INTEGRATION OF “MOBILE NON-MIGRANTS”

President Trump’s statement in January 2018 that the United States would be better served by seeking its migrants from Norway than sub-Saharan Africa was blunt. Yet, in its substance, this statement was nothing new. President Trump’s outspoken opinion expressed many widespread underlying assumptions and beliefs regarding the processes of migration and integration.

In recent decades, we have witnessed the emergence of a dual discourse on migration (cf. King 2002). The concept and image of “the migrant” has come to be seen by many, including policy makers, as primarily characterised by those who are poor, have lower levels of education, and who are racially and/or culturally different from the host society; they are typically seen as originating from poorer countries, usually in the Global South, and are generally assumed to have had some compelling reason, whether persecution, violence or poverty, to leave their homes. Many policy makers start from these assumptions, but often, migration scholars do so as well. There are clearly many exceptions, but even so, far too many migration scholars use this lens when studying migration flows from the Global South to the Global North, with migration within the Global South a secondary area of focus, and migration within the Global North only an emerging field of research. Yet of the estimated 258 million international migrants in 2017 (UN DESA 2017), over half, or 146 million, lived in the Global North. Of those, more than one-third (39%), totalling 57 million, had been born in another country in the Global North (UN DESA 2017, 1). Migrants from and within the Global North are not an insignificant category.

Even so, those from the Global North are not, for the most part, regarded as migrants in the mainstream literature (although see, e.g., Marrow and Klekowski von Koppenfels 2018; Weinar 2017). They are systematically removed from the “migrant” category and referred to, instead, as “expats” or, indeed, a plethora of other terms, but above all, seen as mobile individuals who are not migrants – mobile non-migrants. We argue that this discursive mechanism creates an illusion of vastly different migration – or mobility – experiences. In this special section, we propose to problematise this duality, engaging with the construction of the migration experience, focusing on migrant integration, and arguing, building on King (2002), that this false dichotomy undermines, rather than clarifying, migration research. Kunz (2019)
similarly argues that “the ‘migrant’ is a central if at times silent category in constructions of the ‘expatriate’” (15).

While the question of who migrants are and how the concept of migrant-hood is constructed has been examined in depth (e.g. Akerlund and Sandberg 2015, Cohen et al. 2015, Ho 2011, King and Wood 2013, Klekowski von Koppenfels 2014, Lundström and Twine 2011, Yeoh and Khoo 1998), both in migration and in management literature, there has been less focus specifically on the integration of migrants, often highly skilled, from the Global North as such – namely as migrants. There has been substantial literature on specific patterns of integration among the highly-skilled and migrants from the Global North (Duchêne-Lacroix and Koukoutsaki-Monnier 2016, Ryan and Mulholland 2014, King et al. 2014, Piekut 2013, Fechter and Walsh 2010, Fechter 2007), but an examination of the integration of these migrants as migrants is lacking. This section seeks to fill that gap.

North-North migrants are, more often than not, characterised as “expatriates,” “lifestyle migrants” (Benson and O’Reilly 2009), “cosmopolitans” (Chalk 2014), “Eurostars” (Favell 2011), as “elite migrants” (Beaverstock 2005), “knowledge migrants” (Ackers 2005) or international or “mobile” students (King and Raghuram 2013). They are, in short, presented as non-migrants and, as such, they are exempt from the expectation of integration, with, indeed, self-segregation seen as being the norm rather than the exception (see, e.g. Ahmed 2011, Beaverstock 2002, Cohen 1977, Croucher 2009, Fechter 2007, Glasze 2006, Pow 2011, Smith and Favell 2006).

This special section focuses on this gap and brings into the light the experience of these “non-migrants” as migrants, who do indeed go through the integration experience. At the same time, it acknowledges the complexity of the concept of integration, which clearly has many facets, grades and stages. We focus on three broadly defined integration areas: socio-economic, political and cultural. In all these instances, we also include the question of the effect and impact of the country of origin on integration of a given group of Global North migrants in another Global North country, which we broadly define as belonging to the OECD. We also argue that the near-total exclusion of migrants from the Global North within mainstream migration theory has undermined the widespread applicability of those theories. We seek to contribute to a broadening of the applicability of migration and integration theories to all migrants, regardless of country of origin or destination.
We engage with assumptions surrounding both migration and integration, and deliver a range of evidence concerning migration and integration issues experienced by migrants from the Global North. Conventional wisdom has it that integration of North-North migrants is usually positively boosted by the “country label”. There is a set of beliefs about a country’s cultural, social and economic characteristics that defines its passport holders in the eyes of the host community. This leads to unrealistic and even surrealistic reactions to Otherness and inconsistent expectations for integration outcomes: for example “expatriate” segregation is to be expected (de facto high-income economic migrants), but again is not seen as a problem per se (Smith and Favell 2006) while the segregation of low-income labour or family migrants is a cause of diminishing social cohesion or even results in social outrage (Musterd 2003).

Just as Global North migrants are often portrayed as something other than migrants, their integration is similarly often portrayed as a phenomenon separate from that of migrants from the Global South. When discussing highly skilled migration, Smith and Favell (2006) argued that integration policy seems to be thought unnecessary for this category of migrants, a stance that seems to be widely held for all North-North migration. Yet, as the papers in this section demonstrate, integration is a challenge for all migrants, regardless of origin; at the same time, we acknowledge, and examine, the nuanced role – usually an advantage, but not unequivocally so – of country of origin. Camenisch and Suter examine this phenomenon in four Chinese cities.

We propose thus to look at the integration of North-North immigrants through the lens of these “country labels” which we operationalise as the effects of the country of origin. These effects are discussed as endogenous or exogenous features. The characteristics that are endogenous to the country are not mere perceptions, they are rather building blocks of a migrant’s human capital. They can underpin a “country label” but are measurable, such as level and quality of education provided, social and cultural development, migrants’ health levels. The characteristics exogenous to the country, or what might be called the “country label”, are included in a set of beliefs existing in any given host country vis-à-vis a sending country and its citizens. These beliefs can result in negative stereotypes and racism in the host country towards one group, but also in attitudes towards another group which are based on perception of the (high) status of the country of origin, and not the migrant group itself (Klekowski von Koppenfels 2014). The exogenous characteristics are built on skewed (over-estimated or underestimated) data concerning endogenous factors. For example, the stereotype of Japanese citizens
as both temporary migrants and as wealthy, healthy investors has paved the way for the unproblematic integration of Japanese students and low-skilled workers in Italy (Bonifazi 1998). In another example, President Trump calling for migration from Norway used a label that was effectively a proxy for white Christian migrants. Emigrants from the Global North, however, are not always white and Christian, for a variety of reasons, including rising diversity (Weinar 2017), which then has implications for integration. French citizens of African origin and Haitian migrants might well face similar challenges of discrimination in the United States.

Global Northerners: lifestyle migrants, economic migrants or both?

For the purposes of this special section, we understand the contemporary Global North as being composed of industrialised, liberal-democratic countries with high levels of per capita GDP and having an absence of conflict. One roughly equivalent measure might be membership in the OECD as of the end of the Cold War, thus including Australia and New Zealand, but excluding Mexico, Chile and Poland. All affluent, and largely white and Christian, they have historically been conceptualised as countries of destination rather than origin, a characterisation which continues to affect any of the citizens of those countries who have emigrated, whether permanently or for a temporary stay, who continue to be seen as “mobile non-migrants” rather than migrants tout court. Nonetheless, the concept of the “Global North” may well be a misnomer – while Australia and New Zealand, located in the southern hemisphere, would fall into this category, it is only relatively recently that Germany, for instance, has been seen as such. Economic prosperity is a key factor in the distinction between migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries, both in terms of significance of flows and of characterisation of a country as such by policymakers and others.

Yet the apparent sub-division of migration into labour migration and expatriate mobility along these rough lines of Global North and Global South has hindered, rather than helped, our understanding of the global patterns of migration and of integration, as others have argued (e.g. Fechter and Walsh 2010). This bifurcated approach has undermined the universal relevance of migration theories, removing an entire population of migrants from the mainstream of migration studies (Smith and Favell 2006). Migrants from the Global North in other OECD countries are almost never included in discussions of migration (with the interesting exception of some intra-
EU migration, for instance Polish migrants in the UK or British migrants in Spain). Or, perhaps more accurately, they can be included at one point in time and then disappear (e.g. Italian migrants to Germany or Belgium or German or Italian migrants – now more often “expats” – in the United States).

What makes Global Northerners migrants?

We acknowledge that migrants from the Global North are almost certainly less vulnerable than those from the Global South; largely highly skilled, they have easier access to legal channels of migration and are less likely to have to turn to smugglers, for instance, to cross an international border. Nor are they likely to have to flee conflict or corruption-fuelled effects of climate change. Indeed, a mutual trust exists between the countries of origin and destination in the Global North; this is a trust in their institutions and procedures, which both underlies and perpetuates the relative ease of movement. However, the ease with which Global Northerners can cross borders within the OECD club should not necessarily be understood as cosmopolitanism (and a false facilitator of integration, (Barbulescu 2013)). Individuals from Global North countries can often, we argue here, be understood as migrants, *tout court*.

Despite such arrangements of mutual trust as the Bologna agreement within the European Union which facilitates the recognition of another EU member state’s diplomas, those with similar skill levels from the Global North and from the Global South very often face many of the same integration challenges. All of the articles in this special section demonstrate precisely that. Examining the cases of migrants from the Global North in the United Kingdom, Israel and China, these three articles show the complexity of integration for those from the Global North. Far from a smooth integration, almost to the contrary, it becomes clear that their passports alone cannot guarantee seamless access to the labour market, nor are they guarantors of host language skills or recognition of academic and professional qualifications.

In the cases presented here, there are three characteristics that shape integration outcomes for these migrants from the Global North: first, as for migrants from the Global South, social and cultural capital and its worth brought from the country of origin is significant. Second, the varying value of the migrant’s social and cultural capital in the country of destination. Third, the migration procedure used to enter the country (temporary vs permanent, family reunification vs
employment) similarly plays a role in integration. These factors significantly impact their processes of integration – as these factors do for migrants from the Global South.

CONCLUSION

In short, there is a strong argument to be made that migrants from the Global North experience integration processes much as do their similarly-skilled counterparts from the Global South with difficulties in recognition of qualifications, travails of language learning, challenges of identity and overall struggles to settle in. When policymakers, however, continue to reinforce an artificial distinction between groups of migrants, largely on the basis of the wealth or stability of the country of origin, the distinction between the “deserving” and “undeserving” migrant, or the “good” or “bad” migrant, is further perpetuated, with further repercussions, reinforcing a negative context of reception for those who have been stigmatised as the “undeserving” or “bad” migrants. Examining cases of the integration of migrants from the Global North, as this special section does, helps to diminish the starkness of these dichotomies and contributes to a more nuanced discussion of migration and integration overall.

REFERENCES


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