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Citizen Endorsement of Contested Peace Settlements: Public Opinion in Post-Dayton Bosnia

Abstract

This article asks what shapes public support for comprehensive peace agreements that aim to end violent conflict in deeply divided societies. Although public perceptions are critical for the success of territorial settlements, little scholarly attention has focused on citizen attitudes towards peace in the post-implementation phase. We develop and empirically test a theory of citizen support for peace agreements that relates power-sharing institutions to broader citizens' security considerations and integrates into this theory the roles of international peacekeeping, ascriptive minority/majority identities and exposure to alternative governance structures (i.e. federal, consociational and centripetalist). We argue that the degree to which a peace treaty provides credible security to citizens determines public support for power-sharing. We test this argument in a least likely case Bosnia Herzegovina. Using data from a 2013 representative survey with 1007 respondents, we examine the determinants of popular support for the Dayton Peace Accords. Our findings suggest that in each of the three main ethnic groups of Bosnia, more people would have voted for Dayton than against it and highlight the mechanisms through which individual and ethnic group security concerns shape support for the country's post-conflict institutions.

Keywords: federalism, consociationalism, Bosnia, peacemaking, centripetalism.

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Introduction

During post-conflict mediations, elites typically attempt to construct peace through multi-dimensional compromises involving, *inter-alia*, democratization and power sharing, security reforms, territorial concessions and the rights of war victims, including internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees. Simultaneously, they aim to reconstruct state institutions to ensure these have the support of citizens who have engaged in or experienced violent conflict. To ensure success, scholars frequently advocate peace agreements involving ethnic federal territorial aspects and power-sharing at the centre.¹ There is also a wide academic consensus that those peace agreements mandating broad and shared control over state institutions are more likely to ensure peace.² The reconstruction of power on a shared basis inside the state, buttressed by supporting external provisions, seems to result in agreements that work. Unlike practices of government which exclude specific groups,³ inclusive peace agreements have the potential to give parties credible long-term guarantees of their security.⁴

Elites can use these agreements to share core state institutions, such as the security services, policing institutions and the justice system, thus limiting the capacity of spoilers to undermine peace. In terms of security, this will mean that the use of force to favour one particular group in the country can be checked. In terms of identity politics, broad representation tends to reduce inter-ethnic anxieties and security dilemmas.⁵ In addition, elites can protect and project their policy preferences through their representation in reconstructed power-sharing state institutions. By increasing security through broader

inclusivity and reducing incentives to engage in violent conflict, these multidimensional peace settlements could help secure peace in the implementation phase.⁶

Much scholarly literature has asked how warring antagonists can be persuaded to share power in return for peace⁷ and how to optimally design power-sharing peace agreements to prevent the recurrence of conflict.⁸ An often overlooked question, however, is on what basis ordinary citizens come to support power-sharing agreements, particularly following their implementation. Bosnia offers a theoretically informative case study of the evaluations and real-life experiences of ordinary citizens as respondents have experienced the consequences of a peace settlement (in other words, they are not just reflecting on hypothetical scenarios as often reported in Israel/Palestine or Cypriot polls).

In fact, two decades after Dayton, the merits and pitfalls of the Peace Accords have become subject to re-interpretation during regular electoral cycles in all three main communities, giving us an opportunity to assess the public's perception of its provision of security and governance. It is important to note that at the time of Dayton., external actors prioritized the urgent need to pacify Bosnia and have left democratic legitimization for a later stage. Few months before Dayton, in a Serb-only referendum about 90 percent of voters opposed arrangements later reflected in the Accords.⁹ Subsequently, Dayton received criticisms from all sides in Bosnia as well as international observers.¹⁰ Given its reputation, it could be therefore argued that Dayton constitutes a hard case for public support.

Although power-sharing peace settlements may be externally imposed or agreed upon by warring elites, public opinion is important, both in the short and long term. To this end, at an early stage in negotiations, citizens could be consulted in referendums or constitutional conventions.¹¹ Naturally, if they do not support the peace settlement, this may derail or delay the process (e.g. Greek Cypriots voting against the Annan Plan in 2004 or the failed National Dialogue Conference in Yemen in 2013-14). We can expect comparable effects if peace

settlements become subject to electoral politics, and opponents rather than supporters gain the upper hand (e.g. the 1996 surprise victory of Benjamin Netanyahu against Shimon Peres in Israel). In the long term, public perceptions of the (il)legitimacy of the settlement and overall citizen satisfaction could shape the ground for elites to reform an existing settlement as, for instance, in the cases of post-Dayton Bosnia or post-Good Friday/Belfast Agreement Northern Ireland.¹²

So far only a handful of studies have tried to establish the basis on which citizens support or oppose power-sharing peace treaties or adopt pro-reconciliation attitudes following civil wars.¹³ Although the literature suggests power-sharing cannot be separated from security concerns,¹⁴ this claim has yet to be tested with public opinion data. In what follows, we argue that citizens' individual and group-level security considerations are key determinants of their support for peace settlements. We test this argument with survey data from Bosnia-Herzegovina, where Dayton's unique institutional architecture and access to representative data allow us to explore the micro-foundations of support for post-civil war peace accords.

Citizen Preferences, Security and Support for Power-sharing

In our analysis, we ask why individuals will support (or not) a power-sharing peace agreement after a civil war in which combatants have been mobilized on the basis of ascriptive identities such as ethnicity, race or religion. We focus on the degree to which provisions in the peace agreement and its implementation address the security concerns of ordinary citizens, such as the promise of freedom from physical harm and the stability required to build a future for oneself and one's family. Although previous studies have linked security to power-sharing, few scholars have attempted to integrate both traditional and broader 'human security' elements in the discussion.¹⁵ We argue that if a peace treaty is

unable to offer basic human security, it is unlikely to be supported, leaving citizens open to alternative governance options (i.e. secession or centralization).

Put otherwise, our argument relates power-sharing to security considerations at the individual level, suggesting that the degree to which a peace treaty provides credible security to citizens shapes the support for a power-sharing settlement overall. Fear of state discrimination and favouritism of one ethnic group over another over a range of outcomes produces insecurity, in some cases strong enough to lead to civil war.¹⁶ To prevent domination by one group and reduce (mutual) inter-ethnic security threats, power sharing assures all contending groups of their ability to influence decision-making processes in the future. While the literature claims power sharing increases security by safeguarding the credibility of the commitments elites make to each other,¹⁷ we argue that developing wide-ranging power-sharing institutions could address critical citizen security concerns associated with post-civil war conditions. Power-sharing institutions could go beyond the political to include integrated military and economic institutions.¹⁸ These institutions could formalise the relationship between majorities and minorities and constrain the state from violating minority rights or marginalizing the views of non-dominant groups.¹⁹

If our argument holds, precisely which aspects of power-sharing provisions lead individuals to feel secure? Do peace agreements garner support because they guarantee the protection of individual rights and physical security or because they protect the rights and security of specific groups with defined attributes? This question is especially salient in post-conflict settings in which ethnic identities have been mobilized around violence and confrontation. Individuals will have experienced direct threats to their security based on their shared group membership and may fear discrimination because of certain ascriptive characteristics identifying their membership in that group.²⁰

In what follows, we argue that the feeling of individual security, while important, will be less important than group identity in shaping support for peace agreements because of the nature of group identity cleavages, in-group solidarity and identity mobilizations through violent conflict or its memorialization.²¹ Even if individuals feel they are personally safe to some degree, but they know people with the same attributes are being persecuted, this is likely to undermine their support for a settlement. We therefore expect support for or opposition to power-sharing peace treaties will be based on the extent to which individuals belonging to particular groups perceive individuals with their group identity are secure. For example, if the conflict has revolved around language or religious divisions, they will consider how well the peace treaty protects people with attributes previously rendering them vulnerable to attack and/or displacement. Our expectation, then, is that the desirability of a power-sharing treaty will be structured around the extent to which it protects the primary ascriptive identities mobilized and reinforced during the conflict.

The conflict and post-conflict literature points out that we can expect differences between majority and minority groups with respect to how they view power sharing and its costs and benefits.²² Majorities will feel most secure when they can dominate the state; thus, they are expected to resist constitutionally-binding compromises with groups whom they might otherwise dominate numerically. Horowitz notes, for instance, that discontent with consociational schemes ‘has been greater among majorities than among minorities in Northern Ireland, Belgium and Bosnia’.²³ He emphasizes that dominant majorities may be tempted to abandon consociational arrangements once they regain demographic, economic and political strength. This security-based preference for unfettered majority rule, we anticipate, will lead majorities to be reluctant to support power-sharing agreements. Yet for members of those groups, improvements in their security (e.g., through international

peacekeeping) could be a potential trade-off for sharing power with numerically smaller groups.

Minority groups are also more likely to have their security concerns met through power-sharing arrangements, particularly if they fear a return to violence or if secession and/or minority dictatorship are not viable alternatives. However, the extent to which power-sharing arrangements and peace agreements meet their concerns depends on how power is shared or divided and how different groups are represented in the political system and other institutions, including the military.²⁴ Two possible political systems are consociationalism and centripetalism. So far, the academic literature on negotiated peace settlements is divided on which is preferable.

Advocates of consociationalism have promoted the idea of guaranteed group representation by establishing mutual vetoes and representation in governments in the form of grand coalitions, granting some groups control over key policy domains but giving all groups veto rights in joint decision areas.²⁵ Consociationalism, among other key features, stipulates that power be shared by majorities and minorities, and it implies formal or informal veto rights for all parties.²⁶ Consociationalism involves power-sharing at the centre, exemplified, for instance, by the collective presidency in Bosnia or the allocation of certain key posts to members of specific religious or ethnic groups in Lebanon. Challenging the system's over-reliance on identity markers, critics have pointed to problems with functionality, ethnic polarization and the absence of cross-ethnic alliances based on other cleavages.²⁷ Scholars have proposed alternatives, such as centripetal institutional designs to encourage power sharing and inter-ethnic cooperation by providing electoral incentives for different groups to vote for each other (e.g. in Indonesia or Nigeria).²⁸ Centripetalism has been defined as the type of institution design for deeply divided places that 'seeks to foster a type of politics that converges on the center—or moderate—ground' advocating that

‘electoral systems should be selected to advantage politicians by making it profitable for them to appeal across different ethnic communities’.²⁹ Although scholars provide several examples of consociational and centripetal governance proposals, one could point that arrangements on the ground rarely fit precisely all the prescriptions of the two schools or recent advances and recommendations in the literature.³⁰ Bosnia, as we argue below, comes close to conventional definitions by utilizing centripetal arrangements for minority Croats whilst accommodating Serbs via consociational arrangements. To the best of our knowledge, Dayton is unique in its contrasting approach to ethnic minority community rights.

That said, we anticipate differences between minorities who achieve separate representation and group autonomy and minorities who must rely on the uncertainty of electoral politics rather than the formal recognition of their group rights to share power. This leads us to the following hypotheses:

H1: Support for a power-sharing peace treaty will be higher amongst individuals who feel secure under its terms.

H2a: Members of the majority community will be less supportive of power-sharing peace agreements than will members of minority communities.

H2b: Minority communities who are explicitly covered by consociational protections are more likely to support the peace treaty than those who are not.

The Bosnian Case

We test these hypotheses using survey data from Bosnia focusing on attitudes to the Dayton Peace Accords. Individual-level data on support for peace agreements are sparse, and we were fortunate enough to design and draw upon a 2013 representative survey of Bosnian citizens with a range of questions about alternatives to the country’s current peace settlement (survey details below). This allowed us to track in detail respondents’ preferences not only for the peace settlement but also for its possible variants. Thus, we could examine the extent to which majority and minority communities would prefer majority rule or secession as

hypothesized by our theory, even though they might support Dayton overall. The data allowed us to exploit variations between majority and minority communities and differences in the degree to which the latter have been accommodated by the peace settlement. Bosnia is a crucial test case for our theory, as it is one of the few examples where two minority communities, Serbs and Croats, have been differentially accommodated.

Specifically, Annex 4 of the Dayton Accords established Bosnia as a democracy of two constituent states, Republika Srpska and Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnian-Croat Federation), thus essentially establishing a federation within a federation.³¹ Through this compromise (summarized in Table 1 below), Dayton secured a form of territorial arrangement under Republika Srpska for Serbs. Croats gained less extensive territorial autonomy in the cantons of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and emerged with no clearly defined federal entity. Unlike Bosnian Serbs, they did not gain a unitary ethno-territorial autonomous unit, but two Croat-dominated cantons and two shared cantons. The Dayton agreement, as indicated in Table 1, precluded any opportunity to secede and unite with Croatia or Serbia and enabled expelled minorities to return to Republika Srpska and the Croat cantons. Dayton generally ignored third groups (e.g. Roma and the Jews) and non-ethnic collective interests (based on class, gender, age). It could be argued that this made sense, as the war was about mobilisation of ethnic identities and solidarities. Dayton recognized that reality and entrenched it in the future.

Dayton guaranteed a Croat would be one of the three Presidents of the country by introducing a form of rotating presidency between a Croat, a Bosnian Muslim (i.e. Bosniac) and a Serb.³² The Croat President is equal to the other two Presidents; legally, there is no difference between the three. The elected President with the highest number of votes (most likely a Bosniac) assumes the eight-month rotating position of Chair first, unless he/she has already held the position.³³ However, unlike their Serb counterparts, Croats and Bosniacs

have to vote together (as suggested by centripetalists), thereby limiting the independence of the Croat electorate. More specifically, in Republika Srpska, the Serbian candidate with the highest number of votes wins the race, whereas in the Federation, the Bosniac or Croat candidate with the most votes wins the election for the state President.³⁴

To put this arrangement into context, in 2000, Bosniacs represented 48 percent of the electorate, Serbs 37.1 percent and Croats 14.3 percent.³⁵ In centripetal terms, Croats should be happy to achieve parity (i.e. political equality) with the more numerous Serbs and Bosniacs. However, in consociational terms, the cross-voting should be resisted by Croats, as it limits their community's autonomy. As Bosniacs outnumber Croats by four to one, the election of a Croat President is more likely to be influenced by the more numerous Bosniac vote, a contention proved in the last two elections. Željko Komšić was elected primarily through the social democrat Bosniac vote, thus hijacking the Croat seat in the presidency.³⁶

The predominantly centripetal arrangements for minority Croats stand in direct contrast to the consociational arrangements for minority Serbs. Although both schools have evolved in their prescriptions since the Yugoslav wars, Bosnia is still a highly relevant case. Given the architecture of the peace agreement, we would expect stronger support among minority Serbs would be revelatory of the major principles of consociational theory (Lijphart, 1968; McGarry & O'Leary 2006) whilst stronger support amongst Croats would indicate the broader appeal of centripetalist institutions.³⁷ This asymmetry in the accommodation of the two main minority groups is particularly useful to test our theoretical arguments (and specifically their impact on minority group preferences). In this sense, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs offer a unique comparative case, whilst the passage of almost two decades between Dayton and our survey offered respondents the opportunity to evaluate the impact of the settlement and democratization in the region over a longer period of time.

Table 1 below summarizes the overall views of the peace settlement as perceived by the ethnonationalist camps of the three main communities (Bosniacs, Croats, Serbs), as well as Others (Roma, Jews, ethnically non-identified).

Table 1: What each group in Bosnia got from the Dayton Peace Agreement

Main Groups	Positives	Negatives
Bosniac nationalists:	Territorial unity of Bosnia was restored. Territories were gained, by shifting the front lines, around Sarajevo and creating a territorial link to Gorazde. The IDPs and the refugees got the right to return to their homes, so there was hope that some of the territory could be regained.	Republika Srpska, an ethno-territorial entity widely seen on the Bosniac side as created by war crimes, received constitutional protection and recognition. Herceg-Bosna continued to exist as a de facto Bosnian Croat ethnic homeland. The unitary pre-war political set-up was replaced by complex federal and power-sharing arrangements.
Croat nationalists:	Significant territorial gains in the last phase of the war at the expense of Serbs were added to Bosnian Croat canton (Herceg Bosnia). In the Federation, the Bosniac and Croat candidates with the most votes win the two posts for the Presidency but the Croat candidate is often elected by Bosniacs.	Unlike Bosnian Serbs, Croats did not receive a single, unitary ethno-territorial autonomous unit, but two Croat dominated cantons and two shared cantons (with Bosniacs). Dayton precluded any opportunity to secede and unite with Croatia. The agreement enabled expelled minorities to return to Croat territories around Mostar and Drvar.
Serb nationalists:	Republika Srpska (RS) was recognized as the ethno-territorial homeland. Many residual powers were left at the entity level, creating a somewhat decentralized federation. In Republika Srpska, the Serbian candidate with the highest number of votes wins the third post for the presidency.	There was no option to secede RS from Bosnia and unite with Serbia. The creation of Brcko as a separate unit cut RS into eastern and western parts. Serbs were forced to give up territories around Sarajevo and Gorazde.
Others (Roma, Jews, ethnically non-identified):	Dayton ended the war and war crimes. It provided protections on the right of return for all groups in the country and access to the ECHR (as part of Bosnia's membership in the Council of Europe).	There are no constitutional protections for national minorities and no collective rights or protections in the entities, i.e. from Serbs in the Federation or for Bosniacs and Croats in the RS (this was changed later). Non-ethnic collective interests (based on class, gender, age, and so on) are generally neither politically institutionalised nor subject to power sharing.

Methods, Survey and Data

We tested the hypotheses outlined above using data collected in a survey conducted in Bosnia in June and July 2013. IPSOS conducted the survey using a four-stage stratified sample. In the first stage, it selected municipalities using simple random sampling;³⁸ in the second, it selected a polling station proportional to its size within selected municipalities; in the third, it selected households using random route technique selection from a given address; finally, in the fourth, it selected individuals within the household to be interviewed using a Kish table. If respondents consented to an interview, the field interviewers conducted face-to-face interviews in the homes of the participants. The senior staff of the survey agency conducted the day-to-day monitoring of the data collection process and provided daily updates to the PI. The response rate was 63.53 percent, with a total of 1,007 interviews completed. After data collection, the results were entered into an SPSS file, and original copies of the questionnaires were destroyed. An IPSOS survey statistician calculated weights on the basis of inclusion probabilities and the available demographic data.³⁹

Our main dependent variable was constructed from responses to a question on support for Dayton. Respondents were asked ‘If there had been a referendum today on the Dayton Peace Accords how would you vote?’ and given the option to respond ‘definitely for’, ‘probably for’, ‘not sure’, ‘probably against’ and ‘definitely against’. The variable was coded so that ‘definitely for’ had the highest numerical value. In the multivariate analysis, we estimated a number of ordered logit regression models that took account of this ordered structure to the response variable.⁴⁰

Results

Ethnic Preferences for Power-sharing: Descriptive Evidence

Overall, we found a higher level of support for the treaty than some of the literature and media commentary on Dayton would assume,⁴¹ with 47 percent of respondents supportive and only 20 percent ‘probably’ or ‘definitely’ against it. To begin our evaluation of our hypotheses, we examined the preferences of the main ethnic groups, looking first at their overall support of Dayton and second at their support for various elements of the power sharing. We initially examined descriptively how ethnic identification was related to support for different aspects of Dayton; then, we tested our arguments in a multivariate setting. Recall that the agreement required the majority Bosniacs (Bosnian Muslims) to share power with minority Serbs and Croats. The Serbian community gained a higher degree of representation by safeguarding its majority representation in Republika Srpska, but Croats did not receive guaranteed representation in the Bosnian Federal Entity.

The evidence shows that the majority group does not favour the treaty and the different minority groups do favour it to the extent each is favoured in representation as consistent with our second hypothesis (H2a and H2b). The support for the treaty correlates with ethnic groups as expected, with 65 percent of Serbs ‘definitely’ or ‘probably’ supporting it compared to 35 percent of Croats and 40 percent of Bosniacs.⁴²

Table 2: Support for Dayton by Ethnic Self-Identification

	Bosnian	Croat	Serb	Bosniac/ Muslim	Mixed	Total
definitely for	4 (7)	6 (8)	126 (41)	126 (26)	7 (28)	268 (28)
probably for	13 (24)	20 (26)	72 (24)	70 (14)	11 (42)	187 (20)
not sure	15 (27)	28 (36)	66 (22)	122 (25)	5 (17)	236 (25)
probably against	6 (11)	8 (11)	8 (3)	49 (10)	2 (6)	74 (8)

definitely against	17 (32)	10 (13)	4 (1)	86 (18)	1 (3)	119 (12)
no response	0 (0)	5 (7)	26 (9)	38 (8)	1 (4)	71 (7)
Total	55 (100)	78 (100)	303 (100)	491 (100)	27 (100)	954 (100)

Note: weighted count, column percentages in parentheses.

To take a closer look, we examined responses to three questions related to the possibility of relaxing certain aspects of the power-sharing agreement embedded in Dayton. The questions asked respondents how they would feel about abolishing Republika Srpska, creating a Croat federal entity and making the Republic independent. We expected opinion on these issues would follow ethnic lines: Bosniacs would oppose further representation for minorities; Croats would favour greater representation of their group via the creation of a Croatian entity; Serbs would oppose the possibility of abolishing Republika Srpska in favour of independence. As we expected and consistent with our second hypotheses (H2a and H2b), 70 percent of Croats supported the idea of creating a separate Croat entity within the institutional framework provided by the Dayton Peace Accords, and 80 percent of Bosniacs were opposed.

In summary, the descriptive evidence establishes a correlation between support for Dayton and membership in an ethnic group. This is consistent with our hypothesis that the main majority group is likely to be less supportive of the treaty than the minority group with the greatest degree of representation (H2a and 2b). There is *prima facie* evidence that these differences in ethnic group preferences can be linked to the different preferences for power-sharing arrangements in Dayton, partly because of the differential security and representation it offers the groups.

In the next stage of our analysis, we tested these arguments in a multivariate setting and considered the extent to which individual or group security shaped preferences for power-sharing peace agreements.

Individual and Group Security and Support for Dayton: Multivariate Analysis

To assess our hypotheses on the sources of support for Dayton in a multivariate context, we estimated an ordinal logit regression model⁴³ presented in Table 3. In the analysis, we used the previously discussed five-point scale of support for Dayton with the response ‘definitely for’ given the value of five. Thus, we estimated how likely it was for responses with particular profiles to move up the scale. In addition, we estimated the determinants of support for the Dayton using logit models (available from the authors upon request). The results for the variables of interest are in line with the findings of the ordered logit modules; for reasons of space, we restrict discussion to the model in Table 3. The main variables of theoretical interest are related to respondents’ perceptions and experience of security and the level of political representation and accommodation majority/minority groups receive under the institutional arrangements established by Dayton.

To measure security, we note there is no commonly used measure of human security in survey research and debates on human security incorporate a range of dimensions (King & Murray 2001), not all of which we can address on the basis of our survey questions. To address the extent to which individuals felt secure in their future well-being and livelihood, we used answers to the following question: ‘To what extent do you agree with the following statement: “I see a future for me and my family in my current place of residence.”’⁴⁴ We recorded responses as a binary variable if respondents agreed or disagreed. To measure ethnic identity, we used a measure of self-identified ethnicity⁴⁵ constructed from responses to the question ‘Do you see yourself as a member of one or more nations? Which?’ The survey

permits multiple answers. We recorded a series of indicator variables coded one if the respondent self-identified with the respective ethnic group and zero otherwise and labelled these variables *Bosnian* (a civic identity), *Bosniac/Muslim*, *Serb*, *Croat* and *Mixed*.

In addition to the main explanatory variables, we included a number of control variables capturing other attributes of individuals that might influence their attitudes: social and economic status; wartime experience which might confound the relationship between perceptions of future security and support for Dayton; current attitudes to and perceptions of the role of the international community; and prospects for inter-ethnic co-operation.

Measures of social economic status included *gender*, coded zero for male respondents and one for females, and *location*, coded zero if the respondent was located in a rural location and one if located in an urban location. Urban was defined as a settlement containing more than 2,000 residents. *Age* was a continuous variable based on the respondent's date of birth. *Education* was measured on a four-point scale: zero indicated the respondent had received no formal schooling, one indicated he/she had a primary level of education or less, two indicated between primary and secondary level education and three indicated university graduation. *Income* was measured on a categorical scale indicating the income level where respondents said they belonged.

To address the extent to which individuals had wartime experiences that might influence their perceptions of Dayton, we drew on two sets of indicators: *displacement* and *wartime victimisation*. The first captured types of refugee experiences; for this measure, we coded two indicator variables: *returnee* was coded one if the respondent was forced to leave during the civil war and had returned home to the initial place of residence and zero otherwise; *still displaced* was coded one if the respondent was displaced during the war and had not returned to his/her initial place of residence and zero otherwise. The second set of indicators measured victimisation and included two binary variables, *abused in war* and *close*

person killed, coded one if the respondent reported the experience and zero if s/he did not.

The first captured personal experience of abuse, ranging from verbal insults to torture. The second captured whether a person close to the respondent was killed in the war.

The next control variable revealed the extent to which positive perceptions of the role of the international community increased support for Dayton net of the influence of perceptions of security. To measure this variable, we used a question about the effect of international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) on the post-war inter-ethnic relations in Bosnia. Respondents were asked to rank the effect of these organisations on the quality of inter-ethnic relations on a five-point scale from very negative to very positive.

Finally, we were interested in respondents' expectations of inter-ethnic cooperation. The final control variable, *vote only for coethnics*, captured the extent to which individuals were or were not prepared to vote for candidates who did not share their ethnicity. We measured this on a five-point scale, with responses coded five for agreeing strongly with the statement 'In light of everything that happened, we should only vote for co-ethnics.'

Table 3: Explaining Support for Dayton: Ordinal Logit Model

	(1) Support for Dayton
Can See a Future	1.88** (0.56)
Serb	4.36*** (1.09)
Bosnian	0.40** (0.18)
Croat	0.84 (0.24)
Mixed Identity	2.40** (1.00)
Education	0.66*** (0.10)
Urban	0.93 (0.20)
Women	0.86 (0.19)
Age	0.99 (0.01)
Income	1.05 (0.06)
Returnee	0.69 (0.20)
Still Displaced	0.75 (0.20)
Abused in War	0.96 (0.33)
Close Person Killed	0.79 (0.18)
INGO	1.14 (0.11)
Vote only for Coethnics	1.05 (0.08)

cut1

Constant	0.11*** (0.08)
<hr/>	
cut2	
Constant	0.22** (0.17)
<hr/>	
cut3	
Constant	0.95 (0.71)
<hr/>	
cut4	
Constant	2.78 (2.09)
<hr/>	
N	641.00

Note: Table entries are odds ratios with standard errors in parentheses. Reference category Bosniac. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

Table 3 presents the results of our analysis, and we begin our discussion of the results of this module by focusing on our indicator of individual security. Recall hypothesis one (H1): support for the peace settlement will be higher among individuals who feel secure under the peace agreement. We find support for this hypothesis, as the odds that respondents who can see a future in their place of residence will support Dayton are around 88 percent higher than respondents who do not see a future. This variable is statistically significant at the five percent level. Our measures of wartime experience of insecurity reduce support for Dayton, though not at a statistically significant level, suggesting forward-looking expectations of security are important in shaping individual attitudes.

Our results for the indicators of ethnic identity suggest this is the major driver of support for Dayton. Our results are consistent with the claim that differences in minority groups' support will be related to the degree of representation they have achieved (H2b). The key results of interest are those enabling us to compare Serb and Croat support for Dayton. The indicator variable for Bosniac self-identifiers is excluded from the model; it becomes the reference category for interpreting the effects of membership in the other groups on support for Dayton. The model estimates Serb speakers are around four times (an odds ratio of 4.36) more likely to support the treaty than Bosniac self-identifiers, a finding which is statistically significant at the one percent level. In contrast, Croat self-identifiers appear no different from

Bosnian self-identifiers in their support for the treaty. Taken together, these findings support the hypothesis (H2a and H2b) that majorities and minorities who are not able to secure representation in the post-war polity will be less supportive of the treaty than majorities who do secure representation.

Few other control variables appear to be influential or consistent determinants of support. One exception is education, which is statistically significant and negatively correlated with support for Dayton, reducing support by about 40 percent and statistically significantly at the one percent level.

Discussion

Our results substantiate our first hypothesis (H1), namely that support for Dayton's power-sharing arrangements will be higher among individuals who feel more secure. As we anticipated, perceptions of security leading to support for power sharing have both an individual and an ethnic group component, with the latter showing a greater effect. Finally, our results capture significant inter-ethnic group variations in support for the peace agreement.

Findings also support our second set of hypotheses (H2a and H2b): the degree to which groups support the peace agreement will depend on the extent to which their preferences for group protection are recognized. Majority Bosniacs are less supportive of the treaty; they would prefer to see the protections for other ethnic groups eroded with the abolition of Republika Srpska whilst preventing the emergence of a Croatian political entity. A long-term orientation of a significant part of the Bosniac political leadership has been to replace the federal, power-sharing political structures with a unitary state, with Bosniacs the dominant ethnic group, just as Serbs are in Serbia and Croats are in Croatia. More civic-minded Bosniacs generally reject the excessive institutionalization of ethnicity and hope for a

more civic nationalist arrangement. For both groups, it would be ideal if Republika Srpska were eliminated or at least made as irrelevant as possible, and they would certainly oppose another Republika Srpska on the Croat side. For Bosniacs, the creation of Bosnian Croat ethno-territorial autonomy would probably lead to a formal division of Mostar, as Croat authorities are aiming for Western Mostar as their capital, leaving Bosniac Canton 1 (Una-Sava) completely surrounded by Croatia, RS and a Bosnian Croat entity.⁴⁶

For their part, Serbian respondents supported the treaty even though they would prefer independence for the Republic. In the post-Dayton period, the great powers have had a major influence on the evolution of Bosnian state institutions. Generally, their tendency has been to remove ultra-nationalists and war criminals from office, enable the return of property to victims of forced displacement and strengthen the central government as much as possible. The strengthening of the central government has been especially visible in the creation of (at least formally) unified military forces; these internationally-backed centralization attempts alarmed the Bosnian Serbs who ended up defending the original Dayton accords.⁴⁷ As anticipated, Croats who receive fewer protections under Dayton are not so supportive and would like to see the creation of a Croatian political entity.

Finally, we find a mediating effect of individual security on group support for Dayton. Though Bosniacs, on average, are less supportive of Dayton than Serbs, members of this majority group who anticipate a future in their place of residence are more supportive than those who are not, a finding that suggests both individual and group-level security are important predictors of support for a peace agreement.

Conclusion

What do Bosnia's citizens think of the Dayton peace agreement today? Despite the many pitfalls of Dayton's externally mediated institutions, by 2013, the majority of Bosnians

would have not opposed Dayton if they had the chance to vote for it in a peace referendum. Interestingly, in each of the three main ethnic groups, more people would have voted for Dayton than against it. Dayton has been described as ‘both a blessing and a curse’⁴⁸, yet in the eyes of most ordinary citizens, the former seems more salient.

Admittedly, previous studies have indicated general dissatisfaction with Dayton. Specifically, UN data for the same period suggest only 12 percent of citizens would describe their ‘state of mind in positive terms’.⁴⁹ Yet it is important to decouple Dayton as a failing reconstruction project from Dayton as a conflict-mitigating institution. Even though it was clearly not an ideal settlement, for the majority of Bosnians, it offered an antidote to lethal violence, secession and the abolition of federal autonomy. This seems to refute negative views of the Dayton accords and erroneous predictions of Bosnia’s constitutional collapse.⁵⁰

Whilst we recognize the inherent weaknesses of the Bosnian constitutional model and the limitations of our own data (e.g., we lack comparative, longitudinal or experimental data), our findings suggest federal/consociational settlements should be options in post-conflict negotiations. Critics failed to predict correctly the long-term impact of Dayton or the changing public perceptions documented by this survey and other public opinion data.⁵¹ Based on what we see here, ethnic federal solutions could be a reasonable first step for withdrawal from hostilities, especially in situations where internal and external parties lack any alternatives. Widely criticized yet still considered as a potential archetype of a peace settlement, the Dayton accords tell a theoretically insightful story about which institutions and trade-offs should be prioritized or avoided based on the experiences and evaluations of the citizens themselves. As our article demonstrates, survey data, particularly those collected during the post-implementation phase of a peace agreement, are critical to understand contemporary dilemmas in international security and peace mediations. Whilst ours is not the first article to attempt to understand citizen preferences as opposed to elite ones in Bosnia, it

provides a set of previously unexplored mechanisms linking power-sharing, security and citizen endorsement. In effect, we provide a missing empirical link, addressing some of the unresolved tensions in the academic literature and highlighting new understandings of the micro-foundations of support for peace agreements.

To explain how Bosnians came to support Dayton, we suggest perceptions of security led to support for power sharing at both the individual and the ethnic group level, with the latter having a greater effect. This suggestion is important for the design of future peace agreements and has key policy implications, not least because it indicates the need to combine the two issues in dedicated interrelated work packages during mediations and to identify the most suitable mechanisms to compensate compromising majorities with security provisions in exchange for concessions on power-sharing institutions. Future research might be able to offer additional evidence and more nuanced win-win packages to support mediations across deeply divided societies and territorial conflicts.

Finally, our findings speak to a major dilemma in peacemaking: the face-off between the centripetalist and consociational schools. We integrate an important argument about these conflicting alternatives for divided societies into a framework that explains variations in citizen preferences about peace treaties on the one hand and provides a test of their arguments on the other. As noted above, advocates of consociationalism argue for guaranteed group representation, such as ethnic federalism and the separate election (if voters so choose) of community leaders⁵²), whilst centripetalists advocate limits on group rights and argue for incentives for cross-community cooperation, aiming to foster consensus across ethnic lines.⁵³ Admittedly, Bosnia does not fully match the views and prescriptions of the architects of these schools, and subsequent work has provided improved versions of the two power-sharing alternatives. Yet we argue Dayton offers a close approximation of the two tested simultaneously in a single country after decades of implementation. Our results capture

significant inter-ethnic group variations in support for the peace agreement amongst Bosnia's main communities depending on the extent to which their preferences for group protection have been recognized. Despite the strong historical legacies of Serbian nationalism, minority Serbs now see Dayton as guaranteeing their territorial autonomy and associate the agreement with the continued existence of Republika Srpska. Meanwhile, Croats are less happy with the centripetalist arrangements and the fact that unlike Serbs, they did not receive explicit ethno-territorial autonomy after the war.

The sustainability of peace arrangements might depend on the normatively difficult-to-defend consociational model. The guarantees offered by consociationalism appear to be more credible preconditions for convincing potentially secessionist minorities to endorse peace settlements. This final point explains why Bosnia did not suffer the fate of the former Yugoslavia despite similarities in ethnic composition, history and institutional setup. Unlike in the former Yugoslavia, entities in Bosnia could not pressure for more autonomy; in fact, the Office of the High Representative has put pressure in the opposite direction. In other words, the possible abolition/dilution of the Dayton regime deterred violent mobilization for partition. Fearing diminished status within the country, Bosnian Serbs have become increasingly attached to the 'original Dayton', using it strategically to defend the preservation of their entity and their extensive rights. Although they do not find it an ideal compromise, Bosnian Serbs have gradually realized opposition to Dayton would more likely lead to a centralized Bosnia than to secession. A key lesson, therefore, is that starting with an 'over-generous arrangement' to minority groups through territorial concessions could help build deterrence by minimizing future secessionist behaviour that would undermine these initially generous concessions. Overall, Bosnia and Dayton suggest that contrary to conventional wisdom, in the right circumstances and with the right incentives, support for compromises can emerge, no matter how opposed the players are in the early phases of the peace process.

NOTES

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- ¹ Bieber, *Post-war Bosnia*; McGarry & O'Leary, *The Northern Ireland Conflict*; Zahar "Power Sharing in Lebanon".
- ² Yet scholars understand inclusivity in different terms, e.g. see debate between Horowitz, "Electoral systems: A primer for decision makers" and Lijphart, "Constitutional design for divided societies" as well as subsequent works by Bakke, *Decentralization and Intrastate Struggles* as well as collection of essays in McCulloch and McGarry eds., *Power Sharing*.
- ³ Wimmer et al., "Ethnic politics and armed conflict"
- ⁴ Walter, *Committing to Peace*; Wolff, *Ethnic conflict*
- ⁵ Hartzell and Hoddie "Institutionalizing Peace"; Lake and Rothchild, "Containing Fear"
- ⁶ McGarry & O'Leary, *The Northern Ireland Conflict*;
- ⁷ Wolff, *Ethnic conflict*; Jarstad and Sisk eds., *From War to Democracy*.
- ⁸ Belloni, "Peacebuilding and Consociational Electoral Engineering in Bosnia and Herzegovina"; Hartzell and Hoddie, *Crafting Peace*; McEvoy, Joanne. 2014. *Power-sharing Executives*.
- ⁹ Facts On File World News Digest, "Bosnian Serbs Again Reject Peace Plan"
- ¹⁰ Kumar, "The Troubled History of Partition"; Woodward, "Bosnian Fates".
- ¹¹ McEvoy, "Letting "the people (s)" decide";
- ¹² Cochrane, *Northern Ireland*; Manning "Political Elites and Democratic State-building Efforts in Bosnia and Iraq".
- ¹³ Northern Ireland (post-implementation) and Cyprus (pre-implementation) feature regular surveys on power-sharing. For Cyprus, see SEED and PAKEPE surveys e.g. Lordos et al., *A People's Peace in Cyprus*; Psaltis et al. "Internally Displaced Persons and the Cyprus Peace Process."; for Northern Ireland, see Evans and Tonge, "From Abstentionism to Enthusiasm"; Garry *Consociation and voting in Northern Ireland* as well as NI's national election surveys. For Bosnia itself, see Tuathail et al., "Bosnia-Herzegovina ten years after Dayton"; Bakke et al. "Social distance in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the North Caucasus region of Russia".
- ¹⁴ McGarry & O'Leary *The Northern Ireland Conflict*; Zahar, "Power Sharing in Lebanon".
- ¹⁵ For a discussion of human security, its usefulness and limitations as a concept, see Barnett and Adger "Climate change, human security and violent conflict"; Paris, "Human security".
- ¹⁶ Wimmer et al., "Ethnic politics and Armed Conflict", 321.
- ¹⁷ Walter, "Bargaining Failures and Civil War"
- ¹⁸ Hartzell and Hoddie, *Crafting Peace*;
- ¹⁹ Gates et al. "Power Sharing, Protection, and Peace."
- ²⁰ Wimmer et al., "Ethnic politics and armed conflict"
- ²¹ Kaufman, "Escaping the Symbolic Politics Trap"; McDoom, "The Psychology of Threat in Intergroup Conflict".
- ²² Horowitz "Ethnic power sharing"
- ²³ Ibid 12.
- ²⁴ McEvoy, *Power-sharing Executives*; Hartzell and Hoddie, *Crafting Peace*
- ²⁵ Lijphart, "Consociational democracy"; McGarry and O'Leary, "Consociational theory, Northern Ireland's Conflict, and its Agreement."
- ²⁶ Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation*.
- ²⁷ Lustick, "Lijphart, Lakatos, and Consociationalism"; Selway and Templeman, "The myth of consociationalism?"

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- ²⁸ Horowitz, *Constitutional change and democracy in Indonesia*; Reilly “Political Engineering and Party Politics in Conflict-Prone Societies”.
- ²⁹ McGarry and Loizides “Power-sharing in a Re-united Cyprus”, 849
- ³⁰ Horowitz, *Constitutional change and democracy in Indonesia*; Wilson, “A Closer Look at the Limits of Consociationalism”; McCulloch and Vandeginste “Veto Power and Power-Sharing”.
- ³¹ Zahar, “Bosnia and Herzegovina (Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina)”
- ³² Bieber, *Post-war Bosnia*
- ³³ *ibid*
- ³⁴ Zahar, “Bosnia and Herzegovina (Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina)”, 78.
- ³⁵ For more info see, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bk.html> (accessed 17 October, 2013)
- ³⁶ Keil & Perry, “Back to square one?”
- ³⁷ For an insightful qualitative comparison of the two theories, see Bochsler, Four Ways to avoid Centripetal Effects.
- ³⁸ The sampling frame uses two stratification variables. The first is based on Bosnia’s two entities: Federation and Republika Srpska. The second is based on the coefficient of return (CR) for each municipality. The CR combined the 1991 pre-war Census data with the 2005 estimates of return (provided by the Bosnian Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees (Nomadic et al: 2005)) to express the estimated percent of the pre-war minority population returning to a given municipality in the post-war period. The median value of the CR for the Federation is 12.49 percent; the median for the RS is 14.74 percent. In the Federation, we randomly selected 12 municipalities where the CR was less than the median and 11 where it was greater. Similarly, in Republika Srpska, we randomly selected seven municipalities where the CR was less than the median and five where it was greater
- ³⁹ The analysis was conducted using the statistical software package Stata 1
- ⁴⁰ Long and Freese, *Regression Models for Categorical Dependent Variables using Stata*
- ⁴¹ See, for instance highly critical views by David Harland’s ‘Never again: International Intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina’ available at <https://www.hdcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Never-again-International-intervention-in-Bosnia-and-Herzegovina.pdf> or Julian Borger’s *Guardian* piece on ‘Bosnia’s bitter flawed peace deal, 20 years on’ available at <https://www.theguardian.com/global/2015/nov/10/bosnia-bitter-flawed-peace-deal-dayton-agreement-20-years-on>
- ⁴² The word Bosnian is used for all citizens of the country whilst Bosniac or Bosniak is commonly used for Bosnians associated with a Muslim background/heritage.
- ⁴³ Long and Freese, *Regression Models for Categorical Dependent Variables using Stata*
- ⁴⁴ This question in our survey best integrates traditional and ‘human security’ definitions, as it assumes physical security is a necessary but not sufficient condition for seeing a future in the current place of residence (i.e. other factors need to be present, such as safety from chronic threats like hunger and repression). See United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report, 1994*. On the importance of incorporating future expectations into measures of security see Inglehart and Norris “The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse: Understanding Human Security”
- ⁴⁵ A second measure of these identities was derived from a question asking respondents what language they usually spoke at home. As a robustness check, we replicated all the analysis reported here with this variable; there was no substantive change in the results.
- ⁴⁶ For the contrasting case of Sudan, see Beber et al., “Intergroup Violence and Political Attitudes”.
- ⁴⁷ See also public opinion a decade after Dayton e.g. in Tuathail et al., “Bosnia-Herzegovina ten years after Dayton”.

⁴⁸ Weller and Stefan, “Bosnia and Herzegovina ten years after Dayton”.

⁴⁹ See Prism Research, *Public Opinion Results*, Prism Research, 2013. “United Nations Resident Coordinator Office in Bosnia and Herzegovina” p. 329.

http://ba.one.un.org/content/unct/bosnia_and_herzegovina/en/home/publications/public-opinion-poll/ last accessed August 04, 2020)

⁵⁰ Kumar, “The Troubled History of Partition”; Woodward, “Bosnian Fates”.

⁵¹ See also more recent work by James Lyon (2015. Is War about to Break out in the Balkans? *Foreign Policy*. Available at: <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/26/war-break-out-balkans-bosnia-republika-srpska-dayton/>; last accessed October 26, 2015).

⁵² McGarry and O’Leary, “Consociational theory, Northern Ireland’s Conflict, and its Agreement.”

⁵³ Horowitz, *Constitutional Change and Democracy in Indonesia*.

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