Paris Occupied:
Space, Place and Resistance, 1940-1944

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Abstract

Since the liberation of Paris in August 1944, an unceasing fascination with capital’s four long ‘dark years’ of Nazi occupation has encouraged the publication of a bewildering number of journals, memoirs, popular histories and academic studies. This vast historiography has expanded our understanding of the political, social and cultural metamorphosis that Paris underwent during this period, and how these changes affected the lives of Parisians and their German occupiers. Yet in engaging with these sources, historians have continued to ignore the vital importance that spatial factors played in the shaping of occupation experience. Rather than serving as a neutral backdrop, the complex and profound changes to people’s lives were intimately connected to their perceptions of, and interactions with, their surroundings. The spaces and places of Paris – both real and imagined – were thus an essential determinant in the development and course of the occupation of Paris. In focusing on the phenomenon of Parisian resistance, this thesis will explore the relationships between various forms of resistance and a diverse selection of Paris spaces – cafés, underground spaces, stores and marketplaces, statues and memorial – to demonstrate the value of a spatial approach. Drawing on a range of contemporary French, British and German archival sources, newsreels, literary works, oral histories, diaries and personal accounts, it argues for the recognition of space as a missing dimension of occupation and resistance history.
Note on translations

I have cited existing English translations of French texts where possible. Elsewhere the translations given are my own unless otherwise stated.
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Abbreviations

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<td>ADP</td>
<td>Archives de Paris</td>
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<td>AN</td>
<td>Archives nationales</td>
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<td>APP</td>
<td>Archives de la Préfecture de la Police</td>
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<td>CGQJ</td>
<td>Commisariat général aux questions juives</td>
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<td>CNR</td>
<td>Conseil national de la Résistance</td>
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<td>FFI</td>
<td>Forces françaises de l’intérieur</td>
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<td>FTP</td>
<td>Francs-Tireurs et Partisans</td>
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<tr>
<td>JORF</td>
<td>Journal officiel de la République française'</td>
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<tr>
<td>MBF</td>
<td>Militärbefehlshaber in Frankreich</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOI</td>
<td>Main-d’œuvre immigrée</td>
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<tr>
<td>NARA</td>
<td>National Archives Records Administration</td>
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<td>OCM</td>
<td>Organisation civile et militaire</td>
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<td>PPF</td>
<td>Parti populaire français</td>
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<tr>
<td>RNP</td>
<td>Rassemblement national populaire</td>
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<td>SHD</td>
<td>Service historique de la défense</td>
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<td>SIS</td>
<td>Secret Intelligence Service</td>
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<td>SOE</td>
<td>Special Operations Executive</td>
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<tr>
<td>STO</td>
<td>Service du travail obligatoire</td>
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<td>TNA</td>
<td>UK National Archives</td>
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<td>UFF</td>
<td>Union des femmes françaises</td>
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* Between 1941-1944 the title was changed by the Vichy government to the *Journal officiel de l’État Français*. 

Introduction

Paris: A Capital under Occupation

The German occupation of Paris, which stretched from 14 June 1940 to 25 August 1944, was one of the most revolutionary periods in the city’s history. It was also divisive, claustrophobic, exciting, terrifying, unpredictable and, for some, even liberating. The deprivations and mortal dangers faced by Parisians during these four ‘dark years’ might recall the bloody events of the Paris Commune seventy years before, but in truth the nature of this particular trauma was unique and unparalleled in its scale and severity. Descriptions of the tragic events that accompanied its introduction demanded the definite article to convey their gravity: la débâcle (the debacle), the military collapse of France within six weeks of invasion, was accompanied by l’exode (the exodus), the miserable train of perhaps eight million refugees including more than a million Parisians, streaming south from the Low Countries and northern France, an event of biblical scale.1 A month after the capitulation of Paris, the shock of national defeat led to the formation of a new constitution, a new head of state, Marshal Philippe Pétain, and the establishment of what became known as the l’État français, the French State, better known as the Vichy government. Banished to an ersatz capital 200 miles away within the southern ‘Free’ or ‘Unoccupied’ Zone, Vichy nevertheless remained in charge of much of the civil administration in Paris, albeit under increasing German scrutiny.2 Thus the city’s citizens lived under two dominant, dynamic powers, sometimes aligned, sometimes in opposition, always in flux. As French citizens across the country were being divided

2 Paris remained the de jure capital of France, despite the refusal by German authorities to allow the return of a significant French government presence.
by new borders and frontiers of all kinds – material, political, social, historical, personal, metaphorical, imaginary – those living in Paris attempted to comprehend and define their relationships to the occupation and their place in it.

Disillusioned after a year of the Vichy government’s *révolution nationale*, a nostalgia-fuelled programme intended to sweep away a moral turpitude blamed for the country’s defeat, the novelist André Gide confided in his journal that ‘the France of today has ceased to be France.’ A year later another writer, Jean Guéhenno, left Paris to cross into the Unoccupied Zone, where he found himself in ‘a strange country, a sort of principality’ that prompted him to ask the question ‘[w]here is France?’ This sense of disorientation was felt across the nation, but as Guéhenno’s own journal in retrospect later attested, nowhere was it more apparent than in Paris itself. Indeed, it even affected its new victorious occupiers. In December 1940, an early recruit to the cause of resistance, Pierre de Bénouville, thought a group of German tourists visiting the Arc de Triomphe appeared lost, as if they ‘had been living in a completely unreal world of their own’.

Disconcerted by the distance maintained by the city’s resident population towards its unwelcome guests, ‘their bewildered faces seemed to ask: Where is this Paris, anyhow?’

Over the next four years this question would become ever more pertinent, both for the invaders and the invaded. This was a Nazi-occupied capital unlike any other: in structural terms it suffered nothing like the bomb damage endured by other European cities, nor did its occupiers change or destroy significant parts of it:

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6 Ibid.
compared with Berlin, Hamburg, Rotterdam or indeed many French provincial centres, the concentration of Allied attacks on the peripheries of Paris ensured that the city’s centre emerged relatively unscathed. For some German francophones it was an opportunity to visit old haunts and slide into pre-war nostalgia, while many more soldier-tourists sought its simpler pleasures: shopping, sightseeing, eating, drinking, sex. Yet for all that which remained so identifiably Parisian, the city underwent enormous and comprehensive change.

The material changes were soon starkly apparent. A French businesswoman visiting Paris in December 1940 reported ‘emptiness, much emptiness’ and ‘broad, deserted streets, avenues along which the light streams from one end to the other without a break’. Returning as an undercover agent a year later, Benjamin Cowburn was shocked by the changes that he witnessed. ‘I shall never forget that first impression’, he wrote later, of arriving on a grey morning in late 1941, noting the bleakness of the metro, the murmur of sparse traffic on the grands boulevards, the dismal ‘shop windows with their shoddy displays’ and the passing women who ‘clattered along on wooden-soled shoes’. Expressions of German dominance were unmistakable. The rapid and ubiquitous sprouting of stark, black-on-white wooden signage across the city was one of the most visible and yet insidious examples of how Nazi ideological values and national identity rooted themselves. The old, heavy blackletter Fraktur typeface, used on banners such as that of the Kommandantur on place de l’Opéra, became the most noticeable of these cultural stamps, while the more modern Antiqua, favoured by Hitler to best represent ‘an age of steel and iron, glass and concrete, of womanly beauty and manly strength’, jarred with the softer forms of Hector Guimard’s Métropolitaines font that complemented the Art Nouveau

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ironwork entrances to the city’s metro stations.⁹ These concrete manifestations both normalised the experience of occupation, and unconsciously asserted both a sense of entitlement and permanence to the German presence in the city. The imposition of foreign language signs at street corners and junctions also established new, ‘closed’ networks and trajectories, navigating traffic to abbreviated and codified locations only intelligible to military personnel. While such actions seemed to trample on the beauty of Paris, Germans showed a deference towards the French capital that was not afforded to others across occupied Europe. A subtler but equally visible form of occupation was demonstrated in the enthusiastic continuation of tourism. Four days after the arrival of the Germans in Paris, American war correspondent William L. Shirer reported that:

Most of the German tourists act like naïve tourists...It seems funny, but every German carries a camera. I saw them by the thousands today, photographing Notre-Dame, the Arc de Triomphe, the Invalides. Thousands of German soldiers congregate all day at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, where the flame still burns under the Arc. They bare their blond heads and stand there gazing.¹⁰

Encountering more troops in Normandy two weeks later, Simone de Beauvoir compared them favourably to those in the capital, noting in her diary that ‘[a]ll those I have now seen in Paris with their cameras and their pink faces looked so stupid.’¹¹ For many French people this unexpected enthusiasm for sightseeing remained a buoyant, and sometimes humiliating, characteristic of daily life for almost the entire duration of occupation.

¹¹ Simone de Beauvoir (trans. Anne Deing Cordero, Margaret A. Simons and Sylvie Le Bon de Beauvoir), Wartime Diary (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2009), p. 286.
Occupation quickly revised definitions of the quotidian. The reconfiguring of the modes and rhythms of everyday life in occupied Paris were profoundly unsettling and demanded adaptations of all sorts. Getting around was no longer a simple business: the restriction on the mobility of civilians, whose access to motor cars virtually disappeared, combined with the closure of dozens of metro stations and restricted pedestrian access altered one’s measurement of public space. Novelist Jean Bruller recalled that he felt ‘very much of an outsider’ in his refusal to accept the new norms of occupied life, but sought to illustrate the choices and dilemmas they continually presented.\textsuperscript{12} Like many of his fellow citizens the necessity of walking longer distances also reconnected him with the streets, where the sight of a \textit{vélo-taxi} (an improvised rickshaw) became increasingly common yet undignified vehicle for both driver and passenger. As he later wrote, ‘[h]owever tired I sometimes was from traipsing interminably across a Paris where public transport had become scarce, I could never bring myself to be pulled along by another man’.\textsuperscript{13} This sense of spatial recalibration also depended on other variables. The district/s where one lived and worked, one’s family background, politics, religion, wealth or social standing: all could determine the speed and the severity with which the occupation might alter one’s perception of the city. In 1942, Hélène Berr, a 21-year-old Sorbonne student, was living with her family in an apartment situated in the prosperous seventh \textit{arrondissement}, barely two hundred metres from the east pillar of the Eiffel Tower. Jewish but secular, the Berrs considered themselves no less French than any other Parisian household. Hélène began keeping a journal, recording her boyfriend troubles, concert recitals and her daily thoughts: for the first six weeks one could be forgiven for mistaking it as a diary written in peacetime, with no evidence of a straitened existence. But the introduction of the German Eighth Ordinance, requiring Jews to

\textsuperscript{12} Vercors (trans. Rita Barisse), \textit{The Battle of Silence} (London: Collins, 1968), p. 122. \\
\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Ibid.}
wear a yellow star by 7 June 1942, signalled the beginning of a constriction on her
and her family’s lives. While they were increasingly excluded from public life (a Ninth
Ordinance in July extended the existing regulations, banning them from restaurants,
theatres, libraries, swimming pools, museums, parks, squares and gardens, among
other places) their physical imprint on Parisian space began to fade too, making them
invisible citizens of a parallel city.\textsuperscript{14} Despite feeling ‘the deep attachment, the essential
affinity, the understanding and reciprocal affection that tie me to the stones, the sky
and the history of Paris’, by October 1943 she also acknowledged that her ‘great
discovery of the year is isolation. The big problem’ she felt, was ‘how to bridge the
gap that separates me from everyone else I see.’\textsuperscript{15} Five months later she was deported
to Auschwitz and died in Bergen-Belsen concentration camp five days before its
liberation.

No Parisian could ignore the disappearance of its Jewish population from the
capital. Of the 150,000 or so Jews living in Paris in September 1940 – approximately
half of France’s Jewish population at that time – perhaps one-tenth were living openly
by 1944, while tens of thousands were deported to death camps in Germany, Poland
and Austria. Although no ghetto was constructed within the city, the utilisation of
Parisian spaces to facilitate the Holocaust nevertheless created the sense of an ‘urban
world on the other side of the fence’, separate yet contiguous and unhidden.\textsuperscript{16} The
obvious example of this is the Vélodrome d’Hiver, the 17,000-seater cycling stadium
where more than 8,000 Jews were held in miserable conditions for five days in July.

\textsuperscript{14} Renée Poznanski, \textit{Jews in France during World War II} (Hanover, NJ: Brandeis
\textsuperscript{15} Hélène Berr (trans. David Bellos), \textit{Journal} (London: Maclehose Press, 2008), p. 167,
p. 190.
\textsuperscript{16} Tim Cole and Alberto Giordano, ‘Bringing the Ghetto to the Jew: Spatialities of
Ghettoization in Budapest’ in Anne Kelly Knowles, Tim Cole and Alberto Giordano
(eds.), \textit{Geographies of the Holocaust} (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014),
pp. 120-157.
1942. A place of leisure transformed into a place of confinement, it was situated not in a secluded suburb but on boulevard de Grenelle, directly opposite Quai de Grenelle metro station in the shadow of the Eiffel Tower. Though the building no longer exists, the site remains an invisible scar on the city’s landscape. Tourists today might be forgiven for passing by unaware of the significance of this space, but it is not unusual today to meet born-and-bred Parisians who have little or no idea of what occurred here. In some respects it has something in common with sites of other traumatic episodes in Paris’s history: as with the Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre in 1572, or the ‘Bloody Week’ that snuffed out the Paris Commune in May 1871, the historical significance of some events have become increasingly abstracted from the physical spaces in which they happened.

For some, these events acted as a call to action. Hélène Berr, whose family had been warned of the Vel d’hiv roundup, began to help to secretly transport Jewish orphans into hiding. Her efforts were relatively uncommon, but she was far from alone. Public demonstrations, although banned, represented occasional manifestations of collective discontent. However, for those choosing to go underground to resist the occupation clandestinely, how one lived became a daily matter of life and death. Across this new metropolitan landscape, the first signs of dissent appeared almost immediately. Beyond individual acts of sabotage and other piecemeal clandestine activity, the first groups were themselves born and shaped by shared space and close proximity to likeminded people, be they family, friends or fellow workers. One of the

18 Bir-Hakeim metro today: the name was altered in 1949, but physically the station is essentially unchanged since its construction in 1906.
19 Stéphanie Le Bars, ‘La majorité des moins de 34 ans ignorent ce que fut la rafle’, *Le Monde*, 17 July 2012, p. 10.
20 Its political prominence was most recently revived following Marine Le Pen’s comments during the debates preceding the French presidential elections in 2017. See, for example, Adam Nossiter, ‘Le Pen Redirects Blame in ‘42 Roundup of Jews’, *New York Times*, 10 April 2017, p. 12.
first significant networks to emerge, formed by the staff of the Musée de l'Homme on place du Trocadéro, was fuelled by a visceral response to signs of the city’s rapid metamorphosis: a sign erected outside the museums announcing free entry for occupation troops, a French policeman saluting a German officer, the withdrawal of a Jewish author’s book from a shop display.\(^{21}\) As the phenomenon of resistance, and notably armed resistance, began to grow, so the ways in which one should operate ‘underground’ also developed. The choice of safehouses and meeting places, the means and routes of travel, the collection and distribution of intelligence or propaganda material – all of these types of considerations shared a common, and commonly overlooked, denominator. Where did resistance happen?

The central argument of this thesis is that this ‘where’, or the spatial component, constitutes a missing dimension of resistance history, and deserves to be recognised and incorporated into its study. The birth and development of resistance in all its forms, from clandestine intelligence gathering and armed attacks on German targets, to the production of underground newspapers and public protests, did not take place within a blank, neutral, balanced environment. The spaces and places of Paris were actors in the drama of occupation, affecting (and being affected by) its course, playing a role. In physical terms, the streets, buildings, bridges, roads, train stations, parks, and public and private spaces of all kinds were an influence, albeit an unconscious one, on how resistance emerged, operated and developed. However, this influence goes beyond the bounds of absolute or ‘real’ conceptions of space: there is also the spatial world beyond three dimensions which resides in the realm of psychological and imaginative constructions, both contemporaneously and retrospectively. The transformation of Paris into an occupied city involved concrete change, but it also changed in the minds of Parisians (and Germans too).

By taking a more spatially sensitive view of a variety of different aspects of Parisian resistance, and incorporating some of the more relevant theoretical perspectives, this thesis will argue that an awareness of space and place can reveal new insights into the phenomenon of resistance, the actions of its participants and its complex relationships with the city. Focusing more closely on spatial aspects also prompts new research questions. In what ways did material changes to the city imposed by occupation encourage ideas of resistance? How did they facilitate or hinder the activities of resisters? How did perceptions of the city differ between ‘external’ and ‘internal’ resistance forces, and how did it shape their respective behaviours? What spatial strategies did resisters employ within the city, both operationally and in their daily lives? How did their ideas of everyday life compare to the rest of the population? How did Germans perceive Paris, and how did spatial patterns of occupation – for example, the concentrations and distributions of occupying forces across the city, or their use of specific spaces – affect resistance? To address these questions, this thesis will draw on existing spatial theories and metaphors to illustrate the co-creative nature of space and place in resistance history, and the intrinsic relationships between resistance and environment. Moreover, it will seek to emphasise the essential interplay of space with social, cultural and other processes: to (re)introduce space to the discourses of resistance is a complementary, rather than segregative, undertaking.

While this argument focuses on Paris and Parisian resistance, this is not to say that these spatial considerations are peculiar to this setting; indeed, it advocates a broader awareness of the setting of resistance wherever it happened. However, in choosing to examine the French capital and the country’s biggest city, this thesis will also highlight how the unique conditions and configurations of space and place influence the particular ways in which resistance manifested and developed.
Spatial History and Historiography

Albert Giordano, Anne Kelly Knowles and Tim Coles have asserted that ‘the facts of location are basic to the understanding of any historical event.’\textsuperscript{22} This is not a novel observation. As Jo Guldi has noted, the forging of a formative link between the material landscape and the writing of national history preoccupied Jules Michelet and his contemporaries in the mid-nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{23} In the following decades, the development of ideas relating geography to space became closely connected to political and national ambitions and policies. Bolstered by Darwinian theory, German geographers, most notably Friedrich Ratzel and Alfred Kirchhoff, fused politics, biology and geography to synthesise a view in which Natural Selection and an inevitable extinction of ‘lesser’ races provided the legitimacy for imperialist and spatial domination.\textsuperscript{24} In his 1901 essay, Lebensraum: Eine biogeographische Studie (Living space: A Biogeographical Study), Ratzel reduced the ‘struggle for life’ to an essential ‘struggle for space’: faced with a finite amount of global ‘surface’ land space and resources, spatial expansion was necessary for any state’s survival. Competition between different races, of which he describes a number of types (though none is explicitly favoured, one might infer a hierarchy from his definitions of ‘hybrid’ and ‘transitional’ peoples) therefore governs the space available: the colonisation of space and displacement of weaker populations by a dominant race is thus understood as part of a natural order.\textsuperscript{25} This laid the foundations for later geographers such as Karl and Albrecht Haushofer, whose influence on Hitler’s appreciation of geopolitics led to

\textsuperscript{22} Knowles, Geographies of the Holocaust, p. 2.


the adoption of Lebensraum as a key National Socialist policy in the 1930s.\(^{26}\) This form of environmental determinism was complemented by the work of Walter Christaller, whose Central Place Theory, first published in 1933, sought to explain the spatial distribution of cities according to scientific, rational laws. In the words of Trevor J. Barnes, Central Place Theory was ‘ideal for the Nazis’, at once respecting rural life and community while also providing a modern, efficient instrument for social planning in occupied territory.\(^{27}\) Lebensraum and Geopolitik presented a pseudo-scientific pretext for the occupation of Soviet Russia and Eastern Europe, and exemplified the Nazi Weltanschauung, or world-view: ultimately the ‘Nazi project was fundamentally geographical’, with ‘space and place pressed into horrific service.’\(^{28}\)

These spatial theories left the notion of postwar discourse on space ‘irredeemably contaminated’, and the toxic heritage of a field that had served the causes of genocide and humanity’s most bestial potential made its rehabilitation a slow business.\(^{29}\) However, with a resurgent interest in space in the early 1970s, partly catalysed by an increasing awareness of growing consumerism, social inequality and environmental pollution, the field of ‘environmental history’ began to emerge to address the complex interplay between human societies and the natural world. Rather than explaining historical developments in traditionally deterministic, causal terms, environmental historians began to concentrate on the interactive and mutually dependent character of these relationships.\(^{30}\) In William Cronon’s Nature’s

\(^{28}\) Ibid.
\(^{29}\) Karl Schlogel (trans. Gerrit Jackson), In Space We Read Time: On the History of Civilisation and Geopolitics (New York City: Bard Graduate Center, 2016), xiv.
Metropolis, a study of Chicago and the Great West during the nineteenth century, the
growth of the city and the recession of the hinterland are presented not as a struggle
of man against nature but as an essential interdependency, or ‘two sides of the same
coin’.31 The rapid development of Chicago, which depended on exploiting its local
natural resources of animals, grain and timber, became a central hub for railroad
networks distributing its products to the eastern cities and beyond. As humanity and
industry concentrated itself in this new urban environment, ‘space contracted and
‘time accelerated’: inward flows of capital devoured ever more land, and meatpacking
and other commercial processes expanded at exponential rates.32 By the 1880s, the
natural origins of the foodstuffs arriving in Chicago from the prairies were becoming
increasingly dissociated from the finished product that consumers bought. Yet life in
the city and the country had become inextricably woven together, with no clear
delineation between the two. If what exactly constitutes nature is never clearly defined
by Cronon, the notion that ‘nature is the place where we are not’ – that humans and
human culture have forever been in a dichotomy with the natural world – is shown to
be a fantasy.33

While Cronon and other environmental historians have concentrated their
studies on home soil in the United States, Chris Pearson’s Scarred Landscapes explores
the relationship between Vichy France and its south-eastern region, spanning an area
from the Rhône river and the Italian border, and reaching up from the Mediterranean
coast to the southern Alps.34 In the wake of defeat in 1940, nature became central to
the Vichy government’s intentions to revive the ‘true’ France. Faced with pressing
economic imperatives, natural resources became important sources of food and fuel,

31 William Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West (New York:
32 Ibid., pp. 9-10.
33 Ibid., p. 18
34 Chris Pearson, Scarred Landscapes: War and Nature in Vichy France (Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).
and radical public works programmes were introduced to meet the demand. But Vichy also saw proximity to nature as a moral tonic, and extolled the virtues of alpinism and outdoor living, not least in its support of the *Compagnons de la France* and the *Chantiers de la jeunesse*, the youth work camps that replaced national service, promoting ‘a healthy and joyous life’.\(^{35}\) Pearson’s analysis throws up interesting ironies, and illustrates how Vichy’s policies towards the managing its natural spaces would reflect and manifest the administration’s many contradictions. For example, Vichy’s recultivation of areas previously considered wasteland was in part achieved by the custodianship of French Jews, the scapegoats of Vichy’s National Revolution and the supposed engineers of France’s collapse.\(^{36}\) Most importantly, however, Pearson demonstrates that ‘nature, in all its diversity, was an historical actor in Vichy France’.\(^ {37}\) Once again, the fundamental interconnectedness of human and non-human actors makes it impossible to consider one without the other. This is not to suggest that nature has agency or exercises a ‘will’, but the importance of the environment’s influence is undeniably linked to the experiences of its human participants and the historical events they become part of.\(^ {38}\)

A word should also be included on German historian Karl Schlögel, who has produced one of the few clarion calls for a greater integration of space within historical research. In *In Space We Read Time: On the History of Civilisation and Geopolitics*, first published in 2003, Schlögel argues that ‘there are no historic events without the stages on which they play out’, and that ‘every history has a place.’\(^ {39}\) Echoing some of the motivations of early environmental historians, he takes the view that historical narratives should venture beyond their preoccupation with chronological and causal factors and open their eyes to ‘the setting or the scene of the

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39 Schlögel, *In Space We Read Time*, xiv, p. 60.
deed. In his remarkably detailed account of Moscow during the Stalinist purges of the 1930s, Schlögel has ably demonstrated the value of a heightened sensitivity to space by composing snapshot-like chapters that expose 'the complexity that is concealed by the separation of events from the locations in which they took place.' Although Schlögel has been criticised for his lack of engagement with more conceptual aspects of spatial theory, his work demonstrates the possibilities of integrating the significance of place into social and political historical narratives, as well as the innovative use of diverse and unusual sources.

It would be wrong to claim that spatial thinking has remained completely absent from the historiography of cultural histories of cities. The two edited volumes of *Capital Cities at War*, comparing the experiences of Paris, London and Berlin between 1914 and 1919, are a valuable contribution to the study of the changes war brings to the urban environment. While primarily works of social and cultural history, their broad mix of quantitative analysis, demography and representations of war finds room to incorporate spatial concerns. Many of the chapter titles in the second volume are noticeably place-oriented, and a number of these chapters explore the relationships between public spaces and changing social relations. Another edited volume, *Cities into Battlefields: Metropolitan Scenarios, Experiences and Commemorations of Total War*, published in 2011, also pursues questions with a spatial flavour, analysing the extents to which 'mass-industrialised warfare blurred distinctions between home and front'. While Patrice Higonnet focused on the notion of occupied Paris as a capital that kept its distance from the destructive horrors of

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44 Stefan Goebel and Derek Keene (eds.) *Cities into Battlefields: Metropolitan Scenarios, Experiences and Commemorations of Total War* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011).
total war, chapters by Maureen Healey and Tim Cole directly addressed spatial questions relating to European cities in the Second World War, namely the primacy of local spaces in Viennese conceptions of the enemy; and the influence of imagined spaces in the establishment of ghetto boundaries in Budapest and Warsaw.\(^{45}\)

Across the vast historiography devoted to life under occupation, space has largely remained an absent variable. In many respects this dimension of resistance history has remained unaddressed, and one cannot chart any historiographic pattern of spatially relevant studies of occupation and resistance history.\(^{46}\) Although reasonably balanced, Henri Michel’s two workmanlike books on the Parisian experience, *Paris Allemand* and *Paris Résistant*, both published in the early 1980s, largely sidestep questions surrounding the geography of occupation.\(^{47}\) More notable are H.R. Kedward’s influential studies of resistance across rural Vichy France, which into the following decade did much more to promote a sensitivity towards local and regional differences, and the importance of the close interrelationships between people and place in shaping resistance.\(^{48}\) As he later put it, ‘it’s good to put place and locality at the centre of resistance history right from the start. It was just as important as the other variables.’\(^{49}\) Since the 1990s, a preoccupation with pluralities and specificities has become a firmly established characteristic of research in this field, ranging from case studies of provincial cities and rural communities to minority groups and the experiences of women. Spatial considerations, however, have remained on the

\(^{45}\) Ibid., pp. 73-82; pp. 119-132; pp. 133-150.
periphery, as something of a novelty or occasional indulgence. For example, an international conference in Paris in 1995 entitled ‘Villes, centres et logiques de décision’ skirted some interesting spatially-related topics, presenting papers on the specificities of the city in relation to the underground press, the notion of the city as a crucible of resistance, and separate studies on the significance of the city in the regions of Brittany, Provence-Côte d’Azur and Alsace.  

More recently, the subject of wartime borders, frontiers and exiled populations has attracted some historians’ interest, though their research has focused more on geosocial and geopolitical questions. And despite acknowledging the roles of previously under-represented groups, newer synthetic histories of resistance have failed to incorporate a spatial awareness into their accounts, preferring to stay within the bounds of more familiar social and cultural territory.

Though worthwhile in principle, projects attempting to map significant physical sites of Parisian occupation, compiling locations of German requisitioning and resistance activity, have been disappointing: published works by Anne Thoraval and Cécile Desprairies have failed to provide what could be called comprehensive or solidly referenced studies, and both omit analyses and explanations of the spatial relevance of their research. And Chris Pearson’s aforementioned work on Vichy France does not appear to have (yet) encouraged other scholars to investigate similar lines of environmental investigation. Overall, then, occupied space continues to be

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rendered as an inert, neutral backdrop, and any engagement with spatial issues in a
more sustained, substantive manner seems a rather distant prospect.

**Spatial Concepts, Theories and Thought**

With all of its personal, social, moral and political complexities, the phenomena of
occupation and resistance have been endlessly recorded, discussed and studied, but the
continuing absence of a spatial discourse is surprising. Occupation, after all, is defined
is the ‘action of filling or taking up space’. Yet, as Susanne Rau notes, raising the
subject of space can even today generate responses ranging from smirks to
amazement. Edward Soja puts it more strongly, asserting that ‘spatializing has never
had the same intellectual prestige and recognised interpretive power as historicizing’, a
prejudice which has led to ‘scholarly and popular discrimination and subordination’.

Part of the reason lies in its definition. Nigel Thrift’s view of space as ‘the
fundamental stuff’ of human geography can be extended to a number of disciplines
today, and spatial research is increasingly being recognised as a valid endeavour.

Human activity happens in space, shapes space, and is shaped by it. However, the
sheer breadth and banality of the word makes it extremely difficult to define. A
recurring obstacle in getting to grips with spatial concepts is that ‘something that
appears as though it really ought to be quite straightforward very often isn’t’.

Despite their central importance to geographers, the definitions of the terms ‘space’
and ‘place’ continue to resist any consensus. As Tim Cresswell notes, this stems from

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54 ‘Occupation’, in *The Oxford English Dictionary* [online]. Available at
56 Edward Soja, ‘Taking space personally’, in Barney Warf and Santa Arias (eds.) *The
Spatial Turn: Interdisciplinary Perspectives* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), p. 34.
57 Nigel Thrift, ‘Space: The Fundamental Stuff of Geography’, in Nicholas J. Clifford,
Sarah L. Holloway, Stephen P. Price and Gill Valentine (eds.), *Key Concepts in
the ubiquity of both terms: place, a ‘word wrapped in common sense’, is both familiar and extraordinarily complex.\(^5^9\) We refer to places without giving thought to the word’s infinitely malleable nature. Similarly, beyond declaring space as ‘the extent of an area, usually expressed in terms of the Earth’s surface’, the *Oxford Dictionary of Geography* can offer only competing definitions from various practitioners, and is likely to leave the reader more confused than enlightened.\(^6^0\) One of those cited, geographer Yi-Fu Tuan, contends that space is mediator between places (one moves from place to place through space), but also ‘a place requires a space to be a place’, making both terms fundamentally co-dependent.\(^6^1\) Tuan’s view also emphasises the interaction of time on this relationship. Space that becomes imbued with meaning loses momentum and is transformed into a ‘pause’ in the flow of space.\(^6^2\) The volumes of geometric spaces can be quantified and measured, while some are more vaguely delimited, such as ‘public’, ‘social’ or ‘private’ spaces. Both space and place can be used to describe any scale, from a street corner to a planet. Definitions of space can also reach into metaphorical constructions, to ‘thinking space’, ‘mythic space’, ‘virtual space’ and so on.

These are terms that effortlessly slip between the concrete and the abstract, bringing into question how one sees the world and categorises it.\(^6^3\) For Edward Soja, the Marxist sociologist Henri Lefebvre conceives of space as ‘simultaneously objective and subjective, material and metaphorical, a medium and outcome of social life’.\(^6^4\) There are also, as John Agnew points out, additional, temporal considerations to contend with: place tends to be associated with the past, space with the present or

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\(^6^1\) *Ibid*.
\(^6^3\) *Ibid*.
future. Clearly, then, the use of ‘space’ and ‘place’ as distinct terms is a matter of perspective, and indeed some blurred demarcations will appear throughout this thesis. (In line with the approach of Tuan, I will attempt to employ ‘space’ as a location or state without meaning, and ‘place’ to describe space that has developed a form of meaning or human attachment.)

Despite these questions, some of the most prominent spatial thinkers of recent decades have presented theories that are particularly relevant to discussions of occupation and resistance. Among them is Michel de Certeau, who recognised the importance of everyday spatial practices – defined by their ‘repetitive and partly unconscious nature’, such as travelling to and from work, shopping, cooking and so on – as ways that individuals can contest the ruling power in society. He illustrates this best by considering the relationships between space and language, and specifically focussing on walking through the city. If the flâneur, the archetypal detached nineteenth century observer of Parisian life, was a reader of its streets, in de Certeau’s view such outsiders are also writers of urban space. Walking is a demonstration of individual agency, and can be understood as being ‘to the urban system what the speech act is to language’. The strategic planning and organisation of a city can be imposed by a dominant class, but the choices of how citizens utilise those structures offer the possibility to subvert that order. A government can design and determine the shape of city spaces, but it cannot determine exactly how they will be used:

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66 Yi-Fu Tuan, Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), p. 6.
inhabitants are consequently able to rewrite their own space, inscribing and furnishing it with their own memories to create new places. Mapping the paths of pedestrians might reveal the routes they prefer, but ‘making invisible the operation that made it possible’ ignores the ‘the act itself of passing by’.\textsuperscript{70} Thus the trajectories of walkers within an urban landscape can be seen to be exercising a form of unrecognised freedom, power, and resistance against a city power structure. To apply this metaphor within the context of the Nazi occupation of Paris, for example, the imposition of spatial restrictions – the closure of transport services, the blocking of streets, the introductions of curfews, and so on – becomes a means of stifling its voice, of silencing the city.\textsuperscript{71}

De Certeau relates this concept of resistance to that of ‘making do’, which has a strong resonance to life under occupation.\textsuperscript{72} The term \textit{Système D}, from the verb \textit{se débrouiller} – to improvise, or get by – has a long cultural history in French life, coming to prominence during the First World War.\textsuperscript{73} Although often depicted as a trait reflecting an innate French adaptability, resourcefulness and ingenuity, in the eyes of the Vichy regime it became the epitome of the selfishness, opportunism and corrupt behaviour that had typified the nation’s previous constitution, the Third Republic, and precipitated the downfall of the country. Yet in a time of shortages of all kinds, \textit{Système D} became a natural and inevitable feature of most people’s everyday existence. Here one can draw an equivalence to de Certeau’s idea of subverting hegemonic power through ‘tactics’, or ways of manipulating everyday practices as a form of resistance. Since occupation disrupts and distorts the very

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{71} The comparison of speech and movement becomes all the more poignant when one recalls the \textit{Cité de la Muette} (the Silent City), an unfinished social housing project begun in the 1930s in the north-eastern suburb of Drancy. Transformed into a transit camp for Jews in 1941, it became the departure point for nearly all of the deportations from France to Auschwitz.
\textsuperscript{72} De Certeau, \textit{The Practice of Everyday Life}, pp. 29-42.
notion of what constitutes peacetime practices, so the notion of tactics and Système D can be seen to share some similarities in their opportunistic intents. Resorting to a black market street vendor, or exercising influence at a local store to improve one’s ration allowance, are ways of ‘making do’ by taking advantage of unpredictable circumstances. It is interesting to extend this concept of Système D and apply it to the situation of clandestine resistance. The famous impetus of the underground fighter compelled ‘to do something’ (faire quelque chose) often entailed employing unconventional or improvised methods to survive, such as taking circuitous routes on foot or by metro to avoid being followed, or giving a German wrong directions or swapping waybills on train carriages. In this sense a life lived in the clandestine world employed the tactics of the everyday, demanding new spatial practices to ‘get by’. Jean Cassou, a founding member of the abovementioned Musée de l’Homme group, characterised the life of a resister as ‘la vie inventée’, the invented life, contingent by its very nature.⁷⁴

Although Michel Foucault’s work on spatial issues was relatively modest, his brief presentation of the concept of heterotopia, published in 1986, has become extremely influential.⁷⁵ Relating to ‘real places that do exist’ rather than imaginary or metaphysical space, heterotopias are spaces of ‘otherness’ that possess, in Foucault’s words, the ability ‘to suspect, neutralize, or invert the set of relations that they happen to designate, mirror, or reflect’.⁷⁶ Whether Foucault intended the idea of the heterotopia to be applied to real-world settings has been questioned.⁷⁷ Nonetheless, they are spaces defined by a contradictory and paradoxical nature, juxtaposing meaning and contesting themselves. This notion has a particular relevance in relation

⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 24.
to the transformative effects of occupation on peacetime routines and ways of living. One can also extend the idea that much of the Paris, or at the very least those areas that one could designate ‘tourist Paris’ became heterotopic. Ian Ousby likens the essential strangeness manifested by the occupation of Paris and ‘the unexpected conjunction of German and French, French and German’ to appear almost beyond belief, as if ‘the result of a Dada prank’.  

Among the most prominent and relevant of spatial thinkers whose research gravitated particularly towards the city was Henri Lefebvre. His own life was shaped by the occupation: having been a critic of the Nazis in the 1930s, his books were consigned to the Otto List, a list of authors banned in occupied France, and he fled Paris for the Unoccupied Zone in 1940. While his alleged resistance credentials have yet to be properly established, his Critique de la vie quotidienne (Critique of Everyday Life), which was first drafted in 1945, reflected the popularity of communist support and the optimism in the early post-Liberation era for a revolution in the concept of everyday life. Commonly characterised as a fiercely independent thinker, he nevertheless presents what is essentially a Marxist-inspired interpretation of space, seeing it not as a simple container of experience but as a social product, created by the dominant forces of power, capital, ideas, knowledge and ways of thinking. Lefebvre’s central work, La production de l’espace (The Production of Space), published in 1974, declares space to generated by the interplay of a triad of variables: ‘perceived space’ (or ‘spatial practice’), which equates to the physical space of daily experience; ‘conceived space’ (‘representations of space’), space designed or modelled, for example by architects, town planners or technocrats, shaping the ways in which power is

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organised and applied; and ‘lived space’ (‘spaces of representation’) which is space experienced through imagery and symbols, as a subjective, ‘real-and-imagined’ space.\textsuperscript{80} ‘Lived space’ is an elusive construction, but can be seen as a balancing element, lying between perceived and conceived space, combining sensory engagement with the symbolic.\textsuperscript{81} For Lefebvre, social relations cannot be extricated from spatial relations, space being the medium in which social life happens.\textsuperscript{82} Thus cities are concentrated manifestations of the production of space, and, in somewhat similar terms to de Certeau, the control of space underpins the dominant power of the state.

Leaving aside the political intentions of Lefebvre’s thinking, his essential reformulation of space is important. Rather than being a fixed, measurable object or a natural, geometric certainty, space in Lefebvre’s world is a matter of social relations, not a container of physical reality. Space can thus extend beyond three dimensions to more abstract concepts, including metaphorical, imaginative and other non-material forms. Coming to prominence in the mid-1970s, humanistic geographer Yi-Fu Tuan took a more phenomenological view of space in relation to varieties of subjective experience and perceptions, attitudes, values and emotions. One of his most relevant spatial concepts was that of ‘topophilia’, which he used to describe ‘the affective bond between people and a place or setting’ (the poet W. H. Auden is actually credited with coining the term in 1947, but it also appears in philosopher Gaston Bachelard’s \textit{The Poetics of Space}, first published in the 1950s).\textsuperscript{83} Unlike politically-preoccupied theories discussed above, Tuan is aware that his conceptions of space sound ‘more like poetry than a basis for serious argument’, and he has been criticised by more

\textsuperscript{80} Lefebvre, \textit{Critique of Everyday Life}, x; p. 64.
\textsuperscript{81} Stuart Elden, \textit{Understanding Henri Lefebvre} (London: Continuum, 2004), pp. 190-192.
\textsuperscript{82} Rau, \textit{History, Space}, p. 30.
materialist geographers for his lack of methodological rigour.\textsuperscript{84} Nevertheless, for Tuan topophilia is ‘a general framework for discussing all the different ways that that human beings can develop a love of place’.\textsuperscript{85} It is also a broadly applicable concept: it can be directed to any material object and can vary in its duration and the degree to which it is expressed and felt; in its most compelling form, it can become the carrier of emotionally charged events or a symbol.\textsuperscript{86} Yet despite this emotional focus, the object of topophilia is anchored in ‘real’ or material space, and thus provides a means of analysing subjective experience in relation to physical places.

These theoretical approaches provide historians and practitioners of other disciplines to explore spatial aspects of their subject. But as rewarding as they may be, they can only take us so far, and it is worth acknowledging their limitations. As Susanne Rau acknowledges, although there is no reason why historians should not draw on a broad range of spatial approaches, some may lose their relevance over time.\textsuperscript{87} Post-war theories, especially those developed in the 1960s or later, tend to reflect the political and social concerns of their era, such as the emergence of counter-cultures, social inequality and environmental issues, urban gentrification and the reclamation of public space, the rapid advances of technology, consumerism and mass media and so on. Consequently, their ability to relate to the profound structural changes that wartime occupation imposes renders some of their assertions redundant or irrelevant. For example, simplistic binary notions of ‘dominant’ and ‘dominated’ come under pressure when confronted with the unique political, social and spatial complexities that can manifest under occupation. Both the German and Vichy administrations were composed of competing factions, leading to contradictions and inconsistencies that require more flexibility. Equally, some spatial theorists’

\textsuperscript{85} Tuan, \textit{Topophilia}, xii.
\textsuperscript{86} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 93.
\textsuperscript{87} Rau, \textit{History, Space}, p. 2.
contributions can be less than definitive. While recognising the historical ‘devaluation of space’ and its reputation as the domain of ‘the dead, the fixed, the undialectical, the immobile’ compared to the ‘richness’ and ‘fecundity’ of time, Foucault’s engagement with geography and spatial questions overall remained peripheral, and he was criticised for his ‘fuzzy’ thinking on the subject (not least by Lefebvre, who pointed out that Foucault never explained ‘what [kind of] space it is that he is referring to’). As Steven G. Ogden has stated, the concept of heterotopias acts as a ‘catalyst for thinking about the complexities of spaces’ rather than a fully formed theory. In addition to completely ignoring questions of gender and gendered space, Michel de Certeau’s dense, poeticised prose displays not only a tendency to steer his analyses away from what Jeremy Ahearne calls ‘clear demarcations of analytic thought’, but to employ metaphorical language that converts ‘incomprehension into aesthetic pleasure’. Michel Trebitsch likens to the casual nature of Lefebvre’s thinking to ‘strolling’, while J. Nicholas Entrikin and Vincent Berdoulay have argued that the diverse and often disparate nature of Lefebvre’s work has fallen prey to appropriation and a form of theoretical reductionism, in which ‘contemporary interpreters of Lefebvre often add greater consistency and clarity to his ideas of space and place than is warranted’. These criticisms are valid, and inevitable: the labyrinthine discourses of spatial theory and their interdisciplinary natures invite complexity and competing interpretations. Therefore, while this thesis will apply spatial theories discussed above, it does not attempt to either vindicate any particular theory or create any harmonious

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synthesis of concepts. Rather, they provide some useful frameworks and departure points from which to begin to analyse spatial aspects of resistance and demonstrate the insights they can offer.

The Ecology of Occupied Paris

Occupation reached into the lives of Parisians in every imaginable way. As Emmanuel Sivan and Jay Winter point out, the concept of ‘normality’ could be inverted within occupied space to the extent that horrors intolerable in peacetime life became invisible or barely worthy of note. While Paris remained instantly recognisable, a unique ‘ecology of occupation’ overtook the city and ushered in ‘the birth of a new urban culture’, one that shaped the lives of its citizens and their rulers.

The German administration of the city imposed new physical boundaries. Three sectors – east, west and north-west – were designated for the maintenance of order: the eastern sector was based at the Hotel Ambassadeur, on boulevard Haussmann; the southern sector at Hotel d’Orsay, on the quai d’Orsay; and the north-western sector was run from the Hotel Vernet, on rue Vernet. The overtaking of hotels for the administration’s use – especially the Hotel Majestic, Hotel Lutetia, and the concentration of hotels in the vicinity of the place Vendôme (the Ritz, Scribe, Crillon, Intercontinental, Meurice and Brighton) – stamped the administration’s power on the centre of the city. Germans, even high-ranking ones, could feel a sense of privilege when visiting Paris’s more historic locations. In November 1940, Reich

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Minister Alfred Rosenberg addressed 600 German officials at the requisitioned Palais Bourbon, previously the seat of the Chamber of Deputies. ‘It was a strange feeling to speak here’, Rosenberg later wrote, ‘from the spot from which Clemenceau and Poincaré had thundered against the Reich, from which the stirring up of anti-German sentiments worldwide commenced again and again.’

Indeed, the occupation did not seek to rebuild Paris, nor did it comprehensively revise the cultural identity of its existing public spaces. In 1941, the Théâtre Sarah-Bernhardt on place du Châtelet was renamed the Théâtre de la Ville, to dissociate itself from actor Sarah Bernhardt’s Jewish background. But while French collaborationists doggedly petitioned the SS to rename streets commemorating Jewish figures, they were ignored. For example, contrary to an assertion made by Henri Michel, boulevard Pereire, named after nineteenth century Jewish financier Émile Pereire and situated one of the wealthier areas of the seventeenth arrondissement, was never changed by the Nazis to boulevard Édouard Drumont (Drumont was the author of the bestselling antisemitic diatribe of the 1870s, La France juive, and a prominent anti-dreyfusard). Rue Crémieux, rue Erlanger, rue Édouard-Colonne and many other city street names with Jewish origins were also left untouched.

Nevertheless, the visible imprint of German occupation was impossible to avoid. As Paris served as the hub of German control for occupied France, it demanded thousands of administrators and the establishment of a bewildering array of departmental headquarters, offices and appropriated spaces. This required the requisitioning of huge numbers of public and private properties. Hotels, restaurants,

95 Theatre notice, Paris-Soir, 24 November 1941, p. 2. The prefect of the Seine, Charles Magny, approved the reopening.
96 Michel, Paris Allemand, p. 82.
depots, factory premises, train stations, grocery and department stores, bookshops, sports centres and family homes were all sequestered for the occupiers’ needs. By July 1944, the German authorities had requisitioned more than 8000 properties across Paris.  

98 No definitive catalogue of them has been compiled, but those mapped by Cécile Desprairies give some idea of the geographical bias that characterise the German administration’s overtaking of the city’s spaces from 1940.  

99 In general, the great majority of properties taken were concentrated in the central and western districts of the city: as a rough guide, an area stretching from the Louvre to the Arc de Triomphe, radiating out to envelop the first, eighth, and sixteenth arrondissements, accounted for most of the key governmental sites including the administrative centre of the Militärbefehlshaber in Frankreich (MBF, the German military government) at the Hotel Majestic. A military band that paraded down and up the avenue des Champs-Elysées became a daily expression of power along this powerful east-west axis, replicating the trajectory of France’s previous historical conquerors. The relentless regularity of the daily march, crossing noon, became metronomic, a daily reminder for Parisians of the perpetuity of occupation.

100 Unsurprisingly, the sixteenth, the most conservative and wealthy of all districts, became home to many German senior officers, as well as the SS, which took over large villas on avenue Foch. The French gangsters who did much of their dirtier work kept their headquarters a few streets away; the address used by the Bonny-Lafont gang, at 93 rue Lauriston, would later become infamous for its association with collaborators.

Entertainment venues and restaurants became the focus of requisitioning in the tourist areas to the north and south of the city, in the eighteenth and fourteenth arrondissements respectively. Within Montmartre and Montparnasse, the traditional playgrounds of Parisian pleasures, Germans were keen to lay claim to restaurants such

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98 Michel, Paris Allemand, p. 145.
as the historic La Mère Catherine, overlooking place du Tertre; and brothels such as Chez Hélène, on place Pigalle (another dozen brothels across the city were also brought under the MBF’s management). For most occupying Germans, however, the densely-populated, working class eastern districts remained terra incognita, off the map: though the Tourelles barracks and La Roquette prison were used to intern Jews and resisters, neither was requisitioned, and the MBF made little effort to impress itself on these areas, limiting requisitions to depots, factories and yards. Although the Parc des Buttes-Chaumont, Père Lachaise cemetery and the view of the city from the heights of Belleville may have attracted some tourists to these neighbourhoods, their large immigrant populations (including many Jewish families) and strong communist support largely excluded them from the German notion of where the ‘real’, or at least desirable, Paris resided.

With the escalation of acts of armed resistance from the summer of 1941, the streets of Paris increasingly became a battleground. Though German headquarters were defended by roadblocks and guards, the ability of young resisters, especially young communists, to launch attacks literally on the doorsteps of their targets, represented a crossing of spatial boundaries as well as political ones. Marcel Rayman, leader of one of the more prolific immigrant communist cells, was, like many of his comrades, an inhabitant of the working-class eastern districts, having grown up on rue des Immeubles-Industriels, close to place de la Nation in the eleventh district. This tightly knit community of immigrants was a world away from the lavish apartments and mansions of the sixteenth, but a number of his attacks occurred there, the most successful of which assassinated SS General Julius Ritter outside his residence on rue Pétrarque, in September 1943. Of course, any congregation of Germans – in

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101 Desprairies, Paris dans la collaboration, p. 331, p. 618.
cafés, restaurants, cinemas, theatres, train stations, or those travelling in vehicles – were commonly selected for armed resistance operations, as were administrative buildings; headquarters of French collaborationist groups were also under threat.\footnote{For example, in September 1942 a communist cell led a grenade attack on the offices of the pro-German \textit{Parti populaire français} in the sixteenth \textit{arrondissement}, killing two. See Stéphane Courtois, Denis Peschanski and Adam Rayski, \textit{Le Sang de l'étranger: Les immigrés de la M.O.I. dans la Résistance} (Paris: Fayard, 1989), p. 181.} Aside from the most German secure locations in the centre of the city, the opportunistic nature of clandestine warfare meant that very few locations were really safe from the possibility of attack.

As the city with the highest population density in France, social bonds within neighbourhoods, and personal connections to a street or neighbourhood could be particularly strong. More specifically, social ties and physical proximity could facilitate the development of resistance. As François Marcot points out, the concentration of know-how and the facilities needed to resist explains the acceleration of Parisian-based resistance in early days of occupation.\footnote{François Marcot, ‘Dans quelle mesure les villes exercent-elles un pouvoir de commandement et d’orientation sur la résistance dans son ensemble’, in Douzou, \textit{Villes, Centres et Logiques}, p. 222.} Printmaking expertise for creating underground tracts, for example, was supported by local sympathetic booksellers and distributors in the city.\footnote{Dominique Veillon, ‘La ville comme creuset de la résistance’, in Douzou, \textit{Villes, Centres et Logiques} pp. 141-142.} And though Lyon would later become known as the capital of resistance, Paris’s clandestine press was more active in 1940 than in the south, despite the greater dangers and restrictions in the Occupied Zone.\footnote{Claude Lévy, ‘La ville comme lieu de fabrication de la presse clandestine’, in Douzou, \textit{Villes, Centres et Logiques}, p. 200.} Proximity also facilitated recruitment, as well as other kinds of assistance. Jacques Bureau, a radio expert and part-owner of the Hot Club, a jazz venue in the Pigalle district, was brought into clandestine work by Germaine Tambour, a neighbour living four doors from him on avenue de Suffren, by the Eiffel Tower.\footnote{Jacques Bureau, \textit{Un Soldat menteur} (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1992), pp. 87-89.} Tambour had
already recruited Marie-Louise Monnet and her daughter Léone, living in the
apartment above them. Albert Grunberg, a Jewish hairdresser living in an
apartment in rue des Écoles, was successfully hidden from the Gestapo by the other
residents in his block for nearly two years, only emerging two days before Paris was
finally liberated.

As such examples illustrate, it would be incorrect to assume that the bonds of
pre-war Paris social life were completely severed by the conditions of occupation. But
neither was the divide between Paris and the provinces: if the Vichy regime suspected
Parisian life to be infused with the ‘spirit of pleasure’ that had caused the moral
decline and ultimately the defeat of the French, for the occupiers the same spirit of
pleasure was exactly the thing that made it attractive. Rather than representing the
‘dehumanised ugliness of urban life’, Paris was an urban idyll, less the antithesis of
ruralism than a modern, cultivated city, an environment under human control. As
will be discussed in Chapter Three, the peculiar spatial characteristics of Paris under
occupation not only seduced visiting Germans, but Allied agents as well.

Though the German occupation refrained from major physical reshaping of
the city, it did seek to redefine Parisian space for its own consumption. The
Wehrmacht took the business of tourism seriously, and soldiers visiting Paris were
presented with carefully managed perspectives. It quickly became a substantial
undertaking; as many as 6,500 sightseers a day were chaperoned by appointed tour
guides, taking in the Sacré-Coeur, Notre-Dame Cathedral, the Invalides and other

historic sights; by May 1941, close to one million soldiers had been taken on these excursions.\textsuperscript{112} Tour clients were ordered to stay away from cafés along the way, and were instead shepherded to requisitioned restaurants to be catered for by the German Red Cross; becoming involved in ‘harmful influences’, along with smoking in public places and relaxed dress codes were all prohibited.\textsuperscript{113} ‘Jeder einmal in Paris’ (Everyone in Paris once), a separate German tourist organisation whose goal was to offer every soldier in France the opportunity to visit the capital, ran no fewer than nine differently themed itineraries.\textsuperscript{114} Whatever the focus, all tour narratives extolled France’s glorious past rather than the ‘social backwardness’ of its pitiful present, a state to which Germany would not be allowed to succumb.\textsuperscript{115} To return to de Certeau’s metaphor, tours thus represented trajectories with very clear, albeit layered, spatial stories. Prescribed routes were augmented by strictly controlled narratives that mapped sanctioned physical locations, reinforcing the strategy of the Nazi state.

This curation of space also extended into virtual realms. As Karl Schlögel observes, maps are evidence of geographical spaces that ‘let us render pasts visible’, and can transmit ideas of power, expansion, and domination, as well as simply delineating territorial boundaries.\textsuperscript{116} For soldier-tourists and other newcomers to Paris, a range of German language guidebooks and souvenir publications projected an authorised description of the city, according to the administration’s wishes. However, in the words of Julia S. Torrie, these guides also ‘commemorated the experience of occupying the territory’.\textsuperscript{117} As a souvenir, such a book would serve as a future reminder of the time, as one foreword puts it, ‘when we carried out our duty for the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{112} Julia S. Torrie, \textit{German Soldiers and the Occupation of France} (Cambridge University Press, 2018), p. 102.
\item \textsuperscript{113} Bertram M. Gordon, \textit{War Tourism: Second World War France from Defeat and Occupation to the Creation of Heritage} (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018), p. 120.
\item \textit{Ibid.}\textsuperscript{114}
\item \textit{Ibid.}\textsuperscript{115}
\item Schlögel, \textit{In Space We Read Time}, xxi, p. 63.
\item Torrie, \textit{German Soldiers}, p. 124.
\end{itemize}
Führer and Volk bravely and proudly on Europe’s Western Front. But the reader was also being encouraged to co-create new spaces of occupation: while the guide established the boundaries, defined points of interest and encouraged particular experiences of Paris, the act of using the guide reinforced soldiers’ ‘sense of themselves as historical actors’. To take Lefebvre’s perspective, by walking the city, following the spatial routes and rules of such guidebooks, space is being produced. To take an example, Pariser Nächte (Parisian Nights) was a pocket guidebook produced in 1941, providing a full-colour, fold-out city map to accompany the text, supplemented by four additional district plans to identify the locations of recommended venues. It limited its coverage of the capital to the Champs-Élysées, Opéra, the grands boulevards, Montparnasse and Montmartre. The rest of the city is left blank, save for the inclusion of coloured metro lines, which give it an almost skeletal structure. This map is obviously reductive, ignoring many of Paris’s other districts and features. But it is also instructive. Just as medieval maps were created to represent the itineraries of religious pilgrimages, ‘articulating spatial practices’ by marking out places along to the route to stay at or visit, these four highlighted zones of Paris – the centres of entertainment, dining, sex and tourism – display itineraries of occupation. Despite the accompany text stating that ‘one should not think that Parisian nightlife is restricted to the four centres we have named’, the intention, as with the guide tours, was to direct its audience towards the most obvious entertainment venues and away from less ‘harmful’ neighbourhoods.

Maps could also distort the city. In a map repeatedly included in Der Deutsche Wegleiter für Paris (The German Guide to Paris), the fortnightly tourist guide produced by the Wehrmacht, the Arc de Triomphe and Notre-Dame Cathedral form

118 Ibid.
119 Ibid.
120 Doré Ogrizek, Pariser Nächte (Paris: Ode Verlag, 1941).
121 De Certeau, Practice of Everyday Life, p. 120.
122 Ogrizek, Pariser Nächte, p. 133.
the east-west boundaries of the city, and place Clichy and the Palais du Luxembourg
the north-south boundaries, with the area from Île Saint-Louis to the eastern edges of
the city appearing blank and compressed.123 This was subliminally instructive,
transmitting to newcomers a prescribed understanding of where ‘German’ Paris
existed, and did not: historical landmarks and requisitioned ‘Soldaten’ venues were
clearly indicated, and whatever lay ‘off the map’ was assumed to be irrelevant. This is
complemented by the Wegleiter’s text. Although the format and content changed
through the occupation, it was chiefly concerned with informing readers about
entertainment (theatres, cinemas, cabarets, shopping, art galleries, restaurants) and
carefully selected examples of French cultural talents. Maurice Chevalier’s 1942 song
‘La Marche de Ménilmontant’ is described as an example of ‘delightful local
patriotism’ (Chevalier grew up in the district) but remained a space of the imagination
for German listeners, and never an item on their sightseeing itineraries.124 Even for
soldiers and officers living in the city, their perceptions were substantially mediated
through the Wegleiter and other publications.

Methodology, Sources and Structure

While spatial analysis has become more established in the fields of geography,
sociology, literary studies and elsewhere, in the words of Susanne Rau, ‘the field of
historical research concerned with space is relatively disparate.’125 In her view, the
conceptual underpinnings of what space is and how it should be approached by
historians are matters still very much up for debate: some historians continue to talk
about space without defining it at all, while others adopt exclusively conceptual or
physical/territorial standpoints.126 And although her plea to establish some clearly

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123 For example, Der Deutsche Wegleiter für Paris, 31, 1-15 November 1941, p. 57.
124 ‘Maurice Chevalier’, Der Deutsche Wegleiter, 56, 24 October-7 November 1942,
pp. 36-37.
125 Rau, History, Space, p. 67.
126 Ibid., p. 4
defined and commonly agreed methodological bases for historians embarking on spatially related research is welcome, she makes no claim to be their architect, and consensus on what a ‘conceptually reflective and methodologically precise approach to space’ might look like is very far from clear.\textsuperscript{127} This thesis has no pretensions in respect of achieving this goal, nor does it attempt to align itself with any particular theoretical model. Rather, it seeks to draw on some of the spatial thinking discussed above and incorporate it into its analyses of several case studies, with the aim of introducing some greater spatial awareness into this field of historical research.

This also brings up the question of sources. Clearly, some sources are better suited to address specific types of spatial questions. Maps, as discussed above, can be relevant in analysing physical and territorial space (the establishment of borders), but also in considering virtual, more conceptual forms (how space is being projected and represented, or hidden). In contrast, novels, poems or diaries might be a means to study a subject’s ‘inner’, emotional and imaginative understanding of space. This thesis will employ a wide variety of primary and secondary sources, a few of which are less commonly employed by resistance historians. In many cases, however, conducting spatially relevant research can be more a question of interrogating conventional sources in different ways: often the evidence resides in familiar territory waiting to be used.

Among archival sources, contemporary reports compiled by both German and Vichy administrations, held at the French National Archives, have provide a great deal of useful information, enabling some comparison of perspectives both on specific events and general topics. However, as with all sources, they deserve to be treated with care. While extremely useful as evidence of living conditions and political opinion at street level, the utility of official sources have limitations and challenges. As Gaël Eismann recognises, relying on German official documents to gain psychological

\textsuperscript{127} \textit{Ibid.}
insights into the perceived public opinion of the French during the occupation is very
difficult.\textsuperscript{128} Vichy prefects’ monthly reports are often cited by historians, particularly
in illustrating the economic hardships French citizens were suffering in both Occupied
and Unoccupied zones. But they too are susceptible to bias and compliance. Police and
other administrative reports of widespread pro-gaullist sympathies among local
populations could be ignored by prefects, whose own reports might prefer to present
more favourable assessments to their superiors.\textsuperscript{129} Similarly, reports from the Archives
of the Prefecture of Police relating to the pursuit and arrest of resisters can sometimes
only offer a partial and incomplete account, based on the information available to
case officers at the time. Still more awkward are the possible distortions and
omissions arising from the changing fortunes of the occupiers: the zeal shown by some
police inspectors in pursuing resisters in 1941 or 1942 may have been tempered by the
prospect of an Allied victory in 1944, which may have resulted in more lenient (or
non-existent) reporting.\textsuperscript{130} Notwithstanding these shortcomings, however, the wealth
of material on police counter-resistance activity across the capital is an invaluable
resource. Locational data submitted in criminal reports will often include, beyond the
place of arrest, details on residences associated with resisters, as well as statements
from which it is possible to reconstruct resisters’ trajectories across the city, along
with notes on habitual behaviour (for instance, regularly visiting a particular bar or
restaurant, or using a particular method of contact). Of course, there is the danger of
witness unreliability in addition to police unreliability: resisters knew that twenty-four
hours, or ideally forty-eight, would give their comrades time to clear out caches of
papers or weapons, relocate to new safe addresses and so on. There is also the

\textsuperscript{128} Gaël Eismann, ‘L’opinion publique et les comportements des Français sous l’œil du
Majestic’ in \textit{Villes, Centres}, p. 268.
\textsuperscript{129} John Sweets, \textit{Choices in Vichy France: The French under Nazi Occupation} (New
\textsuperscript{130} Franck Liaigre, \textit{Les FTP: Nouvelle histoire d’une résistance} (Paris: Perrin, 2015),
pp. 31-32.
question as to whether a suspect had given information under duress, since this is unlikely to be detected within the report. Corroboration, either with other contemporary reports or postwar sources (memoirs or diaries) is therefore helpful.

In examining the work of ‘external’ resistance in Paris, and particularly undercover agents deployed by the Special Operations Executive (SOE) from 1941 onwards, the archives held at the UK National Archives at Kew are a goldmine. While most of SOE’s papers were destroyed after the war, thousands of files still survive, ranging from individual personal files to reports on missions, relations with gaullist and other foreign secret services, and all kinds of operational information. While historians typically trawl these files for biographical and mission-related data, an enormous amount about ‘normal’ life is ignored, detailing agents’ daily activities and routines, ranging from the addresses of regular haunts and rendezvous to the regularity of public transport. A comparison of Paris agents’ reports can not only corroborate locations, but also offer different, and sometimes conflicting, views of the city. Unlike many primary sources in this field, these aspects of the files have hardly been mined, making them an especially attractive resource.

Away from the archives, witnesses’ accounts of the occupation of Paris are numerous: resisters, collaborators and all those somewhere in between rushed to publish personal stories after the war. Although there are exceptions, they often share familiar tropes and, if read in succession, can feel somewhat formulaic. If question marks appear over the veracity and objectivity of official sources, still more inevitably crop up in the use of the memoirs and accounts of resisters. That ‘the resistance’ was more pluralist in nature, reflecting the social and political divisions within French society, is now commonly accepted, and partisan feelings can certainly be traced in the writings of many of its protagonists. Within the focus of the Parisian experience,

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however, memoirs can also be unique sources of incidental detail on the locations of clandestine activity. Gilbert Renault’s numerous volumes of personal memoirs and associated recollections published under his wartime pseudonym ‘Rémy’ may suffer from his inclusion of reconstructed dialogue and retouched drama. But they provide extensive references of addresses and venues associated with his intelligence network, the *Confrérie Notre Dame*, which can be used both to construct the spatial distribution of its activities in Paris, as well as to build up a picture of daily life from an agent’s point of view.\(^{132}\) To meet the methodological challenge of researching subjective concepts such as topophilia – to understand people’s experiences of Paris, how they conceived of, and felt about it – the personal qualities of memoirs, personal accounts, diaries and letters are essential sources, as are literary works. And though rarer, the recollections of Germans living in occupied Paris can offer a different, but not necessarily alien, perspective of the city. The often-quoted journals of army officers Ernst Jünger and Gerhard Heller, both Francophiles well-acquainted with Paris before the war, are largely preoccupied with visiting the places they know and love. Similarly, oral testimony can provide us with unique personal insights, but recorded interviews conducted with former resisters and agents decades after the event can easily become muddled; consequently only a very selective use of such sources has been made in this thesis.\(^{133}\)

On a related note, a word should also be included on the phenomenon of imposture among resistance memoirs, which even seventy years on continues to hoodwink and deceive casual readers and eminent historians like. In 2018, the publication of *The Saboteur*, a biography of an alleged resistance hero and intrepid SOE agent, Robert de la Rochefoucauld, was warmly received by reviewers.

\(^{132}\) Of particular note is Renault’s detailed study of the network’s betrayal in 1943. See Rémy, *Une Affaire de Trabison* (Monaco: Raoul-Solar, 1946).

Unfortunately, not a scrap of evidence exists to support La Rochefoucauld’s claim to have been recruited by SOE, or to have conducted his most daring actions; indeed, his own record of service written and signed by him in 1945 confirms that he never set foot on British soil during the war, and not a single trace of him or his exploits appears in the SOE archives now available.\(^\text{134}\) Somewhat ironically, the original memoir written by La Rochefoucauld is cited in Laurent Douzou’s otherwise excellent examination of resistance historiography, *La résistance française: une histoire périlleuse*.\(^\text{135}\) These examples are thankfully rare, but they continue to pose a hazard for the unwary.

Among the less obvious sources used extensively in this thesis, already mentioned earlier, is the Wehrmacht’s in-house guide for soldier-tourists, *Der Deutsche Wegleiter für Paris*, which was published for the entire duration of the city’s occupation. Not only did each issue provide an extensive listing of German-approved bars, clubs, restaurants and other venues, but its regular features and articles offer very useful insights into an officially sanctioned German-eye view of Paris, and illustrate how the administration wished to promote it to visiting soldiers. As discussed above, the use of maps by the *Wegleiter* and other approved publishers sought to project an idealised and geographically distorted image of the city.

Photographs of occupied Paris are potentially an extremely informative source, though one needs to beware of first impressions. The image of Hitler visiting Trocadéro in June 1940 served as a defining statement of occupation, with the Eiffel Tower, the cultural icon of the capital, forced into the background. However, as Catherine E. Clark states, the photographic practices of the occupiers and the restrictions placed on photography in the city changed how photographs were taken.

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and understood; Germans taking photographs became an expression of occupation, and the *Wegleiter* printed readers' photographs as one of its regular features.\(^{136}\) It is hard to overstate the influence the visual allure of Paris on the occupation’s forces, even those involved in its darkest endeavours. A catalogue of photographs chronicling the work of *Möbel Aktion* (Operation Furniture) – the systematic looting of Jewish property, begun in 1942 – is introduced with images of the Eiffel Tower, Arc de Triomphe and Paris’s famous thoroughfares; as Sarah Gensburger concludes, it is difficult to see their inclusion as anything but fond souvenirs of time spent in the city.\(^{137}\) French publishers, meanwhile, wanting to avoid presenting views of their occupied city, resorted to including pre-war photographs in books as ‘a way of denying Paris’s contemporary reality’.\(^{138}\) For the researcher, then, the idea of a source of ‘accurate’ photographs of Paris consequently becomes less relevant than these competing representations of Parisian spaces and places, and the spatial imaginaries they are attempting to create.

A more obscure but no less essential resource are the Didot-Bottin trade directories, which, incidentally, were employed by SOE in London during the war as source of intelligence on possible sabotage targets in France.\(^{139}\) SOE had to rely on pre-war editions, but fortunately these reference works continued to be published during the occupation. While of little use for details on requisitioned properties, they provide comprehensive coverage of Parisian streets and addresses no longer extant, as well as details on traffic restrictions, city population and density and so on.

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\(^{138}\) Clark, *Paris and the Cliché of History*, p. 89.

Lastly, physical traces of resistance during the occupation have also played a role in the course of this research. Many hours were spent on foot retracing the spaces and places cited, and in the case of René Suttel’s underground mapping work, explored in Chapter 4, it was possible to gain access to Paris’s subterranean spaces and locate some of the symbols he used to navigate by. Although one cannot consider this a source in any normal sense, it cannot help but inform one’s research.

Rather than lurking in the shadows for the past seventy-five years, the spatial elements of resistance have often lain hidden in plain sight: while many historians have diligently researched the details of all kinds of resistance activity, rarely have their analyses extended to the settings in which they occurred. Taken together, the insights presented in the following chapters draw attention to this curiously neglected aspect of occupation history. Ranging from the intimacy of cafés to underground spaces, they illustrate how an appreciation of space and place can offer valuable new perspectives and open up avenues for future enquiry. To acknowledge and engage with them will inspire a more sophisticated understanding of this phenomenon and broaden the horizons of future research.
Chapter One

Focal Points of Power and Protest

In a slim volume entitled ‘112 Gripes About the French’, published in 1945, the United States Army sought to challenge the prejudices of American servicemen arriving in Paris, tackling imagined but plausible Francophobic opinions that cast doubts on Gallic character, cleanliness, morals, transportation, politics, economics, manners and, of course, France’s wartime record. Under the section heading of ‘They got off pretty easy in this war’, gripe 105 complained that ‘[y]ou wouldn’t think they’d even been in the war the way a city like Paris looks.’ Had it fallen into the hands of French readers, they might have been appalled by the breadth of the xenophobia harboured by their liberators. But unlike much of the book’s material, this statement wasn’t entirely unreasonable. While four years of occupation had wrought widespread destruction and caused thousands of civilian deaths across France, the capital had only become the target of Allied bombing raids from 1942, which were mainly restricted to the city’s industrial peripheries where factories such as Renault and Gnome et Rhône were dedicated to German war production; it had not torn out its landmarks or reduced its centre to rubble. And while Hitler might have called for Paris to be destroyed before its liberation in 1944, he had earlier shown restraint. Touring the city after the signing of the Armistice in June 1940, his architect Albert Speer recalled how the Führer had thought Baron Haussmann ‘the greatest city planner in history’ but had also considered destroying Paris before elevating Berlin as the capital of the Nazi world. He quickly

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1 112 Gripes About the French (Fontenay-aux-Roses: Information & Education Division of the US Occupation Forces, 1945), p. 98.
relented, and would later praise it as ‘one of the jewels of Europe.” Any Allied soldier
who had picked up a discarded copy of Signal, the German army’s glossy propaganda
equivalent to Life magazine, may also have felt his views were justified by the images of
André Zucca, whose carefully composed scenes of Parisian life portrayed a garish
Agfacolor world, identifiably under occupation yet strangely normal. The objectives that
Zucca, a naturalised Frenchman by the time he began working for Signal in 1940, had
been pursuing have long been a matter for debate. But his perspectives of Paris,
characterised by bustling boulevards, elegant women and smiling faces, were at odds
with most Parisians’ experiences.

Contrary to the newcomers’ assumptions, the transformation Paris had
undergone during the occupation had been profound. Jean-Paul Sartre, who had returned
to the capital in 1941 after being released from a prisoner-of-war camp in Germany,
surmised that ‘Paris was no longer the capital of France’ but had been reduced to a ‘great
agglomeration, flat and useless, haunted by the memories of her grandeur’, more a
spectator of the war than a participant. Explaining the depth of the trauma to the GIs
who found Parisians ‘less thin than they imagined’ seemed impossible, just as they
themselves could not express or adequately convey the unique experience of occupation.
‘Paris was dead’, Sartre concluded, but its inhabitants could ‘barely grasp the sense of the
change’.

Nothing characterised this more than an all-pervading sense of relative silence
and emptiness, a feature which came to dominate memories and memoirs of the

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Hitler’s Table Talk, 1941-44: His Private Conversations (New York: Enigma, 2008), p.
77.
5 An exhibition of 250 of Zucca’s photographs at the Bibliothèque Historique de la Ville
de Paris in 2008 led to a heated debate over support for revisionist views of the
Occupation and the ethics of showing such work. See Mary Louise Roberts, ‘Wartime
Flânerie: The Zucca Controversy’, French Politics, Culture & Society, 27:1 (2009),
pp. 102-110; Danièle Voldman, ‘Les Parisiens sous l’Occupation, une exposition
6 Jean-Paul Sartre (trans. Lisa Lieberman), ‘Paris under the Occupation’, Raritan, 24:3
7 Ibid., p. 137.
8 Ibid., p. 142.
occupation. The depopulation of the streets, the disappearance of motor traffic, the shortages and deprivations of all kinds fundamentally altered the rhythm of Paris, reducing it to ‘a skeleton city’. One of the most evocative first impressions of this transformation comes from Jean Bruller, who in 1941 returned to the city after being demobilised. Bruller, who under the nom de guerre ‘Vercors’ would become one of the founders of the clandestine press Éditions de Minuit, likened Paris to an imitation of René Clair’s 1924 science fiction fantasy Paris qui dort (Paris asleep), in which the city is frozen in time by a mad scientist. ‘As far as my eyes can see’ he later wrote, there was ‘not a car, not a bus, not a living being’. This was compounded by the isolation maintained by the occupied towards the occupier, captured in his 1942 novel, La silence de la mer, the story of a German officer billeted with a French household that refuses to acknowledge his presence.

Parisians often recorded in their journals how familiarity and physical proximity to the invaders did not lead to a greater accommodation or closer cohabitation: many continued to maintain their distance by ignoring them. ‘People pass by the Germans without seeing them. They are surrounded by silence. Silence on the trains, silence in the metro, in the street’, wrote the economist Charles Rist in November 1940. Four months later, Jean Guéhenno observed how Parisians continued to ‘pass by the Germans the way they pass dogs or cats. It seems they neither see them nor hear them.’ And while social situations might prompt one or the other to interact, the bunker mentality often remained. Journalist Jean Galtier-Boissière noted the awkwardness shown by a young German soldier who offered his seat on the metro to his wife, then to him. When both

9 Sartre, ‘Paris under the Occupation’, p. 143.
11 Bruller’s novel also found its way into British bookshops in 1943, It was released by Hachette in London as part of its ‘Cahiers du Silence’ imprint, which also published Bruller’s other works and those of Éditions de Minuit. Le silence de la mer was translated in 1944 and was well received by English-speaking audiences. See Vercors (trans. Cyril Connolly), Put Out the Light (London: Macmillan, 1944).
had politely refused, the embarrassed German chose to stand next to the empty seat too, unsure of how to react. Though accommodations of all kinds would be made between Parisians and Germans at all levels, citizens and invaders often shared spaces but continued to inhabit separate, though overlapping, layers of social, cultural and working life. The endless complications created by this artificially constructed society were further multiplied for those becoming involved in resistance work or collaborating with the enemy, whose identities and allegiances might cross many boundaries.

Some of the most significant concrete and symbolic changes affecting this shared Parisian landscape centred around its commemorative statues and monuments. Though a period of ‘statuemania’ begun in the late nineteenth century had left Paris swamped by figurative sculpture, the Vichy government’s programme from 1941 to recycle bronze statuary for the war effort inevitably changed the city’s character. While the selections of artworks to be culled seem not to have been driven by an intention to impose a new political or cultural identity, the disappearance of familiar landmarks left its mark on Parisians, while commemorative monuments that remained became flashpoints of dissent and protest.

This chapter will argue that, contrary to previous research on the eradication of statues, Parisians valued their statuary and were sensitive to their disappearance. Their destruction represented another deprivation of occupation, but also a change in perception of one’s locale and the erasure of a familiar spatial characteristic. Drawing on Tuan’s concept of topophilia or ‘a love of place’, I will illustrate how, rather than diminishing their power, the removal of statues and monuments heightened Parisians’ sense of loss, imbuing them (or the spaces they once inhabited) with a greater, not lesser, significance and worth.

While Verena Andermatt Conley makes the common but unsupported assertion that Haussmann’s redevelopment of Paris in the nineteenth century was designed to

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prevent public protest, she also describes the public monument as a ‘monolith of repression that imposes spatial practices’, forcing its opponents to alternative, peripheral, social spaces.\textsuperscript{15} However, under occupation Parisian statues and monuments were also appropriated by protestors, using monuments as a way to recreate and reclaim space. In focusing on two examples of public demonstrations during the first year of occupation – Armistice Day, 11 November 1940, and the Joan of Arc commemorations of 11 May 1941 – I will further argue that Parisians’ topophilic connections to statues and monuments became the grounding points for the public expression of patriotic and anti-German feelings. Moreover, they were ‘supercharged’ by their physical situation: not only did they lie along the city’s most symbolic axis, drawing on its historic and commemorative power, but were also sited at the centre of the German administrative heartland of the occupation, fomenting the first open public conflicts between occupier and occupied, as well as pro- and anti-German French citizens.

\textbf{Vichy, Statuary and Sites of Power}

The spaces around monuments and commemorative statues in Paris have often become intimately connected to and shaped by the statues that occupied them, creating complex relationships between representation, meaning and place.\textsuperscript{16} As the first example of a monarch being represented in a public space in France, the equestrian statue of King Henri IV, erected on the Pont Neuf in 1614, established itself as a unique manifestation of royal power. Sited in the city’s epicentre, balanced between the populations of the left and right banks of the Seine, the statue’s popularity led to its incorporation into royal procession routes, and also became a venue for the reading of peace treaties and


celebration of royal occasions.\textsuperscript{17} Along with the later statues of Louis XIII in place des Vosges, Louis XIV in place des Victoires and place Vendôme, and Louis XV in place de la Concorde, it was swept away by the French Revolution. As in many previous instances, defacing and destroying these statues was a powerful means of eradicating the prestige and civic power of the ancien régime, as well as the political narratives they fostered.\textsuperscript{18} Yet the imprint of Henri could not be removed so easily; the site continued to serve as a social meeting place in the absence of his statue, and a replacement was inaugurated on the same spot in 1818. This example also demonstrates how the political vicissitudes of France were reflected in the cyclic processes of commemoration and re-commemoration, where the hero of a previous regime could be literally remoulded to fit a new one. The statue of Napoleon atop the Vendôme Column, placed there in 1806, was melted down to become the new steed of Henri IV.\textsuperscript{19}

A monument could imbue a place with meaning, but it could also reinforce or multiply existing commemorative power by tapping into its spatial history. The site chosen for the statue of Etienne Dolet, a sixteenth century printer and vocal opponent of the Catholic Church, occupied the place Maubert in the Odéon quarter of the Left Bank, where had been burnt to death as a heretic. Dolet’s spirit became woven into the cultural identity of the area: after his death it became the site of barricades during the Fronde and the 1848 revolution, as well as a meeting place for students.\textsuperscript{20} And even after Haussmann’s partial gentrification of the area in the mid-nineteenth century, the inauguration of Dolet’s statue at place Maubert in 1889, the centenary of the Revolution, reasserted his political influence in a locale long associated with bohemian life; Dolet’s followers, the freethinkers, made an annual pilgrimage to the statue.\textsuperscript{21} A comparable

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.  
example is that of the July Column on place de la Bastille, created under King Louis-
Philippe’s reign. While the column commemorated the *trois glorieuses* of the July
Revolution of 1830 that brought the new sovereign to power, its political credibility was
founded on the myth of the storming of the Bastille on the same site forty years earlier.
As architectural historian Françoise Choay has written, a monument’s power lies in its
ability to reach beyond objective meaning, ‘stirring up, through the emotions, a living
memory’, creating a narrative link between the present with the past.\(^\text{22}\) This must, in part
at least, comprise a common memory, an agreed version of the past reflected by it
(although, as will be seen later, rival memories can lay claim to the same monument).
Nevertheless, this reinforcement of commemorative power can imbue both the
monument and its surrounding space with great political, historical and cultural
significance.

Many commemorative statues and monuments in Paris became appropriate
platforms for expressing opinions at inaugurations and demonstrations.\(^\text{23}\) However, their
meaning (or multiple meanings) could also evolve or be substituted, and or simply
become irrelevant. Erected in 1838, James Pradier’s allegorical statue, *The City of
Strasbourg*, is one of eight monuments set at each point of the octagonal place de la
Concorde, each representing one of France’s major cities. Though the place had become
the scene of regicide during the Revolution and the blood-soaked execution ground of
The Terror, in time it would achieve something approaching political equilibrium. After
being dominated by statues of Louis XV, then a plaster statue representing Liberty,
respectively representing the values of the *ancien régime* and the new Republic, in 1830
the introduction of the Luxor Obelisk imposed a sense of national pomp and authority
without expressing any overt message. However, while the Place was largely cleared of
political meaning, Pradier’s *Strasbourg* was unabashedly militant. With her feet resting
on a cannon, a sword cradled in one arm and the other on her hip, this defiant

\(^{22}\) Françoise Choay (trans. Lauren M. O’Connell), *The Invention of the Historic
\(^{23}\) Hargrove, ‘Shaping the National Image’, pp. 48-63.
personification became the focal point of Parisian emotion when the Prussians first besieged, and then occupied, the sensitive territory of Alsace-Lorraine in September 1870: many people flocked to this site, covering it in flags, wreaths and draping in black. It even inspired the writing of a nationalist hymn, ‘The Statue of Strasbourg’, sung to the tune of the Marseillaise; a second temporary statue, of Strasbourg’s military commander General Uhrich, was installed in front of Pradier’s, intended as a symbol of his defence of the city.\(^{24}\)

As Maurice Agulhon has noted, the representation of the country’s cities around the Place transformed this centre of Paris into a centre of France.\(^ {25}\) This spontaneous mobilisation of a memorial instantly became an essential means of expressing grief over the loss of the city and of the Alsace-Lorraine region; subsequently it attracted nationalist and revanchist supporters, but later served as a symbol of victory and restoration of sovereignty. On 17 November 1918, 150,000 people massed along the avenue des Champs-Elysées and across the place de la Concorde to celebrate the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France, President Raymond Poincaré delivering his speech on a stand placed next to Pradier’s allegorical figure.\(^ {26}\) Nevertheless, the monument’s power quickly faded, and the speed of the German invasion in June 1940 prevented any manifestation comparable to that shown in 1870. Despite the conscription of Alsatians into the Germany army and the expulsion of Jews from the region along with the rise of local resistance, the commemorative memory of this site was not revived or mobilised.\(^ {27}\)

Given that statues and monuments had become important in defining the character of Paris’s political and social spaces, it would have been natural enough to expect the German occupation of 1940 to obliterate any representation of French national pride or power. However, though Parisians’ fears about the ruthlessness of the


German invader would later be vindicated, the establishment of a new German administration was not heralded by a planned campaign of monumental destruction. Its targets were few, highly selective and appeared to be based on impulsive rather than systematic choices.

The eradication of a large monument to Edith Cavell, set in the eastern recess of the Jeu de Paume gallery in the Tuileries, was perhaps the most significant. The execution of Cavell, a British nurse who had helped Allied servicemen return to their own lines from Belgium in 1915, had been portrayed as an act of German bestiality which exceeded all notions of decency and demonstrated a capacity to commit war crimes against women. It is worth noting that the initiative to design and produce a monument came from popular rather than official quarters: the newspaper *Le Matin* and *The Daily Telegraph* ran similar campaigns to erect memorials in Paris and London (both were inaugurated shortly before the interment of the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at the Arc de Triomphe, and the Tomb of the Unknown Warrior at Westminster Abbey). But each country reflected very different views of their heroine. While Sir George Frampton’s sculpture, sited on St Martin’s Place at the lower end of Charing Cross Road, posed Cavell standing upright, a dignified heroine eternally resurrected by posterity, the French sculptor Gabriel Pech’s bas-relief at the Jeu de Paume cast her as a fallen martyr: lying dead with a German helmet provocatively laid on her body, classical figures soared above her, casting petals in her honour. Frampton’s Cavell is predominantly a patriotic heroine contrasting with Pech’s more religious interpretation, a feature not missed during the unveiling of the monument in June 1920. During his address, André Maginot, the minister of pensions, noted its proximity to the newly-canonicalised Jeanne d’Arc, whose own statue stood a few hundred metres away in place des Pyramides. Despite Jeanne being so closely identified with routing the English, President Poincaré had made an

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29 ‘Le monument offert par le Matin’ à la mémoire de Miss Cavell a été inauguré hier sous la présidence de M. Maginot, ministre des pensions’, *Le Matin*, 13 June 1920, p. 1.
impassioned speech the previous month which emphasised the reconciliation of two
nations which had defeated their common enemy, Germany. Maginot too declared this
new memorial as a symbol of Anglo-French union, also referring to the ceremony shortly
after Cavell’s death in 1915, during which a British delegation had laid flowers at the
foot of the statue of Jeanne d’Arc as a symbol of Allied solidarity. *Le Matin* proudly
declared it a ‘monument which will preserve, in the heart of Paris, the memory of Edith
Cavell and guard against forgetting the greatest crime in the most criminal of wars’.31
However, aside from its provocative and plainly Germanophobic aspects, the central
positioning of such a monument threatened to become an important site of
commemoration under the occupation. To destroy a monument to a British heroine
offered the opportunity to denigrate the enemy and encourage anti-British sentiment
among a populace which, following the chaotic withdrawal of Allied forces from France,
was now more susceptible to supporting the notion of *perfide Albion*.

The removal of the memorial to Cavell was accompanied by the destruction of a
statue of General Charles Mangin, which stood on place Denys Cochin. Its position was
also important, but for a quite different reason: the figure of Mangin would have been
visible to Hitler on his brief tour of Paris at the end of June 1940. As his car approached
Napoleon’s tomb at the Invalides the sight of Mangin’s strident pose, flanked by North
African *tirailleurs*, probably accounts for its prompt removal. Having endorsed the use of
colonial forces in his 1910 polemic *La Force noire*, Mangin had exercised the use of
Senegalese troops during his time as military commander of the French occupation of the
Rhineland in 1923, the memory of which rankled in the minds of many Germans.
Lacking the geographically central placement awarded to Cavell, Mangin’s statue
appears simply to have been the victim of a personal grudge of Hitler’s. According to the

Prefect of Police, Paul Langeron, it was comprehensively demolished before the end of June.32 Though cannon were also taken from the northern perimeter of Les Invalides, other military statues such as First World War Commander-in-Chief Joseph Joffre, which had recently been erected in front of École Militaire overlooking the Champs de Mars, and General Fayolle, whose statue also stood in view of the Invalides, were left in place.33 And only a single First World War memorial, dedicated to the soldiers of Vincennes in the east of the city, was destroyed on German orders.34 Sited between the newly-overtaken Fort Neuf army barracks and the Château de Vincennes, this monument – an imperious statue of a poilu, supported by kings and notable leaders from French history, whose boot was victoriously planted on the neck of a vanquished imperial German eagle – was quickly noticed by occupying troops, who appear to have been responsible for vandalising it repeatedly during July 1940.35 Despite representations made by the local mayor, who proposed various solutions from boarding up the monument to removing the soldier’s statue and the eagle but leaving the base intact, the Paris Kommandantur had apparently decided on the fate of this local landmark.36

On 26 July, pneumatic drills arrived to install explosives inside the plinth, while ‘an enormous crowd’ assembled at 4pm, causing the Germans to erect barricades to cordon off the surrounding area. A minute after the sounding of a klaxon at 5.29pm, the charges were detonated, leaving behind only the ugly remains of the monument’s base. Afterwards, the mayor described several thousand people making ‘a pilgrimage’ to the

32 There are conflicting dates cited for the destruction of the monument. For example, the Prefect of Police, Paul Langeron, notes in his diary that this occurred on 28 June, while Elizabeth Karlsgodt cites 18 June. See Paul Langeron, Paris, juin 40 (Paris: Flammarion, 1946), pp. 103-104; and Elizabeth Campbell Karlsgodt, ‘Recycling French Heroes: The Destruction of Bronze Statues under the Vichy Regime’, French Historical Studies, 29:1 (2006), p. 146.
33 Langeron, Paris, juin 40, p. 133.
34 Ibid.
35 ‘Délibération du conseil municipale de Vincennes du 10 aout 1940’, Archives municipales de Vincennes.
36 Ibid. That the monument’s inscription caused particular offence is not mentioned but has been stated elsewhere as a cause of the destruction. See Martin Blumenson, The Vildé Affair: Beginnings of the French Resistance (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977), p. 56.
foot of the ruins to honour this former ‘page of our history of France’ and the ‘artistic
heritage of our town’.  

This was an undeniably traumatic episode for the locals of Vincennes, and
blackly ironic given the monument’s title: ‘The Present, Son of the Past’. For a country
defeated by its old enemy in just six weeks, this once-popular rallying point for patriotic
marches now symbolised only shame and loss. From a broader perspective the German’s
attack on Parisian statues showed restraint, reflecting the new German administration’s
intent to avoid unnecessary confrontation with the civilian population. However, the
staff of the Militärbefehlshaber in Frankreich (MBF, the German military government in
Paris) did consider other possible targets, albeit on a more improvised basis. For
example, the Francs-Tireurs des Ternes monument on place Saint-Ferdinand in the
seventeenth arrondissement, which commemorated the locally-recruited French
sharpshooters of the Franco-Prussian war in 1870, happened to draw the attention of a
senior German official as he passed it. He thought the portrayal of these ‘glorified
snipers’ and especially the act of saluting guerrilla fighters was insulting to the memory
of their German victims, and that the bronze sculpture deserved to be earmarked for
demolition.

This and many other bronzes were indeed destroyed soon afterward, but not by
the MBF. In early 1941 the German administration had threatened to begin melting
church bells in the Occupied Zone, a requisition that fell outside the terms of the
Armistice.  

37 ‘Délibération du conseil municipale de Vincennes du 10 aout 1940’, Archives
municipales de Vincennes.
38 The Pariser Zeitung, a daily German newspaper produced in France during the
occupation and which also catered for French readers, portrayed the British as the
destroyers of artworks. See, for example, ‘Briten schänden Schätze des Altertums’,
39 Archives Nationales, Paris (AN), AJ 40/887, Dr Parisius to Dr Rademacher, 27
January 1941; and MBF to Rademacher, 6 February 1941.
40 Kirrily Freeman, From Bronzes to Bullets: Vichy and the Destruction of French Public
was now in short supply: up to 1939, France had been importing 20,000 tonnes of copper a year, but Allied naval blockades now created a substantial shortfall.\textsuperscript{41} To avert this act of desecration Vichy sought ways to produce an equivalent amount of nonferrous metal, but their options were limited. Thus little opposition was encountered when the head of government, François Darlan, proposed instead a programme of recycling bronze statues, and on 11 October 1941 Pétain’s government passed a law to begin ‘the removal of statues and monuments made of copper alloys located in public places and administrative locales, which do not display an artistic or historic interest’.\textsuperscript{42} At a rate of 30 francs per kilo, the ‘mobilisation’ of French bronze art – a euphemism that attempted both to disguise French material poverty and the destruction of the nation’s cultural property – would be governed by commissions for each department and overseen by the Ministers for Education and Industrial Production, with decisions about the fates of Paris statues and monuments were being left to the prefect of the Seine and an array of civil servants, art historians and public planners.

In general, Vichy exempted representations of Jeanne d’Arc, Louis XIV, Henri IV and Napoléon Bonaparte, national figures who exemplified the qualities that it espoused and wished to promote. The choice of which of the remaining monuments and statues to destroy was a complex process, influenced by politics, personal taste and rhetoric, but also by manpower, circumstance and happenstance. Contrary to expectations, the available evidence suggests that Vichy did not take this as an opportunity to erase artworks on ideological, political or cultural grounds. Elizabeth Karlsgodt’s quantitative analysis of the bronzes known to have been destroyed shows that the Paris commission preyed on figures of the Right just as much, if not more, as the Republican Left.\textsuperscript{43} Certainly pro-fascist elements chose to interpret Vichy’s actions as iconoclastic, ridding Paris of Voltaire, Zola and other figures associated with republican values. But it is also

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., p. 14.
\textsuperscript{42} Journal Officiel de l’État Français, 15 October 1941, p. 4440.
interesting that they themselves took almost no action against symbols of British, American or Jewish representations in statuary. One exception was the toppling in May 1942 of an equestrian statue of King Edward VII, located on place Edouard VII in the ninth arrondissement, which was reportedly carried out by a group of young anti-British activists. Though this has been assumed to have been a random act, it seems likely that it was spurred by an Allied bombing raid the night before on the Gnome et Rhône aircraft factory at Gennevilliers, to the north-west of the city, and which was condemned as a direct attack on the Parisian people.

This nationwide eradication of statuary has remained somewhat underexplored, and the historiography of statues and commemoration during the Occupation leaves many questions unanswered. Exactly how many of Paris’s statues were destroyed is still not known. Karlsgodt estimates more than seventy; photographer Jahan stated that more than eighty statues were taken to a scrapyard in the twelfth arrondissement, where he secretly recorded their last hours in early December 1941. A prefect’s postwar report states a total of 61, including those taken from the banlieue. How did Parisians react to this denuding of its city spaces? Recent scholarly analysis has focused on the experience of provincial towns and cities, and particularly the local unrest that the removal of statues and monuments often caused. While Vichy’s National Revolution extolled the virtues of regionalism, its destruction of commemorative statuary within rural and suburban communities presented a fundamental contradiction: breaking historic links between people and their venerated local heroes by melting their statues clashed with the idea of encouraging respect for local customs and cultures. Yet Paris is generally

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considered to have been more casual in its regard towards its statues, and its citizens far less concerned about their loss.\textsuperscript{48} This in part might stem from the anti-metropolitan opinions of regional officials who assumed Paris to be too impersonal and uncaring to form bonds with its historical figures.\textsuperscript{49} But more common is the perception that Vichy’s programme was, as Kirrily Freeman puts it, a ‘salutary correction to the excesses of the Third Republic’, a reference to the phenomenon of ‘statuemania’ which took hold in the city in the last years of the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{50} The rapid cluttering of streets and squares with statues of politicians, scientists, artists, poets and other notable figures transformed the look of Paris. This prompted commentators of all kinds to take up cudgels against the perpetrators, condemning this littering with symbols of republican virtue as a sort of spatial vandalism. Fewer than half of sites chosen for statues during that period had any relevance to their subjects.\textsuperscript{51} A columnist in the \textit{Journal des débats} thought the Jardin du Luxembourg had become a ‘depot for statues’, complaining that ‘there is no longer a lawn that is free. There is no longer a cluster of trees which do not shelter a monument. Painters, poets, musicians, economists, next to vestal virgins, Hercules, bathers and fauns. It’s a meeting of grotesques.’\textsuperscript{52} More playfully, Louis Aragon’s surrealist work, \textit{Paris Peasant}, published in 1926, envisaged a day when ‘it will scarcely be possible to make one’s way along the streets choked with statues’, a condition in which ‘humanity will perish’.\textsuperscript{53} However, the view of Freeman and others ignores the much more restrictive environment that Parisians were living in, compared to those in the provinces. The rising density of the city’s population, the increased surveillance by Vichy and German police services, assisted by the major collaborationist groups, the restrictions in spatial freedoms, not to mention the occupier’s sensitivity to the greater propaganda

\textsuperscript{48} Freeman, ‘Bronzes to Bullets’, pp. 90-91.
\textsuperscript{49} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{50} \textit{Ibid.}
potential that visible acts of resistance in the capital might carry, all made protests of this kind more dangerous.

Moreover, their views tend to be based on reports largely from members of the Paris commission, art historians, political commentators and bureaucrats, not from ordinary citizens who had actually lived in the locales which had been denuded. Yvon Bizardel, curator of the Musée Galliera during the occupation, commented that ‘as soon as the invader placed his hands on the most debatable of bronzes, this gesture was enough to make it dear to us.’\textsuperscript{54} While inaccurate in blaming the Nazis for the disappearance of statues, it does highlight the personal and collective responses to the removal of public art.

Contrary to the notion that Parisians had become weary or even contemptuous of municipal statuary in the pre-war years, their attachments to them provoked the same reactions as provincial citizens. Evidence of their connection had already been manifested during the First World War, when public statues had become totems of public emotion and opinion. Standing outside the Théâtre-Français, the statue of poet Alfred de Musset, known for his anti-German poem \textit{Le Rhin allemand} in 1840, was capped with a military helmet, while Soiteux’s statue of the Republic, standing on the quai Malaquais by the Institut Français, bore a heartfelt dedication to the soldiers scribbled in charcoal.\textsuperscript{55} Others were covered with anti-German graffiti, while an effigy of a German soldier was placed between the paws of the Lion of Belfort at place Denfert-Rochereau.\textsuperscript{56}

These were not random, unthinking acts. Parisians were transforming public spaces to voice their patriotism and were doing so with an understanding of their historical resonance. The adornment of Musset’s statue reflected a shared historical knowledge of previous opposition to Germany, while the Lion of Belfort had become a potent symbol of defiance to the Prussian invasion of 1870. Thus it should have come as

\textsuperscript{56} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 72.
no surprise that removing bronzes among the city’s residents in 1940 was quickly
recognised as a powerfully humiliating act. In October, the acting Vichy delegate in Paris,
General de la Laurencie, submitted in his report that in removing ‘the ancient cannons of
the Invalides, the Germans have needlessly wounded the national pride of Parisians.' 57
Retired schoolteacher Berthe Auroy wondered if the statue of the Republic might be
turned into cannon, and even whether the Eiffel Tower might be next. 58

Shortly after they had taken away the statue of Mangin, two old friends, Paul
Hauet and Maurice Dutheil de la Rochère, met by chance as they went to pay their
respects before the dynamited debris of the plinth. 59 Hauet took away a chunk of granite
as a keepsake, and the anger they felt at this desecration hardened their resolve to resist. 60
And after the removal of Etienne Dolet’s statue in December 1941, workers from local
publishers gathered to place wreaths at the foot of the plinth. 61 This was not a unique
occasion: a local resistance group repeated the gesture in 1944. 62 Bizardel related how
individuals could be horrified by the round-up. One witness recalled that ‘when I saw
them take Victor Hugo, I cried. And to think he had no one to stick up for him!’ 63 Three
weeks after noting the removal of the bronze of scientist François Arago in
Montparnasse in December 1941, Jacques Biélinky mourned the disappearance of the
statue of Théophraste Renaudot, on the Île de la Cité; for a fellow journalist, Renaudot’s
disappearance exactly 310 years after founding France’s first newspaper, La Gazette, was
especially poignant. 64 The remaining plinths were soon becoming, as they were elsewhere

57 AN, AJ 47/397, Synthèse zone occupée, 16 October 1940.
58 Berthe Auroy, Jours de guerre: Ma vie sous l’Occupation (Montrouge: Bayard
59 The head survived and can be found today in the Musée de l’Armée at Les Invalides.
60 Julien Blanc, Au commencement de la résistance: du côté du musée de l’homme 1940-
62 AN, 72 AJ/158, dossier 8, piece 7, Témoignage de M. Perbet dit Gilbert, 14 February
1945.
63 Yvonne Bizardel, Sous l’Occupation: souvenirs d’un conservateur de musée (Paris:
64 Jacques Biélinky, Journal, 1940-1942: un journaliste juif à Paris sous l’occupation
in the country, ‘an emblem of absence’. These ‘bases without statues’ reminded all Parisians of what had been lost as a result of occupation: on one level the loss could be felt personally, but being situated within the French capital made them especially conducive to being perceived as representing a communal or national symbol of cultural desecration.

It is also interesting to note that a statue did not have to be removed for that space to become a meaningful symbol of occupation. Pauline Avery Crawford was an American expatriate resident of Paris during the occupation whose poems had become a regular feature in the Paris edition of the *Herald Tribune*. Living on rue Jules Chaplain during the occupation, she frequently passed Auguste Rodin’s sculpture of writer Honoré de Balzac, which had been erected in 1939 just around the corner, at the junction of boulevards Raspail and Montparnasse. For three years she worked on a sonnet dedicated to it, which she finished in September 1943: imagining the statue’s contempt as it looked down on passing German tourists, Balzac ‘[s]till stands sardonic, mocking the attack | Of element and enemy’. Perceived as a proud local signifier of defiance, this bronze figure of one of Paris’s most famous sons still ‘does battle for his Paris’.

Avery’s example serves as a particularly good example of Yi-Fu Tuan’s concept of topophilia, the ‘affective relationships’ that result from the ‘qualitative assessments that people make of the places that they interact with on a day-to-day basis’ – the close bonds or love that people develop for a street, a café, or, as in this case, a statue. Tuan draws particular attention to the spatial importance of sculptures, which have ‘the power to create a sense of place by their own physical presence’; a statue also has the capacity ‘to

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65 Freeman, ‘Pedestals dedicated to absence’, p. 164.
create its own space’ and ‘incarnate personhood and be the centre of its own world’.\textsuperscript{70}

This can be thought of as a kind of vortex, generating a gravitational ‘pull’: what may seem to a passing visitor an unremarkable object ‘can be the focus of a world’ for one who has known it all their life.\textsuperscript{71} Moreover, this is a visceral attachment, not an intellectual product of a ‘discerning eye or mind’.\textsuperscript{72}

Peter Murphy makes the important point that the size and complexity of the metropolis denies the possibility of developing affective relationships with its entirety.\textsuperscript{73} As Tuan puts it, a large city is known at two levels, of ‘high abstraction’ and ‘specific experience’.\textsuperscript{74} Beyond the vague, abstract notions of what a city ‘is’, any claims to feel love, hate or ambiguity for Paris are founded on relationships with its particular places: districts, parks, streets, buildings, monuments and so on.\textsuperscript{75} Moreover, these relationships are formed by interaction with people and the accumulation of previous experiences in those places.\textsuperscript{76}

Being predominantly touristic in nature, German experiences of the city were necessarily more distanced, not having the personal, affective relationships to the city’s places as a born-and-bred Parisian would have. For Parisians, occupation brought a heightened awareness of sensitivity to local places and change in all its forms, and amid the fears and uncertainties of daily life familiar and predictable places such as statues and monuments became anchors, a valued symbol of continuity and permanence. Such affection will also engender a desire to protect them: as Gaston Bachelard notes, these are places ‘that may be defended against adverse forces’.\textsuperscript{77}

Underground newspapers understood this reaction. An article entitled ‘Notre Paris’ (Our Paris), published in \textit{Les Lettres Françaises} in 1942, appealed to Parisians’ personal ties to their local spaces, declaring that:

\begin{footnotesize}
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    \item \textsuperscript{70} Tuan, \textit{Space and Place}, p. 162.
    \item \textsuperscript{71} \textit{Ibid}.
    \item \textsuperscript{72} \textit{Ibid}.
    \item \textsuperscript{73} Murphy, ‘Economy and Affect’, p. 202.
    \item \textsuperscript{74} Tuan, \textit{Topophilia}, p. 224.
    \item \textsuperscript{75} Murphy, ‘Economy and Affect’, p. 202.
    \item \textsuperscript{76} \textit{Ibid}.
    \item \textsuperscript{77} Bachelard, \textit{Poetics of Space}, xxxv.
\end{itemize}
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The tenderness that ties us to a landscape does not depend solely on its immutable beauty but on a secret emotion as well. The walks, the squares, the monuments of our town we love them as the flesh and blood of a living city. Our Paris is a Paris alive.78

The same sentiment is echoed in the changes Jean Guéhenno witnessed around him:

One by one, the statues of Paris are disappearing, the balloon on Place des Ternes...Chiappe and his telegraph, and the two pharmacists at the end of the boulevard St Michel. The other day, on the Place du Panthéon, I saw them taking down Rousseau. Poor ‘Citizen’, you’re going to become the soul of a gun.79

He also noticed the two pharmacists, Pierre Pelletier and Joseph Caventou, the discoverers of quinine whose statues stood together on the corner of the boulevard Saint-Michel and rue de l’Abbé de l’Epée from 1900. Like the statue of Arago, they were statues funded by public subscription, as were many others across Paris. For the Vichy government to uproot these figures could be seen as a simple act of civic or cultural theft rather than as a necessary sacrifice, even if an iconoclastic intent was lacking. Protests made by Professor Augustin Damiens, who was mindful that 1941 also marked the centenary of Pelletier’s death, failed to sway the commission.80 These examples illustrate that Parisians did recognise and react to these losses, which were yet another spatial reflection of the increasing deprivation overtaking all aspects of their daily lives. In a capital city witnessing the disappearances of the living, whether under the auspices of the forced labour programmes or by deportation, the purging of bronze statues also invited disturbing comparisons to the industrialisation of extermination, the full horrors of which would only become widely known in 1945, months after the liberation of Paris.

79 Guéhenno, Diary of the Dark Years, p. 140.
80 Guy Devaux, ‘Le monument à Pelletier et Caventou: ses souscripteurs girondins’, Revue d’histoire de la pharmacie, 345 (2005), pp. 136-142. It should be noted that Vichy planned to restore some missing statues with stone replacements, an idea which continued through the postwar years. Although few were actually produced, a startlingly incongruous allegorical figure finally replaced Pelletier’s and Caventou’s statues in 1951, arguably drawing attention to the absence of the original bronze as capably as an empty base.
To see a familiar landmark erased, such as in the case of Etienne Dolet above, clearly possessed a strong local dimension. People recognised their importance just as those in the provinces had suffered comparable losses. But what of national monuments, which remained unmolested but subject to new spatial restrictions? Within the unique spatial configuration of the capital city, how were these sites perceived as both local places and national sites of power?

**Parisian Protests, 1940/41**

Through the occupation surviving statues and monuments continued to play an important role as rallying points and focal points of protest, and the first signs of resistance and the manifestation of public demonstrations were intimately related to several particular sites. During the first year of occupation, when both the occupier and the occupied were first being acquainted, Parisians turned the commemoration of Armistice Day and Joan of Arc’s feast day into inaugural declarations of defiance, flouting the new laws that banned their celebration. The will to protest was often encouraged by early resistance tracts that aligned themselves with a revolutionary immediacy and vitality, encouraging readers to take inspiration from figures such as Voltaire, Léon Gambetta, Alphonse de Lamartine and Émile Zola. And yet this alignment with republican rhetoric did not provoke a close identification with, or mobilisation of, associated places.

Charles de Gaulle’s famous BBC broadcast of 18 June 1940, during which he declared that the ‘flame of resistance must not be extinguished and will not be extinguished’, meant a great deal for a few who heard it in France.\(^{81}\) However, what form this resistance might take, and how dissent might be encouraged remained, for de Gaulle as well as ordinary Parisians, unanswerable questions. The first major

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commemorative holiday following the fall of France was 14 July, Bastille Day, which passed without any call for action or significant manifestation of protest: the combined shock of invasion, occupation and governmental collapse, followed by the abolition of the Republic and the creation of a new ‘French State’ just four days earlier, made this understandable. However, the two other major commemorations, Armistice Day, in November, and Jeanne d’Arc’s feast day, in May 1941, were occasions which symbolised national prestige, pride and unity, qualities that the German government was determined to suppress. Towards the end of the year de Gaulle and the BBC’s French Service sought to encourage demonstrations at these times, calling citizens together at commemorative sites to encourage civilian dissent without inciting violence or provoking open confrontation.

Although these broadcasts were heard and acted upon across France, the northern Occupied Zone was subjected to restrictions not imposed in the south. Those in Paris were prohibited from celebrating national holidays such as Armistice Day except with permission from the MBF. Organising processions, displaying the national flag or singing the Marseillaise could lead to arrest. New regulations preventing reunions, cortèges, marches or the use of flags or bunting at commemorative days were introduced on 28 August 1940, with the thought of banning such activities long before Armistice Day.82 The public ceremony at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier under the Arc de Triomphe, the focus of Armistice Day commemoration since 1920 and a national holiday since 1922, would cease. For the Vichy government, acknowledging the end of the First World War was an embarrassment, especially five months after the humiliation of a comprehensive defeat. However, in a sense the German position was equally awkward. The occupiers did not seek to mock or deface the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, the signifier of its own defeat and the misery that followed at the hands of Allied forces. By contrast with the destruction of the Vincennes memorial, the MBF’s approach to this

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central site of French memory was literally to salute it. The title page of the November edition of *Der Deutsche Wegleiter für Paris* included a photograph of a single German soldier solemnly saluting before the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, accompanied by the command to ‘Gedenkt der Toten!’ (Remember the dead!).

The obvious contradictions in commemorating those who fought to kill Germans are compounded by the interest shown for the Tomb by German troops either posted to, or on leave in Paris, who appeared to have treated the site with respect, or at least as a prime location for taking tourist snaps. For the French, there was further confusion when a decision was made to shift Armistice Day from 11 November to 2 November, All Souls’ Day, imbuing what had been a secular event to honour the dead with religious meaning. Notre-Dame Cathedral became the substitute venue for the Arc de Triomphe, the service being given by the Archbishop of Paris, Cardinal Suhard, with Vichy representative General de la Laurencie in attendance. Newspaper coverage of the day was muted, although *Le Petit Parisien* stated that it was the dead of both wars that were being remembered, an interesting comment which mirrored the apparent neutrality of the *Wegleiter*’s editorial. In ignoring the traditional commemorative ceremony of the Armistice, the distinctions between French dead and German dead were becoming blurred.

The momentum towards a manifestation of protest had been slowly building since the reopening of the University of Paris at the end of July. Students who felt humiliation of occupation were determined to express their anger, at first by decorating the walls of the Latin Quarter and their classrooms with gaullist propaganda in the form of *papillons*, handwritten or crudely printed stickers with anti-German and anti-Vichy slogans. But it was after Pétain shook hands with Hitler in Montoire-sur-Loir on 24 October that momentum started to build. On 30 October, Pétain broadcast his intention to embark on a path of collaboration with Germany, the same day that renowned

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83 *Der Deutsche Wegleiter*, 7, 1-15 November 1940, p. 3.
physics professor Paul Langevin was arrested at the Collège de France, being suspected of
resistance activities. The Prefect of Police, Paul Langeron, noted in his journal on 7
November that gaullist propaganda was calling for students to leave flowers tied with
tricolor ribbons at the foot of the statue of Georges Clemenceau, the First World War
prime minister known as ‘the Tiger’, on the coming Sunday.85 On 8 November, a protest
to free Langevin manifested itself in the square of the Collège de France on rue des
Écoles, despite a call from the Collège’s director Edmond Faral that ‘no demonstration,
even a silent one’ should be allowed to take place; though fewer than 100 students were
involved, it also spilled out into minor manifestations around the Sorbonne, particularly
on the corner of rue Soufflot and boulevard Saint-Michel.86 German warnings that no
celebrations on 11 November would be tolerated were aired on Radio Paris, but
instructions for a bigger demonstration were already in circulation.87 Orders heard on the
BBC were being disseminated, mainly by word of mouth and tracts distributed between
students. The plan was simply to gather on the avenue des Champs-Élysées to
commemorate the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at 5:30pm. Though concise, the
wording afforded some rhetoric: ‘the 11 November 1918 was the day of a great victory.
The 11 November 1940 will signal an even greater one.’88

The first act of commemoration happened very quietly that Sunday but left its
mark on the course of the day. Around 5.30am, two members of the Musée de l’Homme
group, André Weil-Curiel and Léon-Maurice Nordmann, arrived to place flowers at the
foot of the statue of Clemenceau on the avenue des Champs-Élysées, along with a large
card dedicated to de Gaulle. Later that morning students began meeting at the Sorbonne
before crossing across the Seine towards the Arc de Triomphe, a journey that
geographically and politically shifted them from Republican Left to militarist, monarchist

86 Quoted in Philippe Burrin (trans. Janet Lloyd), France under the Germans, (New York:
documentation française, 2007), pp. 50-51.
87 Thibault, Les jeunes et la Résistance, pp. 50-51.
88 A surviving tract is presented on the website of the Musée de la résistance. Available at
Right, the same route taken by the ceremonial procession to bury the Unknown Soldier twenty years before.\textsuperscript{89} Throughout the day students also deposited their own tributes before the statue as they passed by, which the French police attempted to remove as best they could.\textsuperscript{90}

June Hargrove has asked why Clemenceau’s statue, among others, was saved by Vichy.\textsuperscript{91} Though Kirrily Freeman agrees that there ‘seemed to be no ideological rhyme or reason’ for the exemption, one possible explanation was the status of its sculptor, François Cogné.\textsuperscript{92} This commission, completed in 1930, a year after Clemenceau’s death, was just one of many; among his clients he counted Pétain, with whom he became well acquainted. By late 1940 Cogné had already been appointed the official sculptor to the Vichy administration, being given the task of producing a bust of Pétain to be mass-produced and installed in mairies across the country.\textsuperscript{93} Cogné’s work also served as a portal for what Henry Rousso calls the ‘contemporary referential’, a perspective through which the understanding of the Nazi occupation was ‘primarily based on the memories of the preceding war’, creating a phenomenon of continuity founded on shared war experiences.\textsuperscript{94}

That Clemenceau was ‘inseparable from wartime memories’ across the nation thus imbued the statue with an immediacy and relevance which few others possessed, and which its defiant composition, based on the films and photographs of his visits to the front lines, could only reinforce.\textsuperscript{95} Unlike the attire of typical statesmen, he is wrapped in a military greatcoat, wearing gaiters and carrying a stick under his arm; his hat is sometimes mistaken for a French casque (helmet). Poised as if entering a storm, his whole

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{89} Avner Ben-Amos, \textit{Funerals, Politics and Memory in Modern France, 1789-1996} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 219-223.
\item \textsuperscript{90} Guéhenno, \textit{Dark Years}, p. 34.
\item \textsuperscript{91} Hargrove, \textit{Statues}, p. 372.
\item \textsuperscript{92} Freeman, \textit{Bronzes to Bullets}, p. 185.
\item \textsuperscript{93} Laurence Bertrand Dorléac (trans. Jane Marie Todd), \textit{Art of the Defeat, France 1940-1944} (Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute, 2008), pp. 127-130.
\item \textsuperscript{95} Hargrove, \textit{Statues}, p. 271.
\end{itemize}
demeanour fulfilled Cogné’s brief to ‘show the man in full action’, standing not on an elaborate plinth but on a low flat boulder, reflecting his political groundedness and populist appeal. But beyond the military associations Clemenceau had more generally also come to represent the best of the Republic, particularly in terms of strong government, which contrasted sharply with the turbulence and instability that characterised French politics after his death in 1929. The police report later stated that 750 supporters had stopped to pay their respects at the foot of the statue.

The location of the siting of this statue had proved contentious. Though plans were proposed to place Clemenceau’s statue in the Tuileries, then at the Rond-Point on the Champs-Élysées, fears of cluttering Paris once again with monuments led to a battle ending in a modest victory: after more deliberation, place Clemenceau was established on the corner of avenue Aléxandre III (today avenue Winston Churchill). Once the scene of France’s victory parade in 1918, Clemenceau’s statue was now perfectly situated to observe the daily parade of an increasingly ruthless German occupier. Equally he was also a symbol to passing Germans of the man who had opposed them so vehemently. Such thoughts must have arisen during the deliberations of the Paris commission for the mobilisation of bronze statues, since Cogné’s work had been placed on a list of more politically sensitive statues for review by Vichy’s education minister; whether it was artistic merit that saved it, or fear that its removal would cause public outrage, is unknown.

Clemenceau’s symbolic importance for the resistance was significant. From its first issue, Combat, which became one of the biggest resistance movements and whose newspaper would later be edited by novelist Albert Camus, quoted Clemenceau for its strapline: ‘[d]ans la guerre comme la paix, le dernier mot est à ceux qui ne se rendent

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96 Ibid., p. 275.
98 Thibault, Les jeunes et la Résistance, p. 51.
99 Hargrove, Statues, pp. 271-272.
100 AN, 68 AJ/164, List of monuments reserved for the decision of the Secretary of State for National Education, n.d.
jamais’ (in war as in peace, the last word goes to those who never surrender). For one 
British agent, Pierre de Vomécourt, the Clemenceau name alone held the potential to 
reunite France and lead it to victory. Returning to London in 1942, de Vomécourt 
proposed Clemenceau’s son, Michel, whom he had secretly met during his mission in 
France, as a possible alternative to de Gaulle. However, Michel stood on the fringes of 
politics and had no inclination to offer himself as a candidate. After a meeting with de 
Vomécourt the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, cast his doubts on Clemenceau’s 
suitability and made no attempt to pursue the idea.

If the day started peacefully, rising tensions between students and police made 
both increasingly nervous. In small groups, the demonstrators came to witness the 
sombre atmosphere under the Arc de Triomphe and, in clear contravention of the 
regulations, lay flowers at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. One noticed a British flag 
among the bouquets and tricolour ribbons. Support for de Gaulle was evident too, 
famously illustrated by the appearance of students carrying two fishing rods (a visual pun 
on ‘deux gaules’, meaning two poles or rods). As more supporters began to surge 
westwards up the avenue des Champs-Elysées later that afternoon the French police, who 
had been anticipating trouble, held their lines but came under pressure as the numbers 
increased. Just after 5pm a scuffle broke out with a group of supporters of the pro-
German Jeune front, who were in uniform and giving Hitler salutes outside the Brasserie 
Tyrol, at the corner of rue Balzac on the north side of the Champs-Elysées. As the 
weather deteriorated, German troops situated in trucks around the Étoile finally moved 
in with bayonets fixed. Confrontations in the surrounding streets such as rue Marceau 
were accompanied by the sound of shots being fired, and a few teenagers were hit,

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101 Combat, No. 1, December 1941. In July 1941, the first edition of another clandestine 
newspaper, Libération-Sud, also opened with a quote from Jean Martet’s dialogues with 
Clemenceau in Le Tigre.
102 The National Archives, Kew (TNA), HS 9/1539/6, Pierre de Vomécourt Personal File, 
103 Micheline Bood, Les années doubles: Journal d’une lycéenne sous l’Occupation (Paris: 
104 Ibid., pp. 19-20.
though none was killed.\textsuperscript{105} No consensus exists on the total number of demonstrators, but estimates range between 3,000-10,000, bringing with them more than 1500 bouquets.\textsuperscript{106}

Even if the lack of organisation and planning among the demonstrators contributed to the chaos of the afternoon, the heavy-handed actions of the Germans and French police failed to maintain moral authority. The arrests of more than a hundred students – figures differ, but a German report that states 143 were held in custody – was followed by a cordonning off of the area around boulevard Saint-Michel, and orders from the MBF to close the University of Paris until further notice.\textsuperscript{107} Two days later, students living within the Seine département were also required to register daily at their local police station.\textsuperscript{108} Although the communists later declared themselves to be the instigators of the march, the nature of this manifestation was characterised by its heterogeneity, with students and lecturers from schools and universities across the city joining older non-students from diverse backgrounds.\textsuperscript{109}

Broadcasting on the BBC’s French Service on 23 December, Charles de Gaulle called for a New Year’s Day protest which would avoid repeating the violence of November by emptying the streets rather than filling them. Between 3pm and 4pm in the Occupied Zone, and 2pm and 3pm in the Unoccupied Zone, a ‘mute protest’ would be achieved by all French people by ‘remaining in their houses’.\textsuperscript{110} Although relatively few people actually heard the broadcast, the effect on nascent resistance press was evident.

The first edition of Libération, a typed sheet written by socialist and trade union official

\textsuperscript{105} A BBC broadcast on 18 November reported that 11 students had been killed. This was seen by the Germans simply as propaganda, but the question of whether anyone had died during the demonstration lingered. Alain Monchablon, ‘La manifestation à l’Étoile du 11 novembre 1940’, Vingtième Siècle: Revue d’histoire, 110 (2011), pp. 67-81.
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{107} AN, AJ 40/876, Memo from Militärbefehlshaber to regional commanders, 12 November 1940. The Sorbonne was reopened on 20 December.
\textsuperscript{108} Monchablon, ‘La manifestation à l’Étoile’, p. 74.
\textsuperscript{110} Charles de Gaulle, Discours aux Français, 18 juin 1940- 2 janvier 1944 (Algiers: Office Français d’Edition, n.d.), p. 68. Paris and Occupied France was run on German time from June 1940. Vichy France did not adopt the same time until May 1941.
Christian Pineau of the *Libération-Nord* movement, spread the word, urging its readers to stay at home. In mobilising ‘the emptiness of the street’ the city’s population ‘will show to the Germans the attraction that Parisians have for their “hosts”’.\(^{111}\) This call was also distributed by *Résistance*, the tract of the *Musée de l’Homme* group. Under the headline of ‘the hour of hope’, a phrase also taken from de Gaulle’s speech, it repeated his message that this ‘mute manifestation will unify the thought, suffering and trust of all French people’ and will demonstrate ‘our faith in the final victory and in the resurrection of France’.\(^{112}\) Following a brief broadcast by de Gaulle, at four o’clock the BBC French Service played the Marseillaise.

Judging the effectiveness of these calls to action through inaction is difficult: while one can estimate the size of a protesting crowd, the strength of an absence defies measurement. But foreign news reports were at best equivocal, suggesting that while some in Lyon and Marseille heeded de Gaulle, many others in Cannes ignored him.\(^{113}\) Moreover, there were other equally compelling reasons not to leave home: aside from being a public holiday, the winter temperatures were the coldest on record for decades. Whether families really gathered at home to reflect together ‘on their homeland and victory’ is also questionable.\(^{114}\) Parisian newspapers printed photographs of the snowbound Tuileries, Arc du Carrousel and deserted streets, but otherwise remained silent too.\(^{115}\) The clearest indicator of the action’s failure is the complete lack of German concern. A report to the MBF concluded that New Year’s Day had been ‘completely quiet’, mainly because of the exceptionally cold weather.\(^{116}\) Later that month de Gaulle’s ploy reportedly became the object of German mockery, when collaborationist Radio

\(^{111}\) *Libération*, No. 5, 29 December 1940, p. 2.

\(^{112}\) ‘L’heure d’esperance’, *Résistance*, 15 December 1940, p. 6.

\(^{113}\) ‘Test Fails to Show Whom French Back’, *New York Times*, 2 January 1941, p. 3;


Paris broadcast that for the next protest he would ask the French to lift the little fingers of their left hands and spit three times.117

**Joan of Arc Demonstration: 11 May 1941**

The first major commemorative demonstration of 1941 would be held on 11 May, the feast day of Joan of Arc. Unlike Clemenceau, her historic and symbolic importance was a great deal more complex. As a uniquely potent propaganda weapon, conflicting interpretations and claims to Joan’s influence were manifest from the early days of occupation. For the resistance, the image of the young, courageous militant determined to drive out a foreign occupier was obvious. For Pétain’s regime, Joan’s power lay in her moral and redemptive qualities, which incorporated romantic medieval notions of a true French race dogged by Jewish, Protestant, masonic and immigrant elements; she thus represented an alternative, provincial, pastoral mysticism that would become so central to Vichy’s National Revolution. Bizarrely, its propagandists sought to portray Pétain as a Joan-like figure, emphasising their common quest for national regeneration and moral purity rather than armed struggle against the occupier.118 Comparisons of the octogenarian hero of Verdun to the Maid of Orleans shaped the 11 May commemorations in Lyon, Limoges, and other cities across the Unoccupied Zone in 1942.119 In his broadcast on the day of celebration, his message to the French people emphasised duty and redemption, urging them to rally to Joan as ‘the symbol of France’ and offer her their love, loyalty and hope.120 However, ideas of her as a figure of resistance to occupation would also prove just as inspirational to many Parisians.

119 *Ibid*.
Beginning on the evening of 1 May, the BBC French Service called for action between 3pm and 4pm, during which the French ‘will circulate on the public promenades, alone, with their parents or their friends. They will observe silence.’ At 9.30pm the order was read again, instructing listeners to ‘pass before the statue of Jeanne d’Arc. But take care not to stop, not to form a parade, no shouting. Nothing. Beware of agents provocateurs.’

Five statues of Joan existed in Paris, all of them dressed in armour, portraying a more martial figure rather than a submissive martyr. The oldest and most obvious, by Emmanuel Frémiet, was erected in 1874, just after the Franco-Prussian war, and represented the first commemorative monument of the Third Republic. This gilded bronze of Joan astride a horse, holding aloft a standard, stood on the site of the newly constructed rue des Pyramides, linking the Louvre and Charles Garnier’s new opera house to the north. Aside from its central location, this area held great historical significance, since it was near this spot that the old porte Saint-Honoré once stood (since marked by a plaque), where Joan had been wounded during the fight to retake Paris from the English in September 1429.

At the time of its inauguration, the statue stood in front of the charred remains of the Tuileries Palace, an obvious reminder of the deep divisions within French society, but also of the possibility of a new era of national unity and renovation. It is the only statue of Joan in Paris to display any overt Catholic symbolism, ‘Jhesus Maria’ being inscribed on her banner. To some degree this denies exclusive appropriation: the proximity of the other statues to the church of Saint Augustin, Denys de la Chapelle and the Sacré-Cœur Basilica inevitably imbues them with Christian meaning and a greater antipathy to

121 AN, AJ 40/887, Note on gaullist propaganda, 6 May 1941.
122 Only one stands on the Left Bank, at boulevard Saint-Marcel; two equestrian statues, on place Saint-Augustin, and above the entry to the Sacré-Cœur Basilica; and one further north was sited at St Denys de la Chapelle, the eleventh century chapel where Jeanne reputedly once prayed.
Republican narratives. Moreover, its gilded finish and positioning within the geographical heart of the Paris more readily lent itself to notions of resistance than passivity. Surrounded by requisitioned buildings now in the hands of the enemy, including the Hotel Regina on the place des Pyramides itself, this beacon of French independence would have seemed to defy the invader, both in its dazzling appearance and close proximity to the occupation’s administration.\textsuperscript{124}

As with 11 November, 11 May began quietly. Arriving at the place des Pyramides at 10.45am, the Vichy ‘Delegate General to the Occupied Territories’ in Paris, Fernand de Brinon, was accompanied by Interior ministry delegate Jean-Pierre Ingrand, the Prefect of Police, Camille Marchand, and the Prefect of the Seine, Charles Magny, all of whom laid wreaths at the foot of the statue. With the French Republican Guard lining the square, six hundred members of Marcel Déat’s collaborationist \textit{Rassemblement National Populaire} (RNP) marched down the rue de Rivoli. The sunny weather ensured services being held at the church of Saint Augustin in the eighth \textit{arrondissement}, where small groups from the Vichy youth organisation \textit{Centres de la jeunesse} placed 53 bouquets of flowers at the foot of Jeanne’s statue. Services were also held at Notre-Dame Cathedral and several churches across the Latin Quarter including Saint-Séverin and Saint-Laurent.\textsuperscript{125}

At the beginning of the afternoon the whole city remained normal. Then two groups, one from the direction of the avenue des Champs-Elysées, the other from around the Palais-Royal, began to form along the parallel streets of rue Saint-Honoré and rue de Rivoli. The Tuileries started to fill; at 3.25pm, the strains of the Marseillaise could be heard coming from the Carrousel du Louvre. While the RNP’s rally was beginning across the Seine in the Latin Quarter, enacting scenes from George Bernard Shaw’s \textit{Jeanne d’Arc}, French police were sealing off the place des Pyramides to the thresholds of rue St Roch and rue de l’Echelle, pushing back increasing numbers of people towards the

\textsuperscript{124} The Hotel Regina was requisitioned in 1940. Desprairies, \textit{Paris dans la collaboration}, p. 35.
\textsuperscript{125} ‘La France a célébré dignement la fête de Jeanne d’Arc’, \textit{Le Matin}, 13 May 1941, p. 1.
Tuileries, place de la Concorde and the Palais Royal. Within half an hour, reinforcements had extended the barricade to the Rohan pavilion of the Louvre to the east, and all the way along the rue de Rivoli, effectively closing it and all the adjacent streets as far as rue de Mondovi.\textsuperscript{126}

Restricting their flow, protestors were channelled out of the Tuileries through the smaller gates and under the arches of the rue de Rivoli, directing them around the statue on the place des Pyramides. Some attempted to throw flowers, but the police prevented them from reaching the foot of the statue.\textsuperscript{127} The sporadic singing and taunting that had broken out earlier became stronger as protestors were channelled north past the offices of the \textit{Parti populaire français}, the collaborationist organisation of communist-turned-fascist Jacques Doriot, at 10, rue des Pyramides. Among the crowd was Raymond Burgard, a professor at the Lycée Buffon in the fifteenth \textit{arrondissement} and the founder of the \textit{Valmy} press network. \textit{Valmy} was typical of a grass-roots resistance group, growing from a mix of pre-existing friendships and associations, in this case between Catholics of the \textit{Jeune république}, a socialist group with left-leaning tendencies. Burgard had encouraged his students to take part in the Armistice Day demonstrations the previous November, and was leading from the front, inspiring the crowd to sing the Marseillaise. Being of Alsatian origin, he felt himself insured against the possibility of arrest.\textsuperscript{128} One person darted past the cordon to lay flowers below the plaque dedicated to Jeanne in front of the Café de la Régence, the former site of the porte Saint-Honoré, while small rallies briefly occupied the area by the Palais Royal.

As booing, the singing of the Marseillaise and cries of ‘vive de Gaulle’ grew outside the Kommandantur, the German central administrative office just opposite the Palais Garnier, additional troops arrived from the direction of rue de la Paix, confronting the crowd massing at the place de l’Opéra. The throng swung west through the

\textsuperscript{126} AN, AJ 40/887, Police report on Fête de Jeanne d’Arc, 11 May 1941.  
\textsuperscript{127} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{128} When the network collapsed later in 1942, Burgard was arrested. He was executed in Germany in 1944.
boulevard des Capucines and boulevard de la Madeleine, heading towards the statue of Joan at place Saint-Augustin, but here German trucks in nearby streets closed in to bar their way up boulevard Malesherbes. One of Burgard’s fellow resisters, Paulin Bertrand, describes the demonstration petering out there.\textsuperscript{129} By 4.30pm those at place de la Concorde who had been prevented from reaching the main protest had been largely dispersed, and by 5pm only pockets of protestors were left there, and on the avenue de l’Opera. At the Cathedral of Notre-Dame, Cardinal Suhard, oblivious to the commotion happening in the centre of the city, was attending vespers, while another service quietly took place at St Denis de la Chapelle, in the north of the city.

In some respects, the BBC’s warning to avoid forming a large gathering had failed, even if the results had been less costly than the Armistice Day protests. Moreover, there was no indication of the motives of those who had turned up. For all the chanting and catcalls, this was not a march with a clear gaullist agenda. Although describing the day as ‘a people’s rising’, Bertrand thought that many of those who turned up had done so ‘merely from curiosity’ and only ‘got bolder’ as the day progressed, a view shared by the French police.\textsuperscript{130} This differed from the editorial line of the May edition of \textit{Valmy}, which described how Germans had been ‘white with rage’ at seeing how ‘the revolutionary breath of Valmy passed over the people of Paris’.\textsuperscript{131} It estimated that 200,000-300,000 Parisians – a vastly over-inflated figure, presumably for propaganda purposes – had come together to pass by the statue of Jeanne at place des Pyramides.\textsuperscript{132} German and French sources do not give numbers, but a more plausible estimate would be a few thousand.

\textsuperscript{129} ‘Paul Simon’, \textit{One Enemy Only}, 69.
\textsuperscript{130} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 68. The police report referred to the ‘spontaneous character’ of the demonstrations, which ‘never gave the impression of having been organised’. Neither had there been any trouble in other areas of Paris. AN, AJ 40/887, Police report on Fête de Jeanne d’Arc, 11 May 1941.
\textsuperscript{131} ‘La Fête de Jeanne d’Arc’, \textit{Valmy}, May 1941.
By 6pm, the streets had returned to normal. There were no reports of shooting and only 42 demonstrators had been arrested, a fraction of the figure for the Armistice Day march. Curiously, the relighting of the flame at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, which was attended by 250 French reserve officers and officers’ widows at 6.30pm, proceeded in usual fashion and without incident. Paris newspapers gave enthusiastic coverage of the morning’s events, but were silent on the protest and arrests. The newsreel released the following week portrayed quiet, almost deathly ceremonies at both place des Pyramides and place Saint-Augustin, with the backgrounds of rue de Rivoli and boulevard Malesherbes looking completely deserted. Yet the German response was swift, holding Vichy responsible for the outrage even though it also strove to condemn the act. De Brinon batted away the protests as ‘a total failure’ but there were signs of the French administration’s embarrassment and sensitivity towards the event. A New York Herald Tribune reporter’s coverage of the protests caused a ten-day suspension of reporting freedoms for his ‘comments on the [Vichy] government’ following the Joan of Arc celebrations. Vichy was fined 20 million francs for this show of resistance, while the commandant of Greater Paris, Ernst Schaumburg, took immediate steps to deal more forcefully with public order violations. Those arrested for the same offenses in future would only be released with the explicit personal permission of Schaumburg himself. ‘I do not intend to tolerate a repetition’, he warned.

Two months later, a grand military parade filed down the avenue des Champs-Elysées and across the place de la Concorde, in honour of the Paris Commandant, 

133 AN, 72 AJ/81/I, piece 2d, Textes de conférences de Paul Simon à Londres, notamment celle intitulée ‘Comment la France résiste’, 1942.
135 For example, ‘La Fête de Jeanne d’Arc a été célébrée avec ferveur’, Le Petit Parisien, 13 May 1941, p. 1.
General Schaumburg. It reinforced his status as commandant and German military power in the city, and although demonstrations would continue, the increasing repression of the occupation would make it much more difficult to assert the same freedom to protest in the capital. The police were informed that some students planned to wear black ties and ribbons to mark the first anniversary of the German entry into Paris, on 14 June, but intervened in time. Such exercising of symbolic gestures would be dealt with more severely the following month, during the celebrations for 14 July.

Conclusion

Contrary to previous assumptions, the passing of statuary and monuments were mourned by Parisians. Their disappearance changed the spatial configuration of the city and were easily recognisable markers of the privations brought by occupation. Moreover, they changed people’s own cognitive maps of what home looked like. For some statues and monuments acted as a familiar marker on the way to the metro, to work or school; for others they were anchored to specific, important personal memories, and generated a topophilic connection that strengthened under occupation. The absence of a familiar figure on the street corner, even one made of bronze, became a signifier for loss. Empty space, haunted by the memory of what had once filled it, could distil the miseries and continual uncertainty that characterised occupation, as well as channel anger towards the occupiers. But this was not just a phenomenon confined to one’s immediate vicinity or neighbourhood. In the words of Tuan, ‘[t]he city itself can be a monument’. If the layout and geometry of the city itself served as an expression of the city’s society, hierarchies, values and sense of identity, the multitude of empty plinths and other spatial markers of occupation – requisitioned buildings, closed streets, German signage – were a constant reminder of the spatial distortions imposed by occupation.

140 ‘Un défilé des troupes allemandes à Paris’, Le Matin, 10 July 1941, p. 1.
142 Tuan, Topophilia, p. 197.
These changes affected the ways in which statuary and monuments were regarded, but also limited access to them. In some cases, this was a permanent arrangement, the outright destruction of pieces deemed offensive to the German administration. But what the two protests highlighted in this chapter demonstrate is how the transformation of the city under occupation, and particularly its geographical centre, only increased their power as focal points for the population. As Robert Gildea puts it, they become symbols ‘supercharged’ by the occupation.143 Amounting to a few thousand participants in both cases, neither of the protests featured here could be considered examples of mass protest or rebellion. But one has to place their scale in context. Unlike the villages and towns of the Unoccupied Zone, the extent of the German presence in Paris, the closer surveillance and the concentrations and extent of its security apparatus, not to mention Paris’s importance to the Germans in representing the ‘centre’ of the occupation of France made this a much more difficult environment in which to voice any form of resistance. Nevertheless, these actions represented an attempt to reappropriate places, and important symbolic places at that.

In the two examples of protest in 1940/41, of the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, and the statues of Clemenceau on the avenue des Champs-Elysées and Jeanne d’Arc on the place des Pyramides, one cannot overlook the geographical centrality of these two sites. Though the Germans and Vichy sought to revise and dissociate spatial connections to commemoration, such as removing the Arc de Triomphe from Armistice Day, the spatial draw of these locations were not easily dissolved. The early demonstrations around these sites can be seen as a contest for the city’s commemorative centre. It was in the breaching and appropriation of spaces vital to the German occupation, and in harnessing the topophilic pull that Parisians felt towards these sites, that the protests generated their power.

The Vichy programme of removing statues and monuments in Paris did not systematically destroy its bronze enemies or reshape the city to its own political ends. In decentralising the implementation of the process by delegating the decision-making to a local commission, the selection of statues and monuments became more a question of artistic merit and personal preference, as well as the logistics of demolition and available manpower, resulting in an execution list without any clear pattern or bias. If Vichy had intended an iconoclastic sweep across Paris, toppling all figures at odds with its own ideology, the outcome would have been very different. Prevarication over removing some politically sensitive pieces, such as that of Danton on boulevard Saint-Germain, or Clemenceau on the avenue des Champs-Elysées, also saved some, while Abel Bonnard, the education minister who had sought to broaden and expedite the campaign from 1942, unexpectedly stalled German demands to recycle a number of works, including Auguste Rodin’s *The Age of Bronze* and Jules Dalou’s *Delacroix.*

As Julian Jackson points out, dissidence and resistance can be viewed as distinct: to disobey may not necessarily constitute an act of resistance. Moreover, one can see these manifestations as a means not just of dissent, but as an act of social connection, of citizens coming together to participate in a collective national event. But in defying the occupation’s new regulations such acts can be seen at least as a means that facilitated the development of resistance, no matter in how minor or indirect a way. In revealing the ‘correct’ behaviour initially shown by German forces in the capital to be illusory, the MBF’s propensity for repression and brutality, as well as Vichy’s complicity in subjugating its own people, were laid bare. At this time the concept of organised secret armies remained a distant prospect, but the notion of resistance in its broadest sense gained legitimacy. It is also important to recognise that these first public demonstrations and expressions of gaullist support were not equalled by, or a consequence of, coherent


145 Jackson, *France: The Dark Years*, pp. 387-388. The complexities of defining ‘resistance’ are well beyond this chapter’s reach, but a list of the more recent discussions on the subject are given in Gildea, *Fighters in the Shadows*, footnote 8, pp. 498-499.
gaullist policies towards resistance. Jean-Louis Crémieux-Brilhac states that practically no real understanding had existed in London about the scale or willingness of the French people to act against the invader until the autumn of 1941. Just as the situation in London lacked clarity, de Gaulle’s orders could seem distant and irrelevant for those resisting in Paris. In the words of Christian Pineau, ‘we know him having listened to his speeches on Radio London, but he is not our chief. We took our first actions without him’. Similarly, for Combat’s leader Henri Frenay, resistance was ‘a new, original, diverse phenomenon which we invented step by step’, and did not depend on outside intervention. Nonetheless, the dissemination of de Gaulle’s broadcasts and edicts via word of mouth, on papillons plastered throughout Paris’s streets, and in the clandestine press was an early but significant step in strengthening public associations between his leadership, and the emergence of acts of resistance which reappropriated Parisian space.

With the entry into the war of Soviet Russia in June 1941, the swift participation of communists in resistance, and particularly the wave of assassinations committed during the latter half of the year, provoked de Gaulle to call for restraint and greatly increased the complexity of the situation. Following a crackdown on Bastille Day celebrations in July 1941, future demonstrations would prove to be much more muted. A police report on Armistice Day in November 1941 estimated 6600 Parisians to have passed by the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, ‘neither singing nor shouting’, with just fifteen being turned away for bringing flowers or wearing tricolour ribbons. The words ‘Français, vengez-moi!’ (People of France, avenge me!), scrawled at the foot of the Joan of Arc statue on place Saint-Augustin in 1941, were this time ignored.

150 AN, AJ 40/884, police report, 11-12 November 1941.
151 Ibid., 10-11 November 1941.
In this early phase of occupation, spaces traditionally understood to be symbolic of monarchist and nationalist values became focal points. The *voie royale*, running east-west from the Arc de Triomphe down the avenue des Champs-Élysées, through the Tuileries to the Hôtel de Ville, an axis with predominantly imperial and royalist meaning, became the front line for demonstrations and the focus of protestors’ attempts to reclaim spaces of cultural patrimony. Individual acts continued to mobilise these spaces. For example, when Catholic student Josèphe-Marie Cardin wanted to protest at the new law in June 1942, requiring the compulsory wearing of the yellow star for Jews, she chose the avenue des Champs-Élysées as the place to be wear a star donated by her Jewish friend. They were both arrested by French police at the Rond-Point, near Clemenceau’s statue.¹⁵²

Only Clemenceau, who is situated squarely, and in some ways incongruously, along this axis, stands out as a symbol of republicanism with sufficient cultural weight and meaning. Being referred to as ‘Père la Victoire’ and ‘le vieux Tigre’ in de Gaulle’s broadcast of 11 November 1941 reinforced his importance as a unique figure for resistance, and sometimes for clandestine meetings.¹⁵³ The power of his myth may not have equalled Joan of Arc’s, but Clemenceau’s vital connection with the previous war imbued his statue with a sense of relevance, continuity and immediacy that a fifteenth-century martyr could not. And yet when recounting his triumphant Liberation parade through the city on 26 August 1944, the path taken through the city by de Gaulle was more monarchical than presidential. After relighting the torch at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, de Gaulle acknowledged the statue of Clemenceau from the Champs-Élysées, which he described appearing ‘as if he were springing up to march beside us’.¹⁵⁴ From place de la Concorde, the sight of the Tuileries framed ‘the majesty of the state

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under two emperors and two monarchs’ before he passed by Joan of Arc and Henri IV on the Pont Neuf to attend a service at Notre-Dame Cathedral.\textsuperscript{155} That the bronze statue of de Gaulle in Paris, erected in 2000, should have been sited on the Champs-Elysées just a few yards from Clemenceau’s, was no surprise.\textsuperscript{156}

\textsuperscript{155} \textit{Ibid.}

Chapter Two

A Woman’s Place: Gendered Space and Resistance

In Marcel Aymé’s short story *Les Sabines*, published in 1943, a married woman living a
dull life in Montmartre develops an ability to multiply herself.¹ In one of her parallel
lives, Sabine pursues an affair with Theorem, a pretentious, procrastinating artist, and
joins him on holiday in Brittany while her other half dutifully follows her husband to the
Auvergne. Soon she begins to expand her alternate horizons on a grander scale, sending
off increasing numbers of her other selves – some 67,000 by the final count – to travel
the world, marrying aristocrats, Indian princes and living according to their whims and
desires. However, things start to unravel when one of her many alter egos, Cunégonde,
attempts to atone for her moral failings and moves to Saint-Ouen in the *Zone*, then a
suburban wilderness just outside Paris’s city limits. There she is raped by a brutish
criminal, and is finally murdered along with Theorem, thus ending the lives of Sabine
and all of her doubles.

As with another of his stories published the same year, *Le passe-muraille* (The Man
Who Walked Through Walls) – in which an ordinary Montmartrois learns to pass
through solid objects and embarks on a crime spree, safe in the knowledge that no cell
can confine him – Aymé’s preoccupation with supernatural forms of spatial freedom
seem inspired by the restrictions of occupation.² In the case of *Les Sabines*, one can also
clearly identify some other contemporary themes: the depraved murderer preying on
women invites comparisons with the conduct of the German occupier, and the title itself
refers to the legend of the abduction of the Sabine tribe’s women by the ancient Romans,

² *Ibid.*, pp. 1-15. That Aymé chose to sell these and other stories to collaborationist
magazines such as Je Suis Partout and La Gerbe earned him considerable criticism, but
he faced no legal proceedings following the Liberation. For an appreciation of the
relevance of Aymé’s work to the occupation and the question of collaboration, see
Kenneth Mouré, ‘Marcel Aymé and the Moral Penury in Occupied France’, *French
which led to war and then a union of the two sides, bearing certain similarities to the creation of Vichy France. Moreover, Sabine herself can be seen to represent a multidimensional existence that stands as a potent metaphor for Parisian women’s experiences under occupation. With husbands in prisoner-of-war camps in Germany, children suffering from the privations of rationing and a government wishing to restrict their social, economic, political and spatial freedoms, women were forced to adapt and transform themselves to meet a bewildering number of challenges and restrictions. In confronting the changes, demands and impositions of the Vichy government and the German occupiers, women could find themselves performing many different roles – mother, housewife, breadwinner, resister – some of which would have been unimaginable before 1940. For those who chose to resist, the challenges of maintaining different public, private and clandestine lives presented unique, mortal dangers.

In the late 1990s, H.R. Kedward recalled a conference organised by the Union des femmes françaises in Paris in 1975 as ‘a high point in women’s reclamation of their resistance past’, but also conceded that women resisters had continued ‘to be treated either as a small number of outstanding heroines, or as an anonymous, background element in an essentially male story’. While the focus on individual women’s lives is still very much a feature of resistance history today, it has broadened somewhat in the last twenty-five years, to consider other social groups and the everyday experiences of women. Within the field of women’s resistance during the occupation, however,

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relatively little progress has been made since Jean-Marie Guillon’s evaluation of the subject more than a decade ago, when he noted that historians’ approaches had been predominantly reductive and exclusively focused on their political aspects. And though one can identify some interest in examining geographical differences and specificities, questions surrounding the relationships between gender, resistance and the importance of space and place have been effectively ignored.

To investigate the interplay of these factors, I will focus on two celebrated, communist-led resistance actions taking place during the summer of 1942 on rue de Buci and rue Daguerre, in the sixth and fourteenth arrondissements respectively. Although women in resistance have been predominantly associated with ‘auxiliary’ roles (supporting male resisters, hiding fugitives or Allied escapers, obstructing police raids, courier and liaison work), closer analysis of these particular examples of female-led actions reveal a complex interaction between resistance, gender and space. Specifically, this chapter will argue that the relationship between these gendered places and the resistance events that occur is an intimate and reciprocal one. The long-established pre-war identities and characteristics of these places, shaped predominantly by the lives and spatial practices of working-class women, were profoundly altered under occupation. Rather than appearing a blank, incidental background, these changes determined their selection by communists as resistance targets, and the necessary selection of women to lead both operations. Passing as housewives, their attempt to ‘reoccupy’ and reclaim these spaces was thus legitimised by the delineation of traditional gender roles.


Gender, Mobility and Resistance

From the beginning of occupation in June 1940, the policies of both the Germans and the Vichy government and their political, social and economic effects changed the gendering of spaces of Paris. Vichy’s conception of the place of women, defined by the values of its révolution nationale and the vision of a return to traditional gender roles, centred on an idea of a withdrawal away from the workplace and into the home. This first manifested itself in October 1940 with a policy prohibiting married women in the civil service, and the forced retirement of women over the age of 50. But as the occupation continued, so an inevitable contradiction developed in Vichy’s position: most women could not embody an ideal and survive without economic or financial support. By 1942, the exigencies of occupied life and German demands for labour began to prevail over folkloric notions of femininity, and while increasingly draconian laws concerning abortion and marital rights continued to erode women’s independence, their return to the workplace became essential. Women’s increasing mobility in no way reflected the state’s adoption of a more enlightened view. Yet by September 1942, a husband could no longer prevent his wife from working, and the following year women were able to take jobs as auxiliaries in the post office, the railways and in the police.\(^8\) Despite these relaxations, however, the number of men in the capital was continuing to fall. In addition to Parisian men in prisoner-of-war camps, the effects of the Service du travail obligatoire (the compulsory labour service introduced in February 1943) resulted in more than 180,000 men being exported, while others fled for the provinces.\(^9\) The effects of this depletion in male labour were apparent in everyday life, but they also had significant effects for those working in the spheres of resistance.

If the impositions of Vichy sought to confine and constrict women’s lives in Paris, the minority who became involved in resistance networks faced particular challenges.

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Some forms of resistance depended on private spaces as camouflage, extending home life as a form of cover. Many women were not devoted full-time to resistance work, and had to fit in work, academic study, housework and childcare with their other clandestine commitments.\textsuperscript{10} The Comet Line, an escape line passing downed Allied pilots between Brussels and the Pyrenees, run by a young Belgian woman, Andrée de Jongh, relied greatly on female resistance workers who could offer shelter to individuals or small parties on their way south. When Paris became its centre of operations in 1942, a number of apartments in the Vaneau area of the seventh arrondissement were dedicated to Comet’s work. Several addresses along rue Vaneau and rue de Babylone were employed, while another on the adjoining rue Oudinot became Comet’s headquarters.\textsuperscript{11} Leaders of such networks were also often women, who involved themselves in the transporting of ‘bodies’ across France as well as the day-to-day business of keeping their organisations secure.\textsuperscript{12} Beyond some celebrated examples, however, assessing the extent of women’s roles in more ‘homebound’ resistance continues to remain awkward, not least since many women did not recognise the role they played themselves, or preferred not to take the credit after the war.\textsuperscript{13}

Much has been written about the opportunities afforded to female liaison agents and couriers, who were often perceived by police and occupying forces as innocent because of their gender and thus able to more easily pass through checkpoints and evade capture. By consciously acting out or exaggerating what might be construed as ‘traditional’ female behaviour – accenting physical weakness, passivity or sexual

availability, for example – women could potentially better exploit and take control of a situation where more masculine qualities would have failed. 14 Particularly for the women who committed themselves to these forms of resistance, mobility was clearly an essential prerequisite. However, while such work could be rewarding, it was evidently far from liberating. The eradication of many bus services, the closures of metro stations, the disappearance of taxis and even the scarcity of bicycle tyres or comfortable footwear recalibrated notions of scale and distance within the minds of Parisians: a journey that once took thirty minutes across the city might now take hours, especially if it was interrupted by police checks. And though the imposition of German checkpoints and street closures were most obvious in the centre of Paris, the rest of the city could feel at times to be something of a maze, too: why the roads of the thirteenth arrondissement had been blocked around the porte d’Italie, porte de Gentilly, porte de Choisy and porte de Vitry remained a mystery to its residents, as well as an inconvenience. 15 Cécile Ouzoulias, a liaison agent who carried messages for her husband, Albert, across the city, wrote that her resistance work was a demanding full-time occupation, which left no time for household chores: moving from one rendezvous to the next, she estimated travelling an average of thirty kilometres a day on foot, and closer to a hundred after obtaining a bicycle in 1943. 16 While such distances are possibly exaggerated, the gruelling physical nature of this job was nonetheless impressive, as was a courier’s ability to pass through a city whose roads and communications were becoming ever narrower and constricted. 17

17 Cécile’s husband stated that one of his couriers cycled more than 75 kilometres per day. See ‘Les Femmes: Sans elles, la moitié de notre travail aurait été impossible’, L’Humanité, 31 August 1944, pp. 1-2.
Communist resisters such as Ouzoulias typically faced the same economic hardships as other ordinary working-class women, though the outlawing of the Communist Party in September 1939 had also required its followers to adapt to clandestine living long before the beginning of the occupation. They were also familiar with clearly defined structures and hierarchies that gave them an advantage over more ‘homegrown’ réseaux, that sometimes took a more cavalier attitude to security. In addition, smaller independent networks could require female recruits to combine their courier work with numerous other responsibilities. Yvonne Paraf, who became an essential member of the underground publishing house Éditions de Minuit (the Midnight Press), transformed her own kitchen, the supposed focal point of every woman’s domestic existence under Vichy, into a space of resistance activity: from here in her small top-floor apartment on rue Vineuse in the sixteenth arrondissement, she translated foreign manuscripts for printing as well as helping to glue and stitch the books themselves, on one occasion producing 500 copies in just two weeks.\(^{18}\) Described by her childhood friend and founder of the group, Jean Bruller, as their ‘indefatigable organiser’, she also served as a distributor for the network, providing new stock to local bookstores and even to a discreet bouquiniste on the banks of the Seine.\(^ {19}\) As the network’s name spread, she also made trips south into the Unoccupied Zone as a representative, secretly approaching writers who might contribute their work.\(^ {20}\) The spatial distribution of printers in Paris, sited near the metro stations of Monge and Austerlitz on the opposite side of the city to Paraf’s apartment, necessitated arduous and dangerous journeys, and as their operations began to demand more space, Paraf posed as a black marketeer in order to obtain a room at 15 rue Servandoni, a suitably secluded street between the Jardin du Luxembourg and Saint-Sulpice church, in the sixth arrondissement. The landlady believed that ‘Madame Desvignes’ would use it to store cosmetics and knew nothing about its real use as a depot for illegal books.\(^ {21}\)

This address already had something of a clandestine history, having once been the refuge of the Marquis de Condorcet during the revolutionary Terror of 1793. As Paraf considered the metro too dangerous, and buses and taxis were no longer available, she resorted to delivering lead type, paper stocks and finished books by bicycle, a job which left many ‘unpleasant memories’ of the gendered nature of the occupied street. Since the weight of her baggage would regularly result in a flat tyre, her only option was to wheel her bicycle to her next destination, raising the possibility that a passing German officer might stop and offer his help to an apparently innocent woman. While this threat clearly preoccupied her, she did not mention whether such an incident ever occurred. But in spite of her myriad roles, Paraf was never caught.

By mid-1942, Francs-Tireurs et Partisans (FTP), the recently launched armed wing of the Communist Party, was particularly reliant on its female recruits for intelligence work: though small in number, half of the agents working for its section on the Left Bank were women. But this relative freedom of movement for women was not exploited by the FTP for armed actions, and only exceptionally did women undertake killings on the streets of Paris. Teenage resister Madeleine Riffaud, who had cut her teeth on liaison work with the FTP, later earned the admiration of many male resisters for her assassination of a German soldier by Solférino bridge in July 1944. Rather than viewing resistance and civil disobedience as ‘temporary responses to extraordinary circumstances’ and only legitimate under the conditions of occupation, Riffaud believed them to be inseparable from the struggle to create a better society, and thus represented a direct link

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20 Debû-Bridel, Éditions de Minuit, p. 49.
21 Vercors, The Battle of Silence (London: Collins, 1968), pp. 231-232. For the sake of security, Bruller sometimes used the name ‘Monsieur Desvignes’, though he and Paraf were never married or romantically involved.
22 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Liaigre, Les FTP, p. 79.
to previous revolutionary insurrections all the way back to 1789.\textsuperscript{26} Though the FTP did not approve her action, or armed actions by women in general, Riffaud later described this assassination on the street in broad daylight as ‘a job for a woman’ (‘seule le femme peut le faire’), and refers in one of her poems to ‘the man you heard shooting …was me’.\textsuperscript{27} Riffaud’s postwar stature is thus closely tied to the overt nature of her resistance activity: unlike most female resisters, she came out of the shadows to undertake what was considered a task for men, disregarding the boundaries of gendered space. Yet there is also a sense in which she appropriated aspects of male identity in order to break the norms of resistance. For example, she took a male codename, ‘Rainer’, from the German poet Rainer Maria Rilke, a provocative act which challenged the role she was expected to play as a woman.\textsuperscript{28} (This particular form of passing was by no means unique, or rare: for example, the Comet Line’s leader Andrée de Jongh requested that her British handlers change her codename from ‘Postwoman’ to ‘Postman’.\textsuperscript{29}) Moreover, her overriding inspiration came from one of her male ancestors: from an early age her great-great grandfather, Edme Liron, a Parisian revolutionary who had manned the barricades against the coup led by Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte in 1851, became a mythic figure in her life.\textsuperscript{30} Taking up arms and fighting on the same streets thus situated her in what Keren Chiaroni calls ‘a narrative of intergenerational legacies and inherited features’, where the city’s spaces resonated with intertwined personal, family and national legacies.\textsuperscript{31}

\textsuperscript{26} Keren Chiaroni, \textit{Resistance Heroism and the End of Empire: The Life and Times of Madeleine Riffaud} (London: Abingdon: Routledge, 2017), p. 35.
\textsuperscript{27} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 47.
\textsuperscript{28} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 33.
\textsuperscript{31} Chiaroni, \textit{Resistance Heroism}, p. 7.
Although women working in communist networks mostly survived on slender means, more abundant financial resources could improve one’s mobility and allay possible suspicion. This is particularly noticeable in cases of ‘external’ resistance, and specifically women infiltrated into occupied France to work as undercover agents, who often arrived with substantial sums of cash to fund their missions. On reaching Paris in March 1944, Jeanne Bohec, an agent sent by the London-based Bureau central de renseignements et d’action (BCRA) as a sabotage instructor, recalled the welcome of two female liaison agents at a rendezvous outside Concorde metro, who, unlike some of her male BCRA colleagues, ‘understood very well that for the special work that awaited me a woman was worth as much as a man.’

Having dined in London the previous night, Bohec was somewhat disconcerted when the three of them went to lunch around the corner at Maxim’s, a restaurant routinely filled with German officers and collaborators. Despite her nervousness at being in such a dangerous, male-dominated venue, their presence was apparently ignored. While Bohec’s adventures in Paris can be corroborated, the reported abilities of other female agents to operate unnoticed in such environments are less convincing. Interviewed by Paula Schwartz in the 1980s, a woman known only as ‘Claude’ purported to have been a communist femme fatale who was ordered to seduce a Gestapo officer at Maxim’s. Luring him in the back of a taxi (a form of transport that had disappeared from Parisian streets), she claimed to have produced a gun and shot him dead as they drove down the rue de Rivoli, an unlikely tale that would benefit greatly from some corroboration.

Judging where the ‘front lines’ of women’s clandestine lives lay is problematic. Beyond the difficulties in assessing what constitutes resistance, a question which is inextricably linked to how forms of women resisters have been remembered and portrayed, attempting to draw the boundaries of ‘home’ and ‘public’ forms of resistance

33 Ibid.
often defy simple quantitative or comparative evaluations. In examining occupied life in rural southern France, Kedward’s notion of ‘the woman at the doorway’, an obstructive figure capable of delaying a police search while incriminating material was being disposed of inside, or maquisards were making their getaway through the back door, clearly illustrates how some forms of resistance can relate to the threshold of home in material terms. But under occupation the idea of ‘home’ space was commonly extended to the street and beyond, redefining Parisians’ perceptions of ‘private’ and ‘public’ realms. All of Paris was ‘home’ to some: Sonia Vagliano-Eloy, a student protestor at the Armistice Day demonstrations in November 1940, later wrote, ‘[t]hey were there, chez nous, and that was unbearable’. For French women particularly, this sense of being invaded was closely connected and affected by a sense of connection to the street, especially the shopping areas in their neighbourhoods, and their roles as wives and mothers. When rationing was introduced by the Vichy government in September 1940, only mothers eligible for a carte de priorité, a card that entitled larger families to increased food allowances and priority in queues, could make use of it, a restriction that not only reinforced gender roles but also ensured the necessity of her maintaining a connection with the marketplace in order to shop for the household. In some respects, the disappearance of so many men from Paris had increased the associations of women with shopping areas, as they were taking over the running of stores. But as consumers, and more specifically providers for their families, these notions of territoriality soon began to relate to survival as much as sovereignty.

36 Kedward, In Search of the Maquis, pp. 89-90.
38 Ibid, p. 112.
‘Endless queues, tramping in the mud’

The phenomenon of the shopping queue under occupation changed the rhythms of everyday life in the capital and revolutionised the character of its streets. In another of Marcel Aymé’s stories from 1943, *En attendant* (While Waiting), the routine of queueing outside a grocer’s store in Montmartre’s rue Caulaincourt brings together a forlorn band of fourteen strangers – among them a prostitute, an elderly dressmaker, a mother of four starving children, the wife of a prisoner-of-war – united by their tales of rationing misery and hatred for government officials, the racketeers and the rich. As Kenneth Mouré has noted, changes to the food economy ushered in ‘a whole new dimension of sociability…Material need fostered new social relations and a communal sense of economic justice’. Though there may have been some exceptional Parisians who refused to join a queue, considering this an act of resistance, for nearly everybody else the humiliation of waiting in the street became an unavoidable aspect of daily existence. Those with friends and relatives in the provinces could take advantage of regular food parcels, though resorting to such measures became morally awkward: Jean Guéhenno admitted in February 1941 that ‘[o]ne feels rather ashamed to eat. The poor people in the neighbourhood have no more bread…If we’re still eating in our house, it’s because we’re members of the bourgeoisie and can send for packages from Brittany at great expense.’ More generally, however, the search for food, whether by legal means or through black market channels, lured life back to the streets, the pavement becoming ‘a living room where women came with the latest local gossip’. In the news vacuum created by controlled press, censorship and propaganda, queues soon became rumour mills, where

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45 Guéhenno, *Dark Years*, p. 60.
fantastic tales often brought colour to the lives of those who spent countless hours waiting in line, reflecting people’s wishes more than probable reality. For example, in September 1941 a queue bystander overheard the news that Marcel Déat, leader of the collaborationist Rassemblement national populaire (National Popular Rally) party, had been recognised in the street and chased by people intending to cut him to pieces.47 As Jean-Marie Guillon has noted, such stories represented in themselves a ‘black market of information’ but also created a ‘daily solidarity’ outside shop doorways and an ephemeral, isolated form of ‘resistance limited to words’.48

The ubiquity of queues on Parisian streets made them targets for those wanting to encourage dissent against the government and distribute propaganda in the form of illegal tracts. As a phenomenon of the occupied street, the queue was unique in the way its constituents created its own social rules and strategies. A resister who distributed communist propaganda in the street noticed how queueing women were typically composed of a ‘silent majority’, wary not just of the consequences of voicing anti-Vichy or anti-German sentiments, but also of the collaborators who habitually infiltrated queues, blaming the queues on the sins of the Third Republic and the fecklessness of the pre-war Popular Front government.49

As food supply difficulties worsened, the volatility of these gatherings inevitably worried the city’s administrators. At the end of February 1942, the Prefect of the Seine reported that the ever-lengthening waiting lines had become ‘a new centre of propaganda’, which was having ‘an unfortunate effect on the morale of the population.’50 Queues were thus creating and occupying new forms of gendered urban space: as the social and economic power that housewives had once exercised over their local markets and stores weakened, the queue became the focal point of the street, where prospective

female customers – in some cases travelling outside their own neighbourhoods – found themselves spending hours in close physical proximity with similarly frustrated housewives, unsure if stocks would run out before they reached the counter. For the Communist Party, the recruitment and mobilisation of disaffected and angry women as potential supporters would become an important objective. Yet as one propagandist later reported, many housewives were really concerned only with finding something to eat, not with reading tracts.51

The lack of food, rising food prices relative to wages was provoking ‘frequent verbal manifestations of discontent’ from women on the street.52 But while the communists were able to portray the burgeoning black market both as the fault of Pétain’s government and the capitalist opportunists who were profiting from the miseries of hungry Parisians, Vichy lacked the administrative infrastructure and resources to effectively combat such a huge problem, and to some extent gave into it.53 One notable example of its perceived prevalence was the resignation in July 1941 of Jean Achard, Vichy’s Minister of Food Supply, following accusations that his murky, profitable relationships with large food producers were to blame for the capital’s failing food stocks.54 Ultimately Vichy’s later attempts to restore public support by handing out seized black market goods were of little value, and itself became embroiled in its own forms of theft: while the Milice (Vichy’s militia, a paramilitary force dedicated to hunting Jews, communists and resisters) was busy handing out ‘liberated’ tins of contraband food to the people in the

51 Ibid.
52 Institut d’Histoire du Temps Présent (IHTP), Synthèse des rapports des préfets – Zone Occupée, November 1941. Available at http://www.ihtp.cnrs.fr/prefets/fr/content/synth%C3%A8se-zone-occup%C3%A9e-novembre-1941-mi [accessed 2 August 2018]
54 Ibid. See also Jackson, France: The Dark Years, p. 333. Fabrice Grenard has proposed the view that Achard was the victim of a campaign by the collaborationist press to oust him. See Fabrice Grenard, Les scandales du ravitaillement (Paris: Payot & Rivages, 2012), pp. 75-91.

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poorest districts in 1944, it was also helping to distribute furniture stolen from Jewish homes; neither helped to win the hearts and minds of the recipients.  

Despite the Vichy government’s attempts to blame food shortages on Allied blockades and bombing, the scale of German requisitioning was impossible to explain away. The appearance of queues along streets represented visible and increasingly irrepressible contradictions of Vichy propaganda, and became focal points for exploiting political discontent specifically among women, inciting anti-German sentiment and provoking political action. Vichy had been aware of the potential political and social power of waiting lines, having in 1940 introduced the censoring of photographs showing them. In September the same year, the prefect of the Paris police already noted their potential as ‘centres of intrigues, provocations and denunciations’, leading to the introduction of police units dedicated to their surveillance. However, it was impossible to prevent their influence seeping into the national consciousness. In Paris and other areas where food was harder to obtain, girls incorporated scenarios of fruitless queueing and empty shelves into their play, imitating the adults around them. Consequently, any refusal to acknowledge the capital’s suffering could only rebound on Vichy. When Fernand de Brinon declared in June 1941 that ‘life in Paris is normal’, local responses were scathing. The editorial of one tract stated that ‘M. Brinon has without doubt never had contact with the people of Paris, with the real face of actual Paris, that of housewives rising at dawn, anxious to find that, after 3 or 4 hours of queueing, the shortage of food, the meagre pittance of the brood’. Privately, of course, de Brinon was

55 For example, see the images in Françoise Denoyelle, La photographie d’actualité et de propagande sous le régime de Vichy (Paris: Éditions CNRS, 2003), p. 190; and Fabrice Grenard, La France du marché noir (Paris: Éditions Payot et Rivages, 2008), pp. 205-207.
56 Denoyelle, La photographie d’actualité, p. 119.
all too aware of the situation: in a report to Pétain the following month, he revealed that Parisians were unable to obtain more than one-seventh of their ration entitlement, which on average would equate to fewer than 200 calories per day.61 Beyond the physical changes to Paris’s landscape, the changes to its economic life were profoundly altering its character. The boundaries between the city and the Zone, the old belt of land once known as the refuge of ragpickers, itinerants and the dispossessed on the periphery of Paris, no longer felt so definite. The privations and hardships of the occupation were not only transforming Paris, they were turning all Parisians into zoniers of a sort, exiles in their own city, reduced to living on the margins of civilised life.62

**Women’s Journals**

From the beginning of the occupation, resistance activity among women communists was closely supported by the production of clandestine journals and tracts. They were written, edited, printed and distributed by the comités féminins, women’s committees formed in 1940 to gather grass roots support in their local districts and neighbourhoods. Typically composed of single sheets, they were evidently constrained by shoestring budgets and limited printing facilities: while non-communist titles such as Défense de la France and Combat became increasingly professional in their production standards, editions of tracts such as La Voix des Femmes (the name of a women’s rights newspaper begun in the revolutionary days of 1848) which appeared in local varieties across the southern suburbs of Paris, continued to be copied from handwritten or hastily typewritten originals, with crudely drawn illustrations. This lack of sophistication suggests a limited readership, but it also reflected the audience which it was targeting. As Karen Adler has described, their content was driven by a ‘limited repertoire’ of subject

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matter typically restricted to themes of ‘patriotic motherhood’, ‘sacrifice’ and ‘daring’.63

Style and content were simply matched: the typical nature of their content, particularly in the calls for more bread, milk for infants, help for the wives of prisoners-of-war and so on, was certainly repetitive – in fact the call for 500 grams of daily bread remained a familiar but unfulfilled demand throughout the whole of the occupation. But this rudimentary presentation also reflected the conditions under which ordinary people were living. Early tracts also encouraged petitions to confront their local town halls over food and other shortages.64

Though surviving examples are far from complete, those produced by Parisian committees strongly reflect their local focus. Indeed, their simplicity and repetitive messages were the basis for expanding communist influence across Paris and mobilising its existing support within the suburban ‘red belt’ that encircled it. In working-class districts, the connections between the street and the dissemination of political thought were well established. In his study of the quartier de la Gare in the thirteenth arrondissement, sociologist Henri Coing described the pre-war worker selling the communist newspaper L’Humanité on the street corner as the ‘natural delegate of his street’.65 The distribution of material which referred to specific local situations and problems faced by women looked to encourage direct intervention in economic matters and provoke confrontation in public spaces. This could involve marches on town halls and administrative centres, to highlight the failures of Vichy bureaucracy in combating the rapidly escalating black market activity, and to demand the release of stockpiled food and goods.66 In respect of contraband, Vichy and its female communist critics were remarkably aligned: though it always lacked the administrative infrastructure to seriously curtail the black economy, Pétain’s regime preached similar rhetoric about the suffering

64 ‘Quelques modèles de listes de petition’, Propagande feminin, February 1941, p. 7.
66 La Voix des Femmes, 20ème arrondissement, May 1943, p. 2.
caused by the avarice of capitalist opportunists, whose selfishness had contributed to France’s defeat in 1940.

Not only did separate committee groups produce an edition for each _arrondissement_, detailing specific local matters, but they also voiced concerns about ‘enemies’ at a neighbourhood level, naming black market profiteers and those alleged to be stockpiling goods for personal gain. For example, in January 1941 _Nous les femmes_, a tract produced by the women’s committee of the seventeenth _arrondissement_, pointed a finger at the owner of a business on rue des Moines in the working-class neighbourhood of Batignolles, who was accused of profiting from queues by preventing the distribution of goods for sale.67 _La Ménagère Parisienne_, a later publication dating from 1943, drew attention to stores on rue de Flandres in the nineteenth _arrondissement_, where a million tins of sardines and a thousand kilos of coffee were supposedly being kept hidden from its customers.68 Those suspected of hoarding goods rather than selling them could be equally despised. Ninetta Jucker saw:

>a curious deviation, probably due to fear of the Germans, irritation over the shortage of food was more often directed against the French government and its delegates, the retailers, than against the occupying authorities...the small shopkeeper class was hated because of the barter it waged with products which ought to have been on general sale...In the event of a popular insurrection it was generally supposed that the shopkeepers would be the first victims.69

The Prefect of the Seine agreed with this view, characterising the figure of the trader as a ‘local tyrant’.70 The complicity of both Vichy and German officials in this racketeering was also targeted: while Parisian children and the elderly were reduced to skimmed milk, the director of the _police municipale_, Émile Hennequin, and the _Soldatenkaffee Madeleine_, a German-only café in central Paris, were offered generous daily quotas.71

That the French authorities themselves were struggling to combat preferential treatment

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70 Avakoumovitch, ‘Les manifestations de femmes, 1940-1944’, p. 11.
71 _Ibid._
being given to certain suppliers only compounded the problem. In April 1941 one report noted the dissatisfaction of small retailers who felt they were losing business because market regulations favoured their bigger competitors. They cited the case of the ‘Le Sphinx’ on boulevard Edgar Quinet, known to many German clients as one of the most luxurious Paris brothels, whose manager was able to buy four crates of chickens from a larger operator while more modest storekeepers were still waiting for delayed deliveries of stocks.²² According to a police report in April 1941, other exclusive restaurants in Paris secured similarly valuable connections with butchers at Les Halles and La Villette, including the ‘One-Two-Two’, one of the Sphinx’s competitors on rue de Provence, as well as the Lido and Fouquet’s on the Champs-Elysées, and La Tour d’Argent.²³

Such pressing concerns did not prevent the editorial of women’s propaganda from connecting this struggle to the city’s long history of insurrection. As Madeleine Riffaud believed, the importance of historical continuity, of situating one’s actions in relation to the revolutions of 1789 and the nineteenth century was a way of legitimising resistance work, but also of framing personal stories within the city’s history. The Women’s March on Versailles in October 1789, which set out to demand bread from the king and precipitated his return to Paris and all that followed, is frequently cited in articles throughout the occupation. One tract from 1943 declared ‘women and mothers of Paris, we must put an end to the criminal machinations and resolve the question of bread in the manner of the women of [17]89’.²⁴ Just as the Communards of 1871 had looked back to the revolutionary city of the 1790s for inspiration, so comparisons of hardship led some to recall stories once recounted by relatives of daily life during the Siege of Paris by the Prussians in 1870-71. In her journal, Simone de Beauvoir compared the meagre offerings of menus during the occupation to those of the starving city seventy years before, which

²² Archives de la Préfecture de Police, Paris (APP), BA 1807, Rapports diverses 1940-1941, Ministère du ravitaillement: État d’esprit de la population, unsigned report, 12 April 1941.
²⁴ Sauvetage de la famille française (Organe de combat des femmes françaises dans le Front National), March 1943, p. 1 [emphasis in original].
had featured elephant, antelope and other animals from the zoo of the *Jardin d’acclimatation.*\(^75\)

The question of family members being conscripted for work in Germany was met with calls for readers to defend their families by encouraging women to defy the drafts, a sentiment which was made more acute by Vichy’s proposal to introduce labour service for women without children in early 1944. Though never implemented, it was another sign of economic imperatives competing with policies to enforce a more housebound femininity. Communist propaganda exhorted readers to resist the labour programmes for sons and husbands by refusing to fill out official forms, particularly after the introduction of the *Service du travail obligatoire* in 1943. The message was typically simple in its call to action: one tract distributed across Montmartre declared that ‘it is necessary to act if we want to save our loved ones from the certain death that awaits them over there, in Boche hell’.\(^76\) In the same district, a woman reportedly made a speech outside a local cinema to 600 bystanders on 1 May, encouraging them to resist the deportations of French workers.\(^77\) These local focal points for women’s resistance were often accompanied by inequalities being created by the occupation, excluding working-class women from their city limiting their mobility. While Champs-Elysées-Clemenceau, one of the many metro stations closed to help reduce the strain on the service’s resources, was reopened in December 1941 on the order of the German authorities, the women’s committee for the twentieth *arrondissement* protested at the later closure of Saint-Fargeau metro station, noting how such ‘populous quarters’ were of little interest to senior managers of the metro company, who kept open the stations of the ‘grands quartiers de la capitale’ to serve the best hotels of the central and western districts.\(^78\) The

\(^{75}\) De Beauvoir, *Wartime Diary*, p. 298.

\(^{76}\) For example, *La Voix des Femmes du 18ème*, May 1943, p. 2.


\(^{78}\) AN, F1/CIII/1187, Report of the Prefect of the Seine, 1 January 1942. *La Voix des Femmes, 20e arrondissement*, May 1943, p. 2. It is worth noting that Champs-Elysées-Clemenceau station was only reopened after 7pm, suggesting that this measure benefited off-duty German soldiers and officers wanting to visit the attractions of the avenue des Champs-Élysées more than those working in the vicinity.
closure of Abbesses metro in May 1943 drew similar criticism: by ignoring the needs of local inhabitants who would now have to climb the steep slopes of the butte of Montmartre on foot, the ‘gentlemen’ in power were unnecessarily depriving them of an essential means of transportation.\(^{79}\)

**Early Protests**

Robert Gildea states that for women, ‘the street, after their home, was their domain, as it had been since the Revolution of 1789’.\(^{80}\) But the occupation turned it into a territorial battleground and the setting for significant challenges to public order under Vichy.\(^{81}\) Being traditionally responsible for feeding their families, women were most directly affected by food shortages and the often drastic consequences of rationing under occupation. As mounting supply problems coincided with the arrival of the bitter winter of 1940-41, signs of unrest too began to multiply, though identifying the number and location of these incidents is fraught with difficulty, since it can be difficult or impossible to corroborate various sources. For example, Yvan Avakoumovitch’s chronology of women’s demonstrations across France, apparently compiled from reports produced by official sources and actions mentioned in clandestine communist press, fails to indicate the provenance of its entries and omits in many cases the numbers of demonstrators.\(^{82}\)

From the beginning of occupation, and particularly after the introduction of rationing in September 1940, private grumbles about food quickly grew into collective, spontaneous, public demonstrations. By December 1940, women were already beginning to openly complain outside stores and to market vendors about the shortages of meat, butter, cheese and fat, along with the increasing costs of living and time spent waiting in line. One police report stated that they were attributing these problems to the massive

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\(^{80}\) Gildea, *Fighters in the Shadows*, p. 64; Jackson, *France: The Dark Years*, p. 333.

\(^{81}\) Jackson, *France: The Dark Years*, p. 333.

purchases being made by the Germans, which demonstrated ‘their contempt for the essential needs of the country’. But if the occupiers were the culprits, the focus of protest was the failure of the Vichy government to act. This meant ensuring the flow of food into the capital, but also combating the increasingly lucrative black market.

Unable to feed their families, the domestic grievances of women turned food into an intensely gendered matter, one which could be mobilised for political ends. The Communist Party saw an opportunity to capitalise on this groundswell of dissatisfaction among the city’s housewives, playing on traditional associations of women as food providers to attract support for street protests. Employing the female activists of its comités féminins, a series of planned actions across the districts of Paris and its suburbs sought to draw new members to the Party and demonstrate women’s opposition to the Vichy government and the German occupiers. In January 1941, the first signs of coordinated protests began to appear. On 11 January, around sixty women approached the Hôtel Matignon on rue de Varenne, the French Prime Minister’s pre-war residence and effectively Vichy’s political centre in Paris, to submit a letter demanding the release of political prisoners from prison. The event passed without incident. But it was followed by similar protests, targeting the Minister for Food Supply, and the German embassy on rue de Lille. The women’s committee of the thirteenth arrondissement declared that women ‘will return if they are not satisfied’. However, a repeat attempt on 29 March to launch a protest at the Ministry of Food Supply, on rue de Grenelle, did not succeed: the police corralled a crowd of 250 women towards the nearby Chambre des Députés metro station (since renamed Assemblée Nationale), ensuring that they had no opportunity to regroup. While the French authorities recognised the possible intervention of communist agitators in these demonstrations, there was no doubting the

83 APP, BA 1807, Anonymous report, 28 December 1940.
84 APP, BS 2 GB 112, Bagarres manifestations reunions 1941-1942, unsigned report, 11 January 1941.
85 ‘Pour que nos enfants mangent’, La Voix des femmes, 13e arrondissement, No.1, February 1942.
86 APP, BS 2 GB 112, Police report of 7e arrondissement, 29 March 1941.
genuine suffering and the sincerity of many women presenting themselves at local town halls. When a crowd of sixty women petitioned the mayor of Villejuif to supply them with coal, the district police commissioner was evidently sympathetic to their plight, reporting that ‘these protests may be inspired and exploited by extremist elements, but in any event, it is absolutely necessary and urgent that measures be taken to aid these poor people.’

Future delegations targeting government departments and town halls found themselves also being given short shrift: the government’s tolerance of such protests was wearing thin. As a result of these demonstrations police were now on alert on Saturdays, in order to be ready to deal with similar women’s protests. The assumption was that women working during the week were most likely to take part in protests on their day off. Distributed tracts also commonly gave details on the dates and times of future demonstrations, which allowed the police to prepare for them and prevent crowds from forming around the targeted venues.

In total, 46 women’s food protests were reported across Paris during 1941. However, the demonstrations of 1942 would increase in number, and be characterised less by negotiation than by confrontation. Despite successive waves of arrests among its senior ranks during the spring, the Front National was under pressure both to recruit more supporters and escalate its activities across Paris. To these ends a new, military branch was launched in April, the Francs-Tireurs et Partisans, which would open its doors to non-communists as well as party members. With few resources at their disposal, women’s protests against food shortages were proposed as a means of accelerating political discontent on the street, welding together political action and social

87 APP, BS 2 GB 112, report by police commissioner of Gentilly, 12 January 1941 [emphasis in original].
88 Alary, Les Français au quotidien, p. 276.
89 APP, BS 2 GB 112, Police report of 7e arrondissement, 29 March 1941.
90 Yvan Avakoumovitch, ‘Les manifestations de femmes, 1940-1944’, p. 32.
91 Vinen, The Unfree French, p. 244.
92 Courtois, Le Sang de l’étranger, p. 231.
protest. In addition to handing out propaganda, singing the Marseillaise and encouraging disobedience in queues, activists would launch direct action in public places across Paris: in ‘liberating’ food stocks from grocery stores, women would be spurred on to reassert their power in the gendered spaces of markets and shopping areas, encouraging mass disobedience and ultimately a country-wide national insurrection. To combat possible police repression, women demonstrators would be accompanied by armed protection squads, ready to retaliate if attempts were made to intervene. Although these bodyguards were instructed to act only if threatened, it was clear that confrontation with Vichy police and perhaps German troops was possible, even likely, especially in the more central areas of Paris. Below I will examine two examples which came to define this approach during the summer of 1942.

‘The crazy little world of Sunday morning’: Rue de Buci, 31 May 1942

In his journal entry for 1 June, retired police commandant Georges Benoit-Guyod wrote that ‘a significant episode was added today to the history of Buci crossroads’. He was referring to a demonstration directed the previous day by a 33-year-old Breton, Madeleine Marzin, certainly one of the most important women’s protests ever to be held on the streets of Paris. A schoolteacher and veteran communist activist since the early 1930s, Marzin quickly became involved in resistance, constructing women’s groups within the fifteenth arrondissement, in the south-west of the city. A few days earlier she had been given the task of leading a group of women to march on the Magasins ‘Eco’ (short for ‘Économique’) store in the sixth arrondissement, known to have been recently stocked with tins of sardines and other goods. As to why this particular store had been

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93 Jackson, France: The Dark Years, p. 443.
selected, she later stated that such a sale of sardines had not been seen in Paris since the beginning of the occupation, guaranteeing that large numbers of shoppers would appear and thus improving the visibility of their protest. She also claimed that this district was known as a hotbed of black market activity, and that local residents were angered by stores such as Magasins Eco whose stocks were reserved for German clients and for export to Germany, though no research to date has presented evidence to support this claim. Marzin’s objective was to ‘liberate’ the store’s stocks to queueing housewives, while others would sing the national anthem and distribute propaganda to bystanders, with the intention of drawing supporters to their cause.

To prevent the police intervening, the women would be accompanied by an armed protection squad. This tactic, at least in principle, was not new: the idea of distributing propaganda accompanied by members of the Organisation spéciale (OS), an earlier armed wing of the Communist Party, may have begun as early as 1940, though archival traces are lacking. However, this approach was envisaged as a method of encouraging housewives to undertake direct action, simply taking what they needed on the grounds that the needs of their families were greater than those of the German occupiers and the French retailers who were profiting from the misery of their fellow citizens.

The crossroads of rue de Buci and rue de Seine, like the narrow, winding neighbouring streets, are unmistakably medieval, although the market here only became noted from the eighteenth century, and its reputation as a ‘domain of housewives’ was only established towards the end of the nineteenth. Nonetheless, this was a place with a

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100 An example of this kind of rhetoric can be found in La ménagère de Paris, February 1942, p. 1.
much older historical significance. Benoit-Guyod’s statement above is actually slightly confused, since the Buci crossroads (*carrefour de Buci*) specifically refers to the junction just to the east, where rue de Buci intersects with rue Mazarine, rue Dauphine, rue Saint-André-des-Arts and rue de l’Ancienne-Comédie. However, the *carrefour de Buci* commonly describes a much bigger area around the junction, and particularly the market along the narrower strip of the rue de Buci, where much of its activity was concentrated.\(^{101}\) Being situated at the intersection of the two streets at 77, rue de Seine, Magasins Eco was surrounded by a variety of traders and stores. In its immediate vicinity one could find a fishmonger (69), a confectioner (78), two butchers (62 and 79), a dairy (81), an Italian grocer (83), a cobbler and fish merchant (69). On the rue de Buci axis, where Magasins Eco’s address was listed as number 21, it neighboured a *pâtisserie* (14), a dairy (17), two *charcuteries* (20 and 25), a baker (22) and wine merchant (32).\(^{102}\)

This marketplace, the most important shopping area within the *arrondissement*, evoked the old days of Paris, having been the site of barricades during the revolutions of 1830 and 1848.\(^{103}\) It had also become a point of tension early in the occupation: in December 1940 a police report indicated that a queue on rue de Buci had formed at 5am (when the curfew ended), and within four hours just twenty officers found themselves attempting to manage a crowd of 2000 expectant shoppers.\(^{104}\) Magasins Eco had had a mere 300 portions of rabbit to offer them, and the surrounding butchers’ shops were closed because they had nothing to sell. In another report on the incident, it was stated that five German soldiers had been allowed to jump to the front of the queue.\(^{105}\) Although the situation did not escalate, a police meeting held afterwards concluded that disorder in the streets was inevitable if nothing was done to improve food supply.\(^{106}\)

\(^{101}\) Benoit-Guyod, *L’Invasion de Paris*, p. 113.
\(^{104}\) Paula Schwartz, ‘The politics of food and gender’, p. 38.
\(^{105}\) Vinen, *The Unfree French*, p. 238.
\(^{106}\) *Ibid.*
In truth, little if anything could be done to stem such a ravenous and disgruntled population. To refer back to de Certeau’s spatial practices of everyday life, Parisians can be seen to employ ‘tactics’ to circumvent the rules. Since the success of tactics depends on time, or the arrival of an opportunity to perform an alternative spatial practice to the expected one, queueing was an especially relevant situation to deploy them. When a regulation was introduced to prohibit queueing more than half an hour before stores were due to trade, Parisians simply paced up and down the street beforehand, or even paid the concierges of neighbouring buildings to loiter in their hallways before the shopkeeper next door opened for business.107 In his poem ‘La rue de Buci maintenant’ (rue de Buci now), Jacques Prévert lamented the pre-war vibrancy and social life of this marketplace, snuffed out by the occupation: ‘Where did it go, the crazy little world of Sunday morning? Who, then, brought down this terrible curtain of dust and iron on this street, this street once so happy and so proud to be a street’.108 Although unpublished until 1946, Prévert’s Paroles, an anthology clearly preoccupied by the transformative power of occupation on spaces of the capital, was being distributed by the underground press before the Liberation.109 The streets of Paris had become dangerous, volatile, contested spaces. All the police could do was to continue their surveillance and try to prevent minor disturbances spiralling out of control.

Aside from an urgent need to step up resistance activity, Marzin’s demonstration was also planned to coincide with two commemorative events. The first, the seventy-first anniversary of the fall of the Paris Commune in 1871, was of little direct relevance to a women’s protest, and seems to have been overlooked in later press reports.110 But the second held much greater significance. Beginning the previous year, the Fête des mères (Mother’s Day) had been promoted by the Vichy government as a means of celebrating

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110 Chatel, Des femmes, p. 44.
the virtues of motherhood, being held on the last Sunday in May. Though it had been established long before the occupation, Mother’s Day became an opportunity to express Vichy’s encouragement of women as mothers, but it also served as a distraction from the worsening food shortages, the inequalities of the black market and commercial profiteering.\textsuperscript{111} Vichy’s attempts to establish and legitimise its image of women on the *Fête des mères* concentrated on holding ceremonies in the capital’s major theatres, town halls, churches, schools and other municipal public spaces, including a rarely-approved French gathering at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, clearly aligning French mothers with the notion of sacrifice and patriotism.

In offering decorations to mothers eligible for the *Médaille de la famille*, a medal and diploma awarded to those women raising larger families, Vichy sought to publicly acknowledge their efforts with money prizes and additional (though somewhat meagre) food rations.\textsuperscript{112} Some smaller services were held across the rest of Paris, but one venue which generally escaped press attention was the monument to French mothers in the thirteenth *arrondissement*, near the porte d’Italie. Commissioned in 1938 by the Popular Front government as an attempt to improve its pronatalist credentials (France’s birthrate had recently plummeted to its lowest numbers during peacetime), the Stalinist overtones of its social realist sculptures were an obvious political and cultural clash with Vichy’s more traditional tastes. But it also stood as an embarrassing reminder of France’s pre-war lack of young men eligible for military service, recalling Pétain’s famous explanation for the country’s defeat in 1940: ‘too few allies, too few weapons, too few babies’.\textsuperscript{113}

Unsurprisingly, the focus of the controlled press remained on happenings in the centre of Paris.\textsuperscript{114}

\textsuperscript{111} The *Fête des mères* was officially celebrated as a national day from 1926. See Alary, *Les Français au quotidien*, p. 205.
\textsuperscript{112} The day received substantial coverage from the controlled French press. For example, ‘Un émouvant témoignage de reconnaissance’, *Le Matin*, 25 May 1941, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{114} A photograph of a girl laying flowers on the monument appeared in *Paris-soir* on 30 May, but the accompanying article made no reference to it.
At this time support for the Communist Party was weak in the Odéon quarter, where the demonstration would first meet, which may explain why Marzin and her supporters were given the task. Travelling by metro, they arrived in couples or threes, alighting at Odéon metro station just before 10am, when the Magasins Eco would open. In the case of Marzin, she had told her supporters to attend a rendezvous at La Motte-Piquet Grenelle metro at 8.45am on the morning of the protest (La Motte-Piquet Grenelle served Line 10, which runs eastwards directly to Mabillon and Odéon stations); the details of the demonstration were not divulged until just before it commenced.

Wearing a beige trenchcoat that she planned to throw away after the demonstration, the diminutive Marzin (four feet ten inches tall, according to a later police report) conferred with each group, relaying her instructions before they made the short walk to rue de Buci. As they joined the queue of women already waiting, ration tickets in hand, they were ready to begin. But things did not go to plan. The woman expected to begin singing the Marseillaise, which would be the signal to begin the demonstration, failed to materialise, and as the minutes ticked away Marzin began to fear the worst, later recalling that ‘we had let the best moment slip away, and everyone had begun to relax.’ Believing this part of town to be a hotbed of black market activity, and therefore likely to be patrolled regularly by police, it was necessary to act quickly.

Taking charge, she entered the store, accompanied by two of her accomplices, and went to the counter. When asked for her ration tickets, she replied, ‘today we don’t need tickets!’ and began taking tins off the shelves, hurling them over the heads of shoppers through the doorway. As the store staff attempted to shut the doors, trapping her inside, another employee at the counter attempted to apprehend her. Marzin and her

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116 Chatel, *Des femmes*, p. 46.
117 APP, BA 2128, Marzin arrest sheet, 1 June 1942.
118 Chatel, *Des femmes*, p. 44.
assistants made a hurried exit with the help of André Dalmas, one of the protection group, who punched the man obstructing Marzin in the face.121

Georges Benoit-Guyod, who had been fortunate enough to purchase a large tin of sardines at the Eco store, had noticed while waiting that many customers had been turned away, having insufficient tickets for the bigger tins on sale.122 Complaints had been relatively few, but on reaching the end of rue de Seine he heard a commotion behind him, and turned to see crowds of people massing outside the Magasins Eco store.123 While Marzin had quietly walked away from the scene, a dozen women were continuing to distribute tins to perhaps as many as fifty others outside, while singing the Marseillaise and throwing handfuls of tracts into the air, entitled ‘Écoutez-nous’ (listen to us).124

The store manager, Alexandre Chasseau, left the premises to call over two nearby policemen, one standing by the pâtisserie opposite, to arrest Dalmas, who was still inside the store. Although putting up some resistance, he was overpowered and escorted towards the nearby police station on rue de l’Abbaye. However, as they reached the corner of rue de Buci and rue de Bourbon Le Château, they found themselves being enveloped by the crowd, with some bystanders trying to free Dalmas, shouting ‘let him go! Let him go!’ More officers arrived to try and control the situation, including an off-duty officer, Eugène Vaudrey, who had been buying milk at the Saunier crèmerie at 1, rue le Bourbon le Château. As he approached the rue de Buci, the communist protection team opened fire, hitting him and another policeman, Camille Morbois, who had arrived on a bicycle. Three more officers managed to apprehend one of the young shooters, Edgar Lefebure, despite being attacked by a woman with an umbrella.125 More shots rang out from within the crowd, injuring three more policemen, one seriously.

121 APP, BA 2128, Statement by Pierre Flatot and Edmond Depirou, 31 May 1942.
123 Ibid., p. 203.
125 APP, BS 2 GB 098, Statement by Inspector Blanchet, 31 May 1942.
Another off-duty policeman walking along boulevard Saint-Germain, René Hebros, saw three other individuals running towards him along rue de Buci. He pursued one, Henri Meunier, who crossed the boulevard and stopped at a garage on nearby rue Clément to throw away his revolver. Tackled by Hebros and a second officer, Meunier was marched back across the road, joining Lefébure and Dalmas at the police station on rue de l’Abbaye. Though more arrests were made among those remaining in the crowd, Marzin, still dressed in her beige trenchcoat, had walked alone back to the Odéon metro without incident. But the following day she was arrested and interrogated by inspectors of the Brigades spéciales (elite police units created to seek out communists, resisters and Jews) who through a combination of repeated questioning and more brutal methods attempted to make her talk. Her police interrogation report reveals that almost everything she told them was fabricated, revealing nothing of any value. At a tribunal on 25 June, she, Dalmas, Lefébure and Meunier were sentenced to death, making her the first woman during the occupation to be given the death penalty for a political action. But in August she was able to escape during a prison transfer from Montparnasse train station and continued with resistance work until the Liberation.

The Second Front: Rue Daguerre, 1 August 1942

The direct effects of the rue de Buci incident may be difficult to assess, but the prefect’s report for the following month drew attention to a growing sense of anger overtaking the resignation apparent among most Parisians, which manifested itself in the increasing scenes of violence witnessed in queues. These feelings may also have been encouraged in part by a series of similar demonstrations and unfolding political events in the capital. On 1 June, groups organised by comités féminins from Seine and Seine-et-Oise sectors converged on the corner of rue Chaussée d’Antin and rue Lafayette in the centre of Paris,

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126 Ibid., Statement by René Hebros, 31 May 1942.
127 APP, BA 2128, Affaire de la rue de Buci, interrogation of Marzin, 2 June 1942.
128 ‘Madeleine Marie Marzin’, Le Maitron: Dictionnaire biographique.
by the Galeries Lafayette department store. Hanging an effigy of Laval from a lamppost, they also employed the familiar tactics of handing out tracts and singing the Marseillaise. This was followed by the imposition of the Jewish star from 7 June, and by Laval’s radio broadcast announcing his wish to see a German victory. After the announcement later that month concerning the introduction of the relève, exchanging prisoners of war for greater numbers of French labourers work in Germany, another protest manifested itself, on 28 June, at the junction of avenue Ledru-Rollin and rue du Faubourg Saint-Antoine, in the twentieth arrondissement. July also brought momentous changes in the capital, most notably with the rafle that incarcerated more than eight thousand Jews in the Vélodrome d’Hiver stadium, in the fifteenth arrondissement. In his monthly report, the Prefect of the Seine noted the public feeling stirred by these new measures, and ‘degree of emotion caused by the great number of women and children taken to the concentration camps’.  

Although the rue de Buci incident had been viewed seriously both by the police and the press, it was another demonstration planned for 1 August that would leave a greater mark. This would become most closely associated with its woman orator, Lise Ricol. A communist fighter with the International Brigades during the Spanish Civil War, she had taken up with the comités féminins in 1940, and by 1942 was responsible for the Seine-et-Oise sector, covering the southern and western areas around Paris. According to Ricol’s memoirs published in the 1990s, the familiar posters pasted across Paris by the Germans informing the public of the execution of three of the protection group, Dalmas, Lefébure and Meunier, were the spur for a new operation, an action that would ‘demonstrate the impossibility of overcoming the resistance by terror’. Actually the details of the operation were agreed at the end of July between Henri Rol-Tanguy, one of

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the future leaders of combined resistance forces in Paris, and Roger Linet, a local FTP commander.133

The location chosen was the corner of rue Daguerre and avenue d’Orléans, in the fourteenth arrondissement on the Left Bank, approximately a mile south of rue de Buci. This was home to a large branch of Félix Potin, a precursor of the modern supermarket and a familiar sight on Parisian streets since the mid-nineteenth century, which sold a variety of goods.134 Ricol later described it as ‘a busy place with many people, especially on Saturday mornings…people came to buy something to eat.’135 According to Ricol, Rol-Tanguy saw such commercial streets as ‘an excellent place to lead actions, to address the population, to call for protest, to demand better provision’.136 Like the rue de Buci, it was not in the vicinity of any requisitioned German property.137 More importantly, the locale of the rue Daguerre was characterised by its predominantly working-class, diverse population. A market street filled with numerous small shops, cafés and street traders, this was a close-knit community, ‘both homogeneous and disparate, rich in contrasts’, whose close proximity to Montparnasse station accounted for the influx of many Limousins during the early twentieth century.138 It was also home to both French and immigrant Jewish families, as well as those involved in resistance against Nazi and Vichy repression: one street survey identifies more than a dozen addresses of resisters and half a

134 ‘On voulait montrer que nous n’avions pas peur’, L’Humanité, 1 August 2007, p. 1. Three days before this demonstration, the basement of another of Potin’s branches, on rue de Rennes, had repeatedly caught fire, though it wasn’t clear if this had been started intentionally. No mention of it was made by Ricol or other communist sources cited in this chapter. APP, 220 W 10, ‘Incidents’, Situations de Paris, August 1942.
135 ‘On voulait montrer que nous n’avions pas peur’, L’Humanité, p. 1.
136 Bourderon, Rol-Tanguy, p. 203.
137 The nearest requisitioned building was a bus depot at 33, avenue d’Orléans, some 350 metres from the scene of the demonstration. See Desprairies, Paris dans la collaboration, pp. 409-410.
dozen deported Jewish households. Though not considered a breeding ground of resistance, one minor incident was reported in August 1941, around a dozen youths had walked down the street sporting French tricolour flags, singing the Marseillaise before being dispersed by police.

The operation was planned for a Saturday afternoon, once more targeting a weekend when working women supporters would be able to attend. It would involve three protection groups, who would be better organised and prepared than those employed in May. The primary team would be posted by the metro exit twenty metres opposite the entrance, while a second, standing on the opposite side of the avenue d’Orléans, would act to protect it and cover its withdrawal if necessary. A third, situated close to the Félix Potin entrance, would in turn support the other two, and ensure the safe withdrawal of Ricol. Each group, composed of three members, would also be given a specific function: the designated shooter would be protected by the second member, while the third would ensure the withdrawal of the other two. If there was trouble, the communist women taking part in the demonstration would ‘have to keep their cool and lose themselves in the crowd, becoming simple housewives doing their shopping’.

Ricol chose to change her appearance before the demonstration began, dressing in a beret and a waxed trenchcoat, which Parisian women were often seen wearing. It is interesting to note that in recalling this detail, she compared her appearance to actress Michèle Morgan in Marcel Carné’s 1938 poetic realist film Le Quai des Brumes. While underlining the performative nature of her role and its vital importance in generating sympathy among that day’s bystanders, it also invites speculation as to whether Ricol also saw a touch of the gritty romance of Carné’s cinematic world in her extraordinary life as a resister.


APP, BS 2 GB 112, unsigned report, 17 August 1942.


Duvernois, took a circuitous route, meeting the FTP chief of the Left Bank sector, René Sevi, who escorted them past rue Daguerre, giving the protection groups the opportunity to recognise her. According to Linet, the total number of armed men exceeded a dozen and, though all were only carrying pistols, a submachine gun and a grenade had been also brought in the event of the arrival of German troops. At 4pm, climbing up onto an outside counter in front of the store, Ricol began her speech, concentrating her invective on two central targets: the ever-growing shortages of food, and the evils of the relève, sending husbands and sons to factories in Germany. In analysing this situation, it is useful to introduce Roxanne Mountford’s idea of ‘rhetorical spaces’ in relation to performance within gendered spaces. In her examination of the pulpit, Mountford sees how this traditionally male space asserts rhetorical power through its concrete properties: in the elevated position of the preacher, and in the decorated stone and wood structures that form a barrier between preacher and congregation, one can see how such a space can express and reinforce ideas of authority and hierarchy. In the case of Ricol, her rhetorical power stemmed from an appropriation, or reappropriation, of economic and gendered space, bringing herself down, literally and metaphorically, to the level of her constituents. Rather than encouraging a sense of distance or authority over her audience, performing her speech standing on hijacked store counter better communicated a sense of solidarity and a rejection of the economic inequalities it now represented.

On this occasion none of the store staff was reported to have tried to intervene as the women began to distribute tins of food from the store. However, as Ricol’s team of helpers began throwing tracts in the air and singing the Marseillaise, two police officers appeared and tried to pull her down from the counter. This prompted the protection team to fire several shots, felling both men. A passing German soldier then approached

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144 Avenue d’Orléans was renamed avenue du Général-Leclerc in 1945.
145 Linet, La traversée de la tourmente, p. 286.
to assist them and was also shot. Immediately people began to quickly disperse, with some women picking up the remaining tins of food before leaving. Ricol and her bodyguards left the scene without being followed. By the time police reinforcements had arrived, the scene of the demonstration was deserted. The two French policemen and the German soldier had only been injured, but one bystander, Jacques Duriot, had been killed.

Unlike the rue de Buci incident, no arrests were made that day, and in Linet’s view, the protection groups had ‘worked perfectly’. However, in an unconnected incident eleven days later, Ricol and her partner (and future husband) Artur London were arrested at a safehouse at rue Copernic in the sixteenth arrondissement: Ricol was sentenced to hard labour for life, but was pregnant and did not give birth until May 1943. In 1944, she was deported to Ravensbrück concentration camp but survived. Several of the protection team members were also arrested later the same month, again due to events unrelated to the demonstration.

Both the rue de Buci and the rue Daguerre demonstrations received substantial media interest. The Parisian controlled press recognised the ‘exceptional gravity’ of the rue de Buci protest, but the killing and injuring of civilians on rue Daguerre drew special criticism. They focused on the wanton violence of the ‘terrorists’, who claimed to act for the French people but apparently fired indiscriminately on the public. Somewhat ironically, Duriot, the civilian killed on the day, was a baker; four other bystanders received gunshot wounds, the most seriously injured being an 82-year-old woman. In an address, Vichy’s ambassador to the Occupied Zone, Fernand de Brinon, condemned

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150 Quoted in Bourderon, *Rol Tanguy*, p. 204.
the rue Daguerre demonstration, blaming the influence of American, British and Soviet propaganda:

[Last Saturday, in Paris, we once again saw the effects. When a shrew cried out: ‘rise up, the Americans have told us’, some terrorists, instructed in the techniques of the Komintern, randomly shot at some Parisian housewives, in order to escape and protect their retreat. They killed a bystander, seriously wounded two police officers and a soldier of the occupying army, who bravely rushed to offer his help…it sufficed, last Saturday, to see the disapproval of the French people before these events.155

The characterisation of Ricol as the ‘shrew’ ensured her infamy as the main perpetrator of the demonstration (de Brinon’s words would be slightly misquoted in future, and he is usually believed to have referred to ‘la mègère de la rue Daguerre’ – the shrew of the rue Daguerre).156 The choice of imagery is important: presenting Ricol as a bestial, spiteful creature is dehumanising, but more importantly gender-specific: the term ‘shrew’ implies subordination to male power, most obviously illustrated in Shakespeare’s early play The Taming of the Shrew, but also has a long association with witches and demonic power.157 Ricol’s cries in the open street, unleashing violence and death, are thus the antithesis of Vichy’s housebound, feminine ideal. Moreover, this is a form of resistance that crosses multiple thresholds, shifting from the domestic, private space of the home into the public domain, but also from obscure, clandestine activity into overt political action.

Despite having no part in the shooting during the rue de Buci demonstrations, the inspectors of the Brigades spéciales who interrogated Marzin considered her to be a similarly shrew-like female terrorist. They reportedly held her directly responsible for the deaths of the policemen, making a point of telling her guards that she had ‘made their

156 The attribution of this phrase to de Brinon is found in numerous histories. For example, see Gildea, Fighters in the Shadows, p. 65; or Raphael Spina, Histoire du STO (Paris: Perrin, 2017), p. 68. Lise London (Ricol married Artur London in 1945) used the phrase as the title of her first volume of memoirs.
children orphans’. She also reported being accused of a coldblooded killer who ‘hadn’t thought about the kids of the agents’, along with belonging to ‘a bunch of pétroleuses’, a reference to the mythic Communard women who had roamed the streets of Paris in 1871, burning down homes and terrorising the city.

While the communist press was keenest to forge historical connections with the capital’s revolutionary past, this last comment provokes an interesting comparison to the demonisation of rebellious women seventy years before by the French government, and is made all the more ironic since the rue de Buci demonstration was partly intended to remember those who died defending the Commune. They presented the shouts of Ricol as an expression not of savagery but of freedom. ‘The French want the right to shout, in the heart of Paris, their hatred of boches, to call the population to action against those starving us’, declared one tract. Another, L’Université libre, aimed at students and intellectuals, claimed that the young policeman who had been seriously injured was well known in the same neighbourhood for the brutal way that he treated people waiting in queues. Certainly Vichy and specifically ‘the boche police of Laval’ were portrayed as facilitating the German theft of French goods and enforcing the poverty of ordinary Parisians. Another tract, claiming to represent the traders and small businesses of the rue de Buci and rue Daguerre, declared that the names of both streets would be remembered forever as symbols of ‘the people united against the exploitation of the big chain stores.’ But how far did Parisians really approve of these two demonstrations? Ricol noted that the supporters of the comités féminins were politically and socially diverse, drawn together in a common cause to improve women’s lives.

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159 Ibid.; Chatel, Des femmes, p. 47.
160 AN, Z/4/146/A, Section spéciale de la cour d'appel de Paris (1941-1944), dossier 534, ‘Rue Daguerre, nouveau crime de la police française. La police aidée par les boches tire sur les ménagères’, n.d.
161 L’Université libre, 13 August 1942, p. 4.
163 AN, Z/4/68, dossier 484, ‘Les petits commerçants et les artisans solidaires des patriotes de la rue de Buci et de la rue Daguerre’, 1942, p. 3.
the composition and views of the women who were caught up in these protests remain sketchy. Communist propaganda following the rue Daguerre demonstration stated that 500 women had listened to Ricol’s speech, which, given the size of the area outside the Potin store, seems generous.\ref{165} Ricol later stated that one of her group’s staunchest members, Jeanne Fannonel, loitered around the rue Daguerre after the demonstration to listen in on bystanders’ gossip, and overheard women saluting the bravery of Ricol and her resisters.\ref{166} That month’s police intelligence report painted a less favourable picture, taking the view that ‘[t]he terrorist attacks committed in recent days have left among the population a bad impression, and that of the rue Daguerre especially has provoked strong feelings because of the civilian victims. These criminal acts are unanimously condemned not only for the reprisals which they may bring, but also because they are unjust and are serving the head of State and the government.’\ref{167} Nevertheless, despite fears about possible repercussions, the report underlined the point that ‘the question of food supply still remains at the forefront of Parisians’ concerns’.\ref{168} The prefect’s report in August 1942 remarked that ‘[i]n the queues, still very numerous, housewives complain bitterly of the extreme lack of seasonal vegetables…and the price increase.’\ref{169}

**Conclusion**

This chapter has shown that resistance was shaped by the spatial transformation that occupation brought to gendered spaces. Notions of womanhood and the deprivations faced by women under occupation were closely linked to the changes felt across the marketplaces and shopping thoroughfares of Paris. The social and economic rhythms of

\begin{footnotes}
\item[165] AN, Z/4/146/A, ‘Rue Daguerre, nouveau crime de la police française. La police aidée par les boches tire sur les ménagères’, n.d. The same figure is quoted in *L’Université libre*, 13 August 1942, p. 4. Lise London later stated that ‘hundreds’ of women descended on rue Daguerre to support the demonstration. See Ricol, ‘Dès 1940-1941, avec les femmes de la région sud de Paris’, in *Les femmes dans la résistance: tenu à l’initiative de l’Union des Femmes Françaises*, p. 188.
\item[166] London, *La ménagère*, p. 163.
\item[168] *Ibid.*
\item[169] AN, F1 CIII 1187, Report of the Prefect of the Seine, 31 August 1942.
\end{footnotes}
streets and squares so closely associated with housewives, where women exercised social and economic power, were radically changed by rationing, shortages, the dominant economic power of German customers, as well as the surveillance by police and occupying forces. In the two examples of rue de Buci and rue Daguerre, these changes determined their selection as resistance targets, and women resisters became essential in the planning to reclaim these gendered spaces reshaped by occupation. In order to influence and mobilise female public audiences, they therefore took on a much more dangerous, frontline role. While calculated to win political support among disaffected housewives queueing in the streets, these actions were also dependent on women resisters shifting from ‘clandestine space’ to operating in an exposed public arena, with all the dangers that presented. Marzin, Ricol and their female comrades were called on to pass as disgruntled housewives and were thus acting ‘undercover’, while also carrying out ‘overt’ resistance, in broad daylight. Moreover, the effects of occupation on these gendered spaces, privileging German customers and interests, was crucial to legitimising their actions. The reappropriation of gendered spaces, even if temporary, were reminders of women’s power in the street, and their potential to defy the increasing restrictions on their lives and those of their families. In fighting for food, women also fought to reclaim space, contesting power on the streets where ordinary women were struggling to survive.

Women’s reclamation of gendered spaces also depended on reinforcing, or at least maintaining, traditional gender roles. While Jeanne d’Arc and Communard heroine Louise Michel were sometimes cited as shining examples of resistance, communist propaganda focused on women’s roles as wives and mothers, not as violent insurrectionists. On the one hand women clearly initiated direct action, walking into stores, delivering speeches to bystanders and distributing ‘liberated’ food. Yet no women took part themselves in the protection squads, a job clearly intended for men only.¹⁷⁰ The clear division of labour between men and women in these particular events was defined

by the places in which they happened. As Hanna Diamond states, the presence of women leading this particular instance of resistance changed its character. Without women as the principal actors, these actions would have been more readily classified as simple acts of defiance against the police, or even as common theft, rather than resistance actions. Men necessarily played a secondary, supportive role, even if the press attempted later to portray them as the protagonists. Thus, in these two examples resistance both shaped, and was shaped by, its relationship with gendered space.

These demonstrations did not result in a surge of support for the *comités féminins* or the communist cause in general, and recruitment would continue to be a primary concern to the Paris sections of the FTP until the Liberation. It is also worth noting that the commemorative demonstration planned for the 150th anniversary of Valmy, the battle won by the French Revolutionary army over the Prussians in 1792, failed to materialise at the place de la République as expected. A special curfew was introduced by the MBF, prohibiting any civilian in Paris from venturing outside after 3pm. It was then announced that 116 communist hostages would be shot in retaliation for the recent attacks on ‘German soldiers and French civilians’, a clear reference to the rue Daguerre demonstration. 43 of the 116 hostages were later executed at Mont-Valérien.

Both the rue de Buci and rue Daguerre protests were significant enough to receive international attention. The BBC and Radio Moscow both reported on Lise Ricol’s speech in their broadcasts. In an article on Marzin’s demonstration, entitled ‘Paris Food Riot’, *The Guardian* reported that ‘several men’ had been responsible for

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174 For an example of the propaganda material promoting the demonstration, see AN 72 AJ/69, Parti Communiste I, Circulaire intérieure relative à la préparation de la journée du 20 septembre, August 1942.
176 The announcement of the curfew and execution of hostages were published in newspapers. For example, see *Paris-soir*, 21 September 1942, p. 1.
distributing food, and only mentioned women as the recipients. Marzin also remarked that the police were nervous during her interrogation, being seriously concerned that the rue de Buci protest had been planned as the ‘signal of the revolution’ and that an escalation of armed action was imminent. Through the summer, daily newspapers in Paris scorned the idea that an Allied invasion of France was possible, and derided the notion that ‘small groups of terrorists willing to let French blood flow’ were about to wreak havoc across the city. But these two relatively minor actions in May and August had clearly generated a great deal of debate among journalists at least, and represented a coordinated escalation of communist action. On 5 August, the collaborationist newspaper *L’Œuvre* declared on its front page that this new second front ‘ran from the rue de Buci to the rue Daguerre’.

Whatever the gains in propaganda, both actions were costly for the FTP. The improvised nature of the rue de Buci demonstration, and the inexperience of those protecting it – half of the members of the protection group were teenagers, with very limited exposure to armed operations – led to death, deportation and imprisonment for many of its participants. As noted earlier, Marzin had been fortunate to escape and avoid execution, having been judged responsible for the fatal shootings (despite having been unarmed herself). But a further five of their conspirators, all students of the Lycée Buffon, were handed over to the Germans and executed the following year. Another twelve conspirators were sentenced to hard labour of varying terms, of whom several were later deported to concentration camps on German orders. Women accounted for half of this total, indicating that no leniency was shown on gender grounds. And

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179 Chatel, *Des femmes*, p. 47.
183 One of the five, Pierre Benoit, had been sentenced to death in absentia during the trial of Marzin in June 1942. Along with Lucien Legros, Jean Arthus, Jacques Baudry and Pierre Grelot, Benoit became one of the ‘five martyrs of the Lycée Buffon’ commemorated after the Liberation.
although the MBF had kept a certain distance when it came to women’s demonstrations, leaving justice a matter for the French authorities, the killing of a German soldier at the rue Daguerre demonstration escalated their involvement. On 10 August, SS chief Carl Oberg had announced the execution of 93 hostages in retaliation for the actions of ‘communist terrorists’, warning that measures would be taken against the whole population if such action continued.184

The FTP continued to sanction operations of this kind, but none achieved the same impact, and were soon rolled up. The last incident, occurring on 17 September at a market in the southern suburb of Kremlin-Bicêtre, was a relatively minor affair: when two women were refused chocolate without the necessary ration tickets, they began pillaging the store and distributing goods to other women shoppers. When two policemen tried to apprehend one of the women, an assailant shot one of the policemen dead; she, another woman and the assailant all escaped.185 Though women’s demonstrations would continue, they would rely on gaining communist support without resorting to such provocative strategies. The increasingly repressive measures employed in the latter half of the occupation did not suppress women’s demonstrations.186 By July 1944, the Union des femmes françaises (UFF), a federation of the comités féminins established during the preceding year, claimed that Parisian women ‘now currently occupy “the street”’ and reminded its readers that ‘even without arms, we women can do a great deal’.187

Following the liberation of Paris in August 1944, Rol-Tanguy, having become the communist head of the FFI, paid testament to the roles Parisian women undertook for the resistance cause, claiming that without them half of their work would have been

186 Tartakowsky, Les Manifestations de rue, p. 468.
impossible.188 Yet although Ricol and Marzin have been remembered as female resisters, the phenomenon of women’s demonstrations has been largely been considered as separate and beyond the bounds of resistance memory.189 Marzin was awarded the Médaille de la résistance in 1946, but was apparently considered unworthy of the Légion d’honneur and received no other more prestigious decoration.190 These demonstrations represent a short-lived and ultimately forlorn experiment, but they did illustrate the potential of women to fight in new ways, simultaneously taking on the roles of protestor, propagandist and resister. In her memoirs, Ricol wrote, ‘[f]or the first time, fifteen of the FTP were engaged in broad daylight in the centre of Paris, in a mass action without encountering any losses. It was an urban guerrilla operation.’191 It is significant that she omits any references to gender in this statement. Henri Michel was accurate in describing these protests as a form of combat: these women’s contributions in 1942 were neither ‘auxiliary’, ‘passive’ or some type of ‘para-resistance’.192 But these specific manifestations illustrate how complex the relationships between, space, gender and resistance could become.

189 Peschanski, Dictionnaire historique, p. 737.
190 Service historique de la défense, Vincennes (SHD), GR 16 P 400755, Madeleine Marzin Personal File.
191 London, La mègère, p. 163.
Chapter Three

‘I led more or less a normal life’:
SOE Agents and Clandestine Café Culture

In May 1943, following the historic first meeting of the Conseil national de la Résistance, Jean Moulin took his secretary, Daniel Cordier, to a restaurant he knew from before the war, Aux Ducs de Bourgogne on place d’Anvers, in the Rochechouart quarter of Paris. ‘When Rex [Moulin] invited me to lunch or dinner, it was always to work’ Cordier said, but ‘this evening he did not seem concerned to give me instructions’.¹ Instead he used it to mark their achievement by thinking about life beyond the war. Moulin reminisced about his art collection and talked of taking Cordier to the Jeu de Paume – then a gallery full of looted artworks destined for export to Germany – after the Liberation. His wish would remain unfulfilled. A month later Moulin fell into German hands and was returned to Paris only to face torture and death, though this poignant, discreet celebration had not been the cause.

Cordier’s vividly sketched memory may not represent a typical clandestine rendezvous in occupied Paris, but no urban spaces evoke the shadowy world of resistance so seductively as secluded cafés and backstreet bistros. In Jean-Pierre Melville’s L’Armée des ombres (The Army of Shadows), released in 1968, the mystique of the wartime café and its connections to the heroism and tragedy of resistance are exemplified in a far more familiar scene, where conspiratorial conversations are exchanged across marble-topped tables in an intimate, mirrored corner café. Cycling through images of the members of Philippe Gerbier’s resistance group holding their secret meetings, Melville emphasises how ‘rank and file men are interchangeable’ and thus resistance is ‘a collective

¹ Daniel Cordier, Alias Caracalla (Paris: Gallimard, 2009), p. 848. Ironically, this venue was well known to Germans: Der Deutsche Wegleiter, the Wehrmacht’s tourist guide, regularly recommended it.
operation’, one which is based on solidarity but also of self-sacrifice. Nevertheless, both of these examples, real and imagined, are reminders of how cafés and restaurants have become intimately bound up in the mythology of resistance. This can be seen as one manifestation of nostalgia for the café as a cultural institution, a phenomenon which has grown since 1945 and correlates with their steady decline in France. In the early 1950s, Alexander Werth noted that visitors to Lyon were shown around the ‘various obscure little cafés and restaurants’ where the likes of Moulin and other heroes of the secret war were ‘supposed to have met to discuss “resistance business”’. Such tours may no longer run, but the café setting continues to be an essential ingredient for portrayals of the French resistance in films, novels and television. Yet its significance within the history of the occupation remains almost completely unexplored.

Since the 1990s, a growing acknowledgement of the importance of specificité in the study of resistance has challenged generalised and reductive approaches in favour of a broader, sensitive and more comprehensive understanding. In that time, the thoughts and actions of individuals and small groups, the roles of women, of immigrant and foreign forces, and the continual tensions and disengagements between personal experiences and national narratives have all become recognised as fruitful areas of research. In ‘discovering what is specific to those places, groups, events and institutions, which created or sustained resistance’, one encounters a more nuanced, sometimes fragmented and disparate picture of who and what made it happen. The renewed interest in oral testimony, along with the publishing (and republishing) of journals, diaries, letters and memoirs in recent years has encouraged the study of subjective


6 Ibid., p. 271.
experience, while the emergence of interest in those whose actions were ignored or
marginalised by the gaullist myth of a France exclusively ‘liberated by its own efforts,
liberated by its people’. Yet this broadening of perspective has failed to incorporate or
even acknowledge spatial concerns as relevant in the complex interactions and
relationships between resisters and the spaces they resisted in, or the growth and activity
of resistance networks. Despite being recognised historically as centres of conspiracy and
scheming, surveillance, sabotage and terrorism, the attention generally afforded by social
and cultural historians, let alone scholars of resistance and occupation, to the study of
cafés and restaurants to date has been slight, and whether even a ‘microdiscipline of café
studies’, can be said to exist is questionable. While being ‘part of the fabric of France,
woven into the lives of ordinary people, leading ordinary lives’, cafés simultaneously also
became the scenes of extraordinary human drama.

Although theoretical studies of everyday life can offer useful insights within
peacetime conditions, their application and relevance to the extraordinary conditions of
military occupation are quickly limited. To take one example, Henri Lefebvre classed the
café as predominantly a place of leisure:

_The café:_ generally an extra-familial and extra-professional meeting
place, where people come together on the basis of personal affinities (in
principle and at least apparently), because they have the same street or
the same neighbourhood in common rather than the same profession or
class...It is a place where the regulars can find a certain luxury, if only
on the surface; where they can speak _freely_ (about politics, women, etc.),
and where if what is said may be superficial the freedom to say it is
fiercely defended; _where they play._

Beyond its obvious gender bias, such a description is clearly inadequate in the context of
everyday life under occupation – indeed, the notion of speaking freely in a Parisian café

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7 Gildea, _Fighters in the Shadows_, p. 6.
8 Daniel A. Gordon, Review of _The Thinking Space: The Café as a Cultural Institution in
10 Henri Lefebvre (trans. David Moore), _Critique of Everyday Life, Volume One_
shared with German clients well illustrates the upending of normality that occupation brought to daily life. If the continuation of ‘extra-familial and extra-professional’ interactions continued, and even a sense of ‘play’ endured, the Parisian café was also transformed into far a more complex social space. For the countless ‘native’ or internal resistance groups that sprang up across Paris from 1940, driven by varying measures of enthusiasm, ideology and prudence, they provided opportunities for conducting undercover activity, where plans for sabotage or assassination could be hidden by the quotidian gossip and chatter of ordinary civilian life. Moreover, this multidimensional quality to café space could accommodate many layers of secrecy which could, as will be shown below, lead to dizzying levels of complexity.

This chapter will demonstrate the ways in which Parisian spaces were transformed by occupation, and how these transformations affected, and were affected by, both occupiers and resisters. Focusing specifically on the changes to Parisian cafés, it argues that, despite the privations and dangers that occupied life imposed, members of both sides succumbed in varying degrees to the pleasures that they could still offer. The establishment of German-only ‘Soldaten’ venues did not succeed in preventing many soldiers, and particularly those on leave, from being seduced by a Paris imaginary, paradoxically encouraged by the Wehrmacht’s own propaganda. The seductive notion of a capital apparently unaffected by the ravages of war, fuelled by the ready availability of black market goods, did not just attract Germans, however. Allied secret agents were also susceptible to the enticements of fine dining and an almost pre-war state of everyday living. Despite the constant dangers of detection and death, maintaining close proximity to, and sharing space with, the enemy became unremarkable, with tragic results. To analyse this further, I will draw on Michel Foucault’s concept of the ‘heterotopia’, literally ‘other place’, defined as ‘places that are outside of all places’ that are in relation to other sites but ‘in such a way as to suspect, neutralize, or invert the set of relations that they happen to designate, mirror, or reflect’.\textsuperscript{11} In essence, heterotopias are

\textsuperscript{11} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 24.
characterised by their strange, disturbing, reflexive qualities, superficially unremarkable but possessing hidden depths. Foucault famously illustrated the concept with the metaphor of a mirror: the mirror reflects a utopia, a ‘placeless place’ that does not really exist, whereas the mirror, a real object projecting utopia, is a heterotopia. While Edward Soja sees Foucault’s definitions of heterotopia as ‘frustratingly incomplete’ and lacking the ‘axiomatic neatness’ required to properly describe itself, he recognises that its essential thrust matters more than the delivery of a complete theory: what counts is the intent to challenge a comfortable, established order of spatial thinking and present instead ‘an alternative envisioning of spatiality’, one that refuses to deny the ‘otherness’ of these spaces. Flexibility was a feature of Foucault’s works, whose parameters leave, in his own words, the opportunity for others to adapt and utilise them ‘however they wish in their own area’. Certainly cafés do not stand out as typical examples of heterotopic sites, neither meeting Foucault’s qualification as spaces of ‘crisis’ (sacred spaces that play an important role in an individual’s life stages) nor ‘deviation’ (where those exhibiting behaviour beyond the norm are found – hospitals, prisons and so on). But the phenomenon of occupation possesses the power to radically change the nature of places, and under these conditions, cafés can be seen to undergo a radical metamorphosis. The café is a place woven into the everyday lives of its citizens and associated with the most mundane of everyday practices: eating and drinking, socialising, exchanging news and opinions, and so on. As a signifier of the city’s character it is a fixture of both the real and imagined Paris, associated with writers, artists and revolutionaries as well as ordinary workers. Yet under occupation it becomes a multi-faceted arena of public and secret life, simultaneously becoming a tourist attraction, a place of black market business, as well as a refuge for clandestine resistance workers, German counter-intelligence services and double agents. Though cafés were hardly

unique in being transformed by occupation, I will argue that they reflected a strong heterotopic quality, simultaneously supporting everyday social and cultural practices while also becoming places of extraordinary clandestine dramas. On the question of specificity, it is important to separate from the ‘institutional’ character commonly associated with heterotopias: I am not asserting that this otherness was a quality to be found in all cafés; nonetheless, cafés did exhibit it. In taking Foucault at his word, I will thus expand on the concept of heterotopias to highlight the multifaceted nature of these everyday sites in occupied Paris, in which both occupier and occupied are the creators of heterotopic space.

Broadly speaking, resisters’ improvised efforts were usually limited by scant resources and necessarily local in nature. Meanwhile, Allied secret services were planning much bigger, strategic objectives for waging an underground war. Undercover agents of the Special Operations Executive (SOE), trained and equipped to carry out sabotage and subversion, would seek to recruit or work alongside these grass roots fighters, yet their approach to undercover operations in the capital was markedly different. By examining SOE’s networks in Paris, and particularly those of its ‘Independent’, or ‘F’ Section, whose recruits were drawn mainly from British or Commonwealth backgrounds, this article will examine how café life also played an essential, even fatal, role in their development, and how their choice of living spaces and meeting places set them apart from resident resisters already established within the city.

**Parisian Cafés and Resistance**

Nowhere else has been quite so affected, socially, politically or economically by the phenomenon of the café as Paris. By the summer of 1940, it had long been one of the city’s most prominent signifiers, as identifiable as the Eiffel Tower or the Moulin
Since being introduced in the mid-seventeenth century, its proliferation had been unparalleled: at the end of the 1880s, cafés in all their different forms numbered 30,000; by 1911, Paris had had more cafés than any other city, three times as many as New York, and more than five times that of London. This dramatic rise is partly explained by the ways in which the social functions of the café space developed. A shortage of private space at home was a common problem for Parisians, particularly those in poorer districts where overcrowding became rife and many tenements lacked cooking facilities. Eating, drinking and socialising thus spilled out into the city’s streets: cafés and restaurants became annexes, essential extensions of living space, offering the working classes ‘an accessible, public and open forum for social life’. Close bonds were formed not just between patrons, but also with proprietors. While café owners became associated with offering credit to their customers, they also fulfilled ceremonial duties, adopting a quasi-pastoral role. They were the most popular witnesses at weddings, and some actually held weddings on their premises.

The associations between espionage and cafés reaches back at least to the eighteenth century, when any man who spent his days frequenting cafés rather than working was likely to come under suspicion as a spy. Government agents were regularly used in tracking the activities of ‘café politicians and agitators’ in the early nineteenth century, and it is perhaps no coincidence that the beginnings of the historic collaboration of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels can be traced to their meetings at the

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15 Although I will loosely differentiate between the terms ‘café’, ‘bistrot’, ‘brasserie’ and ‘restaurant’, in practice the divisions are often difficult to properly separate. While each has its own distinct historical origins, the various classifications of débits de boissons – a term introduced in 1880 to describe any establishment serving drinks from salons de thé and cafés, café-tabacs, café-bars and so on, to cabarets, clubs and brothels – make applying clear delineations cumbersome and, for the purposes of this chapter, unnecessary.
18 Ibid., pp. 45-49.
Café de la Régence, the famed haunt of chess players in place du Palais-Royal, in 1844.\(^{20}\) Napoleon III’s suspicions of the café as home to seditious thinkers and secret societies led to greater surveillance during the Second Empire, while Baron Haussmann’s modernisation of Paris blurred further the boundaries between the private and the public, bringing a greater performative aspect to street life. Cafés sited on the city’s wide new, commerce-driven boulevards and avenues were designed for seeing and being seen, and a vogue for ‘display and diversion, not conspiracy and agitation’.\(^{21}\) However, the displacement of workers from the city centre to the impoverished eastern and northern districts developed a kind of counter-café culture, bringing together different social groups and encouraging closer personal contacts, creating what W. Scott Haine calls the ‘intimate anonymity’ of the working-class café.\(^{22}\) The forming of these ‘micro-societies’ became essential for the activities of strikers and anarchists, who turned café spaces into meeting places and sometimes unofficial headquarters, especially in the eastern districts of Belleville and Ménilmontant.\(^{23}\) Other cities witnessed similar mobilisations, and one can draw interesting comparisons with the appropriation of beer halls and saloons across New York’s Lower East Side, where immigrant German anarchists were creating their own ‘spatial community’ during this same period.\(^{24}\)

While many cafés continued to maintain a reputation as incubators of polemic and conspiracy, Paris’s more commercially successful establishments were viewed as the new bulwarks of bourgeois, reactionary values, making them the first modern targets of terrorism. In February 1892, a waiter at ‘Le Véry’ on boulevard de Magenta, close to the Gare du Nord train station, had helped the police to arrest one of his customers, the wanted anarchist François-Claudius Ravachol. Two months later, two of Ravachol’s

\(^{21}\) Haine, ‘Café Friend’, p. 610.
group took their revenge, leaving a suitcase full of explosives by the bar of Le Véry. But it was not until 1894, when lone anarchist Émile Henri threw a homemade bomb into Saint Lazare’s Café Terminus, killing one customer and injuring another twenty, that the terrible vulnerability of this most Parisian of social spaces became obvious. And with the shooting in 1914 of French socialist leader Jean Jaurès while he sat at a table in his local café on rue Montmartre, a link between terror and the café was forever forged.

These first examples of modern assassination made cafés an attractive target for future assassins and saboteurs worldwide too. However, the first call to café resistance against the Nazi occupation was much less deadly. In 33 Conseils a l’occupé (‘33 Hints to the Occupied’), an anonymously-published clandestine pamphlet illegally produced by a small printshop on rue Rochechouart in August 1940, journalist Jean Texcier presented advice to Parisians on how to conduct themselves towards their new German cohabitants. One tip recommended that if one should try to make conversation at a café or a restaurant, ‘you should politely let him know that what he has to say will not interest you’. Texcier’s dry humour disguised an intent to communicate and embolden a sense of solidarity between French readers, an aim which was fully achieved according to one who was ‘absolutely overjoyed’ to discover a copy of this ‘glimmer of light in the darkness’. But many others did not follow Texcier’s directive, however uncomfortable they felt sharing their café spaces with the new invaders.

Jean-Paul Sartre described how the initial sight of Germans in cafés had ‘made us ill’, but awkward exchanges with these foreign soldiers more often resulted in a mumbled, half-hearted ‘old human readiness’ to cooperate, leaving him and other citizens feeling ‘dissatisfied with ourselves’. Feeling a similar sense of ‘dissatisfaction’, critic Léon Werth felt a keener sense of shame at his and others’ acquiescence in such social situations. He likened such behaviour to ‘the prisoner who flatters his jailer’, a

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25 Merriman, The Dynamite Club, pp. 80-81.
pathetic excuse for the ‘silent contemptuous pride’ shown by prouder Parisians during
the Prussians’ occupation of their city seventy years before. In the following months this
uncomfortable sharing of café spaces further complicated the relationship between
occupier and occupied, as the German population chose to engage with, or disengage
from, French culture.

The Occupation of Cafés
While the French were confused about how they should behave, many Germans were
determined to enjoy themselves. From its earliest issues in the summer of 1940, the
Wehrmacht’s Der Deutsche Wegleiter für Paris encouraged its readers to view Paris from
a café terrace, from where behind a glass of beer or coffee the less conspicuous
serviceman ‘may in complete privacy observe the crowds of Parisians flowing past’.
Among its particular recommendations were Le Colisée and Fouquet’s on the avenue des
Champs-Elysées, Café de la Paix on boulevard des Capucines, and La Coupole and Café
de la Rotonde on boulevard Montparnasse, all of which attracted many thousands of
uniformed customers during the next four years. Yet it is interesting to note that among
the many subscribers to the Wegleiter were troops fighting on the Eastern Front, seeking
a distraction from brutal Russian winters and an increasingly bleak future. Viewing the
sights of Paris from these famous venues, even in one’s imagination, offered a respite
from the horrors of total war.

The Wehrmacht’s requisitioning of Paris spaces for German use became an
ongoing feature of occupation. Many were made instantly recognisable by bold black-
and-white gothic signage they displayed, which indicated different types of Soldaten

29 Quoted in Nathan Bracher, After The Fall: War and Occupation in Irène
Nemirovsky’s Suite Française (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press,
2010), p. 123.
30 Der Deutsch Wegleiter, August 1940, p. 14.
31 Ibid.
establishment. Particularly prominent were the *Soldatenheime*, comparable to an army mess or lounge, which were accompanied by *Soldatentheater* (theatres), *Soldatenkinos* (cinemas), and a single *Soldatenkaffee* (café), situated on rue du Faubourg St Honoré in the heart of the city. Guest houses, bookshops and lounges for officers and the Luftwaffe’s pilots (*Fliegerheime*) soon followed, along with a *Soldatenkaufhaus* (department store) on the avenue des Ternes in the seventeenth arrondissement, just north of the Étoile.

These establishments remained an unavoidable feature of life during the occupation, being mainly situated in the capital’s busiest centres. By October 1940, five *Soldatenheime* had been established, on the avenue des Champs-Elysées; on boulevard Sebastopol; on boulevard Saint-Michel, close to the Panthéon; on avenue de La Motte-Piquet, by École Militaire; and on place Blanche, opposite the Moulin Rouge. These were complemented by *Soldatentheater* and *Soldatenkinos*: the Rex, at one time Europe’s biggest cinema, on boulevard Poissonnière; the Marignane cinema and Théâtre Champs-Elysées on the avenue des Champs-Elysées; the Théâtre de Chaillot at Trocadéro; and the Empire on avenue de Wagram. These venues were distinct from other requisitions. La Coupole on boulevard Montparnasse, one of the most famous Paris cafés of the interwar period, was requisitioned in March 1943, though only the first floor was reserved – the terrace and ground floor were open to all.\(^{33}\) Its equally reputable neighbours, Café de la Rotonde, La Closerie de Lilas and Le Dôme, all remained independent. Such segregative measures increased the sense not just of German appropriation of French space, but in the case of cafés and restaurants, of space closely associated with French social life. Lily Sergueiew, a Russian-born Parisian journalist who would be recruited to work as a spy for the Abwehr (German military intelligence), returned to France at the end of 1940. She was surprised to find ‘how different reality is from what one dreams’ believing that the ‘German occupation has but little altered the outward aspect of the

\(^{33}\) Desprairies, *Paris dans la collaboration*, p. 405.
city’ though noted how already the ‘cafés and restaurants are crowded with Huns.’

A year later she met her German handler at the Café Dupont on place de Clichy, a chain popular with both French and Germans, and previously a meeting place for the Surrealists during the inter-war years. The scene left a memorable impression:

What a strange place for an appointment!... At the other side of the square, the Café Wepler, transformed into a ‘Soldatenspeisesaal’ [soldiers’ dining room], shows its white barriers guarded by policemen. The passersby are obliged to step down from the pavement and walk in the middle of the street. From a distance, they can admire at their leisure the sardines, the butter, the slices of sausages, the steaks with fried potatoes which the German soldiers remorselessly devour. Why shouldn’t they? Aren’t they the masters? And the windows are bare of curtains, so that those who are hungry can tell themselves that, had we won the war.

Sergueiew’s view might appear somewhat cruel, and it lends a certain irony to an advertisement in the Wegleiter declaring that ‘the typical Parisian could not imagine a city without the famous Dupont café.’ But her journal underlines a point that is difficult to contest: these conspicuous displays of appropriation were simultaneously a visible stamp of German ownership of the city and a widening economic divide.

These divisions were complicated by the element of tourism. More specifically, to some degree Soldaten venues became representative of the tensions inherent in the rise of military tourism in Paris. On the one hand, the notion of the ‘correct’ German soldier-tourist was encouraged to sample the delights of the city, including its cafés and restaurants: aside from its effect on morale, it also supported the attempts by the Militärbefehlshaber in Frankreich to promote the image of a cooperative and relatively peaceable occupation. But criticisms of this Etappengeist – the softening of soldiers’ sense

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of duty in a comfortable backwater – posed a threat to the effectiveness of German troops and their commitment to the fatherland.  

These contradictions were never resolved. The official tourist literature produced portrayed Paris as ‘simultaneously exquisite and morally deficient’. To the very end of the occupation, Paris was seen by the occupiers as a world-class tourist destination, even when orders were being given to German personnel to be armed when visiting the opera or theatre, in case of resistance attack. Ninetta Jucker, a British mother living in Paris through the occupation, recalled watching German diners withdrawing ‘behind a triple barricade of geraniums, sentinels and chevaux de frises’ as the occupation lengthened, with the Soldatenheim becoming an increasingly important retreat where Germans ‘consumed white bread and kuchen and gave up all pretence of mixing with the population’. Echoing Friedrich Sieburg’s qualified praise of French culture in his 1929 Gott in Frankreich? Ein Versuch (‘God in France? A Test’), a 1943 Paris guidebook reminded German readers that a fine Parisian restaurant still ‘allows you to live as a God in France’. But as one homesick German soldier wrote in his diary, ‘Paris is magnificent but foreign, and that is the bottom line’. From 1943, the divisions became more apparent with the introduction of fifty-metre security cordons around cinemas and theatres. These not only created further spatial demarcations between military and civilian populations, but also served as concrete manifestations of a growing psychological fear of armed resistance.

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38 One SOE agent in Paris noted such a conflict of views in public, which led to ‘a nasty row between men who had been in Russia and were being sent back, and others who had never been there at all. The ones who had fought accused the others of never doing any fighting but just spend their time looking pretty.’ TNA, HS 9/1648, Denis Rake Personal File, Interrogation of Rake, 19 May 1943.  
44 Courtois, Le Sang de l’étranger, p. 266.
In addition to German requisitioning of cafés and restaurants, potentially dangerous or subversive places could become subjected to occupation of a different kind. The Café d’Harcourt, on the corner of place de la Sorbonne in the fifth arrondissement on the Left Bank, had long been the haunt of artists and especially students, and certainly a place with a history of political dissent. In 1893, a spat over the Fine Arts Ball, an annual carnival in the city criticised for its nudity, led to the death of one of the café’s customers and kept the Latin quarter ‘in a ferment’ for several days. A resurgence of the same rebellious spirit was reported in the early autumn of 1940 by the Geheime Feldpolizei (GFP, the secret military police working for the Abwehr and SS security services) describing how, during the course of the several preceding weeks, students had taken to mocking and goading German soldiers in the café, leading to some physical confrontations. Following the Armistice Day demonstrations on the avenue des Champs-Élysées in November, the café was shut down and replaced by the ‘Librarie Rive-Gauche’, a bookshop and cultural centre named after the French pre-war ‘Rive Gauche Society’, a far-Right group which sought to encourage Franco-German cooperation. The openly collaborationist intentions of this new store made it a target for the communists, who bombed the premises in November 1941. But it reopened soon after, and continued to host book signings for antisemitic writers such as Lucien Rebatet. Thus a place long associated with the political Left was transformed from a social hub into an instrument exclusively for promoting the occupation. From the German perspective, the neutralisation of this former trouble spot was a clear success. But the resulting displacement of former café customers merely led to their inhabiting new venues, where manifestations of resistance continued to diversify and expand.

46 AN, AJ 40/870, GFP 603 report, 19 November 1940.
47 APP, BS2 GB 099, Librairie Rive Gauche.
The scale of the changes brought by the occupation to Parisian cafés was significant. The establishment of Soldaten venues across the city had appropriated and ‘Germanised’ leisure spaces, but the allure of the Parisian café remained strong, especially for soldiers on leave. While Paris and its people endured the hardships of occupation, the enduring fantasy of a Paris existing outside the war turned cafés into places where perceptions of the real and the imagined existed simultaneously, creating the heterotopic quality of a ‘juxtapositional, relational space’.\textsuperscript{49} Next, I will analyse how resisters and Allied secret agents further exaggerated this spatial complexity within cafés and café life.

**SOE Agents in Paris**

As Raymond Aubrac, one of the founders of the Libération-Sud resistance movement, described it, two societies coexisted under the occupation. There was an ‘official society…marked by the presence of the Nazi army and a government which collaborated with it’ and ‘at the same time, an underground society…a resistance society’.\textsuperscript{50} But this resistance society was far from a unified or confluent force, and the ways in which resistance manifested itself in cafés was diverse. Even those unwilling or unable to play an active role were able to exercise a certain defiance by speaking their minds in café spaces. Jean-Paul Sartre reported hearing hundreds of political conversations openly conducted by French café dwellers within earshot of a German patrons who, ignorant of their language, stared blankly, appearing ‘more like walls than men’.\textsuperscript{51} Whatever the veracity of this statement, both French and German café dwellers were aware that their fellow patrons at the next table might belong to Aubrac’s ‘resistance society’, but another layer of social infiltration was also underway in Paris, separate from the underground groups that had developed since the beginning of the occupation. Agents of the British

\textsuperscript{49} Iwan Sudradjat, ‘Foucault, the Other Spaces, and Human Behaviour’, *Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences*, 36 (2012), pp. 28-34.


\textsuperscript{51} Sartre, ‘Paris under the Occupation’, p. 140.
Special Operations Executive (SOE), sent behind enemy lines to encourage resistance and sabotage the German war effort, had been arriving in Paris since 1941. Although their task was to form secret networks by recruiting local supporters, these highly trained men and women were mostly operating in a foreign country, having to pass as civilians and adopt the role of an unremarkable Parisian. Despite their extensive preparation in rehearsing faked identities and cover stories, some were temperamentally more suited to the game than others. 52

Since the 1990s, increasing numbers of SOE files have been released to the National Archives at Kew, including the personal files of individual agents sent to work in Paris. Though historians of resistance and intelligence have drawn on SOE agents’ reports for operational information, the wealth of detail they offer on everyday life under occupation has been ignored. The social and economic conditions, the extent of security controls and hazards of using different forms of transport, fluctuations in living costs, the availability of accommodation and many other aspects of life were documented, and in many cases such information was used to inform inexperienced agents before their own deployment. Combined, these give a unique insight into the experiences, views and habits of trained British and French operatives working alongside ‘native’ or internal resistance. Drawing on these sources and concentrating particularly on those submitted by F Section agents, offers a new way to understand aspects of the spatial dimension of resistance in Paris, identifying ways in which these agents viewed the city, the places where they met and lived. In what follows, I will show how cafés and meeting places played a fateful role in their work.

While the communists provided the most visible manifestations of armed resistance on Parisian streets, assassinating German soldiers and hurling grenades through café doorways, SOE was more concerned with preparing for future action, specifically in creating, training and arming secret groups capable of carrying out

sabotage and launching attacks in support of an eventual Allied invasion. This kind of work demanded places receive air drops of arms and supplies, and people, often farmers and landowners, to hide them. Much of the work of F Section’s networks in Paris through 1942-1944 was actually conducted outside the city, in the more rural areas of the northern départements of occupied France where weapons and supplies could be dropped by air and hidden by local recruits. Agents’ decisions to base themselves in Paris thus stemmed in part from a need to maintain wireless communications with London, but also with each other.

F Section’s earliest attempts to gain an initial foothold in France did not begin in Paris, but in the Unoccupied Zone. Its first agents had been parachuted literally and metaphorically into the dark: hardly anything was known about how the country had changed under occupation since 1940, and the efforts to create rudimentary networks across the country were initially error-prone and mostly fruitless. Pierre de Vomécourt – codenamed Lucas, a French-born aristocrat, schooled in Britain – related his first visit to a bar, where he made the mistake of ordering brandy in his coffee on a jour sans, one of the three days in the week when alcohol was prohibited. The barman made a phone call to the local police station, and de Vomécourt was lucky to avoid arrest.53 When he made another mistake in trying to buy cigarettes without a tobacco ration card, he found shopkeepers assumed he was attempting to buy on the black market and the refusal was ‘generally courteous’.54 Such trial and error, though highly dangerous, represented the way SOE learned its trade. In the autumn of 1941, following the arrests of a number of agents and the loss of wireless contact with London, a small band of survivors gravitated towards the capital. Despite making some useful contacts with nascent resistance across the country, what became known as the ‘Autogyro’ network – mockingly referred to as

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54 Cowburn, No Cloak, p. 18.
On Boxing Day 1941, de Vomécourt attended a meeting with a lawyer and resister, Michel Brault, on the terrace of the Café Georges V on the avenue des Champs-Élysées. There Brault introduced him to Mathilde Carré, now the head of a Franco-Polish intelligence network, Interallié, whose wireless operators could help Autogyro re-establish contact with London. Uncomfortable with conducting clandestine meetings in such a public space, Carré noticed that Brault was continually looking around in all directions, ‘saying in a loud voice “it’s not good to talk here, there are some of them here for sure” (“some of them” meaning the Gestapo’). Brault later corroborated her account, recalling that ‘I had a feeling that she [Carré] was watched that day in the café. There were funny faces and a man left the café as soon as we arrived. I told Lucas we could not talk there, but he was very imprudent.’

Brault’s hunch proved correct. Unknown to both men, Carré, referred to within her own circle as ‘The Cat’, was now a double agent, and had given up dozens of her Interallié comrades to the Germans the previous month. Furthermore, Carré’s captor, the Abwehr spycatcher Hugo Bleicher, had indeed been ‘watching everything’ from a nearby table, while quietly pretending to read the Paris-Soir. Only several weeks later did de Vomécourt realise that Carré could not be trusted, by which time all of Autogyro’s agents had already come under Bleicher’s surveillance, having unwittingly shared his taste for the Auberge d’Armaille, a Russian restaurant near the Étoile, conveniently near de Vomécourt’s address. Holding a meeting at the same venue, de Vomécourt broke the

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55 Ibid., p. 35.
56 TNA, KV 2/931, Mathilde Carré Personal File, Extracts from ‘Avec le Gestapo et le Service de Contre-Espionage Allemand’, p. 82.
57 TNA, KV 2/931, Mathilde Carré Personal File, Interrogation of Miklos @ Jerome, 23 March 1944.
58 TNA, KV 2/931, Mathilde Carré Personal File, Extracts from ‘Avec le Gestapo’, p. 82.
59 Carré was a friend of the Auberge’s owner. See TNA, KV 2/166, Hugo Bleicher Personal File, Appendix D: Landa Affair.
news to his stunned comrades. ‘I felt just nothing at all at first’, Cowburn recalled, ‘and found myself stuffing another forkful of pommes de terre à l’huile into my mouth’.  

Cowburn and a fellow agent thought about hatching a plan to ‘bump off Bleicher’, but after considering their very limited options decided that instead ‘the best way of dealing with the situation was to have a very good lunch’. However, de Vomécourt continued with his own subterfuge, arranging a rendezvous with Carré at an unnamed café where his brother Philippe, also working for SOE, was instructed to secretly photograph her. If anything happened to Pierre, Philippe would now have no trouble in recognising Carré and arranging her death. An extraordinary chain of events eventually led to the demise of Autogyro – though not of its agents – in April 1942, when Bleicher finally arrested de Vomécourt at the Café des Palmiers, on the rue de Rome. But these early exploits both demonstrated and prefigured the central role that cafés and restaurants would play in SOE’s future work in Paris.

SOE’s Rules of Café Etiquette

Unlike French resisters whose urge to act had been spontaneous and often ill-prepared, SOE agents received intensive training on how to live clandestinely in an occupied country. Before being dropped behind enemy lines, both male and female recruits underwent a series of courses which usually concluded with what became known as the ‘finishing school’ at the Beaulieu estate in Hampshire, which taught the mechanics of creating an underground network, methods of internal communications and how best to avoid detection by the enemy. The continual demand for agents necessarily kept this training short, and some of those who passed it were of questionable suitability: for

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60 Cowburn, No Cloak, p. 70.
61 TNA, KV 2/927, Mathilde Carré Personal File, Note on interview with Benoit, 30 March 1942.
63 TNA, HS 9/1539/6, Pierre de Vomécourt Personal File, Preliminary Interrogation of Sylvain @ Lucas, 21 April 1945, p. 2.
example, two sent to France in late 1942, one of them a wireless operator, had been judged illiterate.\textsuperscript{64} Under these constraints, instructors made a point of emphasising the golden rules of security, above all keeping personal contact to a minimum, and using ‘cut-outs’ (intermediaries) and ‘letter boxes’ (places to exchange messages) whenever possible.

The training syllabus stressed the importance of realising that life in occupied France had largely become unrecognisable from its pre-war state. Homegrown resisters in Paris had slowly become accustomed to the changes that occupation had brought to the city. But newly arrived agents from Britain, especially those who had lived in France before the war, were often left shocked and disoriented by the transformations. Even for those recruits who had grown up in France or felt a strong connection to it, success depended on adapting to ‘a new way or system of living, in which every action is calculated’.\textsuperscript{65} The experience of more established agents could be invaluable in showing novices the ropes: one female agent in Paris made it her job to ‘help acclimatise themselves [sic] to present day conditions, by escorting them in Paris, visiting restaurants and shops. She helped them to gain confidence by making them realise that they could circulate without inviting disaster at every turn’.\textsuperscript{66}

The gap between the limits of instructors’ knowledge and the realities of operating behind the lines required a constant revision of what was being taught. This included changes in café life, an institution against which the Vichy government took an increasingly intolerant stance, deploring its connections with working-class culture as well as its longer historical reputation as a crucible of dissent. This view was bolstered by the belief that drink had been a malign influence on the French army and had played an


\textsuperscript{65} TNA, HS 7/52, SOE Group B Training Syllabus, Internal Communications, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{66} TNA, HS 6/567, Circuit mission reports and interrogations, Aisner interrogation, 23/24 January 1945.
essential part in its swift defeat in 1940. Legislation to impose heavier penalties against café owners was introduced from the very start, though in fact steps to curb alcoholic consumption were nothing new, similar fears having been voiced during (and before) the First World War in France. Prohibiting the sale of alcoholic drinks on Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays in public places – the rule that had caught Pierre de Vomécourt by surprise – was actually proposed in March 1940, though this ‘law against alcoholism’ only came into effect in August. Successive regulations would demand that cafés be kept away from cemeteries, churches, schools and hospitals, and by 1943 prefects and the interior ministry were granted the power to close down any establishment to ‘preserve order, health and public morality’.

As spaces in which to conduct meetings, cafés were not considered ideal by SOE. Though better than hotels or brothels, the slightly bizarre list of preferred venues included parks, dance halls, Catholic churches, Turkish baths, beaches, private houses or offices and art galleries. The exchanging of messages in café settings was practiced during training, in writing as well as verbally. Yet when it came to making a genuine café rendezvous in occupied territory, security rules were adapted or simply ignored by some agents. Nicholas Boiteux, who survived two missions in France, later expressed his feelings bluntly:

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69 Journal officiel de la République Française (JORF), 1 March 1940, p. 1513; JORF, 24 August 1940, p. 4765.
70 Journal officiel de l’État français, 11 September 1943, p. 2398.
72 Agazarian’s training report in passing verbal messages is given in TNA, HS 9/11/1, Jack Agazarian Personal File, Report on Scheme in Newcastle, 27 November-1 December 1942, Sheet Two.
There was a lot of stuff I thought was rubbish in the training...we should meet our wireless operator in a café and have an aperitif and he would offer me a cigarette, then give me a matchbox to light my cigarette and in the matchbox would be a message. I’d open the matchbox and take out the message. Well, that seemed a bit stupid. All he had to do was whisper, not even whisper, just talk. ‘I’ve got a message from London. Your next dropping zone has been accepted. Everything’s OK.’ No-one’s going to hear him say that.73

Another veteran, Harry Despaigne, agreed, saying that ‘passing a message in a café was so obviously wrong that we never did it in real life.’74 Some networks prohibited café meetings altogether.75 But no consensus existed: agents varied greatly in their appreciation of what they had been taught. Sometimes, circumstances made it difficult to avoid using one. Marcel Jaurant-Singer, a wireless operator for SOE’s ‘Mason’ network in Burgundy, made a general point of avoiding cafés, preferring to use a barber’s shop for his meetings. On one occasion when he had to attend a café meeting, he was dismayed to find the appointed place filled with members of a local resistance group.76 Whatever place was chosen, Beaulieu warned of the need to ‘change your meeting places frequently’, stressing that ‘it is never safe to keep to the same one for long’.77 However, agents in Paris rarely followed such advice.

The Physician Network – ‘Prosper’

F Section’s need to replace Autogyro was understood but it was not until September 1942 that plans were ready to initiate a new network in Paris. Named ‘Physician’, it was more commonly referred to as ‘Prosper’, after the codename of its head, Francis Suttill. Its role was to organise and arm resistance groups in the Paris area, but soon developed connections across large areas of northern France. During the following year it would

74 Ibid, p. 60.
75 For example, see TNA, HS 6/569, Circuit mission reports and interrogations, Maurice Dupont interrogation, 16 February 1945, p. 6. See also Foot, SOE in France, p. 91.
76 Correspondence with Marcel Jaurant-Singer, 22 August 2016.
77 TNA, HS 7/52, SOE Group B Training Syllabus, Internal Communications, p. 3.
work closely with a number of other networks, including: ‘Juggler’, led by a Parisian businessman, Jean Worms; France Antelme’s ‘Bricklayer’, which was concerned mainly with political liaison with French resistance and financing SOE’s networks; ‘Donkeyman’, commanded by a former French army officer, Henri Frager; and ‘Inventor’, under Sidney Jones, which was to liaise with Donkeyman. One other, ‘Farrier’, run by a French aviator, Henri Déricourt, was responsible for arranging the infiltration and exfiltration of agents from secret airfields across north-western France. It would play a critical role in both SOE’s operations and its turbulent historiography, not least because Déricourt is known to have worked as a double agent, maintaining relations with the German Sicherheitsdienst (SD), the SS counter-intelligence service.

According to Jack Agazarian, one of Prosper’s wireless operators, ‘all rendezvous took place in cafés’.\(^{78}\) Where they met was largely determined by the locales in which they lived, but also by their tendency to keep to a relatively limited number of venues. Annie Guéhenno, a French agent working for the gaullist Bureau des operations aériennes (BOA, Office of Aerial Operations), coordinating air support for Free French resistance, wrote that her daily rendezvous were usually made in cafés which would be changed every few days, and were often situated in very different settings. The venues were typically ‘frequented by young people where we would not be noticed, but in the more diverse districts, or around the Étoile, we mixed with the rich young set...sometimes near the Bastille, at the Tambour or the Flambeau, we met some shady people whom we imitated...or we found ourselves with students in the Latin Quarter, at the Dupont, at La Source or the bar of Le Faluche’.\(^{79}\) By contrast, her British counterparts became used to keeping set times on certain days for meetings, and in the same neighbourhoods. The instructions described here by Déricourt are typical: ‘I shall be at the Courcelle [‘Le Courcelles’, a café on rue de Courcelles] at noon every Tuesday and Saturday...If the person concerned does not know me [they] must ask for Monsieur

\(^{78}\) TNA, HS 9/11/1, Jack Agazarian Personal File, General Report from Marcel, 23 June 1943.

Gilbert at the pay-desk. Password: ‘Pardon, Monsieur, n’êtes-vous pas Monsieur Gilbert?’ ‘Non, mais je le connais fort bien’ [Excuse me, sir, aren’t you Mr Gilbert? No, but I know him very well].  

In order to make the necessary arrangements with agents before their departure or after their arrival in Paris, or to make contact with other resident SOE agents operating in the city, Déricourt made numerous rendezvous at cafés, mainly concentrated on the western side of the city. More specifically, they centred around the avenue de Wagram, one of the broad thoroughfares leading off the Étoile, leading northwards down towards the place des Ternes in the seventeenth arrondissement. Near the top of the avenue was the Café Monte-Carlo, which became one of his usual meeting places. Two F Section agents passing through Paris, Tony Brooks and Harry Despaigne, recalled separately how Déricourt had met them at the Monte-Carlo in the summer of 1943, during which he unexpectedly asked them details about their missions, though neither obliged. What is especially interesting about this place is its attraction for operatives working on both sides. In his attempt to draw out the heads of the Interallié network, the Abwehr’s Hugo Bleicher had forced one of its captured agents to request an urgent rendezvous at the Monte-Carlo, a ploy which did not succeed. However, Bleicher had better luck in his pursuit of SOE’s Donkeyman network. Having recruited Donkeyman’s second-in-command, Roger Bardet, as a double agent, Bleicher was able to engineer a meeting there with Bardet’s superior, Henri Frager, in July 1943. Presenting himself as a disillusioned German officer wishing to help the resistance cause, Bleicher, aided by Bardet’s own treacherous endorsement, fooled Frager into believing his story. The consequences were fatal both for Frager and a number of other SOE agents in Paris.

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82 TNA, KV 2/164, Hugo Bleicher Personal File, Internal Memorandum from S/Ldr Beddard to Colonel Stephens, 9 July 1945.
83 TNA, WO 208/5219, MI 5 Interim Interrogation Report on the Case of Hugo Ernst Bleicher, Appendix B.
Moreover, this café became the place of a completely separate German counterintelligence operation, one carried out by the Gestapo. Arrested here in September 1943, André Grandclément, a regional head of the OCM (Organisation civile et militaire) resistance movement, quickly agreed to collaborate with the Germans, leading to the destruction of SOE’s giant ‘Scientist’ network in Bordeaux, to which Prosper had been closely tied.\(^8^4\) There is no evidence to link these events to those above, which were conducted by the SD and the Abwehr. Déricourt had no part in the Grandclément affair, nor contact with Bleicher.\(^8^5\) This spot also posed a completely different form of danger in the form of communist resistance, aimed not at SOE’s agents but the large numbers of Germans known to frequent the area. In March 1943, two diners were injured as they left the café, walking into a grenade attack launched on the corner of rue Tilsitt. The attack was targeting soldiers leaving the Théâtre de l’Empire, a Soldatentheater just further down from the Monte-Carlo, at 41, avenue de Wagram.\(^8^6\)

Why does this venue seem to have been so attractive to both Allied and German secret services? As far as Bleicher was concerned, he had already found the nearby Café Longchamps, ‘a little café with a gallery from which you could survey the whole place without being seen’, to be an ideal place for carrying out his kind of counter-intelligence work, having already arrested one of Bardet’s colleagues there.\(^8^7\) Since there is nothing apparent to link these different strands of clandestine activity, the situation of the Monte-Carlo seems to have been crucial: the terrace offers a wide field of view of the whole avenue as well as rue Troyon, on which corner it stands. Though the testimony of Bardet may be questionable, he would later identify its proximity to the northern exit for the Étoile metro station, situated close to the Arc de Triomphe, on the same side of the street

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\(^{84}\) Foot, *SOE in France*, pp. 249-251.

\(^{85}\) Bleicher’s account of the meeting with Frager and Bardet is recounted in his memoir. Hugo Bleicher (trans. Ian Colvin), *Colonel Henri’s Story* (London: William Kimber, 1954), pp. 121-123. Bleicher believed that he had seen Déricourt by the SD’s headquarters on avenue Foch but could not positively identify him.

\(^{86}\) Two Germans were also injured. APP, BS 2 GB 099, Attentat Avenue de Wagram, 9 Mars 1943.

\(^{87}\) Bleicher, *Colonel Henri’s Story*, p. 76.
as the café. In describing the preparation for the meeting with Frager, Bardet said that he chose this place ‘in case we were drawn into a trap...the crowd at the exit of the metro would make it easier to get away’. It is interesting that Déricourt also regularly met his assistant Rémy Clement at the same spot before going to the café. According to Clement, this was their usual rendezvous point because ‘being a large space, open all around, it would be easier to run for it if it looked as if one might be going to be arrested’.89

Just fifty metres away from the Monte-Carlo was Chez Tutulle, a small café-restaurant halfway down rue Troyon, an area characterised by ‘cafés illuminated with red lights’ and ‘prostitutes and sidestreets full of little brothels’.90 Déricourt claimed that it was recommended through Jean Worms, the French head of Juggler network, whose agents were also based in Paris.91 Owned by the Tourets, a husband and wife who came to know their SOE clients well, Chez Tutulle was initially used by Déricourt but he became discouraged by the habit of Suttill and his team ‘eating together too often’ there, and stopped using it himself.92

A few hundred metres further down the avenue, at place des Ternes, were two additional venues, the Brasserie Lorraine and ‘Chez Mas’. An Art Nouveau interior luxuriously decorated with chandeliers and ornate mosaics, the Brasserie Lorraine had been so named by its new owner in 1924 to mark the return of Lorraine territory to France following the First World War. From the beginning of the occupation the Lorraine was keen to attract new customers, its advertisements promising a ‘sympathetic reception’ from its waiters and German-speaking barman.93 It also continued to draw in

88 TNA, KV 2/1175, Roger Bardet Personal File, Interrogation by DST, 20 December 1944, p. 2.
90 Quoted in Desprairies, Paris dans la collaboration, p. 601.
91 Fuller, Déricourt: The Chequered Spy, p. 215.
92 Minute sheet, 10 March 1944, Déricourt Personal File, HS 9/422, TNA. Déricourt did not change his story about being the first to make use of Chez Tutulle, although Fuller recorded that Déricourt had first introduced it to Jean Worms, Juggler’s head. See Fuller, Déricourt: The Chequered Spy, pp. 112-113.
93 ‘Kennen Sie das Restaurant Lorraine?’, Der Deutsche Wegleiter, 8, 16-30 November 1940, p. 27.
local clients, including writer Jean Genet, whose wartime years amounted to a series of incarcerations, petty criminal exploits and sexual encounters with members of the occupying forces; he found the Lorraine a useful vantage point for ‘looking at the handsome German soldiers’. For a few military visitors in particular, their affinities with the Lorraine ran much deeper. Ernst Jünger, the author best known for his First World War memoir In Stahlgwittern (published in English as Storm of Steel), became a form of cultural liaison officer for the Wehrmacht. Accompanied by his colleague at the Hotel Majestic, fellow Francophile Gerhard Heller, he spent much of his time recreating his younger days and reigniting treasured pre-war memories. ‘Whether we were at the place du Tertre, the Brasserie Lorraine on the place des Ternes, or on the rue Mouffetard’, Heller wrote, ‘Paris was for us like a second spiritual home, the most perfect picture of all that remained precious from ancient forgotten civilizations’. Jünger’s affection for the Lorraine and the place des Ternes remained particularly strong. Taking tea there in the spring sunshine of 1941, he likened the sandwiches to consecrated hosts dedicated to the ‘memory of an abundance disappeared’ under occupation. Such reminiscences would return to haunt him when walking through the bomb-ravaged remains of Hanover in late 1944, when the war was all but lost.

It is unlikely that Déricourt shared such sentimental associations with the Lorraine or its surroundings. Whether his dealings with the SD began here is a mystery, but he had other reasons to choose it as a meeting place. As with the Monte-Carlo, the Brasserie Lorraine gave a good overview of the vicinity: facing west from the terrace, one could easily scan the converging streets and keep watch on both of the metro exits,

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separated by the florists in the middle of the Place. As his biographer later wrote, ‘across that expanse of low flower-stalls, nobody could creep towards him unobserved’.  

Opposite the Lorraine, on the corner of avenue de Wagram, was the more modest Chez Mas, ‘a big, bright brasserie’ which Déricourt claimed to prefer when he felt he was becoming too well known. His other haunts also offered good vantage points from where one could spy anything unusual. ‘Le Courcelles’, sited on the corner of boulevard de Courcelles and rue de Chazelles, was just a few minutes’ walk from place des Ternes, and the next stop eastbound on Line 2 of the metro. Just as with the Lorraine, the Courcelles metro entrance stands directly opposite, making it impossible for anyone to exit unseen.

Two other venues, Café Dupont and Café Biard, were situated four metro stops further north at place de Clichy, a busy working-class area on the western fringe of the Montmartre tourist trail, where the eighth, ninth, seventeenth and eighteenth arrondissements converge. Again, these venues offered similarly broad vantage points. Their proximity to the imposing Soldatenheim, at the former Café Wepler opposite, presented more of a risk, not just from the concentration of Germans but from resistance actions: like the Monte-Carlo, the Wepler was subjected grenade attacks during March and April 1943. Déricourt stated that he had chosen to use Café Biard after ‘making careful enquiries’ about its suitability, noting that it was open all day and ‘chiefly frequented by workmen of the quarter who come and go quickly’. Whether he had passed some or all the locations of his café rendezvous to the SD is unclear, but in late 1943 another agent reported spying a crowd of Algerians at the Café Biard, whom he believed to be working for the Germans as surveillance agents. Each was given an

98 Fuller, Déricourt: The Chequered Spy, p. 332.
99 Nicholas, Death Be Not Proud, p. 126.
100 TNA, HS 9/421, Henri Déricourt Personal File, Report by Gilbert, 14 June 1943.
102 APP, GB 046, Attentats Paris Région Parisienne, 1943.
envelope by a German contact before the group quickly dispersed.\textsuperscript{104} When questioned, Déricourt only admitted to knowing a single Algerian there, with whom he soon cut contact.\textsuperscript{105}

Not all agents were comfortable relying on cafés for making personal contact. During her debriefing in London, Déricourt’s assistant, Julienne Aisner, stressed the dangers of making contacts in cafés:

One must go to the café at the same time for several days in succession if the body does not turn up on the first occasion. A man or woman sitting about in a café, obviously waiting for someone to turn up, always attracts attention. A couple can do this easily without being noticed, but for a single person it is too dangerous. Source [Aisner] prefers to make contacts in a crowded underground station or a large shop. There are many rafles [roundups] in Paris at the moment. Source recently saw 18 buses full of people being taken away for verification of papers after a rafle in the Champs-Elysées.\textsuperscript{106}

Nonetheless, the most popular terraced cafés in Paris, regularly advertised to German soldiers in the pages of the \textit{Wegleiter}, were also used as meeting places by SOE’s agents.\textsuperscript{107} In June 1943, France Antelme arranged rendezvous at Café de la Régence at Palais-Royal, while others made use of the Café Georges V, the Café Colisée and Le Select in the avenue des Champs-Elysées.\textsuperscript{108} The Café Garnier, one of the more luxurious venues on rue du Havre, opposite Saint Lazare station, was used by Suttill’s wireless operator, Gilbert Norman, Agazarian and others.\textsuperscript{109} It seems that many of these meetings passed without incident, but the dangers inherent in using such places were highlighted in May 1943, when two Abwehr agents, Richard Christmann and Karl Boden, attempted to

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{104} TNA, HS 9/127, Robert Benoist Personal File, Second interrogation of Robert Benoist, 10 February 1944.
\footnotesuperscript{105} TNA, HS 9/424, Henri Déricourt Personal File, Second interrogation of Gilbert, 11 February 1944. It is clear from Déricourt’s wireless operator, André Watt, that Aisner and René Clement both knew of and used Café Dupont as a meeting place. See TNA, HS 6/583, Circuit mission reports and interrogations, Interrogation of A. P. Watt by Captain Seward, 6 December 1944.
\footnotesuperscript{106} TNA, HS 9/140/7, Julienne Besnard Personal File, Interrogation of Mme. Aisner, 14 April 1944.
\footnotesuperscript{107} See, for example, ‘Kaffeehäuser mit Terrasse’, \textit{Der Deutsche Wegleiter}, 3, September 1940, p. 26.
\footnotesuperscript{108} TNA, HS 9/42, J.A.F. Antelme Personal File, Report, 12 August 1943.
infiltrate Déricourt’s organisation by posing as Allied escapers. Asking for Gilbert at Chez Tutulle (Gilbert being Déricourt’s codename), the proprietor Madame Touret mistakenly believed them to be asking for Prosper’s wireless operator, Gilbert Norman. The two men were thus directed to an address at Square Clignancourt, on the northern edge of the city in the eighteenth arrondissement, where Norman, Andrée Borrel and several others were playing poker at an apartment of one of their French sub-agents. The ensuing confusion led to a future appointment being made at the Café des Capucines, on boulevard des Capucines, close to the Opéra Garnier. Agazarian reported what happened at the meeting:

[We] met at the Capucines as arranged, [Boden and Christmann] being already there when source [Agazarian] arrived. Only about five tables were in use inside the café, the rest of the café being roped off for cleaning, and at one of the tables on the terrasse outside the café was a civilian in a grey hat and mackintosh, with nothing on the table in front of him. [Christmann] afterwards said he did not think the man was there when they arrived: up to about a minute before source arrived, the café was empty, and then suddenly it was full of people.

[We] had been there a little time and source was in conversation with [Christmann], when he noticed [Christmann] looking over his shoulder at two German officers dressed in green uniform (they might have been Feld Gendarmerie) questioning other people. Immediately [Boden] got up and with his hands in his pockets, walked out: not fast enough to be in a hurry and not slow enough to be quite natural. The German officer looked up, watched [Boden] go out and went on with the examination. [Christmann], who saw [Boden] being taken across the road by a civilian, said to source: ‘They have arrested [Boden]’; [I] told him to be quiet, and they proceeded to discuss their cover story. The German officer then asked for their papers, which he examined thoroughly, but took no further action. Source and [Christmann] left the café separately and [I] joined [Borrel]... at the Napolitain [Café Napolitain, also on boulevard des Capucines].

Agazarian’s subsequent report illustrates his complete ignorance that Christmann and Boden were in fact enemy agents, and that the arrest had been staged by the Abwehr to extricate Boden and abort the mission. Agazarian and his fellow agents were clearly now known to the Germans, and he was fortunate to walk away unscathed. Later that year a

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110 TNA, Jack Agazarian Personal File, Interrogation of Glazier, 5 July 1943.
similar rendezvous set up by the SD lured wireless operator Noor Inayat Khan to the Café Colisée on avenue des Champs-Élysées, where she met two impostors acting as newly arrived SOE agents. She too managed to slip away and avoid arrest, though without recognising that the appointment had been a trap.\textsuperscript{111} In his debriefing made in London on 23 June 1943, the eve of the Prosper network’s collapse, Agazarian reported that ‘Paris is comparatively normal’ and new recruits had ‘nothing to worry about’ if their papers were checked by police.\textsuperscript{112} But in the months to come, Paris would be anything but normal for SOE’s agents.

**Cafés and the Black Market**

Living undercover in the more affluent parts of Paris made different demands to those working in poorer neighbourhoods or the provinces. While the working class were generally seen by agents all over France as the engine of resistance, looking inconspicuous in Paris cafés and restaurants meant looking ‘respectable’. Passing as a businessman or even a well-heeled black marketeer in Paris could prove better cover for an SOE agent than a factory worker. Inventor’s wireless operator, Marcel Clech, observed that ‘well dressed people do not stand out’.\textsuperscript{113} This comment was echoed by RF Section agent Forest Yeo-Thomas, whose report in April 1943 judged it ‘preferable that an agent should appear within the limits of probability well dressed’, and recommended a frequent change of hats, which ‘adds greatly to the appearance of affluence’.\textsuperscript{114} Similarly, Victor Gerson viewed French attitudes towards the *petit-bourgeois* as helpfully predictable. Though a dirty or impoverished character might attract suspicion, they

\textsuperscript{112} TNA, Jack Agazarian Personal File, General Report from Marcel, 23 June 1943.
\textsuperscript{113} TNA, HS 9/324/4, Marcel Clech Personal File, Interrogation of Clech, 17 April 1943, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{114} TNA, HS 9/1458, Yeo-Thomas Personal File, Information given by F/Lt Yeo-Thomas, 22 April 1943.
would ‘feel it impossible that a man of this class should be involved in sabotage or other type of subversive work’.\textsuperscript{115}

One must also acknowledge the crucial role that money played for British agents. If one examines the cafés that they frequented and the lifestyle that they led, it soon becomes obvious how essential funds were. At the time of Autogyro in 1941, Pierre de Vomécourt described the amounts given to agents in these early days as ‘ridiculously little’, since SOE had no idea how prices had been affected by the occupation, nor appreciated the importance of the black market.\textsuperscript{116} The reports of returning agents provided a valuable update on current French economics, and by 1943 agents were arriving in France carrying sums ten times greater, which were further enlarged by loans made by French donors which were underwritten by SOE.\textsuperscript{117} That agents began to carry hundreds of thousands of francs was a security risk, but the ubiquity of the black market made it more common also. One agent observed how ‘it is quite usual to see a man in a café bring out a large wad of notes’.\textsuperscript{118}

The opportunity to sample the best of Paris cuisine was seductive for both occupiers and resisters. Ernst Jünger’s privileged position literally and metaphorically afforded him views of Paris out of reach to most of its citizens. His reflections of dinner in 1942 at La Tour d’Argent, one of the ‘big six’ restaurants whose reputations at this time exempted them from pricing categories applied to lesser establishments.\textsuperscript{119} Situated on quai de la Tournelle with its panoramic views overlooking Notre-Dame Cathedral and the Seine, the restaurant’s extravagance and its vaulted space combined to magical

\textsuperscript{115} TNA, HS 8/174. VIC Circuit: Operational Orders, Interrogations, Agents and Helpers, Interrogation of Vic, 26 July 1943.

\textsuperscript{116} Ruby, \textit{F Section SOE}, p. 20. De Vomécourt is not specific on the amount he took into France, but it is likely to have been in the region of 20,000 francs, comparable to other agents. Wireless operator Georges Bégué landed the same month with 15,000. TNA, HS 9/115/2, Georges Bégué Personal File, Report made by Georges I, 19 November 1942. See also Cowburn, \textit{No Cloak}, pp. 27-28, p. 57.

\textsuperscript{117} TNA, HS 7/121, F Section History, summary of financial expenditure, 1941-1944.

\textsuperscript{118} TNA, HS 9/1648, Denis Rake Personal File, ‘Interrogation of Rake’, 19 May 1943.

\textsuperscript{119} Kenneth Mouré, ‘\textit{La Capitale de la Faim}: Black Market Restaurants in Paris, 1940-1944’, \textit{French Historical Studies}, 38:2 (2015), pp. 311-341. The other five were Lapérouse, Lucas Carton, La Tour d’Argent, Drouant and the Ritz.
effect. Pondering the thought of Henry IV having once been a patron, Jünger recorded a
visit one evening there in July 1942, admiring the same elevated view from where:

[O]ne can see the Seine and its islands, as if from the dining room of a great aeroplane. The water in the light of the setting sun, shimmered in pearly hues. The difference in colours between a weeping willow and its reflection in the water was beautiful to behold – the silvered green of the foliage, absorbed in its own contemplation, became a little darker in the river’s flow.

One has the impression that the people up there at their tables, eating sole and the famous duck, are like gargoyles, seeing below them, with a kind of diabolical satisfaction, the grey ocean of rooftops under which starving people are just getting by. In such times, eating well and extravagantly gives one a feeling of power.\textsuperscript{120}

Jünger’s recollections seem to bear out Sartre’s comment that the ‘insolence of luxury cafés’ was a constant reminder of the widening chasm between those who benefited and those who suffered under the occupation.\textsuperscript{121} The miserable effects of rationing, brought in by Pétain as ‘a painful necessity’ in September 1940, had been felt almost immediately. Through the bitter winter of 1940-41, writer Paul Léautaud wrote to his literary critic friend Yves Florenne, describing how meat was now ‘extremely rare’, eggs had ‘completely disappeared’ and butter and cheese were ‘true treasures impossible to find’.\textsuperscript{122}

In January, temperatures plummeted to -11°C but the local coal merchant remained closed, unable to fulfill the monthly fuel ration.\textsuperscript{123} ‘We freeze’, Léautaud complained, his numbed fingers barely able to roll a cigarette.\textsuperscript{124} Despite repeated public protests in Paris and elsewhere, the Vichy government’s continued attempts to respond to the food crisis remained woefully inadequate. The introduction in 1942 of restaurants communautaires, restaurants providing cheaper meals for workers on low incomes, were of a dubious

\textsuperscript{120} Jünger, \textit{Journaux de guerre, II}, p. 316.
\textsuperscript{121} Sartre, ‘Paris under the Occupation’, p. 152.
\textsuperscript{123} \textit{Annuaire statistique: Cinquante-sixième volume, 1940-1945} (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1946), Table 1, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{124} Escaig, \textit{Je vous écris de Paris}, p. 195.
quality. Among her many waspish observations of life under occupation, Englishwoman Ninetta Jucker condemned them as ‘a wretched farce’, and though initially popular – 300 were introduced across Paris in 1943 – they became viewed by many others as little better than soup kitchens.\textsuperscript{125} Meanwhile, a crippling exchange rate, fixed by the occupiers at 20 francs to the mark, represented a considerable drop in the pre-war French currency value and proved a great advantage for all German visitors to Paris, especially those eating in requisitioned restaurants. In October 1942, Marie Vassiltchikov, an office worker from German Foreign Ministry in Berlin, was pleasantly surprised by the ability to eat well – ‘say, with oysters, wine, cheese and fruit’ – for 100 francs, ‘which is, after all, only 5 marks’.\textsuperscript{126} But for the top brass prestige, rather than money, was the object. Hermann Goering demanded that ‘the excellent cuisine chez Maxim’s [on rue Royale] should be reserved for us’, leaving ‘nothing for the French’.\textsuperscript{127}

While many endured the Vichy-endorsed ‘Café National’ – a revolting ersatz concoction brewed from roasted barley, acorns and chicory – and saccharine pellets in place of sugar, SOE agents could often afford better. Some, such as Benjamin Cowburn, were able to defy the occupiers by infiltrating even the most exclusive of Paris’s places. He and a fellow agent shared Goering’s fondness for Maxim’s, another of the hors catégorie restaurants: Cowburn recounted an evening there in late 1941, when the waiter ushered them upstairs and brought over a folding screen, separating these ‘French’ clients from their military ones. Seduced by the opulence and absence of the occupation in their surroundings, Cowburn had to keep peeking around it to ‘view the German generals every now and then’ to remind himself that there was still a war on.\textsuperscript{128} Describing the food and service as ‘marvellous’, he was also surprised by the candour of the sommelier,

\textsuperscript{126} Marie Vassiltchikov, \textit{The Berlin Diaries 1940-45} (London: Pimlico, 1999), p. 75.
\textsuperscript{127} Quoted in Mouré, ‘\textit{La Capitale de Faim}’, pp. 312-313.
\textsuperscript{128} Cowburn, \textit{No Cloak}, p. 55.
who expressed his distaste for his more regular visitors, remarking how ‘after the third course, the pig begins to show.’

Visiting agents from provincial networks also took advantage of Paris’s best restaurants. The head of the one network based in south-western France, described making visits to Maxim’s and La Tour d’Argent. In April 1944, his deputy, Jacques Poirier, was taken by the writer André Malraux to Prunier, renowned for its seafood, on rue Duphot. Malraux batted away Poirier’s security worries but his reputation as a respected novelist along with a nervous tic made him easily noticeable, and he was warmly and conspicuously greeted by the maître d’hôtel. Unperturbed by the numerous German officers eating around them, Malraux launched into one of his typically lengthy monologues, arguing that the defeat of the occupiers was a certainty; the rest of the afternoon was spent walking across the city accompanied by Albert Camus, now editor of the underground newspaper Combat. Another SOE patron, unconnected with F Section’s Paris networks, was Guy Vivian, who arrived in the city after the suspicious disappearance of his chief in southern France in 1943. Having set himself up in a plush apartment in rue des Belles-Feuilles in the sixteenth arrondissement, he also made use of Prunier as a rendezvous with a wealthy French contact, who donated substantial funds to Vivian’s causes.

Prunier’s pro-resistance sympathies did not discriminate between factions and offered its services just as readily to Free French agents, most notably to Gilbert Renault (better known as Rémy) and his intelligence network, La Confrérie Notre Dame (CND). The restaurant’s owner, Simone Barnagaud-Prunier, had become a strong early supporter

129 Ibid.
132 Ibid.
of the gaullist cause. While her London branch in Jermyn Street offered an ‘Air Raid Lunch’ and ‘Blackout Dinner’ as well as an inclusive taxi service to shuttle patrons to and from the restaurant, Parisians’ experience of Prunier’s altered relatively little. At Prunier-Traktir, its satellite restaurant on avenue Victor-Hugo in the exclusive sixteenth arrondissement, Rémy also received help from the maître d’hôtel there, Maurice Rossi, who was able to find hiding places for CND’s wireless sets. The full details of Rossi’s own exploits are not clear, but Simone Prunier states that he was in close contact with staff at other renowned restaurants, and had plans for a coordinated campaign to poison their German patrons, though he was forced to flee Paris before it could be effected. More successful was Rémy’s use of Prunier’s good Sauternes to bribe a German engineer and obtain plans of several German naval submarine bases. The manager Jean Barnagaud sold him six bottles at list price, totalling 288 francs, much less than the price of lunch.

Clearly, the ways in which ‘external’ and ‘internal’ resistance understood and used Parisian space were markedly different. Unlike most of their German opponents, many agents arriving from London had known the city well before the war and had developed their own preferences and favourite haunts. Rémy’s own weakness for fine wine and dining came as something of a surprise to those who witnessed it. Frequenting the likes of Ledoyen on avenue des Champs-Élysées and Schubert’s on boulevard Montparnasse (a ‘depressing and expensive’ restaurant, in the opinion of Simone de Beauvoir), one more impoverished resister judged that he ‘could spend on a single meal what we had to live on for a month.” But such behaviour as exceptional. The swingeing economic measures and growing inequalities introduced by the German


\[135\] Ibid., p. 262.


\[137\] Ibid., p. 268.

\[138\] Ibid., p. 309, p. 319.

administration had a more adverse effect on ‘internal’ resisters, whose financial situation
did not afford them the same opportunities to forget the occupation. The socially
corrosive effects of allowing top restaurants unlimited choice was eventually checked by
Vichy in 1942, but this did nothing to materially improve the lot of the average
Parisian.\footnote{Mouré, ‘La Capitale de Faim’, pp. 322-323.} Jacqueline Pardon, who worked with the student-led movement Défense de la
France, described herself as being ‘hungry like everyone, like the whole population’, and
made use of stolen ration cards provided by resisters who raided the local town halls.\footnote{Blondeau, Rester debout, p. 290.} These privations generally had little or nothing to do with political commitments or
maintaining solidarity with the greater population. For Cécile Rol-Tanguy, a lifelong
communist and dedicated FTP liaison agent, the black market remained out of reach
simply because ‘we didn’t have the means, we couldn’t afford it.’\footnote{Ibid., pp. 290-291.} But for some this
poverty would become symbolic of the sacrifices made by resisters of the \textit{première heure},
whose integrity was founded on an intimate knowledge of their shared hardships. In
portraying the early days of his resistance career, the leader of \textit{Combat}, Henri Frenay,
wrote that ‘we ate in restaurants for 15 francs, we travelled in third class...This was the
heroic time during which solid links of friendship and trust formed themselves’.\footnote{Quoted in Henri Noguères, Marcel Degliame-Fouché and Jean-Louis Vigier, \textit{Histoire
de la Résistance en France de 1940 à 1945: La première année, juin 1940-juin 1941}
(Paris: Robert Laffont, 1967), p. 101. Similar sentiments are echoed in Mireille Albrecht,

SOE agents may have been partial to the delights of sumptuous top-class
restaurants, but their daily lives revolved around black market cafés. France Antelme
stated that ‘the rations in France are quite inadequate, therefore everyone, including the
Germans, obtains food from the black market’.\footnote{TNA, HS 9/44, J.A.F. Antelme Personal File, ‘Interrogation of Bricklayer’, 23 March
1943.} His view is largely representative of a
more general view among SOE agents that everyone in the city relied on it.\footnote{TNA, HS 8/174. VIC Circuit: Operational Orders, Interrogations, Agents and
Helpers, Interrogation of Vic, 20 December 1943.} However, the reality was somewhat different, and such sweeping statements hint at their distance
from many Parisians who were living much closer to the breadline. In practice, relatively few could afford the inflated prices of illegal food, whether offered in a restaurant or from the back of a van. Nevertheless, there is no question that visiting black market outlets became routine for SOE’s agents in Paris. Victor Gerson, the head of ‘Vic’, SOE’s most successful escape network in France, reckoned on a rate of around 600-1000 francs for a meal, which broadly matched Antelme’s estimates. Jack Agazarian reported slightly more modest prices, quoting a daily expenditure of 1000 francs. Such relative luxury was not confined to food either. Despite the shortage of fine wines, bottles of good pre-war vintages were still available to those who could afford it. Antelme noted in March 1943 that ‘inferior green wine’ was flooding the market at the time, and that ‘the best wines are hidden, but for 350 francs a fairly good bottle of wine can be obtained’. An agent working for the Gaullist RF Section in Paris estimated the typical price at double that. When one compares these figures to an average worker’s monthly income – in the region of 2000 francs per month – the vast differences in the standard of living of agents become obvious. Antelme’s bottle could easily have cost a typist the best part of a week’s wages. Not unsurprisingly, drinking to excess is not typically a noteworthy feature of agents’ reports, but it is worth mentioning one given by Joseph Chartrand, who in June 1943 became an assistant to Jean Bouguennec, organiser of the ‘Butler’ network. Although Butler was tasked with building up resistance in Brittany, Bouguennec and his team based themselves in Paris, where, according to Chartrand, ‘the

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146 Ibid.
147 TNA, HS 9/11/1, Jack Agazarian Personal File, untitled report, 11 April 1943.
149 TNA, HS 9/1458, Yeo-Thomas Personal File, Information given by F/Lt Yeo-Thomas, 22 April 1943.
way we were living’ and ‘the amount of liquor being consumed’ made him so nervous that ‘I came very close to asking for my immediate return [to England]’.  

Beyond eating and drinking, black market cafés and restaurants also had other attractions. Café telephone boxes could be used without having to show one’s papers, as at post offices. And a café barman could prove invaluable when it came to buying cigarettes or small black market items. Indeed, Cowburn paid tribute to the ‘enormous importance’ in a Parisian agent’s café life:

If you wanted food, drink, tobacco, an address for a pair of shoes, a confidential message delivered to a friend, ask the barman – our Figaro of the dark days! Who had not sought his assistance? Some day a statue should be raised to The Anonymous Barman! Largo al Factotum! (I can see the bas-relief around the pedestal: the inside of a bar equipped with an endless row of bottles; a customer seizing a packet of cigarettes, a police inspector watching a Resistance man pocketing an envelope and a mysterious gentleman telephoning, while behind his back another mysterious gentleman listens, etc.)

It is interesting to apply de Certeau’s spatial practices of everyday life to Cowburn’s tableau. As Pierre de Bénouville later wrote, operating undercover meant that ‘everything was uncertain, furtive, dangerous. Peril might lurk in a café you entered by chance…Everything was unstable in our secret world, nothing permanent’. And yet the life of a resister constantly wove in and out of the mundane: what Claude Bourdet calls the ‘schizoid’ character of his clandestine life meant that he could still be subject to the daily preoccupations and choices of ordinary civilians even when carrying a gun under his jacket. Cowburn’s frequent visits to the kind of barman he describes can be

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152 TNA, HS 9/299/10, Joseph Chartrand Personal File, Report by Dieudonné, 4 December 1943. Although Buckmaster appears to have been confident of Bouguennec’s abilities, another agent judged him ‘an extraordinarily heavy drinker for his age’. TNA, HS 9/189/8, Jean Bouguennec Personal File, note reporting comments made by George Langelaan, 13 January 1943.

153 Foot, SOE in France, p. 89.


155 Cowburn, No Cloak, p. 38.

156 De Bénouville, Unknown Warriors, p. 212.

considered, in de Certeau’s terms, as the deployment of ‘tactics’ (using a café as place not drink or socialise, but to purchase goods otherwise unavailable) as well as a matter of clandestine fieldcraft (passing a secret message to another agent). In such situations, where do the quotidian and the extraordinary begin and end? Furthermore, the unpredictability of the resister’s existence stressed by de Bénouville also governs the nature of tactics, which are ‘always on the watch for opportunities’ and ‘must be seized “on the wing”’.158

Other forms of professional help could prove equally useful. After meeting Déricourt at the Brasserie Lorraine, Tony Brooks found accommodation at a local brothel around the corner, on rue de Courcelles. Though naively believing it to be a hotel, a room here proved a much safer option since it required no paperwork to book a room, and the police would routinely warn these establishments if any German raid was expected.159 Although ‘the whole place was shaking’ during his stay, it otherwise passed uneventfully.160 This might be more an example of an agent’s resourcefulness than of textbook tradecraft, but SOE’s instructors regularly endorsed the use of such unorthodox means. Women toilet attendants may not have seemed an obvious choice for passing messages but were recommended as they ‘frequently act as postboxes for clandestine lovers’ and were ‘therefore ideal for clandestine work.’161 This was proven advice, to which Gerson could attest. He relayed this back to London, recommending that ‘using a dame des lavabos of any big café’ was especially helpful if you ‘write a short note as if you are writing to a girl…As all these dames des lavabos are used to transmit love messages, it does not matter at all when later on a man calls for the message instead of a girl’.162

159 Brooks, ‘C’est bien de votre âge’, p. 2.
For women agents especially, this association of cafés with an atmosphere of ‘intimate anonymity’, to return to Haine’s term, offered a unique social space where clandestine contact might easily be mistaken for a casual liaison. But as Cowburn’s illustration suggests, the surveillance of cafés posed potential, and possibly fatal, dangers for both sexes. Sometimes first-hand reports could inform SOE that its existing training methods might be counterproductive. Antelme advised that ‘there are hundreds of people in cafés on the lookout for Black Market offenders, and if the agents behave as instructed, they are bound to attract attention. It is much better if they meet quite naturally, and leave the café together – or, if they have not met previously, then one agent should be sent to the dwelling place of the other’.\(^\text{163}\) When both Vichy and German authorities stepped up their rhetoric against the evils of black market dealings and rationing infringements in mid-1943, Agazarian noted how black market restaurants had become ‘much emptier’, as police were now beginning to prosecute patrons as well as restaurateurs.\(^\text{164}\) Since being arrested would involve the checking of agents’ false identities, the risks of being exposed as a resister would inevitably increase. While the *Brigades spéciales* employed skilled surveillance teams across the city, often to target specific suspects, no systematic police surveillance of cafés seems to have been instigated during the occupation.\(^\text{165}\) Certainly none of SOE’s agents working in Paris reported being arrested simply for using a black market outlet: whether this was because agents were in fact more prudent than their testimonies sometimes suggest is difficult to assess. However, as Kenneth Mouré has shown, the enormously lucrative nature of illicit dealings in scarce goods, along with the evasive practices of cafés and restaurants – hiding black market supplies or posting a lookout at the entrance – ensured their popularity, especially since many customers were Germans themselves.\(^\text{166}\) Agazarian, ‘in

\(^{165}\) Correspondence with Jean-Marc Berlière, 7 September 2016.
\(^{166}\) Mouré, ‘*La Capitale de la Faim*’, pp. 319-321
discussion with a German in a certain café’, also reported learning of one black market operation to bring five tons of coffee imported from Portugal to sell to the Wehrmacht, even enlisting German trucks to transport it.\footnote{167 TNA, HS 9/11/1, Jack Agazarian Personal File, ‘General Report from Marcel’, 23 June 1943.}

Proximity and Accommodation

Just as the number of meeting places expanded during 1943, so the rise in SOE’s presence in Paris increased the requirement for additional safehouses. Although hundreds of thousands of Parisians had fled south during the summer of 1940 many had returned to the capital by early August 1940, but a German ordinance introduced in September 1940, forbidding the return of Jews across the Demarcation Line, combined with the reluctance of other refugees to risk returning to a life under occupation resulted in many more homes in western districts being left abandoned.\footnote{168 Colin Dyer, \textit{Population and Society in Twentieth Century France} (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1978), p. 110. Diamond, \textit{Fleeing Hitler}, pp. 157-158.}

These were rapidly overtaken by new German residents in Paris, both for official and residential uses. Western Paris, and specifically the sixteenth arrondissement, the location for the headquarters of the MBF, the SS and much of the machinery of occupation administration, quickly became the centre of German power in the city.

SOE networks in Paris found the question of securing accommodation something of a headache. As unemployment worsened through the occupation, so increasing numbers of civilians came into the city to find work, which inevitably reduced the number of apartments and houses available to rent. By the spring of 1944, one SOE agent had found it ‘very difficult to find a flat in Paris now’, noting that sub-letting avoided the need for verification of an agent’s identity.\footnote{169 TNA, HS 9/140/7, Julienne Besnard Personal File, Interrogation of Mme. Aisner, 14 April 1944.} Agents typically found accommodation in one of two ways. Where connections with existing networks were available, safehouses belonging to known (and trusted) resistance workers provided the
simplest, though not necessarily most secure, option. In the case of Prosper, Suttill was
given the name of Germaine Tambour, a former secretary of the head of ‘Carte’, a
resistance network that F Section had supported in southern France. Tambour’s family
home was used as a safe house and a letter box, helped by the residents of a
neighbouring apartment. The alternative, for those who had lived in France before the
war, was simply to call on the help of friends, family, ex-work colleagues or other
reliable acquaintances. For example, Suttill’s wireless operator, Gilbert Norman, lodged
with an old school friend, Nicolas Laurent, in boulevard Lannes on the edge of the Bois
de Boulogne, in the sixteenth arrondissement. Their courier, Andrée Borrel, was able
to call on help from her sister and brother-in-law, who lived in rue Caumartin, close to
the Opéra Garnier. Any arrangements involving close relatives were especially
dangerous, but it was not unknown for agents to return to their spouses. James Amps, a
former French jockey sent as Suttill’s assistant but considered useful for ‘one or two
minor jobs only’, returned to stay with his French wife at her home on rue Légendre in
Batignolles, whom he had left behind at the outbreak of war.

The first method was inherently dangerous. The ‘contamination’ of Prosper by
mixing with Carte’s former contacts meant that the Germans’ discovery of one network
could easily lead to the exposure of the other. Unknown to Suttill and F Section’s staff in
London, the names of two hundred of Carte’s members had already fallen into the hands
of the French police months before, which may well have accounted for the eventual
arrests of both Tambour sisters in April 1943. A foolhardy attempt by Suttill to buy
them out of jail failed completely and jeopardised his network’s safety still further.

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170 Foot, SOE in France, p. 275.
171 M.R.D. Foot and Francis J. Suttill, ‘SOE’s ‘Prosper’ Disaster of 1943’, Intelligence &
172 TNA, HS 9/183, Andrée Borrel Personal File.
173 TNA, HS 9/30/2, James Amps Personal File, F/REC to F/ADM, 1 December 1944.
Pierre de Vomécourt also contacted his wife while he was working undercover in Paris,
though she would later state that he asked her for a divorce over dinner in April 1942,
just a few days before he was arrested. She nevertheless arranged for a lawyer to defend
him. TNA, HS 6/582, Interrogation of Madame de Vomécourt by Major Cardozo,
12 February 1945.
174 Foot, SOE in France, p. 280.
the without any independent infrastructure to fall back on, SOE agents had little choice but to take such risks, at least initially. Nowhere else was particularly safe: staying in hotels, while convenient, meant filling in forms and the likelihood of police identity checks, which inevitably led to some arrests. To improve the situation, Déricourt’s assistant Julienne Aisner was tasked with finding new spaces to house agents. Initially she was only expected to secure two apartments, but demand was such that she ended up renting seven. These properties were primarily temporary accommodation for agents about to leave for Britain, but in practice those operating in Paris took them over for longer periods. Whether Aisner deliberately selected addresses close to cafés and rendezvous used by the network is not clear, but those within Paris all fell within a short distance of her own home at 148 avenue Malakoff, and offices at 1 rue de Berri, on the corner of avenue des Champs-Elysées. These offices also had a small studio apartment, where several agents were lodged. On the eve of the fall of Prosper in June 1943, Jack Agazarian, by then safely back in London, reported that ‘theoretically speaking, we did not know each other’s addresses’. But in practice they often did.

Since Aisner did not rely on using a false identity, she was better able to rent property without fear of being investigated. With the exception of the purchase of an apartment in Neuilly, a more exclusive area for which she consulted a property agency, those within the city were scattered across the sixteenth and seventeenth arrondissements. One, on rue du Colonel Moll, she obtained by responding to an advertisement in a window. Telling the concierge that she would be letting it to an eloping couple, Jack and Francine Agazarian were in fact husband and wife, Francine having joined to work as a courier. When the Agazarrians flew back to London in June 1943, Aisner stopped renting it, thinking an empty apartment would draw the attention

176 Ibid.
179 Ibid.
of the police. Another apartment at place des Ternes came to her by word of her cousin, for which Aisner paid the existing tenant six months’ rent in advance, with no questions asked. A third, on rue Lauriston, found through Aisner’s partner (and later husband) Jean Besnard, was an especially unfortunate selection, since number 93 was the headquarters of the infamous Bonny-Lafont gang, whose thugs incidentally were working for the SD on the hunt for SOE’s agents. It was inhabited by Vera Leigh, courier for the Inventor network, who found it ‘modest and uncomfortable’, preferring Aisner’s own studio. One address at porte de Champerret, belonging to another of Jean Besnard’s contacts, was used only briefly. Two other properties served as boltholes in special circumstances: a ‘very discreet flat’ in the northern suburb of Saint-Ouen was the property of her cousin, for which Aisner paid no rent; another, at Brunoy, to the east, served as a useful place for agents who were at risk of being recognised in Paris.

Given that resistance was always the pursuit of a tiny minority of the population, it is striking that SOE’s agents in Paris were not only living close to one other, but also near agents of other organisations. In June 1943, a wireless message to London reported that a Free French wireless operator had been arrested next door to Gilbert Norman’s transmitting hideout. Neither Norman nor his neighbour had been aware of each other’s presence, and fortunately for Norman the Germans did not investigate the same block any further. Such dangerous coincidences suggest that the concentrations of resistance groups in particular areas of the city must have been much higher. At various times, the rue du Colonel Moll not only housed the Agazarians and Déricourt, but also Mathilde Carré’s group Interallié (at number 14), which incidentally was also used by a gang of French collaborators as an interrogation centre; at number 7, Pierre de Froment, co-founder of clandestine newspaper Les Petites Ailes de France, once received a visit from

180 Ibid.
181 Dépôt central des archives de la justice militaire (DCAJM), Le Blanc, Indre. Déricourt trial papers, Nouvelle audition de Pierre Bonny, 10 September 1944.
183 DCAJM, Déricourt trial papers. Aisner deposition, 2 February 1945.
future *Combat* leader Henri Frenay.\(^{185}\) That Hugo Bleicher’s mistress, Suzanne Laurent, and Henri Déricourt occupied neighbouring apartments, at 56 and 58 rue Pergolèse respectively, appears to have been pure coincidence, although Déricourt may have become aware that Bleicher spent time there.\(^{186}\) Bleicher later described how he ‘first saw SIMONE [Vera Leigh] in the rue Pergolèse, where he himself was living, as she lived in a street running parallel to rue Pergolèse and Ave. Foch. He had seen her identity on a false identity card…and recognised her’.\(^{187}\) Bleicher however never discovered that a few doors down, at number 38, another restaurant, Chez Touret, was being used by Antelme as a letter box.\(^{188}\) This was a simply luck: like so many other SOE addresses in Paris, exploiting existing contacts to furnish agents with meeting places was convenient but jeopardised security.

**SOE’s Café**

With greater numbers of SOE agents passing through Paris, arranging additional locations for rendezvous became increasingly urgent. In the spring of 1943, Aisner asked if a more permanent safe address could be established where agents might make contact with her network to arrange the details of their flights to England. Though there was no precedent for such a venture, F Section agreed that ‘a small café was the ideal solution’.\(^{189}\) On her return to Paris, she approached a commercial agency ‘which specialised in the sale of cafés’, and was shown a bistrot at 28, rue-Saint-André-des-Arts, one of the winding narrow medieval streets in the northern edge of the Latin Quarter, sandwiched between the quai des Grand Augustins and the boulevard St Germain.\(^{190}\) The bistrot was paid for with SOE funds delivered by a senior SOE officer, the nominal

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\(^{187}\) TNA, KV 2/1175, Roger Bardet Personal File, Summary of Interrogation of Bleicher by S/Ldr Beddard, 15 August 1945, p. 3. Leigh was living at this time on rue Marbeau, a street adjoing rue Pergolèse.

\(^{188}\) TNA, HS 9/42, J.A.F. Antelme Personal File, Report from Renaud, 23 July 1943.

\(^{189}\) TNA, HS 6/567, Aisner interrogation, 23/24 January 1945.

\(^{190}\) *Ibid.*
ownership being handed to Jean Besnard. Though small, it offered three entrances, and a small back room with a door leading to a closed courtyard. To manage the day-to-day running of the café, Aisner employed an acquaintance who had previously lost worked at a similar establishment. Through a contact working within the Vichy administration, she was able to extricate him from factory work and provide papers which would exempt him from being called for Service du travail obligatoire. The barman, whose name is not given in Aisner’s reports, was never told the true nature of the café’s business, though Aisner thought he suspected them of being ‘une bande de gaullistes un peu piqués’ (a group of slightly nutty gaullists). Some concern was later voiced about the café having been within ‘easy reach’ of the Abwehr’s headquarters at the Hotel Lutetia, but there is no evidence that any surveillance was attempted.

Déricourt’s deputy, Rémy Clement, had thought that a bookshop would have been ‘less obvious than a café’ and offer a space where ‘one could exchange messages while pretending to browse’. He was not alone in preferring bookshops to cafés as a meeting point. Several members of the intelligence network Gloria SMH, noted for its recruitment of playwright Samuel Beckett, ran a bookshop nearby on rue des Beaux-Arts, named ‘Le Peau de Chagrin’ for the same purpose. So too did Défense de la France, a group whose store ‘Au Vœu de Louis XIII’ stood on an adjoining street, rue Bonaparte. Perhaps the most famous example of all is Pierre Brossolette’s librairie on rue de la Pompe, which became one of the earliest hubs of resistance communication. Despite his socialist convictions, Brossolette’s meeting with the conservative Gilbert Renault led to him producing propaganda for Renault’s intelligence network, although

192 TNA, KV 2/1132, Henri Déricourt file, Draft report on Bardet, 2 September 1944.
195 Both of these bookstores were raided. In the case of the latter, a number of the group’s members were arrested, including de Gaulle’s niece, Geneviève de Gaulle-Anthonioz. See Michel, Paris Résistant, p. 210.
Gestapo interest resulted in the hurried closure of the store, forcing Brossolette and his family to flee to London.196

Aisner’s café opened for business at the end of August 1943, a time when, following the collapse of Prosper, F Section’s networks were increasingly in jeopardy and the transport of agents was especially dangerous. Déricourt preferred not to hold his own meetings there, claiming it was ‘too static’ and therefore riskier, though his mysterious relations with the SD make it impossible to gauge the truth of this.197 Nonetheless, this front initially proved very successful as a meeting point for agents being transported between England and France. Acting as the manager, Aisner would arrive between 6pm and 8pm to meet any visitors who had identified themselves to the barman by exchanging passwords.198 However, in October her suspicions were raised after Bleicher’s double agent Roger Bardet made contact with her at the café, shortly after which Vera Leigh was arrested at Chez Mas on place des Ternes.199 Though Aisner was unaware of it, Leigh had been the victim of Bardet’s treachery, as had her chief, Sidney Jones, the head of Inventor. Further enquiries made by two agents in March 1944, ‘who looked like policemen in civilian clothes’ made her wary.200 Despite her fears, these were in fact genuine SOE agents – they had received the password by wireless from London – but by this time her nerves were beginning to fray.201 After Déricourt’s recall to London in February amid concerns over his loyalties, Farrier’s agents found themselves being pursued by the SD, and Aisner finally decided to close the café. Both she and her partner Jean flew back to England in April 1944. Though SOE would maintain a presence across

197 TNA, HS 9/325/5, Maurice Rémy Clement Personal File, ‘Outline Report of René Rivière (Marc)’, 22 September 1943.
200 Ibid.
201 Ibid. For a description of the incident from the agents’ side, see TNA, HS 9/420/8, Henri Derringer Personal File, Interrogation of Toinot, 11 April 1944.
the Paris region, its role during the liberation of the capital was at best peripheral;
lacking arms, its groups were mainly restricted to small-scale sabotage in the suburbs.  

Conclusion

This chapter has shown how occupation transformed Paris’s cafés from places of
mundane, peacetime life into complex vortices of extraordinary, occupied life. For
Germans, ‘Soldaten’ venues established requisitioned spaces as German enclaves that not
only insured its patrons from Parisian culture but rationing too; the ability to eat and
drink well thus conferred power. Yet great numbers of visiting soldiers also saw the Paris
café as an irresistible part of the tourist experience, and readily took advantage of the
opportunities to indulge in black market cuisine and fine wines. Both the producers and
consumers of propaganda were the architects of an imaginary Paris. The Wehrmacht’s
representations of a historically and culturally vibrant city, one almost living in a parallel
dimension to the rest of Europe, was inevitably attractive – compared to the view from a
foxhole outside Stalingrad, the Wegleiter’s Paris appeared to be a promised land. But
many soldier-tourists were all too willing to step through the looking glass to participate
and further strengthen that fantasy. Arriving Allied agents, too, better funded than the
communists and other ‘native’ resisters, quickly began to feel at home in occupied Paris.
As Déricourt’s wireless operator, André Watt, put it, ‘I led a more or less normal life’.  
Thus for soldier-tourists, black marketeers, resisters and German counter-intelligence
officers, cafés became the nexus for different material and metaphorical symbols of real
and imagined Paris, accommodating worlds within worlds. In this way, cafés became
multidimensional, contradictory, multi-layered ‘counter-sites’, juxtaposing, the words of
Foucault, ‘in a single real place several spaces, several sites that are in themselves

202 TNA, HS 8/1002, British Circuits in France by Major Bourne Paterson, Appendix C:
Activities of Prosper Circuit, pp. 11-12, p. 31.
incompatible." Even as the occupation lengthened and cafés became the target of armed attacks, the utopic perceptions of Parisian café life were never quite shattered in German minds. For SOE’s agents, however, the dangers of occupying the same café spaces as their enemies was fatal. In disregarding SOE instructors’ insistence on the need to keep personal communication between individuals to a minimum, the clandestine café society that developed in Paris brought together agents – and double agents – of different networks, creating conditions which sooner or later were bound to cause catastrophe.

In the spring of 1943, SOE’s presence in Paris was rapidly expanding and had promised great things. Within a year, nearly all of its networks had been destroyed or had come under German control. The reasons why are complex and sometimes obscured by contradictory and unreliable reports, numerous lacunae and inexplicable oversights made by SOE’s staff in London, all of which have generated currency for various conspiracy theories. The collapse of the Prosper network itself was the result of a chain of events occurring outside Paris, and its sister networks that fell in its wake did so for different reasons. Nonetheless, the sociability which characterised so much of SOE’s activity in the capital, described by M.R.D. Foot as an ‘intelligible, pathetic error’, was a fundamental weakness: as he rightly stated, the most remarkable thing was not that they were caught, but that it took so long for the Germans to catch them. Of the agents named in this chapter, only Aisner, Bardet and Déricourt (both double agents), Guerne, Brooks, Despaigne, Gerson, de Vomécourt and Cowburn survived, the rest being executed in concentration camps. However, their survival was not necessarily an indication of better personal security: for example, one of Autogyro’s locally recruited

\[^{204}\] Foucault, ‘Of Other Spaces’, p. 25.
\[^{205}\] The most well-known and enduring of these was published by Robert Marshall in All the King’s Men: The Truth Behind SOE’s Wartime Disaster (London: HarperCollins, 1988), the research for which had formed the basis for a BBC Timewatch documentary shown the previous year. Its main assertions are that the Prosper network was sacrificed for the purposes of strategic deception, with Déricourt acting secretly under the orders of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, MI 6) which sought to sabotage SOE’s work and ensure the arrests of its agents.
\[^{206}\] Foot, SOE in France, p. 276.
\[^{207}\] Recent research suggests that approximately 160 agents and members of Prosper and its related networks did not survive. See Suttill, Shadows in the Fog, pp. 277-285.
sub-agents was shocked to see Cowburn and de Vomécourt ‘discussing clandestine matters over the public bar’ during one meeting, and told Cowburn ‘that if he wished to remain alive in France he must open his mouth more when speaking’.\(^{208}\) As always, luck could play a decisive role.

Gerson had understood through his dealings with Déricourt that ‘too many people were in direct touch with Prosper’, although other agents’ social habits were equally lax.\(^ {209}\) On 1 July, a week after the initial wave of Prosper arrests, several members of the Prosper and Juggler networks were caught, having met at Chez Tutulle. Juggler’s head, Jean Worms, had ignored the advice of other SOE agents not to return there. But his ‘too frequent visits to the restaurants were known to the Gestapo’, and the place was already under surveillance.\(^ {210}\) Six months later, after the capture of many more agents, a café trap rounded up the last of Juggler’s agents at a ‘dull, drab little place’, ironically called *Le Soleil d’Or*, on place de la Trinité (now place d’Estienne d’Orves).\(^ {211}\)

The reliance on pre-war contacts and the search for clandestine space – safehouses, wireless posts and meeting places – shaped the way SOE, and especially F Section, operated in Paris. Although some links were generated in the northern districts of Clignancourt and Montmartre, and Montparnasse and the Latin Quarter in the south, it is noticeable that British agents’ movements predominantly revolved around the western, more conservative areas, where agents’ personal acquaintances and SOE’s existing resistance links were concentrated. The whole of the eastern side of Paris, characterised by densely-populated immigrant and working-class neighbourhoods, was effectively ignored, although it should be noted that Prosper did establish limited connections to communist groups in these areas, donating arms and explosives which were evidently put to good use. Antelme reported in March 1943 how ‘Germans are

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\(^{208}\) TNA, HS 6/574, Circuit mission reports and interrogations, Lippmann Interrogation, 19 February 1945.

\(^{209}\) VIC Circuit: Operational Orders, Interrogations, Agents and Helpers. Interrogation of Vic, 26 July 1943.

\(^{210}\) TNA, HS 9/631/5, Armel Guerne Personal File, RVPS Report, 17 June 1944.

\(^{211}\) This was Sonia Olschanezsky. See Nicholas, *Death Be Not Proud*, p. 268.
killed daily in the streets of Paris’, estimating that ‘90% of these attacks are made with arms provided by us.’

Certainly photographed displays of communist arms caches captured by the Brigades spéciales show weapons of British origin. But their very different attitudes towards security kept contact between the two sides to a minimum. Some of the credit for the communists’ attacks was taken by SOE, although Prosper did undertake a limited amount of sabotage itself outside Paris. There is also a report that in December 1942 Suttill gave a Sten gun demonstration to several members of his team at the premises of the Hot Club in rue Chaptal on the edge of Pigalle, where arms were also hidden. However, no armed attacks were led by the network in Paris.

Richard Vinen has asserted that the relative scarcity of German habitation in northern and eastern Paris offered a refuge for resisters, and that ‘anyone who wanted to hide from the Germans was better off in the winding streets of Belleville than in the wide open spaces of western Paris’. This may have been true for some, but given the middle-class backgrounds of many agents, remaining inconspicuous in more tightly knit working-class communities might have been problematic, as would creating believable identities and cover stories. This preference for the wealthier part of town does not seem to have been section-specific. For example, during his three missions the deputy head of RF Section, Forest Yeo-Thomas, also relied on safehouses predominantly located across the sixteenth and seventeenth arrondissements, which were largely found through his pre-war contacts.

213 APP, BS 1 GB 047, Divers.
214 TNA, HS 8/1002, British Circuits in France, Appendix C: Activities of Prosper Circuit, p. 32.
215 Bureau, Un Soldat menteur, p. 106-107. Bureau’s susceptibility to conspiracy theories raises questions about the reliability of his testimony, but the use of the club for instruction was also recounted by another Prosper agent, Armel Guerne. See TNA, HS 9/631/5, Armel Guerne Personal File, RVPS Report, 14-20 May 1944, paragraph 15.
217 For example, Francis Suttill was a barrister by trade; Gilbert Norman had been a chartered accountant; France Antelme was a successful businessman, well connected in French banking circles.
218 TNA, HS 9/1458, Forest Yeo-Thomas Personal File, Interrogation of Squadron Leader Yeo-Thomas by Captain Whittaker, 14 June 1945.
later become an outspoken critic of the mistakes made by its commanding officer, Maurice Buckmaster, Yeo-Thomas’s own precautions in this respect were also sometimes lacking.\(^{219}\) For example, he and Brossolette had made use of an apartment owned by a long-time friend of Brossolette’s, Claire Davinroy, on rue de la Faisanderie. Yeo-Thomas claimed this safehouse was safer than most, since the neighbouring residences were mainly occupied by Gestapo officers and was situated just a street away from the offices of the *Sicherheitsdienst* and Gestapo on avenue Foch. As he put it, ‘[w]e therefore could hardly be safer, since who would suspect Allied agents of inhabiting such an environment?’\(^{220}\) Yet this address was also being used by another resistance organisation, and in October 1943 Davinroy’s home was raided: Yeo-Thomas was fortunate to avoid arrest, while Davinroy herself was taken by the Gestapo and deported to Ravensbrück concentration camp.\(^{221}\) Indeed, Yeo-Thomas’s own downfall was, as he admitted, due to ignoring basic security rules. The operational instructions for his third mission emphasised that he should ‘take very strict security measures and make his personal security a matter of paramount importance’.\(^{222}\) However, when a liaison agent failed to appear at a pre-arranged rendezvous as Passy metro, he chose to make another pass at the appointed spot and was instantly caught.\(^{223}\) Similarly, when constructing the Paris section of his escape line Victor Gerson had similarly scoured his own pre-war address book of personal contacts across western Paris.\(^{224}\) Although centring his network in Lyon, he gave a single address for all initial enquiries in the capital, which were dealt with by a *concierge* at 87 avenue de Wagram, coincidentally another address within


\(^{220}\) Seaman, *Bravest of the Brave*, p. 76.

\(^{221}\) SHD GR 16 P 584058, Claire Clémence Valy (épouse Davinroy) Personal File.


\(^{224}\) TNA, HS 8/174, VIC Circuit: Operational Orders, Interrogations, Agents and Helpers, Report No.4: René’s Financial Arrangements with HQ.
metres of place des Ternes. Agents who chose to operate in working-class Parisian districts are more difficult to identify. For example, in his interview for Marcel Ophüls’ *The Sorrow and the Pity*, Denis Rake, a wireless operator with a compulsion to mix fact and fiction, referred to the support he received from communists and railway workers, being sheltered by a family at Juvisy, on the south-eastern outskirts of Paris. His SOE reports make no mention of this, however.

Drawing a clear distinction between simple profligacy and the displaying of extravagant tastes for the sake of operational efficiency is also problematic. Living in a more comfortable part of the city did not necessarily equate to a disregard for security: what might appear to be expensive living in peacetime may have merely enabled agents to do their job better and more securely in a time of war. As Henri Michel states, one must acknowledge that life for all Parisians was physically exhausting, and for resisters the physical and mental strain of working undercover was all the greater. And while living in the midst of German residential territory held clear dangers, the close proximity of agents’ accommodation to their designated cafés and meeting places reduced the need for journeying across the city, which in itself was a tiring and perilous business: as mentioned above, the disappearance of nearly all motor cars and taxis profoundly changed the spatial experience of Parisians, making journeys longer and more likely to encounter police controls and rafles. Aside from being expensive, bicycles were subject to road restrictions (cycling along certain boulevards was prohibited, as it was on other major routes through the city) and could actually attract more attention than pedestrians. According to Antelme, it was ‘not advisable to go by bicycle in Paris, as one is stopped as many as ten times a day’.

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226 *The Sorrow and the Pity*, directed by Marcel Ophüls (Productions Télévision Rencontres, 1969).
is the only means of transport in the city’, was widely held. Most realised that avoiding the bigger and more popular stations, such as Châtelet, République, Bastille, Concorde and Saint-Lazare was more prudent, since checks were far more common there.

It should also be said that SOE’s regular use of cafés was not unusual within Parisian resistance. Though headquartered on the hill of Montmartre, the Interallié network relied on a stream of written intelligence reports delivered to the cloakroom of ‘La Palette’, another of the popular haunts of interwar artists and writers orbiting the intersection of boulevards Montparnasse and Raspail. Café Lacan, on rue de Vanves (now rue Raymond-Losserand) in Montparnasse, became the headquarters of Honneur de la Police, formed from police officers within the Paris Prefecture. The same group also made use of Brasserie Zimmer, which, despite being prominently situated on place du Châtelet, served not just as a common rendezvous but also as a hiding place for arms, which were stashed in its cellar. And while the various divisions of communist resistance were recognised as security conscious, this did not preclude its senior commanders making use of them for clandestine meetings. In August 1941, a committed communist youth activist, Albert Ouzoulias, met with his superior, Danielle Casanova, at a haunt of her student days, La Closerie des Lilas, ‘the pretty café on the corner of boulevard Montparnasse’. Its prettiness was not lost on German visitors either, who were attracted by its long historical associations with great artists and writers.

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230 TNA, HS 9/1458, Yeo-Thomas Personal File, Information given by F/Lt Yeo-Thomas, 22 April 1943.
231 For example, TNA, HS 9/11/1, Agazarian Personal File, Interrogation of Glazier, 5 July 1943; TNA, HS 9/420/8, Henri Derringer Personal File, Interrogation of Toinot, 11 April 1944.
232 A plaque outside the brasserie commemorates the arrest of several of its key members there in December 1943, and the business continues to refer to its resistance credentials in its marketing. After the war it continued to accommodate clandestine activity of a different kind, serving as a meeting place for members of the homophile organisation ‘Arcadie’. See Julian Jackson, Living in Arcadia: Homosexuality, Politics and Morality in France from the Liberation to AIDS (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), p. 88, p. 135.
The crucial difference between homegrown resistance and SOE’s networks lay—or should have lain—in the training the latter’s agents had received. Tony Brooks, an F Section agent who had passed through Déricourt’s hands and repeatedly visited Paris during his four missions in France, remained convinced that security ‘was the most important part of the training and stressed that he ‘took it very seriously’, ascribing his survival to the careful application of what he had learned.\textsuperscript{234} What one discovers in analysing the tragic results of much of SOE’s activity in Paris is a general lack of such diligence among other agents, a weakness that was encouraged by the unique environment in which they operated. The sheer concentration of Germans in Paris obviously compounded the risk of being discovered, although the unreality of seeing the enemy ‘strolling around the streets of Paris like a lot of tourists’ could be simultaneously terrifying and insignificant. Another British agent on his way to meet Déricourt at the Café Monte-Carlo in September 1943 later recalled how easy it was to feel that the war was elsewhere, and how it would have been ‘so much nicer if I could have gone up to some of them and introduced myself as another foreigner enjoying the sights’.\textsuperscript{235}

What Cowburn described as the ‘terrible weakness created when agents were in touch with each other’ was a striking feature of agents’ daily life in Paris, and greatly jeopardised their safety.\textsuperscript{236} The pressures on F Section and SOE as a whole to deliver sufficient numbers of agents no doubt resulted in bad judgements in the selection of personnel: some, such as Worms, had a reputation for an ‘inability to keep silent’, while Suttill’s assistant Amps was soon judged ‘no good’ by his leader and largely left to his own devices.\textsuperscript{237} Moreover, the lack of a reliable base of contacts and a shortage of wireless operators and safehouses highlighted the very limited support that F Section in London was able to provide. But the casual nature of their meetings in cafés and

\textsuperscript{236} Cowburn, \textit{No Cloak}, p. 54.
\textsuperscript{237} TNA, HS 9/1621/1, Jean Worms Personal File, Training Notes, 30 December 1942; HS 9/30/2, James Amps Personal File, F/REC to F/ADM, 1 December 1944.
restaurants and their selection of venues suggests that perhaps the *Etappengeist* that seduced German visitors might have also affected their enemies too.
Chapter Four

As Above, So Below?
Occupation and Resistance in Subterranean Paris

In November 1944, a French newsreel entitled ‘L’Armée nouvelle’ saluted the new army units recently formed from resistance groups of the Forces françaises de l’intérieur (FFI), the organisation that three months earlier had led the insurrection against the Germans in Paris.¹ Opening with a scene across place Denfert-Rochereau in Montparnasse, dominated by the Lion de Belfort sculpture at its centre, a messenger arrives at a secluded doorway and descends several long flights of stairs. Beyond a guarded armoured door, he enters a calm and orderly array of offices, where secretaries, switchboard operators and administrators efficiently go about their business. The voiceover explains that ‘no precaution has been overlooked’ to ensure the security of this secret headquarters, whose leader is shown dictating his orders for the liberation of Paris.² Playing himself was ‘Colonel Rol’, or Henri Rol-Tanguy, who three months earlier had led the insurrection in Paris against the Nazis from the same bunker. This well-orchestrated and disciplined portrayal came to characterise the nature of the FFI’s victory over the Germans in the capital. Despite its few arms, the effective coordination of its people and resources defied a professional military government and enabled Allied forces to successfully enter the city. The actions of Rol-Tanguy and his command also became an essential chapter in the Paris Liberation narrative, asserting its power by retaking the capital’s symbolic spaces: the catacombs, the metro, the sewers and underground tunnels all held historical and cultural significance. Yet this commemoration of a literal underground war did not represent the culmination of a longer struggle. Indeed, this

¹ ‘L’Armée nouvelle’, France Libre Actualités, 24 November 1944.
² Ibid.
mobilisation of subterranean spaces was much more an exceptional event in occupation history.

Although it has generated a certain curiosity in passing, the underground side of occupied Paris has received very little attention from historians. During the insurrection itself, none of the major clandestine newspapers referred to Rol-Tanguy's mobilisation of underground spaces. Only the movement Défense de la France made a point of broadcasting its own, earlier, utilisation of underground space, namely the basement of the Sorbonne which was used to print its newspaper. Accessed by a staircase behind a discreet doorway, the article emphasised the resistance's dominance of this space, in which even 'the most determined agent of the Gestapo would become lost' as if abandoned in 'the thickets of the Vercors'. But even they could only imagine the 'other labyrinths' that lay deeper below, where 'another underground' existed. Early accounts of the Liberation, such as Raymond Massiet's La préparation de l'insurrection et la bataille de Paris, published in 1945, and Adrien Dansette's Histoire de la libération de Paris, released the followed year, barely mention Rol-Tanguy's headquarters and devote little time to underground operations. It did however, continue to appear in narrative histories of the underground: Rol-Tanguy himself returned to the bunker several times, and in 1968 Raymond Bruckberger held a press conference there to support the release of his resistance documentary, Tu moissoneras la tempête (You will reap the whirlwind). After Rol-Tanguy's death in 2002, Denfert-Rochereau metro was subtitled ‘Colonel Rol-Tanguy’ and the street leading from the place above the bunker was also renamed ‘avenue du Colonel Henri Rol-Tanguy’ in his honour. In August 2019, the Musée de la

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5 Ibid.
Libération de Paris, previously located within the building complex surrounding Montparnasse train station, was relocated to one of Nicolas Ledoux’s toll houses standing above the former FFI headquarters on place Denfert-Rochereau. According to the mayor of Paris, Anne Hildago, the idea was inspired by Cécile Rol-Tanguy, who in 2013 had presented the story of her husband’s exploits there during the insurrection of 1944. That ‘the place that was so important for the resistance’ has now become a major attraction within the museum, offering visitors the opportunity to walk down into ‘this mythic place’, attests to the continuing public fascination with Paris’s underground history.

Despite the interest in Rol-Tanguy’s exploits, the dearth of accounts addressing the broader picture of subterranean resistance in Paris has led some to simply assume that the city’s underground spaces must have played a significant role. For example, Benjamin Fraser and Steven D. Spalding make the unqualified statement that ‘the French resistance went underground, and exploited the large network of catacombs, tunnels and galleries beneath Paris to circulate beyond the control of the police.’ Others have claimed that tunnels ‘provided cover for snipers and escape routes for Resistance members conducting guerrilla operations’, and that ‘most of the city’s sewer and telephone workers were Resistance members who knew this hidden world, with its miles of tunnels and hundreds of hiding places, intimately.’ In addition to the idea that ‘the resistance was led from below’ and that resistance fighters took advantage ‘of the many

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8 Anne Hildago, Video presentation, ‘Coullises d’un chantier’ (temporary exhibition), Musée de la Libération de Paris, October 2019.
possibilities offered by underground Paris’, it has also been suggested that it became a
refuge for Jews and other fugitives from the Nazis.12

This chapter will demonstrate how a spatial approach can enable the exploration
of previously untouched spaces of occupation and provide new perspectives on our
understanding of resistance. Given the vastness of the quarries, sewers and metro tunnels
across Paris, one might have expected resistance to utilise these spaces for its own
purposes, either as a means of enabling clandestine communications, intelligence
gathering, evasion, sabotage or armed operations. There were few obstacles in the way:
although the occupiers did establish limited spatial boundaries underneath Paris, these
were largely extensions of requisitioned buildings on the surface, leaving nearly all the
various networks unmonitored and unguarded. However, I will argue that while
subterranean resistance did manifest itself in various forms during the occupation, the
victories of Rol-Tanguy and the FFI were not the culmination of a dominant or even
partial control of the world below Paris’s streets. Resistance never literally went
underground to the extent that might have been expected or has been asserted.

The Underworld, Real and Imagined

While remaining invisible to most of its citizens, Paris has always been supported both
literally and metaphorically by its relationships with subterranean life. One could not
have thrived without the other: the concrete development of the city above ground, from
Notre-Dame Cathedral to its bridges and royal squares, relied on the exploitation of the
quarries underneath it. From medieval times, the limestone, chalk and gypsum that built
Paris was mined from its own foundations, mostly under the butte of Montmartre to the
north; Passy and Chaillot to the west; Belleville and L’Amérique to the east; and
Montparnasse and Montrouge to the south.

Liehr and Olivier Faÿ, Les souterrains de Paris (Riom: Éditions de Borée, 2007),
As Gilles Thomas points out, describing the underground spaces known as the ‘Paris Catacombs’ is more a metonymic convenience than an accurate definition.\textsuperscript{13} Of the 177 miles of quarries and tunnels extant today, less than 1\% have ever been used to accommodate the dead.\textsuperscript{14} Their migration began in the 1780s, when the boundaries of teeming cemeteries finally spilled into the spaces of the living, breaching the cellars of private houses and finally forcing the city to address this long-standing problem of cohabitation. Bones from the Cemetery of the Innocents within the Les Halles district and other graveyards were transported underground to areas renamed by the Church as the Catacombs, creating associations with Christian Roman burial places and conferring a certain religious respectability on what amounted to an act of civic expediency.\textsuperscript{15} Another crisis some years earlier had led to the establishment of the \textit{Inspection Générale des Carrières} (IGC), which had been formed to address the alarming rate at which houses were collapsing through their own weakened foundations. Unrestrained commercial excavations had left Paris dangerously undermined, a situation which demanded the urgent consolidation of quarries and the creation of an enormous network of connecting tunnels, mirroring the streets above them.

These dangers combined with a morbid fascination that made the underground fashionable. The future Charles X visited the Catacombs in 1787, along with the Duchess of Polignac, a favourite of Marie-Antoinette, the following year.\textsuperscript{16} Tales of the Revolution and the Terror also drew the Austrian emperor François I in 1814.\textsuperscript{17} However, the allure of Paris’s underworld was nothing new. Walter Benjamin recorded that medieval guides promised paying customers a glimpse of ‘the Devil in his infernal

\textsuperscript{15} Blanche M. G. Linden, \textit{Silent City on a Hill: Picturesque Landscapes of Memory and Boston’s Mount Auburn Cemetery} (Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2007), p. 22.
\textsuperscript{17} Clément and Thomas, \textit{Atlas}, p. 77.
majesty’ on their underground tours.\textsuperscript{18} Legends, such a tunnel leading from Reid Hall in Montparnasse to the Luxembourg Palace, supposedly where the Duchess of Valois and the Duke of Richelieu met in secret at the time of Louis XV, were common.\textsuperscript{19} These tales had the power to affect even the most rational of minds. For example, when Louis XVI had made his forlorn attempt to flee Paris in 1791, rumours quickly circulated that he was hiding beneath the city; a search of underground passages was not called off until the monarch’s capture at Varennes.\textsuperscript{20} The secrecy and mystery that seeped into the underground were also rich material for writers and artists who drew on its great dramatic possibilities. Just as Paris’s dead had encroached on the city’s spaces, now its outlaws and social outcasts became the focus of readers’ imaginations and fears, in part a reflection of the growing class segregation within many modern cities.\textsuperscript{21} The characters of Eugène Sue’s bestselling serial of the 1840s, \textit{Les Mystères de Paris} (The Mysteries of Paris), and Alexandre Dumas’ derivative follow-on, \textit{Les Mohicans de Paris}, published a decade later, made use of the great southern network of limestone quarries stretching from Grenelle to Montrouge, which was viewed at the time as ‘a veritable underground country, criminal by nature’.\textsuperscript{22} Particularly for Sue, it is Cité, ‘that labyrinth of obscure, narrow and winding streets’ which become his focus, ‘the lurking place, or rendez-vous, of a vast number of the very dregs of society’ found between the Palais du Justice and Notre-Dame Cathedral.\textsuperscript{23} Dumas’ own urban Mohicans, savages just as divorced from society as those of James Fenimore Cooper’s novel \textit{The Last of the Mohicans}, terrorise the city, at one point mining the tunnels so well that ‘a spark would have been

\textsuperscript{21} Pike, \textit{Subterranean Cities}, p. 7
enough…to blow up the entire Left Bank’.\(^{24}\) Despite exhaustively researching the real and imagined places of Dumas’ novels, Francis Miltoun chose not to investigate his subject’s use of the underground, feeling it appealed only ‘to a special variety of morbidity which is as unpleasant to deal with and to contemplate as are snakes preserved in spirit’.\(^ {25}\) But Sue’s and Dumas’ illumination of the darker recesses of Parisian life, however melodramatic, drew the peripheries of the city into readers’ imaginations. In 1862, Victor Hugo’s *Les Misérables* delved still deeper. Hugo’s reliance on the writings of Henri-Charles Emmery, who had taken charge of the Paris sewers during the time in which the novel was set, gave his descriptions a realistic grounding.\(^ {26}\) Nevertheless, like Sue’s and Dumas’ work before it, Hugo set *Les Misérables* in the revolutionary days of the 1830s to critique contemporary social inequalities and injustices ‘through the vision of an absent past’.\(^ {27}\) His explorations into the capital’s subterranean world begin with the descent of protagonist Jean Valjean into the ‘entrails of the monster’, the unmapped sewer system where criminality and social injustice dominate.\(^ {28}\) Working from Emmery’s descriptions Hugo depicts the underside of Paris as the historical ‘resting place of all failure and all effort’ in the city.\(^ {29}\) For Valjean it becomes a refuge, and though the police search for him underground he emerges unscathed, although only with the help of one of sewer’s frequenters, the villain Thénardier.

In 1867, the gypsum quarries of Buttes-Chaumont in the north-east of the city were drawing the attentions of the police and the army, who ventured into the tunnels to flush out the underground criminal communities and stifle the ‘still growing audacity of the prowlers who infest this zone of Paris’.\(^ {30}\) Technological progress, too, was helping to transform and illuminate these long-feared spaces. The cold clarity of Félix Nadar’s

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\(^ {24}\) Benjamin, *The Arcades Project*, p. 616.
\(^ {26}\) Reid, *Sewers and Sewermen*, p. 22.
photographs of the catacombs and sewers, taken in the 1860s, reflected them in a new, more scientific light, bringing ‘a veritable record of the unmapped underworld to a mass audience’. Sewers tours offered an undeniably impressive demonstration of the city’s entry into the modern age, running every two weeks during the summer using gondola forms of the workers’ sluice boats to carry passengers. The tour operator advertised that ‘ladies need have no hesitation in taking part’, with only the ‘rushing cascade of dirty water tumbling into the sewer’ a reminder of the place’s functions. Even its reputation as the source of the city’s foul odours had been dispelled, and visitors reported that the ‘noxious nasal trials’ they might have been expecting did not materialise. Just as the eradication of narrow streets and alleys made room for the gentrification and commodification of Paris above ground, so the transformation of the sewer system sought to install social and moral, as well as physical hygiene. The ‘cartography of delinquency’ was redrawn: those living in the shadows on the periphery of Parisian life but physically occupying the dankest corners of its central quarters were swept out. And yet the dark imaginative links between the underworld and the underground remained unbreakable.

These old fears surfaced with the introduction of the metropolitan train system in 1900, which many Parisians believed would be transporting them through dripping tunnels infested with rats, criminals and the ‘fetid heritage of past generations’; some expected it to undermine the city’s foundations and destroy its statues. It would also once more bring the living closer to the dead. Architect Louis Heuzé, who had proposed a completely aerial rail system, expected that ‘for the adjective métropolitan, Parisians will soon substitute that of Nécropolitan [sic], for a railway obliging the public to

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32 Reid, Paris Sewers and Sewermen, pp. 39-44.
33 Ibid., p. 44. Taking the same tour a century later, architectural critic Ian Nairn described it only ‘smelling faintly of gas and piss’ and opined that ‘everyone ought to experience it if they can’. Ian Nairn, Nairn’s Paris (Honiton: Notting Hill Editions, 2017), pp. 34-35.
35 Pike, Subterranean Cities, p. 48.
descend by way of long staircases into veritable catacombs!\textsuperscript{36} For popular audiences, however, even the darkest and most fantastically disturbing imaginings of the underground remained irresistible. When arch-criminal Fantômas, the great anti-hero of French serialised fiction and silent cinema, retreats to a Montmartre quarry in the 1912 adventure \textit{Le Bouquet Tragique}, he enslaves a band of blind minions to create a ‘kingdom of larvae’, a seething malevolent mass about to burrow into the world above.\textsuperscript{37} Gaston Leroux’s equally grotesque Erik, the title character of \textit{Le Fantôme de l’Opéra}, whose lair lay beneath the Palais Garnier, demonstrated also how a fantastic story could be nudged towards the realms of believability: a stubborn idea that Leroux’s inspiration drew on a real incident on stage there in 1841 has been shown recently to be purely apocryphal in nature.\textsuperscript{38} As Matthew Gandy puts it, ‘the rationalising impulse of modernity could never completely erase the surviving elements of a mythic urban space’, nor was it able to tame the psychological power of the underground.\textsuperscript{39} For some visiting German soldier-tourists, the strange, foreign nature of this ‘mythic urban space’ did inspire a sense of unease, comparable to the much older fears harboured by Parisians. Yet its historical reputation as a spatial zone beyond the reach of state authority and control did not extend into the occupation. As will be shown later, while resistance activity would manifest itself to some degree in the metro, in general the subterranean strata of the city remained neutral, mainly demilitarised and untouched by the complexities of occupied life above.

\textsuperscript{36} Quoted in Peter Soppelsa, ‘Urban Railways, Industrial Infrastructure, and the Paris Landscape, 1870-1914’, in Fraser and Spalding, \textit{Trains, Culture and Mobility}, p. 122.
War and Insurrection

The military value of modernised sewer channels and the already vast networks of quarries and tunnels first became a concern with the Siege of Paris during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. The possibility of a silent enemy infiltration had not gone unnoticed either by French generals or armchair strategists. In October 1870, a letter to the British periodical *Notes and Queries* asked, ‘[d]oes any plan exist of the extensive excavations that occur under a great part of Paris south of the Seine, known as the Catacombs, and which will probably, in case of a close siege, now become the scene of important operations?’ ⁴⁰ In fact the French government had taken steps to fortify the city both above and below ground. While the gates of the city walls were being closed, workers of the IGC formed three armed companies to guard the areas beneath the forts of Ivry, Montrouge and Vanves, on the southern boundaries of the city. ⁴¹ The Asnières Collector, a sewer channel running between the north-western suburb of Clichy and place de la Concorde, was also sealed off. However, though the Prussian soldiers sketched on the tunnel walls during their bombardment of the city, they did not attempt an underground invasion. Indeed, it was only after the fall of the Paris Commune in May 1871 that fighting was seen below ground, when French government troops began hunting their own citizens. More than 400 Communards were pursued through the catacombs and sewers, and the bodies of a further 800 insurgents shot by the gypsum quarries of Buttes-Chaumont were transferred to the tunnels of nearby L’Amérique, around place du Danube. ⁴²

Despite the advent of the metro and increasing public appropriation of the underground during the twentieth century, its associations with plotters and seditious thought did not disappear. While Leon Trotsky’s thought to ambush the Tsar’s general staff by using Saint Petersburg’s sewers proved impracticable, the notion of an

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underground-led insurgency was later adopted by French revolutionaries at the other end of the political spectrum. In the mid-1930s, the Comité secret d’action révolutionnaire, better known as ‘La Cagoule’ (The Hood) made use of the quarries of southern Paris when plotting to bring down the Third Republic. Gaining access to the tunnels via a service entrance at Arcueil on the edge of the city, its members were able to pass under Parc Montsouris and the Hospital Cochin towards the areas underneath the Senate at the Luxembourg Palace and beyond: although their plan in November 1937 to incite a coup against a fabricated communist threat failed, the President of the Senate introduced security measures to prevent future possible assaults from below. Drawings of hooded figures, arrows and other symbols were later found on tunnel walls, a legacy of their occupation. Post-war concerns, caused by the perceived threat of communist plotters and later by the terrorist efforts of the Organisation armée secrète (OAS), dedicated to sabotaging Algerian independence, provoked further defensive fortifications of the underground, including new armoured doors and alarm systems.

This theme of an unseen threat became central to Nazi antisemitic propaganda, portraying Jews as an unseen, bestial enemy with literal and metaphorical associations to the underground. This is particularly apparent in Goebbels’ 1940 propaganda film Der ewige Jude (The Eternal Jew), in which the characterisation of Jews as bringers of ‘subterranean destruction’ is compounded by images of rats pouring from a sewer.

The idea of clandestine Jewish infiltration into western society is illustrated further by the film’s depiction of Léon Blum, the former French prime minister who is described as one ‘who knows how to act like a true Frenchman’. This encouraged Parisians to take a

43 Reid, Paris Sewers and Sewermen, p. 51.
45 Suttel, Catacombes, p. 193.
46 Tournoux, L’Histoire secrète, p. 319.
47 Der ewige Jude, directed by Fritz Hippler (Deutsche Filmherstellungs- und Verwertungs GmbH, 1940).
similar view of Jewish immigrant populations, particularly those living in the northern and eastern districts of the city, though such ideas were nothing new. Indeed, Charles Maurras, an ideologue of the far-Right movement *Action Française* and later supporter of the Vichy government, had made use of similar metaphors to denounce an insidious enemy twenty years before. Warning that ‘the immense ghettos of central Europe are marching in the direction of Paris’, he talked of the ‘new Bohemians within our walls’ as ‘pathogenic political, social and moral microbes’.\(^49\) It is somewhat ironic, therefore, that the proliferation of vermin would become a feature and direct consequence of the German occupation. No provision had been made initially for the increased demands of refuse collection in the city, which led to a rapid rise in rat populations around German installations, leading to the prefecture of police hurriedly introducing a *dératisation* programme in the spring of 1941.\(^50\) The extent of its success is not clear, but at least some of Paris’s native residents seemed unconcerned by this new terror. From her Palais-Royal apartment, the writer Colette opined that ‘there were no rats in this quadrangular city’, and even if there had been, ‘the purge was noiseless’.\(^51\) For both the people of Paris and their occupiers, the notion of an underground insurrection from below no longer preyed on their imaginations as it had done in earlier times.

**Défense Passive: Preparing for the Worst**

If French governments had feared being literally undermined by its people, they also played an important role in protecting their lives during wartime. Parisians were no strangers to the threat of aerial attack and had been utilising defensive underground spaces long before 1939. Seventy years earlier, they had sheltered in cellars and underground quarries during the Siege of Paris, when Prussian artillery bombardments

had killed at least 400 civilians.\textsuperscript{52} Repeated strikes during the First World War by Zeppelins, fixed-wing Gotha aircraft and the Germans’ long-range ‘Paris Gun’ in the early months of 1918 left a more lasting impression on its victims and the city landscape.\textsuperscript{53} During that time, metro stations had provided refuges rather than substantial defensive posts capable of withstanding heavy shelling, but the organisation of such shelters had proved insufficient, and it was not until February 1918 that the \textit{Commission supérieure pour l’examen des mesures à prendre en cas d’attaque d’aeronefs ennemis} (High commission for the measures to be taken in the event of attack by enemy aircraft) was established to address the question of Parisian civilians’ safety.\textsuperscript{54} The following month, a German attack on the Bolivar metro station resulted in 70 deaths when those seeking shelter were crushed against the station doors, which could not be opened from outside.\textsuperscript{55} This tragedy, along with the colossal social trauma of the war, ensured that civil defence (\textit{Défense passive}) remained a concern for successive governments through the 1920s. However, it was only during the next decade, when the possibility of war seemed to be increasing, that intentions turned into significant action.

The extent of civil defence went well beyond equipping town halls and public spaces with shelters. Private businesses began providing their own protection, extending into premises of all kinds. As early as 1934, Marcel Jamet’s ‘One-Two-Two’, an infamous brothel in rue de Provence that later made substantial profits from visiting German soldiers, brought in architect Léon Louvet to build a concrete, gasproof installation capable of accommodating more than a hundred people. Louvet was proud enough of his work to produce 5000 matchboxes advertising it.\textsuperscript{56} However, it was only

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{52} H. de Sarrepont, \textit{Le bombardement de Paris par les Prussiens en janvier 1871} (Paris: Librarie de Firmin Didot Frères, 1872), p. 353.
\item \textsuperscript{53} Bomb damage is still clearly visible today from the raids of January 1918. It is particularly apparent outside the École des Mines on boulevard Saint-Michel, which later suffered additional damage during the liberation of Paris in 1944: plaques by the main entrance, surrounded by the scars of two wars, commemorate both events.
\item \textsuperscript{54} Gilles Thomas, \textit{Abris souterrains de Paris: refuges oubliés de la seconde guerre mondiale} (Paris: Parigramme, 2017), p. 7
\item \textsuperscript{55} ADP, 10331/56/1 153, ‘Installations de sécurité nécessitées par l’exploitation du Réseau en cas d’hostilités (travaux complémentaires)’, 7 June 1939.
\item \textsuperscript{56} Thomas, \textit{Abris souterrains}, pp,36-37.
\end{itemize}
in 1938 that civil defence projects were funded from the national budget, and provision elsewhere in the city was often less elaborate. Though theoretically one could be conscripted for civil defence work, in practice most wardens were volunteers.\(^{57}\) Trench shelters, dug to a depth of two metres and roofed with reinforced concrete, were erected relatively easily, but the construction of more elaborate underground shelters took time, manpower and not considerable expenditure.\(^{58}\) By January 1939, 23 kilometres of trench shelters had been constructed in parks, gardens and open spaces across Paris, able to accommodate perhaps 100,000 people, while concierges became responsible for directing their residents into reinforced domestic cellars.\(^{59}\)

Central to the civil defence programme was the mobilisation of the metro network, which would become an essential means of protecting the Parisian population.\(^{60}\) In June 1939, Paul Martin, the Director General of the Compagnie du chemin de fer métropolitain de Paris (CMP, the company responsible for the running of the metro), warned of an ‘urgent need’ to overcome ‘a certain hesitation’ apparent in the minds of the government on the question of additional funding for such projects.\(^{61}\) It had already begun work on deep underground shelters: Maison Blanche and Place des Fêtes, two stations on the southern and eastern suburbs respectively, were among the most well-equipped against gas attack and heavy bombing. Another built for the CMP’s own workers was situated at Villiers metro, near its own headquarters. Though never used, these were designed to defend against chemical warfare, supported by disinfection stations at hospitals, town halls and universities and mobile ambulance posts.\(^{62}\) However, provision of such public shelters always fell short of expectations. Even by 1943, when


\(^{59}\) Thomas, Abris souterrains, p. 23, pp. 36-37.


\(^{62}\) Thomas, Abris Souterrains, pp. 57-59.
more than five million people had access to some form of shelter across the department of the Seine, only 300,000 could be placed in metro stations and 450,000 in trench shelters, less than half of Paris’s population.\footnote{63} The possibility of bombardment was not just a threat to Paris’s living residents. Photographer Brassai’s images of sculptures, evacuated from the churches of Paris and hidden in the crypt of Saint-Sulpice church, symbolised the shared dangers of bombing and the importance of underground shelters for Paris’s cultural heritage as well as its people.\footnote{64} These measures, along with the issue of gas masks and numerous government-produced public safety leaflets on how civilians should protect themselves, prepared Paris for the worst. But the worst simply did not materialise: after the French government declared the capital an open city in June 1940, Paris remained untouched by aerial attack, and plans to build further shelters were shelved.\footnote{65} Those who had already made an effort to use shelters during 1939 often returned home or to bed before the all-clear siren had sounded, convinced that the ‘Phoney War’ was just that.\footnote{66} To a German immigrant, Françoise Frenkel, Parisian women seemed more concerned with proving their contempt for danger, while air raid wardens became increasingly apathetic.\footnote{67} Indeed, the confusingly bureaucratic nature of government advice became easy prey for satirists: one faked official information tract ridiculed the complexity of the air defence regulations, stating bewildering arrays of sirens to indicate various states of alert, including an all-clear that would be indicated by the playing of the children’s nursery rhyme, \textit{J'ai du bon tabac}.\footnote{68} The bombing of industrial targets on the periphery of Paris began with an attack on the Renault works at Boulogne-Billancourt in March 1942.

\footnote{63}{Baudoli and Knapp, \textit{Forgotten Blitzes}, pp. 105-106.}
\footnote{65}{Baudoli and Knapp, \textit{Forgotten Blitzes}, p. 105.}
\footnote{67}{Françoise Frenkel (trans. Stephanie Smee), \textit{No Place to Lay One’s Head} (London: Pushkin Press, 2018), p. 58.}
\footnote{68}{Liliane Schroeder, \textit{Journal d’Occupation, Paris 1940-44} (Paris: François-Xavier de Guibert, 2000), tract reproduced in Annexe.}
Despite the civilian casualties – 373 dead and 317 injured – it neither accelerated Vichy’s provision of shelters nor care for those made homeless. A fatally late air raid warning preceded another attack on Renault in April 1943, which resulted in a total of 403 dead, more than 80 being killed by stray bombs falling on Pont-de-Sèvres metro station. Further raids, particularly that of the night of 20/21 April 1944 which battered the metro’s workshop at Saint-Ouen and the marshalling yards at La Chapelle, came as a bigger shock. One Montmartre resident who had been captivated by the sight of the March 1942 raid now cowered in her bedroom, wondering if the Allies were about to destroy all of Paris. Nevertheless, an air of complacency was reported elsewhere in the city. An American staying in Passy had been dumbfounded by the casual attitudes of those living around her: despite the protestations of air raid wardens, lights shone freely from peoples’ apartment windows and her host showed no urgency in evacuating her young son from the building. More than 600 civilians were killed and hundreds more injured, prompting the press to criticise the lacklustre implementation of civil defence procedures. Yet such cavalier attitudes towards the threat of aerial annihilation appeared to be endemic among Parisians. Jean Guéhenno, living on rue Pierre-Nicole on the Left Bank, described how ‘the people were at their windows, rather happy to watch’ while air raid sirens sounded to herald the arrival of another raid in May 1944. A few residents, such as the writer Édith Thomas, claimed that she had seen out the whole occupation without ever setting foot in a shelter. Despite a long preoccupation with the civil defence of Paris, the relatively light bombardments that Paris endured meant that its

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70 Overy, Bombing War, p. 560.
71 Auroy, Jours de guerre, p. 297.
73 ‘Dans les décombres, à la recherche des corps qui restent ensevelis les sauveteurs inlassables s’affairent’, Le Matin, 25 April 1944, p. 1.
74 Guéhenno, Dark Years, p. 252.
citizens were not forced underground in the same way as in other European cities. As we will see, the characteristic reluctance of many civilians to retreat beneath the streets was also shared by resisters, who remained figuratively in the shadows but rarely sought the relative safety of subterranean spaces.

**Resistance Underground**

‘On the surface Vichy continues to play at being a government’, wrote Joseph Kessel in 1943, while ‘the living France is all in the depths...In the catacombs of revolt the people are creating their own light and finding their own law.’\(^7^6\) This metaphorical ‘republic of the catacombs’, the refuge of a secret, separate stratum of French society fighting for liberation and the restoration of ‘free’ France, is a recurring signifier in writing about the occupation.\(^7^7\) But to what extent was the rhetorical power of the underground mirrored by the physical exploitation of underground spaces? From the beginning of the occupation, the conditions for the growth of subterranean resistance were in some respects favourable: as above ground, the German administration simply did not have the manpower to surveil the miles of underground quarries, nor the sewers or metro, and so continued to rely on the civil authorities that had managed them before the war.\(^7^8\)

Though the publicly accessible section of the catacombs was closed from September 1939, from 1940 the *Services techniques* (Technical Services) section of the Paris prefecture continued to manage the quarries and underground tunnels as before.\(^7^9\) The CMP, the privately-owned company running the entire metro network on behalf of the government since 1930, was similarly afforded considerable independence, although it


\(^{78}\) Suttel, *Catacombes*, p. 193.

\(^{79}\) *Bulletin Municipal Officiel de la Ville de Paris*, 7 February 1946, pp. 225-226. In 1940 the work of the IGC transferred to the *Direction générale des services techniques*, as a department of the prefecture of the Seine. ADP, Inspection Générale des Carrières, inventory for series 1674W.
was subject to the scrutiny of German councilllors of the *Reichsbahn* (German State Railway) based at the Hotel Majestic.

As the surface of the city became increasingly demarcated and regulated, creating an invisible maze of prohibited zones, detours and dead ends, the world underneath remained unoccupied and unwatched. In 1941, this offered a unique opportunity for a few experts working in the PTT (Postes, Télégraphes et Téléphones) administration to exploit a weakness in Germans’ communications security. At the request of Vichy’s intelligence service, PTT engineer Robert Keller devised a means to intercept the underground cables carrying German telecommunications, initially running between Paris and Metz. From a residential listening post situated in the eastern suburbs, what became known as ‘Source K’ provided intelligence to the French *Deuxième Bureau* at Vichy until Keller and his small team were discovered at the end of 1942.80 Yet other examples of resistance operations underground are quite rare, and difficult or impossible to corroborate. Gilbert Tomazon, one of the organisers of British-backed intelligence network Gloria SMH, may have been able to use his position as an engineer with the *Travaux Publics* (Office of Public Works) to gain access to areas to tunnels where he was reportedly able to store the network’s documents.81 Another apocryphal story concerns the celebrated resister Jean Cavaillès, a long-serving member of *Libération-Nord* and later leader of its offshoot network *Cohors*, who supposedly made use of a secret underground entrance by Montparnasse cemetery, possibly as a letter box or perhaps for passing messages via the underground. A similar tale of Cavaillès having used the vaults of the Louvre as a hiding place is equally intriguing, but unfortunately also lacks any traceable source.82 *Libération-Nord* may additionally have planned to infiltrate the

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81 SHD, GR 16 P 573270, Gilbert Tomazon Personal File.
quarries below the Palais de Chaillot, disguising its agents as workmen, but this story is no better supported.83

The only verifiable example of a resister making extensive use of the underground is René Suttel, whose exploits were truly remarkable. Born in 1912, Suttel was a reserve officer at the outbreak of war and a medical student during the occupation, studying at Saint Anne’s hospital, Paris’s main centre for psychiatric medicine.84 Sheltering during an air raid in the hospital’s basement in 1942, he noticed a locked grille set into one of the walls: overcome by the temptation to investigate further, he picked the lock and began to explore the tunnels beyond it.85 With the help of several fellow medical students including Jean Talairach, Suttel began to map the quarries and tunnels of the Grand réseau sud (Great Southern Network) which is mainly concentrated across the sixth, thirteenth and fourteenth arrondissements.86 Lacking any existing maps, they had no idea of the scale of the work ahead of them: the fourteenth arrondissement alone comprises some 65 kilometres of tunnels across several levels, passing to a depth of 35 metres, well below the metro and sewer networks.87

Suttel’s underground exploits and resistance connections remain obscure, and it is significant that his only published work, a fragmentary collection of his wartime experiences woven into a more general history of subterranean Paris, is little known and rarely cited.88 Certainly both he and Talairach were recognised for their resistance work after the war, providing medical services during the liberation of Paris in August 1944 with a local group known as the ‘réseau des Anges’ (Angels’ network).89 However, the extent of his research is illustrated by the map he created, a copy of which is owned by

84 SHD, GR 16 P 559224, René Suttel Personal File.
85 René Suttel, Catacombes, p. 19.
86 Suttel refers to two other accomplices (‘Leulier’ and ‘Petit’) but only by surname and gives no other information about their involvement. Suttel, Catacombes, p. 19.
87 Ibid., p. 29.
88 Ibid. Suttel’s book was published by the Société des Études Historiques des Anciennes Carrières et Cavités Souterrains, dedicated to the study and preservation of Paris’s underground heritage.
89 SHD, Suttel Personal File.
Saint-Anne’s hospital. Though inaccurate in its rendering of scale, it displays an extraordinary level of detail, denoting entrance and exits, staircases and ladders running between different quarry levels, available shortcuts, corresponding street names above ground, directional arrows and even explanatory notes on tunnel drawings and graffiti. The scale of his work was such that it was possible to navigate from the southern edges of Paris to areas north of the Jardin du Luxembourg. Mindful of its potential as a tool for resisters, Suttel’s intention was to simply guide the map’s reader to the easiest and quickest route from one point to another. As a means of navigating Suttel made use of various symbols which are still identifiable today on the walls of the Carrières des Capucins, the quarry under the Cochin hospital in Montparnasse. Unlike the aerosol paint used for most of today’s subterranean graffiti, these figures were usually drawn in the traditional way, with black smoke produced by placing a candle flame against a wall.

Though Talairach’s subterranean explorations distracted him from pioneering work on neuronal imaging, he was nevertheless awarded a prize by the Académie de Chirurgie in 1942. However, it was not until 1967 that his pioneering work mapping the human brain and the creation of the ‘Talairach Atlas’ brought him international recognition. It is impossible not to compare the neuronal structures so apparent in Suttel’s underground map with Talairach’s later project. Indeed, the methodology Talairach used in measuring the angles and distances between points along the tunnels was essentially the same one he employed to produce the first 3D model of the brain.

When writing the preface to Suttel’s book, Talairach’s comment that ‘l’instinct du psychiatre t’y avait mené’ (the instinct of the psychiatrist led you there) might apply to both of them. Just as with other body metaphors applied to Paris, such as the market halls of Les Halles as the city’s stomach in Émile Zola’s novel Le Ventre de Paris, or

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90 Ibid., p. 20.
91 Ibid., p. 21.
94 Suttel, Catacombes, p. 7.
Hugo’s sewers as its foetid intestines in *Les Misérables*, the underground can be seen as the multi-layered centre of the city’s consciousness. This recalls Freud’s topographical metaphor describing Rome as ‘a psychical entity… ...in which nothing that has once come into existence will have passed away and all the earlier phases of development continue to exist alongside the latest one’.\(^95\) The journal of Felix Hartlaub, a young German private posted to Paris in 1941, offered some newer interpretations that reflected how the deprivations of occupation were beginning to show. For him, the zinc-sheeted roofs of Saint-Germain had become the protruding ribs of a rationed, undernourished city.\(^96\)

Suttel later stated that the underground remained essentially unvisited: the Germans only frequented the areas where its own air-raid shelters were situated, and most of his explorations were conducted in ‘perfect isolation’.\(^97\) But during a tour of the areas around the Jardin du Luxembourg he unexpectedly encountered signs of enemy activity. Reinforced steel blast doors, electric lighting, clearly scripted signage in German and alarm system showed that the Germans had been working here for some time. Indeed, his arrival had been met with a sudden illumination of the tunnel and the sounding of an alarm. Expecting guards to arrive any moment, he was thankful when the lights flashed off and he could make a retreat.\(^98\) He would nevertheless return to map out this newly established border with German territory.

Suttel had not been the first Frenchman to encounter it. In February 1942, agents of the *Services techniques* were making routine inspections of access points in the same area of the sixth *arrondissement*, in the vicinity of the old Vanvert quarries. They quickly realised something was wrong. Descending the restricted service stairways, they were confronted by wooden panels and instructions in German, and found their keys to the

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\(^{97}\) Suttel, *Catacombes*, p. 23.

\(^{98}\) *Ibid.*, pp. 22-23, p. 82.
tunnel entrances on boulevard Saint-Michel, rue des Notre-Dame-des-Champs, rue Bonaparte and rue d’Assas no longer fitted the locks. Despite having left control of the underground in the hands of the French, the Germans had for some time been constructing two large air raid shelters in the area, the biggest being that under the Lycée Montaigne, on the southern edge of the Jardin du Luxembourg (although schools were not typically taken over by the occupier, its proximity to the Palais du Luxembourg and size made it especially useful as a barracks). This had not come as a complete surprise to the French, following the requisitioning of both the Palais du Luxembourg and the lycée in 1940. But it demonstrated how the independence of the Services techniques could easily be quashed by the Luftwaffe, which had established its headquarters at the Palais. Objections were drafted (whether they were actually sent remains unclear) but the Germans continued to deny access, blocking French surveillance and policing of the underground areas underneath the Jardin du Luxembourg. While many concrete blockhouses and bunkers sprang up across Paris, including one by the Palais du Luxembourg, substantial underground shelters were rarely built by German engineers, who preferred to make use of existing Défense passive installations. One exception was begun underneath the Jardin du Luxembourg, to the south-east of the palace, by the Medici fountain. And in the spring of 1943, a substantial shelter was also constructed on the far side of town, under 28 and 29 avenue Kléber: covering more than 600 square metres, it could comfortably accommodate the officers of the MBF based at the Hotel Majestic and Hotel Raphaël nearby.

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99 These were located at 73, rue Notre-Dame-des-Champs; 92, rue Bonaparte (today the address of the Hungarian Institute); via an access shaft under a garage at 92, rue d’Assas; and 64, boulevard Saint-Michel. ADP, 1011/44/1 17, Report by Chief Engineer, 23 February 1942.
100 Desprairies, Paris dans la collaboration, p. 117.
101 ADP, 1011/44/1 17, ‘Benutzungs – Vorschrift’, Chief Engineer to Director General of Services techniques, 17 March 1942. Yet another apocryphal story suggests that Suttel and Talaraich fashioned a key to open some of these doors and used a saw blade to bypass those which were electrically operated.
102 ADP, 1011/44/1 17, Rapport de M. Bressot, 17 March 1942.
103 Desprairies, Paris dans la collaboration, p. 140.
104 Ibid., p. 501.
As Suttel notes, these underground shelters were well equipped. Today, the steel doors still remain, along with a colour-coded system of signs painted on a whitewashed background, directing users either towards the Lycée’s schoolyard, north-east to Saint-Michel or west/north-west towards rue Notre-Dame-des-Champs or rue Bonaparte. While modern graffiti has overtaken much of the tunnel space since, few contemporary examples of German soldiers etching their names have been found; an indication, along with the still extant ‘no smoking’ signs, of the discipline which governed the use of such military shelters. Suttel, whose resistance connections were apparently minimal during his explorations of the tunnel networks, only passed on his map to the FFI at the beginning of 1944. Through an unattributed resistance contact, an underground rendezvous was arranged with a ‘Doctor Morel’, who may have either been Rol-Tanguy, or an engineer, Louis Tavès. Suttel handed over the most detailed copy of his map, though exactly how and to what extent it was consulted, and its overall value in assisting FFI operations, remains obscure.

The Metro: Segregation and Resistance

While adaptations to the metro infrastructure turned it into an important means of protecting the Parisian population from aerial attack, the metro also remained the most important means of travel for Parisians throughout the occupation. Though the reduction of metro services began with the outbreak of war in September 1939, the defeat of France did not interrupt them for long, and by 15 July the network was largely

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106 SHD, Suttel Personal File. His record of service is dated from January 1942, but details of his exploits before 1944 are lacking.
107 Suttel, Catacombes, p. 194. In his correspondence with researchers during the 1980s and 1990s, Rol-Tanguy maintained that he had no recollection of accompanying Suttel underground, nor had he been made aware of the German bunker underneath the Lycée Montaigne. Since Tavès also used the name ‘Morel’, it is possible that he was Suttel’s contact. AN 672 AP/27, Rol-Tanguy Private Papers, Rol-Tanguy correspondence, 20 October 1990; Rol-Tanguy to M. Thomas, 21 February 1995.
back in service. By the end of the year figures had risen back to around two million journeys daily, as many Parisians returned to the capital. As motor traffic dwindled to military vehicles and a just a few thousand private cars, other options were limited. ‘The Frenchman is a pedestrian and a cyclist’, Jean Guéhenno observed, but most Parisians continued to rely on the metro as the only reliable way to get around. Public bus services had been cut drastically by the autumn of 1940, reducing the number of vehicles to around 500, about one-seventh of its pre-war fleet. The emptiness of the roads made it possible to drive across this strangely silent city in just ten minutes. Aside from the horse and cart returning to daily life, vélo-taxis, with their ‘haggard perspiring human motors, pedaling away with all their might’ was in itself a form of humiliation: one American spectator noted how ‘I shuddered to see Europeans – Parisians – slaving away in this fashion, at a sort of labor against which Europeans in China had once objected on the ground that it was too degrading to human dignity.’ The act of travelling across the city, by whatever means, served as an inescapable reminder of occupation.

The effect of overcrowding could lead to frustrations purely between Parisians. In December 1941 Andrzej Bobkowski described the experience of travelling on the metro during rush hour as a ‘veritable Chinese torture’. Aside from the foetid atmosphere cause by the appalling overcrowding, the sheer pressure of confined bodies ensured that those alighting at each station were ‘propelled through the door like a champagne cork’ before others struggled aboard to take their places. Towards the end of 1941, the CMP complained that the public response to the cuts in services would cause ‘general

110 Michel, Paris Allemand, p. 234.
114 Ibid.
discontentment among the population’. The signs of neglect were already becoming obvious: dead light bulbs were not replaced, trains were less frequent and often consisted of three or four carriages rather than the usual five. Lifts and escalators stood silent. But the service continued to run. Although the CMP’s extensive pre-war plans for extensions across the network were curtailed by shortages of materials and manpower as well as the obstruction of the German authorities, some improvements were also made: the extension of Line 5 to the north-eastern areas of Pantin, and two shorter, southern, extensions to lines 7 and 8 were all completed in October 1942.

While French citizens could choose to ignore Germans in the street, the confines of metro travel enforced an often unwelcome but unavoidable cohabitation with the occupier, who found it just as vital a means of transport as for Parisians. In November 1940, Édith Thomas related a couple of incidents in her journal which are typical of the ‘folklore’, as she characterised it, circulating among Parisians of the time. In one, a black Senegalese man dared to gaze at a German officer, who was so outraged that he shot him. Another describes a German asking a student for directions. The student remained silent until he alighted at a station, when he turned to reply, ‘you wanted to come to Paris, work it out yourself’. Other journals cite similar encounters. Writer and philosopher Jean Grenier heard at a dinner party the story of a German officer who had been seen walking through the metro with ‘Vive de Gaulle’ written on his back. Such rumours, as in other parts of the country, were not necessarily taken as fact by Parisians
but represented an alternative source of information free from official control, a ‘vital counterweight’ to German and Vichy propaganda and news censorship.\(^\text{121}\)

In its broadest sense, the architecture of the metro also held powerful cultural associations for Parisians. Ethnologist Marc Augé has written that the metro serves as ‘a memory machine’, relating how his experiences living near the stations of Maubert-Mutualité and Cardinal Lemoine during the occupation became forever linked to General Leclerc and the liberation of the city.\(^\text{122}\) For the head of the BCRA, André Dewavrin, the choice to adopt metro names as codenames for himself and his agents – Passy, Saint-Jacques, Bienvenüe, Barbès, Drouot, Corvisart – was the stuff of espionage novels and reflected his and others’ romantic attitudes towards their new roles, but it also expressed a reclaiming of their own capital.\(^\text{123}\) For Dewavrin in London or the average Parisian living under occupation, their connections to the metro were both collective and personal, and always beyond the reach of the occupier.

The annoyances caused by huge increases in passenger numbers were of course compounded by the close physical proximity of the occupying forces. As German and French populations were pushed closer together, so the question of segregation became more prominent. The extent and endurance of what Sophie de Schaepdrijver refers to as ‘patriotic distance’, expressed here in the French rejection of the occupier by maintaining spatial separation, is somewhat difficult to address, since our judgements inevitably rely on often-quoted journalists and personal postwar reflections.\(^\text{124}\) But these sources suggest

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\(^\text{121}\) Guillon, ‘Rumours in Wartime France’, p. 74.
that the occupier remained a distinctly incongruous, alien presence, maintaining the status of a loathsome invader rather than an object of curiosity.\textsuperscript{125} Increasing repression also bred fear. With the first signs of communist-led resistance, accompanied by notices announcing the executions of demonstrators during August 1941, Jean Guéhenno noted that passengers were more careful to avoid trouble, a public place where ‘no-one dares to talk anymore’.\textsuperscript{126} This only compounded the sense of estrangement. In February 1943, he wrote directly to an imaginary German listener. ‘When you get into the metro we squeeze together to make room for you. You are the Untouchable...There you are in the midst of us, like an object, in a circle of cold silence.’\textsuperscript{127} As Paris increasingly became more difficult for the occupiers to manage, the French sense of bitterness and detachment consolidated itself. The increasing likelihood of encountering a rafle, which would often demand interminable waiting in crowded corridors, only added to Parisians’ resentment. In February 1944, an evening check at Strasbourg Saint-Denis station detained more than a thousand people, taking three hours to process. Those held up had to be issued with a \textit{laisser-passer}, since the delay had prevented passengers from getting home before curfew.\textsuperscript{128}

German scrutiny of the French and the metro is also difficult to assess. \textit{Der Deutsche Wegleiter für Paris} continued to portray a sometimes romantic yet foreign view of the experience of using the Paris metro. In ‘S.O.S. in the Metro’, a short story published in the winter of 1942, a few hapless soldiers arrange to meet some German female auxiliaries but quickly become lost after taking the wrong train. Trying to get their bearings, one declares that they will never get used to this confusing metro network and asks the assistance of an old Parisian flower seller. When she is unable to help them, they make a telephone call to their German compatriots who become their ‘metro-

\begin{itemize}
  \item\textsuperscript{125} Benjamin, \textit{Arcades Project}, p. 84.
  \item\textsuperscript{126} Guéhenno, \textit{Dark Years}, p. 111.
  \item\textsuperscript{127} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 196.
  \item\textsuperscript{128} ADP, 10331/56/1 33, Report of an incident during 26 February 1944 (Line 8).
\end{itemize}
saviours’ and save the day.¹²⁹ That their compatriots’ expertise was a more reliable source than Paris’s own citizens seems to reflect the experiences of German travellers, who remain culturally and ideologically insular. This emphasis on foreignness also appears in a later article on the metro, which reminds the reader that ‘the Metro is a Parisian concept’ as are its French women passengers, who are portrayed as desirable but equally curious.¹³⁰ A different form of interest was noted by Felix Hartlaub, who recalled seeing two soldiers discussing the racial origins of a woman they spy in their carriage, unable to decide on her nationality.¹³¹

One example of imposed segregation was the designation of air raid shelters solely reserved for use by German personnel, and the requisitions of a number of station-refuges, which, unlike the better-equipped stations-bris were numerous but offered less protection from air raids. By the end of 1943, 38 stations-refuges had been made available to the occupying forces, particularly those close to Soldatenkinos, Soldatenheime and other exclusively German venues across Paris.¹³² Aside from protection from bombing, this separation of populations prevented the threat of Germans becoming isolated among crowded and potentially hostile French civilians using public shelters.¹³³

Like other major enterprises in occupied France, the CMP was largely compliant in its dealings with the Vichy government and the MBF. While the CMP’s management and particularly its Director General, Paul Martin, were seen to cooperate from the start of the occupation, the traditional support for trades unions among the metro’s station agents and staff inclined them towards a less cooperative, if not resistant, outlook.¹³⁴

¹³⁰ ‘Die Metro’, Der Deutsche Wegleiter, 46, 6-20 November 1943.
¹³² ADP 10331/56/1 33, 31 May 1945, René Claudon to Prefect of the Seine. See also Thomas, Abris souterrains, p. 86.
¹³³ Thomas, Abris souterrains, p. 86.
Certainly Martin was diligent in his submission of regular reports to the Prefecture of the Seine, which were then translated into German and forwarded to the Hotel Majestic for review. In November 1940, instructions were distributed to CMP’s agents stressing that their relations with all German passengers (all German military and civilian personnel were eligible for free travel on the metro) should be polite and attentive, and that any potential ‘incidents’ should be avoided. A further demonstration of the elevated status of the occupiers was illustrated by another concession, recommended by Martin. From 1 December 1940, some lines would introduce split first-class carriages on trains with five cars, reserving half the space exclusively for German use. On others, separate first-class carriages would be available for Germans and French. Though preparations were made to introduce this measure, the MBF decided not to pursue this complicated and provocative arrangement.

This was not the first act of segregation to have been proposed. In August 1940, the CMP received notice of a German ruling to exclude black passengers from first-class carriages, and to dismiss its own black station agents. Although the MBF had been careful to stipulate no that public notifications of the change should be made, protests from a Franco-African organisation and a group dedicated to the memory of slavery abolitionist, Victor Schœlcher, were quickly lodged against the CMP’s apparent willingness to implement the policy. Vichy France’s representative in Paris, General de la Laurencie, advised that, since black soldiers had given their lives for their country, the

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136 ADP, 10331/56/1 33, Note aux gares et stations du réseau urbain et de la ligne du Sceaux, 19 November 1940; ADP, 10331/56/1 32, Extrait de l’ordre de la Place No. 107, 6 November 1940.
137 ADP, 10331/56/1 33, Paul Martin to the Prefect of the Seine, 29 November 1940; Engineer-Inspector Casabianca to Prefect of the Seine, 13 December 1940.
138 ADP, 10331/56/1 33, Report of the meeting with Principal Advisor Finck, 27 December 1940.
139 ADP, 10331/56/1 33, Mlle. Léopold to Administrateur-délégué, 30 August 1940. See also ADP, 10331/56/1 33, Paul Martin to the Prefect of the Seine, n.d.
140 ADP, 10331/56/1 33, Letter from Les Amitiés Franco-Africaines, to Prefect of the Seine, 4 September 1940; ‘Protestations des Nègres de Paris’, 9 September 1940; letter from ‘Le groupe du souvenir de Victor Schœlcher’ to the Prefect, 4 September 1940.
CMP should not bar their entry to first-class carriages. However, he remained more circumspect on the question of the employment of black workers, leaving it to the CMP ‘to decide for itself what measure it estimates will satisfy the German request, subject to the reservation that the moral and material interests of those concerned should not be affected’. Given that La Laurencie had not opposed the appropriation of Jewish businesses – indeed, he had sought to secure Vichy’s claims to Jewish property rather than hand it over to the Germans – it is perhaps unsurprising that he ignored the question of ‘moral and material interests’ towards Jewish ex-servicemen, or Jews per se.

Regardless of this issue, the military governor of Paris, Ernst Schaumburg, was content that his control over the CMP was assured, declaring in November 1940 that ‘the director of the metro has been advised that all German military personnel have priority over the French’. A further restriction was applied in the spring of 1941, when all metro workers were also obliged to declare their non-Jewish status and any links with Freemasonry. The number of dismissals arising from this measure isn’t known, but by mid-1941 around half of its employees had been put out of work, in large part due to the CMP’s efforts to reduce its wage costs. In June 1942, the imposition of segregation against Jews was finally implemented: they could no longer buy first-class tickets, and would have to travel in the last carriage of the metro with black passengers. Once again, metro stations remained free of any notices to announce these measures, although metro agents received specific instructions that first class tickets should not be sold to Jews, who from now on would be identifiable by the yellow star.

141 ADP, 10331/56/1 33, General de la Laurencie to the Prefect of the Seine, 15 November 1940.
142 Paxton, *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order*, p. 177. ADP, 10331/56/1 33, General de la Laurencie to the Prefect of the Seine, 15 November 1940.
143 Quoted in Mitchell, *Nazi Paris*, p. 15.
146 ADP, 10331/56/1 33, Memo, 5 June 1942.
Just as in the streets, the metro became the target of pro-gaullist graffiti and stickers, its labyrinthine passages offering inexhaustible wall space. In July 1941, German police also complained to the CMP about inscriptions spotted on the walls of first-class carriages. Interestingly, they were directed not at the occupiers, but at Vichy. ‘Enough talk, we are hungry, we want work and bread’ and ‘we want to eat, watch out Pétain, Darlan and all you bastards. Vive de Gaulle’ were just two examples cited. The metro management emphasised that its agents were duty bound to remove all graffiti but pointed out the impossibility of keeping the entire network free of it. This excuse was accepted, on the understanding that there should be no relaxation of their efforts. Given the enormous proliferation of such messages across the city during 1941, it is impossible to know the extent to which metro workers were turning a blind eye to these defacements. The same complainant remarked that the removal of discarded tickets torn into V and H shapes (to symbolise Victory and Honour) had been almost completely successful, a view which was at odds with some Parisian observers. But the Germans responded to the battle for wall space with their own clever propaganda, replacing official-looking posters with small stickers that resembled those distributed across the city by pro-resistance students. They also imposed the harshest penalties. The executions of Henri Bekerman and fellow communist Eugène Massé, both of whom had been arrested separately while carrying propaganda on the metro, were unfortunately not exceptional. Yvonne Paraf, who helped to produce Edition de Minuit’s clandestine publications from 1942, realised the dangers and chose to transport heavy lead typesets

147 ADP, 10331/56/1 33, ‘Compte-rendu de l’entretien du 17 juillet 1941 avec M. l’Oberleutnant Genz’.
148 Ibid. Compare with Bobkowski, En guerre, 16 July 1941, p. 207.
149 Guénnno, Dark Years, p. 79.
across Paris by bicycle. Though flat tyres often meant long and arduous journeys walking rather than cycling to her destination, she was never caught.\textsuperscript{151}

The daily reports of incidents submitted to the Prefecture of Police reveal a range of misdemeanours, from minor infractions to murder. Most occurred within areas of higher concentrations of German personnel, on metro stations along the avenue des Champs-Elysées, Saint-Michel, Opéra, and more generally in the seventh and sixteenth arrondissements.\textsuperscript{152} Though uncommon, tensions between Germans and French spilled over into violence. In March 1944, a confrontation between soldiers and a group of civilian passengers at Marbeuf station led to a bayonet being drawn, causing light injuries.\textsuperscript{153} The following month, a group of German civilians and officers were reported to have opened fire on two young people at Porte-de-Saint-Cloud metro; as with other violent incidents launched by Germans, no motive was determined and the attackers disappeared from the scene.\textsuperscript{154} More regular were reports of soldiers discharging their firearms, often through drunkenness, sometimes by accident. In many cases the bullets ricocheted harmlessly off the platform ceiling, but both civilians and soldiers were sometimes injured and even killed.\textsuperscript{155} Other incidents involving fatal shootings suggested suicide.\textsuperscript{156} Altercations between CMP agents and the occupier amounted to just 103 between 1941 and 1944, the causes of which were various and not always easily identifiable from the reports.\textsuperscript{157} While metro staff were sometimes subjected to violence by German soldiers, they also risked death from rail electrocution, tunnel collapse or unexploded ordnance resulting from Allied bombing attacks. Two CMP agents were

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\textsuperscript{152} Antelmi, ‘Les incidents dans le métro parisien sous l’occupation’, p. 85.
\textsuperscript{153} ADP, 10331/56/1 33, Report of an incident during 16 March 1944, Line 1.
\textsuperscript{156} ADP, 10331/56/1 33, Report of an incident during 20 July 1944, Line 12.
\textsuperscript{157} \textit{Ibid}. For typical examples of violence against metro agents, see ADP, 10331/56/1 33, reports for 1 July and 4 August 1943.
\end{flushright}
killed by a bomb falling on Balard metro station in September 1943. Traces of bombings or attacks directed against Germans are relatively rare: between 1941 and 1944, only nine bombings, 28 ‘intentional shots’ and eighteen attacks were recorded.

The omissions within these reports are as revealing as the incidents described, particularly in relation to actions undertaken against Jews. Identity checks and subsequent arrests during rafles are unrecorded: Valérie Antelmi suggests that such events came to be considered normal within the terms of the occupation, and were therefore superfluous and unworthy of note. In the reported cases of sabotage, it is impossible to know the extent of station agents’ involvement in facilitating the evasion or escape of perpetrators. However, some isolated events tend to suggest a more general attitude of neutrality or even a willingness to assist the police. For example, one report details how an American agent who parachuted close to Massy station in February 1944 was immediately handed over to the German authorities. Despite the expectation that metro workers might be predisposed towards resistance activities, there are few examples to cite. Lucien Noël, chief of Pelleport metro on the eastern side of Paris, began a minor network named La France Libre in the summer of 1941, working with his daughter and two brothers who printed clandestine tracts in nearby rue de Ménilmontant. Its first newspaper was produced in August 1941, but a new recruit quickly denounced their activities to the police. The group had collapsed by the end of the year, and Noël along with most of his group were shot at Mont-Valérien. It is important to note that this cannot be characterised as an example of ‘metro resistance’: aside from Noël, his group was not drawn from his fellow station workers, nor did it focus its efforts on resistance within metro stations or spaces.

160 Ibid, p. 91.
161 ADP, 10331/56/1 33, Report, 6 February 1944.
162 SHD, GR 16 P 446228, Lucien Noël Personal File.
Published research on resistance undertaken by those affiliated with the metro and sewer networks is also very limited. But if evidence for clandestine activity undertaken by metro agents is thin, station spaces clearly became important for the resistance operations of other groups. The meeting of young communist demonstrators at Havre-Caumartin metro station on 13 August 1941 resulted in more than a dozen arrests, leading to the execution of one of them, Samuel Tyzelman. The retaliatory assassination of German cadet Alfons Moser on 21 August by Tyzelman’s friend and fellow communist, Pierre Georges, marked the beginning of an escalation in armed resistance in the city, but it was not an isolated example of assassination on the metro. The killing of a German soldier on 20 April 1942 at Molitor station triggered a large roundup of communists and the deportation of more than a thousand prisoners the following July. As FTP attacks in the city multiplied, metro stations also became regular rendezvous points, particularly for the subgroups formed within its armed FTP-MOI wing (created in the 1920s, the MOI or Main-d’œuvre immigrée had represented immigrant workers led by the French Communist Party). For example, a small but very active group led by Polish Jew Marcel Rajman used Ternes, Cadet and Sentier stations as meeting points before and after grenade attacks on cafés in 1943.

Though the Confédération Général du Travail (CGT, the main trade union federation) had been banned by Vichy in 1940, its clandestine reconstitution in 1943 was broadcast by the publication of the first edition of Les Métros, the CGT’s underground

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**164** Combat metro station on Line 2 was renamed ‘Colonel Fabien’ in Georges’ honour in 1945.

**165** Grason, ‘Rajman, Marcel’, *Le Maitron: Dictionnaire biographique*. 
tract, that July.\textsuperscript{166} It called for action against Vichy and the ‘current directors’ as well as protests for salary rises and better conditions, ‘demonstrating that the workers are retaking confidence in the possibility of action’.\textsuperscript{167} It also included mention of the CMP’s main workshop in rue Championnet in the eighteenth \textit{arrondissement}, which had been requisitioned in October 1940 by the \textit{Reichsbahn} for the repair of tanks and military vehicles.\textsuperscript{168} In total, between 1500 and 2000 engineers were externally drafted to meet the occupiers’ demands, joining 600 existing CMP employees.\textsuperscript{169} Some propaganda and sabotage activity in 1941 had been encouraged by two union representatives, Georges Ginfray and Gustave Allyn.\textsuperscript{170} Others were operating within an FTP group run by René Pajon, known as ‘Commandant Danton’.\textsuperscript{171} However, the most significant group to rise from within the metro, \textit{Métro-Autobus}, led by the station chief at Bel-Air metro, Louis Bouchet, only began in October 1943.\textsuperscript{172} This organisation, which appears to have been mainly composed of \textit{Milice patriotiques} – resistance auxiliaries dedicated to maintaining public order and policing duties during the liberation of Paris – fell under FFI control during 1944, but its specific activities and operations before the insurrection remain vague.\textsuperscript{173} From April 1944, this and another group under the newly-created \textit{Mouvement de libération nationale} would be coordinated by Robert Réa, a metro engineer with the FTP.\textsuperscript{174}

\textsuperscript{166} \textit{Les Métros}, No.1, July 1943.
\textsuperscript{167} \textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{168} In January 1942, the \textit{Société des transports en commun de la région parisienne} (STCRP, responsible for the running of the Paris bus networks) was subsumed into the CMP, a merger which failed to properly integrate the two organisations. Early resistance at the rue Championnet and other STCRP workshops was largely snuffed out by March 1942, in part because of the closer cooperation between the STCRP management and the French police. After further changes, the present-day \textit{Régie Autonome des Transports Parisiens} (RATP) was formed in 1948. See Pascale Fitzner, ‘La STCRP pendant la seconde guerre mondiale’, in \textit{Métros, Dépôts, Réseaux}, pp. 69-82; also Michel Margairaz, \textit{Histoire de la RATP: La singulière aventure des transports parisiens} (Paris: Albin Michel, 1989), pp. 59-60.
\textsuperscript{169} ADP, 10331/56/1 32, Bilan de l’occupation allemande pour les VFIL Tramways et Services Routiers annexes, 15 November 1944.
\textsuperscript{170} Zuber, \textit{La Patrimoine de la RATP}, p. 228.
\textsuperscript{171} SHD, GR 16 P 455244, René Pajon Personal File.
\textsuperscript{172} SHD, GR 19 P 75 91, FFI \textit{Métro-Autobus}.
\textsuperscript{173} \textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{174} SHD, GR 16 P 502174, Robert Réa Personal File.
Resistance in the Sewers

Resistance within the Paris sewers has received even less attention from resistance historians, and though the Musée des Égouts (the museum dedicated to its history) happens to be coincidentally situated underneath place de la Résistance by the Alma bridge, only a few overlooked and somewhat cryptic plaques by its giftshop indicate any connection with resistance to the occupation. One is dedicated to Édouard Maury, who before the war had been secretary of the syndicalist section of the CGT. According to trade unionist Marcel Paul, Maury had formed a popular committee for sewer workers, a means of representing their concerns following the ban on the CGT in 1940.\(^{175}\) Maury had also been providing regular batches of discarded pistols and daggers found in the sewers, which were used to arm the early communist *Organisation spéciale* groups, forerunners of the FTP.\(^{176}\) But in 1942 he was arrested after taking part in a demonstration, and was shot at Mont Valérien in December 1943.\(^{177}\) Two other workers, Paul Grossin and Roger Bonnand, were denounced for selling, rather than donating, several revolvers. Neither had communist links, but both suffered the same fate as Maury.\(^{178}\) Plaques dedicated to Louis Chevalier and André Bénard, who both died in concentration camps in Germany, are not supported by documentary evidence and neither was officially homologated after the war as a resister. An awareness of the possibility of underground activities prompted the MBF to initiate searches of the sewers, which were delegated to French police units. A large haul – 16,000 revolvers and rifles, and 19 machine guns – was made between September 1941 and March 1942.\(^{179}\)


\(^{176}\) Quoted in Guérin, *Chronique de la Résistance*, pp. 279-280.


The extent to which regular policing of the sewer system was undertaken is undocumented, but one intriguing letter, written in 1942 by an anonymous German officer, suggests that the possibility of a large-scale insurrection may have been contemplated by the MBF, and perhaps even been planned for. After describing the ‘bitterness of French hatred for the Germans, the impossibility of the Germans ever managing to reconcile the French and the certainty that the French would assist any Allied invasion of France’, he predicted dire consequences for Paris and its citizens if the occupying forces were forced to evacuate:

[I]n the event of resistance on a larger scale and should German troops have to be withdrawn from Paris, the German military authorities contemplate a punitive judgement on the capital. In that case, a frightful destruction of Paris is to be expected, for which preparations have already been made. This means that whole sections of the city would be blown up using the canalization system of Paris or the subway (Metro).\(^{180}\)

The FFI Headquarters at Place Denfert-Rochereau

On 18 August, Rol-Tanguy moved his headquarters briefly to 66 rue de Meaux, a site which also been used until a few months before as a workshop by the movement *Ceux de la Résistance*, producing false identity papers.\(^{181}\) Situated in the north-eastern corner of the city, it was strategically remote. A move therefore was arranged the next day to offices of the *Service d’assainissement des eaux de la Ville de Paris* (the city’s water services) at 9, rue Victor Schœlcher, by Montparnasse cemetery. With the help of Louis Tavès, an engineer with the *Travaux Publics* (Office of Public Works), a new headquarters was established within an air raid shelter situated just moments away, beneath one of two former tollhouses standing on the western side of place Denfert-Rochereau.\(^{182}\) The bunker itself, 26 metres below the surface, comprised ‘a vast array of

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\(^{180}\) TNA, FO 371/32124, British Embassy, Washington DC to French Department, Foreign Office, 22 September 1942.


\(^{182}\) SHD, GR 16 P 563690, Louis Tavès Personal File.
rooms, offices and subterranean corridors’, having been designed for use by officials of the water services.\textsuperscript{183} It was protected from gas attack and extensively equipped, having its own ventilation system, medical facilities, a diesel generator (with backup bicycle generators in case of power failure), a telephone switchboard and a parallel telecommunications system dedicated to the sewer network.\textsuperscript{184} Even if all telephone communications had been disabled, a team of 200 sewer workers was readied to courier messages on foot if necessary.\textsuperscript{185} Rol-Tanguy noticed that the ventilation systems were produced by Nessi Brothers, where he had worked in 1936, and could thus have actually personally manufactured the equipment he now depended on.\textsuperscript{186} This location had strategic importance. being more centrally placed and within easier reach of other headquarters located across southern Paris. It also offered access to the neighbouring Sceaux Line, a rail line running down to Porte d’Orléans (today incorporated into Line 4 of the metro), which provided a direct line of communication with General Leclerc’s forces when they arrived in the south of the city.

One of Rol-Tanguy’s lieutenants, Robert Villate, called the launching of the insurrection on 19 August as a ‘military operation’ and described the headquarters as a model of discipline and orderliness.\textsuperscript{187} Nothing seemed left to chance:

\begin{quote}
The HQ functioned normally, as a real body of command…Several times a day, the colonel [Rol-Tanguy] and his adjutants went out, completed their liaison missions in the different quarters of Paris, at the Prefectures, at rue Guénégaud at the HQ for the department of the Seine, and the centres of resistance in the districts and quarters. Only one or two officers remained at Denfert-Rochereau. A direct telephone link with the Prefecture of Police enabled the reception of many messages by which intelligence was passed on from police stations, or from many other sources finding their way to the Prefecture, which became the symbol of resistance. This intelligence, often exaggerated, is controlled by the headquarters, confirmed or otherwise by the agents of the water services.
\end{quote}

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\textsuperscript{183} Bourderon, \textit{Rol-Tanguy}, p. 419.  \\
\textsuperscript{184} Ibid., pp. 421-424.  \\
\textsuperscript{185} Verpraet, \textit{Paris, Capitale souterraine}, p. 284.  \\
\end{flushright}
or the metro, which ensures that HQ of Denfert always stays informed of the current situation of the battle, and is able to respond quickly to what is happening. It is estimated that, during the time that the headquarters is based at Denfert, it received 285 messages from the Prefecture of Police, which amounts to around 50 communications per day.  

In similar fashion, Rol-Tanguy’s wife and long-serving résistante, Cécile Rol-Tanguy characterised the bunker as a ‘a real hive of activity’, where ‘everybody was working at their post’. Though they were working in the shadows, it is noticeable nothing of the cloak-and-dagger nature of clandestine activity was present either in these veterans’ testimony or in subsequent postwar depictions of their work.

While this location may not have been chosen for its historic significance, it was an undeniably resonant one. Directly above the bunker was one of two tollhouses designed by Nicholas Ledoux, marking the old Barrière de l’enfer (the Gate of Hell), one of the gateways through the Wall of the Farmers-General, an eighteenth-century perimeter through which commercial traffic was taxed on its way into the city. And dominating the centre of the square is the bronze replica of Frédéric Bartholdi’s monumental sculpture Lion de Belfort, commemorating Colonel’s Denfert-Rochereau’s defence of the city of Belfort during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. Despite the eventual signing of an armistice that allowed the Prussians to march into Paris, a concession which Denfert-Rochereau himself despised, the lion became a national symbol of heroic defiance. Yet as with Bartholdi’s original sculpture, the lion looks west rather than towards the German border, a decision taken to avoid provoking Bismarck’s government (the inauguration of the monument in September 1880 was purposely kept a low-key affair for the same reason). During the occupation it gained commemorative significance of a different kind in the early hours of 4 October 1941, when a German

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188 Ibid., p. 63.
staff car careered into the statue’s substantial plinth. The vehicle was written off, while the lion remained untouched. This had also been the resting place of France’s Unknown Soldier before his ceremonial burial under the Arc de Triomphe in November 1920, an act that redressed the national shame of defeat of the Franco-Prussian War. If Rol-Tanguy’s headquarters had finally arrived at this spot by circumstance rather than clear planning, it could not have been, geopolitically speaking, better placed.

By this time the metro service was faltering, with many sections of the network closed. Most of the disruption had been caused by strikes, but not all. Following the bombardments of the rue Championnet and Saint-Ouen workshops in April 1944, Line 11 was withdrawn entirely on the grounds of electricity shortages. But soon the platforms of Porte des Lilas metro were requisitioned by the Germans for machining aircraft parts, the depth of the station making it safe from bombing. Despite protests from the CMP and Paris authorities, ‘the Luftwaffe took possession of the underground’, depriving 45,000 local residents of a means of transport and shelter from air raids.

The march of CMP strikers on the Hôtel de Ville on 16 August, possibly numbering as many as 3000, followed the strike of the police the day before, pushing the city towards insurrection. Following Rol-Tanguy’s call on 19 August for Parisians to take to the streets, the coordination of metro workers facilitated underground communications, particularly around the Prefecture of Police on Île de la Cité, which

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192 Henri Michel describes a crowd of French onlookers, but this seems unlikely given the time of the incident was 4:10am. See Michel, Paris Résistant, p. 154.
194 Bobkowski, En guerre, 9 July 1944, p. 576.
196 Zuber, La Patrimoine de la RATP, p. 238.
197 AN, F14 16926, Paul Martin to Jean Bichelonne, 17 May 1944; Jean Bichelonne to Laval, 3 June 1944.
198 SHD, GR 16 P 502174, Robert Réa Personal File.
became the first and most important stronghold for resistance.\textsuperscript{199} The use of metro tunnels linking to Cité metro station enabled the secret flow of fighters to and from the Prefecture of Police, situated very near the metro’s exit on place Louis-Lépine.\textsuperscript{200} Elsewhere, sewer technicians reportedly had raised water levels at certain points, flooding German installations at porte Dauphine, Opéra, and the Hotel Majestic on avenue Kléber.\textsuperscript{201} Some members of Vichy’s Milice, having deserted their posts, were reportedly hunted in the sewers by resisters, recalling the government troops pursuing Communards seventy years before.\textsuperscript{202} On the eastern side of the city, an attack by FFI fighters at Ménilmontant metro station resulted in the surrender of Germans defending the tunnel.\textsuperscript{203} Mobilisation of other underground spaces was also considered, but not carried out. For instance, a note on 23 August discussed the use of the Villiers loop on Line 2, an old gyratory thought to be unknown to the Germans and since transformed into a shelter for CMP workers, which could hold 300-400 people comfortably.\textsuperscript{204} A few, such as \textit{Métro Autobus} recruit Camille Monnin, were killed fighting on the barricades.\textsuperscript{205}

Identifying reliable figures on the number of metro workers taking part in resistance at this time is difficult. For example, one source claims that 6000 CMP staff came out to protest on 18 August, acting as observers and carrying out combat operations.\textsuperscript{206} However, those actually homologated after the war as resisters belonging to \textit{Métro Autobus} amount to just 263, many of them being recruited on or after 18 August.\textsuperscript{207} Similarly, how many were serving with the \textit{Milice patriotiques}, recruited under the FFI banner to maintain public order and act as auxiliaries rather than front-line

\begin{footnotes}
\item\textsuperscript{200} AN, 72 AJ/59/5, Témoignage de M. Priou-Valjean, recueilli par Henri Michel, 10 January 1947, p. 4; Interview with Roger Priou-Valjean, 10 January 1947.
\item\textsuperscript{201} Bourderon, \textit{Rol-Tanguy}, p. 336.
\item\textsuperscript{202} Massiet, \textit{Le préparation de l’insurrection et la bataille de Paris}, p. 216.
\item\textsuperscript{203} Verpraet, \textit{Paris, Capitale souterraine}, p. 286.
\item\textsuperscript{204} AN, 72 AJ/54/I, piece 1e, ‘Possibilité de cacher des hommes dans les souterrain’ 23 August 1944.
\item\textsuperscript{205} SHD, GR 16 P 426816, Camille Monnin Personal File.
\item\textsuperscript{206} SHD, GR 16 P 502174, Robert Réa Personal File, report dated 12 April 1945.
\item\textsuperscript{207} SHD, GR 19 P 75 91, FFI \textit{Métro-Autobus}.
\end{footnotes}
resistance fighters, remains vague. But regardless of the figures, it is clear that only during the Liberation did significant numbers of underground workers become involved in any form of resistance activity.

‘Abri Laval’

If Rol-Tanguy’s secret headquarters became associated with the glory of Liberation, the ruins of an unfinished project a mile north stands as its polar opposite, representing the Vichy administration’s preparations for withdrawal and eventual capitulation. On 11 February 1944, the director of the Défense passive, the Prefect of the Seine, and various French governmental heads discussed the creation of a ‘governmental command post’ to be made available in case of aerial bombardment. It would be developed from an air raid shelter then reserved for schoolchildren, situated at the eastern end of the rue des Feuillantines, a few hundred metres east of the Lycée Montaigne. The project, to be overseen by the Inspector-General of the École des Mines, Pierre Lafay, was a considerable undertaking: occupying 800 square metres, it would need to be able to provide adequate protection from attack as well independent electricity and water supplies, extensive telephone communications with government offices above ground and living quarters for the head of the government, Pierre Laval, as well as his ministers and Otto Abetz, the German ambassador. Along with further excavation of the existing shelter space, there would be a need for consolidation of the ceiling and the construction of three spiral staircases as exits. Beyond these structural issues lay more central questions about the practicalities of reaching the shelter, questions which appear to never have been resolved. According to Lafay, Abetz had proposed using a handcar along a metro tunnel from Solférino, the nearest station to the German embassy on rue de Lille.

208 ADP, 1011/44/1 17, Dossier Abri des Feuillantines, ‘Compte-rendu de la reunion tenue le 11 février 1944’.
209 Ibid.
210 APP, BA 18, Report by Director of Services techniques, 10 December 1945.
But it is difficult to see how this undignified means of transport would have helped, since no line runs close to the shelter’s location.\footnote{Ibid.}

While Rol-Tanguy would direct his forces against the Germans in August, Vichy was keen to restate that it would play no military role in the event of an Allied invasion. This new command post would only be responsible for maintaining civic services, and any further involvement in hostilities would contravene Article 10 of the Armistice agreement signed in 1940, prohibiting any French military action against Germany.\footnote{ADP, 1011/44/1 17, Dossier Abri des Feuillantines, ‘Projet de note sur les devoirs des administrations et services publics dans l’hypothèse d’opérations militaires’, 1 February 1944.}

Initial consolidation of the site under 4-8 rue des Feuillantines began almost immediately, with an expectation for the main work to be completed in two months, employing thirty workers.\footnote{ADP, 1011/44/1 17, Dossier Abri des Feuillantines, Report to the Prefect of the Seine, 21 February 1944.} Following Laval’s personal consent for the plan, work properly began in April, but the combination of a lack of transport and building materials, along with the arrival of the Allied landings in June, halted the project before its completion.\footnote{APP, BA 18, Report by Director of Services techniques, 14 February 1945.}

On 20 August, the same day that Rol-Tanguy moved his operations to place Denfert-Rochereau, Pétain and Laval met in Belfort, having both been brought there under German escort, en route to Sigmaringen. Their forced excursion to the scene of Denfert-Rochereau’s heroic defence signified the effective collapse of the Vichy government.

\section*{Conclusion}

This chapter has demonstrated how, while occupied Paris above ground became an increasingly requisitioned and demarcated environment, the underground city remained largely untouched and unknown to both Parisians and Germans. While the idea that Rol-Tanguy personally ‘knew this troglodyte world as well as anyone’ is without foundation, the ingenuity and solidarity shown among various resistance groups in the few days
before the liberation of Paris certainly demonstrated a determination to retake the city, and a recognition of the strategic value of opening up lines of communication under the Germans’ feet.\(^{215}\) At this critical point, resistance activity above and below ground began, for the first time, to reach some form of equilibrium, with one supporting the other. But for the greater part of the occupation, the historical reputation of the underground as a refuge and a space to foster rebellion did not inspire the work of resistance groups, nor did it feature significantly in the postwar memories of Liberation.

The paucity of sources on the subject of the underground under occupation certainly reflects the short period of activity it is remembered for. As David Pike rightly points out, subterranean Paris during the occupation ‘played probably a smaller role in the city’s spatial representation than it had at any time since the Revolution.’\(^{216}\) The limited extent of underground resistance activity before 1944 elevated the importance of Rol-Tanguy’s secret headquarters at place Denfert-Rochereau, making it the focal point not just of resistance but of the Liberation and victory.

The more generally muted and disparate nature of commemoration of underground resisters can be partly explained by the strength of long-running local and familial connections, which have encouraged a preference for more private forms of remembrance. This is particularly apparent in the cases of metro workers, where plaques were often erected on the walls of their former workshops or stations.\(^{217}\) As Maurice Halbwachs observed, a place of commemoration does not require a strong historical or spatial connection to act as a focal point of remembrance.\(^{218}\) Yet the contrasting natures of CMP employees’ activities during 1914-1918 and 1940-1944 have complicated attempts to produce a central site (or sites) of commemoration. An impressive marble memorial inaugurated in 1931 at Richelieu-Drouot metro station, dedicated to metro workers killed while serving in the First World War, was not altered to incorporate the


\(^{216}\) Pike, *Subterranean Cities*, p. 175.


names of metro resisters during the occupation. Only the addition of the word
‘Libération’, engraved after the names of Verdun and other major battles, commemorates
the sacrifices made fighting the Nazis. A plan in 1948 to erect a separate memorial at
Strasbourg-Saint-Denis metro station was never completed.\footnote{219}{Gérôme, \textit{Le deuil en hommage}, p. 26, p. 39.}

The awkward merging of the CMP with the \textit{Société des transports en commun de
la région parisienne} (STCRP) in 1942 also resulted in the inauguration of separate
plaques at local centres of memory such as bus depots, workshops and the STCRP’s
former headquarters at Quai des Grands Augustins.\footnote{220}{Ibid., p. 44-45.} Just 25 CMP workers are actually
recognised on plaques erected across the metro network.\footnote{221}{Ibid., p. 13. On Jean Jeantroux, see Philippe Castetbon, \textit{Ici est tombé: paroles sur la libération de Paris} (Paris: Éditions Tirésias, 2004), pp. 118-121.} Moreover, it is worth noting
that not all of these were killed because they were involved in resistance work: for
example, Jean Jeantroux, commemorated at Nation metro station, was killed by an
Allied bomb in 1944.\footnote{222}{Gérôme, \textit{Le deuil en hommage}, p. 12. Similarly, A. Pouille, one of three names
commemorated on a plaque at Robinson station, does not appear to have been
recognised as belonging to any resistance group.}

The lack of a central focus of commemoration also provokes questions regarding
some darker aspects of the CMP’s history. While Paul Martin and Pierre Mariage, the
heads of the CMP and STCRP respectively, were dismissed from their posts after the
Liberation, awkward questions relating to the STCRP’s role in the large-scale
transportation of German troops to Normandy in June 1944, and particularly its
facilitation of the Vélodrome d’Hiver rafle and the deportations of Jews from Paris, have
lingered.\footnote{223}{Zvenigorosky, ‘Paris et son métro’, p. 271. The investigations of Jean-Marie Dubois
into his grandfather’s wartime position with the STCRP revealed his complicity in the
deportations of Jews and resisters, as well as a wider reluctance to acknowledge the
organisation’s role in the Holocaust. See Jean-Marie Dubois and Malka Marcovich, \textit{Les
bus de la honte} (Paris: Tallandier, 2016).}

It is worth also mentioning here the capital’s best-known commemorative
engagement with the underground, the Mémorial des Martyrs de la Déportation,
dedicated to the 200,000 Jews, resisters and others deported from France during the occupation. Inaugurated in 1962 in the shadow of Notre-Dame Cathedral, its situation is historically resonant: during the nineteenth century a morgue once stood on the same site, which displayed corpses found in the Seine for the morbid titillation of thousands of fascinated tourists and Parisians alike.\textsuperscript{224} The focal point of the memorial itself is a long subterranean chamber decorated by glass beads representing each life, adjoining an octagonal crypt inscribed with the words ‘They descended into the depths of the earth and did not return’.

Although Paris did not suffer the same traumas as Warsaw, there are some interesting comparisons to draw between their very different underground occupation experiences. During the Warsaw Uprising of 1944, the sewers had served as an important evacuation and courier route out of the city’s Old Town, leading to the development of a certain ‘sewer paranoia’ among Germans, who feared that a surprise attack might at any moment emerge from a nearby drain or manhole cover.\textsuperscript{225} Yet despite their attempts to flush out their enemy – measures included building an underground dam, the use of poison gas and dropping grenades through manholes – underground territory remained in the hands of the resistance.\textsuperscript{226} One might have expected Polish cinema to be drawn towards such tales of heroism, but the single most influential film on the subject took a very different approach. Andrej Wajda’s \textit{Kanal}, released in 1956, follows the nightmarish and ultimately doomed journey of a squad of resistance fighters into the sewers, who all fall prey to disorientation, madness and despair.\textsuperscript{227}

Many had expected the film to honour those who had resisted the Nazis during the Warsaw Uprising. But as Mathilda Mroz has noted, the spatial linking of insurgency with the capital’s sewers soiled its intended commemorative function: rather than focussing on the heroic stand of Polish fighters on the streets, the memory of its martyrs

\textsuperscript{226} \textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{227} \textit{Kanal}, directed by Andrej Wadja (Zespół Filmowy 'Kadr', 1956).
was relegated to the ‘waste and abjection that lies beneath’. This disgust is reflected in the character of Lieutenant Zadra, who baulks at the idea of his group retreating like rats to the sewers of Warsaw. On receiving the order, he asks a messenger ‘how I am to look my boys in the eyes?’ Ultimately, his fear of the underground is vindicated: the few who find their way to the surface are captured, killed, or kill each other. In a nod to Hugo, two of the characters emerge into daylight only to discover that their exit to the riverbank is barred. But unlike Valjean, there is no Thénardier to unlock the gate. Only much more recently has the sewer featured again in Polish film. *In Darkness*, directed by Agnieszka Holland, has adapted the story of sewer worker Leopold Socha, who hid a group of Jews under the streets of Lvov for fourteen months. While the underground was also used as a place of refuge for Jews in Warsaw, hiding in specially-constructed bunkers under the Ghetto, there seems to be no verifiable examples of Parisian Jews or any resistance groups using the sewers and quarries of Paris. Although it has generated some public interest, a claim that 1700 Jews may have been given refuge in caves underneath the Grand Mosque in the fifth arrondissement has yet to be properly substantiated.

While accepting the vast differences of these occupations, Zadra’s revulsion at the idea of descending into the sewers might have some relevance in considering French attitudes towards underground resistance. It was images of ordinary Parisians on the barricades, showing their open defiance to the occupiers, that came to characterise the fight for Liberation, not the subterranean activity of metro workers. Historically, France has not been as seduced by romantic notions about espionage and the clandestine as other countries, establishing what Anja Becker calls cultural ‘tradition of disdain’ for

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229 *In Darkness*, directed by Agnieszka Holland (Sony Pictures, 2011).
cloak-and-dagger work. Thus the idea of waging a secret, ‘dirty’ war underground, a place so closely associated with criminality and moral degradation, may have some bearing on why subterranean resistance has remained an unexamined aspect of the occupation, and why the portrayals of Rol-Tanguy’s operations at place Denfert-Rochereau exhibit such a military flavour. It is important to acknowledge that, although René Suttel had mapped the underground with resistance in mind, he conceded that operating in the confined spaces of quarries and tunnels was not easy. But he believed they could be useful for hiding people and arms, and as a means of communication within small groups, opportunities that seem never to have been exploited. After the war, Rol-Tanguy wrote that he had never seriously envisaged carrying out underground attacks across Paris, though he did not give reasons why. One plan to break up through the foundations of La Santé prison to free captured resisters was considered possible, but evacuating the prison by ladder would have been too slow and risky.

It is tempting to wonder what might have been achieved had a few dozen speleologists of Suttel’s calibre had undertaken similar mapping projects. During the battle to liberate Paris, the idea of Germans operating under the city’s surface also caused some Parisians to worry about attacked from below. In her apartment on rue Notre-Dame-des-Champs, in the vicinity of the Luftwaffe’s Lycée Montaigne bunker, Odette Lainville wrote, ‘[i]t feels like we are sitting on a volcano! Were the Huns not moving around in the sewers last night? What were they doing down there? Had they planted explosives?’ The psychological fear that propaganda such as Der ewige Jude attempted to tap into, that of a powerful unseen enemy lurking under one’s feet, might potentially

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233 Ibid.
234 AN, 672 AP/27, Rol-Tanguy papers, Rol-Tanguy correspondence, 20 October 1990.
235 Ibid. *Le Trou* (The Hole), directed by Jack Becker (Filmsonor, 1960) was reportedly based on a real breakout from La Santé in 1947, during which a group of prisoners dug their way into the sewers.
have delivered a serious blow to German morale and demanded a commitment of greater resources to the policing of subterranean areas, an undertaking the MBF could have ill-afforded in any sense.
Conclusion:

The Case for Space

Despite the enormous growth of motor traffic and some significant structural changes in recent decades, Paris remains a walker’s city. Whether one keeps to the tourist trail or not, the scars of its revolutions and insurrections are to be seen everywhere, from the iconoclasts’ revisions to the friezes of Saint-Sulpice church in the Latin Quarter to the Communard graffiti within Saint-Paul-Saint-Louis church in the Marais. And whatever has been swept away by town planners and developers since the occupation, signs of the ‘dark years’ are still remarkably visible. The Prefecture of Police, opposite the Cathedral of Notre-Dame, appears almost as much a memorial as a working building, decked in plaques and displaying numerous bullet holes from August 1944. Nevertheless, some reminders are easy to miss. The lengthy (and at the time of writing, ongoing) renovations at the Hôtel de la Marine, overlooking place de la Concorde, have recently scrubbed its Lutetian limestone. But its eastern and western exteriors still betray the scars of wartime damage, and along its southern façade one can still find an unauthorised inscription from 1942. The artist responsible – presumably a bored or mischievous soldier – is unknown, but a primitive Reichsadler, the Nazi eagle emblem survives, along with some fragmented text. During the Journées du patrimoine in September, visitors to the Ministry of the Interior on rue des Saussaies can view just how intimately Paris continues to accommodate its extraordinary past within the most banal, everyday spaces. At the end of a white, modern office corridor, a single door opens into a tiny cell, untouched since 1944. Illuminated by a single naked bulb, the messages and names scratched into its walls are the last testaments of its occupants, resisters who would have once known this block as the headquarters of the Gestapo.

Although I came to this subject with a long-standing interest in clandestine resistance, these enduring signs of occupation in Paris were very much the inspiration for
this thesis, along with many hours spent exploring the former locations of those involved in the secret war against the Nazis. Some routes, detailed in contemporary reports, can be traced exactly. On a cold November morning in 1941, Mathilde Carré, then the deputy of one of the biggest intelligence networks in occupied France, climbed the stairs from rue Lamarck in Montmartre, past the old cabaret venue, Au Lapin Agile, to the rue des Saules. Noticing a suspicious group of men outside the club, she soon recognised that she was being followed: turning into place du Tertre, she passed its famous restaurants, Le Vieux Chalet, Chez ma Cousine and La Mère Catherine, and briefly considered taking a different route, down the steps in front of the Sacré Cœur. Instead she headed back the way she had come, a momentary decision which changed the course of her life. As she reached the corner of rue Cortot, the location of her safe house, she found the German police waiting for her.¹ After a trial in 1949 found her guilty of betraying 35 of her own agents Carré narrowly avoided execution, and in 1958 she returned to the same spot to be photographed in front of another local landmark, La Maison Rose.²

As Susanne Rau states, space is a ‘central dimension of society and human action’.³ This thesis has shown that where resistance happened has largely been overlooked by historians, but it constitutes an important aspect of its activity and development. During the occupation of Paris space became another actor, and the environmental conditions in which resisters operated affected what they did, and how they did it. In the first chapter I demonstrated how the power of statues and monuments influenced Parisians’ to demonstrate against the occupation. The programme of bronze ‘mobilisation’ undertaken by Vichy changed Parisians’ spatial understanding of their city, and their connections with it. Contrary to previous interpretations, Parisians were all too aware of the surroundings and did not view their statuary as a disposable vestige of municipal overindulgence; rather, a sense of personal and local identity was forged by the

² This image was used for the cover of the same book. The scene, including the lamppost she is pictured leaning against, remains exactly as it was.
familiar sights within their locales and, through these topophilic associations, connected their histories to the history of the city. Removing statues from their plinths did not simply leave behind an empty void. The spaces that absent statues once occupied became imbued with, and the focus of, a collective sense of loss that continued to resonate through the occupation. Moreover, commemorative statues and monuments also became focal points of protest, reappropriating public space within the geographical centres of German administration and national memory.

In the second chapter, the complex and intimate links between resistance and gendered space are illustrated by the examples of communist-led attacks in 1942. Under occupation, Paris’s marketplaces became signifiers of inequality as well as deprivation: rationing, German requisitioning of food supplies and ‘queue culture’ created new rhythms and spatial practices on the street. Moreover, the inconsistency of Vichy’s policy towards women, on the one hand extolling their virtues as mothers and homemakers while restricting their ability to work and provide for their families, not only transformed women’s relationships with market spaces and shopping areas, but also created tensions that could be exploited by resistance groups. In the communist-led operations at rue de Buci and rue Daguerre, the transformation of these highly gendered places had determined their selection as targets as well as the unusual selection of female resisters as protagonists. The character of these places also dictated the delineation of gender roles: unlike Madeleine Riffaud’s shooting of a German soldier in 1944, the actions of Madeleine Marzin and Lise Ricol in 1942 were dependent on passing as housewives and identifying with those women it sought to recruit. Far from being the incidental locations for acts of resistance, space played an important role in the way resistance happened.

How does occupation change spatial perceptions of the city? And how do those changes affect the ways in which resisters perceive and use space? The third chapter demonstrates how Paris’s most instantly recognisable places could be profoundly distorted by the phenomena of occupation and resistance, and the relationships between space, food and power. For visiting German soldier-tourists, cafés remained one of the
great signifiers and attractions of the French capital, a reminder not only of peacetime pleasures but the antithesis of the savagery of the Eastern Front and total war. However, while these new clients were drawn to the novelty and allure of Parisian café culture, these same venues were simultaneously becoming spaces in which to conduct a different, secret war. Rather than restricting their rendezvous to unremarkable sidestreet bistros, resisters often met and conspired in close proximity not just to the enemy, but the very counter-intelligence services who pursued them. Indeed, in certain instances one café could host many layers of clandestinity, with each party operating while being unaware of the other. In applying Foucault’s concept of heterotopia, one can see how the unique spatial conditions of occupied life in Paris transformed cafés into spaces of ‘otherness’, which juxtaposed everyday life, tourism and resistance activity of all kinds.4

The connections between food and power were also exploited in unexpected ways by Allied undercover agents, whose patronage of black market cafés and restaurants in the wealthiest districts of Paris contradicted the notion that resistance always remained in the shadows. While the occupation overturned many peacetime conceptions of everyday life, fundamentally discomposing the rhythms of most people’s daily existence, both Allied agents and millions of German soldier-tourists were seduced by the fantasy of a pre-war Paris. Although some resisters were alert to the dangers of frequenting the same cafés and letting their guard down, the temptation to be drawn to pre-war contacts or places they knew was difficult to ignore. Looking back on his time in Paris, Adher (‘André’) Watt, the wireless operator for Henri Déricourt’s Farrier network, admitted how, after arriving in Paris, he was ‘immediately incorporated into the family, so I really wasn’t alone all the time’.5 That a wireless operator – the most valuable but also vulnerable of agents, who typically was kept as isolated as possible – should have described his fellow agents in Paris as ‘a family’ is telling. ‘You had a tendency’, he explained, ‘at least…I had a tendency to find that it was too easy, and that you were

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4 Torrie, German Soldiers, p. 6.
5 IWM, Watt interview (1988).
tempted to do things which you shouldn’t do, such as meet others or go to nightclubs or things like that.” Occupied space changed the spatial practices of cafés, but Allied agents perceived them to be safer than they really were; this failure to perceive the dangers led to tragic consequences.

In Chapter Four, I show how taking a spatial approach enables the exploration of unexplored regions of the city, and the analysis of their relationships to occupied space and resistance. Though Paris’s underground spaces helped to form both its material and metaphorical foundations, these ‘invisible’ strata, previously ignored by resistance historians, provoke some important questions. How far did resistance groups utilise the underground, and which areas did it exploit? And to what degree were underground spaces and resistance understood in the context of deeper historical links between insurrection and subterranean activity? As the cultural history of the sewers and the catacombs have long been associated with criminality and the darker sides of Parisian life, it has often assumed to have been the natural domain of ‘underground’ fighters. For the few days preceding the capitulation of German forces, the ability to mobilise resisters from an underground bunker linked by telephones as well as human networks of metro and sewer workers was undoubtedly successful, and helped to bolster the image of a well-organised and disciplined force whose intimate spatial knowledge of its ‘home’ city contributed to its victory. However, until 1944 subterranean Paris had remained largely unknown to resistance, and certainly the idea of launching an attack against underground German installations was, according to Rol-Tanguy, ‘never seriously envisaged’. But the truly extraordinary exploits of René Suttel and his colleagues in mapping the catacombs, a story which has hitherto remained unknown, demonstrates the great potential that this vast underworld plane could have offered. It is precisely because of a reluctance to engage with spatial aspects of occupation that this subject has not been

6 Ibid.
7 AN, 672 AP/72, Rol-Tanguy papers, Rol Tanguy correspondence, 20 October 1990.
investigated, and why a greater awareness of the city’s spaces is a necessary step in better understanding its resistance history.

Taken together, these insights demonstrate the advantages of engaging with spatial thinking and research. Whether we consider the changes to material spaces, from street corners to national monuments, or the psychological re/mappings of occupying and occupied populations, it is nonsensical to consider the history of resistance without accepting the role that space plays. It frames resistance activity; it becomes a variable in the locations and vectors of resistance; and it influences the choices that individual resisters and resistance networks make. This is not to ignore or diminish other approaches. Incorporating a spatial dimension should be seen as a complementary rather than competitive matter: as has been shown above, space is fundamentally a contributor, an essential addition to existing social, cultural and other perspectives. Just as Chris Pearson argues that the natural world was not a ‘static backdrop’ within Vichy France, so urban space should be recognised as an actor and a determinant in Parisian resistance. To remain ignorant of the ‘where’ in resistance history renders any serious historical enquiry incomplete.

A web project supported by Eastern ARC has begun to extend this initial research by mapping the locations used by individual clandestine groups, to further analyse how resistance developed across the city. However, there are many other potential avenues for future research that deserve to be addressed. For example, there is a need for more detailed examinations of how the city changed in concrete terms, and the ways in which buildings were used and adapted to the conditions of occupation. Although building projects were mainly halted during the occupation, Vichy’s management of the capital’s spaces are often complex. The work of Isabelle Backouche and Sarah Gensburger on Îlot 16, a southern section of the Marais in the fourth arrondissement whose houses were classed as insanitary, demonstrates how the bureaucratic interests rather than ideology

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8 Pearson, Scarred Landscapes, p. 69.
lent their support to acts of racial persecution.\textsuperscript{10} Similarly, James Cannon’s study of the razing of the peripheral zones of Paris illustrates Vichy’s uneven views towards its inhabitants.\textsuperscript{11}

Beyond the more general question of spatial boundaries and notions of private and public spaces, the impositions of the German occupation and so on are especially pertinent when one considers questions of sovereignty and national identity. For politicians and policy makers, imaginary representations of a capital city are more relevant and vivid than the actual city itself.\textsuperscript{12} Rather than imposing its order on a defeated nation by rebuilding its capital according to Nazi tastes, the German occupation attempted to usurp Paris’s grandeur for its own ends. It is worth remembering that at the heart of Albert Speer’s plans for Berlin was an immense avenue running along a north-south axis, creating a ritual platform on which a regime can demonstrate its power and achievements.\textsuperscript{13} For de Gaulle, exiled in London, the question of asserting his legitimacy in spatial terms was an enormous challenge. Unable to assert or confirm its legitimacy from within French territory, the creation of a mythic French space within London, particularly through its BBC wireless broadcasts, became a means of replanting the French capital on foreign soil.\textsuperscript{14} In March 1941, the British Home Secretary, Herbert Morrison, suggested to Prime Minister Winston Churchill that that the flame burning at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Paris might be ignited in London, in an effort to bolster the morale of de Gaulle’s followers.\textsuperscript{15} Whether Morrison had envisaged the flame

\textsuperscript{15} TNA, FO 371/28519, ‘Proposal to transfer the sacred flame from the Arc de Triomphe to England’.
travelling from Paris to London in some clandestine equivalent of the Olympic torch ceremony, or simply lit as a symbolic representation in London, was never clarified. When Churchill’s intelligence advisor, Desmond Morton, made discreet enquiries to gauge opinions at the Foreign Office, the response was thus plainly sceptical, if not disdainful. The head of its French Department, William Mack, was clear in pointing out that the sacred flame ‘means more to the French that the Centotaph or the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier mean to us...It dominates Paris and is a perpetual reminder of France’s former military glory.’ Morton’s idea ‘that the Free French should light it, guard it and so on’, on the understanding that this would be ‘a purely propaganda notion’ failed to address the most basic question of where this new symbol might be situated. Mack had no doubt that any idea to tamper with the flame ‘would be strongly resented by the French people’, citing the student demonstrations in November 1940 as a sign of as an example of Tomb’s importance as a permanent commemorative anchor, whose power was rooted in the centre of its capital. In conclusion, Morrison’s idea was rubbished as ‘fantastic’, a view endorsed by the Permanent Under Secretary, Alexander Cadogan. What the effect might have been of establishing competing flames in Paris and London raises some interesting scenarios.

Immediately following de Gaulle’s triumphant return to Paris in August 1944, commemoration of a different kind was under way. If space was an important component of the occupation, it was essential to remembering it, and even an absent-minded tourist today would find it difficult to see Paris without noticing the hundreds of plaques scattered across it. The great majority of them, dated between 19 and 25 August 1944, bolster the narrative of a city that fought to free itself. But the business of imprinting the memory of resistance within local spaces had sprung up spontaneously long before Liberation. For example, after the execution of Jules Auffret, a hostage shot at Châteaubriant in October 1941, an improvised plaque was hung outside his former

16 TNA, FO 371/28519, W.H.B. Mack to Desmond Morton, 23 March 1941.
17 TNA, FO 371/28519, Morton to Mack, 21 March 1941.
18 TNA, FO 371/28519, W.H.B. Mack to Desmond Morton, 23 March 1941.
home, while another inscribed ‘rue Jules Auffret’ was placed on rue du Foyer in Bondy, the street where Auffret had lived. Similar rituals of renaming streets after executed hostages were also reported on Armistice Day at Aubervilliers and Saint-Ouen. This serves as a reminder of Parisians’ strong connections with street spaces, and a raw example of Pierre Nora’s notion of the ‘democratisation of the commemorative spirit’, a common determination to create a place of remembrance and put a name on a map. In the words of Rebecca Solnit, ‘a place is a story, and stories are geography’. How common these forms of commemoration might have been is unclear. More surprisingly the distribution and locations of official resistance commemoration have yet to be understood. As Henry Rousso points out, commemoration in the immediate post-Liberation period was characterised by its fragmentary and politically divided nature. The dead were not equitably commemorated, nor were commemorative symbols commonly linked to the places of their resistance activity. Although streets were quickly renamed in honour of a newly appointed canon of martyrs such as including Danielle Casanova, Bertie Albrecht, Pierre Brossolette, Estienne d’Orves and Gabriel Péri, the locations chosen were not necessarily meaningful or relevant. One prominent exception is Guy Môquet, a teenage communist activist shot by the Germans as a hostage in 1941, whose name was adopted in 1945 by a metro station on Line 13 and a street, both of which are situated close to his former home in rue Baron, in the Épinettes quarter in the seventeenth arrondissement. By contrast, the only street dedicated to a British resister,

19 APP, BS 2 GB 0112, unsigned report, 11 November 1941.
20 Ibid.
24 Alfred Fierro, Histoire et mémoire du nom des rues de Paris (Paris: Parigramme, 1995), pp. 94-95. Parisian street signs remembering Vichy’s heroes appear to have been few and far between. Avenue Philippe-Henriot (today avenue du Président Wilson), in the eighth arrondissement, was inaugurated in honour of its propaganda minister just two weeks after his assassination by the resistance in July 1944, only to be renamed shortly after Liberation the following month. See ‘Paris a désormais une avenue Philippe-Henriot’, Le Matin, 15 July 1944, p. 1.
25 The question of Môquet’s resistance credentials make these particular commemorations interesting. A mural on the platform of the metro station honours his
rue Yeo-Thomas, is tucked away in the twelfth, despite his having lived in the sixteenth. It is also noticeable that the street sign is incorrectly spelt ‘Yéo-Thomas’ with an unnecessary accent, which might suggest a certain French appropriation. It would be useful to further explore the distributions of these commemorative spaces and their relation to the lives of those remembered.

Resistance historiography has witnessed many twists and turns over the last seventy years. In recent decades we have witnessed an increasing shift towards diversification, a focus on minorities and micro-histories, all of which have done much to highlight the importance of geopolitical and social differences across France. One of the more untypical works has been Alya Aglan’s *Le Temps de la Résistance*, which seeks to restore the importance of time within the study of resistance. Like space, she argues, time has been overlooked as a simple container of the ‘fundamental stuff’ of history, and ‘is no longer just the form in which all stories unfold; it acquires a historical quality itself’. In recognising the broader conception of past, present and future from the perspective of the resistance, one is able to incorporate a much richer understanding of its motivations, inspirations, fears and goals. Living in a backwater of Vichy France in October 1940, Léon Werth wrote that ‘[t]ime is absorbed in me without my being aware of it. And I don’t know if it is long or short. Slack water. It doesn’t move and neither do I.’ Later, he described life since the Armistice as ‘time out of life, intermediate time.’ Just as Aglan has shown how the occupation transformed people’s experience of the temporal, memory with the word ‘résister’ prominently displayed. But his arrest was for distributing communist leaflets that called for action against the ruling classes, not the Germans (communist resistance against the occupation only began in earnest after the Nazi invasion of Soviet Russia in June 1941). His name is thus absent from the *Dictionnaire historique de la résistance*, and the contested nature of his memory has proved awkward for communists as well as former French president Nicholas Sarkozy. See Jean-Marc Berlière and Franck Liaigre, *L’affaire Guy Môquet: Enquête sur une mystification officielle* (Paris: Larousse, 2009).


so taking account of the spatial dimension will reveal new ways to better understand the phenomenon of resistance.
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BS 2 GB 099 Librairie Rive Gauche
BS 2 GB 112 Bagarres manifestations reunions 1941-1942
Dépôt central des archives de la justice militaire, Le Blanc, Indre (DCAJM)
Henri Déricourt trial papers

Institut d'histoire du temps présent (IHTP)
Synthèse des rapports des préfets: Zone Occupée

Imperial War Museum, London (IWM)
Documents Collection (Private papers)
Jean Overton Fuller
Henri Leonard Thomas Peulevé

Sound Collection (Interviews)
Tony Brooks (1986) 9550
Harry Despaigne (1987) 9925
Adher Pierre Watt (1988) 10448

The National Archives, Kew (TNA)
Foreign Office files (FO)
FO 371/28519 Proposal to transfer the sacred flame from the Arc de Triomphe to England
FO 371/32124 Threatened German punitive measures on Paris in the event of French resistance

SOE files (HS)
HS 6/180 RAT/GOAT Mission
HS 6/181 RAT/GOAT Mission
HS 6/223 Caroline; Andree escape organisation; de Jonghe
HS 6/567-582 Circuit mission reports and interrogations
HS 9/11/1 Jack Agazarian Personal File
HS 9/30/2 James Amps Personal File
HS 9/42 J.A.F. Antelme Personal File
HS 9/43 J.A.F. Antelme Personal File
HS 9/44 J.A.F. Antelme Personal File
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<td>HS 9/1621/1</td>
<td>Jean Worms Personal File</td>
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<td>HS 7/52</td>
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**Security Service files (KV)**

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**War Office files (WO)**

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Service historique de la défense, Vincennes (SHD)

GR 16 P 42711  Samuel Beckett Personal File
GR 16 P 400755 Madeleine Marzin Personal File
GR 16 P 426816 Camille Monnin Personal File
GR 16 P 446228 Lucien Noël Personal File
GR 16 P 455244 René Pajon Personal File
GR 16 P 502174 Robert Réa Personal File
GR 16 P 559224 René Suttel Personal File
GR 16 P 563690 Louis Tavès Personal File
GR 16 P 573270 Gilbert Tomazon Personal File
GR 16 P 584058 Claire Clémence Valy (épouse Davinroy) Personal File
GR 19 P 75 91  FFI Métro-Autobus

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L’Aube
Action Française
Bulletin Municipal Officiel de la Ville de Paris
Der Deutsche Wegleiter für Paris
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Journal officiel
Le Matin
Le Monde
Le Monde Illustre
The New York Times
Les Nouveaux Temps
L’Œuvre
Le Point
Paris-Soir
The Times
Clandestine Journals and Tracts

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*L’Humanité*
*La Ménagère Parisienne*
*La Ménagère de Paris*
*La Voix des Femmes*
*Libération-Nord*
*Les Métros*
*Nous les femmes*
*Propagande féminine*
*Résistance*
*Sauvetage de la famille française*
*L’Université libre*
*Valmy*

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Films

*L’Armée des ombres*, directed by Jean-Pierre Melville (Les Acacias, 1968)

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*Der ewige Jude*, directed by Fritz Hippler (Deutsche Filmherstellungs- undVerwertungs GmbH, 1940)

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*In Darkness*, directed by Agnieszka Holland (Sony Pictures, 2011)

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*Le Trou*, directed by Jack Becker (Filmsonor, 1960)
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