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Republic of China Independence (*Huadu*): A Realist-Constructivist Account of Taiwan’s Maintenance of Its De Facto Independence

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Thesis submitted for the award of PhD in International Relations

School of Politics and International Relations

University of Kent

February 2019

Approved as to style and content by

Head of School:

First supervisor:

Second supervisor:
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Abstract

In attempting to account for a weaker Taiwan’s maintenance of its de facto independence in the face of a more powerful China’s irredentist claim, much of the literature is predicated on counter-factuals, misconceptions and wishful thinking. That is, it sees Taiwan facing an inhibited binary choice between independence from (taidu) and unification with (tongyi) Beijing. In doing so, the literature ignores the fact that Taiwan has been an independent, sovereign state under the name of the Republic of China since 1949 and that this status quo constitutes that reality through an intermediate state identity and discourse of “ROC Independence”, or huadu. Huadu, therefore, is worth analysing in its own right as the phenomenon that accounts for Taipei’s maintenance of its de facto independence. Huadu developed from rational responses by the authoritarian ROC state to three crises of legitimacy on Taiwan; first, in 1947 when it responded with violence and entrenchment, second, after 1971 when it responded with liberalisation and, third, after 1987 when a democratising ROC pivoted to the PRC. The fortuitous result of that encounter for Taipei was that huadu became encoded as the 1992 Consensus of One-China-Respective-Interpretations (OCRI) - a tacit agreement with Beijing that permitted de facto peaceful international relations while shelving Taiwan’s de jure status as long as neither side violated the status quo. This study argues that huadu nucleated in post-1987 democratisation and crystallised in post-2008 Rapprochement with Beijing, legitimating and securing the ROC ontologically as a sovereign Taiwan. In so doing, huadu delegitimizes taidu and tongyi and effectively stalemates Beijing’s power by compelling its sanction. A realist-constructivist account that uses a linguistics-informed discourse analysis is an innovative approach that best elucidates huadu. It is realist and constructivist because, first, it provides firm textual warrant for huadu’s
intersubjective co-constitution in power politics and, second, it treats cross-Strait relations as they are, not as interested parties would like them to be.
Acknowledgements

This project would not have come to fruition without the committed guidance, counsel and insight of others. My supervisors, Dr Pak Kuen Lee and Dr Seán Molloy provided unstinting support that allowed me to craft what was an amorphous mass of semi-connected ideas into a relatively clearly argued thesis. Dr Jonathan Joseph offered thoughtful pointers and suggestions at the start of the project that opened up a new direction of research and for further comments on the methodology. Dr Philip Cunliffe and Martin Williamson provided valuable critical commentary on the earliest chapter drafts at the GRTS. Dr Kevin Manton has provided insightful, no-nonsense observations on academic style and on the crafting of the project over the years. Dr Sam Barkin has been gracious with his time and advice, providing prism-like clarity on the avoidance of potential theoretical and structural pitfalls. Drs Malte Kaeding and Colin Alexander have kindly read over chapters and provided valuable commentary. Dr Jonathan Culpeper’s comments have allowed me to hone what is for IR a novel approach to discourse analysis. The European Association of Taiwan Studies provided a library grant and colleagues at the SOAS Centre for Taiwan Studies have sat patiently through and provided feedback on what must have seemed an idiosyncratic approach to the study of Taiwan. Most of all, my deepest gratitude goes to Pauline and Sophie, two xin taiwanren whose selfless care and support has allowed me to complete this project.
Acronyms and Abbreviations

APEC   Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARATS  Association for Relations across the Taiwan Straits (PRC)
ATIEM  Association of Taiwan Invested Enterprises on the Mainland
CCP    Chinese Communist Party
CDA    Critical Discourse Analysis
CINC   Composite Index of National Capability
CL     Corpus Linguistics
CNFI   China National Federation of Industries (ROC)
CSECC  Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Committee
CSR    Cross-Strait Relations
CSSTA  Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement
DHA    Discourse Historical Approach
DIG    Domestic interest group
DPP    Democratic Progressive Party
ECFA   Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement
EY     Executive Yuan (ROC executive)
FDI    Foreign Direct Investment
FPE    Foreign Policy Executive
FPSE   Foreign Policy and Security Executive
GATT   General Agreement on Tarrifs and Trade
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>Kuomintang (Chinese National Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LY</td>
<td>Legislative Yuan (ROC parliament)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAC</td>
<td>Mainland Affairs Council (ROC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOEA</td>
<td>Ministry of Economic Affairs (ROC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ROC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCR</td>
<td>Neoclassical Realism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td>New Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>National People’s Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPP</td>
<td>New Power Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPPC</td>
<td>National People’s Consultative Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUC</td>
<td>National Unification Council (ROC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUG</td>
<td>National Unification Guidelines (ROC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCRI</td>
<td>One Country Respective Interpretations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCTS</td>
<td>One Country Two Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFP</td>
<td>People First Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Realist Constructivism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROC</td>
<td>Republic of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROT</td>
<td>Republic of Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>Societal elite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEF</td>
<td>Straits Exchange Foundation (ROC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFG</td>
<td>Systemic Functional Grammar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIPs</td>
<td>State identity politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>---------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Small to Medium Sized Enterprise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAO</td>
<td>Taiwan Affairs Office (PRC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBA</td>
<td>Taiwanese Businessmen’s Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEEMA</td>
<td>Taiwan Electrical and Electronic Manufacturers’ Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIM</td>
<td>Taiwan Independence Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSU</td>
<td>Taiwan Solidarity Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WC</td>
<td>Wendtian Constructivism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Note on Translation and Romanisation

The English versions of government text in this study are the official versions provided by government bodies in Taiwan and China. Other statements by political elites are taken from the literature and cross-referenced with the original where possible. When it has not been possible to locate an official English translation of a statement in Chinese, the author has translated the statement himself and added a comment in the footnotes as necessary.

Han-yu pinyin is the international standard for Chinese transliteration into Latin text adopted by the PRC (1958), the ISO (1982; 2015) and the UN (1986). While Taipei officially adopted han-yu pinyin in 2009, personal and geographic names in Taiwan reflect a syncretic mix of Wade-Giles, Yale, Cantonese and idiosyncratic Taiwanese romanisation systems. For Taiwanese and Chinese political actors and scholars of China and Taiwan, the different systems carry a discursive force that reflects cross-Strait ideological differences. This study uses han-yu pinyin as its default system. Other spellings are used where they reflect the subject’s own use or where they are historically recognisable. For instance, Jiang Jieshi (han-yu pinyin) is spelt Chiang Kai-shek (Cantonese) and Li Denghui (han-yu pinyin) is spelt Lee Teng-hui (Wade-Giles). There is no nominal capitalisation in han-yu pinyin; it is conventionally added for proper nouns and at the beginning of sentences in English texts. Italics are used for Chinese transliteration, except where the name is historically recognisable.
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Term</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benshengren</td>
<td>Taiwanese/islander</td>
<td>Huaren</td>
<td>Ethnic/Cultural pan-Chinese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bentuhua</td>
<td>Taiwanisation</td>
<td>Huatong</td>
<td>Chinese Unification under the ROC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bentupai</td>
<td>Localised KMT faction</td>
<td>Kuomintang</td>
<td>(Chinese Nationalist Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daguo</td>
<td>Great Power</td>
<td>Qing</td>
<td>Last Chinese imperial dynasty before the ROC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dangwai</td>
<td>Outside the (KMT) Party</td>
<td>Taidu</td>
<td>de jure Taiwan Independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutai</td>
<td>&quot;Stand alone&quot;/ huadu</td>
<td>Tianran duli</td>
<td>Natural independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feizhulipai</td>
<td>anti-mainstream KMT faction</td>
<td>Tongyi</td>
<td>Chinese Unification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guangfu</td>
<td>Retrocession</td>
<td>Waishengren</td>
<td>Mainlander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guoyu</td>
<td>Mandarin/Standard Chinese</td>
<td>Xin taiwanren</td>
<td>New Taiwanese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hakka</td>
<td>sub-ethnic group from southern China</td>
<td>Zhonghua minzu</td>
<td>Chinese nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Han</td>
<td>Dominant “Chinese” ethnic group.</td>
<td>Zhongtong</td>
<td>Chinese unification under the PRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoklo</td>
<td>Fujianese/ Taiwanese language</td>
<td>Zhulipai</td>
<td>Mainstream KMT faction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huada ROC</td>
<td>Independence</td>
<td>Ziyou zhongguo</td>
<td>Free China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huangfuxing</td>
<td>Rejuvenation/Renaissance faction of KMT</td>
<td>Ziyou zhongguo banyue</td>
<td>Free China Fortnightly</td>
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### Timeline

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>Japan returns Taiwan to Republic of China (ROC). Kuomintang (KMT) troops arrive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Martial Law under KMT <em>Temporary Provisions</em> and <em>Taiwan Garrison Command</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Mao Zedong founds People’s Republic of China (PRC). ROC flees to Taiwan. Taiwan Independence Movement (TIM) leaders flee to Hong Kong and Japan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-52</td>
<td>Land reform. Limited local democracy. <em>Free China; Secure Taiwan; Defend Taiwan; Develop Taiwan; Build Taiwan; Liberate the Mainland.</em> KMT Central Reform Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>KMT Seventh National Congress.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954-5</td>
<td>First Taiwan Strait Crisis.</td>
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<td>1958</td>
<td>Second Taiwan Strait Crisis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td><em>A Declaration of Formosan Self-Salvation.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>TIM leader Thomas Liao surrenders to ROC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>ROC expelled from United Nations. PRC occupies China’s seat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td><em>Dangwai.</em> Zhongli Incident.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td><em>Meilidao.</em> Kaohsiung Incident. US recognises PRC and derecognises ROC. Taiwan Relations Act. PRC proposes direct post, transport and trade links with Taiwan. ROC rejects with <em>Three Noes:</em> “no contact, no compromise and no negotiation with the Chinese Communists”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>PRC proposes <em>One Country Two Systems</em> (OCTS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area and revocation of Temporary Provisions end state of war with CCP. ROC constitutional changes permit free elections. Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) founded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>ROC Constitution allows direct election of the ROC President, Taiwan provincial</td>
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<td>Year</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<td>PRC White Paper: <em>The Taiwan Problem and the Unification of China</em>.</td>
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<td>Lee Teng-hui: <em>The Sorrow of the Taiwanese</em>.</td>
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<td>1995</td>
<td>Beijing suspends SEF-ARATS talks to protest ROC President Lee Teng-hui’s visit to US.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Third Taiwan Strait Crisis. PRC tests missiles off Taiwan to deter voters in first democratic presidential election.</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Lee Teng-hui elected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>18 July: Taiwan Provincial Government streamlined.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>KMT loses power. DPP’s Chen Shui-bian becomes ROC President.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Chen Shui-bian narrowly re-elected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>National Assembly disbanded. Future constitutional change subject to referendum. PRC passes Anti-Secession Law. Pan-Blue elites visit Beijing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Taipei and Beijing sign FTA (ECFA).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Xi Jinping becomes General Secretary of CCP. Ma Ying-jeou re-elected ROC President.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Xi Jinping becomes President of PRC. September Strife: split within KMT.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Xi-Ma summit in Singapore. Ma reaffirms status quo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>DPP wins election. Tsai Ing-wen becomes ROC President. Reaffirms status quo.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 1: Constructing the cross-Strait Status Quo

Everyone should just think: Is there another relationship in the world like the cross-strait relationship? There is none. It is extremely complex and involves internal issues, foreign relations, military matters, and economics.¹

In 1999 the DPP also adopted a resolution that recognized the status quo that Taiwan is already independent with the national title the Republic of China, and I’m sure the Chinese know that.²

There is only one China in the world and Taiwan has been a part of China's territory since antiquity. This is a reality widely recognized by the international community.³

1.1. Introduction

The People’s Republic of China (PRC), seated in Beijing, retains overwhelming material power preponderance over Taiwan, or the Republic of China (ROC), seated in Taipei. The military website, Global Firepower, ranks the PRC 3rd and Taiwan 18th in terms of warfighting capability in 2017.⁴ The Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) places the PRC as the world’s most powerful country and Taiwan 24th in 2007.⁵ At the same time, by deploying its daguo, or “Great Power” state

identity, the PRC claims sovereignty over Taiwan and aims at unification, by force if necessary. Furthermore, the UN, the US, most states and Taiwan’s own ROC constitution formally recognise Taiwan as part of China. Although Taiwan does possess impressive national power resources that allow it to punch above its weight, the PRC is superior in every measure.⁶

Despite progressive economic convergence between 2008 and 2016 under an ostensibly China-identifying and Chinese-Nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) administration, Taipei continued to face an acute security threat from the PRC.⁷ Yet, Taipei resisted Beijing’s pressure to deepen political convergence while continuing to buck-pass to the US and hedging by engaging in détente with Beijing. Rather than explicitly acceding to or rejecting Beijing’s demands through unification (tongyi) or de jure Taiwan Independence (taidu), Taipei continued to diverge politically by maintaining the status quo of de facto independence as the ROC. Taiwan’s de facto sovereign status is “ROC Independence”, or huadu.

Traditional rationalist approaches would claim that Taipei’s sovereignty under the cross-Strait status quo is permitted by the US-China relationship.⁸ First, Taipei

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became a US Cold War proxy from 1950. Second, the 1972 US-PRC Shanghai Communiqué created an ambivalent US One-China policy that “acknowledged” China’s (ROC and PRC) One-China Principle. Third, the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act provided Taipei with a US security umbrella, even as the US de-recognised the ROC and formally recognised the PRC. Both permitted Beijing and Taipei to agree the 1992 Consensus, which consolidated the status quo in One-China Respective Interpretations (OCRI). However, while such an approach explains the permissive environment, it effaces Taiwan’s development of a state identity, separate to that of China, between 1950 and 1992. This study argues that “respective interpretations” in OCRI legitimated Taipei’s separate state identity and permitted its political divergence from China. Hence, this study abstracts out US material power to focus on how and why Taipei’s state identity accounts for its sovereignty.

Taiwan is worthy of attention because it provides an outstanding example of how a contested state can achieve provisional endorsement, even from its veto state. Taiwan is not a secessionist entity; rather, its contested statehood in the ROC derives from the 1949 Communist Revolution in mainland China, which reduced the ROC to an *ancien regime* holdout. Its legitimacy ameliorates its legal isolation and cross-Strait relations have, in fact, developed Taipei’s statehood through state identity change. This study argues that the 1992 Consensus provides Taipei with legitimacy in *huadu*. That legitimacy bestows on Taipei a form of discursive power that stalemates Beijing’s material power, resists Beijing’s *daguo* identity and delegitimates both *tongyi*, which Beijing supports, and *taidu*, which Beijing resolutely opposes.


Traditional rationalist approaches cannot fully account for this puzzle, but a realist-constructivist (RC) examination of power and identity can.

The aim of this chapter is to present an overview of this study’s argument. Section 1.2 presents the study’s research puzzles and questions. Section 1.3 outlines the research design by briefly summarising the theoretical framework, which explores power and identity through a realist-constructivist lens, and outlining an abductive linguistics-informed discourse-analytic methodology. Section 1.4 presents the study’s findings and originality and explores its expected limitations. Section 1.5 makes the realist and constructivist nature of huadu explicit by locating it in disciplinary terms, identifying taidu, tongyi and huadu forces in Taiwan and defining the nature of the status quo that huadu maintains. Section 1.6 presents a historical overview of huadu’s cross-Strait and domestic political contexts. Finally, section 1.7 provides an outline of the chapters.

1.2. Puzzles and Research Questions

The prevalence of huadu in the outline above raises a number of interrelated puzzles, all derived from the first one below:

1. China surpasses Taiwan in material power, yet lacks the capability to enforce unification (tongyi). Conversely, Taiwan surpasses China in discursive power (q.v. 3.5.1). Yet it does not have the power to declare Taiwan Independence (taidu).

2. Between 1992 and 2016, Taiwan’s state identity shifted from Chinese to Taiwanese, despite rapprochement and deteriorating chances of a ROT.

3. Increasing economic convergence has been paralleled by an increasing security dilemma and further political divergence.
4. In Taiwan between 1994 and 2016, regardless of administration, Chinese national identity declined while Taiwanese national identity increased. Furthermore, although there is little appetite for *taidu*, there is very little desire for *tongyi*, even though rational choice suggests that the latter might remove the island’s security dilemma and increase economic benefits.

5. The 2008-2016 KMT administration’s Chinese turn did not lead to political convergence. Rather, Taiwanese national identity and *huadu* state identity consolidated.

6. Ma Ying-jeou’s 2008-16 cross-Strait policy was perceived as a threat to Taiwan, yet this study’s data suggest he maintained Taiwan’s sovereignty.

**Research Question:** Given China’s material power and the reality of Taiwan’s status, what accounts for China’s inability to compel unification and Taiwan’s maintenance of its de facto independence and how did this phenomenon develop?

**Hypothesis:** The discursive power of *huadu* trumps Beijing’s material power and secures Taiwan’s de facto independence because it legitimates Taiwan’s ROC state identity and trumps Beijing’s irredentist claim. *Huadu* as discursive power and state identity developed out of *Free China* in state identity politics from the earliest days of ROC rule on Taiwan.

As far as puzzle two, above, is concerned, from 1949 Beijing and Taipei competed over who had the right to be called China and by 1980 Beijing had won. Despite this, the ROC prevails internationally in other ways. For instance, the ROC passport is more powerful than the PRC one. It is recognised for visa-free entry to 127 countries and territories, while the PRC passport entitles bearers to visa-free entry to only nine
countries and territories. Yet, while Taipei can no longer credibly use the name China internationally, it cannot declare a ROT (*taidu*) since, regardless of Beijing’s threat, such a move would entail ROC state death.

Regarding puzzle three, above, despite intensive economic convergence with China and post-2008 Rapprochement, Taiwan has continued to diverge from China politically. Figure three below indicates that, since 1989, the PRC has gone from having no commercial links with Taiwan to being its main FDI focus and trading partner. Official Taiwanese trade with China rose from zero in 1990 to around US$130 billion in 2014. FDI and trade with China, however, benefits Taiwan unevenly, favouring large conglomerates over SMEs, farmers and labour, and while Beijing engaged with the KMT administration after 2008, the military balance of power continued to shift in the PRC’s favour and Chinese threats to Taiwan continued. So, there has been little material evidence of a peace dividend from cross-Strait economic interdependence in general and from Rapprochement in particular. Indeed, apart from rhetorical declarations of Chinese identity between 2008 and 2016, the KMT made no moves towards *tongyi*.

In terms of puzzle four above, longitudinal data from NCCU indicates a complete reversal from Chinese to Taiwanese national identity between 1992 and 2017 and a decline in joint Chinese-Taiwanese identification. This corresponds with a marked overall preference for the status quo, a fall in a preference for *tongyi* and a rise in a preference for *taidu*. Figures 1 and 2 indicate that this became more pronounced

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during the 2008-16 KMT administration. Such polling data is significant in that it shows that, despite economic convergence and Taiwan’s status, democratic norms constitute an essential common value across Taiwan’s political spectrum. It also shows that perceived moves toward tongyi or taidu are not supported, that the electorate overwhelmingly prefers the status quo and that maintaining it represents a societal consensus. Shelley Rigger points out that a range of hypothetical outcomes that depend on Chinese threat can be shown to be favoured by the electorate in Taiwan. Indeed, Emerson Niou’s research stands out in this regard. The NCCU polls, however, are seen as robust and representative and since the present study seeks not to deal in counterfactuals and wishful thinking, it uses the NCCU polls as its benchmark. It is this dilemma that Taiwan has resolved through huadu.

Puzzles five and six, above, are particularly pertinent to this study’s discourse analytic methodology. First, an overarching huadu discourse determined the KMT’s 2008-16 cross-Strait policy. As such, what was perceived as a pro-China KMT discourse was in fact simply strategic and instrumental rhetoric; the genuine huadu discourse can be located in this study’s data. Second, Taiwan-leaning (pan-Green) domestic interest groups (DIGs) that coalesced around the Sunflower movement articulated a crystallisation of Taiwanese national identity that was itself constituted by the same huadu discourse.

This study argues that ROC state identity change means taidu is a straw man. Taidu represents Taiwan’s independence from the ROC and, as such, it is fallacious and
misconceived in the context of the PRC’s irredentist claim. What had been a domestic ROC-Taiwan dimension in which Taiwan sought independence became an international dimension in which Taiwan as the ROC sought sovereignty and inter-state relations with China (q.v. 3.4. Fig.5). If the ROC could not be China, it had to become Taiwan and if Taiwan could not free itself from the ROC, it had to make the ROC Taiwanese. Pan-Green domestic groups may have perceived the content of the KMT’s and the DPP’s cross-Strait policy as a threat to Taiwan’s security at different times. However, Taipei’s policy vis-a-vis the status quo has remained constant. Therefore, huadu, as a provisional political status and a state identity accounts for Taipei’s maintenance of its de facto independence, is deployed in Taipei’s cross-Strait policy and has been constructed domestically and in cross-Strait relations. Taiwan’s power is derived from huadu. What power does huadu give Taiwan? The theoretical frameworks in chapters three and four argue that Taiwan’s power is discursive; it is a form of legitimacy that enables de facto, but not de jure, independence. Huadu is a true discourse because the term itself is so rarely uttered by policymakers.
Figure 1 Changes in Taiwanese/Chinese Identity 1992-2017
Source: National Chengchi University.14

Figure 2 Changes in Unification-Independence Stances of Taiwanese 1994-2017
Source: National Chengchi University.15

Available at: http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/pic.php?img=166_8cefc9c5.jpg&dir=news&title=Image
[Accessed 30 March 2018].

15 Election Study Center. National Chengchi University. 2017. Changes in Unification/Independence Stances of Taiwanese. [online] Available at:
1.3. Research Design

1.3.1. Theoretical Framework

Alexandrov’s model of state identity and foreign policy. This synthetic approach combines complementary classical realist and constructivist concepts, principles and axioms rather than neorealist and neo-classical realist positivist variables. That is, core concepts of power politics, a logic of the social and contingency are augmented with a classical realist interest in morality, prudence, diplomacy, statecraft and an approach to power that is social, relational and contextual. Wendt’s interest in anarchy, discursive power, state identity and norms are combined with a broader constructivist interest in legitimacy and Walt’s interest in threat perception. This framework employs these concepts to posit that *huadu*, as discursive power and state identity, operates to legitimate the ROC, thus trumping the PRC’s material power advantage and securing Taiwan’s de facto independence.

This study’s RC framework takes a reflexive approach. Reflexivity is a point of agreement between Classical Realism and Constructivism. It is also directly relevant to RC as an approach that offers a social understanding of power and a prescriptive theory of foreign policy. Therefore, in the interests of analytical prudence, this section purposely explores the limits, ambiguities and biases inherent in a RC framework. The key argument above is expanded on more explicitly in Chapters 3 and 4.

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19 Barkin. 2010: 88
Traditional rationalist IR approaches offer explanations for Taiwan’s maintenance of its de facto independence. However, they do not fully account for the puzzles highlighted above. Approaches that identify power as a factor invariably treat it as material and coercive. Much deals with Taiwan’s reliance on US power or the China-US context.\textsuperscript{20} In locating national identity as a factor, much research either conflates it with or focuses on it to the exclusion of state identity.\textsuperscript{21} To resolve this, this study abstracts out the US-China relationship and deploys a realist-constructivist (RC) synthesis to create a two-level, three-stage, domestic-systemic framework that better accounts for the power of \textit{huadu} to secure Taiwan’s sovereignty (q.v. 3.4.).

To do this, this study does three things. First, in line with Barkin’s (2010) Realist Constructivism, it seeks to escape the positivist trap by eschewing strict variables. Instead it uses core realist and constructivist principles, axioms and concepts to see what can be explained by them jointly that cannot be explained either by materialist and rationalist approaches alone or by realism and constructivism separately. The core realist concept is power politics; the core constructivist one is intersubjectivity. Added to these are contingency, anarchy, identities and interests. It is not so much the distinction between the material and the ideational as that between what is given and what is contingent that creates an opening for RC.\textsuperscript{22} Second, it adopts the main thrust of Wendt’s systemic Constructivism, expressed as “identities are the basis of interests” and “anarchy is what states make of it” to account for cross-Strait power


\textsuperscript{22} Barkin, Samuel. 2010. \textit{Realist Constructivism}. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
politics. It then extends this to the domestic level to explore domestic political struggle and the effect of this on the national interest and foreign policy. In order to do this, it resolves realist and constructivist understandings of power. Walt’s Balance of Threat links domestic politics to cross-Strait politics. Third, the study presents an IR conception of how Taiwan’s state identity is legitimated in cross-Strait policy. Power and identity are dealt with theoretically in separate chapters (q.v. Ch 3 and Ch 4) but there are areas of cross-over and synthesis.

This study’s Realist Constructivism acknowledges that Taipei’s cross-Strait policy reflects unitary state preferences, but prevalent domestic preferences also reflect state preferences. That is, domestic political competition and threat perception are constituted by huadu. This means that, while specific cross-Strait policies oscillate within the status quo, the preferences of powerful domestic groups are in fact constrained by a coherent state identity and Taipei presents a consistent state identity to China that limits Beijing’s policy options. The theoretical framework outlined here closes the gap between the material and the ideational on the one hand and Realism and Constructivism on the other. In doing so, it constitutes a synthetic approach that strengthens realist and constructivist arguments. Waltz claims:

[International relations] theory indicates that some factors are more important than others and specifies relations among them. In reality, everything is related to everything

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Walt also suggests that “[n]o single approach can capture all the complexity of contemporary world politics.”

Given the multidimensional nature of cross-Strait relations, a single-level or single-theory approach carries insufficient explanatory power. For this reason, Wendt notes, a synthetic research framework provides “more compelling answers and a better picture of reality.”

A study of Taipei’s cross-Strait policy is no exception. Cross-Strait policy is foreign policy and its study must synthesise what is salient about Taiwan and its relations with China. This requires problem-driven research rather than approach-driven analysis. RC as a synthetic approach offers a more satisfying account than a single theory. It builds on Sil and Katzenstein’s analytic eclecticism in three ways: first, it seeks pragmatic “middle-range theoretical arguments” to address “concrete issues of policy and practice”; second, rather than testing theory or building on research traditions, it addresses broad problems that integrate real-world complexity; third, by developing comprehensive responses to real-world puzzles, a synthetic approach sacrifices parsimony for complex explication that locates points of tension among core concepts and causal/constitutive mechanisms normally analysed in isolation within separate traditions.

27 Walt, Stephen. 1998. International Relations: One World, Many Theories. Foreign Policy, 100: 30
30 Sil and Katzenstein. 2010:412.
To achieve explanatory power, while adhering to theoretical requirements, such an approach ought not to be constrained by paradigmatic horizons; diverse socio-political concepts constantly reinforce paradigms; thus, reflexivity operates through reasoned assessment to judge among competing normative and theoretical claims across paradigms. IR depends on innovation, including meta-theoretical reflection.\textsuperscript{31} This is not an argument for an unrestrained default to description and interpretation and a return to a pre-theoretical stage in IR. Nor is it a sideways step into area studies. Rather, it presents an alternative to the strictly positivist claim that only through the falsifiable testing of hypotheses derived from paradigmatic positions can plausible explanation be derived.

While RC as synthesis is not eclecticism, the approaches may be combined at the macro-level.\textsuperscript{32} This can be done by locating “common understandings” or “creative confrontations” of core concepts among opposing traditions that permit the exposure of new knowledge.\textsuperscript{33} At the micro-level, however, Sil and Katzenstein see theoretical eclecticism also drawing relevant concepts and factors from different theories and interpreting a specific case using a well-matched concept. For example, in IR the broad realist paradigm provides an approach to the state and power politics. Similarly, IR Constructivism and national identity theory provide a framework for discourse and state identity. Shared theoretical vocabularies permit new knowledge claims concerning new cases. When combined with a linguistics-informed methodology, a new framework for “discursive power” (q.v.3.5.1) as legitimacy helps extend

\textsuperscript{33} Sil and Katzenstein: 113.
arguments and knowledge in each field. Conversely, as a novel explanatory framework that blends meaningful factors from other theories, a RC synthetic approach is more ambitious. It entails a shift in “epistemic commitments” to settle on a new set of research assumptions and principles. Despite Sil and Katzenstein’s preference, however, theoretical eclecticism has meta-theoretical and methodological flaws.

First, an eclectic approach cannot account for a single phenomenon on multiple or heterogeneous theoretical grounds at the same time. To separately weigh each concept is unreasonable since it requires a meta-theoretical mastery of a number of approaches. This in turn makes the application of theory to practical puzzles and cases problematic. Friedrichs and Kratochwil observe that only Sil and Katzenstein claim to be analytically eclectic in IR.

Conversely, even though a synthetic approach draws on a plurality of theories, it weighs each one differently on the grounds that “if one theory provides some value-added to the other,” it is beneficial. At the same time, a synthetic approach does not need to take everything from each theory. While coherence is essential, a synthesis does not need all the ontological assumptions of each theory. There must be theoretical guidance, but while an eclectic approach explains a phenomenon by selecting and treating equally elements from two or three theories, a synthetic approach maintains one theory as pivotal while utilising other concepts as subsidiary to the main theory. For this reason, RC defaults to Classical Realism and what that

34 Sil and Katzenstein: 113.
35 Sil and Katzenstein: 419.
37 Ibid.
38 Checkel, Jeffrey. 2010: 12.
cannot explain is accounted for by Constructivism. What this study does in this regard is to synthetically refine a RC framework that recognises the material and proceeds from theoretical bases that reject positivist assumptions about the nature and purpose of theory.

1.3.2. Methodology

A qualitative methodological approach that draws on post-positivist linguistics methods for support permits exploration of the constitutive inferences suggested by the data and to understand how ideational phenomena produce material outcomes.40 This project uses two overlapping methods – first, historical, theoretical and contextual analysis based on literature review and, second, primary documentary research using discourse analysis. Literature review permits the mapping of the dynamics of haudu in relation to Taiwan’s cross-Strait policy. These include the relevant academic literature as well as historical documents such as government statements, political speeches and official reports. Sources published in Chinese and less noticed in the West can provide new perspectives on the thinking behind haudu and Taiwanese political speech.41 This study’s methodology holds that there are facts that can be located, analysed and interpreted logically and it seeks to unearth core realist and constructivist principles, axioms and concepts and draws on an abductive, pluralist approach to the philosophy of science to explore how they interact.42

1.3.2.1. Discourse Analysis

The main purpose of this study’s discourse analysis is to reveal how haudu as a discourse of state identity is grammatically rather than rhetorically encoded and

42 Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus. 2011. The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and its Implications for the Study of World Politics. Abingdon: Routledge
enacted in Taiwanese political speech and, therefore, more subtle and effective. For this reason, the methods employed are linguistics ones. Discourse is the communicative effect of text; conversely, text is discourse encoded in words and grammar and text is its product. All discourses are expressions of power relations and, as such, they are contested and resisted. Discursive power is a form of social practice that exploits power dynamics to legitimate one actor’s preferences over another’s. Language enacts discursive power to maintain or change a status quo to benefit a knowledgeable actor.

Discourse therefore is not text. Rather, text is a discourse encoded lexico-grammatically and discourses can only be located and analysed through the texts that encode them and the contexts that inform those texts. Nor is rhetoric discourse; political rhetoric is simply the instrumental packaging of language that more often than not provides “not an explanation but an expectation” of policy responses to perceived threats. Rather than rhetoric, it is the overarching discourse that better evidences foreign policy and enacts power.

Discursive power is a meta-textual phenomenon whose meaning is understood pragmatically rather than semantically in power politics. That is, it is conveyed beyond the surface meaning of the text. Discourse is what happens beyond the text when meaning needs to be inferred. But empirical evidence for a discourse can only

be located in text itself, using analytical techniques to locate firm textual warrant for interpretive claims. Therefore, this study argues that the discourse that accounts for Taiwan’s maintenance of its de facto independence – that is, *huadu* - can be identified in the formal linguistic properties of Taiwanese political speech. Taiwan’s effective exercise of discursive power in *huadu* can be observed through linguistic analysis of the text that encodes such discourse. Methodologically, this requires locating text that exhibits Taiwan’s legitimation of *huadu* over *tongyi* or *taidu* and China’s recognising it. The linguistics-driven discourse analysis described in this study best locates this discursive power. This methodology combines micro-interactional and macro-structural IR discourse approaches, corpus linguistics, pragmatics and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) in the form of the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA).

In line with the DHA’s focus on genres, the study uses a variety of scripted and unscripted text produced by policy elites. This is an under-utilised resource that is the by-product of strategic political activity. The data consists of a 5 million word master corpus of Taiwanese political speech with salient discourses triangulated to historical narrative. A number of sub-corpora provide evidence for salient and valent DIG discourses that may be analysed against the master corpus. Corpus linguistics provides an initial way into the text and exposes recurring themes and textual patterns that evidence a discourse. This is the first step in locating valent text and avoids selective interpretation and confirmation bias. The DHA then permits two

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52 Wodak, Ruth and Michael Meyer. 2009.
forms of textual analysis that facilitate this study’s claim that huadu is grammatically rather than rhetorically encoded in political speech. First, analysis of actors’ argumentation strategies exposes superficial rhetoric and, second, linguistic analysis unearths a discourse of huadu. This does two things: first, it locates firm textual warrant for plausible interpretations of a speaker’s meaning, thus actually doing discourse “analysis”; second, it provides empirical linguistic evidence from which pragmatic meaning can be derived, thus linking text and discourse.

Crucially, in focusing on the DHA’s “linguistic means of realisation”, this study creates space to repair certain flaws in CDA by pursuing an innovative path in IR discourse analysis. That is, CDA has been accused of peddling a crude emancipatory agenda that misrepresents basic linguistic concepts and eschews analytical rigour in a hasty leap from textual description to interpretation. In particular, CDA has been accused of epistemological and methodological incoherence, selection and confirmation bias, a lack of reflexivity, of conflating text with discourse, of failing to employ recognised linguistics terminology to support interpretive claims around the meaning of political statements, of misapplying underlying linguistic concepts and of failing to appreciate the role of context in determining how meaning is interpreted differently by different audiences.54

Linguistic analysis based on the DHA’s “linguistic means of realisation” invites an aspect of linguistics research that has been discarded by mainstream CDA – the Systemic Functional Grammar (SFG) and discourse analytic tradition of Michael Halliday, Paul Grice and John Austin that looks at how meaning is understood

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This study’s approach to discourse analysis assumes linguistic universals; that is, while lexical and grammatical features differ across languages, discursive functions do not.

1.3.2.2. Electronic Resources

There is an abundance of primary source electronic data on ROC government and domestic interest group websites. In addition to systematically collected, reliable datasets for quantitative research, supplementary datasets derived from electronic primary sources can be used to gather information on elite speech. For instance, a range of texts created by salient political actors in the context of domestic politics and in the context of cross-Strait discussions are easily accessible online. These texts can be processed and rendered in machine-readable format for analysis by means of computer-assisted content analysis software.

In short, the methodology chapter (q.v. 5.4) relates how a master Taiwanese Political Speech corpus (and a number of sub corpora) was created and texts selected from it for closer examination in the empirical chapters. The process was abductive. First, the IR and area-studies literature was reviewed with the main research question and hypothesis in mind, salient post-1945 historical events and themes identified and explanatory gaps located. Second, corpus linguistics was employed to locate salient and valent text and to avoid selection and interpretation bias. Important texts less noticed in the relevant literature were unearthed in this process. Recurrent themes and discourses were identified and triangulated to historical events, permitting


location of a synchronic huadu discourse. Third, linguistic methods were used to analyse how huadu is presupposed, implied and enacted in Taiwanese political speech. Fourth, the findings were interpreted in historical context through triangulation to Realist Constructivism and to the linguistics-informed methodology.

1.4. Findings, Originality and Expected Limitations

1.4.1. Findings and Originality

US material power may permit Taiwan to exercise power in the first place, but it is abstracted out for two reasons. First, US policy is (however disingenuous) that Taiwan’s status is a matter for Taiwan’s people and that Washington does not seek to interfere in Taipei’s relations with China. Second, huadu as a state identity has been constructed in the context of cross-Strait relations and Taiwan’s domestic politics.

First, this thesis will argue that China’s inability to force unification and Taiwan’s maintenance of its de facto independence are best understood through a RC framework. Second, traditional materialist and rationalist conceptions of power cannot explain Taiwan’s more effective enactment of discursive power than Beijing. A RC framework synthesises power politics and intersubjectivity to show how domestic factors and interstate contact produce cross-Strait policy. Third, textual warrant for huadu is likely to be located through a linguistics-informed discourse analysis of the data.

That Taiwan is able to maintain its de facto independence produces a number of findings: first and foremost, Taipei is able to deploy discursive power more effectively than Beijing to legitimate its sovereignty. Second, Taipei deploys discursive power in the form of huadu by adhering to the cross-Strait status quo. Third, the English term Taiwan Independence is inadequate if it is used to describe both de jure independence in a putative ROT and de facto independence under the
ROC. Fourth, neither taidu nor tongyi reflect cross-Strait relations as they are. Fifth, domestic preferences inform but do not determine Taipei’s cross-Strait policy; rather a huadu discourse constitutes Taipei’s cross-Strait policy and Taiwan’s domestic politics.

In sum, the ROC appeals through huadu to powerful international norms to represent itself as the legitimate Taiwanese state and member of the international community. Powerful groups in Taiwan and abroad buy into this discourse. Forced unification by an authoritarian PRC is deemed unacceptable; unification under the ROC is a pipe dream. Taidu would invite a PRC attack and ROC state death; states do not voluntarily commit suicide. In the context of huadu, Beijing’s concerns around negative ramifications for its own legitimacy deter it from pursuing forced unification. Huadu would render such a move an invasion of a sovereign state rather than irredentist unification. Therefore, Beijing provisionally endorses huadu by sanctioning Taiwan’s Westphalian and domestic, though not international, sovereignty.57

This project contributes to the existing literature in the following ways:

- It shows how state identities construct the national interest through domestic and interstate socialisation to impact on foreign policy.
- It resolves epistemological and methodological problems inherent in a realist-constructivist synthesis by focusing on reconcilable core concepts rather than irreconcilable positivist variables.

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It provides an appropriate conceptual angle from which to understand *huadu* as discursive power and state identity.

In addition, this thesis is original in the following ways:

- It identifies cross-Strait and domestic power politics as overlapping sites in which *huadu* is constructed.
- It maps discursive power onto a RC synthesis to account for Taiwan’s legitimation of its de facto independence.
- It identifies why Taiwan is able to deploy its power in the cross-Strait context more effectively than China.
- It adopts a linguistics-informed approach to discourse analysis, thus increasing the likelihood that firm textual warrant will be located for reasoned judgements to be made on why *huadu* prevails and becomes policy.
- It repairs a flaw in CDA in general by extending the DHA’s “linguistic means of realisation” to cover pragmatics, thus providing firm textual warrant for claims as to the meaning of words.

1.4.1. Expected limitations

1.4.1.1. Methodological Questions

King *et al* point to the fundamental problem of qualitative research being “the pervasive failure to provide reasonable estimates of the uncertainty of the investigator’s inferences.”\(^{58}\) Indeed, one of the main criticisms of CDA as it is sometimes practised in the social sciences is that it is interpretive, highly-selective

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and partisan. This project, therefore, seeks to distinguish between interpretation and linguistic analysis in order to establish warranted inferences by increasing the number of observations, using careful cross-referencing and triangulation methods. The use of Corpus Linguistics provides a way into the text and ensures an acceptable level of bias, while pragmatics provides textual warrant for interpretations.

1.4.1.2. Access to Sources

Official PRC data is restricted and meaningful text is notoriously difficult to gain access to. Taiwan has an open-government stance with regard to internet access to government data and elite policy statements. Extensive and judicious examination of less-guarded text in the public domain can yield valuable data.

1.5. Locating Taiwan

1.5.1. Cross-Strait Relations: The State of the Field

The KMT academic and diplomat, Su Chi, claims that cross-Strait relations began in 1987, when Nationalist China on Taiwan began secret discussions with its mainland Communist Chinese counterparts that culminated in the 1992 Consensus. Taiwan is academically, not just politically, in China’s shadow and this power imbalance is evident in key debates in Taiwan Studies. The island went from being of marginal interest to political scientists in the 1960s to an important theoretical research area in the 1990s. The paradox of Taiwan’s contested political status, China’s irredentist claim, closer economic convergence and tense cross-Strait political divergence led to an interest in comparative politics, democratisation, national identity and asymmetric

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power relations. Prior to that, Taiwan was treated simply as “another right-wing repressive dictatorship whose importance pales before that of the real “China.” Even as recently as 2003, Shelly Rigger observed that Taiwan Studies occupied “a marginal position in the China studies field”. Yet, a steady rise in Taiwan-related scholarship was making a salient link among Taiwan’s domestic politics, cross-Strait relations and the US-China relationship. Jonathan Sullivan (2011) finds a preponderance of IR and security-themed articles in Area Studies journals, followed by domestic politics with a cross-Strait theme. High-impact IR journals between 1998 and 2008 showed an overall rise in the number of Taiwan-themed articles with spikes in 1996, 2000-2001 and 2005-2006 following cross-Strait crises.

This study’s argument abstracts out Taiwan’s importance to US-China security policy as an explanation of its successful resistance to Beijing. So, while rationalist approaches repeatedly refer to the Taiwan Strait as the most likely location for nuclear power conflict, it is from their acknowledgement of Taiwan as “the one jurisdiction where borders and national identity (as well as political ideology) are subject to competing claims” that this study takes its cue. Dafydd Fell (2012) observes that Taiwan is interesting for two reasons: first, its rapid political, social and economic change make it a useful case for comparative political scientists and,

second, cross-Strait relations provide excellent cases for the study of IR theories. This study indicates that Taiwan’s anomalous status provides unique insights into broader issues around sovereignty, state identity and legitimacy in IR.

1.5.2. What and Where is Taiwan?

Shaped like a sweet potato, Taiwan is an island the size of Wales lying a hundred miles off Fujian in South-East China and separated from the mainland by the Taiwan Strait. Alternatively, it is an economy the size of Sweden, situated to the north of the Philippines in the Western Pacific, facing China. A PRC website tells us that “lying off the south-eastern coast of the Chinese mainland, Taiwan is China’s largest island and forms an integral whole with the mainland.” Taiwan has been at various times Formosa - a “beautiful island” and exotic notion on the frontier of the European, Chinese and Japanese imaginations. It has also been Free China (ziyou zhongguo) an Asian Tiger and economic powerhouse and a renegade province of the PRC, controlled by the remnants of the Chiang Kai-shek clique. It is an unrecognised independent state that operates on the basis of human rights and the rule of law. Even Taiwan’s material ontology is contested before what might be considered constructivism’s discursive terrain proper is reached.

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1.5.3. Who, When and Why is Taiwan?

On the eve of Taiwan’s January 2016 presidential election, Chou Tzu-yu, a 16-year-old Taiwanese pop singer, was accused by angry Chinese netizens of promoting taaidu for waving Taiwan’s national flag on South Korean TV. Taiwanese voters hovered between outrage and perplexity when Chou was forced by her Chinese promoter to record a humiliating apology, not least because the flag of Taiwan is that of the ROC. Indeed, the mayor of Tainan pointed out that Chou could not be advocating taaidu because “taaidu elements do not acknowledge the national flag”. 73 Similarly, Beijing’s People’s Daily, cautioned Chinese netizens by pointing out that Chou’s flag waving actually acknowledged the one-China principle. 74 However, the discursive damage was done in that the initial Chinese reaction presupposed an implicit recognition of Taiwan’s sovereignty.

On 16th January, the ostensibly Taiwanese nationalist Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) candidate, Tsai Ing-wen, had already defeated Eric Chu, the candidate for the incumbent KMT, and pledged to uphold the ROC constitution before a portrait of Sun Yat-sen, the father of the ROC. Yet, taaidu groups took a different stance. Rather than defending Chou, Tsay Ting-kuei of the Free Taiwan Party accused her of mindlessly conniving in huadu. On 23rd February 2016, the ostensibly taaidu New Power Party (NPP) legislator, Freddy Lim, said KMT prime minister, Chang Shan-cheng, supported not tongyi, but huadu, since he had said that cross-Strait relations

were based on “equality and dignity”. In accusing Chang of huadu sympathies, however, Lim inadvertently identified himself as a huaduer, drawing the ire of Tsay, who dismissed the NPP, the DPP and other “pan-Green” Taiwan-leaning parties as “conniving in the ROC colonial government-in-exile”.

Thus in 2016, huadu became both a rebuke and a pejorative definition of Taiwan’s provisional status, while taidu defined an aspiration to a Republic of Taiwan (ROT). Deep-Greens perceive ROC institutions and symbols as a threat. Yet the fact is that the ROC flag now represents Taiwan. Nowadays, young Taiwanese paint it on their cheeks as a mark of Taiwanese-ness. For hard-core taidu supporters, this is unthinking acquiescence to Chinese symbols. Yet it shows that, for most Taiwanese, ROC symbols legitimate Taiwan.

The roots of huadu lie in the ROC’s illegitimacy, which led its elites to end authoritarian KMT rule and to democratise after 1987. Huadu is a status, an identity, an interest, a source of power and a discourse. It is the software that runs the operating system of state identity. Few political actors in Taiwan consciously utter the term huadu; it is rare outside of its pejorative use, yet in deploying it taiduers have inadvertently defined a powerful discourse that resolves Taipei’s sovereign status and stalemates Beijing’s power.

Huadu’s power rests in its exploitation of a two-fold misconception. First, the PRC is the ROC’s, and by extension Taiwan’s, veto state. Beijing has the legal right to prevent Taiwan’s secession. Second, the PRC’s veto status is complicated by Taiwan’s unique two-host dilemma. That is, a prospective secessionist state invariably has one host; for instance Catalonia seeks secession from one host state - Spain. Yet two states assert host status vis-à-vis Taiwan and the de facto host state, the ROC, is in turn subject to a host-state claim by the PRC, which threatens to enforce tongyi, in the event of a declaration of taidu.

“Taiwan is not a State, because it does not claim to be”. Yet, it insists on exercising the rights of a state. It does this as the ROC. The PRC’s status as the ROC’s and Taiwan’s veto state is complicated as follows. First, neither the ROC nor Taiwan have seceded or sought to secede from the PRC. Rather, the ROC constitution formally claims jurisdiction over all of China, including Taiwan. Indeed, the ROC cannot secede from the PRC. Second, Taiwan seeks to secede not from the PRC, but from the ROC. Third, the ROC may be conceived of as China’s ancien regime and veto state of the PRC. Yet, it is unwilling and unable to exercise this role. Fourth, as the asserted veto state, the PRC seeks to subvert and prevent the ROC’s wider recognition. In sum, the ROC “has a legal status that is uncertain, an international standing that is indefinite, a legal existence that is often relative, and a security

situation that is at times precarious.”

This contested status creates the conditions for *huadu*.

This makes *taidu* a misconception, since *taidu* seeks Taiwan’s independence from the ROC, not the PRC. Using *taidu* to describe Taiwan’s quest for sovereignty is therefore misplaced because it assumes that the ROC is still a colonial government-in-exile. *Huadu* resolves this dilemma; rather than seceding from the ROC, Taiwan has appropriated the ROC and since it cannot secede from the PRC, the ROC maintains a formal claim to be China. *Huadu* is more than a rhetorical sleight of hand; it is a discursive shift in state identity from Chinese to Taiwanese. Beijing’s *daguo* irredentist claim and veto make it impossible for Taiwan formally to declare de jure independence, yet *huadu* stalemates Beijing’s claim, resists *daguo* and delegitimizes both *tongyi* and *taidu*.

1.5.4. Distinguishing *huadu*, *taidu* and *tongyi*

*Huadu* is not a teleology. Rather it is an extended stage in ROC identity, transforming over time with its audience. The concept is encoded in a number of ROC policy documents, but not explicitly articulated as such. The Additional Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of China (1991) and the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area (1991) provide the legal context for the ROC’s state identity change. The “National

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Unification Guidelines” (NUG) (1991) and "Definition of One China Resolution" (1992) seek to define one China as two equal political entities, referring to the ROC as the “one China”, while “Relations across the Taiwan Strait” (1994) acknowledges a cultural and historic “one China”. “The Official Position of the Republic of China (Taiwan) on the People’s Republic of China’s Anti-Secession (Anti-Separation) Law” (2005) updates these. Rather than three discrete categories, tongyi, huadu and taidu may be seen as three overlapping positions on a continuum from deep-Blue Chinese unification to a deep-Green Republic of Taiwan, limited to the Taiwan Area. As such, taidu as de jure Taiwan Independence is a counter-factual aspiration and cannot account for this study’s research questions. Tongyi may be divided into zhongtong (PRC Unification) and huatong (ROC Unification). Beijing’s official policy is the former, but the 1992 Consensus permits Taipei formally to advocate the latter. It is formal huatong and its articulation in Free China as “[the ROC’s] sovereignty extends throughout China” that permits elision into huadu as “[the ROC’s] current governing authority is only over Taiwan”. Beijing actually perceives huadu in Taipei’s 1991 and 1992 statements on Taiwan’s status, observing that for Taipei “One China” entails "One China, two equal political entities" under

86 Zhang Yazhong. 2012. bofu zhijian: liang'an hexin wenti tansuo. [Peeling off: exploring the core issues of the two sides] On Integration, Taipei: Sheng Chih Book Co Ltd 201: "On Integration", Hong Kong China Review Academic Press, 2014 edition, p. 320. [Online] Available at: http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/242340/2/%E5%89%9D%E5%BE%A9%E4%B9%8B%E9%96%93%E5%85%A8%E6%96%87pdf.pdf?fbclid=IwAR1uUWr1iLDMdn4N8QaWoImDEe8Ly3GOthNFriQZonFXVvwFrwfaE9yTNSs [Accessed 20 October 2018].
the ROC constitution acknowledges that "The Republic of China on Taiwan is a sovereign and independent country" but "at present, it doesn’t have the legitimacy (quan) of mainland China". For Beijing, huadu highlights Taiwan's sovereignty and statehood and seeks dual recognition to create a state identity equal to the PRC. In this regard, the question of whether huadu constitutes a one-China, a two-China or a one-China-one-Taiwan policy is moot. This study argues that the concept allows Taipei semantically to assert the one-China principle as two states within one Chinese nation while pragmatically oscillating between a two-China and a one-China-one-Taiwan policy (q.v. 5.2; q.v. 8.5.).

Although the term was coined by Tsay Ting-kuei in 2016 (q.v. 1.5.3.), huadu is conceptually and analytically similar to the earlier term “stand alone”, or dutai, which became current during the 1990s and is used in the Chinese literature. Dutai originates in the Free China “idealis” of liberal KMT elites (q.v. 6.2.3.2.) who sought abandonment of the narrative of return and a “stand alone” democratic ROC in Taiwan. Dutai also draws on Schubert’s (2004) recognition of political party convergence on national identity and on Fell’s (2005) “diluted” Taiwan independence, in which Taiwan’s political parties converge on the salient divisive

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national identity issue by appealing to maintenance of Taiwan’s de facto
independence as the ROC, opposition to unification and pragmatic cross-Strait
relations in contrast to a “pure independence” taidu position, which seeks a de jure
ROT.\textsuperscript{90}

Huadu also effectively absorbs and articulates popular tianran duli, or “natural
independence” sentiment. Articulated by DPP elite Lin Cho-shui in the context of the
2014 Sunflower Movement, tianran duli locates a naturalised Taiwanese national
identity in the generation born after 1980 that was educated in democratisation and
Taiwanisation. Never having known authoritarian KMT rule, they exhibit less
antipathy to the ROC and view Taiwan as a sovereign, independent state embodied
in the ROC, without explicitly advocating a de jure ROT. This more internationalised
and media-savvy “new Taiwan independence” stance stands in contrast to a more
insular “old Taiwan independence” stance that positioned itself in direct opposition
to the authoritarian ROC’s narrative of return and sought a de jure ROT.\textsuperscript{91}

The concepts of “natural independence” and “diluted independence” certainly inform
huadu. However, neither in-and-of-themselves are state identities. Rather, “natural
independence” appears to be a form of national subjectivity that attaches to a state,
while “diluted independence” relates to party policy positioning rather than a state
identity. Therefore, for clarity, because this is not a study of Taiwan’s party politics
and because its semantic focus is on the ROC’s state identity, this study uses the term
huadu.


\textsuperscript{91} Lin Cho-shui. 2014. “Huashan lunjian” nanging shidai de ziran du (1). “Huashan's sword” the
"natural independence" of the younger generation (1). Thinking Taiwan. 25 July 2014.
By adopting the “divided state” concept, *huadu* produces “one-China-two-equal-political-entities”. This allows Taipei to claim "the sovereignty of the Republic of China is independent in Taiwan" and the country’s name is the ROC. Whereas *taidu* is implicit in “One Country on Each Side” and “One China, One Taiwan”, *huadu* is implicit in the 1992 Consensus of OCRI, in One-Country-Two-Systems (OCTS) and the Two-State theory of “special state-to-state relations”. *Huadu* may converge with China; that is, it semantically entails a sovereign ROC. Conversely, it may diverge from China to pragmatically imply a sovereign ROT. The convergent form references Taiwan as the ROC; the divergent one, as part of a “cultural” China. Specifically, if the One China insisted on refers to the ROC, *huadu* is closer to *tongyi*; if it refers to a cultural China, it is closer to *taidu*.

According to Zhang Yazhong, four positions on ROC state identity may be extracted from the *tongyi* (*huatong*), *huadu*, *taidu* continuum:

- The ROC is legitimate; the PRC is illegitimate. This is *Free China, huatong* and Chiang Ching-kuo’s (1979) *Three Noes*.

- The ROC is legitimate; Beijing only has legitimacy in mainland governance. This is Lee Teng-hui’s NUG (1991) and "Definition of 'One China' Resolution" (1992). This is a sovereign ROC.

- The ROC is legitimate under the One-China principle, and recognises Beijing’s sovereignty on the mainland. This is "Relations across the Taiwan Strait" (1994) and the "Two-State Theory" (1999). This is Taiwan as part of a cultural China.

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There is no "One China" and the ROC is sovereign and independent of the PRC. This is "One country on each side" (2002) and the DPP’s Resolution on the Future of Taiwan (1999). This acknowledges the provisional status of the ROC.

The above are all consistent with the ROC’s sovereign independence. The first is One China under one ROC (tongyi as huatong); the fourth is covert taidu. Two and three are huadu, but are not equal. The second is a thin huadu in which the ROC state is the locus of One China, but the PRC has governing authority on the mainland; the third is a thick huadu in which the ROC is part of a virtual pan-Chinese cultural realm that is the locus of One China. PRC scholars formally claim that huadu is covert taidu. International scholars are ambivalent. Cole (2016) claims taidu and huadu represent two independence camps. Goren and Turton (2016) claim “there is no huadu” – that huadu and taidu are ontologically the same: “independence from China”. This oversimplifies huadu and effaces its discursive power to legitimate the ROC’s sovereignty. This study, however, maintains that neither tongyi nor taidu in fact exist, since both represent delegitimated aspirations and, as such, wishful thinking.

Figure 0, below, provides a conceptualisation of the tongyi, huadu, taidu spectrum. As can be seen, there is overlap among the positions and they do not align neatly to

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constituencies and policy positions. This is indicative of the spectrum’s shifting, discursive nature.

Fig 0 Tongyi, Huadu, Taidu Spectrum

The key social constituencies of huadu’s legitimacy claim are domestic and transnational. The former include the island’s electorate and powerful domestic interest groups (DIGs). The KMT and the DPP seek to appeal to both. The latter include Taiwan lobbies in the US and the EU, such as the Congressional Taiwan Caucus and the European Parliament-Taiwan Friendship Group. It also includes transnational business organisations like the General Chamber of Commerce of the ROC (ROCCOC) and overseas chambers of commerce in Taiwan.97 The ROC and Taiwan’s political elites seek to appeal to these. A material “international community” is harder to pinpoint. However, Taipei maintains international de facto diplomatic and trading relations through its representative offices. The PRC forms a potential constituency in that it provisionally endorses huadu because it averts taidu.

The New Power Party (NPP), represented by elites like Chiu Hsien-chih, Freddy Lim and Lin Fengzheng, espouse citizen democracy within the ROC. The same is true of Social Democratic Party (SDP) elites, Cheng Shang-chih and Jennifer Lu, who espouse anti-corruption and transparency. The SDP competes for a progressive Taiwan-identifying NPP/DPP constituency and reflects a clear shift away from the *taidu - tongyi* nationalist divide in its positioning as a centre-left party. The NPP seeks to “normalise” Taiwan by abolishing the provincial government, permitting territorial changes through a referendum and making cross-Strait relations formally international relations through ministerial realignment. Yet, none of these parties seek to dissolve the ROC. Hence, these changes are simply cosmetic for *taidu* forces, who seek a completely new ROT. 98 Current *taidu* DIGs and parties include the Taiwan Solidarity Union, which in fact does not seek immediate de jure independence. In contrast, the Free Taiwan Party and post-Sunflower “Third Force” groups such as the Formosa Alliance, Welcome Formosa Republic; Farewell to ‘Republic of China’ 99 and From Ethnos to Nation campaign for a Republic of Taiwan. 100

*Tongyi* under a ROC (*huatong*) is based on the “deep-Blue” strand of the pan-Blue coalition. Its ideal end point is unification with a liberal democratic China, but some deep-Blue elites seek more immediate unification. The official New Party policy is eventual unification. However, Yok Mu-ming and Wang Chien-shien of the New Party explicitly call for more rapid unification, as does Chang An-le, the leader of the Bamboo Union gang and the China Unification Promotion Party. The KMT’s *huangfuxing* faction, which represents military veteran officers, and the 800 Heroes

100 From Ethnos to Nation. 2018. About. [online] Available at: https://www.fetn.co/ [Accessed 30 August 2018].
espouse huatong. The former authoritarian KMT governor of Taiwan, James Soong of the People First Party, oscillates between collaboration and competition with the KMT for the same constituency and, although seeking eventual huatong, promotes greater ROC representation in IGOs, thus betraying a huadu policy position. Very few KMT elites explicitly promote unification. Hung Hsiu-chu, the former presidential candidate, is an exception, but was replaced by Eric Chu in 2015 because she alienated the KMT’s core huadu constituency. Wu Den-yih was seen as leader of the deep-Blue KMT faction under Ma, yet he made no calls for unification. Similarly, Lien Chan, who Beijing prefers to deal with because of his perceived Taiwanese-Mainlander identity, articulates a huadu policy position.

Crucial to this study’s argument is that maintenance of de facto independence is a question of sovereignty and that sovereignty is maintained by states rather than nations. This suggests that a focus on Taiwan’s national identity misdirects research to taidu while a focus on state identity properly directs research to huadu. It is a focus on huadu therefore that permits analysis of cross-Strait relations as they are and the ROC state as it is.

1.5.5. What is the Status Quo?

A status quo is a provisional situation within which movement is possible and expected. Philip Hsu (2010) provides an empirical account of the cross-Strait type that allows for multiple interpretations:

…the preference for the status quo as an alternative other than unification or independence can be reasonably comprehended as leaving intact the de facto separation between the two governments in Taipei and Beijing of which each proclaims to be a representative of a sovereign country, without solving their difference in Beijing’s
The status quo is not stasis; Taipei’s policies and identity have changed dramatically since 1987. Yet, cross-Strait relations occur “within the firewalls” of the 1992 Consensus. Both tongyi and taidu would violate and nullify the status quo, causing ROC state death. In this context, the status quo becomes more durable. Huang and James (2014) posit that the status quo has become codified through rational decision making, but that this does not account for what prompted the status quo in the first place. This study suggests such decision making reflects the need for policy to legitimate huadu.

1.6. The Context

The PRC’s claim is historical and successor-state based. To refute this, taiduers say a declaration of a Republic of Taiwan (ROT) would nullify the PRC’s claim by breaking the connection between the ROC and Taiwan. Yet, advocating a name change entails denying Taiwan’s de facto sovereign independence. Because of this, taiduers claim that Taiwan is ruled by the ROC colonial government in exile, not by Taiwan under the name ROC. Yet, to claim that Taiwan seeks independence equates Taiwan with Scotland or Catalonia and inadvertently legitimates the PRC’s claim to Taiwan. For this reason, the 2008-16 KMT administration played along with the PRC’s first line of reasoning –discursively deploying history to say Taiwan has

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103 Huang and James. 2014: 678

104 Rational decision making; perceived transaction costs; uncertainty; cognitive misperceptions; psychological commitment; regret avoidance and the “endowment effect” (departing from the status quo is naturally risky) suggest policy will converge towards maintaining the status quo.

always been part of a pan-Chinese cultural sphere. They flatly denied the PRC’s successor-state line. This created the discursive space for the ROC to equal Taiwan and to legitimate *huadu*. That the ostensibly Chinese Nationalist KMT itself was instrumental in this is important to this study; ROC Premier Jiang Yi-huah rejected alleged similarities with Scotland in 2014, reaffirming that “keeping the ROC as an independent and sovereign state is the government’s top priority”.105

1.6.1. The cross-Strait Context

Taiwan is an anomaly in the international system and an artefact of particular political and historical circumstances. The island has no national past before 1945, when it was “gloriously returned” (*guangfu*) to the ROC at the end of WWII after 50 years of Japanese colonial rule.106 That is not to say Taiwan was not “Chinese” before then; no study of Taiwanese identity can ignore Han Chinese identities.107 The Dutch first brought Hoklo-speaking migrants from Fujian during the 1620s. The Hoklo, along with Hakka from Guangdong, continued to migrate under Qing rule and only partially integrated with Austronesian indigenous tribes.108 The Qing never completely controlled Taiwan, and ceded it to Japan in 1895. However, the Qing represented neither a Chinese state nor a Chinese nation, but a Manchu empire ruling a loose sinic culture to which Taiwan was peripheral. When Sun Yat-sen declared the ROC in 1912, Chinese Nationalists did not consider Taiwan to be Chinese. The ROC

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did not construct an irredentist claim until after the 1943 Cairo Declaration.\textsuperscript{109} By 1945, Japanese rule had constructed a core “native” Taiwanese, or benshengren, community from the Hoklo and Hakka but it took the Chinese Nationalists to turn it into a Taiwanese nation. In doing so, the KMT shattered its legitimacy. In February 1947, KMT forces massacred thousands of islanders in the 2-28 Incident and instituted the White Terror and martial law (q.v. 6.2.2.). Official sinification constructed Taiwan as \textit{Free China}. In this way, the KMT party state enacted Chinese Mainlander, or \textit{waishengren}, settler rule in opposition to the “native Taiwanese” benshengren. Combined, these events became the founding national myth that made Taiwanese-ness imaginable.\textsuperscript{110}

In 1949, Chiang Kai-shek’s KMT lost the Chinese Civil War to Mao Zedong’s Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which established the PRC. The KMT withdrew to Taiwan, taking the ROC apparatus and a large \textit{waishengren} refugee community with it. The Soviet boycott of the UN and the Korean War ensured the ROC maintained China’s UN seat. The 1952 ROC-Japan Treaty of Taipei left Taiwan’s status undetermined, but under de facto ROC administration. The ROC remained recognised in the UN until 1971, when post-colonial support for the PRC and a US move to balance the Soviet Union through rapprochement with Beijing prompted the UN to “expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek” and “restore all rights” to the PRC.\textsuperscript{111}

The UN resolution shattered the ROC’s legitimacy to represent either China or Taiwan. In 1972, the US-China Shanghai Communique “acknowledged” Beijing’s claim that “all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China”. The ROC haemorrhaged diplomatic allies and, in 1979, following the PRC’s 1978 Open Door Policy, the US normalised relations with Beijing and ended official relations with Taipei. Beijing offered Taipei One Country Two Systems (OCTS), which Taipei rejected, officially maintaining Free China under the Three Noes of “no contact, no compromise and no negotiation with the Communist bandits”. However, the US did not abandon Taipei; instead, it passed the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which guaranteed Taiwan’s military security. The stand-off continued throughout the 1980s until the end of the Cold War changed the international system again.

The hijacking of a Taiwanese cargo plane to Guangzhou in 1987 effectively reversed the Three Noes by creating a pretext for engagement with Beijing. Given that both sides claimed to be China, talks were conducted secretly, then through “white-glove” quasi-governmental organisations – the ROC’s Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the PRC’s Association for Relations across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS). Talks culminated in December 1992 with One China Respective Interpretations (OCRI), a verbally delivered statement that had been composed by the ROC Office of the President and thus represented Taipei’s policy on the One China question at the time:

The two sides of the Taiwan Strait uphold the One China Principle, but the interpretations of the two sides are different [...] Our side believes that One China should mean the Republic of China established in 1912 and existing today, and its

sovereignty extends throughout China, but its current governing authority is only over Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matzu. Admittedly, Taiwan is a part of China, but the mainland is also part of China.  

The 1992 Consensus, as it became known, recognised the status quo that had existed since 1949 and allowed Taipei to seek greater political divergence from China between 1992 and 2008.

By 1992, loss of legitimacy and the end of the Cold War had led the ROC to reassess its identity. Democratisation, industrialisation, social change and de facto inter-state relations were constructing a Taiwanised ROC that maintained a formal claim to China. Taipei diverged from China and Chinese-ness became less important to its state identity, despite a shared cultural background. By 1998, SEF-ARATS talks had already broken down and would remain suspended until 2008. In July 1999, ROC President Lee uttered the Two States Theory; that is, relations between Taipei and Beijing were “state-to-state” or “special state-to-state”. Despite its initial outrage, however, Beijing softened its One China principle (q.v. 7.5.). In September 1999, PRC President Jiang Zemin reiterated Beijing’s offer of OCTS, contingent on four red lines: involvement of a foreign power; a declaration of de jure independence (taidu); deployment of nuclear capability by Taiwan or “massive disorder” on the island. In 2000, the DPP’s Chen Shui-bian assumed the ROC presidency and

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116 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. 1995. Continue to Promote the Reunification of the Motherland. 30 January 1995. [online] Available at: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ljzg_665465/3568_665529/t17784.shtml [Accessed 25 November 2011]. “Taiwan will keep its existing social and economic systems as well as way of life, and enjoy a high degree of autonomy”; that “the central government will not garrison any troops in Taiwan and people in Taiwan may take office in central government”. Beijing’s intervention doctrine contained four red lines: involvement of a foreign power; a declaration of independence (taidu); deployment of nuclear capability by Taiwan or “massive disorder” on the island.
called for cross-Strait talks without preconditions, but the PRC insisted he recognise
the One-China principle. Despite leading an ostensibly pro-taidu party, Chen stressed
shared Chinese culture and history, promised not to declare taidu and further
liberalised cross-Strait trade. In 2002, Chen stated "with Taiwan and China on each
side of the Taiwan Strait, each side is a country". In 2003, in response to perceived
threat from PRC missiles, a referendum law permitted a “defensive referendum”.
Although the 2004 referendum’s content did not cross the huadu-taidu red line, Beijing saw it as a vote on sovereignty and a step towards taidu through
constitutional change. The result was invalidated due to low turnout and Beijing’s
response was initially restrained. However, Beijing responded in 2005 with
military drills and an Anti-Secession Law that explicitly threatened Taiwan with
invasion if it declared taidu. These were perceived as direct threats and Chen
responded by restricting cross-Strait trade and further Taiwanising the ROC through
a “Name Rectification Campaign”. After the DPP victory in 2000, Beijing had
rejected the 1992 Consensus and insisted on a strict one-China principle. However,
back-door KMT-CCP talks after 2005 proposed it as a basis for rapprochement and

117 Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan). 2000. Taiwan Stands Up: Presidential
118 International Committee for Human Rights in Taiwan. 2002. President Chen: “One country on
121 Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States. 2005. Anti-Secession Law (Full
text)(03/15/05). [online] Available at: http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/999999999/t187406.htm
[Accessed 20 November 2015].
Beijing offered to tolerate Taipei’s “respective interpretations” of OCRI. The KMT’s 2008-16 cross-Strait policy turned notional rapprochement into official Rapprochement with Beijing. This entailed cosmetic re-sinification of the ROC and an attempt to drive through a comprehensive free trade agreement (ECFA) and several follow-on agreements, notably a trade-in-services pact (CSSTA). These policies were predicated on the 1992 Consensus. Domestic opposition to Ma’s cross-Strait policies contributed to the KMT losing the 2014 mid-term elections. Yet, Ma still met Xi Jinping in 2015 in Singapore – the first ever meeting between ROC and PRC heads of state.

Despite its rhetorical turn to China, however, the 2008-16 KMT administration had in fact constructed a *huadu* discourse (q.v. Ch 8). Rapprochement foundered and, when the DPP returned to power in 2016, China suspended talks, citing the DPP’s refusal to recognise the 1992 Consensus. Yet the new president, Tsai Ing-wen, blocked a referendum on *taidu* because the DPP’s 1999 Resolution on Taiwan’s Future recognises Taiwan’s title as the Republic of China. This suggests that *huadu* was as far as Taipei wanted to go, regardless of administration.

1.6.2. The Domestic Context

In the domestic realm, the authoritarian KMT-ROC party state was Leninist, corporatist and anti-Communist. As a settler state, it was more resilient than a colonial state. Unlike the colonial state, the classic settler state exercises authoritarian

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The Resolution states “Taiwan, although named the Republic of China under its current constitution, is not subject to the jurisdiction of the People's Republic of China. Any change in the independent status quo must be decided by all residents of Taiwan by means of plebiscite”.

control to secure legitimacy and has substantial military and financial reserves to resist domestic threats.\textsuperscript{125} Taiwan represented a refuge and a permanent home for the \textit{waishengren}, holding out against both metropolitan Communist and local \textit{benshengren} resistance. Chinese ascendancy over the Taiwanese required a de facto independent state to maintain legitimacy.

At the same time, however, the ROC’s paternalistic, developmental nature facilitated economic growth and created a modern, industrial Chinese state on Taiwan. Land reform in 1950 had created a \textit{benshengren} small-farmer class, beholden to the KMT and removed from its rural elite.\textsuperscript{126} Sinification made Mandarin the lingua franca for this native-Hoklo-speaking \textit{benshengren} rural elite, which transferred to industry to become Taiwan’s bourgeoisie. KMT sinification forced the islanders to identify with the ROC. However, demographic change, reformist political pressure and the co-opting of young \textit{benshengren} technocrats into the KMT elite meant that the Taiwanese became a political force.\textsuperscript{127}

The death of Chiang Kai-shek in 1975 led to limited liberalisation under his son, Chiang Ching-kuo.\textsuperscript{128} A social process known as \textit{bentuhua} – localisation, or Taiwanisation – driven by the \textit{dangwai} (outside the KMT party) movement drove this (q.v. Chapter 6).\textsuperscript{129} As Chiang Ching-kuo drew on \textit{bentuhua} to Taiwanise the KMT and the provincial government, he liberalised Taiwan’s political culture, spawning Taiwan-identifying domestic interest groups (DIGs).\textsuperscript{130} With no ties to the Chinese mainland, \textit{benshengren} KMT technocrats and \textit{dangwai} activists aimed at common

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{126} Gold, Thomas. 1986; Tien, Hung-mao. 1989.
\item \textsuperscript{127} Gold, Thomas. 1986.
\item \textsuperscript{128} Jacobs, Bruce. 2012. \textit{Democratizing Taiwan}. Leiden: Brill.
\item \textsuperscript{129} Makeham, John and Hsiau, A-chin. eds. Cultural, Ethnic and Political Nationalism in Contemporary Taiwan: Bentuhua. New York: Palgrave Macmillan: 1.
\item \textsuperscript{130} Jacobs, Bruce. 2012.
\end{itemize}
political ground between *waishengren* and *benshengren*.\(^{131}\) The explicit aim of the *dangwai* was state identity change through democratisation, with socialists, Chinese liberals and Taiwanese nationalists competing. Sequential domestic shifts in power from Chinese to Taiwanese prompted KMT loss of legitimacy, with the Zhongli Incident in 1977, the Kaohsiung Incident in 1979 and the Lin Family Murders in 1980 salient (q.v. Chapter 7).\(^{132}\) In 1987, the KMT ended martial law. The opposition DPP had already formed in 1986, presaging a liberal-democratic political spectrum based loosely on the *benshengren* – *waishengren* ethnic distinction and expressed through Taiwanese and divergence-leaning “pan-Green” and Chinese and convergence-leaning “pan-Blue” partisan groupings, centred on the DPP and the KMT respectively. Given the KMT’s penetration of society, however, it could still count on broad *benshengren* electoral support.

The *benshengren* KMT leader, Lee Teng-hui, became President in 1988 and began democratic reforms that led to a loosening of *waishengren* power. However, the *waishengren* were 14% of the population in 1990 with 80% of the seats in the legislature and control of the military and provincial government. In 1991, Lee introduced constitutional reforms that limited the ROC’s sovereignty to the Taiwan Area and the electorate of Taiwan while implicitly recognising the PRC.\(^{133}\) In the same year, the DPP inserted a Taiwan Independence Clause in its party charter. In 1996, in response to DPP and pro-Taiwan concerns, Lee imposed restrictions on cross-Strait trade (No Haste), to the chagrin of economically liberal business interests.\(^{134}\) This created space for the ROC to diverge further from China politically.

\(^{131}\) Hughes, Christopher. 1997.

\(^{132}\) Gold, Thomas. 1986.

\(^{133}\) Lee’s constitutional reforms constituted *huadu* by aligning the ROC’s de facto territorial claims to the island of Taiwan and the offshore islands.

\(^{134}\) Lin, Syaru Shirley. 2016.
By retiring waishengren elites and co-opting others while working with the DPP on a top-down Taiwanese nation-building project, Lee made provocative statements on Taiwan’s political status, splitting the Taiwanised KMT mainstream, or zhulipai, and its Chinese Nationalist anti-mainstream, or feizhulipai. Yet, he maintained tongyi as the long-term goal and rejected the DPP’s taidu stance. However, on a private visit to Cornell University in 1995, Lee stated: “What actually is the goal of Taiwan’s democratization? Speaking simply, it is the ‘Taiwanization of Taiwan (taiwande bentuhua).’”

Beijing was angered, and responded with verbal threats and missile tests before Taiwan’s first full democratic elections in 1996. Taiwanese voters elected Lee. Lee’s KMT faction, with DPP support, continued with its Taiwanese nation-building project. In 1998, Lee articulated a civic New Taiwanese, or xin taiwanren, national identity to assuage a perceived ethnic cleavage between waishengren and benshengren and to counteract the DPP’s lean towards taidu (q.v. 7.3.). As the ROC continued to Taiwanise, however, Taiwan Independence as taidu became a straw man. In 1999, the DPP acknowledged the ROC’s legitimacy. This “Grand Compromise” was struck because only a minority of Taiwan’s population supported taidu as de jure independence in the short term. Systemic factors aside, an independent Taiwan would require a new state.

Despite post-2008 Rapprochement under a China-identifying KMT, Taipei’s interest in tongyi continued to wane. Longitudinal data from National Chengchi University in figure 1 below indicate the island’s national identity shifted from predominantly

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136 Taiwan Documents Project. n.d. DPP Resolution on Taiwan's Future, 8 May 1999. [online] Available at: http://www.taiwandc.org/nws-9920.htm [Accessed 3 January 2018]. The resolution stated: “although named the Republic of China under the current constitution...any change in the independent status quo must be decided by all residents of Taiwan by means of a plebiscite.”
Chinese at the start of democratisation to a prevailing Taiwanese identity by 2017. In 1992, over 25% perceived themselves as exclusively Chinese. This fell to under 11% in 2001 at the start of Chen Shui-bian’s DPP administration and was just 3% in 2016. Conversely, exclusive Taiwanese identity rose dramatically from under 18% in 1992 to over 41% in 2001 and almost 60% in 2016. Joint Taiwanese-Chinese identification also declined steadily from just over 46% to under 34% percent in the same period. In other words, nearly two-thirds of Taiwan’s population identified as exclusively Taiwanese by 2017, and this crystalised under Ma Ying-jeou’s ostensibly China-leaning post-2008 KMT administration. Even KMT elites suggest that Taiwanese national self-identification stands at 85% and Chinese at less than 5%.

A major challenge to the KMT arose in 2014. However, this time the challenge sought to defend the ROC’s liberal democratic identity and delegitimate the KMT as guardians of that identity. Intense opposition to the KMT’s cross-Strait policies arose when students and civic groups occupied Taiwan’s legislature and effectively blocked the CSSTA trade agreement, alleging lack of due diligence and democratic process. Pan-Green groups claimed it threatened national security, acquiesced in Beijing’s efforts to achieve tongyi by stealth and were a KMT attempt to sell Taiwan out. The Sunflower Movement, as it became known, appealed not to taidu but to the ROC constitution, thus consolidating huadu. At the same time, Taiwan’s business community (including the taishang – Taiwanese businesspeople in China) broadly supported the CSSTA while driving a business-friendly DPP economic policy in the

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run-up to the 2016 presidential election, suggesting that the DPP had become the party of the Taiwanese bourgeoisie.  

The contexts above confirm that all domestic politics imply cross-Strait relations and that the two are cross-cutting. Taiwan has diverged from China. At the same time, while there is little appetite for taidu, there is almost no desire for tongyi. In this context, Taipei pursues a cross-Strait status quo that eschews both taidu and tongyi. It is huadu embodied in the status quo that secures Taiwan’s de facto independence.

1.7. Chapter Outline

Chapter 2 maps the Area Studies, Comparative Politics and IR literature on cross-Strait relations to explore Taiwan’s maintenance of de facto independence and sets up knowledge gaps. It identifies the ROC’s crises of legitimacy, sinification, bentuhua and democratisation as a salient causes of ROC state identity change. While the literature itself does not explicitly identify huadu, it does two things: first, it locates huadu epistemologically and, second, it constitutes huadu by progressively constructing a categorical distinction between Beijing and Taipei. The theories, frameworks and concepts used in the literature are of value to a synthetic RC approach as are the historical findings. In this way, the literature review creates a gap for huadu.

Chapter 3 outlines a RC theoretical framework that conceives of huadu as discursive power; that is, a form of legitimacy that maintains Taiwan’s de facto independence,

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delegitimates tongyi and taidu and compels Beijing to sanction it. In this way, Taipei’s relational power stalemates Beijing. The framework resolves realist-constructivist approaches by using the core-concepts of power politics and intersubjectivity and triangulates to DIG threat perception. In this way, it escapes the sterile language of positivism and scientific realism. In so doing, it constructs a two-level, three-stage RC model of huadu’s inter-subjective co-constitution in domestic and cross-Strait power politics.

Chapter 4 presents a state identity theoretical framework. This extends the RC theoretical framework to conceive of ROC state identity change as a form of legitimation constructed in crises of legitimacy. To do this, it acknowledges the modernist explanation of national identity in Taiwan and applies it to Wendtian understandings of state identity. Alexandrov’s concept of state identity politics (SIPs) show how huadu is disseminated in cross-Strait and domestic power politics.

Chapter 5 sketches this study’s novel discourse analytic approach. It adopts an applied linguistics approach to IR conceptions of discourse. The framework is a systematic combination of corpus linguistics (CL), Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) in the form of the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) and pragmatics. This approach does two things: first, while not going the full positivist hog, it permits empirically warranted evidence for interpretations based on pragmatic analysis and historical triangulation. Second, it distinguishes between Taipei’s diplomatic rhetoric and its authentic discourse of huadu. It is in this distinction that huadu is legitimated.

Chapter 6 is the first of three empirical chapters. It triangulates theory and methodology to historical events, using this study’s data to account for a process: the construction of Taiwan as Free China between the late 1940s and 1987. It argues that the ROC has been independent of China since 1949 and that its state identity change
legitimated this separateness, creating an independent ROC. Huadu was constituted first through sinification and bentuhua under Free China and, second, in an extended crisis of legitimacy after 1971 and, third, through further Taiwanisation and cross-Strait relations under a democratic ROC.

Chapter 7 applies theory and methodology to historical events to account for the nucleation of huadu between 1987 and 2008. Using this study’s data, it explores the political speech that constituted huadu in linguistic terms and triangulates to historical events, thus providing firm warrant for interpretations around the legitimation of huadu.

Chapter 8 is also empirical. It examines how huadu underwent the litmus test of Rapprochement with Beijing. It relates how contending domestic interests combined bottom-up with a powerful top-down discourse of huadu state identity to constitute ROC legitimacy and sovereignty, thus maintaining Taiwan’s de facto independence in the status quo. This chapter refutes the claim of much area studies research that domestic preferences prevented a China-identifying KMT from converging with China to a degree that threatened its de facto independence.

Chapter 9 presents a summary, conclusions and implications. These are that huadu accounts for Taiwan’s maintenance of its de facto independence as the ROC. This status secures Taiwan’s sovereignty and delegitimates China’s irredentist claim, since China deploys an anti-taidu, not an anti-huadu, discourse. In the process, Taipei compels Beijing to endorse huadu and, by extension, Taiwan’s sovereignty. The study is prescriptive in that it does not seek to predict cross-Strait outcomes. However, it argues that only huadu permits the status quo, that taidu and tongyi would result in ROC state death and that Beijing cannot violate huadu without
destroying its own legitimacy. This fragile situation secures peace and (potential) prosperity – a social purpose of power beyond security itself.
Chapter 2: Mapping the Literature on cross-Strait Relations

2.1. Introduction

This chapter reviews the literature on cross-Strait relations to ascertain the extent to which it answers the study’s central question: given China’s power preponderance, what accounts for Taiwan’s maintenance of its de facto independence? The review makes reference to a range of Political Science, Area Studies and IR research to provide intellectual, theoretical and methodological context. It establishes the argument that to answer the research question, no existing approach alone is adequate. Rather, one that foregrounds the discursive power of state identity is needed. For reasons of space and coherence around huadu and the ROC, the review intentionally excludes the literature on Beijing’s Taiwan policy.

While cross-Strait Relations as a political phenomenon and a field of study in IR began in 1987, this review’s key sources draw on the broader historical and area-studies literature on Taiwan going back to the 1950s. The major issues and debates addressed centre on Taiwan’s political status; China’s irredentist claim and resultant unification-independence debate; the cross-Strait balance of power and security dilemma; the definition of One China; democratisation and identity change in Taiwan – particularly the remarkable decline in Chinese and rise in Taiwanese national identity; the Washington-Taipei-Beijing strategic triangle; Washington’s and Taipei’s China policies; Taiwan’s domestic and party politics; the effects of KMT authoritarian rule; the role of interest groups and the reciprocal effect of all of these on cross-Strait relations and their meanings for the nature of the cross-Strait status quo. Salient themes are the tenacity and viability of the status quo; the puzzle of economic convergence alongside political divergence and Taiwan’s resistance to China’s superior power.
The realist tradition explains China’s lack of power to force unification in terms of cross-Strait balance of power, Chinese threat and security dilemma in the broader context of US-China relations and US commitment to Taiwan. Neoliberal approaches address power ambivalently in the context of economic convergence, seeing in it prospects for peace, but accepting that China may deploy economic power to coerce Taiwan. Constructivist approaches bring in the power of Taiwan’s norms, values and identities to account for its effective resistance to Chinese power. It is clear that the literature constructs Taiwan in the act of naming it.\(^{140}\) Yet, it does not satisfactorily explain how or why this identity operates to resist Beijing’s power.

Crucially, the literature review identifies the following gaps:

- None of the literature identifies the constitutive power of state identity in relation to domestic interests and Taiwan’s cross-Strait policy; There is no explicitly realist-constructivist research on cross-Strait relations;
- The literature is limited in its conceptualisation of Taiwan’s state identity. Much presupposes an inhibited binary choice between unification and de jure independence or linguistically implies a normative preference for de jure independence.
- There is almost no linguistics-driven discourse analytic research on Taiwanese political speech and, what there is is insufficient to locate textual warrant for Taiwan’s discursive power to maintain its autonomy from China;
- The existing literature does not adequately explain discursive power, legitimacy, state identity, security and interests in the context of Taiwan’s resistance to Chinese power.
- The existing literature does not adequately account for huadu and why Beijing sanctions it.

This chapter is organised as follows: section 2.2. outlines the political science, foreign policy and international legal literature around the KMT authoritarian period;

\(^{140}\) Harrison, Mark. 2006: 1-2.
section 2.3. covers Taiwan Area Studies; 2.4. covers the IR theoretical literature on cross-Strait relations, dividing it into neorealists, (neo)liberals, (neo)realists and neoclassical realists (NCR) and domestic realist strands; section 2.5. reviews the discourse analytic work on Taiwanese political speech and cross-Strait relations. The conclusion in 2.6. argues that the literature fails satisfactorily to explain Taiwan’s maintenance of its de facto independence because it does not locate state identity as a constitutive and overarching discourse. The literature on Taiwanese national identity and nationalism is dealt with in chapter four for two reasons. First, its size and scope detract from this chapter’s purpose in ascertaining to what extent other concepts, ontologies and epistemologies account for the study’s central puzzle. Second, its conflation of state, ethnic and national identities requires clarification in the context of state identity theory.

2.2. The KMT Authoritarian Period

The Taiwan Strait and Taiwan’s domestic politics became staples of US academic research from the 1950s primarily because of the ROC’s US proxy status vis-à-vis the PRC. Research on Taiwan’s security was linked to US China policy and Taiwan’s legal status. This early body of literature up to 1971 puts this study’s research question in context by highlighting a different perspective on China’s power preponderance and legitimacy; China was the ROC and US power had allowed it to subdue Taiwan but not the PRC.

US policy and diplomatic briefings during the 1950s and 1960s frame ROC power as US power and ROC identity formally as Chinese. Yet, US and ROC government documentation together construct a separate Taiwan. “Formosa” and “Free China” are the default names for the polity in the US literature. “Free China” and “Taiwan” prevail in the ROC’s own policy statements. The US-ROC alignment on “Free China”
itself linguistically qualifies Taipei’s Chinese-ness, while the Taiwan-Formosa opposition presents a paradox; US preference for “Formosa” aligns to the Taiwan Independence Movement’s (TIM) (q.v. 6.3.1.) preferred nomenclature, while the ROC’s use of “Taiwan” aligns the territory categorically to “Free China”. All three forms linguistically isolate the polity from China proper. Indeed, the US articulates a Free China that is not free as the “Formosa Problem”.

Certainly ideological, but with little explicit reference to political philosophy or theory, the literature frames Chiang Kai-shek as a flawed but loyal ally in the UN and Taipei’s non-relations with Beijing as the object of US policy decisions. A 1952 essay entitled Formosa Today, by Albert Ravenholt, is typical, calling for “military aid to Formosa” to repel the “Chinese Red Airforce”. Yet, in 1955, Arthur Dean argues for “flexible realism”: “the Peking government controls continental China” and “any prospect of stabilizing the Far East may of necessity entail that we negotiate with it,” the US holds that “the Government of Nationalist China on Formosa,” is the legitimate government of all of China, including “Formosa” and the US does not recognise the “Red Chinese Government”. In 1960, the US position is only clear on what it will not do: i.e. not recognise Beijing or accept PRC accession to the UN, since this would entail US recognition of PRC sovereignty over “the province of Formosa” and the ROC would reject a two-China UN solution. These early studies spawned a body of legal research on Taiwan’s status that was mostly confined to scholarly journals. O’Connell (1956), Walker (1959) and Jain (1963) are

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142 Ibid: 33
clearly relevant in revealing a gap between legality and legitimacy.\textsuperscript{146} This pre-1971 literature supports the KMT narrative of Taiwan as the repository of an authentic China. Yet, it is ambivalent on whether its separation from the mainland is temporary. Ralph Clough’s \textit{Island China} (1968) and Leonard Gordon’s \textit{Taiwan: Studies in Chinese Local History} (1970) are typical.\textsuperscript{147} Apart from Young’s (1968) volume on negotiating with the PRC, there are few studies of what might now be termed cross-Strait relations and, even then, the relations are not cross-Strait but cross-Ocean.\textsuperscript{148}

Analyses of social, industrial and agricultural development like George Barclay’s \textit{Colonial Development and Population in Taiwan} (1954) and Neil Jacoby’s \textit{US Aid to Taiwan} (1966)\textsuperscript{149} stand out among dry hagiographies to ROC land reform and economic development,\textsuperscript{150} the legal and political status of Taiwan\textsuperscript{151} and historical and social studies that place Taiwan squarely within a pan-Chinese cultural and social sphere.\textsuperscript{152} However, it is the work that links these themes to US policy that


\textsuperscript{147} See also: Koo, Anthony Y.C. 1968. The Role of Land Reform in Economic Development: A Case Study of Taiwan; The Journal of Economic History 29(3): 574-575.


makes the legitimation of the ROC on Taiwan a salient theme. The implicit reference to classical realist notions of diplomacy, prudence, morality and caution in the practice of power is clear in US restraining policy on Chiang Kai-shek. These studies account not so much for China’s inability to subdue Taiwan as for US support for and restraining power on Taipei.

Some sinologists recognised the dilemma. C.P. Fitzgerald argues that Taiwan “should be freed from the Nationalist regime, which is locally detested, and left under a Government of its own inhabitants, guaranteed by the United Nations”. John Fairbank (1957) repeatedly interrogates ROC legitimacy, lamenting “we support Chiang Kai-shek’s claim to represent the Chinese one-quarter of mankind, though the chances of his regaining the mainland are so dim as to be invisible.” George Kerr’s seminal work of scholarly reportage, Formosa Betrayed (1965) stands out in igniting international awareness of authoritarian KMT rule and US complicity, using eye-witness testimony of the 2-28 Incident and White Terror.

Richard Wilson’s 1968 study of political attitudes among mainlander and Taiwanese children and Sheldon Appleton’s Taiwanese and Mainlanders on Taiwan (1970), which interviews university students, makes salient an embryonic Taiwanese national identity. Peng Ming-min’s classic autobiography and position paper, A Taste of Freedom (1970), outlines a programme for Taiwanese (Formosan) self-salvation, rejects Chinese Nationalist rule as illegitimate and draws explicitly on Renan’s modernist concept of the nation. Much subsequent nationalism studies

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154 Fitzgerald, C.P. cited in Harrison, 2006: 34.
156 Kerr, George. 2017 [1965].
literature on Taiwanese national identity (q.v. 4.2.) develops Peng’s normative approach.

Taiwan becomes problematised in the literature following US rapprochement with Beijing in 1971. US studies name Taiwan and locate the security dilemma in the Taiwan Strait and its meaning for the US strategic balancing. Foreign policy studies point to uncertain US Taiwan policy and diplomatic and security strategy.\(^{158}\) For the first time, the logical inconsistency of recognising two Chinese states is revealed and the potential abandonment of Taiwan is explored.\(^{159}\)

Although Earl Ravenal presages OCRI with explicit permutations on the meaning of China,\(^{160}\) Taiwan independence (taidu) is not a major theme in the early literature. Indeed, Wei Yung’s framing of Taipei’s dilemma as one between continued confrontation between and unification of two Chinese states is typical.\(^{161}\) While Taipei certainly perceives Beijing as a threat because of its irredentist claim, there is no question in these studies that the PRC poses a military threat to the ROC’s existence. The literature certainly accounts for Nationalist China’s subjugation of Taiwan, but it does not interrogate why the PRC is unable to do so. Rather, it questions the legitimacy of the ROC.


The meaning of Taiwan’s domestic politics for ROC legitimacy becomes a focus of study after 1971. A number of studies in the years between Kissinger’s first visit to China in 1971 and the US’s final de-recognition of the ROC in 1979 focus on socio-political change in the context of latent Taiwanese nationalism. Elite identity transformation and economic development are identified as the causes of domestic transformation that has significantly altered the relationship between state and society. Mab Huang and Tien Hung-mao stand out in addressing socio-political change with an eye on the nascent Taiwanisation (bentuhua) movement. Their work is among the earliest to conceptualise Taiwan’s domestic political change in terms of confrontation between a Chinese governing elite and local Taiwanese political actors. Drawing on comparative political theory, Arthur Lerman (1978) traces a switch to local Taiwanese power through paternalistic relations between local leaders and elected officials in the late 1960s – earlier than indicated in other sources. However, he notes the contingency of Taiwan’s “fledgling state of political development”, noting that KMT power elites may find Taiwanese power intolerable.

The dramatic domestic events of the late 1970s developed earlier research on conflicting legal claims to the name of China, political change in Taiwan and the dangwai movement. The 1979 Kaohsiung Incident and subsequent trial sparked three themes in the scholarly literature of the 1970s and 1980s which have remained dominant up to the 2010s. These are the security dilemma, Taiwan’s legal and

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political status and the effects of historical political repression.\textsuperscript{164} *Huadu* speaks to all three.

A small number of works exposes a tension between Taipei’s China policy and the KMT’s domestic policy. John Copper (1979) and Thomas Bellows (1976) take Taiwan’s foreign policy strategies as their focus. The context of US-PRC rapprochement and loss of diplomatic partners is ameliorated by US defence guarantees in response to persistent KMT diplomacy. While no direct link between domestic and foreign policy is identified, it is clear that these are reciprocally driven. Bellows refers to Taiwan as a “nation” yet appears ideologically committed to US recognition of the ROC. At the same time, he identifies diplomatic adjustments and its policy of “national revival in Taiwan” as reasons for the ROC’s survival, thus presaging state identity change as a theme.\textsuperscript{165}

The link between cross-Strait material power and legitimacy becomes salient again in Chiu Huangdah’s *China and the Taiwan Issue* (1979).\textsuperscript{166} Chiu focuses on legal claims to sovereignty and legitimacy and predicts incremental political change in the context of the KMT’s orderly democratic reforms, but rules out constitutional change. In examining Taipei’s claim to legitimacy, however, Chiu discards a negotiated unification with the PRC since the KMT party state’s identity rules it out. In doing so, he opens space for this study’s conception of legitimacy as something beyond legal recognition.

\textsuperscript{164} American Institute in Taiwan. 1980. *Transcripts of the Trial of the Kaohsiung Eight*. Taipei: AIT.
\textsuperscript{165} Copper, John F. 1979. *Taiwan’s Strategy and America’s China Policy*. ORBIS 21(2): 261-276;
These studies are relevant to this study in that they set the historical, diplomatic and policy context in line with classical realist principles. In addition, they construct a *huadu* discourse by legitimating a separate ROC identity. They also identify an embryonic domestic-cross-Strait policy link. They do not directly query why China is unable to force unification since the ROC retained a material preponderance at the time and still claimed to be China. However, in addition to pointing out a Taiwanese interest in not being China, they presuppose a joint ROC and Taiwanese interest in not being part of the PRC, thus creating space for an analysis of *huadu* in terms of legitimacy. The domestic and systemic roots of Taipei’s loss of legitimacy that catalysed the elite and DIG-led aspects of its change in state identity are derived from the literature’s identification of this interest. In this regard, this early literature provides valuable insights that subsequent literature builds on.

Criticised as journalism and historiography and for a lack of theory in the wake of new developments in IR research, these studies were subsumed by the tide of specialisation in the discipline of Taiwan Studies that began in the 1990s and was prompted by the rapid political, economic, cultural and social transformations that occurred in Taiwan during the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy. Writing in the wake of Huntington’s (1991) Third Wave Democracy, Christopher Hughes, Denny Roy, Bruce Jacobs, Shelley Rigger, and Alan Wachman stand out as scholars who traced the shift in ROC identity with democratisation, Chinese and Taiwanese nationalism key factors. Developing earlier historical, sociological and comparative politics approaches, this research group argued that a reciprocal process


of state and national identity transformation and democratisation changed Taiwan’s national interest and Taiwanised the ROC, causing it to diverge from China and abandon any interest in unification. This suggests that that the ROC’s inability to subdue Taiwan was a function of Taiwan’s identity-driven interest in separation from China.

2.3. Taiwan Studies

Apart from Lerman’s work above, there was a paucity of scholarly materials that took a theoretical position on domestic politics in Taiwan at the end of the 1980s.169 Taiwan’s transition to democracy during the 1990s allowed Western scholars to access previously unavailable sources and produce well-researched general political histories of Taiwan.170 However, three seminal texts: Tien Hung-mao’s The Great Transition: Political and Social Change in the Republic of China, Thomas Gold’s State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle and Cheng Tun-jen’s Democratizing the quasi-Leninist regime in Taiwan, stand out as exceptions.171 Additionally, Marc Cohen’s Taiwan at the Crossroads (1988) is salient for its close historical description and explanation of domestic policy decisions as responses to identity-driven liberalisation.172 Gold’s volume “awakened the field” of Taiwan Studies, by using frameworks of dependency, world systems and development that had been applied to

Latin America. Tien’s study is the most comprehensive examination of the final days of military rule and the influence of Cheng’s and Cohen’s ground-breaking research introduced Taiwan to the comparative politics field by applying the transition framework.

Since these seminal works, the study of the relationship between Taiwan’s domestic politics and cross-Strait relations within Taiwan Studies has expanded rapidly. The main research strands of value to this study are derived from theoretically-driven and policy-oriented research that deals with themes of power politics; social change, national and state identity, democratisation and democratic consolidation; constitutional and institutional change; partisan, factional and DIG politics; diplomacy; policymaking; sovereignty and security. One observation concerning this strand is the positivist nature of its cause-and-effect analysis; certain historical events, or watersheds, are identified as prompting one-way shifts in domestic power from Chinese to Taiwanese, causing a domestic preference for democracy and thus prompting state identity change. What is important for a RC approach, however, is the intersubjective and co-constitutive nature of such events.

The foreign policy literature published during the 2000s responds to Taipei’s attempts to change the discourse around Taiwan’s political status and is useful for this study in that it describes how Taipei’s elites make policy and the influences on it. Richard Bush’s (2005) absorbing and thoroughly researched study stands out since it is based on first-hand experience and access to ROC policy elites. Bush was Washington’s de facto ambassador to Taipei.

(2008) delineates how nationalism and national identity, the consolidation of democracy and party and local politics in Taiwan have consequences for Taipei’s cross-Strait policy.\textsuperscript{176} While these studies do not utilise concepts or theories of power, they explicate the nature of the relationship among perceived threat, domestic politics and cross-Strait relations.

A series of post-2008 scholarly collaborations suggests China is unable to subdue Taiwan because systemic factors, domestic partisan conflict and the identity cleavage constrained the 2008-16 KMT administration’s policy choices, leading it to diverge politically.\textsuperscript{177} These suggest a RC inflection. First, Kevin Cai’s (2011) edited study of changes in cross-Strait institutions identifies a pattern of policy adjustment on both sides since 1979 resulting from both external and domestic factors.\textsuperscript{178} Second, Hu Weixing’s study concludes that dialogue is unlikely to change Taiwan’s preferences.\textsuperscript{179} Similarly, David Huang argues that the ECFA will not lead to closer political relations because of identity-driven domestic power struggles in Taiwan,\textsuperscript{180} while Shu Keng and Emmy Lin point out Beijing’s “persuasive economic statecraft” has not persuaded the Taiwanese public on unification.\textsuperscript{181} Both Cai and Hu see Ma as constrained because of domestic opposition to closer political engagement. At the same time, any future DPP administration will be unable to move towards de jure

\textsuperscript{178} Cai, Kevin. ed. 2011.
\textsuperscript{179} Hu, Weixiang. ed. 2013.
independence because of Beijing’s stated position. This invites interrogation of ROC state identity as a possible source of domestic preferences.

Jean-Pierre Cabestan and Jacques deLisle’s (2014) edited volume on political changes under Ma Ying-jieou’s administration takes the conversation up to the Sunflower occupation in March 2014. Their general thrust is that, domestic and ideational variables notwithstanding, overarching structural factors constrain Taiwan’s choices and weigh the balance of power in Beijing’s favour. In this regard, it aligns broadly to Ripsman et al’s (2016) NCR stance on power in the system. Yet, this still leaves the puzzle of why China is unable to subdue Taiwan and raises the question of what power Taiwan has. Cabestan and deLisle (2014) look to how partisan, DIG and elite power struggles combined to constrain Ma’s allegedly contentious cross-Strait policy choices. Christopher Hughes’ chapter claims that Ma substantially reversed Lee and Chen’s Taiwanisation policies against domestic preferences and were more China-identifying than they needed to be to maintain the status quo. This claim is challenged by the data in this study, but it reflects both a common liberal-inflected argument and a recognition that domestic and cross-Strait politics invariably cross-cut.

These studies suggest that China is unable to subdue Taiwan and force unification because the power of Taiwan’s national identity operates bottom-up through domestic political struggle to create a national interest in maintaining the status quo.

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184 Cabestan, Jean-Pierre and deLisle, Jacques. 2014.
Problematically, however, they also assume that Ma’s imputed Chinese identity implies policy preferences that domestic interests constrain; this is an essentially liberal-nationalist argument and (Cabestan and de Lisle aside) it does not isolate power conceptually. The strand provides clear epistemological insights that inform a RC approach. However, although they identify domestic constraints as a factor hindering alleged preferences, they fail to identify ROC state identity and its legitimation as a reason why China lacks the power to subdue Taiwan in the first place.

2.4. IR Scholarship on cross-Strait Relations

The historical, comparative politics and area studies literature is useful in that it provides data, observation and insights on historical events that can be drawn on to explain this study’s central puzzle. However, to account for Taiwan’s power as an explanation for China’s failure to subdue it, a clear understanding of how, and under what conditions, power operates is necessary. This section argues that IR theory allows the most credible assessment of Taiwan’s power to resist China. It focuses on the main paradigmatic approaches to the puzzles addressed in this study and reviews recent studies to assess their appropriateness, to identify gaps and to make suggestions for further development.

Wu Yu-shan made a plea for theoretical guidance in 2000 when he emphasised that analysis of cross-Strait relations needed to move “beyond journalistic accounts of events, partisan arguments, policy debates, and wishful thinking”.

As Wu argues, “only by theorising on cross-Strait relations can we get a firm grasp of the subject,

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and avoid being driven by ephemeral incidents and breaking news.”187 Amitav Acharya echoes Wu’s rationale with plea for a more theoretical approach.188 His utilitarian justifications are clearly aimed at policy makers in Taiwan. First, theory explains and produces better policy. Second, it helps leaders learn from others’ experiences. Third, it works as an organisational tool to make sense of different perspectives on the same events. Finally, it allows actors to anticipate events. In sum, it permits more considered policy responses and allows leaders to know why they are doing what they are doing.189 The following sub-sections review the IR theoretically-driven literature under broad neorealist, neoliberal and constructivist headings and examine one particular approach - Neoclassical Realism (NCR) - that has sought to resolve the systemic-domestic tension in terms of power, identity and foreign policy. The section concludes that, while these approaches provide valuable insights into Taiwan’s maintenance of its de facto independence, they fail satisfactorily to account for when, how and why Taiwan leverages its power.

2.4.1. Neorealist IR Literature

Studies of Taipei’s cross-Strait security policy see Taiwan’s oscillating defensive posture driven by the US-Taiwan-China triangle. These explain Taipei’s resistance to Chinese power in terms of deterrence and theories of balancing or bandwagoning.190 Some cross-Strait balance-of-power analysis is ambivalent on whether Taiwan itself

188 Acharya, Amitav. 1999. International Relations Theory and cross-Strait Relations. Proceedings of the International Forum on Peace and Security in the Taiwan Strait, Taipei, Taiwan, July 26-28 1999. [Online] Available at: http://www.imas.nccu.edu.tw/Syllabus/%E6%98%9F%E6%9C%9F%E4%B8%80%E5%8F%B0%E6%B5%B7%E9%97%9C%E4%BF%82-%E8%A2%81%E6%98%93/1/Amitav%20Acharya.pdf [Accessed 15 September 2011].
189 Acharya, Amitav. 1999: 1-2
balances China; it explains China’s inability to subdue Taiwan as a function of Taiwan’s alignment to superior US power and situational determinants like economic dependence and military capabilities. As Taiwan’s relative cross-Strait power declined, studies argued that Taiwan’s asymmetric dependence meant it was gaining relatively less than China, leading to economic insecurity and recourse to national security rather than economic cooperation. This argument explains China’s inability to subdue Taiwan in terms of the security externality problem, hegemonic stability and alliance relationships along with relative gains theory. It reinforces Gilpin’s argument that economic interdependence may actually be a source of conflict. That is, economic interdependence reduces China’s power and increases Taiwan’s power. Yet, the neorealist literature cannot explain why Taipei would not seek de jure independence in taidu, opting instead for huadu. The neorealist literature in general takes the US-China strategic relationship as its framework. Rejecting the notion of Taiwan’s de facto independence as simply a function of enduring CCP-KMT rivalry, Alan Wachman provides a compelling argument for Taiwan’s status as contested “buffer or bridgehead”. Drawing directly on Balance of Power and Balance of Threat and on classical realist conceptions of power politics, Wachman locates Taiwan in the context of the US-China and US-China-Japan strategic triangles. Wu  

194 Wachman, Alan. 2002. Credibility and the US Defense of Taiwan: Nullifying the Notion of a Taiwan Threat. Issues & Studies.38(1); Wachman, Alan. 2009. Thinking about a Healthy Military
Chengqiu uses Game Theory to argue that the US has maintained the cross-Strait balance of threat, thus accounting in structural terms for China’s inability to subdue Taiwan. To this extent, these studies explain Taiwan’s de facto independence in terms of power and threat at the systemic level, but they do not consider how power legitimates state identity at the interstate or domestic levels.

Several important studies from the 2000s that draw on structural deterrence theory to assess prospects for stable cross-Strait relations explain China’s failure to subdue Taiwan. Robert Ross and Thomas Christensen’s work is seminal and identifies preferences, perceptions and capabilities as determining cross-Strait dynamics. First, China respects US power and resolve; second, China has the power to impose catastrophic costs on Taiwan in the event of taidu, and Taipei respects this; third, China seeks to deter taidu rather than enforce tongyi, and Taiwan knows this. Ross’s findings suggest stable security dilemma dynamics account for China’s inability to subdue Taiwan. US power aside, as long as Taiwan adopts a defensive posture and does not declare taidu it is free to engage with China and to remain secure. In this context, superior Chinese power simply permits Taiwan to deploy other forms of power more effectively than Beijing.

Balance in the Taiwan Strait. Asia Policy, 8 (1); Wachman, Alan. 2008. Why Taiwan? Geostrategic Rationales for China’s Territorial Integrity. Stanford University Press.
Christensen however argues that Taipei’s identity and its perception of Chinese threat mean cross-Strait stability is less stable than in Ross’s assessment. The very fact that Taiwan threatens its state identity, rather than territory, is destabilising for Beijing because it makes it potentially easier for Taiwan to declare *taidu*. The logic of preventive war suggests that if the US does not signal strongly to Taipei that it will not tolerate *taidu*, this may signal to Beijing a lack of US commitment that ends up enabling Taiwan’s permanent separation from China. This would prompt Chinese military action. Christensen’s argument approximates but misreads the nature of Taiwan’s power. In doing so, it also provides an explanation for China’s inability to subdue Taiwan. Taiwan’s defensive posture is in fact to do with its state identity; however, it is also territorial. The ROC’s 1991 constitutional reforms constituted the ROC as de facto territorially bounded within the Taiwan Area. *Huadu* allows Taipei discursively to project an identity-driven defensive posture as a territorially-driven one, thus respecting Beijing’s realist stance, stabilising deterrence, ensuring that China is unable to subdue it and maintaining Taiwan’s autonomy. Structural Deterrence Theory, like Neorealism itself, sees the key to international stability in the distribution of power within the system in general, and among the great powers in particular. Thus, logically it explains Taiwan’s resistance to Chinese power as epiphenomenal to China-US power relations. Yet, Christensen’s argument exposes great power anxiety around neighbouring secondary powers’ policies; in doing so, it opens a gap for constructivist approaches to cross-Strait power and identity. Some foreign policy work has coalesced around Ross and Christensen’s arguments to explore the risks posed to Taiwan’s security by the rapidly shifting balance of power.\(^{199}\) Mostly, however, there has been little systemic rationalist theorising on

how China’s deployment of power provokes Taiwan’s resistance to Chinese power. Since Chinese power influences the broader IR literature, its reciprocal effect on Taiwan’s power ought to be analysed more systematically.

John Mearsheimer’s Offensive Realism sees Taipei resisting Beijing only as a function of US power balancing. ²⁰⁰ Mearsheimer fails to acknowledge the ameliorating effect of classical realist principles on power politics. For Mearsheimer, only US power constrains China and guarantees Taiwan’s survival; yet this is to ignore the effect of diplomacy, culture, ideas, restraint, negotiation and statecraft in cross-Strait relations. Granted, he acknowledges that nationalism rather than core neorealist principles is determinant, thus leaving space for Taipei’s unique form of state identity.

Other studies build on Taiwan’s oscillating defensive posture driven by the US-Taiwan-China triangle. Neorealism infers that power disparity can lead to a switch in alliance structures, changes in polarity, power disparity and power transition. ²⁰¹ Additionally, it asserts that a switch in leadership may prompt a reversal in policy, leading some liberal theorists to take leaders’ ideologies as evidence of their foreign policy priorities.²⁰² The deployment of these in studies of post-2008 Rapprochement under Ma and in liberal-inflected neoclassical realist studies attempts to explain

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perceived oscillation in Taipei’s policy in terms of leaders’ identity and ideology-driven preferences. Yet, this raises the question of why China’s is unable to compel Taiwan into tongyi when it converges with it.\footnote{203} Drawing on Alliance Politics Theory, Wu Yu-shan (2015) acknowledges that Taiwan is constrained from declaring taidu.\footnote{204} Yet, he does not say why this does not lead to tongyi.\footnote{205} 

One foreign policy model derived from Neorealism explains China’s inability to compel Taiwan to accept unification as a function of US strategic ambiguity. Benson’s (2012) General Theory of Alliance Commitments sees strategic ambiguity as an optimal response to relative power shifts and transitions in preferences.\footnote{206} Elite struggle within the US determines whether US commitment to Taiwan will be unconditional, conditional or ambiguous (q.v. 2.4.4.). To the degree that US intervention will shape a cross-Strait conflict in Taiwan’s favour and that US elites share a commitment to Taiwan’s elite’s ideal cross-Strait outcomes, optimal US policy is more or less likely to approach unconditional or ambiguous commitment to Taiwan. As an explanation of China’s inability to compel unification, however, this theory falls short. All the above create space for RC to explore huadu as Taiwan’s discursive power.

2.4.2. (Neo)liberal IR Literature

The neoliberal literature explains China’s inability to subdue Taiwan in terms of the power of liberal norms. The influence of post-Cold-War liberal thinking on cross-Strait policy elites in the early 1990s cannot be underestimated. In the wake of

\textit{See:} Lin, Syaru Shirley. 2016. \hfill 203
\textit{Ibid:} 31 \hfill 205


increasing Taiwanese investment in China, economic interdependence and
democratic-peace theorists like Francis Fukuyama and Bruce Russett began to
influence policy elites in Washington, Taipei and Beijing.\textsuperscript{207} Liberal scholars believed
that Taiwan’s democratisation meant cross-Strait economic and cultural links would
mitigate mutual hostility and lead to a stable \textit{modus vivendi}.\textsuperscript{208} Some went further,
stressing that Cross-Strait and US-China economic linkages would make military
confrontation over Taiwan too costly to even consider.\textsuperscript{209} Michael Yahuda claimed
Beijing recognised this and would not risk China’s hard-won economic growth, the
basis of the CCP’s legitimacy.\textsuperscript{210} Yet, the liberal literature seems unable to account
for the ongoing puzzle of cross-Strait political hostility and close economic ties that
are a function of China’s inability to enforce unification because they implies the
practice of power and identity. As such, it simply makes salient the paradox of
Taiwan’s resistance to China’s power.\textsuperscript{211}

\textsuperscript{207} Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. \textit{The End of History and the Last Man}. London: Hamish Hamilton;
\textsuperscript{208} Robinson, Thomas. 1998. [Inter]dependence in China’s Post-Cold War Foreign Relations, in
since the Cold War}. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
\textsuperscript{209} Cable, Vincent and Peter Ferdinand. 1994. China as an Economic Giant: Threat or Opportunity?
\textit{International Affairs}, 70 (2), 243–61; Rosecrance, Richard and Gu Guoliang. eds. 2009. \textit{Power and
\textsuperscript{210} Yahuda, Michael. 2003. \textit{The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific}. Abingdon: Routledge
Curzon.
\textsuperscript{211} Wu Yu-shan. 1995. Economic reform, cross-Straits relations, and the politics of issue linkage. In
Cheng Tun-jen, Huang Chi and Wu, Samuel S.G. eds. \textit{Inherited Rivalry: Conflict across the Taiwan
Straits}. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 111–133; Leng Tse-kang. 1996. The Taiwan-China
Connection: Democracy and Development across the Taiwan Straits. Boulder: Westview Press; Chu
Yun-han. 1997. The political economy of Taiwan’s mainland policy. \textit{Journal of Contemporary China},
Interdependence}. Glenview: Scott, Foresman and Company.
Despite this, post-2008 Rapprochement led to the renewed popularity of liberal scholars such as David Baldwin who claimed that interdependence represented too costly a relationship to break.\footnote{212} Chung (2008; 2010) hailed Rapprochement as the vindication of liberal IR theories and of Ma’s liberal policies.\footnote{213} Some studies use liberal IR theory to focus on the determinants of deepening economic integration.\footnote{214} Kastner (2009) emphasises the power of norms to shape cross-Strait economic policy; suggesting that internationalist business interests prevented Taiwan from effectively restricting cross-Strait exchange, thus suggesting a less powerful policy elite. Syaru Lin’s (2016) study comes to the same conclusion from a liberal-inflected political economy stance.\footnote{215} Yet, this research cannot explain why, if domestic interests determine policy, Taipei has continued to maintain the status quo. Clearly, liberal conceptions of power are of value to this study as they address why Taipei might appeal to and deploy the power of liberal norms to secure its sovereignty. However, they do not account for the constitutive source of Taiwan’s power, which this study locates in ROC state identity.

A broader liberal literature explains China’s failure to compel unification in terms of costs to China and a desire for stability. It examines the political consequences of deeper cross-Strait economic convergence. Some studies draw on Commercial Liberalism to consider whether cross-Strait economic ties reduce the risk of war. For instance, McDonald (2009) develops a cross-Strait case study to argue for the Capitalist Peace. He claims that competitive private markets and reductions in trade

\begin{footnotes}
\item[215] Lin, Syaru Shirley. 2016.
\end{footnotes}
barriers reduce the risks of war among states. \footnote{216} In the cross-Strait case, large-scale cross-Strait trade and investment flows have created powerful domestic interests on both sides favouring peace. This allays fears in Beijing that Taiwan may be drifting toward \textit{taidu}, and further encourages Chinese restraint. \footnote{217} Similarly, Steve Chan (2009) suggests Taipei’s willingness to engage in extensive cross-Strait economic convergence represents a tacit assurance not to declare \textit{taidu} and therefore not to escalate political and military tension, given the costs.\footnote{218} Peng Li (2013) views the ECFA as facilitating stability because it increases the costs of war, makes elites more cautious and helps reinforce China’s preferred policy of peaceful reunification with Taiwan.\footnote{219} Gartzke and Li (2013) claim that cross-Strait economic integration fosters peace by enabling both sides to signal resolve more credibly; it makes both economies more sensitive to tension; any threats that are made therefore become more costly and credible, thereby reducing the risk that conflict could arise from misperception.\footnote{220} Yet, this liberal peace argument in the case of cross-Strait relations is incoherent. It cannot explain China’s failure and Taiwan’s continued divergence. These studies explain China’s inability to compel Taiwan to unify in terms of costs to China, but not how Taiwan might deploy power in that knowledge. Costs aside, the desire for stability appears to be a discursively constructed norm that reflects

\footnote{216} McDonald, Patrick. 2009. The Invisible Hand of Peace: Capitalism, the War Machine, and International Relations Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 15. \\
\footnote{217} Ibid. \\
power. As IR, Neoliberalism recognizes the nation state, so must presuppose that Taiwan seeks sovereignty and that it exercises power in its national interest. None of these studies, however, examine power per se as a determinant or a consequence. This leaves a gap to see Rapprochement as the enactment of Taiwan’s, not China’s, power.

Other liberal studies claim economic integration gives China leverage and influence over Taiwan. Much economic statecraft literature highlights Taiwan’s vulnerability and asymmetrical dependence on China. By 2000, the literature pointed to a potential Hirschman-like effect in Taiwan, in which taishang would lobby to relax Taiwan’s defensive posture.221 This acknowledges that states may deploy economic power; in China’s case using liberal free trade agreements to hollow out and annex Taiwan by stealth. Indeed, post-2014 liberal scholarship acknowledges closer economic integration increases China’s power over Taiwan.

Conversely, Doug Fuller’s observation that some pan-Green Taiwanese domestic responses to ECFA were based on threat misperception opens space for this study’s claim that Taiwan’s huadu state identity operated through elite and interest group discourses, rather than Taiwanese national identity at the domestic level constraining elites. ECFA, he claims, was merely a diversion that would neither increase Beijing’s power over Taiwan nor hasten convergence.222 This suggests economic integration itself actually accounts for China’s inability to compel Taiwan to unify because state identity becomes operative in that process.

The literature on soft power actually exposes Taiwan’s weakness while claiming that it is potentially stronger than China. Global rankings tend to exclude Taiwan because

221 Sterling-Folker. 2009.
of China’s relative soft-power strength in public diplomacy. The Soft Power 30, for instance, ranks China 25th, yet excludes Taiwan completely because it is not recognised as a state.\(^{223}\) Joseph Nye has written admiringly of China’s soft power, but concludes that it is an area in which it is weak.\(^{224}\) Conversely, Shelley Rigger sees soft power as an area in which Taiwan is potentially stronger than China; Taiwan accrues power from liberal norms to gain international support. Yet, Jacques deLisle claims Taiwan can only use soft power because of the hard-power advantage it retains through the US.\(^{225}\) Rawnsley (2014) sees Taiwan’s structural soft power resources as weak, however, arguing that elite agency is required to transform these into power.\(^{226}\) A problem with soft power as an explanation for both Taiwan’s maintenance of its de facto independence and China’s failure to compel unification is that, not only is it conceptually vague, it also assumes that liberal norms are self-evidently preferential without exploring the material power liberal states have to back up such norms. Indeed, the Taiwan case may highlight a fundamental flaw in the soft power thesis; for a state to project soft power, international recognition is a prerequisite. That legitimacy trumps liberal democratic values and soft power is the

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preserve of those who have the coercive power to deploy it.\textsuperscript{227} So, any attempt to account for China’s failure to force unification and Taiwan’s resistance can discard soft power. The term’s inherent vagueness fails to account for what provides Taiwan with power in the first place.\textsuperscript{228} It is the existence of the ROC rather than liberal democratic values per se that provides Taiwan with power. After all, an authoritarian Free China retained power preponderance over Beijing. The rationalist literature above cannot fully account for Taiwan’s maintenance of its de facto independence because, first, it does not adequately explore alternative conceptions of power politics and discursive power; second, it does not fully explore how state identity change has changed Taipei’s interests and preferences. This creates space for constructivist readings to show first, how power politics, discourse and identity are contingent and intersubjectively constructed and, second, how rationalist explanations do not fully account for seemingly irrational state behaviour.

In short, the literature on the political and security implications of cross-Strait economic ties examines how and why economic ties might create an influence effect in Taiwan, thereby increasing China’s power and reducing Taiwan’s. Hence, these studies simply further entrench the puzzle. They say a lot about threat perception, but not much about why China cannot translate its power into subjugation of Taiwan. These studies themselves raise the question of the discursive power of Taipei’s state identity.


2.4.3. Constructivist IR Literature

A growing body of research draws on non-rationalist IR approaches to account for discursive power and threat perception in cross-Strait relations. There is ethnographic research on cross-Strait identities that takes a thick constructivist angle; Harrison (2006) and Hwang (2007) stand out. However, most IR contributions adopt the thinner constructivism of Onuf, Wendt and Katzenstein. Constructivist research suggests Taiwan perceives an ideational threat in China’s power and responds to it accordingly. While some argue that Beijing’s cross-Strait policy tends towards realist perspectives on pragmatic grounds, a significant body of research highlights nationalist sentiment within China constructing an irredentist claim to Taiwan. Rex Li argues that this threat is driven by the power of Chinese nationalism encoded in Beijing’s cross-Strait policy. William Callaghan and Peter Hayes Gries locate China’s claim to Taiwan in a discourse of a peaceful rise and great power status grounded in the Century of Humiliation as evidence of a strong constructivist vein historically promoted by Beijing’s policymakers.

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234 Li, Rex. 2009.

Although not strictly Constructivists, Zhang Yongjin and Zhao Shuisheng claim the PRC’s post-Tiananmen, post-Cold-War Patriotic Education Campaign directly constructed Beijing’s "Great Power" (daguo) state identity and, by extension, its cross-Strait policy. In this context, Taiwan is daguo’s crucial missing piece and one without which national humiliation will never be expunged. This rich research provides a constructivist context for China’s claim to Taiwan. It shows how Beijing constructed Taiwan as a threat to its ontological security and how this, in turn, created cross-Strait threat perception (q.v. 4.6.3.). It helps understand how KMT Chinese Nationalism constructed Taiwan as a bastion of Free China, simultaneously creating a Taiwanese Self and a Chinese Communist Other. Most of all, it accounts for the intensity of China’s discourse of national reunification. However, it does not explain why China is unable effectively to use this discourse to enforce unification or why the KMT discarded it. Nor does it account for the power of Taipei’s state identity. To fully account for the influence of ideational factors on Taipei’s cross-Strait policy, ROC identity change is crucial.

A body of constructivist research has developed around the construction of Taiwanese and cross-Strait identities and interests that challenges both rationalist and Chinese nationalist explanations. This strand provides plausible insights into China’s inability to coerce Taiwan and, more pertinently, the discursive power of Taiwanese national identity to resist China. Dean Chen draws on Wendt to challenge the


rationalist belief that China’s conciliatory Taiwan policy on OCRI during
rapprochement was strategic and cynical. Rather, he argues, the shifting discursive
meaning of One China genuinely changed Chinese policymakers’ perceptions of
Taiwan.239 Li Yitan (2014) suggests that this identity change accounts for the paradox
of economic convergence and political divergence. As such, this suggests Beijing’s
endorsement of huadu – a claim that this study seeks to return to.

2.4.4. Neoclassical Realist and Domestic Realist IR Literature

Neoclassical Realism (NCR) is a strand of Realism that draws on Constructivism to
explore how domestic identities impact on foreign policy in the face of systemic
power constraints. As an attempt to meld the domestic, the state and the systemic
levels, it addresses this study’s theoretical framework. Drawing on earlier Taiwan
Studies research and, crucially for this study in theoretical terms, Robert Putnam’s two-level game, 240 NCR and other domestic realist approaches
provide a number of narrative case studies of how Taiwan has responded to the rise
in China’s relative power. 241 These studies suggest China’s inability to subdue
Taiwan is a function not of its direct relative material capabilities and power position,
but of Taiwan’s indirect power position; that is, power filtered through Taiwan’s
domestic identities.

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Amitav Acharya, for instance, accounts for Lee Teng-hui’s motivations for his state-to-state relations comment on the grounds of domestic partisan imperatives.242 One of the most fascinating studies in this regard is Su Chi’s *Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China: A Tail Wagging Two Dogs* (2009).243 This account of Taipei and Beijing’s moves towards detente during the 1990s provides first-hand accounts of the domestic political forces within Taiwan that impacted on cross-Strait policy decisions. Concentrating on the struggle for power within the KMT and between the KMT and the DPP, the book invites a domestic explanation of Taiwan’s cross-Strait policy centred on power politics. In this regard, it is realist. Yet, Su’s analysis also sheds light on how Taiwan’s state identity changed and was deployed in cross-Strait policy. Lee Teng-hui, as a skilled political entrepreneur, was able to manipulate the post-1995 tension between a prevailing “heart” of Taiwanese national identity and a state-centred “head” that sought to maintain the status quo. However, he was only able to do this in the domestic context; when he touched on the status quo “taboo” in his Two States Theory in 1999, he had to reassure the electorate and the US that “two states” meant the status quo and not *taidu*.244 In attempting to locate a *taidu*-seeking Taiwanese national identity as a danger to Taiwan’s autonomy through the status quo, Su inadvertently exposes the gap of *huadu*.

These historical and foreign policy accounts reflect the effect of identity politics, social cohesion and liberal norms on perceptions of China leading to more assertive

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243 Su Chi. 2009.

244 Su Chi. 2009: 49.
and unpredictable cross-Strait policy statements from Taipei. The picture of a deeply polarised domestic politics has been a prevailing feature in the literature. These studies suggest that China’s inability to subdue Taiwan is due to the influence of the countervailing power of domestic identity-driven politics on Taipei’s cross-Strait policy.

Recent NCR research by Björn Lindemann explains Taiwan’s more conciliatory approach towards relations with China over IGOs in 2008 in terms of the power of its liberal norms and a China-leaning state identity. Dean Chen’s study of Taipei’s cross-Strait policy under Ma Ying-jeou explains Taiwan’s rejection of ECFA and ousting of Ma as a function of bottom-up interest-group rejection of a China-identifying KMT elite cross-Strait policy that threatened Taiwan’s security and therefore its autonomy. Shirley Lin (2016) comes to a similar conclusion explaining a cross-Strait policy that oscillates between convergence and divergence as being based on identity change and DIG preferences. Sterling-Folker (2009) adopts the same argument. The argument in this strand is, however, flawed. First, epistemologically, it is a liberal bottom-up argument and thus contrary to core realist assumptions (q.v. 3.2.2.). Second, empirically, in the case of Rapprochement, it commits an ideology-driven fallacy in claiming that domestic preferences saved Taiwan from being sold out by Ma. In both cases, this argument ignores, first, the

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246 Lindemann, Björn. 2014. Cross-Strait Relations and International Organizations: Taiwan’s Participation in IGOs in the Context of Its Relationship with China. Tubingen: Springer.


top-down role of state identity and as such violates realist principles and, second, the co-constitutive nature of identity construction, thus violating constructivist principles.

Sterling-Folker and Shinko (2005) attempt to merge Realism and Constructivism by testing the theoretical predictions of NCR against case studies from the historical record; in so doing, they observe how each perspective conceptualises power in its empirical practice and application and how this affects foreign policy making across the Taiwan Strait.250 The exercise is a step towards Sterling-Folker’s (2009) NCR case study of Taiwan.251 In this regard, then, it addresses this study’s conceptual focus on power. Again, however, its national-identity focus allows huadu to slip through the net.

Two further domestic realist strands that shed light on China’s inability to subdue Taiwan are Diversionary Theory and Audience Costs Theory. Diversionary Theory suggests that Taiwan’s elites might deploy the power of national identity against China when their domestic support declines. Li, James, and Drury (2009) find that Chen Shui-bian was particularly likely to emphasise taidu when his approval rating was low, seeking to distract voters from domestic problems by redirecting them to the sovereignty dispute.252 However, creating a causal link between elite statements and underlying preferences is notoriously difficult and, as Sullivan (2011) and Sullivan and Lowe (2010) point out, leaders’ “tough talk” is contextually circumscribed. That is, political rhetoric – as this study affirms – is a poor indicator

251 Sterling-Folker. 2009.
of preferences, let alone policy positions. This is a gap that this study addresses through linguistics-informed discourse analysis to show how the discursive power of *huadu* is deployed in the lexico-grammar of Taiwanese political speech, rather than in rhetoric and diplomatic frames.

A growing body of IR literature suggests audience costs are highly relevant in cross-Strait relations. For China, any leader that loses Taiwan by acquiescing to *taidu* would risk the CCP’s legitimacy. Similarly, any Taiwanese leader who appears either to acquiesce in China’s attempts to impose its cross-Strait policy on Taiwan or to endanger Taiwan’s survival by provoking China will suffer at election time. In this context, leaders who back down in a dispute in the Taiwan Strait are likely to pay substantial audience costs. Both diversionary theory and sensitivity to audience costs affect Taiwan’s elite policymaking and crisis decision-making. In this regard, they operate top-down in a reverse manner to NCR intervening variables. While they are difficult to prove empirically, they can be said partially to account for China’s inability to subdue Taiwan in that they show how Taiwan’s state identity is deployed in foreign policy.

These studies are valuable in that they locate Taiwan’s maintenance of its sovereignty in terms of the discursive power of national identity. In doing so, however, they persist in the *taidu* fallacy; that is, they persist in conceiving of Taiwan’s unrecognised status as simply an inhibited search for a Republic of Taiwan. Hence, they miss how state identity, rather than national identity, drives preferences

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and policy. What is missing from the previous literature – and this is particularly pertinent in the case of NCR and other domestic realisms – is huadu. That is, while the IR literature clearly suggests national identity is a constitutive factor in China’s inability to subdue Taiwan, it deals with it tangentially as a bottom-up phenomenon. The literature exposes and alludes to, but needs to make much more of the ROC’s state-identity change and Taipei as a state that is at times able to operate in a unitary manner for a plausible explanation of China’s inability enforce unification to be found. It is the literature that interrogates national identity directly that offers a better route to state identity and this study reviews this literature in Chapter 4.

2.5. Discourse Analysis and cross-Strait Relations

Much research on legitimacy in cross-Strait relations claims to use discourse analysis when, in fact, it is carrying out what Widdowson refers to as reader-response interpretive commentary more akin to literary criticism. A case in point is Harrison’s (2006) commentary on Peng Ming-min’s words in *A Taste of Freedom* (1970) about Peng’s father’s response to the arrival of KMT troops in 1945. In what is otherwise an extremely compelling analysis of the broader discursive construction of Taiwan’s legitimacy, Harrison simply repeats verbatim what he feels to be meaning-laden words used by Peng and interprets them as self-evidently expressing Taiwanese identity emerging from a cognitive dissonance. This is interpretation without textual analysis, since it provides no “textual warrant” for its assertions and singularly fails linguistically to convey what Harrison argues the point of the passage is – that is, to delegitimate the KMT and Taiwan’s putative Chinese identity.255

Other research, correctly, argues that Beijing and Taipei routinely use instrumental rhetoric. Randolph Kluver (1996) sees PRC and ROC legitimacy resting on the use

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255 Harrison. 2006.
of rhetorical tropes and formulaic conventions.\textsuperscript{256} Ann-Marie Brady (2015) claims both states adhere to strict diplomatic framing techniques.\textsuperscript{257} However, such language has a transparently instrumental and diplomatic purpose. It cannot be argued that it functions covertly to exercise discursive power. Closer to the mark is what P.T. Jackson (2006) terms a “war of words” over legitimation.\textsuperscript{258} Using Jackson’s conception, \textit{huadu, taidu} and \textit{tongyi} represent competing constituencies and competing forms of legitimation that cross-cut as “exchange[s] of rhetorical efforts to characterize the situation in particular ways that render certain” identities and interests legitimate while ruling others illegitimate.\textsuperscript{259} Certain historical events (“magic moments” or exogenous shocks) operate to free agents from previous structures, granting them discursive power.\textsuperscript{260} Certain statements by state actors gain legitimacy because states can legitimately perform speech acts that other actors cannot. Thus, a state-uttered statement may legitimate \textit{huadu}. For Jackson, such statements may not advance novel claims; rather, they draw on contextual “rhetorical commonplaces” and link them to cross-Strait policies. Jackson, again correctly, points out that such rhetorical commonplaces may invite multiple interpretations.\textsuperscript{261} This preserves contingency and agency. Jackson’s approach resolves the contested relational nature of \textit{huadu}. However, the loose term “rhetorical commonplaces” minimises the powerful linguistic nature of discourse. Further evidence in the form of linguistic analysis is needed to provide firm textual warrant.

\textsuperscript{259} Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus. 2006: 139.
\textsuperscript{260} Ibid 139
\textsuperscript{261} Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus. 2006: 144
Jackson’s discourse analysis claims to challenge “the very terms in which events are framed”. The present study accepts that the framing of such events may be challenged epistemologically by researchers after the fact. However, it cannot be challenged linguistically by interlocutors in the course of a communicative event. Rather, the linguistic features deployed in such statements inhibit in-the-moment empirical evaluation and thus the statements “pass up” to the discourse unchallenged. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) claims to locate and explain such linguistic features.

Many CDA studies provide valuable insights into how power is deployed in Taiwanese political speech. However, they vary in the degree to which they deploy linguistics-informed methods such as pragmatic analysis and Corpus Linguistics (CL). In this regard, while they create space for linguistics-driven research that aligns to IR theoretically derived hypotheses, none specifically address Taiwan’s state identity.

There is no research that uses CL as such. However, Jonathan Sullivan has used Computer Assisted Analysis (CAA) to mine large amounts of political text. Using quantitative content analysis, Sullivan codes text for salient content words in elite political speech such as ‘Taiwan’, ‘China’, ‘independence’, ‘unification’ and interprets the speaker’s policy position based on lexical salience. His findings suggest that perceived policy proposals in ostensibly diversionary elite speeches are aimed simply at responding rhetorically to core constituency preferences. However, while Sullivan’s methods are valuable and his findings compelling, they do not cover

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262 Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus. 2006.
the context or co-text of the words uttered. As such, while they do reveal instrumental identity-driven discourses, they do not account for Taiwan’s successful resistance to Chinese power.

Of the qualitative linguistics research that uses CDA, much draws on Kuo Sai-hua’s work on news text and political statements. Wang Honglei’s study of news reports of CCP-KMT discussions does employ CL as well as CDA. Chang Hui-ching and Rich Holt’s work explores Chen Shui-bian’s unique rhetorical style, switching between the terms ‘Taiwan’ and ‘ROC’ to create a discourse of Taiwanese-ness. However, a lack of linguistics-informed analysis renders the findings unconvincing without triangulation. Jie Cui and Diao Wenhua improve on these studies by analysing how pronouns are manipulated to present discourses of Chinese-ness in Hu Jintao and Ma Ying-jeou’s New Year Speeches. Lin Gang, using a textual analysis of Hu Jintao’s 2009 Six Points, to argue that Beijing actually recognises Taiwan’s de facto status, even if unification is the long-term goal, potentially confirms this study’s claim that huadu compels Beijing’s endorsement. Wei Chi-hung (2015) adopts the linguistics approach that this study seeks to employ in his explication of

the discursive construction of the 1992 Consensus. He argues that, as a discourse, the 1992 Consensus shifted its meaning over time, constructing Taiwan’s identity in the process.269 With the exception of Cui and Diao (2011) and Wei Chi-hung (2015), the conclusions in all of these studies are interpretive in that they do not rest on established linguistics principles. They also do not align with CDA’s focus on power and resistance (q.v. 5.2.3.). There is therefore a clear gap for a linguistics-informed discourse analysis of Taiwanese political speech that draws on CL, CDA and pragmatics to locate how *huadu* is legitimated.

### 2.6. Conclusion

This review has mapped the literature from social and historical narrative through sociology, law, comparative politics, anthropology and development economics to IR theory-based studies. It has shown how Taiwan and cross-Strait relations as objects of study developed as distinctive fields. Arguing that Taiwan cannot be studied in the absence of China, it has also shown how political science and IR theoretical frameworks have been applied to the study of Taiwan and its relations with China. This has produced a body of research that provides important theoretical insights into this study’s research question. In this regard, Sil and Katzenstein’s approach to synthesis in Chapter 1 above applies (q.v. 1.7.1).

As far as this study is concerned, the PS, IR and AS literature provides sufficient conceptual basis and context for plausible theory-driven answers. Neorealism goes some way to explaining the China-Taiwan-US triad materially and structurally in terms of power balancing and the security dilemma. However, it fails fully to answer this study’s research question because, first, it does not fully address Taipei’s cross-

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Strait policy; second, it cannot account for *huadu* either as state identity or discursive power and, third, it focuses on cause-and-effect relations rather than relations of co-constitution. Neoliberal approaches shed some light on Taiwan’s search for international space and economic integration with China and also address power. However, they both fail to explain why China lacks the power to subdue Taiwan; they fail therefore to account for Taiwan’s de facto autonomy. Although there is cross-over in the literature reviewed, none says whether agency or structure is more important in Taiwan’s case. The constructivist literature attempts to fill this gap using ideational variables, particularly norms and national identity construction. Its introduction of intersubjectivity and co-constitution resolves the agent-structure debate, but does not provide a satisfactory account of the state or of power politics.

The political science, area studies and IR literature to this point also fails to link approaches and levels of analysis coherently to fully answer the research question because they do not link to Taipei’s cross-Strait policy. This leaves a realist-constructivist gap. Accretions that take on board identity-driven interest construction, power politics, foreign policy, the state and domestic preferences provide a more satisfactory theoretical framework.

Methodologically, much of the scholarly literature on Taiwan has been narrative description and interpretive commentary on domestic and foreign policy. Quantitative research using opinion polls and government economic and population data also features in the literature and quantitative research has been used in a limited way to analyse the discourse of political speeches. Qualitative research on foreign policy decisions is often ad hoc narrative case-study based and there is limited work using either CDA or sociolinguistic techniques of discourse analysis. This study aims to fill the gap through the critical application of a RC framework. In addition,
methodologically, it takes a critical approach to CDA to find textual warrant for the legitimating power of *huadu* in Taiwanese political speech of policy elites. More rigorous empirical evidence of discursive constitutive effects can be found in the text of Taiwanese political speech using linguistics-informed discourse analysis.
Chapter 3: Power – Theoretical Framework

3.1. Introduction

The inability of China to bring about unification with Taiwan suggests a more effective deployment of power by Taipei than by Beijing. This cannot be explained by the literature reviewed in this study. None of the approaches or theories alone satisfactorily explains the nature of Taipei’s power – that is its discursive power to secure its sovereignty in the face of Beijing’s superior material power. This chapter proposes a realist-constructivist (RC) synthesis to account for Taiwan’s discursive power. It presents a synthetic two-level, three-stage systemic-domestic RC framework to explain this.

Cross-Strait relations are international relations and are state and power-centred. Therefore, any exploration of Taipei’s deployment of its power cannot ignore IR theoretical debates. Power is implicit in cross-Strait policymaking; “international politics are always power politics, for it is impossible to eliminate power from them.”270 This chapter locates Taiwan’s discursive power in the ROC’s huadu state identity.

The chapter is structured as follows: first, it justifies a synthetic approach based on Western IR conceptualisations. Second, it briefly outlines the core realist and constructivist principles, axioms and concepts that make this framework possible. Third, it shows how a combination of realist and constructivist conceptualisations of power accounts for Taiwan’s situation. Specifically, it focuses on the power of huadu to legitimate Taiwan’s sovereignty as the ROC. Fourth, it presents a two-level, three-stage systemic-domestic realist-constructivist framework that builds on RC in the form of Classical Realism and the constructivist literature on identity. The

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conclusion suggests that this RC conceptualisation and framework provides a plausible account for Taiwan’s de facto independence.

### 3.2. Synthesising Theories

As Waltz (1988) notes, while IR theories prioritise some factors over others for the sake of parsimony, phenomena and factors are in fact cross-cutting and interlinked. With this in mind, a synthetic problem-driven framework is a more appropriate way of explaining Taiwan’s power to resist Beijing (q.v. 1.7.1.). As far as power itself is concerned, the complex relationship among power, identities, interests and norms cannot be explained by one paradigm alone, but by selective melding of concepts from different paradigms and approaches. With this in mind, interconnections between material interests and ideational factors and attention to both the systemic and unit levels can solve the puzzle. So, in this way it is possible to retain the realist tradition’s power-related argument while drawing on a range of alternative readings of power.

#### 3.2.1. Conceptualisations

The use of Western IR theoretical conceptions to explain power in cross-Strait relations has been challenged in three areas; whether it is appropriate to define these relations as “international” in the first place; the appropriateness of Western IR theories to what is a non-Western case and an alleged lack of conceptual crossover between Chinese and Western terms. First, Beijing refuses formally to treat cross-Strait relations as international relations and, thus, some Chinese scholars deny that IR theories can be applied to what they say is a domestic issue. However, although it remains diplomatically isolated, Taiwan is “a human community that (successfully)
claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory”. It also meets all the basic criteria used to define a state according to the Montevideo Convention. More importantly, though, other states recognise Taiwan’s statehood by engaging with it as if it were a state and scholarly community treats cross-Strait relations as international.

Second, the degree to which Western theories can be applied to non-Western cases has been much debated, with David Kang arguing, “[b]ecause Europe was so important for so long a period, in seeking to understand international relations, scholars have often simply deployed concepts, theories and experiences derived from the European experience to project onto and explain Asia.” A Confucian narrative promoted by Beijing (and in the past by the ROC) is that East Asian states have historically tended to align to rather than balance a rising China because of the Tributary System, which reinforced Chinese cultural norms and institutional diffusion. For this reason, Amitav Acharya claims, “East Asian regional relations have historically been hierarchic, more peaceful and more stable than those in the West.” The Opium Wars, the Century of Humiliation and Japanese aggression, it is alleged, disrupted this. However, Wang Yuan-kang challenges claims for Confucian pacifism. Arguing that Chinese foreign policy has historically been assertive when the state was strong, he shows how historically China’s leaders have


275 Populist ‘Confucian peace’ texts by conservative intellectuals like Liu Mingfu’s The China Dream 2015, Yan Xuetong’s Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power, 2011, have been read by Chinese policy elites, while scholarly studies like David Kang’s China Rising: Peace, Power and Order in East Asia (2007) influence Chinese and other academics. All use history to promote a peaceful narrative for the likely character of China’s rise in the twenty-first century. William Callaghan, 2012, argues that they simply give an academic spin to Chinese exceptionalism.
pursued realist conceptions of power.\textsuperscript{276} Indeed, Neorealists say their analyses reflect the mind-sets of East Asian policy elites in general and that analysts “should not underestimate the persistence of realist beliefs among political leaders” in the region.\textsuperscript{277} Furthermore, Taiwan is acknowledged as an exception; as it is the missing piece in the jigsaw of Chinese national humiliation and, China will spare no effort to redeem it.\textsuperscript{278} Indeed, Buzan and Acharya, like Kang, conclude that Western theories are already up to the analytical and explanatory job due to their capacity to evolve and absorb a range of other approaches.\textsuperscript{279}

Finally, the claim that it is not possible linguistically to align Chinese and Western philosophical concepts adds to confusion over Chinese exceptionalism. How can we be sure that policymakers are using concepts in the same way? For instance, three Chinese concepts broadly translate as “power” in English. The first, \textit{daode} (道德), is more commonly translated as “virtue” or “morality” - but, according to Edmund Ryden, is more appropriately translated as “power” when used as \textit{daode liliang}（道徳力量）, or “moral force”. In Daoism, it refers to the higher power that is “The Way”, but in Confucian usage the term translates as “awe”, “fear” or “terror” – words that imply a realist compulsion. The second term is \textit{quanli} (權力), “power”, “strength” or “authority”, or the exercise of power by a ruler. The third is a homophone of the second, with a different meaning - \textit{quanli} (權利), meaning “right”,

\begin{footnotesize}
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“benefit” or “interest”.280 The second is the term used for power in modern Chinese writing on IR, but is shortened to the first character, quan (權), in speech leading to ambiguity.281 Zhang Dainan interprets the second quanli (權力) in classical Chinese political philosophy as a ruler’s absolute power, arguing that law, confidence and authority are needed to impose power. Legalist texts recommend absolute concentration of power in the hands of the ruler and appeal to the people without recourse to ministers and advisors.282 This appears to be consistent with David Lake’s conception of power.283 It also seems to echo Hobbes’ “power of the mighty (the Leviathan) hath no foundation but in the opinion and belief of the people”.284 Indeed, the difference between the two Chinese concepts appears to mirror Weber’s Macht and Herrschaft. This suggests functional equivalence between Confucian and Western IR conceptualisations.285 This permits the use of Western IR theories to conceptualise and explain this study’s research question.

3.2.2. Principles, Axioms and Core Concepts

Morgenthau’s (1978) Six Principles of Political Realism provide the realist underpinning of this study. First, politics is governed by objective laws with roots in

282 Ryden, Edmund. 2002: 361. Legalism was a more pragmatic and ‘realist’ strand of classical Chinese political thought, which openly justified maximum state power and the use of fear and greed as the essential tools of statecraft
285 See: Pinker, Steven. 2007. The Stuff of Thought: Language as a Window into Human Nature. London: Penguin: 124-128; Steiner, George. 1998. After Babel: Aspects of Language and Translation. Oxford: Oxford University Press: x. Steiner argues eruditely that comprehending texts that are the product of a distant past and foreign culture, written in a different language is nigh on impossible and great caution should be exercised. However, Pinker argues much more convincingly that the notion that concepts are inevitably culture-bound risks claiming that cognitive abilities vary across language groups, runs counter to common sense as well as notions of cause and effect and comes close to being racist.
human nature; second, the power of interest gives rational order and theory to politics; third, the meaning and practice of power are not fixed, but contextual; fourth, there are moral consequences to political action, but such principles are weighed and contingent on context and agency; fifth, a state’s claim to moral rightness and universal morality are unconnected; the power of interest saves states from unrestrained behaviour; sixth, “political man” is a necessary theoretical abstraction who in the real world makes utilitarian trade-offs in order to live politically with others.286

Morgenthau’s principles produce certain broadly classical realist assumptions: first, the world is as it is, not as it ought to be; second, power produces recurrent patterns of conflict; third, agentive, security-seeking states are the focus of international relations, may be status-quo, revisionist or unitary, but are ultimately contingent.287 Fourth, states seek survival as the most important national interest; fifth, anarchy permits rather than causes state behaviour; sixth, anarchy can hinder cooperation, pushing states towards relative over absolute gains.288 For Morgenthau, anarchy may inhibit or permit state behaviour, since ideas and domestic factors all influence foreign policy. 289 To these assumptions, Morgenthau adds morality. 290 For Morgenthau, power cannot be separately measured and it is always perceptual.291

287 Ibid.
289 Morgenthau, Hans J. 1978: 272
Power is not pure atavism; rather it is ameliorated in international relations by civilization. For this reason, events occur in a complex, historical dialectic between power and morality “because certain moral rules impose an absolute barrier”.292 For Morgenthau, power dictates the practice of cross-Strait relations. Morgenthau is sceptical on rationality, and complex on power and morality.

Although expressed differently, the ontological and epistemological claims of IR Constructivism align with those of Classical Realism: there is a real world out there, but states exist in a world of their own making in which social facts depend on human action.293 Social reality is the product of social construction.294 International relations are shaped by changing identities, practices and norms. In this sense, actors are social beings whose identities and interests are “the products of inter-subjective social structures”.295 Wendt’s systemic Constructivism takes intersubjective co-constitution and claims: first, states are the principal units of analysis for international political theory; second, the key structures in the states system are intersubjective rather than material; third, state identities and interests are constructed by these social structures, rather than exogenously given.296 These claims produce two core Wendtian axioms, namely “identities determine interests,”297 and “anarchy is what states make of it”.298 A social identity entails a collective interest.

The claims, principles and assumptions above suggest that certain core concepts can be used to create a realist-constructivist framework that draws on Barkin (2010). This

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294 Katzenstein, Peter. 1996.
core-conceptual approach takes Classical Realism’s interest in power politics and foreign policy and Constructivism’s intersubjectivity as its start point. It then expands these into a framework. Classical Realism acknowledges morality, prudence and diplomacy in international relations, but may be combined with Constructivism for epistemological and ontological backing. The political is the social, so the anarchic structure leads states to redefine their identities through socialization, co-constituting each other and the structure. Material reality is the product of historical social practices and can be transcended in socialisation. Core concepts interact in complex ways, providing a lens to analyse connections among the material and the ideational, social construction and rationality, and identities and interests. This RC argues the following: first, the intersubjective co-constitution of agents and structure accounts for power politics; second, the distinction between what is given and what is contingent rather than the social construction, materialism and rationality distinction is the real dichotomy; third, Realism and Constructivism share a logic of the social, made explicit in the national interest; political ideas are contextual and perceived differently by different actors; fourth, social structures constrain and enable foreign policy, with human agency driving and changing it. Classical Realism indicates that Constructivism is neither necessarily idealist nor distinct from materialism or rationalism.

In attempting to create a systemic-domestic RC that accounts for foreign policy, the material-ideational problem presented by huadu can be addressed by treating state identity and its normative representations as aspects of power that can be understood and explained (q.v. 5.3.). Appropriately explicated, these can be integrated into a

301 Barkin, Samuel. 2010.
systemic-domestic RC. Walt’s Balance of Threat then provides a structural realist link with Classical Realism’s acknowledgement of domestic actors’ varying normative responses to policy choices, above. By accounting for threat perception, it brings in constructed identities and interests. Wendt’s bracketing of the domestic invites analysis of how powerful domestic interest groups relate to the state. Such a two-level, three-stage RC framework looks at how power translates domestic preferences into systemic interaction.

3.2.3. Power in the Realist Tradition

The realist tradition suggests that power is ubiquitous in international relations. Weber’s claim that power is the ability to enforce one’s will despite resistance suggests China lacks the power to subdue Taiwan or that it uses that power ineffectively. Morgenthau’s claim that humans have a universal will to power, filtered through interest and manifested in the desire of states to dominate other states, suggests cross-Strait relations are a power struggle that reflect elite will. “International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power” and “statesmen think and act in terms of interests defined as power”. Robert Dahl’s explication of power as the ability of A to get B to do what B would otherwise not do provides a benchmark for realist power. His symbolic notation might be used to argue that the

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305 Morgenthau, Hans. J. 19781960]:  27.
difference between China’s maximum force and Taiwan’s maximum force is the figure for China’s power over Taiwan. Yet, Realists realise that compulsion needs to be balanced with interests. Interests last; capabilities are mutable. So realist power is not just material and tangible; rather, it may be ideational and intangible. Indeed, the oft-quoted Athenian assertion in Thucydides’ *The Peloponnesian War* that “the strong do what they have the power to do; the weak accept what they must” challenges the implication that Taiwan ought necessarily to submit to China’s will. Rather, it acts as a warning to China to know the limits of its power.

Kenneth Waltz argues that power based on the distribution of states’ military capabilities creates a Balance of Power in the system. Although Waltz asserts that his Neorealism is not a theory of foreign policy, it certainly informs foreign policy. Waltz points to this in earlier work: “the first and second images describe the forces in world politics, but without the third image it is impossible to assess their importance or predict their results”. Neorealism may be seen as a framework for further inquiry into power. In predicting that states seek security, Waltz provides insights into why Taiwan exercises its power to this end. As Zakaria observes, states seek to implement their preferences by maximising influence, not material power. Influence invokes discursive power and legitimacy and the internal working of state preferences reveal states’ motives. The apparatus of neorealist theory does not obviate an exploration of this claim. Yet Neorealism cannot explain a

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state’s foreign policy without examining state and domestic motivations; it is from this premise that RC takes a cue.

The anarchic international system and power competition within it create a security dilemma for Taiwan. For such a neorealist-inflected foreign policy account, the US – China balance of power determines Taiwan’s ability to maintain its autonomy, with Taiwan-China relations contingent on US coercive power.\textsuperscript{314} In other words, cross-Strait stability is down to exogenous material and military factors, particularly the forward military posture of the US against a rising China. Hence, Taiwan free rides on US power because the balance of power produced by anarchy ties great powers to small powers. Any rapprochement over Taiwan between China and the US would falsify Neorealism. So, while Balance of Power explains Taiwan’s maintenance of its sovereignty in terms of US material power, it fails to explain why Taiwan should need to change its state identity in the first place and this alone permits the present study’s abstracting out of US power. Steven Walt’s defensive realism better explains Taiwan’s deployment of power as a response to Chinese threat, regardless of China’s power. That is, Taiwan perceives a Chinese threat to its survival and deploys power to balance it. Taiwan might rationally choose to bandwagon with China in order to “share the spoils of victory,” but chooses to balance by aligning to the US instead “rather than to risk subordination to a potential hegemon”.\textsuperscript{315}

Mearsheimer’s Offensive Realism also sees power as ubiquitous, but that the structure of the international system encourages not just survival, but the aggressive pursuit of hegemony, with all states seeking to increase their relative power. On the grounds that "[t]he most dangerous states in the international system are continental


powers with large armies,” he puts Taiwan’s dilemma into brutal perspective when he says “[i]n the anarchic world of international politics, it is better to be Godzilla than Bambi”.316 For this reason, “[s]tates recognize that the more powerful they are relative to their rivals, the better their chances of survival” and for all Realists, “calculations of power lie at the heart of how states think about the world around them”. 317 Since the more powerful state prevails in any given dispute, for Mearsheimer, Taiwan’s outlook is bleak.318 Randall Schweller adds that as long as power-seeking agents remain unchallenged through balancing, there will be insecurity.319 So the effective deployment of material power is crucial to security. Analysis of China’s material capabilities certainly indicates that it is becoming a continental power with a capability to subdue Taiwan before US help can arrive.320 Mearsheimer claims “China and the US are destined to be adversaries” and Taiwan will be the catalyst that sparks military conflict.321 That has not happened yet, he argues, because the US retains a material and coercive power advantage over China.

Mearsheimer’s reference to Godzilla falls victim to the fallacy presented in some readings of Thucydides’ axiom from the Melian Dialogue that “the weak suffer what they must”. That is, in the long run, nemesis follows hubris. That observation, however, does not console the weak in the short term. Mearsheimer’s claim refers to “any given dispute,” not the long run. Mearsheimer’s argument, therefore, would seem to suggest that Taiwan’s power derives from US power and that, once China’s power surpasses that of the US, it will subdue Taiwan.

317 Mearsheimer, John J. 2001: 12
318 Ibid: 43.
On the face of it, then, Neorealism provides parsimonious ontologies of power, a framework for the security dilemma across the Taiwan Strait and an explanation for Taiwan’s maintenance of its autonomy. However, these tend to be predictive and to concentrate on compulsory and relative power. Traditional realist power remains the capacity of A to achieve its material interests by getting B to do what B would otherwise not do. Nevertheless, it must be noted that reading realist power politics as the politics of brute force ignores its contextual, relational and social nature. For this reason, this study’s framework discards US power as a factor and abstracts out the US security guarantee to concentrate on the domestic and cross-Strait context.

3.2.4. Conceptualising Discursive Power

In its most abstracted form, discursive power is power politics. More specifically, it may be defined as a linguistic phenomenon that constitutes the ideational power to achieve desired material effects in power politics. For Taiwan, since *huadu* is a discourse and a state identity, it means Taiwan exploits the power of ideas to secure de facto independence by legitimating its state identity in the domestic and cross-Strait arenas (q.v. 3.2.7.). That process constructs a discourse that takes on a life of its own, recreating the ROC state (and cross-Strait relations and domestic politics) as the social structure in which it is embedded.

This constructivist approach complements classical realist understandings to provide a realist-constructivist definition of discursive power (q.v. 3.2.6.). Constructivism

reinforces the classical realist acknowledgement that ideas provide the context for power.\textsuperscript{324}

It is realist power’s relational turn that initially permits a realist-constructivist discursive power. The dialectic between realist interactional and constructivist constitutive power then creates space for power politics, rather than power \textit{per se}, providing a bridge to a realist-constructivist discursive power.\textsuperscript{325} Power for Constructivists is shared knowledge – or discourse – but there is still a real world out there and, in this sense, it aligns to classical realism in seeing power politics as an external social fact.\textsuperscript{326}

Morgenthau acknowledges that power may inhere in any social relationship and that it is contextually contingent.\textsuperscript{327} Discursive power “inheres in structures and discourses that are not possessed and controlled by any single actor”.\textsuperscript{328} Yet, actors may strategically exploit tensions and gaps in such power to achieve desired outcomes.\textsuperscript{329} That is, although it has material effects, power is not purely material. Rather, it may inhere linguistically in the illocutionary-perlocutionary gap (q.v. 5.2). This discourse itself empowers the actor (state) as a social structure. Yet, the state may in turn manipulate the discourse.

Figure 4 demonstrates how classical realism and constructivism have compatible understandings that permit this study’s conception of discursive power. Constructivism sees international relations as discursively co-constituted through

\textsuperscript{325} Barkin. 2010: 132.
\textsuperscript{326} \textit{Ibid}. 1999: 24.
\textsuperscript{328} Barnett, Michael and Duvall, Raymond. eds. 2005: 44.
\textsuperscript{329} Barnett, Michael and Duvall, Raymond. eds. 2005: 23.
power; classical realism accepts this dialectical logic and accepts that non-material factors are essential to power. So, classical-realist power discursively constructs material reality in the social institutions that reproduce it.

Classical realist power is relative, relational, interactional and social. Constructivist power is intersubjective, constitutive, productive and structural. For a realist-constructivist reading, classical realism’s core concept is power politics, not realpolitik or power per se. That is, Taiwan’s power is contingent on China’s power and the cross-Strait context, visible in practice (doing) and outcomes, corporate (state-based) and not equal to China’s in content. The logic of power politics rests on classical realism’s core axioms and principles above.

For realist-constructivist discursive power, classical realism’s morality is seen as analogous to constructivist norms. A dialectic between norms and power operates through morality and the practice of prudence and diplomacy in power politics. RC accepts classical realism’s observation that states must distinguish between the ideal and the possible and filter their moral principles (norms) “through the concrete circumstances of time and place”. A classical-realist thesis of socially contingent power constructing morality and a constructivist antithesis of socially contingent norms constructing power produce a RC synthesis of mutually constitutive morality and power visible in huadu’s normative representations.

Prudence constitutes rational and pragmatic power politics; it is the ability to recognise the political consequences of deploying norms. In cross-Strait policy, therefore, the enactment of huadu’s normative representations must entail self-

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331 Barkin. 2010: 132.
332 Barkin. 2010: 74.
reflective prudence on the part of Taipei’s elites. Self-reflection guides moral action instrumentally by recognising the role of power and rational self-interest in decision-making. Morgenthau sees power operating in the context of morality through internationally sanctioned norms that exist as a policy template, even if anarchy prevents their enforcement.

Normative representations, tempered by morality, are asserted in power politics; the enactment of power without morality is sterile. 334 A realist-constructivist discursive power reveals that morality inheres in state normative representations, that it provides legitimacy and that states use the power of norms, tempered by morality, as a means to foreign policy ends.

Power politics plus morality invokes the discursive power of the ROC’s normative representations to legitimate its state identity. The tension between the ROC’s normative transformation and the limits imposed by power on huadu invokes morality. States deploy norms discursively to enact foreign policy, while that norm-governed foreign policy relationally invokes morality to recreate structural power. So the limits of huadu’s power depend on China’s power and the norms and morality operative in the cross-Strait context. 335

For Constructivists, non-material, ideational forces co-constitute state power, allowing underdogs to exert pressure on international relations. 336 This suggests that China, as Dahl’s powerful A state, may acquiesce to the power of a weaker

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335 Barkin. 2010: 74.
Taiwanese B state. Constructivism suggests that Taiwan’s power is not given by anarchy. Rather, in line with classical realism, it sees it as socially constructed. Social processes can be interstate, suggesting Wendt’s systemic theory, or domestic, invoking Wendt’s domestic dimension. Using constructivist approaches, classical realist social power more visibly becomes the cross-Strait and domestic inter-subjective co-constitution of power politics.

In this context, Taiwan has the discursive power to deploy normative representations, tempered by morality and prudence in power politics, to trade on its status as a pluralistic, liberal democracy, in contrast to an authoritarian China, thus reinforcing the informal liberal norm that the takeover of a liberal democracy by an authoritarian state cannot be tolerated. Taiwan linguistically legitimates *huadu*, and delegitimates *tongyi* and *taidu* and, in so doing, causes China and competing domestic constituencies to buy into, or sanction, *huadu*. To do this, Taiwan, as a “knowledgeable” actor, strategically exploits “discursive tensions and fissures,” in cross-Strait relations “to increase [its] sovereignty, control [its] own fate, and remake [its] very identit[y].”  

*Huadu* gives Taiwan the power to determine who, when and why it is and to secure its national interest in the status quo.

Barnett and Duvall’s (2005) constructivist conceptualisation of power acknowledges classical-realist understandings. It sees power as constitutive and interactive; operating structurally and agentively. Within the constitutive-interactive dialectic, productive power constitutes identities. This means that Taiwan and its DIGs are

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337 Barnett, Michael and Duvall, Raymond. eds. 2004.: 23.
constrained and enabled in the extent to which they are able to determine their own fates through social relations with others. Equally, China is constrained and enabled by this dialectic. In this regard, productive power co-constitutes structures and institutions.

![Figure 4 Realist-Constructivist Taxonomy of Discursive Power](image)

Discursive power dialectically generates dominance and resistance and Taiwan resists China’s institutional power by deploying the constructivist productive and realist interactional power of *huadu* to affect the cross-Strait structure (maintain the status quo). Such discursive power operates even when A does not act intentionally to exercise control over B.340 Productive power concerns the limits of the power of *huadu* in cross-Strait relations.341 In this regard, Taiwan has the productive power to maintain *huadu*, but not to declare *taidu*. Productive power also involves the discursive processes and practices of cross-Strait relations and domestic power politics that produce Taiwan’s social identities and capacities as they give meaning

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341 Foucault, Michel. 1972.
to them. So, Taiwan and the Taiwanese, as actors, are the effects as well as the intended targets of power. Productive power constructs *huadu* socially by constituting structure, co-constituting Taiwan and the Taiwanese-based on norms, discourses and identities, by framing meaning.\(^{342}\) So, categories like “peaceful”, “stable”, “mainland”, “side” and “China” are contested to generate asymmetric capacities.\(^{343}\) Similarly, how Taiwan names itself and China is associated with what is politically imaginable.\(^{344}\) For instance, contested efforts to fix meanings to “1992 Consensus” and “One China” are expressive of productive power.\(^{345}\) Both are intersubjectively co-constituted, shaping actors’ social capacities, self-understandings and perceived interests. Most importantly, *huadu* represents Taiwan’s productive remaking of its identity. Thus, Taipei, as a canny actor, is able to identify discursive gaps and subvert them to increase its sovereignty.\(^{346}\) *Huadu* is therefore both productive and structural and it operates to legitimate Taiwan as sovereign in the ROC.

### 3.2.5. Giving Wendt Some Power

Wendt’s systemic Constructivism aligns to mainstream rationalist approaches, providing Realism with enough ontological common ground to show that reality can be accounted for by social facts.\(^{347}\) It accepts anarchy, but sees it not as a cause of conflict or cooperation but as an outcome of international relations.\(^{348}\) In other words, interaction creates anarchy, but it is a contingent and socially constructed ideational phenomenon. For Wendt, the “structures of human association (in this case, cross-

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\(^{342}\) Ibid.
\(^{343}\) Ibid.
\(^{344}\) Ibid.
\(^{345}\) Ibid.
\(^{346}\) Barnett, Michael and Duvall, Raymond. eds. 2004.
Strait relations) are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces and the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature”.349 Hence, as Katzenstein argues, “state interests do not exist to be ‘discovered’ by self-interested, rational actors”; rather, they are “constructed through a process of social interaction”.350 This does not mean that anything goes. States may be historically contingent, but they also exist and are governed by rules and patterns. Norms and ideas influence human agency, behaviour and motivations, but there is still a real world of power politics out there.351 In other words, to paraphrase Wendt, anarchy may be what states make of it, but states cannot make of it whatever they want.

Wendt’s thin Constructivism accepts that the world exists independently of human observations of it and that “the state and states system are real structures whose nature can be approximated through science”.352 However, “the social structure of international politics does not exist prior to or outside of the mutable norms and discourses that define the identities and interests of actors”.353 So social structures, while material and “real”, are also co-constituted and inter-subjective. That is, both “people and society” and “identities and structures” are inter-subjectively co-constituted; neither has ontological priority.354 Discourses create identities and structures that are neither subjective nor objective, but socially embedded and reproduced by “interpreters who participate in their production and workings”.355 For

349 Wendt, Alexander. 1999: 1
350 Katzenstein, Peter J. ed.. 1996.: 1
352 Wendt, Alexander. 1999: 47.
Constructivists, “it is the fact that we hold ideas and understandings in common, rather than any objective status of those ideas and understandings, that matters in international relations”.356

Wendt’s approach has a clear application to cross-Strait relations in its focus on the importance of inter-state socialisation to identity and national interests. However, it needs modifications to fully account for Taiwan’s state identity. First, it lacks theoretical application to country-specific empirical case studies.357 Thus, while it may theorise an idealised liberal cross-Strait systemic identity, it does not explicitly account for how interstate socialisation interacts with elite and domestic group preferences to construct state identities, or how these identities are generated in the first place. Second, it has nothing to say about the role of state identity politics or power politics in general. Rather, it assumes that the corporate state acts consciously and rationally in transferring from trade interests to the development of foreign policy. Third, it fails to account for what happens if states do not move to the Kantian peace, but remain stuck as Lockean rivals or return to Hobbesian enemies or what states might do discursively to evade this (q.v. 3.3.).

Wendt does not provide a separate conceptualisation of power. However, he argues that power politics are not logical or causal outcomes of structure but of process. Power politics are an institution, not essential features of anarchy. So, anarchy is what states make of it. For Wendt, “people act towards objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them”.358

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356 Barkin, Samuel. 2010: 27.
357 Sterling-Folker, Jennifer. ed.. 2006.: 115-122.
forces matter, people act intentionally and states are the focus of analysis in IR. However, the core realist concept of power politics is socially constructed.\(^{359}\)

Wendt’s ideational reading of power in and of itself, however, is insufficient. If power is constituted by ideas, then it needs to be used to explain the practice of international relations. Wendt provides no definition or rival conceptualisation of power, so his Constructivism needs to be contextualised in order to give it explanatory force. RC provides a bridge.

3.2.6. Realist – Constructivist Power

Discursive power combines classical realist and constructivist understandings, permitting a revised conceptualisation of Taiwan’s power (q.v. 3.4.2.). The ability of A to achieve its interests by getting B to do what B would otherwise not do remains the realist baseline.\(^{360}\) This seems reasonable because, first, it adheres to the principle of defaulting to realism; second, it provides an ontological focal point for constructivist conceptions and, third, it invites empirical evidence, thus aligning to the data in the study. However, rather than relative power, it is Taiwan’s relational capacity to shape China’s norms and values or its ability to determine outcomes that reflects its constructed identities. Clearly, Taiwan does not have raw, relative “power over” China. Yet, it does have the “power of” its state identity and “power to” act and effect outcomes.\(^{361}\) Classical realist readings acknowledge that “power over opinion … is a necessary part of all power”.\(^{362}\) Morgenthau calls power “the


An alternative reading of the realist literature suggests that power is not absolute, but contingent, in that the power that A enforces on B is only meaningful in terms of B’s power or the context. Non-material factors are also necessary for a complete understanding of Taiwan’s power in cross-Strait relations and power politics cannot be reduced to positivist measurements of material capabilities.\footnote{See: Morgenthau, Hans. 1978; Carr, Edward Hallett. 2001 [1964]; Walt, Kenneth N. 1979; Walt, Stephen. 1990.} Taiwan’s power is more aptly considered, not relative to China’s but in relation to it. Even Waltz states “the extent of one’s power cannot be inferred from the results one may or may not get,” implying that power is not the property of a single state actor and “an agent is powerful to the extent that he affects others more than they affect him”.\footnote{Ibid: 192.} This is clearly a relational argument.

Realist Constructivism, as a prescriptive approach, seeks to account for what Taiwan has done. Therefore, to account for Taiwan’s power to maintain its sovereignty, \textit{huadu} is crucial, since it sets the parameters of the status quo. There is space for convergence between Realism’s traditional biasing of power towards interaction and Constructivism’s focus on constitutive power. For constructivists, as for realists, power in cross-Strait relations may be seen as “a contest about shaping and being
responsible for the future”. By deploying huadu to resist Chinese power, Taiwan produces in and through cross-Strait relations, effects that shape its capacity to maintain its autonomy and reconstruct the nature of cross-Strait relations. This can be interpreted as the effective exploitation of discursive gaps. That is, the occupation of the locutionary space between what is uttered (illocution) and what is perceived (perlocution) in political speech (q.v. 5.3; 5.3.7.). The historical shift in the official terms used by Beijing to describe Taiwan indicates that Taipei has effectively deployed the discursive (structural and productive) power to construct what Taiwan is more effectively than Beijing has.

Taiwan’s pursuit of the status quo invites a conception that still accepts a realist benchmark of power as winning conflicts. Berenskotter’s (2007) “limiting alternatives” and “shaping normality” suggest voluntary compliance and threats of enforcement constitute political power. The threat of a Chinese attack on Taiwan is, in theory, ever-present and power politics are fundamentally about the capacity and authority to use violence. So, this conceptualisation retains the realist analytical link while allowing constructivist readings.

For a RC reading, however, power also operates in diffuse rather than direct social relations. Diffuse discourses rather than isolated, direct actions produce subjects like Taiwan. But warrant for diffuse discourses can only be located in isolated events. Constructivist readings of power complement, rather than contradict, realist readings. Constructivism finds “power operating in structures of thinking and behavior that previously seemed to be devoid of power relations”. Barnett and Duvall’s

369 Ibid: 17.
contrasting of interactional power and intersubjective power covers material and ideational sources. So, the strong do not necessarily do what they can and the weak do not have to do what they must. In this regard, then, there is space for convergence between Realism’s interactive and Constructivism’s constitutive, or intersubjective, power. Power politics provide the realist-constructivist context for this convergence.

Waltz’s structural realism is not the hard core of the realist research program. Stephen Walt’s Balance of Threat provides a more appropriate structural link to domestic and inter-state contexts to account for threat perception. Rather than Structural Realism, it is Classical Realism that this study’s RC adopts. First, the state is the dominant actor, but states impose their identities on DIGs in power politics. The power of those identities explains the relationship between the state and the identities and norms that motivate states’ actions. Second, foreign policy closes the gap with power politics and links with Constructivism through state identity formation. Third, the dynamics of inter-state and domestic power politics explain inter-state conflict. Fourth, RC allows for policymakers playing a two-level game, responding to systemic incentives while dealing with domestic constraints. A RC focus on domestic variables sees Taipei’s cross-Strait policy not simply as the neoclassical realist outcome of the domestic identities and interests that prevail in domestic power competition and state institutions. For RC, Taipei is able to resist Beijing’s threat and to perceive a Chinese security threat accurately. Rather, what accounts for perceived underbalancing is DIG (mis)perception of leaders’ intentions.

372 Ibid: 2004: 10. See also: Barkin, 2010:
and the nature of Ripsman et al’s (2016) three intervening variables - leaders’ perceptions, the state’s relations with DIGs and state extractive and mobilisation capacity – are determined by state identity. 374

This study’s RC adopts the classical realist logic that state power itself, derived from state identity, constitutes domestic identities and interests and, by extension elite preferences and foreign policy. This suggests that those powerful domestic groups that respond coherently in line with state identity prevail and that their threat perception is a function of top-down state power over identity, not just bottom-up. This study’s RC therefore suggests that powerful domestic groups simply perceive state underbalancing as a threat to security and identity; that is, through the prism of threat perception. In fact, huadu ensures that Taiwan’s power prevails domestically.

For sure, “understanding the links between power and policy…requires close examination of both the international and the domestic contexts within which foreign policy is formulated and implemented”. 375 Relative power capabilities, like state identity, act indirectly on policy in complex ways through domestic politics. 376 Thus, Taiwan’s power results from political decisions and agency that derive from perceptions of power. 377 Systemic analysis alone cannot explain this. Domestic groups bargain, lobby and deploy power to obstruct the policy elite. 378 But the power of those groups that prevail is constituted by state power.

So, the value of RC to this framework is that it allows for domestic effects on policy. In this way, it shows how domestic and interstate constraints impede rational choice

376 Ibid.
(as opposed to rationality) and bring Classical Realism back in by looking at foreign policy and the state. In this analysis, rather than being constrained by domestic power struggle, Taipei’s elites cannot accede to Beijing’s demands for unification because of the power of the ROC state. An individual policymaker’s national identity and ideology is irrelevant. Classical Realism’s focus on the state and Constructivism’s focus on identity permit a RC domestic realist argument for Taiwan that is not the bottom-up liberal one but one that examines how a prevailing hua\text{\textdollar} corporate identity is domestically constructed in the first place and determines policy responses, regardless of interest group perceptions around threat. This invites analysis of state identity construction in chapter four, but makes salient for this framework the power that the ROC possesses.

In sum, then, the intersubjective relationship between state power and state identity in power politics is the basis of RC analysis. Domestic elite interaction and state identity lead to states being concerned with relative power; from this, foreign policy results. Socialisation creates state identities that involve self-other distinctions and, therefore, impact on domestic and external politics. This creates space for power as a social phenomenon that provokes domestic and inter-state power competition through competing state identities. Domestic groups perceive external threats and jostle for control of the state in order to create foreign policy in response to those threats. Yet, that threat perception is a function not only of threatening state or home state policy elite actions but of a determinative state identity. Relative power within states is as important as between them, but, contra NCR, Taiwan’s identity-driven

\footnote{See: Sterling-Folker, Jennifer. 2009: 111.}
power competition has never trumped “rational and consciously desired peace dividends”.380

State power is the ability to extract resources to pursue foreign policy.381 Taiwan’s deployment of state power in domestic politics after US de-recognition led to its deployment in cross-Strait relations. Subsequent domestic power competition in response to the perceived threat derived from cross-Strait relations resulted in further state-domestic group interaction that reconstructed Taiwan’s state power. So, while domestic groups may attempt to lobby Taipei in the context of cross-Strait interaction in an attempt to determine Taipei’s cross-Strait policy choices, a RC reading suggests it is Taiwan’s prevailing state power that determines policy choices and which domestic interests will apparently prevail. Domestic groups may only prevail if they assume the power of the state.

In conclusion, then, realist-constructivist power is contextual, social and relational; it is not just the capacity to compel but the ability of the user to effect outcomes. “Power may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man” and “its content and manner of its use are determined by the political and cultural environment”.382 In other words, A is constrained by B’s response. So, realist analysis of power needs to be aware of political and cultural contexts and the norms that both the subject and object share. On this reading of realist power, then, China lacks sufficient coercive power to prevail over Taiwan because it is constrained by Taiwan’s discursive power, which is a function of the power of Taiwan’s state identity to legitimate its sovereignty.

380 Ibid.
3.2.7 Power as Legitimacy

Legitimacy invokes social recognition through discursive power. Lipset (1983) defines legitimacy as “the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for society”.383 That is, legitimacy is a general understanding that a polity’s actions align to a “socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions”.384 While for Classical Realists, power bestows legitimacy, Constructivists see legitimacy as a source of power.385 For Arendt, the power of legitimacy is productive (q.v. 3.2.4.).386 For Reus-Smit (2007), legitimate actors may draw on the “resources and energies” of certain actors to achieve the compliance of a third actor “in accordance with their rules, decisions, or commands”, obviating coercion and bribery.387 For Franck (1990), international society legitimates states, pulling them toward normative compliance with rules.388 For Bukovansky (2010) legitimacy is a discursive phenomenon.389 The power of such rules rests in sovereignty and democracy; “sovereignty is conditioned by legitimacy” and “the existence in the system of a form of rule considered to be the most powerful and legitimate … facilitate[s] the accumulation of material preponderance”.390 Reus-Smit (2007) concurs, arguing that actors establish legitimacy through language by constructing “self-images and the public justification of priorities and practices”. Other actors linguistically contest or endorse such

384 Mark C. Suchman, “Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches,” The Academy of Management Review 20, 3 (July, 1995), 574
387 Reus-Smit. 2007. 163-4
388 Ibid 24
389 Bukovansky, Legitimacy and Power Politics, 216.
representations in the context of the prevailing social norms that determine what can and cannot be said.\textsuperscript{391} Thus, language invokes discursive power (q.v. 3.2.4; 5.2.).

Legitimacy operates in power politics, specifically in state identity politics (SIPs), and it conditions the practice of power. Actors ascribe power to the ROC based on the legitimacy of its state identity and they do so with reference to norms that specify how a democratic Taiwan ought to act. Even when China contests the ROC’s right, it does so on the grounds of what constitute the operative norms and their interpretation. Ascribing legitimacy is also dependent on discursive practice; Taiwan establishes its legitimacy through the rhetorical and discursive construction of contested self-images. Maintaining ROC legitimacy through \textit{huadu} constitutes discursive power, and its content depends on prevailing cross-Strait and international norms.\textsuperscript{392}

Taipei’s legitimacy is crucially related to post-Cold War discourses of liberal democracy and self-determination alongside wider Westphalian norms and an international norm against secession. These provide order and stability.\textsuperscript{393} Clark (2001) suggests such norms crystalise in “inauspicious circumstances” after exogenous shocks in which broad principles of pragmatism and consensus-building are operative.\textsuperscript{394} Such norms became deeply embedded in state-building. Rather than an essentialist \textit{apologia} for liberal democracy, such norms operate as a set of ideal membership rules for new states, drawing even non-democratic states into the

\textsuperscript{393} Geldenhuys, Deon. 2009.
\textsuperscript{394} Clark already makes this argument about the end of the Cold War in \textit{The Post-Cold War Order: The Spoils of Peace} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
Clark suggests actors come to understand, accept and internalise such norms through “setting an example”. Yet, others argue that the international community’s inconsistency around Taiwan shows liberal democracy can never be a norm in a world of power politics. Others describe the norm of liberal democracy as an imperialistic project aimed at protecting US hegemony. Such perceptions miss the legitimating power of liberal discourse. Granted, power politics trump legal and ethical considerations, but liberal norms are “not just a rhetorical veneer”. There is, as yet, no other macro-political game in town to legitimate the exercise of state power.

Material power can only sustain legitimacy for Beijing if Taipei and others judge, first, that such power reflects a China whose identity and interests are compatible with international norms and, second, that China will use its power in line with prevailing norms of rightful state action (q.v. 4.5.). Taipei and Beijing judge each others’ legitimacy through the filter of norms. The relationship between legitimacy, on the one hand, and norms, on the other, is necessarily mediated by discursive power.

The RC synthetic conceptualisation generated above means that huadu is a question of the practice of power. As a form of discursive power constituted through SIPs in

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396 Clark, Legitimacy in International Society, 173-174
domestic and cross-Strait power politics, *huadu* legitimates Taiwan’s de facto independence. An RC approach reveals that *huadu* represents the linguistically enacted material outcome of ideational phenomena and is neither conceptually, culturally nor linguistically exceptional. Thus, it may be accounted for using Western IR approaches and understandings of power. In this regard, core classical realist and constructivist precepts show that, while it is social and productive, *huadu* represents Taiwan’s status as it actually is. Accretions from Wendt’s systemic constructivism and Walt’s Balance of Threat show *huadu* is co-constitutive of Chinese threat and Taiwanese norms and enacted through a prudent morality in cross-Strait policy within an anarchy that is what Taipei (and *huadu*) makes of it. In this regard, DIGs may misperceive elite cross-Strait policy and both DIG misperception and Taiwan’s de facto independence as a cross-Strait policy outcome are determined by the power of *huadu*.

### 3.3. From Power Politics to Foreign Policy

For Wendt, anarchy does not compel states to competitive power politics; inter-state socialisation can overcome this logic and certain aspects of anarchy are changeable. Yet power politics must be operative whether they enact change in the system or co-constitute it. A Wendtian reading suggests *huadu* matters to its deployment of power because it informs cross-Strait relations and policy. RC shows how when Taiwan’s interests became coherent, they prevailed and gave motivation and power to *huadu*. For Wendt, Taiwan’s power in cross-Strait relations, as a discourse, is contingent on shared ideas, identities and interests.\(^{400}\)

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\(^{400}\) Wendt, Alexander. 1999: 24.
Realist logics of power express it as relative and based on interest; constructivist logics as relational and based on identities. The fundamental power link between Classical Realism and Constructivism therefore is the RC view that power is social and relational, as well as relative; that it involves agency and the ability of an actor to effect outcomes to his own benefit and that it is ideationally influenced. Wendt resolves this by using intersubjective co-constitution to explain the relationship between identities and interests. Constructivism accepts that actors may deploy power to invoke identities instrumentally to maximise their interests.

Wendt’s Constructivism above suggests that states will change their identity through socialisation from Hobbesian enemy to Lockean rival to Kantian friend. This follows a firmly liberal ontology and is prevalent in the literature and in Taipei’s foreign policy thinking. As such, it informs economic convergence and is the philosophy behind Rapprochement. In fact, “most leaders still cling to the longstanding belief that expanding economic ties will cement the bonds of friendship between and within nations that make the resort to arms unfathomable,” and “few scholars today question the belief that trade brings universal benefits and peace under all conceivable conditions.” RC helps to explain why this is not necessarily the case. In focusing on state identity, this study’s RC permits the incorporation of constructivist core concepts; identities are intersubjectively co-constituted. Classical Realism then examines power politics, agency and how the state constructs the national interest. The outcome for a RC synthesis is that socialisation with other

403 Wendt, Alexander. 1999.
states and domestic competition blend with state identity politics, threat perception and foreign policy choices. In this way, an ideational as well as a material security dilemma may exist alongside economic interdependence and a state may trade with a security threat while enacting its own state identity; a weaker state may resist a stronger state’s coercive material power. The possibility of convergence between Classical Realism and Constructivism is clear.

3.4. A Two-Level, Three-Stage Framework

This theoretical framework does the following: first, it combines the core concepts outlined above to create a two-level, three-stage, RC framework; second, it states the methods employed; third, it outlines the data gathered to relate these concepts to the research question. The framework in figure 5 below shows how discursive power legitimates huadu and deploys it in foreign policy and how these phenomena are co-constituted within and across domestic and inter-state socialisation. There is nothing analytically fundamental to Realism or Constructivism that says they must exclusively concern themselves with interstate interaction.

This framework adapts Bozdağlıoğlu’s (2007) constructivist model to classical realist principles to show how huadu is enacted in foreign policy, acknowledging intersubjectivity as the processual catalyst of power politics. First, the ROC state accrues discursive power and legitimacy domestically - a stage theoretically implied by WC, but observed in the realist practice of power in domestic politics and in modernist national-identity theory; that is, the ROC created the Taiwanese nation. In doing so, the state appeals to state identity-driven normative representations,

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invoking classical-realist morality. Second, that domestic power is deployed through inter-state socialisation – assumed by Wendt’s Constructivism, but also core to Classical Realism. Here, the state’s identity-driven interests are discursively enacted as normative representations, again implying classical realism’s morality. Third, in observing inter-state (cross-Strait) socialisation, powerful Taiwan-identifying domestic groups perceive a threat and re-deploy identity-and-norm-driven power (bestowed by the state) in domestic politics, a stage implied by Classical Realism and by Walt. The actors then return to stage two in Figure 5. In the power political process, the ROC and Taiwan converge (Figure 5, stage b) in a process of Taiwanisation of the ROC state that causes the ROC’s state identity to diverge from that of China (Figure 5, stage b), legitimating *huadu*, enacting Taiwan’s national interest in security in the status quo of de facto independence and determining the systemic identity, or cross-Strait culture of anarchy, that prevails around that.

The power of *huadu* is operative domestically and in cross-Strait relations. It is Wendt’s distinction between *corporate* and *social* state identities and his concept of the *first encounter* that opens a gap for systemic-domestic discursive power as legitimacy (q.v. 4.5.). The link may be summarised here. First, Wendt’s identities entail interests “because an actor cannot know what it wants until it knows who it is.”407 Second, states do not have a portfolio of decontextualised interests; rather, “they define their interests in the process of defining situations”.408 For Wendt, the former implies that *corporate* identities are acquired prior to first encounter while *social* identities are acquired afterwards through socialisation. This means power must be operative in their construction and deployment at both levels. Since power arises from intersubjective processes of knowledge creation, intersubjectivity must

408 Wendt, *Anarchy*, 396.
operate domestically too. Granted, how a state deploys power to fulfil its corporate interests depends on its view of self and other, which entails power deployed in the system, but its genesis must be domestic.409

RC’s acknowledgement that social facts are discursive permits Wendt’s Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian systemic identities (cultures of anarchy) whose representations of enmity, rivalry and friend are determined through socialisation.410 Accordingly, for Wendt, as states engage and threat perception changes, structure determines how power is deployed.411 However, Wendt’s first encounter suggests states bring the power of unshared and unrefined a priori national interests and state identities.412 These are exogenous to first-encounter because Wendt treats “identities and interests as endogenous to interaction”.413 Yet, they cannot be exogenous to their domestic formation. Thus, power is exogenous and endogenous.

For a workable RC domestic-systemic argument, therefore, Wendt’s constructed corporate identities need domestic power for three reasons. First, state power in state-national socialisation changes state identity and interests before the other’s recognition. Wendt identifies the two sources, but fails fully to account for their co-constitution because he has bracketed the domestic. One could argue that by bracketing he is saying what is true of the system is true of the domestic, but this would still make them discrete rather than interconnecting categories. Second, Wendt treats states as unitary actors, stripped of contingency; domestic realism brings power and agency to state identity construction. Third, the content of a state’s corporate identity may predict who it will identify with, despite Wendt’s assumption that inter-

409 Bozdağlioğlu. Constructivism and Identity Formation: 136-7
410 Wendt, STIP, 264.
411 Wendt, Anarchy, 397.
412 Wendt, STIP, 328.
413 Wendt, STIP, 336.
state socialisation determines in or out-groupness.\textsuperscript{414} Granted, a state may do this and subsequently be disabused of the idea in socialisation, causing cultures of anarchy to oscillate after first encounter.

Power politics transform state corporate identity through strategic practice; Taipei’s discursive power transforms huadu through domestic politics. Social processes such as democratisation, constitutional changes and elections alter domestic actors’ roles in the state-making process.\textsuperscript{415} Powerful groups institutionalise their own preferences to resist and disrupt state power as foreign policy is developed; this may create cleavage and oscillation.\textsuperscript{416} The perceived threat of systemic changes caused by inter-state trade policies can affect domestic cleavages, weakening or consolidating state power.\textsuperscript{417} Figure 5, stage b points to where such changes may stabilise or weaken identification with others, shifting from selfish to collective or vice versa. It is not necessarily Wendt’s one-way Liberal argument. However, over the long term, neither DIGs nor the executive can retain an identity separate to that of the nation that the state constructed. A two-level, three-stage systemic-domestic process can exacerbate domestic identity conflict that rebounds in inter-state socialisation and foreign policy.

The RC framework above modifies Wendt’s systemic model to bring in the domestic. It combines classical-realist and constructivist understandings of power with Walt’s Balance of Threat to create a RC synthesis that accounts for Taipei’s cross-Strait policy in the constitution of huadu. The framework shows how huadu refutes

\textsuperscript{414} Bozdağhoğlu: 137
\textsuperscript{416} Barkin, J. Samuel. 2010: 72.
\textsuperscript{417} Ibid, 413
Wendt’s liberal constructivist argument to demonstrate how cross-Strait relations default to an oscillating Lockean status quo rather than fulfilling policy aspirations to a Kantian liberal peace. Granted, *huadu* has ended the Hobbesian enemy stance that prevailed under the authoritarian ROC.

Figure 5 Two-Level-Three-Stage Model of Discursive Power

3.5. Conclusion

The RC conception of power and the theoretical model above explain Taiwan’s successful deployment of discursive power to maintain its autonomy from a perspective that takes threat perception and cross-Strait and domestic power politics into account. Taiwan’s maintenance of the status quo represents an impressive deployment of *huadu*, since it effectively stalemates Beijing.

China has compulsory power over Taiwan not just because it can use brute force, but because Taiwan knows it. 418 However, China is also constrained by Taiwan’s

responses. In this context, and despite representing a nominally Chinese Nationalist party, Taipei’s KMT policy elites resisted Beijing’s attempts to set a timetable for unification after 2008. The concepts highlighted above explain why maintenance of the status quo is the logical outcome.

Relative power has switched from Taiwan to China since the early 1990s when Taiwan was investing in China. Now the roles have reversed, but Taiwan is a sovereign political entity; Taiwanese identity is now embedded as the norm. The framework above accounts for oscillating cross-Strait relations up to 2008 and Rapprochement and its reversal after that. At the same time, China now enjoys a relative material power advantage, meaning the resources and policy options available to each side differ. This determines that in order to maintain its de facto independence, Taiwan must continue to deploy the discursive power of huadu. The next chapter shows how Taipei enacts the discursive power of its state identity in power politics to legitimate its de facto independence.
Chapter 4: State Identity – Theoretical Framework

4.1. Introduction

The previous chapter provisionally argued that huadu draws on and bestows discursive power on the ROC to maintain Taiwan’s de facto independence. That is, it legitimates Taiwan’s sovereign status. This chapter takes up and develops a framework of huadu as a state identity. This is necessary because discursive power in and of itself is not legitimacy; rather, it is derived from legitimacy which, in turn, is bestowed by state identity. Legitimacy permits the enactment of discursive power in foreign policy. That is, Taiwan’s legitimacy is both a source and a product of its discursive power to maintain its de facto independence and it is enacted in cross-Strait relations, stalemating China’s power in the process.

This study’s realist-constructivist (RC) framework holds that power and state identity is intersubjectively co-constituted in power politics. Hence, neither materialist and rationalist IR accounts nor modernist national identity theories can fully explain why Taiwan is able to use huadu to maintain its de facto independence. Rather a RC state identity framework that conceptualises legitimacy does. Huadu arose as a necessary ROC reassertion of preferences in response to a threat to its legitimacy entailed in domestic and international crises of legitimacy. So, huadu represents the co-constitutive legitimation of ROC power, identity and interest in response to internal and external threats to these. Huadu provides a cognitive framework for Taiwan’s preferences and cross-Strait policy.

This chapter does the following: first, as indicated in Chapter 2, it reviews the literature on Taiwan’s national identity to locate gaps for huadu as state identity. Second, it conceptualises Taiwan’s sub-state identities to show how, while none of...
these are sufficient to explain *huadu*, a modernist conception of national identity helps. Third, it offers a framework for *huadu* as state identity. Fourth, it conceives of *huadu* in relation to legitimacy and argues that it arose in different ways from the authoritarian ROC’s loss of legitimacy as *Free China*. Fifth, it links *huadu* to cross-Strait policy, showing how it is intersubjectively co-constituted in anarchical norms and deployed in power politics through state identity politics (SIPs). Finally, it argues that *huadu* provides Taiwan with ontological security – or security in its ROC state identity - and that this enables Taiwan to maintain the status quo of de facto independence while compelling China to sanction this status. Without *huadu*, there is no conceptualisation or theorisation of the cross-Strait status quo. The alternative is simply extrapolation of an inhibited struggle between two impossible choices, Chinese unification in *tongyi* and de jure Taiwan independence in *taidu*.

4.2. Literature on Taiwan’s National Identity

This section argues that while the literature on Taiwanese national identity lacks a clear conceptualisation of Taipei’s state identity, it provides pointers to that identity both in its understanding of national identity construction and in its linking of it to cross-Strait policy preferences. Any national identity theory may account for Taiwan’s divergence from China; it is how Taipei exploits national identity that matters and that implies a state identity. Studies of democratisation go back to post-1945 authoritarian rule to understand its genesis in ROC state identity change (q.v. 2.2; 2.3.). The literature on Taiwanese national identity itself presupposes a legitimate ROC state identity that aligns to *huadu*.

Like the IR literature, much of the NI-driven literature views Taiwan’s political divergence from China as either an inhibited search for *taidu* or a false choice between *taidu* and *tongyi*, effacing the ROC. The dominant approach is positivist and
sticks close to NI modernism; Taiwanese national identity developed in opposition to the authoritarian ROC other after 1945 and cannot be considered without reference to Chinese national identity. In the 1990s, Taiwanese national identity, driven by the consolidation of democracy, pivoted to mainland China as its other, drawing the ROC into its scope in the process. State identity is implied throughout the literature. This provides an explanatory way out of the tongyi-taidu puzzle.

Alan Wachman’s seminal 1994 study Taiwan: National Identity and Democratization identified a lack of KMT-DPP consensus on national identity alongside consensus on civic democratic identity. Christopher Hughes’ (1997) Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism locates Taiwanese national identity in democracy; this broke the link between Chinese Nationalism and KMT legitimacy and decoupled the ROC from Chinese Nationalism. This clearly implies a shift to “an intermediate” state identity. The salience of a pronounced post-democracy shift from a Chinese to a Taiwanese state identity and a corresponding shift towards a policy preference for the status quo that eschews both tongyi and taidu (q.v. 1.4.) is a broad theme operating through two cross-cutting strands: first, post-democracy changes in Taiwan’s partisan structure involving factional tension; second, the shift from an ethnic to a civic national identity. These two strands further explain how Taiwanisation of the KMT and the ROC caused national identity to impact on domestic power politics and cross-Strait relations. What is left insufficiently explored is a conceptualization of state identity as the solution to the sovereignty issue. Huadu provides this.

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With regard to the first strand above, post-democracy changes in Taiwan’s partisan structure led to competing nation-building projects, with the DPP-KMT opposition dominating. National identity was the dominant party cleavage. Yet, there was consensus on Taiwan’s sovereignty and nation-building required the ROC state. This elite-led project co-opted Taiwanese national identity to the ROC to head off taidu between 1991 and 2000. Between 2000 and 2008, the DPP sought to reconstruct the ROC as a Taiwanese nation state while rhetorically threatening to enact taidu. This presupposes ROC state power and identity. Niou (2004) uses Constructivism to show how Taiwanese identity was talked into being. Quantitative analyses of elite discourse by Sullivan and Lowe (2010) and Sullivan and Sapir (2012) confirm Schubert’s (2004) qualitative research revealing converging KMT and DPP positions on a Taiwanese national identity linked to the ROC. This suggests huidu.

The second strand shows how sub-ethnic identities influenced domestic politics from 1945 and constituted a Taiwanese national identity that gelled in democratisation. A Mainlander (waishengren)-Taiwanese (benshengren) cleavage arose from brutal KMT suppression and hampered sinification during the 1950s and 1960s, ensuring

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an oppositional state-seeking Taiwanese national identity. A number of books expose KMT brutality: Mancall’s (1964) *Taiwan: Island of Resignation and Despair* and Mendel’s (1970) *The Politics of Formosan Nationalism* relay a sense of benshengren hatred towards waishengren. Harrison (2006) provides a thick constructivist account of historical national identity construction. These allude to taidu as Taiwan’s independence from the authoritarian ROC, not the PRC. This strand invites examination of huadu as a response to an earlier KMT crisis of legitimacy – that is the one sparked by 2-28 in 1947.

The striking shift from sub-ethnic identities to a civic national identity driven by democratisation was already visible in 1997, when Lee Teng-hui articulated the New Taiwanese identity (q.v. 7.3.). Taiwanese accept China as a cultural and ancestral focus, but identify nationally with Taiwan in the form of the ROC. With ethnic identity resolved, civic democracy represents Taiwanese identity. Despite a positivist bent, however, a closer reading of the literature invites a RC conceptualisation of

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democratisation; that is, rather than Taiwanese national identity causing the ROC to
democratise, democratisation was co-constituted by the state and the national group.

National identity in ethnic struggle gathered power in the 1990s but was also visible
in local elections from the 1950s. Chao (1992) and Chen (1995) confirm a tension
between local and national KMT factions that contrasts the Chinese Confucian
political culture of KMT elites and their Taiwanised local-government counterparts.433 Chao and Myers (2000) claim these pre-democratic elections worked
as pressure valves for grievances against the KMT while allowing it to embed
patronage through the party state.434 This strand culminated in Makeham and Hsiau’s
(2005) magisterial study of the dangwai movement that tracked the progression of
bentuhua outside of the KMT party structure and which was to form the nucleus of
the DPP (q.v. 6.4.).435 An overall tension between a Free China state identity and a
Taiwanese national identity is clear.

Research based on mass surveys pointed to a general civic national identity
developing in Taiwan during the 1990s that was culturally Chinese, but politically
Taiwanese. Democratisation and Chinese threats were its drivers. Mainlanders
(waishengren) developed a more flexible national identity between 1997 and 2008.436
The 2000 DPP victory marked a shift to an overtly “self-conscious nation-building
project”, reflecting anxiety over increasing economic convergence with China with
research exploring the DPP administration’s construction of a Taiwanese national

433 Chao, Yung-Mao. 1992. Local Politics on Taiwan: Continuity and Change. In Denis Fred Simon
and Ying-mao Kao (Eds.) Taiwan: Beyond the Economic Miracle. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe: 43-68.
434 Chao, Linda and Ramon Myers. 2000. How Elections Promoted Democracy in Taiwan under
(ed.). Memories of the Future: National Identity Issues and the Search for a New Taiwan. Armonk:
memory. By 2008, though, what Beijing and the pan-Blues perceived as a move to *taidu* led to electoral defeat for the DPP. Quantitative studies and opinion polls revealed that the electorate was pragmatic on unification/independence. This reflected a salient rise in pro-independence and fall in pro-unification sentiment overall between 1992 and 2016, but with the majority preferring the status quo. These studies locate Taiwan’s preference for the status quo in China’s inhibition of Taiwanese nationalism’s desire for *taidu* and Taiwan’s inability to accept *tongyi* leading to an “unresolved national identity dilemma”. Liu and Ho (1999) identify a decline in Chinese identity and a rise in Taiwanese identity regardless of ethnicity; they locate national identity as the key variable in political thinking and attitudes. The NCCU data point to a sharp rise in Taiwanese identity and fall in Chinese identity after ROC constitutional changes (q.v. 1.3.2.). The elite-led decoupling of

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the tongyi-taidu debate from national identity and democracy created a space for 
huadu to occupy, making civic identity prominent. 441

KMT Taiwanisation remained an important research theme throughout the 2000s.
Research revealed that to equate Chinese identity, support for the KMT and pro-
tongyi sentiment on the one hand and Taiwanese identity, support for the DPP and a
pro-taidu stance on the other based on an imprecise Taiwanese-Mainlander
distinction was simplistic. By 2000, the KMT itself had democratised and
Taiwanised and the party showed no appetite for tongyi in the short term, while by
2000 the DPP showed less appetite for taidu. Yu Wu-shan (2011) argues that a
rational KMT sought a strong bargaining position vis-à-vis China that could be
modified to maximise votes. To this end, it moved towards the DPP on identity and
sovereignty during the 1990s. In opposition during the 2000s, it shifted to Chinese
nationalism to appeal to a core constituency alarmed at perceived shifts to taidu by
the DPP, but the 2008-16 KMT position under Rapprochement was practical, hoping
to strengthen Taiwan’s economy and achieve a modus vivendi with Beijing.442

Such endogenous partisan change reflects findings on state identity change. Winckler
(1984) and Tien Hung-mao (1989) suggest ROC institutional change, a generational
shift in power from Chinese to Taiwanese leaders and to liberal authoritarianism
presaged change.443 Gold (1986) suggests social change meant ROC identity had to
change.444 Bruce Jacobs (2012) sees the KMT as a Chinese colonial regime that

Taiwan and the China Impact: Challenges and Opportunities. Abingdon: Routledge.
identity in flux. In: Schubert, Gunter and Damm, Jens. eds. Taiwanese Identity in the 21st Century:
443 Winckler, Edwin. 1984. Institutionalization and Participation on Taiwan: From Hard to Soft 
Politics and social change in the Republic of China. Taiwan: SMC Publishing.
Taiwanised.\textsuperscript{445} Phillips (2003) relates Chinese Nationalist elites negotiating Chinese and Taiwanese state identities.\textsuperscript{446} Dickson (1993; 1997) identifies KMT elite agency as motivating state identity change.\textsuperscript{447} Mattlin (2011) argues that it was the KMT’s penetration of Taiwanese society itself that facilitated intense politicisation of the polity.\textsuperscript{448} All of these make state and elite agency salient in national identity change.

These insights into the dynamics of Taiwan’s complex national identity formation show how it is co-constitutive of *huadu*. First, Taiwan’s national identity has been formed at the domestic and cross-Strait levels; second, this national identity reinforces Taipei’s sovereignty claim around the status quo; third, it restrains top-down Taiwanisation and sinification policies, coalescing around the status quo; fourth, it was constituted by democracy - democratisation is Taiwanisation.\textsuperscript{449}

In sum, elite-led national identity construction, tempered by the intervening role of civil society, constitutes *huadu*. Yet, much research is too influenced by a misplaced debate over the role of nationalism and national identity in an inhibited search for *taidu* to fully account for the constitution of ROC state identity. Indeed, Dawley notes that post-2000 research in particular tends to conflate national, state and ethnic categories while being “too heavily influenced by contemporary debates over Taiwanese independence”.\textsuperscript{450} Admittedly, to distinguish among these categories is

\textsuperscript{445} Jacobs, Bruce. 2012.
not easy; national and state identities often overlap epistemologically (q.v. 4.2.) and ethnic identity has been strategically deployed alongside national identity in Taiwan’s domestic politics. The two-host dilemma (q.v. 1.1.) invites conflation of the Chinese nation and state but, theoretically, some scholars do use national identity for what is clearly state identity.\textsuperscript{451}

This study argues that there is, in a \textit{huadu} conceptualisation, no necessarily inhibited “quest for Taiwanese sovereignty” vis-à-vis Beijing.\textsuperscript{452} Taiwanese sovereignty has already been achieved through \textit{huadu} and that invites an account of ROC state identity change. In order to conceptualise \textit{huadu} as state identity, it must be separated from its sub-state identities. This entails first exploring how those sub-state identities constitute state identity.

4.3. Sub-State Social Identities

Aristotle’s first principle of being states “why a thing is itself” is self-evident, since it is not something else.\textsuperscript{453} This principle confirms an ontological difference among \textit{huadu}, \textit{tongyi} and \textit{taidu}, belying any overlap (q.v. 1.5.). It supports the claim that the ROC is a contingent, constitutive actor that combines sub-state identities in an individual \textit{huadu} corporate one that is Taiwanese because it is not Chinese.

Identity may consist in Taylor’s (1969) self-consciously acting.\textsuperscript{454} It may also be Erikson’s (1968) observation of the individual’s ontological reflective start point as


“what do I want to make of myself and what do I have to work with?” Indeed, Chen Shui-bian, invokes this question at the national (state) level in his 2000 inauguration speech. Hua du is performative, that is being and acting Taiwanese. A Taiwanese state is Taiwanese not simply because it is not Chinese, but because it “does” Taiwanese-ness in hua du.

The Taiwanese nation and the ROC state constitute each other in hua du, since all collectives require that members internalise their identity within them. As a corporate identity, hua du represents the collective location of the Taiwanese Self in relation to the Chinese Other. No other collective identity within Taiwan overrides the power of “we are Taiwanese” and “we are Taiwanese” cannot operate absent the ROC. The ROC, discursively through power politics, requires that Taiwan’s other identities identify with it.

4.3.1. Ethnic Identity

While there is no phenotypical difference between Chinese and Taiwanese, Taiwan has instrumentally mobilised perceived ethnic identity in power politics in the pragmatic pursuit of its interests. Giddens’ definition of ethnicity as self-identification allows for Taiwanese “cultural practices and outlooks” that “set them apart from” Chinese and provides some insight into the early development of the domestic identity cleavage. Ethnicity in this sense has been instrumentally co-opted in the construction of Taiwanese and Mainlanders as benshengren and

waishengren, defining Taiwan in the context of KMT sinification and bentuhua (q.v. Ch 1). However, ethnic identity is neither national identity nor state identity because it does not attach itself to a state or seek to operate in foreign policy. This study rejects any link between benshengren clan bonds and a putatively modern Taiwanese nation since the former have no “necessary” relation with Taiwan as a territorial unit. Hence, ethnicity may be discarded as necessarily constitutive of huadu and as an explanation of Taiwan’s maintenance of its de facto independence.

4.3.2. National and State Identities

A nation itself cannot be an agent of foreign policy. So, a conception of group identity that links the Taiwanese nation to its state is required. This means the terms “nation” and “state” need to be clarified. Anthony Smith (2001) provides a working definition of national identity as “the continuous reproduction and reinterpretation of the patterns of values, symbols and traditions that compose the distinctive heritage of a nation, and the identification by individual members with that pattern and heritage and with its cultural elements”. Yet, Verba (1971) restricts national identity to those who “fall within the decision-making scope of the state”. A state, according to Barrington (1997), is “the principal political unit in the international political system,” as distinct from the nation, or “a collective of people, whose belief in the right to territorial self-determination is what unites them”. However, this suggests the state appropriates national identity to locate itself ideationally in relation to other states. That is, state identity is a set of representations ascribed to the state by elites

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and recognised and understood by the other states’ elites to determine that state’s foreign policy.\textsuperscript{464} The nation identifies with the state as the social institution determining external relations and securing its sovereignty and both are co-constituted in domestic and inter-state power politics. To account for power’s co-constitution of the national interest, domestic and international factors need to be considered. Hopf (1997) sees the identity of a state implying its preferences and consequent actions:

\begin{quote}
a state understands others according to the identity it attributes to them, while simultaneously reproducing its own identity through daily social practice. The producer of the identity is not in control of what it ultimately means to others; the intersubjective structure is the final arbiter of meaning.\textsuperscript{465}
\end{quote}

The state deploys nationalism to construct a nation and that nation seeks a state to represent it. Hence, national identity cannot be separated from state identity. In this sense, the ROC and its nation are mutually sustaining and mutually legitimating.

As state identities, \textit{Free China} and \textit{huadu} (and \textit{tongyi} and \textit{taidu}), differ in their power to command legitimacy. The sovereignty of Taiwan as the ROC is derived from the assumed individual sovereignties of each Taiwanese, not Chinese. Thus \textit{huadu} is a corporate state identity, existing as long as the Taiwanese nation keeps the same preferences. \textit{Free China} claimed to be that of a collective Chinese individual prevailing over the wills of individual “Chinese” citizens. \textit{Huadu} identity is civic in that it entails citizenship which may be voluntarily acquired or abandoned. The principles of \textit{huadu}’s civic identity are those of liberal democracy; that is, it appeals to an enfranchised middle class, yet serves the interests of elites and powerful DIGs. \textit{Free China} represented a limited social basis: that is, it was adopted by and served

\textsuperscript{464} State identity is a set of qualities symbolically ascribed to the state by elites, meaningful to the international community and understood to determine the state’s foreign policy orientation.

\textsuperscript{465} Hopf, Ted. The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory.” \textit{International Security} 23(1): 175.
the interests of a narrow waishengren elite intent on preserving its status (q.v. 6.2.). The new technocrats and dangwai trying to attain status within this traditional social framework then transformed it in a crisis of legitimacy and transmitted it to the masses through bentuhua (q.v. 6.4.).

Certainly, then, the national-identity dynamic has influenced Taiwanese state-building through cross-Strait policy and this is salient in the literature. However, the focus on national identity causes research to fall into the tongyi-taidu fallacy, ignoring huadu. This section argues that while national and state identities are co-constituted, analytical separation of state identity better explains huadu and its deployment in cross-Strait policy.

4.3.3. Taiwan’s Modernist National Identity

A more promising explanation of the sources of huadu state identity is offered by modernist national identity theory. This explains Taiwan’s interest in independence from China in terms of the ROC’s creation of the Taiwanese nation. The concept of the nation is salient in Taiwanese political speech. Peng Ming-min and the dangwai refer to Renan’s conception, while Lee Teng-hui talks of the Taiwanese nation in Biblical terms as a City on a Hill. A city implies a state. Nationalism offers a clear policy platform of self-determination, territorial integrity, national autonomy and unity based on a state.

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The ROC provides the Taiwanese nation with a ready-made state through which it seeks political autonomy from China.\(^{469}\) The question then arises whether the ROC created Taiwan or vice versa. The modernist paradigm sees the ROC structurally and historically creating Taiwan. As such, \textit{huadu} aligns to Gellner’s (1983) principle that the nation and the state should be congruous.\(^{470}\) For modernists, the Taiwanese nation is an entirely recent socio-political construct created by the ROC using nationalist ideologies, which themselves are the expression of industrial society.\(^{471}\) Modernism sees nationalism’s focus on the will of the people that “[t]he source of all sovereignty resides essentially in the Nation”.\(^{472}\) This makes salient the tension between Chinese and Taiwanese nationalisms embodied in the ROC and invokes \textit{huadu} to resolve this tension. Since nationalism arose instrumentally to create industrial societies through state power, this materialist argument would see the Taiwanese nation as objectively necessary for the ROC state. The Taiwanese nation was created as the means of production determined necessary by the ROC.\(^{473}\) It was not accidental or invented, but the inevitable result of Taiwan’s shift to modernity, logically contingent, but politically necessary.\(^{474}\) In other words, modernity, in the shape of nationalism, required and created Taiwan as follows:

First, the Taiwanese nation was mobilised in industrial capitalism during the Taiwan Miracle by authoritarian KMT political elites operating through the ROC Party State;\(^{475}\) second, it was socially necessary for modern industrial capitalism, requiring


\(^{472}\) encapsulated in the Abbé Siéyés’ 1789 pamphlet, Qu’est-ce que le Tiers État? clarified in Thomas Payne’s assertion in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen.

\(^{473}\) Gramsci


a high culture in the form of Standard Chinese provided by a public education system;\textsuperscript{476} Standard Mandarin, restricted to a tiny elite in 1945, became national under the authoritarian ROC;\textsuperscript{477} third, it developed through a technocratic ROC state using Chinese nationalism to support state sovereignty;\textsuperscript{478} fourth, it is a wholly modern, instrumental, self-serving elite construction.\textsuperscript{479} Taiwanese national identity arose from the island’s geographical and political separation from China, KMT authoritarian rule and subsequent democratisation. Huntington’s Third Wave nationalism fleshes out Taiwan’s case to account for dangwai influence post-liberalisation.\textsuperscript{480} In other words, Taiwan is a modern nation constructed by elite KMT and dangwai-inspired DPP craftsmen who constructed an identity in pursuit of their interests.\textsuperscript{481} In this sense, Taiwan is a rationalist project aiming to build a new state using the existing ROC framework.\textsuperscript{482}

Yet, this alone does not fully answer why the Chinese state that created a Taiwanese nation would generate an interest in state identity change. After all, the ROC explicitly claimed to be constructing a Chinese nation. This suggests it was not the shift to modernity alone, but the ROC’s crises of legitimacy that constructed the Taiwanese nation. These crises were also necessary in ideological terms, since loss of legitimacy entailed an ideological shift. This invites a realist-constructivist explanation of Taiwan’s resistance to China first as the ROC and then as the PRC. 

\textit{Huadu} is a rational response by the authoritarian ROC state to its two crises of

\textsuperscript{478} Giddens, Anthony. 1991; Smith, Anthony. 1986.
\textsuperscript{479} Hobsbawm and Ranger. 1983.
\textsuperscript{480} Huntington, Samuel. 1992. \textit{The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century}. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
legitimacy in 1947 and 1971. The former created an inhibited Taiwanese interest in *taidu* as independence from the ROC. The ROC responded with supression, sinification and a change in state identity to *Free China*. *Bentuhua* was the antithesis as sinification deepened. The latter, more prolonged, crisis created an ultimately successful Taiwanese interest in democratisation. The ROC responded by appropriating *bentuhua*, liberalising and changing state identity from Chinese to Taiwanese in *huadu*. *Huadu* as state identity was co-constituted by the ROC using Chinese and Taiwanese nationalism to reassert legitimacy as it pivoted to the PRC between 1987 and 1992.

The modernist paradigm provides a partial account of state interests determining state identity. For Hechter (2000), modern nationalism is motivated by reason, rational choice and informed group identity. The sources of *huadu* can therefore be explained rationally in terms of powerful domestic groups’ perceptions of the strength of China and benefit to those interests if Taiwan’s autonomy is maintained. In this view, Taiwanese nationalist subversion of Chinese nationalist control of the ROC was employed strategically and produced sovereignty. The ROC was weakened by a crisis of legitimacy and *dangwai* resistance during the 1970s and 1980s. Taiwanese nationalism was a peripheral elite response to direct ROC rule over Taiwan. So, Taiwanese nationalism bound the peripheral people to its elite against the centralising ROC (which was itself territorially detached from its metropolis) in the form of a nation. Hechter’s thesis explains Taiwan’s resistance to the Chinese metropolis represented locally by the ROC and Taiwan’s search for *taidu*. It may also explain the Taiwanisation of the KMT, but it does not explain why the authoritarian ROC was a state that was one-and the-same with its periphery. Nor

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does it explain the constitution of huadu as a state identity socially constructed and deployed in cross-Strait relations. The modernist approach partly explains why Taiwan sought a state and why that state gave it a national character. It does not explain why that state should remain the ROC and not become the ROT.

Weber claims “a nation…tends to produce a state of its own”,\(^ {484}\) while Rousseau proposes that if a nation lacks a national character, “we must start endowing it with one”.\(^ {485}\) Taiwanese elites captured the ROC and explained Taiwan’s distinct historical character by articulating “who we are”, “when we began” and “where we are going”.\(^ {486}\) This approach explains Taiwanese elite actions as entirely rational; there exists a nation called Taiwan that has an explicit character whose interests align with the realist political goals of the modern ROC state (authoritarian and democratic). Non-material explanations can be discarded in rational terms. By 1992, neither tongyi nor taidu forces were strong enough to push Taiwan towards unification or de jure independence. There was, however, a broad consensus on Taiwanese national identity.\(^ {487}\) This invited tongyi and taidu constituencies to buy into huadu, Taiwanising the ROC in the process.

Modernist approaches alone cannot provide a satisfactory framework for huadu; nor can they account for its role in Taiwan’s successful maintenance of its de jure independence. This is because they do not account for state identity change in the context of a crisis of legitimacy and the relationship between domestic and cross-Strait construction of that identity. Specifically, they do not account for the


\(^{487}\) Hughes, Christopher. 2011.
relationship among power, interest, domestic politics, cross-Strait policy and threat. Crucially, they cannot explain how and why Taipei chose among tongyi, taidu and huadu identities. These issues are crucial in explaining how huadu secures Taiwan’s autonomy and stalemates Chinese power. Once Taiwan’s de facto independence was secured in the form of huadu, NI approaches are less successful at explaining Taiwan’s resistance to China as the PRC. In other words, NI explains the domestic co-constitution of a corporate state identity, but not its constitution or deployment as a social identity in cross-Strait relations (q.v. 3.2.7.). Thus, a RC approach that draws on IR state identity theories is required.

In this regard, Gunter Schubert (2004) conceives of Taiwan’s national identity as adhering to the ROC state and observed in partisan policy preferences. That is, all mainstream parties agree that the ROC’s constitution must be protected and asserted. In Taiwan’s quest for sovereignty, taidu and tongyi are “obsolete as genuine political objectives”. The Taiwanese nation exists, based on state identity (guojia rentong) not ethno-cultural identity (minzu rentong), and stressed in mainstream party policy. Thus, no party has a mandate for taidu or tongyi. Rather, huadu is recognised and endorsed by a preponderance of Taiwanese and Taiwanese identity is primarily a state identity that constitutes the Taiwanese as a political community. However, Schubert’s conception of this identity is still ontologically and epistemologically national; it refers to a political community that acknowledges a state rather than a state as such.

490 Schubert, Gunter. 2004: 537.
4.4. States and State Identity

The idea of the state is central to IR. States have existed in various forms at various times in history and states, not nations, act in international relations.491 Modernist approaches to national identity make salient its state-driven character; that is, states create nations. The primary identity accounting for Taiwan’s maintenance of its de facto independence must therefore be its state identity. Taiwan may be a self-conscious nation, but it is the ROC that constitutes the political institutions that represent the Taiwanese nation and its territorial juridical unit. The academic debate around defining the ROC state in the literature on Taiwan reflects foreign policy analysis and IR perspectives. The former sees the ROC from a domestic political science and sociology perspective, distinguishing state from society and seeking to understand their interaction.492 The latter focuses on external relations, viewing the ROC as a territorial entity interacting with the PRC in cross-Strait relations.493 This distinction leads to two definitions. First, a Weberian one sees state and society as separate phenomena and the state as an almost entirely institutional construct. That is, the state means the central government.494 Second, a Durkheimian one in which the state operates within a system and is legitimated by that interaction. That is, the state is a territorially defined socio-political entity.495 Clearly, Taiwan’s contested status complicates these perspectives, yet both are necessary to understand huaedu.

A Weberian institutional approach to state identity sees the state as “a human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory”. In other words, the state is the institution sanctioned to administer and coerce all other groups over which it claims authority. States are the most powerful units in the system and, as a form of political organisation, the state constitutes political legitimacy. The state’s legitimacy implies a state identity and interests and, by extension, foreign policy.

Conversely, a Durkheimian legitimacy approach acknowledges that institutional capacities are important, but that “it is in the realm of ideas and sentiment that the fate of states is primarily determined”; a state’s power is its capacity to command loyalty – in other words, its right to rule. Hence, states face crises when they lack legitimacy rather than material power. This section argues not that the authoritarian ROC lacked power to perform the functions of statehood. Rather, it lacked an underlying legitimacy, both as China and Taiwan.

Thomas Gold uses Skocpol’s Weberian definition to frame the authoritarian ROC state as “a set of administrative, policing and military organizations headed, and more or less well coordinated by, an executive authority” that controls a specific territory. For Gold, the KMT party state was the “pact of domination” that served Chinese Nationalist interests, guaranteed elite Chinese control over Taiwanese society and sought its own survival. Although partially penetrated by Taiwanese technocrats, the ROC preserved itself by acting against Taiwanese nationalist

interests and enjoyed autonomy from domestic and foreign groups. The KMT, as a “tightly organized, well-disciplined political party representing Chinese elite interests” recreated and dominated the ROC state on Taiwan after 1947. This state and its elite began to change its identity in a second crisis of legitimacy after 1971 (q.v. 6.4.1.).

Buzan adopts a Durkheimian approach. He argues that, while all states have institutional and physical components that provide civil order, collective goods and protection, they also require legitimacy. In other words, the state is an idea as well as an institution. Without a broad and rooted idea of the state within its constituency, its institutions could not survive. Furthermore, Buzan points out, not all states are alike. The ROC, for instance, is formally unrecognised and this, along with China’s irredentist threat, helps understand why the ROC behaves differently, even though it shares certain characteristics with the PRC. Having said that, without an understanding of ROC state-like characteristics Taiwan’s maintenance of its de facto independence cannot be explained.

The ROC faced sequential crises of, rather than collapse of, its legitimacy between 1947 and 1987. That is, its structure and authority did not fall apart such that it necessitated reconstitution in a ROT or as part of the PRC. In Taiwan, the ROC has never lost its right to control public affairs.

4.4.1. A Constructed *huadu* State Identity

Wendt (1999) and Katzenstein (1996) provide rationalist, though not rational-choice, state identity frameworks. These allow changes in ROC interests to be integrated. The ROC’s interest in becoming Taiwanese and observing liberal democratic norms is in its self-interest and becomes internalised in *huadu*. Wendt’s (1999) “identities determine interests” provides a constructivist pointer to the construction of *huadu*. States are actors; socialisation among states involves state identities; these identities constitute the structures of international relations through inter-subjectively held beliefs. These structures in turn constitute states as actors by defining their roles and goals in the system, and thus their identities. State identities tell states who they are and what their interests are, provide them with a method of predicting the behaviour of other states, and provide a framework for action. Thus, for Wendt’s systemic approach, *huadu* arose out of interaction with China. Yet, Wendt’s corporate identity (q.v. 3.4.) and the political science and area studies literature (q.v. 2.3.) suggest that *huadu* also arose in domestic interaction between the ROC and Taiwan.

In a Wendtian conception, *huadu* is culture as well as identity; that is, it is “socially shared knowledge”, with “knowledge” as “any belief an actor takes to be true”. Since for WC, the ROC is a unitary cross-Strait actor, the domestically shared knowledge that comprises *huadu* as a corporate culture must enter a culture of anarchy only when shared between China and Taiwan. The “1992 Consensus” constitutes the encoding of the shift from corporate to social *huadu* identity and suggests a transition from “first encounter” in 1987 that represents a tentative shift to inter-state relations.

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Cultures of anarchy mutually constitute a *huadu* social, or role identity as Taiwan’s “distinct posture or orientation of the Self” toward the Chinese Other “with respect to the use of violence”.  

For Wendt, Taiwan’s interest in sovereignty is a by-product of that system-level role. Certainly, Taiwan and China have moved from a Hobbesian enemy culture to an oscillating Lockean rival culture to a failed attempt at a Kantian friend culture. Yet, Wendt’s theory suggests an unproblematic shift from Hobbesian to Kantian culture. This suggests the puzzle of China’s buying into *huadu* as implicit recognition of cross-Strait Westphalian sovereignty and internalising of a tenuous rival/friend role relationship.

Wendt would conceive of *huadu* as a unitary ROC and PRC view of Self and Other in a shared cross-Strait culture of anarchy. But there must be a difference between the culture of anarchy and the *huadu* identity it is supposed to constitute. Unlike, say, Canada and the US, Taiwan and China have quite different corporate identities; hence it is not surprising that 2008-16 Rapprochement failed to align to Wendt’s model. Corporate and social role identities will always be in conflict and *huadu* itself presupposes a ROC interest in maintenance of de facto independence – something that is in conflict with *tongyi*. To operationalise *huadu* as state identity, a RC definition that acknowledges its cross-cutting internal and external dynamics of co-constitution in power politics is needed.

4.4.2. A Realist-Constructivist *huadu* State Identity Framework

Drawing on Alexandrov (2003), this framework proposes a definition of *huadu* as a set of discursive representations of the ROC’s qualities in relation to the PRC.

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511 Alexandrov, Maxym. 2003. 35.
alongside beliefs about how it should act to maintain legitimacy.\textsuperscript{512} The Taiwanese state is the ROC.\textsuperscript{513} The ROC has a \textit{huadu} identity. A \textit{huadu} identity has two dimensions. The internal one exhibits the representations and beliefs held by the nation in the form of elites and powerful domestic groups within the state. The external dimension consists of representations and beliefs about the Taiwanese (ROC) state held in common by Beijing’s and Taipei’s elites in cross-Strait socialisation. This synthesises RC and shows the degree to which China and powerful \textit{tongyi} and \textit{taidu} domestic constituencies in Taiwan buy into \textit{huadu}. Wendt brackets the domestic, so by acknowledging that there must be a point at which the state becomes and starts acting as a unitary actor, the unitary-actor ontology can be relaxed and domestic realist aspects of RC can be brought in (q.v. 2.2; 3.7). The point at which the state becomes and starts acting as a unitary actor is between the DIG-FPE and state-state interfaces (q.v. 3.4.). Such a definition implies agency, ascribes state identity construction to power (politics) and resolves the agent-structure problem. For RC, power politics involve identity politics. A \textit{huadu} identity of itself cannot causally determine ROC interest and policies. It has to be mediated by threat perception and interest and enacted through power (politics) in a given cross-Strait policy. Thus, \textit{huadu} is co-constitutive of power politics in cross-Strait relations, but it is also co-constitutive of domestic elite and interest-group political struggle that responds to Taipei’s cross-Strait policy. Such domestic struggle constructs \textit{huadu} representations. By implicitly presenting a given cross-Strait policy as an expression of \textit{huadu}, actors construct \textit{huadu} in power politics, thus legitimating it. Similarly,

\textsuperscript{512} Alexandrov, Maxym. 2003: 39; Alexandrov’s definition of state identity is: “a set of broadly accepted (often symbolic or metaphorical) representations of [the] state, in particular in its relation to other states, together with the corresponding beliefs about the appropriate behavior, rights or responsibilities”.

Chinese actors are acutely aware of and attempt to influence Taiwan’s domestic power politics by supporting tongyi constituencies or attempting to win over taidu ones, principally to delegitimate taidu. Conversely, taidu-supporting actors in Taiwan may perceive huadu as tongyi-by-the-back-door.

In response, elite actors may exercise agency to redefine internal and external identity. Both domestic and cross-Strait dimensions of huadu include multiple, contradictory representations of appropriate behavior. Dominant huadu representations may be supplanted by influential taidu or tongyi representations that mobilise resources in domestic power politics over time and change both huadu and Taiwan’s cross-Strait policy. For instance, cross-Strait relations reveal a tension between representations of cross-Strait convergence and divergence and between liberalism and protectionism among Taiwan’s elites. In response to Beijing’s elites’ denoting Taiwan as a “splittist” province during the first DPP administration between 2000 and 2004, KMT elites visited China, ostensibly to build bridges using a tongyi discourse that emphasised common Chinese identities. Rapprochement was a conscious effort to get China to reject taidu and tongyi representations and buy into huadu ones. However, through repeated protests against any perceived Taiwanese moves towards taidu, China has also participated in Taiwan’s domestic power politics. Moreover, many Taiwanese policymakers are acutely aware that certain policies could endanger huadu, reinforcing China’s taidu representation. In so far as these policymakers avoid such policies, Chinese protests influence Taiwan’s cross-Strait policy. Apart from the external dimension of Taiwan’s identity, Taipei’s name rectification and constitutional reform show that China’s actors actively respond to
Taiwan’s internal identity debates in power politics. *Huadu* has prevailed, so China has succeeded in averting *taidu* but not enforcing *tongyi*.  

This study goes beyond the content of *huadu* to examine its enactment in power politics to explain Taipei’s interest in maintaining the status quo. This requires foreign policy. Since discursive power is the legitimation of state representations, power politics constitute a site of contestation and negotiation for state legitimacy. Hence, legitimation in power politics may be conceived of as the defining mechanism of international relations.

In international and domestic politics, power benefits from being perceived to have legitimacy. This study therefore takes a RC approach to discursive power as the legitimation of *huadu* operating in power politics as state identity politics (SIPs). China’s compulsory power provokes resistance in Taiwan, yet its prevention of *taidu* functions through its broad recognition of *huadu* as a state representation that defines appropriate behaviour for China and Taiwan. In other words, as long as Taiwan maintains *huadu*, China will not enforce *tongyi*. The reason why China insists so much on the 1992 Consensus is that, rather than permitting *tongyi*, it encodes *huadu*, thus averting *taidu*. State self-understanding is discursive power; that is, representations that invoke legitimacy. Legitimacy enables actors to impose state representations through SIPs. This power is not compulsory as it is not direct. It is more diffuse than material power, endowing Taiwan and its DIGs with more influence than their material capabilities alone permit.

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515 Alexandrov, Maxym. 2003. 40
4.5. *Huadu* as Legitimacy

Chapter 3 conceptualised legitimacy as an aspect of discursive power (q.v. 3.2.7). This section returns to that concept to account for *huadu* as state identity. In a Lockeian sense state identity confers legitimacy and presupposes consent.\(^{516}\) That is, a state identity becomes legitimate when its foreign policy is socially endorsed, or sanctioned. Recognition of a mandate entails an external perception that a state’s identity is rightful (q.v. 3.2.1). \(^{517}\) Legitimacy therefore represents the Weberian probability that a state will be in a position to use its identity to enact its will “despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability exists”.\(^{518}\) The power of *huadu*, therefore, is more than a resource; *huadu* represents Taipei’s power to engender cross-Strait and domestic behavioural change and effect the outcomes it wants.\(^{519}\) The material effect of Taiwan’s maintenance of the status quo therefore rests on the legitimacy of the ROC and the legitimacy of the ROC rests on *huadu*. *Huadu* operates in What Reus-Smit (2007) terms the state’s “realm of political action” – the geopolitical scope that includes Taiwan and cross-Strait relations to legitimate Taipei’s identity. The state’s “social constituency of legitimation” constitutes the actual social groupings among which a state identity seeks and commands legitimacy; that is, legitimacy requires a claimant (*huadu*) and an endorser who sanctions or recognises that claim. A social constituency of legitimation provides the latter and must have legitimacy itself as “the social grouping in which legitimacy is sought, ordained or both”.\(^{520}\)


\(^{517}\) Ibid: 158


\(^{520}\) Reus-Smit. 2007.
For this study, *huadu*’s “subject constituency of legitimation” constitutes Taiwan’s electorate, policy elites and powerful interest groups, including domestic and transnational non-state actors such as Taiwanese business elites operating in China and the *taishang* (q.v. 8.3.). *Huadu*’s “non-subject constituency” encompasses Beijing, Washington and the international community as its realm expands. Domestic *taidu* and *tongyi* constituencies are tiny and represent *huadu* subject constituencies as *huadu*’s legitimacy expands. Beijing, as Taiwan’s veto state, becomes a non-subject constituency as *huadu* commands its endorsement in cross-Strait relations.

The concepts of realm of political action and social constituency of legitimation present a dissonance for Taipei. The ROC’s second crisis of legitimacy from the 1970s made salient a disjuncture between these as international, transnational and domestic, with “domestic” shifting from including the mainland to being simply Taiwan. Cross-Strait relations recalibrated both to include the mainland again. This resulted in cross-cutting subject and non-subject realms and social constituencies. Reus-Smit (2007) suggests powerful non-subject constituencies must also buy into state identity for it to be legitimate. Symons (2011) points out states “do not need to gain legitimacy among all subject constituencies within their political realm of action”. The degree of sanction varies within a constituency. Thus, what legitimates the ROC as Taiwan is a viable *huadu* “legitimacy nexus” that includes Taiwan, Beijing and the international community in its scope. In this regard, *taidu* and *tongyi* as subject constituencies and Beijing as a non-subject constituency lack the discursive power to delegitimate *huadu*.

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In itself, Taiwan’s success in maintaining its de facto independence does not bestow legitimacy on huadu; the meaning of huadu as well as how it is perceived by others must also be considered. For instance, if huadu is simply a price Taiwan pays for cross-Strait peace that effectively subdues Taiwan to China’s power, it will not be seen as “rightful”. In Reus-Smit’s (1999) conception, huadu is not legitimate simply because it effectively secures Taiwan’s sovereignty; that sovereignty must align to prevailing international norms. What bestows legitimacy on huadu is that it aligns to normative representations that are recognised not only by Washington and the international community, but also by Beijing. Huadu legitimates the ROC by giving it the “right” to enact “huadu-ness”. Huadu-ness entails liberal democracy and self-determination as norms that are perceived as rightful to the international community, but it also entails Westphalian statehood. The latter compels Beijing’s tacit endorsement even as it formally refuses to recognise Taipei. That is, the ROC is “a stable set of norms, rules, and principles” that constitute Taiwan’s sub-state actors and China “as knowledgeable social agents” (q.v. 3.2.4.).

Taipei deploys huadu to regulate these social agents’ behaviour, causing them to sanction that identity. ROC legitimacy therefore requires Beijing’s social perception and recognition. Huadu commands legitimacy because the ROC issues successful legitimacy claims that denote the politics of legitimation encoded in state identity politics (SIPs).

4.5.1. A Crisis of Legitimacy

Many IR scholars see state identity as slow-forming and unchanging. Yet, to understand huadu, such a view is limiting. While some state identities endure over

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at 160; 163-4.
long periods, in states that experience rapid socio-political change, state identity may
shift rapidly in a crisis of legitimacy. A state faces a crisis of legitimacy when
recognition of its state identity as rightful declines to the point where, rather than
deploying material coercive power, it has to reconstitute the social bases of its
legitimacy. Such crises are “critical turning points in which the imperative to adapt
is heightened by the imminent possibility of (state) death”. To resolve a crisis of
legitimacy, a state must reconcile its identity with the normative expectations of
other actors within its realm. This entails an internal and an external dimension
and the crisis may be both domestic and international. A crisis of legitimacy,
therefore, is the “critical turning point when decline in an actor’s or institution’s
legitimacy forces adaptation (through re-legitimation or material inducement) or
disempowerment”. For huadu to achieve a “legitimacy dividend”, its realm and its
social constituency need to approximate one another. Taiwan’s process of crisis -
and hence ROC identity – resolution, therefore, involves domestic debate over social
norms among tongyi, taidu and huadu constituencies. That means achieving a degree
of consensus by delegitimating and compelling tongyi and taidu constituencies to
buy into huadu. It also requires not delegitimation of Beijing’s sovereignty, but of its
Great Power (daguo) state identity’s claim on Taiwan. Once the ROC, as an actor
and an institution, has achieved sufficient legitimacy within its new realm of political
action to achieve its objectives through right and voluntary compliance then the crisis

524 Reus-Smit, Christian. 2007 166.
526 Reus-Smit, Christian. 2007: 167
527 Ibid 164
Democratic transformation is essential to change in security structure.\textsuperscript{529}

\textbf{4.6. A Realist-Constructivist Model of State Identity, Security and cross Strait Policy}

Taiwan’s cross-Strait policy is national security policy and it is shaped by state identity. Its social construction occurs in both cross-Strait and domestic dimensions in the context of contested authority, conflicting interests and power relations.\textsuperscript{530} A crisis of legitimacy originally prompted the ROC to change identity and this change became most salient in post-1987 democratisation and cross-Strait relations. This invites a RC model of state identity, security and cross-Strait policy.

\textit{Huadu} means that the ROC is Taiwan. Taiwan’s national interest and national security are state interest and state security.\textsuperscript{531} For Wendt the state is the subject of security; national insecurity arises when the state locates an external threat to its identity. States respond to threats by deploying the discursive power of their identity and the two-level, three-stage framework in chapter three resolves this by locating the discursive power of Taiwan’s state identity in \textit{huadu} (q.v. 3.4.). \textit{Huadu} resolves the two-host dilemma (q.v. 1.2.3.) by making the ROC Taiwan. In so doing, it resolves Shih Cheng-fong’s (2004) puzzle that locates Taiwan’s national identity and security in the ROC’s state identity and security. First, Taiwan’s national identity impacts on its perception of state security; second, national security and perception of Chinese (PRC) threat make the ROC reconcile its identity with Taiwan, resolving earlier antagonistic national (Taiwanese) and state (Chinese) identities. Finally, since China is the object of Taiwan’s threat perception, Taiwan’s national (state) security

\textsuperscript{528} Reus-Smit: Christian. 2007:172
\textsuperscript{529} Weitzer, Ronald John. 1990: 1.
\textsuperscript{531} Katzenstein, Peter J. 1996. Introduction.
policy is cross-Strait policy and the constitutive link between state identity and cross-Strait policy is intermediated by DIG struggle and cross-Strait socialisation. 532 This invites a RC reading. Taiwanese national identity co-constitutes ROC state identity as *huadu*. For Shih, the historical paradox of ROC national (state) security in opposition to China (PRC) created a pan-Blue-pan-Green tension between *tongyi* and *taidu* in which neither outcome could be achieved because of the threat from China on the one hand and the strength of anti-*tongyi* sentiment on the other. Yet, the prevalence of *huadu* confirms that the state deploys its identity to ensure ROC state survival, regardless of Beijing’s and domestic Taiwanese preferences.

*Huadu* influences Taiwan’s threat perception, constituting state identity formation.533 Walt’s neorealism would see identity as a stable, exogenous element; Taiwan’s national interests determine Chinese threats, and threats in turn determine Taiwan’s policy of *huadu* to maintain its autonomy. However, Constructivism sees identities as malleable and endogenous to the process.534 For RC, state identity and interests co-constitute each other and decide how threats are perceived.535 For Wendt, identities determine interests and are an independent variable. A RC approach moves away from the positivist language of variables to show how *huadu*, as a state identity, is intersubjectively co-constituted in cross-Strait and domestic power politics to legitimate Taiwan as a sovereign state that successfully resists China’s power.


4.6.1. *Huadu* and Anarchical Norms

*Huadu* presupposes Westphalian anarchical norms. Wendt says states follow norms because they have internalised those norms into their identities. Yet Chapter 3 in this study suggests that whether states see norms as legitimate depends on their corporate identities and these are not constructed in anarchy, but domestically. Therefore Katzenstein (1996) makes explicit reference to state identity when he defines norms as “collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors within a given identity”. Katzenstein distinguishes between liberal regulatory norms and constitutive norms that construct states’ identities and interests.536 Despite the formal rhetoric, post-2008 Rapprochement attempted to create a cross-Strait relationship based on “standards of appropriate behavior within a diplomatic relationship defined in terms of long-term interests”.537

*Huadu* goes beyond the rational-choice view of norms. A particular action prohibited by *huadu* norms, *tongyi*, becomes incompatible with Taiwan’s Self-image and therefore illegitimate. However, the norm that forbids *tongyi* does not in itself call for *taidu* since the ROC’s earlier anti-Communist Chinese state identity forbade both. Democratisation changed that, permitting *huadu* which is, in fact, an ideologically rearticulated rendering of the authoritarian ROC’s identity. Norms are therefore part of state identity. Without state identity, Wendtian norms would be analytically neoliberal. *Huadu* is thus a repository for norms constituted in power politics. By conceiving of the ROC as a unitary actor, Wendt’s approach offers a parsimonious definition of *huadu* as the ROC’s self-understanding.538 In this view, *huadu* shapes

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536 Katzenstein, Peter. 1996: 27.
537 Katzenstein, Peter. 1996: 150.
538 Alexandrov, Maxym. 2003: 36.
the ROC’s interests, which in turn guide its cross-Strait policy. This invites a RC framework.

The state-identity framework presented here better explains huadu. It does so by resolving three RC problems with state identity: first, it specifies the relationship among state identity, power, interest, foreign policy and threat; second, it locates a way of identifying how the ROC state chose among tongyi, taidu and huadu identities; third, it provides a RC definition and framework for the link between huadu as identity and huadu as power. Huadu, as a tool of cross-Strait strategic interaction, must be analytically separated from national identity for two reasons: first, power (politics) is the key concept in realist approaches; second, the case of the ROC exposes a clear national-state identity puzzle in the form of the two-host phenomenon.\textsuperscript{539}

Wendt (1992; 1994; 1999) underspecifies the relationship among state identity, power, interests, threat, foreign policy and how states choose among alternative identities. Wendt (1999) sees inter-state socialisation in three cultures of anarchy as the primary determinant of state identity. When internalised, these cultures co-constitute state identities and interests that are secondary to these system-level identities. Ideal socialisation between state A and state B should lead from Hobbesian through Lockean to Kantian, co-constituting a shared state identity in which the boundaries of the Self expand to include the Other.\textsuperscript{540}


\textsuperscript{540} Wendt, Alexander. 1999. 229.
*Huadu* must be ontologically separate from Wendt’s culture of anarchy, since a culture is simply a context. However, Wendt’s intersubjectivity itself actually resolves a number of other puzzles. Abductive analysis reveals that *huadu* is the intersubjectively co-constituted synthetic outcome of a dialectical struggle between a thesis of *tongyi* and an antithesis of *taidu*. Reconceptualising state identity by linking it to power therefore creates a broad realist-constructivist conception. Domestic realist aspects of Classical Realism imply socialisation in power politics among domestic interest groups as a source of state identity, Wendt’s pre-first-encounter corporate identity resolves the mismatch between domestic and systemic state-identity construction (q.v. 3.3.). For instance, first, state identity, interest and policy outcomes are co-constitutive. Second, Taipei chooses among *tongyi*, *taidu* and *huadu* on the basis of salience and place in the hierarchy co-constituted in power politics; that is preferences change and become legitimated in SIPs. This also opens the way for state-identity modification of DIG interests in the foreign-policy construction process. Neither identities nor interests therefore are ontologically prior. Interests are produced by identities, but then identities are chosen because of certain interests.

### 4.6.2. *Huadu* in Power (State Identity) Politics

*Huadu* operationalises discursive power (operating system) in the form of state identity (software). State identity consists of representations that are enacted in SIPs to produce legitimacy. Such a RC conception is acceptable to Constructivism and to Classical Realists. It also assumes that the ROC is a rational, self-interested actor because legitimation implies rationality.

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Only through SIPS can *huadu* articulate Taiwan’s interests and policies. SIPS constitute attempts through power politics by elites and DIGs to deploy existing representations of state identity and beliefs by mobilising resources to capture the state or influence its foreign policy by influencing its identity.\textsuperscript{544} SIPS are ubiquitous in cross-Strait and domestic power politics and are explicitly and implicitly deployed to exert the power of *huadu*.

How the ROC enacts *huadu*-driven cross-Strait policies that result in strengthening or weakening those representations, depending on the outcome. So, linking a policy with *huadu* as compatible with, say, democracy, economic liberalism or peace and prosperity may be considered an expression of ROC SIPS. This framework avoids privileging either the internal or external dimension of *huadu* and accepts crossover. Actors who use SIPS, domestically or cross-Strait, come from both inside and outside the ROC state; they may be the foreign policy executive, public servants, societal elites or domestic interest groups. Domestic elites and interest groups are aware of and can influence the cross-Strait deployment of *huadu*, while the foreign policy executive and cross-Strait actors may participate in domestic SIPS. For instance, Taiwan’s cross-Strait identity still includes the representation of “troublemaker”, with “splittist elements” that seek to disrupt the status quo; this is consciously reinforced by Beijing’s elites. Through regular reassurances (or not) by Taipei that it seeks not to disrupt the status quo, Taipei reinforces *huadu*, deploying SIPS domestically.

As a RC framework, this one sees discursive power as central to *huadu*. China has military and economic superiority over Taiwan but, while this is a superior form of compulsion, the potential cost in resistance is high. Even China’s recourse to the

\textsuperscript{544} Alexandrov, Maxym. 2003.
discursive power of a putative tongyi identity engenders resistance. Authority and rule require legitimacy. The ROC’s legitimacy and the cross-Strait status quo that it constitutes function through the state representations that define how Taipei should act from its actual power position. This suggests that Taipei is able to impose huadu interpretations and indirectly compel Beijing to buy into them. This is more diffuse than structural power, constituting much more productive power in the ROC and powerful interest groups than their material capabilities alone allow.

4.6.3. Ontological Security

Ontological security - a state’s security in its own identity achieved through a search for a stable inter-state context - is an IR concept that explains how the ROC mobilises huadu in response to perceived Chinese threat. Jennifer Mitzen (2006) argues that state identity and foreign policy are co-constituted. All states seek territorial security and all realist scholars agree uncertainty causes conflict in state interactions. The extent to which there is an ideational security dilemma across the Taiwan Strait rests on each side’s perceptions of the other’s intentions and the extent to which China and Taiwan are status quo or revisionist powers. An ideal-type model would see China, as a greedy state, creating cross-Strait ideational dilemmas and insecurity through tongyi discourses while Taiwan, as a security seeker, creates ideational uncertainty through taidu discourses, causing China to react with threats. However, this is to underplay the potential for state identity change. Taipei,

perceiving a Chinese threat, seeks to reassure Beijing by using huadu to maintain the status quo, thus securing its own autonomy and stalemating China’s power.

States become ontologically insecure when perceived threats disrupt the status quo, raising fundamental questions about state identity. Taiwan’s security requires a secure state identity and ontological insecurity represents a threat to its identity. Agency for Taiwan requires a stable status quo in which Beijing and Taipei establish routines that create certainty. Huadu, therefore, creates ontological security on both sides, since it creates predictable routines. In this context, post-2008 Rapprochement was a concerted attempt to routinise the language of cross-Strait conflict by framing it diplomatically and rhetorically at the surface level. Taipei cannot sustain huadu without Beijing reciprocating; the Other’s recognition allows the Self to retain its type. This suggests that huadu provides ontological security for both China and Taiwan by maintaining the status quo and averting taidu. Cross-Strait relations constitute a routinisation of conflict that actually avoids uncertainty as to China’s and Taiwan’s identities. Because of loss of legitimacy and Chinese threat, the ROC cannot securitise a Chinese identity. For this reason, it reconstructed its identity and sought certainty in what appears to be an uncertain huadu state identity to maintain the status quo. This creates a paradox.

Since it is not uncertainty but certainty that provokes cross-Strait threat perception, huadu actually creates certainty in routinisation. Thus, Taipei may in the long run be creating uncertainty for Beijing since huadu entails a Taiwanese ROC state identity and, consequently, political divergence. Therefore, the increasing ontological certainty entailed in huadu may actually deepen the security dilemma. Material

549 Mitzen, Jennifer. 2006.
security for Beijing means neutralising Taiwan as a neorealist threat. Ontological security for Beijing means Taiwan must be Chinese. For this, hua
du must entail eventual tongyi; yet the discourse shows that it is code for taidu. So, by deploying hua
du, Taiwan threatens China’s ontological security. “No realist argument fully captures the identity effects of persistent conflict because none acknowledges the social construction of state identity”.\(^\text{552}\) Huadu, as a form of ontological security seeking, gives a structural explanation for irrational conflicts, inviting a RC conception. The paradox exists in the gap between semantic and pragmatic meaning in illocution and perlocution (q.v. 5.3; 5.3.7.).

### 4.7. Conclusion

This chapter has argued that hua
du is a state identity that draws on and deploys discursive power to bestow legitimacy on the ROC as Taiwan. As such, it constitutes Taiwan’s de facto independence. The literature on Taiwan’s national identity cannot fully account for hua
du because it con
fates state, national and ethnic identities and misunderstands Taiwan Independence. This gap prompts this study’s state-identity framework. Five observations are salient. First, NI modernism suggests that the ROC created the Taiwanese nation and that the latter identifies with the ROC. Second, hua
du is a state identity that achieves legitimacy through its de facto authority to govern and in Taiwanese norms. Thus, it achieves the sanction of a broad legitimacy nexus that includes the international community and Beijing. Third, modernist NI, Weberian and Durkheimian approaches, Wendtian constructivism and Alexandrov’s IR model together provide a RC framework that accounts for hua
du’s construction in ROC crises of legitimacy, cross-Strait relations and domestic politics through SIPs. Such SIPs are linguistically enacted in power politics as discursive power. Fourth, an

\(^{552}\) Mitzen, Jennifer. 2006: 343.
RC framework shows how *huadu* resolves the ROC-Taiwan cleavage and the two-host dilemma. In doing so, it defines Taiwan’s preferences and normative representations in a Lockean culture of anarchy, providing a more expansive explanation than Wendt’s alone. Fifth, the 1992 Consensus provides the permissive cross-Strait encoding of *huadu* as state identity, achieving Beijing’s buy-in because it semantically averts *taidu*. This potentially provides ontological security on both sides because routinisation creates certainty. Yet, paradoxically, such certainty creates ontological insecurity for Beijing because read pragmatically *huadu* is tacit *taidu*.

*Huadu* maintains Taiwan’s de facto independence through the status quo and resists China’s power. It is co-constitutive of state sovereignty and determines what constitutes security and the national interest. Thus, state identity construction always occurs in the context of power politics. Discursive power creates state identity as legitimacy and uses it to bolster its own position.

In short, Taiwan is an example of a general phenomenon; the co-constitutive dynamics of power, interests, threat perception and identity determine whether and how states emerge as independent and sovereign. Most importantly, *huadu* as state identity is inert unless catalysed through power politics (SIPs), interest and threat perception in cross-Strait policy.

*Huadu* constitutes prevailing discourses concerning the Taiwanese (ROC) state’s relationship to China (and the Taiwanese nation). These discourses are socially constructed in power politics internally and externally in preference to *tongyi* and *taidu* and represent discursive power - that is, legitimation. They deploy traditional ROC symbols such as the flag and names and more recent Taiwanese attributes such as democracy to create a Taiwanised synthesis. As such, *huadu* prevails over *tongyi*.
and *taidu* and secures Taiwan’s sovereignty, stalemating China’s power in the process.
Chapter 5: Discourse Analysis

Prosaic, routine words ... rather than grand memorable phrases 553

5.1. Introduction

In the film The Godfather Part II, the head of a Mafia family, Michael Corleone, is brought before a congressional committee hearing to answer an investigation into organised crime. Frank Pentangeli, a Made Man in the Corleone family, is about to testify for the FBI against the family. When he arrives at the hearing, Pentangeli sees his long-lost brother sitting next to Corleone and immediately retracts his testimony. The chair of the committee is exasperated and asks who the man next to Corleone is. Corleone’s consigliere, Frank Hagen, explains “he came at his own expense, to aid his brother in his trouble”. As a member of Corleone’s subject social constituency, Pentangeli perceives a rebuke in Hagen’s words: a Made Man is not expected to break the omertà – the Mafia’s moral code of honour and silence. In appearing willing to violate the normative representations of his Mafia identity by selling Corleone out, Pentangeli has lost personal legitimacy and threatened the Family’s legitimacy. However, in addition to a rebuke, Pentangeli also perceives a veiled threat: snitch and your brother gets it. Either way, he and Michael Corleone face a crisis of legitimacy. As an outsider, the chair of the committee blusters “I don’t know what is going on here, but I’ll get to the bottom of it”. 554 Michael Corleone is operating outside of his subject realm and social constituency, but he achieves legitimacy by compelling not only Pentangeli’s compliance (and subsequent suicide) but also the committee’s provisional sanction in their adjournment of the hearing.

Threats are often issued in covert language because the target might call the issuer’s bluff by responding with defiance or force. In order to maintain the legitimacy on which survival depends, the issuer would have to carry out the threat – a pointless move, if its aim is to coerce the target into doing what he would otherwise not do. An implied threat solves the problem. If the threat is covert, the issuer is harder to pin down; if defied, he can opt not to carry it out and still maintain his legitimacy. In this way, as the concept of ontological security suggests, covert threats provide security for the issuer and insecurity for the target. The same is true of rebukes (q.v. 4.6.3.).

The previous chapters have presented a realist-constructivist framework for Taipei’s ability to enforce its legitimacy in the face of Beijing’s superior material power through huadu. Huadu legitimates Taiwan’s de facto sovereign independence by achieving sanction in a legitimacy nexus that includes Beijing. The process by which Taipei has legitimated huadu is discursive and involves the covert threat of taidu. Taiwan’s discursive power is linguistic and operates through state identity politics (SIPs). In line with Realist Constructivism, Taiwan’s SIPs have a social purpose; that is, they represent what P.T. Jackson (2006) terms a “war of words” over legitimation. This linguistic struggle reveals how huadu has come to mean what it does and how it is able to do what it does.

This chapter outlines a linguistics-informed discourse-analytic method that locates firm textual warrant for the legitimation of huadu. The chapter is divided into two main parts. The first (q.v. 5.2.) sketches a philosophical and methodological framework for IR discourse analysis that draws on linguistic concepts. More

555 See: Pinker, Steven. 2007: 412.
556 Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus. 2006; Krebs, Ronald and Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus. 2007..
specifically, it draws on the linguistics sub-field of pragmatics to expose two phenomena:

- Political actors legitimate *huadu* in the discursive gap between illocutionary force (what the speaker means) and perlocutionary effect (what the listener understands). They do this by linguistically manipulating the “Cooperative Principle” and by harnessing discursive knowledge routinely to presuppose, imply and index *huadu*.

- Competing actors misperceive each others’ policy preferences because they read plausible meanings into each others’ statements based on context. Context and identity are co-constitutive.

To locate these phenomena, this approach synthesises Corpus Linguistics (CL), Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and pragmatics. The form of CDA used is the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA). The design is synthetic in that CL, the DHA and pragmatics are used abductively to inform each other. In so doing, it balances post-positivist and interpretive methods to align to RC.

The second part (q.v. 5.6.) operationalises the philosophical and methodological framework in the form of a research design. First, it relates how data were gathered and analysed. Second, it presents overarching linguistic findings to apply to subsequent empirical chapters.

The value of this approach is threefold. First, it aligns to a RC framework in revealing how *huadu* has come to mean what it does and and how it is able to do what it does in power politics. That is, it separates the semantic meanings of *huadu* from their pragmatic, or communicative, effect on different constituencies. Second, it permits a large amount of data to be analysed, providing a way into the text to locate salient themes and language and significantly reducing researcher bias. Third, it identifies the crucial difference between instrumental political rhetoric and discourse
proper. In this way it shows how, since identities are “embedded in linguistic structures such as vocabulary and syntax,” huadu is implicitly encoded in the lexico-grammar (vocabulary and grammar) of political speech.\(^{557}\) It is such implicit language that powerfully legitimates huadu, compels Beijing’s sanction and stalemates Beijing’s power. Huadu constitutes a meaningful discourse, encoded in Taiwanese political speech and “it is for this reason that the study of discourse … cannot properly be separated from the study of the grammar that lies behind it”\(^{558}\). Such a linguistics-driven research design is innovative in IR.

To understand huadu requires focusing on language in the context of salient historical themes, events and watersheds. It highlights co-constitution, rather than cause-and-effect. It foregrounds methodology and epistemology to argue that while huadu is not teleologically achieved, it is “out there” and can be apprehended. However, huadu’s “out-thereness” is contingent. A purely positivist approach cannot fully account for huadu’s discursive production. Yet, a purely heuristic one effaces its empirical linguistic evidence and risks subjective over-interpretation, or what this study calls the “parsing fallacy”. This design, therefore, acknowledges the value of post-positivism in analysing textual evidence using linguistics methods. This requires revealing the rhetoric and the words and grammar that construct and legitimate huadu and, crucially, how these are perceived and misperceived in communication.

### 5.2. Discourse: A Philosophical and Methodological Framework

Statements by state actors gain legitimacy because states can legitimately perform speech acts that other actors cannot. Thus, a state-uttered statement may legitimate


Such statements may not advance novel claims; rather, they draw on agreed diplomatic frames and rhetorical conventions. Wodak and Meyer (2009) outline two common rhetorical features used in political speech: topoi and fallacies. Topoi are “formal or content-related warrants…which connect the argument with the claim”. Fallacies occur when actors flout the accepted rules of rational dispute. 559 Such topoi and fallacies may exploit Jackson’s (2006) “rhetorical commonplaces” or Anne-Marie Brady’s (2015) diplomatic frames to make their point. 560 In this way, cross-Strait relations and Taiwan’s domestic politics cross-cut as rhetorical exchanges that legitimate and delegitimate competing state identities and make huadu possible. In this way, huadu is legitimated in rhetorical struggle with tongyi and taidu in the form of state identity politics (SIPs). Such rhetorical phenomena are powerful, but they are often banal, surface-level and instrumental in purpose and are open to being perceived as such by others. For this reason, this study’s approach also seeks to locate the underlying textual features that legitimate huadu. To do so, this chapter sketches a framework that permits the linguistic evaluation of such rhetoric. To do this, it argues the following:

- Political statements constitute functional speech acts that are intended by the utterer variously to assert, justify, warn, rebuke, threaten, advise, protest, offer and so on;

- Such intended meanings may be misinterpreted by hearers based on a discursive mismatch between the speaker’s intention and the hearer’s understanding;

- Speakers encode the truth of their statements not just rhetorically, but grammatically in a way that inhibits challenge by hearers on linguistic grounds.

560 Brady Anne-Marie. 2015.
This framework permits, first, the resolution of post-positivist, scientific realist, rationalist and interpretive methodologies using qualitative and quantitative methods; second, a response to the explaining versus understanding debate in IR; third, the application of a discourse analysis that produces robustly warranted evidence for interpretive claims.

First, this framework aims to address a methodological problem inherent in a realist-constructivist synthesis. If theory dictates methodology, then this study’s recourse to a modified Wendtian constructivist account of state identity construction must be reconciled with a RC approach (q.v. 3.3.). This means that discourse analysis must rely on linguistically-warranted textual evidence. Therefore, this research design takes a middle way between positivism and interpretivism.\textsuperscript{561} To do this, it assumes that discourse:

- both reflects and constructs material political effects that are mind-independent.\textsuperscript{562}
- is both “language in use” and “a context-dependent logic of social action that reflects power relations”.\textsuperscript{563}

The research design shows how identities and power politics are co-constituted by focusing on:

- an abductive/recursive analysis among individual texts in institutional contexts and texts as historically aggregated evidence for broader structural discourses;


\textsuperscript{562} Wendt, Alexander. 1999: 75

discourses as reflective of realist power at the micro and macro-levels; actors deploy power through interactions that perpetuate structural power asymmetries while claiming to redress them.

This research design seeks not to produce falsifiable results in the manner required by King, Keohane and Verba, but plausible ones that pass P.T. Jackson’s notional “baloney test” to provide empirically grounded justifiable claims.564 In so doing, it challenges King et al’s thesis that qualitative research should align to a quantitative and positivist template.

Second, the research design addresses the explaining-versus-understanding debate in IR. Martin Hollis and Steve Smith (1990) define explanation as the location of exogenous material causes, while understanding is to do with endogenous ideational meaning.565 Yet, as Jackson (2011) points out, plausible research findings are iterative and abductive, rather than simply deductive. Thus, in order to explain Taiwan’s maintenance of its de facto independence, understanding huadu is a prerequisite.

Third, the discourse-analytic approach in this research design provides a way of locating and analysing textual evidence in a way that provides robustly warranted support for interpretive claims. This design uses quantitative Corpus Linguistics (CL) methods as a way into the data before qualitative, interpretive CDA (DHA) analysis of the data. It does this to locate salient themes and linguistic features in the data rather than to carry out statistical analysis. The pragmatic analysis provides warrant for interpretive claims. A design that combines CL, the DHA and pragmatics implies an abductive dialogue between historical events and interpretation. In applying these

methods, this study seeks to be judged on its pragmatic explanatory utility rather than whether it follows a strictly positivist scientific methodology.

In sum, this form of discourse analysis satisfies a RC approach by marrying positivist and heuristic and quantitative and qualitative methods. In doing so, it amends flaws in IR and CDA approaches by locating discourses in text, analysing them in terms of pragmatic principles and triangulating findings historically to provide justified interpretations. In this way, it locates the legitimating power of *huadu* in rhetorical commonplaces, but more crucially in the lexico-grammar of political speech.

This section does the following: first, it outlines an IR approach to discourse analysis; second, it clarifies a number of discourse-analytic phenomena to lay the groundwork for this study’s linguistics approach; third, it offers a critical interpretation of the CDA approach; fourth, it presents the DHA as a valid form of CDA; fifth it justifies corpus linguistics as a way into the text and, sixth, it presents pragmatics as a robust linguistics-driven approach to CDA. The DHA, CL and pragmatics together address CDA’s methodological flaws and permit a positivist-interpretivist synthesis.

5.2.1. IR Discourse Analysis

This study aligns to contemporary IR discourse analysis in two ways. First, it assumes the ideational and the material are inter-subjectively co-constituted. Second, it adheres to a core CDA discourse-analytic tenet that conceives of discourse as “talk and text in context”. That is, context implies a material world out there that humans cannot relate to without language. This study also addresses debates in three areas: first, the nature of discourse and how it relates to Constructivism, in figure 6 below;

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second, the agent-structure debate, in figure 7 below and, third, the relationship between power and the agent-structure debate in figure 8 below.

To do this, the research design adheres to a thin IR Constructivism that acknowledges material reality (Fig. 6). This means the macro-structure and the micro-structure are co-constitutive (Fig. 7). It then uses both the micro-interactional and macro-structural approaches to productive power (Fig. 8) to find huadu in cross-Strait and domestic discourses. Since Taiwan’s discursive power is conceived of as interactional and constitutive, productive and structural power (q.v.3.2.4.), textual warrant for a macrostructural huadu discourse is best located in actors’ linguistic micro-interactions.

Such a RC IR discourse-analytic synthesis marries core concepts of power politics and identity and resolves the agent-structure debate to recognise co-constitution all the way down. ⁵⁶⁸

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discourse and Reality</th>
<th>Thin Constructivism</th>
<th>Thick Constructivism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discourse and Reality</td>
<td>Some forms of communication mirror the world out there (bargaining by coercion); others construct that world (arguing by discourse).</td>
<td>Material reality can never exist independently of discourse —the world is always talked into existence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definition of Discourse</td>
<td>A specific form of social interaction and a particular logic of action that depends on institutional and normative setting within which communicative interaction takes place.</td>
<td>Constitutive of social reality; no social reality conceivable outside of the meaning-structure that influences how individuals perceive and act toward the world.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 6 The Role of Discourse in Thin and Thick Constructivism*  
(Adapted from: Holzscheiter. 2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discourse Definition</th>
<th>Micro-interaction Approach</th>
<th>Macro-Structure Approach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Text in context but emphasis on discourse as communicative exchange</td>
<td>Text in context but emphasis on historically grown structures of signification</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predominant Level of Analysis</th>
<th>Agents/Individual—“Subjects make meaning”</th>
<th>Structure/Holistic—“Meaning makes Subjects”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Text: Small instances of everyday communication.</td>
<td>Text: Texts as aggregated evidence for large meaning-structures.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Context: Institutional Setting for communicative Exchange</td>
<td>Context: Broad historical or sociopolitical context</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
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*Figure 7 Ontological Differences among Discourses*  
(Adapted from: Holzscheiter. 2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predominant Level of Analysis</th>
<th>L1: Agent Micro-interaction</th>
<th>L2: Macro-Structure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P1: Deliberative</td>
<td>Discourse as communicative rationality—discourse as the place where “power of the better argument” comes to bear</td>
<td>Deliberative design of institutions allows redressing power asymmetries in global politics through discourse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P2: Productive</td>
<td>Discourse as knowledge–power nexus: Actors strive to impose their view of reality on others in discourse</td>
<td>Discourses as institutionalised meaning-structures inevitably produce and perpetuate power asymmetries</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 8 Levels of Discourse-Analysis (L) and Discourse-Power Relationship (P)*  
(Adapted from: Holzscheiter. 2014)
5.2.2. Text, Context, Co-text, Discourse and Discourse Analysis

This study acknowledges Foucault’s claim that discourse is part of a broader social process that reflects power relations in society. However, Foucault does not articulate any empirical methods apart from his “little toolbox” and rules for locating what he terms “discursive formation”. None of Foucault’s rules articulate a set of techniques based on the linguistic features of the text itself.

For a linguistics-informed discourse analysis, text and discourse must be seen as separate categories. Widdowson (2008) defines discourse as “the pragmatic process of meaning negotiation” and the “acting of context on code”. “Text is its product”. That is, discourse is a meta-textual phenomenon in which meaning is conveyed beyond the level of the text. Text, conversely, is a discourse codified in the lexico-grammar.

As The Godfather example above demonstrates (q.v. 5.1.), discourses more often than not (almost always) produce texts that attempt but fail semantically to align to their pragmatic meanings, leading to a gap between pragmatic meaning and textual form. Discourse is what happens beyond the text when meaning needs to be inferred, but evidence of a discourse can only be located in text. Thus, all human communication is a process of filling in textual gaps using contextual information – reproducing the discourse in the process.

Context refers to shared historical and schematic knowledge beyond the text, while co-text is text around the text being analysed, within the text itself. Just as anarchy is

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569 Foucault, Michel. 1972.
what states make of it, so texts are what recipients make of them - or mistake them for - and what they make of them are discourses. Readers do not read possible meanings off from a text, but plausible meanings into a text. This reading is an interpretation based on identity, interests, historical context and power relations. Widdowson’s definition above suggests that a speaker’s intended meaning and a hearer’s interpretation can converge or diverge, depending on context.

5.2.3. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)

As a heterogeneous tendency within the field of discourse analysis, CDA is a well-established approach in IR. Unlike traditional linguistics, CDA studies discourse by analysing texts in context, rather than as isolated objects. As part of the linguistic turn in social science, CDA also displays an “interest in the relationship between language and power [and] overt relations of struggle and conflict”. Its focus on power and discourse as “socially constitutive as well as socially shaped” invites Realist Constructivism. CDA is political discourse analysis and is ideally suited to this study’s research hypothesis.

The strategic driver of discourse is power; the elite enactment of power produces discourse. Power is deployed grammatically to reproduce state identity; linguistic analysis locates and exposes that identity and explains foreign policy choices. Political actors may deploy power by variously constructing new ones and deconstructing existing ones. In this way, actors deploy generic discourses to coerce, resist and dissimulate in order to legitimate state identities.

Traditional CDA has been severely critiqued on epistemological and methodological grounds. Widdowson (1995; 1996) accused it of a highly interpretive, emancipatory agenda that misrepresented basic linguistic concepts and leapt from description to interpretation, bypassing analysis. In particular CDA has been accused of selection bias and of eschewing firm textual warrant for interpretive claims around the meaning of political statements. The most notable CDA development in response to this critique is Ruth Wodak’s DHA.

5.2.4. The Discourse Historical Approach

Wodak’s Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) may be used to measure the discursive construction and legitimation of huadu and to explain its deployment to
maintain Taiwan’s sovereignty. The DHA is a thorough, methodical and systematic procedure that identifies five discursive strategies for identity construction and the deployment of power through language:

1) How are actors named and referred to linguistically?

2) What representations are attributed to them?

3) By means of what argumentation schemes do actors legitimate themselves and delegitimate others?

4) From what perspective are these argumentation schemes expressed?

5) Are actors’ utterances articulated implicitly or explicitly, intensified or mitigated?

These five strategies fall into categories of themes, argumentation schemes and rhetorical patterns and linguistic means of realisation. It is this step that crucially permits this study’s separation of rhetoric from discourse proper. It accounts for misperception of elite policy preferences in terms of the tendency of different actors to read plausible meanings into texts based on context (q.v. 5.1.).

These strategies and categories are located in a wide range of scripted, semi-scripted and unscripted political genres including policy documents, inauguration speeches, diplomatic meetings, government information leaflets, campaign speeches, press conferences, newspaper editorials and social media. Applied to the data, DHA analysis finds textual warrant for an overarching huadu discourse.


587 Wodak, Ruth. 2009:73. I have reworded these to orient them towards an empirical IR reading rather than an emancipatory CDA one.
The DHA contains a promising set of methods for measuring and explaining the discursive power of *huadu* to secure Taiwan’s sovereignty. Most importantly, it resolves language as lexico-grammar and language as rhetoric. The DHA establishes a methodological separation between data collection and objective linguistic description and analysis. In substituting a more Kantian concept of critique as *kritik* for traditional CDA’s Critical Theory approach, the DHA permits an empirical as opposed to an emancipatory application of CDA methods. In doing so, it paves the way for a reintroduction of CDA’s Critical Linguistics heritage, based on pragmatics.

5.2.5. Corpus Linguistics

Corpus Linguistics (CL) is an analytic and descriptive method that uses computer software to analyse corpora to find probabilities, trends, patterns and co-occurrences in linguistic features to make inferences about linguistic phenomena.588 Basic methods include word lists, key words, collocates and concordances. The results can be used in qualitative discourse analysis to interpret and explain the political significance of linguistic phenomena. Stubbs (1997) suggests using CL to bolster CDA through random sampling, large data sets, and comparison of textual features with language norms captured in a corpus to make reliable generalisations about typical language use. CDA scholars now accept the innovation of combining CL and CDA for methodological rigour.589 This study seeks to use CL in two ways: first, as a way into the data to locate salient linguistic features and themes and, second, to locate, analyse and interpret (measure) linguistic features that encode *huadu*.

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5.2.6. Pragmatics

Morgenthau claims that facts have no social meaning outside context. Widdowson argues that such meanings are read into texts rather than off of them. Pragmatics seeks to locate these meanings through a problem-solving, abductive approach that draws on experience rather than a deductive model. As a subfield of linguistics, it examines not the direct semantic meaning of a text but its inferred contextual, or discursive, meaning. That is, pragmatic analysis reads between the lines using covert linguistic triggers in the text.\footnote{Widdowson, Henry. 2008.} Discourse studies suggest that most meaning is inferred pragmatically in context.\footnote{Ibid.} Pragmatic analysis compensates for and plausibly explains meaning by locating the lexico-grammatical triggers that prompt interpretation. As such, it acts as a necessary positivist corrective to purely interpretive analysis. Morgenthau’s social world cannot simply be an artefact of man’s mind and his is not an argument for crude relativism. There must be a truth out there otherwise huadu would have no meaning and no communicative effect.

Wodak (2007) outlines the need for a return to pragmatics in CDA analysis, including the DHA, in order empirically to locate powerful actors’ assumptions and stances in the lexico-grammar.\footnote{Wodak, Ruth. 2007. Pragmatics and Critical Discourse Analysis. A cross-disciplinary inquiry. Pragmatics and Cognition, 15(1): 203-225.} As a powerful assumption or taken-for-granted stance, huadu is ripe for pragmatic analysis. The DHA’s broad category of linguistic means of realisation can be used as a template to analyse huadu’s legitimating power pragmatically.

The following sub-sections elucidate a number of concepts that are crucial to this study’s use of pragmatics within the DHA. First, Halliday’s Systemic Functional
Grammar shows how grammar functions ideationally to legitimate identities. Second, Austin’s Speech Act Theory exposes the gap between illocution (intended meaning) and perlocution (understood meaning) that makes legitimation contestable. Third, Grice’s Theory of Meaning and the Cooperative Principle reveal how actors exploit the discursive gap between illocution and perlocution to legitimate identities. So, whether Jackson’s (2006) rhetorical commonplaces and Brady’s (2015) diplomatic frames (q.v. 5.1.) legitimate hua du or not depends on their relationship to the phenomena described here. Statements succeed in legitimating identities because, first, the Cooperative Principle rather than the listener’s critical faculties prohibits their being challenged and, second, political actors exploit the discursive gap between illocution and perlocution to deploy discursive power.

5.2.6.1. Systemic Functional Grammar and Speech Acts

Halliday’s Systemic Functional Grammar (SFG) presents language as a system that construes meaning. That is, unlike Saussurean and Chomskyan grammar, the purpose of SFG is to locate social meaning and communicative effect in language. For this reason, all human languages have an ideational component and a social-relational component that are combined in a coherent textual component. Austin argues this means interlocutors are attuned not explicitly to each other’s words and grammar, but to the speech acts that those words and grammar perform: requests; threats; invitations; assertions; promises; refusals; apologies; predictions; prescriptions and so on. Austin’s identification of a gap between the illocutionary force of a speaker’s utterance – that is, whether they meant it as a threat or not – and its perlocutionary effect – that is, whether the addressee perceives it as a threat or not –


creates space for this study’s conception of discursive power as legitimation. That is, knowledgeable political actors actively exploit discursive fissures in Taiwanese political speech to construct and enact *huadu*.\(^{595}\) At the same time, competing actors misperceive such discursive exploitation based on identity-driven shared knowledge.

5.2.6.2. (Un)Cooperative Speech Acts

Language is a cooperative phenomenon and Grice’s *Cooperative Principle* determines how a speaker’s words are perceived; that is, how discourses are read into texts.\(^{596}\) As a linguistic “Highway Code”, the Cooperative Principle sums up prototypical communicative assumptions that hold across languages. That is, all human conversation is, in a linguistic sense, as clear as necessary, as much as necessary, truthful and delivered in the right way. This is not to say that speakers do not routinely lie and dissimulate. However, they do this by strategically flouting or violating the Cooperative Principle. It is in this way that actors signal policy and legitimate identities (q.v. 5.2.6.3 and 5.2.6.4.).\(^{597}\) Cross-Strait and domestic power politics determine whether the Cooperative Principle should be respected or violated and this entails the use of implicit language.\(^{598}\) Austin’s Speech Act Theory reveals how such implicitness results in a mismatch between intended meaning and

\(^{595}\) Barnett and Duval. 2005

\(^{596}\) Grice, H. Paul. [1957] 1989. The Cooperative Principle: Make your contribution as is required, when it is required, by the conversation in which you are engaged. a) Quality: Contribute only what you know to be true. Do not say false things. Do not say things for which you lack evidence. b) Quantity: Make your contribution as informative as is required. Do not say more than is required. c) Relation (Relevance): Make your contribution relevant. d) Manner: (i) Avoid obscurity; (ii) avoid ambiguity; (iii) be brief; (iv) be orderly

\(^{597}\) In order to convey meaning effectively, for instance, Ma Ying-jeou will not say to Xi Jinping at a summit “I hope you had a pleasant journey here, Mr Xi” and expect Xi Jinping to understand by that utterance that he means “I am the President of the ROC and I seek no change in Taiwan’s political status”. Ma may, however say “we wish to maintain the status quo of peace and prosperity” and expect Xi or another third party to perceive that utterance as an assertion of sovereignty and not simply advisory. Indeed, it is

perceived meaning (q.v. 5.2.6.1.). This occurs in the discursive gap between illocutionary force and perlocutionary effect. Barnett and Duval’s (2005) productive power shows how canny political actors manipulate that gap to legitimate identity (q.v. 3.2.4.). Identities are legitimated by violating the Cooperative Principle, but meaning may remain contested because of misperception in the gap between illocution and perlocution.

5.2.6.3. Presupposition and Implicature

Presupposition and implicature are types of implied meaning. They are notoriously hard to separate and a presupposition may also operate as an implicature. A presupposition is an assumption about the context of an utterance that the speaker assumes the addressee will take as read.599 For instance, a 2003 speech by George W. Bush included the utterance:

(1) British Intelligence has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.600

>> Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.601

It later became apparent that this intelligence was incorrect, but Bush’s phrasing of the utterance, using the factive verb learn in the present perfect tense to imply resultative knowledge, implicitly framed it as true. Consider the following:

(2) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs yesterday strongly condemned China’s poaching of yet another of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies, the Dominican Republic.602

>> China has poached Taiwan’s diplomatic allies before.

601 The symbolic notation >> denotes “presupposes”. In this study, it also denotes an implicature.
Taiwan has a Ministry of Foreign Affairs that is not Chinese.

Taiwan practices international relations.

These presuppositions invite certain implicatures, such as:

- Taiwan is a sovereign state.
- Taiwan is not China.
- China’s behaviour is unethical.\(^{603}\)
- The utterer of the statement is annoyed.\(^{604}\)

Presuppositions serve to legitimate a stance covertly. They aim to make a piece of information that the speaker believes (or asserts that he believes) what the listener should believe, even when it is untrue or contested.\(^{605}\) In legitimating *huadu* in the form of presupposition, its representations (and, by implication, those of *taidu* and *tongyi*) are taken for granted and hence need not be specifically asserted. Unlike an assertion, a presupposition is usually linguistically accepted without much critical attention. States, as knowledgeable actors, use presupposition to legitimate their identities and compel sanction.

Implicature (implication) is to say something and to mean something else by it.\(^{606}\) It refers to what is suggested, rather than explicitly expressed or logically entailed, by an utterance.\(^{607}\) For example:

(3) Beijing will have to take the largest share of responsibility for any possible consequences.

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\(^{603}\) CL reveals that the verb ‘to poach’ (steal) occurs invariably in negative co-texts.

\(^{604}\) CL reveals that the adverbial construction ‘yet another’ often occurs in co-texts that encode the speaker’s frustration or exasperation.


\(^{606}\) Grice, Paul. 1957: 382.

there may be a negative outcome for Beijing.

As an Austinian speech act, this statement may constitute a (hollow) implicit threat by Taipei to Beijing since Taipei lacks the power to make good on its threat. Yet, if we acknowledge the discursive power entailed by huadu, the threat is not hollow because it may be addressed not just to Beijing but to the international community. Presupposition and implicature are pragmatic phenomena whose meanings rely on context for interpretation, but they may be located through explicit lexico-grammatical features in the co-text.

Kartunnen (1979) and Levinson (1983) cite a number of presupposition triggers that may indicate both presuppositions and implicatures. These include a range of lexico-grammatical features. These triggers’ Chinese equivalents carry a similar pragmatic force. In this study’s data, Ma’s statement to Xi that Taiwan “seeks to maintain the status quo of peace and prosperity” gives four presuppositions in the English text: first, through the definite article “the status quo” that “there is a status quo”; second, through the implicative verb “to maintain” that the status quo has existed, exists and will continue to exist; third, through the preposition “of” that peace and prosperity define the status quo; fourth, through the factive verb “to seek” that this is a policy statement. Whether or not Xi accepts Ma’s policy statement critically, the linguistic presupposition must remain unchallenged. In this way, Ma—as a knowledgeable actor speaking for the ROC—legitimizes huadu and compels Xi Jinping—as a knowledgeable actor speaking for the PRC—to allow huadu to pass up.

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into the discourse. As such, huadu is an extremely powerful discourse when it is unchallenged or implicit because it delegitimates tongyi and taidu and compels Beijing’s sanction.

5.2.6.4. The Pronouns of Power and Solidarity

Language conveys power as “an asymmetrical and antagonistic drive for dominance”. By the same token, it also conveys solidarity – “a symmetrical and reciprocal drive for rapport”. Power politics entail tension between power and solidarity and invite the unconscious use of implicit, covert and strategic language. Power and solidarity are thus invoked by breaking sociolinguistic rules to include or exclude others and actors may legitimate an identity by implicitly including or excluding others’ in its scope. Conversely, in line with illocution and perlocution, others may include or exclude themselves. Such inclusion and exclusion is commonly invoked in English and in Chinese through deixis. That is, by linguistically pointing through address forms and pronouns.

Brown and Gilman’s (1960) seminal study, The Pronouns of Power and Solidarity, shows how a speaker’s choice between the familiar/informal tu form and the polite/formal vous form in French (the t/v semantic) enacts either power or solidarity in the interaction. The t/v semantic applies to a number of languages, including Chinese between ni （你）(t) and nin （您）(v). However, while Brown and Gilman focus on second-person pronouns, power and solidarity dynamics are salient in the first-person pronouns, I and we.

613 Brown, Gillian and Yule, George. 1983.
The first-person plural, *we*, is the most socially powerful pronoun. Yet, traditional grammars do not fully account for *we*’s complex identity-legitimating functions. Unlike its singular counterpart, the plural *we* denotes “I + powerful”. The royal or presidential *we* is the most well-known form, but *we* invariably speaks like a Greek Chorus with one voice multiplied. This allows the speaker to reinforce the collective power of Self (us) against Other (them). Political actors exploit *we* discursively to assume and deny agency, to assert ideology and policy, to index identity and status.

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617 Wales, Katherine. 1996.


and to include and exclude. In this view, we does legitimating work locating actors in power relations with each other. This approach shows how pronouns signal pivots towards Self and Other. As a referent of state identity, we compels sanction by a social constituency through the deployment of power and solidarity. We is will-enforcing and rightful (q.v. 4.3). We may include and exclude other actors within and across subject and non-subject social constituencies (q.v. Fig 9 above).

Huadu has a national limit that extends to its social constituency. The constituency referred to by the we of huadu continues until it reaches the boundary formed by another group marked by they. This national limit can be contested though; pronominal inclusivity suggests the limit of the we of huadu surpasses its core social constituency to include competing subject constituencies within its realm (q.v. 4.3.). So, although the we of huadu is used to denote Taiwan, it necessarily seeks to extend to tongyi and taidu constituencies, to appeal to the international community and to compel Beijing’s sanction.

5.3. Provisional Concluding Remarks

This section has shown how a linguistics approach to discourse analysis best operationalises this study’s hypotheses and theory. The model is novel and marries post-positivist and heuristic methods to provide linguistic warrant for interpretive claims around the meaning of huadu, thus countering the “parsing fallacy”. This model respects the intersubjective construction of state identity in power politics across micro-interactions and the macro-structure, resolving the agent-structure problem (q.v. 5.2.1.). Speech Act Theory and the Cooperative Principle account for

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knowledgeable actors’ legitimation of huadu and delegitimation of tongyi and taidu. Actors seek rhetorically to legitimate huadu through fallacies and topoi. However, textual features, specifically, presupposition, implicature and deixis, more subtly and powerfully index Taiwan’s sovereign status, compelling Beijing’s sanction. The use of the pronoun we in political speech provides better evidence of huadu’s legitimation than diplomatic frames, topoi and fallacies because the latter are often banal and explicitly instrumental in purpose and thus more consciously manipulable. Elite actors legitimate state identity when they speak (or write) because they create the context. This implies a consensus whenever language is discursively manipulated; it anticipates acceptance on the part of the listener.622 When an utterance goes linguistically unchallenged, it passes up to and constructs the discourse 623

5.4. Data Collection, Ordering and Analysis

In line with its philosophical and methodological framework (q.v. 5.3.), this study’s discourse analysis proceeded abductively as follows: first, data collection to create corpora; second, corpus linguistic processing as a way into the text; third discourse analysis using the DHA; fourth, pragmatic analysis. An iterative, abductive approach meant findings could be revised, defining concepts against the data and IR discourse analytic models (q.v. 5.2.1.).624 Analysing the data as corpora permitted further hypotheses and modification of the design. This revised design was then applied to and tested on the data and the historical record in the empirical chapters.

622 Fowler, Roger. 1991. Language in the News: Discourse and Ideology in the Press. London: Routledge. Of course, a listener may flout the Cooperative Principle by saying “speak for yourself, mate”, but the power of we is not negated by this, since such a response represents a social rather than a linguistic challenge.
Political text provides a better source for data than polls and interviews for three reasons. First, polls in Taiwan are insufficient to identify those who favour the status quo as a categorical and self-conscious “legitimacy nexus” that aligns to hua\-du. After all, hua\-du’s social constituency and the ROC’s realm extend beyond the Taiwanese electorate. Second, elite interviews are subject to subjective bias and forgetting. Third, a unitary ROC implies a state-constituted hua\-du discourse. Political text is an under-utilised resource, often treated as a mere bi-product of strategic political activity. Yet, it is legitimating and state bodies, political parties and domestic interest groups in Taiwan have a large amount of online policy-related text in English and Chinese. YouTube also contains a large number of English-language and subtitled interviews, documentaries and policy speeches by elite and DIG actors. This study hypothesised, first, that a large enough corpus of Taiwanese political text from the period 1945-2016 would produce data from which a hua\-du discourse might be derived and, second, that it would encode a legitimating hua\-du discourse.

5.4.1. Corpus Linguistics

The literature was surveyed and primary political text extracted and converted into Word and .txt files. A range of ROC government and Taiwanese non-state websites were crawled in order to mine English-language data and process it into machine-readable .txt files. A number of texts containing relevant English-language political speech by Taiwanese elites and interest groups across a number of genres were downloaded from the Internet and manually processed into .txt files. A number of YouTube videos containing interviews with elites and DIGs were transcribed manually. Many of the YouTube interviews and speeches already contained

machine-generated transcripts; these required editing to make them grammatical. Those videos that did not have transcripts were transcribed by hand by the researcher. Chinese-language text was translated by the researcher. The resulting data was cleaned to remove rubric so that it represented as closely as possible the speech of the actor who uttered it. The resulting .txt files were then sorted into a single 5-million-word master corpus labelled *Taiwanese Political Speech*. A range of study corpora were then extracted.

The corpora are listed as follows:

**Master corpus**

1. Taiwanese Political Speech.

**Study corpora**

2. SEF-MAC text 1992-2016 (SEF-MAC policy statements, reports of SEF-ARATS meetings, SEF official speeches)

3. Presidential Office text 1996-2016 (including presidential speeches)

4. Pan-Blue elite text 1992-2016 (including KMT and Taiwan industry)

5. Pan-Green elite text 1992–2016 (including DPP, student and civic groups)

6. ROC Cross-Strait Policy Documents

7. Taiwanese Political Speech (ROC and Opposition elite text): 1945-1992

Each of the study corpora were divided into sub-corpora containing political speech by individual actors, divided by genre among media interviews, press conferences, speeches, policy statements, press releases, presidential speeches, social elite speeches and interviews and official government reports.
5.4.2. Provisional Hypotheses across Data

The researcher hypothesised the following:

H1 Pan-blue DIG data will seek to legitimate *tongyi*;

H2 Pan-green DIG data will resist H1 and seek to legitimate *taidu*;

H3 State-produced data, including elite speech, will legitimate prevailing DIG discourses

H4 Official diplomatic frames and rhetoric will mask an underlying discourse encoded in the lexico-grammar;

H5 State-produced data including elite speech will legitimate *huadu*;

5.4.3. Salient Linguistic Data

The purpose of CL in this study was not to carry out quantitative statistical analysis on the data, but to provide a way into the data by unearthing salient themes and discourses for further analysis using the DHA and pragmatic analysis. As such, it aligns to Baker’s (2008; 2012; 2013) use of CL to reduce selection bias. The analysis of word frequency, clusters and co-textual features permits the identification of potential sites of interest, including themes, rhetorical and argumentation strategies and lexico-grammatical features. This study specifically sought to locate those features that trigger presuppositions, implicatures and deixis. Using the ‘find’ function on Microsoft Word and the online concordancers, Yoshikoder, Sketch Engine and AntConc, the *SEF-MAC 1992-2016* corpus was analysed to locate the most prolific actors in cross-Strait talks mediated by SEF-MAC and ARATS-TAO.626

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Figure 10 shows the most prolific actors, listed by frequency of mention and cross-referenced to one salient cross-Strait SEF-ARATS-sponsored event they attended. This allowed the researcher to cross-reference different actors to events. To compile Figure 10, the researcher created a keyword list using Yoshikoder’s word count function and searched it manually for the organisational names, surnames and given names of all actors and copied them into an Excel spreadsheet, listing them by frequency of mention. The data in Figure 10 was then analysed and a further online search done to locate political speech by the actors selected. The resulting data was then added to the existing corpora and the initial *Taiwanese Political Speech* corpus enlarged. The same process was repeated for Figure 11, which shows the most frequently mentioned organisations, which were compiled in the same way. A manual examination of Figures 10 and 11 facilitated the location of further text to create a mental picture of the most influential DIGs and elites with an interest in cross-Strait negotiations.

Of course, the researcher’s own knowledge of the domestic political context in Taiwan confirmed that the SEF-ARATS site did not contain a representative sample of potentially influential Taiwanese elites and interest groups, since it referred overwhelmingly to KMT appointees and pan-Blue-sympathising business constituencies involved in cross-Strait diplomacy. To correct this, it was assumed that opposition domestic elites and interest groups who were not involved in cross-Strait talks would also influence KMT cross-Strait policy. A manual search of websites related to the DPP, the Sunflower Student Movement and other pan-Green constituencies was therefore searched and the resulting data processed as above. The

process of corpus enlargement was again repeated until a final master corpus and set of study corpora were arrived at.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>公司</th>
<th>名称</th>
<th>提及频次</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>海基会</td>
<td>Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF)</td>
<td>3498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>海协会</td>
<td>Association for Relations across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS)</td>
<td>2097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>大陆委员会</td>
<td>Mainland Affairs Council (MAC)</td>
<td>513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>經済部</td>
<td>Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA)</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>国台办</td>
<td>Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO)</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>中国共产党</td>
<td>Communist Party of China (CPC)</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>台商协会</td>
<td>Taiwanese Businessmen's Association (TBA)</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>中國國民黨</td>
<td>Kuomintang (KMT)</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>兩岸經合會</td>
<td>Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Committee (CSECC)</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>民主進步黨</td>
<td>Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>金管會</td>
<td>Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC)</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>中華民國財政部</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance (MOF)</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>中华人民共和国商务部</td>
<td>Ministry of Commerce (MOC)</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>中華民國全國工業總會</td>
<td>Chinese National Federation of Industries (CNFI)</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>中華民國外貿協會</td>
<td>Taiwan External Trade Development Council (TAITRA)</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>大陸台灣同胞投資企業聯誼會</td>
<td>Association of Taiwan Investment Enterprises on the Mainland (ATIEM)</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>中華民國交通部</td>
<td>Ministry of Transportation and Communication (MOTC)</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>中国公证员协会</td>
<td>China Notaries' Association (CNA)</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>国家统计局</td>
<td>National Bureau of Statistics (NBS)</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>教育部</td>
<td>Ministry of Education (MOE)</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 10 Most frequently mentioned corporate actors in SEF-ARATS negotiations (2008-2016)*

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position/Role</th>
<th>Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Чжан Бинъу</td>
<td>Chairman SEF, Former VC KMT</td>
<td>KMT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Гоу Кунь</td>
<td>SEF VC &amp; SG 2008-14; KMT China Affs Head 2014</td>
<td>KMT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ли Цзюнь</td>
<td>SEF Chair 2012; KMT SG</td>
<td>KMT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Май Янь</td>
<td>President ROC</td>
<td>KMT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Цзян Цзинъу</td>
<td>Chairman ARATS</td>
<td>CCP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Чжэн Ли</td>
<td>Exec VC ARATS</td>
<td>CCP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Цзян Демин</td>
<td>President ARATS</td>
<td>CCP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Сюэ Минь</td>
<td>VP ROC</td>
<td>KMT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Фу Динъюань</td>
<td>Premier ROC</td>
<td>KMT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Вань Дянъюань</td>
<td>PRC Minister Foreign Affs; TALSG, TAO</td>
<td>CCP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Цзян Дэминь</td>
<td>DG TAO</td>
<td>CCP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Линь Цзянь</td>
<td>KMT Hon Chair, APEC Envoy</td>
<td>KMT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Гоу Ченъфу</td>
<td>Chairman SEF, CEO Koos Group, Film producer</td>
<td>KMT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Цзянь Цинъпинь</td>
<td>PRC President, TALSG</td>
<td>CCP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Чжан Ючжунь</td>
<td>MAC Minister</td>
<td>KMT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Вань Даохань</td>
<td>Chairman ARATS</td>
<td>CCP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Лай Цзянюань</td>
<td>MAC Minister, Chairwoman</td>
<td>KMT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Тан Цзюй</td>
<td>Permanent VC ARATS</td>
<td>CCP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ли Яфэй</td>
<td>SG ARATS</td>
<td>CCP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Янь Чжанъфу</td>
<td>VM Commerce, Hon Chair AETATS</td>
<td>CCP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 11 Most frequently mentioned individual actors in SEF-sponsored activity 1994-2016*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lien-sheng Tsai</td>
<td>Secretary General</td>
<td>CNFI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph C. Chen</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary General</td>
<td>CNFI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong-ming Tsai</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary General</td>
<td>CNFI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jason Fong</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary General</td>
<td>CNFI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. C. F. Koo</td>
<td>Perm Hon Chair</td>
<td>CNAIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Jeffrey L. S. Koo</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hon Chair, CNAIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenneth C.M. Lo</td>
<td>Hon Chair</td>
<td>CNAIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Por-Fong Lin</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
<td>CNAIC, VC, CNFI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leslie Koo</td>
<td>VC, CNAIC</td>
<td>CNAIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel Tsai</td>
<td>VC, CNAIC</td>
<td>CNAIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morris Chang</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>CNAIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eugene T. C. Wu</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>CNAIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William W. Wong</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>CNAIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong-tu Tsai</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>CNAIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>King Liu</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>CNAIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Douglas Tong Hsu</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>CNAIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Show-Chung Ho</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ming-Cheng Lin</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>CNAIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kai-Tai Yan</td>
<td>Board Director</td>
<td>CNAIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barry Lam</td>
<td>Board Director</td>
<td>CNAIC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12 Most Salient Taiwanese Businesspeople 2008-2016

As an initial way into the resulting text, the final Taiwanese Political Speech corpus was machine-processed in Yoshikoder for lexical frequency and the words manually sorted into parts of speech. Dividing by part of speech facilitates linguistic analysis since, in line with the DHA’s section on linguistic means of realisation, verb, noun, 

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adjective and adverb forms carry specific discursive force. Chinese, like English, is a subject-verb-object language. However, it does not have a tense system, has no plural forms and does not distinguish among noun, verb, adjective and adverb forms, relying on other adverbial and aspectual markers to convey temporal information and part of speech in a text. Unlike English, Chinese text is noun rather than verb driven and this is reflected in the official English translations of the original Chinese text; nouns outnumber verbs by around four-to-one. Therefore, for this study plural forms were collapsed into singular and the different verb tenses aggregated to their infinitives in English in order to reflect both Chinese semantic prosody and the true number of verbal concepts in the data. Modal verbs were left as they were because, first, language processing software cannot distinguish between temporal and modal forms and, second, because their functional equivalence in English does not reflect the Chinese. English personal pronominal forms were stripped down to their subject forms to reflect Chinese grammar. Figure 13 shows the resulting lexical preference sorted by part of speech. The figure demonstrates which concepts, actions and attitudes are most salient in ROC state speech. As such, it operates as an important first step in unearthing and accounting for a huadu discourse by identifying what Taipei considers important in its relations with Beijing. The nouns indicate the most salient concepts and ideas (people, places and things) for Taipei; the verbs point to Taipei’s foreign policy actions; the adjectives show how Taipei qualifies or interprets salient concepts and ideas; the adverbs demonstrate the manner in which Taipei seeks to implement foreign policy actions in power politics.

### SEF 1994-2016 Lexical preference

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Noun</th>
<th>Verb</th>
<th>Adjective</th>
<th>Adverb</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>taiwan</td>
<td>be</td>
<td>cross-strait</td>
<td>also</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mainland</td>
<td>have</td>
<td>economic</td>
<td>jointly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>side</td>
<td>hold</td>
<td>vice</td>
<td>actively</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chairman</td>
<td>visit</td>
<td>new</td>
<td>promptly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agreement</td>
<td>sign</td>
<td>taiwanese</td>
<td>mutually</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cooperation</td>
<td>say</td>
<td>related</td>
<td>fully</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>trade</td>
<td>make</td>
<td>mutual</td>
<td>forward</td>
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<td>talks</td>
<td>agree</td>
<td>chinese</td>
<td>especially</td>
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<td>china</td>
<td>lead</td>
<td>public</td>
<td>nearly</td>
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<tr>
<td>negotiation</td>
<td>hope</td>
<td>well</td>
<td>greatly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>people</td>
<td>reach</td>
<td>taiwan's</td>
<td>effectively</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>president</td>
<td>continue</td>
<td>international</td>
<td>highly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>development</td>
<td>promote</td>
<td>financial</td>
<td>officially</td>
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<td>relations</td>
<td>help</td>
<td>joint</td>
<td>formally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>year</td>
<td>support</td>
<td>last</td>
<td>without</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>exchange</td>
<td>travel</td>
<td>cultural</td>
<td>furthermore</td>
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<td>agreement</td>
<td>create</td>
<td>national</td>
<td>smoothly</td>
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<td>meeting</td>
<td>visit</td>
<td>past</td>
<td>gradually</td>
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<td>investment</td>
<td>strengthen</td>
<td>chiang-chen</td>
<td>closely</td>
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<tr>
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<td>announce</td>
<td>further</td>
<td>recently</td>
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<tr>
<td>affairs</td>
<td>express</td>
<td>major</td>
<td>finally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>straits</td>
<td>meet</td>
<td>deputy</td>
<td>currently</td>
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<tr>
<td>issues</td>
<td>increase</td>
<td>institutionalized</td>
<td>steadily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ecfag</td>
<td>order</td>
<td>important</td>
<td>certainly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>delegation</td>
<td>provide</td>
<td>industrial</td>
<td>successfully</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 13 Taiwanese Political Speech: Lexical Preference*  

Salience indicates how important a theme, concept or word is to an actor. However, salience is not valence and raw frequency gives a limited picture of what the speaker intends each time he utters a word or what the addressee understands each time he hears it. Some software allows words and phrases to be analysed in co-text.

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631 Straits Exchange Foundation. n.d. *Policies and Issues*. [online] Available at:  
Straits Exchange Foundation. n.d. *Dialogue and Negotiation*. [online] Available at:  
Yoshikoder allows the researcher to create multiple dictionaries, to apply these to multiple corpora and to create concordance lines to examine how terms collocate. AntConc allows for direct collocation of words. Sketch Engine allows words to be analysed in multiple grammatical co-texts.

A master dictionary was then compiled in Yoshikoder. Five steps were followed. First, Sullivan’s (2010; 2011; 2012; 2013) indicative dictionary of elite Taiwanese political speech was consulted. Second, the researcher used his own contextual and historical knowledge to manually combine words from Table 10 into terms, for instance, 1992 with Consensus, peace with prosperity, mainland with China and so on. Third, salient terms were grouped into themes of economy, sovereignty, identity and security. Fourth, the Taiwanese Political Speech corpus was then searched manually using Microsoft Word to locate the most salient themes and language and, this language added to the dictionary categories using ‘*’ as a wild card. For example, for the sovereignty category, appending the word “nation” with ‘*’ to produce “nation*” allowed the dictionary to recognise the words “national”, “nationality” and “nationally”, while creating “democ*” allowed the dictionary to locate “democracy”, “democratic” and “democratically” in the texts it was applied to. Clearly, the boundaries among the categories are fuzzy, but they permit the researcher to bridge salience and valence, semantic and pragmatic analysis and corpus processing and qualitative DHA analysis. The master dictionary is shown in Appendix 1. While themes and discourses are not separate categories per se, within these themes, salient

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discourses could be identified; these were among others One China/ 1992 Consensus, peace and prosperity, status quo, democracy, shared interests, benefit of the people, and peaceful development. Of course, huadu is a discourse par excellence, since (q.v. 1.2.3.) the word almost never appears and is almost never uttered other than as a pejorative. Rather, huadu can be deduced from elite references to nominal phrases like the 1992 Consensus and the status quo and located in the concept of “ROC Sovereignty” and phrases like “the ROC is already an independent country”; “Taiwan is already independent”; “Taiwan is a sovereign state called the ROC”. It is also presupposed, implied and indexed lexico-grammatically throughout the corpus.

Clearly, individual words change meaning in co-text and context. For this reason, using the WordSketch function in Sketch Engine, the researcher took an interest in the words Taiwan, Taiwanese and Taiwan’s and did the same for China and its derivatives. Contextual knowledge allowed the researcher to separate out different Chinese-language terms for Chinese to differentiate between zhongguoren (PRC Chinese people – political) and huaren (ethnic Chinese people) and to create a separate category for One-China-Respective-Interpretations and its derivatives. The researcher searched for terms that legitimated Taiwan as a sovereign state by locating the words state, nation and country. However, it was not considered necessary to differentiate semantically among state, nation and country, since the popular use of these terms and their Chinese versions does not conform to IR conventions. These words were treated as indexing huadu and processed using WordSketch. Appendix 2 shows a WordSketch of names for Taiwan.

Drawing on Baker (2012; 2013), in order to get a better picture of the co-texts in which sovereignty-and–state-identity-indexing (SSII), or huadu legitimating, words occur, the researcher created a list of the ten most salient patterns in their noun forms,
applied the dictionary to the *Taiwanese Political Speech* master corpus and selected the patterns in turn using the concordance function. This produced the ten most salient adjective and verb collocates of words linked to *huadu*. The *WordSketch* of these SSII terms is shown in Appendix 3. A further application of *WordSketch* permitted a co-textual analysis of the discourses identified above. This is shown in Appendix 4. Concordance lists were then created using the *Taiwanese Political Speech* master corpus. Appendix 5 shows a set of concordance lines for the phrase *Taiwan is*. This gives an indication of how *huadu* is predicated in elite state and domestic political speech. The most salient predications of *huadu* from concordancing and dictionary exercises provide *huadu*’s normative representations. As such, these predications legitimate *huadu*. The most frequent are of Taiwan as “a pluralistic society where people are free to express their views”; “a society of freedom, democracy and the rule of law” and “a democratic society”. It is also “a major trading power”. This three-part step provided a way to select salient language for further analysis in subsequent chapters using the DHA.

5.4.4. Revised Research Questions and Hypotheses

Extraction of salient data produced a revised set of research questions:

(a) Does the data provide plausible support for the claim that the 2008-2016 KMT administration was constrained in its preferred cross-Strait policy by DIG interests?

(b) Does the data provide plausible support for the claim that ROC state identity was operative in power politics between 1945 and 2016?

(c) Does the data indicate that *huadu* legitimated the ROC as Taiwan?

(d) Does the data support the claim that ROC state identity changed diachronically from Chinese to Taiwanese between 1945 and 2016?
In this regard, the research questions considered competing *tongyi* and *taidu* policy positions, since all co-constitute *huadu*.

Thus, detailed hypotheses became:

i) An overarching *Free China* discourse constituted *huadu*

ii) *Huadu* is legitimated in Taiwanese Political Speech 1992-2016.

iii) *Free China* and *huadu* are co-constituted in Taiwanese Political Speech: 1945-1992

5.4.5. DHA and Pragmatic Analysis

Texts were then selected from the study corpora and revisited abductively. These became the basis for analysis of the discursive construction and legitimation of *huadu*. The DHA’s alternative categories of *argumentation schemes and rhetorical patterns* and *linguistic means of realisation* permit the separation of diplomatic frames, *topoi* and fallacies from the lexico-grammatical features (see appendix). In analysing the texts in terms of these categories, the researcher sought to identify the following:

1. How *huadu* was rhetorically legitimated through tropes, fallacies, *topoi* and argumentation schemes in Taiwanese political speech;

2. How *huadu* was linguistically legitimated through presupposition, implicature and deixis in Taiwanese political speech.

A pilot study based on Ma Ying-jeou’s political speech around the Xi-Ma summit in November 2015 confirmed that the research design worked as predicted. It showed that, contrary to the pan-Green claim that the KMT sought to sell Taiwan out, Ma’s discourse in this case legitimated *huadu*. This research design is operationalised in subsequent chapters where political speech is triangulated to political context and historical description.
5.4.6. Legitimating Taiwan through the “we” of huadu

Drawing on the pronouns of power and solidarity (q.v. 5.3.7.4.), the researcher sought to locate the *we* of huadu in the Taiwanese political speech corpus. This section finds that *we* is deployed discursively to legitimate Taiwan as a sovereign state. It operates in a cross-cutting manner across its realm and social constituency (q.v. 4.3). First, it does this directly by invoking power in relation to China and to tongyi and taidu constituencies to exclude them. Second, it does it indirectly by strategically invoking solidarity to include these constituencies. Third, it operates vaguely to leave inclusion or exclusion undetermined. Vague uses of *we* mean the line is not always clear (q.v. Fig. 9).633

This third “wandering” *we* permits listeners to include themselves in its scope irrespective of the speaker’s intentions. Indeed, the fact that Taiwanese political actors may have to address huadu, tongyi and taidu constituencies as well as China and the world simultaneously requires vagueness in the *we* of huadu and demands its strategic exploitation. So, while the prototypical *we* operates to draw clear distinctions between in and out-groups, it is used in SIPs to make the border fuzzy (q.v. 4.2.2.). This suggests that there is a kaleidoscope of different *wes* of huadu in Taiwanese political speech and, rather than unconsciously assuming a *we* of huadu, listeners may need to bring contextual knowledge to bear to recognise the particular *we* being invoked. Since Austin’s Speech Act Theory (illocution-perlocution) claims it is the addressee who decides who *we* refers to and who is excluded, context

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determines pragmatic interpretation and whether and why hearers (Beijing; international community; tongyi and taidu constituencies) act on it.

Fairclough (2000) argues that this “constant ambivalence and slippage between exclusive and inclusive we” means that we is a powerful tool of political persuasion and state identity construction.  In all cases, huadu deploys we in order to gain legitimacy. The meaning of the we of huadu is contextual, understood pragmatically and used to legitimate huadu through shifts in power and solidarity and exploitation of the discursive gap between illocution and perlocution. The scope of we in English and Chinese can often only be inferred from context. And as the gap between illocution and perlocution means actors in an interaction interpret the context in different ways, there is often the possibility that hearers will include themselves in the scope when the speaker did not intend to do this, or vice versa.

The we of huadu is the we of Taiwan. This double inference is made possible not just by the politics of Taiwan’s contested status, but by the inclusive-exclusive overlap inherent in we that makes the “wandering” we possible in the first place. It is this double-inferential quality of we that asserts and legitimates Taiwan’s de facto independence and resists China’s power. To locate it, this section takes Fairclough and Wodak’s (2010) framework in figure 5 as an ideal-type starting point. This ideal-type taxonomy abstracts out inherent vagueness to argue that a propositional we may be identified semantically as referring inclusively or exclusively to I (Taiwan – ROC) and certain others. Whether we indexes Taiwan (ROC) regardless of inclusion or exclusion is also of interest.

Elites may exploit the inclusive-exclusive boundary to deploy the *we* of *huadu*, instrumentally using a double-inference *we* to speak exclusively for the ROC (Taiwan) and inclusively for the audience. 635 Thus, through the inclusive *we*, Taiwanese elites speaking for the ROC (Taiwan) may imply a generic collective *we* that assumes that addressees recognise themselves in *huadu*. 636 It is what *we* indexes – or points to - that is important in legitimating *huadu*. Like all pragmatic political speech, personal pronouns represent verbal coercion through the strategic interplay of inclusion and exclusion.

States rarely feature explicitly as actors in political text in the sense that they are not usually nominalised. Because of its contested status, this is even more the case with Taiwan. The strategic use of *we* therefore bestows agency on Taipei and has a number of potential pay-offs in terms of legitimacy. First, it compels a unified stance between speaker and addressee; second, it obviates the political challenge of explicitly mentioning Taiwan or the ROC; third, it determines the responses of all addressees within an expanding social constituency; the core subject *huadu* constituency can interpret *we* as meaning Taiwan, while *taidu* and *tongyi* constituencies are drawn into the subject constituency’s scope; fourth, the international community, as a non-subject constituency is invited to endorse *huadu* in its recognition of the *we* of *huadu*’s reference to liberal norms; finally, Beijing is compelled to recognise its own relationship to the *we* of *huadu* thus compelling its sanction of *huadu* over time.

Based on the discussion above, this study seeks to locate the following uses of the *we* of *huadu* in the data:

• Exclusive *we* — the speaker-inclusive, addressee-exclusive *we*, where *we* denotes the speaker as the ROC identifying with Taiwan.

• Inclusive Taiwanese *we* — the speaker-and addressee-inclusive *we*, where *we* refers to the speaker as the ROC and his constituency in Taiwan.

• Exclusive cross-Strait *we* — the speaker and addressee-exclusive *we*, where the speaker as the ROC is speaking to China and including Taiwan in *we*.

• Inclusive cross-Strait *we*— the speaker and addressee-inclusive *we*, where *we* denotes both sides acting together, or a pan-Chinese *zhonghua* identity.

• Instrumentally vague or wandering *we* — strategic and hedging.

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_Figure 14 Symmetrical v asymmetrical power relations with we_ (Fairclough and Wodak (2010) after Lakoff (1990)).

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5.5. Conclusion

This research design successfully operationalises this study’s research hypothesis and theoretical framework. It accounts for China’s inability to subdue Taiwan in terms of Taipei’s deployment of a powerful *huadu* discourse, thus legitimating and securing Taiwan’s sovereignty. The data shows that an overarching *huadu* macro-discourse is co-constitutive of domestic Taiwanese and cross-Strait power politics. Discourse analysis is not to do with the subjective and interpretive parsing of political speech. Discursive patterns encoded in language manipulate readers’ perceptions and “politics, knowledge and transformation are the products of myriad collective linguistic interchanges”.

While it is true that Taipei and Beijing have created a diplomatic rhetorical framework that seeks to avoid ascribing legitimacy to each other, the pragmatic meaning unconsciously and less-guardedly encoded in cross-Strait text tells a different story. Rhetoric and diplomatic frames permit constructive ambiguity in elite political speech. Taiwanese political speech does not spout propaganda; rather, it positions actors so that they impose their identities on others’ interpretation of text and both inter-subjectively reproduce that text as discourse. Thus, *huadu* is flagged unconsciously on a daily basis. *Huadu* may have become salient in a crisis of legitimacy, but it is legitimated every day in Taiwanese political speech as its normative representations are signalled and reproduced in “prosaic, routine words” that take the ROC’s sovereign independence for granted.

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Chapter 6: Building and Dismantling Free China 1947-1987

*One day I fell into conversation with two Americans in a jeep beside the road and, in passing, explained to them that I was not a Japanese but a Chinese from Formosa. It was something of a shock to find myself for the first time openly and proudly making this distinction.*

6.1. Introduction

This chapter argues the seeds of ROC Independence, or *huadu*, can be found in the authoritarian KMT’s failed attempt to legitimate itself as *Free China*, or *ziyou zhongguo*. Between the late 1940s and 1987, a dialectical process of sinification (*zhongguohua*) and Taiwanisation (*bentuhua*) constituted and then dismantled a de facto independent Free China, separate from China proper. This process in turn constituted *huadu*. This and subsequent chapters operationalise this study’s realist-constructivist framework and discourse analysis by triangulating to historical and linguistic description. They offer empirical evidence for the hypotheses generated in the introduction and the research design. That is, first, the discursive power of *huadu* legitimates Taiwan’s ROC state identity, trumping Beijing’s material power, compelling its sanction and securing Taipei’s de facto independence. Second, textual warrant for this claim exists in Taiwanese political speech. Third, that textual warrant indicates that an overarching *huadu* discourse is operative in Taiwanese political speech regardless of political party. As such, it reveals a process of state identity change that accounts for Taiwan’s maintenance of its de facto sovereignty in the face of Beijing’s power.

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The chapter proceeds as follows: Free China rose and fell in response to two extended crises of legitimacy for the ROC. Both involved fundamental state identity change to achieve sanction across a shifting realm of political action and social constituency of legitimation. Taiwan’s cession to the ROC in 1945 led to a Taiwanese revolt, the 1947 28th February Incident (2-28). The KMT responded to this with brutal suppression in martial law and the White Terror from 1947. After its retreat to the island in 1949, the KMT restructured and imposed Free China on Taiwan through sinification. Second, from the 1970s, Free China metamorphosed into Taiwan through bentuhua even as sinification policies intensified. International de-recognition prompted delegitimation in the context of domestic protest. This time, the state responded with liberalisation, ending martial law in 1987 and paving the way for democratisation and huadu. Between these crises, resistance to authoritarian Free China took cross-cutting Taiwanese and Chinese liberal and nationalist forms, but these achieved limited sanction in the face of KMT power. Sinification attempted and failed to maintain a Nationalist Chinese state identity on Taiwan; Taiwanisation dismantled that state identity, but secured the ROC.

6.2. Sinification

Sinification (zhongguohua) represents China’s (as the ROC) efforts to make Taiwan Chinese in Free China, while Taiwanisation (bentuhua) represents Taiwan’s efforts to make China (as the ROC) Taiwanese in huadu.\textsuperscript{641} The ROC is the locus of the shift from one to the other. While the principles of huadu are the ideological and moral tenets of liberal democracy, with sovereignty embodied in the Taiwanese nation, Free China permitted the ROC to assert the sovereignty of the Chinese nation in

Taiwan. That most citizens were Taiwanese necessitated an authoritarian Chinese nationalism to legitimate China’s claim. This claim was based, first, on the successor-state principle (the ROC had succeeded the Qing, which had surrendered Taiwan to Japan); second, the illegitimacy of Japan’s rule (the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki was an unequal treaty); third, a primordialist claim that Taiwan had been “Chinese since antiquity”; fourth, the “narrative of return” that delegitimated Communist rule on the mainland. The ROC claimed sovereignty over all of China based on Sun Yat-sen’s *Three Principles of the People*, the 1947 Constitution and the 1948 Nanjing parliament. The outbreak of the Korean War bestowed international legitimacy on Free China as an anti-Communist state. As the narrative of return became less tenable, it attempted to sinify Taiwan and create the ROC anew as Free China. The ROC legitimated this identity semantically, through explicit assertions and rhetorical tropes, and pragmatically through implicit linguistic formulations.

The ROC sought to delegitimate both Taiwan Independence (taidu) under a putative ROT and zhongtong (PRC-led) Chinese Unification (tongyi). Yet, in asserting Free China, the ROC constructed a categorical difference between itself and the PRC and qualified its Chinese-ness. In setting Free China’s normative representations in opposition to those of the PRC, the ROC enacted a norm-based morality that constituted a realm and constituency in Taiwan alone. Thus, sinification isolated Taiwan from China since it was enacted not by the metropolis, but by a state insulated from its metropolis.

In sinifying Taiwan, the KMT made the island Free China’s realm and the Taiwanese its constituency. Yet, these constructs were contingent and only remained legitimate for the ROC as long as the ROC itself retained legitimacy. Free

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China represented a limited social base: it served elite Chinese Nationalist interests and made the Taiwanese a persecuted minority, even as sinification made them citizens of China. As sinification intensified, Taiwanese elites within the KMT and the non-KMT dangwai challenged Free China through bentuhua.\textsuperscript{643} In the process, the KMT abandoned Free China, using the same linguistic techniques used during sinification. It is Taiwan’s optimistic, then wary, then traumatic contact with the ROC between 1945 and 1950 that constitutes the first phase in the transition to Free China.

6.2.1. Retrocession

A national consciousness implies a group aspiration to statehood and that did not exist for Taiwan until contact with the ROC.\textsuperscript{644} Yet, the arrival of the KMT in September 1945 prompted an identity crisis, since any residual pre-1895 Chinese consciousness had taken a Taiwanese form under Japanese rule. This exhibited itself in local elites acting Japanese in public, but practising a maritime sinic culture based on the Hoklo and Hakka languages and on folklore and religion at home.\textsuperscript{645} Mandarin-speaking Taiwanese elites initially welcomed Retrocession.\textsuperscript{646} Yet, Peng Ming-min (1972) relates the shame and confusion felt by his Taiwanese elite father on formally welcoming the KMT army to Kaohsiung:

> The ship docked … and off came the troops of China, the victors. The first man to appear was a bedraggled fellow who looked and behaved more like a coolie than a soldier, walking off with a carrying pole across his shoulder, from which was suspended his umbrella, sleeping mat, cooking pot, and cup. Others like him followed, some with shoes, some without. Few had guns. With no attempt to maintain order or discipline,

\textsuperscript{643} See: Hughes, Christopher. 1997; Makeham, John and Hsiau, A-chin. eds. 2005.
\textsuperscript{644} Edmonson, Robert. 2002: 25.
\textsuperscript{646} Kerr, George. 2017 [1965]. xiv.
they pushed off the ship, glad to be on firm land, but hesitant to face the Japanese lined up and saluting smartly on both sides. My father wondered what the Japanese could possibly think. He had never felt so ashamed in his life.\footnote{Peng Ming-min, 1972: 51.}

Peng implies that the “hesitant” Chinese lacked the confidence “to face” (a verb that implies threat) the Japanese, “saluting smartly”. The presupposition in “few had guns” and “no attempt to maintain order or discipline” is that armies have guns and are ordered and disciplined. Therefore, by implication, the KMT is not a legitimate army and cannot provide security (and therefore constitute a threat). The co-textual juxtaposition of the grandiose term “the troops of China, the victors” with the demeaning terms “bedraggled fellow” and “coolie” discursively dismiss the KMT army (corpus analysis and Speech Act Theory indicate that these terms imply an insult). Peng’s musing over his father’s thoughts acts as a presuppositional trigger, inviting a flood of negative interpretations of the Chinese. Read pragmatically, the text may be interpreted as appealing to an international audience, with knowledge of 2-28 and The White Terror, to delegitimate China’s rule from the outset.

Retrocession set the stage for the Taiwanese (benshengren) – Mainlander (waishengren) cleavage that set a Hoklo/Hakka core in opposition to a heterogeneous Mainlander one based on loyalty to the KMT. General Chen Yi, the new Chinese governor, viewed the Taiwanese as Japanese collaborators and set the tone for 2-28. The resentment and bitterness generated by Chen’s governorship was reflected in a graffito that appeared in Taipei, referring to the departure of the Japanese and the arrival of the Chinese: “Dogs go, pigs come”.\footnote{Kerr, George. 2017 [1965]: 1-3.}
6.2.2. February 28 and the Settlement Committee

As a founding massacre, 2-28 represents a clear watershed in the articulation of Taiwanese nationalism. In February 1947 the Taiwanese, increasingly disenchanted with Chinese maladministration and brutality, revolted.\textsuperscript{649} Locals took over the KMT administration on 4\textsuperscript{th} March and a locally-constituted Settlement Committee attempted to negotiate with Chen Yi. Its early demands were varied: democratic elections; surrender of the KMT army; greater autonomy within the ROC; representation in peace-treaty negotiations with Japan; a referendum on Taiwan’s political future and an end to corruption.\textsuperscript{650} Others sought UN trusteeship, full independence and an alliance with the Chinese Communists.\textsuperscript{651} The conveners spoke as legitimate representatives of Taiwan and on 5\textsuperscript{th} March the Committee stated:

\begin{quote}
Pending approval by the Central Government, the … Committee to Settle the February 28 Incident will undertake reorganization of the present administration...we should acknowledge the aim of this action, that there is no other desire except to demand a reformation of Government.\textsuperscript{652}
\end{quote}

But “reformation of Government” could be read differently in the discursive gap between illocution and perlocution and, thus, mean many things. Power was up for grabs and the Committee sought to legitimate its own role in the ROC with rhetorical references to Chinese nationalist ideology. In their 32 demands, they stated, “we are all sons of the Yellow Emperor and of the Han race. The quality of national government depends on all citizens of the republic”.

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{649} Ibid: 5.
\end{flushright}
The 32 Demands may be read pragmatically in the discursive gap that arose in the state’s crisis of legitimacy. Normatively, they oscillate between taidu and tongyi, presaging an ideal Free China, yet creating a gap for what would become huadu norms. While retaining the ROC, they deploy both nascent Taiwanese nationalism and liberal Chinese nationalism in civic democracy. The demands pledge allegiance semantically to the ROC since there is no alternative institutional infrastructure to legitimate a sovereign Taiwanese state. Yet the KMT had not yet legitimated China’s sovereignty over Taiwan. The KMT had established the institutions to propagate Chinese norms. But ROC legitimacy had collapsed under KMT’s governance by 2-28.

The KMT exploited the gap, making administrative amends and acceding to some of the Committee’s demands. Seven Taiwanese were brought into the 14-strong Taiwan Provincial Commission. At the same time, it brutally suppressed the wider revolt. By the end of March, the KMT had instituted the White Terror, imprisoned and executed local leaders and elites. The number killed is a matter of debate. 2-28, as it became known, became both taboo and totemic – the “most important single event in Taiwan’s history because it made Taiwanese history thinkable”.

Free China had not yet been born and the ROC was still based in Nanjing, but 2-28 was a crisis of legitimacy for the ROC, which responded with coercion, martial law and terror to maintain its identity as an anti-Communist, Chinese Nationalist party state. The White Terror peaked between 1950 and 1953 and overlapped with martial

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654 Harrison, Mark. 2006: 83.
656 George Kerr, US Consul at the time, estimated 10,000 locals were killed on 28th February and another 10,000 massacred in the following weeks. A Taiwanese delegation to Nanjing reported that between 3,000 and 4,000 people throughout the island had been executed.
law, which was instituted in May 1949 and lasted until August 1987. About 140,000 Communists and Taiwan independentists were imprisoned and 3,000 to 4,000 executed. Later prosecutions were of liberal Mainlander (waishengren) intellectuals who had fled the Communists in 1949. The White Terror effectively neutered the Taiwan Independence Movement (TIM) (q.v. 6.3.1.), which went into exile, penetrated by KMT agents. The result was that there was no effective domestic independence movement during martial law. As such, the White Terror enabled sinification, constituting the ROC as Free China in opposition to the PRC in isolation on Taiwan. Yet, it also presaged huadu by constituting a Taiwanese constituency through agricultural, economic and educational reform. These led to economic development in the Taiwan Miracle while allowing a distinctive Taiwanese identity to flourish. Through land reform, the KMT had hoped to separate Taiwan’s rural elite from its constituency. However, excluded from political life, rural elites moved to manufacturing, becoming the Taiwanese bourgeoisie.

6.2.3. Constructing and Legitimating Free China

Free China arose in a traumatic, fundamental crisis of legitimacy. It was consolidated in KMT reform and institutional restructuring in Taiwan between 1950 and 1952. Yet, Free China was in fact two identities –a KMT party-state one and a quasi-opposition KMT one. This study conceives of these as Free China “realis” and Free China “idealis”. The former represents authoritarian KMT rule encoded in the

Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of National Mobilization for

658 Shelley Rigger states “Peng Ming-min, Bo Yang and Lei Chen” were “high -profile White Terror cases” in the 1960s but in fact, “thousands of Taiwanese and Mainlanders were swept up by the White Terror, suffering imprisonment, torture…execution”. In 1969, Lee Teng-hui was again detained and interrogated by the Taiwan Garrison Command, asked about his Communist activities and threatened with execution.


Suppression of the Communist Rebellion and the Taiwan Garrison Command and enacted in martial law and White Terror. The latter represents an idealised ROC as conceived in Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles and visible in liberal Chinese Nationalist discourse. Sinification exhibits a tension between them. This section argues that huadu was dialectically constructed in this tension since it mutually constituted the ROC and Taiwan as separate to China.

To legitimate Free China, the KMT had to enact Chinese nationalism using sinification to penetrate and mobilise Taiwanese society. This required a police state. Writing in January 1949, Chiang Kai-shek wrote:

> The biggest reason for our defeat was that we never have been able to establish a new, solid organizational system. The old one had long deteriorated and collapsed. In the current, crucial phase between the old and the new, we have lost the basic means to rebuild and save our country. This is why we have been defeated.

Between 1950 and 1952, the KMT party state reformed and became Free China. This state identity constructed Taiwan in its own right in successive discourses. “Defend Taiwan” became “Develop Taiwan” and “Build Taiwan”. Granted, in their original form these were simply mobilising slogans. Read retrospectively in the context of huadu, however, they reveal the intersubjective, co-constitutive and dialectical nature of state identity construction. While not an explicit plan to build a Taiwanese state, these discourses reflect SIPs that constituted Taiwan as the ROC’s

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661 Harrison, Mark. 2006: 100-01.
realm and constituency, constructing Taiwan in its own right from the earliest days of the KMT rule.663

In January 1950 the recently exiled ROC perceived a threat to its survival when the US decided not to intervene in the event of a Communist attack. In March, Premier Chen Cheng told the National Assembly, “We must concentrate all our efforts to defend Taiwan and prepare for a counteroffensive on the mainland”.664 Between April and May, Chiang Kai-shek enacted local elections to legitimize a defeated Chinese regime that had no Taiwanese support after 2-28. The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 saved the KMT. Although the US acknowledged Taiwan’s unresolved status, it secured the ROC, impeding a Republic of Taiwan.665 Yet, the resulting KMT reforms constituted the ROC’s realm and constituency within Taiwan alone.

In reforming its normative representations and organisational structure, the KMT sought to reassert legitimacy at the Seventh National Congress in October 1952. These included the revolutionary, nationalist and democratic aspects of the *Three Principles* and the Party’s Leninist structure.666 Yet, representational inconsistency highlighted the *Free China* “realis-idealis” split. KMT General Chang Ch'i-yun stated the KMT was revolutionary in its methods but not in its goals, while for Fu Xuming the goal was democracy.667 Fu invoked the *Three Principles*’ military rule and tutelage, justifying the White Terror and sinification. Leninist reorganisation

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666 Dickson, Bruce. 1993. The Lessons of Defeat: The Reorganization of the Kuomintang on Taiwan, 1950-52 The China Quarterly, 133: 56-84 at 68
667 Chang Ch'i-yun, 1955. *The Rebirth of the Kuomintang*. Taipei, China Cultural Service. 81
allowed the KMT to secure *Free China*’s long-term goals of political stability, economic growth and anti-Communism, to survive and subjugate Taiwan’s political elites. The naming of Taiwan by the KMT pragmatically isolated and insulated the ROC, synthesising pan-Chinese and Taiwanese discourses to legitimate *Free China* in opposition to *Red China*.68 In doing so, it constituted Taiwan as a separate realm and constituency.

6.2.3.1. *Free China* “Realis”: Build Taiwan and Prepare for the Counter offensive

*Free China* “realis” was constituted in the authoritarian ROC’s development policies, framed as anti-Communism and enacted in Martial Law and the White Terror. Yet, these implicitly defined *Free China* as independent, presaging *huadu*:

The aim [of development] is to protect the freedom of the people (*minzu*) and national (state - *guojia*) independence. The measures of the Communist bandits … are premised upon class interests. This poisonous … rebellion shatters social cohesion … confounds ethics and annuls morality. … To target this cultural aggression, we must strengthen education in the cultural movements of the Three Principles … and ensure the fostering of national consciousness.669

Linguistically, the KMT co-textually juxtaposes securitising verbs (“protect”; “strengthen”; “ensure”; “foster”, “target”) with destructive ones (“shatter”; “confound”; “annul”) to frame Beijing as a threat. The ROC is legitimated rhetorically in “the freedom of the people”, “national consciousness” and “national independence”, while the “poisonous” “Communist bandits”, who carry out “cultural aggression” and “rebellion” against the KMT’s “social cohesion”, “ethics” and “morality” are linguistically delegitimated. The illocutionary-pelocutionary gap explains why Taiwanese addressees may have perceived a dissonance between “the

668 Harrison, Mark. 2006: 103.
people” and “national independence”. Yet, for the KMT, such a Free China “realis” offered Taiwan a corporatist, nationalist state identity that sought to naturalise a 5,000-year Chinese cultural identity. 670 It followed Sun’s Three Principles of nationalism, democracy and livelihood, which envisaged three stages: military rule, tutelage and then democracy. Yet, under KMT restructuring, it focused on military rule and tutelage, shelving democracy in the process. Free China “realis” legitimated the ROC’s claims to territories lost by the Qing, including Taiwan. 671

Chiang re-introduced the ROC’s 1930s quasi-fascist and militaristic aspects, fetishising submission to the state. 672 In his speeches and interviews through the 1950s and 1960s, he exhorted the people to resist Communism and build a New China that spoke to an independent Republic of China. In his 1951 national day speech, Chiang said:

A democratic and free Republic of China has now been established for forty years. . . .
the glorious record of our revolutionary martyrs who struggled with blood and tears to save and reconstruct the nation. . . . In spite of the failure of our anti-Communist war on the mainland, we continue to vigorously struggle for national independence…. Now Taiwan, the base area of Free China, is the foundation of national recovery and reconstruction. . . . Everyone should reflect on whether he has lived up to the expectations of the father of the nation, Dr. Sun Yat-sen and the revolutionary martyrs. 673

From the earliest days of the “independent” ROC in Taiwan, “the nation” reflected a discursive dependence on Chinese nationalist language. “The nation” is China and Chiang constitutes a narrative of Chinese national unity from 1911 in Nanjing to 1951 in Taiwan. Yet, the realm and constituency are Taiwan. Here, the word

671 Sun: 9
672 Harrison: 102
“independence” changes pragmatic meaning. For Chiang, independence meant China’s aspiration to self-determination and non-dependence on foreign powers. But in fact it constituted the ROC’s material non-dependence on a mainland realm and constituency and self-determination in the ROC’s discursive and material independence from China.

The 1950s and 1960s saw the consolidation of Free China “realis” as the KMT enforced sinification through the ROC. Educational reform was part of the legitimating process. In order to align to Sun’s Three Principles, Taiwan’s inhabitants had to be made Chinese and anti-Communist and share a destiny with the Mainland. Mandarin was imposed in schools, local varieties suppressed, and a Nationalist Chinese curriculum imposed. Yet, its harshness varied and a vibrant bentuhua appropriated Mandarin while resisting cultural sinification (q.v. 7.3.). The KMT’s response was further sinification in 1966 and even as it sought to liberalise from 1975 it formally enacted Free China in education.674 The result was that a generation of Taiwanese identified with the ROC in opposition to the PRC.

However, while the KMT legitimated Chinese nationalism through economic and social development, its state identity became ambivalent. Tongyi under the PRC (zhongtong) and taidu in a ROT were sedition; this meant Free China sought sanction from a Taiwanese constituency. Authoritarian development legitimated Free China by de-legitimating the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution. Yet, relentless delegitimation of the PRC created a deeper state identity gap, delegitimating Taipei’s claim to Chinese-ness. Paradoxically, Free China “realis”

permitted the Taiwan Miracle, legitimating Taiwan in terms of its own name and economic performance.675

6.2.3.2. Free China “Idealis”: “Develop the Freedom and Democracy of Society”
The presence of waishengren intellectuals such as Lei Chen, Bo Yang, Li Ao and Hu Fo within the KMT after 1949 prompted a more liberal form of Chinese nationalism in opposition to Free China “realis”. This is salient in the opposition between Taipei’s asserted identity and that of the propaganda vehicle it set up to promote that identity, the liberal-nationalist Free China Fortnightly (ziyou zhongguo banyuekan).676 A forum for free discussion and propaganda against the PRC, the KMT suppressed it when it became critical of its own Party State.

Lei Chen, who edited Free China Fortnightly, sought a Chinese civic democracy based on the 1919 May 4th Movement and Sun’s Three Principles. This Free China “idealis” aspired to ROC-led tongyi, not taidu. The editors switched between support for and open critique of KMT policies. In 1957, the journal asserted, “assuming the existence of a strong opposition to the party is one of the fundamental conditions of democratic government”.677 Lei Chen went further to openly challenge the KMT’s rhetoric and policies. In “Opposing the Mainland,” Lei wrote: “Our opposition to communism is not for political rights, rather it is a way of life, covering everything from ideology to lifestyle, and in substance it is no different from communism.

676 The journal is sometimes known as Free China or Free China Journal in English. Indeed Mark Harrison (2006) refers to it as Free China Journal. However, this leads to confusion with an English-language journal, Taiwan Today, which was formally known as Free China Journal. The Chinese title of Lei Chen’s publication, ziyou zhongguo banyuekan, translates as Free China Fortnightly. Hence, this study uses this wording.

itself”. In 1958, the *Free China Fortnightly* presented a *Free China Movement* manifesto:

1. We must declare to all the people of the world that freedom and democracy are absolutely fundamental, and then that we must urge the government (at all levels) that in addition to reform of economic governance, we must develop the freedom and democracy of society.

2. We must support the government using all possible efforts to fight for freedom under the iron curtain of communism.

3. We must use all our strength to assist the compatriots in occupied territories, and help them to recover their freedoms.

4. Our first goal must be to establish all of the Republic of China as a free China.

In epistemically asserting the norms of freedom and democracy to “all the people of the world” through the modal verb “must”, the Manifesto explicitly seeks international legitimation of a *Free China* “idealis” and delegitimation of Chinese Communism. Yet, through the implicative verb “urge” and the conjunction “in addition to” in the co-text of “economic governance” and “freedom and democracy”, it also implies pragmatically that these do not exist under *Free China* “realis”. Rather than a semantic assertion of ROC norms, the manifesto was therefore read by the state pragmatically as an implicit rebuke and threat (q.v. 5.1).

*Free China Fortnightly* helped create a proto civil society in Taiwan and presaged the *dangwai* through a liberal, urban Chinese nationalist tradition. Yet, it constituted *Free China* as separate from China. Lei implicitly criticised the KMT for failing to live up to *Free China*’s normative representations, but avoided explicitly asserting normative representations different to those ideally claimed by the KMT, such as self-determination for Taiwan. The KMT shut *Free China Fortnightly* down in 1960

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678 Lei Chen, “Fangong dalu wenti (The Problem of Retaking the Mainland),” *Ziyou Zhongguo Banyue* (Free China Fortnightly) 17(8) 1 August 1957: 5.
when Lei and Yin Haiguang called the KMT “political garbage”, proposed a China Democratic Party and advocated a Democratic Republic of Chinese Taiwan (zhonghua taiwan minzhuguo). Lei was charged with sedition for “harbouring a Communist agent” and imprisoned. 680

Free China “idealis” surfaced again in the context of the ROC’s expulsion from the UN in 1971. Yang Hsi-kun proposed to the US ambassador that Taiwan’s ties with China should be cut and the ROC renamed the “Chinese Republic of Taiwan” (zhonghua Taiwan gongheguo).681 Unconsciously presaging a form of huadu (q.v. 1.5.), the ambassador interpreted “Chinese” as “a generic term stemming from the Chinese ethnic origin of the populace on Taiwan” rather than a “political meaning”.682

6.3. Resistance

In 1948, the Far Eastern Economic Review reported: “What information leaks out of Taiwan … is a story of exploitation and oppression suffered by the natives at the hands of the Chinese masters.”683 Some Taiwanese fled to mainland China, seeking zhongtong under the CCP. 684 However, a more prominent group, the Taiwan


684 E.g. Xie Xuehong and Lin Moshun
Independence Movement (TIM - or haiwai taidu yundong), escaped to Hong Kong, Japan and the US.

The TIM should not be conflated with taidu constituencies in democratic Taiwan; it was a disparate collection of exiled interest groups that drew on Formosan nationalism between the late 1940s and early 1980s. Because of KMT penetration of Taiwanese society and taidu’s status as sedition, the TIM remained the strongest articulation of an aspiration to taidu during Martial Law.685

6.3.1. The Taiwan Independence Movement

As a nationalist response to 2-28, the Taiwan Independence Movement (TIM) coalesced semi-clandestinely among exiled dissidents and overseas sojourners. Shu’s (2002) research suggests most TIM activists were “privileged”, “marginalized”, “educated” benshengren graduate students who had been “exposed to liberal professors who … criticised the KMT’s record on the Mainland and attributed the debacle of 1949 to the corruption and ineffectual leadership of the KMT”.686

The TIM’s disparate organisations merged in 1970 as the World United Formosans for Independence (WUFI). 687 Yet, while it was capable of mobilisation and direct action overseas, the TIM singularly failed either to penetrate Taiwanese society or to achieve a RoT and was effectively delegitimated by the KMT and marginalised by the dangwai movement within Taiwan. 688 While TIM activists used the name “Taiwan” in Chinese, in English propaganda they used “Formosa” to counter ROC

685 Harrison. 2006: 95.
688 The TIM almost assassinated Chiang Ching-kuo in New York in 1970; in December 1979 it targeted KMT representative offices in the US in response to the Kaohsiung Incident.
naming practices, to highlight the “Formosa Problem” and to present *Free China* as linguistically and conceptually illegitimate. In doing so, they appealed for legitimacy to a broader international constituency.

The TIM sought a plebiscite on self-determination and UN trusteeship until this could be held. In September 1948, they petitioned the UN to demand “all properties and assets taken over or away by the Chinese rulers be conserved in the hands of the provisional Formosan administration until the wishes of the people, after the plebiscite, have become known” and that “all Chinese nationals who arrived after August 15, 1945, be concentrated and repatriated.” In a memorandum to the UN, *Formosa Speaks*, in September 1950 the TIM advocated a state identity based on an incoherent mix of primordialist, racial, cultural and liberal representations. The legitimacy of such a *taidu* identity was challenged by the reality of Taiwan’s material link to the ROC and its Chinese cultural heritage.

By 1955, the brothers Joshua and Thomas Liao had formed a “hapless … fractious and ineffective” Provisional Government of the Republic of Formosa (*Taiwan gongheguo linshi zhengfu*) and a Provisional National Congress in Japan. While The Cold War marginalised them in the face of KMT and CCP ideology, they operated within UN norms and the institutions of the Provisional Government provided a degree of legitimacy. Campaigning for a new state based on Wilsonian self-determination and decolonisation, *taidu* remained an aspiration.

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689 Harrison, Mark. 2006: 12-33.
690 Liao, Joshua. 1948.
691 Harrison. 2006: 86.
692 Harrison: 95.
The Provisional Government used publications – *Formosa Quarterly* and *Independent Formosa* – to promote *taidu*. Yet, although their political speech contained Republic of Taiwan rhetoric, it did not encode a state identity as the *Three Principles* or *Free China* had done. Rather, it sought to undermine *Free China* by reporting human rights abuses and articulating an ethnic Taiwanese national identity. As *Free China* gained a degree of legitimacy, Formosan nationalists developed a sentimental counter-narrative of an oppressed nation, denied statehood. In 1963, *Formosa Quarterly* lamented: “the ten million Formosans living in Formosa are groaning under the heartless mechanism of oppression”.694

In 1965 the exile, Ko Kiansing, ramblingly attempted to define Taiwanese national identity, but failed to articulate a state identity:

> What is this nation called Formosa? The Formosan and the Chinese themselves correctly distinguish one another by instinct. Be that as it may … rooted essentially in nationalism … the Formosan may be defined as those, their descendants inclusive, who (1) had maintained continuous living in the island until the time of its cession to Japan on 2nd June, 1895, in consequence of the Sino-Japanese War terminated earlier that year, (2) chose to remain Formosan by staying in the island after 8th May, 1897, the day the people of Formosa were given a chance to decide their future path—whether or not to leave the island of Formosa. . . . Their decision was, in fact, an indication of the will of the Formosan to share the same fate with the land and, furthermore, of the birth or awakening of the “Formosan Consciousness” omnipresent in the minds of the people of Formosa.695

As an attempt to distinguish Taiwan from China, this does not define any normative representations beyond nationalism and its concepts of “the Formosan”, “the Chinese”, “continuous living”, “instinct”, “will”, “fate” and “land”. For Ko, simply existing or being in Taiwan before 1895 and after 1897 makes one nationally

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Taiwanese. There is no “doing” of Taiwanese-ness. Rather, the subject merely exercises a “choice” to “awaken” a “Formosan Consciousness”. Granted, “choice” may be seen as presaging Lee Teng-hui’s concept of the New Taiwanese, but citizenship, sovereignty and state-seeking are absent and the latter accepts incomers from the mainland while Ko’s articulation excludes them. Formosan nationalism is not then, as Harrison (2006) claims, a clear break with Sun Yat-sen’s essentialist concept of the nation; it simply switches essentialism from China to Taiwan.

In May 1965, the KMT managed to split the Provisional Government, co-opting Thomas Liao, who returned to Taiwan, stating:

I, Thomas Liao have been working for the interests and happiness of the Taiwanese people overseas for almost 20 years ... But now I recognize … that the biggest threat is the infiltration and subversion by the Chinese Communists. Thus, I have renounced my Taiwanese independence activities and have decided to answer the call from President Chiang's Anti-Communist Union.696

The KMT reported Liao’s return with glee in the Free China Review. The report rhetorically deploys Free China “idealism” norms of magnanimity, unity, freedom and democracy. However, a pragmatic reading exposes the chilling Free China “realism” beneath the rhetoric. The counter-factual, “any government so challenged might have put a price on his head and hunted him to the ends of the earth” would have been read by taidu constituencies as a thinly veiled threat since it references what the KMT actually did to other dissidents.697 Free China Review identified Beijing as its main threat and definitively delegitimated the TIM as “a weak but noisy” nuisance that needed to be co-opted in the struggle for tongyi (huatong) under the ROC:

What mattered to the Chinese government was not the past error of Dr. Liao's thinking, but his awakening to the fact that he had played into the hands of Communism and his

697 Murder of Henry Liu
decision to stand foursquare with President Chiang Kai-shek in fighting the supreme enemy of the Chinese people and nation. As for separatism, [Liao] said he had come to realize the impracticality of an independent Taiwan. President Chiang and the government showed their magnanimity … with a full pardon for Dr. Liao [who] elected to return to Taiwan … to heed the call of duty in defending it from the Communists.\(^6\)

In December 1965 a TIM offshoot, the United Young Formosans for Independence, advocated a more civic *taidu* that presages Lee Teng-hui’s New Taiwanese:”’Formosan’ refers to all people who love Formosa as their homeland, who seek independence and happiness for Formosa, and who pray for her progress and prosperity.”\(^6\)

Paradoxically, while it failed in its aims, Formosan nationalism constituted Taiwan’s maintenance of its de facto independence from China. While compared to the Communists, it was not a serious threat to ROC legitimacy, it failed to articulate any state representations beyond nationalism itself and had no effective realm or constituency. The TIM’s presence legitimated the ROC by providing the latter with a scapegoat. Yet, it also kept Taiwanese nationalism alive when this was sedition and so not an option for the *dangwai* within Taiwan. In doing so, it co-constituted *huadu* since a *huadu* without Taiwanese nationalism would simply be Free China “idealis”.

6.3.2. A Declaration of Formosan Self-Salvation

Within Taiwan, the *benshengren* dissident KMT technocrat Peng Ming-min’s 1964 critique of *Free China* “realis” and “idealis” provides a more compelling articulation of resistance. As such, it forms the political underpinnings of *bentuhua*. Using Renan’s claim that national identity rests only loosely on imprecise notions of language, ethnicity and culture, it conceives of a state that represents “neither race, language, nor culture” but rather “a deeply felt Taiwanese sense of community and

shared destiny” \textit{(mingyun gongtongti)}.ootnote{Peng, Ming-min. [1964] 1994. \textit{taiwan zijiu yundong xuanyan [A Declaration of Formosan Self-Salvation].} Peng Ming-min Educational Foundation: 187-198.} Peng identified the KMT claim to Taiwan as modernist and realist wrapped in primordialist appeals.\footnote{Peng, Ming-min. [1964] 1994: 187-198.} First, just because Taiwan had “always” been part of China did not mean that it had to remain so; second, the ROC attitude to Taiwan was cynical since, for centuries, the mainland authorities had dismissed it as a pirates’ lair; third, since 1895, there had been only four years of contact between Taiwan and the mainland under a joint government – and these had been traumatic; fourth, the KMT claim that Taiwan was crucial to salving national humiliation was bogus; China might have been a victim, but it had stood up under the Communists in 1949. Finally, he argued, the KMT was using Chinese nationalist mythology to maintain a corrupt and brutal regime that could represent neither China nor Taiwan.\footnote{Ibid. These claims were repeated by the meilidao protestors.} Peng’s determination to break the link between ethnicity and the state is clear in his claim that the Chinese should learn:

\begin{quote}

to distinguish clearly between ethnic origin, culture and language on the one hand, and politics and law on the other, and to abandon the idea that those who are ethnically, culturally, and linguistically Chinese must be politically and legally Chinese as well.\footnote{Peng, Ming-min. 1972: 244}
\end{quote}

This social-contract, Peng believed, would more effectively undermine \textit{Free China} “realis” ethnic nationalism than an exclusive sub-ethnic Taiwanese nationalism.\footnote{Ibid: 279.} Peng was arrested and exiled in 1970 and the extent of his influence on \textit{bentuhua} in the early 1970s was hidden until the \textit{dangwai} revived it in the discourse of the \textit{Meilidao} protests at Kaohsiung in 1979 (q.v. 6.4.2.).
6.4. Taiwanisation

Bentuhua – Taiwanisation or localisation – was a discursive social process co-constituted by sinification.\textsuperscript{705} As a cultural and intellectual response to KMT rule and deepening sinification in the 1960s, it became political in the 1970s.\textsuperscript{706} Political bentuhua developed in ROC liberalisation between 1975 and 1987 as a response to the ROC’s extended crisis of legitimacy. Appropriated by the ROC, it helped dismantle Free China “realis”. Bentuhua was instrumental in the construction of huadu and maintenance of Taiwan’s de facto independence after democratisation and up to 2016.\textsuperscript{707}

If KMT sinification meant making Taiwan align to Chinese norms, bentuhua meant aligning China, first as the ROC, then as the PRC, to Taiwanese norms.\textsuperscript{708} It aligned the ROC to Taiwan by appropriating it; it aligned the PRC to Taiwan by compelling its provisional sanction. On the one hand, a ROC centre, detached from its metropolis, attempted to remake the Taiwanese periphery in China’s image through Free China. On the other, the Taiwanese periphery appropriated aspects of the Chinese centre, particularly in the dangwai’s absorption of Free China “idealis” liberal and democratic norms. These processes were knowingly absorbed by Taiwanese political entrepreneurs.\textsuperscript{709} As such, bentuhua expanded the ROC’s realm and constituency.

6.4.1. Dismantling Free China

Several political events facilitated bentuhua’s dismantling of Free China. These prompted policies that cannot be explained in purely rational-choice terms; the data

\textsuperscript{705} Lan, Yiping. 1983: 11-12.
\textsuperscript{706} Makeham, J. and Hsiau A-chin. 2005.
\textsuperscript{707} Makeham, J. and Hsiau A-chin. 2005.
\textsuperscript{708} For a discussion of sinification, see: Katzenstein, Peter J. 2012: 9
\textsuperscript{709} Katzenstein, Peter J. 2012: 8-9
strongly indicate that legitimacy was crucial. The ROC’s loss of legitimacy meant *Free China* could no longer define the island’s identity, so the state’s identity had to change.

First, in October 1971, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 2758, recognising the PRC and expelling “the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations”.\(^{710}\) Yet, the subsequent 1972 Shanghai Communique between the US and the PRC ambiguously acknowledged both PRC and ROC One-China principles, creating a linguistic pretext for *huadu*.\(^{711}\) The ROC shed diplomatic allies, but Taiwan’s importance as a trading economy, discursively constructed an Asian Tiger and “Made in Taiwan” economic identity and a Taiwanese state that was categorically not China.\(^{712}\) This led other states to sanction Taiwan’s de facto statehood and engage Taipei in functional terms through commercial representation.

Second, after Chiang Kai-shek’s death in 1975 his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, co-opted *bentuhua* to liberalise the ROC through limited elections, bringing Taiwanese technocrats into the Mainlander-elite dominated state. However, these first steps


\(^{711}\) Taiwan Documents Project. Joint Communique of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China. February 28 1972. [online] Available at: [http://www.taiwandomuments.org/communique01.htm](http://www.taiwandomuments.org/communique01.htm) [Accessed 20 September 2011] The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves

towards Taiwanising the ROC were aimed at securing KMT rule and did not constitute democratic reforms.\textsuperscript{713}

Third, a \textit{bentuhua} discourse of resistance became embodied in the \textit{dangwai}, a loose confederation of non-KMT Mainlander and Taiwanese democracy activists.\textsuperscript{714} Drawing on the ideas of Peng Ming-min and local \textit{waishengren} liberals, the \textit{dangwai} rejected replacing the ROC’s Chinese nationalism with a Hoklo-based ethnic Taiwanese nationalism. Instead, they sought a participatory civic culture.\textsuperscript{715} Advocating \textit{taidu} was sedition and a capital offence, despite \textit{taidu} forces within the broader \textit{dangwai} constituency. For instance, in 1977, the Presbyterian Church, which had agitated alongside the \textit{dangwai}, issued a proclamation that urged “our government to face reality and to take effective measures whereby Taiwan might become a new and independent country”.\textsuperscript{716}

Later that year, the \textit{dangwai} won over a third of the vote in the Taiwan provincial elections and this had an effect on liberal and Taiwanese elements within the KMT. A KMT councillor, Hsu Hsin-liang, ran as a \textit{dangwai} candidate at Zhongli on an anti-corruption, socialist ticket that advocated human rights and parliamentary democracy. Hsu's supporters rioted and burned down a police station in response to KMT ballot-stuffing. The KMT deployed young Taiwanese conscripts, prompting

\textsuperscript{713} Jacobs, Bruce. 2012.
\textsuperscript{715} Extensive accounts of the development of Taiwanese identity from the \textit{dangwai} to the KMT can be found in Hughes, 1997, \textit{Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism} and in Makeham, John and Hsiau, A-chin (eds.) \textit{Cultural, Ethnic and Political Nationalism in Contemporary Taiwan: Bentuhua} and Jacobs, Bruce. 2012. \textit{Democratizing Taiwan}.
protestors to chant “do not beat your fellow Taiwanese”. The Zhongli Incident marked a definitive shift in legitimacy away from *Free China* in domestic politics.\(^{717}\)

Fourth, PRC reforms and US de-recognition in December 1978 followed by Beijing’s January 1979 offer of OCTS deepened Taipei’s crisis of legitimacy, prompting business interests to pressure Taipei to permit trade with the PRC. The context of the PRC’s reforms and the ROC’s *tongyi* identity ought to have prompted negotiation. Yet, the ROC responded with the Three Noes of “no contact, no compromise and no negotiation” with “the Chinese Communists”, formally asserting the ROC’s legitimacy. Taipei’s rejection of business lobbying suggests a unitary state balancing a perceived Chinese threat.

During the 1980s, the KMT continued rhetorically to assert *Free China*, while instituting liberal reforms. At its 13\(^{th}\) National Congress in 1981, it announced defiantly “the Chinese Communist regime is at death's door” and reasserted its mission as an “anti-Communist revolutionary party” that sought to “unify China under the Three Principles of the People by completing “the economic development of the Taiwan bastion” for “the people’s well-being.”\(^{718}\) The hijacking to China of a ROC cargo plane in 1986 provided a pretext for Taipei to abandon the Three Noes and re-establish unofficial contact with Beijing as a de facto independent state. While making salient the dissonance between *Free China* and Taipei’s legitimacy to act as such, de facto state-to-state contact offered an opportunity to re-legitimate the ROC in an expanded realm and constituency.

Fifth, the publication of *Formosa Magazine (Meilidao)*, by *dangwai* activists in 1979 promoted a democratic Taiwanese voice. *Meilidao* drew on Peng Ming-min’s 1964

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\(^{717}\) Gold, Thomas. 1986.

Declaration to argue that the KMT’s legitimacy was flawed since the ROC was detached from its sovereign metropolis, thus presenting a dilemma: the ROC’s link with the Chinese nation was premised on the 1948 Nanjing parliament, yet local democracy meant that the demos was Taiwan, meaning the ROC legislature could represent neither Taiwan nor China.

Sixth, In September 1986, eighteen dangwai defied the ban on opposition parties and founded the DPP, contesting the 1986 election. Committed to constitutional change, freedom of speech and association, the ending of censorship, the environment and democracy, the DPP did not initially support taidu, as this was sedition. However, it did insert a Taiwan Independence Clause into its charter; this clause foresaw a future de jure independent state. Once the DPP had representation in the legislature, it challenged the KMT. However, it lacked power until 1991, when elderly KMT legislators, elected in Nanjing in 1948, were retired. Lee Teng-hui sought to strengthen his presidential power so that the DPP could not take control of the legislature and declare taidu. In doing so, he delegitimated taidu, secured huadu and averted a Chinese Nationalist coup.

Wang Fu-chang, claims a bottom-up shift in sub-ethnic and domestic politics during the 1970s and 1980s caused by bentuhua led inexorably to delegitimation of Free China. However, Bruce Jacobs argues that KMT elite-led, top-down liberalisation shifted state identity, leading to subsequent democratisation and Taiwanisation under Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian.\textsuperscript{719} This study’s Realist-Constructivism resolves the debate. Co-constitution in power politics, rather than cause-and-effect, accounts for policy outcomes.

\textsuperscript{719} Jacobs, Bruce. 2005: 17–54
6.4.2. In Politics, Learn from Kaohsiung!

The Kaohsiung Incident of 10th December 1979 stands out as a relentless linguistic delegitimation of *Free China*. It resulted from a *Meilidao* demonstration to mark International Human Rights Day. \(^{720}\) The title of *Meilidao*’s pre-demonstration editorial meeting, “Democracy, Unity, Love Taiwan”, summarised its policy concerns.\(^{721}\) In an act of explicit and implicit linguistic delegitimation, the *Meilidao* leader, Shih Ming-teh, invoked Taiwanese nationalism to appeal to local conscripts policing the demonstration:

> All armed troops: You are the sons and brothers of Taiwanese. You are the troops of the Taiwanese … Taiwanese must not fight Taiwanese. … The Taiwanese are to be pitied; do not fight them. Taiwan soldiers withdraw! Taiwan soldiers go! … Taiwanese soldiers, move back! … They have their own problems. Let them get away. Don’t fight the Taiwanese soldiers. … Don’t fight the Taiwanese people. Taiwanese people, move back a bit … Taiwanese people don’t fight each other.\(^{722}\)

As more riot police arrived, Shih addressed them:

> I hope the security police will constrain themselves and will not trample on the Taiwanese people. I warn the security police not to trample on the Taiwanese people. Take your weapons home …. This NT$ 60 billion worth of equipment of yours is meant to fight our enemies, not to fight your fellow Taiwanese.\(^{723}\)

In addressing both the troops and demonstrators in Hoklo, in the presence of Nationalist Chinese officers and watching KMT elites, he excludes *Free China* and creates a Taiwanese national solidarity.\(^{724}\) Shih’s micro-discourse reflects a *bentuhua* macro-discourse understood by the participants in the context of the ROC’s wider

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\(^{720}\) Kaplan, John. 1981 The Court-Martial of the Kaohsiung Defendants (Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California.16.


\(^{722}\) Ibid 29

\(^{723}\) Ibid 31

\(^{724}\) The tapes are predominantly in Hoklo
delegitimation (q.v. 5.2.1.). Indeed, to ascribe Taiwanese-ness to the KMT troops was to urge them to reject the legitimacy of the KMT to call them Chinese. Although the word “Chinese” is not uttered, it is understood pragmatically in context by all participants and thus passes up to the discourse. The outcome, however, indicates that while *Free China* may have been shaky, the KMT still retained enough legitimacy to assert authority through coercion. There was no mutiny and the troops broke up the demonstration.

Shih’s micro-discourse also instrumentally invokes the legitimacy of a Chinese historical macro-discourse to delegitimate *Free China*: “Taiwanese must not fight Taiwanese” invokes the 1937-45 anti-Japanese War when the Chinese Communists used the slogan “Chinese should not fight Chinese but should fight Japanese” to rebuke the KMT for lack of patriotism in attacking the Communists. In addressing the troops as his proximal audience, Shih invites his distal – secondary but intended - elite KMT audience to perceive a rebuke. In fact, they perceive a threat (q.v. 5.2.6.1.). He appropriates the language of Chinese nationalism as uttered by the KMT’s enemies and retools it for Taiwanese nationalism. In doing so, Shih delegitimates the KMT as defenders of the Chinese and the Taiwanese nations. Austin’s *Speech Act Theory* elucidates how, paradoxically, Taiwan’s Chinese heritage allows Shih, as a knowledgeable actor, to exploit the discursive gap between his instruction to his proximal audience and his rebuke to his distal audience to make Taiwanese identity pass up to the discourse. Grice’s implicature accounts for how, in doing this, Shih implies linguistically that the KMT can represent neither China nor Taiwan. “This NT$ 60 billion worth of equipment of yours is meant to fight our enemies, not to fight your fellow Taiwanese” discursively exploits the pronouns

725 Ibid.
“yours”, “our” and “your” to expose shifting identities and loyalties and invite the troops’ commanders to recognise that “our enemies” means Beijing, since that is the only threat to Taipei’s sovereignty.

Before Kaohsiung, Chiang Ching-kuo had stated “we cannot afford dissent,” reinforcing the Free China “realis” aim of retaining power. Yet, Premier Sun had aluded to Free China “idealis” representations, implying that the ROC was not liberal enough: “if we are to unite with China, then in politics the mainland must follow the example of Taipei.” Yet, at Kaohsiung, Lu Hsiu-lien (later, the DPP legislator Anette Lu) suggests that it is not Taipei that should serve as a model for Beijing but the protestors in Kaohsiung who represent the liberal norms that the ROC merely claims to aspire to:

Premier Sun said that in politics the mainland should learn from Taipei. We all understand quite clearly what he means by this. But when I think of this meeting here tonight, it seems to me that the Chinese Communists should not be learning from Taipei, but they should be learning from Kaohsiung! … Article 11 of the Constitution of the Republic of China reads as follows: “The people shall have freedom of speech, teaching … and publication.” They have “freedom of assembly, and of association.”

Although freedom of speech, assembly and association were the pretexts, Taiwanese nationalism and ascription of norms of popular sovereignty to that Taiwanese-ness were also implicit in Lu’s speech. Rallying the protestors, she ridiculed watching KMT elites and warned CPP elites through a rebuke to the troops that invoked Free China “idealis” norms to legitimate Taiwanese ones by oscillating between the two identities:

Dear fellow Taiwanese … all you people with a conscience and with compassion … The founder of our nation, Sun Yat-sen once said: “People’s rights don’t fall from heaven, you have to fight for them.” … Dear members of the security police … You

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726 Ibid 43
727 Ibid: 43.
are human beings too. You are Taiwanese … Today you have already gone against many of President Chiang Ching-kuo’s own teachings. Your behavior today has been very violent. You have brought disgrace to Prime Minister Sun’s words [to the Chinese Communists]: “In politics learn from Taipei” … and you have made him lose face [and] you will make the people on the other side of the Taiwan Straits laugh … You are not counterattacking the mainland. Rather, you are providing the communists with good propaganda! … But without your … uniforms, your hearts are the same as ours, your blood is the same as ours. Please … be Taiwanese too. I can see inside your hearts today … perhaps you are being deceived. It doesn’t matter. The taxes of eighteen million Taiwanese people should not be used to trample our Taiwanese people, but rather against those on the other side of the Taiwan Straits. 728

This speech constitutes a shift in state-identity perception. It articulates the Meilidao protestors’ productive power to legitimate the protestors’ cause and change the structure (q.v. 3.2.4.). In accusing the troops of disloyalty in not adhering to Free China “idealis”, Lu rebukes the ROC as hypocritical. Taiwanese protestors in the crowd would perceive this as a legitimation of a Taiwanese identity, while the KMT would perceive it as a taìdu threat to its security.

The Meilidao activists repeatedly use the trope of “freedom” in contradistinction to the Free China articulation, making “freedom” linguistically contested. For the ROC, to be free is to sanction Free China “idealis”; for Meilidao, it is to refuse Free China “realis” and “idealis”. The introduction of Taiwanese nationalism at Kaohsiung delegitimizes Free China, full stop. From this point, the Three Principles cannot save the ROC. Rather, liberal democratic norms must do so in Taiwanisation.

Power requires state capture. In discursively attempting to align the ROC to Taiwan, Lu Hsiu-lien articulates the greater discursive power of the dangwai to claim legitimacy in referencing the KMT’s 1965 claim that taìdu forces were simply an irritant compared to the Communist Chinese: “Possibly the authorities of Taiwan may feel that we outside the Party are a nuisance. But unlike them, we rely upon

words, not guns. Does this not make us superior?"729 She appeals to solidarity and popular sovereignty, refers to the mainland Chinese threat and refuses the ROC’s legitimacy to represent Taiwan by repeated rhetorical questions:

How are we going to be able to talk about a peaceful solution? What capability do we have to discuss weighty matters of international affairs? I ask you, who is qualified to represent our eighteen million people and negotiate a peaceful solution? Who is qualified to represent us and fight for our rights? Has the KMT government the full legal authority to represent the opinions of the eighteen million Taiwanese people? Please answer me! Can the present members of the National Assembly and of the Legislative Yuan represent us? Can the members of the Provincial Assembly and the five wan [yuan - branches of government] represent the eighteen million people of Taiwan?730

The Meilidao leaders were tried by a military court. Before the trial, Premier Sun chillingly attempted to reassert the legitimacy of Free China “realis” through an implicit threat: “the Kaohsiung Incident involved nothing but a handful of radicals who acted beyond the bounds of democracy. Our handling of the incident will teach them the real meaning of democracy”.731 Yet, the trial itself delegitimated the ROC domestically and internationally. The KMT crackdown after Kaohsiung lasted until 1985. During that time, however, a number of civic groups arose to challenge the ROC.732 The end of martial law in 1987 came as a co-constitutive process involving public demonstrations, the KMT and liberal academics. By liberalising, the ROC was able to survive and maintain its independence when it pivoted to Beijing after 1987. The DPP was founded on 28 September 1986 by dangwai activists and the KMT let it stand. The press made it public. On 5th October 1986, Chiang Ching-kuo told the KMT Central Standing Committee:

729 Ibid: 36.
730 Ibid: 41. The term wan is used in the original.
731 Ibid: 50.
Times are changing, circumstances are changing, and the tide is changing. To meet these changes, the ruling party must push reforms according to new ideas, new methods, and based on constitutional democracy. Only so will our party be able to move with the tide and to be with the people all the time.\textsuperscript{733}

Rather than a failed bottom-up attempt by Taiwanese interest groups to influence Taipei’s relations with China, Kaohsiung may be seen as a key event in the dismantling of Free China. Chapter three explains it as the intersubjective domestic construction of a Wendtian corporate state identity prior to first contact with China. Meilidao activists co-constituted huadu by synthesising taidu and Free China “idealis” conceptualisations. A single political event threatened the ROC’s security, becoming integral to state identity change. The Taiwanese political speech data indicates a macro-discursive continuity from pre-1987 to post-1987. The Meilidao leaders’ speech is an articulation of this, incorporated into the corpus and the canon of Taiwanese political speech and passing up to the discourse.

6.5. Conclusion

This chapter has shown how sinification and bentuhua built and dismantled Free China, legitimating Taiwan’s de facto independence in the status quo in the process. It has argued that bentuhua resolved the authoritarian ROC’s second crisis of legitimacy in liberalisation and state identity change. The KMT’s 1950s defensive realist needs and the myth of ROC-led tongyi necessitated economic reconsolidation and sinification to ensure ROC survival. However, state identity became dislocated through isolation from the metropolis. ROC power was clear under martial law, yet it lacked legitimacy. The Party-State attempted to maintain legitimacy by instrumentally deploying Free China “idealis”, but more saliently through Free China “realis”. There was no effective civil society until the dangwai. The TIM was

\textsuperscript{733} Quoted in Harrison. 2006: 160
ineffective. KMT military, financial and organisational power maintained control over other sectors. But, KMT land reform ensured *benshengren* support. Zhongli, then Kaohsiung shifted legitimacy from Chinese to Taiwanese, but the ROC reasserted itself to appropriate *bentuhua* and change state identity. The next chapter accounts for the nucleation of *huadu* in domestic and cross-Strait politics.
Chapter 7: The Nucleation of *huadu*: The End of Martial Law and Democratisation

Democratisation is simply Taiwanisation.\(^{734}\)

### 7.1 Introduction

This chapter does the following: first, it shows how post-1987 ROC identity change in domestic and cross-Strait power politics (q.v. 7.1.) led to a flexible and tentative *huadu* in the 1992 Consensus (q.v. 7.2.). Second, it relates how *huadu* was embedded and achieved domestic sanction under the KMT and DPP in democratic politics between 1992 and 2008 (q.v. 7.3. and 7.4.). Third, it shows how Beijing also sanctioned *huadu*, implicitly affording Taipei the legitimacy that it formally denies (q.v. 7.5).

The chapter concludes that the ending of martial law in 1987 and subsequent democratisation and cross-Strait relations prompted a profound reassessment of ROC identity that led to the nucleation of *huadu* (q.v. 7.6). The ROC’s loss of legitimacy had sown the seeds of *taidu*, but domestic and cross-Strait politics meant *taidu* was misconceived in terms of Taiwan’s relations with the PRC. Cross-Strait relations shifted the state identity dimension from a domestic ROC (China)-Taiwan one to a cross-Strait PRC (China)-Taiwan one with the ROC becoming Taiwan. The ROC’s pivot to the PRC as Taiwan meant *taidu*’s pivot from the ROC to the PRC was problematic. The PRC had an irredentist claim to Taiwan, but Taipei did not seek independence from Beijing. Hence, it sought to deflect the PRC’s irredentist claim by rejecting both *tongyi* and *taidu* and maintaining the cross-Strait status quo in *huadu*. Taipei did this by appealing to liberal democratic normative representations.

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\(^{734}\) Lan,Yiping. 1983: 11-12.
To define Taiwan’s democracy, this study adopts Jacobs’ (2012; 2017) definition of liberal democracy as a political system in which people regularly choose their leaders freely and peacefully and make opposition in government with freedom of speech, press freedom and equality before the law. It does not make any normative claims around liberal democracy. Rather, it recognises the legitimating power of Taipei’s appeal to it.

7.2 Cross-Strait Identity Change

In 1988, the KMT elite began to extract itself from Free China through democratic reform. When Lee Teng-hui became ROC president and KMT chairman that year, the KMT was already Taiwanese in terms of membership and elite constitution. Believing that the KMT had to identify with Taiwan to survive in a democratic system, Lee developed a more inclusive, civic politics to counter exclusive Taiwanese nationalism. He co-opted the KMT elite in appointing the waishengren KMT general and defence minister, Hau Pei-tsun, as Premier in 1990. In this way, he neutralised the conservative Mainlander feizhulipai, or anti-mainstream KMT faction, that had organised against him. Hau refused to carry out a coup against Lee and thus Lee’s democratic, Taiwanese-oriented mainstream faction, or zhulipai, maintained power and instituted constitutional reforms that changed ROC identity. In 1994, Lee stated:

Anybody facing the enthusiastic competition of party politics in Taiwan, if they cannot sincerely identify with Taiwan as the paramount objective, definitely cannot survive.

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735 Jacobs, Bruce. 2012: 5
738 Hughes, Christopher. 2011.: 5
739 Hughes, Christopher. 2011: 6.
Moreover, there are priorities. The reasoning is plain to see. If you go beyond identifying with Taiwan, and just strive to identify with something at an even higher level, the result must definitely be the loss of both. 740

By shifting between inclusion and exclusion in addressing tongyi-identifying pan-Blue elites, using the words “anybody”, “they” and “you”, Lee implies that these elites risk losing the legitimacy to represent both China and Taiwan (“something at an even higher level…losing both”) in a realm and social constituency that identifies with Taiwan. It is unclear whether Lee is promoting taidu at this point; however, in the context of rapidly developing cross-Strait relations and domestic electioneering Lee is responding not only to elite SIPs, but also to demands from civil society, articulated by competing DIGs. 741 Huadu is thus co-constituted in tongyi-taidu contestation and the ROC made to identify with Taiwan. ROC institutional changes in response to cross-Strait contact constituted huadu by creating a bureaucratic mechanism for cross-Strait relations. They functioned to ascribe a new state identity to the ROC. In October 1990, Lee Teng-hui set up the National Unification Council (NUC); this included KMT and former dangwai DPP elites. This was followed in January 1991 by the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), with Ma Ying-jeou as head. In February 1991, the MAC created the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF), a “white-glove” quango to enable “unofficial” cross-Strait contact. The National Unification Guidelines (NUGs) constituted the guiding principles for Lee’s mainland policy. Later, Lee was to confirm that the NUC and NUGs were simply strategic proto-tongyi moves designed to outwit the KMT old guard and consolidate his position. 742

In practical terms, however, the NUGs set tongyi as a long-term objective contingent on the Mainland’s “political democratisation and economic liberalisation”. In this regard, they became a consensual “document sustaining the status quo”. As such, the NUGs constituted a thin huadu (q.v. 1.5). That is, a sovereign, independent ROC state became the locus of One China.

The KMT constituted huadu in democracy by pursuing a policy that secured the status quo. That is, it actively resisted both tongyi and taidu, legitimating itself as sufficiently Taiwanese in its realm and constituency. During the 1991 National Assembly elections, its discourse shifted from “Unite China under the Three Principles of the People” to “reform, security and prosperity” and “Be Taiwan’s masters! Elect your own president!” TV adverts depicted a Chinese soldier arriving in Taiwan in 1949 and not being understood by a local Taiwanese family; fast forward to 1991 and they are all smiling and criticising the DPP in Taiwan-accented Mandarin. The DPP was unable to block the KMT’s constitutional reforms and it moved away from taidu towards the status quo, sanctioning huadu in the process.

In this way, huadu extended its subject social constituency within its realm.

ROC institutional changes between 1987 and 1992 nucleated huadu in state identity change. In 1991, the KMT secured the ROC and huadu through constitutional reform. In institutionalising The Free Area of the Republic of China as coterminous with the Taiwan Area, Lee Teng-hui legitimated huadu and delegitimated both tongyi and taidu in one move. In April 1991, the National Assembly passed the Additional

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743 Su Chi. 2009: 5.
744 Ibid: 5.
745 Hughes, Christopher, 1997: 71
747 Hughes, Christopher. 1997: 73.
Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of China, including the Termination of the Period of General Mobilization for the Suppression of the Communist Rebellion and the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and Mainland Area. This had two effects; first, it completed the ending of martial law and, second, it changed the ROC’s definition of the Mainland from a “bandit group” to an equal part of China. This move fundamentally changed ROC identity, changed Chiang Ching-kuo’s Three Noes (q.v. 1.3.1.) and implicitly entailed ROC recognition of the PRC. At the start of the 1990s, then, ROC constitutional change formalised cross-Strait relations as huadu. In effect, Taiwan had declared its de facto independence and recognised the PRC. Without huadu’s nucleation in this process, there could be no cross-Strait relations.

With regard to whether huadu is essentially a “Two Chinas” policy, this study’s separation of semantic meaning from pragmatic meaning explains the puzzle. The policy documents referred to here semantically encode “One China” as the Republic of China. Yet, their tacit recognition of the PRC’s governing authority on the mainland and the ROC’s actual authority within the Taiwan Area in fact creates a “Two Chinas” puzzle. The solution to the puzzle is pragmatic. That is, although the ROC constitution does not permit “Two Chinas” or “One-China-One-Taiwan”, these documents pragmatically encode the ROC as Taiwan only under the legal artefact of the ROC. In other words, these documents permit observers to read Taiwan into the ROC by exploiting the illocutionary-perlocutionary gap between what is meant and what is understood. In this way, these documents create space for a huadu discourse that takes on a life of its own and permit de facto diplomatic relations between China (PRC) and Taiwan (ROC).

7.3 The 1992 Consensus: One China Respective Interpretations

ROC identity change in cross-Strait relations required elite agency. The period of identity change between May 1987 and August 1992 was accompanied by nine highly secret meetings between PRC and ROC elites. Functional matters aside, Taipei sought to convince Beijing that Lee did not advocate *taidu*. ROC envoys were under Lee’s direct orders; Taipei was autocratic, while Beijing operated on CCP policy consensus.749 However, the 1992 Koo-Wang Talks in Hong Kong, the first SEF-ARATS open talks, broke down on sovereignty in the context of the One-China principle. The resolution came down to the issue of text and its discursive interpretation. In August 1992, the NUC issued a *Definition of One China Resolution*. It stated:

>The two sides of the Taiwan Strait uphold the One China Principle, but the interpretations of the two sides are different…Our side believes that One China should mean the Republic of China, established in 1912 and existing today, and its sovereignty extends throughout China, but its current governing authority is only over Taiwan...Admittedly, Taiwan is a part of China, but the mainland is also a part of China.750

A semantic reading of this text is minimally ambiguous; the locus of One China is the state, not the nation, and that state is the ROC. Taiwan and the mainland are part of the ROC and “current governing authority” implies that the ROC is a provisional government that aspires to de jure sovereignty over all of China. However, the context of constitutional change and ROC Taiwanisation invites another pragmatic reading; “current governing authority” is also a provisional status that encodes Taiwan’s de facto independence as the ROC, restricted to the Taiwan Area. That is the status quo. This permits interpretive slippage and discursive change in *huadu*.

749 Ibid: 10-12.

According to Su Chi (2009), this wording “represented Taiwan’s internal consensus” (that is, its elite consensus) and gave Taiwan “maximum negotiating power”.\textsuperscript{751} On 3\textsuperscript{rd} November 1992, in the wake of the collapse of the Hong Kong talks, the SEF proposed that each side state its position verbally to break the impasse; Taipei then verbally reaffirmed the NUC resolution. On 16\textsuperscript{th} November, ARATS sent a formal letter stating it “fully respects and accepts your Foundation’s suggestion”, adding:

both sides of the Strait uphold the principle of One China, and actively seek national unification, but the political interpretation of the One China principle will not be referred to in the cross-Strait negotiations on functional issues.\textsuperscript{752}

Like *huadu*, therefore, the 1992 Consensus is a discourse without a written definitional text. First, there was no official document and, in diplomatic terms, it represented simply an “exchange of notes”; second, it has no legal standing, but was a “perfectly simple and appropriate description of the mutual views expressed”.\textsuperscript{753} Third, the term One-China-Respective-Interpretations (OCRI) did not appear in the verbal text, yet they discursively summarise the intention of the text. Fourth, the substance of the consensus was that while Taipei’s wording, “Taiwan and China are both parts of China”, implied parity, Beijing’s “Taiwan is a part of China” implied a subordinate relationship. Because of the commonality of “One China”, the existence of the NUG and the secret negotiation channels however, Beijing was confident that Taipei would not declare *taidu*.\textsuperscript{754} It allowed functional talks to go ahead. However, the discursive power of the 1992 Consensus and OCRI is clear. It is the ROC constitutional changes and attendant texts followed by the 1992 Consensus that legitimated Taiwan’s de facto independence in *huadu* as OCRI. This represents a thin

\textsuperscript{751} Ibid: 13.
\textsuperscript{753} Su, Chi. 2009: 14-15.
\textsuperscript{754} Ibid: 15-16.
huadu (q.v. 1.5.) and Beijing’s sanction means that huadu – as Taipei’s state identity – had expanded its realm to the cross-Strait arena and its social constituency to a non-subject Other.

Taiwan’s elites see the 1992 Consensus as “a point of departure for assessing where things are now”. That is, the 1992 Consensus delegitimates taidu and tongyi and legitimates huadu. While pan-Blue and pan-Green micro-interpretations clash, both camps implicitly recognise it, bringing their potential taidu and tongyi constituencies with them. For the KMT and the CCP, it is a “basis of trust”. By contrast, while for the DPP the 1992 Consensus is an agreement between the CCP and the KMT for which there is no legal basis, the party acknowledges it in substance. The 1992 Consensus enjoys “the beauty of ambiguity”. In this sense, for Su Chi “confusion represents safety” provides for strategic ambiguity, political confidence and security-building mechanisms. It also permits mutual non-denial between cross-Strait institutions, allowing formal political talks to be deferred in favour of de facto state-to-state relations. Yet, as shown in Chapter 5, such ambiguous language carries implicit threat (q.v. 5.1.) and Beijing’s recognition of huadu’s threat to its security (q.v. 4.6.3.) became apparent as relations progressed.

Despite the DPP’s refusal formally to accept the 1992 Consensus in 2016 and Beijing’s breaking off of cross-Strait talks, Taiwan’s elites agree that the logic of the 1992 Consensus is the default option. That is, the status quo secures Taiwan’s de facto independence. In 2000, Chen Shui-bian’s inauguration speech alluded to the spirit of the 1992 Consensus and Tsai Ing-wen repeated the term. Both have used the term “ROC”. Tsai’s 2012 and 2016 cross-Strait policy platform was that the ROC is

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555 Huang, Chin-hao and James, Patrick. 2014. 678.
556 Su, Chi. 2009: 15.
557 Ibid: 15-16.
Taiwan’s state and the prevailing pan-Green domestic coalition that delegitimated KMT rule between 2014 and 2016 adheres to and seeks to defend that stance.  

7.4 Lee Teng-hui’s Discursive Construction of *huadu*

While the 1992 Consensus provided a stop-gap that secured the status quo, subsequent competing definitions of One China by Beijing and Taipei changed *huadu’s* meaning. Beijing noted *bentuhua’s* reconstitution of the ROC and it reiterated the One-China Principle in its seminal 1993 policy statement, *The Taiwan Question and the Reunification of China*: “there is only one China in the world, Taiwan is an inalienable part of China and the seat of China's central government is in Beijing”. Taipei sought to reassert the ROC’s expanded realm and social constituency while not provoking Beijing, stating that while Taiwan and the mainland were both Chinese territory, “it is an undeniable fact that the two have been divided and ruled separately since 1949”. Its description of China as an entity with “multifaceted geographical, political, historical, and cultural meanings” was a clear attempt to break the link between the ROC and the mainland and to redefine *huadu* as the thicker, cultural version in Chapter 1 (q.v. 1.5.).

Beijing perceived a threat, but Lee Teng-hui’s articulation of a civic ROC identity meant he was able to respond to domestic interests at a time of relative military advantage while not provoking either Beijing or pro-*tongyi* KMT elites. In December 1991, Lee stated “we cannot break our relations with the rest of the Chinese people, nor can we cut our links with Chinese culture”, reminding Taiwan that its interests

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758 Huang and James. 2014: 680
760 Mainland Affairs Council. 1993. *There is no 'Taiwan Question' There is Only a 'China Question': views on the Chinese Communists' white paper "The Taiwan question and reunification of China": 4.
lay not in alienating the island from Chinese culture. His use of the presuppositional trigger “the rest of” invites Taiwanese to identify as Chinese too and appropriates Free China “idealism” tropes (“unify the country”; “revive the nation”; “Three Principles”) to secure the Taiwanese nation’s survival. As Lee explained:

Identify with Taiwan, cherish Taiwan, struggle hard for Taiwan; that is a Taiwanese; do not give up the hard work and hope of unifying the country and reviving the nation (minzu); that is Chinese . . . This view of identity is the understanding that “with survival is hope; only with survival is there development”. Only by advocating this view of identity can the nationalism of the Three Principles of the People serve the new significance of the age.

For Lee, the survival of the ROC is paramount, yet he invokes both bentuhua and sinification instrumentally to rearticulate Free China “idealism” as huadu.

While adhering to Renan’s doctrine of nation-state congruence in his constitutional reforms, Lee appealed to liberal democracy as grounds for nationhood. Within constraints, Lee developed a civic huadu. By August 1991, Lee was able to suggest “grafting the concept of Gemeinschaft onto traditional Chinese family ethics”. This shares Peng Ming-min’s (1964) proposition that a political community arises when citizens identify with the state. Lee developed this as locating sovereignty in the people:

The establishment of the ideal of sovereignty in the people is to stir up every citizen to use his consciousness of being master of his own country (guojia), contributing his wisdom and strength, realizing the respect that should be given to a complete individual.

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765 Lee Teng-hui, ‘From Uncertainty to Pragmatism’. In Creating the Future: 117. The term ‘shengming gongtong’ is translated into English using the German term, Gemeinschaft. Of course, the German term is simply ‘Community’ as in Europaische Gemeinschaft.
And the cohesion of a Gemeinschaft, is to mutually integrate the free will of the individual with the whole wealth and good of society, to establish a civilized society with individual freedom, social harmony and prosperity.⁷⁶⁶

Lee's Gemeinschaft rejects cleansing Taiwan of Chinese influence; rather, the state should encourage a pluralistic identity:

Among the 21 million people in Taiwan, there are aboriginals, and there are the compatriots who have come from the mainland over several hundred years. Between us, there should be no argument about ethnic division. We are all Chinese. Only identify with Taiwan, give your heart to preserving and developing Taiwan, no matter what ethnic group, no matter whether you came to Taiwan early or late, then all are Taiwanese.⁷⁶⁷

Lee names Taiwan as a polity. His articulation of Chinese, however, is not a political one linked to the PRC (zhongguo). Rather, “Chinese” (huaren) is a pan-Chinese cultural category into which Taiwanese can slot as “Australian” might slot into “English-speaking” or “Anglo”. Lee invited the ROC’s social constituency to identify politically with a Taiwanised ROC. Overall, this identity rested on full participation in democracy by all citizens of the Taiwan Area based on a social contract.⁷⁶⁸

In 1994, in an interview with a Japanese journalist, Lee spoke of “the sorrow of being born Taiwanese”. He lamented that “until today, all those who have held power in Taiwan have been foreign regimes”.⁷⁶⁹ Beijing read it as reflecting a sinophobic, taidu mindset. Pan-Green, taidu-leaning constituencies read it as

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⁷⁶⁶ Speech to KMT conference held to examine performance in the elections for provincial governor and city mayors. Full text in Zhongguo shibao (China Times), 31 December 1994.
⁷⁶⁸ Hughes, Christopher. 2011: 10
*bentuhua* sentiment. The PRC claimed Lee lacked the “sentiments of a Chinese”. In June 1995, Lee made a private visit to Cornell University, where he gave a speech entitled “The Longing of the People is Always in my Heart”. The visit was followed by high profile” vacation diplomacy”. This in turn encouraged pro-*taidu* constituencies to assert an exclusive Taiwanese ethnic identity. Lee manipulated this polarisation to mobilise support. In September 1995, he challenged those who did not want to contribute to Taiwan to “emigrate quickly”. Beijing launched a propaganda campaign against Lee in the run-up to the 1996 presidential election; polarisation among ethnic and interest groups became marked. Yet, Lee was ambivalent on how Taiwanese the ROC was when he exhorted competing constituencies to “contribute” and “identify with” Taiwan. By invoking *taidu* through a thicker *huadu* he was able implicitly to threaten Beijing before rowing back to a thinner *huadu*. The DPP rejected the One-China Principle, opposed cross-Strait trade and demanded the PRC "treat Taiwan as an equal”. Yet, they took the broad *huadu* position that Taiwan was already independent, so *taidu* was unnecessary unless the PRC attacked.

Non-aligned pan-Blue elites supported the One-China Principle and supported deeper cross-Strait links, claiming that Lee had abandoned *tongyi*. In 1996, Beijing perceived Lee’s *huadu* stance as backdoor *taidu* and China fired missiles in the Taiwan Strait to deter Taiwanese voters from voting for Lee. Taiwan responded by electing Lee, thus legitimating *huadu*, even though the concept remained unarticulated as such.

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772 Hughes, Christopher 2011: 15
In 1998, in supporting the *waishengren* KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou as Taipei mayor, Lee’s explicit articulation of a New Taiwanese, or *xin taiwanren*, civic identity gave *huadu* more national substance:

Today, all of us who have grown up and lived together on this island are Taiwanese… [H]ow to transform our love of Taiwan and our feelings towards our compatriots into specific action… is the mission of every New Taiwanese.773

In response, Ma stated “I am a New Taiwanese who has grown up drinking Taiwan water and eating Taiwan rice.”774 New Taiwanese was a KMT trope that aimed electorally to counter the DPP, but it drew on broader *bentuhua* discourses.775 By combining *waishengren* and *benshengren* identities into a common civic national one, Lee averted ethnic strife and in the process constituted a liberal-democratic ROC.

In 1999, in an interview with the German public broadcaster, *Deutsche Welle*, Lee articulated a *Two State Theory*, arguing that ROC constitutional amendments had altered Taiwan’s sovereign status:

The Beijing authorities ignore … that the two sides are two different jurisdictions and that the Chinese mainland continues to pose a military threat against us… the Chinese communist regime … has never ruled Taiwan … the legitimacy of the rule of the country comes from the mandate of the Taiwan people and has nothing to do with the people on the mainland … the 1992 constitutional amendments determine that the reconfigured national agencies represent only the people of the Taiwan Area….the 1991 constitutional amendments have designated cross-strait relations as a state-to-state relationship or at least a special state-to-state relationship, rather than an internal relationship. Thus, the Beijing authorities' characterization of Taiwan as a "renegade province" is historically and legally untrue.776

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773 Lee Teng-hui, quoted in Harrison, Mark. 2006: 197.
776 Taiwan Documents Project. n.d. Interview of Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui with *Deutsche Welle* radio, 9 July 1999. [online] Available at: [http://www.taiwande.org/nws-9926.htm](http://www.taiwande.org/nws-9926.htm) [Accessed 7 December 2011].
In linguistic terms, it is not so much Lee’s phrases “state-to-state” and “special state-to-state relationship” that legitimate huadu, even though that is what is most picked up on in the literature and, indeed, what Beijing pointed to in perceiving the statement as a threat - although this did not prevent Beijing linguistically relaxing the One China principle (q.v. 7.5.). These terms are Lee’s parsing of the facts and the Chinese term “special” (teshu) is a common euphemism meaning “different” or that means the speaker does not want to specify its meaning in detail. Rather, it is the idea of Taiwan as a sovereign state entailed in the terms “Taiwan Area” and “the country” juxtaposed co-textually with “the Taiwan people” in opposition to “the people on the mainland” that causes the presupposition that Taiwan is not China to pass up to the discourse. Furthermore, although he does not mention it and the term had not yet been coined as such, it is reasonable to assume that Lee has in mind the wording of what was to become the 1992 Consensus (the actual term was coined and applied retroactively by Su Chi in 2000). In this sense, Lee’s micro-discourse takes on a broader macro-discourse without explicitly referencing it (q.v. 5.2.1.).

In terms of the ROC’s state identity, Lee did not discard unification. However:

the Republic of China has been a sovereign state since it was founded in 1912. Moreover, [because of] the special state-to-state relationship...there is no need to declare independence. The resolution of cross-strait issues hinges on ...different systems. We cannot look at issues ... simply from the perspective of unification or independence.... the ROC has become the first democracy in the Chinese community (zhonghua).777

This statement legitimates huadu in terms of the “special” nature of cross-Strait relations. He locates huadu in Taiwan’s “different system”, thus legitimating the ROC’s democratic identity and delegitimating tongyi and taidu. Lee went on to lay down the policy line in “We want to maintain the status quo, and maintain peace

777 Ibid.
with Beijing on this foundation”.

The deictic “we” in relation to the status quo and Beijing powerfully implies Taiwan’s sovereign status and separateness from China, regardless of Lee’s implicative use of the verb “want” with “maintain”. Lee’s “Two States Theory” may be read semantically as thin huadu located in the ROC. However, there is clearly ample scope for discursive slippage to a thick huadu. It is the latter that justifies any suggestion that Beijing may have read it pragmatically as implying the threat of taïdu (q.v. 7.5.).

7.5 Huadu in Democratic Politics

7.5.1 The DPP’s Sanction of huadu

The DPP began openly promoting taïdu in 1991, before the ROC’s scrapping of the sedition laws in 1992. Yet, subsequently, it implicitly legitimated the KMT’s thin huadu by supporting its constitutional reforms. This led to cooperation as the KMT Taiwanised under Lee Teng-hui. As huadu nucleated around the status quo, the DPP and KMT converged on the status quo, despite elite policy statements that were perceived as supporting taïdu or tongyi. For instance, while pan-Green DIGs prevented Taipei restarting cross-Strait dialogue under the one-China Principle, in December 1996, the former DPP chairman and Meilidao political prisoner, Shih Ming-teh, joined with KMT and New Party delegates in a multi-party National Development Conference. Shih argued, “it is unnecessary to declare Taiwan Independence” because Taiwan is already an independent state. This constituted implicit sanction of a broad huadu position by a known taïdu-supporting elite and former Meilidao dissident. Granted, DIG preferences were a factor; the DPP had performed poorly in 1994’s provincial and municipal elections on a slogan of “build an independent nation” (duli jianguo) and switched to “renovate and protect Taiwan”.

778 Ibid.
(gexin baotai). Shih’s articulation proposed that Taiwan “need only preserve the existing international situation in order to maintain its sovereignty and independence”. Even the staunchly taidu DPP New Tide faction changed its position in line with Shih. Its leader, Lin Cho-shui, responded with his own slogan, “in sovereignty, we already are independent, but we have yet to build a nation”. Such instrumental discursive changes transformed the DPP from a taidu party to a huadu party by 1996. Yet, it is clear that huadu meant different things to different actors. Neither Beijing nor the DPP’s deep-Green constituency acknowledged this at that point. In May 1999, the DPP passed a Resolution on Taiwan’s Future, which asserted that Taiwan was “a sovereign and independent country” formally called the ROC and was not part of the PRC. At its 9th National Congress in 2001, the party amended the Resolution to allow “room for the party to re-interpret the so-called (sic) “Taiwan Independence clause” to give “flexibility in reacting to mainstream policy changes” and that "the latter resolution's effect supersedes the previous one". In prioritising the 1999 Resolution over the Independence Clause, the DPP sanctioned huadu and the ROC. Yet, whether this is thin or thick huadu is unclear. Although the Resolution locates huadu in the ROC and not a cultural China, shifting from “the ROC is independent” to “Taiwan is independent and is currently called the ROC” tests the line between thin and thick huadu (q.v. 1.5).

The compromise nature of Taipei’s cross-Strait investment policies, which saw competing DIGs perceiving Chinese threat differently, served to maintain huadu. Pro


and anti-convergence DIGs were not neatly divided on partisan or national lines. Thus, some pan-Green interests favoured economic convergence, while some favoured taifu.781 This facilitated alignment on the status quo, and it played out in DIG lobbying through intra-DPP factional struggle between the New Tide faction and Formosa factions. The compromise policy of Strong Base, Westward Advance became the DPP’s platform, combining the New Tide’s desire for a stronger Taiwanese business identity with the Formosa faction’s platform of greater economic integration with China.782 Westward Advance was predicated on the liberal prediction that economic links would secure Taiwan’s sovereignty by upgrading Taiwan’s economy and shifting low-value production to China. Rather than absorbing Taiwan into China, increased trade would make cross-Strait relations inter-state. In this context, cultural links simply made the island the logical source for FDI in China; would socialise China into liberal international norms and align Taiwan with globalisation.783

The New Tide faction called Westward Advance dangerously naïve in a neorealist system characterised by the BoP and a clear Chinese threat; economic integration would lead to political talks with China. National security would be best ensured through diplomacy and improvement of Taiwan’s investment environment. Increasing economic integration would threaten even thin huadu, blurring Taipei’s state identity with Beijing’s in the minds of the electorate. The DPP’s main job, therefore, was top-down strengthening of Taiwan’s civic identity.784 Strong Base,

783 Ibid.
*Westward Advance* represented a DPP consensus that adhered to the policies and principles that the KMT had developed under Lee. The logical position on the sovereignty spectrum for the DPP therefore became *huadu* and not *taidu*. Yet, it was cultural, linguistic and trade links with China that served as the most powerful pretext for discursive slippage into a thick *huadu*. *Taishang* interests in China could be framed as non-political, obviating questions of sovereignty.

In power, the DPP initially endorsed the 1992 Consensus. On 26 June 2000, President Chen told William Fuller, CEO of the Asia Foundation "the new administration is willing to accept the consensus reached by the SEF and the ARATS prior to the talks, which is 'one China with respective interpretations'". The following day, then MAC Minister Tsai Ing-wen stated:

> the two sides are willing to address the controversy over the 'one China' issue by allowing each side to make oral interpretations and statements, which has become the actual process of reaching the cross-Strait consensus. The so-called 'one China with respective interpretations' is the term used to describe this process. 785

Later that year, Tsai addressed the LY, stating "our position is to respectively interpret 'one China".

7.5.2 Embedding *huadu* 2000-2008

Lee left the Presidency after the DPP’s election victory in 2000, was expelled from the KMT and moved to a *taidu* position in the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU). Yet, his construction of *huadu* and cautious but constructive cross-Strait policy are clear

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785 Mainland Affairs Council. Republic of China (Taiwan). 1992 Consensus: The Key to cross-Strait Peace and Prosperity. [online] Available at: [http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/MMO/MAC%E6%91%BA%E9%A0%81-%E8%8B%B1(%E5%AE%9A%E7%A8%BF%E7%89%88).pdf](http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/MMO/MAC%E6%91%BA%E9%A0%81-%E8%8B%B1(%E5%AE%9A%E7%A8%BF%E7%89%88).pdf) [Accessed 20 May 2016].
in Chen’s 2000 and 2004 inauguration speeches. In the 2000 speech, Chen framed the ROC in terms of liberal values while appropriating the title of Mao Zedong’s 1949 speech “China Stands Up”, proclaiming “Taiwan stands up” and “the country belongs to its people (renmin)”. He calls for “leaders on both sides” to uphold “democracy and parity”, implying that Taipei seeks state-like equality with Beijing. His assertion that “we believe leaders on both sides possess enough wisdom and creativity to jointly deal with the question of a future one China” is a Gricean implicature that challenges Beijing to come to the negotiating table while remaining non-committal on the meaning of “One China”. In this way, huadu’s meaning is left open, yet Beijing’s failure to respond linguistically confirmed Chen’s implication that Beijing’s leaders lacked cooperative statecraft, thus accruing sanction for Taipei internationally.

In the speech, Chen locates the difference between China and Taiwan in separate post-1895 political experiences rather than culture. Most saliently, he states that as the “popularly elected president of the Republic of China”:

I must abide by the Constitution, maintain the sovereignty, dignity and security of our country, and ensure the well-being of all citizens. Therefore, as long as the CCP regime has no intention to use military force against Taiwan, I pledge that during my term in office, I will not declare independence, I will not change the national title, I will not push forth the inclusion of the so-called "state-to-state" description in the Constitution,

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and I will not promote a referendum to change the status quo in regard to the question of independence or unification.787

In downplaying cultural differences and highlighting political ones, Chen might be seen as articulating a thick hua. Yet, his securing of ROC institutions averts taidu and actually signals a thin hua, potentially reassuring Beijing. By not declaring Taiwan’s independence from the ROC and referring to “our country” and “all citizens”, the ROC remains the semantic locus of One China. Yet, the discursive context affirms that the mainland is not included in the scope of “our country” and “all citizens” in a pragmatic sense. It suggests Taiwan cannot declare independence from the PRC, because the PRC has never governed it and it does not need to declare independence from the ROC because it is the ROC. The ROC’s identity change legitimates its sovereign status. In the 2000 speech, Chen mentions the ROC nine times and Taiwan 50 times. China is mentioned twice – once as a nation, but in categorical opposition to Taiwan, and implicated as a colonial aggressor when Chen says “over the past one hundred plus years, China has suffered imperialist aggression, which left indelible wounds. Taiwan has had an even sadder fate, tormented by brute force and colonial rule”. Chen’s use of the cultural Chinese terms huaren and zhonghua instead of the political ones zhongguoren and zhongguode invoke a thicker hua (q.v. 1.5.). When addressing China, Chen uses the exclusive “we”; when addressing Taiwan’s electorate, he uses the inclusive “we” (q.v. 5.4.6.). Both uses invoke solidarity with Taiwan against China. Variations of the word “democracy” are used co-textually with Taiwan 30 times and “freedom” eight times, making salient representations of ROC state identity in terms of hua. Chen’s representations test the line between thin and thick hua.

Chen also uses the same argumentation schemes seen in Ma Ying-jeou’s speech after 2008 when he states:

Chinese people emphasize the difference between statesmanship and hegemony, believing in the philosophy that a government which employs benevolence ‘will please those near and appeal to those from afar,’ and ‘when those from afar will not submit, then one must practice kindness and virtue to attract them.’ Such Chinese wisdom will remain a universal value.788

He mentions “the mainland”, “people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait” and “governments and people on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait”, but cautiously refers to Chinese leaders as “Mr” to avoid ascribing legitimacy, given that he is President of the ROC.789 All of this constructs huadu in the context of Chinese threat. In a December 2000 address in Taiwan, “Bridging the New Century”, Chen appears to revert to a thicker huadu by referring to a cultural China, stating:

the people of Taiwan and China share the same blood, culture and historical background...China’s leaders should take cross-strait economic, trade, and cultural integration as a starting point for gradually building mutual trust...then jointly seek a new framework for permanent peace and political integration between the two sides.790

Pro-taidu interest groups in Taiwan took “political integration” to mean Chen aimed at a variant of One-Country-Two-States (OCTS) in return for peace and prosperity.791 They also claimed Chen’s “wishy-washy statements”, poor practice of democracy, deep-Blue elite refusal to accept the DPP as “the legitimate, democratically-elected

789 Ibid
government” and residual bureaucratic KMT corporatism meant Taiwan’s democracy and taidu might come to nothing.792

It is Chen’s statement in an August 2002 telecast in Hoklo to the annual conference of the World Federation of Taiwanese Associations stating that “with Taiwan and China on each side of the Taiwan Strait, each side is a country” (yi bian, yi guo) that provoked Beijing’s anger again and pleased taidu constituencies.793 This was a departure from his 2000 promise of “Four Noes and One Without” and threatened to elide straight from huadu to taidu.

Yet, in January 2003, at a US think-tank Q&A, Chen switched back to thin huadu, but equated the ROC with Taiwan and not China in seeking the endorsement of the international community:

> The Republic of China is a sovereign state.... The ROC effectively exercises jurisdiction over the islands of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu -- a fact no one can deny...Taiwan is not a part of, a local government of, or a province of any country…We want to emphasize to the international community that, as a sovereign state, the ROC cannot be downgraded, treated as a local government, or marginalized by anyone”.794

By his 2004 inauguration speech, Chen is back to a thick huadu that tests the boundary with taidu by appealing to Taiwan nativism. Taiwan’s de facto sovereignty is the enactment of democracy by the Taiwanese themselves in the context of local culture. Chinese culture is welcome but is not part of Taiwan’s native culture: “allow the establishment of Taiwan’s native culture to naturally connect with the culture of

the Chinese people (*huaren*) and world culture*.\(^{795}\) On October 10, 2004, Chen stated: “the sovereignty of the Republic of China belongs to the 23 million Taiwanese people, the Republic of China is Taiwan, and Taiwan is the Republic of China. This is a fact that no one can deny”.\(^{796}\)

Despite Chen’s 2000 promises, China continued to counter *bentuhua* by influencing power politics in Taiwan, yet sanctioned *huadu* as it shifted from facilitating *tongyi* to preventing *taidu*. The CCP isolated *taidu* activists, but met pan-Blue elites, Lien Chan and James Soong, and wooed the DPP’s core *taidu* constituency and rural pan-Green interests with economic concessions. In response, in 2006, Chen further Taiwanised the ROC institutionally through the *Name Rectification Campaign*, abolishing the ROC’s National Unification Council (NUC) and its unification guidelines (NUGs).\(^{797}\) On the pretext of a PLA missile build-up, he made the announcement at a commemoration of the 2-28 Incident in an emotional address to a *taidu*-leaning constituency during which he intentionally addressed a watching Beijing by asking the Taiwanese crowd in Mandarin, using the diminutive form of his name to create solidarity: “is A-bian wrong? Is A-bian wrong in returning the right to choose their future to the 23 million people of Taiwan?” The rest of his speech was in Hoklo – a direct snub that excluded Beijing, as well as *tongyi* constituencies in Taiwan, from the conversation. Chen claimed the NUC and NUGs, as “products of absurdity rendered in an absurd era … products created in a police state” did not align with Taiwan’s democratic normative representations and sought


\(^{796}\) Su, Chi. 2009: 265.

\(^{797}\) Financial Times. 2006. Interview Transcript: Chen Shui-bian. 2 November 2006. [online] Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/b8af3b80-6a53-11db-8ae5-0000779e2340 [Accessed 2 July 2018].
the sanction of Taiwan’s electorate in stating “I believe most Taiwanese people do not want to continue to accept such an historical absurdity.”

It is clear that both the KMT and Beijing perceived Chen’s articulation of *huadu* as tantamount to *taidu*. The KMT sought to impeach Chen. Beijing responded by criticising him for "leading the nation towards disaster … endangering regional peace" in the "first step toward his goal of achieving de jure independence for Taiwan." The TAO stated: "we will never permit Taiwan Independence and splittist forces under any name or under any form to separate Taiwan from the motherland,"

So, while Beijing provisionally sanctioned a thin *huadu*, it had become clear that this sanction could apply to the thick form as long as de jure independence was not declared (q.v. 1.5.). Indeed, Taipei responded by reassuring Beijing:

> We believe …any change in the status quo must be approved by the people of Taiwan through democratic means such as a referendum…our president has said that Taiwan [is] a sovereign country and there is no need to declare so-called "independence".

Interviewed in the Financial Times, Chen accused Beijing and the KMT of seeking to change the status quo:

> Taiwan is already a sovereign independent country and does absolutely not belong to the People’s Republic of China, is not a part of them, and is not a province of the PRC either. We have a government. We have jurisdiction. We have sovereignty. But they intend to change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait…But Taiwan, the 23m Taiwanese,

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we still want to continue to walk down our own path of democracy, of freedom, of human rights and of peace.800

Yet, Chen explicitly rejected changing the cross-Strait status quo: “Ma’s proposed peace treaty in exchange for no independence and removal of China’s threat would be a surrender treaty because it would change the status quo”.801

Chen’s maintenance of huadu in the face of pressure from taidu and tongyi constituencies legitimated Lee’s inclusive version of identity and the DPP’s Grand Compromise discourse. Taidu and tongyi were delegitimated in the process because of their recourse to ethnic identity politics. Lee’s and Lien Chan’s benshengren factions on the one side and the James Soong’s waishengren faction on the other had split the main KMT and spawned pro-China parties like the People First Party (PFP) that appealed to alienated waishengren.802

On the pan-Green side, Lee’s supporters founded the TSU to “persist in sovereignty and establish a sovereign, independent Taiwan,” to “normalize the Taiwanese state and cross-Strait relations.” 803 The TSU still defined bentuhua inclusively as “identifying with Taiwan, contribution to Taiwan, and being willing to work for Taiwan’s future”.804 Yet, it also maintained that China and Taiwan were separated by politics rather than language and culture.805 At the same time, however, because the TSU threatened Beijing and tongyi, it appealed to a more nativist taidu

800 Financial Times. 2006. Interview Transcript: Chen Shui-bian. 2 November 2006. [online] Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/b8a13b80-6a53-11db-8ae5-0000779e2340 [Accessed 2 July 2018].
801 Ibid.
802 Hughes. 2011: 16
804 Ibid.
805 Ibid.
constituency. Having been elected with only 39% of the vote, Chen was in danger of being outflanked by the TSU on Taiwanisation of the ROC.

During the 2000s, the DPP and the KMT struggled to discard ethnic elements in SIPs in order to promote civic norms. Pan-Blue elites, James Soong and Lien Chan, worked to prove their loyalty to Taiwan in 2004 after the DPP focused on their mainland connections. Chen admitted in his 2004 inauguration speech that the DPP needed to shift away from ethnic SIPs and towards increased *taishang* investment in China while strengthening the ROC’s civic identity. This study does not seek to discuss party positioning in local elections. However, SIPs continued in local elections when Chen portrayed the December 2006 Kaohsiung mayoral election as a struggle between Taiwan and China. Yet, by 2008, the KMT had still not fully shed its Chinese nationalist identity, which had become stronger with Chinese support and because of Chen’s perceived shift to *taidu*. Ethnic politics came to a head within the KMT when the *waishengren* Ma Ying-jeou competed with the *benshengren* Wang Jin-pyng for the KMT party chairmanship and the KMT candidature for the 2008 presidential election. Wang stated in campaigning that many people thought it was not right for an ethnic minority (Chinese) to rule over the majority in Taiwan. So, *huadu* still contained scope for *waishengren-benshengren* ethnic struggle, despite its legitimacy resting on civic norms.

The resilience of *huadu* suggests that bottom-up lobbying did not determine Taipei’s cross-strait policy with regard to its bottom line of retaining de facto independence through the status quo between 1992 and 2008. Most saliently, partisan ideological

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division was most clearly not replicated in the ROC’s cross-Strait policy. The DPP in power did not deploy cross-Strait policies that satisfied pro-\textit{taidu} constituencies while the KMT in power failed to enact policies that fully reflected the desires of \textit{tongyi} constituencies.\footnote{Hughes, Christopher. 2011.} This suggests four things. First, the DPP and KMT were constrained by cross-Strait factors – China will not permit \textit{taidu}. Second, state-enacted \textit{bentuhua} constituted a state identity that eschews \textit{taidu} and \textit{tongyi} and embraces \textit{huadu}. Third, this state identity takes a civic form. However, the ROC deployed SIPs that enacted ethnic forms for instrumental reasons and DIGs sought to influence Taipei’s cross-Strait policy by appealing to ethnicity. Fourth, policy elites, constrained as they were, responded to DIG demands through cautious cross-Strait policies that reflected vote-maximising behaviour to retain power and legitimate \textit{huadu}. The PRC offered to discuss Taiwan’s international space, so long as One China under the 1992 Consensus was accepted.\footnote{Hughes. 2011: 15} By oscillating between thin and thick versions of \textit{huadu}, Taipei was able to adhere to the 1992 Consensus even if the DPP formally rejected it as a legitimate encoding of Taiwan’s political status.

### 7.5.3 The KMT’s 2008 Election Campaign

By 1992, \textit{huadu} had nucleated semantically. Between then and 2008, its pragmatic meaning, or its communicative effect, oscillated between thin and thick forms. Its constitutive influence in Taiwan’s domestic politics can be seen in cross-party consensus on “New Taiwanese” identity and the Taiwanised KMT’s conscious articulation of \textit{bentuhua} during the 2008 presidential election. Yet, as Kaeding (2009) points out, the KMT went further and deployed more Taiwanese ethno-cultural SIPs that year. This suggests an appeal to thick \textit{huadu} for instrumental electoral reasons. Kaeding ascribes this to two factors: first, he argues, the KMT sought to
counter pan-Green perceptions of the KMT as seeking tongyi that had been exacerbated by the party’s informal negotiations with the CCP while out of power. Second, the KMT perceived DPP discourse as covert taidu. The KMT sought to counter both by appealing to a social constituency that it suspected may be susceptible to taidu.810 While this might suggest an aspiring foreign policy executive heading off possible domestic constraints by allaying fears, this study’s realist-constructivist framework suggests both pan-Blue and pan-Green camps identified threats from Beijing based on misperception, not material fact. That is, if the KMT had simply stuck to New Taiwanese normative representations they would still have won, since huadu would have carried the day. After all, the perceived threat to Taiwan from China prompted by the DPP’s perceived covert taidu discourse legitimated the KMT as more competent to secure Taiwan’s sovereignty anyway.

Indeed, Kaeding himself points out the discursive importance of the New Taiwanese to the KMT’s understanding of ROC state identity in a pamphlet, co-authored by Ma Ying-jeou and Yang Tu in June 2007.811 This sought to counter Taiwanese ethnic nationalism by explicitly invoking civic, bentuhua-inspired normative representations that encompassed certain Free China “idealis” ones. Specifically, it indexed China’s role in Taiwan’s development and challenged the pro-taidu narrative of a privileged ethnic Hoklo identity.812 Ma’s pamphlet accused Hoklo elites, descended from Fujianese migrants, of crude nativism. Stressing the waishengren role in the dangwai, Ma reiterated, “bentuhua is inclusiveness, it is the integration of immigrant culture, it is a process of constant addition, constant

812 Hughes, Christopher 2011: 18; Kaeding, Malte. 2011.
rejection and constant renewal”. Thus, Ma used bentuhua to legitimate huadu but one that rejected taifu-leaning bentuhua in that it emphasised that democratisation had to involve China. In this regard, the pendulum swung back to a thin huadu that approached a ROC-centred (huatong) version of tongyi.

The 2008 presidential election was held two months after the KMT had secured a 75% majority in the legislature. The results reflected dissatisfaction with the DPP, the economy, corruption surrounding President Chen and concerns over cross-Strait relations. Yet, the ethnic undertone of bentuhua under the second Chen administration alongside Ma’s waishengren identity presented KMT strategists with a challenge that prompted them to oscillate between civic and ethnic identity in order to delegitimate taifu and tongyi. To gain the presidency, Ma needed to legitimate himself and his party.

Ma was the favourite against the DPP’s former Kaohsiung Mayor and Premier, Hsieh Chang-ting. As KMT Justice Minister and Mayor of Taipei, Ma had cultivated support among the deep-Blue KMT, taishang and Beijing. However, his personal identity remained ambivalent. Born in Hong Kong to Mainlander parents, he had held important positions during the authoritarian era, issues raised by the DPP to challenge his loyalty to Taiwan. To respond to domestic demands, Ma needed to portray himself and the KMT as authentically Taiwanese, defending Taiwan’s sovereignty. He therefore aimed to align the KMT’s Chinese and Taiwanese identities with the Taiwanese identity of its social constituency. However, his platform included policies that pan-Green taifu constituencies perceived as threatening. He identified China as key to Taiwan’s economic recovery, assuring

813 Yang Tu. 2007: 27.  
814 Kaeding, Malte. 2009. The DPP claimed that Ma possessed a valid US green card and that his two daughters possessed US passports.
voters of his commitment to Taiwan, with the *Three Noes* of “No Independence; No Unification; No War”.

In separating *bentuhua* from de-sinification, Ma responded to domestic demands for security by presenting the KMT as the party that could boost Taiwan’s flagging economy through formal commercial engagement with China, even though the DPP had driven massive Taiwanese FDI on the Mainland and also sought engagement with China. He proposed a wide-ranging FTA and follow-on agreements - in effect a cross-Strait common market. Ma lauded Taiwan as a model Chinese (*huaren*) democracy with a democratic deficit caused by the DPP. Promising ethical governance, he portrayed the KMT as the authentic guarantors of a free, democratic, multi-ethnic Taiwan. Such ambivalence between thin and thick versions of *huadu* belies any claim that the KMT’s understanding of One China aligned to that of Beijing.

By 2008, the DPP’s Taiwanisation policies had not led to *taidu*, yet relations with China were poor, *taishang* were alienated and domestic inequality had deepened. The KMT promised economic liberalisation through a series of FTAs to secure Taiwan’s interests, adding the 2008 global financial crisis as a post-facto justification. Despite being portrayed as a pro-*tongyi waishengren* by the DPP, Ma won 58% of the popular vote. In his inaugural address, he linguistically indexed *huadu*, referring to a “Taiwan Renaissance” based on democracy, ethnic harmony, deeper cross-Strait

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816 Kaeding, Malte. 2009.


relations and a liberal economy. This would strengthen Taiwan’s economy and make Beijing more amenable to Taiwan’s signing FTAs with other countries, allowing fuller integration into the global economy. The implication was that this would secure Taiwan’s sovereignty. Rather than securing huadu, pro-divergence DIGs perceived closer cross-Strait relations and a liberal economy as a threat to huadu as well as to their interests.

7.6 Beijing’s Sanction of huadu

Just as Taipei’s statements have constructed huadu (q.v. 1.5.), Beijing’s official statements on Taiwan’s status have created a discursive gap for huadu to occupy. That cross-Strait relations themselves are inter-state constitutes an endorsement of huadu by Beijing as Taipei’s principal non-subject social constituency and only existential threat. This might seem a bold claim, given Beijing’s steadfast position on unification and the stridency of its public rhetoric against Taiwan Independence. It must be remembered, however, that Beijing seeks to avert Taiwan’s de jure independence in taidu, not its de facto independence in huadu. For instance, the PRC’s 2005 Anti-Secession Law permitted “non-peaceful means” to avert taidu, not huadu.

Dean Chen (2014) claims that changing interpretations of One China constructed cross-Strait peace. Li Yitan (2014) argues that post-2008 Rapprochement turned peaceful cross-Strait economic integration into a new norm. For Chen, strategic

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calculations cannot account for Beijing tacitly accepting the ROC during Rapprochement; rather, huadu has permitted fundamental change in cross-Strait norms, rendering the unification-independence framework obsolete. Yet, as this study shows, the 1992 Consensus had already rendered it obsolete because the concept of OCRI contained within it enabled subsequent discursive shift.

In November 1992, Beijing asserted that One China was the PRC and that Taiwan was part of it. However, it acknowledged Taipei’s position that One China was the ROC, that both Taiwan and the Mainland were part of it and, crucially, that the ROC’s governing authority was restricted to the Taiwan Area. By the late 1990s, however, Beijing had endorsed a looser one-China principle that more clearly foregrounded Taiwan and the mainland being equal parts of China. Not stating which China that was made Chinese state identity ambiguous, easing cross-Strait relations and permitting Beijing’s implicit recognition of the ROC. Shared revolutionary ties meant the CCP recognised the KMT’s contribution to China. This tacit recognition gave the CCP legitimacy through Republican China.823 It also legitimated the ROC in the process and averted taidu. Discursive change in Taiwanese political speech had changed Beijing’s perceptions of Taiwan and prompted its linguistic reconstitution of One China. Beijing relaxed its One China principle because it perceived that huadu as encoded in ROC speech was not taidu. Thus, huadu allowed Beijing to grant Taipei Westphalian and domestic, but not international, sovereignty.824 In so doing, huadu compelled Beijing’s sanction.

Beijing had been firm on One China after 1949. However, its rhetoric of “the Chiang Kai-shek clique” became “peaceful reunification” after 1971 once Beijing had been

823 Chen, Dean. 2014: 22
recognised by the UN. Even as Taipei claimed to be Free China, in a New Year’s Day Message to Taiwan Compatriots in 1979, Beijing promised to:

take present realities into account in accomplishing the great cause of reunifying the motherland and respect the status quo on Taiwan and the opinions of people in all walks of life there and adopt reasonable policies and measures in settling the question of reunification so as not to cause the people of Taiwan any losses.\(^825\)

However, all of this meant One China was the PRC and unification meant \textit{zhongtong}.\(^826\) A shift came after Taipei’s November 1992 One China statement; Beijing stated that it:

fully respects and accepts your Foundation’s suggestion and both sides of the strait uphold the principle of one China, and actively seek national unification, but the political interpretation of the one China will not be referred to in the cross-strait negotiations on functional issues.\(^827\)

Jiang Zemin’s 1995 Eight Point Proposal relaxed the 1992 articulation and offered “phased” negotiations leading to \textit{tongyi}. If Taipei accepted One China, then Beijing would renounce force, recognise Taiwan as an equal and grant it international space.\(^828\) ARATS’ Chairman, Chen Yunlin followed this in 1997 with “cross-strait negotiations are equal talks based on the principle of one China, not in the name of talks between the central government and a local government”.\(^829\) In 1997, Jiang


\(^{826}\) Chen, Dean. 2014.: 39.


Zemin’s “new security concept” aimed to “rise above one-sided security and seek common security through mutually beneficial cooperation”.\textsuperscript{830}

In October 1998, the second Koo-Wang SEF-ARATS talks in Shanghai provided a platform for Beijing’s policy shift. Beijing had been adamant that “our consistent stand before the two sides across the strait are reunified [is that] there is only one China across the strait, Taiwan is part of China, and Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity are indivisible”. Yet, this wording in itself implied a linguistic shift from the 1992 assertion that Taiwan was part of the PRC. ARATS’ Chairman Wang Daohan stated “one China” does not refer to “either the ROC or the PRC. [This] indicates a unified China that will be created by the Chinese people of the two sides in the future”.\textsuperscript{831} At the subsequent press conference, ARATS VC, Tang Shubei, cited the 16 November 1992 ARATS fax that constituted the 1992 Consensus: “Both sides of the strait stick to the ‘one China’ principle and will strive to pursue national unification. However, negotiations on routine matters across the strait do not involve the political meaning of one China”.\textsuperscript{832} Tang went on to say “anything can be put on the table under the one China principle [and] the two sides should still negotiate on equal footing under the principle that there is one China. The issue of whether the talks are between central or local authorities can be left aside”.\textsuperscript{833}

Granted, Beijing’s 2000 White Paper on Taiwan asserted that the advent of the PRC meant that the ROC was illegitimate in terms of China’s sovereignty and that it was simply “a local authority in Chinese territory”.\textsuperscript{834} Yet, PRC elites were stating “both

\textsuperscript{830} Chen, Dean. 2014: 27
\textsuperscript{831} Chen, Dean. 2014: 36.
\textsuperscript{833} Kan, Shirley. 2002: 59.
the mainland and Taiwan belong to one China”, but “China does not necessarily mean the PRC”. In July 2000, Beijing signalled conciliation to the incoming DPP in Taipei. Qian Qichen articulated a more flexible One China:

With regard to cross-strait relations, the one China principle we stand for is that there is only one China in the world; the mainland and Taiwan all belong to one China; and China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity are indivisible.835

By saying that Taiwan and the mainland were both part of One China rather than that Taiwan was part of the PRC or of China, Beijing implied pragmatically that Taiwan and China were equal polities since it removed Taiwan’s adjunctive quality. In an interview with the Washington Post in January 2001, Qian Qichen said:

In the past, Chinese officials said “one China” meant Communist China, that Taiwan was a breakaway province and the Beijing government was the only legal government. When Taiwan’s leaders thought of one China, they were trapped. In order to ease their doubts, we said “one China” not only includes the mainland, but also Taiwan. We think of this China as an integral whole which can’t be separated in sovereignty or territory. This is the true meaning of “one China.” And, they had another doubt ...They think that Taiwan being part of Chinese territory means Taiwan and China are not equal ...To ease this doubt, we said the mainland and Taiwan belong to the same one China. At least, it shows some kind of equality. I think it can help ease their doubt ... Once we said we would liberate Taiwan, then we said Taiwan was just a province of China, now we are saying Taiwan can be our equal ...For the mainland to make these kinds of adjustments in policy is not an easy thing.836

In 2002, perceiving greater taidu sentiment in Taiwan, Beijing asked Taipei to renew negotiations on the basis of the 1992 Consensus. Chen Shui-bian refused and cross-Strait relations became confrontational as Taipei diverged politically from a Chinese state identity. In 2004, PRC Vice-Premier Qian Qichen stated:


835 Kan, Shirley. 2002: 65
both the mainland and Taiwan belong to one China. Despite the absence of reunification at present, the two sides should work hard to create conditions for it by reducing contentions, improving cross-strait relations and breaking the political deadlock... The importance of the ‘1992 consensus’ lies in the fact that, under the prerequisite of adhering to the ‘one-China’ principle, both sides seek common ground while reserving differences in a flexible way and take the interests of both sides into consideration with a view to building mutual trust, negotiating matters in a practical manner and always looking towards the future.837

Hu Jintao’s “peaceful development” and “harmonious world” discourses granted further space for huadu to fill. In 2004, Hu asserted China would not seek global domination, would “transcend ideological differences to strive for peace, development, and cooperation with all countries of the world”.838 In 2007 at the 17th CCP Party Congress, he reprised Lee Teng-hui’s notion of Gemeinschaft, suggesting a “community of common destiny [in which] one China does not mean the PRC’s China, but [simply] a common homeland for both sides”.839

Huadu is socially constructed and Beijing’s sanction stems from Beijing’s and Taipei’s respective interpretations of One China permitted by OCRI.840 Rationalist arguments cannot fully explain this because tongyi has been its formal policy since 1992. Beijing’s power gives it leverage, but OCRI is a socially constructed discourse with competing interpretations. “One China” attempts to prescribe the definitional limits of state identity. Yet huadu pushes them, both semantically and pragmatically using OCRI’s “respective interpretations”. So, a realist-constructivist account sees huadu as being as much Beijing’s construction as Taipei’s. Wendt’s Constructivism

840 Chen, Dean. 2014: 22.
would see *huadu* as less threatening to Beijing than *taidu*.\footnote{Li, Yitan: 31. See also: Wendt, Alexander. 1987. The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory. *International Organization*, 41(3): 335–370; Wendt, Alexander. 1992: 398; Katzenstein, Peter. ed. 1996: 55.} For Beijing, Cross-Strait socialisation has led it to endorse *huadu* because it is not *taidu*. In this regard, Taipei has compelled Beijing’s sanction of *huadu*.

### 7.7 Conclusion

This chapter has shown how Taiwan used the discursive power of *huadu* to legitimate its de facto independence in the status quo. Between 1987 and 2008, *huadu* oscillated in thin and thick forms, pragmatically understood in different ways by different constituencies. *Huadu*’s semantic meaning, however, had nucleated in the 1992 Consensus. First, *huadu* was co-constituted in the dismantling of the ROC’s *Free China* identity through *bentuhua* and democratisation and resolved the authoritarian ROC’s second crisis of legitimacy. Second, it secured the ROC, thus stalemating the PRC’s irredentist threat. Third, it directed policy towards the status quo and in oscillating within that status quo, ensured that China remained unable to subdue Taiwan, Fourth, *huadu* legitimated the ROC as the Taiwanese state, delegitimated *tongyi* and *taidu* and compelled Taiwan’s mainstream parties and Beijing to sanction it. *Huadu* arose from the delegitimation of authoritarian sinification, *Free China* “realis” and “idealis”, *bentuhua*, globalisation, acknowledgement of Chinese cultural roots and democratisation. It developed co-constitutively in cross-Strait and domestic politics, drawing both pan-Green and pan-Blue DIGs and parties towards a preference for de facto independence in the status quo.

*Huadu* has its origins in *bentuhua*. In power, both the KMT under Lee and the DPP under Chen oversaw the Taiwanisation of the ROC. However, state-led *bentuhua*
alone does not account for *huadu*’s power to maintain the status quo. It required cross-Strait and nation-state socialization. Strategically enacted by the KMT and the DPP, *bentuhua* constituted both parties’ identities, legitimating *huadu* in their social constituencies. Between 2000 and 2008, despite high tension and Chinese and KMT perceptions of a move towards *taidu*, however, the DPP enacted policies that reflected a popular preference for the status quo. These policies had a strong *bentuhua* ideational component that responded to Beijing’s anti-*taidu* policy signals. *Huadu* was legitimated in SIPs, where ethnic politics were tempered by *huadu* to legitimate civic democratic normative representations. In this sense, this study’s findings suggest that, contrary to mainstream narratives on heightened political divergence over the period, the discursive changes in ROC state identity did not constitute a material change in Taiwan’s political status from 1992.

In sum, by 2008, *huadu* had Taiwanised the ROC and secured its de facto independence. The 2008-16 period would be a litmus test for *huadu*; could it withstand Rapprochement with China under the 1992 Consensus and maintain the ROC’s Taiwanised identity in the status quo or would it elide into *tongyi* as PRC-centred *zhongtong*? The next chapter accounts for how *huadu* was tested and survived in Rapprochement to crystallise in a form that reconciled thick and thin understandings.
Today I wish to put forth five points for maintaining the status quo of peace and prosperity in the Taiwan Straits.

8.1. Introduction

This chapter presents a puzzle: a turn to China by a more China-identifying KMT administration was accompanied by a crystallisation of huadu and Taiwan’s maintenance of the status quo. The chapter argues that, while domestic preferences certainly constrained Taipei’s micro-level policies, Taiwan’s national interest and prevailing interest group preferences converged in huadu. This finding refutes the claim that Rapprochement represented underbalancing, that the KMT sought to violate the status quo and that prevailing domestic preferences stopped them. The puzzle of misperception may be explained pragmatically in the discursive gap between the illocutionary force of KMT statements and their perlocutionary effect on pan-Green constituencies. That is, actor A’s statements are filtered through actor B’s threat perception which, in turn, is contextually constituted by B’s preferences. This meant that, while pan-Green interest groups perceived Rapprochement as a threat to the status quo and to huadu, pan-Blue groups saw it as securing them. Moreover, Beijing perceived Rapprochement as inhibiting taidu and therefore sanctioned it.

This chapter focuses on a series of overlapping cases. First, it outlines a broad divide between pro-convergence (with China) and pro-divergence (from China) interest groups in Taiwan and explains how Taipei formulated cross-Strait policy. Second, it explicates the cross-Strait environment (q.v. 8.3.), tracing how Taipei pursued Rapprochement on the basis of the 1992 Consensus and sold the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) and the Cross-Strait Service Trade

Agreement (CSSTA) to the taishang. Third, it explicates the domestic environment (q.v. 8.4.), showing how ECFA and the CSSTA drove two cases– the Ma-Wang conflict and the Sunflower Occupation. Fourth, it shows how huadu played out discursively in Ma Ying-jeou’s policy statements at the Ma-Xi Summit in Singapore in November 2015, fixing the status quo (q.v. 8.5.). Finally, it reiterates Beijing’s role and interest in legitimating huadu.

In sum, the chapter concludes that Rapprochement was huadu’s litmus test and the ROC came out as Taiwanese. First, huadu prevailed, filtered through domestic power politics in the form of SIPs; second, huadu legitimates the ROC’s sovereign status as Taiwan, delegitimates taidu and tongyi and compels Beijing’s sanction; third, huadu explains China’s inability to force unification on Taiwan and accounts for the latter’s maintenance of its de facto independence.⁸⁴² Huadu, while it remains unarticulated as such and is therefore a genuine discourse, is a secure position for Taiwan.

8.2. The cross-Strait Environment

This section locates tense cross-Strait relations and Taiwan’s economic predicament at the end of the 2000-2008 DPP administration as the context for Rapprochement and the 1992 Consensus as its discursive vehicle. It argues that, while the DPP and pan-Green DIGs perceived it as a threat to Taiwan’s security, Rapprochement actually legitimated huadu. Indeed, prevailing pan-Green micro-discourses legitimated huadu. This finding challenges the claim that the KMT was constrained by pan-Green DIG opinion.⁸⁴³

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8.2.1. Convergers and Divergers

*Huadu* operates in Taiwan’s domestic power politics to constitute broadly convergent or divergent preferences. These preferences cross-cut with thin and thick forms of *huadu* tangential to the Blue-Green national spectrum. Only a tiny minority support *taidu* or *tongyi* in the short-term. The status quo is the preferred position of Taiwan’s most powerful elites and interest groups. Taiwan’s 2008-16 internal spectrum therefore differed simply on whether Rapprochement threatened the status quo. While not a strict binary distinction, the divergence camp aligned to the pan-Green grouping and the convergence camp aligned to the pan-Blue grouping. However, as this study shows, both pan-Blues and pan-Greens sought an outcome that secured the status quo. Pan-Blues saw economic liberalisation with China as the best way to secure the status quo while pan-Greens saw economic liberalisation vis-à-vis China as a threat to the status quo. By 2016, liberal democracy had been legitimated, while economic liberalisation with China had been delegitimated as a threat to Taiwan’s democracy and, by extension, Taipei’s *huadu* identity.

8.2.2. How cross-Strait policy was formulated

At the beginning of the 2008-16 KMT administration, Taiwan’s executive, the Executive Yuan (EY), formulated and implemented general cross-Strait policy, with the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) responsible for coordinating different agencies. Once the EY reached a policy decision, implementation was left to respective ministries. The Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) provided governmental services to *taishang* and negotiated with ARATS, the Chinese agency that came under the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO). However, Rapprochement shows how power

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politics combined with DIG threat perception to co-constitute huadu in cross-Strait policy. In 2008, Ma appointed Lai Shin-yuan, a long-time advocate of Taiwan’s sovereignty, as MAC chairperson.845 This appointment and later evidence from MAC policy statements suggest that Ma’s position on sovereignty was not as fragile as pan-Greens perceived. In 2010, Lai defined cross-Strait policy as:

1. Upholding the ROC’s democratic constitution while building peaceful, stable cross-strait relations;
2. Creating external conditions for peace and prosperity, to make Taiwan a force for stability;
3. ‘Mutual non-denial’ in cross-strait institutionalized negotiations to build mutual trust;
4. Taiwan’s way of life and democratic values as a benchmark for reforms on the Mainland;
5. Working with regional allies to protect the security of the Taiwan Strait846

8.2.3. Rapprochement and Resistance under Ma

The KMT’s move towards Rapprochement had begun in September 2005 when Lien Chan visited China for KMT-CCP talks and Ma Ying-jeou as Mayor of Taipei asked, “What is wrong with promoting this policy if Taiwan is put first and the benefits are well taken care of?”847 In March 2007, it became a proactive policy on cross-Strait relations under the principle of “putting Taiwan first” to “maintain the status quo

under the condition of benefiting the people” while “minimizing the threats and maximizing the opportunities”. The KMT promised to “firmly guard and staunchly protect Taiwan’s interests and stand with the people of Taiwan”. Rapprochement will be “conducive to our national survival”, will “work for and defend Taiwan’s interests” through “economic issues first and political issues later, easy issues first and difficult issues later, and urgent issues first and less pressing issues later”.  

In strategically shelving sovereignty, Ma invoked huadu’s liberal normative representations, yet acted prudently in adopting a realist morality. In his inaugural address in May 2008, he stated “resolution of cross-strait issues does not lie in sovereignty disputes but in core values and way of life”. Minister Lai later parsed this as “democracy” being Taiwan’s “most important core interest”; that Taiwan’s security is guaranteed “under the ROC government elected by the citizenry” of Taiwan whose sovereignty under the ROC constitution guarantees their right to “freely choose the future of cross-strait relations and participate in international relations”. The core interest of Taiwan, therefore, is its right to sovereignty and it is the ROC that ensures that. On May 26, 2008 the SEF proposed resumption of institutionalised negotiations with Beijing under the 1992 Consensus.


8.2.4. Rapprochement under the 1992 Consensus as huadu

The assumption that powerful interest groups are instrumental in foreign policy is understandable. Certainly, KMT policy frames taishang as a crucial cross-Strait interest group to be actively courted. In September 2013, Lin Join-sane encapsulated taishang influence on policy in an address to business and political elites, saying KMT elites Lien Chan, Vincent Siew and Hau Pei-tsun had told him always to listen to the taishang: “every time we heard the opinions and responses of Taiwan businesspeople, we would transform them into the government’s major policies”. The political role of taishang predates cross-Strait relations, though. As early as 1985, under Free China, the KMT elite, Vincent Siew, had linked “Build Taiwan” to illicit cross-Strait trade as unavoidable and “beneficial to Taiwan's survival and development”. In January 2001, he suggested the EU model would lead to ‘win-win’, and the “sharing of sovereignty”. By then, however, huadu had changed Taiwan’s preferences.

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The data in this study refute Schubert’s (2016) claim that taishang do not constitute a cohesive interest group. Several trade bodies that represent taishang interests in China and in Taiwan and constitute an influential interest group. The Association of Taiwan Invested Enterprises on the Mainland (ATIEM), for instance, aims to safeguard “the legitimate rights and interests of the taishang, promoting laws and regulations … and solving members’ problems”. Indeed, a conference call convened by ATIEM President Kuo Shan-hui on 11th June 2010 sets the tone for KMT-CCP-taishang cooperation and a statement dated 15th October 2013, ATIEM fully endorsed the CSSTA as reflecting taishang interests and repeated the same five benefits put forward by Taipei.

The ECFA was the major cross-Strait policy proposal of Ma’s first term and the follow-on agreements were those of his second term. The ECFA itself was intended as a preferential trade agreement that would include a framework agreement (ECFA) to cover trade in goods (CSMTA); trade in services (CSSTA); investment protection, a dispute settlement mechanism and an early harvest list allowing China to remove tariffs on 530 Taiwanese products and open 11 service sectors including banking and investment to Taiwan. In return, Taiwan would reduce tariffs on 267 Chinese

products and open nine sectors, including banking. The agreements benefited Taiwan since they implemented WTO processes while bypassing the WTO itself, thus obviating China’s refusal to deal with Taiwan there because of sovereignty implications. Taiwan’s preferential treatment around investment in China would benefit taishang, who had an interest in access to finance. The ECFA would also allow Taiwan greater access to the international political economy through FTAs that China had previously blocked. Ma hoped that, even if China did not formally recognise Taiwan’s sovereignty, it would relent on FTAs if Taiwan showed willing by liberalising. In this way, deployment of huadu would legitimate Taiwan in the international political economy, securing its sovereignty through rules and norms.

Despite its instrumental shelving of sovereignty in its courting of taishang interests, therefore, Taipei clearly signalled huadu from the start. At his June 2008 meeting with Hu Jintao in Beijing, SEF Chairman Chiang Pin-kung reiterated “peace and prosperity” under the 1992 Consensus. However, while sticking to standard diplomatic frames, he also pressed Hu on Taiwanese identity and sovereignty, implying that China’s reluctance to acknowledge this was a threat to Rapprochement:

the people of Taiwan place great importance on their ability to participate in the international community with dignity. If they suffer repeated setbacks in the international community, it will have an impact on cross-strait relations. It is therefore hoped that in future, the two sides can mutually assist each other in the international arena. The people on both sides share a common Chinese (zhonghua) heritage.

The presupposition of Taiwan’s sovereignty and legitimating of *huadu* through “the people of Taiwan” implies that Taipei considers itself sovereign.

The claim that powerful interest groups affect foreign policy is also visible on the pro-divergence side. There was relentless opposition to ECFA from its proposal in December 2008 to its signing in 2010 and afterwards. Pan-Green DIGs and the DPP opposed it, questioning Ma’s identity and motives. Despite favourable opinion polls, most pro-divergence groups opposed ECFA on economic costs and perceived security threat. In late 2008, ARATS VC Zhang Minqing visited Taipei and Chiang Pin-kung met with Chen Yunlin, the ARATS Chairman, at the Second Chen-Chiang Summit, the highest level KMT-CCP meeting in six decades. SEF had brought pro-convergence academics on board to prepare for Chen’s visit, and promised to continue negotiations on the basis of “peace, reason and dignity”. In response, pro-divergence DIGs galvanised to protest Chen’s visit. The police response to the protests was robust and the Wild Strawberry movement emerged as a reaction. SEF accused the DPP of orchestrating the demonstrations and said they had “harmed Taiwan's international image”, suggesting the KMT saw its policies as a delicate balancing act designed to secure *huadu*.

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In May 2009, the DPP leader, Tsai Ing-wen, attacked the KMT for lack of consultation, stating “Taiwan’s democracy is actually becoming more vulnerable to Chinese influence”. At the same time, MAC Minister Lai admitted “a significant number of Taiwanese feared that the government might undermine Taiwan’s sovereignty by being too accommodating to China”, but that the Chinese market was so important that the KMT had no choice, implying that building mutual trust with China would create political space for Taiwan. Thus, MAC aimed to “build a foundation of consensus within our domestic society” and there was no time for “highly political issues”. The EY rejected a DPP request for a referendum on ECFA and the KMT organised a series of forums to promote it, framing it in terms of shared cultural Chinese identity, pragmatism and critical opportunity. In April 2009, on a visit to Nanjing, Chiang Pin-kung stated:

On March 30, 2005, I walked up to the mausoleum of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and prayed before Dr. Sun for cross-strait peace and the people's wellbeing. Last year, the KMT resumed the reins of government and launched cross-strait negotiations rooted in the principles of pragmatism, reciprocity, and dignity…we turned back from a looming crisis at just the last moment, creating a historic opportunity for the two sides.

Negotiations were supposed to be limited to economic matters; sovereignty would not be explicitly mentioned and Taiwan’s economy would be protected. However,
pro-divergence DIGs pointed out that ECFA would have to involve mutual recognition of sovereignty. Indeed, Taipei’s insistence on institutional parity and dignity presupposed Taiwan’s sovereignty. In February 2009, the DPP liaised with pro-divergence academics to frame Ma’s rush to push ECFA through in terms of a threat to Taiwan’s sovereignty, demanding domestic consensus-building measures from the KMT. In sum, for the KMT and pro-convergence interest groups, Rapprochement secured *huadu*, while for the DPP and pro-divergence DIGs, Rapprochement threatened *huadu*.

In a series of speeches leading up to and beyond the signing of ECFA in June 2010, KMT elites and Taiwan business groups relentlessly pushed its economic benefits; ECFA would ensure Taiwan’s economic and political survival and secure sovereignty. Couched in terms of liberal internationalism, SEF statements reference Taiwan’s sovereignty as the ROC, a state that claims equal international status with the PRC. While for pro-divergence groups, the KMT’s framing of “the two sides” and “mainland China” implies that Taiwan does not enjoy sovereignty, these terms may be read as diplomatic frames. In April 2010, Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen engaged in a televised debate on ECFA and although both tried to stick to economic costs and benefits, Ma effectively legitimated the KMT’s understanding of *huadu* and delegitimated the DPP’s through pragmatic manipulation of pronominal and address forms, asserting his authority and perceived economic competence over Tsai. The result was that public support for ECFA and Ma’s ratings went up.

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870 Lin, Syaru Shirley. 2016: 178

However, pro-divergence groups continued to oppose ECFA, with public protests demanding “oppose a one-China market”. The ECFA was signed on 29th June 2010 to take effect on 1st January 2011. After the signing, pro-divergence attention shifted to ECFA’s content rather than the concept.

The crystalisation of *huadu* became salient in the ECFA ratification process, which exposed an identity paradox. The KMT insisted on treating the ECFA as an international treaty requiring no legislative debate, while the DPP wanted it treated as a domestic law that required a line-by-line review to allow for amendments. While these positions were taken for instrumental reasons to do with legislative power, the discursive effect was to legitimate *huadu*. Despite the KMT having a majority, the *benshengren* KMT Speaker Wang Jin-pyng called a legislative review, implying a perceived threat to *huadu* in ECFA. The ECFA was passed after a brawl and a Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Committee (CSECC) was created to negotiate details. However, the negotiation process simply prompted further opposition that culminated in March 2014 during the passage of the CSSTA.

8.2.5. Ma’s *huadu* Discourse

Christopher Hughes (2013) claims that Ma’s deployment of Chinese (national) identity went far beyond what was necessary to maintain the status quo. Indeed, pro-divergence DIGs clearly perceived a threat in his discourse: on several occasions he says: “the people on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are Chinese (*huaren*)” and makes regular rhetorical reference to “the emperors Yan and Huang”. Ma’s 2011
New Year’s Day message, titled “Building Up Taiwan, Invigorating Chinese Heritage”, claimed that “as a result” of the ROC’s Taiwan-born heroes, Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles, Chinese nation building, the KMT’s Northern Expedition and the anti-Japanese War, “Taiwan was returned to the fold of the Republic of China” and the Nanjing Government joined the UN; melding “the essence of Chinese culture with the core features of Western democracy… we rebuilt the nation in Taiwan and dispelled the myth that democracy is unsuitable for a Chinese (zhonghua) society”.

This suggests that huadu’s realm and social constituency encompasses China. Ma’s reference to “we” and “the nation” create a locutionary gap that invites listeners to include themselves in its scope. “We” may be the KMT, but may also be the Taiwanese people. Equally, the nation may be China or Taiwan. Since his listeners know from the historical context, however, that the ROC is Taiwan it may be understood that he is inviting them to recognise “we” and “the nation” as Taiwanese. Moreover, contra pro-divergence DIG perceptions, it is this indexing, and therefore legitimation, of ROC state identity that Chinese netizens perceived as Taiwanese and not Chinese when they attacked Chou Tzu-yu in January 2016 (q.v. 1.2.3.). Ma’s reference to zhonghua and not zhongguo for China simply reinforces the categorical separation from the PRC. In other words, for China, ROC symbols are not Chinese but Taiwanese.

Ma cannot avoid legitimating huadu and delegitimating tongyi and taidu in referencing Taiwan’s normative representations. Yet, he straddles thin and thick huadu. Extoling Taiwan’s liberal democratic values, deploying the we of power to

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rebuke pan-Green DIGs for their accusations of disloyalty in a May 2011 speech, he states “no group or political party holds a patent on love for Taiwan…what we must not do is…accuse others of selling Taiwan out.” In October 2011, Ma states “democracy and freedom … define the spirit of Taiwan” making it “a benchmark for Chinese communities around the world”. Then, he asserts “the Republic of China is a sovereign and independent nation, and Taiwan is our home” and acknowledges that “mainland China” has “threatened and hemmed in” Taiwan, but that ‘in issues that touch upon national sovereignty and Taiwan’s dignity…the people of Taiwan do not back down!Long live the Republic of China! Long live Taiwan’s democracy!”

Certainly, in his 2010 National Day address, Ma articulated huadu, but one that pan-Greens DIGs might perceive as oscillating towards China. The pronoun “we” may reference China or Taiwan. In presaging the 100th anniversary of the ROC, Ma frames “the bond between the ROC and Taiwan” as resisting “Communist China’s” threat so that:

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today, we continue to grow and develop on this land. We share a collective destiny and embrace a common dream. We cherish Taiwan and identify with the Republic of China. We wish the best for Taiwan and want the ROC to flourish. Next year will mark the Republic’s centennial. Let us celebrate the birth of our nation together and create for it a more resplendent second century.879
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“Parity, dignity and reciprocity” ensure that the KMT “puts Taiwan first for the benefit of its people” and “staunchly defends the sovereignty and dignity of Taiwan”. For Ma, “the ROC is a country with independent sovereignty. We conduct relations

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with mainland China under the framework of the ROC Constitution and on the basis of the 1992 Consensus”. Through the use of the presuppositional trigger, “although, at this stage…nevertheless”, Ma implies that Taiwan’s lack of de jure recognition is merely provisional, and by extension that cross-Strait relations are state-to-state: “although at this stage the two sides of the Taiwan Strait cannot accord de jure recognition to each other, we nevertheless should be able to pragmatically adopt a policy of de facto mutual non-denial.”

Despite the KMT’s assertion that ECFA would secure Taiwan, it failed to solve Taiwan’s economic problems. Pro-divergence DIGs sought to delegitimate it on the grounds of Ma’s competence, perceived kowtowing to Beijing and rhetoric of Chinese identity. Polls indicated that Taiwanese national identity and support for the status quo had become consolidated. Support for cross-Strait policies was ambivalent, despite support for liberal policies in principle. Pro-divergence DIGs who perceived a security and identity threat and marginalised KMT-supporting constituencies who perceived an economic threat expressed stronger support for protectionism. In a situation of public ambivalence, the mobilising role of DIGs accounts for continuing opposition to the follow-on agreements and subsequent shifts in that policy. Given that Ma’s KMT legitimated huadu, it seems reasonable to assume that identity-driven misperception of the KMT’s preferences influenced pro-divergence DIG opposition. In sum, competing DIGs agreed the need to strengthen Taiwan’s sovereignty and its identity, but were divided on how to do it.


881 Fuller, Douglas. 2014.

On October 8, 2011, Tsai Ing-wen stated the ROC existed only in Taiwan after 1949, so "Taiwan is the Republic of China, the Republic of China is Taiwan" and "the Republic of China is no longer a foreign government, but a Taiwanese government."883 The KMT called this “covert taïdu”. In 2013, the DPP proposed "Republic of China Resolutions", which stated that "Taiwan is the Republic of China; the Republic of China is Taiwan".884 From 2008, the DPP turned pro-divergence DIG threat perception into policy. Yet, DPP cross-Strait policy was not substantially different from that of the KMT and this can be seen in the spill-over from huadu in DPP statements. DPP policy was not driven by anti-liberalism per se: “the idea of liberalisation is a bit more complicated when it comes to China because … there are other political and security considerations”.885 Rather, the DPP perceived ECFA as a threat in the context of defence, economic and social issues and presented the KMT as complicit. Hsiao Bi-khim, the DPP’s spokesperson, articulated DPP policy in 2012. The DPP has:

a policy of gradually normalizing our economic relationship with China but risks need to be managed and focus should be on distribution of benefits…people are sick of winner-takes-all, animosity, divisions and socio-economic injustice of the KMT administration.886

884 Qiu, Yueguang. 2013. The DPP’s China policy does not rule out another resolution. Taiwan People News. 28 December 2013. [online] Available at: http://www.peoplenews.tw/news/83fe4ab6-5a0a-46a7-89a8-4ee70c1884b1 [Accessed 17 October 2018].
The DPP does not seek to challenge cross-Strait economic relations in principle; rather it seeks to delegitimize the KMT in terms of its capacity to secure the normative representations of *huadu* through cross-Strait policy, a discourse that the Sunflowers would return to in 2014. Despite Rapprochement, Hsiao claims the heightened Chinese missile threat means “*we* will continue to budget for US defence purchases”. 887 In relation to the 1992 Consensus, the DPP proposed a Taiwan Consensus:

> What happened in ninety-two it was a spirit of 1992 - a spirit to agree to disagree and that enabled the two sides to engage in dialogue and interaction across the Strait over the past nearly two decades … And our view is …internal Taiwan Consensus … would be much more stable consistent and predictable in the long term and a more solid foundation for interacting across the strait in the long run. 888

In terms of a definition of *huadu*, the DPP was splitting hairs. While acknowledging that “ethnic differences” have evolved and that Taiwanese identity is “whether or not one identifies with Taiwan as their homeland,” Hsiao alleges that Lee Teng-hui originally coined the phrase “New Taiwanese” “to help Ma Ying-jeou get elected as mayor of Taipei and to help him integrate into native Taiwan society”. 889 The pragmatic implication is that Ma was not a “native” Taiwanese, does not naturally identify with Taiwan and that “New Taiwanese” is simply an instrumental construct. However, the DPP also acknowledged that, despite political differences and security considerations, China’s “peaceful development” is “an acceptable phrase”.

> *We* will engage proactively with the Chinese and *they* should understand that in a normal democracy … political parties … come and go…peaceful development is a common language and a common interest…a recognition of existing differences but a

887 Hsiao, Bi-khim. 2012. DPP: English opening statement, international press conference 12 January 2012. Available at: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mDgIdzpnzKk](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mDgIdzpnzKk) Q&A at 39.00 [Accessed 15 July 2017].
888 Ibid
889 Ibid
willingness to work on common interests continues to be the spirit of our China policy.890

On the idea of One China, Hsiao deploys the power of the exclusive “we” to invoke DPP solidarity with Taiwan. Hsiao implicitly threatens Beijing; “the Chinese” are “they” and “should understand” that Taiwan’s state identity is different to that of the PRC. Taiwan is “normal” and the PRC is not, by implication. Later on, Hsiao uses “Taiwan” instead of the “ROC” to index huadu as legitimate and in doing so, implies that the KMT has not deployed huadu’s normative representations in cross-Strait policy:

the people of Taiwan wish … a democratic system; we seek to protect and defend our democracy. We seek to pursue greater international space in a dignified way. We want pragmatic relations with China. Our people want to be able to travel do business .... They're happy to welcome Chinese visitors to Taiwan as well, but at the same time we seek to preserve Taiwan's sovereignty, our dignity and our international space. 891

This position on huadu means it has to respond to “that sentiment of the people of Taiwan”, implying that the KMT’s huadu does not do this. In 2012, the DPP’s cross-Strait policy was still inarticulate. The Taiwan Consensus was vague and the electorate gave Ma the benefit of the doubt. By 2014, however, the economic situation had worsened, Ma was more unpopular and this combined with the perceived threat of the CSSTA. Pro-divergence DIGs galvanised around the Sunflower Movement which, despite its distancing from the DPP, bestowed legitimacy on it. By 2016, alleged KMT illegitimacy rested on its failure to align to the perceived normative representations of huadu. Rather, the KMT was seen by pro-divergence DIGs as reverting to the its authoritarian past domestically by operating a

890 Ibid author’s italics.
[online] Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mDg1dzpnzKk Q&A at 39.00 author’s italics. [Accessed: 15 July 2017]
“black box” and compounding that reversion in cross-Strait relations by colluding in corrupt, United Front work with the CCP and taishang. Together, this was perceived by pro-divergence DIGs as proof positive that the KMT sought to sell Taiwan out. In this regard, by 2016 the DPP policy platform chimed with domestic concerns.892

In January 2016, DPP elite, Joseph Wu reiterated that the DPP sought to maintain the status quo, even using the KMT’s preferred term “the Mainland”.

The DPP’s 1991 policy platform called for a Republic of Taiwan, but a 1999 resolution recognized the status quo. The DPP has never denied … that the cross-Strait dialogues took place in 1992, and indeed acknowledges the shared desire of the two sides at that time to advance … mutual understanding. As for the specific phraseology of the 1992 Consensus, created by the KMT in the year 2000, [Tsai Ing-wen] advocates a return to the original spirit of setting aside differences to seek common grounds that formed the basis of the 1992 cross-Strait meetings…our objective in … relations between Taiwan and the Mainland is to safeguard peace and stability between the two sides, and in order to for us to safeguard peace and stability between the two sides, the guiding principle, always, is to maintain the status quo… that Taiwan is already independent with the national title, the Republic of China, and I'm sure the Chinese know that. And the resolution position was reiterated by the DPP again in the 2014 China Policy Review, and the review was adopted by the Central Standing Committee, and therefore our newest position is not the Taiwan independence platform, and I'm sure the Chinese side knows it.893

The DPP had accepted the substance of the 1992 Consensus, which presupposed OCRI and entailed huadu.

8.3. Selling ECFA to the taishang

Taipei’s campaign to sell ECFA to the taishang began in 2008, overlapped with and was ultimately halted by the Sunflower Movement in 2014 (q.v. 8.4.2.). This section argues that, although the taishang had always been supportive of economic

893 Wu, Joseph. 2016.
convergence for commercial reasons, Taipei sought actively to persuade them to support its guiding role through ECFA and the CSSTA by stressing *huadu* normative representations. This led to a tension between political and commercial interests. The data amassed for this study show that, in promoting ECFA, the ROC legitimated *huadu*, delegitimated *tongyi* and *taidu* and compelled first *taishang* and then Beijing to sanction *huadu*.

Certainly, high-profile tycoons such as Tsai Eng-meng and Terry Gou overtly pushed for political unification. Yet, most *taishang* were simply interested in how Taipei could assist their operations in practical terms and supported Rapprochement for commercial reasons. 894

Schubert suggests up to three-quarters of *taishang* voted KMT in 2004 and 2008, while the overwhelming majority voted KMT in 2012 because they saw the party as aligned to their business interests. 895 Taipei’s message was that Taipei and *taishang* shared preferences and that Taipei would protect *taishang* by liaising with their counterparts in China. Business organisations mobilised the *taishang* vote to help the KMT. 896 At an ATIEM meeting in Shenyang before the November 2010 mid-term elections, the chairman stated:

> ATIEM supports the peaceful development of cross-strait relations…the ECFA is related to our vital interests [and] it is particularly important to actively mobilize our families to return and support the most favorable political parties in Taiwan and to invite the TAO to assist with tickets and pricing. 897

At the same meeting, ATIEM president Kuo Shan-hui explicitly lobbied taishang to vote KMT:

Taiwanese businessmen are the direct beneficiaries of the policy of liberalization and peaceful development of cross-strait relations … ATIEM has got a number of airlines to … allow taishang to quickly return [to] abide by the purpose of your membership … the peaceful development of cross-strait relations, for the sake of peace between the two sides, for the sake of people's well-being, for the cause of development … the cause of Taiwan business needs your vote; peace on both sides requires your vote; the future of Taiwan needs your single vote.898

Large Taiwanese trade associations linked to KMT patronage ambivalently championed Rapprochement’s utilitarian commercial benefits. On 7th June 2010 the Chairman of ATIEM, Kuo Shan-hui, and 108 taishang leaders advertised in Taiwan newspapers, calling on “the Taiwan government to sign ECFA as soon as possible for Taiwan's economic development”.899 Yet, in April 2012, before Taiwan’s elections, Taiwan’s Chinese National Federation of Industries (CNFI) accused the KMT of politicising cross-Strait trade through unreasonable minimum-wage demands rather than helping with business operations.900 The Taiwan Petrochemical Association sent an urgent letter to the government to push ECFA quicker: “our requirements are quite simple…we need equal treatment. If Taiwan keeps the status quo on this, about half of our products will be unsellable soon”.901

898 Ibid.
Why did Taipei not just take taishang at their word, create the economic conditions for them and let them get on with it? Business aside, Taipei felt it needed to sell ECFA to a cross-Strait constituency whose identity was ambivalent, whose loyalty to Taiwan was questioned domestically and who would be enacting KMT policy on the ground in China. Taishang constituted a social constituency that operated in a non-subject realm of political action in which huadu was highly contested. In other words, Taipei sought to consolidate the taishang as a social constituency that would sanction huadu.

In October 2008, SEF started a continuous cycle of support visits to Taiwan Business Associations (TBAs) in China to “upgrade, transform and smoothly weather this financial crisis”. These developed into KMT elite visits to canvas opinion and to promote Taiwan’s cross-Strait policy organised under the auspices of SEF, MAC and ATIEM with close involvement from TAO and ARATS, as well as numerous meetings, trade fairs and procurement visits. This study’s data show intimate networks of TBA chapters, “Taiwan business circles, related government agencies” and political elites on both sides. Every year, Beijing’s Taiwan Affairs Office held a Taiwan Business Seminar, while Taipei’s Mainland Affairs Council held an annual Lunar New Year Gathering, Dragon Boat Festival and Mid-Autumn Gathering of taishang, TBAs, Taiwan business organisations and civil servants. Themes like

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“Peace, Prosperity, and a Century of Well Being” and “peace and prosperity, happiness for 100 years” predominated.905

SEF data give a good empirical picture of *taishang* thinking on Taipei’s cross-Strait policy and Taipei’s attempts to influence that thinking. At the first SEF Board Meeting in May 2008, Chiang Pin-kung suggested Rapprochement was about Taiwan’s national interest:

> jointly face up to realities, shelve controversies, and plan the future [through] new thinking, great wisdom and true sincerity…to resume negotiations on the basis of the 1992 Consensus [for a] win-win outcome for cross-strait relations [and] long-term peaceful and stable interactions across the Strait…Ma's policy guideline of "Taiwan first, for the good of the people" will make SEF and ARATS a platform for implementation of government authority.906

Taipei sought *taishang* sanction through SEF missions and events framed as “caring for” and “listening to” their concerns. The ECFA and its follow-on agreements were framed as crucial to Taiwan’s economic and political survival.907 A June 2010 SEF

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symposium illustrates how the KMT and the TBAs used taishang to drive a liberal discourse of economic convergence. Here, SEF Vice Chairman Kao Koong-lian explained that the symposium aimed to hear taishang opinions, “so as to provide a reference for the drafting of government policy”. In response, ten TBA regional presidents

loungingly appealed for the government to promptly sign the ECFA so that Taiwan can have more contact with ASEAN countries...increase Taiwan’s international competitiveness...get closer to the Chinese market...reduce tariffs to protect jobs in Taiwan [and that] Taiwan’s survival is linked to the signing of the ECFA [which will] help Taiwan to step out and compete in the world.

In response, the Dongguan TBA President, Yeh Chun-jung, said that Taipei would institute policies “to help vulnerable industries” and that “Taiwan will only have a chance to sign FTAs with other countries if the cross-strait ECFA is signed”. He urged liberalisation of financial services to “truly help Taiwan businesses in industrial upgrading”. At the same time, the regional TBA presidents wanted Taipei to help them compete “fairly” in China, proposing that Taipei introduce protectionist measures.

While these taishang concerns are framed in terms of operational issues, it is important to note two linguistic presuppositions in the record of the symposium. First, Taiwan is a state separate to China, since it is to Taipei’s representatives that the taishang appeal and who in return present themselves as the legitimate representatives of the taishang. Second, taishang perceive a Chinese threat to their
commercial interests and see the solution resting in FTA processes, something that implies an economic agreement between two sovereign states. The pragmatic implication throughout the text is that Taiwan is categorically different to China and that relations are effectively inter-state.

A series of policy statements and speeches throughout 2010 and 2011 and reveal a discourse conscious of Taiwanese identity that sought to legitimate *huadu* in liberal terms. In March 2010, MAC Minister Lai stated, “if Taiwan does not sign the ECFA, the country risks being marginalized”, that “ECFA has nothing to do with deepening Taiwan’s economic reliance on mainland China” but will act as a springboard to global markets. 911 SEF Chairman, Chiang Ping-kun, implied that Chinese pressure compelled Taiwan to accept ECFA. Framing ECFA’s importance to a sovereign Taiwan in terms of security fears, he countered that it was “an immutable iron law” that “the earlier an economy opens up and internationalizes, the more competitive it is”. 912 In June 2010, The Office of the President stated ECFA sought to “strengthen, revive, save, stabilize, secure and protect the country to create the foundation for a golden decade”. “Protecting the country by promoting peace,” means liberal-economic-reform-led promotion of “the nation’s” and “Taiwan’s competitiveness” so that “Taiwan can promote a peaceful external environment”. It acknowledged pro-divergence concerns in Taiwan: this policy will not damage the ROC’s sovereignty or dignity in any way…The improvement of relations with mainland China has caused some people to grow concerned about whether the ROC’s sovereignty might suffer and whether Taiwan’s dignity be harmed, but each agreement has put ‘Taiwan first for the benefit of the people [so] we needn’t


912 Straits Exchange Foundation. 2010. ECFA to create new opportunities, pave way for golden decade of Made-in-Taiwan products. 25th June 2010. [online] Available at: [Removed from SEF website since 2016]. [Accessed 8 February 2016].
sacrifice our sovereignty or suffer indignities in order to achieve cross-strait peace and prosperity.913

In September 2010, Taipei reprised Taiwan’s sovereignty in the context of cross-Strait peace and prosperity. This time, however, ECFA was explicitly framed as a means of promoting Taiwan’s democracy. Minister Lai told an EU audience that “democracy is Taiwan’s asset and our most precious soft power. Hence, Taiwan does not fear to deal with mainland China”.914 The appeal to the international community is clear. A week later, the Office of the President stated:

Taiwan is a democratic society and [that] Taiwan’s future shall be decided by its 23 million people. At the present stage, the government, based on the framework of the ROC Constitution, will continue to maintain the status quo of “no unification, no independence, and no use of force”. In addition, based on the 1992 Consensus, the government will operate on the principle of putting Taiwan first for the benefit of the people, and it will also promote the development of mutual benefit and shared prosperity between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.915

These stances presuppose, index and imply huadu while respecting OCRI’s diplomatic frames:

We are also a nation with lots of outstanding and enterprising people …an open society that emphasizes the values of democracy and freedom ... ECFA … will enable our economy to take off [and] ‘sign free trade agreements with other nations… Our vision is to welcome the world to Taiwan and to send Taiwan out into the world. We expect to

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In December 2013, in a speech to the SEF Board, Lin Join-sane stressed Taiwan’s democratic identity, suggesting that China had endorsed it since, when ARATS Chairman, Chen Deming, visited Taiwan he saw:

Taiwan’s strong business and management skills [how] well-educated and polite the people of Taiwan are…different opinions in our plural society…I told him this is only normal in a free, democratic and multicultural society, where the government is able to lay down right policies after listening to different opinions about public administration.

In an attempt to force ECFA through the legislature, Ma deployed the same fallacy of urgency and economic constraint seen in pro-divergence DIG discourses, issuing an implied threat in urging the legislature to pass it by presupposing that it is the only rational choice. His language created a perception among pro-divergence interest groups that he was acting contrary to huadu’s normative representations:

we need to move quickly’ [so] I would like to urge the Legislative Yuan to speedily screen and pass the ECFA, firstly because [it] requires the amendment of various laws, and … needs to be reviewed by the legislature, which represents the will of the people. We plan for Premier Wu to go to the Legislative Yuan to report on the ECFA and clearly explain to everyone how we plan to proceed and what the benefits will be for us. We hope that this arrangement will enable our parliamentarians to fully understand that the moves we are making to integrate into the global economy are beneficial to Taiwan, and that this is the correct decision at this critical point in time.

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916 Ibid. Italics are this author’s.
Lin Join-sane and Chen Deming signed the CSSTA in Shanghai on 21st June 2013 “in the hope of creating a favorable environment for cross-strait investment, trade, and market development”.⁹¹⁹ Taipei then went on a domestic campaign, courting academic support for the CSSTA as crucial to Taiwan's liberalisation, regional economic integration and security and sovereignty. Minister Wang stated “We cannot turn our backs on this market, which has a vital bearing on Taiwan’s future survival”.⁹²⁰

As CSSTA negotiations progressed, *huadu* became explicit. February 2014 saw an explicit diplomatic move towards “normalization of official interactions and exchanges across the Taiwan Strait” when MAC Minister Wang and TAO Director Zhang Zijun held the first of a series of meetings in Nanjing. They agreed to negotiate under the 1992 Consensus. Wang talked about the *Three Principles of the People* and claimed relations were not state-to-state. Yet, these meetings endorsed Taiwan’s sovereignty. At APEC in October 2013, Wang and Zhang had addressed each other using their official titles, openly flouting Beijing’s previous diplomatic frames, and the PRC media repeated this.⁹²¹ The DPP called the meeting as a sell-out. Yet, in linguistic terms, *huadu* achieved the PRC’s direct semantic sanction.

What pro-divergence groups perceived as violation of *huadu*’s normative representations is salient in official ROC text around the passing of the pact and the constitutional crisis it provoked. Ma performed a cabinet reshuffle “for the benefit of

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the people”; that is, in the national interest.922 The CSSTA was passed in the LY and the LY building was immediately occupied by the Sunflower student protestors (q.v. 8.4.2.). However, SEF attempted to delegitimate the Sunflowers from the start by ignoring them. Instead of the occupation and chaos on the streets of Taipei, the SEF website records a SEF mission to taishang that listened to the “investment and operational problems encountered by Taiwan companies,” explained the “benefits of the cross-strait agreements signed to date” and “promoted the government’s major mainland policies”.923 Even on 20th March 2014, well into the Sunflower Occupation, SEF were reporting Taiwan’s export orders, an increase in mobile phone demand and “advanced wafer processing”.924

Finally, on 3rd April 2014, SEF acknowledged that the CSSTA was a national security issue, noting the EY’s processing of a draft Cross-strait Agreement Supervisory Act in response to “high level of public concern over cross-strait agreement supervision and the impact of the agreements on national security, as well as demands for a more open and transparent process”.925 On 8th April, a day after the official end of the Occupation, the 13th Boao Forum deployed an economic liberalism discourse of structural reforms. However Vincent Siew, representing Taiwan, implicitly acknowledged the Sunflowers’ concerns by urging “mainland

922 Straits Exchange Foundation. 2014. Cabinet reshuffled to further advance the wellbeing of the people. 3rd August 2014. [Removed from SEF and MAC websites since 2016].
923 Straits Exchange Foundation. 2014. SEF Vice Chairman Ma Shao-chang visits Taiwan businesspeople in Hainan and Guangxi. 18th March 2014. [Removed from SEF website since 2016].
924 Straits Exchange Foundation. 2014. Taiwan’s export orders increase 5.7% year-on-year. 20th March 2014. [Removed from SEF website since 2016].
Premier” Li Keqiang “to defuse concerns over the marginalization of Taiwan's economy”. Economic and cultural missions by both sides continued in May 2014 ignoring the Sunflowers to highlight positive growth and trade figures, historical and cultural links. The KMT and CCP’s sense of alarm is palpable and clumsy attempts were made to stress cross-Strait historical ties. Anhui CCP secretary Zhang Baoshun noted “Taiwan's first governor, Liu Ming-chuan, was an Anhui (mainland province) native and that this visit to Taiwan comes with an especially strong sense of closeness”. Yet, Lin Join-sane’s May 2014 SEF mission to Chongqing acknowledged CSSTA’s threat to Taiwanese businesses and asked for the CCP’s understanding.

That June, the 10th High-level SEF-ARATS talks were held in Taipei. There, TAO Minister Zhang was met with relentless protests by the Taiwan Solidarity Union and Black Island National Youth Front, shouting “One Country Each Side”. When he met the DPP mayor of Kaohsiung, Chen Chu, one of the 1979 Kaohsiung Eight, he relayed Beijing’s acknowledgement of Taiwan’s “social and cultural” identity. Lin Join-sane acknowledged domestic opposition to the CSSTA based on national security, pointing out to TBA heads that the government was consulting with the

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927 Straits Exchange Foundation. 2014. Chairman Lin Join-sane meets CPC Anhui Provincial Committee Secretary Zhang Baoshun. 8th May 2014. [Removed from SEF website since 2016].

928 Straits Exchange Foundation. 2014. Chairman Lin Join-sane leads a delegation to Chengdu and Chongqing. 15th May 2014.

However, he assured them that the CSSTA would be passed and implemented, “hoping to help prevent, reduce and avoid disasters for the benefit of people's livelihood across the Taiwan Strait,” despite the Sunflowers having effectively destroyed the pact. 

In sum, Taipei’s promotion of ECFA and CSSTA in its missions to taishang formed an integral part of its cross-Strait policy between 2008 and 2016. This promotion framed Taiwan as the legitimate representative of taishang interests in China. The purpose was to legitimate huadu in a social constituency that was perceived as likely to tend towards tongyi and be susceptible to Beijing’s United Front. In doing this, Taipei aimed to achieve taishang sanction of huadu. The next section shows how huadu was also deployed in domestic power politics and cross-cut with cross-Strait power politics.

8.4. The Domestic Environment

Two overlapping domestic events during Ma Ying-jeou’s second term constrained the KMT’s cross-Strait policy around the CSSTA and legitimated huadu. Both were driven by threat perception among pro-divergence domestic groups, constituted by huadu. Both involved the deployment of SIPs and sought to legitimate different conceptions of huadu. First, in 2013, a cleavage between the Chinese Nationalist and the Taiwanised wings of the KMT opened in what became known as the September Strife, or the Ma-Wang Conflict. Second, the March 2014 Sunflower Movement

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prevented the passage of the CSSTA, effectively ending the cross-Strait economic agreement process. These are relevant to the legitimation of huadu in that, first, they reflect a struggle between misperceived tongyi and taidu discourses. Pro-divergence observers of the Ma-Wang conflict misperceived Ma as representing the threat of tongyi, when in fact he sought to legitimate huadu. Moreover, pro-convergence constituencies misperceived Wang as attempting to delegitimate Rapprochement when in fact he represented a different conception of huadu. Similarly, pro-convergence constituencies misperceived the Sunflowers as representing taidu when in fact they sought to legitimate huadu and delegitimate the KMT’s version of huadu. These misperceptions intensified as Wang was co-opted as an ally of the Sunflowers.

8.4.1. The 2013 September Strife: Ma-Wang Conflict

The Taiwanese KMT elite, Wang Jin-pyng, had overseen the 1990s ROC constitutional reforms that had instituted huadu. As KMT vice-chairman between 2000 and 2005 and LY President after that, he was also trusted by the DPP. Part of the KMT’s localised (bentupai) faction, he helped legitimate waishengren elites. Wang had run against Ma for the KMT chairmanship and presidential nomination in 2005 and 2008. Both runs were bitter and he was accused of using identity politics against Ma.\textsuperscript{932} As early as 2005, the PRC had opposed his nomination as Taiwan’s APEC representative. In the 2008 election, Wang threatened to run as an independent and rejected Ma’s offer of the Vice-Presidential candidature. Instead, he nailed his Taiwanese colours to the mast by broadly supporting economic convergence, while perceiving in it an implicit Chinese threat. In this, he presaged the Sunflowers’ 2014 demands to warn that Taipei’s cross-Strait policy must consider three points:

one is guaranteeing national sovereignty, two is safeguarding national security, three is the rights of the 23 million people must be protected…Especially for the first point, all development of cross-strait consultations and negotiations will inevitably involve sovereignty, and both sides of the issue are so complex, so subtle, that negotiators are often unaware of the sacrifice of sovereignty, and don't realize that it has occurred.933

During the September Strife, Ma accused Wang of influence peddling by illegally lobbying for the DPP Chief Whip. Wang was expelled from the KMT and his legislative posts. However, the evidence against Wang had been gained accidentally through a KMT wiretap of another politician, in collusion with Taipei’s security services. The incident highlighted the fragility of the KMT’s democratic credentials and exposed Ma, who had sworn in his inauguration speech in May 2008 that such monitoring would cease.934

Wang appealed against his expulsion and was reinstated - fortuitously for pro-divergence DIGs, since the March 2014 Sunflower Occupation and Wang’s final appeal hearing converged, pitting both Wang and the Sunflowers against Ma Ying-jeou. Wang’s KMT membership and LY speakership were reinstated on 19th March 2014, the second day of the Sunflowers’ occupation of the legislature. This ensured that Wang remained Speaker and thus he – rather than Ma - could decide on police action, providing him with a bargaining chip and potential allies in the Sunflower Movement. With his position strengthened, he distanced himself from Ma’s KMT grouping. Thus, the KMT split entered the strategic context of the Sunflower Movement. The KMT retained Wang as LY speaker because of his strong Taiwanese base within the KMT. But Wang ran the LY in ways that protected minority parties

and coalitions, thus frustrating KMT policies. Wang’s prevalence over Ma damaged the latter’s personal credibility, but also delegitimated the KMT’s ability to defend Taiwan’s sovereignty in huadu. This was not so much because of Rapprochement per se, but because of what pro-divergence DIGs perceived and were able effectively to frame as an authoritarian tendency in KMT domestic governance that violated huadu’s core normative representations.

8.4.2. The 2014 Sunflower Occupation

The Sunflower Occupation was sparked by the KMT’s clumsy attempt to force the CSSTA through Taiwan’s legislature. It was the most serious domestic political crisis of Taiwan’s democratic period. Despite evidence that ECFA’s benefits were unevenly spread in Taiwan, in June 2013 Ma had used his executive powers to get SEF to sign the CSSTA without public consultation. As the content became clear, domestic opposition from threatened business DIGs to pro-divergence civic groups rose. Yet, the government decided to push ahead, opening Taiwan’s service sector to Chinese investment and allowing Chinese professionals to work in Taiwan, sharpening threat perception and opposition to liberalisation from pro-divergence DIGs.

Crisis point came in March 2014 during the passage of the CSSTA through the legislature. The KMT’s Wang Jin-pyng and the DPP called for a public review of the CSSTA, but the KMT rushed it through, declaring it considered without amendment. The DPP blocked it, but on 17th March 2014, the KMT passed it in 30 seconds in a furtive reading by one legislator into a microphone outside a toilet in a

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corridor. At 4am on March 19th, 2014, 400 students from the Black Island National Youth Front occupied the legislature. They quickly metamorphosed into the Sunflower Movement, a loose coalition of diverse domestic interests. Joined by thousands of volunteers, the students demanded the withdrawal of the CSSTA, a line-by-line review and legislative procedures to govern future cross-Strait agreements. However, the KMT repeated its defence of ECFA and the CSSTA benefiting Taiwan more than China. During an international press conference, Ma reiterated that the CSSTA would “stimulate Taiwan's service sector, ensure Taiwan's economic vitality and create conditions conducive to Taiwan participating in the process of economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region.”

The Ma-Wang conflict deepened on 20th March when Wang announced that he was responding to the students’ concerns. From then on, the Sunflowers concentrated on widening the split, rejecting Ma’s proposals and engaging with Wang’s. “Talking to Wang would strengthen him against Ma. It would be an insult for Ma if we negotiated with Wang”. On 22nd March the KMT VP, Jiang Yi-huah, met student leaders, but on 23rd March Ma peremptorily told them to go home. Students responded by occupying the EY and on 30th March a half-million-strong demonstration of civic groups supported the students, repeating the refrain of “Taiwan’s democracy”. The “anti-black-box protests”, as they became known, claimed the CSSTA threatened national security, posed major risks to Taiwan’s

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economy and exposed the KMT’s authoritarian lack of transparency and responsiveness “to the people’s concerns”.939 The Sunflowers continued to exploit the Ma-Wang split. On 6th April, Wang accepted the Sunflowers’ demand for an oversight bill. He then persuaded the students to leave, allowing them to save face and capitalise on public support. Students reported that if they had not seized the opportunity with Wang and support had declined, then the movement might have collapsed.940 The relationship between Ma and Wang was common knowledge, so the students sought legitimacy through Wang.941 On 6th April, Wang’s promise of a legislative review of all future cross-Strait agreements including the CSSTA sparked KMT infighting.942

Two student leaders, Lin Fei-fan and Chen Wei-ting, became the movement’s spokesmen. Eschewing the DPP, but advised by pan-Green legal academics, they created a coherent policy position from the disparate groupings. On 7th April, the Sunflower Movement issued a press release that presented its thinking on Taiwan’s status. Taiwan was sovereign; sovereignty rested with its people; Taiwanese democratic identity involved breaking with the authoritarian KMT past; there was a threat to Taiwan through “closed-door” and “black-box” collusion between the KMT and China to “sell Taiwan out” in the context of a constitutional crisis and democratic deficit in KMT governance:

[The Occupation] has made Taiwanese citizens realize that it is our choice not to let the rules and authority of the past generation to confine us, and that the constitutional

942 Democracy at 4am. 2014. Available at: http://4am.tw/
principle that “sovereignty shall reside in the whole body of citizens” is a living experience that belongs to every Taiwanese citizen of our generation.943

The Sunflowers’ policy stance presents a puzzle. On the one hand, their discourse is clearly driven by Taiwanese nationalism and bentuhua; this was a generation that identified only as Taiwanese and had no memory of Free China. However, their focus on the KMT’s lack of adherence to the ROC constitutional and legal framework pulled them towards huadu located in the ROC. The Sunflowers’ epistemic community consisted of pan-Green academics and activists. In particular legal scholars, Huang Kuo-chang and Lai Chung-chiang, argued that since the 1991 ROC Constitutional amendments treated the “Mainland Area” and “Taiwan Area” as separate jurisdictions within one China, there was no legal procedure for review of a treaty-type agreement like the CSSTA. In the absence of a ROT constitution, a supervisory mechanism was needed to provide “public oversight” of cross-strait agreements.944 This move located Taiwan’s national interest in huadu, not taidu, and legitimated the Sunflowers as its guardians while delegitimizing the KMT as threatening it.

Claiming that the Sunflowers had redefined the relationship between Taiwan and China, Lin Fei-fan deployed SIPs to brand the KMT undemocratic and therefore un-Taiwanese: “we showed the government that Taiwan’s future belongs to its 23 million people. We should be the ones to decide our future.”945 In this regard, Lin Fei-fan articulated a huadu position that upheld the ROC Constitution, created

internal Taiwanese solidarity and excluded China. Yet, in aluding to “other different opinions” it it implicitly refused to sanction taidu:

we occupied the parliament because it was not functioning properly…we seek a more institutionalized solution that complies with the rule of law. Actually what we are doing is quite simple, we are not attempting to represent all these other different opinions.946

Democratisation is Taiwanisation.947 But Taiwan is the ROC, the ROC is not China and the rule of law is constituted in the ROC. So it is the Sunflowers who redefined huadu in 2014. This position locates Taiwan’s state identity in the ROC and aligns to huadu normative representations as defined by the KMT in Taiwanese political speech after 2008. The paradox is that the Sunflowers perceived the KMT as not adhering to these norms. So the Sunflower huadu is tangential to the thin and thick versions (q.v. 1.5.)

The Sunflower position was neither non-rational nor illiberal per se.

We definitely aren’t against more trade... But …we have to see what the specific details are, what sectors are opened and what you are giving up. Are the gains worth the costs, and are the gains shared by the people, or by certain business interests? Also, signing a trade pact with China has very high [political] costs for Taiwan.948

This contrasts with Chen Wei-ting’s more Marxist position that frames the Sunflowers’ defence of Taiwanese democratic identity as anti-globalisation and China’s use of economic liberalism to control Taiwan as the Hegelian peace in reverse:

947 Lan, Yiping. 1983:11-12.
while Taiwan is facing this world of globalized capitalism, it is even more dangerous facing the rise of China… because China claims sovereignty over us… the past 6 years we have seen how China has steadily taken over our economy. We are against this trend of globalized free trade, because it benefits capitalists and hurts the disadvantaged people, and we are especially against China’s role in riding the wave of free trade to monopolize Taiwan’s economy and politics.949

Despite sanctioning huadu, Chen Wei-ting accused the DPP of reneging on its social-democratic pro-taidu platform and shifting to the right on free trade: “Even when the DPP is giving up on this principle, we want to protect it, and economically we need to be more on the left to balance them.”950

Although the catalyst was the KMT’s undemocratic domestic actions in forcing through the CSSTA, protests articulated grievances around the domestic economy and social movements and the KMT’s authoritarian response in the context of a perceived Chinese threat. The Sunflower leaders capitalised on these grievances, but they did not propose taidu.

It is tempting to read the Ma-Wang Conflict and the Sunflower Occupation as DIG constraint on foreign policy, as a response to state underbalancing in the context of perceived threat and as DIGs “pulling and hauling” the FPE back to the status quo.951

What is striking, though, is that huadu was operative in the political speech of both the student leaders and the administration throughout the Occupation. Both groups sought to legitimate different interpretations of huadu – one economically liberal and soft-authoritarian, the other protectionist and civic-democratic. Neither of these can be said to align strictly to the thin or thick versions (q.v. 1.5.). While the Sunflower


950 Ibid.

version legitimates the ROC, it avoids One China altogether. The Sunflowers perceived the CSSTA and the KMT’s cross-Strait policy in general as incompatible with *huadu*, as a threat to Taiwan’s sovereignty and illegitimate. The KMT and Beijing perceived the Sunflowers as pro-\textit{taidu}. However, rather than seeking a de jure ROT, the Sunflowers sought to defend *huadu*, protecting the symbols of Chinese nationalism such as Sun Yat-sen’s portrait and the legislative seal, and demanding that ROC institutions operate constitutionally. The Sunflower Occupation suggests that constraint on Taipei’s cross-Strait policy was not simply a bottom-up process, but a top-down one as well. The identities and interests of the Sunflowers, as Taiwan’s most powerful domestic interest group, were themselves constituted by *huadu*.

8.5. The Ma-Xi Summit

Despite pro-divergence interest group perceptions in Taiwan, the KMT’s framing of Taiwan’s core interests around democracy, sovereignty and security and the primacy they assign to democracy presuppose and imply that the ROC’s identity is Taiwanese and not Chinese and that sovereignty means *huadu*. At the Xi-Ma summit in November 2015, Ma Ying-jeou presented a policy platform and discourse that recognised Sunflower articulations of *huadu* norms while reasserting the 1992 Consensus of OCRI as its basis.

At the summit, Ma’s speech rested on a number of presuppositions around ROC constitutional changes in 1991 and 1993, a series of rhetorical tropes and a number of lexico-grammatical signals. In his opening statements, during the closed-door meeting, at the press conference and on board the flight to Taipei, Ma repeatedly mentioned the 1992 Consensus and OCRI. Ma combined a strong defence of the ROC as the locus of *huadu* with a cultural One China, thus appearing to combine
thin and thick *huadu* (q.v. 1.5.). This is surprising because, first, he knew that China had progressively moved away from “respective interpretations” and, second, he was perceived by *taidu* constituencies as identifying as sympathetic to *tongyi*. However, as this study’s Realist Constructivism argues, as President of the ROC he had to present a policy position that reflected Taiwan’s and not China’s national interest. The fact that Ma asserted this form of *huadu* at the summit confirms Beijing’s sanction; the wording would have been agreed beforehand.

First, the two sides separately identified the One-China Principle as the core of the 1992 Consensus; Xi said “the significance of the 1992 Consensus lies with the one-China principle it embodies”. 952

Ma stated in his opening speech:

> On Aug. 1, 1992, our National Unification Council passed a resolution on the meaning of “one China,” which said that both sides of the Taiwan Strait insist on the “one China” principle, but they differ as to what that means. The consensus reached between the two sides in November 1992 is that both sides of the Taiwan Strait insist on the “one China” principle, and each side can express its interpretation verbally; this is the 1992 Consensus of “one China, respective interpretations.” For our part, we stated that the interpretation does not involve “two Chinas,” “one China and one Taiwan,” or “Taiwan independence,” as the Republic of China Constitution does not allow it. This position is very clear, and is accepted by the majority of the people of Taiwan. 953

Second, according to their respective constitutions, One China can mean either the People’s Republic of China or the Republic of China. However, since One China was coined, both sides have had different interpretations of who represents the one China.

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Ma knew that China knew that. In the meeting, diplomatic protocol determined that neither explicitly expressed his own full interpretation. However, Ma’s respective interpretation can be pragmatically inferred from the broader macro-discourse and historical context (q.v. 5.2.1.). OCRI is not treaty-bound, but is articulated pragmatically and is therefore discursive.

Third, the two sides did not explicitly state what One China meant. China has never acknowledged the “different interpretations” since it could discursively mean that Taiwan is not part of the same One China as the PRC. Given this concern, Ma told Xi from a prepared text, “the interpretations of the Taiwan side do not include ‘two Chinas’ or ‘one China, one Taiwan’ or ‘Taiwan independence’ because those are not allowed by the Republic of China’s Constitution”.954 This makes the ROC the locus of One China and its identity as huadu. The ROC constitution does not permit Taiwan’s independence from the ROC, yet there is no point in independence from a de facto Taiwanese state. The ROC and Taiwan are one and the same. The problem of what the PRC is is dealt with by ROC constitutional change to the Taiwan Area and abolition of the NUC and NUGs. Thus, Ma’s statement is a policy position that maintains the status quo.

After this, Xi stated “[the 1992 Consensus] makes it clear that the mainland and Taiwan belong to the same one China and the relationship across the Strait is not a state-to-state one or between one China and one Taiwan”955. Although there is a semantic difference, the two statements may be interpreted by pro-tongyi

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955 Huang, Jiashu. 2015.
constituencies as having the same meaning; that is, both sides belong to one country, but are effectively under separate administrations. In this sense, the two sides have a semantic consensus on what the 1992 Consensus does not mean, but they do not have a pragmatic one. It is what One China does not mean, therefore, that constitutes the illocutionary-perlocutionary gap that huadu fills.

This leaves discursive space for the claim that the ROC is merely a constitutional artefact, territorially bounded by the Taiwan Area. However, what China opposes is not “respective interpretations” but interpretations deviating from the legal principle of one China – in other words taidu. So long as this principle is not explicitly violated, the ROC is legitimate and China sanctions huadu. Trying to pin huadu down semantically is a dead end. It can only be interpreted pragmatically in context.

8.6. Beijing’s Sanction of huadu in Rapprochement

After 2008, both Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping implicitly acknowledged the ROC, thus sanctioning huadu. In March 2008, in a call to the US President, George W Bush, Hu suggested Beijing and Taipei should “restore consultation and talks on the basis of the ‘1992 consensus,’ which sees both sides recognise there is only one China, but agree to differ on its definition”. In December 2008, he stated “both the mainland and Taiwan belong to one China” and urged both sides to “make pragmatic explorations in their political relations under the special circumstances where the country has not yet been reunified”. Hu’s 2009 Six Points imply linguistically Beijing’s recognition of Taiwan’s de facto status.


957 Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China. Full text of Hu’s speech at the “Forum Marking the 30th Anniversary of the Issuance of the Message to Compatriots in
ECFA constitutes Beijing’s endorsement of Taiwan since a FTA cannot be concluded between a state and a local authority. In signing the ECFA, Beijing sanctioned Taiwan and presupposed two central governments under a facilitating “one China” framework.

In March 2012, Hu Jintao said to KMT Chairman, Wu Po-hsiung, “the CCP should view cross-strait situations “objectively,” that is, the “fact that [both] the mainland and Taiwan belong to one China [is] in line with the current cross-strait rules and regulations and should be observed by both sides”.

Ma Ying-jeou asserted huadu forcefully in May 2012.

When we speak of “one China,” naturally it is the Republic of China. According to our Constitution, the sovereign territory of the Republic of China includes Taiwan and the mainland. At present, the ROC government has authority to govern only in Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu. In other words, over the past two decades [since 1992], the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have been defined as “one Republic of China, two areas.” This status has remained unchanged throughout the administrations of the [past] three presidents ...[One ROC, two areas] is an eminently rational and pragmatic definition, and constitutes the basis for assuring the ROC’s long-term development and safeguarding Taiwan’s security. Both sides of the Taiwan Strait ought to squarely face up to this reality, seek common ground while respecting differences, and establish a consensus regarding “mutual non-recognition of sovereignty and mutual non-denial of authority to govern.” Only in this way can the two sides move forward with confidence.

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Beijing did not challenge Ma’s articulation because it aligned semantically to the 1992 Consensus. Beijing stated that “the mainland was not surprised to hear Ma’s statement, as it was consistent with his previous policies … We consider any statements, ideas or policies that adhere to this fact [that there is one China] to be positive and conducive to the peaceful development of cross-strait relations”.\textsuperscript{961} Yet, Ma’s words “both sides of the Taiwan Strait ought to squarely face up to this reality” imply a rebuke to Beijing and a pragmatic claim that Taiwan is a sovereign state separate to China.

In January 2013, Xi Jinping reasserted the semantic meaning of Beijing’s original claim in the 1992 Consensus:

\begin{quote}
China will pursue its development by seeking a peaceful international environment [and]
safeguarding and promoting world peace, but will never give up [its] legitimate rights
and will never sacrifice [its] national core interests.\textsuperscript{962}
\end{quote}

In February 2013, he reiterated to Lien Chan that nothing could “change the fact that both sides on the Taiwan Strait belong to one China.” Beijing sought “peaceful development of cross-strait ties … to maintain consistencies in policies toward Taiwan by unswervingly upholding the one-China principle and continuing to promote cross-strait exchanges and cooperation”. Yet, Xi also voiced the flexible post-1995 One China. “Both Taipei and Beijing”, he stated, “base their legal and government systems on the one-China principle, under which Taiwan is a part of China, as is the Chinese mainland”. This articulation presupposed that the ROC was a state in its acknowledgement of “legal and government systems” in relation to


“Taipei”. The aim is clearly tongyi, but as a concession he added, “of course, we also are soberly aware that historical problems remain in cross-strait relations, and that there will be issues in the future that will require time, patience, and joint effort to resolve”. 963

Projecting flexibility, the TAO Director, Zhang Zhijun, implied that cross-Strait relations were political, saying “political issues should never be artificially categorized as a restricted area”. 964 At the Boao Forum in April 2013, Xi Jinping reiterated “the Chinese mainland and Taiwan should jointly push cross-strait economic cooperation to a new level by strengthening cross-strait high level dialogue and coordination”. 965 “High-level” may pragmatically be read as “government-to-government”, effectively sanctioning huadu.

In June 2013, Wu Po-hsiung told Xi Jinping that One China meant the ROC. Xi Jinping responded that “seeking common ground and shelving differences requires both sides to rally political wisdom, pool and expand consensus on promoting development of cross-strait ties and manage differences appropriately”. 966


the non-committal nature of the words suggests instrumental diplomacy. Yet, it is the lack of semantic precision itself that creates discursive space for *huadu* to occupy.


It is both sides’ willingness to pursue Rapprochement under the rubric of the 1992 Consensus, which provides for different interpretations of One China that allowed Taipei to deploy *huadu* and compel Beijing’s sanction. Once OCRI had been encoded, respective interpretations meant it became a discourse that took on a life of its own and developed into a war of words over legitimacy. Simply by engaging with Taipei and articulating interpretations of One China, Beijing sanctioned *huadu*. Granted, Beijing has a strategic interest in sanctioning a thin *huadu* that averts *taidu*. However, by being unable to challenge Taipei’s *huadu* discourse linguistically,
Beijing was compelled to cede discursive space for Taipei to do with *huadu* what it wanted.

### 8.7. Conclusion

This chapter has related how *huadu* was tested and crystalised during the 2008-16 KMT administration. In undergoing the litmus test of Rapprochement, *huadu* was re-legitimated as a Taiwanese state identity and *tongyi* and *taidu* finally delegitimated as alternative state identities because both entail state death and only *huadu* secures the ROC. *Huadu* as civic form of liberal democracy, threatened by a perceived KMT authoritarian turn in alliance with Chinese interests, was secured by the DPP’s presidential election win in 2016.

The KMT’s attempt to enact Rapprochement through ECFA and its follow-on agreements failed because, as *huadu* crystalised, these were perceived by powerful domestic groups as threatening Taiwan’s sovereignty even though an overarching *huadu* discourse constituted both KMT and DIG preferences. The crystalisation of *huadu* in fact empowered Taiwan as a legitimate actor in Rapprochement in three ways, all related to Beijing’s voluntary compliance. First, Taipei drew on the active support of Beijing, who did more than simply comply with *huadu*, actively investing resources in Rapprochement. Second, Taipei drew on Beijing’s simple compliance; Beijing behaved in accordance with *huadu*-driven rules, decisions and commands. Finally, Taipei benefited from low levels of opposition from Beijing, which reduced the costs of coercion and bribery.\(^{971}\) This process co-constituted and embedded *huadu*, securing Taiwan’s de facto independence and compelling Beijing’s sanction.

The Sunflower Movement damaged the KMT’s hold on power and reversed Rapprochement. The KMT was wiped out in the November 2014 mid-term elections,\(^{971}\) Reus-Smit. Christian. 2007:163-4.
the legislature blocked all follow-on agreements with China. At the domestic level, Taiwan’s social movements were revitalised; The Sunflowers mobilised support and spawned “Third Force” parties, such as the NPP and the SDP, who pressure the DPP from the left, but aligned to huadu, not taidu.972 The Sunflowers supported the anti-nuclear movement immediately following the LY occupation in 2014 and backed former DPP elite and Kaohsiung defendant Lin Yi-hsiung’s hunger strike in support of it. The KMT lost the 2016 election; domestic economic issues and the KMT’s administrative competence were factors, but so was the perception that the KMT had violated huadu norms. This was perceived by powerful groups in Taiwan as threatening the status quo and by extension Taiwan’s de facto independence.

Taiwan’s business organisations switched to lobbying the DPP to institute “business-friendly” labour reforms in Taiwan, confirming the DPP as the party of Taiwanese business. The NPP and the SDP supported Taiwan’s trade unions against these labour reforms. The DPP’s refusal formally to accept the 1992 Consensus as the basis of cross-Strait talks led Beijing to isolate Taipei internationally. Taipei adopted liberal economic policies while switching away from China to a “Southbound Policy”. Yet, at the same time, the new DPP administration, supported by the pan-Blue KMT and PFP caucuses, enacted a Referendum Act prohibiting any constitutional change to the ROC’s official title and territory through referendums, confirming that, despite Taipei’s semantic rejection of the 1992 Consensus, huadu is Taiwan’s state identity, national interest and political status.

972 Beckershoff, Andre. 2015.
Chapter 9: Conclusions

9.1. Introduction

On 2nd January 2019, Xi Jinping reiterated Beijing’s January 1979 offer of “One Country, Two Systems” (OCTS) to Taipei. While stressing “peaceful reunification” and respect for “the legitimate rights” of the Taiwanese, he reasserted “China must and will be reunified” and retained Beijing’s option of force as a last resort against “Taiwan independence separatists”.973

International media focused on an existential threat to Taiwan.974 Yet, Tsai Ing-wen recognised Xi’s mention of taidu as a straw man and immediately occupied the discursive gap that he had helpfully directed her to, tweeting:

As President of the Republic of China, I must solemnly emphasize that we have never accepted the “1992 Consensus”. The fundamental reason is that the Beijing authorities’ definition of the “1992 Consensus” is “one China” and “one country, two systems”. So again, I am calling on China to accept the reality of the Republic of China (Taiwan); it must respect the commitment of the 23 million people of Taiwan to freedom and democracy; it must handle cross-strait differences peacefully, on the basis of equality, and it must be governments or government-authorized agencies that engage in negotiations.975

Tsai’s formal rejection of the 1992 Consensus appears puzzling alongside her defence of the ROC and the fact that her four substantive demands reiterate those of Ma Ying-jeou (and reflect 2008-16 Rapprochement): Beijing must recognise that the ROC is a sovereign state; Taiwan is a liberal democracy; cross-Strait relations are peaceful and state-to-state and relations must be functionally diplomatic ones. In fact, Tsai justifies rejecting the 1992 Consensus because Beijing’s interpretation (OCTS) would make Taiwan a Special Administrative Region of the PRC and, as such, entail ROC state death. Granted, Tsai’s interpretation of ROC sovereignty diverges from Taipei’s contribution to the 1992 Consensus (q.v. 7.2.) and Ma Ying-jeou’s 2015 interpretation (q.v. 8.5). However, it certainly aligns to the DPP’s position expressed by Joseph Wu in January 2016 (q.v. 8.2.6.). So, Tsai’s rejection of OCTS keeps the ROC in play and, to achieve this, she keeps on the table a pragmatic interpretation of what Taipei said in 1992, modified by intervening policy statements (q.v. 7.3; 8.2.6; 9.4.1.). In so doing, Tsai legitimates the ROC, maintains the status quo, secures Taiwan’s de facto independence and adheres to huadu. Beijing sanctions this. The 1992 Consensus is not essential to the status quo or to huadu; it was simply a means to those ends.

In her 2019 New Year speech, Tsai reiterated “what the two sides of the strait really need is a pragmatic understanding of the fundamental differences in the values we espouse, our lifestyles, and our political systems”. 976 Indeed, Xi also acknowledged

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that different normative representations were the sticking point and reiterated that OCTS would respect Taiwan’s democracy.977

In this regard, then, the 2019 New Year exchange confirms this study’s realist-constructivist and discourse-analytic arguments around the logic of huadu. Taipei’s deployment of huadu’s normative representations in cross-Strait power politics is ameliorated by prudence and morality. Huadu crystalised in Rapprochement; Beijing and Taipei endorse huadu and huadu encodes Taiwan’s normative representations in the ROC, securing the status quo and Taiwan’s de facto independence. Taidu is a straw man and, while PRC-centred tongyi may be Beijing’s goal, it remains simply an aspiration as long as it endorses huadu.

This chapter seeks not simply to relate the study’s key findings. The study’s unique theoretical framework, data set and methodology require and invite a much broader and more involved response. To do so, it does the following: first, it summarises the findings of the thesis (q.v. 9.2.). Second, it expands on how these findings relate to state identity change (q.v. 9.3.). Third, it shows how this study’s realist-constructivist framework and discourse-analytic methodology support the findings (q.v. 9.3.). Fourth, it discusses the logic of huadu (q.v. 9.4.). Fifth, it outlines the academic and policy implications of the findings (q.v. 9.5.). Finally, the chapter offers a number of concluding remarks for consideration. In doing so, this study offers a plausible explanation of the Taiwan Problem and a useful and innovative approach to a number of IR issues. In particular, it suggests that in pursuing huadu Taipei seeks not just security but peace.

9.2. Main Findings

This thesis concludes with the following findings:

First, the concept of Taiwan Independence is misconceived; Taiwan has been independent in the ROC since at least 1950. In this regard, *huadu* is a state-centred identity that exists on a pan-Blue-pan-Green spectrum that runs from unification (*tongyi*) to de jure independence (*taidu*) and oscillates within the cross-Strait status quo of de facto Taiwan independence. Violating *huadu* would spell the end of the ROC.

Second, this study accounts for *huadu* analytically as a state identity; Fell and Schubert do not – they treat Taiwan’s de facto independence as a national-identity-driven function of domestic party politics. The data in this study show that *huadu* was constituted in authoritarian KMT sinification as well as in Taiwanisation (*bentuhua*), democratisation and cross-Strait relations from the earliest days of Free China. *Huadu* norms are visible in Free China “idealis”, while Free China “realis” embedded the ROC’s political isolation in Taiwan. *Huadu* was catalysed by the ROC’s crises of legitimacy, oscillated within the status quo after 1992 and had nucleated by 2008. After 2008, *huadu* underwent a domestic and cross-Strait test of its Taiwanese-ness that led it to crystalise as transparent, civic and liberal democratic. These representations bestow legitimacy.

Third, *huadu*’s normative representations reflect a domestic struggle between ethnic and civic nationalisms, deployed strategically in SIPs. KMT and DPP rhetorical appeals to Chinese and Taiwanese nationalisms belied a strong defence of *huadu* and when ethnic identity threatened *huadu* (and the existence of the ROC), elites restrained it. Rather, liberal democracy became a key *huadu* norm through a civic-nationalist appeal to the “New Taiwanese”. Taiwan’s presidential-parliamentary
system facilitated elite (presidential) entrepreneurship and agency in constituting *huadu* in the first place. Yet, it also permitted authoritarian “black-box” practices that potentially threatened *huadu* norms. Such practices in turn prompted the Sunflowers’ defence of *huadu* norms, determining who got to legitimate *huadu*.

Fourth, Beijing pragmatically sanctions *huadu* because it provisionally averts *taidu*. Yet, that sanction in itself threatens Beijing’s ontological security. As this study has argued, *huadu* contains the pragmatic threat of *taidu* (q.v. 4.6.3.). For this reason, Beijing must relentlessly delegitimate *taidu* and blur the meaning of Taiwan Independence. China’s *Great Power* identity sees the recovery of Taiwan as an imperative.\(^978\) Yet, Beijing has relaxed its original One China definition, sanctioning the ROC’s Westphalian and domestic sovereignty, but not international recognition. It resists the Washington Consensus, adopting Peaceful Development as its cross-Strait policy agenda.\(^979\) *Huadu* forces Beijing to accept international liberal norms to a degree. While Taipei perceives a threat in Beijing’s semantic support for *tongyi* and opposition to *taidu* Beijing lives in fear that *huadu* will violate its boundary with *taidu*. The formal loss of Taiwan would delegitimate the CCP, empowering Chinese liberal and nationalist dissidents as well as the separatist movement in Xinjiang. Taiwan perceives an immanent threat in Beijing’s power. But it is this rise combined with its state identity that is perceived as a threat.

Fifth, the crystallisation of *huadu* in Rapprochement refutes any claim that the KMT sought to sell Taiwan out or that Taiwan-leaning elites sought to pull the KMT administration back to an optimum policy position, or indeed that elites even know what that position is. *Huadu*, rather than leaders’ motivations and ideologies,

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\(^{979}\) Gries, Peter Hayes. 2004.
constitutes cross-Strait policy and the preferences of powerful domestic groups. But domestic groups may misinterpret leaders’ intentions based on threat perception and national identity. This phenomenon is apparent in the 2014 Sunflower occupation and the 2015 Ma-Xi summit.

Sixth, the Sunflowers aligned to huadu norms, thus delegitimizing the KMT as defenders of those norms. In this regard, the Sunflowers did not seek taidu. Rather, like Taiwan’s other powerful DIGs, they sanctioned the ROC and formed part of its legitimacy nexus. The discursive power of the huadu discourse accounts for this.

Seventh, Taipei actively sought to draw the taishang, who were perceived as China-leaning by Taiwan-leaning interest groups, into huadu’s legitimacy nexus. It did this discursively through engagement with Taiwanese Businessmen’s Associations that framed Taipei as the authority that represented and secured taishang interests diplomatically on the mainland. In this regard, the data in this study refute Schubert’s claim that the taishang do not constitute a coherent interest group.

Eighth, the 1992 Consensus permits huadu, while ROC constitutional change permitted the 1992 Consensus, allowing de facto international relations. That the term 1992 Consensus was not created until 2000 is irrelevant; the discourse clearly exists in the data. Similarly, the DPP’s semantic refusal of the 1992 Consensus does not mean that it does not recognise it pragmatically or that the DPP’s own discourse is not constituted by it.

Ninth, this study’s Taiwanese Political Speech data facilitates a linguistics-driven discourse analysis that reveals the findings above and accounts for them in a way that previous studies do not. In particular, it reveals how a huadu discourse developed and that huadu’s discursive power to secure Taiwan’s de facto independence should
be understood pragmatically rather than semantically. That is, *huadu* is presupposed and implied over the long term in Taiwanese political speech through a discourse that takes Taiwan’s de facto independence for granted.

### 9.3. State Identity Change and Taiwan’s Maintenance of its de facto Independence

This section relates the above findings to Taiwan’s state identity change and its maintenance of de facto independence in the face of superior Chinese power. The argument has been that, despite its relative material power advantage, Beijing is unable to realise its irredentist claim to Taiwan because of the discursive power of *huadu*. *Huadu* is primarily a state identity, but it is also a discourse and a political status that speaks to a social constituency to legitimate a sovereign ROC as Taiwan. In this way, Taipei delegitimates Beijing’s *Great Power* (*daguo*) irredentist claim by averting two forms of unification, or *tongyi* - Beijing’s preferred PRC-centred *zhongtong* (under OCTS) and ROC-centred *huatong*, which Beijing acknowledges but opposes. It also averts Beijing’s worst-case scenario of *taidu*. For Taipei, such outcomes are not only normatively inimical to its state identity, but materially impossible, since both would result in state death.\(^{980}\)

As a rational response to and discursive resolution of perceived PRC threat and the ROC’s loss of legitimacy as *Free China*, *huadu* has transformed the ROC from authoritarian and Chinese to democratic and Taiwanese in power politics. Taipei appeals to this identity to exercise discursive power more effectively than Beijing. Taipei’s discourse represents Taiwan as a legitimate sovereign state in the ROC and a more legitimate member of the international community than Beijing. While the

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\(^{980}\) The Qing was an empire, the 1895 ROT was territorially restricted and did not enjoy legitimacy and Taiwan’s status under Japan was that of a colony. The 1991 ROC constitutional changes made the ROC a Taiwanese state.
PRC has existed since 1949, the ROC has existed since 1912. Yet, its post-1996 liberal-democratic political system and free-market economy appeal to powerful liberal internationalist discourses and gain it widespread sanction as Taiwan. Taiwan’s powerful interest groups and constituencies – including taishang, Sunflowers, policy elites, mainstream political parties and the electorate - seek to maintain the status quo. The international community supports Taiwan. Forced unification by the PRC is not deemed acceptable.

That huadu receives the sanction of the US and the international community is not a novel claim. The US also sanctioned Free China and the international community sanctioned the Asian Tiger. The power of huadu is that it has a legitimacy that Free China and the Asian Tiger never achieved. That is, it also compels Beijing’s implicit sanction by nullifying the latter’s principal red line – a formal declaration of taidu. The PRC’s legitimacy could not survive a successful taixi. Beijing’s concerns over the negative ramifications to its international reputation and legitimacy as a permanent member of the UNSC and a responsible global citizen deter it from attempting forced unification. Huadu would render such a move an invasion of a well-functioning liberal-democratic state rather than the settling of an irredentist claim. The fact that Beijing has engaged in de facto state-to-state relations with Taipei at least since 1992 and that this is encoded in political text means that Beijing sanctions huadu. Whether that sanction is instrumental and provisional or not, it passes up to the discourse, thus reinforcing Taipei’s legitimacy, and to break it would delegitimize Beijing. In this regard, huadu represents Taipei’s more effective discursive power to legitimate its de facto independence.

By side-stepping the tongyi-taidu binary choice through huadu, Taipei also exposes taixi as misconceived in relation to China’s irredentist claim in two ways. First,
since *taidu* represents Taiwan’s aspiration to independence from the ROC and the ROC has been constituted as Taiwan since 1991, Taiwan is already independent as the ROC. Second, Taiwan’s two-host puzzle explains Beijing’s claim to Taiwan as part-and-parcel of its successor-state claim as China to an ROC that also claimed to be China. Since the ROC has reconstituted itself, its claim to be China has dissolved into *huadu*, thus delegitimizing Beijing’s claim. Beijing cannot legitimately pursue its claim through force as long as Taiwan remains the ROC. The expansion of legitimacy from domestic and transnational non-state constituencies to other states, including enemies, constitutes a powerful legitimacy nexus. For *huadu* to stand, Beijing counts more than the US, domestic and transnational constituencies or the international community of states.981 Yet, in sanctioning *huadu*, Beijing’s own ontological security is threatened.

Security and sovereignty through the legitimation of its state identity define Taiwan’s national interest and cross-Strait policy between 1945 and 2016. Exogenous shocks like international crises of legitimacy change elite views and lead to foreign policy change if the state wishes to survive. As this thesis has shown, foreign policy cannot operate independently of state identity, since both seek to promote the national interest. In this regard *huadu*, as a reconstituted state identity, was bound to lead to divergence from China as Taiwan’s national interest diverged. Taiwan has sought to resolve this through cross-Strait economic and social convergence alongside political divergence on the one hand and intense domestic political struggle on the other.

It may seem that if *huadu* continues to define Taipei, China will be unable to compel Taiwan to unify and still retain legitimacy and Taiwan will be unable to achieve de jure status as the Republic of Taiwan. This raises certain questions: is there a way out

981 Yeh, Chieh-ting. 2016.
of this quandary for Taiwan? Can huadu sustain Taiwan’s security in the long term? What traction does huadu have beyond maintaining the cross-Strait status quo? Does huadu have a political purpose beyond security? This thesis provides tentative answers and points to some areas in which the post-2016 DPP leadership has reconstituted huadu. The DPP’s management of cross-Strait relations permits tentative verification of the main arguments in this thesis.

Huadu is ideationally driven, but it is realist and rational. For Realist Constructivism, the intersubjective nature of power politics and contingency of state identity provides insight. Cross-Strait relations and domestic politics are power politics and a struggle for power. However, power politics are contextual and contingent. The discursive power of huadu to legitimate Taipei’s normative representations must balance the morality of political action with its likelihood of success. Carr, Morgenthau and Wendt see the fundamental puzzle of IR as moral. If the moral imperative of huadu is cohesive, peaceful cross-Strait relations that secure Taiwan’s de facto independence, then economic power combined with political will might constitute systemic structural change; Taiwan may have the latter, but it does not have the former. Rapprochement, and indeed cross-Strait relations in general, attempted this. Yet, for Realist Constructivism, conflict is just as likely as cooperation in IR. Reading huadu through Carr, it might be seen as purposeful appeasement of Beijing to produce temporary cross-Strait harmony. For Morgenthau, prudence may allow huadu to produce some providential outcome favourable to Taipei – and to Beijing for that matter. Prudence and morality, not ideology, guide huadu norms as cross-Strait policy. In Rapprochement, Taipei sought to avoid ideological confrontation and to acknowledge Beijing’s interests while protecting and promoting its own. As a

state in limbo, the ROC must legitimate itself. This carries threats. Therefore, policy elites constantly seek sanction for *huadu* through normative representations as well as de facto ability to function. Paradoxically, legal non-recognition has facilitated state-building. Loss of international standing forced Taipei to engage directly with powerful international norms, institutionalising legitimate government. The ROC did not face an explicit international demand to reform, since this would have entailed formal recognition. However, Taipei knows that internationally-held standards of governance provide security.

9.4. A Realist-Constructivist *huadu*

This study has argued that neither Realism nor Constructivism alone can adequately account for the power of *huadu*. However, a realist-constructivist synthesis can for the following reasons. First, it fits theory to problem rather than vice-versa, obviating paradigmatic overstretch. Second, it presents *huadu* as both rational and ideational; this opposition is dialectic, not exclusionary. Third, it conceptualises Taiwan’s discursive power as the productive power of *huadu* to legitimate the ROC as Taiwan (q.v. 3.2.4.) and it conceptualises *huadu* itself as Taiwan’s state identity (q.v. 4.4.2.). Thus, it applies Realism’s core concept of power and Constructivism’s core concept of intersubjectivity to show how *huadu* draws on and bestows discursive power – that is, legitimacy constructed in power politics – on Taiwan. Fourth, it invites a discourse-analytic approach that melds positivism and interpretivism to locate empirical textual warrant for the semantic meaning of *huadu* and for its pragmatic communicative effect (q.v. 5.2.). Fifth, a realist-constructivist synthesis brings a classical-realist focus on *huadu*’s role in power politics and cross-Strait policy and constructivist methodology for co-constitution of structures (*huadu*; ROC state;  

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cross-Strait relations) and agents (elites, constituencies, interest groups, states) in cross-Strait policy to account for Taipei’s refusal of Beijing’s power. Sixth, it combines bottom-up domestic construction of a unitary state foreign policy response with top-down, systemic construction of unitary state preferences, permitting a two-level, three-stage analysis of cross-Strait policy construction (q.v. 3.3.). Finally, it provides constructivist epistemological and ontological support for classical-realist morality and prudence and avoids the contradictions of the scientific turn in Waltz’s neorealism.985

To justify the study’s innovativeness and analytical appropriateness, the primary argument is that a single conception of power and identity cannot explain Taiwan’s maintenance of its de facto independence because, first, all factors affecting state behaviour are interrelated.986 Second, a neorealist focus on material forces provides useful core concepts of balance of power and balance of threat. Neoliberalism provides core concepts of economic interdependence and liberal institutionalism. These partially explain policy choices and how the cross-Strait sub-system constrains Taipei’s options. Yet, they cannot provide a comprehensive theoretical account of Taiwan’s maintenance of de facto independence because they do not satisfactorily align ideational factors like state identity, legitimation and norms with foreign policy. Wendt’s constructivist approach provides a broad understanding of state identity construction in socialisation with other states, with each state identifying Self and Other as Hobbesian enemy, Lockean rival or Kantian friend and formulating preferences in relation to Others. That is, it provides a Highway Code for state behaviour in the system.

Yet, Wendt’s approach alone is problematic in Taiwan’s case. First, his systemic theory merely brackets the domestic, meaning that Wendt’s corporate state identities require further exploration. Second, Wendt downplays the role of power politics in state identity formation. This requires opening up the domestic to unearth the agency of Taiwan’s political elites and DIGs to construct state identity and cross-State policy, a step permitted by Realist Constructivism. Yet, as this study observes, Taiwan’s elites resort to context and selectively deploy SIPs to legitimate *huadu*. Thus, they make context crucial to state identity and foreign policy.

Between 1947 and 1987 the KMT retained power by deploying sinification and *bentuhua* to construct *huadu* through *Free China*. From 1987 to 2016, the ROC enacted *huadu* to shift from being Chinese to Taiwanese. The democratic presidential elections in 1996, 2000, 2008 and 2016 indicate oscillation between pan-Blue and pan-Green, but other domestic watersheds that signal power shifts are first, 2-28 in 1947; second the Zhongli Incident in 1977; third, the Kaohsiung Incident in 1979; fourth, the end of Martial Law in 1987; fifth, the ROC Constitutional changes of 1991 and, sixth, the 2014 Sunflower Occupation. These gamechangers institutionalised state identity and gave agency to powerful interest groups and elites to change norms and make them stick. They also allowed *huadu* to speak to and construct a legitimacy nexus by expanding its realm of action.

### 9.4.1. *Huadu* as Realist-Constructivist Discursive Power

This thesis has argued that the discursive power of *huadu* can be conceived of thus: first, it is constituted in power politics; second, it is material and ideational; third, it follows a logic of the social; fourth, it is the national interest; fifth, it is prudence and

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987 Wendt states only “contemporary states have been interacting for dozens, even hundreds of years, during which they have accumulated considerable knowledge - [namely historical experiences] - about each other’s interests.”
morality; sixth, it is agentive change; seventh, it is prescriptive; eighth, it is constitutive and understood through a dialectic logic; ninth, it is understood pragmatically in context. In this regard, it conforms to Morgenthau’s six principles and to realist-constructivist core concepts (q.v. 3.2.2).

First, *huadu* entails the ROC’s rational interest in survival; this, along with intersubjectivity permits a realist-constructivist synthesis in power politics. Realist-constructivist power politics are relative, relational, contingent and social. Thus, *huadu* responds to constraints in the cross-Strait context.

Second, *Huadu’s* material and ideational nature invokes intersubjectivity as a discursive process of material construction that is mind-independent. The social reality of cross-Strait relations out there confirms *huadu* is the status quo and that its internal logic is intersubjectively accepted by a legitimacy nexus. However, that logic – like the ROC – is contingent because if Beijing decides not to buy in, it will change.

Third, *huadu* follows a logic of the social in that it is a preference, socially and rationally constructed by knowledgeable state and domestic actors. It is rational since it seeks legitimacy through reason, even when its agents may not act optimally in power politics. *Huadu* defines how its social constituency interacts and self-identifies. As such, it generates political interaction with *tongyi* and *taidu* constituencies and with Beijing that enables its deployment in cross-Strait policy. This study’s RC admits the logic of the social; “we” as a Taiwanese constituency are constituted before “we” and “them” as a cross-Strait constituency. Morgenthau

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988 Barkin, Samuel. 2010: 25
989 Barkin, Samuel. 2010: 50-1
990 Morgenthau, Hans. 1946 [1967]:10; Barkin, Samuel. 2010: 54
991 Barkin, Samuel. 2010: 58
locates the state as “we”. Carr claims there is no political man in isolation from the state. Thus, the first “we” must be Taiwan as the ROC, constituted in huadu.

Fourth, to legitimate itself as Taiwan’s national interest, huadu compels sanction from its subject (Taiwan) and non-subject (Beijing) social constituencies. Neither taidu nor tongyi have the legitimacy to do this. Neither represents Taipei or cross-Strait relations as they are and so constitute wishful thinking. Elites who deploy huadu therefore co-opt a constituency that (explicitly or implicitly) sanctions Taiwan’s national interest in huadu. In this way, power politics constitute Taiwan’s interest in huadu. It is the ROC’s legitimacy that invokes Taiwan’s national interest in maintenance of its de facto independence.

Fifth, huadu has a social purpose beyond security and “its content and manner are determined by the political and cultural environment”. This suggests huadu is a prudent, moral compromise between tongyi and taidu that recognises Taiwan’s national capabilities, its discursive power and the appeal of its norms to Beijing. As such, huadu as political change cannot be understood absent “the compromise between power and morality”. Huadu eschews overconfidence and insures against unpredictability.

Sixth, as agents, huadu’s social constituency consists of “purposeful actors whose actions help transform” Taiwanese politics and cross-Strait relations. Free China could not have become huadu without entrepreneurship. Elite agency has been

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994 Barkin, Samuel. 2010: 68.
996 Barkin, Samuel. 2010: 73.
crucial in Taiwan in avoiding a bloodbath by creating an intermediate state in huadu.

Seventh, the logic of the social reveals Taiwan’s dilemma as unpredictable.\textsuperscript{1000} Huadu may reflect a political attempt to inject predictability into cross-Strait relations. However, although Realist Constructivism may infer from huadu to make contingent policy predictions, it cannot epistemologically predict outcomes. To account for huadu, it must avoid scientific prediction and have a normative context.\textsuperscript{1001} Conversely, a prescriptive power approach sees cross-Strait relations as both foreign policy and elite and domestic-group agency, but it effaces the constitutive nature of huadu and agency. Viewing huadu’s legitimating power in power politics permits recognition of its constitutive power.\textsuperscript{1002} Unpredictability may account for ROC presidents having enforced change in the absence of a full knowledge of their social constituency. Eighth, for this study’s Realist Constructivism, huadu represents both interactional and constitutive power; it is generated in SIPs (actions) and constitutes these as power politics (social relations).\textsuperscript{1003} Thus, a pre-constituted ROC and PRC engage in foreign policy through cross-Strait relations. At the same time, power operates in cross-Strait relations that analytically precede the ROC’s and PRC’s state identities. Chapter 4 argues that huadu co-constitutes productive and structural power in cross-Strait and domestic power politics.\textsuperscript{1004} Yet, since the ROC is a corporate actor, it is able to deploy huadu as structural power to a social purpose in cross-Strait

\textsuperscript{1000}Morgenthau, Hans. 1967: 19) Barkin, Samuel. 2010: 118.
\textsuperscript{1001}Barkin, Samuel. 2010: 119.
\textsuperscript{1002}Barkin, Samuel. 2010: 132.
\textsuperscript{1003}Barnett and Duvall. 2005: 45-6.
\textsuperscript{1004}Barnett and Duvall. 2005: 52-3.
relations and domestic politics; that social purpose is to legitimate the ROC. Huadu is agency and structure.\textsuperscript{\ref{1005}}

Ninth, huadu is understood pragmatically not semantically by its social constituencies (q.v. 5.2.6.). In other words huadu legitimates the ROC discursively and its constituencies recognise it not in explicit policy statements but in implicit political language that presupposes and indexes Taiwan’s sovereign status over time. Political actors exploit the discursive gap between illocution and perlocution to legitimate huadu and that gap in itself accounts for competing actors misperceiving threats.

Realist logic explains huadu best in its recognition of power politics, cross-Strait policy, morality and agency. Constructivist logic amends prediction; it provides a framework to link agency to cross-Strait relations and methods to do this by exploring discourses, identity and power.\textsuperscript{\ref{1006}} Yet Realist Constructivism has limits.

9.4.2. Limits of RC in Explaining huadu

This study has critiqued the Wendtian suggestion that huadu is only a systemic identity, or culture of anarchy, generated in inter-state relations. In this regard, it has made salient its operation in 2008-16 Rapprochement to challenge Wendt’s liberal analytical contention that if states get institutions right, international relations will become cooperative and the KMT’s normative appropriation of that claim for cross-Strait relations.\textsuperscript{\ref{1007}} Rapprochement shows that institutional sociability is not perfectibility.\textsuperscript{\ref{1008}} The KMT (unconsciously) attempted to recreate a Wendtian cross-Strait system beyond competing ROC-PRC state identities and to fill it with “a more

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{1005} Barkin, Samuel. 2010: 19; Dahl, Robert. 1957.
\bibitem{1006} Barkin, Samuel. 2010: 137.
\bibitem{1007} Barkin, Samuel. 2010: 109.
\bibitem{1008} Barkin, Samuel. 2010: 110.
\end{thebibliography}
rational discourse based on collective problems as they exist ‘out there’ rather than as they exist ‘in here’ where our identities originate”. In deploying huadu to do this, however, they were bound to fail since huadu self-evidently starts as the corporate “in here” of Taiwan. Since sociability entails group affinity and relative power, cross-Strait relations cannot be reduced to inter-state functional needs. Thus, huadu cannot perfect institutions; it must prolong tension. Yet, as agency represents the unexpected, it may change huadu as structure. A prudent cross-Strait policy recognises and allows for the unexpected effects of agency.

A Wendtian conception of huadu as normative liberalism lacks explanatory power. Rapprochement adopted this stance ideologically then disproved it analytically. So, in analysing huadu’s power as legitimacy, Realist Constructivism seeks not to privilege liberal norms in China-Taiwan relations or to assume the normative primacy of Taiwan’s liberal democracy. Realist Constructivism simply assumes that normative structures are socially constructed and de-constructed.

9.5. The Logic of Huadu

This thesis has argued that huadu’s logic is rational but not rational-choice. Thomas Schelling (1960) argues that “it may be perfectly rational [...] to wish for the power to suspend certain rational capabilities in particular situations”. So, huadu is rational in that it offers certain advantages; Taipei may suspend rationality to use huadu as a strategic tool to shape Beijing’s expectations. It may do this by blurring the boundary between huadu and taidu, and among thin, thick and other conceptions of taidu, thus convincing China that Taiwan is not rational on certain issues,

1010 (116)
enhancing the credibility of Taipei’s commitments and threats. Such situations include, for example, Taiwan trying to deter (or compel) China by implicitly threatening *taidu*.\(^{1012}\) Similarly, Taipei may resist Chinese threats and make a self-binding commitment to a particular bargaining position, such as in Ma’s statement to Xi in the 2015 summit (q.v. 8.5.). Granted, Beijing may anticipate Taiwan’s actions by structuring cross-Strait relations to its advantage.\(^{1013}\)

Such an instrumental *huadu* is rational. Yet to effectively resist Beijing’s power, *huadu* also needs to transcend the ROC’s control. *Huadu’s* strength is that it represents liberal democratic norms that reject explicit state control over state identity, since once such control becomes obvious to Beijing, it can more easily delegitimate the “controlled” identity, as Taiwan was able to do with *Free China* and is able to do with *Great Power*. This is the disadvantage the PRC and *tongyi* face in confronting *huadu’s* liberal norms. At the same time, in the hands of powerful interest groups within its subject realm and constituency, *huadu* becomes a potential constraint on Taipei’s policy options since it may metamorphose into *taidu*.

China prevails over Taiwan in terms of material power. Yet to assume that Taiwan’s maintenance of its autonomy is puzzling in this regard is to ignore the power of *huadu*. China’s military capabilities do not by definition produce desired outcomes.\(^{1014}\) *Great Power* lacks the legitimacy of *huadu*. Absent domestic support, Beijing might be unable or unwilling to subdue Taiwan. Yet at the same time, a militarily unchallenged *taidu* would represent the end of the CCP’s legitimacy, since Beijing’s own deployment of *Great Power* has made Taiwan the *sine qua non* of

\(^{1012}\) Schelling, Thomas. 1960, 19.


Great Power. Thus, Beijing must buy into huadu at all costs. In the context of huadu, China has no hope of subduing Taiwan materially; it also has no hope of making tongyi prevail. It must, therefore, sanction huadu while continuing to delegitimate taidu forces, thus further legitimating huadu. This is Beijing’s quandary and the threat implicit in huadu’s provisional security guarantee (q.v. 4.6.3).

This study has argued that sinification, Free China, bentuhua and a New Taiwanese collective identity constructed huadu to legitimate ROC power itself. This reciprocal relationship between power and state identity means that ROC power legitimates Taiwanese identity and Taiwanese identity seeks to secure itself by legitimating the ROC state. The two phenomena cooperate through domestic and cross-Strait competition so that separating them becomes nearly impossible.

State identity legitimation demands a credible sovereign claim. The authoritarian ROC did not have this. The legitimacy of Free China “was undermined by the intrinsic mismatch between the de jure state structure and its actual practice of a sovereign state on Taiwan over four decades”. 1015 Lee Teng-hui fixed this in 1991 through huadu. Huadu’s legitimacy arose in the ROC’s social interaction with and co-option of the Taiwanese population. Power politics legitimated the norm of self-determination. 1016 Chiang Ching-kuo’s acceptance of the DPP’s unlawful formation in 1986 and his decision three weeks later to announce the lifting of Martial Law pushed ROC identity change “beyond the point of no return”. 1017 Lee Teng-hui cannily exploited discursive gaps between Chinese and Taiwanese state identity,

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1016 Cheng, Tun-jen. 1989: 499

1017 Chu, Yun-han and Jih-wen Lin, 2001: 121
ambivalently framing Taiwan as China under the ROC while discursively legitimating it as Taiwan through huadu.

_Huadu_ commands legitimacy because its power is recognised as rightful by a legitimacy nexus. _Huadu’s_ legitimacy secures Taiwan’s sovereignty because with social recognition comes domestic, transnational and other-states’, including Beijing’s, compliance. With compliance comes a stable status quo and Taiwan’s maintenance of its sovereignty. Legitimacy is crucial to Taipei’s power to resist Beijing and to maintain stability in cross-Strait relations. The ROC’s crises of legitimacy were potential sources of international instability and disorder. Their resolution therefore is of some importance to the maintenance of international peace and stability.1018

9.5.1. The 1992 Consensus: _huadu’s_ encoding

This study has argued that the 1992 Consensus legitimatied _huadu_ by encoding it in the form of a prudent compromise. In doing so, it sought to ensure both sides’ ontological security by making cross-Strait relations predictable. Yet, its effect was to threaten Beijing’s ontological security.

The 1992 Consensus provided both sides with a way out of the state identity dilemma by allowing Taipei to be Taiwan in the form of _huadu_, thus inhibiting _taidu_. Yet, the corporate domestic “we” of _huadu_ had already been constructed in the 1991 constitutional changes, compelling _taidu_ and _tongyi_ constituencies’ domestic sanction. The 1992 Consensus represents Beijing’s sanction of _huadu_ and also interstate sanction. That is, in the 1992 Consensus, _huadu_ expanded its realm of political action to the cross-Strait level and compelled Beijing’s sanction as a non-subject social constituency. Nevertheless, China continues rhetorically and diplomatically to

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warn against *taidu* in public statements. Yet, Beijing knows that the 1992 Consensus rhetorically and discursively inhibits *taidu* by permitting *huadu* and that the ROC cannot violate it even if it does not explicitly acknowledge it. Thus, for Beijing the 1992 Consensus semantically encodes *huadu* and guarantees China’s ontological security. Yet, read pragmatically, *huadu* prompts ontological insecurity for Beijing precisely because it represents Taiwan’s de facto independence (q.v. 4.6.3.).

9.5.2. Rapprochement: *huadu*’s litmus test

This study acknowledges the appeal of seeing 2008-2016 Rapprochement as an attempt to move from a Hobbesian through a Lockean to a Kantian culture in which allies “do not use violence to settle their disputes and work as a team against security threats”. In this view, Beijing and Taipei attempted to internalise liberal norms that they perceived as legitimate, fully accepting their claims by adopting a corresponding identity. They did this by agreeing to respect the 1992 Consensus. Yet, Beijing formally maintained the threat of war if *taidu* were declared (q.v. 1.2.1.) and Taipei, in fact, deployed *huadu* in a way that maintained its political divergence from China (as ROC and PRC). Indeed, Taipei’s rhetorical buy-in to the 1992 Consensus meant Beijing bought into Taipei’s discursive deployment of *huadu*.

From the 1990s, cross-Strait economic relations attracted liberal scholars and journalists, who proclaimed the Liberal Peace in the Taiwan Straits. However, the puzzle of a continuing security dilemma and political divergence during the 2000s made salient the contested nature of Taiwan’s state identity. Rapprochement was

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1020 Wendt, Alexander. 1999: 258.

intended to resolve the security dilemma through deepening economic integration. Crucial to this was the ECFA and its follow-on agreements. Yet, despite being launched in September 2008 and signed in June 2010, ECFA had not been completed by the time the KMT left power in May 2016. This was due to the collapse of the CSSTA in the face of the Sunflower Movement. It ought not to have happened in rationalist terms, given deep economic interdependence; the projected economic benefits outweighing potential costs for Taiwan; geographic proximity; elite agency on both sides and promised diplomatic cooperation that would have enhanced Taiwan’s international space. So the Kantian Peace was elusive.

In this regard, Chapter 8 explains Taiwan’s ditching of the CSSTA and Rapprochement in terms of the crystalisation of *huadu*. While there were strong cost-benefit arguments against the CSSTA, Taiwan’s response to it resists rational-choice, cost-benefit accounts alone. According to rational choice explanations, Taiwan rejected the CSSTA because of the perceived threat to weaker sectors in Taiwan; China’s economic power constituted a threat that activated Taiwan’s traditional protectionism.

Such explanations, however, cannot fully explain Taiwan’s threat perception around China’s economic ascent. This study’s Realist Constructivism finds the source of Taiwan’s resistance in the crystalisation of *huadu*. That is, CSSTA was perceived by Taiwan’s (ROC) core social constituency that included powerful DIGs as facilitating a more powerful China’s entry into Taiwan’s (ROC) realm of political action and violation of *huadu*’s boundary with *tongyi*. In resisting the CSSTA, Taiwan’s pro-divergence DIGs sanctioned *huadu*, but *huadu* itself had already passed the litmus test of Rapprochement with China. This was evident during the Lee and Chen administrations, but under Ma deeper negotiations with Beijing crystalised *huadu* as
they touched on political issues. Indeed, prudence demanded that Taipei consider the CSSTA’s political implications and avoid provoking China. *Huadu* resolved this quandary.

This case has demonstrated how *huadu* maximised Taiwan’s core national interest in maintaining its sovereignty. It has argued that pro-divergence threat perception related to China’s and the KMT’s intentions were constituted by *huadu*, certainly filtered through domestic interests, but overarching and constitutive of policy elite preferences as well. *Huadu* effectively guided Taipei’s cross-Strait policy to start with. Thus *huadu*, while facilitating Rapprochement, became the primary impediment to its full realisation. As such, Rapprochement was *huadu*’s litmus test and the ROC came out as Taiwan.

9.5.3. The Status Quo: *huadu*’s legitimation

The status quo is taken for granted in Taiwanese political speech. Ma Ying-jeou’s Three Noes slogan “no unification, no independence, no war” is devastatingly simple in this regard. In deploying a traditional Chinese three-step rhetorical device Ma implicitly equates “war” with unification and independence. Rather than making “war” a third and equal option to independence and unification, Ma craftily lodges it next to unification and independence in the collective mind of the legitimacy nexus, invoking *huadu* to fill the illocutionary-perlocutionary gap. If power is A’s ability to get B to do what B would otherwise not do, then a hearer who has not yet considered *huadu* is invited to do so and pragmatically to associate it with peace. If it is a knowledgeable actor’s ability to exploit discursive gaps to remake his identity, then Ma as President has deployed the identity of the Taiwanese state and compelled Beijing to sanction it.
Chapters 3 and 4 have provided a theoretical framework for huadu as state identity and discursive power. Chapter 5 has operationalised it. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 have provided a plausible answer to the research question. That is, change in state identity and interests in Taiwan in a crisis of legitimacy constituted huadu in opposition, first, to Free China and then in opposition to taidu and tongyi. In so doing, it rejected China’s Great Power state identity that supported tongyi, but also compelled Beijing’s sanctioning of huadu by inhibiting taidu. Chapter 6 showed how Free China was constructed and dismantled in successive crises of legitimacy, sowing the seeds of huadu in sinification and bentuhua. Chapter 7 showed how huadu nucleated in domestic politics and cross-Strait relations. Chapter 8 showed how it crystallised under the test of Rapprochement. These chapters showed the co-constitutive nature of huadu as state identity and the discursive power to legitimate the ROC as a sovereign Taiwan.

Against this backdrop, Rapprochement may be seen as dramatic state identity change by Taipei. Lee and Chen’s Taiwanisation of the ROC, military vulnerability and diplomatic exclusion may have caused the conflict that Rapprochement sought to resolve. Yet, Taiwan’s perceived economic dependence on China in Rapprochement may have resulted in economic, then political, subordination to China and tongyi by force, thus killing huadu and the ROC. Given China’s rapid military modernisation, these factors help explain why pro-divergence elites and DIGs perceived a Chinese threat in the KMT’s policy. As has been argued, however, material factors alone cannot provide a complete account. Rather, they operate as functions of state identity. Therefore, pan-Green threat perception arises not just from China’s economic rise but from the threat to Taiwan’s huadu state identity, since Great Power status
demands tongyi. In this context, this study finds that huadu has legitimated Taiwan’s sovereignty as the ROC, but that it is not completely secure.

Rapprochement did not result in enhanced diplomatic recognition for Taipei. Rather, Taiwan lost existing diplomatic recognition soon after 2016. In this context, 2014 was decisive in powerful Taiwanese interest groups galvanising perceptions of Chinese threat. In addition to the perceived threat of ECFA and the CSSTA themselves, continued revelations of United Front work in Taiwan, accusations of treason among ministers and military elites and the Ma administration’s cooperation with Beijing in the Diaoyutai (Senkkaku Islands) dispute with Japan coupled with Ma’s diplomatic rhetoric of pan-Chinese-ness. Ma himself proposed and then rejected a peace treaty with China to formally end the Civil War. Yet, such a treaty would have violated huadu since it would of necessity have been between the KMT and the CCP. Technically, it would also have violated Beijing’s state identity as the PRC.

9.6. Implications of the Thesis

This thesis has shown that huadu legitimates Taiwan’s sovereignty in the ROC and that, as such, it balances Beijing’s threat in the form of the latter’s material power and its Great Power state identity. It also delegitimates tongyi, threatening Beijing and taidu, provisionally reassuring Beijing. It has argued that state identity has determined Taipei’s cross-Strait policy because it is constitutive of prevailing elite and DIG preferences vis-à-vis China. Conclusions derived from this thesis, therefore, have important academic and policy implications.

9.6.1. Academic Implications

First, the issues discussed in the thesis account for Taiwan’s maintenance of its de facto independence in the face of superior Chinese power regardless of systemic
factors. That is, the role of the US has been abstracted out. Second, the thesis provides a snapshot of cross-Strait relations over the last thirty years as a template for policy practice. After the 1992 Consensus, cross-Strait relations oscillated between convergence and divergence, yet they adhered to a status quo that kept the peace. As the thesis indicates, however, cross-Strait relations have not been smooth.

Specifically, this study serves as a useful basis for the study of realist-constructivist approaches in general, the status quo and Taiwan’s political status, party-political convergence, legitimacy, conflict resolution and contested state identities. For instance, in terms of conflict resolution, Taiwan’s status may be conceived of as resolved rather than settled. That is, *huadu* in the status quo represents a provisional, uncoerced accommodation that represents the most powerful social constituencies and compels the sanction of a broad legitimacy nexus. A resolution is not definitive, yet it does require trust and is not immediately vulnerable to repudiation in a reversion to the status quo ante.\(^\text{1022}\) The Good Friday Agreement and the Northern Ireland peace process may be seen in this context - as might relations between the UK and the EU. Such relations are not simply economic and rational-choice. They rest on on contested state identities, sovereignty and legitimacy. With regard to the EU, SIPs in London and Brussels may trump shared liberal democratic values, an inter-connected neoliberal economic structure and joint external ties to other economies. There are clear parallels between Taiwan’s threat perception around ECFA post-Financial-Crash and pro-Brexit threat perception around the negative costs of economic integration with the EU in the context of Austerity. The link to Britain’s state identity as an offshore balancer in the context of potential EU collapse

is a logical extension. Amelia Hadfield’s historical-cultural NCR study certainly provides fascinating insights into the link between national identity and UK foreign policy in this regard. Indeed, Hadfield-Amkhan’s loosening of NCR’s positivist variables invites a realist-constructivist analysis of power politics, state identity and legitimacy in UK-EU relations.

The disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union may also be seen in the context of crises of legitimacy, nationalism and shifting state identities and normative representations. States may not voluntarily die, but exogenous shocks may compel this. A realist-constructivist approach may help explicate the Ukraine’s relations with Russia in the context of state identity and threat perception. There are also clear implications for Taiwan’s oscillating relations with its former colonial master, Japan. In this regard, huadu widens understandings of Taiwan-Japan relations. It may explain Taiwan’s “Japan Fever”, or hari, and China’s negative response to this. Taiwan did not suffer under Japan as China did.

Further academic insights are that, first, this research contributes to the IR literature on state identity, legitimacy and foreign policy more specifically. The RC framework has clear applications to cases in which the material and the ideational converge. In terms of Taiwan Studies, this study contributes to and expands on the debate on polarisation and convergence in Taiwan’s domestic politics. For instance, it confirms Fell’s thesis around pure and diluted independence in Party Politics in Taiwan, Schubert’s overarching consensus and the natural independence of the Sunflower Movement. However, in identifying huadu as a state identity, it provides greater analytical depth in terms of foreign policy; nations require a state to enact foreign

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policy. Furthermore, this study also challenges Schubert’s claim that the taishang do not represent a coherent interest group. Crucially, the data suggest that both the Sunflowers and Ma Ying-jeou’s KMT administration sanctioned huadu and sought to defend the ROC.

There are further factors that are unique to Taiwan: For instance, this research has shown how an unrecognised state that represents one partner in a two-host claim over a nation that seeks independence has an identity that actually corresponds to that nation, but is itself subject to an irredentist claim by the other partner in the two-host phenomenon. It shows how state identity change in a crisis of legitimacy ensures state survival and also the de facto survival of the putative independent entity assesses the growth of a large neighbour with an irredentist claim by suggesting a realist-constructivist framework based on legitimacy and state identity. Taiwanese threat perception around China is influenced by material factors such as military upgrading and economic convergence. These are crucial but not sufficient explanations. We still need state identity in order to clarify and anticipate future implications for cross-Strait relations. The rationale behind Taiwan’s elite and domestic perceptions provide for action at a government level.

9.6.2. Policy Implications

Zhou Enlai’s maxim of “seeking common ground while shelving differences” is ubiquitous in Chinese diplomacy and invokes classical-realist morality and prudence. It is crucial to the 1992 Consensus and is reflected in Rapprochement in

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Ma Ying-jeou’s “easy first; hard later; economics first; politics later”. As such, it typifies the pragmatism and prudence of huadu. Such common sense might be said to reflect the faltering course of cross-Strait relations from 1992 to 2016. There were two honeymoons: 1987 to 1993 and 2008 to 2014, with confrontation and wary engagement in the meantime. Rapprochement proved too much and tested the hard issue of state identity, confirming Carr’s contention that politics trump economics.\textsuperscript{1025} While business embraced Rapprochement, state identity resisted. The 1992 Consensus was invoked to resolve matters.

If Taipei and Beijing clash over the DPP’s acceptance of the 1992 Consensus, does that mean it is essential to \textit{huadu}? The 1992 Consensus encodes and permits \textit{huadu}, but the DPP’s non-recognition does not stop Beijing sanctioning \textit{huadu}. \textit{Huadu} is Taipei’s state identity under the KMT and the DPP. This suggests that a state identity (operating system) can be upgraded or changed, while \textit{huadu} (software) can be swapped. Cross-Strait relations (the network) and the ROC state (the computer) cannot. A ROT would involve swapping a computer for one that might not be compatible with the network and the computer of the PRC. In this regard, the 1992 Consensus operates as a firewall – an anti-virus that stops \textit{huadu} becoming infected by \textit{taidu} or \textit{tongyi} and thus secures an “aquamarine” status quo. Despite the status quo, cross-Strait relations are historically progressive. They are not teleological, yet they move.

\textbf{9.7. Conclusion}

This chapter has summarised this study’s argument regarding Taiwan’s state identity to conclude that \textit{huadu} accounts for Taiwan’s maintenance of its de facto

independence and resistance to Beijing’s power. For policymakers and scholars, Taiwan’s maintenance of its de facto independence presents a puzzle. Clearly, to understand all the drivers of cross-Strait policy is an impossible task. If cross-Strait relations continue to be constrained by the failure of Rapprochement and the DPP’s refusal semantically to endorse the 1992 Consensus, it does not mean that there will be no huadu. Nor does it mean that Beijing will not sanction huadu. After all, the absence of a written code of ethics does not entail unethical behaviour.

At the same time, however, the DPP’s adherence to the status quo coupled with its shift to the Right in domestic economic policy endangers the huadu-taidu boundary. That is, social movements that grew from the Sunflower Movement identify the DPP as the party of the Taiwanese bourgeoisie, which aligns it to taishang and “cross-Strait capitalist” interests. Given that the DPP defends huadu, if these movements – led by the NPP and SDP – do not accept the ROC Constitution, a tendency to identify workers’ interests with taidu may prove too hard for huadu to resist.

Morgenthau argues that, beyond security, states have an interest in peace and that power politics, ameliorated by prudence and diplomacy, have the normative purpose of achieving peace. “Peace” is a recurring theme in cross-Strait political speech. Two recurring phrases in this study’s data that draw on broader historical Chinese discourses are the “peaceful development of cross-Strait relations”, or liang’an guanxi heping fazhan and “peace and prosperity”, or heping yu fanrong. Both terms are invariably accompanied by the term “for the benefit of the people”, or weile renmin de liyi. This can be read as the national interest, since “benefit” and “interest” are both liyi. What is remarkable about huadu is that it has secured cross-Strait peace

so far. Considering that current cross-Strait relations are at a historic low, an explicit recognition of *huadu*’s peace-securing quality and value cannot but help.
## Appendices

### Appendix 1: Indicative master dictionary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Pattern</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sovereignty</td>
<td>One China; One-China-Respective-Interpretations; Republic of China; ROC; 100 years; ROC constitution; international status; national sovereignty; sovereign; independent; international participation; national borders; nation; country; state; 1992 Consensus; community; peaceful unification; status quo; constitution; Taiwan; Taiwan’s; Taiwanese; Mainland China; cross-Strait policy; Taiwan Area; Mainland Area; jurisdiction; government; legal; Beijing; Taipei; territory; legislation; political; domestic; power; The ROC government; Cross-Strait; cross-Strait relations; side; leaders; officials; the two sides; the other side; representatives; competent authorities; agencies; organs; personnel; peaceful development; status quo;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| State Identity    | Democratization; democratic; democracy; rule of law; freedom; human rights; freedom of speech; citizen; freedom; public opinion; pluralistic; personal liberty; safety; civic society; civil society; human rights; Taiwanese democracy; Taiwan’s democracy; democratic values |

| Economy | Trade; agreements; business; businesspeople; reforms; liberalization; protectionism; investment protection; shared prosperity; ECFA; trade in services; Three Links; investment environment; economic development; FTA; financial crisis; manufacturing; services; enterprise; economic development; Taiwanese businessmen; TBA; companies; free-trade; FTA; FDI; international competitiveness; goods; early harvest; media; jobs; provide assistance; measures; mainland tourists; tourism; telecoms; regulations; remittances; output; diversify; dependency; restructuring; trademark; internationalization; individually owned; property; competitiveness; intellectual property; TPP; FEPZ; Free Economic Pilot Zone; Trade in Goods; early harvest package; zero tariff; mutual recognition agreement; offshore banking units; original design manufacturing; original equipment manufacturing; RMB Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (RQFII) |

| Security | Threat; Chinese threat; missiles; point; target; defence; national defence; PLA; PLAN; confrontational; peaceful; mutually cooperative; problem-solving; ROCAF; ROC forces. |
Appendix 2: Deonymic and Geonymic Co-text of the Words “Taiwan”, “Taiwanese” and “Taiwan’s”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deonym/geonym</th>
<th>adjectival modifiers</th>
<th>Adjectival predicates</th>
<th>noun modifiers</th>
<th>predicates</th>
<th>verbs with name as subject</th>
<th>verbs with name as object</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>democratic; prosperous;</td>
<td>first; willing; [ordinal number]; able; grateful; small; unable; more; proud; competitive; ready; interested.</td>
<td>Strait(s); businesspeople; business; Relations Act; side; people; association; company; Office; independence; enterprise; government; Area; society; democracy.</td>
<td>country;</td>
<td>be; have; become; rank; make; hope; sign; face; do; need; provide; receive;</td>
<td>visit; say; help; enable; rank; put; support; make; include; allow; give; transform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwanese</td>
<td>overseas; fellow; as; young; many; courageous;</td>
<td>chamber; businesspeople (men); people; business; fisherman; company; enterprise; boat; industries; firm; investment; community; society;</td>
<td>living on the same land and connected to; our fate is; busy all the time; peace-loving and friendly people; developing their own unique experience; concerned with how to invest in China; concentrated on one function; a passionate people who love to help others; open to good diplomatic and economic relations with China; creating their own society;</td>
<td>Consider; Identify; Organize; Allow; Be;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan’s</td>
<td>participation; economy; development; partner; democracy; industry; people; bid; effort; competitiveness; security; relations; sovereignty; society; identity; freedom</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Appendix 3: Word Sketch: Indicative Taiwan sovereignty and identity terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sovereignty-and-State-Identity-indexing (SSI) Term</th>
<th>Modifying Adjective</th>
<th>Verb (subj)</th>
<th>Verb (Obj)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Businessmen/people</td>
<td>Taiwan; Taiwanese; Taiwan’s; mainland-based; China-based; local; many;</td>
<td>operate; be; work; make; have; face; invest; go; attend; contribute</td>
<td>visit; participate; encourage; be; care; invite; help; attend; include; provide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business*; company; enterprise; firm;</td>
<td>Taiwan; Taiwanese; medium-sized; individually-owned; mainland-based; domestic; own; Taiwanese-invested; Taiwan-invested; manufacturing; many.</td>
<td>have; be; face; make; encourage; invest; operate; support; establish; lead;</td>
<td>do; encourage; help; visit; assist; develop; be; run; conduct; support;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People</td>
<td>Young; many; Taiwan; Taiwanese; Chinese; indigenous; more; business; local; other;</td>
<td>be; have; make; do; believe; support; live; share; think; share; want.</td>
<td>help; enable; benefit; allow; encourage; say; give; let; urge; serve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Society</td>
<td>International; (ethnic) Chinese; civil; Taiwan; democratic; pluralistic; open; just; Taiwanese; harmonious; modern.</td>
<td>Be; have; need; provide; become; do; regard; continue; recognize; regard; respect.</td>
<td>Be; build; establish; create; age; become; make; have; base; characterize; serve.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>Taiwanese; Taiwan’s; successful; developmental; valuable; abundant; practical; past; own; share;</td>
<td>Be; have; show; leave; make; gain; prove; provide</td>
<td>Share; have; exchange; be; accumulate; use; learn; gain; provide; offer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>National; Taiwan’s; Taiwan; Taiwanese; own; common; cultural; great-China;</td>
<td>be</td>
<td>Strengthen; confirm; have; verify; base; regard;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>culture</td>
<td>Chinese; Taiwan’s; traditional; Hakka; diverse; high-quality; ethnic; indigenous; rich; unique; local; different</td>
<td>Be; have; make;</td>
<td>Promote; be; create; preserve; develop; experience; admire; appreciate; enrich; share; have</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>democracy</td>
<td>Taiwan’s; freedom; constitutional; young, mature; new; true; human rights; sovereignty; political; full-fledged; liberal</td>
<td>Be; have; do; become; take; face; win; play; grow; show</td>
<td>Promote; deepen; consolidate; emerge; uphold; pursue; become; strengthen; establish; safeguard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>investment</td>
<td>Foreign; mainland; trade; total; Taiwan’s; private; more; two-way; Taiwanese; bilateral</td>
<td>Be; have; total; reach; increase; create; fall</td>
<td>Attract; make; increase; promote; expand; encourage; allow; protect; welcome; facilitate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>community</td>
<td>International; Taiwan business; world; global; ethnic Chinese; overseas Chinese; academic; Taiwanese; Taiwan’s; local; pacific; democratic</td>
<td>Be; have; recognize; applaud; understand; praise; take; see; ignore; pay;</td>
<td>Urge; enable; show; help; join; hope; pay; benefit; serve; be;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>citizen</td>
<td>Fellow; ROC; senior; Taiwan; Taiwanese; Taiwan’s; ordinary; local; private; global; Chinese; world</td>
<td>Be; have; work; reside; live; make; think; want; enjoy; approve; support</td>
<td>Allow; encourage; give; grant; urge; benefit; welcome; protect; provide; become; empower; wish; honor; entitle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>participation</td>
<td>Taiwan’s; meaningful; international; active; enthusiastic; great; political; public; full; ROC; equal;</td>
<td>Be; have</td>
<td>Support; expand; seek; have; advocate; increase; include; pursue; promote; encourage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>economy</td>
<td>Taiwan’s; Global; world; large; knowledge-based; second; domestic; market; robust; China’s; nation’s; Asian; efficiency-driven; innovation-driven; country’s;</td>
<td>Be; have; recover; begin; grow; continue; face; become; move; improve</td>
<td>Develop; revitalize; stimulate; boost; help; emerge; improve; revive; reinvigorate; strengthen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>development</td>
<td>Economic; Taiwan’s; peaceful; sustainable; national; democratic; future; industrial; stable; positive; further; social; nation’s country’s ROC’s.</td>
<td>Be; have; show; please; indicate; demonstrate; point; need; give; make.</td>
<td>Promote; support; pursue; see; foster; ensure; boost; maintain; spur; boost; achieve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>security</td>
<td>National; Taiwan’s; regional; important; economic; public; food; banking; social; nation’s.</td>
<td>Be; have</td>
<td>Ensure; be; safeguard; maintain; defend; threaten; protect; strengthen; enhance; concern</td>
</tr>
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<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sovereignty</td>
<td>National; Taiwan’s; popular; nation’s; ROC’s; territorial; ROC; China’s; country’s; independent</td>
<td>Be; have; belong; lie; claim; do; rest; remain</td>
<td>Defend; safeguard; have; regard; maintain; claim; exercise; uphold; involve; vest; preserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interests</td>
<td>National; Taiwan’s; common; mutual; good; great; public; overall; own; keen; business; country’s.</td>
<td>be</td>
<td>Protect; have; safeguard; express; serve; share; represent; pursue; show; ensure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>freedom</td>
<td>Democracy; press; religious; personal; peace; Taiwan’s; complete; speech; human rights; great; economic; political</td>
<td>Be; have</td>
<td>Enjoy; protect; defend; uphold; have; pursue; promote; safeguard; ensure; embrace; seek</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Appendix 4: Word Sketch of Discourses in Taiwanese Political Speech.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discourses</th>
<th>adjectives</th>
<th>Verbs (subj)</th>
<th>Verbs (obj)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Status quo</td>
<td>Peaceful; of peace and prosperity; current; present; of peace and stability; of no unification, no independence and no use of force; of Taiwan(‘s) being; independent; stable;</td>
<td>Be; do exhibit; continue;</td>
<td>Maintain; change; define; defend; undermine; sustain; threaten; safeguard; create; be;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One-China</td>
<td>Principle; policy; dispute; respective interpretations; resolution; different interpretations</td>
<td>Be;</td>
<td>Adhere to; accept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>consensus</td>
<td>1992; Taiwan; cross-Strait; national; broad; basic; social; initial; public; internal; concrete; joint</td>
<td>Be; have; regard; serve; reach; exist; follow; provide; do</td>
<td>Reach; be; forge; build; form; accept; have; seek; achieve; consolidate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECFA</td>
<td>Negotiation; agreement; Early-harvest list; early-harvest program; work; certificate; implementation; item; talk; phase; plan; people; issue</td>
<td>Be; have; take; cover; do; constitute; come; bring; damage; relate; focus; require; include</td>
<td>Sign; support; promote; conclude; negotiate; review; regard; have; pass; approve; implement; make</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>independence</td>
<td>Taiwan; de jure; energy; judicial; economic; formal; unification; national;</td>
<td>Be;</td>
<td>Declare; gain; promote; seek; pursue; oppose; achieve; ensure; support; advocate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>threat</td>
<td>Military; China’s; Beijing’s; serious; missile; great; external; potential; big; major; security; nuclear.</td>
<td>be</td>
<td>Pose; be; face; reduce; renounce; increase; deter; constitute; minimize; address;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military threat</td>
<td>China’s; Beijing’s; constant; perennial; persistent; constant; perennial; strategy—posing; ever-mounting; unconventional; unrelenting; two-pronged; view; massive; pre</td>
<td>Increase; face; pose; reduce; be; grow; overlook; mount;</td>
<td>Be; intimidate; characterize; exist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix 5: Concordance Lines: Taiwan’s Predications

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chairman Lin joined a meeting with Governor Li and welcomed him to Taiwan. He also emphasized that Taiwan is a pluralistic society where people are free to express their views. He hoped that the revi...</th>
<th>Taiwan is a pluralistic society where people are free to express their views. He hoped that the rev...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SEF Chairman Lin joined the meeting on July 27. He emphasized that Taiwan is a pluralistic society where people are free to express their views and expressed hope that</td>
<td>Taiwan is a pluralistic society where people are free to express their views and expressed hope that...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the SEF and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs held a meeting on September 15. In addition to welcoming the governor, Chairman Lin emphasized that Taiwan is a pluralistic society where people are free to express their views. He expressed hope that</td>
<td>Taiwan is a pluralistic society where people are free to express their views. He expressed hope that...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and APEC in the coming years. He added that Taiwan is a pluralistic society where people are free to express their views and expressed hope that</td>
<td>Taiwan is a pluralistic society where people are free to express their views and expressed hope that...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council noted that Taiwan is a society of freedom, democracy, the rule of law and human rights in which various opinion</td>
<td>Taiwan is a society of freedom, democracy, the rule of law and human rights in which various opinion...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in favor of improving relations with mainland China through institutionalized negotiations. Since</td>
<td>Taiwan is a society of freedom, democracy, the rule of law and human rights in which various opinion...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Ma has repeatedly stated publicly that Taiwan is a pluralistic society and that Taiwan's future shall be decided by its 23 million people. A</td>
<td>Taiwan is a pluralistic society and that Taiwan's future shall be decided by its 23 million people. A...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Cultural Taiwan</td>
<td>Taiwan is a powerhouse of traditional Chinese culture. For more than sixty years now, Taiwan has bee...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea are the 34 nations in the region that have not participated in the integration process.</td>
<td>Taiwan is a major trading power. Last year, exports accounted for 62% of Taiwan's GDP, with 48% cont...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea are the 34 nations in the region that have not participated in the integration process.</td>
<td>Taiwan is a major trading power. Last year, exports accounted for 62% of Taiwan's GDP, with 48% cont...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Department of Trade and Industry, which has primary responsibility for the integration, noted that the scheme only aimed to</td>
<td>Taiwan is a major trading power. Last year, exports accounted for 62% of Taiwan's GDP, with 48% cont...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to ensure a smooth transition to a new trading environment. The scheme, which includes the</td>
<td>Taiwan is a major trading power. Last year, exports accounted for 62% of Taiwan's GDP, with 48% cont...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2013. It is estimated that the scheme will reduce import duties by 25% on the goods involved.</td>
<td>Taiwan is a major trading power. Last year, exports accounted for 62% of Taiwan's GDP, with 48% cont...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Department of Trade and Industry, which has primary responsibility for the integration, noted that the scheme only aimed to</td>
<td>Taiwan is a major trading power. Last year, exports accounted for 62% of Taiwan's GDP, with 48% cont...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Taiwan is a major trading power. Last year, exports accounted for 62% of Taiwan's GDP, with 48% cont...</td>
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<td>on the goods involved.</td>
<td>Taiwan is a major trading power. Last year, exports accounted for 62% of Taiwan's GDP, with 48% cont...</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>to ensure a smooth transition to a new trading environment. The scheme, which includes the</td>
<td>Taiwan is a major trading power. Last year, exports accounted for 62% of Taiwan's GDP, with 48% cont...</td>
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<tr>
<td>on the goods involved.</td>
<td>Taiwan is a major trading power. Last year, exports accounted for 62% of Taiwan's GDP, with 48% cont...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Department of Trade and Industry, which has primary responsibility for the integration, noted that the scheme only aimed to</td>
<td>Taiwan is a major trading power. Last year, exports accounted for 62% of Taiwan's GDP, with 48% cont...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Taiwan is a major trading power. Last year, exports accounted for 62% of Taiwan's GDP, with 48% cont...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Taiwan is a major trading power. Last year, exports accounted for 62% of Taiwan's GDP, with 48% cont...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>The Department of Trade and Industry, which has primary responsibility for the integration, noted that the scheme only aimed to</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>to ensure a smooth transition to a new trading environment. The scheme, which includes the</td>
<td>Taiwan is a major trading power. Last year, exports accounted for 62% of Taiwan's GDP, with 48% cont...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix 6: Pan-Chinese Diplomatic Rhetoric (Argumentation Schemes and Rhetorical Patterns)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Text</th>
<th>Structure and themes</th>
<th>Argumentation: Claims and topoi -(false) warrants and appeals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Opening remarks</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Today Mr. Xi and I, as leaders of mainland China and Taiwan, respectively, have moved on from the past 66 years, reaching out to share this handshake, to hold the past, embrace the future, and uphold the aspirations for prosperity of the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. This carries historic significance.</td>
<td>T: Making history</td>
<td>Argument: This historical meeting must agree to pursue the cross-Strait status quo based on the 1992 Consensus because it is that which has brought peace and prosperity and which is in the interests of the people on both sides.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T: (common) interest of prosperity</td>
<td>Claim 1: This meeting is historic and interest-reflecting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Topos of improved history and interests</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Topos of teleology linked to interests</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twenty-two years ago, in April 1993, Mr. Koo Chen-fu (辜振甫), chairman of Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation, and Mr. Wang Daohan (汪道涵), chairman of mainland China's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits, met in Singapore. Four agreements were signed, laying the groundwork for institutionalized cross-strait consultations. Twelve years ago, in October 2003, I met with the founding Prime Minister and Senior Advisor of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew at the East Asia Economic Summit. We both believed then that cross-strait developments must be based on the interests of the people.</td>
<td>T: Historical lead-up</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T: (common) interests of the people</td>
<td>Topos of teleology and appeal to common interests and identities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Topos of ‘it’s now or never’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At this moment, Mr. Xi and I are sitting across from each other, gathered together in one room. Behind us is the historical backdrop of six decades of separate governance on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. Before us lie the accomplishments that the two sides have achieved in the past few years through our commitment to replacing antagonism with dialogue and confrontation with rapprochement. We hold in our hands the future objective of sustainable peace and prosperity. At this time, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are proclaiming loudly and clearly to the rest of the world our determination to consolidate peace in the Taiwan Strait and the message that we will promote peace in the region.</td>
<td>T: Linking the past, present and future</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T: Visible accomplishments through dialogue</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T: (common) interest of</td>
<td>Claim 2: Peace has allowed cooperation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Over the past 66 years, **the two sides of the Taiwan Strait** have developed under different systems. That we have been able to shift from military confrontation to cooperative exchanges is certainly not an overnight achievement. Over the past seven-plus years, **the two sides** have concluded 23 agreements, and have created over 40,000 student exchanges, 8 million annual cross-strait visits, and US$170 billion in two-way trade. The foundation for these momentous changes is peace.

History has bequeathed **the two sides of the Taiwan Strait** an epochal and convoluted issue that, as *Shang Shu* (The Book of Documents, 尚書) says, is easy to understand but difficult to resolve. Sensitive issues on which each side maintains a firm position must be faced squarely and pragmatically, and handled with wisdom, patience, and good will by both sides. In the meantime, we can devote continued effort, through institutionalized consultations that we have facilitated over recent years, to building rapprochement and cooperation, and to promoting sustainable peace and prosperity. This is a common aspiration of **the two sides of the Taiwan Strait** as well as the international community.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Today I wish to put forth five points for maintaining the status quo of peace and prosperity in the Taiwan Strait.</strong></th>
<th><strong>T: From confrontation to cooperation through peace</strong></th>
<th><strong>T: From confrontation to cooperation through peace</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>First, consolidation of the 1992 Consensus and the maintenance of peace. The two sides of the Taiwan Strait arrived at the 1992 Consensus of “one China, respective interpretations” in November 1992. This consensus provides the common political basis for the two sides to promote peaceful development. It is because the two sides share a common</strong></td>
<td><strong>T: 1992 Consensus is basis of détente and peaceful development</strong></td>
<td><strong>T: 1992 Consensus is basis of détente and peaceful development</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Claim 4: the 1992 Consensus led to peace and prosperity</strong></td>
<td><strong>Claim 4: We should continue with détente</strong></td>
<td><strong>Claim 4: We should continue with détente</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Claim 3: We should continue with the status quo</strong></td>
<td><strong>Topos of peaceful development</strong></td>
<td><strong>Topos of peaceful development</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>T: Resolution of historical difficulties through détente</strong></td>
<td><strong>Topos of history and culture</strong></td>
<td><strong>Topos of history and culture</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>T: interest of peace and prosperity</strong></td>
<td><strong>Appeal to common interests and identities</strong></td>
<td><strong>Appeal to common interests and identities</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Appeal to authority</strong></td>
<td><strong>Appeal to authority</strong></td>
<td><strong>Appeal to authority</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Note:** The table above is a representation of the text content in the image. It aims to capture the main points discussed, the arguments put forth, and the appeals made to various topoi in the text. The table structure and columns were added to facilitate clearer understanding and organization of the material.
respect for this consensus that, over the past seven and a half years, we have reaped many rewards and ensured peace and prosperity—which includes the conclusion of 23 agreements—leading to the most peaceful and stable cross-strait relations in 66 years. I will elaborate on this point later in our meeting.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Second, reduction of hostility and peaceful handling of disputes. The two sides are no longer in a state of confrontation. Both sides should continue to reduce hostility and resolve disputes in a peaceful manner.</th>
<th>T: Peaceful development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Third, expansion of cross-strait exchanges and mutual benefits. Efforts should be stepped up to resolve issues such as a trade-in-goods agreement, reciprocal establishment of representative offices, and flight transfers in Taiwan for mainland Chinese travelers, so as to create a win-win situation for both sides.</td>
<td>T: increased exchanges create common benefits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth, establishment of a cross-strait hotline to handle important or urgent matters. A liaison mechanism is already in place between the heads of the Straits Exchange Foundation and the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Straits, as well as between the deputy heads of the Mainland Affairs Council and the Taiwan Affairs Office. A hotline between the heads of the MAC and the TAO should be set up to deal with important or urgent issues.</td>
<td>T: High-level cross-strait hotline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth, joint cooperation for cross-strait prosperity. The people of both sides are Chinese, descendants of the emperors Yan and Huang. The two sides should cooperate to promote cross-strait prosperity.</td>
<td>T: Cooperation in interests of mutual prosperity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These five points are not aimed at achieving selfish goals or unilateral gains, but a better future for coming generations. Both sides should accord great importance to the values and way of life that our people cherish, maintain cross-strait peace, and ensure mutual benefits and success for both sides with the wisdom embedded in Chinese culture.
Cross-strait relations are at their most peaceful and stable since 1949. In the past few years, I have often seen students from the two sides talking, taking part in sports, playing music, and enjoying themselves together on university campuses around Taiwan. This natural gathering of students is very touching. They show passion and creativity, with no enmity or historical burden. They are able to build friendships at an early stage of life; this will certainly cement a strong foundation for sustainable cross-strait peace. We must cherish and expand on this foundation.

As Northern Song dynasty scholar Zhang Heng-qu (張橫渠, 1020-1077) advised: Devote your heart to heaven and earth, devote your life to the people, uphold the wisdom of past sages, create peace for generations to come. For the people of both sides of the Taiwan Strait, let us work together, devote our lives to our people, create peace for generations to come, and open a new chapter of peace and a glorious future.
## Appendix 7: Discourse of Taiwanese Identity (Linguistic Means of Realisation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Discursive Strategies</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How are people, places and things related to Taiwanese identity referred</td>
<td>Nomination strategies</td>
<td>Discursive construction of political actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to linguistically?</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>personal names</em></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Mr Xi; Mr Koo Chen-fu; Mr Wang Daohan; Lee Kwan Yew, Yan; Huang; Zhang</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Heng-qu</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>titles</em></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>chairman; leader; prime minister; senior adviser; emperors; deputy</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>heads; scholar; sages; heads;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>national toponyms</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Singapore; the two sides (of the Taiwan Strait); both sides; mainland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>China; Taiwan; Taiwan’s; mainland China’s; cross-strait; Chinese;</td>
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<td></td>
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<td><em>sub-state names</em></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF); Association for Relations Across the</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Taiwan Strait; Mainland Affairs Council (MAC); Taiwan Affairs Office</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(TAO); representative offices; East Asia Economic Summit;</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>geographic toponyms</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>the region; in the Taiwan Strait; around Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>deictic and anaphoric reference</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>I, we (both); us; our; they; your; across from each other; gathered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>together in one room; before us; this;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>collectives, including national anthroponyms</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>the people; the people of both sides; our people; travellers; coming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>generations; generations to come; students (from the two sides);</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Discursive construction of things</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
• material
handshake; one room; accomplishments; message; groundwork; military confrontation; cooperative exchanges; 23 agreements; 40,000 student exchanges; cross-strait exchanges; 8 million annual cross-strait visits; US$170 billion in two-way trade; achievements; issue; Shang Shu, Northern Song Dynasty; consolidation; maintenance; rewards; meeting; disputes; expansion; liaison mechanism; representative offices; flight transfers; hotline; university campuses; separate governance

• ideational
  • institutional
Cross-strait relations; 1992 Consensus; Once China Respective Interpretations (OCRI); interests; agreements; institutionalized cross-strait consultations; cross-strait developments; systems; the international community; separate governance; the rest of the world; institutionalised consultations; status quo; common political basis; joint cooperation; trade in goods agreement;
  • mental
peace; prosperity; historical backdrop; (common) aspirations; commitment; antagonism; dialogue; confrontation; rapprochement; objective; determination; achievement; difficult issues; wisdom; patience; good will; peaceful development; (common) respect; hostility; mutual benefits; win-win situation; cross-strait prosperity; selfish goals; unilateral gains; better future; importance; success; wisdom; passion; creativity; enmity; historical burden; friendships; foundation;
  • normative
values; way of life; Chinese culture;
  • temporal
the past 66 years; the past; the present; the future; twenty-two years ago; April 1993; twelve years ago; six decades; the past few years; at this time; overnight; the past seven years plus; in the meantime; over recent years; in November 1992; over the past seven and a half years; in 66 years;

discursive characterization/qualification of people, places and things (more or less positively or negatively)

• Political actors: political elites have acted wisely in the interests of the people; the people share common interests and identities

• Things: teleological move from conflict to peace and prosperity through rapprochement
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What characteristics and qualities are attributed to people, places and things?</th>
<th>predicating strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>persuading addressees of the truth of speaker’s claims</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Claims of truth regarding existence of, reasons for and effects of cross-Strait peace and prosperity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Claims of normative rightness regarding need and desire for cross-Strait peace and prosperity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Claims of ‘should’ regarding future actions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>positioning the animator’s point of view (identity?) and expressing involvement or distance (solidarity or power?)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• ideological perspectives: commercial liberalism and rapprochement bring peace; elite-driven common interests and identities constitute each other</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• grammatical distancing: ‘Four agreements were signed’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>modifying illocutionary force through implicature, epistemic and deontic modality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• explicit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>maintain the status quo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• implicature</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• All rhetorical fallacies contain implicatures and presuppositions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• presuppositions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both sides share common interests and identities; peace and prosperity outweigh all other considerations;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• epistemic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o mitigation</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>fallacy of submission: ‘Taiwan respectively’;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>topos of formulaic denial of separate sovereignty: mainland China; the two sides; cross-strait; Mr Xi;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
What arguments are employed in discourses of Taiwanese identity?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From what perspective are these nominations, attributions and arguments expressed?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Are the utterances explicit, implicit intensified or mitigated?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>argumentation strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>fallacy of ‘the people’, diminishing separate national identities – which people?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>○ intensification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fallacy of false ascription and co-option: ascribing peace and prosperity to the actions of elites who share common interests and identities with constituencies. Use of pronouns of solidarity (we, our); assumed warrants (through);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fallacy of authority: ‘as leaders of mainland China and Taiwan’;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fallacy of appeal to history: History as a teleology, the weight of history.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fallacy of appeal to authority: Lee Kuan Yew, Koo Chen-fu, Wang Daohan, shang shu, Northern Song Dynasty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fallacy of ‘now or never’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of positive verb and noun forms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>False warrant regarding support for 1992 Consensus and OCRI and link between these and peace.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>perspicivization strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fallacy of beauty of youth and shared identity and interests linked to future peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fallacy of win-win through ‘so as’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Deontic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>○ mitigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>○ intensification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of ‘we both’; modal verb ‘must’; ‘let’s’; ‘should’;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>mitigation and intensification strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
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