Medieval Diplomacy in Practice: Anglo-Papal Relations between King Henry III (1216–1272) and Pope Alexander IV (1254–1261)

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Abstract

This thesis looks at the diplomatic relationship between Pope Alexander IV (1254–1261) and King Henry III of England (1216–1272). Using Anglo-papal correspondence, English administrative records and thirteenth-century narrative sources, it will explore the political relationship between these two rulers as well as the diplomatic and administrative practices and procedures which underpinned this relationship, with a particular focus on the agents who conducted these exchanges between England and the papacy in the mid-thirteenth century.

Until recently, diplomatic relations between rulers have largely been understood through the outcomes of their interactions. Yet, this thesis seeks to highlight the methods, agents and language underpinning this relationship in order to better understand how diplomatic practices were conducted and how the machinery of government was utilised in diplomatic exchanges between these two rulers.

There has been very little study into the pontificate of Alexander IV, as such, this thesis will shine light on his political activities and style of rulership through his relationship with the English king and the English realm. Indeed, Alexander’s pontificate was particularly shaped by his relationship with the English as it covered a period of political turbulence in both England and the Italian peninsula.

This thesis has been arranged into three sections addressing the themes of: (1) ‘mediation and arbitration’, (2) ‘representation’ and (3) ‘communication and correspondence’. The first section on ‘mediation and arbitration’ comprises of Chapter One which highlights the key political events effecting England within which this pope intervened. The second section, ‘representation’, consists of Chapters Two, Three and Four which shed light on the variety of agents who significantly shaped Anglo-papal relations through their activities. Finally, section three, ‘communication and correspondence’, covers Chapter Five which explores the production, structure and language of the diplomatic letters, exploring the development of letter-writing practices between England and the papacy as well as the political relationship between Henry III and Alexander IV through the correspondence.
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Abbreviations

AM – Annales Monastici, ed. H. R. Luard, Rolls Series, 5 vols (London, 1864–9)

BF – Bullarium Franciscanum, ed. J. H. Sbaralea, 4 vols (Rome, 1761)

BL – British Library

CCA – Canterbury Cathedral Archives


EHR – English Historical Review

Foedera – Foedera, conventiones, litterae et ciuscunque generis acta publica inter reges Anglie et alios quosvis Imperatores, Reges, Pontifices, Principes, vel Communitates, ed. T. Rymer, 4 vols in seven parts (London, 1816–69)


MGH – Monumenta Germaniae Historica

MIÖG – Mitteilungen des Instituts Für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung


Potthast – Potthast, August, Regesta Pontificum Romanorum inde ab a post Christum natum MCXCVIII ad a MCCCIV, 2 vols (Graz, 1957)


Salimbene – Salimbene de Adam, Cronica, ed. Giuseppe Scalia, 2 vols (Roma, 1966)

TNA – The National Archives, Kew
Introduction

The aim of this thesis is to explore the diplomatic relationship between King Henry III of England and Pope Alexander IV from 1254 to 1261, and through this study to demonstrate how Anglo-papal diplomacy functioned and developed during this period.

Hamilton and Langhorne have defined medieval diplomacy as ‘the peaceful conduct of relations amongst political entities, their principals and accredited agents’.

This thesis will explore medieval diplomacy through the methods, agents and language that shaped these exchanges between the pope and the English king. While fourteenth-century diplomacy has received a degree of scholarly attention, thirteenth-century specialists have largely overlooked the modalities of diplomacy. This study will therefore examine the political relations, the activities of a variety of agents, and the developing administrative and diplomatic practices between England and papacy in a period which has been overlooked.

The period coinciding with Alexander IV and Henry III is especially interesting, not just because the pope was the overlord of Henry’s kingdom, but because papal and royal interests were so heavily intertwined. King Henry III had committed himself to the pope’s crusade in Sicily against Frederick II’s illegitimate son, Manfred of Lancia (c.1232–1266) between 1254 and 1258. The English king was also facing significant external pressure to make peace with his French counterpart, Louis IX. Moreover, Henry was facing a baronial revolt from 1258 to 1261 and a baronial war from 1263–1265, which effectively paralysed his personal rule (1234–1258) until the baronial rebels were defeated at the battle of Evesham in 1265. Hence, the success of the pope’s crusading policy was dependent on the outcome of Henry’s own foreign and domestic affairs. The relationship between Alexander and Henry remains vastly unexplored by the historiography. An examination of the methods, agents and practices utilised in diplomatic exchanges between Alexander and Henry will not only expose the conduct and function of mid-thirteenth century Anglo-papal diplomacy but will highlight the nature of their specific political and spiritual relationship.

This thesis engages with three main historiographical debates: the practice of medieval diplomacy, political and administrative English history, and the history of the medieval papacy. Although these three areas cover the same period, they do not interact with each other. The aim is to

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undergo a more thorough investigation into mid-thirteenth century diplomatic activity between England and the papacy. This will be achieved firstly by merging the existing research within these three areas, and then by expanding on it through an examination of the primary material regarding diplomatic interactions between Henry III and Alexander IV. This material will be investigated through three modes: mediation and arbitration, examining the pope’s role and intervention in English political matters; representation, looking at the role played by Anglo-papal representatives and agents and the significance of their contribution; and finally, communication, exploring the production, form and language of the diplomatic correspondence and how it was impacted by these diplomatic exchanges between England and the papacy.

**Medieval Diplomacy: Historiography**

While many medievalists studying a range of political, economic, social and cultural factors have, at some point, used diplomatic sources in their work, there has been a surprising lack of investigation regarding the specific theory and practice that led to the creation of these sources. Even in the nineteenth century, when historians were particularly interested in political, administrative and diplomatic European history, there was little serious study into ‘the unique character of medieval diplomacy’.

2 This was partly because nineteenth century scholars took a more ‘narrative and descriptive’ approach to their work which left little room for an analytical investigation regarding diplomatic trends.3 They also viewed the study of diplomacy and foreign affairs as an aspect of political history and the study of relations between rulers as opposed to a study in its own right.

4 The study of medieval diplomacy began to grow and develop in the twentieth century. Plöger has pointed out three separate historiographical approaches to this area of research.5 Firstly, there is the study of international relations between ruling bodies as a way to manage political and diplomatic affairs. While this direction of scholarship started to take shape in the nineteenth century, it has been largely moulded by the work of several twentieth-century scholars: namely, Francois Louis Ganshof, Viktor Menzel in *Deutsche Gesandtschaftswesen im Mittelalter* (Hanover, 1892), and M. de Maulde La Clavière, *La diplomatie au temps de Machiavel*, 3 vols (Paris, 1892–3). Karsten Plöger, ‘Foreign Policy in the Late Middle Ages’, *German Historical Institute London Bulletin*, 28 (2006), 35–46 (36).

5 Plöger, ‘Foreign Policy in the Late Middle Ages’, 37.

6 See for example, Leopold Von Ranke, *History of the popes, their church and state, and especially of their conflicts with Protestantism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries*, trans. E. Foster, 3 vols (London, 1880–3).

7 See Plöger, ‘Foreign Policy in the Late Middle Ages’, 35–46.
Garrett Mattingly and Donald Queller. Ganshof’s study on international relations in the Middle Ages provided a comprehensive setting for the issue of diplomatic practices, examining diplomacy through the international relations between rulers. Shortly afterwards, Garrett Mattingly argued that by 1400, the West still viewed itself as ‘one society’ of ‘Romans’ under the rule of a common law and as such any ‘precise definition of a body of diplomatic principles had to wait for a revolution in men’s thinking about the nature of the state’. He proposed that the permanent model of modern European diplomacy was an invention of the Italian Renaissance. Mattingly was primarily focused with the relations between rulers and states and is still widely cited for his work on the evolution of pre-modern diplomacy. Yet, his work does not sufficiently explore or engage with the character of diplomatic principles and practices before the fifteenth century. Following in Mattingly’s footsteps, Queller examined ‘how diplomatic representation was used in the Middle Ages to conduct relations among states’, agreeing with Mattingly that modern European diplomacy was an Italian invention in place by the end of the fifteenth century. Queller focused primarily on Venetian, Flemish and English documents which distorted his interpretation of diplomatic methods and practices across medieval Europe. For example, he explored the role of diplomatic personnel working for these three secular authorities, and then used this evidence to make broader generalisations regarding the function, powers and duties of all types of medieval diplomatic representatives. Unlike Mattingly, Queller made some effort to engage with the material pre-fifteenth century, but has focused primarily on secular models of diplomacy. As such, through a discussion on Anglo-papal diplomatic relations in the mid-thirteenth century, this thesis will challenge established assumptions that the growth of diplomacy coincided with the formation of bureaucratized states in mid-fifteenth-century Italy.

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8 Ibid., p. 55.
10 Nicolson argued that ‘it was the Byzantines who set taught diplomacy to Venice; it was the Venetians set the pattern for Italian cities, for France and Spain and eventually the whole of Europe.’ Harold Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, 3rd edn (Oxford, 1963), pp. 12, 24–5.
The second historiographical approach to the study of medieval diplomacy has been through a study of the administrative and diplomatic practices. This approach has been shaped by George Cuttino and Pierre Chaplais, who examined the technical features, functions and formulation of diplomatic and administrative documents in order to comprehend the forms and structures of medieval diplomacy.12

Cuttino examined several ‘landmark’ documents through which historians can gain a greater understanding of the structure and forms of diplomatic documents and the development of medieval diplomacy. One of these was the Treaty of Paris (1259), which features prominently throughout this thesis.13 While Chaplais must be noted for his extensive and detailed research into the form and practice of thirteenth and fourteenth-century English diplomatic documents, which has heavily shaped successive studies in this field. He devoted his life to the study of medieval diplomacy and wrote many works regarding the administration of diplomatic documents, including transcriptions of original documents, now held at The National Archives.14 In particular, Chaplais’ work on English Diplomatic Practice in the Middle Ages (completed in December 1992, but not published until 2003) gave a detailed analysis of diplomatic correspondence, representatives, and the structure of simple and solemn embassies, which now serves as a manual for scholars interpreting the methods, mechanics and protocol of these diplomatic procedures.15

Both Cuttino and Chaplais expressed an interest in administrative history alongside diplomacy, marking them out from other scholars of diplomacy. Yet, their work focused on thirteenth and fourteenth-century Anglo-French relations and did not expand on the papacy’s role in these international affairs. This is an area which still needs to be explored in detail, although, according to Clifford Davies, Chaplais had intended to discuss the mechanics of Anglo-papal diplomacy in a second volume on English Diplomatic Practice in the Middle Ages but was never able to complete his study on diplomatic practice as he sadly passed away on 26 November 2006.16

13 Cuttino, English Diplomatic Administration; Cuttino, English Medieval Diplomacy.
14 Jones and Vale, England and her Neighbours, pp. xxi–xxiv.
At the end of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first century, partly due to changing social and cultural values in the West, the study of diplomatic, political, and administrative European history dramatically decreased in popularity. It has since been replaced by a growing number of social, cultural, gender and interdisciplinary studies which reveal more about the everyday lives and experiences of the whole medieval community. This change has engaged a new and diverse group of researchers with the study of medieval history and, in turn, sparked an interest in the ‘social and cultural’ study of medieval diplomacy through an exploration of the symbolism, ceremonies, rituals, procedures, and protocol associated with diplomatic practices. Jenny Benham, Karsten Plöger and Isabella Lazzarini have placed their work within this field of ‘social and cultural diplomacy’. Plöger examined the protocol, procedures and the ceremonial throughout fourteenth-century Anglo-papal diplomatic relations. Benham researched the symbolic acts, rituals, oaths, and ceremonies associated with the conduct of medieval peacemaking processes in England and Denmark between the eleventh and the thirteenth centuries. Both Benham and Plöger discuss the political discourse between rulers along with the cultural and social aspects of diplomacy, intertwining these two approaches to the study of medieval diplomacy. More recently, Lazzarini has added to this by examining the political and cultural transformations of power and authority in Renaissance Italy (1350–1520), and the emergence of diplomacy as ‘flexible political activity’ within both formal and informal settings.

This new focus on the cultural and social aspects of medieval diplomacy has unfortunately resulted in a lack of research regarding the more administrative aspects of diplomacy. As such, this thesis seeks to bridge the gap between the first two historiographical approaches to diplomacy – the study of diplomacy as political and international relations between rulers, and the study of administrative and diplomatic practices – through the Anglo-papal relations between Henry III and Alexander IV, and in so doing, shed light on the specific methods and practices of diplomacy between England and the papacy in the mid-thirteenth century.

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Anglo-papal Diplomacy: Historiography

Although the study of medieval diplomacy has continued to develop, not many extensive studies have been written on the diplomatic relations between England and the Papacy in the Middle Ages. When researching Anglo-papal diplomacy, three scholars – Karsten Plöger, Patrick Zutshi and Barbara Bombi – stand out for their extensive work in this field for the fourteenth century. As noted above, Plöger intended his work as a cultural study of Anglo-papal relations, while Zutshi has highlighted the curial administrative developments and activities of English petitioners and their agents at the papal curia. Likewise, Bombi has examined the administrative practices and routine business, alongside the management of international relations, between England and the papacy. These historians have shaped and improved our understanding of fourteenth-century Anglo-papal diplomatic relations through a detailed exploration of the diplomatic personnel, communications, protocols and procedures, and methods of arbitration. Apart from the work by Jane E. Sayers, in which she examines the growing exchanges between England and the papacy in the first half of the thirteenth century, Anglo-papal diplomacy in the thirteenth century has received significantly less attention by the historiography.


In his study on Renaissance diplomacy, Mattingly identified the papacy as ‘the first western power to make systematic use of diplomacy’ through its confrontations with the Holy Roman Empire in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. It is probable that secular powers learned how to conduct their ‘machinery of diplomacy’ through observing the papal system. The significance of the papacy in the evolution of diplomatic practice is paramount. Plöger, Zutshi and Bombi have acknowledged that by the fourteenth century, sophisticated governmental structures already existed in both England and the papal curia which were developed and utilised for the purpose of diplomatic exchanges. These complex and bureaucratic diplomatic structures did not suddenly appear in the fourteenth century; they had been developing throughout the Middle Ages, and were shaped by the papacy’s role in European diplomatic exchanges and practices.

The diplomatic relations between lay rulers and the pope in the Middle Ages were unlike any other. A prince, king or emperor could not deploy the same language or methods of negotiation which he would frequently utilise in diplomatic communications with other secular authorities. Moreover, as Plöger noted, a king ‘could not buy the pope’s loyalty, extract oaths of fealty or homage from him, formally defy and wage war against him, and – for even more obvious reasons – marry his daughters off to him.’ These relations required more tact, skill and careful negotiation regarding certain conventions, protocols and etiquette, and as such needed to be conducted within a more sophisticated framework.

For the thirteenth century, complex relations already existed between royal and spiritual powers which also shaped these Anglo-papal diplomatic interactions. Moreover, England became a papal fief in 1213, following King John’s submission of his realm to Pope Innocent III, and this also impacted the English king’s diplomatic relationship with the papacy in the thirteenth century.

Clearly, there is much to be discussed regarding Anglo-papal diplomacy in the thirteenth century, and through this case-study on the relations between Henry III and Alexander IV from 1254

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22 Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, pp. 17, 22.
to 1261, this thesis will shed new light on these evolving practices and modalities. While this study is focused on a small timeframe, it is a detailed discussion regarding Anglo-papal diplomatic methods and practices which can shape other studies engaging with this field. For as Plöger has noted:

If one aims to understand the intricacies of the communication process between these two protagonists [the Pope and the King], there is no choice but to opt for a decidedly microscopic view and clearly define one’s ‘exploratory trench’ (to use Michael Clanchy’s expression).\(^{25}\)

As mentioned above, this thesis centres on the seven years of diplomatic exchanges between Henry III and Alexander IV. Although Alexander IV’s pontificate has been overlooked by the historiography, it was characterized by major international diplomatic and political negotiations, particularly with the English King.

Alexander IV was pontiff from 12 December 1254 until his death on 25 May 1261, and yet nothing major has been written about his pontificate since Tenckhoff published his seminal work entitled *Papst Alexander IV* in 1907.\(^{26}\) Tenckhoff devoted little attention to the relationship between Henry III and Alexander IV from 1254 and 1261, spending more time on the papal-imperial relationship.\(^{27}\) Alexander has been largely overshadowed by his more famous predecessors, particularly Pope Innocent III, Gregory IX and Innocent IV.\(^{28}\) Historians have traditionally concluded that nothing of any significance happened during Alexander’s pontificate.\(^{29}\) Nonetheless, the years 1254 to 1261 ushered in political and social upheaval as well as economic plight in both the English and Italian kingdoms, and as a result, there is evidence of extensive diplomatic communication


\(^{27}\) For Anglo-papal relations concerning the Sicilian Business, see Tenckhoff, *Papst Alexander IV*, pp. 36–42.


between England and the papacy. Thus, it marks a critical point in the history of Anglo-papal relations which deserves further exploration.

Equally, although England had a special relationship with the papacy by virtue of being a papal fief, scholars working on English political history and Henry III’s reign have largely overlooked Anglo-papal relations. Instead, the many papers, articles and books which have been written about Henry III have focused on his minority, personal rule, the Baronal Revolt and war, governmental structures, and foreign relations. Indeed, the overwhelming approach towards Henry’s reign has been an Anglo-centric one, which focused on these legal, administrative and political developments. However, considering Henry’s foreign familial background, and the fact that his policies were heavily shaped by his continental ambitions and personal piety, it is important to examine this European and religious context in more detail to gain a broader perspective on his reign and methods of rulership. One way in which historians have begun to place Henry’s reign within its European context has been through comparative analyses of his political relations with foreign counterparts, such as Emperor Frederick II, Louis IX of France, and Alfonso X of Castile. Nonetheless, for historians to fully comprehend how Henry’s rulership was influenced by both his foreignness and his religiosity, they must explore Henry’s extensive interactions with the papacy.

From the beginning of his reign, Henry’s relationship with the papacy was already defined as one of lord (the pope) and vassal (the king) which impacted all aspects of his reign. This suggests that Henry was conscious of this special relationship between the English monarchy and the papacy, and that he utilised it accordingly. David Carpenter once asserted that in the late 1250s Henry was

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‘the Pope’s greatest friend in England’. Whether this was a throw-away comment or something more substantial is yet to be seen. Regardless, it conjures up an image of a special and unique relationship existing between Henry and Alexander – one built on mutual trust and respect. It also suggests that through this special relationship, the papacy did exert some influence over Henry’s policy and decision-making. Nonetheless, English political historians have devoted little attention to the diplomatic relationship which existed between Henry and Alexander (and the papacy as a whole). This is something which will be explored in more detail throughout this thesis.

Political Context

Before exploring the methods, agents, and language associated with Anglo-papal diplomatic practice, it is important to highlight the political context which surrounded these relations between Church and Crown from 1254 to 1261. There are three main strands to this political context which need to be addressed. Firstly, the Sicilian Business (1254–1258); secondly, the Treaty of Paris (1259); and thirdly, the English Baronial revolt (1258–1261).

The Sicilian Business (1254–1258)

From 1254 to 1258, Anglo-papal communications were largely dominated by their efforts towards the crusade in Sicily, known as the ‘Sicilian Business’. Following the death of the Holy Roman Emperor and King of Sicily, Frederick II on 13 December 1250, Pope Innocent IV (1243–1254) became intent on ending Hohenstaufen’s imperial rule over the papal fiefdom of Sicily, which had been threatening the power and security of the Patrimony of St Peter and the surrounding provinces. To achieve this aim, he sought a new claimant to the Sicilian throne – one who could provide financial and military backing against the Hohenstaufen. After failing to motivate either Richard of Cornwall (1209–1272) or Charles de Anjou (1226–1285) to claim the throne, Innocent IV offered the kingdom to Henry’s second son, Edmund, in December 1253 through his envoy, Master Albert of Parma. Henry accepted this offer on behalf of his son in February 1254, which

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was officially confirmed by the pope on 14 May 1254. There is no surviving evidence regarding the full agreement between Innocent IV and Henry III, though it may have been similar to the agreement presented to Charles of Anjou.

All the while, Sicily was still under the rule of Frederick’s son, Conrad IV, who had tried to resolve the issue of Sicily by separating it from the Empire and awarding it to his brother Henry of Hohenstaufen. Unfortunately, Henry died soon afterwards in December 1253, followed by Conrad on 21 May 1254. Before his death, Conrad had appointed Innocent IV as the guardian of his young son, Conradin (1252–1268), the new king of Sicily. Furthermore, he had also appointed Berthold of Hohenburg, a relative of his wife, as regent, in an attempt to stop his half-brother, Manfred of Lancia (c.1232–1266), the illegitimate son of Frederick II, from claiming this position. Regardless, Manfred soon had himself appointed Regent of Sicily on behalf of Conradin. Meanwhile, the pope was trying to assert his own control over the kingdom of Sicily, and although Manfred did briefly surrender Sicily to the pope in October 1254, this accord did not last long, and the pope became engaged in battles against him. After Innocent’s death in December 1254, his successor Alexander IV took on the role of Conradin’s guardian and attempted to make peace with Manfred. However, after failing to agree terms of peace in March 1255, Alexander engaged in open war against Manfred. As such, Alexander turned to Henry III for financial and military aid to support his war.
against Manfred confirming the investiture of Edmund as King of Sicily on 9 April 1255. In return for the throne of Sicily, and under pain of excommunication and interdict, Henry promised to pay the pope 135,541 marks (the amount which the papacy had already spent in Sicily plus interest), and to send an army to Sicily by October 1256 to fight Manfred and the ‘Saracens’.\(^{44}\) This agreement signalled the beginning of an intense period of diplomatic activity between England and the papacy.

The existing historiography surrounding the Sicilian Business offers some conflicting conclusions. Traditionally, Treharne, Powicke and Runciman argued that the papacy took advantage of the English king’s ‘simple’ nature and pressured him to commit an unreasonable amount of resources in Sicily.\(^{45}\) More recently, Lloyd and Weiler have suggested that Henry actively sought the Sicilian kingdom for his son and was not manipulated by the papacy in this endeavour.\(^{46}\) Sicily was a prosperous land, with key trading links to the East, and more importantly, a strategical location in relation to both France and the Holy Land.\(^{47}\) The English king was failing in his efforts to reclaim Angevin land in France and, as such, he sought new ways to expand his continental territory. His aim was to ensure the appointment of his son, Edmund, as king of Sicily, and his brother, Richard of Cornwall, as the new Holy Roman Emperor and king of Germany.\(^{48}\) Furthermore, Morris, Egger, Lloyd, and Carpenter have all suggested that Henry and Alexander IV were allies and friends throughout the Sicilian affair, as they both strove to defeat Manfred.\(^{49}\) The real question, therefore, is not whether they were working as allies, but how this alliance was presented and, moreover, how

\(^{44}\) BL, Cotton MS Cleopatra E. I, fols 189–90; transcribed in Rymer’s *Foedera*, I/1, pp. 316–18.


\(^{49}\) Lloyd, ‘King Henry III, the Crusade and the Mediterranean’, p. 119; Morris, *The Papal Monarchy*, p. 556; Carpenter, *Henry III*, p. 185. Egger has argued that Henry III realised he needed to have a close relationship with the papal curia while he was trying to secure Sicily for his son Edmund, Egger, ‘Henry III’s England and the Curia’, p. 218.
it was shaped and by whom during these ongoing diplomatic encounters – something which will be explored in the subsequent chapters.

**The Treaty of Paris (1259)**

Clearly, the Sicilian Business had a huge impact on the relationship between Henry III and Pope Alexander IV. Likewise, the events leading up to the Anglo-French peace, known as the Treaty of Paris, were impacted by Henry’s diplomatic relationship with the pope.

In the thirteenth century, peace was not always on the cards for England and France. For the first part of Henry III’s reign, his relationship with the French King was very fragile as he had continued pressing his hereditary claims to Angevin lands in France which Louis saw as a threat to the ‘unity and independence’ of his realm. Nonetheless, a significant truce was agreed between these two kings in 1243, following Henry’s failed expedition to Poitou (1242–1243). This truce was renewed in 1248 and 1249 so that Louis could focus on his crusade to the Holy Land. Similarly, two days after Henry had taken the crusading vow on 6 March 1250, he sought to renew this truce for a further six years to allow him time to prepare to go on crusade to the Holy Land. In each case, the kings of England and France had sought to extend peace so they could focus on their crusading policies.

The year 1254 signified a turning point in these Anglo-French relations. In this year, Louis IX returned from a failed expedition to the Holy Land in which he had been captured and forced to pay a heavy ransom to the Muslims in return for his freedom and that of his men, nearly bankrupting the French kingdom. Louis was keen to build new alliances and prevent attacks on his kingdom at this vulnerable time. As such, he shortly sanctioned Henry’s planned pilgrimage to the shrine of St Edmund of Abingdon at Pontigny, and invited his brother-in-law to Paris to spend Christmas as a family. Le Goff argued that through this occasion a ‘warm friendship developed’ between these

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53 Chaplais, *Diplomatic Documents*, i. no. 261; *CPR, 1247–58*, p. 62; Lloyd, ‘King Henry III, the Crusade and the Mediterranean’, p. 100.


two kings, and as a consequence, plans for a more long-lasting Anglo-French peace could take shape.\textsuperscript{57} However, this was only one side of the story. The pope wanted Henry to make peace with France so he could focus his attention on Sicily, and he spent the following years, between 1255–1258, encouraging the English king to quickly pursue and finalise this treaty. Ultimately, the diplomatic relationship between England and the papacy had a direct impact upon the diplomatic relationship between the kings of England and France, as will be argued below in Chapter One.

**English Baronial Revolt (1258–1261)**

The final event to be impacted by Anglo-papal relations between Henry III and Pope Alexander IV was the English Baronial Revolt (1258–1261).

Throughout Henry’s reign, particularly during his personal rule, the English magnates and prelates became increasingly dissatisfied with the king’s running of the state, poor management of finances, obligations to the papacy, overzealous engagement in foreign endeavours, and personal preference towards certain foreign council members, particularly his half-siblings, the Lusignans.\textsuperscript{58}

The English magnates and prelates became particularly angered by the king’s favour towards the Lusignans, who had arrived in England in 1247, and whom the king gifted with extensive land, wealth and titles, and allowed to abuse their positions.\textsuperscript{59} Moreover, when Henry became involved in the Sicilian Business, this further enraged his magnates and prelates as the king had agreed to the outrageous terms of the Sicilian agreement without their consultation, even though they were expected to provide the military and financial aid towards this expedition.\textsuperscript{60} To make matters worse, in November 1256, Llywelyn ap Gruffydd, a lord in the north of Wales, launched a revolt in Wales.

\textsuperscript{57} Le Goff, *Saint Louis*, pp. 193, 355.

\textsuperscript{58} Maddicott, *Simon de Montfort*, pp. 151–2.


The Marches of Wales were disturbed by this rise of power, leading to a series of rebellions in Wales. This caused further tensions in Henry’s government, as Henry was not willing to properly address the situation in Wales due to his preoccupation with the Sicilian Business. As a consequence, a number of Henry’s barons rose up to resolve these issues by limiting the king’s abuses of power, reforming the English state, and expelling the Lusignan family from England. On 30 April 1258, a group of seven barons met the king at Westminster and demanded that he relinquish his power to a council of magnates and expel the Lusignans from England. These barons were John fitz Geoffrey, Simon de Montfort, Peter Savoy, Peter de Montfort, Richard de Clare, Roger Bigod and Hugh Bigod. On 2 May 1258, the king and his eldest son, Lord Edward, agreed by oath to the formation of a council of twenty-four men of England to run the kingdom on his behalf and to observe the ‘Provisions of Oxford’, a set of ordinances which bound the king to seek baronial approval before engaging in any major activities. This council consisted of twelve men chosen by the barons and twelve chosen by the king. By July, this council of twenty-four was replaced with a council of fifteen, who had been appointed by the twenty-four to assist the king in ruling the realm. This new council of fifteen primarily comprised of baronial supporters.

While historians have discussed at length the causes, protagonists, outcome and overall significance of the Baronial Revolt, there has been little discussion regarding the papal involvement at the time of the revolt. The only historiographical observation regarding the pope’s role in this revolt has been regarding his contribution to bringing about discord in England. Treharne, Powicke and Runciman have argued that the king’s participation in the pope’s Sicilian endeavour directly resulted in the emergence of the Baronial Revolt and usurpation of royal government between 1258–
More recently, Maddicott, Carpenter and Weiler have downplayed the role of the papacy and instead blamed the abuses of the Lusignans as the primary incentive for rebellion. Therefore, the pope's specific engagement with this revolt needs to be reassessed throughout this thesis to gain a greater understanding of the diplomatic relationship between the king and the pope.

**Thesis Structure**

This thesis seeks to bridge the gap between the study of the political interactions between rulers and the study of administrative procedures, through exploring the methods, agents and language that shaped diplomatic exchanges between the papacy and the king of England. It will particularly focus on the diplomatic personnel who carried out these exchanges and the practices they engaged with rather than exclusively assessing the political outcomes of these interactions. As such, this thesis has been divided into three sections – mediation and arbitration, representation and communication – which will be used to explore the conduct and management of Anglo-papal diplomacy between Alexander IV and Henry III from 1254 to 1261 and ultimately shed new light on developing medieval diplomatic practices between Church and Crown in the mid-thirteenth century.

The first section, comprised of Chapter One, explores the ways in which Pope Alexander IV intervened throughout the three case-studies highlighted above: the Sicilian Business (1254–1258), Anglo-French peace known as the Treaty of Paris (1259), and the English Baronial Revolt (1258–1261). This chapter asks whether the pope acted as a mediator, an arbitrator or in another capacity in these three scenarios, exploring his justifications for intervention and involvement in English foreign and domestic policy.

The second section examines the important role of representatives and agents who managed these diplomatic exchanges between the English king and the pope, and how these representatives shaped the events as well as the practice of diplomacy between these two powers. Due to the significant and varied roles played by a wide range of representatives, this section has been broken down into three chapters: Chapter Two, highlighting the general modalities of diplomatic

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representation throughout the first half of the thirteenth century; Chapter Three, which examines a number of case-studies for envoys appointed to conduct business between Henry III and Alexander IV; and finally, Chapter Four explores the specific use of friars as envoys, since so many friars were appointed in negotiations between England and the papacy in the mid-thirteenth century.

Finally, the third section, covering Chapter Five, undergoes a textual and linguistic analysis of the diplomatic correspondence to highlight the specific administrative conduct and the development of a shared diplomatic language. This section will highlight developments at the English and papal chanceries in the thirteenth century, exploring the production and form of the Anglo-papal diplomatic letters, as well as the specific language and rhetoric deployed in the correspondence. This chapter will make suggestions regarding the influence of papal writing-practices on the English chancery style while also using the language to consider the political and spiritual relationship between Alexander IV and Henry III (and during the Baronial Revolt, Henry’s council), focusing particularly on how this pope was presenting himself and his relationship with the English Crown and how this influenced the Anglo-papal correspondence.

Sources

This thesis utilises three main types of document: Anglo-papal diplomatic letters; English administrative documents; and thirteenth-century narrative sources to point out a number of features regarding the modes of mediation and arbitration, representation, and communication which were deployed during Anglo-papal diplomatic exchanges between 1254 and 1261. By examining and comparing these different documents, it is possible to gain a broader idea of the everyday function of Anglo-papal diplomacy in the mid-thirteenth century, the people who managed it and the processes involved.

A surprising amount of documentary evidence still exists for the period covered in this thesis. In fact, by the thirteenth century both England and the papal curia had ‘highly bureaucratized and efficient central administrations’ and as such many documentary sources have survived and been preserved in both the English and Vatican archives. 69 Cheney has noted that about 1,100 papal letters

from the years 1198–1305 have survived in England, most of which were in royal custody, as the English Reformation resulted in the destruction of papal letters in major monastic archives.\textsuperscript{70} A large number of these letters now reside in the SC 7 (Special Collections, Papal Bulls) series at The National Archives in Kew. In particular, The National Archives contains a large collection of papal letters from Alexander IV’s pontificate which form the main body of this interpretation. Aside from Sayers, few English historians have examined papal letters for the thirteenth century in detail.\textsuperscript{71} Papal letters have been particularly neglected as a resource by English political and administrative historians. Yet, these letters are incredible resources which, when used in conjunction with English administrative records and narrative sources (i.e. chronicles), can provide an insight into the function and mechanics of Anglo-papal diplomacy in the mid-thirteenth century. There are edited transcriptions of these original papal documents in the SC 7 series contained in Thomas Rymer’s \textit{Foedera}. However, this thesis will refer to both the original documents and Rymer’s transcriptions, as the \textit{Foedera} contains some minor errors and ambiguities with regards to spelling, punctuation and dating.

Alexander IV’s pontifical registers have also been utilised as part of this investigation. These registers contain copies of outgoing papal letters from the \textit{Registra Vaticana}, edited into three volumes by ed. J. de Loye, P. de Cerival, et A. Coulon in the first half of the twentieth-century. According to Barraclough, with the exception of the \textit{Registra Vaticana}, almost all the series of curial registers were conceived in the first half of the fourteenth century.\textsuperscript{72} At this point, not all outgoing letters were registered. Petitioners could pay a high price to have their documents registered at the papal chancery as a safety measure against the loss of the original. This would strengthen the legitimacy of the document and ensure it was observed. This practice was discouraged by the papacy as it was an expensive and time-consuming process for the papal chancery. Likewise, the pope could request the registration of outgoing letters which concerned matters of high importance, specifically

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those ‘issued on the pope’s own volition’. However, many original documents were not registered for this period.

With regards to English administrative and diplomatic personnel and practices, this thesis has also relied heavily on evidence from several chancery enrolments, particularly the Patent Rolls (C 66) and Close Rolls (C 54) series which have been either transcribed or translated into Calendars. The Patent Rolls contain a variety of open ‘letters of procuration, protection and safe conduct’, while the Close Rolls detail royal orders to particular individuals as well as a number of credentials which are highly useful within this study of Anglo-papal diplomatic practice. Moreover, these enrolments of English letters to the papacy tell us about the language, rhetoric and style employed in communications with the papacy. Some of these documents regarding the king’s political correspondence, have also been transcribed in Rymer’s Foedera. This thesis will also draw on a range of TNA exchequer documents, to gain a broader understanding of English diplomatic and administrative practices.

Finally, a range of contemporary English and European narrative sources will be used to support this study. Thirteenth-century chroniclers often took a vast interest in administrative procedures, foreign relations, political revolts, and papal activity and as such provide some unique insight into how certain members of the public perceived and reacted to political, social and economic activity. The most notable is the Chronica Majora composed by the Benedictine St Alban’s monk, Matthew Paris (c.1200–1259) between c.1235/6 and 1259. Matthew Paris was highly critical in his retelling of contemporary events, and yet, he had personal connections to a range of governmental figures, and many of his accounts can be verified by other sources. Matthew Paris in particular provides a rich variety of source material for the reign of Henry III, which includes a number of Anglo-papal letters copied into his chronicle. Moreover, Matthew Paris’ vivid and bold account of

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73 Sayers, Papal Government, pp. 72, 74.
76 Plöger, England and the Avignon Popes, p. 11.
thirteenth-century England has grabbed the attention of many scholars as it provides such a wonderful insight into the medieval mind of the English monk. While chronicles are often criticised for their perceived bias and embellished accounts, it would be a mistake to ignore or exclude these sources as, among other things, they often contain the only surviving copies of a range of documents (particularly monastic documents), after the originals were disposed of, lost or even destroyed during the sixteenth century Dissolution and Reformation. When used in conjunction with official papal and royal administrative and diplomatic documents, chronicles can add a fuller, and more personable layer to the history, which would be otherwise lost. Every source for this period has its own limitations and to assert that one kind of document is more valuable than the other would be a grave error in judgement. By using and interpreting all the sources together, historians of diplomacy can make the most of the available evidence to highlight the variations in both the perceived and real practice of diplomacy.

Ultimately, this thesis aims to bridge the gap between two historiographical traditions, namely the study of diplomacy as international relations between rulers and the study of administrative and diplomatic practices, during a previously overlooked period. Medieval diplomatic communications unfolded not only through intervention, arbitration and mediation at a political level, but also through the important work of representatives and agents, the employment of certain writing forms and language and the utility of a developing set of administrative and diplomatic practices. Furthermore, the relationship between King Henry III and Pope Alexander IV has been vastly underexplored and yet it offers fertile ground for the scholar of diplomacy. The aims of both king and pope were closely aligned throughout a period of political unrest in both England and the Italian Peninsula, and they engaged in extensive diplomatic communications between 1254–1261. This thesis will therefore use the rich surviving material to demonstrate how medieval diplomacy was practiced between England and the papacy in the mid-thirteenth century.
Section One

Chapter One - Papal Intervention, Mediation and Arbitration

As noted in the Introduction, the papacy in the thirteenth century was becoming increasingly involved in the resolution of conflict in Christendom. Indeed, Pope Alexander IV was drawn into a number of English affairs, in a variety of ways. Before discussing modes of papal intervention utilised by Alexander IV in his exchanges with King Henry III, this introduction will briefly summarise the methods of intervention and ‘dispute resolution’ in the thirteenth century. As with any period of history, conflict, both international and domestic, was a frequent feature throughout the Middle Ages. Parties who were engaged in conflict, but who sought resolution, had several ways to settle their differences. They could take their case to the relevant court and engage in litigation, agree directly to come to an agreement, or they could submit their case to mediation or arbitration. By the thirteenth century the process of arbitration was increasingly utilised across Europe as a way to settle disputes.  

The practice of arbitration had been developed from Roman law and yet the term ‘arbitor’ did not exist in Justinianic Roman law. Canon lawyers developed and adapted the Roman term ‘arbiter’ in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries to suit the growing practice of arbitration. Indeed, they developed three classifications of arbitrator: the arbiter, the arbitrator, and the amicabilis compositor. In theory, the arbiter was used in a formal procedure and had the power to decide the outcome of a case, the arbitrator was used more informally and often took the role as a mediator who aimed to bring about a mutually acceptable settlement between disputing parties. Likewise, the amicabilis compositor was also essentially a mediator. However, these terms can be wholly misleading and entirely prescriptive. In practice, they were used much more flexibly, and were still developing throughout the thirteenth century. Often, the chosen arbitrator or arbitrators would first mediate a dispute to try and reach a compromise, and if no settlement could be reached,

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3 Moeglin and Péquignot, Diplomatia, p. 699.

they would judge the best outcome of the case. Ultimately, there was no clear distinction between the processes of mediation and arbitration at this time. It was not until the Late Middle Ages that these terms became more clearly defined.

Moeglin and Péquignot have identified two types of arbitration for the Middle Ages: arbitration through a ‘unique arbitrator’ and arbitration through a ‘joint commission’. In a joint commission a number of judges were appointed by both opposing parties to preside over a case, while there were more arbitrations by joint commission, they usually took place after a peace accord had been made and were intended to settle certain outstanding issues. This study is more concerned with the role of the so-called ‘unique arbitrator’. If a dispute was submitted to a ‘unique arbitrator’, this meant that an impartial third party was chosen to preside over a case, someone who was either unconnected to either side, or who was a friend of both sides. Kings could be called on to act as an arbitrator in disputes between their vassals (particularly between members of the aristocracy), or even between other secular rulers. For example, Henry II of England arbitrated the dispute between the kings Alphonse VIII of Castile and Sanche VI of Navarre in 1176–7. However, appointing the right person to settle royal disputes could be complicated, particularly in matters of international conflict. From the eleventh century onwards, it was the pope who would often be called on to intervene in disputes between secular powers, and to preside over the case as a ‘unique arbitrator’.

Indeed, Chaplais has referred to the role of the pope as a ‘third party’, who could initiate preliminary discussions between parties seeking to make peace. On the other hand, Benham has suggested that there is little evidence regarding how initial contact was made during peace negotiations, or how ‘third parties’, intervened in these affairs. While neither historian has clarified or defined the function and role of a ‘third party’, it is important to recognise the different capacities through which

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7 Ibid., p. 705.
the papacy could intervene as such in a range of international secular and ecclesiastical disputes, and how the pope’s role would change or develop in connection with each individual case.13

As the medieval terminology was often very vague, and the methods of papal intervention very flexible, it is particularly crucial to re-examine the generic concepts of arbitration and mediation in a medieval context. Those who took on the task as a mediator or arbitrator could have a variety of motives and affiliations which shaped their activity within different disputes.14 This was as much the case for the pope as for another third party. Furthermore, it is important to explore the cases where mediators and arbitrators were chosen for their supposed impartiality (as was often the case with intervention via papal representatives), and to challenge this position. Even if a third party was a friend to both opposing parties, this did not make them a neutral participant throughout the negotiations.

Before delving into the topic of papal intervention, it is also important to clarify how the pope acquired and justified his right to intervene in secular disputes. Following the collapse of the Roman Empire and attempts by different political powers to re-establish peace and order across the West, the papacy firmly established its position as the ‘arbiter of Christendom’ between 1050–1300.15 Indeed, following the Gregorian reforms in the mid-eleventh century and the rise of papal monarchy from the eleventh century onwards, the papacy significantly increased its claims to heightened powers in both ecclesiastical and secular affairs – including the power to oversee and help resolve international secular disputes.16 In the thirteenth century, Pope Innocent III (1198–1216) further pushed the argument that the pope was in a superior spiritual position as the ‘Vicar of Christ’, namely, Christ’s representative on earth, and as such had the power to intervene in secular affairs through his prerogative as ‘arbiter of Christendom’.17 Ultimately, the pope claimed the right to

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13 The pope’s role continued to vary in the fourteenth century. For example, Plöger discussed the role of Pope Clement VI’s as a mediator between England and France in 1344, Plöger, England and the Avignon Popes, pp. 33–4.
16 Richard W. Southern, Western Society and the Church in the Middle Ages (Harmondsworth, 1970), pp. 104–33. For more on the growth of the medieval papacy see Barraclough, The Medieval Papacy; Morris, The Papal Monarchy.
17 Innocent III, the decretal Per Venerabilem (1202), (Decretales 4.17.13), Corpus Iuris Canonici, ed. E. Frieberg, 2 vols (Leipzig, 1879–81), ii. cols. 714–16; Tierney, Crisis of Church and State, pp. 136–8.
oversee, facilitate, judge and settle disputes between opposing Christian bodies, and encouraged Christians to seek papal intervention to solve their conflicts. Innocent III made extensive use of this papal right. Indeed, in his decretal *Novit* (1204) he specifically argued his right to arbitrate the Anglo-French dispute by reason of sin (*ratione peccati*).18 He argued that he was intervening on behalf of the English king who claimed the French king had ‘sinned against him’ through an act of violence. Innocent had the right to judge the French king’s sin as this matter pertained to papal jurisdiction.19 In subsequent years, the medieval papacy continued to intervene in secular matters through its role as ‘arbiter mundi’. For example, Pope Honorius III (1216–1226), and later, Gregory IX (1227–1243), assisted in settling the dispute between Emperor Frederick II and the Lombard League.20 Moreover, Gregory worked to bring peace between the English and Scottish kings and also maintained a peace truce between England and France throughout his pontificate in aid of the Crusades.21 Furthermore, following his election, Pope Innocent IV (1243–1254) utilised his theoretical position as supreme judge and arbiter to further assert his papal power over temporal rulers – especially throughout his disputes with the Emperor Frederick II and his attempts to arbitrate peace between Frederick and the


21 Gregory IX sent his legate, Otto, Cardinal Deacon of St Nicholas, to ‘labour to effect a lasting peace’ between Henry III and Alexander II of Scotland (1214–1249), Horace K. Mann, *The Lives of the Popes in the Early Middle Ages*, 19 vols (London, 1902–29), xiii. pp. 342–4. Henry III stated he would obey the pope’s orders to maintain a truce with France. The pope had sent Master Stephen, his chaplain and nuncio to help negotiate this truce *Foedera*, I/1, pp. 191, 194, 211–12. 14 May 1233, the pope stated that the kings of England and France were to refrain from wars against each other for the sake of the Crusades, *Royal Letters*, i. pp. 551–2.
Lombards. Yet, as shall be discussed below, his successor, Alexander IV, differed in his demonstration of this position as *arbiter mundi*.

Although the role of papal arbitration in the thirteenth century has been noted in previous studies, there has been a general lack of detailed discussion regarding the papacy’s role as a ‘third party’ in secular and spiritual disputes, aside from Maleczek’s study on the pope as a peacemaker in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Moreover, Ullmann has argued that through canon law ‘the pope had compulsory jurisdiction’ which applied to all Christians. Benham, however, has challenged this statement, arguing that in practice, papal mediation and arbitration ‘by no means involved simply the issuing of papal commands followed by loyal obedience to these commands.’ The reception of papal intervention was shaped by the pope’s relationship with each participant. Indeed, in a recent communication, Kamp highlighted the complex task of Pope Boniface VIII to arbitrate peace between the English and French kings (Edward I and Philip IV) in 1297–1298 as he himself had such a turbulent political relationship with the French king. Thus, although canon law emphasised the theoretical role of the pope as *arbiter mundi*, in practice, the pope’s response to secular disputes was more complex and varied. Each pope responded differently to his position and canonical duties as spiritual judge and arbiter of Christendom. His approach and reaction to this position was shaped by his own personality, his familial, educational and professional background, political and spiritual ideology, relationships with those around him, as well as a range of external political, economic and environmental factors. Moreover, the pope did not necessarily maintain the same position throughout these conflict resolutions; he adapted his role to suit each dispute. Thus, by engaging in more detailed studies regarding individual popes and their involvement in external disputes, one can better explore these modes of papal position within thirteenth-century conflict

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22 In 1243, Pope Innocent IV tried to facilitate peace negotiations between Frederick II and his enemies, but to no avail, Mann, *The Lives of Popes*, xiv. pp. 363–7.
23 Maleczek, ‘Das Frieden stiftende Papsttum im 12. und 13. Jahrhundert’, pp. 249–332. Thanks to the work of Karsten Plöger, and more recently Barbara Bombi, the pope’s role as mediator and arbitrator in the fourteenth century has been discussed in detail, see Plöger, *England and the Avignon Popes*; and Barbara Bombi, *Anglo-Papal Relations*.
26 Hermann Kamp, *Arbitration and mediation in the conflicts between France and Flanders around 1300* (Conference paper given at Leeds International Medieval Congress, July 2019).
resolutions. One has to look to the records on a case by case basis to understand how the pope was acting in each case and moreover how the pope, and his contemporaries, interpreted the role of the pope and the Apostolic See within each dispute settlement. As such, this chapter will explore the capacity in which Alexander IV intervened as a ‘third party’ in England’s international and domestic disputes, asking why he intervened and how his role varied on a case by case basis.

When discussing the role of the papacy in secular disputes, it is also important to consider the papal style of governance in these matters. Previously, scholars have argued for the role of the papacy as a ‘proactive policy-making’ body, which took the initiative on formulating policies and imposing them on secular rulers and kingdoms.  

This has reinforced the views of contemporary chroniclers, particularly the famous Benedictine monk, Matthew Paris, who frequently protested against the overzealous papal meddling in England. More recently, scholars have begun to challenge the view that the papacy was a proactive political entity, instead arguing in favour of a more responsive papal government, both in its approach to Church governance and intervention in foreign matters. As Bombi put it:

The medieval papacy pursued its interests and legislated within its jurisdiction through what we can define ‘responsive forms of government’, namely the papacy was approving or rejecting requests and petitions according to religious, political, social and economic circumstances.

That being said, Morris and Zutshi have held some reservations towards the idea of a fully responsive papal government, particularly with regards to the crusades. The crusading movement was often an integral part of papal policy, which was not chiefly governed by requests from petitioners, but led by

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papal initiative. Yet, generally speaking, the papacy was responding to petitions from supplicants in a variety of matters. As Smith puts it, the papacy had the power to shape diplomatic interactions, modify or completely reject petitions, but did not conduct a ‘top-down’ style of governance. It was responding to external political factors. In particular, the papacy responded to a variety of requests from royal leaders to participate in secular disputes, as opposed to actively commanding rulers or ruling bodies to follow papal instruction. For example, it was Philip Augustus who appealed to Pope Innocent III for assistance in his dispute with Richard I in 1198 and later, King John appealed to the same pope in his dispute against Philip Augustus in 1203. When the Lombard League and Frederick II were at war in the 1230s, they both appealed to Pope Honorius III, and later, Gregory IX, to mediate and assist in their peace negotiations, suggesting that this responsive approach was a typical dimension of thirteenth-century papal activity in secular matters.

This chapter will address how Pope Alexander IV intervened throughout three key political disputes involving the English king: the Sicilian Business (1254–1258), the Treaty of Paris (1259), and the English Baronial Revolt, (1258–1261). The aim of this chapter is to examine the perception and projection of papal activity in secular disputes in the thirteenth century, not only through an examination of factual evidence and chronicle accounts, but also through exploring the papal rhetoric in diplomatic correspondence with English authorities. By establishing how Alexander’s role differed throughout these three political affairs, this section will explore both the perceived and real modes of papal intervention within English matters in the mid-thirteenth century.

As discussed, England was a papal fief from 1213 onwards and the young Henry III began his reign as a ward of the papal see. In his 1910 study, Gasquet noted the special relationship which Henry shared with successive popes throughout the thirteenth century. More recently, Mayr-Harting has argued that Henry III was largely ‘in the pope’s pocket’ throughout his reign.

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31 Smith, Curia and Crusade, p. 24.
example, on 27 April 1226 Pope Honorius III forbade Henry from making war with the king of France, describing him as one whom the pope ‘loves with greater affection than other princes’. Whether Henry was actually under the control of the pope is highly debateable, however, what is clear is that he held a rather unique relationship with the papacy throughout his reign. He could draw on papal assistance in a way that other kings could not. Thus, this section will also assess the feudal relationship between pope and king, and how these feudal and spiritual duties shaped the pope’s approach to his role within English matters. Papal overlordship of England provided the necessary justification to intervene in English matters, but whether the pope actually deployed this justification is another matter. Furthermore, Wiedemann has recently argued that once a king had submitted his realm to the overlordship of the papacy, he and his successors could ‘instrumentalise’ this papal favour for assistance regarding both foreign and domestic matters. This chapter will not only highlight the ways in which the pope was projecting his papal power in English matters, but also the extent to which this power was being utilised by the English King and his magnates for their own aims.

When considering Alexander IV’s role as third party it is also necessary to compare his approaches to those of his predecessors. Three of his predecessors – Innocent III, Gregory IX, and Innocent IV – used canon law to assert their rights to supreme jurisdiction and authority as the ‘arbiter mundi’. In particular, Innocent IV, himself a skilful canon lawyer, made extensive use of canonical justifications in both spiritual and temporal matters. Indeed, in his capacity as private doctor of canon law, he had written a commentary on the deposition decree which he later promulgated as pope.

Just as Christ had had power when he was on earth, Innocent argued, to impose sentences on kings and emperors and any other sort of ruler had he so wished, so he had empowered his vicar with the same jurisdiction. Christ himself had meant his people to be subject to the rule of one overriding authority with discretionary power to act for the common good.

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36 Royal Letters, i. p. 546.
37 Wiedemann, Papal Overlordship, p. 3.
38 Southern referred to them as ‘the lawyer-popes’ – stating that they were the most notable popes between 1159–1303, Western Society and the Church, pp. 131–3.
of the whole, a ruler whose responsibilities included power to judge and punish the political conduct of Christendom’s lay rulers.39

In contrast, Alexander IV did not have formal legal training; he had been (amongst other things) a scholar of theology at Paris, a papal legate in several regions in the Italian Peninsula, Cardinal Protector of the Franciscan Order from 1227 (until his death), as well as a key papal administrator (particularly during the pontificate of Innocent IV).40 It is important to acknowledge how his background would have influenced his own interpretation and presentation of papal power and intervention within secular disputes. As such, the following sub-sections will highlight Alexander IV’s self-presentation and justification for intervention along with external interpretations (both contemporary and modern) of his role within these three matters.

The Sicilian Business (1254–1258)

This first study centres on the joint Anglo-papal expedition known as the Sicilian Business (1254–1258). As mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, the ‘crusade’ to Sicily was orchestrated on the initiative of Pope Innocent IV, intended to free the Mediterranean from Hohenstaufen rule and protect papal lands from potential imperial invasion. As the business had been initiated by Innocent IV, some historians have argued that his successor, Alexander IV, had little choice but to pursue war against Manfred, following his failed attempt to make peace in March 1255. Alexander was simply responding to a supplication from Henry to confirm the candidacy of Edmund as king of Sicily, suggesting that he had not actively sought Henry’s involvement.41 Nonetheless, Powicke has suggested that Alexander engaged in the Sicilian Business ‘even more whole-heartedly’ than his predecessor.42 Similarly, Cuttino noted how Alexander IV pursued this Sicilian venture ‘with a vengeance’.43 Yet, to understand Alexander’s approach to this business, and his role within it, one must examine how his position is portrayed in the official Anglo-papal correspondence in

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41 BL, Cotton MS Cleopatra E. i, fols 189–90: ‘tuis supplicationibus … approbamus’.
conjunction with thirteenth-century narrative sources and modern scholastic interpretations of these political events.

Throughout the 1250s, the papacy had been keen to maintain control over the kingdom of Sicily. If the papacy lost this fiefdom, it could face further challenges on its right to feudal lordship, and more importantly, would have its spiritual authority in Christendom questioned. For, if God’s representative on Earth could not retain control over his own lands, then maybe God was not on his side. Furthermore, as the kingdom of Sicily was on the doorstep of the Patrimony of St Peter, the papacy needed to ensure it posed no physical threat to papal territory, property, or people – as it had done when Frederick II was the king of Sicily. In essence, the papacy needed to maintain control over Sicily, not only to protect papal land from external threats but to protect the papacy’s spiritual rights over Western Christendom.

When Alexander ascended to the pontifical throne, he was faced immediately with a number of political and financial crises – from a revolting Roman senate, a number of anti-papal communes around central Italy, as well as factional strife amongst members of the Roman nobility, all of which was made worse by the threat from Manfred and his imperial forces in Sicily. Moreover, the papacy was overwhelmed with debt following years of crusade and conflict with Frederick II, who had extensively plundered the wealth of the Church. Yet, according to Waley, there was no crisis more important to Alexander than the Sicilian affair – on which he was fixated. This may well have been true because the threat in Sicily directly impacted the severity of the threats from elsewhere in the Italian peninsula. Certainly, Manfred worked hard to befriend any imperialist sympathisers or the fellow enemies of the pope in the Italian provinces. As such, it was the pope who sought intervention and aid from the English king in this political endeavour.

When Alexander became pontiff, he reconfirmed Henry’s son, Edmund as the king of Sicily on 9 April 1255. As part of this confirmation, Alexander set out a number of new terms and

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44 Rome had been in the hands of Senator, Brancaleone degli Andalo, the Count of Casaleccio from 1252. Alexander IV had him deposed in 1255. Later, in 1257 he was recalled to re-take his position as senator, by popular demand, and allied himself with Manfred against the pope, Waley, The Papal State, p. 160; Manselli, ‘Alessandro IV’, pp. 393–4.
conditions under which the kingdom of Sicily was to be confirmed to Edmund. These terms were very clear and strict. For example, Henry was to send the very specific sum of 135,541 marks, to be made in three initial payments of 10,000 marks to the pope. From this point the king could send the rest of the money to various Italian merchant-bankers who had loaned money to the papacy for this war. After the repayment was made, the king was to either come himself or to send a representative with a sufficient military force to Sicily to fight Manfred. Henry was to meet these terms by October 1256. If he failed to comply, he was to face excommunication and his kingdom would be placed under interdict. Moreover, Henry was to remit the loan of a thousand pounds which Innocent IV had formerly promised him to support his efforts towards the repayment. Amongst other things, Henry also had to promise that the holder of the kingdom of Sicily would not strive to become the King of the Romans. The papacy was anxious for this not to happen again, following the disastrous conflict with Frederick II, who had been Holy Roman Emperor and King of Sicily. This was a substantial list of terms which the English had to sign up to. Evidently, Alexander IV was not a weak pope as scholars have previously suggested. He was clear and direct in his demands and expectations of this king in this endeavour. However, the way he framed his power to make these demands was rather atypical.

The popes of the thirteenth century frequently drew on their ‘plenitudo potestatis’ to justify their actions and support their decisions. In contrast, Alexander noted that this investiture had been previously authorised through the ‘plenitudo potestatis’ of his predecessor, Innocent IV. He was simply confirming the ‘special authority and mandate’ of his predecessor, although he acknowledged that, with the advice and consent of his cardinals, he was altering those conditions agreed between Henry and Innocent IV ‘with apostolic authority’. These new conditions made more extensive

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48 His predecessor, Innocent IV had been more flexible in his approach to the Sicilian Business and had not laid down such a clear list of instructions to be followed by the English king. Alexander had learnt from the mistakes of his predecessor.
49 BL, Cotton MS Cleopatra E. I, fol 189–90.
52 BL, Cotton MS Cleopatra E. I, fol 189–90.
demands on the English than those confirmed by Innocent IV and yet, Alexander did not refer to the source of his own power when justifying their insertion. He relied on his predecessor’s ‘plenitudo potestatis’ combined with his own apostolic authority, and that of his cardinals, to confirm these alterations. Grand statements of papal power had been heavily utilised by several of Alexander’s predecessors, particularly Innocent III, Gregory IX and Innocent IV, when justifying their role in both ecclesiastical and temporal matters. Innocent IV, in particular, made extensive use of canon law to justify his actions in correspondence with secular rulers. Clearly, there is a stark difference between the way Alexander conducted himself in this business and the way he presented and justified these political actions. Indeed, even the way he presented his relationship with the English king was through a very subtle declaration of papal lordship.

When confirming the investiture of Edmund as King of Sicily (9 April 1255), Alexander drew on the existing ‘special relationship’ which he held for the English king and his family, and he often expressed this special relationship through the language of motherhood. This language was used to evoke the feudal relationship which already existed between the pope and the English king. Indeed, as part of the original feudal agreement made between England and the papacy in 1213, John had promised Innocent III that he would come to the aid of the pope and the patrimony of St Peter when required. As a result, Alexander could encourage Henry to commit fully to Sicily and to aid his overlord in the removal of these external threats. Moreover, this Sicilian agreement was in effect a new feudal agreement between the pope, Henry and his young son, Edmund. Through its confirmation Alexander could further stress their special relationship and put greater pressure on the English king to fulfil his feudal obligations to the papacy.

In May 1255, shortly after the confirmation of Henry’s son as king of Sicily, Alexander authorised Master Rostand and Boniface, archbishop of Canterbury (1241–1270), to commute King Henry’s crusading vow from fighting a crusade in the Holy Land to waging war against Manfred in

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54 Select Charters and other illustrations of English constitutional history, ed. William Stubbs (Oxford, 1913), p. 284; translated in Ernest F. Henderson, Select Historical Documents of the Middle Ages (London, 1910), pp. 430–1: ‘I will impede their [the papacy’s] being harmed if I know of it, and will cause harm to be removed from them if I shall be able… I will aid to the best of my ability in holding and defending against all men the patrimony of St Peter, and especially the kingdom of England and the kingdom of Ireland.’
55 On 21 May 1255, the pope asked Henry to take an oath of fealty and to pay homage to the pope on behalf of his son, Edmund, TNA, SC 7/1/26.
It was therefore on papal initiative that Henry’s vow was to be commuted.\textsuperscript{56} Alexander wanted Henry to devote his full attention to Sicily as it was a matter of such great urgency for the papacy, so much so that in March 1255 he had also formally forbidden Henry from commuting his vow to the Holy Land to assist the King of Castile, Alfonso X, in his Crusade in North Africa.\textsuperscript{58} Recently, historians have argued that the papacy rarely took the initiative on secular policies, and yet, as Forey and Lloyd have noted, Alexander IV’s decision to commute Henry’s vow to Sicily and to forbid the king from crusading elsewhere is a clear example of papal proactivity, namely an assertion of his power and authority over temporal rulers.\textsuperscript{59} Clearly, papal initiative had encouraged this endeavour and yet, the extent to which the king felt he had to obey the pope’s demands remains an open question. We know that Henry was keen on expanding his continental territory and promoting his image as a pious and saintly king. Moreover, he had openly pursued the Sicilian throne in communications with both Alexander and his predecessor. The king sought to increase his international power and prestige by exploiting the wealth and strategic location of the Sicilian kingdom and encircling his traditional foe, the king of France.\textsuperscript{60} However, Henry did not focus his attention solely on this business and, according to Lloyd, he ‘never formally commuted his vow to Sicily’.\textsuperscript{61} After the pope had forbidden Henry from commuting his vow to North Africa, Henry had secretly authorised several envoys to tell Alfonso that Henry had not commuted his vow to Sicily and that he would not do so without Alfonso’s consent.\textsuperscript{62} Certainly, it was not until 2 September 1256 that Alexander commissioned Master Rostand and the bishop of Worcester to set a fixed term for Henry (and other crusaders) to go to Sicily and there is no evidence that Henry was ever given a fixed date to arrive.\textsuperscript{63} In effect, Henry did not formally abandon his promise to wage crusade in either the

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{56} TNA, SC 7/1/13, SC 7/1/15, SC 7/3/43.
\bibitem{57} Ibid.
\bibitem{58} On 15 March 1255, Master William de Frassin, papal chaplain, refused to commute Henry’s crusading vow to go to the aid of the Holy Land into a vow to undertake an expedition against the Saracens in Africa, TNA, SC 7/1/32. On 18 September 1254 Henry had asked Pope Innocent IV to commute his crusader vow to Holy Land so that he could join Alfonso X on Crusade in North Africa, \textit{Foedera}, I/1, p. 304. For more on the crusade to North Africa see, Méndez González, \textit{Anglo-Iberian Relations}, pp. 232–43.
\bibitem{60} Weiler, ‘Henry III and the Sicilian Business’, p. 131.
\bibitem{61} Lloyd, \textit{Henry III, the Crusade and the Mediterranean}, p. 113.
\bibitem{62} \textit{Foedera}, I/1, p. 331. Whereas in 1258, Henry wrote to Alfonso stating that he had not engaged in the African crusade because the pope would not allow him to engage in anything other than the Sicilian Business, \textit{CR}, 1256–9, pp. 314–15; Forey, ‘Crusading vows of the English King’, p. 239.
\bibitem{63} TNA, SC 7/3/1.
\end{thebibliography}
Holy Land, North Africa or Sicily, as each endeavour served to benefit and support his ambitious continental policy.\textsuperscript{64} Evidently, there were clear limitations to papal power over secular rulers, even papal vassals like Henry.

However, the official correspondence presents a different perspective on papal intervention in this business. In the letter authorising Master Rostand and Boniface, archbishop of Canterbury, to commute Henry III’s crusader vow from the Holy Land to Sicily, the pope described himself as the \textit{mater ecclesia}, whose ‘pious devotions’ were being ‘wickedly’ impeded by Manfred and his Saracen allies in Sicily.\textsuperscript{65} This mention of ‘Saracens’ was a direct reference to the Muslim community in Lucera, which Frederick II had originally exploited for its ‘military and fiscal potential’ and which the papacy was now using as part of its crusading propaganda against Manfred.\textsuperscript{66} In reality, the Muslims in Lucera were not posing any real threat to Christendom; the pope was waging (and losing) a political war against Manfred. Alexander was exploiting the existence of this community to present papal actions in Sicily as being spiritually motivated – born out of his ‘spiritual love’ (\textit{caritas}) for the Christian people in Sicily.\textsuperscript{67} If this had truly been the case, the pope would not have abandoned the Holy Land Christians who were desperately seeking aid to fight off the Saracens.\textsuperscript{68} Evidently, this pope did not deploy grand statements of papal power to authorise the commutation of Henry’s crusading vow. Nor did he reference his feudal relationship with the English Crown as justification for this commutation.\textsuperscript{69} He presented himself as the mother of Christendom whose deep spiritual love for both England and Sicily (his papal fiefs), and desire to protect the people of Christendom from

\textsuperscript{64} Lloyd has argued that Henry was trying to ‘keep his options open’, Lloyd, \textit{Henry III, the Crusade and the Mediterranean}, p. 113. A crusade to the Holy Land would not only improve Henry’s reputation as a pious leader amongst his people, but if he was successful, he would outshine his rival, Louis IX of France, who had recently returned from a failed crusade, as the true champion of the Holy Land. The crusade to North Africa, would also strengthen his ties to the Castilian throne, and remove any threat from Alfonso who had hereditary claims to the German throne and the Gascon territory. Méndez González, \textit{Anglo-Iberian Relations}, pp. 232–43; for the King of Castile’s claims to Gascony see, pp. 159–69, 205–7.

\textsuperscript{65} TNA, SC 7/1/15; transcribed in \textit{Foedera}, I/1, p. 320.


\textsuperscript{67} \textit{Foedera}, I/1, p. 115.

\textsuperscript{68} The commutation of the crusading vow from Jerusalem to Sicily also caused grief and anger to those Christians in the Holy Land waiting for reinforcements to oppose the Muslim armies, who were forced to make a ten year truce with the Soldan of Babylon, Weiler, ‘Matthew of Paris, Richard of Cornwall’s candidacy for the German throne, and the Sicilian Business’, 86.

\textsuperscript{69} Alexander IV could have drawn on the terms of King John’s concession of England to the papacy in 1213 in his, \textit{Foedera}, I/1, p. 113. In May 1255, Alexander wrote to Henry ordering him to pay homage to the pope for Sicily, on behalf of his son Edmund, TNA, SC 7/1/26.
the enemies of Christ were justification enough for his involvement in this business. Ultimately, he did not reference the feudal relationship with the English king because he did not have to – the English king was an enthusiastic participant and ally of the pope throughout the Sicilian Business, even, as we shall see, when he was struggling to meet the terms of the agreement.

To finance the Sicilian endeavour, Henry required extra funds. As such, the pope granted him greater access to church revenue in the English realm to put towards this business. Contemporary monastic chroniclers in England strongly vocalised their resistance to this increased taxation, particularly as they had no interest in the king’s political war in Sicily. The thirteenth-century Benedictine chronicler, Matthew Paris, was particularly critical in his interpretation of events, asserting that ‘the pope and the king, just like the shepherd and the wolf, were allied together for the destruction of the sheep [the English Church]’. Paris was mocking and vilifying these two God-appointed authorities who were neglecting their responsibility to protect all Christians by exploiting the English Church. In this criticism, Paris crucially identified that these two powers were working together as allies. Whereas, in the official correspondence, neither the pope nor the king referred to themselves as such. This gives a unique insight into the contemporary monastic perspective of this Anglo-papal relationship – as an unholy alliance of pope and king working together to exploit the English Church to fund an unpopular political war in Sicily. Matthew Paris’ interpretation led Powicke to summarise Henry’s role as that of ‘the sworn agent as well as the ally of the pope in a distant political endeavour’.

By 1255, the papacy had already expended a large sum of money on the war in Sicily. Furthermore, in that same year, the pope sent Cardinal Ottaviano with an army to fight Manfred, but

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70 TNA, SC 7/1/15. See also Chapter Five, ‘The Pope as Mother’, pp. 231–7.
71 From the 1240s, Crown revenues had significantly declined. In particular, the Gascon expedition (1253–1254), the Westminster abbey re-building project, and the Sicilian Business put immense strain on the king’s finances, R. C. Stacey, Politics, Policy, and Finance under Henry III 1216–1245 (Oxford, 1987), pp. 256, 258.
74 CM, v. pp. 532, 540: ‘papa et rex, velut pastor et lupus, in ovium exterminium cofoederati, omnibus ruinam minabuntur; papa et rex in gravamen ecclesiae et cleri confoederabantur’.
75 Later, Paris accused the pope and his envoys of preying on the simplicity (simplicitatem) of Henry with the empty promise of Sicily, CM, v. p. 681.
76 Powicke, Henry III, i. p. 343.
after initial success, the papal army was pushed back into the *Terra Laboris*.\textsuperscript{77} Thus, in a desperate attempt to change the political arithmetic in Sicily, Alexander wrote to the king of England on 18 September 1255, asking him to make speedy preparations to send money and a strong military force to Sicily.\textsuperscript{78} He lamented this great burden (*pondus*) on the Church and bemoaned the exhausted and indebted papal camera (treasury).\textsuperscript{79} The pope was particularly keen to receive money from the English as soon as possible. Indeed, in this letter he also commissioned the king to accept the papal nuncio, John of Dya, O.F.M, to assist in the collection of the money for Sicily. Throughout this letter, Alexander continued to draw on the deep love and affection he held towards Henry and his son, Edmund, in this matter.\textsuperscript{80} He emphasised the special relationship between them, which joined them in this endeavour. Regardless, the king did not have the necessary money, troops, or political support to assist the pope.

As the original deadline for repayment loomed, Alexander’s urgency for assistance became more apparent. Indeed, in February 1256, he had written to the bishop of Hereford, prompting him to speed up the collection, complaining of the merchants who were threatening to take possessions of the papacy, if they did not get their payment soon.\textsuperscript{81} Then in May 1256, Alexander again asked Henry and his son to accept John of Dya as papal collector to help collect money for the business. The pope asked for the king and his son to quickly assume the Church’s ‘burden’ (*pondus*) and send money and troops to Sicily, so that ‘the business might be guided, with the help of the Lord, to an honourable, prosperous and tranquil state.’\textsuperscript{82} The pope was reliant on the king to free the Church from this political and financial burden in Sicily and he often restated the immeasurable costs, which had already been spent on the business and the need for a resolution to this affair. All the while, the pope continued to present himself as the *mater ecclesia*, who through an ‘unworned duty of care’ (*indefessa sollicitudo*) towards the English king and his family, sought to show favour through the

\textsuperscript{77} TNA, SC 7/3/31.
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{79} *Ibid.*: ‘exauriverimus … cameram nostram innumera contraxerimus debita’.
\textsuperscript{80} *Ibid.*: ‘ad amplexus tuos brachia internae dilectionis extendimus … quam affectose te dictumque natum in praefato negotio respexerimus’.
\textsuperscript{81} TNA, SC 7/2/16: ‘Ab eisdem mercatoribus jugiter stimulemur, et mercatores Romani parati sunt, nisi satisfaciat eis in termino ad possessiones Ecclesiarum Urbis quae obligate sunt eis avidas manus extender.’
\textsuperscript{82} TNA, SC 7/2/11: ‘eadem Ecclesia totum quasi pondus eiusdem negotii, portandum super humeros suos assumptis, e diversis partibus exercitum instaurando magnificum, ac deputando Legatos ad prosecutionem illius, non sine magna effusione sumptuum, ut posset illud, Domino adjutore, perducere ad statum honorabilem, prosperum, et quietum’.
gift of Sicily.\textsuperscript{83} Primarily, he was pursuing the essential financial and military aid from his English ally, in order to fight Manfred and stop him from pressing his army northwards, towards the Papal State. Indeed, Forey and Carpenter have suggested that the pope was more concerned with receiving Henry’s money than his military leadership.\textsuperscript{84}

By late 1256, it became very clear that the English king could not meet the original deadline for repayment, as stipulated within the terms of the Sicilian agreement. In particular, he was struggling to amass any financial or military support from his magnates who were frustrated by his commitment to the business without their counsel and consent.\textsuperscript{85} As such, he petitioned the pope for more time to acquire the funds to pay off these debts and send troops to Sicily.\textsuperscript{86} On 27 September, the pope replied to Henry’s first petition for an extension, agreeing that from 6 October 1256 he would move the original deadline, which bound Henry to send money and troops to Sicily, from October 1256 to 1 June 1257.\textsuperscript{87} In a letter, dated 9 November 1256, the pope confirmed that he was sending the archbishop of Messina to extend this deadline on his behalf. Alexander was clearly growing impatient with Henry’s delays, complaining of his financial woes and ‘exhausted treasury’, and effectively blaming the king for the loss of Cardinal Ottaviano’s military position in the \textit{Terra Laboris} through his slowness to take action.\textsuperscript{88}

Once Henry had started asking for concessions and delays to be applied to the conditions of the Sicilian agreement, Alexander could do little but respond to these royal petitions. The pope’s knowledge of English matters was limited, and he had to rely on his envoys in England for accurate information regarding the political and economic situation. On 23 October 1256, he commissioned a report from Master Albert of Parma regarding his mission to England in 1253–1254, in which he had

\textsuperscript{83} TNA, SC 7/2/11.
\textsuperscript{84} Forey, ‘Crusading vows of the English King,’ pp. 239–40; Carpenter, ‘King Henry III and the Sicilian Affair’, Fine of the Month (Feb., 2012).
\textsuperscript{85} In November 1255, all provisions for the Sicilian Business were made with the assent of a number of Henry’s councillors, only two of whom – the earls of Gloucester and Warenne – represented the English barons, \textit{CR, 1254–6}, p. 240. The barons made it clear that they disapproved of the Sicilian Business. They argued that the king had pursued the business not only without their counsel and assent but with their ‘crying out in protest and unwillingness against it’, \textit{CM}, vi. p. 400.
\textsuperscript{86} CPR, 1247–58, pp. 488, 520.
\textsuperscript{87} TNA, SC 7/3/9. Following this, on 4 October 1256 Alexander again wrote to Henry and Edmund, confirming this concession made on 27 Sept, TNA, SC 7/3/39. On 6 October Alexander extended the deadline, TNA, SC 7/2/10, SC 7/2/14 (duplicate); copied in \textit{Reg. Alex IV}, i. no. 1543.
\textsuperscript{88} TNA, SC 7/3/12: ‘omni difficultate ac tarditate remota statim copiosa et strenua militia mitteretur…’. In January 1255 Ottoviano was made \textit{legatus a latere} in Sicily, Agostino Paravicini Bagliani, \textit{Cardinali di Curia E ‘Familiae’ Cardinalizie dal 1227 al 1254}, 2 vols (Padova, 1972), t. p. 285.
presented the business of Sicily to Henry on Innocent IV’s behalf. In this report, Albert documented Henry’s frankness regarding his financial difficulties, and inability to fulfil his obligations of the Sicilian Business under Innocent IV without monetary assistance. However, with no alternative, Alexander had little choice but to continue pursuing his unreliable English ally for aid. In fact, by August 1256, the pope had granted Henry further access to English Church revenue in an attempt to speed up the repayments owed.

According to Carpenter, the pope’s response to Henry’s petitions for further concessions was ‘friendly and reassuring’. Surely, the pope’s letters were somewhat sorrowful, but also hopeful and supportive. The pope did not resort to harsh, threatening language, nor did he begin to deploy grand canonical statements of papal power to press the king into more immediate action in Sicily. He maintained his position as a friend and ally of the king – albeit a somewhat frustrated one. Ultimately, Alexander IV worked to persuade the king to take more speedy action in this business by stressing both his love of the king and the plight of the Sicilian kingdom and the Church. Moreover, in January 1258, when justifying his right to authorise another delay to the original deadline of repayment, Alexander IV emphasised that these concessions were made ‘for the advantage of the Church, and also for the success of the same business [of Sicily]’.

Arguably, the pope’s decisions to approve further royal concessions was shaped more by his own need for assistance in Sicily than by his ‘particular favour’ for his spiritual son, Henry. He was a diplomat, not a lawyer, utilising the negotiation skills and rhetorical devices which he had developed during his early career as a papal legate and cardinal protector of the Franciscans.

During the latter half of 1258, the pope came to realise the full extent by which the barons were in control of the English realm and, although he did not acknowledge this in his reply, dated December 1258, there is a clear air of caution and unease in his response. He makes excuses for not

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89 Reg. Alex IV, iii. no. 3036; Carpenter, ‘King Henry III and the Sicilian Affair’, Fine of the Month (Feb., 2012).
90 On 23 August 1256, the pope granted the king one year’s fruits and rents of all dignities and minor dignities and other ecclesiastical benefices, prebendal and otherwise which fell vacant during the next five years in England and in the king’s other lands. TNA, SC 7/3/4. See also SC 7/3/2 and SC 7/2/7 for further allowances on English ecclesiastical revenue in aid of Sicily.
91 Carpenter, Henry III, p. 185.
92 See in particular, TNA, SC 7/3/52.
93 TNA, SC 7/2/37.
94 See Chapters Four and Five of this thesis for more on Alexander IV’s relationship with the Franciscans and use of Franciscan rhetoric in his letters.
approving English petitions for a cardinal legate, and more importantly, he effectively annulled the business with Henry – stating that he would seek another candidate to take the throne.\footnote{BL, Cotton MS Cleopatra E. I, fols 203–4; transcribed in Rymer, \textit{Foedera}, I/1, pp. 379–80. A near-identical letter addressed to the English barons was copied by Matthew Paris into his \textit{Cronica Majora} and transcribed by Luard in \textit{CM}, vi. 410–16. Baronial letters sent to the pope in the summer of 1258 reveal that they had taken control of the English government, confirming that the king and his first son, Edward had agreed to observe the baronial provisions, \textit{CM}, vi. pp. 400–9.} The English were no longer reliable allies in the papal war against Manfred.

Clearly, Henry III and Pope Alexander IV had worked together as friends and allies, fighting a political war against the imperialists in Sicily. However, they never referred to each other as allies in their correspondence, preferring to utilise familial language to frame their relationship.

The business itself was instigated on papal initiative and as such it was described as a crusade against Manfred and his ‘Saracen’ allies – the ‘enemies of Christ’.\footnote{TNA, SC 7/1/15.} Indeed, it was the pope who sought intervention in this matter from the English king, requesting both military and, more importantly, financial aid from the English. Henry was keen to support the pope in this endeavour, recognising the political advantages of claiming power in Sicily, however, he was in no position to grant military or financial aid to the pope, receiving little support from his barons or from the clergy.

Ultimately, the Sicilian Business had a huge impact on both England and the papacy in the mid to late 1250s – significantly shaping foreign and domestic policy as well as pope’s approach to English matters throughout Alexander’s pontificate, as shall be evidenced in the following sections.

**The Treaty of Paris (1259)**

The second area to address regarding papal intervention in English secular matters, is the papacy’s involvement throughout the Anglo-French treaty known as ‘the Treaty of Paris (1259)’. As mentioned in the introduction, England and France had been in conflict for much of the first half of the thirteenth century and following a number of peace truces in the 1240s and 1250s both kings were in favour of securing a more long-standing peace settlement.\footnote{The King of Castile, Alfonso X, had also urged Henry to make peace with Louis IX and to aid him on crusade in Africa, \textit{CR}, \textit{1254–6}, pp. 195–6.}

Previously, there has been an overwhelming focus on Anglo-French incentives for concluding a peace treaty in 1259. The prominent scholar on Louis IX, Jacques le Goff, noted the
close familial ties between these two royal households as one of the primary motives for this peace.\textsuperscript{98} The French queen, Marguerite de Provence, and the English queen, Eleanor de Provence, were sisters. Yet, many historians have also observed that between 1255 and 1258 the pope put Henry ‘under considerable pressure’ to make peace with France.\textsuperscript{99} Certainly, in her study on Saint Louis, Le Goff further argued that making peace with Henry III was one of Louis’s greatest successes, Le Goff, \textit{Saint Louis}, pp. 131, 192–3; See also Abigail Sophie Armstrong, \textit{The Daughters of Henry III} (Unpublished PhD Thesis, Canterbury Christ Church University, 2018), pp. 127–8.\textsuperscript{98} The French queen, Marguerite de Provence, and the English queen, Eleanor de Provence, were sisters. Yet, many historians have also observed that between 1255 and 1258 the pope put Henry ‘under considerable pressure’ to make peace with France.\textsuperscript{99} Certainly, in her study on Saint Louis, Le Goff further argued that making peace with Henry III was one of Louis’s greatest successes, Le Goff, \textit{Saint Louis}, pp. 131, 192–3; See also Abigail Sophie Armstrong, \textit{The Daughters of Henry III} (Unpublished PhD Thesis, Canterbury Christ Church University, 2018), pp. 127–8.\textsuperscript{98}Certainly, in her study on \textit{Saint Louis}, Labarge downplays the significance of this familial relationship between the English and French, arguing that the Sicilian Business was ‘the real force which speeded the peace treaty’.\textsuperscript{100} Despite this, there remains a lack of in-depth discussion regarding the treaty itself, and more importantly, the papacy’s specific role within this treaty.\textsuperscript{101} In this section I will therefore reassess the pope’s position throughout these negotiations in order to establish the specific role and capacity through which he acted throughout this peace settlement.

Before mapping the papacy’s role throughout this treaty, one must highlight each stage of this peace process. Chaplais highlighted four main stages of this treaty, namely, \textit{inita pax, firmata pax, ratificatio} and \textit{publicatio}.\textsuperscript{102} After initial contact had been made, it was during this first stage (\textit{inita pax}) that negotiations could commence between French and English envoys, resulting in a drafting of the final terms of peace. The second stage (\textit{firmata pax}) was when the final terms were officially agreed, and envoys from both sides would meet and take the oath on behalf of their principal’s soul stating that ‘he would observe these articles of peace.’\textsuperscript{103} During the third stage of the process (\textit{ratificatio}), each party would ratify the agreement and exchange formal letters, authenticated with their seals, stating their promises to observe the terms of this treaty. The final part of the process was the ‘publication’ (\textit{publicatio}) of the treaty, so that people from both kingdoms could observe the terms of this peace. Through an examination of papal intervention during these four main stages, one can decipher both the pope’s self-presentation in this business and the actual role he played, and how this role developed throughout the treaty.

\textsuperscript{98} Le Goff further argued that making peace with Henry III was one of Louis’s greatest successes, Le Goff, \textit{Saint Louis}, pp. 131, 192–3; See also Abigail Sophie Armstrong, \textit{The Daughters of Henry III} (Unpublished PhD Thesis, Canterbury Christ Church University, 2018), pp. 127–8.


\textsuperscript{100} Labarge, \textit{Saint Louis}, p. 191.

\textsuperscript{101} Le Goff only devoted eight pages to the treaty of Paris in his lengthy study on \textit{Saint Louis}.


\textsuperscript{103} \textit{Ibid.}, 238.
Immediately after Pope Alexander IV had endowed Henry’s son with the throne of Sicily in April 1255, an English embassy was sent to France to extend the existing peace truce for another three years. Through this truce, initial contact between the two opponents had already been established, and the extension of this truce was intended as a short-term solution, while a more permanent peace could be discussed. The English had initiated this process to establish a more long-term peace treaty, and these actions had been directly encouraged by the papacy’s promise of Sicily. Moreover, the notion of peace was supported by the French king, and hence the initiation of this peace process was relatively simple.

It was on 20 February 1257 when formal peace negotiations began, after Henry commissioned Simon de Montfort, earl of Leicester, and Robert Walerand, steward of his household, to begin negotiating peace between himself and Louis. Although little is known of what happened on this mission, in a royal letter dated 10 May 1257, Henry requested ‘mediation, financial aid and favour’ from the papal curia to help conclude peace with France for the sake of Sicily. This evidence not only confirms that Henry needed papal help to conclude this peace with France, but also gives some indication as to how Henry perceived the pope’s role throughout this treaty, as that of a mediator. Henry expected the pope to contribute not only mediating counsel, but also financial aid and favour towards this peace with France. He considered papal aid essential to the success of their mutual endeavour in Sicily, as discussed above.

On 22 June 1257 Henry commissioned three envoys, Walter Cantilupe, bishop of Worcester, Hugh Bigod, and Brother Adam Marsh, O.F.M, to negotiate peace with Louis IX. Six days later, Henry petitioned the pope to send a special legate to assist these envoys in peace talks at Paris. Consequently, on 13 September 1257, Alexander asked Henry to give credence to the Franciscan,

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104 On 20 May 1255 Henry ordered Peter of Savoy and Simon de Montfort to extend the truce with France for a further 3 years, CPR, 1247–58, p. 411. The truce was concluded in June 1255, Foedera, I/1, p. 324. The truce was in effect from 1 October, Foedera, I/1, p. 327. Then, on 24 January 1256, Henry orders John Mansel, provost of Beverley, and Bertramo de Crioyl to conclude a truce for three years, CPR, 1247–58, p. 460.


106 Royal Letters, ii. p. 121; CPR, 1247–58, p. 542. In April 1257, Henry appointed the bishop of Hereford, Master Bernard Aysun, constable of Bordeaux, and Master Peter Franc, to treat with the French party regarding interruptions to their truce, CPR, 1247–58, p. 549; Foedera, I/1, p. 355.

107 CPR, 1247–58, p. 567; Foedera, I/1, p. 355: ‘Ut per hoc, vestro etiam mediante consilio, auxilio et favore, praefatum negotium, ad honorem Dei et ecclesiae Romanae, ac nostrum, prosperis successibus convalescat’.

108 Foedera, I/1, p. 358. For more on this mission see p. 170–1.

109 CPR, 1247–58, p. 567; Foedera, I/1, pp. 355, 359.
Brother Mansuetus of Castiglione Fiorentino, whom he was sending to Paris to negotiate peace on the king’s behalf. In this case, the pope was responding to petitions from Henry for more practical assistance in this treaty, as opposed to taking the initiative on this matter, which was so important to the success of the Sicilian Business. Hence, although Matthew Paris heavily criticised the papacy for its overzealous meddling in English affairs – particularly in its taxation of the church and frequent appointments of foreign officials to ecclesiastical benefices in England – the official records tell a different story, one of a responsive papal government.

Throughout this business, there is no direct reference to Mansuetus as a ‘mediator’. As discussed, the line between mediator, advocate and envoy was not always clearly drawn in the medieval documentation. Mansuetus was a mediator in the sense that he had been appointed by the pope to help two opposing kings negotiate a peace settlement. While Mansuetus was technically intervening on behalf of the English king, his appointment and intervention was supported by the French king. Moreover, he was, above all else, looking out for the interests of the papacy through his mediation.

In the letter authorising Mansuetus’ right to carry out this mission, the pope did not present himself as an arbiter or mediator, but as a peacemaker, as the peacemaker of Christendom. Furthermore, he did not directly quote the source of power through which he asserted this right to intervene in this peace. This was in direct contrast to his predecessor, Innocent IV, who had emphasised his position as ‘Vicar of Christ’ and ‘supreme judge’ to justify his intervention in secular disputes. While Innocent IV had exploited canon law to highlight the power, authority and right of the papacy to intervene in secular affairs, Alexander used the language of peace and love to reflect the image of a supportive, motherly Church, seeking to bring peace and tranquillity to all Christians. To Alexander, his role was to be a facilitator of peace. Yet, by ‘peace’ he really meant ‘law and order’. Through this self-presentation as Christ’s peacemaker Alexander could still assert his rights

\[\text{\footnotesize TNA, SC 7/3/48.} \]
\[\text{\footnotesize CM, v, pp. 525–7, 532–3, 540, 672–3, 681; Smith, ‘The Italian Connection Reconsidered’ (forthcoming).} \]
\[\text{\footnotesize Foedera, 1/1, p. 376.} \]
\[\text{\footnotesize For the French king’s reception of Mansuetus see pp. 123, 177.} \]
\[\text{\footnotesize For more details on the idea of pope as peacemaker see Chapter Five, ‘Pope as Peacemaker’, pp. 237–40’.} \]
\[\text{\footnotesize Decretales 2.1.13, Novit, [no. 76], Commentaria Super Libros Quinque Decretalium (c.1250) (Frankfurt, 1570), fol. 194 cited in Tierney, Crisis of Church and State, p. 153.} \]
as ‘arbiter mundi’ in a subtler way. Furthermore, he could exploit this new language of peace to justify his crusading policy in Sicily and defend himself from criticism regarding his temporal self-interest. Ultimately, by styling and promoting himself as a peacemaker, the pope could effectively reinforce and justify papal rights to intervene within the wider medieval world.\footnote{117 See also Chapter Five, ‘Pope as Peacemaker’, pp. 237–40.}

When peace talks opened in January 1258, the English envoys demanded that all Henry’s ‘overseas territories’ should be returned to him.\footnote{118 CM, v. pp. 649–50, 659–60, 663; David Carpenter, ‘Aspects of the Revolution of 1258’, Fine of the Mound (Sept., 2012), Henry III Fine Rolls Project. [Accessed on 7 August 2019].} This request was unsurprisingly rejected by the French barons, and so Henry’s embassy returned to England in February 1258 having failed to agree peace terms.\footnote{119 CM, v. p. 659–60.} Although Henry’s envoys were assisted by Mansuetus in the negotiation of peace, their unwillingness to concede Henry’s rights to Angevin land in France meant no resolution could be attained. It was going to take more than papal intervention to ensure that peace was settled between England and France, highlighting the practical limitations to papal intervention in secular disputes.

Following the failure of these initial peace talks as well as Henry’s inability to meet the original terms of the Sicilian agreement, the king petitioned the pope to alter the terms of the Sicilian Business and to further extend the deadline for repayment and suspend the penalties for non-payment. In response, the pope sent his notary, Master Arlot, who, while on mission, pushed Henry to quickly firm up peace with Louis so that he could sufficiently execute the business of Sicily, through his financial and military aid.\footnote{120 CM, v. p. 673; ‘Annals of Tewkesbury’, AM, i. p. 163; iii. p. 208; Close rolls (supplementary) of the reign of Henry III, preserved in the Public Record Office, 1244–66, ed. Ann Morton (London, 1975), p. 30; M. Gavrilovitch, Étude sur le traité de Paris (Paris, 1899), p. 20; Powicke, Henry III, i. pp. 375–6; Chaplais, ‘Treaty of Paris’, 239.} Following this, the king immediately ordered several key envoys to renegotiate this peace treaty with France.\footnote{121 Foedera, I/1, p. 371; CPR, 1247–58, pp. 628, 663.} This English delegation travelled to Paris accompanied by Mansuetus to oversee the business and report back to the pope on final terms of the treaty.\footnote{122 Close Rolls suppl. 1244–66, p. 30, Sean L. Field, Isabelle of France: Capetian Sanctity and Franciscan Identity in the Thirteenth Century (Notre Dame, 2006), pp. 71–2; Sanders, ‘The Texts of the Peace of Paris’, 84; Richard, Saint Louis, pp. 200–1; Labarge, Saint Louis, p. 193. Chaplais, ‘Treaty of Paris’, 239.} Evidently, the king was following papal orders to swiftly conclude this peace with France as, by complying with these demands, he hoped to retain papal favour and acquire a new payment extension from the curia, regarding his Sicilian debts.
The articles of the treaty of Paris were agreed on 28 May 1258. As part of this settlement, the English representatives agreed that Henry would renounce his rights to Normandy, Anjou, Touraine, Maine, and Poitou, and receive Gascony as a fief held from the French Crown. They also agreed that Henry’s brother, Richard of Cornwall, and sister, Eleanor, countess of Leicester, would renounce their claims to the Angevin land in France. These were significant concessions on Henry’s part – he rescinded his hereditary rights to land in France, which, only months prior, he had been adamant he would not surrender, proving the extent of his desire to claim Sicily.

Hermann Kamp has argued that mediators could ‘influence the formulation and conditions of a treaty’. Certainly, Mansuetus had personally helped secure a promise from Louis of enough money to hire five hundred knights every two years in aid of the Sicilian Business, which was integral to the continuation of this endeavour. It was further agreed between Henry’s baronial proctors, the pope’s mediator, and the French counterparts, that this money could only be used ‘in the service of God, the Church or to the profit of the kingdom of England’. This section was inserted to guarantee that Henry would not misuse the funds. Furthermore, Mansuetus made sure that the French king’s money would be used primarily to subsidise the pope’s war in Sicily. Hence, he was not just a mediator, but a papal representative, sent to oversee this treaty and to secure the best outcome for the pope and the Sicilian endeavour.

Following the initial settlement of these peace terms, Henry and his baronial council thanked the pope for encouraging peace between England and France and for sending Mansuetus to assist in these negotiations. In this reply they were acknowledging and emphasising Alexander’s role as the promoter and facilitator of God’s peace, who sent Mansuetus ‘to undertake the business diligently, faithfully, and prudently’. They were appealing to the pope’s presentation of himself as a peacemaker.

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123 For full terms of peace agreed on 28 May 1258 see TNA, E 30/1077; transcribed in Foedera, I/1, p. 390.
127 TNA, E 30/1077.
129 Foedera, I/1, p. 376: ‘qui sibi commisso negotio diligenter, fideliter institit et prudenter, quasi per angelum pacis nos multipliciter monuistis’. CR, 1256–9, p. 325.
130 The ways in which the English were mimicking papal rhetoric and letter writing practices shall be explored in Chapter Five, ‘English Letters’, pp. 242–52.
The pope did not retain the same position throughout this peace treaty. In fact, when he dissolved the Sicilian agreement on 18 December 1258, he effectively abandoned his role as peacemaker and mediator of this treaty and would no longer assist Henry in his efforts to conclude peace. Through this act it becomes clear that, although in theory Alexander wanted to be viewed and remembered as a peacemaker, in practice he was a pragmatist, willing to abandon this image when it no longer served the best interests of the papacy and the Roman Church. Although in this letter the pope did not officially dissolve or break off the business, he stated that he would ‘pronounce it dissolved or broken off’ so he was free to look elsewhere for candidates who could take the throne.131 The pope was keeping his options open in order to find the best outcome for Sicily and for himself. Despite this, between 1258 and the end of Alexander IV’s pontificate in May 1261, the pope did not make any further progress on this matter.

Even though the Sicilian Business had effectively ended, and at this time the barons were in control of Henry’s council, Henry would not give up in his efforts to attain a peace settlement with Louis in order to pursue his son’s claims to the Sicilian throne.132 The ratification of this peace treaty was delayed by Eleanor’s refusal to renounce her hereditary rights to land in France until the issue of her dower and dowry were settled.133 Nonetheless, throughout 1259, Henry kept the pope and the college of cardinals up-to-date on the process of his treaty with France in the hope that the papacy would reconfirm the Sicilian agreement.134 In fact, Henry had the support of seven (out of nine) members of the college of cardinals, who had been promoting his interests at the curia and encouraging the pope to revive the Sicilian Business, as will be observed in Chapter Two.135 While appealing to the cardinals could help the advancement of Henry’s interests at the curia, he ultimately needed to convince the pope to recommit to the business, and the correspondence would suggest that he did not achieve this. Alexander IV has been criticised for his ‘indecisive nature’ and policies of

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133 Following the death of her first husband, William Marshal, earl of Pembroke, in 1231, Eleanor was granted a dower of £400 a year to be paid in two equal amounts at Easter and Michaelmas. However, this was not paid regularly. On top of this, Henry did not grant Eleanor a dowry when she married Simon de Montfort, Sanders, ‘The Text of the Peace of Paris (1259)’, 88, n. 2.
134 On 16 March 1259, Henry wrote to the College of Cardinals stating his intention to keep the pope and the cardinals fully informed on matters relating to the peace treaty with France, Foedera, I/1, p. 381.
135 See p. 86.
‘compromise and alliance’ to resolve domestic and foreign crises. Thus, it is possible that Alexander could not decide whether or not to re-commit to the Sicilian Business, after it had shown prominent signs of weakness. This would have been a difficult situation for any pontiff, and Alexander’s cautious approach was certainly understandable given the tense political atmosphere in both England and the Italian peninsula. On 20 May 1259, Henry informed the pope that the completion of the peace treaty with France was still slightly delayed due to Eleanor’s refusal to renounce her claims to Angevin territory. The English king had worked tirelessly to encourage Louis to remove this condition from the treaty, so that he could meet the pope’s demands. Louis did eventually agree to the omission of this clause, but only temporarily, to allow Henry more time to ascertain the required renunciations from Eleanor. The final ratification of the treaty of Paris was dated 13 October 1259 and included both Henry and Louis’ seals. Chaplais has noted several copies of this ratified treaty (dated 20 May 1259, 3 September 1259, 5 September 1259 and 13 October 1259). Yet there is no mention of the pope within any of the texts of this treaty, suggesting that he had either renounced his official role as mediator or that he had been acting in an unofficial capacity throughout this peace process. Bombi noted that when the pope acted as an unofficial or ‘private’ mediator in Anglo-French peace negotiations in the fourteenth century, his letters would be authenticated with his personal name as opposed to his papal name. For example, throughout Innocent VI’s arbitration of the Treaty of Guines (1354) he was referred to by his personal name, Étienne Aubert. Although this treaty was not ratified, it gives evidence of the unofficial intervention of a pope. While Alexander IV never referred to himself with his personal name throughout these negotiations, he was effectively mediating in an unofficial capacity.

While the final form of the Treaty of Paris had been ratified in October, it still did not include Eleanor’s renunciation clause, and so Henry promised Louis that he could deduct 15,000 marks from the amount owed to Henry as part of their treaty, as pledge for the settlement of Henry’s dispute with his sister. In response to this, Eleanor and Simon finally agreed to concede their claims on 3

139 TNA, E 30/1077, E 30/10, C 47/29/1/1; Foedera, I/1, pp. 389–90.
140 See Bombi, Anglo-Papal Relations, pp. 222–3.
December. Thus, the final form of the peace treaty was immediately published the next day, on 4 December 1259. Following this, Henry informed Alexander that this peace had been finalised between himself and Louis.142 Furthermore, on 16 January 1260 he wrote to the archbishop of Messina from Paris stating that now peace had been made between him and Louis, he hoped to take up the Sicilian enterprise more vigorously.143 Yet, by this point Henry was in no position, financially, politically or militarily, to continue the Sicilian Business, and had lost the support and ‘mediating counsel’ of his international friend and ally, the pope.

For Cuttino, the pope had acted as a ‘neutral third party’ throughout the Treaty of Paris, who had arranged initial contact between the English and French kings, and who then sent representatives to observe the negotiation proceedings with a ‘watchful eye’.144 However, Benham has argued that papal impartially and neutrality were rare, especially when the Church’s own interests were involved.145 Indeed, Alexander’s role in this treaty was largely shaped by his own domestic and foreign policy. He pushed for peace between England and France so that Henry could join his Crusade against Manfred and his army, who were threatening the safety and security of the papal state. It would therefore be wrong to infer that the papacy was a neutral peacemaker and mediator in these secular disputes. Nonetheless, it is important not to diminish the papacy’s significance in bringing about this treaty. If Alexander had not offered Henry the Kingdom of Sicily and subsequently urged him to quickly make peace with France to facilitate this business, then Henry would not have been so eager to conclude this treaty.

Secondly, Alexander only arranged these initial contacts in so far as he instructed Henry to make peace with France, and then after a royal petition, sent Mansuetus to assist in these Anglo-French negotiations. The papacy’s vested interest in this peace did not make him a proactive participant, as Matthew Paris might have us believe. Throughout the proceedings, he largely responded to royal petitions for practical assistance in these negotiations, and it was only in the first half of these proceedings that he offered any real assistance. It was Henry who was determined to

142 Royal Letters, ii. p. 143. Letters were also written to the cardinals, and Master Arlot, informing them of this peace between England and France, Foedera, I/1, p. 392; Chaplais, ‘Treaty of Paris’, 247.
143 Royal Letters, ii. pp. 147–8.
144 Cuttino, English Medieval Diplomacy, p. 8.
145 Benham, Peacemaking, p. 186.
acquire the Sicilian Kingdom: willing, if not always able, to comply with papal demands in aid of this endeavour.

There is a clear divide between the theory and practice of papal involvement in secular disputes. In this case, Alexander presented himself as the peacemaker of Christendom, and yet, once he realised that Henry could not effectively assist his war in Sicily, he abandoned his role as peacemaker and rejected Henry’s requests for further assistance.

When discussing the pope’s role in this peace, it is interesting to consider why the papacy might want these two kings to establish a treaty when they already had a truce in place. Arguably, neither the pope, nor the English or the French king were content with the mere presence of a truce, due to its instability and fragility. A truce was a ‘state of suspended hostilities’ which could be broken by any act of war without a formal renunciation of the truce, while a peace was a more long-lasting, amicable and legally-binding agreement.146 As Sicily was such an important international endeavour, Alexander and Henry needed to secure a more long-lasting and legally-binding peace with France. Likewise, the French king wanted to put an end to Angevin claims on French soil, so he could finally focus his efforts and resources on domestic matters. War between England and France had been a long-standing issue for the Apostolic See; indeed, both Pope Innocent III and Pope Honorius III had tried to mediate peace between these two kingdoms.147 Following a petition from the English king in 1215, the papacy had sent Cardinal Guala, followed by Master Pandulph (in 1218), to assist in the mediation of peace between England and France.148 In this case, the papacy had been motivated to mediate this peace in aid of the Fifth Crusade. Furthermore, peace between England and France would allow the future King of France (Louis VIII) to focus his attention on the Albigensian Crusade.149 Louis made peace with the English king on 12 September 1217, and this treaty was ratified at Lambeth on 20 September.150 Ultimately, peace between Christian kings was a necessary

147 Following a petition from Philip II, the pope had compelled Richard I ‘by ecclesiastical punishment’ to make and maintain peace with the French king. This papal mediation resulted in a five-year truce between England and France. Later, after a petition from King John, Innocent demanded Philip II to made peace with England, but this attempt to bring peace between these two kings failed, Cheney, *Innocent III and England*, pp. 278–80, 287–91.
148 For more on Guala see pp. 92–3.
150 Carpenter, *The Minority of Henry III*, p. 44.
prerequisite to the success of papal crusading policy and this can be seen throughout the thirteenth century. It is possible that Alexander IV saw an opportunity to oversee the conclusion of a firm peace between the two traditional opponents of England and France in the 1250s, which he could then use to influence Christendom’s collective image and memory of him as a ‘peacemaker’ and ‘arbiter of Christendom’. Ultimately, Alexander was not only waging a crusade against the ‘enemies of Christ’ in Sicily, he was simultaneously creating peace between Christian nations as part of this policy.

The English Baronial Revolt (1258–1261)

As can be seen in the first two case-studies, the pope was presenting himself as a peacemaker who, through his ‘duty of care’, could bring tranquillity to Christendom. Yet, in practice, he was prioritising his own interests, and those of the Church, through his interventions in secular disputes. During the first part of Alexander’s pontificate (1254–1258), his interests had been heavily intertwined with those of the English king due to their joint efforts in Sicily, and this largely influenced and shaped his involvement in English affairs. However, towards the end of his pontificate (1259–1261), the pope was drawn into Henry’s domestic disputes, which had stopped him from engaging effectively in foreign matters (like the Sicilian Business). As such, this final case-study will readdress the pope’s role as ‘third party’ in an English setting, through Alexander’s participation throughout the English Baronial Revolt (1258–1261). This will be explored through three examples: the papal response to the baronial request for a cardinal legate (1258); the disputed episcopal election of Aymer de Lusignan (1258–1259), one of Henry’s Poitevin half-brothers who had come to England in 1247; and the papal absolution from the observation of baronial provisions (1261).

As observed in the introduction, much of Henry’s reign was overshadowed by fragile relations with his barons, gentry, and churchmen, many of whom had become increasingly dissatisfied with his running of the state, poor management of finances, obligations to the papacy, overzealous engagement in foreign endeavours, and personal preference towards certain foreign

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151 This quick conclusion of peace helped bring about the more intense issues between England and France in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century, Cuttino, English Diplomatic Administration, pp. 2–28.
council members, such as the Lusignans. In May 1258, following renewed papal threats of excommunication and interdict for non-payment of the remaining Sicilian debt, the majority of Henry’s barons, led by Simon de Montfort, rose up against the king, in order to curb the king’s abuses of power, to reform the English state and to expel the Lusignan family from England. By July of that year, a council of fifteen barons had been appointed to assist in the ruling of the realm, expel the Lusignans, and force Henry to agree to the Provisions of Oxford which bound the king to seek baronial approval before he engaged in any major activities. While historians have deliberated at length over the causes, protagonists, outcome and overall significance of the Baronial Revolt, there has been little discussion regarding papal intervention throughout this revolt. This is surprising considering the pope’s status as overlord of England and frequent interaction with his ‘beloved son’, Henry. Thus, this section will reassess the pope’s role as arbiter mundi throughout this turbulent period in England. Furthermore, this section will shed new light on the ways in which Henry’s barons tried to utilise papal overlordship to their own benefit, when in control of English government.

While the barons had formerly been resistant to papal intervention in English matters, particularly with regards to the Sicilian Business, it was following their uprising that they realised they could exploit the special status of England as a papal fiefdom to petition the pope for assistance in their reforms and effectively ‘instrumentalize papal authority against the king’. In July 1258 the baronial council organised a special embassy to the curia on behalf of the whole of England, more specifically the community of earls, nobles, magnates and all others of the kingdom of England, to petition the pope to send a cardinal legate to England. This papal legate was requested to help conclude peace with France, to oversee English reforms to the realm, to renegotiate the Sicilian Business on more favourable terms, and depose Henry’s half-brother, Aymer de Lusignan, from his see at Winchester. Primarily, the barons desired a cardinal legate to help restore the English realm

152 Maddicott, Simón de Montfort, pp. 151–2.
154 Treherne, Baronial Plan; Treherne, Simón De Montfort and Baronial Reform; Powicke, Henry III; Maddicott, Simón de Montfort; Carpenter, Henry III; Howell, Eleanor of Provence; Jobson, The First English Revolution; Ambler, ‘Simón de Montfort and King Henry III’.
155 Wiedemann, Papal Overlordship, p. 122.
156 CM, v. pp. 716–17; vi. pp. 400–9; ‘Annals of Burton’, AM, i. pp. 170–4, 463–6; Foedera, I/1, p. 373. In 1258, King Louis IX had also requested the pope send a cardinal legate to oversee the signing of the peace treaty between himself and Henry III. He specifically asked Alexander to send one of three cardinals: Giovanni Gaetano Orsini, Eudes of Chateauroux or Hugh of Saint Cher, O.F.P. He also showed concern at the lack of cardinals and hinted that the pope should appoint more. Fr. Henri-François Delaborde,
to ‘a good, healthy, and prosperous state’.\(^{157}\) The speaker of this embassy, whose identity and mission will be discussed in Chapter Three, used threatening language to push Alexander IV to send a legate to England.\(^{158}\) They were anxious to receive a cardinal legate, invested with the full powers of the pope, to mediate between court factions and encourage the restoration of good English governance through ‘the guidance and blessing of the Church’.\(^{159}\) Papal approval and assistance would help legitimise their usurpation of royal powers. Indeed, these barons did not want to make the same mistakes as their predecessors (from the 1215 Baronial Revolt) and allow the king to utilise papal power to suppress their uprising.\(^{160}\) The barons needed papal favour, support, and mediation if their reforms were to have any long-term success.

In response to this baronial petition, the pope was vague and non-committal in his answer. In two identical letters, one addressed to the king and one addressed to the barons and magnates of the kingdom, the pope conditionally agreed to send a cardinal legate to England to help reform the English realm and conclude peace with France after he had been better informed about the state of the English realm and the progress of the Anglo-French peace.\(^{161}\) In reality, the pope was facing a multitude of domestic crises which had been either caused or exacerbated by Manfred which was limiting his ability to address these foreign issues.\(^{162}\) Moreover, he inherited ten cardinals, but by the end of May 1259 he only had eight, none of whom he was prepared to send to England at this fragile political time.\(^{163}\) It could be argued that if the pope had been in a less tenuous political and financial position he would have been more willing to engage in these English matters. Yet, in both letters, the

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161 On 28 October 1213, Innocent III mandated the archbishops, bishops, abbots, and all other prelates of the churches, and princes, earls, barons and the whole body of knights and people throughout Ireland, to remain faithful to King John and his heirs, TNA, SC 7/19/18. Furthermore, on 18 June 1215, Innocent mandated the English barons to assist John against those barons who, ‘now that he has made satisfaction with God and the Church, presume to attack him’, TNA, SC 7/52/2. On 24 August 1215, Innocent III annulled Magna Carta at the request of King John, BL, Cotton MS Cleopatra E. I, fols 155–6; transcribed in Rymer’s *Foedera*, IV, pp. 135–6.

162 BL, Cotton MS Cleopatra E. I, fols 203–4.

163 By the end of August 1258, Manfred had crowned himself King of Sicily, invaded much of southern Italy, and gained anti-papal allies in the March of Ancona, Richard, *St Louis*, p. 263; Bemont, *Simon de Montfort*, 167; Waley, *Papal State*, p. 162. In his letter to the barons, the pope stated he only had ‘few cardinals’ so he wanted to be better informed before sending one to England, *CM*, vi. pp. 410–16.

pope stressed that he would only support, favour, and strengthen reform in England if it were to ‘the
exaltation of the Church, the honour and advantage of the king, and the prosperous and tranquil state
of his kingdom.’ Furthermore, he exhorted the barons and magnates of England to show ‘all due
fidelity and respect’ towards the king and his family, on account of the pope’s ‘tender affection’
(tenera affectione) for the English king. In all probability, the pope would have been informed of
the king’s perilous situation in England, and as such would have been reluctant to support English
matters which had not been authorised by the king. As overlord of the realm it was his duty to support
and protect his vassal, Henry. Furthermore, Alexander IV effectively dissolved the Sicilian Business
in this message to the English. The pope realised that the English king was facing extensive
financial difficulties and internal strife and was in no position to sufficiently assist the papacy in
Sicily. The pope took seriously his role as the ‘overlord’ of the English kingdom and his duty to
protect the realm and the interests of the king. In this letter, he described England as being under ‘the
defence and care’ of the Church – evoking his feudal duties in relation to the English realm.
Evidently, while not directly referencing it, he was asserting his position as the ‘overlord’ of England
and firm supporter of the English king and in doing so, placing himself in opposition to any ‘power
grab’ by the barons.

In successive letters with the barons, the pope showed little tolerance towards their demands,
and strongly asserted his papal power and authority over them. For example, in January 1260, in
response to complaints from the nobles, barons, and magnates of England regarding his alleged
abuses of provisions and encroachment of royal power regarding presentations to benefices during
the vacancies of sees, he stated that the barons had written things on this matter which they ought not
to have written to the ‘Vicarius Christi’. It was not their place to discuss these matters as they were
‘laymen, ignorant of the words of wisdom’. Alexander IV made it clear that they were abusing
their position. He utilised his canonical position as ‘Vicarius Christi’, a title used more openly and

164 CM, vi. pp. 411–12.
165 Ibid., p. 416.
166 Ibid., pp. 410–16.
167 BL, Cotton MS Cleopatra E. I, fols 203–4: ‘Hoc regnum est ager devotionis ferttis et amoenus, circa
cuius munimen et cultum praedicta ecclesia cogitare attentius et opem ad hoc propensionis studii administrare
tenetur’.
168 Royal Letters, ii. pp. 145–7. For more on papal provisions for benefices see Smith ‘The Italian Connection
Reconsidered’ (forthcoming).
169 Foedera, I/1, p. 393.
boldly by some of his predecessors, namely Innocent III and Innocent IV, in their correspondence with secular rulers.\footnote{For example, in a letter from Pope Innocent III to King John in 1215, the pope stated that Christ had sent the pope ‘His [Christ’s] vicar on earth’ asking that ‘all men should obey His Vicar’ and that all Christian kings should ‘venerate this Vicar’ and serve him devoutly to ensure they are reigning properly, \textit{Selected Letters of Pope Innocent III, concerning England (1198–1216)}, ed. C. R. Cheney and W. H. Semple (London, 1953), p. 177; see also Tierney, \textit{Crisis of Church and State}, pp. 127–57.} Alexander had never used this title in his correspondence with the English king. Clearly, he took a more authoritative approach towards his relationship with the English barons. They were not his equals and did not deserve the same respect he showed to the king.

While the pope was reluctant to assist in the reformation of the English realm, he took a very different approach regarding his duties towards Henry’s Lusignan brother, Aymer de Lusignan. Several letters between England and the papacy, preserved in Matthew Paris’ \textit{Chronica Majora}, record this case. Shortly after the parliament of Oxford had expelled the Lusignans from England, the baronial council had brought a legal case before Alexander at the curia as part of their embassy dated July 1258. In their appeal they requested the pope to officially depose Aymer from his position as bishop-elect of Winchester, for he was a liar, consumed by greed, and ‘hostile to justice and peace in the kingdom of England’.\footnote{\textit{CM}, vi. p. 407: ‘vir fabricator mendacii, lucis impatiens, turpis lucr i negotium perambulans in tenebris, vir justiciae et pacis regni Angliae inimicus’.} In response, Alexander IV had agreed to judge the case fairly, once Aymer had provided a legal representative to make his case before the papal court.\footnote{\textit{CM}, vi. pp. 415–16.} According to Ullmann, it was only two years earlier, through the disputed election of the bishop of Ely in 1257, that papal arbitration in disputed episcopal elections was established as part of the constitution.\footnote{Walter Ullmann, ‘The Disputed Election of Hugh Balsham, Bishop of Ely’, \textit{The Cambridge Historical Journal}, 9 (1949), 259–68 (262). In this case, the king, the monks and the archbishop of Canterbury had each wanted their own candidate to be appointed. The king favoured Henry Wingham, the monks favoured Hugh of Balsham and the archbishop put forward Adam Marsh, O.F.M. Ultimately, the pope elected Hugh of Balsham as bishop. \textit{Ibid.}, 265; see also Geoffrey Barraclough, ‘The Making of a Medieval Bishop’, \textit{Catholic Historical Review}, 19 (1933), 275–316 (292–7).} Ullmann stated that before this case, there was ‘no canonical regulation dealing with the problem of whether a disputed episcopal election devolved upon the pope’.\footnote{Ullmann, ‘Disputed Election of Hugh Balsham, Bishop of Ely’, 265.} Yet, he goes on to say that there may have been ‘some sort of understanding in England that this kind of dispute necessitated papal arbitration’ even though ‘the canon law gave no clear ruling’.\footnote{\textit{CM}, vi. pp. 415–16.} Ultimately, the case in 1257 officially established the pope’s role as arbitrator in appeals concerning disputed episcopal elections.
This continued for the next seventeen years until Pope Gregory X significantly altered this rule in the ninth canon of the Second Council of Lyons (1274).\textsuperscript{176} Following an influx of appeals to the pope for intervention in disputed elections, the decree of 1274 stated that all disputed episcopal elections were no longer considered ‘\textit{causae majores}’ which required intervention by the pope.\textsuperscript{177}

Aymer’s counsel soon presented his case before the curia, stating that Aymer had been deprived of his possessions, ejected from his episcopal see, and violently expelled from England by a small group of personal enemies (only three or four men), and that the mass of Englishmen would readily accept his re-entry.\textsuperscript{178} Ultimately, the pope supported Aymer in this case and yet, the barons continued to bring about his deposition, securing the election of Henry of Wingham, the king’s chancellor, as the new bishop of Winchester in January 1259.\textsuperscript{179} In response to this disobedience, the pope took decisive action, and on 29 January 1259 he ordered the Franciscan, Brother Velascus Gometti, on pain of excommunication, to personally induce the king, earls, barons, and other councillors of the king, to desist from the removal of Aymer and to restore the goods belonging to him and his see.\textsuperscript{180} In this letter to Velascus, the pope stated how the Church was being hindered in its duty of care by some ‘growing disturbance’ (\textit{surgente turbatione}) which was disrupting the tranquillity of Christendom.\textsuperscript{181} By this ‘disturbance’, he was referring to the actions of the English barons who had wrongfully expelled Aymer from his see. The letter continued by stating that Aymer had appealed to the pope for the defence of necessary protection against these disturbances.\textsuperscript{182} By defending Aymer against the barons, the pope was fulfilling his duty of care to the sons of the Church and restoring peace and tranquillity to the English realm. The pope justified his intervention through

\textsuperscript{176} \textit{Ibid.}, 267.
\textsuperscript{180} \textit{BF}, ii. no. 464; Potthast, ii. no. 17460; \textit{CPL}, i. p. 364.
\textsuperscript{181} \textit{BF}, ii. no. 464.
\textsuperscript{182} \textit{Ibid.}: ‘\textit{Sane dilectus filius Ademarus Wintoniensis Electus adversante sibi temporis qualitate, adversitatis huius in se asperitatem sentiens, et multa, et magna, ut asserit, perferens nocumenta, providit ad Apostolicæ Sedis providentiam habere recursum; ut ab ipsa matre justitiae illatae sibi castigentur injuriae; ac ex ea illud oppressorum refugio suscipiat contra molestatores suos necessarii praesidii munimentum’.
the ambition of peace in Christendom. In truth, the pope’s aim was to ensure that his position as ‘supreme judge’ in all ecclesiastical matters was respected.

Initially, the barons would not permit Velascus’ entry into England.\(^{183}\) When Velascus eventually gained access into England around June 1259, he proceeded with his assignment to command the king and his council to restore Aymer to his episcopal see at Winchester, under the authority of the papacy.\(^{184}\) Yet, in a blow to papal efforts, and in spite of the threat of excommunication, the king wrote to the pope on 23 September 1259, thanking him for sending Velascus. In this letter, he lamented that ‘despite his desire to obey the pope’ he could not restore Aymer without ‘provoking crisis and overturning laws in the kingdom’, as it was contrary to the oaths he had made in the Provisions of Oxford (1258) and Westminster (1259).\(^{185}\) Although the king was clearly being forced to comply with the baronial demands, he and the pope had worked together as allies to resist the barons’ attempts to stop Aymer re-taking his office in Winchester.\(^{186}\) The pope continued to demand the restoration of Aymer de Lusignan to his diocese until it officially happened in May 1260.\(^{187}\) However, the situation was only really resolved when, in December 1260, Aymer died in France on his journey back to England to take his place as bishop-elect of Winchester.\(^{188}\)

Determination and decisiveness are traits, which, as noted above, medieval chroniclers and modern historians have often denied Alexander IV in their accounts of his character. However, the pope’s unfaltering vigour and determination to protect Aymer’s status highlighted his decision-making abilities, particularly within the ecclesiastical domain. Indeed, it was Alexander who confirmed the role of pope as arbitrator in disputed episcopal elections, believing it was the supreme right of the pontiff to judge and decide the outcome of these cases.

Finally, in 1261, the English king asked the pope to help him suppress the baronial uprising. At parliament in March 1261, Henry listed his many grievances against the council and declared his

\(^{183}\) For the details of this event see pp. 178–80.


\(^{186}\) On 18 December 1260, Velascus and the archbishop of Tours were granted safe conduct from the king, confirming that Velascus had returned to England in 1260, possibly to relay the information regarding the death of Aymer de Lusignan, *CPR*, 1258–66, p. 132; ‘Annals of Osney’, *AM*, iv. pp. 125–6.


\(^{188}\) *Flores Historiarum*, ii. p. 460.
intention to seek papal absolution from the baronial provisions. He stated that he was mostly driven to seek papal absolution as the council had refused to pay off the king’s debts to finance the Sicilian Business.\(^{189}\) He also reiterated this to the pope in explanation for his inability to provide sufficient financial and military support to Sicily in the previous years.\(^{190}\) The baronial council broke down in December 1260 and the king sent Master John Mansel, the nephew and namesake of Henry’s leading administrator, John Mansel, to the curia to request absolution in January 1261.\(^{191}\) In response to this petition Alexander IV sent three papal bulls, one addressed to the king (dated 13 April 1261), and two addressed to the king’s envoys (dated 29 April and 7 May 1261). In these bulls the pope asserted his position as ‘overlord’ of England and protected the king’s royal powers in the face of this baronial uprising.

On 13 April 1261, the pope declared that Henry did not have to obey the baronial provisions, freeing the king from his bond.\(^{192}\) Significantly, he deployed papal *plentudo potestatis* to absolve Henry from this oath.\(^{193}\) This is one of few examples where Alexander claimed papal power in temporal matters. On the king’s request for aid, the pope had assumed his role as overlord of England and protected the rights and position of his vassal. Alexander also referred to Henry’s secular powers in the same terms as his own to strengthen this bull.\(^{194}\)

This letter of grace absolving the king from the baronial provisions is in some ways similar to Pope Innocent III’s letter of grace annulling of Magna Carta in 1215. In both cases, the English king was drawing on the powers of his overlord, the pope, to suppress a domestic revolt on his behalf. However, there are some clear differences in these two letters, particularly in the *sanctio* clause.\(^{195}\) The *sanctio* clause of Alexander’s bull, dated 13 April 1261, reads:

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\(^{189}\) DBM, pp. 213, 221.


\(^{191}\) Treharne, *Baronial Plan*, pp. 428–9; Maddicott, *Simon de Montfort*, p. 207; Jobson, *The First English Revolution*, p. 59. Master John Mansel is the nephew of his more famous uncle John Mansel (Provost of Beverley and later treasurer of York), *CPR*, 1258–66, p. 55. The sources are not always clear on which John Mansel is being referred to, indeed, there are some errors on the National Archives database and in the Calendar of Patent Rolls. This thesis has clarified, where possible, which John Mansel is being discussed.

\(^{192}\) BL, Cotton MS Cleopatra E. I, fol. 213; transcribed by Rymer in his *Foedera*, I/1, p. 405; also transcribed and translated in *DBM*, pp. 238–41.

\(^{193}\) BL, Cotton MS Cleopatra E. I, fol. 213.


\(^{195}\) The *sanctio* will be discussed on p. 220.
Whereas the sanctio in Innocent III’s bull annulling Magna Carta, dated on 24 August 1215, reads:

Nulli ergo omnino hominum liceat hanc paginam nostre cassationis et prohibitionis infringere, vel ei ausu temerario contraire. Si quis autem hoc attemptare presumperit, indignacionem omnipotencis Dei, et beatorum Petri et Pauli, apostolorum eius, se noverit incursurum.  

At first glance, these two clauses look almost identical, both adopting the same formulaic language and structure. Indeed, Sayers confirms that sanctio clauses were essentially ‘settled in form by the thirteenth century.  

However, there is a clear distinction which must be noted. Alexander IV granted papal ‘absolution’ while, Innocent III had granted ‘annulment and prohibition’.  

This variation in the choice of vocabulary is intentional and significant. Papal ‘absolution’ confirmed that Henry was released from his oath to the barons, while the ‘annulment and prohibition’ of Magna Carta indicated that the entire document was being made invalid and forbidden. Innocent was completely rejecting the baronial documentation, whereas Alexander was simply freeing the king from observing the provisions without making any statement regarding their validity. Alexander’s approach was more measured than that of his predecessor. On the surface, each pope’s approach is in keeping with our modern interpretation of their characters. Alexander is remembered as a mild-mannered pope and a seeker of compromise, whereas Innocent is remembered as a more assertive pope who greatly advanced the authority and power of the papacy in secular matters. Yet, it is important to bear in mind that Innocent III was also the first papal overlord of the English king, and as such the first to use his position to address a baronial uprising in England. Moreover, Alexander had the benefit of hindsight – he would have known that Innocent’s annulment of Magna Carta had failed to resolve the matter, which culminated in civil war between the Crown and the English

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196 BL, Cotton MS Cleopatra E. I, fol. 213.
197 BL, Cotton MS Cleopatra E. I, fols 155–6.
198 Sayers, Papal Government, p. 100.
barons. It is therefore possible that he took a more temperate approach in his treatment of the baronial provisions, in an attempt to curtail any future attempts at civil war.

On 29 April 1261, Alexander ordered Boniface, archbishop of Canterbury, Simon Walton, bishop of Norwich (1258–1266), and Master John Mansel to absolve the prelates, magnates, members of the clergy, laity, and themselves, from oaths that were prejudicial to the king’s authority. He argued that certain prelates, magnates and other men had exacted these oaths from the king and his family ‘by a kind of compulsion’ to the ‘diminution and depression of the king’s power’. Those who opposed papal absolution would be constrained ‘by ecclesiastical censure’ without the ‘right of appeal’. There is no explicit mention of excommunication or interdict in this text. Shortly afterwards, on 7 May 1261, Alexander ordered the same three envoys to warn the barons, clergy and laity of the kingdom of England not to observe the provisions and to remain faithful to their king. In this letter, Alexander IV explicitly threatened excommunication and interdict on the lands of any who rejected these papal warnings.

In his annulment of Magna Carta, Innocent III had directly referred to the barons as vassals (vassali) who had gone against their lord king (dominus) and overlord, the pope. Moreover, he argued that John could not observe Magna Carta as the pope, his overlord, needed to give special mandate to grant this. In contrast, Alexander IV did not use the terms ‘lord and vassal’ in his letters. He stated that these barons were subjects (subditi) who should not bind their king to their judgement, but who should show ‘prompt fidelity’ and ‘obedience’ to his royal power. In contrast, Thomas Wykes (1222–1291) observed in his chronicle that the pope had absolved Henry from observing the baronial provisions because, as a vassal of the pope, the king had no right to take an oath of such importance without the ‘consent and will of the pope and his cardinals’. Clearly, Henry’s position

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200 In September 1215 King John wrote to the pope complaining of his barons who continue to rise up against him, and prevent him attending the Fourth Lateran Council, *Foedera*, I/1, pp. 138–9; Cheney, *Innocent III and England*, pp. 388–9.
202 Ibid.
203 Ibid.
204 TNA, SC 7/3/25; transcribed in *Foedera*, I/1, p. 406; and transcribed and translated in *DBM*, pp. 243–7. All three of these papal bulls of absolution did not arrive in England until May 1261, after Henry had managed to seize control of the ports of Dover and the Cinque ports from the barons, Ridgeway, ‘Henry III’, *ODNB*.
205 *Foedera*, I/1, pp. 135–6.
206 TNA, SC 7/3/25.
207 ‘Chronicle of Thomas Wykes’, *AM*, iv. p. 128: ‘Sine consensu et voluntate de Papae et cardinalibus ecclesiae Romanae, cujus vassallus Rex Angliae fore dinoiscitur, hujus momenti sacramentum praestare non
as a papal vassal was well known, and provided clear justification for papal intervention in this matter. However, the pope did not explicitly use this reasoning in the official correspondence. Alexander IV did not often make direct claims to papal power in reference to his relationship with the English king. Moreover, according to Wykes’ thirteenth-century chronicle, it was well known amongst the English that their king was a vassal of the pope, hence this justification was already implied. Instead, he portrayed his relationship with Henry as one of love and familial respect. The pope conveyed his feudal relationship with the king, through the language of their ‘special friendship’.

This is a rare example where Alexander was asserting his right to judge and intervene in secular matters, in order to end the king’s observance of these baronial provisions. He was arbitrating this case in the sense that he was making a decision regarding the king’s authority in England. In Alexander’s letters, he suggests that this absolution was made on account of his genuine respect and affection for the pious English king who, through ‘the sincerity of his Christian faith and the integrity of his Catholic devotion was recommended among the rest of Christian princes’. This has been questioned by Treherne, who argued that the pope only removed Henry’s observance of the Provisions of Oxford (1258) because he realised Henry would never be able to take up the Sicilian venture as long as these provisions remained in force. While Sicily would have influenced Alexander’s decision to absolve the king, it was not the primary factor, as by this point Alexander had effectively dissolved the Sicilian Business with Henry. In truth, if Alexander had not supported Henry’s royal authority and position, he would have gone against the terms of their feudal agreement. Moreover, he would have effectively legitimised challenges to his own position of power which was built on similar justifications of ‘celestial ordinance’. Thus, it was in Alexander’s interest to favour the king and re-confirm his royal power, as through this justification he could re-

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208 TNA, SC 7/3/25: ‘Quem inter ceteros Christianos principes fidei Christianae sinceritas, et catholice devotionis integritas recommendant’.
209 Treherne, Simón De Montfort and Baronial Reform, p. 105.
confirm his own justifications to papal power. Furthermore, on a more personal level, it is evident that the barons had not endeared the pope to their cause, they had insulted his position and gone against his orders (for example, when they instated Henry Wingham to the see of Winchester without the pope’s approval in 1259). Alexander shared a ‘special relationship’ with his vassal, the English king, whom he frequently praised above the other Christian princes; hence it is no surprise that the pope sided with the king on this matter.

Ultimately, Alexander had remained on Henry’s side throughout the Baronial Revolt, though he tried to remain sympathetic towards the rebels, encouraging them to seek forgiveness and favour with their king.211 If the English people did not respect the authority of the king, they could waver in their respect towards the authority of the pope. As sacerdotium et regnum, Alexander and Henry had to protect and confirm the rights and privileges of one another and uphold the ‘status quo’.

Conclusion

By the thirteenth century, canon law dictated that the pope was the supreme judge and arbiter mundi who had the right to intervene within secular disputes. However, each pope’s utilisation of this position varied from case to case and was determined by his own personality, education and ideology, the company he kept, as well as a number of external political, economic, and financial factors. Pope Alexander IV’s approach and demonstration of his role as mediator, arbitrator and judge differed somewhat from those of his immediate predecessors. In his correspondence with the English king, he did not readily employ grand canonical statements of papal power. Likewise, he did not openly exploit his status as overlord to justify his intervention throughout English secular disputes, although this was partly because his position as overlord was already understood and did not need to be reiterated. Furthermore, as these three case-studies have shown, his approach to these disputes varied in accordance with the specific and complex nature of each conflict.

Throughout the Sicilian Business the pope sought aid from his loyal son, Henry in return for the gift of Sicily. He presented himself as the mother and protector of Christendom who was seeking

211 On 25 February 1262, Urban IV confirmed Alexander IV’s letter of absolution. TNA, SC 7/33/4; transcribed in Foedera, I/1, p. 416. However, in October 1262 Simon de Montfort claimed that the pope had supported the Provisions of Oxford, John Maddicott, ‘Who was Simon de Montfort, Earl of Leicester?’ in Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, sixth series, 26 (Cambridge, 2016), pp. 43–58 (p. 54); Treharne, Baronial Revolt, p. 289.
to save the Christians of Sicily from Manfred and his ‘Saracens’. In truth, the pope was keen to remove the imperialist threat from his borders and to bring peace to the Italian provinces. Likewise, the king wanted to claim Sicily for his son to expand his continental territory and to encircle the French kingdom. As such, modern scholars, shaped in their interpretation by contemporary narrative sources, have agreed that the king and pope were friends and allies in this business, both keen to rid Sicily of Manfred for their own personal reasons.

The pope also played a key role in bringing about the Anglo-French peace known as the Treaty of Paris in 1259. In this matter he presented himself as a peacemaker of Christendom, who wanted to join the sons of Christ in peace and concord. In reality, he was acting as an unofficial mediator, encouraging the English king to seek and firm peace with France to allow him to focus his efforts on Sicily. He provided practical help through his envoy, Brother Mansuetus, who helped agree the terms of this treaty in 1258. The pope recognised, as many popes before him had, that for the English king to successfully wage a crusade against Manfred in Sicily, he would have to first secure peace with France. After encouraging and helping the king to initiate this lasting peace, the pope took a more responsive role in this treaty. Indeed, by 1258, he realised that the Sicilian Business was failing and as such he did not provide any more help towards this peace. However, the English king was still focused on Sicily to such an extent that he agreed severe concessions as part of this peace with France in 1259.

Throughout the English Baronial Revolt, the pope took a more authoritative position against the barons in his efforts to defend and protect papal and royal prerogatives in England. In his correspondence with the barons, he utilised more traditional canonical statements of papal power, like those made by his predecessors, to assert his position over them. Moreover, he was very cautious in his replies to their demands, making only conditional promises. Conversely, the pope was quick to respond to royal petitions for papal absolution from the provisions of Oxford and Westminster, asserting the papal and royal ‘plenitudo potestatis’ to further exert his and the king’s rightful position of power above the barons. Moreover, this pope advanced his right to arbitrate disputed episcopal elections.
Throughout these three case-studies, Alexander IV adapted his position and justification for papal involvement in each dispute. His diplomatic intervention and utilisation of papal prerogatives were always careful, calculated and suited to the particular situation. These studies have thus highlighted the pope’s flexible approach to his diplomatic role – as an arbiter, a mediator, and even an ally of the English king. When the Church’s interests, reputation and appointees were directly involved, the pope was more actively engaged. It must, however, be noted that he typically did not involve himself in these matters until directly petitioned for assistance by the king and his council – except in matters of extreme urgency, as we have seen with the commutation of Henry’s crusading vow to Sicily. The pope was limited in his capability to assist the English king in diplomatic and political affairs, and much of his power resided in his ability to persuade the secular authority to carry out papal wishes.

Ultimately, when discussing modes of papal intervention in English matters it is important to remember that, from the pope’s perspective, the interests of the Church were his main priority. When ecclesiastical interests and papal powers were threatened, the pope would respond more vehemently. When the pope defended the rights and position of the English king he was protecting and defending the power and authority of the two ruling bodies in Christendom – *Sacerdotium et Regnum*.

The following section will discuss the practice of diplomatic representation, exploring the agents who conducted and shaped the diplomatic exchanges between England and the papacy in the mid-thirteenth century. As this section forms such a large part of this study on diplomacy, it has been broken down into three chapters: Chapters Two, Three and Four, which will discuss different aspects of this practice.
Section Two

Chapter Two - Representation: The Modalities

International relations between medieval kings and popes have often been discussed as if they were being personally conducted by these rulers themselves. This was rarely the case – kings and popes did not often meet in person. Instead, they appointed a range of representatives and agents to carry out business on their behalf. Both secular and papal representatives were largely responsible for the practical management and implementation of their principal’s foreign policy.

As discussed in the Introduction to this thesis, from the mid-eleventh century, the papacy greatly increased its claims to power over both ecclesiastical and temporal matters which, among other things, led to a growing number of interactions between the papal curia and secular rulers. Consequently, there was a growth in the number of agents being appointed by the pope and the English king who were employed to carry out exchanges between these two polities.

Thanks to the number of surviving diplomatic records in European archives for the Later Middle Ages, particularly for England and the papacy, the scholarship has been able to explore in detail the role and function of diplomatic representatives for this period. Mattingly, Queller, Cuttino and Chaplais have all touched on the important contribution made by a growing number of diplomatic representatives and administrative agents. Plöger, Zutshi and Bombi have addressed the important role played by representatives throughout Anglo-papal diplomatic relations in the fourteenth century. For the thirteenth century, the practice of Anglo-papal representation has been addressed to some degree by Sayers. However, there has not been much detailed study regarding the conduct

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1 Sayers noted in particular the rapid growth of the papal judicial system, which attracting a greater number of petitioners and their agents to the curia, Sayers, *Papal Judges-Delegate*, pp. 2–3. See also Zutshi, ‘Petitioners, Popes, Proctors’, pp. 265–93.
of Anglo-papal representation in the mid-thirteenth century. As such, this chapter will shed new light
on how this practice was developing in the first half of the thirteenth century, up to 1261.

Following the rediscovery of Roman law, thirteenth-century canon lawyers worked to
redefine the roles of envoys through canon law. In his Speculum legatorum, the leading French
canonist, Gulielmus Durandus (1230–1293), asserted that:

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\text{legatus est seu dici potest, quicumque ab alicubi missus est... sive a principe, vel a}
\text{papa ad alios... sive ab aliqua civitate, vel provinciam ad principem vel ad alium...}
\]
\[
\text{sed et nuncii, quos apud nos hostes mittunt, legati dicuntur, quorum legatorum}
\text{causa sancta res est.}^{5}
\]

Similarly, in his Summa Aurea, Henry of Susa, known as Hostiensis (1200–1271), agreed that ‘a
legate is, or could be called, anyone sent by another for the purpose of legation’.\(^6\) These two
descriptions from Durandus and Hostiensis perfectly encapsulate the ambiguity, complexity and
flexibility surrounding positions accorded to both papal and secular envoys in the thirteenth century.
A deeper analysis is therefore necessary for a more comprehensive understanding of the roles and
activities of these representatives in the thirteenth century.

The aim of this chapter is to use the available evidence to highlight the general methods and
procedures associated with the practice of representation between England and the papacy in the first
half of the thirteenth century. This will include an examination of the individuals involved in this
process and the capacities through which they operated. This chapter highlights the role played by
these Anglo-papal representatives, exploring, amongst other things, the different types of
representative and agent involved in these diplomatic communications, the practical issues which
might be faced by those travelling between England and the papacy, and finally, how they were
repaid and rewarded for their services.

**English and Papal Representatives and Agents in the Thirteenth Century**

By the thirteenth century, a range of representatives and agents were involved in the conduct
and management of diplomatic relations between England and the papacy. As Bombi has argued,

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5 Guillemus Durandus, ‘De legatis’, in De Legatis et Legationibus Tractus Varii, ed. Vladimír
Émmanuilovich Grabar (Dorpat, 1906), p. 32.
6 Hostiensis, Summa Aurea (Venice, 1574), lib. 1, col. 317: ‘Quicumque ab alicubi mittitur, legatus dici potest
de legationibus’.
these representatives and agents were involved to ‘different degrees’ in these missions. There were representatives who were appointed to engage in the physical management and delivery of these missions. Some agents facilitated these exchanges in an administrative capacity, preparing and producing correspondence at the English or papacy chancery, while others promoted their employer’s business at court through more unofficial channels of communication. This chapter will primarily focus on the roles of representatives and agents who physically travelled between England and the papacy, while the administrative officials will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Five.

In preparation for a foreign mission, representatives would be appointed to form an embassy, namely, a team of officials who worked together to carry out an assignment on behalf of their principal. This embassy would then travel to the court of the recipient to present their credentials on behalf of their master and carry out their assigned duties. In the first half of the thirteenth century, there were no resident ambassadors like those identified by Mattingly and Queller for the fifteenth century. Instead, envoys were chosen on an ad hoc basis to act as ‘part-time’ agents and to carry out the assigned mandates authorised by their master in accordance with their specific mission. As such, the length of time which they could be employed on a mission could vary depending on the assignment itself.

Embassies could comprise of a variety of individuals who performed different functions. Broadly speaking, an embassy consisted of representatives, appointed by official English or papal correspondence, who had been chosen to act in accordance with the powers and duties assigned to them in their mandate/s for this mission. These representatives were accompanied by subdelegates, who were not often named within the official correspondence but who assisted in the day-to-day management and administration of the mission. Moreover, they could hire external agents to carry out particular duties on a mission, which required the intervention of someone with a specific set of expertise. They could also appeal to members of the recipient’s court to assist in a more unofficial

7 Bombi, Anglo-Papal Relations, p. 102.
8 Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, pp. 61–78; Queller, Office of Ambassador, pp. 60–84.
9 Cuttino, English Diplomatic Administration, p. 95; Queller, Office of Ambassador, p. 157.
capacity. Official diplomatic representatives were assigned with the powers to carry out certain duties on their patron’s behalf. The powers and duties granted to each representative were fundamentally shaped in accordance with the requirements of each assignment.

Representatives could engage in a variety of activities in accordance with the powers and duties listed in their mandates. Prior to their mission, English and papal envoys were entrusted with a number of documents connected to their assignment. There is some variation in the types of document authorised to English and papal envoys. Regardless, they would all receive instructions, or a mandate of appointment, which laid out the powers and duties accorded to them as part of their mission. Unfortunately, very few of these original documents have survived as they were usually destroyed after a mission was completed. In some cases, the content of these mandates has only survived because they were copied into contemporary chronicles or English chancery enrolment series. Envoys would also carry letters of credence, intended for their recipient, which assured the recipient of their credentials and authorised them to act on their sender’s behalf. These may have been incorporated into political letters authorised by their sender, which usually comprised of petitions from the king or responses to petitions from the pope. Furthermore, they carried letters of ‘safe-conduct’ ensuring safe passage on their journey and effectively providing them with diplomatic immunity while travelling to their destination. They would receive a letter of ‘safe-conduct’ from their principal for the out-going mission, and a second one from the recipient of their mission for their return journey. English envoys who had been assigned with powers to negotiate would also carry letters of procurations, which authorised them to present items ‘viva voce’ at court, using their own initiative to verbally convey the wishes of the king and to make decisions on his behalf, which he would ratify after the mission – rarely did these letters explicitly state how oral messages should be conveyed by envoys to their recipient.

While envoys could undertake a wide range of diplomatic missions in accordance with their specific mandates, broadly speaking, there were three main types of mission. Firstly, those addressing

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12 For example, a list of instructions to Henry’s envoys going to the papal curia in 1257 was enrolled see CPR, 1247–58, pp. 567–8; Foedera, I/1, p. 360.
13 Bombi, Anglo-Papal Relations, p. 57; Chaplais, Diplomatic Practice, pp. 211–14; Plöger, England and the Avignon Popes, p. 185.
important diplomatic matters (e.g. to negotiate the terms of an agreement), or which facilitated a ceremonial occasion (e.g. an act of homage, excommunication or coronation), which have been referred to by the historiography as ‘solemn embassies’. There were also those which dealt with more routine matters or which were preparing the way for more important diplomatic missions. Finally, there were those which engaged in more secretive business. These different types of mission will be discussed throughout the following sections on English and papal agents.

Having highlighted some general trends regarding diplomatic embassies in the thirteenth century, it is important to take a closer look at these Anglo-papal missions in the first half of the thirteenth century, in order to gain a greater understanding of how these missions were being conducted and managed. Historians have tended to examine English and papal diplomatic representation separately, so the following two sections have been separated accordingly. The first will explore the role of English representatives at the curia and the second will investigate the roles of papal representatives at the English royal court.

**English Representatives and Agents at the Papal Curia**

For the Early medieval period, there is a particular lack of documentary evidence and a greater reliance on oral diplomatic communication, and as such little is known about the duties and conduct of envoys and agents during this time. All that can be inferred regarding this period is that the terminology surrounding appointments of representatives was more flexible due to the lack of official documentation or existence of centralised, bureaucratic structures of government. Only from the late twelfth century onwards is there evidence of European diplomatic records being logged more rigorously and consistently, particularly in England, the Italian cities, and at the papal curia. This increasing presence of documentation prompted a selection of twentieth-century scholars, most prominently Mattingly, Queller, Cuttino and Chaplais, to study medieval diplomacy, particularly engaging with the practice of diplomatic representation between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries. Mattingly primarily focused on Italian and Venetian sources from the fourteenth and fifteenth

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century, while Queller explored Italian, English and Flemish sources from the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries. In contrast, Chaplais and Cuttino focused on the comparison of English and French sources from the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Each study has sought to explain certain classifications and faculties which they have assigned to different groups of medieval envoys. For the thirteenth century, they have broadly agreed that there were two main categories of representative: the nuncii and the procuratores.\(^{17}\) Mattingly, Cuttino and Chaplais have agreed that, in accordance with Roman law, a nuncius was essentially a messenger sent in the place of a letter to relay a message, while Queller proposed that a nuncius also had the power to negotiate terms which could then be referred to his principal for approval.\(^{18}\) Essentially, these historians have agreed that ‘the power of a nuncius to bind his lord was strictly limited.’\(^{19}\) Yet, they cannot agree on the ways in which it was limited, or when these roles became standardised.

The scholarship has generally agreed that a procurator was someone who had the power to exercise their own will in negotiations on behalf of their principal and who could be empowered to conclude these matters.\(^{20}\) Chaplais has argued that a procurator was a specific type of envoy ‘who had been appointed by a letter of procuration’. A procurator could also be referred to as a nuncius, but an envoy carrying only an oral message could not be called a procurator because he did not have a letter of procuration.\(^{21}\) Mattingly argued that from the fourteenth century, the title ambassiator came to replace that of procurator to denote a diplomatic envoy with powers to negotiate.\(^{22}\) Chaplais agreed that the term ambassiator came into use in England from the fourteenth century, arguing that this was a ‘non-technical term’ used to describe both a procurator and a bearer of an oral message,

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17 Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, pp. 30–1. Mattingly mentioned the greater use of the title nuncius instead of legatus to describe leading papal agents. Queller, ‘Thirteenth-Century Diplomatic Envoys’, 196. In a brief study regarding thirteenth-century diplomatic personnel, Queller observed that the titles of ‘legate’ and ‘ambassador’ were rarely employed at this time, instead ‘nuncio and procurator’ were the two terms associated with diplomatic representatives from the thirteenth century.


but not a letter-bearer. Furthermore, Chaplais noted that, for England, the titles ‘nuncii solempnes’ and from the fourteenth century, ‘ambassiatores solempnes’, were used to denote envoys of high-status, while the title ‘nuncii simplices’ was used to describe lower-ranking representatives such as clerks and knights. In general, the scholarship has been too prescriptive in its understanding of the medieval terminology which has been based on limited evidence, primarily from Italian and English sources from the Later Middle Ages. Indeed, Benham has readdressed this question for the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, concluding that ‘by making a strict legal definition between nuncii and procuratores, historians may be glossing over some of the subtleties of medieval international politics’.

Evidently, too much emphasis has been placed on attempts to sort representatives into clearly defined categories, rather than focusing on the roles and powers accorded to them on a case by case basis. Moreover, there has been little attempt to explore the roles of English agents engaging in diplomatic business with the papacy in the thirteenth century. Hence, the remaining aim of this section is to highlight the more flexible and fluid nature and roles of English representatives on diplomatic missions to the papal curia.

In the second half of the twelfth century and the first half of the thirteenth century, there was a notable increase in the number of embassies travelling between England and Rome. In particular, the Close and Patent Rolls have provided evidence for a range of letters relating to English diplomatic embassies to the papal curia. Similarly, contemporary chronicles provide another rich source regarding a number of these embassies abroad.

Typically, the official diplomatic correspondence named between one and six individuals as English envoys. These envoys were often either high-status individuals – specifically prelates and magnates, royal administrators and/or household officials, members of religious orders, and in some cases, they held a combination of these roles. These types of envoy will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Three through a number of case studies. Traditionally, missions which discussed important diplomatic matters or which entailed a key ceremonial occasion such as an act of homage

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23 Queller stated that, broadly speaking, all envoys in Europe were nuncii, Office of Ambassadors, p. 5. According to Chaplais, the word ambassiator was not used in England until 1300, Chaplais, Diplomatic Practice, p. 153.
or coronation, were headed up by one or more high-status individuals deemed worthy enough to represent the powers and dignity of their sender.\textsuperscript{26} Indeed, Chaplais argued certain English diplomatic duties were ‘reserved for envoys of high-rank’.\textsuperscript{27} In some cases, having the appropriate status could dictate the success or failure of a mission. If the leading negotiator did not have the appropriate ceremonial status and powers required of his mandate, he could be rejected by the recipient of the mission. The high-status envoy leading this mission did not necessarily have to be skilled in the ‘technical side of diplomacy’ as they would be assisted by a staff of administrators who carried out these practical duties.\textsuperscript{28} These important diplomatic and ceremonial embassies – ‘solemn embassies’ – provided the chance for the king to demonstrate his wealth and grandeur throughout the procession itself. A famous example of an important English lay embassy is that of the royal Chancellor, Thomas Becket, who went on mission to France in 1158 to ask Louis VII to agree to a marriage alliance between his daughter Marguerite and the English Prince, Henry (1155–1183). According to the \textit{Vita Sancti Thomae} written by one of Becket’s clerks, William Fitz Stephen, Becket departed for France with an entourage of at least two hundred members of his household, including knights, clerks, stewards, servants, esquires, as well as sons of noblemen serving him in arms. This extravagant embassy travelled with eight wagons pulled by five war horses and accompanied by dogs, and birds of all kind.\textsuperscript{29} This highly lavish embassy was intended to demonstrate richness of the English realm and the wealth of the English king to the French. According to FitzStephen, the French who saw it said: ‘if the Chancellor of England travels in such splendour what must the king be like?’\textsuperscript{30} Becket’s embassy was one of the most highly expensive and splendorous on record, and it clearly highlights the importance of the performance within diplomatic missions abroad in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Important ceremonial embassies engaged with both the performative and practical side of diplomacy as and when required. It is also clear from this example that high-status diplomatic representatives at least, could appoint their own men to act as part of their embassy. Yet, ultimately, this type of embassy would have been highly impractical for a more routine mission carrying out

\textsuperscript{27} Chaplais, \textit{Diplomatic Practice}, p. 156.
\textsuperscript{28} Cuttino, \textit{English Diplomatic Administration}, p. 140.
\textsuperscript{30} \textit{Materials for the History of Thomas Becket}, iii. p. 31: ‘mirabilis est ipse rex Anglorum, cuis cancellarius talis et tatus incedit.’
business which needed to prioritise speed and practical ability over these more performative elements.

English embassies appointed to deal with more routine matters or intended to prepare the groundwork for more important diplomatic embassies would have typically consisted of a small group of envoys led by trusted royal administrators or household officials. These smaller embassies might be required to communicate a message or deliver a payment. For example, in early 1257, Master Rostand and Artaldo de Sancto Romano were appointed to deliver letters to Simon de Montfort and Peter of Savoy in France ordering them to undertake an important diplomatic mission to the papal curia. Their main priority was to travel swiftly to France, to locate Montfort and Savoy at the court in Paris, and to encourage them to accept these orders from the king to go to Rome. Similarly, clerks were often appointed to deliver messages regarding business which was still ongoing at either the papal or royal courts. For example, in 1259 the archbishop of Embrun had sent unnamed clerks to the king to communicate the status of business, being discussed on behalf of the king, at the papal curia.

There is still some dispute amongst historians regarding the type of envoys chosen for diplomatic missions in the thirteenth century. Benham has argued that for England and Denmark the majority of royal diplomatic embassies before 1220 were headed by ‘people of high-status’, even in cases where a simple message bearer was required, because they were seen as suitable representatives of the person or powers of their master. Equally, Church noted that from the early thirteenth century, King John begun to employ household officials to carry out diplomatic missions on his behalf. Arguably, John’s choices of envoys were impacted by the changing political circumstances. During his reign, John had become engaged in a lengthy dispute with his magnates and prelates regarding accusations of his abuses of royal power, which led to the issue of Magna Carta granting barons and prelates more rights and freedoms from royal power. As such, these ‘independent-minded’ magnates and prelates who had their own grievances against the Crown were not the most appropriate figures

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32 *Foedera*, I/1, pp. 360–1.
33 *CPR, 1258–66*, p. 51.
for positions as diplomatic representatives.\textsuperscript{35} Indeed, there is evidence that King John appointed lower-status royal officials to represent his position in certain foreign matters. One example of this was the appointment of the household knights Thomas Erdington and Geoffrey Luttrel, along with the Abbot of Beaulieu, a Cistercian monastery of royal foundation, to act as his leading representatives at the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215.\textsuperscript{36} Benham has criticised Church for arguing that King John favoured the use of knights and clerks as envoys, stating that there are many cases where this was not the standard format of an English embassy.\textsuperscript{37} Yet, when determining who was appointed or why they were appointed on a particular mission, one must always look to the wider historical context. For example, Church noted that there were three regions in particular where John appointed his household knights more frequently as his envoys: Poitou, the papal curia, and Germany and the Low Countries.\textsuperscript{38} For the papal curia, this was certainly the case when John was trying to put his case against the barons.\textsuperscript{39} On this occasion, he could not have sent his magnates as they were the ones he was petitioning against. Household officials were the most trusted of the king’s officials as ‘they owed everything to the largesse of their master’, and could better explain the wishes of the king without seeking his advice.\textsuperscript{40} Indeed, they were particularly well suited for these missions to the papacy as they were carrying out more secretive and sensitive business against the king’s barons.

When Henry III came to power, he faced similar resistance from his barons, and some prelates, particularly from those who objected to the Sicilian Business. As such, the king had to rely more heavily on lower-status individuals, as well as a number of loyal English and foreign prelates, who would engage in this business faithfully and diligently on his behalf, as will be argued further in Chapter Three. Ultimately, ‘what any medieval prince foremostly required from his envoys and mediators was not political inventiveness but the ability to carry out his wishes fully’.\textsuperscript{41} It was the envoy’s trustworthiness and ability to make a journey which mattered the most.

\textsuperscript{35} Stephen D. Church, \textit{The Household Knights of King John} (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 63–5.
\textsuperscript{36} CM, ii, p. 633.
\textsuperscript{37} Benham, \textit{Peacemaking}, p. 132.
\textsuperscript{38} Church, \textit{Household Knights of King John}, pp. 63–5.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., pp. 63–4.
\textsuperscript{41} Church, \textit{Household Knights of King John}, p. 67; \textit{Chronicles of the Election of Hugh Abbot}, pp. 162–3.
As discussed, diplomatic representatives who had been appointed through the official correspondence rarely acted alone. They were accompanied by a range of sub-delegates, who played a crucial role within the running of the mission. On important missions, high-status diplomatic envoys often relied on an entourage of skilled clerks, proctors and scribes to help undertake the practical duties of their mission. They were also accompanied by members of their household and a military entourage. They acted like more of a figurehead, chosen to ensure the embassy was accepted by the recipient.

It has often proved difficult to identify the sub-delegates of a particular mission as their names were not written in the official correspondence and hence their roles have been distinctly absent from the historiography. To identify these individuals, one often has to look through the chancery rolls series for grants of ‘simple protection’ and ‘safe-conduct’, or for mandates awarding payments for service. For example, the king made grants of ‘simple protection’ for three of Master Rostand’s sub-delegates, namely Robert de Brandebry, Thomas Dru, and Gacellinus Galardi, who were accompanying him on a mission to the papal curia in June 1256. Likewise, protection was granted for Walter de Camera and Geoffrey Picot of Aldenham, when they joined the abbot of Westminster on this same mission to the papal curia. Outside of these grants of protection, there is little evidence that these clerks ever existed, and yet they must have assisted in the management of each mission. Because these agents were effectively appointed by the king’s representatives and not by the king, their names were absent from the official correspondence. Ultimately, the surviving documentary evidence tells us little about the actual roles or functions of these sub-delegates, but their contribution was essential to the successful day-to-day management of each embassy.

Curial Proctors

Proctors, working at the papal curia on behalf of the English Crown since at least the early thirteenth century, were particularly essential in communications between England and the papacy.

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42 Cuttino, English Diplomatic Administration, p. 140.
43 ‘Letters of protection guaranteed against the unlawful interference with their property in England while they were away’ and against other legal actions, Chaplais, Diplomatic Practice, p. 219. Payments to envoys will be discussed on pp. 109–22.
44 Simple protection was also granted for Peter Rancon, rector of the church of Bryington, going with Master Rostand to the court of Rome in 1257, CPR, 1247–58, pp. 478, 559.
45 CPR, 1247–58, p. 479.
In the twelfth and the early thirteenth century, only high-status individuals or groups could be represented by proctors at the papal curia. Pope Innocent III, however, relaxed this rule to permit all petitioners to appeal to the pope through proctors.46 By the early thirteenth century, all petitioners and their representatives, appealing at the papal curia had to adhere to the curial diplomatic and administrative practice (the so-called stylus curie) when conveying written and verbal messages at the papal curia. While formularies existed to assist petitioners compose supplications, they could also appoint a professional agent who had experience working with the curia’s administrative, legal, diplomatic and ceremonial practices, to address their business to the curia.47

By the mid-thirteenth century, there were two types of proctor working at the papal court. The first type was either an agent sent by a petitioner to represent their business at the papal curia or a ‘notaries public’, a freelancer who assisted curial staff in different departments; the second type was the general proctor, a resident proctor at the curia who represented the interests of a particular religious order (although not all religious orders had general proctors at this stage).48 From the mid-fourteenth century there is evidence of resident proctors representing secular rulers at the papal curia.49 This led Mattingly and Queller to argue that the appointment of resident proctors at the curia was the precursor to the appointment of resident ambassadors in the fifteenth century.50 This has been challenged by Bombi who has instead argued that it was the general proctors, acting as resident proctors for religious orders at the papal curia from at least the mid-thirteenth century, who were the original forerunners of resident ambassadors.51

The duties of these proctors were defined through specific letters of procurations (procuratorium) granted to them by their petitioner.52 In theory, proctors were allowed up to two years to carry out their mandate at the papal curia, although some proctors conducted business at the

47 Zutshi, ‘Petitions to the Pope in the Fourteenth Century’, 86.
52 Ibid., p. 104.
papal curia for longer than two years after having their appointment renewed. Moreover, general proctors were employed on a more permanent basis than other proctors. The roles of proctors could vary widely depending on the curial department involved, but generally speaking they could be appointed: *ad negotia*, to negotiate financial or diplomatic business; *ad impetrandum*, when they were involved in the issuing of papal letters; and *ad causas/ad litem*, when they engaged in litigation at the papal court.\(^5^3\) As Sayers argued, their roles were essentially ‘to seek letters of grace granting confirmations, favours and indults, and to impetrare the necessary documents in a lawsuit’.\(^5^4\) They were responsible for the reception of papal documents relating to their mandated duties at the curia although, after receiving these documents, they were not necessarily entrusted to deliver them to their employer.\(^5^5\) Proctors were in a position to advise their clients on how to proceed with their case and whether it would be successful. Moreover, they often developed their own unofficial networks of friends and associates at the curia which they could use to their advance to push the case of their clients.\(^5^6\) Their actions could largely determine the success or failure of a petition.

Since at least the early thirteenth century, proctorial endorsements began to appear on the back of certain letters issued by the papal chancery.\(^5^7\) They can be located in the top centre of the letter dorse. In the early thirteenth century, proctors typically endorsed letters with either their initial letters, or certain symbols, whereas, by the mid-thirteenth century, the number of proctors at the curia had risen to such an extent that it became necessary for them to write their names in full, or sometimes in part, on the back of these letters.\(^5^8\) Many of the proctors who endorsed papal documentation intended for the English king do not appear elsewhere in the records. One individual in particular, Capud Leonis, assisted in the drafting and issuing of many letters, requesting payments from the English to be made to the papacy. Cheney argued that Capud was a proctor *‘ad impetrandum’*, but the evidence reveals that he dealt with letters requesting payments from the English, suggesting he

\(^{53}\) Ibid., pp. 104–5.
\(^{55}\) Ibid., p. 162.
\(^{57}\) Plöger, *England and the Avignon Popes*, p. 86.
\(^{58}\) According to Sayers, ‘the first clear endorsement appears on a bull for King John, dated 15 April 1214 at St Peter’s Rome, and was made by a proctor called Thomas’, Sayers, ‘Proctors representing British interests at the Papal court, 1198–1415’, p. 143.
was working *ad negotia*. Even though Capud endorsed a significant number of letters concerning payments, there is little evidence regarding his life and career outside of these endorsements. It is possible that he was an Italian professional proctor who had been hired to act as the king’s proctor at Rome, as argued by Cheney who maintained that Capud must have been ‘well known in the curia’. 

Cheney has questioned whether ‘the endorsement indicates the official proctor *ad impetrandum* or simply the recipient of the sealed engrossment for delivery’. Likewise, Sayers stated that only ‘in some instances’ did these marks denote the proctor ‘who sought the issue of this document’. In one example, the name of John Colonna, archbishop of Messina, is endorsed on the back of a papal letter giving him credence to go on a diplomatic mission to the English king. In this case, Colonna was the recipient of a sealed letter and not the proctor of the case. Likewise, Cheney has highlighted a number of other examples from the mid-thirteenth century which suggest that the use of proctorial endorsements was not yet a consistent or standardised practice.

According to Cuttino, semi-permanent representatives had been residing at the papal curia on behalf of the English king since at least the beginning of Henry III’s reign. These representatives were most likely proctors working on behalf of the English Crown. In contrast, Sayers has argued that professional Italian proctors were more commonly appointed in the thirteenth century because they knew more about curial practice, whereas English freelance proctors became more frequently appointed in the fourteenth century. The king’s envoys could also hire agents to assist in their duties after they arrived at the curia. For example, in 1258–1259, the king’s envoys, the archbishop of Tarentaise, Master Rostand and Master John Clarel, wrote to the king, informing him that they had appointed Master Angelus Romanus as an advocate to help petition the king’s case at Rome.

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62 Ibid., p. 19.
64 The endorsement itself simply reads ‘Messanii’, TNA, SC 7/3/12. See Appendix A.
Angelus was probably a papal clerk. He was appointed on several occasions to conduct business on behalf of the English Crown.  

There is evidence, however, that the English king appointed a range of royal administrators as freelance proctors at the papal court between 1240 and 1263. For example, between 1240 and 1244, the Italian canonist, Hostiensis, had served at the papal curia as the king’s proctor. Hostiensis was a Savoyard, who had probably arrived in England around 1236 as part of the entourage of fellow Savoyard William, bishop-elect of Valence. In England he held the post as a royal clerk from at least 1243 and was also a papal chaplain. Freelance proctors like Hostiensis could have several clients at the same time. Indeed, in January 1244 Hostiensis had been ordered by Pope Innocent IV to promote his cause in the churches of Winchester, Norwich and Bath. Hostiensis was an expert in canon law who had detailed knowledge of curial legal and administrative processes, which allowed him to support the king’s business at Rome. Much like Hostiensis, Master Roger Lovell, king’s treasurer between c.1253–c.1259 and chaplain to Cardinal John of Toledo, served as the king’s proctor between 1250 and 1256 and again between 1261 and 1263. Master Finatus (Fuligmo) of Savoy, papal subdeacon, served between 1254 and 1260, and Robert de Baro, nobleman, served between 1255 and 1260.

These freelance proctors could have personal connections to their petitioners. For example, one papal letter dated 12 October 1255, which ordered the pope’s nuncio, Master Bernard of Siena, not to collect the tenth in England or Scotland for the fellows of Rainald and Tholomeus and Scottus Dominicus, the pope’s bankers, until full payment has been made to Roland Bonsignoris and other

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69 In 1260 Angelus was appointed as a proctor alongside Robert de Baro to prosecute appeals against the restitution of Aymer to his bishopric, CPR, 1258–66, p. 114.
71 TNA, SC 7/20/3; CPR, 1232–47, pp. 241, 274, 373, 375, 409, 411, 417. Hostensis marked the dorsa as ‘mag[iste]r h’. See Appendix B.
74 Foedera, i/1, p. 256.
merchants of Siena, is endorsed by ‘Bartholomew the merchant’. Bartholomew was probably a Sienese merchant representing his company as a proctor ad negotia in this matter at the papal curia. Similarly, Peter d’Aigueblanche, bishop of Hereford, who will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Two, appointed Master Finatus of Savoy, papal sub-deacon, along with Robert de Baro, nobleman, to remain at the papal curia as the king’s proctors following his mission to the papal curia in 1254–1255. As part of Aigueblanche’s mission he had promised money from the English church to repay the merchant-bankers. Finatus and de Baro were primarily hired as proctors ad negotia to ensure that these repayments went smoothly. However, they became engaged in a range of business on behalf of the king while at the papal curia, including matters touching Ireland. Aigueblanche had personal links to the Savoy family, and Finatus, who sometimes signed his name ‘Finatus of Savoy’ was also a member of the Savoy family, which undoubtedly influenced his appointment. Moreover, Finatus already held the title of papal sub-deacon, and as such had experience with curial administration, making him well placed to act as a proctor on behalf of the English king. While little is known about Robert de Baro, we have learnt above that he also had experience working within the papal curia prior to his appointment by Aigueblanche. Lunt argued that Finatus was the king’s ‘permanent proctor’ at the curia, however, it seems more fitting to describe both Finatus and Baro as semi-permanent curial proctors, as in accordance with the rules of curial procuratio they could not remain at their posts indefinitely.

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76 TNA, SC 7/3/44. See Appendix C.
77 CR, 1254–6, p. 211; CPR, 1247–58, p. 450; Foedera, I/1, p. 332. Queller, ‘Diplomatic ‘Blanks’’, p. 486. This meant that the bishop could return to England to communicate the agreed business and to conduct his other pastoral and political duties. Robert de Baro was a noble man, Epistolae saeculi XIII e regestis pontificum Romanorum selectae, ed. K. Rodenberg. MGH, 3 vols (Berlin, 1883–94), iii. nos. 443, 461.
78 Finatus endorsed the back of a letter to the king stating that when the feast of the Translation of St Edward falls on a Saturday, the king was still allowed to eat flesh, even though he had made a vow abstaining from eating meat on Saturdays, 11 June 1256, TNA, SC 7/3/10. Similarly, Finatus endorsed a document which assigned three prelates to posts as the new leading collectors of the crusading tax (following Rostand’s removal from this post), 4 October 1257, SC 7/2/23. Finatus endorsed the back of a document sending Master Arlot to negotiate the terms of the Sicilian Business, 12 December 1257, SC 7/2/22. Finatus endorsed the back of a papal letter with either ‘Finatus’ or ‘Finatus de Savoy’. See Appendix D.
80 For Aigueblanche’s Savoy connections see p. 130.
81 Finatus was still resident as a curial proctor in 1258. Indeed, Master Arlot had promised the king that the pope would authorise Finatus ‘to pledge the unpaid tenth of the churches and manors belonging to the English archbishops and bishops to certain merchants’ if he complied with certain papal demands, Lunt, Financial relations, i. p. 279.
For the thirteenth century, the *procuratoria*, meaning the letters of procuration relating to these appointments, have rarely survived. Yet, there is evidence of at least one document, dated 1 April 1257, addressed to Pope Alexander IV and relaying the *procuratorium* made to Robert Baro, Finatus Fuligmo (of Savoy), and Peter Ranconio, king’s clerk. In this document, the king awarded them ‘power and special mandate to impetrate, oppose, urge, defend and specifically to fight against an election, which is said to have been made in the Church of […]’. This document is damaged and so the name of the church is unknown, however, it was probably referring to the disputed bishopric election at Ely. This document reveals the formulae within a *procuratorium* appointing a proctor to act on behalf of his petitioner. In this case, the proctors had been entrusted to impetrate a legal case on behalf of the king.

When the baronial council took control of royal government in April-May 1258, they too made use of proctorial appointments. They sent Master Richard de Gorono, king’s clerk, as a proctor to appeal against the actions of the papal nuncio, Brother Velascus, who as pointed out in Chapter One, had been appointed to reinstate Aymer de Lusignan, and stop him proceeding any further against the king or the realm. It is unclear whether Richard had the appropriate experience or expertise to undertake this position. He was requested to work alongside Finatus and Baro, the king’s ‘semi-permanent’ proctors at Rome, and Angelus Romanus, advocate, in this appeal against Velascus, suggesting that Richard needed support from these skilled professionals in order to carry out the barons’ requests. Ultimately, this case was unsuccessful and the barons’ control over English matters at the curia was short-lived. In the spring of 1261, the king appointed Roger Lovell and Robert de Baro as his proctors at the court of Rome, and all other procurations were revoked. This was aimed at nullifying the orders of any proctors working towards baronial causes. These two proctors then worked to procure the papal bull from Alexander IV. The bull itself instructed the

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82 TNA, E 30/1061; transcribed in *Foedera*, I/1, p. 354, ‘Robertum de Baro, Finatum de Fuligmo, Petrum de Ranconio, clericum nostrum, procuratores nostros constituimus. Dantes eis et eorum cuilibet potestatem et speciale mandatum impetrandi contradicendi, agendi, defendendi et specialiter impugnandi electionem, quae dicitur esse factam in ecclesia . . . . eiusdem ecclesiae’. This document was probably a draft, as it has survived as a small slip in the National Archives and does not contain any of the official markings of a diplomatic letter of procuration.

83 This election is discussed by Walter Ullmann in ‘The Disputed Election of Hugh Balsham, Bishop of Ely’, *The Cambridge Historical Journal*, 9 (1949), 259–68.

84 *CPR*, 1258–66, p. 113. For more on Velascus’ mission see pp. 59–60.


archbishop of Canterbury, Master John Mansel and Simon Walton, bishop of Norwich, to carry out these papal demands, but it was Roger Lovell and Robert de Baro who had impetrated the pope and his cardinals for this bull. Furthermore, in a letter to Henry III, dated 14 May 1262, Roger Lovell commended masters Rostand and Arlot for their efforts to secure an oath from Alexander IV in 1261 absolving Henry from his oath to the magnates. Jobson credits Master John Mansel for seeking help from Master Rostand and Master Arlot while at the curia. Clearly, the work of proctors at the curia was imperative to the success or failure of English petitions.

It is important to bear in mind that those chosen as proctors could be appointed to a range of different positions on a part-time basis. Hostiensis had performed duties as both a clerk, proctor and a diplomatic envoy, particularly through his position as the archbishop of Embrun (1250–1262). Master Rostand served the English king as a clerk, proctor and diplomatic envoy between 1255 and 1261. Similarly, between 1276 and 1291, Stephen of San Giorgio performed duties as a clerk, proctor, and diplomatic envoy of the English Crown at the papal curia. There is a clear link between these three types of appointment. They required someone with a similar set of skills, and there was not always a clear separation or distinction between those who took up proctorial roles at the papal curia and those who acted as diplomatic envoys, apart from the fact that proctors had broader powers and fewer ceremonial duties than diplomatic envoys.

Unofficial Networks at the Papal Curia

As we have seen, petitioners could appoint freelance proctors to assist their case at the curia – to advise, to help write petitions and to ensure said petitions passed successfully through the papal administration. Yet, as Chapter One has briefly demonstrated, it also benefitted the petitioner and their proctors to have contacts on the inside, members of the curial administration who could help advance their petitions through the appropriate channels. According to Plöger and more recently, Bombi, English proctors and diplomatic envoys developed a number of ‘informal networks of friends and protégés who were willing to support English requests at the papal curia’ during the fourteenth

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87 Royal Letters, ii. p. 209.
89 For Hostiensis’ diplomatic duties as archbishop of Embrun see also pp. 141, 153–154, 156, 211, 215–16.
century. Similarly, in the mid-thirteenth century there is evidence of informal networks of allies supporting English requests at the papal curia. One group with whom the English king and his representatives found particular favour at the papal curia, was the cardinals. On 20 May 1259 Henry had thanked seven of Alexander IV’s cardinals for their support and assistance in promoting the continuation of the Sicilian Business on his behalf at the papal curia, after the pope had effectively abandoned this endeavour in December 1258. The cardinals had been approached by Henry’s envoys and proctors at Rome and urged to give their support in this matter. This was not the first time the cardinals had been found promoting the English king’s interests at the papal curia. Several cardinals in particular were well disposed to the English.

Pietro Capocci, Cardinal deacon of St George’s in Velabro (1244–1259), proved a great advocate of the English king at the papal curia, particularly in matters linked to Sicily. In April 1258, Henry III thanked him for promoting the business of Sicily at the papal curia and for expending 2000 marks towards this business, which the king promised he would reimburse after his son had claimed the throne in Sicily. From this point, Capocci was understandably invested in the success of this business. Moreover, on 1 August 1258 the king addressed letters close to Capocci, as well as ‘other friends of the king at the curia’ asking to show favour and give credence to the archbishops of Tarentaise and Embrun and Master Rostand, whom the king was sending to the papal curia on matters linked to Sicily. This cardinal was assisting the English king in an unofficial capacity, spending his own money in aid of war in Sicily. Capocci himself had been keen for a long time to free Sicily and the surrounding Italian provinces from the Imperialists. He had served as a pontifical rector of the Duchy of Spoleto and March of Ancona as well as papal legate in Sicily in 1249 and his army had been defeated by imperial forces in Cingoli in 1250. It was in his interest to support the English

92 Bombi, Anglo-Papal Relations, p. 108.
93 They were: Pietro Capocci, Cardinal deacon of St George’s in Velabro; John of Toledo, Cardinal priest of S. Lorenzo in Lucina (1244–1261); Giovanni Gaetano Orsini, Cardinal deacon of San Nicola in Carceri Tulliano (1244–1277); Ottobono Fieschi, Cardinal deacon of S. Adriano (1251–1276); Ottoviano Ubaldini, Cardinal deacon of Santa Maria in Via Lata (1244–1273); Hugh de Saint-Cher, O.F.P, Cardinal priest of S. Sabina (1244–1263); Stephen of Vancsa, Cardinal bishop of Palestrina (1251–1270), CPR, 1258–66, p. 52.
94 CPR, 1258–66, p. 52.
95 CPR, 1247–58, pp. 621–2, 625; Foedera, I/1, p. 386. According to Cassidy, the exchequer was ‘struggling to meet the financial demands of the king, who continued to make generous grants and unrealistic promises’ – such as this promise to Cardinal Capocci, Richard Cassidy, The 1259 Pipe Roll (PhD thesis, UCL, 2012), p. 48.
96 CR, 1256–9, p. 324.
97 Parvacini Bagliani, Cardinali di Curia, i. p. 304. On 7 April 1249, Innocent IV wrote to many prominent ecclesiastical leaders asking them to support Cardinal Peter Capocci, the legate and rector of the March of
king and to ensure the success of the Sicilian Business and to free Italy from Manfred and quell the rising Imperial threat.

Similarly, John of Toledo, an English-born cardinal, was often utilised by the English ‘as a channel to papal favour’ – petitioned by Henry’s envoys and proctors for support in English matters at the papal curia. Yet, there is dispute over the extent to which he aligned himself with English interests. Although of English birth, he had become a Cistercian monk at Clairvaux and had spent the majority of his time outside of England. As such Brentano has argued that he ‘was more Cistercian than English’ and only occasionally took specific interest in English matters. John continued to act as an advocate of the Cistercians during his office as Cardinal, and had been responsible for certain papal petitions, made by the English Cistercians, exempting them from paying the crusading tax in England. Lawrence argued that he formed part of a pro-English faction at the papal curia during the pontificates of Innocent IV and Alexander IV. He had gone to great lengths to try and have the king’s brother, Richard of Cornwall, King of the Romans (1257), elected to a senatorial post in Rome in 1261. He also assisted the curial proctors, Roger Lovell and Robert de Baro, in obtaining the king’s absolution from his oath to follow the baronial provisions.

Finally, Ottobono Fieschi, Cardinal deacon of S. Adriano (1251–1276), proved himself to be another loyal ally of the English king. In May 1265, he was appointed papal legatus a latere in England ‘at the king’s insistence’, arriving in October to help defend the king against the revolting barons and prelates and to re-establish peace in the realm and remaining in England until July 1268. Ultimately, there is evidence of a pro-English faction amongst the cardinals, promoting the king’s agenda through both official and unofficial channels at the papal curia.

Ancona and Duchy of Spoleto, in his efforts against the imperialists, Potthast, ii. no. 13274. In the summer of 1249, Capocci summoned the Senate in his efforts to convince the imperialists of the March of Ancona and Duchy of Spoleto to return to the papal side, Partner, The Lands of St Peter, p. 256; Robert Brentano, Rome before Avignon. A Social History of Thirteenth-Century Rome (London, 1974), p. 191.


99 Brentano, Two Churches, pp. 48–9.

100 TNA, SC 7/2/30. The cardinal’s name is signed on the dorse of this document see Appendix E.

101 Foedera, i/1, p. 409; Mann, The Lives of Popes, xv. p. 54.

102 Lawrence, ‘Toledo, John of’, ODNB.

103 Parvacini Bagliani, Cardinali di Curia, i. p. 364.

Papal Representatives and Agents in England

Papal envoys were key facilitators throughout a range of international diplomatic proceedings. Scholars of papal representation, namely Schmutz, Kyer, Figueira, and Rennie have examined the classifications and faculties associated with medieval papal representatives. Schmutz argued that before the eleventh century ‘the terms legatus and nuncius were used interchangeably’ to describe papal envoys, whereas from the twelfth century onwards, he identified similar definitions as those highlighted by Queller to describe the distinctions between these two types of papal envoy. Papal nunci could either negotiate or conclude business but could not perform both these roles without the approval of their principal. According to Queller and Schmutz, they did not receive a mandate, only a letter of credence introducing them to the recipient. In contrast, papal legati (in some cases called procuratores) could exercise their own initiative in negotiating and settling the affairs of their principal. Kyer boldly asserted that after 1245, the roles and titles of papal envoys were more clear and consistent in papal letters. His assessment is, however, too prescriptive. There continued to be a degree of flexibility in the roles and titles of envoys throughout the mid-thirteenth century, as this thesis will observe.

According to Figueira, by the mid-thirteenth century, popes and decretalists had developed a sophisticated classification system for types of papal legates. Using canon law commentaries, Figueira classified legates into three categories: the legatus a latere, the highest class of papal legate, chosen for important missions and assigned with full powers to act within his legatine mandate; the legatus missus who was assigned with fewer powers to deal with a specific matter due to his personal qualities; and the legatus natus which was an honorific title awarded to legates who were addressing matters within the province assigned to them (such as the archbishop of Canterbury). Someone holding the title of legatus would be given a ‘special mandate’ from the pope to carry out certain

108 Schmutz, Foundations, pp. 48–9, 58–9, 90.
reserved papal powers, along with general legatine powers. However, they were not granted unlimited papal powers and were restricted by the powers and faculties specified in their mandates. In addition to this, the pope was increasingly employing judge-delegates to handle a growing number of legal cases being presented at the papal curia. A judge-delegate would be given a single case to conduct and was appointed by direct papal order on request of a plaintiff. More recently, Rennie emphasised the flexible nature and function of papal legation in the earlier Middle Ages (up to the eleventh century). He noted the importance of examining each papal mission within its own context. The nature and functions of papal representatives were subject to a number of factors, including the directive of each individual pope. This flexibility continued into the thirteenth century, making it harder to group envoys into different classifications. Indeed, Schmutz, Figueria, and Rennie have all warned against the reliability of medieval terminology to denote the representational status of a papal envoy, as the medieval scribes were ‘seldom consistent in their use of terms’. As Schmutz put it, when studying papal representation, and in my opinion also secular representation, one should not rely too heavily on classifications used to categorise different agents and should instead look to the mandate itself or ‘the nature of the activity undertaken by the agent’ in order to discern the nature of their role. While historians of papal representation have generally been more flexible in their approach to this study than their counterparts studying secular representation, they have still been too prescriptive in their efforts to assign classifications to different papal representatives. Ultimately, scholars of papal and secular representation have worked off the accepted notion that the system of representation was more flexible in the earlier Middle Ages and then became more standardised and bureaucratic by the High Middle Ages. They worked hard to establish a taxonomy of envoys based on the later medieval terminology, but as such have not been able to explore some of the wider subtleties and nuances surrounding the process of representation.

113 Figueria, ‘Sub-delegation by Papal Legates’, p. 57; For more on the appointment of papal judges-delegate see Sayers, Papal Judges-Delegates, pp. 109–118.
114 Rennie, Foundations, pp. 70–1.
115 Ibid., p. 66.
117 Schmutz, Foundation, pp. 57, 66.
particularly during the thirteenth century, which often encompassed groups of representatives with a range of skills and expertise working together in accordance with the faculties laid out in their mandates.

Plöger and, more recently, Bombi, have both questioned the importance of using fixed classifications to determine the role of Anglo-papal representatives in the fourteenth century. Indeed, Plöger concluded that by the mid-fourteenth century the term *nuncius* and *procurator* could be used interchangeably to describe diplomatic agents travelling between England and the Papacy.\(^\text{118}\) Bombi also diminished the significance of this taxonomy of envoys arguing that it had distracted scholars from exploring some of the wider complexities surrounding the process of medieval diplomatic missions, ‘which often included several representatives with diverse expertise and faculties who worked through both official and unofficial channels.’\(^\text{119}\) Both these studies have broadened our understanding of the roles and activities of Anglo-papal representatives and agents in the fourteenth century, yet there is no equivalent study for Anglo-papal representation in the mid-thirteenth century.

As discussed earlier in this thesis, the papacy’s increasing claims to plenitudo potestatis (plentitude of power) in both the ecclesiastical and temporal realms culminated in a greater demand for papal presence and intervention in international matters. As such, the papacy appointed an increasing number and range of representatives and agents to conduct these matters on its behalf. Queller argued that this rise in papal power and administration was reflected in the developing role of papal representatives who were entrusted with letters awarding *plena potestas* from the pontificate of Gregory VII (1073–1085).\(^\text{120}\) Beattie corroborated this point, stating that ‘as the concept of papal plenitudo potestatis was elaborated throughout the thirteenth century, papal legates enjoyed a corresponding growth in the power they exercised’.\(^\text{121}\) Accordingly, the growth of papal power impacted the conduct and practice of papal representation in this period and scholars have ascribed great powers to envoys acting on behalf of the pope. The aim of this section is to fill in the gap in the literature, outlined above, by highlighting the variations associated with this practice throughout Anglo-papal relations in the first half of the thirteenth century. Certainly, one must take a nuanced

\(^{118}\) Plöger, *England and the Avignon Popes*, p. 86.


\(^{120}\) Queller, *Office of Ambassador*, pp. 27–9

approach to the study of papal representation; as a practice it was shaped by the people, places, and politics involved in each case.

The papacy typically appointed cardinals, high-ranking ecclesiastical officials, government administrators, household officials, and members of religious orders as diplomatic representatives and agents of the Church, as shall be demonstrated in Chapter Three. The choice of each specific representative was influenced by the nature of the mission at hand as well as the ability, social, educational and professional background, personal allegiances, and wider connections of the potential agent. Choices of representative could be greatly impacted by the personality of each pope as well as the wider political context. Those appointed as papal envoys were chosen due to their office and rank, because of their relevant expertise and experience, or a combination of these factors. The qualities required of an envoy varied based on the job they were performing. For example, Adam Marsh, O.F.M, was appointed papal judge-delegate in England in 1256 on account of his skills in mediation and arbitration, his perceived impartiality due to his Franciscan background, and his status as an Englishman.

Traditionally, the medieval papacy called upon its cardinals to perform number of governmental roles, including that of diplomatic envoy. Indeed, by the thirteenth century the role played by the cardinals had become integral to the smooth running and effective management of papal government. It should be noted, however, that thirteenth-century canonists disputed the extent to which popes needed to consult their cardinals before making decisions or passing laws. During the pontificates of Innocent III, Honorius III, Gregory IX and Innocent IV, legati a latere were appointed to conduct important diplomatic matters. Alexander IV’s predecessor, Innocent IV, has been particularly noted for his heavy utilisation of cardinals as legati a latere, believing that as the highest-ranking and most trusted members of papal government, they were most fit to represent the pope’s status and power in important diplomatic matters. He also relied heavily on his cardinals.

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122 Guillemain argued that this was also the case for the fourteenth century, Bernard Guillemain, La cour pontificale d’Avignon, 1309–1376. Étude d’une société (Paris, 1962), pp. 229–30.
123 For more details of this case see pp. 172–3.
124 Pope Innocent III had referred to his cardinals as ‘part of the papal body’ – who were key to the passing of papal judgement, Die Register Innocenz III, i, p. 515; Agostino Paravicini Bagliani, Il Trono di Pietro: L’universalità del papato di Alessandro III a Bonifacio VIII (Roma, 1996), p. 57.
as his most trusted officials. While in exile in Lyons from 1244–1251, he trusted four of his cardinals to manage the papal curia in his absence (one of whom was to succeed him as Alexander IV).127

As discussed, legatus a latere was the highest rank of legate, often reserved for cardinal bishops. They could perform extensive duties on behalf of the pope and so were often sought after by the king to assist in important matters of business. They were even entitled to dress in ‘apostolic apparel and insignia as if the pope himself had come.’128 Often, the appointments of cardinals as legate followed a direct request from the king for legatine intervention. Sometimes a cardinal legate was chosen because they could perform certain ceremonial duties, which a lower status envoy could not perform. For example, in May 1213, King John had received the kingdoms of England and Ireland in fief from the pope in the presence of the papal nuncio, Master Pandulf. On this occasion, John had promised to do homage to the pope as he could not perform the act in the presence of a papal nuncio. Yet, in October 1213, the papal legati de latere Niccolò, cardinal bishop of Tusculum was sent to the king’s presence, so that John could do homage to him personally ‘as the pope’s vicery’.129 In this example, the ceremonial act of homage had to be carried out in the presence of this high-status papal representative, even though it had been agreed before a lower-status papal envoy.

One legation which deserves note is that of Guala Bicchieri (c.1150–1227), Cardinal deacon of S. Maria in Portico, who had been appointed legatus a latere by Pope Innocent III in 1215 to support King John against the rebel barons.130 After John’s death, Guala took on the role as papal guardian of the young Henry III. His job was primarily to support Henry against his enemies, and to speed up the king’s involvement in the crusade.131 Pope Honorius III confirmed Innocent III’s appointment of Guala on 25 July 1216.132 Guala quickly assumed the role of peacemaker, not only to prevent the French from taking over England and to persuade the barons to make peace with the

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127 One of these four cardinals was Rainaldo di Jenne (Alexander IV), who was appointed apostolic vicar in Rome, Potthast, ii. nos. 13060, 13274; Waley, Papal State, pp. 146–7; Paravicini Bagliani, Cardinali di Curia, p. 52.
129 Sayers, Papal Government, p. 163.
131 Potthast, i. no. 5132.
132 Potthast, i. no. 5319.
court, but also to settle the Welsh and Scottish uprisings. He left England in 1218 after he had, in his own words, ‘laboured as much as he was able to secure the peace and the unity’ for the English king and his realm. He effectively utilised the power he was allocated in a way befitting of his ecclesiastical position. From his study on Guala Bicchieri, Vincent deduced that ‘there was no such thing as a typical legation … the office of legate was subject to great flexibility, governed as much by individual circumstances as by any general set of rules.’ Similarly, Cazel compared the two legations of Guala and his successor, Master Pandulf, who was papal legate in England from December 1218–July 1221, to demonstrate that no two papal envoys were the same. He argued that these two men were ‘very different in their personalities, in their careers, and in their conceptions of their tasks’.

While papal legates could claim power to ‘summon church councils, to issue statutes, to delegate and determine cases, and to issue dispensations for certain offences against canon law’, their activities were still largely shaped by the context and requirements of their mission. In some cases, papal legates, particularly legati a latere, were accused of exploiting and extending their powers in the name of the pope. The pope often went to efforts to challenge this image and had chosen Guala, a ‘moderate man’, to travel with a small entourage to England and to only take the necessary procurations while in England and demand no extra money.

Unlike his predecessors, Alexander IV did not frequently utilise his cardinals as legates. As observed throughout Chapter One, he did not appoint any of his cardinals to act during negotiations with the English king, even after requests from both the English and French kings for him to send a cardinal legate to help conclude peace between them. This was partly because he had, in his own words, ‘so few cardinals’, all of whom he had inherited from his predecessor. Mann has proposed that there were two parties among the cardinals, one which favoured ‘government by strong measures’ and the other which was ‘averse to the shedding of blood’. As such, the appointment of

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135 Letters and Charters, p. xlvi.
137 Letters and Charters, p. lxxiv.
138 Diplomatic Documents, i. no. 21.
139 BL, MS 203–4; Potthast, ii. pp. 1284–5, 1472–3; Salimbene, ii. p. 658: ‘cum tamen tempore eius non essent nisi octo’.
140 Mann, The Lives of Popes, xv. p. 56.
Alexander IV was seen as a compromise by these factions and the monastic chronicler of Padua, argued that Alexander did not wish to appoint any new cardinals because he did not wish to favour either faction.\textsuperscript{141} The Franciscan chronicler, Salimbene, confirmed that this pope appointed ‘no new cardinals’ during his time.\textsuperscript{142} That being said, he did deploy some of his cardinals on important legatine missions. In January 1255, he named Cardinal Ottoviano Ubaldini as \textit{legatus a latere} in Sicily.\textsuperscript{143} Ottoviano engaged personally in the war against Manfred, but when papal forces were defeated, he sought a peace accord with Manfred of which the pope did not approve.\textsuperscript{144} He demonstrated a great degree of autonomy in entering peace negotiations with Manfred without prior agreement from the pope. In fact, the level of autonomy ascribed to cardinals as \textit{legati a latere} may have discouraged Alexander from utilising them in future negotiations.\textsuperscript{145}

Like their secular counterparts, the papacy also appointed administrators and household officials as some of the most trusted representatives in international matters. Lunt has noted that from the thirteenth century, popes began to appoint more men of lower rank on important papal missions as they proved to be more ‘amenable and efficient’ than high-status ecclesiastics.\textsuperscript{146} For example, in 1252 Pope Innocent IV sent the papal notary, Albert of Parma, on a secret mission to persuade either an English or French prince to accept the Sicilian throne in fief from the papacy and free the realm from the Hohenstaufen family.\textsuperscript{147} It is probable that Albert of Parma and Sinibald Fieschi (the former Innocent IV) actually met in Parma and from here developed a close working relationship.\textsuperscript{148}


\textsuperscript{142} According to Salimbene, Alexander’s reluctance to create new cardinals was also an attempt to curb the clerical abuses of his predecessor, who had appointed family members into important ecclesiastical posts. Salimbene stated that this pope [Alexander IV] ‘was neither open to making his sister an abbess nor his nephew a cardinal’. This was a direct criticism of Innocent IV, who had engaged in these very acts of nepotism, Salimbene, ii. p. 658; Sandro Carocci, \textit{il nepotismo nel medioevo: Papi, cardinali e famiglie nobili} (Roma, 1999), pp. 118–21. Alexander IV still engaged in nepotistic appointments, just not with regards to his cardinals, Montaubin, ‘Bastard Nepotism’, p. 150.

\textsuperscript{143} \textit{BF}, ii. no. 14.

\textsuperscript{144} In the case of Ottoviano, there is also speculation that he was a supporter of Manfred: Mann, \textit{The Lives of Popes}, xv. p. 23.

\textsuperscript{145} Between 1198 and 1276 the majority of cardinals were Italian and French men (often drawn from powerful and influential families) who held a certain degree of economic independence and political ambition, which may have been tied up with the interests of their families, Paravicini Bagliani, \textit{Il Trono di Pietro}, p. 62. For cardinals of Gregory IX, Innocent IV and Alexander IV, Paravicini Bagliani, \textit{Cardinali di Curia}.

\textsuperscript{146} Lunt, \textit{Financial Relations}, i. p. 572.

\textsuperscript{147} Montaubin ‘Royaume de Sicile’, pp. 159–94.

\textsuperscript{148} Montaubin, ‘Royaume de Sicile’, p. 162. Obizzo Fieschi the bishop of Parma appointed his nephew Sinibald (Innocent IV) to his first clerical position as the canon of Parma cathedral, which he held from 1216–1226. One of Albert of Parma’s family members (also named Albert) had been the doctor of Innocent IV’s uncle, the bishop of Parma.
connections with the pope often led to the appointment of a particular envoy, especially in cases which required a certain level of secrecy. Ganshof has further suggested that from the thirteenth century onwards, nuncii became more important and more frequently deployed as papal envoys because they were cheaper to employ.\textsuperscript{149} Nuncii were indeed cheaper to send, held greater loyalties to the pope (often as members of the papal household), and were more readily available for missions abroad. Kyer has argued that from 1245, ‘solemn’ nuncios could be granted ‘full power’, much the same as a legate, to conduct matters on behalf of the pope.\textsuperscript{150} This made it easier for the papacy to send nuncii instead of legati on a wide range of missions. Bombi has argued that by the early fourteenth century, the Apostolic See preferred to send cardinal nuncii instead of cardinal legati, partly as a way to cut the costs of the embassy and partly because their restricted faculties made them better suited to missions where local authorities might see cardinal legates’ interferences as ‘potentially disruptive and intruding on local ecclesiastical jurisdiction’.\textsuperscript{151} Already, in the early thirteenth century, Stephen Langton had gained confirmation from the pope hat he would not send another legate to England while Langton was still alive.\textsuperscript{152} Moreover, when Henry III had asked the pope to send a legate to England in 1230, his churchmen were perturbed by the threat this posed to their independence.\textsuperscript{153} There were, however, drawbacks to appointing nuncii more frequently. In some cases, they were not well received because they did not have the appropriate status to carry out their assigned powers for their mission. They could be criticised for overstepping their position and asserting greater powers in England than they had been granted. For example, in 1259 the English barons argued that the papal nuncio Brother Velascus did not have the power and authority to threaten them with the penalty of excommunication and interdict.\textsuperscript{154} They used this as reason enough to reject his mission.

Much like with English embassies, papal embassies could consist of a range of individuals who performed different functions, which made them fundamental to the smooth running of the

\textsuperscript{149} Ganshof, \textit{The Middle Ages}, pp. 289–90.
\textsuperscript{154} \textit{CR}, 1256–9, pp. 490–2. For the details of this event see pp. 59, 178–80.
mission. For example, in May 1255, Alexander IV appointed Boniface of Savoy, archbishop of Canterbury and Master Rostand, papal chaplain, to commute the crusading vow of the English king from the Holy Land to Sicily. These two envoys were entrusted with ‘full and free powers’ to negotiate this matter.\textsuperscript{155} This was an important curial affair, commissioned on papal initiative, which needed to be headed up by an appropriate representative. As head of the English Church, the archbishop of Canterbury fit the bill as a suitable representative of the pope’s person. Moreover, in his position he could perform the ceremonial act of commuting the English king’s crusading vow. By contrast, Master Rostand, who will be discussed in more detail later, was a papal chaplain with legal and administrative skills who was to become a central figure in these Anglo-papal diplomatic relations throughout the Sicilian Business.\textsuperscript{156} It is likely that he played a more significant role in the practical management of this business, whereas the archbishop was more of a figurehead. These papal envoys, much like their secular counterparts, did not act alone. They would have been assisted by an entourage of knights, clerks, scribes and household servants. Unfortunately, there is little evidence for the activity of this supporting staff, although through snippets of evidence we learn of their existence. Matthew Paris reported that the papal nuncio, Master Arlot, arrived in England in 1258 accompanied by an entourage of twenty individuals, and when he left the country, he was given safe-conduct for himself and members of his household who had travelled with him.\textsuperscript{157} Equally, the bishop of Bologna came to England ‘with an honourable company of knights’ to formally invest Edmund with the kingdom of Sicily, by means of a ring.\textsuperscript{158} Clearly, they arrived with an entourage befitting of their person and their assignment.

**Papal Collectors**

The appointment of papal collectors in England was very common practice, particularly between the thirteenth and early sixteenth centuries when England was a papal fiefdom. Papal collectors could play a pivotal role throughout the communications between England and the papacy.

\textsuperscript{155} TNA, SC 7/1/13, SC 7/1/15, SC 7/3/43. They were also given full and free power for either one or both of them to absolve the king of Norway and his people from their crusading vows and to commute these vows to the business of Sicily, SC 7/1/14, SC 7/1/17, SC 7/1/18.\textsuperscript{156} For more on Master Rostand’s role in England see Philippa J. Mesiano, ‘Pope Alexander IV, King Henry III and the Imperial Succession: Master Rostand’s Role in the Sicilian Business, 1255–1258’, in Authority and Power in the Medieval Church c. 1000–1500, ed. Thomas W. Smith, Europa Sacra (Turnhout, forthcoming).\textsuperscript{157} ‘Annals of Tewkesbury’, AM, i. pp. 162–3; CM, v. p. 673.\textsuperscript{158} CPR, 1247–58, p. 509; Mann, The Lives of the Popes, xv. pp. 22–3.
and have a significant impact on the political relationship between these two polities. They were important agents of the pope, raising both money and backing from the English public in support of papal endeavours. Moreover, the way they conducted their business could impact the way their mission was received by the English – whether it was accepted or shunned. In this regard, they could shape the wider political events and diplomatic exchanges between these two polities. More than this, papal collectors were often appointed in other capacities, as preachers, penitentiaries, and diplomatic envoys in the thirteenth century. As with most of the agents examined by this thesis, their roles were not static, and they could be appointed in a range of business.

Lunt argued that there were two types of papal collector in the thirteenth century: general collectors and special collectors. General collectors were appointed to collect standard payments such as Peter’s pence, the census, and papal subsides. Special collectors, on the other hand, were appointed on a more temporary basis to collect payments such as income taxes (i.e. crusading tax). However, when no general collector was present, a special collector could be appointed to carry out these duties usually reserved for general collectors. In a similar way to Mattingly and Queller in their approach to English representatives, Lunt has been too prescriptive in his categorisations of general and special collectors. The rest of this section will therefore address the role of papal collectors more generally in order to gain a more nuanced understanding of these representatives.

Lunt has remarked that general and special collectors were typically given the rank of ‘nuncio’ and, in some early cases, ‘legate’, although he argued that Cardinal Otto who left England in 1241 was the last legate to act as a ‘general collector’. As discussed, these titles of legate and nuncio were also ascribed to papal envoys appointed with powers to negotiate diplomatic matters. Hence, the specific powers and duties associated with each collector cannot be demonstrated through their titles alone. Only through an examination of the specific mandate for a particular mission can one understand the specific duties assigned to each agent. A papal collector would be appointed a papal mandate which detailed the revenues he was to collect and gave him certain powers to compel

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159 Lunt argued that from the early thirteenth century ‘the papacy established a continuous series of general collectors in England long before it made the institution universal’, Lunt, Financial Relations, i. p. 571, see also pp. 571–87; W. E. Lunt, Papal Revenues in the Middle Ages, 2 vols (New York, 1934), ii. pp. 42–3.
161 Ibid., i. p. 588.
162 Ibid., i. p. 571.
others to adhere to their authority.\textsuperscript{163} Some copies of these commissions have survived in contemporary English monastic chronicles, see for example the commission to Master Rostand preserved in the Annals of Burton.\textsuperscript{164} All representatives travelling to a different country, including papal collectors, were required to carry a letter of credence, which may also include a request for payment of tribute for the agent’s services, and a letter of safe-conduct.\textsuperscript{165} English natives, appointed as papal collectors, only needed their commissions as well as consent from the English king to perform their duties.\textsuperscript{166}

From the early thirteenth century, there is extensive evidence of papal agents in England carrying out assignments as both papal collectors and diplomatic envoys.\textsuperscript{167} Master Pandulph, for example, acted as papal collector, judge-delegate, and diplomatic representative between 1211–1221.\textsuperscript{168} Pandulph was papal nuncio in England from 1211 to 1216, papal legate from 1218 to 1221, and in both roles had been responsible for collecting the Peter’s pence and the annual tribute (owed as part of the feudal agreement made in 1213). From 1218, he was also responsible for collecting the census and the crusading twentieth.\textsuperscript{169} His fiscal and diplomatic duties were very broad during this period. Similarly, the pope’s key representative in Spain between 1215 and 1225, the \textit{nuncius} Master Gonzalo Garcia, engaged in key diplomatic matters and also collected the \textit{census} in both Spain and Portugal.\textsuperscript{170} Clearly, papal collectors could perform a range of duties alongside their fiscal responsibilities. Indeed, a number of the representatives mentioned throughout this thesis held both roles as collectors and diplomatic envoys, as we shall see below, through the example of Master Rostand.

\textsuperscript{163} \textit{Ibid.}, i. p. 574.
\textsuperscript{165} See p. 71; and also Lunt, \textit{Financial Relations}, i. pp. 575, 590.
\textsuperscript{166} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 590.
\textsuperscript{167} In 1214 Cardinal Nicholas of Tusculum and Master Pandulph Verracclo had collected ‘Peter’s Pence’ in England on behalf of the papacy. Pandulph continued to act as a papal collector after the cardinal left England, Lunt, \textit{Financial Relations}, i. pp. 126–7. Blet maintained that it was the use of nuncios as collectors from the fourteenth century which led to the permanent use of nuncios from the fifteenth century, P. Blet, \textit{Histoire de la Répresentation Diplomatique du Saint Siège des origins à l’aube du XIXe siècle} (Città del Vaticano, 1982), pp. 141–58, 177–202.
\textsuperscript{168} Nicholas Vincent, ‘The Election of Pandulph Verracclo as Bishop of Norwich (1215)’, \textit{Historical Research}, 68 (1995), 143–63 (156).
\textsuperscript{169} Lunt, \textit{Financial Relations}, i. p. 571.
\textsuperscript{170} Linehan, \textit{The Spanish Church and the Papacy}, pp. 18–19.
Lunt further asserts that ‘a collector had to maintain a considerable staff’ and on average, a foreign collector’s entourage, would range from between four and seven persons.\(^{171}\) Moreover, he asserted that a collector’s staff would primarily be concerned with ‘the writing of documents, the auditing and compilation of accounts, the care of money received and similar tasks’, while his household in England would have consisted of a number of individuals – including ‘clerks, messengers, writers and household servants’.\(^{172}\)

A leading collector had to oversee the management and administration of an extensive collection and thus had to employ a number of sub-delegates who could assist in the management and administration of this collection. For example, Master Rostand appointed several deputies, namely Master Bernard of Siena, Master Nicholas of Plimpton, and Master William of Lichefeud in 1255 to assist in the management of the collection of the tenth in England.\(^{173}\) Evidently, he could not be expected to undertake such extensive duties on his own and was given a certain degree of power to appoint ‘employees’ to assist him. All these appointees were already in the service of the pope. Indeed, Master Bernard of Siena had been sent to England to collect the tenth before Rostand had arrived.\(^{174}\) Rostand effectively became the ‘manager’ of these representatives after he took up his post as leading papal nuncio and executor of the Sicilian Business in England.

According to Lunt, papal administrators or members of the papal household were usually appointed as collectors. They did not often hold high-ecclesiastical rank and had studied at university and achieved status as a master. Moreover, they were almost always foreigners to England.\(^{175}\) This could provoke resistance from members of the English clergy, who resented making payments to foreign collectors. Lunt suggests that there was not a ‘strong antipathy’ against foreign collectors, although he goes on to state that foreigners ‘were generally disliked by the clergy’ and that English collectors tended to be received more favourably.\(^{176}\) Moreover, English prelates who took on roles as special collectors tended to be accepted as simply carrying out their duties – they were not hated

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\(^{172}\) Ibid., i. pp. 581.


\(^{175}\) According to Lunt, ‘they were all Italians’ before 1246, Lunt, *Financial Relations*, i. pp. 571–3, 588.

\(^{176}\) Ibid., i. pp. 573, 591.
in the same way as the foreign and lower-ranking collectors.\textsuperscript{177} For example, the bishop of Norwich, who will be discussed below, received less criticism than Master Rostand when collecting the crusading tenth.

Tracking the evidence of papal collection in England in the mid-thirteenth century helps to understand the complex political period. Following Henry’s crusading vow of March 1250 to go on crusade to the Holy Land, the king petitioned the pope for access to Church revenue to fund this endeavour. On 11 April 1250, Pope Innocent IV granted Henry permission to levy a tenth of ecclesiastical revenues from his kingdom for a period of three years starting from June 1254.\textsuperscript{178} The English king had been working with the papacy to excessively tax the English Church and laity in their efforts to fund the next crusade to the Holy Land, and a number of papal tax collectors needed to be deployed to ensure the swift and efficient financial management of this business. On 4 July 1254, Walter of Suffield, bishop of Norwich (1245–1257), John Clipping, bishop of Chichester (1253–1262), and William of Taunton, abbot of Winchester (1250–1255), officially began to collect the tenth for the Holy Land.\textsuperscript{179}

On 22 May 1255, Boniface of Savoy, archbishop of Canterbury and Master Rostand Masson, papal nuncio, were appointed alongside Peter d’Aigueblanche, bishop of Hereford, to replace the Bishop of Norwich, bishop of Chichester and the abbot of Winchester as leading collectors of the ecclesiastical tenth in England, and to transfer this money from funding the king’s crusade to the Holy Land to financing the Sicilian Business.\textsuperscript{180} When new collectors were assigned, they had to obtain all the records of their predecessors. Hence, Rostand, Boniface and Peter would have needed to acquire the previous ‘valuation’ undertaken by the bishop of Norwich and his fellow collectors in England.\textsuperscript{181}

\textsuperscript{177} Lunt, \textit{Financial Relations}, i. p. 591.
\textsuperscript{179} As part of their collection, the bishop of Norwich and his colleagues had been requested to survey and assess the value of all ecclesiastical revenue in England, Lunt, \textit{Valuation}, pp. 52–3, 57, 64, 66–8.
\textsuperscript{181} Lunt, \textit{Financial Relations}, i. p. 579.
Rostand arrived in England in September 1255, accompanying Aigueblanche who had been in Rome pledging a number of English monastic houses as surety for the loans he had acquired from the merchants of Siena and Florence to pay for the Sicilian affair. Shortly after his arrival, Rostand became ‘practically the sole’ collector in England, appointed to oversee Sicilian collection, as Boniface dismissed his duties as a papal collector. Boniface wanted to maintain a good relationship within the English clergy; indeed, he pledged himself to the liquidation of the debts of his see. Unlike Boniface, Rostand did not have the same connections and obligations to the English realm and could carry out his duties as a special collector more effectively.

In his newly appointed role, Rostand made many changes to the administration of the tenth. These included a renewal and extension of the tenth for a further two years, a tax on vacant benefices, and a new, more thorough assessment of the value of benefices and monastic manors expanding on the ‘valuation of Norwich’ made by the bishop of Norwich and his colleagues in 1254. Rostand was to tax both the ‘spiritualities’ (income derived through tithes and other spiritual means), and ‘temporalties’ (lands and rents which they held similar to the laity) of the English clergy – this included all the clergy members’ baronies (which had previously been exempted). As part of this assignment, Rostand was also commissioned to collect the redemptions of crusaders’ vows, indefinite bequests and obventions from England and later, Scotland, in aid of the Holy Land. This increase in the amount, and avenues through which the English Church was to be taxed, reflected the growing financial difficulties and desperation of both the Church and English Crown to acquire revenue.

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183 Lunt, Valuation of Norwich, p. 84.
187 ‘Annals of Burton’, AM, i. p. 354. Innocent IV had ordered a tax to be levied on both spiritualities and temporalities as part of the Norwich taxation in 1254, but he had not taxed baronies, AM, iii. p. 196; iv. 443.
188 TNA, SC 7/3/41, SC 7/2/6.
189 On 3 May 1264, Pope Urban IV stressed that if the Church could quickly recover revenues from the Papal State and the Kingdom of Sicily, they would not have to tax the universal Church so highly, Epistolae saeculi XIII, iii. nos. 594, 588.
Rostand quickly came under criticism for his heavy taxation of the Church as the majority of the English clergy rejected any involvement in the Sicilian Business. Shortly after arriving in England, a papal collector would have to formally publish his commission from the pope. According to Matthew Paris, when Rostand gathered all the clergy in London on 13 October 1255 to formally publish his papal commission, he demanded that they should pay ‘immense sums of money’ to reimburse the Pope.\textsuperscript{190} The clergy were heavily opposed to Rostand’s mandate, and Matthew Paris personally denounced the pope and his collectors as greedy, worldly men.\textsuperscript{191} While Matthew Paris is not a wholly reliable source as he held extensive prejudices against the papal curia for its supposedly overzealous involvement in English affairs, the thirteenth-century Annals of Burton and Dunstable also criticised Rostand for his active and speedy administration of extortionate church taxes.\textsuperscript{192} Some clerics even argued that Rostand had forged the papal bulls sent to him, whilst others accused him of exceeding his position and falsely claiming certain papal powers.\textsuperscript{193} The monks were evoking canon 62 of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) which had forbidden:

\begin{quote}

the recognition of alms-collectors (\textit{quaestores}), some of whom deceive other people by proposing various errors in their preaching, unless they show authentic letters from the Apostolic See or from the diocesan bishop. Even then they shall not be permitted to put before the people anything beyond what is contained in the letters.\textsuperscript{194}
\end{quote}

Undoubtedly, Rostand was acting on papal instruction and further papal bulls sent in 1256 ordered him to continue collecting these taxes.\textsuperscript{195} At an assembly of prelates on 13 January 1256 there was further resistance against Rostand’s collections and reforms.\textsuperscript{196} Shortly afterwards, in an attempt to appease the English clergy, Rostand introduced an exemption to all the hospitals, lazars (leper houses), and communities of nuns who had no churches or tithes and depended on alms and their own labour.\textsuperscript{197} This did little to pacify the clergy, although it does highlight Rostand’s awareness of negative attitudes towards the collection, and attempts to reduce the strain on certain religious communities struggling to pay it. Nonetheless, another blow to the clergy was felt on 13 June 1256,
when Alexander IV confirmed Rostand’s extension of clerical taxation to include all lay fiefs, forcing taxation on ecclesiastics’ manors or baronies.\textsuperscript{198} Similarly, in September 1256, Rostand was ordered to compel the archbishops and bishops of England to provide him with valuations of their property and to pay a tenth of their manors for the past two years.\textsuperscript{199} Furthermore, he was granted powers to excommunicate those members of the clergy who refused to meet the papal demands in order to secure the effective collection of ecclesiastical revenue on behalf of the pope.\textsuperscript{200} On 4 October 1257, he was officially replaced as leading collector by three English prelates – the bishop of Salisbury, the archdeacon of Canterbury and the prior of St Andrew, Northampton – and on 26 December all the English archbishops and bishops were made responsible for the collection in their own diocese.\textsuperscript{201}

Although the presence of papal collectors in England was not new, the level of unpopularity towards each collector varied based on the nature of their duties, the background of the collector, the reasons for exaction, and the ways in which this collector interacted with the clergy.\textsuperscript{202} Rostand and Aigueblanche had made heavy demands on the clergy in aid of an unpopular and unwarranted crusade, and to make matters worse, they were foreigners who received many ecclesiastical benefices in England as payment for their services.\textsuperscript{203} Clearly, Rostand and Aigueblanche were not well liked by the English clergy, and yet, their ill reception did little to diminish the effectiveness of the crusading collection.

On 24 April 1257, Henry III ordered Rostand to stop his collection of ecclesiastical tithes in England and transfer all the existing money into the wardrobe’s Temple treasury. The king gave Rostand little choice in this matter, threatening to confiscate his English possessions if he failed.\textsuperscript{204} Although Henry did not have the authority to halt papal taxation, or transfer the money into his own

\textsuperscript{198} TNA, SC 7/2/2; Potthast, ii. no. 16415; CM, v. p. 553.
\textsuperscript{199} TNA, SC 7/3/7.
\textsuperscript{200} CM, v. p. 525; TNA, SC 7/1/25, SC 7/2/23; CPL, i. p. 341; CPR, 1247–58, p. 590; Foedera, I/1, pp. 378–9; Reg. Alex IV, ii. no. 2238; Durham Cathedral Muniments: Locelli, III.7, III.14; Lunt, Financial Relations, i. pp. 268, 271.
\textsuperscript{201} 4 October 1257, TNA, SC 7/2/23; Lunt, Financial Relations, i. pp. 280, 589.
\textsuperscript{202} Lunt, Financial Relations, i. p. 585. According to Matthew Paris, the papal nuncio, Master Martin, sent to England to collect the arrears of moneys owed to Rome in 1244, quickly became unpopular due to his exaction of excessive procurations for himself, his refusal to accept gifts worth less than 30 marks, his threats of ecclesiastical punishment, and his acquiring of rich prebends, CM, iv. pp. 284, 368, 379, 416.
\textsuperscript{204} CPR, 1247–58, p. 566.
treasury, Rostand obeyed the king’s orders.\textsuperscript{205} By halting this collection, Rostand violated his role as papal collector, and in June 1257 the pope ordered him to stop dispensing this money into the king’s treasury and to continue collecting clerical taxes to repay the merchant-bankers.\textsuperscript{206} While it is unclear whether Rostand obeyed the pope’s renewed order to continue the collection of taxes, it is highly probable that he was soon dismissed from his position as papal collector, as these were the last papal orders to Rostand with regard to this collection.\textsuperscript{207} Matthew Paris noted that Rostand was disgraced and dismissed from papal office in the autumn of 1257 after furthering his own interests in England.\textsuperscript{208} The evidence suggests that Rostand did lose his position as papal nuncio as there is no record of Rostand holding this title after 5 June 1257.\textsuperscript{209} Yet, Rostand’s release from office did not result in a loss of papal favour and may have been a choice made by Rostand, as he realised the full magnitude of this job as papal collector.\textsuperscript{210}

Before the extensive exploitation of Church finances, Henry III had tried to re-pay the pope by other means. In April 1255, he had asked parliament for financial assistance in the Sicilian Business, but the barons refused to give any support unless, in exchange, Henry offered reforms of the realm.\textsuperscript{211} The barons were dismayed by the unfavourable terms of the Sicilian agreement which the king had approved without their consultation, and as such demanded more parliamentary powers.\textsuperscript{212} By May 1258 around 60,000 marks had been collected from England in aid of Sicily, most of which had been taken from the clergy.\textsuperscript{213} This illustrates how, amidst clerical rejection of the Sicilian Business, the pope still managed to amass vast sums of money from the coffers of the English Church, largely as the result of the effective role of his leading special collectors, Mater Rostand and

\textsuperscript{205} Henry III claimed that all papal envoys needed his consent before levying a tax in his kingdom, CPR, 1237–42, pp. 174, 347. However, in this case Henry has already consented to Master Rostand’s mission and thus could not retract his approval of the taxation, Lunt, Financial Relations, i. p. 577.

\textsuperscript{206} Foedera, I/1, pp. 356–7; TNA, SC 7/2/21; CPL, i. p. 345; Potthast, ii. no. 16865.

\textsuperscript{207} Lunt has argued that Rostand was the only papal collector to allow his sympathies to the king to let him forget his duties to the pope, Lunt, Financial Relations, i. p. 572, n. 2.

\textsuperscript{208} CM, v. pp. 647, 666, 672–3.

\textsuperscript{209} The last papal letters naming Rostand as the pope’s nuncio in England are dated: 28 May 1257, Reg. Alex IV, ii. no. 1935; and 5 June 1257, CPL, i. p. 345.

\textsuperscript{210} CPR, 1247–58, p. 629; CPL, i. pp. 354, 362, 363; Reg. Alex IV, ii. nos. 2391, 2393–6; iii. no. 2812.

\textsuperscript{211} CM, v. pp. 520–1, 623–4; Weiler, Henry III and the Staufen Empire, p. 158.

\textsuperscript{212} CM, v. p. 621.

the bishop of Hereford. Ultimately, the cost of papal diplomacy was on the recipient, in this case the English, and more specifically, the English Church.

**Dual appointments**

From the thirteenth century at least, there is also evidence of certain representatives being dually appointed by both the pope and the English king. This dual appointment meant they could be asked to carry out separate tasks, either at the same time, or at separate times, on behalf of the pope or the king. Sayers has argued that this dual appointment would result in ‘less friction’ between these two polities and ensured collaboration between spiritual and secular powers. Dually appointed agents between England and the papacy had to hold an ecclesiastical post to gain appointment by the pope. Often, these agents held positions as both papal and English administrators. As such, they had a greater understanding of the administrative, diplomatic, legal and ceremonial processes and protocols at both courts, and could interact more effectively between the two administrations. Furthermore, they usually started out as a papal administrator who was then employed by the English king as a royal administrator, such as a clerk or a proctor. For example, the papal nuncio, Master Pandulph had conducted a number of matters on behalf of the pope in England between 1211–1221 and also acted on King John’s behalf in diplomatic negotiations with the Welsh and the French in 1213, and with the barons at Runnymede in 1215. Similarly, the papal nuncio, Master Rostand, performed a number of duties on behalf of both pope and king between 1255 and 1261. He held positions as a papal nuncio, collector, preacher as well as a royal clerk, proctor and diplomatic envoy. Moreover, Master Giordano, papal notary and vice-chancellor of the papal curia from 1256–1257, was appointed as the king’s proctor at Rome to assist his envoys in a number of petitions, as well as papal envoy.

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217 For example, in 1255 Giordano had attended to the affairs of the English king at the papal curia, CPR, 1247–58, p. 449. In 1255, he had attempted to negotiate peace with Manfred on the pope’s behalf, Nicolao de Jamsilla, *Historia de rebus gestis Friderici II Imperatoris in Rerum Italicarum Scriptores*, VIII, ed. L. A. Muratori (Milan, 1726), p. 544. In April 1256, Henry III asked his proctor at Rome to ensure the appointment of Giordano as papal envoy in England to discuss the payments owed by the king in aid of the Sicilian Business, CR, 1254–6, pp. 408–9. Although on this occasion his appointment was not successful. Later, in 1257 Henry III asked Giordano to support his appeal regarding the disputed election of the bishopric of Ely, TNA, E 135/2/23. In 1258 he had assisted the king as a proctor at the papal curia, CR, 1256–9, p. 253. Giordano will be discussed in more detail on p. 190.
Envoys on the Road

When discussing the practice of diplomatic representation, another factor to consider is the journey taken by envoys travelling abroad. This journey could be long and perilous and could even deter envoys from carrying out their assignments. While this topic has been covered in depth by the historiography, this section will briefly summarise the different routes taken by envoys travelling between England and the papal curia, the time it took to make each journey, and the kinds of problems which might occur along the way in the late twelfth and first half of the thirteenth century.

The time it took to travel between the English and Roman court could vary based on a number of factors. Generally speaking, it took between four to eight weeks to travel from London to the papal curia.\(^{218}\) In fact, one report from 1188 records an embassy transporting a papal mandate from Rome to Canterbury in 29 days.\(^{219}\)

There were several routes which could be taken from England to Rome. In the first seven pages of Matthew Paris’ *Chronica Majora*, he illustrated the main pilgrimage routes from London to Jerusalem, which passed through the centres of pilgrimage throughout Europe. Paris’ itinerary provides one of the most comprehensive guides to the travel routes from England to Rome in the High Middle Ages.\(^{220}\) According to this itinerary, and factoring in the likelihood that envoys stopped for rest each night, it took between six and seven weeks to get from London to Rome.\(^{221}\) This meant that an embassy would have had to cover about twenty-five miles in one day which was ‘only possible on horse-back’.\(^{222}\) Anglo-papal correspondence can also be used to help estimate the length of time it took for a diplomatic mission to travel from England to the curia. For example, a royal petition dated 29 May 1215 received a papal response dated 7 July 1215 which suggests that it took about four to five weeks for this message to arrive at the papal curia in Ferentino, Lazio.\(^{223}\)


\(^{220}\) BL, Royal MS 14 C VII, fols 2r–4r.


Matthew Paris’ famous itinerary for pilgrims identified three pilgrimage routes from London to Jerusalem, all of which passed through Rome. It is highly likely that these same routes would have been used by envoys travelling to Rome. All three routes began by crossing the channel at the port of Dover. The first route arrived in France via the port of Wissant, then went through Boulogne, Paris, Nogent, Troyes, and Bar-sur-Seine. The second went to Calais and then via Arras, Reims and Charlons-Sur-Marne. The third route went from Wissant, to Paris, Sens, Auxerre, Vezelay, Charlons-Sur-Marne, Lyon, and Chambery. All three routes came together at Beaune, passed through Lyon and crossed the Alps at the Mont-Cenis pass into Italy which went via Turin, down to Pavia, Piacenza, Lucca, Florence, and Siena towards Viterbo. Presumably this pass must have been popular in the thirteenth century as it was so well documented by Matthew Paris. Chaplais has argued that from the early thirteenth century until Edward III captured Calais in 1347, most embassies to France travelled from Dover to the port at Wissant. However, embassies could travel from England to Rome via other routes. For example, they could take the Great St Bernard Pass which meant going via Besançon then turning towards Pontarlier and Vevey towards the Alps. In 1236 Albert of Stade had crossed the Alps via the St Gotthard Pass on a trip to Rome, proceeding down through Milan, Piacenza, Parma, Modena, Bologna, Faenza and then West through Arezzo and Orvieto and down to Viterbo.

The length of each journey varied depending on a number of factors including weather conditions, time of year, the location of the papal curia, the type of embassy (solemn or simple), and whether the embassy encountered any disturbances while journeying across the continent. For example, in 1213, following the interdict period, John sent six envoys to the papal curia to negotiate a peace settlement with the Pope, and yet only three of these six arrived in Rome, as the others had been captured along the way. As Queller argued, these journeys could often be full of ‘dangers, hardships, and discomforts’. The weather could cause considerable disaster for sea crossings. Once, on royal mission to the archbishop of Cologne, the bishop of Carlisle relayed how he had to abandon ship on the crossing to France because of a ‘violent storm’ and was forced ‘to come ashore

224 BL, Royal MS 14 C VII, fols 2r–2v. Birch, Pilgrimage Routes, p. 45; Cuttino, English Diplomatic Administration, p. 174.
225 Chaplais, Diplomatic Practice, p. 221; Cuttino, English Diplomatic Administration, pp. 192–3, 204–7.
227 For Alexander IV’s itinerary see Potthast, ii. pp. 1286–1472.
228 Benham, Peacemaking, pp. 121–2.
229 Queller, Office of Ambassador, p. 161.
in a small boat’ and to borrow a horse to continue his journey to Cologne. At other times, the rigours of winter simply prevented an embassy from carrying out its mission. If an embassy did attempt a journey during the winter, they would encounter a dangerous crossing over the icy Alps. Albert of Stade argued that the best time to travel was in mid-August when the roads were dry and clear and the passage through the Alps was safer. That being said, in the height of summer, the threat of contracting malaria was higher. Due to these many hazards, maladies and costs associated with medieval travel, it could be difficult to find individuals even willing to take on envoy duties. Moreover, in some cases, envoys appointed for a mission were simply unable or too ill-equipped to carry out said assignment. In 1257 Henry wrote to Master John Mansel informing him of how difficult it had proved to find anyone who was both suitable and willing to go on embassy to Castile – only the abbot of Shrewsbury and John of Sumercote had committed themselves. The king then asked Mansel to tell these two men what to do and say on this diplomatic mission to Castile, as they were not experienced enough to carry out the mission alone, but had showed the willingness to go. Evidently, the nature of representation was subject to such great flexibility partly out of necessity. A ruler could be vastly restricted by the availability of suitable representatives.

Due to the itinerant character of the royal and papal courts, envoys would have to be well informed of their whereabouts before arrival. During Alexander IV’s pontificate, he faced many problems with the Roman Senate and as such he spent most of his pontificate in either Viterbo or Anagni, both of which were a couple of days march from Rome. Alexander was particularly attached to Anagni as it was where he had grown up and started his ecclesiastical career as a canon of Anagni cathedral in 1208.

War and hostility between kingdoms could cause further problems. Typically, envoys were given diplomatic immunity and ‘safe conduct’, which helped protect them on their journey through

230 Ibid., p. 162.
231 Annales Stadenses, p. 340; Birch, Pilgrimage Routes, p. 55.
234 CR, 1256–9, pp. 149–50.
235 This trouble in Rome has been discussed on p. 35. Viterbo was 80 km north-west of Rome and Anagni was 71 km south-west of Rome.
hostile territory. Moreover, between 1243–1259, England and France were engaged in a number of truces which culminated in the Treaty of Paris in 1259. In theory, this made the travel route between England and the papal curia safer. That being said, a medieval truce did not equate to the end of all violence between these kingdoms and there were many reports of breaches being made to these truces throughout the 1240s and 1250s.\(^\text{237}\) According to Matthew Paris, both Giles de Bridport, bishop-elect of Salisbury, and Richard Crokesley, Abbot of Westminster, had experienced much injury on their journey to the papal curia in 1256 ‘due to the hostility of the French’.\(^\text{238}\) Some of the greatest hinderances to travel between England and the curia during the thirteenth century were provoked by domestic political turmoil in England. For example, on 8 January 1259, the English barons had issued orders to the barons and bailiffs of the Cinque Ports to ensure that no magnate might enter or leave England without ‘the king's special licence’ for safe conduct which was issued by the English chancery – presently controlled by the baronial council.\(^\text{239}\) Henry had to secretly help the papal nuncio, Master Velascus, O.F.M, acquire this licence without the barons knowing to gain him entry into the English realm.\(^\text{240}\)

**Payments to Envoys**

Envoys who undertook these missions between England and the papal curia were often rewarded greatly for their services. In the thirteenth century, the English Crown and the papacy had to take great measures to ensure sufficient remunerations to a growing number of representatives and agents working between these two polities. This section will explore the ways in which English and papal representatives were reimbursed for their services and what this reveals about the ways in which Alexander IV and Henry III managed and administered their finances. In general, there has been little research regarding payments to diplomatic representatives and agents throughout the

\(^\text{237}\) On 20 January 1256, Henry commissioned Peter de Montfort to regulate the cases of broken truces that had already been submitted to the examination of the French by Simon de Montfort and Peter of Savoy, *Foedera*, I/1, p. 335. On 18 April 1257, Henry appointed the bishop of Hereford, Master Bernard Aysun, constable of Bordeaux, and Master Peter Franc, to treat with the French party regarding interruptions to their truce, *CPR*, 1247–58, p. 549.


\(^\text{239}\) *CPR*, 1258–66, p. 8.

\(^\text{240}\) See this case in Reginald Francis Treherne, ‘Unauthorised use of the Great Seal’, *English Historical Review*, 40 (1925), 403–411 (404).
thirteenth century. This is mainly due to a lack of surviving financial records for the first half of the thirteenth century; there are no surviving registers from the papal chamber for this period. This study will draw together evidence from both the surviving English administrative records as well as existing papal registers to understand how envoys were paid, and what this reveals about the wider process of Anglo-papal representation in the thirteenth century.

As mentioned in Chapter One, both the English Crown and the papal curia were facing extensive financial difficulties in the mid-thirteenth century. When assessing payments to envoys throughout this period, then, it is important to remember that both the papacy and the English Crown were looking for methods of repayment which were readily available, and which minimised the impact on their own treasuries. Furthermore, when assessing remunerations to envoys it should be noted that envoys sent on important diplomatic missions were often 'the most trusted servants of their masters', who were given much privilege and favour in order to ensure their loyalty. Thus, payments and gifts to these envoys are also likely to reflect their masters’ desire to secure and maintain their loyalty, particularly as their services might be required again in the future.

English and papal representatives and agents could be remunerated for their services in a range of ways. Traditionally, the payment each envoy received, and from whom they received them, was reflected by their professional background as well as the services they performed. Hence, clerical envoys were typically rewarded for performing diplomatic services through provisions for ecclesiastical benefices, namely church positions with stipends attached, and favours from the papacy such as indults, dispensations and indulgences. Equally, lay envoys could receive cash sums or gifts from the king as well as favours from the papacy. Methods of repayment to envoys were highly flexible. Each envoy could gain access to different methods of remunerations from the pope and the English king. The kind of payment received varied depending on the status, career, skills, experience, duties, and personal connections of each envoy.

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Remunerations to English Representatives

In the thirteenth century, one of the ways in which English representatives and agents travelling to the papal curia could be reimbursed for their expenses and services was through cash payments. During Henry III’s reign, these payments were typically made through the wardrobe. This continued until 1327, after which payments were made through the exchequer.244

From the beginning of Henry’s reign, the wardrobe was responsible for collecting and dispensing revenue to support the daily requirements of the king.245 During Henry’s personal rule (1234–1258), the wardrobe became ‘the chief and most conspicuous department of domestic finance’.246 In his utilisation of the wardrobe, Henry could assert more freedom and independence over the management and use of his finances.247 He could use this office to bypass the barons of the exchequer and move money straight in and out of the royal coffers. The wardrobe was essentially a more portable version of the exchequer which the king could exploit on his frequent travels between England and the continent.248

The existing wardrobe accounts from Henry III’s reign start from 1224 and are the earliest to survive for any English monarch. They cover 35 years of Henry’s 56-year reign, although these accounts have largely survived in fragments.249 Wild records evidence of 15 wardrobe accounts submitted for audit, or drafted for audit, at the exchequer, managed by a total of ten ‘keepers of the wardrobe’.250 These keepers were often low-ranking administrators such as clerks, courtiers and household officials – individuals whom the king could trust to manage his personal finances.251 Peter Chaceporc, the longest serving keeper from 28 October 1241 until his death on 24 December 1254, may have been also been a member of the Poitevin family, although Wild argues that he was ‘a royal

248 Cuttino, English Diplomatic Administration, p. 171.
249 Most of Henry III’s personal rule (1234–1258) is covered within the wardrobe accounts, Wild, ‘Royal Finance’, 1380.
250 Wild, Wardrobe Accounts, xiv. Records produced by the wardrobe were meant to be audited at the exchequer, abbreviated and enrolled on the Pipe Rolls (E 372) or Chancellor’s Rolls (E 352). Yet, there are no audited wardrobe accounts in the pipe rolls for 1252–1255 and 1256–1261, Richard Cassidy, Pipe Roll, p. 147. The draft wardrobe accounts of 8 July 1258–25 July 1261, TNA, E 361/1 have been transcribed and analysed by Wild, Wardrobe Accounts, pp. cxxxii–cli.
251 Tout, Chapters, i. p. 294.
favourite in his own right’.\(^{252}\) It is also worth noting that several keepers of the wardrobe, including Chaceporc, also acted as envoys on the king’s behalf.\(^{253}\) Clearly, they could be appointed to conduct a range of duties, as Church has noted, the royal servants of the king had to be ‘omni-competent’ – able to take on a variety of roles on his behalf.\(^{254}\)

Wild has recorded wardrobe expenditure to messengers (nuncii) of approx. £6149 for the period between 1224 and 1272.\(^{255}\) More specific to the period under study in this thesis, Wild records payments to envoys between 1255–1256 totalling £209 4s. 0½d. and between 1258–1261 they were placed at £763 4s. 0½d.\(^{256}\) On average, payments to envoys through the wardrobe came to about £240 a year. Alongside these wardrobe accounts, there are two surviving accounts for Henry’s reign regarding expenditure to envoys based on the exchequer accounts for all envoys travelling abroad. They cover the Queen’s accounts from 24 June 1252–24 June 1253 and the King’s accounts from 29 October 1264–27 October 1265.\(^{257}\) The total sum paid through Eleanor’s accounts came to £65 16s. 1d.\(^{258}\) These accounts record two hundred and eighty entries regarding payments to envoys, ten of whom went to the papal curia on the queen’s behalf.\(^{259}\) In contrast, the total sum paid through the king’s accounts came to only £13 5s. 10½d.\(^{260}\) This low sum in 1264–1265 was most likely the result of political circumstances. During this time, Henry was engaged in civil war against his barons. Following the king’s defeat at the battle of Lewes in May 1264, Simon de Montfort and his barons had usurped the government.\(^{261}\) Montfort had spent the next year trying to consolidate his position and from December 1264 to March 1265 he was ‘at the height of his power’, which had declined by the summer of 1265. During this time, he was more focused on domestic reform.\(^{262}\) Hence, it might

\(^{253}\) Peter Chaceporc was the king’s envoy in France, Aragon, and at the papal curia, R. C. Stacey, ‘Chaceporc, Peter (d.1254)’, *ODNB*, Artaldo de Sancto Romano, keeper of the wardrobe from 10 January 1255–October 1257, was appointed as Henry’s envoy on a mission to Paris in June 1257 see p. 76.
\(^{255}\) Wild, ‘Royal Finance’, 1380.
\(^{257}\) TNA, E 101/308/1, E 101/308/2.
\(^{258}\) I would like to thank Abby Armstrong for letting me look at her transcription of the Queen’s wardrobe accounts in TNA, E 101/308/1 (2 mems).
\(^{259}\) TNA, E 101/308/1.
\(^{260}\) TNA, E 101/308/2 (2 mems).
\(^{261}\) Moreover, the exchequer had also been closed from February 1264 until Michaelmas 1264, probably due to riots in London, Maddicott, *Simon de Montfort*, p. 287.
\(^{262}\) Maddicott, *Simon de Montfort*, p. 308. For more on Simon de Montfort’s period of rule see Maddicott, *Simon de Montfort*, pp. 279–345.
be more appropriate think of these as the barons’ accounts and not the king’s accounts, reducing their reliability as a record of envoy expenditure for the reign of Henry III.

The Close, Patent and Liberate Rolls have also recorded evidence of sums awarded to envoys during Henry’s reign. It is here that we can learn more about specific payments to envoys acting at the papal curia on the king’s behalf. For example, on 4 August 1258, Philip Lovel, the king’s treasurer, was commissioned to pay the archbishop of Tarentaise, the archbishop of Embrun and Master Rostand 300 marks each for expenses incurred on their mission at the papal curia and 100 marks to the king’s proctors, Robert de Baro and Master Giordano for assisting these envoys at Rome. According to Queller, the amounts provided to envoys ‘varied according to the rank of the envoy, the size of the entourage, the duration and nature of the mission, the state of the treasury and the generosity of the monarch or ruling body’. In this example, the envoys are receiving the equivalent of £200 each in expenses. This is partly indicative of their rank, particularly in the case of the two archbishops. Certainly, the sum awarded to an envoy could vary from case to case, even in cases where the same envoy was appointed. For example, on 19 February 1256, William Bonquer, king’s knight and marshal, received 130 marks (approx. £87) towards his expenses in going beyond the sea. On 8 November 1256 he received £100 and his clerk, Master Peter de Lymoges, received only 40 marks (approx. £27), to cover their expenses in going to the papal curia. By contrast, on 23 May 1259, Bonquer received 200 marks (£133) to cover his expenses for his mission to the papal curia. This confirms that the sum received in expenses was valued based on a number of factors including the length of the mission, the duties held by the envoy as well as the rank of the envoy.

There is evidence that Henry III awarded a number of cash payments to agents acting as proctors on his behalf at the papal curia through the chamber and the exchequer. For example, on 16 November 1255, while attending to the king’s affairs at the curia, the papal notary, Master Giordano, was to receive 40 marks a year to be paid at midsummer from the king’s chamber until

263 CR, 1256–9, p. 253.
264 Queller, Office of Ambassador, p. 166.
266 Ibid., p. 338.
267 Ibid., p. 462.
268 The chamber was a household office of finance. In the early years of Henry III’s reign, its role had overlapped with that of the wardrobe and the wardrobe was originally the subordinate of the two offices, Tout, Chapters, i. pp. 160, 188.
the king could provide for him more amply. Similarly, Robert de Baro and Finatus of Savoy, the king’s proctors at the papal curia, were to receive 20 marks a year from the chamber, which Henry increased in the following year. One further example was on 20 May 1259, when a payment was made to Master Angelus Romanus, king’s clerk and canon of Cambrai, of 40 marks a year to be paid at the exchequer until the king found him an ecclesiastical benefice worth ‘80 marks of rent’, for engaging in the king’s business at Rome on behalf of the king’s envoys there. Often, these payments made at the exchequer and chamber were intended as a temporary solution while more permanent provisions could be sourced.

As the king’s finances dwindled, he started to borrow more money to make payments to envoys through debts owed to the English king or through loans. For example, in 1255–1256, the king’s brother, Richard of Cornwall, had loaned a vast sum through the wardrobe. This money could be used to pay envoys’ expenses, amongst other things. In May 1258 Henry borrowed £500 from the merchants of Siena and Florence to pay the expenses of William Bonquer and other envoys going to the papal curia on his behalf.

When the barons were in control of government between 1258 and 1261, they made efforts to reform and control all payments going in and out of the wardrobe, and to encourage payments to be made through the exchequer. According to Tout, the wardrobe was not much impacted by these reforms in 1258. While Cassidy has noted that, although the reforms were short-lived, ‘the exchequer provided a much greater proportion of wardrobe income in 1258–61’ than it had done previously. This suggests at least some success in their attempts to regulate the income and activity of the wardrobe while the barons maintained control. Ultimately, however, this reform period (1258–

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269 CPR, 1247–58, p. 449.
270 Ibid., pp. 449–50.
272 Cuttino, English Diplomatic Administration, p. 167.
274 From this loan, William Bonquer received 250 marks at London, 100 of which was for his personal use, CPR, 1247–58, pp. 629, 634; Cassidy, Pipe Roll, p. 48.
275 The Provisions of Oxford, in June-July 1258: ‘[14] Concerning the treasurer and the exchequer. The same [appointment for one year only, as for the Justiciar] as to the treasurer; but he must render account at the end of the year. And other good men shall be appointed at the exchequer according to the ordinances of the twenty-four [the reforming council chosen by the king and barons]. And all the revenues of the land shall come there, and nowhere else. And whatever seems to require reform shall be reformed’, DBM, pp. 106–7.
276 Tout, Chapters, i, pp. 298–302.
277 Cassidy, Pipe Roll, p. 147.
1261) did not have a massive impact on the activities of the wardrobe or the payments to envoys made through this account.

**Remunerations to Papal Representatives**

While English envoys received payments for their expenses primarily from the wardrobe accounts, papal agents were expected to exact procurations of a specified amount from the local clergy to pay for food, lodging and necessities for themselves and their entourage while on mission abroad. This meant that the pope would not be burdened by the maintenance costs incurred by envoys on mission. Likewise, they were usually paid for their services through provisions to ecclesiastical benefices, which will be discussed in the following section.

Originally the right of a papal envoy to ask for food and necessities from the clergy relied on custom, but in 1179 the Third Lateran Council issued several canons which regulated the levy of these procurations. Later, in 1199, Innocent III ruled that all churches were bound to provide procurations for all papal legates and nuncios, unless they were in some way exempted by special privilege. He qualified this order by stating that no church or prelate should be unduly burdened by these costs. The Fourth Lateran Council sought to further regulate the limits surrounding an envoy’s exaction of procurations. Regardless, the exaction of procurations became an on-going source of tension between papal envoys and the English Church throughout the thirteenth century. In 1216, the papal legate Guala Bicchieri had exacted a procuration of £2 10s. from each cathedral and conventual church in England. The thirteenth-century Annalist of Barwell heavily implied that Guala had exploited the English Church, noting that ‘he returned to Rome with infinite money acquired every which way’. Pope Alexander IV made efforts to further regulate these exactions by

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281 Canon 33, ‘Fourth Lateran Council, 1215’, *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils*, i. p. 250.
282 Letters and Charters, p. lxi.
283 Flores Historiarum, iii. p. 379.
ensuring that each envoy carried a papal letter outlining the nature of the procuration which he could levy.285

The letter was to state the number of horses and followers allowed to the envoy, and if he should be present or in the neighbourhood and produce the letter, or if he should be absent and send copies of the letter by his agents, the local prelates and ecclesiastical persons would be responsible for providing him with food and necessities for the specified number in an amount proportioned to the length of his stay.286

Moreover, Alexander IV ordered that envoys could only request procurations from dioceses they passed on their way to and from their destination.287 Yet, this did not stop the envoys from exacting extensive procurations. Giovanni Colonna, the first nuncio to arrive under this new system, ignored this new rule and on 17 February 1257 sent letters to each English bishop asking for full procuration of £2 from each church which had previously provided for former papal nuncios and legates in England.288 The amount which an envoy could procure depended on the importance of his position in relation to the powers and duties assigned to him in his letter of procuration.289 Lunt has argued that by the mid-thirteenth century a nuncio could procure a daily allowance of three marks.290

In May 1258, mandates brought by the papal nuncio, Master Arlot, exacting procurations from the English clergy, differed from those issued by Giovanni Colonna a year previous.291 Lunt reports that procurations of an equal amount were to be collected ‘from each monastery, church, house and ecclesiastical place of the bishop’s city, diocese and cathedral’ excepting ‘those churches which either were not accustomed or were not able to pay full procurations’ who were allowed to pay less.292 Moreover, Master Arlot regretted to admit his daily needs which forced him to apply for procurations, especially as everything was more than twice as expensive due to the particularly poor harvest in the previous year.293 He showed more reluctance than other envoys to take procurations from struggling clerical communities in England. Papal collectors (those assigned to collect taxes on

287 Reg. Alex IV, i. no. 1323.
290 Ibid.
behalf of the papacy) were also given letters of commendation to the English clergy which allowed them to exact procurations of a specified amount from the clergy while they were undertaking their duties. Lunt has noted that procurations to collectors typically varied ‘from seven to ten shillings a day’ and they were to be supplied ‘with replacements of mounts which might become disabled’. 294

Ultimately, procurations to papal representatives could vary depending on the mandate and powers assigned to them by each pope. Regardless, these procurations were to be levied from the resident clergy and this could cause problems. As mentioned, the English Church, and the country at large, were overburdened by the cost of the king’s failed expeditions abroad and requests for crusading taxes. Moreover, they were suffering from a succession of harvest failures in 1255, 1256 and 1257 which resulted in a food crisis in 1258. 295 They resented further requests for procurations from an increasing number of papal envoys coming to England during this period of economic hardship and political turmoil.

For their services, papal representatives could be paid in cash out of crusading tax collection in England. For example, in 1255, Master Rostand had been granted a cash payment of 400 marks a year out of this collection ‘for as long as he was engaged in the business of the cross’. 296 This payment was awarded to Rostand for his role as leading papal collector in England. Expenses incurred by papal envoys could also be covered via this method. Indeed, Pope Alexander IV had mandated Master Rostand to pay the expenses of the bishop of Bologna and his company out of the money acquired from the crusade collection, which the pope granted to the king for the business of the realm of Sicily. 297 Through these two examples it is clear that the pope utilised money from the crusading collection in England to pay both the annual wages and to refund expenses of his envoys. Money from the collection was effectively taken and used as and when required. Thus, it was the English Church who bore the burden of papal diplomacy in England, a fact of which they were very aware and to which they were openly opposed.

294 Lunt, Financial Relations, pp. 546–7, 575
295 In 1258, wheat prices, for example, were 172% above average, Bruce M. S. Campbell, ‘Global Climates, the 1257 Mega-eruption of Samalas Volcano, Indonesia, and the English Food Crisis of 1258’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 27 (2017), 87–121 (90).
297 Ibid., p. 509.
Benefices, Gifts, Favours and Privileges

As mentioned, envoys could be rewarded informally for their services through provisions to ecclesiastical benefices throughout the thirteenth century. This was especially the case for envoys engaged in Anglo-papal business, who were typically from a clerical background.

From the twelfth century, the papacy could directly award individuals with provisions to ecclesiastical benefices, whereas previously, applicants had needed the support of either a local bishop, lay patron or the Crown to gain such an appointment.²⁹⁸ Hence, it became easier for the papacy to reimburse its representatives and agents through papal provisions. According to Smith, the extent to which this system was utilised varied depending on the personality of each pope as well as political and economic context.²⁹⁹

This new route to clerical benefices, combined with the growth in diplomatic and administrative activity between England and the papacy, resulted in greater competition from a wider number of English and foreign men, seeking provisions to benefices in England.³⁰⁰ In fact, the frequent appointment of foreigners to benefices in England in the thirteenth century led to ‘much discontent and anger among the English people’ towards both the Crown and the papacy.³⁰¹ Yet, papal provisions had enabled both the papacy and the English Crown to more easily reward their envoys and agents without putting any strain on their personal treasuries.³⁰²

Smith has noted that in the mid-thirteenth century there was a ‘large spike’ in the number of papal provisions to English benefices. Indeed, Pope Alexander IV issued around fifty-five documents a year concerning provisions to English benefices – higher than the number made by his immediate predecessors and successors.³⁰³ This increase in the number of papal provisions for English benefices corresponds with a period when the pope and the English king were engaged in a frequent diplomatic exchanges concerning their joint political endeavour in Sicily. This business directly increased the

²⁹⁹ Smith, ‘The Italian Connection Reconsidered’ (forthcoming).
³⁰² Plöger observed this for the English king, Plöger, England and the Avignon Popes, pp. 165–6.
³⁰³ Innocent IV was issuing approximately 48 documents per annum regarding English benefices, Alexander IV about 55, and Urban IV around 38, Smith, ‘The Italian Connection Reconsidered’ (forthcoming).

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number of representatives seeking reimbursement for their services. The papacy was largely responding to requests for provisions and favours sought by envoys and external petitioners.  

Provisions for ecclesiastical benefices were often made ‘through gift of the king’ as in some cases this route was quicker than papal provisions. The king was keen to offer patronage to envoys who had proved themselves loyal agents of royal policy. Master Rostand, papal nuncio and royal proctor, stands out as a frequent recipient of ecclesiastical benefices in England through royal gift. Between 1255 and 1257, he received benefices in the churches of York, Bruges, Dalston, Berking (although this was cancelled), Horncastle, Stratham-by-Ely and Gislingham. Rostand was able to exploit his good relationship with the king to be fast-tracked into these appointments. Similarly, John Mansel another leading royal envoy who had performed business at the papal curia, was gifted with many provisions to benefices in England. For example, in January 1256 he was gifted by the king with the treasurership of the church of York, which was a highly prestigious gift. In 1252 Matthew Paris had reported of Mansel’s immense wealth in England.

Envoys who attended to the king’s business at the papal curia often held extensive benefices and dignities in England. This was partly because they could personally seek papal dispensations for themselves and their associates while attending to the king’s business at the curia. When engaged in the king’s business at the papal curia in 1256, Giles de Bridport, bishop-elect of Salisbury, had obtained papal permission to retain the revenues of his former clerical offices. This was then considered part of the remuneration for his services on behalf of the king. Thanks to his position as royal envoy at the papal curia, Giles had been able to present his own petitions before the papacy. This was not uncommon practice in the thirteenth century. Indeed, Matthew Paris infers that clerics were often granted the revenue from their former offices, upon request, in remuneration for their

304 Smith, ‘The Italian Connection Reconsidered’ (forthcoming).
305 CM, v. p. 521; CR, 1254–6, p. 147; CPR, 1247–58, pp. 429, 455, 549–50, 559, 561, 564, 606. The annals of Dunstable note that Rostand was (at some point) also given a benefice at Saint Paul’s, London, AM, iii. p. 214. He also held benefices at St Peter in the East and St Cross in Oxford, CPR, 1247–58, p. 559.
306 CPR, 1247–58, p. 455. He also held the Chancellorship of St Paul’s, London from 1243; the Deanship of Wimborne from 1246; the Provostship of Beverley from 1247; as well as many livings, amongst them: ‘Axminster in Devon; Howden and Hooton in Yorkshire; Wigan in Lancashire; and Ferring in Sussex’, R. C. Stacey, ‘Mansel, John (d.1265)’, ODNB, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/17989 [Accessed on 30 October 2019]. In 1259, the Alexander IV confirmed all the dignities and benefices which Mansel held with or without dispensations, Reg. Alex IV, iii. no. 2811; CPL, i. p. 363.
services at the curia.\textsuperscript{309} Envoys who went on mission to the curia were provided with great opportunity for reward.

Papal and royal envoys could also request royal and papal gifts for their family, staff and members of their household.\textsuperscript{310} This was another means of rewarding them for their service. Alexander IV had ordered Henry III to ensure that Arlottucius, the nephew of Master Arlot, papal nuncio in England, was received in England and granted a pension of £20 per annum ‘as a mark of favour to his uncle’, whose support and advice the king had frequently requested.\textsuperscript{311} This was to be granted at the exchequer of Michaelmas until the king provided fuller provision for him ‘in wards or escheats to that value’.\textsuperscript{312} Likewise, the pope awarded power to the royal envoy, Giles of Bridport, bishop-elect of Salisbury, to grant a dispensation to his brother, Master Simon, and three of his clerks to each hold an additional benefice with cure of souls.\textsuperscript{313} The same opportunity was granted in November 1256 to Master Rostand, when he was also given power to provide dispensations for three of his clerks to hold an additional benefice each with cure of souls.\textsuperscript{314} However, getting payment to a named recipient was not always as straightforward as promising it. In the case of Arlottucius, it took some time for him to receive his promised pension from the king. It was not until October 1260, that Henry wrote to Nicholas de Haudlo, keeper of the temporalities of the bishop of Winchester, requesting him to let Arlottucius have his £20 pension ‘without delay’ for the last Michaelmas term and for the next.\textsuperscript{315}

The English king could also award material gifts and privileges to papal and royal envoys in thanks for their diplomatic services and to ensure their continued loyalty. Evidence of gifts being made to Anglo-papal envoys can be found in English records dating from the early thirteenth century. On 17 August 1215, following assistance from Pope Innocent III in quelling the baronial rebels through an order of excommunication (dated 7 July 1215), King John gifted two unnamed papal

\textsuperscript{309} CM, v. p. 612.
\textsuperscript{310} Plöger, \textit{England and the Avignon Popes}, p. 165.
\textsuperscript{311} On 20 May 1259, Henry’s council made this grant to Arlottucius, \textit{CPR}, 1258–66, p. 22. On 8 September, Alexander IV asked Henry to accept Arlottucius into his realm, TNA, SC 7/38/2.
\textsuperscript{312} \textit{CPR}, 1258–66, p. 22.
\textsuperscript{313} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 339.
\textsuperscript{314} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 338. These three clerks may have been Robert de Brandebry, Thomas Dru, and Gacellinus Galardi who had accompanied Master Rostand on his mission to the papal curia earlier that year.
\textsuperscript{315} TNA, SC 1/2/72; \textit{CLR}, 1251–60, p. 531.
nuncios with two robes of either green or brown. Presumably these unnamed nuncios helped carry out the papal instructions against the rebels. For the reign of Henry III, there are records of frequent gifts of timber, venison and wine to agents who held royal favour. Henry’s particular interest in building work, noted by Susan Wood, may explain his numerous gifts of timber and oak to favoured subjects. Aside from the offer of material gifts, granting privileges was another way to secure favour of certain envoys and agents. In particular, the English king made many allowances for certain suspects to be excused from their crimes or debts at the request of his favoured agents. Indeed, Henry awarded a staggering amount of pardons at the request of Brother John Darlington throughout this period.

Some individuals received royal gifts and favours as a direct result of their envoy duties (like in the case mentioned above from 1215), while others received these awards intermittently as thanks for their continued service. Indeed, those chosen to be envoys were often appointed because they had already proven themselves loyal supporters of the king in other capacities. John Darlington was royal councillor and personal confessor of Henry III before he was appointed as an envoy. As highlighted above, there was no clear separation between individuals who acted as envoys and individuals who acted in other governmental positions. This was a flexible system which is reflected by its gifting process.

The king could also award gifts and favours to papal envoys as thanks for specific activities in England. According to Matthew Paris, in 1255 the bishop of Bologna and the bishop of Toulouse

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316 Memoriale fratris Walteri de Coventria, ii. p. 223; Rotuli Litterarum Clausarum in Turri Londinensi asservati, ed. T. Duffus Hardy, 2 vols (London 1833–4), i. p. 226. Likewise, in December 1255, Henry III ordered for a good cloth to be made for the papal nuncio Master Rostand to wear at the Christmas feast. Later, on 25 May 1257, Henry ordered a red robe for Rostand to be worn at the feast of Pentecost, CR, 1254–6, p. 58; CR, 1256–9, p. 247. On 7 July 1215, Pope Innocent IV had ordered the bishop of Winchester, the abbot of Reading and Master Panduph to discipline those who conspire against the king, CCA, DCC-ChAnt/M247.

317 For example, Master Nicholas of Plimpton received several gifts of venison from the king, CR, 1256–9, pp. 10, 271, 354; the bishop of Salisbury received gifts of venison; pp. 257–8, 275, 375. Master John Clarel was also gifted with venison, CR, 1256–9, p. 409. Similarly, Master Rostand was granted permission to bring 105 tuns of wine to England from Gascony for ‘his personal use’, CPR, 1247–58, p. 549.


319 John Darlington, O.F.P., was Henry’s royal chaplain and councillor who had been appointed as a royal envoy, CPR, 1247–58, pp. 457, 555, 630; CPR, 1258–66, pp. 379, 508, 514, 526, 557, 558, 578, 604, 623, 637, 645.

320 For more on John Darlington see pp. 169–70.
left England with ‘priceless gifts’ following their mission.\footnote{Matthew Paris noted that the bishop of Bologna was granted ‘with rich presents’, \textit{CM}, v. p. 515. Later on, he notes that both the bishop of Bologna and the bishop of Toulouse departed with great gifts, \textit{CM}, v. pp. 532–3.} Another case saw the papal nuncio, Master Mansuetus, O.F.M, who had mediated peace between Henry and Louis IX on behalf of the pope, receive gifts and favours in direct response to his activities. Louis IX had gifted him a piece of the Crown of Thorns and a piece of the True Cross, two highly prestigious gifts which also reflected the great piety of the French king.\footnote{Caroleus-Barré, L., ‘Le reliquaire de la sainte Épine d’Assise: Fra Mansueto et le traité de Paris, 1258–9’, \textit{Bulletin de la Société nationale des antiquaires de France} (1989), 121–31 (128); Carolus-Barré has included the \textit{vidimus} of this letter to Mansuetus on 130–1. Mansuetus had helped Henry secure a promise from Louis of enough money to hire five hundred knights for two years which could be used to continue the business in Sicily, \textit{CR}, 1256–9, pp. 325–6.} It is highly probable that Henry III also awarded gifts to Mansuetus in thanks for his assistance, though there is no surviving evidence of this. What is evident, is that on 4 May 1258, the English king had pardoned Walter son of Henry le Chamberleng and John son of Walter Kychenoure for the death of John Elynton, at the instance of the papal nuncio, Mansuetus.\footnote{CPR, 1247–58, pp. 626–7.} This privilege was also granted as thanks for Mansuetus’ service on behalf of the king.

The pope was under less pressure to award gifts directly to his envoys in England as they could be thanked for their services by the English king, as seen above, as well as members of the English Church. Indeed, some papal envoys received ‘small gratuities’, in addition to procurations, from English clerical communities. For example, in 1257 the monks at St Augustine’s Abbey in Canterbury had gifted ‘3 shillings’ to papal envoys.\footnote{Lambeth Palace Library, MS 242. fol. 1v.} Lunt argued that this act of gifting was ‘common practice’ by the mid-thirteenth century. Moreover, he suggested that the value and number of the gifts made to papal envoys depended on the duties they had performed as part of the embassy, and the solemnity of the mission.\footnote{Lunt, \textit{Financial Relations}, i. p. 544.} Lunt further argued that papal envoys who acted as special collectors in England, namely those collecting a temporary tax such as the crusading tax, ‘did not often receive papal provisions to English benefices’ and were granted fewer privileges than general collectors.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, i. p. 592. Master Rostand was an exception to this rule, \textit{Reg. Alex IV}, ii. nos. 2393–6.} Arguably, the rules surrounding payments to papal envoys were highly dependent on circumstantial factors – each occasion was judged on a case by case basis. Nonetheless, from this examination it becomes increasingly apparent that the cost of Anglo-papal diplomacy was being placed on the English Church.
Conclusion

While Chapter One of this thesis explored the role and intervention of the pope in a number of English political matters between 1254 and 1261, this chapter has highlighted the important role played by envoys throughout Anglo-papal relations. It has established a number of general modes and methods involved in the practice of representation between England and the papacy which developed throughout the first half of the thirteenth century. Moreover, it has highlighted the flexible and fluid practice of Anglo-papal representation, reflected both in the conduct of Anglo-papal missions, the appointments of agents, the physical journey and even the methods of payment to envoys. It also recognises the fundamental impact of contemporary events on the appointment of envoys.

While a number of historians have ascribed classifications to different types of English and papal envoy, in reality, this taxonomy was not so clear cut. An envoy could hold a range of powers and perform a variety of duties in accordance with their mandate. That being said, there were cases when a particular category of envoy was requested to undertake certain business, as they held the appropriate powers and prestige to perform this act.

The makeup of a diplomatic embassy varied depending on the requirements of the mission. Likewise, the identity of representatives chosen for Anglo-papal missions would also vary based on the nature and purpose of the mission, the availability of certain individuals, the political and economic context and the personalities of both sender and recipient. Often, on high-profile missions, high-status envoys were essentially appointed as figureheads, whereas clerks and scribes were integral to the physical running of the embassy.

For the first half of the thirteenth century, there was also a notable increase in the appointment of administrators as both English and papal agents of diplomacy, who had the ability and skill to engage with the increasingly complex administrations at both the papal curia and the English court. Likewise, the majority of envoys engaging in Anglo-papal matters held a clerical office and as such could be appointed to perform duties on behalf of both the pope and the English king.

Envoys could face a number of problems when travelling to their destination, which could be greatly impacted by contemporary events, particularly hostilities and weather patterns. These were
dangerous journeys which could dissuade agents from wanting to attend to the business of their sender and could lead to the appointment of inexperienced and unsuitable representatives.

Throughout the thirteenth century, the cost of Anglo-papal diplomacy increasingly fell on the English Church. They paid heavy taxes towards the crusading policies of the pope and the king, committed procurations to papal envoys in England and were also expected to provide provisions for benefices to favoured royal and papal envoys and their *familiares*.

In order to fully understand the practice of Anglo-papal representation in the mid-thirteenth century, envoy appointments must be examined on a case by case study in exploring the specific powers and duties ascribed to representatives to carry out a particular mission. Therefore, the next chapter will take a closer look at a number of case-studies to explore the subtle nuances and particularities of Anglo-papal interactions, to track the developments of this practice of representation and to see how it was impacted by the wider political context in the mid-thirteenth century.
Chapter Three - Representation: The Case Studies (1254–1261)

As demonstrated in Chapter Two, the practice and conduct of Anglo-papal representation was highly flexible during the first half of the thirteenth century. Agents were appointed on a ‘part-time basis’ to carry out tasks assigned to them in their mandate. A range of representatives and agents, from a variety of backgrounds, could be appointed to assist in the management of relations between these two polities. Indeed, the number and type of people appointed as representatives, and the roles assigned to them, changed and developed to reflect the evolving position of both English and papal governments throughout the thirteenth century.

Bishops and archbishops, English magnates, royal and papal administrators and household officials were all utilised as representatives in diplomatic missions between Henry III and Pope Alexander IV. This chapter will take a closer look at the diplomatic representatives appointed to manage business on behalf of these two rulers. It will highlight different types of representative: bishops and archbishops, English lay magnates, administrators and household officials, who were utilised in these Anglo-papal relations. It will do so by using a number of case studies to indicate who was actually chosen for diplomatic service and why. This chapter will further explore the powers and duties entrusted to each envoy and ask how they shaped and influenced the diplomatic relations through their actions. Ultimately, this chapter will shed light on the highly complex and influential role played by representatives throughout diplomatic relations between Henry III and Pope Alexander IV.

Bishops and Archbishops

According to Queller, members of the clergy were some of the most commonly utilised diplomatic personnel between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries.1 In his discussion of diplomatic representation between secular powers, he argued that the prominent appointment of clerics as envoys was ‘partly because of the protection afforded by their garb, partly because of their education, and partly because of the religious aura which surrounded diplomatic discourse.’2 Cuttino suggested that the ‘higher clergy’, along with the ‘higher nobility’, were often appointed as diplomatic envoys

1 Queller, Office of Ambassador, pp. 150, 153–4.
due to their intimate association ‘with the domestic affairs of the realm’. It was certainly true that while all envoys received a certain level of diplomatic immunity in the form of ‘safe-conduct’ when travelling through opposing territories, those with ‘privilege of the clergy’ had an added layer of protection. Those who received clerical training, especially those of a high-ranking status such as bishops and archbishops, would have often studied at university. There, they would have received six years of study in the liberal arts followed by further study in either rational, moral and natural philosophy, theology, or law. This education equipped clerics with a command of rhetorical practices, and often a grounding in theology and canon law (and sometimes also civil law), making them suitable agents of diplomacy. Theology was ‘the ‘queen’ of disciplines’ which played an important role ‘in the narratives of papal, imperial and royal authority’ and as such featured heavily throughout diplomatic communications, particularly between lay rulers and the papacy. Likewise, religiosity was often synonymous with qualities of trustworthiness and foresight, which were valued traits in any diplomatic representative. Clearly, clerical appointees were chosen as diplomatic representatives for a variety of reasons. Nonetheless, Queller overlooked how clerical appointments in negotiations between secular rulers and the papacy could be greatly influenced by their dual loyalties to these two polities. Bishops and archbishops were frequently chosen for missions between the English Crown and the papacy throughout the thirteenth century because they were important church officials who held personal connections and loyalties to the English king and queen. Alexander IV and Henry III were particularly keen to appoint representatives who held loyalties to both Church and Crown as their relationship was largely shaped by mutual endeavours in Sicily.

The English Crown appointed a number of English prelates, particularly bishops and archbishops, as envoys to the papal curia. From the time of the Norman Conquest, the Crown had strongly asserted its right to influence the appointment of leading church officials, including bishops and archbishops, within its realm. As such, they would use this power to promote the appointments

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4 Canon 15 of the Second Lateran Council (1139) protected clerics and monks against acts of violence, through the bond of anathema, *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils*, i. p. 200.
7 In the thirteenth century, bishops and archbishops were appointed by capitular election. This process included acceptance of the elect, assent by the king, followed by examination and then confirmation by the
of family members and loyal agents to a particular office. Yet, following much pressure from the English Church and the papacy, King John was forced to grant the ‘freedom of election charter’ on 21 November 1214, which stated that the elections of all prelates in his realm would be free, forever.9

As Harvey put it, John had effectively surrendered ‘the direct personal control’ of the English Crown over ecclesiastical elections.10 Nonetheless, by the mid-thirteenth century, many bishops and archbishops still owed their positions to royal patronage. For example, Aymer de Lusignan, Henry III’s Poitevin half-brother, was confirmed as the bishop-elect of Winchester by the pope in January 1251 after special lobbying by the king.11 The English king or queen could utilise the growing system of papal provisions to petition the pope through ‘informal channels’ at the curia to grant ecclesiastical benefices to royal candidates.12 Many royal candidates gained papal provision for benefices and dispensations through this system. Clearly, the English Crown was able to utilise alternative avenues to retain control over episcopal appointments in England. Four clerics, two of whom we know to have been appointed through royal patronage, were frequently utilised throughout diplomatic exchanges between Henry III and Alexander IV. They were: Peter d’Aigueblanche, bishop of Hereford (1240–1268); Boniface of Savoy, archbishop of Canterbury (1241–1270); Rudolph Grossi, archbishop of Tarentaise (c.1246–1260); and Hostiensis, archbishop of Embrun (1250–1262). All four of these men had personal connections to the English Crown, through the Queen’s Savoyard family.13

It is no coincidence that so many individuals with links to the Savoyard family appear in the diplomatic records conducting business between Henry and the papacy. As Ridgeway argued:

They [the Savoyards] originally owed their positions to Henry's need for allies on the continent and to his readiness to cultivate alliances, either by richly rewarding visitors or by encouraging representatives of families of which he hoped to make military or diplomatic use to settle in the English realm.14

9 CCA-DCc/ChAnt/C/109.
10 Harvey, Episcopal Appointments in England, p. 20.
12 Smith, ‘The Italian Connection Reconsidered’ (forthcoming).
Henry had intended to utilise members of the Savoy family as agents of war and foreign diplomacy. Certainly, those foreign allies who held clerical appointments could prove useful in negotiations with the papal curia.

Throughout the thirteenth century, it was not essential for a diplomatic representative to be a subject of the kingdom they were representing. However, Henry III was heavily criticised by his contemporaries for his appointment and favour of so many foreigners. Matthew Paris in particular was fierce in his criticism of Henry’s favour towards ‘aliens’ who had come to England and rapidly acquired high positions within the king’s court. Henry had his ‘foreign favourites’ as Ridgeway termed them, whom he trusted to carry out a range of diplomatic and military endeavours on his behalf, and those of whom held high clerical appointment proved particularly useful in diplomatic exchanges with the papal curia.

Henry’s increasing favour and appointment of foreign clerics, particularly bishops and archbishops, on diplomatic missions to the papal curia in the 1240s and 50s, resulted in a lower appointment of English prelates as Anglo-papal representatives. Furthermore, Henry was facing increasing opposition and complaints from his English prelates regarding his management of the realm between 1239 and 1265, most notably from Robert Grosseteste, bishop of Lincoln (1235–1253) and Walter de Cantilupe, bishop of Worcester (1237–1266), both of whom were close friends with Simon de Montfort and Adam Marsh, O.F.M.

Much like Henry III, Pope Alexander IV also appointed a number of bishops and archbishops to act on his behalf in diplomatic matters with the English. He sent Giacomo Boncambi, bishop of Bologna (1244–1260), and Giovanni Colonna, archbishop of Messina, on separate but equally important missions to Henry III to conduct business related to the Sicilian affair. Both of these men were members of the Dominican order, which, as shall be discussed in Chapter Four, may have

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15 Queller, Office of Ambassador, p. 150.
influenced their appointments. Giacomo was sent to England to formally invest Edmund with the kingdom of Sicily and to negotiate the conditions of the business, while Giovanni was sent to negotiate key terms of the Sicilian Business with the king to ensure its continuation and success and to ask for more money for his business.\(^\text{18}\) Giacomo is a particularly interesting case as he was the son of a merchant who rose up through the ranks of papal government due to his skills as an administrator and a legate.\(^\text{19}\) Generally speaking, Alexander chose bishops and archbishops to act as papal envoys on account of their high ecclesiastical status, which enabled them to carry out certain ceremonial duties on behalf of the pope, such as the investiture of Edmund, as well as their extensive clerical training and administrative experience. Alexander could also appoint English bishops and archbishops to carry out papal business in England. They were, after all, church officials. As we shall see below, the pope often appointed Boniface, the archbishop of Canterbury to conduct a number of matters on his behalf.

Ultimately, archbishops and bishops proved particularly useful as Anglo-papal representatives throughout the thirteenth century. They were suitable representatives of both pope and king due to their high ecclesiastical rank, advanced education, advantageous connections and experience working in both the spiritual and political realms which could influence their appointment as administrators, legislators, counsellors, negotiators and peacemakers. Often, they held loyalties to both Church and English Crown which meant they could represent the interests of both sides, when these interests were aligned, and aid amiable relations between these two polities.\(^\text{20}\) In some cases, their familial connections helped them secure key roles as both high-ranking ecclesiastics and diplomatic envoys. Indeed, their rank and personal connections could be more important factors in their appointment as envoys than their technical ability to negotiate. Accordingly, in other cases, it was their administrative abilities and personal qualities which had helped them rise through the ranks and acquire certain positions. Ultimately, each case should be explored on its own merit to understand


\(^\text{19}\) Giacomo was born in Bologna, the son of a merchant. He studied and taught Roman law at the University of Bologna and joined the Dominican order sometime before 1233. He was vice-chancellor of the papal curia from 1239–1244 and acted as a papal legate for Milan in May 1255, Reg. Alex IV, i. nos. 487–8; Daniel Waley, ‘Giacomo Boncambi’, Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, 11 (1969), http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/giacomo-boncambio_%28Dizionario-Biografico%29/ [Accessed on 03 July 2019]

the reasons behind each appointment, and the way these individuals conducted business between England and the papacy. The following case studies explore the roles and activities of three individuals who carried out diplomatic missions between Henry III and Alexander IV: Peter d’Aigueblanche, bishop of Hereford; Rudolph Grossi, archbishop of Tarentaise; and Boniface of Savoy, archbishop of Canterbury. These case studies will examine why they were appointed and how they shaped the diplomatic communications. The roles and activities of Hostiensis, archbishop of Embrun, have already been discussed in Chapter Two and as such shall not receive attention here, although it is worth reiterating that he was also a highly utilised Anglo-papal representative during this period, thanks to his experience as curial proctor on behalf of the English king, expertise as a canon lawyer, and affiliation with the Savoyard family.

**Peter d'Aigueblanche, Bishop of Hereford**

Peter d'Aigueblanche, bishop of Hereford (1240–1268), deserves attention for his prominent role in shaping both royal and papal policy during the first stages of the Sicilian Business (1254–1258). According to Barrow, he was one of Henry’s ‘hardest-working and longest serving supporters’.  


he began to represent the king as an important diplomatic envoy.26 From 1240, he was appointed on a number of diplomatic missions abroad to places such as Castile, France, Gascony and the papal curia.27 In fact, he was amongst those appointed to negotiate the original confirmation of Edmund as king of Sicily, formally granted by Pope Innocent IV on 14 May 1254.28 Aigueblanche returned to the curia in November/December 1254 to continue treating this business with Innocent IV, as the pope was keen for the English king to quickly meet the terms of the agreement.29

After Henry III accepted the new terms of the Sicilian agreement from Pope Alexander IV in April 1255, Aigueblanche was cited as the leading negotiator (procurator et nuntius) who had accepted these terms on the Crown’s behalf.30 This has led Vincent to mark Peter as the ‘chief author of the Sicilian Business’.31 As part of this agreement, it was confirmed that Henry would pay a vast sum of money to the papacy, as well as any interest incurred on this debt. Once the agreement was confirmed, Aigueblanche worked hard to ensure that Henry was able to pay off this sum, primarily through his duties as papal collector. Initially, he had encouraged the king to ask parliament for financial assistance in the Sicilian Business, but the barons refused to give any support unless, in exchange, Henry offered reforms of the realm, which he would not concede.32 Aigueblanche then went to the pope, along with Robert Walerand (d. 1273), steward of Henry’s household, to inform him that Henry’s magnates were refusing to finance the Sicilian Business, and to suggest a contribution by the English prelates instead.33 According to Matthew Paris’s account, Aigueblanche gave the king ‘putrid counsel’ – convincing him and the pope to agree to the bishop’s evil plan to

26 Aigueblanche had explored the possibility of a marriage between Richard of Cornwall and Raymond-Berengar’s daughter, Sanchia. He promoted the Anglo-Savoyard treaty in 1246, helped negotiate the Anglo-Castilian treaty in 1254, and made negotiations for Lord Edward’s marriage to Eleanor, the half-sister of King Alfonso X, Howell, _Eleanor of Provence_, pp. 33, 47, 111, 122, 128–9.

27 Stacey argued that John Mansel played a leading role on the diplomatic mission to Castile, but Barrow argues that he and Peter d’Aigueblanche worked together ‘as a team’, Stacey, ‘Mansel, John (d.1265)’, _ODNB_; Barrow, ‘Peter d’ Aigueblanche’s Support Networks’, p. 28.

28 TNA, SC 7/21/26. Peter had been appointed alongside six other envoys, including Peter and Thomas of Savoy and John Mansel, Provost of Beverley, _Foedera_, I/1, p. 297.

29 On 17 November 1254, the pope told Henry he had received news of the bishop of Hereford coming to Rome to finalise the terms of agreement, TNA, SC 7/20/1; transcribed in _Foedera_, I/1, p. 312.

30 BL, Cotton MS Cleopatra E. I, fols 189–90: ‘We command this according to the agreement of Hereford himself, elected proctor and nuncio of you [Edmund] and the same king’. _Foedera_, I/1, p. 331: ‘Since the lord pope conceded and conferred the kingdom of Apulia onto us [Henry] and our beloved son, Edmund, which we accepted through the venerable father, the Bishop of Hereford’. See also _CPR, 1247–58_, p. 444.

31 Vincent, ‘Aigueblanche, Peter d’, _ODNB_.


procure money from the English Church.\textsuperscript{34} This involved collecting blank charters signed and sealed on behalf of English monastic houses, filling them with promises of large amounts of money, and then handing them to the relevant merchant-bankers.\textsuperscript{35} Monastic chroniclers at Bury St Edmunds and Dunstable agreed that the bishop of Hereford was exploiting the English Church – ‘falsely and traitorously’ acting as a proctor on their behalf, while the chronicler at Burton decried his demands for ‘large sums of money’.\textsuperscript{36} Thomas Wykes, a canon regular at Osney abbey (d. 1291/3) and ‘strong royalist’ throughout the Baronial Revolt, also wrote harshly of Aigueblanche’s management of the Sicilian affair.\textsuperscript{37} By contrast, Yates has argued that Aigueblanche’s mission was ‘misunderstood by the clergy’ and that he was in fact only offering ‘the uncollected tenths owed by the clergy to the pope’.\textsuperscript{38} Whether we can trust the monastic chroniclers or not, it is clear that both Henry and Alexander IV approved of Aigueblanche’s attempts to fund the Sicilian Business through his taxation of the English clergy.\textsuperscript{39} Indeed, both the king and the pope were eager to pay off the Sicilian debt, and on 5 February 1256, Alexander IV wrote to the bishop of Hereford asking him ‘to take pains’ to see that what was still owing from the tenth was ‘fully paid’.\textsuperscript{40} As discussed in Chapter Two, Aigueblanche also appointed two new proctors, Master Finatus of Savoy and Robert de Baro, to remain at the curia on behalf of the king, and to ensure the full collection of the Sicilian debt, indicating the extent of power the bishop had in choosing representatives to act on the king’s behalf and shaping the king’s business through these appointments.\textsuperscript{41}

Clearly, the bishop of Hereford’s appointment had been shaped by his connections to the English Crown, his ecclesiastical status, and administrative ability. He played a pivotal role throughout the early stages of the Sicilian Business, working to the benefit of both the king and the pope as a negotiator and a papal collector. Moreover, he chose men to remain at the papal curia on

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\textsuperscript{35} \textit{CM}, v. pp. 510–11, 520–1, 526, 532–3.


\textsuperscript{38} Yates, ‘Bishop Peter de Aquablanca’, 306. This is supported by evidence from 1258 when the pope suggested that the unpaid tenth of churches and manors belonging to English archbishops and bishops might be pledged to certain merchant-bankers ‘in the same manner that they had been pledged previously’ by Peter d’Aigueblanche, Lunt, \textit{Financial relations}, i. p. 279.

\textsuperscript{39} \textit{The Chronicle of Bury St Edmunds}, p. 20.

\textsuperscript{40} TNA, SC 7/2/16.

\textsuperscript{41} For more on these appointments see p. 83.
the king’s behalf to carry out duties related to the Sicilian endeavour. Aigueblanche was not simply relaying the commands of his principal, but actively shaping the events through his own actions and initiative. His role was fundamental to the initiation and continuation of the Sicilian Business.

Rudolph Grossi, Archbishop of Tarentaise

Another Savoyard, Rudolph Grossi, took part in a number of important diplomatic embassies between Henry and Alexander IV in his position as the archbishop of Tarentaise (1246–c.1271). Little is known about Rudolph’s life and career. He was a dependent of the Savoyard family, a close advisor of the Queen’s uncle, Peter of Savoy, and a friend to Peter and his brothers.\(^{42}\) He had a clerical education and was appointed the bishop of Aosta from 1243–1246.\(^{43}\) According to an imperial decree issued in 1186, the see of Tarentaise was exclusively dependent on the empire and not the Count of Savoy.\(^{44}\) To gain influence over this diocese, the Savoy family aimed to influence the appointment of friends and allies to this archbishopric. Undoubtedly, Rudolph’s friendship with the Savoyards influenced his selection as the archbishop of Tarentaise. Rudolph’s association with the Savoyard family, combined with his position as archbishop of Tarentaise, helped him acquire a position as a prominent royal envoy acting on behalf of the English king. For example, in 1256 he joined Master Rostand on a mission to find a suitable wife for Prince Edmund.\(^{45}\) Rudolph was engaged in a number of missions to the papal curia. For example, he led an important mission to Rome in June 1257, which will be discussed in more detail below, to ask the pope for concessions to the original terms of the Sicilian agreement.\(^{46}\) Similarly, he helped conclude peace with France in 1258, and was one of the envoys entrusted to report back to the pope on the outcome of these talks.\(^{47}\) After the barons seized control of Henry’s government, Rudolph continued to be appointed by the baronial council on diplomatic missions to the papal curia between 1258 and 1260. In particular, he featured as part of a

\(^{44}\) When Rudolph died in 1271, the Count of Savoy, Philip I, claimed ‘regalian’ rights over the see, Cox, *The Eagles of Savoy*, p. 400.
\(^{45}\) See n. 94.
\(^{46}\) *CR*, 1256–9, pp. 136–7. He was joined by Master Rostand, who will be discussed in more detail on pp. 145–9.
\(^{47}\) *Close rolls suppl.* 1244–66, pp. 29–31. In fact, the articles of this Anglo-French peace were sealed by the archbishop of Tarentaise, on behalf of the English king and the archbishop of Rouen, on behalf of the French king before being deposited in the royal archives at Paris, *Layettes du trésor des chartes*, ed. A. Teulet, et al., 5 vols (Paris, 1863–1909), iii. no. 4416.
significant baronial embassy to the papal curia in August 1258. Moreover, in June 1259 he was the only named envoy on a mission to the papacy to formally renounce Edmund’s claims to Sicily, after the barons had forced Henry to relinquish his son’s position. His continued appointment by the barons may have been partially influenced by his personal relationship with Peter of Savoy, one of the leading figures in the rebellion against the king. Yet, by this point, Rudolph had already shown himself to be an effective and experienced royal agent at the papal curia, where he had developed and cultivated a network of friends and allies as well as an understanding of the curia’s specific administration and diplomatic procedures and processes.

Ultimately, Rudolph had connections to the English Crown through the Savoy family. He worked in a senior position in the Church, was trusted by the English king, baronial council and the pope to effectively negotiate foreign affairs and had proven his ability to do so through a multitude of appointments.

**Boniface of Savoy, Archbishop of Canterbury**

The last envoy to be discussed in this section is Boniface of Savoy, who acted as an envoy on behalf of Henry and Alexander through his role as archbishop of Canterbury. Boniface was a Savoyard uncle of the English queen, Eleanor. He had a clerical education and was the bishop-elect of Belley in France from 1232 until 1239 and the bishop-elect of Valence from 1239–1242. He was appointed archbishop of Canterbury in 1241 and arrived in England in 1244.

During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the person who held the title of archbishop of Canterbury held the highest office in the English church, often entrusted with legatine duties on behalf of the pope and political duties on behalf of the Crown. The king worked hard to ensure that he had some say over the choice of candidate for this most important episcopal official in England.

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49 Peter der Zweite, Graf von Savoyen, Markgraf in Italien, sein Haus und seine Lande. Ein Charakterbild des dreizehnten Jahrhunderts, diplomatisch bearbeitet, ed. Ludwig Wurstemberger, 4 vols (Berlin, 1856–8), iv, no. 518. Originally, he was appointed alongside Simon de Montfort, John Mansel, and Peter of Savoy.
Matthew Paris suggested that the English king had tried, on several occasions, to secure the election of Boniface to an English see – first as the bishop of Durham, then as the bishop of Winchester, and finally as the archbishop of Canterbury.\(^{51}\) Matthew Paris further accused Boniface of being ‘unfit in knowledge, morals, age and education’ to be archbishop, suggesting that his appointment was influenced by his noble and familial ties to the English monarchy as opposed to any skill or ability to perform the duties of an archbishop.\(^{52}\) While his appointment was undoubtedly influenced by his relationship with the English Crown, there is suggestion that he was actually highly educated.\(^{53}\) Nonetheless, Matthew Paris’ critical assessment of Boniface of Savoy, shaped by his personal distain for Henry’s ‘foreign favourites’, has continued to guide the scholarship in this area.

Unsurprisingly, those who held the role of archbishop of Canterbury faced the difficult task of balancing their political duties to the king and the realm with their spiritual duties to the pope and to the Church. Boniface was no different. Between 1254 and 1256, he engaged in diplomatic matters relating to the Sicilian Business. He oversaw the confirmation of the Sicilian agreement on 9 April 1255 alongside the bishop of Hereford and several other representatives.\(^{54}\) Following this, the pope appointed him as a legate to formally commute the English king’s crusading vow from the Holy Land to Sicily and to act as a papal collector for the crusading tax in England.\(^{55}\) Boniface was appointed alongside Master Rostand, whose duties as papal collector have already been highlighted in Chapter Two, and whose diplomatic appointments will be discussed later in this chapter.\(^{56}\) Boniface was in a difficult position; he had to contend with the English clergy’s opposition to the payment of a new crusading tax and his duty of care to the English clergy, which conflicted with his orders from the pope and from the king. As such, he soon abandoned this role as papal collector and supported the English clergy in their dismay against king and pope. In fact, in August 1257 Boniface called a church

\(^{51}\) *CM*, iv. pp. 14–15, 61–2. Certainly, the king did attempt to have Boniface elected as the bishop of Winchester in 1243, *CPR*, 1232–47, p. 400. Paris stated that the monks of Canterbury ‘had faithfully promised to elect Boniface as their archbishop, as the king had most earnestly entreated them to do so’, *CM*, iv. p. 103.


\(^{53}\) Mugnier suggests that Boniface was highly educated, Mugnier, *Les Savoyards en Angleterre*, p. 5.

\(^{54}\) BL, Cotton MS Cleopatra E. I, fols 189–90.

\(^{55}\) Traditionally, the archbishop of Canterbury could command power ‘by virtue of his office’ to commute crusading vows. However, Innocent III had made it easier for ‘semi-permanent legates’ like Master Rostand to carry out these duties through receiving a ‘special mandate’ from the Apostolic See, Barbara Bombi, ‘Papal Legates and their Preaching’, in *Legati, delegati e l’impresa d’Oltremare (secoli XII-XIII)* (Turnhout, 2014), 211–57 (247).

\(^{56}\) For Boniface’s role as papal collector see pp. 100–1.
synod together, against the orders of the king, to discuss the rights of the English Church and the royal abuses against it. Boniface prioritised his position as protector of the English Church and his good relations with fellow English clerics, above his loyalties to the king and to the pope. By prioritising his clerical responsibilities in England, he reduced his utility as a diplomatic envoy and as such was largely excluded from the Anglo-papal diplomatic exchanges between 1257 and 1260.

It was not just Boniface’s devotion to the English Church which reduced his utility as an Anglo-papal agent. He, like so many Savoyards in England, had been adversely affected by the rise of the king’s Lusignan relatives in the 1240s and 50s, who had replaced them as Henry’s ‘foreign favourites’. In fact, he had been personally involved in conflicts with the king's Poitevin half-brothers, particularly with Aymer de Lusignan, bishop-elect of Winchester. As such he was keen to allow the barons, some of whom were his kinsmen, to expel the Lusignans from England, against the wishes of the king and the pope. As Ambler points out, Boniface, the primary prelate in England, possessed the power to arbitrate disputes between the king and his subjects and could have used this prerogative to mediate the conflict between Henry and his barons at the Oxford Parliament in 1258 to try and prevent the Baronial Revolt, and yet, he did not. He had a vested interest in the expulsion of the Lusignans.

While Boniface had initially supported the Sicilian Business, in the end, he prioritised the rights and freedoms of the English Church as well as those of the barons over the wishes of the king and the pope. He disapproved of their exploitation of the English Church to acquire funds for Sicily. Moreover, he held his own grievances against the Lusignans and was keen to remove them from the realm. Hence, Boniface’s actions, or lack thereof, greatly influenced proceeding relations between

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57 Fifteen complaints were made at this council: the intrusion of clerks into benefices by the laity; summons of clerks before secular courts; secular abuses of sanctity; infringements of the rights of clerks; issues relating to probate; seizure of ecclesiastical property; the use of new and unapproved writs; concerns about the king’s approach to ecclesiastical property; amercements of the clergy or their tenants; and demands for the clergy to perform suit at court, ‘Annales of Burton’, AM, i. pp. 403, 534–6. Councils and Synods, II/1, pp. 530–48.


59 In November 1252, Aymer de Lusignan, with help from his brother, William de Valence, had raided the archbishop’s homes at Lambeth and Maidstone and imprisoned one of the archbishop’s officials at Farnham castle. In response, Boniface excommunicated Lusignan and his supporters until January 1253, Vincent, ‘Lusignan, Aymer de (c.1228–1260)’, ODNB. According to Vincent, this dispute led directly to the factional strife between the Savoyards and the Lusignans, Nicholas Vincent, ‘Savoy, Peter of, count of Savoy and de facto Count of Richmond (1203?–1268)’, ODNB, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/22016 [Accessed 17 October 2019].

60 His predecessors, Stephen Langton and Edmund of Abingdon, had both utilised their position to mediate disputes between the king and his subjects, Ambler, Bishops in the Political Realm, pp. 61–81.
the king and his council, and the king and the pope. Through the example of Boniface, one can start to appreciate the potential drawbacks of appointing English bishops and archbishops as diplomatic envoys. Firstly, if they hailed from an important governmental faction, or influential noble family, they could exploit their position to further the aims of said faction or family. Secondly, as a prelate they held certain obligations and loyalties to their local ecclesiastical communities, and yet they could be mandated to perform duties on behalf of the king or the pope that might conflict with their responsibility to support, protect and defend their spiritual community. In such cases, they had to decide where they placed their loyalty, in the hands of the king or the Church.

Bishops and archbishops, a number of whom had connections to the English Crown through the Savoy family, were often utilised as diplomatic representatives on missions between Henry III and Alexander IV. Henry was employing his foreign relations and their associates, many of whom had gained favour through their loyalty and service to the king or to the king’s relatives, and who could be trusted with important matters of state. As evidenced by the examples above, these clerics played an important role in shaping negotiations between the king and the pope through their activities, and even determine the outcome of a political endeavour. They could deploy (or withhold) their ecclesiastical rights and powers to significantly influence the succession of events, as we have seen through the example of Boniface, archbishop of Canterbury. They could also undertake dual duties on behalf of the king and the pope, as we see through both the archbishop of Canterbury and the bishop of Hereford.

Matthew Paris heavily criticised the king for employing so many foreign men, who had no connection or allegiance to the English people, to such prominent positions. Yet, Henry’s appointments of his ‘foreign favourites’ did not always work to the benefit of the Crown. They could be independent-minded men, who had their own personal aims, as well as those of their ecclesiastical community, to consider. Clearly, a bishop or archbishop’s obligations to their ecclesiastical community combined with their duties and personal interests within the political realm could hinder their utility as royal or papal agents when the interests of the king and pope conflicted with their own or with those of their community. Nonetheless, throughout this period, we find a number of bishops and archbishops being repeatedly deployed on Anglo-papal missions and acting as highly effective agents.
English Barons

As seen in Chapter Two, leading barons, much like bishops and archbishops, were traditionally appointed by the English Crown as diplomatic representatives in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. This was influenced by their high social status, political experience and personal connections to the Crown which made them appropriate representatives of the king’s person, particularly in foreign exchanges with other secular rulers. Nonetheless, magnates could hold a vast amount of independent power through their own lands, wealth and titles which could impact their usefulness and reliability as agents of the king, especially in cases where their personal interests might be compromised.

As noted earlier in this thesis, historians have often discussed the turbulent relationship between Henry III and his barons. Clanchy claimed that during his personal rule (1234–1258), Henry was advocating royal supremacy – the divine authority of the king over his people. Yet, Carpenter has argued against this theory of royal absolutism, providing evidence that king tried to retain a good relationship with his barons – reluctant to pursue their debts to the Crown, and allowing them much freedom to exercise their own rule. Regardless, Henry’s relationship with his barons began to suffer during his personal rule, particularly during the 1250s, as they grew increasingly discontent with what they perceived as his mismanagement of the realm. What did this mean for the practice of diplomatic representation in Henry’s reign? Surprisingly, the records reveal that Henry appointed leading English barons on important diplomatic missions abroad right up to the point of the Baronial Revolt in May 1258. After this point, they continued to engage in a number of matters abroad on behalf of the English king and council. Two English barons, namely Simon de Montfort, earl of Leicester, and Peter of Savoy, lord of Richmond, deserve special mention for their diplomatic service on behalf of the king. They were both commissioned on a number of diplomatic missions abroad, including a significant mission to the papal curia which will be discussed below.

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Simon de Montfort and Peter of Savoy

Simon and Peter were two of Henry’s leading barons, both of whom were connected to the Crown through family bonds. Peter was another Savoyard uncle of the English queen, who had arrived in England in 1240 and had rapidly acquired much favour, wealth and land in England, and in May 1241 received the lordship of Richmond. According to Powicke, Peter was ‘the ablest of the Savoyard princes’, particularly in matters of negotiation and military activity. He assisted the English king in a number of difficult foreign matters, including the campaign to Poitou in the 1240s and the withdrawal of Simon de Montfort from Gascony in the early 1250s.

On the other hand, Simon de Montfort was a minor French noble who had arrived in England in 1231 to claim his family’s lands in Leicester. According to Maddicott, he quickly became a ‘foreign favourite’ of the king throughout the 1230s, thanks to his ‘French connections’ and ‘personal qualities’. According to the monastic chronicler, William de Rishanger, Simon was praised by the king for his ‘persuasive way of speaking’ and ‘winning manner’. He even received the honour of marriage to the king’s sister, Eleanor, in January 1238. His skills of persuasion and natural charisma made him an effective diplomatic envoy.

Both Peter and Simon were appointed on a variety of international diplomatic missions including ones to Scotland, France and the papal curia. For example, in August 1254 Henry commissioned Simon to go to Scotland on his behalf to discuss secret business with the Scottish king, Alexander III. Peter had helped negotiate the Sicilian agreement in April 1255 alongside the bishop of Hereford and the archbishop of Canterbury, discussed above. Similarly, both Peter and

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63 Vincent, ‘Savoy, Peter of,’ *ODNB*. Peter had a total annual income of between £2000–£2500 which increased to over £3000 in the 1250s, Ridgeway, *Foreign Favourites*, 592. He received great wardships and gifts from the king, *CPR*, 1232–47, p. 272; *CPR*, 1247–58, pp. 49, 188, 200, 205, 268; *CPR*, 1258–66, p. 27.
65 Ibid., p. 45.
66 Ibid., p. 46. See also Maddicott, *Simon de Montfort*, pp. 109, 308, 350–1.
69 BL, Cotton MS Cleopatra E. I, fol 189–90.
Simon were heavily engaged in the Anglo-French peace talks between 1255 and 1259 which resulted in the Treaty of Paris in 1259.\textsuperscript{71}

In one particular instance, we get a keen sense both for how important these envoys were and the extent to which they actively shaped Anglo-papal exchanges. In June 1257, while Simon and Peter were engaged in negotiations with the French king in Paris, the king sent them orders to go on an important diplomatic mission to the papal curia, alongside the archbishop of Tarentaise and John Mansel, treasurer of York and papal chaplain, to gain certain concessions for the king with regards to the Sicilian Business, or if necessary, to withdraw Edmund’s candidacy.\textsuperscript{72} They were assigned with full power to negotiate this matter on their own initiative, suggesting that the king put a lot of faith in their ability to persuade the papacy to adhere to their demands, even though his personal relationships with these two men were deteriorating.\textsuperscript{73} In fact, the king had issued them ‘twenty blank schedules’ with his seal, eight with seal of Lord Edward and ten with the seal of Prince Edmund for them to fill on their mission to Rome. As Queller noted, it was rare for this number of blank schedules to be issued to the king’s envoys, which highlights the amount of ‘prestige and trust’ they must have held.\textsuperscript{74} This is striking, considering the on-going disintegration of relations between Henry and his barons, who had made known their opposition to the business in Sicily. Regardless of Henry’s trust in them, Simon and Peter would not prioritise this mission to the papacy over their current mission in France. They were more concerned with settling peace with Louis IX so that they could focus on reforming the English realm and establishing what they viewed as a fairer system of governance. Moreover, there is no evidence that they appointed proctors to go in their stead, even though they were requested to do so by the king. They were not interested in the Sicilian Business. As such, the king was forced to send a ‘less impressive’ embassy to Rome on his behalf, led by the archbishop of Tarentaise and Master Rostand.\textsuperscript{75}

\textsuperscript{71} On 20 May 1255, Peter of Savoy and Simon de Montfort were ordered to extend the truce with France for a further three years. \textit{CPR, 1247–58}, p. 411. In February 1257, formal peace negotiations began, \textit{Royal Letters}, ii. p. 121; \textit{CPR, 1247–58}, p. 542. On 28 May 1258 Simon de Montfort, Peter Savoy, and Hugh Bigod agreed the terms of the Treaty of Paris, \textit{Foedera}, I/1, p. 390. Peter of Savoy had been involved in treating the peace truces with Louis IX in 1249 and 1250, Vincent, ‘Savoy, Peter of,’ \textit{ODNB}.

\textsuperscript{72} \textit{CPR, 1247–58}, pp. 566–8; \textit{Foedera}, I/1, pp. 360–1. Queller described Peter and Simon as the ‘principal envoys’ of this embassy, Queller, ‘Diplomatic ‘Blanks’, 487.

\textsuperscript{73} Primarily due to the growing disputes with the king’s Lusignan half-brothers whom the king held in such high esteem and who were abusing their positions due to their privileged status. See Carpenter, \textit{Henry III}, pp. 190–1, 196–7.

\textsuperscript{74} Queller, ‘Diplomatic ‘Blanks’, 489.

\textsuperscript{75} Powicke, \textit{Henry III}, 1. p. 375. Master Rostand’s role in this mission will be discussed on pp. 148–9.
As highlighted earlier in this thesis, Simon de Montfort and Peter of Savoy were amongst those involved in the initial baronial uprising in May 1258, in which seven armed barons had demanded the king hand over a degree of power to the baronial council. Simon de Montfort soon adopted the primary role in the revolt against his brother-in-law, the king. It is worth noting that between May 1258 and December 1260, when the barons had almost full control of royal government, they continued to appoint a number of royal envoys who had previously attended to diplomatic business at the curia. For example, they appointed the archbishops of Tarentaise and Embrun and Master Rostand on the mission in July 1258 alongside their own appointees, Master John Clarel, Peter Brauche, William de Hotintoft and Brother William of the Knights Templar. Furthermore, the barons engaged in separate communications with the papacy on behalf of the community of the realm. Essentially, the barons had to retain certain royalists in their positions, particularly as administrators and diplomatic envoys, to ensure the smooth running of government and management of English domestic and foreign policy. In response, as shall be demonstrated in the following section, Henry became more reliant on loyal household officials to carry out business on his behalf during this period of revolt.

Traditionally, the English barons were often utilised as diplomatic agents in foreign affairs of the king and yet, between 1257–1261, the English king was unable to successfully deploy his barons as envoys in negotiations with the pope. The barons had objected to the king’s expensive and ambitious Sicilian policy which they viewed as a futile endeavour; indeed several historians have suggested that it was Henry’s involvement in the Sicilian Business which directly brought about the baronial uprising in 1258. When Henry tried to appoint Simon de Montfort and Peter of Savoy on an important mission to the papacy to discuss the Sicilian Business in June 1257, they rejected his orders to lead these negotiations, and would not appoint agents to take up this mission in their place. Regardless, when the barons took over the king’s administration in 1258, they continued to appoint envoys who had already served on royal matters at the curia and made use of those who had

76 CR. 1256–9, p. 327.
77 More specifically: ‘communitas comitum, procerum, magnatum, aliorumque regni Angliae’, CM, vi. p. 400. For all letters from the barons to the popes, see CM, vi. pp. 400–9.
78 Treharne, Simon De Montfort and Baronial Reform, pp. 97–8; Powicke, Henry III, i. pp. 245, 377–9; Runciman, The Sicilian Vespers, pp. 63–4; Tyerman, England and the Crusades, p. 119; Cuttino, English Medieval Diplomacy, p. 58.
developed the skills and connections to engage in complex Anglo-papal affairs. They had planted their own men within important embassies to Rome to ensure control over these negotiations, but they also understood the importance of sending individuals who had prior experience acting as royal envoys at the papal curia.

**Administrators and Household Officials**

The rapid expansion of English and papal government in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries led to the employment of more officials and agents who could navigate these increasingly complex administrations. Throughout the thirteenth century, the administrative ability and diplomatic skills of an envoy began to outweigh the merits of their high rank and status.79 The growth of administration was tied up with the growth of diplomacy. Each facilitated the other. Those who were appointed as household clerks and departmental administrators could also be appointed as proctors and diplomatic envoys. The increasing number of diplomatic negotiations between England and the papacy in the mid-thirteenth century led to a greater employment of administrators and members of the royal and papal households who had the skills and knowledge to engage with these processes. Similarly, as diplomatic interactions between Church and Crown became more frequent, the cost of sending high-status envoys could not always be justified and was not always necessary. They travelled more slowly as part of a larger entourage, incurred higher expenses on route, and did not necessarily have the required skills to carry out their mission. Indeed, they often hired proctors and papal clerks to assist them in their duties when they arrived at their destination.80 Moreover, as highlighted earlier on in this thesis, high-ranking magnates and prelates could demonstrate a great degree of economic freedom and political independence which could impact their ability to dutifully carry out the wishes of their sender. That being said, certain solemn embassies were still headed by a high-status representative, who could represent the dignity and rank of their sender.

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79 Cuttino, *English Diplomatic Administration*, pp. 142–3. Lazzarini confirms that by the Later Middle Ages, an envoy’s ‘facility in oral and written communication, and broad political experience’ were more important factors than just their status, Lazzarini, *Communication and Conflict*, p. 125.

80 For example, on 9 October 1254, Peter d’Aigueblache, bishop of Hereford, had been granted two diplomatic blanks to take to the curia – one for the appointment of a royal proctor in the curia and the second for the ‘annual pension of thirty marks’ to a papal clerk at the curia, Chaplais, *Diplomatic Practice*, I/1, no. 114. For more on Diplomatic blanks, see Queller, ‘Diplomatic “Blanks”,’ 476–91.
In England, Henry’s reasons for appointing more administrators and household officials as diplomatic envoys were varied. Firstly, Henry recognised the benefits of appointing lower-ranking officials as leading administrators in his government. Throughout the 1240s and 50s, he was choosing administrators, who had less independent power and prestige than previous appointees, to manage the wardrobe and chancery (which were still being run as part of the royal household). He utilised some of these administrators in diplomatic communications with lay and spiritual rulers.

Secondly, the arrival of more foreign administrators in the English realm, deployed to engage in an increasing number of negotiations with the king, prompted him to employ some of these trained and experienced administrators both as members of his household and as diplomatic agents to act on his behalf in foreign matters.

Thirdly, and most importantly, Henry was facing rising opposition from his barons as well as leading members of the English clergy in the 1240s and 50s who were heavily opposed to the king’s management of the realm, in particular his involvement in the Sicilian Business. As discussed above, Henry’s leading barons refused to support the Sicilian endeavour or to engage in negotiations with the pope. As a result, the king relied more heavily on loyal household officials and foreign administrators as diplomatic envoys in exchanges with the papacy, particularly during the height of the Baronial Revolt from May 1258–December 1260. Although, it is also worth noting that when the barons usurped the government in 1258, they continued to appoint a number of royal administrators as envoys in negotiations with the papacy.

Much like the English king, Pope Alexander IV was also appointing a growing number of household officials and administrators as diplomatic representatives in exchanges with England. The pope, like the king, had recognised the need to appoint agents with a greater understanding of the intricacies of papal and royal administration.

Nonetheless, for the pope at least, a primary factor in the appointment of lower-ranking officials was also to save on expenditure. As discussed earlier in this study, Alexander inherited a vast amount of papal debt when he ascended to the papal throne and went to great effort to record and save more money and to undo the financial deficit left by his predecessors. For example, he
introduced a new fixed service tax and engaged in greater registration of papal receipts.\(^8\) Evidence of the earliest recorded papal receipts date from Alexander’s pontificate, suggesting a greater attempt to manage and record papal financial records.\(^8\) This diligence for cutting costs would have extended to Alexander’s management of diplomatic matters and could help explain why he did not appoint any of his cardinals as envoys. As pointed out above, the cost of sending a cardinal legate was a great financial burden on the Church.\(^8\) Indeed, the procurations awarded to a cardinal legate would have been much higher than those gifted to other envoys. Moreover, papal envoys received a mixed reception from the English, particularly from the clergy. Matthew Paris often spoke out against the greed of the papacy and its representatives, and their extensive demands on the English Church in aid of the Sicilian endeavour. As such, it served in the pope’s best interest to send lower-ranking nunci instead of legati to carry out duties in England as, in theory, they could travel with less opulence as part of a smaller entourage, request fewer procurations, hold fewer powers, and ultimately evoke the image of a less demanding, more humble and respectful papacy. Nonetheless, as we will explore further in the case studies below, Matthew Paris still managed to criticise papal nuncios for exceeding their authority in England. Alexander also began to draw more heavily on members of the mendicant orders, particularly the Franciscans, whom he favoured throughout his pontificate, as papal agents and representatives.\(^8\) The Franciscans were highly popular in the mid-thirteenth century, exalted for their simplicity, poverty and humility, suggesting that they would have been received more favourably as representatives of the pope.

Henry III and Pope Alexander IV also used a number of administrators and household officials, who held dual appointments under the English king and the pope throughout their communications with each other. This was particularly the case between 1255 and 1258 when king and pope were engaged in the mutual political endeavour in Sicily. For example, Master Rostand and Master were both papal sub-deacons and chaplains, king’s clerks and proctors, while Master John Clarel was a king’s clerk, canon of Southwell and papal chaplain. A significant

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\(^8\) For more on the friars as envoys see Chapter Four, pp. 161–183.
proportion of these representatives held the position of ‘papal chaplain’ along with the title ‘master’ (magister). This title was usually indicative of a university education, often in civil law, canon law or both, which was particularly useful for individuals who worked as diplomatic envoys. Indeed, Ross has noted that ‘legal study was overwhelmingly the most common qualification among chaplains noted in curial sources’ for the thirteenth and fourteenth century. This, in turn, helps explains why those who held posts as papal chaplains were often appointed to perform administrative and diplomatic duties ‘at the curia and elsewhere in Europe’. It is worth noting that the title ‘master’ did not always signal a university education, in some cases it was an honorary title awarded to highlight the rank and position of a person working in a particular role in government. For example, papal notaries, such as Master Arlot, probably held this title as a ‘courtesy’, indicating their hierarchical position in the chancery. Ultimately, individuals who held posts in both the English and papal governments proved to be effective and were frequently utilised as Anglo-papal diplomatic representatives.

To better understand why specific administrators and household officials were chosen as Anglo-papal envoys in exchanges between Henry III and Alexander IV, the duties they undertook and the way they shaped the diplomatic relations, the following section will explore four case studies regarding individuals who acted as envoys on behalf of the pope, the king and the king’s baronial council between 1254 and 1261. They are: Master Rostand, a papal nuncio and royal proctor; Master Arlot, papal notary and nuncio; William Bonquer, king’s knight and marshal; and Master John Clarel, royal clerk and papal chaplain. These case studies will investigate the powers entrusted to each representative; the skills and experience they brought to these roles; how their appointments were influenced by the political context; and how they, in turn, shaped the diplomatic relations between England and the papacy through their actions.

Master Rostand Masson

The papal administrator, Master Rostand Masson (d.1261–2), performed a number of key diplomatic and administrative duties relating to the Sicilian Business between 1255 and 1259.

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85 Papal chaplains were often cited in the sources as having undertaken tasks outside the curia as diplomatic envoys, Ross, The Papal Chapel, pp. 13, 53, 87.
86 Sayers, Papal Government, p. 31.
According to Matthew Paris he was dually appointed as ‘the Pope’s nuncio and the King’s proctor’.87 In fact, he held posts as a papal collector and nuncio, crusade preacher, king’s clerk, royal proctor and diplomatic envoy. His duties as a papal collector have been discussed above, and as such this section will primarily explore his other roles as a papal and royal agent, and how he shaped Anglo-papal relations through these activities.88

Rostand arrived in England in the Spring of 1255, appointed as papal nuncio to assist Boniface, archbishop of Canterbury in commuting Henry’s crusading vow to Sicily, to preach a crusade against Manfred and to collect church taxes on behalf of the papacy to fund this endeavour.89 According to Bombi, Innocent III utilised the same agents he had delegated to commute crusading vows to also ‘preach the crusade’.90 Certainly, Alexander IV was continuing this pattern through the appointment of Master Rostand.91 As Rostand was commissioned to perform such a broad range of duties on behalf of the pope while in England, historians have sometimes incorrectly identified his title and position. Gransden referred to him as a ‘legatus a latere’, while Weiler noted that he was a ‘papal notary’.92 Rostand was in fact a papal chaplain and sub-deacon, and a nuncius between May 1255 and June 1257. Nonetheless, these titles tell us little about the duties he actually performed.

Rostand was a native of Bordeaux, Gascony, which was currently a fief of England.93 Moreover, Matthew Paris referred to him as ‘a learned man’ and a ‘lawyer’, suggesting he had a legal education.94 He also acted as a papal judge-delegate in both England and Scotland between 1253–1254, under the instruction of Innocent IV.95 When he returned to England in 1255, the king took

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87 Parts of this section on Master Rostand Masson have been published in: Mesiano, ‘Pope Alexander IV, King Henry III and the Imperial Succession’ (forthcoming).
88 For Master Rostand’s role as papal collector see pp. 100–5.
91 Housley, The Italian Crusades, p. 115.
93 CPR, 1247–58, pp. 429, 629; ‘Annals of Burton’, AM, i. p. 350; CM, v. pp. 519–20. There is evidence from 1255 that Rostand also held several ecclesiastical benefices in Gascony, Reg. Alex IV, i. nos. 398, 399, 538, 550; Lunt, Valuation, p. 84.
95 He acted as a papal judge-delegate on two cases. First, in favour of Master Nicholas de Hedon, archdeacon of Moray, against Andrew, who claimed to be dean of Moray; and then to grant provisions for a certain prebend to Alexander de Ferentino, CPL, i. pp. 295, 302.
him into the royal household as a clerk and by 1256 was appointing him to carry out duties as a diplomatic envoy on missions abroad.96

Performing duties on behalf of both the pope and the king could sometimes prove difficult, particularly when the orders of these two masters conflicted. As observed earlier, Rostand had been ordered by the king to stop collecting money in England for the Sicilian Business in April 1257 and was then re-ordered to collect it by the pope in June 1257, a demand which he would not comply with as the king had threatened to take away his possessions on England.97 Yet, this was not the only example where Rostand prioritised his loyalties to the king over those to the pope. He also threatened the success of the pope’s Sicilian endeavour.

In 1256, sometime before June, Henry gave full powers and special mandate to Master Rostand and the archbishop of Tarentaise to seek and arrange a marriage for his son, Edmund, to ‘some noble woman’.98 Then, on 24 June 1256, he wrote to the king from Tours, encouraging him to act ‘on the advice of some unknown cardinal’ and negotiate a marriage treaty between his son, Edmund and Manfred’s daughter.99 Howell has argued that the archbishop of Tarantaise and Peter of Savoy were also involved in this decision to approach Manfred for a marriage treaty.100 A peace treaty with Manfred would have been the most practical strategy if the English king wished to rule in Sicily. Nevertheless, it would have legitimised Manfred’s position as regent and undermined the papal initiative to remove the Hohenstaufen family from the kingdom. Rostand stated that he had received this advice from a cardinal, and yet it may have been his own suggestion to the king which he credited to a cardinal to give it more spiritual and political weight. While Rostand still held the title ‘papal nuncio’ during this period, in this case he was acting on behalf of the king – as his ‘devoted clerk’.

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96 At the beginning of June 1256, Rostand was appointed on a royal diplomatic mission to the curia alongside Richard de Crokesley, the abbot of Westminster, and Giles of Bridport, bishop-elect of Salisbury, ‘Annals of Burton’, AM, i. p. 392; CM, v. p. 560.

97 See pp. 103–4.

98 TNA, E 30/1653. The TNA catalogue entry dates this document to June 1257, however, Chaplais confirms that this document was dated before June 1256, Diplomatic Documents, i. no. 282.

99 TNA, SC 1/47/34, transcribed in Chaplais, Diplomatic Documents, i. no. 283.

100 Howell, Eleanor of Provence, p. 134.
Later, on 26 June 1257, Henry III commissioned an embassy to go to Rome to petition the pope for further concessions to the original terms of the Sicilian agreement. These terms included either a removal of penalties for failure to pay the papal debt in the agreed time or, if these failed, a demand for the withdrawal of Edmund’s candidacy for Sicily. Within these instructions, Henry ordered his envoys to secretly seek an alliance with Manfred and to offer his son Edmund in marriage to Manfred’s daughter, ensuring that Henry could still claim Sicily via this marriage alliance, if negotiations with the pope failed. This was the same proposal Rostand had made to the king a year earlier. It is possible that Rostand even assisted in drafting these instructions to Henry’s envoys, through his capacity as a royal clerk. As mentioned earlier, there is evidence that he ordained this letter with a number of diplomatic blank schedules, confirming his occupation in the English chancery. Rostand had also been ordered to deliver these instructions, along with the diplomatic blanks and a copy of the Sicilian agreement, to the king’s envoys, Simon de Montfort and Peter of Savoy, in France. However, as discussed above, Simon and Peter refused to accept this mission, or to assign proctors to undertake it on their behalf, and as a result Rostand carried out this mission to the papal curia alongside the archbishop of Tarentaise.

On this mission, Rostand did not take up official duties as a royal envoy and he is not listed in the pope’s formal response to the king regarding this embassy. However, the pope did note Rostand’s contribution to this mission, stating that a deal had been reached ‘according to the advice of Master Rostand, papal chaplain and royal counsellor’. The pope’s reference to Rostand as a ‘royal counsellor’ confirms that, on this occasion, he was acting as a royal adviser, encouraging the pope to support the case. He was essentially a freelance agent, utilising his skills in negotiation, understanding of curial etiquette and good relations with the pope to advance the king’s business. He

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101 The original envoys chosen for this mission were Simon de Montfort, Peter of Savoy, the archbishop of Tarentaise and John Mansel.
103 Foedera, I/1, p. 360.
105 CR, 1256–9, pp. 136–7. They were joined by William of Bitton, bishop of Bath and Wells (1248–1264), Laurence of St Martin, bishop of Rochester (1251–1274), Master Nicholas of Plimpton, papal chaplain and archdeacon of Norfolk (1257–1264), as the king ‘proctors and nuncios’ on this mission, TNA, SC 7/3/52.
106 TNA, SC 7/2/36.
had acted to advise and assist in the conduct of diplomatic duties on behalf of the king and the pope and his success in shaping interactions between these two powers highlights the significant role played by administrative agents throughout Anglo-papal exchanges.

Matthew Paris stated that Rostand had been dismissed from papal office in the autumn of 1257 after furthering his own interests in England. There is no record of Rostand holding the title of ‘papal nuncio’ after 5 June 1257. Yet, Rostand’s dismissal from office did not result in a loss of papal favour and was simply a resolution to this conflict of interest, which had come about after the king had adopted Rostand as his own agent in negotiations with the papacy regarding concessions to the Sicilian Business. By December 1259, there is evidence that Rostand had retained his role as papal chaplain and sub-deacon, been made archdeacon of Agen and granted papal permission to enjoy the fruits of his benefices for five years while engaging in the service of Henry III. Similarly, Rostand continued to conduct business at the curia on behalf of the English king for the rest of his life.

**Master Arlot**

Master Arlot, another papal administrator, was appointed to replace Master Rostand as papal nuncio in England in 1257. He was a papal notary and sub-deacon of Roman birth, appointed to relay the pope’s responses to the king’s requests for concessions to the Sicilian Business, which Rostand had helped negotiate. It is possible that his appointment was even encouraged by Master Rostand. Mann noted that Rostand had worked with the king’s envoys to ‘arrange the appointment’ of Master Arlot. Moreover, Rostand and Arlot arrived in England together in March 1258. Arlot had been tasked with delivering the pope’s response to royal petitions concerning the Sicilian Business, and it was at the Hoketide parliament of 1258 that he formally extended the deadline for

108 See p. 104.
113 The majority of contemporary monastic chroniclers have reported that Master Arlot arrived in England in March 1258, *CM*, v. p. 673; ‘Annals of Burton’, *AM*, i. p. 409; ‘Annals of Dunstable’, iii. p. 208. However, the Annals of Tewkesbury stated that Arlot arrived around the feast of Saint George (23 April), ‘Annals of Tewkesbury’, *AM*, i. p. 163.
He asked the king to send money and troops to aid the pope, and also to quickly conclude peace with France. Henry responded to the pope on 8 May 1258, stating that peace with France was progressing, but asking for concessions in all other matters. Henry stated that he was not yet able to send the requested sum of money or troops to Sicily, but that he would once he had assured aid from his barons. It is important to note that this official correspondence from the pope to the king, communicated by Arlot, emphasised that Henry and his realm would not face excommunication and interdict at this time.

As we have seen in Chapter One, this correspondence from Alexander was measured and fair, and yet the contemporary monastic chroniclers recorded a very different interpretation of events. Matthew Paris stated that the pope was angered by the king’s requests for concessions, and had threatened excommunication against the king and his realm through his envoys. Other monastic chroniclers insisted that Arlot had openly threatened the parliament with excommunication and interdict if they did not quickly pay an extortionate sum of money. It is possible that Arlot exaggerated the threat of excommunication and interdict in an attempt to encourage those present at the English parliament to adhere to the pope’s requests. This could explain why the English monastic chronicles presented Arlot in such a negative light. Alternatively, they may have received inaccurate accounts from those present at the council. The thirteenth-century monastic chroniclers further criticised Arlot for overstepping his position as nuncio and exerting too much power in England. Matthew Paris argued that he had been assigned ‘with the greatest powers and authority’

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114 TNA, SC 7/2/22.
115 Arlot asked the king to promise an additional sum of 30,000 marks to be paid immediately to the merchants; to confirm that his curial proctors will pay 10,000 marks (in expenses) to the pope; to go or send a captain to Sicily by 1 March 1259 with two thousand knights, six thousand foot-soldiers and five hundred crossbowmen; and to ask his magnates for aid in acquiring these forces, Close Rolls suppl., 1244–66, pp. 29–30.
116 Henry stated that 30,000 marks was too high a price to pay as it went over the original amount required from the ecclesiastical tenth and other papal graces. Instead, Henry offered to recognise the original amount owed by the Church which would be paid over the next four to five years. Close Rolls suppl., 1244–66, pp. 29–30; Lunt, Financial Relations, i. p. 281.
117 TNA, SC 7/2/22.
119 The Annals of Tewkesbury stated that Arlot threatened the whole Church with interdict if the king did not rapidly pay the pope the agreed sum as part of the Sicilian contract, AM, i. p. 162–3. The Annals of Dunstable presented the king and his magnates as victims of excessive papal demands, stating that Arlot was sent to threaten the king and his magnates with excommunication if they did not re-pay over 100,000 marks to the pope, AM, iii. p. 208.
120 Carpenter, Henry III, p. 185.
in England. He goes on to assert that Arlot exceeded his station in England and ‘displayed all the pomp and splendour of a legate’. Similarly, the Annals of Dunstable noted that Arlot had been sent to England with ‘great powers’. However, the official correspondence reveals that Arlot was commissioned with full power (*plena facultate*) to act in accordance with the duties outlined in his mandate. He was not granted ‘full and free powers’, suggesting he was not granted the freedom to exert his own will throughout negotiations. Regardless, as we have seen through the example of Master Rostand, contemporary monastic chroniclers in England often accused papal envoys of exceeding their positions and asserting more powers than they had been granted, whether this was the case or not.

On 19 January 1258, Arlot had received a separate mandate from the pope granting him the power to extend the Sicilian deadline for up to another three months from June, until 1 September 1258. Yet, the king does not mention this additional suspension until July 1258, suggesting that Arlot delayed in telling the king about this new deadline. It is not clear why Arlot withheld this information from the king, although it seems probable that he waited until the first extension ran out before announcing the new extension, as the king would have been less motivated to meet the June date if he knew about the September deadline.

During his time in England, Arlot demonstrated a certain degree of agency to decide when and how to convey the pope’s response to the king. Despite his efforts, Arlot was unable to encourage

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121 CM, v. p. 673.
124 TNA, SC 7/3/52, SC 7/2/22; Reg. Alex IV, ii. no. 2379. SC 7/3/52 has been damaged and the date is not clear. Potthast has dated it to July/August 1257. Potthast, ii. no. 16955. However, Mann has suggested that it was commissioned December 1257, around the same time as SC 7/2/22, dated 12 December 1257, Mann, *The Lives of Popes*, xv. p. 78. As such, this thesis has presumed this document to be dated c. December 1257. On 26 December 1257, the pope also wrote to the bishops and archbishops of England informing them that their financial obligations to the papacy will be made void if the business cannot be amended between the King and the Roman Church, SC 7/3/47; *Foedera*, I/1, p. 368.
125 TNA, SC 7/2/37.
126 In a letter enrolled on 27 July 1258, Henry informed the pope that the ‘discreet and prudent man’ Master Arlot had suspended the Sicilian deadline until 1 September, *Foedera*, I/1, p. 375. In 1259, the king sent letters to the pope, cardinals, Master Giordano and Master Arlot, apologising for the delay in sending envoys to Rome, *Foedera*, I/1, p. 392. Carpenter also argued that Arlot ‘probably delayed’ before telling the king of this new deadline, Carpenter, *Henry III*, p. 185.
the king to promptly meet the terms of the Sicilian agreement, and according to Paris he ‘departed quietly’ in August 1258, after having witnessed ‘the disturbed state of the kingdom’.

**William Bonquer**

William Bonquer, a knight and marshal of the king’s household, went on several missions to the papal curia on the king’s behalf, to discuss matters relating to the Sicilian Business.

Bonquer was a knight by profession, who had been appointed king’s marshal sometime before 1256, making him a high-ranking and trusted servant of the king’s household. There is no evidence that he had any formal university education. He gained knowledge and experience of curial practices and procedures through his duties as proctor and diplomatic envoy at the papal curia between 1256 and 1260, which will be discussed below. Indeed, the papal curia operated much like ‘a training school’ for administrators. Moreover, he served the king in a number of judicial posts in the 1260s, ‘including justice of the Jews, King’s Bench, the common pleas, and justice in eyre’. Meekings has argued that Bonquer started as the most junior of five justices in the Bedford eyre, and his appointment followed ‘a large number of unexpected deaths and retirements since 1255’.

In February 1256, Bonquer was appointed alongside Master Peter de Solerio, the canon of Hereford, as the king’s proctors at the curia. Bonquer was ordered to negotiate the terms of the Sicilian Business and to promote the election of a new king of Germany. In the pope’s response, dated 11 June 1257, he referred to William and Peter as the king’s nuncii and praised them for carrying out their duties with ‘great discretion, prudence and care’. Accordingly, he impressed the pope with his skill during the undertaking of this mission. Following this papal reply, Henry appointed several diplomatic envoys to continue negotiations concerning the Sicilian business.

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127 CM, v. p. 713. On 9 August, Arlot and Rostand were granted safe-conduct for returning to Rome, CPR, 1247–58, p. 650.
128 Hennings, *Language of Kingship*, p. 64.
131 CPR, 1247–58, p. 463; CPR, 1258–66, p. 52.
132 *Foedera*, I/1, p. 337. The pope referred to this petition in his response, dated 10 June 1256, TNA, SC 7/2/11.
133 TNA, SC 7/2/11: ‘quos de multa discretione, providentia, et sollicitudine circa commissa eis negotia plurimum commendamus’.
134 CPR, 1247–58, pp. 488, 520.
Essentially, Bonquer had been responsible for opening up discussions with the papacy, regarding concessions to be made to the original terms of the Sicilian Business.

Over the next few years, Henry continued to appoint Bonquer as his representative on several diplomatic missions to the papacy linked to the Sicilian endeavour. In May 1258, he authorised ‘the blessed and faithful’ William Bonquer to go alongside the archbishops of Tarentaise and Embrun, and the Archdeacon of Liège, to petition the pope to send a cardinal legate to England to help conclude the Sicilian Business and to ask the papacy to improve, relax, and reform the Sicilian agreement.\(^{135}\) They were granted ‘full powers and special mandate’ to carry out these orders.\(^{136}\) However, Bonquer did not go to Rome on this occasion as he had been asked to return to England from France ‘by the counsel of the magnates’.\(^{137}\)

This mission had been authorised during the period of baronial usurpation, and yet there is evidence that it had been commissioned by the king and not by the barons. Indeed, at the time of its commission, the chancellor, Henry Wingham, was ill and the great seal was in the hands of the deputy chancellor, Walter of Merton.\(^{138}\) Although Wingham had been appointed chancellor by Henry on 5 January 1255, in 1258 he had agreed to take the baronial oath to observe the Provisions of Oxford and to not seal any prerogative writs of the king without authorisation from the baronial council.\(^{139}\) In contrast, Walter of Merton, a member of the king’s household, remained a loyal subject of Henry, and managed to retain his position as deputy chancellor and keeper of the exchequer seal.\(^{140}\) It was during these periods of Wingham’s absence that the king could, with Walter’s assistance, regain some control over the authorisation of important royal documents.\(^{141}\)

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\(^{137}\) *CPR, 1258–66*, p. 24.


\(^{140}\) Tout, *Chapters*, i. p. 299; G. H. Martin, ‘Merton, Walter of (c.1205–1277)’, *ODNB*, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/18612 [Accessed on 9 June 2019]. When the barons effectively usurped the government in 1258, they did not remove all individuals who remained loyal to the king. Indeed, they could not simply remove people who had essential skills and experience of running the king’s administration.

\(^{141}\) See, for example, the case concerning Velascus’ entry into England, Chapter Four, n. 107.
of government in the summer of 1261, he had appointed Walter as royal chancellor and keeper of the
great seal, in thanks for this loyal service.\footnote{142}

Later, in May 1259, Bonquer was again appointed on a mission to the curia to ask the
archbishops of Tarantaise and Embrun, Master Rostand, and John Clare\footnote{d} (or those of whom had
remained at the curia following their mission in 1258) to sue the pope for a legate in England, to
address the affairs relating to Sicily, to inform the pope of the progress of peace with France, and to
disclose other ‘secret affairs’ on behalf of the king. In this document he was again referred to as a
‘blessed and faithful’ man of the king.\footnote{143} Bonquer was appointed with full powers to negotiate
alongside these other envoys at Rome; the king would then ratify whatever decision they made.\footnote{144}
Chaplais argued that he was chosen for this secret mission because he was a faithful\footnote{familiaris} of the
king, not because he held any particular office.\footnote{145} Certainly, the repeated references to Bonquer as a
‘blessed and faithful’ man of the king confirms his trustworthiness. We will never know the specific
nature of the secret business which Bonquer relayed verbally to the pope, although it was probably
connected to the business in Sicily or the baronial usurpation of the English realm.

On 2 August 1259, the king and his council commissioned all or one of his envoys resident
at Rome to press the pope to send a cardinal legate to England to negotiate the same matters of Sicily
and England.\footnote{146} Then on 28 December 1259, Henry wrote to the pope and his cardinals from Paris,
asking them to give credence to William Bonquer, the archbishop of Embrun and the archdeacon of
Liège, whom he was sending to the curia to tell them that peace had finally been concluded with
France.\footnote{147} Boncher was amongst some of the king’s most utilised representatives at the papal curia.
Clearly, he was employed to undertake business on a number of occasions, both by the king and by
his barons. He worked hard to gain favour for the king’s Sicilian Business at the papal curia to

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\begin{itemize}
  \item \footnote{142} When the king re-took control of government in the summer of 1261, he removed all the members of his household whom the barons had installed, ‘Chronicle of Thomas Wykes’, AM, iv. pp. 128–9: ‘Et desposit dominium Hugonem Dispensarium de officio justiciarii, et fecit dominium Philippum Basset justiciarium, et abstulit sigillum de magistro Nicholao de Ely et commisit illud domino Waltero de Mertone’; Martin, ‘Merton, Walter of (c.1205–1277)’, ODNB.
  \item \footnote{143} Foedera, I/1, p. 386. CPR, 1258–66, pp. 51–2.
  \item \footnote{144} John Clarel was appointed king’s proctor for this mission, CPR, 1258–66, p. 52.
  \item \footnote{145} Chaplais, English Diplomatic Practice, p. 166.
  \item \footnote{146} At this time, the archbishops of Tarantaise and Embrun, Master Rostand, and William Boncher were present at the curia, Foedera, I/1, p. 388.
  \item \footnote{147} Foedera, I/1, p. 392.
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encourage the papacy to continue this matter. On this occasion, Bonquer was pushing to reopen the Sicilian Business on behalf of the king. This was the king’s primary focus at the curia.

In the late 1250s, Henry was appointing certain trusted members of his household to negotiate delicate English business at the papal curia. Bonquer was a prime example of this. He was given freedom to negotiate on the king’s behalf and there is also evidence of him actively promoting the king’s case with regards to Sicily while at the curia. He was diligently fighting for the survival of the Sicilian Business on behalf of the king. There were clearly advantages to appointing men like Bonquer in these delicate missions abroad, especially during a time of political turmoil and revolt, in which the king had limited powers and could trust few members of his court. As discussed, the Sicilian Business had proved to be a controversial foreign endeavour, hated by many, and as such Henry had needed men whom he could trust to carry out his orders loyally and diligently at the papal curia.

Master John Clarel

Master John Clarel, the final representative to be discussed in this chapter, was a royal clerk and the canon of Southwell appointed as a diplomatic envoy by the English barons to undertake duties at the papal curia on behalf of the English king and council. While little is known about Clarel’s career, it is evident that he had previous experience as a diplomatic envoy. He had acted as the ‘special clerk’ of John Mansel, treasurer of York and papal chaplain, on a variety of diplomatic missions to Castile and as such would have learnt how to conduct important diplomatic negotiations on behalf of the English king.148 John Mansel was himself a key royal administrator, often deployed on diplomatic missions on behalf of Henry – particularly in interactions with the papacy and with secular rulers in the Spanish peninsula and Scotland.149 Mansel had no formal university education

148 For example, on 15 May 1253, John Clarel was ordered to act in the place of John Mansel in diplomatic negotiations with the king of Castile if Mansel could not attend said negotiations, CPR, 1247–58, p. 230.
and yet he became one of Henry’s most talented negotiators in foreign matters. Ultimately, men like John Mansel, his protégé John Clarel, and William Bonquer, were able to build up their ability and prestige as diplomatic agents through their experience with diplomatic and administrative processes.

After the barons effectively usurped Henry’s government in May 1258, relations with the papal curia began to suffer as the barons started to openly challenge the papacy on certain matters relating to England. Yet, the council continued to communicate with the pope on behalf of the king and to retain a certain level of continuity in their management of Anglo-papal affairs. In July 1258 they commissioned the archbishops of Embrun and Tarentaise, Master Rostand, Master John Clarel, William of Hotintoft, knight, Peter of Brauche, nobleman, and Brother William of the order of Knights’ Templar in England, to negotiate the terms of the Sicilian Business with the pope and to ask for a cardinal legate to help reform the English kingdom and to conclude peace with France. Treharne has argued that John Clarel, William of Hotintoft, and Brother William were appointed by the baronial faction to lead this embassy and to keep check on the three royal envoys, namely the archbishops of Tarentaise, Embrun and Master Rostand, appointed by the king. Furthermore, he has argued that John Clarel was appointed as the speaker for this mission. In contrast, Mann and Gasquet asserted that this message had been communicated by the pope’s own nuncio, Master Arlot. There is also suggestion that this message was relayed by Master Rostand, indeed, there is evidence that suggests both Master Arlot and Master Rostand travelled to Rome in August 1258. The full speech given by this embassy has been recorded in the Annals of Burton, which according to Bombi, is one of only two known orations at the papal curia for the thirteenth century. An

150 According to Maddicott he was a ‘inveterate royalist’ to Henry throughout the Baronial Revolt, Maddicott, Simon de Montfort, p. 204.
151 CPR, 1247–58, pp. 643, 649–50; Foedera, I/1, pp. 375–6; CR, 1256–9, pp. 326–8. They were to present their case at the curia on 15 August 1258, ‘Annals of Burton’, AM, i. pp. 461–6. The archbishop of Embrun, the archbishop-elect of York and Master John Clarel were also granted separate letters of procurations to reform the business of Sicily, to ask for a cardinal legate to help reform the English kingdom and to conclude peace with France, CR, 1256–9, pp. 327–8. See papal response to this mission in BL Cotton MS Cleopatra E. I, fol. 203–4. Peter of Brauche died on the way to the papal curia, CM, v. p. 717.
152 Treharne, Baronial Plan, p. 104.
153 Ibid., p. 105.
154 Mann, The Lives of Popes, xv. p. 81; Gasquet, Henry the Third and the Church, p. 379.
155 On 9 August 1258, Rostand and Arlot were granted safe-conduct in their journey to Rome, CPR, 1247–58, p. 650.
156 Bombi, Anglo-Papal Relations, p. 59. Little is known about the author of the Burton annals. They were written by several contemporary monastic writers from 1189–1263, suggesting that they had some knowledge of contemporary affairs in England, AM, i. p. xii. Luard has argued that the Annals of Burton was
exploration of this oration, its language and rhetorical style, will help to illuminate the identity of the speaker.

In this oration, the speaker formally asked Alexander IV to send a cardinal legate to England primarily to make peace with France, and also to depose the bishop-elect, Aymer de Lusignan, from his see at Winchester. The speech only contained a few rhetorical embellishments, mainly comprised of standard biblical quotations and legal references, suggesting that it was conducted by someone with limited command of curial rhetorical practices. As such, it could not have been given by Arlot or Rostand, both of whom had a rigorous understanding of the *stylus curie*. Instead, the language of this oration was that of an English clerk. Furthermore, it was the language of someone who felt strongly about the success of this mission, pinpointing several key matters which were at the heart of the barons’ discontent with the king and pope and capturing the emotion of the ‘English community’ towards these Anglo-papal endeavours – particularly towards the removal of Aymer from the realm.

In this oration, the speaker states how the king’s relatives have drawn him away from his duty to the country, and as a result ‘justice has been expelled from the same [English] kingdom’. This can be compared directly to the language in the Song of Lewes, written anonymously in 1264 to celebrate and justify the victory of the barons at the battle of Lewes during the Baronial War. Indeed, the Song describes the unjust acts of the king’s foreign councillors and officials, particularly his Lusignan brothers, who deceived the king and ‘banish[ed] justice to put injustice in its place’.

The speaker of the English embassy went on to quote from the book of Joel in his denouncement of the king’s ‘aliens’: ‘*Residuum erucae comedit locusta, et residuum locustae*’

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157 In the first part of this memorandum, the speaker of the embassy lavished great thanks on Alexander for his efforts in bringing about peace between the three kings of England, France and Germany and requests a cardinal legate to confirm the peace with France. In the second part, the speaker discussed matters related to England – asking for a legate to be sent to assist the king in reforming the realm and then goes on to beg the pope to authorise the formal removal of Aymer de Lusignan from his see of Winchester, ‘Annals of Burton’, *AM*, i. pp. 463–6.

158 On 1 August 1259, John Clare was appointed as the barons’ proctor at Rome to ‘undertake the procurational burden for the defence of the king and the realm against Aymer’, *CPR*, 1258–66, p. 41; Jobson, *First English Revolution*, p. 34.


160 Charles L. Kingsford, *The Song of Lewes* (Oxford, 1890), l. 574: ‘ut iniuriam iura supplantarent’. Kingsford has argued that the Song of Lewes was written by a Franciscan friar, probably educated at Oxford under the tutorship of Adam Marsh and Grosseteste, p. xviii.
comedit brucus, residuum bruci comedit aerugo (Joel 1: 4)’. Similarly, the Song of Lewes discussed the destruction caused to the realm by these ‘aliens’. Evidently, this oration at the papal curia had been drawn up by the barons and their supporters. It seems highly probable that it was Clarel, as Treharne suggested, who ‘passionately pleaded’ for the pope to send a cardinal legate to England through his ‘frank and near begging language’. Furthermore, the speaker antagonised the pope through this address, stating that if the pope did not send a cardinal legate to England then he was proving his own ‘malice, hatred and greed’ towards England, which was already suspected due to his previous threats against them. Essentially, the barons were implying that people would think the pope did not want to make peace between the sons of Christendom, commit finances towards the cost of this legatine mission, or even choose a cardinal to act as legate, lest it cause envy amongst his cardinals. In their manipulations, they were exploiting the pope’s desire to be viewed as a peacemaker. Neither Master Rostand, a skilled papal administrator and ‘devoted clerk’ of the king, nor Master Arlot, a loyal papal envoy, would have used this kind of language in their communications with the pope and his cardinals. As noted in Chapter One, the pope responded to this embassy by effectively cancelling the Sicilian Business and ending his ‘alliance’ with the English king, illustrating how negatively this mission had impacted relations between England and the papacy.

John Clarel was the speaker of this mission who had shaped the outcome of the Sicilian Business through his harsh words at the curia. He was neither working for the pope nor the king, but for the barons, highlighting the interchangeable duties of envoys as freelance agents. He was not a man of high rank or social status, but one who had practical experience in conducting diplomatic matters, and who, more importantly, sympathised with the barons’ desires for reform. He effectively conveyed the barons’ desperation in achieving these aims, but ultimately condemned the success of this mission through the near-threatening and highly controversial tone towards the papacy.

162 The Song of Lewes, ll. 301–6 and 559–81.
165 See pp. 43, 50, 57.
Conclusion

This chapter has shown that a wide range of individuals could be appointed as envoys and agents throughout diplomatic exchanges between Henry III and Alexander IV. In particular, bishops and archbishops, as well as royal and papal administrators and household officials proved to be effective envoys throughout Anglo-papal interactions.

During this increasingly tumultuous period in England, the king was struggling to retain support from his barons, particularly with regards to the Sicilian Business and as such began sending a greater number of loyal household officials and prelates, as well as foreign administrators to engage in business on his behalf at the curia. All the prelates he appointed for missions with the papacy had personal connections to the queen’s Savoyard family. Likewise, he appointed William Bonquer, a knight and marshal of his household on a number of missions to the curia.

When the barons usurped control of Henry’s government in May 1258, they started to appoint a number of their own supporters on missions to the papacy. However, they also continued to send royal representatives who had previously conducted business on behalf of the English Crown at the curia. The barons viewed this as a transitional phase for the English government and as such, retained a level of consistency in their appointments – sending representatives who were already known to the curia and who could engage with the curia’s complex administrative practices and procedures.

In a similar fashion, Pope Alexander IV carefully chose suitable representatives for diplomatic missions to England. He picked individuals who would be well-received by the English king and realm, who had the appropriate dignity and rank for their mission, who may have been known to the English king from previous engagements with him, or who had a reputation as someone with high morality and religiosity. Often, he sent trusted papal administrators and household officials who had the experience and skills to engage in delicate diplomatic negotiations, but who were also cheaper to employ. Indeed, he heavily depended on Master Rostand and Master Arlot throughout this period along with a number of friars, who will be discussed in the following chapter. It is also clear that these papal officials could be utilised by the English king to communicate and negotiate the king’s replies.
To conclude. By the mid-thirteenth century both the king and the pope were employing an increasing number of administrators and household officials as diplomatic representatives. They did not necessarily have the same ‘symbolic value’ as high-status prelates or magnates, but they had the skills, ability and trust of their principal to sufficiently undertake their duties. Their reasons for sending these officials could vary somewhat. Indeed, for the pope, they were cheaper to employ, and could be used to project the image of a simple and humble pope, while, for the king, their loyalty was of the utmost importance during the period of Baronial Revolt. Ultimately, by prioritising the skills, experience and loyalty of an envoy above their status and title, the king and pope could ensure smoother and more efficient collaboration and interaction between the two realms. This will be explored further in Chapter Four through a number of case-studies exploring the use of friars as envoys between Alexander IV and Henry III.
Chapter Four - Representation: The Use of Friars as Envoys

Throughout this section on diplomatic representation, it has become clear that a range of people could be appointed as envoys on missions between England and the papacy in the mid-thirteenth century. One group which deserves special attention are the friars, specifically the Franciscans and Dominicans, a significant number of whom were appointed as representatives on missions between England and the papacy in the mid-thirteenth century.¹ The current scholarship on the mendicant orders has instead focused on areas such as their *vita apostolica*, their duties of pastoral care, their fight against heresy, the issue of poverty and the institutionalisation of the orders.² Scholars have begun to acknowledge the important contribution played by friars as agents of diplomacy in the Middle Ages. In 2015, Lazzarini observed that ‘monks and friars often played a crucial role as mediators in peace treaties and leagues since at least the thirteenth century’.³ Yet, there remains a lack of detailed research into the role and function of friars as envoys. This chapter shall therefore investigate why the Dominicans and Franciscans were particularly utilised as diplomatic envoys throughout exchanges between King Henry III and Pope Alexander IV from 1254 to 1261. It will explore whether they were chosen because they were friars or rather because they held other important offices in the royal and papal administrations, and ultimately what this reveals about the practice of diplomatic representation between England and the papacy in the mid-thirteenth century.

The Early Use of Friars as Envoys

Following their foundation in the early thirteenth century, the Dominicans and Franciscans quickly rose in number and favour across Western Christendom and soon became some of the most effective facilitators of papal and royal policy.⁴ While the Franciscans were originally approved orally by Pope Innocent III in 1210 and the Dominicans were confirmed by Pope Honorius III in

³ Lazzarini, *Communication and Conflict*, p. 133.
1216, it was Pope Gregory IX who began appointing these friars as diplomatic envoys during his pontificate. Similarly, his successor, Innocent IV, though less supportive of the friars, continued to assign Franciscans and Dominicans to positions as envoys. Pope Alexander IV, an ardent supporter of the mendicant orders, heavily utilised the friars as envoys. Likewise, following the arrival of the Franciscans and Dominicans in England and France, Henry III and Louis IX began to appoint them to a variety of roles, including those of royal confessor, councillor, and diplomatic envoy.

As noted above, Pope Gregory IX was the first pope to start making use of friars as envoys. This was largely due to his own personal connection to these new orders – particularly the Franciscans. Elias of Cortona, twice Minister General of the Franciscan Order (from 1221–1227 and again from 1232–1239), stands out as a prime example of a Franciscan whose background and personal connections to Gregory influenced his appointment as papal envoy. Before becoming pope, Hugolino dei Conti di Segni (Gregory IX) took a great interest in the new mendicant orders and became the first Cardinal protector of the Franciscan Order from 1220–1227. Through this appointment he built a good relationship with Francis of Assisi and his companions. In 1238, at a very stormy time in the clash between the pope and Emperor Frederick II, Gregory appointed Elias to mediate peace between himself and Emperor Frederick II following the emperor’s victory at Cortenuova against the pope’s allies, the Lombard League. Elias had been one of the original companions of Francis, as well as a close friend of Clare of Assisi (the founder of the female order),


7 Salimbene, i. p. 50. Cardinal Giovanni San Paulo also helped Francis of Assisi gain oral approval of his Rule from Innocent III, Maria Pia Alberzoni, ‘Francesco d’Assisi, il Cardinale Giovanni di San Paolo e il Collegio Cardinale’ in Francesco a Roma dal signor Papa, ed. Alvaro Cacciotti and Maria Melli (Milan, 2008), pp. 61–92.

8 Salimbene, i. pp. 54, 136; R. B. Brooke, Early Franciscan Government from Elias to Bonaventure (Cambridge, 1959), p. 148; Giulia Barone, ‘Brother Elias Revisited’, Greyfriars Review, 13, Supplement (1999), 1–18 (8). For the greater part of his pontificate, Gregory was closely engaged in a major dispute with the Holy Roman Emperor, Frederick II, who was intent on expanding his empire further into Italy see Van Cleve, Emperor Frederick II, pp. 194–454; D. Abulafia, Frederick II: A Medieval Emperor (London, 1988), pp. 164–350. The Lombard League (which included most of the northern cities in Italy) had been formed in December 1167 to fight for independence from the Hohenstaufen rule. For more on the Lombard League see Giancarlo Raccangni, The Lombard League, 1167–1225 (Oxford, 2010).
and as such became well acquainted with Hugolino. In fact, following his ascension to pontiff in 1227, Gregory trusted Elias with the important task of overseeing the building of a ‘special church’ in honour of Francis (the Basilica of St Francis in Assisi). Brooke and, more recently, Alberzoni, have pointed to his good relationship with the Emperor, Frederick II. Elias had not only been a friend of Francis, Clare, Gregory IX and Frederick II, he was also renowned as an effective governor, administrator and peacemaker. His skills in administration and mediation increased his suitability for this diplomatic mission in 1238.

Elias was not only an effective envoy of the pope, but also of the emperor. After he had been deposed as Minister General in 1239 and following reports of his luxurious lifestyle and autocratic rule which resulted in several alleged attempts on his life, he fled to the court of Frederick II. He was later excommunicated for allying himself with the emperor. Since Frederick had witnessed Elias’ skills as a papal diplomat, he soon commissioned the disgraced friar to return to the curia as an imperial envoy to negotiate peace on his behalf. Elias never arrived at the curia, as he had heard rumours that his enemies planned to capture him on route. He had been appointed due to his experience as a diplomat, his understanding of curial administrative and legislative procedures, as well as his sympathies towards the emperor. Barone has further suggested that Frederick chose Elias for this imperial mission to ‘create divisions’ within the Franciscan Order and damage their reputation as loyal agents of the papacy. Indeed, Frederick was no friend of the mendicants. They had been the most zealous in their preaching of anti-imperial propaganda – particularly the Dominicans, who were encouraged by the papacy to preach against the heresy of the emperor in the

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9 See Maria Pia Alberzoni, ‘Frate Elia Tra Chiara d’Assisi, Gregorio IX e Frederico II’, in Elia di Cortona tra realtà e mito: Atti dell’incontro di studio (Spoleto, 2014), pp. 91–122.
11 Ibid., p. 147. According to Salimbene, Elias was ‘a special friend’ to both Gregory IX and Frederick II, Salimbene, i. pp. 136, 141.
12 In 1233 Elias mediated peace between the communes of Spoleto and Cerreto, E. Lempp, Frère Élie de Cortone (Paris, 1901), pp. 171–2. Alberzoni argued that Elias ‘served as a mediator between Clare and the papacy after the promulgation of Quo elongati’, which Clare resisted as it sought to impose relaxations on the Franciscan way of life, Maria Pia Alberzoni, Clare of Assisi and the Poor Sisters in the 13th century (New York, 2004), p. 50.
Regno, Lombardy and Germany.\textsuperscript{16} As such, Frederick saw the mendicants as the ‘evil angels’ of the pope who conspired against him and the peace of his realm.\textsuperscript{17} Evidently, Elias’ appointments were influenced by his background as one of the first companions of Francis. Through this post he developed a good relationship with Hugolino which ultimately influenced his appointment by the emperor.

Pope Innocent IV continued to utilise the friars as envoys throughout his pontificate. Between 1243 and 1248, he sent two Dominicans, André de Longjumeau and Ascelinus of Cremona, and one Franciscan, Giovanni of Piano Carpini, on three separate missions to the East to establish contact with the Mongol authorities.\textsuperscript{18} Similarly, in 1248 André de Longjumeau was selected by King Louis IX to lead a French embassy to the Mongols and convince them to join the Christians in crusade against the Moslems.\textsuperscript{19} These friars were chosen as papal and royal envoys due to their morality, trustworthiness, mobility, preaching abilities and education. Furthermore, André’s appointments were specifically influenced by his extensive knowledge of Eastern languages.\textsuperscript{20} The friars had proved themselves to be effective implementors of papal policy and Innocent IV continued to employ them as such. Certainly, he sent several friars as envoys to England between 1247 and 1254.\textsuperscript{21} Consequently, Alexander IV and Henry III were not the first rulers to appoint friars as envoys, but they did continue to utilise friars extensively in these roles between 1254 and 1261.\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{17} Acta Imperii inedita saec. XIII, Eduard Winckelmann, 2 vols (Innsbruck, 1880), i. nos. 359, 657, 856.
\textsuperscript{20} According to Matthew Paris, André could translate Arabic and Persian into Latin, CM, vi. p. 115. Similarly, the papal envoy, Eudes de Châteauroux (d. 1273), revealed that André was one of the French king’s envoys to the Tartars who had provided a translation of letters from Mongolian into Latin, Spicilegium sive collectio veterum aliquot scriptorum in Galliae bibliothecis Delituerant, ed. Luc D’Achery, 3 vols (Paris, 1723), iii. 624–8.
\textsuperscript{21} In 1245 the English Franciscans and Dominicans were ordered to preach the new crusade to the Holy Land. In 1246 Innocent IV ordered the same Franciscans and Dominicans to collect revenue for the business of the cross, Lunt, Financial Relations, i. p. 435. In 1247 Innocent IV appointed two Franciscans, John the Englishman and Alexander, to collect funds for the papal treasury, CM, v. pp. 599, 600, 619. In 1248 the same John was acting as collector of the crusader tax in England, Scotland and Ireland, BF, i. no. 268; CPL, i. p. 243; Later, in 1250 John was acting as papal nuncio in England, p. 263. Innocent IV sent the Franciscan John of Dya to England in 1254 to investigate abuses of patronage, BF, i. no. 509.
\textsuperscript{22} For more on the prominent role of Franciscans as agents of the pope and the English Crown between 1247 and 1263 see Victor G. Green, ‘The Franciscans in Medieval English Life (1228–1348)’, Franciscan Studies, 20 (1939), 1–164 (81–5).
Pope Alexander IV and the Friars

As we have seen in Chapters Two and Three, Pope Alexander IV sent a variety of agents to England to carry out business on his behalf. At least eight of these envoys were friars, seven of whom, Giacomo Boncambi, Giovanni Colonna, John of Dya, John of Kent, Mansuetus of Castiglione, Velascus Gometii, and Walter of Rogat, were given powers to negotiate matters on the pope’s behalf.23 These seven friars, some of whom have been mentioned in the chapters above, represented a significant portion of the total number of envoys appointed by Alexander on diplomatic missions to England.24 Similarly, Henry III selected a number of friars to act as diplomatic representatives on his behalf. Henry began appointing friars as envoys shortly after their arrival in his realm. For example, in 1233 he chose Agnellus of Pisa, founder and Minister Provincial of the Franciscans in England, to negotiate with Richard Marshal, earl of Pembroke, and bring him back into allegiance with the king after he had raised arms against the king in the Welsh Marches.25 Agnellus was a household member and counsellor of the king, trusted with important matters of diplomacy.26 Arguably, his position and status as a Franciscan minister in England encouraged his appointment as a member of the king’s household. Equally, his position as a household official increased his utility and trustworthiness as a diplomatic agent.27

Much like Gregory IX, Alexander IV’s decision to employ friars as papal envoys mirrored his own special relationship with the mendicant orders.28 On 19 March 1227, Pope Gregory IX had appointed Rainaldo di Jenne (Alexander IV) to take his place as cardinal protector of the Franciscan

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23 Giovanni Colonna, John of Dya, John of Kent, Mansuetus di Castiglione and Velascus Gometii will be discussed in detail throughout this chapter. For more on Giacomo Boncambi’s role as papal envoy in England see pp. 128–9. On 30 April 1259, Alexander IV sent the Franciscan, Walter de Rogat, papal penitentiary and member of his household (familiaris), on a diplomatic mission to Henry’s brother, Richard of Cornwall, King of Germany, to exhort the princes to formally recognise Richard as the king of the Romans, Foedera, I/1, p. 382.

24 England was not the only kingdom to which Alexander IV sent friars as papal nuncios. In January 1255 he sent the papal nuncio, Rufino da Piacenza, O.F.M, to Sicily to act in place of his legati a latere, Cardinal Ottaviano, for the territories of Sicily. Rufino was described as a skilful adviser who had previous diplomatic experience under Innocent IV, BF, ii. no. 14.


26 CM, iii. p. 257: ‘familiaris…domino regi et consiliarius’.

27 In the late 1250s, Henry was certainly appointing loyal household officials to represent his position at the papal curia see pp. 143–5, 152–5.

28 For Alexander’s special relationship with the mendicants and the Franciscans in particular see Mesiano, Papa Oblitus: Vita praematura Alessandri IV, pp. 25–33.
Order. Thereafter, he devoted much of his time to assisting and supporting both male and female branches of this order. Unlike Gregory, Rainaldo did not relinquish his position as cardinal protector until his death in 1261, suggesting an even closer bond existed between himself and the order throughout his pontificate, and reportedly, he frequently kept Franciscans around him. He has also been regarded as a ‘friend and confidant’ of Clare. Arguably, he encouraged Clare of Assisi to write her rule and persuaded the pope to confirm it on 9 August 1253. Following her death and his ascension to pontiff, he had her canonised on 26 September 1255. He commissioned the Legend of Clare to be written in 1255 and within this hagiography he is referred to as ‘a friend of all holiness… a guardian of religious, and a firm support of the Orders’. Indeed, he awarded many special privileges to the Franciscans and Dominicans throughout his pontificate. He strove equally to organise and exalt the religious life of other mendicant orders. During the first part of his pontificate, Alexander made strong attempts to defend the mendicant masters who had been embroiled in a conflict with the secular masters at the University of Paris since 1253. This involved a criticism from the seculars on the friars’ ‘ideal of a life of mendicancy’.

The clash at Paris had been the result of growing competition between the secular and mendicant masters for students, chairs in the faculty of theology, and financial backing. As part of

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30 Rainaldo spent much of his early ecclesiastical career assisting the Franciscans, especially between 1252–54 see Potthast, ii. nos. 12879, 13747, 14002, 14411, 14651, 14467, 14559, 14725, 14873, 15086, 15152.
32 *Clare of Assisi: Early Documents*, p. 28.
33 *Ibid.*; Rainaldo had first approved Clare’s Rule on 16 September 1252. It was later confirmed by Innocent IV, *BF*, i. no. 494; Potthast, ii. no. 15086; translated in *Clare of Assisi: Early Documents*, 108–126.
34 ‘The Legend of Saint Clare’, *Clare of Assisi: Early Documents*, p. 328. However, it is important to remember that Alexander was the patron of this hagiography and thus it was bound to present him as a deeply religious supporter of the mendicant movement.
35 See *BF*, ii. pp. 1–421, for privileges and concessions to the Franciscan Order. See *Bullarium Ordinis Fratrum Prædicatorum*, ed. T. Ripoli and A. Brémont, 8 vols (Rome, 1729–40), i. pp. 266–416, for privileges and concessions to the Dominican Order.
36 For example, he granted a number of privileges to the Carmelites, and reformed the orders of hermits in 1255 and 1256, Frances Andrews, *The Other Friars: The Carmelite, Augustinian, Sack and Pied Friars in the Middle Ages* (Woodbridge, 2006), pp. 18, 22, 83–4; Potthast, ii. nos. 15928, 15942, 16190, 16225.
37 This dispute arose in 1253 when, after an attack had taken place on several students by the local night watch, the mendicant school failed to cooperate with the secular faction in protesting this event, G. Geltner, *The Making of Medieval Anti-fraternalism* (Oxford, 2012), p. 17.
38 V. Mäkinen, *Property Rights in the Late Medieval discussion on Franciscan Poverty* (Leuven, 2001), p. 21. This anti-fraternal movement at Paris had been led by Master William of St Amour who wrote his famous polemic against the friars (*De periculis*) in April 1256. Alexander IV and Louis IX worked together to have William’s polemic condemned and destroyed and have him expelled from France, Salimbene, *i.* pp. 74, 438; Labarge, *Saint Louis*, p. 163.
this dispute, the seculars had expelled the mendicants from teaching at Paris, and between May and July 1254, Pope Innocent IV supported this suspension and agreed to forbid the mendicants from retaking up their positions at the university.40 Contrary to this, when Alexander IV came to power he revoked Innocent IV’s mandates against the friars and restored all their privileges and rights at Paris.41 Furthermore, this dispute directly influenced Alexander’s appointment of friars on major international missions in an attempt to restore the reputation of these orders and to emphasise their good relationship with the papacy.42

The rivalry between secular and mendicant masters at Paris not only highlights Alexander’s favour towards the friars, but also the increasing appeal of a mendicant education. In fact, this dispute was influenced by the increasing number of students joining the mendicant school at Paris. Throughout the thirteenth century, a growing number of mendicant schools were being founded across Europe which, in turn, led to the development of an international network of friar scholars.43 Friars from this expanding network were well suited for diplomatic missions due to their mendicant education, scholarly reputation and international links.44

Henry’s French counterpart, Louis IX, became a firm supporter and employer of friars following their arrival in his kingdom.45 He built strong ties with the friars at the University of Paris and appointed the Franciscan Eudes Rigaud, a renowned theologian at Paris, as the archbishop of

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41 On 14 April 1255, Alexander IV forced the university to readmit the friars who had been expelled and to stop limiting the number of magisterial chairs available to them, *BF*, ii. no. 43.
Rouen from 1248–1275, and later as a key negotiator in the peace talks with England in the lead up to the Treaty of Paris. His position as a friar and scholar at Paris had aided his elevation to archbishop of Rouen, which in turn influenced his appointment as royal envoy throughout the Anglo-French peace negotiations. Generally speaking, the scholarship has suggested that Henry III’s own endorsement of the friars was influenced by his attempts to rival the piety, morality and kingship of his French counterpart. Yet, clearly, it was the papacy’s increased utilisation of these pious individuals which influenced and encouraged both Henry and Louis to appoint friars as royal agents. Jordan further asserted that Henry and Louis filled their courts with Franciscans and Dominicans as, due to their reverence of poverty and detachment from the royal council and the ‘traditional powers in local society’, they were deemed pious, educated, and incorruptible agents. These factors certainly made them highly effective negotiators and mediators. Moreover, the mendicants were allowed a level of mobility which had not been ascribed to any other religious order, increasing their utility and desirability as envoys. While, in theory, these attributes made the friars suitable candidates for positions as diplomatic envoys, their appointments were also heavily influenced by the nature, personality and style of rulership of their principal. In the first half of the thirteenth century, the friars represented ‘the cutting edge of Christian piety’. Moreover, in missions of high importance an embassy needed to contain envoys who could adequately represent their sender. Through the appointment of representatives from a mendicant background, Pope Alexander IV could emphasise his own piety, peaceful nature, and close relationship with the friars. Similarly, the French and English kings could highlight their own personal piety, humility and spiritual initiative,

47 Lawrence, The Friars, p. 169; Röhrkasten, ‘The English Crown and the Franciscans’, p. 79. Carpenter has downplayed this rivalry, instead arguing that these two kings had ‘much in common’ with regards to their piety and religious activities, Carpenter, ‘The Meetings of Kings Henry III and Louis IX’, pp. 10–11, 17–19.
49 Indeed, on 30 April 1250, Pope Innocent IV gave permission for English Franciscans and Dominicans to relax their rule to allow them to ride on horseback, Potthast, ii. no. 13965. This further increased their ‘physical freedom of movement’, Plöger, England and the Avignon Popes, p. 76.
50 Jordan, Louis IX and the Challenge of the Crusade, p. 54.
51 The anonymous author of the Legend of Clare, commissioned by Alexander IV, presented this pope as a ‘most gentle prince’, ‘The Legend of Saint Clare’, Clare of Assisi: Early Documents, p. 328. See Chapter Five, ‘Pope as Peacemaker’, pp. 237–40, for more on Alexander’s use of Franciscan rhetoric to emphasise his self-presentation as a peacemaker.
as well as their close connection to the papacy and the Roman Church. In appointing envoys from a friar background, papal and royal authorities could also save on expenditure. Due to the increased presence of mendicant communities across Europe in the thirteenth century, friars could be housed and provided for by fellow mendicants when on route to their assigned destinations. As mentioned in Chapters Two and Three, the thirteenth-century papacy was employing more lower-status envoys on diplomatic missions to England. Indeed, five of the seven friars chosen by Alexander IV to conduct diplomatic duties in England were papal nunci and two were papal legati. Unsurprisingly, it was the two Dominican archbishops, Boncambi and Colonna, who were assigned duties as papal legati. Their high ecclesiastical status allowed them to perform certain legatine duties which could not be conducted by a lower-ranking official.

The Friars in England

Following their arrival in England in the 1220s, the Dominicans and Franciscans were well received by King Henry III and were endowed with extensive benefactions and royal support. The king supported and provided for both orders, and yet Röhrkasten has argued that he clearly favoured the Dominicans. This can be highlighted through the example of John Darlington, a Dominican friar who rose to become Henry’s royal confessor. In June 1258, Darlington was chosen by the king to sit on the council of twenty-four, which was to choose the council of fifteen that was to assist in ruling the realm. As a loyal courtier, he could also be trusted to undertake certain diplomatic duties on behalf of the king. While Henry had been in France in early 1260, his son Edward had allied

53 For example, when the Franciscans first arrived in London in 1224, they were kindly received by the resident Dominicans. They remained with the Dominicans for fifteen days, ‘eating and drinking what was set before them as though they were members of the family.’ Thomas of Eccleston, De adventu fratrum minorum in Angliam, MF, i. p. 9. Jackson noted the presence of friar communities across Eastern Europe which would have housed the mendicants on their missions to the Mongols, Jackson, ‘Franciscans as papal and royal envoys to the Tartars’, pp. 224–5.
54 For royal benefactions to Franciscans see CR, 1254–6, pp. 50, 52, 87, 142, 251, 283, 304, 335, 343, 346, 360, 367, 417, 431; 1255–9, pp. 48, 94, 96, 136, 163, 221, 225, 256, 262, 263, 268, 273, 378, 395. For royal benefactions to Dominicans see CR, 1254–6, pp. 50–1, 283, 292, 323, 335, 339, 350, 366; 1256–9, pp. 73, 89, 95–6, 221, 234, 263, 268, 308, 378–9, 384.
55 The Dominicans were the first to arrive in England and proved to be more useful to the English king as, unlike the Franciscans, they handled cash and actively ‘sought out influential figures, making contact and soliciting their support’. J. Röhrkasten, Mendicant Houses of Medieval London, 1221–1539 (Münster, 2004), pp. 342, 344. Howell, Eleanor of Provence, pp. 8, 63, 90–5.
56 DBM, pp. 10, 100–1; CR, 1256–9, pp. 315–16. From December 1274–1278, Darlington was appointed as a papal collector in England, CCA-DCC-ChAnt/C/223.
himself with Montfort, and thus, in an attempt to encourage the king’s return to England, Darlington took on the role of mediator and travelled to France to assure the king of his son’s loyalty.\textsuperscript{57} Later, in 1263, Darlington was appointed to negotiate peace with the barons, following Montfort’s acquisition of London.\textsuperscript{58}

Clearly, the pope and the king were both utilising the friars as court officials and envoys during the mid-thirteenth century. However, as we shall see, Alexander IV deployed more friars as envoys than the English king in their exchanges. The following section shall draw on four case studies to illustrate the use of friars as envoys by the king and the pope in diplomatic exchanges. These envoys are: Adam Marsh, O.F.M, Giovanni Colonna, O.F.P, Mansuetus of Castiglione, O.F.M and Velascus Gometti, O.F.M.

**Adam Marsh, O.F.M**

While Henry favoured the Dominicans over the Franciscans, Hinnebusch has stressed that members from both orders served as the king’s ‘ambassadors and messengers.’\textsuperscript{59} Their appointments could be influenced by both their skills and their personal connections. In fact, on 22 June 1257, Henry entrusted the English Franciscan Adam Marsh, Hugh Bigod and Walter Cantilupe, bishop of Worcester, to help Henry’s leading negotiators, Peter of Savoy and Simon de Montfort, treat peace with the King of France. As discussed in Chapter One, the pope had encouraged Henry to make a lasting peace with Louis so that he could focus his attention on Sicily.\textsuperscript{60} This royal embassy did not depart for France until late December 1257 – just in time to join Simon and Peter in attendance at Louis’ parliament in January.\textsuperscript{61} The embassy returned via Dover in February 1258 having failed to agree terms with the French because the English envoys had demanded that Louis returned all the English possessions he held, a term which the French barons refused to accept.\textsuperscript{62}

\textsuperscript{57} Lawrence has argued that this ‘paved the way for the formal reconciliation between father and son in May of that year’, C. H. Lawrence, ‘Darlington, John of (d.1284)’, *ODNB*, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/7159 [Accessed on 2 December 2018].
\textsuperscript{58} *CPR*, 1247–58, pp. 268–70. After 1265, Darlington mediated between the government and opponents who had lost their estates or been left with high fines, Röhrkasten, *Mendicant Houses of Medieval London*, p. 211.
\textsuperscript{60} See pp. 45–6.
\textsuperscript{62} *CM*, v. p. 663.
When thinking about why Adam was chosen for this mission it is important to note that this appointment was made following ‘consent and advice’ from Simon de Montfort and Peter of Savoy, who, as we have seen, were already engaged in these peace negotiations in France. Clearly, these two leading envoys played a crucial role in influencing the appointment of fellow royal agents to assist them in their duties. Indeed, Marsh had a very close relationship with Simon de Montfort. They shared many ideals, and Marsh supported Montfort in his ambition to reform the English government. Moreover, Maddicott and Ambler have noted that Simon was a religious man and a strong supporter of the friars, particularly the Franciscans. He ‘loved the friars minor religiously’ and in turn, they commended him as a saint. Consequently, Montfort effectively chose Marsh for this mission as he was a close ally and companion who could be trusted to help protect and defend the Montfort family’s hereditary rights to territory in France when negotiating the terms of the treaty.

Clearly, Marsh was not chosen for this mission simply because he was a Franciscan – the skills, education and personal connections he had acquired through his Franciscan education and training had made him a suitable candidate for diplomatic service. He had completed a Master of Arts degree at Oxford in 1226, joined the Franciscan order around 1232, and been taught theology by Robert Grosseteste, bishop of Lincoln (1235–1253), a fellow ally and supporter of Simon de Montfort, at the Franciscan school at Oxford. Shortly afterwards, he became the first Franciscan to

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64 Maddicott, Simon de Montfort, p. 140. Likewise, Walter Cantilupe was a close ally of Simon de Montfort and Hugh Bigod was one of the baronial councillors who would later join Simon and Peter in revolt against Henry in April 1258, Howell, Eleanor of Provence, p. 64.
65 Adam Marsh, ‘Epistolae’, MF, i. nos. 135, 137, 140–1, 143–4, 146. He also had a close relationship with Simon’s wife, Eleanor de Montfort. For letters to Eleanor de Montfort see nos. 157–64.
69 C. H. Lawrence, ‘Marsh, Adam (c.1200–1259)’, ODNB, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/95 [Accessed on 19 June 2017]; MF, i. pp. lxxvii, lxxix. Grosseteste wanted to encourage the Franciscans to stay educated so they could avoid becoming like other orders and falling into the ‘darkness of ignorance’, Thomas Eccleston, MF, i. p. 91. Grosseteste was a vocal opponent, alongside Walter Cantilupe, of the proposed
lecture at the university as a Chair of Theology in 1230.70 This education in rhetoric, logic and theology would have prepared Marsh for a career as a spiritual advisor, diplomat and mediator.71 Likewise, his association with Grosseteste, and Grosseteste’s school of thought would have influenced his political career and strengthened his relationship with Montfort.

Clearly, Adam Marsh’s relationship with Simon de Montfort influenced his appointment as envoy on this royal mission to France. Nonetheless, this was not his first diplomatic mission abroad on behalf of the English Crown. In 1247, he had been sent on a diplomatic mission overseas alongside the Dominican, Matthew of Bergeveny.72 The king clearly understood the advantages of utilising this friar as a royal agent. Indeed, in a letter to Marsh dated September 1235, Grosseteste commented on his ‘holy, sweet and effective powers of persuasion’ – desirable qualities in an agent of diplomacy.73 Marsh had also cultivated a particularly good relationship with the English queen, Eleanor of Provence, and her uncle, Boniface of Savoy, the archbishop of Canterbury, highlighting his ability to make important connections, which increased his chances of appointment as a royal envoy and also his suitability to act on the Crown’s behalf.74

Marsh rapidly gained a reputation for his skills in negotiation and was often called on to settle legal disputes, and protect the rights of others.75 On 22 June 1256, he was appointed papal...

71 Lawrence, *The Friars*, p. 175.
72 The details of this mission are unknown, *CLR*, 1245–51, p. 133.
74 Queen Eleanor sought much advice from Adam Marsh, ‘Epistolae’, *MF*, i. nos. 152–5. She had appealed to Marsh to use his influence to ensure that William Batale, O.F.M., was sent to attend her as a spiritual director, Adam Marsh, ‘Epistolae’, *MF*, i. no. 185. It is also possible that Adam was her royal confessor. Moreover, Eleanor’s sister, Margaret de Provence (the Queen of France), was also a supporter of the Franciscans and from 1277–1295 her royal confessor was the Franciscan, Guillaume de Saint-Pathus. J. Bradbury, *The Capetians: Kings of France, 987–1328* (London, 2007), p. 227. Adam Marsh was often summoned by the archbishop of Canterbury, David Knowles, *The Religious Orders in England*, 3 vols (Cambridge, 1948–59), i. p. 181. A. G. Little stated that ‘in 1256 the King and archbishop of Canterbury tried to force him [Adam Marsh] into the bishopric of Ely’, *The Grey Friars in Oxford* (Oxford, 1892) p. 138. However, according to Ullmann, the king had favoured Henry Wingham for this post, Ullmann, ‘The Disputed Election of Hugh Balsham, Bishop of Ely’, 259, 264.
judge-delegate to settle a dispute between the bishop-elect of Winchester, Aymer de Lusignan, and the monks of St Swithun’s Priory, following further complaints from the monks on Aymer’s misconduct against them which included replacing them with his own men.76 Evidently, friars in England could be selected to carry out duties on behalf of the pope and king due to their clerical appointment and dual loyalties.77

Upon entry into the Franciscan order, Marsh had given up his wealth and titled positions and, supposedly, rejected any new opportunities to acquire them.78 This made him a more desirable agent of both pope and English Crown. The friars, and the Franciscans in particular, were renowned for their adherence to a life of humility, poverty and simplicity which immunised them to ‘the seductions of bribery’ while on diplomatic mission.79 However, Eccleston warned against the commendation and advancement of Franciscans through royal favour as this was not in keeping with their life of simplicity and poverty. He recounts the case of a certain Brother Ralph de Rose who:

became very intimate with the Lord King of England through the exceeding great charm of his preaching, but his end proved how displeasing to God is the friendship of this world and how contrary it is to the simplicity of the Order of Friars Minor to be lifted up by the favour of the great and to dwell constantly in the courts of princes.80

The friars were not completely invulnerable to the attractions of courtly life, but they had the advantage of appearing to be uninterested in any worldly possessions and titles.

Soon after their foundation, the friars grew to form an international network of scholars. Marsh was famed within this network for his scholarly ability, and as such would have taught

76 On 24 May 1255 during proceedings at the curia, Aymer was accused of seizing the occupation of the goods of the priory of St Swithun’s and ejecting certain monks from the priory amongst other matters, TNA, E 135/3/25. On 22 June 1256 Adam Marsh was also commissioned by the pope to investigate the virtues of Richard of Wyche (d.1253) ‘with a view to his canonization’, Reg. Alex IV, i. no. 1394; BF, ii. no. 199. Papal judges-delegate appointed in clerical disputes were often local men, chosen by the plaintiff. It was normal practice for the plaintiff to name the judges they wanted, however, in some cases a distant judge was required who may have been chosen by the plaintiff for their ‘personal reputation’ and expertise, Sayers, Papal Judges-Delegate, pp. 110, 113–14.

77 For example, Henry III had appointed John of Dya, O.F.M, as a royal envoy at the papal curia in 1241, CPR, 1232–47, p. 245. This friar also played a part in negotiations regarding Richard of Cornwall’s election as king of Germany, ‘Annals of Burton’, AM, i. p. 392.

78 Marsh was the nephew of Robert Marsh, royal chancellor of King John who had presented Marsh with the rectory of Wearmouth, which he held until he joined the Friars Minor in 1232, C. H. Lawrence, ‘The Letters of Adam Marsh and the Franciscan School at Oxford’, Journal of Ecclesiastical History, 42 (1991), 218–38 (224).


80 Thomas Eccleston, MF, i. p. 38; translated in Green, ‘The Franciscans in Medieval English Life’, p. 76.
students from across Europe. It is possible that he utilised connections with this network of friar scholars in France to gain favour at the court of Louis IX in 1257. Certainly, there is evidence that he was in communication with Eudes Rigaud, the Franciscan Master at Paris who was appointed as Louis IX’s leading negotiator in the peace negotiations with Henry. There is evidence that Rigaud was a friend of both Adam Marsh and Simon de Montfort and was well acquainted with the English king. It is possible that Marsh and Rigaud may have met at the Franciscan School at Paris.

Ultimately, Marsh’s eminence as a moral teacher had enabled him to become a friend and advisor of many high-ranking English royals and nobles, including the king and queen, and the archbishop of Canterbury. However, it was surely his relationship with Simon de Montfort that had enabled him to gain position on the diplomatic mission to France in June 1257.

**Giovanni Colonna, O.F.P, Archbishop of Messina**

Henry’s favour of the mendicants, and particularly the Dominicans, could also influence the appointment of the papal envoys sent to England. For example, Giacomo Boncambi, bishop of Bologna (1244–1260), who had confirmed Prince Edmund as King of Sicily through the gift of a ceremonial ring and further negotiated the terms of the Sicilian agreement, was a member of the Dominican Order. Likewise, Giovanni Colonna, the Dominican archbishop of Messina, was sent by Alexander IV to England in 1257 to extend the deadline for the money and troops owed by the king as part of the Sicilian agreement. Colonna’s choice as envoy was advantageous in two respects. On the one hand, Colonna was a Dominican, an order which found particular favour with the English king, and as such could gain a more positive response from the king regarding these crucial papal demands. Indeed, the pope emphasised Colonna’s high piety in his letter of credence to Henry. On the other hand, Colonna was a member of one of the most powerful families in Rome, the Colonna

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81 ‘Brother Adam Marsh, a friar minor and another great scholar…was also famous in England and wrote many books’, Salimbene, i. p. 335.
82 Louis employed many friars into positions within his court, Little, ‘Saint Louis’ Involvement with the Friars’, 125–48.
85 *CM*, v. pp. 515–16; TNA, SC 7/2/24, SC 7/1/19.
86 In October-November 1256, the pope wrote to inform Henry that he was sending the archbishop of Messina to England, TNA, SC 7/2/10, SC 7/3/12. Colonna was also entrusted to request further church taxes, *Reg. Alex IV*, i. no. 1544; ‘Annals of Burton’, *AM*, i. pp. 384–6.
87 TNA, SC 7/3/12. For Colonna’s credence clause see p. 213.
family, who had much authority within the Church through the clerical appointments of its family members.\textsuperscript{88} Alexander stressed his ‘noble birth’ in his letter of credence to emphasise his position as a member of the Colonna family and to underline the importance of the mission, headed up by a member of the Roman nobility.\textsuperscript{89} He was a highly educated, religious, and well-positioned individual whose status as a Dominican had led him to Sicily in 1251 to re-establish the order within this kingdom following the death of Frederick II, who had previously expelled them from the Sicilian realm in 1240.\textsuperscript{90} Despite this, his consecration as the archbishop of Messina by Alexander IV in October 1255 was more influenced by his social status as a member of the Colonna family than his experience in Sicily.\textsuperscript{91} Following his archiepiscopal appointment, he became deeply engaged in the papal-imperial conflicts within Sicily, and in 1256 was exiled from the kingdom by Manfred, who had effectively usurped the kingdom by 1255.\textsuperscript{92} As such, he was well placed to serve on diplomatic mission to England to seek aid for the Sicilian realm.

Individuals of high social and ecclesiastical status were often appointed as envoys on missions of high importance, not because of their ability to conduct or settle matters of diplomacy, but because they were considered suitable symbolic representatives of the very person of their patron.\textsuperscript{93} Indeed, their suitability was largely influenced by their personal and familial ties. On 10 May 1257, Henry agreed to observe Giovanni’s orders and thanked Alexander for sending such a respected man ‘of the highest religion and prudence’ to England, confirming that Colonna had been well received by the English king due to his social prestige and Dominican piety.\textsuperscript{94} While it was

\textsuperscript{89} TNA, SC 7/3/12.
\textsuperscript{90} N. Kamp, ‘Colonna, Giovanni’, \textit{Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani}, 27 (1982), http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/giovanni-colonna_res-06f86afe-87eb-11dc-8e9d-0016357ee51_ (Dizionario-Biografico) [Accessed on 13 November 2018]. Giovanni’s uncle and namesake, Cardinal Giovanni Colonna (1206–1245), had sent him to train in theology at the University of Paris where he had decided to join the Dominican Order. Cardinal Giovanni disapproved of his nephew’s choice and appealed directly to Pope Gregory IX to dissuade his nephew from becoming a Dominican, but Giovanni fled to France to avoid papal messengers, Kamp, \textit{Kirche und Monarchie}, iii. p. 1031.
\textsuperscript{91} Eubel, \textit{Hierarchia}, i. p. 337. Cardinal Giovanni Colonna had formerly supported Frederick II and led the revolt in Rome against Pope Gregory IX in 1241. It is likely that he was trying to regain favour for his family through the clerical appointment of his nephew, Carocci, \textit{Baroni di Roma}, pp. 38–9; Van Cleve, \textit{Emperor Frederick II}, p. 446.
\textsuperscript{94} \textit{Foedera}, I/1, p. 355: ‘quod talem et tantum virum utique circumspectum, summae religionis et prudentiae’.
standard protocol for the English king to acknowledge the reception of papal envoys to his court, this
is a rare example for this period where Henry praised the ‘highest’ (*summa*) religion of this envoy,
suggesting that Colonna had exploited Henry’s pious nature and favour towards the Dominicans to
receive such honour and respect from the English king. The religiosity of an envoy was a quality
which Christian rulers particularly revered in the thirteenth century as it was also linked to his moral
standing and faithfulness. There was a certain ‘religious aura’ surrounding these European diplomatic
negotiations, which encouraged the utility of highly religious and pious envoys, particularly in
exchanges with the papacy. 95 Ultimately, Colonna’s appointments as archbishop and papal envoy
were not dictated by his status as a Dominican, but the pope could certainly make use of his
mendicant position to acquire a more positive response from the English king, who was an open
advocate of the order.

**Mansuetus of Castiglione, O.F.M.**

As has been shown, familial background and political favour could shape the appointment
of a diplomatic envoy. Yet, the choice of friars as envoys could also be influenced by their specific
expertise, education and international connections. This can be seen in the case of Mansuetus of
Castiglione, the Franciscan papal chaplain and penitentiary whom the pope sent as his nuncio to Paris
in 1257 to assist in peace negotiations between England and France. 96 After the English king had
agreed to make a lasting peace with Louis IX, he petitioned Alexander IV to send a ‘special legate’
to help negotiate this treaty. Thus, with the assistance of Mansuetus, the final terms of the Treaty of
Paris were agreed on 28 May 1258. 97

Mansuetus was an Italian Franciscan who had been appointed papal penitentiary and
chaplain shortly after Alexander IV’s election as pontiff in December 1254. There is suggestion that
he spent some time in Paris in 1255. 98 Indeed, he most probably attended the Franciscan school at
Paris, as it was so well renowned in Europe as a place of mendicant learning, and he was appointed
as papal nuncio due to his ‘high religion’ and ‘great knowledge’, suggesting he was a gifted

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97 For more details on Mansuetus’ role in this peace treaty see pp. 46–9.
98 Field, *Isabelle of France*, p. 71. Chaplais argued that the ideal diplomatic envoy was someone ‘well
acquainted with the topography, vernacular, and customs of the country which he was to visit’, as this would
speed up the embassy and make it safer for the envoy to travel, Chaplais, *Diplomatic Practice*, pp. 140–1.
theologian. Moreover, there is evidence in the *Bullarium Franciscanum* that in 1259 Mansuetus played some role in the composition and approval of the Franciscan Rule of Isabella of France, Louis IX’s sister. This point further supports the idea that he was highly educated in theology and had a rigorous understanding of the Franciscan doctrine which helped him build connections and favour with members of the French royal family. Mansuetus was well positioned to utilise his education and personal links in France throughout these Anglo-French negotiations. By appointing this Parisian-educated friar scholar, the pope could also highlight the value of these friar scholars as loyal and effective papal representatives and improve their international reputation following the secular-mendicant controversy at Paris.

As highlighted earlier in this thesis, the English and French kings thanked Mansuetus for mediating this peace. Mansuetus had acquired favour and respect from both the French and English monarchy due to his piety, connections to the Parisian friar scholars and skills in mediation. Shortly afterwards, Alexander IV sent Mansuetus on a second mission to England to collect the redemption money from the crusaders in aid of Sicily, emphasising the interchangeable appointment of envoys as both diplomatic envoys and tax collectors. Due to his status as papal penitentiary, he was also assigned with full powers to absolve the ‘partisans of the king’ from their sins – including excommunication. This promise of absolution allowed Henry’s supporters to violate recent oaths which had bound them to observe the baronial provisions and to instead assist the king throughout the Baronial Revolt (1258–1261). Matthew Paris stated that Mansuetus was appointed on this mission ‘at the insistence of the king’, suggesting that the pope would choose someone who was already favoured by the English king. Hence, evidence of Mansuetus’ two separate missions to England highlights not only the flexibility of assignments entrusted to papal envoys, but the favourability and utility of friars who could carry out spiritual and administrative duties while on mission.

99 TNA, SC 7/3/48. For Mansuetus’ credence clause see p. 213.
100 *BF*, iii. no. 62; Field, *Isabelle of France*, p. 71.
102 On 23 March 1257, Mansuetus was ordered to go to Pisa to lift the sentence of excommunication from the city, Potthast, ii. no. 16793.
104 Mansuetus was reappointed by Pope Alexander IV as a papal envoy in 1260, Potthast, ii. no. 17790.
Finally, evidence suggests that friars were also chosen as envoys by virtue of their diplomatic expertise, as proven in the case of Velascus Gometii, papal penitentiary and chaplain, dispatched to England as a papal nuncio in 1259.\footnote{105} We first met Brother Velascus in Chapter One, when he was appointed as the pope’s nuncio in January 1259, ordered to force the English king and his councillors to reinstate Aymer de Lusignan to his see at Winchester, on pain of excommunication and interdict, following the Baronial Revolt and expulsion of the Lusignans from England.\footnote{106} The barons tried to forbid Velascus’ entry into the realm, but following a secret request from Velascus, Henry managed to sneak him into the kingdom via the port at Dover.\footnote{107} Velascus was a skilled diplomat who had made his case to the English ‘with much persuasion, insistence and solicitude’.\footnote{108} Nonetheless, the baronial council rejected his orders in the name of the king and challenged his powers to carry out this assignment, stating that the customs of the realm did not allow Velascus, as a papal nuncio, to make such threats or proclaim such sentences.\footnote{109} This was the first time one of Alexander’s envoys had been openly challenged by the English king in his right to carry out papal orders, supporting the idea that this opposition came directly from the baronial council and not from the king. On 16 January 1260, the baronial council appointed Richard de Gorono as a proctor at the papal curia to appeal against Velascus’ attempts to reinstate Aymer to his ecclesiastical post.\footnote{110} Nonetheless, the pope continued to demand the restoration of Aymer until this came about in May 1260.\footnote{111}

\footnote{105} The letter of safe-conduct for Velascus is recorded in both the Calendars of Close Rolls and Patent Rolls. In the Close Rolls, Velascus is referred to as the papal penitentiary and chaplain, \textit{CR, 1256–9}, p. 484: ‘fratri Velasco pentitenciario et capellano domini Pape’. Whereas the patent rolls identified Velascus as a ‘penitentiary of the Friars Minor and nuncio of the pope’, \textit{CPR, 1258–66}, p. 43. When thanking the pope for sending Velascus to England, the king again referred to him as the pope’s penitentiary and chaplain, \textit{CR, 1256–9}, p. 490.

\footnote{106} See p. 59.

\footnote{107} When the chancellor, Henry Wingham, was abroad (he left on 6 or 7 July) the great seal was left with the deputy chancellor, Walter of Merton. Henry ordered Merton to issue letters close on 28 July for Velascus to be given this ‘special licence’ for safe conduct from Dover to London, by the constable of Dover, Richard de Grey. This safe conduct explicitly mentioned the Council’s consent, and the Council’s choice of Richard de Grey to assist in Velascus’ admission, thus Grey had no reason to question it. However, a letter patent, commissioned the following day, did not include specific consent from the Council, confirming that Henry had acted without their authorisation. For full details see, Treharne, ‘Unauthorised use of the Great Seal’, 403–411. The letter of safe-conduct for Velascus was dated 28 July 1259, \textit{CR, 1256–9}, p. 484.

\footnote{108} \textit{CR, 1256–9}, p. 491: ‘multis persuasionibus, instancia et sollicitudine.’

\footnote{109} \textit{CR, 1256–9}, p. 491.

\footnote{110} \textit{CPR, 1258–66}, p. 113.

\footnote{111} On 18 December 1260, after the barons’ power over the realm had been weakened, Velascus and the archbishop of Tours were able to obtain safe-conduct from Henry to travel to England to ensure Aymer’s restoration to his office, \textit{CPR, 1258–66}, p. 132.
Due to a lack of evidence, it is difficult to conclusively pinpoint why Velascus was appointed for this mission, however there is enough to suggest that his mendicant background influenced this diplomatic appointment. Originally from Portugal, he was an experienced and well-travelled papal envoy who had been appointed by Pope Innocent IV in 1253 and 1254 on missions to Cortona (Italy), Portugal, Castile and Aragon.\(^\text{112}\) Indeed, he was chosen for this mission to England in 1259 on account of his frequent appointments as nuncio ‘in many parts of the world’.\(^\text{113}\) Moreover, he was confirmed as the bishop of Guarda in May 1267 by Pope Clement IV (1265–1268) due to ‘his significant legations in the presence of almost all the kings of Europe’.\(^\text{114}\) He was clearly a skilful and experienced envoy who had often been utilised by the papacy in highly important missions with secular rulers. It seems plausible that he was particularly favoured by Alexander IV due to his position as a Franciscan, which made him a pious and trustworthy representative with access to an international network of friars. Moreover, in a letter of safe conduct sent from the English king to Velascus on 28 July 1259, he was praised for the ‘merits of honesty’ (propitatis meritis) through which he had been appointed, confirming his favour with the pope.\(^\text{115}\) As a Franciscan, he was reputed as a highly religious, moral and peaceable character who had the freedom of movement required to carry out diplomatic missions across Christendom effectively. Even when the English council wrote to the pope to explain why they could not accept Velascus’ demands, they emphasised his position as ‘a religious man’ and ‘transmitter of peace and concord’.\(^\text{116}\) As discussed above, members of the clergy and religious orders, such as the friars, were afforded a certain level of physical protection, which meant Velascus could move more easily and safely across various kingdoms.\(^\text{117}\) In addition to this, it is possible that while Velascus waited in France for entry into the English realm, he may have

\(^\text{112}\) In May 1253, Innocent IV had ordered Velascus to go to Cortona to absolve Elies de Cortona from excommunication, Lempp, Frère Élie de Cortone, pp. 179–87. On 5 July he was appointed to award a papal dispensation to Ottokar, the son of Wenceslaus, king of Bohemia, so that he could marry Margaret of Austria, Pothenast, ii. no. 15047. He also went on diplomatic missions to Spain and Portugal, Les registres d’Innocent IV, ed. Élie Berger, 4 vols (Paris, 1884–1920), iii. nos. 7787, 8307; he was also appointed as a papal collector in parts of Spain, nos 8306, 8308. His son was commended to the King of England in 1288, TNA, SC 7/30/3.


\(^\text{114}\) Ibid., iv. p. 279: ‘optime de Ecclesia meritus, perfunctus multis apud universos ferme Europae Reges ponderosis Legationibus’.

\(^\text{115}\) Henry had sent this letter to Velascus while he waited in France to gain entry into England, CR, 1256–9, p. 484.

\(^\text{116}\) CR, 1256–9, p. 490–1: ‘religiosum virum fratrum Velascum… vir providus et circumspectus, pacis et concordie relator’.

\(^\text{117}\) See pp. 125–6.
been offered shelter and provisions by the French mendicants. Ultimately, he was an experienced diplomat and a trustworthy representative who was afforded a certain level of mobility, protection and hospitality due to his Franciscan garb which made him ideally suited for missions abroad.

Friars as Papal Collectors

As highlighted in Chapter Two, envoys could be appointed to perform either dual or interchangeable duties as diplomatic envoys and tax collectors throughout their careers. The Franciscan, John of Dya, papal penitentiary and chaplain, had been appointed as a papal nuncio to join Master Rostand in 1255 as an executor of the Sicilian Business in England and to negotiate concerning the amount of money owed as part of the Sicilian agreement. His first order of business was to work with Master Rostand to ensure the collection and repayment of money to the Sienese and Florentine merchants who had loaned vast sums to the papacy in ‘defence of Sicily’. Likewise, the Franciscan, John of Kent was made a fellow nuncio and executor for the Sicilian Business between 1256–58 and was required to negotiate as part of this role. Moreover, he went on to have a prominent career as a papal collector in England under Pope Urban IV. Generally speaking, the positions of diplomat and tax collector required someone with similar qualities – trustworthiness, moral integrity and a disinterest in worldly affairs – for which the early friars were famed. While some friars were sent to England to perform duties as diplomatic envoys and tax collectors, others were appointed solely as collectors. For example, from 20 December 1254, John de Canter, a Franciscan of the Worcester diocese, was commissioned by Alexander IV, alongside the Archdeacon

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119 On 18 September 1255 the king was ordered to give credence to John of Dya whom the pope was sending to England, TNA, SC 7/3/31. In a letter to the pope dated 27 March 1256, Henry III thanked the pope for sending the ‘religiosum virum’, John of Dya, *Foedera*, I, p. 337. A second letter of credence for John was dated 10 June 1256, SC 7/2/11. According to Grosseteste, John of Dya was from a foreign land, Thomas Eccleston, *MF*, i. p. 114.
120 13 June 1256, TNA, SC 7/2/1; 14 June 1256, SC 7/2/4; 30 July 1256, SC 7/3/15.
121 In 1258 John of Kent joined John Mansel to negotiate a loan from the merchants of Florence and Siena for Henry to pay a two-year tax (at 1000 marks a year) to the papacy *CPR*, 1247–58, pp. 470, 498, 631. John of Kent may have been the same ‘John the Englishman’ appointed by Innocent IV in 1247 who was ‘of the Kent order’, *CM*, v. p. 599.
122 On 5 December 1261, John was appointed to collect ‘St Peter’s Pence’ in England, *BF*, ii. no. 11. On 13 December 1261, he was sent to collect the annual census owed to the papacy from the last two years, TNA, SC 7/33/14. In July 1263, he succeeded Master Leonard as papal nuncio in England and was ordered to put Henry’s chapel under interdict if the king did not pay the annual census owed to the papacy for the last three years, *CPL*, i. pp. 379, 386–7. On 8 November 1263, he was appointed to collect the remaining money owed for the Sicilian Business in England, *BF*, ii. no. 105. During the Baronial War (1264–1265), he disappeared from the records but in May 1266 he returned to urge Henry to pay the annual census to the papacy, *CPL*, i. p. 424.
of Middlesex, to collect crusaders’ vows, obventions, bequests and legacies for the Sicilian Business and to distribute the collected taxes to crusaders as and when needed. Furthermore, in 1254 Henry’s council appointed members of the Franciscan and Dominican Orders to assist the bishop of Norwich in collecting church taxes for the Sicilian Business. The use of Franciscans as tax collectors, in particular, was in contradiction with the original Franciscan vow of absolute poverty. Yet, ironically, it was this same vow which made them such desirable appointees, as they could be trusted not to embezzle money from the collection.

**The Decline of Friars as Envoys**

Significantly, appointments of friars as papal envoys declined following Urban IV’s ascension to pontiff in 1261. Urban, the former patriarch of Jerusalem, had no connection to the friars and instead favoured the military orders during his pontificate. While this pope did continue to utilise some friars as envoys, these were individuals who had already gained the relevant experience under his predecessor. Urban had succeeded a pope who had strongly favoured the friars and trained them in a variety of duties, as both diplomats and collectors, and so logically, he continued to exploit these trained and experienced friars on certain missions throughout his pontificate. The declining presence of friars as envoys was not only sparked by Urban IV’s disinterest in these orders. By the second half of the thirteenth century, the Franciscan order became increasingly plagued by an internal

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123 *Foedera*, I/1, p. 325; Potthast, ii. no. 15959. On 28 July 1258, Alexander ordered John de Canter not to prejudice the grant made to the king regarding the redemptions, obventions and legacies, TNA, SC 7/3/42, SC 7/3/45. Following his ascension to pontiff, Alexander IV had ignored a grant made by Innocent IV to Henry that these legacies and obventions belonged to the king. Henry soon complained that he was not receiving this money and Alexander commissioned the archbishop of Canterbury and Master Rostand to collect these obventions and legacies, store them in a safe place and eventually hand them to the king, Lunt, *Financial Relations*, i. pp. 441–2. Obventions, bequests and legacies were all forms of revenue which the executors of the business could collect from crusaders in aid of the business of the cross.


125 In their first rule, approved by Honorius III in 1221, the Franciscans were not permitted to even hold money, ‘The Earlier Rule (1221)’, *Francis of Assisi: Early Documents*, i. p. 69. In the second rule, they were not to receive coins or money through themselves or through an interposed person, ‘The Later Rule (1223)’, i. p. 102. Within twenty years of Francis’ death, several papal bulls had been issued to relax this vow of poverty, making them more effective papal agents, Lambert, *Franciscan Poverty*, pp. 104–6.

126 One of Louis IX’s envoys criticised the use of Franciscans as collectors of papal revenue, CM, vi. p. 106. In the ‘Protest of St Louis’, Louis himself had opposed the use of Franciscans as papal collectors, Jordan, *Louis IX and the Challenge of the Crusade*, p. 54.


128 For example, Mansuetus was reappointed as a papal envoy by Urban IV, BF, ii. nos. 73–5; Potthast, ii. nos. 18612, 18387, 18391.
dispute regarding the observance of the doctrine of absolute poverty.\textsuperscript{129} This damaged the reputation of the order and reduced their access to key religious and political positions across Europe. While the Dominicans did not suffer the same internal strife, they too began to lose the favour and respect among Christian communities, particularly in England, following increasing reports of their corruption and abuses of privileges.\textsuperscript{130} Yet, ultimately, it was the increasing professionalisation of envoys in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries which saw an end to the appointments of ‘part-time’ representatives such as the friars.\textsuperscript{131} Instead, those trained specifically in matters of law and diplomacy rose up to take on permanent roles as international negotiators and keepers of the peace.

**Conclusion**

The case-studies above have shown that a number of friars were specifically chosen for diplomatic missions between the papacy, England, and France between 1254 and 1261. This was partly due to their particular favour with these three kingdoms, which was both influenced and facilitated by a rapidly expanding international network of friars across Europe. Moreover, the use of friars as Anglo-papal envoys was a reflection of their patron’s spiritual ideals and style of Christian rulership. Certainly, the Franciscans were especially utilised as envoys by Pope Alexander IV because of his own personal and long-standing relationship with this order.

The individual appointments of diplomatic envoys could be largely influenced by their personal connections, familial background, expertise and experience. Indeed, Colonna’s appointment was shaped by his family connections and Marsh’s was influenced by his personal connections to the English nobility and monarchy, whereas Mansuetus’ was determined by his education in theology and position within an international scholarly network, and Velascus’ was influenced by his experience and skills as a diplomat. Nonetheless, all of these appointments were influenced by the

\textsuperscript{129} For the issue of Franciscan poverty and the dispute between the Spiritual and Conventual factions of the order (between those who wished to return to the original vow of absolute poverty and those who believed in the relaxation of this rule) see Lambert’s study on *Franciscan Poverty*.

\textsuperscript{130} See M. Bowden, *A Commentary on the General Prologue to the Canterbury Tales* (New York, 1948), pp. 119–41, esp. pp. 119–23. Although, as Arnold Williams has argued, this interpretation has been based on evidence of the ‘the widespread criticism of the friars in the vernacular literature of the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries’ and it may not have been accurate, Arnold Williams, ‘Chaucer and the Friars’, *Speculum*, 28 (1953), 499–513. After the mid fourteenth century the friars lost their prominent status and position in English government, Röhrkasten, ‘Local ties and International Connections of the London Mendicants’, pp. 182–3.

mendicant background of each individual. Primarily, their access to scholastic training and certain privileges combined with the popularity of these new religious orders helped them gain positions within both papal and secular government, build connections with important people, and move swiftly and safely between kingdoms. In many ways, these friars were suited to a range of duties as diplomats, peacemakers, tax collectors, penitentiaries, royal advisors and confessors. They were particularly favoured as negotiators of peace and facilitators of financial repayment. As such, they were particularly sought after on missions which required someone to carry out a range of political, spiritual and administrative duties.

Ultimately, it is clear from the last three chapters that by the mid-thirteenth century there was still no standardised process of diplomatic representation and choices of envoys were based on their suitability for a specific mission, as well as personal links, and trends of favourability. In this climate, certain Franciscans and Dominicans found themselves in a situation in which their characteristics and personal connections made them particularly eligible for diplomatic duties. Yet, in an ever-changing world where diplomatic methods and practices were continually adapting to meet the demands of each new generation, individuals such as the friars were eventually usurped by a growing number of professional diplomats in the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.
Section Three

Chapter Five - Communication and Correspondence

This thesis has already addressed the methods of papal intervention in English political affairs between 1254 and 1261, as well as the representatives and agents involved in these Anglo-papal communications. However, it has yet to examine the administrative practices and diplomatic language associated with these communications. As such, this chapter will take a closer look at the English and papal chanceries in the mid-thirteenth century, exploring the production, form, registration and language of the Anglo-papal correspondence to further understand both the diplomatic relationship between the English king and the papacy as well as the administrative and diplomatic practices being adopted and developed by these two polities throughout their exchanges.

As mentioned, England and the papacy had been developing more complex bureaucratic and administrative structures throughout the first half of the thirteenth century. These administrations encompassed a variety of methods for managing written and verbal communications and recording the outcomes of these interactions. Developments in written and verbal communications were in part influenced by the revival of the *ars dictaminis*, the art of prose and verse composition, which became a central component within European administrations throughout the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.\(^1\) The *ars dictaminis*, which developed at Monte Cassino in Southern Italy and Bologna around the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries, was adopted to define how official correspondence should be communicated both in writing and in speech.\(^2\) The papal chancery incorporated and adapted the *ars dictaminis* as part of its own writing practice in the early twelfth century.

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2 The medieval *ars dictaminis* had been adapted and developed from classical rhetorical theory, notably that of Cicero. Rockinger argued that the *ars dictaminis* was created by the Benedictine monk, Alberic of Monte Cassino in the late eleventh century. Whereas, Schmale stated that this rhetorical genre was authored by Adalbertus Samaritanus in Bologna in the early twelfth century. In contrast, William Patt suggested that the *ars dictaminis* was a more widespread genre that developed over time. Alberic of Monte Cassino, *Breviarium de dictamine*, ed. L. von Rockinger, *Briefsteller und Formelbücher des elften bis vierzehnten Jahrhunderts*, 2 vols (Munich, 1863–4), i. pp. 29–46; Adalbertus Samaritanus, *Praecepta dictaminum*, ed. Franz-Josef Schmale, MGH, Quellen zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 3 (Weimar, 1961), pp. 30–4; William D. Patt, ‘The Early *ars dictaminis* as Response to a Changing Society,’ *Viator*, 9 (1978), 133–55.
This rhetorical art also gained momentum in France throughout the twelfth century, particularly at Tours, Meung and Orleans, where the *stylus supremus*, which placed emphasis on rhetorical flourishes, was developed. Ultimately, the *ars dictaminis* promoted ‘a new genre of rhetorical manual’, known collectively as the *dictamen*. By the first half of the thirteenth century, the *ars dictaminis* was being heavily utilised at the court of Emperor Frederick II. Its use was encouraged and developed by Frederick’s chancellor, Peter de Vinea (c.1190–1249) and his key advisor, Taddeo da Sessa (c.1190–1248), as well as several other administrators, all of whom had acted as envoys for Frederick on diplomatic missions across Europe – these included key missions to England, France and the papal curia. Notably, Vinea had negotiated the marriage between Henry III’s daughter, Isabella, and Frederick II in 1234 and communicated extensively with the papal envoy and notary, Thomas of Capua.

By the mid-thirteenth century, the art of writing and speaking in accordance with the *dictamen* was more widespread across Europe. Indeed, Kantorowicz has argued that Peter de Vinea’s visits to the English court, particularly in 1234–1235, influenced the adoption of dictaminal models in English writing practices. Grévin, on the other hand, has praised Stephen of San Giorgio, who served as a ‘clerk, proctor and diplomatic envoy’ at the papal curia on behalf of the English Crown, for the arrival and adoption of the *dictamen* in England in the 1270s. Finally, Hennings has argued that the formation of this dictaminal genre of texts in England was part of an ongoing process which was ‘only finalised in the late thirteenth century’. In her view, this was a gradual process which had

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3 The monk, Alberic of Monte Cassino has been credited with creating the first treatise on the *ars dictaminis*. One of Alberic’s former students, John of Gaeta (Pope Gelasius II from 1118–19), introduced the *ars dictaminis* into the papal Chancery during his time as chancellor (from 1089). This was later developed by Albert of Morra (Gregory VIII, 1187), during his time as papal chancellor, Perelman, ‘The Medieval Art of Letter Writing’, pp. 101–2; Sayers, *Papal Government*, p. 96.


its roots in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and which was strongly advanced throughout the first half of the thirteenth century thanks to the likes of Peter de Vinea.\textsuperscript{10}

According to Powicke, England was engaged in ‘continuous intercourse with Rome’ between 1237 and 1259.\textsuperscript{11} This likely impacted the speed at which their writing practices developed. Indeed, diplomatic correspondence made up a significant portion of all the records being logged and archived by both polities. Moreover, all diplomatic letters to and from the pope were written in Latin – the ‘\textit{communis lingua}’ of Christendom, and the official language of the Church.\textsuperscript{12} According to Bombi, this paved the way for the development of a ‘shared language of diplomacy’ between these two polities in the fourteenth century, which adopted certain etiquette, formulae and rhetorical devices, influenced by formularies and treatises as well as certain ceremonial, diplomatic and administrative practices at these two courts.\textsuperscript{13} Bombi has used evidence from the fourteenth century to determine that this shared language developed out of the papal rhetorical style, which in turn had been influenced by the \textit{ars dictaminis}.\textsuperscript{14} In her view, this was not an amalgamation of both English and papal techniques, but an adoption by the English court of the papal style. As such, this chapter will examine the extent to which writing practices at the English chancery were being influenced by papal style and practice in the mid-thirteenth century, exploring evidence of a ‘shared language of diplomacy’ in their correspondence.

Another feature of Anglo-papal communications which needs to be readdressed is what happened to documents after they were received. This chapter will engage with the growing importance of record-keeping in the English and papal administrations, which was influenced by the greater level of documentation coming in and going out of the chanceries. This was an important period of change and growth, and how these administrations chose to record and preserve their documentation has influenced how we interpret it now. However, due to a lack of surviving evidence it is sometimes unclear how, where and why certain documents were recorded and stored. This chapter will use the surviving records to make some suggestions about the methods of record-keeping.

\textsuperscript{10} Hennings, \textit{Language of Kingship}, p. 269.
\textsuperscript{11} Powicke, \textit{Henry III}, i. p. 259.
\textsuperscript{13} Bombi, \textit{Anglo-Papal Relations}, pp. 50–2.
\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 51.
By exploring the different types of diplomatic correspondence exchanged between England and the papacy, this chapter will also make inferences about the development and formalisation of the papal and English chanceries and their writing practices in the mid-thirteenth century.

Finally, this chapter will explore the language and rhetoric of the Anglo-papal letters sent between December 1254 and May 1261. This is vital to our understanding of the diplomatic relationship between Henry III and Alexander IV, which until now has lacked detailed scholarly investigation. These letters reveal much about the presentation of this relationship and of papal and royal power.

Ultimately, this chapter will examine how administrative and rhetorical procedures impacted and in turn, were impacted upon by the management, conduct, style and, frequency of diplomatic communications between England and the papacy. This will not only shed light on the development of a ‘shared language of diplomacy’ between England and the papacy in the mid-thirteenth century but will also provide insight into the diplomatic relationship between Pope Alexander IV and King Henry III.

**Chancery Practice**

To comprehend how diplomatic communications were conducted between England and the papacy between 1254 and 1261, it is important to explore how documents were impetrated and produced at both the English and papal chanceries. As such, this section will discern how formalised these two chanceries were in the mid-thirteenth century and how they were utilised by the king and the pope in communications with each other.

**The Papal Chancery in the Thirteenth Century**

The papacy chancery, alongside the papal camera, was one of the most important administrative bodies of papal government. It was responsible for the administration of petitions, favours and consultations addressed to the papacy. Bresslau has argued that the early papal administration had adopted the administrative institutions of the Roman Empire and further had been influenced by the Byzantine model in the Early Middle Ages.\(^{15}\) By the late eleventh century, the

papal administration was becoming more developed in conjunction with the growing political importance of the papacy.\textsuperscript{16} In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the papal chancery expanded to cope with the increasing number of petitions and legal arbitrations which were being presented to the papal curia, as well as the growing practice of awarding papal provisions to ecclesiastical benefices.\textsuperscript{17} Moreover, throughout the thirteenth century, the papal chancery began syncing up its activities with the \textit{audientia publica} (overseeing legal cases), the penitentiary (granting papal graces, i.e. dispensations), and the papal camera (managing papal finances), to ensure the effective management of this increasing amount of business.\textsuperscript{18} In the late twelfth and first half of the thirteenth century, the papacy sought to hold more direct management over ecclesiastical, and some secular, affairs in Christendom. As such, it needed to sufficiently develop its own administrative structures in order to effectively oversee the increasing amount of business being transacted at the curia.

From the early twelfth century, the papal chancery developed its own \textit{cursus} (system of rhythmical prose composition) known as the ‘\textit{cursus Romane curie}’, which had been influenced by the \textit{ars dictaminis}.\textsuperscript{19} In the late twelfth century, the papal \textit{cursus} was further reformed by Alberto de Morra (the future Pope Gregory VIII).\textsuperscript{20} From the thirteenth century, the \textit{cursus} formed part of the papacy’s in-house administrative style, the \textit{stylus curie}, which encompassed certain rules, customs and procedures that had to be followed at the papal curia.\textsuperscript{21} Barraclough noted that the development of the \textit{stylus curie} in the thirteenth century was influenced by the ‘notarial system’ at the papal curia, which involved the employment of notaries at the papal chancery and freelancer ‘notaries public’ in the curial administration.\textsuperscript{22}

The \textit{stylus curie} was used to verify the authenticity of papal documents and prevent forgeries.\textsuperscript{23} This method of verification was becoming ever more important due to the increase in both input and output of documentation from the papal curia. Throughout the thirteenth century, there is evidence of secular administrations beginning to follow the rules of the \textit{stylus curie}, including the

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{}\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., pp. 207–19.
\bibitem{}\textsuperscript{17} Zutshi, ‘Petitioners, Popes, Proctors’, pp. 265–8; Bombi, Anglo-Papal Relations, pp. 32–52.
\bibitem{}\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., p. 33.
\bibitem{}\textsuperscript{21} The \textit{stylus curie} applied to all documents drafted at the papal curia, Barraclough, \textit{Public Notaries and the Papal Curia}, p. 20, n. 5.
\bibitem{}\textsuperscript{23} Bombi, Anglo-Papal Relations, p. 64.
\end{thebibliography}
papal *cursus*, in their correspondence with the papacy. Indeed, from the early thirteenth century, papal rhetorical features and protocols were noted in formularies, collections of letters, which helped petitioners and their agents to use the *stylus curie* correctly.\(^\text{24}\) The number of surviving formularies from the thirteenth century is small.\(^\text{25}\) One of the earliest extant examples was the *Libellus de formis petitionum secundum cursum Romane curie*, produced by Guala Bicchieri in 1226–1227 for petitioners at the papal curia.\(^\text{26}\) Other collections of formularies giving instructions to petitioners date back to the pontificate of Gregory IX.\(^\text{27}\) Nonetheless, Denholm-Young has argued that, while the papal *cursus* was known to the English, it was only deployed consistently in English communications with the papacy from around 1310 onwards.\(^\text{28}\)

When thinking about the structure of the papal chancery and how this developed throughout the thirteenth century, it is worth considering the role of the chancellor. Traditionally, the papacy appointed one of its cardinals as chancellor and head of the papal chancery, on account of their high rank and status.\(^\text{29}\) The cardinals were not part of the papal household and as such they had a certain degree of freedom and independence to act on their own initiative.\(^\text{30}\) By the late twelfth century, the papacy began appointing a vice-chancellor to replace the chancellor as the head of the chancery. The vice-chancellor was not a cardinal, but someone chosen for his clerical and administrative abilities as opposed to his high ecclesiastical rank.\(^\text{31}\) Pope Alexander IV continued to adopt this practice of appointing administrators to the post of vice-chancellor during his term. For example, between December 1254 and May 1256, Guglielmo (de Gatadhego), Master of the school of Parma, held the position as papal vice-chancellor. Guglielmo had been appointed as vice-chancellor by Innocent IV.

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\(^\text{30}\) Thomas Smith previously identified the cardinals as members of the papal household, but this was not the case, Thomas W. Smith, ‘The College of Cardinals under Honorius III: A Nepotistic Household?’, *Studies in Church History*, 50 (2014), 74–85. See Paravicini Bagliani, *Il Trono di Pietro*, pp. 51–67.
\(^\text{31}\) Bresslau, *Manuale di diplomatica*, pp. 225–7. Tout has argued that from the pontificate of Innocent III the office of chancellor was suppressed in an attempt to limit the power of ‘magnate cardinals’, Tout, *Chapters*, i. p. 285.

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in December 1251. He had proved himself to be an experienced and learned administrator, who deserved to hold this post. Later, in 1256 and again in November 1257, Alexander appointed Master Giordano Pironti of Terracina, papal sub-deacon and notary, as his vice-chancellor. Neither of these men possessed high rank or title. Giordano in particular was a skilled administrator who had been appointed papal rector of Campagna and Marittima by Pope Innocent IV in 1252, a position he held for the rest of his life. He was heavily involved in the management and administration of correspondence between the papal curia and the English king during this period of heightened activity between these two polities. While there has been suggestion that Giordano was of noble birth, with familial ties to the Segni family, namely, a relative of Alexander IV, Gregory IX and Innocent III, Carciogna has recently argued that there is no proof Giordano was of noble birth or that he was related to these popes. Indeed, by appointing someone of lower status with less independent power, the pope could retain a greater degree of personal control over the chancery. Furthermore, the appointment of skilled administrators, instead of men of high social and ecclesiastical rank, as the head of the chancery signifies not only a concerted effort by the pope to strengthen his personal control over the apparatus of government, but also an attempt to prioritise the administrative ability and capacity of those working in the papal chancery and to increase the efficiency and productivity of this office in dealing with a growing amount of business.

Delisle and Von Heckel argued that it was from the beginning of the thirteenth century, during on the pontificate of Innocent III, that the papal administration, particularly the papal chancery, became more formalised. More recently, Stelzer and Sayers have questioned the extent

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34 Carciogna, ‘Pironti, Giordano’, Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani.
35 Ibid.
36 That being said, there is evidence that Giordano worked to raise the status and power of his family in Terracina, Carciogna, ‘Pironti, Giordano’, Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani. Moreover, Alexander’s successor, Urban IV, continued to trust Giordano as his vice-chancellor until 1262, when he promoted Giordano to the cardinalate, Bresslau, Manuale di diplomatica, p. 227; Eubel, Hierarchia, i. p. 8.
to which these reforms should be accredited to Innocent III.\textsuperscript{38} This argument has been challenged by Zutshi who noted Innocent III’s ‘special interest’ in the reform of the chancery.\textsuperscript{39} According to Zutshi, Pope Innocent III sought to more strictly manage the increased level of business being transacted through the papal chancery through a number of reforms, and was particularly concerned with preventing the forgery of papal documents.\textsuperscript{40} Moreover, Schwarz and Zutshi have suggested that Innocent III was responsible for the introduction of a college of scribes.\textsuperscript{41} On the other hand, Sayers argues that the establishment of ‘a full ‘college’ or guild structure’ of scribes cannot be confirmed until the ‘later thirteenth century’.\textsuperscript{42} Despite this, there is clear evidence that Innocent III went to great lengths to increase the productivity and efficiency of the chancery through a number of reforms to cope with an increasing level of business at the curia in the early thirteenth century.

In the thirteenth century, the roles of chancery officials became more clearly defined. Chancery scribes (scriptores), who were originally appointed out of the papal chapel and who throughout the thirteenth century continued to hold positions as papal chaplains, soon became solely responsible for the writing of documents.\textsuperscript{43} One of their tasks was to write the ‘fair copies’ (final copies) of papal documents, after they had been checked and approved. Formerly, this role had belonged to the notaries in the chancery, of which there were seven, who had been responsible for both the writing and archiving of papal documents. It was now the job of the notaries to work alongside the abbreviatores, to convert petitions presented to the papal curia into minutes using the curial writing style.\textsuperscript{44} There is also evidence of a number of notaries being sent on diplomatic missions from the thirteenth century. For example, the papal notaries, Master Albert of Parma and

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{Zutshi1937c} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 16–17.
\bibitem{Bombi1931} Bombi, \textit{Anglo-Papal Relations}, p. 34.
\end{thebibliography}
Master Arlot, were sent on key diplomatic missions to the England in the 1250s.45 Alongside these chancery officials, were the *correctores*, who checked fair copies of papal letters after they had been written by the scribes; the *registratores* who recorded and copied these messages in the papal registers; and the *bullatores*, who sealed papal letters before they were sent out.46 While, in some ways, the chancery office appears to have developed a greater level of autonomy in its function, it is important to note that chancery personnel often held positions as chaplains and sub-deacons and remained very much a part of the papal household.47 Clearly, the pope aimed to maintain more direct control over the management of papal government. Innocent III had helped to improve the efficiency of the chancery office without threatening the pope’s position at its head. However, there is also evidence of petitioners influencing the impetration and documentation process through the work of their proctors. In some cases, they sought to secure the involvement of a notary who would favour their cause, or to include some favourable clause to themselves within the documents they were impetrating.48

The pope’s personal and direct control over papal government extended into the production of certain letters. As noted by Zutshi, there were two kinds of letters issued by the papal chancery in the thirteenth century: curial letters and commons letters. Curial letters dealt with matters of great significance to the papacy, such as key political and diplomatic matters, particularly those relating to the crusades and the fight against heresy, and were produced on the initiative of the papacy as either letters patent or close.49 They were issued at the chancery on papal initiative, but were often written in response to petitions from lay rulers. By contrast, common letters were sent in response to written petitions, addressing everyday ecclesiastical business which had been approved by the papal curia.50 Zutshi argues that by the mid-thirteenth century, the pope’s role in the composition of curial letters

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45 The role of Master Arlot has been discussed on pp. 149–52.
47 Papal scribes were often also papal chaplains. Likewise, papal notaries usually held the rank of sub-deacon. Sayers, *Papal Government*, pp. 16, 30.
had become more personal and critical.\textsuperscript{51} This leads one to question how far the person of the pope was involved in the physical production of curial documents. As Sayers and Egger have argued, it is impossible to prove whether the pope’s person was directly involved in the composition of curial texts. Moreover, it is very doubtful that if the pope were directly involved, that he composed curial letters by himself. These duties of letter composition and production were shared among the pope, his vice-chancellor, his notaries, as well as other curialists.\textsuperscript{52} Yet, what is clear is that the content of these curial letters was devised by the pope and his advisors.\textsuperscript{53} Zutshi has argued that ‘papal administration was more monolithic’ than secular administration and more ‘subject to the ruler’s control’, hence papal voice was more evident throughout.\textsuperscript{54} Similarly, Sayers has argued that while only some curial letters were directly dictated by the pope himself, the vice-chancellor and notaries also dictated these letters, ‘the essence of a letter’ was from the pope’s mind.\textsuperscript{55} It reflected his personal approach to rulership. For Alexander IV, it seems reasonable to suggest that he had a certain personal influence over the production of important diplomatic letters to the English king, and this will be explored in more detail later in this chapter.

Clearly, an increasing amount of documentation was being processed at the papal curia throughout the first half of the thirteenth century. Yet, there remains some inconsistencies regarding the registration of papal documents in the thirteenth century and the impetus behind the registration of particular documents. Essentially, there is confusion surrounding the reasons why some documents were recorded, and others were not. Or at least, why some survive, and others do not. As mentioned earlier in this thesis, when an outgoing papal document was issued at the request of a petitioner, the petitioner would have to make a high payment to ensure the document was recorded at the papal chancery. Likewise, the pope could ensure that certain important outgoing letters were recorded.\textsuperscript{56} There is some evidence from 1198 onwards of special papal registers being used to record the political correspondence between popes and secular rulers. For example, during the pontificate

\textsuperscript{51} Zutshi, ‘Personal Role’, p. 236.
\textsuperscript{53} Smith, \textit{Curia and Crusade}, p. 58.
\textsuperscript{54} Zutshi, ‘Personal Role’, p. 236.
\textsuperscript{55} Sayers, \textit{Papal Government}, p. 29.
\textsuperscript{56} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 74; Zutshi, ‘Petitioners, Popes, Proctors’, p. 290.
of Innocent III, papal interactions with the empire were recorded in the *Registrum super negotio Romani imperii*. Pásztor suggests that curial letters, noting information of political interest, were recorded in separate quires during the pontificates of Innocent IV and Alexander IV, although these quires no longer exist. It seems highly probable that separate quires of curial letters did exist for the pontificate of Alexander IV, since the surviving registers for this time primarily record letters dealing with ecclesiastical benefices and everyday curial business. The existence of a now lost register recording important political and diplomatic matters would explain why a significant amount of the political correspondence is absent from the registers. That being said, several letters from Alexander IV to Henry III were copied into the registers. These letters have a large ‘R’ and the ‘scriptum’ marked on the dorso, which, according to Bock, Sayers and Zutshi, confirms that these letters were ‘copied into papal registers’. By the pontificate of Innocent IV, the *scriptum* included the number on the document in the register and the pontifical year. During the pontificate of Alexander IV this process was more detailed. That being said, Bock has noted that sometimes documents were registered without these marks, while others had the ‘R’ without the word ‘scriptum’ or vice versa. These were important curial letters pertaining to significant concessions the pope was making regarding the original terms of the Sicilian Business, following petitions of the king, and hence they were probably recorded on papal initiative.

Historians have continued to debate the extent to which the increasing registration of papal documentation was encouraged by the growing number of petitioners at the papal curia or whether it was conducted on the initiative of the papal administrators, specifically, chancery personnel. The

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58 Pásztor, ‘Contributo alla storia’, 37–83; Pásztor focuses her research on the first register for the pontificate of Alexander IV.
61 Sayers, *Papal Government*, p. 69. For example, document SC 7/2/22 is marked ‘R script dcclxi capitulo anno tertio’.
majority of papal documents were written in response to supplications from petitioners made at the papal curia. Even the Sicilian Business, which was instigated on papal initiative, came to be modified and shaped through supplications from the English king and council, as the English were unable to meet the original terms of the agreement. Furthermore, there are several examples of these papal responses to Henry’s supplications regarding Sicily being registered. It seems plausible that a growing number of petitioners inevitably resulted in an increasing number of documents being recorded and registered at the papal curia. Likewise, it was important for the pope to register the curial letters mentioned above, as they concerned matters of grave importance to the papacy.  

The English Chancery in the Thirteenth Century

In the thirteenth century, there were several key administrative offices in the English government which issued documents: the chancery, the exchequer, and the wardrobe. By the mid-twelfth century, the exchequer had been established as a more autonomous office for the governing of royal revenue. Yet, as highlighted in Chapter Two, Henry III’s wardrobe became the most important personal administrative office of the king, through which he could manage his finances directly thanks to his ‘keepers of the wardrobe’. The chancery was responsible for the production of charters and writs, which will be discussed in more detail below. Documents issued by the chancery could cover a range of subjects relating to matters of diplomacy, finance and justice. As Carpenter put it, the English chancery was ‘at the centre of the king’s personal rule’ in the thirteenth century.
It moved around with the king, and more importantly, the king used it to manage the activity of the exchequer. However, from the late thirteenth century, the king and chancery were spending more time apart and in the fourteenth century, the chancery became a more autonomous administrative office, separate from the personal power of the king, and fixed in its location at Westminster. To better understand communications between the English king, his council and the pope in the mid-thirteenth century, it is important to examine how the English chancery grew and developed in the first half of the thirteenth century, and how it was managed by the English Crown during this period.

Historians have generally agreed that during the reign of King John, the English chancery greatly developed and expanded its letter production and record-keeping practices, largely in response to international disputes, domestic instability and growing political unrest between the king and his barons. When Hubert Walter was chancellor from 1199–1205, the chancery much improved its record-keeping system – copying outgoing letters onto rolls. This does not necessarily mean that more business was being transacted, but that more business transactions were being recorded. The increasing number of documents being recorded by John’s chancery led to the creation of a number of new enrolment series from 1199 onwards. All charters were recorded on the charter rolls, letters patent on the patent rolls, and letters close on the close rolls, while letters which dealt with royal expenditure were recorded on the Liberate rolls from 1226.

In the early thirteenth century, the English chancery was managed by the chancellor (cancellarius); who was supported by the vice-chancellor (vice-cancellarius), also the keeper of the seal; and the protonotary (protonotarius), who supervised the writing duties of the clerical staff. They were responsible for a number of royal clerks who worked in the chancery to produce

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68 Treharne has argued that the English administrative system ‘surpassed everything which Europe could show elsewhere’ and that it was ‘the strongest of its time’, Treharne, Baronial Plan of Reform, p. 40; Pierre Chaplais, English Royal Documents: King John–Henry VI 1199–1461 (Oxford, 1971), p. 3. The year running from June 1204 ‘is the first year where all three rolls – charter, patent and close – survive in anything like the form that they were to take after’, Nicholas Vincent, ‘Why 1199? Bureaucracy and Enrolment under John and his Contemporaries’, in English Government in the Thirteenth Century, pp. 34–5, 40–1.
69 Clanchy, From Memory to Written Record, pp. 94, 105.
70 Carpenter, English Chancery, pp. 50–1; Chaplais, English Royal Documents, pp. 3–4.
71 Chaplais, English Royal Documents, p. 3.
documents. Chaplais has suggested that under King John the number of royal clerks working in the chancery significantly increased to keep up with the growing level of business and need for record-keeping.\textsuperscript{72}

The process of document production was quite straightforward. First, a draft was produced. Once this draft had been checked, altered (if necessary) and approved, the document would be produced in a ‘fair hand’ (ready to send out) and submitted to the seal.\textsuperscript{73} Before being dispatched, documents were often copied onto rolls for future reference. Under Henry III, there were three seals in use: the great seal, the seal of the exchequer (which had been brought in under Henry II), and the privy seal (probably brought in during John’s reign). Henry tended to use the great seal in matters of diplomacy and administration, yet there were points when he adopted the privy seal, his personal seal; particularly during the period of baronial rule, as we shall see below.

While papal historians have largely focused on the development of papal chancery practices and bureaucratisation of the office throughout the thirteenth century, English administrative historians have spent more time reflecting on Henry III’s efforts to retain a household administration, over which he could assert more personal control. Furthermore, they have questioned how Henry’s management of his government impacted (and in turn was impacted by) his relationship with the English barons.\textsuperscript{74} As highlighted earlier, from 1234–1258, the king was facing growing political unrest from his barons which encouraged him to manage his administration more closely through the wardrobe. Similarly, this increasing unrest impacted his management of the chancery. Before 1244, Henry had appointed powerful men of high status as chancellor – the last of whom was Ralph Neville, bishop of Chichester (1242–1244). From 1244–1258 Henry effectively postponed the appointment of a chancellor, instead appointing men of lower standing, often members of his household, as ‘keepers of the great seal’.\textsuperscript{75} Essentially, Henry favoured the appointment of individuals who were loyal to him and who did not have the independent power of earlier chancellors. As discussed, this

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid.
change in appointment reflects the king’s attempts to retain a greater level of personal control over the English administration at a time when he was facing increasing criticism for his management of the realm. After the death of Henry’s chancellor Ralph Neville in 1244, all of the proceeding chancellors were household officers, and in this sense, were dependants of the Crown.76 From 1248 the barons began to complain that the offices of state were held by ‘unworthy dependants of the Crown’.77 According to Tout, the king wished to rule ‘by clerks and subordinates, amenable to his pleasure and unable to hold their own against him’.78

When the barons took control of Henry’s government in May 1258, they had ordered the king to hand over the royal seal to a ‘discreet man’ who would be chosen by the council.79 By handing over the royal seal (the great seal), the king was relinquishing the physical instrument used to authorise royal documents, and thus, the personal control of his chancery. In 1258 the great seal was held by the chancellor, Henry Wingham.80 While Tout has recorded only two references when Henry used the privy seal between 1234–1258, it is difficult to accurately pinpoint the methods for sealing during the years of the Baronial Revolt.81 When the king was abroad between November 1259 and April 1260 the great seal went with him and he was attended by Wingham in his authorisation and authentication of documents.82 In contrast, when Henry was abroad between September and October 1263 the great seal remained with the new baronial chancellor, Nicholas Ely. Furthermore, on the king’s return and in the months leading up to the baronial war, the great seal remained with the barons and the king relied more heavily on the privy seal, setting it up as against the great seal which was now fully under baronial control.83 This suggests that while Henry had to observe the rule of the barons in this period between 1258 and 1261, he did not lose all power to commission and authorise royal documents. Indeed, Hugh Bigod had complained in 1259 that ‘the king kept his great seal in his chamber’.84 Tout notes that ‘in 1260 a chancery writ could still be read before the king and

76 Before the 1240s, the English chancery had been largely in the hands of ‘magnate chancellors’ who would retain their position for life. From 1238 Henry began to push Neville into the background, Tout, Chapters, i. p. 284.
78 Ibid., i. p. 286.
79 Annals of Tewkesbury’, AM, i. pp. 163–5; Carpenter, Henry III, p. 188.
80 See p. 153.
81 Ibid., i. p. 289.
82 Tout, Chapters, i. p. 289.
83 Ibid., i. pp. 304–7.
84 Flores Historiarum, ii. p. 434.
approved by him in his wardrobe in the presence of select magnates and sealed by their precept with
the great seal.' 85 However, in 1261 Henry reflected on the baronial usurpation, stating how the barons
had taken away ‘his power and royal dignity, so that no one carries out his orders… they obey his
command less than that of the lowest member of his council’. 86

Clearly, the English administration was recording more outgoing documentation in the
thirteenth century. What is more elusive is how the English were recording incoming correspondence
from the papacy. As mentioned in the Introduction to this thesis, The National Archives holds a
significant number of original papal documents, many of which were addressed to the English king
and his officials. These documents must have been archived after they were received, as it would
have served the king well to keep a record of certain letters of grace and mandates which he received
from the pope, particularly those linked to their diplomatic, feudal and fiscal relationship. However,
the question remains of how, where and why these documents were recorded.

The information on the dorse of these original papal letters gives some insight into how these
documents may have been archived after they were received by the English administration. Jane
Sayers has carefully recorded the information on these dorses in her volume on Original Papal
Documents. 87 The majority of dorses reveal evidence of archival notes, written in a thirteenth-century
English chancery hand, summarising the content of each letter. 88 The word ‘exam[inatur]’ is
inscribed on most of these letters, proving that they were examined in the royal chancery after they
were received. 89 Similarly, almost every document is marked with one, or several numbers written
in contemporary Roman numerals. 90 Some of these numbers are accompanied by a superscript ‘a’,

85 Foedera, I/1, p. 402; Tout, Chapters, i, p. 303.
88 TNA, SC 7/1/11, SC 7/1/12, SC 7/1/13, SC 7/1/14, SC 7/1/15, SC 7/1/17, SC 7/1/18, SC 7/1/19, SC
7/1/20, SC 7/1/21, SC 7/1/24, SC 7/1/25, SC 7/1/26, SC 7/1/27, SC 7/1/32, SC 7/2/7, SC 7/2/11, SC 7/2/15,
SC 7/2/21, SC 7/2/22, SC 7/2/23, SC 7/2/27, SC 7/2/30, SC 7/2/31, SC 7/2/32, SC 7/2/33, SC 7/2/36, SC
7/3/34.
89 TNA, SC 7/1/32, SC 7/1/13, SC 7/1/14, SC 7/1/17, SC 7/3/40, SC 7/1/20, SC 7/3/19, SC 7/3/8, SC 7/1/21,
SC 7/1/27, SC 7/2/21, SC 7/2/11, SC 7/2/2, SC 7/2/3, SC 7/3/1, SC 7/3/16, SC 7/2/5, SC 7/3/7, SC 7/2/34,
7/1/19, SC 7/1/24, SC 7/1/26, SC 7/1/32, SC 7/2/21, SC 7/2/30, SC 7/2/37, SC 7/2/38, SC 7/3/10, SC 7/3/12,
90 TNA, SC 7/1/32, SC 7/1/10, SC 7/1/11, SC 7/1/13, SC 7/1/14, SC 7/1/15, SC 7/1/16, SC 7/1/17, SC
7/1/18, SC 7/3/40, SC 7/1/20, SC 7/3/19, SC 7/3/8, SC 7/1/21, SC 7/1/27, SC 7/2/21, SC 7/2/11, SC 7/2/2,
SC 7/2/3, SC 7/3/1, SC 7/3/16, SC 7/2/5, SC 7/3/7, SC 7/2/33, SC 7/3/47, SC 7/3/14, SC 7/3/17,
while others are also prefaced with the word ‘\[literate\]’. These numbers are often located just underneath the thirteenth-century English archival notes and written in the same script suggesting they were added at the same time as part of this archival process. A second number sometimes appears in the bottom left hand corner, or bottom centre of the document, this number might also have been added as part of the archival process. Three documents, all linked to payments to be made to the merchants, have evidence of a single letter ‘T’ in the bottom right-hand corner of the document, suggesting that they might have stored with other documents marked with the same letter. Clearly, documents were examined, summarised, numbered and stored after they were received. Some of these papal documents give evidence on their dorso that they had been duplicated (dupplicatur). Moreover, a number of documents were marked with a roman numeral + the words ‘\[reg. in novo libro\]’ to indicate that they had been copied into a separate book at the chancery. Other documents (and in two instances, the same documents) have been marked ‘\[irrotulata\]’ (sometimes spelt \[ino\[rotulata\]\]) suggesting they were also copied and enrolled. All of the documents which were endorsed with the mark ‘\[reg. in novo libro\]’ or ‘\[irrotulata\]’, were linked to the king’s crusading efforts in Sicily and the collection of money in England in aid of this endeavour between 1255–1256. They were important documents which needed to be preserved. Some of these letters were both enrolled

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and duplicated.\textsuperscript{97} For example, SC 7/1/14, dated 11 May 1255, authorised the archbishop of Canterbury and Master Rostand to compel all the crusaders of the kingdom of Norway who had had their vows commuted to go to Sicily. Similarly, SC 7/2/10, dated 6 October 1256, granted the king an extension to the time by which he had to collect money and send troops to Sicily. SC 7/3/42, dated 28 July 1255, ordered Brother John de Canter, O.F.M, and the archdeacon of Middlesex not to prejudice the grant formerly made to the king of England of the ransoms of crusaders' vows, obventions, bequests and legacies for the aid of the Holy Land.\textsuperscript{98} SC 7/3/40 was a grant to the English king of the ecclesiastical twentieth in Scotland in aid of the crusade in Sicily. These letters marked for enrolment may have been copied into a chancery enrolment series which has now been lost. Indeed, there is evidence from 1259 of chancery enrolments that record out-going foreign correspondence ‘to the German Empire, France and the papacy’.\textsuperscript{99}

Although there are numbers on the dorse of each document, it has been difficult to establish any clear numbering system or sequence of letters. That being said, there are some examples which appear to follow a sequential pattern, suggesting these documents were recorded and stored together. For example, SC 7/3/31 (dated 18 September 1255) is marked ‘xxii’; SC 7/2/11 (dated 10 June 1256) is marked ‘xxiii’ and SC 7/3/15 (dated 30 July 1256) is marked ‘xxiii’.\textsuperscript{100} All three of these letters were requests to the English king to allow Brother John of Dya and Master Rostand to collect and make payments to the Italian merchants. Two other letters, SC 7/2/1 (dated 13 June 1256) and SC 7/2/4 (dated 14 June 1256) are identical in content to SC 7/3/15.\textsuperscript{101} However, neither SC 7/2/1 or SC 7/2/4 have any evidence of a number on their dorse, and instead have the symbol of an hourglass.\textsuperscript{102} Sayers states that this symbol was the mark of the Sienese merchants, which could have indicated ‘ownership’ or otherwise could have been an indicator ‘as to whom the documents concerned’\textsuperscript{103}

\textsuperscript{98} SC 7/3/45 (duplicate).
\textsuperscript{99} These were collected in the TNA Treaty Rolls series (C 76). The Treaty Rolls published up to 1339 are in Treaty Rolls preserved in the Public Record Office, ed. P. Chaplais and J. Ferguson, 2 vols (London, 1955–72). This matter has been discussed by Barbara Bombi in her article on ‘The Roman Rolls’, 605 and her recent study on Anglo-Papal Relations, p. 196.
\textsuperscript{100} See Appendix F.
\textsuperscript{101} All three letters are addressed to the king and open with the clause: ‘Super solutionibus, faciendis de quampluribus pecuniarum summis tam mercatoribus Romanis quam Florentinis e Seriensis diversas litteras dilectis filiis Magistro Rostando Capellano et fratri Johanni Ordinis fratrwm minorum in Anglia nuncius nostri meminimus direxisse.’
\textsuperscript{102} See Appendix G.
\textsuperscript{103} Sayers, Original Papal Documents, p. 588.
Indeed, this symbol may have been the proctorial mark for an unnamed proctor. It is also possible that all the letters discussing the repayments due to the Italian merchants were archived together.

One document, SC 7/1/13 has the word ‘vacantur’ written in a different script on its dorse, confirming that it was cancelled at a later point. This letter, dated 3 May 1255, was the first order to Master Rostand and the archbishop of Canterbury asking them to commute Henry’s vow from the Holy Land to Sicily, which would have been cancelled at some point after 1258. This gives further evidence of letters being arranged and rearranged, copied, enrolled and updated.

Interestingly, the words ‘non registratus’ appear on the left-hand corner of the dorse of several documents. Three of these, SC 7/2/27 and SC 7/2/31, both dated 13 December 1257, and SC 7/2/28, dated 18 December 1257, were all requests from the papacy addressed to the English king. One was a request to the king to receive Roger Fimett, of Lentini, a nobleman of Sicily. The second was a request to the king to revoke the process of his justices in a suit brought by the archbishop of Tuam and the bishop of Clogher against the late archbishop of Armagh. The third asked the king to restore the goods of the see to Abraham O’Conellan, chaplain of Cardinal Hugh of Saint Cher, whom the pope had appointed archbishop of Armagh. These documents were all papal requests asking the English king to support someone who held papal favour. Presumably, they were not registered because they were not linked to important English state business. The fact that they have survived is in itself intriguing.

Ultimately, there is evidence that by the mid-thirteenth century, the English chancery was effectively being managed as a household administration under the personal control of the king, who was using more lower-status administrators and household officials. At the same time, the pope was employing a greater number of administrators and household officials as leading chancery personnel. This was largely to meet the demands of an increasing number of litigants and petitioners, but it was also a way for the pope to maintain more central control over his government. While both the king and the pope were engaging in similar developments, the driving force behind these developments somewhat differed. The English king was fighting to keep personal control over his government in

105 TNA, SC 7/2/27.
106 TNA, SC 7/2/31.
107 TNA, SC 7/2/28.
the face of the barons, whereas the pope was adapting his administration to more effectively manage the increased level of activity at the curia.

With regards to the recording processes, both the English and papal administrations were formalising their methods of recording and archiving both incoming and outgoing correspondence. That being said, not all communications were being recorded at this stage. At the English chancery, only certain papal documents were copied and enrolled, possibly onto a now lost diplomatic enrolment series, while at the papal chancery there is still debate over the reasons why certain documents were recorded and others were not – whether this was on the initiative of the papacy or the petitioners at the papal curia. Moreover, there is also evidence to suggest that one or more registers containing political correspondence with secular rulers may have been lost. In the mid-thirteenth century, both the pope and the English king were asserting personal control over the management and organisation of their expanding administrations.

Types of Correspondence

After having established the basic structure of the English and papal chanceries, we can now discuss the types of documentation being produced at these offices in the thirteenth century. This discussion will first touch on all types of documentation and will then address the types used in Anglo-papal exchanges, which addressed a number of political matters, judicial disputes, papal taxation and papal provisions to benefices.

Papal Types of Correspondence

There were two types of document produced by the papal chancery: privileges (privilegia) and letters (litterae). Privileges awarded grants of land, property or jurisdiction. These documents can be identified by several key features. The opening line of a privilegium had elongated letters, it was not addressed to anyone and instead the opening protocol ended with the words in perpetuum. The document ended with a triple amen, the papal rota (autograph), the bene valete monogram (a closing benediction), a list of subscriptions of the pope and his cardinals, and the formula datum per

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108 Frenz, I Documenti Pontifici, p. 13; Chaplais, Diplomatic Practice, pp. 20–6; Smith, Curia and Crusade, pp. 50–8.
109 For an example of a privilegium from 1223 see Smith, Curia and Crusade, p. 52.
manum followed by the name and title of the chancery official who had written the document. Privilegia were composed on large skins of parchment, authenticated with a lead bull (bulla plumbi) attached by a red and yellow silk cord (filo serico). Between the rota (on the left) and the bene valete (on the right), was the subscription of the pope. According to Smith, the pope would personally write the elongated ‘E’ in ‘Ego’ and the scribe would write the rest of his name e.g. Ego Alexander catholicae ecclesiae episcopus sub scripsi. While common in the twelfth century, privilegia were much rarer during the thirteenth century.

In comparison, letters (littere) were used much more freely and widely to cover a range of topics and could differ in appearance, size, and quality. Some letters were issued as letters close (littere clause), which had the seal attached to the side of the document. According to Smith, the seal was intended not just to authenticate the letter but also ‘to secure it and prevent it being read by the prying eyes of messengers and third parties’. These were only a small percentage of letters. The rest were issued as open letters, letters patent, with the seal attached to the bottom of the document. The papal documents discussed throughout this thesis are all types of littere, the vast majority of which were issued as letters patent.

There were two categories of littere: letters of papal grace (littere gratie), issued to grant a papal favour in response to a petition, and papal letters of justice or mandates (littere iustice), which were used more commonly and often addressed legal and administrative matters. The seal of a littera gracie was attached by a red and yellow silk cord (littere cum filo serico), while letters of justice and

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110 ‘The rota is drawn of two concentric circles. The outer circle bears the motto of the pope... The smaller circle is divided into four quadrants with a cross. The upper left quadrant contains the name of St Peter, the upper right, that of St Paul. The lower quadrant bears the name of the pope... split across the two parts’, Smith, Curia and Crusade, p. 61.
111 Frenz, I Documenti Pontifici, p. 20.
112 Smith, Curia and Crusade, p. 61.
113 Frenz, I Documenti Pontifici, p. 20.
114 Smith, Curia and Crusade, p. 53. Previously, Cheney identified five original papal letters close held in English archives, C. R. Cheney, The Papacy and England 12th–14th Century: Historical and Legal Studies (Variorum Reprints, 1982), Chapter VII ‘A Neglected Record of the Canterbury Election of 1205–6’, 235, n. 3. In addition to these five, there are a further two papal letters close held at Canterbury Cathedral Archives, both issued during the pontificate of Alexander III: CCA-DCC-ChAnt/M/372 and CCA-DCC-ChAnt/A/209; and one held at the National Archives, issued during the pontificate of Alexander IV, TNA, SC 7/1/10. Papal letters close can be identified by the slits down the right and left-hand side of the document. These slits were used to close the letter with the seal and to allow it to be opened without removing the seal. None of these documents have retained their seals. For more on papal letters close see Frenz, I Documenti Pontifici, p. 28 and Werner Maleczek, ‘Litterae clausae der Päpste vom 12. Bis zum frühen 14. Jahrhundert’, in Kuriale Briefkultur in späteren Mittelalter: Gestaltung – Überlieferung – Rezeption, ed. Tanja Broser, Andres Fischer and Matthias Thumser (Vienna, 2015), pp. 55–128.
mandates used hemp cords to attach the seal (littere cum filo canapis).\textsuperscript{115} Often, it has been asserted that the silk cord (filo serico) was only used on important papal documents, while the hemp cord (filo canapis) was used in letters carrying orders or regarding legal cases. Yet, Smith has highlighted that curial letters concerning political matters such as the crusades were also issued as littere cum filo canapis.\textsuperscript{116} Similarly, the majority of documents studied as part of this thesis were issued as littere cum filo canapis, even some which have been identified as important curial letters.\textsuperscript{117} Some papal litterae gracie shared some characteristics with the privilegia. For example, the papal confirmation endorsing Henry’s son, Edmund as the King of Sicily in April 1255, shared a significant number of external features with a privilegium; it was written on a large piece of vellum, had elongated letters on the first line, ended with the papal rota and subscriptions of the pope and his cardinals, and referenced the chancery official who wrote the document.\textsuperscript{118} However, it is not written in perpetuum and it has an addressee, Henry III, who was granted this confirmation on behalf of his son.

**English Types of Correspondence**

In the thirteenth century, the English chancery was responsible for producing three types of document: charters (carte), letters patent (littere patentes) and letters close (littere clause).\textsuperscript{119} These different types of document were enrolled in three separate rolls series.\textsuperscript{120} The carte, much like papal privilegia, were grants made in perpetuity to a person or group, usually involving a gift of land or certain rights and they included subscriptions from a list of witnesses. Meanwhile, letters (or writs), could cover a broader range of topics, and would often involve some administrative, judicial or political matters.\textsuperscript{121} Letters patent were sent open with the king’s seal attached to the bottom, while letters close were meant for private consumption by the intended addressee.\textsuperscript{122} The seal on English

\textsuperscript{115} Frenz, *I Documenti Pontifici*, pp. 23–6.
\textsuperscript{116} Smith, *Curia and Crusade*, p. 55.
\textsuperscript{117} See for example TNA, SC 7/3/48, discussed later in this chapter.
\textsuperscript{118} BL, Cotton MS Cleopatra E. I, fols 189–90. At the bottom of the document is the papal rota followed by the pope’s subscription: ‘Ego Alexander catholicae ecclesiae episcopus’, and surrounding it are the subscriptions of six of his cardinals: John of Toledo, Hugh of Saint Cher, O.F.P, Stephan of Vasca, William Fieschi, Richard Annibaldi, and Ottaviano Ubaldini. This document was written at Naples, by the hand of William of Parma, papal vice-chancellor (1252–1256) on 9 April 1255.
\textsuperscript{119} Chaplais, *English Royal Documents*, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{120} See p. 196.
\textsuperscript{121} Letters took the form of writs (brevia) named as such for their ‘brevity and directness of style’, Clanchy, *Memory to Written Record*, p. 92.
letters close was used to authenticate and physically close the document – only to be opened by the intended recipient.\textsuperscript{123}

In correspondence with the pope, the English chancery issued letters patent and letters close. In the mid-thirteenth century, letters to the papal curia were typically either \textit{littere recommendatorie}, which included a recommendation for royal envoys assigned to carry out duties on the king’s behalf, or \textit{littere missive} which relayed information and intentions.\textsuperscript{124} These letters would often include petitions from the lay powers, seeking some sort of papal favour and giving credence for envoys being sent to discuss this business. Few original supplications to the papal curia survive for the thirteenth century.\textsuperscript{125} Petitions were disposed of after they were either accepted or rejected. If a petition was accepted then a papal letter would be issued in response and it is this document that had ‘legal validity’, not the petition.\textsuperscript{126} There was no reason to retain the petition, and even successful petitions were ‘deliberately destroyed as part of the chancery process’.\textsuperscript{127} The first register of petitions was recorded by the papacy in the \textit{registra supplicationum} from the pontificate of Clement VI (1342–52).\textsuperscript{128} From 1306, the Roman Rolls were employed in England to record correspondence to the papal curia and the cardinals, mostly discussing ecclesiastical matters.\textsuperscript{129} In fact, through an examination of the Roman Rolls, Bombi has suggested that in the fourteenth century the English Crown continued to petition the papacy in \textit{littere missive} and \textit{recommendatorie} when it should have used \textit{littere deprecatorie}.\textsuperscript{130}

\textsuperscript{123} Few closed examples survive today, as they would have been opened by the recipient.
\textsuperscript{124} Bombi has highlighted the different types of correspondence to the papal curia in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, Bombi, ‘Petitioning between England and Avignon’, p. 71. See also Smith, \textit{Curia and Crusade}, p. 85.
\textsuperscript{125} The earliest surviving extant petition was made to Alexander IV in 1261, P. A. Linehan and P. N. R. Zutshi, ‘Fiat A: The Earliest Roll of Petitions signed by the Pope (1307)’, \textit{EHR}, 122 (2007), 998–1015 (1001).
\textsuperscript{127} Smith, \textit{Curia and Crusade}, p. 49. See also Linehan and Zutshi, ‘Fiat A’, 998.
\textsuperscript{129} See Roman Rolls, series C 70 in the National Archives.
\textsuperscript{130} Bombi, ‘Petitioning between England and Avignon’, p. 70.
Structure of Diplomatic Documents

While the broad structure of medieval letters was dictated by dictaminal treatises and formularies, the specific language and structure of English and papal diplomatic documents was shaped by each court’s chancery style and practice. This section will examine some of the features of English letters and papal mandates issued for envoys conducting Anglo-papal business between Henry III and Alexander IV, specifically: letters of credence, letters of procuration, and mandates of appointment. Through this examination, one can make suggestions regarding the formalisation of both the English and papal chanceries as well as the methods and practices deployed by each chancery in correspondence intended for Anglo-papal exchanges in the mid-thirteenth century.

Letters of Credence

Once a ruler and his council had decided to send an embassy to a foreign power, entrusted to deliver an oral message or negotiate certain matters, they would choose one or more envoys to carry out this mission. They would then decide on the type of credence for these envoys, providing them with letters of credence befitting of their mission to present to the intended recipient. These letters, issued as *litterae recomendatione*, assured the recipient of an envoy’s credentials and ability to carry out said task on behalf of his principal. Letters of credence were often seen as an essential part of any diplomatic communication, particularly in cases where an envoy was to deliver a message orally. These letters ensured that the envoy’s words could be trusted. In fact, there are cases where recipients rejected an oral message because the envoy delivering it had not been issued with letters of credence.\(^1\) Thus, any sender authorising a representative, or representatives, to carry out an assignment on their behalf needed to issue a credence for this mission.

The majority of diplomatic letters exchanged between England and the papacy in the mid-thirteenth century included a credence for their envoys. Yet, as Bombi has argued for the fourteenth century, ‘the administrative practice and formularies employed in the letters of credence could vary greatly’.\(^2\) Those produced by the English chancery differed in style from those produced at the

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1\(^{1}\) For example, in 1234 Peter des Rivaux told the English king’s envoy, Richard d’Argentan, that he would not answer the king through him as he did not have ‘*litteras de credulitate*’, *Curia Regis Rolls*, xv. p. 224 cited in Chaplais, *Diplomatic Practice*, p. 189.

2\(^{2}\) Bombi, *Anglo-Papal Relations*, p. 57, n. 20.
papal chancery. As such, this section will explore the structure, language and style utilised by each chancery in their production of letters of credence in order to highlight how these two chanceries were conducting diplomacy.

Both Chaplais and Cuttino have analysed English royal letters of credence utilised in diplomatic exchanges with France, during the thirteenth and fourteenth century. They have primarily focused on letters from the later thirteenth and fourteenth century, highlighting the internal and external features of letters of credence issued by the English chancery. According to Cuttino and Chaplais, there were four parts to a letter of credence: the ‘address’; the ‘clause of notification’, where the king would notify the recipient that he was sending certain envoys to convey a message on his behalf; the ‘clause of supplication’, asking the recipient to give credence to them; and finally, the dating clause.  

Chaplais has further identified several different types of letters of credence. He described letters of credence stricto sensu, which he argued were ‘mainly reserved for occasions which required a formal approach rather than a friendly one’. Moreover, he argued that diplomatic exchanges with the pope were typically conducted ‘with more formality’ than those between lay rulers. According to Chaplais, if a letter of credence was sent in response to a foreign mission, it would take the form of an ‘effusive thanks or a matter-of-fact acknowledgement’. Some of these letters of credence responding to foreign missions could include a clause de statu. Through this clause, the king would take a friendlier and more complimentary tone, informing the recipient about himself and his family; in some cases, he would also enquire after the health of the recipient.

A number of royal letters of credence to Pope Alexander IV were sent in response to papal missions. They took the form of this ‘effusive thanks’ and adopted a similar structure to the one highlighted above by Cuttino and Chaplais. However, the ‘clause of notification’ was replaced with a ‘Gratiam agere’. This included the phrase ‘vobis ad gratiarum actiones assurgimus’ in which the king was giving thanks to the pope for his previous actions, before setting out new requests which

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133 Cuttino, English Diplomatic Administration, pp. 156–7; Chaplais, Diplomatic Practice, p. 177.
134 Chaplais, Diplomatic Practice, p. 177.
135 Ibid., p. 248.
136 Ibid., p. 177.
137 Ibid.
138 Ibid., p. 178.
were to be transmitted to the pope by the king’s envoys returning to the curia. For example, in a letter of credence dated 20 May 1259, the king gave thanks to the pope for the many graces to himself and his family, particularly in relation to Sicily, before requesting credence for his envoy, William Bonquer, whom he was sending to the curia to address a number of matters by word of mouth. The letter can be broken down as such:

**Address:**

*Domino Pape, salute cum reverentia et honore.*

**Gratiam agere:**

*Super gratis multimodis nobis et Edmundo nato nostro, maxime de regno Siciliae, et aliis nos et honorem nostrum contingentibus, et vestrae sanctitatis clementia favorabiler impensis, vobis ad gratiarum actiones assurgimus, cum devotione speciali; Vestrae paternitati significantes, quod pax inter Regem Franciae illustrem et nos aliquantulum cepit dilationem, a qua magna pars subsidii praedicti regni Siciliae dependebat.*

**Clause of supplication:**

*Super quo sanctitati vestrae attentius supplicamus quatenus, ob causam praedictam, et alias, quas dilectus et fidelis noster, W. Bonquer, miles et marescallus noster, vobis oretenus ex parte nostra, plenius exponat, memoratam gratiam vestram, apud nos et praedictum natum tam egregie et liberaliter inchoatam, necnon et benigne continuatam, fine piissimo consummare dignemini; et eidem, super negotio Siciliae, et facto Wintonensi, et ad pertinentibus; nec non et aliis negotiis nostris et regni nostri, plenam fidem adhibere velitis.*

**Date:**

*Teste meipso apud Westmonasterium, xx die Maii, anno regni nostri xliii.*

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139 In some cases, the word ‘assurgimus’ is replaced with ‘refundimus’, but the sense remains the same, see for example *Foedera*, I/1, p. 376.

140 TNA, C 66/73 m. 8d.
This letter of credence adopts certain formulae, such as: ‘*Vestrae paternitati significantes*’, ‘*vestrae sanctitatis*’ and ‘*cum devotione speciali*’, typical of thirteenth-century communications with the papacy.

It is also important to note that these letters of credence were not only sent to the pope but also to the College of Cardinals. This letter of credence for Bonquer was also sent to Pietro Capocci, Cardinal deacon of St George’s in Velabro; John of Toledo, Cardinal priest of S. Lorenzo in Lucina (1244–1261); Giovanni Gaetano Orsini, Cardinal deacon of San Nicola in Carcere Tulliano (1244–1277); Ottobono Fieschi, Cardinal deacon of S. Adriano (1251–1276); Ottoviano Ubaldini, Cardinal deacon of Santa Maria in Via Lata (1244–1273); Hugh of Saint-Cher O.F.P, Cardinal priest of S. Sabina (1244–1263); and Stephen of Vancsa, Cardinal bishop of Palestrina (1251–1270). The cardinals were not excluded from these diplomatic interactions, indeed, they could play an active role in shaping the diplomatic exchanges with England.

Letters of credence for the king’s envoys travelling to the papal curia could be issued on behalf of a group of envoys. Similarly, the credence for an envoy could be incorporated as part of a longer political letter to the pope. Moreover, the English king could also send letters of credence for papal agents who had performed duties on behalf of the papacy in England, and whom he was now sending back to the papacy to communicate his response. For example, on 10 May 1257 he produced a letter of credence for the pope’s envoy, the archbishop of Messina, whom he was sending back to the curia alongside his other ‘solemn envoys’ (*solemnibus nunciois*). In this message, the archbishop of Messina was trusted to relate the king’s response *viva voce*.

English letters of credence often gave a brief outline of the matters to be discussed by the king’s representatives. For example, Bonquer’s credence dated 20 May 1259 and discussed above, stated that he was being sent to the pope to discuss the business of Sicily, the issue of Winchester, which related to Aymer’s deposition as bishop, and other business of the king and the kingdom.

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142 See for example, *Foedera*, I/1, pp. 355, 376.
143 *Foedera*, I/1, p. 355: ‘prout idem archiepiscopus beatitudini vestrae plenius reserare poterit viva voce.’
144 For example: *CR*, 1256–9, p. 327.
145 TNA, C 66/73 m. 8d.
This tells us almost nothing about what he actually discussed. This was a way of protecting against this information falling into the wrong hands.

Chaplais argued that letters of credence were typically sealed close if they were addressed to one person and patent if they were addressed to a group of people, while Cuttino maintained letters of credence were always letters close.\textsuperscript{146} For the mid-thirteenth century, however, this was simply not the case. Indeed, William Bonquer’s letter of credence, discussed above, was sealed patent, even though he had been trusted to relay ‘secret business’ to the king’s envoys at Rome, archbishops of Embrun and Tarentaise, Master Rostand and Master John Clarel, on his behalf.\textsuperscript{147} To explain these occurrences, Chaplais has suggested that letters of credence could be sealed patent if they were intended to act as a procuration. Although he also accepted that these ‘sealing anomalies’ cannot be sufficiently explained.\textsuperscript{148} Ultimately, the fact that Bonquer’s letter was sealed patent did not matter much, as the secret business he was trusted to relay would be disclosed by word of mouth (\textit{oretenus}), and his letter of credence did not reveal much about the nature of the mission. Ultimately, there was a degree of flexibility within this practice of sending letters of credence to the papacy.

Much like the English chancery, the papal chancery produced letters of credence for its envoys, issued as \textit{littere iustice}. As Rennie put it, since the Early Middle Ages letters of credence were ‘regularly employed by the papacy as a mechanism of formal exchange’, primarily to introduce the pope’s envoys to a third party.\textsuperscript{149} In the thirteenth century, papal envoys coming to the English court carried letters of credence to prove that they had been authorised to speak \textit{viva voce} on the pope’s behalf. Papal letters of credence for English envoys were usually issued to one individual, to discuss certain matters on behalf of the pope. These letters were mostly issued as letters patent; they were open documents to be presented at the king’s court. The internal structure included two primary clauses: the first (A), identifying who the pope and his cardinals had chosen to send on their behalf to the king and his council, and the second (B), asking the king and council to accept this man. See, for example, the letter of credence for Master Arlot, dated December 1257:

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{146} Chaplais, \textit{Diplomatic Practice}, p. 186; Cuttino, \textit{English Diplomatic Administration}, p. 156.
\textsuperscript{147} TNA, C 66/73 m. 8d: ‘pro… secretis nobis ibidem expendiendis’.
\textsuperscript{148} Chaplais, \textit{Diplomatic Practice}, p. 186.
\end{quote}
Clause A:

*In hoc igitur nostrae deliberationis consilia resederunt, ut dilectum filium Magistrum Arlottum subdiaconum et notarium nostrum, virum utique nobis et fratribus ipsis acceptum, et habentem ad consummationem ipsius negotii purae intentionis affectum, de cuius fide plenam et indubitam obstinamus fiduciam ad tuam præsentiam mitteremus plena sibi facultate per alias litteras nostras de praedictorum fratrum concessa consilio, sub certa forma in eisdem litteris annotata, tecum et cum praedicto Rege dicti Regni negotium reformandi.*

Clause B:

*Quocirca serentitatem [tuam?] regiam nonemus, rogamus et hortamur attente quatinus, eundum notarium favorabiliter in nomine nostro suscipiens...*\(^{150}\)

In this example, Arlot had been chosen by the pope and his cardinals to conduct this business due to his trustworthiness – his ‘pure intentions’. He was awarded the ability to conduct this business by other letters, meaning by his mandate of appointment. The pope then went on to ‘advise, ask and encourage’ the king to accept and support his envoy, Master Arlot. Often, as in this example, the pope approved his envoy ‘de consilio fratrum’, namely from the counsel of his college of cardinals. The pope usually included his cardinals in the decision-making process for the approval and authorisation of papal representatives conducting business with lay rulers.

Papal letters of credence could provide detailed information about the mission before introducing the envoy.\(^{151}\) Conversely, some letters of credence for solemn envoys focused more closely on the suitability of the envoy for their particular mission throughout the letter.\(^{152}\) The credence for an envoy (see clause A and B highlighted above) could vary somewhat in length and

\(^{150}\) TNA, SC 7/3/52.

\(^{151}\) See, for example, TNA, SC 7/3/12.

\(^{152}\) For example, the mandate giving credence for Giacomo Boncambi, O.F.P., bishop of Bologna, to negotiate the manner and conditions of the privilege of Sicily with the English king, issued on 13 May 1255, opens by celebrating this envoy for his ‘great prudence... which has shone forth in his execution of many and challenging matters’. TNA, SC 7/1/24; a duplicate was addressed to Edmund, king of Sicily, SC 7/1/19: ‘Laudanda magnae prudentiae virtus venerabilis fratis nostri Bononiensis Episcopi, quae diu in multorum et arduorum executione negotiorum enuit, nostro suggerit animo, ut suis robustis humeris, gravium agendorum deferre onera consuetis, incumbentem nobis undique ponderum partem non minimam imponamus, quatumin apostolicae moles sarcinae, divisa provide sic per plures, a nobis levius supportetur.’

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detail in accordance with the solemnity and directives of each mission. In some letters of credence for papal envoys carrying out important duties on behalf of the pope, Alexander IV emphasised his choice of a certain envoy through a description of their character and qualities. The bishop of Bologna is described in his credence, issued on 13 May 1255, as: ‘virum religione conspicuum, scientia praeditum, probitate pollentem et nobis et praedictis fratribus carum inter praelatos alios admodum et acceptum’. Furthermore, the credence for both Giovanni Colonna, O.F.P, archbishop of Messina, issued in November 1256, and Brother Mansuetus, O.F.M, issued in September 1257, are strikingly similar in format. Giovanni was described as: ‘virum utique religione conspicuum, genere nobilem, consilio providum et morum grauitate maturum, nobisque ac predictis fratribus sue merito probitatis acceptum’. Similarly, Mansuetus was introduced as: ‘virum utique religione conspicuum, scientia preditum, morum honestate maturum, nobisque ac fratribus nostris sue merito probitatis acceptum’. All three of these men were friars, chosen for their high religion and trustworthiness.

Moreover, Boncambi and Mansuetus were commended for their knowledge – ‘scientia preditum’. While the language used to describe each envoy differed depending on their specific background, the structure and format of each clause remained the same. It is probable that these clauses of credence were drawn from a set of templates, based on papal formularies, suggesting the existence of a more formalised papal chancery in the mid-thirteenth century. Similar language was deployed to describe important papal envoys in the early thirteenth century. For example, in May 1218 Pope Honorius III wrote to the clergy and crusading army of Outremer setting out the powers of his legate, Pelagius, whom he was sending to them. This letter described Pelagius as ‘viro itaque prudentia, honestate, scientia’. The qualities of trustworthiness, prudence and knowledge were usually deployed to recommend papal envoys in the thirteenth century. The papal chancery was employing a selection of established formulaic words and phrases to describe and recommend individuals to their posts.

153 See for example, TNA, SC 7/1/24, SC 7/3/12, SC 7/3/48.
154 TNA, SC 7/3/12.
156 The credence for Brother Walter of Rogat, O.F.M, given in May 1259 was very similar, Foedera, I/1, p. 382.
157 Reg. Vat. 9, fol. 265r cited in Smith, Curia and Crusade, p. 270.
In contrast, Alexander IV issued two separate letters for the papal nuncio, Brother John of Dya, O.F.M, on 18 September 1255 and 10 June 1256 to go to England on his behalf. In both letters Dya was described simply as one ‘de quo nos et fratres nostri plenam in domino fiduciam obtinemus, propter hoc specialiter ad te duximus destinandum’.

Both Dya and Rostand had been trusted to conduct matters relating to the collection of money in aid of Sicily. These missions did not have the same level of solemnity as the ones led by the bishop of Bologna, the bishop of Messina and Brother Mansuetus.

**English Letters of Procuration**

Envoys were almost always given letters of credence. Yet, English envoys who were granted powers to negotiate and exert their own will on their sender’s behalf were usually authorised to do so through letters of procurations. These letters detailed the specific powers assigned to an envoy to carry out a particular activity and to assert their own will.

According to Cuttino, English letters of procuration typically had six clauses: the address, the ‘clause of constitution’, informing the recipient who is being sent; the ‘clause of limitation’, highlighting the powers assigned to the envoys to carry out a certain order; the ‘clause of guarantee’, otherwise known as a ‘de rato’ clause, stating that the king would ratify what they had decided on his behalf, and clarifying that not all the envoys named in the letter had to carry out the mission; the clause of ‘signification’, confirming the actions by the king’s seal and letters; and the dating clause.

Cuttino argued that letters of procurations were issued letters patent, and while this may have been the case for the later period, for the mid-thirteenth century they could be issued as letters close. For example, on 1 August 1258 the king and council issued a letter close appointing the archbishop of Embrun, the archbishop of York, and Master John Clarel to petition for the prorogation of the

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158 TNA, SC 7/3/31. See also SC 7/2/11: ‘de quo nos et fratres nostri plenam in domino fiduciam obtinemus ad te, de ipsorum fratrum consilio duximus destinandum’.

159 Cuttino, *English Diplomatic Administration*, pp. 155–6. Chaplais refers to this second part of the ‘guarantee clause’ as the ‘quorum’, which was intended as a precaution in case one or more envoys appointed for a mission were prevented from carrying out their duties, either through ‘illness, capture or some other unforeseeable impediment.’ Chaplais, *Diplomatic Practice*, p. 181. Benham refers to this clause as the *de rato* clause, Benham, *Peacemaking*, p. 120.

terms in the Sicilian agreement and to ask for the reformation and improvement of these conditions through letters close.

Address:

_Domino Pape rex Anglie pedum oscula beatorum._

Clause of constitution:

_Sanctitati vestre notum facimus quod nos venerabiles patres H. Dei gracia Ebredunensem archiepiscopum et G. electum Eboracensem et dilectum clericum nostrum magistrum J. Clarel nostros constituimus procuratores nostros et nuncios ad petendum prorogacionem terminorum in privilegio confecto super concessione regni Sicilie contentorum et ad petendum reformacionem et melioracionem conditionum in dicto privilegio contentarum;_

Clause of limitation:

dantes eisdem plenam potestatem et speciale mandatum obligandi nos et regnum nostrum sub quibusdam pactis et penis ac jurandi in animam nostram de ipsis servandis;

Clause of guarantee:

_ratum habituri et gratum quicquid per ipsos tres vel duos ex ipsis super hoc actum fuerit vel etiam procuratum._

Clause of signification:

_In cuius rei testimonium sigillum nostrum presentibus duximus apponendum._

Date:

_Teste me ipso apud Westmonasterium primo die Augusti._

This letter also adopts certain formulae established in thirteenth-century formularies, helping petitioners communicate effectively with the papacy. On the same day the king had appointed the archbishops of Embrun and Tarentaise and the Master Rostand to negotiate the terms of the Sicilian agreement. Their letter of procuration was slightly different to the one granted to the archbishop of Embrun, the archbishop of York, and Master John Clarel. They were the king’s ‘_procuratores ... et nuncios_’

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161 TNA, C 54/73 m. 4d.
speciales’ with ‘potestatem et speciale mandatum’ to negotiate the terms of the Sicilian agreement. There was no quorum clause in their procuration, suggesting they were all expected to carry out this mission. \( ^{163} \) Evidently, while there were some variations, by the mid-thirteenth century, letters of procuration contained a clear structure which continued to be utilised in the fourteenth century. \( ^{164} \) Ultimately, these letters were legal documents and hence they had to contain some flexibility in their instructions to retain validity and ensure the likelihood of a mission going forward.

Similar letters of procuration were issued for Brother William of the Knights Templar, Master John Clarel, Peter Brauche and William de Hotintoft, who accompanied the archbishops of Embrun and Tarentaise and Master Rostand to the curia. \( ^{165} \) At the same time, procurations were granted for Hostiensis, archbishop of Embrun, Godfrey of Ludham, archbishop-elect of York, and Master John Clarel. \( ^{166} \) They were given ‘full powers and special mandate’ to reform the business of Sicily, to ask for a cardinal legate to help reform the English kingdom and also to conclude peace with France. \( ^{167} \) A separate letter of procuration was commissioned for each assignment, and for the envoys assigned with that task. An envoy could be issued with several letters of procurations at the same time, asking him to conduct different matters.

**Papal Mandates of Appointment**

As we have seen, powers assigned to papal envoys were very flexible. Each papal mandate of appointment was crafted to suit the requirements of each mission and was addressed to the envoys appointed to carry out particular duties on behalf of the papacy. The letter would describe what they had been appointed to do as well as the powers granted to them. Formulaic language was employed to define how much power had been ascribed to an envoy and the extent to which they could act on the pope’s behalf. For example, in a letter issued on 3 May 1255 Alexander IV granted Master

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163 CR, 1256–9, p. 327.
165 CR, 1256–9, p. 327.
166 Ludham received royal assent on 25 July and was consecrated as archbishop of York on 22 September 1258. Not much is known about his life, particularly his activities in England’s political realm, David M. Smith, ‘Ludham [Kineton], Godfrey de (d.1265)’, *ODNB*, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/95190 [Accessed on 27 October 2019].
Rostand and Boniface, archbishop of Canterbury, ‘*plenum et liberam potestatem*’ to commute the crusading vow of Henry III from the Holy Land to Sicily, on the authority of the Apostolic See.\(^\text{168}\) Being granted ‘*plenum et liberam potestatem*’ meant that an envoy could adopt the full powers of the pope to act in a free and independent way with regards to the duties ascribed in their mandate. On 16 May 1255, Alexander IV granted the same Master Rostand and the archbishop of Canterbury ‘*plenum et liberam facultatem*’ to absolve Henry III from his commitment to go on crusade to the Holy Land.\(^\text{169}\) ‘*Facultatem*’ was interchangeable with ‘*potestatem*’ and both were commonly deployed in papal mandates of appointment to describe an envoy’s powers. Likewise, on 7 October 1256, Alexander granted Master Rostand ‘*plenum potestatem*’ from his authority to grant pardon to all ecclesiastical persons in England who had paid fully the tenth of their revenue in aid of the Holy Land.\(^\text{170}\)

In December 1257, Master Arlot had been granted ‘*plenum facultatem*’ to act ‘*sub certa forma*’ of his mandate to negotiate the terms of the Sicilian Business. The words ‘*sub certa forma*’ were intended as a safeguarding clause, indicating that the mandate could not be overturned or overrun.\(^\text{171}\) Although the original mandate of appointment does not survive, these powers granted to Arlot are referred to in two surviving letters linked to his mission.\(^\text{172}\) Indeed, few original papal mandates of appointment have survived for this period as these documents were usually disposed of once they had been received. In one surviving mandate of appointment for Arlot’s mission, dated 19 January 1258, Alexander IV ordered him to extend the time by which the king could meet the deadline of the Sicilian agreement for another three months from June 1258.\(^\text{173}\) This mandate referred back to the previous powers granted to Arlot in December, stating that the pope and his cardinals had

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\(^{168}\) TNA, SC 7/1/13. See also TNA, SC 7/1/14, SC 7/1/15 and SC 7/1/18.

\(^{169}\) TNA, SC 7/3/43: ‘Nosque nobis absoluendi eundem regem a votu crucis illudque in susceptionem et exequutionem negotii Regni Sicilie commutandi plenam et liberam concesserimus per nostras litteras facultatem; discretione nostrae presentium auctoritate committimus ut nos vel alter nostrum postquam huissusmodi votum taliter commutaueritis prefatum Regem a predicto juramento absolvere per nos vel per alium seu alias valeatis.’

\(^{170}\) TNA, SC 7/3/52, SC 7/2/22.


\(^{172}\) TNA, SC 7/3/17: ‘de qua plenam in domino fiduciam obtinemus’.

\(^{173}\) TNA, SC 7/2/37: ‘discretione tuae, de qua plenae confidimus de praedictorum fratrum nostrorum consilio, auctoritate praeuentium concedimus et mandamus, ut praedictum temporis spatium, ad reformandum idem negotium tibi in litteris supradictis’.
mandated Arlot to extend the previous deadline. This new mandate gave Arlot more flexibility to negotiate the final deadline for repayment with the English king.

While few original mandates of appointment or instructions for papal envoys have survived, the features and formulae of these mandates reveal that they were issued in accordance with the needs of each mission. Envoys could hold a range of papal powers listed in their mandate. These specific powers were chosen and dictated by the pope and his cardinals. Moreover, envoys could be issued with a number of successive mandates, linked to the same mission, which ordered them to carry out separate orders, or to conduct additional tasks. In theory, envoys were limited by the instructions in their mandates, although, as we have discovered in Chapters Two and Three, that this was not always the case.

**Language and Rhetoric**

As noted in the introduction to this chapter, correspondence between England and the papacy in the mid-thirteenth century adopted a number of rhetorical features, which were influenced and shaped by the *dictamen* and the *stylus curie*. In accordance with the *dictamen*, medieval letters were typically divided into five parts. They began with an *intitulatio* (also referred to as a *salutatio*) which incorporated the address, title and greetings clause. The order of both the sender and the recipient’s names and titles within this clause was crucial, as it signified the hierarchical relationship between them. In accordance with the *stylus curie*, any correspondence to or from the pope would place the pope’s name and title at the beginning of the address, as a sign of courtesy to his position of spiritual superiority.174 Hence, a typical *intitulatio* from the English king to the pope might open as such: ‘Sanctissimo Patri ac Domino Alexandri, Dei gratia, Sacrosanctae Romanae Ecclesiae, summo Pontifici’, followed by the king’s name and title, a greeting and finally a *supersalutatio*, the most common being: ‘devota pedum oscula beatorum’.175 Similarly, a papal *intitulatio* would start with the pope’s name, followed by the words: ‘episcopus servus servorum Dei’, and then the name and title of the recipient. Christian emperors or kings who enjoyed papal favour would be referred to as

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174 Chaplais, *Diplomatic Practice*, p. 102.
175 Ibid., p. 111.
the ‘carissimo in Christo filio’. Papal correspondence always ended with the greeting clause: ‘salutem et apostolicam benedictionem’.

After the intitulatio came the arenga (in some cases called the exordium), which acted as a preamble on an appropriate theme, highlighting the rhetorical features of the letter. This part of the letter was designed to encourage the recipient to be more receptive to the message. It was intended to provide an impressive opening, often filled with poetic and biblical language, which would flow into the subsequent clauses. Moreover, it was an opportunity for the pope or king to justify the decisions or strengthen the requests made in the successive clauses. Not every letter contained the arenga, which was reserved for matters that required an extra layer of persuasion. However, Denholm-Young has remarked that the arenga became a more common feature in English correspondence to the papacy in the fourteenth century.

Afterwards came the narratio, which, according to Frenz, summarised the ‘petitioner’s account of the facts’ that had led to the issuing of this letter. This often opened with the word ‘therefore’ or some variant on this, such as ‘cum autem’, ‘cum igitur’, ‘sane’, ‘dudum siquidem’ ‘itaque’ and ‘quocirca’. A papal narratio might summarise a petition from the king, to which the pope was responding. As so few original petitions to the papal curia have survived, the narratio in papal letters can provide the best surviving evidence for the content of the original petition. In contrast, an English narratio to the pope might outline the previous orders given by a papal envoy in England, before detailing the king’s response.

The dispositio or petitio followed on from the narratio. For the English king, this part of the letter was often a petitio to the pope, where the king and council made requests to the pope on certain matters. The dispositio was usually a chance for the pope to respond to a request from the king, which would have been outlined in the narratio. This part of the letter often opened with the word ‘nos

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176 For example, papal letters addressed to Henry III and Louis IX adopted the same formula see Arch. Nat. Paris. L. 250 nos. 97, 111–12 copied into Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, ed. Heinrich Denifle et Émile Châtelain, 4 vols (Paris, 1889–97), i. no. 282: ‘carrissimo in Christo filio ... regi Francorum illustri salutem et apostolicam benedictionem’; nos. 289–90: ‘carrissimo in Christo filio ... regi Francie illustri salutem et apostolicam benedictionem’.

177 Reginald L. Poole, Lectures on the History of the Papal Chancery down to the time of Innocent III (Cambridge, 1915), p. 43; Smith, Curia and Crusade, p. 213.


180 Frenz, I Documenti Pontifici, p. 44; Smith, Curia and Crusade, p. 59.

181 Smith, Curia and Crusade, p. 59.
(autem)’ to indicate that the sender was about to give an order or a decision in response to the previous letter.\textsuperscript{182}

Letters ended with a \textit{conclusio} which would explain the potential results of the \textit{dispositio} or \textit{petitio}. This could be followed by a \textit{subsalutatio}, ‘a final greeting or valediction’.\textsuperscript{183} Some letters ended with a \textit{sanctio}, a ‘safeguarding clause’, which essentially stated that the letter should be adhered to in order to avoid certain sanctions (which were laid out in the letter).\textsuperscript{184} While the \textit{sanctio} could contain slight variations depending on the content of the letter, as noted in Chapter One, they followed a standardised form from the thirteenth century onwards. All letters ended with a \textit{datum}, which stated where the letter had been sealed and in what year – regnal or pontifical.

Alongside letter structure, the formulaic language and rhythmical prose deployed in Anglo-papal correspondence were influenced by the rhetorical and administrative practices outlined above. In accordance with thirteenth-century formularies, the papal chancery adopted certain formulaic language in correspondence with secular rulers. For example, Frenz has noted that in the correspondence the pope was always referred to in the plural (\textit{nos}), while Zacour has suggested that the papal chancery would address a recipient, whatever their rank, in the singular (\textit{tuus}), to indicate the papacy’s spiritual authority over all men.\textsuperscript{185} Royal epistolary style dictated that the voice of the king would be placed in the first person plural.\textsuperscript{186} As such, Henry’s political correspondence to the pope referred to both pope and king in the plural (the king was ‘\textit{nos}’ and the pope, ‘\textit{vos}’), and effectively placed these two rulers on equal footing.\textsuperscript{187}

As pointed out above, a certain style of rhythmical prose was also deployed in these letters. The \textit{cursus}, developed by the papal chancery in the twelfth century, was adopted and adapted by a number of European chanceries throughout the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The \textit{cursus} dictated the rhythmical prose at the end of each clause and sentence. This was achieved by grouping together words of the right length, with complimenting accents. These clauses were intended to be read out

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Frenz, \textit{I Documenti Pontifici}, p. 44.
\item Chaplais, \textit{Diplomatic Practice}, p. 112.
\item Smith, \textit{Curia and Crusade}, p. 62.
\item Hennings, \textit{Language of Kingship}, p. 243.
\item For example: \textit{Foedera}, I/1, pp. 355, 359, 376.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
loud to sound lyrical and to produce sounds that were pleasing to the ear. According to Hennings, the *cursus* could adopt several endings:

the *planus* (a paroxytone trisyllable preceded by a paroxytone disyllable), the *tardus* (a proparoxytone tetrasyllable preceded by a paroxytone disyllable), and the *velox* (a paroxytone trisyllable preceded by a proparoxytone tetrasyllable), as well as combined or compound clausulae.

These three examples denoted the five, six or seven syllables which made up the two (or three) words at the end of a clause or sentence. Typically, the *planus* (the shortest of the three) was used before a short pause, the *tardus* (medium length) was used before a colon, and the *velox* (the longest of the three) was used at the end of a sentence. Previously, historians highlighted that England took longer than the rest of Europe to adopt this rhetorical practice. Indeed, Chaplais argued that it was only from the reign of Edward I that the number of English diplomatic letters written with rhymical prose increased dramatically. Similarly, Denholm-Young maintained that, while the *cursus* was increasingly utilised over the course of the thirteenth century, it was not used in the English chancery’s foreign correspondence until the final years of Henry III’s reign, becoming a fully established practice during the reign of Edward I. However, Denholm-Young did identify one clear exception to this rule, a letter from the English barons to Pope Honorius III, sent in either the second half of 1220 or the first half of 1221, which utilised rhythmical clausulae typical of the *cursus*. Denholm-Young has suggested that this was an outlier, a ‘diplomatic freak’, which was most likely written by a clerk of Master Pandulph, the papal legate in England. That being said, he acknowledged that between 1250 and 1450 there were men in England who clearly understood the *cursus*. Equally, Hennings has recently highlighted evidence from the mid-1230s onwards of the *cursus* being employed at the English chancery in correspondence with the papal curia. She used four letters to highlight this fact: one letter addressed to Gregory IX (April 1236), two addressed to

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188 Chaplais, *Diplomatic Practice*, p. 113.
190 Chaplais, *Diplomatic Practice*, p. 113.
Innocent IV (1244 and 1246), and one addressed to Innocent’s cardinals (1246). Each one contained an *arenga* and a ‘significant number of *cursus* clausulae’. Hennings has suggested that this use of the *cursus* may have been a result of the ‘imitation of content and not form’ but recognises that the distinction between imitation and scribal practice can be hard to identify.

Clearly, England was not isolated from developments in European writing and administrative practices, many of which had been influenced by the papal curia. In fact, Barraclough has argued strongly in favour of the specific influence of papal chancery practices over certain areas of English chancery practice during the reign of Henry III. In his view, the English chancery ‘copied and adopted’ the formulae developed by the papal chancery ‘for the disposal of benefices’ but used its own language and practice in secular matters. It was through these provisions for benefices that the forms and style of the papal chancery arrived in England. This has been supported by Sayers who argued that in the twelfth, and more so in the thirteenth century, papal ‘forms and terminology’ were influencing the English chancery, particularly in business which involved frequent interaction with the papal curia. However, she is hesitant to make any broad generalisations about the adoption of papal style in England during the thirteenth century. Nonetheless, there is evidence of the English chancery utilising and adopting certain papal formulae and rhetoric in political correspondence to the curia in the mid-thirteenth century. As such, this section will be split into two main parts. The first will explore the language and rhetoric in the pope’s political letters to the English government, asking why certain language was deployed at this time and in this context. The second will ask how the English chancery was influenced by these papal forms and style, and whether this was reflected in its returning correspondence. Ultimately, this section will examine the extent to which the English and papal chanceries were developing a ‘shared language of diplomacy’ in the mid-thirteenth century, and more specifically how Alexander IV and Henry III (and during the Baronial Revolt, Henry’s council), were using certain language and rhetoric to demonstrate their

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political intentions and stylise their relationship with each other, with special attention being paid to how this pope presented himself and his relationship with the English Crown and how this, in turn, influenced the Anglo-papal correspondence.

**Papal Letters**

To fully understand Alexander IV’s style of rulership and political intentions, as well as his relationship with the English king, one must look at the language and rhetoric utilised in his correspondence with Henry III. While this might not reveal much about the practical relationship between these two rulers, it demonstrates how the pope perceived this relationship and how he wanted his position to be conveyed within the correspondence. As discussed, there has also been a strong suggestion that by the mid-thirteenth century the person of the pope was more involved in the drafting of curial letters, particularly in shaping the *arenga*, which provided the pope with the freedom and space to express his own voice and personality. It is particularly important to examine the *arengae*, for information regarding each pope’s specific approach to political and diplomatic matters.\(^{202}\) When the *arenga* is not present within the correspondence, the *narratio* and *dispositio* clauses can still be used to highlight the pope’s position and approach to these political endeavours. Moreover, when the *arenga* is present, it needs to be examined in conjunction with these *narratio* and *dispositio* clauses, to appreciate how certain rhetorical devices are being used to support and justify papal intervention in English matters.

Only some of Alexander IV’s curial letters to the English contained *arengae*. When included, these clauses are often much shorter and less elaborate than those deployed by Alexander’s predecessors. This is not evidence of a disorganised papal chancery rushing to produce letters. Each *arenga* was intentional and purposeful. These preambles were carefully worded justifications of papal power, a place where the pope could emphasise his pastoral duties and ‘supreme responsibility for the care of the universal Church’ as well as the merits of the letter’s recipient.\(^{203}\) In essence, the *arengae* were used to support the pope’s political and spiritual position within a certain scenario and

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to strengthen his reasons for making a certain decision or request in the *dispositio* clause. Through examining the language and rhetoric utilised by Pope Alexander IV in his letters to the English king and council, it becomes clear that this pope wanted to portray a particular image of himself and his position in relation to England. Indeed, this section will address several recurrent themes in his letters to the English king, exploring the special relationship between the pope and Henry; the rhetoric of papal motherhood; the concept of pope as peacemaker; and finally, the pope’s interpretation of papal and royal power.

The Special Relationship between Pope Alexander IV and King Henry III

While the special relationship between Alexander IV and Henry III has already been touched on in Chapter One of this thesis, this theme will now be explored in more detail through the language of the correspondence.

This special relationship between the English Crown and the papacy was explicitly and repeatedly stated in papal correspondence to the king on matters relating to the Sicilian Business. Moreover, the pope’s increasing need for urgent financial and military assistance encouraged him to emphasise this relationship to prompt the king to commit more money and troops to this affair.

The initial letter of grace confirming the offer of Sicily to Henry on behalf of his son, dated 9 April 1255, set the tone for all the proceeding correspondence regarding Sicily. This letter opens with an *arenga*, noting the careful consideration under which the Apostolic See has taken the decision to offer this gift to the English:

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Assueta sedis apostolicae circumspectio, habens in sua liberalitate providentiae studium, attente propensat quibus dexteram aperiat largitatis, ut ampliori erga illos munificentia exuberet qui potioribus circa eam fulgere meritis dinoscuntur. Unde, quia semper inclitum genus tuum puritate fidei, devotionis sinceritate, sedulique prosecutione seruitii erga Romanam ecclesiam matrem suam excellenter effulsit; idcirco ipsa, quae prompta in gratia, in dono benivola, copiosa in premio et in retributione magnifica invenitur, majoribus genus ipsum cupit ampliare beneficiis et altioribus honoribus sublimare; ut, quanto habundantius de materni dulcedine uberis auxerit, tanto in ipsius matris beneplacitis vehementis delectetur (Isiah 66:11).204
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204 BL, Cotton MS Cleopatra E. I, fols 189–90.
In this *arenga*, the pope articulated the exalted piety of the Plantagenet family who, ‘with purity of faith, sincerity of devotion and pursuit of attentiveness have always shined forth with excellence of servitude towards their mother, the Roman Church’. Through these words the papacy sought to explain why the English royal family was worthy of the gift of Sicily. They had earned it because of their long-standing religious devotion to the *mater ecclesia*. This clause sought to stress the special relationship which already existed between England and the papacy, as discussed in Chapter One. The English had already proved their loyalty and devotion to the Church through previous endeavours, significantly through the submission of their realm to papal authority, and as such, were fully deserving of the gift of Sicily.

In this clause, the Plantagenet family are described as ‘shining forth’ in the service of the Church. This may have been an allusion to Matthew 5:14–16, evoking the idea of Christ as ‘the light of the world’, whose light may continue to shine forth through the servitude of the Plantagenet family.205 This language would have appealed greatly to the English king, who wanted to outshine his French rival, Louis IX, as the most pious Christian king. Indeed, in later correspondence, the pope stressed that the gift of Sicily ‘was envied by all other Christian princes’, explicitly drawing on the competition between Henry and other Christian kings (particularly Louis IX) to be the most devout, beloved and favoured son of the Church.206

As discussed in Chapter One, the pope made strong demands on the English king to meet a range of strict conditions laid out within the *dispositio* of this confirmation of Sicily. The *arenga* and *narratio* therefore needed to encourage, flatter and justify why the pope had made such extensive demands to ensure the king’s acceptance and adherence of these terms and secure the success of this business. Ultimately, for the Sicilian Business to succeed, the pope and his curia had to cultivate and ‘raise up’ the special and unique relationship which existed between the English king and the papacy.

As the pope grew more anxious to receive aid from the English, he stepped up his efforts to persuade the king to quickly attend to this business. This is evident through a number of curial letters dispatched to England between September 1255 and December 1258. As mentioned in

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206 TNA, SC 7/3/31: ‘illum inter Principes caeteros tanti doni tantique honoris largitione magnificans et sublimans’.
Chapter One, the pope sent a letter, dated 18 September 1255, encouraging Henry to quickly fulfil his obligations to the papacy and furthermore, to accept the pope’s envoy, Brother John of Dya, to collect money for the Sicilian endeavour. In this letter, the pope made it clear that he was struggling to win the war against Manfred and made an urgent request for financial and military assistance from the English king. This letter began with a short *arenga* clause:

_De multa cordis benivolentia et animi sinceritate processit quod Romana Ecclesia super Regno suo Siciliae fecit gratiam nato tuo, illum inter Principes caeteros tanti doni tantique honoris largitione magnificans et sublimans, prout in Apostolico, super hoc obtento privilegio, continetur._

In this clause, the pope noted his devotion to the successful outcome of Sicilian Business through which he proceeds with ‘much benevolence of heart and sincerity of soul’ and towards Edmund whom he was praising ‘among all the other princes’ through this gift. This metaphor of the heart was often utilised by the papacy throughout this business to emphasise how important Sicily was to the Church. Indeed, as we shall see, this rhetorical expression was replicated by the English king in his returning correspondence to the papacy.

On 10 June 1256, the pope sent a second letter to the king asking him to accept Brother John of Dya to assist in the collection of money for the Sicilian Business. In this letter, the pope pressed Henry to undertake this expedition, as delays will be fatal to the kingdom and people of Sicily. This was a more urgent appeal to the English king to quickly adhere to the papal requests for money and assistance. Throughout this letter, the pope more strongly repeated the sentiment of the previous letter, dated 18 September 1255. It began with the following *arenga*:

_Quia sedes apostolica inclitum genus tuum quadam semper, inter orbis Reges et Principes, dilexit praerogativa benivolentiae specialis, eiusque continue honorem et comodum indefessa sollicitudine procuravit, quia circa progenitorum tuorum exaltationem, sub diversitate temporum, omnem, quam potuit, adhibuit opem et operam efficacem. Nos, attendentes quod, ex hoc regio genere, tam insigni, susceptit mater ecclesia semper, et susceptit filios benedictionis et gaudii, filios factis et fama pollentes, filios oportuni auxilii et favoris. Quodque in hoc genere suavem delibat dulcorem reverentiae filialis, auritque de ipso continue amonenm innatae sinceritatis odorem._

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207 TNA, SC 7/3/31.
208 TNA, SC 7/2/11.
This *arença* praised the English royal family, whom the papacy had ‘always cherished … among all the kings and princes of the world, with a special kind of benevolence’. The use of the words ‘*semper*’ and ‘*benivolentiae specialis*’ are particularly significant here. Alexander was repeatedly drawing on the long-standing special relationship between England and the papacy to encourage and persuade the king to quickly follow papal instructions with regards to Sicily. Moreover, the pope stressed its ‘unwearied duty of care’ for the English through this business. The inclusion of the adjective ‘*indefessa*’ is also noteworthy. It implied that delays had occurred which should have worn down the papacy, and yet the pope remained determined in his enthusiasm both for the continuation of the business and in his role as protector of the English king. The pope further stated that the Church had always ‘received children of blessing and joy, children outstanding in their deeds and reputation, children of timely help and favour’ from England. He was highlighting the longevity of this good relationship with England and the worthiness of the Plantagenet family, who had always supported the Church. This language was not unique to the relationship between England and the papacy. After the kings of France and Aragon had agreed the Treaty of Corbeil in May 1258, they finalised this treaty through a marriage alliance, petitioning the pope for a dispensation of consanguinity (third degree on one side and fourth degree on the other) for Louis IX’s son, Philip, to marry Isabella, daughter of James I of Aragon. Alexander IV allowed this marriage to take place, justifying it in the *dispositio* by signalling the pious offspring which would result from this union.\(^{209}\) The language in this dispensation was identical to that used to talk about Henry III, proving that certain formulae was reused by the papal chancery to describe good and loyal Christian rulers and their families.

Nonetheless, there is no denying that there was a particular relationship between England and the papacy at this time which specifically revolved around matters in Sicily. By 1257, the king admitted to the papacy that he was struggling to send money and troops to Sicily and asked for concessions to be made in this matter. In December 1257, the pope sent a letter to Henry asking him to accept the papal envoy, Master Arlot, whom he was dispatching to implore the king to quickly send aid towards this endeavour and to make peace with France for the sake of Sicily. This letter

started with an arenga in which the pope stressed his love and affection for the king and his son, encouraging them to continue this endeavour:

Quamvis super Regni Siciliae negotio Romana Ecclesia, spirituali peculiarium filiorum affectione compuncta, sibique ipsi non parcens, satis materne, satis impigre laboravit; utinam tamen in oculis divinae clementiae aut habeatur innoxium, aut veniam mereatur si tenera caritas, qua te, ac Carissimum in Christo filium nostrum E. natum tuum Siciliae Regem, compectimur, et zelus, quo in utriasque augmentum nostra et fratrum nostrorum studia diriguntur, circa ordinationem eiusdem Regni aliqua tarditatis attulere dispensa, et statum illius populi multiplici vexatone divulsum, contra intentionis nostrae propositum, in aliquod deterioris conditionis traxere discrimen. Porro, quia longioribus spei taediis caritatis fortitudo non vincitur, nec, quamdiu spes ipsa probabilibus refovetur indiciis, desiderii nostri circa te propositum superatur, ecce! 210

The pope had been ‘prompted by spiritual affection of particular sons’ to work diligently in this business. It was first and foremost because of his love for the king and his son, Edmund, that he worked so fully towards the success of this business. He went on to use two nominative nouns ‘caritas’ and ‘zelus’ to describe the ‘spiritual love’ through which the papacy ‘embraced’ Henry and Edmund, and the ‘zeal’ through which the pope and his cardinals pursued their mutual aims in Sicily. The pope is repeating ideas expressed in previous letters, regarding the ‘zeal’ (studium) through which he was pursuing the business in Sicily and the ‘deep love’ (interna dilectio) which he held for the king in this mutual endeavour. 211 However, in this particular example ‘caritas’ was deployed instead of ‘dilectio’. In this context, ‘caritas’ was a spiritual love, greater than any other love. To exhibit caritas was to demonstrate a religious love for God, or for one’s neighbour who loves God, whereas to have dilectio for someone was to hold them in great regard, namely, to have respect for them. Papal caritas was also a way to highlight the social hierarchy and spiritual relationship between the Church and the English Crown. 212 This emphasis on love for the English king and his son and zeal for the business is then contrasted against the language of failure and crisis which the people of Sicily were facing due to the slow progress of the business. The pope places his love for the king and

210 TNA, SC 7/3/52.
211 See TNA, SC 7/1/15, SC 7/1/18, SC 7/3/31, SC 7/2/11.
212 According to Hermann Hold, caritas was often expressed by the Avignon popes in their arengae, Hold, ‘Autoritative Rhetorik’, pp. 175–97; see also idem, Unglaublich glaubhaft: Die Arengen–Rhetorik des 12 Avignonenser Papatiums, 2 vols (Frankfurt am Main, 2004).
his zeal towards the success of their mutual endeavour above all else – even though its slowness has
drawn out the suffering of the Sicilian people – ‘because the strength of love’ for the king ‘[was] not
defeated by such long tedium of expectation’. Yet, he was also using the plight of the Sicilian people
to urge the king to act more quickly. Clearly, this letter communicated an increasingly imperative
request to the English king to carry out his obligation to the pope as part of the Sicilian agreement,
to accept Master Arlot to reform the Sicilian Business and to push the king to firm peace with the
French king, Louis IX. The pope appealed to the king to come to the aid of the Church and to restore
the kingdom of Sicily to ‘some happy resolution’.

On 18 December 1258, the pope had signalled to Henry his intention to effectively cancel
the Sicilian agreement. However, this letter continued to emphasise the special relationship between
the English Crown and the papacy. In the narratio and dispostitio clauses, the pope reflected on the
Church’s special relationship with the English, going so far as to use the same language expressed in
SC 7/2/11 to describe the deeds and reputation of the kings of England who had so devoutly served
the mother Church.213 Moreover, he highlighted the ‘amor praecipuus’ which he held for Henry,
distinguishing him as the most favoured son of the Church and using this language of love, utilised
in previous Anglo-papal correspondence, to express the ‘particular friendship’ between them.214 As
mentioned in Chapter One, England was described in this letter as being under the protection of the
Church; the devoted child of the Church.215 The fact that this language was utilised in correspondence
with the English king at such a late stage in the Sicilian Business is significant. It suggests that this
special relationship between Henry and Alexander did not deteriorate over time. This may have been
an attempt to assure the English king that he had not lost the favour of the papacy and to give hope
for the continuation of Sicilian Business. Indeed, in the following years the king continued to suggest
that he could continue the business once he had gained control of his government.216 As such, it was
in the pope’s interest to continue emphasising this special relationship.

213 BL, Cotton MS Cleopatra E. I, fols 203–4: ‘de hoc regno suscepit semper et suscipit mater ecclesia
filios benedictionis et gaudii, filios factis et fama pollentes, filios etiamopportuni auxili et favoris’.
214 Ibid.
215 Ibid: ‘ager devotionis, fertilis etamenus, circa cuius munimen et cultum prædicta ecclesia cogitare
attentius’.
216 On 21 March 1261, Edmund begged the pope to continue showing favour towards him as the King of
Sicily, stating that he would remain obedient to the pope, Foedera, I/1, p. 405.
Throughout the Sicilian Business, the pope had repeatedly singled out Henry and his son for their worthiness to undertake this affair in comparison to other Christian rulers. For example, when asking Henry to accept the archbishop of Messina for the reformation of the Sicilian Business in November 1256, the pope placed the English king and prince above the other secular rulers of the world, through their special relationship with the Mother Church. Arguably, this language was reserved for members of the Plantagenet family. Indeed, in a letter addressed to Richard of Cornwall, concerning papal support for his election as king of the Romans, Alexander IV described Richard as ‘inter alios Catholicos Reges et Principes orbis terrae refulsit’. Similarly, this could simply be language intended for favoured sons of the Church, whoever they may be.

Expression of this special papal favour towards the English king was not solely reserved for correspondence which directly referenced the Sicilian Business. On 2 September 1256, the pope reassured the king that the payment of ecclesiastical tenth would not prejudice his right to service dues from the manors of English prelates. In this letter, the pope praised the English king for his ‘purity of faith, fervour of devotion and strength of perseverance … among the other princes of the world’. Similarly, when the pope absolved the king and his subjects from observing baronial rule in April-May 1261, he reminded his recipients that Henry was ‘recommended among the rest of the Christian princes’ for the ‘sincerity of his Christian faith’ and the ‘devotion of his Catholic integrity’. Moreover, in 1244 when extorting the English prelates to commit money to the papacy, Innocent IV praised their king ‘amongst all the other princes of the earth’. Arguably, this language was intended to evoke Henry’s status as a papal vassal and ‘special son’ of the Church. Essentially, the pope was drawing on his particular relationship with the English king, emphasising the worthiness and piety of this king, to justify any decision that he was confirming in the correspondence. However, the Sicilian Business was always in the back of his mind. He had worked so closely with this king throughout his pontificate and he had to explain why he favoured this particular king. Moreover, each decision made in the king’s favour helped to ensure the continuation

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217 TNA, SC 7/3/12: ‘prae caeteris mundi regibus’. See also n. 207 which singled Edmund out above all other princes of the world.
218 Foedera, I/1, p. 382.
219 TNA, SC 7/2/7: ‘fidei puritas, devotionis fervor, et constantiae firmitas … caeteris inter principes orbis’.
221 CM, iv. p. 364: ‘inter reges caeteros orbis terrae’.

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of the business in Sicily. Especially the decision to absolve the English people from baronial rule. If he could help the king to recover control of his government and of his people in 1261, the pope could potentially regain an ally in the Sicilian Business.

While this section has discussed the special relationship between Alexander IV and Henry III, it is important to acknowledge that Alexander was a good friend to other Christian kings, particularly the French king. In fact, Alexander had formerly tried to convert Louis IX to the idea of conquering the kingdom of Sicily, ‘readily agreeing to the French king’s requests, and doing him many favours.’ However, the French king showed little interest and so Alexander turned back to the English king for support. Both Louis and Alexander were strong advocates of the mendicant orders, and in 1256 they worked together to have William of St Amour’s polemic against the mendicant masters at Paris condemned and destroyed and to have him expelled from France. Moreover, the pope also supported Louis in his inquisition against heresy in 1255–1256 in France, in which the mendicants played a prominent role. Louis had wanted to make a firm peace with England; the pope did not need to coerce him into seeking peace. However, Alexander IV spent the majority of his pontificate engaged in the Sicilian Business with the English and stressed his special relationship with the English king because of this mutual endeavour. If Louis or his brother, Charles, had accepted the task of conquering Sicily, the pope would have shown more favour to the French and this would have been reflected in the Franco-papal correspondence.

The Pope as Mother

As mentioned in Chapter One, Pope Alexander IV often utilised the language of motherhood in his correspondence with Henry III, frequently referring to the Church as the *mater ecclesia*. He was not the first pope to make use of the concept of Church as mother. In fact, the first allusion to *mater ecclesia* dates to the second century, inspired by St Paul’s presentation of Jerusalem as mother.

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223 See Chapter Four, n. 38.
225 For example, Pope Innocent IV referred to his role as *mater eccesia* in a letter to the prelates of the English Church in 1244, Potthast, ii. no. 11443.
of the Christian people (Gal. 4:26). Patristic writers often used *mater ecclesia* to describe the collective identity of the Church, summarised by St Cyprian (200AD–258AD) in his treatise *On the Unity of the Church*: ‘she is the mother, plentiful in the results of fruitfulness: from her womb we are born, by her milk we are nourished, by her spirit we are animated.’ The early fathers recognised the Church’s maternity as a natural extension of God’s paternity. These patristic writers further developed this idea of Church as mother to incorporate the concept of ‘Christ as mother’ in their writings. The Greek fathers in particular (i.e. Clement, Origen, Irenaeus and John Chrysostom) made many references to Christ’s maternal love in their works, more so than the Latin fathers, Ambrose and Augustine. In the eleventh century, Anselm of Canterbury went on to describe Jesus as both the mother and the father – ‘the mother who loves’ and the father who ‘rules and produces’. He described Christ the mother as ‘the consoling, nurturing Jesus as a hen gathering her chicks under her wing (Matthew 23:37) and suggested that ‘mother Jesus revives the soul at her breast.’ This imagery of motherhood and fatherhood was adopted by the medieval papacy.

The idea of the nursing and nourishing ‘mother Jesus’ was also adopted and developed by new religious orders between the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The Cistercians were the first to build on this concept of spiritual motherhood, following a theological shift towards the devotion of ‘the humanity of Christ’, through which ‘love rather than knowledge’ was now the key to one’s union with God. The Cistercians particularly focused on the femininity of Christ’s humanity. The famous Cistercian, Bernard of Clairvaux (1090–1153) also used this language of motherhood. According to Walker Bynum, Bernard’s ‘use of maternal imagery for male figures is more extensive and complex than that of any twelfth-century figure’. He adopted this language to describe ‘Jesus, Moses, Peter, Paul, prelates in general, abbots in general’, as well as himself. In particular, he emphasised the

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maternal image of ‘nurturing’ and particularly the image of suckling at the breast in letters to members of his community.\(^{233}\) Bernard adopted this image of Christ as mother and extended it to himself, the abbot, as the mother of his community, using the language of motherhood to reinforce this idea. For example, in a letter to abbot Baldwin of Rieti he wrote: ‘as a mother loves her only son, so I loved you, when you clung to my side pleasing my heart’.\(^{234}\)

This concept of Christ as mother was later adopted and adapted by the Franciscan order, with St Francis himself utilising maternal language and imagery in his letters. For example, in a letter to brother Leo, dated 1224–1226, Francis was helping Leo not to be troubled by questions regarding Francis’ way of life. As dictated by the Gospels, he stated, ‘I am speaking, my son, in this way – as a mother would’.\(^{235}\) In Francis’ letter to Leo, Francis was not telling Leo what to do, he was advising him as a mother would to a son. Francis was expressing his authority over his community through the language of familial love and protection. In his *Earlier Rule (1221)*, Francis further emphasised this language of motherhood in relation to his community: ‘Let each one love and care for his brother as a mother loves and cares for her son in those matters in which God has given him the grace’.\(^{236}\) In his *Later Rule (1223)*, Francis continued to employ this maternal imagery: ‘if a mother loves and cares for her son according to the flesh, how much more diligently must someone love and care for his brother according to the Spirit!’\(^{237}\) For Francis, the love and care which one brother showed for another was the very expression of spiritual motherhood – of being joined to Christ by the Spirit. For the Cistercians, Jesus was Mother, the exemplar, but for the Franciscans, one was joined to Christ in familial relationship by the Spirit.\(^{238}\) According to Delio, ‘it is in the context of family that the motherhood of Jesus assumes its meaning for Francis’.\(^{239}\) Furthermore, in his *Later Admonition and Exhortation (1220)*, Francis went on to assert that ‘We are mothers when we carry him [Christ] in our heart and body through love and a pure and sincere conscience; we give birth to him through [his] holy manner of working which should shine before others as an example’.\(^{240}\) Francis was using


\(^{240}\) ‘Later Admonition and Exhortation’, *Francis of Assisi: Early Documents*, i. p. 49.
maternal imagery to explain his relationship with his community, as well as their relationship with each other and with God.

Clare of Assisi (d.1253), the first female Franciscan, also expressed the language of motherhood to explain her own relationship with Christ. To Clare, the idea of ‘giving birth to Christ’ was fundamental to her comprehension of what it meant to be part of the Church.\(^{241}\) She was the mother, sister, daughter and bride of Christ.\(^{242}\) Moreover, she could use this imagery to compare herself to Mary the mother of Christ.

Clearly, the Franciscans had developed their own understanding of spiritual motherhood through the concept of Christ as Mother. Yet, to what extent did this influence papal rhetoric in letters to secular rulers? As shown in Chapter Four, the friars, and especially the Franciscans, were being utilised by Gregory IX, Innocent IV and Alexander IV as agents and representatives of the papal curia on diplomatic missions abroad. Alexander IV, in particular, was the cardinal protector of the Franciscan order from 1227 until his death in 1261 and a strong supporter of the order throughout his pontificate. Moreover, he held a particularly special relationship with Clare of Assisi.\(^{243}\) In fact, it is possible that his relationship with Clare and his familiarity with her own spiritual ideology encouraged him to utilise the language of motherhood in his political and spiritual correspondence.

When Alexander IV appealed to Henry III to attend to the crusade in Sicily, he deployed this language of motherhood. When confirming the gift of Sicily to Henry’s son, Alexander stressed the position of the Church as the mother and the English royal family as the children of Christendom in the *arenge* clause. For the Plantagenet family ‘might be raised up abundantly from so much sweetness of the maternal breast and may take so much pleasure in the approval of their vehement mother’.\(^{244}\) Alexander was evoking the passage from Isaiah 66:11 which refers to Mother Jerusalem, nursing her children from the milk of her ‘consoling breast’ (*ubere consolationis*), letting them ‘drink

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\(^{243}\) For Alexander IV’s relationship with the Franciscans see pp. 165–9. For his relationship with Clare of Assisi see p. 166.  
\(^{244}\) BL, Cotton MS Cleopatra E. I, fols 189–90: ‘idcirco ipsa, quae prompta in gratia, in dono benivola, copiosa in premio et in retributione magnifica invenitur, majoribus genus ipsum cupit ampliare beneficiis et altioribus honoribus sublimare; ut, quanto habundantius de materni dulcedine uberis auxerit, tanto in ipsius matris beneplacitis vehementis delectetur’.
deeply with delight from her glorious abundance.\textsuperscript{245} Alexander IV was adopting this metaphor to refer to the pope as the mother who nurses the English royal family. Through this language of motherhood, the pope could cultivate his image as a protector of Christian kings and princes. Just as a mother has an instinctive and overwhelming urge to protect her child, the pope stressed the same desire to protect and support his spiritual son. In this example, the sweet milk is the gift of Sicily, which the papacy has offered to the king’s son. Later, when the pope encourages the king to send money and troops to Sicily in September 1255, he emphasised how mater ecclesia had ‘laid open every favour in the apostolic bosom’ to Henry through this endeavour, again evoking this maternal language.\textsuperscript{246} On 10 June 1256, the pope again implored the king to send money for Sicily and spoke of the Church tasting ‘the pleasant sweetness of filial respect’ from the English royal family – drawing on their familial relationship.\textsuperscript{247} This was not the first time this metaphor had been drawn on in Anglo-papal correspondence. When, in 1244, Innocent IV wrote to the English prelates requesting funds from them, he described himself as their ‘spiritual mother’ who was being ‘severely oppressed’ and was in need of financial contribution from her devoted sons.\textsuperscript{248} In the following year, Innocent described the ‘special paternal regard’ (specialis paternum gerentes) which the Apostolic See held for the English king, when responding to a royal request to be excused for the Council of Lyon.\textsuperscript{249} In the same year, the English barons wrote to the pope, drawing strongly on maternal language in their appeal against the actions of the pope’s envoy, Martin, who had been abusing his position in England.\textsuperscript{250} Furthermore, in 1246, Henry asked Innocent IV to stop making severe financial demands on his people, particularly the English prelates, appealing to the pope ‘as a son to his mother, whom she has suckled at her own breasts’.\textsuperscript{251} This evidence reveals that Alexander was


\textsuperscript{246} TNA, SC 7/3/31: ‘Nos autem, postquam ad culmen fuimus summi apostolatus assumpti, mox ad amplexus tuos brachia internae dilectionis extendimus, mox tibi nostri pectoris, ad exauditionis beneficium reseravimus januam; moxque ad omnem gratiam apostolicum expandimus tibi sinum.’

\textsuperscript{247} TNA, SC 7/2/11: ‘Quodque in hoc genere suavem delibat dulcorem reuerentiae filialis, auritque de ipso continue amonenum innate sinceritatis odorem.’

\textsuperscript{248} CM, iv. p. 369.

\textsuperscript{249} Ibid., p. 413.

\textsuperscript{250} Ibid., p. 441: ‘ut dolor aggravans filiali materno solatio mitigetur. Quod quidem solatium mater filio eo tenetur mitius et facilius imperti, quo ipsum maternae dulcedinis alimento gratum repetit et devotum.’

\textsuperscript{251} Ibid., p. 534: ‘Novit ille qui nihil ignorat, quod matrem nostram Romanam ecclesiam semper habemus in visceribus dilectionis sincere, sicut eam quam diligere valemus, et ad quam imminentibus necessitates articulis, ut filius ad matrem, quem suis lactavit uberibus [et] fovere tenetur sub sua protectione specialiter militantem, confugimus confidente’.

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building on an existing rhetorical tradition, namely the expression of spiritual motherhood, which had been formerly displayed within Anglo-papal diplomatic discourse. This rhetoric seemed to be particularly exploited on occasions when the papacy was in need of essential financial or military aid, or when the English were appealing against a former papal request. It was used to make an empathic appeal. Indeed, in December 1257, Alexander reiterated the maternal intent of the Roman Church who has worked ‘very motherly and actively’ on this business in Sicily in his urgent appeal to the king to send money and troops to Sicily.\footnote{TNA, SC 7/3/52: ‘satis materne, satis impigre laboravit’.

\footnote{Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 169 v cited and translated in Smith, Curia and Crusade, p. 232.}

\footnote{Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 141v cited and translated in Smith, Curia and Crusade, p. 233.}

The papacy, through the Church, was the mother working to protect and defend the children of Sicily from Manfred and his ‘Saracen’ allies owing to her actions. Through this rhetoric the pope could justify his involvement in the Sicilian matter calling on the right of the Church to protect the children of Christendom. The mother was defending her children and hence was fully justified in her decision to attack. Clearly, this language of motherhood could be carefully exploited to assert and justify papal action and intervention.

In the thirteenth century, the papacy sometimes employed maternal and familial language as part of its crusading propaganda, to persuade secular rulers (the sons of the Church) to assist the pope in freeing the Holy Land from the infidels. For example, on 20 May 1220, Pope Honorius III used maternal language to flatter the young Frederick II and encourage him to go on Crusade: ‘the Mother Church has so excellent and so great a son’ in Frederick.\footnote{Reg. Vat. 10, fol. 169 v cited and translated in Smith, Curia and Crusade, p. 232.}

In another letter to Frederick, dated 13 June 1221, Honorius employs familial language to chastise the young emperor for his delays in attending to the Crusade: ‘because a father who loves his son, rebukes him, and the Lord loves, blames and chastises those he loves’.\footnote{Reg. Vat. 11, fol. 141v cited and translated in Smith, Curia and Crusade, p. 233.}

Honorius referred to both the paternal nature of God and maternal nature of the Church in his diplomatic correspondence with Frederick. Clearly, there are some parallels in the way Honorius appealed to Frederick to go on crusade and the way Alexander appealed to Henry to go to Sicily.

While this language of motherhood was utilised as part of Alexander’s crusading rhetoric in Sicily, it was also deployed throughout a range of other diplomatic exchanges with the English as a means to convey and justify the power of the papacy. For example, in a letter to his nuncio in
England, Brother Velascus, O.F.M, whom he had commissioned to reinstate Aymer of Lusignan to his position as bishop-elect of Winchester, Alexander notes how the Church is honouring its maternal duty of care (*materna sollicitudo*) to its sons by bringing peace to Christendom.\textsuperscript{255} Furthermore, the pope portrayed himself as ‘*mater justitiae*’ in this letter, as a way to illustrate his power as ‘supreme judge’ in the dispute over the election of Aymer de Lusignan.\textsuperscript{256} Similarly, in a letter dated 21 April 1259, Alexander IV praised Richard of Cornwall as one who was being ‘embraced’ in the Church’s ‘unremitting arms of maternal love’.\textsuperscript{257} This pope utilised the language of motherhood to present his relationship with secular rulers as one built on familial love, and to defend his right to ask for their aid or intervene in their disputes.

For Alexander the concept of ‘pope as mother’ was a useful rhetorical device as part of his crusading propaganda, but also as a way to portray his relationship with secular rulers, to express papal power and to justify papal actions. It is probable that he was influenced by the Franciscan theological tradition to make broader use of this rhetoric in his diplomatic correspondence. Indeed, as shown in Chapter Four, more Franciscans served as diplomatic agents in exchanges with the English during Alexander’s pontificate and this maternal language was utilised in papal exchanges conducted by friar envoys. Through the context of pope as mother, Alexander was able to make a more humble and subtle expression of papal supremacy and jurisdiction in communication with the English king. The pope sought to emphasise that the English king was joined to Christ in familial relationship through the Church with the pope at its head.

**Pope as Peacemaker**

Another theme identified in Alexander’s curial letters to the English is the notion of ‘pope as peacemaker’. As discussed in Chapter One, the pope’s role was not only as the supreme judge and arbiter of Christendom, but also the keeper of peace and order. Indeed, Alexander shared with his predecessors this desire for peace in Christendom, alongside the ambition to wage crusade against

\textsuperscript{255} *BF*, ii. no. 464.
\textsuperscript{256} *Ibid.* Although this letter was not addressed directly to the king, it would have been communicated to Henry by Velascus.
\textsuperscript{257} *Foedera*, I/1, p. 382: ‘assiduis te brachiis materni amoris amplectens’. 
the enemies of Christ and to free the Church from the heretics and the infidels.\textsuperscript{258} This can be seen particularly through one papal letter to Henry III in September 1257, asking him to accept the papal envoy, Mansuetus, O.F.M, whom he was sending to France to assist in the treating of this peace. It began with an \textit{arenga} which was used not only to persuade the king to accept and support Mansuetus as the pope’s representative, but to justify the pope’s right to intervene as a mediator in this case. During this period, it was typical for the pope to issue a new \textit{arenga} for each letter commissioning a papal envoy to carry out important duties on behalf of the papacy.\textsuperscript{259} Smith has argued that this was certainly the case during the pontificates of Pope Innocent III and Pope Honorius III, who issued new and original crusading \textit{arengae} in letters for important papal envoys.\textsuperscript{260} Certainly, Alexander was no different. This \textit{arenga} reads:

\begin{quote}
\textit{Inter cetera bona quae hominem amabilem proximis et placidum deo reddunt illud specialiter acceptum fore credimus quod caritatem cordibus inserit et animarum vinculum operatur. Hoc inquam bonum pax est quae procul depellit hodium rancorem abicit fugat invidiam excutit livorem pacat mentes corda conciliat serenat pectora et sociat voluntates hanc siquidem querimus hanc inter ecclesiae filios serere propagare ac nutrire studemus. Hanc firmis in christianis regibus principibus et magnatibus solidari radicibus ac adul tus extendi et consurgere ramis et effectibus clarere perspicuis maxime affectamus ut dilectionis et pacis counti nexibus in se ipsis suavem et salubrem illius fructum in propriis degustent commodis et ad alios ipsius dulcedinem effundant laudabiliter per exemplum (Judges 9:11).}\textsuperscript{261}
\end{quote}

In this passage, Alexander implores Henry III to make peace with Louis IX, suggesting that kings, united through love and peace, are able to ‘taste in their own rewards the sweet and health-giving fruit’, and by their example, encourage others to make peace. This passage evoked Joatham’s parable of the trees in Judges 9:11. The trees considered themselves equal under God and did not try to rule over one another.\textsuperscript{262} Through this passage, the pope was rebuking a king who tried to rule over other kings, as this role was reserved for God. By joining in peace, the kings of England and France could

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\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{258} For Pope Innocent IV and Gregory IX and their conflict with Frederick II see Brett Edward Whalen, \textit{The Two Powers: The Papacy, The Empire and the Struggle for Sovereignty in the Thirteenth Century} (Philadelphia, 2019). For Pope Honorius III and his crusading endeavours see Smith, \textit{Curia and Crusade}.
\item \textsuperscript{259} Smith, \textit{Curia and Crusade}, p. 248.
\item \textsuperscript{260} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 260.
\item \textsuperscript{261} TNA, SC 7/3/48.
\end{itemize}
become equals, better able to serve the Lord. Alexander IV encouraged the kings to allow peace to take root in their kingdoms and ‘shine with illustrious effect’ through their example, again evoking this imagery of Christ, the light, shining through them, which has been discussed above. Likewise, Saint Francis had stressed the importance of teaching by example and he himself had imitated the example of Christ in his life. The pope was drawing on Franciscan teachings in his efforts to encourage peace between England and France. Moreover, the pope had appointed the Franciscan, Mansuetus, to carry out this peace mission on his behalf, and thus the use of Franciscan thought seems entirely fitting. This arenga provided Alexander with the opportunity to emphasise his role as the peacemaker of Christendom, who sought ‘to sow this peace… to propagate it, and also to nurture it amongst the sons of the Church.’ The pope’s choice of the verb ‘nutrire’ is also significant. Through this verb, the pope could highlight his maternal role to ‘nurture’ peace amongst the sons of the Church. This language conjures up the image of pope as mother, while also stressing the pope’s role as a caretaker of peace. In essence, the pope could use this arenga to justify why he had invested Brother Mansuetus with papal powers to carry out this mission on his behalf.

While it was not new for a pope to present himself as a peacemaker, Alexander’s presentation of himself as a peacemaker was surely influenced by his relationship with the Franciscans, and preserved in memory by a Franciscan chronicler, Salimbene de Adam (c.1221–1290). In his Chronica, Salimbene described Alexander IV as a ‘good, merciful and pious’ man who ‘did not concern himself with wars, but lived all his days peacefully’, emphasising his adherence of Franciscan ideals. This depiction had a vast impact and has largely shaped modern interpretations of Alexander IV as a weak pope. Significantly, Salimbene received this information regarding Alexander’s character directly from his friend, Brother Mansuetus, the same envoy Alexander had sent to assist in peace talks between England and France. Thus, Salimbene’s presentation of Alexander’s character was shaped

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263 In December 1258, the pope emphasised that this peace between kings had taken root in their bosoms, BL, Cotton MS Cleopatra E. I, fols 203–4.
264 ‘The Life of Saint Francis by Thomas of Celano (1228–1229)’, Francis of Assisi: Early Documents, pp. 184, 228, 266.
265 Smith, Crusade and Curia, p. 251.
266 Salimbene, ii. p. 658: ‘non intromisit se iste papa de guerris, sed pacifice duxit dies suos’.
267 Alexander IV ‘was honestly anxious for peace, the suppression of heresy and the reform of abuses in the Church’, Previte-Orton, ‘Italy 1250–1290’, vi. p. 176. ‘He was known for his gentleness and his piety’, Labarge, Saint Louis, p. 221.
268 Salimbene, ii. p. 658.
by the pope’s Franciscan envoy, and thus reflected the image the pope wanted to project – as a pious and peaceful pontiff. In reality, this pope did engage in wars; in fact, he mediated the Anglo-French peace to aid war in Sicily.

Clearly, a growing number of Franciscans, such as Mansuetus, were taking on a range of spiritual, administrative and diplomatic duties at the papal curia. The pope was undoubtedly influenced, whether consciously or not, by Franciscan ideals. This ideology was largely shaped by the twenty-eight teachings of Francis, number fifteen of which concerned peace. In this passage, Francis quoted Matthew 5:9: ‘blessed are the peacemakers, for they will be called the children of God’. To Francis, ‘those people are truly peacemakers who, regardless of what they suffer in this world, preserve peace of spirit and body out of love of our Lord Jesus Christ.’

For the Franciscans, the devotion for peace was an important feature of their early development. As mentioned, Francis himself had acted as a peacemaker in his own lifetime. Moreover, Agnellus of Pisa, the first minister general of the English Franciscans played an important role as a peacemaker in England in 1233. Arguably, Alexander made use of this Franciscan pursuit of peace, going so far as to send a Franciscan as his chosen peacemaker to help conclude peace between England and France.

**Papal and Royal Power**

While papal letters can be used to understand the political and spiritual motivations of each pope, they can also give insight into the pope’s presentation of the power dynamic between himself and secular powers. As noted in Chapter One, the thirteenth-century papacy worked hard to promote the concept of papal supremacy through its ‘pleniude of power’ and position as the ‘Vicar of Christ’. Yet, Alexander IV took a more subtle approach in his demonstration of papal power when communicating with Henry III. This was not the case in letters commanding the king’s subjects. In April and May 1261, Alexander authorised three letters to the English (one to the king and two to his representatives) cancelling the baronial provisions. All three letters make clear the relationship between papal and royal power and the relationship between the king and his subjects. The letter dated 7 May 1261, addressed to the archbishop of Canterbury, the bishop of Norwigh and Master John Mansel, and instructing them to persuade

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270 See Chapter Four, n. 75.
271 See p. 165.
the barons to adhere to their king faithfully, employs an *arenga*. This *arenga* is used to demonstrate the relationship between papal and royal power:

*Rationalibus sensibus materiam iuste admirationis importat securim aduersus illum, qui cedit in ea, uel serram contra illum, qui trahit ipsam* (Isiah 10:15); *eos, videlicet, quos potioribus legitimus subministrationum ordo subiecit, aduersus auctoritatem presidentium eleuari, et principes, legum dominos, quos pre suis participibus celestis ordinatio sublimauit, premi arbitrio subditorum.*

The *arenga* opens with a direct reference to Isaiah 10:15, in which the Assyrian leader is being chastised by God for his arrogance. He is reminded that he is an instrument of God. He is the ‘axe’ (*securim*) and the ‘saw’ (*serram*); God is the wielder. Alexander IV was drawing on this idea of a secular ruler wrongfully acting against the will of God, and comparing it to a subject wrongly acting against the will of the secular ruler. He was using this allusion to punish the English barons who had rebelled against their king. By going against the will of the king, who was also an instrument of God, they were essentially disobeying the will of God. The pope is using this biblical rhetoric to justify his right to free the king and his realm from baronial subjugation. Furthermore, the pope was reiterating and confirming the supremacy of both royal and papal power and authority. Indeed, in the subsequent *dispositio*, he drew on the plenitude of papal power and plenitude of royal power, which has already been touched on in Chapter One. Within this clause, the pope justifies his reason for strengthening the power of the king as it is ‘for the salvation of others’. This language of salvation was the same defence he used in the letter to Brother Velascus to endorse his intervention in the matter of Aymer’s deposition as bishop-elect of Winchester. It was through the salvation of mankind that the pope could legitimise his right to intervene in English matters. It is worth noting that the pope’s efforts to bolster both royal and papal power in this letter were also encouraged by the political turmoil he was facing in the Italian peninsula, particularly from Manfred and his imperial supporters.

The language and rhetoric of these papal letters reveals much about Alexander IV’s ideology, spiritual influences and political relationship with the English king and kingdom. The pope

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272 TNA, SC 7/3/25.  
273 *BF*, ii. no. 464.
emphasised his special relationship with the English king and his son, Edmund because of their joint involvement in Sicily. The pope often drew on the piety of the English king and his family and their long-standing devotion to the Church, to justify this mutual endeavour against Manfred. Moreover, Alexander IV was building on key Franciscan ideals in his expression of rulership. As discussed above, he shared a close relationship with the Franciscan order throughout his career to the extent that he utilised them as some of his most trusted envoys. It is even possible that the Franciscans at his court were helping to draft these letters, carefully cultivating the pope’s image as a spiritual mother, devoted peacemaker and special friend of the English king. Alexander IV often evoked the language of motherly love and spiritual protection in his correspondence with lay rulers. Ultimately, the language used in curial letters was largely influenced by each pope’s background, education, and personal aims, as well as the people around him and the contemporary political and economic climate.

**English Letters**

As noted in Chapters Two, Three and Four, there were many envoys and agents delivering messages and negotiating business between England and the papacy throughout this period. As such, England was not shielded from the growing European political and rhetorical developments in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Therefore, this section will explore the language within the English correspondence to the papacy using it to highlight both the political relationship between Henry III and Alexander IV, as well as the impact of papal writing practices on the Anglo-papal correspondence in the mid-thirteenth century.

As discussed in the previous section, certain language and rhetoric was being used by the papacy in its political correspondence with the English king and council. As noted by Barraclough, there is clear evidence that the English chancery was copying and adopting some of this papal rhetoric and formulae as part of English letter-writing practices. Moreover, as Hennings notes, there is some evidence of the papal *cursus* being utilised in English correspondence from mid-1230s. Yet, to what extent was the English chancery mimicking the language and rhetoric of the pope throughout exchanges between Henry III and Pope Alexander IV?
As noted earlier in this thesis, several historians have drawn on the close relationship between Henry III and the papacy throughout his reign. Arguably, this influenced the use of language and formulae utilised in Anglo-papal correspondence under Henry III. One formula ‘Ecclesiam Romanam matrem nostram/suam’ is particularly worthy of note. This phrase was often deployed to describe the papacy in letters to and from the papacy throughout the twelfth and thirteenth century, particularly in correspondence with the English king and realm. For example, one letter from Henry III to Pope Innocent IV, issued in 1246, contains the clause: ‘quod matrem nostram Romanam ecclesiam semper habemus in visceribus dilectionis sincerae’. A similar clause is utilised in a letter from Henry III to Alexander IV, dated 28 June 1257: ‘affectionis et devotionis sinceritas, quam ad Ecclesiam Romanam matrem nostram semper habuimus’. Both of these letters describe the Church as the ‘Ecclesiam Romanam matrem nostram’. Yet, what is more striking about these two examples is the almost identical use of language and formulae to convey the king’s lasting sincerity of his devotion to his mother, the Roman Church. Clearly, certain papal language was being replicated in Anglo-papal correspondence over successive years. It is possible that this language was being internalised by English chancery officials and thus re-used in sequential communications. Either way, this provides clear evidence of papal formula being used in Anglo-papal correspondence by the mid-thirteenth century.

When exchanging correspondence regarding the Sicilian Business in the mid-1250s, Henry mirrored the language of the heart (cordis), which the pope had used to communicate his feelings regarding Sicily. For example, in May 1255, the pope wrote to the king asking him to commute his vow to Sicily. In this letter, Alexander stated that Sicily ‘may reside in such a special and principal place in our heart’ (tamquam speciale ac praecipuum residet cordi nostro). In a letter to the pope

274 See pp. 14–15, 17, 32.
275 For example: in a letter from Pope Alexander III to the bishop of London in 1168, *CM*, ii. p. 242; from Emperor Frederick II to the English king against the pope in 1228, *CM*, iii. p. 152; from Pope Gregory IX to his legate, Otho against the Emperor Frederick II, dated 1239, p. 572. In letters from the papacy to secular rulers, the pope is their mother: ‘Romanam Ecclesiam matrem suam’. While in letters from secular rulers the pope is ‘our mother’: ‘Romanam Ecclesiam matrem nostram’. For more examples of this phrase in correspondence between England and the papacy see: *Councils and Synods*, i. pp. 17, 392; *CM*, iv. pp. 364, 441.
277 *Foedera*, I/1, pp. 359–60.
278 TNA, SC 7/1/15.
dated 10 May 1257, Henry confirmed his intentions to make peace with the King of France for the sake of the Sicilian Business. In this short missive he noted how the business of Sicily ‘may reside so close to our heart’ (*plurimum resedit cordi nostro*). Moreover, in December 1257, the pope repeated this language in a letter to the English prelates, encouraging them to accept his envoy, Master Arlot and adhere to papal orders: ‘*pro negotio Regni Siciliae quod specialiter resedit cordi nostro*’. The replication of this language in the Anglo-papal correspondence relating to the Sicilian Business not only helped the pope to emphasise the importance of this matter to the English people, but allowed the English chancery to convey Henry’s sincere intentions, devotion and commitment to this mutual endeavour. In the medieval Christian West, body metaphors discussing the head and the heart were particularly prevalent. According to Le Goff ‘the impact of these metaphors stems from the fact that the Church as a community of the faithful, is considered to be a *body* of which Christ is the head.’ Metaphors of the heart were particularly strong in Christian thought frequently drawn on in the Bible. Xavier-Léon Dufour noted that, in the New Testament the heart is not only the ‘*seat of vital forces*’ but the ‘*the source of intellectual thoughts, of faith, of comprehension… the centre of decisive things, of the moral conscience, of unwritten law, of encounters with God*’. It was viewed as the deepest centre of a person, and as such the deepest desires of the heart could only be truly seen and understood by God: while ‘*the heart of kings is unsearchable (Prov 25:3)*’, in the time of judgment God ‘will make manifest the counsels of the hearts (1 Cor 4:5)’. Hence, Henry’s pure and sincere devotion towards Sicily could only be understood by God and would be judged by God at the end of time. To use the language of the heart was to express true love and devotion to God.

Two letters, both dated 1 August 1258, provide further insight into the ways in which the English chancery was replicating papal rhetoric in its letters to the papal curia, and as such reveal more about the development of writing practices at the English chancery. One letter was addressed

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279 The same missive was also enrolled on 28 June 1257; it may have been sent twice to reiterate the king’s intentions, *Foedera*, I/1, pp. 355, 359.
280 *Foedera*, I/1, p. 368.
to the pope and the other was addressed to the college of cardinals. Both letters were authorised by
the baronial council which was in control of the English government between the summer of 1258
and the spring of 1261. Moreover, they were both linked to the council’s request for a cardinal legate
to help conclude peace with France.284 The first of these two letters, addressed directly to the pope,
opened with the following arenga clause:

Regi gloriae (Psalms 23:7–10), et gratiae largitori, ac vestrae sanctitatis clementiae
gratiarum refundimus actiones, qui, pacem faciens in sublimibus suis, animum vestrum
erga nos excitare dignatus est, vobis inspirans ut illa antiqua et vetus controversia, inter
nos et illustrem Regem Franciae longis temporibus agitata, quae innumerabilium
provinciarum populos traxit in exterminium et ruinam, per mansuetudinis vestrae
gratiam dissolvatur: Unde, cum jocunditate animi, ac cordis jubilo, dicere possimus vos,
qui locum Dei tenetis in terris portare pacem et illuminare patriam, et populis, vobis
subditis, procurare quietem; ut per vos Altissimus glorificetur in caelis, pax ministretur
in terris hominibus benivolae voluntatis.285

This letter was essentially a carefully crafted appeal to the pope to continue his work as God’s
peacemaker and to send a cardinal legate to conclude this peace between England and France, while
also thanking the pope for the work already carried out by his envoy, Brother Mansuetus. The
opening arenga begins with the words ‘to the king of glory, the giver of grace and to the clemency
of your holiness’. It is addressed to Christ first and then to the pope. This was framed as an appeal to
God and to the pope. Moreover, the reference to Christ as ‘the king of glory’ in conjunction with the
discussion of the kings of England and France is interesting. This use of rhetoric suggests that there
are three kings, and the pope is mediating between them all. He is Christ’s mediator. The English
king and his council were confirming the position and right of the pope to intervene in this Anglo-
French matter as a mediator, as one who ‘brings peace’ to the Christian people through God.286
Moreover, the use of particular language such as ‘illuminare patriam’ is an attempt to evoke papal
rhetoric surrounding the idea of Christ’s light. In other words, Christ was the light of the world and
his light was being illuminated through the example of the patria (England) in making peace with
the help and support of their mother, the pope. The barons were skilfully deploying this papal rhetoric
of peace, using it to appeal to the pope’s presentation of himself as the servant of God who works

284 For more on the baronial request for cardinal legates see pp. 55–6.
285 TNA, C 54/73 m. 4d.
286 See, for example, the pope’s letter to Brother Velascus, BF, ii. no. 464.
through God to bring peace to God’s people. As discussed in the section above, Pope Alexander IV in particular wanted to emphasise his humble position as a servant of peace and of God, as God’s intermediary. He adopted Franciscan ideology to present himself as a devout seeker of peace. Within this *arenga*, the pope was described as he ‘who holds the place of God on Earth’. In earlier correspondence to the pope, Henry utilised the language of spiritual love and friendship. He did not directly emphasise the pope’s position as God’s representative on Earth. By contrast, this letter would have been dictated by the baronial council and its appointees and, as such, was more direct in its expression and understanding of papal power.

It is not only through the *arenga* that the English could utilise papal rhetoric to encourage the pope to submit to their petition. In the *narratio* clause of this letter, popular biblical rhetoric was deployed to further encourage the pope to agree to send a cardinal legate to help conclude peace:

*Sperantes exinde ut, per ipsius pacis proventum, ecclesia Dei de variis laboribus respirabit ad pacem, et annunciabit Dominus annum placabilem; ut mirabiles elationes maris (Psalms 92:4), quibus Petri navicula fluctuare videtur (Matthew 14:24), mirabilis in altis Dominus cessare faciet, statuens procellam in auram.*

In this example, the Church would ‘spread peace … just as the wonderful surges of the sea, on which the boat of Peter seems to rise in the waves, will be calmed by the Lord’. This is a reference to Jesus protecting Peter’s boat from the stormy Sea of Galilee (Matthew 14:24). Peter was the first pope of the Church, who was responsible for steering the Church (i.e. the ship) out of stormy waters with the help and protection of Christ and his father in heaven. The papacy often emphasised the role of the Church as the ship and the role of the pope as its ‘captain’ and protector. For example, in a letter to Brother Velascus, asking him to stop the barons from deposing Aymer from his ecclesiastical post, the pope compared the Church to a ship caught up in a storm of ‘disquiet’ caused by the disturbance in England. Clearly, the English were purposefully mimicking the pope’s frequent use of this biblical ship imagery to describe the Church’s position within the world.

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287 TNA, C 54/73 m. 4d.
289 BF, ii. no. 464.
Further on in the *narratio*, Brother Mansuetus is described as being like an ‘*angelum pacis*’ in his role as mediator of the Anglo-French peace. From the pontificate of Innocent III to the 17th century, ‘*angelus pacis*’ was a common formula deployed by the papacy to describe its peacemaking envoys. Indeed, the word *angelus* came from the Greek ‘*angelos*’ meaning ‘messenger’ and this term became synonymous with those of *legatus* and *nuncius*. This formula implied that papal actions had been guided by God and his angels, emphasising the spiritual motive and justifications for the papacy to seek this peace. In 1213, this formula had been used by Pope Innocent III to describe the papal legate, Nicholas the bishop of Tusculum, whom he had sent to England to help bring peace between Church and State following the succession crisis settlement in May 1213. Furthermore, this comparison of the pope’s envoy to an angel of peace further emphasised the pope’s position as a peacemaker. Through utilising the same language of peace and reinforcing the pope’s role as God’s peacemaker, this letter from the English was intended to flatter the pope and show gratitude for his assistance in English matters. The English chancery personnel drafting these letters to the papacy had a clear understanding of common papal formulae as well as frequently utilised biblical passages in papal correspondence and were making a conscious decision to replicate it. Is it also possible that those involved in the drafting of these letters had previous experience with the *curie stylus*. One could further speculate that this letter had been drafted with the help of Master Rostand. Rostand was indeed one of the envoys chosen for this mission, who had previous experience as a papal chaplain and administrator and who worked as a clerk in the royal household. Moreover, he may have been asked to help draft royal letters to the papacy, and it is thus possible that he had a more active role in the drafting of this letter. Regardless, it would make sense for the barons to utilise the skills of people who already proven their knowledge and ability and understanding of papal rhetorical devices and conventions. In fact, it is worth noting that this letter also adopted elements of the papal *cursus* in the *arenga, narratio* and *petitio* clauses. It is highly rhythmical. Whether this was intentional or simply a consequence of utilising the same papal formulae is unclear. This further suggests that the

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291 *Foedera*, 1/1, p. 113: ‘quasi pacis et salutis angelum destinemus’.

292 For more on Master Rostand’s possible role in the drafting of royal documents see p. 148.
document was drafted by someone who had an understanding of the papal style of rhymical verse and prose, like Rostand.

By the mid-thirteenth century, only a small number of letters to the papacy contained an *arenga*. This practice was not consistently deployed in correspondence to the papacy until the fourteenth century. On the other hand, Hennings has argued that the *arenga* was more utilised when the English king or council had reason to complain to the papacy and when they were felt they needed to defend their rights and liberties.\(^{293}\) In contrast, Denholm-Young argued that the inclusion of an *arenga* ‘was the sign that some care had been taken with the composition of the letter’.\(^{294}\) Clearly, in the case outlined above, the *arenga* was being utilised as a way to make a greater appeal to the pope. The baronial council were unsure of their chances of success in gaining a cardinal legate, and as such had to make a strong case to the pope. As discussed in earlier chapters, the barons had strong motivations to receive a cardinal legate. Not only did they want said legate to help conclude peace with France, they also needed assistance in their efforts to reform the English realm and curb the abuses of the king and his officials. This was a high-profile mission of great importance to the English baronial council. It was a grand appeal to the papacy and as such needed to draw on a range of rhetorical devices to try and persuade the pope to agree to the request of the letter. At this time, few English letters to the papacy included this kind of lavish *arenga* clause. Indeed, few included an *arenga* clause at all.\(^{295}\) In this case, this elaborate *arenga* was deployed because the mission called for it.

This example can be contrasted with another letter sent on the same day and making the same petition, but this time addressed to the pope’s college of cardinals. After the standard *salutatio*, this document included a short and simple *arenga*:

\[
\text{Scimus multis et infallibilibus documentis quod sacrosancta Romana ecclesia, piissima mater nostra, vigilant\textit{i} studio et perpen\textit{s}iore cura considerat ea que incolumitatem respici\textit{unt regni nostri, quod ostendit evidentissime his diebus}.}^{296}
\]

\(^{294}\) Denholm-Young, ‘The *Cursus* in England’, p. 43.  
\(^{295}\) There are several surviving letters to the pope and the cardinals discussing the matter of peace between England and France, none of which contained an *arenga* clause. For example: *CR*, 1256–9, pp. 472–3.  
\(^{296}\) TNA, C 54/73 m. 4d.
Through this arenga the barons were simply commending the cardinals who had always deliberated over English requests through their ‘attentive concern and weightier care … to those things which are in relation to the safety of our kingdom’. The proceeding narratio and petitio clauses do not make the same use of rhetorical flourishes or biblical quotations and allusions as the previous letter to the pope. Clearly, certain writing practices of the English chancery were not observed uniformly in all correspondence with the papal curia. Nonetheless, this letter still contained certain papal language and formulae, typically deployed in correspondence between England and the papacy. For example, the clause ‘piissima mater nostra’ is used to describe the Church. The continued reference to the Church as ‘our mother’ shows a certain continuity in letters to the pope and his cardinals. Moreover, the word ‘piissima’ has been added to flatter the ‘most devout mother Church’, while the words ‘studium’ and ‘cura’ were commonly emphasised in papal correspondence with the English king – often to describe the relationship between the English kingdom and the papacy. Similarly, in the petitio of this letter there is a specific appeal to the Church as ‘the author of peace who bestows peace on us.’ The English council were directly appealing to the curia’s desire to achieve its own aims through the peace of its sons. It was intended to encourage the cardinals to persuade the pope to observe this royal request for a cardinal legate. Indeed, it would be one of their rank who would be chosen to carry out this duty.

It is worth briefly noting that this letter also observed certain elements of the cursus. However, it did not strictly conform to this style of rhythmical prose. There is evidence of a number of velox clauses and cursus medius – ‘in which a trisyllabic with an unstressed penultimate was preceded by another polysyllabic with an unstressed penultimate’. The medius ‘was not allowed by the strictest interpretation of papal practice but was an acceptable addition’. It was clearly meant to be read aloud. Ultimately, this letter differed in style from the previous letter to the pope. It was more direct and straightforward in its language and style of petition. It was not addressed to the pope and as such did not need to make the same emphatic plea for papal intervention. However, it

298 Ibid., p. 292.
was sent to strengthen the first request. If the barons could gain favour from the cardinals, they were more likely to achieve success.

While these two letters were prepared by the English chancery under the name of the king, there is also evidence of separate letters, dispatched around the same time, addressed from the English barons to the pope. These letters have been recorded and preserved in Matthew Paris’ *Chronica Majora*. They were probably sent alongside the official royal correspondence discussed above, as part of the baronial embassy which departed for the curia in August 1258. Of these letters, one in particular is very striking in its use of papal rhetoric and biblical quotations in an attempt to persuade the pope not to reinstate Aymer of Lusignan to his see at Winchester. The opening *arenge* is a very long, descriptive passage littered with biblical references. It carefully draws on the special relationship between England and the papacy through the evocation of papal rhetoric: ‘*nobis peculiare favoris praeidium specialiter largiretur, et paterne munificentiae gremium liberaliter aperiret, pacem nostram ac regni Angliae tranquillitatem nullatenus perturbaret.*’ By referencing both the paternal and maternal nature of the papacy through ‘the bosom of paternal munificence’ as well as the particular regard it held for England, the barons were echoing papal language to persuade the pope to look more kindly on their request. Moreover, this clause further stated that the Church ‘might not perturb our peace and the tranquillity of the kingdom of England’. This seems almost like a threat. The barons knew how important it was to the papacy (and to Alexander IV specially) for there to be peace and tranquillity in the English realm and they were almost manipulating the papacy’s desire to maintain this peace to gain favour in their appeal against Aymer. Clearly, they were aware of the language and rhetoric used in the official correspondence between the papacy and the king and they made use of this. It is also possible that they employed chancery clerks to help draft these letters on their behalf. Master John Clarel presented the baronial case to the pope *viva voce* thanks to the surviving evidence of his oration. Ultimately, the barons’ letters to the pope are constructed using some of the same formulae as that which was deployed in official Anglo-papal correspondence.

From this investigation of English correspondence to the papacy, it is clear that the English chancery was mirroring certain papal rhetorical features and formulae in its letters. This was a way to encourage papal favour and a positive response to English supplications. Moreover, it was a way to demonstrate the king’s sincerity for working together with the pope to bring peace to all Christians and to fight the enemies of God. The inclusion of an *arenga* could be used to strengthen an appeal to the pope in matters of great importance to the English, although during the mid-thirteenth century the *arenga* was not utilised to the same extent as it was in the fourteenth century. When the baronial council usurped control of the government between 1258 and 1261, the language and rhetoric deployed in official English correspondence with the papacy did not change. They continued to echo papal rhetoric to seek special favour. Moreover, the separate correspondence from the barons to the papacy also drew on certain rhetorical features typical of papal correspondence. This suggests that there was a conscious effort to evoke papal rhetoric in these communications. It is possible that government personnel, familiar with the formularies and treatises used to draft this type of communication, were still drafting these letters – ensuring a certain level of consistency and continuity in content and style. Ultimately, English letters sent in communications with the papacy adopted certain linguistic features commonly used in papal letters.

By the mid-thirteenth century, both the papal and English chanceries were developing and adapting their processes to cope with a greater amount of business. However, the English chancery was still being run as part of a household administration. Henry was trying to maintain personal control over his government in the face of growing unrest from his barons in the 1240s and 50s. While both the English and papal chanceries engaged in a number of parallel developments, the papal chancery was arguably more bureaucratised than the English by the mid-thirteenth century, as it had needed to rapidly increase its productivity and efficiency to deal with the growing number of petitioners and their agents making appeals at the papal curia. However, the pope still commanded a great degree of direct control over his government, particularly through the appointment of more administrators and household officials into important curial offices. These men held lower social and ecclesiastical status, but greater administrative and clerical skills. Ultimately, both papal and English chanceries were going through a period of growth and development which required the assistance of more skilled administrators to help manage these more complex structures of government.
Both the English and papal chanceries deployed letters and mandates containing credence for their envoys. While there were some similarities in the content, each chancery adopted their own style and structure of credence. The English issued letters of procuration for envoys vested with powers to negotiate and to assert their own will, whereas the papacy issued mandates of appointment which set out the powers and duties of their envoys. Indeed, papal envoys could be deployed with ‘full and free powers’ where English envoys were granted power of ‘procuration’. These developments were taking place at the same time but were not greatly influenced by the practice of the other.

With regards to the language, papal letters conveyed the pope’s political intentions, spiritual ideology, as well as his perception and presentation of papal power. Alexander IV, in particular, was adopting Franciscan language in his curial letters, most evident throughout the arengae. He pressed the notion of ‘pope as mother’ as well as ‘pope as peacemaker’, both of which were influenced by the Franciscan theological tradition.

In turn, correspondence from the English king and council reflected their own understanding of this relationship with the papacy. They utilised certain papal rhetorical devices and writing practices, particularly mirroring the language of motherhood, love and friendship. There is also evidence of the cursus deployed in English letters to the papacy. By mimicking papal rhetoric and elements of the cursus, Anglo-papal discourse was adopting elements of a ‘shared language of diplomacy’, one which was shaped by papal administrative and diplomatic practices. This ‘shared language’ developed further throughout the fourteenth century.

Conclusion
This thesis set out to investigate the diplomatic relations between King Henry III and Pope Alexander IV from 1254 to 1261, exploring not only the political events which framed their relationship, but also the administrative and diplomatic practices which were utilised and developed throughout these interactions. Up until now, the historiography has largely overlooked the diplomatic relationship between Henry III and Alexander IV. Indeed, Alexander’s pontificate has received little scholarly attention in the last hundred years. In essence, this study has addressed the political relationship between Henry III and Pope Alexander IV, and the ways in which this relationship was managed through three modes: mediation and arbitration, representation, and communication.

This thesis has shown that Alexander IV intervened in English political matters in a variety of ways. Indeed, his relationship with the English king was a focal point throughout much of his pontificate. He took an active role in the Sicilian Business (1254–1258), ordering the English king to commute his crusading vow from the Holy Land to Sicily and to send money and troops quickly in order to aid the war against Manfred of Lancia and the imperialists in Sicily, who were threatening the peace and security of the papal state. The pope helped mediate peace between England and France in the years leading up to the Treaty of Paris in 1259, in order to encourage Henry to focus his efforts on Sicily. He also arbitrated the disputed episcopal election of Aymer of Lusignan in 1259 at the request of the barons. Finally, following petitions from the king’s agents, he absolved the English king and realm from observing the baronial Provisions in 1261. Ultimately, papal modes of intervention were flexible, acting as an active participant, as a mediator, or as an arbitrator. The pope adapted his approach to each situation in a way that would best protect his power and authority and the interests of the Church. In most cases, Alexander IV was responding to petitions from the English for assistance in these matters, and yet, in the case of Sicily, he actively encouraged Henry to pursue this endeavour to help support and protect the Church and its people. While the pope tended to be responsive in his approach to governance, he was proactive in the promotion and pursuit of his crusading policy.

Through examining the mode of representation, this thesis has noted the highly important role played by the envoys who managed and shaped diplomatic relations between England and the papacy in the mid-thirteenth century. Envoys could be appointed with a variety of powers and duties to undertake a wide range of missions on behalf of their master. Indeed, they could directly influence
the outcome of an event through their actions (or lack thereof). While historians have assigned classifications to English and papal envoys, this thesis has questioned the usefulness of a taxonomy of envoys, instead choosing to examine the activities of envoys on a case by case basis, and where possible, exploring them in conjunction with the powers and duties assigned to them in their mandates. The practice of medieval representation was flexible and changeable. Those chosen for missions could vary according to the political and economic circumstances as well as the personal preferences of the sender and personal connections of the envoy.

This thesis has further identified several groups who were utilised as agents during exchanges between Henry III and Alexander IV, namely bishops and archbishops, lay magnates, administrators and household officials. In particular, Henry III appointed a number of Savoyard bishops and archbishops as diplomatic envoys in negotiations with the papacy. Both the king and the pope were also appointing more administrators and household officials as Anglo-papal representatives. For the pope this was because they were cheaper to send and had the administrative and diplomatic skills to carry out this business effectively. For the king, it was particularly during the Baronial Revolt (1258–1261) that he prioritised the appointment of loyal household officials over men of high status and noble birth. Clearly, the choice of envoys was impacted by the contemporary political events. Yet, there was also a trend towards appointing more skilled and experienced administrators who understood these increasingly complex structures of administration. Ultimately, when it came to appointing envoys for Anglo-papal matters in the mid-thirteenth century, their loyalty, trustworthiness, experience and administrative ability began to outweigh their high rank and status.

Before now, the important role played by the friars as envoys throughout these Anglo-papal exchanges has gone unnoticed. This thesis has noted the pivotal role played by friars in Anglo-papal negotiations, especially during the pontificate of Alexander IV. The Franciscans, in particular, were heavily utilised as agents by Alexander IV due to his long-standing relationship with this order. Likewise, the English king supported the growing number of friars in England, inviting them to hold positions in his household and sending them on diplomatic missions on his behalf. The friars were particularly well-suited to performing duties as spiritual advisors, peacemakers, crusading preachers.
and tax collectors. Moreover, their appointments as papal and royal agents were directly influenced by their positions as friars.

Finally, this thesis has shed new light on the language employed in the diplomatic correspondence between Henry III and Pope Alexander IV which has so far been vastly overlooked by the historiography. In curial letters to the English king, Alexander IV drew heavily on the Franciscan theological tradition, presenting himself as a spiritual mother and a peacemaker of Christendom, encouraging the English and French kings to spread love and peace by their example, as Saint Francis had done. Unlike his predecessor, Innocent IV, Alexander IV did not deploy grand canonical statements of papal power (such as ‘Vicar of Christ’), preferring to draw on his special relationship with the English king through the language of familial love and friendship. Likewise, the English chancery mirrored this language of familial love and devotion in its efforts to gain a favourable response to royal petitions at the papal curia. The English chancery even adopted elements of the *cursus* in some of its correspondence to the papacy. Clearly, a ‘shared language of diplomacy’, shaped by papal chancery and administrative practices, was beginning to develop between these two polities.

This work has filled in a historiographical gap regarding the special relationship between Pope Alexander IV and King Henry III of England. The focus on agents and their use of these developing administrative and diplomatic structures will open up new avenues of investigation which will help broaden our understanding of medieval diplomacy. Further comparative works on Anglo-papal relationships across the thirteenth century, as well as on interactions between Alexander and other European monarchs, will help to give us a more comprehensive understanding of European diplomacy.

Ultimately, the activity of agents has emerged as pivotal to understanding the management of diplomacy as well as diplomatic and administrative practices between England and the papal curia in the mid-thirteenth century. This thesis has shown that these practices are just as significant in the study of the modalities of medieval diplomacy as the political and international relations, traditionally addressed by historians specialising in this field. By considering the individuals and
their characteristics and practices alongside political context and international relationships, we can come ever closer to understanding diplomacy in the mid-thirteenth century.
Appendices

Appendix A
TNA, SC 7/3/12

Dorse, top centre:

Appendix B
TNA, SC 7/20/3

Dorse, top centre:

Appendix C
TNA, SC 7/3/44

Dorse, top centre:

Appendix D
TNA, SC 7/3/10  TNA, SC 7/2/22  TNA, SC 7/2/23

Dorse, top centre:  Dorse, top centre:  Dorse, top centre:
Appendix E
TNA, SC 7/2/30

*Dorse, top centre:*

Appendix F
TNA, SC 7/3/31  TNA, SC 7/2/11  TNA, SC 7/3/15

*Dorse, mid centre:*

Appendix G
TNA, SC 7/2/1  TNA, SC 7/2/4

*Dorse, top centre: *
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C 66 (Chancery and Supreme Court of Judicature: Patent Rolls)
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E 101 (King’s Remembrancer: Accounts Various)
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