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Chapter 5
Ethnic cleansing: Reversing the effects

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Abstract

This chapter examines how the right of return has been defined, negotiated and implemented in post-conflict societies. It draws on new research on post-conflict returnees aiming to identify the conditions under which displaced persons choose to return often despite opposition from new occupants and hostile local authorities. The chapter integrates diverse contributions across the social sciences focusing on the role of institutional design, emerging legal practices, inter-ethnic contact, trust and social capital to demonstrate the potential for and limits of community effort in reversing the effects of displacement and to suggest possible policy directions.

Introduction

Worldwide forced displacement is at the highest level ever recorded, exceeding 65 million in 2018 (UNHCR, 2019). Although return is the preferred solution and is generally seen as the most durable and socially appropriate, the factors and processes that enable peaceful voluntary returns are sparsely examined in the academic literature. This chapter focuses on and enumerates some of the factors enabling return after prolonged displacement by looking at a number of counter-intuitive cases. Whilst many scholars have focused on displacement (e.g. McGarry 1998; Mann 2005), only a handful of academic or policy-related studies have systematically studied and compared voluntary return following negotiated peace settlements. To cover this gap, in this chapter, we discuss the broader literature and key findings in recent studies of durable returns. We look more closely at the cases from Southeast Europe and the Middle East, highlighting the role of established explanations in the literature (i.e. economic, psychological and security related factors), as well as some more novel ones, such as social capital and institutional design. We point out the strengths and weaknesses of the existing
solutions and propose ways to facilitate successful returns in post-conflict societies. We conclude with a discussion of the meaning and operationalization of ‘right to return’.

**Common Wisdom?**

UNHCR (2013) defines protracted displacements as those involving 25,000 or more refugees for more than five years and generally recommends the reversal of those situations as quickly, voluntary and as peacefully as possible. Yet evidence on whether return is feasible or even desirable following protracted displacement is mixed and contradictory (Warner, 1994; Zetter, 1999; Adelman & Barkan, 2011). Conventional wisdom says displaced persons are unlikely to return to their former homes with the passage of time. As studies on durable solutions have demonstrated the broader context matters (Black, 2001; Tuathail, 2010; Başer & Çelik, 2014). Victims of displacement could be accommodated (or more frequently forced to) in designated refugee camps and face unbearable restrictions, or they could be integrated into a new environment in mixed neighbourhoods in major metropolitan centres; each situation will differently influence intentions to return home therefore generalizations are often problematic.

Furthermore, return is conditioned by domestic legal frameworks often established against the rights of IDPs and refugees. Some forced migrants cannot possibly return because of nationalist opposition or legal restrictions, as in the case of Palestinians in Israel, ethnic Georgians in Abkhazia and South Ossetia or Greek Cypriots forced out of Northern Cyprus. In other cases, migrants are forced to return, as in the case of the mass return of Bosnian refugees from Germany after the Bosnian War or, more recently, the Rohingyas repatriated from Bangladesh to Myanmar despite UN genocide warnings. In still other cases, displaced persons might have developed a sense of belonging in their place of exile and have no desire
to go ‘home’. Sometimes, however, returning to pre-displacement homes is a real possibility and a meaningful voluntary choice. In those cases, asking what drives voluntary return makes sense, and systematic research on the views of refugees themselves becomes a priority, not least because it facilitates the development of effective policies.

Scholars have already formulated several hypotheses about why people return. These often come from the social capital literature, institutional design and inter-group contact. Inspired by the social capital theory (Putnam, 1993: 167; Varshney, 2001; Castles, 2003; Celik, 2005) one could emphasize the efficacy of trust, norms and networks in facilitating return. The institutional design theory focuses on constitutional provisions for refugees and the broader design of institutions in peace processes (Loizides, 2016; Morgan-Jones et al. forthcoming), including property restitution and compensation, policing arrangements and specific provisions in electoral system that encourage participation and enable displaced persons to vote (see also Leckie, 2003). Finally, the contact theory examines the direct and indirect contact of displaced persons with the historical outgroup and shows how it may affect their desire to return under that group’s administration (Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Psaltis et al 2019).

Despite the development of a strong theoretical foundation, few studies have specifically asked why displaced persons choose to return or to stay in a new environment. Nor can the sparse findings be generalized, as existing research tends to focus on single cases, such as Bosnia (Dahlman & Ó Tuathail 2005; Sert, 2008), the South Caucasus (Toal & Grono, 2011), Kazakhstan (Kuşçu, 2014), Colombia (Ibáñez & Moya, 2010), Turkey (Celik, 2005) and Northern Uganda (Joireman et al. 2012). Although studies are country and case-specific and, as such, not entirely generalizable, most indicate the importance of a general set of push and
pull factors (Ozaltin et al 2019; Stefanovic et al 2016). As noted above, displaced persons are less likely to return to their former homes if they successfully settle in a new environment (see Zolberg, 1989:406; Zetter, 1999; ICG, 2002; Ibáñez & Moya, 2010). If they have found permanent jobs, acquired property and developed their language skills (Wahlbeck, 1999; Annan et al. 2011; Toal and Grono, 2011), they may have less inclination to leave. Another factor is accommodation in the place of exile: looking at the case of Northern Uganda, Joireman et al. (2012) point to the relocation of displaced persons in close proximity to roads, suggesting the centrality of access to social aid and provisions. Also relevant is the ethno-political make-up of the neighbourhood of pre-conflict residence and the extent of community support in exile. Here, researchers note the salience of majority/minority patterns and the limitations minority returnees face when the choose to relocate in areas controlled by potentially hostile local or national majorities (Toal and Dahlman, 2005; Celik, 2005; Belloni, 2006; Sert, 2008).

**The Way Home Project**

By studying cases of successful voluntary return, we might be able to determine which institutional arrangements and policies could help people decide to return and then support them once they’re back. With this possibility in mind, in ‘The Way Home Project’, funded by EU, Canadian and UK grants, we analysed three cases of forced displacement: Bosnians, ethnic Kurds in Turkey, and Greek Cypriots. By minority returnees, we are referring to displaced persons returning (or aiming, in the case of Greek Cypriots, to return) to an area now under the political control of another ethnic group. As nationalisms in the region have often sought to end ethnic and religious diversity through assimilation, ethnic cleansing and genocide, our research is driven by an attempt to understand how communities and individuals, often in opposition to state policies, struggle to defend their rights of return. We
also examine the interrelated objectives of international organizations and peacekeeping missions such as restoring a multi-ethnic environment and re-introducing positive and mutually respectful relations among conflicted communities.

Our findings point to gender, age and education as main individual-level predictors of return. In both Bosnia (Stefanovic & Loizides, 2017) and Turkey’s Kurdish region (Stefanovic et al 2015), for example, those who are highly educated and have found permanent employment in the place of displacement are less likely to return. In the various models we present in these two studies, young and educated women are very unlikely to return while elderly men with low education are very likely to do so. To be more specific, our statistical model for Bosnia, which correctly predicted return in 89.29% of the cases we analysed, gives the probability of return for a 30-year old woman with a permanent job as 11.54%; in stark contrast, a 63-year-old man without a permanent job has a 93.92 % probability of return. The model is based on the survey evidence, and we offer some possible explanations for age and gender differences below. However, our ability to fully explain the differences is constrained by the questionnaire used. Future research focusing for instance on integration opportunities and family dynamics could explain why elderly men are most pro-return whilst young women are the most opposed while public policy could adjust to those findings. As Jansen (2009) summarizes the situation in Bosnia, ‘the elderly are dying to return and returning to die.’ Our research indicates the pattern is repeated among Kurdish forced migrants in Turkey and Greek Cypriot potential returnees (Loizides & Stefanovic, under review).

Many factors driving return are emotional/ideological rather than pragmatic (i.e., job availability in the new place). Forced migrants are more likely to return if they have positive memories of pre-conflict inter-ethnic relations, and they still see the pre-conflict residence as
‘home.’ Data from Bosnia and Cyprus also demonstrate how less nationalistic persons are more likely to return and accept life as a minority in their old place of residence than more nationalistic ones. A possible explanation of this finding is that nationalists tend to subscribe to dominant narratives emphasizing ethnic homogeneity as well as they might be more prejudiced or fearful of other communities. Another commonality across cases is that informal associations of neighbours in exile play a role in facilitating return, at least in rural areas. A related finding is that forced migrants from areas of high return are more likely to return themselves (Metivier et al 2017).

Co-ethnicity is another issue driving decisions to return. In protracted displacements, return is not always desirable as people have re-established their lives but even after decades, a significant percentage aspires to return, especially to areas with high concentration of co-ethnics. In Cyprus, the percentage of those Greek Cypriots aspiring to return under Greek Cypriot administration is almost triple of that of those aspiring to return under Turkish Cypriot administration. In the 2016, University of Cyprus/Centre of Field Studies survey about a third they never thought of returning even following a negotiated peace settlement, another third said they rarely or sometimes thought about it, and the final third said they were always thinking about it (Psaltis et al. 2020). Taking into consideration that a reunited Cyprus will be a federation with a Greek and Turkish Cypriot constituent states, we presented two scenarios to potential returnees. When they were asked ‘How likely it is for you to return and live in your pre-1974 home under Greek Cypriot administration in the next 3 years?’, 59.5 percent said they would likely or very likely return. When the same question was asked in the same way but ‘under Turkish Cypriot administration’, numbers dropped to 22.5 percent (ibid).
While the above findings are significant, current studies have failed to systematically collect data on decision-making processes within forced migrant families. The return decisions often seem to be made by families – not individuals. We know that elderly men are most pro-return whilst young women are most opposed. However, to the best of our knowledge, existing studies do not include the necessary evidence to help us understand how and why families arrive at a certain return decision, hopefully without a painful split if, for example, there are both elderly men and young women in the family unit. And while we know young women, particularly educated women, are the least likely to return, we are unable to tell whether this preference is the result of greater educational and paid employment opportunities in their new surroundings. Perhaps they simply want to avoid returning to a patriarchal rural community. This gap in the refugee and gender studies literature requires more investigation especially for NGOs and international organizations attempting to tailor their policy to attract and keep returnees.

In addition, we know the majority of successful mass return cases have been to mono-ethnic rural communities, but we would like to know what kind of policies are needed to facilitate mass minority returns to urban areas, especially to re-create multi-cultural cities. As Joireman (2017) observes, Kosovo Serb returns have been into minority ghettos or ethnic enclaves, as these likely provide a sense of security and community. By way of contrast, the small number of urban minority returns suggests the limits in restoring pre-war and the need for alternative policies to support urban returnees such as the creation of economic and employment opportunities and a multi-ethnic police force. Urban returnees may also depend on the willingness of others (i.e. the majority) to hire them, therefore enforcing non-discriminatory hiring practices should be an important priority in the legal frameworks of post-conflict societies.
How to Support Returnees

Despite these gaps, we have some suggestions about the kind of policies and institutional arrangements that may facilitate return, especially among those who are less inclined to do so. Obviously, preventing ethnic cleansing in the first place should be the most critical priority given the rising numbers of forced migrants worldwide. Yet this may not be always possible given global environmental challenges and political violence, the reluctance of the international community to enforce norms on ethnic cleansing, and new technologies enabling an easier escape of forced migrants from deadly violence. For these reasons, research on ethnic cleansing and possible options in reversing its effects is extremely important. In this section, to lay the foundation for our suggestions, we take a closer look at several cases, particularly Bosnia, arguably a counter-intuitive case of relatively successful returns. For the most part, the experience of Bosnia has the potential to shed useful light on what triggers return and what keeps people ‘home’ once they’re back.

In Bosnia, the presence of international security forces and the removal of war criminals from a position of power have certainly been helpful, convincing many to return. In addition, in Bosnia and also in Turkey’s Kurdish region, the return of property (houses and land) or compensation for lost or destroyed property definitely facilitated returns. In the Kurdish case, during the country’s brief democratic opening in 2009-2012 there has been a degree of reconciliation. Specifically returnees receiving state compensation were three times more likely to return, net of other factors (Stefanovic et al. 2016), however the return of violence in the Kurdish case also suggests the limits of durable returns in the absence of a completed peace settlement. By way of contrast and despite its limitations, the peace process in Bosnia
provided the full range of support mechanisms for the displaced including full property
restitution, civilian protection mechanisms, and electoral rights for the IDPs in their pre-
conflict residences.

Particularly, the latter tend to receive little attention among scholars of forced migration.
Importantly, enabling forced migrants to vote in the local elections in their pre-war place of
residence (distant voting) was a very important facilitator of the re-capture of local political
power in several Bosnian cases of successful mass return (e.g., Kozarac and Drvar). Annex 3
Article IV of the Dayton Peace Agreement should be a template for peace processes around
the world. The annex stipulates that ‘a citizen who no longer lives in the municipality in
which he or she resided in 1991 shall, as a general rule, be expected to vote, in person or by
absentee ballot, in that municipality’ (Stefanovic & Loizides, 2015). This electoral provision
permitted refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) to cast absentee ballots in their
pre-war home cities; in 1997, for example, the exiled Mile Marčeta was elected mayor of
Drvar on the strength of the absentee ballot. Described by the international media as a
‘symbol of hope in a land of hate’, the mayor convinced 1,600 to 2,000 displaced persons to
accompany him back to the municipality. Despite Croat ultra-nationalists’ resistance, the
murder of two elderly returnees and an assassination attempt against Marčeta himself, forced
migrants managed to re-establish themselves on their land. The Coalition for Drvar not only
helped reverse ethnic cleansing but also played a leading role in mobilising support from the
international community and at home among the multi-ethnic country-wide Coalition for the
Return of the Expelled (ibid).

The Drvar experience highlights the importance of remote voting for successful returns.
Many continued to vote in their pre-conflict municipalities while in exile. As per Article 20.8
of the Bosnian Election Law, distant voting for displaced persons will remain in place until decided otherwise by the UN High Representative or the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH. Voting rights was a key element of the Dayton architecture – in contrast to other UN-led peace mediations such as the Annan Plan for Cyprus which included significant restrictions on the political rights of displaced persons or national laws such as the ones in Georgia restricting IDPs from Abkhazia and South Ossetia voting in national elections (even though the latter are ethnic Georgians). As Mooney and Jarrah (2005) argue in Georgia the Soviet legacy of *propiska* (i.e. restricting freedom of movement by tying the exercise of rights to an individual’s approved place of residence), was reinforced by the political goal of promoting return and resulted in legal restrictions denying IDPs (until 2001) the right to vote for representatives in the areas where they were ‘temporarily’ residing.

How should post-conflict societies balance the electoral rights of new and old residents? It is imaginable that under any electoral system problems might arise especially if one of the groups comes to dominate the political system in a permanent basis. To prevent situations where municipal authorities represent either new or old inhabitants but not both, we suggest that peace settlements should combine remote voting with power-sharing systems at the local level. Such institutional mechanisms could allow displaced persons to maintain financial, institutional and political ties with their home region while rebuilding majority-minority relations at the local level.

Despite its many successes, the Bosnian return experience points to several limitations of internationally sponsored peacekeeping. In outlining these limitations and proposing solutions, we are seeing return not as a single act, but as a process with several key phases – intention to return, return attempts, and sustainable return – in which factors crucial for
success in some phases might be less significant in others. Even in the townships where the intention to return was strong, with community effort leading to successful returns, the mass return was generally not followed by well-designed and well-funded economic development programmes. Consequently, many returnees left again, this time for economic reasons – to find jobs. To ensure sustainability, local economic development and economic opportunities need to be planned well in advance, and returnees will need support once they arrive.

**Safeguarding Rights of Return**

Could successful returns in Bosnia be replicated in other post-conflict societies? Whilst some conditions appear to be unique to Bosnia and hard to replicate – such as the massive presence of the international agencies in a *de facto* protectorate – others might work elsewhere. In Bosnia, the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) guaranteed the victims of ethnic cleansing the right to return. While the exercise of that right was fiercely resisted by ultra-nationalists, there was clarity as to its implementation and commitment of the international community.

In contrast to the provisions of Dayton, many of the conflicts around the world feature conflicting legal, political and normative interpretations of the ‘right of return’. This largely depends on its definition of the ‘right of return’ which could, in theory, involve not only the right of mobility/movement (i.e. a person’s right to return to a pre-conflict village or city) but also three other necessary components: first, the right to restitution for property, including financial support for the loss of income and for the reconstruction of destroyed properties; second, individual and communal rights, such as non-discrimination, electoral rights, participation in local decision-making processes and representation in policing and security mechanisms; and third, the transferability of those rights to one’s immediate family, for instance, descendants and spouses. Even though each is necessary for the restoration of a
multicultural community, no comprehensive legal framework currently includes all three, let alone credible enforcement mechanisms.

There is also a key differentiation between international and EU/Council of Europe decisions. Within the EU legal system, it is possible for the right of movement and re-acquisition of properties to be seen as facilitating potential returnees. While the right of mobility for European citizens _de facto_ mitigates part of the older displacement disputes among EU members (e.g. post-WWII Germans fleeing Poland), it has several major weaknesses and cannot be seen as a resolution for historical cases of ethnic cleansing. To begin with, it lacks all other aforementioned elements that constitute the right of return. Secondly, it has led to no practical returns among the many cases occurring within European nations for centuries and finally, it downgrades displaced persons and their rights to the level of migrants/citizens of third states covered by EU treaties that might or might not be preserved in the future.

Displaced persons are more likely to return if they have the right to do so under international law. Our own interpretation is that following the wars in the former Yugoslavia, international law is in the process of integrating the right of return but as of today, this right has not been secured in relevant international legal provisions, practices and norms. The UN’s Pinheiro Principles on housing and property reinsertion come close to integrating the right of return into international legal practices (ECOSOC 2005). The Principles include detailed provisions on the rights of dispossessed owners, emphasizing their right to have their properties restituted, if they so wish and without stipulating time limitations. They require adequate consultation and participation of displaced persons in decision-making (principle 14) during the process of return. Pinheiro, however, proposes non-binding principles (soft law) which are up to the discretion of individual member states to accept or reject. The Principles also fail to include
the need for electoral decision-making mechanisms, such as distant voting (a key finding for the Bosnian case) and the role of community rights and organizations.

Beyond the ‘universal’ Pinheiro Principles, standards on the right of return are documented in resolutions of international organizations such as the UN (Leckie, 2003: 12) but with relevance only to specific country cases. Leckie cites two types of UN resolutions: binding ones from the Security Council and non-binding from the General Assembly. Security Council resolutions have emphasized the right of return in the former Yugoslavia (Kosovo), Georgia, (Abkhazia), Croatia, Iraq (Kuwait) and Cyprus; General Assembly resolutions have focused on Palestine/Israel. To give an example, Cyprus SC RES. 361, Aug. 30, 1974 calls on parties to ‘permit persons who wish to do so to return to their homes’ (Leckie, 2003: 12). Critics of the resolution might argue that the conditions 40 days after the Turkish invasion were far different from the conditions now, after 50 or so years. ECHR decisions already point in this direction, with decisions restricting property restitution to second-generation displaced persons (Skoutakis, 2010). Countering this point, Barkan argues that no matter how long ago an injustice occurred, its legitimization or a concomitant failure to defend displaced persons encourages other wrongdoing (Barkan, 2000: xxxiii).

Another concern is that the right of return cannot be established without family reunification and community rebuilding. As this chapter demonstrates, displaced persons particularly minority groups are very unlikely to return in significant numbers unless there is significant community involvement and mobilization for return. Likewise, the right of return could be interpreted as covering descendants and non-displaced partners. On many occasions, displaced persons might not have been displaced directly at the time of the conflict; some
might have left earlier for financial reasons but found the right of return to an ancestral land restricted as a result of a conflict.

A key challenge for human rights activists is that the right of return is not universally defined or even welcomed in legal or political terms. Characterizing a population en masse, rather than making the effort to break down various demographic and attitudinal characteristics is highly problematic. An often-unchallenged view is that protracted refugee situations produce radicalized populations who will cause renewed conflict if allowed to return (Adelman, 1998; Lischer 2015). Following the signing of the Dayton Accords, for instance, Chaim Kaufmann argued that refugee return provisions were undesirable and unenforceable, suggesting compensation for lost property instead (Kaufmann, 1996:168). Others have emphasized the security dimension and even coined the term ‘refugee warriors’ (Zolberg et. al. 1986), thus introducing a language that explicitly uses security concerns to limit the rights of displaced persons. Adelman and Barkan have probably been the strongest proponents of the ‘irreversibility thesis’; they specifically argue that ‘the ideology and commitment to return, conveys the notion of repatriation as a distant, impractical solution in the face of real desperation’ (Adelman and Barkan 2011: xvii). Even though its advocates offer many well-reasoned qualifications, their general assumption is that forced displacements are irreversible once new demographic facts are established on the ground (e.g., Kaufmann 1996; Adelman and Barkan 2011).

Our own research challenges the irreversibility thesis and acknowledges more opportunities for returnees than conventionally assumed. Beyond the case of Bosnia, our database of peace processes and durable returns demonstrates how in comprehensive peace settlements, displaced persons are supported by various mechanisms. The rates of return in 25 settlements
we examined using the Peace Accords matrix of the Kroc Institute suggest a range of outcomes from almost full return (e.g. El Salvador) to ten percent return (Angola); the remaining cases lie within this range. Second, as noted above, public opinion data outside Bosnia do not support claims that displaced persons tend to be more radicalized (see Psaltis et al. 2020 on Cyprus) whilst in Bosnia, returnees were more open to reconciliation (Hall et al. 2018).

Conclusion

To this point, seeing displaced persons as potentially radicalized populations constitutes a view that needs to be challenged by broader comparative evidence. As mentioned earlier, in Cyprus we discovered -much to our surprise- stronger pro-settlement attitudes among Greek Cypriot displaced persons. Specifically, the percentage of non-displaced persons determined to reject a future peace plan was almost double that of the displaced,\(^3\) whilst comparable research by Khalil Shikaki and Dahlia Scheindlin among Palestinians suggests refugees are slightly more likely to accept a peace plan than never-displaced Palestinians (39 percent compared to 35 for non-refugees) indicating similar trends even in more polarized environments (see also Hall, 2016 on Bosnians).\(^4\) Giving a voice to those affected most by conflict and in the case of forced migrants have lost properties is not only a normative necessity in shaping future humanitarian missions but also a practical step in establishing durable peace settlements.

A second important conclusion, relates to the role of social and political capital among forced migrants. Well-organized associations of neighbours in exile also provided coordination in the Bosnian return, enhanced a sense of security and recreated some sense of community after return in Drvar and Kozarac, as shown by Sivac-Bryant’s (2016) ethnography. In the
absence of political institutions and organized associations, new technological improvements might potentially assist peace mediations and the right of return. This could include for instance new software/apps popularizing public consultation in peace processes and census platforms aiming to collate and verify property data across dispossessed owners and to assist them to reach amicable compromises with the new occupants of disputed homes and properties (Andrade, A. D. and B. Doolin 2016; Stefanovic & Loizides, forthcoming).

These innovations could facilitate but not substitute political leadership. As the differences in the experiences and the minority return rates of Bosniacs and Bosnian Serbs imply, if the political leaders of an ethnic/religious community openly and consistently support the return as ‘patriotic’, forced migrants are more likely to be successful. The case of Bulgaria is also particularly instructive here in terms of involving each community’s political leadership. Following the voluntary return of approximately 40 per cent of forcibly expelled Turks in the post-Zhivkov era, an ambitious process of improving minority-majority relations and integrating Bulgaria to the EU was initiated. The return of the displaced was not only supported by EU institutions during the accession talks but also by Bulgaria’s own inclusive political institutions (i.e. the use of proportional representation) which incentivised coalitions and allowed the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), the political party formed by the Turkish community following Bulgaria’s transition to democracy, to become the “king-maker” in elections and to play an active role in all critical legislative processes in Parliament (Loizides & Kutlay, 2019). The return of the displaced in the case of Bulgaria provides additional evidence on the positive role of electoral institutions and (informal) power-sharing in enhancing durable solutions to displacement (Koinova, 2003; Kutlay, 2017).
Finally, this chapter highlights the demographic profile of returnees (i.e. age, education and gender), their immediate and long-term needs, as well as other support mechanisms. As the majority of the early returnees are likely to be older persons, the provision of good health care services might be a crucial factor. Moreover, the finding that displaced persons from rural areas are more likely to return, because coordination, social organization and economic sustainability are easier to achieve in such settings, suggests that dedicated community lands for returnees might increase return. Co-ethnic neighbours could provide a sense of community, solidarity and security in line with emerging normative practices in most liberal democracies (Kymlicka 1995, 43; see Joireman 2016 for post-conflict settings). Finally, our survey findings on demographics (e.g., age, rural/urban split) could help international agencies to better target the scarce funds for the support of the return process. For the reasons we provide, a voluntary, sustainable and successful return process, requires forced migrants in question – from Syria, Columbia, Myanmar or any other country -- to voice their concerns, trade-offs, priorities and intentions. They are the ones who must find the strength and the courage to face hardships and dangers -- but hopefully also joys and victories – as they take the difficult path home.

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*International Migration* 52 (2): 178-197


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1 For exceptions see Black and Koser, 1999; Belloni, 2008; O’Loughlin et al. 2011; Bradley, 2007

2 Our research and surveys were funded by EURIAS, SSHRC, Leverhulme and British Academy grants

3 All participants (IDPs and non-IDPs) with voting rights in the Greek Cypriot community were asked about their stance if there was a referendum and their political party supported a Yes vote. About 40 percent said they tended towards voting Yes or were sure to vote Yes, about 26 percent tended towards or were sure to vote No, and about 34 percent were equally likely to vote Yes or No Twenty-one percent of non-IDPs were sure to vote No, compared to 12.5 percent of IDPs. Psaltis et al 2020

4 For the Israeli/Palestinian data see panel discussion at Mitvim Institute at [https://p-upload.facebook.com/Mitvim/posts/2116956235028539](https://p-upload.facebook.com/Mitvim/posts/2116956235028539) & Khalil Shikaki's Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research [http://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/154](http://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/154)