Citation for published version


DOI

https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066119868283

Link to record in KAR

https://kar.kent.ac.uk/77049/

Document Version

Author's Accepted Manuscript
Realism and Reflexivity: Morgenthau, Academic Freedom, and Dissent.

As a double *emigré* from fascism in Germany and Spain, Hans Morgenthau developed an ‘attuned sensitivity to the weaknesses of liberal democracy’ (Tjalve 2008, 98). Morgenthau’s sensitivity to this weakness extended to his adopted country of America, particularly during the McCarthy witch hunt (1955a; [1961]1970, 96). In response to McCarthy’s rabid populism, and what he saw as a period of stagnation in general under Eisenhower, Morgenthau wrote *The Purpose of American Politics* to warn about the erosion of the USA’s democratic foundations. The book reasserts the ‘self-evident truths’ that Morgenthau argues ought to undergird democratic life: without a renewal of democracy by reference to values such as equality in freedom American political culture would decline into Jacobin style majoritarianism and the manipulation of the masses by power hungry elites. It is in this context of a republic imperiled by stagnation and democratic decline that Morgenthau developed a theory of academic freedom and intellectual responsibility in which the scholar has a special duty to speak out in relation to government policy. Morgenthau’s commitment to political and social criticism was in keeping with other mid-century Realists who were also ‘engaged in the … substantial task of assessing the consequences of political modernity, and in discerning the intellectual and social dimensions of liberalism it found deeply and disastrously insufficient’ (Williams 2013, 650).

Morgenthau’s advocacy and exercise of academic freedom has received little sustained attention in the flood of publications that have sought to re-examine his legacy.¹ Morgenthau’s thinking on academic freedom crystallized into its fullest expression during the period of his opposition to the Vietnam War.² This article explores Morgenthau’s insistence on the right and duty of an academic to dissent when necessary from his state’s foreign policy. The article also examines the consequences of Morgenthau’s exercise of academic freedom during the conflict: his removal from the Department of Defense and public vilification by persons and institutions directly and indirectly linked to the Johnson administration. Morgenthau’s case is important in the sense that it illuminates academic freedom in the positive sense of his right to protest and the extent to which his negative freedom was affected by the actions of the executive branch of the United States and its allies.³

This article consists of five sections. The first section concerns the critical function of theory according to Morgenthau. The second section outlines Morgenthau’s approach to the role of the theorist as a *dissident*. The third section investigates Morgenthau’s opposition to the Vietnam War. The fourth section examines the backlash Morgenthau endured. The fifth section explores the relevance of Morgenthau’s theory and practice of dissent and academic freedom for contemporary debates in IR relating to reflexivity. Overall, the article reorients the disciplinary understanding of Morgenthau: demonstrating the extent to which his work in the 1960s was informed by a reflexive understanding of the interrelationship between democracy, academic freedom, responsible criticism and the theorization of IR.

The Critical Function of Theory and the Political Role of the Theorist

For Morgenthau political philosophy begins ‘with the assumption that man in the political sphere is not allowed to act as he pleases and that his action must conform to a standard
higher than the standard of success’ (1945, 5). Elsewhere, Morgenthau (1955b, 457) insists that the ‘use of theory ... is not limited to rational explanation and anticipation. A theory of politics also contains a normative element’ of critique.\(^4\) ‘At its very best,’ argues Morgenthau (1955b, 446), political science ‘cannot help being a subversive and revolutionary force with regard to certain vested interests - intellectual, political, social in general. For it must sit in continuous judgment upon political man and political society, measuring their truth, which is in good part a social convention, by its own.’ In this vein, Morgenthau (1959, 121) asserts ‘that there exists a truth, however dimly or falsely seen, that is valid for all men and all time,’ as the denial of objective truth leads to the political world being ‘conceived as the interplay of ephemeral forces,’ reducing the study of politics ‘to a technical, descriptive, methodological, and ameliorative enterprise,’ limited to avoiding ‘getting caught in the interplay’ of those forces. In this scenario theory is forced into a ‘relativistic’ dilemma with only two possible outcomes: that political science takes ‘flight in a subjective dogmatism that identifies the perspective and preferences of the observer with objective general truth – thus becoming the ideology of a particular view of society,’ \(^5\) uncritically rationalizing and justifying government actions; or, political thought travels ‘the relativistic road to the end,’ surrendering ‘the very concept of objective, general truth, concluding from the subjectivity of its own insights that there is nothing but opinion and that one opinion is as good as another, provided society does not object to it’ (1959, 129). Total relativism would lead to foreign policy theorists and practitioners pandering to public opinion.\(^5\)

To avoid the relativistic dilemma, Morgenthau (1967a, 212) identifies the ‘main practical function’ of theory as being a specifically political act, i.e., ‘to confront what governments do, and what governments and peoples think, about international relations with independent prudential judgement and with the truth, however dimly perceived and tenuously approximated.’ This critique, Morgenthau (1967a, 213) stresses, ‘is of necessity the aggressor. It examines critically what is officially held to be true and exposes falsehood where it finds it.’\(^6\) For Morgenthau, although democracy is by nature relativistic, the standard by which political systems and actions are judged, is not: belief in an ideal democracy allows assessment of democratic politics by reference to this ideal.

In *The Purpose of American Politics*, Morgenthau critiques unrestricted relativism by arguing American politics had lost sight of its fundamental purpose: the achievement of equality in freedom. Morgenthau traces the decline of democratic politics in America to the abandonment of a commitment to assess formulations of this premise by reference to the ideal form revealed by reason. In the early American republic, ‘[s]ociety was believed to be embedded in, and guided by, self-evident truths, rational and moral, from which society derived whatever truth was to be found in its thought and action,’ but in the contemporary ‘prevailing view of social life, nothing precedes and transcends society; whatever exists in the social sphere has been created by society itself and the standards by which it abides are also its own’ (Morgenthau1960a, 223). The reduction of the truth about society to that which it finds consistent with its prevailing tendencies leads to a society that ‘can hold no truths to be self-evident nor any moral standards to be absolute, but must limit itself to stating empirically that at a particular time and in a particular place certain people appear to believe that certain statements are true and certain moral standards ought to be complied with.’ As Tjalve (2008, 112) observes, Morgenthau thought that ‘[w]ithout faith in transcendence ... American society had lost its sense of finitude, hailing itself as absolute perfection and hence reducing political dedication to
the adulation of the status quo,’ she continues (122), ‘Morgenthau thus believed faith in transcendence to be a potential source of democratic critique and limitation: a means by which to submit society to critical revision and attack.’ Without a transcendent standard truth is merely a product of prevalent social forces, leading to ‘an unrestricted relativism that is no longer limited by objective rational and moral standards and, hence, finds itself at the mercy of the preferences of society. From those preferences there is no appeal to a “higher law,” rational or moral, aesthetic or economic, political or religious’ (Morgenthau 1960a, 224). As such, ‘a society conceived so as to find the standards for its thought and action only within itself becomes the sovereign arbiter of all things human. The objective criteria ... are blurred if not obliterated by the self-sufficient preferences of the crowd’ (Morgenthau 1960a, 225) i.e., the preferences of the majority, not reason, determines the content of the truths by which we live. The honest critic cannot accept this social foundation for truth and must operate outside the majority framework as a dissident who draws on the transcendent to highlight the rational and moral shortcomings of prevailing attitudes. Rösch (2015, 125) argues that ‘if this critical inspection is missing, governments are facing the danger of losing sight of the common good because a monopolization of truth takes place, as happened in the United States. For Morgenthau, therefore, critical scholarship meant pointing out shortcomings and encouraging people to construct different sociopolitical lifeworlds.’

The Political Role of Theorist

As an honest critic of government, the theorist must avoid the corruption of judgment inherent in too close an identification with power. One case in particular is illustrative, i.e., the extent to which Richard Goodwin surrendered academic freedom in the service of President Johnson. Morgenthau ([1966a]1970, 413) claims that Goodwin’s attempt to combine the roles of intellectual, scholar, and partisan in Triumph or Tragedy: Reflections on Vietnam, is ‘psychologically revealing but politically calamitous.’ In cases such as Goodwin’s ‘scholars cease to be scholars but turn into ideologues: they provide justifications and rationalisations of power politics’ (Cozette 2008, 21). Goodwin’s actions as an intellectual in the service of power exemplify Benda’s trahison des clercs (Morgenthau [1966b]1970, 17). Driven by conformity or personal ambition, ‘White House-trained’ intellectuals and academics forego their academic freedom in an acquiescent relationship to power (Morgenthau [1966b]1970, 25). Conformism was a significant issue for Morgenthau as it ‘prevented a serious discussion of the challenges at hand even in the protected halls of the academy’ (Schuerman 2009, 174). Cozette (2008, 15) argues that Morgenthau viewed conformism as the most pernicious temptation, mindful as he was that ‘Nazi intellectuals are the archetypal example of scholars who betrayed their moral responsibility to speak truth to power and who ended up justifying the unjustifiable as they bowed to social and political conformism.’

The government for its part ‘does not leave the silence and subservience of the intellectuals to chance. It has at its disposal a plethora of varied, subtle and insidious instruments with which to forge reliable ties with large segments of the intellectual world ... [creating] an academic-political complex in which the interests of the government are inextricably intertwined with the interests of large groups of academics.’ Tied by strings of patronage to the government, formal and informal relationships develop, the latter of which, ‘are the more dangerous to intellectual freedom, as they consist in the intellectuals’ unconscious adaptation to the imperceptible social and political pressures’
exercised by government (Morgenthau [1966b]1970, 25). Klusmeyer (2011, 78) links Morgenthau’s theory of the corruption of the academic community to his critical resistance to the development of the ‘national security state’ in the US, which enabled a considerable expansion of ‘its ability to exert influence deep into the realm of academic scholarship through the allocation of research grants and other rewards. As a result, its power to silence and corrupt those most likely to have the intellectual background to effectively challenge its policies had grown immeasurably.’ No longer the academically free agent who assesses the words and deeds of the politician by reference to a philosophical ideal, the ‘academic … enters into a subtle and insidious relationship with the government, which imperceptibly transforms his position of independent judge to that of client and partisan … he becomes a political ideologue, justifying morally and rationalizing intellectually the policies of government’ (Morgenthau [1966b]1970, 26).

The emergence of the ‘academic-political complex’ impaired ‘the integrity and independence of the educational community,’ leading to a situation in which academics have ‘become the handmaiden of government’ while maintaining a ‘pretense to independence. It is that contrast between pretense and actual dependence that is incompatible with intellectual integrity’ (Morgenthau [1967]1970, 54). Morgenthau ([1967]1970, 54) is clear that ‘there is nothing wrong with student leaders’ or academics’ serving the government as long as they do not pretend that they are serving their organizations or the truth.’ Morgenthau’s (1960b, 349) denunciation of Charles Van Doren and his supporters in government accurately sums up what is at stake when the lines separating the powerful and the academic lack this clarity: ‘[t]he stronger the commitment of the scholar to values other than the truth, such as wealth and power, the stronger will be the temptation to sacrifice the moral commitment to the truth for social advantage.’

Speaking Truth to Power: The Dissenter and the Confessor

The seduction of power allows a negative understanding of what it is to exercise academic freedom with integrity, i.e., to avoid the status embraced by academics in universities that have become ‘gigantic and indispensable service stations for the powers-that-be’ (Morgenthau 1970a, 438). Morgenthau is clear that ‘insofar as the university has been faithful to its mission to speak truth to power, it has been a thorn in the side’ of political elites (Morgenthau 1970a, 438). The theorist of integrity must be skeptical and critical in relation to the pronouncements of power. In contrast to embedded ‘White House-trained’ academics the free intellectual possesses the detachedness of Homer, Herodotus and Thucydides, of whom Morgenthau ([1969]1970, 69) claims, ‘one finds it hard to determine “whose side they are on.”’ The non-partisanship of these writers is exceptional according to Morgenthau, who claimed that ‘the Greek historians have had no successors. A deep chasm separates the modern historic sensibility from that of the Greeks’ (1970e, 70).

Detachedness in emulation of the Greek historians allows the most important function of academic freedom: the right to dissent, which ‘derives from the relativistic philosophy of democracy. That philosophy assumes that all members of society, being rational have equal access to the truth, but none of them has a monopoly on it.’ Morgenthau believed that democracy and truth were not subject to singular, monopolistic understandings. This position is important because ‘[o]nce we abandon the position that a particular group or individual could ever monopolize political or moral wisdom … we can ground egalitarian
norms on which modern democracy rests' in a pluralistic, dynamic, and unfixed manner (Scheuerman 2009, 183). Robert Myers (1992, 68) succinctly expresses Morgenthau's take on the positive role that a properly understood, limited relativism plays in American democracy: 'he believed that relativism is the operative philosophy in American democracy – everyone should have access to the truth, with no one having a monopoly, and inherent in the American democratic system is the possibility that today's minority might be tomorrow's majority.' American democracy is not majoritarian: 'American democratic philosophy and practice do not hold that the will of the majority is the ultimate source of truth in matters political. They assume the existence of a “higher law” with which the majority must conform in order to be obeyed as legitimate' (Morgenthau [1968a]1970, 41). As Scheuerman (2009, 183) writes, the American system in Morgenthau's reading requires that 'we cannot assume that even large political majorities a priori possess more wisdom than outvoted minorities ... majority rule only makes sense if it is reversible.' The majority must conform to the principles that undergird American democracy. The decline of democratic politics in America was a result of giving undue weight to the will of the majority. Morgenthau saw this as an unfortunate shift from representative democracy understood as the rule of law and embodiment of reason to Jacobin majoritarianism.

Legitimate dissent directed against government policy, or the dissent of a minority against a majority, is an essential safeguard of democracy. Illegitimate dissent such as when minorities aim 'at thwarting the will of the majority' endangers the existence of democracy itself, which, according to Morgenthau ([1968a]1970, 42), rests on 'a kind of implicit social contract in which both pledge that, however much they might disagree on specific policies, they will abide by those basic principles' of the higher law upon which American democracy rests. The minority threat to democracy is eclipsed however by that posed by the majority's indifference to legitimate dissent: 'the historical record shows that it is generally their predominant social and political power that induces the majority and its government to overstep the bounds of the compact.' The violation of the compact between majority and minority leads the latter to dissent in its most extreme form, directed 'upon the system itself, a system that permits the corruption and violation of the very principles from which it derives its moral sustenance' (Morgenthau [1968a]1970, 41-42).

In this light, Morgenthau (drawing on de Tocqueville) argues that 'the rational requirements of good policy' based on the prudential calculation of the national interest constitute important higher truths that states must observe more than the will of the majority. Lebow (2018, 97, 98) observes that both de Tocqueville and Morgenthau 'warn of the tyranny of the majority' in which the 'vox populi becomes the arbiter of everything, and it often represents the lowest common denominator. Conformity becomes the most powerful social norm.' De Tocqueville notes (and Morgenthau obviously approves) of Washington's policy of non-intervention in the wars of the French Revolution that the majority, 'reprobahed his policy, but it was afterwards approved by the whole nation,' i.e., the minority position pursued by a responsible government became a majority position when vindicated by the course of events. Washington allowed majority opinion to dissent but could not let it dictate policy (Morgenthau [1968a]1970, 43). The decline of democratic politics in America is a result of sacrificing the higher principles of the national interest on the altar of public opinion. Eschewing efforts 'to try to create through courageous leadership a new majority on behalf of sound foreign policies,' successive
administrations chased short-term political advantage pursuing policies to secure the support of public opinion, 'an easy and in the long run disastrous course' (Morgenthau [1968a]1970, 43). The expert manipulation of the public, further undermined 'any effective democratic check on policymakers' (Klusmeyer, 2016, 66), accentuating the already dangerous concentration of power in the hands of the executive. Klusmeyer (2018, 115) stresses that the growth of executive power was at the heart of the malaise affecting American democracy: 'Morgenthau came to see the growth of the national security state and the unaccountable exercise of executive power as a twin threat to the foundations of republican government. His critique emphasized the 'moral corruption' and other pathologies of policymakers who were insulated within this state apparatus.'

When the government abdicates its responsibility to lead and educate the citizenry and instead seeks to manipulate them for its own ends, 'a dissenting minority performs a vital function for the political and moral welfare of the Republic' (Morgenthau [1968a]1970, 44). Academics like Morgenthau must exercise their influence in the public sphere as part of the dissenting minority:

By upholding the rational principles of sound foreign policy, it offers an alternative to the foreign policy pursued by the government with the support of the majority; at the same time it keeps open the possibility that the minority of today will become the majority of tomorrow and that the principles of sound foreign policy will then prevail. If the government should pursue a foreign policy that is not only unsound on rational grounds but also repugnant to the very principles upon which the American democracy is based, the dissenting minority, by its very existence, would remind the government and its majority of the continuing vitality of those principles (Morgenthau [1968a]1970, 44).

What is imperative for the sake of the preservation of American democracy is that 'both the majority and the minority remain within this relativistic ethos of democracy, while at the same time respecting those absolute, objective principles that are beyond the ken of that relativism' (Morgenthau [1968a]1970, 44). 'Rising above this relativism, and making it workable,' argues Robert Myers (1992, 68) in his analysis of Morgenthau's position, 'is the transcendent notion of a “higher purpose” that guides American democracy and acts as a brake on simple majoritarianism.' Fidelity to fundamental beliefs is necessary 'if democracy were to avoid succumbing to a decadent relativism in which competing political majorities periodically set up their own partisan political preferences as universal and permanent truths' (Scheuerman 2009, 186).

Morgenthau asserts the importance of critical opposition by drawing a direct parallel between critics of American foreign policy and those in Athens who opposed the disastrous Sicilian expedition during the Peloponnesian War. Morgenthau (1965a, 60) argues that '[t]o point to the likely consequences of present policy is, then, not only a right, which ought not to require apologetic assertion, but it is also a duty, burdensome yet inescapable.' The burden is the social and professional cost to be borne by the critic. 'The genuine intellectual,' argues Morgenthau (1960a, 68), 'has of course always been lonely, for he must be “the enemy of the people,” who tells the world things it either does not want to hear or cannot understand.' The particular burden that falls on the foreign policy theorist is that he must 'perform the function of an intellectual conscience which reminds the policy makers as well as the public at large of what the sound principles of foreign policy are and in what respects and to what extent actual policies have fallen short of those principles' (Morgenthau [1964]1970, 259). The dissenting critic's vital task is to
identify flawed policy in that ‘[t]o lay bare what is wrong is not an ideal exercise in ex post facto fault-finding. Rather it is an act of public purification and rectification. If it is not performed and accepted by government and people alike, faults, undiscovered and uncorrected, are bound to call forth new disasters, likely to be different from the one in Vietnam but just as detrimental’ (Morgenthau, [1968b]1970, 416).

If truth and power are to be entwined, it cannot be on the basis of supine intellectuals kowtowing to their masters in government. In ‘The Trouble With Kennedy,’ Morgenthau (1962a, 54), argues that for all their talents the president’s advisors ‘cannot give him what he needs more than anything else: the tragic sense of politics.’ It is with this deficit in mind that Morgenthau claims that Kennedy ‘who knows his history, will remember that the princes of old reserved a place among their advisers for a man who called their attention to the limits of their power beyond which there is the realm of Providence and fate’ (1962a, 54). Johnson is given starker advice: ‘What the President needs, then, is an intellectual father-confessor, who dares to remind him of the brittleness of power, of its arrogance and blindness, of its limits and pitfalls; who tells him how empires rise, decline, and fall, how power turns to folly, empires to ashes. He ought to listen to that voice and tremble’ (Morgenthau [1966b] 1970, 27-28).

Morgenthau’s opposition to Johnson was rooted in a desire to protect democracy as a political form predicated upon dissent, ‘challenging Cold War notions of consensus and patriotism that equated disagreement with disloyalty’ (See 2001, 446). Johnson can be seen as Morgenthau’s anti-Washington, pursuing a war contrary to the national interest because he thought it was consistent with public opinion and his electoral prospects. Johnson could not allow dissent as it called into question the contingent bases of the legitimacy of the war as, if the majority in favour of war changed their mind, the war would, in effect, become illegitimate. The replacement of dissent as ‘substantive controversy, the lifeblood of creative renewal’ with sterile conformism in American democracy, was identical with the decline of democracy itself (Morgenthau 1960a, 227).

‘We are here in the presence of a truly psychotic situation.’ Morgenthau, Lyndon B. Johnson and the Exercise of Academic Freedom.

American involvement in Vietnam concerned Morgenthau from his first visit there in 1955, when he incurred the displeasure of the US backed authoritarian ruler Diem by criticizing his divisive policies (1962b, 371). At a symposium in 1956 sponsored by the American Friends of Vietnam, Morgenthau ([1966c]1970, 157) encountered Senator John Kennedy, a figure that left him ‘baffled’ – ‘a bland, slick, polished façade, acting in word and gesture with almost mechanical precision.’ Morgenthau's impression of Kennedy as President was little better in that while his presidency was not without promise in terms of what he might have done, ‘while he lived as President he achieved little of substance,’ save some powerful rhetoric, ‘from which no action followed,’ other than indecisive policies announced before they had been properly thought through (Morgenthau [1968c]1970, 183; 1962a, 51-55). The policy that would have most importance in terms of Morgenthau’s exercise of the right to critical dissent would be Kennedy’s drift into choosing ‘half-heartedly and almost by default ... a purely military solution’ to the conflict in South Vietnam (Morgenthau 1962b, 372). Kennedy's successor, Lyndon Baines Johnson, despite running as the ‘peace’ candidate in the 1964
presidential election, escalated the limited conflict of Kennedy into America's most significant military conflict since World War Two.

The crux of Morgenthau's criticism of Johnson's policy was his opposition to the administration's determination to extricate the USA from Vietnam in a manner that would not contradict the flawed wider strategy of military containment of China in Asia. 'The United States has recognized that it is failing in South Vietnam,' wrote Morgenthau (1965b, 86), '[b]ut it has drawn from this recognition a most astounding conclusion.' Instead of complying with the dictates of the national interest by withdrawing from South Vietnam, '[t]he United States, stymied in South Vietnam and on the verge of defeat, decided to carry the war to North Vietnam not so much in order to retrieve the fortunes of war as to lay the groundwork for “negotiations from strength.” In order to justify that new policy, it was necessary to prove that North Vietnam is the real enemy.' The justification was provided in the white paper “Aggression from the North: The Record of North Vietnam's Campaign to Conquer South Vietnam,” a remarkable document that subverted the basic nature of policy making: 'normally foreign and military policy is based upon intelligence – that is, the objective assessment of facts – the process is here reversed: a new policy has been decided upon, and intelligence must provide the facts to justify it' (Morgenthau 1965b, 87). As justification, the white paper was 'a dismal failure' and a 'particularly glaring instance of the tendency to conduct foreign and military policy not on their own merits, but as exercises in public relations. The Government fashions an imaginary world that pleases it, and then comes to believe in the reality of that world and acts as though it were real.' Anticipating his own fate, Morgenthau (1965b, 87) writes of 'public officials' being resentful of those commentators who confronted them with facts on the ground in Vietnam to the extent that they 'have tried to shut them off from the sources of news and even to silence them.'

Morgenthau followed 'We Are Deluding Ourselves in Vietnam' with a series of high-profile interventions. The first was a 'teach-in' organised by the Inter-University Committee for a Public Hearing on Vietnam held at the Sheraton Park Hotel in Washington D.C. attended by thousands and broadcast in whole or in part across the United States. Morgenthau's contribution was to warn that 'if the administration's present policy is not reversed the United States may have 300,000 troops in Vietnam within the next six months ... and cautioned of the danger of war with Red China.' Morgenthau also highlighted the failure of the bombing raids in North Vietnam to have any significant effect on Viet Cong activity in the South, a failure that highlighted the speciousness of the Johnson administration's claim that the Viet Cong were controlled by Hanoi (Chicago Tribune May 16, 1965). Richard Reston (Los Angeles Times, May 16, 1965) recorded Morgenthau as declaring “We have tried to create an imaginary world into which we fit our policy ... if the policy contradicts the facts, the facts will punish the policy.” In his response to the Johnson administration representative, Robert Scalapino, Morgenthau addressed why the government had got itself into an intractable problem in Vietnam: 'It is because we set ourselves goals in Asia ... which cannot be achieved with the means we are willing to employ. And as it is in philosophy and in pure logic, if you pose a wrong question you find it extremely complex to give a simple and correct answer' (New York Times, May 17, 1965). The core of the problem is a contradiction 'between what we profess to want and the policies we want to employ and the risks which we want to take ... if you really want to achieve in Asia what the spokesmen for our Government say they want to achieve you must be ready to go to war with China, with all that that
entails,' a risk that Morgenthau assessed the Johnson administration was unwilling to run, leaving its Vietnam policy devoid of credibility.

A televised debate with McGeorge Bundy at Georgetown University on June 21st afforded Morgenthau the opportunity to confront one of the Vietnam War’s principal architects. The debate culminated in a ‘caustic exchange’ (Frankel, 1965) between Bundy and Morgenthau, in which the latter emphasized that ‘the factual situation in South Vietnam is infinitely graver than what we have been led to believe by “official reports”’ (Los Angeles Times Jun 22, 1965). Morgenthau went further by stressing that South Vietnam was an illegitimate creation that only existed by the will of the United States and through the repressive offices of the Diem regime and its successors, who were subcontracted agents of the American state. American foreign policy in Asia mistakenly applied military means to the Chinese threat, which was primarily political in nature. Vietnam policy should be based on ‘a face-saving device to withdraw honorably,’ (Chicago Tribune Jun 22, 1965) best achieved by ‘a holding strategy based on a string of well defended strongpoints along the coast. The Vietcong would then be forced to negotiate a final settlement to get the Americans out of the country’ (Richard Scott, 1965).

The Consequences of Exercising Academic Freedom: Ejection from the Department of Defense and Public Vilification

After the publication of ‘We Are Deluding Ourselves in Vietnam’ McGeorge Bundy sent a secret memo to Lyndon Johnson claiming that there was a consensus among senior CIA operatives that Morgenthau (along with Walter Lippman, Senator William Fulbright, and the student anti-war movement) was doing ‘great damage by creating false hopes in unfriendly breasts,’ in North and South Vietnam (Bundy, 1965). Johnson’s response to Morgenthau’s criticism pointedly rejected his right to dissent:

‘What was his reaction? Not to test my opinions, which were put forward in rather moderate and decent terms, but to try to destroy me. He established in the White House a “Project Morgenthau,” staffed with a full time man, for the purpose of getting something on me. He mobilized the FBI and Internal Revenue Service, and he ordered the Secretary of Defense in unprintable language to fire me forthwith’ (Morgenthau and Chomsky 1972, 369).

The reaction of the regime was not limited to Johnson’s immediate wrath. Bundy’s responses to Morgenthau during the televised debate display a premeditated effort to undermine Morgenthau’s personal credibility. A suspiciously well briefed Bundy produced a sheaf of notes from which he read instances in which, he argued, Morgenthau had been mistaken in the past about US foreign policy implying he should be dismissed as a critic due to his ‘congenital pessimism.’ The Chicago Tribune (Jun 22, 1965) refers to Bundy describing Morgenthau as ‘giving in to “congenital pessimism.”’ Richard Scott in The Guardian (Jun 23, 1965), noted that Bundy (a ‘ruthless virtuoso in debate’) did not react to Morgenthau’s proposals regarding Vietnam, but rather ‘piled up more debating points by quoting from the past writings of Professor Morgenthau to show how “pathologically pessimistic” he is and how wrong he had been in the past.’ Bundy’s ad hominem attack was designed to discredit Morgenthau as pathologically or congenitally prone to a negative reading of America’s actions due to a psychological flaw in his character. Bundy’s mendacious approach was exemplified by his claim that Morgenthau opposed the Marshall Plan when in fact his position was that the Marshall Plan did not go far enough in addressing the serious flaws in Europe’s social, economic and political
structures (Morgenthau [1968c], 1970, 190). As Morgenthau (1984, 383) related in an interview several years later: ‘To call this “opposition” to the Marshall Plan is like saying that a man who advocates a higher minimum wage is opposed to the minimum wage. It was this kind of underhanded argument which was used against my position.’ Bundy’s invective was so vicious it prompted a scientific study of character assassination by the public communications and debate expert Robert P. Newman (1965, 30, 32), who determined that while the ‘attack was spectacular, and left the audience gasping,’ and that Morgenthau ‘clearly was shaken,’ nonetheless ‘an attack on Morgenthau’s credibility does not in any way verify the credibility of the intelligence reports upon which American policy is based – and which Bundy is obliged to defend.’

*Ad hominem* character assassination and selective reading of Morgenthau’s texts would become a feature of successive attacks on Morgenthau in the wake of his criticism of the war, to the extent that Morgenthau (1968, 110) wrote that the ‘attacks upon my competence as a scholar, appearing simultaneously in the most diverse places, point to a central inspiration aiming at silencing or at least discrediting me.’ Whether or not the attacks were centrally inspired, they were widespread and displayed thematic unity. In an anonymous editorial entitled ‘Why Hans Protests,’ *The Chicago Tribune* (Jun 12, 1965) described Morgenthau’s opposition to the war as ‘embarrassing many of his friends and may even be embarrassing to himself,’ before finding him guilty by association with Linus Pauling and ‘the infantile leftist, Joan Baez.’ In a McCarthy like move, the Tribune implied that Morgenthau was un-American and his writings on Asia ‘conditioned by his Europe-firstism.’ *The Tribune* concluded its account of Morgenthau’s motivations by implying his opposition to the Vietnam War was an act of petty vengeance against McGeorge Bundy who had ‘nixed’ Morgenthau’s appointment to a Chair at Harvard in 1961.

Morgenthau’s un-American (indeed anti-American) character was stressed in *The New York Times* (Oct 24, 1965) by the Washington insider John P. Roche, who described Morgenthau as ‘a scholarly, urbane intellectual: his major premise is that Americans cannot be trusted with power, and since Johnson (like Kennedy, who got the same treatment) is an American, there is little more to say.’ According to Roche intellectuals in general (and one assumes Morgenthau was among them) were motivated by ‘a simple irrational distrust of Lyndon B. Johnson.’ Another Washington insider, Joseph Alsop, launched a series of tirades, comparing Morgenthau (a refugee from Nazi Germany) to Nazi appeasers and claiming that Morgenthau’s solution to the Vietnam problem was ‘to recognize the Chinese as the Asian *Herrenvolk* and to allow them to gobble their neighbors at will, even though their neighbors happen to be our friends and allies’ (*Los Angeles Times*, Apr 23, 1965). Alsop’s key move came in 1966, when he denounced Morgenthau’s reading of Chinese history, and scholarship in general, as worthless: ‘In the face of these fairly startling facts, how can any sane person treat Morgenthau as an authority on Chinese aggression, or indeed, as an authority on anything at all’ (*Los Angeles Times*, Mar 12 1966). In reply, Morgenthau (1965c, 4) called out Alsop for acting as the consistent spokesman of a ‘small but influential group within our government,’ adding that his first article was ‘a scandal. It is a flagrant abuse of the freedom of the press, for he uses that freedom as a license to smear, abuse and misinform.’

Perhaps the most significant attempt to discredit Morgenthau was conducted by Leo Cherne and Leonard Sussman of Freedom House. The controversy began with an advertisement by Freedom House in *The New York Times* (November 30, 1966). The
advertisement called upon ‘responsible’ critics to dissociate themselves from extremists in the anti-war movement. Echoing the logic of the CIA and Bundy in the memo of April 20, 1965, Cherne insisted that failure to ‘draw the line between their positions and the views expressed by irresponsible extremists could encourage our Communist adversaries to postpone serious negotiations, raising the cost in lives and delaying the peace we earnestly seek.’ In response, Morgenthau (1967b, 17-19) argued that he, a ‘responsible’ critic of the war, was ‘guilty’ of taking positions akin to the ‘extreme’ positions, leading him to the conclusion that ‘by the standards of this document’ he and other moderate and ‘responsible’ critics were ‘indeed “extremist” and “irresponsible.”’ Morgenthau identifies therefore what was at stake in the Freedom House intervention: ‘while the document pretends to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate criticism, its purpose is really to put the stamp of illegitimacy upon most of the criticism – past, present, or future – advanced against our Vietnam policies,’ and by doing so restrict academic freedom and freedom of speech. The political orthodoxy Freedom House promoted neutered dissent as it ‘tells us that we are morally entitled to criticize the government, but not with regard to the fundamental issues it enumerates ... we are not morally entitled to criticize the government in any meaningful way.’ Under the perverse logic of Freedom House, the opponents of the war are blamed for its continuation.

Cherne’s reply in the following issue of The New Leader accused Morgenthau of failing to meet his academic obligation to be ‘accurate ... [to] exercise appropriate restraint’ and ‘show respect for the opinion of others.’ First, Cherne accuses Morgenthau of engaging in personal abuse of President Johnson akin to the insults used by Lincoln’s detractors during the American Civil War or the protestors whose placards accused Johnson of killing children - drawing a direct equivalence between Morgenthau and the extremists. Second, he labels Morgenthau’s criticism of American policies as ‘untrue, unjust and patently extremist’ and of employing hit-and-run tactics that ‘turn the debating rostrum into a privileged sanctuary for the wreckers.’ Third, echoing the editorial in the Chicago Tribune, Cherne accuses Morgenthau of pursuing a ‘self-confessed vendetta with the policy-makers.’ The alleged “self-confession” was Morgenthau’s assertion (1967b, 19) that if his advice had been followed then the disaster of the Vietnam war might have been avoided. It is patently not a self-confession of a vendetta. Fourth, Cherne accuses Morgenthau of ‘slandering’ the US armed forces. Finally, Cherne implies that Morgenthau’s position is based on a pretense that ‘self-control has no place in a free society’s dialogues beyond the libel laws’ (Cherne 1967, 11-13) and as a result, Morgenthau was abusing academic freedom. Demonstrating the extent to which Freedom House and the government were linked in relation to Morgenthau, Cherne sent a copy of the reply to W. Marvin Watson, Special Assistant to President Johnson (Rafshoon (2001, 71) in what Steele (2010, 58) identifies as ‘a move that implicates this institution’s connections to political power.’ The Executive Director of Freedom House, Leonard Sussman (1967, 34) continued in the same vein as Cherne by accusing Morgenthau of misusing academic freedom ‘to direct emotionalized abuse’ at signatories of the original Freedom House advertisement such as Eisenhower, Acheson and Conant, ‘all of whom had personally felt McCarthy’s severest blows.’ Sussman, echoing the Bundy line, also accused Morgenthau of providing ‘not only support for the “black” propaganda of Hanoi’ but also of offering ‘reassurance for those who refuse to serve or who disrupt the service of others in the Armed Forces.’
In response to Cherne, Morgenthau (1967c, 17) stated he opposed Freedom House's position as it was McCarthyite in character and expressed an American variation of the stab in the back legend that poisoned German democracy in the Weimar Republic. Morgenthau (1967c, 18) asserted that Cherne's complaint that Morgenthau did not denounce others opposed to the war as ‘irresponsible’ or ‘extreme’ (‘guilt by lack of disassociation’) was worse than McCarthy's guilt by association. Morgenthau (1967c, 18) also pointed out that he had never insulted an American President or slandered the American armed forces, merely pointed out that the kind of war they were fighting, with the means that they employed, would inevitably result in indiscriminate killing. Morgenthau’s replies are important in that they demonstrate the extent to which he was determined not to overstep the limits of responsible criticism as outlined by the AAUP statement of 1940 or its related documents from the 1960s that established the parameters for the appropriate exercise of academic freedom.\textsuperscript{11}

**Reflexivity and the Critical Function of the Intellectual: The Contemporary Relevance of Morgenthau’s Theory and Practice of Academic Freedom**

The foregoing discussion is important in that it reveals the extent to which Morgenthau was committed to thinking through the theory and practice of scholarship in response to the intellectual, social, and political contexts in which he found himself. In the 1960s Morgenthau confronted a series of challenges: the decline of democratic politics, the failure of academics and intellectuals to act in an appropriately critical fashion during this period of decline, and the particular crisis of a war in Vietnam conducted more by reference to opinion polls and electoral advantage than to the dispassionate calculation of the national interest. In contemporary IR parlance, Morgenthau was thinking and acting reflexively about the nature of IR theory and his role, duties, and responsibilities, within the discipline and wider society. The recollection of Morgenthau's reflexive theorisation of academic freedom is of contemporary relevance because in Arlene Tickner’s words (2013, 627), ‘Reflexivity is everywhere. If one had to choose a single buzzword that is driving current debates within the field of International Relations (IR), especially those that are about IR itself, the ‘R’ word would be at the top of the list’ (2013, 627).

Perhaps the most prominent efforts to assess the place of reflexivity in Morgenthau’s work are critiques offered by Guzzini (2013) and Hamati-Ataya (2010). These critiques, while flawed, nonetheless provide a fruitful point of departure for a more comprehensive account of what is at stake when Morgenthau’s work is considered in terms of its potential contribution to how reflexivity is understood and employed in IR. Guzzini credits Morgenthau for ushering IR into the first, primitive stage of reflexivity, i.e., developing a mode of theory aware of itself as such. The problem with Morgenthau’s reflexivity is that it did not reach the second stage, i.e., the meta-theoretical reflection as to what constitutes ‘good’ theory. Morgenthau’s efforts, Guzzini argues, (2013, 528) were restricted to ‘trying to show that the maxims of practical knowledge are a scientific theory. From ‘no theory needed’, Morgenthau moved to ‘no new theory needed.’ The crux of Guzzini’s critique (2013, 528) is that as a conservative, Morgenthau’s position is that ‘although theory is needed, there is really nothing new under the sun; some amendments and systematization of the existing first-level reflection of the reason of state will do, as exemplified by the different developments of balance of power theory.’
Guzzini’s reading mistakes the nature of Morgenthau’s engagement with modernity – particularly in the middle and late stages of his career. As explored in Science: Servant or Master? (1972) and other works of this period, Morgenthau stresses the radically altered nature of the political, social and moral foundations of late modernity, particularly in the wake of the qualitative shift in the nature of global politics effected by the advent of nuclear weapons. The task facing theorists in late modernity was not to insist that there was nothing new under the sun, but rather to assert the complete opposite: there are many new things under the sun and they require theorisation. Morgenthau’s position, which evinces the ‘reflective distance’ Guzzini alleges he lacks, is to stress the responsibility of the theorist to develop new practical knowledge and advocate new forms and processes of global politics in a modern, revolutionary era that is dangerous precisely because of its proliferating, revolutionary innovations in politics, morality, and technology. These massive ontological shifts on the global scale, coupled with the ongoing crisis represented by the decline of democratic politics in America, prompt Morgenthau’s reflexive considerations upon theory and the role of theorists that resulted in his parrhesiastic criticism of US foreign policy in SE Asia and his advocacy of global governance, particularly in relation to the administration of nuclear weapons.

Innana Hamati-Ataya (2010, 1084) recognises a deeper level of reflexivity in Morgenthau’s work rooted in cognitive scepticism and an awareness of the ‘limitations of scientific investigation.’ Hamati-Ataya also recognises that Morgenthau ‘acknowledges the contextual nature and significance of any cognitive endeavour’ coupled with a ‘specifically moral stand that denotes an ethics of social responsibility,’ which, in her words, ‘clearly shows that Morgenthau’s objectification of the social world is intrinsically committed to reflexivity.’ Morgenthau’s reflexivity, however, is limited to the individual, intimate level of the private ethics of the observer and interpreter of social reality. While it expresses a genuine dedication to the ‘ethos of reflexivity’, his critical stand does not offer a foundation for an actual reflexive epistemology (Hamati-Ataya 2010, 1085). The essence of Hamati-Ataya’s charge regarding the insufficiency of Morgenthau’s reflexivity is that it:

‘does not offer any empirical framework to evaluate and test the scholar’s relation to power. Morgenthau’s reflexive discourse is limited to a priori identification of (the role of) valuations and these are not actually or systematically treated as empirical, testable variables involved in social and cognitive processes. As a result of their non-empirical status, Morgenthau’s assertions about the role of scholarship also reduce social and moral accountability to the scholar’s own individual subjectivity; whereby she is ultimately free to determine whether she achieved her moral commitment, and to justify her actions from her individual perspective. Epistemic reflexivity, on the other hand, requires an instrument of measure that is more substantial than the scholar’s own ‘conscience’, which Morgenthau himself would not trust: it requires more specifically, the empirical objectification of valuations as both causes and effects of social interaction. Morgenthau’s ‘philosophical’ approach can therefore not offer a sociological assessment of the impact of values and theory, because it addresses the problem as an individual, not a collective phenomenon, that is left to accompany and ‘contain’ the objectification of world politics, instead of being an integral part of it.’ (Hamati-Ataya 2010, 1087).

Leaving to one side the dismissal of methods of inquiry other than the systematic, empirical testing of variables, Morgenthau’s texts from the Vietnam War period offer a reasonable framework for the evaluation and testing of the scholar’s relation to power. Morgenthau is unequivocal – either the scholar retains his/her autonomy, or s/he
becomes part of the academic-military complex. This is not to say that one could not be in favour of war and be autonomous as an intellectual, but one cannot be at one and the same time a genuine intellectual and a partisan of government. The commitment to speak a truth consistent with fundamental principles, principles that themselves must be rooted in a legitimate political philosophy, is a collective responsibility not for the individual, but the community of scholars as a whole. The evaluation and testing of the scholar’s relation to power is simple but effective: on which side of the line separating the ethical practice of scholarship (particularly the responsibility to speak truth to power) from shilling for power does an individual fall? The assessment may or may not be “sociological” in the limited sense proposed by Hamati-Ataya but more importantly it is politically reflexive regarding scholarship and its relationship to power and the modes of knowledge production.

Uncovering a political reflexivity for theorists is a positive side-effect of the recollection of the underpinnings of Morgenthau’s exercise of his academic freedom during the Vietnam War and opens the possibility of a more immediately relevant understanding of the role reflexivity can play in allowing IR theorists to understand their meta-theoretical and praxeological commitments than the ‘Bourdiesuan’ category of reflexivity advocated by Hamati-Ataya and others. Furthermore, the core ‘Bourdiesuan’ practice of objectifying the objectifying subject is, as Samuel Knafo (2016, 30) argues, itself unconvincing as a reflexive practice as it relies upon an assumption by Bourdieusians ‘that they could be objective about the very thing they have the least reason to be neutral about: themselves … Bourdieu’s sociological reflexivity asks from the reader an incredible leap of faith in granting to reflexive scholars the ability that they themselves refuse to grant to others.’ Knafo (2016, 44) continues in this vein, ‘reflexive scholars apply different standards on those they criticise, than what they subject themselves to, since they never clarify what expectations they set for themselves. In this way, reflexivity has often served a rhetorical purpose in claiming a distinct quality to the knowledge reflexive scholars produce, on the basis of their awareness of the limits to objectivity. What was originally a project based on recognising one’s own limitations was thus turned into a claim to enlightenment; one which mostly dresses up the knowledge claims we make instead of changing how these claims are produced in the first place.’ The vaunted internalisation sought by Hamati-Ataya achieves only the depoliticization of the subject and ‘to lose in the process the very thing that reflexivity was intent on putting up front: the politics that are played out in our interventions’ (Knafo 2016, 38). Drawing on Michael Lynch, Knafo concludes (and I can only agree with him): ‘the illusion that reflexive scholars have a monopoly over reflexivity, as if reflexivity was a quality only possessed by some scholars or approaches, is highly problematic’ (Knafo 2016, 45).

What is required is a less exclusionary idea of reflexivity, one that actually recognises the political stakes of reflexivity. As Mark Neufeld (1993, 76) writes in his ground-breaking article, ‘[t]he point of reflexivity is, after all, that the study of world politics always has been informed by political agendas, and that it is time that the content of those agendas be brought out into the open and critically assessed’. Morgenthau’s political agenda during the Vietnam war, i.e., to act as a scholar-advocate against the war, exercising a dissident voice within a democratic political culture that was in danger of forgetting its fundamental bases, fulfils this most primary goal of a reflexive approach, i.e., a theorist’s commitment to understanding his/her role within the context of the production of knowledge and the implications of that knowledge within the social and political realms.
Morgenthau’s position is reflexive in Jackson’s sense (2010, 157-72) as he possesses the necessary self-awareness of the scholar in relation to his socio-political environment, the tendency to challenge dominant forces, and a commitment to work to change the world for the better whilst remaining as disinterested as possible, that Jackson identifies as typical of the reflexivist. Incorporating aspects of positionality, critique, and political agency (‘grappling with the world and the regimes of knowledge that influence political actors’), Morgenthau’s approach is also exemplary of the ‘reflexivity as practice’ proposed by Steele and Amoureux (2016, 4) in that his work displays ‘a socially meaningful, self-conscious, and continuous approach to ethical agency in scholarship and politics.’

Morgenthau, Bourdieu and the Function of the Intellectual – Reflexivity and Political Critique

Addressing reflexivity in terms of a political commitment in the manner of Morgenthau’s opposition to the Vietnam War as opposed to an exclusionary concern with the minutiae of the process of the objectification of the objectifying subject is important in that it forces theorists to think more about the implications of exercising reflexivity in a political environment. In this regard it is important to remind the IR theory community that ‘Bourdieu himself was a very prominent activist intellectual’ (Eagleton-Pierce: 2011, 817). There is much to be learned about reflexivity by comparing Morgenthau and Bourdieu’s treatment of the distinction between those intellectuals who serve power and those who critique it. The essential Morgenthauian opposition in the sociology of knowledge is that between the ‘White House-trained’ intellectual and the speaker of truth to power, or in Bourdieu’s terms, that between ‘old-style’ intellectuals and the ‘nouveaux philosophes’ ([1977]2008, 70). The nouveaux philosophes, also described as doxosophists, are dangerous according to Bourdieu ([1993]2008, 197), because they shore up power: ‘The powerful who are short of thoughts call on support from thinkers who are short of power, and the latter rush to offer them the justificatory notions that they need.’ The doxosophists, like Morgenthau’s academic-political complex, play important roles in the ‘monopoly of production and representation of the social world’ that must be disputed by those who critique rather than serve power for its own sake. Like Morgenthau’s arguments protesting the indistinguishability and complicity of the academic and political worlds, Bourdieu ([1985]2008, 132) insists that ‘the only possible basis for a power that is specifically intellectual, and intellectually legitimate, lies in the most complete autonomy in relation to all existing powers.’ Descendants of Julien Benda, Morgenthau and Bourdieu realise and oppose the danger posed when the ‘educators of the human mind now take sides with Callicles against Socrates, a revolution … more important than all political upheavals’ (Benda [1928]2007, 123) because it was the contradiction between the intellectuals and power that ‘formed the rift whereby civilization slipped into the world’ (Benda [1928]2007, 65). The subservience of the intellectuals threatens to close the rift and reverse the civilization that critique made possible.

In this context, and in a manner akin to that of Morgenthau, Bourdieu ([1988]2008, 190) identifies the proper social role of the intellectual as being ‘to speak out … in the exercise of civic vigilance which, by criticism and revelation … would contribute to bringing about a political world in which those with political responsibility had an interest in virtue.’ Advocating a ‘realpolitik of reason’ Bourdieu ([1992]2008, 216) further demonstrates his affinity to Morgenthau by stating the duty of intellectuals and academics as being ‘to
assert themselves as a power of criticism and supervision ... vis-à-vis our technocrats, or – out of an ambition that is both superior and more realistic – to commit themselves to a rational action in defence of ... these privileged social worlds in which the material intellectual instruments of what we call Reason are reproduced.'

**Conclusion**

Morgenthau’s experience is both an instruction in how to perform the role of a **parrhesiastes** and a warning of the dangers inherent in the exercise of academic freedom. Morgenthau perceived himself as contributing to the preservation of the social fabric of democracy from the threats posed to it by the untrammeled exercise of power by un-reflexive politicians and their intellectual *aides de camp*. Morgenthau, like Bourdieu’s subject, Karl Kraus, learned the hard way the extent to which fulfilment of the duty to speak truth to power, would provoke ‘personal attacks ... ad hominem attacks that aim to destroy the very basis, the integrity, veracity and virtue of the person’ who reproaches power (Bourdieu 2008 [1999], 308). Morgenthau’s opposition to Vietnam was also to cost him professionally as, in addition to losing his positions within the government, there is evidence that his candidature for the presidency of the American Political Science Association was stymied by forces within the profession who opposed his criticism of the Vietnam war (Rösch 2015, 126-127; Lebow 2003, 240; Lebow 2018, 109). As Brent Steele (2010, 51) observes ‘the condition of danger in which a **parrhesiastes** puts himself’ is an intrinsic result of his ‘courage to oppose the demos.”

Morgenthau clearly considered that despite the vicissitudes it entailed, his exercise of academic freedom was a worthwhile enterprise. Evoking the capacity of intellectual resistance to contribute to the restraint of political power he was of the opinion that: ‘[i]n the long run ... the voice of truth, so vulnerable to power, has proved more resilient than power. It has built empires of the mind and the spirit that have outlasted, and put their mark upon, the empires of power’ (1970b, 8). In an era in which academics continue to engage in what Bourdieu ([1993b]2008, 223) refers to as the ‘insidious violence’ of ‘competition for positions, honours, titles’ from their government sponsors, Morgenthau’s reflexive insistence on his academic freedom to exercise critique remains as relevant as it did in 1965. As the discipline of IR becomes more aware of the requirement for critical engagement with its intellectual history as a means of adding depth and nuance to its understanding of itself, recollection of Morgenthau’s position on academic freedom and the role of the theorist within a democratic system assists contemporary efforts to understand what it means to be reflexive in IR.

**Acknowledgments**

The author wishes to thank Anthony F. Lang, Jr. for arranging the panel on academic freedom at the 2017 International Studies Association conference in San Francisco which prompted the earliest draft of this paper. The author also wishes to thank Richard Ned Lebow, Nicholas Michelsen, Vassilios Paipais, and Brent Steele for reading or commenting on earlier drafts.
Endnotes

1 One exception is Robert J. Myers’ (1992) attempt to interrelate Morgenthau’s efforts to ‘speak truth to power’ with his wider theoretical and political concerns. Felix Rösch’s (2015) engagement with Morgenthau’s opposition to the status quo as embodying the role of a ‘conscious pariah’ is an interesting addition to the literature that stresses Morgenthau’s critical edge. While Rösch’s parallel reading of Morgenthau and Arendt is valuable in terms of fleshing out Morgenthau’s philosophical commitments, it does not hone in specifically on his theory of dissent. Indeed dissent, particularly what Morgenthau regarded as legitimate dissent, seems to offer a third option to those Rösch (123) claims Morgenthau offers in relation to critique: apathy or violence. Vibekes Schou Tjalve’s excellent study (2008) demonstrates the extent to which dissent played an important role in Morgenthau’s conceptualisation of the patriotic duty of the theorist to offer critique.

2 This article is concerned with the theoretical bases of Morgenthau’s articulation of a right and duty of an academic to dissent. I am not writing an historical account of Morgenthau’s opposition to Vietnam – a topic that has been covered in several admirable studies already (See 2001; Rafshoon 2001; Zambernardi 2011). Zimmer (2011) provides the most comprehensive historical account of Morgenthau’s importance to the anti-war movement.

3 In his (1960a, 21) discussion of freedom and equality in their broadest senses Morgenthau argues these ‘are correlational concepts, not terminal ones … The meaning of freedom is revealed by the answer to the question: freedom from what? And the meaning of both is completed by the answer to the question: equal and free for what?’

4 For Rösch (2015, 107), the assumption of the outsider identity of ‘pariahness showed Morgenthau that … civic engagement implies a continuous, affirmative process of criticizing the socio-political status quo.’

5 Morgenthau’s theory of ‘objective’ truth is consistent if not always expressed in the clearest manner. Considerations of space forbid further elaboration.

6 Rösch (2013, 11-12) interprets Morgenthau’s insistence on making dissidence the guiding principle of scholarship as intrinsically linked to his determination to resist dehumanisation in academia and public life.

7 Johnson’s difficulty lay in the fact that his credibility as President and the delivery of his ambitious reform projects were tied to Vietnam. Fearful of comparisons to Truman, who had ‘lost’ China, Johnson ‘thought that hawkish Dixiecrat and small-government Republicans’ would ‘filibuster the civil rights and social legislation … if he could be made to appear an appeaser of Communists who had renege on Eisenhower’s and Kennedy’s commitment of U.S. honor’ (Bator, 2008, 329).

8 Morgenthau and Chomsky 1972, 364.

9 Shortly before his assassination Kennedy made public the intention of his administration to vacate Vietnam by 1965 (Salverstone, 2010, 485).

10 The extent to which Morgenthau was the subject of a sustained campaign designed to discredit him is unknown (and perhaps unknowable). One fairly senior figure in the administration, Zbigniew Brzezinski, denied any knowledge of a particular ‘Project Morgenthau’ and called its existence into question, but admitted ‘that there were probably efforts to undermine Morgenthau’s argumentation with the Administration,’ (Zambernardi, 2011, 1353). Ellen Glaser Rafshoon (2001, 69) has uncovered evidence that the prominent Johnson administration staffer Fred Panzer wrote to Walt Rostow of the need to ‘defang’ Morgenthau’s criticism of US foreign policy in Asia.

11 The rights, duties and obligations of academics in America are detailed in the American Association for University Professors’ Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure (AAUP, 1940).

12 Contra Levine (2012) I would argue that Morgenthau does not ‘despair’ at the innovations of modernity and that his thought does not curdle into a nostalgic backlash against modernity. For Morgenthau (1978, 68) the task of the theorist is to face the new challenges of modernity with moral courage, i.e., not to despair but to embody the ‘searching mind, conscious of itself and of the world, seeing, hearing, feeling, thinking, and speaking—seeking ultimate reality beyond illusion.’ Ultimate reality may never be attained but the commitment to seek it is an ethico-philosophical principle that enables the theorist to remain engaged with the world. In this vein, see Paipais’ (2013) arguments regarding the insights that remain to be unlocked from Morgenthau’s work precisely because of his refusal to despair.

13 Michael C. Williams (2004) has also noticed the affinity between Morgenthau and Bourdieu, ‘it might even be argued that Morgenthau’s understanding of power and interest has its closest analogues in social theories more commonly associated with the work of Pierre Bourdieu and Michel Foucault, with their very broad understanding of power and the political field, rather than with the narrow understanding of politics that realism stands accused of adopting.’ P. 639.
14 ‘Realpolitik of Reason,’ Bourdieu ([1993b]2002, 222) elaborates, is to ‘fight for reason, for the undistorted communication that makes possible the rational exchange for arguments.’

References


Selverstone, Marc J. (2010). ‘It’s a Date: Kennedy and the Timetable for a Vietnam Troop Withdrawal,’ *Diplomatic History*, 34 (3): 485-495


