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# 1 **Global no net loss of natural ecosystems**

2

## 3 **Abstract**

4 A global goal of No Net Loss (NNL) of natural ecosystems or better has recently been  
5 proposed, but such a goal would require equitable translation to country-level contributions.  
6 Given the wide variation in ecosystem depletion, these could vary from Net Gain (for  
7 countries where restoration is needed), to Managed Net Loss (in rare circumstances where  
8 natural ecosystems remain extensive and human development imperative is greatest).  
9 National contributions and international support for implementation also must consider non-  
10 area targets (e.g. for threatened species) and socioeconomic factors such as the capacity to  
11 conserve and the imperative for human development.

12

## 13 **Main text**


14 Momentum is building for an ambitious new commitment to be signed at the Conference of  
15 the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) in 2020 as a global framework  
16 for nature conservation<sup>1-4</sup>. Notable are calls for retention of half the Earth's natural  
17 ecosystems<sup>5,6</sup>, to be enshrined by 2030 as a target under the deal. Yet this leaves little 'room  
18 to move'—approximately half the Earth's terrestrial ecosystems have already been lost<sup>7</sup>.  
19 Nevertheless, complete cessation of anthropogenic impacts on natural ecosystems is  
20 infeasible, given the imperative for socioeconomic development where current levels of  
21 human development are low<sup>8</sup>. Conservation that ignores such differences among nations is  
22 likely to be unjust<sup>9</sup>.

23 In this context, a goal of global No *Net* Loss (NNL) of natural ecosystems is likely the most  
24 ambitious target that society can realistically achieve<sup>10,11</sup>, at least by 2030. Such a goal allows  
25 for losses in some places and gains in others, which, taken together, ensure no further net  
26 decline of natural ecosystems, benefitting the species and people which rely upon them<sup>12</sup>.  
27 Global NNL implies an absolute cessation of decline in net terms—a key distinction from the  
28 relative 'NNL' that characterises biodiversity offset policies<sup>13</sup>.

29 It is far from trivial to translate a global NNL goal to effective policy mechanisms and  
30 mitigation approaches at the national level; indeed, the problem is akin to dividing

31 humanity's 'carbon budget' equitably<sup>14,15</sup>. Here, we examine how different countries might  
 32 set goals for retention and restoration as part of a contribution to achieving global NNL of  
 33 natural ecosystems, using terrestrial ecosystems as an example.

34 Translating a global NNL goal to a blanket requirement for each nation to achieve NNL  
 35 would clearly be inappropriately coarse. Instead, a global NNL target would act as an  
 36 umbrella for a range of minimum net outcome goals adopted by each country as their  
 37 respective contributions to global NNL (Fig. 1). Some countries support natural ecosystems  
 38 across almost their entire extent—10 have more than 75% of original natural ecosystems  
 39 according to the latest published human footprint<sup>16</sup> (e.g. Suriname and Canada Fig. 1; see  
 40 Supplementary Information for methods), while others retain close to none of their original  
 41 natural ecosystems in reasonable condition (68 countries including France, Italy and India  
 42 have <5% remaining; Fig. 1). Countries also vary tremendously in the imperative to convert  
 43 or degrade those ecosystems in the pursuit of needed economic development, and in their  
 44 capacity to protect and restore ecosystems. So, under a global NNL commitment, some  
 45 countries might focus on restoring earlier losses, while others might further deplete their  
 46 remaining ecosystems. Thus, some countries might commit to Net Gain, some to NNL, and in  
 47 some circumstances, controlled loss, or drawdown, of ecosystems (here termed Managed  
 48 Loss).



49

50 **Fig. 1.** Potential contributions of countries to global NNL. The proportion of natural ecosystems (Human  
 51 Footprint value <4) remaining per country varies enormously, as does variation in the depletion among different  
 52 ecosystems (Gini coefficient; see Supplementary Information). The minimum country-level contribution to a

53 global NNL goal must reflect this, as well as the absolute area of natural ecosystems remaining (Fig. 1b).  
54 Ecosystem depletion must be considered alongside other factors in setting targets; e.g., the number of threatened  
55 species according to the IUCN Red List of Threatened Species (for fully-assessed taxa only - mammals, birds  
56 and amphibians) relates only weakly to retention of ecosystems (Fig. 1a).


57

58 Information about depletion of natural ecosystems can help frame both country-level  
59 conservation goals, and policy mechanisms for achieving those goals. For example, even  
60 NNL is likely to be inadequate to conserve threatened species and functioning ecosystems for  
61 countries whose natural ecosystems are most severely depleted. Therefore, for such countries,  
62 Net *Gain* in the extent of their natural ecosystems is likely to be essential. For example, the  
63 UK has only 6% of ecosystems with a Human Footprint of <4 remaining (a threshold used as  
64 a proxy for ecosystem intactness<sup>7</sup>). The UK government recently proposed biodiversity Net  
65 Gain as a requirement for new development projects<sup>17</sup>. Similarly, France has committed to  
66 zero net conversion of natural land<sup>18</sup>. On the other hand, those countries with largely intact  
67 remaining ecosystems (e.g. Suriname, Gabon) may, in some circumstances, be able to accept  
68 further limited and controlled depletion ('Managed Net Loss') (Fig. 1). However, even if all  
69 countries with less than 25% of natural ecosystems remaining adopt Net Gain and seek to  
70 double the extent of those ecosystems through restoration, this would only contribute 4% to  
71 global ecosystem extent. Conversely, even a small percentage of net loss from countries with  
72 extensive remaining natural ecosystems, such as Australia and Brazil (5,535,401 km<sup>2</sup> and  
73 4,643,615 km<sup>2</sup>, respectively), would shift a very substantial restoration burden to other  
74 countries, if global NNL is to be achieved.

75 Even within countries that retain similar amounts of natural ecosystems, variation in  
76 depletion among different ecosystems can be lower (e.g. Norway, where retention of all its  
77 different ecosystem types is similarly high) or higher (e.g. Chad, where some ecosystems are  
78 much more depleted than others). In such cases, approvals for unavoidable losses of less-  
79 depleted ecosystem types might be tied to requirements to restore other, more-depleted  
80 ecosystems, using compensatory policy mechanisms like biodiversity offsetting<sup>19,20</sup>. Further  
81 complexity is introduced by the fact that some ecosystems may be extensive within a country,  
82 but globally rare; conversely, others are highly-depleted at a country level, yet globally  
83 common. Therefore, both country-level goal-setting, and trading losses for gains among  
84 different ecosystems within a country, must reflect this variation to ensure all ecosystem  
85 types can be adequately conserved.

86 We use the retention of terrestrial natural ecosystems to illustrate the complexity of  
87 translating global NNL to country-level goals, and propose that a similar exercise could  
88 consider the translation of the concept to the marine realm, or indeed to non-political units  
89 such as ecoregions. However, area-based retention is only one type of target that must be set  
90 for biodiversity to be adequately conserved. For example, the number of species listed as  
91 threatened with extinction does not correlate strongly with the depletion of natural  
92 ecosystems within a country (Spearman's  $R = 0.17$ ; Figure 1a), though species decline often  
93 lags behind habitat loss<sup>21</sup>. Therefore, further ecosystem losses even from countries with  
94 relatively extensive natural systems could have a disproportionately negative impact in the  
95 most diverse but imperilled places (e.g., Brazil; 55% ecosystems remaining but 290 globally-  
96 threatened species birds, mammals and amphibians).

97 A purely biophysical basis for conservation goal-setting in a country ignores important  
98 socioeconomic realities, which may further modify appropriate relative contributions of  
99 countries to a global NNL goal. Countries vary enormously in their levels of human  
100 development; people's basic needs in many countries are not currently being met<sup>12</sup>. Rapid  
101 economic growth for those at the bottom of the global wealth rankings is the most important  
102 goal for governments in many such countries and is essential from a human rights  
103 perspective. The countries with the most severe ecosystem depletion (and therefore requiring,  
104 in principle, biodiversity Net Gain) include many countries with the lowest Human  
105 Development Index (HDI) values (e.g. numerous African countries) (Fig. 2). Given that  
106 converting ecosystems can contribute to much needed development, and significant amounts  
107 of ecosystem degradation in poorer countries has contributed to fuelling economic growth in  
108 richer countries<sup>22</sup>, it is unrealistic as well as unjust for goals to be set without socio-economic  
109 circumstances being considered. Addressing these equity implications, while also recognising  
110 the fundamental role of nature in supporting achievement of the Sustainable Development  
111 Goals<sup>12</sup>, will also be essential to secure support for a global NNL commitment.



112

113 **Fig. 2.** The degree of human development should affect minimum country-level contributions to achievement of  
 114 global NNL, such that high HDI countries commit to at least country-level NNL. Bubble size reflects the  
 115 Corruption Perceptions Index (2017) for each country; see Supplementary Information.

116

117 Given that globally, biodiversity loss already exceeds safe levels<sup>23</sup>, NNL at the country level  
 118 might be the minimum acceptable standard for wealthy, developed countries where standards  
 119 of living are already high (e.g. Australia, Canada; Fig. 2). We suggest their conservation  
 120 goals should be set such that further degradation and loss of ecosystems is halted—at least in  
 121 net terms. This may require radical solutions including moving away from the paradigm that  
 122 economic growth is always desirable<sup>9</sup>.

123 Countries with low HDI are more likely to face further pressure on their natural ecosystems  
 124 to facilitate urgently-needed economic development. Therefore, even where the level of  
 125 depletion of natural ecosystems implies a NNL goal, Managed Net Loss may be unavoidable  
 126 for such countries (Fig. 2), at least temporarily<sup>24</sup>. Countries with a low HDI may reasonably  
 127 expect support from the international community to deliver on their contribution to a global  
 128 NNL goal. Unfortunately, weak governance in some low HDI countries discourages such  
 129 investment<sup>25</sup> and can limit the effectiveness of any development support<sup>26</sup> or of any in-  
 130 country mechanisms to compensate for biodiversity losses. For example, many of the  
 131 countries to which assistance may need to be provided score poorly on the Corruption

132 Perceptions Index (Fig. 2). Achievement of global biodiversity conservation arguably is most  
133 sensitive not to the global goals and targets that are agreed, but to how well such wicked  
134 challenges to their implementation are addressed<sup>27</sup>.

135 Our framework provides guidance on the principles through which different countries could  
136 identify appropriate respective contributions toward a global goal of NNL of biodiversity.  
137 Any agreed set of contributions must tackle the reality of both biodiversity depletion, its  
138 causes, and global inequity in both ongoing pressures and capacity to respond to them. Goals  
139 must be transparently managed to avoid the task falling inequitably upon the world's poorest  
140 countries, while recognising that development at the expense of biodiversity is  
141 unsustainable<sup>28</sup>.

142 Loss without limit is the paradigm under which natural ecosystems are currently being  
143 destroyed<sup>3</sup>. The need to clarify the overarching goal of the CBD and sharpen our  
144 commitments to retain, restore, and protect natural ecosystems was underscored resoundingly  
145 by the recent release of the IPBES global assessment<sup>29</sup>. So, as the focus turns to setting post-  
146 2020 conservation targets under the CBD, calls to dramatically increase their ambition<sup>1,30</sup> and  
147 to set explicit nature retention targets<sup>3</sup> must be heeded—and a pathway to translate them to  
148 country-level contributions laid out. A global NNL goal sets a limit to the loss we—and  
149 biodiversity—can tolerate, while allowing for human development where it is most urgently  
150 needed. Any basis for country-level commitments to a global NNL goal must reflect the  
151 substantial variation among countries in the level of depletion of their natural ecosystems—  
152 but also the degree to which capacity to conserve and the imperative for human development  
153 varies globally.

154

155



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234

235

## 1 **Supplementary Information**

2 We used the depletion of natural ecosystems as one proxy for biodiversity loss, and the global  
3 Human Footprint 2009 dataset<sup>1</sup> as an indicator of this depletion. The Human Footprint is a  
4 comprehensive representation of anthropogenic threats to biodiversity, which cumulatively  
5 accounts for eight human pressures—built environments, crop lands, pasture lands, human  
6 population density, night lights, railways, major roadways, and navigable waterways<sup>1</sup>. It is  
7 mapped across the terrestrial surface of the globe at a 1 km<sup>2</sup> resolution, on a scale of 0  
8 (lowest Human Footprint) to 50 (highest Human Footprint). Human Footprint values of 0-3  
9 are representative of land that is largely devoid of infrastructure and development (although  
10 may support sparse human populations)<sup>2,3</sup>. We therefore considered areas with a Human  
11 Footprint value of  $\geq 4$  to be transformed – in other words, no longer supporting a natural  
12 ecosystem (as per Watson, et al.<sup>3</sup>).

13 For 170 countries (for which data were also available for all measures), we calculated the  
14 area of the country that is mapped with Human Footprint values of 0-3, as a proportion of the  
15 area of the country (for which Human Footprint mapping was available). This represented our  
16 measure of the proportion of the original natural ecosystems remaining in each country. We  
17 also calculated the variance in depletion of specific natural ecosystem types in each country.  
18 To do this, we used the map of global terrestrial ecoregions<sup>4</sup>, to represent the broad  
19 ecosystem types that do or would have naturally occurred in each country. We calculated the  
20 loss of each ecoregion type per country, by overlaying the Human Footprint map (value  $\geq 4$ ).  
21 To calculate the variation in depletion among ecoregion types within each country, we used  
22 the Gini coefficient – a metric frequently used to indicate dispersion within a frequency  
23 distribution. Although most commonly used as an index of income inequality, it can be used  
24 as an index of inequality for disparate datasets; a value of 0 indicates all values are identical  
25 and 1 indicates extreme disparity among values. All GIS analysis was undertaken using  
26 ArcMap6.1, with spatial datasets projected to a Mollweide coordinate system.

27 To explore the extent to which countries differ in their biophysical context, we plotted the  
28 proportion of the original natural ecosystems remaining in each country against the variance  
29 in depletion of natural ecosystems. We also considered two other measures of the status of a  
30 country's biodiversity: the number of species listed as threatened under the IUCN Red List of  
31 Threatened Species (restricted to fully assessed taxa only, as of November 2018: mammals,

32 birds, amphibians; note that most taxa are poorly known, so this too is a partial measure); and  
33 the total area (km<sup>2</sup>) of natural ecosystems remaining in each country.

34 To examine how countries varied in environmental *and* socioeconomic contexts, we  
35 incorporated two further datasets into our analysis. We used the 2017 Human Development  
36 Index (HDI)<sup>5</sup> as a representation of key elements of human development at the national level.  
37 This composite metric subsumes indices relating to life expectancy, education and per capita  
38 income. We also considered the 2017 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)<sup>6</sup>, which represents  
39 relative public sector corruption levels of nations as perceived by experts and businesspeople,  
40 and has been linked with the strength of a nation's democratic institutions<sup>7</sup>. We plotted these  
41 variables as they relate to a nation's level of depletion of ecosystems, to examine how  
42 variation in a country's socioeconomic factors potentially affect its capacity to contribute to a  
43 goal of global NNL.

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