same or very similar relationship even if the two were not related. In this case, some family members can be counted as friends. Can Platonic erôs, however, account for friends? I argue that the development of the lover at 210b4-c leaves open this possibility. At this stage, the lover has moved beyond loving only beautiful bodies, and has come to “believe that the beauty in souls is more honourable than that in the body.” The love one has for beautiful souls can include those of one’s friends and family—if indeed they are beautiful souls and they are loved as such. The brief aside at 210c1 (ἐξαρκεῖν αὐτῷ) indicates that these relationships can in fact be distinctly non-sexual. Seen in this light, being able to have erôs—when conceived and acted upon appropriately—for one’s parents may move beyond being laughable to being, in fact, rather enviable.

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223 Symposium, 218e: “For you are trying to acquire the truth of beautiful things in exchange for the seeming and opinion of beautiful things; and you really have in mind to exchange ‘gold for bronze’.” This quotation from Homer, Iliad, 6.236, is reminiscent of the myth of the metals Socrates offers in Republic, 414c-417b.

224 Perhaps this is exactly what is meant by Alcibiades’ intimation at 221e-222a: “For were one willing to hear Socrates’ speeches, they would at first look altogether laughable (γελοῖοι)…For he talks of [nonsense] and it looks as if he is always saying the same things through the same things; and hence every inexperienced and foolish human being would laugh at his speeches. But if one sees them opened up and one gets oneself inside them, one will find that they alone of speeches have sense inside.” Two other things besides love directed to one’s parents are said to be laughable in the Symposium: Socrates’ metaphors, and Aristophanes’ hiccup. Plato uses Alcibiades to show that, at least sometimes, the only things that have sense are wrapped in the ridiculous. Cf. Symposium, 189b, 199b, 215a.
A final exclusivist critique is that Plato’s theory would treat human beauties exploitatively, as means to an end, instead of as ends in themselves with their own aims, feelings, and desires. The crux of this issue is that Plato’s theory of love seems not to allow for one to love another person “for his own sake”, nor, as Kant would express it, “as an end in himself.” While Rowe suggests the first mention of the phrase “the perfect revelations—for which the others are means”, in Socrates’ speech, refers to the first and second types of engendering (human children and soul-children), there is no getting around the similar phrase at 211c, “…always to proceed on up, using these beautiful things here as steps.” There is also no denying that Plato’s theory requires particulars—including human beings—to be “used” in this way, however unsavoury that may sound. However, the way in which an individual beloved is used is not at all exploitative: rather, I argue, it is decidedly aimed at the interest of the beloved for his own sake. When it comes to human beloveds, the manner in which they are approached is that of, as has been asserted, intellectual edification and moral improvement through speeches and guidance. Individual beloveds in the Symposium do specifically benefit—and in an important way for Plato—by the role they play in the ascent. While it may be their beauty that attracts a lover, it is the most unique part of themselves—the soul—that benefits and is the focus of the lover’s attention. Irwin asserts that because, as Plato claims,

persons have tripartite souls, and have interests including above all the supremacy of reason in the soul; and a Platonic lover who makes his beloved virtuous will be essentially concerned with him as a person…the person or self whom a virtuous man loves and benefits, his own or someone else’s, is the character which benefits from being virtuous. On this view, concern for persons’ overriding interests and concern for persons as persons must be exactly the same.
For the exclusivist to criticise Platonic erōs because the lover herself does benefit from what the beloved can offer her, through conversations and exploring together the world of beauty, would be to advocate a selflessness too far.

As Vlastos frames his understanding of loving individuals for their own sake in Kantian terms, a second response to this complaint is a Kantian one. Both Vlastos and Irwin note the problem of treating individuals as passive objects, waiting to be shaped and acted upon by the lover. The Kantian critique will not be satisfied with the lover acting in the beloved’s best interest if this is not what the beloved wants. Plato, of course, would find this nonsense: no one knowingly desires what is bad for him, so if some course of activity or lesson is, in fact, good for him, it remains good for him regardless of whether or not he himself desires it.  

Hence the Kantian view faces the conflict of letting the beloved be free to harm himself, or go against his interests, or get himself into a position that will limit his autonomy or freedom. To be forced to be free does not satisfy the Kantian need for respect as autonomous end-choosers. The all-encompassing respect and tolerance that the Kantian critique finds lacking in Plato’s theory also distances it from the very aim for which it was intended in Vlastos’ critique: it does not really sound like love at all. Working within Kant’s framework, impartial respect is due to all persons, even strangers; any amount of personal attachment—and especially love—must include more than mere respect, but end-oriented respect: valuing the beloved enough to know when acting to benefit them is needed, regardless of the consequences.

Is Platonic love exclusive, discarding its objects once a more brilliant beloved is found? No. In the first two steps, it is the beauty in bodies that is thought trivial or petty—not the soul. Beyond this, as Rowe asserts, “there is no indication that the lover will ever desert the beloved, even if his love turns out to include others as well…love of other people evidently does have a part in Plato’s scheme.” As a final note as to the value of individuals as objects of love in the scala amoris, regard the remarkably

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231 Kamtekar, 2, 22, 29, 31, 32; Gorgias, 468b-d.
232 Irwin, 272.
233 Rowe [Plato], 195, ad loc. 210c2.
overlooked omission of the *soul* in the summary passage at 211c-d. Considering the “close attention”\(^{234}\) Diotima bid the reader pay just prior to the summary of the *scala*, and the fact that in place of the soul it was again the body thought trivial at 210c (all that was said of the soul in this regard was that it was more honourable than the body), this is “a further indication, perhaps, that the lover never moves beyond his attachment to souls, that is, to ‘caring for’ and improving them.”\(^{235}\)

I propose that an appropriate way to understand the role of the many beautiful particulars discussed in the ascent passage is not of as tools—disposable objects meritorious only for their use in achieving an end—but as necessary lessons, valuable in their own right and accordingly worthy of cherishing as the origin and instigator of proper ocular turning, as it were, in one’s youth and the course of continued delight and inspiration to greater virtue in her maturity.\(^{236}\) At the foothill of the final stage in the ascent, Diotima asserts:

> Whoever has been educated up to this point in erotics, beholding *successively* and *correctly* the beautiful things, in now going to the perfect end of erotics shall suddenly glimpse something wonderfully beautiful in its nature…\(^{237}\)

The terminology employed here sets the level of measure that Plato is using in describing the distinction between lower and higher levels of erôs. These beauties are to be viewed clearly as successive steps, perhaps laterally rather than strictly and only hierarchically of value. Further, the previous stages of erôs are, in the quoted passage, explained as part of erotic education. Like successive lessons in mathematics, the earlier stages may fulfil the very important function of providing a foundation upon which to build, a foundation that is not despised, thought worthless, or regretted because one goes on to learn about other subjects in time. While the latter is valued more highly in the sense that it is “more honourable”,\(^{238}\) the curriculum-like language of succession

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\(^{234}\) *Symposium*, 210e.
\(^{235}\) Rowe [*Plato*], 200, ad loc. 211c3-6.
\(^{236}\) *Symposium*, 211c3.
\(^{237}\) Ibid., 210e. My italics.
\(^{238}\) Ibid., 210b.
and correct order suggests that perhaps there is something to the focus of succession worth valuing in its own right.

The role of succession (ἐφεξῆς) in Plato’s lexical thought provides insight into its use in the Symposium. In the Sophist, the Eleatic Stranger broaches the subject of words and their order, asserting “those which are spoken in order (ἐφεξῆς λεγόμενα) and mean something do unite (συναρμόττει), but those that mean nothing in their sequence (συνεχεῖα) do not unite.” Succession in grammar gets its value through the unity of meaning, which the Stranger defines as creating discourse: “making a statement about that which is or is becoming or has become or is to be”. The words must indicate existence of anything that exists, which is what gives meaning to succession. If the succession of loves in the Symposium is subjected to this standard, then their meaning must originate in an intimation of something that exists: the presence of beauty in the beloveds. As the succession continues to its culmination, the lowest together with the highest can be said to be in harmony. Viewed in this light, it is notable that Plato uses συνόντος both at the beginning and the end of his scala amoris: first when speaking of beholding a beloved body, then in beholding the beautiful itself. For even “the most abstract and intellectual beauty provokes the urge to possess it no less than the most sensual inspires the passion to come to know it better.” United by a continuous pursuit of beauty, the loves of the lesser and higher mysteries are bound together in a meaningful development.

That the particular beauties are also to be loved “correctly” (ὀρθῶς) for the lover to continue on the ascent is furthermore significant. The adverb is used six times in just over one Stephanus page, and thus merits investigation. With a strictly lexical translation of “straight in height or in line”, the term captures the sense Plato

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239 Sophist, 261d-e.
240 Ibid., 262d.
241 Symposium, 211d6, 212a2; Nehamas, Only a Promise of Happiness: The Place of Beauty in a World of Art [Promise] (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 141; see LSJ, s.v. συνεχεῖα, 672-673.
243 Symposium, 210a2, 210a4, 210a6, 210e3, 211b5, 211b7.
244 Suitable to an ascent, the word indicates the tall, standing position of a man upright, of buildings with their walls intact, or of mountains viewed as rising vertically from the earth; from the Proto-Indo-European
requires for the passage by its association with sight: to see straight, as the opposite of being blind. Beholding beautiful particulars correctly is the responsibility of an education in erotics, not only to ensure that the student proceeds along in the appropriately successive order, but also that she sees and beholds these beauties ‘straightly’, that is, in the right way. The primary argument of the exclusivist interpretation is that the ascent passage speaks contemptibly of earlier beloveds as the lover ascends the *scala*. The language of four passages in particular fuel these accusations. First, when progressing from the love of one beautiful body upwards, the lover is encouraged to “realise [she] must be the lover of all beautiful bodies and in contempt slacken this erotic intensity for only one body in the belief that it is petty.”

Second, when she sees the beauty in laws and activities is all related to itself, she “may come to believe that the beauty of the body is something trivial.” Third, when she sees the whole vast sea of the beautiful, the lover, “by looking thus on beauty in the mass may escape from the mean, meticulous slavery of a single instance, where [she] must centre all [her] care, like a lackey.” Finally, describing the lover’s experience when at last beholding the beautiful itself, Diotima illustrates the Form as “not infected with human flesh, colours, or a lot of other mortal foolishness.”

While the language employed by Diotima is striking, the exclusivist’s claim cannot be substantiated without taking the negativity of the language into consideration alongside the content of those passages. Her description of the duties of the guide in erotic education in the passage at hand upholds the necessity of having an account as a resource in making the ascent at each particular step. The scope of such an account merits revisiting a previous concession. The curriculum model proposed above accurately describes what is happening in the ascent passage from a structural

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*eredh-, “high; to grow”. Julius Pokorny, *Indogermanisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch* (Bern: Francke, 1989), 339. The moral sense of this uprightness, associated with the term by Plato’s time, would perhaps have come from the difficulty in and discipline required for scaling such bodies, cf. the Latin *arduus* (“high, steep”) and its English cognates.


246 Symposium, 210b.

247 Ibid., 210c. On this notion of triviality, see Chapter 4, §I.A.

248 Symposium, 210c-d.

249 Ibid., 211e. All my italics.
perspective, yet objections arise when one questions how this curriculum arises naturally. Irwin provides a valuable insight when he espouses:

Plato does not mean to describe just a curriculum, where the pupil sees no reason to pass from one stage to the next. We might suppose that just as we need to learn some mathematics to learn physics, we must see the less abstract kinds of beauty at the lower stages before we see the more abstract at the final stages. But this alone will not satisfy Plato; for it would still require compulsion to move a pupil from the lower to the higher stages. In Plato’s ascent, a pupil at each stage has to be shown, from principles he already accepts, that he has reason to move to the higher stage.250

As I interpret this passage of the Symposium, the guide, who is mentioned briefly at 210a, is to lead the lover to love and then to come to a realisation about the object of this love. This realisation provides the lover with the reason for her ascent. The inclination of moving from loving one body to realising the beauty there is related to that in another, and from loving two bodies to realising the beauty in all bodies is one and the same, is a process of loving something, seeing it correctly, then loving something further. The love of an earlier beloved was therefore necessary to see it correctly. Loving something correctly—and coming to see it as it really is—is essential for the course of erotic education to persist. An inclusive reading of the text is supported in this respect by Reeve, who explains the negative realisations as epistemological accounts conducive to continued love. “The lover comes to see his beloved’s beautiful body as one among many: if it is beautiful, so are any other bodies the accounts fit. And this initially cognitive discovery leads to a conative change.”251

Coming to love another beautiful beloved is not to think less of the first, but to think of it appropriately, that is, in accordance with wisdom and in light of the reasons for its particular beauty. Beautiful particulars thus do function as steps leading successively from one to the next, and this inclination is an epistemological ascent as well.

The role of dialectic in the education of the philosopher-kings in the Republic provides insight into the nature of how such an account may be generated. It was

251 Reeve, 132.
dialectic that best caught sight of the true nature of the objects and subjects under contemplation. “Dialectic gently draws [the mind] forth and leads it up above, using the arts we described as assistants and helpers in the turning around.”\textsuperscript{252} It was erôs, Socrates asserted in the end of his speech, whom he believed to be the best assistant and co-worker with human nature in the attainment of making the ascent. Bury, in fact, hypothesized that the “certain single philosophic science” at 210d was dialectic, although he does not go into it any further.\textsuperscript{253} As Plato, the literary champion of the dialogue form, would assert, dialectic gets its most crucial value from the interaction of interlocutors. Thus, the role of interpersonal dialectic grants individual beloveds to be of the utmost importance for Plato’s theory of love and philosophic progress. The knowledge gained in the love for an earlier beloved is not destroyed because one now knows something new. In fact, it is the “vast open sea of the beautiful” in its breadth that provides the vantage point from which one can suddenly catch sight of the Form of beauty itself.\textsuperscript{254}

\textbf{V. CHAPTER CONCLUSION}

Rather than being a vicious and Tantalean-like circle of pursuit, the love Plato depicts in the \textit{Symposium} is a virtuous one. Precisely because “erôs cannot be classed together with hunger and thirst among the desires capable of satisfaction”,\textsuperscript{255} it does not fall prey to the negative complaints of exclusivity and misuse. Erôs cannot be consummated by owning the beloved in an appetitive way because its \textit{telos} is not acquisition or collection but union and assimilation. Appetitive emotion is dispensable because it can be satisfied, whereas philosophic erôs cannot—it is thus neither strictly desiderative nor dispensable. It is built into the nature of Platonic love that it not be satisfied. For this reason, no expression of erôs has been more fraught with controversy and danger than the love of wisdom. It is life-consuming. It hardly matters, then, if—as

\textsuperscript{252} \textit{Republic}, 533c-d.
\textsuperscript{253} Bury, \textit{ad loc.} 210d.
\textsuperscript{254} \textit{Symposium}, 210d.
\textsuperscript{255} Halperin ["Platonic Erôs"], 169.
Halperin appropriates Shelley—men don’t call it love. This creative impetus is what makes life most worth living: a powerful rebuttal to those who claim Plato takes the best life to be an ascetic one.
CHAPTER IV: Participation in the Symposium

Argument: The emotive-turn-to-cognitive relation Plato presents in the ascent passage is the clearest picture he paints of what participation is.

The precise nature of the relation between Forms and particulars is a notoriously outstanding problem for understanding Plato’s metaphysics. Participation is often taken to be an “undefined”, “primitive” term. Plato does not set out a straightforward definition of participation—but then, of course, that is not his way. What we are offered in the dialogues are glimpses, descriptions, similes, stories: “phantom images” of the teleological structure Plato attempts to uncover through his chosen philosophic method. In this chapter, I argue that the emotive-turn-to-cognitive relation Plato presents in the ascent passage of the Symposium is the clearest picture he paints of what participation is. Participation is a forward-looking, generative assimilation. As love leads, in the best cases, to knowledge, so does knowledge lead to assimilation. This assimilation manifests itself in the production of beauty and virtue of soul. Love in relation to the beautiful leads to desire for knowledge of the Form, enabling the lover to cultivate and bring into being new beauty in herself and in the perceptible world. The participation relation presented in the Symposium is love, which acts as a bridge binding the two—Form and particular—together in a generative manner, fulfilling all the metaphysical requirements of the individual’s qualification by participation. This

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2 *Symposium*, 212a.
generative account of participation, I argue, explains how love in relation to the beautiful can enable the lover to inherit the only immortality available to mortals.

My challenge is to satisfy those who claim that Plato does not present in the dialogues any clear explanation of participation. Silverman suggests that participation “somehow”3 brings about the particular. My account explains how: the love one has for a beautiful beloved manifests itself in a commitment to knowledge—knowledge which leads to assimilation via generation; that is, to becoming beautiful by producing beauty in the soul. If participation is to account for how particulars become beautiful, this love relation just is participation. One hermeneutic benefit of my interpretation is that it can offer a coherent explanation of how love brings a kind of immortality to mortals, as Socrates suggests it can do at the conclusion of his speech. The immortality available to mortals is not immortality via fame, remembrance, or vicariism, but immortality via sameness and the resulting indissolubility that occurs of those compounds between whose elements there is no contrariety.

I aim to answer two questions in this chapter: (1) Can erôs as presented here count as participation; and (2) Can what Plato says deliver what he wants? To answer question one, I will first detail how knowledge of the Form leads to generating the same virtue in the soul as the Form contemplated, and that this knowledge is strong enough to ground action. Second, I will show how assimilation motivates becoming beautiful by the production of beauty in the soul. This will be explained as the activity of the participation relation and the aim of love. Third, I will respond to objections regarding this description of the participation relation. Once I have set out and defended how love functions as participation, I will assess the second question of whether Plato’s theory can deliver what he wants, and conclude that the production of beauty which occurs in the assimilation of individual to Form does, in fact, bestow upon the lover a kind of immortality that is more than mere metaphor. In holding this view of participation, Plato opens a two-pronged account of being and immortality (one manner for Forms and one for particulars), one which is internally consistent and which

3 Silverman [Dialectic], 144.
offers previously unharnessed support for traditional predication problems—specifically, the resemblance regress and recent developments in the Third Man Argument.

I. KNOWLEDGE LEADS TO GENERATION

I.a. The explanatory power of an erotic education

The portrait of erôs painted in the Symposium reveals that love involves a forward-looking commitment to knowledge, a commitment to coming to know what it is that makes the beautiful objects that attract us beautiful. The cognitive nature of human erôs is made clear in Diotima’s description of the lover’s ascent, as detailed in the previous chapter. From the first steps in the ascent, the lover finds herself reflecting on the beautiful beloveds with which she comes into contact, and coming to realise facts about them.4 This cognitive engagement with the beauty of the sensible world continues on throughout the ascent, during which Diotima consistently refers to the lover’s activity as a series of “lessons”, and calls even the beginning stages of the ascent an educative process—whether the lover was aware of it at the time or not.5

The subject of these lessons—towards which erôs’ cognitive endeavours aim—is the ultimate reality and cause of all that is beautiful in the world. The attraction we have towards a beautiful object leads the lover to wanting to know more about it, and thus erôs’ orientation to reality is demonstrated in how it links attraction and attention to particulars to knowledge of the whole of beauty. In this section, I will show how the steps of the ladder of love are each organised not haphazardly but causally. In just over one Stephanus page, Diotima uses the word “correctly” (ὀρθῶς) six times to describe the steps of beauty with which the lover will spend time.6 What is the reason for this orderliness? It is especially striking in a context such as love—a decidedly personal experience associated in the ancient Greek world to unpredictability, chaos, even

4 Symposium, 210a-b.
5 Ibid., 210c, 210d, 210e, 211c-d.
6 Ibid., 210a2, 210a4, 210a6, 210e3, 211b5, 211b7.
madness in its uncontrollability. Our modern, Romantic conception of pursuing love as the freedom to ‘follow your heart’, wherever it may lead, might even chafe against the idea of orderly love with a preset curriculum. A close reading of this passage of Diotima’s speech, however, suggests the relation of one step to the next—rather than being an external order imposed on the lover—is tied closely to an explanatory ontological connection.

Diotima states of the erotic mysteries that the lover begins with one beautiful body, which she will eventually see is related—ἀδελφόν, literally brother—to the beauty of other bodies. Whilst Diotima next makes mention of the beauty of souls, I maintain this is not the next level of the ascent, for two reasons. First, Diotima never says here that the lover will pursue or love the beauty of souls, as she describes the lover’s activity in 210b as “going to beautiful bodies” and later in 210c as “ beholding the beauty of pursuits”. All she says is that after seeing that all bodily beauty is “one and the same” that the lover will come to “believe that the beauty in souls is more honourable than that in the body.” I take this to mean that when the lover concerned herself with the beauty of bodies, she was engaging in the type of behaviour characteristic of those pregnant in body. Now, upon realising that caring for the beauty of one’s soul is a more honourable pursuit, she sets out on the way to producing beauty of the soul, and retains this focus for the duration of the ascent. The second reason I take beautiful souls not to be an individual step is that in 211c-d, when Diotima

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8 Symposium, 210b.

9 Ibid., 210b.
summarises the ascent, she makes no mention of souls whatsoever, but moves directly from all beautiful bodies to beautiful customs; as will we.

The next rung in the ascent is the beauty of customs and laws (τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασι καὶ τοῖς νόμοις καλὸν). Now, what is the “correct” progression Diotima is at pains to ensure between beautiful bodies and beautiful customs and laws? It is, on my reading, a successive relation of causal explanation. All instances of bodily beauty are said by Diotima to be “brother” to each other. Though different, they share something in common that enables a familial resemblance, the recognition of which enables the lover to see that their beauty is the same. The source of this sameness, I argue, is hinted at in the customs and laws that shape the individual. The beauty of a culture’s customs and laws explains, at least to a certain extent, what makes the individual human beautiful. Whilst this is not the ultimate cause of particular beauty, it is the direction of knowledge the lover can identify at this point. Each progressive step along the ascent is to come to learn about an earlier generation in the family tree of beauty, as it were. To this it may be objected that it is not culture that brings about bodily beauty— but genetics! But Diotima is crafting a larger genealogical story here. At the level of beauty of customs, she describes how the lover will “engender and seek such speeches as will make the young better”.

What speeches are these? Those learned in beholding the beauty of customs and laws. Speeches concerning the beauty of customs and laws are what make the young better. Accordingly, the young is made better by the beautiful customs and laws. Soon enough, she will realise this is not the end of the story, but progress on to the beauty of lessons and knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), which make the customs and laws orderly and beautiful. These intermediate causes, however, do not explain as well as the higher levels. So, then, the lover is compelled to see that the objects of knowledge are what cause those sciences to be beautiful. The final object of

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10 Christopher Rowe, Plato: Symposium [Plato] (Warminster: Aris & Phillips Ltd., 1998), 200, ad loc. 210c3-6, suggests a complimentary reason for the absence of souls in Diotima’s summary, “a further indication, perhaps, that the lover never moves beyond his attachment to souls, that is, to ‘caring for’ and improving the soul.”

11 Symposium, 210c.

12 Ibid., 210c.
beautiful knowledge—and the explanation for each beautiful particular going on down the ladder—is, of course, the Form of beauty.

The benefits of this reading are two-fold. First, it goes some way in the defence of the individual as object of love. A common support of the exclusive reading of Platonic love, detailed in Chapter 3, is that when the lover ascends to the beauty of laws, she comes to think the beautiful body as something trivial and small, something σμικρόν. Viewed according to the genealogy of causation, however, the judgement is appropriate to the object. The particulars within one class (all beautiful bodies) are sons of the same mother. The Form, then, is in a way the great-great-grandparent of that human beauty. Of course the lover will come to think of the beauty of bodies as something σμικρόν...it’s just a little one! Second, it follows from what Diotima says at 210e-211a, that it was for the sake of the Form of beauty that the earlier labours were undertaken—it is the Form of beauty that explains all particular beauty, such that coming to understand about the Form of beauty finally answers the question of why the particular beauty is the way it is (and also why it is qualified the way it is—it is not the Form).

Yet the lover’s interest in what is beautiful does not stop there—with a purely cognitive achievement. Instead, the lover aims to come to behold the beautiful as intimately as she can, which leads her to create beauty, both in herself and in the world. Whilst erôs leads the lover to come to know and experience greater and wider realms of beauty in the world, the activity of erôs is further constituted by the *generation of beauty*, by creating and engendering. As analysed in Chapter 3, Socrates’ account holds that the object of all love is “bringing to birth in beauty both in terms of the body and in terms of the soul.” This engendering activity takes place at each step of the ascent: from the first love of a beautiful body as she is led to “generate beautiful speeches

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13 Symposium, 210c.
14 See Aristotle, Physics, 192a14, at which point the Prime Mover is said to be “the mother, as it were, of creation.”
15 As argued in more detail in Chapter 3, §IIIa., I take this “bringing to birth in beauty” to be the object of erôs from the fact that this is the objective genitive. See, e.g., Symposium, 206b, 206c, 206e.
to the very height and perfect end of all erôs when she beholds beauty itself and there “give[s] birth to and cherish[es] true virtue”. The hypothesis we are presented with in the Symposium is that every contact with beauty (from perceptual and sensual contact, to emotional and cognitive contact) gives rise to erotic desire to generate in beauty. This generation, I will argue, takes the form of assimilation with beauty itself. Erôs unites the Form with the particular lover, binding them together, thus enabling the production of any and all particular beauty.

I.b. Education grounds generative activity

Is the cognitive nature of erôs Plato has in mind here strong enough to ground such generative activity? Much has been said about the desiring temperament of Erôs. Of his blood relations, it is Penia with whom most commentaries tend to associate him. Yet, throughout the entire text of the dialogue runs the notion of Erôs’ duality: of the productive tension resulting from his intermediate state between need and resource, mortality and immortality. He inherits much from his mother, but it must not be forgotten that Erôs’ father dines with the gods. I argue that as Erôs regarding the beautiful has led to knowledge, so does knowing about the beautiful lead to assimilation. Such a tendency finds comparison in the Republic, where training in dialectic leads the young philosopher-kings to becoming morally virtuous and hence to being able to lead well and to produce a good city. In the Symposium, cognition and contemplation of the beautiful similarly lead to association and assimilation, and hence to being able to produce beauty on earth.

In the course of his educational exposition in Book VII of the Republic, Socrates reveals how an understanding of the truth is more than a displacement of ignorance for knowledge, but is intimately tied to bringing about a moral change in the student. The study of dialectic enables one “to attain to each thing itself that is...[to] grasp the

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16 Symposium, 210a.
17 Ibid., 212a.
19 Symposium, 203b.
reason for the being of each thing”, with the result that one will be able to separate decisively the Form from the many particulars that bear a relation to it. Thus grounded in the truth, the philosophers will be in the best position to produce good things—in themselves and in the city. Socrates asserts, “Once they see the good itself, they must be compelled, each in his own turn, to use it as a pattern for ordering the city, private men, and themselves for the rest of their lives.” These philosopher-rulers are pronounced thoroughly beautiful (πάγκαλος), and can become “authors of the greatest good” by bringing into being the “well-governed city”. But is witnessing the Forms, in whatever way mortals might be able to do, enough to cause or bring about moral change?

The method by which the philosopher-king shapes and creates the beautiful city and beautiful citizens (including herself) is described by Socrates as that of the inspired artist:

I suppose that in filling out their work they would look away frequently in both directions, towards the just, beautiful, and moderate by nature and everything of the sort, and again, towards what is in human beings; and thus, mixing and blending the practices as ingredients…taking hints from exactly the phenomenon in human beings which Homer too called god-like and the image of god…And I suppose they would rub out one thing and draw in another again, until they made human dispositions as dear to the gods as they admit of being.

This time spent in contemplation of the Forms provides a way for the philosopher to become like them, through imitation and assimilation. Socrates concludes, “Then it is the philosopher, keeping company (ὁ μιλῶν) with the divine and the orderly who himself becomes orderly and divine, in the measure permitted to man.” What we have

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20 Republic, 532a, 534b.
21 Ibid., 540a-b.
22 Ibid., 540c.
23 Ibid., 495c; cf. 499b, 520d, 521a.
24 Ibid., 501b. See also Timaeus 28a-b: “Now everything that becomes or is created must of necessity be created by some cause, for without a cause nothing can be created. The work of the creator, whenever he looks to the unchangeable and fashions the form and nature of his work after an unchangeable pattern, must necessarily be made beautiful and perfect, but when he looks to the created only and uses a created pattern, it is not perfectly beautiful.”
25 Republic, 500c-d.
here is an account that seeing the Form, and then comparing it to what is in humans, compels one to recognise a deficiency in herself, which is motivation to rectify the deficient aspect and bring about a change in herself in the attempt to make what is mortal more like the immortals. This harmonises with what Socrates asserts regarding being compelled to use the Forms as patterns for shaping and ordering themselves and the city.26 There is good in them because of their knowledge of and assimilation with the Form, and as a result of this togetherness, they are the best able to produce good things in the city.

Assimilation with the beautiful occurs when the mortal produces beauty on earth in the same way that the Forms do in the universe. There has been much discussion in the recent literature regarding Plato’s notion of ‘becoming like god’ (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ).27 This idea is presented analogously in the Philebus and Laws. What place, if any, do association and assimilation have in becoming like god? Armstrong employs the notion of becoming like god to assert that, contrary to a number of Plato’s ancient critics, this activity does not necessarily mean a devaluing or abandonment of the temporal world.28 He asserts, “When we consider the role of intelligence in Plato’s cosmology and theory of virtue, we can see the deep and elegant connection between metaphysics and ethics in Plato’s thought.”29 In the Philebus, Socrates assigns to intelligence a fundamental role in the realm of being: “to mix limit and unlimited to produce harmonious and well-proportioned things such as the most perfect forms of music, the seasons, health in the body, and virtues in the soul (25d-26b).”30 In the Laws, the Athenian Stranger asserts, “For mortals, the god would be the measure of all things…The one who would be dear

26 Republic, 540a-b.
28 See Armstrong, 171-183, esp. 172, n. 2, for a list of the ancient thinkers who interpreted Plato—with specific focus on Theaetetus, 176a5-b2—in this way.
29 Armstrong, 182.
30 Ibid., 175.
to such a being must needs become, so far as he possibly can, of a like character to that being.” Armstrong’s reading of what the gods do provides a way for him to understand Plato’s ethical theory as deriving out of that activity:

Like god, we are agents: efficient causes of change in the world (cf. Tim. 89a). Unlike god, however, we can be more or less intelligent and thus more or less effective at creating order in the world and in ourselves. To become like god, then, is not only to have goodness, beauty, or proportion feature more prominently in our own souls; it is to effect order in the world of change.32

This cosmologically-derived theory of ethics is indeed helpful in understanding how being leads to becoming in the Symposium. Armstrong cites the discussion between Clinias and the Athenian Stranger in Book XII of the Laws that reveals how the guardians must have knowledge of the beautiful and the good, and be able to articulate the relationship between the good itself and the many good things in the world, and thus be “capable of expounding it in speech and conforming to it in deed.”33 The change effected through association with the beautiful in the Symposium is also a process of knowledge and cognition (though not exclusively), with the same result of becoming “dear to the gods”.34 As Armstrong finds in the ethical theory presented in the Laws, “a metaphysical backdrop that connects the ordering agent of the universe with that which orders individual souls and cities”,35 so can we find in the erotic theory of the Symposium a metaphysical understanding of how education in the beautiful, through contemplation and the performance of beautiful deeds, results in the lover becoming beautiful as well.

The parallel in the Republic continues when Socrates states that the sufficient condition for the unity of the state is the education and nurture of its citizens. At 423e, he asserts of the future philosopher-kings that “if, well-educated, they become measured men, then they will see all these things easily”.36 Now, the received view is

31 Laws, 716c1-d3.
32 Armstrong, 175.
33 Laws, 966b5-7.
34 Ibid., 716c; Symposium, 212a.
35 Armstrong, 181.
36 Republic, 423e5-7.
that the vocabulary of vision Plato uses here and indeed throughout the dialogues is simply a metaphor for understanding. On this view, Plato would not be committed to saying that the natural faculty of sense-perception can be educated. Instead, it would be left up purely to the intellect. This view is supported by the idea identified elsewhere in the Republic, and perhaps most notably in the Phaedo, that sense-perception ought be abandoned by the intellect as much as possible if one is really serious about reaching true knowledge. A different response to Plato’s use of perception terminology asserts that the point of this metaphor is to show that understanding is determined by some kind of direct contact with its objects. However, I want to argue that these responses underestimate the cognitive significance of perception as detailed both in the Republic and in the Symposium. Furthermore, as McCabe notes, a purely metaphorical view of sight “fail[s] to explain how education and dialectic would render us capable of direct contact with the supreme realities” at all.

Perceptions such as those of the finger at Republic 523c-525e, the view of the sun outside the cave at 516b, and the philosophical dog at 376b, support the idea that the perception Plato has in mind here has complex cognitive content: it is not merely passive attention to what the eyes take in, but rather it could be parsed as ‘perception that’ or ‘perception as’. A virtue of this reading is that it makes sense of how the released prisoners of the cave can be said to see more correctly. Note Socrates’ claims in the following lines: “Once freed and able to turn and see different things, they are able to reflect on their present perspective relative to their perspective from before, and eventually conclude that their vision has improved—that they can see things for what they really are.” It would seem, then, that Plato held the view that vision can thus be developed—indeed, educated.

What Socrates seeks to accomplish in the education of the philosopher class is to make them in some way better. In Republic 518b-d, he asserts:

38 Republic, 537d.
39 Phaedo, 64c-67b, esp. 67a, 83c-e.
40 M.M. McCabe, “‘Look, see!’ Plato on Moral Vision” (paper presented at the Northern Association for Ancient Philosophy meeting, University of York, United Kingdom, 7 April, 2011). My italics.
41 Republic, 515d3-4.
Education is not what the professions of certain men assert it to be. They say that they put into the soul knowledge that isn’t in it, as though they were putting sight in blind eyes. The present argument, I say, signifies that this capacity in the soul, and the instrument by which each person learns—as if an eye were not able otherwise than with the whole body to turn towards the light from the darkness—so with the whole soul it must be turned around from what is coming into being until the soul becomes able to bear the view towards what is and towards the brightest part of what is…⁴²

Accordingly, to be educated requires more than an increase in cognitive content, but a complete change to a new capacity. The phrase of δυνατὴ γένηται ἀνασχέσθαι at 518c indicates that the goal of this sort of education is a capacity, an ability. Education via contact with the Form will generate more than simply the acquisition of new content, but the ability to bear it. Such a change to the whole of body and soul would be a transformation of one’s very character. But what does this transformation entail? To answer this we must look more closely at what sort of assimilation occurs in ‘keeping company’ with the divine.

II. GENERATION: BECOMING BEAUTIFUL BY CREATING BEAUTY

As put forward in the previous chapter, the object of love in the Symposium is the generative activity of bringing to birth in beauty. In this section, I argue that we can interpret this activity as the creation of new beauty. Generation, resulting from the desire to know the beautiful, occurs in becoming beautiful by the production of beauty in the soul and in the wider world. I aim to accomplish this through (1) proving the generative nature of erôs by textual support in the dialogue; (2) advancing an account of what exactly it is that is generated in this activity, arguing against Sheffield’s interpretation; and (3) showing that this generation of beauty is a becoming beautiful, an assimilation to the Form of beauty. This will set the stage for the main argument of this chapter: that this generating is the mortal method of participation.

⁴² Republic, 518b7-d1. My italics.
II.a. What is generated mirrors its cause

Love is the spark of the divine in us mortals. Not only is Erôs, as a daimon, divine due to his parentage, but what erôs effects in the human individual is said by Diotima to be divine as well: “This matter of giving birth is something divine: living creatures contain this immortal element, of pregnancy and bringing to birth—it is something immortal in the animal that is mortal.” Generation, creativity—this is the immortal activity that humans can perform. Erôs, the divine in us, is, as Socrates concludes at the end of his speech, the best co-worker we can find for realising our potential for immortality.

Recent trends in the literature have championed this creative aspect of erôs. Controversy extends, however, in defending what it is, exactly, that is generated. Sheffield praises erôs’ creative activity in its ability to help us realise our human nature. She argues,

If it is the case that all human beings are pregnant in body and soul and we naturally desire to give birth when we reach a certain age (206c1-4) in reproductive activity, these dual claims suggest that erôs is the natural way in which we express our nature. […] What we desire is not just ourselves, but ourselves realized in our productive activities as good. This is what eudaimonia consists in, and it is the task of our productive ergon to effect this self-transformation, and of beauty to inspire each thing towards the realization of its own nature in the best way possible.

All human beings carry various natural potentialities (206c1-3) which require productive work for their expression (206c1-8). […] Expressing true virtue (delivering our pregnancy) in the work of reproduction is also to realize our nature. If so, then we might also say that our nature, properly speaking, is the virtue of nous…[expressed in] contemplating the form (noetic activity) and begetting true virtue.

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43 Symposium, 206c.
45 Sheffield, 111.
46 Ibid., 136, 134.
Taking into account the productive work of erôs, the desire to engender at its most divine level is thus a “self-transformation”, as Sheffield asserts. However, in contrast to Sheffield, who holds it to be “ourselves realised in our productive activities as good”, Diotima never says anything about generating goodness. The only reference to the good in the passage Sheffield refers to is at 207a, and it is doubly conditional: “From what we’ve agreed, it is necessary to desire immortality along with the good—if indeed love is of the good’s being one’s own.” Rowe notes here with interest that Socrates does not say that he has agreed to this formulation. While Sheffield’s insight into the “intimate relationship” between one’s erotic and pregnant nature and the productive work necessary for its expression in the realisation of her telos follows a tight and precise reading of the text, there remains more to be said about how exactly one carries out the activity of erôs she identifies. Bury asserts what is generated is “thought”. Along similar lines, Sheffield claims “contemplating the form just is to beget the virtue of nous”, “contemplation of the form just is the production of true virtue”. Is this just it? Let us press further. Sheffield continues that “the compressed description of contemplation and [begetting] virtue suggests that there are not two distinct activities […which] gives us no reason to think that there is anything further required for eudaimonia.”

Sheffield follows Menn in defining nous as a virtue—the virtue of thinking—as opposed to the faculty of thought. She asserts that this virtue of thinking is man’s telos, and that human happiness resides in contemplation. I disagree on lexical grounds with Sheffield’s identification of nous as the virtue posited of the soul in contemplation of beauty. For contemplation is a pale translation of θεωμένω, the activity described at

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47 Sheffield, 111, 224.
48 Rowe [Plato], 184, ad loc.
50 Sheffield, 134, 153. My italics.
51 Ibid., 134, 135.
52 Stephen Menn, Plato on God as Nous (Carbondale, IL: Journal of the History of Philosophy Monograph Series, 1995), 14-18.
the height of the ascent at 211d.\textsuperscript{53} The Greek word has cognitive connotations, to be sure, but also involves a grasping or beholding that is much richer than even the virtue of thinking.\textsuperscript{54} If we unpack this beholding as possessing or taking the object into oneself, then the perfect end of all erotics is beholding beauty and making it ours. It is not immediately clear that this actually is contemplation in thought, even if that activity is construed as a virtue. How do we take beauty into ourselves and possess it ourselves? Whilst Sheffield reads “production as possession”,\textsuperscript{55} I argue possession requires production.

The productive activity of erôs is the generation not of nous, nor the virtue of thinking, but the virtue of beauty in the soul. In what follows, I aim to show that cognition is not just equal to the acquisition or production of virtue, but that it is a step along the way to the productive activity of generation. The case I make for this claim will involve a brief triangulation of three sources of explanation: Plato’s discussion of education for virtue in the Republic, Alexander of Aphrodisias’ discussion of phantasia, and Diotima’s discussion of engendering.

Recall again the philosopher-qua-artist passage in Republic Book VII, in which the philosophers were said to look “towards the just, beautiful, and moderate by nature…and again, towards what is in human beings…they would rub out one thing and draw in another again, until they made human dispositions as dear to the gods as they admit of being.”\textsuperscript{56} In the maieutic process of shaping the soul, the philosopher takes the particular Form to be imitated as the model for assimilation: she looks to the Form to create in the soul something similar (that is, to produce the virtues she aims to bring about, and to make as close a resemblance as possible). Nous, or thinking, is not that model. Sheffield acknowledges that no claim is made in the Symposium that the gods engage in contemplation,\textsuperscript{57} and Diotima herself makes it explicit that “no one of

\textsuperscript{53} Gregory Vlastos, Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 78, asserts that the term “ecstatic contemplation” captures the lover’s experience most aptly.
\textsuperscript{54} LSJ, s.v. θεάομαι.
\textsuperscript{55} Sheffield, 99.
\textsuperscript{56} Republic, 501b.
\textsuperscript{57} Sheffield, 136.
the gods philosophises and desires to become wise—for he is so.” The burden of proof therefore lies on Sheffield if she is to claim that contemplation of one Form (beauty) yields the generation of a different virtue (nous).

A illuminating parallel, purely for illustrative purposes, can be found with reference to Alexander of Aphrodisias, in the section of his De Anima that examines the effect perceptual objects can have on the soul. First, he details how objects of perception imprint the soul as a kind of portrait, asserting:

We need to understand that as a result of the activities involving perceptibles, a kind of imprint, as it were, and picture is produced inside of us...It is a kind of trace of the change produced by the perceptible that persists and is preserved even when the perceptible is no longer present, like a kind of portrait of it, which, when preserved by us, is also responsible for memory.

Alexander explains that this kind of imprint is called a “representation...an impression in the soul, and in the governing part”. For Alexander and the Peripatetics, this governing part is not the mind, but rather the heart. The perceptible particulars produce a representation within us, our way of seeing has been changed, and in turn that produces a change in the soul:

[Given that]...the primary perceptual organ, which was changed by perceptibles through the activity involving them, in turn produces change itself in the soul for representing through the change that had been produced in it by the perceptibles, just as perceptibles produce change in the soul for perceiving it, [it follows that] in the same way similarly, what occurs in us pictorially and from things which are not present produce change.

What has been created here is a trace of the change produced by activity involving the object of perception, which lingers and accounts for memory of the object. He goes on to explain that “[a] true representation is a representation in activity involving a trace

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58 Symposium, 204a.
60 Alexander, De Anima, 68.10-12.
61 The organ was changed, hence the way of seeing itself has been changed.
that (i) has been produced from something that is, and (ii) is the sort of thing the [object] is and is in the state [the object is in] when the representation involving the trace occurs."\(^{63}\) True and lasting changes are those that have been produced from contact with something that unqualifiedly is and, crucially, is the same sort as the object.

More than the similarity of language and metaphor, these two descriptions of perception-based education may help to explain Diotima’s account of the generation of psychical children in the *Symposium*. She asserts:

> So in touching the one who is beautiful, I suspect, and in association with him, he engenders and gives birth to offspring with which he was long pregnant; and whether the [lover] is present or absent he holds the beautiful one in memory and nurtures with him that which has been generated in common. Therefore, those of this sort maintain a greater association and firmer friendship with one another than do those who have children in common, because the children they share in common are more beautiful and more immortal.\(^{64}\)

Taking these three explanations together, it is clear that the source of the imprint in the soul responsible for change via production of a virtue is, for Plato, the Form which corresponds to that virtue. In the *Symposium*, the Form being contemplated is, without question, the Form of beauty. Thus, the activity of erôs will be the generation of beauty in the soul—becoming beautiful.

This production of beauty can be read as one’s becoming beautiful, an assimilation to the Form of beauty. To become more beautiful is to bring into being new beauty in the soul. It must be noted, however, that Diotima concludes her speech by saying that the lover in contact with true beauty will be able to give birth to and cherish true virtue (τεκόντι δὲ ἀρετὴν ἀληθῆ καὶ θρεψαμένῳ), not beauty. This follows from what she said earlier regarding the cultural creations of Lycurgus and Solon, who “by their showing forth of many beautiful deeds, have engendered every kind of virtue.”\(^{65}\) What is

\(^{63}\) Alexander, *De Anima*, 70.23-71.2.

\(^{64}\) *Symposium*, 209c.

the connection between beauty and virtue, and what is it that is created in the lover’s engendering?

II.b. The beauty of virtue

The text, as well as related discussions elsewhere in the corpus,\(^{66}\) indicates that the lover responds to the beauty she encounters by creating beauty. I follow Lear\(^{67}\) in concluding that whilst Socrates does not here state that this virtue is beautiful, nevertheless all previous creations in Socrates’ speech were called beautiful. It is therefore plausible to assume the true virtue generated at the height of the ascent is, indeed, something beautiful. In the lower mysteries, the lover gives birth to speeches, poetry, laws, civil societies, and deeds of justice, moderation, prudence, and every kind of virtue. The creations love inspires are many and varied—but each of them is described by Diotima as beautiful.\(^{68}\) As these creations are held to be “more beautiful and more immortal”\(^{69}\) than the human children produced by those pregnant in body, it stands to reason that the creations at the higher levels of ascent increase in beauty as well. And indeed they do. When the lover encounters a beautiful body, she gives birth to beautiful speeches,\(^{70}\) and when she spends time soaking up a beautiful culture and beholding the vast beauty of the sciences, she creates many speeches that are beautiful and magnificent (μεγαλοπρεπεῖς), befitting a great soul.\(^{71}\) In beholding true beauty itself—no mere illusion—the lover gives birth to that which is true, and creates and nurtures a true virtue which must be most beautiful of all human creations.

Using Diotima’s multiple references to the generation of beautiful speeches, White argues that “by now it should be plain that this true virtue is not a state of their souls” but rather “the works that they produce and leave behind them”, specifically, external

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\(^{66}\) For example, Republic 501b, as above; Timaeus 28a-b; and, in Symposium 174a, when Socrates says he has “made himself beautiful to go to a beauty.”

\(^{67}\) Lear (“Permanent”), 99-100.

\(^{68}\) Symposium, 209a6-8, 209d6-e3.

\(^{69}\) Ibid., 209c.

\(^{70}\) Ibid., 210a7.

\(^{71}\) Ibid., 210d4-5.
discourses about virtue.\textsuperscript{72} This, however, is to ignore the majority of the very examples Diotima gives. Of those pregnant in body, she notes “how terribly their disposition (διάκεινται) is made by their love”,\textsuperscript{73} including Alcestis’ self-sacrifice to save Admetus, Achilles’ fateful activity following Patroclus’ death, and the mythical king Codrus’ deliberately allowing himself to die for his city. This is not to mention the activities of the animals obviously incapable of speech, who “stop at nothing to nourish their offspring.”\textsuperscript{74} But perhaps what White has in mind is that it is characteristic only of those pregnant in soul whose immortal creations are only external discourses. Yet this is not so either. For Diotima specifically says at 209a-b that those pregnant in soul “conceive those things that it is appropriate for the soul to conceive and bear. And what is appropriate for the soul? Prudence and the rest of virtue; it is of these things that …[they] are procreators” and that they are “pregnant in the soul with these things”.\textsuperscript{75} What lovers are pregnant with, they procreate. Beautiful speeches are a facet of what is included amongst those things, as Diotima implies at 210d, but hardly all. Whilst the creation and delivery of beautiful speeches are evidently important to the lover’s pedagogic and personal endeavours towards producing true virtue itself, it is clear from the text that Diotima believes the development of personal virtue in the soul is one of the most beautiful offspring the lover in the presence of beauty could hope to bring forth.\textsuperscript{76}

\textsuperscript{73} \textit{Symposium}, 208c.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., 207b.
\textsuperscript{75} I follow Rowe \textit{[Plato]}, 190, ad loc. 209b1, in taking “these things” to be the virtues of prudence, moderation, and justice just mentioned.
Furthermore, I argue, it is a Platonic convention to regard virtue as itself beautiful. In the Republic, Socrates describes virtue as “a beauty of the soul.” This comes just after his discussion with Glaucon in Book IV regarding the critics who would complain at a statue’s eyes not being painted purple in order to put the most beautiful colour in the most beautiful part of the body. Socrates retorted to these supposed critics, “Don’t expect us, quaint friend, to paint the eyes so beautifully that they will not be like eyes at all, nor the other parts. But observe whether by assigning what is proper to each we render the whole beautiful.” What is proper for the soul, according to Socrates, is, of course, to carry out its function or achieve its end. This is put forward most clearly later on in the Republic, when Socrates asks of Glaucon, “Do not the virtue, the beauty, the correctness of every implement, living thing, and action refer solely to the necessary use for which each is made or by nature engendered?” Fulfilling its purpose, the soul is rendered beautiful. An orderly soul, well-proportioned and fitting to its work, will be beautiful (as indicated elsewhere in the dialogues, e.g. Laws 668a-b, Gorgias 503a-504a, and Timaeus 87c). In the Symposium, what is proper for the soul to bear, is virtue—and, specifically, the beautiful manifestations of that virtue in their own καλὰ ἔργα.


78 Republic, 420c-d. See also, for this aesthetic principle, Phaedrus 264c, and Aristotle, Poetics, 1450b1-2.

79 I take χρεία, here, as more than a merely functional “use”, but as tied to an ultimate (and so, necessary) end or purpose. This is reflected in the sense of χρεία of an intimate need stemming from a lack (see, e.g. Republic 566e, 373d, 369d; and, as Poverty personified, Euripides Helen, 420, a sentiment hinted at in Socrates’ question to Diotima at 204c, “τοιοῦτος ὑπὸ δὲ ἐρως τίνα χρείαν ἐχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις:”). Adam, ad loc., notes, “The historical Socrates was in the habit of testing the beauty, excellence etc. of an object by the degree in which it fulfilled its function or purpose: see especially Xenophon, Symposium, 5.5ff. together with other passages cited by Krohn Pl. St. p. 369. Plato himself adopts the same standard in [Republic] 352e-353e and elsewhere.” The Republic of Plato (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1902).

80 Republic, 601d. See also Hippias Major 295c: “For I say, then: whatever is useful shall be for us beautiful (τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ ἐστὶ ἡμῖν καλὸν, δὲ ἀν χρῆσιμον ἄλοιπον).”

81 Symposium, 209e3-4; Lear [“Permanent”], 99.
reasonable to conclude, therefore, that the true virtue engendered by the Symposium’s lover, is indicative of its beauty.\textsuperscript{82}

III. PARTICIPATION BY GENERATION

In his exhaustive analysis of Platonic participation, Bigger asserts, “‘Participation’ is the name of the ‘relation’ which accounts for the togetherness of the elements of diverse ontological type in the essential unity of a single instance.”\textsuperscript{83} In this section, I argue that the generation of beauty in the soul—becoming beautiful—is the mortal method of participation in the Form of beauty. I will take the following premises as steps to explain how generating beauty is participation, the causal sharing-in the Form: (1) Love is a bond, uniting mortal and divine; (2) this bond is between two different ontological types; and (3) this bond brings the two together in a unity through generation; to conclude that the generative relation of love satisfies the function of the Form’s causal relation to particular beauty. Love leads, in the best cases, to production of new beauty, fully explaining how beauty comes to be in the world, and thus fulfilling all the metaphysical requirements of an individual’s qualification by participation.

III.a. Love is a bond, uniting mortal and divine

Plato begins Socrates’ contribution to the dialogue with a discussion between Socrates and Agathon. In this interlude, Erôs is described as lacking beauty and

\textsuperscript{82} I have focussed here on the connection between virtue (ἀρετή) and beauty. The relation of goodness to beauty—whether, for example, beautiful things are beautiful because they are also first good, or that beauty supervenes upon one’s goodness—is, likely, another matter entirely, and one I hope to investigate in my future research. For now, I point the interested reader to Republic 517c, 452e, and 508e-509a, and Lear, “Plato on Learning to Love Beauty,” in Blackwell Guide to the Republic, ed. Gerasimos Santas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). While I am convinced that Plato thinks virtue of soul will manifest as beauty, I am less certain the reverse is necessarily true. On this, see Alexander Nehamas, “Beauty of Body, Nobility of Soul: The Pursuit of Love in Plato’s Symposium,” in Maieusis: Essays in Ancient Philosophy in Honour of Myles Burnyeat, ed. Dominic Scott (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 126, and “‘Only in the Contemplation of Beauty is Human Life Worth Living’ (Plato, Symposium, 211d)” (Katz Lecture in the Humanities, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington, 17 November, 2005, http://depts.washington.edu/uwch/media-publications/podcast-page/548).

goodness.\textsuperscript{84} When Socrates recites his conversations with Diotima, we find Erôs lacks happiness, immortality, and wisdom as well.\textsuperscript{85} It is Diotima who explains to Socrates that not being one thing does not mean it is necessarily its opposite.\textsuperscript{86} Rather, Erôs is between (τι μεταξύ) beauty and ugliness, good and bad, wisdom and ignorance, immortality and mortality, god and man, and so on.\textsuperscript{87} This being between is held to be essential to Erôs’ nature as a daimon, and, I will argue, to its being a kind of bond. To do this, I will offer a brief overview of the meaning of μεταξύ and its use in Plato and the Platonic tradition.

The compound preposition μεταξύ—from μετά (‘between’ or ‘with’) and σύν/ξύν (‘together with’)—is used primarily to mean ‘between’, ‘association’, or ‘to be with’.\textsuperscript{88} In Plato’s dialogues, it can refer to some one thing being between two either spatially (as in Charmides being seated between Socrates and Critias),\textsuperscript{89} temporally (as in the long time between Socrates’ trial and his death),\textsuperscript{90} or, in a literary hybrid, narratively (as in the transition dialogue between two speeches or between two parts of one speech).\textsuperscript{91} The two positions between which Plato tends to use the term are either states or opposing kinds. For the former, we get examples of being between being worse and better or greater and smaller,\textsuperscript{92} learning and forgetting as intermediate stages between the states of knowledge and ignorance,\textsuperscript{93} and what exactly one would be when in the

\textsuperscript{84} Symposium, 201a-210c.
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., 201e-202d.
\textsuperscript{86} Reminiscent of the Stranger’s discussion with Theaetetus on the difference between contradictory terms and contrary terms in Sophist 256b-c.
\textsuperscript{87} Symposium, 202a3, 202a9, 202b5, 202d10, 202c1, 204b1, 204b5. Cf. 202e6 and 203e5 where she uses ἐν μέσῳ. While Diotima also says Erôs “is never either without resources or wealthy”, but does not state explicitly that he is between them, I believe it is safe to infer that this is implied as well.
\textsuperscript{88} LSJ, s.v. μετά, ξόν, μεταξύ; Pierre Chantraine, Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque (Paris: Editions Klincksieck, 1969), s.v. μεταξύ.
\textsuperscript{89} Charmides, 155c4-5.
\textsuperscript{90} Phaedo, 58c5.
\textsuperscript{91} Republic, 393b7-8, 533c. I think it no surprise, then, that Plato discusses the intermediate nature of erôs in such an interlude between Agathon’s speech and the beginning of Socrates’ speech proper, and in another interlude between the introduction of Diotima and her own “rather long” speech.
\textsuperscript{92} Phaedo, 71a1-2.
\textsuperscript{93} Theaetetus, 188a2-3. Note the particular description in Symposium 202a of erôs being analogous to ὀρθὴ δόξα; and, on this, see María Angélica Fierro, “Plato’s theory of desire in the Symposium and Republic” (PhD diss., University of Durham, 2003), 52-54.
process of change from being to destruction. Reference to the latter type of position—existence between opposing kinds—comes in the *Gorgias* and *Lysis*. In the *Gorgias*, Socrates proposes a neutral class of entities, states, and actions that are neither good nor bad (sitting, sailing, sticks and stones) and so are in between kinds. Μεταξύ is also mentioned briefly in the *Lysis*, again referring to a human’s position in between good and bad. Socrates there explains that it is the deficiency an intermediate suffers that makes him friend to that which he lacks. Here I follow Fierro, contra Frede, in identifying an active understanding of μεταξύ: it is specifically the lack suffered due to being intermediate that propels one to satisfy that lack. Different to Fierro, however, I maintain that Socrates is not here specific about the nature of the activity prompted. It remains open whether this involves the desire “to obtain and possess...the good”, as Fierro concludes, because Socrates simply indicates the desiring one will become “friend to that which it desires” and “by some natural bond belonging to each other”. Nevertheless, we can discern in Plato’s own use of μεταξύ not simply the state of being intermediate between two entities, states, or places, but intermediary: desiring with an orientation to that which it lacks.

Plato’s use of μεταξύ in the *Symposium* reiterates its meaning as both spatial and active. The primary passage in which Plato sets out this relation is worth quoting in length. When Socrates asks Diotima what manner of creature Erôs could be, if not mortal or immortal, Plato writes:

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94 *Parmenides*, 156e8-157a2.
95 *Gorgias*, 467e-468a. The argument of Dorothea Frede, “Out of the cave: what Socrates learned from Diotima,” in *Nomodeiktes: Greek studies in honour of Martin Oswald*, eds. R.M. Rosen and J. Farrell (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1993), 405, regarding this passage—that the activities engaged in by those in such a state of being “neither good nor bad” are always morally neutral, is challenged by Fierro, 50, who asserts Plato considers at least two other possibilities viable for these intermediates: (1) when such activities are undertaken as “good means for attaining” the good, they participate in the good; and (2) “if these activities were done for a bad end, they would participate in the bad.”
96 *Lysis*, 220d.
97 Fierro, 51-52; contra Frede, 404-406.
98 *Lysis*, 221d-e with *Symposium*, 212a. It would be an assumption that that which the desirer desires while being in between good and bad is necessarily the good. We could be forgiven for assuming this of Plato if we take good and bad to be on a scale of increasing perfection—the ascension of which reduces the deficiency in a way descending does not—rather than a case of mere opposites, on which reading the intermediate lacks bad just as much as he lacks good.
It’s as in the previous cases, she said, between mortal and immortal.

What is that, Diotima?

A great daimon, Socrates, for everything of the nature of daimons is between god and man.

With what kind of power?

Interpreting and ferrying things from men to gods and from gods to men: the men’s requests and sacrifices, the gods’ commands and returns for sacrifices; for it is in the middle of both and fills up the interval between them, so that the whole itself is bound together by it. It is through this that the whole expertise of the diviner works its effects, and that of priests, and of those concerned with sacrifices, initiatory rituals, incantations, and the whole of prophecy and magic. God and men do not mingle; but through this occurs the whole intercourse and conversation of gods with men…

Erôs is μεταξύ, between gods and men. That this involves a spatial dimension can be inferred from 202e; that it binds “the whole” together can be understood to be, at least at the theological level, a bond between the heavenly and the earthly dwelling-places of these entities. We also learn that Erôs as μεταξύ is not passively intermediate, but has the power (δύναμις) of the intermediary, binding (συνδεδέσθαι) the two together.

99 Symposium, 202d-203a.
100 Diotima reveals at 211b her acknowledgement of a heaven and an earth, so it is reasonable to assume she would posit the gods in the former and men in the latter.
Further, this power as a bond is what enables conversation\textsuperscript{101} as well as intercourse or togetherness\textsuperscript{102} between the two.

III.b. Love is a bond between different ontological types

In this section, I will show that love in the \textit{Symposium} is a bond between different ontological types, and not merely two groups of beings residing in different cosmological spaces. Diotima presents a standard, if streamlined,\textsuperscript{103} ancient theology: the whole itself constitutes gods, daemons, and men. Looking solely at the \textit{Symposium}, we can identify gods and men as of two different ontological classes. One key point is in the passage quoted above, Diotima’s statement at 203a that “Gods and men do not mingle”. What is more interesting is why. To answer this, I will look at three passages of Socrates’ speech: the discussions about erôs’ intermediary nature, the two types of immortality presented, and Diotima’s remarks at the height of the ascent regarding the Form of beauty compared to earthly beauties.

\textsuperscript{101} For daemons possessing the power to communicate between gods and men, see, e.g. Hesiod, \textit{Works and Days}, in \textit{The Homeric Hymns and Homerica}, trans. Hugh G. Evelyn-White (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1914), 109, 122, 252. The influence of this passage within and without the Platonic tradition is, I maintain, a support for the reading of love as bond. According to Philo, \textit{On Dreams}, in \textit{The Works of Philo}, trans. C.D. Yonge (London: G.H. Bohn, 1854), I.141 = 586d, daemons are angels of the “divine word” (\textit{ὁ ἱερὸς λόγος}), who convey to and fro (διαγγέλλουσι) “the injunctions of the father to his children, and the necessities of the children to the father.” In Plutarch, \textit{On the Failure of Oracles}, in \textit{Plutarch vol. V}, trans. Frank Cole Babbitt (Cambridge, MA: Loeb Classical Library, 1936), 416e-f, cf. 415a, 416c-f, we hear of an interval between earth and moon (\textit{μεταξὺ γῆς καὶ σελήνης}), full of air, the dwelling place of the hermeneutic daemons (\textit{δαιμόνων γένος}), whose interpretive function is said to be so important that if they were to cease to exist, not only would man be subject to confusion (ταράττειν), but it would destroy the whole communion (κοινωνία) of the universe. Apuleius, \textit{On the God of Socrates}, in \textit{The Works of Apuleius}, trans. Hudson Gurney (London: Bell & Daldy, 1866), 359, carries on this imagery, describing the daemons as residing in the air and being the clouds, in composition “a mixture of both” earthly and heavenly, and if hidden, “depressed downwards, as through for the purpose of bringing forth.”

\textsuperscript{102} On this point, I disagree with Catherine Osborne, \textit{Eros Unveiled} (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 108-109, that the function or power of daemons “is entirely concerned with communication” (my italics). The unity of gods and men achieved through the daemons is indicated in, e.g. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, \textit{The Roman Antiquities IV}, trans. Earnest Cary (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1943), I.77, and Plutarch, \textit{supra}.

\textsuperscript{103} Although John G. Gager, \textit{Curse Tablets and Binding Spells from the Ancient World} (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1992), 12, is, of course, correct that the ancient world saw the introduction of a dizzying multitude of divinities such that “most people were less certain about where to draw the lines between gods, daemons, planets, stars…”, the ancient conception, at least, of gods and men as distinct classes is undisputed. See, e.g. Osborne, 108-111; Plutarch, \textit{supra}; Proclus, \textit{In Remp.}, ed. Wilhelm Kroll (Amsterdam: Verlag Adolf M. Hakkert, 1965), II. 48.4ff.
A significant part of what Diotima teaches Socrates is regarding erôs’ nature as being between two contradictory positions, but being himself only contrary to each of those. As Osborne asserts, “Gods and men are not treated as links on a chain, but rather as polar opposites…[T]he pair god and mortal is treated as logically similar to the pairs beautiful and ugly, good and bad, and wise and ignorant that we had earlier met in Diotima’s speech as examples of opposites”. At 202a, Diotima discusses the distinction between knowledge and ignorance by saying of the former “for how could knowledge not be able to give an account…how could ignorance be that which hits upon what is?” It might be objected here that whilst gods and men could be considered different ontological types, beauty and ugliness, knowledge and ignorance are clearly not. My claim, however, is not that the same intermediary entity is between each of these pairs, but rather, erôs manifests itself in different ways. It is not love that is between knowledge and ignorance, but true opinion. Erôs takes on different titles depending on which pair it navigates. Each intermediary is represented by the daimon class, which I take to be a possible implication behind 203a: “The daemons are many and various, and one of them is Erôs.” Nevertheless, why should we consider gods and men of different types when beauty and ugliness are not? Each half of the pair is opposite in some way to the other, that much is true, but how can we explain that this pair is opposite not in definition but in ontological type? For this I turn to the Symposium itself, and its explanation of the different modes of being attributed to the two classes.

In the Symposium, Diotima teaches Socrates that gods and men are of two different ontological types by reference to their different, and mutually exclusive, methods of immortality. Diotima states, “Mortal nature is capable of immortality only in this way, the way of generation […] by the fact that that which is departing and growing old leaves behind another young thing that is as it was.” The gods, however, have “a

104 Osborne, 109.
105 Symposium, 207d, 208a-b.
different way […] by being absolutely the same forever.” This distinction stems logically from Plato’s traditional understanding of the two distinct ways of being: Being and partaking. Different ways of being forever ought to indicate different ways of being simpliciter.

Third, at the conclusion of Socrates’ speech, Diotima describes the Form of beauty itself as not “infected” by any “mortal nonsense” (φλυαρίας θνητῆς) such as mixedness, colours, or flesh, but is rather the “divine beauty” (θεῖον καλό). Her use of divine and mortal in this passage concerning the comparison of Forms and particulars hints at the parallel I argue Plato draws between the metaphysical and theological hierarchy of types, with gods and Forms each of a fundamentally different nature than men and particulars. If, then, erôs functions as a bond between gods and men, this bond is between two different ontological types.

III.c. The bond of love unites the two through generation

In order to prepare the way for my hypothesis that the Symposium suggests a manner in which the bond of love brings the two—Form and particular—together into a unity, it will be of benefit to review the key points of the long-standing objection to the mere possibility of a relation or bond between such different ontological types. This “radical separation” between Forms and particulars, is, for Bigger and others, what makes the problem of unity “a very central problem, perhaps the most important” for

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106 Symposium, 208b, 208a. This is reminiscent of the debate surrounding the possibility of different types of participation: that of Forms participating in other Forms, and that of particulars participating in Forms. On which, see Silverman, 26, 88-89; Bigger, 96, who says that “[p]articipation is not univocal” with respect to transcendental, regulative, and constitutive Forms; F.M. Cornford, Plato’s Theory of Knowledge (New York, NY: Bobbs-Merrill Co. Inc., 1957), 256, who asserts that the relation between Forms, even though called participation, cannot be the same as the relation between Forms and particulars; and Bruce Thomas Lidsten, “Plato on Participation: An Examination of the Relation between Forms and Particulars” (MA diss., McMaster University, 1979), 65, who agrees and follows Paul Seligman, Being and Not-Being: An Introduction to Plato’s Sophist (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), 46, in that as Forms and particulars are of different ontological types, that “is enough to ensure that the relations described are different.”


108 Symposium, 211e.

109 Bigger, 48.
Plato’s metaphysics. Jowett and Campbell famously claim that Plato “has no idea of a unity of opposites or differences”, following perhaps from Aristotle. One compelling reason for this disavowal of any possible unity is the argument regarding what the two could ever hope to share in common such to secure that unity. Made prominent by Spinoza in his *Ethics*, and taken up by Butler, Ryle, and, more recently, Thomas et al., this objection asserts that for two things to be in any kind of relation, they must share something in common. Different ontological types by definition share nothing in common, so there can be no relation, let alone unity, between them. Furthermore, even to posit something in common between Forms and particulars would be to threaten the Forms’ perfection: if it is of particulars, it must be qualified, and no Form can in any way be qualified.

The objection that entities of different ontological classes do not and cannot mingle is, of course, even encapsulated in Plato’s own critical look at the Theory of Forms: the Greatest Difficulty argument of the *Parmenides*. The argument, which is echoed in the *Cratylus* and *Sophist*, begins with Parmenides’ claim that the Forms cannot have any direct interaction with the realm of particulars:

> [T]hose absolute ideas which are relative to one another have their own nature in relation to themselves, and not in relation to the likenesses, or whatever we choose to call them, which are amongst us, and from which we receive certain names as we participate in them. And these concrete things, which have the same names with the ideas, are likewise relative only to themselves, not to the ideas, and belong to themselves, not to the like-named ideas.

110 Bigger, 51.
111 Benjamin Jowett and Lewis Campbell, *Republic: the Greek text* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894), 235; Aristotle, *Politics*, B2. 1261aff. Of course, the project of making one from many underlies the entire structure of the Kallipolis! (As *Republic* 423d.)
114 *Parmenides*, 133c-d.
The “fearful consequence” of such radical separation, Parmenides admits, is that the gods, who have knowledge of the Forms and thus exist in their realm, (1) would not be our masters; and (2) would have no knowledge of human affairs and we no knowledge of them or theirs. The *Parmenides* dialogue thus supports the parallel between gods and men on the one hand, and Forms and particulars on the other, that I propose underlies the metaphysical claim of the *Symposium*. But it is startling to find that the *Symposium* offers a tailored response to the Greatest Difficulty of the *Parmenides*! With Erôs as intermediary between gods and men, the two realms can be bridged. In particular, the very activities Diotima mentions at 202e-203a as now being allowed only through love are Parmenides’ own two “fearful consequences”. Through love, the gods can (1) pass on orders to humans, thereby putting them into the relation of mastering; and (2) hear of and respond with requitals to the prayers and sacrifices of mortals, thereby granting them knowledge concerning the happenings of the mortal realm such to respond to it.

If the gap can thus be bridged, it remains to be seen whether staking this victory comes at the expense of biting the Spinozan bullet of the two realms having something shared in common. Does the relation of unity necessitate sharing some extra thing in common? I propose not. The unity of a single instance required for the gap-bridging participation Plato intends, I argue, is the coming-together into a whole, such that the removal or withdrawal of some part of that whole will disband the state-dependent nature of its elements. It is not that multiple things coming together simply become one, but that that coming together yields a unity, a new whole whereby there is more goodness in the world as result. The unity of the Form of the good and a particular good is that they are each and both good—albeit via different methods, for Forms are in ways different to how particulars are, as we have seen. In the *Republic*, Plato presents the state as coming into being by the unity of the different classes of citizens. By this coming together, the state is one. A similar story is offered in the *Symposium*, only instead of different classes of citizens he uses the example of different classes of entities.

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115 *Parmenides*, 134c-e.
116 *Republic*, 423d, 462b.
It is through the unity of the individual parts of the state that the Republic’s ideal state is bound together as a one (ὅ ἂν συνδῇ τε καὶ ποιῇ μίαν); and it is through the uniting power of erôs that the Symposium’s cosmos is bound together (τὸ πᾶν αὐτὸ αὐτῷ συνδεδέσθαι).\textsuperscript{117} In the Timaeus, Plato describes the binding power of an intermediary:

But it is not possible that two things alone should be conjoined without a third; for there must needs be some intermediary bond to connect the two. And the most beautiful of bonds is that which most perfectly unites into one both itself and the things which it binds together...

δύο δὲ μόνω καλῶς συνίστασθαι τρίτου χωρὶς οὐ δυνατόν: δεσμὸν γὰρ ἐν μέσῳ δὲι τίνα ἁμορφὸν συναγωγὸν γίγνεσθαι. δεσμῶν δὲ κάλλιστος ὃς ἂν αὐτὸν καὶ τὰ συνδούμενα ὃτι μάλιστα ἐν ποιῆ...\textsuperscript{118}

On Spinoza’s account, the third thing—the bond—becomes that which is shared in common. But this is not the only way to understand an intermediary bond. The bond that participation must be is not some third new thing shared by the two; but rather, it is the mechanism by which a new thing comes into being that now constitutes both bound together. This a unity whereby the Form is instantiated in the physical world, and the particular is what it is through not only the Form, but the relation of participation itself. Now, it is all well and good to suggest that love is this bond and that the bond binds the two. The crucial question now is how? How does love so bind? The answer, on the interpretation I defend, is by generation: by the creation and bringing into being of beauty in the soul.

“[B]eing together (συνουσία) is a bringing to birth”, Diotima claims.\textsuperscript{119} It is via this bringing to birth that mortal creatures stay the way they are, for any length of time. On Diotima’s story, mortals bring to birth not just physically—as in the birth of children, the generation of new skin cells, or the growth of bones and hair—but also in terms of the soul, one’s character.\textsuperscript{120} Bringing to birth virtues of the soul can be achieved in “the

\begin{footnotesize}
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  \item \textsuperscript{117} Republic, 462b; Symposium, 202e. Cf. Pseudo-Denys, Divine Names, trans. J. Jones (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1980), 4.15, 713a-b, and 4.12, 709c, who calls erôs a “unifying and combining power” and “a power that is one-making and binding”, quoted and discussed in Osborne, 202-214.
  \item \textsuperscript{118} Timaeus, 31a-b.
  \item \textsuperscript{119} Symposium, 206c.
  \item \textsuperscript{120} Ibid., 207c.
\end{itemize}
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performance of beautiful deeds (καλὰ ἀποφηνάμενοι ἔργα)” inspired by and in association with a beautiful beloved. The lover is joined to the beloved through love, which seeks (has as its object) not the beautiful itself, but engendering. When this engendering is realised, and the more beautiful the beauties engendered, this bond is made stronger: for “those of this sort maintain a greater association and firmer friendship with one another”. The bond of love, the being together, is therefore precisely this generation. I follow Bigger in holding that participation is not about having something in common, but is “a real relation, one whereby at least one relatum is through the other”. The reason for the being of particular beauty in the lover (one relatum) is the generation of beauty that is the object of love. Love is therefore the conduit by which new beauty comes to be, fulfilling the metaphysical requirements of the participation relation by (1) binding the (2) two diverse ontological types of the particular beauty of the lover and the Form of that beauty (3) into a unity. The mortal method of participation in beauty—of being beautiful—is generating new beauty.

IV. OBJECTIONS

In this section, I will address two objections which could be raised to this theory. First, if the lover comes into the cognitive-emotive relation to beauty thus described, and as a result becomes beautiful, why is this becoming beautiful by creating beauty not the resemblance relation of particular to Form? As described most explicitly in the Parmenides, the conception of participation as the resemblance occurring between Forms and particulars was posed by the young Socrates:

I think the most likely view is, that these ideas exist in nature as patterns, and the other things resemble them and are imitations of them; their participation in ideas is assimilation to them, that and,

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121 Symposium, 209e.
122 Ibid., 209c.
123 Bigger, 73, 74.
124 See Chapter 2, §§I.b, II.c., for further analysis of the resemblance relation of participation. The resemblance relation between Form and particular is also indicated in Phaedo 74a-76a, 100c-d; Republic 472b7-c7, 510aff., 514ff, 597a4-5, 596b6-8; and Timaeus 29c1-2, 48e5-49a1, 50c4-6. I thank Gerasimos Santas for pressing me on this point.
nothing else. Then if anything resembles the idea, can that idea avoid being like the thing which resembles it, in so far as the thing has been made to resemble it; or is there any possibility that the like be unlike its like?\textsuperscript{125}

We can summarise the resemblance relation as follows: Forms stand to particulars as patterns to imitations. Particulars come to participate in the Form by being (or being made to be) like them. My account of the generative relation is that the Form stands to the particular as ancestor to heir.\textsuperscript{126} Particulars come to participate in the Form by being brought to birth. While it may be true that particulars ‘resemble’ the Forms in which they participate, resemblance does not explain how the particular comes to be in that relation. Resemblance is an outcome of the relation, not the nature of the relation itself.\textsuperscript{127} Just as the answer to the question, ‘Where do babies come from?’ can plausibly be answered with: ‘From their parents’, the more satisfactory answer would include the very specific details of conception, pregnancy, and delivery. In fact, the first answer is not just unsatisfactory, but wrong: while the parents are necessary conditions for the child’s coming into being, their mere existence is simply not sufficient. For the same reason, the cause of the particular cannot be the Form alone; the participation of particular in the Form is required.\textsuperscript{128}

Furthermore, I am not convinced that Plato was necessarily committed to the resemblance relation at all in the Symposium—at least in the imitative sense of resemblance.\textsuperscript{129} Meinwald calls the resemblance interpretation of participation “absurd”,\textsuperscript{130} taking a strongly non-self-predicating view of Forms. Indeed, the resemblance relation is often taken to imply self-predication. As Allen retorts, “[N]ot\textsuperscript{131}

\textsuperscript{125} Parmenides, 132d-e. This understanding of participation is taken up by Gail Fine, On Ideas: Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato’s Theory of Forms (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 211-212, 214.

\textsuperscript{126} To say ‘as parent to child’ poses problems, of course, as parents undoubtedly go through changes in the process of procreation. What I have in mind here is the kind of abstract familial resemblance underlying such claims as ‘She has the MacKinnon cheeks’ or ‘the Hosty nose’, which point to no particular parent as source.

\textsuperscript{127} As Anna Marmodoro, “Is Being One Only One? The Uniqueness of Platonic Forms,” Apeiron 41:4 (2008): 219, asserts, “claiming resemblance…is more a statement than an explanation.”

\textsuperscript{128} Note that in, e.g. Phaedo 100c, 101c, Socrates includes participation in his explanation. On this, see Lidsten, 13-14, 23.

\textsuperscript{129} And, at least not in Socrates’ speech.

even God can scratch Doghood behind the Ears. The view is more than peculiar; it is absurd.\textsuperscript{131} In the context of the \textit{Symposium}, I must agree. Diotima claims at the end of her speech that the Form of beauty is “not to be compared” to beautiful particulars.\textsuperscript{132} Never in the ascent passage does Plato refer to the lover making earthly beauties resemble the Form—and how could she, given that she is generating and producing beauty well before seeing the Form of beauty to use it as a model, as described in the \textit{Republic} and \textit{Timaeus} passages cited in support of a resemblance-based participation relation? Rather, the terminology employed in the \textit{Symposium} is almost exclusively generation or birth-based, for example, \textit{ἀδελφόν}, and \textit{συγγενής}.\textsuperscript{133}

This is not the very practical ‘imitation’ of Aristotle’s ethics, of blindly imitating the good man of society until you get it right. As argued in Chapter 2, the object of love is not the Form of beauty, but bringing to birth in beauty. It is precisely because this object of love is not the Form that resemblance is not the method of participation. The lover does not desire the Form itself—a plausible interpretation of which might be to be like it—but generation.

A second objection to my interpretation of participation as the generative process of creating beauty is whether it can account for not only purposeful agents and the moral virtues, but as well for artefacts and inanimate natural objects’ being what they are. I argue that it does. In the \textit{Phaedo}, equal sticks are said to strive after Equality itself, but fall short.\textsuperscript{134} Silverman states that the language of lack and striving in these passages is metaphorical; Broadie claims that taking this language as anything other than metaphor threatens making inanimate objects “too real”; and, recently, Sedley argues that the reference to it “should be henceforth abandoned.”\textsuperscript{135} However, I maintain that this was Plato’s way of understanding how the world works. In the \textit{Symposium}, this idea of

\textsuperscript{132} \textit{Symposium}, 211d.
\textsuperscript{133} Ibid., 210b, 210c.
\textsuperscript{134} \textit{Phaedo}, 75a, 75b.
particulars striving and aiming for, or to become the same as, their teleological good is
turned into a desire to give birth, to produce. Plato takes the painter-creator model of
the Republic and Timaeus even further, beyond creating an external object to creating in
oneself. What Plato attempts to accomplish in Socrates' speech is to present a
naturalistic account of becoming. This account is meant to posit participation as a
recipe for self-constitution, or self-creation, using the human experience of erôs to
provide a model for how the metaphysical is attained through a physical process.

V. MORTAL IMMORTALITY IS ACHIEVED THROUGH
INDISSOLUBILITY

At the climax of the ascent, Diotima claims that once the lover engenders and
nurturest true virtue, “it lies within him to become dear to the gods and, if it is possible
for a human being, immortal as well.”136 How can generating beauty bestow upon the
lover any serious immortality? In this section, I will argue that the kind of immortality
granted to the lover who is able to be together with the Form of beauty cannot be
vicarious or through remembrance, as was the case for the lovers in the lower mysteries.
Rather, the lover achieves an immortality through the indissolubility which follows from
sameness or oneness with the Form. After presenting this interpretation of immortality,
I outline how it might resolve outstanding concerns relating to the Aristotelian
reception of Plato’s Theory of Forms.

V.a. The rival theories: External immortalities

The claim that philosophy can offer immortality has not gone over well. Held refers
to ascensions to godlikeness in both the Symposium and the Theaetetus when he laments,
“And what mortal can do that? […] Closure and full delineation of truth and reality,
through rational inquiry, is not possible for mortals.”137 Can erôs fulfil its promise?
What can Diotima mean that the lover, in contact with the Form of beauty itself, can

136 Symposium, 212a.
inherit immortality? Three interpretations of this immortality—which dominate the literature—posit that this immortality is gained externally, that is, in virtue of some additional circumstance or party: vicarious immortality by torch-bearers, vicarious immortality by remembrance, and immortality by contact.

By immortality by torch-bearers I refer to that view according to which one obtains a vicarious immortality by her ideas, values, methods, or other major missions in life ‘living on’ through, most often, students who can preserve and keep alive the teacher’s passionate fire. The idea that one’s most influential teachers attain a form of immortality in the generations of students they leave behind is, of course, a beautiful and poetic testament to inspiring teaching. Nevertheless, this is not immortality of the *lover*: what is being passed on from generation to generation, and what never dies in such cases are her ideas, values, and methods. However much one holds an idea to be the truth and worth preserving, there is a fundamental difference between immortality of the inventor and immortality of the invention. What the lover in contact with the Form of beauty engenders is in her own soul, and so is not left behind in her students. This view of immortality by the perpetuation of students likely gets its impetus from a particular interpretation of what Diotima means by ‘birth in beauty’.

139 This obscure phrase is commonly held to mean birth ‘in a beautiful body’, that is, in the soul or mind of a student. Obdrzalek also finds this vicarious immortality problematic, but I disagree with her reason for rejecting it. She argues that this imposing ideas on others aligns with the forgetfulness and studying by refreshing one’s

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139 Hence Pender, 85. I would add, though, that there is nothing stopping this lover from leaving behind ideas as well as producing virtue in the soul. These ideas are, however, not the lover and it is the potential immortality of the lover with which our explanation is concerned.

140 Rowe (“Socrates and Diotima”), 256, argues that procreation is in the beautiful beloved.
memory, which is then contrasted by Plato with “the real thing at 208a7-b4”.\textsuperscript{141} If this is the case, she would need to account for how we humans—in obtaining immortality—suddenly jump to the kind of immortality the gods have.

Related to immortality by torch-bearers is immortality by remembrance, by performing such wondrous deeds or exemplifying such greatness of soul so as to secure being remembered forever. Living on in the minds of those who remember you played a significant role in ancient Greek culture and theology, which accounts for Diotima’s explaining the lower levels of erôs in terms of remembrance. For these reasons, it is unsurprising that a great many commentators understand this as the only kind of immortality available to humans at the height of the ascent.\textsuperscript{142} Lear, for example, asserts, “For it is only by acting in a genuinely beautiful way, in a way that commands the admiration of human beings across great reaches of time, that their names will be remembered and praised.”\textsuperscript{143} One significant problem with remembrance as the basis for immortality, however, is that it is no doubt possible to be remembered for being hideously and notoriously evil. If Plato wants the beholding of true beauty to be the best life imaginable, one which leads to the friendship of the gods and the inheritance of immortality, it is doubtful this can be just as easily accomplished through performing such nefarious deeds that one is remembered forever for vice. To this it can be objected that, for Plato’s audience, the prospect of an honourable remembrance was what was important—one’s notoriety echoing through eternity could never be desired. However, if what we are attempting to ascertain in Plato’s theory is the function by which immortality could be thought to be bestowed, simply being held in memory will accomplish this, honour not required. So, if Diotima’s invitation to immortality must be both functional and moral, immortality by remembrance is not sufficient.


\textsuperscript{142} Lear [“Permanent”], 109; Warner, 336; Rowe [“Socrates and Diotima”], 257; White [“Virtue”], 373; White [“Beauty”], 75.

\textsuperscript{143} Lear [“Permanent”], 109.
A third interpretation of the kind of immortality Diotima has in mind is an immortality attained through contact with what is already immortal—the Form. Obdrzalek dismisses this possibility as “philosophically unfathomable”, and I agree that it is not immediately clear what manner of contact alone might be able to bestow immortality. The focus is certainly a philosophic endeavour of some kind—the lengthy description of the Form of beauty, the language of lessons, and Diotima’s summary of an erotic education in 211b-d all resonate with passages elsewhere in the corpus—but it would be a mistake to assume that what is aimed at in the ascent is merely and solely an intellectual achievement. The immortality spoken of does not arise after cognitive or visual contact with the Form alone, but after the begetting of true virtue. Diotima does not say that the lover becomes immortal because of beholding the Form, but that beholding the Form enables the lover to bring to birth “because he is grasping what is true” and that “once he has given birth to and nurtured true virtue” then he might become immortal. In 1950, Hackforth admitted that, to his knowledge, none of the commentaries acknowledged this point. Instead, the focus was almost solely on passive contemplation, put forward with such certainty as: “The philosopher, we are told, is especially entitled to be called immortal in virtue of his ability to see ideal truth”; “This (sc. The apprehension of the Idea of Beauty) alone…confers upon him immortality”; “This ascent which leads to the sight of the beautiful itself…is also the way to…immortality,” and “in so far as he is a philosopher, a purely rational soul, grasping eternal objects, he is immortal”. This trend of ignoring the begetting requirement and focussing solely on the intellectual achievement as the means of immortality continues, with Sheffield claiming “Finally, the [lover in contact with true

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145 Obdrzalek, 442.
146 For example, the Sun and Line Similes in the Republic.
147 Symposium, 212a.
148 Hackforth, 44.
150 Shorey, 196.
152 Bury, xlv, n. 3.
beauty] recreates himself as ‘godlike’ in the activity of contemplation.” While contact of some kind must be necessary for the immortality, it is not sufficient: birth is required, and birth can only happen in beauty. The benefit of acknowledging this begetting part of the equation is that it explains how that immortality is acquired in a way that passive contact or gazing alone cannot.

V.b. The sameness of the Form

I propose, therefore, that these three interpretations of the immortality to which Diotima refers do not quite grasp it entirely, and that all fail because they do not contend with how she discusses immortality earlier in the speech. Obdrzalek asks,

In the ascent, the Form is characterized as eternal, perfectly unchanging and unaffected—exactly the characteristics which Plato earlier identifies with genuine immortality, and which he categorically denies to human nature (208a7-b4). Does the philosopher’s soul undergo some radical change in kind, such that it becomes capable, now, of true immortality? This notion of “genuine”, “true”, or “full” immortality, however, is puzzling given the very passage Obdrzalek cites. Here, Plato makes no reference to any kind of tiered or qualified immortality, but rather plainly states that gods and mortals (and, presumably, daimons) have different kinds of immortality—defined differently, and attained differently. Much as it is irksome to consider different kinds of immortality, it must surely be more problematic to consider degrees of immortality, as Obdrzalek et al. appear to do. At 207d-208b, Diotima presents these two types of immortality: that by which mortals could be immortal, and that by which the gods are immortal. In the one realm, “Mortal nature is capable of immortality only in this way, through the process of

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353 Sheffield, 151. Though Sheffield acknowledges that “generation is the way in which the mortal partakes of immortality”, on her reading, this generation “just is” thought or contemplation.
354 Obdrzalek, 442.

generation”, bringing into being something new and losing what was had before.\textsuperscript{156} While she does say that the lover really is bringing new bits of body and soul into being, and in that sense is preserved for some time, Diotima is careful here not to say that the lover remains the same. Rather, she says that by this process the lover can be “said to be”, “spoken of as”, “called”, and “thought to be” the same.\textsuperscript{157} Her hesitancy here implies that the lover is not in fact the self-same over time. Diotima asserts quite clearly that mortal things are the way they are, or have the attributes they do, by generation.

Whereas, in the other realm, the gods have “a different way” of being immortal: “always being absolutely the same forever.”\textsuperscript{158} Bury makes an interesting distinction on this point between temporal immortality and immortality of being, which is worth considering as mapped onto the two methods of immortality Diotima presents.\textsuperscript{159} If the mortal’s way of immortality is constant renewal, this accounts for continuity over time. The gods however, are also the same over time—which Plato includes in his mention of the gods’ “always” (ἀεὶ) being the same.\textsuperscript{160} The concept of the essential sameness of gods and changeableness of man is captured in the illustration of triangles inherited by Plato’s second successor at the Academy, Xenocrates, and recorded almost exactly from Plutarch to Proclus:

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\text{T}he \text{equilateral he compared to the nature of the gods, the scalene to that of man, and the isosceles to that of the daimons; for the first is equal in all its lines, the second unequal in all, and the third is partly equal and partly unequal, like the nature of the daimons, which have human emotions and godlike power.}\textsuperscript{161}
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The key difference between the two manners of immortality Plato presents in the \textit{Symposium} is the essential sameness of the divine—sameness over time, yes, but also exact sameness barring individual or internal change of any kind.

\textsuperscript{156} \textit{Symposium}, 207d.
\textsuperscript{157} Ibid., 207d4, 207d5, 207d7, 208a3. Cf. Aristotle, \textit{Metaphysics}, 980b: “numerous memories of the same thing eventually produce the effect of a single experience.”
\textsuperscript{158} \textit{Symposium}, 208a.
\textsuperscript{159} Bury, \textit{xlv}, n. 2.
\textsuperscript{160} It is noteworthy that the two mechanisms of immortality are, in fact, diametrically opposed: one is achieved through constant change, the other through sameness.
If Diotima is right that it might be acceptable to call the kind of preservation mortals can get by constantly renewing parts of themselves ‘immortality’, ought mortals even dare to dream of obtaining unqualified sameness? Or are they stuck to their lot of preservation-immortality without ever being themselves same over any length of time? What manner of immortality does the lover who beholds and is together with the true Form of beauty stand to gain? In what follows, I argue that the bringing to birth of true virtue would, if it were possible, bring the lover the immortality of sameness—unity and oneness with the Form. Indissolubility is a kind of perfect unity, and unity with the immortal is the most secure immortality mortals may strive to achieve.

This account does not require a change in the mode of immortality. The mortal way of acquiring immortality is always the same, at all levels of the ascent: generation and bringing to birth. This is true even at the height of the ascent—as argued above, Diotima is clear that generation is still involved and is in fact the necessary condition for human immortality. What is different about the lover who can secure the same immortality as that of the gods’ is that what this lover generates is true virtue whereas the lower lovers generate only “phantom images of virtue”, qualified and transient.\textsuperscript{162} I take Plato’s argument to include the following steps:

1. The Form is true, unqualified, and always the same
2. What is true, is perfect
3. The lover generates true virtue
4. Generating is the mortal way of being and becoming
   \(\therefore\) The lover becomes perfect
   \(\therefore\) The lover becomes the same as the Form
5. Two which are the same are indissoluble
6. The Form is immortal
7. The lover has become the same as the Form
   \(\therefore\) The lover is immortal

To this it may be objected that it is the lover’s beauty or virtue that is immortal, being the same as the Form, but not the lover herself as a whole. Yet, perhaps what it means to generate true and perfect virtue and beauty of soul in fact encompasses every aspect

\textsuperscript{162} \textit{Symposium}, 212a.
of the lover’s being: body and soul. If this is what Plato has in mind, it paves the way for beauty to have a significant causal role in his teleology, a prospect to be examined in more detail in the final chapter of this thesis. That the lover’s immortality stems from perfection of soul is espoused by Bury, O’Brien, and Sheffield, though none of these commentaries explain how this perfection is achieved beyond passive contemplation. Obdrzalek objects to this line of reasoning because it “requires an unannounced shift in the sense of *athanatos*, from everlasting to perfect.” According to my reading, however, the perfection of soul is not just a perfection that simply yields immortality. Rather, the generation of true, perfect, unqualified beauty of soul means the lover and the Form are one.

Plato’s revolutionary idea is what is implicit in premise 5: *Two which are the same are indissoluble.* What is one is indissoluble. The same is true of two entities if, though two, they are always alike. If what is one cannot be dissolved, then neither can compounds between whose elements there is no inconsistency. This is echoed in Aquinas, “For corruption is found only where there is contrariety.” The Forms have no essential contrariety. Achieving togetherness with the Form leads, if possible, to becoming the same as them, and so secures the immortality of indissolubility.

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164 Obdrzalek, 443.

165 “Non enim invenitur corruptio, nisi ubi invenitur contrarietas.” *Summa Theologiae* (Rome: Textum Leoninum, 1888), Ia q.75 a. 6 co. Recall that it was the essential complexity of the body that Socrates held to be responsible for change in the Affinity Argument of the *Phaedo*, on which see Silverman, 56-57. Unlike Aquinas, however, Plato holds that generation is “something divine”, 206c.

166 This I take to be the metaphysical import of the final lines of John Donne’s “The good-morrow”:  
  What ever dies, was not mixt equally;  
  If our two loves be one, or, thou and I  
  Love so alike, that none do slacken, none can die.  
These lines prompted Coleridge, Donne’s greatest critic, to remark, “Too good for mere wit. It contains a deep practical truth—this Triplet.” In *Metaphysical Lyrics & Poems of the Seventeenth Century: Donne to Butler*, ed. Sir Herbert J.C. Grierson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1921), 1, 217. The reality of two individual entities, one becoming exactly the same as the other—not only in resemblance, but in activity—and thus securing an indissolubility whereby the virtue of their sameness ensures that they act always alike is, of course, the foundational premise of the physical phenomenon of Quantum Entanglement. Two which are exactly alike will respond with correlated activity, thereby gaining for the instantiation of information the indissolubility of a single entity.
VI. INFLUENCE IN THE TRADITION: ARISTOTLE ON PREDICATION, AND THE PRIME MOVER

The interpretation offered in this chapter that the lover participates in the Form through the creative and generative activity of love offers insight into two controversial aspects of ancient metaphysics recorded in Aristotle: his assorted reformulations of the Third Man Argument; and his startling claim in the *Metaphysics A* that the Prime Mover moves the universe by being the object of desire. As the contributions of my theory to the reception of Plato in Aristotle are merely hypotheses, they will be presented only in broad brushstrokes here.

The first concerns a new response to the so-called Third Man Argument offered by Parmenides in Plato’s eponymous dialogue, and referred to at several places in Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* and *Sophistic Refutations*. While there is notable debate on the precise formulation of the Third Man Argument, I take the significant steps of the objection suitable for summary to be the following: if everything that is beautiful is so because it participates in the Form of beauty, and if the Form of beauty is itself beautiful, then the Form must be a member of the set of entities that so participate. The Form, however, must be distinct from particulars, therefore a third entity must be needed to explain how the beautiful particulars and the Form of beauty are beautiful, which leads to an infinite regress damaging to the uniqueness of Forms. Meinwald’s groundbreaking solution, developed by Pelletier and Zalta against later objections, was that Plato meant for us to recognise the difference between the Form’s being beautiful in relation to beautiful particulars, and its being beautiful in relation to itself. The two ways of immortality presented in the *Symposium*, however, appear to offer another angle to this solution. The Form of beauty itself is beautiful in a different way than

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167 Parmenides, 132a-133b; Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 84.23-85.3, 93.1-7, 990b17 = 1079a13, 1039a2, 1059b8; *Sophistic Refutations*, 178b36
169 As at least implied by Diotima at several places in 210d-211e, especially 210e, “something wonderfully beautiful in its nature”. I follow Rowe [Plato], 198 at 211a2-5 ad loc. that this is unproblematic.
particular beauties are beautiful: it is beautiful not just “via Being” as opposed to via participation as Silverman argues, but specifically, by always being the same to itself, a kind of internal consistency.

A second implication of interpreting participation through love is that it sheds light on Aristotle’s surprising claim in the *Metaphysics* A that the Prime Mover moves the universe by being the object of desire. A key feature of his physics and metaphysics, the Prime Mover is Aristotle’s idea of a necessary and first cause in the universe. He establishes that if all movement depends on there being a mover, there must be a first mover that is the source of all motion in the universe: “for there is something which always moves that which is moved, and the ‘prime mover’ is itself unmoved.” Crucially, Aristotle wants this Prime Mover to cause the movement of the universe not as a strictly efficient cause—because that would require a change to itself—but as a final cause, the end goal of the movement itself. Regarding how, exactly, the Prime Mover can achieve this effect, Aristotle is infamously reticent. In Chapter 7 of the *Metaphysics* A, Aristotle observes, “The object of desire (τὸ ὀρεκτὸν) and the object of thought move without being moved.” Demonstrating that the objects of desire include what is best and most beautiful, and hence in itself choice-worthy, he claims that the way the Prime Mover causes motion in the universe while remaining unmoved, is by attraction: “it causes motion as being an object of love (ὡς ἐρώμενον).”

171 Silverman, 111.
174 Osborne, 133.
attempts have been made to connect Aristotle’s hypothesis with Plato’s account of erôs in the Symposion, my interpretation of love as participation resolves some of the outstanding issues in drawing that connection.

It was a short step for Aristotle to turn the metaphysical Platonic relation of becoming through generation into a causal relation of Prime Mover to physical movement. In a recent article, Chang argues against Lloyd to claim not only that “Plato’s treatment of the Beautiful [in the Symposion] foreshadows Aristotle’s understanding of the Unmoved Mover in its nature and function”, but that Aristotle’s account of the Prime Mover as cause of particular objects being what they are is “a revision of Plato’s notion of the Form of the Beautiful.” The radical difference between Chang’s interpretation and what I have argued for above is that Chang posits the Form of beauty as the object of love. This is a neat and tidy solution, but suffers a damaging objection for the connection he draws between Plato and Aristotle. For he claims that Aristotle’s major development of and contribution to Plato’s theory was to extend the range of objects subject to the efficacy of the Prime Mover to the universe as a whole, including inanimate objects. This places the Prime Mover in contrast to the Form, “whose influence does not extend beyond the world of mortals.” At stake here is whether the account of participation I find in the Symposion can hold for non-mortal participation. By holding the object of love to be generation, rather than the Form of beauty, my interpretation accounts for the way in which love moves the lover. Simply having the Prime Mover—or, in Plato’s case, the Form—attract the universe does not explain what they are doing when they move, in order to move. With love’s object generation, the Symposion shows how one moves in becoming increasingly closer to true beauty. Even if it is granted that Plato does not offer the relation of love as capable of extending to inanimate objects—putting aside the simple solution of creator-product efficient cause, where the producer’s love becomes the required love responsible for the

import of this account to subsequent theories of motion and cosmology, see Richard Sorabji, Matter, Space, and Motion (London: Duckworth, 1988), 219-226.

177 Chang, 431, 446.
178 Ibid., 440-441, 446
179 Ibid., 441.
product’s being what it is—this is still not a problem for my theory because the language of striving, desiring, and even loving to be is employed by Plato in his descriptions of inanimate particulars’ participation elsewhere in the corpus, as discussed above. This should satisfy those who would assert Aristotle’s extension here is unique, for it is the same line of reasoning Aristotle himself takes to cast the love model over a particularly difficult set of inanimate objects: the stars. He writes, “A tradition has been handed down by the ancient thinkers of very early times, and bequeathed to posterity in the form of a myth, to the effect that these heavenly bodies are gods, and that the Divine pervades the whole of nature.”

By making the heavenly bodies conscious gods, he is able to build his account in Chapter 7 that a perception of the objects of love and the objects of thought is required to effect movement. Otherwise, Aristotle’s system suffers from the threat of inconsistency posed by Aquinas between a supreme first principle responsible for all being and movement, and constituents of the world unaffected, impervious, or inaccessible to that power.

If Aristotle can successfully account for the Prime Mover being the cause of inanimate objects’ material and formal existence through the model of love and striving, so can Plato.

Chang asserts that “although Plato argues that the Form of the Beautiful is a divine thing (θεῖον, Symposium 208b1, 211e3), he does not make it a god (θεὸς) as Aristotle does the Unmoved Mover (Metaph. 1072b25, b28-30).” Chang says the reason Aristotle does this is due to the necessity for Aristotle to ascribe thought to the Prime Mover, so that it becomes a conscious being, and so must be anthropomorphised into a god. Of course, Plato does associate the Form of beauty with a deity: Καλλονή, goddess of childbirth. It is to beauty that we now turn.

180 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1074b1-5.
181 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1a. 70. 3.; Osborne, 132-138.
182 Chang, 438.
VII. CHAPTER CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have offered an account of participation to be found in the *Symposium*: just as Eros the daimon navigates the interval between gods and men, binding the two together into a unity and enabling the transport of desire and desert between them, so the generative emotion of love is the mortal method of participation in the Forms, bridging the realms of different ontological type. The *Symposium* therefore offers a complete account of the participation relation that binds mortal and immortal, particular and Form. The Form of the beautiful makes all things beautiful through participation, and particulars and Forms are bound together in this way to comprise a united, teleological system for Plato. Love in response to beautiful particulars motivates human action, beginning with the cognitive progress from sensible perception of those particulars to knowledge of what makes them beautiful: the Form. In the best cases, the experience and knowledge of beauty inspires the generation of new beauty in the soul of the lover—an active endeavour which elucidates Plato’s identification of love as being of bringing to birth. Plato’s theory of daimonic, philosophic love provides an explanation of how inconstant particulars can actively relate to the eternal, immutable Forms. Participation in the beautiful, is to become beautiful. One becomes beautiful by generating the true virtue of beauty within herself, and thus participates in that holism in her becoming uniquely beautiful.

This is the most immortal of all engendering, and makes one dear to the gods and as immortal as a mortal can be. She is dear to the gods to the extent that she is like them, and is herself like them to the extent that she, by engendering a productive excellence within herself, has effected the Forms’ causal activity. The best, beautiful mortal works to bring about as much beauty in the sensible world as possible, by engendering it most clearly. The reason the emotional goes hand-in-hand with the metaphysical in this dialogue, is because Plato has endeavoured to build a single, naturalistic process of becoming that explains both. The process changes only with respect to context, but not content. This theory of participation harnesses the motivational capacity of love, which identifies the relation as distinctly not a passive one. The entire ascent passage concerns
itself with individual movement and change: exploring and learning about the wider world in coming to behold the great sea of beauty, and the personal development of virtue and beauty of the soul. Such a life, far from proving “a sorry sort of thing,” turns out to be the best life imaginable.

184 Symposium, 211e-212a.
CHAPTER V:

The Virtue of Beauty

Argument: The generation of beauty as a virtue of soul can only happen in beholding the beautiful because beauty is our access to knowledge of the true. Accordingly, the theory of participation defended in this thesis yields constructive implications for moral education.

The Symposium demonstrates that love leads to cognitive pursuit which manifests in a desire to generate beauty in the soul. Love can thus be seen to have both educational and creative value when engaged in the presence of beauty. But what is it about beauty that leads to this education which, in the best cases, results in virtue? The details of the ascent passage, as analysed in Chapter 3, make it clear that beauty is a fundamentally attractive concept, one that makes the lover curious to know more about it. I have argued that this element of love thusly sets in motion a mechanism of self-creation, whereby the lover makes herself beautiful. As one comes to learn about the various beauties present in the world, she can develop her understanding of the Form of beauty itself in the cognitive attainment of realising and beholding the essential one over the many beautiful particulars. The question remains, however: why should beauty motivate this cognitive and creative activity?

In her account of the Form of beauty’s role in the creative process, Diotima makes the startling claim that generation can only occur “in beauty”.1 In this chapter, I argue that the generation of beauty as a virtue of soul can only happen in beholding the beautiful because beauty is our access to knowledge of the true. Beauty’s attracting nature is the result of its bearing every mark of the Forms in a manner of clarity unique

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1 Symposium, 206c-d.
to it. It is only through beauty that one may access the virtue of soul one can truly attain.

I will first outline the background in the Symposium text in which Diotima describes the Form’s role in generation, along with an overview of the Greek term for beauty, καλόν, which demonstrates how Plato appropriates this term for his own argument; next, this textual and historical background provides support for an explanation of why generation can only happen in beholding beauty: beauty is our access to truth. The final section of this chapter then turns to an examination of practical implications of this argument for a broad conception of the content and context of a moral education that engages the emotions.

I. BEAUTY’S ROLE IN GENERATION

I.a. Beauty, Καλλονή, καλὸς, and κάλλος

In the prelude to her discussion of the lower and higher mysteries, Diotima makes a number of startling claims about the human capacity for generation. Whilst all humans are “pregnant” both in body and in soul, and all desire to give birth, she says, there is a specific requirement for this giving birth. She asserts of human nature that it is incapable of giving birth in ugliness, but only in beauty, for the being together (συνουσία) of a man and woman is a bringing to birth. It is a divine affair, this engendering and bringing to birth ( κύησις καὶ ἡ γέννησις), and it is an immortal element in the creature that is mortal. It is impossible for this to happen in the unfitting, and the ugly is unfitting with everything divine, but the beautiful is fitting (ἁρμόττον). So Kallone [Beauty] is the Moira [Fate] and Eileithyia [Clever Midwife] for birth.²

At the end of this passage, we learn that beauty (personified here as the goddess, Kallone) presides over generation. Beauty oversees all creation. I formulate what I take to be the steps of this slightly unusual argument below:

1. The togetherness of a man and woman is a generation
2. Generation is an immortal element of human nature
3. Generation is divine
4. The beautiful is harmonious with the divine
   ∴ The beautiful is harmonious with generation
5. The ugly is not harmonious with the divine
   ∴ The ugly is not harmonious with generation
   ∴ Human nature can only generate in communion with beauty, never with ugliness

A number of crucial premises are, of course, missing from this argument. We can nevertheless understand these sweeping statements to conclude that generation is something divine, and can only happen in the beautiful because generation can only happen in or with what is fitting or harmonious to the divine, and the beautiful is fitting to the divine. Is the beautiful the only thing fitting with the divine? What about truth, or goodness? To investigate this, I shall first turn to the specific concept we are dealing with in these passages of the Symposium: ὁ καλὸν.

The Greek term καλὸς, as the adjectival form of τὸ καλὸν, the beautiful, is commonly translated as either “beautiful” or “fine”. When applied to a person, the term usually carries with it a sense of the visual—as a human characteristic, the familiar sense of being perceptibly beautiful, pretty, handsome, or attractive—but this is not the extent of its use within the Greek society of Plato’s day. Inanimate objects, sensible phenomena, activities, and actions can also be καλὸς. Artefacts called καλὸς are praised with respect to their efficacy, how well they are made, and how well they perform their intended function—that for which they were created. Furthermore, whilst “neat and

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3 Of the most accepted recent translations, Christopher Rowe says ‘beautiful’ is “generally the most appropriate translation in Symp.” Plato: Symposium (Warminster: Aris & Phillips Ltd., 1998), 172 ad loc. 201c1-2. For the background senses of καλὸς, and its relation to other moral terms, especially ἀγαθὸς, see, still, Sir Kenneth Dover, Greek Popular Morality at the Time of Plato and Aristotle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), esp. 69-73.

well-proportioned”, “fair-cheeked”, or “manly” could be said of a person’s body, to describe a person as καλός would be to suggest the bearer of that quality was admirable, creditable, or honourable. This is reflected in the fact that in later Greek usage, κάλλος even replaced ἀγαθός as the general term for ‘good’. The opposite of καλός—αἰσχρός (ugly)—also demonstrates the moral aspect of beauty Plato’s contemporaries would have recognised. To be αἰσχρός is to be disgraceful, shameful, even scandalous. Inscriptions in Attic pottery, as well as representations in ancient graffiti, describing a person as καλός implied that the person was, yes, beautiful in the sense of appearance—that element does not leave the concept—but also in the sense of sophistication and even moral uprightness. Calling someone καλός was therefore an indication of the promise of good and beautiful behaviour in the future as well as a statement regarding their status at the present moment. If this association is correct, as Nehamas asserts, “to describe people as kaloi is to go beyond the features of their appearance and indicate an assessment of their status and actions as well. It is to make a forward-looking judgment.”

When experiencing something καλός, as Dover suggests, “[f]avourable reactions include unspoken thoughts such as ‘I wish I could be like that!’”. This sense resonates with much of what we have gathered from the Symposium. When the καλός object is an external object, there is the judgement that one’s life would be better if this object were a part of it, and the sustained desire that the object continue to be present to the beholder.

The desire to be like a καλός person is a claim about more than one’s physical appearance, but it is here that the translation ‘beautiful’ runs into difficulty in the

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5 [Ἀστεῖοι καὶ σύμμετροι (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 4.3, 1125b6-8); καλλιπάρηος (Homer, Iliad, 1.143); ἀνδρικός (Republic, 474e)].
6 Dover, 71.
9 Dover, 70.
contemporary aesthetic scholarship. Kosman, for example, laments that the range of objects described as καλός within Plato’s dialogues is simply too broad to account for the relatively specific content of the English term ‘beautiful’, concluding that it would be “misleading” to translate it as such categorically.\(^\text{10}\) However, I maintain that the very content of beautiful beloveds in the Symposium’s ascent passage demonstrates that it is precisely this range of beauties—from boys to poetry to the sciences to a friend’s character—that all qualify as beautiful. For, as Lear insists, Plato’s underlying point in that passage was to build the account that each of these objects do have something essential in common: they all participate in the Form of beauty!\(^\text{11}\) Whether or not ‘beautiful’ turns out to be the most appropriate translation for the term, it is nevertheless clear that Plato intended it to encompass far more than surface-level appearance. What is there on the surface, however, held an especial role for Plato, as indicated in both the Symposium and, more explicitly, in the Phaedrus.\(^\text{12}\) Beauty manifests a certain claritas, a radiance shining forth from the object that catches the senses and prompts further engagement and focus. Beauty, perhaps, is indicative of its ability to lead to knowledge.

\textit{I.b. Why is generation only in the beautiful?}

What we can discern from Diotima’s description of Kallone is that generation can only happen in the beautiful because—at least on the account that I have argued is presented in the Symposium—generation is a self-creative, bringing-into-being of new beauty and virtue in the lover. It is our human nature to bring to birth, and the best realisation of that nature is to bring to birth true virtue.\(^\text{13}\) One’s virtue is her good, just as a knife’s good is to be sharp. By positing love’s activity as the participation relation, we can articulate just how moral virtue includes the ordering of affective motivation. To be virtuous, one must first become virtuous; to become virtuous, one needs to

\(^{10}\) Kosman, 348-349, 351.


\(^{12}\) Phaedrus, 250c-e.

\(^{13}\) Symposium, 206c, 212a-b.
produce virtue, or have virtue produced in her; and to produce virtue is, as we have seen, a matter of generation. The Form of beauty is necessary for this task. This is a teleological generation, and the Symposium’s account of how one ascends to her potential. By creating beauty one participates in beauty, and this is the immortal activity in which mortals may partake: the power within us to shape our future becoming. Erôs, on the other hand, is the quasi-divine element within the mortal, the co-worker with human nature to realise the end goal of that human nature.

If generation is the bringing into being of new beauty, then there are two accounts by which generation can only happen in beholding the beautiful: the naïve, and the sophisticated. On the naïve account, the generation of new beauty requires beauty (whether the Form of beauty, or some other existing beautiful particular) as a pattern to look to in that creation. This is, of course, very practical: every artist needs her model. Even in the case of conceptual creativity, it is the idea, impetus, or inspiration behind the artwork which functions as muse manifested on the canvas. There is one crucial way, however, in which this account will not be able to harmonise with the moral theory of Socrates’ speech. If the only reason beauty is required for generation is for it to function as a model for creation, then surely ugliness or vice could so function as a model as well. Diotima’s story of erôs would result in, as it were, children of the night and so be the birth in ugliness she expressly denies is possible at 206c-d. Yet ugliness and vice very plainly exist in the world, a fact that Socrates clearly acknowledges.14

The sophisticated account of how generation requires beauty holds that beauty is the philosopher-lover’s access to truth and the other moral Forms. The view of the lover in the Symposium goes as follows: she sees and is struck by something beautiful, and is immediately led to ask questions about it. She wants to know more about it: where it comes from, who made it, how it works, what it is like. Curiosity is the natural response of the soul to beauty. This curiosity is the mechanism of love: it is love working its power to shape and direct the course of one’s life. Generation can then only happen in the company of the beautiful because otherwise it would bring about a

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14 Symposium, 201c, 205e, 206c-d.
miscarriage of that development. In the Symposium, Diotima describes what happens with ugliness which explains clearly why it could not lead to generation of anything: ugliness makes one “shrink up, and turn away”\(^{15}\). When an object, idea, or person is actually ugly—and not simply unusual—one recoils. This is a powerful indifference, impelling one in the opposite direction of knowledge of the object: she simply wishes to know nothing at all more about it.

Beauty, precisely because it begs such curiosity, is therefore that element of the physical world that brings us access to the true and secure objects of knowledge. The view of the Form of beauty as a ‘gateway Form’ to the other Forms has been noted by Rist, who asserts, “For unless it is the case not only that Forms exist but that we want to know them, then they are of no help in our moral lives—and for Plato also for our intellectual lives”.\(^{16}\) Although in the Symposium the only Form mentioned is beauty, at least in this dialogue, beauty is all that is needed for the engendering that can make the lover “dear to the gods”.\(^{17}\) The received view regarding the Form of beauty’s privileged status in the Symposium is the dialogue’s setting: a symposium, at which the beauty on offer would be natural as a theme, especially in a discussion on erôs.\(^{18}\) But perhaps beauty is Plato’s example of a Form so frequently precisely because it bears all the marks of a Form: not only the technical requirements of Forms as satisfied in Diotima’s encomium at 210a-211c, but its function as a standard for evaluation, and an aim of moral excellence towards which to strive.

II. IMPLICATIONS FOR MORAL EDUCATION

I shall turn now to what I view as an opportunity for future development in the study of the emotions: what Plato’s discussion of love, beauty, and cognition in the Symposium might be able to contribute to our current understanding of the emotions’ role in moral development more generally. If love proves to be the mechanism by which

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\(^{15}\) Symposium, 206d.


\(^{17}\) Symposium, 212a.

\(^{18}\) On which, see n. 153 in Chapter 3, §III.a.
one shapes herself to realise her nature, then there is much room for building an account of how both love and beauty may be utilised proactively in teaching and learning.

II.a. Engaging the emotions in education

Can the emotions be educated? Ought they? The past twenty years has witnessed a groundswell of academic interest in the emotions, with considerable attention being given to arguing and articulating their philosophical, political, and medical import.19 Yet the role of emotions in moral education has seen an unfortunately neglectful polarisation, with as-yet unresolved tension pitting educating for rationality against educating for moral development of the total person. This is, of course, not a new debate. Accordingly, this interest has sparked something of a minor Renaissance of and academic focus on historical treatments of the emotions, particularly Aristotelian views on love and friendship, Stoic applications to psychological health, and pre-Socratic discussion of the emotions in the poetry of, for example, Hesiod and Empedocles.20

Plato is often portrayed as advocating an abandonment of such emotions as love and desire, in order for the philosopher to have access to the true objects of knowledge. Yet, in the Symposium, he writes that a life without love is not worth living, and that love is the best chance the philosopher has at true knowledge of beauty and virtue. In


what follows, I argue that education by attraction to the beautiful motivates moral development through a unique form of self-creation. I will first outline the state of the challenge between a solely cognitive basis for education, and one that allows for affective or emotional considerations. Next, I will show how Platonic virtue ethics, specifically his theory of love in moral development, holds out the most tenable prospect for an education of reason and emotion, as the emotive-cum-aesthetic power of love carries with it a distinctly creative element: the generation of virtue in the soul. Finally, I sketch three practical ways this creative love might be employed in the classroom. I conclude that love’s virtue is its peerless power to impel one to develop and shape herself. Beauty incites creation of beauty, and the mechanism for that creation is love.

II.b. Moral education review

The instrumental and utilitarian trends that pervade significant areas of contemporary education are typified by the promotion of the value of school as being primarily or even solely in the service of economic benefit to state or student. In spite of such trends, there remains a sound argument for the view that education ought concern itself with a more comprehensive view of human development. Humans are undeniably emotional beings, and thus that personal development must take the emotions into serious consideration. The challenge is traditionally presented as between a strictly cognitive view of education, and one that seeks to shape the character through emotional development. A brief analysis of these two general views will provide insight into where a virtue ethical framework might be able to contribute a degree of reconciliation for moral educational curricula.

The former view is made prominent by Kohlberg’s cognitivist understanding of moral development, which—stemming from Piagetian cognitive theory—takes that development to encompass only emotionally disinterested rational capabilities such as social cognition, problem solving, and perspective-taking without affect.21 On the

Kohlbergian educational program of study, moral development is seen as largely the province of cognitive development, relegating emotion to the sidelines as impeding the rationality which is its exclusive focus. On the other hand, two influential anti-Kohlbergian systems have also arisen in the literature: character education, as best exemplified in the works of Lickona and Kilpatrick, and the ethics of care defended by Noddings, Gilligan, Chodorow, and Slote. Proponents of character education “rally around the belief that the formation of moral dispositions is a vital part of moral education and ascribe to a comprehensive definition of character which views character as comprising dispositions of thought, action, and feeling.” The ethics of care take the emotion of caring to be “ontologically basic to human excellence” and that the aims of maintaining and enriching caring relationships must be the anchor of all educational


Maxwell and Reichenbach, 158.
activities and policies. Both of these theories, especially character education, may be mistaken for a brand of virtue ethics, but they differ in at least one significant respect when it comes to educating for moral development: neither character education nor the ethics of care appear to offer a specific mechanism for incorporating reason into their praxis. As Carr laments of care ethics, “it seems in itself to be opposed to any very principled definition of moral association.”

Is there a view of moral educational theory that does not place attentiveness to the emotions over and above the development of rational capacities, nor sacrifice them for a quasi-Kantian view of education that all but ignores the emotive aspect of ethical development? In what follows, I want to focus on the emotion of love and its role in educating for virtue. With this as a focus, I hope to show we can find such an educational theory in Platonic virtue ethics.

II.c. Platonic virtue ethics

Virtue ethics can be argued to hold out more over its rival moral theories with regard to education since its focus takes into account the human soul as a whole—specifically including emotions such as love, but also fear, shame, and the more contentious feelings of Schadenfreude, pride, anger, and maudlin. I identify three reasons for virtue ethics to be the primary candidate for a social scientific educational theory of moral development. First, virtue ethics is fundamentally about a particular ordering of the emotions so as to be compatible with reason. Plato’s discussion of the properly ordered soul in his dialogue, the Phaedrus, depicts reason as a charioteer harnessing the motivational force of an angry but righteous horse on the one hand, and

25 Maxwell and Reichenbach, 155; Noddings [Challenge to Care].
the wily but chaotic and desiderative horse on the other. The account is famously set out in an educational context in Book IV of his Republic, where the virtuous individual is one whose rational, spirited, and erotic capacities are established “in a relation of mastering, and being mastered by, one another that is according to nature.”\(^{28}\) That relation is beautifully expressed by Lewis in his short treatise on emotion and morality in education, The Abolition of Man, as the condition in which “the head rules the belly through the chest.”\(^{29}\) Rather than deny, ignore, or suppress the emotions, or relegate them to extra-curricular training, virtue ethics fully acknowledges the potential conflicts between reason and emotion and sets out a structure that accounts for their role in the virtuous life. The major benefit of this accommodation is that it allows for movement in the direction of a possible reconciliation with moral educational theories that focus more on training for rationality.

Second, that virtue ethics is a satisfactorily principled cognitive system ought go some way to warning off the threat of emotions taking over and destroying the work of reason when faced with a personal moral dilemma. For virtue ethics, especially contemporary virtue ethics as set out in Geach and Hursthouse, does hold that some actions or activities are absolutely wrong.\(^{30}\) The difference between virtue ethics and consequentialist theories here, however, turns on those situations when a morally bad act is required in the face of a more damaging alternative. Whereas the consequentialist would see the act as morally neutral or even positive in its achievement of the best outcome, the virtue ethicist would still be committed to the principle that the act was, in fact, wrong.\(^{31}\)

A third reason virtue ethics is our best candidate for an account of moral education that facilitates the interaction between reason and emotion is that it affords a positive role for reflection in emotive development. Aristotle’s ‘doctrine of the mean’—according to which the virtuous action is the mean between two extremes of character;

\(^{28}\) Phaedrus, 246a-254c; Republic, 427c-444e, esp. 444b-e.
\(^{31}\) Carr (“Literature”), 140.
for example, cowardice and recklessness—requires cognitive reflection in order to locate that mean, or, in the case of his supreme virtue, magnanimity, to be able to identify the particular pitch and balance magnanimous action requires in a given situation.\textsuperscript{32}

That virtue ethics is conducive to emotions in education is perhaps not surprising. The vocation-focused or economically-impactful curricula referenced above share a common trajectory with deontological and utilitarian ethical systems in their emphases on satisfying objective lists or calculating consequences and benefits. If the underlying strength of virtue ethics is its ability to account for the entire human complex—messy emotions and all—a virtue ethical pedagogy of moral development would, at least in theory, be primed to avoid those perhaps negative priorities. My interpretation of the \textit{Symposium} demonstrates how Plato’s virtue ethical system puts love at the heart of not only cognitive motivation, but moral development in tandem.

\textit{II.d. Curriculum: Beauty in the classroom}

This idea of creative thinking led by love, I argue, was a key feature of Plato’s educational theory and derives from insightful analysis of the human powers of motivation. You cannot navigate with merely a highly polished rudder—you must start with the motor before navigation even begins. Once we have engaged the emotions, then we can deliver the directional standards of a particular curriculum.

The hypothesis we are presented with in the \textit{Symposium} is that every contact with beauty (from perceptual and sense-based contact, to emotional and cognitive contact) gives rise to erotic desire to generate in beauty. This generation, as I have argued above, manifests in an assimilation with beauty itself. Love unites the Form with the particular lover, binding them together, and thus enabling the production of any and all particular beauty. If Plato is right about this, his message to posterity is that teachers should teach by beauty, and by engaging the emotions. Philosophy, the love of wisdom, has a responsibility not to sit alone in the study or retreat to the ivory tower—building edifices of purely rational construction—but to connect with the world of art and

\textsuperscript{32} Aristotle, \textit{Nicomachean Ethics}, 1106a26-b28, with 1106a36-b7, 1122a18-1125a17.
culture to generate the virtue that those in pursuit of it have come to love, and to know.

Kristjánsson divides moral education of emotion projects into three inter-related areas of inquiry: (1) are emotions appropriate objects of education; (2) ought, and if so, how, can emotions be shaped within education; and (3) what specific activities or techniques can teachers employ in the classroom. As the above discussion has emphasised, the debate on educating the emotions tends to focus on the first two questions—understandably, of course, as we are philosophers. Precious little, however, is available to educators seeking practical, straight-to-the-classroom application of the results of all this research. Indeed, Maxwell and Reichenbach even go so far as to say that “not a single intervention programme or identifiable body of educational practices or strategies grounded in a major theoretical perspective in contemporary social psychology exists which specifically and explicitly targets moral emotions.” In what follows, I would like to outline, briefly, some of the positive ways the virtue of love—being the internal motivation to seek not only knowledge of the attracting object, but the activity of shaping oneself and generating in the soul—may be encouraged in the contemporary classroom.

First, educators can engage the emotion of love through *bringing beauty into the classroom*. The “vast, open sea of beauty”, to appropriate Plato’s description of the lover’s vision, is diverse and limitless. Depending on the level of schooling, a range of examples in art and literature (conceived broadly to include as well drama, music, dance, design, and more) can be creatively incorporated into lessons with the specific aim of grabbing the emotions, which in turn compel further investigation (in the classroom, in extra-curricular activities, and in personal free pursuit), and indicate future lines of discussion. There exist in the literature a number of compelling arguments that engaging the emotions of, for example, compassion, sympathy, and empathy—through materials and stories—is the “sine qua non of the ability to

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33 Kristjánsson, 671-689.
34 Maxwell and Reichenbach, 148.
35 Symposium, 210d.
formulate moral assessments.”

Educating through love and attraction to the beautiful, however, offers a uniquely powerful capacity to harness the motivational aspects of the emotion. For it is the initial pangs of love, read as the desire to know, which first present as curiosity and develop into a commitment to finding out more, and a passion for the subject that may shape the course of a life. Bringing beauty into the classroom—all classrooms, not just the art studio—can launch this motivation in new and exciting ways.

The beauty of great literature and compelling art has a further especial role to play in developing imagination, particularly in the consideration of multiple perspectives that arouse emotion. Such subjects are often exceptionally concerned in depicting or commenting on the complex interplay of human emotions in moral situations. Indeed, Wordsworth defined poetry as “the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings.” By presenting material that prompts an emotional response, students can be inwardly led to appreciate certain aspects of a case they may not otherwise have acknowledged. I should emphasise here that bringing beauty into the classroom ought go beyond art appreciation courses as one among other (subtly more ‘serious’, ‘academic’) subjects. The beauty of art and literature should instead be seen as a powerful impetus to moral development and so afforded a place in any and all subjects deemed appropriate by the educator.

What engaging the emotions can contribute to educational and cognitive development is what Schwarz and Clore term “affect as information”. According to this theory, internal emotional experiences supply individuals with information about their external environment. This information can then be harnessed in creative ways as

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it influences the individual’s evaluations, decisions, concerns, and further courses of action. Educators can consider how facilitating students’ attending to their emotional response to material may enhance the learning experience and understanding of course content. Take, for example, the following classroom exercises:

- Upon the presentation of visual illusions such as Adelson’s Checkershadow Illusion, below, the mind is primed to accept that the squares marked A and B are of different colours.

In fact, they are the same colour, and this can be confirmed by the educator using the proof image:
When the illusion is experienced for the first time, students often respond with a range of emotions including bafflement, awe, amusement, and incredulity—the latter of which leads naturally to further questioning and explanation. In my undergraduate philosophy classes, I use this illusion to introduce Descartes’ radical doubt: how much can we trust our senses if they can be so wildly taken in by illusion? The emotional response, however, can be harnessed for motivating the intellectual virtues of curiosity and care towards a host of subjects. For example, such virtues can serve to widen appreciation for suspending judgement on controversial figures in a History class until the motivations for actions can be carefully considered; or for precision and caution in a Science lab.

- Literature, poetry, and other story-telling media can also stimulate the emotions to enhance achievement outside of English and Literature classes. Upton Sinclair’s *The Jungle* is often featured in American History class readings lists, but its ability to generate powerful emotions of shock and disgust at the conditions of the meat-packing industry in the early 20th-century can function to initiate discussions and projects across the educational spectrum. Despair at the working conditions the novel presents is a unique way to contribute to lessons on trade unions and class poverty in Economics; and revulsion at unsanitary factory farming practices can initiate a personal dimension to considerations of vegetarianism and veganism in a Physical Education or Health class, or of animal welfare and organic farming in Government and Business classes.

What is important to focus on in such exercises is that the students attend consciously to their emotions in response to the subject matter of the lesson: drawing out what it is the experienced emotion *tracks*, and considering that aspect of the content as *information* which can be explored further in discussions or assignments.
Second, educators can use *Gadfly questions* to engage the emotions in response to an apparent wrong. Socrates’ reference to himself, in the *Apology*, as a gadfly who bites the sluggish horse in order to arouse that horse to action is put into practice by his acting the rogue street philosopher, constantly questioning his contemporaries in such a way that they would feel compelled either to defend their premises or realise further thought and refinement of those premises was needed.\(^3^9\) Plato acknowledges that children possess the ability to love the beautiful, and blame and hate the ugly, even before they are capable of rational speech.\(^4^0\) By pressing intuitively controversial points, challenging assumptions, or playing *advocatus diaboli*, educators can stir up instinctive defences of what is, or is at least thought to be, true.

Gadfly questions can be directed towards the course content and students’ answers to questions, in addition to their emotional responses to that course content. Facilitators may take cues from Socrates’ own method as to what kinds of questioning best get at the heart of the interlocutor’s statements, probing responses to ferret out analytic distinctions as well as to elicit commitment to a view by proposing a radical alternative. The use of the Socratic Method in education has long been championed for its ability to aid students in clarifying and justifying their thoughts on the topic under question.\(^4^1\) Of specific relevance to our topic of engaging the emotions in education, is to direct gadfly questions towards the students’ own emotional responses to material (and perhaps especially towards unexpected emotional responses), which can be indicators of a further question or line of reasoning. Examples of such gadfly questions towards emotions may include:

- *Do you think all parties (or characters) involved in the event felt the same way in response? Why or why not?*

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\(^3^9\) *Apology*, 30c.

\(^4^0\) *Republic*, 401e-402a.

- Why do you think you like X more than Y?
- Is there a difference between our society and the society under discussion that might make the situation look different to you?
- What element of the lesson would you be most (or least) likely to remember tomorrow?
- What element of the lesson makes you the most surprised (or angry, or curious)? Why?

The task in employing gadfly questions specifically, within the broader teaching style of the Socratic Method, is to harness the motivational power of the emotions and direct it towards identifying new ways of thinking about course content. By attending to their emotions in this reflective manner, students can link their own affective responses to the subject of a lesson and find in that link a personal reason to defend and articulate their thoughts.

A third practical application of Plato’s theory of love’s virtue is to use beauty as a tool for cognitive appraisal and reflection. Art and literature can present vastly different beauties, which the student can then evaluate in relation to other beauties presented in the course, and in relation to other types of beauties she experiences in her wider world. This is the very basis of Plato’s metaphysical theory of Forms, according to which one learns about, for example, abstract, absolute beauty by reflecting on what each of these particular beauties perceived and experienced have in common. Identifying what is essential to each of: a beautiful work of art; a beautiful scientific equation; a beautiful soul; and a beautifully accomplished action or performance is at once, then, a cognitive-emotional-aesthetic (not to mention interdisciplinary) exercise. Encouraging students to ask, and reflect on, what it is they think that makes each of the different beauties they encounter beautiful can culminate in synthesisation assignments which aim at articulating and defending an account of what the terms beauty, art, or justice actually can mean. Methods for employing this concept in the classroom could include the following exercises:
- Having students each curate an ongoing journal focussing on a key concept of the course (e.g., citizenship, tragedy, respect, or abuses of power). Journals can be written in a notebook or—to introduce technology where appropriate to the level of the course—created online, as on a Tumblr microblog or Pinterest board. Students add examples of the concept they identify in art, current affairs, or the media and are asked to reflect on each entry asking what it is they think makes the particular example fall under the concept heading: what it is that makes the piece of work beautiful, or the court ruling unjust. The task here is to allow the emotions first to locate the particular examples, which can then become the subject of appraisal and reflection. This reflection aims at developing creative or lateral thinking, which draws connections between disparate instances of a concept.

- Incorporating music created in a particular culture or era into a World Civilisations, History, or Foreign Language class. This can be done at intervals throughout the term, with students instructed to choose a song or music style they liked best at the end; or as a one-off project for a particular time period. Students are to reason about what in the period might have inspired or influenced the artists. Rather than making this a research exercise, it can be done as in-class writing, to facilitate lateral thinking between their emotional response to the music and the historical-cultural facts presented in the course content.

My aim in highlighting this third kind of exercise is to draw attention to the particularly creative impetus beauty in art can have on the emotions, which—when attended to with cognitive reflection—can draw the mind to identify causal relationships between material previously unnoticed. The development of the ability to draw such relationships is a key feature of the kind of lateral and creative thinking which marks original thought.
I may at this point anticipate the objection regarding Plato’s infamous ‘banishment’ of the poets from his ideal city in Republic Book X, on the basis that they morally corrupt an audience. To argue that this demonstrates a rejection of art as an educational tool, however, would be to miss the point. A significant part of Plato’s critique was that certain works of art present falsehood as truth, with the effect that the student may come to think justice involves what is actually unjust, thereby obscuring what being just ‘looks like.’ However, the fact that Plato’s dialogues are positively littered with myths, similes, dramatic characters, and other poetic devices, coupled with the fact that the Symposium dialogue itself lists the work of Homer and Hesiod as highly-praised creations of beauty, reveals that Plato openly acknowledged the positive benefit of poetry.\textsuperscript{42}

The above exercises may already be carried out in the classroom for a host of other reasons, for example, to integrate technology, to make connections to other classes, or to practice writing across the curriculum. What I wish to emphasise here is that they can also be used as starting points to hook students with the aim of facilitating a uniquely powerful and generative connection between student and subject. It may, however, be argued that these three types of classroom exercises take beauty in art for moral purposes in such a way that places the theory squarely in that instrumental view of education lamented above: merely substituting moral or emotional development for economic benefit as an educational aim. I argue against this. The Platonic virtue ethics set out above holds as a fundamental tenet that it is because the lover values the beautiful \textit{for its own sake} that she strives to become like it by creating beauty in herself. The lover in the Symposium does not perceive beauty and focus only on the many benefits she can gain by attaining it, but rather self-creation is an emotive-creative \textit{response of the soul} to the beauty present to her. Love in relation to the beautiful leads to the creation of new beauty.

\textsuperscript{42} Symposium, 209a-e.
III. CHAPTER CONCLUSION

Curiosity is ultimately driven by desire: the desire to know. Accordingly, we can find in Plato’s theory of love an understanding of how education in the beautiful—a generative process led by love—results in the lover becoming virtuous through the self-creation of beauty and virtue in the soul. This theory connects Plato’s ordering agents of the universe (the Forms) with that which orders individual persons. That the world is a world of the good and beautiful—that it is this world—must be the reason why, on Diotima’s account, generation and the beautiful are so fundamentally connected. It is an education by attraction. We can take away from Plato’s Symposium dialogue the following hypothesis: if education is to be truly transformative—making us into responsible citizens, rational problem-solvers, creative thinkers—it must begin with honing love, employing those mechanisms which attract and which motivate a commitment to discovering more. What’s exciting, and challenging, is that you never know where those journeys might lead.
CONCLUSION

Participation is the name for Plato’s enigmatic relation that holds between immutable, unqualified Forms, and variable, qualified particulars. One of the longstanding problems with interpreting participation is the claim that Plato gave it a name but never attempted to explain it. I have aimed to challenge that complacency by proposing a solution for how exactly participation works. That solution is found in Socrates’ speech on Erôs in the Symposium. Just as Erôs, the daimon, navigates the interval between gods and men, binding the whole together, so does the emotive relation of love bind together Form and particular. The generative activity of love is what motivates the lover to come to learn about beauty itself, and—in the best cases—to bring into being new beauty as a virtue of the soul.

To set up this account of participation, I first reviewed the nature of the Forms and the nature of the participation relation as described in varying levels of detail in the Platonic corpus.

I then provided an analysis of love as presented in Socrates’ speech, demonstrating two essential features that enable love to function as participation. First, love is distinctly cognitive: the love one experiences when beholding a beautiful beloved leads her to come to know that beauty better, a commitment to finding out more which leads outwards in ever-widening circles of beauty. From this experience of multiple beauties, the lover can learn about the nature of the Form of beauty itself through the characteristic Platonic account of Forms as the one cause over many particulars.
Second, I argued that the object of love in the *Symposium* is neither beautiful particulars nor the Form of beauty, but the *generation* of beauty: love’s object is *bringing to birth in beauty*. The erôs of the *Symposium* can be seen as an aesthetic and intellectual attraction that aims not at satisfaction but self-creation.

Next, I argued that the generative relation of love fulfils the function of the Form’s causal relation to particular beauty: participation. Love, as Diotima states, is a bond between two ontological types—Form and particular—and, through our generation, brings the two together such that the latter *is* what it is through the former. The emotive-turn-to-cognitive relation of erôs is the clearest picture Plato paints of how possession of properties can be explained through participation in Forms.

Finally, I examined what it is about beauty that enables this generative activity. Beauty prompts cognitive achievement by shining out through the perceptible world, to motivate the lover to learn more about that world. In the best cases, this activity results in a self-transformation and the further creation of beauty. I closed the thesis with a forward look to the implications of this theory of emotive participation for moral education.

Love binds Form and particular by its being the mechanism for change that results in a new characterisation of the individual. What is unusual here is just how much the process includes the Form. We are led to ask, is Plato’s theory of attraction to the beautiful an attempt, perhaps, to explain the formal and efficient causes in one? In a dialogue whose topic is such a distinctly physical and human one, building a naturalistic account of causal motivation is fitting. Whether Beauty might trump the Good as the ultimate Form for generation remains to be seen—and pursued.
APPENDIX

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Citation:

What Good is Love?

Lauren Ware

Abstract:

The role of emotions in mental life is the subject of longstanding controversy, spanning the history of ethics, moral psychology, and educational theory. This paper defends an account of love’s cognitive power. My starting point is Plato’s dialogue, the Symposium, in which we find the surprising claim that love aims at engendering moral virtue. I argue that this understanding affords love a crucial place in educational curricula, as engaging the emotions can motivate both cognitive achievement and moral development. I first outline the state of the challenge between dominant rival theories regarding emotions in learning. Next, I demonstrate how Platonic virtue ethics offers the most tenable prospect for an education of reason and emotion. Third, I sketch three practical ways educators might constructively engage emotions in the classroom. I conclude that love’s virtue is its peerless power to motivate the creative and lateral thinking which leads to moral development.

Introduction

Love can get us into all kinds of trouble—love of power, love of ourselves, love of what’s harmful, not to mention unrequited love and limerence. Furthermore, the emotions in general are often taken to be at odds with reason, getting in the way of making informed decisions, and love is no exception to such criticism. This paper sets out to discuss whether love can ever fulfil its promise to make life better, by investigating a controversial suggestion of Platonic virtue ethics that it is love which really ought to be at the heart of creative thinking and moral decision-making.

Can the emotions be educated? Ought they? The past twenty years has witnessed a groundswell of academic interest in the emotions, with considerable attention being given to arguing and articulating their philosophical, political, and medical import. Yet the role of emotions in moral education has seen an unfortunately neglectful polarisation, with as-yet unresolved tension pitting educating for rationality against educating for moral development of the total person. This is, of course, not a new debate. Accordingly, this interest has sparked something of a minor Renaissance of and academic focus on historical treatments of the emotions, particularly Aristotelian views on love and friendship, Stoic applications to psychological health, and pre-Socratic discussion of the emotions in the poetry of, for example, Hesiod and Empedocles.

Plato is often portrayed as advocating an abandonment of such emotions as love and desire, in order for the philosopher to have access to the true objects of knowledge. Yet, in his dialogue, the Symposium, he writes that a life without love is not worth living, and that love is the best chance the philosopher has at true knowledge of beauty and virtue. In this paper, I argue that education by attraction to the beautiful motivates moral development through a unique form of self-creation. I will first outline the state of the challenge between a solely cognitive basis for education, and one that allows for affective or emotional considerations. Next, I will show how Platonic virtue ethics, specifically his theory of love in moral development, holds out the most tenable prospect for an education of reason and emotion, as the power of love carries with it a distinctly creative element: the
The instrumental and utilitarian trends that pervade significant areas of contemporary education are typified by the promotion of the value of school as being primarily or even solely in the service of economic benefit to state or student. In spite of such trends, there remains a sound argument for the view that education ought concern itself with a more comprehensive view of human development. Humans are undeniably emotional beings, and thus that personal development must take the emotions into serious consideration. The challenge is traditionally presented as between a strictly cognitive view of education, and one that seeks to shape the character through emotional development. A brief analysis of these two general views will provide insight into where a virtue ethical framework might be able to contribute a degree of reconciliation for moral educational curricula.

The former view is made prominent by Kohlberg’s cognitivist understanding of moral development, which—stemming from Piagetian cognitive theory—takes that development to encompass only emotionally disinterested rational capabilities such as social cognition, problem solving, and perspective-taking without affect. On the Kolhbergian educational program of study, moral development is seen as largely the province of cognitive development, relegating emotion to the sidelines as impeding the rationality which is its exclusive focus. On the other hand, two influential anti-Kolhbergian systems have also arisen in the literature: character education, as best exemplified in the works of Lickona and Kilpatrick, and the ethics of care defended by Noddings, Gilligan, Chodorow, and Slote. Proponents of character education “rally around the belief that the formation of moral dispositions is a vital part of moral education and ascribe to a comprehensive definition of character which views character as comprising dispositions of thought, action, and feeling.” The ethics of care take the emotion of caring to be “ontologically basic to human excellence” and that the aims of maintaining and enriching caring relationships must be the anchor of all educational activities and policies. Both of these theories, especially character education, may be mistaken for a brand of virtue ethics, but they differ in at least one significant respect when it comes to educating for moral development: neither character education nor the ethics of care appear to offer a specific mechanism for incorporating reason into their praxis. As Carr laments of care ethics, “it seems in itself to be opposed to any very principled definition of moral association.”

Is there a view of moral educational theory that does not place attentiveness to the emotions over and above the development of rational capacities, nor sacrifice them for a quasi-Kantian view of education which all but ignores the emotive aspect of ethical development? In what follows, I want to focus on the emotion of love and its role in educating for virtue. With this as a focus, I hope to show we can find such an educational theory in Platonic virtue ethics, which I will set out in section two.

Virtue ethics can be argued to hold out more over its adversary moral theories since its focus takes into account the human soul as a whole—specifically including emotions such as love, but also fear, shame, and the more contentious feelings of Schadenfreude, pride, anger, and maudlin. I identify three reasons for virtue ethics to be the primary candidate for a social scientific educational theory of moral development. First, virtue ethics is fundamentally about a particular ordering of the emotions so as to be compatible with reason. Plato’s discussion of the properly ordered soul in his dialogue, the Phaedrus, depicts reason as a charioteer harnessing the motivational force of an angry but righteous horse on the one hand, and the wily but chaotic and deservative generation of virtue in the soul. Finally, I sketch three practical ways this creative love might be employed in the classroom. I conclude that love’s virtue is its peerless power to impel one to develop and shape herself. Beauty incites creation of beauty, and the mechanism for that creation is love.
horse on the other. The account is famously set out in an educational context in Book IV of his Republic, where the virtuous individual is one whose rational, spirited, and erotic capacities are established “in a relation of mastering, and being mastered by, one another that is according to nature.” That relation is artfully expressed by Lewis in his short treatise on emotion and morality in education, The Abolition of Man, as the condition in which “the head rules the belly through the chest.” Rather than deny, ignore, or suppress the emotions, or relegate them to extra-curricular training, virtue ethics fully acknowledges the potential conflicts between reason and emotion and sets out a structure which accounts for their role in the virtuous life. The major benefit of this accommodation is that it allows for movement in the direction of a possible reconciliation with moral educational theories which focus more on training for rationality.

Second, that virtue ethics is a satisfactorily principled cognitive system ought to go some way in warning off the threat of emotions taking over and destroying the work of reason when faced with a personal moral dilemma. For virtue ethics, especially contemporary virtue ethics as set out in Geach and Hursthouse, does hold that some actions or activities are absolutely wrong. The difference between virtue ethics and consequentialist theories here, however, turns on those situations when an ostensibly morally bad act is required in the face of a more damaging alternative. Whereas the consequentialist would see the act as morally neutral or even positive in its achievement of the best outcome, the virtue ethicist would still be committed to the principle that the act itself was, in fact, wrong.

A third reason virtue ethics is our best candidate for an account of moral education that facilitates the interaction between reason and emotion is that it affords a positive role for reflection in emotive development. Aristotle’s “doctrine of the mean”—according to which the virtuous action is the mean between two extremes of character; for example, cowardice and recklessness—requires cognitive reflection in order to locate that mean, or, in the case of his supreme virtue, magnanimity, to be able to identify the particular pitch and balance magnanimous action requires in a given situation.

That virtue ethics is conducive to emotions in education is perhaps not surprising. The vocation-focused or economically-impactful curricula referenced at the beginning of this section share a common trajectory with deontological or utilitarian ethical systems in their emphases on satisfying objective lists or calculating consequences and benefits. If the underlying strength of virtue ethics is its ability to account for the entire human complex—messy emotions and all—a virtue ethical pedagogy of moral development would, at least in theory, be primed to avoid those perhaps negative priorities. In the next section, I focus specifically on how one particular virtue ethical system puts love at the heart of not only cognitive motivation, but moral development in tandem.

Love’s Virtue in Platonic Ethics

It was the dinner party that went down in history. Decades afterwards, the eager curious desperately gossiped to get a taste of what brought together the beautiful and powerful in one night of intoxicating conversation: Love. In the Symposium, Socrates shocks his interlocutors by proclaiming that Ερός, “god of love”, is, in fact, not a god at all. Rather, Love is a daemon, intermediary between gods and men. As he describes the activity and purpose of the daemon class, it begins to become clear the importance that Plato attributes to this emotion. He writes:

*For Ερός is in the middle of both gods and men and fills up the interval so that the whole cosmos itself has been bound together by it. For a god does not mingle with a human being; but through Ερός occurs the whole connection and conversation of gods with men.*
Love’s power is to bind together the ethical absolutes of virtue, and what approximates it in the individual person. How can love bind together such different realms, the human and the divine? As I interpret Plato, love does this by having as its object the creation of beauty and virtue. Love quickens the curiosity we have about the beautiful objects and art forms we encounter in the world, which inspire us and move us to come to know them better, and to learn about what beauty itself really is.

1. **Love is oriented to knowledge**

Stendhal’s famous maxim that beauty is “the promise of happiness” could well be said to be true of the sort of beauty Plato has in mind in the Symposium: we can define Plato’s love as a belief about the beloved that one’s life would be better if that beloved were a part of it. The beauty one experiences in the world constantly beckons her forward to get to know it more intimately. It is sometimes difficult to tell, however, in what way an attachment to the object will impact her. It is for this reason that she is led to study and come to know the object, so as to know whether time spent with it will leave her better or worse. Plato here presents a compelling view regarding the interrelation of all beautiful things in the world and their role in the philosophic life. As one becomes attracted to a beautiful particular, and pursues it with natural curiosity to learn more about it—Where does it come from? Why does it work the way it does? What makes it different to others of its kind?—she will find herself pursuing other beautiful particulars in ever-expanding circles of beauty. As one is beckoned forward by beauty to come to know one work or object, she will find she must learn about another, its context, its language, its history, and other similar beauties. As Nehamas asserts,

> To love something is always in part to try to understand what makes it beautiful, what drew me—and, as long as I love it—continues to draw me toward it. To understand what it is and to see how it will affect me and to see what it will be able to give me. The more I try to understand a particular object, the more I need to learn about the world in general. The deep and the broad are just facets of one another.

This is the account of love and beauty we find in the famous “ascent passage” of the Symposium (209e-212a). In this passage, the lover is depicted as being led from one beauty by a desire to know more about it, to come to see the beauty in other similar things, and the culture and laws which allow such beauty to flourish, and finally to glimpse that absolute beauty that is the source of all beauty experienced in the world: the beholding of which turns out to be the best life imaginable.

Yet the lover’s interest in what is beautiful does not stop there—with a solely cognitive achievement. Instead, the lover aims to come to behold the beautiful as closely as she can, which leads her to create beauty, both in herself and in the wider world. Whilst love leads the lover to come to know and experience greater and wider realms of beauty in the world, the activity of love is further constituted by the creation of beauty.

2. **Love’s object is moral self-creation**

The framing characteristic of love, Socrates asserts, is that it is “of something”—just as a father is father of a child so too love is of something, and it “desires that something.” Plato’s focus on the object of love reveals the complex relational quality essential to it. For love to have an object is simply part of its grounding logic, and the identification of this object is thus fundamental to any attempt to define and understand love. In contemporary moral psychology, this object of love serves as the “intentional object” which is said to be “about” objects and
states of affairs quite external to the agent.”

My account of love’s object in the Symposium, however, locates this object within the individual as her own moral development.

It is commonly claimed in the scholarly literature that the object of love, in the Symposium dialogue, is beauty. However, I argue against this view and assert that love’s object is the creative activity of “bringing to birth in beauty”—to translate precisely the Platonic text. For Plato writes at line 206e that this object of love is decidedly not beauty, but rather the creative process of generating beauty, both in the individual and in the wider world. What we witness in Socrates’ speech is Plato challenging the received wisdom of his day. Upon seeing beauty in the world, the lover is led to make herself more like that beauty. In so doing, she brings into being further beauty by making herself more beautiful. Thus, love is not purely relational, as emotional intentionality is standardly analysed, but teleological—seeking its end. The highest form of love, for Plato, is an instrument of creation. He sees in the human soul a self-generation principle: a compass of self-design, externally triggered by beauty. Crucially, however, instead of turning to point towards beauty, the compass turns to point to itself, to design and craft itself. Time spent in pursuit of beauty provides a way for the lover to become beautiful: shaped by the course of her life. Plato thus establishes that the lover will have an inwardly-directed motivation to find ways to achieve this end.

Is the cognitive nature of love Plato has in mind here strong enough to ground such generative activity? I argue that as love regarding the beautiful has led to knowledge, so does knowing about the beautiful lead to assimilation. Such a tendency finds comparison in the Republic, where training in dialectic leads the young philosopher-kings to becoming morally virtuous and hence to being able to lead well and produce a good city. In the Symposium, cognition and contemplation of the beautiful similarly lead to association and assimilation, and hence to being able to produce beauty on earth.

In the course of his educational exposition in Book VII of the Republic, Socrates reveals how an understanding of the truth is more than a displacement of ignorance for knowledge, but is intimately tied to bringing about a moral change in the student. The study of dialectic enables one “to attain to each thing itself that is...[to] grasp the reason for the being of each thing”, with the result that one will be able to separate decisively the Form of absolute goodness from the many particular instances which bear a relation to it. Thus grounded in truth, the philosophers will be in the best position to produce good things—in themselves and in the city. Socrates asserts, “Once they see the good itself, they must be compelled, each in his own turn, to use it as a pattern for ordering the city, private men, and themselves for the rest of their lives.” These ruling men are pronounced thoroughly beautiful, and can become “authors of the greatest good” by bringing into being the “well-governed city”. But is witnessing the Forms, in whatever way mortals might be able to do, enough to initiate moral change? I argue it is.

The method by which the philosopher-king shapes and creates the beautiful city and beautiful citizens (including herself) is described by Socrates as that of the inspired artist:

> I suppose that in filling out their work they would look away frequently in both directions, towards the just, beautiful, and moderate by nature and everything of the sort, and again, towards what is in human beings; and thus, mixing and blending the practices as ingredients...taking hints from exactly the phenomenon in human beings which Homer too called god-like and the image of god...And I suppose they would rub out one thing and draw in another again, until they made human dispositions as dear to the gods as they admit of being.

This concept is repeated in Plato’s Timaeus dialogue as well, where Socrates asserts:
Now everything that becomes or is created must of necessity be created by some cause, for without a cause nothing can be created. The work of the creator, whenever he looks to the unchangeable and fashions the form and nature of his work after an unchangeable pattern, must necessarily be made beautiful and virtuous...

Time spent in contemplation of the Forms of beauty and goodness provides a way for the philosopher to become like them, through imitation and assimilation. Socrates concludes, “Then it is the philosopher, keeping company with the divine and the orderly who himself becomes orderly and divine, in the measure permitted to man.” What we have here is an account that considering the Form, and comparing it to what is in humans, compels one to change and rub things out in the attempt to make what is only qualifiedly virtuous more like the unqualifiedly virtuous. There is good in the philosopher, because of her knowledge of and assimilation with the Form, and as a result of this togetherness, she is the best able to produce good things in the city and in the individual citizen. The object of love is therefore its greatest virtue: impelling the lover to shape herself in the image of virtue, and bringing about new virtue in the soul.

Beauty in the Classroom

This idea of creative thinking led by love, I argue, was a key feature of Plato’s educational theory and derives from insightful analysis of the human powers of motivation. You cannot navigate with merely a highly polished rudder—you must start with the motor before navigation even begins. Once we have engaged the emotions, then we can deliver the directional standards of a particular curriculum.

The hypothesis we are presented with in the Symposium is that every contact with beauty (from perceptual and sense-based contact, to emotional and cognitive contact) gives rise to erotic desire to generate in beauty. This generation, as I have argued above, manifests in an assimilation with beauty itself. Love unites the Form with the particular lover, binding them together, thus enabling the production of any and all particular beauty. If Plato is right about this, his message to posterity is that teachers should teach by beauty, and by engaging the emotions. Philosophy, the love of wisdom, has a responsibility not to sit alone in the study or retreat to the ivory tower—building edifices of purely rational construction—but to connect with the world of art and culture to generate the virtue that those in pursuit of it have come to love and to know.

Kristjánsson divides moral education of emotion projects into three inter-related areas of inquiry: (1) are emotions appropriate objects of education; (2) ought, and if so, how, can emotions be shaped within education; and (3) what specific activities or techniques can teachers employ in the classroom? As the above discussion has emphasised, the debate on educating the emotions tends to focus on the first two questions—understandably, of course, as we are philosophers. Precious little, however, is available to educators seeking practical, straight-to-the-classroom application of the results of all this research. Indeed, Maxwell and Reichenbach even go so far as to say that “not a single intervention programme or identifiable body of educational practices or strategies grounded in a major theoretical perspective in contemporary social psychology exists which specifically and explicitly targets moral emotions.” In what follows, I would like to outline, briefly, some of the positive ways the virtue of love—being the internal motivation to seek not only knowledge of the attracting object, but the activity of shaping oneself and generating virtue in the soul—may be encouraged in the contemporary classroom.

First, educators can engage the emotion of love through bringing beauty into the classroom. The “vast, open sea of beauty”, to appropriate Plato’s description of the lover’s vision, is diverse and limitless. Depending on the level
of schooling, a range of examples in art and literature (conceived broadly to include as well drama, music, dance, design, and more) can be creatively incorporated into lessons with the specific aim of grabbing the emotions, which in turn compel further investigation (in the classroom, in extra-curricular activities, and in personal free pursuit), and indicate future lines of discussion. There exist in the literature a number of compelling arguments that engaging the emotions of, for example, compassion, sympathy, and empathy—through materials and stories—is the “sine qua non of the ability to formulate moral assessments.” 31 Educating through love and attraction to the beautiful, however, offers a uniquely powerful capacity to harness the motivational aspects of the emotion. For it is the initial pangs of love, read as the desire to know, which first present as curiosity and develop into a commitment to finding out more, and a passion for the subject. Bringing beauty into the classroom—all classrooms, not just the art studio—can launch this motivation in new and exciting ways.

The beauty of great literature and compelling art has a further special role to play in developing imagination, particularly in the consideration of multiple perspectives which arouse emotion. Such subjects are often exceptionally concerned in depicting or commenting on the complex interplay of human emotions in moral situations. Indeed, Wordsworth defined poetry as “the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings.” 32 By presenting material that prompts an emotional response, students can be inwardly led to appreciate certain aspects of a case they may not otherwise have acknowledged. I should emphasise here that bringing beauty into the classroom ought to go beyond art appreciation courses as one among other (subtly more “serious”, “academic”) subjects. The beauty of art and literature should instead be seen as a powerful impetus to moral development and so afforded a place in any and all subjects.

What engaging the emotions can contribute to educational and cognitive development is what Schwartz and Clore term “affect as information”. 33 According to this theory, internal emotional experiences supply individuals with information about their external environment. This information can then be harnessed in creative ways as it influences the individual’s evaluations, decisions, concerns, and further courses of action. Educators can consider how facilitating students’ attending to their emotional response to material may enhance the learning experience and understanding of course content. Take, for example, the following classroom exercises:

- Upon the presentation of visual illusions such as Adelson’s Checkershadow Illusion, below, the mind is primed to accept that the squares marked A and B are of different colours.
In fact, they are the same colour, and this can be confirmed by the educator using the proof image:

When the illusion is experienced for the first time, students often respond with a range of emotions including bafflement, awe, amusement, and incredulity—the latter of which leads naturally to further questioning and explanation. In my undergraduate philosophy classes, I use this illusion to introduce Descartes’ radical doubt: how much can we trust our senses if they can be so wildly taken in by illusion? The emotional response, however, can be harnessed for motivating the intellectual virtues of curiosity and care towards a host of subjects. For example, such virtues can serve to widen appreciation for suspending judgement on controversial figures in a History class until the motivations for actions can be carefully considered; or for precision and caution in a Science lab.

- Literature, poetry, and other story-telling media can also stimulate the emotions to enhance achievement outside of English and Literature classes. Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle is often featured in American History class readings lists, but its ability to generate powerful emotions of shock and disgust at the conditions of the meat-packing industry in the early 20th-century can function to initiate discussions and projects across the educational spectrum. Despair at the working conditions the novel presents is a unique way to contribute to lessons on trade unions and class poverty in Economics; and revulsion at unsanitary factory farming practices can initiate a personal dimension to considerations of vegetarianism and veganism in a Physical Education or Health class, or of animal welfare and organic farming in Government and Business classes.

What is important to focus on in such exercises is that the students attend consciously to their emotions in response to the subject matter of the lesson: drawing out what it is the experienced emotion tracks, and considering that aspect of the content as information which can be explored further in discussions or assignments.

Second, educators can use Gadfly questions to engage the emotions in response to an apparent wrong. In the Apology, Socrates refers to himself as a gadfly which bites the sluggish horse in order to arouse him to action: he put this into practice by acting the rogue street philosopher, constantly questioning his contemporaries in such a way that they would feel compelled either to defend their premises or realise further thought and refinement of
those premises was needed. \(^{34}\) Plato acknowledges that children possess the ability to love the beautiful, and blame and hate the ugly, even before they are capable of rational speech. \(^{35}\) By pressing intuitively controversial points, challenging assumptions, or playing *advocatus diaboli*, educators can stir up instinctive defences of what is, or is at least thought to be, true.

Gadfly questions can be directed towards the course content and students’ answers to questions, in addition to their emotional responses to that course content. Facilitators may take cues from Socrates’ own method as to what kinds of questioning best get at the heart of the interlocutor’s statements, probing responses to ferret out analytic distinctions as well as to elicit commitment to a view by proposing a radical alternative. The use of the Socratic Method in education has long been championed for its ability to aid students in clarifying and justifying their thoughts on the topic under question. \(^{36}\) Of specific relevance to our topic of engaging the emotions in education, is to direct gadfly questions towards the students’ own emotional responses to material (and perhaps especially towards unexpected emotional responses), which can be indicators of a further question or line of reasoning. Examples of such gadfly questions towards emotions may include:

- *Do you think all parties (or characters) involved in the event felt the same way in response? Why or why not?*
- *Why do you think you like X more than Y?*
- *Is there a difference between our society and the society under discussion that might make the situation look different to you?*
- *What element of the lesson would you be most (or least) likely to remember?*
- *What element of the lesson makes you the most surprised (or angry, or curious)? Why?*

The task in employing gadfly questions specifically, within the broader teaching style of the Socratic Method, is to harness the motivational power of the emotions and direct it towards identifying new ways of thinking about course content. By attending to their emotions in this reflective manner, students can link their own affective responses to the subject of a lesson and find in that link a personal reason to defend and articulate their thoughts.

A third practical application of Plato’s theory of love’s virtue is to use beauty as a tool for cognitive appraisal and reflection. Art and literature can present vastly different beauties, which the student can then evaluate in relation to other beauties presented in the course, and in relation to other types of beauties she experiences in her wider world. This is the basis of Plato’s metaphysical theory of Forms, according to which one learns about, for example, abstract, absolute beauty by reflecting on what each of these particular beauties perceived and experienced have in common. Identifying what is essential to each of a beautiful work of art, a beautiful scientific equation, a beautiful soul, and a beautifully accomplished action or performance is at once, then, a cognitive-emotional-aesthetic (not to mention interdisciplinary) exercise. Encouraging students to ask, and reflect on, what it is they think that makes each of the different beauties they encounter beautiful can culminate in synthesis assignments which aim at articulating and defending an account of what the terms beauty, art, or justice actually can mean. Methods for employing this concept in the classroom could include the following exercises:

- Having students each curate an ongoing journal focusing on a key concept of the course (e.g., citizenship, tragedy, respect, or abuses of power). Journals can be written in a notebook or
introduce technology where appropriate to the level of the course—created online, as on a Tumblr microblog or Pinterest board. Students add examples of the concept they identify in art, current affairs, or the media and are asked to reflect on each entry asking what it is they think makes the particular example fall under the concept heading: what it is that makes the piece of work beautiful, or the court ruling unjust. The task here is to allow the emotions first to locate the particular examples, which can then become the subject of appraisal and reflection. This reflection aims at developing creative or lateral thinking, which draws connections between disparate instances of a concept.

- Incorporating music created in a particular culture or era into a World Civilisations, History, or Foreign Language class. This can be done at intervals throughout the term, with students instructed to choose a song or music style they liked best at the end; or as a one-off project for a particular time period. Students are to reason about what in the period might have inspired or influenced the artists. Rather than making this a research exercise, it can be done as in-class writing, to facilitate lateral thinking between their emotional response to the music and the historical-cultural facts presented in the course content.

My aim in highlighting this third kind of exercise is to draw attention to the particularly creative impetus beauty in art can have on the emotions, which—when attended to with cognitive reflection—can draw the mind to identify causal relationships between material previously unnoticed. The development of the ability to draw such relationships is a key feature of the kind of lateral and creative thinking which marks original thought.

I may at this point anticipate the objection regarding Plato’s infamous “banishment” of the poets from the ideal city in Book X of his Republic, on the basis that they morally corrupt an audience. To argue that this demonstrates a rejection of art as an educational tool, however, would be to miss the point. A significant part of Plato’s critique was that certain works of art present falsehood as truth, with the effect that the student may come to think justice involves what is actually unjust, thereby obscuring what being just “looks like.” However, the fact that Plato’s dialogues are positively littered with myths, similes, dramatic characters, and other poetic devices, coupled with the fact that the Symposium dialogue itself lists the work of Homer and Hesiod as highly praised creations of beauty, reveals that Plato openly acknowledged the positive benefit of poetry.37

The above exercises may already be carried out in the classroom for a host of other reasons, for example to integrate technology, to make connections to other classes, or to practice writing across the curriculum. What I wish to emphasise here is that they can also be used as starting points to hook students with the aim of facilitating a uniquely powerful and generative connection between student and subject. It may, however, be argued that these three types of classroom exercises take beauty in art for moral purposes in such a way which places the theory squarely in that instrumental view of education lamented above: merely substituting moral or emotional development for economic benefit as an educational aim. I argue against this. The Platonic virtue ethics set out in section two holds as a fundamental tenet that it is because the lover values the beautiful for its own sake that she strives to become like it by creating beauty in herself. The lover in the Symposium does not perceive beauty and think of all the great benefit she can gain by attaining it, but rather self-creation is an emotive-creative response of the soul to the beauty present to her. Love in relation to the beautiful leads to the creation of new beauty.
Conclusion

Curiosity is ultimately driven by desire: the desire to know. Accordingly, we can find in Plato’s theory of love an understanding of how education in the beautiful—a generative process led by love—results in the lover becoming virtuous through the self-creation of beauty and virtue in the soul. This theory connects Plato’s ordering agents of the universe (the conceptual ideas of absolute goodness and beauty) with that which orders individual persons. It is an education by attraction. We can take away from Plato’s Symposium dialogue the following hypothesis: if education is to be truly transformative—making us into responsible citizens, rational problem-solvers, creative thinkers—it must begin with honing desire, employing those mechanisms which attract and which motivate a commitment to discovering more. What’s exciting, and challenging, is that you never know where such journeys might lead.

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21 Republic, 532a, 534b.
22 Republic, 540a-b.
23 Republic, 540c.
24 Republic, 495c; cf. 499b, 520d, 521a.
25 Republic, 501b.
26 Timaeus, 28a-b.
27 Republic, 500c-d.
28 Kristjánsson, 671-689.
29 Maxwell and Reichenbach, 148.
30 Symposium, 210d.

34 Apology, 30e.
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37 Symposium, 209a-e.

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