Citation for published version


DOI

Link to record in KAR

https://kar.kent.ac.uk/81152/

Document Version

UNSPECIFIED

Copyright & reuse
Content in the Kent Academic Repository is made available for research purposes. Unless otherwise stated all content is protected by copyright and in the absence of an open licence (eg Creative Commons), permissions for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher, author or other copyright holder.

Versions of research
The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the published version of record.

Enquiries
For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact:
researchsupport@kent.ac.uk

If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down information provided at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html
PARTY COMPETITION OVER THE CENTRE-PERIPHERY CLEAVAGE. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE SPANISH REGIONS

Guillermo Reyes Pascual

SCHOOL OF POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Word Count: 99,756

Dissertation submitted to the University of Kent for the fulfillment of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in Comparative Politics

Supervisors: Dr Paolo Dardanelli and Dr Erik Larsen
Las islas en que vivo

Un día habrá una isla
que no sea silencio amordazado
Que me enterren en ella,
donde mi libertad dé sus rumores
a todos los que pisan sus orillas.
Solo no estoy. Están conmigo siempre
horizontes y manos de esperanza,
aquellos que no cesan
de mirarse la cara en sus heridas,
aquellos que no pierden
el corazón y el rumbo en las tormentas,
los que lloran de rabia
y se tragán el tiempo en carne viva.
Y cuando mis palabras se liberen
del combate en que muero y en que vivo,
la alegría del mar le pido a todos
cuántos partan su pan en esta isla
que no sea silencio amordazado

Pedro García Cabrera
Las Islas en que vivo 1971
ABSTRACT

This investigation is an examination of party competition over the centre-periphery cleavage. The focus is placed on which factors are expected to have a deep effect on the way parties compete when framing the relations between centres and peripheries. The literature has explored different key elements that are able to strongly influence party behaviour along this cleavage, such as for example, party type, ideology, identity, or language. This thesis is centred on other factors that have been overlooked by the same different studies. These are: distance, fragmentation, and polycentricity. The main purpose is to observe the ways in which parties adapt to them in the different regions in which they compete. This research problem is approached via the research question: what factors shape party competition on the centre-periphery cleavage?

To answer this research question, the research method used is the sub-national comparative method. This method is applied by using a sequential mix method approach, with a quantitative followed by a qualitative analysis. The purpose of this is obtain at the same time a complete and in-depth understanding of the phenomenon. Employing a case study research strategy, Spain is examined based on the politically salient territorial tensions between its centre and peripheries. In order to observe how the centre-periphery cleavage unfolds, the main sources of information chosen are the political manifestos articulated by parties to compete in regional elections. Addressing the regional level allows to comprehend with more detail how this territorially based cleavage is formulated.

From the above three factors, the main findings point in the direction of characterising distance as the element that influence the most the way in which parties compete along the centre-periphery cleavage. The further away a region is from the centre, the more parties territorialise their appeals to the voters. This is followed by fragmentation, which has unexpected and promising results. Polycentricity has to be further analysed in future research agendas, but the results preliminary flag the importance of its different degrees of impact. Finally, these factors are best understood in a qualitative manner in contrast to the literature that also examines Spain, normally based on quantitative data.
DEDICATIONS

I want to dedicate this thesis to my loving parents, without their support and encouragement, this adventure would not have been possible. My gratitude has no limits, and this goes for them. A special dedication goes to Concepción Dolores Reyes Aguilar and María Terrassa Nebot. Both have always been an example of constant and hard work, and they have exercised these values as a way of life.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Foremost, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor Dr Paolo Dardanelli for the many hours dedicated to this project, continuous support throughout these four years, his patience, advice, and guidance. It has been an honour. This gratitude also goes to Dr Erik Larsen and Dr Sudulich, both have provided fundamental insights to complete this thesis.

My sincere thanks also go to the School of Politics and International Relations for this opportunity to complete my studies in a prestigious academic institution such as the University of Kent. Both the academic and administrative staff have always provided the necessary help and assistance.
### TABLE OF CONTENTS

*ABSTRACT* .......................................................................................................................... ii

*DEDICATIONS* ......................................................................................................................... iii

*ACKNOWLEDGMENTS* ............................................................................................................... iv

*TABLE OF CONTENTS* ............................................................................................................. v

*LIST OF TABLES* ....................................................................................................................... x

*LIST OF FIGURES* ...................................................................................................................... xi

*ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS* .......................................................................................... xiii

**CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION** .............................................................................................. 1

1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 2

2. ESTABLISHING A RESEARCH AREA ................................................................................. 2

3. ESTABLISHING A RESEARCH AGENDA AND MAIN RESEARCH QUESTION .............. 5

4. RESEARCH PLAN ................................................................................................................... 12

5. CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................................................... 15

**CHAPTER 2 - LITERATURE REVIEW** ..................................................................................... 17

1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 18

2. CENTRE-PERIPHERY CLEAVAGE ...................................................................................... 18

2.1) Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 18

2.2) The emergence of states and cores ................................................................................. 19

2.3) Centre-periphery relations ............................................................................................. 25

2.4) Counter-core movements ................................................................................................. 28

2.5) Sources of regional conflict ............................................................................................. 32

2.6) From horizontal inequalities to regional conflict .............................................................. 34

2.7) Regionalism as a counter-core movement ......................................................................... 35

2.8) Spatial dimension ............................................................................................................. 37

3. PARTY COMPETITION .......................................................................................................... 40

3.1) Party competition ............................................................................................................. 40

3.2) Party competition as multi-dimensional ......................................................................... 40

3.3) Strategies adopted by political parties in a multi-dimensional competition .................. 46

4. PARTY COMPETITION OVER THE CENTRE-PERIPHERY CLEAVAGE IN SPAIN .......... 48

4.1) The centre-periphery cleavage in Spain and its evolution .............................................. 48
4.2) General overview of party competition along the centre-periphery cleavage .............................................................. 51
4.3) Saliency and position ............................................................... 53
4.4) Strategies ........................................................................ 56

5. IDENTIFYING THE GAP IN THE LITERATURE ......................... 57
  5.1) The general literature ............................................................ 57
  5.2) Spain ............................................................................ 59

6. CONCLUSIONS ...................................................................... 61

CHAPTER 3 - CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ....... 62

1. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................... 63

2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK .................................................. 64
  2.1) Centres and peripheries ......................................................... 64
  2.2) Regions ............................................................................. 66
  2.3) National identity, nacionalidad, and regional identity .......... 67
  2.4) Parties ............................................................................. 69

3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK .................................................. 73
  3.1) Pro-centre/periphery positions of parties ......................... 73
  3.2) Main explanatory variables ................................................ 77
    3.2.A) Distance ..................................................................... 77
    3.2.B) Fragmentation ............................................................... 86
    3.2.C) Polycentricity ............................................................... 94
  3.3) Regional-level control variables ......................................... 100
    3.3.A) Economic development ................................................ 100
    3.3.B) Identity ..................................................................... 104
    3.3.C) Language ................................................................ 107
  3.4) Party-level control variables .............................................. 110
    3.4.A) General Framework ..................................................... 110
    3.4.B) Party type ................................................................. 111
    3.4.C) Party ideology ............................................................ 114
    3.4.D) Interaction between party type and ideology .............. 119
    3.4.E) Party structure ........................................................... 122
    3.4.F) Interaction between the three party-level control variables
           focused on SWPs ....................................................... 127

4. CONCLUSIONS ...................................................................... 128

CHAPTER 4 - METHODOLOGY ................................................... 136

1. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................... 137
2. RESEARCH STRATEGY AND CASE SELECTION .................................................. 137
   2.1) Research strategy: case study ................................................................. 137
   2.2) Case selection: Spain ............................................................................. 139
3. RESEARCH APPROACH: MIXED METHODS ................................................. 142
4. SAMPLING FRAME AND DESIGN IN A MIXED METHODS APPROACH .......................................................... 146
   4.1) Sampling frame ...................................................................................... 146
   4.2) Sampling design .................................................................................... 147
5. MAIN SOURCES OF EVIDENCE AND DATA-SETS .................................... 148
   5.1) Main source of evidence ....................................................................... 148
   5.2) Main data-set for the quantitative analysis ......................................... 150
   5.3) The RMP .............................................................................................. 152
   5.4) Main source of evidence for the qualitative analysis ......................... 155
   5.5) Criteria used to select the parties ......................................................... 156
   5.6) Criteria used to select the periods of analysis .................................... 156
   5.6) Steps followed to select the manifestos ............................................. 156
6. QUANTITATIVE DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS ....................................... 157
   6.1) Quantitative approach ........................................................................ 157
   6.2) Regions selected for the quantitative analysis .................................... 158
   6.3) Parties and manifestos selected for the quantitative analysis .......... 160
   6.4) Operationalisation of the dependent variables ..................................... 160
   6.5) Operationalisation of the explanatory and control variables .......... 166
   6.6) Accounting for electoral period effects .............................................. 169
   6.7) Accounting for interaction effects ....................................................... 170
   6.8) Description of the data ....................................................................... 171
   6.9) Quantitative analysis performed ....................................................... 171
7. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS ........................................................................... 172
   7.1) Qualitative approach .......................................................................... 172
   7.2) Regions selected for the qualitative analysis ...................................... 173
   7.3) Parties and manifestos selected for the qualitative analysis ............ 174
   7.4) Operationalisation of the dependent variables .................................... 175
   7.5) Operationalisation of the explanatory and control variables ........ 177
   7.6) Triangulation ....................................................................................... 180
   7.7) Qualitative analysis performed ........................................................... 180
8. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................ 181
CHAPTER 5-QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

1.INTRODUCTION

2.DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA

2.1) Introduction

2.2) Saliency of the regional level

2.3) Position on competence distribution

2.4) Attitudes towards multiculturalism

2.5) Conclusions

3.RESULTS

3.1) Organisation of the regression analyses

3.2) Saliency of the regional level

3.3) Position on competence distribution

3.4) Attitudes towards multiculturalism

3.5) Conclusions

4.ANALYSIS

4.1) Saliency of the regional level

4.2) Position on competence distribution

4.3) Attitudes towards multiculturalism

4.4) Conclusions

5.DISCUSSION

6.CONCLUSIONS

CHAPTER 6-QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

1.INTRODUCTION

2.ANALYSIS

2.1) Saliency of the regional level

2.2) Constitutional status of the region

2.3) Position on competence distribution

2.4) Identity

3. DISCUSSION

4.CONCLUSIONS

CHAPTER 7-DISCUSSION

1.INTRODUCTION

2.DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS

3.CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE LITERATURE ON PARTY COMPETITION ALONG THE CENTRE-PERIPHERY CLEAVAGE
4. CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................................... 324

CHAPTER 8 - CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................. 325

APPENDIX A .............................................................................................................. 335

APPENDIX B .............................................................................................................. 336

APPENDIX C .............................................................................................................. 339

APPENDIX D .............................................................................................................. 341

APPENDIX E .............................................................................................................. 342

APPENDIX F .............................................................................................................. 343

APPENDIX G .............................................................................................................. 344

APPENDIX H .............................................................................................................. 347

APPENDIX I .............................................................................................................. 349

APPENDIX J .............................................................................................................. 357

APPENDIX K .............................................................................................................. 358

APPENDIX L .............................................................................................................. 359

APPENDIX M .............................................................................................................. 360

REFERENCES ............................................................................................................ 367
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>Main Hypotheses</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Sample of Cases</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>Mixed Methods Typology</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>Application of the Criteria using Three Steps to Select the Manifestos for each Type of Analysis</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Saliency of the Regional Level</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Position on Competence Distribution</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>Attitudes Towards Multiculturalism</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>Hypotheses Confirmed or Rejected for the Quantitative Analysis</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>Hypotheses Confirmed or Rejected for the Qualitative Analysis</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>The process of emerging cores and peripheries</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>Centre-periphery continuum</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>Regional political demands continuum</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>Pro-centre/periphery continuum</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>Sources of latent power in space</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>Effect of distance and its spatial dimension</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>Comparison between contiguous and fragmented regions</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>The three levels of identification and loyalties in the Canary Islands</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>Possible polycentricity scale</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>The different party-level control variables that might shape party competition on the centre-periphery cleavage</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Strata and regions in Spain</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>Structured categorisation matrix</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>Structured questions matrix</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Saliency of the regional level</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Position on competence distribution</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>Attitudes towards multiculturalism</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>Relation of the regional with the centre and the local levels for the PSOE</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>Relation of the regional with the centre and the local levels for the PP</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>Relation of the regional with the centre and the local levels for the PA/CA and CC</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>Timelines of the different PSOE’s regional branches regarding the constitutional status of the regions</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>Description of the constitutional status according</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
to the parties and regions

6.6 Extension and nature of the calls for more competences of the different parties

6.7 Description of the articulation of regional and national identities

6.8 Summary of the pro-centre/periphery Positions of the PSOE, PP, PA/CA, and CC
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+G-P.G.</td>
<td>Coalición Galega</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGE</td>
<td>Alternativa Galega de Esquerda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AHI</td>
<td>Agrupación Herreña Independiente</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIE M</td>
<td>Arbitrio sobre las importaciones y entregas de mercancías</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNG</td>
<td>Bloque Nacionalista Galego</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC</td>
<td>Coalición Canaria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCN</td>
<td>Centro Canario Nacionalista</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDN</td>
<td>Convergencia Demócratas Navarros</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHA</td>
<td>Chunta Aragonesista</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CiU</td>
<td>Convergencia i Unió</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMP</td>
<td>Comparative Manifesto Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUP</td>
<td>Candidatura d’Unitat Popular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CxG</td>
<td>Coalición por Galicia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CxI</td>
<td>Convergència per les Illes/El PI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>Eusko Alkartasuna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAJ-PNV</td>
<td>Partido Nacionalista Vasco in Navarre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECLAC</td>
<td>United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EH</td>
<td>Euskal Herritarrok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERC</td>
<td>Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA</td>
<td>Foro Asturias Ciudadano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNC/PNC</td>
<td>Federación Nacionalista Canaria/Partido Nacionalista Canario</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGIC</td>
<td>Impuesto General Indirecto de Canarias</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INE</td>
<td>Instituto Nacional de Estadística</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRPF</td>
<td>Impuesto sobre la Renta de las Personas Físicas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRI B</td>
<td>Lliga Regionalista de les Illes Balears</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Na Bai</td>
<td>Nafarroa Bai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NC</td>
<td>Nueva Canarias</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA/CA</td>
<td>Partido Andalucista/Coalición Andalucista</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAR</td>
<td>Partido Aragonés Regionalista</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAs</td>
<td>Partiu Asturianista</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCa</td>
<td>Partido Carlista</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNV</td>
<td>Partido Nacionalista Vasco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>Partido Popular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR</td>
<td>Partido Riojano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>Partido Regionalista de Cantabria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSM</td>
<td>Partit Socialista de Mallorca</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSOE</td>
<td>Partido Socialista Obrero Español</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REF</td>
<td>Régimen Económico y Fiscal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMP</td>
<td>Regional Manifesto Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWPs</td>
<td>State-wide Parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TG</td>
<td>Terra Galega</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UA</td>
<td>Unión Alavesa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCCDS</td>
<td>Centro Democrático y Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UM</td>
<td>Unió Mallorquina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPL</td>
<td>Unión del Pueblo Leonés</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPN</td>
<td>Unión del Pueblo Navarro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URAs</td>
<td>Unión Renovadora Asturiana</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
1. INTRODUCTION

Multi-level politics have provided the grounds to create new arenas of party competition, granting the opportunity to further address social cleavages with a more contextualised focus (Jeffery 2010: 145-147). Regional-scale politics are now viewed to be of crucial importance (Jeffery and Schakel 2013: 300), contributing with a much wider and deeper understanding of social processes and phenomena. With this in mind, this investigation aims to address how parties compete along the centre-periphery cleavage at a regional scale to observe how they adapt to the context in which they act. The purpose of this chapter is to frame the broad lines of this investigation, outline the theoretical umbrella under which this thesis develops, identify and justify a research problem and agenda, provide a well-structured research question and a rationale for it, and orientate the reader in the chosen methodological direction. This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section refers to the general research area in which this investigation can be inserted. The second section identifies and highlights a research agenda that fits the purpose of this thesis, introducing and justifying the main research question. The third section refers to the research design and roadmap.

2. ESTABLISHING A RESEARCH AREA

The aim of this section is to establish a general topic within which to locate the research developed here. Social cleavages have been long studied in Political Science as one of the key social and political identification processes that Lipset and Rokkan (1967) developed in their seminal work. In order for a social cleavage to become politically salient, three main conditions have to apply (Pisciotta 2016: 195): first, people have to be distinguished according to one of the characteristics of the cleavage; second, people have to be able to identify to which group they belong in relation to those characteristics of the cleavage; and third, parties need to organise their support and compete around this cleavage. With this in mind, this investigation is located in the dynamics that the third condition unfolds. Amongst the different social cleavages, the centre-periphery cleavage is crucial in understating multi-level relations in decentralised states. Party competition can be understood, therefore, as organised and structured as a mechanism of expressing these different social cleavages (Hooghe and Marks 2018: 112). In
order to do so, parties articulate the relations between centres and peripheries as an axis of competition (Alonso et al. 2015: 852).

The original Cleavage Theory was designed before the regions became one of the main centres of decision-making processes in politics. Regions and territorial politics, through processes such as decentralisation, have been evolving in the past decades to become, currently, one of the most salient political arenas (Goldsmith and Newton 1988: 359-361; Jeffery and Hough 2003: 206). For example, regionalism, as an example of territorial politics, can be either top-down and through decentralisation (Loughlin and Guy Peters 2004), or bottom-up and through social and political mobilisation (Keating 1998). The literature that explores social cleavages has observed, throughout the last few years, a process of stable alignment, de-alignment, and re-alignment (Dalton et al. 1984). This means that, in regards to the centre-periphery cleavage, there has been both a trend of de- and re-territorialisation (Knutsen 2011: 144). In this sense, this cleavage has been stable, abandoned, and deepened, depending on the regions that one studies, providing a high degree of regional variation that needs to be further understood (Jeffery and Schakel 2013: 300). The increasing importance of regions and territorial politics draws attention to the way in which previous assumed state-wide phenomena, such as social cleavages, are also addressed at a regional scale (Jeffery 2010: 137-139).

The terms centres and peripheries are widely, and perhaps therefore variably, used. Using the crucial work done by Rokkan and Urwin (1983: 13), a peripheral region can be characterised as geographically distant (Gottman 1980: 11), and culturally different and economically dependent (Rokkan and Urwin 1982: 2-3). Although Rokkan and Urwin (1982: 5) proposed a broad definition of centres, this can be narrowed down to define them in political terms: “the centre is normally the place where the seat of authority is located. It is usually called the capital” (Gottman 1980: 15). Both definitions imply subordination and dominance, where centres have, and maintain, a predominant relation of advantage over the peripheries. The result is the ability of the centres to control, rule, and obtain substantial benefits from exercising their authority on the peripheries. These dominant relations generate territorial grievances between centres and peripheries. This is when the centre-periphery cleavage starts to be articulated
and become important, politicising these territorial grievances and identifying peripheral populations as deprived groups. To help maintain this status quo, centres, through state-wide parties (from now on SWPs), articulate political projects that have in their core ideology the protection of these dominant relations. In order to challenge this situation, peripheries, through regionalist parties, identify the political projects that come from the centres as detrimental to their interests, linking their future to a more regionalised power-based relations. At this point the centre-periphery cleavage is finally consolidated, when parties compete and frame the relations between centres and peripheries as part of their axes of competition, and where this investigation is inserted.

The last step in this section is to outline the two main characteristics that in this investigation defines the centre-periphery cleavage. These characteristics are, on one hand, the centre-periphery cleavage understood as a process, and on the other, this process characterised as dynamic. The first characteristic refers to the centre-periphery cleavage as a process. Centres, as highly developed and locus of decision-making processes, and peripheries, as geographically distant, and poorly developed regions, can be analysed using a process-centred perspective (Kühn 2015: 368). This process can be labelled as corelisation-peripheralisation. In this process, centres and peripheries are articulated using economic, cultural, and political dimensions. Centres and peripheries are not static but contingent. They can be articulated and dismantled over time. A region is not a centre of decision-making processes, depositary of human and material resources, or the opposite, per se. The regions are labelled as centre or as peripheries depending on the result of a specific process, making centres as politically dominant and strong, and peripheries as politically dependent and weak. Regions can be considered as centres or peripheries at a certain point in time, but this can change over time. The key idea is that this process is not deterministic. One region influences the other and vice versa in a bi-directional way.

The second characteristic considers the centre-periphery cleavage as a dynamic process. This dynamism is provided by the actors that are responsible for articulating regions as centres or peripheries. These actors make the above process unfold in a certain way. In this investigation, the actors that are
responsible for the unfolding of this process are political parties. Delimiting centres and peripheries are a result of how parties act and interact on the centre-periphery cleavage. The behaviour of parties determines which regions are centres and peripheries. These rational actors comply with a certain political project to fulfil the interest of the elites that they represent. The elites at the centre try to, through SWPs, implement a certain political project to control the peripheries and extract the necessary surplus to maintain their dominant position. In response to this, the elites at the peripheries attempt to, through strong regionalist parties, challenge this political project via a regionally based political project to defend their interests. Because not all regions have the same characteristics, parties need to adapt to the regions in which they act. This reinforces the idea that the centre-periphery cleavage is a process of defining centres and peripheries, and at the same time, dynamic because it varies across regions.

This broad theoretical discussion and research area is the umbrella under which this investigation can be found and feeds from, understanding the centre-periphery cleavage as a profound salient focus of political struggle and tensions between regions through party competition. The comparative studies that started with authors such as Rokkan (1975), Strassoldo (1980), or Rokkan and Urwin (1982;1983) can be considered as the best examples of how the study of the centre-periphery cleavage provides a variation of observations that need to be understood in a highly contextualised scenario. In other words, understand social cleavages through a regional scope and away from the state lenses, which sometimes, hide their real impact (Wimmer and Schiller 2002: 302). The centre-periphery cleavage can be understood as a universal response to territorial tensions, but this needs to be specified to the case in which it unfolds. Regional variation strengthens the idea of the new dynamics that multi-level politics introduce, considering regional-scale politics as a completely new, and standing on its own, field of study (Jeffery and Schakel 2013: 300).

3. ESTABLISHING A RESEARCH AGENDA AND MAIN RESEARCH QUESTION

The intention of this section is to identify a specific research agenda within which the main research question can be inserted. With the above
characteristics of the centre-periphery cleavage in mind, the purpose of this investigation is to address the following research problem: *understand party competition along the centre-periphery cleavage, defined as a dynamic process that balances out the power relations between regions.* This falls into the limits of the research agenda identified by authors such as Gómez et al. (2009), Alonso (2012), Gómez et al. (2014), and Alonso et al. (2015; 2017) through the Regional Manifesto Project (RMP). This research agenda addresses precisely how parties behave, at the regional level, in a multi-dimensional political space, amongst which the centre-periphery cleavage is one of the main axes of competition (Alonso et al. 2013: 194-199). The RMP, building on the previous methodology provided by the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP), provides the necessary data and sources of information to approach the aim of this investigation with the necessary depth.

The rationale for identifying this research agenda and following the path opened by the RMP is fourfold. Firstly, the literature needs to increase the focus on the actors that articulate the dynamic processes that social cleavages represent (Herrschel 2011: 98). The multi-level and multi-dimensional party competition in decentralised states is crucial to understand how social processes are addressed in other levels which are not the national level. Comprehending how these social processes unfold can be done by putting the focus on those actors that heavily influence them. In this case, and as explained above, these are political parties. These actors belong to a heterogenous family. On one hand, SWPs, having their centre of loyalties at the centre, adapt to multi-level party competition by addressing the regional demands with a state-wide perspective and adjusting their internal structure (Deschouwer 2003; Fabre 2008; Swenden and Maddens 2009). This goes in line with the idea of considering regional elections as first-order elections (Jeffery and Hough 2003: 210). On the other hand, regionalist parties, which vary in their demands (Hepburn 2009: 480-485), represent the main mechanism through which the defence of the peripheral interests are articulated (De Winter and Türsan 1998; De Winter et al. 2006; Dandoy 2010). The two types of party, therefore, tend to behave differently. Not only these parties tend to behave differently, but their patterns of interaction are also varied (Jeffery 2009: 645). One of the possible
reasons behind this is that they need to adapt to the region in which they act, providing regional variation that needs to be addressed in depth, as the RMP aspires to.

Secondly, the gap identified by the literature in relation to the actors that articulate the centre-periphery cleavage (Kühn 2015: 376) is being filled by projects such as the RMP. The data provided by these projects at a regional scale opens the door to address research questions with a regional lens, such as the ones that are articulated around this cleavage. This provides the literature with detailed answers to social phenomena which could be faded or concealed at the national or supra-national levels (Wimmer and Schiller 2002: 302). Peripheral mobilisation is better understood at the regional level, where its bases are situated, locating the regions at the centre of the agenda (Fabre and Swenden 2013: 344). If the work done by Lipset and Rokkan (1967), Rokkan (1980), Rokkan and Urwin (1983), or Caramani (2004) was aimed to address the problem of power and territory, this was informed, to some extent, by a national bias. This investigation tries to approach the phenomenon of territorial tensions at a regional scale, better understanding that regions might not be as assimilated units as part of the literature suggests (Keating 2008: 63). The centre-periphery cleavage is territorial in nature (Alonso et al. 2013: 190), and therefore, this needs to be considered in its proper territorial unit, the region. The regional level is the one addressed by the RMP and its research agenda, being the most suitable data-base to approach the centre-periphery cleavage at the territorial level where it unfolds.

Thirdly, the RMP grants the literature with a set of categories that can be used to articulate a precise centre-periphery scale to address the complexity of this social cleavage. Although some authors have proposed a centre-periphery scale that gravitates around two main dimensions, the competential and identitarian dimensions (Alonso et al. 2013: 192-193), the RMP has flexible categories that could be used to articulate alternative scales. This flexibility is crucial to approach social phenomena which, due to their complexity, need to be understood via different approaches. The deep effects of multi-level politics in decentralised states might challenge the existing assumptions of part of the literature, and the flexibility of the categories offered by the RMP and its research
agenda grants the opportunity to provide the field with new results that could be used to picture with more detail profound social processes. These alternatives do not undermine each other, they are intended to enrich the literature and procure different approaches to compare results and accumulate knowledge.

Fourthly, more empirical studies of how this cleavage unfolds through party competition as its fundamental driving force are needed (Alonso et al. 2013: 190). Most of the existing studies are based on either quantitative (Alonso and Gómez 2011; Alonso 2012; Alonso et al. 2013; 2015; 2017) or qualitative data (De Winter and Türsan 1998; Tronconi 2006; Massetti 2009; van Houten 2009). To further provide the literature with solid, robust, and in-depth empirical findings, this investigation aims to contribute with both quantitative and qualitative results, in the same way as Basile (2015) or Massetti and Schakel (2015) do. Providing findings of both natures can enrich the literature that addresses party competition along the centre-periphery cleavage. The data collected at the national level, informed by the national bias outlined above, has provided rich data to produce important research at the mentioned level, but this does not address the regional variation (Jeffery and Schakel 2013: 301) that can be found in important decentralised states, where the regions are crucial units of decision-making processes. The RMP and its research agenda allows to approach the main research question developed below with both types of data. On one hand, quantitative data via its fully developed data-set, and on the other hand, qualitative data via the original manifestos.

As mentioned above, the RMP, and the research agenda that builds on it, provides the grounds to understand how parties behave at the regional level in multi-level decentralised states and in a multi-dimensional political space. In this multi-dimensional arena of competition, the centre-periphery cleavage is one of the main axes of competition, contributing to observe how social cleavages with a clear territorial base, such as this one, are articulated and unfold. With this in mind, the main research question is the following:
**What factors shape party competition on the centre-periphery?**

The justification for this research question is twofold. Firstly, the centre-periphery cleavage, as a dynamic process, needs to be further specified to make sense of it. The regional variation that one can find in decentralised states, where regions represent key centres of decision-making processes, requires a deeper explanation that needs to go beyond the dichotomous labels of centres and peripheries. Centres can be considered as stable and consolidated, but peripheral regions are more dynamic. This means that inside the broad label of “peripheral regions”, one can find a high degree of variation that differentiates one peripheral region from another. The literature does not take into consideration this variation with enough depth, and regards all peripheral regions to belong to the same category. This fades away the possible reasons behind how regions interact. To address this gap, the centre-periphery cleavage is understood in this investigation not as a dichotomous scale of centre versus peripheries but as a continuum. Both labels (“centres” and “peripheries”) need to be addressed with more precision to fit the context. The centre-periphery continuum, as developed in the conceptual framework, has more grey scales than simple centres and peripheries, allowing for a better understanding of the variation between regions.

Secondly, and as further developed in the next chapter, the research agenda based on the RMP focuses on party behaviour around three main issues. These are, the saliency, position, and strategies that parties adopt to compete, at the regional level, on multiple axes of competition. This is, there is deep understanding on the behaviour of parties when they selected which issues to emphasise, what position they assume according to the issues they address, and the strategies they adopt to position themselves on different axes of competition. Although this investigation can be inserted in this research agenda, the focus here lies on comprehending what shapes party behaviour (Bielasiak 2005: 334). The literature has identified some of the factors that shape and can explain, to some extent, party behaviour. Examples of these are economic development, identity, or party type, but there is little or no work done on other factors that might also deeply shape party competition on the centre-periphery cleavage. To address this gap, this investigation turns the focus to
three main factors that are also expected to strongly shape party behaviour along the centre-periphery cleavage: distance, fragmentation, and polycentricity. Overlooking these factors might provide misleading results, and this investigation aims to observe and comprehend how and with what intensity they shape party competition on the centre-periphery cleavage to provide a wider and more detailed picture of the phenomenon.

Linking both justifications for the main research question, it can be theorised that the regional variation that the specification of the centre-periphery cleavage can help to outline can be understood, to some extent, according to the effects that the above factors may have on party behaviour in relation to the regions in which parties act. In other words, the context in which parties act is presumed to shape their behaviour. The expected effects that distance, fragmentation, and polycentricity may have on party behaviour are dependent on the region that is being analysed, and this derives from exploring the proposed centre-periphery continuum. Disentangling the centre-periphery cleavage into precise categories, as this investigation aims to achieve, is theorised to procure the necessary observations to contextualise with more accuracy the impact that these factors are hypothesised to have on how parties frame the relations between centres and peripheral regions.

Once the different explanatory variables have been addressed, the final task is to disentangle how the centre-periphery cleavage is captured. Parties have based their claims for the decentralisation of power and strengthening of subnational autonomy on various justifications, such as for example, ethnic, cultural, linguistic, or religious arguments (Rodríguez-Pose and Sandall 2008: 56), and this is still the case, subsuming these issues in a broader territorial axis (Alonso et al. 2017: 253-256) as an intrinsic measure of how centres and peripheries relate to each other (Alonso et al. 2013: 190-192). In order to follow the same path opened by the RMP and its research agendas, this investigation builds on this territorial axis that includes two different dimensions: the competential and identitarian dimensions. The competential dimension refers to the different claims for authority to be devolved to the regions in order to reinforce their political importance inside and outside the state. The identitarian dimension relates to the issues that gravitate around the idea of strengthening
the national/regional identities in the regions as a means of implementing the culture from the centre or as a challenge to this. To address both dimensions, this investigation taps into the centre-periphery cleavage using five different dependent variables: saliency of the regional level, competence distribution, attitudes towards multiculturalism, constitutional status of the region, and identity. The purpose of these dependent variables it be able to capture to the full extent both dimensions in which the centre-periphery cleavage, territorial axis, is disaggregated. All together can provide an in-depth understanding of how parties calibrate the relations between the centre and its peripheries. As it is explained in the fourth chapter, they are applied differently to fit the purpose of the methodological approach chosen, and its main aims, developed in this investigation.

- Spain as a politically salient case study

Following the argument given by Fishman (2020: 15), the importance of Spain as a politically salient case study for comparative politics is very difficult to deny. In terms of its political development throughout Modernity, Spain experienced the same stages of evolution that other modern European states have, but this does not rule out its importance or dilute it amongst a general population of cases so easily. Analysing Spain using a comparative analysis framework highlights the difficulties to classify this case study using a simple and clear criteria in relation to an specific topic, as it can be observed for other countries, such as for example France and colossal research agenda on the building of a national identity (e.g., Bell 1996; Byrnes 2005; Greenwalt 2009; Hampton 2001; Jenkins and Sofos 1996; Kaiser 1999; Safran 1991). This lack of agreement amongst academics already gives the reader a clue of the importance of scrutinising this case in depth to comprehend what makes it divert from the generality of the population without considering it unique in any way (Fishman (2020: 16-17). The mix record of conjunctions and divergences with general theories in Politics that one can find in Spanish political history provides the grounds for further explorations that should attract the attention of any researcher who is interested in employing a comparative approach to obtain generalisable findings which can be applied to a broader set of cases both in a theoretical and empirical perspective. This is even more apparent after the transition to
democracy and the process of democratisation, making Spain one of the most successful and studied cases in Europe (Linz and Stepan 1996: 87).

One of the most salient issues in the Spanish political context is the articulation of the centre-periphery cleavage (Fishman 2020: 26-27), both in its decentralisation (e.g., Colino 2008; Colomer 1998; Convery and Lundberg 2017; Martínez-Herrera 2002; Moreno 2002) and identititarian dimensions (e.g., Flynn 2001; Lecours 2001; Martínez-Herrera and Miley 2010; Medrano and Gutiérrez 2001; Moreno et al. 1998; Núñez Seixas 2001; Núñez Seixas and Umbach 2008) and its constant cycle of appearance, disappearance and re-appearance throughout the last two centuries (Ruane 2003: 29-32). As it is further developed in the next chapter, the centre-periphery cleavage developed parallel to the processes of state- and nation-building, which provided, and still provides, very contextualised political responses both by the centre and the peripheries, making Spain a source of new theoretical and empirical findings which reconfigured, and still reconfigures, the understanding of these processes. Since the 19th century, this social cleavage has been in the very core of Spanish politics, and is still nowadays a source of important political decisions when it comes to the design of the Spanish state and nation (Balfour and Quiroga 2007: 1-3). The undeniable importance and deep-rooted saliency of the relations between the centre and its peripheries in Spain procures a very challenging research arena in which one can address key political quizzes that can be used to reinforce the explanation of the emergence of state and nations in Western Europe with a more detailed lens.

4. RESEARCH PLAN

The first step in this research plan is to address the main research method, which can be inserted in the broad category of the comparative method. The comparative method is defined here as Lijphart (1971: 682) does: one of the basic methods that can be used to generate valid empirical inferences linking them to a comparison between the principal variables. The two aims of this method are, on one hand, outline the possible relations that may exist between the most important variables whilst controlling for other possible explanatory variables (Collier 1993: 105-108), and on the other hand, address the validity of
the design in its internal and external spheres (Pennings et al. 2006: 6). These two features were originally designed to be applied on a national scale. In other words, the comparative design had some degree of national bias. The main problem with this procedure was that the use of national averages was inappropriate to understand how sub-national units, such as regions, unfold (Snyder 2001: 97). The new waves of decentralisation helped the articulation of sub-national units of decision-making networks and centres. In this scenario, comparative designs driven by the above national bias needed to be updated to have better and more precise answers to important research questions. With this in mind, the main research method used in this investigation is a variant of this well-known comparative method: the sub-national comparative method.

The sub-national comparative method is the methodological answer to this decentralisation challenge. In this method, sub-national units of analysis are put in the centre of the research process. Comparing sub-national units of measurement decreases the risk of falling into national biases and provide the grounds for researchers to gain in-depth knowledge of complex social processes that under the state-scale scopes are not approached with enough accuracy (Jeffery and Schakel 2013: 300). The sub-national comparative method provides three main advantages to the pre-existing general comparative designs (Synder 2001: 94). The first main advantage addresses and improves the limitations that a small or single-N study has in terms of the externalisation of the findings in controlled comparisons. The second main advantage refers to the selection and coding of the cases that could be selected. The third main advantage concerns the ability of researchers to better understand complex processes that are uneven in their spatial development.

The rationale for the use in this sub-national comparative method in this investigation is as follows. Synder (2001: 95-97) outlines two key: the increase in the number of observations, and the increase of the trustfulness of the controlled comparisons. The first key strength links to the problem of a small number of observations in studies with a low, or single, number of cases (King et al. 1994, 208), such as the small-/single-N designs. The purpose of this is to have more relevant sources of knowledge that can result in an increase in both the internal and the external validity of the design. For example, although a
single-N design is applied, sub-national units of measurement result in an increase in the number of observations, allowing to extract more important results and findings, helping to further develop detailed and developed answers to the research questions articulated around this single case (Landman 2008: 91-92). With these extra observations and findings, the aim is to avoid the well-known criticism of too few cases and too many variables (Goggin 1986). In this investigation, the sub-national units of observations are the regions.

The second key strength relates to the ability to make strong controlled comparisons. The rationale is to be able to compare cases, and at the same time, have control over other possible explanatory variables (Lijphart 1971: 689-690). Managing a comparison between sub-national units that share the same characteristics avoids the application of the Galton´s problem, but in this case, applied at a regional level. This is, comparing two variables which belong to two different contexts can lead to misleading findings and spurious relations between the variables. Providing general conclusions from political systems that have heterogeneous sub-national units (King et al. 1994: 222) can lead to poor and unspecific inferences and answers. Within-nation comparison is the specific technique that this investigation uses as part of the application of this sub-national comparative method. In the case of this investigation, all the regions need to share more or less the same cultural, historical, and socioeconomic characteristics so that the inferences and variation can be highlighted with more precision, controlling for other possible explanatory variables.

The second step in this research plan is to outline the proposed structure and roadmap. To answer the main research question, this thesis has eight main chapters that deal with the necessary steps to comply with the principles of internal and external validity, and reliability.

Chapter 2-The Literature Review. This chapter outlines the main literature on the research problem. Two main research areas are addressed: on one hand, the centre-periphery cleavage, and on the other hand, party competition. The aim of this chapter is to further develop the research area and agenda in which this investigation can be inserted.
Chapter 3 - The Conceptual and Theoretical Framework. This chapter contains, first, the definitions of the main concepts used in this thesis, and second, a theoretical framework that explores the main variables and hypotheses to be tested. This chapter provides the theoretical bases from where this investigation feeds before addressing the main research question with the analysis of the different sources of information and data.

Chapter 4 - Methodology. The sub-national comparative method of analysis is further developed in detail to comply with the required methodological thickness and truthfulness that any investigation needs. This chapter aims to set the research design that is followed to obtain the inferences that are used to address the main research question.

Chapter 5 - Quantitative Analysis. After detailing with the methodology used, the first step is to proceed with the quantitative description and analysis of the main data-set selected. The aim of this chapter is to obtain a general and big picture of the phenomenon.

Chapter 6 - Qualitative Analysis. After providing a general and big picture of the phenomenon, a second step is introduced to analyse the different sources of information with a qualitative approach. The aim of this chapter is to allow for an in-depth knowledge of the phenomenon.

Chapter 7 - Discussion. The inferences and partial conclusions obtained in the quantitative and qualitative analysis are integrated to addresses the main research question. The aim is to finalise with a final answer according to the knowledge gained from both analyses in a unified approach.

Chapter 8 - Conclusions. This final chapter summarises all the different steps that have been taken in this investigation. The aim of this chapter is to conclude with the overall most important ideas and findings that can be extracted from the research process as a whole.

5. CONCLUSIONS

This first chapter has been used to introduce the primary research area, the research agenda where this investigation finds its purpose, the main
research problem and question, and finally, a reasonable research method and roadmap to approach it. The centre-periphery cleavage is the primary research area where this thesis finds its foundations. In relation to this social cleavage, the research agenda that addresses multi-level party competition at the regional level has yet to deal in depth with distance, fragmentation, and polycentricity as key factors that may contribute to shape party behaviour in establishing, maintaining, and/or challenging the relations between the centres and peripheries. With this in mind, the main research question is: what factors shape party competition on the centre-periphery cleavage? The sub-national comparative method is viewed here as the most reliable design than can be used to answer research questions that refer to units of analysis that are not located on a national scale, like regions, which are the main focus of this investigation.
CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW
1. INTRODUCTION

The objective of this chapter is to review the literature on the main research problem, understand how parties compete on the centre-periphery cleavage. This provides the necessary foundations to accumulate knowledge, contributing to expand and map the various explanations to this phenomenon through the different approaches taken by the main authors in the field. This chapter aims to meet two main criteria (Creswell 1994: 37): on one hand, present the existing literature that addresses the same research problem, and on the other hand, review the research agenda in which this investigation can be inserted. The literature provides multiple answers on how parties behave at the regional level, adapting to the existence of multiple dimensions and levels of competition where the centre-periphery cleavage plays a major role. As outlined in the previous chapter, this investigation can be inserted in the research agenda that build around the RMP, this is, multi-dimensional party competition at the regional level. This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first outlines the literature regarding the centre-periphery cleavage as the main research area from which this investigation feeds. The second deals with party competition in general terms. The third focuses more specifically on party competition along the centre periphery cleavage in Spain as the main research agenda that fits the purpose of this thesis.

2. CENTRE-PERIPHERY CLEAVAGE

2.1) Introduction

The notion of centre-periphery cleavage in its original form can be traced back to a variety of different disciplines, such as Human Geography (Hartshorne 1941; Gottmann 1952; Cox and Reynolds 1974; Landes 1998; Porter and Sheppard 1998), Economics (Perroux 1950; Hirschman 1958; Vidal 2002; Martínez Peinado 2011), or Architecture and Urban Development (Brunn and Williams 1993; Brockerhorff 2000). Mainly employing a comparative method, the centre-periphery cleavage is framed in political science in different scenarios, from nation-states to world-wide phenomena, to understand the ways in which different types of regions interact with each other. In this chapter, the main focus is located on nation-states through a comparative perspective (Deutsch 1961;
Rokkan and Urwin 1982; Kuznetsov 2015). Despite this, it has to be acknowledged that there is an extensive application of the centre-periphery analysis with a world-wide perspective (Wallerstein 1974; 1978; 1983). Finally, this section is based on the seminal work done by Wellhofer (1988; 1989).

Wellhofer (1989: 340) summarises the findings with which political science contributes to expand the knowledge and understanding of the relations between centres and peripheries. Firstly, centre-periphery location is important for understanding politics and social organisation. Secondly, the dynamics between core and periphery are crucial to understand social change. Thirdly, the interpretation of the type and kind of relations between the core and the periphery can explain the political and social status between them. With this in mind, the literature can be grouped into three main questions or debates (Wellhofer 1989: 340): how do centres and peripheries arise? (the emergence of states and cores); which mechanisms are used to establish the dominant position of the core vis-a-vis the periphery? (centre-periphery relations); and counter-core movements and their analysis (counter-core movements).

2.2) The emergence of states and cores

The first of the three main questions, outlined by the literature, gravitates around one of the most discussed issues in political science: the emergence of states, although some authors think that this concept is out of data (Levi 2002: 34). This is addressed in two steps. The first step refers to the key features that characterise the emergence of states, and the second step describes this as a process. Amongst the different characteristics that the literature identifies in order to understand the emergence of states, here, the focus is located on four key elements: a centralised bureaucracy; taxation; the use of war as a catalyst; and economic expansionism.

Some authors consider centralised bureaucracy as the most important feature of the emergence of states (Vu 2010: 151). Large-scale bureaucracy and standardised processes were implemented to address the different needs of the population and the state itself (Pierson 1996: 16-17). This centralised bureaucracy saw an evolution from the early processes, first described as a cooperative relation between the vassals and the lords, and then as less
patrimonialised and more rationalised (Vu 2010: 153). Part of the literature identifies the implementation of standardised processes as a result of the survival of the elites, or in other words, the collective rule of the ruling class (Adams 2005: 14-21). As states emerged, the elites adapted to this evolution on the basis of their own survival, forcing a change from above through this centralised bureaucracy (Spruyt 1994). This centralised bureaucracy enlarged at the same rate as the state itself in order to cope with its needs (Riggs 1997: 347), adapting to new contexts. Although considerable bureaucratic complexes were not new in history, the professionalisation of the personnel and the hierarchical relations between levels were characteristics that defined the emergence of states after the 15th century (Rothstein 1998: 291).

The next element is taxation and the spread of centralised processes of collecting revenues through a strong effective fiscal system (Dincecco 2015: 903). This factor can be seen, to some extent, as a direct consequence of the implementation of a centralised bureaucracy to cover the costs of the expansion of the state’s coercive means (Tilly 1975: 73). No state could have emerged without the ability of extracting resources for its existence (Tilly 1990: 96). The collection of revenues was spread state-wide and all citizens became subjects to taxation, spreading the internal cohesion and legitimacy of modern states in comparison to the systems in place in earlier periods (Pierson 1996: 25-26). As with a centralised bureaucracy, this taxation system also saw an evolution as states emerged. The introduction of a centralised taxation system developed from a decentralised market-base method of collecting revenues in the early modern period, to a centralised and bureaucratic fiscal system of the last period of the modern era (Johnson and Koyama 2014: 2). This process could be defined as the evolution from tax farming to standardised state-wide taxation (Tilly 1989: 565).

The third characteristic was the use of war as a catalyst, identified as one of the most prominent features of the emergence of states (Spruyt 2002: 135). The building of armed forces to expand the influence of the state outside and inside its borders (Tilly 1990: 20-21) contributed to the survival of the ruling classes (Vu 2010: 152). As with the above two characteristics, this feature also experienced an evolution. The needs of the emerging states increased as they
faced threats from the outside and the inside, pushing for more modern and professional armed forces, resulting in the so-called “military revolution” of the 16th and 17th centuries (Ertman 2005: 378). Consequently, the development of more sophisticated war technology and the expansion of state war machines strengthened the centralised bureaucracy and taxation means to support them (Spruyt 2002: 136). The result of military expansion placed much tension on pre-modern institutions, which in some cases, collapsed and gave way to modern military-bureaucratic states (Downing 1992: 239).

The final characteristic of the emergent states was the economic expansionism of the centralised military-bureaucratic administration. Acquiring more resources to fuel the state machinery is identified by the literature to be a key aspect of the emergence of states (Tilly 1990: 16-17). Some authors link the rise of capitalism with the need to strengthen the power of emerging modern states (Strayer 1970; Mendels 1972; Brenner 1976) to secure the markets from where the ruling classes extracted the surplus to finance their own survival via their increasing coercive forces (Spruyt 2002: 137). At the same time, securing new sources of resources favoured the efficiency of the centralised bureaucracy and taxation systems (Vu 2010: 156-157). This economic expansion of the modern states also had another side effect. The fragmented scenario of Europe during the last part of the feudal period limited, to some extent, the expansion of the states (Spruyt 2002: 138). The reason for this was the resistance of the urban elites to support excessive taxation and economic subordination to the needs of the ruling classes (Tilly 1989: 656-566), especially after the crisis of the 14th century and the strengthening of cities (Ertman 2005: 373). This resulted in the incorporation of the interests of these urban classes (Spruyt 1994: 177), reinforcing the link between public and private interests, and the economic success of the state itself (Spruyt 2002: 138).

The second step pictures the emergence of states as a process. The above discussed characteristics are better understood if they are inserted in a context in which they unfolded. The key point in this process is outlined by Tilly, who identified this as a reaction of the ruling classes to continuum
historic events (Gustafsson 1992: 192). There was no beforehand plan to react to the events that came along. Modern states emerged improvising and adapting (Tilly 1990: 26). Spruyt also outlined the reaction to specific historical contextual events to make sense of the emergence of states (1994:21-25). This can also explain, to some extent, the variety of state forms in Europe during the late medieval period. Part of the literature identifies the period of the 11th century as the starting point when the European modern states began to emerge (Spruyt 2002: 132), evolving until the most refined political formation, the nation-state (Tilly 1990: 15; Ertman 2005: 375). The period before was characterised by the segmented local power of lords and kings. Some features that favoured this evolution were identified by Pierson, including demographic changes, transformation of the modes of production, and the implementation of capitalism (1996: 28). With this in mind, the emergence of modern states in Europe saw an evolution from fragmentated entities to homogeneous nation-states after the French Revolution (Spruyt 2002: 133). This is, an evolution from empires in the 5th century to the modern nation-state of the 19th century (Pierson 1996: 30-44), fulfilling stages such as feudalism and the absolute state (Held 1992: 74-90). Finally, it is important to consider how pre-modern institutions adapted and gave way to sustain modern states, being part of this evolutionary process (Tilly 1975: 48).

Considering that the modern state rose to respond to specific historic conditions (Hall 1985: 158-161), and that the feudal period was characterised by a strong fragmentation (Jonsson et. al. 2000: 62-63), this part of the section addresses the emergence of cores and peripheries. This is divided into two main dimensions: the spatial and the process dimensions. Regarding the spatial dimension, the argument is that the feudal system located the new centres of power in the peripheral areas of the old empires (Rokkan 1973: 77; Rokkan 1975: 576). This provided these peripheries with a strong control over the economic, cultural and political agendas, becoming the new cores during the period after the fall of the Western Roman Empire (Held 1992: 79-82). Despite this spatial dimension, the discussion can be further expanded to address the process
dimension through which these peripheries became the new cores. The literature is divided into two main arguments. On one hand, those who argue that the modern states and cores emerged from the feudal and rural aristocratic elites (Rokkan 1973; 1975; Anderson 1974a; 1974b; Hechter and Brustein 1980), and on the other hand, those who argue that they emerged from the urban bourgeois elites (Moore 1966; Tilly 1990; Epstein 2000; Boone 2002).

The two schools of thought can be merged into what can be labelled as the process of corelisation-peripheralisation. As the old empires collapsed, the new centres of power where located in the rural peripheries, controlled, at the beginning, by aristocratic rural elites. Cores emerged, to some extent, from natural advantages, with a strong rural elite that attracted resources to further develop, backed up by expanding cities and urban centres with consolidated communication and financial channels (Kindleberger 1978: 66-134; Parker 1984: 145). As these rural elites expanded their influence and control through the implementation of a centralised bureaucracy, taxation system, professional armies, and economic expansionism, they found increasing resistance from the urban elites that emerged from the concentration of new modes of production, which replaced the old rural modes of production (Hilton 1979). The struggle between the rural and urban elites to control the new modes of production and resources can be described using the process of corelisation-peripheralisation, resulting in the emergence of new cores and European states. Corelisation-peripheralisation can be conceptualised as the process of transition from the aristocratic rural to the urban bourgeois elites (Merrington 1975: 71-73).

The corelisation-peripheralisation process can be developed through Anderson’s analysis (1974a; 1974b). The fragmentation of power structures, Anderson argues (1974b: 148-52), favoured the rivalry between the aristocratic rural and the emerging urban bourgeois classes. The absence of a strong centralised power granted the best scenario for power competition because there was little or no control of one ruling class over the other (1974a: 21). The process through which the new cores and modern European states emerged can be described as a reaction of the rural aristocracy against the urban bourgeois elites.

---

1 Rokkan’s analysis does not describe how and through which processes did these modern European states and cores rise (Wellhofer 1989: 345).
classes and vice versa. Identifying, for example, the absolutist state as a reaction to the emerging urban bourgeoisie by the rural aristocracy (1974a: 18).

This struggle has one key element that favoured its appearance: a strong class consciousness. The aristocratic rural classes had a more developed class consciousness in comparison to the urban bourgeoisie (Wellhofer 1989: 345), which at the beginning, were no more than a group of local artisans and merchants. As Hechter and Brustein (1980: 1990) described, this resulted in a delegation of personal power by the aristocrats to the new centralised modern European states to secure their privileged position (Hechter 1977: 1068-1073). This scenario was not always the same, and the urban bourgeois classes, as they become stronger, challenged the existing power relations (Rotz 1985: 64; De Long and Shleifer 1993: 685-695; Dumolyn and Haemers 2005: 374-380). This highlights the fact that this process was dynamic in nature and changing over time. The means through which these urban bourgeois classes challenged this status quo were, amongst others (Rokkan 1973: 91), the development of a literate bureaucracy and legal institutions, growing trade, and the establishment of cultural standards, which latter on facilitated the processes of nation-building. This gave way to a change in power relations with the introduction of new capitalist modes of production, and therefore, the development of new forms of

Figure 2.1. The process of emerging cores and peripheries.
political organisation like the liberal state (Held 1992: 89). Therefore, those cities or city-belts located in the old peripheries became the new cores, replacing the old aristocratic rural elites and centres of power through a predominant and emerging urban bourgeoisie via controlling the new modes of production and the supply of goods (Jacob 1984: 42-44; 63-64). This class struggle and the predominance of the urban bourgeoisie were responsible for the emergence of the modern European states (Epstein 2000: 29-30). It is not a simple change of role, the old peripheries becoming the new cores, it was a whole political, social, and economic process. The cores of the modern European states were those regions where the incipient urban bourgeoisie located its centres of power (Moore 1966)\(^2\), replacing the original rural aristocratic classes as Rokkan theorised (1975: 596-597)\(^3\).

2.3) Centre-periphery relations

The second question that the literature on the centre-periphery cleavage addresses is the ways in which the relations between cores and peripheries are conducted and governed. The literature, in this case, is clearly divided into two main schools of thoughts: the neoliberal and the neomarxist schools of thought. The first approach is adopted by authors such as Lipset-Rokkan (1967), Urwin (1982) and Meny and Wright (1985), and the second approach is defended by authors such as Hechter (1975a), Nairn (1977) and Frank (1979).

- **Neoliberal school of thought**

It draws its theoretical arguments from the classical liberal economic discourse and pluralist theories of politics (Wellhofer 1989: 341). The main assumptions considered here are, amongst others (Wellhofer 1988: 285-286): first, society is represented as a reservoir of scarce resources continuously reallocated by the market through the price mechanism; second, in the long term, markets are self-regulating mechanisms returning to equilibrium; third, inequalities are noncumulative; fourth, trade is based on comparative advantages

---

\(^2\) For a more detailed analysis of Rokkan’s conceptual map, see Allardt (1981) and Flora (2007: 95-209).

\(^3\) It is curious that Rokkan, in his conceptual map of Europe (1973: 80-84) develops more in detail the theory of Moore, but goes in the opposite direction when he lays the foundations of the modern European state on the rural aristocratic classes.
of market participants; fifth, who enter the market from free choice; sixth, wealth is created by the division of labour in conjunction with free markets; seventh, a distinction is drawn between private and public, with corresponding lines between politics and economics; and eighth, conflict is competitive, integrating competitors into a new equilibrium functioning as a regenerative mechanism for the existing social order. In simple terms, the neoliberal approach states that when markets are articulated in a free, voluntary, mutually beneficial way, both the cores and the peripheries benefit from them. These free markets of the cores will bring prosperity and benefits to the periphery so that the relations would be considered complementary and harmonious (Jacobs 1984: 47). This idea of harmonious relations is contained in other analyses, such as O´Brien (1982) or Smout (1980: 623-624) with reference to Scotland, considering this way that due to this mutual benefit gained through the free markets, the periphery does not exist on the dependency vortex that the neomarxist approach argues but on the assumption of complementary and interdependence (Meny and Wright 1985: 7).

Rokkan argues that competing markets and institutions help to self-limit the long-term accumulation (Rokkan and Urwin 1983: 166-192), resulting in a more or less equal distribution of wealth amongst the regions through, for example, the mechanism of gaining representation at the cores by the peripheries (Rokkan 1970: 121). A difference between Rokkan´s analysis and other neoliberal approaches is that he introduced not only the economic (Jacobs 1984: 140-144; Parker 1984: 145) but also the political and cultural spheres. The equilibrium, according to Rokkan, is found in the interconnection between the three. Not only is the equilibrium favourable, but competition between the core and the periphery is seen as a good thing which brings regeneration of the nation-states (Meny and Wright 1985: 6). The neoliberal theoretical approach relies strongly on the liberal economic theory, stating that free markets would bring mutual benefits to the cores and the peripheries. This competition becomes a dynamic force that would favour the regeneration of the state when dealing with an unequal development of the different regions (Wellhofer 1988: 289). The self-regulation feature of the market would prevent any social group or class from being too dominant over the others, finding, through an economic equilibrium, political and social stability.
- Neomarxist school of thought

If the neoliberal approach assumes that the market is a free entity capable of self-regulating and produce mutual benefits for both the cores and peripheries, establishing not a dependency relation but one of respect and beneficial competition, the neomarxist approach questions this premise. It does so by using terms such as internal colonialism (Hetcher 1975a) in order to articulate a theoretical framework that advocates the idea that the relations between cores and peripheries are dominated by a position of subordination of the latter to the former. This can be observed by the transfer of surplus to the cores, with the state as the political structure that is there to ensure the subordination of the peripheries. Using the example of the core-periphery economic analysis that came from Latin America and the ECLAC (Furtado 1964; Dos Santos 1970), the Dependency Theory\(^4\) was applied within the nation-states. The peripheries are seen therefore as mere surplus extracting regions for the core to maintain its economic dominance. Following the economic subordination came the cultural and political subjugation of the peripheries, which, in order to regain control over their own modes of production, rise as a collective.

The main assumptions of this school of thought are, amongst others (Wellhofer 1988: 290): first, the spheres of economy, cultural and politics are not separate, but connected with a predominant domination of the first one; second, instead of distinguishing the cores and the peripheries using living standards, they are distinguished using the modes of production that reflect the living standards; third, markets are not free, balanced, and self-correcting mechanisms but they are unbalanced mechanisms of coercive relations; fourth, the wealth attracted by the core is not due to the division of labour or the markets, it is based on the extraction of surplus from the peripheries; and fifth, conflicts are not beneficial but cumulative and disintegrated. The main argument of the neomarxist approach is that the cores use the peripheries, under a relation of dominance, to

\(^4\) The Dependency Theory uses a core-periphery perspective worldwide to describe the economic dominance of the core over the peripheral regions, integrating both kind of regions in the so-called world system. Its two main theoretical assumptions are: first, the poor regions (nations in this case as the perspective is worldwide) provide the rich regions with wealth, cheap labor, surplus and markets; and second, these rich regions maintain the dominance power relations through the economic, cultural and political interconnected spheres (Cardoso and Faletto 1969; Cardoso 1973; Wallerstein 1978).
extract surplus to maintain the economic, cultural and political superiority to sustain the division of labour in the two regions. This approach does not consider possible to separate social interaction into three different spheres which operate separately. As Wallerstein states (1978: 7), the economic is the root for the cultural and political, and therefore, the latter two are the main consequences of the former. This thesis of non-separation of the three spheres is not only defended by authors of this school of thought in politics (Massey 1984: 12-17; Burawoy 1985: 30-32), but also by some authors in other fields of study, such as Marvin Harris (1975; 1979), Dollimore and Alan (1985) or Price (1982) in Anthropology and the Cultural Materialist approach.

The spatial analysis of the neomarxist approach regarding cores and peripheries deals with the diffusion of capitalism and the different development of the regions. Taking into account the irregular characteristics of the expansion of capitalism (Walker 1978: 28; Amin 1983: 363-365), the spatial differentiation of labour and modes of production produce an uneven relation between those developed cores and those less advanced peripheries. The main result is the unequal exchange mechanisms to maintain the relations of dominance between them (Johnston 1982: 51). One of the main results of this uneven diffusion of capitalism is segmented labour markets, which at the same time fuel a spatial division of social classes and, if some regions that have ethnic original population, a cultural division of labour (Hechter 1985; Levi and Hechter 1985; Rogowski 1985). None the less, cores and peripheries are distinguished by these means using labour control mechanisms which fit perfectly to the different stages of evolution and penetration of capitalism (Burawoy 1985: 263-268; Wellhofer 1988: 291).

2.4) Counter-core movements

This section deals with the dilemma that is most important for this investigation, the counter-core movements. These movements have been gaining strength throughout the second half of the 20th and first part of the 21st century, challenging both the state and the nation. The idea of a harmonious integration of peripheries through processes such as state or nation-building is somehow disproved by the case studies used by the recent literature. The early
literature viewed the peripheral regions as traditional and less developed (Seers 1979: 3; 8-9; 12-14) and the cores as modernising forces, bringing development in the economic, cultural and political arena (Randall and Theobald 1998: 15-21). The expansion of the cores to the surrounding peripheries (Hoogvelt 1997: 15) meant the integration of the latter into the economic system of the former. This results into an integration of the peripheries into the cultural and political networks of the cores (Shils 1961: 128) under a relation of domination. This economic, cultural and political assimilation would end up in the loyalty of the peripheries towards the core in the state and nation-building processes (Almond and Powell 1966: 36). Despite this initial premise, a nation-state, although still the central unit of political organisation of a given population, does not have the internal homogeneity that it was thought to have (Fitjar 2010a: 1). The recent tensions on the nation-states that are focused on the pooling of sovereignty to supra-national entities and globalisation (Holton 1998: 97), and the growing spatial differences between cores and peripheries (Massey 1984: 82; 112) have not been solved by the processes of state and nation-building, triggering territorial tensions between the cores and the peripheries.

- The centre-periphery conflict

Territorial tensions between cores and peripheries are, according to Lipset and Rokkan (1967: 13), the direct result of the state and national-building processes. More precisely, the reaction of the minorities in the peripheries to the homogenisation and assimilation by the core (Deutsch 1961: 498) through economic, cultural, and political standardisation (Rokkan and Urwin 1983: 59; Urwin 1985: 160-164). Cores and peripheries, when confronted with each other, become antagonistic units, representing huge obstacles to the processes of state and nation-building, resulting, sometimes in armed conflict and secession (Lopez-Aranguren 1983: 29). As Lopez-Aranguren (1983: 30) points out, the processes of state and nation-building have two main handicaps. First, the problem with the state-building process is that it involves the establishment of a centralised authority in regions where other cultural and political groups have their own social networks (Weiner 1966). Second, the problem with the process of nation-building is that it involves that those same differentiated cultural and political groups need to pay allegiance to the new centralised power or they risk
being assimilated under the cultural and political relations coming from the core (Almond and Powell 1966: 36). Europe is currently going through a time of sub-national mobilisation (Hooghe 1995; Loughlin 2004; Teló 2007; Dardanelli 2017), through movements such as regionalism (Fitjar 2010a: 5), balancing the tensions between simple administrative decentralisation and total independence. The psychological bases of regional mobilisation are being triggered by the centre-periphery conflict⁵.

- Analysis of the counter-core movements

According to Wellhofer (1989: 346-348), there are three main analyses that can be applied to the conflict between cores and peripheries: the developmental or functionalist theory (Alford 1963; Lipset and Rokkan 1967; McKenzie 1977); the reactive ethnicity theory (Hechter 1975a; Ragin 1977); and the ethnic competition theory (Hannan 1979). The first theory follows the neoliberal approach and the last two follow the neomarxist approach. To narrow down the scope, the most important theories for this instigation are the last two, as the relations between the centres and the peripheries are framed using the neomarxist approach.

The ethnic reaction theory argues that the diffusion of capitalism to pre-capitalist regions create uneven class furtherance, which combined with the pre-existing territorial, ethnic or cultural identification, splitting the cultural division of labour (Bonacich 1972: 558; Meadwell 1989: 139-142), triggering the ethnic cleavage (Wellhofer 1989: 346). This model was developed by authors such as Hechter (1975) and Hechter et al. (1982) to explain, using terms such as internal colonialism, the social context of ethnic groups in regions inside nation-states that are under the dominance of the cores, reinforcing the struggle between ethnic groups (Ragin 1979: 621). Due to the dominance relation of cores over peripheries, the continuing economic, cultural and political differences will carry on, which will not be shadowed by an increase in the contacts between cores and

⁵ The psychological bases of social integration (named as national but that can be applied to any social group) are numbered by Katz et. al. (1970), and are four types: first, symbolic commitment to signs and symbols representing the group; second, functional commitment to the benefits and rewards that the commitment to the group offers; third, normative commitment to the norms and rules of the group; and fourth, ideological commitment to the idea that articulates the group.
peripheries (Lopez-Aranguren 1983: 24). The result would be the opposite, inequalities would be institutionalised rather than disappear (Leifer 1981). This means that certain roles are assigned to certain individuals because of their ethnic characteristics (Bonacich 1979), resulting in a cultural division of labour (Hechter 1978: 295-296). Not only assigned roles are institutionalised but also there is a relation between the higher roles, assigned to the members of the cores, and the lower roles, assigned to the members of the peripheries. This ethnic division will relentlessly end up in the foundation and reinforcement of a differentiated periphery in contrast to the core (Nielsen 1985), favouring its mobilisation and reinforcing ethnic antagonism (Bonacich 1976: 549).

Two variants of this theory can be found (Wellhofer 1989: 346). The first variant is that reactive ethnicity becomes stronger when de-territorialisation of life (Williams 1979: 279-280), proletarianisation and extraction of surplus (Poulantzas 1980: 103-105; Johnston 1982: 123-147) from the peripheries is strongly perceived by the working class of the region that share ethnic features. This is even more evident where inter-group differences are sharper (Rogowski 1985: 94). The second variant is that ethnic nationalism is a reaction to modernisation by the middle class or intelligentsia of the peripheries in order to maintain its privileges, seeking the mobilisation of the population to weaken the assimilation by the cores (Ragin 1977: 449; Smith 1981: 60), although this might not necessarily result in the disappearance of the ethnic group (Olzak 1983: 362).

As Cunningham states (2012: 507), the ethnic competition theory states that, building on Barth’s theory of boundary social making (1969), when two or more ethnic groups compete for the same resources in the same space, group boundaries are reinforced (Hannan 1979: 253-256). Uneven economic development and inequalities will strengthen the cohesiveness of group identity (Wellhofer 1989: 346), focusing on the grievances that these differences create (Rothschild 1981:43). Ethnic boundaries are generally perceived in a low intensity scale when ethnic groups inhabit separate economic, cultural and political systems. On the other hand, when competing ethnic groups occupy the same economic, cultural and political space, ethnic solidarities intensify and contribute to increased territorial based conflict (Soule and van Dyke 1999: 728-731). The ethnic competition model of Barth (1969) is more likely to appear when the
expansion of capitalism and its economic, cultural and political networks start to interfere with the local economic, cultural and political networks. Modernisation processes cause that the economic opportunities are not linked any more to specific ethnic assignments and they are based on a merit and success scale, articulating a competition habitat for multiple ethnic groups to compete for the same resources. Ethnic solidarity is essential when competing for the resources available.

As for the above ethnic reaction theory, here, the middle class and intelligentsia of the regions are responsible for this ethnic solidarity amongst the groups who are competing for the resources (Banton 1983; Brass 1991). This theory was inspired by an instrumentalist critique of primordialism. They disagree with the assumption held by primordialists that "ethnicity is strongly determined by common ancestry and traditions. Instrumentalism has directed attention toward ethnicity as a calculation of social, economic, and political profits carried out by political elites" (Vermeersch 2011: 7). Authors such as Nagel (1996: 23) argue that ethnic mobilisation is the result of individuals engaging "in continuous assessment of situation and audience, emphasising or deemphasising particular dimensions of ethnicity according to some measure of utility or feasibility".

2.5) Sources of regional conflict

In this investigation, the main source of regional conflict is found in the concept of horizontal inequalities. Horizontal inequalities are understood as systematic economic and political inequality between regional groups (Ostby 2013: 207), although it should be acknowledged that the literature also applies this concept to other types of groups, such as ethnic or religious collectivities (Cederman and Girardin 2007). The focus is put on inequalities amongst groups and not amongst individuals, as vertical inequalities suggest (Stewart 2008: 12-13). The latter tries to explain how greed instead of grievance between groups is able to explain inequalities (Collier and Hoeffler 2004: 587-589). Horizontal inequalities are taken as a multidimensional frame, with an economic, social, cultural, and political dimension (Stewart 2002: 9), all considered intrinsically connected, one affected by the other (Stewart 2008: 13).
A variety of reasons can be found to explain these differences between regional groups, from economic relations to the distribution of resources (Brown and Langer 2010: 29-31). The key issue is that these inequalities are maintained through time, helping to create privileged groups in the cores and disadvantaged groups in the peripheries (Ostby 2013: 215). These inequalities, maintained over time, are perceived as a dominating mechanism implemented by the cores (Ostby 2013: 215). This perception by the population of the peripheral regions leads to its mobilisation when it is articulated as a grievance between them and the cores. Grievances are understood here as the feeling that a group has when it perceives itself being dominated by another from a superior position (Cederman et al. 2013: 37-44).

- **Socio-economic grievances**

  The socio-economic source of regional conflict is the uneven capitalist development between centres and the peripheries. Not only is an uneven development required, but it has to be institutionalised by the core in order to keep the inequalities as a source of income for its own elites. The uneven economic development affects therefore the regional population, and is perceived as an extraction of surplus by the core and its elites, strengthening these inequalities (Myrdal 1957). The socio-economic relation is perceived as a relation between the dominated (periphery) and the dominant (core). The strengthening of the inequalities results in a social unrest in the peripheries as they see their status being undermined in comparison to the core. These socio-economic grievances can also be cross-regional. Poor and rich regions can claim that their development is limited by the transfers they provide to other regions (Keating 2017: 12). This might affect the inter-regional solidarity and raise normative issues regarding the territorial justice of the welfare state (Strorper 2011: 6-7).

- **Cultural grievances**

  The process of nation-building, unlike the state-building process, is more based on the assimilation of the peripheries into the cultural network of the core (Keating 2001: 29). This implies the suppression or dissolution of the cultural base of the peripheries if they contradict the culture coming from the core (Coakley 1992: 344-345). Cultural grievances can be seen as more drastic if
there are strong pre-existing distinct cultural elements that differentiate the periphery from the core (Lopez-Aranguren 1983: 32). Using a Marxist and a cultural materialist framework of analysis, the cultural network is a direct result of the economic relations existing in a society. Those who own the modes of production are able to articulate a whole superstructure of many mechanisms, including culture, to express the economic relations on the base of society. Therefore, the existing and dominant culture in a society is the reflection of the economic relations (Harris 1975; 1979). The nation-state that the core is trying to assert in the peripheries is not a simple political entity (Hall 1993: 355), it is the articulation of economic relations, expressed through culture, that clashes with the economic relations in the periphery, and inevitably with its culture.

- Political grievances

The uneven distribution of power among the elites is a source of territorial tensions (Lopez-Arangure, 1983: 33), with the ones coming from the core seeking to gain more and more power in the peripheries and the local ones seeking to maintain the one they have. The regional population seems to feel a disconnection between the defence of their interests and the power relations and decision-making processes, from which they are excluded. The exclusion of the regional population from any power relations and decision-making processes deepens the feeling of being subordinated to the interest of others. The power struggle between the different elites is the main example of the political grievances that the implementation of certain power relations creates. In terms of the relations between the centres and the peripheries, this can be contextualised in the homogenous wave that tries to strengthen the interests of the elites at the core (Rokkan and Urwin 1982), subordinating the peripheries to their will.

2.6) From horizontal inequalities to regional conflict

The process that explains regional conflict through horizontal inequalities can be divided into two main steps. The first step refers to the identification of horizontal inequalities as grievances, and the second step refers to the grievances as a source of mobilisation amongst the regional population. Referring to the first step, the main argument is that grievances on their own are
not enough to promote regional conflict (Ostby 2013: 216). The reason for this is that, in opposition to horizontal inequalities, grievances are seen as subjective phenomena (Cederman et al. 2011: 481). These grievances need to be acknowledged by the regional population in order for it to construct its own group identity that identifies it as a disadvantaged social group (Stewart 2008: 7-12). This own identity articulated by the regional population is the first step to fuel regional conflict between the periphery and the centre. Social comparison is key here to understand how a group identifies itself as disadvantaged in comparison to others, increasing the chances for conflict (Ashmore et al. 2001: 3-4). The result of these self-perceived grievances amongst the regional population is the feeling of resentment, as Petersen states (2002: 40), understood as the feeling of being politically dominated.

The second step focuses on the process of mobilisation. For a group to be able to mobilise around these grievances, two main elements are needed (Ostby 2013: 216): organisation and opportunity. Organisation is understood as the ability to organise a social group in order to achieve a goal in the name of that group and in detriment of another (Stewart 2008: 11-12). Opportunity is addressed using Gurr’s argument (1993: 130), understanding it to be internal or external, depending on whether this relates to intra-group issues (internal), or if it relates to the context in which the group acts (external). Both elements have to be present in order to use the already identified grievances as a source of regional mobilisation. The fulfilment of the process that explains regional conflict through horizontal inequalities is expressed in regionalism as one of the main counter-core movements that can be found in sub-national political scenarios.

2.7) Regionalism as a counter-core movement

- **Socio-economic regionalism**

Socio-economic regionalism is based on the socio-economic subordination and dependence that the peripheries suffer (Johnston 1982: 51; 123-133). The main reason for the appearance of this kind of regionalism is the permanent state of undevelopment that the local population of the periphery sense their region has (Lopez-Aranguren 1983: 39). This can be expressed in many ways, such as for example, low wages or poor communication links. The
main claim of socio-economic regionalism is the differences between the regions and their socio-economic development, having the idea that the relation between the core and the periphery is unevenly balanced towards the former (Frank 1969). Socio-economic regionalism demands also focus on more equal social opportunities for all regions and not the institutionalised inequalities that make some regions richer and more developed than others, highlighting the importance of upgrading the less favoured regions with more investment in order to catch up with the rest.

This kind of regionalism is the best example of the clash between the elites in order to rearrange the socio-economic relations and ownership of the modes of production (Massey 1984: 105; 112). Demanding a full decentralisation of socio-economic matters is one of its most mentioned purpose, being the best way to manage from within the region the interests of the local population and its socio-economic aspirations and needs. Worth mentioning here is the contrasts between socio-economic regionalism and what the new regionalism approach\(^6\) means by regionalisation. Regionalisation can be understood as political measures approved by the government to: first, approach the territorial organisational needs of a region; second, draw an economic plan to fulfil the needs of the region; and third, solving the excessive bureaucratised weight of a too centralised state. Socio-economic issues are increasingly presented through the regional scope, fuelled by socio-economic grievances (Keating 2017: 13).

- **Cultural regionalism**

This type of regionalism emerges when certain cultural elements, such as language, religion or traditions, are challenged by the culture coming from the core (Lopez-Aranguren 1983: 35). The key point is that these cultural elements that are challenged by the core become politicised. When certain cultural elements are challenged by another social group, the threatened social group tends to make those cultural elements the political bases of a distinct identity and intra-group solidarity (Easton 1965). The main aims of cultural regionalism are: first, fight the uniformity that globalisation and the modern nation-states bring

---

\(^6\) To learn more about the New Regionalism Approach, see: Ethier (1998), Hettne and Söderbaum (1998), or Söderbaum (2003).
(Robertson 1992: 98-105); second, recognition of the cultural differences that exist from one social group to the other (Türsan 1998: 3-7); third and final, redistribution and decentralisation of power (Weiner 1992: 318-320). In other words, regional elites, using regional cultural elements, politicise a distinct regional identity from the one coming from the core to maintain their own interests as the main privileged group in the periphery. Although in some occasions decentralisation processes can fuel strong secessionist positions, normally, this distinct regional identity can be part of a broader national project (Núñez Seixas 2001: 485-486), claiming the self-rule of the region based on this distinctiveness (Keating 2001: 28-30).

- Political regionalism

This can be considered as the activity that uses the multi-level political channels to reinforce the importance of the regions. This can unfold through the institutional design of the state (such as the Senado in Spain or the Bundesrat in Germany (Hooghe 1993; Börzel 2000)), or through the adaptation of parties to multi-level competition. Decentralisation is one of the most obvious issues raised by the regions to protect and promote their interests (Bukowski 1997). Decentralisation engages with the process of devolving competences to the regions in order to correct, or sometimes to deepen, the differences between the regions inside a state through, for example, efficiency in implementing policies (López-Santana and Moyer 2012: 770-771). This increases the regional and local representativeness and importance in party competition. Examples of political regionalism can be seen in the process of political centrifugation SWPs. For example, the importance of regional leaders (León 2014: 393), the degree of autonomy of the regional branches (Maddens and Libbrecht 2009: 228), or the adaptation of strategies when competing with regionalist parties (Libbrecht et al. 2011: 625).

2.8) Spatial dimension

Paradoxically, and despite the fact that the location of cores and peripheries has an important role in the whole analysis, the reality is that geographical location is not the indispensable element that it appears to be from the brief summary given above. More than a spatial dimension, the centre-
periphery analysis gives a territorial dimension, not necessarily attached to a
specific physical and geographical element. For example, Shils (1975: 3), when
describing what a core is, gives it a central position when being a productive
element of cultural values, but does not mention a geographical or physical
location of this core. Other social sciences incorporate in the centre-periphery
analysis a more relevant spatial dimension, with authors such as Lewthwaite
(1966) or Harvey (1969) when they deal with human geography for example. This
could be seen more as a metaphor rather than an analytic construct using
location as a determinant element (Wellhofer 1989: 342). Although it must be
highlighted that at the beginning of the centre-periphery analysis (Myrdal 1957),
geographical location and the dynamics that the relations between cores and
peripheries had were used as united and parallelly important, the later
development of different schools of thought lost the physical locus of the regions
and focused on the relations as dynamics with different labels, such as urban and
rural differences (Rokkan 1970: 181-225) or state service delivery (Tarrow et. al.
1978), without a geographical or physical location.

- Distance as a geographical variable

Two main general considerations can be developed here. The first
consideration refers to distance as a political metaphor. Distance, real or
imagined, is used as a political instrument to forge identities, being an active part
of political discourses (Keith and Pile 1993: 2). If identities are articulated, and
therefore changing (Hall 1990), space could be part of the characteristics used in
this shifting (Hall and Jacques 1990). These distances are mainly negotiated and
not only geographical, meaning that they act in both ways (Giampapa 2004: 193),
from the core to the periphery and vice versa. On one hand, distance can tend to
unify by introducing a common identity capable of incorporating the peripheries,
or on the other hand, distance tends to be used to differentiate, used by the elites
at the peripheries to articulate a different identity from the one coming from the
core.

The first consideration of distance is understanding it as a political act. One
of the possible effects of being far away from the centre and having a unified
political aim of new power relations that benefits the periphery and not simple
delegations of the core through identity, is the potential for the agency factor (Giampapa 2004: 193). This means that the political community at the periphery can, either move from the periphery to the core and become included in its economic relations, or create a new core and maintain the preexisting economic relations in the periphery (reconfiguration of the periphery), challenging the power relations of the core. In the first move, distance is considered as a characteristic of the relations between the two types of region, not used to undermine the status quo. In the second example, distance is mediated to create and increase a sense of common identity in the periphery and consolidate its political saliency as an element of distinctiveness. Connor (1994: 159) described how ethnonational bonds are stronger than any other ties, making the intragroup solidarity the best example of group identity, being this at the core or at the periphery.

The second consideration analyses distance as a geographical and psychological factor. The argument here is that the farther a community is from the core, the more chances for that community to articulate its own identity based on distance. Spatial distance makes individuals see events as more abstracts (Henderson et. al. 2006), and therefore, more difficult to make them key to their identity articulation. The relation between geographical spatial distance and the psychological factor of abstraction is the following. The core, when articulating an identity, needs to adapt and assimilate the characteristics of the peripheries in order to avoid the abstraction effect, and this adaptation needs to increase as distance, and therefore the abstraction effect, also increases. This can be translated into a broader political project. The political project that is articulated in the core is stronger because the abstraction effect has little impact, and less strong at the peripheries because the abstraction effect has a big impact due to spatial and social distance. To keep the abstraction effect as weak as possible, the political project that comes from the core needs to adapt and mutate to assimilate the characteristics of the periphery, and therefore, seem closer to the local population.
3. PARTY COMPETITION

3.1) Party competition

According to the main literature, party competition is essential in the functioning of modern democracies (Bielasiak 2005: 331) and democratic processes (Powell 1982: 3), but there should be a clear difference between the former and the latter. Having party competition as the only way of popular involvement in democratic processes makes any democracy very limited (Ware 1989: 21). Party competition is part of the democratic process, but not the process as a whole. In this investigation, party competition is understood using two key elements. On one hand, parties’ political issues and positioning and the strategies to adopt them (Rovny 2012: 269), and on the other hand, the struggle over the interconnectivity of the different dimensions that make up the political space (Rovny and Edwards 2012: 59). Parties decide to compete and position themselves on the different axes of competition in order to shape the political agenda. The four main conditions for party competition are (Bartolini 2002: 89-90): electoral contestability, electoral availability, electoral decidability, and electoral vulnerability. Contestability is aimed to capture and understand the degree of openness of the political arena when new competitors want to enter it. Electoral availability refers to the articulation of different segments of the electorate to be able to produce a change in their preferences. Decidability is understood as the process were parties dedicate themselves to produce a change in the political scenario through competition. Vulnerability is intended to capture the extent to which governments are threatened by the opposition through a change in office.

3.2) Party competition as multi-dimensional

Articulating the political space in a single-dimension is not enough to understand the dense and complex nature of political competition (Albright 2010: 699-700). The multiplicity of issues makes party competition a multidimensionality struggle to connect the different axes of competition in which the political space can be divided into (Rovny and Edwards 2012: 56-58). Parties, in this complex nature of competition, position themselves according to a designed plan and not randomly (Albright 2010:702-704), calculating how they
can differentiate between themselves (Tavits 2008: 51). SWP and regionalist parties compete to position themselves on these dimensions using different strategies in order to maximise the support obtained from the voters (Rovny 2012: 269-270). Parties, in order to be more efficient when framing their own positions, articulate the political space in different dimensions to address the issues that are salient for the electorate (Sartori 1976: 350). The multi-dimensional nature of party competition is in constant evolution. Parties introduce new issues and axes of competition mainly due to two reasons (Albright 2010: 702). First, parties fail to obtain the most out of the current structure of voting preferences, making them restructure the political space by introducing new issues and dimensions to become more efficient. Second, the changing nature of the political space makes voters turn to new issues and axes, making parties also turn to them in order to obtain political advantage when competing.

To understand party competition as a multi-dimensional struggle, the two main theories that are reviewed here are the spatial (or positional competition) and the salience theories of party competition. Despite the fact that they are different forms of competition, and following Elias et. al. (2015: 839-840), both theories are better understood as complementary and not competing views (Alonso 2012: 19; Wegner 2012: 857; Rovny 2013: 5). The spatial and salience theories are useful to understand how political parties interact and shape political spaces (Rovny and Edwards 2012: 53). Parties behave as suggested by the two theories, shaping their own agendas and the agendas of the other parties when competing (Green-Pedersen 2007: 609-610).

Starting with the spatial theory, Downs (1957: 132-133) argues that the political space is made up by an unlimited number of issues that the voters perceive that could be addressed by their representatives. In his model, these issues can be reduced to a single axis, the left-right dimension (Down 1957: 132). If a party seeks success in any given election, the wider the range of issues, the weaker the position of the party. This results in parties converging these different issues along the left-right axis (Alonso 2012: 15). This theory, applied to other political dimensions, expects parties to position themselves on multi-axes political

---

7 This theory is known as the Proximity Theory (Down 1957).
spaces to compete with each other (Elias et. al. 2015: 840). Following with the salience theory, and according to Budge and Farlie (1983: 23), it can be seen that parties challenge each other using issues that are considered important and in which they are going to be judged positively. The way they choose the issues is more based on their own credibility and prestige (Petrocik 1996: 825-826). In this sense, they “own” the issues that they use to maximise votes. This theory expects parties to selectively emphasise issues favourable to them (Alonso 2012: 16). Parties accommodate these issues for their own purpose, which means that they emphasise more an issue if they think that they will gain more support or centralise their discourses when an issue needs to be settled down with a low profile (Klingemann et. al. 1994). Following Elias et al. (2015: 841), and focusing on the Steenbergen and Scott (2004: 190-191), there is a key difference between the two theories. On one hand, the positional theory expects parties to challenge each other by moving within the political space available. On the other hand, the salience theory expects parties to challenge each other by selectively emphasising issues that are favourable to them, defining the political space. The difference is that in the first case, the position of parties is endogenous to competition, and in the second case, it is the salience which is endogenous to competition.

Finally, three main sets of assumptions can be emphasised after setting out the main lines of the two theories described above. The first set of assumptions deals with the single-axis debate concerning Downs´ argument. Despite the argument given by Downs (1957: 132), parties can be classified using a multi-axis dimension (Alonso 2012: 31) and not only the left-right dimension. This links with the consideration, by part of the literature, of regionalist parties as niche parties, which deal only with a specific issue, normally unaligned on the left-right axis (Elias et. al. 2015: 841). Support for these parties is based on quasi-exclusive issues was used to support the niche theory (Meguid 2008: 14-15). The recent debates in the literature have proved with empirical data that regionalist parties could be considered in the same way as SWPs, this is, as rational actors in the political space, acting strategically (Elias 2009: 549-552; Hepburn 2009:

---

8 This theory is known as the Salience and Issue Ownership Theory (Robertson 1976; Budge and Farlie 1983).
These studies reflect the fact that regionalist parties position themselves on other axes and not only on their core strategy (Elias et al. 2015: 843). Dealing with the second set of assumptions, and despite the fact that Downs’s analysis of the classification of parties on a single-axis is not sufficient for this investigation, here it could be said that his assumptions that the spatial theory of voters is informed by the self-interest of the actors (1957: 31) can also be applied to parties. Political parties move in a multi-axis political arena seeking self-interest (Rovny 2013: 1), positioning themselves and selecting any issue that would benefit them (Tavits 2008: 51). The third and last set of assumptions goes in the same lines as Budge’s and Farlie’s theory (1983). Although voters’ preferences can change over time according to their own choices (1957: 46), parties also attempt to move them to maximise their changes, moving voters’ preferences to their own location.

- **Two axes of competition considered in this investigation**

Following Alonso (2012: 31), political spaces are better understood as a multi-axis framework and not only a single-issue focus, such as Downs’s (1957: 132) development of the left-right axis. As seen above, party competition is understood as a multi-dimensional competition (Elias et al. 2015: 842), nearly without an end to the number of possible dimensions due to the complexity of the political space and party competition (Albright 2010: 699-700). An axis of competition is understood as the main issue packages or related dimensions in which a party competes and positions itself. To narrow down the number of axes ex ante and in advance (Benoit and Laver 2012: 196), two have been selected: the left-right, and the centre-periphery (or territorial) axes. These two axes make up the, in multi-level and in multi-national democracies, the two most salient dimensions in party competition (Alonso et al. 2015: 852; Field and Hamann 2015: 902)

The first axis of competition is the well-known left-right axis. This axis has been considered by the literature in the past years as the single or most important axis of the political space (Huber and Powell 1994: 294; Powell 2000: 162-163; Adam et al. 2006: 31; Albright 2010: 701). In order to prevent concept stretching and to narrow down the scope of this investigation, two main dimensions are
considered to be part of this axis: the economic and the social dimensions. In other words, the degree of control over the economy and the degree of inclusiveness towards minorities or other social groups (Benoit and Laver 2012: 195). Economic issues are mainly the first considerations when dealing with this axis, but the literature also has identified other issues that may relate to the left-right axis (Elias et al. 2015: 842). Issues such as social concerns, religious values or alternative ways of doing politics have also been considered to be contained in the left-right axis (Hooghe et al. 2002: 967; Marks et al. 2006: 156-157; Wagner 2012: 849-852; Massetti and Schakel 2015: 877). Left positioned parties tend to be more inclusive in opposition to right positioned parties, which tend to be more conservative. The reason to have the left-right axis included in this investigation is that ideology can be seen as the narrative that is used by parties to interconnect the different dimensions in which the political space is divided into (Rovny and Edwards 2012: 59), but without collapsing all dimensions into it because it would not capture other issues with sufficient depth (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976: 269-272). This is especially applicable to SWPs in multilevel party competition.

The second axis of competition is the centre-periphery (territorial) axis. This axis is based on the centre-periphery cleavage described above. Party competition on this axis can be seen as an example of how the left-right axis of competition is not adequate enough to channel regional conflict with the needed robustness, even if the state is more ethnically homogeneous than multi-ethnic (Albright 2010: 702). This centre-periphery cleavage is articulated around the dispute for the political control of the peripheries (Alonso et al. 2015: 852). The homogenisation wave that the core tried to impose state-wide gets challenged by the peripheries that, on one hand, have a distinct historical, economic, cultural, and/or linguistic background, and on the other hand, do not have strong distinctive characteristics but politicise other grievances such as economic or political inequalities. The motivations for this centre-periphery cleavage differ from region to region, and there is not a common denominator regarding mobilisation in the peripheries (Elias et al. 2015: 843). Despite this variation, one main shared characteristic can be outlined here. All the actors that compete along this axis share in common that they seek territorial control over their region (Alonso 2012: 25; Hepburn 2009: 482). It emerges when the elites in the
periphery within distant, distinct, and dependent peripheries challenge and oppose the homogenisation wave coming from the core and which represents the interests of the central elites (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Rokkan and Urwin 1983). The centre-periphery axis can be defined for this investigation as the axis where the state’s right to rule uniformly state-wide is challenged (Elias et al. 2015: 843).

This centre-periphery axis, which is the direct translation of the centre-periphery cleavage, needs to be considered as deeply rooted in political competition and not as a niche issue or dimension (Rovny 2015: 915). The point of view that takes the left-right axis as the prime dimension in which all other issues can be collapsed is not valid any more as the multidimensionality of party competition makes dimensions interact, with no clear dominant axis. This argument is applicable especially to multi-national and multi-level democracies or political scenarios where the centre is heavily challenged by its peripheries (Elias et al. 2015: 843). In states where the peripheries are empowered enough to become a threat to the centre, the centre-periphery axis becomes as important as the traditional left-right divide (Field and Hamann 2015: 900). SWPs, when positioning themselves on this centre-periphery axis, tend to nationalise the issues discussed, subordinating the sub-national to the national level (Cabeza et al. 2017: 80). On the other hand, regionalist parties tend to focus more on issues that belong to the centre-periphery cleavage, or at least, articulate issues according to this axis (Alonso et al. 2015: 852). In other words, and comparing the left-right and centre-periphery axes, it can be said that SWPs tend to collapse all issues into the left-right axis (Libbrecht et al. 2011: 636-637), and regionalist parties tend to collapse all issues into the centre-periphery axis (Massetti and Schakel 2015: 866-868). In relation to this, it must be stated that regionalist parties have clearer pro-periphery positions than SWPs in general (Alonso et al. 2017: 252-253), which may vary for the latter depending on their position on the left-right axis and their degree of inclusiveness.

The above argument can be summarised by putting the focus on the purpose of the elites that use parties to achieve a certain goal. Political parties are understood as the main instrument to impose power relations and decision-making processes in the core and in the periphery (Fitjar 2010a: 7-9). In this sense, on one hand, some SWPs try to impose centralisation, which legitimises
certain socio-economic relations through a strong national-dominated project, and on the other hand, some regional and SWPs try to challenge that core-dominated political project with a more regional, regionalist or secessionist project. As the literature dealing with the new waves of regionalism argues (Agnew 2002; Paasi, 2004; Keating 2008) in comparison to the “old” regionalism (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Rose and Urwin 1975), territorial tensions are central to the explanation of the success of some regional and SWPs and the subsequent territorial policies. An example of this can be observed in the articulation of regional identities. At this point is where the analysis of Paasi regarding identity and region (2002: 139-141) could be introduced, but applied to political parties as the main actors. Taking into account Keating’s three elements of any regional identity (1998: 86), the important one that could be applied here is the third one. This refers to the regional identity as instrumental, where the region is used as the basis for mobilisation and collective action amongst the local population through the described grievances. Regional identity, as a hierarchical and nested social phenomenon (Herb and Kaplan 1999) is articulated using features which correspond to the region itself that are stereotyped (Paasi 2002: 140) by political parties in order to mobilise the local population in the regions.

3.3) Strategies adopted by political parties in a multi-dimensional competition

There are four basic strategies that parties can follow to position themselves in the different dimensions that articulate party competition (Elias et al. 2015): the uni-dimensional, the blurring, the subsuming, and the two-dimension strategy. Before going into the analysis of each of these strategies, one important point could be clarified. These strategies are not circumscribed to electoral campaigns or periods (Elias et al. 2015: 841). For this investigation, the strategies that parties select are considered more in a long run rather than designed exclusively for electoral campaigns. Political competition is articulated rather as a process that is sustained in time, although this process can be divided into the institutional scenario and the campaigns, but both part of the same process nonetheless (Benoit and Laver 2006: 37).
- Four main strategies

The first strategy is the uni-dimensional strategy. Here, parties select one dimension, either the left-right or the centre-periphery axis, and focus on that one ignoring the other one. The way parties articulate this strategy can be as follows: they chose a certain axis, either left-right or the centre-periphery axis, depending on how much they are interested in exploiting that same axis. They will tend to emphasise the issues along the core axis and ignore any other issue that is not aligned to it (Elias et al. 2015: 844). Some SWPs are expected to position themselves on the left-right axis and ignore any issue that constitutes the centre-periphery axis, and some regional and SWPs are expected to do the opposite, emphasise the centre-periphery axis and ignore the left-right axis.

The second strategy consists in adopting a vague, contradictory, or ambiguous strategy towards issues that are placed in the second dimension or axis. The difference between this strategy and the first uni-dimensional one is that here parties do not ignore issues on the second axis, they just have a calculated vague position, so they do not lose support from voters on the first axis and at the same time do not leave the second axis entirely for the other parties to benefit from all the voters there. This is set by the party-system agenda, forcing parties to take positions on issues from the second axis that sometimes they are not willing to take. In order to position themselves along the second axis and keeping it at the same time vague, they express their opinions blurry (Elias et al. 2015: 844). Some SWPs are expected to focus on the left-right axis and position themselves vaguely on the centre-periphery axis, and some regional and SWPs are expected to act the opposite way.

The third strategy can be labelled as the subsuming strategy. Here, parties deliberately try to erase the second dimension by framing the issues associated with it into the core axis (Elias et al., 2015: 845). Parties will try to frame and accommodate a secondary dimension issues into their core axis, which Rovny and Edwards (2012: 70) found that for SWPs this means subsuming territorial issues into the left-right axis. This is, according to Elias et al. (2015: 845), a rhetorical strategy of the parties to try to attract to their core axis as many voters as possible that normally prioritise the second axis. Some SWPs are expected to
subsume territorial issues into the left-right axis, and vice versa with some regional and SWPs.

The last and fourth strategy is known as the two-dimension strategy (Elias et al. 2015: 845). In this strategy, parties position themselves on both axes without distinguishing which one is the main and which one is the secondary axis or dimension. SWPs and regionalist parties will position themselves on the left-right and centre-periphery axes. The positions in this strategy differentiate from the first, second, and third in the sense that parties will position on the left-right and centre-periphery axes with clear and structured opinions about issues concerning both axes (Alonso et al., 2015: 853). The secondary axis is considered by the literature as complementary to the first axis (Alonso et al., 2015: 853), but it rather seems as if both axes act as principal axes, and not simply one complementing the other, which would distinguish this strategy more clearly from the second and more sharply from the third one.

4. PARTY COMPETITION OVER THE CENTRE-PERIPHERY CLEAVAGE IN SPAIN

4.1) The centre-periphery cleavage in Spain and its evolution

Before introducing the review of the literature regarding the behaviour of parties along the centre-periphery in Spain, it is necessary to set out the evolution of this social cleavage in the last two centuries. Instead of going far back in history, the starting point of this narrative is the 1812 Constitution, not because it was the first one based on national sovereign (Torres del Moral 2011: 88-92), which it was (Eastman and Sobrevilla Perea 2015: 2-3), but because it was the first time that a true articulation and development of the Spanish state was attempted, which included the regulation of the relations between the different regions (Muro and Quiroga 2004: 20-22). This key event represents the start of the transition of Spain from an imperial to a national state and kick started the processes of state- and national-building in full (Ruane 2003: 30), providing at the same time the grounds for the emergence of the modern social cleavages identified by Rokkan (1987; 1999), amongst which the centre-periphery split represented one of the most salient ones.
Conflicts between regions have been strongly present in Spanish modern history before the 1812 Constitution (Moreno 2002: 399), but it was the dissolution of most of the Empire by the first quarter of the 19th century and the introduction of modern economic relations what triggered important regional grievances (Centeno and Ferraro 2013: 14-18), which fuelled by some resilient cultural differences in important peripheral regions (Beramendi 1999: 81), gave way to territorial tension that where mostly dealt with via two dichotomous solutions: federalism (e.g., Peyrou 2007) and centralism (e.g., Aróstegui 1998). The enforcement of these two political solutions did not solve the centrifugal problems of the state-building process that Spain underwent, reinforcing the negative reaction of the central and peripheral elites. The struggle between these elites did not only undermined the establishment of a solid Spanish state, but it also weakened any attempt of articulating a Spanish national identity, which fluctuated between its civic and ethno-cultural variants (Muro and Quiroga 2005: 15). By the end of the 19th century, Spain could be described as a, to some extent, “failure” both in its state- and nation-building processes (Linz et al. 2004: 15), with an evident lack of ability to implement, on one hand, a unitary political structure in the form of a modern state (Linz 1973: 102), and on the other hand, the articulation of a national base with which the generality of the Spanish people could identify (Linz 1993: 255). In addition, the regional grievances in certain peripheral areas, specially the Basque Country and Catalonia, were used by local elites to establish a solid intellectual base with which to articulate strong peripheral nationalisms in the incoming century (Muro and Quiroga 2004: 23).

The succession of military and civil coups, weak governments, territorial tensions, and uneven socio-economic development of powerful industrialised and backward agricultural regions during the second half of the 19th century weighed down the coming of the new century (Ruane 2003: 30). The loss of the last overseas territorial possessions deepened the general sense of the Spanish failure in terms of building a modern European state and nation (Muro and Quiroga 2005: 15-16). In this context, the struggle between central and peripheral elites became political with the emergence of strong regional movements in Catalonia and the Basque Country, where the new bourgeoise local elites had the means to establish well-grounded social bases (Enrlich 1998: 400; Mees 1990: 49).
Taking advantage of the weakness of the Spanish regime, these movements were channelled through newly created political parties, or at least the first examples of regionalist parties in Spain, which attracted the desires for more autonomy in both regions. The *Lliga Regionalista* (e.g., Smith 2010) and the *PNV* (e.g., Castells *et al.* 2007) were the result of these tensions and the response of the peripheral elites in their demands against the centralist forces of Madrid. The central governments reacted to this challenge in two main ways. On one hand, the resurge of a strong ethnical Spanish-Castilian nationalism in light of the intellectual discussion to find the psyche of the nation (Muro and Quiroga 2004: 26), and on the other hand, using repressive and strongly ideologised means which crystallised during the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera in the 1920s (Quiroga 2004: 243-245). After a short alliance of the left and the peripheral movements using a more liberal understanding of the Spanish nation during the Second Republic (1931-1939) (Pastor 2012: 96-102), the fascist dictatorship of Francisco Franco (1939-1975) reinforced these centralist ethnical tendencies with even more brutal mechanisms (Núñez Seixas 2007: 61-63). As a result, the first three quarters of the 20th century saw powerful centripetal forces that deepened the grievances between the centre and its peripheries (Muro and Quiroga 2005: 20).

With the end of the fascist dictatorship and the coming of the current democratic regime, both the central and peripheral elites articulated a political compromise to incorporated regional demands in an overall inclusive Spanish state (Moreno 2002: 399-400). In light of this new context, which left behind the incarnate struggle between the different ideas of Spain, the Autonomous Communities were, and still are, a reflection of these demands, which not only included the historical Catalan and Basque appeals, but also incorporate the new regionalisms (Ysàs 1994: 106-107). This political climate of negotiation and compromise also favoured the articulation of a Spanish national identity based on liberal and democratic premises and leaving behind its hyper-Castilian conception (Martínez-Herrera and Miley 2010: 7-11), and at the same time, open to the possibility of recognising sub-national realities (Muñoz Mendoza 2012: 50-70). This resulted in a dual identity feeling (no contradiction between feeling Spanish and belonging to a specific region) that most of the Spanish population
currently has (Moreno 1997a: 126-127). Spain now can be described a multinational state with a strong decentralised system in which territorial disparities could be dealt with via well-established channels (Colomer 1998: 40-41). Despite this political compromise between the centre and the peripheries, the regional grievances did not disappear as this new quasi-federal system resulted in a de facto uneven territorial outcome, with many differences between Autonomous Communities (Moreno 2002: 400). The main contribution In comparison to previous historical periods is that the Constitution of 1978 implemented a political system in which territorial tensions and grievances can be solved peacefully (Moreno 1997b: 65-66), and this was a key step in Spanish history.

This new peaceful multi-level scenario deepened the complexity of the centre-periphery cleavage and added new dynamics which trespassed the simple dichotomy between the centre and its peripheries. As Flynn (2004: 139-141) puts it, it is now a tripartite competition between the state-legitimating centralists, the non-Spanish nationalist, and the Spanish-identified regionalist. This competition takes place in the three main levels of power (central, regional, and local) that resulted from the process of decentralisation and which are now the fundamental arenas of competition in which parties move to fulfil their main agendas, being these state-wide or purely regionalist (Keating and Wilson 2009: 536-538). Party competition in these arenas can be labelled as multiple ethnoterritorial concurrence (Moreno 1995). It can be described as a competition between different political actors and agendas which represent different ways of understanding Spain with the purpose of solving territorial conflicts in a peaceful way by incorporating and acknowledging the existence of different ethnical realities without undermining the possibility of articulating an overall plural society (Moreno 1994: 163). This rests on three principals that the new regime stablished as the pillars on which the state was going to lay down (Moreno 1997: 73): democratic decentralisation; comparative grievance; and interterritorial solidarity.

4.2) General overview of party competiton along the centre-periphery cleavage

The aim of this subsection is to review how parties behave and compete in Spain along the centre-periphery cleavage that the Constitution of 1978
channeled through peaceful means. Party competition in Spain is well-established as multi-dimensional (Amat 2012: 451), where the decentralisation process initiated by the Constitution of 1978 gave way to strong regional governments. This federalisation of the Spanish state (Agranoff 1996; Moreno 1997a; Requejo 2004) pushed parties to adapt to a multi-level and multi-dimensional political arena using multiple strategies to maximise their performance during regional elections (Jeffery and Hough 2003: 200-201; Rovny 2012: 270-273) and an appropriate internal structure suitable to face this challenge (Fabre 2008: 318-324).

The literature that focuses on party competition in Spain has dealt with different topics to understand party behaviour at the regional level (Wilson 2012: 124). Some studies focus primarily on the external behaviour of parties, dealing with issues such as the formation of regional governments (Falcó-Gimeno and Verge 2013), how new parties affect national and regional party systems (Rodon and Hierro 2016), or the negotiation of bills in the national parliament (Field and Hamann 2015). In terms of the internal behaviour of parties, the main topics are essentially the strategies that parties can adopt to positions themselves in a multi-dimensional political space (Alonso et al. 2015), how they adapt their internal structure to a multi-level democracy (Hopkin 2009), or the interaction of SWPs and regionalist parties (Keating and Wilson 2009). To narrow down the scope of this subsection, party behaviour is understood to be articulated around three main issues: saliency, position, and strategies.

Overall, the saliency, position, and strategies of SWPs and regionalist parties, using mostly the RMP but also other data sources, can be summarised in the following conclusions. In terms of saliency, SWPs normally tend to emphasise the left-right axis in comparison to regionalist parties, which emphasise more the centre-periphery axis, their respective core dimensions. When it comes to their positions, SWPs can be located in overall pro-periphery positions, graduated by their nature as state-wide actors. In comparison, regionalist parties have stronger pro-periphery positions, in line with the expected behavior of these kind of parties. The strategies that both types of parties adopt are more focused on positioning themselves on both dimensions, in line with the
literature that considers SWPs and regionalist parties multi-dimensional competing actors.

4.3) Saliency and position

When it comes to the saliency and position of parties that compete at the regional level in Spain along the centre-periphery cleavage, the literature has tried to give an overview of how they behave using mostly quantitative methods of analysis (Libbrecht et al. 2009; Alonso 2012; Alonso et al. 2013; Alonso et al. 2015; Alonso et al. 2017). These different analyses are based mostly on the CMP and, most recently, the RMP, which applies the same methodology (Klingemann et al. 2006) but with a multi-level perspective. Depending on which data-set is used, the results are different, but some general behaviours can be outlined. The main purpose of these seminal works is to highlight the emphasis that parties give to the centre-periphery axis, what issues they emphasise along it, and how they position along it.

In terms of the saliency of the centre-periphery cleavage, the results are the following. SWPs vary in their emphasis on the centre-periphery axis (Alonso et al. 2015: 856), mainly to avoid attempting to battle with regionalist parties on their own terrain (Libbrecht et al. 2009: 74). SWPs, in line with the issue-ownership theory, emphasise more the left-right axis (Libbrecht et al. 2009: 74), where they are seen by voters as reliable actors (Alonso 2012: 73-75) and it is considered their core dimension (Alonso et al. 2015: 855). Turning to the positional scores, overall, they adopt more pro-periphery positions rather than clear pro-centre in defense of the interests where their loyalties are based (Alonso 2012: 75). Their behaviour, both in terms of saliency and position, is strongly determined by the context in which they act, and this needs to be studied according to the region in which they act (Libbrecht et al. 2009: 75-76). Competition with strong regionalist parties make SWPs´ behaviour clearly shift. This is translated into further emphasising the centre-periphery axis (Alonso et al. 2015: 856) and the position they adopt is less consistent, increasing variation, having stronger pro-periphery position but also introducing clearer pro-centre positions. Other authors confirm this shift, but with less significance (Libbrecht et al. 2009: 76). When applying the RMP, Alonso et al. (2013: 203-207) are able to
confirm this shift with more precision in the behavior of both the PSOE and the PP during the period 2008-2011. An example of this can be found in the PP, where its manifestos for the Basque Country and its regional framework were clearly pro-centre (Alonso et al. 2013: 206).

The final observation in relation to SWPs is that their behavior is affected by their ideological orientation (Libbrecht et al. 2011: 625). Probably the most significant behavior than can be pointed out from the above-mentioned studies is not the overall saliency and position of SWPs on the centre-periphery axis in Spain, but the different behavior observed between the PSOE and the PP. The reason is that the PSOE, being a more inclusive and decentralised party, allows for a stronger saliency of the centre-periphery axis and pro-periphery positions in comparison to the PP, a more conservative and integrated party (Libbrecht et al. 2009:76; Libbrecht et al. 2011: 631; Alonso et al. 2013: 205-206). This is also outlined by the findings of Alonso and Gómez, who pointed out the higher dispersion of emphasis and position that the regional branches of the PSOE have in comparison to the PP (2011: 196-201). Hopkins (2009) also confirms these differences between the regional branches according to which party they belong to, especially focused on the PSOE. The decentralisation process of the Spanish state coincided with the decentralisation process of the party, which matches the expectations of the regions in a multi-level party competition scenario (Hopkins 2009: 192-195).

When comparing SWPs with regionalist parties, Alonso (2012) and Alonso et al. (2015) are able to describe the emphasis given by the latter to the centre-periphery axis. According to these authors, overall, regionalist parties give more emphasis to the centre-periphery axis than SWPs (Alonso 2012: 72-73), as expected. Despite this, the results of the above two studies showed a clear difference depending on the data-set used. Using the CMP (Alonso 2012), regionalist parties gave more emphasis to the left-right axis in comparison to the centre-periphery axis. This might not be a surprise when it comes to the SWPs, but it is somehow an interesting result for regionalist parties, taking into consideration that the centre-periphery cleavage is supposed to be their core dimension (Alonso et al. 2017: 242). When the RMP introduced data for the regional elections (Alonso et al. 2015), results seemed to change, and regionalist
parties dedicated more amount of space, and therefore, emphasised more the centre-periphery axis (Alonso et al. 2015: 855-856), but without dismissing the left-right axis, outlining the importance of both axes for these parties (Alonso et al. 2017: 249).

The studies that used the RMP (Alonso et al. 2013; 2015; 2017), in comparison to those that used the CMP (Libbrecht 2009; Alonso 2012; Libbrecht et al. 2011), are more precise in their findings. The variation in the results obtained applying the RMP can be explained by observing how regionalist parties adapt to the context and circumstances in which they act (Alonso et al. 2017: 258). In relation to the position along the centre-periphery axis, these studies confirm the regionalist parties’ programmatic clarity. This is, they strongly emphasise pro-periphery positions along the centre-periphery axis (Alonso 2012: 79-84; Alonso et al. 2017: 251-253). Results show that the variation on the left-right axis is higher than on the centre-periphery axis, where pro-centre positions are non-existent (Alonso et al. 2015: 856). The positions on the left-right axis are less consistent in comparison to SWPs, and this is more determined by a catch-all strategies of vote maximisation (Alonso et al. 2017: 258).

Finally, it is worth mentioning the different dimension and issue packages that make up the centre-periphery axis for both the SWPs and regionalist parties. The centre-periphery axis is made of two primary dimensions (Alonso et al. 2013: 190-192): the competential and identitarian dimensions. The competential dimension refers to the distribution of political authority between the regions and the central government. This dimension affects all the issues that regionalist parties emphasise. These range from health to economic issues, or in other words, all the issues that make up their manifestos except for those that make up the next dimension. The identitarian dimension relates to the claims over nationhood, nation-building, and identity in the region. The issues that make up this dimension are those related to the regional-building process, especially culture, language, and regional-building policies.

With these two dimensions in mind, and applying them to regionalist parties, the latter have a mixed record of emphasising either (Alonso et al. 2017: 253-257). For example, *Eh Bildu* focuses its manifestos on a clear identitarian
themes. In contrast, CC behaves in the opposite direction, emphasising more the competential dimension of the territorial axis. Regionalist parties can be grouped in three different behaviours when combining the competential and identitarian dimensions (Alonso et al. 2017: 256-257). The first group focuses on the identitarian dimension, leaving little space for the competential dimension. The second group centers its attention on the competential dimension. Finally, the third group combines the two dimensions more or less with the same intensity. Alonso et al. (2013) show that the emphasis given by SWPs to both dimensions is more or less the same, in line with the above third group of the regionalist parties. Libbrecht et al. (2009) try to disentangle the issues that make up the electoral profile of SWPs, classifying them under the different competences that can be found in Spain, amongst which one can find, for example, agriculture, health care, defence, or education.

4.4) Strategies

The strategies that parties follow when competing in regional elections along this multi-dimensional political space can be observed in Libbrecht et al. (2011), Alonso (2012), and Alonso et al. (2015). Other authors also focus on the different strategies that parties adopt at the regional level but in relation to other issues, such as, for example, strategies for government coalitions (Tronconi 2015), territorial reform (Verge 2013), or how regional branches nationalise regional politics (Cabeza et al. 2017). When it comes to the strategies of SWPs and regionalist parties along the centre-periphery axis, it must be pointed out that both parties, when competing at the regional level, blur less on the centre-periphery than on the left-right axis (Alonso et al. 2015: 857). This is not strange for regionalist parties, as this is their core dimension, but for SWPs, this was not expected. It is important, despite these results, to highlight that, because party competition is multi-dimensional, along the centre-periphery and left-right axes, both the SWPs and regionalist parties contextualise their strategies in both dimensions (Alonso et al. 2015: 859-860).

The behaviour of SWPs in Spain has been explained by Libbrecht et al. in the following way (2011: 626). When competing with regionalist parties, they can adopt three kinds of strategies. The first is the accommodative strategy, applied
when SWPs adopt centre-periphery issues to compete with regionalist parties, especially if the latter are strong. The second is the adversarial strategy, when SWPs compete with opposite demands to those of regionalist parties. The third is the dismissive strategy, applied when SWPs do not face regionalist parties. According to the results, findings point to the fact that SWPs normally adopt the first strategy, although more recently, the literature has identified a more defined two-dimension strategy as the most common one (Alonso 2012: 36; Alonso et al. 2015: 858). Facing strong regionalist parties in most of the regions (Libbrecht et al. 2011: 634-637) results in a position over the two axes of competition (Elias et al. 2015: 846). These different strategies reveal that SWPs need to adapt to the regional context to select the necessary strategy (Alonso et al. 2015: 859-860).

In order to counterbalance these pro-periphery positions by SWPs, regionalist parties also adopt a two-dimension strategy (Alonso et al. 2015: 859; Elias et al. 2015: 846). This is translated in two different outcomes (Alonso 2012: 234-235): either they emphasise more radical pro-periphery positions, or they diversify their positions on the second dimension, the left-right axis. Decentralised states tend to give way to grievances between regions, and regionalist parties can use this circumstance to adapt to multiple scenarios in order to maximise their performance (Alonso 2012: 235). The two-dimension strategies locate regionalist parties on stronger pro-periphery positions than SWPs, in line with their primary purpose.

5. IDENTIFYING THE GAP IN THE LITERATURA

5.1) The general literature

As it has been outlined in the sub-sections above, the main literature that addresses party competition on the centre-periphery cleavage in Spain at the regional level gravitates around three main issues that are used to define their behaviour: saliency, position, and strategies. A decentralised state like Spain is a salient case to understand how parties adapt to a multi-level democracy where the regional arena is crucial and compete in a multi-dimensional political space where the centre-periphery cleavage is one of the key axes of competition (Alonso et al. 2015: 852). Turning the focus to the regional level to understand how territorial tensions are addressed, it is important to observe how parties
adapt to new dynamics of competition (Jeffery 2009: 640). This applies to both SWPs and regionalist parties, which, as rationale actors, look to contextualise and maximise their electoral performance (Hepburn 2009: 487-489; Libbrecht et al. 2009: 75-76; Massetti 2009: 502; Libbrecht et al. 2011: 634-636; Alonso et al. 2015: 859-861; Rovny 2015: 916).

The different studies that build on the research agenda established by the RMP address, in order to understand party behaviour, topics such as for example, issue packages in party manifestos (Alonso et al. 2017), the importance of internal consistency and cohesion (Klingelhöfer 2014), SWPs facing regional elections (Gómez et al. 2014), or how parties try to nationalise regional elections (Cabeza et al. 2017). Some of these studies focus on the possible factors that are expected to shape party behaviour in relation to these issues. Amongst these different factors, the most common are type of party, SWPs facing or not regionalist parties, or ideological position. The same can be observed in the literature that does not utilise the RMP but also centres the attention on party behaviour via other research agendas. The main issues that are addressed are, for example, party issue profile in relation to the distribution of competences between levels (Libbrecht et al. 2009), how do parties adjust to a two-dimensional party competition (Massetti 2009; Massetti and Schakel 2015), possible strategies that parties might follow in regional elections (Libbrecht et al. 2011), the importance of internal cohesion (León 2017), or how decentralisation has affected the ideological positioning of parties (León 2014; Massetti and Schakel 2016) and behaviour (Elias and Tronconi 2011). Again, some factors that are expected to shape party behaviour in relation to these issues are introduced to better understand the main findings, such as for example, party systems, economic development of the regions, or identity.

Despite this considerable body of literature on party competition, the factors that are expected to shape their behaviour tend to be the same: economic development of regions, identity, language, party type, ideological position, and SWPs facing or not regionalist parties. These can be divided into regional- and party-level factors. The first category refers to the characteristics that can be used to describe a region, such as for example, economic development, identity, and language. The second category addresses the characteristics that can be used
to define parties, such as for example, party type, ideological position, and SWPs facing or not regionalist parties. The main findings in relation to these factors provide strong insights and have expanded knowledge on party behaviour in a multi-dimensional political space. However, there is little or no attention to other possible factors, as preliminary flagged in the previous chapter, that could also deeply affect how parties compete on the centre-periphery cleavage and are currently overlooked. This is the gap in the literature that this investigation tries to engage with in relation to the above identified research problem.

Amongst these overlooked factors, the emphasis is placed on: *distance, fragmentation, and polycentricity*. The task here is to understand *what* makes parties behave as they do when they select to emphasise a certain issue or position themselves in a certain direction when they compete along the centre-periphery axis through stressing the importance of other factors that the literature has overlooked when approaching the main research problem. These factors can contribute to further comprehend in detail party behaviour with more a contextual lens which would provide additional reasoning for the regional variation that the literature encounters. Although these factors can be considered as static (distance and fragmentation) and very stable over time (polycentricity), their effect on how parties compete is circumscribed to the region in which they unfold, and context is key here. This will allow to further explain the way in which parties adapt to regional variation, depending on the context in which they act. The remaining regional- and party-level factors already identified by the existing literature are also taken into consideration to control for them in order to observe if the results obtained here go in the same line as the results presented by previous studies. All these factors are theorised in the next chapter.

5.2) Spain

The same can be concluded for the body of literature that addresses Spain as a case study. There seems to be a match between the above identified gap in general literature and the factors that the specific literature on Spain misses to scrutinise in detail. Most of the research that considers party competition along the centre-periphery in Spain focus on the same factors, such as for example, party type (e.g., Leonisio 2012; Rodríguez-Teruel and Barrio 2016), ideology
(e.g., Pardos-Prado 2012; Alonso and Rovira 2015), economic grievances (e.g., Vampa 2016; Barrio et al. 2018), and distinctive cultural markers (e.g., Beswick 2002). Regional-level factors such as the ones that are the centre of this research receive, or have received, little or no attention. If the aim of this research, in relation to on the general literature, is to provide further knowledge on how to understand the centre-periphery with a more developed and fine-grained point of view linked to unattended, but also important, structural characteristics, the purpose of this study is also to build on and depart from the specific literature on Spain in two main ways.

First, and in line with the general literature, understanding how these three regional-level factors affect party competition along the centre-periphery cleavage will provide a more detailed picture of how parties frame the relations between centres and peripheries with focus on Spain, a politically salient case when it comes to these kind of territorial tensions. Being a significantly important case adds the necessity of comprehending the dynamics that make it prominent to be able to extract conclusions that could be generalised to a broader population which is informed by the same features. Combining the results obtained here with the already existing studies portraits a more developed image of the behaviours that parties have when managing the tensions between regions. Second, the case studies that have been developed by this body of literature normally involve specific regions, for example, the Basque Country or Catalonia, or consider Spain as a whole. With this in mind, the methodological approach elaborated here has the aim of providing the overview of Spain as a case study in combination with the use of subunits of analysis to be able to extract conclusions which are at the same time general to Spain and specific to regions that encompass the entire centre-periphery cleavage. Overall, this research builds on the conclusions provided by previous research on how parties articulate the relations between regions and departs from it presenting it as a novel approach that not only contributes to the existing literature on Spain at an empirical, but also at a methodological level.
6. CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has approached the centre-periphery cleavage in relation to how parties compete and frame the relation between centres and peripheries. The purpose was to explore how the main literature understands this social phenomenon. The traditional dominant left-right axis is now confronted with other social cleavages which are as rooted as the former in the struggle for political domination, which in this investigation is the centre-periphery axis. The interconnectivity of these dimensions of political competition is articulated through parties that position themselves along them to connect with the voters and gain support in order to shape and implement their own political agendas. In order to move in this multi-dimensional political space and combine the positions on multiple axes of competition, parties can use four main strategies to obtain support from the voters by setting their primary and secondary dimensions of competition. This general idea is further explored using Spain as a case study and how parties behave along the centre-periphery cleavage. The results show that parties move along both the left-right and centre-periphery axes, emphasising and positioning themselves on each one by adapting to the context in which they act.
CHAPTER 3

CONCEPTUAL

AND

THEORETICAL

FRAMEWORK
1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter aims to outline the conceptual and theoretical framework used in this investigation. A framework such as the one presented here is an essential part of any research, helping to support and account for the arguments that are used to explain the phenomenon studied by proposing reasoned observable implications to be tested (King et al. 1994: 19). In order to develop a conceptual and theoretical framework with a strong explanatory power, this chapter builds on previous knowledge and proposes a narrative which connects the principal variables with the main expectations and hypotheses (Toshkov 2016: 28-30).

The three main factors that are expected to shape party competition on the centre-periphery cleavage are: distance, fragmentation, and polycentricity. These three main factors, as developed in this chapter, represent key characteristics of outer-peripheries, key subcategory in which the general category “peripheral region” is divided into by the proposed centre-periphery continuum. Adapting to the context requires parties to accommodate to the characteristics of the regions in which they act, and these three factors, as fundamental features of important peripheral regions, are expected to strongly shape their behaviour. To control for the different factors that the literature has identified to shape, to some extent, party behaviour when competing along the same cleavage, the following variables are also included: economic development, identity, language, party type, ideology, and party structure. These factors are considered here as control variables. The first three control variables are labelled as regional-level variables, and the last three are labelled as party-level variables.

In order to achieve the aim described above, this chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section clarifies the main concepts to provide coherent and rigorous definitions along all the investigation. The second section outlines the main explanatory and control variables with the purpose of delimitating and setting the scene. Each variable is theorised in three main steps. The first step analyses the variable at an abstract level. The second step applies it to all the regions of Spain. The third step applies it to a comparison between Castilla-La Mancha, Andalusia, and the Canary Islands.
2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

2.1) Centres and peripheries

As it was observed in the previous chapter, the literature that addresses the centre-periphery cleavage uses the labels “centres” and “peripheries” as consolidated and stable units. This does not comply with the regional variation that one can find in decentralised states such as Spain or Germany. In order to engage with this gap in the literature and to be able to understand with more precision the variation between one region and another, this investigation introduces a centre-periphery continuum. The purpose is to be able to measure with more accuracy this variation and address the complexity of the centre-periphery cleavage. The three explanatory variables that are the centre of this thesis are expected to have a different degree of impact depending on the region that is being studied, and therefore, this continuum is aimed to help disentangle these different effects with more accuracy.

A possible centre-periphery continuum can be articulated using the definitions of centres and peripheries provided by Wellhofer (1988: 283; 1989: 342) and Rokkan and Urwin (1982: 2-3; 1983: 14-18). This continuum gravitates around two main dimensions: the geographical and the political dimensions. The geographical dimension takes into consideration the distance between the cores and the peripheries, helping to identify the different types of regions that can be found when analysing the broad category of periphery. The political dimension outlines the political characteristics of centres and peripheries, and tries to capture the subordination situation in which peripheries are in relation to the centres. In combination, both dimensions help to reinforce and maintain the contrast between centres and peripheries as opposing regions in general terms, and at the same time, approach and acknowledge the variation that one can find between the different peripheral regions.

Dealing with the geographical dimension, the centre-periphery continuum can be divided into different types of regions depending on the distance that separates them. Distance is a factor that helps to reinforce the differences between centres and the peripheries. In this sense, the latter are negatively affected by the distance that separates them from the networks of political power.
relations and decision-making processes that are located at the centre. The further away a periphery is from the centre, the deeper the differences. Added to this, the division of states into regions results in scenarios where the distances between centres and the peripheries are not homogenous in all cases. Some peripheral regions are further away from the centre than others. With the above in mind, in this investigation, the centre-periphery continuum is therefore divided into three main categories: centre, inner-, and outer-peripheral regions.

![THE CENTRE-PERIPHERY CONTINUUM](image)

Figure 3.1. Centre-periphery continuum.

Focusing on the political dimension, this is articulated around the assumption that centres are the regions where the political power is seated. This means that centres exercise a set of political power relations in order to maintain a privileged position in comparison to peripheries, making the latter subordinate to the former. An example of these political power relations that make peripheries subordinated to the centres can be observed in the capacity that both regions have to be the centre of decision-making processes. Centres are able to impose on the peripheries decisions that are designed to politically subordinate them to their interests by implementing and reinforcing decision-making processes where
the outcomes are skewed in their favour. In contrast, peripheries are unable to counterbalance these political power relations to the extent of freeing themselves from this subordination situation. This results in centres being more politically developed and advanced than peripheries (Rokkan and Urwin 1982: 2-3; 1983: 14-18).

Using both dimensions, the centres, inner-, and outer-peripheries are defined in this investigation as follows. Centres are regions characterised by imposing coercive political power relations that keep peripheries subordinate to their interests through decision-making processes that reinforce this situation. In comparison, peripheries are regions that are far away from centres and politically less developed and subordinated to them. This means that they are not able to balance these power relations in order to be able to challenge the political hegemony of centres. In these general category of peripheral regions, one can find inner- and outer-peripheries, the former being closer to centres than the latter. This makes outer-peripheries even less developed in comparison to inner-peripheries due to their remoteness from the networks of political power relations and decision-making processes located at the centres.

2.2) Regions

Following Fitjar’s (2010a: 2) statement that a region can be defined using multiple terms and concepts, in this investigation, the best approach is to give a definition that tries to avoid this variety of meanings and reinforce the need for a single constant concept (Loughlin 1997: 154). A region for this investigation is defined using an institutional approach. According to this approach, a region is defined as a bounded territory organised by its own administrative rule. This means not only a geographically distinct territory but also a political-administrative body to deal with highly contextualised socio-political situations (Power and Goertz 2011: 2388-2389). Regions are ruled by some kind of self-government institutions, such as the Autonomous Communities in Spain or Länder in Germany. This suggests the existence of a strong and extensive network of social and political institutions that serve the purpose of the self-rule of regions (Safran 2000: 12-13).
This institutional approach has one main implication for this investigation. As distinct territorial and institutional entities, regions can be considered, just as nations are for the modernist approach in the field of nationalism (Anderson 1991; Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1990), imagined communities (Smouts 1998: 33-35; Süßner 2002: 200). As for the nationalist doctrine, the regions in regionalism should have a congruence between the political and the regional unit. Here, a region is defined as a political and institutionally bounded and distinct territory which is used as the geographical base of a community that identifies itself as a separate group of people in relation with other communities and exercises its own self-rule through a regional-based institutional network. In this thesis, the region is the main unit of observation. They represent the administrative and political level that is between the central government and the municipalities.

Following from this, regionalism is understood as the phenomenon of territorial tension between a dominant core and a subordinate periphery (Lopez-Aranguren 1983: 33). It is used to describe the movement that arises in the regions when territorial tensions are adopted to base regional demands. It is the politicisation of regional issues with a regional bias (Fitjar 2010a: 5). It offers objectives and aims to solve the problems that affect the region, trying to rearrange the relations between the core and the periphery, and the peripheries between each other. It could plead for self-determination or not, depending on the benefits that the relation with the core offers to the region. In the case that the region fulfils its aims through means like the devolution process, it will remain strong but inside a state-wide project. In the case the different processes of accommodation do not fulfil the region’s aims, it could turn to a secessionist attitude.

2.3) National identity, nacionalidad, and regional identity

In this investigation, the conceptual framework requires a differentiation between national identity, nacionalidad, and regional identity that is applied specifically to Spain as a case study. Starting with national identity, one can find various and well-argued definitions. This is based on the vast amount of discussions amongst the different authors that contribute to the debate (Geertz 1963; Connor 1978; Smith 1991). Although the definition of national identity
requires an extensive discussion, and in order to focus the debate, here, national identity is defined as the feeling of belonging to a certain social group named as nation (Wodak, 1999: 3-4), based on the perception of a distinct economic, cultural and political national reality.

*Nacionalidad* is a term introduced by the Spanish constitution of 1978 to fulfil the demands of the so-called “historic” regions (Ñúnez Seixas 2010: 132-133). This was applied, at the beginning, to the Basque Country, Galicia, and Catalonia to protect, and at the same time, recognise the cultural and regional diversity that can be found in Spain (Pallarés et al. 1997: 137-139). The key aspect here is that the label *nacionalidad* is not equivalent to national identity despite the fact that it is used in most of the literature as synonymous with it. The Spanish constitution, with this label, formally differentiated the *nacionalidades* (regions) from the nation (Spain). *Nacionalidades* refers only to the cultural identities that the historic regions articulate, but never to another entity with the same status as the Spanish nation (Serra 2006: 40). Although originally applied to the historic regions, currently, “new” regions are developing their *Estatutos de Autonomía* in the direction of recognising themselves as *nacionalidades*. Finally, regional identity can be defined as the feeling of belonging to a specific social group called region (Fitjar 2010a: 3), but subordinated to the national identity, like a complement to it rather than a challenge. It is based on the perception of a distinct economic, cultural and political regional reality in comparison to other identity realities such as the nation or other regional identities (Lopez-Aranguren 1983: 58).

The above differentiation has a final aspect that also requires to be explained. This is the relation between the three. These different labels are related in subordination. In Spain, the labels are related in the following way. According to the interpretation of the Spanish constitution, the national identity is the primary term. This means that there is only one nation, the Spanish nation. Subordinated to this, one can find *nacionalidades*, which refer to the different cultural identities found in Spain (Galicia, Catalonia, Basque Country, Valencia, Valencia,

---

9 *Estatutos de autonomía* refers to the basic norm in Spain that regulates the regions. They have constitutional recognition and they develop the right to self-rule of the regions (Aja 2003). From now on, the label used is *Statute of Autonomy*. 
Andalusia, Aragon, the Canary, and Balearic Islands). Finally, regional identities are used to define the regions that identify themselves as regions but not to the extent of positioning themselves as distinct cultural units. In Spain, the labels that the different Statutes of Autotomy use to refer to regional identities are: comunidades históricas (Asturias, Cantabria, and Castilla y Leon), regiones históricas (Extremadura), and identidades históricas (La Rioja).

2.4) Parties

Using Sartori´s (1980: 91) definition of parties, this is, any political group identified with an official label in the elections that is able to present candidates in elections (free or not) and achieve seats for public office, this investigation makes a difference between SWPs and regionalist parties. To simplify the different views that academics have in the literature regarding the characteristics that define a political party, three dimensions are used: 1) its organisation, 2) its social base and support, and 3) its core level or the place where its loyalties lay.

- State-wide parties (SWPs)

SWPs play a major role in federal and quasi-federal states, as they are the link between the regional and national level of party competition, helping to understand the dynamics of multi-level competition (Swenden and Maddens 2009: 253). In terms of their organisational dimension, SWPs are understood as parties that act throughout the state with a state-wide organisation, regardless of the structure, which could be for example, federal or quasi-federal (PSOE) or highly centralised (PP) (Deschouwer 2006: 293). In multi-level states, such as Spain, SWPs have to adapt to this specific context, meaning that they structure a multi-level organisation (Biezen and Hopkins 2006: 15), having a national, regional and local dimension inside the same organisation (Lancaster 1999: 64). The main effect of this state-wide organisation is the territorial pervasiveness of the parties (Deschouwer 2006: 292). This refers to the number of regions where these parties run for elections and fill in candidates. SWPs tend to run and fill in candidates for all the elections in most or all of the regions, having a high territorial
Regarding the social base and support dimension, the main consequence of having a state-wide organisation and high level of territorial pervasiveness is that they receive support from citizens throughout the entire state. This is, they receive support nationally and regionally (Molas 1977: 188). This means that their political projects need to acknowledge a high variety of interest, making them to be perceived and considered as state-wide, defending the interests of the whole state. Focusing on the last dimension, the core level of SWPs, these place their loyalties at the centre (Deschouwer 2003: 216–17).

- **Regionalist parties**

Regionalist parties in this investigation are considered multi-dimensional parties (De Winter 1998: 208–211) in the same way as SWPs, in contrast to some of the existing literature that considers them niche parties and focused on a single dimension of party competition (Müller-Rommel and Pridham 1991; Mudde 1999; Meguid 2005; 2008; Adams et al. 2012; Wagner 2012). Here, regionalist parties also move in a two-dimensional political space (Tranconi 2006; Gómez-Reino 2008; Massetti 2009), the left-right and territorial axes (Alonso 2012: 42). The position of regionalist parties in this two-dimensional political space is determined by political choice and strategy in order to maximise their options in pre- and post-electoral scenarios (Elias et al. 2015: 841). The defence of the region in which they act is their main mission (Gómez-Reino et al. 2006: 258).

Turning to the organisational dimension, regionalist parties are understood to act in only one or a few regions, and considered to have a regional-based organisation (Brancati 2005: 143-145). It has to be acknowledged that they might

---

10 The aim of Deschouwer with these different levels is to divide the parties into a typology that considers their performance in a multi-level political system. The typology has two axes: on one hand, the territorial pervasiveness (referring to the constituencies in which parties’ act; one region, some regions, and all regions), and on the other hand, the participation in elections (regional, national, or both). Cross-validating these two axes result into a total number of 9 levels. The higher the level, the more the party operates in a higher number of regions and at the same time, the more they compete in different type of elections. For example, a party scoring a level of 1 means that the party only operates in one single region and only competes in the regional elections only. A party that scores a level of 5 means that in comparison, the party operates in more than one region and competes in the national elections only. A party scoring a level of 9 refers to a party that operates in all the regions and competes in regional and nation elections (Deschouwer 2006: 291-293).
also have a multi-level organisation to adapt to multi-level states, just as SWPs do (Fabre 2011: 345). Translating this into their territorial pervasiveness, they only run and fill in candidates for the elections in their own region (or few regions), having a low pervasiveness (level 7) (Deschouwer 2006: 292). Considering the social base and support dimension, regionalist parties receive their support from a regional social base (Brancati 2005: 143-145). One possible reason for this is that they are perceived as one of the most effective ways to represent and defend the interests of the regions (Heller 2002: 658). In terms of their political projects, these can be graded between a simple regional and a secessionist project, as it is developed below. This variation can explain the different labels used by the literature, such as ethnoregionalist parties (Müller-Rommel 1998: 18-19) or peripheral parties (Alonso 2012: 2). The core level dimension, referring to the location of their loyalties, is also regionally based (Deschouwer 2003: 216–17).

- **Types of regionalist parties in relation to their political demands**

  Developing more in depth the different political demands that regionalist parties have, the idea is the following. A possible continuum of political demands can be articulated using a scale ranging from simply regional to openly secessionist demands. The key difference is their ideological position in the defence of the interest of the regions, promotion of territorially defined identities and cultures, and centred on developing the self-government of the territory (De Winter 1998: 204-205), reorganising the national state for the benefit of a certain region (Gómez-Reino et al. 2006: 11-15).

  This reflects a disparate number of demands coming from, not only regionalist parties (Urwin 1983: 227), but regionalist parties in general (Alonso 2012: 27). This is based on the definition given by Massetti (2009: 503) to regionalist parties, but applied broadly. According to this author, one of the characteristics of regionalist parties is that their activity is focused on the explicit defence of only the identities and interests of their own region. The more the party positions itself in a dichotomous scenario between its region and the state in which it is currently inserted, the more it changes from a regional or regionalist project to a more nationalist or secessionist one. In other words, the ideological position of these parties gravitates around their understanding of the region as a
separate entity (Massetti and Schakel 2016: 60), but the degree of their demands depends on the challenge that this represents to the state in which they are inserted (Dandoy 2009: 4-6).

With this in mind, in this investigation, the regional political demands continuum is based on four main points, going in the same direction as part of the literature that classifies these types of party according to the same categories (Keating 1988; Sorens 2008; Massetti 2009; Dandoy 2010; Massetti and Schakel 2013; 2016): regional, regionalist, nationalist, and secessionist political demands. Regional demands are pushed forward to defend the interests of the regions within the political current scenario, with no links for more autonomy or devolved competences, such as the recognition of regional cultures (Toubeau 2011: 429-432). Regionalist demands are held when parties request more autonomy for the regions and devolving more competences by the central government (Massetti and Schakel 2017: 432-434). Nationalist demands go a step further, deepening and strengthening the degree of self-government, with a special link to the recognition of regions as nations inside the state in which they are inserted but with the necessary changes in the constitutional design of the state to adapt their demands (Hepburn 2011: 4-9). These two last degrees are to be understood inside the constitutional framework in which the regions are inserted (Fitjar 2010a: 5), considered in general terms as autonomist parties. They aim to deepen the self-government of the region (De Winter 1998: 204-205). This gravitates around the idea of the region being a distinct community based on characteristics such as culture, identity, or language. Finally, secessionist demands request full independence of the regions as nation-states (Dandoy 2010: 201-212).
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1) Pro-centre/periphery positions of parties

Before theorising the different explanatory and control variables, it is important to highlight what is understood as the effects that these may have on parties when competing over the centre-periphery cleavage. This is, *what effects* do these factors have on party behaviour. Party behaviour is defined here according to two main effects that these factors may have. These effects are, on one hand, pro-centre, or on the other hand, pro-periphery positions along the centre-periphery cleavage, both linked to the five dependent variables used to tap into the latter. Despite the fact that these dependent variables are described in detail in the methodological chapter, it is also necessary to do so here at a theoretical level in order to have a deep understanding of the effects that these
explanatory and control variables may have on party competition along the centre-periphery cleavage.

When parties are described to have pro-centre positions, this means that they emphasise more the centre. This is translated into a negative emphasis on the saliency of the region, re-territorialising competences towards the centre or retaining the ones it currently has, negative attitudes towards social groups in the periphery, supporting the constitutional subordination of the peripheral regions towards the centre, and reinforcing the identity coming from the core. In contrast, when parties are described to have pro-periphery positions, these should be interpreted as emphasising more the periphery. This is, they put more emphasis on the saliency of the region, claiming for more devolved competences to the region, having a positive attitude towards social groups in the periphery, increasing the importance of the region with a more favourable constitutional status, and protecting and promoting regional identities. These positions on the centre-periphery cleavage are not understood here as static and absolute categories, they can be graduated. This means that parties can emphasise more or less these positions to adapt to the specific characteristics of the regions. These two effects can be inserted in a continuum with each category at the far ends, granting parties the possibility to move from one to the other. For example, a party can have milder pro-periphery positions in one region and stronger in others. At the same time, moving towards one of the ends of this continuum does not put parties in a dichotomous position towards the other end. This means that their positions tend to be more absolute towards one of the categories. It is the articulation of these positions that makes them dichotomous or not.
The way this section is structured further develops how these different positions are understood. Each explanatory and control variable are theorised in three main steps. The first step theorises the variable in an abstract way with a general discussion. This is, the possible effects of the variable on party competition on the centre-periphery cleavage are described as pro-centre or pro-periphery as a whole. How these positions are understood are further developed in the next two steps. The second step applies the variable to all the regions of Spain. The purpose is to have a general overview of how it affects party competition on the centre-periphery cleavage with a state-wide perspective, where the 17 regions present a variety of different characteristics. Eight variables are taken into consideration, the three main explanatory and five control variables: *distance, fragmentation, polycentricity, economic development, regional identity, regional language, party type,* and *party ideology.* These variables are expected to have an effect on the following dependent variables:
saliency of the regional level, position on competence distribution, and attitudes towards multiculturalism.

The third step applies the variable to the regions of Castilla-La Mancha, Andalusia, and the Canary Islands. The purpose is to present a focused comparison between the centre (Castilla-La Mancha), inner-periphery (Andalusia), and the outer-periphery (the Canary Islands). The aim of this is to have an in-depth analysis of how parties compete on the centre-periphery cleavage across these three regions, covering all three categories of the above centre-periphery continuum. The expected behaviour is that they will adapt their discourses to the specific characteristics of the regions. The variables selected are six, the three main explanatory and three control variables: distance, fragmentation, polycentricity, party type, party ideology, and party structure. These variables are applied to the following dependent variables: saliency of the regional level, constitutional status of the region, position on competence distribution, and identity.

With these three steps in mind, a party has an overall strong pro-periphery position when, focusing on all the regions of Spain for example, it strongly emphasises the saliency of the regional level, calls for more competences for the region, and displays a positive attitude towards multiculturalism. A final observation has to be outlined here. The same list of control variables is not applied in steps two and three. This is, a different set of control variables is applied, on one hand, to all the regions of Spain, and on the other hand, to Castilla-La Mancha, Andalusia, and the Canary Islands. This is because some are controlled via case selection in the specific comparison between the latter three regions. The different measurement schemes, justification for the explanatory and dependent variables selected, and the analyses performed, are further developed in the next chapter.
3.2) Main explanatory variables

3.2.A) Distance

*General discussion*

The first point to make is that in political science, the literature has not dealt sufficiently with distance theoretically. Theories concerning space, place, and territory (Herb and Kaplan 1999; Paasi 2004; Elden 2005), can account to a certain degree for distance and its effects on the articulation of the centre-periphery cleavage, but for a deeper understanding, other fields of knowledge are also valuable. For this purpose, social psychology is useful here, and more precisely, the Construal Level Theory (Nisbett *et. al.* 1973; Fiedler *et. al.* 1995; Linville *et. al.* 1996; Idson & Mischel 2001)\(^{11}\). Distance represents one of the main characteristic of outer-peripheries, as outlined in the above centre-periphery continuum. The main argument here is that the farther away a community is from the centre, the more abstract that centre becomes. Spatial distance makes individuals see events as more abstract (Henderson *et. al.* 2006) and therefore, affects the ways in which they relate to the centre.

Combining political science with social psychology, a theoretical development of the effect of distance is to consider the variable as a mixture of three different dimensions: space, place and territory. All three dimensions are seen here as interlinked in the way communities articulate a sense of attachment to what they call “home". The point of departure for this section is the analysis that Penrose (2002: 278-285) makes of the latent powers of space, place, and territoriality for human beings. Although implicit in the analysis of distance as a psychological dimension, space, place, and territoriality are different aspects which are seen as part of the same process of boundary making. The basic argument of these three aspects of boundary making process dealing with the physical characteristics of nature is that they act as a successive culmination of stages. In this sense, first comes space, then place, and finally territoriality through a process of psychological and political articulation.

\(^{11}\) To read more about this theory see, amongst others, Fujita *et. al.* (2006), Trope and Liberman (2010), and Fiedler (2012). In this investigation the important factors of this theory are the spatial and social distances (Matthews and Matlock 2011).
- **Space**

Starting with space, it has been proven very difficult to define. Penrose (2002: 278) gives a definition of space which is valid for this investigation. Space is everything that can be seen as structures of the real world. In other words, the structures that naturally can be found in the real world and that are a product of the evolution of the planet. Two important factors are mentioned at this stage which are extracted from the above definition. The first factor is that space is the raw material with which the discourses of places and territoriality are articulated (Penrose 2002: 278). Due to the aspect of raw material of space, other authors, such as Shaefer (1953: 232), suggest that it could be better named using other terms, like for example structures of the real world. The second factor is that space is independent from the discourses that build up places and territorialities (Penrose 2002: 278).

The analysis of space holds two main sources of latent power for human beings (Penrose 2002: 278-279). The first source of latent power relates to the raw aspect of space, which contains the main resources used to sustain human life. This source of latent power is referred to as the latent material power, or in other words, the power to sustain life, and therefore, communities. Distance is seen as one of the factors that determines the ability of the communities to sustain life. If the resources to sustain life are far away from a community, that same community has two options, either move closer to those sources, or look for alternatives in the surrounding spaces. The survival of the community using the resources that are available triggers an emotional feeling of belonging and attachment response by the community towards that same space. Not only does it survive physically, but also emotionally. This emotional response to space gives way to the second source of latent power that space represents.
The second source of latent power refers to space as a source of latent emotional power. The community, through the process of survival gained through the experience of working space, fills the psychological need of attachment. At this stage, the psychological attachment to this raw piece of terrain is not greater than an emotional response to the space that a community uses to survive. This psychological response is not expected to be considered yet as a basis for the articulation of an identity. The community channels the emotional response through what Penrose (2002: 279) calls the relational dimension of space. This second source of latent power of space is characterised by the filter of the experience of the community using the relational dimension of space to articulate a psychological response of attachment to the space used for survival. The relation between the latent material and the emotional power is skewed towards the former one, being this the most important source of latent power.

*The degree of dependency relates to the dependency that the community has towards it*

![Diagram of Sources of Latent Power in Space]

Figure 3.4. Sources of latent power in space.

- **Place**

  The latent emotional power is here seen as the point of departure that determines the transformation of space into place. The emotional response of the
community is a symbolic one. A concrete space supports the community, and this same community is emotionally required to take care of it, making a space become a place (Penrose 2002: 281). Therefore, place can be defined as the symbolic articulation of space. Place is the social construction of space. Places can be delimited using an economic, cultural, political, or natural dimension (Paasi 1995: 42). A space becomes a place when it acquires certain stability for a community in a multi-dimension spectrum. A place is not necessarily a delimited space in comparison to other spaces until it acquires perceptual unity for the community (May 1973: 212). This multi-dimension stability and perceptual unity is achieved through the psychological process of place attachment. The main argument that social psychology uses to explain the psychological process of place attachment is that the latter can be divided into three main dimensions (Scannell and Gifford 2010: 2-6): the person dimension\textsuperscript{12}, the process dimension\textsuperscript{13}, and the place dimension.

Place dimension, is considered as the most important dimension for this investigation. Scannell and Gifford (2010: 4) divide place dimension into two main levels: the social and physical levels of place attachment. It is expected for the last level to have a deeper theoretical impact for this research. The social level refers to the bounds created around social ties inside the group, such as family for example (Riger and Lavrakas 1981: 56-58), and the physical level links to the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{12} This dimension is subdivided into two further components: the individual and the group level. The individual level deals with place attachment that involves individuals on their own. In the group level, the analysis concerns the way social groups share the psychological multi-dimension issue of place attachment (Low 1992). For this thesis, the focus is put on the group level of analysis. This is, the symbolic meaning of a place that the members of a community share. In this sense, communities develop place attachment to pieces of terrain or land where they actually develop their practices and cultures (Michelson 1976).
  \item \textsuperscript{13} The process dimension is divided into three main levels, and concerns the way in which the individuals and groups relate to a place: place attachment as affect, as cognition, and as behaviour. Place attachment as affect can be summarized as the relations between a person and a group with a place, and this represents a variety of different kind of emotions, from love and happiness to hatred and ambivalence (Manzo 2005). Place attachment as cognition can be described as the memories, beliefs, meaning, and knowledge that individuals and groups associate with being personally important (Proshansky et. al. 1983). Place attachment as behavior is defined through the actions of the individual or group (Twigger-Ross and Uzzell 1996). The main argument is that there is a positive affective link between the individual or group and a specific place, based on the closeness of the individual or group o that place (Hidalgo and Hernández 2011: 274).
\end{itemize}
bounds created around physical features of the place. Focusing on the physical features of the place, it is based on the ability of these physical features to provide the community with the necessary conditions to achieve its aims (Stokols and Shumaker 1981: 442-448), ranging from a mountain to the sea in the case of archipelagos (Manzo 2005: 81-84). If a correlation between the arguments used to describe space and place attachment is drawn using the two sources of latent power, place attachment relies more on the latent emotional power.

The relations between nature, space, and place have been commonly defined as place attachment (Kyle et. al. 2004)\textsuperscript{14}. Social theorists have stated that places, i.e. physical spaces, are sources of identification and affiliation (Hosany et. al. 2015: 484). In this sense, places represent for people and social groups a source of attitudes, values, and beliefs (Sack 1992: 16-19), in which identity is placed and articulated around physical features of spaces (Budruk et. al. 2009: 824-827). This articulates place-identity, which refers to the connection between people and places (Proshansky 1978: 148-150). The greater the dependency of a group on the physical characteristics of a space, the more likely the group will be loyal to it (Scannell and Gifford 2010: 4-6). In contrast, the further away one moves from these physical characteristics, more abstract it becomes for the population.

Despite the fact that distance itself has been overlooked by most of the literature that deals with the centre-periphery cleavage, relations, and regionalism (Cartrite and Miodownik 2016: 124), some studies have tried to prove that, especially in insular outer peripheral regions, geographical remoteness is an important factor of distinctiveness (Corner 1988: 231-235). The argument is that, as distance increases, abstraction increases, and therefore, the less loyal the population affected by the effect of abstraction is to the core because the physical characteristics of that region, as they are not physically present in the periphery, do not satisfy people’s needs generated by place attachment (Stokols and Shumaker 1981: 445-448).

\textsuperscript{14} Place attachment can be defined as: it involves an interplay of affects and emotions, knowledge and beliefs, and behaviours and actions in reference to a place (Altman and Low 1992: 5).
- Territory

Distance, real or imagined, is used as a political instrument to forge identities, being an active part of political discourse (Keith and Pile 1993: 2). This is where the process of territoriality, and final stage of the process of boundary making, is an important factor (Penrose 2002: 280-282). When a community transforms spaces into places, and the latter into territories, they are hardening the boundaries that previously were not a source of political identification. This can be called the process of territoriality. Cores and peripheries are now articulated to distinguish communities. A place becomes a source of political identification (a territory) through the process of delimitation. Spaces, places and territories can exist all at a same point in time, and the process is sequential and not alternative (Sack 1986: 16). In this way, first comes space, then place, and finally territory.

The process of territorialisation, according to Penrose (2002: 280-282), has four main dimensions. The first dimension is that territories are seen and conceptualised as natural. Distance acts therefore as a factor that delimits naturally a space, which at the same time, marks a certain place. This naturalisation of territories is aimed to frame the territories with an aura of
immutability (Jackson and Penrose 1993: 2-3). Islands and archipelagos are used here as an example. Both types of insular regions are considered as bounded territories because of their natural characteristics. The sea acts as a natural frontier that the discourses of territoriality use to reinforce the idea of a territorial unit. The second dimension refers also to the naturalness of territories, but in this case, with the natural relation between communities and territories. The third dimension considers the psychological attachment to the territory that most of the people living in it have. The fourth dimension represents the way in which the relation between territories and communities are reinforced.

For the analysis of distance and how it affects the interaction between the centre, the inner-, and the outer-peripheries, the most important dimension of territoriality is the first one, the naturalization of spaces in territories using their natural features as frontiers. These natural frontiers have to be present for the community to articulate a feeling of belonging and identification. Distance can act as a catalyst for this articulation. If a community interacts every day with certain natural features that define a territory, the more it will use these natural features to articulate an identity around them. For example, when a community of an archipelago outer-periphery stands in front of the sea as a natural barrier, two types of identification can be articulated. The first type of identification is a self-identification process. The community identifies itself as islanders, using the sea as a characteristic of its identity. The second type of identification refers to the sea as an indicator to identify and differentiate a community from another. This is expected to deepen the sense of distance between the archipelago and the mainland. By this mechanism, the sea as a frontier is used as a basis of a distinct identity from the one in the mainland. If identities are articulated, and therefore changing (Hall 1990: 222-225), space, place and territory are part of the characteristics used in this shifting (Hall and Jacques 1990: 12-19). This articulation is mainly negotiated, meaning that it acts in both ways (Giampapa 2004: 193), from the core to the periphery and vice versa.

This may respond to what Penrose (2002: 284) describes as the two main forms of territoriality in modernity. The first form defines identity as cultural. The significance of territoriality builds on the fact that culture is geographically distributed. The second form refers to identity being defined territorially. The
geographical distribution of a political unit that is used to delimit a specific territory (Sack 1983: 56-58). The natural characteristics and its symbolic meaning for the community are used to influence in its formation and are mechanisms to articulate means of preserving it through an identity which re-evaluates the natural features of the territory. If, as Guibernau suggests (1996: 3), it is the combination of the two forms of territoriality that is privileged in modernity over any other, then it is understandable that nationalism and regionalism procure most of its resonance and resilience from the natural features of a given territory.

This abstraction level can shape party competition on the centre-periphery cleavage in the following way. The starting point is that as distance from the centre increases, the same happens with the abstraction level. Therefore, as distance increases, more difficult it becomes for the regional population to identify itself with the centre because this becomes more and more abstract. With this in mind, SWPs are expected to accommodate and adapt their discourses and position on the centre-periphery cleavage to the increasing distance and abstraction level to counterbalance their negative effect and maintain the identification of the regional population with the centre. Their discourses are expected to adapt to the regional-level characteristics to be able to prevent the regional population from articulating a strong challenge to the centre based on confronting the characteristics of the centre to the ones of the periphery. The more the regional population identifies exclusively with its own characteristics, the stronger the challenge to the centre. This is favoured by the increasing distance from the latter. Therefore, the further away the periphery is from the centre, the more SWPs need to adapt to the characteristics of the regions to counterbalance the effect of distance and the abstraction level. Their discourses can be adapted, amongst other ways, by positioning themselves in a more pro-periphery attitude, increasing as distance also increases. This is, regionalising their discourses in the face of the difficulties to make the centre visible. By doing so, these parties try to balance at the same time the interests of the centre and the peripheries, and therefore counterbalance distance as a factor that helps the articulation of the peripheral regions as dichotomous to the centre.

Regionalist parties, seen as one of the best mechanisms to defend the interests of the regions and having a regionally based social support, are
expected to adapt to distance and the abstraction level by increasing their pro-periphery positions. Again, as distance increases, the more regionalist parties will use this factor in order to challenge the centre. For these parties to articulate a strong challenge to the centre, they can argue that the distance that separates them from the core is a strong characteristic of the region and a source of identification for the peripheral population. As they adapt their discourses to the increasing distance, this also affects their political demands. Distance counter-balances the centre-periphery cleavage towards more pro-periphery positions. The higher the distance, the more chances for regionalist parties to support stronger pro-periphery positions.

With this theorisation in mind, a general hypothesis can be formulated to understand how distance affects party completion on the centre-periphery cleavage. This general hypothesis is:

**H1** - the further away from the centre, the stronger the pro-periphery positions of parties

*Distance applied to all the regions of Spain*

In Spain, distance is expected to play a major effect as one moves away from the centre (Madrid, Castilla-La Mancha, and Castilla y Leon). It is expected to have a major effect in, for example, the Balearic Islands, an inner-peripheral region, but this effect is expected to be even greater as one moves even further away, to the outer-periphery of the Canary Islands. Parties adapt to this effect by giving more importance to the region as distance increases. This is hypothesised as follows:

**H1.A** - the greater the distance from the centre, the more parties emphasise the regional level

**H1.B** - the greater the distance from the centre, the more calls from parties for more competences for the regions

**H1.C** - the greater the distance from the centre, the more emphasis of parties on positive attitudes towards multiculturalism
Distance applied to Castilla-La Mancha, Andalusia, and the Canary Islands

Considering these three regions, the effect of distance is aimed to be further analysed. By doing so, the aim is to test if the abstraction effect actually increases as one moves away from the centre. This effect is expected to increase when moving from Castilla-La Mancha (centre) to Andalusia (inner-periphery), and finally to the Canary Islands (outer-periphery). The hypotheses are:

**H1.D** - as distance from the centre increases, parties will emphasise more the regional level as one moves from Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, and finally to the Canary Islands.

**H1.E** - as distance from the centre increases, parties will emphasise a more differentiated constitutional status of the region as one moves from Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, and finally to the Canary Islands.

**H1.F** - as distance from the centre increases, parties will increase the demands for more competences as one moves from Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, and finally to the Canary Islands.

**H1.G** - as distance from the centre increases, parties will increase the emphasis on a differentiated identity as one moves from Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, and finally to the Canary Islands.

3.2.B) Fragmentation

*General discussion*

The previous discussion of distance and the abstraction effect has a counterbalance in certain regions with specific characteristics of space, places and territory. This alternative effect applies specifically to archipelagos because of the natural features that distinguish these kinds of regions. Although islands can be understood as the best example of periphery, they have been studied only to some extent in the field of comparative politics (Royle 2001: 42), with the issue of non-sovereignty and island jurisdiction as the most develop themes (Baldacchino and Milne 2009; Baldacchino 2010; Hepburn and Baldacchino 2013). This variable is theorised in this investigation because most of the outer-
peripheries to be found are archipelagos. Archipelagos such as Hawaii or the Canary Islands are examples of how fragmentation affects the articulation of the region. Following Hepburn and Elias’s (2011: 862) argument, fragmentation is understood, in relation to the periphery, as follows. Fragmentation, or insularity, stands in the very far end of the centre-periphery continuum, meaning that, because of the very nature of islands, “the experience of peripherality and isolation is enhanced to the greatest extent in the island context”. This specific nature of islands affects all the aspects of the political articulation of archipelagos and the dynamics that this encompasses (Baldacchino 2004: 272-275).

Fragmentation, via identifying the islands as the territories where the loyalties of the local populations rest, may undermine the effect of distance and the articulation of a strong regional discourse. This factor is outlined according to three key elements: the psychological effect of fragmentation, the spatial, and the political dimensions. Working against fragmentation could trigger the reaction of the local population, preventing the articulation of a strong regional project. In order to avoid this reaction, parties are expected to necessarily adapt to fragmentation by, although having pro-periphery positions, also favouring the local level. This would inevitably undermine their pro-periphery positions.

- The psychological effect of fragmentation

Regions seem to be the most used units of observation in the literature, as if this was the granted scale on which the centre-periphery analysis should be focused. This is, that, as Paasi (2002: 138) puts it, regions are taken for granted and there is no further fragmentation of the region into smaller units of identification. The literature has placed little emphasis on smaller units that may have major effects and that are not taken into account. This should not be taken as monolithic. Regions, especially archipelagos, are also subdivided into smaller units (islands) that the local population see as their bounded territories. The fragmentation of archipelagos into islands may counterbalance the effect of distance, abstraction, and place attachment, weakening identification with the region. Hay (2003: 203) argues in this respect that the “water boundary is conducive to psychological distinctiveness, because it promotes clearer, ‘bounded’ identities.”.
In archipelagos, the islands become the units of identification for the space, place, and territory. Islands are compacted natural units, which deepens the notions of location and identity (Baldacchino 2004: 272). In these regions, the local population, affected by this psychological effect of fragmentation, may identify with their own islands more than with the region. Hache (1998: 47) further develops how insularity is used to articulate a distinctive island-based identity. Not only does the local population identify with its own island, but it also considers this island-based identity to be threatened by any other identity that tries to assimilate it. A regional identity might be seen as a threat if it negates the existence and importance of these island-based identities. This psychological effect is better understood via the two dimensions outlined below.

- **Fragmentation as a spatial dimension**

  The fragmentation of the unit "archipelago outer-periphery" also has to be considered when observing the articulation of a regional project. This means that islands are perfectly delimited units of land which are perceived by the communities not only as space, but also as place and territory at the same time. In other words, the three dimensions coincide inside the same borders that water encircles. The local populations in archipelagos tend to identify more with their islands than with the region, determined by the insular characteristics of the territory to which they are attached to (Baldacchino 2004: 272). Communities in islands are inherently related to their delimited natural spaces and separated from the exterior by this specific natural characteristic. The island is identified as the condition of its own character, and therefore, it is the unit upon which the local loyalties relay. It is, as Goldman states (2008: 28), "...literally the space of the people and their place in the world is shaped by the relationship between the land and the surrounding waters.". It can be said that islands have the power to **subdivide** the archipelago into smaller units. These island-based loyalties tend to undermine the ability of parties to articulate a strong regionally based discourse.
Although in contiguous territorial states, such as Germany or Poland, regions may be the best possible unit of observation to explain the centre-periphery cleavage, in other states, such as those that have archipelago outer-peripheries, this may not be necessarily the case. The argument behind this can be summarised using Penrose’s words (2002: 280) “…islands are frequently viewed as discrete geographical entities because the boundaries of the land are clearly marked by water.”. Islands individually and not the archipelago are the natural feature that the local population uses to fulfil the place attachment requirements. The distance that separates each island of the archipelago acts in the same way as the distance that separates the archipelago from the mainland regions, reinforcing the island-based identification. Even if there is a relatively short distance between islands, the sea still retains its psychological effect of natural barrier, perfectly bounding the island-based territories.

- **Fragmentation as a political-administrative dimension**

  If distance and the abstraction level is a factor that increase the importance of the region as the preferred unit of identification for the peripheral populations, fragmentation, via this political-administrative dimension, is a factor that counterbalances this effect, blurring the region as a whole. It can be said that the above Construal Level Theory can be further applied to sub-regional units.

---

**Figure 3.6. Comparison between contiguous and fragmented regions.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MAINLAND VS. ARCHIPELAGOS OUTER-PERIPHERIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province/Municipality</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Having these sub-regional units of identification is a factor that works against the region as the main source of latent emotional power for the local population to identify with. The identification with these sub-regional ruling bodies increases as the abstraction level also increases. The more abstract the centre becomes, the more important local ruling bodies become for the local population to fulfil its attachment feelings. As one moves away from the centre, the political-administrative dimension of fragmentation increases its negative effect as the local population increments its identification with the local ruling bodies. All parties are expected to be affected with the same intensity. This position can be labelled as pro-subregional. This dimension can affect both archipelago and continuous regions.

It has to be pointed out that fragmentation is expected to have deeper effects if both dimensions coincide, like in archipelagos. In this sense, the recognition and acknowledgement by parties of the importance of these island-based loyalties (spatial dimension) and island-based ruling bodies (political-administrative dimension) for the local population may prevent the articulation of a strong regional discourse. Not only does the local population strongly identify with the island, but also with the local body that rules it. In other words, this focuses on the political agency factor that spatial fragmentation favours (Giampapa 2004: 193). This means that the island-based political community unifies under the local body that rules the island. This undermines the capacity of a regional project to be articulated with a strong regional base. Local bodies such as Provincial Councils in continuous regions can be assimilated to the local island-based ruling bodies, but the degree of importance for the local population is higher in the case of the latter due to the perfect match between the islands and the jurisdiction that these island-based local bodies can exercise. The boundaries coincide, reinforcing the link between the territory and the political-administrative body that governs it. If only one dimension (spatial or political-administrative) is present, the negative effect is also expected, as theorised, but with a lower degree of impact than when the two are combined.

15 Provincial Councils in Spain represents the administrative and governmental level between the regions and the local bodies such as municipalities. Some regions have a territorial division called province, but no actual council, such as the Canary and Balearic Islands.
Focusing on the above theorisation, the general hypothesis that can be formulated to understand how fragmentation affects party completion on the centre-periphery cleavage is the following:

**H2-fragmentation undermines the pro-periphery positions of parties**

*Fragmentation applied to the different regions of Spain*

The above theoretical discussion can be applied to the different regions of Spain in the following way. Because all regions are affected by political-administrative fragmentation, the focus is put on the first dimension. In the archipelago regions of the Balearic and the Canary Island, spatial fragmentation is expected to undermine the articulation of a strong regional discourse by parties. This first stage tries to observe if the spatial dimension of fragmentation in isolation has the theorised effect. The acknowledgement of island-based loyalties and identities is predicted to negatively affect the pro-periphery positions of parties. Increasing the importance of the region with more pro-periphery positions is perceived as going to the detriment of these island-based loyalties and identities. This is hypothesised to have the following adverse effects:

**H2.A-fragmentation undermines the emphasis of parties on the regional level**

**H2.B-fragmentation reduces the calls from parties for more competences for the regions**

**H2.C-fragmentation favours a less positive attitude of parties towards multiculturalism**

*Fragmentation applied to Castilla-La Mancha, Andalusia, and the Canary Islands*

In the case of these three regions, the analysis is expected to be useful to observe, on one hand, the increasing negative impact of political-administrative fragmentation as distance from the centre increases, and on the other hand, if the combination of both dimensions of fragmentation has the profound effect above theorised in comparison to the presence of only one due to the perfect match between the boundaries of the islands and the jurisdiction of the local island-based bodies.
First, the effect of political-administrative fragmentation is expected to increase as one moves away from the centre. The higher the distance from the centre, the more abstract its ruling bodies become for the local population in the peripheries, and therefore, the more important the local bodies of the peripheries become to fulfil its attachment feelings. For example, the Provincial Councils in Andalusia have had a major role in the region, both in history (Girón Reguera 2004; Romero and López 2005) and in the current democratic period (Yerga Cobos 2010). In comparison, the importance of the same local bodies in Castilla-La Mancha is less, although also present in history (Pillet Capdepón 2015). This is where the Construal Level Theory explained above can be further applied to this factor in order to explain this variation. The distance from the centre is higher in Andalusia than in Castilla-La Mancha, and therefore, the more important these local ruling bodies are for the local population in the former region as the abstraction level increases when one moves away from the centre. This effect is expected to be even deeper in the Canary Islands. This is based on the fact that because the distance that separates this region from the centre is even greater, the abstraction level is expected to be also higher. Overall, political-administrative fragmentation is expected to deepen its effect as one moves from Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, and finally to the Canary Islands due to the increase in importance of the local bodies for the local populations.

Added to this increase in the impact of political-administrative fragmentation as distance from the centre increments, the region of the Canary Islands is expected to be even more affected by fragmentation due to the combination of both dimensions of this factor via the Cabildos\textsuperscript{16} (García Rojas and Alvardíaz García-Portillo 2005). The Cabildos represent the perfect match between the spatial and political-administrative dimensions of fragmentation. The islands found in the Canary Islands are well distinct bounded territories, which undermine the possible image of the region as a whole, being this more abstract for the local population. This does not happen in continuous regions due to the lack of spatial fragmentation. This combination reinforces the importance of the Cabildos in the Canary Islands, where they are a key element of the political life

\textsuperscript{16} Cabildos are the insular-based governments of the islands in the regions of the Canary and the Balearic Islands. They took over the competences of the Provincial Councils.
of the islands (Ramírez Muñóz 1996: 278-280). The loyalties are stronger in these well-bounded insular territories, leading to what is known as *insularismo* (Hernández Bravo 1989) or insular dimension (Hernández Bravo 2004), which refers to the political loyalties between the local population and the islands (Hernández Bravo 1989). Figure 3.7 summarises the strength of the loyalties is the Canary Islands.

![Diagram showing the three levels of identification and loyalties in the Canary Islands](image)

*Figure 3.7. The three levels of identification and loyalties in the Canary Islands.*

With the above expectation, the hypotheses are the following:

**H2.D**-fragmentation undermines the articulation of a strong regional level by parties due to the acknowledgement of the importance of the local level,
increasing its effects as one moves from Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, and finally to the Canary Islands

**H2.E**-Fragmentation weakens the ability of parties to articulate a differentiated constitutional status of the region due to the acknowledgement of the importance of the local level, increasing its effects as one moves from Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, and finally to the Canary Islands

**H2.F**-Fragmentation reduces the ability of parties to call for more competences for the region due to the acknowledgement of the importance of the local level, increasing its effects as one moves from Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, and finally to the Canary Islands

**H2.G**-Fragmentation erodes the ability of parties to articulate a strong regional identity due to the acknowledgement of the importance of the local level, increasing its effects as one moves from Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, and finally to the Canary Islands

3.2.C) Polycentricity

**General discussion**

Polycentricity is normally understood as the existence of several urban centres of more or less the same size (Roberts *et al.* 1999) and capability of agglomerating resources (Agarwal *et al.* 2012: 434) more efficiently than smaller ones (Puga 2010: 209-210), without being subordinated to a full extent to another larger city. Two important aspects are added in order to define polycentricity for the purpose of this investigation: on one hand, the decision-making processes, and on the other hand, the competition between them. Taking into account the first aspect, polycentricity can be defined as the existence of multiple centres of decision making-processes with some degree of independence from one another to act and develop their own socio-economic programmes (Ostrom *et al.* 1961: 831). Considering the second aspect, these centres of power are in constant competition to attract more resources and expand their capability to incorporate more decision-making process and accumulate resources. For this investigation, polycentricity is informed by their constant competition to become the centre
decision-making process and attract more resources to expand their influence in the region.

The articulation of an alternative to the centre is expected to generate a debate in the peripheral regions. This is, which urban area will replace the centre as the new location of the decision-making processes and power relations in the periphery? This debate would gravitate around the power fight of the different candidates to become this new centre of power. The different centres of power would compete to become the new dominant centre of power in order to improve their own position in the region. This would prevent them becoming subordinated, as a new form of peripherality inside the periphery itself (Herrschel 2009: 242). When it comes to the articulation of the centre-periphery cleavage, the presence of multiple centres of power in the peripheral regions can be expected to have a negative effect. This is because the articulation of an alternative discourse is due to have a strong single centre of power in the periphery to be presented as a challenge to the one in the centre. The absence of a strong unique centre of power in the periphery provides a high degree of uncertainty. The regional population would not have a strong centre of power to turn to in order to seek a political project that is supposed to replace the one coming from the centre.

Apart from the overall negative effect of polycentricity, an effect that has not yet been theorised is the concentration of competition in a few. With this in mind, this can be used to articulate a scale of polycentricity to observe if its negative effect deepens as the concentration of power in small number of urban centres increases. The starting point is the presence of multiple centres of power having an overall negative effect, as theorised above. Further developing this, on one end of the scale, one could find multiple centres of power and a high degree of polycentricity in combination with a low impact of its negative effect, and on the other end, one could find the opposite scenario, few centres of power and a low degree of polycentricity in combination with a high impact of its negative effect. The reason for this is that having multiple centres of power (high degree of polycentricity) can produce a positive status quo where all benefit from it and there is no real action taken by any to increases its predominance in case it loses its influence by the counteraction of the others. The current situation in which they already are is considered as positive and they have more to lose than to win. The
pro-periphery positions of parties are expected to be affected as the general discussion for this factor has outlined above, but with a low impact of its negative effect. This is expected to change as one moves to the other end of the scale and the number of centres of power decrease and the competition is concentrated around two or three centres of power (low degree of polycentricity). As the degree of polycentricity decreases and the competition is concentrated in few centres of power, the more the pro-periphery positions are expected to be further undermined (high impact of its negative effect). The reason for this is because as competition is concentrated around two or three centres of power, the higher the expectations to improve as there are fewer challengers. This encourages the few centres of power to increase their competitiveness and react negatively to any move from any other actor that might undermine their own positions. The previous positive status quo is not beneficial anymore. This is when the pro-positions of parties are deeply undermined. In this investigation, both the overall negative effect and the decreasing degree of polycentricity is expected to be observed. Figure 3.8 can summarise this possible polycentricity scale.

Figure 3.8. Possible polycentricity scale.
Polycentricity in archipelagos

Although the presence of multiple centres of power is expected to affect both continuous and archipelagos regions, polycentricity in interaction with fragmentation is expected to deepen the negative effect of both factors. Like the effect of fragmentation, which explores a new unit of identification, the island, having two or more rival centres of power traces another negative effect. If the islands represent clearly defined units of identity, as discussed above, the political agency factor that spatial and political-administrative fragmentation in combination favours (Giampapa 2004: 193) is also expected to work at this level, promoting the creation of island-based centres of power. With this in mind, the presence of island-based rival centres of power can be seen as one of the main possible consequences of fragmentation interacting with polycentricity. The relation between the island as a territory, the local island-based body, and a strong island-based centre of power is reinforced. All three dimensions work in the same direction, the strengthening of the island as a whole inside the archipelago. The intergroup solidarity (Dovidio 2015: 164) amongst the different island-based social groups of the archipelago that encouraged the articulation of a challenge to the centre is threatened by polycentricity and the need to articulate a strong single centre of power. This intergroup solidarity would be undermined as the articulation of a single strong centre of power endangers the already existing island-based centres of power, where the loyalties of these social groups seat. This is expected to further undermine the pro-periphery position of parties in comparison to continuous regions.

This factor is expected to affect party competition on the centre-periphery cleavage in a negative way. Parties, to articulate a strong challenge to the centre, need to present an alternative centre of power to the one at the core. The existence of multiple centres of power in the region erodes this. The power struggle between them to become this alternative centre of power weakens the challenge. Although there is a possibility to become more influential in the region, the different centres of power also see a threat to their current position via a possible subordination to the alternative new single centre of power. This concern becomes stronger if the different centres of power have more or less the same degree of influence in the region. Having more or less the same degree of
influence strengthens competition amongst them, which is not present if there is a considerable difference, resulting in subordinated relations between them. The pro-periphery positions of parties would be reinforced if they are able to articulate a region with a strong single centre of power that challenges the one at the core, but they would be undermined if they are not able to do so. Parties are expected to comply with the social groups where their loyalties are based, and these are normally found in strong centres of power. If these feel threatened by a stronger alternative centre of power, they would pressure parties to weaken the latter, inevitably eroding their overall strong pro-periphery positions.

Considering the above description of how polycentricity might affect party competition on the centre-periphery cleavage, the general hypothesis is the following:

H3-polycentricity undermines the pro-periphery positions of parties

Polycentricity applied to all the regions of Spain

Polycentricity is theorised to affect the way parties compete on the centre-periphery cleavage, as developed above, in an overall negative way. By considering all regions, the aim is to observe if polycentricity, in general terms, has this expected negative effect. As it is outlined in the quantitative analysis chapter, the high number of regions with multiple centres of power provides the necessary observations to test if polycentricity has the basic theorised negative effect. The different hypotheses are:

H3.A-polycentricity undermines the emphasis of parties of the regional level

H3.B-polycentricity weakens the calls from parties for more competences for the regions

H3.C-polycentricity diminishes the positive attitudes of parties towards multiculturalism

Polycentricity applied to Castilla-La Mancha, Andalusia, and the Canary Islands.

If applying polycentricity to all the regions of Spain is intended to observe its negative effect in general terms, applying it to Castilla-La Mancha, Andalusia,
and the Canary Islands is aimed at examining if the different degrees of polycentricity make a difference. As further outlined in the data utilised in the quantitative chapter, multiple centres of power are present in all three regions, so the same basic general negative impact is to be expected. This is, polycentricity is expected to negatively affect party competition on the centre-periphery cleavage. Building from this, Castilla-La Mancha and Andalusia, according to the possible scale of polycentricity proposed above and as outlined in the qualitative chapter, have higher degree of polycentricity in comparison to the Canary Islands. Santa Cruz de Tenerife and Las Palmas de Gran Canaria are the two very distinct centres of power that compete in the Canary Islands. This is the so-called pleito insular\textsuperscript{17}, which has a deep impact on how parties in the region act (Hernández Bravo 1998).

The competing dynamics between these two centres of power are expected to have a deeper negative impact than the dynamics found when several centres compete due to the competitiveness to become the new centre of power of the region, affecting how parties frame the region as a whole. This is also favoured by the fact that the fragmentation of the archipelago into major and minor islands has established a high degree of subordination of the latter to the former. This is sometimes called segundo pleito insular (Ferrer Peñate 2012). In the Canary Islands, the minor islands can be considered as the periphery of the archipelago (La Palma, El Hierro, La Gomera in the province of Tenerife; Fuerteventura and Lanzarote in the province of Gran Canaria), source of surplus for the two main islands and centres of power (Santa Cruz in Tenerife and Las Palmas in Gran Canaria). This has been in place since the 19\textsuperscript{th} century (Acirón Royo, 1998; Millares Cantero 2007), and has deep roots in the political reality of the archipelago (Ramírez Muñoz 1996; García Rojas 2003; Sánchez Herrera 2004). The more the competition can be condensed into small number of centres, the higher the negative impact of polycentricity. Further to this, the interaction of polycentricity and fragmentation is expected to deepen the negative effect of both factors in the Canary Islands. As the data employed to determine the presence of multiple centres of power contained in in this investigation suggests, it is also

\textsuperscript{17} Pleito insular refers to the tensions that exist between Tenerife and Gran Canaria, which are the two main centres of power in the region.
expected to find a difference between the two mainland regions. Andalusia has fewer competing centres of power (Sevilla, Malaga, and Cadiz) in comparison to Castilla-La Mancha (Albacete, Guadalajara, Toledo, Talavera de la Reina, and Ciudad Real), considering the former to have a lower degree of polycentricity than the latter, and therefore, being more affected overall by this factor. Therefore, polycentricity is expected to increase its negative effect as one moves from Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, and finally to the Canary Islands. This can be hypothesised as follows:

**H3.D** - polycentricity weakens the ability of parties to articulate a strong regional level, increasing its effects as one moves from Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, and finally to the Canary Islands

**H3.E** - polycentricity undermines the ability of parties to articulate a differentiated constitutional status of the region, increasing its effects as one moves from Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, and finally to the Canary Islands

**H3.F** - polycentricity erodes the ability of parties to call for more competences for the region, increasing its effects as one moves from Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, and finally to the Canary Islands

**H3.G** - polycentricity reduces the ability of parties to articulate a strong regional identity, increasing its effects as one moves from Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, and finally to the Canary Islands

3.3) Regional-level control variables

3.3.A) Economic development

*General discussion*

One of the factors that has been identified by the literature capable of shaping party competition on the centre-periphery cleavage is the economic development of the regions (Hadjimichalis 1987; Keating 1998; Beer *et al.* 2003; Mistry 2003; Scot and Storper 2003). Although part of the literature in the past anticipated the decrease in importance of territory in economics and politics (Elkins 1995; Burnham 1999; Sassen 2000), this has not been reached with the
degree that was expected (Fitjar 2010a: 18). Instead of a gradual disappearance of small bounded economic arenas, the economy has become reterritorialised towards the regions (Porter 2003; Haughton and Naylor 2008; Prager and Thisée 2012). The reterritorialization of the economy has provided the regions with more opportunities to seek new economic opportunities (Pike et al. 2007: 1259-1261). Economic disparities between regions, horizontal inequalities, is a strong incentive to fuel sub-national mobilisation and nationalism (Gourevitch 1979: 302-322).

This control variable can be divided into two main dimensions: the international and the national dimension. The international dimension can be explained theoretically by the reterritorialisation of the regions in a globalised world of economic relations (Keating 1997: 383-385) and the access to new markets, such as the EU single market (Kreinin and Plummer 2002; Petrakos et al. 2005; Balassa 2013). Attracting more capital and specialised labour (Turok 2004: 1070-1071) gives the elites at the regions (Acemoglu and Robinson 2008: 268-273) a reason to demand more presence in an increasing globalised arena. The national dimension deals with the tension between the regions in order to obtain more influence according to their economic development and the uneven distribution of resources (Fitjar 2010a: 29-30). The uneven development of regions pushes the local elites to put forward demands to increase their weight in providing and receiving economic resources from the central government and rearrange the current relations between them. In this investigation, the national dimension is the focus.

The key point in the national dimension is the economic relation between the centre and the peripheries, and between the peripheries themselves. According to the internal colonialism perspective (Hechter 1975a; Williams 1977; Simon 2011), the centre extract surplus and raw materials from the peripheries in order to maintain their economic superiority (Wellhoffer 1988: 284). This subordinating relation is maintained by the centre to keep the peripheries as sources of surplus (Rokkan and Urwin 1983: 2-3). These economic inequalities deepen the identity of the peripheries as exploited regions (Fitjar 2010a: 27-28), supporting the notion of economic grievances. The common identity of being exploited by the centre leads the peripheral elites to demand a change to this
situation, pushing forward for a fairer exchange relation between them. By doing so, they would be in position to fulfil their economic perspectives, rearranging the regional economies to meet the needs of the local population (Porter 2003: 559-562).

This applies not only to poor regions, to improve their economic situation, as expected (Hechter 1975a: 30-34), but also to richer regions (Keating 1988: 12), as they seek to match their economic importance to their political importance in the national context, strongly challenging the centre (Urwin 1982: 430). Economic inequalities and grievances provide the regions with a strong incentive to mobilise (Deiwiks et al. 2012: 292-293). These economic inequalities are understood here as the difference between the transfer the regions receive and the transfers they provide. As Bookman (1992: 115) puts it, the regions can claim that they receive too little to achieve their economic needs, or they give too much, preventing them to reach their economic perspectives. The poorer regions might demand more resources from the central government so that they can put an end to the dependency situation in which they are via a fairer distribution. This can be seen as a “revolt of the poor” to demand more presence to avoid the negative impact of economic marginalisation (Keating 2017: 12). The richer regions might argue that their contribution to the development of the poorer regions undermines their ability to further develop (Fitjar 2006:336-339). This “revolt of the rich” is intended to reduce their contribution to the solidarity that regional economic plans from the centre implement to redistribute the wealth (Keating 2017: 12). Both types of regions may seek more decentralization, either demanding a fairer distribution of economic resources or to retain them for their own benefit (Newhouse 1997).

The economic development of regions shapes party competition on the centre-periphery cleavage by tensioning the balance between fulfilling the demands of the peripheries and maintaining the core as the seat of economic dominance. SWPs would not necessarily pressure for more pro-centre positions per se, as the peripheries are the main source of surplus, but they are expected to adapt to the regions in which they act. In poorer regions, they would push for more pro-periphery positions so that they receive the requested transfers from the centre to reach the average economic development rates of the country. In
rich peripheries, SWPs would also adapt to the grievances that are perceived due to the high transfers from these to poorer regions. The perception of retracting resources can shift parties to locate themselves in more pro-periphery positions. Approaching these grievances based on high transfers may be, indirectly, related to prevent secessionist conflict, especially if these grievances are also linked to ethno-characteristics of the regions (Hechter 2000; Roeder 2007).

On the other hand, regionalist parties are expected to have stronger pro-periphery positions in comparison to SWPs because regional elites want to be able to have access to more economic resources, seeking to fulfil their own needs. Access to new markets and resources is a strong incentive for regional elites, providing the means to improve the economic perspectives of the region and decrease the economic dependency of the centre. This attitude can be found both in poor and rich regions. In poor regions, these positions might go in the direction of having a fairer distribution of economic transfers. This can be labelled as internal colonialism (Hechter 1975a). In rich regions, they might go in the direction of criticising the balance between what they transfer to poorer regions and what they receive from the central government, arguing that they give more than they receive, undermining their capacity to further develop. This can be labelled as bourgeois regionalism (Harvie 1994).

Taking into consideration the explanation of the effect of economic development on party behaviour, the general hypothesis is as follows:

**H4** - the higher the difference between the regional and national degree of economic development, the stronger the pro-periphery positions of parties

**Economic development applied to all the regions of Spain**

The variety of economic development of the regions of Spain can provide the necessary observations to test if the perception theorised above has the described result. It is expected that the wider the gap between the region’s economic development and the country’s average, the more chances for the parties to have stronger pro-periphery positions to address the economic grievances produced by this deviation. The hypotheses are as follows:
H4.A-the higher the difference between the economic development of the region and the country’s mean, the more emphasis of parties of the regional level

H4.B-the higher the difference between the economic development of the region and the country’s mean, the more calls from parties for more competences for the regions

H4.C-the higher the difference between the economic development of the region and the country’s mean, the more emphasis of parties on positive attitudes towards multiculturalism

3.3.B) Identity

*General discussion*

Using Friedman’s (2000: 31) statement that identity is for humans as important as "food in the belly", in this investigation the concept of identity is key. In the field of psychology, identity is found to be essential to construct the self-awareness of humans. This derives from their knowledge of belonging to certain social groups, based on the emotional value of attachment to those groups (Tajfel 1982: 2). The articulation of any identity is based on two dimensions: the objective and subjective dimensions. The objective dimension is the one that refers to the usage of objective elements to differentiate one group from another, such as language or culture. The subjective dimension is the psychological awareness of those objective elements. Hobsbawm argues (1990: 5-6) that to articulate an identity, national or regional, both dimensions are required. For this investigation, the subjective dimension is the most important one, following authors such as Anderson (1991: 6), Guibernau (1996: 47), or Moore (1997: 906).

In this investigation, identity is understood not only as a mechanism to articulate the self-awareness of individuals or groups, but also as a social construct which is subjected to dynamics of change and articulation (Holt and Gubbins 2002: 1). Identity is socially constructed and reproduced through discourse (Benwell and Stokoe 2007: 4). If discourses and discursive practices produce, reproduce and reinforce identity, this is done by incorporating
characteristics of uniqueness and difference (De Cillia et al. 1999: 153-154). In this sense, identity is used as a collective marker to articulate the distinctiveness of a social group vis-à-vis other groups. Consequently, collective identity is used by social groups to mobilise the population to achieve a specific goal, which in the case of parties, is political in order to reinforce the borders between groups (May 2001: 27). Parties try to articulate identity, via identity consciousness\(^\text{18}\), to fit the purpose of their discourses, which reflects the defence of certain interests (Paasi 2013: 1207-1208).

National/regional identity is the key issue on which parties struggle to politicise identity in order to achieve political mobilisation. On one hand, SWPs use national identity to homogenise the state in order to defend the interests of the elites that are located in the centre. National identity is defined here as the feeling of belonging to a certain social group named as nation (Wodak 1999: 3-4), based on the perception of a distinct economic, cultural and political national reality. On the other hand, regional identity is used by regionalist parties to defend the interest of the elites located in the peripheries. Regional identity is understood in the same way as national identity, as a hierarchical social phenomenon (Herb and Kaplan 1999: 13-17) which is nested (Paasi 2002: 140), but bounded to a region. It is based on characteristics of the region that have been classified by regional social groups as constituents of the identity of the region (Chromý and Janu 2003: 108). These characteristics can be based on natural markers of the region (Sörlin 1999: 103-104), or on socio-economic differences (Johnson and Coleman 2012: 864-867).

To understand this argument better, Paasi (2002: 140), divides regional identity into two dimensions: an ideal and a factual regional identity. The former refers to the collective and normative aspect of the regional identity, or in other words, the final ideal target of what a region is supposed to mean politically. The latter relates to identities as framed through social interaction, like for example,

\(^{18}\) Following Lopez-Aranguren (1983: 55-58), this investigation relies on three levels to identify the degree of development of any social identity consciousness: the first and lower level is the perception or awareness of the elements that define a social group in comparison with others. This is, the subjective dimension of identity. The second and medium level is the identification of the elements that define a social group in comparison with others. This is the objective dimension of identity. The third and superior level is the aspirations of making the distinct social identity a reality, based on economic, cultural and political grounds.
through parties. If nationalism can be understood as a political doctrine that aims to converge the ideal to the factual nationalist identity, then regionalism should be understood in the same way, the aim of converging the ideal to the factual regional identity. If identity is used as a mark of distinction, this means that the political community of the periphery can either resign or resist (Chromý and Janu 2003: 106). This is, move from the periphery to the centre and become assimilated, moving only in the factual sphere of the regional identity, or challenge it and legitimise its own reality in the periphery through converging the ideal and factual regional identity spheres into a single one based on its distinctiveness.

Combining these two dimensions with Keating´s third element of regional identity (1998: 86), the theorisation is the following. This third element refers to the regional identity as instrumental, where the region is used as the basis for mobilisation and collective action amongst the local population, articulated through political discourse to achieve a concrete political convergence of interests and distinctiveness (Miodownik and Cartrite 2010: 733). Parties, understood as political instruments of certain social groups in the regions (Fitjar 2010a: 7-9), are used to imposed a specific political project, either from the centre or to challenge centralisation (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 14). In this sense, SWPs try to impose centralisation through a strong national identity, and regionalist parties try to challenge it with a strong regional identity.

As the literature dealing with regionalism argues (Agnew 2002; Paasi 2004; Keating 2008), territorial identities are central to the success of regionalist parties and the subsequent territorial policies. It does not matter how historical the peripheral identity is or if it is only restricted to a small group in the periphery, it is still a political binder which gives regionalist parties a sense of common aim which they use to build a challenging political movement towards the centre (Alonso 2012: 24). SWPs are expected to adopt pro-periphery positions on the centre-periphery cleavage when these regional identities are strong. They do so in order to be able to contextualise their national project and incorporate these identities into a broader national identity. Positioning themselves against these strong regional identities can trigger resistance form the regional population, deepening the feeling of becoming assimilate against their will. In comparison, regionalist parties are expected to have stronger pro-periphery positions in
defending regional identities as they are used to articulate distinct communities at the peripheries, making this a specific marker to challenge the centre.

The effect of strong regional identities on party completion on the centre-periphery cleavage is hypothesised in this investigation in the following way:

**H5**-strong regional identities reinforce the pro-periphery positions of parties

*Identity applied to all the regions of Spain*

The existence of strong regional identities in Spain is a key element of the tensions between the centre and the peripheries (Keating 1993; Lecours 2001; Llera 2009) at the regional level (Chernyha and Burg 2012). This has been present since the 19th century (Beramendi 1999), and its implication in politics is very deep (Aja 2001; Flynn 2004). Theorising that the stronger the regional identity, the stronger the pro-positions of parties to address this mark of distinction, either to incorporate it to a broader national project by SWPs, or to challenge the centre by regionalist parties. The hypotheses are:

**H5.A**-the stronger the regional identity feelings, the more emphasis of parties of the regional level

**H5.B**-the stronger the regional identity feelings, the more calls from parties for more competences for the regions

**H5.C**-the stronger the regional identity feelings, the more emphasis of parties on positive attitudes towards multiculturalism

3.3.C) Language

*General discussion*

Culture-base factors are well studied arguments on how regional distinctiveness affects party competition on the centre-periphery cleavage (Rose and Urwin 1969; Rose 1974; De Winter and Türsan 1998; Knutsen 2004). The formation of a strong centre requires for the peripheries to be homogenised in order to nationalise the state-building process (Caramani 2004: 32). The main challenge to this centre-formation process comes from regions that have their
own regional cultures and present resistance to this homogenisation wave coming from the core (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 10). This resistance, when it becomes a strong counter-core movement over time in order to protect regional distinctiveness, is labelled here, as outlined in the conceptual framework, regionalism (Hueglin 1986: 439). From all the possible dimensions that make up this regional distinctiveness and the centre-periphery cleavage (Rokkan and Urwin 1983: 16), this investigation focuses on the cultural dimension, and more precisely, on language.

Language, inside this cultural dimension of the centre-periphery cleavage, is agreed to be a strong source of regional distinctiveness when it is shared by the peripheral population in contrast to the one used in the centre (Cartrite and Miodownik 2016: 122). The processes of state- and nation-building are designed to, through the homogenisation wave when forming the centres, create a scenario with one state, one nation and one language (Mar-Molinero 2000: 11). Therefore, language plays one of the most important factors to, on one hand, shape a common identity (Barbour and Carmichael 2000: 4), and on the other hand, maintaining this common identity (Wright 1994: 3). When these processes expand to peripheral regions with local languages, this element becomes a source of distinctiveness and political competition (Beswick 2007: 30). There is a clash between the language that comes from the centre and the languages spoken in the peripheries. The key issue considered here to classify them as different is done based on a political choice (Carter and Sealey 2007: 21). This is, languages are politically articulated to reinforce a certain identity, linked to a specific culture, and the latter to a specific territorial unit. The result of this link is that the relation between a certain language, a certain culture, a certain territory, and therefore, a certain population, is constantly reinforced through political engagement. This engagement happens from the centre towards the periphery, with the homogenisation wave, and from the periphery towards the centre, with regional distinctiveness and regionalism as a counter-movement to the former.

As a distinctive marker, language is used to frame group identity in the centre and in the periphery (Carter and Sealey 2007: 23). If regionalism is understood as a collective struggle deeply rooted in territorial grievances (Murphy et al. 2002: 77), language is one of the issues over which regionalism frames
most forms of fight (William 1997: 112-115) where this distinctive marker is present. In terms of party competition on the centre-periphery cleavage, this is a major issue, especially in regions where there is coexistence between the language from the centre and the language from the periphery. Despite this, the mere existence of a regional language is not the reason per se for a strong regional distinctiveness (Beswick 2007: 40). This has to come through a well-developed political engagement to turn it into a source of political distinctiveness. Parties are the mechanism through which these regional languages are used to articulate this political distinctiveness.

SWPs position themselves in the support of the language from the centre, where their core level and loyalties lay. Despite this, the protection and promotion of regional languages can be part of their discourse, being able to articulate one where both languages can coexist, but the limit is always drawn by the language that is spoken at the centre. If a regional language poses a threat to the language of the centre, they can position themselves in more pro-periphery positions in order to incorporate it to a broader national political project and protect, via this way, the national language (Heller 1995: 374). The stronger the regional language, the more SWPs would try to incorporate it to a national-wide political project to prevent a negative reaction from the regional population that identifies with it. This is graduated by their ideological position in terms of their ability to promote the inclusion of minority cultures and languages. Regionalist parties are expected to have stronger pro-periphery positions. As language is an important marker in the articulation of cultures and identities, the existence of regional languages is argued by these parties as a key issue in party competition to highlight their defence of the region. Regional languages provide regionalist parties the reason to put forward strong pro-periphery demands on the centre-periphery cleavage. Language becomes a marker in the conflict with the centre and an instrument to articulate a strong counter-core movement (Llobera 1994: 131). Around language, regionalism reinforces the common identity of the periphery and is able to mobilise the population (Roller 2001: 42).

The general hypothesis that can be articulate to understand how regional languages affects party completion on the centre-periphery cleavage is the following:
H6 - regional languages reinforce the pro-periphery positions of parties

Language applied to all the regions of Spain

As with regional identities, regional languages in Spain have deep roots in politics (Lasagabaster 2011) and the political relations between the centre and the peripheries (Shabad and Gunthe 1982). Some of these regional languages have major impact in regions such as Catalonia (Hoffmann 2000; Strubell and Boix-Fuster 2011), Galicia (Beswick 2002; van Morgan 2006), or the Basque Country (Conversi 1990; Urla 2012), being a trigger for regional mobilisation. This mark of distinction plays an important role in these regions, where a coexistence, not always peaceful, between the national and the regional language can tension how parties frame this conflict. In order to adapt their discourses to the existence of strong regional languages, parties are expected to have stronger pro-periphery positions where these are present. The hypotheses to test this are:

**H6.A** - a regional language makes parties increase the emphasis of the regional level

**H6.B** - a regional language makes parties increase the calls for more competences for the regions

**H6.C** - a regional language makes parties increase the emphasis on positive attitudes towards multiculturalism

3.4) Party-level control variables

3.4.A) General Framework

The party-level control variables focus on describing the characteristics of political parties and how these can affect party competition on the centre-periphery cleavage. Because practices and discourses shape socio-spatial consciousness, legitimising structures of dominance (Paasi 1996), parties are one of the most effective means to shape the relations between the centre and the periphery. In this investigation, the focus is put on how parties and their characteristics can shape the multi-dimensional party competition along the centre-periphery cleavage to maximise their performance (Heller 2002: 660). For
a better understanding of this framework, the party-level control variables selected are: party type, ideology, and structure.

![Diagram of political parties and control variables]

*Figure 3.9.* The different party-level control variables that might shape party competition on the centre-periphery cleavage.

3.4.B) Party type

*General discussion*

Using the definition of SWPs and regionalist parties contained in the conceptual framework above, this control variable is expected to shape party competition on the centre-periphery cleavage in the following way. Having the core level and main organisation in the centre for SWPs (Massetti 2009: 503), or
in the region for regionalist parties (Brancati 2005: 143-145), is assumed to make a difference in the position that parties have on the centre-periphery cleavage. SWPs tend to articulate a discourse that reinforces the centre by undermining a possible strong periphery that is articulated as a threat to the former, but without having pro-centre positions per se. This has to be put in context of decentralised states. The more decentralised the state is, the more important and complex the regional level becomes (Hopkins 2003: 227-230), and SWPs accommodate to this new political arena accordingly (Pallarés and Keating 2003: 243). These parties have the responsibility of maintaining a state-wide cohesion across all regions (Fabre and Swenden 2013: 343), so going against the interest of the regions in regional elections might make this task difficult and counterproductive for their electoral perspectives. To avoid a negative reaction from the regional population and maintain their project as state-wide and inclusive, they are expected to emphasise, to some extent, pro-periphery positions. In contrast, regionalist parties, because they are seen as the main instrument to defend the region (De Winter 1998: 204-205), articulate a discourse that strengthens the periphery vis-à-vis the centre. Therefore, regionalist parties are expected to have stronger pro-periphery positions than SWPs.

An important consequence that party type has on the centre-periphery cleavage taken into consideration here is when SWPs face regionalist parties in regional elections. In regions where SWPs face regionalist parties, the former need to adapt to an even more complex competition to attract votes in comparison to a scenario where SWP, although in regional elections, compete between each other with no third actor (Alonso and Gómez 2011: 187-188). In this sense, SWPs, when competing with strong regionalist parties, try to adapt more pro-periphery positions to avoid ownership of territorial issues from the latter (Swenden and Toubeau 2013: 253). For example, Meguid (2005) refers to this interaction as pro-decentralisation strategies. Despite this, adopting this agenda by SWPs might not always grant them the credibility from the voters that they initially intended (Alonso 2012: 182-191). Leaving aside the possible strategies that SWPs can undertake (Elias et al. 2015), the key point is that not all SWPs adapt in the same way. Not all SWPs have the same behaviour when competing with regionalist parties, adapting with different intensity on the centre-periphery
cleavage. Some limitations can be, for example, ideology and structure (Meguid 2008; Swenden and Maddens 2009; van Houten 2009).

With this in mind, on one hand, facing regionalist parties might pose pressure on the SWPs to regionalise even more their positions on the centre-periphery cleavage in order to still benefit from electoral competition (Alonso et al. 2015: 855) through granting more autonomy to their regional branches (Hopkin 2003: 233). On the other hand, not facing regionalist parties might benefit the SWPs by taking ownership of the territorial dimension of party competition to prevent a strong regionalist party to consolidate (Alonso and Gómez 2011: 189). For example, a SWP that faces a regionalist party in a region where a regional language is an important distinctiveness marker is expected to adapt differently than when the same party competes in a region with a lesser degree of regional identification (Libbrecht et al. 2011: 628). This behaviour can be also observed in regionalist parties. Their behaviour is expected to change when facing SWPs in order to adapt to the behaviour of the latter (Elias 2015: 94-95).

In light of the above theorisation of how party type might affect party competition along the centre-periphery cleavage, the general hypothesis is as follows:

**H7** - SWPs have milder pro-periphery positions than regionalist parties

*Party type applied to all the regions of Spain*

In order to avoid the missing data from the RMP in relation to the regionalist parties, the hypotheses designed for this control variable are focused on the *PSOE* and the *PP*, both SWPs, with very consistent electoral performance in all regions across the vast majority of electoral periods. With this in mind, the hypotheses are:

**H7.A** - SWPs emphasise less the regional level than regionalist parties

**H7.B** - SWPs call for less competences than regionalist parties

**H7.C** - SWPs call for less competences than regionalist parties
Following with the focus on SWPs, and as theorised above, one of the consequences of this factor is that the presence of a regional competitor might make SWPs change their behaviour. The expected behaviour is that SWPs, in order to present themselves as parties that are able to defend the interests of the region to the same extent as regionalist parties, adopt stronger pro-periphery positions. In order to be able to test this, the hypotheses are:

**H7.D**-SWPs emphasise more the regional level when facing regionalist parties

**H7.E**-SWPs call for more competences when facing regionalist parties

**H7.F**-SWPs emphasise more positive attitudes towards multiculturalism when facing regionalist parties

*Party type applied to Castilla-La Mancha, Andalusia, and the Canary Islands*

In comparison to all the regions of Spain, the regionalist parties in Andalusia and the Canary Islands allows to extent the hypotheses to the PA/CA and CC, further testing the theorised expectations. To test this, the hypotheses are:

**H7.G**-the PA/CA and CC emphasise more the regional level than the PSOE and the PP

**H7.H**-the PA/CA and CC emphasise more a differentiated constitutional status of the region than the PSOE and the PP

**H7.I**-the PA/CA and CC emphasise more the devolution of competences to the region in comparison to the PSOE and the PP

**H7.J**-the PA/CA and CC emphasise a stronger regional identity in comparison to the PSOE and the PP

3.4.C) Party ideology

*General discussion*

This sub-section deals with the ideological position of parties, categorised using the dichotomy left vs. right orientation. Following Elias *et al.* (2015: 842)
argument that the economic dimension is not the only one that defines the ideological orientation of “left” and “right” parties, there are other issues that could be more useful for this investigation. In this section, the focus is placed on the social dimension, understood as the social change values (Fuchs and Klingemann 1990: 215) or value orientation (Knutsen 2011: 155).19

Knutsen (2011: 155-158) defines social values as the belief that some social and personal behaviours are preferred to others. This means that for some social groups, some behaviours with respect to themselves, and/or other social groups, are better than others. It could be interesting to add to this definition the one given by Fuchs and Klingemann (1990: 215), who understood social values as those which refer to some kind of social change and its acceptance. Combining these two definitions, it is possible to come up with a useful meaning of social values that can help understand the purpose of this section. With this in mind, here, social values are understood as the behaviour or social position, and the way in which it may change, that a group adapts with respect to the social and political participation of other groups and the possible exercise of minority rights (Knutsen 2011: 155-156). Social values can be summarised in the dichotomy of libertarian vs. authoritarian political orientation of parties (Rovny and Edwards 2012).20 In other words, the way in which parties allow for the social and political participation of other social groups.

The basic argument is that left/centre-left parties tend to be more progressive (Fuchs and Klingemann 1990: 213) and less resistant to change (Thorisdottir et al. 2007: 175). In the sense, they are more open to social change in order to promote the social and political participation of other social groups. Right/centre-right parties therefore tend to be more conservative (Fuchs and Klingemann 1990: 214), more resistant to change (Thorisdottir et al. 2007: 175), and defend a national culture and community from the challenges of, for example,

---

19 The inclusion of social values to the left vs. right categorisation of parties is sometimes labelled in the literature as the new politics orientations (Inglehart 1991: 279–285; Freire 2006: 360; Knutsen 2011: 156).
20 This does not mean that in this investigation the dichotomy libertarian vs. authoritarian is considered as a separate dimension or category of the parties (Middendorp 1989; Evans et al. 1996), but as a characteristic of those same parties that are categorised as left or right. Using Ray’s (1982: 33) wording, libertarian vs. authoritarian is not really a new dimension but more a characteristic or variable of the left vs. right parties.
sub-national or regional identities in the case of right/centre-right SWPs (Hooghe et al. 2002: 981). This is what can be labelled as the value orientation of parties, the degree to which they are able to include, depending on their categorisation as left or right, other groups and their interests to the political project they emphasise. It is important to highlight that this applies both to SWPs and regionalist parties indistinctively, and value orientation can be very useful to understand party competition on the centre-periphery cleavage (Knutsen 2011: 157).

Ideology affects party competition on the centre-periphery cleavage in the following way. Right/centre-right parties tend to have more conservative values (Fuchs and Klingemann 1990: 214), defending the traditional dominance of a social group over the rest, offering some resistance to change this set of power relations (Hooghe et al. 2002: 981). These parties tend to defend a political project that has a dominant position with respect to other groups and interests, reinforced by traditionalism as one of their main characteristics. These conservative values make right/centre-right parties articulate their positions on the centre-periphery cleavage in a more exclusive way, being this at the centre or the peripheries. These parties are less able to incorporate other cultures and social groups to their political projects. Left/centre-left parties tend to be on the opposite side (Kundnani 2012). They tend to be more inclusive regarding other cultures and social groups (Fuchs and Klingemann 1990: 213), presenting less resistance to change (Thorisdottir et al. 2007: 175) when it comes to the redistribution of power relations. These parties are characterised as inclusive towards other social groups regarding their rights and interest, aiming for a peaceful coexist inside broad political projects. Their positions on the centre-periphery cleavage would be more open to be inclusive towards other cultures and social groups, being this at the centre or the peripheries.

The key point here is that ideology, in this investigation, is considered first in isolation. Most of the literature develops the ideological orientation of parties in relation to their type (Sorens 2008; Massetti 2009; Elias and Tronconi 2011; Massetti and Schakel 2013; 2016). The aim is to observe if this factor actually determines the inclusiveness of the political projects and positions of parties. If these are more or less inclusive or exclusive pro-centre or pro-periphery depends
on which party articulates them. The lesser degree of compatibility between
groups, the more the positions would skew to one of the ends of the centre-
periphery continuum. Determining which this end is, is the result of ideology in
interaction with party type. Ideology on its own is expected to determine the ability
of parties to incorporate other social groups to these pro-centre/periphery
positions.

The effect of ideology on the positions that parties have when competition
along the centre-periphery cleavage is hypothesised in general terms as follows:

\[ H_8 \text{- the ideological orientation of parties affects the inclusiveness of the }
\text{pro-centre/periphery positions} \]

\textit{Ideology applied to all the regions of Spain}

The high number of different types of parties that are both left and right
orientated in Spain, including SWPs and regionalist parties, allows to test if
ideology on its own is expected to shape party competition on the centre-
periphery cleavage as theorised above. The hypotheses are:

\[ H_{8.A} \text{- the ideological position of parties makes no difference on the emphasis of }
\text{the regional level} \]

\[ H_{8.B} \text{- the ideological position of parties does not influence the calls for more }
\text{competences for the regions.} \]

The reason for hypothesising that the ideological position of parties is not
expected to shape party competition along the centre-periphery cleavage via
these two dependent variables is that, for example and in the case of the saliency
of the regional level, the \textit{PSOE}, a left/centre-left SWP, can emphasise the region
more than the \textit{PP}, a right/centre-right SWP, but at the same time, less than the
\textit{PNV}, a right/centre-right regionalist party, or the \textit{BNG}, a left/centre-left regionalist
party. This is, this dependent variable is not directly affected by the social
dimension of the ideological position of parties. Social values have little influence
over it. The same can be observed for the position on competence distribution.
Where ideology is expected to have a deep impact on its own is in the attitudes of parties towards multiculturalism, where the social values are key to understand how parties behave along the centre-periphery cleavage, independently from their type. Left/centre-left parties, as framed above, are able to include other social groups to broader political projects in opposition to right/centre-right parties, more resistance to social change and shifts in the power relations that they support. This can be hypothesised in the following way:

**H8.C**-left/centre-left parties are able to have more positive attitudes towards multiculturalism than right/centre-right parties.

**Ideology applied to Castilla-La Mancha, Andalusia, and the Canary Islands**

Due to the mixture of SWPs and regionalist parties, the same can be developed when comparing Castilla-La Mancha, Andalusia, and the Canary Islands. It is difficult to separate the influence of party type from their ideological position. Again, it would be interesting to see if this also applies to these three specific regions in the same degree as for all the regions of Spain, reinforcing or rejecting the possible results from the above expectations. This applies for the saliency of the regional level and the position on competence distribution. The hypotheses, with this in mind, are the following:

**H8.D**-the ideological position of parties makes no difference in the emphasis of the regional level

**H8.F**-the ideological position of parties does not influence the calls for more competences for the regions

Taking this last variable as an example, ideology on its own is supposed to have little influence on the way the PSOE, the PP, the PA/CA (left/centre-left party), or the CC (right/centre-right party) articulate the distribution of competences for the same reason as in the above application to all the regions of Spain. Finally, the ideological position of parties is believed to have a deep impact in the way parties frame the region in relation to its inclusiveness with other social groups. Without considering if the identity that parties support is national or regional, the social values that they support make them more or less...
open to interact and coexist with other social groups. The hypotheses are the following:

**H8.E** - the PSOE and the PA/CA are able to articulate a more inclusive constitutional status of the region

**H8.G** - the PSOE and the PA/CA are able to articulate a more inclusive national/regional identity than right/centre-right parties

### 3.4.D) Interaction between party type and ideology

*General discussion*

The above consideration takes party ideology on its own, but this has another major effect, which is the interaction of this variable with party type. Taken together, these two party-level control variables can deeply affect how parties compete on the centre-periphery cleavage. Considering SWPs first, the context in which these parties adapt their positions is determined, to some extent, by the degree of decentralisation and the multi-level party competition that results from it (León 2014: 392-394). The never-ending regional demands from empowered regional elites are dealt by SWPs taking into consideration the political reality in which they act, and in decentralised states, this can become a challenge. Their positions on the territorial axes can be, to some extent, divided into those who support more decentralisation and inclusion, and those that do not (Massetti 2009: 513). In this sense, one can say that SWPs subsume the centre-periphery into the left-right dimension, core of their ideology (Alonso 2012: 72-73).

Left/centre-left SWPs are able to articulate a discourse which is capable of including regional cultures and social groups into a broader state-wide national political project. This means that their positions tend to be more pro-periphery so that this national inclusive discourse is regionalised. The coexistence of a national and regional culture is put forward as a value of this discourse in order for the regional population to identify itself with the state-wide national project. These regional cultures and social groups are not only incorporated, but this is done so by applying a multiculturalist approach of recognition and protection. In contrast,
right/centre-right SWPs would behave with less openness towards these regional cultures and social groups. Their less inclusive values result in resistance to incorporate them in the same way as left/centre-left SWPs. This does not mean that they would position themselves in pro-centre positions exclusively, always thinking that multi-level party competition requires them to adapt and regionalise their positions to some extent. On the contrary, they would still have pro-periphery positions but with less emphasis. This mild pro-periphery positions would be articulated in the way of subordinating regional cultures and social groups to the culture and social groups at the centre.

In terms of regionalist parties, their ideological position also affects their position on the centre-periphery cleavage, being a more complex dynamic in comparison to SWPs (Coakley 1992: 16), where, for example, regional characteristics can play a major role (Massetti 2009: 505-512). Right/centre-right regionalist parties tend to have more exclusive values in terms of a peaceful coexistence with the culture and social groups coming from the core. The pro-periphery positions of these parties are articulated in contrast to broader state-wide political projects like the ones some SWPs put forward (Pallarés and Keating 2003: 242-243). Left/centre-left regionalist parties, due to their high degree of inclusiveness, are more open to defend demands where regional and national cultures can coexist. Their pro-periphery positions are not framed in a necessarily dichotomous way, and are open to be included in a broader state-wide national political project.

These positions would have to be highly contextualised in order to be able to put them into a scale (Newman 1997; Erk 2005), where the lower inclusiveness could be considered as stronger pro-periphery positions than those which are more open to interaction with other social groups. This can be explained because their ideological stand and their territorial political preference for the region normally come together (Aguilar and Sánchez-Cuenca 2008: 115; Massetti and Schakel 2013: 803), resulting in a variety of positions (De Winter 1998: 205-207), ranging from autonomist to secessionist demands and with self-government rule as the starting point of all (Alonso 2012: 1), as outlined in the conceptual framework. This variation in the position of regionalist parties can give support to the thesis outlining that this type of parties subsumes left-right issues into the
centre-periphery dimension, core of their ideology (Massetti and Schakel 2015: 867).

In regional elections, the ideological orientation of parties has its importance, both for SWPs, when they have to considerate their secondary dimension (centre-periphery dimension), and for regionalist parties, when they convey with their also secondary dimension (left-right dimension) (Massetti and Schakel 2015: 866). This is developed in the next section.

The general hypothesis that can be articulated when considering this interaction between party type and ideology and its effect on party competition along the centre-periphery cleavage is the following:

H9-leftcentre-left SWPs are more able to have stronger pro-periphery positions

Interaction between party type and ideology applied to all the regions of Spain

To observe the interaction of party type and ideology when applying it to all the regions of Spain, the focus is put on the two most important SWPs, the PSOE and the PP. The reason for this is that these two parties act in all the regions of Spain except for the PP in Navarre until 2008. This provides a high number of observations to analyse the impact of this interaction over time. Regionalist parties could not be the best choice for this due to two main reasons. First, their electoral performance is less consistent, and second, their own existence. In this sense, not all regionalist parties have been present in the regions for the same period as the PSOE and the PP. Some have disappeared and some have been newly formed, preventing a proper analysis of trends over time. The general pattern is that the PSOE is expected have more pro-periphery positions in comparison to the PP (Massetti 2009: 513). Taking this into consideration, the hypotheses are:

H9.A-the PSOE, in comparison to the PP, emphasises more the regional level

H9.B-the PSOE, in comparison to the PP, calls for more competences for the regions
**H9.C**—the PSOE, in comparison to the PP, has more positive attitudes towards multiculturalism

*Interaction between party type and ideology applied to Castilla-La Mancha, Andalusia, and the Canary Islands.*

In the case of Castilla-La Mancha, Andalusia and the Canary Islands, the consistency of the regionalist parties acting in the last two regions allows to apply the interaction of party type and ideology not only to the PSOE and the PP, but also to the PA/CA and CC. This would provide a wider view of the ways in which this interaction affects the way parties compete on the centre-periphery cleavage. The PSOE is expected to be able to include to its broader national project the social groups in the peripheries, having stronger pro-periphery positions than the PP. Considering the ideological position of the PA/CA and CC, the latter would have stronger pro-periphery positions than the PA/CA, due to its less capacity of incorporating other social groups to its political project. The hypotheses are the following:

**H9.D**—the PSOE, in comparison to the PP, is more capable of incorporating the regions with a more important role in relation to the centre

**H9.E**—the PA/CA, in comparison to the CC, emphasises a more symmetrical constitutional status of the region

**H9.F**—the PSOE calls for more and more important competences to be devolved to the regions in comparison to the PP in order to fulfil the needs of the social groups in the peripheries

**H9.G**—the PP and CC articulate a less inclusive national/regional identity in comparison to the PSOE and the PA/CA

3.4.E) Party structure

*General discussion*

The structure of parties is key to understand how they accommodate to a multi-level competition scenario (Thorlakson 2013: 714) in partially federal and federal states (Dardanelli 2019: 8-12), where the regional level plays an important
role. Parties in multi-level systems face strong challenges that are directly related to the organisation of the state (Deschouwer 2006: 291-291). In this case, parties need to adapt in order to merge their electoral performance (Deschouwer 2003: 217) and the possibility to hold a position in office at the different levels (Thorlakson 2013: 714). The main purpose of these multi-level integration is to maintain their image amongst the voters as a way to defend their interests. Therefore, these internal dynamics condition party performance (Hopkin 2003: 228). In this thesis, this applies especially to SWPs. The ways in which the state-wide party and its regional branches articulate their relations determines the ways in which they position themselves in the different dimension of the political space.

The support that SWPs receive comes from two main sources (Thorlakson 2013: 714). The first source is the state-wide support that the party receives, normally in general elections. The second source comes from the support that they receive from sub-national arenas, such as regions and municipalities. The balance between these two sources is where the internal structure plays a major role. The way in which the checks and balances are articulated between the state-wide party and regional branches form the way in which both can benefit from each other without undermining the position of each other in their specific competition level (Filippov et al. 2004: 195). A multi-level system puts upon SWPs major challenges in their electoral performance (Hopkins 2003: 231-233), internal integration (Mueller and Bernauer 2018: 565-566), and ideological cohesiveness (León 2017: 2). When competition shifts from the national to the regional level, this is reflected in the internal cohesion of parties, and therefore, power balance also shifts (Hopkins 2003: 230).

Vertical integration is understood as the organisational links, cooperation, and the relations and interactions between the state-wide party and regional branches (Thorlakson 2009: 161-162). This is, the intra-organisational aspect of the same party (Deschouwer 2003: 216). An important feature of this vertical integration is that, although they compete under the same name and despite the fact that they can have programmatic variations in the different elections in which they fill in candidates (Klingelhöfer 2016: 2-3), they share a common goal and loyalties (Filippov et al. 2004: 192). The common goal and loyalties refer to the relation with the core level of the party as a whole (Deschouwer 2003: 216-217).
In other words, taking into considerations the existence of differences between the state-wide party and the regional branches, both are merged in a single integrated party (Thorlakson 2013: 716).

Horizontal integration is understood as the differences between the actions taken by the regional branches of a party in their specific regional contexts (Thorlakson 2006: 39). The key issue to understand the horizontal integration of parties is the highly regionalised context in which regional branches act. Policy heterogeneity might be key for electoral and office success (Mueller and Bernauer 2018: 567), and therefore, certain programmatic autonomy of regional branches is necessary. Every region possesses its own characteristics, being this cultural, historic or economic. If the behaviour of parties is understood as a reflection of the social context in which they act (Mueller and Bernauer 2018: 569), then the variation across regions is inevitable. The behaviour of regional branches in regions with a specific language is not the same as the behaviour in regions where this marker is non-existent. The more the party is able to regionalise its strategies and structures, the more it can benefit from electoral success (Roller and van Houten 2003: 4-5).

Some authors, such as Thorlakson (2009; 2011), differentiate vertical and horizontal integration from autonomy. The latter refers to the degree of autonomy that the state-wide party has to act with no constrains from the regional branches (Thorlakson 2009: 162-163). In multi-level party competition, this can be further applied. Parties need to take into account that the regional level is highly contextualised, shaped by the interests of the regions. Therefore, this need to be addressed directly. Due to the fact that every region is distinct vis-à-vis the others, the autonomy of the regional branches is at the same time affecting the vertical and the horizontal integration of parties. The main result of this is that the conceptualisation of autonomy can also be applied to the regional branches (Fabre and Swenden 2013: 345). Therefore, autonomy can be also understood as the degree of action that regional branches have to act with no constrains from the state-wide party (Fabre and Méndez-Lago 2009: 103). By doing so, the state-wide party benefits from the direct link between the regional branches and the regional demands (Klingelhöfer 2016: 2). This takes into consideration the link between the location of the loyalties and core level of the party as a whole.
In order to maintain their influence and performance in regional elections, SWPs provide their regional branches with some degree of autonomy. This involves not only some sort of autonomous organisation (Jeffery 2010: 139-141), but also some sort of autonomous positioning on the different axes of competition in comparison to the state-wide party (Grofman 2004: 39). This applies especially to regions where specific characteristics or markers that tension the centre-periphery cleavage, such as those that have cultural or identity distinctiveness (van Houten 2009: 141). The main result is the appearance of tensions with their core levels and loyalties (León 2014: 399). This autonomous organisation and positioning are also applied horizontally, and each regional branch is granted some sort of autonomous action to adapt to the specific region in which they are acting. The behaviour of the regional branches is therefore highly regionalised, like for example, in the articulation of their electoral programmes (Müller 2013: 178). This puts tension on the horizontal integration of SWPs. This is better explained by the delegation model between SWPs and their regional branches (van Houten, 2009a; 2009b).

This can be summarised in the degree of integration of the SWPs. The more integrated the structure of the SWP is, the less autonomy the regional branches have. The less integrated, the more autonomy the regional branches have. SWPs that have a more integrated structure are expected to have milder pro-periphery positions or even pro-centre positions. The autonomy given to the regional branches is enough to regionalise their discourses but not to have a high degree of variation amongst the different regions and regional branches. This is designed to have a strong internal cohesion in defence of the interests of the elites at the centre. In contrast, SWPs that have less integrated structures can be expected to display a more regionalised performance depending on the region in which they act. The pro-periphery positions are therefore stronger because their discourses are highly contextualised as the regional branches have more freedom to adapt to the specific characteristics that they face. One can find more horizontal variation in SWPs with less integrated structures. This stronger pro-periphery positions put more tension on the internal cohesion, as regionalising
discourses might put pressure on the interest of the elites at the centre, and even more in regions with distinctive characteristics (Roller and van Houten 2003: 4-5), such as having a strong identity or language.

The effect of the structure that SWP have when competition along the centre-periphery cleavage is hypothesised in general terms as follows:

**H10**-SWPs that are less integrated are able to have stronger pro-periphery positions

*Party structure applied to Castilla-La Mancha, Andalusia, and the Canary Islands*

This variable is only applied to these three regions. The reason for this is that there is no consistent measuring scheme that can be applied to regionalist parties and provide the same results as for SWPs. Regionalist parties can also have local branches, like CC, which is a regionalist party with, on one hand, a strong island-based identity, and on the other hand, island-based branches. In comparison, the PA/CA has a different structure, which is expected due to the different characteristics and historic development of Andalusia. This makes measuring the structure of these regionalist parties difficult for the purpose of this investigation. To avoid this difficulty, this variable is only applied to the PSOE and the PP to test the expected behaviour theorised above. The hypotheses to test this are:

**H10.A**-the greater autonomy of the regional branches of the PSOE makes them emphasise more the importance of the regional level in comparison to the PP, resulting in more horizontal variation

**H10.B**-the greater autonomy of the regional branches of the PSOE increases the possibility to articulate a more differentiated constitutional status of the regions in comparison to the PP, resulting in more horizontal variation

**H10.C**-the greater autonomy of the regional branches of the PSOE increases the possibility to call for more and more important competences for the regions in comparison to the PP, resulting in more horizontal variation
H10.D-the greater autonomy of the regional branches of the PSOE increases the possibility to reinforce the coexistence of multiple identities in comparison to the PP, resulting in more horizontal variation

3.4.F) Interaction between the three party-level control variables focused on SWPs

This sub-section is used to describe the interaction between the three party-level control variables with special focus on SWPs. This is focused on two main issues, the social values on one hand or ideological position, and internal cohesiveness on the other. Although right/centre-right parties tend to be less inclusive to any changes that come from minority cultures and populations, the multi-level party organisation of SWPs will deal with these issues in a more contextualised dimension. This means that right/centre-right SWPs tend to assimilate regional cultures and population into a state-wide political project in each region via their regional branches. This can be translated into a less inclusive vision or attitudes towards multiculturalism in peripheries where the regional cultures and populations have more consciousness of their distinctiveness and may present a challenge to the culture and population of the centre, leaving less autonomy to their regional branches when dealing with these issues. Having a state-wide project does not mean per se that right/centre-right SWPs will have an exclusive vision of the regional cultures and populations. These SWPs can have an inclusive vision of the regional cultures and populations, despite the fact that some states can be highly ethnically divided, favoured by these multi-level organisations and adapting to the different circumstances that may appear (Biezen and Hopkins 2006: 15-19), like for example, giving their regional branches some autonomy to deal with the regional contexts in which they operate (Filippov et al. 2004: 192–194).

Left/centre-left SWPs, being more inclusive towards regional cultures and minorities, favour the articulation of a broad state-wide national project. In order to be able to incorporate regional cultures and minorities, their regional branches will tend be have more autonomy to contextualise this incorporation to a project in which the former should identify themselves. This means that they will tend to have stronger pro-periphery positions in comparison to right/centre-right SWPs.
The higher degree of autonomy granted to the regional branches when it comes to left/centre-left SWPs can be seen as the result of incorporating regional cultures and minorities, not assimilating them, to a broad national political project that could be described as multicultural. The variation that can be found in the attitudes of the regional branches that both types of SWPs have can be explained by the horizontal variation across the different regions of the state (Deschouwer 2006: 294) and how the parties adapt to each context (Fabre 2008: 311). Not only have SWPs to adapt to the regional contexts but also, they have to adapt to the demands of their voters and try to preserve their internal structure (Hopkin and Bradbury 2006: 136), their cohesiveness (León 2017: 1-3), and maintain a coherent ideological position (Swenden and Maddens 2009: 260-263). This means that despite their degree of flexibility depending on the social values they defend when including regional cultures and interest, both right/centre-right and left/centre-left SWPs need to preserve their internal cohesiveness around their state-wide political project.

4. CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this chapter was to conceptualise and theorise the ways in which the different factors outlined here can shape party competition on the centre-periphery cleavage. The main concepts, theory, assumptions, main expectations, and hypotheses outlined here are seen as intended to introduce the theoretical pillars on which the main research problem rests. It is not only an extension of the literature review but a more developed relation between the main concepts and the explanatory and control variables. In total, nine main variables have been theorised: distance, fragmentation, polycentricity, economic development, regional identity, regional language, party type, party ideology, and party structure. On one hand, the first three are considered as the main explanatory variables, and on the other hand, the last six are treated as the main control variables. All are theorised and expected to shape the way in which parties compete along the centre-periphery cleavage, first in abstract terms, and then applied to Spain as a case study. Taking into consideration Spain, there is a difference between the expectations for all the region and the focused comparison between Castilla-La Mancha, Andalusia, and the Canary Islands. Finally, the main hypotheses (Table 3.1) outlined here are differentiated
depending on the aim to be fulfilled, either a general view of Spain and all its regions, or the comparison between Castilla-La Mancha, Andalusia, and the Canary Islands.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>GENERAL HYPOTHESIS</th>
<th>HYPOTHESES QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS</th>
<th>HYPOTHESES QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>DISTANCE</strong></td>
<td>H1-the further away from the centre, the stronger the periphery positions of parties</td>
<td>H1.A-the greater the distance from the centre, the more parties emphasise the regional level; <strong>H1.B</strong>-the greater the distance from the centre, the more calls from parties for more competences for the regions; H1.C-the greater the distance from the centre, the more emphasis of parties on positive attitudes towards multiculturalism</td>
<td><strong>H1.D</strong>-as distance from the centre increases, parties will emphasise more the regional level as one moves from Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, and finally to the Canary Islands; <strong>H1.E</strong>-as distance from the centre increases, parties will emphasise a more differentiated constitutional status of the region as one moves from Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, and finally to the Canary Islands; <strong>H1.F</strong>-as distance from the centre increases, parties will increase the demands for more competences as one moves from Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, and finally to the Canary Islands; <strong>H1.G</strong>-as distance from the centre increases, parties will increase the emphasis on a differentiated identity as one moves from Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, and finally to the Canary Islands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FRAGMENTATION</strong></td>
<td><strong>H2</strong>-fracturation undermines the pro-periphery positions of parties</td>
<td><strong>H2.D</strong>-fracturation undermines the articulation of a strong regional level by parties due to the acknowledgement of the importance of the local level, increasing its effects as one moves from Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, and finally to the Canary Islands; <strong>H2.E</strong>-fracturation weakens the ability of parties to articulate a differentiated constitutional status of the region due to the acknowledgement of the importance of the local level, increasing its effects as one moves from Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, and finally to the Canary Islands; <strong>H2.F</strong>-fracturation reduces the ability of parties to call for more competences for the region due to the acknowledgement of the importance of the local level, increasing its effects as one moves from Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, and finally to the Canary Islands; <strong>H2.G</strong>-fracturation erodes the ability of parties to articulate a strong regional identity due to the acknowledgement of the importance of the local level, increasing its effects as one moves from Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, and finally to the Canary Islands; <strong>H2.A</strong>-fracturation undermines the emphasis of parties on the regional level; <strong>H2.B</strong>-fracturation reduces the calls from parties for more competences for the regions; <strong>H2.C</strong>-fracturation favours a less positive attitude of parties towards multiculturalism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLYCENTRICITY</td>
<td>H3-polycentricity undermines the pro-periphery positions of parties</td>
<td>H3.A-polycentricity undermines the emphasis of parties of the regional level; H3.B-polycentricity weakens the calls from parties for more competences for the regions; H3.C-polycentricity diminishes the positive attitudes of parties towards multiculturalism</td>
<td>H3.D-polycentricity weakens the ability of parties to articulate a strong regional level, increasing its effects as one moves from Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, and finally to the Canary Islands; H3.E-polycentricity undermines the ability of parties to articulate a differentiated constitutional status of the region, increasing its effects as one moves from Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, and finally to the Canary Islands; H3.F-polycentricity erodes the ability of parties to call for more competences for the region, increasing its effects as one moves from Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, and finally to the Canary Islands; H3.G-polycentricity reduces the ability of parties to articulate a strong regional identity, increasing its effects as one moves from Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, and finally to the Canary Islands</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| CONTROL VARIABLES | REGIONAL-LEVEL VARIABLES | ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT | H4-the higher the difference between the regional and national degree of economic development, the | H4.A-the higher the difference between the economic development of the region and the country’s mean, the more emphasis of parties of the regional level; H4.B-the higher the difference between the economic development of the region and the country’s mean, the more calls from parties for more competences for | NOT APPLICABLE |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>REGIONAL IDENTITY</strong></th>
<th>Stronger the pro-periphery positions of parties</th>
<th>the regions; <strong>H4.C</strong>-the higher the difference between the economic development of the region and the country’s mean, the more emphasis of parties on positive attitudes towards multiculturalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>H5</strong>-strong regional identities reinforce the pro-periphery positions of parties</td>
<td><strong>H5.A</strong>-the stronger the regional identity feelings, the more emphasis of parties of the regional level; <strong>H5.B</strong>-the stronger the regional identity feelings, the more calls from parties for more competences for the regions; <strong>H5.C</strong>-the stronger the regional identity feelings, the more emphasis of parties on positive attitudes towards multiculturalism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>REGIONAL LANGUAGE</strong></td>
<td><strong>H6</strong>-regional languages reinforce the pro-periphery positions of parties</td>
<td><strong>H6.A</strong>-a regional language makes parties increase the emphasis of the regional level; <strong>H6.B</strong>-a regional language makes parties increase the calls for more competences for the regions; <strong>H6.C</strong>-a regional language makes parties increase the emphasis on positive attitudes towards multiculturalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PARTY TYPE</strong></td>
<td><strong>H7</strong>-SWPs have milder pro-periphery</td>
<td><strong>H7.A</strong>-SWPs emphasise less the regional level than regionalist parties; <strong>H7.B</strong>-SWPs call for less competences than regionalist parties; <strong>H7.C</strong>-SWPs call for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDEOLOGY</td>
<td>positions than regionalist parties</td>
<td>less competences than regionalist parties; <strong>H7.D</strong>-SWPs emphasise more the regional level when facing regionalist parties; <strong>H7.E</strong>-SWPs call for more competences when facing regionalist parties; <strong>H7.F</strong>-SWPs emphasise more positive attitudes towards multiculturalism when facing regionalist parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H8</strong>-the ideological orientation of parties affects the inclusiveness of the pro-centre/periphery positions</td>
<td><strong>H8.A</strong>-the ideological position of parties makes no difference on the emphasis of the regional level; <strong>H8.B</strong>-the ideological position of parties does not influence the calls for more competences for the regions; <strong>H8.C</strong>-left/centre-left parties are able to have more positive attitudes towards multiculturalism than right/centre-right parties</td>
<td><strong>H8.D</strong>-the ideological position of parties makes no difference in the emphasis of the regional level; <strong>H8.E</strong>-the PSOE and the PA/CA are able to articulate a more inclusive constitutional status of the region; <strong>H8.F</strong>-the ideological position of parties does not influence the calls for more competences for the regions; <strong>H8.G</strong>-the PSOE and the PA/CA are able to articulate a more inclusive national/regional identity than right/centre-right parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERACTION BETWEEN PARTY TYPE AND IDEOLOGY</td>
<td><strong>H9</strong>-left/centre-left SWPs are more able to have stronger pro-periphery positions</td>
<td><strong>H9.A</strong>-the PSOE, in comparison to the PP, emphasises more the regional level; <strong>H9.B</strong>-the PSOE, in comparison to the PP, calls for more competences for the regions; <strong>H9.C</strong>-the PSOE, in comparison to the PP, has more positive attitudes towards multiculturalism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| PARTY STRUCTURE |  | needs of the social groups in the peripheries;  
| H9.G-the PP and CC articulate a less inclusive national/regional identity in comparison to the PSOE and the PA/CA  
| H10-SWPs that are less integrated are able to have stronger pro-periphery positions | NOT APPLICABLE | H10.A-the greater autonomy of the regional branches of the PSOE makes them emphasise more the importance of the regional level in comparison to the PP, resulting in more horizontal variation;  
| H10.B-the greater autonomy of the regional branches of the PSOE increases the possibility to articulate a more differentiated constitutional status of the regions in comparison to the PP, resulting in more horizontal variation;  
| H10.C-the greater autonomy of the regional branches of the PSOE increases the possibility to call for more and more important competences for the regions in comparison to the PP, resulting in more horizontal variation;  
| H10.D-the greater autonomy of the regional branches of the PSOE increases the possibility to reinforce the coexistence of multiple identities in comparison to the PP, resulting in more horizontal variation. |
CHAPTER 4

METHODOLOGY
1. INTRODUCTION

The aim of this chapter is to give a fully developed record and account of the process used in the analysis of the different sources of evidence. Here, the sub-national comparative method outlined in the introduction chapter is expanded to specify how it is applied in this investigation. A mixed method approach has been selected to obtain a complete and in-depth picture of the identified phenomenon, with Spain as the chosen case study. In order to do so, the five dependent variables outlined in the introduction chapter have been articulated to be able to fulfil both requirements, applied differently to fit their needs. This detailed account can be labelled as an audit trail of the process used (Altheide 1996: 25-33). The purpose of this audit trail is understood to be applicable to both a quantitative and qualitative analysis, suitable for the methodological approach selected. To fulfill this aim, this chapter is structured in six main sections. The first section deals with an outline of case study as the main research strategy and case selection. The second section introduces an account of the mixed methods approach as the one adopted. The third section underlines the sampling frame and design. The fourth section outlines the main sources of evidence. The fifth section expands on the quantitative analysis performed. Finally, the sixth section elaborates on the qualitative analysis carried out.

2. RESEARCH STRATEGY AND CASE SELECTION

2.1) Research strategy: case study

In this investigation, a case study design is considered as the main research strategy (Verschuren 2003: 128-133). Despite the fact that this strategy is commonly used in qualitative research, here, it is applied to a mixed methods approach. Analytical pragmatism and opportunism represent two of the key elements of this research strategy (Stake 2005: 443). This strategy is the one that is better focused on answering research questions that are articulated around context as the key element. A case study research strategy encourages to pursue, with the assistance of multiple methods of analysis, an in-depth knowledge of a complex phenomenon through the incorporation of the context in which it unfolds (Flyvbjerg 2006: 221-223; Simons 2009: 21).
The justification for the use of a case study is fourfold. The first argument is that a case study grants the opportunity to understand a complex social phenomenon in a real-life environment, allowing for an in-depth and thick understanding of it (Verschuren 2003: 133-134). The second rationale is that context can incorporate as one of the key elements for the understanding of the phenomenon (Yin 2009: 23). The third justification deals with the idea that it permits the use of a combined set of methods of analysis to complement each other and avoid possible faults in a mono-analysis process (Stake 2005: 443-444). The fourth reason observes this strategy as the one that favours the use of multiple sources of data and evidence, granting the possibility of a strong triangulation when combining methods of analysis and within method robustness (Noor 2008: 1602).

When it comes to the type (Thomas 2011: 518-519) or category (Levy 2008: 3) of case study, the literature identifies three main ones. In order to choose the proper one, issues such as the research question itself, control over the events, and the focus on contemporary or historical events have to be taken into consideration (Kohlbacher 2006: 4). The three types or categories of case studies are (Yin 2009: 17 and 47): exploratory, descriptive, or explanatory. In this investigation, the type or category chosen is an exploratory case study, which at the same time, includes a certain degree of description in order to be able to fully clarify the phenomenon. Focusing on an exploratory case study also brings along the ability of describing.

To finish this account, the specific case study design needs to be clear before the sampling scheme and final case selection are determined. The two main designs that are available are (Yin 2009:38-51): single-case study, focused on one single case to gain as much in-depth knowledge as possible to understand and explore a specific and complex phenomenon (Baxter and Jack 2008: 549), and multi-case study, focused on the ability for cross-case comparative, generalisations, and replications. These two main designs can be further divided into four more specific subdesigns (Yin 2009: 38-56): single-case (holistic) designs, single-case (embedded) designs, multiple-case (holistic) designs, and multiple-case (embedded) designs. Holistic designs refer to case studies that use
only one unit of analysis, and the embedded designs refer to the designs that use one unit of analysis but divided into further subunits of analysis.

With the above in mind, in this investigation, a single-case embedded design has been selected. The rationale is fourfold: first, this design allows for an in-depth understanding of which factors shape party competition over the centre-periphery cleavage in a specific context (Toshkov 2016: 285); second, this design allows for a richer understanding of the phenomenon by introducing a cross-case analysis and comparison of different subunits of analysis within the main unit of analysis; third, the main purpose of these subunits of analysis is to add more extensive and developed understanding of the unit of analysis as a whole (Scholz and Tietje 2002: 30-31); and fourth, using subunits of analysis grants the ability to analyse the data with more precision (Baxter and Jack 2008: 550), leading to an increase in the exploration of the phenomenon as a whole.

2.2) Case selection: Spain

The task of this sub-section is to determine the total population, the targeted population or sampling frame, the sample, and finally the case selected and the rationale to justify it. In terms of the definitions of each concept, Toshkov (2016: 111-112) defines them as: total population refers to the entire set of cases to which and from which the case(s) belong, the targeted population or sampling frame refers to the population from which cases could have been drawn to form a sample, the sample refers to a subset of cases from the total population or if used, targeted population or sampling frame. A sampling scheme is understood as the strategy and process of selecting the case(s) (Onwuegbuzie and Collins 2007: 283). The key step for any case selection is the ability of that case to be informative enough of the phenomenon (Mabry 2008: 217).

Starting with the total population, this refers to all countries in the world, as all can be considered to have a centre and a periphery. The targeted population or sampling frame refers to the countries with an outer-periphery that can be found worldwide, indistinctively of these being archipelagos or mainland peripheries. The key aspect is that this outer-periphery has to be detached and far away from the rest of the country. Here is where the sampling scheme is
introduced to determine the sample. The sampling scheme used is the homogeneous scheme, which is developed by selecting a set of cases that share the same or similar specific characteristics (Collins et al. 2007: 272). The characteristics used to define the sample according to this homogeneous sampling scheme are fourfold: 1) distance from the centre’s to the regions’ capital of at least 1,000 km; 2) a permanent and stable percentage of civil population of at least 0.3% of the total population; 3) the outer-periphery has to be detached from the rest of the country and share the same political status as the inner-periphery and the core; and 4) have political parties acting in the region. A number of countries have been discarded because their outer-peripheries are not far away from the centre (Finland-Aland Islands), have a small percentage of/or no population (Chile-Region de Magallanes), only inhabited by scientific or military population (Chile-Hermite Islands), or are dependent territories according to the UN (British Bermuda Islands). With these characteristics, the sample has a size of five countries with outer-peripheries: Japan (Ryukyu Sholo), Russia (Kaliningrad), Spain (the Canary Islands), and the USA (Hawaii).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARCHIPELAGO</th>
<th>DISTANCE (KM)</th>
<th>POPULATION (% of the local population in comparison with the total population of the state)</th>
<th>CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS</th>
<th>PARTIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JAPAN (Ryukyu Sholo-</td>
<td>+/- 1,554</td>
<td>1,392,503 (1.08%)</td>
<td>Prefecture</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okinawa Islands &amp; Sakishima)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUSSIA (Kaliningrad)</td>
<td>+/- 1,091</td>
<td>467,289 (0.33%)</td>
<td>Oblast</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPAIN (The Canary Islands)</td>
<td>+/- 1,070</td>
<td>2,128,647 (4.51%)</td>
<td>Autonomous Community</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA (Hawaii)</td>
<td>+/- 3,000</td>
<td>1,362,000 (0.43%)</td>
<td>State of the Union</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1.-Sample of Cases
From this sample of cases, Spain is the chosen case study. Although Spain is the case study selected, this investigation focuses on the Spanish regions as the main subunits of analysis to better understand the centre-periphery cleavage. The selection of the specific regions for each type of analysis is outlined in the sections below. The justification for Spain as the chosen case study is threefold: political saliency of the case, the importance of the Canary Islands, and availability of sources of evidence. The first consideration refers to Spain as a salient case study. Spain represents a salient case study in two key aspects. On one hand, the impact and importance that the centre-periphery cleavage has in Spain, and on the other hand, the multi-level and multi-dimensional party competition in a highly decentralised context. The complex relations between the centre and the peripheries in Spain picture a challenging phenomenon to understand because of its political implications, linked to the centre-periphery cleavage and regional claims (Hueglin 1986: 442; Moreno 1995: 15-16; Ruane 2003: 29-32). The well-known cases of the Basque Country (García Venero 1945; Payne 1974; Linz 1986; Llera 1994; Lecours 2007; Muro 2008; Gray and Gillespie 2015) and Catalonia (Trías Vejarano 1975; Llera 1984; Ross 1996; Guibernau 2000, 2004; Greer 2007) are examples of how the centre-periphery cleavage unfolds and how the centre is being challenged by inner-peripheral regions. In comparison, the Canary Islands is an outer-peripheral region which may have other implications for the cleavage if compared to the former ones. All the regions in Spain can be classified using the centre-periphery continuum outlined in the previous chapter, and this investigation tries to obtain inferences taking into account these differences.

Another reason for selecting Spain is the development of an explanation of how the centre-periphery cleavage unfolds in the so called “contemporary” regions (Hueglin 1986: 442-443). Much emphasis has been placed on the most problematic and “historic” regions (Galicia, the Basque Country and Catalonia), but little attention has been given to other peripheral regions when it comes to the study of this cleavage, known as contemporary due to their recent autonomous development. Finally, Spain is a political salient case study in terms of multi-level and multi-dimensional party competition because, on one hand, there is a significant difference between the national and the regional-level
(Wilson 2012: 124-125), although some argue that they are linked and one relies on the other and vice versa (Pallarés and Keating 2003: 239-242), and on the other hand, there is a high variation of asymmetric behaviour of parties at the regional-level (Libbrecht et al. 2009: 72-75).

The second consideration is the importance of the Canary Islands in comparison to the other outer-peripheries. The importance is calculated by taking into consideration the regional population in comparison to the rest of the state. As it can be observed, this outer-periphery is the most important region. This makes it the most suitable option when applying this criterion to the sample of cases presented here. The third consideration takes into account the availability of sources of evidence needed for the analysis. As it is explained below, the sources of evidence used are, amongst others: political manifestos, parliament discourses, and other political documents issued by parties. Regarding this, there is no data or sources of evidence, especially political manifestos, at a regional level in the cases referred to in Table 4.1. Using the RMP, access to these main sources of evidence is relatively easy. Not only the availability of the sources is important, but also the manageability of these sources is a key factor, affecting therefore the depth of the study. The sources of evidence are written in Spanish, which is the mother tongue of the researcher, making them suitable for this study.

3. RESEARCH APPROACH: MIXED METHODS

The starting point of this section is the consideration of mixed methods as the third major methodological approach. In this triumvirate of methodological approaches, the first is the quantitative approach, the second is the qualitative approach, and the third is the mixed methods approach (Teddlie and Tashakkori 2009: 7). Mixed methods research is understood here as the combination of multiple methodological approaches, quantitative and qualitative, to analyse and understand in depth the phenomenon that is under research (Tashakkori and Creswell 2007: 4). Only using a quantitative analysis is not sufficient enough to unfold the necessary in-depth understanding of the centre-periphery cleavage that is required (Mahoney 2007: 124), but combining this with a qualitative analysis provides, at the same time, the necessary substratum to develop a more complete and in-depth answer to the main research question (Robson 1993).
The strengths that a quantitative analysis brings to this study are that, on one hand, a time- and context-free research (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004: 14; and Denzin and Lincoln 1994: 4-10) helps to achieve a high degree of objectivity, and on the other hand, increases the ability to generalise findings. The process of this research approach can be outlined in four main stages (Golafshani 2003: 597-598): first, the emphasis is on empirical objective facts; second, the data and evidence is presented in numerical form; third, the mathematical process is the norm for analysing numerical data, which in this case is the regression analysis; and fourth, the final result is expressed in statistical terminology. In contrast, the strengths that a qualitative analysis brings to this study are that, on one hand, it addresses the main research question in a more detailed way (Mahoney 2007: 122) allowing researchers to identify and track over time the variation in the dependent variables as key to the explanation (Collier 2011: 823-826) rather than applying generalisations, and on the other hand, it is done contextualising the phenomenon (Schwandt 2000: 205-210), and not treat it without the necessary values that bond the researcher to it (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004: 14). In this investigation, the idea is to bridge this dichotomy of quantitative versus qualitative with this third paradigm, where the research process is enriched, labelled as the fundamental principle of mixed methods research (Johnson and Turner 2003: 299). The purpose is to increase the possibilities to accumulate knowledge.

The rationale for the use of a mixed methods approach is fourfold. First, increasing the validity and reliability of the findings using triangulation as a technique. Triangulation can be understood as within-, or between-method triangulation (Flick 2004: 179-180). This within-method triangulation is designed around, and involves, the crosschecking of the evidence to increase the internal validity, credibility, and consistency of the findings (Denzin 1978: 297-313). This allows for a more robust and solid understanding, and increases the in-depth knowledge of the phenomenon. Between-method triangulation refers to the procedure that combines the two research approaches to have strong inferences and be able to obtain at the same time statistical and analytic generalisations, which is the appropriate research strategy selected for this investigation in relation to the research question. Second, the ability to articulate a complete and
in-depth picture of the phenomenon that is studied here. Third, engaging with both classical approaches to assess the credibility of each other’s findings. Fourth, to compensate the weaknesses of one research approach by using the strength of the other. The combination of these strengths are the bases of the rationale to select this mixed methods research approach, putting emphasis on four of the different purposes for it (Bryman 2006: 105): triangulation, completeness, corroboration or confirmation, and compensation. Overall, this mixed method approach is intended to provide, at the same time, a compete and in-depth understanding of the research problem.

It is necessary to clarify which specific mixed methods research design is used in this thesis. Due to the different typologies of mixed methods research that can be found in the literature (Patton 2002; Creswell et al. 2003; Creswell and Plano Clark 2007; Leech and Onwuegbuzie 2009), and in order to keep the description contained in this section as concise as possible, it is best to avoid too much complexity, but at the same time, be as clear as possible regarding this issue (Tashakkori and Teddlie 2003: 680). Two main phases can be used to choose a proper mixed methods design: the first phase consists of the primary decisions that have to be taken to achieve a suitable design (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004: 20), and the second phase deals with the different designs that can be selected (Leech and Onwuegbuzie 2009: 267-272). Regarding the first phase, and according to Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004: 20), three main decisions have to be taken before choosing from the different types of mixed methods designs contained in the second phase: firstly, the focus on one of the primary methods (quantitative or qualitative), or whether the weight of both methods is going to be equal; secondly, the timing of the execution of the analysis and whether the execution is going to be concurrent or sequential; thirdly, where the mixing of both methods is going to occur, either merged in the data, embedded in the data, or connected to the data. Regarding the second phase, and according to Leech and Onwuegbuzie (2009: 267-272) and Johnson et al. (2007: 123-124), using the above first two decisions, here is where a specific mixed methods design has to be chosen. In total, there are nine mixed methods designs (contained in Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004: 22):
The design chosen is a mixed method design where both quantitative and qualitative research methods are mixed with an equal status and in a sequential way. This means that in the first instance, a quantitative method of analysis is used to obtain a complete picture, and second, a qualitative method of analysis is used in order to have an in-depth overview of the phenomenon. Finally, the interpretation of the results from both methods is merged during the final discussion, after each individual analysis has been performed.
4. SAMPLING FRAME AND DESIGN IN A MIXED METHODS APPROACH

4.1) Sampling frame

The process of sampling and case selection in a mixed methods approach is more complex and denser than for a monomethod approach. The aim of this sub-section is to fully develop a rationale to justify the sampling schemes used in both analyses in relation to a mixed methods approach. The sampling frame is required to base the explanation of how a single-case embedded case study design allows for a deep understanding of the phenomenon studied. In this case, the sampling frame is articulated around the two comparative approaches that the literature identifies (Ragin 1997).

The use of a single-case embedded case study allows for the comparison of subunits of analysis within the same case to obtain solid inferences in terms of the exploration of the centre-periphery cleavage, which in this case study are the Spanish regions, resulting in a cross-case comparison of the former. It is designed to provide a solid base for an in-depth understanding of what factors shape party competition on the centre-periphery cleavage, allowing for both a quantitative and qualitative analysis over time, one of the key features of this study (Bennett and Elman 2006: 252-256). This is granted by the cross-case analysis that a comparative approach allows for. Focusing on this cross-case analysis (Collier et al. 2004), this comparison best fit the requirements for a case study design which, in its quantitative and qualitative analysis, is designed to produce a complete and in-depth understanding of a complex phenomenon (Seawright and Gerring 2008: 294-295). This is because the comparison between the different subunits of analysis helps to extract inferences according to the different features with which these regions contribute to make Spain a salient case (Mahoney 2007: 131). The justification to use this cross-case comparison is: first, the different cases represent rich examples of the phenomenon; second, the cases are comparable both in terms of their similarities or differences; third, the cases are available for the researcher to study; fourth, the connections between the cases can be stated by the researcher and explain both the similarities and differences; fifth, the researcher produces new knowledge of the cases using this type of analysis (Khan and van Wynsberghe 2008: 5).
Inside this cross-case analysis, two comparative approaches can be used (Ragin 1997: 28-30): the variable-, and the case-orientation approach. The variable-oriented approach focuses on the problem of assessing relations between variables, making possible statistical generalisations of a large sample of cases, and the case-oriented approach focuses on making possible analytic generalisations of a small sample of cases, which have been selected because they are significant for the understanding of the phenomenon (Della Porta 2008: 202-208). In this investigation, both strategies are used. The variable-orientated approach is used for the quantitative analysis, and the case-orientated approach is employed in the qualitative analysis. The reason for this is to be able to, as outlined above, obtain at the same time a complete and in-depth understanding of the phenomenon through the introduction of the context for the specific cases in both analyses.

4.2) Sampling design

Now that the justification for a cross-case comparison with different subunits and the sampling frame has been developed, the next step is to clarify the sampling design. When a mixed method approach is used for any research, the sampling process needs to be designed considering both the quantitative (variable-orientated) and qualitative approach (case-orientated) (Onwuegbuzie and Collins 2007: 290), and therefore the exposition of the rationale needs to be more detailed. To do so, Onwuegbuzie and Collins (2007: 290-296) have developed a process to end with a solid sampling frame and case selection in a mixed methods approach. In order to do so, the two authors identify the need to state clearly the: sampling design; the sampling scheme, which refers to the strategy used to select the cases specified depending on the type of analysis; the sample size; and finally, the selected cases themselves (Onwuegbuzie and Collins 2007: 283).

In terms of the sampling design, this focuses around the time-orientation and the relation between the quantitative and qualitative samples (Onwuegbuzie and Collins 2007: 292). Depending on the time-orientation and the relation between the samples that the study uses in the mixed methods approach, one selects the proper sampling design. There are eight possible designs
(Onwuegbuzie and Collins 2007: 292-296): concurrent identical, concurrent parallel, concurrent nested, and concurrent multilevel on one side, and sequential identical, sequential parallel, sequential nested, and sequential multilevel on the other side. The sampling design selected in this investigation is a sequential nested design, which determines that it is sequential in terms of the time-orientation, and nested in terms of the relation between the quantitative and qualitative samples. A sequential nested design implies that the quantitative and qualitative analysis happened one after the other and are dependent from each other (sequential), and that the cases from one of the samples (qualitative sample) is a subset of the other sample (quantitative sample) (Onwuegbuzie and Collins 2007: 292).

5. MAIN SOURCES OF EVIDENCE AND DATA-SETS

5.1) Main source of evidence

Measuring party preferences is one of the most important empirical tasks that researchers have when analysing party behaviour. To do so, most of the literature identifies three main different sources of evidence on parties (Alonso et al. 2013: 192): expert surveys, mass surveys, and electoral manifestos (Laver and Garry 2000; Laver et al. 2003; Benoit and Laver 2006). All the evidence that can be extracted from these sources is used to determine not only the left-right positioning of parties, but also any other dimension that could be coded, including a possible centre-periphery dimension. This is due to the fact that the evidence is collected using different categories and policy domains, and not only focusing on one specific dimension. Combining these categories and policy domains, different dimensions can be captured with sufficient detail.

From the above three methods of measuring party positions, expert surveys and voter surveys relate to each other in terms of the methodology used. The expert surveys provide, such as the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys, multi-level policy dimensions of party preferences. The strong points of this method of measuring party positioning can be summarised in the following way (Bakker and Hobolt 2013: 35): first, the surveys provide explicit party positions and measures, second, the reliability of the measures provide a concrete degree of uncertainty that can be actually measured, and third, party positions are measured using a
variety of documents, increasing the validity of the measurements. Amongst the possible limitations of this method of measuring party positions, one can identify the subjectivity of the measurements, as they are based on the evaluation of experts. Policy domains are subjectively constructed, leaving little possibility of replicating the measurements and domains. The mass surveys, focused on voters, also have the same strengths as the previously described expert surveys as they follow the same design but the sample comes from the voters and not the party themselves. The strengths of this method are, on one hand, the availability of reliable party positions and measurements and the ability of calculating the degree of uncertainty, and on the other hand, it introduces the self-positioning of the voters in relation to the positioning of the parties, providing extra information on the image of the party amongst the voters. The main limitation is again the subjectivity of the measurements. This prevents replicability from other researchers, limiting the overall reliability of the data.

Regarding the last method, electoral manifestos, this provided the necessary strength that was required for this research. Instead of relying on the subjectivity of the experts in both types of surveys, this method focuses on the objectivity of the position that parties take in relation to a policy domain. This is done by extracting the information from the official statements given by parties, so there a clear prove of where do they stand. The data obtained from party manifestos allows for longitudinal studies as they remain fixed in time, increasing the ability to track behavioural changes over time. Linked to this, the coding system is based on commonly designed schemes so that researchers can apply them over time and across different parties and countries. The limitations can be summarised, on one hand, in the lack of a possible measurement of uncertainty, and on the other hand, the different measurements provided by the different data-sets that are based on this kind of data lack some degree of internal validity as they collapse categories into general scales like the left-right scale (Bakker and Hobolt 2013: 32).

From the mentioned three sources of evidence, the justification for the use of party manifestos is ninefold (Helbling and Tresch 2011: 176: Roooduijn and Pauwels 2011: 1274): the first reason is that they are documents that are driven and self-declared, the second reason is that the data can be collected
retrospectively, the third reason is that the data is available for long time-series, the fourth reason is that change over time can be traced, the fifth reason is that manifestos treat parties as unitary actors, the sixth reason is that manifestos can be flexibly coded according to issues or categories, the seventh reason is that data can be aggregated to generate indicators, the eighth reason is that causal analysis may be possible, and the ninth reason is that manifestos are appropriate to give a clear view of where the party stands on a certain issue at a specific point in time. Therefore, the main unit of analysis in this content analysis are party manifestos. In term of the unit of measurement, this changes. Here, unit of measurement or meaning unit (also labelled as textual unit in the literature (Krippendorff 2004b: 788-789) is understood as the sentences, paragraphs, or group of words that refer to a specific theme, category, subcategory, code, or issue in which the unit of analysis is dissected into.

To finish the account and justification for the use of party manifestos, the level addressed is due to be mentioned: the micro, the meso, and the macro level. The micro level refers to the usage of political discourses at a local level. An example of this could be the party manifestos for the local elections. The meso level refers to a level where the micro discourses are connected to each other or they are aimed to be harmonized. Finally, the macro level refers to the level where major social practices and behaviour are aimed to be changed or shaped. In this investigation, the level target is the meso level, or in other words, the regional level. This aims to fill the gap between the traditional macro-micro distinction (Hall 1987: 10). Methodologically, the justification is that, on one hand, the evidence available on party manifestos in relation to the centre-periphery cleavage is richer and more detailed in the manifestos that are designed for the regional level, and on the other hand, in order to observe how some variables affect the centre-periphery cleavage (regional identity or regional language), the regions are the most suitable units of observations to look at in this case study.

5.2) Main data-set for the quantitative analysis

The quantitative analysis contained in this investigation uses the data collected and coded by the RMP (Gómez et al. 2009; Alonso et al. 2011), which is based on the pre-existing CMP. This data-set codes party manifestos which
were designed for a regional-level competition (Klingemann et al. 2006). Two main reasons can be outlined to justify the use of the RMP (Alonso et al. 2013: 194). The first reason is methodological. The RMP uses manual coding content analysis, and it has developed a trusted classification scheme that could fit with the measurement of some of the dependent variables selected for this investigation. Content analysis and not pure text analysis is used by the RMP because although pure text analysis could be less time consuming, it still does not capture with sufficient and necessary detail the meaning of the text. In this sense, pure text analysis is expressly quantitative, not only in numerically content, but also in the analysis (Benoit 2009), and for the purpose of measuring the dependent variables articulated here, also the understanding of the text is needed (Alonso et al. 2013: 194). Pure text analysis interprets manifestos not as discourses but as data in form of words (Laver et al. 2003), and content analysis contributes precisely contributes to achieve this, a more systematic measure of the dependent variables as a discourse. Following with this rationale, the focus of this investigation is the regional level, which is the one addressed by the RMP. Other existing data-sets are informed, to some extent, by a national bias, and this prevents robust inferences at this level.

The second reason is the accumulation of knowledge. The RMP has started to be used in comparative politics as one of the most successfully adapted data-set in the field for many studies. If party manifestos are the main source of evidence in this investigation, then the most reliable data-set for a comparative study based on a regional context that currently exists is the RMP. Also, not only a comparison is possible, which fits with a cross-sectional study, but this thesis evaluates the change of discourse of parties over time, a longitudinal study, and therefore, the RMP allows for this kind of research to be executed with a high degree of reliability. As Alonso et al. state (2013: 194), the main enterprise of the RMP has been the adaptation of the CMP’s methodology to a multi-level political scenario. This means that not only the RMP could be used for regional comparisons such as the one being carried out in this thesis, but also cross-national comparisons amongst regions of different states could be also achieved.
5.3) The RMP

The RMP shares with the CMP the same quantitative methodology, so methodologically speaking, changing from the state-wide CMP to the regional-based RMP is not so drastic as it may seem. The methodology of the CMP, and of the RMP subsequently, goes as follows. In each electoral program the units of measurement (text units of analysis), the so-called quasi-sentences, are identified and assigned a code with a classification scheme that captures exhaustively all public policy issues and preferences about the territorial distribution of competences of the political manifesto analysed. Once the electoral program has been coded using its text, the number of quasi-sentences devoted to each code, referring to each particular issue or topic, is recorded under 6 main policy domains. The indicator featured in the database is the percentage of quasi-phrases that the electoral program dedicates to each of the codes (issues or topics) for total quasi-phrases contained in the program. This percentage allows direct measurement of the importance or saliency that a party gives to the various issues or topics in its electoral program. This direct measurement of the saliency of an issue or topic is the ratio of mentions that an issue or topic is given by parties in the manifestos. Therefore, a high score in this saliency measure indicates the importance that a party gives to that issue or topic, and with the tone (positive or negative) not only importance is measured but also the meaning and understanding of the discourse.

The difference between the CMP and the RMP, although they share the same general methodology described above, is that there are some aspects that are specific to the RMP that the CMP does not have. The CMP subsumes all what is related to the centre-periphery cleavage under two positional issues: decentralization-positive (code 301) and centralization-positive (code 302). In other words, the CMP summarises all the aspects of the centre-periphery cleavage only under two main uses, whether it has to do with the political, cultural or economic aspects of the cleavage. What is effective and efficient for the CMP, which is state-based, is not even effective for the RMP, which is regional-based, for a possible measurement of the centre-periphery cleavage in the regions. To go into more detail about the components of the cleavage and how and to what extend parties make those components more salient, two new components are
added: 1) a newly designed territorial authority claim (Appendix A), and 2) new sub-categories are added to the original 56 categories of the CMP to try and capture the centre-periphery cleavage (Appendix B). In other words, the RMP adapts the existing CMP to multi-level politics or decentralised states using these two new characteristics. Real manifestos examples are contained in appendix C.

- **Contribution of the RMP**

  The first contribution of the RMP to the existing CMP is that it includes a territorial authority competential preferences claims scheme to capture the level of administration that is addressed by the policy, and/or the relationship between the levels (Alonso *et al.* 2011, 9). It is important to specify that these territorial authority competential preferences claims scheme does not necessarily reflect the real existing distribution of competences between the levels, but more a goal than a reflection of reality (Alonso *et al.* 2013, 195). So, although it uses the word “competential”, this does not refer to the actual distribution of competences or the actual competential degree of the region in the constitutional design of the state. The main problem with decentralised states, such as Spain or Germany for example, is that the relations between the administrations are also addressed by the parties in order for them to reference the level at which the policy preference will be applied. This territorial authority competential preferences claims scheme allows the researcher to capture efficiently these multi-level references made by the parties. This necessary competential scheme is the first step to adapt the existing CMP to the multi-level political scenarios. This territorial authority competential preferences claims scheme is articulated using the following codes (Alonso *et al.* 2011, 9-10): the first digit refers to the level or government for which the policy preference is articulated, a second code that refers to the preferred degree of authority for that level (more or less). Alternatively, when more than one level of government is mentioned at the same time, 4 different codes are used to capture this multi-level relationship that is expressly addressed (Alonso *et al.* 2013, 196) (Appendix A). Finally, these two codes need come before the policy reference (Appendix B), in order to refer to the administrative level to which it is applied.
The second main contribution of the RMP to the existing CMP are the new sub-categories added in order to measure more precisely the centre-periphery cleavage. In total, the RMP adds 20 new sub-categories to the coding frame that the CMP has (Alonso et al 2011, 9) (Appendix B). These new sub-categories are intended to capture in detail the extent and ways in which the centre-periphery cleavage works in the different regions. Not all regions have the same development and political dynamics, so therefore the existing CMP needs to be adapted in order to measure these specific regional characteristics. The more solid way to capture these very different regional dynamics is to re-define the existing definitions of some categories, when not creating new categories, to fit the data-base to the different preferences of the parties acting in the regions. The CMP main category of decentralisation (e.g. positive or negative: 301 and 302) subsumes everything related to the centre-periphery cleavage into this broad definition, independently of the policy preference, financial or political for example. This could work for state-based elections, but regional-based elections deal with precisely these issues but in a more detailed manner. In this sense, regional elections effectively deal with decentralisation but the financial sphere is treated very differently from the political one for example. In order therefore to also capture these dynamics with precision, the definition of the CMP category must be re-defined, and if this does not work effectively, new sub-categories need to be articulated, as the RMP does so.

The total amount of manifestos regarding Spain contained in this data-set is 289, which correspond to some of the main parties that act in the 17 autonomous regions\(^{21}\). Two important issues have to be mentioned here in relation to the manifestos coded. The first one is that not all parties that act in the regions are included due to their lack of relevance. This is justified by considering the number of votes and seats obtained in the regional parliaments. The second one is that not all elections have been included. The main reason behind this is that the data-set is relatively new and it is projected to be expanded in the future. This allows for a quantitative analysis, opening the possibility to draw a complete picture of the phenomenon under investigation.

\(^{21}\) The autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla are not included in this data-set.
- **Limitations of the RMP**

The main limitation of the RMP in relation to this investigation is the fitting of the different sub-categories and the dependent variables introduced here. As it is further explained in the section below that addresses the quantitative analysis, the description of the sub-categories not always correlate perfectly with the dependent variables or the indicator selected to measure them. Despite the fact that the RMP is currently the best data-set to carry out a quantitative analysis of the positioning of parties along a possible territorial axis at the regional level, one has also to acknowledge that the definition of the sub-categories that are used to code the manifestos not always comply with the dependent variables used to measure that same territorial axis. This is one of the main reasons why in this investigation the dependent variables selected for each type of analysis change. In order to adapt to this mismatch in some occasions, the RMP was left aside in favour of more precise qualitative data and analysis. Other data-sets are available to quantitatively analyse party manifestos, such as for example, the Manifesto Corpus (Lehmann et al. 2016; Merz et al. 2016), but they do not reach the required precision for the regional level analysis that is presented here.

5.4) Main source of evidence for the qualitative analysis

The RMP also provides the actual manifestos through its data-base. These original manifestos provide the necessary documents to perform a qualitative analysis of the evidence, widening the research scope. Despite the fact that the data-base contains most of the necessary original manifestos, some are missing, and they have been obtained by direct contact with the parties when they offered to collaborate, which was not always the case. There was an added problem in terms of availability and the specific case of the PA/CA. This party is now extinct and it does not have digital archives. This made it hard to obtain the manifestos that were missing from the RMP data-base, and contacting an extinct party is costly and difficult. The RMP, by providing the original documents, saves considerable efforts in terms of time and resources to be able to have access to the manifestos. This allows for a qualitative analysis that opens the possibility to draw an *in-depth* picture of the phenomenon under investigation.
5.5) Criteria used to select the parties

When it comes to the selection of the parties for both types of analysis, the criterion is twofold. First, the two main SWPs and their local branches. In all the regions of Spain, both the *PSOE* and the *PP* are relevant parties. If one wants to study which factors shape party competition over the centre-periphery cleavage, then these two parties need to be included due to their political importance, deep rooting amongst the population, and influence in the different regions across Spain. Added to this, due to their characteristics as state-wide parties, they are expected to behave in a specific way, allowing for a comparison with other types of parties. Second, in terms of the different regionalist parties, this is limited by the availability of data and evidence. For the quantitative analysis, the parties selected are those already coded by the RMP per region. For the qualitative analysis, the regionalist parties selected are the most important parties based on the votes cast during the regional elections selected.

5.6) Criteria used to select the periods of analysis

The selection of the manifestos for the quantitative and qualitative analysis is designed to be carried out based on specific periods of time. In regards to this, for the quantitative analysis, it has to be stated that the periods of time are limited and reduced by the data coded by the RMP available for the region of Andalusia, which is restricted to the elections held during 2000, 2008, and 2012. In order to have homogenous time periods for both analyses, the qualitative analysis has to be also limited by the same parameters as the quantitative analysis. An added difficulty is that not all regions held their regional elections in the same years as Andalusia, so in order to breach this gap between the different regions, three electoral periods have been specified. The electoral periods chosen for both types of analyses are: 1998-2000, 2007-2010, and 2011-2012.

5.6) Steps followed to select the manifestos

This sub-section develops the steps used in the application of the above criteria to select the specific manifestos for the quantitative and qualitative analysis. The practical application is summarised in three steps. The first step deals with the selection of the main sources of data and evidence. The second
step is used to select the parties that are going to be compared in both types of analyses. The result is that the parties that are compared are the local branches of the two main SWPs (PSOE and PP), and the most important regionalist parties. The third step is the selection of the regional elections to be compared, or in other words, the time-frame. Again, this step is constrained by the data and evidence available for Andalusia, and the result time periods of 1998-2001, 2007-2010, and 2011-2012.

| Table 4.3.-Application of the Criteria using Three Steps to Select the Manifestos for each Type of Analysis |
|-------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
| STEP 1                                             | STEP 2                                             | STEP 3                                             |
| Selection of the main source of data and evidence: | Selection of parties for both analyses:           | Selection of the electoral periods (time-frame) for both analyses: |
| 1) **Quantitative Analysis:** RMP coded manifestos | 1) The local branches of the two main SWPs.       | 1) 1998-2001. |
| 2) **Qualitative Analysis:** Original manifestos | 2) The main regionalist parties.                  | 2) 2007-2010. |
|                                                   |                                                   | 3) 2011-2012. |

6. QUANTITATIVE DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS

6.1) Quantitative approach

When it comes to the first of the two methodological approaches, the quantitative approach, it must be said that the aim of this research approach is generally linked to a positivist philosophy. In this sense, research is be done objectively. This means that the researcher needs to treat the data and observations as objective entities with no connection with the person who is researching it. This kind of research is time- and context-free (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004, 14; and Denzin and Lincoln 1994, 4-10). Probably is the closes type of research approach that can be compared, in social science, to the natural sciences in terms of the reliability and validity. Quantitative analysis permits the researcher to highlight the measurable relation between concepts, in
this case the different components of the centre-periphery cleavage, and the final measurements. The main characteristics of quantitative research is the focus on a deductive approach, testing or confirmation of a theory and hypotheses, and finally, using a statistical analysis method to deal with the data. It is a numerically summary of the text that is being analysed (Neuendorf 2002, 21). In other words, it is the quantification of the message through categories and the relation between them in terms of frequency and occurrence (Riffe et al. 2014, 3).

In terms of the justification to use this research approach, there are four main reasons that can be very useful for the purpose of this thesis: the first reason is that this approach can help test and validate hypothesis that have been articulated before the analysis. The second reason is that the findings can be generalised to a broader population of cases. The third reason refers to the trustworthiness of the investigation, increasing the credibility and validity of the investigation. The fourth and last reason is that quantitative research allows for the understanding of a larger set of observations. Overall, the purpose of this quantitative approach is to obtain a complete picture of the research problem.

6.2) Regions selected for the quantitative analysis

The literature identifies around 24 different sampling schemes (Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998). One of the main characteristics of a mixed methods approach is that in order to answer the main research question, the sampling design, explained above, can employ any of the sampling schemes that the quantitative and qualitative approaches normally use (Teddle and Yu 2007: 85). The rationale for the selection of the sampling scheme and sample size is focused on the different purposes of the study (Teddle and Yu 2007: 86). Before establishing the sampling scheme and case selection for the quantitative analysis, and in order to adapt Spain to the centre-periphery continuum, the latter has to be divided into strata so that the different subunits of analysis are catalogued accordingly. This continuum is divided into three different strata: centre, inner-, and outer-periphery.
For the quantitative analysis, and in order to have a complete picture of the phenomenon in Spain, two steps need to justify the sampling scheme and case selection. The first step refers to the total population from where the cases are selected. Spain has 17 regions and 2 autonomous cities. Leaving out the 2 autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla because they are not actual “regions”, there is no coded data, and they are not represented in the main data-set used, the total population is made up of 17 possible cases. The second step refers to the sampling scheme used to select the cases. Because the main purpose of the quantitative analysis is to produce a complete picture of Spain, there is no need

*Figure 4.1. Strata and regions in Spain.*
to have a defined sampling scheme or case selection. This means that all the 17 regions have been selected. The sample size is appropriate, and at the same time, has a strong statistical power in order to answer the main research question with solid generalisations. In the quantitative analysis, all the regions that belong to the centre, the inner-, and the outer-periphery have been taken into consideration to have a complete picture of the phenomenon.

6.3) Parties and manifestos selected for the quantitative analysis

The selection of parties for this analysis needs to help to portray a complete picture of the phenomenon. The parties selected are: the main local branches of PSOE and PP in all regions (but not in all the electoral periods), and the most relevant regionalist parties contained in the data-set. It is important to say that some important regionalist parties are missing in the coding performed by the RMP. It would not have been advisable to code the missing manifestos because it would have broken the homogeneity of the coding and results done originally by the RMP team. The application of both criteria gives the result of 44 manifestos in the electoral period of 1998-2001, 44 manifestos of the electoral period of 2007-2010, and 51 manifestos in the electoral period of 2011-2012. Tables 1 and 2 in appendix C show which parties have been selected and the statistical summary for the distribution of the manifestos by regions.

6.4) Operationalisation of the dependent variables

To bridge the lack of a measurement scheme for a quantitative analysis of the centre-periphery cleavage (Alonso et al. 2013: 192-194), the purpose of this sub-section is to explain and justify the measurement used to quantify the three selected dependent variables or components of the centre-periphery cleavage for this analysis: saliency of the regional level, position of parties regarding the distribution of competences between territorial levels, and the attitudes towards multiculturalism. All three measurement schemes are designed to try and capture the articulation of the centre-periphery cleavage in all the regions of Spain addressing the competential and identitarian dimensions that the RMP proposes, as outlined in the introduction of this thesis. In other words, to capture the complete picture of how parties articulate the centre-periphery cleavage nation-wide. These dependent variables fit into the different sub-categories implement
by the RMP to maintain the homogeneity of the data-set via this quantitative approach. The saliency of the regional level and the position of parties regarding the distribution of competences are designed using the new territorial claims scheme introduced by the RMP (Gómez et al. 2009), and the attitude towards multiculturalism is constructed using the definition of the categories of multiculturalism introduced by the CMP but applied regionally by the RMP. Although the first two measurement schemes use the same territorial claims scheme developed by the RMP, for the purpose of a clear explanation, they are dealt with separately.

For each measuring scheme, the territorial levels are constructed by dividing Spain into three different layers, considering the basic administrative structure of the Spanish state: the central, the regional, and the local level. The main idea behind these two schemes is to use the territorial claims to observe the saliency and position of the parties in regards to each territorial level and the distribution of competences without considering any differences between policy preferences. This will enable the measurement of the saliency and the position of parties regarding the distribution of competences in reference to the region, which this scheme allows for. So far, this is the most specific development that the RMP has provided the field with in order to capture multi-level party competition. In this investigation, the main difference with previous works that use this territorial claim scheme is that here the territorial level that is going to be the focus is only the regional level, not considering the centre or the local levels. The reason is that the main territorial level researched is the region, and the other two administrative layers would not provide relevant evidence to answer the research question.

According to authors such as Maddens and Libbrecht (2009), the position that a political party has with regards to any issue can include two main components: a salience and a positional component. The first component refers to the degree to which a party emphasises an issue, including a specific territorial level, through a manifesto or other means. The second component refers to the substantive content of the party’s issue profile, or in other words, the direction that a party takes with regard to an issue (Maddens and Libbrecht 2009: 205). Using this idea, the first measuring scheme focuses on the first component and
the idea of mapping specifically the saliency in regards to the regional level. This measures the number of times a party mentions the region in its manifestos. This same measuring scheme is introduced in the literature by authors such as Alonso et al. (2013: 201), but here, the regional level is measured not only using the territorial references to the region itself with no authority claim (Gómez et al. 2009: 3), but also adding the mentions to the region with respect to taking away or giving more competences.

In other words, the articulation of this dependent variable is as follows: all the references to the regional level. This is, those territorial references starting with the digit 2, that in the classification scheme of competential preferences explained above is accompanied at the end by the digit 0, 1, and 2 (Formula contained in appendix D). Finally, the higher the final score, the more emphasis of the regional level. The justification for this specific dependent variable is threefold. Firstly, if from manifestos that are produced for regional elections one could expect to see the regional level to be the most mentioned territorial level in comparison to the centre or the local levels, then it is reasonable to verify this expectation. Secondly, to observe if the region acquires more and more importance through a period of time in the manifestos as the Spanish state becomes gradually a more decentralised state, or if the mentions to the level remain the same independently from the decentralisation policies. Thirdly, based on the literature that refers to the changes that political parties may have over time (Janda et al. 1995), one can observe the general trends and fluctuations over time in relation to the mentions that the regional level receives.

The second measuring scheme is based around describing the position that parties have in regards to the distribution of competences, or in other words, measuring the position that parties have when it comes to the call or not for more competences to be devolved to the regions. This is, the positional component, which refers to the substantive content of the party’s issue direction (Maddens and Libbrecht 2009: 205). According to Laver and Garry (2000: 627), a party’s position is defined as the direction that a party prefers regarding an issue. In this case, no specific policy is considered but all the policies that refer to the attribution of more or fewer competences to the region. As Maddens and Libbrecht put it (2009: 219), this variable measures the statements expressing a preference for
more or fewer competences for the region, independently of the policy. The specification of this dependent variable is as follows: subtract, using the classification scheme of competential preferences explained above, the territorial demands ordered under the first digits starting with 2 and ending with the digit 1, from the same territorial demands order under the first digits starting with 2 and ending with the digit 2 (Formula contained in appendix D). This final result is considered as a positional score. In this investigation, in order to obtain positional scores, the formula presented by Budge et al. (2001) is used in comparison to the one given by Laver and Garry (2000). This means that when one subtracts opposite categories, the final measurement can be considered not only as a saliency score but also as a declaration of the party’s attitude towards the issue (Alonso et al. 2013: 202). Finally, the higher the score, the more competences are called for to be devolved to the regions.

It is important to specify that this territorial claim scheme does not necessary reflect the real existing distribution of competences between the territorial levels, but more a goal or a claim for more competences to be delegated or devolved to the regions from the central state than a reflection of the competences that a region already holds in reality (Alonso et al. 2013: 195). So, although it uses the word “competential”, this does not refer to the actual distribution of competences or the actual competential degree of the region in the constitutional design of the state. The justification for this measuring scheme is fourfold. The first reason is based on the identification of the general trends that can be described. The second reason is focused on identifying the possible reasons for the variation outlined in these trends. The third reason is to observe which parties call for more or less competences to be devolved. The fourth is based on the fact that with this positional scale, and according to Maddens and Libbrecht (2009: 219), one can suggest specific tendencies in regards to the attitude that these have with respect to the de/re-centralisation process. This means that if a party scores high, this may be due to a more autonomist or decentralising tendency in comparison to what may be occurring in other regions.

The third measuring scheme refers to the attitudes that parties may have when it comes to include and/or incorporate other identities or minority groups into a broader project. This broader project can be seen as exclusive or inclusive
depending on the greater or lesser degree of resistance that parties have when it comes to open the scope of it. As it has been explained in the theoretical framework, this exclusive/inclusive framework is linked to the extent to which a party is able to articulate a national/regional identity that is open or not to other identities. Multiculturalism has been used in the past decades to try and incorporate minority cultures into a broader political community which is not so much dependent on ethnic identities but more on a common citizenship (Habermas 1992), even to the extent of subordinating national/regional identities to a duty towards the common good (Mason 1999). A political community could have a common national civic identity (Calhoun 2002) with the coexistence of different national/regional identities in a pacific manner. This can include minority cultures to make every social group part of the community without losing what for those communities is important, such as their identities. The measuring scheme proposed in this sub-section is aimed at measuring this exclusive or inclusive vision of a broad national/regional identity that incorporates other identities to articulate a common one with which most of the community identifies without being alienated. Before detailing the components of this measuring scheme, one has to acknowledge the limitations that the data has. The theoretical definition of this exclusive/inclusive index may not match perfectly the definition of the variables of multiculturalism contained in the CMP and the RMP. Due to the lack of direct variables that distinguish between migrants from the outside or coming from other regions of the same state, this index is the best one available.

The articulation of this measuring scheme is based on the categories of multiculturalism contained in the RMP. The definition of the category "multiculturalism" contained in both the CMP and RMP data-bases (Appendix B) can be suitable to articulate this measuring scheme: "favourable mentions of cultural diversity and cultural plurality within domestic societies. May include the preservation of autonomy of religious, linguistic heritages within the country including special educational provisions" (multiculturalism positive: code 607), and "the enforcement or encouragement of cultural integration and appeals for cultural homogeneity in society" (multiculturalism negative: code 608) (Volkens et al. 2016: 20 for the CMP and Alonso et al. 2012: 36 for the RMP), depending if the position in regards to multiculturalism is positive or negative. To construct
an index for this scheme, the final step is to subtract the saliency score for the
category of multiculturalism negative from the category of multiculturalism
positive, and the result should be treated as a positional score for the attitude
towards multiculturalism. Therefore, the higher the score, the more able is a party
to articulate a more inclusive vision of a national identity that is able to
accommodate other regional identities (Formula contained in appendix D).

The justification behind this measuring scheme is based on the following
reason. The rationale relates to the fact that the articulation of a political project
is determined, to some extent, by the ability to incorporate minorities. This ability
refers to the possibility for communities that could be considered as minorities, to
recognise themselves as part of a broader political community without being
alienated and therefore react negatively, triggering the intra-group solidarity and
closing down as a social group. The less opposed a community is to the political
project that is being brought to them from the centre, the more chances there are
for a community to become part of the state-wide community without losing their
own identity. The opposite could happen if there is a strong reaction against the
political project that the community sees as less inclusive in regards of their own
identity, triggering the desire to articulate its own national/regional political project
in opposition to it. As it has been outlined in the theoretical framework, the more
inclusive a party is, the more it is able to address and adapt the centre-periphery
cleavage in a broader way, benefiting the communities in all the regions.

The main limitation of this measuring scheme is precisely the definition of
the subcategories introduced by the RMP. The theoretical explanation given in
the previous chapter for this dependent variable does not fit perfectly, or in the
same manner as the former two dependent variables, the definition given by the
RMP for attitudes towards multiculturalism. The original definition provided by the
RMP refers to the attitudes towards immigrants coming from outside into a state
and the definition given here refers to the attitudes towards immigrants coming
from inside the same state. There is an evident mismatch, but despite this, these
subcategories are able to capture, to some extent, the general attitude towards
immigrants (being from outside or inside), and therefore, it is the currently the
best measuring scheme that can be used to fit the purpose of this dependent
variable.
6.5) Operationalisation of the explanatory and control variables

- **Explanatory variables**

Three main explanatory variables have been used for this analysis: *distance, fragmentation, and polycentricity*. For the variable *distance*, the operationalisation scheme is the measured distance in kilometres from the capital of the Spanish state, Madrid, to the capitals of the different regions\(^\text{22}\). *Fragmentation* is operationalised by giving a value of 1 to the regions which are considered spatially fragmented and 0 to those which are not. The next variable is *polycentricity*. This is operationalised as considering the total population of the urban areas in each region that the *Instituto Nacional de Estadística* (INE) lists. In order to get a final measurement, a dichotomous scheme is used. This dichotomous scheme is applied by coding regions where the difference in population between the different urban areas is enough to consider that there is only one dominant urban area with a 0 (with the largest city having an urban population of at least 65% of the total urban population or the region), and regions where the difference in population is not enough to consider the existence of a single dominant urban area and therefore has multiple centres of power with a 1 (with the largest city having an urban population of less than 65% of the total population of the region).

- **Control variables**

Five main control variables have been selected for this analysis: *economic development, regional identity, regional language, party type, and ideology*. The variable *economic development* is operationalised by taking into consideration the difference between the regional and the national average GDP per capita. The data is obtained from the INE. The variable *regional identity feelings* is divided into two main indicators. On one hand, the regional identity feelings that the political class and elites have, and on the other hand, the regional identity feelings that the masses have. By having these two different measurements, one

\(^{22}\) Some regions have no official capitals but what are known as *de facto* capitals. There are two regions in Spain with *de facto* capitals: the Basque Country (Ley 1/1980, de 23 de mayo) and Castilla y Leon (Ley 13/1987, de 29 de diciembre). In this investigation, these *de facto* capitals are considered as the capitals of their regions in the same level as the official capitals of the other regions.
can have a more robust overall indicator of the regional identity feelings that can be found in the different regions.

The political regional identity feelings indicator is operationalised by giving a value of 1 to the regions that have in their Statutes of Autonomy the recognition of the region as a historic Nacionalidad, and a value of 0 to those regions that do not. For the popular regional identity feelings, the indicator is operationalised in the following way: the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) has had several surveys containing a question regarding the degree to which the regional populations identify with the regions (An example of this is contained in appendix E). These surveys are regionally based and over time. The surveys selected for this variable are the ones that coincide with the three electoral periods. The answer to this question is fivefold. The first two answers refer to the feelings that tend to be more Spain centric, the middle one considers the feelings towards the Spain and the region as being equal, and the last two refer to the feelings that are more region centric. For this variable, only the addition of the last two answers to the question are taken into consideration, the ones that refer to prioritising the regional identity in contrast to the Spanish or dual identities. The measurement has a scale of a maximum of 100. The higher the measure, the more the regional population identifies with the region.

The variable regional language has been operationalised by taking into consideration the official status of another regional language apart from Spanish stated and listed in the Statutes of Autonomy of the region. The measurement is dichotomous again, having 1 for the regions with another co-official language and 0 for the regions that do not have another co-official language. The operationalisation scheme of the variable party type uses again a dichotomous direction. On one hand, the SWPs, and on the other hand, the regionalist parties. The values are opposite, scoring a 1 for the SWPs and 0 for the regionalist parties. For the interaction effect of whether SWP are facing or not regionalist parties, this is operationalised by considering if SWP are facing or not regionalist parties during the different electoral periods. In order to do this, it is considered that a SWP is facing regionalist parties when both parties contested the same regional elections. The regionalist parties that are considered here are not only those parties that are region-wide, but also those sub-regionalist parties such as
the UPL in Castilla y Leon. The values are, again, dichotomous. Those regions where SWP face regionalist parties are coded 1 and those regions where SWP do not face regionalist parties are coded 0.

Taking into consideration the last variable, party ideology, the operationalisation scheme used here is the same as the one used by the RMP to obtain a positional measurement on the left-right axis (Gómez et al. 2009; Alonso et al. 2011; Alonso et al. 2012), based on the widely used scheme developed by the literature when coding manifesto data (Laver and Budge 1992; Klingemann 1995; Budge et al. 2001; van der Brug 2001). The scale in this case is not dichotomous but it goes from a maximum of -100 for a left party to a maximum of 100 for a right party. In order to increase the reliability of the data, the measurements obtained for all the parties included here have been compared to other authors to see if the measurements coincided (Heller 2002; Massetti 2009; Alonso et al. 2015; Massetti and Schakel 2015).

There is part of the literature that questions the validity of this measuring scheme (Laver and Garry 2000; Elias et al. 2015) used by some researchers when applying the original, or some derivative of the same, “rile” variable developed by the CMP (Laver and Budge 1992) to capture the social values of parties acting on the left-right axis, key point of the ideological position of parties, as explained in the previous chapter. The main criticism is focused on the ability of the “rile” variable, or derivates, to include the social dimension of the left-right axis (Elias et al. 2015: 842-843). This inclusion is problematic because it would be based on a very contextualised analysis of the country and party analysed (Benoit and Däubler 2014: 36), being highly problematic, for example, in Eastern Europe (Mölder 2016: 45). Therefore, according to this criticism, the most reliable measuring scheme for this dimension should be the economic dimension of the axis, which is consistent over time and space (Mark et al. 2006: 156-157).

Despite this argument, in this investigation, the measuring scheme developed by the RMP (Gómez et al. 2009: 4) is used. The justification for this is that the researchers that develop the RMP outline that a left-right axis, measured using the “rile” variable or derivates, should be able to capture, to some extent, the social values and collapse them with the economic dimension of the left-right
axis (Alonso 2012: 65-66; Alonso et al. 2017: 252) in a broad socio-economic dimension. Both the social values and the economic aspects of the meaning of “left” and “right” are intrinsically related (Knutsen 1995: 86-87), being at the same time dynamic in adapting to specific contexts (De Vries et al. 2013: 235). Klingemann et al. (2006: 83-84) approached the left-right axis developed by the CMP to empirically test it for reliability, being the results positive, and therefore considering in general that the CMP measuring scheme for the left-right axis is sufficiently reliable.

To avoid the main criticism described above, this is, the problem of adding social values to the economic dimension of the axis, it has to be pointed out that the “rile” index was completed using a set of variables that where empirically and intuitively (Mölder 2016: 39), as well as theoretically (Laver and Budge, 1992: 26) driven, which points out that social values are also considered and not only economic aspects (Budge 1994: 457-458). This means that the “rile” variable is able to articulate a broad meaning of what is due to be “left” and “right” in a socio-economic dimension. Therefore, because the RMP measuring scheme used here derive from the former, it should be also considered as a reliable way to obtain a socio-economic measurement of what is due to understood as “left” and “right”. Finally, these social values might change in their meaning if one compares two or more countries, preventing a robust measurement. To prevent this and increase the trustworthiness, this index has to be inserted in a specific context. In this case, because Spain is the case study, the meaning of these social values is expected to be the same in the different regions.

6.6) Accounting for electoral period effects

Before going into outlining the description and quantitative analysis performed, the fixed effect for the different electoral periods has to be explained. The fixed effect designed here are the three different electoral periods (1998-2001, 2007-2010 and 2011-2012). There are two main ways to control for the possibility of omitted variable bias: instrumental variables regressions and fixed effect regressions\(^{23}\). For this investigation, the main method used to avoid omitted

\(^{23}\) Fixed effect regressions can solve, just like the random effect regressions, the correlated errors, but they go a step further and are able to control for the unobserved variables using
variable bias is the fixed effect regression. Fixed effect regressions measure the combined effects of all time-invariant predictors that differ across the different units of observations of a data base. Therefore, by controlling for all time-invariant differences in observables and unobservables, fixed effects regressions attempt to reduce as much as possible the possibility of omitted variable bias (Allison 2009: 1-4). Two characteristics are necessary to use the fixed effect regressions (Allison 2005: 2). The first characteristic is that the same unit of observation in the data-set needs to have two or more measurements in the dependent variable. This is different from a cross-sectional panel, where the unit of observation has only one measurement. The second characteristic is that there needs to be a variation over time throughout the selected periods for the same unit of observation. As it has been explained above, the data-set fulfils both requirements.

6.7) Accounting for interaction effects

Some interaction terms have been used to test the relation between two variables and the its effect on the outcome. The account contained in this chapter focuses on the last type of relation that can be found in a causal model, the moderated relationship, or also known in the literature as interaction effect (Jaccard and Turrisi 2003: 1). The aim of the different interaction terms designed here is to test whether a moderation variable intensifies the effect of an explanatory variable on the outcome (Coulton and Chow 1993: 181), which on its own would be only partial (Pollock 2005: 170). The different interaction terms employed in this investigation are: fragmentation and polycentricity, political regional feelings and distance, party type and ideological position, political regional feelings and ideological position, political regional feelings and language, political regional feelings and party type, political regional feelings and popular regional feelings, language and party type, and language and ideological position. They are designed based on the impact that they may have on the outcome.
6.8) Description of the data

In order to put the reader into context, a previous description of the data is presented. This is achieved by contextualising the data with a cross-case comparison of how the dependent variables unfold in each electoral period. This description of the data only takes into consideration the representation of how the three dependent variables unfold in each region without taking into consideration any of the explanatory and control variables or interaction effects described above. This is performed in two different phases. The first phase considers the statistical description of the three dependent variables aggregated for all regions. The second phase considers the description of three dependent variables disaggregated by regions. The purpose of these two phases is, on one hand, to have a statistical description of the three dependent variables without taking into consideration the different regions of Spain, and on the other hand, to have a specific description of the three dependent variables in each individual region to be able to compare them.

6.9) Quantitative analysis performed

As it has been explained in this section, the broad concept of centre-periphery cleavage has been operationalised into three main dependent variables: saliency of the regional level, distribution of competences, and attitudes towards multiculturalism. Despite the broad nature of the cleavage, these three dependent variables allow us to measure with greater precision the ways in which the relation of the centre with the different peripheries is articulated using party manifestos as the main source of data. These three dependent variables tap into the ways in which the centre-periphery cleavage is articulated in Spain using the different regions as the subunit of analysis. With this basic idea as a starting point, the aim of this sub-section is to explain the analysis performed on these three dependent variables.

The statistical analysis that has been performed on the three dependent variables is a regression analysis. Four reasons can be stated here to justify this method of analysis. The first is to observe the relation between variables (Jaccard and Turrisi 2003: 1), the second is to estimate the importance of an explanatory or control variable in regards to the outcome (Johnson 2000: 1-2), the third is to
test the different hypotheses introduced in this study (Cohen et al. 2003: 3-4), and the fourth is to try and explain the outcome on the dependent variable when applying a number of different independent variables (Harrell 2015: 2). Amongst the different regression analysis methods available, the best choice is the multiple linear regression analysis. The aim of this method is twofold. On one hand, predict the value of the three dependent variables based on the effect that the three explanatory and five control variables have on the former, and on the other hand, determine the overall fit and explain the variance of the models in relation to the relative contribution of each of the explanatory and control variables. This is one of the most solid methods capable of isolating the effect of a certain explanatory or control variable on the outcome whilst, at the same time, controlling for the other independent variables introduced in the different models (Pollock 2005: 168-170).

7. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

7.1) Qualitative approach

The other main methodological approach used in this investigation is the qualitative analysis to try and address the main research question in a more detailed way (Mahoney 2007, 122). This qualitative approach provides the means to procure an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon. For this approach, research is done contextualising the data, and not treat it without the necessary values that bond the researcher to it (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004, 14). This necessary bond will provide the detailed and rich analysis needed at this stage of the analysis. As previously stated, this approach was introduced to examine the specific context in which a phenomenon unfolds (Schwandt 2000, 205-210), and using only using a quantitative analysis does not capture with enough depth the centre-periphery cleavage. Added to this limitation, a quantitative analysis is methodologically silent in terms of how to pursue this in-depth understanding (Mahoney 2007, 124). A qualitative analysis fills in this gap, and at the same time, provides the necessary inferences needed to develop a strong answer to the main research question with the discretion of the researcher to select the method (Robson 1993). The way it is designed lastly depends on the research question and the variables taken into consideration (Robson 1993, 79-94).
In terms of the justification to use this research approach, there are four main reasons that can be very useful for the purpose of this thesis: the first reason is that qualitative research is useful for studying very few cases but with in-depth understanding of them. The second reason is that this approach is very useful to understand very complex phenomena. The third reason is that the description and understanding of the phenomena is always placed in their own context. The fourth and final reason is that the researcher can study longitudinal processes of the phenomena. A qualitative analysis in this investigation provides two main inputs. The first input is that it allows the researcher to gain in-depth knowledge of the cases selected. The second input is that in order to gain the in-depth knowledge of the case selected, it also allows researchers to identify and track over time the variation in the dependent variables as key to the explanation (Collier 2011, 823-826).

7.2) Regions selected for the qualitative analysis

In order to have an in-depth picture of the phenomenon in Spain, the same two steps outlined for the sampling scheme in the previous section need to be clarified here, applied specifically to the qualitative approach. The first step is the total population from where the cases are going to be selected. As it has been mentioned, the sampling design selected in this investigation is a sequential nested design, and here is where the “nested” part of the design is introduced. To fulfill this characteristic of the design itself, the total population is the 17 regions from the previous quantitative analysis. The second step is which cases are selected from this total population. To do so, the sampling scheme used is the stratified scheme. This scheme implies that the 17 regions are divided into different strata of homogeneous subgroups. This has already been completed and explained in Figure 4.1. After stratifying Spain into three main subgroups (centre, inner-, and outer-periphery), a purposeful sample is used to select from each subgroup the necessary cases (Collins et al. 2007: 271-272).

Once the different strata have been designed, the next phase deals with the sample size of the subgroups. According to Onwuegbuzie and Leech (2007: 246-248) and Onwuegbuzie and Collins (2007: 288-289), the sample size needs to be at least of 3 cases per subgroup or stratum. In this case, and because a
nested sampling design that involves a qualitative analysis is aimed to redefine ideas and expand knowledge (Charmaz 2000: 519), only one case per stratum is chosen. With this in mind, one case per stratum, having three regions in total, provides the necessary strong analytic inferences and generalisations. The regions chosen for the qualitative analysis are: Castilla-La Mancha (centre region), Andalusia (inner-peripheral region), and the Canary Islands (outer-peripheral region). The justification to select these three regions is the following, and it approximates to the most similar system designs in comparative analysis. The regions in each stratum (centre, inner-, and outer-periphery) need to belong to the so called “contemporary” autonomies to avoid other important factors, such as the fueros\textsuperscript{24}, which would affect the homogeneity of the cases and inferences. In this sense, the regions need to have similar historic, economic, cultural, and political development. In other words, the three regions are similar in most of their characteristics, except for the distance that separates them from the centre.

7.3) Parties and manifestos selected for the qualitative analysis

In this qualitative analysis, because the sample is reduced to Castilla-La Mancha, Andalusia, and the Canary Islands, the selection of parties needs to be adapted. The parties selected, amongst those that act in these regions, are: the local branches of PSOE and PP, and the most relevant regionalist party in Andalusia (PA/CA) and the Canary Islands (CC) according to the votes cast during the elections. As it can be observed, the PA/CA, the most important regionalist party in Andalusia, has been included for this qualitative analysis. The reason is that in the previous quantitative analysis, coding this party would have threatened the internal coherence of the original coding. For this analysis, the inclusion of this party is not only possible but desirable in order to increase the internal validity of the findings. The application of the criteria to select the most relevant parties gives the result of 24 manifestos, which can be divided into 6 manifestos that correspond to the main regionalist party in Andalusia (3) and the Canary Islands (3), and 18 manifestos that correspond to the local branches of the two main SWPs in the Canary Islands (6), Andalusia (6), and Castilla-La

\textsuperscript{24} Fueros refers to the regional privileges of Navarre and the Basque Country in relation to issues such as tax transfers and civil law, recognised by the Spanish constitution and the Statutes of Autonomy of both regions (Sánchez-Prieto 2012).
Mancha (6). Tables 1 and 2 in appendix F show the parties selected and the statistical summary for the distribution of the manifestos by regions.

7.4) Operationalisation of the dependent variables

The purpose of this sub-section is to describe and justify the measurement schemes used to explore the four selected dependent variables or components of the centre-periphery cleavage presented in this qualitative analysis: saliency of the regional level, constitutional status of the region, position on competence distribution, and identity. As it has been said above, this qualitative method of analysis of political texts is used to incorporate context into the analysis (Krippendorff 2004a: 90-93). This aids to make interpretation of political discourses more reliable in order to address the main research question (Jahn 2010: 750). The justification to add the dependent variables constitutional status of the region and identity, which substitute attitudes towards multiculturalism, in comparison to the quantitative analysis is that, on one hand, the RMP and the sub-categories introduced by this data-set are not precise enough to capture and match the theoretical explanation and expectations for these two dependent variables, and on the other hand, the analysis needs to be more fine grained than the quantitative analysis allows for in relation the way parties behave when addressing these issues, which normally are very contextualised, whilst still complying with the two dimensions in which the RMP disaggregates the territorial axis. This provides the grounds to get an in-depth understanding of party behaviour along the centre-periphery cleavage. In other words, these four dependent variables adapt to the purpose of the qualitative approach developed in this section.

To apply this qualitative method of analysis, a category system or a categorisation matrix needs to be developed (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane 2006: 84-90), which allows for a comparison of concepts and models (Marshall and Rossman 1995). When creating a categorisation matrix, generally two approaches can be used (Maxwell and Miller 2008: 465-467): the structured or unstructured matrix. The structured matrix refers to the practice of only selecting the aspects that fit the matrix itself from all the data. The unstructured matrix refers to the different aspects that the data contains and that can be used to
inductively infer conclusions. For this investigation, the structured matrix is used. The reason behind this is that the four dependent variables used as categories may not be addressed as such in the manifestos, making it necessary to create subcategories beforehand (Dey 1993: 102) that fit their boundaries to try and capture their full meaning along the manifestos.

\[\text{MAIN THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK} \rightarrow \text{MAIN CATEGORIES} \rightarrow \text{SUBCATEGORIES}\]

\[\text{PARTY COMPETITION ON THE CENTRE-PERIPHERY CLEAVAGE} \rightarrow \text{SALIENCY OF THE REGIONAL LEVEL} \rightarrow \text{CENTRAL LEVEL, REGIONAL LEVEL, LOCAL LEVEL}\]

\[\text{CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF THE REGION} \rightarrow \text{SPECIAL STATUS, FEDERATED STATE, AUTONOMOUS REGION}\]

\[\text{POSITION ON COMPETENCE DISTRIBUTION} \rightarrow \text{MORE COMPETENCES, STATUS QUO, FEWER COMPETENCES}\]

\[\text{IDENTITY} \rightarrow \text{DISTINCT NATIONAL IDENTITY, NACIONALIDAD, REGIONAL IDENTITY}\]

*Figure 4.2. Structured categorisation matrix.*
7.5) Operationalisation of the explanatory and control variables

Before analysing the manifestos using the above structured categorisation matrix, an important issue has to be clarified. Despite the fact that qualitative analysis is introduced to incorporate context to the analysis (Bryman 2004: 542), there is still some lack of specific procedures to apply it. This is explained by the flexibility that this method of analysis provides. To bridge this gap, it is necessary to design a process where the evidence extracted from the manifestos using the above structured categorisation matrix is measured. Leaving behind frequency techniques and similar (Mayring 2014: 22-26), the focus in this analysis is placed on an analytic technique that allows to gain more in-depth knowledge and meaning of the statements contained in the manifestos. Due to the lack of standardised procedures in comparison to a quantitative analysis, establishing this before the analysis is a crucial part of any qualitative analysis, and this must fit the purpose of the study (Mayring 2014: 39). Three main aims form the bases that establishes this procedure beforehand: first, give answers to the possible criticisms that this kind of approach rise in positivist researchers, such as the lack of objectivity (Wesley 2014: 142-143); second, these answers should strengthen the trustworthiness of the qualitative analysis of these manifestos (Wesley 2014: 144); and third, having a detailed account of the procedure allows for other researchers to audit the methodological trails of the study (Altheide 1996: 25-33).

The procedure for the analysis of the manifestos designed in this chapter is divided into two phases (Gill 2007: 179-180). The first phase deals with the search for patterns in the text, and the second phase compares the main hypotheses to these patterns. More precisely, when it comes to applying these two phases, the first phase deals with the identification and articulation of the different categories and subcategories described in the above sub-section that deals with the operationalisation of the dependent variables, and the second phase considers the operationalisation of the explanatory and control variables to confirm or not the hypotheses and find possible answers to the main research question. The analysis of the data in qualitative analysis can be defined as the comparison of the data gathered using the structured categorisation matrix (Figure 4.2) with a set of questions that have been articulated in order to assess
and evaluate the outcome of the case study (George and Bennett 2005: 213). This can be seen as a fourth stage in the analysis of political documents in addition to the three stages described by Wesley (2014: 150-154). The first three stages deal with a broad overview of the texts selected for the study, the articulation of the categorisation matrix, and the fine grain ordering of the data under the different categories and subcategories articulated. The fourth stage can resemble the one described here, dealing with the inferences that are extracted in relation to the main hypotheses and research question.

This comparison requires a structured questions matrix to be applied to the data ordered by the above structured categorisation matrix. These structured questions are based on the main research question and hypotheses designed for this case study. The articulation and comparison of the structured categorisation matrix to the required structured questions matrix can be extracted from the analysis process proposed by the method of Discourse Tracing, applied to this qualitative analysis. This comparison has the aim of highlighting and trace over time political discourse (LeGreco and Tracy 2009: 1531-1534) around the centre-periphery cleavage contained in the manifestos and other documents issued by parties to deal with the regional level. This analysis gravitates around three main explanatory and three control variables: the explanatory variables are distance, fragmentation, polycentricity, and the control variables are party type, party ideology, and party structure. The structured questions that are introduced at this stage are designed using these variables to observe how the evidence obtained through the structured categorisation matrix changes over time and region, and how they are or can be connected (LeGreco and Tracy 2009: 1532). Once the comparison has been done, a second task needs to be completed (LeGreco and Tracy 2009: 1534-1534), which involves the articulation of a narrative to answer the main research question. The aim is fulfilled in the discussion section.
Figure 4.3. Structured questions matrix.

- **Distance**
  - How does distance affect the articulation of the centre-periphery cleavage?

- **Fragmentation**
  - How does fragmentation affect the articulation of the centre-periphery cleavage?

- **Polycentricity**
  - How does polycentricity affect the articulation of the centre-periphery cleavage?

- **Party Type**
  - How does party type affect the articulation of the centre-periphery cleavage?

- **Party Ideology**
  - How does party ideology affect the articulation of the centre-periphery cleavage?

- **Party Structure**
  - How does party structure affect the articulation of the centre-periphery cleavage?

**Explanatory and Control Variables**
- Distance
- Fragmentation
- Polycentricity
- Party Type
- Party Ideology
- Party Structure

**Structured Questions**
- How does distance affect the articulation of the centre-periphery cleavage?
- How does fragmentation affect the articulation of the centre-periphery cleavage?
- How does polycentricity affect the articulation of the centre-periphery cleavage?
- How does party type affect the articulation of the centre-periphery cleavage?
- How does party ideology affect the articulation of the centre-periphery cleavage?
- How does party structure affect the articulation of the centre-periphery cleavage?

**Categorisation Matrix**
- Saliency of the regional level, constitutional status of the region, competence distribution, and identity
7.6) Triangulation

To increase trustworthiness, one can, apart from following the different procedures that the literature suggests, such as Morse et al. (2002: 14-16), focus on various ways to increase the level of the inferences of this study. Triangulation involves collecting, analysing, and cross-checking a variety of data that deals with the same case. Here, triangulation is addressed by introducing new sources of evidence. In general terms, triangulation derived from the labelled triangle analogy, implying that the observation of the same phenomenon through different and independent sources of evidence (Decrop 1999: 158). This should not be confused with the known between-method triangulation (Denzin 1978: 304).

In this investigation, triangulation is understood as this way of triangulating different sources of data (Flick 2004: 178), or in other words, the use of other sources of evidence to increase the trustworthiness and confirm to some extent the findings (Patton 2002: 541-590). To perform the proposed triangulation based on different sources of evidence (Boyatzis 1998: xiii, and 144-159), this qualitative analysis complements the regional manifestos with other documents produced by the parties that may contain important evidence. These different documents deal with regional issues and are thought to answer and/or present the ideas that the different parties have regarding the articulation of the autonomous communities and their constitutional design. In terms of the different documents, the ones selected for performing this triangulation are: political resolutions for the congress that the parties had during the three electoral periods, the regional frameworks that SWPs issue for regional elections, and the inaugural speech. The specific documents can be found in Table 1, appendix G.

7.7) Qualitative analysis performed

Content Analysis is used as the main qualitative method of analysis in this investigation. This has the aim of incorporating context to the analysis (Titscher et al. 2000: 62). In order to do this, Content Analysis codes and categorises large amounts of textual evidence to highlight possible patterns and trends (Gbrich 2007: 189-199), used to validate inferences from different sources of evidence in their own context (Krippendorff 2004a: 18). Focusing on the main source of evidence, the aim of this qualitative method of analysis is to disentangle political
discourse to gain in-depth knowledge of a case. Content Analysis grants the ability to, through the reading and coding of political texts, outline patterns over time of social processes inserted in a specific social context, providing the necessary in-depth understanding of the phenomenon that is being studied.

The rationale for the use of Content Analysis is twofold. First, and focusing on the case study strategy outlined above (Eckstein 2000: 119-124), the following can be said. As this is a case study, Content Analysis fits the context-dependent knowledge required for an in-depth understanding of the case selected (Seawright and Gerring 2008: 294-295). Analysing three subunits of analysis (Castilla-La Mancha, Andalusia, and the Canary Islands) has the aim of finding a balance between the internal and external validity of the design. This balance of validities consolidates the in-depth knowledge of the case (Gerring 2004: 347-348), and provides the ground to open the door to some degree of generalisation of the findings (Ragin 1987: 70-71). The second rationale is the flexibility that Content Analysis allows in terms of designing the measurement schemes of the different dependent and independent variables in order to obtain the required in-depth knowledge of the topic and context (Neuendorf 2017: 24-31). Content Analysis has no straight line in terms of the actual process to obtain an answer to the main research question. This is an advantage when it comes to gaining in-depth knowledge, but at the same time, can be a disadvantage if the process used is not sufficiently justified along the study (Wesley 2014: 153-56). The flexibility needs to be accompanied by a detailed explanation of the method used and how the results were achieved (Holliday 2007: 7), rationale for this section.

8. CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this chapter was to outline and describe in detail the methodology used in this investigation. This is one of the main procedures though which the characteristics of validity, reliability, replicability, and transparency can be achieved in social sciences. This methodological account needs to be used as the main pillar on which this investigation relays. The main research design used here is the sub-national comparative design, using a case study strategy as the most appropriate one to gain in-depth knowledge of Spain in a highly contextualised understanding. A mixed methods approach is used to combine the
strengths of both the quantitative and qualitative approaches when analysing the different sources of evidence. This combination fits the aim of obtaining a complete and in-depth understanding of the phenomenon. Using a sequential nested design to select the different subunits of the analysis in Spain opens the path to obtain the necessary inferences in order to address the main research question with a solid and strong answer.
CHAPTER 5

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
1. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to quantitatively analyse the manifestos. The dependent variables in which the centre-periphery cleavage was divided into were: saliency of the regional level, position on competence distribution, and attitudes towards multiculturalism. These provided a complete overview of party behaviour when articulating the centre-periphery cleavage nation-wide. Added to the three main explanatory variables, the control variables selected were economic development, regional identity, regional language, party type, and ideology. This chapter tried to fill in the gap identified by Alonso et al. (2017: 244), highlighting the fact that most studies concerning the research problem identified in the literature review chapter were based on state-level data. Here, regional-level quantitative data has been introduced to observe how the above-mentioned factors were expected to shape party competition along this cleavage in the 17 regions of Spain. This chapter is divided into four main sections. The first section describes the data, the second presents the results of the quantitative analysis, the third contrasts the main findings with the hypotheses designed for all the regions of Spain, and the fourth discusses the most important inferences in relation to the research question.

2. DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA

2.1) Introduction

The aim of this section is to present the data obtained regarding the three dependent variables for all the regions of Spain. The organisation of this section is the following: three main sub-sections, each one describing the data corresponding to each dependent variables. Each sub-section is divided into, on one hand, a cross-sectional description of each electoral period, and on the other hand, a longitudinal description of the three electoral periods. The raw data for the explanatory, control, and dependent variables is contained in appendix H (aggregated data) and appendix I (disaggregated data).
2.2) Saliency of the regional level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ELECTORAL PERIOD</th>
<th>MEAN</th>
<th>MEDIAN</th>
<th>S.D.</th>
<th>MAX.</th>
<th>MIN.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998-2001</td>
<td>90.89</td>
<td>91.02</td>
<td>3.89</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>83.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-2010</td>
<td>91.86</td>
<td>93.02</td>
<td>5.08</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>68.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011-2012</td>
<td>92.06</td>
<td>91.83</td>
<td>3.80</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>85.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Statistical summary of the aggregated data for the regions of Spain in appendix H. The disaggregated data for this table can be found in appendix I.

This cross-section statistical summary suggests four main points. The first point is that the expected weight of the region in the manifestos is strongly verified. All means show that overall and in all three periods, the regional level was addressed in over 90% of the total content of all manifestos. The second point is that not only was the regional level the most referenced one in comparison to other possible levels, but also that it gradually received more attention in the manifestos over time. The third point deals with the results for the maximum and minimum categories. The former reveals that, in some regions, there were some manifestos that were entirely dedicated to the regional level in some electoral periods. From the latter category, one can observe that there were some manifestos in some regions that dedicate considerable space to other administrative levels, with a considerable difference of more than 20 points between the mean and the minimum category for the electoral period 2007-2010, double the difference in comparison to the other two electoral periods. The fourth point deals with the scores for the standard deviation category. Both the first and last electoral periods score very similar results, with an insignificant difference between them. The most interesting result comes for the period 2007-2010, which shows a score of 5.08, representing a significant difference and a higher variation if compared to 1998-2001 and 2011-2012, which, added to the scores for the maximum and minimum categories for the same period, where the difference between them was the highest, represents the regional elections where the references to the regional level were less consistent.
The main observation from Figure 5.1 is that the general mean for all the regions had a positive tendency with a gentle incline. It can be said that most of the regions, with some exceptions such as Cantabria, Murcia, or Aragon, had the same positive trend. A good indicator of this general observation is that there were about half of the regions that started below the general mean line in the first electoral period and most of them ended above the same general mean line in the last electoral period 2011-2012. There were also exceptions to this, but nonetheless, they still followed the same positive pattern. Andalusia is a good example. In the first electoral period, the region had a mean considerably under the general mean, and in the last electoral period the mean of the region was still under the general mean, but at the same time, it had a positive trend. Navarre
can be considered as an opposite example of the latter region, but with the same positive trend. All its means were above the general mean and at the same time had a positive trend. There were regions that had negative trends in comparison to the above general observation. Murcia is a good example of a region with a negative trend. Its first mean scored above the general mean and its last mean scored below. This shows a clear negative trend. Aragon, the Balearic, and the Canary Islands followed the same negative trend. Castilla y Leon is an interesting region with different scores compared to the positive and negative trend described above. Although its second mean was under the general mean, the region had a general flat tendency overall.

The overall conclusion for both the cross-sectional and longitudinal description is that the general trend, represented by the three means in the cross-sectional and the general mean in the longitudinal description, was positive. The regional level was the most referenced level compared to others, and this increased over time. Two reasons can explain this. The first reason for this may be that as the regions developed their Statutes of Autonomy with more competences delegated by the centre, this is the administrative level on which the bulk of the state’s functioning falls. Therefore, the region is the entity to which the citizens refer most of the time when they have to deal with the state, making the regions the direct receptor of their attention. In other words, the region is increasing its presence over time in the everyday life of the citizens. The second reason can be that the manifestos were compiled for regional elections, and therefore, the focus was on the region. The same happens with manifestos that address the national or local levels. In a multi-level democracy like Spain, each level is addressed specifically by the parties. If the elections correspond to the regional level, then, it is expected to observe the emphasis of the manifestos focused on the level addressed.
2.3) Position on competence distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ELECTORAL PERIOD</th>
<th>MEAN</th>
<th>MEDIAN</th>
<th>S.D.</th>
<th>MAX.</th>
<th>MIN.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998-2001</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>4.71</td>
<td>7.95</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-2010</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>9.03</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011-2012</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>3.72</td>
<td>16.41</td>
<td>-0.65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Statistical summary of the aggregated data for the regions of Spain in appendix H. The disaggregated data for this table can be found in appendix I.

Three main observations can be outlined using this cross-sectional description. The first observation has to do with the means regarding each electoral period. All three periods had positive numbers, meaning that in each period, the parties in the regions demanded more competences for the regions in general terms. Despite this positive scores for all the means, it can be pointed out that the scores decreased from the first electoral period to the second, and increased from the second to the third. The positive mentions towards devolving more competences to the regions were numerous during the period 1998-2001 and fewer during the period 2007-2010, but this increased during the period 2011-2012. The second observation refers to the maximum and minimum categories. Regarding the maximum category, one can observe that the scores increased from one period to another, reaching a significantly higher number during 2011-2012. In the first two periods, the minimum scores were both 0, meaning that no party in any of the 17 regions called for competences to be removed from the region to be assigned to other territorial levels. This changed during the period 2011-2012, where a negative score of -0.65 can be found, meaning that some competences were demanded to be taken away from the regional level. The difference that can be found between the maximum and minimum category reaches its peak during the last electoral period, with a score of 17.06, more than double the minimum, reached during the period 1998-2001 with a score of 7.95. The last observation deals with the standard deviation category. The scores for the periods 1998-2001 and 2011-
2012 differ significantly from the one for the period of 2007-2010. The standard deviation for the period 2007-2010 is significantly lower, meaning that the variation in the positioning of parties calling for more competences to be devolved to the regions reached its minimum. In opposition, the period where one can find more variation in the same behaviour is the first electoral period.

![Figure 5.2. Position on competence distribution.](image)

From this longitudinal description, two main observations can be made. The first observation, and possibly the most important one, is that there was a negative trend regarding the general mean for all the regions despite the increase in the last electoral period. Most of the regions, with some exceptions, had a negative trend. The negative trend had different declines, like for example, the decline of the Basque Country was more pronounced than the decline of the Balearic Islands. Despite this, some regions had a steady positive trend, such as
Galicia for example. Aragon is another example of a region with a positive trend. The second observation deals with the position most regions have in comparison to the general mean had over time. Most of the regions started during the first period 1998-2001 below the general mean, and during the second and third electoral period, this remained the same. This means that most of the regions either followed the same negative trend, as for example Andalusia, or they had positive trends but they still scored below the general mean, as for example La Rioja.

The general conclusions regarding the cross-sectional and the longitudinal description of the data are the following. Despite the fact that negative results can be observed in very few cases, the call for more competences to de devolved to the regions was general in all regions. Nonetheless, these positive calls had a negative trend, decreasing over time. The high scores for the standard deviations support the variation around the general mean observed in Figure 5.2, where there were some regions that prominently deviated from it. An example of this is the Basque County in the first electoral period and Catalonia in the last one. During the middle electoral period, 2007-2010, one can observe how the regions tended to be more concentrated around the general mean, meaning that the calls for more competences were more homogenous in general.

A possible reason for the negative trend over time could be the development of the ongoing decentralisation process. The Spanish state has gone, according to the literature, through four waves of decentralisation (Gómez Corona 2009). In other words, the regions have developed their foundational laws and structure in four different waves, depending on the process they were assigned by the Constitution and the different reforms that their Statutes of Autonomy have undertaken. The four waves were (Castellà Andreu and Martín Núñez 2009: 49): the first during 1991, the second during 1994, the third during 1996-2001, and the fourth during 2006-2007. As the regions developed their Statutes of Autonomy with more devolved competences, there were fewer that they could call for, and therefore, less emphasis on calling for more competences could be made as the list of transferable competences got shorter. In other words, the more competences the regions had, the fewer they called for as fewer competences were available to be devolved.
According to the above observation and the four waves of decentralisation, by the electoral period 2011-2012 the mentions dealing with the distribution of competences towards the regions should be expected to be fewer than the mentions in the previous electoral periods. This is because there would be no other competences that could be devolved by the central government to the regions. This is not apparently the case. It seems that the mentions increased. The reason behind this increase could be found in the consequences of the Constitutional ruling of 2010 over the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia 2006. The ruling discussed the competences that could be devolved to the regions (López Bofill 2011: 186-187). From this ruling, a new clarification and interpretation of the legal framework to devolve competences was introduced (Ortega Álvarez 2011: 54). This could have triggered the issue of devolving new competences, or at least, introduced the discussion of this new interpretation of the existing legal framework in those regions that are were currently planning to reform their Statute of Autonomy in a possible fifth new wave of decentralisation (for example, the proposed reform of the Statute of Autonomy of the Canary Islands 1996) 25. Parties, in order to position themselves in line with this new interpretation, could have increased their mentions to devolving more competences to the regions during the last electoral period 2011-2012.

2.4) Attitudes towards multiculturalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ELECTORAL PERIOD</th>
<th>MEAN</th>
<th>MEDIAN</th>
<th>S.D.</th>
<th>MAX.</th>
<th>MIN.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998-2001</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-2010</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>-0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011-2012</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>-0.65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Statistical summary of the aggregated data for the regions of Spain in appendix H. The disaggregated data for this table can be found in appendix I.

25 http://www.congreso.es/public_oficiales/L12/CONG/BOCG/B/BOCG-12-B-10-1.PDF. This is the proposal to reform the Statute of Autonomy of the Canary Islands 1996.
This cross-sectional description of the data can be summarised as follows. The first consideration deals with the means. There was an initial increase, from 199-2001 to 2007-2010, and a later decrease, from 2007-2010 to 2011-2012, but nonetheless, this last score was still higher than the one for the first period. Despite this fact, the lowest score were found during 1998-2001 and the highest during 2007-2010. As regards to the maximum and minimum categories, the second consideration is the following. The maximum scores decreased from the first to the second electoral period, and increased from the second to the third period. The opposite behaviour can be found in the minimum category. The scores increased from the first to the second period, and decreased slightly from the second to the third electoral period. Regarding the differences between the two categories, one can observe a difference of 1.42 in the first period, a difference of 1.74 in the second period, and a difference of 3.35 in the last one, being this last difference the highest one. The last point regarding these two categories is that the minimum scores reflect that, in some regions, the attitudes of some parties towards other cultures were negative. The third consideration relates to the scores for the standard deviation. They increased from one period to the next. Despite this general increase, the difference in increase between the first and the second period was slightly higher, 0.14, than the increase between the second and the third period, 0.10. The last result, 0.51 during 2011-2012, points in the direction of observing a more heterogeneous behaviour by parties regarding the attitudes towards multiculturalism, being this less consistent than in the first two periods.
From what can be observed in Figure 5.3, containing the longitudinal patterns, the general trend for all regions was either flat or very slightly positive over time. Despite this general trend, there were examples of negative tendencies. The region of Extremadura is an example of these negative trends. The last main observation deals with the negative results for regions such as the Balearic Islands, La Rioja, Valencia and Castilla-León. One can find negative results in these regions, meaning that, at some point in time, parties had negative attitudes towards multiculturalism, but this does not mean that they had an overall negative trend per se. In fact, there were examples of both positive trends with negative scores, such as Valencia, and negative trends with negative scores,
such as Castilla-Leon. Following this observation, it must be said that most of the regions scored above 0 across the three electoral periods. This means that in most of the regions, parties had consistent positive attitudes towards multiculturalism. The general conclusion that can be stated here is that one can find either a flat or a slightly positive trend over time, and that the dispersion of the regions around the general mean increased at the same time. The first point can be reinforced comparing the means for all the three electoral periods and the line for the general mean for all regions. The second point can be supported using the scores for the standard deviation and the dispersion that can be observed in the Figure 5.3.

2.5) Conclusions

From the description of the data in relation to the three dependent variables in which the broad concept of centre-periphery cleavage has been divided into, the following can be said. Regarding the variable *saliency of the regional level*, the conclusion is that there was a positive trend overtime. This positive trend seems to had been steady over time, with a solid pace in its increase. With respect to the variable *position on competence distribution*, the cross-sectional and longitudinal description highlighted a negative trend overtime, but nonetheless, the calls for more competences to be devolved were positive overall, with very few negative examples. This means that parties, as time passed, called for fewer competences for the regions. Regarding the variable *attitudes towards multiculturalism* in all three electoral periods, the results showed a flat or a very slightly positive trend, with some consistently negative results.

3. RESULTS

3.1) Organisation of the multiple regression analyses

The multiple regression analyses are organised in the following way. Model 1 for every dependent variable contains only the three explanatory variables in a linear functional form and the account for the time effect. Model 2 introduces to the above all the control variables, again in a linear functional form. Finally, models 3-8/9 (depending on the dependent variable) contain the linear functional form of the explanatory and control variables on one hand, and the
different interaction functional forms theorised to have an effect on the other hand\textsuperscript{26}.

3.2) Saliency of the regional level\textsuperscript{27}

From all the explanatory and control variables, the one that has the strongest statistical significance is regional identity feelings via the indicator political regional feelings. This significance is robust and consistent in all the models presented, with a minimum statistical significance \( p \)-value of .05 and a maximum of .01. The association is also the strongest, with a maximum result of -4.91 and a minimum of -2.39.

All the three explanatory variables have no statistical significance in any of the models. This applies for model 1, with the three explanatory variables on their own, model 2, with all the explanatory and the control variables, and models 3-8, with all the explanatory and control variables, and interaction effects. From the three, the one that has the strongest association with the dependent variable is fragmentation, being this consistently negative with a maximum score of -2.67. In regards to the regional-level control variables, none, except regional identity feelings via the indicator political regional feelings, has any statistical significance across the different models presented. When it comes to their impact, there is a mixture of positive and negative associations, being economic development and language representatives of the former, and regional identity feelings characterising the latter. Although with no statistical significance, regional language has the second strongest association, with a maximum of 1.72 in model 3. Finally, economic development has no association. Reporting the results for the party-level control variables, the observations are less varied. The control variable that has the strongest statistical significance is party type, with a \( p \)-value of .1 in all models. Its effects on the dependent variable are also strong, with a maximum of -1.62 in model 6. The variables ideological position of parties and SWPs facing regional parties do not have any significance in any of the models.

\textsuperscript{26} The results are contained in appendix J, K, and L.
\textsuperscript{27} Data for the multiple regression for the saliency of the regional level is contained in appendix J.
From these two last control variables, the latter scores strong associations, with a maximum score of 2.57 in model 4.

Focusing on the interaction effects and the electoral periods, the following can be said. Their impact on the dependent variable is marginal, except for the interaction of fragmentation and polycentricity, which has the strongest positive association of all, with a score of 6.56. The only electoral period that has a strong statistical significance is 2007-2010, with a maximum p-value of .05 in models 1 and 2, but this is an exception as there is none in the remaining ones. Its effects are considerable, with a positive association of 1.69 at its peak (Model 1). Regarding the different models presented, all have a strong significance in relation to the saliency of the regional level, with a maximum p-value of .05, being model 3 the strongest, with a F-statistic of 0.03. The highest R-square can be found in model 4, having the overall highest explanatory power (.16), although this leaves much variation unexplained. The most interesting result with respect to the different models is that one can highlight the fact that the three explanatory variables on their own have very insignificant impact on the outcome. This increases when they come in combination with the different control variables.

3.3) Position on competence distribution

In comparison to the results outlined for the previous dependent variable, this analysis presents more significant results. Overall, it can be seen at first hand the results for the statistical significance of the different explanatory and control variables contain more substantive results in most of the models. In regards to the results for the association with the position on competence distribution, the general overview is that they are consistently higher. Finally, the models present an overall considerably more significance than the ones for the saliency of the regional level.

From the three explanatory variables, two main results can be highlighted. On one hand, the results for the statistical significance and association with the dependent variable, and on the other hand, the sharp difference between the

---

28 Data for the multiple regression for the saliency of the regional level is contained in appendix K.
explanatory variables being on their own (model 1) or in combination with the control variables (model 2-9). Starting with the first set of important results, the explanatory variable with the most consistent statistical significance in all models is distance, with a consistent $p$-value of .05 except for model 1. This is followed by polycentricity, with strong statistical significance but less consistent, with variation of a maximum $p$-value of .05 and a minimum of .1. Fragmentation has no statistical significance in any of the models in which is it present. The strongest and consistent association can be found in relation to polycentricity, being this positive and with a maximum score of 1.76 in model 9. Distance displays an extremely negative weak association, with a maximum score of -0.008 in model 4. Finishing with the second set of important results is that in model 1, where the explanatory variables are on their own, none score any statistical significance. This changes when these come in combination with the control variables in model 2. Except fragmentation, distance and polycentricity have consistent statistical significance in all models. In addition, the associations turn direction for distance and fragmentation (positive to negative in the case of the former, and negative to positive for the latter), and in the case of polycentricity, its sharply increases.

Considering the regional-level control variables, the ones with the strongest statistical significance are, in order of importance, regional language and regional identity feelings via both indicators. This relation varies, in most of the cases, from a minimum $p$-value of .1 to a maximum of .01, but it can be considered as robust and consistent across all models. Only economic development has no significance and association. When it comes to the association with the position on competence distribution, there is a clear cut between, on one hand, regional identity feelings via the indicator political regional feeling with very strong positive effects (a maximum of 3.75 in model 6), and on the other hand, regional language, with clearer consistent negative association (a maximum of -2.87 in model 6). Only economic development has no significance nor association.

Turning to the party-level control variables, party type has the most significant relation with the dependent variable, being this consistent across all the models, with a minimum $p$-value of .05 and a maximum of .01 (with the only exception of model 7). Ideology is also significant, but with less intensity than
party type, with a maximum \( p \)-value of .05, except for models 4, 5, and 7. Nonetheless, this last control variables can be considered as robustly related to the dependent variable. Party type has a solid and persistent negative association across the different models, with a maximum of -2.87 (model 6). Ideological position of parties also has a negative association on the dependent variable, but its effect is significantly inferior if compared to party type, with a maximum of -0.24. The control variable SWPs facing regionalist parties has a variate statistical relation, having in some models none and in others a maximum \( p \)-value of .05. Its association is consistently negative, with the second highest scores.

From the different interaction effects, three out of seven have some statistical relation with the dependent variable, varying from a minimum \( p \)-value of .1 and a maximum if .05. These interaction effects are: party type and ideological position, regional language and ideological position, and political regional identity feelings and party type. The other four interaction effects have no statistical relation to the position on competence distribution. Considering their association, there is considerable positive effect for the interaction of fragmentation and polycentricity, with a score of 4.00, and a strong negative result of -2.88 for the indicator political regional identity feelings and party type. Regarding the different models presented here, all are statistically significant with a maximum \( p \)-value of .01 and a minimum of .05, with the exception of model 7. All the results for the R-squared are higher in comparison to the same category from the previous dependent variable. The models presented here can explain a minimum of 5.7% (model 1) and a maximum of 42% of the outcome (model 4). As with the analysis for the saliency of the regional level, in this case, the same behaviour regarding the difference between the explanatory power of the explanatory variables on their own or in combination with the control variables can be observed, but with a sharper gap. On their own, the three explanatory variables have a very weak explanatory power over the distribution of competences.
3.4) Attitudes towards multiculturalism

The analysis performed on the final dependent variable also shows interesting results. From the three main explanatory variables, only distance has some statistical significance with the dependent variable, with a consistent $p$-value of .05, but at the same time with null association. In regards to fragmentation and polycentricity, both are statistically insignificant. When it comes to their association, these have opposite behaviours. Fragmentation being positive with a maximum score of 0.15 (model 7), and polycentricity being negative, with a maximum score of -0.15 (model 3). From the different regional-level control variables, regional identity feelings, via the indicator political regional feeling, and regional language are the ones that have a clearer and stronger statistical significance. This relation varies from a minimum $p$-value of .1 and a maximum of .01, with only very few exceptions. When it comes to their association, regional identity feelings via political regional identity feelings and regional language have the strongest, opposite, effect (with a maximum effect of 0.43 for the indicator political regional feelings in model 7 and -0.39 for regional language in the same model). Economic development has no statistical significance nor association. Turning now to the party-level control variables, it must be pointed out that only ideology had some statistical significance, with a $p$-value of .1 in most of the models. The association of party type is the highest, with a maximum score of -0.12 in model 5. Ideology has less impact on the outcome in comparison. SWPs facing regionalist parties does not show any overall important significance or association.

From the different interaction effects, none have any significance. In terms of their possible associations, all have a negative impact, except for the interaction between fragmentation and polycentricity, with a positive score of 0.64. Finishing with the electoral periods, both have an insignificance impact on the dependent variable. The different models present an overall explanatory power of 22% (model 6). As with the above two analyses, one can again see the important difference between the explanatory power of the three explanatory variables.

---

29 Data for the multiple regression for the saliency of the regional level is contained in appendix L.
variables on their own and in combination with the different control variables. When distance, fragmentation, and polycentricity come on their own, they have a very insignificance explanatory power on the outcome of this dependent variable.

3.5) Conclusions

The analysis that presents the most promising results in terms of statistical significance and association is the one performed on the dependent variable *position on competence distribution*. The results for the *saliency of the regional level* and *attitudes towards multiculturalism* are also, to some extent, overall significant. In terms of the significance of the different models and their explanatory power, the most positive results can also be found, again, for the dependent variable *position on competence distribution*, where both the statistical significance and the R-squared results are consistently higher. For the variable *saliency of the regional level* and *attitudes towards multiculturalism*, the results are also, to some extent, noteworthy.

4. ANALYSIS

4.1) Saliency of the regional level

Overall, the results of the analysis performed on this dependent variable do not show, to the full extent, the expected behaviour of parties. From all the explanatory and control variables that can affect the saliency of the regional level as hypothesised, only party type and ideology fulfil the expected outcome. The remaining variables do not confirm the expectations and hypotheses outlined in the theoretical chapter. Focusing first on the three explanatory variables, all the hypotheses are rejected (*H1.A, H2.A, and H3.A*). None affect party behaviour along the centre-periphery cleavage as expected. One of the most unpredicted results can be observed for the interaction of fragmentation and polycentricity. It was theorised to have a negative effect on the saliency of the regional level. This is not confirmed, but the results describe a very strong positive impact on the dependent variable.

Regarding the party-level control variables party type and ideology, the expected effect on the outcome is the one hypothesised, confirming hypotheses
H7.A and H8.A. The relation between these control variables and the saliency of the regional level is as theorised. First, in regards to party type, the expectations are met and the predicted outcome fulfilled. The findings show that SWPs emphasised less than regionalist parties the regional level. A possible reason for this is that, in order to prevent the articulation of challenging peripheral regions towards the centre, SWPs, although defending the regional interests, inserted these in a state-wide project. Regions were not necessarily subordinated to the centre, but placed in a second place in importance, being the centre where their loyalties were placed. As explained, this does not mean that SWPs did not defend the regions or their interests, this means that these interests were not upgraded to achieve an equal treatment as the centre, where SWPs locate the decision-making processes and loyalties. Second, the irrelevance of ideology on its own is also confirmed by the results. There is no statistical significance and the association was insignificant. If ideology is observed in isolation and in relation to this dependent variable, the effect is the one theorised.

The regional-level control variable that shows the most interesting results is regional identity feelings. Despite the fact that it has very strong statistical significance via the indicator political regional feelings, the results reject hypothesis H5.A. The results show strong negative scores, especially for the latter indicator. A reason for this negative association might be that the pro-periphery position of SWPs in regions with a recognised historic nacionalidad were very weak. This can be related to the fact that SWPs might have seen this recognition of nacionalidad as an element that could be used by regional elites to fuel the challenge to the centre via the understanding that the region has a distinct identity from the centre. In order to prevent this distinctive marker becoming a salient issue in the relations between the centre and the peripheries, SWPs might have weakened their pro-positions to undermine this possible effect. The results reject hypotheses H4.A, H6.A, H7.D, and H9.A, in the sense that economic development, language, SWPs facing or not regional parties, or the interaction of party type and ideology do not affect this dependent variable as theorised.

Regarding the three electoral periods, the one that had some significance was 2007-2010. One possible reason for this positive effect could be found in the consequences of the new Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia passed in 2006 by
the regional and national parliament. The extended new design of the region, including the label *Catalan Nation* when referring to the regional population of Catalonia, might have triggered the regional horizontal grievances of other regions. The parties in other regions might have used this opportunity to make their regions stronger by starting a new period of regional institutional development. One of the ways in which these grievances could be shown is in the increasing saliency of the regional level in the electoral period just after 2006, the one labelled here as 2007-2010.

4.2) Position on competence distribution

In comparison to the saliency of the regional level, the analysis of this dependent variable provides the most overall interesting results, both in significance and association with the different explanatory and control variables. The most prominent results are obtained for the control variables party type and regional identity feelings. The rest of the explanatory and control variables show some strong statistical significance, but the associations go in the opposite direction to the one theorised, rejecting the main hypotheses.

As with the above analysis in regards to the saliency of the regional level, the results for this dependent variable reject all the hypotheses articulated for the three main explanatory variables (*H1.B*, *H2.B*, and *H3.B*). Despite this general conclusion, promising results can be observed for both fragmentation and polycentricity. The positive results for the association with this dependent variable can point in an interesting direction. It was theorised that both variables would have a negative impact on the calls for more competences for the regions. The positive results that the analysis shows can be explained as follows. In Spain, competences can be devolved from the central government to the regions, and from the regions to the local bodies. This is, the competences that are devolved to the regions can be further devolved to the local level. With this in mind, the local island-based bodies and centres of power might saw the devolutions of competences to the region not as a threat but as an opportunity. The more competences the regions had, the more the local level could call for. By having more competences to exercise, the more chances to expand their influence and consolidate their position at a local level. This argument can be reinforced by the
very strong positive results of the interaction effect of fragmentation and polycentricity. Another possible reason, especially linked to spatial fragmentation, is that parties, by acknowledging its negative impact, called for more competences in order to prevent or minimise its impact. For example, having competences over marine transport could have given better, more contextualise, and specific solutions to this problem in comparison to the centre. In this case, both the regional and local-island bodies could benefit from these calls.

Focusing on the results for the party-level control variable party type, the analysis confirms hypothesis H7.B. This is, SWPs undermined the calls for more competences to be devolved to the regions. The correlation between this control variable and the outcome is very strong, confirming the theorised relation. With this in mind, the focus turns now to the effect that party type has on the outcome. Party type strongly affects the position on competence distribution in a negative way. This can be explained using the following argument. SWPs, as explained in the theoretical framework, had their loyalties located at the centre. This made them the best instruments to defend the power relations of the former on the centre-periphery cleavage. If the regions wanted to challenge these relations and become a strong alternative to the centre, they would need to develop a strong institutional framework. Having more competences to exercise provided the means to expand their influence and power, directly challenging the centre. Therefore, SWPs, in order to undermine this possible scenario, weakened their calls for more competences to be devolved to the regions. Following with this, SWPs strongly call for less competences when facing regionalist parties, going against the expectations and rejecting hypothesis H7.E.

Regional identity was hypothesised to affect the dependent variable positively. This is confirmed by the analysis. In most of the models, the relation between this regional-level control variable and the position on competence distribution is very strong for both indicators, confirming hypothesis (H5.B). This means that the feelings of a distinct regional identity affected positively the calls for more competences. This can be due to two possible reasons. The first one can be related to the protection and the promotion of regional identities. In order to protect and promote regional identities, more competences were needed. For example, protecting and promoting regional cultures, possible base of regional
identities, could be better done if regions actually had the competences to do so. The second reason can be linked to the feeling of being a distinct social group. Strongly feeling a distinct social group from both the masses and the elites could have been used to call for more competences in order to have the means to achieve the goals of this social group, which were different from the goals other social groups in other regions might had. The regional population and elites had these specific ambitions based on them being a distinct social group, and therefore, to fulfil these, they needed more competences. Following with the above argument, and outlining an interesting sideway of these results, SWPs actually called for fewer competences where there was a strong regional identity feeling, especially when this feeling was exercised by the elites, as the interaction between political regional identity feelings and party type suggested, with strong significance and negative results. It can be assumed that SWPs saw these strong regional identity feelings as a mechanism to tension the relations between the centre and the peripheries in favour of the latter to trigger strong regionalist movements. The more competences the regions had to strengthen regional identities, the stronger the challenge to the centre.

Although the expectations with the regional-level control variable regional language are not met and hypothesis H.6.B is rejected, the results were no predicted. One could have expected that the existence of regional languages would affect positively the calls for more competences in order to protect and promote them. The results show that, despite the fact that the relation between the existence of a regional language and the position on the distribution of competences was strong, the effect is the opposite to the one expected. The existence of regional languages affected negatively the calls for more competences. This could be explained in the same way as the results for regional identity feelings and SWPs. In order to prevent regional languages from becoming a challenge to the Spanish national language, these parties tried to undermine the calls for more competences in order to protect and promote these regional languages. Regionalist parties were those ones expected to call for more competences to protect regional languages, but the results probably show that the emphasis was stronger by SWPs in order to prevent this. The latter could have observed in these regional languages a distinctive marker that, if with
enough strength, could have posed a real threat to the national language of the centre, and therefore, where their loyalties rested. The results for the interaction effect of regional language and ideology can be explained by taking into consideration the sample analysed. The number of regionalist parties coded in comparison to SWPs are skewed to the latter, as outlined in the methodology chapter, and this could have affected the results. A right/centre-right party was not expected to call for less competences per se, considering their conservative social values. The negative result could be explained because the observations coded for the PP, a SWP right/centre-right party are higher than the observations for the PNV, a regional right/centre-right party which strongly emphasised Basque.

Considering party ideology, the results are, to some extent, curious. According to the analysis, hypothesis H8.B is rejected. It seems that right/centre-right parties called for fewer competences, going against the theorised expectations. To interpret these results, one could take into consideration the type of party that called for them. This behaviour, if only considering SWPs, could be the expected one, reinforced by the results for the interaction effect of party type and ideology, confirming hypothesised H9.B. If considering both SWPs and regionalist parties, then the results for the association of ideology on its own are not the expected ones. This could be explained in the same way as the results for regional language. The unbalanced number of observations for SWPs in comparison to regionalist parties might produce these unpredicted results. Finally, as with the previous analysis of saliency of the regional level, hypothesis H4.B is rejected, and the economic development does not affect the calls for more competences to be devolved to the regions, against the theorised expectations.

4.3) Attitudes towards multiculturalism

Considering attitudes towards multiculturalism, it can be said that the significance and associations of the different explanatory and control variables on the outcome are less clear and consistent in comparison to those of the dependent variable position on competence distribution, but nonetheless, display considerable results. The variables that fulfil the expectations are ideology and
regional identity. The results concerning the rest of the explanatory and control variables reject the main hypotheses. From the three explanatory variables, the analyses show that all the main hypotheses are rejected (H1.C, H2.C, and H3.C). The association of polycentricity with the dependent variable goes in the expected direction, but the lack of significance prevents the theorised effect to be confirmed. Although distance had consistent significance, the impact is null. As with the previous analyses, the interaction of fragmentation and polycentricity shows promising results, applicable to the archipelagos of the Canary and Balearic Islands. Again, a positive result is shown, but there is no significance. Despite this, it can be said that, to some extent, the combination of island-based loyalties and centres of power were recognised as having a negative effect on the region as a whole, making parties move to prevent it.

The results for party type reject hypothesis H7.C. Despite this, it has to be mentioned that the negative results confirm the association theorised. SWPs emphasised fewer positive attitudes towards multiculturalism. This can be explained by the idea of defending the centre from any challenge coming from the peripheries. If the peripheries were treated equally as the centre, they might articulate a threat towards the latter. In order to prevent this, the centre, though SWPs, undermined this possibility. This does not mean that regional cultures and populations were not recognised in any sense, but they were not equally recognised as the one from the centre. Recognising minority cultures and social groups could be part of the discourses articulated by SWPs, especially in regions where these were strongly felt, such as for example, in Catalonia, but the recognition was always inserted in the category of nacionalidades. As outlined in the conceptual framework, these nacionalidades are constitutionally recognised and accepted, confirming the will of the central government to incorporate these realities into a broader state-wide political project, but this incorporation is limited by the Spanish nation. This subordination can explain, to some extent, the limits imposed to the SWPs when recognising minorities in the peripheries. Following with this, the positive results for the variable SWPs face regionalist parties could be used to say that the theorised expectations where to some extent consolidated but the lack of significance rejects hypothesis H7.F.
The ideological position of the parties fits the theoretical expectations. The expected behaviour of this variable was that left/centre-left parties would tend to have more positive attitudes towards multiculturalism than right parties. The results show that there is significance in some of the models where this control variable is present. The negative results seem to help confirming, to some extent, hypothesis H8.C. These results can be useful to confirm that right/centre-right parties had fewer positive attitudes towards multiculturalism. As theorised, right/centre-right parties defend traditional values, including resistance in the recognition of other cultural and social groups. This exclusive vision of other cultural and social groups can be applied both ways, from the centre towards the periphery and from the periphery towards the centre. These finding can be applicable to both SWPs and regionalist parties. The results for the interaction between party type and ideology are insignificant, rejecting hypothesis H9.C.

Considering the variable regional identity and focusing on the indicator political regional feelings, hypothesis H5.C can be confirmed. The significance and association of this indicators is consistent in all the different models in which it is included. The existence of a distinct regional identity provided the grounds for parties to have favourable attitudes towards multiculturalism. Parties, to prevent a situation where the minority groups located in the different peripheries felt they were being rejected and excluded, positioned themselves in a multiculturalist vision where the latter were incorporated. SWPs, trying to avoid a clash between social groups, provided the means, via their recognition, to prevent this situation. Regionalist parties could have used this distinctive marker to achieve more recognition and upgrade their overall status inside the state.

The results for the regional-level control variable regional language reject hypothesis H6.C, but these go in line with the results obtained for the dependent variable position on competence distribution and the effect of SWPs. SWPs emphasised a stronger defence of the Spanish national language than regionalist parties their regional languages. For example, to protect the centre, the PP could have insisted in undermining the recognition, protection and promotion of regional languages. The interaction between regional language and party type, although there is no significance, can point in this direction with negative scores. The negative effects can support the idea of SWPs undermining positive attitudes
towards multiculturalism in regions where a strong regional language was present and recognised. Defending the Spanish national language could have made them less inclusive towards other languages and resistant to recognise and protect them if they posed a threat to the language they identify as their own. This argument regarding the importance of distinctive markers, such as regional languages and identities, posing a threat to the centre as a possible catalyst of regionalist movements and the reaction of SWPs against this could be further observed in the results for the interaction of political regional identity feelings and regional language. The negative results can give some support to this reaction by SWPs. This might show that the combination of two important distinctive markers in the same region increased the reaction against the inclusion of strongly self-identified minority groups, especially in regions where one can observe both elements in interaction, such as in Galicia, the Basque Country, or Catalonia. Finally, and in line with the results for the previous dependent variables, hypothesis H4.C is rejected, meaning that economic development has no effect over the attitudes towards multiculturalism.

4.4) Conclusions

The different analyses discussed here have helped to understand which explanatory and control variables affect the most party competition on the centre-periphery cleavage in a quantitative manner and state-wide. On one hand, some results have been used to discuss and reject the hypotheses in relation to the main explanatory variables, and on the other hand, some results have been used to discuss and confirm, to some extent, the hypotheses in relation to the control variables selected. From the five control variables, the results that show a more solid relation, confirming the expectations, are party type, ideology, and regional identity.

To bring together the conclusions for the three main explanatory variables in relation to the saliency of the regional level, position on competence distribution, and attitudes towards multiculturalism, the following can be said. Starting with the main conclusion, the results presented here reject all the hypotheses. None show the expected effects. Despite this general statement, the most consistent relation can be found between distance and the three dependent
variables, although the association is not as significant as the one theorised. The most promising results can be found for the interaction of fragmentation and polycentricity, picturing a scenario where the presence of island-based loyalties and centres of power can favour the strengthening of the region as a whole. Spatial fragmentation on its own is a variable that has contrasting results. It was theorised to have a negative impact, but some results show the opposite. Polycentricity has also interesting contrasting results. It can be said that, overall, it actually affects positively the way parties compete along the cleavage. The theorised discussion between the centres of power can actually benefit the region in the sense that the more important the region is and the more competences the region has, the more this will benefit the different centres of power in the region.

5. DISCUSSION

After considering the main results from the above analyses, the next step is to relate them to the main research question. Considering the main explanatory variables, the results do not show the expected effects on party behaviour along the centre-periphery cleavage. If all Autonomous Communities are considered, the theorised impact of these factors is faded or concealed. The main substantive political interpretation of this appreciation is that these three factors do not have a real impact on how parties position themselves when articulating the relation between the centre and its peripheries in a state-wide perspective. The systematic rejection of all hypotheses seems to confirm this. Further developing this conclusion, it is reinforced by comparing the results obtained for the R-square of model 1 and 2 in all three dependent variables. On their own (model 1), distance, fragmentation, and polycentricity have a very weak, at its best, influence on the behaviour of parties. When considered in combination with the control variables (model 2), the overall explanatory power increase sharply and this indicates that the latter variables are more determinant than the former. In summary and state-wide, in Spain one can observe that these three explanatory variables have very little impact on the way the centre-periphery cleavage is articulated by parties.

The results can be explained, to some extent, in relation to the sample used for the different analyses. For example, in the case of distance and
fragmentation, the peripheral regions that were theorised to be deeply affected by these factors were a maximum of two (the Canary and Balearic Islands in the case of fragmentation). The balance between the peripheral regions that were supposed to be profoundly affected by distance and fragmentation on one hand, and the ones affected by other important factors such as regional identities and regional languages on the other hand, was heavily skewed towards the latter, with a minimum ration of 8.5:1 in the case of fragmentation. Despite this, there are promising results for future research. For example, the positive results for the association of fragmentation and polycentricity in some of the dependent variables can point in the opposite direction to the one theorised. These factors seem to strongly affect party behaviour in a positive way, strengthening their pro-periphery positions. Added to this, and in the case of the Canary and Balearic Islands, the combination of these two factors pushed parties to have even stronger pro-periphery positions. A possible reason can be that parties, both SWPs and regional, tried to avoid the negative effects of both factors in combination on the regions as a whole. Although these strong pro-periphery positions could have been seen as a threat to local island-based loyalties and centres of power at the beginning, the regional solutions that parties might have had proposed could have benefited them more than undermined them.

From the regional-level control variables, the two most influential control variables than can also help explain, to some extent, how party competition is shaped along the centre-periphery cleavage in Spain are regional identity feelings and regional language. Despite the fact that the association was not always the expected one, nonetheless, they can further help to answer the main research question. The existence of strong regional identity feelings and regional languages reinforced the pro-periphery positions of regionalist parties, but at the same time, moderated them in the case of SWPs. The contrasting results, especially for the variable regional language, can be seen as an example of the latter. It was expected to observe regionalist parties, in regions where a regional language coexisted with Spanish, use this distinctive marker to reinforce the importance of the region. On the other hand, SWPs, although acknowledging the importance of these regional languages, could have seen them as a threat to the national language of the centre, and therefore, a threat to its social group, where
their loyalties rest. Again, the results do not show that SWPs turned to be hostile to regional languages, but it could be concluded that they were reluctant to make them even more important for the regional population, and prevented these from becoming a trigger of regional conflict between the centre and the peripheries.

Overall, it can be concluded that the acknowledgement by SWPs of the importance of distinctive markers for the regional population is consistent, and this can be observed in the results for the variable regional identity feelings. The positive association can support, to some extent, that SWPs accepted and adapted to deeply rooted distinct regional characteristics and not necessarily introduced a strong pro-centre discourse. Their ability to accommodate to these strong regional distinctive markers can be said to be determined by the threat that they posed to the centre, as the results for the regional languages propose. Finally, the factor economic development of the regions did not have the expected results. One possible reason can be the indicators used. In the case of this investigation, only one indicator has been used, and this might have faded or concealed the effect of this factor.

Out of all party-level control variables, the factor that influence the most how parties compete on the centre-periphery cleavage is party type. Being a SWP or regionalist party strongly determined the position they adopted. The behaviour of regionalist parties was the one expected, which the results contained here confirm. The regional population saw them as the best option to address the interests of the region. Therefore, their strong pro-periphery positions were consolidated. On the other hand, the behaviour of SWPs was more complex, determined by their loyalties to the centre. The protection of the interests of the centre undermined their ability to also have the same strong pro-periphery positions. This does not mean that they emphasised pro-centre positions per se. It is important to highlight this fact, which will be further examined in the next chapter. What can be concluded from these findings is that regionalist parties had overall stronger pro-periphery positions in comparison to SWPs. It is interesting to observe that competing with regionalist parties did not push SWPs to have more stronger pro-periphery positions to gain support as a trustworthy actor in defending the interests of the regions, as one might have expected. The results suggest that the possible shifts to stronger pro-periphery positions have
to be considered specifically to the dependent variable analysed, as the contradicting results for the three dependent variables show.

The ideological position of parties in isolation seems to have the theorised effect. This was confirmed by the results for the saliency of the regional level and the attitudes towards multiculturalism. The pro-centre/periphery positions were more or less inclusive according to the ideological orientation of parties. Despite this, the results for the dependent variable position on competence distribution can point to the fact that it is complicated to isolate its effect without the influence of the type of party. With this in mind, these results can be used to differentiate between the political projects of SWPs and regionalist parties. Left/centre-left SWPs were more able to have more strong and inclusive pro-periphery positions due to their ability to include the minority groups at the peripheries, whilst on the other hand, right/centre-right SWPs had more difficulties, resulting in milder and less inclusive pro-periphery positions. When it comes to right/centre-right regionalist parties, these already strong pro-periphery positions can be understood as less inclusive towards other social groups in comparison to left/centre-left regionalist parties, which were able to articulate broader political project.

6. CONCLUSIONS

In terms of the general conclusions that can be extracted from this quantitative description and analysis of the data, the following can be said. From the description, two general conclusions can be outlined. On one hand, the variables that showed an overall positive trend were saliency of the regional level and attitudes towards multiculturalism. Parties referred to the region with more emphasis from one electoral period to the other, and the same happened when they had to be inclusive with other cultures or social. On the other hand, the variable position on competence distribution showed the opposite, a negative trend. In this case, parties seemed to have emphasised less the calls for more competences for the regions over time, although all mentions were positive. The regression analysis showed that the three main explanatory variables did not seem to have the expected effects on party competition along the centre-periphery cleavage, but some results point in a promising direction for future
research. The interpretation of the overall results could be us to conclude that the factors that influenced the most how parties compete along the centre-periphery cleavage at a state-wide level were the control variables party type, ideology, regional identity feelings, and regional language. Table 5.4 contains all the hypotheses tested in this analysis.
## Table 5.4.- Hypotheses Confirmed or Rejected for the Quantitative Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>SALIENCY ON THE REGIONAL LEVEL</th>
<th>TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS</th>
<th>POSITION ON COMPETENCE DISTRIBUTION</th>
<th>TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS</th>
<th>ATTITUDES TOWARDS MULTICULTURALISM</th>
<th>TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DISTANCE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>H1.A-the greater the distance from the centre, the more parties emphasise the regional level</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
<td>H1.B-the greater the distance from the centre, the more calls from parties for more competences for the regions</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRAGMENTATION</td>
<td>H2.A-fragmentation undermines the emphasis of parties on the regional level</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
<td>H2.B-fragmentation reduces the calls from parties for more competences for the regions</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
<td>H2.C-fragmentation favours a less positive attitude of parties towards multiculturalism</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLYCENTRICITY</td>
<td>H3.A-polycentricity undermines the emphasis of parties of the regional level</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
<td>H3.B-polycentricity weakens the calls from parties for more competences for the regions</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
<td>H3.C-polycentricity diminishes the positive attitudes of parties towards multiculturalism</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### CONTROL VARIABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTROL VARIABLES</th>
<th>H4.A - the higher the difference between the economic development of the region and the country’s mean, the more emphasis of parties of the regional level</th>
<th>Rejected</th>
<th>H4.B - the higher the difference between the economic development of the region and the country’s mean, the more calls from parties for more competences for the regions</th>
<th>Rejected</th>
<th>H4.C - the higher the difference between the economic development of the region and the country’s mean, the more emphasis of parties on positive attitudes towards multiculturalism</th>
<th>Rejected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REGIONAL IDENTITY FEELINGS</td>
<td>H5.A - the stronger the regional identity feelings, the more emphasis of parties of the regional level</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
<td>H5.B - the stronger the regional identity feelings, the more calls from parties for more competences for the regions</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>H5.C - the stronger the regional identity feelings, the more emphasis of parties on positive attitudes towards multiculturalism</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LANGUAGE</td>
<td>H6.A - a regional language makes parties increase the emphasis of the regional level</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
<td>H6.B - a regional language makes parties increase the calls for more competences for the regions</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
<td>H6.C - a regional language makes parties increase the emphasis on positive attitudes towards multiculturalism</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARTY TYPE</td>
<td>H7.A - SWPs emphasise less the regional level than regionalist parties</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>H7.B - SWPs call for less competences than regionalist parties</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>H7.C - SWPs call for less competences than regionalist parties</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWP FACING REGIONALIST PARTIES</td>
<td>H7.D - SWPs emphasise more the regional level when facing regionalist parties</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
<td>H7.E - SWPs call for more competences when facing regionalist parties</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
<td>H7.F - SWPs emphasise more positive attitudes towards multiculturalism when facing regionalist parties</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDEOLOGICAL POSITION</td>
<td>H8.A - the ideological position of parties makes no difference on the emphasis of the regional level</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>H8.B - the ideological position of parties does not influence the calls for more competences for the regions</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
<td>H8.C - left/centre-left parties are able to have more positive attitudes towards multiculturalism than right/centre-right parties</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERACTION OF PARTY AND IDEOLOGY</td>
<td>H9.A - the PSOE, in comparison to the PP, emphasises more the regional level</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
<td>H9.B - the PSOE, in comparison to the PP, calls for more competences for the regions</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>H9.C - the PSOE, in comparison to the PP, has more positive attitudes towards multiculturalism</td>
<td>Reject</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

216
CHAPTER 6

QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS
1. INTRODUCTION

The aim of this chapter is to proceed with the qualitative analysis of the manifestos. The main difference with the earlier quantitative analysis focuses on, on one hand, the dependent variables selected, and on the other hand, the control variables chosen. The dependent variables were **saliency of the regional level, constitutional status of the region, position on competence distribution, and identity**. The purpose of re-introducing **saliency of the regional level and position on competence distribution** was to be able to capture in detail aspects that were not flagged in the previous chapter. Following with this, the prior quantitative analysis was not precise enough to pursue an accurate scrutiny of the variables **constitutional status of the region and identity**, main reason to introduce them here. Overall, with these four dependent variables one obtained the necessary particular understanding of the research problem that this qualitative approach allowed for, permitting for much richer and detailed findings (Taylor et al. 2015: 7-8), securing and avoiding possible spurious relations (Mahoney 2007: 132). Apart from the three main explanatory variables, the control variables chosen for this qualitative analysis were **party type, ideology, and party structure**. The remaining control variables were controlled for via case selection, as outlined in the methodological chapter. In summary, this analysis provided an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon (Manson 2006: 10-13), resulting in a much more profound and thorough analysis of distance, fragmentation and polycentricity. This chapter has two main sections. The first section contains an analysis of the manifestos in relation to the main dependent variables and hypotheses for Castilla-La Mancha, Andalusia, and the Canary Islands. The second section offers a discussion to illustrate how parties position themselves along the centre-periphery cleavage in relation to the main findings.

2. ANALYSIS

2.1) Saliency of the regional level

A general analysis of the manifestos shows that the regional level is, in comparison to the centre and the local levels, the most referenced level. For both SWPs, the **PSOE** and the **PP**, and both regionalist parties, the **PA/CA** in Andalusia and **CC** in the Canary Islands, the regional level is the most referenced
level across three electoral periods in all three regions. The main differences can be found in the relation to be established between the different levels. The factors that most affect the saliency of the regional level are fragmentation, polycentricity, party type, ideology, and party structure. Distance seems not to have a clear effect.

In terms of the explicit content of the manifestos for the PSOE across the three electoral periods and regions, the region is the main level addressed. The difference between the references to the regional level across the three electoral periods in the three regions is insignificant. In this sense, the region is the centre of the main policy proposals. These policies vary from specific issues, such as public health or immigration policies, to general statements on the development of the region as a whole. In terms of the references towards the centre and the local level, both are mentioned in more or less the same terms, except for two specific points in time. During the elections in Castilla-La Mancha in 2007 and 2011, there are no references to the centre or the local level at all. In terms of the tone given, there is no significant difference between both and they are mentioned in a positive way, specifically when it comes to coordination and cooperation between the three levels.

Some examples of these references regarding cooperation and coordination are: "Strengthen the instruments of cooperation and collaboration between the different administrative levels..." (PSOE C-LM 1999: section 199)\(^{30}\); “We will increase, in collaboration with the local governments, the coverage, intensity and specialisation of the Home Help Service...”\(^{31}\) (PSOE AND 2008: 83); and “To favour the institutional cooperation between Municipalities, Cabildos, Autonomous Communities and Central Government, to ensure a balanced, sustainable and transparent territorial development that avoids illegal land use and speculation practices.”\(^{32}\) (PSOE CI 2007: 112). Despite this, it must be noted that the main difference between the centre and the local levels is that the latter

\(^{30}\) “Reforzar los instrumentos de cooperación y colaboración entre las distintas administraciones...”. Own translation in the main text.
\(^{31}\) “Aumentaremos, en colaboración con las Entidades Locales, la cobertura, intensidad y especialización del Servicio de Ayuda a Domicilio”. Own translation in the main text.
\(^{32}\) “Favorecer la cooperación institucional entre Ayuntamientos, Cabildos, Comunidad Autónoma y Gobierno Central, para asegurar un desarrollo territorial equilibrado, sostenible y transparente que evite las prácticas abusivas y especuladoras del suelo.”. Own translation.
is also mentioned in terms of developing it alongside the region. Example of these references regarding the developing of the local bodies as a priority area of the regional government includes are: section 4 of the manifesto for Andalusia 2000 dedicates an entire section solely on the development of the local bodies as one of the priorities of the region (PSOE AND 2000: 23); and section 3.5 of the manifesto for the Canary Islands 1999 dedicates one section to the implementation of a federal political system within the Autonomous Community through the development of the Cabildos and Municipalities (PSOE CI 1999: 47).

Despite the above, there is an apparent increase in the importance of the local level as one approaches the outer-periphery, and one possible reason for this can be its importance for the region itself, more precisely, the importance of the local bodies that lay between the region and the municipalities. In the manifestos for Castilla-La Mancha, the local level is mentioned with very little frequence, being the region that has less development in this sense. Next and stepping into Andalusia, the local level is more addressed, not only in quantitative terms but in its importance. The Provincial Councils become an important part of the discourse. This importance is stated, for example, in the manifesto for the election of 2000, when it said that: “As for the Municipalities and Provincial Councils, the process of decentralisation and transfer of competences has allowed the regional Administration to become an active agent of such strategies and to act as a promoter of endogenous development processes.” (PSOE AND 2000: 23). In comparison to Castilla-La Mancha, it seems that these entities have deeper roots amongst the regional population. Finally, when one reaches the Canary Islands, this idea of the increase in the importance of the local level is better observed. Before the introduction of the Autonomous Communities, the Cabildos were the political-administrative level that was most present in the lives of the citizens, which made them the key element in the relation between them and the state. This could have promoted the image of the Cabildos as one of the political-administrative traditions of the Canary Islands. This importance could have transcended the Autonomous Communities and the importance of these local bodies are still very present, not only in terms of the existence and utility of the Cabildos, but also in the references to them in terms of the organisation of the region itself. In comparison to Andalusia, these local bodies are an intrinsic
part of the everyday life of the regional population with more profound consequences than in the inner-periphery.

In terms of the latent content of the manifestos, for the PSOE, the region is also the centre of the manifesto in qualitative terms. It is the centre of the discourse, with the local bodies as a secondary level to be developed as the region develops over time, and finally having the centre as a tertiary auxiliary level that should allow the development of the former. This is because the centre is the level that has the capacity and resources that can allow the development of the other two through, either decentralising more competences and resources, and/or increasing financial support. The PSOE conceptualises a triangle of relations representing different degrees of cooperation and coordination between the three administrative levels. Figure 6.1 summarises and illustrates this argument.

![Figure 6.1: Relation of the regional with the centre and the local levels for the PSOE.](image)

Further developing this, it can be asserted that the ideological position of the PSOE seems to affect the way the region is understood in relation to the latent
content of the manifestos. Being a left/centre-left oriented party makes the PSOE have a more open attitude towards incorporating social groups in the peripheries to a broader national project. In this sense, the regions are seen as a key part of this discourse, not subordinated to the centre but as an intrinsic component of the Spanish state. Articulating the regions as an essential part of the Spanish state in a relation of cooperation with the other levels is favoured by its ideological position in two ways. First, incorporating the needs and demands of the social groups that are not the ones at the centre, and second, these needs and demands are not in a relation of subordination but in a relation of mutual benefit from their cooperation.

When it comes to the PP, the manifestos follow the same path as one described for the PSOE in relation to the explicit content. The region is the administrative level which is mostly referenced across all three electoral periods in all three regions. Again, there is no significant difference in terms of the mentions of the regional level in the three regions and across the three electoral periods. The region is mentioned both in specific public policy proposals and in general terms. The local level seems to be developed qualitatively in the same lines as the PSOE did. This is, the importance of local bodies increase as one reaches the outer-periphery. The main difference is that the overall references increase and there is a more developed emphasis. One reason for this can be to gain more power at this level, as it is stated in the manifesto for the Canary Islands in 2011: “Popular Party governments are needed in Municipalities, Cabildos and in the Autonomous Community.”³³ (PP CI 2011: 4). Taking into consideration that the Autonomous Communities were a new political-administrative level of the Spanish state in the mid-1980s, the PP could have opted to preserve its power in the local bodies rather than attempting to obtain some power at the regional level. This can be observed in the results for the local elections between 1999-2011 (1999, 2007, and 2011). The PP had more local power than the PSOE in two of the three electoral periods (1999 and 2011)³⁴. Example of these references

³³ “Hacen falta gobiernos del Partido Popular en los Ayuntamientos, los Cabildos y en la Comunidad Autónoma.”. Own translation in the main text.
³⁴ The local power here is measured by the number of municipal councillors per party in all the municipalities in Spain. 1999-PSOE (21,917), PP (24,623) 2007-PSOE (24,029), PP (23,348) 2011-PSOE (21,766), PP (26,507) (García-Guereta Rodriguez et al. 2014: 57).
Regarding the developing of the local bodies as a priority area for the region can be seen in the following: the manifesto for Castilla-La Mancha 1999 dedicates a section to the explanation of the development of the local bodies as part of the decentralisation process in Spain, known as the Local Regional Pact (PP C-LM 1999: 87); the manifesto for Andalusia 2008 dedicates a section to what the PP calls a “second decentralisation wave”, which is focused on the local bodies (PP AND 2008: 36); and the manifesto for the Canary Islands 2011 dedicates a section to the decentralisation of competences to the local bodies to develop them as a key level of the region (PP CI 2011: 22-23).

Cooperation and coordination are emphasised by the PP with the same intensity and tone as in the case of the PSOE. Examples of these references regarding cooperation and coordination can be seen in the following: “Sufficient amounts of aid and support will be allocated to the Municipalities for the acquisition and transfer of development land ...”35 (PP C-LM 1999: 80); “We will promote the implementation of the University Permanent Training Workshops, in collaboration and coordination with Municipalities and universities.”36 (PP AND 2012: 62); and “A reformist project, of wide scope and with high expectations. With the indispensable collaboration of all the Municipalities and Cabildos of the Archipelago.”37 (PP CI 2011: 5).

Considering now the latent content, the analysis is the following. Regarding the centre, here is where one can find two main difference between the two SWPs. First, the references to the centre seem to point in the direction of the importance of this level in developing the regions and local bodies, and second, the way in which the centre is articulated. For the PP, although the regions are at the heart of the manifestos, the tone changes in comparison to the PSOE. The PP considers the centre level as the one with the leadership and not as an auxiliary level. The relation is not auxiliary any more but necessary. The

35 “Se consignarán presupuestariamente cantidades suficientes de ayuda y colaboración con los ayuntamientos para a adquisición y cesión del suelo urbanizable...”. Own translation in the main text.
36 “Impulsaremos la puesta en marcha de Aulas de Formación Permanente de la Universidad, en colaboración y coordinación con ayuntamientos y universidades.” Own translation in the main text.
37 “Un proyecto reformista, de amplio calado, y con altura de miras. Con la imprescindible colaboración de todos los Ayuntamientos y Cabildos del Archipiélago.” Own translation in the main text.
PP emphasises the fact that the regions are an extension of the central government. Two examples of this can be seen in the manifesto for the Canary Islands 2011: “The Autonomous Communities are an essential part of the constitutional Spain, of the social and democratic Rule of Law that we have all been building since 1978”\(^{38}\) (PP CI 2011: 7); and “Confidence in the regeneration of the institutions, in our renewed Statute of Autonomy and in the Constitutional Spain that gives meaning to our Autonomous Communities.”\(^{39}\) (PP AND 2008: 11). This does not mean that the PSOE does not recognise the regions as part of the Constitutional system, which it does, as analysed previously, this means that the PP emphasises a subordinating relation between levels. The PP introduces these statements to make clear that the mother level is the central government, and the rest develops from it. The loyalties are to be put at the central level. This is reinforced by the integrated structure of this party, very determined by the centre in comparison to the degree of freedom granted to the regional branches of the PSOE. The local level remains the same, as a secondary level that should be developed as the region develops, but in this case, with more importance. This latent content is summarised in Figure 6.2.

\(^{38}\) “La España autonómica es parte esencial de la España constitucional, del Estado social y democrático de Derecho que entre todos venimos construyendo desde 1978.”. \textit{Own translation in the main text.}\(^{39}\) “Confianza en la regeneración de las instituciones, en nuestro renovado Estatuto de Autonomía y en la España Constitucional que da origen y sentido a nuestro sistema autonómico.”. \textit{Own translation in the main text.}
The relations contained in Figure 6.2 highlights the second main difference between the PP and the PSOE. The PP articulates the centre as the mother level, with the other two as extensions of it. This centralist vision needs to be further developed in relation to its ideological position. This control variable affects the saliency of the regional level in opposition to the PSOE. This relation can be seen as coherent with the behaviour and orientation of a highly centralised right/centre-right state-wide party like the PP. The PP is less open to include regions and other social groups to the power relations that it favours. This makes the PP articulate a discourse where the regions are, although the heart of the manifestos, seen as some kind of extension of the central government. Overall, the PP articulates the regions in the following way and in concordance with its ideological position: first, development of the regions as a branch of the central government, and second, the regions are subordinated to the interest of the centre, including the needs of the regional populations.

The regionalist parties in Andalusia and the Canary Islands also have some specificities in terms of the references to the region when it comes to its
development. For both parties, the regional level is the administrative level that is most referenced across the three electoral periods in both regions, with no significant differences that stand out between them, like the PSOE and the PP. The main difference between these parties and both SWPs, especially the PP, is the tone with which the reginal level is addressed. The regional level is not only the main level addressed but also the mother level. As it can be observed, this changes the relation between levels that was highlighted above for both SWPs.

The relation is not any more necessary or auxiliary, but it is now subsidiary. In this case, the centre should allow the development of the regions, complying with their needs. This reaches sometimes a character of bilateral relations, in the same way as relations between two independent states. Example of this bilateral references can be seen in the following references: “Relations with the State” (PA/CA AND 2008: 102-103); and “The Special Statute must be the framework that determines our relationship with the State.”40 (CC CI 2007: 8). Sometimes, the references also articulate an image of the region suffering deprivation of its resources by the action of the central government. This can convey the idea that the region is been undermined by the centre in pursuing its development. An example of this language can be seen in the manifesto of PA/CA for 2008 (PA/CA AND 2008: 41) 41, when the party claims a so-called historical debt of Andalusia vis-à-vis the central government. Another example can be found in the manifesto of CC for 2011 (CC CI 2011: 6) 42, when the party states that the restriction on regional competences concerning the coastal territory prevents the region from conserving it. It must be observed that the references to the historical debt that

40 “El Estatuto Especial debe ser el marco que determine nuestra relación con el Estado.”. *Own translation in the main text.*

41 “Es decir, no se habían paliado, con la financiación de las transferencias realizadas, los déficits de los servicios públicos existentes en Andalucía y por lo tanto no se garantizaba un nivel mínimo de prestación. Esta circunstancia ha perjudicado gravemente a Andalucía porque los distintos sistemas de financiación autonómica han partido de la cuantificación del gasto existente para determinar los recursos correspondientes en el año de referencia del sistema.”. *Translation: “That is to say, the deficits of the public services existing in Andalusia had not been mitigated, with the financing of the transfers made, and therefore a minimum level of provision was not guaranteed. This circumstance has seriously damaged Andalusia because the different autonomous financing systems have started from the quantification of existing expenditure to determine the resources corresponding in the reference year of the system.”.*

42 “En los últimos años la política restrictiva del Estado en materia de costas ha perjudicado a Canarias. Debemos mejorar nuestros recursos costeros respetando su conservación y su desarrollo sostenible.”. *Translation: “In recent years, the restrictive State policy on coastal matters has harmed the Canary Islands. We must improve our coastal resources respecting their conservation and their sustainable development.”.*
the central government has with Andalusia is also mentioned by the PSOE in Andalusia (PSOE AND 2000: 15) but not in the Canary Islands. These bilateral relations could resemble the relation between two independent states, but the analysis of the references suggests more a differentiated relation inserted in the Constitutional design of Spain according to a more decentralised/federal state. Not even CC, with the notion of a Special Statute, articulates the region as an independent political organisation outside the decentralised Spanish political architecture. What is clear is that both parties see the centre as subsidiary to the regions, allowing and promoting decentralisation with more emphasis: "... Article 2 of the new Statute of Autonomy, which establishes the duty of the State to adapt its political, legislative, regulatory, financial and budgetary decisions to the defining characteristics of the Canary Islands ..."43 (CC CI 2011: 119).

The local level is also mentioned as a level that needs to be developed alongside the region, as it happens with the PSOE and the PP, but the tone given is different. The local level, in this case, is not a distinct level any more, it is a sort of extension of the region. Both regionalist parties acknowledge the importance of the local bodies but prefer to emphasise more the regional level to the detriment of these. Following with this and in line with the above described idea of the increasing importance of these local bodies highlighted for both SWPs, the same behaviour can be outlined. The importance of the local bodies increases as one jumps from Andalusia to the Canary Islands. In relation to this, the position of the PA/CA is very peculiar in comparison to CC, as it calls for the disappearance of the Provincial Councils (PA/CA AND 2012: 14) and the replacement of these by Counties (PA/CA AND 2008: 28), but this does not change the initial idea. Despite this peculiarity, the emphasis of these local bodies in less evident that in the case of the CC in relation to the importance of the Cabildos in the Canary Islands. CC emphasis more the importance for the regional population of the Cabildos as part of the Canarian identity. Overall, for the PA/CA and CC, the region is the main administrative level addressed in the manifesto, having the centre as a subsidiary level and the local bodies as a

43 "...el artículo 2 del nuevo Estatuto de Autonomía, que establece el deber del Estado de adaptar sus decisiones políticas, legislativas, reglamentarias, financieras y presupuestarias a las características definitorias de Canarias...". Own translation in the main text.
secondary level that derives from the region, to which the region delegates some of its power. This latent content is summarised in Figure 6.3.

*Figure 6.3. Relation of the regional with the centre and the local levels for the PA/CA and CC.*

- **Testing the hypotheses**

  From the three main explanatory variables, the two factors that seem to play an important role in shaping this dependent variable are: fragmentation and polycentricity. Distance has no apparent effect on the salience given to the regional level. Comparing all three regions, the analysis shows that the effect of these two explanatory variables increases as one reaches the Canary Islands. Starting with fragmentation, and as stated in the theoretical chapter, there are two dimensions in which this factor affects the regions: the spatial and the political-administrative dimensions. Castilla-La Mancha and Andalusia are only affected, to some extent, by the second dimension. Spatial and political-administrative fragmentation come together only in the Canary Islands, deepening its overall effect. An example of the combination of these two independent variables acting
together is the statement: “Starting from the administrative model that we defend, based on the principles of efficiency, economy, maximum proximity to the citizen and attention to the insular condition44, we will continue in the line of devolving more competences to the Cabildos and Municipalities, thus bringing the decision making process and the providing of services closer to the citizens.45 (Rodríguez Rodríguez CC, Official Diary 1999 núm. 3: 12).

Starting with the first dimension, the emphasis is put on insularity. Starting with the PSOE, the party tries to put forward the perception of the negative effects that fragmentation has on the region. The discourse uses the negative effects of spatial fragmentation to criticise CC and PP, but nonetheless, the base is still the ways in which this dimension of this factor negatively affects the region: “Unfortunately CC and the PP have made the Canary Islands electoral subsystem adopt a formula that reverses the constitutional mandate exacerbating the insular territorial representation, undermining the representativeness of the regional governments in the Canary Islands during the past years.”46 (PSOE CI 2007: 68); and “... so that their functions and competences cannot be diminished by insular criteria, which lack a supra-insular perspective.”47 (PSOE CI 2007: 110).

The PP also emphasises the need to overcome the dangers of spatial fragmentation: “The government of the Canary Islands will ensure the balance between the different islands, deepening the effort to increase convergence among all, ... have in mind the costs implicit in the double and triple insularity.”48 (PP CI 2011: 27). CC, like the PSOE and the PP, emphasises the negative effect of fragmentation and the need to overcome it: “... as well as an effective

44 Insular condition refers in the discourses articulated in the region of the Canary Islands to the insular characteristic of the archipelago, fragmentated into different islands.
45 “Partiendo del modelo administrativo que defendemos, basado en los principios de eficacia, economía, máxima proximidad al ciudadano y atención al hecho insular, continuaremos en la línea de transferencia a las Cabildos, así como delegación a los ayuntamientos, acercando de este modo las decisiones al administrado y la prestación de los servicios de manera más próxima.”. Own translation in the main text.
46 “Desgraciadamente Coalición Canaria y el Partido Popular se han encargado que en el subsistema electoral canario se adopte una fórmula que invierta el mandato constitucional primando hasta el paroxismo la representación territorial insular y poniendo como consecuencia en peligro la representatividad de los Gobiernos en Canarias durante los últimos años.”. Own translation in the main text.
47 “...por lo que sus funciones y competencias no pueden verse mermadas por criterios insulares, que carecen de perspectiva suprainsular.”. Own translation in the main text.
48 “El gobierno de Canarias velará por el equilibrio entre las distintas islas, profundizando en el esfuerzo de aumentar la convergencia entre todas,...tener en cuenta los costes implicitos en la doble y triple insularidad.”. Own translation in the main text.
articulation of the compensatory measures of the costs derived from the ultraperipheral insular event.”49 (Rodríguez Rodríguez CC, Official Diary 1999 núm. 3: 15); “At the dawn of the 21st century, the Canary Islands faces two new problems derived from its insular reality, absolutely unprecedented: the risks of overexploitation of the territory and overpopulation in a limited geographical space, fragmented and located in one of the richest natural areas of the world.”50 (CC CI 2007: 7); and “In this sense, we will promote corrective measures of the cost of double insularity and distance for ...”51 (Rivero Baute CC, Official Diary 2011 núm. 3: 8).

Focusing on the second dimension of fragmentation, the following can be said. The references to the local bodies contained in the manifestos from all parties can affect the saliency of the regional level because, although the manifestos are articulated for the regional elections, the importance of these entities in terms of their political-administrative relation with citizens is acknowledged by all parties. For the purpose of this research, the key idea here is that the references to the local bodies that lay between the region and the municipalities (Provincial Councils and Cabildos) and their importance increase with distance. In this sense, as one moves from Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, and finally to the Canary Islands, these local bodies become more and more important, and parties recognise this and they have acknowledged it in their manifestos (again, it must be outlined that the PA/CA calls to replace the Provincial Councils by Counties, but this does not change the argumentation for this factor). As distance from the centre increases, these local bodies tend to become more important, and therefore, the more they undermine the articulation of a strong regional level because they play a major role in the everyday life of the local populations. Weakening their influence and power might be considered as an attack to the political community that they represent. Although the importance of these local bodies increases as one reaches the outer-periphery,

49 “...así como una articulación efectiva de las medidas compensatorias de los costes derivados del hecho insular ultraperiférico.”. Own translation in the main text.
50 “En los albores del siglo XXI, Canarias se enfrenta a dos nuevos problemas derivados de su realidad insular pero absolutamente inéditos: los riesgos de la sobreexplotación del territorio y la superpoblación en un espacio geográfico limitado, fragmentado y situado en una de las zonas de mayor riqueza natural del mundo.”. Own translation in the main text.
51 “En este sentido, propiciaremos medidas correctoras del coste de la doble insularidad y lejanía para...”. Own translation in the main text.
they have an even deeper impact in the articulation of the Canary Islands based on the combination of both dimensions of fragmentation (Ramírez Muñóz 1996: 278-280), especially through the competences that are devolved to them by the region (Rodríguez Rodríguez 2001). The perfect match between the islands and the Cabildos multiples the negative effect of fragmentation. Overall, fragmentation affects more the saliency of the regional level as one moves from the centre to the outer-periphery, proportionally undermining the pro-periphery positions of parties as the abstraction level increases.

Fragmentation was hypothesised to affect negatively the saliency of the regional level. The main findings point in the direction of confirming hypothesis H2.D. First, the analysis shows, to some extent, the increasing importance of the local bodies as one moves towards the Canary Islands (political-administrative fragmentation). Second, this increase in importance has the effect of increasing the undermining effect of fragmentation, weakening the ability of parties when articulate a strong regional level as one moves towards the outer-periphery. For example, the Cabildos in the Canary Islands, when articulating the archipelago itself, are to be taken into consideration without shrinking their influence and power, and the same happens in Andalusia but with less intensity, and even lesser in Castilla-La Mancha. Added to this and also in relation to the Canary Islands, these local bodies reflect the combination of the spatial and the political-administrative dimension of fragmentation, not present in the mainland regions, deepening even more the negative effect of fragmentation as a whole. Overall, political-administrative fragmentation increases its negative effect as one reaches the outer-periphery as the importance of local bodies also increase, and this is deepened when combined with spatial fragmentation.

Polycentricity affects the Canary Islands in two different ways. The first way is the so called pleito insular, where Tenerife and Gran Canaria compete with each other as the two main rival centres in the region. This is expressed in the following statements by the PSOE: “…the logic of shifts and distributions in the social needs, at the service of a strategy that has led to the insular
confrontation and to a worrying deficit of social cohesion.” 52 (PSOE CI 2007: 3); and “... without any credibility and with falsehood, a struggle, unprecedented in its execution, against the pleito insular, against the tension, ...”53 (López Aguilar PSOE, Official Diary of 2007 núm. 4: 4). CC also converges with the same idea, despite the fact that the PSOE blames the party for it: “... that foster territorial cohesion and the overcoming of the pleito insular...”54 (Rivero Baute CC, Official Diary of 2007a núm. 3: 5). The second way is the struggle of the smaller islands to free themselves from the dominance of Tenerife or Gran Canaria. This is outlined by this statement: “Where do we stand, are the islands of Gran Canaria and Tenerife the only ones that are not going to have limits to their growth? Is it a problem that only affects the peripheral islands?”55 (Saavedra Acevedo PSOE, Official Diary 1999 núm. 4: 15). Another example is: “We cannot treat equally what is unequal, hence the actions aimed towards the local population that lives in the islands of Lanzarote, Fuerteventura, La Palma, La Gomera, El Hierro and La Graciosa, so that they do not see their quality of life diminished with respect to what they do and what they already enjoy in Gran Canaria or Tenerife”56 (Barragán Cabrera CC, Official Diary of 2007 núm. 4: 15).

As the data used for the quantitative chapters points out, multiple centres of power can also be found in Castilla-La Mancha and Andalusia, but the above analysis of the manifestos for these regions show that the importance and impact of polycentricity is not mentioned or developed with the same intensity as in the Canary Islands. One reason for this can be directly linked to fragmentation in the following way. Having two very distinct major islands, represented at the same time by two major centres of power (Santa Cruz de Tenerife and Las Palmas de

52 “…la lógica de turnos y repartos que, en las necesidades sociales, al servicio de una estrategia que ha abocado al enfrentamiento insular y a un preocupante déficit de cohesión social.”. Own translation in the main text.
53 “…sin ninguna credibilidad y con fariseísmo, una lucha, inédita en su ejecutoria, contra el pleito insular, contra la crispación...”. Own translation in the main text.
54 “…que fomenten la cohesión territorial y la superación del pleito insular...”. Own translation in the main text.
55 “¿En qué quedarnos, o es que sólo las islas de Gran Canaria y Tenerife son las que no van a tener límites al crecimiento? ¿Es un problema que sólo afecta a las islas periféricas?”. Own translation in the main text.
56 “No podemos tratar igual a lo que es desigual, de ahí que las acciones apuntadas para que los canarios y canarias que viven en las islas de Lanzarote, Fuerteventura, La Palma, La Gomera, El Hierro y La Graciosa no vean disminuida su calidad de vida con respecto a lo que hacen, a lo que ya disfrutan en Gran Canaria o Tenerife.”. Own translation in the main text.
Gran Canaria), favours the undermining of a regional discourse due to the clash between their interests. In Castilla-La Mancha and Andalusia, having more than two strong centres of power can prevent this fierce competition, especially because there is not a so strong subordination of other provinces or centres of power to their interests, as there is in the Canary Islands with the minor islands and their capitals. Another possible explanation for this is linked to the proposed polycentricity scale. As one can observe from the data contained in Table 1 (appendix M), the degree of polycentricity is lower in the Canary Islands than in Castilla-La Mancha and Andalusia, consequently having a deeper negative consequence, as the analysis shows. Table 1 (appendix M) contains the disaggregated data for the explanatory variable polycentricity and the different centres of power per region, showing an increase in the concentration of population, and therefore, of competence, in fewer urban centres as one moves from Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, and finally to the Canary Islands. This can be used to confirm, to some extent, that the concentration of competition in fewer centres of power can be more determinant in the shifting of party positions that the mere presence of centres of power.

The above analysis and the two possible explanations for the findings can be used to confirm, to some extent, hypotheses H3.D. All parties in the Canary Islands recognise the negative effect of having two very defined centres of power competing between each other, undermining the region as a whole, pointing to the fact that the degree of polycentricity has an overall unfavourable consequence in comparison to the basic presence of multiple centres of power. In order to undermine the negative effect, all parties advocate to stop the power fight between Santa Cruz de Tenerife and Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, reinforcing the regional level. There is no mention to the effect of polycentricity in the regions of Castilla-La Mancha and Andalusia in the same degree as in the Canary Islands, which can point in the direction of also confirming the importance of concentrating competition around two or few centres of power in comparison to their mere presence. Despite this, it is also important to acknowledge the possibility of considering the impact of polycentricity in the Canary Islands as a secondary effect of spatial fragmentation. As it has been pointed out, in all three regions you have the presence of multiple centres of power, but spatial
fragmentation is only present in the Canary Islands, where the effect of polycentricity is deeper, so there might be an underlining relation that has to be further analysed. The main reason to consider the hypothesis confirmed is that although multiple centres of power are present in all three regions, the concentration of competence in a reduced number of the former increases as one moves towards the outer-periphery, but always considering important alternative interpretations.

Focusing now on the control variables, the results are the following. With the above analysis, the hypothesis that can be tested at this point is H7.G. The analysis seems not to show this difference, and therefore, this hypothesis can be rejected. All parties seem to emphasise the regional level with the same intensity. One possible reason for this can be that the manifestos were framed for regional elections, and therefore, it was expected to observe the region to be the level with more emphasis. This applies for both SWPs and regionalist parties. The saliency of the regional level was also theorised to be unaffected by party ideology. Hypothesis H8.D can be confirmed. There is no difference in the emphasis of the regional level in relation to the ideological position of the partiers in any of the three regions and electoral periods. Hypothesis H9.D for the interaction between party type and ideology was focused on the two SWPs. The findings can confirm this hypothesis. Although both parties emphasise the region with the same intensity, as shown in this analysis, a key difference between the PSOE and the PP can be highlighted, centred on their ideological position. The PSOE, a left/centre-left SWP, addressed the regions as an intrinsic part of the Spanish state, having an auxiliary relation between them and the centre, and a mutual relation between the regional and local levels. The PP, a right/centre-right SWP, see the regions as an extension of the central government, subordinating their needs to the interests of the centre. It is not that the PSOE quantitatively emphasises more the regional level than the PP, but its ideological position helps framing them in a different qualitative manner. It could be said that by giving a more important role to the regions in comparison to the PP, the PSOE gives them, overall, a more equal treatment, not subordinating their demands to the centre.

Finally, the effect of party structure also can be tested here. The analysis in relation to the above can point to confirming hypothesis H10.A. This increase in
the importance of the regions in the *PSOE* can be the result of contextualising its response to their demands. Giving more importance to the regions can be better done in relation to the high degree of freedom granted to its regional branches.

By being able to contextualise their behaviour, the regional branches of the *PSOE* help to empower the regions. This cannot be observed in the *PP* with the same intensity. The variation between its regional branches is less evident. The centre is always seen as the mother level, allowing for less stretching of these limits.

Despite these conclusions for structure and ideology, there is some degree of complexity in disentangling their individual effects.

2.2) Constitutional status of the region

In terms of the constitutional status of the region, the general analysis of the manifestos show that both SWPs are normally found in the middle ground between a federal state and the current Autonomous Communities, and that both regionalist parties are located between a special status for the region and the development of Spain as a fully symmetric federal state. The factors that most affect the constitutional status of the region are distance, fragmentation, party type, ideology, and party structure. There is not enough evidence to conclude whether polycentricity has a clear effect or not.

The *PSOE* has an interesting approach to the constitutional status of the region for the different electoral periods and regions. The behaviour for the *PSOE* changes depending on the region where it acts. On one hand, there is the intention of developing the Autonomous Communities as they are, as in Castilla-La Mancha, and on the other hand, there is a clear support for developing a symmetric federal state, as in Andalusia and the Canary Islands. Both approaches can correspond to the position that a state-wide party might have in relation to the architecture of the state. In Castilla-La Mancha, the party calls for the development of the region inside the current system of Autonomous Communities. An example of this defence of the current Autonomous Community is the following: “Regional elections are seeing an increase in their importance through more and more social repercussion. They are an essential part of the democratic functioning, and a key factor for the consolidation of the Autonomous
Communities as a constitutional structure.”57 (PSOE C-LM 1999: 1); and “Allow me, ladies and gentlemen, before I finish, to make a declaration of constitutional loyalty from my position as candidate for the Presidency of Castilla-La Mancha. I am very clear, ladies and gentlemen, that Castilla-La Mancha is nothing without Spain. If Castilla-La Mancha today has autonomy is because it has been recognized in a Constitution approved in the Spanish Parliament and endorsed by the Spanish people and because the Parliament and the Government of Spain are guarantors of the application of this Magna Carta. Castilla-La Mancha will be strong if Spain is strong, that is why our Statute and all our policies are planned and will be considered within the strict framework of the Constitution.”58 (Barreda Fontes PSOE Official Diary 2007 núm 2: 11).

This is interesting because Castilla-La Mancha is a core region, and the discourse of the PSOE in this region seems to be extremely loyal to the current political architecture of Spain. One can observe that the position of the PSOE does not evolve across the three electoral periods, meaning that the degree of change was nil in terms of the constitutional status of the regions. This position changes in regions that are not part of the centre. Andalusia and the Canary Islands are examples of this. Not only can it be noted how these two regions differ from Castilla-La Mancha, but at the same time, it can be observed how the position of the party evolved. In the first electoral period, 1998-2001, the party called for the development of a federal state, where the regions are designed as federated states, in the same way as the German Länder. Examples of this can be the following statements for both regions: “The assumption of greater competences that define a trend of approximation towards the constitution of a State with federal characteristics, not exclusive of, or excluding, any Autonomous

57 “Las elecciones autonómicas cobran cada vez más repercusión social. Son parte esencial del funcionamiento democrático y factor clave para la consolidación del Estado de las Autonomías como estructura constitucional.”. Own translation in the main text.
58 “Permitanme, señoríass, que antes de terminar, haga una declaración de lealtad constitucional desde mi condición de aspirante a la Presidencia de Castilla-La Mancha. Tengo bien claro, señoríass, que Castilla-La Mancha no es nada sin España. Si Castilla-La Mancha tiene hoy autonomía es porque se ha reconocido en una Constitución aprobada en las Cortes españolas y refrendada por el pueblo español y porque las Cortes y el Gobierno de España son garante de la aplicación de esta Carta Magna. Castilla-La Mancha será fuerte si España es fuerte, por eso, nuestro Estatuto y todas nuestras políticas se plantean y se plantearán en el marco estricto de la Constitución.”. Own translation in the main text.
Community.”\textsuperscript{59} (PSOE AND 2000: 15); and “The regional administration will adapt its structure and operation to the achievement of a federalist model for the Canary Islands in a Federal Spain.”\textsuperscript{60} (PSOE CI 1999: 46).

These two statements can be included in the category of a symmetric federal state for Spain. This clashes with the position put forward in Castilla-La Mancha during the same electoral period. This is the biggest difference that can be observed in the PSOE in regards to the constitutional status of the regions. It has to be highlighted that this symmetric federal claim calls for recognising the distinctive characteristics of the region without making these characteristics a source of privilege. Turning to other possible sources of information to observe this same change, the most solid political texts can be the regional frameworks that the party used to frame the different regional elections. Two of these documents can be useful here: the one for 1995 and 1999. Although this electoral period is 1998-2001, taking into consideration also the 1995 regional framework can be useful to recognise if Castilla-La Mancha was an exception, or on the contrary, if Andalusia and the Canary Islands constituted the exception.

In both documents, 1995 and 1999, there is no mention of a symmetric federal state for Spain (PSOE FRAM 1995; PSOE FRAM 1999). It can be observed how the 1999 regional framework underlines the loyalty to the current constitutional design and the protection of it, with no major changes in regards to the regions except for the transfer of more competences: “We believe in this project of constitutional autonomies, as a framework and solution to build the future of Spain.”\textsuperscript{61} (PSOE FRAM 1999: 4); and “We are not in favour of deep reforms in the constitutional design, except in what refers to the configuration of the Senate.”\textsuperscript{62} (PSOE FRAM 1999: 6). It is the core that determines the position of the PSOE, with the inner- and outer-periphery trying to change this position.

\textsuperscript{59} “La asunción de mayores competencias que definan una tendencia de aproximación hacia la constitución de un Estado de características federales, no exclusivo ni excluyente para ninguna Comunidad Autónoma.”. \textit{Own translation in the main text.}

\textsuperscript{60} “La administración autonómica adecuara su estructura y funcionamiento a la consecución de un modelo federalista para Canarias en una España Federal.”. \textit{Own translation in the main text.}

\textsuperscript{61} “Creemos en este proyecto de autonomismos constitucional, como marco y solución para construir el futuro de España.”. \textit{Own translation in the main text.}

\textsuperscript{62} “No somos partidarios de reformas profundas en el bloque constitucional, excepto en lo que se refiere a la configuración del Senado.”. \textit{Own translation in the main text.}
Despite this initial position for a symmetric federal state in Andalusia and the Canary Islands, this changes in the manifestos for 2007-2010 and 2011-2012 in the direction of defending the current Autonomous Communities. This is, the PSOE changed its position to a more status quo position, the same as the one put forward at the centre. It seems as if there has been a clarification of the message in both regions to adapt to the position of the party at the centre. The change of position does not mean that the PSOE defends the status quo of the regions, but it defends a further development of the Autonomous Communities inside the current constitutional architecture. It can be said that the change of position was affected by its condition as a state-wide party, articulating a project that includes all regions but skewed towards the interests of the centre.

Despite this change of position, the PSOE still supports the inclusion of the distinctive characteristics of some regions in their constitutional status, as in the manifestos for 1999, 2007, and 2011 in the Canary Islands (PSOE CI 1999: 48; PSOE CI 2007: 70; PSOE CI 2011: 24), but without creating privileges based on them. This claim is maintained from the previous suggestion of a symmetric federal state in the electoral period of 1998-2001. The support for this recognition is also stressed in all the regional frameworks. In Andalusia these distinctive characteristics are normally based on subjective elements such as regional identity, but in the Canary Islands, these are based on objective aspects, such as the distance from mainland Spain and insularity: “The existence and recognition of peculiarities should not be understood as justifying inequalities between the Communities.”\(^{63}\) (PSOE FRAM 1995: 4); “Ensure cohesion and equality by respecting peculiarities”\(^{64}\) (PSOE FRAM 1999: 6); and “It also includes economic-financial or institutional character, adapted to the singularities or distinctive features of each region”\(^{65}\) (PSOE FRAM 2007: 10).

Although there is a general acknowledgment by the PSOE to recognise these singularities, the references to them and their importance seem to increase

\(^{63}\) “La existencia y el reconocimiento de los hechos diferenciales no deben entenderse como desigualdades entre las Comunidades”. Own translation in the main text.

\(^{64}\) “Asegurar la cohesión y la igualdad respetando los hechos diferenciales”. Own translation in the main text.

\(^{65}\) “También incluye el carácter económico-financiero e institucional, adaptado a las singularidades de los hechos diferenciales de cada región”. Own translation in the main text.
as move approaches the outer-periphery. With this in mind, the increasing emphasis of the references goes as follow. In Castilla-La Mancha, there are no references to any distinctive characteristics at all. The party in this core regions seems to defend the current constitutional status of the region. The emphasis in Andalusia increases in comparison to Castilla-La Mancha, but not to the extent of incorporating them to the constitutional status of the region. Some distinctive characteristics are referenced as intrinsic to Andalusia, such as the cultural heritage. Despite this, the PSOE does not seem to understand that these need to be recognised in the constitutional status of the region. Finally, in the Canary Islands, these references are mentioned with much more emphasis in comparison to the mainland regions, to the extent of calling for recognising them in the constitutional status of the region. The outer-periphery, according to this party, needs to be identified according to a certain set of distinctive characteristics.

Two main distinctive characteristics are the focus in the outer-periphery: distance from the mainland and fragmentation. An example of these can be observed in the following statement: “Include the peculiarities derived from distance and insularity so that the State takes them into consideration when it comes to legislating.” (PSOE CI 2011: 103). Considering distance from the mainland, it must be said that this is probably the most emphasised distinct characteristic. Distance is linked to the concept of ultra-periphery, established by the EU to consider the far away territories as regions that need special legal provisions to deal with their specific characteristics. Fragmentation is considered here with the label “insularity”: “The Canary Islands will defend the maintenance and improvement of the protection of its remote insularity ...” (PSOE CI 1999: 46). The recognition of these distinctive characteristics implies their inclusion in the constitutional status of the region. The role of distance and fragmentation is important only in the Canary Islands in comparison to Castilla-La Mancha and Andalusia.

---

66 “Incluir las peculiaridades derivadas de la lejanía e insularidad de modo que el Estado las pondere a la hora de legislar.”. Own translation in the main text.
67 “Canarias defenderá el mantenimiento y mejora de la protección de su insularidad alejada...”. Own translation in the main text.
The regional variation found in the analysis of the *PSOE* can be explained not only by the type of party, but also by its ideological position and structure. Regarding its ideological position, it can be argued that the left social values of the *PSOE* allow for a more inclusive vision of the social groups in the peripheries, especially when these peripheries can be defined according to distinctive characteristics. If incorporating these social groups in the peripheries means that the status of the regions in the constitutional framework needs to change so that they feel recognised, then left parties like the *PSOE* are more open to accept this situation. This variation is also affected by its structure. The degree of freedom that its regional branches have can explain the different articulation of the regions depending on the context in which they act, despite the pressure that they receive from the state-wide party.

Exercising a high degree of freedom by its regional branches does not mean that the main centre of loyalties changes, but a balance between the interest of the core and the peripheries is, at least, aimed for. An example of this degree of freedom and the contextualised position of the regional branches can be recognised in the fact that in core region of Castilla-La Mancha the party always had the same position, whilst in the inner- and outer-periphery of Andalusia and the Canary Islands, its position changed. Developing the example of a differentiated constitutional status of the region according to the context in which the regional branches act can be observed in the Canary Islands. As regards to the constitutional status of the region, the Canarian branch of the party called for the recognition of the ultraperipheral characteristic of the region, both in the EU and the Spanish constitutional architecture, which was not matched by a similar call in Andalusia. The type of party, ideological position, and structure of the *PSOE* can account for this change in position. Its regional branches, in order to adapt to the local peculiarities by having a more positive and inclusive vision, adopted certain policy proposals to fulfil them. The degree of freedom that regional branches have in a federal party is much higher than in a centralised party, and this might put some pressure on the relation between them and the state-wide party, shown by the change in the initial position of the *PSOE* in Andalusia and the Canary Islands, where the position of the centre was imposed. Despite this, the loyalties of the *PSOE* still remain in the centre because of its
nature as a SWP, resulting in these position strains between the interests of the regions and the core.

The PP had a consistent position across the three electoral periods in all three regions, always standing on the position of developing the regions inside the current constitutional status. As a state-wide party, the PP has a clear idea of how to develop the Spanish state. There is no difference between what the regional branches of the PP argue in Castilla-La Mancha, Andalusia, or the Canary Islands. The current constitutional design is for the PP the best system that the Constitution can have: “Ladies and gentlemen, I firmly believe in our Autonomous Communities, in the Autonomous Communities that the Constitution
The position that the PP has can be attributed to, as the with the PSOE, not only to the type of party, but also to its ideological position and structure. The PP, as a right/centre-right orientated and centralised party, also acts in the regions through its regional branches. This, although expected to create the same tension as in the PSOE, are less evident due to its highly integrated structure, clearly influenced by its social values. The local branches have some degree of freedom to deal with the local demands, but the position in terms of the constitutional status of the regions remains consistent, reinforced by the social values of a right party, meaning that the ability and willingness to incorporate other social groups in the peripheries is weak. The Autonomous Communities do not need a new constitutional status is this pose a threat to the centre. Upgrading the regions with new constitutional status might make them an equal actor in their challenge to the centre, and the PP is clearly against this scenario. The local branches have freedom to act but inside very clear red lines, and the constitutional status of the regions is, according to the analysis, one of them. These red lines are drawn by the centre and can be observed in the regional frameworks: “Spain is a Nation of free and equal citizens before the law. The Autonomous Communities are the constitutional expression of a diversity based on cohesion and solidarity, which contributes to the progress and well-being of all. We understand constitutional loyalty as an essential element for the...”

68 “Señorías, yo creo firmemente en nuestro Estado Autonómico, en el Estado Autonómico que la Constitución creó...”. Own translation in the main text.
69 “Entendemos la lealtad constitucional y la cooperación como elemento esencial para el funcionamiento del estado de las autonomías.”. Own translation in the main text.
70 “...la reforma del Estatuto de Autonomía, lo hemos hecho con la finalidad de ampliar los niveles de autogobierno de esta Comunidad, bajo un planteamiento de solidaridad interregional y en desarrollo de un modelo de Estado constitucional en el que la organización territorial ha de ser necesariamente descentralizada...”. Own translation in the main text.
functioning of the Autonomous Communities.”71 (PP FRAM 2007: 12); and “The Autonomous Communities are an essential part of the constitutional Spain, of the social and democratic Rule of Law that we have all been building since 1978.”72 (PP FRAM 2011: 13).

Focusing on the PA/CA and CC, the manifestos analysed show how these parties have different positions regarding this dependent variable. The PA/CA has a consistent position in line with a clear regionalist agenda on the constitutional status of the region. In all three electoral periods, the party stands for a federal state, which is going a step further than a SWP because it would contradict the current Constitutional architecture of the state, limit imposed by the latter. It recognises the positive effects of the Autonomous Communities, as for example: “The Spanish Constitution has been a valid experience to advance in the freedoms and in the decentralized political culture of the Spanish State.”73 (PA/CA AND 2000: 1-2), but calls for a more decentralised constitutional status of the region, suggesting a federal state: “The Autonomous Communities are, today, just one step, an instrument that should serve as a springboard to walk from the current compounded state or quasi-federal State to a fully-fledged federal state ...”74 (PA/CA AND 2000: 1-2). At the same time, this federal state needs to be symmetric and inclusive, without privileges granted to the so-called traditional nacionalidades. The system proposed by the PA/CA is more state-wide than only considering Andalusia on its own. The party calls for an equal bilateral relation between all the federated regions in this new Spanish federation: “... the full self-government of Andalusia in convergence with the other regions of the State in freedom and equality ... We do not accept, on the contrary, ... that it would be an unbalanced State where the highest degrees of self-government

71 “España es una nación de ciudadanos libres e iguales antes la ley. El Estado de las autonomías es la expresión constitucional de una diversidad basada en la cohesión y la solidaridad, que contribuye al progreso y al bienestar de todos. Entendemos la lealtad constitucional como elemento esencial para el funcionamiento del estado de las autonomías.”. Own translation in the main text.
72 “La España autonómica es parte esencial de la España constitucional, del Estado social y democrático de Derecho que entre todos venimos construyendo desde 1978.”. Own translation in the main text.
73 “La Constitución Española ha sido una experiencia válida para avanzar en las libertades y en la cultura política descentralizada del Estado español.”. Own translation in the main text.
74 “El Estado de la Autonomías es, hoy por hoy, sólo un paso, un instrumento que debe servir de trampolín para caminar desde el actual Estado compuesto o cuasifederal a un modelo federal acabado...”. Own translation in the main text.
would only correspond to the so-called historical nationalities."  

75 (PA/CA AND 2000: 1). This symmetric federal system is mentioned in all three electoral periods: "That is why we are Andalusianists, but also pro-European and supporters of a federal Spain."  

76 (PA/CA AND 2012: 11); and “... relations of equality between the territories, so we propose to move towards federal formulas both in the Spanish State and in the European Union from equality, solidarity and the redistribution of wealth."  

77 (PA/CA AND 2008: 22). Although it is a regionalist party, the PA/CA is able to admit the inclusion of Andalusia in a broader political project.

When it comes to the CC, the evolution goes from an asymmetric federal state to a Special Status for the region. In line with a regionalist agenda, it calls for a restructuring of the state where regions would benefit in detriment of the centre. During the 1999 elections, CC positioned itself like the PSOE, with the support for a federal system, but introducing an asymmetric characteristic based on its conservative social values: "We advocate for an asymmetric federal model of the State ..."  

78 (CC IC 1999: 7). This position evolves, using this asymmetry, to the defence of a Special Status for the Canary Islands, but not focused on independence and inside the current constitutional framework (CC IC 1999: 7), understood in the following way: “Our objective - essential in this second modernisation wave- is a Special Statute that reinforces and enhances our identity and our self-government by recognising the singularities derived from the double insularity and remoteness, for which we reject any claim to impose a Statute alien to our interests as a people."  

79. As in the case of the PSOE and the PP when they move from Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia,
and finally to the Canary Islands, the change in the position of the PA/CA and CC in relation to the constitutional status of the region can be linked to the distance that separates the regions from the centre. Taking into consideration these two peripheral regions, it can be observed that as move moves away from the centre, the constitutional status of the regions becomes more distinct and exclusive. The state-wide symmetrical federal system of the PA/CA contrasts to the Special Status of the Canary Islands of CC.

As it can be observed, the ideological orientation of CC supports the asymmetrical status of the region in order to protect the social groups in the outer-periphery. Being a right/centre-right party allows CC to support a more favourable treatment to the Canary Islands on detriment of other regions and social groups. Both parties criticised the privileges of the so-called nacionalidades (CC CAN 2007: 8; PA/CA AND 2012: 24), but CC, based on its ideological position, goes a step further and calls for the same privileges for the Canary Islands through this Special Status instead of calling for a symmetric federal state like the PA/CA: “...self-government through its own status. Status that, as already happens in the Basque Country or Navarre, would allow asymmetry amongst the different regions.”80 (CC CI 2011: 118). Finally, to be precise, the Special Status that CC tries to obtain through an asymmetric federal design is more a degree of asymmetry rather than a new step to a possible federal state.

If the ideological position and structure of the PSOE differentiates it from the PP, the difference in the constitutional status of the region between the PA/CA and the CC can be also explained along the same lines, especially focused on the ideological orientation. The PA/CA, a left/centre-left orientated party, bases its framing of a Spanish symmetrical federal state on an equal treatment to all the different regions, with no privileges to any. This can explain the criticism to the status of the Basque Country and Navarre. Therefore, the PA/CA, although calling for a deepening of the decentralisation process until Spain reaches the status of a federal state, this is based around the principle of equality between regions. The opposite can be observed for CC. As a right/centre-right orientated

80 “...el autogobierno mediante un estatus propio. Estatus que, como ya sucede en el País Vasco o Navarra, permiten la asimetría del Estado Autonómico.”. *Own translation in the main text.*
party, it defends the privileges of the social group that it represents. This is translated into a federal system, in the same way as the PA/CA, but with privileges, which in this case, applies to the Canary Islands via a Special Status. This asymmetric system would protect the privileges of the elites in the region, in line with the social values of right/centre-right parties.

The factors used by parties to differentiate the constitutional status of the region as one reaches the outer-periphery are distance and fragmentation. When the recognition of the geographical characteristics of the Canary Islands in a new Statute of Autonomy, the Constitution, and the EU legal framework were brought up in the above analysis, distance and fragmentation were introduced as factors that helped deepening a possible differentiated status. These two characteristics only affect to a greater extent the Canary Islands, as there is also a degree of distance and fragmentation in Andalusia in comparison to Castilla-La Mancha. All three parties that act in the region, the PSOE, the PP, and CC, agree on the need to acknowledge distance and fragmentation in the constitutional status of the region. The recognition of distinctive characteristics seems to affect the Canary Islands the most, but in Andalusia, there are also some references to these, linked to other markers or characteristics, but to a lesser degree. In this case, the distinctive characteristics of Andalusia are based on elements such as its cultural heritage. Finally, in Castilla-La Mancha, there are no references to distinctive characteristics.

The PSOE shows strong support for the inclusion of the distinctive characteristics. This does not mean that the PSOE calls for an asymmetric autonomous or federal system, but the recognition of distinctive characteristics without privileges. This claim is maintained from the previous support for a symmetric federal state in the electoral period of 1998-2001. This is also stressed in all the regional frameworks included here. As stated above, there is a difference between Andalusia and the Canary Islands in terms of the distinctive characteristics that the party emphasises. In both regions, the PSOE calls for the recognition of these characteristics in the Statutes of Autonomy, but in Andalusia this normally is based on subjective elements such as regional identity, and in the Canary Islands, this is based on objective aspects, which in this case are distance from mainland Spain and insularity: “The existence and recognition of
peculiarities should not be understood as justifying inequalities between the Communities.” ⁸¹ (PSOE FRAM 1995: 4); “Ensure cohesion and equality by respecting peculiarities” ⁸² (PSOE FRAM 1999: 6); and “It also includes economic-financial or institutional character, adapted to the singularities or distinct characteristics of each region” ⁸³ (PSOE FRAM 2007: 10).

An example of the inclusion of distance and insularity as distinctive markers is the following statement: “Include the peculiarities derived from distance and insularity so that the State takes them into consideration when it comes to legislating.” ⁸⁴ (PSOE CI 2011: 103). Considering distance from the mainland, it must be said that this is probably the most emphasised distinctive characteristic that the PSOE mentions in the manifestos. Distance is linked to the concept of ultra-periphery that the EU framework established to consider the far away territories as regions that need special legal channels to deal with their specific characteristics. Fragmentation is considered here with the label “insularity”: “The Canary Islands will defend the maintenance and improvement of the protection of its remote insularity...” (PSOE CI 1999: 46). ⁸⁵

The PP seems to have the same behaviour in relation to recognise certain set of distinctive characteristics. The references to these singularities also increase as one moves towards the outer-periphery. In Castilla-La Mancha, there are no references. The PP does not observe the need to mention any distinctive characteristics. The party, in Andalusia, moves to reference some certain characteristics that are used to define the region. As in the case of the PSOE, they are not explicitly mentioned in a possible new constitutional status of the region. They are used more to contextualise the appeals to the voters rather than in relation to an updated status of the region. When the PP adapts to the context of the Canary Islands, the references not only increase, but they are observed as

⁸¹ “La existencia y el reconocimiento de los hechos diferenciales no deben entenderse como desigualdades entre las Comunidades”. Own translation in the main text.
⁸² “Asegurar la cohesión y la igualdad respetando los hechos diferenciales”. Own translation in the main text.
⁸³ “También incluye el carácter económico-financiero e institucional, adaptado a las singularidades de los hechos diferenciales de cada región”. Own translation in the main text.
⁸⁴ “Incluir las peculiaridades derivadas de la lejanía e insularidad de modo que el Estado las pondere a la hora de legislar.”. Own translation in the main text.
⁸⁵ “Canarias defenderá el mantenimiento y mejora de la protección de su insularidad alejada...”. Own translation in the main text.
essential in the understanding of the region, and this is better done if they are referenced in the constitutional status of the outer-periphery.

The most referenced distinctive characteristics that the PP references in the Canary Islands are distance and fragmentation. In this sense, and despite the consistent initial position in terms of the defence of the current Autonomous Communities, the party calls for the recognition of the same distinctive characteristics in the Canary Islands as the PSOE does. The position of the PP is the same as the PSOE, where the constitutional status of the region is the current design but with the recognition of the characteristics, especially the one labelled as ultra-peripheral, as announced in the UE legal framework, and insularity. The PP, when it calls for the recognition of these distinctive characteristics, does not call for an asymmetric Autonomous Community, but a recognition without privileges: “... the reflection of the necessary resources without discrimination, under the express recognition of the insularity and remoteness made in the Spanish Constitution, the Treaty of the European Union or the Law on Economic and Fiscal Regime of the Islands.” (PP CI 2011: 27).

The Special Status that CC calls for is also affected by distance and fragmentation. Using the asymmetry introduced for the regions that developed their Statute of Autonomy following article 151 of the Constitution, CC calls for a Special Status that recognises the Canary Islands as the region with the most distinctive characteristics in the Spanish state: “Needless to remember that the Canary Islands is the territory of the Spanish State with the most singularities and, in addition, recognised by the European Union.” (CC CI 2011: 118). The support for an asymmetric system that CC puts forward is based on the distinctive characteristics of each region, which would lead to the final Special Status that the party requires for the Canary Islands: “That is, an asymmetric State based on the singularities of each community, in which the remoteness and insularity of the

---

86 “Tenemos que consolidar todo un conjunto de incentivos, de singularidades, peculiaridades dentro de la Unión Europea". Translation: “We have to consolidate a whole set of incentives, singularities, and peculiarities within the European Union” (Soria PP Official Diary Canary Islands 2007 núm 4, 69).

87 “...el reflejo de los recursos necesarios sin discriminación, bajo el reconocimiento expreso de la insularidad y lejanía que hace la Constitución Española, el Tratado de la Unión Europea o la propia Ley de Régimen Económico y Fiscal de las Islas.”. Own translation in the main text.

88 “Huelga recordar que Canarias es el territorio del Estado español con más singularidades y, además, reconocidas por la Unión Europea.”. Own translation in the main text.
Canary Islands appear as the obvious singularities given their special influence on the self-government of the Archipelago.”89 (CC CI 2007: 26). The distinctive characteristics in the case of the Canary Islands, according to CC, are distance from Madrid, the ultra-peripherality of the archipelago and fragmentation. This can be observed using the following statement: “... has not understood things that were practically impossible to understand with respect to a territory that is more than 2,000 kilometres away from Madrid, a fragmented territory, which has other difficulties and that has nothing to do with the mainland?”90 (Rivero Baute CC Official Diary 2007b núm 4: 24). These characteristics need to be recognised by a special status of the region.

The above references are based on both the spatial and political-administrative dimensions of fragmentation in combination. In this case, CC is the party that most clearly reference this element: “The new Statute of Autonomy should emphasise the relevance of the Cabildos as the insular government, representation and administration of each Island.”91 (CC CI 2011: 120). One would expect that strong local island-based bodies like the Cabildos would undermine a differentiated constitutional status of the region which would reinforce the latter. This would ultimately undermine their power. The analysis shows the opposite. The Cabildos are actually referred to in order to underpin the call for a special status of the region in a positive way. One reason for this can be that these local island-based bodies, if also referenced in this differentiated constitutional status of the region, can reinforce their influence and power. The PSOE and the PP, although not directly calling for the Cabildos to be recognised in this differentiated constitutional status of the region as CC does, also reference the importance of recognising them somehow in the self-government of the region: “The Canarian socialists affirm categorically that not only the region, but

---

89 “Esto es, un Estado asimétrico en función de los hechos diferenciales de cada comunidad, en el que la lejanía e insularidad de Canarias aparezcan como el hecho diferencial evidente dada su especial incidencia en el autogobierno del Archipiélago”. *Own translation in the main text.*

90 “...no ha entendido cosas que eran prácticamente imposibles que entendiera con respecto a un territorio que está a más de 2,000 kilómetros de distancia de Madrid, un territorio fragmentado, que tiene otras dificultades y que no tiene que ver nada con el territorio continental?”. *Own translation in the main text.*

91 “El nuevo Estatuto de Autonomía debe subrayar la relevancia de los Cabildos Insulares como órganos de gobierno, representación y administración de cada Isla.”. *Own translation in the main text.*
also the islands-based governments and the Municipality are defining and decisive elements of our self-government…”92 (PSOE CI 1999: 47)

- Testing the hypothesis

From this analysis, the explanatory variables that most affect this dependent variable are distance and fragmentation. Starting with distance, it was theorised to affect the constitutional status of the region in a positive way. The above analysis seems to confirm hypothesis H1.E. Distance deepens the calls for a more differentiated constitutional status of the region. Although this is more apparent when comparing both regionalist parties, it can also be outlined for both SWPS when one takes into consideration the bases for this differentiated status. As it has been observed, distance is also one of the two distinctive characteristics that base the differentiated status that parties outline for in the Canary Islands. The parties in this outer-periphery use distance to reinforce the support for the recognising of a differentiated constitutional status for the region around this factor. This behaviour can be observed for the PSOE, the PP, and CC. There is a need to acknowledge the fact that the region is far away from the centre, or in other words, the Canary Islands being an ultra-periphery. Overall, the pro-periphery positions of parties are deepened by distance when they articulate the constitutional status of the region.

The same behaviour can be observed for fragmentation. From the analysis, one can conclude that hypothesis H2.E can be rejected. Not only distance, but also fragmentation is a factor that deepens and reinforces support for a distinct constitutional status, strengthening the pro-periphery position of parties. The analysis of the manifestos for the parties in the mainland regions outline the importance of the Provincial Councils and Counties, and this is higher in Andalusia than in Castilla-La Mancha (for example, PSOE AND 2000: 23; PA/CA AND 2012: 2), but not to the extent of recognising them as part of a differentiated constitutional status of the region as in the Canary Islands. In this sense, it can be said that the same behaviour observed for the saliency of the regional level in

---

92 “Los socialistas canarios afirmamos rotundamente que no sólo la región, sino también la islas y el municipio son elementos definitorias y decisivos de nuestro autogobierno…”. Own translation in the text.
relation to fragmentation can also be highlighted here, but having the opposite effect, strengthening the articulation of a more differentiated constitutional status of the region. In other words, the deeper the effect of the political-administrative dimension of fragmentation, the more parties call for a more differentiated status of the region. In addition to this, the coincidence of the spatial and the political-administrative dimensions of fragmentation in the outer-periphery region of the Canary Islands also contradicted the expected negative effect, providing unpredicted observations. The coincidence of both dimensions of fragmentation had the opposite effect to the ones theorised, reinforcing a more differentiated constitutional recognition of the region. Overall, it can be said that the deeper the effects of fragmentation, the more it favoured a more differentiated constitutional status of the region.

Turning to the control variables, the conclusions are the following. The hypotheses that can be approached refer to party type, ideology and structure. Regarding party type, it was hypothesised that the PA/CA and CC would emphasise a more differentiated constitutional status for the region than the PSOE and the PP. The analysis shows that hypothesis H7.H can be confirmed. The constitutional status that the regionalist parties support is more differentiated than the one proposed by the PSOE and the PP. This differentiated constitutional status vary between a symmetric federal system in Andalusia (PA/CA) and the recognition of a Special Status for the region in the Canary Islands (CC). The PSOE and the PP, on the other hand, defend the current Autonomous system, although the PSOE has two major exceptions in Andalusia (2000) and the Canary Islands (1999), closer to the position of the regionalist parties.

When it comes to the hypothesis regarding ideology (H8.E), this can be confirmed. In this sense, the PSOE and the PA/CA, both left/centre-left parties, emphasise a more inclusive symmetrical constitutional status of the regions, empowering the regions with the same rights and status. The PP, a right/centre-right party, articulate a symmetrical constitutional status of the region, as the previous parties, but with less degree of inclusiveness of the regions. For the PP and in relation to the above analysis of the saliency of the regional level, the regions, although with no privileges, are still subordinated to the centre. They are an extension of the centre. Empowering the regions with an upgraded
constitutional status might undermine the influence and power of the centre, establishing an asymmetrical relation between the latter and the former. CC, also a right/centre-right party, emphasises a more asymmetrical constitutional status of the region to protect the interest of the social groups in the outer-periphery influenced by its social values, undermining the possibility of applying the same to other Autonomous Communities. The hypothesis (H9.E) for the interaction between party type and ideology can be also confirmed. CC emphasises a more differentiated constitutional status of the region, inserted in an asymmetrical federal system with the same privileges as the Basque Country for example, based on its ideology. As a right/centre-right party, the less ability to incorporate other social groups outside the region, as the PA/CA does, makes this party focus on defending the privileges of their own social group, promoting a special protection so that the economic relations that empowers the social group where it bases its loyalties are preserved. This can be used to conclude that the ideological orientation of CC makes this party have a slightly stronger pro-periphery position than the PA/CA.

The structure of the PSOE and the PP was hypothesised to affect the constitutional status of the region as follows: the greater autonomy of the regional branches of the PSOE increases the possibility to articulate a more differentiated constitutional status of the regions in comparison to the PP, resulting in more horizontal variation. The analysis shows that hypothesis H10.B can be confirmed. The change in the position of the PSOE in Andalusia and the Canary Islands, in comparison to the consistent position of the PP in all three regions across all three electoral periods, points in this direction. The higher degree of freedom that the regional branches of the PSOE have can explain, to some degree, this variation, although the state-wide party, locating its loyalties at the centre, seems to impose its point of view. This existing initial version can be used to reinforce the confirmation of the stated hypothesis, but if one takes into consideration more regional elections, especially further back in time, the picture could be clearer. It has to be acknowledged that the change in position, forced by the state-wide party, undermines these conclusions, but at the same time, it points in the direction of the importance of the freedom that the regional branches of the PSOE had, and still have. It can be said that the mere presence of the initial proposition
in Andalusia and the Canary Islands confirms this hypothesis. This variation is not observed for the PP, a more integrated party. Figure 6.5 summarises the overall analysis contained in this sub-section.

**Figure 6.5. Description of the constitutional status according to the parties and regions.**
2.3) Position on competence distribution

The general analysis for all parties across the three electoral periods is that the calls for the devolution of more competences for the regions is common to all. There were two occasions where the PP called for recentralising competences, but these were an exception rather than a general call. Normally, all parties link this devolution to specific public policies, but some manifestos called also for more competences in general terms, normally connected to the development of a new Statute of Autonomy. In comparison, advocacy of more competences for the local level is emphasised much less. In terms of developing the region, all parties identify the devolution of competences as a key step towards this aim. The factors that most affect party positioning on competence distribution are, distance, fragmentation, party type, ideology, and party structure. There is not enough evidence to conclude whether polycentricity has a clear effect or not.

Before analysing the manifestos, an important point needs to be clarified in terms of the different types of competences developed the Spanish constitution. In the allocation of competences to the regions and the central government, three main types of competences can be identified: exclusive, shared, and concurrent. The first one refers to the exclusive exercise of the competences by one of the levels, the central government or the regional administration, depending to which one they are assigned. The second one refers to the case where competences over a certain issue are distributed by levels, depending on what powers each level has over it. Examples of these competences are: the attribution of the basic legislation to the central government, and the execution of this basic legislation by the Autonomous Communities. The third one refers to the case where both levels have the possibility of concurring with the same powers to regulate a matter. The competences that are exclusive to the central government refer to those that are used to define an independent state with the ability to control its own territory and population. In other words, those that are necessary to exercise jurisdiction, which are, for example: justice, defence, international relations, customs and tariff regime, foreign trade, or general treasury and state debt.
Regarding attitudes to competence distribution in the PSOE, the overall behaviour in all three regions and electoral periods is that the party calls for the devolution of more competences to the regions: “Education: the assumption of competences in non-university education will mark the next term.”93 (PSOE C-LM 1999: 6); “Promote the process of devolving the competences that deal with the issue of communications that are contemplated in the Constitution.”94 (PSOE AND 2000: 37); and “The Autonomous Community of the Canary Islands must assume full regulatory powers in terms of financing derived from the Canary Islands Economic and Tax Regime.”95 (PSOE CI 2007: 76). There is an exception in the manifesto for 2011 for Castilla-La Mancha, where there is no reference to more devolution of competences to the region, but this is not a call for recentralisation in favour of the central government.

These references are linked to specific policy proposals, and at the same time, some manifestos dedicate a specific section to the devolution of competences to the region as a whole. The first part of the manifesto for 2008 in Andalusia and the last part of the manifesto for 2011 in the Canary Islands contain a full section dedicated to the development of a new Statute of Autonomy, and this development is focused on the devolution of more competences to the regions. Examples of these calls are: “We consider necessary and urgent a reform of the Statute of Autonomy to fulfil the following objectives: ... claim new competences.”96 (PSOE CI 2011: 24); and “Access to greater competencies that define a trend of approximation towards the constitution of a state with federal characteristics, not exclusive of, or excluding, any Autonomous Community.”97 (PSOE AND 2000: section 2). There is less emphasis on more competences to be devolved to the local level in comparison to the regional level, but nonetheless,

93 “Educación: la asunción de las competencias en materia de educación no universitaria marcará la próxima legislatura.”. Own translation in the main text.
94 “Impulsar el proceso de transferencia de las competencias que en materia de comunicación se contemplan en la Constitución.”. Own translation in the main text.
95 “La Comunidad Autónoma de Canarias debe asumir competencias normativas plenas en materia de financiación derivada del Régimen Económico y Fiscal de Canarias.”. Own translation in the main text.
96 “Consideramos necesaria y urgente una reforma estatutaria para cumplir los siguientes objetivos:...asumir nuevas competencias.”. Own translation in the main text.
97 “La asunción de mayores competencias que definan una tendencia de aproximación hacia la constitución de un Estado de características federales, no exclusivo ni excluyente para ninguna Comunidad Autónoma.”. Own translation in the main text.
they are present: “As for the Municipalities and Provincial Councils, the process of decentralisation and devolution of competences has allowed the regional Administration to become an active agent of such strategies and to act as a promoter of their own development processes.”98 (PSOE AND 2000: 23). There is general support for a reorganisation of competences between the three levels and not only devolution per se: “Recognition of the existence of other levels of government and administration, typical of a democratic and decentralised state, while integrated into the European Union, with its own and / or shared tasks and competences ...”99 (PSOE CI 2007: 73).

There are no calls for a recentralisation of policies. The PSOE supports the principle of reorganising, in general terms, the competences that the three levels currently have, aiming for a more efficient administration: “We will approve the general legal framework for the local bodies in Andalusia, which will regulate the devolution of competences to the Municipalities, cooperation between Municipalities, and coordination with the Provincial Councils.”100 (PSOE AND 2008: 19). Reorganising the way the three levels interact is focused more on devolving competences to the region and the local bodies as opposed to making the centre more involved. Competences are better managed at the regions and local bodies.

In terms of the type of competences that the PSOE calls for in all three regions, the party tries to push forward some demands for competences that can be considered exclusive of the central government. Examples of these are: “We will demand the approval of the National Hydrological Plan, the devolution of competences regarding water in the intra-community basins and the

98 “Al igual que para los Ayuntamientos y Diputaciones Provinciales, el proceso de descentralización y transferencia de competencias ha permitido a la Administración regional convertirse en un agente activo de tales estrategias y actuar como un promotor de procesos de desarrollo endógeno.”. Own translation in the main text.
99 “Reconocimiento de la existencia de otros niveles de gobierno y administración, propios de un estado democrático y descentralizado, a la vez que integrado en la Unión Europea, con funciones y competencias propias y/o compartidas...”. Own translation in the main text.
100 “Aprobaremos la ley de régimen local de Andalucía, que regulará las transferencias y delegación de competencias en los Ayuntamientos, la cooperación entre los Municipios y la coordinación con las Provincial Councils.”. Own translation in the main text.
management of the Guadalquivir basin.”101 (PSOE AND 2000: 104); and “We will propose the devolution of competences over work permits for foreign people, as well as an increase in the role of the Autonomous Community in the determination of the quotas of foreigners who enter the labour market in Andalusia.”102 (PSOE AND 2008: 18). The importance of the hydraulic resources is a key factor in both Castilla-La Mancha and Andalusia. For Castilla-La Mancha, this can be also observed in the following statement: “…the autonomy, to be the main guardians in defending now the Statute of Autonomy, that thanks to the initiative of the President of Castilla-La Mancha is going to amended, and that it is going to mean to us not only the already devolved competences in matter of water but more financial aid, more competences and, therefore, more possibility of solving these issues that are in the interest of the regional population…”103 (Moreno González PSOE Official Diary Castilla-La Mancha 2007 núm. 2: 28). The same strong calls for more competences can be observed for the region of the Canary Islands: “The Autonomous Community of the Canary Islands must have full regulatory powers in terms of financing derived from the Canary Islands Economic and Tax Regime. In this context, the IGIC and the AIEM, should be configured as taxes of our Autonomous Community, with full powers over its regulation, application, review, and liable to the principles set out in the Statute of Autonomy of the Canary Islands”104 (PSOE CI 2007: 76).

The aim of the PSOE is to increase the capacity of the region by exercising more competences, some belonging to those that are considered as crucial for

101 “Exigiremos la aprobación del Plan Hidrológico Nacional, la transferencia de las competencias en materia de aguas en las cuencas intracomunitarias y la gestión de la cuenca del Guadalquivir.”. Own translation in the main text.
102 “Plantearemos el traspaso de las competencias de las autorizaciones de trabajo de las personas extranjeras, así como incrementar el papel de la Comunidad Autónoma en la determinación de los contingentes de extranjeros que accedan al mercado de trabajo andaluz.”. Own translation in the main text.
103 “…la autonomía, a ser los máximos exigentes en defender ahora el Estatuto, que gracias a la iniciativa del Presidente de Castilla-La Mancha se va a reformar y que nos va a suponer no sólo lo ya consignado en materia de agua sino más financiación, más competencias y, por tanto, más posibilidad de resolver desde la cercanía los asuntos que interesan a los castellano-manchegos…”.. Own translation in the main text.
104 “La Comunidad Autónoma de Canarias debe asumir competencias normativas plenas en materia de financiación derivada del Régimen Económico y Fiscal de Canarias. En este contexto, el IGIC, y el AIEM, deben ser configurados como tributos propios de nuestra comunidad Autónoma, con plenas competencias sobre su regulación, aplicación y revisión y con sujeción a los principios recogidos en el Estatuto de Autonomía de Canarias.”. Own translation in the main text.
an independent state. Despite this, these calls refer to specific issues, not a general call for more competences that are exclusive from the central government. This is a crucial difference. This can be expected in a state-wide party that supports the decentralisation of the state but within the current constitutional architecture. In a decentralised state like Spain, the expected behaviour is for state-wide parties in regional elections to call for more competences to be devolved to the Autonomous Communities, and this is what can be observed for the PSOE. In some cases, as it has been shown, the party pushes the calls for more specific competences that are considered as exclusive of the central government, but this does not mean necessarily the support for creating a full developed independent state. In relation to the process of decentralisation, the PSOE pushes for more competences to be devolved to the regions as distance from the centre also increases. There seems to be an increase both in the calls for more and more important competences for the regions as one reaches the Canary Islands. In order to contextualise its appeals to the local populations, the party observes that calling for more competences is a possible solution to do so. As the appeals increase with distance, the calls for more and more important competences also increase.

In the manifestos of the PP, one can observe the same general position as the PSOE in all three regions and electoral periods, including the increasing emphasis on more competences to be devolved to the regions as distance increases. The PP focuses on the devolution of competences towards the region as a key step for the latter’s development. An example of these calls is: “We will define, in a framework of agreement with the central government, the competences of the Regional Government in the Transversal Railway Axis of Andalusia”105 (PP AND 2012: 98). Three exceptions can be found, two in Castilla-La Mancha (2007 and 2011) and one in the Canary Islands (2007), as if the status quo was satisfactory. Despite this, there is a key difference between the PP and the PSOE this respect. The PSOE, as outlined above, organises these calls in two ways, demanding specific competences or calling for more competences

105 “Definiremos, en un marco de acuerdo con la Administración Central, las competencias de la Junta de Andalucía en el Eje Ferroviario Transversal de Andalucía.”. Own translation in the main text.
through a new Statute of Autonomy. The PP only calls for more competences using the first way, with no mentions of a new Statute of Autonomy in any of the regions or electoral periods. There are no direct calls for the recentralisation of competences, but sometimes the language used points in this direction and greats confusion regarding its position in relation to this dependent variable, especially in the Canary Islands: “It does not make sense for a Municipality, a Cabildo or an Autonomous Community to receive competences that they cannot carry out.”\(^{106}\) (PP CI 2011: 14). For the local level, the proposals contained in the manifestos support devolving more competences towards the Provincial Councils, Cabildos and Municipalities, sometimes directly, and sometimes with references to a specific policy proposal. In comparison to the PSOE, the PP displays a more consistent position in all the manifestos across regions and electoral periods, for example: “The PP of Andalusia considers that, following the principle of subsidiarity, the time has come to devolve regional competences, endowed with sufficient economic resources, to the Municipalities, as established in the Statute of Autonomy.”\(^{107}\) (PP AND 2008: 13). It seems that, in general, the PP focuses more on the local level than the PSOE.

It can be observed that, overall, the PSOE and the PP try to position themselves in further developing the decentralised Spanish state through devolving more competences to the regions and general calls for reorganising competences between the regional, centre, and local levels to make the administration more efficient. On some occasions, these calls include soft calls for exclusive competences of the central government, but these are few. Their behaviour is, therefore, in line with the expected. On top of this general conclusions, one can observe that these calls increase as they reach the outer-periphery. The null call for more competences in Castilla-La Mancha by both parties and the strong decentralisation proposals in the Canary Islands can be an example of this. Both parties understand that the distance that separates a region from the centre needs to be approached by regional solutions, and this is done

\(^{106}\) “No tiene sentido que un Ayuntamiento, un Cabildo o una Comunidad Autónoma tengan asignadas competencias que no pueden llevar a cabo.”. \textit{Own translation in the main text.}

\(^{107}\) “El Partido Popular de Andalucía considera que, en cumplimiento del principio de subsidiariedad, ha llegado el momento de transferir competencias autonómicas, dotadas con recursos económicos suficientes, a los Ayuntamientos, tal y como establece el Estatuto de Autonomía.”. \textit{Own translation in the main text.}
via exercising more competences to give better and more contextualised responses. However, there are still some sharp differences between the two. As observed from the above analysis, the *PSOE* calls, in general terms, for more competences to be devolved to the regions than the *PP*, and the nature of these competences go a step further, focusing more on some competences that normally are understood to belong to the central government. These differences in the attitude regarding the position on the distribution of competences appears to be determined, to some extent, by their ideological position and structure.

Being a left/centre-left orientated party grants the ability to the *PSOE* to increase the calls for more competences for the regions in comparison to the *PP*. This can be explained by the capacity that this party has to fulfil the interests of the regions. In comparison, the *PP* is less open to achieving the same level of interaction with the elites at the periphery. The *PSOE* not only emphasises more the devolution of more competences to the regions than the *PP*, but also the nature of these competences’ changes, and this is also linked to their ideological position. The degree of inclusiveness of the *PSOE* allows this party to go further and demand, not only more competences for the regions but also competences that further develop their institutional frame and increase their political importance. This includes competences that are assumed to belong to a hypothetical independent state. The *PP*, although also promoting the devolution of competences to the regions as the *PSOE*, does not go as far as the latter. Its less openness to include other social groups that might threaten the privileges of the elites that they defend prevents this party to demand as many competences as the *PSOE* does and the types of competences do not trespass the lines of the exclusive competences of the central government with the same intensity.

The regional branches of the *PSOE* are able to contextualise more the demands for more competences than the *PP*. The former, although limited by the state-wide party through documents such as the regional frameworks, is more capable of stretching these limits to respond to the demands of the regions. The regional branches of the *PP* are more limited due to its highly integrated structure, but they still exercise some degree of freedom to contextualise their policies. These regional branches, limited by the interest of the elites at the centre, do not addressed to the same extent the interests of the regions as the reginal branches
of the \textit{PSOE} do, which undermines the call for more competences as a whole. The above analysis suggests that this difference in the structure determines, to some extent, the attitudes that these two parties have towards the distribution of competences.

In comparison, the \textit{PA/CA} and \textit{CC} make overall stronger statements for the devolution of competences to the region. Both regionalist parties have a similar behaviour to the \textit{PSOE}. In this sense, both call for more competences to be devolved in two ways: specific calls in different policy areas and calls for more competences in general terms through the development of a new Statutes of Autonomy. Examples of calls for specific policies are: “Call for the competences on commuter trains to design a commuter network according to the geographical and social needs of Andalusia.”\textsuperscript{108} (\textit{PA/CA AND} 2012: 59); and “Request the competencies in matters of coasts”\textsuperscript{109} (\textit{CC CI} 2011: 6). Examples of the developing a new Statute of Autonomy with new competences are: “Our strategic priority is the defence of our autonomy and for that same reason, without renouncing the reform of the Statute of Autonomy, we want to promote its maximum development, both from the perspective of competence transfer and the development of rights and financing commitments, to respond to the problems and aspirations of the Andalusian people.”\textsuperscript{110} (\textit{PA/CA AND} 2008: 38-39); and “…the Statute of Autonomy must determine a competence system that makes possible the future project for the Canary Islands that we propose.”\textsuperscript{111} (\textit{CC CI} 2007: 8). These two regionalist parties see the centre as the level that should aid the Autonomous Communities to develop: “It is essential to establish in the Constitution, not only the existence of compensation funds or guarantees of solidarity, equality and cohesion, but the obligation of the central government to

\begin{footnotes}
\item[108] “Reclamar las competencias sobre los trenes de Cercanía para diseñar una red de cercanías acorde a las necesidades geográficas y sociales de Andalucía.”. \textit{Own translation in the main text}.
\item[109] “Solicitar las competencias en materia de Costas”. \textit{Own translation in the main text}.
\item[110] “Nuestra prioridad estratégica es la defensa de nuestra autonomía y por ese mismo motivo, sin renunciar a la reforma del Estatuto, queremos impulsar su máximo desarrollo, tanto desde la perspectiva del traspaso competencial como del desarrollo de los derechos y los compromisos de financiación, para que dé respuesta a los problemas y a las aspiraciones del pueblo andaluz.”. \textit{Own translation in the main text}.
\item[111] “…el Estatuto debe determinar un sistema competencial que haga posible el proyecto de futuro para Canarias que proponemos.”. \textit{Own translation in the main text}.
\end{footnotes}
distribute its budgets according to criteria of internal convergence…“112 (PA/CA AND 2008: 23)

Despite these strong calls for more competences to be devolved to the regions by both regionalist parties, there is a difference between them. The analysis shows that CC, in comparison to the PA/CA, calls for more and more important competences to be devolved to the Canary Islands. This observed behaviour goes in line with the one highlighted for the PSOE and the PP. As one moves away from the centre, the regionalist parties call for more and more important competences for the regions. The competences that both parties call for belong to the exclusive list of competences that the Constitution assigns the centre.

When it comes to the type of competences that the regionalist parties demand from the centre, it must be said that there is more emphasis on competences that belong exclusively to the central government than in the case of both SWPs. The PA/CA has a very good example of this. In its manifesto for the election of 2000, the party has a very detailed list of competences that they demand for Andalusia, most of them belonging exclusively to the state, such as a tax agency, foreign health113, penitentiary institutions, or official statistics. There is an interesting fact to highlight, and it is the desire by both the PA/CA and CC to achieve the same development as the “historic” regions through the same competences. This objective focuses on four aspects: international relations, borders, autonomous tax agency, and autonomous police. Some of these competences belong to the state exclusively, such as borders, and international relations. Others, such as an autonomous tax agency and autonomous police are not exclusive to the state to the full extent, but are characteristics of a very developed region.

112 “Es irrenunciable establecer en la Constitución, no sólo la existencia de fondos de compensación o garantías de solidaridad, igualdad y cohesión, sino la obligatoriedad para el Gobierno Central de distribuir sus presupuestos según criterios de convergencia interna…“. Own translation in the main text.
113 Foreign health refers to the competences and activities that the central government has in terms of control of the possible health hazards and risks derived from the import, export or transit of goods, and international passenger traffic (Ley 14/86, General de Sanidad).
Dealing with the competences that belong exclusively to the state, both parties seem to emphasise the competences on international relations and borders. In terms of international relations, because the Constitutional Court has limited this to the central government, the regions can have their own international activity but this “...should be understood as limited to those that do not imply the exercise of a *ius contrahendi*, do not give rise to immediate and current obligations to the powers that be foreign publics, do not affect the foreign policy of the state and do not generate responsibility of this vis-à-vis foreign states or international supranational organisations.”\textsuperscript{114} Both the *PA/CA* and *CC* emphasise the fact that Andalusia and the Canary Islands should have their own international activity focused on the defence of their interests. Examples of this international activity can be found in the manifestos of the *PA/CA* (PA/CA AND 2000: 3) and *CC* (CC CI 2011: 124). It must be stated that this international activity is also mentioned by the *PSOE* in both regions (PSOE AND 2012: 48; PSOE CI 2007: 71). This does not happen with the *PP*. In terms of the borders, this normally comes through the demand to control ports and airports, the main entry gates to the region: “Second, we want to be able to decide on our own model, assuming full powers in the management of ports and airports and ...”\textsuperscript{115} (PA/CA AND 2008: 244); and “In the next four years, we aspire to have a Statute of Autonomy endowed with the competencies that the Canary Islands calls for, especially those relating to the management of our airports, coasts, inter-island air transport and the management of our marine resources ...”\textsuperscript{116} (CC CI 2011: 4).

When it comes to an autonomous tax agency, both parties call for the creation of agencies like the ones that the “historic” regions of the Basque Country and Navarre have: “We claim our own Tax Agency with the same

\textsuperscript{115} “En segundo lugar queremos poder decidir sobre nuestro propio modelo, asumiendo las competencias plenas en la gestión de puertos y aeropuertos y...”. Own translation in the main text.
\textsuperscript{116} “En los próximos cuatro años aspiramos a contar con un Estatuto de Autonomía dotado de las competencias que reclama Canarias, especialmente la relativa a la gestión de nuestros aeropuertos, costas, transporte aéreo interinsular y la gestión de nuestros recursos marinos...”. Own translation in the main text.
competences as Catalonia...”\textsuperscript{117} (PA/CA AND 2008: 43); and “The creation, within the Canarian Public Treasury, of a Tax Agency to collect, in addition to the \textit{REF} and the agreed and assigned taxes, the direct taxes (\textit{IRPF} and \textit{Sociedades}), regardless of the destination that is given to its collection.”\textsuperscript{118} (CC CI 2011: 11). In terms of the autonomous police, which currently can be found in the Basque Country, Catalonia, and Navarre, both parties seem to have the same understanding of developing a true autonomous police and not only a complementary force: “Demand from the central government the competences and funding for the definitive implementation of the Autonomous Police.”\textsuperscript{119} (PA/CA AND 2012: 59); and “The creation of the Canarian Police is reaffirmed to raise the levels of security in the Islands and reinforce the administration of Justice from the regional Government of the Canary Islands for a better service, with guarantees of efficiency, to our entire society.”\textsuperscript{120} (CC CI 2007: 28).

The local level is mentioned in the same way as the \textit{PSOE} and the \textit{PP} do. The Counties, \textit{Cabildos} and Municipalities need to have more competences to be devolved to them in order for them to develop as part of the region rather than a separate level. Examples of the delegation of more competences to the local bodies are: “Devolving competences from the regional government to the Municipalities in relation to matters linked to the provision of services to the citizens, accompanied by unconditional financing that allows their financial autonomy.”\textsuperscript{121} (PA/CA AND 2008: 98); and “Complete the competence devolution process to the \textit{Cabildos} and Municipalities.” (CC CI 2007: 150). Examples of the local bodies as part of the region are: “The \textit{PA/CA} is committed, in coherence with its municipalist tradition, to a revitalisation of the role of Municipalities in

\textsuperscript{117} “Reivindicamos una Agencia Tributaria propia con las mismas competencias que Cataluña...”. \textit{Own translation in the main text.}
\textsuperscript{118} “La creación, dentro de la Hacienda Pública Canaria, de una Agencia Tributaria que recaude, además de los impuestos del REF y los cedidos, los impuestos directos (IRPF y Sociedades), independientemente del destino que se le dé a su recaudación.” \textit{Own translation in the main text.}
\textsuperscript{119} “Demandar al Estado las competencias y financiación para el impulso definitivo a la Policía Autonómica.”. \textit{Own translation in the main text.}
\textsuperscript{120} “Se reafirma la creación de la Policía canaria para elevar los niveles de seguridad en las Islas y refuerza la administración de Justicia desde el Gobierno de Canarias para una mejor atención, con garantías de eficiencia, a toda nuestra sociedad.”. \textit{Own translation in the main text.}
\textsuperscript{121} “Traspaso de competencias desde la junta a los municipios de materias relacionadas con la prestación de servicios a los ciudadanos, acompañada de una financiación incondicionada que les permita autonomía financiera.”. \textit{Own translation in the main text.}
Andalusian public life, an issue that has to materialise in the integration between the municipal administrations and the regional administration.”\(^{122}\) (PA/CA AND 2000: 16); and “In this sense, CC will lead a series of measures aimed at actively promoting the policies carried out by the public administration as a whole (Regional Government, Municipalities and Cabildos) with total respect ...”\(^{123}\) (CC CI 2007: 14). Again, and like both SWPs, the statement of reorganising the competences between the three levels is mentioned across the three electoral periods in both regions to make the administration more efficient. In comparison to SWPs, regionalist parties demand more competences to be devolved to the regions, including more competences that belong exclusively to the state. These competences are aimed to fully develop the autonomy of the region, for example, by having tax agency, police, borders, and international activity that is purely regional. The ideological position of the PA/CA and CC does not affect, apparently, the calls for more competence and their nature.

- Testing the hypotheses

As regards to distance, it can be observed that this factor has a degree of effect on competence distribution. If the hypothesis was that the further away a region is from the centre, the more likely a party is to call for more competences to be devolved, the manifestos seem to point in this direction. The further away a region is, the higher the calls for more competences to be devolved to the region. As one moves from Castilla-La Mancha to the Canary Islands, the more competences are called for by parties. Despite this general effect of distance, there is a decrease in the emphasis of these calls over time. This negative tendency can be due to the culmination of the competences that can be devolved to the regions according to the constitutional architecture and the Statutes of Autonomy, but this does not fade away the effect of this explanatory variable.

\(^{122}\) “El Partido Andalucista se compromete, en coherencia con su tradición municipalista, a una revitalización del papel de los municipios en la vida pública Andaluza, cuestión que ha de concretarse en la integración de las administraciones municipales en la administración autonómica.”. Own translation in the main text.

\(^{123}\) “En este sentido, Coalición Canaria liderará una serie de medidas encaminadas a fomentar de manera activa las políticas llevadas a cabo en el conjunto de la administración pública canaria (Gobierno, Ayuntamientos y Cabildos) con total respeto...”. Own translation in the main text.
Distance was theorised to affect the position of parties on competence distribution in a positive way. With this analysis, hypothesis H1.F can be confirmed.

The regions, over the past decades, have expanded the number of competences that they are exercising, reducing the competences that they can still demand. If the number of competences that can still be demanded is reduced over time, consequently, the fewer competences can be requested, and therefore, the less emphasis for more competences to be devolved. This can be summarised by the following statement: “We have lived in the last almost thirty years an intense political decentralisation in which the PSOE has played a decisive historical role. In the Canary Islands the change and the decentralising force of the autonomic principle has been spectacular and, why not say it, with an extremely positive balance. Political autonomy has taken root in the Canarian society.”124 (PSOE CI 2007: 68). Despite this, there is still more decentralisation to be done, and this is emphasised more in the outer peripheral region of the Canary Islands: “Self-government has two complementary aspects: improving the management of competencies already delegated and increase the material scope on which to exercise it; that is, more and better self-government.”125 (CC CI 2011: 117).

Developing more the above argument, the Canary Islands is affected by distance in another way. This region adds to the general call for more competences the fact that this request is based on the negative impact that distance has on the region. In order to overcome the latter, this factor is used as the base for more competences to be devolved to the archipelago: “...the Canary Islands were able to manage a part of their calls to be able to adequately exercise part of its competences in terms of the public services that the Autonomous Community has, however we are still a long way from solving the problems

124 “Hemos vivido en los últimos casi treinta años una intensa descentralización política en la que el Partido Socialista Obrero Español ha jugado un papel histórico decisivo. En Canarias el cambio y la fuerza descentralizadora del principio autonómico ha sido espectacular y, por qué no decirlo, con un balance extremadamente positivo. La autonomía política se ha enraizado en la sociedad canaria.” Own translation in the main text.
125 “El autogobierno tiene dos vertientes que se complementan: mejorar la gestión de las competencias ya asumidas y aumentar el ámbito material sobre el que ejercerlo; es decir, más y mejor autogobierno.” Own translation in the main text.
derived from our multiple insularity and remoteness ...”126 (CC CI 2011: 10). Not only distance has a direct effect on the competences that the archipelago already has, but also in the way the centre exercises its own: “... or what ultraperificity imposes on the State, within the scope of its competences, the need to modulate its policies when those circumstances of insularity and remoteness demand it ...”127 (CC CI 2011: 188). The references that parties use to request the recognition of the distinctive characteristics that affect the archipelago, which are basically distance and fragmentation, are the pillars on which new competences are called for to precisely correct their negative effects.

Focusing on fragmentation, the analysis shows two very different results that go in opposite ways. On one hand, spatial fragmentation seems to favour the call for more competences in order to avoid its negative impact. From the analysis, distance and spatial fragmentation come together. Both are the main distinctive characteristics that need to be recognised in order to avoid their negative impact on the region, and this comes through the devolution of more competences. On the other hand, political-administrative fragmentation seems to undermine the call for competences due to the importance that the Provincial Councils, Counties, and Cabildos have in the regional reality, as expected. This undermining effect seems to increase as one reaches the Canary Islands. This can provide evidence to confirm that the undermining effect of political-administrative fragmentation increases as one moves away from the centre in relation to the increasing importance of these ruling bodies for the local populations. This can be illustrated in the following statements: “...in such a way that the strengthening of regional power must not imply, in any way, the undervaluation of the other two institutional elements.” “128 (PSOE CI 1999: 47); “The commitment to greater prominence of the Cabildos is irreversible. The

126 “...Canarias logró una parte de sus reclamaciones para poder ejercer adecuadamente parte las competencias y servicios públicos que la Comunidad Autónoma ostenta, todavía estamos muy lejos de conseguir que se atiendan totalmente las especiales dificultades de nuestra múltiple insularidad y lejanía...”. Own translation in the main text.
127 “...o en que la ultraperificidad imponga al Estado, en el ámbito de sus competencias, la necesidad de modular sus políticas cuando esas circunstancias de insularidad y lejanía así lo demanden...”. Own translation in the main text.
128 “...de tal forma que el fortalecimiento del poder regional no ha de implicar, en modo alguno, la minusvaloración de los otros dos elementos institucionales.”. Own translation in the text.
**Cabildos** will be the main administration par excellence.”\(^{129}\) (PP CI 2011: 23); and “The **Cabildos**, as the authentic island governments and institutions of the Autonomous Community, will be endowed with a more stable framework ...”\(^{130}\) (Rodríguez Rodríguez CC Official Diary 1999 núm 3: 12). Reinforcing the region with more competences in detriment of the **Cabildos** can have a negative impact on the life of the local populations in each island, and therefore, the call for more competences to the region is undermined by the importance of these local island-based bodies. Without this deep effect of fragmentation, the calls for more competences would be higher, as there would be no opposing ruling body that would be undermined by this.

With this analysis, hypothesis H2.F can be partially confirmed via the political-administrative dimension of fragmentation. The calls for more competences for the regions are undermined by the importance that the Provincial Councils and Counties have in Castilla-La Mancha and Andalusia, and the **Cabildos** in the Canary Islands, and this increases as one reaches the outer-periphery. Although parties in Castilla-La Mancha (e.g. PSOE C-LM 1999: 98-100) and Andalusia emphasise the importance of the local bodies (e.g. PA/CA AND 2008: 28; PP AND 2012: 122), this increases when one turns to the Canary Islands. In this last region, they seem to act as the “true” ruling body and not the region itself, and this situation further undermines the ability of any other administrative level to increase its importance via, for example, calling for more competences to expand its influence. The positive results for spatial fragmentation can be taken into consideration when observing the effects of the combination of both dimensions of fragmentation in the Canary Islands.

According to the above, the combination of the two dimensions of fragmentation in the Canary Islands can turn parties to stronger pro-periphery positions on some occasion. The negative effect of political-administrative fragmentation is still present, but there is a genuine concern of all parties to avoid the overall negative impact of both dimensions of fragmentation. The more competences the region has, the more this negative effect can be overcome. These two contradicting

---

\(^{129}\) “La apuesta por un mayor protagonismo de los Cabildos es irreversible. Los Cabildos serán la administración gestora por excelencia.”. Own translation in the main text.

\(^{130}\) “Los Cabildos, como auténticos gobiernos insulares e instituciones de La Comunidad Autónoma, serán dotados de un marco más estables...”. Own translation in the main text.
results are challenging, and they should be further analysed to outline the causal mechanism that can explain them, but for the current research, the results can be used only to partially confirm the stated hypothesis.

Turning to the hypotheses that deal with the control variables party type, ideology, and structure, the conclusions are as follows. Party type was hypothesised to observe regionalist parties calling for more competences for the regions in comparison to both SWPs. The analysis shows that hypothesis H7.I can be confirmed. The regionalist parties in Andalusia and the Canary Islands seem to call for more competences that the SWPs. Ideology appears to have the same effect as for the saliency of the regional level, and the analysis confirms hypothesis H8.F. The ideological position of parties does not influence the emphasis for more or less competences for the regions. The PP and the CC are both right/centre-right parties, but the former seems to call for less competences for the regions than the latter. It has to be acknowledged that the ideological position of parties affects the way the Psoe and the PP articulate their attitudes toward competence distribution, but the comparison with the results for the PA/CA and CC point in the direction of considering the importance of ideology in relation to party type when it comes to both SWPs. Putting emphasis on the Psoe and the PP, the hypothesis (H9.F) for the interaction between party type and the ideological position of parties can be confirmed. The Psoe, as shown, calls for more and more important competences in comparison to the PP. This can be reasoned in the fact that this left/centre-left party is more willing to incorporate other social groups into a broader political project, and one way can be by fulfilling the need via more and more important competences, even those that belong exclusively to the central government, in order to achieve the aim. The Psoe calls for competences that belong exclusively to the state in both regions, but these are contextualised to the needs of the region, as its structure suggests.

The final hypothesis deals with the structure of the parties, with the focus on both SWPs. This analysis confirms hypothesis H10.C. Not only does the Psoe call for more competences than the PP to be devolved to the regions, but also the nature of these competences changes. The competences that in some occasions are called for by the Psoe, are those that could be considered as
belonging to an independent state, and they are called for to address the interest of the regions. The call and nature of the competences are in relation to the needs of the regions and not to those of the centre exclusively. Therefore, the call for competences are highly contextualised, having more horizontal variation than the PP, which is limited by the centre. One of these limits can be precisely the competences that belong to the central government. Figure 6.6 summarises the overall analysis for this dependent variable.

Figure 6.6. Extension and nature of the calls for more competences of the different parties.
2.4) Identity

The manifestos for all parties in all regions and for the three electoral periods in terms of the articulation of a regional identity can be generalised using the following statement. Identity is referred to by parties in two main blocks: on one hand, the sources of identity, and on the other hand, the articulation of the identity itself. SWPs tend to refer to the first block with more emphasis, the sources of identity, and less to the second. In comparison, when it comes to the PA/CA and CC, both mention the sources and the articulation of identity itself with the same intensity. They position themselves on the defence of a strong regional identity, which is articulated in a national way in both cases and in all the electoral periods. The factors that affect the most this dependent variable are distance, fragmentation, party type, ideology, and party structure. There is not enough evidence to conclude whether polycentricity has a clear effect or not.

As it has been outlined, identity is approached in two different blocks, and in Castilla-La Mancha, both SWPs do not seem to develop any of the two. There are only highly indirect references to some kind of identity that comes from the identification of the hydraulic resources as part of the Castilian identity, which seems to be a salient issue in the new regionalism is Spain (Lopez-Gunn 2009: 3070-371). Therefore, it can be stated that, in Castilla-La Macha, both the PSOE and the PP do not refer to the articulation of a regional identity itself. The reason for this can be twofold. The first reason is the lack of deep rooted historical characteristics that are used to articulate a regional identity as it has been done in the Basque Country, Galicia, and Catalonia with a regional language, or a regional culture like in Andalusia or the Canary Islands: “Regions that do not know or cannot forge their identity will harm their people and their territories. Some put the accent on their history or on their nationalist ideologies; Castilla-La Mancha has put it, from its configuration as an Autonomous Community, in its majority will expressed for the last 16 years: HAVING VOICE...”\(^{131}\) (PSOE C-LM 1999: 3). In Castilla-La Mancha, the most common issue that the local population share are

\(^{131}\) “Las regiones que no sepan o no puedan forjar su identidad perjudicarán a sus gentes y a sus territorios. Algunos ponen el acento en su historia o en sus ideologías nacionalistas; Castilla-La Mancha lo ha puesto, desde su configuración como comunidad autónoma, en su voluntad mayoritariamente expresada desde hace 16 años: TENER VOZ...”. *Own translation in the main text.*
the hydraulic resources such as the rivers Segura, Jucar, Guadiana, and Tajo: “We do not want to shield any river. This region is a very solidary region, it does not intend to make exclusive use of water if others need it and we have more, but we have to enrich ourselves with our water and we must fight for the defence of the interests of the men and women of Castilla-La Mancha”\textsuperscript{132} (Dolores de Cospedal PP Official Diary Castilla-La Mancha 2007 núm. 2: 17). The second reason is that the regional identity in Castilla-La Mancha is, at its best, weak. This is because it identifies with the centre. The possible regional identity that can be found in Castilla-La Mancha coincides with the Spanish national identity. When parties in Castilla-La Mancha refer to the Spanish national identity, they are also referring to the Castilian regional identity. How this Spanish national identity is to be understood is not outlined.

SWPs in Andalusia display a different dynamic in relation to the two blocks. The references are a mixture of possible sources and the articulation of the regional identity in Andalusia. The references to the sources of a regional identity can be observed for both parties in the many references to the need for promotion and protection of the regional culture and heritage through various methods, such as cultural programmes and the use of public media: “... as a unique element of the Andalusian cultural heritage.”\textsuperscript{133} (PSOE AND 2008: 92); and “... for the enhancement of the heritage and identity of our peoples and cities...”\textsuperscript{134} (PP AND 2008: 127). These references can also come through recognising the need to develop the distinctive characteristics of Andalusia in a new Statute of Autonomy as in 2000: “The guarantee of distinctive features...”\textsuperscript{135} (PSOE AND 2000: 15).

The important references in Andalusia come in the second block, the articulation of the regional identity. An example of these references to the articulation of a regional identity can be found in the PP for the elections of 2008 and 2012, making use of the term andalucismo constitucional: “The PP

\textsuperscript{132} “No queremos blindar ningún río. Esta Región es una Región muy solidaria, no pretende hacer un uso exclusivo del agua si los demás la necesitan y a nosotros nos sobra, pero tenemos que enriquecernos con nuestra agua y hay que luchar por la defensa de los intereses de los hombres y mujeres de Castilla-La Mancha.” \textit{Own translation in the main text.}

\textsuperscript{133} “...como elemento singular del patrimonio cultural andaluz.” \textit{Own translation in the main text.}

\textsuperscript{134} “...para la puesta en valor del Patrimonio y señas de identidad de nuestros pueblos y ciudades...”. \textit{Own translation in the main text.}

\textsuperscript{135} “La garantía de los hechos diferenciales...”. \textit{Own translation in the main text.}
in Andalusia establishes its ideological base on Constitutional Andalusism”¹³⁶ (PP AND 2008: 15). The PSOE also refers to the issue of the regional identity, but without introducing an specific term for it: “... cohesive in social and territorial matters, proud of its cultural identity and its history ...”¹³⁷ (PSOE AND 2000: 5); and “... to contribute to the knowledge of the history and common signs of identity of all Andalusian citizens.”¹³⁸ (PSOE AND 2008: 22).

Both the PSOE and the PP articulate an Andalusian regional identity that is not only compatible with the Spanish identity, but also part of it: “Mr. Chávez, we have always believed that Andalusia, our culture, our identity and our interests can be developed without confrontation, suspicion, or confusion with the whole of Spain in a common future project.”¹³⁹ (Siaz PP Official Diary 2000 núm. 3: 58). Andalusia’s identity is part of the Spanish national identity for both SWPs. The main difference is that there is more emphasis on a distinct regional identity in Andalusia than in Castilla-La Macha. The reason for this is that they compete in the periphery, where the centre has to compete with the reaction of the local population using identity as a distinctive marker. The centre, through the SWPs, interacts with regional identities through a Spanish national identity which is capable of incorporating the former. The common ground that the PSOE and the PP share is that none refer to the Andalusian identity as national or as a nacionalidad. The difference in the case of Andalusia when comparing the two SWPs is that the PSOE tries to make the Spanish national identity compatible with the Andalusian regional identity, whilst the PP tries to assimilate the latter to the former.

When it comes to the Canary Islands, the same behaviour can be observed. In this region, the references are also divided into the references to the sources and the articulation of the regional identity itself. The SWPs feel comfortable discussing the articulation of a regional identity, but again, without

¹³⁶ “El Partido Popular de Andalucía sienta su base ideológica en el Andalucismo Constitucional.”. *Own translation in the main text.*
¹³⁷ “...cohesiona en lo social y en lo territorial, orgullosa de su identidad cultural y de su historia...”. *Own translation in the main text.*
¹³⁸ “...para contribuir al conocimiento de la historia y las señas de identidad comunes de toda la ciudadanía andaluza.”. *Own translation in the main text.*
¹³⁹ “Señor Chaves, siempre hemos creído que Andalucía, nuestra cultura, nuestra identidad y nuestros intereses pueden ser desarrollados sin confrontación ni recelos ni guirigáis con el conjunto de España en un proyecto de futuro común.”. *Own translation in the main text.*
considering it a national, *nacionalidad*, or incompatible identity with the Spanish one. The analysis shows that the *PSOE* and the *PP*, in all three elections, refer with more or less degree of emphasis, to a Canarian regional identity, but their references are not directed to consider it in-depth nor giving it a status that could make it stand in equal consideration as the Spanish national identity. Rather than referring to the Canarian regional identity as a distinct identity, they refer to it using other labels, such as distinctiveness features: “... and taking into account the unique characteristics of the Canarian culture.”°°⁴ (PSOE CI 2007: 14). Using the two blocks in which the references to a regional identity can be divided into, both SWPs are comfortable dealing with the first block, the possible sources of the Canarian regional identity, but their references to the second block, its articulation, are determined by which party develops it. Again, the *PSOE* tries to make the Spanish national identity compatible with the Canarian identity and the *PP* tries to make assimilate it to the Spanish national identity.

Although a general behaviour can be observed in approaching regional identities, there are verifiable differences between the *PSOE* and the *PP*, and these appears to be determined by their ideological position and structure. Left/centre-left parties, more willing to incorporate other cultural groups, are open to develop a peaceful coexistence between regional and national identities. This is the case of the *PSOE*, which stands on this position. Although an SWP, it is able to stretch the boundaries of the Spanish national identity to make it compatible with the identities found in the regions. This is reinforced by the degree of freedom that its regional branches have. These two elements, in combination, grants the *PSOE* the capacity of incorporating regional identities to a more inclusive Spanish national identity without them being in a dichotomous relation. The opposite happens with the *PP*. Being a right/centre-right and highly integrated party limits its action when dealing with regional identities. This does not mean that the party does not acknowledge them, but the relation with the Spanish national identity is very determined by the centre. In other words, the Castilian-centred Spanish national identity that the *PP* defends is not as capable of incorporating regional identities as the broader Spanish national identity of the

°°⁴ “...y teniendo en cuenta las singularidades propias de la cultura canaria.”. *Own translation in the main text.*
PSOE. These limitations are reinforced by the action of its regional branches, which highlight the articulation of a regional identity which is subordinated to the Castilian-centred Spanish national identity, as shown in the case of Andalusia. Overall, both SWPs deal with regional identities with the attitude of recognising them, but the extension of this recognition is determined by their ideological position and structure.

In comparison to the PSOE and the PP, both regionalist parties have the same emphasis on developing the Andalusian and Canarian identities as national identities or nacionalidades, but they differ in terms of the compatibility of these identities with the Spanish national identity. In the Spanish context, as outlined in chapter 3, this national identity is referred to as a nacionalidad, which is compatible with the Spanish national identity but in a hierarchical relation. These nacionalidades are below in rank to the Spanish national identity. They have constitutional recognition, but initially thought for the so-called historical regions, such as Catalonia or the Basque Country. Both the PA/CA and CC stand on the position of recognising their regions as nacionalidades. References to the Andalusian and Canarian identities are made by using most of the time the term identidad, but both parties refer to this identity as a national reality, national identity or nacionalidad, being this the key point. The references to this identity are done, as in the case of both SWPs, using the same two blocks. The difference with the SWPs is the relation with the Spanish national identity, dictated by the constitutional recognition described above.

When it comes to the inner-periphery of Andalusia, the references to the sources of the regional identity come through the same methods as for the PSOE and the PP. These are, for examples, references to the historical heritage or regional culture: “The Andalusian culture is our main resource of distinctiveness for progress and our main patrimony for a coexistence based on the values of tolerance, autonomy and equity.”\textsuperscript{141} (PA/CA AND 2008: 180) or “The environment is, together with our culture, the greatest heritage of the Andalusians and a basic

\textsuperscript{141}“La cultura andaluza es nuestro principal recurso de singularidad para el progreso y nuestro principal patrimonio para una convivencia asentada en los valores de tolerancia, autonomía y equidad.”. \textit{Own translation in the main text}. 

275
collective right ..."142 (PA/CA AND 2012: 21). Adding to this explicit content of the manifestos, the political texts incorporate other non-textual elements that can help reinforce this argument. The PA/CA, in the case of the manifesto of 1999, introduces a quote at the beginning which refers to the *Manifiesto de la Nacionalidad de 1919*143, where Andalusia is defined as a national reality.

In terms of the articulation of the Andalusian identity, the PA/CA refers to it as a national reality or *nacionalidad*: “We understand the national reality of Andalusia as a living process ...”144 (PA/CA AND 2008: 27) and “… rational articulation of the different institutional areas and in the national self-government of Andalusia.”145 (PA/CA AND 2012: 26). There is a doubtless reference to the identity in Andalusia as being national. The next step is identifying when this national identity is part of a broader Spanish national identity. In other words, what kind of relation can be established with the Spanish national identity. The party defines this national identity as: “We understand the national reality of Andalusia as a living process and subject to continuous transformation and progress. Our identity has been shaped throughout centuries, thanks to the influence and contribution of multiple cultures and will continue being built and enriched in this way, thanks to the incorporation and integration of the new Andalusians who today come to live and work in our land.”146 (PA/CA AND 2012: 33). These references to the national identity in Andalusia, the sources and the articulation of it, and the way it is put forward can be summarised concluding that for this regionalist party, the national identity of Andalusia, although it is...

---

142 “El medio ambiente es, junto con nuestra cultura, el mayor patrimonio de los andaluces y un derecho colectivo básico...”. *Own translation in the main text.*

143 *The Manifiesto de la Nacionalidad de 1919* was articulated by the *Asamblea de Cordoba de 1919*, where Andalusia was declared a national reality. The current Statute of Autonomy of 2007 refers to this manifesto of 1919 to define Andalusia as a historic nationality, as stated in art. 2 of the Constitution of 1978.

144 “Entendemos la realidad nacional de Andalucía como un proceso vivo...”. *Own translation in the main text.*

145 “…articulación racional de los distintos ámbitos institucionales y en el autogobierno nacional de Andalucía.”. *Own translation in the main text.*

146 “Entendemos la realidad nacional de Andalucía como un proceso vivo y sometido a continua transformación y avance. Nuestra identidad se ha conformado a lo largo de los siglos, gracias a la influencia y a la aportación de múltiples culturas y va a seguir siendo construida y enriquecida de este modo, gracias a la incorporación e integración de los nuevos andaluces que hoy vienen a vivir y trabajar a nuestra tierra.”. *Own translation in the main text.*
articulated with its own distinct components, is compatible with other identities with an equal status, being them national or not.

The nationalism shown by the PA/CA seems to be able to cohabit with other identities, including the Spanish national identity: “Today the citizen shares multiple identities. Especially the Andalusian feels identified, to a greater extent than another Spanish citizen, with the different institutionalised territorial areas (Europe, Spain, Andalusia, his city). This is because our Andalusian identity is not exclusive but a melting pot, and where others see incompatibilities, we appreciate complementarity and synergy.”147 (PA/CA AND 2008: 30). The identity that is developed by the PA/CA can be classified as a national identity that is able to complement itself with other identities, including a Spanish national identity, on an equal footing.

When it comes to the outer-peripheral region of the Canary Islands, the analysis shows that in comparison to Andalusia, the regional identity articulated by CC goes a step further in its articulation. The references to the regional identity are as national or as a nacionalidad: “Recognition of the Canary Islands as a national entity.”148 (CC CI 2007: 29); and “The definition of the Canary Islands as an Atlantic Archipelago, in which its unique identity gives it the character of Nationality ...”149 (CC CI 2011: 119). This national identity seems to be different from the Spanish identity, and its origins are stated to be different: “... historical character of the Canarian identity that alludes to the aboriginal populations until our days, happening through the Rome of the III century dc., the Europe of the s. XIV, the Spanish conquest, belonging to the Spanish State or integration into the European Union, without forgetting relations with America and Africa.”150 (CC CI...
2011: 199); and “Our geographical situation is determining in the conformation of a distinct identity forged through five centuries…”\footnote{151} (CC CI 2007: 7).

The references to the sources of the identity of the region are the same as for the other parties (PSOE, PP, and the PA/CA) and regions: “Study, rescue and promotion of cultural values linked to the landscape and identity of the Canary Islands …”\footnote{152} (CC CI 2007: 40); and “We will promote the Canarian cultural heritage as a social and cultural structuring tool of the Canary Islands, as well as a means for the assumption of our identity as a people.”\footnote{153} (CC CI 2011: 61). Regarding the visual references, observed also for the PA/CA in Andalusia, it must be stated that CC does not use quotations like the PA/CA, but instead, introduces the so-called independence flag\footnote{154} in the manifestos of 2007 and 2011, in the same way as the estelada\footnote{155} flag is used in Catalonia.

Regarding the articulation of a Canarian identity, the same question as with the PA/CA in Andalusia has to be asked: is this national identity compatible with other identities, especially with the Spanish identity? The answer seems to be positive in general terms: “We are in the Spanish State for history and tradition, and we defend our nationality status, with the maximum of competences … in it we will be”\footnote{156} (CC CI 1999: 7); and especially “The trace of our origins can never be destroyed. Neither conquest, nor colonization, nor centralism, have managed to erase the certainty of this living culture. We do not deny the ties that bind us to the peoples of Spain, but we claim our own personality. In the historical process, we have assimilated those elements that have served to conform our peculiarity and rejected what did not suit it. Our universality is based on our

\footnote{151} “Nuestra situación geográfica es determinante en la conformación de una identidad distinta forjada en cinco siglos...”. Own translation in the main text.

\footnote{152} “Estudio, rescate y promoción de los valores culturales ligados al paisaje y a la identidad de Canarias...”. Own translation in the main text.

\footnote{153} “Promoveremos el patrimonio cultural canario como un instrumento de vertebración social y cultural de Canarias, así como un medio para la asunción de nuestra identidad como pueblo.”. Own translation in the main text.

\footnote{154} The independence flag of the Canary Islands has the same design as the current flag but substituting the constitutional coat of arms with 7 green stars organised in a circle. This flag was designed in 1964 by the Movimiento por la Autodeterminacion e Independencia del Archipielago Canario (MPAIAC) to be the future flag of an independent Canary Islands.

\footnote{155} The estelada is the independence flag in Catalonia, which substitutes the traditional Senyera by introducing a blue triangle with a white star in the left side of the flag.

\footnote{156} “Estamos en el Estado español por historia y tradición, y defendemos nuestro estatus de nacionalidad, con el máximo de competencias ... en ella estaremos”. Own translation in the main text.
primordialism.” (CC CI 2007: 30). The national identity in the Canary Islands, according to CC, is distinct with its own characteristics but compatible with the Spanish national identity. This coincides with the definition of the Andalusian national identity articulated by the PA/CA.

There is a key difference between CC and the PA/CA when it comes to the compatibility of the regional identity with the Spanish national identity, and the ideological position of these two parties seems to reinforce this difference. Although both regionalist parties defend the identity of Andalusia and the Canary Islands as national or as a nacionalidad, compatible, to some extent, with an inclusive Spanish national identity, these nacionalidades become compatible or not depending on the social values that the parties support. The statements where the PA/CA defines the Andalusian nacionalidad as universal and result of a melting pot (PA/CA AND 2008: 30) are expected from a left/centre-left party that embraces universalism and openness to other cultures. In the case of CC, although some manifestos contain references to this (CC CI 1999: 7), the right social values that this party support makes this degree of compatibility less evident. The references that CC makes to the past of the Canary Islands as a territory conquered by Castilla (CC CI 2011: 199), and being the Canarian identity distinct from the Castilian-centred national identity (CC CI 2007: 7), seem to point in the direction of articulating a nacionalidad which is compatible but to a lesser extent in comparison to the Andalusian nacionalidad that the PA/CA articulates. Introducing elements that differentiate the Canarian nacionalidad in opposition to the Castilian-centred national identity can contribute to conclude that CC, in contrast to the PA/CA, frames the Canarian nacionalidad as less compatible with the Spanish national identity.

This degree of compatibility locates CC in a grey zone where the compatibility of the regional identity is put forward, like the PA/CA does, but the language used to construct the identity can point in the direction of having them...

157 “Nunca podrá ser destruida la huella de nuestros orígenes. Ni la conquista, ni la colonización, ni el centralismo, han logrado borrar la certidumbre de esta cultura viva. No negamos los lazos que nos unen a los pueblos de España, pero reivindicamos nuestra propia personalidad. En el proceso histórico, hemos asimilado aquellos elementos que han servido para conformar nuestra peculiaridad, y rechazado lo que no se acomodaron a ella. Nuestra universalidad se fundamenta en nuestro primitivismo.”. Own translation in the main text.
separate and not together in a broader Spanish national identity. It seems as if CC wants to keep both identities separate and only admitting their interaction but not their mixture. On the other hand, the PA/CA seems to accept that both the Andalusian and Spanish national identity can, through their cohabitation and interaction, articulate a broader identity with the incorporation of characteristics of both. Feeling Andalusian can mean feeling Spanish and vice versa. CC keeps this difference solid. Feeling Canarian does not necessarily mean feeling Spanish and vice versa, but at the same, it is not incompatible per se. This is the reason for considering the attitude of CC to be somehow in a grey zone. The ideological position of CC can help reinforce this idea, as right/centre-righted orientated parties are less open to include other social groups and identities.

When it comes to the effect of distance and fragmentation (spatial dimension), the development of the reasoning can be the following. The more differentiated nacionalidad that CC defends in comparison to the PA/CA can point in the direction of distance and fragmentation making a major difference in this degree of distinctiveness. In the analysis of the dependent variable constitutional status of the region, CC suggested that the outer-periphery of the Canary Islands needs to have some kind of recognition in the Constitutional architecture of the state by the means of enumerating the distinctive characteristics that this region has in comparison to the rest. These characteristics were distance and fragmentation. Taking this as a starting point, the same can be said for identity, but in this case, CC argues that the national identity of the Canary Islands is based, to some extent, on distance and insularity: “... that reinforces and enhances our identity and our self-government through the recognition of the peculiarities derived from the double insularity and the distance, ...”\(^\text{158}\) (CC CI 2007: 8). Through these kinds of statements, CC introduces distance and fragmentation as part of as distinct national identity in the Canary Islands.

The incorporation of distinctive characteristics of the region to the regional identities is not an exception of the Canary Islands: “For Andalusians, commitment to the environment is not only a matter of rationality but also of

\(^{158}\) “...que refuerce y potencie nuestra identidad y nuestro autogobierno mediante el reconocimiento de las singularidades derivadas de la doble insularidad y de la lejanía,...”: Own translation in the main text.
affectivity and symbolism because our territory, the conservation of Andalusian landscapes, the protection of our environment and our aesthetics, constitute our own identity.” (PA/CA AND 2008: 198). As it has been shown, both regionalist parties make use of the distinct characteristics of the region to reinforce its identity, but distance and fragmentation draws a difference between Andalusia and the Canary Islands. In the case of the Canary Islands, distance and fragmentation are pillars on which to articulate the Canarian nacionalidad, which does not happen for the case of Andalusia. Distance and fragmentation make the Canarian identity more distinct from the Spanish national identity than the Andalusian identity. Therefore, it can be observed that distance and fragmentation make the regions of Andalusia and the Canary Islands differ from each other when it comes to their identity. The emphasis on distance and fragmentation in the Canary Islands as part of its identity seem to be made mainly by CC in opposition to the PSEOE and the PP. The latter use these characteristics to support a differentiated constitutional status of the region rather than for a distinct Canarian identity.

- Testing the hypotheses

Distance was theorised to affect positively the articulation of the regional identity in a positive way. The analysis, especially for CC, shows that being far away from the centre has fostered the strengthening of a Canarian identity. The isolation from the centre fuelled the articulation of a very distinct identity, which is based on this distance that separates the archipelago from any other sources of identity. As one can observe, distance has also contributed to the articulation of an Andalusian identity, not as a distinctive characteristic like in the Canary Islands but as a factor that has favoured its differentiation from the Castilian-centred Spanish national identity found in Castilla-La Mancha. Therefore, hypothesis H1.G can be confirmed. The lack of development of the Canarian identity by both SWPs undermines this possible conclusion but nonetheless, the behaviour of CC points in the direction of confirming the stated hypothesis. One possible reason

---

159 “Para los andalucistas el compromiso con el medio ambiente no es sólo una cuestión de racionalidad sino también de afectividad y simbolismo porque nuestro territorio, la conservación de los paisajes andaluces, la protección de nuestro medio ambiente y de nuestra estética, constituyen nuestras propias señas de identidad.”. Own translation in the main text.
for this might be the fear of the PSOE and the PP to articulate a Canarian identity so different from the Spanish national identity that is might serve as a bases for some independentist groups to support secession, going against the interest of the centre.

Added to distance as a source of identity, the same can be said for fragmentation. With this in mind, hypothesis H2.G can be rejected. One could expect fragmentation to affect negatively the articulation of a strong regional identity due to the identification of the local population with the local ruling bodies and their islands, in the Canary Islands, as the main source of identity. The opposite seems to be occurring. Fragmentation is used to strengthen the regional identity via the incorporation of this distinctive characteristics as part of the Canarian identity. The references to these distinct characteristics linked with identity are made primarily by CC, whereas the PSOE and the PP mentioning distance and fragmentation as characteristics of the region in general and not specifically in relation with the Canarian identity. Looking at the elections for the local bodies in this region might help reinforce this conclusion of open the door to a new understanding of this phenomenon, so this should be taken with caution.

As a general conclusion for parties in Andalusia and the Canary Islands, the following can be said. The PA/CA and CC call for the regional identities to be recognised as national realities, nacionalidades, or national identities. Both national identities are defined as distinct from a Castilian-centred national identity (PA/CA AND 2012: 4; CC FRAM 2008: 3-5), but at the same time and to some extent, compatible with a more inclusive Spanish national identity (PA/CA AND 2008: 30; CC CI 1999: 7). However, the degree of this compatibility is graduated by their ideological position. This analysis can be used to confirm hypothesis H7.J. These two regionalist parties support the recognition of the regional identities found in Andalusia and the Canary Islands as nacionalidades in contrast to the PSOE and the PP. The ideological position of parties makes a deeper difference in comparison to the above dependent variables. This was hypothesised that left/centre-left parties are able to articulate a more inclusive national/regional identity than right/centre-right parties. The analysis also suggests that hypothesis H8.G can be confirmed. Both the PSOE and the PA/CA seem to have a more inclusive vision of the identity that they articulate, being this
national or regional. It can be said that the degree of compatibility is higher in left/centre-left parties.

This degree of compatibility of the regional identities and the Spanish national identity can be further observed in the interaction between party type and ideology. With these results, hypothesis H9.G can also be confirmed. The PP and CC articulate a Spanish/Canarian national identity which is less inclusive of others, especially of each other. This can be translated in the former having milder pro-periphery positions in comparison to the PSOE, and the latter stronger pro-periphery positions than the PA/CA. When it comes to the party structure of the PSOE and the PP, hypothesis H10.D can be also confirmed. The highly integrated structure of the PP allows less contextualisation from its regional branches to stretch the limits of a strong Castilian-dominated Spanish national identity. Figure 6.7 summarises the overall analysis of this dependent variable.
3. DISCUSSION

After qualitatively analysing the manifestos to address the different hypotheses designed for the comparison between Castilla-La Mancha, Andalusia, and the Canary Islands, the purpose of this section is to contrast the main findings with the structured questions contained in the methodological chapter to conclude how distance, fragmentation, polycentricity, party type, ideology, and party structure shape party competition on the centre-periphery cleavage. Overall, the main finding points in the direction of identifying all these factors to have some degree of impact.

In this qualitative analysis, contrary to the findings in the previous chapter, distance seems to have a pro-periphery effect on how parties’ position on the
centre-periphery cleavage. This can be one of the main contributions of this chapter, showing that distance has a much deeper effect than the one observed in the previous analysis. The effects of distance on the behaviour of parties can be linked to the increasing effect of the abstraction level as one moves away from the centre, strengthening their pro-periphery positions. This is, the effect of distance increases exponentially when reaching the Canary Islands. The process of territorialisation makes the region increase its importance amongst the peripheral population, making parties shift to adapt to this new circumstance, adopting stronger pro-periphery positions as the region becomes the location of the loyalties of the regional population. Both SWPs and regionalist parties turn to the characteristics of the region to find a link to fulfil the place attachment feeling that the local population requires to form part of an identifiable political community. Not only distance seems to have a pro-periphery overall effect on party behaviour, but this factor is explicitly referenced to justify their positions. This can be better observed in the analysis for the dependent variables constitutional status of the region and position on competence distribution. Parties acting in the Canary Islands not only call for a more differentiated constitutional status of the region, but also, this differentiated this needs to gravitate around the fact that the distance from mainland negatively affects its development. In order to deal with this situation, parties increasingly call for more competences to be devolved to the region to address the negative impact of the ultra-peripherality of the region.

The above analysis shows that fragmentation provided unpredicted effects from the ones theorised. The expected undermining effect on the pro-periphery positions of parties is only observed in the results for the dependent variable saliency of the regional level. The unexpected results come in relation to the dependent variables constitutional status of the region and identity, clearly going in opposite direction to the theorised expectations. According to this, one can say that fragmentation has a mixture of effects on the positions of parties that reveals its complexity. First, the expected negative effect of political-administrative fragmentation was confirmed when analysing the saliency of the regional level, preventing a strong regional discourse and undermining the pro-periphery positions of parties, finding its strongest impact in the Canary Islands. In this last
region, the coincidence of the spatial and political-administrative dimensions of fragmentation deepens even more the negative effect of fragmentation as a whole, based on the perfect match between the island-based loyalties (spatial dimension) and the island-based ruling bodies (political-administrative dimension). The positive effects of fragmentation on the pro-periphery positions of parties can be observed when articulating a differentiated constitutional status of the region and a strong regional identity in the Canary Islands. In the case of these two dependent variables, when both dimensions of fragmentation coincide, parties turned to stronger pro-periphery positions in order to reinforce the region. Parties in this outer-periphery strengthen their pro-periphery positions based on acknowledging this explanatory variable as an intrinsic characteristic of the region without which it cannot be understood. It can be observed how fragmentation is taken as one of the pillars on which the strong image of the archipelago region is built on.

The analysis of the dependent variable position on competence distribution shows contrasting results themselves, but they provide a clear picture of its complexity. Initially, and as expected, parties, although calling for more competences to be devolved to the regions, draw the line in not undermining the competences that the Provincial Councils, Counties, and Cabillos already have. This refers to the political-administrative dimension of fragmentation, undermining the ability of parties to have strong pro-periphery positions when calling for more competences to be devolved to the regions. This increases with distance from the centre, as the importance of these local bodies also increases. Opposite to this and the theoretical expectations, spatial fragmentation pushed parties to adopt strong pro-periphery positions to deal with its negative effects at the regional level in the Canary Islands. As it can be observed, depending on the dimension analysed, the results are different. This complexity is even greater when considering both dimensions in combination. When both dimensions of fragmentation coincide like in the Canary Islands, picturing the same theorised deep negative effect as in the analysis of the saliency of the regional level outlined above, parties, instead of adopting the same behaviour, turned to stronger pro-periphery positions. With this in mind, the overall conclusion in relation to the position on competence distribution can be that the importance of Provincial
Councils, Counties, and *Cabildos* prevents parties from calling for more competences to be devolved to the regions, but the combination of the two dimensions of fragmentation can make them, on some occasions, turn to strong pro-periphery positions based on their determination to avoid its negative impact.

As a whole, the complexity of these findings regarding this factor points in the direction of further researching for a possible causal mechanism that might help understand its real impact on the centre-periphery. Having two very different and opposing scenarios highlights the importance of scrutinising fragmentation more in detail to observe if, on one hand, the two dimensions proposed here are related to each other in a different way, and on the other hand, one is a catalyst of the other. Providing an example of the latter, if the importance of the political-administrative dimension of fragmentation is exacerbated by the spatial dimension of fragmentation, then this would change the understanding of fragmentation as a whole. In this sense, the important dimension of fragmentation would be the political-administrative one, and spatial fragmentation would then be considered, for example, as a causal mechanism to explain the deep impact that local ruling bodies have, as the *Cabildos* do in the Canary Islands, in insular regions.

The anticipated negative effect of the degree of polycentricity was only observed, to some extent, in the saliency of the regional level. This leads to preliminary conclude that the existence of two very dichotomous centres of power (low degree of polycentricity) undermines, to some extent and as theorised, the pro-periphery positions of parties, acknowledged by all in the Canary Islands in contrast to the high degree of polycentricity found in Castilla-La Mancha and Andalusia. As suggested by both the analysis and the data used to set the number of competing centres of power in the three regions, the degree of polycentricity is the factor that might further shape party positions and not the mere existence of different centres of power per se. Despite this observation, this needs to be further analysed as the inferences for the rest of the dependent variables are not enough to confirm or reject the remaining hypotheses. Added to this, the analysis also highlighted the fact that the strong effect of the degree of polycentricity in the Canary Islands can be linked to fragmentation, making this factor one of its main effects or consequences.
As with the quantitative analysis, party type seems to deeply shape how parties compete along the centre-periphery cleavage. Party positions turn more or less pro-periphery according to which type of party articulates the discourse. With this in mind, regionalist parties seem to have the strongest pro-periphery positions than SWPs. This behaviour can be observed in Andalusia and the Canary Islands, where these parties push for more benefits for their regions. This is the expected outcome. Their centre of loyalties, located in the peripheries, determine their positions. SWPs have a more complex behaviour to be examined. The importance of the Autonomous Communities pushes the PSE and the PP to contextualise their discourse, especially at the regional level. The results obtained for the quantitative analysis already suggested this complexity. The PSE and the PP do not have pro-centre positions per se because of their nature, but their defence of the regions is shaped by it. The need to adapt to a decentralised political arena in combination with their nature as state-wide political actors make them adapt to the regional context with pro-periphery positions but with less emphasis than regionalist parties. This can be observed in the three regions. The pro-periphery positions are clear, but moderated by their defence of the centre, limit not present in the case of the regionalist parties.

Ideology has interesting results that need to be further explained. This qualitative analysis clarifies the results obtained in the previous quantitative analysis and the overall expectations. According to the main findings, ideology does not have a significant effect on the saliency of the regional level and the distribution of competences, where the social values in isolation do not have a deep influence. The opposite happens with the variables constitutional status of the regions and identity, where the social values were expected to play a major role. The social values that characterise left/centre-left parties, in contrast to right/centre-right parties, allows the former to articulate a discourse that is more open to include minorities and other social groups. The articulation of a more inclusive constitutional status of the region and national identity can be observed in the case of the PSE and the PA/CA. In general terms, these results can be used to conclude that the ideological position of parties can be considered on its own and not necessarily always in interaction with party type to understand its real impact on how parties compete on the centre-periphery cleavage.
Turning to the interaction of party type and ideology, the results suggest the following conclusions. Putting the focus on the *PSOE* and the *PP*, the analysis shows that their ideological orientation moderates their competition on the centre-periphery cleavage. This can be better seen for the analysis of the variable saliency of the regional level. The social values that the *PSOE* defends makes this party incorporate the regions with a much more important role than the *PP*. In this sense, the *PSOE* empowers the regions to make them stand as an intrinsic part of the state and not as an appendix or branch of the central government as the *PP* does, strengthening its pro-periphery positions. In the case of these two SWPs, the interaction of ideology and party type makes the *PSOE* shift, overall, to stronger pro-periphery positions than the *PP*. The position of regionalist parties can also be considered to be moderated by their ideological positions. The constitutional status of the region and identity are examples of this. The *PA/CA*, a left/centre-left party, calls for a symmetrical constitutional recognition of the regions in contrast to *CC*, a right/centre-right party, which calls for the defence of the elites in the Canary Islands via a Special Status of the region, shifting this party to stronger pro-periphery positions in comparison. The Andalusian identity that the *PA/CA* articulates is more inclusive and opened to be included in a broader national identity, like the Spanish national identity, in opposition to *CC*, which sees the Canarian identity as less integrated, again, reinforcing the pro-periphery positions of this party.

The structure of SWPs, in light of the analysis, also make parties along the centre-periphery cleavage shift to milder or stronger pro-periphery positions. As outlined in the methodological chapter, this variable applies only to the *PSOE* and the *PP* due to the difficulties of dealing with regionalist parties with the same accuracy. The main conclusion is that the importance of the horizontal variation found for the *PSOE* in comparison to the *PP* allows the former to address the regional demands and interests with more precision. This produces a shift of the *PSOE* to stronger pro-periphery positions. The other side of the coin is that this high degree of horizontal variation also produces tensions with the state-wide party. The location of the loyalties at the centre acts as a limit to the action of the regional branches. This cannot be observed in the *PP* with the same intensity. Its highly integrated structure prevents its regional branches to stretch the limits,
resulting in a very consistent position. In the *PSOE*, where the degree of freedom is higher, the contextualisation of the discourse is greater. This can be an example of how the pressure of the regional branches affect the overall position of parties, but this can also be top-bottom. The shift of positions in Andalusia and the Canary Islands when putting forward a federal symmetric system is an example of how the state-wide party imposes its views. This horizontal variation can also be affected by their ideological position. The social values of the *PSOE* can contribute to contextualise more the responses to the demands of the regions. The calls for more and more important competences by this party in comparison to the *PP* can be an example of this interaction of party type, ideology, and structure, resulting in overall stronger pro-periphery positions.

Considering all the factors analysed in this chapter, Figure 6.8 locates the *PSOE*, the *PP*, the *PA/CA* and *CC* in the pro-centre/periphery continuum according to this qualitative analysis.

---

*Figure 6.8.* Summary of the pro-centre/periphery positions of the *PSOE*, *PP*, *PA/CA*, and *CC*. 

---

290
4. CONCLUSIONS

As this qualitative analysis has shown, two main conclusions can be outlined. First, the explanatory variables distance, fragmentation, and polycentricity shape party competition, to some extent, as expected. From the three, distance has the most profound effect. Fragmentation provided some interesting contradicting results which were not theorised, expanding the understanding of its complex impact on the positions of parties. Polycentricity has to be further analysed as the inferences where not enough to study its real impact with the necessary depth, although the results point in the direction of confirming the expected influence. The above results can confirm that, in the case of Spain, these factors need to be qualitatively analysed to grasp their real impact in shaping party competition on the centre-periphery cleavage. Second, the control variables confirmed the theorised behaviour. The results obtained in the previous quantitative for these variables have been further validated with this qualitative analysis of the manifestos, reinforcing the expectations. Table 6.1 contains all the hypotheses tested in this analysis.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>SALIENCY ON THE REGIONAL LEVEL</th>
<th>TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS</th>
<th>CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF THE REGION</th>
<th>TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS</th>
<th>POSITION ON COMPETENCE DISTRIBUTION</th>
<th>TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS</th>
<th>IDENTITY</th>
<th>TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>DISTANCE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H1.D</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
<td></td>
<td>H1.E</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- as distance from the centre increases, parties will emphasise more the regional level as one moves from Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, and finally to the Canary Islands</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- as distance from the centre increases, parties will emphasise a more differentiated constitutional status of the region as one moves from Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, and finally to the Canary Islands</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H1.E</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- as distance from the centre increases, parties will emphasise more the regional level as one moves from Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, and finally to the Canary Islands</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H1.F</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- as distance from the centre increases, parties will emphasise a more differentiated constitutional status of the region as one moves from Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, and finally to the Canary Islands</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H1.G</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- as distance from the centre increases, parties will emphasise more the regional level as one moves from Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, and finally to the Canary Islands</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FRAGMENTATION</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H2.D</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- fragmentation undermines the articulation of a strong regional level by parties due to the acknowledgement of the importance of the local level, increasing its effects as one moves from Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, and finally to the Canary Islands</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H2.E</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- fragmentation undermines the articulation of a strong regional level by parties due to the acknowledgement of the importance of the local level, increasing its effects as one moves from Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, and finally to the Canary Islands</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H2.F</td>
<td>Partially Confirmed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- fragmentation undermines the articulation of a strong regional level by parties due to the acknowledgement of the importance of the local level, increasing its effects as one moves from Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, and finally to the Canary Islands</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H2.G</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- fragmentation undermines the articulation of a strong regional level by parties due to the acknowledgement of the importance of the local level, increasing its effects as one moves from Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, and finally to the Canary Islands</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLYCENTRICITY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H3.D</strong>-polycentricity weakens the ability of parties to articulate a strong regional, increasing its effects as one moves from Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, and finally to the Canary Islands</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H3.E</strong>-polycentricity undermines the ability of parties to articulate a differentiated constitutional status of the region, increasing its effects as one moves from Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, and finally to the Canary Islands</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not enough evidence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H3.F</strong>-polycentricity erodes the ability of parties to call for more competences for the region, increasing its effects as one moves from Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, and finally to the Canary Islands</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not enough evidence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H3.G</strong>-polycentricity reduces the ability of parties to articulate a strong regional identity, increasing its effects as one moves from Castilla-La Mancha to Andalusia, and finally to the Canary Islands</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not enough evidence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTROL VARIABLES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PARTY TYPE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H7.G</strong>-the PA/CA and CC emphasise more the regional level than the PSOE and the PP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H7.H</strong>-the PA/CA and CC emphasise more a differentiated constitutional status of the region than the PSOE and the PP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H7.I</strong>-the PA/CA and CC emphasise more the devolution of competences to the region in comparison to the PSOE and the PP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H7.J</strong>-the PA/CA and CC emphasise a stronger regional identity in comparison to the PSOE and the PP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confirmed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IDEOLOGICAL POSITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>H8.D</strong>-the ideological position of parties makes no difference in the emphasis of the regional level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H8.E</strong>-the PSOE and the PA/CA are able to articulate a more inclusive constitutional status of the region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H8.F</strong>-the ideological position of parties does not influence the calls for more competences for the regions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H8.G</strong>-the PSOE and the PA/CA are able to articulate a more inclusive national/regional identity than right/centre-right parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confirmed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTERACTION OF PARTY AND IDEOLOGY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>H9.D</strong>-the PSOE, in comparison to the PP, is more capable of incorporating the regions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H9.E</strong>-the PA/CA, in comparison to the CC, emphasises a more symmetrical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H9.F</strong>-the PSOE calls for more and more important competences to be devolved to the regions in comparison to the PP in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H9.G</strong>-the PP and CC articulate a less inclusive national/regional identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARTY STRUCTURE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H10.A</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H10.B</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H10.C</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H10.D</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 7

DISCUSSION
1. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to integrate the findings from the two types of analysis (Onwuegbuzie and Teddlie 2003: 375-378), helping to maximise the inferences, and by doing so, obtain a full and detailed picture of the case study (Yin 2006: 42). Along this investigation, the aim of the research process was to obtain an answer to the main research question: *what factors shape party competition on the centre-periphery cleavage?* In modern political systems, and through the processes of state-/nation-building, relations between centres and peripheries are a salient issue that have a major effect not only on the sub-national (Keating 2008: 60-64), but also on the national (Caramani 2004: 32) and supranational levels (Bartolini 2004: 19-21). This chapter presents a full narrative that, by approaching the different hypotheses underlined in the theoretical framework, engages with the main research question and contributes to enlarge knowledge on the topic. This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section merges and discusses the findings from the two previous analyses for both the explanatory and control variables in relation to the main hypotheses and research question. The second section outlines the intended contributions to the literature on party competition along the centre-periphery cleavage.

2. DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS

- **Explanatory variables**

Considering distance, the conclusions are the following. With the centre-periphery continuum outlined in the conceptual framework in mind, the distance that separated a peripheral region from the centre made a difference on how a party behaved. The effect of distance was the theorised and expected one. As one moved towards the outer-periphery, the pro-periphery positions of parties consolidated and strengthened. Both SWPs and regionalist parties were equally affected, so it can be considered a deeply rooted transversal factor. This was better shown by the qualitative analysis in relation to the dependent variables constitutional status of the region, competences distribution, and identity, confirming hypotheses H1.E, F, and G. The results for the dependent variable saliency of the regional level, rejecting hypothesis H1.D, could be explained in relation to the fact that the manifestos were articulated for regional elections, and
independently from the distance that separated a peripheral region from the centre, these documents addressed this level with the same degree of intensity in all regions.

SWPs, to avoid the negative effects of the abstraction level, adapted to the characteristics of the region in order to find a link between their state-wide discourses and the psychological attachment feeling towards the territory that the regional population had. By doing so, they were able to articulate a discourse where the peripheral regions were part of a broader state-wide political project. The analysis showed that this adaptation increased as one approached the Canary Islands, revealing a strengthening of the pro-periphery positions of the PSOE and the PP. The results for the regionalist parties also confirmed this expectation. The further away from the centre, the more these parties emphasised the characteristics of the region to increase the territorialisation process and articulate a discourse where the periphery was naturalised as distinct because it was far away and placed in opposition to the centre. This resulted in CC having stronger pro-periphery positions in comparison to the PA/CA, putting more emphasis on the territorial attachment feeling of the regional population towards the region, identifying it as distinct. Both SWPS and CC strengthened their pro-positions as one reached the Canary Islands by emphasising a more differentiated constitutional status of the region, called for more competences to be devolved to the region, and articulated a more differentiated regional identity.

Remoteness on its own, without considering other distinctive markers, was salient enough to shift party positions, and as one moved towards the outer-periphery, these became strongly pro-periphery. The analysis also showed that distance was explicitly mentioned and referenced by parties as the raison d’être for these positions, and this was done where this factor was theorised to have its deepest impact, in the outer-periphery. All parties based their positions on the fact that the Canary Islands were far away from the centre. This was not observed in Andalusia, and therefore, it can be assumed that the impact of this factor increased exponentially as one moved away from the centre. The results for the qualitative analysis can be used to confirm, to some extent, that without disentangling the centre-periphery cleavage into the more specific labels of inner- and outer-
periphery, the variation observed between Andalusia and the Canary Islands could not have been explained with the necessary detail. Both regions belonged to the general category of “peripheral” regions, but this was not enough to understand how, in this case, distance strengthened the pro-periphery positions of parties as one moved from Andalusia to the Canary Islands.

Notwithstanding the above conclusions, which provide a detailed picture of the effect of distance for the specific comparison between Castilla-La Mancha, Andalusia, and the Canary Islands, the quantitative analysis did not show the expected results for the rest of Spain, rejecting all hypotheses (H1, A, B, C). Two possible reasons could explain this. First, the limitation of the data. According to the strata in which Spain was divided into (Figure 4.1), the only outer-periphery region was the Canary Islands with a ratio of 13:1 in favour of the inner-peripheral regions. This might have faded or concealed the effect of distance as it was not expected to have the same deep impact in the inner- as in the outer-periphery. To avoid this, and in the case of Spain, this explanatory factor needs to be considered in a qualitative manner to fully understand its effect on party competition. Second, the importance of other factors apart from distance. Not only there was a considerable difference between the number of inner- and outer-peripheries, but the presence of important regional distinctive markers in some of the former regions (Catalonia, the Basque Country, or Galicia) could also have faded or concealed the effect of distance. The strong pro-periphery positions of parties in these regions gravitated around other dominant factors such as identity or language, which were not present in Andalusia or the Canary Islands. In comparison, the effect of these distinctive regional characteristics might have been more salient than distance. When these were not present, as the qualitative analysis showed, distance had the deep theorised effect.

Focusing on fragmentation, the analyses showed an overall mix of expected and unpredicted effects on party behaviour. Comparing this factor with distance, it can be concluded that the results provided a less consistent scenario to the one theorised. It was hypothesised that the two dimensions of this explanatory variable (spatial and political-administrative dimensions) would have an overall negative effect on the pro-periphery positions of parties, counterbalancing the effect of
distance. As with the previous factor, the qualitative analysis provided the most interesting inferences. Although the analysis of the dependent variable saliency of the regional level confirmed, to some extent, the theorised expectations and hypothesis H2.D, the unexpected results were linked to the dependent variables constitutional status of the region and identity, rejecting hypotheses H2.E and G. The analysis of the variable position on competence distribution had contradictory results themselves that can enrich this discussion (the results were used to partially confirm hypotheses H2.F).

Starting with the dependent variable saliency of the regional level, the expectations were fulfilled by the results. The main findings showed that the impact of fragmentation was overall negative, and even deeper when both the spatial and political-administrative dimensions were present, as expected. First, the impact of the spatial dimension, only present in the Canary Islands, had the expected negative effect when articulating a regional discourse. Second, the impact of the political-administrative dimension was expected to affect more negatively the Canary Islands in comparison to the other two regions due to the deep roots of the island-based political ruling bodies, and the analysis confirmed this. The results also signalled a different degree of impact of this dimension in the three regions. The importance of the local ruling bodies for the regional populations increased as one approached the outer-periphery. Although there was a clear difference between the importance of the Cabildos and the Provincial Councils and Counties, even between the mainland regions, there was a difference between the centre and the inner-periphery. The Provincial Councils and Counties had different degrees of importance, and they seem to have been more relevant for the regional population in Andalusia than in Castilla-La Mancha. Overall and comparing these three regions, the conclusion is that the negative effect of fragmentation, via the political-administrative dimension, increased as one reaches the outer-periphery. At the same time, when both dimensions of fragmentation coincided in the same region, like in the Canary Islands, the pro-periphery positions of parties were further undermined.

The centre-periphery continuum was again key to understand the regional variation in relation to this factor. Without specifying the label “peripheral” regions,
the negative effect of fragmentation in Spain could not have been flagged. Not only did the negative effect of fragmentation deepen exponentially as one moved away from the centre, as the above results showed, but the combination of the spatial and political-administrative dimensions in the Canary Islands can be used to reinforce the need to approach regional variation with more precision, as the centre-periphery continuum did. With the above observations, it can be concluded that fragmentation proportionally counterbalanced the positive effect of distance, undermining the pro-periphery positions of parties and accentuating its negative effect as one reached the outer-periphery.

Despite the above findings, they have to be taken with caution. Although the effects of fragmentation seem to have been confirmed, to some extent, by the qualitative analysis in relation to the dependent variable saliency of the regional level, two main limitations have to be acknowledged at this point. First, the difficulties to disentangle the effects of fragmentation from those of distance. An indicator of this difficulty might be the exponential counterbalance of the effect of distance by the political-administrative dimension of fragmentation. As the qualitative analysis showed, the further away the region was from the centre, the more fragmentation, via the political-administrative dimension, undermined the pro-periphery positions of parties. The abstraction level that grounded the effect of distance affected the attachment feelings that the regional populations had towards the institutions of the centre, and this was also captured, precisely, by this dimension of fragmentation. With this limitation in mind, it is hard to differentiate the effects of fragmentation from those of distance because both factors affected the same attachment feelings that the regional populations had towards the institutions of the centre. Second, and in relation to the first limitation, it is difficult to measure the real magnitude and impact of the political-administrative dimension of fragmentation in comparison to the spatial dimension. The latter dimension was relatively easier to measure as the focus is the geographical objective fragmentation of the region, and the former was more subjective, and therefore, harder to measure.

As outlined above, the unexpected results can be observed for the dependent variables constitutional status of the region and identity, rejecting
hypotheses $H2.E$ and $G$. The contradicting results themselves for hypothesis $H2.F$ are used here to further expand the argument. Opposite to the theorised expectations and the above discussion of the dependent variable saliency of the regional level, the results showed that when the two dimensions of fragmentation were present, the behaviour of parties turned, sometimes, to strong pro-periphery positions. Although this has to be highly contextualised, in this case for Spain and the Canary Islands, it can be concluded that not always did this factor lead to an undermining of the pro-periphery positions of parties. One possible reason can be used to explain this behaviour. The acknowledgement of the impact of fragmentation, as outlined in the results for the dependent variable saliency of the regional level, was used by parties in the Canary Islands to reinforce the region by addressing and overcoming its negative impact. For example, calling for more competences for the region was used to counterbalance the negative effect of spatial fragmentation. The positive results in the association between fragmentation and the distribution of competences in the quantitative analysis can also point in this direction, although there was not statistical significance. The same was observed in the calls for a differentiated constitutional status of the region. The profound impact of political-administrative fragmentation in the Canary Islands was used to strengthen the need of recognising this distinctive characteristic as intrinsic to the region, without which the archipelago itself could not be understood. Parties, in this outer-periphery, aimed to build the region on the bases of considering fragmentation as the grounds on which to articulate it. It was not any more a dichotomy island versus archipelago, but more a single unit with different fundamental characteristics.

The rejection of all the hypotheses in the quantitative analysis ($H2.A$, $B$, $C$) can be explained, like in the case of distance, in relation to the limitation of the data and the importance of other regional distinctive markers. First, spatial fragmentation, tested on its own, did not have the expected effect. These results can be explained in relation to the low number of archipelagos in Spain. Comparing only the Balearic and the Canary Islands to the rest of the mainland regions, with a ratio of 8.5:1 in favour of the latter, could have faded or concealed the possible impact of this dimension. Second, the importance of other distinctive regional characteristics could have been more salient than this factor, fading away the
impact of spatial fragmentation. Despite the above, the qualitative analysis showed that this dimension still had the expected negative effect in some occasions. As with distance, this factor needs to be considered in a qualitative manner. The best example of this was the deep effect of the combination of the spatial and political-administrative dimensions in the Canary Islands. In this region, the deep undermining effects of insularity on the pro-periphery positions of parties could be considered as the result of the combination of these two dimensions of fragmentation, favoured by the “perfect” match between the island and the island-based ruling body.

Turning to the last explanatory variable, polycentricity, the results showed that, to some extent, the importance of the theorised degree of polycentricity was more decisive than the mere presence of multiple centre of power in terms of undermining the pro-periphery positions of parties. The qualitative analysis helped to signal a differentiated impact of polycentricity depending on its degree via the dependent variable saliency of the regional level, confirming hypothesis H3.D. The further analysis of the pleito insular in the Canary Islands showed that the lower the degree of polycentricity, the deeper its negative effect and the more the pro-periphery positions of parties were undermined. Multiple centres of power were present in all three regions, but the concentration of competence in two very distinct centres of power strengthened its negative impact, as shown in the struggle between Santa Cruz de Tenerife and Las Palmas de Gran Canaria. This can be used to confirm that, at least in the Canary Islands, it was the concentration of competition in two confronting centres of power that accentuated the undermining of the pro-periphery positions of parties and not the presence of multiple centres of power per se. This can be further confirmed by the quantitative analysis. On the contrary to observing the rejection of all the hypotheses (H3.A, B, C) as negative, the results could show that the presence of multiple centres of power was not as important as the degree of polycentricity, outlined by the qualitative analysis. The data used to confirm the number of regions with multiple centres of power in comparison to those with only one was not affected by the same limitation as distance and fragmentation were, helping to reinforce the utility of these findings. Despite this, one limitation can be pointed out here. This investigation, although
proposing a possible scale of polycentricity, did not develop a quantitative measuring scheme for it to further expand the results for the qualitative analysis.

The centre-periphery continuum also helped to explain the variation between the three regions. As it can be observed from the data used to establish the presence of multiple centres of power (Table 1 in appendix M), the concentration of power in small number of centres of power increased (therefore decreasing the degree of polycentricity) as one reached the outer-periphery, parallel to the intensification of its negative impact, as the qualitative analysis showed. With this in mind, it can be concluded that the exponential negative effect of this factors deepened when moving away from the centre, in the same way as fragmentation, reaching its peak in the Canary Islands. Again, without precising the “periphery” into more accurate labels, this would not have been signalled. Despite this overall conclusion, this factor needs to be further analysed. For example, only the hypothesis for the dependent variable saliency of the regional level was approached in the qualitative analysis. In this analysis, there were not enough evidence to confirm or reject the hypotheses designed for the dependent variables constitutional status of the region, competences distribution, and identity (H.3.E, F, G). Another example can be found in the results for the quantitative analysis. Although all the hypotheses were rejected, the strong positive association between polycentricity and the dependent variable position on competence distribution can point in the direction of an unexpected behaviour of parties. The more competences the regions have, the more they can be further devolved to the local level, where these centres of power could benefit from them. This can push parties to call for more competences at a regional level.

Two main limitation that affected the findings for all three explanatory variables can be highlighted. The first main limitation is linked to the type of analysis that has provided the most interesting inferences. Comparing both the quantitative and qualitative analysis, the main limitation is that only the latter provided important results. This might produce a scenario where these three explanatory variables seem to only deeply affect the specific outer-peripheral region of the Canary Islands, undermining the possibility of generalising the findings, or in methodological terms, weakening the external validity of this
investigation. It is important to outline that the intention was not to present the Canary Islands as unique, but to show how these three factors were expected to shape party behaviour along the centre-periphery cleavage in the context of exploring how the cleavage itself could be specified to the more concrete labels of “centre”, inner-periphery”, and “outer-periphery”. Despite this limitation regarding distance, fragmentation, and polycentricity, the results for the party-level control variables, as shown below, seem to point in the same direction as the ones obtained for the quantitative analysis, not undermining to the same extent the possibility of generalising the findings in relation to these variables.

The second main limitation is related to the mechanism of triangulation. In this research, triangulation has been used to incorporate other sources of evidence apart from party manifestos. This has proven very useful for the qualitative analysis, but it can be further extended. Added to party manifestos, party frameworks, and parliament speeches, one can also acknowledge the importance of incorporating other methods of collecting data such as for example in-depth interviews with political leaders. In-depth interviews can provide this research with a deeper understanding of how parties adapt to the explanatory variables introduced here. Although party manifestos are a very good measure of party positions, they are also limited by the public to which they are addressed. Normally the are very concise and summarised, articulated in a format that is able to effectively and efficiently pass on the message to the voter. This limits to some extent the understanding of how parties adapt to complex dynamics, specially in multi-level state. In-depth interviews would provide a wider picture of the research problem, not only for a descriptive, but also for an explanatory approach.

- Control variables

Out of the six control variables, and according to both analyses, the three party-level variables impacted the most party competition on the centre-periphery cleavage. In this respect, party type had the most consistent impact on party behaviour. It was expected SWPs to have milder pro-periphery positions than regionalist parties. The results for both analyses showed that depending on which type of party emphasised or adopted a certain position regarding a salient issue, this behaviour was more or less pro-periphery, confirming all hypotheses except
one (H7.A, B, C, H, I, J). In terms of SWPs, the results confirmed that the positions of these parties were overall pro-periphery. Although they located their loyalties at the centre, there was no occasion where they adopted specific pro-centre positions. Both the PSOE and the PP adapted to a multi-level party competition arena by contextualising their preferences to the needs of the different peripheries, incorporating them to their state-wide political projects. In comparison, regionalist parties had stronger pro-periphery positions. This went in line with their core ideology, as they were perceived as the best mechanism to defend the interest of the region. With this in mind, the results showed that their consistent pro-periphery positions complied with what their main aim was, protect and empower the regions to improve their position in relation to the centre.

This investigation also turned to one of the main consequences of competition between SWPs and regionalist parties. This was, the possible strengthening of the pro-periphery positions of SWPs when facing regionalist parties. The quantitative analysis rejected all hypotheses (H7.D, E, F). In this sense, SWPs did not turn to stronger pro-periphery positions when they faced regionalist parties. Despite this, the analysis showed a mixture of interesting results, although there was no statistical significance in any of the three dependent variables. On one hand, the considerable positive association with the dependent variable saliency of the regional level can point in the direction of confirming that SWPs tried to engage with regionalist parties in their own agenda, shifting to stronger pro-periphery positions. On the other hand, the important negative association with the dependent variable distribution of competences can suggest that SWPs, when facing regionalist parties, called for fewer competences for the regions to prevent these from becoming too strong and pose a real threat to the centre, empowered by the action of regionalist parties. A possible conclusion with these results in hand can be that the behaviour of SWPs when facing regionalist parties has to be more specified and not taken as a whole. SWPs do not turn to stronger or milder pro-periphery positions in general terms when they face regionalist parties, but their behaviour needs to be contextualised to the issues that they are dealing with.
The ideological position of parties was theorised to have, when considered on its own, a deep impact when articulating the inclusiveness or not of the position that parties adopted along the centre-periphery positions. This is, the pro-centre/periphery positions were more or less inclusive in relation to the ideological position of parties. The qualitative analysis better provided the necessary inferences to observe the PSOE and PA/CA were more able to incorporate other social groups to their political projects than the PP and CC, being these state-wide or regional, confirming hypotheses H8.D, E, F, and G. This was further supported by the quantitative analysis in relation to the dependent variables saliency of the regional level and attitudes towards multiculturalism, confirming hypotheses H8.A and C. Overall, left/centre-left parties were more able than right/centre-right parties to incorporate other social groups to their political projects. The ideological orientation of parties did not skew parties to stronger pro-centre/periphery positions, but made them more or less inclusive.

Considering the interaction of party type and ideology was fundamental to understand party behaviour along the centre-periphery cleavage. The results for both analyses showed that the interaction of these two factors could push parties to stronger or milder pro-periphery positions based on their degree of inclusiveness, confirming most of the hypotheses (H9.B, D, E, F, G). This interaction explained, to some extent, the variation observed between parties that belonged to the same type. SWPs, according to the above discussion of the control variable party type, had overall pro-periphery positions, but the analysis also showed a substantial difference between the PSOE and the PP, and this was better understood via this proposed interaction. The same happened with CC and the PA/CA. Both had stronger pro-periphery positions than SWPs, but there was a sharp difference between one and the other. Turning the focus to the PSOE and the PP, the former was more capable of articulating an inclusive state-wide political project which was able to include regional social groups. Both parties had their core level at the centre, but the interaction of party type and ideology turned the PSOE to stronger pro-periphery positions in order to approach regional needs with the willingness to incorporate them to its state-wide political project. The lower degree of openness of the PP prevented this party from following the same path. This resulted in, although still having pro-periphery positions, these were not as
strong as in the case of the *PSOE*. Applying the same argument to *CC* and the *PA/CA*, the results were similar but at a regional scale. The less degree of openness that *CC* had in comparison to the *PA/CA* made the former have stronger pro-periphery positions. In the same way as the *PP* had a strong Castilian-centred state-wide project with other social groups in subordination, *CC* had a strong Canarian-centred regional project which was less able to incorporate social groups which came from outside the region, skewing its position to the absolute pro-periphery end of the pro-centre/periphery continuum. In contrast, the *PA/CA*, although still having its core level at the region, was more capable of articulating a broader inclusive Andalusian-centred regional project.

The variation observed between the *PSOE* and the *PP* was also explained in relation to their structure. The qualitative analysis showed that the higher degree of freedom granted to the regional branches of the *PSOE* allowed this party to contextualise more its response to the regional demands than the *PP*, confirming all hypotheses (*H10.A, B, C, D*). This resulted in the *PSOE* having, or being able to sustain, stronger pro-periphery positions in comparison to the *PP*. Not only the regional branches of the *PSOE* had more freedom to adapt their discourses, but they were also freer to have different positions depending on the region in which they acted. This was better observed when analysing the dependent variable constitutional status of the region. The variation found in the regional branches of the *PSOE* in Andalusia and the Canary Islands in comparison to Castilla-La Mancha can be taken as the result of the ability to contextualise their discourses to the needs of the regions in which they acted. Another important conclusion is that this degree of freedom granted to the regional branches in the *PSOE* also fuelled conflict with the state-wide party. Again, focusing on the same dependent variable as before, the state-wide party seemed to have pressurised the regional branches in Andalusia and the Canary Islands to change their positions to make them coincide with the one coming from the centre. This resulted in a change from calling for a federal system to the defence of the current State of Autonomies. This internal conflict was not observed with the same intensity in the *PP*, mainly because the control of its regional branches by the state-wide party, via a lower degree of freedom, was stricter.
From the three regional-level control variables, regional identity had the deepest impact on party competition on the centre-periphery cleavage. The results showed that strong regional identities made parties shift to consistent pro-periphery positions, confirming hypotheses \( H5.B \) and \( C \). From the two indicators, the political regional identity feelings, which measured the identitarian feelings of the elites, had the strongest effect. In comparison, the results showed that the indicator popular regional identity feelings, although with the same statistical significance, did not affect party behaviour with the same intensity. In this sense, what influenced the pro-periphery positions of parties in relation to this factor was what the elites felt and not so much the sentiment that the regional population had.

In contrast to these findings, the presence of strong regional languages, which were expected to have the same effect as the previous factor, did not skew parties to pro-periphery positions. The results rejected all hypotheses (\( H6.A, B, C \)). The findings for these two factors, which represented strong distinctive markers, can be used to conclude that the mere existence of these characteristics did not push parties to pro-centre/periphery positions as such. They have to be observed in context and not taken as a whole, being part of the dynamic process that the centre-periphery cleavage represents. Finally, the results for the economic development of the regions rejected all the hypotheses (\( H4.A, B, C \)). A possible reason for this might be a limitation in the indicator chosen. Although the economic development of the regions was thought to be important, especially if party competition was multi-dimensional, the difference between the regional and national average GDP per capita did not shift party positions along the centre-periphery cleavage. The economic development of regions is a broad term which includes many indicators, such as for example unemployment rate. This variety of indicators and the results for the quantitative analysis suggest that this factor may be better measured with an index rather than with single indicators.

With the results provided by both analyses, a possible answer to the main research question can be the following. All three explanatory variables seem to have shaped party competition along the centre-periphery cleavage, but their degree of impact was different. The factor with the strongest influence was distance. As one moved away from the centre, parties clearly strengthened their pro-periphery positions. This affected both SWPs and regionalist parties. Following
this came fragmentation, which had a lesser, but still important, degree of impact. This thesis has outlined how this factor shifted party positions both to milder and stronger pro-periphery positions, depending on the dependent variable analysed. Although this has to be highly contextualised, it can be concluded that in the case of the Canary Islands, the theorised undermining effect of the pro-periphery position of parties was not always present. Overall, the analysis of this factor provided a scenario which was less consistent in comparison to distance. In this sense, the pro-periphery positions of parties were undermined in some cases, but in other occasions, they were reinforced. Polycentricity was the factor that least affected party competition, but nonetheless, the results showed that the weakening of the pro-periphery positions of parties came via its degree of impact and not the presence of multiples centres of power per se.

From the control variables, the party-level control variables were the factors that most strongly skewed party positions along the centre-periphery cleavage. From these, party type had the deepest impact. Regionalist parties had stronger pro-periphery positions than SWPs. When it came to their ideological orientation, this factor did determine the inclusiveness or not of the positions they adopted. The interaction of these two factors was the key element that can made these positions further shift to one end or the other of the pro-centre/periphery continuum. Left/centre-left SWPs, influenced by their ideological orientation, had stronger pro-periphery positions than right/centre-right SWPs due to the resistance of the latter to incorporate other social groups to the power relations of the centre. The inverse happened with regionalist parties. Right/centre-right regionalist parties had stronger pro-periphery positions than left/centre-left regionalist parties due to their opposition to incorporate social groups outside the periphery to the power relations in the peripheries. Finally, the structure of SWPs also influenced their positions along the cleavage. The PSOE, a less integrated party, was able to have stronger pro-periphery positions than the PP because of the degree of freedom granted to its regional branches so that they could contextualise the response of the party to the interest of the regions.

Turning to the regional-level control variables, the factor that fulfilled the theorised expectations was regional identity. The presence of strong regional
identities made parties adopt stronger pro-periphery positions. The same was theorised to be the case for regional languages, but the results showed, to some extent, unexpected results. SWPs might have seen these as a threat to the national language of the centre, and therefore, turned to milder pro-periphery positions in order to defend it. In the case of regionalist parties, the results matched the expectations, and this factor strengthened their pro-periphery positions. The economic development of the regions did not strengthen or undermined the pro-periphery positions of parties overall, with very insignificant results.

3. CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE LITERATURE ON PARTY COMPETITION ALONG THE CENTRE-PERIPHERY CLEAVAGE

- **Explanatory variables**

As it can be observed, distance was the explanatory variable which most affected party behaviour. There is no discussion in the literature in relation to the possible effect of this factor on how parties compete along the centre-periphery cleavage in Spain. The results provided in this investigation can be used to approach this gap. The qualitative analysis provided enough inferences to confirm that, in Spain, the further away a peripheral region is from the centre, the more abstract the latter becomes to the regional populations and the more parties have to adapt to it by shifting to stronger pro-periphery positions. In more general terms, and to some extent, this confirms that the Construal Level Theory can be successfully applied in comparative politics (Idson and Mischel 2001; Fujita *et al.* 2006; Trope and Liberman 2010). The main consequence is that the regional populations, in order to replace their place attachment feelings towards the centre as this becomes vaguer with distance, turn to the region to fulfil this need (Hosany *et al.* 2015: 484). Distance affects both types of parties with the same intensity, and it is used as a distinctive marker to articulate either a state-wide or regional identity linked to a specific political project (Keith and Pile 1993: 2). In regions with no other distinctive markers such as regional identities or languages, distance can fuel strong regionalism (Cartrite and Miodownik 2016: 124). For future research agendas, these findings can be exported to observe if the effect of distance outlined in this investigation can be also found in other insular and archipelago regions as the general hypothesis proposes (H1), which represent the typical
outer-periphery (Baldacchino and Milne 2000; Baldacchino 2010; Fazi 2012; Hepburn and Baldacchino 2013).

In the same way as the literature on party competition along the centre-periphery cleavage in Spain has overlooked the effect of distance, fragmentation has received no attention. To fill in this gap, the results in the case of Spain suggest that this factor could be analysed with more precision via the two proposed dimensions. The contribution to the literature in relation to this factor is twofold: on one hand, based on the confirmed expectations, and on the other hand, centred on the unexpected outcomes. Regarding the confirmed negative effects of this explanatory variable, theoretically, it can be proposed that the Construal Level Theory goes beyond the region as a whole. As the centre becomes more abstract with distance, the regional population not always turns to the region in order to locate its loyalty. This can be placed on a specific territory (island) and/or local body (Provincial Councils and Cabildos) which correspond to the sub-regional level. This effect is even deeper when the two dimensions of fragmentation coincide. In this sense, the centre and the periphery are both abstract, and the islands are the logical territory to which the local population turns to fulfil its attachment feelings. When it comes to the unexpected outcomes, this thesis has also provided encouraging results. The main contribution to the literature in this respect, to further expand on the above, is that not always the undermining effect of fragmentation is present. The incentives that overcoming the negative effects of fragmentation as a whole pose to the parties can be strong enough to make them focus on the region instead of approaching them at the sub-regional level. Articulating a strong regional level might by the best way to deal with this factor in archipelago regions.

Generalising these findings to a broader set of cases, the focus can be located on the effects of insularity as the result of combining the spatial and political-administrative dimensions and how it might affect party behaviour. This can add a new perspective of analysis to the literature concerning island jurisdiction via the general hypothesis (H2) (Watts 2000; Warrington and Milne 2007; Hepburn 2012). For example, in terms of party competition in archipelagos, this can propose a new dimension. This is, an island-based axis in addition to the
typical centre-periphery axis of competition (Ferri et al. 2019: 130-136) to observe how fragmentation can articulate island-based versus other identities that strengthen sub-regional loyalties (Hache 1998; Hay 2003; Baldacchino 2006). Further developing this, insularity can be approached not only as a factor that empowers sub-regional units of identification, but also as a way of articulating a strong archipelago region via the overcoming of the negative effects of its main distinctive characteristic, as explained above. The archipelago peripheral regions can be framed by parties around the dimensions of spatial and political-administrative fragmentation as the essential pillars on which these regions themselves relay. This investigation has provided grounds to consider insularity as an entangled factor, being at the same time positive and negative for the articulation of a strong regional discourse, and future research agendas can further approach this complexity.

The main contribution to the literature of the analysis of polycentricity is the support to the idea of developing a possible scale of its impact. The presence of multiple centres of power does not affect party competition along the centre-periphery cleavage with the necessary depth, but it is the concentration of power struggle in a small number of urban centres what can shift party positions with more strength. This has not yet been approached by the literature in the case of Spain. The results can be used to confirm that, at least in the Canary Islands, the struggle between two very dichotomous centres of power undermined the pro-periphery position of parties. In addition, and in line with the general hypothesis (H3), the analysis also showed that this undermining effect can be linked to the interaction of polycentricity with fragmentation, as part of the literature that deals with urban centres and archipelagos suggests (Picornell 2014; Grydehøj et al. 2015). The impact of this factor has received little attention in relation to party competition along the centre-periphery cleavage, and the results contained here can be used for future research agendas by providing in-depth understanding of polycentricity in the case of Spain. Although these results have to be understood inside a specific context, they can be used to propose a comparison between different case that can provide the literature with a wider comprehending of the phenomenon.
Control variables

When it comes to the economic development of the regions, the results seem to confirm the existing literature for the case of Spain (Alonso et al. 2015: 861). The influence of the degree of economic development of the regions seems not to have the theorised impact when only one indicator is selected. There are different indicators used by the literature to measure the economic development of the regions, like for example, the unemployment rate, regional GDP, or economic activity (van Houten 2007: 556; Deiwiks et al. 2012: 296; Kyriacou and Morral-Palacín 2015: 8-9), but the results contained here suggest that considering them in isolation is not enough to capture the effect of this factor. An index of economic development made of different indicators might be precise enough to measure its impact. When it comes to the general literature, for example, on party competition in a multi-dimensional political space with the left-right and the territorial axes interacting (Massetti and Schakel 2015: 870), or on regionalism (Sorens 2008: 345-346; Fitjar 2010b: 61), the results show a strong link, but this is not the case for Spain (Alonso et al. 2015: 2015: 861), at least, when it comes to the indicator selected for this investigation. With the idea of articulating an index of economic development of the regions in mind, not only this factor could be further analysed in the case of Spain, but also in broader terms, as the general hypothesis suggests (H4), to test if the measurements are more precise and its effects are properly captured.

The results for the control variable regional identity support the existing literature on the topic. This factor can be framed as the consequence of multiple ethnoterritorial party competition in a country where the centre and the peripheries have related to each other on other issues rather than only class struggle (Moreno 1995: 11). Decentralisation in Spain has contributed to regionalise identities and locate loyalties in the regions rather than exclusively in the central state, opening the political sphere to increasing number of dual identities and the decline of monolithic ones (Beramendi and Máiz 2004: 138). The effect and importance of regional identities in contemporary Spain has been thoroughly analysed by the literature (Moreno et al. 1998: 65-66; Lecours 2001: 211; Muro and Quiroga 2004: 28-33), and the results provided here confirm the main findings. Strong regional
identities make parties shift to stronger pro-periphery positions. The main contribution of this thesis is that regional identities are better approached via two main indicators in combination to measure their real impact, as these feelings can have multiple dimensions. This has been done focusing, on one hand, on the feelings of the regional population through the well know “Moreno question” (Pallarés et al. 1997: 151-155; Martínez-Herrera 2002: 433-434; Chernyha and Burg 2012: 777-780), and on the other hand, through a historical institutionalism perspective (Lecours 2001: 214-215) and the recognition of some regions as nacionalidades due to their historic development as distinct political units (Martínez-Herrera and Jeffrey 2010: 7-11). These two indicators, as used in this investigation, are factors that, overall, favour sub-national mobilisation around identity, in harmony with the main literature on the topic (Lecours 2011).

In line with the main literature, the findings confirm that this applies for both SWPs and regionalist parties. In terms of the latter, the importance of regional identities for these parties has been analysed by part of the literature as an intrinsic dimension of regional conflict and as part of their core ideology (Urwin 1982: 427-429; Núñez 1999: 127-133; Alonso et al. 2017: 253-256; Keating 2017: 13-14). This pushes regionalist parties to stronger pro-periphery positions, as shown here. When it comes to the PSOE and the PP, these, although more complex due to their condition as state-wide parties, consider the importance of this distinctive marker for the regional population (Keating 1993: 204-210), and position themselves in an overall positive attitude when articulating their territorial axis (Alonso et al. 2013: 203-206). These results contribute to confirm the already existing studies in relation to the importance of strong regional identities and party competition on the centre-periphery cleavage. In general terms, these findings can be used to explore and compare other salient cases where this factor has a major impact, such as the case of Scotland and the UK, testing with new inferences if regional identities shift or not party positions to stronger pro-periphery, as the general hypothesis suggests (H5).

The results for regional languages, linked to strong regionalisms (Wright 1994: 3; Fitjar 2010a: 53; 2010b: 523-525; Cartrite and Miodownik 2016: 122; Massetti and Schakel 2016: 61), point in a different direction in the case of Spain.
The negative association in the quantitative analysis can highlight a reaction from SWPs that was not theorised or expected. Like with regional identities, SWPs were expected to adopt stronger pro-periphery positions when regional languages where present, but this was not the case, with important negative scores for the dependent variables distribution of competences and attitudes towards multiculturalism. Part of the literature has observed the same behaviour. A possible explanation for this can be the reaction of SWPs to the strengthening of regional grievances that come from the Spanish regional autonomy system (Hombrado 2011: 482-282). As a result of the asymmetric political design of the Autonomous Communities in relation to the cultural distinctiveness, this can make the non-historic regions see themselves as losing influence and importance (Moreno 1997a: 97-100).

These grievances can fuel strong regionalist movements in these regions to achieve the same influence and importance as the historic Autonomous Communities (Giordano and Roller 2004: 2173). One way to avoid these grievances to expand amongst the non-historical regions is to prevent the historical Autonomous Communities from becoming more empowered by articulating more and more elements that differentiate them from the rest. In the case of Spain, the negative results observed in the quantitative analysis go in line with this identified negative reaction from SWPs. In more abstract terms, this can suggest an undermining of the devolution Spanish autonomous process as a whole (Máiz et al. 2010; Máiz and Losada 2011), especially coming from the PP (Gómez and Cabeza 2013). Generalising these findings, this reaction observed in Spain can be also tested using the general hypothesis (H6) in other countries where strong regional languages can also cause regional grievances, like for example, in Belgium.

From the party-level control variables, the factor that most influenced party competition on the centre-periphery cleavage was party type. This was, to some extent, the expected outcome in line with the existing literature. Most of the seminal works that focus on Spain (Libbrecht et al. 2009, 2011; Alonso and Gómez 2011; Alonso 2012; Amat 2012; Alonso et al. 2015, 2017; Field and Hamann 2015; Cabeza 2017) distinguish between the types of parties to explain how these behave along the centre-periphery cleavage. When addressing this, the starting
line is the distinction between SWPs and regionalist parties. Both the quantitative and qualitative analysis confirmed this. In the case of Spain, this factor has deep implications. The accommodation of strong peripheral movements in the post-fascist Spain can be explained, to some extent, due to the agreement that SWPs and regionalist parties had towards recognising this reality in the constitution of 1978 (Moreno 2002: 400). Although both types of parties have this same commitment and starting line, their behaviour along the centre-periphery cleavage change according to which family they belong to. The general hypothesis (H7) has been strongly confirmed in the case of Spain, but these findings could be used in broader terms to compare and expand the existing literature with cases where the decentralisation process is not as developed, like for example, in France.

The decentralisation process of Spain owes much to regionalist parties, and this has to be taken into consideration (Liebert 1990: 147-151), resulting in the significant variation in party competition in the different regions (Detterbeck and Hepburn 2010: 114). The importance of regionalist parties in the Spanish regional elections has been confirmed by the literature (Revenga and Sánchez 2002; Pallarés and Keating 2003), making them an important actor that can shape the centre-periphery cleavage in a strong way. As the main promoter of the region´s interests, the positions they have on the centre-periphery cleavage are strongly skewed towards the peripheries. These pro-periphery positions have some determinants to be considered, like for example, adapting their regional political demands to ongoing decentralisation processes (Sorens 2008: 329-331; Massetti and Schakel 2016: 59-62), or their involvement in regional and national governments (Elias and Tronconi 2011: 507-513), but all seem to reinforce the predominance of the region’s interests. The results discussed above confirm these findings.

The expected behaviour of the PSOE and PP in regional elections, on the other hand, seems more complex in this multi-level party competition arena (Jeffery and Hough 2003: 199-201; Wilson 2012: 124-125), as the literature suggests. In comparison to regionalist parties, which have their loyalties clearly located in the regions, regional elections in a decentralised state like Spain make SWPs shift their strategies and structures (Verge 2013: 322-330; León 2014: 393-
394) to accommodate to a reality in which they seek to obtain their maximum electoral performance (Hopkins 2003: 228-230) and maintain at the same time a coherent discourse of an integrated state (Convery and Lundberg 2017: 389-290). As the results have shown, this complexity can affect their positions on the centre-periphery cleavage in a much wider and deeper aspect in comparison to regionalist parties, addressing regional assertiveness, which varies from region to region (van Houten 2001: 2). Despite this complicated behaviour, it must be observed that they position themselves in overall pro-periphery positions, as the main literature also has outlined (Alonso 2012: 72-75), favouring in general terms decentralisation (León 2014: 395). Contradicting results can be found when analysing the behaviour of SWPs when facing regionalist parties. In this investigation, the results show that their pro-periphery positions seem not to turn stronger, as the main literature suggests (Alonso and Gómez 2011: 189-190; Alonso *et al.* 2015: 856-857). A possible reason for this, as discussed above, can be that the behaviour of SWPs when facing regionalist parties has to be taken into consideration with more precision and not as a whole.

Ideology is one of the factors that showed potential results to be further developed in future research agendas by considering it in isolation. It was theorised that considering ideology on its own was expected to have effects on the pro-centre/periphery positions of parties by making these more or less inclusive. This was confirmed by the quantitative and qualitative analysis. Ideology, if considered on its own, affects how parties compete on the centre-periphery cleavage by making them more or less open to include other social groups. The literature normally treats this factor in combination with party type, in the sense that the behaviour of the different types of parties along this cleavage is affected in combination with their ideological positions. The results presented here go a step further, and confirms that, if the factor party type is taken away, ideology on its own can explain the nature of the positions that parties adopt via the social values of the labels “left” and “right”. The results contained here can be used to address the general hypothesis (H8) in the case of Spain, but in order to observe if the theorised expectations have broader implications, it could be useful to expand the existing literature on the topic by exploring other case studies where ideology on
its own might have a stronger effect than the one identified, faded away by its interaction with other factors, such as party type.

Considering the interaction party type and ideology, the results are consistent with the literature on Spain and the general hypothesis (H9) addressed in multiple cases. Although both the PSOE and the PP are SWPs, and therefore, their core-level remains in the centre (Deschouwer 2003: 216–17), their positions on the centre-periphery are different, affected by their ideological orientation (Verge 2013: 318). The PSOE locates itself in a more pro-peripheral position due to its ideological orientation in comparison to the PP, which has less openness towards other social groups. Both favour decentralisation towards the regions (León 2014: 395), but their attitudes are different. The ideological orientation of the PSOE (Méndez Lago 2006, 431-432) allows it to be more inclusive towards the needs of the regions. In some occasions, even pushing for a clearer federal system in comparison to the PP (Astudillo and García-Guereta 2006, 410-414), who defends the current constitutional design of the state and the political status quo, in line with a coherent conservative party (Layton-Henry 1982: 1-3). The latter, influenced by its conservative ideological position (Balfour 2005: 146-151), tries to undermine the aspirations for a more decentralised system if this changes the current political situation. At the same time, the pressure to adopt stronger pro-periphery positions by the regional branches of the SWPs are somehow contained by their characteristic as national-wide symbols and instruments of the current political scenario (Libbrecht et al. 2009: 63).

The above argument can also be applied to regionalist parties in Spain, as the literature suggests. The ideological orientation of regionalist parties can make their pro-periphery positions shift more to the absolute pro-periphery end of the pro-centre/-periphery continuum outlined in the conceptual framework. Taking the comparison of CC and the PA/CA as an example, the former can be considered a right/centre-right party and the latter a left/centre-left, but at the same time both are non-secessionist regionalist/nationalist parties (Massetti 2009: 507). As expected, both locate themselves clearly in strong pro-periphery positions (Massetti and Schakel 2015: 875), but their ideological orientation can make these positions shift even more towards absolute pro-periphery positions. CC and the PA/CA call for a
more decentralised state, further developing their regions with more powers, but
the inclusiveness of the PA/CA allows this party to have an open view towards an
inclusive state-wide political project. In comparison, CC is less inclusive, resulting
in a call for the region to be differentiated from the rest.

CC can be considered a non-secessionist regionalist party, but it has
experienced, along the three electoral periods, an evolution that makes it stand
between being an autonomist and an open secessionist party. This evolution was
suggested by Massetti and Schakel (2013: 801-802), although at this point in time,
the evolution is not clear enough to confirm this change yet. The more its
ideological orientation makes it move away from moderately autonomist to more
assertive autonomist positions (Massetti 2009: 505), the more its political project
will become less inclusive. This seems not to be the case of the PA/CA. This non-
secessionist regionalist/nationalist party has a consistent position and remains
strongly autonomist (Massetti 2009: 505) along all the electoral periods. Its political
project remains with the same degree of inclusiveness along all the three electoral
periods. These varieties of positions in regionalist parties go in line with the
research agenda that identifies the deep influence of ideology on these parties
(Gómez-Reino et al. 2006: 254).

As shown when analysing the behaviour of SWPs, the results confirm the
existing literature that explores the adaptation of these parties to a multi-level
setting in decentralised states like Spain (Montero 2005: 63-66; Fabre and
Swenden 2013: 345) via the general hypothesis outlined (H10). One of the factors
that can explain this complex behaviour, apart from ideology, is their internal
structure (Deschouwer 2006; Laffin et al. 2007). These parties organise
themselves according to the reality in which they act, adapting, in this case, to the
regional context. This adaptation needs to acknowledge that SWPs are the main
link between the different levels of party competition (Fabre and Sweden 2013:
343), and at the same time, integrated parties (Thorlakson 2013: 716-718). They
have the responsibility to maintain a state-wide project that can be recognised in
most of the state, adapting it to the needs of the regions through a pragmatic
approach (Fabre 2011: 345) and maintaining internal consistency (Klingelhöfer
2014: 4) and cohesion (León 2017: 1-4). This process of pragmatic adaptation to
the regional needs results in the autonomy of their regional branches (Filippov et
al. 2004: 192–194). When regional elections are held, the regional branches make the centre of power inside the party shift from the centre to the peripheries (Hopkins 2003: 230).

This internal adaptation can be behind the diverse and varied set of results observed when comparing the PSOE and the PP in the three regions. According to these, and in line with the main literature, the PSOE has maintained, to some extent, a formal federal structure with strong regional power (Libbrecht et al. 2009: 68). The PSOE grants its regional branches with a high degree of autonomy to adapt to the needs of the region (Hopkins 2009: 188-195). Despite this degree of freedom and the regional variation amongst the different regional branches, this did not reach the same level as the one granted to the PSC in Catalonia (Keating 2001; Roller and van Houten 2003). The PP can be placed on the opposite side, with a more integrated structure, with the location of decisions-making processes clearly at the centre (García-Guereta 2001: 401-402). Its regional branches have less degree of autonomy, and therefore, they have fewer possibilities to adapt to the regional context, following with more precision the instructions coming from the centre (van Biezen 2003: 93-101). This can explain the stronger pro-periphery positions of the PSOE in comparison to the PP, acting nearly as a fully federal party (Hopkins 2009: 192-195). In light of the existing literature, the results, to some extent, confirmed this behaviour. Overall, they adopt pro-periphery positions to comply with the decentralisation Spanish process (Keating and Wilson 2009: 538), but their internal structure determines, to some extent, their strength. Future research agendas can focus on the interaction of this factor with the ideological orientation explained above to understand more in detail how this degree of freedom is articulated.

In relation to the above, two other main findings have emerged from the analysis that further confirm the literature. First, the internal tensions. Adapting to different regional scenarios entails conflict that puts under pressure their internal coherence (Fabre 2008: 310-312) and their image as integrated part of the current political system (Hopkins and Bradbury 2006: 136). These emerged when observing the behaviour of the PSOE in the regions of Andalusia and the Canary Islands. In these two regions, it seems that the regional branches had stretched
too much the limits imposed by the centre and the ability to articulate a recognisable state-wide discourse, undermining its possibilities in other regions (Chandler 1987: 152). This threat was addressed by imposing to the regional branches the view of the centre, displayed by the regional frameworks (Klingelhöfer 2014: 2). This can contribute to measure the importance of the so-called *baronias*\(^{160}\) in the Spanish context and their impact in the internal power structure of the *PSOE* and the *PP* (Astudillo y García-Guereta, 2005: 3; Betanzo 2006: 247-249; Astudillo 2010: 343-349). Second, the competition against strong regionalist parties. The variation observed in both parties can also be explained by the competition with strong regionalist parties, not present in Castilla-La Mancha. Regionalist parties pressure the regional branches of the SWPs to stretch their degree of freedom and point out their contradictions between what they say at the national-level and what they say at the regional-level (Meguid 2005: 357-358). The results showed that both the *PSOE* and the *PP* regionalise more their discourse in Andalusia and the Canary Islands. This change can be explained, to some extent, because two strong regionalist parties act in these regions. The stronger the regionalist parties, the more autonomy is granted to the regional branches (Jeffery 2010: 9).

**Further contributions**

Considering the results contained here in a broader sense, a crucial factor has to be outlined. This is, the importance of the context in which the phenomenon unfolds (Alonso *et al.* 2015: 853; Rovny 2015: 916). This was highlighted in the analysis of both the explanatory and control variables. According to the interpretation of the Rokkian model, the relations between the centre and the peripheries are constrained and determined by the context in which they unfold. As the analyses have shown, the Spanish context is key to understand the results. Fragmentation can be an example of this. What happens in the Canary Islands can be confounded to the Canarian reality, with difficulties to extrapolate it. Despite this, the results for this archipelago can be tested against other outer-peripheries to see if there is a common narrative to be able to articulate a general theory of

\(^{160}\) *Baronias* is a label used in the Spanish political arena to refer to the power that the regional branches of the *PSOE* and the *PP* have inside the state-wide party.
fragmentation. The same can be said for distance. Can the same results be found in the island of Réunion (France)? This can only be answered considering the island of Réunion in depth. The qualitative analysis contained in this investigation was intended to bring in context as a key factor. Understanding the conditions in which parties act can anticipate the possible answers to the main research question.

This investigation has addressed the specific Spanish regional context via three main explanatory and six control variables. The combination of these two types of variables has provided a wider picture of the phenomenon in the case of Spain. Focusing only on the explanatory variables might have weakened the final answer to the main research question. The main findings in relation to the control variables show that the literature on parties can be, to some extent, confirmed. The main contribution of this investigation goes along the main explanatory variables. As it has been shown, distance, fragmentation, and polycentricity procure promising results for further research agendas, approaching important factors that have been overlooked by the existing literature, both in general terms and in relation to Spain as a specific case study. Applying a mix method approach has granted this investigation with the proper means to observe how these variables need to be considered in both a quantitatively and qualitatively manner to grasp their real impact on party positioning on the centre-periphery cleavage. Using only one method of analysis might have discard important inferences that need to be considered to fully understand how parties behave and articulate the relations between the centre and the peripheries. These results build on the general literature that addresses party competition along the centre-periphery cleavage and the specific research based on Spain. In the case of the first body of literature, the conclusions contained in this chapter can be used to expand on the existing knowledge of how parties articulate the relation between regions. Regarding the second type of studies, the inferences discussed in the present thesis can be used to, on one hand, better understand how parties address the tensions that dichotomous regions cause in Spain and how they are dealt with, and on the other hand, this novel mixed methods approach contributes to also widen the different routes that one can take when dealing with this same research problem.
In this thesis, a centre-periphery continuum has been proposed. The purpose was to disentangle the broad concept of “centre-periphery”. By introducing distance, this has to be further broken down to seek precision in the analysis. The distance from the centre makes a difference, and the impact of this factor in the inner-periphery is not the same as in the outer-periphery, as shown by the analyses. Being further away from the network of power relations and decision-making processes of the centre is key to understand the level of development of the regions, and more broadly, of the state itself. Managing these differences, especially by SWPs, has to be put in context in decentralised states like Spain, deeply affected by multi-level party competition and strong regionalist tensions. Adapting to never-ending demands by regionalist parties and demands from the regional populations is better understood if the concept “centre-periphery” concept is precise. This investigation has tried to contribute with a centre-periphery continuum that the results seem to support. The differences between regions can be explained, to some extent, by classifying them into centres, inner-, and outer-peripheries.

Finally, the last main contribution is linked to the analysed context. The findings over time have shown that the relations between the centre and the different peripheries change, and this reinforces the idea that this cleavage is an ongoing dynamic process. Building on the literature that considers the process of state/nation-building a dynamic process (Bartolini 2005: 122-131), social cleavages, like the one presented here, also need to be inserted in these major dynamics. The centre-periphery cleavage can be understood as an example of how social cleavages change and adapt over time under the pressure of major processes that are multi-level and socio-structural in nature. With this in mind, this investigation is circumscribed to a specific case study and time period, Spain 1998-2012. The results answer the main research question for this period of time in Spain. They have to be further contrasted to the current political reality. The behaviour of the PP can be an example of change over time. The current recentralisation dynamics of this party reinforces, on one hand, the idea of an ongoing process, and on the other hand, highlights the fact that the results need to be updated to provide the literature with an explanation over time and of the current situation at the same time.
4. CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has provided the necessary discussion of the main findings provided by both analyses in relation to the main research question and contribution to the existing literature. The results showed that all factors shaped, with different degrees of impact, party competition on the centre-periphery cleavage. From the three explanatory variable, distance was the factor that had the deepest effect. In the case of fragmentation, the results showed interesting and unexpected behaviours by parties in the specific circumstances of the Canary Islands. Polycentricity also affected party competition as theorised, but this factor needs to be further analysed. These three main factors were better explained using the proposed centre-periphery continuum, without which the variation between the regions could not have been explained with the necessary depth and detail. From the six control variables, the expectations were fulfilled with more strength by the three party-level control variables, in line with the main body of the literature. The findings for the three regional-level control variables showed that these factors also had some degree of impact, providing the literature with a wider and more precise understanding of the phenomenon, like for example, via the relation of strong regional languages and SWPs.
CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSIONS
This investigation has been based on the idea of better understanding party competition over the centre-periphery cleavage as the main research problem. Approaching this phenomenon is crucial to comprehend the deep roots that social cleavages have for the articulation of political struggle. Being central actors in configuring political agendas make parties responsible for structuring modern democracies and linking the citizens with the institutions that are in charge of providing the necessary means to fulfil their needs and interests. Not only are parties responsible for articulating political agendas around the most salient social cleavages, but this is done at the level in which they unfold. Political research, when dealing with this same research problem, has been informed by a strong national bias, which has provided deep understanding of the phenomenon, but social cleavages go beyond the nation-state as the perfect unit of analysis. Examining social cleavages at the level in which they unfold opens the door to have a more detailed picture of party competition and provides stronger answers to important research questions. In decentralised states, this is fundamental. The increasing importance of supra-national, regional, and local bodies in the current political scenario of globalisation needs to be addressed at the proper level, without which, the impact of social cleavages would be faded or concealed by other factors that do not reflect their actual influence on the everyday life of citizens.

This multi-level context makes party competition more complex. Party structures, organisations, and behaviours respond to these new settings by adapting to social processes that are informed by many different interests that not only radiate from the central level. This makes these social processes dynamic, stressing the ability of parties to adjust to never-ending demands from many different actors and that respond to many different circumstances. Amongst these different dynamic social processes, the centre-periphery cleavage maybe represents one of the most influential cleavages that shape party competition in a multi-level political arena. Political mobilisation at the regional level poses a real threat to the interest of the elites at the centre. Other social cleavages could be considered more or less state-wide, but the centre-periphery cleavage reveal the uneasy assimilation of sub-national social groups which identify with other loyalties that do not necessary match those that come from the centre. In order to address
this strongly territorialised social cleavage, this thesis has focused on the regions as the main unit of observation.

Many European states have experienced, in the past decades, impressive decentralisation and devolution processes. This has led regions, especially peripheral regions, to be the locus of significant political processes that are not limited by national borders, increasing their importance both outside and inside the states in which they are located. This has generated tensions in the relations with the centres via deeply perceived territorial grievances, triggering alternative sub-national mobilisation movements. On one hand, peripheries claim a more important role in state-wide issues, and on the other hand, centres try to maintain their privileged position. The elites in both types of regions politicise these territorial grievances to rearrange the institutional context to their own benefit. It could be said that regions and territorial politics have emerged as political spaces in their own right. To adapt to the saliency and prominence of the centre-periphery cleavage and respond to its challenges, parties now frame political debate with an intense territorial sub-national base, upgrading the importance of the regional level and not considering it any more of second order. The main consequence is that party competition has become both inter- and intra-regional. Observing this regional variation using a national lens might prevent the efforts to properly understand how parties compete along the centre-periphery cleavage as the main research problem, and how this configurates the way in which centres and peripheries frame their relations.

In order to approach the above research problem, this thesis has focused on examining what shapes party behaviour when engaging in political competition over the centre-periphery cleavage. The literature that deals with this phenomenon has centred its attention on disentangling how parties position themselves in relation to the different issues that articulate this cleavage. This is, party behaviour along the centre-periphery cleavage is defined, in general terms, in relation to which issues they emphasise, what position they assume regarding these, and what strategies they can adopt to conform their political agendas and maximise their electoral performance. To better grasp the ways in which parties behave, the different authors have also taken into consideration which factors shape this
conduct. Regarding this, the literature has drawn attention to elements such as party type, ideology, identity, or language. Numerous studies have confirmed that these have a deep impact on the way this cleavage is articulated and how the relations between centres and peripheries are framed by parties. Despite this considerable body of literature, there is a gap in relation to other factors that might also have profound effects. This thesis has had the purpose of addressing this vacuum. With this in mind, the main research question has been: what factors shape party competition on the centre-periphery cleavage? The focus was centred on three regional-level factors that have received little or no scrutiny in the literature in the field of comparative politics and party competition over the centre-periphery cleavage: distance, fragmentation, and polycentricity. In order to acknowledge the importance of the different factors that the literature has identified, six control variables were also selected: economic development, regional identity feelings, regional languages, party type, ideology, and party structure. The purpose was to observe if the findings presented here went in line with the existing studies.

The effects that these three factors were expected to have on party competition on can be summarised in two dichotomous outcomes. On one hand, distance was expected to strengthen the pro-periphery position of parties. This was based on the effect of the abstraction level addressed by the Construal Level Theory. As the centre becomes more abstract with distance, parties would turn to the region to fulfil the attachment feelings of the regional populations. This territorialisation would increase exponentially as distance from the centre also increases. On the other hand, fragmentation and polycentricity were expected to have the opposite effect, this is, the weakening of the pro-periphery position of parties. The reason for this was that the Construal Level Theory was expected to go beyond the region. In other words, the abstraction level was also thought to affect the region. The sub-regional entities or urban centres of power would be the locus of the loyalties of the regional populations as the abstraction level increases with distance. The importance that the local ruling bodies and centres of power have for the regional populations would undermine the ability of parties to strengthen the regional level if this went to the detriment of these local bodies. Added to the gap in the literature described above, one can find that the different studies that explore the centre-periphery cleavage take the labels “centre” and
“periphery” as absolute. This does not match the regional variation that the same studies find. To approach this, this investigation has proposed a centre-periphery continuum that disentangles this cleavage into more precise labels to capture with more detail the evident regional variation that one can find when analysing regions that are articulated and framed by parties according to factors that do not apply homogeneously to all. These labels are “centres”, “inner-peripheries”, and “outer-peripheries”.

The research method selected has been the sub-national comparative method of analysis. This method has the advantage of dealing with the regional variation identified above when examining party competition along a strongly territorialised social cleavage like the centre-periphery cleavage with more precision, and this has been key in this investigation, as the centre-periphery continuum suggested. The case selected has been Spain. The reason for this was the salience of the centre-periphery cleavage in this case study. The different processes of decentralisation and devolution have made Spain an example of a consolidated de facto federal state. This has encouraged peripheral regions to demand more political weight inside the state, tensioning the relations with the centre. Not only have the different peripheral regions become increasingly important, but also their different degrees of development procure a high regional variation that provides the necessary scenario to engage with the ways in which parties adapt to the context in which they act.

To apply this sub-national comparative method, a mix method approach was chosen. The reason for this was to obtain at the same time a complete and in-depth picture of the phenomenon. The complete picture took all the 17 regions of Spain to observe the impact of the three factors state-wide. This was done using a quantitative method of analysis via a multiple regression analysis. The RMP provided the most developed data-set and sources of information for this analysis. The in-depth picture specifically compared Castilla-La Mancha, Andalusia, and the Canary Islands to test the impact of distance, fragmentation, and polycentricity in regions that shared more or less the same economic, cultural, and social context. This was performed using a qualitative content analysis method. Political manifests were selected as the principal source of information as these documents faithfully represent the position that parties had over time with more

According to the main findings, distance was the factor that most affected party competition over the centre-periphery cleavage. As distance from the centre increased, the pro-periphery positions of parties also strengthened. This could be used to confirm that the Construal Level Theory could be applied to the centre-periphery cleavage with some degree of success. As one moved towards the outer-periphery, the abstraction level also increased and parties adapted to it by territorialising their appeals to the regional populations. This affected both SWPs and regionalist parties, so this factor could be considered as transversal and with profound roots in the way they frame the relations between regions. The expectations that were theorised were, to some extent, confirmed. The different analyses confirmed that from the three main explanatory variables, this factor had the most consistent impact on party behaviour.

Following with fragmentation, this factor also had deep effects, which at the same time weakened and strengthened the pro-periphery positions of parties. This explanatory variable has been analysed through two main dimensions. On one hand, the spatial dimension, which referred to the spatial fragmentation of the region, like in archipelago regions. On the other hand, the political-administrative dimension, which linked to the importance that the local ruling bodies had for the local population. Considering first the weakening effects, the analyses confirmed that the pro-periphery positions of parties were, to some extent, undermined. The abstraction level that increased with distance also turned against the region when the local populations had consolidated sub-regional units of identification to turn to when seeking to fulfil their needs and demands. When the two dimensions of fragmentation coincided, like in the case of the Canary Islands, the undermining effect multiplied its strength. Turning now to the strengthening effects, the analysis also showed that, in the same case and in some occasions, the combination of the two dimensions of fragmentation not always had the undermining effect outlined above. This is, the results showed that in some specific occasions, the pro-periphery position of parties strengthened on the bases of trying to avoid its
negative effects and to build the region around this specific and intrinsic characteristic.

In the case of polycentricity, the results showed that this factor needs to be further analysed as the inferences where not enough to obtain the same answers and explanations as for the previous two factors. Nonetheless, the results showed that the degree of polycentricity was more important in shifting party positions than the presence of multiple centres of power per se. This factor affected the position of parties over the centre-periphery cleavage via the concentration of competition in a reduced number of centres of power. Considering the main finding for all three explanatory variables, this thesis has shown that in the case of Spain, these factors are better understood in a qualitative manner. When it comes to the control variables, the findings pointed in the direction of confirming what the literature has outlined regarding party type, ideology, party structure, and regional identity. Economic development and regional languages, although going in another direction than the mainstream literature, provided interesting insights which could be used to better understand the phenomenon.

In relation to the limitations mentioned in the previous chapter, these could be dealt with in large comparative studies. The specific limitations regarding the data used, the significant difference between the results obtained in the quantitative in comparison to the qualitative analysis, and the impression of presenting the Canary Islands as a unique case could be solved by exporting this investigation to other case studies and outer-peripheries. One possible way to overcome the above limitations could be to apply this research process to case studies which have a more balanced distribution of inner- and outer-peripheries. Examples of this could be Portugal, Denmark, or Japan. These three countries have, on one hand, more outer-peripheries than Spain, and on the other hand, more archipelago or insular regions than the case study analysed in this thesis. These types of cases could provide enough quantitative and qualitative inferences to further understand, and with a higher degree of detail, the real impact of distance, fragmentation, and polycentricity.

With these conclusions in mind, a possible answer to the main research problem, and key message of this investigation, could be the following. All three
main factors affected party competition on the centre-periphery cleavage, but with different degrees of impact. In this sense, the factor that most affected the behaviour of parties was distance, strongly skewing their positions to the absolute pro-periphery end of the pro-centre/periphery continuum. In the second place came fragmentation, which although confirming the expectations to some extent, also revealed stimulating unpredicted outcomes. This factor, considered in a specific context, had the theorised undermining effects, but sometimes and in the case of the outer-peripheral region of the Canary Islands, turned parties to adopt strong pro-periphery positions. Polycentricity came in last place. Its negative effects were confirmed in relation to its degree of impact, but the lack of further inferences prevented a fully detailed picture of its influence on the behaviour of parties when articulating the relations between the centre and the different peripheries. Without the proposed centre-periphery continuum, the regional variation that the analyses have flagged would not have been identified and explained as this investigation has tried to. The effects of these factors were different depending on which region was examined. Their impact was not the same in the centre than in the peripheries, and at the same time, the peripheral regions were affected differently depending on which one was scrutinised.

This investigation has provided encouraging findings for future research agendas. In terms of distance and the Construal Level Theory, this factor could be applied to other outer-peripheries that are further away than the Canary Islands to observe, for example, if the abstraction level reaches a maximum point or if this could go as far as to sustain secessionist positions when parties are unable to procure a solid link between the centre and the periphery. Applying this theory to the field of comparative politics has yet to be developed in its full extension and in different contexts. Fragmentation has more complex implications, but future research agendas could focus on, on one hand, how the Construal level Theory could also be applied to sub-regional realities, and on the other hand, understand in depth how the combination of the two dimensions of this factor proposed here really affect the articulation of the regional level in archipelago peripheries. In relation to the latter, and to make the overall analysis of this factor more accurate and detailed, one possible research line could be specifically focused on articulating a possible measuring scheme for the political-administrative dimension.
of fragmentation for it to be quantitatively analysed. With this, one could examine state-wide the impact of both dimensions of fragmentation in both types of analyses in the same way as distance.

The results for polycentricity imply that future examination of this factor could be associated to its degree of impact rather than to the presence of multiple centres of power per se. To achieve this, and following with the example of the measuring scheme for the political-administrative dimension of fragmentation, a future research line could be centred on developing a measuring scheme for its degree of impact to test it quantitatively. This would allow polycentricity to be analysed in depth via two ways. Firstly, measure the impact that the presence of multiple centres of power have, as this investigation has tried to achieve. Secondly, observe if the degree of polycentricity really has the deep effects that the qualitative analysis contained here has suggested. Another research line in relation to the concentration of competition in small number of centres of power, as this thesis has outlined, could be focused on the study of the interaction of polycentricity and fragmentation. In this sense, the relation between these two factors may be deeper than the one theorised. The perfect match between the island, the local population, and the island-based ruling bodies could be expressed through strong island-based centres of power, especially if the archipelago has two or more mayor islands, and this needs to be further analysed to fully understand the insular dynamics of this type of regions.

In order to address the significance of the results contained here in relation to the factors economic development and regional languages, which go against the mainstream literature on the topic, future research agendas could be directed to obtain, on one hand, a more reliable measuring scheme for the economic development of the regions, and on the other hand, a more detailed understanding of the processes of centralisation and SWPs. Regarding the first, the indicator employed in this investigation did not show the expected results, and this could be linked to the measuring scheme selected. Using only one economic indicator to measure the economic development of regions seems not to be enough to capture what this factor was theorised to measure. The economic development of regions is a broad concept which is articulated around many different economic indicators, and therefore, focusing only on one might fade or conceal the real degree or state
of the economic development of the regions. Articulating an economic index composed of these different economic indicators might be one possible research lines to study how the economic development of the regions affects the way parties frame the relations between centres and peripheries in a quantitative manner. In relation to the second, the centralisation processes that consolidated decentralised states such as Spain are experiencing could be one of the ways to understand and further explain the impact that strong regional distinctive markers have on the behaviours of parties, especially those of SWPs. The results presented here can open a new line of research which links these processes of centralisation and their impact on strong regional distinctive markers and party behaviour. The tensions created between region by these processes could be expressed or signalled via the articulation of these kind of regional markers.
APPENDIX A

The Territorial Authority Competential Preferences Claims Scheme:

**Level of government (first digit):**
1 the local level;
2 the regional level;
3 the state level;
8 the European level;
9 the international level.

**Preferred degree of authority (second digit):**
1 the quasi-sentence claims less authority for the respective level;
2 the quasi-sentence claims more authority for the respective level;
0 the quasi-sentence contains no authority claim. It states only the level of government addressed by the policy preference, without claiming more or fewer competencies for that particular level of government in that policy area.

Classification scheme of the territorial authority competential preferences claims.

**Code Explanation**
11 Less authority for the local level
12 More authority for the local level
21 Less authority for the regional level
22 More authority for the regional level
31 Less authority for the national level
32 More authority for the national level
81 Less authority for the European level
82 More authority for the European level
91 Less authority for the international level
92 More authority for the international level
10/20/30/80/90 No explicit claim for more or less authority to the level of government addressed.
00 No competential preference is expressed (no level addressed, no direction).

01 In favour of subsidiary principle.
02 In favour of clear (jurisdictional) distinction between levels (accountability).
03 In favour of shared authority between levels, i.e. explicit calls for cooperation or co-ordination between higher and lower levels (vertical cooperation).
09 More than one level addressed at the same time; all levels addressed at the same time.
APPENDIX B

The Standard Comparative Manifesto Project Coding Frame: 56 Categories in 7 Policy Domains.

Domain 1: External Relations
101 Foreign Special Relationships: positive
102 Foreign Special Relationships: negative
103 Anti-Imperialism
104 Military: positive
105 Military: negative
106 Peace
107 Internationalism: positive
108 European Community: positive
109 Internationalism: negative
110 European Community: negative

Domain 2: Freedom and Democracy
201 Freedom and Human Rights
202 Democracy
203 Constitutionalism: positive
204 Constitutionalism: negative

Domain 3: Political System
301 Decentralisation
302 Centralisation
303 Governmental and Administrative Efficiency
304 Political Corruption
305 Political Authority

Domain 4: Economy
401 Free Enterprise
402 Incentives
403 Market Regulation
404 Economic Planning
405 Corporatism
406 Protectionism: positive
407 Protectionism: negative
408 Economic Goals
409 Keynesian Demand Management
410 Productivity
411 Technology and Infrastructure
412 Controlled Economy
413 Nationalisation
414 Economic Orthodoxy
415 Marxist Analysis
416 Anti-Growth Economy

Domain 5: Welfare and Quality of Life
501 Environmental Protection
502 Culture
503 Social Justice
504 Welfare State Expansion
505 Welfare State Limitation
Domain 6: Fabric of Society

601 National Way of Life: positive
602 National Way of Life: negative
603 Traditional Morality: positive
604 Traditional Morality: negative
605 Law and Order
606 Social Harmony
607 Multiculturalism: positive
608 Multiculturalism: negative

Domain 7: Social Groups

701 Labour Groups: positive
702 Labour Groups: negative
703 Agriculture
704 Middle Class and Professional Groups
705 Minority Groups
706 Non-Economic Demographic Groups

The Standard Coding Frame for Regional Manifestos: 20 new Sub-categories in the 7 Policy Domains of CMP (notice that RMP codes each policy preference with 4 codes instead of the 3 that CMP uses).

Domain 1: External Relations
1017 Interregional Relationships: Positive
1027 Interregional Relationships: Negative

Domain 2: Freedom and Democracy
2024 Representative Democracy: Positive
2025 Participatory Democracy: Positive

Domain 3: Political System
3012 Sub-state Finance
3013 Differential Treatment among Regions: Negative
3014 Differential Treatment among Regions: Positive
3031 Administration of Justice

Domain 4: Economy
4111 Management of Natural Resources

Domain 5: Welfare and Quality of Life
5032 Equal treatment of immigrants
5042 Welfare for immigrants
5051 Welfare limitations for immigrants
5062 Education expansion for immigrants
5071 Education limitation for immigrants

Domain 6: Fabric of Society
6015 Promotion and Protection of Vernacular Language(s)
6016 Cultural links with Diaspora
6017 Bilingualism: positive
6051 Immigrants' negative impact on law and order
Domain 7: Social Groups
7053 Immigrants: positive
7054 Diaspora: positive
### Table 1.- The Coded, Existing, and Available Data in the RMP for the Quantitative Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>La Rioja</td>
<td><em>No coded data available</em></td>
<td>2007: PSOE and PP</td>
<td>2011: PSOE, PP, and PR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REGION</td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>STATE-WIDE PARTIES</td>
<td>REGIONALIST PARTIES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andalusia</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>No data for the relevant regionalist parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aragon</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asturias</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>No data for the relevant regionalist parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balearic Islands</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basque Country</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canary Islands</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cantabria</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castilla-La Mancha</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>No relevant regionalist parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castilla y León</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cataluña</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremadura</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Electoral Cartel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galicia</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Rioja</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madrid</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>No relevant regionalist parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murcia</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>No relevant regionalist parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navarre</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valencia</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>No data for the relevant regionalist parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>139</strong></td>
<td><strong>97</strong></td>
<td><strong>42</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.- Statistical Summary of the Manifestos Selected for all the Regions
APPENDIX D

Formulas for the saliency scores for the regional level:

centre \((c_{30}+c_{31}+c_{32})\)

region \((c_{20}+c_{21}+c_{22})\)

local \((c_{10}+c_{11}+c_{12})\).

**Formula for the positional scores on the distribution of competences:**

centre \((c_{32}-c_{31})\)

region \((c_{22}-c_{21})\)

local \((c_{12}-c_{11})\)

Formulas for the attitude towards multiculturalism:

Multiculturalism positive saliency score: \(c_{607}\)

Multiculturalism negative saliency score: \(c_{608}\)

Exclusive/inclusive positional score: \(c_{607}-c_{608}\)
APPENDIX E
CIS Survey 2286/5-0 (05/05/1998)

**PREGUNTA 48**
¿Con cuál de las siguientes frases se identifica Ud. en mayor medida?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>(N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Me siento únicamente español</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>(18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Me siento más español que canario</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>(9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Me siento tan español como canario</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>(258)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Me siento más canario que español</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>(158)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Me siento únicamente canario</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>(77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.C.</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>(523)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Translation:**
Question 48

With which of the following statement do you identify more:

- a) I feel only Spanish
- b) I feel more Spanish than Canarian
- c) I feel both Spanish and Canarian
- d) I feel more Canarian than Spanish
- e) I feel only Canarian
- f) N/A
Measuring Scheme: the final results for the independent variable *Regional Identity* is obtained by adding up the last 2 answers to the question asked in the survey (d+e), this is, more Canarian than Spanish and only Canarian. The result in this case is 44.9%.

APPENDIX F

Table 1.- *The Selected and Available Manifestos for the Regions of Castilla-La Mancha, Andalusia, and the Canary Islands*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGIONS</th>
<th>ELECTION YEARS</th>
<th>PARTIES</th>
<th>% OF VALID VOTES CAST- Nº OF SEATS IN THE REGIONAL PARLIAMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Castilla-La Mancha</strong> <em>(core region)</em></td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>PSOE, PP</td>
<td>PSOE: 53.42%-26, PP: 40.40%-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>PSOE, PP</td>
<td>PSOE: 51.95%-26, PP: 42.38%-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>PSOE, PP</td>
<td>PSOE: 43.40%-24, PP: 48.11%-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Andalusia</strong> <em>(inner-peripheral region)</em></td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>PSOE, PP, PA/CA</td>
<td>PSOE: 44.32%-52, PP: 38.02%-46, PA/CA: 7.43%-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>PSOE, PP, PA/CA</td>
<td>PSOE: 48.41%-56, PP: 38.45%-47, PA/CA: 2.76- No Seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>PSOE, PP, PA/CA</td>
<td>PSOE: 39.56%-47, PP: 40.67%-50, PA/CA: 2.51%- No Seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Canary Islands</strong> <em>(outer-peripheral region)</em></td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>PSOE, PP, CC</td>
<td>PSOE: 24.03%-19, PP: 27.13%-15, CC: 36.93%-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>PSOE, PP, CC</td>
<td>PSOE: 34.51%-26, PP: 24.04%-15, CC: 24.24%-19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.- *Statistical Summary of the Manifestos Selected for the Regions of Castilla-La Mancha, Andalusia, and the Canary Islands*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGIONS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>SWP</th>
<th>REGIONALIST PARTIES</th>
<th>RATIO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Castilla-La Mancha</strong> <em>(core region)</em></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>No relevant regionalist parties</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELECTORAL PERIOD</td>
<td>MAIN DOCUMENT</td>
<td>TRIANGULATION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-2001</td>
<td>Regional manifesto</td>
<td>Political resolutions of the Federal Congress 34/35+Party regional political framework for 1999+Inaugural Speech</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Castilla-La Mancha</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PSOE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-2001</td>
<td>Regional manifesto</td>
<td>Political resolutions of the National Congress 13-<em>indirect source</em>+Inaugural Speech</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Castilla-La Mancha</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-2001</td>
<td>Regional manifesto</td>
<td>Political resolutions of the Federal Congress 34/35+Party regional political framework for 1999+Inaugural Speech</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Andalusia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PSOE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-2001</td>
<td>Regional manifesto</td>
<td>Political resolutions of the National Congress 13+Inaugural Speech</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Andalusia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-2001</td>
<td>Regional manifesto</td>
<td>Inaugural Speech</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Andalusia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PA/CA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-2001</td>
<td>Regional manifesto</td>
<td>Political resolutions of the Federal Congress 34/35+Party regional political framework for 1999+Inaugural Speech</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The Canary Islands</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PSOE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-2001</td>
<td>Inaugural Speech</td>
<td>Political resolutions of the National Congress 13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The Canary Islands</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-2001</td>
<td>Regional manifesto</td>
<td>Not available directly+Inaugural Speech</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The Canary Islands</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-2010</td>
<td>Regional manifesto</td>
<td>Political resolutions of the Federal Congress 37+Party regional</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Castilla-La Mancha</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PSOE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Type of Document</td>
<td>Content</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-2010</td>
<td>Regional manifesto</td>
<td>Political resolutions of the National Congress 16+Party regional political framework for 2007+Inaugural Speech</td>
<td>Castilla-La Mancha</td>
<td>PP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-2010</td>
<td>Regional manifesto</td>
<td>Political resolutions of the Federal Congress 37+Party regional political framework for 2007+Inaugural Speech</td>
<td>Andalusia</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-2010</td>
<td>Regional manifesto</td>
<td>Political resolutions of the National Congress 16+Party regional political framework for 2007+Inaugural Speech</td>
<td>Andalusia</td>
<td>PP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-2010</td>
<td>Regional manifesto</td>
<td>Inaugural Speech</td>
<td>Andalusia</td>
<td>PA/CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-2010</td>
<td>Regional manifesto</td>
<td>Political resolutions of the Federal Congress 37+Party regional political framework for 2007+Inaugural Speech</td>
<td>The Canary Islands</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-2010</td>
<td>Regional manifesto</td>
<td>Political resolutions of the National Congress 16+Party regional political framework for 2007+Inaugural Speech</td>
<td>The Canary Islands</td>
<td>PP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-2010</td>
<td>Regional manifesto</td>
<td>Political resolutions of the 4th National Congress+Inaugural Speech</td>
<td>The Canary Islands</td>
<td>CC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011-2012</td>
<td>Regional manifesto</td>
<td>Political resolutions of the Federal Congress 38+Party regional political framework for 2011+Inaugural Speech</td>
<td>Castilla-La Mancha</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011-2012</td>
<td>Inaugural Speech</td>
<td>Political resolutions of the National Congress 17+Party regional political framework for 2011</td>
<td>Castilla-La Mancha</td>
<td>PP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011-2012</td>
<td>Regional manifesto</td>
<td>Political resolutions of the Federal Congress 38+Party regional political framework for 2011+Inaugural Speech</td>
<td>Andalusia</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011-2012</td>
<td>Regional manifesto</td>
<td>Political resolutions of the National Congress 17+Party regional political framework for 2011+Inaugural Speech</td>
<td>Andalusia</td>
<td>PP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011-2012</td>
<td>Regional manifesto</td>
<td>Inaugural Speech</td>
<td>Andalusia</td>
<td>PA/CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011-2012</td>
<td>Regional manifesto</td>
<td>Political resolutions of the Federal Congress 38+Party regional political framework for 2011+Inaugural Speech</td>
<td>The Canary Islands</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011-2012</td>
<td>Regional manifesto</td>
<td>Political resolutions of the National Congress 17+Party regional political framework for 2011+Inaugural Speech</td>
<td>The Canary Islands</td>
<td>PP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011-2012</td>
<td>Regional manifesto</td>
<td>Political resolutions of the 5th National Congress+Inaugural Speech</td>
<td>The Canary Islands</td>
<td>CC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX H

**Table 1.- Aggregated Data for the Dependent, Explanatory, and Control Variables**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>OBSERVATIONS</th>
<th>MEAN</th>
<th>STD. DEV.</th>
<th>MIN</th>
<th>MAX</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEPENDENT VARIABLES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA INENCY OF THE REGIONAL LEVEL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator: RMP c.20+c.21+c.22</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>91.628</td>
<td>4.272</td>
<td>68.12</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POSITION ON COMPETENCE DISTRIBUTION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator: RMP c.22-c.21</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>2.359</td>
<td>3.673</td>
<td>-0.65</td>
<td>26.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATTITUDES TOWARDS MULTICULTURALISM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator: RMPc-607-c.608</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>0.204</td>
<td>0.411</td>
<td>-0.80</td>
<td>2.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EXPLANATORY VARIABLES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISTANCE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator: distance in Km from Madrid to</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>419.1007</td>
<td>376.045</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the capital of the region</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONTINUOUS variable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRAGMENTATION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator: archipelago regions</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>.117647</td>
<td>.3321056</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CATEGORICAL variable (No=0/Yes=1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLYCENTRICITY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator: existence of multiple centres</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>.496403</td>
<td>.5017953</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of power</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CATEGORICAL variable (No=0/Yes=1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CONTROL VARIABLES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator: Difference between regional</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>3332.05</td>
<td>1935.513</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>8146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and national average GDP per capita</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONTINUOUS variable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REGIONAL IDENTITY FEELINGS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Regional Identity Feelings</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>23.29597</td>
<td>16.32874</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>50.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator: CIS identity question</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONTINUOUS variable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REGIONAL IDENTITY FEELINGS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Regional Identity Feelings</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>.561151</td>
<td>.4980412</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator: recognition of the region as</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a historic nacionalidad in the Status of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CATEGORICAL variable (No=0/Yes=1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>std. dev.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REGIONAL LANGUAGE</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>0.43849</td>
<td>0.4980412</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARTY TYPE</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>0.697842</td>
<td>0.4608542</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEDOLOGICAL POSITION</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>-1.459065</td>
<td>7.513842</td>
<td>-26.58</td>
<td>14.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWP FACING REGIONALIST PARTIES</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>0.870504</td>
<td>0.3369628</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 1.- Disaggregated Data for the Three Dependent Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGIONS</th>
<th>SALIENCY OF THE REGIONAL LEVEL</th>
<th>POSITION ON COMPETENCE DISTRIBUTION</th>
<th>ATTITUDES TOWARDS MULTICULTURALISM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indicator: RMP c.20+c.21+c.22</td>
<td>Indicator: RMP c.22-c.21</td>
<td>Indicator: RMP c.607-c.608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andalusia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000:</td>
<td>PSOE: 85.06 PP: 87.94</td>
<td>PSOE: 92.67 PP: 90.45</td>
<td>PSOE: 0.57 PP: 0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008:</td>
<td>PSOE: 95.61 PP: 90.55</td>
<td>PSOE: 2.59 PP: 3.02</td>
<td>PSOE: 0.50 PP: 0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012:</td>
<td>PSOE: 92.67 PP: 90.45</td>
<td>PSOE: 1.88 PP: 0.62</td>
<td>PSOE: 0.58 PP: 0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aragon</td>
<td>1999: PSOE: 90.04 PP: 94.48</td>
<td>2007: PSOE: 85.65 PP: 91.61</td>
<td>2011: PSOE: 0.93 PP: 0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CHA: 87.75 PAR: 88.53</td>
<td>CHA: 2.41 PAR: 5.74</td>
<td>CHA: 0.11 PAR: 11.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000:</td>
<td>PSOE: 2.56 PP: 0.68</td>
<td>PSOE: 1.46 PP: 0.09</td>
<td>PSOE: 0.23 PP: 0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008:</td>
<td>CHA: 93.43 PAR: 88.55</td>
<td>CHA: 3.76 PAR: 4.01</td>
<td>CHA: 0.84 PAR: 0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PSOE: 3.04 PP: 1.95</td>
<td>PSOE: 0.37 PP: 0.36</td>
<td>PSOE: 0.16 PP: 0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basque Country</td>
<td>1999: PSOE: 89.15 PP: 91.34</td>
<td>2007: PSOE: 87.15 PP: 94.26</td>
<td>2011: PSOE: 0.06 PP: 0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PNV: 83.79 CC: 94.86 EH: 86.17</td>
<td>PNV: 4.31 CC: 12.38 EH: 26.28</td>
<td>PSOE: 0.06 PP: 0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009:</td>
<td>PSOE: 93.84 PP: 90.64</td>
<td>PSOE: 91.83 PP: 94.26</td>
<td>PSOE: 0.06 PP: 0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011:</td>
<td>PNV: 95.10 EA: 94.86 EH: 86.17</td>
<td>PNV: 94.51 EA: 12.38 EH: 26.28</td>
<td>PSOE: 0.06 PP: 0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CC: 93.69</td>
<td>CC: 90.94</td>
<td>PSOE: 0.10 PP: 0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009:</td>
<td>PSOE: 90.54 PP: 86.95</td>
<td>CC: 7.56</td>
<td>CC: 3.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007:</td>
<td>PNV: 95.04 PP: 92.52</td>
<td>PNV: 94.51</td>
<td>CC: 3.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011:</td>
<td>EA: 91.20</td>
<td>EA: 12.38</td>
<td>CC: 3.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PRC: 94.29</td>
<td>PRC: 90.32</td>
<td>PSOE: 0.48 PRC: 0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009:</td>
<td>PSOE: 0.85 PP: 0.49</td>
<td>PSOE: 0.95 PP: 0.30</td>
<td>PSOE: 0.48 PRC: 0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007:</td>
<td>PRC: 94.29</td>
<td>PRC: 1.12</td>
<td>PRC: 0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011:</td>
<td>PSOE: 0.95 PP: 0.49</td>
<td>PSOE: 0.48 PP: 0.30</td>
<td>PRC: 1.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PRC: 94.29</td>
<td>PRC: 0.72</td>
<td>PRC: 0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castilla-La Mancha</td>
<td>86.22</td>
<td>88.01</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castilla y Leon</td>
<td>92.42</td>
<td>97.44</td>
<td>84.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catalonia</td>
<td>84.19</td>
<td>91.40</td>
<td>91.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremadura</td>
<td>92.06</td>
<td>96.56</td>
<td>95.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galicia</td>
<td>90.70</td>
<td>93.06</td>
<td>93.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Rioja</td>
<td>94.61</td>
<td>93.01</td>
<td>94.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madrid</td>
<td>89.57</td>
<td>96.75</td>
<td>91.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murcia</td>
<td>94.13</td>
<td>90.51</td>
<td>86.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navarre</td>
<td>86.34</td>
<td>92.22</td>
<td>89.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valencia</td>
<td>84.78</td>
<td>95.56</td>
<td>92.86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2.- *Disaggregated Data for the Explanatory Variables*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGIONS</th>
<th>DISTANCE Indicator: KM from Madrid to the capital of the regions</th>
<th>FRAGMENTATION Indicator: spatial fragmentation of the region</th>
<th>POLYCENTRICITY Indicator: multiple centres of power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Andalusia</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aragon</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asturias</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balearic Islands</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basque Country</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canary Islands</td>
<td>1747</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cantabria</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castilla-La Mancha</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castilla y León</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catalonia</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremadura</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galicia</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Rioja</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madrid</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murcia</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navarre</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valencia</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REGIONS</td>
<td>ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT</td>
<td>REGIONAL IDENTITY FEELINGS</td>
<td>REGIONAL IDENTITY FEELINGS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indicator: difference between the regional and national average GDP per capita</td>
<td>Popular regional identity feelings</td>
<td>Political regional identity feelings</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Table 4.- Disaggregated Data for the Party-level Control Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGIONS</th>
<th>PARTIES Indicator: type of party</th>
<th>IDEOLOGICAL POSITION Indicator: RMP left-right scale</th>
<th>SWP FACING REGIONALIST PARTIES Indicator: electoral competition between SWP and regionalist parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Andalusia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Year 1</td>
<td>Year 2</td>
<td>Year 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SWP:</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PP</td>
<td>PNV</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EA</td>
<td>EA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EH</td>
<td>EH-Bildu</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SWP:</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PP</td>
<td>PP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regional:</td>
<td>PNV</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SWP:</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PP</td>
<td>PP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regional:</td>
<td>PRC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mancha</td>
<td>SWP:</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PP</td>
<td>PP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regional:</td>
<td>PRC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SWP:</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PP</td>
<td>PP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regional:</td>
<td>UPL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>SWP</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catalonia</td>
<td>1999:</td>
<td>SWP:</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2010:</td>
<td>SWP:</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2012:</td>
<td>SWP:</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremadura</td>
<td>1999:</td>
<td>SWP:</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2007:</td>
<td>SWP:</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2011:</td>
<td>SWP:</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galicia</td>
<td>2001:</td>
<td>SWP:</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2009:</td>
<td>SWP:</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2012:</td>
<td>SWP:</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Rioja</td>
<td>1999:</td>
<td>SWP:</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2007:</td>
<td>SWP:</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2011:</td>
<td>SWP:</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madrid</td>
<td>1999:</td>
<td>SWP:</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2007:</td>
<td>SWP:</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murcia</td>
<td>1999:</td>
<td>SWP:</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2007:</td>
<td>SWP:</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2011:</td>
<td>SWP:</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1999:</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>CiU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2010:</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>CiU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2012:</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>CiU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1999:</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>PREX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2007:</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>PREX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2011:</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>PREX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1999:</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>BNG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2007:</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>BNG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2011:</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>BNG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1999:</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2007:</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2011:</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

355
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>SWP:</th>
<th>PSOE</th>
<th>PP</th>
<th>SWP:</th>
<th>PSOE</th>
<th>PP</th>
<th>SWP:</th>
<th>PSOE</th>
<th>PP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Navarre</td>
<td>PP</td>
<td>PP</td>
<td>PP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999:</td>
<td>SWP:</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
<td>Regional: UPN NaBai</td>
<td>SWP:</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
<td>Regional: UPN NaBai</td>
<td>SWP:</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
<td>Regional: UPN NaBai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007:</td>
<td>SWP:</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
<td>UPN NaBai</td>
<td>SWP:</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
<td>UPN NaBai</td>
<td>SWP:</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
<td>UPN NaBai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011:</td>
<td>SWP:</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
<td>UPN NaBai</td>
<td>SWP:</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
<td>UPN NaBai</td>
<td>SWP:</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
<td>UPN NaBai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valencia</td>
<td>PSOE PP</td>
<td>PSOE PP</td>
<td>PSOE PP</td>
<td>PSOE PP</td>
<td>PSOE PP</td>
<td>PSOE PP</td>
<td>PSOE PP</td>
<td>PSOE PP</td>
<td>PSOE PP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999:</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
<td>PP</td>
<td>-1.43</td>
<td>2007:</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
<td>PP</td>
<td>-1.43</td>
<td>2011:</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999:</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
<td>PP</td>
<td>-0.40</td>
<td>2007:</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
<td>PP</td>
<td>-0.40</td>
<td>2011:</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011:</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
<td>PP</td>
<td>-0.93</td>
<td>2011:</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
<td>PP</td>
<td>-0.93</td>
<td>2011:</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX J

**Saliency of the Regional Level**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory and Control Variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
<th>Model 7</th>
<th>Model 8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distance</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fragmentation (Yes)</td>
<td>-2.284</td>
<td>-1.971</td>
<td>-2.130</td>
<td>-2.669</td>
<td>-1.981</td>
<td>-1.997</td>
<td>-1.986</td>
<td>-1.929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2.729)</td>
<td>(2.527)</td>
<td>(2.581)</td>
<td>(2.643)</td>
<td>(2.536)</td>
<td>(2.520)</td>
<td>(2.541)</td>
<td>(2.456)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polycentricity (Yes)</td>
<td>0.483</td>
<td>0.662</td>
<td>0.297</td>
<td>0.368</td>
<td>0.632</td>
<td>0.718</td>
<td>0.643</td>
<td>0.642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.739)</td>
<td>(0.879)</td>
<td>(0.939)</td>
<td>(0.879)</td>
<td>(0.887)</td>
<td>(0.892)</td>
<td>(0.908)</td>
<td>(0.891)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Development</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Identity Feelings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Regional Feelings</td>
<td>-0.043</td>
<td>-0.056</td>
<td>-0.043</td>
<td>-0.045</td>
<td>-0.044</td>
<td>-0.043</td>
<td>-0.043</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>(0.043)</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Language (Yes)</td>
<td>0.986</td>
<td>1.717</td>
<td>1.224</td>
<td>1.022</td>
<td>1.032</td>
<td>0.877</td>
<td>0.958</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.082)</td>
<td>(1.251)</td>
<td>(1.081)</td>
<td>(1.117)</td>
<td>(1.099)</td>
<td>(1.851)</td>
<td>(1.125)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Type (SWP)</td>
<td>-1.548*</td>
<td>-1.447*</td>
<td>-1.457*</td>
<td>-1.475*</td>
<td>-1.624*</td>
<td>-1.553*</td>
<td>-1.524*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.812)</td>
<td>(0.804)</td>
<td>(0.795)</td>
<td>(0.874)</td>
<td>(0.829)</td>
<td>(0.832)</td>
<td>(0.801)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological Position</td>
<td>-0.046</td>
<td>-0.049</td>
<td>-0.046</td>
<td>-0.067</td>
<td>-0.070</td>
<td>-0.045</td>
<td>-0.033</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.053)</td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td>(0.053)</td>
<td>(0.068)</td>
<td>(0.096)</td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td>(0.067)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWP Facing Regional Parties (Yes)</td>
<td>1.609</td>
<td>2.259</td>
<td>2.567</td>
<td>1.679</td>
<td>1.549</td>
<td>1.633</td>
<td>1.628</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.546)</td>
<td>(1.702)</td>
<td>(1.757)</td>
<td>(1.582)</td>
<td>(1.578)</td>
<td>(1.611)</td>
<td>(1.564)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Period 1998-2001 (Reference)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Period 2007-2010</td>
<td>1.689**</td>
<td>1.349</td>
<td>1.320</td>
<td>1.380</td>
<td>1.341</td>
<td>1.369</td>
<td>1.343</td>
<td>1.346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.796)</td>
<td>(0.932)</td>
<td>(0.939)</td>
<td>(0.937)</td>
<td>(0.817)</td>
<td>(0.952)</td>
<td>(0.938)</td>
<td>(0.939)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Period 2011-2012</td>
<td>1.222</td>
<td>0.579</td>
<td>0.543</td>
<td>0.565</td>
<td>0.541</td>
<td>0.616</td>
<td>0.574</td>
<td>0.538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.969)</td>
<td>(1.161)</td>
<td>(1.169)</td>
<td>(0.161)</td>
<td>(1.159)</td>
<td>(1.183)</td>
<td>(1.170)</td>
<td>(1.237)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fragmentation (Yes)#Polycentricity (Yes)</td>
<td>6.560</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5.990)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Regional Feelings (Yes)#Distance</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Type (SWP)#Ideological Position</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.099)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Regional Feelings (Yes)#Ideological Position</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.115)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Regional Feelings (Yes)#Language (Yes)</td>
<td>0.145</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.930)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language (Yes)#Ideological Position</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.879)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>90.607***</td>
<td>90.782***</td>
<td>91.401***</td>
<td>91.891***</td>
<td>90.690***</td>
<td>90.827***</td>
<td>90.773***</td>
<td>90.784***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.751)</td>
<td>(1.669)</td>
<td>(1.733)</td>
<td>(1.893)</td>
<td>(1.709)</td>
<td>(1.702)</td>
<td>(1.685)</td>
<td>(1.676)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Freedom</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>1.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-statistic (p-value)</td>
<td>0.162</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>0.053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>0.146</td>
<td>0.154</td>
<td>0.158</td>
<td>0.147</td>
<td>0.147</td>
<td>0.147</td>
<td>0.147</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

357
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position on Competence Distribution</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
<th>Model 7</th>
<th>Model 8</th>
<th>Model 9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Explanatory and Control Variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-0.005*</td>
<td>-0.008**</td>
<td>-0.006**</td>
<td>-0.005**</td>
<td>-0.005**</td>
<td>-0.005**</td>
<td>-0.005**</td>
<td>-0.005**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fragmentation (Yes)</td>
<td>-1.434</td>
<td>1.106</td>
<td>1.009</td>
<td>1.167</td>
<td>1.471</td>
<td>1.189</td>
<td>0.747</td>
<td>0.895</td>
<td>0.986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.904)</td>
<td>(1.208)</td>
<td>(1.159)</td>
<td>(1.227)</td>
<td>(1.292)</td>
<td>(1.285)</td>
<td>(1.294)</td>
<td>(1.221)</td>
<td>(1.219)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polycentricity (Yes)</td>
<td>0.764</td>
<td>1.494**</td>
<td>1.272*</td>
<td>1.688**</td>
<td>1.329*</td>
<td>1.532**</td>
<td>1.362*</td>
<td>1.248*</td>
<td>1.763**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.815)</td>
<td>(0.754)</td>
<td>(0.720)</td>
<td>(0.796)</td>
<td>(0.737)</td>
<td>(0.759)</td>
<td>(0.766)</td>
<td>(0.694)</td>
<td>(0.726)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Development</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>-0.000*</td>
<td>-0.000*</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.0002)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Identity Feelings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Regional Identity Feelings</td>
<td>0.158**</td>
<td>0.150**</td>
<td>0.171***</td>
<td>0.158***</td>
<td>0.161***</td>
<td>0.149**</td>
<td>0.110</td>
<td>0.156**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.061)</td>
<td>(0.058)</td>
<td>(0.062)</td>
<td>(0.060)</td>
<td>(0.063)</td>
<td>(0.061)</td>
<td>(0.069)</td>
<td>(0.061)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Regional Identity Feelings (Yes)</td>
<td>1.907**</td>
<td>2.028***</td>
<td>2.323***</td>
<td>1.630**</td>
<td>1.825**</td>
<td>3.752***</td>
<td>0.668</td>
<td>2.052***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.756)</td>
<td>(0.756)</td>
<td>(0.707)</td>
<td>(0.694)</td>
<td>(0.754)</td>
<td>(1.115)</td>
<td>(1.165)</td>
<td>(0.712)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Language (Yes)</td>
<td>-2.256**</td>
<td>-1.810*</td>
<td>-2.488**</td>
<td>-2.492**</td>
<td>-2.939**</td>
<td>-1.788*</td>
<td>-1.863*</td>
<td>-2.036**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.999)</td>
<td>(0.920)</td>
<td>(0.998)</td>
<td>(1.002)</td>
<td>(1.914)</td>
<td>(1.023)</td>
<td>(0.961)</td>
<td>(1.004)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Type (SWP)</td>
<td>-2.344***</td>
<td>-2.282**</td>
<td>-2.514***</td>
<td>-2.147**</td>
<td>-2.867***</td>
<td>-0.409</td>
<td>-2.369***</td>
<td>-2.704***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.885)</td>
<td>(0.910)</td>
<td>(0.751)</td>
<td>(0.858)</td>
<td>(0.742)</td>
<td>(0.819)</td>
<td>(0.894)</td>
<td>(0.861)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological Position</td>
<td>-0.124**</td>
<td>-0.127**</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>-0.018</td>
<td>-0.127**</td>
<td>-0.101</td>
<td>-0.119*</td>
<td>-0.243**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.061)</td>
<td>(0.062)</td>
<td>(0.074)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.062)</td>
<td>(0.063)</td>
<td>(0.063)</td>
<td>(0.101)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWP Facing Regional Parties (Yes)</td>
<td>-1.729*</td>
<td>-1.333</td>
<td>-2.177**</td>
<td>-1.569*</td>
<td>-1.818**</td>
<td>-1.188</td>
<td>-1.087</td>
<td>-2.018**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.943)</td>
<td>(1.074)</td>
<td>(0.964)</td>
<td>(0.923)</td>
<td>(0.896)</td>
<td>(0.893)</td>
<td>(0.824)</td>
<td>(0.936)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Period 1998-2001 (Reference)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Period 2007-2010</td>
<td>-1.362*</td>
<td>-0.110</td>
<td>-0.127</td>
<td>-0.686</td>
<td>-0.135</td>
<td>-0.107</td>
<td>-0.239</td>
<td>-0.248</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.693)</td>
<td>(0.447)</td>
<td>(0.451)</td>
<td>(0.547)</td>
<td>(0.478)</td>
<td>(0.455)</td>
<td>(0.448)</td>
<td>(0.450)</td>
<td>(0.455)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Period 2011-2012</td>
<td>0.704</td>
<td>1.278</td>
<td>1.256</td>
<td>0.872</td>
<td>0.929</td>
<td>1.272</td>
<td>1.225</td>
<td>1.153</td>
<td>1.453**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.996)</td>
<td>(0.787)</td>
<td>(0.785)</td>
<td>(0.862)</td>
<td>(0.781)</td>
<td>(0.785)</td>
<td>(0.794)</td>
<td>(0.767)</td>
<td>(0.078)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fragmentation (Yes)#Polycentricity (Yes)</td>
<td>4.001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(3.931)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Type (SWP)#Ideological Position</td>
<td>-0.231**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.110)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language (Yes)#Ideological Position</td>
<td>-0.212*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.108)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language (Yes)#Party Type (SWP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.832)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Regional Identity Feelings#Party Type (SWP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-2.878**</td>
<td>(1.399)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Regional Identity Feelings (Yes)#Popular Regional Identity Feelings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>(0.061)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Regional Identity Feelings (Yes)#Ideological Position</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.179</td>
<td>(0.124)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.631)</td>
<td>(1.640)</td>
<td>(1.578)</td>
<td>(1.507)</td>
<td>(1.547)</td>
<td>(1.275)</td>
<td>(1.361)</td>
<td>(1.646)</td>
<td>(1.625)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Freedom</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>3.05</td>
<td>3.92</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>3.87</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>4.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-statistic (p-value)</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>0.383</td>
<td>0.386</td>
<td>0.418</td>
<td>0.413</td>
<td>0.385</td>
<td>0.400</td>
<td>0.388</td>
<td>0.401</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

358
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudes Towards Multiculturalism</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
<th>Model 7</th>
<th>Model 8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distance</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-0.000**</td>
<td>-0.001**</td>
<td>-0.000**</td>
<td>-0.000**</td>
<td>-0.000**</td>
<td>-0.000**</td>
<td>-0.000**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fragmentation (Yes)</td>
<td>-0.102</td>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>0.140</td>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>0.149</td>
<td>0.154</td>
<td>0.110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polycentricity (Yes)</td>
<td>-0.102</td>
<td>-0.109</td>
<td>-0.145**</td>
<td>-0.118</td>
<td>-0.107</td>
<td>-0.070</td>
<td>-0.069</td>
<td>-0.114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Development</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Identity Feelings</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.009*</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.017***</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Regional Identity Feelings (Yes)</td>
<td>0.222**</td>
<td>0.242***</td>
<td>0.207**</td>
<td>0.228***</td>
<td>0.340***</td>
<td>0.426**</td>
<td>0.232**</td>
<td>0.195**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Language (Yes)</td>
<td>-0.314**</td>
<td>-0.242*</td>
<td>-0.327**</td>
<td>-0.317***</td>
<td>-0.085</td>
<td>-0.378***</td>
<td>-0.234</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Type (SWP)</td>
<td>-0.111</td>
<td>-0.101</td>
<td>-0.100</td>
<td>-0.117</td>
<td>-0.100</td>
<td>-0.107</td>
<td>-0.050</td>
<td>-0.143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological Position</td>
<td>-0.0141*</td>
<td>-0.014*</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td>-0.015*</td>
<td>-0.015*</td>
<td>-0.014*</td>
<td>-0.014*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWP Facing Regional Parties (Yes)</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.097</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>-0.016</td>
<td>-0.072</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>0.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Period 1998-2001 (Reference)</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>0.098</td>
<td>0.109</td>
<td>0.086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Period 2007-2010</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>0.098</td>
<td>0.109</td>
<td>0.086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Period 2011-2012</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fragmentation#Polycentricity</td>
<td>0.642</td>
<td>(0.500)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language (Yes)#Ideological Position</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Type (SWP)#Ideological Position</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Regional Identity Feelings (Yes)#Language (Yes)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.303</td>
<td>(0.204)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Regional Identity Feelings (Yes)#Popular Regional Identity Feelings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language (Yes)#Party Type (SWP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.222***</td>
<td>0.145</td>
<td>0.205**</td>
<td>0.146</td>
<td>0.152</td>
<td>0.164</td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>0.093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Freedom</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>2.03</td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>2.87</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>2.51</td>
<td>1.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-statistic (p-value)</td>
<td>0.804</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.201</td>
<td>0.209</td>
<td>0.211</td>
<td>0.201</td>
<td>0.215</td>
<td>0.215</td>
<td>0.203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Root MSE</td>
<td>0.421</td>
<td>0.390</td>
<td>0.390</td>
<td>0.389</td>
<td>0.392</td>
<td>0.388</td>
<td>0.388</td>
<td>0.391</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
## APPENDIX M

### Table 1.- Disaggregated Data for the Explanatory Variable Polycentricity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>POPULATION</td>
<td>% OF THE TOTAL</td>
<td>% OF THE TOTAL</td>
<td>% OF THE TOTAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANDALUSIA (Total Population)</td>
<td>POPULATION</td>
<td>% OF THE TOTAL</td>
<td>% OF THE TOTAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sevilla</td>
<td>1174751</td>
<td>15.88</td>
<td>26.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Málaga</td>
<td>766742</td>
<td>10.36</td>
<td>17.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahía de Cádiz</td>
<td>585248</td>
<td>7.91</td>
<td>13.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Granada</td>
<td>436848</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>9.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Córdoba</td>
<td>314034</td>
<td>4.24</td>
<td>6.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahía de Algeciras</td>
<td>206484</td>
<td>2.79</td>
<td>4.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almería</td>
<td>187920</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>4.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa del Sol</td>
<td>156490</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>3.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huelva</td>
<td>158921</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>3.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaén</td>
<td>131533</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>2.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roquetas de Mar</td>
<td>47571</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>1.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vélez-Málaga</td>
<td>63894</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>1.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Ejido</td>
<td>55710</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>1.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanlúcar de Barrameda</td>
<td>61737</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>1.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motril</td>
<td>50812</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>1.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linares</td>
<td>57796</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>1.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utrera</td>
<td>45862</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>4502353</td>
<td>60.83</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HH-INDEX (Hirschman-</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herfindah Index)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Populated</td>
<td>% of the total</td>
<td>% of the urban total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARAGON</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaragoza</td>
<td>649920</td>
<td>54.25</td>
<td>89.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huesca</td>
<td>45874</td>
<td>3.83</td>
<td>6.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teruel</td>
<td>30789</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>4.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>726583</td>
<td>60.65</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HH-index</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASTURIAS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gijón</td>
<td>269270</td>
<td>25.04</td>
<td>48.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oviedo</td>
<td>201005</td>
<td>18.69</td>
<td>36.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avilés</td>
<td>83553</td>
<td>7.77</td>
<td>15.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>553828</td>
<td>51.50</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HH-index</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BALEARIAN ISLANDS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palma</td>
<td>447780</td>
<td>50.96</td>
<td>85.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eivissa</td>
<td>73724</td>
<td>8.39</td>
<td>14.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>521504</td>
<td>59.35</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HH-index</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BASQUE COUNTRY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URBAN AREAS</td>
<td>POPULATON</td>
<td>% OF THE TOTAL</td>
<td>% OF THE URBAN TOTAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URBAN AREAS</td>
<td>POPULATION</td>
<td>% OF THE TOTAL % OF THE URBAN TOTAL</td>
<td>POPULATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Las Palmas</td>
<td>505126</td>
<td>28.36</td>
<td>529801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/C Tenerife</td>
<td>405138</td>
<td>22.74</td>
<td>437851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gran Canaria Sur</td>
<td>149056</td>
<td>8.37</td>
<td>181925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Orotava</td>
<td>103555</td>
<td>5.81</td>
<td>108999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenerife Sur</td>
<td>94554</td>
<td>5.31</td>
<td>160611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrecife</td>
<td>45549</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>56834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1302978</td>
<td>73.15</td>
<td>1476021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HH-INDEX</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>URBAN AREAS</th>
<th>POPULATION</th>
<th>% OF THE TOTAL % OF THE URBAN TOTAL</th>
<th>POPULATION</th>
<th>% OF THE TOTAL % OF THE URBAN TOTAL</th>
<th>POPULATION</th>
<th>% OF THE TOTAL % OF THE URBAN TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albacete</td>
<td>149507</td>
<td>8.52</td>
<td>164771</td>
<td>8.33</td>
<td>171390</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guadalajara</td>
<td>102558</td>
<td>5.85</td>
<td>136147</td>
<td>6.89</td>
<td>155245</td>
<td>7.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1302978</td>
<td>73.15</td>
<td>1476021</td>
<td>72.86</td>
<td>1546844</td>
<td>72.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HH-INDEX</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>URBAN AREAS</th>
<th>POPULATION</th>
<th>% OF THE TOTAL % OF THE URBAN TOTAL</th>
<th>POPULATION</th>
<th>% OF THE TOTAL % OF THE URBAN TOTAL</th>
<th>POPULATION</th>
<th>% OF THE TOTAL % OF THE URBAN TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Santander</td>
<td>306335</td>
<td>56.98</td>
<td>320779</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>328635</td>
<td>55.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>306335</td>
<td>56.98</td>
<td>320779</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>328635</td>
<td>55.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HH-INDEX</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>URBAN AREAS</th>
<th>POPULATION</th>
<th>% OF THE TOTAL % OF THE URBAN TOTAL</th>
<th>POPULATION</th>
<th>% OF THE TOTAL % OF THE URBAN TOTAL</th>
<th>POPULATION</th>
<th>% OF THE TOTAL % OF THE URBAN TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albacete</td>
<td>149507</td>
<td>8.52</td>
<td>164771</td>
<td>8.33</td>
<td>171390</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guadalajara</td>
<td>102558</td>
<td>5.85</td>
<td>136147</td>
<td>6.89</td>
<td>155245</td>
<td>7.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1302978</td>
<td>73.15</td>
<td>1476021</td>
<td>72.86</td>
<td>1546844</td>
<td>72.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HH-INDEX</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>URBAN AREAS</th>
<th>POPULATION</th>
<th>% OF THE TOTAL % OF THE URBAN TOTAL</th>
<th>POPULATION</th>
<th>% OF THE TOTAL % OF THE URBAN TOTAL</th>
<th>POPULATION</th>
<th>% OF THE TOTAL % OF THE URBAN TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albacete</td>
<td>149507</td>
<td>8.52</td>
<td>164771</td>
<td>8.33</td>
<td>171390</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guadalajara</td>
<td>102558</td>
<td>5.85</td>
<td>136147</td>
<td>6.89</td>
<td>155245</td>
<td>7.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1302978</td>
<td>73.15</td>
<td>1476021</td>
<td>72.86</td>
<td>1546844</td>
<td>72.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HH-INDEX</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Area</td>
<td>Population</td>
<td>% of the Total</td>
<td>Population</td>
<td>% of the Total</td>
<td>Population</td>
<td>% of the Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toledo</td>
<td>90609</td>
<td>5.16</td>
<td>107933</td>
<td>5.46</td>
<td>118174</td>
<td>5.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talavera de la Reina</td>
<td>83100</td>
<td>4.74</td>
<td>94432</td>
<td>4.78</td>
<td>98796</td>
<td>4.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ciudad Real</td>
<td>71560</td>
<td>4.08</td>
<td>83917</td>
<td>4.24</td>
<td>89315</td>
<td>4.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuenca</td>
<td>46490</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>52980</td>
<td>2.68</td>
<td>56703</td>
<td>2.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puertollano</td>
<td>49613</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>50838</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>52200</td>
<td>2.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>593437</strong></td>
<td><strong>33.83</strong></td>
<td><strong>691018</strong></td>
<td><strong>34.95</strong></td>
<td><strong>741823</strong></td>
<td><strong>35.07</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HH-INDEX</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CASTILLA Y LEON**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Urban Area</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>% of the Total</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>% of the Total</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>% of the Total</th>
<th>% of the Urban Total</th>
<th>% of the Urban Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valladolid</td>
<td>372672</td>
<td>15.03</td>
<td>395545</td>
<td>15.64</td>
<td>408647</td>
<td>15.97</td>
<td>29.12</td>
<td>29.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>León</td>
<td>182563</td>
<td>7.36</td>
<td>194210</td>
<td>7.68</td>
<td>199597</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>14.22</td>
<td>14.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salamanca</td>
<td>180274</td>
<td>7.27</td>
<td>188821</td>
<td>7.47</td>
<td>191034</td>
<td>7.47</td>
<td>13.61</td>
<td>13.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burgos</td>
<td>167043</td>
<td>6.74</td>
<td>175718</td>
<td>6.95</td>
<td>181187</td>
<td>7.08</td>
<td>12.91</td>
<td>12.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palencia</td>
<td>94736</td>
<td>3.82</td>
<td>97319</td>
<td>3.85</td>
<td>97156</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>6.92</td>
<td>6.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ponferrada</td>
<td>77650</td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>82650</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>85070</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>6.06</td>
<td>6.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zamora</td>
<td>68958</td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td>70276</td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td>70194</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segovia</td>
<td>64350</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>70641</td>
<td>2.79</td>
<td>71664</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>5.11</td>
<td>5.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ávila</td>
<td>47967</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>53794</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>59008</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>4.20</td>
<td>4.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soria</td>
<td>34640</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>38205</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>39987</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>2.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>1290853</strong></td>
<td><strong>52.07</strong></td>
<td><strong>1367179</strong></td>
<td><strong>54.07</strong></td>
<td><strong>1403544</strong></td>
<td><strong>54.86</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HH-INDEX</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CATALONIA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Urban Area</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>% of the Total</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>% of the Total</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>% of the Total</th>
<th>% of the Urban Total</th>
<th>% of the Urban Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barcelona</td>
<td>4391120</td>
<td>69.04</td>
<td>4858016</td>
<td>67.37</td>
<td>5030679</td>
<td>66.72</td>
<td>84.10</td>
<td>84.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarragona-Reus</td>
<td>291328</td>
<td>4.58</td>
<td>359645</td>
<td>4.99</td>
<td>382304</td>
<td>5.07</td>
<td>6.39</td>
<td>6.39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Urban Area</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>% of the Total</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>% of the Total</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>% of the Total</th>
<th>% of the Urban Total</th>
<th>% of the Urban Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barcelona</td>
<td>4391120</td>
<td>69.04</td>
<td>4858016</td>
<td>67.37</td>
<td>5030679</td>
<td>66.72</td>
<td>84.10</td>
<td>84.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarragona-Reus</td>
<td>291328</td>
<td>4.58</td>
<td>359645</td>
<td>4.99</td>
<td>382304</td>
<td>5.07</td>
<td>6.39</td>
<td>6.39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

363
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lleida</strong></td>
<td>130191</td>
<td>150801</td>
<td>166874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Girona</strong></td>
<td>115437</td>
<td>141792</td>
<td>152477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Manresa</strong></td>
<td>84470</td>
<td>97619</td>
<td>102739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Blanes-lloret de Mar</strong></td>
<td>57438</td>
<td>79027</td>
<td>86033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sant Feliu de Guixols</strong></td>
<td>48182</td>
<td>58330</td>
<td>60913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>5118166</td>
<td>5745230</td>
<td>5982019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HH-INDEX</strong></td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**EXTREMADURA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>URBAN AREAS</th>
<th>POPULATION</th>
<th>% OF THE TOTAL</th>
<th>% OF THE URBAN TOTAL</th>
<th>POPULATION</th>
<th>% OF THE TOTAL</th>
<th>% OF THE URBAN TOTAL</th>
<th>POPULATION</th>
<th>% OF THE TOTAL</th>
<th>% OF THE URBAN TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Badajoz</td>
<td>141614</td>
<td>13.23</td>
<td>47.47</td>
<td>150403</td>
<td>13.80</td>
<td>46.96</td>
<td>157122</td>
<td>14.16</td>
<td>46.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cáceres</td>
<td>92742</td>
<td>8.67</td>
<td>31.09</td>
<td>102116</td>
<td>9.37</td>
<td>31.88</td>
<td>106345</td>
<td>9.59</td>
<td>31.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>298348</td>
<td>27.88</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>320298</td>
<td>29.39</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>334442</td>
<td>30.15</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HH-INDEX</strong></td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**GALICIA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>URBAN AREAS</th>
<th>POPULATION</th>
<th>% OF THE TOTAL</th>
<th>% OF THE URBAN TOTAL</th>
<th>POPULATION</th>
<th>% OF THE TOTAL</th>
<th>% OF THE URBAN TOTAL</th>
<th>POPULATION</th>
<th>% OF THE TOTAL</th>
<th>% OF THE URBAN TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vigo-Pontevedra</td>
<td>553751</td>
<td>20.26</td>
<td>39.45</td>
<td>576705</td>
<td>20.80</td>
<td>39.22</td>
<td>587843</td>
<td>21.03</td>
<td>39.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Coruña</td>
<td>370725</td>
<td>13.57</td>
<td>26.41</td>
<td>397944</td>
<td>14.35</td>
<td>27.06</td>
<td>410401</td>
<td>14.68</td>
<td>27.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferrol</td>
<td>136579</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>9.73</td>
<td>136933</td>
<td>4.94</td>
<td>9.31</td>
<td>136698</td>
<td>4.89</td>
<td>9.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santiago de Compostela</td>
<td>126012</td>
<td>4.61</td>
<td>8.98</td>
<td>135706</td>
<td>4.89</td>
<td>9.23</td>
<td>142325</td>
<td>5.09</td>
<td>9.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ourense</td>
<td>127717</td>
<td>4.67</td>
<td>9.10</td>
<td>129213</td>
<td>4.66</td>
<td>8.79</td>
<td>131695</td>
<td>4.71</td>
<td>8.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lugo</td>
<td>88901</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>6.33</td>
<td>93853</td>
<td>3.39</td>
<td>6.38</td>
<td>98007</td>
<td>3.51</td>
<td>6.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>1403685</td>
<td>51.36</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>1470354</td>
<td>53.03</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>1506969</td>
<td>53.91</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HH-INDEX</strong></td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

364
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>POPULATION</strong></td>
<td>% OF THE TOTAL</td>
<td>% OF THE URBAN TOTAL</td>
<td>% OF THE TOTAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logroño</td>
<td>142745</td>
<td>53.35</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>142745</td>
<td>53.35</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HH-INDEX</strong></td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>POPULATION</strong></td>
<td>% OF THE TOTAL</td>
<td>% OF THE URBAN TOTAL</td>
<td>% OF THE TOTAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madrid</td>
<td>5096704</td>
<td>94.88</td>
<td>99.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aranjuez</td>
<td>40113</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>5136817</td>
<td>95.62</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HH-INDEX</strong></td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>POPULATION</strong></td>
<td>% OF THE TOTAL</td>
<td>% OF THE URBAN TOTAL</td>
<td>% OF THE TOTAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murcia</td>
<td>519659</td>
<td>43.65</td>
<td>65.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cartagena</td>
<td>198592</td>
<td>16.68</td>
<td>24.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>795326</td>
<td>66.81</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HH-INDEX</strong></td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>POPULATION</strong></td>
<td>% OF THE TOTAL</td>
<td>% OF THE URBAN TOTAL</td>
<td>% OF THE TOTAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pamplona</td>
<td>283856</td>
<td>51.06</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>283856</td>
<td>51.06</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HH-INDEX</strong></td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valencia</td>
<td>1367584</td>
<td>32.55</td>
<td>47.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alicante-Eliche</td>
<td>572498</td>
<td>13.63</td>
<td>19.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castellón de la Plana</td>
<td>249408</td>
<td>5.94</td>
<td>8.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Blanca</td>
<td>163963</td>
<td>3.90</td>
<td>5.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gandía</td>
<td>99077</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>3.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torrevieja</td>
<td>68772</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>2.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denia-Jávea</td>
<td>81953</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>2.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orihuela</td>
<td>72803</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>2.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elda-Petrer</td>
<td>81383</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>2.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcoy/Alcoi</td>
<td>78150</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>2.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sagunto/Sagunt</td>
<td>59690</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>2.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>2895281</strong></td>
<td><strong>68.91</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HH-INDEX</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.37</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.28</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
REFERENCES


396


Rotz, R. A (1985). "Social Struggles or the price of power? German urban uprisings in the late Middle Ages", Archive for Reformation History vol. 76, issue jg, pp. 64–95.


- (2002). The origins, development, and possible decline of the modern state”, Annuals Reviews of Political Science vol. 5, pp. 127-149.


- (1997). "The national and the universal: can there be such a thing as world culture?", Culture, Globalization, and the World-System, A. D. King (eds.). Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, pp. 91-105.


