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The Force Publique's Campaigns in the Congo-Arab War, 1892-1894

Abstract

Between 1892 and 1894 the *Force Publique* of King Leopold II's Congo Free State engaged in a series of little-known counter-insurgency operations against ivory and slave traders from Zanzibar, commonly referred to as Arabs. Without a particularly strong tradition of imperial service, this article argues that the predominantly Belgian officer corps borrowed and adapted methods used by more experienced colonial forces in the 19th Century. Whether taken from existing literature or learned through experience, it reveals that the *Force Publique's* counter-insurgency methods reflected many of the more recognisable aspects of traditional French and British approaches. It suggests that, despite the unique nature of each colonial campaign, basic principles could be adapted by whomsoever to overcome the military and political challenges of colonial conquest. The *Force Publique's* campaigns in the Congo-Arab War, therefore, provide further evidence as to how some basic theories could be universally applied.

Article

When the *Société d'Études Coloniales de Bruxelles* published *L'art militaire au Congo* under the direction of Colonel Donny of the Belgian Army in 1897, few could blame late-nineteenth century students of colonial warfare for barely taking note.¹ Its largely forgotten pages offered little in the way of revolutionary approaches to the conduct of small wars. Instead, it focused on the tactical and operational narrative of a small, locally-raised force under the stewardship of a handful of white officers bent on denying the Swahili-speaking Muslim warlords, commonly referred to as Arabs by contemporary Europeans, access to Congolese ivory and slaves. Compared to its contemporaneous publications such as Charles E. Callwell's 1896 book, *Small Wars: their principles and practice*, or Hubert Lyautey's 1900 article, 'Du rôle colonial de l'armée', Donny's exaltation of methods used in the Congo Free State (CFS) paled into insignificance. After all, what lessons could a solitary campaign for economic supremacy, conducted by an inexperienced force, in a largely unknown area of Africa, offer readers that were not already being extrapolated from the myriad campaigns fought by the armies of more established Empires?² Yet, *L'art militaire au Congo* was not a useless piece of self-indulgence. It offered, and continues to offer, a window into the approach taken by the predominantly Belgian-officered *Force Publique* to overcome the specific challenges posed by the Congo-Arab War of 1892-1894. Whether taken from existing literature or learned through experience, it reveals that the *Force Publique's* counter-insurgency methods reflected many of the more recognisable aspects of

traditional French and British approaches. It suggests that, despite the unique nature of each colonial campaign, basic principles could be adapted by whomsoever to overcome the military and political challenges of colonial conquest. The *Force Publique's* campaigns in the Congo-Arab War, therefore, provide further evidence as to how some base theories could be universally applied.

Recent scholarship on modern counter-insurgency has tended to contextualise itself within the historical precedents of the nineteenth century.³ However, the suggestion that an uninterrupted lineage of doctrinal development can be traced from the late eighteenth century is inherently problematic. Irregular warfare is anything but formulaic. The diversity of colonial operations did not permit for a set of tactical principles to be distilled for consistent application in all scenarios as was the fashion for conventional warfare in Europe.⁴ As Douglas Porch notes, 'Callwell can hardly claim to be the Clausewitz of colonial warfare, but that is precisely the point. From its earliest days, small wars were embraced as a refutation of modern, intellectual, more strategically sophisticated analytical and technological approaches to warfare.'⁵ Instead, flexibility in the formulation of attainable objectives, both militarily and politically, came to determine the degree of European success in the colonies. If this meant 'going native' and assimilating oneself in the cultural and military practices of one's enemy, as the French were more wont to do than the British at times, then so be it.⁶ These were the kinds of transferable principles that might be adapted to accommodate the vagaries of different colonial campaigns. Certainly, this is where it is possible to trace a degree of universality between the Congo-Arab War and the better-documented French and British experiences. For, as Belgium's pre-eminent scholar on the subject has noted, the *Force Publique's* success under the command of Francis Dhanis, owed as much to his subordination of military operations to political objectives as it did to his willingness to disregard conventional tactical practices.⁷

Like so many colonial officers before him, and many to come thereafter, Dhanis' approach to colonial campaigning was improvised. It relied on personal qualities of energy, imagination, and skill in both military and political spheres. The Arab campaign was less a pure act of war than a means of taking possession and organising territories, which required officers to transcend the somewhat limited framework of conventional military training received at the *École Militaire*.⁸ This was no different to elsewhere. Colonial warfare was anathema to most European armies, whose institutional conservatism and obsession with 'real war' precluded the former from being taught at military academies. Despite Callwell's attempts from the mid-1880s to synthesise colonial experiences beyond the British case in a bid to contribute to an international scholarly debate, the most common means of information transmission was through informal channels; soldier-to-soldier interactions, private study, and personal experience.⁹ This, it has been argued, established the basis for 'national traditions' to develop in counter-insurgency methods.¹⁰

Thus, the French, from Louis-Gabriel Suchet and Thomas-Robert Bugeaud in the first half of the nineteenth century, through to Joseph-Simon Gallieni and his protégé, Lyautey, at its conclusion, slowly developed a population-centric approach to assimilate political and military objectives that would come to form the recognisable concept of the *tache d'huile*, or oil stain.¹¹ Meanwhile, British concern with costs, manpower, and enemy morale quite often led to a preference for seizing the initiative, which, as the twentieth century dawned, frequently manifested itself in 'butcher and bolt' operations.¹² Although Belgium did not have a strong imperial tradition to draw upon itself, the experiences of its officers attached to the French in Algeria in the 1840s and Mexico in the 1860s, provided a point of reference for aspiring colonial officers.¹³ Be it recognising the importance of conciliatory policies in the aftermath of Bugeaud's brutal *razzias*, or the emphasis placed on mobility and tactical flexibility of his, and later Bazaine's, mobile columns in fighting an elusive enemy, clear transferable principles of counter-insurgency operations were in circulation for prospective *Force Publique* officers to digest.¹⁴

Whether adapted from the nascent pan-European discourse, personal reflection on historical precedents, or an organic arrival at similar conclusions, the *Force Publique* applied a combination of methods in its struggle to pacify and control the Congo region. The primacy of political objectives, the importance of population-centric approaches, the emphasis on morale, and the adoption of local fighting methods suggest a degree of uniformity in the approach to colonial warfare. Therefore, even if the officers during the Congo-Arab War did not act from a position of prior knowledge, there is a strong indication that these commonalities in nineteenth century counter-insurgency methods emerged organically across different armies at around the same time. Without being limited to a 'British way' or a 'French way', there is good reason to believe that an adaptive synergy of core principles was developed by like-minded officers when faced with the unique challenges posed by colonial campaigning. In this sense, the experiences of Dhanis, documented – but, subsequently forgotten - in Donny's work, are as important in understanding the essence of nineteenth century counter-insurgency as those of more famous colonial soldiers and campaigns.

Circumstance clearly played a significant role in determining the CFS's approach in the pacification of the Congo. For this was no ordinary colonial war of conquest in which the invading army sought to force a resistant local population into submission. There was some of that, to be sure, but the primary enemies were themselves interlopers into the host territory. The Arabs had begun to penetrate into the eastern part of the Congo from Zanzibar in search of ivory and slaves in the mid-nineteenth century. Amidst the internecine struggles of the Congo region, which were aggravated by the influx of firearms, these Arab warlords drew strength from continuous expansion. With greater access to animal, human, and the monetary rewards to be harvested therein, came greater desire to

push for more.¹⁵ This was not a new phenomenon. Richard Reid has notably demonstrated that many sub-Saharan socio-political systems had competed in arms races from as early as the seventeenth century in order to establish themselves over their adversaries.¹⁶ By the nineteenth century, there was veritable African military revolution taking place with endemic violence at the hands of increasingly well-armed militaristic societies at its heart.¹⁷ Broader trends towards the militarisation of politics in eastern and central Africa were, consequently, well established before CFS forces became embroiled in the struggle for economic monopolisation from the 1880s.¹⁸ As such, the embryonic *Force Publique* faced quite a task to pacify and expand its own economic reach against a well-armed, well-financed, and shrewd opponent.

From the outset, King Leopold II's imperial venture into the uncharted territory spanning central Africa equally elicited the use of brute force against the autochthone populations of the region. Henry Morton Stanley's numerous expeditions, during which he established trading posts and defensible bases along the Congo River and its tributaries, were frequently bloody affairs. Later, with the creation of the *Force Publique* in 1885, violence in the economic exploitation of the Congo region became systematised and endemic – albeit well-hidden behind a humanitarian veneer.¹⁹ A report by the Interim General Administrator of the Department of the Interior to King Leopold II exemplified this, when it stated that the repression of the slave trade had always been at the heart of the enterprise. It was the Arab '*razzias*' – an interesting use of the term - which compelled Commanders to extend their influence so as to offer local populations protection against these slave runs.²⁰ However, it was soon evident that white officers were using this liberty to directly compete with the Arab warlords for economic hegemony.²¹ Far from shielding indigenous peoples from the cruelties of foreign invaders, the CFS' own intervention exacerbated the use of violence in the region. The likes of Clément Brasseur's 'reign of terror', for example, earned him the local nickname of "*Nkulukulu*" after a bird 'whose inner wings are bloody red'.²² Over time, through the introduction of the *système domanial*, the brutalisation of the Congo became aligned with a system of values that prioritised profit over all else. As Guy Vanthemsche has suggested, the CFS could not rely on the metropolis to meet the military and administrative costs of Empire, resulting in 'a particularly severe and exploitative regime'.²³

Nevertheless, CFS agents and officers spent much of their time following up hard pacification with something more akin to hearts and minds. Before, during, and after the Congo-Arab War, great lengths were taken to keep certain indigenous chiefs on side. Good relations not only provided the CFS with greater ease of movement through the vast territory, but also afforded it access to auxiliary forces. By simple means of establishing bases for trading and agricultural purposes, expelling the Arab slave raiders, and supplying weapons and gunpowder to support weaker kingdoms in settling old

scores, CFS officers and officials were able to mask some of their own brutality.²⁴ In Dhanis' case, his description as 'a charming man, if a little strange at times, an old African, but of a rare intelligence, speaking all the languages of the country like they were his own,' served him immeasurably well during the campaign.²⁵ Even before serious hostilities commenced, he managed to subdue the entire Kwango province by means of 'diplomacy', supported by just 80 soldiers and 150 porters.²⁶ The results separated the local population from the enemy by creating a base of natural support, which then provided keen and willing sources of intelligence to facilitate future military operations.

In this regard, similarities can be drawn with both British and French experiences. Divide and rule was not a new idea, as the establishment of Britain's Indian Army and the general appropriation of social hierarchies broadly testified.²⁷ However, the manner in which the French began to apply this in Algeria during the 1840s demonstrated first-hand to Belgian observers the importance of marrying long-term political objectives to a military campaign. As Porch has noted:

Whatever the military arguments in favour of the *razzia*, its long-term effects were baleful. Discipline was difficult to maintain when soldiers were allowed to burn, pillage, and rape. Soon attitudes hardened, sensibilities were anesthetized and any political or military goals beyond utter devastation were lost in an orgy of brutality and excess.²⁸

Indigenous populations who were unwilling to 'accept the yoke of conquest' after witnessing the devastation wrought by a flying column could expect 'a war of extermination'.²⁹ However, for those willing to submit, Bugeaud was prepared to accompany his military successes with a durable political plan to pacify the region. His ideas of Franco-Arab assimilation led to reconciliation between conqueror and conquered by selecting the most influential and willing tribal leaders to govern under the supervision of French officials in the newly created *bureaux arabes*.³⁰ This did not put an end to the use of maximum force by any means, but the ultimate aim of French imperialism to culturally integrate indigenous peoples demonstrated a willingness to move past the purely military facets of conquest.³¹ This was later refined and adapted by the likes of Faidherbe and Galliéni - to relatively good effect - before culminating in Lyautey's policy of 'peaceful penetration'.³²

Although CFS officers instinctively erred towards the offensive, dealings with the Arab warlords often required them to heed Callwell's words that a 'delay in entering upon hostilities will but slightly prejudice the chance of ultimate success, [but] any hesitation when operations have commenced is to be deprecated'.³³ In the absence of sufficient infrastructure to adequately take the war to the Arab slavers, it was recommended to pursue an intermediary policy of appeasement while CFS strength was built up. To this end, conciliatory methods, such as the nomination of Hamad bin

Muhammad bin Juma bin Rajab el Murjebi, otherwise known as Tippu-Tip, to the Governorship at Stanley Falls on 24 February 1887 were taken. This, temporarily at least, curbed the frequency of the *razzias* by encouraging the Arabs to sell their ivory to the CFS instead of using large slave caravans to transport their goods to Zanzibar.³⁴ However, it did not put an end to human trafficking. *Force Publique* officers routinely employed Arab slave-traders as recruiting agents, whose sole access to physically-able young men was through slave raids.³⁵ Sefu, one of Tippu-Tip's sons, was one such agent paid 10 francs per month with an additional bonus of 100 francs for each able recruit furnished.³⁶ In this way, as in others, the CFS actually encouraged the continuation of the slave trade they purported to be fighting against.

Notwithstanding, relations between the CFS and the Arab warlords remained on a knife-edge. With both parties evidently competing for influence and access to untapped riches, there was good reason to believe that something was likely to give.³⁷ Enforcing the structures of the State on the Arabs and reminding them of their duty to uphold law and order within their jurisdictions was a delicate matter in itself.³⁸ The flagrant strengthening of the *Force Publique*, the fortification of outposts, and the expansion of infrastructure only exacerbated existing issues. Still, the instructions issued by the Governor General, Camille Janssen, to Lieutenant Nicolas Isidore Tobbacq on 30 April 1890, revealed that the Arabs were not believed to have offensive intentions in the near future.³⁹ As such, CFS officials continued to promote caution in their dealings, for it would be 'unpardonable to [attack] without having every chance of winning'.⁴⁰ It was simply unthinkable, given the state of the Congo's existing communications, the as yet incomplete recruitment of the *Force Publique*, and the lack of control over certain strategic points, to engage and be beaten in a protracted war.⁴¹ This was not to say that further preparations could not be made. For instance, Janssen advocated fortifying the key defensive positions under CFS control, whilst simultaneously seeking opportunities to secure others in order to demonstrate to the Great Powers 'our rights to our conquests through our ability to defend them'.⁴² As long as sufficient explanations and assurances were given to the Arabs to justify any action taken; for instance, declaring that those attacked were taken to be irregulars operating against the express wishes of the legitimate chief with whom the CFS wished to remain on good terms, the Governor General felt certain trouble could be avoided.⁴³

Local engagements between the CFS and Arab forces in 1890 and 1891 were not unheard of. In fact, they were to play a significant role in the deterioration in CFS-Arab relations by 1892. The defeat of the former slave, turned vassal of Tippu-Tip, Ngongo Luteta on the Lomami; engagements at Ibembo and Majorapa; and Captain Guillaume Van Kerkhoven's expedition in the upper-Ouellé, highlight the frequency with which the two competing empires came to blows.⁴⁴ These actions, which often resulted in significant bloodshed were made worse by the unsolicited requisition of ivory from

Arab possession. Although supposedly acting within the agreed territorial limits of CFS/Arab influence, the combination of military operations, venturesome commercial activities, and the introduction of a tax on ivory, gave cause for rival Arab warlords in Maniema to set aside their differences. Financially threatened, Mounié Moharra, Sefu's uncle and one-time opponent of Tippu-Tip, declared that 'the white man was too evil to live with'.⁴⁵ Rejecting the authority of King Leopold II, the Arab chiefs united in open rebellion.⁴⁶ When, in May 1892, the commercial expedition led by the British ivory trader, Arthur Hodister, was massacred at Riba-Riba by order of Sefu, the bleak prospect of a full-scale insurgency became apparent.

The opposing forces differed in numbers, quality, and equipment. It has been estimated that just over 10,000 men were utilised by the CFS during the campaign. Opposing them, the Arab warlords had access to some 100,000 men, although their inability to concentrate their manpower squandered a key advantage.⁴⁷ This disparity was further compensated for in training, weapons, and command. Although the embryonic *Force Publique* was not, as yet, at the height of its preparedness, the establishment of a military base at Boma in 1886 had already turned out over 2,000 trained regulars by the end of 1888.⁴⁸ By 1891, the *Force Publique* numbered 3,186.⁴⁹ These locally-raised troops, recruited on a seven year engagement, gradually began to replace the more expensive, short-service coastal volunteers (predominantly, but not exclusively, Haoussas and Zanzibaris) from neighbouring imperial possessions.⁵⁰ Like the British and French before them, the CFS preferred to recruit across a number of ethnicities; though this created problems in itself. Separate quarters, the imposition of French as a language of command, as well as racial stereotyping shaped officers' opinions of the regulars under their command. Tobback, for example, described Haoussas and Bangalas as deferential and compliant, but completely 'ignorant of their profession as soldiers.'⁵¹ However, Lieutenant Emile Lémery's recollection that, 'In war, they [Haoussas] are real lions; they throw themselves at the enemy with a cry, feverishly savage, brandishing their gun in one hand and a terrible machete in the other, of which they make good use,' suggests that indigenous troops could sometimes be forgiven for a lack of European professionalism.⁵²

Nevertheless, armed with the latest Albini rifles, the *Force Publique's* regular units consistently out-soldiered and out-gunned the enemy.⁵³ Although possessing somewhere in the region of 30,000 guns, many of which were percussion pieces, the Arab forces tended to operate independently of one another and lacked the organisation and fire-discipline to make their numeric advantage count.⁵⁴ A clear indication of this can be found in, the then, Lieutenant Francis Dhanis' early 1892 engagements against the former slave, turned warlord, Ngongo Luteta.⁵⁵ Acting independently of the events brewing in Maniema, this vassal of Tippu-Tip had, once again, taken to the field in an attempt to cross the Sankuru River on a slave run. Although outnumbered, Dhanis was able to count on the superior

training and equipment of the *Force Publique* to redress the balance of forces. The steadfastness and firepower of Dhanis' regular troops reaped its rewards as Nongo Luteta was defeated four times in three weeks: on 24 April at Mona-Kialo; on 5 and 9 May at Batubenge; and again on 12 May at Kisima-Souri.⁵⁶ Comprehending the shift in momentum, Nongo Luteta submitted to Dhanis. His capital of N'Gandu was turned over to CFS control while he, and his entire retinue, offered their services to the *Force Publique*. Ever the pragmatist, Dhanis exhibited shrewd political acumen in accepting the offer, for, not only did it furnish him with thousands of auxiliary troops for the upcoming campaign he planned to wage in Katanga, but it also pacified the region between the Sankuru and Lomami Rivers. However, it should be noted that Nongo Luteta was equally playing a shrewd political game in allying himself with the Europeans, having already submitted to Delcommune the previous year. Access to weapons, munitions, and information was as crucial to his personal ambitions as his manpower was to Dhanis.⁵⁷

Auxiliaries were an important addition to the CFS' order of battle. Despite their shaky performance at Batubenge on 9 May, during which approximately 500 of them had fled, sheer numbers, combined with local fighting techniques, offered Dhanis tactical and operational flexibility. In addition to Nongo Luteta's warriors, the CFS was able to call upon thousands of irregular soldiers at short notice from pacified regions.⁵⁸ Placed under the command of promoted black NCOs, these more mobile units often acted independently from the main force, carrying out raids and *razzias* as they harassed the ephemeral enemy. In short, auxiliaries were used to carry out much of the 'dirty work' during the campaign.⁵⁹ It echoed the practice adopted in many nineteenth century colonial campaigns and counter-insurgencies, in which it was 'the disciplined army that [was] obliged to conform its methods to those of [its] adversaries'.⁶⁰ Bugeaud's light columns in Algeria were famously reorganised to become 'even more Arab than the Arabs', while mobile forces were raised or converted to gather intelligence and take the fight to irregulars in France's Mexico campaign and countless British expeditions.⁶¹ Understanding the enemy's characteristics and displaying flexibility in meeting them was the surest way of establishing achievable operational objectives to counter the strategic advantage the enemy regularly held.

Invariably, the objective was always to bring the enemy to battle in order to secure a swift end to otherwise costly campaigns. Dierk Walter even goes as far as to label it an 'obsession'.⁶² This was imperative for, as pre-1914 German counter-insurgency showed, the absence of 'identifiable strategic targets [could combine] with decentralised command and control to cause operational solutions to expand to fill a vacuum of civilian oversight and vague war aims'.⁶³ For Donny this meant the destruction of the enemy's men and resources through offensive military action – the complete removal of the Zanzibari Arabs from influence in the Congo region.⁶⁴ However, as Callwell had

previously noted, 'the disinclination shown by undisciplined warriors to commit themselves to a general engagement' forced European officers to find alternative ways of bringing about a decisive solution.⁶⁵ Vigorous operations to secure vital river crossings, capitals, as well as human and material resources were often required to bring an enemy to battle. Thus, General Sir Garnet Wolseley wrote that the objective should be 'the capture of whatever they prize most, and the destruction or deprivation of which will probably bring the war most rapidly to a conclusion.'⁶⁶ It also explained why the French became so preoccupied with wars among the people, for as General Pierre le Comte de Castellane put it,

In Europe, once [you are] master of two or three large cities, the entire country is yours. But in Africa, how do you act against a population whose only link with the land is the pegs of their tents? [...] The only way is to take the grain which feeds them, the flocks which clothe them. For this reason, we make war on silos, war on cattle, [we make] the *razzia*.⁶⁷

In the case of the CFS' campaign in the Congo, the targeting of ivory stocks served the dual purpose of crippling the Arabs' fragile economy and forcing them into giving battle. It also had the subsidiary effect of enriching the State's, and officers' personal, coffers.

Dhanis' actions were clearly inspired by a quest for glory and personal advancement. Seizing the initiative and winning a campaign that would deliver a pacified and organised territory, ripe for economic exploitation, would almost certainly be rewarded by a grateful Sovereign. As a Second Lieutenant in the 8th Line Infantry Regiment, who had passed out 16th in his cohort at the *École Militaire*, colonial aggrandisement equated to opportunity.⁶⁸ After all, even Belgian officers who had achieved far less abroad in the past, be it in French service or that of the CFS, had obtained recognition for their efforts as the few men who returned to the Belgian army with any campaign experience.⁶⁹ This also proved to be the case for a number of Dhanis' contemporaries, whose search for a release from the 'trammels of European convention' was only matched by the ambition to better otherwise stagnant military careers.⁷⁰ To this end, valorous exploits in the name of 'the nation' or the 'noble cause' were frequently recorded with a home audience in mind.⁷¹

In a sense, this was not a new phenomenon. French and British colonial officers frequently acted hastily and beyond the bounds of respectability in order to establish a reputation back home. Often restrained by governmental policy or popular scrutiny, it was not uncommon to find ambitious men taking matters into their own hands in an attempt to fashion a *fait accomplis*. Whether it was Bugeaud's effective, but inhumane, methods of the '*razzia*', or Marchand's epic, but desperately illogical, march across Africa to Fashoda, the pressure to obtain results that would be lauded and accepted by the *métropole*, was an influential factor in the conduct of war.⁷² That Sefu afforded Dhanis

with such an opportunity by redirecting his gaze from Katanga to the Maniema and beyond, was viewed as heaven-sent fortune. For with news of the Hodister massacre and the assassination of the Kasongo Residents, Lieutenant Josheph Lippens and Second Lieutenant Henri De Bruyne in November 1892, came a pretext to wage an all-out war on the Arab slavers that cautious CFS administrators had heretofore sought to avoid.

The campaign that ensued required Dhanis to swiftly redirect his forces to Maniema. Spread out across a vast distance, initial operations were as much about pushing Sefu back beyond the Lomami as they were about concentrating men and resources.⁷³ Battles and skirmishes were recorded on almost a daily occurrence in November and December 1892 as Dhanis, supported by Ngongo Luteta marched on Nyangwé and Kasongo. Defeating the forces of Mounié Moharra in early January 1893, during which the Arab warlord was killed, CFS troops arrived at the Lualaba River opposite Nyangwé by the end of the month. After an encounter battle that pushed the Arabs beyond the river, Dhanis entered an abandoned Nyangwé on 4 March. By 22 April, Kasongo had also fallen, forcing Sefu to retreat with the remainder of his forces to join with another Arab warlord, Rumaliza, 70 miles to the Southeast at Kabambare. Simultaneously, Captain Louis-Napoléon Chaltin was ordered by the State Inspector, Fivé, to leave his camp at Basoko in the North and join forces with Dhanis at Nyangwé. Steaming down river with 300 men, Chaltin arrived at a flaming Riba-Riba on 30 April 1893 and learned of the former Arab governor, Mserera's, retreat to Stanley Falls.⁷⁴ Pushing on, Chaltin reached Stanley Falls just in time to relieve the besieged Tobback, whose relationship with Rashid, Tippu-Tip's nephew and successor, had deteriorated markedly since the Hodister massacre. Together, the CFS forces pushed the Arabs out of the region from where they made for Kirundu and, subsequently, Kabambare.

These early engagements were characterised by Dhanis' eagerness to organise and direct his disparate forces. Great energy was exerted in unifying forces ahead of engagements, but the distances involved and the fragility of communications meant that separation in the field, 'ever [...] a fruitful source of disaster' according to Callwell, was a necessary evil.⁷⁵ Relying on good intelligence networks, CFS forces could operate independently from one another and of their bases. Provided mobile columns could supply themselves on the move and were kept abreast of enemy movements, the *Force Publique* could seize the operational initiative with a degree of confidence. This allowed Michaux, with just a quarter of Dhanis' regulars, to score a victory on the Lomami River in November 1892 while Dhanis, supported by Ngongo Luteta, dealt with the threat posed by Mounié-Pambé, Mounié Moharra's son, on the Lualaba in December.⁷⁶ Separate engagements in early January 1893 fought by detachments attempting to make contact with Dhanis' main force, as well as Chaltin's redirected campaign to relieve Stanley Falls in April, demonstrates the degree to which local initiative was allowed for when dealing with multiple threats.⁷⁷ Mobility and reactivity were key in this regard.

Although concerted efforts were made at various points to reorganise, regroup, and reinforce, the separation of forces was countenanced in order to retain the initiative.

Bugeaud had operated under similar principles in Algeria when utilising a combination of intelligence and mobility to strike deep into areas that would keep his enemy off-balance.⁷⁸ In spite of the humiliating reverses at Isandlwhana (1879) and Majuba Hill (1881), Callwell could also see the benefits, under certain circumstances, to trust in the separation of forces to secure an operational advantage against a disorganised enemy. He wrote,

If each part of a divided army is in itself a match for whatever force the enemy may bring against it, defeat in detail is not to be feared. When dispersion is not prejudicial to security it has much to recommend it. The mobility of an army is in inverse proportion to its size. Movement in several columns therefore facilitates operations. The same forces moreover are at work in preventing the massing of the hostile legions against one fraction of the divided host as tend to safeguard its communications against organized attack. [...] A strong argument in favour of invasion on several lines is [...] in the moral effect produced on the enemy by the occupation of wide stretches of territory, and in the influence that the appearance of hostile bodies on all sides must exert on a people who know not how to turn the situation to account.⁷⁹

The CFS' advances on Nyangwé, Kasongo, Riba-Riba, and Stanley Falls in short order clearly paid homage to this principle.

In other ways, Dhanis' prioritisation of psychological and moral factors in tactical considerations also spoke to a patchwork of nineteenth century counter-insurgency ideals. Fortitude, enthusiasm, and perseverance were more important than line, square, or shock.⁸⁰ *Élan* was often prized above all else. Lémery's recollections detail the importance of the white officer to lead the attack, from which point, 'Nothing can stop the force of the *élan*; either everyone dies or ends up victorious. It is the savage and spontaneous attack, which throughout this campaign, has been our strength, as we were always lacking in numbers'.⁸¹ Certainly, there is evidence to suggest that Dhanis and other *Force Publique* officers deliberately withheld fire in engagements where the possibility of hand-to-hand combat presented itself. While this may well have been part of a broader attempt to conserve precious ammunition – particularly when faced with small-scale skirmishes fought in open order - it soon became evident that the bayonet had an important psychological role to play in the Congo-Arab War. Arab warriors, it was felt, feared cold steel and fled at the sight of it, leaving many suspicious officers as whole-hearted converts to its place on the African battlefield.⁸² This was

reflected in Donny's tactical summary of operations too, though he noted that it ought to be exclusively used in bush areas, at night, and when forming square.⁸³

This is not to say that firepower was not equally prized. As previously stated, the benefits of a well-drilled force laying down a significant weight of shot could also compensate for the deficit in numbers. After all, as Callwell noted, 'Confronted with the rifle and the field piece, assegai and jezail are robbed of their terrors. Individual daring and fanaticism are no match for discipline and mutual reliance.'⁸⁴ This spoke to Bugeaud's theories on firepower in pitched battles as much as it did to Donny's, whose views echoed those of his predecessors and contemporaries in striking fashion. Operating on the offensive but assuming the tactical defensive would allow for the weight of fire to increase the chances of success. It was his opinion that,

colonial campaigns will be shortened, therefore also rendered more economical, if the troops are comprised of a strong nucleus of veritable soldiers, calm, proven marksmen, well supervised, trained to be stoic rather than to flee, armed with sophisticated weapons and carrying a large quantity of ammunition.⁸⁵

However, colonial warfare rarely offered up many opportunities for decisive fire-action. When they did, as in the case of Omdurman in 1898, the superiority of weaponry and training proved itself to devastating effect.⁸⁶ In more open skirmishes, where factors such as terrain, surprise, or manoeuvre might alter the effect of the rifle, it was often deemed prudent to withhold fire and pursue alternative methods to break the will of the enemy. In this sense, mobility and *élan* proved to be as important.

By mid-1893, and the second phase of the campaign, the *Force Publique* began to encounter different tactical challenges. Positional warfare is not something that ordinarily resonates with theories of counter-insurgency or small wars, but in the case of the Congo-Arab war came to define the conduct of operations. Rumaliza, alongside the remnants of other beaten Arab forces, remained the solitary threat to the CFS. When intelligence was received that he was marching on Kasongo with 10,000 men, Dhanis moved immediately to meet him. Crossing the Luama River (a tributary of the Lualaba) the opposing forces met for the first time on 15 October 1893. However, this was no ordinary encounter. Rather than facing the prospect of an ambush, skirmishing, or a traditional open-order firefight across bush, village, or woodland, the *Force Publique* found Rumaliza's forces well-ensconced in defensive *bomas* (defensive works constructed from hardened clay), from which they proved difficult to dislodge. Dhanis' forces had previously laid siege to towns such as Nyangwe and Kasongo, but specifically designed defensive earthworks demanded tactical adjustments to force a military decision.

'The art of field fortification as understood by antagonists such as we have to deal with in Asia and Africa, and as applied against them,' Callwell wrote, 'is interesting, for it illustrates the advantages derived from the most simple defence works in such wars.'⁸⁷ This proved to be the case as Dhanis' force of 400 men failed to break through following an audacious flanking attack. The *bomas* were so well fortified that, even at a distance of 100 yards, the light artillery on hand struggled to make much of an impression.⁸⁸ Lacking in men and materiel, Dhanis was forced to await reinforcements as he tried to starve out his opponents. In the meantime, his forces were subjected to constant harassment by the enemy, whose sorties in October caused many casualties, including the death of Lieutenant Pierre Ponthier. By mid-November, the combination of battle casualties and food supplies began to bite. As both sides took stock of events, Rumaliza evaded surveillance and retreated during the night of 15/16 November. Captain de Wouters was placed in charge of the pursuing light column, while Dhanis returned to Kasongo to prepare a better equipped expeditionary force.⁸⁹ Contact was made at Ogella on 19 November. The ensuing firefight proved to be a reversal for the *Force Publique* during which Lieutenant de Heusch was also killed. Were it not for the death of Sefu among the multitude of Arab casualties, Dhanis might well have considered the whole sorry episode a complete failure.⁹⁰

As it was, Dhanis led his new expedition of 15 Europeans, 700 regulars, and approximately 2,000 auxiliaries, back towards Rumaliza's newly established defensive *bomas* covering Kabambare.⁹¹ Still short of adequate supplies to force the issue, Dhanis was obliged to lay siege and await further reinforcements from Captain Hubert Joseph Lothaire, who would later be infamously embroiled in the Charlie Stokes Affair in 1895.⁹² The junction was made in mid-December 1893, adding a further 300 men to Dhanis' strength.⁹³ Importantly, Dhanis also brought with him heavier artillery pieces, which had been used to great effect by Chaltin against similar opposition during his campaign to relieve Stanley Falls.⁹⁴

Since Bugeaud's arrival in Algeria, the quest for mobility in combatting irregular forces condemned the role of artillery to that of a secondary importance. Mobile columns relied on speed and logistical self-sustainment. Artillery was considered cumbersome and burdensome to colonial operations.⁹⁵ Light field and mountain pieces had found specific roles, but its general experience had shown 'an average expenditure of shell far below what is usual in Continental campaigns.'⁹⁶ For the *Force Publique*, however, the moral and operational advantages of deploying artillery was somewhat out of step with contemporaneous trends of thought. Twelve 75mm Krupp mountain pieces were shipped to the Congo in 1890 to be formed into a fully-fledge battery under the command of Michaux. An unknown number of lighter, 37mm Hotchkiss and a further 23, 47mm Nordenfeld guns, built by Cockerill of Seraing, were added to the CFS' arsenal in 1892.⁹⁷ The latter were specifically designed for Africa with removable parts allowing for ease of transportation. Apart from the gun itself, which

required two men to carry it, its other components and its ammunition, never exceed 35 kilograms in weight and could be carried by a single porter. Capable of being assembled in five minutes, these guns were seen as ideal for the Congo. Artillery, in general, was viewed by Donny as having a tremendous moral effect on the enemy and was, as such, indispensable to overcoming specific obstacles during the campaign.⁹⁸

On the banks of the Lulundi River, Dhanis encountered Rumaliza's *bomas* echeloned across the road to Kabambare. On 14 January 1894, an assault on the *bomas* dislodged the Arabs from their defensive works. The artillery was at the heart of the victory. Having isolated the *bomas* from one another ahead of a general assault on Rumaliza's grand *boma*, an errant shell from a 75mm Krupp gun landed inside the central structure. Setting it ablaze, the Arab forces panicked and fled. Rumaliza escaped with a handful of his followers. The other *bomas* capitulated and their occupants were taken prisoner. Rumaliza fled first to Kabambare before being pursued into German East Africa by Lothaire at the head of a 400-strong column. All that remained was to make contact at Lake Tanganyika with the Anti-Slavery Society forces led by Captain Alphonse Jacques (later raised to Baron Jacques of Diksmuide for his services in the Great War), who had been engaged in operations against one of Rumaliza's lieutenants in the region.⁹⁹ This done, by March 1894 the CFS could claim its territory largely free of Arab influence.

At the cost of just 16 Belgian officers and non-commissioned officers (six through sickness), the destruction of the ill-co-ordinated Swahili Empire was the making of those that survived.¹⁰⁰ Promotions followed, and in the case of Dhanis, the title of Baron was bestowed, demonstrating the degree to which imperial service, as in Britain and France, could confer status on those whose careers might otherwise have lacked notoriety. For a nation that struggled to fully buy into the imperial project, the enthusiasm with which funds were raised by public subscription for a memorial to him in Antwerp in 1913 reveals the extent of Dhanis' domestic fame.¹⁰¹ Nevertheless, Dhanis' name does not sit within the pantheon of counter-insurgency practitioners or theorists for one simple reason. His methods did not diverge significantly from the basic principles of those whose actions served to carve out larger empires for France and Britain. Yet, this is precisely the reason for which his actions, and the Congo-Arab War more generally, ought to be examined. A series of commonalities underpin the experience of most nineteenth century counter-insurgency that cannot be ignored. The subordination of political to military objectives, the assimilation of local culture and practices into pacification methods, the seizure of the operational initiative to counter the strategic deficit, and the importance of a well-drilled cadre to execute flexible tactics in order to bring the weight of technological superiority to bear, are all recognisable facets that transcend national traditions. Whether consciously adopted or developed independently, these basic principles provided many a colonial officer with

answers to the vagaries and unpredictabilities that small wars produced. No two campaigns were ever the same and precise rules are anathema to a successful counter-insurgency. However, action taken within the bounds of basic, adaptable principles allowed for the likes of Dhanis to cobble together a hybrid system that led his meagre forces to victory in the Congo-Arab war against a numerous, well-equipped, and highly capable opponent.

¹ Colonel Donny, *L'art militaire au Congo*. Brussels: G Muquardt, 1897.

² Charles E. Callwell, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice*. London: HMSO, 1896. Reprinted by Oregon: Watchmaker Publishing, 2010; Hubert Lyautey, 'Du rôle colonial de l'armée', *Revue des deux mondes* (15 January, 1900). To understand the frequency of colonial campaigning in the late nineteenth century, see Ian F.W. Beckett, *Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerrillas and their Opponents since 1750*. London & New York: Routledge, 2001, 31-32.

³ Thomas Rid, 'The Nineteenth Century Origins of Counterinsurgency Doctrine', *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 33, no. 5 (2010), 727-758; David French, *The British Way in Counter-Insurgency, 1945-1967*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011; and Douglas Porch, *Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

⁴ Douglas Porch, 'Bugeaud, Gallieni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare', in Peter Paret (ed.), *The Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986, 377.

⁵ Porch, *Counterinsurgency*, 50.

⁶ Porch, 'Bugeaud, Gallieni, Lyautey', 377.

⁷ Philippe Marechal, *De 'Arabische' Campagne in het Maniema-Gebied (1892-1894) Situeren Binnen het Koloniatieproces in de Onafhankelijke Kongostaat*. Tervuren: Musée Royal de l'Afrique Centrale, 1992, 239-241.

⁸ Ibid., 241; and L.H. Gann & Peter Duigan, *The Rulers of Belgian Africa 1884-1914*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979, 53.

⁹ Captain Charles E. Callwell R.A., 'Lessons to be Learnt from the Campaigns in which British Forces have been Employed Since the Year 1865', *RUSI*, vol. 31, issue. 139, (1887), 357-412.

¹⁰ Beckett, *Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies*, 24-25 & 35.

¹¹ Ibid., 27-29, & 40; and Porch, *Counterinsurgency*, 52-54

¹² Ibid., Beckett, 42.

¹³ For more on Belgian colonial campaigning, see Jacques Robert Leconte, *Les Tentatives d'Expansion Coloniale sous le Regne de Léopold 1er*. Antwerp: V. Van Dieren & Co, 1946. For Mexico, a detailed account of Belgian involvement in Mexico, see Albert Duchesne, *L'Expédition des volontaires belges au Mexique 1864-1867: au service de Maximilien et de Charlotte*. Vols. 1 & 2. Brussels: Musée Royale de l'Armée et d'Histoire Militaire, 1967-68.

¹⁴ Porch, *The French Foreign Legion: A Complete History*. London: Macmillan, 1991, 145-148.

¹⁵ Gann & Duigan, *The Rulers of Belgian Africa*, 55-56.

¹⁶ Richard J. Reid, *Warfare in African History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, 103-104.

¹⁷ Ibid., 107-145.

¹⁸ Giacomo Macola, *The Gun in Central Africa: A History of Technology and Politics*. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2016, 84.

¹⁹ Guy Vanthemsche, *Belgium and the Congo 1885-1980*. Translated by Alice Cameron & Stephen Windross; revised by Kate Connelly. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, 19-22.

²⁰ Royal Archives, Brussels [RA], Cabinet Léopold II [CLII], Expansion, 144/39, Report to the King on the political and military measures taken to bring about the repression of the slave trade in the territories of the State. Undated [Likely, 1889].

²¹ War Heritage Institute, Brussels [WHI], Archives of Belgian Military Abroad [BMA], 43/51 XV/16, Théophile Wahis to Camille Janssen, 31 August 1890.

²² Macola, *The Gun in Central Africa*, 107.

²³ Vanthemsche, *Belgium and the Congo*, 22-23.

- ²⁴ RA, CLII, Expansion, 144/39, Report to the King. Undated [Likely, 1889]; WHI, BMA, 43/55 XV/263/18, Henri Doquier to Merette & Constant Desmet, 3 August 1892; & Macola, *The Gun in Central Africa*, 93.
- ²⁵ Marechal, *De 'Arabische' Campagne*, 240; WHI, BMA, 43/55 XV/314, Émile Lémery Papers, clipping from *Le Soir*, 5 August 1955. This was part of a series of articles printed between 4-6 August 1955 based on rediscovered correspondence by Lémery's nephew. And *Le Baron Dhanis au Kwango et pendant la campagne arabe*. Antwerp: J.-B. Van Caneghem, 1910, 21.
- ²⁶ Thomas Pakenham, *The Scramble for Africa, 1876-1912*. London: Abacus, 1992, 438.
- ²⁷ Beckett, *Modern Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies*, 34. For a general appreciation of British recruitment policy in India, see David Omissi, *The Sepoy and the Raj. The Indian Army 1860-1940*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1994; Kaushik Roy, *War and Society in Colonial India, 1807-1945*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006; and *The Army in British India: From Colonial Warfare to Total War, 1857-1947*. London: Bloomsbury, 2012; and Rob Johnson, 'General Roberts, the Occupation of Kabul, and the Problems of Transition, 1879-1880', *War in History*, vol. 20, no. 3 (2013), 304, & 311-312.
- ²⁸ Porch, 'Bugeaud, Galliéni, Lyautey', 380-381.
- ²⁹ Bruce Vandervort, *Wars of Imperial Conquest in Africa, 1830-1914*. London: University College London Press, 1998, 68.
- ³⁰ Rid, 'Origins of Counterinsurgency Doctrine', 739-740; and Anthony Thrall Sullivan, *Thomas-Robert Bugeaud: France and Algeria, 1784-1849: Politics, Power, and the Good Society*. Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1983, 99-100.
- ³¹ Beckett, *Modern Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies*, 41.
- ³² Porch, 'Bugeaud, Galliéni, Lyautey', 388; and *Counterinsurgency*, 51-54.
- ³³ Callwell, *Lessons to be Learnt*, 363.
- ³⁴ RA, CLII, Expansion, 144/39, Report to the King. Undated [Likely, 1889].
- ³⁵ WHI, BMA, 43/51 XV/17, Edmond van Eetvelde to Camille Janssen, 15 September 1890.
- ³⁶ WHI, BMA, 43/51 XV/13, Théophile Wahis to Camille Janssen, 30 July 1890.
- ³⁷ For an overview of European-Arab relations and its deterioration see, R.P. P. Cuelemans, *La question arabe et le Congo (1883-1892)*. Brussels: Académie royale des Sciences coloniales: Classe des Sciences Morales et Politiques, 1959, 64-85, 98-121, 147-235 & 269-367; and Ruth Slade, *King Leopold's Congo: Aspects of the Development of Race Relations in the Congo Independent State*. London: Oxford University Press, 1962, 89-102 & 106-110.
- ³⁸ WHI, BMA, 43/51 XV/16, Théophile Wahis to Camille Janssen, 31 August 1890.
- ³⁹ WHI, BMA, 43/51 XV/12, Copy of Instructions from the Governor General to Nicolas Isidore Tobbacq, 30 April 1890.
- ⁴⁰ Ibid.
- ⁴¹ Ibid.
- ⁴² Ibid.
- ⁴³ Ibid.
- ⁴⁴ *La Belgique Militaire*, No. 1052, 31 May 1891, 657-658; and Lord Wah, 'Le Congo: le retour de Dhanis – La Guerre Arabe', extract from *Revue de l'Armée Belge* (Tomes II & III, 1894-95). Liège: Direction & Administration, 1894, 29. For a comprehensive overview see, R. P. L. Lotar, *La Grande Chronique de l'Uele suivant la collection du Mouvement Géographique, de la Belgique Coloniale, etc. ainsi que des documents inédits en possession de l'auteur ou lui communiqués*. Brussels: Académie royale des Sciences coloniales: Classe des Sciences Morales et Politiques, 1946.
- ⁴⁵ Demetrius Charles Boulger, *The Congo State: Or, the Growth of Civilisation in Central Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, 161-162; and WHI, BMA, 43/51 XV/36, Lieutenant Sibieux to Nicolas Isidore Tobbacq, 14 March 1892.
- ⁴⁶ Pakenham, *The Scramble for Africa*, 436-437.
- ⁴⁷ Marechal, *De 'Arabische' Campagne*, 233-234.
- ⁴⁸ Deuxième Section de l'État-Major de la Force Publique, *La Force Publique de sa Naissance à 1914: Participation des militaires à l'histoire des premières années du Congo*. Gebloux: J. Duculot, (1952), 36-39.
- ⁴⁹ Gann & Duigan, *The Rulers of Belgian Africa*, 79.
- ⁵⁰ Marechal, *De 'Arabische' Campagne*, 233-234; L.F. Vanderstraeten, 'Léopold II et la Force Publique', in Patrick Lefèvre (et.al.) (ed.), *Léopold II et la Force Publique du Congo*. Brussels: Cercle royal des anciens officiers des campagnes d'Afrique, 1985, 12; and Guy De Boeck, *BAONI: Les revoltes de la Force Publique sous Léopold II 1895-1908*. Antwerp: Les Editions EPO, 1987, 34-35.
- ⁵¹ WHI, BMA, 43/51 XV/35, Nicolas Isidore Tobbacq to Camille Janssen, 27 February 1892.
- ⁵² WHI, BMA, 43/55 XV/314, Émile Lémery Papers, clipping from *Le Soir*, 5 August 1955.
- ⁵³ Vanderstraeten, 'Léopold II et la Force Publique', 15.

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- ⁵⁴ Marechal, *De 'Arabische' Campagne*, 233-234.
- ⁵⁵ In Belgian sources and historiography this is often spelled as Gongo Lutété, however more recent Sankuru-based historians prefer to use Luteta in a bid to establish him as an authentic 'Tetela'. See, David M. Gordon, 'Interpreting Documentary Sources on the Early History of the Congo Free State: The Case of Ngongo Luteta's Rise and Fall', *History in Africa*, vol. 41, (2014), 17-18.
- ⁵⁶ *Le Soir*, 21 August 1892; and *Le Baron Dhanis au Kwango*, 18-19.
- ⁵⁷ Gordon, 'Interpreting Documentary Sources', 19-22.
- ⁵⁸ RA, CLII, Expansion, 144/39, Report to the King. Undated [Likely, 1889]; and Marechal, *De 'Arabische' Campagne*, 233.
- ⁵⁹ Marechal, *De 'Arabische' Campagne*, 234.
- ⁶⁰ Callwell, *Lessons to be Learnt*, 362; and Dierk Walter, *Colonial Violence: European Empires and the Use of Force*. [Translated by Peter Lewis]. London: Hurst & Company, 2017, 98-101, 210-212 & 245-247.
- ⁶¹ Porch, *Counterinsurgency*, 20; and *The French Foreign Legion*, 147-149; and Edward Spiers, *The Late Victorian Army, 1868-1902*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992, 295 & 317-318.
- ⁶² Walter, *Colonial Violence*, 82.
- ⁶³ Isabel V. Hull, *Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005, 134-135
- ⁶⁴ Donny, *L'art militaire au Congo*, 17.
- ⁶⁵ Callwell, *Lessons to be Learnt*, 364.
- ⁶⁶ Beckett, *Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies*, 33.
- ⁶⁷ Vandervort, *Wars of Imperial Conquest*, 68.
- ⁶⁸ Musée Royal d'Afrique Centrale [MRAC], Francis Dhanis Papers, HA.01.0003/40, Letter of Promotion to Second Lieutenant, 12 May 1884
- ⁶⁹ Mario Draper, *The Belgian Army and Society from Independence to the Great War*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018, 51, & 74-76.
- ⁷⁰ Gann & Duignan, *The Rulers of Belgian Africa*, 61-64.
- ⁷¹ Marechal, *De 'Arabische' Campagne*, 240-241. An interesting example of this was Lieutenant Henri Doquier, who hoped that his service in the Congo-Arab War and his decision to risk the perils of another expedition in 1896, would ensure his promotion to Captain, which was 'in his sights'. See WHI, BMA, 43/55 XV/263/26, Henri Doquier to Merette & Constant Desmet, 27 November 1893; 43/55 XV 263/1-33, Henri Doquier to Merette & Constant Desmet, 9 June 1896; & 43/55 XV 263/33, Henri Doquier to Constant Desmet, 2 November 1896.
- ⁷² Porch, 'Bugeaud, Galliéni, Lyautey', 380-382, 385-386, & 401.
- ⁷³ MRAC, Francis Dhanis Papers, HA.01.0003/140, Francis Dhanis to Alexandre Delcommune, 28 December 1892.
- ⁷⁴ Sidney Langford Hinde, *The Fall of the Congo Arabs*. London: Methuen & Co, 1897, 215; & Vanderstraeten, 'Léopold II et la Force Publique', 21.
- ⁷⁵ Callwell, *Lessons to be Learnt*, 367.
- ⁷⁶ MRAC, Francis Dhanis Papers, HA.01.0003/140, Francis Dhanis to Alexandre Delcommune, 28 December 1892; Wah, 'Le Congo: le retour de Dhanis', 32; and *Le Baron Dhanis au Kwango*, 19.
- ⁷⁷ Wah, 'Le Congo: le retour de Dhanis', 33; and *Le Baron Dhanis au Kwango*, 20.
- ⁷⁸ Porch, 'Bugeaud, Galliéni, Lyautey', 378-379.
- ⁷⁹ Callwell, *Lessons to be Learnt*, 367.
- ⁸⁰ Marechal, *De 'Arabische' Campagne*, 240.
- ⁸¹ WHI, BMA, 43/55 XV/314, Émile Lémery Papers, clipping from *Le Soir*, 5 August 1955.
- ⁸² WHI, BMA, 43/55 XV/192, Edgard Cerckel Papers. Clipping from *Le Soir*, October 1952 entitled 'Un survivant de la campagne anitesclavagiste du Congo; and 43/55 XV/188 Florent Cassart Papers. Extract from *Le Franc Tirreur*, 7 December 1913.
- ⁸³ Donny, *L'art militaire au Congo*, 41-42.
- ⁸⁴ Callwell, *Lessons to be Learnt*, 370.
- ⁸⁵ Donny, *L'art militaire au Congo*, 141-142.
- ⁸⁶ Ian F.W. Beckett, *The Victorians at War*. London: Hambledon Continuum, 2006, 182.
- ⁸⁷ Callwell, *Lessons to be Learnt*, 397.
- ⁸⁸ *Baron Dhanis*, 25; Wah, 'Le Congo: le retour de Dhanis', 35.
- ⁸⁹ *Baron Dhanis*, 27.
- ⁹⁰ Hinde, *The Fall of the Congo Arabs*, 231.
- ⁹¹ *Baron Dhanis*, 28.
- ⁹² For more on this see, W.R. Louis, 'The Stokes Affair and the Origins of the Anti-Congo Campaign, 1895-1896', *Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire*, vol. 43, no. 2, (1965), 572-584; Daniel Laqua, *The Age of Internationalism*

and Belgium, 1880-1930: Peace, Progress and Prestige. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013, 56-57; Pakenham, *The Scramble for Africa*, 586.

⁹³ WHI, BMA, 43/55 XV 284/1, Extract from *La Belgique Militaire*, 24 October 1897.

⁹⁴ MRAC, Francis Dhanis Papers, HA.01.0003/138, Louis-Napoléon Chaltin to Francis Dhanis, 17 November 1893; WHI, BMA, 43/56 XV 426, Notes of Service by Auguste Théophile Léon Rom [Undated]; and Wah, 'Le Congo: le retour de Dhanis', 37.

⁹⁵ Porch, *Counterinsurgency*, 16 & 20; and, 'Bugeaud, Galliéni, Lyautey', 378.

⁹⁶ Callwell, *Lessons to be Learnt*, 407.

⁹⁷ Vanderstraeten, 'Léopold II et la Force Publique', 15.

⁹⁸ Donny, *L'art militaire au Congo*, 42-45.

⁹⁹ Vanderstraeten, 'Léopold II et la Force Publique', 23; & Wah, 'Le Congo: le retour de Dhanis', 36.

¹⁰⁰ Gann & Duignan, *The Rulers of Belgian Africa*, 57.

¹⁰¹ Matthew G. Stanard, 'Learning to love Leopold: Belgian popular imperialism, 1830-1960', in John M. Mackenzie (ed.), *European empires and the people: Popular responses to imperialism in France, Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany and Italy*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011, 135.