Metagovernance and NGOisation in Thailand:  
An Exploratory Study of the Thai Health Promotion Foundation (THPF) and Nongovernmental Organisations (NGOs)

Theerapat Uengsuchaval

School of Social Policy, Sociology, and Social Research  
University of Kent

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“You must go on a long journey before you can really find out how wonderful home is.”

–Snufkin (Comet in Moominland)

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Abstract

The thesis is an exploratory study of the Thai Health Promotion Foundation (THPF), an independent autonomous public organisation (APO) and its NGO partners in Thailand. It aims to make an explanatory account on why NGOisation of civil society has unfolded in Thailand. Since it was established in 2001, the THPF has operated by subsidising its partners to promote public health policies and civil society. It has become one of the biggest sources of funding for the NGO sector and has a considerable impact on the trajectory of the sector. The funded NGOs are facilitated in adapting themselves to become reliable partners in order to match the aims of THPF’s overall programme. However, the relationship between them does not involve an absolute patronage relationship. In fact, different NGOs have different kinds of relations with the THPF. The different relations also affect the overall character of the THPF. Hence, the relationship is dynamic. To be precise, this thesis argues that the THPF-NGO relations are interdependent, asymmetrical, and consequential.

Two major theoretical frameworks are developed and employed to investigate the phenomenon: NGOisation and metagovernance. NGOisation helps examine the influences of the funding on the NGOs. It encourages us to look at the signs and the development of the funded NGOs. Metagovernance helps conceptualise the way the THPF has steered and governed the funded NGO partnership in a way that allows the NGOs to develop their autonomy.

The research is navigated by critical realism (CR) which typically encourages the search for mechanisms of metagovernance and NGOisation instead of people’s understanding or associations with them. As qualitative research, information is drawn from in-depth interviews with 50 participants from the THPF and the funded NGOs and documents such as minutes of meetings and publications of the relevant organisations.

The thesis found that while NGOs have relied on the funding to operate, and perhaps to survive, the THPF has depended totally on the NGOs to implement the projects/programmes. The THPF has been strategically functioning in an ‘innovative’ way combining different kinds of governance mechanisms to steer the NGOs in the ways they perceive as appropriate. The THPF is also seen to exercise its power through its societal partners signifying a relational aspect of state-society cooperation.
As an independent APO, the THPF is equipped with resources and the capacity to steer. As an enabler to promote health and improvements in society, it aims to bring about changes in health and social developments. This thesis argues that the THPF performs metagovernance. The THPF strategically uses interactive governance mechanisms, namely quasi-markets (proactive granting) and quasi-network (partnership). They are the key mechanisms employed by the THPF to metagovern its NGO partners.

Consequently, NGOisation of civil society has unfolded. This phenomenon signifies a version of civil society which is focused on institutional advocacy, elite civil society, and upward accountability. NGOised organisations are driven to become more professionalised, institutionalised, bureaucratised, and depoliticised. Organisational reproduction is becoming the essence of the organisation of NGOs rather than the social constituencies they are supposed to represent.

The THPF-NGO cooperation thus represents a version of state-society relations in Thailand, where the state has changed from a traditional form of government to a metagovernor exercising its power throughout civil society and a combination of governance mechanisms beyond mere hierarchies. It also reflects how civil society has become more professionalised, institutionalised, bureaucratised, and depoliticised. This paves the way to looking at a relational dimension of the state-society relations and NGOisation.


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Abbreviations

APO = Autonomous public organisation
CODI = Community Organisation Development Institution
CR = Critical realism
GONGO = Government-organised nongovernmental organisation
HiAP = Health in all policies
HPF = Health Promotion Foundation
HPP = Healthy public policy
MoPH = Ministry of Public Health
NESDP = National Economic and Social Development Plan
NGO = Nongovernmental organisation
NPM = New Public Management
PAC = Plan Administrative Committee
PSC = Project Steering Committee
Quango = Quasi-autonomous nongovernmental organisation
RDM = Rural Doctor Movement
SDH = Social determinants of health
THPF = Thai Health Promotion Foundation
UHC = Universal Health Coverage
VicHealth = Victorian Health Promotion Foundation
WHO = World Health Organisation
Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1 Research Aims

Thai nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) are arguably naïve towards state funding. The research found that many NGO workers do not see the political aspect attached to asymmetric power relations in their interactions with the funder, reflecting a narrow world view of state power held by the NGOs (Rakyutidharm 2014a, 2014b). Likewise, in a recent survey of organised civil society across the country (n=1,000) conducted by the Civil Society Empowerment Institute (Chaiyapan 2019), funding, either from the state or business agencies, is only seen by organised civil society as an opportunity for work and a technique which can be managed, notably through lobbying and negotiating; it has never been mentioned as a threat to the development of the sector. Instead, what is seen as threats are more direct such as government policies that violate community rights and jeopardise the environment, government barriers on information access and public hearing, capitalism and passive citizenship. Worst, some NGO workers, as stated in the survey, tend to view ‘receiving government funding’ as ‘a kind of utilisation of public resources’: an action which is legitimate for the NGOs to do. NGOs think that grants derived from people’s tax are spent by them in the public interest as they claim to represent a specific constituency. This can imply that the NGO community is not concerned much with the indirect effect of state actions, particularly funding, let alone other subtle instruments of governing, which can have a considerable impact on the sector. The problem is, argued Barnett and Walker (2015), that funders control the resources and the agenda although they claim to build a partnership and empower the partners; they tend to include only initiatives and actors which reinforce their position and interests.

Sombatpoonsiri (2018a, p. 9) depicts several weaknesses from which Thai civil society has suffered:

Some groups pursued single-issue-based campaigns that were blind to the intersections of different social problems. Many competed for resources and prestige rather than cooperating with each other and a number of organisations lost their political independence by relying on state funding. Others adopted a patronising stance toward grassroots communities and became increasingly detached from the changing needs of rural populations… Efforts to address these shortcomings remained limited. Together with Thai society’s authoritarian political culture, which views NGOs’
contentious politics as a driver of political instability, this failure to self-reflect reduced the legitimacy of NGOs in the public eye.

The statement above obviously reflects a symptom of NGOisation mostly due to the state and its funding. NGOisation of civil society refers to a shift from rather loosely organised, horizontally dispersed and broadly mobilising social movements to more professionalised, technocratic, member-less, vertically structured organisations (Lang 2013; Choudry and Kapoor 2013a). Besides, from what Sombatpoonsiri (2018a) said, there is a limited source of knowledge concerning the issue of civil society funding and the state-civil society relations in Thailand. The relationship that NGOs have with the state and public agencies has not been sufficiently empirically investigated. The way the NGOs have been influenced by the state is also overlooked in empirical research. This thesis would like to address the state influence and the modus operandi of NGO funding, which is often overlooked, by investigating the relationship between the THPF and the NGOs.

This thesis mainly aims to study why the NGOisation of civil society happens and become the way it does through the examination of the relationship between the Thai Health Promotion Foundation (THPF), one of the largest public funding initiatives for civil society in the country, and NGOs in Thailand. The research of the thesis is assisted and guided by critical realism (CR). For CR, dealing with ‘why’ is to deal with explaining the cause or reason which requires a ‘retroductive’ research strategy: the creation of hypotheses regarding the structures and the mechanisms responsible for the phenomena of the study and theories to guide the data collection and analysis (Blaikie 2010). In other words, retroduction involves an examination into the potential mechanisms which lead to the emergence of the phenomena. This will be discussed in Chapter 3.

Using the analytic of metagovernance and the concept of NGOisation, the thesis investigates the ways in which the NGOs are governed and steered by the THPF. It is expected that the mechanisms of metagovernance conducted by the THPF are the ones generating the NGOisation of civil society in Thailand. As a result, this thesis also aims to build or develop an explanation of the phenomenon of NGOisation which has happened through the THPF-NGO relations.

The level of analysis of the research is at the organisational and inter-organisational level. This work is interested in the relationship between the THPF and its NGO partners. It suggests
that the expansion of THPF funding has been central to the very nature of contemporary civil society in Thailand. It describes the new funding landscape which arose after the 2000s focusing on the emergence of the THPF that fundamentally altered the terrain of NGOs, and specifically shows how the THPF has used its governing mechanisms to transform what may be described as the NGO ecosystem in Thailand.

The main argument of the thesis is that the THPF metagoverns, or strategically steers its NGO partnership in a way which typically allows the NGOs as recipients to perform their ‘own’ missions and enjoy their autonomy. The metagovernance of the THPF, notably through strategic funding and partnership, is mostly responsible for driving NGOisation. The NGOs under the funding of THPF have become more NGOised, that is, become preoccupied with organisational reproduction and institutional advocacy at the expense of gradually distancing themselves from their social base and social movement strategies. With the metagoverning position of the THPF, the NGOisation has emerged and continues ‘by default’. The THPF is successful in integrating the NGOs into its system and creating partnerships; it is responsible for coordinating non-state initiatives. Also, the NGOs share certain agendas with the THPF. They principally and practically act in concert with the THPF and the NGOisation.

Consequently, three main research questions are formulated to reach an explanatory account of NGOisation of civil society:

1) What is the nature and characteristic of the relationship between the THPF and the funded NGOs?
2) How are the funded NGOs steered and metagoverned by the THPF?
3) What does the relationship produce? (or in what way are the funded NGOs driven to be NGOised?)

1.2 Setting the scene: an introduction to NGOs and the THPF

1.2.1 NGO in Thailand

Among Southeast Asian countries, civil society in Thailand is generally considered to be relatively vibrant and able to enjoy a certain degree of legitimacy and political space (Weiss 2015; Shigetomi 2004b, 2004b). Thai NGOs have been recognised as influential and crucial actors in politics and society at both national and local levels. According to the National Economic and
Social Development Board (NESDB) (2010), there are 70,792 non-profit organisations (NPOs) in Thailand which operate in many social fields. Thai law, namely the Civil and Commercial Code (see Cheecharoen and Udornpim 1999), requires NGOs to register either as a foundation (*mulanithi*) or as an association (*samakom*). Together with numerous unregistered NGOs, they are believed to significantly constitute civil society.

According to the Social Research Institute (SRI) (2003), the non-profit sector contribution to gross domestic product (GDP) accounted for 0.062-0.15 percent in 1999. The number is quite similar to the studies run by the Centre for Civil Society Studies, John Hopkins University and the NESDB which suggested that the contribution of the sector to total GDP is equivalent to an annual average of 0.8 percent (Salamon et al. 2012; NESDB 2010). It is important to note that the small contribution of the sector to GDP does not necessarily mean that the sector is not societally significant. It is believed in Thailand that the role of the sector is not to support the economic system of the country but the social sector. The latter is extremely difficult to measure quantitatively (SRI 2003).

Historically, organisations which are nongovernmental and work for philanthropic purposes have existed for a century in the form of religious organisations (see Greene 1971; Nitayarumphong and Mulada 2001). The first generation of Thai NGOs were founded as a reaction against state-led, top-down, inequitable social and economic development (see Leangchareon 2000; Suksawat 1995; Suwana-adth 1991). They emerged to support underprivileged people, reach the ‘unreached’ and proposed an alternative way for national development (Shigetomi 2004a). They operated where the state failed to do. Yet the use of NGOs as leading agents in modern civil society did not appear until the 1980s (Baker and Phongpaichit 2014; McCargo 2004; Connors 2002).

Since the 1980s, there has been a dramatic growth in the number of NGOs (see SRI 2003), as shown in the figure 1.1. The blossoming of the sector made NGOs become more visible to government agencies and a mechanism for political transformation as well as a legitimate and indispensable actor in public affairs. The proliferation of NGOs allowed the beginning of a political structure where NGOs can comment on government policy and launched public protest and campaigning as a means of influencing the state. The National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), for example, made it clear that the government would seek help from NGOs for its development (Laothamatas 1991).
The positive atmosphere of NGO-government relations continued through the 1990s when the country was becoming more liberalised. The government had a clear vision to promote NGOs (Farrington et al. 1993). NGO participation in public development is highly recognised and organised civil society has been empowered to deliver public services, both locally and nationally (see Balassiano 2011; Thammasat University Research and Consultancy Institute (TU-RAC) 2012).

The 1990s also witnessed the promulgation of the 1997 constitution which significantly encouraged public participation and decentralisation. The constitution transformed the structure and governance of the state which then allowed and supported the emergence of non-departmental and non-state initiatives, giving a large space for civil society to enjoy. In addition, with the application of the notion of ‘Thammarat’ (literally means ‘the righteous state’) or ‘good governance’ (see Tejapira 2009; Banpasirichote 2004; Orlandini 2003), integrated into the 1997 constitution, NGOs and their methodologies were increasingly incorporated into state institutions in the name of ‘good governance’ (Elinoff 2014). As mentioned by Roy (2008), civil society involvement has become a prerequisite as well as an indicator of good governance. This marks the beginning of the state-civil society partnership era and the emergence of ‘institutional civil society’ in which NGOs could participate more in policy processes and government settings rather than keeping protest on the street (see Brenner et al. 1999; Johnson and Forsyth 2002). NGOs have since become a leading agent in civil society creating an age of ‘NGO-based civil society’ (McKinnon 2011).

**Figure 1.1** The proliferation of organised civil society in Thailand
The development trajectory of the NGO sector is dynamic and closely linked with the state. In developing countries including Thailand, civil society and its component organisations are different from the idealised version of community that is independent of both the state and the market. Indeed, civil society exists in degrees (Boychuk 2007). The state and government are crucial to the development and operation of NGOs. As Lang (2013, p.7) contends, ‘transparent, interactive, and very public government-civil society relations’, not a stricter separation of them, are pivotal to a stronger civil society.

There have been several times when the sector was suppressed by the state and censured by the public. When the government adopted a more liberal approach, the sector could exercise its operation well. When the government took a rather authoritative, antagonistic approach, the sector was subjugated. Throughout history, many barriers have been erected by different governments, either civilian or military, to constrain civil society. For example, at the end of the 1990s, NGOs were subject to trivial bureaucratic intimidation. Acting from suspicion, the government checked the accounts of NGO activists by auditing their activities and finances on a monthly basis. Those who refused to comply were defamed and suppressed. NGOs were discredited, accused of being related to organised crime and heavily investigated by the Anti Money Laundering Office (AMLO) (Phongpaichit and Baker 2009). There was also an attempt to label NGOs as ‘undesired’ or ‘useless’, creating only conflict (see The Secretariat of the Senate 2003). NGOs were finally portrayed by the government as evil anarchists, ‘enemies of the state’ (Janchitfah 2003).

During the 2000s, the role of NGOs as intermediaries has also been given less importance as the government launched a series of policies which resulted in the emergence of a direct relationship between the government and the people (Phongpaichit and Baker 2008). NGOs, especially ones located in the centre, lost their power over rural areas. Individuals in the rural areas were forced to contact the government without the help of NGOs (Prasertkul 2009). Splitting NGOs from their bases considerably reduced the importance of NGOs while increasing the positive influence of the government. The government has managed to totally occupy the space that used to belong to NGOs. Complaints were made by activists that people movements and NGOs were facing a dilemma of needing to choose between remaining self-reliant without contacting the state or rising up against the state (Prasertkul 2009). Civil society became ‘superfluous’ for the state (Phongpaichit and Baker 2009).
Criticism and discouragement of NGOs by the government eventually undermined public support for NGOs (Simpson 2005), leading the public to begin to be sceptical of NGOs. Anti-NGO ideas were disseminated. NGOs were increasingly envisioned as having a top-down, bureaucratic relationship, drifting away from their supposed roles, and operating against the national interest (Shigetomi 2004a). As a consequence, they have started to lose public trust and their place in public activities (Bureekul et al. 2010, 18). Nevertheless, as Cohen (2008) pointed out, the oppositional discourses of NGOs mainstreamed and became incorporated into government ideology, policies and institutions. This in fact indicated the growing influence of the NGO movement in the country.

1.2.2 The THPF and the changing landscape of NGO funding

Before the 2000s, NGOs in Thailand had managed to survive by strengthening their independent managerial strategies (Dechalert 2002). Despite that, after the 2000s, as will be shown in Chapter 4, Thailand has witnessed the rise of public funds for social purposes managed by quasi-nongovernmental organisations (quangos). These funds have immediately become a major source of funding for the Thai NGOs and influenced the development of the NGO sector driving NGOisation of civil society. The NGOs have slowly become dependent on this public funding. These quangos have operated to provide funding and support for a certain cause, mostly a policy change. Among them, the THPF can be regarded as prominent.

Since its establishment, the THPF has seen numerous achievements (see Galbally et al. 2012; Sopitarchasak, Adulyanon and Lorthong 2015). The most famous campaigns the THPF has run are focused on reducing alcohol consumption and the smoking rate, and increasing road safety and accident prevention. Many of the THPF’s campaigns have been highly acknowledged at international level (see WHO 2016; Glassman and Temin 2016; Moodie et al. 2000). The THPF likes to claim that its achievements cannot be attributed only to the organisation, but are to be acknowledged as collective contributions by its partners and collaborating organisations throughout the country (Adulyanon 2012). Notably, THPF’s investments in health promotion seem to provide a high return to the public (Hanvoravongchai et al. 2014).

The THPF is not resource-dependent on the government as it has a secure independent income from ‘earmarked tax’. It is not like a common quango which has limited autonomy over its budgeting. Focusing on structural and behavioural changes, the THPF often intervenes in
society and other governmental areas. It works through cross-sectoral operations and network governance. The THPF is thus a hybrid organisation functioning with multiple mechanisms, principally non-hierarchical ones such as market and network.

Currently, the THPF has annual revenue of about US$120 million. The amount may seem large on an individual level compared with other quangos (see National Reform Council 2015). Yet, it is relatively small (about 7.3 percent) compared with the financial expenses of other state agencies in the health sector (Sopitarchasak, Adulyanon and Lorthong 2015; Watabe et al. 2017). The THPF annually provides a large amount of funding to various organisations, both public and private, through its innovative, proactive scheme. However, the majority of THPF’s grantees are local NGOs, universities, and research institutions. Through the funding, the THPF strongly advocates the establishment of many innovative social and health policies. Interestingly, when necessary, the THPF even establishes new societal organisations to mobilise and run campaigns (Galbally et al. 2012). Expanding networks of partners have become the tools for advocacy of the THPF.

Given these, the THPF is arguably influential in contemporary civil society. The THPF is recognised as one of the most significant players in Thai civil society (Pitidol 2016a, 2016b; Rakyutidharm 2011, 2014b; Shigetomi 2006, 2009) and believed to be one of the largest sources of funding for organised civil society in Thailand (Phatharathananunth 2014; Rakyutidharm 2014a; Ungpakorn 2009; Chutima 2004). This influential status of the THPF is also acknowledged by every participant in the research. The THPF has a significant impact on NGOs’ decision making and activities. Receiving funding from the THPF has led many NGOs to adapt themselves, for instance, to become more professionalised and institutionalised, in order to suit the THPF’s working approach and agenda. This corresponds to an observation mentioned by Phaholyothin (2017, p. 193):

1 Professionalisation is a contested concept. In NGO studies, Evetts (2007, p. 752) suggests that NGOs professionalise ‘in order to promote and protect their own interests’. Professionalisation indicates the ‘authority of institutionalised expertise’ which makes NGOs being better recognised and gaining an insider position at negotiation tables and institutional decision-making settings, which in turn promises a higher rate of policy advocacy success (Lang 2013; Clemens 2006; Zwingel 2005). With the authority of institutionalised expertise, NGO members become conversant in the same language as knowledge producers, governments and funders, and reorganise to meet their needs (Elbers and Arts 2011; Jad 2007; Henderson 2003). In the context of this thesis, professionalisation is closely links the way the NGOs adopted modern management knowledge and skills to enhance their organisational performance. Professionality is also associated with the way the NGOs form their organisational identity or signature and engage with their donors. This topic will be significantly explored in chapter 5 and chapter 8.
With its large annual budget funding over 1,000 projects per year, the THPF has been criticised for distorting the NGO sector by creating a monopoly on funding and influencing the priorities and programs of the sector.

Arguably, the THPF refashions the funding system for civil society in Thailand. As will be discussed later, the THPF has become the biggest available domestic funder for civil society in the country; the majority of its funding goes through non-state institutions. It is therefore possible to see the THPF as a new form of philanthropy in Thailand. The THPF can be regarded as a prominent emergent philanthropic actor and a key funding organisation; it is one of the largest grant-making entities in philanthropic engagement. However, in Thailand, large foundations such as the THPF are the exceptions rather than the norm (Phaholyothin 2017). The creation and operation of the THPF is unique. This point will be discussed further in Chapter 4.

Interestingly, the THPF is institutionally odd in its dual nature: a granting foundation and a public organisation. As a foundation, the THPF echoes the ‘outcome-oriented’ type of foundation (Tompkins-Stange 2016) mainly aiming to attain desired policy change and produce an impact. Phaholyothin (2017, p. 193) points out that there are four major institutional characteristics which make the THPF considered to be a new form of local philanthropy and a typical foundation. First, the THPF has a secure endowment source, guaranteed by law from the state, through excise tax on tobacco and alcohol. Second, the THPF does not obtain donations or money from the public or any other source. Third, the THPF has governance and staffing structures comparable to other professionally-run foundations. It is overseen by boards, managed by a CEO and run by staff who are recruited based on their qualifications. It is also obliged to report annually to the cabinet as well as to both houses of the Thai parliament. Lastly, the THPF implements active and strategic programmes. Its ‘partnership model of granting’ (Galbally et al. 2012) places emphasis on seeking out grantees rather than issuing open calls for proposals, and thus makes the THPF align with the notion of ‘strategic giving/philanthropy’ (see Frumkin 2006, 2010; Reckhow 2013; Brest 2012) and ‘venture philanthropy’ (see Scott 2009; Letts, Ryan and Grossman 1997; Frumkin 2003). The THPF is working in the ‘new frontiers’ of philanthropy and social investment (see Salamon 2014).

As a public organisation, the THPF represents the logic of new governance in which the state is hollowed out through networks and contracts (Milward and Provan 2000; Rhodes 2012; Goldsmith and Eggers 2004), having some missions devolved to other agencies—thereby,
becoming an enabler rather than a doer. In the language of Osborne and Gaebler (1992), the THPF mostly performs ‘steering’ while its partners do the ‘rowing’. Its tasks centre on organising resources, of both itself and others, to produce outcomes within the web of multisectoral relationships. In this sense, the THPF strategically manipulates its partners to run the business, performing ‘metagovernance’. As an orchestrator of metagovernance, the THPF draws NGOs to play in the field under the state-applied rule in which the NGOs became the state’s partners and assistants in reaching the THPF’s and the state goals. The emergence of the THPF can be conceptualised as a new form of statecraft that aims to (re)gain control over a networked administration/civil society, although it does not function like a straightforward instrument of the state.

However, the state is not coherent and homogeneous (Miliband 1973). Although the THPF can comfortably be seen a part of the state system, it has barely been perceived as a ‘state’ agency in practice. It would be misguided to address the THPF as a department of the state for the reason of its proximity to the state and its law of establishment. However, the THPF can be analytically seen as an ‘incarnated’ form of state agency which reflects the state’s success in creating a ‘bureaucratic field’ (Bourdieu 1994). In this regard, the THPF is also an object of metagovernance of the Thai state. It is a delegated state mechanism in the form of a quango: an arm of the state.

Besides, it is misleading to see the THPF as merely working in the health sector with health actors. In fact, the THPF has been working with a variety of actors across areas of interest mostly outside the health sector such as education, sexuality, women, family, children, labour, environment, food and nutrition, agriculture, social development, human rights, volunteering, media literacy, and so on. Applying the Ottawa Charter on Health Promotion (WHO, 1986), the THPF is using the ‘non-health to address health’ approach signifying an emphasis on non-health sectors. Hence, it is can be suggested that the THPF is an actor in civil society, or specifically, as part of the infrastructure or ‘enabler’ of civil society.

Unfortunately, the THPF is one of the most significant and the most controversial, yet understudied, institutions in Thailand. The logic which guides the THPF and its partners is not well understood and acknowledged. Arguably, the THPF is a key element in Thailand’s unwritten and rarely described state and civil society. Studying and examining the THPF is thus important, not just to debate its merits but unavoidably invoking particular risks to principles which the THPF is seen to embody, most of all those fundamentals of the relationship between state and society.
A major strand of literature concerning the THPF is written by its own staff and its associates to promote the development and the operation of the THPF as a health promotion fund (e.g. Sopitarchasak, Adulyanon and Lorthong 2015; Vathesatogkit, Lian and Ritthiphakdee 2013; Buasai, Kanchanachitra and Siwaraksa 2007). There is also an amount of literature focusing on financial investment in health promotion by the THPF (e.g. Tangcharoensathien et al. 2017; Srithamrongsawat et al. 2010; Chandoevwit, Thampanishvong and Rojjananukulpong 2014). Unfortunately, little social research on the role of the THPF has been conducted.

Among the available social studies of the THPF, the research conducted by Atchara Rakyutidharm (see Rakyutidharm 2014a, 2014b) is worthy of mention. Rakyutidharm’s work mainly aimed to study the general transformation of NGO-state-people relations in the context of resource and environmental policy. Parts of her project looked at the relationship between the THPF as a state funder, NGOs, and people in the funding context. The THPF was considered in the work as an arm of the state inviting NGOs to operate in a bureaucratic field under the state’s rule and financial support. The NGOs were found to be working in a collaborative manner sharing certain common development ideologies with the THPF. Her research concluded that the emerging, dynamic relationship between the THPF and the NGOs has significantly affected the positioning of the NGOs in society where they are cooperating more with, rather than challenging the state in order to gain positive responses from the state. By ‘cooperation’, the NGOs are not only obtaining money from the THPF. They also share opinions, work together and support each other in reaching a common goal. The relationship ‘blurs the boundary between the state and civil society’ in Thailand (Rakyutidharm, 2014a, p. 530). However, her research merely addressed the THPF as an actor in the bigger picture of the politics of NGO funding. The work did not particularly highlight the THPF per se, the ways it relates or steers the NGOs, its impact on the NGO community, and why it has become the way it is. Hence, it is possible to say that the THPF and its relation to NGO recipients has been overlooked in the social science literature, not only in Thailand but also in general as the case can contribute to other societies as well.

1.3 State of the research

There are three important aspects to the thesis. The first aspect involves an enquiry into the characterisation of the relationship between the THPF and its NGO partners highlighting collaborations and tensions. As noted by Fernando (2011), most NGO scholarship has downplayed
or failed to address the ways in which NGOs can be co-opted, disciplined, transformed, and reproduced within the ideological parameters of the state. The role of the state and its institutions in this process has not yet been widely studied even though it is a very important determinant of NGOs. The role and posture of the Thai state, its agency and relationship with civil society is reflected on. This work aims to refocus the debate on NGOs and examine how they have been affected and transformed by the THPF, and perhaps the state, which leads to the second and the third enquiry.

The second aspect is concerned with the cause of the transformations of the funded NGOs through the funding of the THPF. As the NGOs are financially dependent on the THPF, they are driven to develop certain attributes to become a ‘suitable’ partner of the THPF. NGOisation of civil society thus happens. The third aspect is focused on metagovernance, the rationale and techniques of governance strategically employed by THPF in relation to its NGO network. There is a significant overlap between these enquiries.

1.3.1 NGOs and the state funding

Nowadays, NGOs in reality are part of the neoliberal state-devolved service delivery sector, the ‘community face of neoliberalism’ (Petras 1997). There are growing critical accounts of NGO actions which evidence that NGOs appear to be themselves ‘the problem’ rather than solving problems (see Henderson 2003; Blaser, Feit and McRae 2004; Barry-Shaw and Jay 2012; Choudry and Kapoor 2013b). All too often, NGOs place themselves and work as outriders of neoliberal ideology (see Fowler 2000), albeit not necessarily bound to it, and ignore democratic and public practices. NGOs are seen as part of an extended or shadow state functioning through contracts made with government. Wolch (1990) proposed the ‘shadow state’ thesis which refers to an increase of the non-state actors in performing welfare state functions. These functions were subsidised, enabled, and regulated by the state which made the NGOs subject to state-imposed - directly or not - constraints on their autonomy. In this sense, NGOs have progressively become channels for and direct beneficiaries of development aid provided by national and foreign governments (Biel 2000; Wallace 2003). This situation makes government-NGO relationships grow and continue; governments, in particular, turn increasingly to NGOs for support in carrying out publicly funded functions, the process which has been called ‘nonprofitisation’ (see Nathan
1996; Salamon 2015). Expansion of the funding base for NGOs through government contracting and corporate sponsorship is counted as a mega-trend for civil society (Casey 2016).

In the study of NGO-funder relations in Russia, Henderson (2002) argues that the often-proclaimed goal of funders to ensure the development of civil society was in fact stalled by their preoccupation with projects focusing on short-term objectives and reports instead of long-term civic development. As a result, NGO projects have become homogeneous and the NGOs themselves are developing into a vertical, institutionalised, and isolated, albeit well-funded, civic community. Moreover, the changing environment of NGOs in relation to the state donor suggests that NGOs are now operating in the age of contract and new governance, where the cooperation between governments and NGOs is increasingly becoming a common practice. NGOs are made to financially rely on government and public funding. In such an environment, NGOs are facing the ‘fundamental revenue problem’ (da Silva Themudo 2004) which causes resource scarcity and uncertainty. The funding is conditioned by donors’ motives and presents challenges for NGOs to survive while keeping to their original missions effectively.

An increase in government-NGO cooperation signifies a less confrontational position of organised civil society towards governments and the state. Smith and Lipsky (1993) argue that government-funded NGOs are conditioned to remain on good terms with government because the relationship they have with government is unbalanced reciprocity, albeit interdependent. Government is the dominant force in the relationship. Besides, public funding and programmes under the umbrella of ‘new governance’, in particular, are believed to depoliticise NGOs, making them detach from political activity and attempting to influence the government decisions (see Bloodgood and Tremblay-Boire 2017). However, the relationship can also be productive depending on contingencies such as the ability of NGOs to steer the relationship in their favour (see Commins 1997) or the characteristic of the funder and the state (see Smillie et al. 1999). As shown by da Silva Themudo (2004), resource dependence on the funder does not necessarily lead to the loss of organisational independence. NGOs can pursue various independence strategies to negotiate with the structure of funding and the funder. Moreover, the relationship between the funder and the funded should not be addressed only from a financial dimension but also on other non-financial, symbolic dimensions in which NGOs can have more power over the relationship (Ebrahim 2005).
To become reliable partners of government, NGOs find themselves experiencing an intense pull to professionalism and ‘being colonised by governmental ways of doing business’ (Harwood and Creighton 2009, p. 19). In this respect, NGOs are influenced by inner-organisational processes and a rationalisation of modern bureaucracy to maintain their organisational reproduction. The issue of the position of NGOs in relation to government and their changing behaviours thus prompt a critical account to look at NGOs in some detail.

1.3.2 NGO studies in Thailand

Like many Asian countries, the Thai third sector or organised civil society was not given much attention before the 1990s (Lyons and Hasan 2002). This has resulted in a serious lack of information regarding the infrastructure, scope and size of the sector (Salamon and Anheier 1997).

Most literature about Thai civil society and NGOs did not start to show a significant presence until the late 1990s (Shigetomi 2004a). Reliable quantitative data on the size of the sector in Thailand began to be gathered only at the beginning of 2000 (see SRI 2003). Dechalert (2002) points out that the analysis of NGOs in Thailand is confusing and varied because there is little academic research dedicated to distinguish NGOs from the bigger picture of civil society.

Most literature about civil society and NGOs in Thailand has heavily revolved around the roles, activities and organisational attributes of NGOs (e.g. Prompitak 2009; Sangiampongsa 2003), the development of the philanthropic, nongovernmental sector and civil society (e.g. Nitayarumphong and Mulada 2001; Chienthong 2000; TDRI 2000; Pongsapich 1997), grassroots organisations and community actions (e.g. Natsupa 1991; Tabchumpon, 1998), and social and political movements (e.g. Missingham 2003; Phatharathananunth 2006; Pintobtang 1998).

Also, too many studies have explored civil society and its political role in democratisation (e.g. Pitidol 2016b; Kuhonta and Sinpeng 2014; Kongkirati 2015). According to Elinoff (2014), political studies of civil society in Thailand are focused on two different, but related, aspects of civil society: its role as a regulator of the state, and its role as an organisational sphere that serves as the agent of democratisation. Such attention has made most literature on civil society in Thailand both analytical and normative, portraying civil society as a singular protagonist driving a uniform democracy. The language of civil society in Thailand expects civil society to be ‘the repository of hope’ (Phongpaichit 1999), a space for those who have been left out of formal politics. Civil
society has thus become ‘a dream that sought to produce a particular version of democratic governance’ (Elinoff 2014, p. 363).

This kind of vision of civil society has certain ‘eschatological’ features, signifying an end of and an end to history. Such features reflect a linear, teleological understanding of history in which history changes and progresses toward the final destination. In this sense, civil society is dreamed of as a sphere or a state of virtue and instructive solutions to problems signifying the victory of good over evil and an end to suffering, conflict and corruption (see Dean and Villadsen 2016). Problems arise as, in reality, civil society and NGOs are definitely not an always happy solution to the problems of society, and civil society always raises questions about legitimacy, accountability, and democracy and is sometimes itself the centre of conflict.

Arguably, one important point that these various studies commonly imply, explicitly and implicitly, is that the dynamics of the NGO sector and civil society is significantly related to that of the state. This thesis supports the position that organised civil society, specifically NGOs, has consistently been defined vis-a-vis the state. In other words, the development, role, and positioning of NGOs can best be understood in terms of their dynamic relationship with the state (see Purdue 2007). A state-society dialectic is in play: ‘through its administrative, legal, and coercive systems, the state structures its relationships with civil society, as well as relations within civil society’ (Smith 2013, p. 94).

As the sector is growing in influence, it has interacted with other sectors, especially the state. Unfortunately, study concerning the influence of the state and government policies on the NGO sector has received much less attention than that of the state on the business sector (e.g. see Laothamatias 1992; Siroros 1995; Doner 2009). To a certain degree, this thesis would also like to fill the gap that few people have researched, by exploring the relationship between the state through its institutional mechanism and its influence on the NGO sector. This helps contribute to the understanding of the development of the sector in the country.

1.3.3 Why does NGOisation matter?

Since the 1980s, more movement-oriented organisations have turned to or/and been replaced by more professionalised and effectiveness-oriented groups, developing a powerful NGOised footprint (Lang 2013). This phenomenon has led to the centralisation of funding to NGOs, particularly those located in the capital city, and the change in the NGOs’ ecosystem, which
creates preconceived notions of how civil society should operate and the divisions of NGOs (Edwards 2014). In this thesis, to become NGOised is to become overwhelmed with organisational reproduction and institutional advocacy at the expense of public movement. The inward-looking approach, which impels the NGOs to prioritise organisational reproduction, has replaced the forward-looking one, which drives NGOs to make social changes. NGOisation thus represents a change of NGOs both in terms of organisational structure, mission, management, and activity and their interaction with other agencies and the public.

NGOisation does not just happen naturally. It is caused. Research has found that incentives from ‘outside patrons’ are inclined to promote routinisation and professionalisation (Stone 1996; Guo 2007; Walker and McCarthy 2010). More specifically, funding from government, often expressed as a sub-contracting relationship or foundation, is the key source of the pull to NGOisation (Choudry and Kapoor 2013a; Lang 2013; Carroll 2016). The critical factors for NGOisation are donors’ capacities to control through funding and expectations. Repeatedly, ‘the donors expected to encounter an upwardly mobile, fully service-oriented, professional environment exhibiting all the regalia of a trustworthy business enterprise’ (Lang 2013, p. 84). Aksartova (2009) points out that NGOs are constrained by ‘quantifiable indicators’ of success, such as numbers of projects conducted and reports issued, created by public donors as a part of result measurement and for public presentation of the donors themselves. Project-by-project funding compels NGOs to transform their organisation by adopting certain forms of professional practices, functions and priorities (Choudry and Kapoor 2013a).

Funding is the important parameter in the development of relationship between donors and their NGO partners (Malhotra 2000). An extensive amount of literature places attention on the impact of funding or pressures from donors and government toward the recipient organisations, or how the funding has shaped or influenced the recipient organisations (e.g. Edwards and Hulme 1996; Hudock 1999; Deakin 2001; Ebrahim 2005). Government funding, in particular, has been seen to decrease NGOs’ autonomy and flexibility, displacement of goals, bureaucratisation and accountability conflicts (see Smith and Lipsky 1993; Salamon 1995; Froelich 1999).

NGOs tend to rely on financial assistance from sources outside their control (Fowler 1997; Lewis 2014). This can be seen as dependency which puts NGOs in a vulnerable position by being subjected to external constraints such as international agencies, governments, and donors (Hudock
NGOs, then, are at risk of losing their identity and legitimacy, drifting away from their original course (Hudock 1995).

Donors are seen to have a significant influence over recipient NGOs as they can force NGOs to accept their agenda (Edwards and Hulme 1996; Lewis 2001). It is imperative to note that donors are not naïve; they hold certain ideologies and agendas which are normally translated and channelled through funding. Funding has never been merely a matter of giving money but has often embraced the donors’ agendas (see Ottaway and Carothers 2000). The funding relationship, particularly when funding is project-based, is suspected of putting NGOs in a position where they are treated as mere instruments of donor agencies and thus damaging the endeavour to establish a genuine partnership. NGOs may ultimately become more responsive to, or compliant with, donors’ demands, agendas, and ideologies rather than those of their constituencies or beneficiaries (Fowler 1994, 1998). In other words, NGOs are becoming more distant from their bases. This concern is known as the ‘piper hypothesis’ (da Silva Themudo 2004) referring to the saying ‘the one who pays the piper calls the tune’. It suggests the potential danger which NGOs can have of losing independence and playing the funder’s tune rather than their own when they receive increased funding or become resource dependent on the funder. The higher the resource dependence NGOs have on the funder, the less they can keep their organisational independence. This reflects the increase in external control and constraint over NGOs. Being resource dependent allows the activation of a range of interventions which have been adopted to influence NGOs including the use of ‘sticks’ (closure, deregistration, investigation and co-ordination) and ‘carrots’ (tax exempt status, access to policy makers and public funding) (Edwards and Hulme 1997).

It is also important to mention that the literature of NGOisation heavily revolves around the investigation of ‘neo-colonial’ and externally induced mechanisms operated by foreign donors, Western governments, and global philanthropic foundations, which in turn advocates for the scrutiny on movements to transcend ‘beyond NGOisation’ (see Alvarez, 2009; Jacobsson and Saxonberg, 2013a). This literature corresponds with the popularity in the study of the relationship between NGOs and foreign, international donors/funders (e.g. Henderson 2002; Ebrahim 2005; Mercea and Stoica 2007).

However, this thesis aims to apply the concept of NGOisation to explain domestic government-induced pulls for NGOs to transform themselves, mostly in terms of professionalisation and institutionalisation. It looks at the relationship between NGOs and a certain
‘local’ public funder in a context where international/foreign donors have become less significant for, or perhaps absent from, the contemporary development of civil society. In such settings, local funders have become more influential and essential for the survival of the NGO sector.

Unfortunately, little systematic research on the relationship between the Thai NGOs and their local funder exists, let alone NGOisation. The Thai NGO community is seen to be lacking self-reflection and being occupied by ‘familial hierarchy’ (Simpkins 2003; Rakyutidharm 2014b; Pitidol 2016b). The uncritical context of the sector potentially limits the healthy development of the sector and also knowledge generation in the field. A critical examination of the sector is needed. Looking at the role and position of the NGOs in politics and society can explain the livelihood of civil society but cannot say much about the situation within the sector. This study instead aims to critically investigate what is going on between the NGOs and their funder.

Studying NGOs through the lens of NGOisation can bring us back to the reality of their operation. The concept allows us to see NGO transformation in terms of professionalisation, bureaucratisation, institutionalisation and depoliticisation in the context of ‘neoliberalisation of civil society’ (Goldman 2005). NGOs are not inherently democratic but political. They have a complex relationship with their funder and the state. It is important to note that changes in NGOisation are neither linear nor haphazard but transformational (see Archer 1995). NGOisation refocuses the study of NGOs by looking at the sector and its relations, not its role as a force for/against democratisation or the state. It focuses on what is going on within the NGO community, especially in the funding context. NGOisation will, to some extent, lead us to see the contradiction of NGOs in terms of their legitimacy, accountability and democratic values. This thesis is not interested in what an NGO is but how the ‘NGOisation’ is done through the metagovernance of the THPF.

1.3.4 Why does metagovernance of the THPF matter?

The concept of metagovernance is highly and variously conceptualised but poorly applied in empirical research. The way this thesis applies metagovernance is rather different from many in the field. The concept is popularly used to investigate the macro-level phenomenon, namely the relations between the state and society, and to analyse the state departmental governance because the state is obviously the one holding the absolute authority over its territory. It is less likely to be used for meso-/micro-level analysis concerning the inter- and intra-organisational relations
(Meuleman 2008). Besides, Baker and Stoker (2015) explain that the interest in metagovernance, indeed, comes from (a) the rise of the disaggregation of the state resulting in a relatively stable pattern of devolved institutions that are semi-autonomous yet ultimately subjected to government authority or operate in the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ and (b) the continuing significance of hierarchies due to the enduring capacity of the state in steering, coordinating and shaping norms and values in some circumstances. This thesis would like to take the challenge in applying the concept to study the meso-/micro-level by looking at the functioning of a devolved institution of the state – that is the THPF, and its relations with its NGO partners.

Unfortunately, only a handful of scholars are interested in using the concept to explain semi-autonomous, non-departmental public bodies or quangos (e.g. Hammond et al. 2019; Dowling and Washington 2018; Flinders and Tonkiss 2016; Dommett and Flinders 2015), let alone non-government actors. Their analyses, however, revolve around the relationship between the quangos and the state, typically envisioning the quangos as an object of metagovernance. Unlike them, this thesis distinctively examines the relationship that such non-departmental bodies have with non-governmental actors, which mainly points to the metagoverning quangos as the potential subject of metagovernance, not only the object of it.

Metagovernance is simultaneously taking place within, and shaped by, the broader power relations which exist in society (Jessop 2010). This makes metagovernance an interesting issue and worthy of study. Metagovernance is closely related to the state-society relations. As McMahon (2017) argues, the state is ‘credited or criticised for the growth of NGOs [and other societal institutions] and their expanding budgets, but rarely is the relationship explored in much depth’ (p.68). In contemporary governance, the state has not lost its power to the growing number of societal actors, but is increasingly sharing the power with them and sometimes exercising power through them (Bell and Hindmoor 2009). Collaborative relationship with societal actors is the key for the state to develop its capacity to govern. This has resulted in an increase of the state-society partnership and is why the research needs to adopt a relational approach to comprehend how interactions shape perceptions and practices of the NGO as well as the state (see Anderson 2015). It is the relationship that matters.

The way the state and its institutions employ power does not merely rely on traditional government but a variety of new modes of governance that are non-hierarchical and hybrid. The state, together with its apparatuses, performs a form of governance which is more subtle, giving a
distance to those being governed. The THPF can be seen to perform metagovernance, which is an attempt to influence and coordinate, notably through funding and strategic supervision, its societal partners by offering ways for them to see one another as mutual partners.

It is appealing and interesting to study the THPF and its NGOs through the lens of metagovernance because this can uncover the operation of the THPF and the relationship it has with the NGOs. The THPF arguably performs metagovernance in two senses. Firstly, it strategically utilises and combines different, but related, modes of governance—hierarchies, markets, and networks—in order to achieve its goals. This emphasises the significance of interactive governance. Indeed, it is not surprising that the THPF involves a range of governance mechanisms because health is an area where ‘hybrid’ forms of governance are widely witnessed (Kickbusch and Gleicher 2012; Ramesh, Wu and Howlett 2015; Hort, Jayasuriya and Dayal 2017). Secondly, the THPF governs or steers its partners, in this case, the funded NGOs as a self-organised, inter-organisational governance network. The THPF as the metagovernor applies the designed interactive governance to metagovern its NGO network. To be effective, these two kinds of metagovernance have been conducted in the shadow of hierarchy.

1.4 Structure of the thesis

The thesis contains 9 chapters in total. This chapter provides the overview of the thesis encompassing the rationale of the research, purpose of the study, and structure of the thesis. Chapter 2 critically provides the theoretical frameworks applied in the thesis. Metagovernance and NGOisation will be elaborated. Chapter 3 discusses the methodology developed and used to navigate the research. The qualitative approach guided by critical realism will be fleshed out. Chapter 4 critically discusses the background of the study focusing on the state-society relations in Thailand, the NGO funding narrative, and the creation and the governance of the THPF. Chapter 5 analytically explores the different relations the NGOs have with their funder, the THPF, within a context of the THFP-NGO partnership. It also looks at the different characters of the THPF as perceived and expected by stakeholders. These facilitate and constraint the capacity to steer of the THPF which in turn influences metagovernance in practice. Chapter 6 investigates the THPF as a metagovernor which favours civil society and NGOs and interactive governance. It also looks at the manifestation of the ‘shadow of hierarchy’, the necessary condition where metagovernance takes place. Chapter 7 further examines the key mechanisms of metagovernance of the THPF:
partnership strategy (the ‘tri-power strategy’) and proactive granting. Chapter 8 explores the NGOisation as a consequence of metagovernance by the THPF. The funded NGOs are driven to develop certain attributes to suit THPF’s frameworks. This significantly affects the trajectory of the sector in general. The thesis concludes in Chapter 9 by summarising the significant points made and their implications.
Chapter 2  
**Theoretical frameworks: NGOisation and Metagovernance**

This chapter discusses the core theoretical frameworks employed in the thesis: NGOisation and metagovernance. They are, implicitly and explicitly, related to one another and used in a complementary way explaining the same phenomenon from different perspectives (see Cairney 2013). The value of the multiple explanations using a complementary approach to theorising lies with their potential to give different answers to the same phenomenon and encourage researchers to search for evidence which they would not otherwise uncover (See Allison 1969).

The concept of NGOisation provides a theoretical basis to investigate the way the NGOs have been influenced by their funder in the modern world to become more inward-oriented corporate organisations. It is used in this thesis to help explore what kind of the influence the THPF has on the funded NGOs and civil society as the NGOs have been driven, intended or not, to develop certain characteristics so that they can become ‘suitable’ partners for the THPF. To further examine the way the THPF relates to the NGOs resulting in the NGOisation of civil society, the concept of metagovernance is employed as a framework to study the THPF-NGO relations. It systematically and distinctively provides an analytical lens on how state agencies like the THPF steer decentralised (governance) networks. It also emphasises the coordination of structures and processes of interactive governance mechanisms within a particular system or institution. Through metagovernance, the rationales and techniques of the funder towards the relationship are highlighted. In this thesis, the concept helps explore how and why the THPF steers or governs the funded NGOs.

### 2.1 NGOisation

The concept of NGOisation has been variously used to comprehend the condition of civil society (see Lang 2000; Kamat 2004; Aksartova 2009; Choudry and Kapoor 2013b). Unfortunately, its analytical power is underdeveloped. Most literature addresses the term in a descriptive, rhetorical way. Few have developed it as an analytical framework to investigate empirical events. This thesis takes an approach which relates NGOisation to the financial dependence of NGOs suggested by Choudry and Kapoor (2013a, p. 5). In other words, to analyse NGOisation is to:
examine ways in which funding and other material support can orient organisations to prioritise institutional survival and maintenance at the expense of mobilisation, and account for how NGO/movement actions may be shaped by material incentives.

There is ambivalence in the concept of NGOisation. The term can create obfuscation in its conflation of process and end-state of that process and their invocation of inevitability (see Taylor 2000). It can refer to a process (of becoming NGOised) and an outcome of that process which consists in a particular organisational form, a constituted entity with a formal or informal regulation and emergent effect. Recognising the double meaning of the term NGOisation is important for the analysis. This thesis develops and employs concept of NGOisation-as-a-process, as a theoretical framework while the NGOisation-as-a-product is the state of NGOs expected to be seen as a consequence of the process. The former is better referred to as the ‘NGOisation process’ while the latter is addressed as the ‘NGOisation of civil society’.

It is noted that the concept developed here aims to move beyond conceptualising NGOisation as inherently ‘good’ or ‘bad’. Instead, it seeks to highlight NGOisation as an analytical concept to understand NGOs and their relations with funders, or the state in general. NGOisation thus describes ‘a culturally and politically mutable tendency rather than a narrowly confined path’ which possesses ‘different iterations and [can] be fuelled by different processes in different global or local constellations’ (Lang 2013, p. 65).

2.1.1 NGOisation process

According to Kamat (2013), two important factors are relevant for NGOisation around the world: the weight of geopolitical imperatives\(^2\) and the nature of the state. As this thesis is interested in the domestic force of the Thai state toward the NGOisation, the focus here is rather on the latter. The way the state governs society and the history of the country suggest the extent to which NGOs can act. The society that has strong centralised, bureaucratic government without political stability

\(^2\) Geopolitics is quite clear, for example, in some cases where western influences and national elites play pivotal roles in a surge of NGOs. NGOs strive to adapt themselves to the requirements of foreign donors and fail to meet the need of the people or their constituencies. In other cases, there are resistances against the NGOisation process or even rejection of NGOs as a politically viable organisational form given the historical trajectory of the activists and organised movements.
is likely to have a limited and uneven NGOisation process. NGOisation thus unfolds and manifests differently in different contexts and struggles (Choudhry and Kapoor 2013a, p. 10). Historical context and the idea and practice of NGOs in a specific society are important in comprehending NGOisation of a particular country (Mojab 2009). There is no ‘Iron Law’ of NGOisation (Alvarez 2009). Yet, it is possible to see common characteristics of the phenomenon.

NGOisation, for Choudhry and Kapoor (2013a), refers to the institutionalisation, professionalisation, depoliticisation and demobilisation of movements for social and environmental change. In this sense, it involves the capacity of NGOs to depoliticise practices and discourses of social changes, becoming a more conformist/reformist, rather than a radicalist. A more systematic account of NGOisation is provided by Lang (2013, pp. 63-64) who frames it as,

the process by which social movements\(^3\) professionalise, institutionalise, and bureaucratised in vertically structured, policy-outcome-oriented organisations that focus on generating issue-specific and, to some degree, marketable expert knowledge or services.

The latter definition highlights organisational reproductions and the cultivation of funding resources. It seems that there is no difference between large and small organisations when they are needed to be treated as legitimate actors by government donors; they experience a similar pull to behave as professional organisations albeit with different capabilities to respond. For Lang (2013), NGOisation therefore signifies a move to more institutional and professional organised civil society featuring an inward orientation and represents a ‘bureaucratic’ organisational type, which is different from social movements representing a collectivist-democratic type of organisation (see Rothschild and Whitt 1986).

Likewise, in a cross-national and cross-organisational study of the third sector by Kallman and Clark (2016), five basic institutional logics of the nongovernmental sector, which operate simultaneously within the sector, can be identified. Their combined presences, to a different degree, generate tensions, synergies and unevenness in the sector. The five institutional logics are: clientelism (emerged in terms of financial support); paternalism (appeared in practice of

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\(^3\) Social movements in this definition refer to any collective endeavour to change the social structure which occasionally utilise extraconstitutional methods (Minkoff 1997). They are not confined to mean just an organised movement which protests on streets.
philanthropy); bureaucracy (emerged in negotiating power sharing and responsibilities in conjunction with arms of government); activism (appeared as the language and tactics of social movements or organisation of volunteers to make sense of participation); and professionalism/professionalisation (emerged as the process which transforms a job into a skilled profession). These institutional logics stress an organisational-sociological dimension as to how certain constructed belief systems shape NGOs’ cognition and behaviour in a given environment. In other words, they are the ‘institutional properties’ of NGOs.

Consequently, NGOisation can be conceptualised and defined as an organisational shift from social movement properties towards NGO properties or institutional logics. Specifically, NGOisation in respect of NGOs – which is the main focus of this thesis – denotes the intensifying of their specific properties, quantitatively and qualitatively. In other words, NGOisation drives NGOs to have stronger commitments to the properties. As the thesis aims to study the cause of the NGOisation, it develops the concept in line with the aforementioned conceptualisations and suggests four major developments which should be looked at as signals for the beginning of NGOisation: professionalisation, institutionalisation, bureaucratisation and depoliticisation. Inducements from funders significantly generate these developments, which in turn fuel the NGOisation process. It is also possible that the NGOisation drives the developments.

Under such a framework, the degree of agency played by NGOs is recognised as NGOisation which is essentially about responses to environmental pressures and the ‘processes of material complicity with capital’ (Choudhry and Kapoor 2013a, p. 14). When material or organisational forms of civil society meet capital or money, NGOisation is a consequence, though commonly unintended. In order to capture NGOisation, it is important to look at funding, reporting and monitoring requirements, and other subtle signs of funders as principle inducements for NGOisation.

In this respect, NGOisation as a theoretical framework does not merely refer to an increasing number of NGOs but a conjunction of certain mechanisms with emergent properties: the professionalisation; the institutionalisation and organisation; the bureaucratisation; and the depoliticisation (see Figure 2.1). These mechanisms are not mutually exclusive. For instance,

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4 These properties or logics are not strict in reality. It is hard for an organisation to appear in the pure type. In particular, NGOisation-as-process means that an organisation can possess properties of both organisational types. Civil society thus has multifaceted organisations which are not limited to NGOs.
professionalisation drives more institutionalisation, while institutionalisation serves as a supportive base for professionalisation. Ultimately, NGOisation intensifies these developments too. It is imperative to note that, in reality, the mechanisms can be counter-acted. Contingencies, such as institutional stickiness of NGOs, the context and nature of the organisations, and the nature of the funder, are likely to play a part in the process as well. The NGOisation process is thus dialectical, interactive, and iterative. It has emergent properties which are irreducible to its components. NGOisation, in a broader context, changes the landscape of the civil society ecosystem, and at an organisational and institutional level, changes the properties of a particular NGO in a way that either professionalisation or institutionalisation alone cannot make.

**Figure 2.1 NGOisation framework**

![NGOisation framework diagram](image)

### 2.1.2 NGOisation of civil society and its implications

As mentioned, NGOisation generates a certain outcome, which is a more inward-oriented organised civil society focusing on organisational reproduction and institutional advocacy. Such an organised civil society has been professionalised, institutionalised, bureaucratised and depoliticised. Lang (2013) asserts that NGOisation brings material and symbolic returns to NGOs. Through material returns, NGOs will achieve a better legal status which in turn makes it easier for them to access funding and to influence policy. By symbolic returns, it makes it easier for NGOs to get closer to the donors or governments, thereby normalising the relationship they have with governing agencies and donors. These, however, have drawbacks. When a relationship is strongly
formed, there is always the exclusion of some parties and perspectives which show less organised interests. This results in a form of client or insider relationship between selected NGOs and government (see Alvarez 1999; Lang 2000). In summary, NGOisation serves as a conduit for internal/organisational reproduction and external legitimacy for gaining funding (Lang 2013).

Moreover, NGOisation has considerable implications for the transformation of civil society.

*Modern civil society in Neoliberalism*

First, it is a specific condition that NGOs operate in the 21st century or the late modern civil society influenced by neoliberal ideologies and policies. For some, it is a product of neoliberal globalisation and the rise of issue-specific NGO-led civil society (Stubbs 2007; Yacobi 2007; Sheppard et al. 2009). It also refers to a development in the organisational formation of civil society vis-a-vis the government. NGOs become more stable which enables them to ‘support moral claim-making with fact-driven claims’ (Lang 2013, p. 86).

According to SustainAbility (2003), the 21st century NGOs are more insiders and a part of the system which would be changed. They are focused more on solutions delivered through market mechanisms which are contradictory to the previous generation of NGOs that spotlighted problems considered as symptoms of market failure. They also invest heavily in networks and see government and corporate funding as investment. They then actively persuade supporters that they are good investors and professionals. In addition, they do not solely follow charity sector rules but adapt strategy and business management to their work. New modes of governance that are non-hierarchical seem to be the NGOs’ preferred way.

Phenomena like professionalism and bureaucracy feature modernity. Bureaucratisation in particular is considered as one of the main features of Neoliberalism (Hibou 2015). Promoting NGOs is seen as the policy and practice of strengthening civil society and good governance which are counted as intrinsic pillars of neoliberal policy (Petras and Veltmeyer 2005; Kamat 2004). For donors, funding NGOs is then a strategy to democratise a society through ‘civil society’ (Veltmeyer 2007). Therefore, professionalisation and the other developments function well for neoliberal regimes. Many point out that NGO operations are inclined to welcome capitalism rather than seeking to transform it (Greenfield 2001; Petras and Veltmeyer 2001; McNally 2002). Funding, in fact, is a market mechanism that is the act of providing financial resources. NGOised organisations have become part of the ‘non-profit industry complex’ (INCITE 2007) modelled on
capitalist structures. NGOisation, ultimately, to put it in Petras and Veltmeyer's words (2005), serves to keep the existing power structure intact while promoting a degree of change and development. In short, the process of NGOisation, especially professionalisation, is driven by the neoliberal policy context in which NGOs work (Kamat 2004).

**Collaborative partnership between the state and NGOs**

The second feature of NGOisation is that the state-NGO relationship is developing into a greater ‘collaborative’ kind. The changing relationship heavily relies on the capacity of the state donor in drawing NGOs to function with government. Under such a relationship, NGOs better meet the need of the state and donors that seek reliable and competent partners. NGOs realise that public advocacy strategies typically involving protests and direct opposition are not welcome by government donors. A collaborative environment then transforms the working approach of NGOs to be a more professional but tamed civil society. In this sense, NGOisation happens in an arena of new governance. NGOisation represents a precondition for NGOs to engage in modern governance arrangements, especially state partnerships.

Conceptually, a considerable change in the new governance is the selection of the instruments to reach a governance purpose by the state. Instead of depending on traditional ‘command and control’, the state utilises ‘softer’ or more indirect instruments such as co-operative arrangements with non-state actors, and ‘co-production’ in particular (see Ostrom 1996; Pestoff 2012; Pestoff, Brandsen and Verschuere 2012). In this sense, the state has shifted from being a direct ‘doer’ to become a ‘regulator’ of private provision, thereby, becoming a ‘regulatory state’ (see Majone 1997; King 2007; Levi-Faur 2013). This kind of state increasingly expands the use of rule-making, monitoring and administrative techniques over the societal actors. For Power (1994, 1997), such desire to enhance the capability of the state to oversee non-state actors is well manifested in an ‘audit explosion’: the increase in state strategies for creating and managing networks and partnerships through setting up all kinds of arrangements for auditing and regulating other organisations.

A greater collaboration between the state and NGOs facilitates ‘civic society’, rather than civil society (see Huang and Young 2016; Lee 2002; Koh and Ling 2000). ‘Civic society’ is not inherently political and exists in concert with most authoritarian polities (Hewison and Rodan 1996). The state is happy to support ‘civic’ activities which are confined to effective and efficient
management and governance of communal matters (Huang and Young 2016). It is not content with activities that inherently challenge its authority. In this sense, NGOisation helps the state to secure influence over civil society by making the NGOs become integrated into the state system. The promotion of the ‘civic society’ generates a ‘manufactured’ civil society (Hodgson 2004): a civil society which is not developed organically but engineered or formed and funded through some type of state initiative, at least initially. Such civil society prioritises the state and tries to reach agendas set by the state that ‘manufactures’ it. Then, the state-manufactured organised civil society becomes ‘a tool for the government to co-opt and control [other parts of] civil society’ (Crispin 2000, p. 21).

Furthermore, government-NGO collaboration raises an important question of what makes NGOs legitimate actors in late modern civil society and public affairs. In fact, some point out various sources of legitimacy which NGOs can claim (see Thrandardottir 2012; Beetham 2013; Lang 2013). Even so, this thesis argues that it is the process of NGOisation which significantly makes an NGO a legitimate and reliable partner for governments.

**Donor-driven NGOs and ‘elite civil society’**

Legitimacy from the donors is prioritised over that from the movement base. Upward accountability to donors is expected. As a result, NGOs are inclined to become a ‘memberless’ and donor-driven (see Atia and Herrold 2018). NGOisation makes NGOs learn to speak the particular linguistic repertoire of their donors for acquiring funds and status (Aksartova 2009). It is possible to say that NGOisation reveals one of the basic truths about NGOs: they are not only working for their beneficiaries as commonly assumed, but they are also serving their donor(s) and aiming to produce projects (see Krause 2014). The NGOs’ organisational reproduction becomes the goal around which work is organised, displacing other ends.

The greater collaboration between the state and NGOs also points to the rise of ‘elite civil society’ which is upwardly accountable to donors and the state, not the people. Carroll (2016) argues that NGOisation brings about selective political inclusion in which NGOs that are happy to cooperate and compromise with the state are legitimised and can gain better access and resources while those who are not willing to, are excluded. NGOisation, on the one hand, presents an image of pluralism and openness favouring non-state initiatives. Yet, on the other hand, it has the potential to divide civil society into the group that is ‘good’ and the other that is ‘bad’, seen as
closed and radicals. The ‘good’ ones tend to become an ‘elite civil society’ which functions on models of harmony and consensus, sharing certain common interests with the state and donors rather than with the constituencies they are supposed to represent (Choudry 2010; Guilhot 2007; Phatharathananunth 2006).

### Institutional advocacy

The fourth implication involves the growth of ‘institutionalised advocacy’ (Lang 2013), a mode of work giving NGOs better access to institutional contexts and being competent and reliable experts in a particular state governance arrangement. Institutional advocacy refers to ‘the attempt to influence decision making by gaining some degree of insider status in institutions or in organisations that initiate, prepare, legislate or execute policy change’ (Lang 2013, p. 22). Major tools are lobbying and sharing experience and knowledge. It champions informal/internal consultation and collaboration. This is different from public advocacy, defined as ‘attempts to achieve policy success by engaging broader publics and… actively stimulating citizen voice and engagement in the process’ (Lang 2013, p. 23). Important to the latter approach are such tools as protest and social movement. It champions external communication with the public and confrontation. These advocacy approaches are summarised in the figure 2.2.

Although techniques performed in institutional advocacy seems to give greater help to NGOs in reaching their advocacy goals and getting in contact with the authority (see Adams 2007), it has drawbacks. Institutional advocacy diverts NGOs from their constituencies and public movement activities. NGOs tend to become elitist, upscaled, and uncommitted to the real lives of people (see Henderson 2003; Carroll 2016; Choudry 2010; Guilhot 2007). Institutional advocacy produces images of expert NGOs ‘speaking for’ instead of ‘engaging with’ their social base (Lang 2013). NGOs also run a risk of NGOs being co-opted. In society where the NGO sector is developing, fragmented, and heavily dependent on the state for funding due to chronic lack of other resources, state-NGO collaboration can, and is likely to, be used as a ‘co-option’ strategy by government because the government may understand that NGOs are often guided, notably through fiscal and contractual mechanisms, toward provision of social services and away from advocacy (Breen, Dunn, and Sidel 2017, p. 9).
2.2 Metagovernance

Metagovernance is a popular, yet often undeliberated, practice of contemporary public management conducted by different kinds of actors. As Sørensen (2006) wrote, ‘metagovernance can potentially be exercised by any resourceful actor – public or private. All it takes is resources and a desire to influence activities performed by self-governing actors’ (p.103). There has been an increased use of metagovernance as a scholarly concept since 1997, yet the concept is still relatively ill-researched and has never become a trending topic in academia. Meuleman (2019, p. 84) suspects that this is because studying metagovernance requires people ‘to step out of their comfort zones’.

The literature of metagovernance is varied across disciplines (see Stoker and Baker 2015; Jessop 2004, 2011; Kooiman and Jentoft 2009; Meuleman 2008; Torfing et al. 2012). As a conceptual framework, metagovernance generally encourages us to look at the modes or orders of social coordination and how they are manifested, utilised, and interacted. As a practice, it is about a process of ‘steering devolved governance processes’ (Peters 2010, p. 37), involving,
deliberate attempts to facilitate, manage, and direct more or less self-regulating processes of interactive governance without reverting to traditional statist styles of government in terms of bureaucratic rule making and imperative command (Torfing et al. 2012, p. 122).

Hence, any attempts to coordinate different modes of governance essentially is sufficient to be called metagovernance because at the heart of the concept is the interactive nature of governance. It is constructive to develop the analytical concept of metagovernance to help study the practice and process of steering better and more critically.

2.2.1 Metagovernance and governance

The concept of metagovernance cannot replace that of governance which provides the general basis for metagovernance. A discussion of governance is needed upon which to build the understanding on metagovernance.

Governance is one of the most contested, but ubiquitous, concepts within the study of politics and public policy (Fawcett 2016; Bevir 2012; Frederickson 2005) where government has become an increasingly complex matter dependent on hybrid practices and diverse stakeholders. Governance broadly refers to a mode of social coordination (Thompson et al. 1991; Lowndes and Skelcher 1998; Meuleman 2008; Bevir 2012). The study of governance is believed to cover the study of structures and procedures (of the governance itself and the governor) and the relations with those who are governed, be they subordinates, partners, or clients (Meuleman 2019, p. 23).

For Jessop (2016a, p. 74), ‘governance’ is ‘both equivocal, because it has different but stable meanings in different contexts, and ambiguous, as its meanings vary even in similar contexts’. Its utility is slippery (see Welch 2013) and the term is often used in conjunction with a particular qualifying prefix (Ansell and Torfing 2016). Hence, ‘governance’ has the character of a stipulative definition (Rhodes 1997) in which the term can be given a certain meaning for a certain purpose in a certain context. However, ‘governance’, in essence, could etymologically be traced back to the Greek word ‘kybernân’ or ‘kubernetes’ which means ‘the art of steering, governing, piloting’ associated with how to create a system of rule (Kjær 2004; Torfing, et al. 2012).

As a theory of governing, governance is an analytical tool to understand and participate in the purposive actions and practices of attempting, directly or indirectly, to provide or coordinate ordered governing mechanisms/structures regardless of whether government plays an active role
(Peters and Pierre 2016; Ansell and Torfing 2016; Bevir 2012). Indeed, there is no ‘single theory’
of governance, but rather many overlapping theoretical discussions and debates (see Ansell and
Torfing 2016). In the area of politics and public management, one common point the theories of
governance contribute to is a re-consideration of the role of the state in governance arrangements.
Governance theories do not suggest that the state has simply lost its power in governing but that
the state is exercising power in a different manner. To study governance is thus to study the state
and its relationship with society.

Two major generations of governance studies can be identified (Palumbo 2015; Ansell and
Torfing 2016; cf. Rhodes 2012). The first generation has sympathetically focused on the
innovations generated through changes in governance and usually highlighted their positive
achievements. Its theories have revolved around a unidirectional shift from ‘government to
governance’ suggesting that processes of governing were somehow self-organising and did not
require government. This conceptualisation of governance is still dominant in the field. In contrast,
the second generation has put more emphasis on the critical aspects of those alleged achievements.
Governance is starting to be seen as not replacing government, but rather supplementing and
transforming government. Some even prefer to see how governance operates in the shadow of
hierarchy and how government participates in governance. In addition, critical analysis of any
ideal forms of governing has been advocated. A form of governing is seen in itself susceptible to
failure. This second generation of governance studies is inclined to envision governance in the
broader sense emphasising the relational dimension of governance: ‘how different governance
modes, hierarchies, markets, or networks co-exist and the potential tensions and dilemmas that
arise from their co-existence’ (Kjær 2011, p. 106). Metagovernance is derived from, and positioned
in, the second generation.

2.2.2 Steering through hierarchies, markets, and networks

Given that governance involves a mode of social coordination in a complex, intertwined
system, it not involves oversight and control (hierarchies), but also non-hierarchical coordination.
Treated as a coordinating mechanism, several kinds of governance are identified by governance
scholars (see Jessop 2011, 2016b; Thompson et al. 1991; Kooiman 2003; Meuleman 2008). The
three most basic ‘modes of governance (steering)’ are often classified as hierarchies, market, and
networks. This classification is typological or speculative rather than empirically grounded (Jessop
2016b). They are three ideal types of social coordination. Each of them depends on a certain form of steering to coordinate actions. Some see these modes as structural arrangements, the ways of providing direction towards certain governance problems (Pierre and Peters 2000). This means that there is a ‘right’ governance solution through manipulating the ‘structures’ within which it is presumed to be generated. In this respect, the occurrence of governance is at the intersection of different modes of social relations which then allows the plausibility of adopting different approaches to their interplays. Various hybrids are possible.

Each mode has its own distinctive strengths and weaknesses. They are not interchangeable. Hierarchies depend on authority and centralised control. They divide complex tasks into more manageable ones, thereby encouraging a division of labour, specialisation, and effective goal attainment. The typical hierarchical relation involves dependency and subordination. A good example of hierarchical governance is steering through rules and regulations. On the contrary, markets depend on prices and dispersed competition. They produce coordination through exchanges although most of their activities often rely on laws and governments. The typical market relation involves independency. Market governance aims to reach efficient allocation of resources typically through steering by contracts and grants.

In contemporary new governance arrangements where various non-state stakeholders and ‘wicked problems’ (Peters 2017) are involved, hierarchies and markets are seen as not being sufficient for the distribution of public goods and services. On the other hand, networks are championed by governance scholars, especially those of the ‘network governance’ school (see Rhodes 1997; Smith 1998; Richards and Smith 2002). Networks depend on trust across webs of associations. They do not usually contain an authoritative centre to coordinate, but repeated and continuous dialogue. The typical network relation involves inter-dependency, coordination and reciprocity. Steering through co-operations, coalitions, and partnerships are good examples of network governance.

### 2.2.3 Conceptualising metagovernance

There are various conceptualisations of metagovernance (see Jessop 2004, 2011; Sørensen and Torfing 2007; Meuleman 2008; Stoker and Baker 2015). In general, metagovernance can be examined from the macro-level of the whole governance system (Jessop 2003, 2004; Kooiman 2003; Kooiman and Jentoft 2009) and from the more micro- or meso-level which focuses on how
networks are steered and, if they can be steered, in what ways and by whom (Sørensen 2006; Meuleman 2008). The former chiefly emphasises how the national governance system rearranges and interacts, involving normative aspects. In contrast, the latter tends to see metagovernance as ‘network management tools and techniques’ for steering networks by: (a) ‘hands-off’ approaches implemented at a distance such as design and framing contexts and conditions; and (b) more interventionist ‘hands-on’ approaches implemented by a network manager within the network such as through management and participation.

Metagovernance is also usefully comprehended through state-centric approaches (see Torfing et al. 2012; Bell and Hindmoor 2009; Jessop 2007, 2016b) rather than through more society-centric ones, which favour network governance and a relatively dominant role of non-state actors for steering networks. For the state-centric approach, metagovernance is focused on how the state revitalises its role in response to the changing context of governance. In such a context, the state might be less hierarchical in terms of organisation, yet hierarchies still play an important role in terms of coordination. As Scharpf (1993) contends, hierarchical organisation and hierarchical coordination are not the same. This means that hierarchical organisations can rely on non-hierarchical forms of coordination, or non-hierarchical organisations can rely on hierarchical coordination.

In any public organisation, state power is routinely and authoritatively implicated in the exercise of all forms of governance. The state is central as it can bring to bear enormous financial resources to develop and support governance arrangements (Bell and Hindmoor 2009, p. 13). Even though the state has become less hierarchical, it does not necessarily ‘exclude a continuing and central political role for... states’ in creating the rules and context within which governance takes place (Jessop 2004, p. 66).

State actors execute metagovernance with a relatively dominant role, mostly, by influencing the strategic context within networks (Jessop 2004; Daugbjerg and Fawcett 2017). Metagovernance is not only limited to the world of network governance. Advocates of state-centric metagovernance argue that the state plays a relatively crucial role, and non-state actors have little incentive to metagovern (see Bell and Hindmoor 2009). However, this does not mean that non-state actors and institutions beyond the centre cannot perform metagoverning (Sørensen 2006; Sørensen and Torfing 2007; Meuleman 2019). They can metagovern but in the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ where,
the state threatens—explicitly or implicitly—to impose binding rules or laws… in order to change their cost–benefit calculations in favour of a voluntary agreement closer to the common good rather than to particularistic self-interests (Börzel and Risse 2010, p. 116).

Jessop is regarded as a prominent voice in studies on the state-centric conceptualisation of metagovernance. He originally defined metagovernance as ‘coordinating different forms of governance and ensuring a minimal coherence among them’ (Jessop 1997). Later, he described it specifically as ‘the organisation of the conditions for governance’ involving the calculated combination of modes of steering to reach the best possible outcomes as set by those engaged in metagovernance (Jessop 2003). In this respect, taking a bird’s eye view on governance, metagovernance is a matter of rebalancing different modes of governance grounded in the philosophy of critical realism (CR) (Jessop 2005). CR will be discussed in the next chapter as the philosophy navigating the research of the thesis.

Besides, for Jessop (2004), metagovernance implies the co-existence of government and governance in the ‘shadow of hierarchy’. Governance does not exist without government. This suggests an analytical way of seeing the state-centric and the society-centric approach to metagovernance as a ‘continuum’, rather than a dualism (Fawcett and Daugbjerg 2012; Daugbjerg and Fawcett 2015). It is a matter of degree as to how the government and the governance merge themselves in relation to one another.

2.2.4 The analytic of metagovernance

Wood (2016, p. 527) argues that metagovernance is a ‘multilevel concept’ which,

... can be applied in multiple contexts, and can have both a deep critical theoretical and even philosophical meaning, but also refers quite legitimately to concrete acts that can be usefully measured in empirical research.

It is possible to state that the analytic of metagovernance is a critical approach to the study of steering self-governing systems: a mode of thinking about how governance is structured and applied. Metagovernance broadens analytical horizons to the study of governance and is developed within four important conceptions of governance as shown in figure 2.3.
(1) The coexistence of government and governance

Metagovernance arguably broadens the analytical capacity by encouraging us to critically examine the oversimplification of the oft-cited idea of unitary shift from old government (hierarchies) to new governance (non-hierarchies), concurred by mainstream governance theories in the aforementioned ‘network governance’ school. The ‘network governance school’ is often criticised for portraying naïve political relationships and underlying changes in governing characterised as ‘governance without government’, often equating governance simply with networks as the only realistic mode of steering if better governance is expected (see Marinetto 2003; Peters and Pierre 2006; Davies 2005; Ungsuchaval 2017). Metagovernance contends that the importance of the state should not be de-emphasised. Instead, it follows the research which has found that the state and hierarchical governance persist and function well even where network governance is predominant (Bell and Hindmoor 2009; Peters and Pierre 2006; Lynn 2011; Hill and Lynn 2005). Metagovernance better captures the reality of public governance as the state in modern governance is a ‘congested state’, full of fragmented and plural forms of governance, not just those of networks (Skelcher 2000).

Metagovernance does not pre-suppose that certain practices or actors are oriented to one superior kind of steering. The underlying idea of metagovernance to govern ‘better’, not less, is often implicitly associated with processes of governmentality (Sokhi-Bulley 2011). Subsequently, ‘government’ and ‘governance’ should be given equal attention. Metagovernance does not portray
governance and government as having an ‘either-or’, binary relationship, as mainstream governance theories often uphold. Instead, government (old, hierarchical steering) and governance (new, non-hierarchical steering) can coexist in a metagovernance perspective. As Whitehead (2003) argues, metagovernance breaks down the arbitrary divide that has been constructed between government and governance, suggesting instead a hybrid form of governance that is fashioned ‘in the shadow of hierarchy’.

It is noted that the term ‘government’ used in metagovernance studies is not simply equated with the central administrative agency of the state. It can also mean any formal structures of the public sector, the apparatuses of the state, and the set of actors which exercise state power including non-departmental bodies (Peters and Pierre 2016). Government, accordingly, is not a single entity but a conglomerate of actors. The term can also be alternatively interpreted as a mode of governing featuring hierarchies. These two interpretations are often used interchangeably.

Metagovernance treats modes of governance equally as the fundamental units of analysis. It highlights theory development of metagovernance in terms of ‘and-and’, not ‘either-or’ (Kooiman 2003). Government and governance are positioned as a duality, not a dualism (Marsh 2011). Empirically, Kjaer (2010) argues that rather than involving contradictory developments, governing and governance in the case of the EU are mutually constitutive in that more governing implies more governance and vice versa. Torfing et al. (2012) found that governments are in fact capable of influencing policymaking in the decentred world of interactive governance through the exercise of metagovernance.

There are numerous ways that governments establish the ground rules for governance (see Jessop 2016b). From a metagovernance perspective, how government and governance coexist, for instance, could be understood as a series of state transformation trends and counter-trends (see Jessop 1997). What should be emphasised here is the trend referred to as ‘a destatisation of politics’ where ‘governments have always relied on other agencies to aid them in realising state objectives or projecting state power beyond the formal state apparatus’ (Jessop 1997, p. 575). This correlates with the relational approach to state-society relations and interactive governance which suggests that governments often enhance their power and capacity by developing close, interdependent relationships with non-state actors and using networks to govern (Bell and Hindmoor 2009; Larsson 2013). Chosen governance strategies are in fact interactive showing a combination of different modes of governance, not merely those of the state. The trend signifies an increase of
‘partnerships’ between governmental, para-governmental, and non-governmental actors. The state integrates more non-hierarchical forms of governing and policy making such as networks and public-private partnerships into its system. This leads the state itself to consider metagovernance issues such as casting the shadow of hierarchy over governance arrangements or adjusting the relatively mixed modes of governing to ensure an effective outcome.

(2) Dialectic of structure-agency in governing

Promoting the co-existence of government and governance, often treated as binary, reflects a distinct stance regarding structure and agency in governance, which transcends mainstream governance theories. Different governance theories raise questions about structure and agency in governing and reflect different meta-theoretical positions (see Ungsuchaval 2016a). Some theories are inclined to be based decisively on structural explanations emphasising the mechanisms of institutional constraint of governance (see Peters 2011; Hay 2002) while the others are focused on decentring the institutions by prioritising the independent agents of governance and constructed narratives (see Bevir and Rhodes 2003, 2015). They place a different priority on structural or agential forces.

However, metagovernance pays attention to the dialectic of structure and agency in governing. It can be seen as an outcome of strategic interaction between governance modes, interactions, and calculations (see Jessop 2005, 2007). As Jessop (2011, p. 108) asserts, governance comprises ‘the structures and practices involved in coordinating social relations that are marked by complex, reciprocal interdependence, and metagovernance refers in turn to the coordination of these structures and practices’. Grounded in the dialectic of structure-agency, metagovernance does not merely involve structures or processes but ‘social relations’.

In analytical terms, the dialectic of structure and agency gives rise to the emphasis on the structural ‘tendency’ and the relationship a metagovernor has created. Jessop (2004, p. 70) refers to metagovernance as ‘the organisation of the conditions of governance in terms of their structurally inscribed strategic selectivity, that is, in terms of their asymmetrical privileging of some outcomes over others’. Consequently, a part of metagovernance points to the analysis of the strategic selectivity or ‘structural tendency’ of certain governance structures and arrangements (Jessop 2005, 2007; Biebricher 2013), namely of what is privileged by a metagovernor and what context gives rise to a governance arrangement that is strategically-selective or structurally biased.
In other words, metagovernors have an ineradicable tendency to favour, produce and reproduce certain structures and structural configurations including actors, strategies, and discourses over others. At the same time, the structural tendency of the governance arrangement is a structural constraint influencing the operations and behaviours of the metagovernor so that they can orient their strategies and tactics to reach a satisfactory outcome. It is noted that the idea of structural tendency is about ‘tendency’ rather than absolutely constraining (Jessop 2016b). Steering is not apparently neutral. Coordinating modes of governance is thus about strategies in the web of complex interaction between structure and agency, and involves inbuilt tendencies or biases of privileging. Yet whether how and how far these tendencies are actualised depends on the changing balance of forces, strategies and tactics metagovernors perform in practice.

In practice, metagovernance signifies the dialectic of structure-agency as well. In their application of metagovernance, Stoker and Baker (2015, pp. 38-39) assert that metagovernance ‘recognises governmental capacity and the constraining role played by institutions and structures whilst allowing for the agency of networked actors’. Metagovernance gives the potential for simultaneous recognition of the continued power of the state that does the governing and the reflexivity of networked players that are the governed. Therefore, to study metagovernance, primarily, is to look at the role, capacity, and legitimacy of metagovernors to exercise control over the more devolved and decentralised forms of decision-making characteristic of network governance (Fawcett 2016).

(3) Interactive governance in the ‘shadow of hierarchy’

The emphasis of metagovernance is not only on the co-existence, but the interactive, interdependent nature of different concepts of governance. As mentioned, hierarchy, market and network as the major concepts of governance are normally conceived in terms of ‘ideal’ or ‘pure’ types. However, it is difficult to find one mode at work purely and solely, especially in the public sector. Bartlet and Le Grand (1993) argue that, in the area of social policy, ‘market’ is different from ‘pure’ ideal-type markets. In practice, all modes share some of each other’s attributes and function in combination. They rely on one another.

For example, as hierarchies rely on networks, Larsson (2013) argues that networks also rely on sovereign power to preserve the conditions for effective network governance. Davies (2011) suggests that coordination of networks has the tendency to degenerate into hierarchical
systems because they fail to cultivate the ‘connectionist citizen-activists’ who could energetically solve policy and management problems in de-politicised, trust-based networks. Similarly, others also found that markets can and often do rely on command, as do networks on competition and hierarchies on trust (Grote 2012; Davies and Spicer 2015). Hence, networks are unlikely to exist without hierarchy and market influence. Markets are unlikely to function without hierarchy and network influence, and so on. In this way, the interactive form of governance proves the fact that government and governance coexist with one another (Fawcett 2016).

Consequently, what is potentially found is quasi-markets, quasi-networks, and quasi-hierarchy (Exworthy, Powell, and Mohan 1999). This corresponds with Torfing et al. (2012), who suggest two key forms of the interactive governance arrangement: quasi-markets (e.g. granting) and quasi-networks (e.g. partnership and governance network). If modes of governance are only perceived in ideal, pure form, one cannot make sense of a high degree of command and control found in managerialism associated with NPM and market-driven governance (see Deetz 1992; Carlisle 2011). NPM, in essence, combines the alleged efficiency of managerial and budgetary practices from the private sector and the regulatory efficacy of steering and funding from the public sector (Bartlett and Le Grand 1993; Hood 1991). It has never been the matter of the market alone. To see the interactive feature of governance is an important stance in the analytic of metagovernance.

Actually, the idea that governance arrangement consists of a combination of modes of governance is not entirely new. What is new in what metagovernance offers is a theorised conception of the compatibility (such as potential complementarity) or incompatibility (such as tension) and the interactive feature of steering within a specific governance arrangement. The challenge of metagovernance in practice is how to provide direction to a governance system through mechanisms which maintain the virtues generated by delegated and devolved forms of governing while providing central direction and control. Indeed, metagovernance holds the most fundamental task of governing, that is, the balancing of control and autonomy. For Jessop (2011), the task of metagovernance can be conducted with the ‘collibration’ of governance: a strategic attempt to adjust or rebalance several modes of governance in the interconnected coordination to improve the effectiveness of steering. This strategic attempt is believed to take place in the ‘shadow of hierarchy’.
The ‘shadow of hierarchy’ refers to the influence, often subtle and indirect, the state exercises over other actors in political and civil society through either the real or imagined pressure of executive or legislative action, or both. Such influence draws on the state’s unique capacities and powers, including coercion (Jessop 2016a, 2016b; see also Scharpf 1994; Whitehead 2003; Héritier and Lehmkuhl 2008). With the ‘shadow of hierarchy’, metagovernance involves the state capability and mentality to steer quasi-networks and quasi-markets by designing the context in which they operate to secure the compatibility of outcomes and broader interests of the state. The ‘shadow of hierarchy’ is considered a defining feature of (effective) metagovernance (Jessop 2004, 2011; Peters 2010; Meyer 2012). It allows the orchestrator of metagovernance to design and combine elements of different governance modes as well as switching between the modes when necessary so that the effectiveness of metagovernance is reached (Meuleman 2019). Even self– or co–regulation featuring networks and markets would not take place without the shadow of hierarchy. This stresses the importance of hierarchical steering running through any kind of governance arrangement (Rhodes and Visser 2011). It would not be surprising if the state is often seen as a default metagovernor which usually decides on the balance between, and the operation of, different modes of governance.

Hence, it is likely that hierarchies in metagovernance are not merely a straightforward governing mechanism (hierarchical steering in a ‘pure’ sense) associated with order, efficiency, and centralised decision-making power; they are in fact manifested as quasi-hierarchies in the form of the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ often positioned in a higher order to steer a governance arrangement.

(4) Higher-order governance as strategic supervision

The analytic of metagovernance highlights the stratified reality of governance. Given the term ‘meta’ conveys meaning of something over and beyond, metagovernance is usually used to refer to the ‘governance of governance’ (Kooiman 2003; Jessop 2011; Meuleman 2008), that is the coordination/steering positioned above modes of governance. Specifically, Kooiman (2003) treats metagovernance as an emerging order, a third-order governance, which emphasises norms and principles for governing as a whole. This metagovernance goes beyond lower order governance which mainly deals with problem solving, the day-to-day activities of steering and the maintenance of the institutions where the activities of governance take place. In this sense,
metagovernance points to the significance of orders of governance, with metagovernance as a higher, emergent level conditioning and steering lower-order governance.

Comprehensively, Torfing et al. (2012, p. 131) address metagovernance as:

a reflexive, higher order governance practice that involves (a) the production and dissemination of hegemonic norms and ideas about how to govern and be governed; (b) the political, normative, and context-dependent choice among different modes of governing, or among different combinations of governing modes; and (c) the strategic structuring and managing of particular institutional forms of governance in order to facilitate sustained interaction, prevent dysfunctions, and advance particular political goals.

The above definition arguably implies that metagovernance is a practice that simultaneously involves inward and outward steering. Metagovernance is interested in the governing of ‘oneself’ as it steers and conducts distinct, but operationally related, modes of governance within a metagovernor’s system of governance (see Jessop 2011). At the same time, it can be seen as a practice of governing ‘others’ involving steering and conducting ‘self-organising networks’ or governance networks (see Klijn and Koppenjan 2016; Torfing et al. 2012) operating outside a metagovernor.

It is believed that higher-order governance is necessity because lower-order governance is inclined to failure (Jessop 1998, 2000; Meuleman 2008) and therefore needs steering to increase its potential. Jessop (2004) argues that metagovernance is used to create some coherence among modes of governance and an appropriate balance among different stakeholders and interests for the sake of social cohesion. In reality, networks of non-state actors commonly assumed to be able to support state agencies in addressing the increasing complex governance problems (see Slaughter 2004; World Economic Forum 2013; Anheier 2017; Munene and Thakhathi 2017) are not sufficiently united in their pursuit of a common goal and not functioning in an efficient, non-conflicting way. Networks are highly political (Gerard 2017) and having depoliticising effect (Wood 2016). The lack of rules in self-governing networks limits their capacity to shape outcomes. Metagovernance in this sense is conducted to ensure the functionality of the networks (as lower-order governance).

In practice, metagovernance as a higher-order governance can be framed as ‘strategic supervision’. As strategic supervision, metagovernance emphasises the coordination among the
actors and mechanisms of steering involved, or how the partnership is developed and run. It can posit values and goals for the partnership. Yet, no means of reaching the goals are necessarily specified. Those who govern thus retain a substantial degree of autonomy, a condition frequently referred to as (self-governing) governance. This is why metagovernance aims at governing, specifically steering and framing, ‘the environment of action… rather than the action directly’ (Peters 2010, p. 38). A good example of strategic supervision is shaping the structural and institutional conditions of the relationship by designing and directing the interactive governance arenas (Torfing et al. 2012).

To be specific, la Cour and Andersen (2016) suggest that metagovernance as ‘strategic supervision’ should stimulate promises about the committed continuation of relationship. For instance, merely developing the contractual relationship is not sufficient. Metagovernance should aim to build the possible perpetuation of the relationship and the common outcomes the actors have not yet created together. The relationship should not be temporary but institutionalised. In doing so, ‘soft’ instruments of steering are needed for governing at a distance so that stakeholders and partners are positioned into a certain governable terrain, where the metagovernor’s organising power and the latitude of the governed are simultaneously enhanced and a common goal is expected.

Therefore, metagovernance is a strategic attempt to indirectly govern or steer those engaged in the relationship, be they relevant actors or modes of governance. Although such an attempt is always conducted within the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ to prevent its potential failure, metagovernance, through ‘soft’ means, must allow some of the latitude of the actors engaged. In other words, in metagovernance, the social actors are given some autonomy to make decisions on their own.

### 2.3 Conclusion

NGOisation and metagovernance are the core theoretical frameworks employed in the thesis to investigate the THPF-NGO relations. The NGOisation framework helps explore in what way the NGOs are driven to develop certain characteristics by the funder. The metagovernance framework assists the researcher to investigate how the funded NGOs are steered by the THPF, or how the THPF strategically governs its NGO partners. Although the concepts are variously used, even in their own fields, they can be linked in a complementary way to study multiple aspects of
THPF-NGO relations. Each concept generates different answers to the same phenomenon which can bring us a better understanding of it. A ‘multilevel description’ is expected to emerge from CR research (O’Mahoney and Vincent 2014). The next chapter is dedicated to the discussion of the methodology used for the research, guided by CR insights.
Chapter 3
Methodology

The main purpose of the research is to explore why NGOisation happens through the metagovernance of the THPF by retroductively tracing back to the potential mechanisms which drive the processes. In this way, the thesis empirically investigates the operation and underlying mechanisms of the THPF used to steer its NGO partners and the NGOisation of them. Qualitative methodology is applied as research ‘orientation’ (Pernecky 2016) and critical realism (CR) is purposively chosen to help navigate the research which orients the empirical investigation in a distinct and a flexible way. This chapter aims to discuss the methodology selected and applied in the thesis. It starts with elaborating on the philosophy of CR adopted in the research and its methodological links. The retroductive research strategy, typically advocated by CR, will then be discussed as the dominant strategy. Then, the chapter explains the method selected for gathering and analysing data in practice. The chapter ends by discussing reflexivity, challenges and limitations of the research.

3.1 Critical realism and social research

CR is portrayed as a ‘seductive’ idea across a range of theories of human and social sciences, mostly because it is commonly known to hold the ostensible and practicable middle ground between (or alternative to) two opposing poles of the philosophical spectrum: extreme positivism and radical constructionism (Sayer 2000; Archer et al. 2016; Pawson 2006). Essentially, CR helps combine and reconcile a realist/objectivist ontology with an interpretivist/relativist epistemology (Maxwell 2012; Sayer 2000, 2010; Bhaskar 1998).

Even so, CR is a relatively young entrant into social science and its methodology. In qualitative research, it can be argued that CR is still developing, often based on some explicitly realist approach to the research (e.g. Maxwell 2012; Sayer 2010; Pawson 2006; Pawson and Tilley, 1997). Not many appealing and accessible materials have been seriously developed regarding empirically applied CR or CR-informed methodology (see Yeung 1997; Oliver 2012; Ackroyd and Karlsson 2014). Most recognised CR research models (e.g. Bhaskar 2016; Collier 1994; Danermark et al. 2002) that are variously applied to the empirical research are often too complicated to be practically applied. When they can be used, the empirical application of the
models is contested and developing (see Craig and Bigby 2015; Blom and Morén, 2011; Fletcher 2013, 2017). There is no ‘one-best-way’ to employ and adopt the CR research models. Nevertheless, among the contestation, the models are arguably similar in essence. They aim to investigate the underlying mechanisms, implicitly and explicitly.

Many strongly advocate that CR can perform serious and useful work in social research and theorising, and as such has implications for methodology (Maxwell 2012; Sayer 2010; Carter and New 2004; Danermark et al. 2002), especially in terms of conceptualisation and conduct of qualitative research. Bhaskar (2016, p. 79) asserts that the interest of CR empirical study is typically ‘exploratory’, that is, ‘to identify, discover, uncover… structures, blocks, and (generically) causes, and the particular sequences, combinations, and articulations of them at work in specific times and places’. This thesis adopts the ideas of CR as follows.

### 3.1.1 The layered ontology and the ‘emergence’

CR distinctively highlights a layered, but interwoven, ontology to social reality (Sayer 2010): the ‘empirical’ domain of sensory experience; the ‘actual’ domain of material existence and events; and the ‘real’ domain of causal powers and mechanisms. The real domain is not always apparent in empirical and actual manifestations. It generates events, which might or might not be experienced. In this respect, the social reality is constituted, not only by events and our perceptions or experiences of the events, but also by structures and mechanisms which are often unobservable and involving tendency. As such the layered ontology of CR enables researchers to investigate the mechanisms located at the real domain which are not merely confined to the study of empirically observed characteristics held by positivism and symbolically expressed meanings held by interpretivism which are located at the empirical level (see Wuisman 2005).

Moreover, the layered ontology points to the idea of ‘emergence’: the complex interaction between entities existing in different levels of reality where new, emergent phenomena cannot be reduced to phenomena existing in any one level of reality (Sayer 2000, Danermark et al. 2002). CR advocates an emergent approach that sees social phenomena as having distinctive qualities and emerging out of certain social conditions. As such the qualities are the ‘emergent property/power’ which makes the social phenomena an emergent reality that is irreducible to its discursive descriptions or component parts it is formed upon. In other words, the ‘higher level’ entities, which are emergent, cannot be reduced to the conditions provided by the ‘lower level’ entities. For
instance, NGOisation may be dependent upon certain developments such as institutionalisation and professionalisation which causally help constitute it, yet NGOisation has its own specific powers and characteristics which generate certain effects which cannot be reduced to the developments driving it. Likewise, metagovernance has a higher power than that of a mere mode of governance. It can strategically calibrate different modes of governance to reach an outcome in a way that each mode of governance cannot do, either alone or together.

3.1.2 Epistemology

The unique ontological position of CR, in turn, shapes the epistemology in a distinct way. For CR, reality does exist independently of our knowledge of it. However, how we see the world is theory-dependent or theory-laden, but not theory-determined. It is subject to conceptual interpretations. As summarised by della Porta and Keating (2008, p. 24), for CR, ‘there is a real material world but… our knowledge of it is often socially conditioned and subject to challenge and reinterpretation’. This double recognition of the realist ontology and relativist epistemology is relatively novel in social science research (O’Mahoney and Vincent 2014). It is important to note that, although CR recognises the interpretive notion of social reality as being communicatively and socially constructed, it does not aim to generate the interpretivist solution (Delanty 2005). CR-inspired research is not interested in meaning, understanding, and interpretation of people as held by interpretivist research, nor factual knowledge and law-like generalisations as held by positivist research. Instead, CR advocates the search for the means to synthesise an account of key social mechanisms and processes with mechanisms from the available ideas and relevant data.

Given this, theories are essential to CR research. CR believes in a possible ‘better’ theory which can help build more accurate explanations of certain social phenomena and mechanisms. However, the theory does not necessarily secure successful empirical research. CR scholars believe that theories are the starting point for empirical research (Bhaskar 2014; Greenhalgh 2014). It is hard to visualise how the reality perceived could be appreciated without the help of theories to clarify and simplify what is observed. Such theories are not absolute but initial and fallible but which enable ‘a deeper analysis that can support, elaborate, or deny’ the theories themselves in order to ‘help build a new and more accurate explanation of reality’ (Fletcher 2017, p. 184). The theories used in the thesis are thus subject to alternation and development throughout the research process. This makes the research iterative (O’Mahoney and Vincent 2014) moving between
conception and application so that ideas are tested against what could be found and observed in empirical settings.

The THPF-NGO relations are approached upfront through the analytical lens of metagovernance and NGOisation. These theories have significantly shaped the way the thesis studies the phenomenon. They are believed to be the ‘better’ theories possessing certain analytical power which can contribute to the analysis in an innovative way.

3.1.3 Causation and mechanisms

The aforementioned ontological and epistemological position of CR yields significant implications regarding CR research methodology in terms of causality. CR distinctively advocates the concept of ‘causation’. This concept is strikingly different from that of positivism, let alone interpretivism which rejects the idea of causal relation. Positivism promotes the ‘regularity’ theory of causation: the theory that sees causality as involving regular associations between events or variables and patterns in data. In contrast, CR employs the concept of ‘mechanism’ as central to explanation of causation (see Danermark et al. 2002; Sayer 2000). CR aims to look beyond outcomes such as ‘if A, then B’ and rather ‘use(s) perceptions of empirical events [those that can be observed or experienced] to identify the [unobservable, underlying] mechanisms that give rise to those events’ (Volkoff, Strong and Elmes 2007, p. 835). In other words, the CR view on causality is not about ‘a relationship among distinct events (e.g., the fact that event ‘A’ by and large has been followed by event ‘B’) but about realising the process and conditions under which ‘A’ causes ‘B,’ if at all’ (Zachariadis, Scott and Barrett 2013, p. 857).

According to Lawson (1997), a mechanism refers to the way a structured entity acts or works. The thing could not work or act in the ways it does without possessing the power to do so. In other words, the underlying mechanisms own inherent powers or tendencies which might or might not be actualised or mobilised and expressed in certain contexts (Bhaskar 2008). They reside in the properties of things and in tendencies in the real domain. The actualisation of the mechanisms or structures heavily depends on contingencies within the contexts. Hence, the CR version of causation is not universally deterministic, but contingent and emergent. For CR, causality is irreducible to either the actualised or the experienced.

Given the focus of this thesis, the NGOisation under investigation might be observable as an emergent phenomenon but the mechanisms driving it are hardly seen empirically. CR helps the
research identify and investigate potential underlying mechanisms which generate the phenomenon. Such mechanisms are found to reside in the THPF-NGO relations and the way the THPF metagoverns its NGO partners. NGOisation is then arguably the unintended consequence of the metagovernance of the THPF.

Furthermore, in CR research, the causal efficacy confirms the ‘reality’ of entities (see Collier 1994; Sayer 2010). In this sense, physical and mental (ideas and meanings) objects and processes, albeit inherently independent, are assumed to be equally real and mutually affect each other (Maxwell 2012). People’s beliefs have consequences for their actions and the reality they are embedded in and vice versa. The threat from managerialism to public governance is a good example. Even though it is not actualised and non-physical, it should be perceived as real because it has causal efficacy. Managerialism causes changes in public service management thinking and practice. It stresses a hierarchical top-down command and control style of management concerned with efficiency and control (Deetz 1992; Carlisle 2011). Although inactivated but perceived as a potential threat, managerialism leads to reaction and perhaps resistance. The effect of potential, indirect threat is real, at least in the minds of agents. This insight implies that meaning, intentions, or mental states and attributes given by interview participants, although not directly observable, are not just being simply theoretical abstractions or social construction but are parts of the real world having causal efficacy. They are considered as mechanisms.

The idea of causation and mechanisms ultimately directs the research to focus on explanations of why things are the way they are to a certain context. This predisposes the researcher to study internal (necessary) relations of the phenomena, the tendencies of the objects of study, the effects of one object on another, and the way the relations are actualised (Sayer 2000; Danermark et al. 2002; Reed 2008, 2009).

3.2 Retroductive research strategy

Ackroyd and Karlsson (2014, p. 21) argue that CR methodology should focus on connecting ‘the inner world of ideas to the outer world of observable events as seamlessly as possible’. In other words, CR research should aim, as closely as possible, to align explanations of reality (the mechanisms proposed to account for the outcomes) with reality itself (the actually existing mechanisms of ‘social object’) (Bhaskar 2008). To identify and explain the underlying
mechanisms methodologically, CR suggests applying neither deduction nor induction, but ‘retroduction’.

CR-informed enquiry is believed to use a form of retroductive analysis (Blaikie 2010; Blaikie and Priest 2017; Reed 2008, 2009). Retroduction guides the researcher from the phenomenon lying at one level to discover the underlying causal mechanisms lying at a different, deeper level (Blaikie 2010; Lawson 1997). In other words, retroduction is a mode of inference in which empirical events are explained by reference to the processes and mechanisms that are capable of producing, or at least helping facilitate, them in particular contexts (Sayer 2010). In this sense, retroduction ‘works backwards’ from the certain substantive phenomena of interest or ‘effects’ to the preceding interaction between various mechanisms and contingencies which produced and sustained the phenomena, or ‘explanatory structures’ (Reed 2008, 2009). A hypothetical model of causal mechanisms is then developed which is believed to produce observable events and objects.

Retroduction prompted the thesis to look for the ‘cause’ of the NGOisation of civil society, that is, to look at what led to the phenomenon. The research aim and questions are formulated in a CR-inspired way, focusing on why NGOisation happens: what mechanisms can explain the NGOisation of civil society and the THPF-NGO relations and why it is the way it is. Blaikie (2010) affirms that retroduction is the best fit concept for asking ‘why’. Accordingly, this thesis aims to create ‘explanations’ of the underlying mechanisms. It is an exploratory study of the mechanisms responsible for driving NGOisation, which resided in the THPF-NGO relation and in the way the THPF metagoverns its NGO partners. The researcher’s model of causal mechanisms essentially involves agents’ deliberations and reflections on pre-existing relevant social structures (e.g. governance, funding and contracting, and partnership) which had facilitating and constraining implications for action. The model helped to explain the participants’ experiences of metagovernance and NGOisation. NGOisation is seen as an unintended consequence of the metagovernance of the THPF in the context of the THPF-NGO relations.

Through retroduction, the role of the researcher is not to predict or to understand, but to establish whether a postulated structure or mechanism exists and operates in the way hypothesised (Blaikie 2010) in order to create potential explanations of why certain phenomena are the way they are and yield outcomes that they yield. Knowledge produced in this way is invariably context-
specific and does not allow the formulation and testing of predictive laws or hypotheses (Reed 2009).

As such the explanation is theoretically- and empirically-grounded. It is ‘theoretical’ because the process of creating explanations involves the intellectual imagination and the abstraction of the characteristic and the operation of underlying mechanisms. The mechanisms are chosen from amongst ‘known’ mechanisms (Blaikie 2010), which are potentially made up on the basis of what we know or we think we know (Williams 2018). It is ‘empirical’ because the explanations of the mechanisms are not a work of pure fiction. They are derived from a methodical search - through reasoning, interviews, and other methods - for empirical evidence which supports the behaviour of the mechanisms in the context they reside in.

Besides, the theoretical and the empirical are dialectical in the search for mechanisms. Some conceptualise the dialectic as the moves between the ‘concrete’ to the ‘abstract’ (see Danermark et al. 2002). What the mechanisms look like at first is depended on where the research starts from, namely theoretical frameworks. The mechanisms are drafted along the description of ‘the context of the action, intentions of the social actors, and the processes through which social action and interaction are sustained and/or changed’ (Blaikie 2010, p. 21). The mechanisms are then confirmed or/and refined through empirical data analysis which later are established as the key underlying mechanisms explaining the phenomenon.

3.3 Data collection and analysis

This section addresses the practicality of the research process by discussing the methods and techniques used for collecting and analysing data. The research instruments are structured for the unit of observation, that is, the THPF and the funded NGOs which are represented through key informants. The research for this thesis utilised in-depth interviews as a core technique with supplementary material via document research and observations. These techniques are interactive. In-depth interviews mainly aim to engage with participants at the management level of both the office of THPF and the funded NGOs. Documentary research deals with text-based resources representing what the THPF professes as an organisation and governance issues at board level. Observation was occasionally conducted to help the researcher become familiar with and be better able to comprehend the field.
3.3.1 In-depth interviews

According to Gorman and Clayton (2005), in-depth interviews usefully (a) give immediacy and mutual exploration, focus on investigation of causation (or why individuals or organisations act in certain ways), (b) provide data which is otherwise perceived as confidential or sensitive (a concern which is particularly prevalent in regard to the study of inter-organisational relations), and (c) generate a large amount of data in a relatively short time period and render complete data sets.

Knowledge generated through interviews provides information on the experience of the participants regarding a certain issue (Brinkmann and Kvale 2015). This experience represents two important aspects (see Zölner, Rasmussen and Hansen 2007; Brinkmann and Kvale 2015). The first aspect involves participants’ observations from places and settings - which could be referred to as ‘factual’ - which the researcher has not been able to see first-hand. This ‘factual’ data is obtained through ‘descriptive’ kind of questions, namely ‘when’, ‘what’ or ‘who’. These questions were asked to encourage the participants to talk about an issue/subject as they had experienced it.

The second aspect involves participants’ inner perceptions and experiences, in the sense of their perception of the social reality and interpretation of such perceptions. These perceptions and experiences are acquired through ‘evaluative’ questions, namely ‘how’ and ‘why’. These questions demanded the participants to elaborate on their reflections on issues such as their own role, other participants’ roles, and internal relations. Examples of questions used to guide the interview can be seen in Appendix A.

In addition, probing was used to generate the follow-up questions which shape participants’ responses into useful data. Two specific techniques of probing were employed. The first technique is ‘levelling’ (see Orne and Bell 2015) which refers to the technique the researcher used to shift participants’ mode of thinking to generate new kinds of information. For example, the participants were implicitly asked questions which navigated their opinions to move upwards to narratives and experiences and downwards to theorising and mechanisms. This means that the interview guide was not strictly used in chronological order. The second technique involves asking agonistic, challenging questions which imply disagreement. For instance, the participants were asked to give their reflections on a criticism that the THPF is ‘a hub of elite civil society’ in Thailand, or the negative effects of the THPF’s funding which leads the funded organisations to be more project-based and fragmented, spoiling the value of civil society. These questions made the participants
defend their statements, generating more information than the researcher would otherwise have obtained.

Indeed, interviewing is a valuable and often the only, way to gain a description of actions and events that took place in the past or in which observational access is unavailable. In this sense, interviews are a means to gain insights into diverse perspectives related to the inner workings of the THPF-NGO partnership, which, in turn, provide the possibility for reaching both the ‘official’ account and different viewpoints that infrequently come to the fore. However, it is important to note that interview data is merely a description of the observational units, or what the participants ‘said’ at the experience domain (Maxwell 1992). In CR, there is also a need for the researcher to make inferences from the description in order to analyse the social contexts and underlying processes and mechanisms, the explanatory unit which is couched in another domain, which represent different aspects of a multi-layered social reality within which the participants act. CR-informed interviews are more than merely appreciating the interpretations of the participants, an activity commonly favoured by interpretivists (Smith and Elger 2014).

To be specific, CR approach to interviewing emphasises the importance of the active, investigative, and analytically informed orientation of the researcher/interviewer in generating data and participants’ descriptions. As Pawson and Tilley (1997) argue, the interviews should be explicitly theory-driven. The subject matter of the interview is ultimately the researcher/interviewer’s theories and conceptualisations, which are then confirmed, falsified, or/and refined by the participants’ thoughts and actions using their own conceptual basis. This suggests that the interviews help connect the research agenda of the researcher to the understandings and experiences of the participants. Data collected from the interviews is not merely detailed information about the ‘factual’ and the participants’ insights but also hypotheses which help to enquire into the relationships among the different causal mechanisms (e.g. modes of governance), the contexts in which these mechanisms operated, and the outcomes, whether anticipated or unanticipated.

In practice, a semi-structured interview guide (see Appendix A) was designed and structured in four major parts. Part A collected general information on the organisation and the interviewee’s experience within it. Part B is specifically focused on the working experience and relationship the participants have with their partner organisation(s). Part C is designed for the participants to give an assessment of certain hypothesised questions involving influences of the
THPF on the funded organisations. Lastly, part D collected the participants’ reflexive opinions of the subject being studied.

The interview guide was pretested in three interviews to increase its validity and applicability. These pilot interviews took place in August 2016. Consequently, the original interview guideline was revised, shortened, and streamlined in some points. The revised guideline was then used with two interviews in December 2016. However, the interviews for the main field phase were conducted over an extended period of six months, from March to August 2017. Every interview was conducted face-to-face. Over this period, 37 stakeholder semi-structured interviews were conducted with THPF staff in different positions, different NGOs under the funding of THPF, and relevant stakeholders. In addition, 8 interviews with experts in the academic field were conducted to provide supplementary insight on the issues and research challenges. Hence, the total number of interview participants is 50 people (see appendix B).

The interviews lasted between 60 minutes and 90 minutes and were recorded and fully transcribed anonymously. This is for reasons of internal validity and reliability and to derive verbatim citations which supported accurate data analysis. Receiving ethical approval from the Research Ethics Committee of the University of Kent’s School of Social Policy, Sociology, and Social Research in October 2016, the research is conditioned to grant anonymity, namely pseudonyms, to all participants. Accordingly, no direct connection between the information or statements and the participant’s name is presented. It is also noted that the interviews were conducted in the Thai language. All citations were translated into English by the researcher. Moreover, every participant was first approached personally by the researcher via a face-to-face meeting, e-mail or mobile contact with the cover letter and other related documents. The documents included the information sheet which consisted of a brief description of the research goals and methods, a consent form and the interview schedule.

The participants in the research were selected through purposeful sampling by seeking out people likely to give rich, informative interviews relevant to the study (Morris 2015; Bryman 2012). Precisely, they were recruited through ‘theoretical sampling’ based on theoretical reasons seeking ‘presentedness’, or what is present in the case, rather than representation (Orne and Bell 2015; Blaikie 2010). For example, research found that resistance to the funder, at least verbally, is common among upper management in NGOs (Ebrahim 2005). The interview is then designed to interview senior officers in NGOs which have obtained the THPF’s funding because they tend
to show more critical thinking. An interview list of NGO officers was created based on the NGOs participating in the public hearings for the Thai Health Promotion Foundation Act (2001) amendment in March and April 2017. These events involved key stakeholders of the THPF which was a good starting point for contacting relevant stakeholders. Additionally, several more NGOs have been added from complementary sources such as the internet and recommendation through snowball techniques. Snowball sampling, or relational recruiting, in particular, leverages the social networks of the participants to reach people the researcher would not otherwise be in contact with (Orne and Bell 2015). As a result, the participants from the NGO sector were at the management level of either an organisation or a project.

Likewise, the participants from the THPF were purposively chosen from the top of the organisation, namely executive staff and the board members, and relevant key stakeholders. The THPF is a public organisation with a relatively flat hierarchical command chain. The CEO and the directors of sections are responsible for the management and the governance of the office. They all have experience of working with NGO partners and are involved with funding issues so they can provide data at both the strategic level and operational level. The participant recruitment network is illustrated in Appendix D.

Although the interviews support the research in terms of providing rich and in-depth insights of the participants, they have limitations. The participants commonly attempt to provide what they ‘think’ is an accurate portrayal of events (Rubin and Rubin 2012). This is the ability of the participants to construct a social ‘reality’ which is usually hard or impossible, to check (Morris 2015). Other techniques are thus needed to help verify, if possible, the interview data.

**3.3.2 Supplementary methods**

Document research as a secondary method was carried out in order to access data which could not be gained through interviews or required further clarification with the hope that it may allow any other unforeseen content to come forth (Bryman 2012). Also, it was used to deal with the inadequacy of interviews with the board members of the THPF. Not many interviews were conducted with the board members because most of them were difficult-to-reach, higher-up politicians or bureaucrats, who are political appointees and are not normally much involved with the THPF’s operation and relationship with the NGOs.
In general, key information from the THPF is well-documented while that of NGOs is poorly-documented and less publicly available. This is because the THPF is a public agency bound to officially produce official documents while the NGOs are non-state agencies which may or may not publish their organisational documents. Also, there is a serious lack of detailed information, both statistical and descriptive, about the size and the scope of the NGO sector. Government reports relating to NGOs necessarily reflect the state’s representation and bias (e.g. The Secretariat of the Senate 2003).

Analysed archival data include the THPF and its partners’ websites, annual reports, minutes of meetings and other relevant publications. Among them, the minutes of the THPF’s board meetings and annual reports are particularly interesting and useful. Firstly, analysing the minutes helped complement the data analysis on the decision-making and the governance level of the organisation. Originally, the minutes of meetings between November 2003 and November 2006, and December 2008 and December 2011 were requested by the researcher. Many THPF staff and NGOs claimed that at those times they were governed by governments that were friendly to civil society and the THPF, and actively supported social policies and programmes. However, access to the records required permission from the THPF. The researcher was asked to provide several important documents related to his identity and status as a researcher and the research description in order to obtain permission to access them. It turned out that he was only granted access to the minutes between November 2003 and November 2006. The permitted minutes were also censored, mostly in parts concerning the exact cost of a proposed project and the amount of granting to politically sensitive projects. This does not considerably affect the research because the figures for granted projects are not the main enquiry of the thesis. Secondly, examining the annual reports provided data on what the THPF has stated as an organisation. It also helped generate the data on how the THPF operates and interacts with its funded organisations.

Apart from the document research, participant observation was also used as a supplementary technique, which helped the researcher to familiarise himself with the issues under investigation, to make connections and networks benefiting the fieldwork, and to grasp how the participants communicate with each other (Bryman 2012). Throughout the fieldwork period, the researcher had the opportunity to observe the operations and the activities of different sections of the THPF. For example, the researcher ‘officially’ attended events, such as the ‘Sharing for Health’ forums, the ‘Presenting, Sharing, and Networking’ forums, and the ‘Thai Health Talk’ (a
considerable event to celebrate the 15 year anniversary of the THPF). These events were organised by the Partnership and International Relations Section (PIRS), a main unit of the THPF dealing with networking and capacity building of the granted organisations.

Importantly, the researcher participated in the public hearings for the 2001 THPF Act amendment held by the government in March and April 2017. The events allowed the researcher to make contact with and continue to observe the ‘Thai Health Promotion Movement’ (THPM): a loose movement founded in 2016 consisting of several key NGOs and activists, both within and outside the area of health, which aims to develop a health promotion system, health watch policies and to advocate the function of the THPF. The meetings and forums of some granted NGOs were also observed. For instance, the researcher contributed to NGO events organised by the ‘Capacity-building Programme for Leadership for Change and Social-Health Justice (Roottogether)’, such as the ‘lesson summaries and directions for civil society movement’ forum. The events were critical as they generated discussions about the future challenges of the NGO sector and civil society in Thailand (see Ungkultassaneeyarat 2017).

3.3.3 Data analysis

Many CR researchers actively used a grounded theory approach to data coding and analysis (see Yeung 1997; Oliver 2012; Kempster and Parry 2014). Nonetheless, this study follows Fletcher (2017) in taking the position that this approach is not ideal for a CR study and not suited to this research. Two major reasons can be provided. Firstly, grounded theory avoids active involvement with existing theory during the analysis process. Grounded theory conducts coding to gradually develop theories grounded in the data, rather than in theories and concepts derived from elsewhere (Corbin and Strauss 2008). CR instead emphasises that ‘active thought experimentation is needed before research even begins’ (Hart, New and Freeman 2004, p. 166). This leads to the theory-led data processing ‘to find the best explanation of reality through engagement with existing (fallible) theories about that reality’ (Fletcher 2017, p. 186). Secondly, grounded theory is principally inductive in terms of inferential processes while CR is retroductive. In other words, grounded theory is more data-driven while CR involves a more theory- and researcher-driven analytical process.

Given the nature of the data collected in which the ordering and exact wording of the answers as well as the questions themselves differ between participants, the thesis adopted a
thematic analysis (Orne and Bell 2015; Ritchie, Spencer, O’Cornor 2003) as the strategy of analysing data which has the capacity to support the creation of explanatory accounts based on empirical data. Searching for themes or codes, in CR, is to look for ‘demi-regularities’, or the tendencies of entities and patterns at the empirical level of reality (Fletcher 2013, 2017). It is ‘demi’ because CR believes in the open system of the social world where any number of occurrences and events often overlap and interact (Brown, Fleetwood and Roberts 2002; Sayer 2010). In such a system, absolute, law-like regularities are barely possible.

In practice, the interview transcripts were read several times in order for the researcher to understand what tendencies or themes/codes were emerging (Silverman 2014). A number of initial codes drew on the author’s research agenda mainly inspired by the relevant literature which was then supplemented by other codes which emerged from the interview data. In other words, these codes were eliminated, changed, and supplemented during the process until every interview transcript was coded. This way of generating codes allowed the researcher to avoid the preconceptions the researcher had which could distort the interpretation of the data (Fletcher 2017). For example, there were several important codes which particularly indicated the CR’s ideas of emergence, layered reality, and structure-agency, such as ‘network’, ‘relationship’, ‘funding/granting’, ‘identity’, ‘power/authority’, ‘transformation/change’. Several codes, such as ‘governance/governing’, ‘civil society’, ‘NGO’, ‘tri-power strategy’, ‘proactive granting’, ‘innovation’, and ‘partnership’ were employed to analyse how the THPF metagoverns its NGO partners. Other codes including ‘policy advocacy’, ‘professionalisation/professionalism’, ‘bureaucracy’, ‘project-based’, and ‘accountability’ were developed and used to analyse NGOisation. Overall, there were 25 codes. Table 3.1 shows each code used and examples of their empirical links. NVivo (version 11) computer software was used to support the categorising and coding of data.

These codes were connected together with other relevant materials at the end of the coding stage to identify the various structures, agents, and underlying mechanisms building the relations between the THPF and the funded NGOs and the processes driving NGOisation. In other words, the data analysis was guided by the following questions in reading the transcripts: what types of relationship are established between the THPF and the NGOs? What mechanisms are at play? What pattern, if any, is emerging? Who is positioned and perceived as passive, dependent or active,
independent? What is implied and what is not said? What consequences do they lead to? To what extent are they generating the NGOisation of civil society?

Table 3.1 Codes and their links to empirical data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Codes</th>
<th>Examples of empirical link</th>
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<tr>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td>In a positive way… the THPF made us accountable to the accountability system. The Thai NGO sector so far has, frankly speaking, no such system. If there is one, it’s weak. Some might not want to receive grants from the THPF because they are afraid of being investigated. The point is that this is making the NGOs become more professionalised. NGOs must be transparent and accountable (Mr Jet, interview).</td>
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<td>Bureaucracy</td>
<td>THPF financial regulation, especially the part that requires an external auditor, is new to us [NGOs]. This matter might be normal for business organisations but for NGOs it is not. Auditing social development projects creates difficulties [for NGOs]. It takes time to adapt [to the system]. The regulations are also stricter than ones of bureaucracy… For example, we need to submit the original receipts for things or services [bought for running the project] (Mr Tan, interview).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil society</td>
<td>In fact, civil society organisations should be created easily and terminated easily as well. If they achieve their missions, they can disappear (Mr Pun, interview).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Community</td>
<td>Many NGO workers are thinking that they have done well at community work, solving local problems, and fighting for ordinary people. Anyway, that era has changed (Dr Luke, interview).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>The THPF has helped expand the boundaries of social and development enterprises by framing them as relevant to daily life. The work entailed is made to become seen as helping oneself, not only others. The enterprise is everyone’s business. People at any level started to perceive the social issues as their own health issues… Social and development work has become diversified (Ms Cat, interview).</td>
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<td>Funding/granting</td>
<td>For foreign funders, when they decided to grant, they just granted. They didn’t have any interventions after that, but there might have been some conditions… They didn’t ask us to write a proposal in order to check whether the ideas proposed matched their ideas. They didn’t expect what we should do… [Instead,] the way the THPF uses [the strategic framework] is to guide the course of what we do by setting the strategic framework and policy priority for the funded organisations. Sometimes it becomes involved in the activities. Moreover, the THPF has implemented many stricter rules into the project review process (Mr Wan, interview).</td>
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<td>Governance/governing</td>
<td>The process [of the THPF] in terms of feedback management, maybe, should be better than this. This is difficult to say… When I first began to work with the THPF, the process of drafting three-year plans was designed by boards and committees. The meeting was run by the inner circle [of the THPF]. Recently, I’ve invited hundreds of partners. They’re happy for the participation. We got new, interesting views. Even so, the process did not cover the broader public. We are not there yet… I can’t say that the others did the same way I did. Yet, my section is rather more advanced than the other sections (Dr Pan, interview).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Health/well-being</td>
<td>The THPF has shifted from the curative approach to health toward the preventive approach by making health became the shared responsibility of all people. Health for the THPF refers to ‘well-being’ involving everyone in the society and having much deeper social roots (Board of Governance 2005, 2 March, item 4.1).</td>
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<td><strong>Identity</strong></td>
<td>My organisation and I have been working before the THPF was created. So the THPF recognises what our identity is and supports us in our direction. This is a good point. Yet, I don’t know how the ones founded after the THPF will get the support like us unless they build their own identity first (Mr Jet, interview).</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Innovation</strong></td>
<td>The THPF can be considered as an innovation for civil society because it has more than money. It also develops our work and skills… (Mr Mr Pun, interview).</td>
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<td><strong>Lobbying</strong></td>
<td>The THPF has emphasised the lobbying strategy [through getting into contact and having informal conversations with the authorities] because the state and the government are authoritative. If we often run external advocacy [including public protest and mass mobilisation], the government is surely not happy. We will only increase our chance to get attacked (Dr Top, interview).</td>
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<td><strong>Movement</strong></td>
<td>By adopting the Ottawa Charter, the THPF envisions that the promotion of health is not to provide a service by professional health workers but to make a change through social movements (Board of Governance 2005, 2 March, item 4.1).</td>
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<td><strong>Negotiation/resistance</strong></td>
<td>We don’t comply with every suggestion the THPF has made. Recently, I disputed with the THPF over withholding tax on wages. What the THPF suggested was contradictory to my organisation’s policy. If we had complied with the THPF, we would have broken the rules. I made it clear to the THPF that we still wanted to do as we have always done… (Ms May, interview)</td>
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<td><strong>Network</strong></td>
<td>the THPF is supposed to stay in the original design, that is, to be clever enough to know that what to do to enable the changes and how to do it. Some changes need money. Others may need knowledge and networks… It is a matter of strategy that the THPF should employ different tools, engage with different types of actors, to make different changes (Dr Sor, interview).</td>
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<td><strong>NGO</strong></td>
<td>Each colour of NGOs has pros and cons. The THPF must properly interact with them. With the dark brown, we need to be careful or sometimes avoid them when the opponent is the government. The THPF anyway is a state agency. We asked our NGOs working in ‘hot’ issues not to show the THPF logo, wear THPF jackets and so on. This isn’t only to protect the THPF but the NGOs themselves. The government might not be able to deal any hard measures with the funded organisations or individuals but it can suppress the THPF, the funder… If the government sees the connection between us and them, and it can’t deal with the NGOs directly, the government comes to us. The NGOs will be worse off in the end (Dr Korn, interview).</td>
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<td><strong>Partnership</strong></td>
<td>the way we work as ‘pakee’ [partnership/partner], the term has become influential because of the THPF. It was spread to the public… (Mr Pun, interview).</td>
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<td><strong>Policy advocacy</strong></td>
<td>To advocate policies is to get in contact with the political or policy authorities, talk to them with a good manner. We can’t go and order them to stop doing anything we don’t like… In politics, negotiation is important. They always ask us ‘why should I believe you?’ We need to convince them with evidence and rhetoric. I’m trying to create an expertise in advocacy [lobby] but it’s so hard (Dr Top, interview).</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Politics/political</strong></td>
<td>The THPF is extremely sensitive and defensive on issues such as rights, environments, etc. which represent the contemporary peoples movement. The THPF is rather happy to work with alcohol and tobacco reduction… I’ve faced an unexplained freeze of a project involving human rights literacy which challenged the government. The THPF was afraid that the project might cause harm. Although the project resumed later, I think this was not right. The THPF should indeed execute ‘health’ beyond physical dimensions, to cover social and environmental determinants as it always</td>
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<td><strong>3.4 Reflexivity and research challenges</strong></td>
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<td><strong>3.4.1 Research reflexivity</strong></td>
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<td>Being ‘reflexive’ is to acknowledge that the researcher and the participants are part of the social world under investigation (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007). It is to acknowledge the inevitable injection of (frequently unexamined) motives, beliefs, personal characteristics, and theories of the researcher into the research process on the outcomes (Blaikie 2010; O’Mahoney and Vincent 2014; Maxwell 2012).</td>
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In CR, the idea of value-oriented research is strongly advocated (Porpora 2015). Subjectivity and bias do not need to be controlled or eliminated, but instead paid attention to and explicitly stated for the sake of the production of knowledge (Maxwell 2012; Bhaskar 2016). They can be productively used in the research (see Maxwell 2013; Tolman and Brydon-Miller 2001; Hatch 2011), for example, through the process of listening to one’s own thoughts, and having an inner conversation about the research processes. In qualitative research, the main instrument ‘is’ the researcher him/herself whereas in quantitative research, the researcher ‘has’ instruments. To seek a better understanding of the research phenomenon, it is suggestive to incorporate the point of view of social actors involved in the research including the researcher.

As the use of in-depth interviews requires an intensive period of involvement in the social world, the researcher has been involved to a certain degree with the participants. Many of them have met the researcher. The researcher has grown up in and variously engaged with the NGO community in Bangkok for more than a decade. The position of the researcher thus lies somewhere between an ‘insider’ and an ‘outsider’. However, many of them considered the researcher as one of their ‘young generation’. Consequently, the researcher decided to ‘go native’, becoming a part of the world of the researched and being drawn into the participants’ constructed reality for the sake of a better and adequate understanding. It is noted that although the researcher knew the community well, he was no longer merely a creature of that environment. The researcher could imagine a universe beyond the community and a different way of perceiving and understanding it. During the fieldwork, an academic stance, detached from the field when necessary, was also applied.

This research has been a very difficult and challenging task. The position of the researcher granted both advantages and disadvantages. The most obvious advantage was access to research participants through personal connection. This does not mean that the researcher did not need to put effort into gathering data, but the connection significantly helped make the contact possible. Some participants were kind enough to refer the researcher to other participants who he was originally unable to reach. On the other hand, the most obvious disadvantage for the researcher was the label of being from the ‘young generation’ which refers to ‘children’ as well as ‘ones who know few things’. Some participants acted as if they were giving a lecture to the researcher and did not provide answers to the interview questions. Nevertheless, the researcher saw this issue as
an opportunity to use the role of a curious-to-know child to obtain the narratives, data or the responses from the participants.

3.4.2 Difficulties in finding mechanisms

Ackroyd and Karlsson (2014, p. 32) note that ‘identifying the mechanism is largely a conceptual matter’. Finding the mechanisms at work, as aforementioned, requires the researcher to be actively involved with, rather than detached from, the theories guiding the research (Danermark et al. 2002; Sayer 2000). This is because the mechanisms are mostly unobservable and not easily uncovered by interviewing people about them (Archer 1998). Interviews are requisite for approaching human thought, meaning, and experience, but they are not by themselves a sufficient basis for analysing the multiplicity of causal factors in play in social relations (Smith and Elger 2014). It is the task of the researcher to interpret and produce explanations of the mechanisms. In addition, there is a challenge in identifying the mechanisms which are neither too generic nor too contingent. If the mechanisms are too general, they would lose explanatory power. On the contrary, if they are too specific, they can only be relevant in a narrow context where it was indicated. Theories are thus particularly essential as a guide, not only to identify, but to generate the balance of the mechanisms. Indeed, proposed mechanisms are potential explanations (Sayer 2010) which are repeatedly evaluated through the process of data collection and analysis until closure is reached. Again, such closure relies on the theoretical insights and the researcher.

Furthermore, it is likely that the actors responsible for the mechanisms themselves might have little awareness of them (Reed 2009). Brown and Roberts (2014, p. 306) then suggest that ‘to gain adequate information about mechanisms, it is… critical that knowledge possessed by respondents is also taken seriously and not brushed aside as being ‘inadequate’ to the proscribed goals of a research project’. The researcher needed to ensure that the participants achieve some insight into the conceptual goals of the research project (see Pawson 1996). In other words, the researcher needed to find a way to enable the participants to become fully aware of the potential mechanisms affecting the context under investigation (see Pawson and Tilly 1997). In practice, the participants, for instance, were asked to think on how they ‘reason’ about a certain context and what resources they feel facilitate or constrain them to behave in certain ways in the context. These points also stress the significance of the researcher as the instrument of the research.
3.4.3 Problems encountered during the fieldwork

Unfortunately, at the time the researcher was conducting interviews in Thailand there was a crisis concerning the THPF and its NGO partners. They were undergoing serious government investigation and public scrutiny. As a consequence, they were defensive regarding any kind of interview if they did not really know the interviewer and his/her background; this made access to them extremely difficult. Some of the provisional participants rejected the request to be interviewed. In addition, the THPF is a public organisation where bureaucratic culture, to a certain degree, has influence. Access to management and governance level personnel required strong connections. The researcher first tried to reach the participants through official contacts but mostly failed to do so. The researcher then used personal connections to reach the participants. This proved more effective. Personal connection thus played a significant role in making the interviews possible. In fact, the interview participants remarked that my project is the first to succeed in obtaining information from most of the high-level people at the THPF.

Sometimes, it was hard to place certain participants into a certain category: the THPF or an NGO. For example, Dr Rice, a senior health officer in a government department, gave an account of his multiple experiences working with both the THPF and the NGOs:

The THPF invited me to be a reviewer since its inception because I have been an expert in mental health and children development. My first engagement with the THPF is to review project proposals... I have been often invited to do so. Then, the THPF asked me to launch my own projects... My team and I built an NGO to receive the THPF’s grants. At that time, I was a recipient as well as a reviewer... After I finished with my projects, the THPF invited me to be a member of a PAC [Plan Administrative Committee] related to my expertise... I have been promoted along the way becoming the chair of my PAC. I stopped receiving any THPF’s grants when I have become the committee member. Finally, I was appointed to be a member of the Board of Governance (Dr Rice, interview).

The story of Dr Rice, along with many other participants, exemplifies the blurred line between the state and civil society in action.

As the interviews were conducted in Thai but presented in English, they obviously underwent a degree of interpretation by the researcher when translating from Thai to English in
the process of the data analysis. Nevertheless, this seems not to be a problem because close analysis of participants’ discourse and language is not the objective of the research.

3.5 Conclusion

This thesis prescribes a qualitative approach as a research orientation. With the use of the philosophy of CR, the research is value-added both in data collection and data analysis, focusing on potential mechanisms at work. Retroductive research strategy is then developed and applied in order to distinctively reach and understand the phenomenon. In-depth interviewing is selected as the main way for collecting data in order to acquire both factual information on the NGOisation process and the metagovernance of THPF and to gain insight into the participants’ perception of these. Interview participants (n=50) are purposively chosen from senior officers at the management level of both the THPF and the NGOs. Interviews are supplemented with documentary analysis and observation. Data collected is then coded and analysed thematically. These research techniques are solely to gain access to information seen to be particularly important in further developing the researcher’s understanding. The techniques are not ends in themselves. It is important to note that CR-inspired methodology is a challenging and creative task. There is no absolute rule book when applying CR to social research. The methodology discussed in this chapter is thus an attempt to apply CR to navigate the study of the relationship between the THPF and the NGOs. Successful research is thus based on intellectual creativity rather than following methodological rules.
Chapter 4

State-society relations, NGO funding, and the THPF

This chapter aims to provide a background to the thesis, beginning with some discussions about state-society relations in Thailand. Then it moves to explore civil society and NGO development in relation to the funding landscape. Such development is juxtaposed with the changing governance of the state as the NGO sector has increasingly relied on public funding, typically managed by autonomous public organisations (APOs). Then, the chapter critically explores the establishment and the development of one of the major public donors of civil society, the Thai Health Promotion Foundation (THPF). Contexts, such as the agencification and health promotion movements, which together gave rise to the THPF, will be discussed. This is followed by a discussion of the THPF’s approach to health promotion and the governance and the development of the THPF.

4.1 State-society relations in Thailand

Analyses of the state-society relations of Southeast Asia, including Thailand, reveal that antecedents of civil society have been largely ‘fostered’ by state policies and funding and made to remain considerably dependent on it. They have thrived alongside and through, state apparatuses which tend to exert more ideological and programmatic control over societal actors (Weiss 2008; Schak and Hudson 2003; Saravanamuttu 1997). The distinction between the realms of the public and private sectors is blurred.

Unlike portrayed in most of the developed, liberal societies where civil society has often explicitly challenged government objectives (Kallman and Clark 2016), the interaction between the state and civil society in Asia often characterised with an authoritarian tradition is not explicitly and necessarily confrontational (Alagappa 2004a). State-society relation in Thailand is rather dynamic and complicated including collaboration, confrontation, and reciprocity (Shigetomi 2002).

Civil society in Thailand is ineluctably conditioned by an authoritative state. This means that ‘civil society operates within the normative confines of the state, is shaped by state policies and discourses, and often finds itself directly incorporated into state policy process’ (Gilley 2014, p. 45). Organised civil society gains its legitimacy and efficacy, or even identity, from its status
and relationship with the state. The growth of the NGO sector is heavily dependent on a political space, namely government policies. The shift of government policy from control to support is a key factor for the sector’s growth.

The Thai state has sponsored significant organisational innovation which can be a precursor to civil society. For example, governmental bodies have given birth to ‘government-organised NGOs’ or GONGOs (Chaiyasan 2013; Thammachat 2008) which have successfully worked in various fields. Many umbrella organisations and coordinating bodies for NGOs were initiated by the state as well.

Since the state has become the key source of NGO funding, it is likely to influence, neutralise, depoliticise, and manipulate the activities of partnership (Phatharathananunth 2006), demanding in return a disciplined partnership. This was particularly true in rural areas. The Thai state was not consistently pushed back by civil society but managed to discover methods to marginalise or co-opt NGOs (Crispin 2000). Collaboration became a favoured strategy for the state to indirectly supervise the NGOs (Simpkins 2003). It is a strategy which demonstrates the effort made to bring NGOs into range of the government's radar. Hence, the Thai state can be best described as ‘consultative authoritarianist’ (Teets 2013) which simultaneously promoted the development of a fair civil society and instruments of state control.

Certain parts of civil society in Thailand have been moving more toward explicit coordination with the government and state agencies, often through subcontracting and funding. This shift alters the dynamic of the NGO sector significantly, moving it away from an ‘independent’ sector towards a position of third-party government (Salamon 1995) prescribing the new governance arrangement. Thai civil society is regarded more commonly in an instrumental sense for its role in enabling or preventing change. It is rarely considered as an autonomous arena, independent of the state, for self-governance (Alagappa 2004a). NGOs have in part become an arm of the state, sharing a common development ideology with the state to control and discipline people’s lives (Rakyutidharm 2014a). By creating their own spheres as part of the state, NGOs can keep their role in the new governance arrangement. It is possible to see that Thai civil society has become ‘elite-led’, if not ‘state-led’ (Albritton and Bureekul 2002). The idea of ‘state-led civil society’ (Frolic 1997) can well describe the situation of Thai civil society.

The state mechanisms linked to the prominent idea of ‘partnership’ among NGO workers have, perhaps unintentionally, weakened civil society by allowing it to become part of the state
whilst strengthening the state’s position within civil society (Phatharathananunth 2006; Jumnianpol 2001). It invites governmental agencies to engage in a vast range of activities formerly carried out independently by organised civil society, thus augmenting the state’s control over society.

However, it is also possible to see that the Thai NGO sector has seemed to be both critical of the performance of the state and optimistic about potential cooperation with public institutions and authorities (Sapyen 2004). They simultaneously cooperate with and suspect each other.

NGOs and the state have a reciprocal, interdependent relationship which means that the NGOs are neither completely autonomous from the state nor completely dependent on the state. This corresponds with the notion of ‘semi-civil society’ (He 1997), instead of a ‘full’ civil society. This situation places it in the middle position between a kind of ‘fully present’ civil society in a liberal society and the entire absence of civil society in an absolute authoritarian society. It serves to illustrate the problematic tension in which NGOs are not absolutely autonomous from the state while the state remains dependent on NGOs, suggesting the interdependency between state agencies and society actors.

4.2 NGO funding

The contemporary Thai NGO sector is funded. Funding from other organisations is essential to the sector. The main source of revenue for the Thai NGOs is not public donation as is generally understood (Chutima 2004). Scholars suggest that, regardless of the negative impacts it may create, funding, especially by the government and other public organisations, is an essential key which makes organised civil society ‘grow’ (Kuhonta and Sinpeng 2014; Simpkins 2003). In Thailand, NGOs could be nurtured and be active in any political regime if the government supports them.

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5 This is mostly because: (1) most of the NGOs are not membership-based organisations (Thabchumpon 2011) and cannot require their members to pay a fee; and (2) fundraising practices are not successful because a large part of charitable giving only goes to religious causes, organisations, or projects under royal patronage, and exceptional well-known charities or foundations. Most NGOs have been left out from such giving circles which are largely driven by religious beliefs and is mostly done through traditional forms of charity represented by temples, established foundations, and charities (Phaholyothin 2017, p. 189).
This section aims to provide a description of the funding landscape of the NGO sector. In Thailand, funding has come from both foreign and domestic bodies, with the former being predominant until the middle of the 1990s and the latter becoming essential throughout the 2000s into the present.

4.2.1 Foreign funding: rise and decline

Historically, the NGO sector has been actively supported by a variety of international bodies. Foreign and international assistance has been widely welcomed as a part of modernisation since the 1960s and provided the basis for domestic philanthropic practices and the voluntary sector (see Pongsapich and Kataleeradabhan 1997; Logerfo 1997). The relationship between domestic NGOs and international bodies has been tightened since then. More importantly, during the 1980s, there has been a dramatic increase in numbers of NGOs (see Figure 1.1). An increase in foreign funding for development projects in Thailand (Quinn 1997; Delcore 2003) was a major catalyst together with the state having more liberal policies. This NGO boom coincided with the opening up of the Thai market to neoliberalism. Most large-funded NGOs were financed and patronised by development aid agencies, which in turn, were funded by Western governments and international organisations.

In this regard, international and foreign bodies had a considerable role in shaping Thai NGOs (see Chutima 2004). Knowledge, institutions, and policies were imported to Thai society without due care. Donors ‘embraced civil society development as a necessary part of democracy promotion and launched hundreds, even thousands, of projects under that rubric’ (Ottaway and Carothers 2000, p. 293). They came up with their ‘priorities’ and ‘preferences’. In particular, Thai NGOs were pulled to welcome a Western style civil society and NGO working system characterised by a professional office and employer culture. Through foreign grants, Thai NGOs developed offices and facilities that seemed respectable and ‘Western-looking’.

Between 1985 and 1989, the ‘Local Development Assistance Program’ (LDAP) was funded by the Canadian International Development Agency, which, in turn, gave financial and academic support to NGOs in local areas. NGO projects covered activities across the country and positively affected the development of the sector. LDAP then developed into the ‘Local Development Institute’ (LDI) in 1991 focusing on the local and community area as well as national NGO networking (see Leangchareon 2000; Connors 2005; Simpkins 2003; Chutima 2004). LDI was one
of the first major packages of foreign financial support for civil society. Core NGOs which operated actively at that time were past or present members of the programme family (Gohlert 1991; Goldschmidt and Boonyarattanasoontorn 1992).

Then during the 1990s, NGOs in Asian countries experienced fluctuations and decreases in foreign funding (Parks 2008). Without an alternative source of funding, most NGOs were forced to alter their activities and goals to suit donor priorities and to acquire future funding. In Thailand, external funding declined in the mid-1990s as a result of domestic economic and political development that in turn necessarily decreased the perceived need of foreign donors (Chutima 2004; Thabchumpon 2011; CIVICUS 2015). This brought about the shrinking of donor funding for NGOs (Shigetomi 2004a; Chutima 2004). Besides, the 1997 Asian economic crisis affected the funding situation as most of the NGO budget had relied on foreign funds (Kulkakornsakul 1999; Poungsomlee, Plainoi and Punpung 2002). NGOs were then encouraged to reconfigure their relations with the state, seeking more support from domestic donors.

Friendly connections between the NGOs and the foreign donors, however, caused tension between the government and NGOs. The government suspected that NGOs could threaten the order of the state government and so clung to the nationalist idea of criticising NGOs for being dishonest recipients of foreign funding. It aimed to jeopardise the link supporting the development of the sector. Some NGO activists were even accused of being provoked, if not brainwashed, by ill-intentioned ‘third-hand’ or ‘foreign-infiltrated’ NGOs (Sattayanurak 2006). There was even a government effort to try and ‘negotiate’ with foreign sponsors of Thai NGOs to withdraw their aid (Phongpaichit and Baker 2009, p. 144). With such an accusation, the government permitted the use of violence against protestors and activists who were claimed to be creating chaos and obstructing national development (Sattayanurak 1995; Hongthong 1995; Prasertkul 2009). Therefore, since the end of the 1990s continuing through the beginning of the 2000s, restrictive foreign funding regulations have been enacted by the government in the name of philanthropic protectionism based on the fear concerning government security. One major consequence of the regulations is that the NGOs must report sources of revenue to the government (Dupuy, Ron and Prakash 2014).

The state influence over the financial flows of the NGOs and the decline of foreign funding has led the NGOs to rethink their financial strategies and seek alternative sources of funding. As a result, the NGO sector has managed to survive by successfully advocating the creation of
alternative viable domestic sources of funding, notably public funding managed by APOs and charitable foundations such as the THPF. The shift from foreign to domestic funding has taken less than two decades. It is assumed that the Thai NGO sector is relatively well-adapted compared to neighbouring nations (Parks 2008).

4.2.2 Public funding and the rise of quangos

In Western societies, the amount of government subsidy for NGOs is significant (see Salamon 2012; Kendall 2003), yet Thailand has a relatively small proportion of public subsidy for non-profit institutions (see Salamon et al. 2012; National Economic and Social Development Board 2010). Traditionally, the interaction between the state and NGOs in terms of funding was not positive. The NGOs did not totally welcome governmental funds. Many of them rejected the assistance because they were sceptical about the true motive of the state (Delcore 2003) and afraid of being controlled or co-opted. NGOs suspected that the government was likely to provide grants to non-political activities or organisations in a hope that this would potentially decrease the advocacy role of the sector. It is believed that funding pressures from the government can make an issue of GONGOs which are reluctant to oppose the elites (Ungpakorn 2009). Yet, in fact, there were many cases to prove that although NGOs received funding from the government, they still protested against it (see Parks 2008).

Most government subsidies for NGOs prior to the 2000s were limited in scale (see SRI 2003), even though some governmental agencies did set up funds to aid them. Two pioneer funds were the ‘Rural Development Fund’ (RDF) and the ‘Urban Community Development Fund’ (UCDF). Unfortunately, the two funds covered just a particular area. It was very late in the 1990s that the closer relationship between the state and NGOs in terms of funding really began. The government, by taking loans from the World Bank and other institutions (Bunyaratanasunthon 2000), instigated the ‘Social Investment Fund’ (SIF) to assist NGOs in responding to the 1997 economic crisis (Shigetomi 2006, 2009; Pongsapich 2000). SIF was seen to be mainly managed by NGOs and their sympathisers (Shigetomi 2006). It employed a participatory approach to improve people’s well-being by promoting long-term self-reliance and empowerment. SIF was the first occasion that the government channelled funds directly to NGOs (Pongsapich 1999).

Around the same time, a wave of political reform focusing on decentralisation during 1995-1996 together with the 8th National Economic and Social Development Plan (NESDP) (1997-2001)
demanded the creation of a national finance institution to help local organisations (Department of Rural Development Coordination 1997). Two important ideas were emphasised: agencification and financing for social development.

Firstly, public sector reform in Thailand throughout the 1990s, particularly through the ‘Master Plan of Public Sector Reform B.E. 2540-2544 (1997-2001)’ focusing on restructuration of the scope and mission of public agencies, together with the 1997 constitution, transformed the structure and governance of the state. Under the plan, alternative concepts and forms of public service delivery were promoted. The idea of ‘agencification’ was predominant allowing an opportunity to set up non-departmental bodies, quasi-autonomous public organisations or ‘quangos’ (see Bowornwathana 2006; Luangprapat 2008, 2013). Agencification refers to the programme of transferring as many government activities as possible into quasi-autonomous or agency-type organisations (Pollitt et al. 2005; Talbot 2004). As such the agencification was considered as a part of the autonomisation of the state and the first official New Public Management (NPM)-driven reform in Thailand (Bowornwathana 2006). Consequently, the ‘Public Organisation Act, B.E. 2542 (1999), also known as the ‘agencification act’, was enacted. The ‘agencification act’ conceptualises and interprets quangos as agency-type organisations, so-called ‘autonomous public organisations’ (APOs), and has made the term relatively well-known across the country (Bowornwathana 2012). The agencification act establishes standard rules and regulations for all organisations created under it. In the 2000s, public management in Thailand was regarded as moving to the beginning of the period of public services by APOs (see Luangprapat 2013; Whangmahaporn 2013).

Secondly, the idea of financing for social development became a central issue of the ‘Policy Committee on Distributing Prosperity to the Provinces and Localities’. The government formulated the policy committee in 1995 as a consequence of the 7th and the 8th NESDP starting from 1992 which began to mention fiscal decentralisation. The 8th NESDP plan in particular was evidence of the changing attitude of the state towards civil society as it addressed the importance of public participation. The committee gave rise to the formulation of the ‘Fiscal and Financial Master Plan for Social Development (1997-2001)’ chaired by the executive director of the Ministry of Finance. The idea of financing for social development was thus introduced for the first time in order to advocate the use of fiscal and financial measures to support and promote the ties between business organisations and community organisations so that they would be strengthened. This was
developed in concert with the idea of creating a new type of public organisations, that is, quangos, to work to support local organisations.

Consequently, APOs operating to give support, typically financially, to NGOs and organised civil society as a strategic partner were established. For example, the ‘Community Organisation Development Institution’ (CODI) was established in 1998 by merging the previous RDF and the UCDF. However, the CODI began to operate completely in late 2001. The CODI is an APO run under the ‘agencification act’ and the supervision of the Ministry of Social Development and Human Security. CODI’s main function is to give support and funding for development activities of organised civil society, in particular community organisations across the country. However, it was criticised by NGOs who felt that they were overlooked or had been missed out from the CODI, most of whose funds went directly to community organisations (Chutima 2004).

Another important example is the establishment of a huge fund, the ‘Thai Health Promotion Foundation’ or THPF in 2001, which is the main object of the study of the thesis. The THPF is an independent APO operating outside the formal structure of government and obtains money from two percent of the taxes from the sale of alcohol and tobacco. It is arguably the product of elite NGOs and progressive bureaucrats, particularly in the field of public health (Ungsuchaval 2016b) and chiefly administrated by social activists, academics or NGO sympathisers. The THPF provided more than 1,000 million Baht or about 30 million US Dollars to promote numerous NGO projects (see Thai Health Promotion Foundation 2011), thereby becoming one of the most important and the biggest fund for civil society at the time (Chutima 2004). This fund is also used to strengthen civil society by stressing community-based development and self-reliance. It has also played a crucial role in shaping NGO strategies. NGOs which got money from the THPF were inclined to follow THPF’s administrative system and project advice. However, the THPF invited NGOs to share opinion, collaborate in planning, hold joint activities, and support each other to reach mutual goals. The idea of partnership was advocated. The THPF referred to grantees as ‘partners’ or ‘owners of the issues’ while positioned itself as ‘supporter’ (Rakyutidharm 2014a). The idea of ‘network’ or ‘alliance’ was popularly used to explain the relationship between NGOs and the THPF. It was the first time that NGOs were drawn to fully operate with the state with their own missions. The development of the THPF will be further discussed below.
The rise of the CODI and the THPF reflects the rise of quangos, especially those which are focusing on social financing, and the immediate need of alternative domestic funding sources. Particularly, the establishment of THPF arguably marked the beginning of the new funding landscape for civil society in Thailand. As already discussed in Chapter 1, the THPF is a new form of philanthropy. The THPF is the first funder that allows the recipients to pursue their own missions while under granting contract. It uses strategic, proactive funding schemes and does not rely on request for proposals (RFPs). Besides, it is new because it is driven by domestic forces as a result of development of the sector. The development of civil society funding is summarised in the figure 4.1.

**Figure 4.1** Brief timeline of the development of civil society funding

![Timeline of civil society funding development](image)

Hence, over time, NGOs in Thailand have increasingly depended on the state, especially in the financial aspect, driving the centralisation and the state-dependency of civil society (Kanchoochat 2019). Nowadays, a limited number of Thai NGOs get funding from foreign donors. Research has found that the majority of NGO funding comes from domestic sources and public agencies (SRI 2003; Rakyutidharm 2014b; Srisanga, Kummuang and Wasi 2015; Rujisatiensap and Yoosamran 2016). The government and APOs have become new patrons for civil society replacing the foreign donors since the middle of the 1990s. Table 4.1 summarises the three major
eras of NGO funding in Thailand. The landscape of the funding has shifted from ‘foreign patronage’ during the 1980s-1990s to ‘state patronage’ from the mid-1990s which was then overlaid with the ‘quango patronage’ from the 2000s onwards. It is obvious from the table that domestic donors are increasingly significant, with the NGOs trying to move beyond funding from external pressures; also the changing nature of state- NGO relations is becoming more collaborative.

There are advantages and disadvantages of the ‘quango patronage’. On the positive side, it is believed that the financial support for NGOs became more institutionalised with the support from APOs (Shigetomi 2006). However, the arrival of quangos in civil society made the funding landscape more complicated. For example, there is an issue about the neither-state-nor-NGO status of such agencies. Interviews with NGO participants revealed that NGOs are ambivalent towards the status of the agencies. As will be discussed in the next chapter, the THPF is differently perceived by stakeholders. This has affected the activity of funding and the relationship between them. Besides, NGOs are criticised for becoming an arm of the state governed through quangos (Rakyutidharm 2014a) as quangos are the manifestation of the NPM-driven state governance which aims to enhance the efficiency and the coherence of public management (Hood 1991; Clarke and Newman 1997). It is possible to state the NGOs and their funding ecosystem are now in the ‘quangocracy era’.

Table 4.1 Eras of civil society funding in Thailand

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Foreign patronage (1980s-early1990s)</th>
<th>State patronage (mid-1990s onwards)</th>
<th>Quango Patronage (2000s onwards)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreign donor involvement</td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic donor involvement</td>
<td>Few</td>
<td>High, increasing</td>
<td>Significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form of public fund</td>
<td>No important public funding</td>
<td>Mostly by the central government and bureaucratic departments</td>
<td>Mostly by quangos, APOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-NGO relationship style</td>
<td>Mostly antagonistic</td>
<td>Antagonistic with some complementary</td>
<td>More collaborative, sometimes co-opted, but sceptical approach</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.3 The rise of the THPF

As aforementioned, the creation of the THPF came about at the turning point of the NGO sector when it was facing a decline in foreign funding and was uncomfortable with patronage from government departments. Arguably, the THPF is an odd institution due to its twofold origins. First, having emerged out of the agencification, the THPF is a result of the changing state starting from the 1990s. It is an independent APO. The agencification provided an ‘institutional basis’ for the THPF and gave an opportunity to link public purpose with the enterprise and innovation potential of the organisation. Second, the THPF originated from the global health promotion development in creating sustainable mechanisms to promote health policy and a healthy society. Among the prominent mechanisms promoted was the establishment of ‘health promotion foundations’ (HPFs) which operate by funding partner organisations. The health promotion development provided ‘content’ on how the THPF operates. In this sense, the status of an APO of the THPF gives the funded NGOs more autonomy, while the status of an HPF encourages the THPF to offer innovation and cross-/multi-sectoral initiatives. The following discussion in this section is dedicated to an account of these two developments.

4.3.1 Agencification movement and the creation of independent APOs

In fact the idea of agencification in Thailand did not only start from the enactment of the 1999 ‘agencification act’. Before that, quangos (or equivalent) were already in existence and operating under their own legislative bases (see Sawaengsak 2006; Nitikraiapot 2000). This situation corresponds with many other countries where legally independent bodies have generally been established earlier than standardised semi-autonomous agencies (see Van Thiel 2012).

However, since the launch of the ‘agencification act’, there are two types of APOs operating in Thailand. The first type is the agency-type APOs founded and governed under the ‘agencification act’. These APOs are not at all autonomised. They do not work at arm’s length of the government as they should do. Instead, they have become an integral part of the ‘bundled government’ and been accountable to the high level bureaucrats and politicians (Bowornwathana 2012). The prime example of these APOs is the CODI. The second type is independent APOs founded and governed under their own legislative foundations. These APOs are also known as autonomous organisations; they have their own legal bases, separated from the standardised
‘agencification act’. Each of these APOs is unique. The differences are summarised in the table 4.2.

Table 4.2. The differences between agency-type APOs and independent APOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agency-type APOs</th>
<th>Independent APOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legal basis</strong></td>
<td>The 1999 agencification act</td>
<td>Ones’ own specialised act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Autonomy</strong></td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>Higher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Example</strong></td>
<td>Community Organisations Development Institute (CODI)</td>
<td>Thai Health Promotion Foundation (THPF)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It would be misleading to consider the THPF as a normal APO founded on the ‘agencification act’. To be precise, the THPF is an ‘independent APO’ with its own dedicated legislative basis, that is, the ‘Health Promotion Foundation Act, B.E. 2544 (2001)’ or the ‘THPF Act’. When the THPF was established, public management in Thailand was in the beginning of the period of public service through APOs. The agencification thus provided an institutional environment for the possibility to create THPF as an APO. The establishment of the THPF symbolises the shift from the bureaucracy model to the disaggregated, autonomised model of the state. As an APO, it suggests that the Thai state has allowed an alternative form of policy and service provision.

4.3.2 Health promotion movement and the creation of the HPFs

Since the 2000s, Thailand has become recognised as a world leader in health promotion and disease prevention because it has relatively advanced policies and programmes years ahead of neighbouring countries (Galbally et al. 2012). One important policy often mentioned by the international community is the implementation of the first tax-financed Universal Health Coverage (UHC) Scheme which guarantees that all Thais can access health services regardless of their ability to pay (see Hughes and Leethongdee 2007; Evans et al. 2012; Hanvoravongshai 2013). However, there is another policy which has become a model for other countries. It is the creation of the first HPF in Asia, that is, the ‘THPF’, which reflects the necessity for reorienting existing health promotion infrastructures toward a greater capacity for social mobilisation (Buasai 1997). The establishment of the THPF marks a new era of health promotion and partnership working in Thailand. Nowadays, the THPF is regarded as a prominent partner of the government in addressing
‘non-communicable diseases’ (NCDs) (Chan-o-cha, 2018). The continued relationship between them generates a synergy for the national health system (see Watabe et al. 2017).

**The global health promotion movements**

The creation of the THPF does not only reflect changes and developments in health promotion systems in Thailand, but also those of the world. As the NCDs have become the greatest global disease burden (Horton 2007; Abegunde et al. 2007; WHO 2013), health promotion has been widely advocated as an essential part of public health around the world. Specifically, it has become a global policy imperative since 1986 at the first Global Conference on Health Promotion in Ottawa, Canada, where one of the most important documents in public health was produced. The document is the Ottawa Charter on Health Promotion which emphasises the new goals of health promotion: to go ‘upstream’ building health-promoting public policies and having an impact on the socio-economic and environmental determinants of health; to focus on population health; to emphasise prevention rather than treatment; and to build capacity in communities and individuals (WHO 1986; Naidoo and Wills 2016). Health promotion has then become conceptualised as the process of enabling people to increase control over their health and its determinants.

As a result, the idea of ‘healthy public policy’ (HPP) and ‘social determinants of health’ (SDH) were promoted. HPP encouraged the government to place health in all policy-making at all levels so that people would be aware of the health consequences of their decisions and behaviours (WHO 1986). Later, HPP has been integrated into the ‘health in all policies’ (HiAP) approach which refers to a broad strategy to address health challenges and promote behavioural change through an integrated policy response across different sectors of government and inter-sectoral collaboration (Naidoo and Wills 2016).

SDH suggests the externalities of public health threats (Deber, McDougall and Wilson 2007), that is, the economic and social factors, shaped by politics and policies, that have a profound effect on health (Dahlgren and Whitehead 1991; WHO 2008, 2009; Marmot 2010). These factors are believed to be the root cause of social inequities and the unfair and avoidable differences in health and well-being status. SDH necessarily links the issues of health with non-health issues and advocates the use of partnership and a multi-sectoral cooperation (Corber 2007; Delaney, 1994) to address the factors. The SDH is perhaps the clearest example of health promotion being one of the
most controversial areas in public health. It is criticised for intervening with different actors, policies, and social lives which are often outside the health area (see Naidoo and Wills 2016; Berridge 2016; Bambra, Fox and Scott-Samuel 2005).

The changing approach to health promotion helped connect public health with the rise of a mixed mode of governance (Rocan 2010; Kickbusch and Gleicher 2012; Malby and Anderson-Wallace 2016) where the public health personnel attempt to influence the outcome of health promotion with and through non-health networks. This provided a framework for creating a new model of health promotion financing and infrastructure (Tangcharoensathien et al. 2017), that is, HPFs.

In 1987, an HPF was founded for the first time in Australia. It is called the ‘Victorian Health Promotion Foundation’ (VicHealth) which obtains funding from government-collected tobacco taxes and is mandated to promote health in the State of Victoria (see VicHealth 2005). The VicHealth reflects the idea that an HPF should ideally be a part of the state but at a proper arm’s length in order to act freely in pursuit of its goals (see Vathesatogkit, Lian and Ritthiphakdee 2013). HPFs should be independent statutory agencies which have a separate budget stream, ideally from a mechanism for health promotion (for example, a tax on tobacco and alcohol). With a strong leading role in promulgating HPF, the VicHealth has become the role model for HPFs around the world including Thailand. It affirms that HPFs can be one of the most effective ways to address SDH and promote HiAP (Mouy and Barr 2006). Additionally, Ottawa’s health promotion principles must be integrated into the main features of HPFs (see Galbally et al. 2012, p. 19).

Health promotion movements and financing for health in Thailand

Prior to the THPF, the Thai health system was traditionally totally passive focusing on the curative dimension, and all health services were provided by the state (Vathesatogkit and Buasai 1998; Puaksom 2015). Efforts to promote the preventive approach were not widely debated and acknowledged. Health promotion was only subtly developed in the movement on health system development (Jindawatthana and Sri-Ngernyuang 2011).

However, there already was a strong record in health promotion provided by non-state actors. The role of civil society and NGOs in health sector governance and development has been well-recognised in Thailand (Chuengsatiansup 2008). They have variously engaged in public
policy processes, running campaigns on social issues, advocating legislative changes, and sometimes working as political watchdogs. There are two groups which can be considered as significantly contributing to the creation of the THPF.

The first group is the anti-smoking and tobacco control movement, led by the ‘Action on Smoking and Health Foundation’ (ASH). This group has been widely recognised in its advocacy role to promote policies and regulation to reduce and ultimately prevent the consumption of cigarettes (see Supawongse 2007; Vathesatogkit and Charoenca 2011). Starting from 1986, it is a pioneer for tobacco control and health promotion work in general. Among its activities, the 1993 campaign to increase the excise tax on cigarettes and earmark the surplus for the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) is a milestone in developing an HPF because it marked the first time that taxes had been increased for health purposes, not for generating greater revenue for the government (Vathesatogkit 2010; Wipfli 2015).

The idea of diverting the earmarked tobacco (and alcohol) tax to finance health promotion is essential for building the sustainable and innovative income of the THPF. As mentioned, the decrease in foreign funding for NGOs in the 1990s led to a lack of civil society funding, so a handful of social activists and NGOs started to seek for new alternative funding within the country and stimulated research and lobbying for the use of the ‘earmarked tax’ for social and health development (Vathesatogkit and Charoenca 2011, p. 231). The ‘earmarked tax’ refers to a non-traditional practice requiring the tobacco and alcohol industries to pay an additional amount of excise taxes (two percent in case of the THPF) to the Ministry of Finance whenever they pay their excise taxes and to put the surcharge revenues into an HPF account (Vathesatogkit, Lian, and Ritthiphakdee 2011, p. 10). It is not subject to annual budgetary review. This unusual financial mechanism is believed to be one of the most effective and innovative for sustainable health promotion in the world (Moodie et al. 2000; WHO 2016).

The second group is the health system development movement, led by the progressive reformist ‘Rural Doctor Movement’ (RDM). Starting from 1978, the RDM has worked to encourage professional contribution to the health of the poor particularly in rural areas. This group are considered to be pioneers in using innovative approaches to social movement, such as the constant use and sharing of resources and statuses among the governmental and non-governmental sectors; many members are prominent health and social policy architects of both sectors in the country (Sapyen 2013). Besides, it has developed one of the most famous ideas in policy advocacy,
that is, the ‘Triangle that Moves the Mountain’ (Wasi 2000), which later became a core of THPF strategy (Adulyanont 2012). The idea refers to a strategy based on three necessary and interconnected angles (knowledge, social mobilisation and political advocacy) to solve difficult social and health problems and create social change (symbolised as the immovable ‘mountain’). Also, research found that its members have actively participated in health system development and also political/social development in general (see Wibulpolprasert 2003; Sapyen 2013; Puchchong, Anupongpat and Chuengsatiansup 2013). The new institutional design of the health system, such as the UHC and the THPF, was considerably influenced by the RDM (Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies 2013; Chokevivat 2014; Sapyen 2013). For the RDM, the idea of the THPF effectively supports the UHC as it was meant to reduce expenditure for UHC (Supawongse 2007) and costs of treatment by promoting a healthy lifestyle and society.

Health promotion in Thailand has only become a serious topic in public policy from the late 1990s. With the introduction of the Ottawa Charter for Health Promotion, the scope of ‘health’ has been profoundly re-shaped to integrate physical, mental, social, and spiritual dimensions, and to advocate civil society engagement. This became the strategy of the THPF. The Charter also helped strengthen the compact of health and governance by emphasising the promotion of good governance and social equity. Together with the promulgation of the 1997 constitution which opened up a new era of participatory democracy, health promotion has been most clearly and intensively adopted (Jindawatthana and Sri-Ngernyuang 2011). Health outcomes became a key factor defining good governance in Thailand (Funahashi 2016).

The health movements to build the THPF were supplemented by the idea of financing for health promotion. Many arguments presented to support the creation of the THPF framed the issues as economic rather than as purely health concerns (Vathesatogkit and Charoenca 2011; Pokpermdee 2010; WHO 2016). The arguments referred to the financial burden of treating diseases caused by tobacco and alcohol consumption as well as other NCDs, and traffic accident injuries from careless alcohol use. In this way the burden could be mitigated by an investment in health promotion, namely by preventing and altering risky behaviours beforehand.

Indeed, the idea of the THPF as an HPF was one of the key measures, along with the UHC, stated in the Fiscal and Financial Master Plan for Social Development (1997-2001) (Siwaraksa 2005; Ungsuchaval 2016b). The plan was to promote the use of financial instruments to build and sustain the relationship between private organisations and community bodies as well as support
the capacity of community for infrastructural service delivery. The plan then encouraged a study of the possibility to establish an HPF as an autonomous body in Thailand (see Thirapanish 2001). The creation of the THPF reflects the changing state that supported fiscal decentralisation and financing for social development as well as allowing the innovative practice of earmarking tax for social development.

In sum, the THPF can be understood as a product of policy synergies and consensus between finance and health sectors, and between the state and the non-state. The context of the 1990s, principally the increase in collaboration between the government and NGOs, the decrease of foreign funding for civil society, public sector reform and the health promotion movements, together provided significant institutional and content bases for the operation of the THPF.

4.4 Health promotion in the era of the THPF

The THPF is regarded as the most innovative agency designed to finance population-wide promotion and prevention activities (Watabe et al. 2017). The THPF claims to be the first organisation of its kind in Asia. Through collaborating with all sectors of the society, the THPF serves as an ‘innovative enabler’ or a ‘catalyst’ to enhance health promotion and a healthy society and environment for all people in Thailand (Buasai, Kanchanachitra and Siwaraksa 2007; Sopitarchasak, Adulyanon and Lorthong 2015). In practice, the THPF administers a long-term health promotion fund and provides financial and technical support as well as ongoing monitoring and evaluation to anyone who shares its visions. It also owns resource centres that assist civil societies in applying, utilising and accounting for its funds efficiently and appropriately (Watabe et al. 2017). Ultimately, the THPF is interested in facilitating sustainability by promoting structural change. With the operation of the THPF, Thailand is considered to have a high intensive mode of coordination and integration between health and other sectors (Shankardass et al. 2001; Lin and Carter 2013). Many hybrid and innovative initiatives are witnessed through the support of the THPF (see Innovation Support Unit 2016, 2017; Chunharas 2008).

4.4.1 THPF’s approach to health

Health is by nature a ‘wicked problem’: complex, multi-factorial, often long-term, and contested (Rocan 2012). The THPF has shifted from the curative approach to health toward the preventive approach by making health became the shared responsibility of all people. Health for
the THPF refers to ‘well-being’ involving everyone in the society and having much deeper social roots (Board of Governance 2005, 2 March, item 4.1). In other words, health is not only the absence of disease but a product of social, biological, and environmental factors. ‘Health’ is made to become recognised as a state of complete physical, social and mental well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity (Achananuparp 2007). The THPF, therefore, marked the new era of health promotion in Thailand.

By adopting the Ottawa Charter, the THPF envisions that the promotion of health is not to provide a service by professional health workers but to make a change through social movements (Board of Governance 2005, 2 March, item 4.1). Health care which belonged to medical professional specialists was reframed into issues for which everyone is responsible and able to promote. Health has become societal and somewhat ‘solvable’. This in turn advocates HiAP and manipulates SDH to improve levels of health. The THPF also redefines many social issues, not only concerning health, and makes connections to everyone’s daily life. It has made people realise the effects of social and environmental problems as their own ‘health’ problems. Ms Cat, a senior NGO working for media literacy and child development, argued that:

The THPF has helped expand the boundaries of social and development enterprises by framing them as relevant to daily life. The work entailed is made to become seen as helping oneself, not only others. The enterprise is everyone’s business. People at any level started to perceive the social issues as their own health issues… Social and development work has become diversified (Ms Cat, interview).

The reframing helps direct policy and practice towards a more collaborative path based on an engagement with policy areas outside health to include various actors from non-health sectors across society. Specifically, the THPF has connected NGOs in different fields and brings them into the same place.

It is possible to categorise the THPF’s approach to health promotion into 6 major groups (Galbally et al. 2012, p. 23): increasing tobacco and alcohol taxes; promoting healthy sponsorship of sports and culture; developing healthy environments; developing multisectoral support for health promotion; taking a social determinants approach; and promoting innovation and new knowledge. These areas of health promotion strategically operate under ten-year goals and the creation of an annual master plan. The development of the master plan is flexible and based on the
Ottawa Charter, government policies and cabinet resolutions, partners’ and experts’ opinions and experiences of the office (Board of Governance 2005, 2 March, item 4.1).

Currently, there are 15 plans (see Table 4.3) that the THPF has endorsed and is bringing together into the master plan. These plans are proactively executed through its recipients nationwide, administrated by different sections of the THPF office, and directed by the Board of Governance (hereinafter the board), the CEO, and the Plan Administrative Committees (PACs) (see Figure 4.2). This proves that the THPF has a flat, less hierarchical structure compared to other state organisations, with only the CEO at the top and different sections (granting sections and support sections) placed underneath.

The plans are divided into three interwoven categories: issue-based, areas/settings-based, and system-based. The area/setting-based plans develop and prepare favourable conditions for the issue-based plans to work in-depth. The issue-based plans generate best practices for the area/setting-based plans to extend the work. The system-based plans provide support for the other two groups.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>Plan</th>
<th>Main Administration</th>
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<tr>
<td>Issue-based</td>
<td>1. Tobacco control plan</td>
<td>Major Risk and Factors Control Section</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2. Alcohol and substance abuse control plan</td>
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<td>3. Road safety and disaster management plan</td>
<td>Social and Health Risk Control Section</td>
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<td>4. Health risk control plan</td>
<td>Healthy Risk Control Section</td>
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<td>5. Physical activity promotional plan</td>
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<td>6. Healthy food promotion plan</td>
<td>Healthy Lifestyle Promotion Section</td>
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<td>7. Healthy media system and spiritual health</td>
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<td>pathway promotion plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Area/setting-based</td>
<td>8. Health promotion plan for vulnerable populations</td>
<td>Health Promotion for Vulnerable Populations Section</td>
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<td></td>
<td>9. Health child, youth and family promotion plan</td>
<td>Healthy Child, Youth, and Family Promotion Section</td>
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<td>10. Healthy community strengthening plan</td>
<td>Healthy Community Strengthening Section</td>
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<td>11. Health promotion in organisations plan</td>
<td>Health Promotion in Organisations Section</td>
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<td></td>
<td>12. Health promotion in health service system plan</td>
<td>Health System Development Section</td>
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The THPF classifies its grantees into two major groups: change agents and partners. The change agents are the grantees typically channelled through the open grant section. They are expected to ‘make a difference’ by what they propose and are then supported to do. The partners are a, if not the, major grantee of the THPF, channelled by most of the granting sections. Although they are relatively small in terms of the size of population, they are the group where most of the
THPF’s budget is spent (Galbally et al. 2012). The partners are also expected to ‘make a difference’ and even ‘change’ the policy and society through the ‘tri-power strategy’, the THPF’s working model developed from the aforementioned ‘triangle that moves the mountain’. This strategy will be discussed later in Chapter 7.

4.4.2 The governance of the THPF

Macro-level governance

With its dedicated ‘THPF act’, The THPF is relatively and highly autonomous compared with other APOs as it is not governed under the standardised ‘agencification act’ and not solely supervised by the Minister of Health, but the independent board of governance under the supervision of the Prime Minister. The ‘THPF act’ and the board can be regarded as the mechanisms enhancing capacity for the continuation of the THPF. Both the Cabinet and, especially the Parliament, must act in order to change or abolish the organisation.

The THPF’s board was invented to have a coordination focus by aiming to supervise the organisation’s governance and works, political development, budget allocation, and regulation enactment. It is chaired by the Prime Minister with the Minister of Public Health as the First Vice-Chair (and Acting Chair) and the selected independent expert as the Second Vice-Chair. Nine senior bureaucrats from different departments and eight independent members from different fields and sector make up the rest of the board.

Involving different government departments is a key to pursuing the broad social health agenda of the THPF which shows that THPF’s work has not been merely occupied by the health sector. Besides, the board is designed to have a strong link with the top levels of government. Having the PM as Chairman is assumed to ensure that the THPF was positioned from the start as a high-level public organisation, on similar footing with government ministries. This helps facilitate the operation of the THPF which needs cooperation from different government departments. This is also believed to be a mechanism which helps the THPF to survive political conflicts (Galbally et al. 2012).

However, it is important to note that such model runs at the expense of flexibility. It runs the risk of becoming bureaucratised. It is possible to see that the board is bureaucrat-oriented consisting of a large number of senior bureaucrats but fewer political executives. The dominance
of bureaucrats in the THPF represents the legacy of bureaucratic polity and the agencification process which were based on a ‘bureau-shaping model’ (Dunleavy 1991). In Thailand, the creation of new APOs which have new authority and budget ramifications is based on the passion to expand the power and organisation of high government officials and bureaucrats. The agencification signifies the operationalisation of bureaucratisation within the process, which in turn affects the degree of autonomy and control over APOs (Pratama 2017, p. 51). The creation of new APOs is thus less about improving public service delivery and more about generating benefits to high-level bureaucrats and politicians (Bowornwathana 2006, 2012).

Apart from the board of governance, the THPF also has the ‘Board of Evaluation’ which is independent of the board of governance and the office. This board is responsible for providing important insights and suggestions for improving the THPF and its operation, and reassuring the board of governance and Parliament that the THPF is on track, going in the planned direction. In practice, the board takes a macro approach in assessing the overall quality and effectiveness of the THPF’s governance and operations, plans, programmes and activities. The relationship between the two boards and the relevant national authorities can be illustrated in the figure 4.3.

**Figure 4.3** Relationship between the THPF, its boards and national authorities

Source: adapted from Galbally et al. (2012, p. 135)
Although the THPF is accountable, typically through annual reporting, to the national authorities, there is no direct command chain of them over the governance and management of the THPF. This proves that the THPF, to some extent, operates at arm’s length. Even so, it is important the note that the THPF has in effect scarcely been independent of government, let alone the state. The THPF has never been ‘independent’ in the sense that its most enthusiastic, perhaps naïve, defenders assume. For example, the board is political/state dominated in that 11 out of 20 executive members on the board are political/state appointees (2 politicians and 9 related high-ranking officers in ministries). Additionally, according to the ‘THPF act’, bureaucrats and other state officers are not prohibited from becoming independent members of the board - a position which is supposed to belong to the non-state sector. However, a least fifty percent of board members must be from the non-state sector, therefore only four seats (out of 8 independent members) are secured for them. The number of political/state appointees on the board often leads to instability and inefficiency of steering as well as political/state interference. It is thus unavoidable that this influences how the THPF operates and also its public image.

Nevertheless, it is noted that the THPF has not always functioned like a straightforward instrument of the government or the governing classes either. Independent APOs are not in unison with government departments. They tend to pursue their own organisational interests which might not be the same as, or be in competition with, those of departmental bodies (see Lane 2016; Hood et al. 2005). In this sense, the THPF has engaged in, using Mills’s language (2016, p. 4), ‘a grey area—sometimes darker, sometimes lighter—between government and civil society’.

*Meso-/Micro-level governance*

In a more meso-/micro-level, the governance of the THPF’s projects/programmes heavily relies on a series of expert advisory committees. Among them, the PACs are the most essential. Currently, there are 7 PACs and their practical operation is flexible and varied. Each PAC has its own autonomy to organise itself and oversee its plans. PACs are an internal mechanism developed by the THPF office itself in 2004 to oversee the implementation of the plans launched. It is expected that the PACs can stimulate: (1) the plan-driven operation regulated by the PACs as an executive body; and (2) the decentralisation of decision-making, moving consideration of non-major issues away from the board in order to boost efficiency and effectiveness (Board of Governance 2004, 29 Nov, item 3.2). Dr Luke, a former THPF senior officer and a PAC member,
explained that a PAC is an expert-driven committee which consists of specialists in a particular area.

To set and run each PAC is dependent on personal judgment of each section director of the THPF’s office… Some PACs consisted of representatives from the relevant organisations in different fields such as alcohol consumption prevention and anti-tobacco. The representatives could be the THPF’s fundee. They could come from either the governmental or non-governmental sector… We thought that, when we wanted to advocate some policies, who would be involved to make the advocacy success. For example, if we wanted to advocate a certain tobacco consumption control policy, the PAC responsible for the task would include the representatives from the Department of Disease Control, the MoPH, the Ministry of Interior, the Royal Thai Police, and other social organisations. The PAC might need to cover the representatives from media organisations, law units, academic institutions if PR and relevant tasks were involved (Dr Luke, interview).

To increase the effectiveness of the steering over the projects/programmes, the PACs can appoint ‘Project Steering Committees’ (PSCs) to oversee the overall performance of any project/programme that receives a grant of 20 million Baht (about 620,000 USD) or more. These two mechanisms are expected to function as a coordinating mechanism, namely an intermediary body, bridging the gap between the board and the office. Some PAC members are also board members. As a result, the board is kept updated about the progress of projects. Misunderstanding and conflicts between the board and the office can be prevented and mitigated. Given this, the PACs help connect different bodies in the implementation of the plans and funding; they can also improve the monitoring of the projects/programmes.

In addition, the PACs and PSCs are believed to increase efficiency and proximity of the granted projects/programmes. They sometimes invite external members, typically those working for the funded organisations. The THPF staff provide secretariat functions within the committees. In this sense, the committees can be considered as ‘inter-structure mechanism(s)’ (see Ebrahim 2005) which allow the THPF and the funded organisations to raise coordination or mutual control over each other’s activities and behaviours. In practice, in an effort to coordinate the demands of the funder, the NGOs can set up an advisory board or committee consisting of representatives from relevant organisations including the funder. In a case where a representative of the funder is present, and to prevent a conflict of interest, the THPF cannot send its staff or executive members
to be a representative in a funded organisation. However, it is possible for the funded NGOs to share representatives, committee members, or experts of the THPF.

It is obvious from the interviews that many NGOs have certain experts, who are PAC or PSC members, as advisors or board members of their own organisation. Members of such advisory committees tend to be distinguished or respected people in the field who can serve to coordinate or negotiate, directly or not, with the funder and bond the partnership or alliance with them. In other words, the NGOs are inclined to have someone the funder listens to. This exemplifies the way in which both parties can use the committees as vehicles for co-opting or partially absorbing key external organisations with which they are interdependent.

The function of advisory committees reflects the autonomy of THPF managerial practices. Besides, the committees are given great authority over how they operate. They have their own preferred style of work. For example, one PAC preferred working with experts and holding workshops while the other favoured close working with programme managers and fieldwork (Board of Governance 2005, 16 Jun, item 3.3). Therefore, on the one hand they create the specialisation of work by leaving things to experts. On the other hand, they can lead to fragmentation as each committee encounters difficulty in standardising and integrating its work.

4.4.3 The development of the THPF

The governance of the THPF does not exemplify the ‘strong board, weak CEO’ model, a common characteristic of Thai APOs (see Bowornwathana 2006, 2012). Instead, the status of an independent APO grants the executives of the THPF considerable autonomy. From interviews, the executives are seen closely linked to the performance and the development of the organisation, rather than that of the board. It is the office that actually deals with detailed managerial practices and granting. In particular, most granting is more associated with section directors who have actual authority over granting and interaction with the grantees. The direction of the operation of the advisory committees and granting is thus heavily reliant on the directors.

Besides, the CEO’s annual performance appraisal is also considered as an appraisal of the THPF’s performance. Based on interviews with several THPF executives, the development of the THPF can be classified into three important stages or eras based on the performance of the CEO and external environments, such as politics and society. Each era has its own uniqueness. However, the eras are not mutually exclusive. Some characteristics of earlier eras have continued to affect
the later eras. One important reason is that the later CEOs had been part of the executive team since the early days of the organisation.

*The era of foundation and establishment (2001-2010)*

The THPF in its early years was focused on building the foundation of the organisation. Resources were invested in systems and processes, in particular the ones related to granting. The first half decade of the THPF was dubbed by some as the age of ‘many things to many people’ (Carroll, Wood and Tantivess 2007). The current philosophy of the health promotion the THPF is a legacy of this era.

The CEO is seen as the centre of the administration of the office surrounded by staff who had a background in public health (which is not the same as medical) and research. The CEO was said by interview participants to be a good strategist and lobbyist. This corresponds to the assessment given by the board which saw the CEO as excelling in dealing with politics and external stakeholders but under-interacting with partners (Board of Governance 2005, 17 Nov, item 5). The THPF was seen as rather inward-looking in the eyes of the partners that favoured lobbyist politics. However, the THPF successfully built its image as standing ‘behind’ partners, supporting them.

As a new organisation with a significant amount of budget, the THPF soon became the target of politicians. Interviews with THPF senior officers sadly revealed that too many resources were wasted to protect the organisation from political intervention, opposing businesses and conservative bureaucrats of the MoPH. The tensions between the THPF and these three groups still continue to the present. To prevent the abuse of funds, the THPF introduced strict regulations and internal policies regarding COI (see Carroll, Wood and Tantivess 2007). One unintended consequence of such a protective stance is that it brought about bureaucratisation because the THPF needs to create extra rules and regulations as measures to prevent against political intervention and help the survival of the organisation. Many of these regulations were later regarded as undesirable.

*The era of expansion and venture (2010-2016)*

The second era can be said to begin with the direction of a new CEO to drive the THPF to become a business-like, entrepreneurial and smart organisation. This reflected the adaptation of managerialism to the organisation. The CEO introduced a re-branding of the THPF by revising the
organisation’s logo, expanding the scope of working areas to cover non-health areas, and setting up new support units such as a Social Marketing Section and the Partnership and International Relations Section (PIRS).

This CEO was said to be rather extrovert and innovative. He emphasised new social sector initiatives such as social enterprises. Although the THPF in general has always been seen to be sympathetic to civil society, this particular era was the time when the THPF explicitly supported civil society. Some projects dedicated to the development of the NGO sector were actively granted, resulting in the enactment of the Regulations of the Office of Prime Minister on Supporting and Developing Civil Society Organisations, B.E.2558 (2015) and the creation of the Civil Society Empowerment Institute (see Kanjanadit 2018).

The new regulation in particular indicates that the THPF’s CEO must be a part of its national committee. Also, Mr Pun, a senior NGO activist who has been engaged in the process to create the regulation since the beginning, interestingly pointed out that the THPF and civil society parties are given a certain authority to select members of the committee.

[We are given] a way of organising movement. The selection of a committee member to join the committee… was influenced by us [the THPF and civil society]. We proposed the candidates. We helped screen them. The authorities, to a certain degree, allowed us to intervene in the selection process. This is why we got a fine committee that we know and can work with (Mr Pun, interview).

Given this, the THPF was made became more visible and recognised by the public. The image of the THPF was re-positioned to become the one standing ‘beside’ partners. However, the re-branding brought some backlash. First, the greater visibility of the THPF as a civil society partner intensified its complicated, comfortable relationship with the state. Second, expanding working areas to greater cover non-health areas was sometimes criticised for the misdirection of funding and the authoritative tendency of the THPF. An image of the ‘intervening father’ of the THPF, who preaches his ‘health’ doctrine to people even outside the health sector, was developed. This resulted in the tense political intervention by the military government in the next era. Third, the adaptation of managerialism focusing on techniques of management was criticised for making the THPF lose its original spirit. Terms such as the value and ideology of health promotion were less discussed. Dr Sor, a founding member of the THPF, strongly warned against this point.
If we [THPF’s staff] do not prioritise the value of health promotion and only emphasise techniques, THPF will not survive. People will keep seeing the THPF as a mere granter holding money (Dr Sor, interview).

**The era of rebalancing and professionalisation (2016-the present)**

This era started with unprecedented, tense political intervention by the government. The military government suspected that the THPF subsidised certain ‘non-health’ projects which supported anti-government movements. The granted research project, ‘Re-examining the Political Landscape of Thailand’ (see Satitniramai, Mukdawijitra and Pawakapan 2013), was particularly labelled as a threat which mobilised the ‘red-shirt’ movement, the anti-coup and military government movement, despite the fact that the project’s real intention was to understand the changing landscape of politics, economy, and society in Thailand in the last decades with a special emphasis on the ‘red-shirt’ movement narrative. Being afraid that the THPF might potentially be an anti-government incubator, the government thus censured the THPF for its misdirection of funding. For the government, there is no link between the THPF – which is supposed to work in the health issues - and the research project. There were also alleged scandals concerning THPF board members concerning issues of conflict of interest (COI). The government, by the authority of the PM, censured seven independent board members from civil society who were involved with the funded NGOs for malfeasance and immediately suspend them from duties (Post Reporters 2016a). These together made the government subject the THPF to a corruption investigation and a series of state investigations in the governance and the management of the THPF.

Following this, the THPF was driven to become more bureaucratised than ever. Its NGO partners suffered from a budget freeze as well as trivial, but numerous, bureaucratic procedures (Wangkiat and Mahitthirook 2016). Civil society has been weakened. To survive the crisis, the THPF prioritised professionalisation. With the management of the third CEO, the THPF has re-focused the scope of work by placing more emphasis on health promotion work. The CEO has a vision to make the THPF become more recognised as a professional player in the health promotion business. In particular, he has tried to rebalance the positioning of the THPF between standing ‘behind’ and ‘besides’ the NGO partners. This implies stepping out from the backstage of the THPF to stand at the front while effectively retaining a supporting and enabling position.
4.5 Conclusion

State-society relations in Thailand are dynamic and interdependent. The NGO sector is facilitated and constrained by the state. Thai civil society should rather be perceived as a ‘semi-civil society’. Thai NGOs are not totally independent from the state while the state is also dependent on NGOs. In terms of the development of the sector, the Thai NGO sector has traditionally been heavily funded through international and foreign donors. The changing landscape of NGO funding which has changed since the 1990s due to the decline in foreign funding has significantly impacted on the Thai NGO sector. The sector was driven to reconfigure its relationship with the domestic donors, typically public organisations. Then, the sector has become more reliant on public funding, typically managed by APOs. One source of the funding that is particularly important is the THPF which emerged from the agencification and the health promotion movements. Through agencification, the THPF operates as an independent APO outside the domain of government with its own mechanisms. Through health promotion, it functions to promote a healthy public policy and favours a multi-sectoral approach. The next chapter will explore the way NGOs differently relate to the THPF. It also discusses the different characteristics of the THPF as perceived or expected by relevant stakeholders. These will provide a basis for further exploration of metagovernance and NGOisation.
Chapter 5
THPF-NGO relations: relational aspects

This chapter aims to discuss the THPF-NGO relations, or how they are related. Although it seems that the NGOs are financially reliant on the THPF, the relationship they have is not totally dependent. Instead, this chapter argues that looking at the relationship as ‘interdependent’ can bring more analytical value. The THPF and the NGOs have mutually relied on each other for operating. Yet, different NGOs have different interaction with, or degrees of interdependency with the THPF. This potentially leads to multiple perceptions of the characteristics of the THPF. Therefore this chapter explores the different roles and positions of the THPF as perceived and expected by stakeholders. It also holds that the capacity of the THPF to steer is also reliant on what roles it is expected to be able to perform.

5.1 The THPF, NGOs and their interdependent relations

5.1.1 Resource dependent NGOs?

As shown in the previous chapter, the Thai NGO sector is funded. At the national level, available statistical studies similarly indicate that the major sources of revenue for the Thai NGO sector are grants and donations from other organisations, either private or government (National Statistical Office 2014; Salamon et al. 2012; NESDB 2010). At the THPF-NGO relation level, it is apparent that what NGOs obtained most from the THPF is money. Unfortunately, there is no exact statistical data on how much the THPF has spent on NGOs. However, it is possible to estimate the budget the THPF has invested in non-state/non-governmental actors by examining its annual reports. As shown in table 5.1, since its establishment, the major beneficiary of THPF funding has been mostly non-governmental agencies. Interviews with THPF executives and section directors also confirm the fact that THPF has granted a significant amount to non-governmental actors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Nongovernmental agencies (e.g. foundations, associations, communities, academic institutes)</th>
<th>Governmental agencies</th>
<th>Other agencies (business, professional associations, etc.)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>39.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>33</td>
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<td>2004</td>
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<td>42</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>65.74</td>
<td>17.74</td>
<td>16.52</td>
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<td>2009</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>21</td>
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<td>2011</td>
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<td>2014</td>
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<td>2017</td>
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<td>25</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6 This is the exact number stated in the annual report. It appears that the summary of proportion slightly exceeds the percentage amount. However, this does not affect the proportion of the funded.

7 No exact number is provided for the nongovernmental agencies and the other agencies in the annual review this year. This number is estimated by the author based on the annual review.

8 Private organisations are included with nongovernmental agencies in this year’s report.

9 No information is provided in the annual report this year.

10 This year’s annual report places governmental agencies with communities and local organisations.
Arguably, there is an issue concerning the possible financial dependency of the funded NGOs on the THPF. Most NGOs interviewed in this study have THPF funding as their main source of revenue. Few NGO participants have THPF funding accounting for less than half of the total budget of the organisation. For the latter group, the alternative funding comes from other government agencies or international donors. Dependency here can be characterised as a result of large asymmetries in resources determined by three important factors:

1. Resource importance – the extent to which a resource is needed by an organisation for survival and operation;
2. Discretion over resource allocation and use – the extent to which an organisation can control how the resource received from another organisation is allocated and used;
3. Concentration of resource control – the extent to which alternative sources of a resource are available and accessible (Ebrahim 2005, p. 60).

For the NGO sector, THPF funding is extremely significant and essential to the function of the sector. As there has been a serious lack of both foreign and governmental funding, the THPF became prominent in civil society funding. Mr Pun, a senior NGO worker, revealed that:

[In the past] we could choose any donors we wanted to work with as there were many of them. [We could ask] ‘who is interesting in our work?’ We then got the money to work for what we genuinely believed in… Their granting systems were also not micromanaged… [Yet] the THPF came into an environment in which it is the only funding source… We used to have funders who wanted to help us. Now, we realise that the THPF is the only available one we can access. It is advocating ‘health’, so we need to adapt ourselves to the funder… They [donors] sought us. Now, we desperately seek them [donors] (Mr Pun, interview).

Seeking THPF grants raises a question on the mission of the NGOs: is their work related to ‘health’? If they are, based on the broad notion of health, the NGOs are at least safe in a sense that they have a chance for a grant. If they are not, some NGO interviewees mentioned trying to adapt some parts of their mission to relate to the health promotion of the THPF. To obtain a grant is then reliant on the ability to connect to the funder, to make it feel that the NGO is working for the same purpose.
Yet, the matter of such connection does not necessarily mean that the THPF totally overwhelms the NGOs’ mission. Mr Pun also defended the system by saying that: ‘indeed, we are still working guided by our ideological values. We just change the language we use… We just add a little bit of ‘health issues’ and can get the money to use. I see this as an adaptation’, (Mr Pun, interview). Even so, it is imperative to note that the endeavour to connect the NGOs’ missions to the THPF’s missions cannot be understood merely as a change in language. Language is an ‘expressive behaviour’ and integrally related to relations of power and dominance (Jacobs and Manzi 1996). It is an activity in itself, not a naïve medium. Changing the language used necessarily affects the changing mentality and practice. The NGOs, to a certain degree, tend to be driven to divert their genuine values towards those advocated by the THPF.

Interestingly, the THPF perceived this issue as having both pros and cons. On the one hand, the THPF was pleased to see that there has been an expansion in health networks and civil society focusing on health promotion, either expressly created for the purpose of health or turning from other areas (Board of Governance 2005, 17 Nov, item 3.1). It was regarded as a success. On the other hand, interviews with THPF senior officers and some NGO activists show that they realise this problem as potentially leading to the monopolisation of funding and civil society. That is why they were motivated to actively advocate the creation of alternative funding for non-health and social purposes, such as the Thai Social Enterprise Office (TSEO), the Thai Media Fund, and the Civil Society Development Fund. The belief is that such alternative funds can alleviate the concentration on the THPF fund, provide civil society with more options, connect other forms of organised civil society outside the THPF radar, and synergise the THPF’s businesses.

Unfortunately, the extent to which the NGOs have financially relied on THPF granting cannot be statistically demonstrated due to the lack of information. Yet, it can be qualitatively elaborated through the help of interviews. One common point interviewees agreed is that the NGO sector significantly relies on THPF granting for carrying out activities or even for their survival. Grants from the THPF were even mentioned as being essential to the daily operations and management of many NGOs. Many of the interviewees from the NGO sector even contend that, to date, they have never, or rarely, known NGOs which have never received grants or support from the THPF.

It appears from the interviews that the funded NGOs cannot control how the financial resource is allocated but they are, to a certain degree, capable of managing how to use the fund in
field operations. The allocation of the THPF fund is regulated by law. It cannot be otherwise. However, the funded NGOs are seen as capable of manipulating the use of the fund through their writing of reports. The monitoring system is mainly focused on the requirement for the funded to submit reports and follow accounting protocols. Even so, many NGO participants similarly mentioned that they sometimes conduct certain activities but reported otherwise. This was particularly the case for advocacy NGOs which often launch emergent campaigns. Some public campaigns and movement activities cannot be planned beforehand because they are responsive and situational. For instance, an anti-alcohol activity is normally created when alcohol businesses have taken an action. Hence, the funded organisations are allowed, in practice, to manipulate how to spend money within the granted budget. Movements of money within the granted funds are usually seen as an acceptable practice. This signifies that reports submitted to the THPF have not always represented what actually happened in the project. There are thus mismatches between the official reports and the way money is used in practice, albeit legally conducted.

Based on the foregoing analysis, the funded NGOs seem to be dependent on the THPF for financial resources. However, it would be misleading to imagine the total interaction the NGOs have with the THFP as one of dependence. In effect, the THPF-NGO relations are much more about financial relationship. It is better perceived in terms of ‘interdependence’.

5.1.2 The interdependent relation

As CR-inspired research, the thesis holds that all relations are seen as interdependent and relational. In fact, the THPF and the NGOs are neither fully dependent nor fully independent of one another. They are ‘interdependent’ as each one needs resources from the other in order to achieve its goals: the NGOs rely, mostly financially, on the THPF to maintain and keep their organisations running while the THPF depends on the funded NGOs for the implementation of its work and for securing or developing its performance and reputation. In other words, the THPF cannot solely work by itself. It works through others, the NGO partners. Dr Pan, a THPF senior officer, interestingly argues that ‘as Buddhist teaching says about interdependence, the NGO is a part of the THPF and the THPF is a part of the NGO’ (Dr Pan, interview). This implies that the THPF is inseparable from the NGOs and, perhaps, vice versa. They are necessarily related in the THPF-NGO partnership. In particular, the THPF has an internal relationship (Sayer 2010) with the NGOs in defining its activities. It cannot function without NGO partners.
Such interdependence implies power relations. The THPF as the governing organisation has tended to deploy resources and use bargaining strategies to try maximising outcomes favourable to it. In contrast, the funded NGOs have tended to avoid becoming dependent on the THPF in the game. It is too naïve to think of the THPF as dominating the NGOs. The relationship is rarely a zero-sum game but a positive-sum one in which parties exchange resources to reach goals (McAnulla 2006), albeit not necessarily equally.

In practice, the THPF needs to earn the expertise, support or assistance of the NGOs in order to successfully formulate and implement its programmes/projects. In return, the THPF needs to provide the NGOs with a means to influence policy. The interaction is not unilateral or merely formed by financial interaction. The THPF is not always in a position to unilaterally impose its preferences. The relationship is interdependent because neither the THPF nor the NGOs totally control all of the conditions needed for reaching the desired action or outcome (see Pfeffer and Salancik 1978).

It is commonly assumed that the less the NGOs depend on the THPF grants, the more the NGOs can retain their autonomy in the use of funds. However, in practice, even though they are financially dependent, the NGOs can manage to retain organisational autonomy and even enter into a reciprocal relationship with the THPF. The interdependency is a matter of degree. It would be misleading to assume that relations between different funded NGOs and the THPF in the THPF-NGO partnership are the same. From the interviews, it could be gleaned that the relations are differently actualised in the context of interacting factors, namely areas that the NGOs work in and the time of their founding.

First, the NGOs’ working areas, whether health-related or not, influence the concentration of the mission. Health-related NGOs tend to well serve the THPF mission while non-health/social-related NGOs would be less prioritised. However, due to the broad approach of THPF health promotion aiming to address the SDH, some non-health/social related NGOs have received special attention, such as media NGOs.

Second, whether the funded NGOs were founded or actively operated before the operation of the THPF does influence the nature of the interaction. NGOs which were founded before the operation of the THPF tend to have a strong commitment to work and a clearer professionality. The professionality of the funded organisations matters in the THPF’s perspective. Dr Pan, a THPF senior officer dealing with NGO partners in major planning, argued that:
we see that NGOs founded before the operation of the THPF tend to have missions and passions showing their own signatures. Because the THPF did not exist, they have seen social problems with [their own] passion to solve them… Although they need funding, they can find it. It doesn’t necessarily have to be from the THPF. Hence, for them, with or without the THPF, they can operate (Dr Pan, interview).

The professionality the NGOs have also makes them experts in their fields. The excerpt from the interview with Mr Jet, a senior NGO worker, as shown below can well exemplify the argument:

Mr Jet: Given that the NGOs were founded after the creation of the THPF, they might need to follow the THPF.
The researcher: Are they the ones run by THPF funding?
Mr Jet: Yes. They are, in a sense, problematic. My organisation and I have been working before the THPF was created. So the THPF recognises what our identity is and supports us in our direction. This is a good point. Yet, I don’t know how the ones founded after the THPF will get the support like us unless they build their own identity first.
The researcher: Does the professionality of the organisations matter? For example, a large NGO which tends to be professional already might be less influenced by the THPF. The THPF cannot do much to them. In contrast, an NGO which isn’t professionalised albeit founded before the THPF is more exposed to the influence from the THPF.
Mr Jet: Yes. You are right. The unprofessionalised ones are likely to encounter difficulties on negotiation with the THPF as the THPF has not seen their identity yet (Mr Jet, interview).

Interestingly, other interview participants used the term ‘ownership’ when they referred to their superior expertise on the topics. For example, Dr Luke, a senior officer of a think tank for civil society on tobacco control funded by the THPF, said:

I feel like I have a high sense of an ownership of the topic. I am one of the people who have played a very important part in building the THPF… I was working in the area long before the THPF came along, so I tend to believe that I know better (Dr Luke, interview).
It can be conceived that these funded NGOs have their own signature missions and passions. They are professional and have the power to negotiate with the THPF. From interviews, the power to negotiate with the funder is closely linked to the degree of professionalism. Although the THPF allows its NGO partners to freely exercise their activities and managerial decisions over a granted project/programme, the ability to negotiate with the funder is relative and dependent on the character of those steering it too.

For example, NGO ‘X’ is an academic-based women’s health advocacy which aims to advocate sexual health and raise awareness on gender roles in order to create large-scale behavioural change. It had a strong link with an international agency based in the US. NGO ‘X’ has been one of the first among others in the area of sexuality, gender, and reproductive health in Thailand. According to the interview with Ms Jeep, a founding member of the NGO ‘X’, professionality does matter when dealing with donors:

If we know what we are, regardless of how small or big the organisation is,… and do not want just to take donors’ orders, we must be clear about what we are doing and would like to do… This is the standpoint, the direction. When granting comes, we need to see whether the project and its indicators serve our missions. Hence, to manage the organisation, we must not manage it following only project-based activities. We must keep and look at our concepts (Ms Jeep, interview).

On the contrary, the NGOs founded after the operation of the THPF, let alone the ones initiated by the THPF, tend to be less professionalised. A network of these NGOs is rather fragmented. Their activities are overshadowed by the THPF. The THPF tends to take a leading role in this relationship, normally by setting the agenda, and gathering and coordinating the relevant actors in the field. These NGOs have been significantly reliant on THPF funding. These NGOs have grown with a mind-set that there is always an available source of funding out there, that is, the THPF and there is no need to seek for alternative funding.

Therefore, different NGOs have different interaction with, or degree of interdependency against, the THPF. The relationship the NGOs differently have with the THPF is influenced by the aforementioned factors. It is possible to classify the funded NGOs into four major kinds. Each kind typically enters a certain type of relationship, as shown in figure 5.1.
(1) Parenting relations

The NGOs in this group have been dramatically influenced by the THPF. These NGOs have a key mission in health-related policies or services. They were founded after the inception of the THPF. For some NGOs, the THPF has even played a pivotal role in initiating them and has since been crucial to funding as well as in influencing organisational policy through its membership on their boards. They can be seen as ‘manufactured civil society’. They are the NGOs engineered by the funding and the initiation of the THPF.

This does not simply mean that THPF managerial staff are actually members of NGO boards. THPF experts or members of PACs or PSCs played a part on NGO boards or even in their managerial teams. In this case, a high level of proximity is witnessed between the NGOs and the THPF where the latter has heavily invested in and been involved with them.

Arguably, these NGOs entered a kind of ‘parenting’ relationship with the THPF. Those initiated by the THPF have been seen as growing through the THPF’s resources and moral principles. They are dramatically, or even totally, reliant on THPF funding. This funding is essential to them and the THPF takes an active role in the relationship. It defines the issue of interest and the means to achieve the outcome. The products of the NGOs are commonly taken to
be as a result of the THPF. There are questions raised towards the professionalism of these NGOs. For example, Dr Pan strongly criticised and questioned such NGOs and their relations with the THPF Fund.

I feel that the NGOs should have their own visions and passions. They are not the THPF’s staff… Some NGOs were criticised for being servants of the THPF and are always ready to protect and defend the THPF. Why not? They are seen as recipients of THPF money… They defend the THPF as if they were defending themselves… The THPF should support ones with strong visions which are able to work without THPF funding… Now, it is apparent that the THPF is the largest funder [of NGOs]. If we support them more, see, it is like we have 200 THPF staff sitting outside the office… Right? If the THPF is demolished, I wonder, will they do something else [or continue doing NGO work]? (Dr Pan, interview).

These NGOs tend to follow the suggestions of the THPF and its experts when implementing projects/programmes. Mostly, the NGOs’ goals are similar to the THPF’s goals. This is why they are often criticised for functioning to serve THPF goals. These kinds of NGOs are thus struggling to search for autonomy and professionalism. Besides, they hold limited power with which to negotiate with the funder, especially at what the THPF excels. The prime examples of this type of NGO are those working for anti-alcohol campaigns such as the StopDrink Network.

The StopDrink Network was founded by the initiative of, and has been being supported by, the THPF to launch anti-alcohol campaigns and act as a watchdog and voice for an effective alcohol policy in Thailand. It was seen as a useful model which uses ‘a hypothecated tax or levy on alcohol sales which is then used to fund NGO activity’. It was viewed as a successful ‘model of active linkage with all elements of civil society and has taken a proactive role in supporting alcohol policy’ (Anderson et al. 2013, pp. 246-247). Such an NGO was often seen by interview participants as a ‘child of the THPF’.

However, the heavy influence of the THPF over an NGO does not totally jeopardise the potential of a partnership for the NGO. Mr Tan, a senior officer of the anti-alcohol NGO, critically reflected that:

we [the THPF and the NGO] work together. THPF staff have worked with us. Both of us were new in the field [when began the anti-alcohol work]. We share the foe which is alcohol. So we do not
think of ourselves as field workers of the THPF. We are rather partners. We share responsibility, help each other think… Alcohol consumption is a co-mission and a major mission of the THPF. They [the THPF] need to share responsibility with us (Mr Tan, interview).

(2) Complementing relations

Although they are directly working in the health area, these kinds of NGOs have been considerably less influenced by the THPF compared to the previous ones. They are seen to be more professional in what they do. They were founded and actively operated before the existence of the THPF. These NGOs arguably enter a ‘complementing’ type of relationship with the THPF. They can function and continue without the THPF but THPF funding functions to complement the NGO’s. It goes well with what the NGOs have already done.

The NGOs in this kind of relationship can effectively negotiate with the funder. The THPF cannot totally occupy the leadership role in the relationship. However, the THPF has played an important role in funding and sustaining the operations of these NGOs and has, in turn, been crucial to their functioning. Shared experts and committees were also witnessed between the two. This type of NGO has shown a close proximity with the funder too. A good example of this kind is ASH Thailand, an anti-tobacco NGO.

The history of ASH Thailand can be traced back to the year 1986 and its initiation by Dr Prawes Wasi, a prominent health thinker who later became one of the most important architects of the health system reforms including the creation of the THPF. Ash Thailand is the first NGO working to reduce tobacco consumption in the country and has been an active advocate for the creation of the THPF. Ash Thailand and the THPF are closely linked. Many successful programmes conducted by Ash Thailand were even adopted by the THPF as examples of best practice for the other NGOs. Ms Day, a senior officer of the anti-tobacco NGO, vehemently expressed her organisational autonomy:

The THPF didn’t dare to change us even though it cut some of our latest budget. Our NGO has a clear signature and direction of our own. We are different from an anti-alcohol NGO which was initiated by the THPF and then had to do whatever the THPF said. We haven’t operated by following THPF orders. No one can replace us. The only thing the THPF can do is to stop giving us more work. If it does, we would reject it outright because we know our limits… The THPF are
not our parents. We are not like the anti-alcohol NGO which is the child of the THPF (Ms Day, interview).

(3) Supplementing relations

The NGOs in this type can be considered as functioning at the furthest distance from the THPF. They were created and fully operational before the THPF came to exist. Their missions are out of the health area, yet included as they are linked to the SDH. It appears that they have their own signature and a high degree of professionalism. Some aspects of their work are even more advanced than that of the THPF. They are NGOs working in areas concerning children, women, sex and gender, human rights, the environment and the like.

These NGOs arguably enter into a ‘supplementing’ kind of relationship with the THPF. The THPF funding adds an extra element or aspect to the NGO projects. These NGOs are less influenced by the THPF. Many of them had experienced a variety of funders, either domestic or international. They were capable of finding alternative sources of funding. Such a skill has made these NGOs more autonomous.

Besides, often these NGOs even take a lead in the relationship. They often see flaws within the THPF and rely more on themselves. For example, Mr Jet, a senior NGO worker in a women’s NGO, mentioned that his cross-networking working model is more advanced than that of the THPF. Much of his collaborative work has functioned without the involvement of the THPF.

I did not run my project through the network initiated by the THPF because I already knew Mr Pen personally as has been taking care of the programme I want to collaborate with. So we just connected and worked together… One problem of the THPF so far is that it can’t effectively link or integrate its internal units [to help networking the partners]. Yet, we [the NGOs] have done it already [with our own resources]. What the THPF can do is just supplement our work. (Mr Jet, interview).

(4) Niched relations

These types of NGOs are those which operate in non-health or social-related areas. They are less prioritised by the THPF and mostly approach the THPF only for its money in order to sustain their work. In interviews, some of them particularly addressed the funding as a window of
opportunity to upgrade their work. For instance, Ms May, a senior NGO officer working for family relationship development, asserted that:

The THPF is a support. It is the organisation, I think, that has the potential to make a change in policy at national level. The THPF should be our linkage. My NGO is a small unit working in local areas. The THPF is needed to create an opportunity for us to play a larger role and link us to the policy level (Ms May, interview).

Although their areas of work are not in the major plans of the THPF which deal directly with major health risks control, it seems that the THPF would like to expand its scope of work to cover these areas too. Although it takes the NGOs’ opinions into account, the THPF makes it clear that the THPF is ultimately in charge. By casting its ‘shadow’, the THPF practically aims to set a perimeter around the NGO work, that is, the direction of the project/programmes granted. However, it has often resisted being involved with the implementation of the projects/programmes.

Arguably, this drives the NGOs into niched relations with the THPF. These dynamic NGOs are a small, specialised group which the THPF have dealt with; good examples are family NGOs and media NGOs. These NGOs are a minority group within the NGO community. They can be considered to be influenced by the THPF because their expertise and signature were not well-established before the operation of the THPF. The latter would be likely to compete with the NGOs to frame the issues and in most cases can dominate, thereby exerting a considerable influence on the funded NGOs. For instance, in media policy, the THPF successfully established the ground rules for developing the first Thai Public Broadcasting Service (ThaiPBS) (see Siroros and Ungsuchaval 2012; Ungsuchaval 2014). Media NGOs were then supported to function in the direction of increasing more creative programme content for children and family and a space for independent producers.

Interestingly, these NGOs have potential to be professionalised. Some of them later managed to establish their signatures as they are working outside the core THPF area. They could negotiate with, or even resist the funder on some important issues. Again, Ms May referred to an incident concerning how her NGO resisted the THPF’s suggestion. She said:

We don’t comply with every suggestion the THPF has made. Recently, I disputed with the THPF over withholding tax on wages. What the THPF suggested was contradictory to my organisation’s
policy. If we had complied with the THPF, we would have broken the rules. I made it clear to the THPF that we still wanted to do as we have always done… It might be true that, before getting the money, we tended to agree with the THPF’s comments. Yet, when we already had the money, we just did what we thought was right. This does not mean that we broke the contract. Our work still reached the project’s goals perfectly well, but the means to reach them rather depended on us. When the THPF suggested that we added to some aspects of the work, I said ‘it’s fine’. Texts in reports could be later written or amended in any way to serve what the THPF wanted. But when the project was implemented, it was supposed to be done in our way (Ms May, interview).

However, it is important to note that whatever type of relationship the NGOs are in, personal connection remains key to every step of the relationship and granting process. It represents a kind of patron-client relationship/tie which is considered as the backbone of organisation and informal forms of contract in Thai civil society and societal networks. Formoso (2014), reasons that such ties bring a powerful sense of obligation, reciprocity and moral indebtedness which are equivalent to the values sustaining the voluntary associations in the West. The sense and obligations of such ties were re-told several times by interview participants. It is possible to state that the stronger the clientship the NGOs have, the less their autonomy.

In sum, the interdependent relationships between the THPF and the NGOs are varied depending on the context of interacting factors, namely the working areas of the NGOs and the time of their founding. They are, in turn, influenced by contingent factors such the degree of professionality, signature, and the dependence of the NGOs. The THPF can influence the funded NGO while the funded NGOs can exert their agency and negotiate with the funder too. The four major kinds of NGOs classified here enter different types of relationship. As a result, together with other stakeholders, they tend to have different perceptions regarding the role and the position of the THPF. This will be explored in the next section.

5.2 Multifaceted character of the THPF

This section argues that different experiences that the stakeholders have with the THPF shape the different ways they perceive the THPF. Also, how the THPF is perceived or expected to perform by stakeholders influences the extent to which the THPF can extend its capacity to steer. This can facilitate as well as constrain the steering of the THPF. This section looks at this issue through an examination of ‘perceptions’ of relationships based on how stakeholders perceive and
talk about their relations with one another. As CR reminds us, ideas and perceptions are as real as physical materials, and the mechanisms of the steering are potentially conditioned by them. Perceptions do have causal efficacy significantly influencing and conditioning the relationship and the governance arrangement in practice. Tensions in relationships due to dissimilarities in perceptions and asymmetries in resources are also given attention. As shown, the THPF-NGO relations are complex interdependencies generated by complementarity and tension between the THPF and the NGOs.

It is possible to differentiate distinctive emphases of the role and position of the THPF into three major aspects: grantor, alliance of civil society, and health and societal promotion enabler (see table 5.2). These aspects are analytically constructed. In reality, they are not mutually exclusive. It is possible to see that the role of a ‘health and societal promotion enabler’ overlays the other roles. However, these perceptions of different roles and positions shape the capacity to steer the THPF in certain ways.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perceived/expected role</th>
<th>Grantor</th>
<th>Alliance/infrastructure of civil society</th>
<th>Health and societal promotion enabler</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perceived/expected position</td>
<td>Public organisation dealing with multiple actors in different sectors on equal terms</td>
<td>Social organisation favouring organised civil society</td>
<td>APO strategically dealing with multiple actors in different sectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main mode(s) of steering</td>
<td>Market (e.g. strategic granting)</td>
<td>Market + Network (e.g. strategic granting and networking, capacity building)</td>
<td>Market + Network + Hierarchy (e.g. strategic granting and networking in the shadow of hierarchy)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 5.2.1 Grantor

The role of grantor is the most basic expectation of the THPF held by all stakeholders. Such a view is related to the perceived position of the THPF as a ‘public organisation’ which is supposed to interact with multiple actors in different sectors on equal terms. To put it simply, the THPF is only expected to be a passive funder whose job is to react to an everyday request-for-proposal. What the THPF should do is just to grant. Experience of the relationship tends to be in
the direction of the grantor-recipient interaction. Granting is perceived as the major mode of coordination.

An interview with Dr Top, a THPF founding member, revealed that ‘the original idea of establishing the THPF came from the need to fund anti-smoking work’ (Dr Top, interview). Before the THPF, the government budget for anti-smoking programmes was limited. The THPF is expected to support the scarcity of government resources. The funding was later developed to include broader health promotion work and became what it is at the moment.

When the THPF is only treated as a funder, money becomes the centre of attention and it becomes problematic in two important ways. First, when the THPF is treated as a mere granting agency, the interaction it has with the grantees is only about reviewing proposals, completing the project/programme granted, and meeting the required conditions. Such a position denotes that everything is about paper and proposal. Development work is reduced to a technical activity of writing proposals. However, many parts of the THPF have tried not to be like this and actively engage with the innovative developmental work. This is why some NGOs turn against the THPF when their proposals are rejected because they only see the THPF as a granting agency which is supposed to respond to proposals and then grant funds. They do not expect the THPF to be involved with their internal organisation, programme/project development, and the strategic decisions on the project proposed.

Second, as a significant source of money, interview participants from the THPF and the NGOs similarly mentioned that the THPF has been under continuous pressure from conservative bureaucrats in the MoPH and politicians as they have tried to manipulate the fund for their purposes. For them, the THPF mostly is a considerable source of budget. Since the THPF was established, there have been political controversies over how the budget ought to be used, with many arguing that the budget could be spent for other, more urgent purposes (Wipfli 2015). Some governments have played a crucial role in defending the activities of the THPF which, in turn, made the THPF and its network grow significantly. Others have obviously tried to abuse and oppose the THPF, wanting to get direct control of the use of funds. This observation concurs with other research suggesting political intervention in the THPF (see Watabe et al. 2017).

Given this, the THPF has used granting to increase the protection of the fund. It granted funds to a number of APOs under the supervision of the MOPH to satisfy the bureaucratic department. The THPF also granted funds to government bodies and committees to help their
policy development process and to develop an alternative mechanism to discuss and recommend policy issues directly from civil society to the authorities. It also granted money to organised civil society and mass media which resulted in an extensive network which could become the protector of the THPF against state intervention (Watabe et al. 2017). This granting can be seen as a strategy to co-opt the stakeholders. Hence, granting is not passively used but strategically calculated.

5.2.2 Alliance/infrastructure of civil society

The THPF was often perceived as an alliance, or even an infrastructure, of civil society. At times, the THPF is a good example of the state appropriation of civil society and non-department initiatives (Cohen 2008). The THPF is considered as a product of the neo-liberal state subscribing to a new health paradigm which favours non-state actors (Wibulpolprasert 2002). In addition, health academics explicitly portray the image of the THPF as sympathetic of civil society. They portray the THPF as having the objective to empower civil society and its main portfolios are broad based civil society campaigns (Srithamrongsawat et al. 2010).

Dr Sor, a founding member of the THPF, stressed the importance of the THPF towards civil society:

The THPF is a part of national infrastructure which has a mission to support and strengthen civil society. THPF itself isn’t a ‘player’, but a ‘platform’ supposed to nurture the development of civil society (Dr Sor, interview).

NGO participants, in particular, were likely to see the THPF as a ‘social organisation’ favouring organised civil society. They did not treat and expect the THPF to be a public organisation. For Mr Pun, a senior NGO worker:

The THPF is the best source of funding in Thailand for civil society, especially in social-health development areas… It has a good resilience. It can build a people’s movement and civil society. It has brought many innovations and gathered skilled and dedicated people (Mr Pun, interview).

There is explicit evidence that the THPF has advocated the strengthening and the development of civil society. For example, as aforementioned, most of the time the majority of
grants go to non-state actors, such as NGOs, community organisations and think tanks, rather than the state actors (see table 5.1). Additionally, the era of expansion and venture of the THPF, discussed in Chapter 4, stresses the point that the THPF has granted and advocated the implementation of the law and the institution in supporting civil society as well as creating the in-house support unit dedicated to the work of segmenting, building capacity, and networking civil society partners. Through this, the THPF is using a combination of market and network mechanisms such as strategic granting, networking, and capacity building. When the THPF is perceived to work in favour of civil society, it becomes more than a grantor. It becomes a supporter.

Nonetheless, there are concerns towards this role and position of the THPF. A romanticised, depoliticised version of the THPF which is supposed to align with NGOs in whatever circumstances is oft-cited among the NGO community. The NGOs were inclined to be disappointed in the THPF if it did not function as they expected. Some interview participants even demanded that the THPF play a protective role for the NGOs when the latter were investigated by the state. Likewise, for them, it is the NGOs and civil society which became the protective shield for the THPF when it came under public scrutiny. They are not realistic in seeing the THPF as a politicised organisation which can function in a way that might be contrasted with, or even harm, the NGOs. The romanticised view of the THPF highlighted by the NGOs also sometimes aggravates negative view the government has of the THPF. The government dislikes the THPF when it explicitly supports civil society and then subjects the THPF and its NGO partners to state control. Sometimes, advocating the THPF to support the NGOs paradoxically restricts the NGO movement itself.

5.2.3 Health and societal promotor enabler

Dr Korn, a senior officer who has been with the THPF since its early years, interestingly gave a statement regarding the work of the THPF staff.

I was a health promotor prior to joining the THPF. I promoted health literacy in the community I was in. When I am here [in the THPF], I can still be a health promotor. Yet, the better term for my current position is a health promotor enabler. The main job of the THPF as a health [and societal] promotor enabler is to enable the health promotors [and societal actors] across the country to work effectively. It is to develop the health promotors (Dr Korn, interview).
For Dr Korn, working in the THPF requires professionality. By being professional, the THPF can stay on its original course that is, promoting health and facilitating the health promotor as an independent APO. It is convincing to perceive the THPF as a ‘health and societal promotor enabler’ because the real objective of the THPF is to enable changes at the national level through its resources, not only funding.

This perception was especially echoed among the executive of the THPF. For example, Dr Sor, a founding member and a former executive of the THPF, contended that:

We didn’t expect the THPF’s primary job to provide funding. Funding is just one method to achieve the work. The real mission of the THPF is to enable changes. Changes would not happen through request-for-project and the funded projects. It is impossible. Therefore, the THPF is supposed to stay in the original design, that is, to be clever enough to know that what to do to enable the changes and how to do it. Some changes need money. Others may need knowledge and networks… It is a matter of strategy that the THPF should employ different tools, engage with different types of actors, to make different changes (Dr Sor, interview).

The term ‘strategies’, said Dr Sor, is consequential. It denotes the ability of the THPF in strategically dealing with multiple actors in different sectors to reach goals. In this sense, the THPF can strongly support civil society if it can reach such goals so as to support the state. Some changes should be made through NGOs while others can be made through collaborating with public sector organisations. With such an idea in mind, the THPF should not only, or specifically, engage with NGOs. Making changes at the national level requires multi-sectoral collaboration and partnership. In the partnership, the THPF can only provide strategic direction or even participate in the activities of the partnership. This is to be strategic.

Besides, being strategic encourages the THPF to combine different kinds of steering to achieve its ends. Although it is sensible that some changes could be made through budgeting and granting, others could be made through knowledge, networking, or social marketing. This function was originally designed to distinguish the THPF from other organisations. However, the THPF was originally designed to utilise new modes of coordination rather than older, hierarchical ones. Networking and marketing tools are routinely seen as the main functions of THPF operations.

Being an ‘enabler’ for the THPF means to provide ‘grants, assistance, and expertise’. This enabler role performs much of the guidance and collective learning–functions which are seen as
defining attributes of new modes of governance (see Sokhi-Bulley 2011). They are steering tasks performed by actors with expertise, or more precisely experts. It is not exaggerated to see the THPF as a ‘network of networks’. The THPF represents, to many interview participants, a collection of multiple actors, or nodes in a rather heterarchical network. Such nodes, in practice, are funded NGOs and programme/project managers. As the THPF governance ecosystem is complex, if read uncritically, power relations tend to be concealed.

*The enabler role and capacity to steer*

Treating the THPF as a ‘health and societal promoter enabler’ gives rich analytical value. This thesis suggests that the THPF should be seen as functioning with various kinds of mechanisms. It allows the conceptualisation and the analysis of the THPF in a way that the THPF can be simultaneously seen as an independent APO and an HPF. Granting is not the only role of THPF operations. In relation to its partners, the THPF is ultimately interested in the capacity building of its partners. Goals cannot be reached only by granting. Unfortunately, being the most visible part to the public, granting is mistakenly seen to occupy all dimensions of THPF functions. It resembles the peak of the iceberg which is easy to see but does not constitute the whole (see figure 5.2).

By investigating the THPF in this way, apart from funding which is easier to be experienced, there are also other key, underlying functions which have made the granting possible and made the THPF become what it is today. They represent the body of the iceberg which constitute THPF functions, the part which is hardly seen by the public. For instance, the THPF is keen on building networks and then utilising them to achieve goals. Granting and networking require the creation of relevant knowledge. They together are made efficient by the flexible management of the THPF.

From this, it is possible to see that the THPF performs various roles in its relationship with NGOs. These roles are not mutually exclusive in reality. However, each different role facilitates or constrains the ability of the THPF to steer. As a grantor, the THPF is mostly expected to use market steering mechanisms such as granting. As an alliance of civil society, apart from granting, the THPF is expected to also use network steering mechanisms such as networking and capacity building of partners. The steering used in this role is rather more strategic in a sense that it privileges civil society actors over the others.
The role of a health and societal promotor enabler can be regarded as the most sophisticated role of all. It is expected to include the tasks and the mechanisms of the previous roles but to utilise them in a distinct way. To achieve efficiency and effectiveness, the THPF inevitably performs a regulatory role via the help of hierarchical steering. Strategic granting and other strategies are implemented in the ‘shadow of hierarchy’. Command and control is needed to supervise the direction of the practices in order to secure the stability and the effectiveness of the tasks. The modes of governance are coordinated to perform complex health and societal promotion enabler role. None of the governance modes alone can be effective for all situations. Hence, the role of a health and societal promotor enabler reflects the most complex capacity to steer the THPF. This role signifies the potential of metagovernance.

5.3 Conclusion
This chapter is trying to answer the first research question regarding the the nature and characteristic of the relationship between the THPF and the funded NGOs. It is suggestive to
perceive the THPF-NGO relations in terms of interdependence. The THPF and its NGO partners, in practice, rely on each other to operate in the relationship. The relationship the NGOs have with the THPF is varied. Four major types of relationship can be specified and when different stakeholders engage with the THPF, they experience the character of the THPF differently. Many perceptions are identified regarding the roles and the positions of the THPF and these different roles are consequential for the capacity of the THPF to steer as the steering is facilitated or constrained by what roles the THPF is expected to perform.

This chapter suggests that the THPF is better perceived as a health and societal promotor enabler. In this role the THPF is expected or perceived to strategically combine different modes of governance and deal with multiple actors across sectors and allows the THPF to perform metagovernance. The following chapters will investigate the THPF as a metagovernor and how the THPF uses and coordinates the different modes of governance in practice.
Chapter 6
Metagovernance of the THPF (I): interactive governance and the ‘shadow of hierarchy’

For foreign funders, when they decided to grant, they just granted. They didn’t have any interventions after that, but there might have been some conditions… Western funders trusted us more than the THPF… They could hire people to monitor us but they didn’t do it. What they did was to look at our portfolios and performance or to visit us once a year… They didn’t ask us to write a proposal in order to check whether the ideas proposed matched their ideas. They didn’t expect what we should do… They also had the strategic frameworks [like the THPF] but they were different… [Instead,] the way the THPF uses [the strategic framework] is to guide the course of what we do by setting the strategic framework and policy priority for the funded organisations. Sometimes it becomes involved in the activities. Moreover, the THPF has implemented many stricter rules into the project review process (Mr Wan, interview).

The statement above was given by Mr Wan, a senior NGO activist who has a rich experience in working with foreign and domestic donors and the Thai NGO community. He portrayed the THPF as a more interventionist donor than the Thai NGOs have previously engaged with. What he said is very interesting in the sense that the THPF seems to perform a role beyond a mere granting. It covers strategising, monitoring, and so on. This corresponds to the role of a health and societal promotor enabler discussed in the previous chapter. Such a role for the THPF is rather novel for the Thai NGO community and is having a significant impact on the sector.

Responsible for health promotion of the entire Thai population, the THPF is capable of taking responsibility for enormous amount money and then spending it on projects through other actors. This reflects the role of metagovernance as mentioned in Chapter 2. The THPF has a ‘state’ status associated with powerful resources and the tendency to influence and govern activities of self-governing actors, the NGOs, through formal legislation, the ‘THPF Act’. Private organisations in Thailand alone are not capable of performing such a task. The THPF exercises every capacity to be a metagovernor and this thesis argues that the THPF can be considered a metagovernor which strategically steers its partners through its interactive modes of governance.

The following two chapters will investigate the THPF as a metagovernor and how the THPF uses and coordinates the different modes of governance as well as steering its NGO partners in practice. To begin with, this chapter begins with an analysis of the THPF as a metagovernor. As
metagovernor, it deals with strategies and creates a certain governance arrangement which is strategically-selective resulting in a structural tendency in the way it steers and coordinates modes of governance. The THPF tends to favour the steering of civil society and coordinates interactive governance, especially market-driven and network-driven steering. This steering and coordination are conducted in ‘the shadow of hierarchy’. The next chapter aims to further examine the key mechanisms of metagovernance conducted by the THPF to steer its NGO partners: partnership strategy and proactive granting. These key mechanisms are made possible through interactive governance and the shadow of hierarchy.

6.1 The THPF as a metagovernor

As mentioned in Chapter 2, the relationship that the metagoverning THPF has created has structural ‘tendency’. In other words, as a metagovernor, the THPF deals with strategies and creates a certain governance arrangement which is strategically-selective resulting in certain tendencies in the way it steers and coordinates modes of governance. This section looks at what is privileged or biased, by the THPF and what context gives rise to such a tendency. Although being a health and societal promoter enabler engaging with multiple actors across sectors and tools of steering, this does not mean that the THPF cannot have a preference for certain actors and tools. This section argues that the metagoverning THPF is inclined to privilege the steering through civil society and coordinate interactive governance.

These tendencies can be seen to be derived from the origins of the THPF, discussed in Chapter 4, namely the health promotion movement and the agencification movement. The health promotion development influenced by the Ottawa Charter has facilitated THPF funding in a direction that supports the non-state actors. The funding is strategically selective, having civil society actors as the main beneficiaries. Moreover, as an independent APO, the THPF is distinctively designed to operate outside central government mechanisms. It utilises interactive governance, especially non-hierarchical mechanisms such as those that are market-driven and network-driven. Yet, as a part of the state system, the interactive governance is typically conducted in the ‘shadow of hierarchy’. These two tendencies are interwoven in practice. Their synergy is what makes the metagoverning THPF what it is. Dr Top, a THPF founding member, said that:
Having an independent status would help the work of NGOs because traditional bureaucracy has not truly recognised the NGOs as partners. The idea of the fund [the THPF] is to give NGOs and public agencies that do not work in the health sector an amount of budget to work with. The key principle is that the fund must engage non-health sectors to address health (Dr Top, interview).

6.1.1 The metagoverning THPF and NGO sponsorship

As mentioned in Chapter 4, the THPF’s approach to health is to encourage people to take greater control over their own health and its determinants, which has in turn increased the role of community and civil society activities. It has successfully reframed the issues of health, making it relevant to everyone. Health has become the business of the whole society which can be collectively solved. As such, the ability to reframe the problem is considered an important attribute of a metagovernor because it facilitates the way the THPF has formed its governance arrangement and relationship.

Arguably, the THPF has structural tendencies regarding working partners. It favours actors from civil society, typically NGOs, over others. The THPF’s approach to health promotes an attempt to mobilise civil society to make changes. The ideal is that the THPF should treat all stakeholders across different sectors equally.

There is convincing evidence to state that the THPF in effect favours NGOs. First, the emergence of the THPF can be considered as a progressive movement to include civil society in the health sector. Like many other places (see Peters and Pierre 2016), decisions in the health policy area had been rather dominated by professional groups and bureaucrats. Civil society has been absent in health sector reform for a long time (see Chuengsatiansup 2008). The very existence of the THPF reflects the idea of the shrinking state which advocates a major role for the non-governmental sector and civil society as alternatives to the state and the market.

Second, the emergence of the THPF also reflects the movement which sought alternative funding for NGOs. This has resulted in granting to a large number of projects/programmes particularly to NGOs and other people organisations (see Table 5.1). For example, in 2014, the THPF spent about 137.3 million US$ (4,874.8 million Baht) of which more than half (51 percent) is used to fund non-governmental agencies (THPF 2015). Since its inception, the major beneficiary of THPF funding has been mostly non-governmental agencies.
Third, NGOs are considered important strategic partners in enabling changes in the THPF. One of the most essential THPF working models, the ‘tri-power strategy’ which is derived from the ‘Triangle that Moves the Mountain’ (Wasi 2000; Adulyanon 2012), regards social mobilisation of NGOs and its equivalent as an extremely pivotal element. Every successful case advocated by the THPF involves the active participation of civil society and NGOs (see Galbally et al. 2012; Sopitarchasak, Adulyanon and Lorthong 2015; Phusavat et al. 2011). The strategy will be further examined in the next chapter as a main mechanism of THPF metagovernance.

6.1.2 The metagoverning THPF and the use of interactive governance

This section explores the way the THPF, as a metagovernor, utilises modes of governance in an interactive manner. It is interesting to see that the independent status of an APO of the THPF reflects an attempt to solve health issues by less reliance on hierarchical structures and mechanisms while relying more on market and network structures and mechanisms. Although the THPF seems to favour non-hierarchical forms of governance, hierarchical mechanisms have never disappeared from the governance of the THPF. In fact, THPF activities can never be successful without hierarchical steering.

The establishment of the THPF through the ‘THPF Act’ can be considered as a hierarchical solution for addressing health and related social problems. At the most fundamental level, the THPF itself is a result of governance at a distance. By this, it means that the relationship between the Thai state (that steers) and THPF (that is the object of steering) is hierarchical. However, the THPF as an organisation to be steered is given an amount of discretion to develop and implement its own policies based on the recognition of self-regulation. The THPF functions in the ‘shadow of hierarchy’, typically the ‘THPF Act’ endorsed by the state, which provides regulations on its governance and administration. The Act is a hierarchical state solution to generate and coordinate health promotion work and keep self-regulation headed towards the general good. Besides, institutionally, the state envisions the THPF as a mechanism supplementing the state hierarchical steering on public health governance. This makes the health governance arrangement of the state qualified, efficient, innovative, and accountable (see Prakongsai 2016). The very existence of the THPF is based totally on hierarchical governance.

Hierarchies can also be observed in organisational bylaws and regulations which regulate the conduct of persons and organisations involved with the THPF. Hierarchies are also seen in the
implementation and enforcement of grant contracts as they are binding in law. Legal consequences are clearly specified and adapted if the contracts are corrupted. However, in metagovernance, hierarchical mechanisms can best be witnessed in terms of higher-order steering, the ‘shadow of hierarchy’, which supervises the interactive governance in order to increase its efficiency. This will be further explored in the next section.

According to Chapter 2, the practice of metagovernance can be witnessed through the manifestations of two key interactive governance arrangements: quasi-markets and quasi-networks. They are key features in the performance of the THPF and its relationship with the NGOs.

**6.1.2.1 Quasi-markets: strategic granting**

As stated in Chapter 4, the THPF is a child of the NPM. The basis of the operation of the THPF in relationship with its partners, comes from the idea of the principal-agent split, a mechanism of quasi-markets. The principal-agent split refers to the division of actors in a relationship into two major parties: purchasers of public services who have authority (the principal) and providers bound by a contract (the agent) (Ryan, Parker and Brown 2000). The THPF, as a grantor (the principal), holds some authority over the funded NGOs bound by a contract (the agent). In other words, the THPF purchases services developed or implemented by the funded NGOs. The THPF specifies what is needed from the NGOs in contract and creates mechanisms to ensure that the agreed goals, outputs or outcomes are reached. The funded NGOs are allowed to act as the state delegated agents, or in to be specific, THPF agents. It is believed that this mechanism can mitigate the inefficient monopolies of the state. In a sense, splitting principal and agent is seen as to shift political control (see Siverbo 2004), moving the responsibility (for health promotion work) out of the state agents to the quangos and non-state agents. It signifies a form of depoliticisation.

Apart from this, many THPF operations and tools function in accordance with the principle of quasi-market aiming to reach the three E’s–efficiency, economy, and effectiveness. Among them, granting is the most prominent mechanism. By categorising the THPF as the principle and the recipients as agents, the THPF can use the granting as a tool for strategic purchasing by choosing service providers more flexibly and allowing them to give targeted prevention services more efficiently. In this sense, the THPF is ‘catalytic and leverages innovative
ideas with flexible funding to a wide range of multi-sectoral networks’ (Watabe et al. 2017, p. 708). Grants for the THPF are an indirect, non-hierarchical tool for public action (see Salamon 2002).

In practice, the THPF provides grants based on projects/programmes bounded by contract for fixed or known periods in the delivery of service or products without legal liability for failure to operate. The grants are renewable depending on the performance, impact and plausibility of the project. They begin by the involvement of a group of potential partners. The THPF and the partners then together develop the projects/programmes. This means that the THPF needs to strategically think about what to promote and who will be the suitable partner for a certain project. In other words, the THPF does not simply operate with different partners, but rather strategically identifies gaps and potential partners. It becomes much more than a mere granter.

If the grantees cannot reach the expected aims of the project or fail to manage the project, the THPF would firstly consult with the grantee to solve the issue. Negotiation is chosen as a default strategy to deal with the partners. The THPF will take a lead in damage assessment. If the grantee is found responsible, the THPF, using its authority, will terminate the project and then order the grantee to return the remaining money. Although there is no legal punishment for failure, THPF granting is a form of legal contract which is activated when two parties sign up to it. It is also supervised by the state-appointed board. If corruption or any illegal activities are evidenced related to the project, the grantees must return all grants obtained since the commencement of the project to the THPF plus an amount of interest. In this sense, the contract is legally-binding based on hierarchical steering.

Hence, THPF granting is never solely a matter of market governance but a hybrid of hierarchies (regulation), markets (financial exchange), and networks (negotiation and partnership). To make the granting strategic and yield better outcomes, networking and partnership strategies (see Gabally et al. 2012) are used to shape the direction of the granting and the participants of the partnership. The partnership strategies replace the pure market purchaser-provider contracts. They collectively design the activity with partners, not just contracting/tendering. In this sense, under the granting, the recipients are driven to design their activities to meet the needs of the THPF and to deal with contracting which unavoidably requires an amount of resources for the preparation of contracts and the supervision of work. Thus, networking plays an important role in making the granting strategic, while hierarchical supervision
plays an important part in ensuring the functionality of the granting. The granting is then rather considered a quasi-market mechanism. The way the granting works as a key social mechanism of metagovernance will be further discussed in the next chapter.

6.1.2.2 Quasi-networks: networks and partnerships

According to the Thailand Health Profile 2011-2015 prepared by the Bureau of Policy and Strategy of the MoPH (Prakongsai 2016), the Thai national health system is more advanced in governance arrangement than other systems in the country because it has used a combination of market, network, and hierarchical steering. Partnerships characterised by voluntary and horizontal relations between government agencies, bureaucrats and NGOs is witnessed. In the system, the THPF is prominently portrayed as dedicatedly using ‘governance by network’ emphasising the partnership approach. Significantly, the THPF is believed to link a variety of stakeholders and the funded organisations in different sectors, levels, and areas. The THPF’s partner network consists of public agencies at policy level, bureaucratic field agencies, community organisations, NGOs, and so on.

Active stakeholder engagement, collaboration with partners to develop and deliver programmes, is essential to THPF organisational strategy (Galbally et al. 2012). In developing master plans and strategies, the THPF has started to adopt a bottom-up approach involving a variety of stakeholders since its early years because it has learnt that stakeholder engagement is key to organisational survival (Board of Governance 2005, 16 Jun, item 4.2). Participation of stakeholders is evident from the beginning of the project cycle developed by the THPF. Potential partners were welcome to discuss the project and further fine tune the project proposal.

Categorising NGO partners

There are five major types of partnership that the THPF has fostered: the THPF itself partnering with other organisations; between-partners through bringing different actors together; existing networks, by working through them to enhance networking around an issue; new networks by facilitating the existing actors to form a new network; and health promotion networks and affiliations (Carroll, Wood, Tantivess 2007). In practice, these partnerships are not mutually exclusive.
In particular with NGO partners, two major categorisations of NGOs are witnessed among the THPF participants. The first categorisation is well exemplified through the interview with Dr Korn, a THPF senior officer. He interestingly classified the NGOs using shades of leaf colour ranging from ‘light green’ to ‘dark brown’. The ‘light green’ are ideal, friendly NGOs mainly providing social services. These NGOs are working in ‘cool’ issues. Conflicts with the state rarely happen with these NGOs. On the opposite of the green are located the dark brown NGOs which aim to make structural changes. ‘Their work is necessary and has an impact on the structure of society but inviting opponents. These are the NGOs the government dislikes’ (Dr Korn, interview). They touch ‘hot’ issues and are often in conflict with the state. The categorisation helps the THPF to properly interact with the NGOs. Dr Korn continued:

Each colour of NGOs has pros and cons. The THPF must properly interact with them. With the dark brown, we need to be careful or sometimes avoid them when the opponent is the government. The THPF anyway is a state agency. We asked our NGOs working in ‘hot’ issues not to show the THPF logo, wear THPF jackets and so on. This isn’t only to protect the THPF but the NGOs themselves. The government might not be able to deal any hard measures with the funded organisations or individuals but it can suppress the THPF, the funder… If the government sees the connection between us and them, and it can’t deal with the NGOs directly, the government comes to us. The NGOs will be worse off in the end. So why do they need to show any open signs of THPF support in their [hot] activities? For the cool works, we are pleased for them to make visible the THPF support. I want them to understand that the position of the THPF is ultimately the state agency with the PM as the chair. We [the THPF] need to work with the government for the sake of maximising performance (Dr Korn, interview).

\[11\] In contemporary social development in Thailand, the term ‘cool’ here is used to refer to development and welfare-related work which is necessarily not against the state and government policies and is not based on confrontation, but negotiation. The NGOs which usually engage with ‘cool’ work are thus likely to cooperate with or and receive funding by the state. On the contrary, the term ‘hot’ is used to refer to advocacy-related work which is inevitably against the state and the authorities and creating contestation. NGOs which often engage with ‘hot’ works tend to be sceptical of the state (see Atchawanitchakun and Vajanasara 2008). Nowadays, NGOs are not likely to engage with ‘hot’ issues, if not necessary, because it can put them in a difficult situation regarding funding opportunity.
The second categorisation uses the metaphor of an egg. Seeing the THPF-NGO partnership as an egg, there are three important components: the yoke, the albumen, and the shell. The yoke represents the inner orbit of the partnership. Only NGOs which are close to the centre of THPF power are trusted enough to be in the inner orbit. They are likely to be the NGOs responsible for significant programmes and play a regular part in THPF key events. Some of them can even help the THPF to decide the direction of the office and the governance of the other partners. It is observed that the leaders of the NGOs participating in the meeting with the THPF executives regularly, both formally and informally are in this group. The albumen represents the general partners which received the THPF granting. These NGOs are given support as necessary. No special treatment is provided. The outermost part, the shell, is where the general population target of the THPF is located. This categorisation helps the THPF focus on strategic partners to develop innovative programmes/projects.

Engaging with NGO partners

The way the THPF aims at taking stock of the relevant stakeholders implies the combination of governance modes. For instance, the THPF has reviewed and assessed situations and options of the stakeholders strategically. Hierarchies are used in the identification of who are ‘opponents’ and ‘friends’ (see Meuleman 2019). It is common for organisations like the THPF to have oppositional forces. From interviews, these oppositional forces are mostly politicians, the conservative faction in the health sector, and the business organisations negatively affected by the work of the THPF such as alcohol and tobacco corporations. Anticipating opponents or obstructions is a common routine for the THPF. Ms Gee, a THPF senior officer responsible for corporate communication and public relations, stressed the importance of such tasks as a part of the strategy of the THPF.

I am dealing with the organisational image… as a part of corporate communication strategy (CCS) to the public as well as the staff and partners within the THPF system because I have found that even the insiders still misunderstood the THPF… Within the CCS, an active approach is taken to deal with organisational risks impacted by news and information, that is, to estimate both the positive and negative consequences the risks can have on the THPF. My team and I daily analyse the risks and then think up possible
responses and how to deal with them. This responses information is also delivered to the executives (Ms Gee, interview).

However, the way the THPF has chosen its strategic partners is not constrained by written rules and instructions (hierarchies). There is no law which prescribes that the THPF should involve certain NGOs. After identifying the potential ‘friends’, networks and markets play an prominent part in involving the ‘friends’, or (potential) partners. In practice, the NGO partners are selected based on two important criteria: trust (network) and potential contribution (market).

Referring to Chapter 2, the logic of network suggests choosing societal actors to be involved according to trustworthiness and reciprocity. The partners are required to be willing to share ideas, knowledge and information. Networks have been used to give a legitimate reason for the participation: stakeholder participation leads to better results and acceptance. The NGOs obtaining the ‘trust’ of the THPF are likely to access funding easily. Besides, trust is a matter of informal connection. Interviews with participants from the THFP and the NGOs concur that informal connection plays a significant part for the NGOs to be engaged with the THPF.

Apart from trust, markets are used to help select those the THPF can closely go into contract with. They must be ‘reliable’ partners who can help maximise the efficiency and the effectiveness of work. NGO partners have been selected on their contribution to THFP’s competitive advantage, mostly based on their ability to show skills and abilities written in the proposal. It is important to note that trust and potential contribution can be treated as resources which are, in effect, exchangeable. The NGOs can use trust to gain a better position as a reliable partner. In a similar way, the NGOs having a good performance history are regarded as reliable partners, which in turn, receive trust from the THPF.

Multiple dimensions of partnership

The THPF has been respected as a pioneer and one of the most successful state agencies adapting and promoting a network governance (Phusavat et al. 2011; Laothamatras and Ratanaset 2014; Lorsuwannarat, Tepthong and Raksuwan 2015). The THPF proactively and strategically executes every programme/project through its partners. Here, the THPF is not an operative agent but a catalytic one which heavily invests in nongovernment stakeholders through shared ownership of the public good and relies on them to perform the tasks. The NGOs are given
a greater role in the THPF ecosystem as agents with the THPF as the facilitator. NGO participants similarly admired the THPF for its connection strategy. What Ms Jeep, a senior NGO worker, said can best represent the admiration among the NGOs:

Different organisations have already operated within their own areas of expertise. The THPF has come to build connections among them, make them see significant linkages that have not been seen before… It is like solving jigsaw puzzles, connecting each element to see the whole picture. This means that the working process of the THPF is one that invites different people, NGOs, and civil society to aim beyond their own projects, KPIs [key performance indicators] and activities (Ms Jeep, interview).

Indeed, the THPF partnership has never been solely based on network mechanisms. It consists of different elements: contractual, empathetic and authoritative. It is contractual, based on market-driven mechanisms of principal-agent division through contractual agreement and innovation promotion. It is empathetic, based on network-driven mechanisms of stakeholder engagement and networking. It is authoritative, based on hierarchical regulations through organisational bylaws and command and control.

There are multiple aspects of the partnership. The partnership can be seen as simultaneously formal and informal. It is formal because it is bound by official contracts which specify the terms of relationship, cooperation, and how benefits are arranged. It is a structured cooperation between the THPF and the NGOs centred around funding exchange: being the funder regulating the funded and the funded trying to reach the agreed objectives. This is a legal aspect of partnership involving a degree of risk sharing as the funded NGOs act on behalf of the THPF as its agent. Responsibility for the activities albeit run by the funded NGOs is shared by the two parties. This formal aspect highlights the partnership as asymmetrical. The THPF is the superior partner as it is the one with money and power to govern. Every interview participant in this study acknowledged that the formal aspect of the partnership created by the THPF often leads to dysfunction in the partnership. Complete mutual trust is difficult to achieve due to the asymmetrical power relations between the funder and the funded, and awkward feelings were reported by some of the NGO participants. Even for Ms Jeep who admired the THPF, said:
Often, NGOs working with the THPF were choked by the THPF through its measurement tools, especially strategies and indicators. These tools are continuously implemented in the partnership. All too often the THPF forget about the actual purpose of these tools (Ms Jeep, interview).

Additionally, the partnership is informal because many activities run by the funded NGOs and the THPF are not specifically required by the contract. NGO participants agreed that it is this informal aspect of the partnership which allows them to enjoy their autonomy. For instance, they can organise and run activities in their own way; they can initiate activities and own the results. In cases where they sub-grant to others, they can apply the THPF’s standard to their own. This informal aspect also highlights the horizontal, two-way interaction. Both parties within the partnership hold different non-financial resources which can be exchanged. Knowledge sharing is a good example of an extra activity in the partnership. It is an exchange of their experience and intellectual resources which benefits the efficiency of work and the nature of the partnership. It highlights ‘trust’ and the informal connection discussed above. The NGOs provide knowledge from the field to the THPF, helping to build the reputation of the THPF, while the THPF supports the NGOs with technical and academic knowledge. This dimension of the partnership is appreciated by both parties. It is particularly seen as cultivating learning development in the civil society community. Mr Pun, a senior NGO worker, argued that:

The THPF can be considered as an innovation for civil society because it has more than money. It also develops our work and skills… Generally THPF officers, from the directors to common staff, never think of themselves as bosses. They do not hold any prestige toward grantees… I’ve met a variety of people when working with the THPF… What the THPF has more than money is friends, networks, and knowledge. This is the strength that I can’t see in other places. When I’ve dealt with bureaucratic departments, I could only follow their formats. That’s all. No friends… [On the contrary,] the THPF allows us to learn from others’ work, to help review others’ projects. Hence, in this way, the learning development in civil society has grown (Mr Pun, interview).

Within the partnership, the THPF performs as a ‘network integrator’ which points out how all parties or entities could contribute to solving the problem. This stimulates information
exchange which leads to better policy solutions. It is evident in many projects that, according to interviews, both THPF and its partners effectively synchronised their responsibilities, plans, and tasks. The partners have dealt with local organisations while the THPF has coordinated with public agencies and private firms at the national level. Network governance is used to concretise and expand THPF work as well as secure success. The partnership is typically steered through its main strategy, the ‘tri-power strategy’ which, as a main mechanism of metagovernance, will be further explored in the next chapter.

The interplay between modes of governance

From interviews, it can be said that a certain mode of governance (often hierarchical) has been frequently used to solve conflicts while others (often networks) are used to develop more solutions. For example, when there was has been an organisational crisis, centralised command and control has been chosen as a strategy to deal with issues. Information and decisions over the very organisation are centralised into the executive members plus a chosen few seen to be capable of effective and efficient planning and problem solving. A recent crisis the THPF has faced since 2015 when coming under investigation by government agencies, ordered by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), has proven the use of such strategy. Mr Heat, a THPF senior officer responsible for policy and strategy, revealed through interview that, to deal with the investigation, only members of the executive level consisting of the CEO, deputy CEOs, and the higher levels in the Policy and Strategy Section were directly responsible for dealing with the crisis.

I told my colleagues that I would take care of it. I started the centralisation strategy to gain authority over management. Every decision then was pooled into the centre… This centralised strategy is believed to provide coherent direction, efficiency and secure time. When things ended, the management resumed to the normal (Mr Heat, interview).

In contrast, stakeholder involvement is employed to generate solutions and overcome wicked problems. Consensual solutions, programmes and projects are developed from collaborative planning with partners or potential partners. Hence, it is possible to argue that hierarchical governance is performed at a deeper level facilitating the better practice of the
networks and markets. This is partly the reason why network and market governance is easier to observe.

Inherent tensions between governance modes in the relationship are high. Hierarchical mechanisms can support as well as harm other modes of governance. For instance, the NGO participants commented that they often become frustrated when detailed control and regulation (hierarchical governance) are launched regardless of reason. Also, networks are often seen as problematic and messy compared with hierarchies which feature order and discipline. Interviews with THPF senior officers and analysis of the minutes of meetings of the THPF board pointed out that when the board was overwhelmed by politicians or state influencers, innovation and collaboration with non-state actors were not supported, or even undermined. Granting to the non-state actors still managed to continue with the support of the THPF office but with bureaucratic intimidation and intervention.

Yet, if used carefully and strategically, hierarchies can raise the effectiveness of the networks. Sometimes when the board was in favour of civil society initiatives, projects/programmes featuring collaborative networking and civil society initiatives were actively supported and widely implemented. Evidence also reveals an association between the board favouring civil society and social policy outcomes advocated by the THPF. Many social policies benefiting civil society such as the launch of the first ThaiPBS, as mentioned, and the first Thailand Social Enterprise Organisation (Sunsaneevithayakul 2013), were found to have a strong connection with THPF support. They were advocated and implemented during the times when the THPF was governed by a board recognised for its sympathy with civil society. THPF senior officers who have engaged with the board meetings similarly concurred in the interviews that they were working ‘more easily’ with the boards that were friendly to civil society.

The interaction of modes of governance is interdependent and relational. Although in a situation or a strategy in which one mode seems to be dominant, the others were running in the background. Hierarchical steering was backed by the trust of partners (networks) and granting (markets) and vice versa. Sometimes, hierarchical steering was used to deal with conflicts. At other times, it was utilised to stimulate the start, and mark the end, of a network process. It appears that a hierarchical structure for the THPF was considered to be necessary in order to force the beginning of network cooperation on a certain issue which was novel, or involved oppositional actors or
fragmented policy community. Likewise, market techniques such as public relations and social marketing were used to stimulate civil society involvement (networks).

*Combining different modes of governance*

The operation of the THPF is designed to combine different modes of governance in order to advocate health promotion. These modes, when implemented, are recombined if necessary. From interviews, it seems the THPF executives have considered it natural, or even suggestive, to switch or combine between modes of governance when they deemed this necessary. It is imperative to note that the matter of utilising and combining modes of governance should not be seen as a complete use, and shift between certain modes by replacing one with another at a time. Instead, it is more flexible and instrumental. Modes of governance are not mutually exclusive when functioning.

The analysis of the THPF project/programme granting cycle reveals well the combination of modes of governance. Four major phases can be distinguished with different governance modes or combinations. Prior to contracting, there is a pre-partnership collaboration driven by network governance. The THPF and the NGOs collaborate together based solely on trust. No financial benefits are involved, and the project/programme is not granted. Then, the partnership is formally created and consolidated. The THPF formally grants a project/programme to the NGOs. Contracts are made between the two parties. Hierarchical governance takes place in order to formalise authority within the board and related staff. Decision-making power is a manifestation of hierarchy albeit delegated. Subsequently, a project/programme is implemented together with the execution of the formal partnership. The NGOs are the ones implementing work while the THPF is the enabler. To enable effectiveness and efficiency, combination modes of governance are executed. Market governance is seen in tendering and contractual agreement between the principal and the agent. Hierarchical governance is employed in regulation and supervision of the funded project/programme. Network governance is used to stimulate non-financial exchanges, assist in production of the project/programme, and expand stakeholder participation. Finally, when it is terminated, some hierarchical mechanisms might be necessarily involved in cases of misused funds or corruption. There is also a matter of succession. This partnership termination and succession heavily rely on network governance: networking between organisations and individuals is used as a way to maintain commitment, involvement and employment.
Shifts in governance modes also happen in daily managerial work to cope with immediate challenges. One good example is how the THPF has responded to resistance, namely NGOs and organised civil society who have disagreed with the function of the THPF.\textsuperscript{12} To deal with them, the THPF has employed a number of persuasion methods (network steering) and negotiated deals using incentives such as funding (market steering). As far as the evidence suggests, there is barely a use of power (hierarchical steering) by the THPF to deal with external resistance. The worst case that can happen is when the THPF just sanctions or expels the resisting bodies from the network.

From the THPF perspective, it is clear that hierarchical steering is used to minimise risk and increase predictability while network governance is mainly used to increase the satisfaction of the parties involved. Market governance is used to maximise advantages. From the funded NGOs’ perspective, hierarchical mechanisms motivate them through fear of punishment preventing them from breaking the codes or rules. Network mechanisms bring the reward of belonging to a group, that is, the NGOs feel they are counted, and market mechanisms lead to material/financial benefits.

\textbf{6.2 The ‘shadow of hierarchy’: the higher-order steering}

As discussed in Chapter 2, metagovernance necessarily takes place in the ‘shadow of hierarchy’. Although the THPF relies more on quasi-market and quasi-network structures and mechanisms, as an independent APO, it cannot avoid the shadow of hierarchy. This chapter suggests that the shadow of hierarchy can be considered as a manifestation of quasi-hierarchies and a higher-order steering, which is essential for metagovernance. For the THPF, the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ is an indirect exercise of institutionalised state power manifested in forms such as threat, symbolic violence, hegemony, governmentality of discipline and control, and so on. As CR reminds us, even though it is merely a ‘shadow’, this shadow is real. It has casual efficacy. It can

\textsuperscript{12} The researcher has encountered such groups during the fieldwork. These societal actors can be mainly divided into two sub-groups. The first one comprises the organisations and individuals who have been sceptical about the ways the THPF and its network functions. The cause of the disagreement mostly comes from the different ideology and strategy. For instance, the THPF is sometimes criticised as a conservative, elite organisation which is against democratic principles, and favours lobbying politics rather than social movement (Harris 2015; Ungpakorn 2009, 2016; Phatharathananunth 2014). Some of them may obtain granting from the THPF merely for financial reasons. The second sub-group comprises the organisations and individuals who have experienced their proposals being turned down by the THPF. These groups hold personal grudges towards the THPF.
be argued that the shadow of hierarchy and vertical coordination has been cast most clearly by the exercise of the state audit and the THPF board: two key hierarchical elements endorsed by the ‘THPF Act’.

6.2.1 Audit as a practice of verification

Political intervention is always an overwhelming pressure influencing the governance model of the THPF. In particular, networking and partnership with the NGOs through a number of empowerment activities has often been contested by the government. Empowered civil society is seen as a threat to the government throughout history. According to interviews with the founding members of the THPF, there were cases when the THPF was pressured to grant a considerable proportion of government projects which were not directly related to THPF values. Yet, the most obvious legitimate political/state intervention is done through audit.

The hierarchical influence of the state audit is evident as auditing has become a ritualised practice of verification focusing more on the production of managerial and organisational legitimacy (Power 1997). The state has employed auditing to cast its shadow of government on the operation of the THPF thereby regulating the functioning of the THPF’s work.

Auditing has been frequently exploited by the government to regulate and control the THPF and its network since the THPF’s inception. The government has often demanded the Office of the Auditor-General and a special panel such as the Monitoring and Auditing Committee on Fiscal Expenditure, to investigate the funding of the THPF as a reason to control the fund and damaging the contesting social forces (Post Reporter 2015). For example, in 2015, the government accused the THPF of the misuse of funds and ran a series of intense investigations resulting in the budget freeze which had an impact on the funded NGOs across the country (Wangkiat and Mahitthirook 2016). The funded NGOs faced severe tax investigations. Some of them were required to pay back-taxes dating back five years, plus fines. The government targeted funds earmarked for ‘non-profit’ activities and claimed that such funds were ‘revenue’ on which tax must be paid (Post Reporters 2016b). At first, it seemed that the government did not understand the connection between the ‘non-health’ projects/programmes granted and the THPF. However, this event later turned out to be a political strategy to gain control over the THPF and its networks.

As a result, auditing for large scale projects/programmes was tightened. Projects/programmes funded by the THPF with grants of more than five million baht a year must
now seek approval from the government auditing committee before the grants are transferred. During the interviews, every NGO participant similarly censured this governmental act and framed it as a state attempt to control civil society. Indeed, the projects/programmes which were allowed to continue after the investigation, according to the PM order, must be either (1) focusing on health promotion as traditionally defined such as exercise, and alcohol and tobacco consumption control, or (2) showing some links to the government-initiated programme, ‘Pracharat’ (state of the people) (Rujivanarom 2016). Projects/programmes which were not in these two categories had to be amended and resubmitted for approval.

This serious state auditing and the manipulation of the governance and the funding of the THPF starting from 2015 led to the (ongoing) attempt to amend the ‘THPF Act’ by the government. Personal observation from the public hearing for the amendment of the act revealed that the amendment revolved around three important issues which caused widespread reaction from civil society: capping the THPF annual budget at four billion baht (around 120 million USD); moving the funding to come under the regulation of the Finance Ministry’s Management of Capital Circulation Act, adding an additional approval step; and replacing a number of non-state members on the board with state ones (see Pongutta et al. 2019; Post Reporters 2018). Unquestionably, this can be seen as a state attempt to regain control over, as well as weaken the THPF and its network: to clip the wings of civil society.

6.2.2 The board of governance as a legitimate hierarchical supervision

The hierarchical influence over the THPF board is evident in two important ways: the authority of the board to select, ratify or rebuff applications for the funding; and the role of the board in monitoring and regulating the work of the THPF office and its partners once the funding has been granted.

According to section 21 of the ‘THPF Act’, the board has the powers and duties to control and supervise the operation of the THPF for the attainment of organisation objectives. The main powers include determining administration policies and approving the THPF action plan; to approve an annual action plan, an annual financial plan as well as an annual budget for the office; to prescribe rules and procedures for the appropriation of money to be expended as subsidies to a variety of activities; to raise funds; and to supervise the performance and administration of general affairs and to issue rules or regulations of the THPF.
The board is thus responsible for the strategic supervision of the THPF: being an arbitrator which establishes the rules for the funding and then deciding who obtains the funding. In other words, the board is a key political authority within the systems of metagovernance which both establishes the ground rules of governance and arbitrates over funding and governing choices and conflicts. It designs the conditions under which governance takes place and shapes the context within which partnerships are forged. In this regard, it is clear to see that THPF partnerships have been constructed and embedded within the prevailing hierarchies of the state.

*Categorising the manifested ‘shadow of hierarchy’*

According to Whitehead (2003), three main mechanisms for governmental control in the shadow of hierarchy can be categorised: the production of strategic frameworks and guidance notes; monitoring and assessment; and the use of tactics of discipline. All of them are considered indirect mechanisms of governmental control. Applying it to analyse the practice of the Board, the actual operation of the board is summarised in the table 6.1.

(1) Establishing frameworks and guidance for the operation of the THPF and its partnerships is a key role of the board. Among a variety of frameworks established, the funding guidance is considered one of the most important and strategic. Through the strategic framework such as the funding guidance, the board establishes a clear procedure on what and how to fund to the partners/applicants and ensure strategic funding. By establishing the standard funding procedure, the THPF can keep operations on track. Such funding guidance does not only include the way of funding and what to (and what not to) grant, but also the operational structure, the strategy, and the monitoring and evaluation of the THPF regarding funding. Another important strategic framework given by the board concerns the master plans which give the direction on what should be the strategic focus of the THPF and its granting. These plans are already explained in the Chapter 4.

The frameworks are indeed essential to the governance and metagovernance of the THPF. They define how the THPF should relate itself with partners and stakeholders, which has already been explored in the previous chapter. Besides, the strategic framework is structurally biased prioritising certain actors and strategies over another as aforementioned. They are ‘strategic’ because they identify different, unequal interests to serve certain purposes.
Table 6.1 Mechanisms for governmental control of the THPF’s board

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Board operations</th>
<th>Governmental techniques</th>
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<tr>
<td>(1) Strategic frameworks and guidance</td>
<td>-Funding guidance</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-Master plans and strategic funding</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Financial control of the fund release</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-Operation guidance</td>
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<tr>
<td>(2) Monitoring and assessment</td>
<td>-Performance review statements</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-Annual reports</td>
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<td>-Milestone checks</td>
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<td>-Staff assessment</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-Output and outcome measurement (key indicators)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-Management system audits</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-Calling in of individual projects</td>
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<tr>
<td>(3) Discipline</td>
<td>-Designation of an accountable body</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-Conflict of interest (COI) protocol</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-Project appraisal approval</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-Funding based on the relevant</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-Intervention</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: the analysis is mostly based on the investigation of minutes of THPF board meetings between November 2003 and November 2006. The minutes for this period were the only records the researcher was allowed to access during the fieldwork.

(2) Under these frameworks, the THPF’s operation and partnerships are carefully monitored throughout their operative steps through an array of administrative procedures and control mechanisms held by the board. These checks were launched on a variety of temporal scales ranging from annual reports to more regular checks on agreed milestones, progress reports, and calling in of individual projects.

The board did not just approve annual reports but also commented on the making of the reports, which in turn helps building the image of the THPF. Interestingly, detailed comments were given such as ‘avoiding bureaucratic report’ (Board of Governance 2004, 28 Jan, item 4.1) and ‘using rural images rather that urban ones’ (Board of Governance 2004, 25 Feb, item 4.1) in order to create an image of the THPF as a new state agency that is not a bureaucracy and is dedicated to development work. In addition, the board is regularly kept updated on the progress of THPF’s work in order that it can plan and decide a strategic granting to certain areas. Progression reports regularly happen in board meetings. Sometimes, the board calls in individual projects to investigate
some problematic issues. A series of rigorous checks and reports is believed to help the board monopolise organisational intelligence which is an important element for effective metagovernance (Jessop 1997).

Another important monitoring and assessment task of the board is to develop and implement the KPIs. In practice, the development of the KPIs is outsourced like many other tasks; yet the final decision on the use of the KPIs and how to use them depends on the authority of the board. Such KPIs are essential for the functioning of the board in terms of governance and monitoring systems as well as strategic development of the organisation. Throughout the history of the THPF, the KPIs have occasionally been revised and updated in response to the evolving complexity of the THPF and its partnership. The board also has the authority to set the internal compliance and audit which is an important mechanism to monitor and assess the function of the THPF. The result of the audit has been regularly reported to the board.

(3) The strategic frameworks and monitoring are supported by the exercise of discipline. The way the THPF funding allocated to projects/programmes is based on the significant, the relevant, and the returns of the projects/programmes proposed, confirms a degree of discipline and associated conformity in the sense that the applicants must identify and align the objectives and priorities of the projects/programmes with the THPF’s.

The issue of managing COI is said to be a challenging task for the board to perform. Studying the meeting minutes of the THPF board reveals that it had spent a significant amount of time trying to establish a clear protocol for the COI and things which a board member must avoid. Such protocol creates a discipline, namely a code of conduct, of being a board member, and has been applied to different levels of governance within the THPF. It appears that every board member strictly follows the protocol. For instance, if involved with the matter being considered in any sense, the member him/herself asks to leave the room unless the board agrees otherwise.

Indeed, monitoring and assessment can also be seen as a disciplinary force to keep the partners on track and ensure the efficiency of the recipients. Inefficient or failing partners would not face punitive strategies unless illegal issues were involved. COI of the partners or a committee member of any level is commonly seen to receive a punitive response such as discharge. This issue is closely linked with political intervention.
The board and the government

The shadow of hierarchy is not only assisting in the formation of the governance structure but also threatening and inhibiting the autonomy of the governance structure and governance network (Whitehead 2003, 2007). This is mostly exemplified in a case of a political intervention of the Board. Whether the THPF and its governance network have been running in the shadow of hierarchy is dependent on the extent to which the state can manipulate the direction of THPF governance, the Board.

Although the government itself, led by the cabinet, appears to have given a more legitimate and efficacious shadow of hierarchy, the transfer of responsibility for the board from the government is seen as a less interventionist manner of administration due to the nature of the THPF as a quango, and its work. Nevertheless, as the board, in principle, is chaired by the PM, the cabinet resolution has impacted upon the THPF. The THPF has always been asked to respond to the cabinet resolutions. For sensible demands, the THPF has been ready to follow. For example, 7 out of 13 plans in the three-year master plans (2005-2007) were launched to directly meet the need of the cabinet resolution (Board of Governance 2005, 2 Mar, item 4.1). Yet, for unreasonable demands, the THPF has not passively obeyed. For example, in 2004, the government requested half of the THPF annual budget to spend on advertising a government road accident prevention campaign (Board of Governance 2004, 28 Jan, item 1). The request did not have a passive response from the THPF as it did not match well with what the THPF should really promote. Besides, the THPF cannot just give money; proposals need to be made for the reviewing processes. This proves that the attempt to manipulate the THPF fund by the government was unreasonable. Besides, there were occasionally proposals, especially in the early years of the THPF, from government departments which asked for money to buy durable goods or create an organisation; the THPF does not have a policy to grant such proposals. The government thus had a narrow vision on how the THPF funding works and what should be supported.

Moreover, the government has framed health promotion in a different way from the THPF. For instance, in a Board meeting in 2005, the PM for the first time gave a speech on health promotion.\(^\text{13}\) His view on health promotion was based on an ‘order and security’ mindset: healthy

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\(^\text{13}\) This was the first time the PM himself attended the meeting since the establishment of the THPF; most of the time the deputy PM has in fact acted as the chair of the board.
people are those who are safe from illness, drugs, and accidents. They generate social security and order. To promote health is to promote ‘safe’, docile and legal behaviour (Board of Governance 2005, 21 Apr, item 4.2). This reflects the authoritarian view of health promotion. Nevertheless, the THPF interpreted health promotion in a more communitarian way believing in self-governing networks and healthy people as those who are able to take care of themselves and their communities.

The attempt to manipulate the THPF also often came in a less interventionist way. For instance, the government through the MoPH once mentioned that THPF plans should have operated in concert with the health policies of the government. The THPF should not work separately. It even recommended that the THPF should work more closely with the government and the MoPH (Board of Governance 2004, 25 Feb, item 4.1). On the one hand, this pointed to a better integration in implementing the national health policy. On the other hand, it can be argued that the government demanded the THPF to serve the government’s agenda, jeopardising the autonomy of the THPF as a quango.

Rejecting the requests and proposals from government departments sometime yielded negative consequences and conflicts for the THPF. Suspension and termination of certain board members was occasionally seen as a political tool to take revenge on the THPF. Many interview participants similarly pointed to the event in 2004 as a good case of political intervention when the government discharged the second chairman of the board from the position without informing or asking for the approval of the board - as a result of the conflict between the government and the THPF. The power of the second chairman has also been significantly reduced since then (Board of Governance 2004, 12 Nov, item 4.1). The conflict disrupted the functioning of the board and the THPF for several months. Board meetings could not regularly be held although they are supposed to be held monthly. There was no the meeting for five consecutive months. Many of the THPF projects were delayed. Likewise, recently in 2016, the THPF witnessed one of the starkest uses of hierarchical power to manipulate the board when the PM suspended seven THPF board members because of an alleged conflict of interest under a special order, Section 44 of the interim charter. Indeed, it was seen that the military government would like to reduce the number of board members from the civil society side as all of the suspended members were from civil society

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14 Section 44 of the Interim Constitution of 2014 provides the PM as the leader of military government the final, absolute power to issue any order which shall be deemed lawful and constitutional.
and supporters of THPF pro-civil society programmes. This event also disrupted the operation of the THPF for a while.

To mitigate or prevent the (potential) conflict, the THPF has learnt to occasionally grant what was proposed by government departments if it was not totally irrelevant to its mission. This is believed to be a negotiation strategy to keep the THPF running. Granting, in this sense, is not a mere economic tool but has become a deliberate political tool. Granting as a political tool has not been used only to deal with the state but also with the business sector. For example, the THPF has begun to grant a significant amount of money to sports associations in order to advocate the separation of alcohol sponsorship and sports events (Board of Governance 2005, 17 Nov, item 3.2). Such granting was strategic because it aimed to advocate beyond immediate cause (sports events) to ultimately advocate the reduction of an unhealthy practice (sponsorship by alcohol companies) in health-related activities.

6.3 Conclusion

The THPF represents an organisation with powerful resources and a tendency to steer, which makes it a qualified metagovernor in the THPF-NGO relations. What was discussed in this chapter directly aims to deal with the second research question: how are the funded NGOs steered and metagoverned by the THPF?

This thesis argues that the THPF as a health and societal promotor enabler indeed performs metagovernance. The metagovernance of the THPF is strategically selective favouring civil society and NGOs and non-hierarchical mechanisms of governance. Specifically, granting (quasi-market) and partnership (quasi-network) are favoured. Yet, hierarchical steering does not disappear from the THPF’s governance. It is interestingly manifested in the ‘shadow of hierarchy’, through the state audit and the exercise of the board, in which the metagoverning THPF operates. The presence of the shadow of hierarchy reminds us that the THPF power to steer can always be pulled back by the centre (or the state) and then imposed more directly. In this sense, it is imperative to recognise the close, but complex, relationship between the state and the THPF and how the shadow of hierarchy operates in practice vis-à-vis interactive governance. As the THPF strategically utilises different modes of governance, it knows exactly when each mode, alone or in combination, is needed. The next chapter will further explore two key mechanisms of
metagovernance of the THPF: granting and partnership. The metagoverning THPF has a typical way of using the mechanisms to steer its NGO partners.
Chapter 7

Metagovernance of the THPF (II): partnership strategy and proactive granting

As a metagovernor, the inherent task of the THPF is to influence social interactions in a way that the NGOs, as social self-organisations, and the state, including the THPF itself, are made complementary. The THPF, to a certain degree, represents the coordination capacity of the state towards the non-state actors. How the THPF acts exhibits the ability of the state to metagovern by the strategic construction of institutional designs which endeavours to, on the one hand, increase the self-regulating capacity of the NGO network while, on the other hand, retain, or even enhance, the coordination or governance capacity of the state.

According to Rakyutidharm (2014a), the successful partnership between the THPF and the NGOs is significantly derived from the ability of the THPF, rather than the work of the NGOs themselves, in engaging the NGO partners to work with and support the THPF and its partnership. In doing so, the THPF allows the NGOs to keep their autonomy and original missions, although they share a common working agenda. The THPF is political and strategically exercises its power as a metagovernor. This was discussed in the previous chapter.

One major challenge of metagovernance concerns the position of the THPF towards the NGO network. The state capacity is heavily dependent on the development of closer state-society relations. If the THPF is too insulated from the social actors it will struggle to pursue its goals. On the other hand, if it is too close, the THPF risks ending up being captured by the NGOs who are seeking to develop closer relations (see Bell and Hindmoor 2009). In fact, one of the major tasks of THPF staff, especially the management - as indicated in their job description - is to support and manage the relationships among and between, the partnerships, networks, and relevant stakeholders. Therefore, the relationship between the THPF and the NGOs needs to be positioned, steered or metagoverned, so that THPF goals are effectively achieved rather than those of the NGOs.

This chapter explores the way the key mechanisms of metagovernance are conducted by the THPF to steer its NGO partners in practice. Two major mechanisms associated with quasi-networks and quasi-markets are identified respectively: the ‘tri-power strategy’ (partnership) and the proactive granting scheme.
7.1 Governing NGO partners: the ‘tri-power strategy’

Although THPF work is executed by the THPF office, they would not be successfully achieved without a wide variety of networks and partners who develop and carry out a range of programmes and projects. The THPF facilitates collaboration both within government across departments and outside of government across sectors. At the core of how the THPF operates is a certain institutional design, the so-called ‘tri-power strategy’ model (Adulyanon 2012; see figure 7.1). The model is derived from the aforementioned idea of the ‘triangle that moves the mountain,’ originally initiated and echoed by Dr Prawes Wasi, a prominent thinker of health promotion and civil society and a respected THPF advisor.

Figure 7.1. ‘Tri-power strategy’ model

The model, claimed as the basis of many policy successes (see Wasi 2000; Thamarangsri 2009; Galbally et al. 2012), essentially suggests that to move the immovable ‘mountain’ (a metaphor for complex social problems and inertia), it is imperative to reinforce the three interconnected angles: knowledge, social movements and political/policy involvement. The lack of any of the angles, especially social movement, likely leads to failure in solving difficult problems (Wasi 2000). Each of THPF’s activities is developed based on this conceptualised strategy. The first angle highlights the need for knowledge generation through research and its translation into a form that can empower the public. Sufficiency of relevant knowledge helps
societal power to move in the right direction. This highlights knowledge management as a foundation for advancing the technical capacity of health promotion professionals and advocating changes. The second angle involves with the facilitation of social movement, and perhaps the organisation of civil society, to support the transformation of the knowledge generated into policy. The combination of the first and the second helps convey the demand for authorities at the third angle: the political angle. In this respect, society must take a lead in social change with support from the others. It is important to note that in Thailand, the strengths of professional associations and NGOs have greatly contributed to successful public campaigns, especially health- and social-related issues. As a result the THPF has been particularly recognised as a pioneer for adapting and deploying the networked government approach (Phusavat et al. 2011). This final angle is focused on the authoritative aspect, namely government and state power. The movement needs to find suitable mechanisms to engage the political authorities and policy-makers because they ‘have authority over utilisation of state resources and in law promulgation, which are very often needed in development. Thus without political involvement the working structure is not complete. Politics without knowledge and social movement will not do’ (Wasi 2000, p. 107). Therefore, academic institutions and think tanks, social movements and organised civil society, governmental agencies and policy-makers are, respectively, crucial actors. This political angle implies that, to achieve a goal, intersectoral collaboration is advocated. Political authorities are welcomed rather than being shunned. This emphasises the importance of policy advocacy strategies, especially ones that lead to contact with authorities employed by the movement.

For the THPF, the triangle represents three different kinds of partners with different personalities. The ‘tri-power strategy’ model, as the THPF’s in-house operative strategy, arguably extends the power of the three angles. The THPF claims the model as one of the most socially innovative methods for achieving policy changes (Innovation Support Unit 2016, 2017). Using the tri-power approach, the THPF has never acted merely as a ‘sponsor’ but ‘a health and societal promotor enabler’. The role of the THPF has diversified in the partnership to include the role of expert stakeholder, partner, facilitator, advocate, system and capacity builder, and change agent. In other words, what the THPF does is to organise resources - often belonging to others - to produce public value within the web of multi-organisational, multi-governmental, and multi-sectoral relationships generated through the idea of the Triangle. In this sense, the THPF advocates the transfer of resources among actors across different sectors in a formulated network.
The ‘tri-power’ strategy is believed to particularly exhibit its strength in the most prominent and original working areas of the THPF: alcohol consumption control, tobacco consumption control, and accident prevention.

(1) Alcohol consumption control

In alcohol consumption control, the THPF funded the establishment of the Centre for Alcohol Studies (CAS), run by the Health System Research Institute (HSRI), in 2004 as the first national research institute for the reduction of consumption and alcohol-related harm. The CAS has successfully become the core of alcohol-related knowledge activities, the knowledge angle. For the social movement angle, the THPF has funded the creation and the operation of the StopDrink Network (SDN), a coordinating NGO body dedicated to alcohol reduction. Many activities of the movements have become viral over the country and generated a widespread public impact (see Sathapitanon et al. 2006). It is one of the most popular movements in contemporary Thailand. For the last angle, the political involvement, the THPF has funded the capacity-strengthening projects for public agencies. One of them is the Tobacco and Alcohol Consumption Control Unit (TACCU) of the MoPH which aims to strengthen regulatory enforcement and to launch social campaigning programmes. The THPF also sponsored many sporting and religious activities organised by government agencies to ban drinking within certain areas. THPF work in alcohol consumption control well reflects the application of the Triangle (Thamarangsi 2009).

The THPF performed a complementary role in coordinating, rather than replacing, existing structures/agencies but when there was a need to create new structures/agencies, it did not hesitate to do so. The creation of the CAS and the StopDrink Network exemplifies the role. Therefore, alcohol control is one of the most successful programmes of the THPF which was seen as the mastermind for anti-alcohol movements. It has shaped the social climate for alcohol through a series of public campaigns and indirectly influenced the process by sponsoring its partners such as the SDN and proactively working with the National Alcohol Consumption Control Committee (NACCC) (Thamarangsi 2008), where at some points it was chaired by the Vice-chair of the THPF’s Board.
(2) Tobacco consumption control

In tobacco consumption control, the work was started long before the establishment of the THPF itself. Thailand had some of the world’s strongest anti-tobacco legislation and an active movement even before the work of the THPF (see Chantornvong and McCargo 2001). However, with the support from the THPF, the community has been institutionalised through the stable funding and the strategic framework driven by the tri-power strategy.

Research and knowledge has played a very important part in tobacco control in Thailand (see Hamann et al. 2012). In 2005, the THPF funded the creation and the operation of the Tobacco Control Research and Knowledge Management Centre (TRC) under the supervision of the Faculty of Public Health, Mahidol University. This is one of the first attempts to establish a solid link with universities as partners ‘in the knowledge angle’. An interview with Ms Woo, a senior THPF officer responsible for the creation of the TRC as well as the CAS, revealed that creating a connection with universities fulfilled the missing link in THPF’s work because they have a typically academic capacity that no other organisations have. It is also believed by the Board that it can help increase the success rate of the project/programme (Board of Governance 2005, 19 May, item 4.1).

The establishment of the TRC is different from that of CAS… We’ve tried to put the CAS under a university as well but it was extremely hard to find a suitable one. Most of the universities could not support the CAS as their alumni associations somehow have a relationship with the alcohol industry. Alcohol corporations sponsored many university events (Ms Woo, interview).

In the social movement angle, the THPF is closely linked with NGOs such as ASH Thailand, an NGO working in the tobacco reduction area long before the THPF. ASH Thailand is an NGO regarded as professional and expert in the field. It has received funding from the THPF continuously since its inception through several programmes. ASH Thailand also hosted several figures that have an influence over the THPF and the policy area in general. Its senior advisor was a founding member and at one time the Vice-chair of the THPF board, and has been regarded as one of the main champions of tobacco control in the world. Apart from supporting the existing organisations, the THPF sponsored the formation of the Thai Health Professionals Against Tobacco (THPAT) and Teachers Against Tobacco Network (TATN) in 2005. These networks have
operated across the country and helped increase the involvement of health professionals and teachers in tobacco control.

In the angle of political involvement, the THPF has worked closely with the Bureau of Non-communicable Diseases of the MoPH, the key state actor in tobacco control. Regarding taxation, the THPF has collaborated with the Excise Department and the Customs Department as it has strongly advocated the rise on tobacco tax. The THPF has also cooperated with the police and the MoPH when the regulation is needed. The tobacco control area represents a model where multiple stakeholders are tightly connected (see Termsirikulchai et al. 2008).

(3) Accident prevention

As with the case of alcohol consumption control, the THPF funded the establishment of the Road Safety Research Centre run by the National Health Foundation (NHF). The centre has become one of the most strategic units to generate relevant knowledge to develop policies and measures in the area of accident prevention. The NHF was a temporary host for the centre; after operating for several years, the centre separated from the NHF and has its own foundation, the so-called ‘Road Safety Policy Foundation’ operating as an academic-based NGO for policy advocacy.

Social movement is essential for the advocacy of accident prevention. The THPF have recognised that road accidents cannot be prevented entirely by police enforcement. The Accident Prevention Network (APN) was sponsored as a social mechanism to deal with local agencies and organisations while the THPF itself is focused more on the coordination with public and private organisations at the national level.

The accident prevention area proved to be a case where many governmental agencies are involved with the activities. These include the Department of Highways under the Ministry of Transport, the Royal Thai Police Department, Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation under Ministry of Interior, the MoPH, and the Department of Corrections under Ministry of Justice. Because of the nature of the area, regulatory power is needed. Also, analysis of THPF Board meeting minutes between November 2003 and November 2006 shows that many cabinet resolutions instructed the THPF to support measures in order to improve road safety activities in Thailand. This is the area where political authority is strongly involved.

Each angle played a different role in each stage of the policy. Together, the THPF and the research centre performed as a network integrator pointing out how all relevant actors could
contribute and solve the problem while the APN and the government agencies performed extensively during the implementation phase (Phusavat et al. 2011).

7.1.1 The different balance of the triangle

In all three cases, there are many common points. Indeed, each area demonstrated a combination of knowledge, social movement, and political authority. Relevant actors from the three angles are connected through the help of the THPF and form the basis for the application of the tri-power. More importantly, the THPF similarly granted funds to create new relevant research institutes and to institutionalise the knowledge angle, be they a think tank under a government department, a centre under a university, or a foundation. This stresses the importance of knowledge-based policy and knowledge management.

However, in each area discussed above, each angle of the tri-power strategy played a different and unequal role within the partnership. In other words, the power of each angle is not similarly actualised on a similar level in different policy areas. The triangle is, in effect balanced differently according to which aspect is highlighted: the knowledge aspect is the key to tobacco control; the social movement is the highlighted aspect in alcohol control; and the political authorities are dominant in the area of accident prevention. The different balance of the triangle can be illustrated in the figure 7.2, which is based on the interviews.

Figure 7.2 The differently balanced triangle in alcohol control, tobacco control, and accident prevention
Arguably, four important factors can be listed as an antecedent responsible for the differently balanced triangle. First, there is a difference in the nature and characteristic of the problem of interest of each network. For alcohol control, the issue is highly contested involving social and cultural dimensions. There is no established solution to the issue. This is in contrast with the issue of tobacco control and accident prevention where consensus was likely to be established. There is an agreement on the negative outcomes of smoking and accidents. Moreover, the accident prevention issue has never been much opposed by businesses and the Excise Department in contrast to the opposition experienced by the anti-tobacco and anti-alcohol NGOs.

Second, the differences in the participation dimension of the network are also worth considering. In alcohol control, wide civil society engagement and social mobilisation are common practice. The network is open and societal-led. Mr Tan, a senior officer in an anti-alcohol NGO, mentioned several times during the interview that the NGOs have taken a central role in the network: ‘we are like a secretariat. We connect stakeholders… Normally, they [the public organisations] can do their work. But by inviting them to work with us, NGOs, they get a higher profile with the public’ (Mr Tan, interview). On the contrary, the network is rather close in tobacco control and accident prevention issues. The tobacco control network is technical and professional, occupied by a group of experts and medical doctors. The accident prevention network is government- and bureaucratic- oriented because it involves authorities and law enforcement agencies. Government agencies took a lead in the accident prevention, and civil society initiatives play a limited role in these two networks.

Third, in terms of leadership in the network, strong leadership was found in the areas of tobacco control and alcohol control. The difference between them is that the leadership in alcohol control is rather centralised having a single direction while that in tobacco control is contested having multiple schools of thought. In contrast, the leadership in accident prevention network is weak and fragmented; a variety of stakeholders and authorities have engaged in the issue with their own agendas and expertise. It is difficult to see any centralised leadership in this network.

Fourth, the direction of the partnership is heavily dependent on the abilities of NGOs to steer the relationship in their favour. Interviews with the NGO participants prove this point well. If the NGOs can manage to expand their horizon to non-financial exchange, they are able to steer the funding as exemplified before, through the discussion of the programme-funded NGOs. However, the NGOs in the major areas of the THPF are unfortunately seen as being less expert
when it comes to discussion of the technical solutions to the ‘health’ problems. They are often regarded as powerful when there is a need to mobilise movements. In these cases, medical professionals are seen as influential, be they respiratory physicians or pulmonologists in the case of anti-smoking, psychiatrists in case of anti-alcohol, or orthopaedists in the case of accident prevention. All actors tend to listen to the medical expertise and knowledge of the field.

Arguably, anti-alcohol work is less influenced by medical professionals because medical expertise mostly involves psychiatrists in this field. Psychiatrists are different from other medical doctors. The emergence of psychiatrists in Thailand is relatively new compared to others; they are specifically trained to see relationship in social issues. Sometimes, their opinions are considered less than those of a medical doctor because they do not treat psychical health. Moreover, anti-alcohol work is the area that is most involved with society and culture. Alcohol is the closest to everyday and social life. It causes a variety of effects, not only in physical and traditional health area but also brings a wide involvement of societal actors.

7.1.2 The ‘tri-power strategy’ as strategic supervision

The tri-power strategy has tried to institutionalise the relationship among different partners across sectors. The partnership does not occur on its own. As an attempt to metagovern, the tri-power strategy, carefully analysed, is in fact enhancing THPF organising power, and then the state power, over the partners. It represents a chance for the THPF and the state to develop more subtle forms of steering to obtain influence in the partnership, the governable terrain.

The tri-power strategy as a metagoverning concept, in practice allows a sphere for the different partners to relate collaboratively and innovatively with each other. The THPF has created such a sphere and become a metagovernor by creating the different partners’ latitude to function in particular ways and steering the partnership, whether with hands-on or hands-off means.

The tri-power strategy has also generated a sense of a common objective for the partnership, which is to drive a ‘mountain’ predominantly defined by the THPF. This does not only refer to what the mountain is but also how the mountain can be driven. The language of ‘we’ often came up during the interviews when projects were discussed. It is assumed that the determined goal of health promotion, created by the lead of the THPF, is the general goal of the partner organisations as well. Every partner has tried to speak the language of THPF health promotion. In this sense, the tri-power strategy is not only developing the collaboration of physical
organisations, but also producing collectivity, or discursive frameworks for those involved: the partners constructed themselves as relevant in the partnership. The contract used between the THPF and the funded NGOs is thus not perceived from the view of the individual interests of each organisation but from a deliberate common interest. Through the co-optation of the common goal, the partner organisations are expected to prioritise the partnership.

As Chapter 2 reminds us, the structural tendency of the ‘tri-power strategy’, as strategic supervision, is necessarily strategically selective. Indeed, the strategy is variously interpreted at convenient for the users. For the THPF, the strategy places a high priority on the need to strengthen civil society. No private or business corporations are directly emphasised in the strategy. This may imply an anti-capitalist world view of the strategy. Also, the strategy is criticised for a continuous tendency to make the THPF and its partners become co-opted by the state because it overemphasises the need to collaborate with the state on any policy activity to secure success. Moreover, interview participants similarly point out the tendency of a lobbying approach to policy advocacy because it is believed to give efficiency in agreeing changes or advocating their desired policies. Research shows that getting in contact with officials and authorities to persuade them of the merits of a certain policy position, using arguments and evidence, is considered one of the most common and effective strategies for citizen lobbying (see Adams 2007). Lobbying is also found as a mechanism of executing power associated with market governance (Meuleman 2019). These issues will be further explored in Chapter 8.

It is interesting to specifically discuss the lobby tendency as a result of the tri-power strategy because this is what the THPF has implicitly advocated the funded to do. Dr Luke, a former member of the THPF, reflected that,

Many NGO workers are thinking that they have done well at community work, solving local problems, and fighting for ordinary people. Anyway, that era has changed. Fighting for the people does not necessarily mean protest and direct action. Sometimes, a lobby of the authorities, although we might disagree with them, is needed. We need to acknowledge that the state power determines the structure of society, laws, and policies. We need to do this part as well. NGOs need to adapt themselves (Dr Luke, interview).

If looked at carefully, the movements in the three areas discussed above, present different modes of advocacy work. Arguably, the anti-tobacco movement preferred to use an institutional
advocacy approach (lobbying) while the anti-alcohol and accident prevention movements were inclined to be sympathetic with a public advocacy approach (see Figure 2.2).\textsuperscript{15}

7.2 Governing civil society through NGOs: proactive granting

Peters (2010) argues that contracting and control over budgeting is ‘perhaps the most obvious means of metagoverning’ (p.46). The THPF uses contracting for many reasons including steering its partners in a way it desires. In general, the THPF has two approaches towards funding and granting: proactive and passive. Passive grants or ‘open grants’ are a channel for anyone to submit a proposal for funding. This means that the THPF only reacts by reviewing and considering the proposal. Generally, it runs three rounds of open submissions a year and might grant an amount to partners who, in turn, grant and manage grants, as they are potentially closer to the community or the target group. Open grant budgets are normally limited to a maximum of 100,000 baht (about 3,200 USD).

In contrast, proactive grants, also known as ‘partnership model’ for funding are a strategy that directly encourages other organisations to perform the activity. This kind of granting accounts for the majority of the total THPF grant budget. Hence, the THPF is in the business of working with partners to create projects mutually, rather than merely reacting to proposals. There are four key stages in the THPF partnership model: proposal development, technical review, project approval, and supervision, monitoring and evaluation (Galbally et al. 2012).

In principle, THPF brings together a group of potential partners for the initial creative design phase and to develop a programme. Subsequently, this group suggests who is best to implement the programme and why. This means that the THPF needs to strategically think about what to promote and who will be the potential partner of the project. This implies that the THPF does not simply operate with different partners, but rather strategically identifies gaps and potential partners. Therefore, it is sensible for the THPF to consider itself more than a funder but an enabler.

According to the 2011 THPF bylaw on regulation and method related to budget allocation for project and activity funding, applicants must first state what the proposed activity is and how it is related to THPF missions and objectives. Then, the proposal will enter the review process

\textsuperscript{15}It is imperative to note that these two approaches can, in effect, be used together, either in different stages of a project or activity, or even at the same time.
which is divided into two important stages: academic review by a number of experts depending on the amount of required budget, and consideration and decision-making. The bylaw also states that grantees must submit reports of performance and finance to the THPF at least once a year. In order to make a contract with the THPF, applicants must be registered as a juristic person under the Civil and Commercial Code.

Proactive granting mostly works through dealing with the partners who have already established a clear connection with the THPF. On the contrary, the passive, open granting scheme constitutes only around 10 percent of the total funding and is considered to be helping decentralise the funding towards new partners. Such granting legitimises the participatory quality of the funding, expanding the horizon of recipients.

It is suspected that the THPF has put less emphasis on the passive granting even though it is the mechanism for legitimising the funding itself. It has been criticised for giving too many proactive grants because of the potential for connection-driven and elite funding limited only to those who know and have experienced working with the THPF. Dr Luke, a former THPF senior officer and a current PAC member with experience of both proactive and open granting, interestingly clarified THPF funding emphasis, linking it to the organisation’s vision.

If we emphasise outcomes, the proactive grant can yield more results than the open grant. Partners in the proactive scheme are the strategic partners such as alcohol and tobacco control movements. They’ve operated for some time to know how to make the work successful. Proactive schemes deal with ones who can work continuously and advocate policy. Anyway, the open grant can indeed give us a degree of legitimacy. Ordinary people can access the money and run a small project but it is difficult for them to make a change at a system or structural level. The THPF always says that its funding is like a lubricant for structural change. Open granting cannot make the THPF reach the goal… The question is, if structural change is the goal, is 10% of the open grant enough? (Dr Luke, interview).

THPF grants have been used to a different degree by different organisations. Some NGOs have used THPF funding for their own organisations while others have used it for certain projects and activities. For those who have totally, or mostly, relied on THPF funding, a high degree of dependency is possible. This is because the fund constituted a significant amount of the organisation’s budget. However, under the significance of THPF’s funding, some NGOs showed
reflexivity. For instance, Ms Jeep, a senior NGO worker whose organisation’s budget is funded 80-90 percent by the THPF said that:

> We’ve analysed and consulted with our committee members about whether it’s too risky [to heavily rely on THPF’s funding]. The committee directed our attention, instead, to the question of whether the funding serves our philosophy and missions. If it does, it’s fine to rely on the funding. We don’t give much importance to the money. If the THPF disappeared and we did not have money to work, we would need to find a new source of funding by whatever means. The work needs to carry on (Ms Jeep, interview).

Also, there might be another side to dependency. The NGOs are, in fact, not only relying on THPF funding because they do not have a choice. They also see it as an opportunity to work with the THPF, an institutionalised state agency, and other parts of civil society. On the other hand, those who have relied on THPF funding only for certain projects or activities were less dependent. Many of them tend to have a more diverse funding pool and are more experienced in dealing directly with funders, nationally and internationally.

However, there are financially-dependent NGOs who are able to show a certain degree of leadership in THPF-NGO partnership. They have not only received granting for short-term projects but also for their long-term programme. Running a long-term programme requires more organisational resources, either financial or non-financial. Programme managers need to exhibit an ability to think strategically and act according to the mission of the organisation and the funder. According to interviews with programme-funded NGO managers, to work at a programme level signifies working on strategy. They similarly hold an ability to think at a strategic level and see changes in multiple levels such as policy, service systems, and movement.

Organisationally, the NGOs which have the complementing, supplementing, and niched relations with the THPF, as discussed in Chapter 5, tend to believe that they hold a certain power to negotiate with, and perhaps even manipulate, THPF funding. Individually, resistance to the funder is common among the upper management in these NGOs. This reflects the agency of NGOs in relation to the funding structure. Ms Cat, whose NGO has been in the niched relationship with the THPF, said that:
I see the THPF as a social innovation which we and Thai society should use to its maximum. If we want to create social innovations in the country, we must help create them together. So, to work with the THPF…, I see myself as a bridge conveying resources [from the THPF] to other NGOs and civil society in local areas. My work, therefore, is to sub-grant other NGOs (Mr Cat, interview).

For an organisation, being a THPF programme manager or a sub-grantor is sometimes criticised as being an arm of the THPF, thereby forsaking the original standpoint. They are often addressed as ‘elite NGOs’ helping the THPF to expand its ‘empire’. On the one hand, these NGO programme managers are delegated power by the THPF to control the use of funding over certain issues. They hold responsibility as a THPF delegate. On the other hand, it is possible to see them as helping the THPF metagovern other parts of civil society. As the majority of the recipients of the THPF are the non-state actors, these NGO managers must deal with their NGO peers. The NGOs are tended to become an ‘arm of the THPF’ while the THPF is inclined to become the ‘biggest NGO’. A social hierarchy of NGOs is then created under the THPF’s funding ecosystem.

Interview participants who are programme managers admitted that there is indeed such criticism. However, it can be defended. For Ms Jeep, a senior NGO worker, the matter of being an arm of the THPF,

is dependent on how strong a standpoint the organisation has. We must not be a little THPF. We must show that, in a way, we [the programme manager and the funded organisations] are in the same movement… Even without granting, we’re still able to be partners, creating a working network. We must not have a kind of funder-recipient relationship but a collaborative relationship… We’re using the social capital, the THPF, to generate changes (Ms Jeep, interview).

Also, the way programme managers sub-grant to other organisations is considered problematic. For example, they are seen to excessively constrain the autonomy of the funded organisations, especially in financial activities. The THPF itself is seen to allow more autonomy to its direct fundees. Mr Tan, a senior officer of an NGO responsible for a THPF programme, tried to explain the reason behind this.

We’ve developed the paperwork system based on the one originally created by the THPF. We’ve created our own systems and financial regulations under the general framework of the THPF.
Where the THPF makes it broad, we narrow it because we have a smaller limited budget [compare to the THPF]… where we need to do like the THPF does, we’ve shrunk the proportion. Yet everything must be under the THPF framework. For project reviews, we’ve a dedicated officer for such tasks (Mr Tan, interview).

According to the example statement given by Mr Tan, it appears that programme managers are allowed to translate and implement THPF rules and regulations to suit their convenience and practices. They can create their own documents, forms, and assessment criteria. This proves the greater autonomy of the programme managers compared to other ‘mere’ fundees.

Given this, it is possible to differentiate the funded NGOs into two levels according to how they are funded: programme-funded NGOs and project-funded NGOs (see Figure 7.3). The programme-funded NGOs usually get a large amount of grant and operate a programme in a strategic, long time frame (e.g. three-year). They are sometimes understood as inner-circle partners. Dr Pan, a THPF senior officer, mentioned that: ‘NGOs which are supposed to be inner THPF partners should not be many. I call them the ‘managing unit’… Their projects can be continued [more than a few years]’ (Dr Pan, interview).

From the THPF side, programme-funded NGOs should be limited to the selected few. They can only operate under the active grant schemes as they are more strategic. From the NGO side, there are a limited number which are able to manage programmes because the position requires certain resources and skills, especially in terms of management. Many NGOs do not possess such levels of skills and resources. An inter-connected approach to work, for example, which looks beyond a single project, is needed; in practice, it is not common practice among the funded NGOs. Not every funded NGO, according to interviewees in this research, exhibits such vision. NGOs running a THPF programme are conditioned to show strategic thinking regarding integration and collaboration. This is different from NGOs running project-level activities, which are mainly focusing on their own businesses, although they are asked and stimulated to look beyond their own horizons. The project-funded NGOs also receive less money and operate a project within a shorter time frame (e.g. one-year). Many of the latter NGOs are from the open grant scheme. This does not necessarily mean that the active grant schemes cannot grant at project level because in fact they do in practice.
Arguably, the different levels of the funded NGO signify the difference in power of the funded over the fund. How they are funded reflects the potential of the funded organisation to negotiate with the funder. In other words, it signifies the power proximity between the funder and the funded. The funded organisations that are far from the centre of power (THPF grant) are less able to negotiate, and often excluded from the key strategic stakeholders involved in the planning of the project/programme. On the contrary, the funded organisations that are closer to the centre of power are able to negotiate with the funder and co-manipulate the fund. To put it more simply, the funded NGOs as programme managers hold more power, resources and have a better position in dealing with the THPF. It seems that, for them, the power relationship between the THPF and themselves is negotiable.

It seems from the interviews that NGOs responsible for managing THPF programme(s) and NGOs that are only project-based funded have different, sometimes contrasting, views toward the THPF. Programme manager NGOs are closer to the power of the THPF and sometimes defend it, albeit remaining mildly critical. They are more strategic and academic, having higher priority
in the THPF’s partner network. In contrast, project-based funded NGOs are inclined to believe that they have a more recipient-funder relationship with the THPF and the programme manager NGOs. They hold a limited amount of power, if not no power, to negotiate with the funder. Nevertheless, both kinds of funded NGOs perceive that they are preoccupied by the THPF because the latter holds the purse strings.

The work processes driven by the proactive granting scheme have been widely criticised (see Carroll, Wood, Tantivess 2007). As it is strategically selective, favouritism is commonly seen in the THPF granting processes as well as projects and planned development. The THPF has been censured for having favourites and not being open to new partners. The extent to which the stakeholders were invited to engage in the process of drafting plans is subjective depending on sections. Different sections of the THPF have different degrees and targets of stakeholder participation. Dr Pan, a senior officer of the THPF, gave an example:

The process [of the THPF] in terms of feedback management, maybe, should be better than this. This is difficult to say… When I first began to work with the THPF, the process of drafting three-year plans was designed by boards and committees. The meeting was run by the inner circle [of the THPF]. Recently, I’ve invited hundreds of partners. They’re happy for the participation. We got new, interesting views. Even so, the process did not cover the broader public. We are not there yet… I can’t say that the others did the same way I did. Yet, my section is rather more advanced than the other sections (Dr Pan, interview).

However, the stakeholder involvement conducted by the THPF is seen as insufficient. For example, Mr Jet, a senior member of an NGO funded by THPF’s major sections, was asked whether he has experienced engaging in the process of developing THPF plans. He unfortunately replied that:

I have a little engagement with the process. I might have some, but it is too little. It is insufficient. Recently, [the section A] has been trying to include partners from the beginning of the process. Anyway, it’s still in the process. The result hasn’t been yielded yet (Mr Jet, interview).
Those who were selected to be included in the process of developing THPF plans were often those who used to be involved before. In other words, the regularly funded NGOs (funded before and tending to be funded in the future) were the regular members of the team.

Each year, the THPF needs to develop the yearly and three-year plans. It then has the process to select the participants from the partner organisations. The selected ones were regulars who have worked for THPF and seen its development (Mr Tan, Interview).

‘Favouritism’ also links with the issue of selectivity in which the THPF tends to work with partners who will do their bidding and follow the THPF line. The THPF is also seen by its nongovernment partners as too demanding with rigidity on reporting requirements, inflexibility, bureaucracy (Carroll, Wood, Tantivess 2007), driving the processes of the NGOisation which will be discussed later. Importantly, no effective standard or formal mechanism for feedback is built in the THPF-NGO partnership. Indeed, the THPF claims to be open for partners’ comments and opinions. The THPF created the PIRS as a formal mechanism for enhancing networking with partners; most of the feedback, in practice, was delivered through informal mechanisms, typically personal communication. This means that different sections of the THPF have different mechanisms for feedback; some sections have tended to deal better with feedback than others. For sections which are close to the partners, feedback is well-used. Partner organisations are comfortable talking and consulting with the sections. This suggests that the proximity and the rapport between the THPF and the funded NGOs are essential for the quality of the relationship; effectively dealing with the feedback shows the care of the THPF. Due to the lack of a formal mechanism to communicate with the funder, in 2016 the funded NGOs together formed a network, the so-called ‘Health Promotion Movement’ partly as a social mechanism to bridge the communication gap between the funded NGOs and the THPF. However, the network is also seen as serving to defend the interests of the funded NGOs against the unfair financial investigation conducted by the state.

*Fragmentation of funding*

The way in which the THPF grant-making process has been organised around departmental or sectional structures has influenced the context in which the THPF agents work. The decision
power over the actual granting is heavily reliant on the section directors. These section directors, in fact, have a high degree of control over their ‘own turf’, a considerable degree of autonomy. On a day-to-day level, they are not inclined to face an immediate challenge from a higher authority, that is, the CEO. Activities and policies are likely to be developed and contained within certain ‘policy chimneys’, formed in a vertical manner under a section, which might adversely affect the activities being pursued by other sections. Sometimes, the directors think of the micro-level interests of their own sections at the expense of the macro-level goals of the whole organisation. This frequently causes the issue of standardisation and fragmentation of granting, signalling the pathology of departmentalism (see Hood 2005; McAnulla 2006; Kavanagh and Richards 2001).

Ms Peach, a senior NGO activist who has experience working with several domestic and international donors, raised the issue:

My experience suggested that each section of the THPF has a different standard and work protocol. For instance, Section A provided a clear account of how we can use an administrative expense while Section B gave none of that. In an organisation as significant as the THPF, it should have a standardised protocol so that operations would be the same. Besides, individual sections did not see the overall direction of work. For example, there was Section B responsible for promoting X. Then, Section C happened to invite me and other NGOs to work in the promotion of X. This made me question, ‘why didn’t they talk to each other within the organisation before talking to us?’ I also strongly questioned the way the THPF coordinates internally (Ms Peach, interview).

Fragmentation or silo-thinking happens when horizontal coordination across departments is weak. It is a typical governance management failure (Meuleman 2019) which hampers cross-border collaboration and prevents coordination. The THPF staff, typically the directors, have been focusing on working in their chimneys, protecting their turf and their own interests rather than advancing the broader organisation programmes. As a consequence, the directors are frequently trapped in battles over power and resources with colleagues, seeking to secure more for their own unit. When they tend to think vertically within the confines of their own areas, they are reluctant to cooperate with other sections on cross-sectional, ‘integrated’ works (Carroll, Wood and Tantivess 2007), which may be of importance to both. Such integration issues are widely recognised by both the THPF and NGO participants.
Fragmentation of funding significantly links with the way the NGOs can manage to access the funding. When the authority is with the segmented executives, standardised protocols are underplayed. Those NGOs with well-established connections to particular section directors, as interview participants complained, have a better chance in securing funding. This stresses the social hierarchy of NGOs. The fragmentation also defines how grants are channelled in practice. All too often, different sections of THPF have unintentionally granted funds to partner organisations which later turned out to work in the same area or be the same organisations.\textsuperscript{16} Sometimes they have done it intentionally to increase their own output and performance. Partners obtaining grants from different sections at the same time have suffered from different standards and protocols.

According to Mr Pun who also had experiences of receiving grants from multiple sections of the THPF, different treatment of different sections depends on the character of section directors:

We’re lucky that Section A had Ms Jai who was academically dedicated to - and an expert on- the work. She understood civil society work because she was chair of an NGO. Hence, the background of being an academic in civil society made her dedicated to make a purposeful change… With her, we created an organised movement. It’s not like we’re asking for money… Working with this section was to work with adjustable strategies and enjoy the goals. We’re not trapped in a frame of funder-fundee. On the contrary, when working with Section B, the section director was from a bureaucratic department with a different background of expertise. She didn’t have much insight about civil society. She did not have a clear understanding of development work and its goal. When the goal was not purposive, we were left to do whatever we wanted. The work wasn’t organised as a movement. A purposive movement did not happen… This finally led to goal displacement. We’re working in a funder-fundee relationship (Mr Pun, interview).

Some NGOs are reported to partly manage the problem of such differences by setting an internal management system with one officer dedicated to a certain project and a section at a time. Nonetheless, this is a matter of resources; only NGOs with sufficient resources and skills have the

\textsuperscript{16} Although there is no formal regulation forbidding the THPF to grant the same organisation more than one project at the same time, it seems that granting more than one project for the same organisation with a similar kind of work is considered ineffective, inefficient, and sometimes causes a conflict of interest. Thus, many directors, in practice, have tried to avoid doing so.
capacity to do this. Apart from Mr Pun, most interview participants that have experienced working with, or receiving grants from, two or more sections of the THPF, either at the same time or at different times, asserted that there are differences between sections such as the nature of their management, leadership, interpretation of the organisation policies and regulations, and vision about civil society and development work. Such differences chiefly come from the difference in leadership and the management style of the section directors.

In a positive aspect, the differences, or fragmentation, of funding proves the flexibility of the THPF as a quango, unlike a rigid standardised bureaucratic department. Yet, it also raises the issue of departmentalism and the division of the NGOs which divert the NGOs’ focus from ‘the big picture’ into their own silo of specialised work and in turn obstructs the emergence of a movement. The fragmentation becomes problematic when the THPF needs to deal with a variety of partners with fragmented practices. This has driven the professionalisation and bureaucratisation of the THPF and significantly affected its NGO partners.

7.3 Conclusion

This chapter further discusses the mechanisms of metagovernance conducted by the THPF. It mainly contributes to answer the second research question regarding the way the funded NGO are metagoverned. The THPF’s use of quasi-networks through tri-power strategy and quasi-markets through proactive granting, together provide a significant amount of managerial freedom for the NGOs. They are instruments or the main mechanisms of metagovernance which give effective steering while allowing the targets of the governance to retain their autonomous capacity to develop and operate their work based on decisions relating to a number of activities. The THPF is, in principle, mainly responsible for steering and monitoring contracts and partnerships.

This chapter reveals that there are dimensions to the metagovernance conducted by the THPF which can be considered the governance of NGO partners by the THPF, notably through the tri-power strategy. This metagovernance performs based mainly on the THPF’s own mechanisms. The metagovernance can also be the governance of civil society through NGOs, typically by granting and leveraging certain of them to act as programme managers. By doing so, some of them act as an intermediary body between the THPF and the rest of organised civil society. This metagovernance is successful, with resources shared between the THPF and the NGO programme manager.
However, as metagovernance is caused, it is also consequential. The way the THPF metagoverns the NGO partners has considerable consequences for them. The NGOs are incorporated into the THPF frameworks and then driven to adapt to suit the frameworks. The next chapter examines the unintended consequences of the metagovernance of the THFP vis-à-vis its NGO partners in terms of NGOisation. The transformation of the NGOs under THPF funding is explored.
Chapter 8

NGOisation of Civil Society

The previous chapters reveal that the relationship between the THPF and the funded NGOs is complex, relational and inter-dependent, and the THPF obviously has a significant influence over the NGOs however honourable its intentions. This chapter is focused more on what is generated through the relationship. It is argued that, in order for NGOs to become a ‘suitable’ partner of the THPF, a target of metagovernance, they are driven to develop certain attributes which are shaped through important intertwined developments: professionalisation, institutionalisation, bureaucratisation, and depoliticisation. These four developments can also be understood as ‘technologies of governing’ utilised by the funder in its relationship of patronage with the funded NGOs (see Atia and Herrold 2018) and together constitute and sustain the NGOisation of civil society. What is discussed here reflects these developments in one way or other as they manifest in various ways through granting, contracting, project reviewing, organising, policy advocating, and so on.

8.1 Professionalisation and institutionalisation of civil society

Research suggests that NGOs are required to adapt to institutional norms and structures, use the language of a certain policy field, and terms of trade, to improve coordination and their own legitimacy while mitigating external criticism (Clemens 1997; Caniglia and Carmin 2005). Thus, NGOs need increased legitimacy, notably through professionalisation, to apply for, and successfully secure, funding (Suarez and Gugerty 2016; Lang 2013; Alexander et al. 2004).

The evidence from the interviews with participants from the THPF and the funded NGOs confirms the professionalisation of the NGO sector, having the THPF as the main influencer. The THPF was said by the participants to have created a new standard of NGO funding system in the country, which is different from the time when NGOs received money from foreign donors. All interview participants from the THPF have realised the strengths and weaknesses of the NGOs. They similarly envision the NGOs as being active, working for a good cause, but which may not like criticism and can be unprofessional. They think it is their job to improve the professionality of the funded NGOs so that they can become ‘better partners’. We can take the example of Dr Pan, a senior officer of the THPF. Dr Pan personally created a large new project covering every
geographical area in the country with the intention of changing the way his partner NGOs worked as he found it difficult to influence them in what they were already doing. Though for this large-scale project he had asked the NGOs to incorporate and make more use of data and research in order to improve working strategies, he thinks that the NGOs have not applied research into action very well.

What I created, the big project, has changed the way NGOs work. I did try several ways before. I told them new concepts. Sometimes, they got them. Sometimes, they did not. Thus, I created the big project. I then allocated the budget. Budgeting is the THPF’s tool. I reduced the budget of their previous projects. If they wanted the budget, they needed to come and defend the new project (Dr Pan, interview).

What Dr Pan said also reflects the power of the funder and may reflect the piper hypothesis mentioned in chapter 1. There is an asymmetrical power relationship at play between the THPF and the NGOs which no one can deny. The NGOs which enter the parenting kind of relationship mentioned in Chapter 5 well reflect such the asymmetrical relations.

For NGOs which enter the complementing and supplementing relationships, although it causes some difficulties, to be professionalised is considered beneficial in the long-term. Mr Jet, a senior NGO worker who has been working with the THPF for long time, said that:

In a positive way... the THPF made us accountable to the accountability system. The Thai NGO sector so far has, frankly speaking, no such system. If there is one, it’s weak. Some might not want to receive grants from the THPF because they are afraid of being investigated. The point is that this is making the NGOs become more professionalised. NGOs must be transparent and accountable. Receiving THPF money to run a project or a programme allows the NGOs to be audited. This is beneficial for me... Apart from the audit, our [NGO] ways of working are reviewed as well. Some of our ways of working might be wrong. Being reviewed by the reviewers and steering committees helps double-check our operations. Yet, the NGOs despise such review because they believe that they are doing it right. I believe that NGOs should also be given critical feedback. The committees indeed assisted us in making our work easier. It’s a help. Although some committee members might misunderstand the NGOs, the NGOs should communicate with them to reach an agreement. It’s right, isn’t it? Thus, the THPF helps cultivate the NGOs (Mr Jet, interview).
One obvious benefit from professionalisation is that the NGOs themselves can have better organisational structure. By being ‘professionalised’, they invite more technocratic control of the organisation and expertise to deal with uncertainty (see Anheier 2014). They provide practices and knowledge of modern developments such as project-based proposals which are structured like business plans in the sense that they have a clear proposed scope of work and strategic plans, detailed budgeting, and a model showing causal links between inputs and outputs. More importantly, they provide a way to monitor and measure quantified progress, proving the NGOs can use the resources efficiently and effectively (see Atia and Herrold 2018; Chahim and Prakash 2014; AbouAssi 2013).

It is evident from stories told by NGO participants that the application processes for the fund demand a great deal of resources and technical knowledge. For some under-professionalised organisations in particular, the struggle to adapt to THPF systems and conditions, especially in terms of financial and accounting management, is harsh and time-consuming creating tension within the organisations.

It is often assumed that having experience of foreign funding would give NGOs the skills to deal with THPF reporting and accounting systems. Yet, this may not always be the case for some interviewees. In fact, this is depends on what kind of agencies NGOs used to work with. Ms Jeep, whose NGO is highly professionalised and has a rich experience with foreign donors requiring the implementation of systems, said that:

Many foreign donors provided [unconditional] grants. When they did, they did not require any systems [of accounting and reporting]. If required, the systems were not strict… NGOs nowadays are then thinking [of such systems] as involving difficulty… to work with the THPF the first thing to do [for NGOs] is to adapt oneself, that is, to set a clear, accountable system which is acceptable for the common standard. I think this matter is good because it sets standards (Ms Jeep, interview).

For NGO participants who have experience like Ms Jeep, they are said to be fine with the THPF system. However, they still need to adapt to it rather subtly. Ms Jeep continued:

I see that if we do not remain on our guard [against the THPF’s system] in the first place, everything should be fine. If we keep thinking that they [THPF] will aim to investigate us, order us to do things, and don’t try to understand them, it [the system] can work… If we want to understand, we
must look at the rationality. Ask for it. Investigate it… Understanding the rationality, we won’t be annoyed by the details, which are sometimes silly (Ms Jeep, interview).

For the THPF, conditioning the NGOs to build their financial management capacity can be understood as ‘a way of providing and maintaining an infrastructure. It can be the scaffolding upon which to build the rest of the organisation. If it is strong, the organisation can flourish; if not, the organisation may struggle or even collapse’ (Cammack 2014, p. 5). In other words, having strong financial management is a way to become more effective and professionally organised because the NGOs can better control their own affairs and then develop improved activities. Interestingly, the funded NGOs, to a certain degree, agree with this point. NGO participants acknowledged that bureaucratic rules and regulations concerning the project management creating constraints and difficulties for the NGOs can ultimately be seen as contributing to a better system. Mr Pun, a senior NGO worker who runs a funded THPF programme, said that:

Were the difficulties [rules and regulations] constructive? They were. They encouraged us to have good governance, prudence, and better clarity in whatever we do especially in finance, accounting and management. [They stressed that] plans when created should be followed, not otherwise. If plans are to be changed, there is a process. The work became systematised which is good for civil society… Working with the THPF made us stronger in return (Mr Pun, interview).

Mr Pun also mentioned that when the organisation was receiving a programme-level grant, most of the resources were used for management tasks as the organisation needs to sub-grant the others; little was dedicated to develop the work content. In this regard, the managerialist drive has stimulated the organisation to professionalise itself, becoming ‘inward-oriented’ featuring the ‘organisation-first’ approach which prioritises success in terms of organisational management (Harwood and Creighton 2009), which in turn ties the NGOs to focus on expanding their projects and the funding.

8.2 Grant-making and ‘contracting regime’

Professionalised knowledge and managerialism as inherent conditions to secure the funding can be criticised as impelling the NGOs to fragment and compartmentalise the world into ‘issues’ and ‘projects’ (Choudry and Kapoor 2013a), which, ultimately, makes them ‘projectised,
log-framed and compliant’ (CIVICUS 2015) under the newly-emerged ‘contract/granting culture’ created by the THPF. A kind of ‘depoliticisation’ of issues, to be discussed later, thus happens in which NGO work tends to become merely a technical matter (see Ferguson 1994; Li 2007).

THPF granting, as discussed in the previous chapters, is contract-based. The THPF yearly provides more than 1,000 million baht (about US$ 28 million) to promote numerous NGO projects. The increasing support and grants from the THPF to the NGOs ultimately causes the creation of a ‘contract regime’ (Smith and Lipsky 1993) in the NGO’s ecosystem, which refers to the partnership configuration that on the one side has government being a funder and on the other side has the NGOs being recipients. The THPF and the NGOs are thus involved in a mutually dependent yet not equal relationship. According to Smith (2010) such contracting profoundly changes the internal management and the political behaviour of the NGOs. It does this particularly by transforming the organisations to a more professionalised, corporate style of management, notably by featuring a professional staff composition.

The THPF claims itself to be more than a ‘sponsor’ which facilitates and supports partnership. For THPF, although the proactive granting stresses the collective activity with partners, unlike normal contracting/tendering, the relationship steered by the granting contract between the THPF and the NGOs is still asymmetric. As the controller of funding decisions, the THPF normally sets the terms of the relationship and its funding decisions are indeed selective depending on THPF yearly plans and frameworks. Criticism for not allowing all interested parties to compete for the right to develop and implement a project is regularly seen. Moreover, organisations excluded from the partners’ pool, especially those who do not receive the grants, often censured the THPF for being a ‘club’ whose inner circle, those who know the THPF board and staff, has advantages in securing funding (Galbally et al. 2012). The ‘funding’ bias coming from the personal relationship between the NGO workers or referees and the THPF is mentioned by many NGO participants and in other research (see Rakyutidharm 2014a, 2014b). Nonetheless, the THPF claims that a wide range of new partners appears every year and the proportion of new potential partners has continually increased (see THPF 2014, 2015, 2016).

NGOs with more resources and technical knowledge are at an advantage in the application process. Being familiar with technical matters for proposing the project and with people working in the THPF, to a certain degree brings the promise of a funding contract. This is the same situation as happens in a market competitive tendering process in which large consulting companies are
frequently excellent at winning competitive tenders because they have a favourably sophisticated tender writing infrastructure in place. The NGOs pursuing THPF funding find they need to adapt themselves and practice the writing of project proposals to suit THPF agendas (Rakyutidharm 2014a). Instead of working with the beneficiaries, the NGOs interviewed are compelled to focus more on technical matters and be familiar with the THPF system of language and regulation. This is particularly important given the partners’ capacity of project evaluation. In effect, those who are part of the initial project design team must have knowledge and experience of appropriate evaluation methods for the proposed project so that the proactive partnership model can produce maximum outcomes. Grantees are asked to specify their evaluation approaches and methods from the outset in order to adjust and improve the project as well as to learn lessons and assess the possibility of scaling up the project (Galbally et al. 2012).

The THPF, intentionally or not, helps to create ‘socialising rituals’ of NGO work. Aksartova (2009) reasons that such rituals are unique to civil society assistance which socialises recipients into the donor-recipient relationship and the donor world view which are venues where the recipients grasp rules of appropriate professional conduct and learn to become familiar with the donor vocabulary. The NGOs are likely to be pushed by the nature of the work contracted with THPF to replace local workers with professionalised experts.

Moreover, when the NGO work becomes more professionalised and technical, people without ‘matching’ expertise will be slightly excluded and fade away from the working circle of the organisation, leaving professional staff to do the organisational routine jobs and distancing themselves from volunteers and the public. The development of the contract regime puts the NGOs in danger of embracing too wholeheartedly the language of the business world. Interviews with NGO staff revealed that they have all become busy devising their mission statements and plans, and concentrating more on their outcomes and throughput, as reported elsewhere by Bates and Pitkeathley (1996). Unsurprisingly, the NGOs that receive grants from the THPF become focused on assessment and strategic planning. They have become what Roy (2014) calls the ‘indicator species’. When they think and work, impact and measurement of the activities come first. Nonetheless, the NGOs tend to experience the contract regime differently, as both a benefit and a threat compromising their autonomy. This is dependent on the relationship the NGOs have with the THPF (see Chapter 5).
8.3 ‘Success myth’ and indicators-led development

Engaging less with social movement, NGOs become focused more on organisational and/or material reproduction as they are required to indicate that their granted money is well-spent on activities in which their impact can be assessed. For NGOs, this increases the chance to get future funding. In this sense, NGOs appear to become obsessive with manufacturing measurable ‘results’, making their work seem successful in order to attract and keep the THPF funding. Having a good performance history is thus a key to the funding. Projects proposed by the NGOs have to clearly state how they plan to expand and develop the results from what they are doing (or what they have done). The THPF expects the impacts of projects to contribute more and more if they are to continue their funding. The logic of success has become the NGOs’ determining factor which makes it hard for them to admit failure.\(^{17}\)

To successfully achieve, established indicators are seen to prove the quality and the effectiveness of the funded organisations. Without failure reported, it helps build trust and a stronger connection with the THPF. When such trust and connection are well-established, however, formal processes of granting and evaluation may be less focused upon. Concerns were raised among participants that connections can, and perhaps already do, guarantee the quality and effectiveness of the funded organisations. This can obviously jeopardise the efficiency of the formal process and increase a reliance on a patronage system based on connection.

Furthermore, NGO participants claimed to be subject to severe pressures through THPF evaluations and measurements which are seen as trying to force THPF logic, frameworks, and goals into the funded organisations, shaping them towards their desired direction. Some indicators, such as sustainability and policy change set by the THPF to evaluate the granted project/programme, are seen as being too difficult, or even impractical, to reach. Sustainability can mean that NGOs should think of: a way to sustain the project without THPF funding, a way to expand the impact of the project with a lesser amount of money, a way to establish a network within the governmental sector, and how to make a policy change which can be treated as an

\(^{17}\) In fact, failure does not have legal consequences, but it ruins the possibility of getting a new grant and the capacity to compete with other NGOs who have reported successful performance. To gain more funding, a success story is needed to legitimise the proposal. Failure denotes a negative outcome. For the THPF, failure is not rewarded. For the NGOs, especially those in surviving mode, failure is not accepted. Grants given by thy THPF are structured as performance-based. The NGOs will only get paid when they meet certain performance targets.
introduction of new legislation. According to NGO participants, the sustainability-as-a-destination unintentionally leads to a working model where the NGOs are driven to work within a narrower scope, more expertise, greater contribution to the institutional level, and lesser budgeting.

Some interviewed NGOs clearly stated that they have fought back for more reasonable indicators. They see the issue as being fought at the conceptual and managerial level. At the conceptual level, they questioned the plausibility of, and the logic behind, the funding for policy change. What Ms Jeep, a senior NGO activist, said is illuminating:

We’re only a small NGO, overlooked by the state. How is it possible for us to change a policy which some ministries are still unable to change? Is this underpaid work? You [the THPF] gave me a few million Baht while the public budget for public agencies is a thousand billion Baht, and they still cannot change a policy (Ms Jeep, interview).

At the managerial level, the NGOs questioned the THPF’s management of resources. As the THPF has a secured budget every year through the dedicated tax, it was expected to grant the funded NGOs - at least the programme-level NGOs - evenly. Reducing funds while at the same time asking for a greater contribution, was considered unreasonable by NGOs. This is clearly reflected in Mr Tan’s speech:

With the reduced budget [for us], it’s apparent that the THPF will use the money for some other purposes… The issue is that the THPF’s budget has never been less. At least, it keeps the same amount every year. Then, the THPF cut our budget but the money was still there… So, we see this as a managerial problem that the office must deal with (Mr Tan, interview).

Arguably, the pressure to secure success is tended to be more severe for the less professionalised NGOs. Yet, for the highly professionalised NGOs which normally enter the complementing or supplementing relations with the THPF, they see this as an opportunity to communicate and negotiate with the THPF. Ms Jeep, whose NGO is highly professionalised, said that:

This is a good chance to educate them. We must continue what we are doing and tell them that their indicators are not working and not suitable for our work… We know what we are doing. We gave
a clear statement about it… If we think and act like this, they [the THPF] will learn… They will know that what they have isn’t suitable for social development work… It is their job to create tools that suit social development work (Ms Jeep, interview).

The above statement is not the only response of the same kind from the interviewees. Others similarly suggest that to reach a goal, there must be a good strategic planning, clear project design and an evidence-based approach. Arguably, only having passion is no longer enough in the contemporary NGO complex.

On the other hand, difficulties in achieving KPIs and reporting, as stated by many funded NGOs in the interviews, might come from the lack of skills of the funded organisations. NGOs with more resources and strong identity seem to manage the issue effectively. This stresses the fact that most NGOs lack skills in areas of funding and modern management, and this is problematic for them. It also emphasises the reason why professionalisation focusing on institutionalised knowledge and skills is encouraged by the THPF and even by the NGOs themselves in the relationship as aforementioned.

To be fair, it is normal for a grantor like the THPF to want to ensure that money would be spent effectively and efficiently. The funding ultimately becomes about exhibiting impacts. However, the THPF itself falls victim to the culture of success. As the THPF is not always on good terms with the government, it is often pushed to corroborate success stories which in turn serve to legitimise the existence of the THPF. This situation also happens to the NGO partners as they are compelled to succeed for their funding to continue.

8.4 Project review mind-set and ‘project-based’ mentality

Issues have been raised by interview participants regarding the THPF’s mind-set on project reviewing. It seems that the THPF has its own project menus and has heavily employed academics as project reviewers, instead of development practitioners in relevant areas. This is why detailed indicators are built with a lack of insight in the field; this has often annoyed the NGOs who are pushed to operate following the indicators based on an academic standard. The problem is that some work cannot be measured academically within a short time frame. To survive, the NGOs are thus urged to focus solely on measurable short-term (e.g. one-year) projects to meet the indicators. As a result, long-term movements or changes, many of which are seen as ‘hot’ issues, are left
untouched. The NGO participants similarly suspect that when there is a lack of practitioners, the focus of projects is inclined to be academic at the expense of tangible and local, area-based development work.

Two contrasting ideas were often raised among participants regarding the reviewing mindset: result-driven and process-driven. In the Thai NGO community, these ideas are normally discussed in the context of project review and evaluation. Result-driven refers to a way of thinking that is focused on results, notably outputs and outcomes; only the result is the measure of success. On the contrary, process-driven is believed to be broader. Success is not solely related to the result but also how the result is achieved. For example, one can look at whether the institutions and procedures of the activities are structured and operated in a way consistent with the implementation of a defined, justifiable goal of social organisations (Murrel 1990). Interviews with the funded NGOs indicated that the NGOs originally favour the process-based thinking as they aim at social reforms which are hard to measure.

Several NGO interviewees also mentioned that THPF’s project reviewers have frequently not understood what they were proposing or trying to do. This is because most of the reviewers employed by the THPF come from academia and are criticised as living in an ivory tower, distant from operational fields and actual practices. They are seen as lacking insight and experience of the nature and characteristics of the work. A usual communication channel between the reviewers and the organisations proposing the project is merely through the paperwork, namely, the proposal. Shared understanding is thus difficult to create.

Interestingly, the NGOs can deny the reviewer’s suggestions. According to the experience of Mr Pun, a senior NGO worker, there is a way to deal with it.

Working with the THPF is rather flexible. What I’ve learnt is that they [the THPF’s staff] do not watch us in every step of what we do during the project. How do they know what we have done? Reporting to the THPF was formally done through document work and it wasn’t frequent. Reports to and from the PAC do not go into much detail. Hence, we can refuse reviewers’ suggestions. We can talk to the section directors… who are more influential than the PAC because they’re the ones who operate with us (Mr Pun, interview).

In order to deal with the reviewer issue, some NGO programme managers have initiated the decentralisation of budget by distributing decision-making on money to local community
organisations which allows for the review process at community level by senior practitioners in the field. This shows the agency of the funded NGOs and that they can build on what THPF has, to develop their ‘better’ way of funding.

As a result, the THPF’s reviewing mind-set has created what many interviewees called a ‘project-based’ mentality, that is, a mode of work in which NGOs are impelled to concentrate on meeting the indicators under a safe, short-term project. It is not exaggerating to say that project-based mentality has become second nature to the NGOs. It is possible to say that such project-based mentality comes from two major sources. The first is the organisational nature of the THPF. Although the THPF is more flexible than departmental public bodies, it retains the status of a public agency which requires a certain kind of bureaucratic regulation. The second source is the direction of the THPF management officials. The officials are the bridge between the institutional regulations and everyday practices. They are responsible for the translation of the systems and regulations. If they are rather orthodox bureaucrats, it is highly likely that the project-based mentality is well-formed. On the other hand, if they are more progressive, they are likely to find a way for the funded NGOs to work more easily and continuously.

Project-based planning and management was regarded by many NGO managers as an obstacle for funded programme management. As the nature of the funded programme requires a large amount of money and a long-term timeframe, project-based thinking which is focused on short-term assessment and a clear inception and destination for the project, does not seem suitable. As Mr Tan, a senior officer of an NGO responsible for a THPF programme on alcohol consumption control, said:

we’re granted less… we’re questioned [by the government and the board] on how long we will ask for THPF money. They asked the question with a project-based mentality and wanted the clear starting and finishing points. Yet, we think with process-based mentality. Work should also empower both the people and their thinking. The mentalities [between us and them] are different… By thinking in terms of project-based, concentrating on indicators, the sustainability [of the activities and works] is reduced (Mr Tan, interview).

What Mr Tan said corresponded with many other NGO participants. For them, the sustainability or the continuity of projects and work is essential as it can create expertise. Such expertise, in turn, can help them effectively meet the needs of the THPF. Yet, with a project-based
mentality as the obstacle, the funded NGOs are not likely to deliver the expected results and meet the indicators. This is a dilemma for THPF granting.

However, the matter of continuity of projects is also dependent on the proximity of the funded towards the funder and the agenda of the funder itself. In cases where the funded organisation or people have a good reputation, a clear record of being a well-behaved recipient, and having a close relationship with the THPF - either with the THPF-as-an-organisation - or senior officers, they are likely succeed in continuing the project. They might use different organisational bases to get in contract with the THPF while retaining the same personnel for the project/programme. Additionally, if the project/programme was initiated in any way by the THPF, it is highly possible that the project/programme will continue being funded, albeit through different sections of the THPF.

Mr Pun, a senior NGO worker who has a rich history with both the THPF and the NGO sector, gave an interesting account of his experiences of continuously receiving grants from the THPF. He has managed a large project, funded by the THPF, aiming to strengthen civil society organisations in different areas of the country. How he has done this relied on inputs from both sides: the THPF and himself.

Indeed, this project has continuously received funding from a certain resolution of the 1st Thai Reform Assembly in 2011 when I was working with the THPF… The solution suggested that we should find a way to make use of a lottery fund to support other public social development funds. I think this topic was really interesting. The THPF’s CEO at that time also gave special attention to the issue and support for the implementation. The CEO said that we should make this issue successful because it will result in more funds for civil society, apart from the THPF. When I left the THPF, I continued working on the issue under Foundation A for the first few years. Then the project was granted under Foundation B. Currently, the project is in the third phase granted under the management of Foundation C. The funded organisation [which managed the project] has changed from one to another. Yet the staff have not changed since the beginning (Mr Pun, interview).

Moreover, the mentality has a profound influence on NGO beneficiaries. Beneficiaries, the target group of the NGOs, are becoming defined by the timeframe of the project (see Jad 2007). Targets are selected and then units of development are prioritised and defined for particular NGOs.
The projects are thus carried out by professionals hired by the organisations to do the ‘job’ rather than driven by voluntarism. NGO work has become more technical, requiring a degree of conformity.

8.5 Colonisation of ‘health’ and isomorphic pressure

There is a critique regarding the inherent imperialist and colonialisim feature of professionalised NGO-led processes of social actions (Rajagopal 2003; Williams 2010). This is because the professionalisation of knowledge employed by NGOs is largely drawn from Western sources and assumptions (Smith 1999; Choudry and Kapoor 2013a). In developing countries like Thailand, a Western model of NGO-ing has been forged during the time of structural adjustment and development aid either in the name of democratisation or development starting from the 1970s. This model is maintained even though direct links with the West have ceased. Such knowledge is not only inherently applied in NGOs themselves by also in other related organisations such as the THPF.

In the case of the THPF, the WHO Ottawa health promotion approach is the bible in the field. NGOs receiving funding from the THPF must align themselves with the approach. Key words of the approach such as ‘well-being’, ‘partnership’, ‘policy advocacy’, ‘community action’, are often repeated and concretised by the interviewee participants.

One good example is the language of ‘health/well-being’ championed by the WHO, the THPF, and the funded NGOs. Mr Pun, a senior NGO worker who has a strong connection with the THPF, was highly critical of the way the THPF has tried to influence its partners:

In my feeling, the THPF has been trying to significantly spread its values and culture. Let’s take the concept of ‘sook ka pawa’ [health/well-being] for instance. Currently, civil society organisations in Thailand are mostly working on ‘sook ka pawa’ issues. Besides, the way we work as ‘pakee’ [partnership/partner], the term has become influential because of the THPF. It was spread to the public… To be fair, it wasn’t from any particular people in the THPF… it also came from us [the NGOs] when we talked to each other. We use a similar language… The term ‘sook ka pawa’ is the keyword. There is a directive from the THPF saying that we need to use this term in order to make a proposal possible. This makes us go further into the issue of health… [However] the influence of ‘health’ [over the funded organisations] is only on a surface level. It hasn’t changed
the behaviour of the workers. It is just a façade that we became ‘healthy’ under the shadow of the THPF (Mr Pun, interview).

This pressure generated by THPF in affecting granting, the contracting regime, and professionalisation is consistent with the analysis of DiMaggio and Powell (1991) on ‘institutional isomorphism’ which suggests that organisations in a certain field (THPF network and health promotion, in this case) are subject to powerful isomorphic dispositions which then drive the organisations to become more similar. In other words, the organisations have the tendency to become more homogeneous in relation to one another. In this sense, isomorphic changes happen as organisations interact more with one another, depend on others for their resources, professionalise their field, and rely on the relationship and funding source. In effect, the NGOs hold less power and are impelled to be like the THPF. This also drives the NGOs to develop bureaucratic structures like the THPF’s. This bureaucratisation aspect will be discussed later.

The funded NGOs adopt similar internal practices in order to compete effectively for the contracts (in the future). The THPF and the NGOs, in tandem, develop norms, practices and other shared professional standards guiding their conduct. It is possible to assume that some NGOs, particularly those with a strong commitment to their original values and strong identity, are able to resist the isomorphic pressures, especially if the THPF fund is a relatively small part of their overall revenue. Yet, as aforementioned, the THPF has become the prominent and influential funder of civil society or even the sole source of income for many NGOs in reality. This makes it difficult, or even impossible, for the NGOs to avoid or resist the pressure.

8.6 Bureaucratisation

As a key apparatus of governing, bureaucratisation involves a plethora of reporting and surveillance techniques that donors employ to regularly oversee their recipients. It is not a hierarchical apparatus confined to only government affairs; rather, bureaucracy is a form of administration found in any organisation pursuing a wide variety of goals on a continuous basis (see Hibou 2015; Beetham 1996) including the NGOs. It is recognised that the recipients need to give frequent, regular, and detailed reporting on aspects of organisation and activity the funders require (Herrold 2016; Wiktorowicz 2000; Bebbington 1997). Such overseeing is criticised as extensive, intrusive, tedious and procedural, demanding considerable staff time and, perhaps,
organisational change in terms of structure and operations in order to comply (Atia and Herrold 2018).

Bureaucratisation through the THPF reflects a paradox of the ‘Iron Law of Liberalism’, that is, the more the state promotes non-state forces, the greater the total amount of regulations, paperwork, and bureaucracy (Graeber 2015). The NGO interviewees often gave accounts of how they have been pressured by bureaucratic requirements, typically through ‘a lot of paperwork’ and ‘intense report writing’ which they found difficult or ‘impossible to meet’, causing them to obsess to comply with bureaucracy. It appears that there is an over-valuing of procedural accountability inflicted by the donor. Ms Day, a senior NGO worker who has been close to the THPF since its inception, expressed that, although the THPF grant is relatively the largest amount of grant her organisation has ever had, she was uncomfortable with the overwhelming amount of paperwork:

Our organisation needed to heavily adapt to the THPF. I’ve spent at least 5 years on learning and developing in-house systems to suit the THPF. Many new functions were created to work under THPF conditions. This sometimes made some of us uncomfortable. We might not have a great skill in writing proposals. Other donors we’ve worked with haven’t had as many systems as the THPF has… It was a burden, I think (Ms Day, interview).

This corresponded with what Choudry and Kapoor (2013a, p. 17) argue: ‘funding criteria and reporting guidelines place a heavy burden of expectation on organisations’. Some NGOs may not be ready to do management work or fit into the criteria, guidelines and goals set by funders. In practice, the NGOs need to report their progress, along with the financial report, several times as outlined in the contract agreement. The amount of information needed to report on increases over the duration of the project. The first report might need not to be as extensive as the final one. Generally, the NGOs are asked to report on activities, their outcomes and participants as well as carry out a self-evaluation of the activities. The tasks of monitoring and assessment consist of many varied indicators and criteria. The NGOs must fill pages of assessment forms which require knowledge and experience, to a certain degree, to effectively complete them. For the final report, they are also required to specify and analyse their target groups and areas, strategies, publicity, publications, participation with other organisations, and so on. These self-assessments are both quantitative and qualitative, and require advanced technical knowledge and expertise. The final report must be written in a standard book format with a cover, acknowledgments, an executive
The funded NGOs are asked to record every detail of financial expenditure/income and submit accounts with audit reports approved by a professional auditor. This creates difficulties for the less professionalised and institutionalised NGOs in particular. Professionalised or large NGOs are likely to have an in-house audit section or similar which performs the finance-related tasks; small NGOs have less developed finance department, if any, and need to hire external accountants to perform the task. Moreover, the NGOs are obliged to act according to numerous laws and regulations which are written in legal language and need to be interpreted into common language. NGOs workers are compelled to learn and familiarise themselves with prescribed rules. One important rule for the grantees is that they must not have been involved in any commercial and advertising activities related to tobacco and alcohol for the year leading to receiving funding from the THPF and must not take any support from tobacco and alcohol industries during the funding period. The THPF even has regulations that the grantee must use the THPF logo and state its mission message on any products, or in any activity, so that the public will know that the activities are funded by the THPF. With minuscule but numerous funding requirements, NGOs funded by the THPF are likely to spend a great deal of time dealing with writing project reports and other documentation, which are perceived as ‘extra’ to the working mission.

Even so, some funded NGOs mentioned some positive aspects of the bureaucratisation. For example, as noted above, the THPF introduced a system where the funded organisations need to hire an approved external auditor and stricter financial regulations. This system is reported through interviews as novel in the social sector. According to Mr Tan, a senior NGO worker:

THPF financial regulation, especially the part that requires an external auditor, is new to us [NGOs]. This matter might be normal for business organisations but for NGOs it is not. Auditing social development projects creates difficulties [for NGOs]. It takes time to adapt [to the system]. The regulations are also stricter than ones of bureaucracy… For example, we need to submit the original receipts for things or services [bought for running the project] (Mr Tan, interview).

Moreover, reporting as a part of bureaucratisation allows the funder to exert influence on a funded project/programme and the funder (Bornstein 2003; Ebrahim 2005). Ms Peach, a senior NGO activist, gave an interesting account of how her organisational initiatives have become a
lesson learnt by the THPF. She started by complaining about the bureaucratic procedures and performance measurement approach of the THPF heavily focusing on the measurable outputs/outcomes which made her feel uncomfortable and then thought of a new way to create an output/outcome. This new way ended up being the model the THPF adopted to run its activities ever since.

We’re asked to justify our output and outcome quantitatively. [At first,] we tried to create a number of trained young people which was a quantity-type work measured within a 2-3 year-timeframe. Later, we tried to do more in a qualitative way, through storytelling and empowerment. We asked the young people to create stories of people… and built the process of coaching. The young people didn’t only stay within our organisation but engaged with the others… We ourselves created the monitoring and empowerment system to support the young people in the areas we’ve trained them. Then, our organisation proposed to the THPF to run activities like this. The THPF at first didn’t have much of a system to develop young people [in local areas] and, indeed, the way to measure the product quantitatively itself. It originally tended to focus more on the Youth Council [the youth organisation officially initiated and endorsed by the state] (Ms Peach, interview).

In fact, the THPF is not the only body responsible for bureaucratisation. The state is also heavily involved in a more direct way. While the THPF directly, albeit perhaps unintentionally, requires the funded NGOs to bureaucratisate, the government always deliberately forces the bureaucratisation of NGOs through formal and informal supervision and interference in their community work. For the government, cutting the source of money is a way to appropriate the NGO sector. Apart from the effort to manipulate the THPF’s fund for its own interest, the government has also tried to bureaucratisate the funding so that the NGOs will find it more difficult, or even impossible, to access. For example, since 2014 with the new government following a coup led by Gen Prayut Chan-o-cha, there has been more oversight from the government and it is suspected to keep increasing. In 2016, every organisational bylaw and guideline was revised by the influence of the government intervention to bureaucratisate the THPF. At the moment, the original THPF Act is in the process of amendment, which has been widely opposed by the NGOs and health activists. The government has tried to make considerable changes to the autonomy of the financial procedure and the governance of the THPF, making it similar to a state department under direct state control.
In an indirect way, although the THPF is a non-departmental agency, it is still a public organisation accountable for the statutory body functioning within the framework of the state bounded to bureaucratic culture. To be fair, the THPF was not born with it, yet as it has evolved, it has become more subject to bureaucratisation. For instance, a clear division between sections within the office and the procedures of the board meetings came about in late 2006 after the THPF had been established for 5 years (Board of Governance 2006, 19 Oct, item 4.3). Many bureaucratic protocols even came after that. Interviews with THPF senior staff support this point, that is, the THPF has barely wanted to be bureaucratic and, indeed, tried to avoid bureaucratisation as much as possible.

The THPF board is also significantly influenced by bureaucracy and state power as the proportion and direction of the members favours the public sector. Chairing by the PM with the help of the MoPH implies that the state and bureaucracy still ultimately hold the decision-making power over the organisation. In addition, the Evaluation Board’s work reflects the logic of the performance-based capitalist market emphasising expertise, competition, accountability and performance. Focusing on outcomes and social impacts, THPF performance is monitored and evaluated at three levels: planning and programming, the master plan, and at organisational level. Consequently, this creates ‘dos’ and ‘don’ts’ of the organisation by monitoring and evaluating the organisation’s performance which will become new criteria for future operations. Although its autonomous status would free it from the rigid and complex structures of a bureaucratic system, bureaucracy-as-professional-administration still functions well in the THPF. It appears that these protocols and working standards are being imposed on the grantees that have a lower position and direct interaction with the THPF. The funded NGOs are inclined to be more hierarchical given the isomorphic pressures put on them by the THPF.

8.7 Becoming stronger, becoming organised

There is a general belief among civil society actors that the more organised they are, the more they can become ‘stronger’. The development pattern of the NGOs from a loosely organised entity to a more organised one is not entirely new. Research suggests that NGOs are likely to constantly evolve through a series of ‘generations’: from ad hoc units interested in meeting the immediate needs of vulnerable people in their initial days, to more formal organisations in their later days reaching the final stage of working in a network focused on certain issues and wider
structural concerns (Korten 1990). To become an organisation is to be institutionalised to some extent (Salamon and Anheier 1992), that is incorporating signs of institutional reality such as rules of procedures, regular meetings, and membership which differentiate NGOs from ad hoc or temporal gatherings (Anheier 2014).

Mr Jet, a senior NGO worker running a THPF programme, explained the assumption underlying such belief:

With the active grant scheme of the THPF, sufficient budget was distributed to innovate in local communities. We NGOs could run activities outside the box. For instance, I’m working on reducing alcohol consumption with communities. I’ve seen communities developing innovations such as helping people to stop drinking by focusing on something else instead. The ones who became successful through the programme were happy when they saw their planting results and so on. I think this is the benefit the THPF gave us. The THPF makes civil society developed and strong. Besides, [with the THPF’s support] we can pass on our ideologies to civil society through our extant works. Although we did not have the THPF then but we had the ideology aiming to make people stronger and become self-reliant. Now we’ve the THPF as a tool to relay our ideologies. Together we advocated for people to form their organisations and became stronger. To reach a long-term goal, people must become stronger and they able to have their own voice. This is what the THPF has generated (Mr Jet, interview).

The organisation of civil society represents the pressure for institutionalisation exerted by the THPF. The THPF perceived that the NGOs often have difficulties with paperwork and finance/accounting systems. They need to be institutionalised so that the collaboration would be easier. Comments from Mr Heat, a THPF senior officer dealing with policy and strategy, clearly describe the situation.

Given they are NGOs, they have less prioritised management and financial systems. When they don’t put an emphasis on them, they can’t become organised, institutionalised. With such arrangements lacking, the NGOs I’ve dealt with have often had to change their finance and accounting staff. The turnover rate is high, I guess. Both big and small NGOs are the same. They can’t effectively manage their finance and accounts… The small NGOs can still sometimes manage their money better because they’ve got smaller, simple budgets (Mr Heat, interview).
The above comment is directly made towards the funded NGOs, regardless of their size. From the THPF’s perspective, the NGOs’ standard of management, especially in finance and accounting - which is the major part the THPF deals with - is rather weak and needs systematisation.

One common way to achieve such systematisation as a part of institutionalisation is to formally register the NGOs with the state. The registration requires the NGOs to possess certain forms of organisation, skills and resources, which can be considered the minimum standards for engaging with the funding. Mr Glass, a senior NGO worker whose organisation has a long connection with both foreign and domestic donors, firmly concurred with the need to institutionalise NGOs in order to attract the funding:

[Back then,] our group was just a loosely organised party. But, one important condition of many donors was they would only recognise a group with legal person status. We then needed to establish our group to be an [organised] NGO, registered with the state so that we could get the legal acknowledgement. Such status has made it easier to deal with donors, be they bureaucracy or foreign agencies. We registered to gain credibility (Mr Glass, interview).

Generally, the THPF requires anyone who pursues the grants to be, to some extent, organised or incorporated as the contract-based funding is a legal activity. In Thailand, only registered NGOs are regarded as official NGOs qualified to conduct legal transactions with other organisations (Shigetomi 2002; Cheecharoen and Udornpim 1999). However, the pull to register with the state risks driving the NGOs to obsess about money and materials as the registration requires a certain amount of endowment fund to prove the organisations’ stability.

Becoming more organised is also believed to increase the NGOs’ chance of getting funding. In an application for granting, the THPF suggests that the project proposal must be carried out by a credible and reliable group of people relevant to the area of the proposed project. These applicants have to be endorsed by a credible individual who has no involvement or interest in any payment from the applicants. In reality, no one would like to be accountable for informal groups without institutional backing. Institutionalisation increases the stability and credibility of the group and makes the credible individual feel, to some extent that the institution is safe to endorse.
Moreover, some NGO members did not think that they were passively confined by institutionalisation pressure. Mr Pun, a senior NGO worker, gave an interesting account relating to this notion:

Change in organisations is normal. Being organised is fine… [However,] as the organisation tends to grow larger, this causes a lot of difficulties in terms of management as it requires a certain amount of money and resources to be managed. Civil society should function with small, but active and flexible organisations. In fact, civil society organisations should be created easily and terminated easily as well. If they achieve their missions, they can disappear. Yet, individuals’ capabilities [within the organisations] might develop over time. Someone might be involved in the task of management task and gain capability. Then, he/she might start a new project or work with a new organisation. The capabilities belong to individuals and they can’t be taken away; what can be taken is just the role the individuals held. This is the flexibility I’m talking about which allows individuals to develop themselves without the limitation of the organisational boundary. I think this can contribute more to civil society (Mr Pun, interview).

It is possible to say that Mr Pun argues for de-institutionalisation of civil society focusing more on civil individual actions. It stresses that working skills and knowledge which are integral to the NGO actions actually belong to individuals. It resonates the notion of ‘non-governmental individuals’ (NGIs) (Wasinpiyamongkhon 2013), possibly understood as a counter mechanism to institutionalisation. The NGIs refer to an NGO-based social activist/worker: ones who see themselves mostly belonging to the NGO sector but believed to be capable of acting without their institutional constraint. It involves the individualistic attribute of individuals’ working style which partially relates to their NGO workplaces. NGIs may not necessarily work for NGOs; yet many NGOs are established to facilitate individuals’ personal work. This potentially explains why Mr Pun advocates the NGO model which in general is momentary and not well-established in the sense that it is not strictly institutionalised. The NGO model was created to support individuals rather than institutions.

8.8 Partnering with the state and the institutional advocacy

NGOs are professionalised and institutionalised so that they are better stabilised and recognised. In the contracting setting, the more professional they are, the higher the chance that
they are selected to participate in institutional settings of government (Take 1999). The state has tended to get involved with social actors that are effectively organised and resourceful because such institutionalised actors can help the state to achieve its goals (Bell and Hindmoor 2009). For the NGOs, this is about resources and inner-organisational building to secure their survival (Kriesi 1996; Campbell 2005) by developing consistent norms, functions, and routines, having a charter, and establishing managerial bodies that are not solely relied on certain individuals. Yet, in the NGOisation context, these processes mean more than contributing to the intention of a system’s stability and professionality (see Lang 2013). It also means an increase in institutional work for the NGOs. Their institutionalisation serves to bolster the NGOs to better socialise with government. As the processes allow the NGOs to work in harmony with the government, they can foster an elite group of activists at the expense of horizontal their (Jacobsson and Saxonberg 2013b). It is suspected that the expansion of the NGOs by fostering top-down, centralised, bureaucratic, corporate NGOs rather than through grassroots, bottom-up processes potentially harms the building of a functioning civil society (Henderson 2002; cf. Fagan 2005).

Furthermore, in the study of the development of the Community Organisation Council in Thailand, Praditsilp (2018) found that there has been an increasing necessity for civil society groups to become institutionalised and formalised, when working with the state system. The Community Organisation Council Act was promulgated in 2008 to meet the need of social movements and community organisations which required an institutional basis to advocate certain policies and issues. Interestingly, the institutionalisation of these civil society groups was heavily advocated by quangos including the THPF which appears to take the lead in championing civil society organisations to work with the state.

The THPF, through its tri-power strategy, shows itself to be in favour of institutional advocacy, as mentioned in the previous chapter. Institutional advocacy, typically through lobby officials and authorities, has been heavily influenced by a successful model of policy advocacy on tobacco control. Other areas of THPF work have often looked upon the tobacco control plan in the hope of learning its secret in achieving changes. The nature of lobbying by the THPF and its NGOs is well represented in what Dr Top said:

Lobbying is an unpleasant work. To advocate policies is to get in contact with the political or policy authorities, talk to them with a good manner. We can’t go and order them to stop doing anything
we don’t like… In politics, negotiation is important. They always ask us ‘why should I believe you?’ We need to convince them with evidence and rhetoric. I’m trying to create an expertise in advocacy [lobby] but it’s so hard (Dr Top, interview).

Dr Top is a distinguished medical doctor who is one of the founding members of the THPF and a senior health worker for tobacco control. His numerous achievements through his organisation are respected by the THPF and its NGO community for being an influential working model. He is regarded by other interview participants as a champion in this field because he often lobbies the authorities to get his propositions formalised.

Also, the lobbyist mentality is arguably embedded deep in the design of the governance structure of the THPF. To have the PM as the chair of the Board is a deliberate design allowing the THPF to directly push its policies to the government through the PM. Getting into contact with the authorities is regarded as one of the best strategies employed by the THPF at all levels.

Another reason why lobbying is seen as a good strategy, is because it avoids tensions and conflicts with the government. Dr Top continued:

The THPF has emphasised the lobbying strategy [through getting into contact and having informal conversations with the authorities] because the state and the government are authoritative. If we often run external advocacy [including public protest and mass mobilisation], the government is surely not happy. We will only increase our chance to get attacked (Dr Top, interview).

However, the lobbying tendency the THPF created is seen to be problematic. The funded NGOs are driven to make changes as a result of the projects/programmes granted. The fact is that it is very difficult for NGOs without any authority or powerful resources, to make a change at the national or systemic level. The change should not only be described as a policy change potentially achieved by contacting with the authorities. In fact, policy/system changes should not only be reached through the expert and the authority. Thinking of lobbying as the default mode of advocacy discourages the potential of civil society and a bottom-up approach to change, reflecting elite, top-down approach instead. Dr Rat, a senior thinker in the health sector who has a close relationship with the creation of the Triangle, firmly criticised the lobby politics of the THPF.
It seems like the THPF has its goal when it grants, that is, to ask the grantees to create impacts, to make a policy change. Lobbying became the common mode they used. I think this comes from the misinterpretation of the THPF on the very idea of the Triangle. The ultimate goal of the Triangle is mutual learning. Making policy change without learning isn’t right. Lobbying is not the goal. The Triangle does not suggest the lobbying of authorities. Those working with the THPF often assume that in order to make a policy change, they need to use lobbying. There are no alternatives. [In fact, they should use more] social communication and learning. Just granting three groups of actors [government departments, academics, and NGOs] isn’t enough. Change won’t automatically happen. The THPF needs to establish a learning mechanism to manage the continuity and the dynamic of the partnership and the collaboration between them. Granting may not be necessary. Policy changes don’t happen only by the authorities in the system. They don’t come exclusively from policy makers and bureaucracy. The THPF shouldn’t let people think in such a top-down view [that the policy always come from above]. To set the goal for the partners to make a system change isn’t wrong, but it is wrong to infer that lobbying the authorities to reach the desired policy outcome is a must (Dr Rat, interview).

Actually, the assumption that the ultimate goal of the THPF and its NGOs is to bring about change is controversial. The THPF and its partners have always been criticised, for example, for increasing earmarked-tax revenue and yet their inability to significantly decrease the rate of alcohol and tobacco consumption, obesity, and related unhealthy lifestyles, which are believed to be the THPF and its NGO partners’ main mission (see ThaiPublica 2015). It seems that, from a critical perspective, changes do not happen. However, this view is based on a misunderstanding that the THPF is the one creating changes. Indeed, the THPF is not a doer, but a facilitator or an enabler. Its operational tools are granting and technical support. Mr Pun, a former senior office of the THPF, interestingly said that:

[To directly make a change] isn’t a mission for civil society and the THPF, but it’s a state bureaucracy responsible for certain issues. The THPF aims at the bureaucracy to effectively let others succeed in their work by giving support, such as technical know-how. Only civil society [funded by the THPF] creates innovation and such know-how. It doesn’t make a change by itself. Bureaucracy must be the focal actor of certain issues. With this belief, it’s reasonable for the THPF to grant a two- or three-year project. When the know-how has been learned [through the project], it’s passed on to relevant public organisations which are the main doers (Mr Pun, interview).
The statement given above by Mr Pun reflects the THPF’s approach to NGOs as lead agents from civil society corresponding to literature on development studies: NGOs are expected to experiment and give successful models of working which others such as public and business organisations could then apply or even replicate (Wallace, Bornstein and Chapman 2006). In this regard, the THPF and its civil society partner are supporters, in particular, of the state bureaucracy to effectively perform its job. The THPF officers always refer to their work as adding a ‘lubricant’ to a machine, provided the machine is the organisation responsible for making the change. The job is to ‘enable’ changes, not ‘make’ them. Additionally, change requires a multi-sectoral approach. This is why the THPF believes that non-state actors are needed to reach the goal and that the tri-power strategy is essential.

However, what Mr Pun said also implies the significant role of the THPF as an intermediary agency between the political authorities and the NGOs. To pass the results or the prototypes of the projects made by the NGOs to the state, the THPF must act as a bridge and connect the authorities within public organisations. Partnerships between the state and the NGOs are also encouraged under such a vision.

The institutional advocacy approach stimulates NGOs to get involved with the government and sometimes gain insider status. Having civil society actors gain insider status in governmental agencies - becoming government insiders while retain sharing the NGOs’ goals and values - is a good example of a product of the institutional advocacy approach (Lang 2013; Banazak 2010; Skrentny 2003). The NGOs can access the inner orbit of governmental decision making and advocate what they want (see Gouws 1996; Chappell 2002). The health system movement seems to excel in this strategy through the operation of the RDM led by health influencers such as Dr Prawes Wasi, a distinguished advisor of the THPF. The RDM is believed to have had significant influence on the THPF since its inception and the general public health institutions (see Wibulpolprasert 2003; Vongtangswad 2017; Sapyen 2013). Many RDM members have played a part in THPF governance and management system at different times through being the CEO, a Board member, an advisor, an expert, and so on. They have also involved many NGOs as committee members. These people originally held government positions in the MoPH and had introduced new approaches to social movement in the country. They created NGOs to function outside the state power while making use of their governmental resources due to their positions, to support the NGOs’ causes (Sapyen 2013). As a result, many policies they advocated were
successfully implemented. They were working for both the NGOs and the government at the same time, providing the institutional setting in government decisions on the NGOs. They have helped many NGOs to connect with political elites (see Vongtangswad 2017). For the THPF, this model tends to bring success in policy advocacy. The THPF has then encouraged the NGOs to participate in any kind of government setting: be it as a participant, a committee member, or a partner.

Traditionally, policy advocacy of the NGOs mainly aimed at creating or changing laws. With the support of the THPF, policy advocacy has become a practice where the NGOs need to integrate themselves into the state structure, helping the state to better achieve its agenda. Sometimes, this runs the risk of making the NGOs merely extras for the state projects.

8.9 Depoliticised NGOs

The processes mentioned so far have brought a certain version of civil society to Thailand, a co-opted, elite civil society in a ‘depoliticised’ partnership. First of all, the NGOs are compelled to focus on their ‘core business’ or the ‘task at hand’, being busy with day-to-day, paper-based jobs with a total interest in their own ‘projects’. Their work has become more focused on managing systems for issue/problem-driven advocacy while discarding their ideological commitments and the broader socio-politico environments as they are not relevant to the funding cycle and their organisational reproduction/survival. It has shaped an advocacy repertoire for the NGOs and established a depoliticised and well-trained professionalised class of civil society (see Lang 2013; Choudry and Kapoor 2013a).

The approach to health promotion advocated by the THPF, particularly in recent years, is seen to make work become more technical. There is little debate about non-economic and political factors regarding health promotion projects. In other words, the broader landscape of health promotion and related social development is often overlooked or oversimplified. The THPF thus has never directly discussed political ideologies and issues related to the projects. It rather addresses their technical aspects. Many interview participants argued that the complexity of issues and work have been reduced to ‘words’ appearing as the indicators in strategic planning. The NGOs are barely asked about the normative dimensions of the issue and work but only the methods to achieve the indicators. According to Ms Jeep, a senior NGO worker:
In the later years of the THPF, it was pressured to respond more to the health problems... The THPF has tried to design activities and strategies to address these problems... Work issues are narrower, for me. We [the THPF and the funded NGOs] must, too much, work to solve issue-based problems... The THPF’s approach to health thus cannot be made widespread... With this mindset, we’re focusing too much on solving problems. Other dimensions, such as prevention and foundation of health promotion, have started to disappear. Premature shortcuts to the problems are always immediately asked for (Ms Jeep, interview).

Worst, the NGOs have stopped asking about or had less interest in the bigger questions, such as how they should respond to the nature of the political regime in which they are embedded, or engaging with questions relating to the kind of authorities that suppress the development of the civil society. Rakyutidharm (2014a, p. 523) found that some NGO activists under THPF funding ‘pay less attention to the politics of the construction of [the] THPF and its political projects and act as if the structure and work of [the] THPF emerge naturally without politics’. To survive, the NGOs are compelled to negotiate and cooperate with the state authorities if the state can help them reach their ‘own’ goals. They risk forsaking their constituencies by negotiating or collaborating with corrupt authorities, just in order to reach their goals. The understanding and definition of social problems is reduced to their own technical problems, revolving only around how to achieve, by using any techniques or means, to reach their own goals.

The THPF also somehow censors the NGOs on ‘risky’ activities. Evidence from interviews suggests that the THPF is quite concerned about its connection with the ‘hot’ work as it can damage the THPF’s image and position with the government. Ms Peach, a senior NGO activist, mentioned activities her organisation did which were sensitive to political conflict and which the THPF was extremely concerned about. Her NGO does not directly work on health areas such as alcohol or tobacco control but on human rights and human development.

The THPF is extremely sensitive and defensive on issues such as rights, environments, etc. which represent the contemporary peoples movement. The THPF is rather happy to work with alcohol and tobacco reduction... I’ve faced an unexplained freeze of a project involving human rights literacy which challenged the government. The THPF was afraid that the project might cause harm. Although the project resumed later, I think this was not right. The THPF should indeed execute
‘health’ beyond physical dimensions, to cover social and environmental determinants as it always claims. Civil society cannot limit itself to only alcohol and tobacco control (Ms Peach, interview).

In fact, for Ms Peach’s NGO, the funding from the THPF has been used specifically for certain activities, not all of those in the organisation. Hence, there have been activities supported by the THPF and others the THPF did not. However, for the public, there is always a misunderstanding that everything the organisations funded must represent the THPF. The funded organisations do not necessarily represent the THPF in all as aspects and vice versa. Ms Peach’s NGO strategically chooses to run the ‘safe’ activities (or ‘cool’ work) with the THPF’s presence while operating ‘sensitive’ activities (or ‘hot’ work) such as protest against the state without it. Furthermore, she carefully chooses to avoid certain terms or alter them to suit the THPF’s comfort zone, if she still wants to do ‘hot’ work, which indeed makes her and her colleagues uncomfortable. These are to mitigate and prevent the tensions between the state, the THPF, and the NGO itself. Ms Peach knows what kinds of projects should be proposed for THPF funding and what should not be, and the THPF does, unofficially, send a kind of signal to warn the NGO of the ‘sensitive’ topics.

The THPF sent some signals when we ran some [sensitive] activities in which the THPF’s presence was obvious. They think it can create some difficulties for them… They said this would make the THPF uncomfortable to work with my NGO. It wanted us to be more considerate [to the THPF’s presence in this kind of issue]… The THPF has been put on a defensive stance too much. They worried too much about what will happen to them (Ms Peach, interview).

However, not every NGO is passively depoliticised. Mr Jet, a senior NGO worker, critically scrutinises the THPF and pointed out during the interview that although the THPF is afraid of the state, which is why it has depoliticised itself to be safe, he is ready and willing to challenge the state if he feels the state is doing wrong, especially to the people.

The THPF may seem obvious in its mission, that is, to promote health and well-being, but it isn’t brave enough to show its position and thought against what it is dealing with… In times of crisis, the THPF doesn’t play its cards. I don’t think this is ok. The THPF should face and confront [the government]. Indeed, the THPF has a shield, its partners and people. They are ready to protect the
THPF. So, why be scared?… I think the THPF is too scared of power that is greater than its own: the power of unjust, undemocratic government. Anyway, the partners are ready to confront such power. Even though we may have to act against the PM’s order, we are not scared. The PM is fallible, isn’t he? Criticism is needed (Mr Jet, interview).

The case of the THPF serves to exemplify the limitation of the state’s ability to ‘purchase’ the NGOs to contribute to public policy. The NGOs which need to work against the state can still oppose government projects or contribute to policy in a way they would like to, although they are told to collaborate with the state or ‘make a difference’ within state institutional setting instead of being outside state coalition. This is made possible due to the double nature of the THPF: being a public organisation constrained by rules but also a foundation allowing the recipients to perform their own missions. However, the NGOs under THPF support run a risk of becoming the anti-political machine of development (see Ferguson 1990; Wood 2016), which is driven by neoliberal ideas of self-interested individualism and market efficiency discouraging interest and engagement in politics and communities.

8.10 Conclusion

This chapter suggests that the relationship between the THPF and the funded NGOs and how the NGOs are metagoverned have consequences toward the development of the NGO sector and civil society in general. In this regard, this chapter aims to respond to the third research question: what does the relationship produce? In doing so, the chapter looks at the way the funded NGOs are driven to be NGOised.

The developments of the characteristics of NGOs under the THPF funding discussed in this chapter emerge regardless of the THPF’s intention to foster them. The NGOs are made to adapt themselves to become appropriate targets of metagovernance, or suitable partners, in the relationship. As a result, they tend to become more professionalised, institutionalised, bureaucratised, and depoliticised, which together strengthens the NGOisation of civil society. In fact, these changes are neither inherently good nor bad. However, they bring a certain version of civil society which is preoccupied with organisational reproduction, institutional advocacy and the state partnership business at the expense of independent social movements attached to their social bases.
Chapter 9
Conclusion

This chapter discusses the major findings in order to draw some conclusions in the light of existing frameworks and current debates. By engaging with retroductive strategy, this thesis particularly aims to make an explanation on what can account for the NGOisation of civil society discussed in the previous chapter. In other words, it is interested in why the NGOisation of civil society has unfolded.

Through this, three main research questions were formulated to guide the analysis of the research:

1) What is the nature and characteristic of the relationship between the THPF and the funded NGOs?
2) How are the funded NGOs steered and metagoverned by the THPF?
3) What does the relationship produce? (or in what way are the funded NGOs driven to be NGOised?)

The overall answer is that NGOisation of civil society happens through the metagovernance of the state donor. The NGOisation discussed in this thesis emerged out of the metagovernance by the THPF of its NGO partners and in turn, intentionally or not, driven them to become more professionalised, institutionalised, bureaucratised, and depoliticised.

9.1 THPF-NGO relations, metagovernance and NGOisation

Metagovernance helps connect broader, abstract ideas of changing state-society relations with what is occurring within practice. NGOisation reflects the relationship between the funder and its funded NGOs as well as the consequence of the relationship. The development of the THPF-NGO relation has resulted in a certain version of state-society relation in Thailand which is different from that of a liberal society, a prominent character of most Western societies.

The analysis of the THPF-NGO relation reflects the relational view of state-society, where the state does not only penetrate society but works closely with social actors. This is because the state can better reach its goals provided that the interests of the state and society are advanced collaboratively, not competitively. The THPF has enabled the state to increase its capacity and reach over the NGO sector, proving that the Thai state has attempted to rearrange governance
arrangements by adopting a metagovernance stance. The THPF itself can be considered as a new working model for a better state-society relation as it is involved with the designation and the implementation of cross-sectoral partnership in promoting health and social purposes. Specifically, it suggests the ‘state-in-society’ approach, the relational model to understand state-civil society interactions. In such relationship, civil society is implicated in all sorts of political and social change, including change in state governance (Weiss 2008).

In specific, in response to the three research questions respectively, this chapter argues that the relationship between the THPF and the NGOs is interdependent, asymmetrical, and consequential.

9.1.1 The interdependent relation: state-society relations in relational perspective

The dependency on funding does not mean that the funded NGOs are totally passive to the THPF. In fact, the THPF needs to rely on the NGO partners to implement the projects/programmes. Without the partners, the THPF is only a source of money. Interaction between the THPF and the NGOs is thus not confined to financial relations. The THPF-NGO relationship is not a common patron-client relationship seen in some literature in the field. This thesis agrees with Rakyutidharm (2014a) that the collaboration between the THPF and NGOs is found driven not only by the reciprocity but also by the shared development ideology, that is, to promote a public health policy. It would be misleading to look at the THPF-NGO in terms of patronage relationship. The relationship between them is rather interdependent.

The thesis found that the NGOs are welcome to become a part of the THPF’s project. As an agent of the THPF, the outputs and outcomes of the NGOs can be considered as those of the THPF too. The NGOs have become a mechanism, a network mechanism, of the THPF while the THPF establishes and exercises its power over/through the NGOs. In other words, the THPF expands it values through societal initiatives and the societal actors enlarge their contribution through the THPF.

The THPF-NGO experience reflects the relational idea of state-society relations. The THPF enhances its power and capacity by developing close, interdependent relationships with NGOs and using networks to govern. The THPF represents a ‘consultative authoritarianist’ state agency which simultaneously promotes the progress of NGO and instruments of governance. Mechanisms of metagovernance such as partnership and granting become favoured strategies for
the THPF to indirectly coordinate and steer NGOs. The THPF has attempted to bring NGOs into the governable terrain by enabling them in a way which supports THPF values. Civil society under the metagoverning THPF is a form of ‘semi-civil society’ which is neither fully autonomous from the THPF nor completely dependent on it. This highlights the reciprocal, interdependent nature of the THPF vis a vis the NGOs.

9.1.2 The asymmetrical relation: the metagoverning THPF and the funded NGOs

The THPF, as a health and societal promotor enabler, always claims that it treats its NGO partners as equal. Yet, the fact that the THPF is an independent APO holding a considerable amount of money necessarily points to its powerful resources and the capacity to metagovern. Indeed, the extent to which the THPF steers its partners is conditioned by how it is perceived to perform. This thesis suggests that the THPF should be treated as a health and societal promotor enabler. This role gives the THPF a distinct capacity to steer using combined modes of governance. The thesis argues that the THPF is performing metagovernance. The THPF strategically metagoverns its NGO partners through interactive governance, namely quasi-markets and quasi-networks. The interactive governance is actualised in the form of proactive granting and the ‘tri-power strategy’.

The THPF strategically grants an extensive number of non-state actors through its proactive approach. The grants are becoming more than just giving money; they are also tools to expand the THPF’s reach into areas where hitherto it had no presence and influence. The relationship between the funder and the funded has, at least in financial terms, never been symmetrical. As discussed in the thesis, the NGO sector in Thailand has received less and less funding from international and foreign bodies since the mid of the 1990s. Since then, APOs have come to be the new patrons for civil society. As a result, the NGOisation driven by the THPF has reshaped the landscape of Thai civil society since the 2000s. Thai NGOs, which managed to survive by strengthening their independent managerial strategies before the 2000s have slowly become dependent on public funding. The THPF has become one of the most significant sources of funding for civil society in Thailand and the NGOs have become dependent on it. It is hard for the NGOs to deny the value of the THPF.

In addition, the funded NGOs, along with other relevant partners, are strategically positioned within the partnership. Through the ‘tri-power strategy’, the THPF initially designs and
steers the interaction of each participant, coordinating them to reach a common goal. As a metagovernor, it defines ‘facts’ beforehand, that is, defines how the problem should be conceived and how it should be addressed in the partnership. Such facts become the common goal. This goal holds the authorities to facilitate or constrain the partnership using both hands-on and hands-off approaches. Sometimes, it merely strategically supervises the partnership by providing resources and connecting a number of agencies in the partnership. At the other times, it participates in the partnership, playing a more interventionist role. The THPF is both structuring and structured by the partnership. This strategy is considered performing at a higher-level of governance to shape how the partnership should operate, steering the strategies, actions and activities.

These key mechanisms of metagovernance are conducted in the ‘shadow of hierarchy’. Authorities and laws have taken place in the relationship. This continues giving the THPF the authority to metagovern its partners in order to secure future partnership. The ‘shadow of hierarchy’ also makes the THPF’s ability to combine different modes of steering possible. Through the ‘THPF Act’, the THPF is granted autonomy to govern itself through its independent board. Different governance mechanisms are designed to operate interactively, which result in the interactive governance discussed in the thesis.

As an independent APO, the THPF has a complicated connection with the state. The THPF and its partners do not function as a straightforward arm of the state governing society and health. In fact, the THPF itself always has an uneasy relationship with the government because it is operating at arm’s length distancing itself from the central state. Sometimes, it is even seen as the NGO incubator by the government, which has led to a series of government investigations and interventions.

For the NGOs, working with the THPF allows them to enjoy a much greater autonomy than when they are funded by other governmental agencies. They are not subject to direct state control. However, it is possible to see that they remain within the purview of hierarchical control, the ‘shadow of hierarchy’, in the name of ‘governance’.

In addition, the NGOs themselves are operating beyond the ‘shadow state’ thesis mentioned in Chapter 1. The case of the THPF-NGO relations suggests that it is not totally correct to perceive the funded NGOs only as a fully-fledged ‘para-state’ apparatus carrying out welfare functions previously shouldered by the public sector. It is evident that the funded NGOs are persuaded to perform the state functions within the THPF’s broad health promotion values; yet,
they are also allowed, or even encouraged, to pursue their own values and missions. The THPF is friendly to civil society in a sense that it is the only public fund in the country whose recipients have the autonomy to carry out their original missions. However, this does not mean that they can do whatever they want. The scope of the activities must match one of the values of the THPF, which as mentioned before, are extremely broad covering most of the social policy areas, not only the health ones.

Therefore, having the relationship with the metagoverning THPF can be seen as both co-opting and enabling. For enabling, the THPF encourages an intense engagement and autonomy of civil society. It facilitates the space for NGOs to negotiate with the authorities which the NGOs alone cannot have. Even so, there is no doubt that the funding entails a series of constraints within which the NGOs must operate. It is extremely challenging for the NGOs to strike a balance between exclusionary tendencies and state co-optation. To position themselves between these two forces is subjective and influenced by the character of the NGOs themselves and the funder. The thesis found that different NGOs have different relations with the THPF. Highly professionalised NGOs which tend to have organisational signature, and poorly professionalised NGOs with no signature, do not enter the same kind of relations with the THPF. In particular, the NGOs founded since the THPF and work in the area of health are subject to a close, parenting kind of relationship with the THPF. On the contrary, the NGOs which were founded and actively operated before the THPF tend to go into a complementing (for health NGOs) or supplementing (for non-health NGOs) type of relation with it. Tension is highly expected in the NGOs which are in the niched relations with the THPF because within this relationship, the THPF and NGOs compete to frame the issue of interest. The winner can establish the leadership role within the partnership. NGOs are allowed a certain space to exert their agency in the relationship.

It should be noted that this work does not suggest that the possible co-optation of NGOs by the THPF (and the state) should blind us to their continuing significance. This thesis agrees that the NGOs are important forces for social and political change in Thailand, thereby becoming, as argued by Phongpaichit and Baker (2000, p. 251), ‘the conscience of the society… which will act as forces for changes towards a better future’. The question is not simply about how the NGOs come to align with the THPF (and state mechanisms) and how NGOs are transformed through THPF funding, but also how to reframe the understanding of these realignments to better
understand the complex social realities animating the contemporary Thai civil society and state-society relations.

9.1.3 The consequential relation: NGOisation of civil society

Unlike many analyses of NGOisation which look at pressures from international organisation or/and foreign donors or governments towards the NGO sector in a particular country, NGOisation argued in this thesis is more domestic and indigenous. It is driven by the THPF, an independent Thai APO. The effects of NGOisation generated through the metagovernance of the THPF are varied across different types of NGOs and the relationship they have with the THPF. However, the detailed empirical investigation of such an effect on different NGOs is not the main enquiry of the thesis. Further study is required. Instead, the main enquiry of the thesis has been about the push for NGOs to become suitable and reliable partners of the THPF (and indirectly the state). It has explored conditions for the emergence of NGOisation. Moreover, NGOisation as explored in this thesis only captures ‘one side’ of a reality where the THPF and its funded NGOs are the protagonists. Recognising large variations in civil society, NGOs, and politics in Thailand, this work has not tried to examine the whole of Thailand’s civil society, but just the THPF-NGO partnership.

As discussed in Chapter 8, NGOs under the metagoverning THPF are driven to develop certain characteristics which will suit the THPF’s system better. However, three prominent features can be considered as emergent effects of NGOisation.

Institutionalised advocacy: NGOisation strengthens the application of institutional advocacy. The social movement-based advocacy heavily favoured by the Thai NGOs since the 1980s has been made less significant through the promotion of institutional advocacy focusing on collaborative interaction with the state. The institutional advocacy is rather compromised, nurturing ‘elite’ civil society that has a capacity to connect with the authority and know the rules of the game behaving well in an increasing state-civil society partnership. In the Thai context, such institutional advocacy or lobbying also implies a tendency for NGOs to be opportunistic, being prepared to work with any government, even an authoritarian one, if the government can help them reach their goals. For the funded NGOs, with the opportunities that proximity to power brings - such as access to resources and insider information - comes the loss of critical distance. The
problem of proximity to power is not just a professional dilemma inherent to NGOs. It is also an aspect of the neoliberal transformation of Thai society. NGOised organisations tend to become elitist, upscale, and uncommitted to the social movements.

**Elite civil society:** as aforementioned, NGOisation creates a division between NGOs resulting in standard and ‘elite’ NGOs. Most NGO participants are NGO programme managers who sub-contract other civil society organisations. They are agents of the THPF. They act as an arm of the metagovering THPF using their devolved authority. These NGOs themselves unavoidably become a significant engine of NGOisation. They become part of the ‘system of managing the system’. These NGOs engage less with the public. They have contributed to their demobilisation and been seen as a legitimate proxy for the government and donors rather than a proxy for the public. In this respect, NGOs working with ideologies shared by the THPF or/and under the funding of THPF can be, to a certain degree, understood through the notion of ‘elite civil society’, mentioned in Chapter 2. They become an elite proxy between people and state agencies. They rather represent the interests of the THPF in the policy process and development work in order to ensure the continuation of funding and their very own survival. This arguably makes advocacy activity without public participation.

In Thailand, the situation in which leaders of the funded NGOs speak the same language and share similar ideas with the funders is noted in other research (Shigetomi 2006; Rakyutidharm 2011) as well as in this thesis. Specifically, Shigetomi (2006) even states that the leaders of APO donors and NGOs are sometimes the same people. This corresponds with the case of the THPF where experts and PAC members are often part of the funded NGOs’ advisory boards.

Besides, NGOisation supporting institutional advocacy (such as gaining state office, becoming an insider to change the state and policy) potentially leads to civil society drifting from its original path to become a more ‘political’ society. In fact, the realm between civil society and political society has been blurred due to the intense interaction of state and non-state actors. This is because, although civil society organisations are regularly intended to influence public policies, they do not seek the acquisition and exercise of state power or form themselves on a partisan basis to advance their interests and officially compete for state office (Alagappa 2004b). For political society, it is an area where actors ‘compete for the legitimate right to exercise control over public power and the state apparatus’ (Linz and Stepan 1996, p. 16). The aim of the political society is
the ‘acquisition and exercise of state power’ (Alagappa 2004b, p. 37). The NGOs are developed to do more than influence the policy; they also try to manipulate state power and policy itself. The matter of NGOisation is thus not limited to cooperatively working with the state but somehow managing to grasp and make use of it.

*Upward accountability:* Rakyutidharm (2014a) found that the collaborative development between the THPF and NGOs is not guaranteed to yield benefits to their intended beneficiaries. Specifically, this thesis found that NGOisation can lead the NGOs to prioritise the funder over their social bases. NGOs are focused on producing and completing their projects/programmes as a way to survive. Organisational reproduction is prioritised. This may be part of the process of adopting corporate organisational models which seek legitimacy from the funder. This research found that the NGO participants rarely mentioned their social beneficiaries during the interviews. Instead, they often showed consideration for their funder, who would assist their careers and support stability for their situation. The NGOs in this thesis are found to be focused more on the demands the funder. Upward accountability occupies the NGOs as they shift their accountability away from their beneficiaries and upward to the THPF.

The THPF functions closely with civil society, thereby significantly affecting the trajectory of the third sector. The THPF has indeed played a crucial role in shaping NGO strategies. Specifically, THPF funding requirements cause significant imposition of institutional blueprint of civil society moulded by the THPF. NGOs which receive money from THPF are required to follow THPF administrative systems and project advice. They are expected to act and think in the way the THPF has designed. A heterogeneity and variety of civil society is replaced by the limited pattern of NGOs.

In conclusion, the THPF-NGO relations reflect a version of state-society relations in Thailand where the state has changed from a traditional government to a metagovernor exercising its power through civil society and a combination of governance mechanisms beyond mere hierarchies. This paves the way to look at a relational dimension of the state-society relations.

**9.2 CR and the research on metagovernance and NGOisation**

CR was used to navigate the research for this thesis. It particularly helped the research in two important ways. First, it helped develop the conceptual understanding of reality, structure and
agency, emergence, and relationship. This is important for developing the theoretical frameworks: NGOisation and metagovernance. The complementary approach used for connecting the theories is in fact supported by the philosophy of CR. As social realities are stratified, there is a need to combine multiple perspectives to explain different aspects of the same phenomenon.

Besides, the CR concept of reality reflects the idea of emergence, which is crucial to the concept of NGOisation. NGOisation can be understood as both a theoretical model and an empirical description of the Thai NGO landscape. It highlights the change in NGOs and their relationship with donors. The NGOisation is conceived as a process (and a result) of the NGO transformation under the influences of the funder to become a suitable partner in the funder’s business. NGOisation consists of several, interrelated developments: professionalisation, institutionalisation, bureaucratisation, and depoliticisation. When these developments are triggered under certain conditions, NGOisation is likely to be manifested and its effects tend to play out. These developments of NGOisation are not mutually exclusive and simultaneously manifested as cause and effect. The effects of NGOisation cannot be reduced to its components. It has emergent power which its components do not have.

The layered ontology and emergence helped shape the analytic of metagovernance. It highlighted the orders of governance. Metagovernance is higher-order governance with emergent power, and the metagovernance of the THPF is a strategically calculated action whose power is far above the power of a certain governance mechanism alone. Mere hierarchical governance cannot make the THPF govern and steer the NGO partners in the way it does. Also, CR understanding of the dialectic of structure-agency and relations is typical. It encouraged the research to look at the interactive governance, the reciprocal, interdependent interaction between the THPF and the NGOs, the internal relations of the THPF-NGO partnership, and the structural tendency of the metagoverning THPF. There are a multiplicity of interrelating mechanisms and structures in the relations.

Second, CR helped develop methodology in a distinct way. As discussed in Chapter 3, CR encourages the used of retroduction which is well-suited to enquiry guided by a ‘why’ question. It made the research ‘exploratory’ in the sense that the research looks beyond people’s understanding and regularities of phenomena located in the experienced domain. It instead seeks casual mechanisms at the real domain which are responsible for the event observed. The research then focused on producing an explanatory account of what is responsible for NGOisation and how
metagovernance functions. The account is theory-driven but grounded in empirical data. Hence, CR is an interesting and constructive philosophical idea. This thesis believes that CR can provide a serious theoretical and methodological consequence shaping the research in a novel way.

9.3 Contributions

It can be considered that this thesis makes some principal contributions to knowledge in the following points:

- Essentially, navigated with CR, the research of this thesis does not only aim at describing things, their relationships, and their construction of meanings but also at explaining why things are the way they are and why it occurs through an investigation of underlying mechanisms. This shows the capacity of this thesis as a social research which tries to give an alternative to positivism and interpretivism. The research also implicitly engages with evaluating things under study such as normative dimensions of the relationship, NGOisation, and metagovernance;

- Methodologically, by applying CR, this thesis shows how CR research can be conducted using retroductive analysis. This helps advance the applicability of CR as a serious methodology for empirical social research. Also, the thesis elaborates the way in which CR can be used to advance other theories and concepts. CR is no longer left being only a philosophical concept but becoming a social theory and a social methodology;

- Theoretically, this thesis directly aims to advance knowledge on metagovernance and NGOisation as analytical, conceptual frameworks. Both of the concept have been either over-theorised or poorly-theorised with deficient empirical application. This thesis thus elaborates a model which can be used to study metagovernance and NGOisation elsewhere;

- To study the THPF-NGO relations reflects an attempt to look at the broader state-society relations and the changing state in contemporary governance in Thailand. The state is no longer exercising its power through state mechanisms. It expands the power with and through non-state, societal mechanisms, thereby developing a relational, interdependent relationship with the social actors. Indeed, what are discovered here can be used to look at and explain state-society relations in other developing countries where the state is authoritative but, at the same time, trying to developing supporting, enabling instruments for civil society development;
• Substantively, as aforementioned, the THPF is widely recognised but largely unexamined, let alone its relationship with civil society. Also, the landscape of civil society funding since the 2000s, where the THPF and other APOs have emerged to be predominant in the field, has been left unexplained academically. This thesis directly aims to contribute to the development of understanding on the THPF as an interesting institution with both a state and foundation functions and its interaction and impacts on societal partnership it has created as well as the contemporary civil society funding development.

9.4 Limitations of the research

All studies have limitations. Four major limitations should be mentioned. First, as this research is navigated by CR, it seems that the approach to apply CR of this study is highly subject to the researcher’s own interpretation and intellectual creativity. As mentioned, there is no common guide of CR research and CR is deficiently applied in empirical research. Different people use and apply CR in their own ways. It is possible that other CR scholars might find this research as diverting from their CR interpretation. However, it is better to treat this issue as a matter of intellectual experiment or discovery because this is believed to be the way to advance the knowledge of CR in actual empirical research.

Second, given the word limits, it is challenging to explain the developing theories and methodologies employed and the arguments made with sufficient and appropriate supporting evidence. Some parts require more space to elaborate better.

Third, a lack of academic research on infrastructure or foundation knowledge of the NGO sector and civil society in Thailand in general, especially quantitative studies like in many Western societies have, gave some limits on the analysis. If Thailand has an updated knowledge and statistical data on the sector, it would be better to see the overall character of the sector and its funding landscape.

Fourth, given the data access, it is obvious that this research found some limitations on getting in contact with some potential participants especially board member-level of the THPF. Although the research chose to complement to lack of such data with document analysis, the document the researcher has obtained was also subject to a degree of censorship and rejection. For example, not all minutes of meeting as requested is available for the researcher to access. The
given minutes were subject to some minor censorship. This indeed limited the analysis of the research.

**9.5 Directions for further research**

It is reasonable to suggest some possible further research which could be conducted to expand and strengthen our understandings and explanations over the issue. They are as follows:

- As this thesis argues that different NGOs have different kinds of relationship with the THPF, it would be interesting to look further into how NGOisation has affected each NGO in everyday practices. It is suspected that they as they go into different types of relationship, they should experience dissimilar actualisation of NGOisation;
- Details on hands-on and hands-off mechanisms of metagovernance of the THPF as well as state agencies which fund organised civil society are worth of research. It is believed that everyday practices of metagovernance involves a web of more complex interacting power and mechanisms. These can give rise to the study of micro-techniques, their coordinations and tensions, of metagovernance;
- Studying of mentality and operation of the board would be interesting as it can reflect the political strategy of the THPF over broader health and society as well as civil society in general. This would also give rise to an investigation in political relationship the THPF has with the government and political interventions which had been taken place over since the inception of the THPF;
- Research on metagovernance of the Thai state on a macro-level analysis is suggested. This can help to historically and analytically comprehend the very nature and manner the Thai state in relation to society. The state is indeed changing itself into a more relational one where its links with society is indispensable. It is considered useful to seriously look into metagovernance which has taken place in other areas of Thailand.

**9.6 Recommendation for the THPF and NGOs**

It is recommended that the THPF needs to take the initiative in re-shaping the relationship and re-define the ecosystem of civil society. The THPF should highlight the interdependency aspects of the relations it has with the NGO partners. This thesis suggests that, unlike what is commonly assumed under the ‘piper hypothesis’, the funded NGOs in practice have considerable
decision-making space and organisational autonomy granted by the THPF. Yet, the autonomy of the NGOs, at the same time, is strongly circumscribed by their considerable financial dependence on the funder, contractual performance agreements, accountability requirements, and importantly working in the ‘shadow of hierarchy,’ that is, the governmental rules and expectations albeit indirectly. In this regard, giving NGOs more autonomy does not indicate a weakening influence of governmental power or the state agency of interest but new ways of governing and steering. This demonstrates the complex relationships the NGOs have, in that although they are dependent financially, they are interdependent in other resources.

With the capacity to metagovern, the THPF should analyse the identity of NGOs, perhaps together with the NGOs themselves, and help them keep their identity as appropriate through the funding. The THPF should not narrowly define its self-perspective by only giving money and then asking the funded organisations to follow its values. It should find a way to bring together different identities and enable them to reach the common goal, that is, to address the social determinants of health and create a healthy society. NGOisation is not inherently bad as realising its potential can benefit the sector too.

For the NGOs, they would like to keep their passion to work and their identity. It is reasonable for them to think of a way to apply the funding to their work regardless of means. Collaboration between the NGOs and the THPF does not mean the NGOs need to be passive. In fact, collaboration is an important way to gain access to the resources including THPF support and knowledge, which in turn provides the NGOs with the chance to pursue their goals in the national institutional setting. The NGOs need to think of a strategy to gain more benefits from the relationship.
References


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Bangkok: Kobfai Publishing Project.


Ungkultassaneeyarat, P. (2017). "Where are we Going?" Thai NGOs and Civil Society in Dilemma [in Thai]. [Online]. 1 August. Available from: https://roottogether.net/leader/taproot/%E0%B9%80%E0%B8%A3%E0%B8%B2%E0%B8%88%E0%B8%B0%E0%B9%84%E0%B8%9B%E0%B8%97%E0%B8%B2%E0%B8%87%E0%B9%84%E0%B8%AB%E0%B8%99%E0%B8%81%E0%B8%B1%E0%B8%99-ngo/ [Accessed 7 December 2017].

Ungpakorn, G. J. (2009). Why have most Thai NGOs chosen to side with the Conservative Royalists, against democracy and against the poor?. *Interface: A Journal for and about Social Movements*, 1(2), 233-237.


Appendices
Appendix A

Interview Guideline (for THPF staff)

Part A: General Information
- How did you become involving or working with THPF?
- What is your current responsibility in the organisation, and how do you do the work?
- What do you think of the status and the role of the THPF in society?

Part B: Working Experiences

B1: Working Experiences within the Organisation
- What do you think of the role of the Board of Governance towards the management of the office?
- Have you encountered any difficulties by working with the Board and other sections of the office?
   If you have, what are they? And how did you overcome them?
- How do different sections of the office operate and collaborate?
- What will you do if there is a conflict between the office and the Board, or within the office, either between sections or different level of staff?
- What is the key for efficiency in management of the THPF?

B2: Relationship with Partner Organisations
- In your view, what is a non-governmental organisation (NGO)?
- Do you think that the THPF is an innovative funding for NGOs?
- Does your organisation or your section have a special strategy or a policy to deal with NGOs and other social organisations? If it does, what is that and how does it work?
- How do you choose the partner organisations? Does THPF have any criteria for the recruitment of the partner organisation?
- What kind of project/programme do you see that suits NGOs best?
- How do you interact with the partner organisations?
- Have you encountered any difficulties by working with NGOs? If you have, what are they? And how have you deal with them?
- What aspect of NGOs you have been dealing with that you want them to improve or develop?
And do you think that the THPF can help with this improvement?

-What do you think about an opinion that the funding of THPF can lead the funded organisations to be more project-based in term of working approach?

**Part C: Influences of the THPF towards the Funded Organisations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) To a very great extent</th>
<th>(2) To a great extent</th>
<th>(3) To some extent</th>
<th>(4) To a small extent</th>
<th>(5) Not at all</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To what extent do you think that civil society and NGO sector in Thailand is depended on THPF funding?</td>
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<td>To what extent do you think that the THPF has changed the funded organisations during and after the funding period (especially regarding the size and the type of work of the funded organisations)?</td>
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<td>To what extent do you think that the THPF has an influence or an impact towards the policy and management of the funded organisations?</td>
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<td>To what extent do you think that the funded organisations have their managerial autonomies under the funding of the THPF?</td>
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**Part D: Reflexive Comments**

-What do you think about a criticism that the THPF is ‘a hub or a network of Dr Prawes Wasi and his followers’ or ‘elite civil society’ in Thailand?
-What do you think about the idea of decentralising the THPF such as having a regional office of THPF?
- Have you satisfied with the performance and the management of THPF so far?
- What aspect of the THPF that you would like to improve for a better working approach with partner organisations?
- In your view, what is the strength of the THPF in comparison with any other social funders in Thailand?
- Do you think that Thailand should have more THPF-like organisations? Why do you think like this?
- Have you ever considered the THPF as a part of Thai civil society? If you have, what is the THPF as a part of civil society?
Interview Guideline (for NGOs)

Part A: General Information
- What is the job of your organisation?
- What is your current responsibility in the organisation, and how do you do the work?
- How did you or your organisation become involving or working with THPF?
- Have you ever work for, or have a position, whatever kind, in the THPF apart from the grantee?
- How many programmes does your organisation receive granting from the THPF? And what are they?
- Have you or your organisation obtained funding from other organisations apart from the THPF? If you have, what were they?
- How many percent does the funding of the THPF constitutes your annual organisation budget? (please give an estimated number)

Part B: Working Experiences with the THPF
- In your view, does your work suit the working approach of the THPF?
- What is the status of the THPF in your perspective? Is it a state agency?
- Do you think that the THPF is an innovative funding for NGOs?
- Does your organisation follow every single suggestion from the THPF? If it does not, what would happen?
- What do you think about the THPF’s project review process done by appointed reviewers?
- Who do you think that hold a power in approving and managing projects/programmes of THPF? Why do you think like this?
- Have you satisfied with the performance and the management of THPF?
- Have you encountered any difficulties when working with the THPF? If you have, what are they? And how have you dealt with them?
- What aspect of the THPF do you think should be improved for a better collaborative working with your organisation and other NGOs?
- Do you think that the funding of THPF can lead your organisation and other funded organisations to be more project-based in term of working approach? If you do, what kind of change do you think it has on your organisation and civil society in Thailand?
Part C: Influences of the THPF towards the Funded Organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) To a very great extent</th>
<th>(2) To a great extent</th>
<th>(3) To some extent</th>
<th>(4) To a small extent</th>
<th>(5) Not at all</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To what extent do you think that civil society and NGO sector in Thailand is depended on THPF funding?</td>
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<td>To what extent do you think that your organisation or/and other organised civil society has been changed during and after the funding period (especially regarding the size and the type of work of the funded organisations)?</td>
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<td>To what extent do you think that your organisation or/and other organised civil society has been influenced by the change in policies and operations of THPF?</td>
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<tr>
<td>To what extent do you think that your organisation or/and other organised civil society has the managerial autonomies under the funding of the THPF?</td>
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Part D: Reflexive Comments

-What do you think about a criticism that the THPF is ‘a hub or a network of Dr Prawes Wasi and his followers’ or ‘elite civil society’ in Thailand?
-If you have obtained funding from other organisations, do you see any differences between the THPF and other funders? If you do, what are the differences?
-Do you think that Thailand should have alternative funding like the THPF? and why?
-Have you ever considered the THPF as a part of Thai civil society? If you have, what is the THPF as a part of civil society?
Interview Guideline (For Experts)

- What is your opinion regarding the NGO sector and civil society after 1997?
- What is your opinion regarding the funding situation of NGOs vis-a-vis the THPF?
- What do you think about the rationale and the social function of the THPF?
- In your view, what is the role and influence of the ‘rural doctor’ movement or Dr Prawes Wasi and his followers towards the THPF and Thai civil society?
- To what extent do you think about the influence of THPF towards NGOs in Thailand? How have NGOs adapted themselves under the funding system created by the THPF?
- Do you think that the funding of THPF can lead NGOs to be more project-based in term of working approach? If you do, what kind of change do you think it has on NGOs and civil society in Thailand?
- What do you think the THPF should improve for a better working approach with NGOs?
- Do you think that Thailand should have more THPF-like organisations? Why do you think like this?
- What is the future direction of Thai civil society and NGOs under the funding of THPF.
Appendix B

Lists of interview participants (Total: 50 anonymised participants)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Pseudonym</th>
<th>Current Position (at the date of the interview)</th>
<th>Background</th>
<th>Place and Date of the Interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ms. Woo</td>
<td>THPF, a section director responsible for social and health risk control</td>
<td>The interviewee has joined the THPF since the first few years of the organisation and has worked in a major granting section since then. Then, the interviewee was promoted to be a director of another section.</td>
<td>THPF’s office, 8 Aug 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Dr. Rice</td>
<td>Ministry of Public Health, a senior advisor of the Department of Mental Health</td>
<td>The interviewee is a psychiatrist and an expert on children and media. The interviewee was a board member (mass communication expert) of the THPF and has also sat on a board of many civil society organisations and public organisations.</td>
<td>Ministry of Public Health, 10 Apr 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Dr. Korn</td>
<td>THPF, a senior officer</td>
<td>The interviewee was an academic in the Department of Dental Surgery in a university and had experienced working with the THPF as a partner when the organisation was in its early years. Then, the interviewee was invited to take a position of a section director of a major granting section. Recently, the interviewee was promoted to be an executive of the THPF.</td>
<td>THPF’s office, 16 May 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Dr. Sor</td>
<td>Quality Learning Foundation (QLF), a senior office</td>
<td>The interviewee is a medical doctor and an expert on health promotion. Before being invited to take an executive role of the THPF in its the early years, the interviewee was a researcher in a health-related research organisation which allowed the interviewee to</td>
<td>QLF’s office, 25 May 17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
involve in the very process of the creation of the THPF. The interviewee was regarded as a founding member of the THPF.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Dr.Sing</td>
<td>Independent social entrepreneur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Ms.Fai</td>
<td>Retired</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Dr.Kob</td>
<td>THPF, a section director responsible for health risk control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Ms.Sora</td>
<td>THPF, a section director responsible for child, youth, and family promotion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Dr.Poom</td>
<td>THPF, a section director responsible for healthy lifestyle promotion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Ms.Cold</td>
<td>THPF, an acting section director responsible for open grant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Dr. Pan</td>
<td>THPF, a senior officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Dr. Jai</td>
<td>Thai Public Broadcasting Service (ThaiPBS), an executive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Ms. Kent</td>
<td>THPF, a section director responsible for a learning centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Ms. Card</td>
<td>THPF, a board member</td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Dr. Dark</td>
<td>THPF, a senior, executive officer</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
innovation development and monitoring and evaluation. Prior to the current position, the interviewee was promoted as a section director responsible for vulnerable and specialised populations.

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<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Experience Details</th>
<th>Location</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Mr. Heat</td>
<td>THPF, a section director responsible for policy and strategy</td>
<td>Prior to joining the THPF, the interviewee had experienced with organisations both in the public and the business sectors. He then applied for a position in the THPF and was accepted. Apart from taking care of policy and strategy of the organisation, the interviewee is also directing financial and accounting unit of the THPF.</td>
<td>THPF’s office, 18 May 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Ms. Gee</td>
<td>THPF, a section director responsible for corporate communication and public relations</td>
<td>The interviewee was a journalist and then invited to join the THPF as a public relations officer in the first decade of the organisation. Since then, the interviewee has been working in the same section.</td>
<td>THPF’s office, 16 Jun 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Dr. Three</td>
<td>THPF, a section director responsible for partnership and international relations</td>
<td>The interviewee was a senior researcher in a science and technology development institute. The interviewee then applied for a job in the THPF and was accepted. The beginning years of the interviewee in the THPF were dedicated to innovation support.</td>
<td>THPF’s office, 2 Aug 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Dr. Top</td>
<td>Action on Smoking and Health Foundation (ASH), a senior officer; the International Network for Health Promotion Foundation (INHPF), advisor</td>
<td>The interviewee is a medical doctor and a well-known health professional. Also, the interviewee has dedicated his life to tobacco control and NGO work. The interviewee was regarded as a founding member of the THPF and used to be a board member of the organisation. With such background, he was promoted as a successful health promotor by international society.</td>
<td>ASH’s office, 11 May 17</td>
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<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Interviewee</td>
<td>Organisation</td>
<td>Interviewee’s Role</td>
<td>Interviewee’s Experience</td>
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<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Ms. May</td>
<td>Family Network Foundation, a senior officer</td>
<td>The interviewee is a professional social worker interested in family and children development. The interviewee’s organisation can be consider a regular recipient of the THPF’s funding, obtaining grants from several sections of the THPF.</td>
<td>Family Network Foundation’s office, 17 Aug 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Ms. Cat</td>
<td>Child and Youth Media Institute, a senior officer</td>
<td>The interviewee has worked in an NGO specialised in children development for decades. Then, the interviewee has expanded her interest to other social determinants of children development such as media and education.</td>
<td>Child and Youth Media Institute’s office, 23 Aug 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Mr. Two</td>
<td>Thailand Walking and Cycling Institute, a senior officer</td>
<td>The interviewee has a rich experience working with international organisations and Northern NGOs. Also, the interviewee authored several articles on NGO funding in Thailand.</td>
<td>Interviewee’s house, 27 Mar 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Mr. Corn</td>
<td>Stop Gambling Foundation, a senior officer</td>
<td>Prior to working in the current position, the interviewee has worked in and directed organised civil society specialised in family development.</td>
<td>Stop Gambling Foundation’s office, 2 Dec 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Mr. Tan</td>
<td>Stop Drink Network Office, a senior officer</td>
<td>Prior to working in the current position, the interviewee has an experience working in big NGOs, specialised in local and social development, funded by foreign donors. The NGOs’ main job was to fund other organised civil society. So the interviewee has a rich experience in civil society funding ecosystem. The interviewee also often coordinated with religious organisations. The interviewee is regarded as working in a major area of the THPF since its inception</td>
<td>Stop Drink Network Office, 6 Apr 17</td>
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and has continuously managed one of the biggest project granted by
the THPF.

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<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Experience</th>
<th>Location</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Mr. Pun</td>
<td>Civil Society Empowerment Institute, a senior member</td>
<td>The interviewee has several experiences in both the THPF and the NGO sector. The interviewee was a manager of an NGO working for promoting family relationship and children development. His interest also covered the creation of public media for children and family. The interviewee was then asked to be a THPF’s section director responsible for health promotion for vulnerable populations. Currently, the interviewee is organising campaigns, funded by the THPF, to advocate the strengthening of civil society organisations in the country.</td>
<td>A hotel in Bangkok, 19 Dec 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Dr. Luke</td>
<td>Tobacco Control Research and Knowledge Management Centre (TRC) (supported by THPF), a senior officer</td>
<td>As an academic in public health, the interviewee has, apart from teaching in a university, engaged with several policy advocacy for health promotion, especially tobacco control. The interviewee is considered one of the first people engaged in the operation and the management of the THPF. Also, the interviewee has an experience as being a plan executive committee of THPF’s plans such as healthy community strengthening plan and health promotion innovation and open grant.</td>
<td>TRC’s office, 1 May 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Mr. Glass</td>
<td>Friend of Women Foundation, a senior officer</td>
<td>Since joining the NGO community, the interviewee has been working for women and labour rights. The interviewee has experienced with foreign and domestic donors. Currently, the interviewee is responsible for female labour and human trafficking prevention in the NGOs he is working for.</td>
<td>Friend of Women Foundation’s office, 5 Apr 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Organisation</td>
<td>Interviewee Details</td>
<td>Location</td>
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<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Mr.Jet</td>
<td>Women and Men Progressive Movement Foundation</td>
<td>The interviewee is regarded as one of the senior, progressive NGO activist in this generation. The interviewee has been working for women rights and anti-violence campaigns since he has joined the NGO sector. The organisation that he is running is founded by him and his team after he left another women NGO. He has a rich experience in people movements. The interviewee has involved with the THPF since its early years running campaigns on alcohol control and its consequence on domestic violence.</td>
<td>Women and Men Progressive Movement Foundation’s office, 5 Apr 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Ms.Day</td>
<td>Action on Smoking and Health Foundation (ASH)</td>
<td>The interviewee has been working for the NGO for a long time. She is better understood as an NGO professional rather than an NGO activist as she is normally taking care of management works rather than going out to the fields. The organisation that she is working for is closely related to the THPF as it actively involved in the creation of the THPF and has been a major partner of the THPF since then.</td>
<td>ASH’s office, 10 Apr 17</td>
</tr>
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<td>30</td>
<td>Mr.Keynes</td>
<td>Makhampom Foundation</td>
<td>The interviewee is an educator and facilitator. He can be considered a pioneer in advocating and experimenting alternative learning to the wide public.</td>
<td>A coffee shop in Bangkok, 10 Apr 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Ms.Read</td>
<td>Reading Culture Promotion Programme</td>
<td>The interviewee has worked with NGOs for children and media for children, particularly cartoon. Then, she was approached to deal with the promotion of reading culture in Thailand. Now, the programme she is working for has been funded by the THPF.</td>
<td>1 May 17</td>
</tr>
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<td>32</td>
<td>Ms.Sky</td>
<td>Holt Sahathai Foundation</td>
<td>The interviewee joined the NGO community for decades working to strengthen family unit of families in crisis in order to prevent child abuse, neglect, maltreatment, and abandonment. The interviewee has</td>
<td>Holt Sahathai Foundation’s office,</td>
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engaged with the funding of the THPF since its first decade. The interviewee’s organisation has a close link with foreign donors providing the interviewee analytical comments on the operation of the THPF.

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<td></td>
<td>Ms.Pa</td>
<td>Folk Doctor Foundation, a senior officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>As an academic, the interviewee has taught public health system and policy in universities for decades. The interviewee has also joined the NGO she is working for since its inception. Her organisation is specialised in health literacy and has involved with the creation of the THPF and continued working with the THPF since then.</td>
<td>Folk Doctor Foundation’s office, 18 Apr 17</td>
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|   | Mr.Wan | Towards Ecological Recovery and Regional Alliance (TERRA), a senior officer |
|34| The interviewee is regarded as one of the senior in the NGO community. He has an insight and a rich experience in NGOs. The interviewee was also the President of the NGO Coordinating Committee on Development (NGO-COD), a national NGO body to advocate development policy in the country. Currently, the interviewee is interested in environment and ecology. | Tum Ma Pan’s office, 19 Apr 17 |

|   | Ms.Peach | Thai Volunteer Service Foundation (TVS), a senior officer |
|35| The interviewee has worked in the NGO community for decades and been an expert on volunteer development. Although the interviewee’s organisation is old, the collaboration between the organisation and the THPF is relatively new. One funded programme the organisation has run became controversial as it involved political dimension. | TVS’s office, 26 Apr 17 |

<p>|   | Mr.Gandalf | Thai Holistic Health Foundation, a senior officer |
|36| The interviewee is considered a senior in the NGO sector. The interviewee has also actively involved with several other NGOs such as the Foundation for Consumers. He holds several positions in committees, either public or NGO. The interviewee was a Plan | Ministry of Health, 20 Jun 17 |</p>
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<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Professional Experience</th>
<th>Interview Details</th>
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<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Ms.Sun</td>
<td>Path2Health Foundation</td>
<td>senior officer</td>
<td>The interviewee has a lot of experience with foreign donors and international organisations. She can be considered a professional NGO worker who dedicated to management development of the organisation. Her organisation has started obtaining the THPF’s grant from a small-budget project to a large-budget one.</td>
<td>Path2Health Foundation’s office, 23 Jun 17</td>
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<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Mr.Club</td>
<td>Information Centre for Gambling Control Policy</td>
<td>a senior officer</td>
<td>The interviewee has experience working for the THPF before joining NGOs. Currently, he is interested in advocating gambling control policy work, which funded by the THPF and managed under the National Health Foundation (NHF).</td>
<td>NHF’s office, 4 Jul 17</td>
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<td>39</td>
<td>Mr.Pen</td>
<td>BioThai (Biodiversity Sustainable Agriculture Food Sovereignty Action Thailand)</td>
<td>a senior officer</td>
<td>The interviewee is considered a senior in the NGO community and has engaged with the THPF for a decade. At first, the interviewee was approached to develop a proposal in health and food security, the issues on which his organisation is still working.</td>
<td>BioThai’s office, 6 Jul 17</td>
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<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Ms.Jeep</td>
<td>Women's Health Advocacy Foundation</td>
<td>a senior officer</td>
<td>The interviewee is a pioneer who has been working in the NGO community to promote and educate sexual health for women. The interviewee has a strong background working with international development organisations and foreign donors. The interviewee has engaged with the THPF since its early years and managed a program dedicated for sexual health promotion since then.</td>
<td>THPF’s office, 21 Jul 17</td>
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<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Dr.Wat</td>
<td>National Reform Council</td>
<td>a member</td>
<td>The interviewee has his background in academic, Pharmaceutical Sciences. The interviewee was also a director of a programme dedicated to health consumer protection funded by the THPF.</td>
<td>National Health Commission Office, 18 Jul 17</td>
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<td>No.</td>
<td>Interviewee</td>
<td>Position/Institution</td>
<td>Details</td>
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<td>42</td>
<td>Dr. Rat</td>
<td>National Health Foundation (NHF), a senior officer</td>
<td>The interviewee is a distinguished, progressive medical doctor in the health sector. He is a part of the Rural Doctors’ Society and several related NGOs advocating for the public health reforms. He was also the first generation of the officer at the Health System Research Institute (HSRI), a think tank providing evidences behind many health initiatives, including the creation of the THPF. He reached his peak in public career when he was a Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Public Health.</td>
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<td>43</td>
<td>Mr. Water</td>
<td>Foundation for Child Development, a senior officer</td>
<td>The interviewee was working for the NGO for a long time. His NGO is one of the oldest NGOs in the country dedicated to child development. The THPF has funded several projects run by the NGO.</td>
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<td>44</td>
<td>Mr. Merlin</td>
<td>Root Together, a senior officer</td>
<td>The interviewee has experienced in running THPF’s programmes dedicated to vulnerable population such as disabilities empowerment. Currently, the interviewee is responsible for a capacity-building programme for leadership for change and social-health justice funded by the THPF.</td>
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<td>45</td>
<td>Dr. Nat</td>
<td>Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, Chulalongkorn University, a senior officer</td>
<td>The interviewee is a respected person in the NGO and social science community. As a sociologist, the interviewee was teaching and researching in a university until his retirement. His main interests are</td>
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<td>46</td>
<td>Dr.Green</td>
<td>Faculty of Agricultural Economics, Kasetsart University, a faculty member</td>
<td>The interviewee is an economist teaching in a university. He is regarded as a public intellect dedicated himself to civil society to develop alternative learning models. His main interests are rural development, agricultural industrial, and resource management. He has many encounters with the THPF.</td>
<td>Kasetsart University, 28 Mar 17</td>
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<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>Dr.Bus</td>
<td>Puey Ungphakorn School of Development Studies, Thammasat University, a faculty member</td>
<td>Prior to work as an academic, the interviewee worked for the THPF in its early years, particularly in evaluation works. The interviewee’s main interests are development studies, social policy, and social enterprise. The interviewee is also regarded as a public intellect dedicated to civil society.</td>
<td>Thammasat University, 4 Apr 17</td>
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<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Dr.Snake</td>
<td>Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, a faculty member</td>
<td>The interviewee is a political scientist interested in civil society, social movement, and political development. She has several experiences with the THPF as a fundee and a hired researcher.</td>
<td>Chulalongkorn University, 4 Apr 17</td>
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<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Dr.Cherry</td>
<td>Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, a faculty member</td>
<td>The interviewee is a political scientist interested in people politics, social movement, and rural development. He has also worked for the people organisations.</td>
<td>Chulalongkorn University, 21 Apr 17</td>
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<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Dr.Plum</td>
<td>Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Thonburi Rajabhat University, a faculty member</td>
<td>The interviewee is a political scientist interested in public governance, civil society, and health reform movement. His PhD thesis investigated the role of the Rural Doctors’ Society, a movement behind the creation of the THPF.</td>
<td>A coffee shop in Bangkok, 21 Jun 17</td>
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Appendix C
Participant recruitment network

The categorisation of interview participants (IP) is set up in order for the researcher to properly address the source of the interviewees. However, it does not reflect the positions or the activities the participants actually involve or have involved. For instance, one is working with a funded NGO while previously worked for the THPF or is a board committee of a section/programme in the THPF. This shows the blurring boundary between different sectors in society, namely between the THPF and NGOs.

According to the figure, this research is heavily relied on the researcher’s personal network in terms of participant recruitment. Most of the participants have never been interviewed about the issue of this research before. They found it interesting and worth to study. Access to these key stakeholders is thus play a substantial part for establishing originality and interesting findings of the research.