Power Distance Orientation as an Antecedent of Individuals’ Intentions to Engage in Radical Political Action

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Abstract

The cultural dimension of power distance refers to individuals’ acceptance of power inequalities in society. Countries characterized by high power distance at the collective level face more domestic extremism. However, research has yet to examine how individual differences in power distance orientation may affect individuals’ intentions to engage in radical and violent political action. In this research, we test the hypothesis that stronger endorsement of power distance values makes people more prone to express the intentions to engage in radical and violent political action. To test the hypothesis’ generalizability across contexts, we sample from two countries characterized by different levels of power distance at the collective level, South Korea (higher power distance) and the United States (lower power distance). Studies 1a and 1b were surveys ($N_{tot} = 1,214$) demonstrating an association between power distance orientation and radical political action over and beyond other known predictors of political participation, including political efficacy, perceived justice, emotions of anger and contempt, political orientation, and social dominance orientation. In Studies 2a-2c ($N_{tot} = 430$; 2c preregistered), priming a higher (vs lower) power distance orientation heightened individuals’ propensity to express the intentions to engage in radical political action. Theoretical implications of the findings, and future research directions, are discussed.

Keywords:
Dual Pathway Model; Power Distance Orientation; Culture; Radical and Violent Political Action; Extremism
Individuals voice their political discontent by voting or protesting (Opp, 2009). In some circumstances, however, they may express it by taking part in radical and violent behavior (Tausch et al., 2011; van den Bos, 2018). A critical issue for psychology is to understand the factors that facilitate individuals’ engagement in such forms of action. Previous research has considered, among others, appraisals and emotional factors (Becker & Tausch, 2015; van den Bos, 2018). However, our understanding of how individuals’ cultural values might contribute to political engagement (radical or not radical) is still very limited (Travaglino, Abrams, & Russo, 2017; Travaglino, 2017; van Zomeren & Louis, 2017).

In this research, we focus on the cultural dimension of power distance, the degree to which individuals accept inequality in society (Hofstede, 1980; Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov, 2010). This is a particularly important dimension in the context of political behavior, because power distance shapes individuals’ views of, and interactions with, the authorities and the state. Whereas societies may differ in their collective levels of power distance (Hofstede et al., 2010), power distance also varies at an individual level, i.e. ‘power distance orientation’ (e.g., Kirkman, Chen, Farh, Chen, & Lowe, 2009).

Thus, our goal is to investigate how individuals’ power distance orientation affects their intentions to engage in domestic radical and violent actions. At the country level, higher power distance is generally associated with the acceptance of status inequality. For instance, societies characterized by higher collective levels of power distance tend to have more authoritarian forms of government (Hofstede et al., 2010; Inglehart et al., 2004). Yet, as outlined in The Economist’s quote above, and perhaps paradoxically, political change in such contexts tend to be violent, often marked by revolutions where those at the top are overthrown through revolts (Hofstede et al., 2010). In this research, we propose and test the
idea that individuals’ acceptance of a high distance between them and the authority is one of the factors that may foster radicalism.

**Participation in Political Action and Culture**

Individuals engage in political action to voice their discontent and pursue (or prevent) social change (van Zomeren, 2016). They may seek to alter the status quo by engaging in actions that are *institutionally regulated*, such as voting. Alternatively, they may use *non-institutional* and non-routinized channels, such as demonstrations or petitions (Van Derth, 2014). Both institutional and non-intuitional forms of political action imply a ‘dialogue’ between protesters and authorities, in which individuals use different participative means to express their demands (see Mendonça & Ercan, 2015).

According to the *Dual Pathway Model*, two distinct pathways contribute to explain individuals’ political engagement (van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004). These pathways are injustice-fueled anger and efficacy. Individuals who perceive their circumstances as *unjust* are more likely to engage in political behavior aimed at changing those circumstances (Walker & Smith, 2002). For instance, research indicates that perceiving the social system as unjust elicits anger against the system, which in turn motivates people to confront the source of the injustice (Jost et al., 2012; Rothmund, Becker, & Jost, 2016).

Moreover, political engagement becomes more likely when individuals believe that they are capable of achieving the desired social change, a concept known as *efficacy* (van Zomeren, Saguy, & Schellhaas, 2013). At the societal level, a key precursor of political action are feelings of efficacy about the political system, i.e. political efficacy (Balch, 1974; Campbell, Gurin, & Miller, 1954). The construct of political efficacy encompasses two distinct domains (Niemi, Craig, & Mattei, 1991): *internal* political efficacy describes individuals’ beliefs about their ability to understand and harness the political process;
external political efficacy taps individuals’ perception that the political context is responsive to their needs and willing to listen to their demands (Niemi, et al., 1991; Lee, 2005).

More recently, the dual-pathway model has been extended to explain participation in more radical forms of action (Becker & Tausch, 2015; Tausch et al., 2011). Such action contravenes shared societal rules and may employ violence as a deliberate strategy to achieve a group’s goal. Previous research has demonstrated the key roles of contempt and lower efficacy in predicting individuals’ intentions to engage in radical and violent action (Tausch et al., 2011). In contrast to anger, feelings of contempt imply a lack of concern for future reconciliation and disengagement from the source of the injustice (Fischer & Roseman, 2007). Such disengagement may result in violence, especially when individuals experience low efficacy and feel the political system is irresponsive to their needs (i.e., lower efficacy).

Previous research on the dual pathway and related models has mainly focused on the instrumental (i.e., efficacy) and emotional (i.e., anger, contempt) considerations involved in individuals’ reactions to perceived injustice and collective disadvantage (van Zomeren, Leach, & Spears, 2012). Not much psychological research has so far examined the role of cultural values in shaping individuals’ political engagement (e.g., Fischer, Becker, Kito, & Nayir, 2017; Travaglino, 2017; Travaglino & Abrams, 2019). Nonetheless, cultural values shape individuals’ responses and perceptions in a variety of domains (Freeman, Rule, & Ambady, 2009; Kitayama & Markus, 1999; Oyserman & Uskul, 2008). It is likely they also inform individuals’ decisions about political action.

In general terms, culture can be conceptualized as ‘shared meaning’ that structures and shapes individuals’ perception (Bruner, 1990). Culture organizes basic perceptual processes as well as providing lenses through which examining and understanding social reality. For instance, according to Geertz (1964), culture is an ordered system of complex symbols that provides individuals with ‘maps’ signposting what is important in the world.
around them. These ‘maps’ help people orient themselves, indicating what actions are appropriate and what should instead be avoided (see also Brewer & Yuki, 2014; Travaglino & Abrams, 2019; Triandis, 2001).

Applied to the political sphere, thus, cultural values may represent a key third route – beyond instrumental and emotional ones – driving individuals’ decisions about engagement (Travaglino, 2017). Specifically, because they bestow meaning on individuals’ social world, cultural values may inform individuals about what types of political responses are appropriate or necessary to express their grievances, and pursue social change (cf. Travaglino & Drury, 2019). In this article, we focus on power distance orientation and examine how this culturally rooted cluster of values and views of authority shape individuals’ political engagement.

**Power Distance Orientation and Political Action**

Power distance is defined as “the extent to which members of society accept the fact that power in institutions and organizations is distributed unequally” (Hofstede, 1980, p. 45). Higher power distance societies tend to be hierarchically structured and characterized by subordinates’ dependence on authority figures. In contrast, lower power distance societies tend to be more egalitarian and characterized by interdependence between subordinates and authorities. Individuals within each given society may differ substantially in their power distance orientation (Brockner et al., 2001; Kirkman, Chen, Farh, Chen, & Lowe, 2009; Lin, Wang, & Chen, 2013).

According to Hofstede et al (2010)’s theorizing, and analysis of country-level data, relatively higher power distance societies (e.g., South Korea) tend to be characterized by stronger political polarization, with the presence of one (or more) extreme political party and a weaker political center. In contrast, lower power distance societies (e.g., the US) are characterized by a stronger and moderate center (see also Hofstede, 2001). Importantly, in high (vs. low) power distance societies, political change takes place more violently. In line
with this analysis, Van De Vliert, Schwartz, Huismans, Hofstede and Daan (1999) reported a positive correlation between power distance and frequency of domestic political violence across a sample of fifty-three countries.

Thus, higher power distance societies are generally defined by deference to authority, acceptance of hierarchies and differences in status. Paradoxically, they also tend to experience more domestic political violence, revolts and violent overthrowing of governments and authorities, compared to lower power distance societies (Hofstede et al., 2010). An important research question to pose is whether these associations found at the macro level, across countries, can be also found at the individual level, within countries. We investigate this question, by testing whether individuals who are characterized by a stronger power distance orientation are also more likely to express the intentions to engage in violent forms of radical actions, compared to lower power distance individuals.

Higher power distance individuals see power inequality as a stable and unalterable feature of social life (Hofstede, 1980). We, thus, reason that they may perceive social and political change as something that can only be obtained through violence. In contrast, lower power distance individuals may perceive social inequality as an undesirable feature of society that can be altered through other political means. Consistently with this reasoning, research in the organizational context indicates that powerless individuals are less likely to express their attitudes and thoughts in contexts perceived as more hierarchical (Anicich, Swaab, & Galinsky, 2015; Schaefer, Lee, Galinsky, & Thau, 2018). A stronger power distance orientation is associated with lower propensity to speak up in the workplace (Hsiung & Tsai, 2017; Landau, 2009; Lin, Chen, Herman, Wei, & Ma, 2017; Khatri, 2009; Wei, Zhang, & Chen, 2015). This pattern can be even observed in the context of workplace interpersonal mistreatment, such as abusive supervision and incivility (Lin et al., 2013; cf. Moon, Weick, & Uskul, 2018). In addition, high power distance individuals are more likely to defer
important decisions to the authority because they may be more worried about the consequences of openly questioning powerful figures (Hsiung & Tsai, 2017; Kirkman, Chen, Farh, Chen & Lowe, 2009).

Applied to political action, this evidence from organizational research suggests that individuals with a stronger power distance orientation may perceive they have fewer opportunities to voice their grievances against the authority through deliberative and participative political means. In high power distance societies, such perception might stem from actual features of the context, including lower social upward mobility or greater distance between higher-status and lower-status groups. However, this perception need not be grounded in objective reality in order to affect political behavior. It may be a correlate, or implication, of embracing a higher power distance orientation, regardless of the societal level of power distance.

Recently, Shuman, Cohen-Chen, Hirsch-Hoefler, and Halperin (2016) demonstrated that individuals who perceive the social world as less changeable are also more likely to engage in violent forms of political action. Similarly, there is evidence indicating that the perceived political marginalization (i.e., the inability to express one’s grievances) and repression of groups and individuals advocating nonnormative positions may be linked to their radicalization, and the emergence of even more violent forms of political engagement (cf. Allan, Glazzard, Jesperson, Reddy-Tumu, & Winterbotham, 2015; Minkenberg, 2006; Ravndal, 2018). For instance, according to the phenomenon of ‘backlashing’, state repression of actors pursuing social change might paradoxically contribute to an increase in violence (LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009). This is because state repression deprives such actors of the channels necessary to express their demands, increasing the chances of retaliation (Argomaniz & Vidal-Diez, 2015; Pridemore & Freilich, 2007). Taken together, this evidence suggests that high power distance individuals might be more likely to voice
political dissent through radical and violent political action which entails disengagement from (rather than a dialogue with) an authority perceived as unchangeable and distant.

**Overview of Research**

The aim of this research is to examine how individuals’ power distance orientation might affect individuals’ intentions of engaging in violent forms of political protest. In Studies 1a and 1b, we test our hypotheses using two surveys analyzed with structural equation modeling with latent variables. We examine the role of individuals’ power distance orientation in the context of the dual pathway model of collective action. Specifically, we draw on the dual pathway model and investigate whether individuals’ endorsement of power distance explains radicalism beyond the psychological pathways of injustice-fueled anger and contempt, and low efficacy. We, thus, seek to avoid an instance of the ‘single factor fallacy’ (cf. Pettigrew & Hewstone, 2017) by considering the contribution of power distance orientation in the context of the broader set of psychological constructs that are known to predict violent and non-violent political action. In Studies 2a-2c we adapt a priming procedure developed by van den Bos, Brockner, van den Oudenalder, Kamble, and Nasabi (2013) to experimentally manipulate the salience of power distance orientation and investigate whether it affects individuals’ political tendencies.

To examine the generalizability of our findings to different contexts, we sample from two different societies, South Korea and the United States. Societies are characterized by prevalent cultural themes that constrain or promote specific values (Kitayama & Markus, 1999). Nonetheless, there exist also substantial variations in individuals’ cultural orientations within societies (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Taras, Steel, & Kirkman, 2016; Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai, & Laccu, 1988). For instance, South Korea is a context where power distance is a prevalent and dominant cultural theme (Hofstede et al., 2010; see also Schwartz, 1999). In contrast, the US are characterized by relatively lower levels of power
distance at the collective level (Hofstede et al., 2010). Nonetheless, across both contexts, variations in individuals’ orientations towards inequality and authority may play a similar role vis-a-vis their political intentions.

In Studies 1a-b, it was not possible to establish measurement invariance for some of the key constructs involved in the model. Thus, in this research, we do not compare directly samples from two different countries, and do not aim to draw inferences about the effect of culture at the collective level. Rather, our goal is to investigate power distance orientation at the individual level of analysis, within countries, in order to extend previous work conducted across nations (Hofstede et al., 2010). It should also be noted that, according to the interpretation paradox of cultural differences, differences across groups characterized by very distinct cultural, social and economic backgrounds might be easy to find, but are hard to interpret (van de Vijver and Leung, 2000; Fischer and Poortinga, 2018). This is because such differences can be attributed to a number of factors that do not directly pertain to culture. The implications of this paradox have recently led a number of authors to recommend comparisons among more than two cultural groups when the objective of the research is to establish the role of cultural differences across groups (Boer, Hanke, & He, 2018; Fischer and Poortinga, 2018). Nevertheless, sampling from the two national groups of South Korea and the US enables us to test the generalizability of our findings across different societies. Thus, in the following studies, we draw on samples from two different geographical, social and economic contexts to investigate the generalizability of the effect of power distance orientation on radical and violent political action.

**Studies 1a-1b**

In Studies 1a and 1b, we investigate the association between power distance orientation and intentions to engage in radical and violent political protest in the context of van Zomeren et al. (2004)’s dual-pathway model and Becker and Tausch (2015)’s extension
of the model to violent political participation. This approach enables us to examine the relative weight of the power distance cultural orientation vis-à-vis other predictors and foci of political engagement. Following previous research (e.g., Tausch et al., 2012), we also include measures of individuals’ intentions to engage in institutional (i.e., voting) and non-institutional (e.g., non-violent protest) forms of political participation to examine individuals’ intentions to express social dissent through different political means.

In the present studies, we examine the ‘injustice-emotions’ and ‘efficacy’ paths in relation to individuals’ general views and appraisal of the political system (Napier & Jost, 2008; Solak, Jost, Sumer, & Clore, 2012; see Travaglino, 2017). Previous research has demonstrated that the way in which individuals perceive, construe and emotionally appraise social institutions and the system has important implications for their political behavior (Stangor & Jost, 1997; Solak, et al., 2012). Following this perspective, we measure individuals’ perceived justice of the system (Jost et al., 2012), their emotional responses of anger and contempt against the system (see Solak et al., 2012), and political efficacy. We include measures of both internal and external political efficacy to explore their role in predicting individuals’ political intentions (Balch, 1974). Moreover, we also control for demographic variables of gender and age. Finally, to examine the role of power distance orientation independently from other indicators of conservatism, across samples, we control for social dominance orientation (due to this construct focus on hierarchical relationships among groups cf. Pratto et al., 2000) and political orientation (due to the linkage between power distance and conservative/traditional political tendencies; Inglehart et al., 2004).

On the basis of previous research, we hypothesize that individuals should be more likely to engage in non-institutional political action (i.e., non-violent participation) when they report a higher sense of internal efficacy and higher levels of injustice-fueled anger (Jost et al., 2012; van Zomeren et al., 2004). We also examine the indirect path from injustice to non-
violent participation through contempt. Previous research has found no statistically significant associations between contempt and non-normative political action (Tausch et al., 2011). However, differently from previous work, we investigate individuals’ emotional responses of contempt in relation to the political system and thus explore this path in the present research.

In line with the dual pathway model, individuals’ feelings they have the ability to understand and harness the political process (i.e., internal efficacy) should be linked to heightened intentions to engage in non-violent political action (e.g., Sherkat & Blocker, 1994). Similarly, a stronger perception that the system is responsive to one’s needs (i.e., external political efficacy) should be associated with stronger intentions to engage in non-violent forms of political action. However, previous findings concerning the association between external efficacy and engagement in non-institutional political action are inconsistent. Some authors report a negative relationship between external efficacy and protest (e.g., Lee, 2005) whereas others found no relationship between these constructs (e.g., Gil de Zúñiga, Diehl, & Ardévol-Abreu, 2017). This suggests that the impact of external efficacy may be context dependent. In these studies, we examine this construct in both South Korea and the US.

We also examine the associations between internal and external efficacy and individuals’ emotional responses of anger and contempt against the political system. Instrumental (i.e., efficacy) and emotional (anger/contempt) considerations are generally considered independent paths to political action. However, previous research has generally focused on individuals’ sense of efficacy in relation to the group to which they belong (group efficacy). In the present studies, we consider efficacy in the context of individuals’ appraisal of the political system (see Valentino, Gregorowicz, & Groenendyk, 2009; cf. Travaglino, 2017). We expect that individuals who perceive the system as unresponsive to their needs are
also more likely to perceive emotions of anger and contempt against the system. These emotions should in turn predict stronger engagement in political action. Similarly, a stronger sense of internal political efficacy should be associated with stronger mobilizing emotions because individuals may feel more confident in their political ability to respond to the system (see Valentino et al., 2009).

Concerning voting, on the basis of previous research, we expect this form of political engagement to be driven mainly by individuals’ perception that they are able to understand and harness the political process (higher internal efficacy; e.g., Moeller, de Vreese, Esser & Kunz, 2014). Given the institutional and system-supporting character of voting, emotions should play a less relevant role in individuals’ decisions about whether voting or not (Tausch et al., 2011; cf. also Travaglino, 2017).

Moreover, in line with previous findings, stronger contempt should predict individuals’ intentions to engage in violent action (Tausch et al., 2011). Research on violent political engagement has yet to examine the independent effects of internal and external political efficacy vis-à-vis this form of participation. For instance, Tausch et al (2011; study 3) used a generalized measure of political efficacy that included items tapping both internal and external efficacy and found a negative relationship between efficacy and attitudes towards violence in the political domain. Thus, we explore the separate role of both dimensions in this study. We expect that it is the sense that the system is irresponsible (rather than one’s self perceived ability to understand the system) that drives individuals’ engagement in radical and violent action. Specifically, individuals who perceive lower external efficacy should also feel stronger contempt towards the system, and thus be more likely to express the intentions to engage in radical and violent forms of political action.

Finally, central to the aim of this paper, we test the hypothesis that higher power distance orientation is associated with heightened intentions to participate in radical and
violent political action. Power distance orientation refers to a cluster of values and meaning that shapes the way individuals perceive authority and inequality. Specifically, high power distance individuals see inequality as a stable and unalterable feature of reality. This implies that they might be less prone to engage in institutional and non-institutional political action because those forms of action imply a two-way dialogue between citizens and the authority. In contrast, they may see the use of violence as the only channel to obtain social change.

Studies 1a-b’s hypotheses and predictions in relation to the different dependent variables are summarized in Table 1.

**Method**

**Participants and procedure**

Study 1a was conducted using a convenience sample from South Korea. Six-hundred-one participants (356 male, 244 female and 1 other; \( M_{age} = 38.36; SD = 14.83 \)) were recruited for this study using Qualtrics via a Korean research company. Participants were invited to participate in a study on social and political issues and received a small financial incentive (3.60 USD, equivalent approximately to 4000 KRW). Study 1b was conducted in the US and included six hundred and thirteen participants (343 men, 267 women, 3 other; \( M_{age} = 33.39, SD_{age} = 11.62; \) 79.3% of the sample was identified as Caucasian). This was a convenient sample recruited using Qualtrics via the online platform Prolific Academic. Participants were invited to take part in a study on social and political issues and compensated with a small financial incentive in exchange for their participation (equivalent to approximately 3 USD).

Measures were first devised in English and then translated into Korean. Sample size was predetermined at six-hundred participants per country due to the availability of funds. No additional participants were recruited after data analysis and no participants were excluded from the analyses (except for deletions due to missing data). The additional participants included in both samples were due to unplanned oversampling from the panel companies.
The minimum recommended sample sizes to detect a small-to-medium effect size ($\delta = 0.2$) in models with 8 latent variables and 35 manifest indicators (Study 1a) or 9 latent variables and 39 manifest indicators (Study 1b) are, respectively, $N = 444$ and $N = 460$. The minimum recommended sample size for the complexity of the model structure is $N = 89$ across models (Soper, 2019; Westland, 2010).

**Materials**

Across both studies, the items were answered on 7-point scales ($1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree$) unless differently stated below. The measures were part of a larger survey examining other aspects of culture and political behavior. Differences in the measures across studies are described below.

**Perceived justice of the system.** Four items from Kay and Jost’s (2003) System Justification Scale were used to measure participants’ perception of the justice of the social system (e.g., ‘In general, I find South Korean [American] Society to be fair’; ‘Most of South Korean [American] Policies serve the greater good’; $\alpha_{\text{Study 1a}} = .84$, $\alpha_{\text{Study 1b}} = .91$). Although we measured individuals’ perceived justice of the system using items from the system justification scale, in the present studies we made no theoretical assumptions about whether individuals’ appraisals were a form of ‘false consciousness’ or an objective assessment of their circumstances (for a recent overview of system justification theory, see Jost, 2019).

**External political efficacy.** External political efficacy was measured using the following three items, ‘The South Korean [American] government does not pay attention to what the people think when it decides what to do’; ‘Public officials in South Korea [America] do not care much about what people like me think’ and ‘The current political system in South Korea [America] responds to public opinion effectively’. The last item was dropped from the analyses in Study 1a due to low communality with the other two (coefficient $< .30$). Low
communality did not affect the item in Study 1b. Reversed items were recoded so that higher scores meant higher efficacy ($\alpha_{\text{Study1a}} = .67$, $\alpha_{\text{Study1b}} = .81$).

**Internal political efficacy.** Three items were used to measure participants’ internal political efficacy, ‘I have the ability to talk about and participate in public affairs’, ‘I have enough ability to understand political matters’ and ‘I am able to understand most political issues easily’ (Lee, 2005). The items formed a reliable scale across studies, $\alpha_{\text{Study1a}} = .89$, $\alpha_{\text{Study1b}} = .89$.

**Power distance.** Power distance orientation was measured using 3 items adapted from Yoo, Donthu, and Lenartowicz’s (2011) Cultural Value Scale (cf. also Winterisch & Zhang, 2014). The items were ‘People in higher positions should make most decisions without consulting people in lower positions’, ‘People in lower positions should not disagree with decisions by people in higher positions’ and ‘People in higher position should avoid social interaction with people in lower position’ ($\alpha_{\text{Study1a}} = .82$, $\alpha_{\text{Study1b}} = .80)$.

**Anger.** Following Travaglino (2017), participants were asked to indicate the degree they felt ‘angry’, ‘frustrated’, and ‘outraged’ against the political system ($1 = \text{not at all}, 7 = \text{extremely}$; $\alpha_{\text{Study1a}} = .90$, $\alpha_{\text{Study1b}} = .92$).

**Contempt.** Following Tausch et al. (2011), we used three items to measure individuals’ feelings of contempt against the political system, e.g. ‘I detest our political system’, and ‘When thinking about our political system, I feel contempt’ ($\alpha_{\text{Study1a}} = .91$, $\alpha_{\text{Study1b}} = .93$).

**Institutional political action (Voting intentions).** Participants indicated how likely they were to vote in the next elections ($1 = \text{very unlikely}, 7 = \text{very likely}$).

**Non-institutional political participation and radical action.** To measure individuals’ intention to take part in non-institutional and radical political action, participants were presented with a list of twelve items adapted from previous research (Becker, Tausch,
Spears, & Christ, 2011; Tausch et al., 2011), and were asked how likely they were to take part in each activity to express their voice and/or dissent in society (1 = very unlikely, 7 = very likely). Five items referred to non-intuional participation (‘participating in a public demonstration’, ‘signing a petition’, ‘attending a political meeting’, ‘convincing other people to attend a demonstration’, ‘participating in a protest march’; αStudy1a = .85, αStudy1b = .90). The remaining 7 items referred to radical and violent participation, (‘throwing stones or bottles during a demonstration’ ‘taking part in an arson attack on private property of responsible groups or individuals’, ‘taking possession or blocking buildings’, ‘disturbing events where responsible people or groups appear’, ‘taking part in an attack on police’, ‘blocking traffic’, ‘throwing eggs or rotten fruit at politicians’; αStudy1a = .93, αStudy1b = .90).

Thus, our measure of political action was not focused on a specific political issue but encompassed different political activities aimed at expressing dissent, including the expression of violence against authorities (i.e., police and politicians) and radical action. Items were displayed in a randomized order to participants.

**Political orientation.** Participants’ political orientation was measured using a single item, ‘Would you consider yourself a Liberal or a Conservative?’ (1 = extremely liberal, 7 = extremely conservative).

**Social Dominance Orientation.** Four items from Pratto et al’s (2013) Short Social Dominance Scale were used to measure individuals’ degree of approval of group-based hierarchies. The items were ‘in setting priorities, we must consider all groups’, ‘we should not push for group equality’, ‘group equality should be our ideal’ and ‘superior groups should dominate inferior groups’. In Study 1a, the low internal reliability among items (αStudy1a = .43) suggested that SDO did not form a scale. Nevertheless, we included the item, ‘Superior groups should dominate inferior groups’, as a covariate in the present SEM model, based on its face validity. In Study 1b, the items were reliable and SDO was a covariate (αStudy1b = .90).
Results and Discussions

We tested the association between power distance orientation and political participation, using structural equation modelling with latent variables (Figures 1a and 1b). Power distance orientation was added as a distinct path to all forms of political action. Data analyses were conducted using the R software with the lavaan package (Rosseel, 2012) and robust standard errors. Gender, age, political orientation and social dominance orientation were covariates in the model. Table 2 and 3 show correlations among the variables and descriptive statistics across studies. Across both studies, the model fit the data well in Korea, Study 1a: $\chi^2 (489, N = 601) = 990.34, p < .001$, CFI = .95, SRMR = .06, RMSEA = .041 (90% CI [0.041, 0.049], $p = 1.00$). The fit was also adequate in the USA, Study 1b, although CFI was below the threshold of acceptability (cf. Hu & Bentler, 1998): $\chi^2 (632, N = 613) = 1996.55, p < .001$, CFI = .90, SRMR =.09, RMSEA = .061 (90% CI [0.058, 0.064], $p = 1.00$). Note that $\chi^2$ was significant across both studies. Nonetheless, $\chi^2$’s strong dependence on the sample size makes it an unrealizable indicator of goodness of fit (Schermelleh-Engel, Moosbrugger, & Muller, 2003).

Testing the effects of perceived injustice and efficacy.

Non-violent participation. Across samples perceived anger against the system was negatively predicted by perceived justice, $\beta_{Study1a} = -.35$, $SE_{Study1a} = 0.08$, $p_{Study1a} < .001$ and $\beta_{Study1b} = -.46$, $SE_{Study1b} = 0.09$, $p_{Study1b} < .001$. In turn, anger predicted engagement in non-violent political action in Korea, $\beta_{Study1a} = .14$, $SE_{Study1a} = 0.05$, $p_{Study1a} = .041$ and the US, $\beta_{Study1b} = .17$, $SE_{Study1b} = 0.06$, $p_{Study1b} = .011$. The indirect effect of perceived justice on non-violent political action via anger was marginally significant in Korea, $\beta_{Study1a} = -.05$, $SE_{Study1a} = 0.024$, $p = .056$ 95% CI $Study1a [-0.093$ to $0.001]$ and significant in the US, $\beta_{Study1b} = -.08$, $SE_{Study1b} = 0.037$, $p = .015$, 95% CI $Study1b [-0.162$ to $-0.017]$. 
Perceived justice was also negatively associated with contempt in Korea, $\beta_{Study1a} = -.40$, $SE_{Study1a} = 0.07$, $p_{Study1a} < .001$, and the US, $\beta_{Study1b} = -.52$, $SE_{Study1b} = 0.07$, $p_{Study1b} < .001$. In turn, contempt predicted non-violent political action in both contexts ($\beta_{Study1a} = .14$, $SE_{Study1a} = 0.06$, $p_{Study1a} = .048$; $\beta_{Study1b} = .16$, $SE_{Study1b} = 0.07$, $p_{Study1b} = .046$). This created an indirect effect of contempt on individuals’ engagement in non-violent action, $\beta_{Study1a} = -.06$, $SE_{Study1a} = 0.03$, $p = .05$, 95% CI $Study1a$ [-0.11 to -0.001]; $\beta_{Study1b} = -.082$, $SE_{Study1b} = 0.046$, $p = .047$, 95% CI $Study1b$ [-0.183 to -0.001].

Non-violent political action was negatively predicted by internal political efficacy in both the Korean, $\beta_{Study1a} = .33$, $SE_{Study1a} = 0.05$, $p_{Study1a} < .001$, and American, $\beta_{Study1b} = .27$, $SE_{Study1b} = 0.06$, $p_{Study1b} < .001$, samples. The effect of external efficacy was instead marginally significant in Korea, $\beta_{Study1a} = .11$, $SE_{Study1a} = 0.06$, $p_{Study1a} = .087$, and significant in the US, $\beta_{Study1b} = .15$, $SE_{Study1b} = 0.09$, $p_{Study1b} = .01$.

In addition, across both samples, external political efficacy was negatively associated with anger ($\beta_{Study1a} = -.16$, $SE_{Study1a} = 0.09$, $p_{Study1a} = .02$ and $\beta_{Study1b} = -.20$, $SE_{Study1b} = 0.10$, $p_{Study1b} < .001$) and contempt ($\beta_{Study1a} = -.25$, $SE_{Study1a} = 0.08$, $p_{Study1a} < .001$ and $\beta_{Study1b} = -.25$, $SE_{Study1b} = 0.08$, $p_{Study1b} < .001$). An inspection of the indirect effects revealed that in Korea, the indirect effects of external efficacy via anger and contempt were non-significant ($p_{Study1a} > .08$). In the US, the indirect effect of external political efficacy on non-violent action through anger was significant, $\beta_{Study1b} = -.034$, $SE_{Study1b} = 0.023$, $p = .034$, 95% CI $Study1b$ [-0.094 to -0.004], whereas the indirect effect through contempt was marginally significant, $\beta_{Study1b} = -.04$, $SE_{Study1b} = 0.031$, $p = .07$, 95% CI $Study1b$ [-0.12 to 0.004].

Internal efficacy was significantly and positively associated with anger ($\beta_{Study1a} = .10$, $SE_{Study1a} = 0.06$, $p_{Study1a} = .039$ and $\beta_{Study1b} = .14$, $SE_{Study1b} = 0.06$, $p_{Study1b} < .001$) in both countries. The indirect effect of internal efficacy on non-violent engagement via anger was, however, only significant in the US, $\beta_{Study1b} = .023$, $SE_{Study1b} = 0.02$, $p = .03$, 95% CI $Study1b$
[0.003 to 0.06] but not in Korea ($p_{Study1a} > .14$). The association between internal efficacy and contempt was non-significant in Korea, $\beta_{Study1a} = .05, SE_{Study1a} = 0.05, p_{Study1a} = .32$, and marginally significant in the US $\beta_{Study1b} = .07, SE_{Study1b} = 0.06, p_{Study1b} = .051$. The indirect effects of internal efficacy through contempt were non-significant in either country ($ps > .16$).

**Voting.** Individuals’ voting intentions were positively predicted by internal efficacy in either country, $\beta_{Study1a} = .27, SE_{Study1a} = 0.05, p_{Study1a} < .001$ and $\beta_{Study1b} = .33, SE_{Study1b} = 0.09, p_{Study1b} < .001$. In the US, there was also an unexpected association between perceived justice and voting intentions, $\beta_{Study1b} = .20, SE_{Study1b} = 0.09, p_{Study1b} = .012$. All other effects were non-significant, $ps > .10$.

**Radical and violent participation.** Consistent with previous research (Tausch et al., 2011), in Korea violent action was predicted by contempt, $\beta_{Study1a} = .30, SE_{Study1a} = 0.07, p_{Study1a} < .001$. External efficacy, $\beta_{Study1a} = -.07, SE_{Study1a} = 0.03, 95\% CI_{Study1a} [- 0.16, - 0.03]$, and perceived justice, $\beta_{Study1a} = -.12, SE_{Study1a} = 0.04, 95\% CI_{Study1a} [- 0.23, - 0.08]$, predicted violent political action indirectly, through contempt. In a similar vein, in the American sample, violent action was predicted directly by contempt, $\beta_{Study1b} = .28, SE_{Study1b} = 0.04, p_{Study1b} < .001$. External efficacy, $\beta_{Study1b} = -.07, SE_{Study1b} = 0.02, 95\% CI_{Study1b} [- 0.09, - 0.02]$, and perceived justice, $\beta_{Study1b} = -.15, SE_{Study1b} = 0.03, 95\% CI_{Study1b} [- 0.15, - 0.05]$, predicted violent political action indirectly, through contempt. All other effects were non-significant.

**Testing the effects of power distance orientation.** Our primary objective in Studies 1a and 1b was to investigate the association between individuals’ power distance orientation and individuals’ intentions to engage in radical and violent political action. Across both studies, this association was significant and positive, $\beta_{Study1a} = .26, SE_{Study1a} = 0.07, p_{Study1a} < .001$ and $\beta_{Study1b} = .31, SE_{Study1b} = 0.07, p_{Study1b} < .001$. Specifically, in line with our hypothesis, across countries, the more strongly individuals embraced cultural values related to the acceptance of power inequalities in society, the more likely they were to report the
intentions to engage in radical forms of political participation to express social and political dissent.

Interestingly, in the Korean sample power distance orientation was negatively and significantly associated with institutional political participation, $\beta_{Study1a} = -0.21$, $SE_{Study1a} = 0.07$, $p_{Study1a} < .001$ and non-institutional political participation, $\beta_{Study1a} = -0.12$, $SE_{Study1a} = 0.05$, $p_{Study1a} = .036$. In the American sample, these associations were in the same direction as the Korean sample but smaller and non-statistically significant $\beta_{Study1b} = -0.09$, $SE_{Study1b} = 0.07$, $p_{Study1b} = .074$ and $\beta_{Study1b} = -0.05$, $SE_{Study1b} = 0.08$, $p_{Study1b} = .379$. The pattern of results in the Korean sample is broadly consistent with previous findings in the organizational context indicating that individuals with a stronger power distance orientation may be less likely to voice their grievances openly in society (Hsiung & Tsai, 2017). In the American sample, the zero-order correlations between power distance orientation and engagement in non-violent political action/voting were significant and in the expected directions (see Table 3). However, the associations between these variables were smaller and did not achieve statistical significance when tested controlling for other predictors.

To summarize, results from two studies conducted in two different countries indicated that power distance orientation was linked to stronger intentions to engage in radical and violent forms of political participation. Across both studies, this effect was independent from the efficacy and injustice-fueled emotional paths, as well as individuals’ political orientation, social dominance orientation, gender and age.

**Studies 2a-2c**

In Studies 2a-2c, we adapt a priming procedure from van den Bos et al. (2013) to examine the causal relationship between individuals’ power distance orientation and intentions to engage in violent forms of political protest. According to the ‘culture as situated
cognition’ prospective, across societies, individuals have access to different clusters of cultural beliefs, values, knowledge and mental schemas (i.e., cultural mindsets) that shape their social appraisals, judgements and behavioral responses (Oyserman, 2011; Oyserman & Lee, 2008). Which cultural mindset is adopted more often in a culture depends on the mindset’s degree of chronic accessibility. Specific contexts tend to promote (and, hence, cue more often) cultural mindsets that are consonant with the culture’s dominant or core values. Nonetheless, alternative mindsets can also be made salient. In turn, a salient mindset activates related cognitive content, inducing cultural dispositions that can alter judgements and perceptions (Oyserman, 2016).

In Studies 2a-2c, on the basis of our theorizing and findings from Studies 1a and 1b, we hypothesize that priming higher power distance should heighten individuals’ intentions to engage in radical forms of political action. This directional hypothesis is tested using a set of one-tailed t-tests. In the presence of a clear directional hypothesis (i.e., \( H_1 = \mu_{\text{high power distance}} > \mu_{\text{low power distance}} \)), one-tailed tests provide researchers with more power to detect an effect (Lakens, 2016), and stronger accuracy (Cho & Abe, 2013). Due to the use of one-tailed t-tests, we decided to run a pre-registered third study (2c, https://osf.io/ekqyx).

Method

Participants and design

In study 2a, a total of 120 South Korean students were recruited using Qualtrics from a university in South Korea (55 men, 65 women; \( M_{\text{age}} = 22.3, SD_{\text{age}} = 2.09 \)). Participants received course credits in exchange for their participation. Study 2b included a total of 151 American participants (78 men, 73 women; \( M_{\text{age}} = 34.85, SD_{\text{age}} = 12.49; 82\% \) of the sample self-identified as Caucasian). Study 2c included 160 participants (77 men, 80 women, 3 unreported; \( M_{\text{age}} = 33.20, SD_{\text{age}} = 11.95; 73\% \) of the sample self-identified as Caucasian).
Participants in Studies 2b-2c were recruited using Qualtrics via the online platform Prolific Academic and were compensated (0.65 USD) for their participation.

Across all studies, participants were randomly assigned to conditions. In study 2a, sample size depended on the size of the class where data collection was conducted. A sample of 120 participants enables us to detect a moderate effect $d = 0.45$ at 80% power and $\alpha = 0.5$ using a one-tailed t-test. The number of participants in Studies 2b and 2c were predetermined at 150 and 160 respectively and enabled us to detect moderate effects of $d = 0.41$ and $d = 0.40$, respectively, at 80% power and $\alpha = 0.5$ using a one-tailed t-test. Across studies, no participants were excluded (except for deletion due to missing cases). Below, we report all measures and conditions included in the studies.

**Procedure and Materials**

Procedures were identical across studies. Participants were invited to participate in a study on “social and political issues”. Across studies, materials were presented to participants through the survey software Qualtrics. Materials for Study 2a were translated in Korean whereas materials for Studies 2b-2c were in English. The cover story of the study, and the justification for presenting the measures of political engagement following the priming procedure was, ‘This research is designed to understand what you think about power differences among people, and your reactions to those differences in the social context.’

Next, participants completed a two-task exercise adapted from van den Bos et al. (2013) to prime power distance orientation. This manipulation was originally devised to prime beliefs that run against cultural core values (vs. control) to elicit responses in cross-cultural comparisons between countries. Because the set of studies below was not designed to make cross-cultural comparisons, we primed high (vs. low) power distance orientations both in Korea and the US. In addition, the manipulation’s original text was slightly modified to
improve its clarity. Modifications relative to the original text appear in square brackets below.

Participants in the high power distance condition read the following instructions (van den Bos et al., 2013):

This part of the study will focus on other people's potential to determine or direct your behavior. More specifically, we ask you to read some materials and answer some questions that ask you to imagine that you are the less powerful and are willing to accept that those who have power over you (e.g., employers, politicians, police officers, etc.) have this because of their formal, hierarchical position.

Participants were then asked to complete the following two tasks. A minimum time of 30 seconds was set for each task before they could proceed with the study. No maximum amount of time was set and participants were able to complete the task at their own pace.

Please describe a situation out of your own life in which there was a large [social] distance between you and the person who formally had power over you. Thus, we ask you to imagine and describe to us a situation in which you were willing to accept that a person had power over you because of the person's formal, hierarchical position. Could you briefly describe this situation to us?

Imagine there is a large [social] distance between you and a person who has power over you, thus that you are willing to accept that a person [has
power over you because of the person's formal, hierarchical position. Could you briefly describe how you would feel in such a situation and why it may be a good thing when a person with power occupies this powerful position by means of a formal, hierarchical appointment?

In the low power distance condition, participants read the following instructions and completed two subsequent tasks.

This part of the study will focus on other people’s potential to determine or direct your behavior. More specifically, we ask you to read some materials and answer some questions that ask you to imagine that you and those who have power over you (e.g., employers, teachers, your parents, etc.) regard each other as equals. Thus, formal positions do not matter so much.

Please describe a situation out of your own life in which there was a small [social] distance between you and the person who formally had power over you. Thus, we ask you to imagine and describe to us a situation in which you and a person who formally had power over you regarded each other more or less as equals. Could you briefly describe this situation to us?

Imagine there is a small [social] distance between you and a person who has power over you, thus that you and a person who formally has power over you regard each other more or less as equals. Could you briefly describe how you would feel in such a situation and why it may be a good thing when a person with power treats you as being equal?
After completing the priming task, participants completed measures of engagement in political action. Specifically, participants were presented with a list of twelve items describing different forms of political actions (as in Studies 1a and 1b). Items were preceded by the following instructions ‘Below there are listed a series of activities people may take part in to express their voice and/or dissent against the government in society. Please indicate how likely you would be to take part in each of these activities in the future if the opportunity arises’. Thus, in these studies, participants were asked to think specifically about engagement in political action against the government. This was done to narrow down participants’ focus on forms of political participation against the authority. Participants were also asked to indicate how likely they were to vote in the next elections.

Items measuring individuals’ engagement in radical and violent forms of action ($\alpha_{\text{Study2a}} = .87$, $\alpha_{\text{Study 2b}} = .97$, $\alpha_{\text{Study 2c}} = .90$) as well as other forms of non-violent political engagement ($\alpha_{\text{Study2a}} = .86$, $\alpha_{\text{Study 2b}} = .91$, $\alpha_{\text{Study 2c}} = .90$) had good internal reliability. To examine whether the items loaded on the intended factors, we submitted the twelve items in each study to exploratory factor analyses using maximum likelihood as the method of extraction and oblimin rotation (Costello & Osborne, 2005). Across all studies, the scree plots indicated the emergence of two-factor solutions. These solutions explained 55.28% of the variance in Study 2a, 78.91% in study 2b and 66.98 in Study 2c. All the items loaded on the intended factors.

Results and Discussions

Across Studies 2a-2c, one-tailed t-tests were used to examine the hypothesis that priming higher power distance would increase individuals’ intentions to engage in violent forms of political action. Results supported our hypotheses both in the sample from South Korea, t-test, $t_{\text{Study2a}} (118) = 1.818$, $p_{\text{Study2a}} = .036$, $d_{\text{Study2a}} = .33$ and the samples from the US,
Means and standard deviations are summarized in Table 4. Across studies, the effect of the manipulation on non-institutional or institutional political participation were not significant, \( p > .14 \) (see Table 4).

We used the OpenMetaAnalyst software (Wallace, et al., 2012) to integrate the effect size across the three studies using random-effect meta-analysis. The Cohen’s is \( d = .37, 95\% \text{ CI} [.18 \text{ to } .56] \) for the effect of power distance priming on individuals’ intentions to engage in radical political action, \( d = -.11, 95\% \text{ CI} [-.30 \text{ to } .08] \) for individuals’ engagement in non-institutional political participation, and \( d = .03, 95\% \text{ CI} [-.17 \text{ to } .22] \) for individuals’ engagement in institutional political action.

**General Discussion**

In this research, for the first time, we investigated the effect of individuals’ power distance orientation on individuals’ intentions to engage in radical and violent forms of political participation. Specifically, we hypothesized that individuals with a higher power distance orientation would be more likely to engage in radical forms of political action. To test this hypothesis, we sampled from two different societies characterized by different relative levels of power distance at the collective level, South Korea and the United States. Results from two surveys (Studies 1a and 1b) and three experimental studies (Studies 2a-2c) support this hypothesis in both societies.

In Studies 1a and 1b, higher internal efficacy predicted voting intentions and, together with injustice-fueled anger and contempt, participation in non-violent political action (cf. van Zomeren et al., 2004). In contrast, only injustice-fueled contempt predicted engagement in violent actions (Tausch, et al., 2011). External efficacy was significantly and indirectly related to violent actions through contempt (cf. Travaglino, 2017). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that these paths have been tested in the under-investigated
Korean context (see Ha, Kim, & Jo, 2013; Hyun, 2015; Kim, Helgesen & Ahn, 2002). Findings from Study 1a (South Korea) indicate that the injustice-fueled emotional and efficacy paths postulated by the dual pathway model are also key predictors of political participation in this novel geographical and social context.

Importantly, supporting the research’s main hypothesis, higher power distance orientation was positively associated with intentions to engage in violent forms of political participation both in Korea and the US. This result is compatible with the idea that individuals’ power distance orientation has implications for their relationship with, and responses to authorities (cf. Hofstede et al., 2010). Specifically, individuals who accept unequal distributions of power as a natural feature of society are more likely to express intentions to voice their discontent through violent and radical means. Interestingly, in Study 1a, power distance orientation was negatively associated with institutional and non-institutional action. In the US these associations were smaller and did not reach statistical significance. This pattern of findings suggests that, at least in the Korean context, high power distance individuals may be less likely (or low power distance more likely) to express discontent through deliberative means. Findings from Korea are consonant with research conducted in the organizational context, which demonstrates that individuals with a higher power-distance orientation are less likely to voice their grievances openly (e.g., Hsiung & Tsai, 2017; Landau, 2009; Lin, Chen, Herman, Wei, & Ma, 2017; Khatri, 2009; Wei, Zhang, & Chen, 2015).

Studies 2a-2c used a priming procedure (van den Bos et al., 2013) to test the causal effect of power distance on individuals’ intentions to engage in radical forms of political action. According to the ‘culture as situated cognition’ prospective, priming a cultural orientation also activates the network of beliefs, practices and appraisal orientations linked to that cultural dimension (Oyserman, 2011). Studies 2a-2c demonstrated that priming high (vs.
low) power distance orientation increased individuals’ intentions to engage in violent forms of political participation against the government. These findings complemented results from the two surveys and provide evidence of the causal role of power distance orientation vis-à-vis violent political participation (integrated \( d = .37 \)).

However, across experiments, power distance orientation was not significantly related to institutional and non-institutional forms of political action and the priming procedure resulted in smaller effect sizes. A possible explanation for these findings is that these forms of political behavior are shaped by multiple, perhaps more relevant factors, including concerns about agency (efficacy), justice and emotions. Thus, priming the cultural orientation of power distance did not affect individuals’ behavioral intentions strongly. Future studies should examine these associations in additional contexts and situations.

**Limitations and Future Directions**

The present research is the first to investigate the association between power distance orientation and individuals’ intentions to engage in violent political action in a domestic context. Results from two surveys and three experiments from two different societies highlight the important role of this cultural dimension in explaining radical forms of political engagement. Nonetheless, this research was affected by some limitations.

First, across studies we measured individuals’ general tendency to express ‘dissent in society’ (Studies 1a-1b) and ‘dissent against the government’ (Studies 2a-2c). This method has the advantage of tapping individuals’ political intentions across a vast array of different groups. The method focuses on the type of protest tactic rather than specific political issues. However, research on political behavior tends to focus on more specific contexts and concrete protest events (van Zomeren et al., 2014). It should be noted that Studies 1a and 1b replicated many of the expected findings concerning efficacy and emotions hypothesized in previous research (Becker & Tausch, 2015; van Zomeren et al., 2014). Nonetheless, an
important issue for future research is to examine the role of power distance orientation (as well as other cultural values) in the context of more specific groups and social problems.

Another limitation of this research is that we did not consider the cultural level of analysis. Instead, we only examined how individuals’ variations in power distance within cultures related to individuals’ political intentions. Many of the measures employed in these studies did not achieve invariance across samples. This is perhaps not surprising, given that the majority of studies of political action in psychology have focused on western contexts (see van Zomeren, 2019). Novel measures sensitive to cultural differences might need to be elaborated to enable comparisons of individuals’ appraisal of the political system across contexts. Future research should explore cultural differences systematically using different countries characterized by different relative levels of power distance orientation.

Future research should also examine more systematically differences between high power distance and low power distance individuals. For instance, future research might add a control condition to the priming procedure used in Studies 2a-c to examine cultural differences across cultures and contexts (van den Bos, et al. 2013). Moreover, latent structure analysis could be used to examine how the combination of different social attitudes such as social dominance orientation (Pratto et al., 2013), or right-wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 2004), together with power distance may result in different forms of political engagement (see Osborne & Sibley, 2017). Finally, future research should consider the role of national and regional identities in driving individuals’ endorsement of shared cultural orientations and power distance values.

Findings from the present studies also suggest novel research avenues in the organizational setting. Research in organizations has examined the role of power distance orientation in individuals’ acceptance of injustice, submission to authority figures, or tolerance of limited voice (e.g., Landau, 2009; Schaerer, et al., 2009; see also Shao, Rupp,
Skarlicki & Jones, 2013). Yet, the present results suggest that such attitudes and behaviors might be paradoxically accompanied by more extreme and radical forms of dissent towards leaders and superiors, such as sabotage (Ambrose, Seabright, & Schminke, 2002) or engagement in destructive organizational deviance (Warren, 2003). Future research should examine the relationships between individuals’ power distance orientation and more radical responses to perceived injustice in the organizational context.

A further important priority for future research is to examine the psychological mechanisms that might explain the effect of power distance orientation on individuals’ intentions to engage in radical forms of political participation. Below, we discuss some potential candidates.

**Psychological mechanisms of the “power distance orientation-radical political participation” nexus.** This research documents the effect of power distance orientation on individuals’ intentions to engage in radical and violent forms of political participation. But what psychological mechanisms may explain this relationship? A plausible construct may be the degree to which high power distance individuals see the web of political relationships and the political system as static and unchangeable. High power distance individuals might perceive political power relationships in society as less likely to be altered by others. This could in turn lead them to perceive violence as the only way to obtain political change (cf. Shuman, et al., 2016).

Additionally, the heightened propensity towards radical violence showed by high power distance individuals may originate directly from the feelings of lacking voice vis-à-vis authority. High power distance individuals are less likely to speak up, express dissent openly or provide feedback to individuals who are higher up in the hierarchy. In part, this is because they assign special qualities to authority figures. They may also feel stronger fear and anxiety when challenging authorities (Daniels & Greguras, 2014; Hsiung & Tsai, 2017; Kirkman, et
al., 2009; Kish-Gephart, Detert, Klebe Trevino, & Edmondson, 2009). For instance, research indicates that the negative effects of authoritarian leadership on voice behavior in organizations are stronger for high power distance employees (Li & Sun, 2015). In the political context, such lack of voice could result in high power distance individuals perceiving to have fewer outlets to express their grievances. This may, in turn, translate in violence.

A stronger propensity towards political violence might also derive from the fact that power distance is associated with stronger intergroup aggression across different domains (cf. Weick, Vasiljevic, Uskul, & Moon, 2017). For instance, cross-country evidence indicates the existence of associations between countries’ power distance indices and homicide rate (Weick, et al., 2017), domestic political violence (Van De Vliert, et al., 1999), incivility (Moon et al., 2018) and aggression (Bergeron & Schneider, 2005). At the individual level, circumstances in which individuals see the target of dissent or even the state as ‘outgroups’, or de-identify from authorities, may result in a stronger push toward violence among those who endorse high levels of power distance orientation.

Finally, there is evidence that chronically powerless individuals are more likely to seek revenge when they eventually experience power (Strelan, Weick, & Vasiljevic, 2014). Individuals who endorse a large social distance between the powerful and the powerless, and who perceive such distance as a natural feature of the environment, may similarly be more likely to react violently for perceived wrongs from the authority, or in order to prove their social worth in a context they perceive as strongly hierarchical. Violent revenge might be especially likely in circumstances in which they experience power, for instance when the authority display weakness. Future research should test this and other mechanisms that could explain the effect of power distance orientation on individuals’ intentions to engage in political violence.
Conclusions

Individuals may express their dissent in different ways, ranging from casting a ballot to more radical and violent forms of protest. In this research, we focused on individuals’ power distance orientation and demonstrate that this cultural dimension plays a key role in individuals’ political intentions. Specifically, this research suggests that differences in cultural values regarding the acceptability of power inequalities in society may orient people towards radical means of political expressions. We hope the present work will stimulate new research on how individuals voice political discontent across cultures and on the values that drive them.
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Footnotes

1 We attempted to establish measurement invariance using the semTools package in R (Jorgensen, Pornprasertmanit, Schoemann & Rosseel, 2019). Whereas it was possible to establish metric invariance across samples for the measures of power distance orientation, perceived anger against, and justice of the system, the other constructs in the SEM model did not achieve invariance. Scalar invariance was not established for any of the constructs. Further details about these analyses can be obtained from the authors.

2 The surveys also measured a number of other constructs, including social value orientation, horizontal and vertical individualism and collectivism, political trust, perceived justice of the economic system, relative deprivation, emotional reactions of disgust, happiness and shame against the political system, attitudes towards hacker groups, favorability towards other Asian and European countries, religiosity, identification with the national groups and life satisfaction. The measures of social value orientation and horizontal/vertical individualism and collectivism were published in Moon, Travaglino, and Uskul (2018) in an exploratory study unrelated to the content of the present article. The selection of the measures used in Studies 1a-1b was based on the theoretical framework of the dual-pathway model.

3 Unexpectedly, in the Korean sample, we found a significant positive direct effect of perceived justice on violent action, $\beta_{\text{Study1a}} = .16$, $SE_{\text{Study1a}} = 0.07$, $p_{\text{Study1a}} < .001$. Surprisingly, individuals who perceived the system as fair were also more likely to express the intentions to engage in violent political action to voice their discontent. In the American sample, the effect was non-significant, $\beta_{\text{Study1b}} = .06$, $SE_{\text{Study1b}} = 0.06$, $p_{\text{Study1b}} = .532$. We explore further this unexpected finding with analyses presented in Appendix A.
### Table 1. Summary of the Hypotheses in Studies 1a-b.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypotheses (non-violent participation)</th>
<th>Korea (Yes/No)</th>
<th>US (Yes/No)</th>
<th>Hypotheses (voting and violent participation)</th>
<th>Supported in Korea (Yes/No)</th>
<th>Supported in the US (Yes/No)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A higher sense that the system is unjust predicts stronger engagement in non-violent political action via perceived anger.</td>
<td>No †</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Higher internal efficacy predicts voting intentions.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Indirect effect of perceived justice of the system on non-violent participation via perceived contempt.</td>
<td>Yes (Negative direction)</td>
<td>Yes (Negative direction)</td>
<td>Perceived contempt predicts stronger engagement in violent political action.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher internal efficacy predicts stronger engagement in non-violent political action.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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**Notes.** * Exploratory research statements where the direction of the association was not specified; † marginally significant results (.05 ≤ p ≤ .10).
Table 2.

Intercorrelations, means, and standard deviations for study variables (Study 1a: South Korea).

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Notes. Gender: 1 = male, 2 = female, 3 = other. ***\(p \leq .001\), **\(p < .01\), *\(p < .05\).
Table 3.

*Intercorrelations, means, and standard deviations for study variables (Study 1b: the US).*

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*Notes.* Gender: 1 = male, 2 = female, 3 = other. ***p ≤ .001, **p < .01, *p < .05.
Table 4.

Measures, and standard deviations for study variables (Study 2a-c).

<table>
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<th>Study 2c United States</th>
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<td>M (SD)</td>
<td>M (SD)</td>
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<td>1.74 (.89)</td>
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<td>4.69 (1.25)</td>
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<td>Voting</td>
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<td>6.48 (.75)</td>
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Figure 1. The latent variables model showing coefficients for the predictors of institutional (voting) and non-institutional and violent political action (Study 1a: South Korea).

Note. Dashed lines are nonsignificant paths at $p > .10$. Political orientation, SDO, gender and age are covariates in the model.

***$p < .001$, **$p < .01$, *$p < .05$, †$p < .10$. 
Figure 2. The latent variables model showing coefficients for the predictors of institutional (voting) and non-institutional and violent political action (Study 1b: the US).

Note. Dashed lines are nonsignificant paths at $p > .10$. Political orientation, SDO, gender and age are covariates in the model.

***$p < .001$, **$p < .01$, *$p < .05$, †$p < .10$. 