**2.1 The Cyprus Stalemate: Opportunities for Peace and Lessons from Turkish-Bulgarian Ethnic Relations**

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**Introduction**

The conflict of Cyprus is commonly associated with prolonged deadlocks, failures in peace mediations, and hardline politics. The collapse of the Crans-Montana talks in the summer of 2017 understandably increased despair and pessimism across pro-settlement groups in the two communities. Likewise, the post-2016 coup in Turkey and the worsening of relations in the Eastern Mediterranean are generally seen as dimming hopes of peace for the broader region and, by extension, for the Cyprus peace talks. Yet as demonstrated elsewhere, nations in conflict are not always hostage to their own history (Pinker 2011) and often this becomes possible even under the most difficult situations.

Our chapter provides an alternative to the mainstream narratives of the Cyprus problem, departing from conventional accounts of its intractability to emphasize the potential for conflict resolution. It utilizes a new term ‘proto-consociationalism’ to define the early stages of cooperation and consensus in the Cyprus peace process (see also Cochrane et al. 2018). While admitting there is a protracted stalemate and discussing past failures to reach a peace settlement, we caution against interpreting the Cyprus problem as intractable. We argue that in its management of the Turkish minority, Bulgaria is an appropriate comparative fit and has the potential to provide inspiration in Cyprus and across the region. More specifically, we enumerate a set of important lessons from post-Zhivkov Bulgaria to support the positive realignment of Turkish foreign policy in a reunited Cyprus and identify the most effective neighborhood policies leading in this direction. We then provide insights into peace-making in the island by identifying a set of conflict resolution breakthroughs, including the Nicosia sewage system and the Committee of Missing Persons, and we propose a series of steps to get past the current stalemate and re-incentivize the peace talks.

**The Cypriot context**

Cyprus is a good case study of intractability and protracted stalemates. Since 1974, the UN has made several proposals to reunite the island, albeit with little success. The Cyprus problem has been called a ‘diplomat’s graveyard’, a metaphor used to describe ‘the effect the intractable Cyprus issue has had on the “parade of UN representatives” who …tried to help fund a settlement, only to depart empty handed’ (Christou 2014). A study published to mark the UN’s 50th anniversary in the island notes that 25 envoys have served under eight Secretary Generals working on the problem (Hadjigregoriou 2014). Admittedly, the Cypriot mediation is complicated, as it involves a set of inherently difficult issues, such as power-sharing, internal displacement, settlers, and security provisions.

Since 1974, UN proposals and resolutions for a negotiated settlement in Cyprus have included federal and consociational provisions. It has generally been assumed that a negotiated settlement will incorporate two federal units and a shared administration at the central government level. Negotiated terms such as ‘bizonal’ and ‘bicommunal’ federation (BBF), as well as references to ‘political equality’, included in previously signed framework agreements and joint statements by the leaders of the two communities point to an important convergence in ideas about sharing power and recognizing each community’s genuine security needs, but the details and substance of a settlement remain unresolved.

As early as the late 1970s, Cypriot leaders on both sides signed two High Level Agreements signifying initial convergence towards a bi-communal federal compromise. However, the 1977-1979 High Level Agreements were not clearly defined. For instance, they emphasized adherence to human rights for all citizens, but the issue of Greek Cypriot internally displaced persons (IDPs) returning to the North was subject to overcoming the ‘practical difficulties’ of the Turkish Cypriot community (Ker-Lindsay 2011, 49-51). Moreover, the decision on whether the two communities should be territorially re-integrated through the return of the displaced to meet Greek Cypriot expectations, or whether federal boundaries would assume a more ‘ethnic form’ to satisfy the Turkish Cypriot positions was left for the future.

Despite these ambiguities, the communities have occasionally voted for pro-federal politicians or rallied in support of the reunification of the island, as for example, the impressive Turkish Cypriot rallies of 2002-2004. Historically, two-thirds of the Greek Cypriot public has voted for pro-settlement politicians hailing from either the nominally communist AKEL (Progressive Party of the Working People) or the center-right DISY (Democratic Rally). Yet these parties have failed to articulate a shared agenda on the Cyprus issue because of their internal political antagonisms. Nor has the prospect of cooperating on issues such as energy and oil and natural gas exploration positively influenced the Cyprus peace talks; in fact, in 2018, the inability to agree led to spiraling crises in the Eastern Mediterranean. Equally, the incentives of EU-accession for both Cyprus and Turkey have failed to lead to a comprehensive settlement in the island (Demetriou 2004; Tocci 2007; Ker-Lindsay2012).

**Why do the negotiations in Cyprus keep failing at the last minute?**

Why have all proposals failed despite being supported by the United Nations and often by moderate parties in both communities? For one thing, it is more difficult to establish power-sharing and political equality between Greek and Turkish Cypriots than between opponents in most other divided communities (e.g. Northern Ireland or Belgium) because of the fundamental demographic inequality; historically Greek Cypriots have outnumbered Turkish Cypriots by four to one. An additional worry for Greek Cypriots is the role of Turkey and Turkish settlers; the latter are often used to exaggerate fears that power-sharing will be a stepping stone for Turkish control of the entire island in the near future. Greek Cypriots could conceivably compromise on power-sharing if there were credible mechanisms for their security but given Turkey’s policies, such credible mechanisms and commitments appear improbable. In other words, there are no immediate trade-offs for Greek Cypriots in terms of security, even though they are expected to make compromises on the right of return for displaced persons under future Turkish Cypriot administrations.

Despite these objective difficulties, progress has been made on multiple issues, and most peace plans and packages proposed so far represent a compromise between the aspirations of the different parties. On the one hand, the UN has attempted to re-establish Cyprus as a unified state with significant territorial readjustments in favor of the Greek Cypriot side to enable the maximum number of returnees among the post-1974 victims of ethnic cleansing. On the other, it has proposed ethnic federal structures recognizing significant autonomy for the future Turkish Cypriot constituent state and political equality within the central government. In short, the UN proposals aimed to establish a form of power-sharing and designated community rights, thereby preventing the Greek Cypriot majority from out-voting Turkish Cypriots on issues of vital political concern.

On the issue of security, in its most recent intervention in the summer of 2017, the UN attempted to abolish Greek and Turkish unilateral guarantees for intervention. However, significant disagreements remain, particularly on the timing and conditions for the complete withdrawal of Turkish troops.

Despite intensive efforts to renegotiate new and comprehensive security, territorial, and power-sharing arrangements, the island remains divided. In addition to the multiple dimensions/challenges of the Cyprus conflict, other obstacles include the history of ethnic nationalism in the island and the region (Loizides 2007; Heraclides 2011), the passage of time and the long separation of the two communities, and lack of trust. As noted above, a comprehensive Cyprus settlement should answer the security fears of both communities and do so in a convincing way to the public and policymakers not only in Cyprus but also the broader region.[[1]](#endnote-1)

In the future, the two sides will have to identify solutions to the questions of power-sharing, refugee return, immigration policy, property rights etc. Property compensations alone will cost tens of billion Euros, depending on an agreed-upon formula that would respect ECtHR requirements and past court decisions.[[2]](#endnote-2) In a nutshell, the key fears of each side will have to be addressed, provisions for IDPs will have to be carefully designed, and the EU will have to assume a more integrated role in the overall equation. The problems are not insurmountable, however, and here the case of Bulgaria offers some useful insights and institutional lessons.

**The Bulgarian-Turkish Precedent**

The peaceful transformation of inter-ethnic relations since the early 1990s makes Bulgaria a useful comparative case (see Anagnostou, 2005; Koinova, 2013). Interestingly, Bulgaria has rarely been compared to Cyprus, despite important parallels.[[3]](#endnote-3) This section discusses Bulgaria’s profound transformation in terms of inter-ethnic relations and points out the factors that make the ‘Bulgarian ethnic model’ successful, despite Turkey’s regional presence and influence as a close neighbor (an often-cited fear of Greek-Cypriots opposing a federal settlement).

Bulgaria has a tormented history in terms of interethnic relations (Crampton 2002), making the peaceful transformation of minority-majority relations and the success of the Bulgarian ethnic model particularly striking. Bulgarian Turks were subject to systematic exclusionary policies and forced displacement throughout the 1980s. Todor Zhivkov, head of the Bulgarian state, who ruled the country for more than 35 years until the collapse of the communist regime, played a key role in formulating and implementing ethnic homogenization.[[4]](#endnote-4) Under his leadership, members of minority communities were forced to change their names and replace them with Slavic ones. The right to access education in their native language was denied, and religious rights and freedoms were removed (Crampton 2002, 177; Bakalova 2006; Baeva and Kalinova 2012; Ataöv 1990). Zhivkov’s homogenization campaign targeted more than one million people; of these, the overwhelming majority were ethnic Turks.[[5]](#endnote-5) His policies triggered mass demonstrations and protests in the city centers; the government pushed back violently, and several demonstrators were shot and killed by militia.[[6]](#endnote-6) According to a Helsinki Watch Committee report, more than 100 people died during the demonstrations in Kardzhali in the winter of 1984-85, and 250 protestors were imprisoned (Zang 1989). Between 300 and 1,500 people in the Turkish minority community were killed during the years of the ‘national revival process’ a term that came to define discriminatory policies by the Bulgarian state (Laber 1987, 4). Suspected leaders of the Turkish minority community were detained and sent to Belene camp[[7]](#endnote-7) while the anti-minority policies took a turn for the worse in May 1989 when Zhivkov announced that the borders would be opened to allow anyone who wanted to leave Bulgaria to do so. Between June and August 1989, more than 340,000 Turkish Bulgarians left for Turkey (Konukman, 1990, 61-71).

What makes Bulgaria a counterintuitive case is that the country made a surprising U-turn, seeing a peaceful transformation of inter-ethnic relations and the voluntary return of approximately 40 per cent of forcibly expelled Turks (Kutlay 2017). The Bulgarian transition can be attributed to three main factors feeding into each other: political leadership, institutional power-sharing, and the enabling role of the EU.

*Political leadership and the role of apologies*

On 10 November 1989, Todor Zhivkov was ousted from office.[[8]](#endnote-8) His removal triggered a series of unexpected events that led to a regime change. The new Bulgarian elite played a critical role in shaping the conditions of transition and informing the post-transition political equilibrium. Two leaders, Zhelyu Zhelev and Ahmet Dogan, spearheaded a consensus form of politics that bridged the conflicting parties and allowed for the Turkish-Bulgarian minority to participate more active in public life; governing coalitions which included the Turkish minority became the norm in the country partly as a result of the country adopting a PR (proportional representation) system with a low national threshold (4 per cent).[[9]](#endnote-9)

In the course of the democratic transition, pro-democracy forces formed a new political platform called the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF). Zhelyu Zhelev was elected the first leader of the group and became Bulgaria’s first democratically elected President on 22 January 1992. Zhelev criticized the treatment of the Turkish community by former Bulgarian elites. He recognized that denial of the mass sufferings experienced in the late 1980s were likely to lead to more inter-ethnic problems, so he took a conciliatory tone, stating, for example that the ‘Turkish people were the largest minority in Bulgaria [and suffered] the consequences of the so-called “national revival process.”’[[10]](#endnote-10) Zhelev saw addressing the tormented past as an opportunity to unify pro-democratic forces at a critical juncture in Bulgarian politics, but he and his advisor on minority issues, Mihail Ivanov, considered moderation was essential for inter-ethnic conciliation.[[11]](#endnote-11) To this end, Zhelev emphasized the importance of European norms and values as the guiding principles towards which Bulgarian political culture should be oriented. The peaceful co-existence of inter-ethnic communities and the restoration of the rights of Turkish community were justified along these lines.

Political leadership was equally important on the Turkish side. Ahmet Dogan, the political leader of the Turkish community who was imprisoned during the 1980s, also played a critical moderating role. Ahmet Dogan adopted a very cautious rhetoric and dismissed all forms of excessive demands by the Turkish minority. He prioritized the restoration of Turkish minority’s fundamental rights and freedoms, but he unequivocally rejected all separatist demands. At first, it was difficult to curtail the power of the ‘hawks’ within the ranks of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), the political party formed by the Turkish community following Bulgaria’s transition to democracy.[[12]](#endnote-12) But Ahmet Dogan and his close aides managed to neutralize the hawkish elements and build bridges with the Bulgarian mainstream, especially with pro-democratic forces.

Bulgarian political elites continued their moderation policies throughout the 1990s, working to consolidate inter-communal rapprochement. State apologies, in this context, became an important symbolic gesture contributing to the sense of belonging of the Turkish minority. The Bulgarian political elite selected politically sensitive times to apologize for the wrongdoings of the past. In 1997, for instance, President Peter Stoyanov apologized to Turks in a speech at the Turkish Parliament in Ankara (Stoyanov 1997, 73). In 1998, Prime Minister Ivan Kostov apologized in Bursa, a Turkish city where migrants were resettled after the forced migration. In 2006, the leader of the Bulgarian Socialist Party, Sergei Stanishev, apologized at the annual conference of MRF. Finally, in 2012, the Bulgarian Parliament signed a declaration defining the former assimilation policies as ‘ethnic cleansing’ and condemned the forced migration of 1989 (Kutlay 2012).

*Institutional power sharing*

The retrospective analysis of Bulgaria suggests that moderation and consensus politics at the elite level carved out a space for inter-ethnic dialogue, even in difficult conditions. The efforts of the politicians paved the way for the creation of inclusive power-sharing mechanisms that institutionalized inter-ethnic co-existence.

The Turkish community established a political party, MRF, in January 1990. The party secured 23 seats in the first democratic elections, and this proved instrumental in advancing the rights of Turkish community. MRF’s participation in Bulgarian politics, however, was not straightforward. The Bulgarian Constitution is explicit: ‘There shall be no political parties on ethnic and religious lines’ (1991, article 11/1). Accordingly, the MRF elites never worked along ethnic lines. This did not stop the nationalist segments of the mainstream political elites from charging the party with violating the Constitution and taking their case (twice) to the Constitutional Court (Nitzova 1997). They lost both times. As Mihail Ivanov, adviser to President Zhelyu Zhelev on minority issues noted in an interview, the Court and the Central Election Commission were aware of the sensitive political situation and considered the potentially devastating impact of the exclusion of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria in their decision.[[13]](#endnote-13)

The Bulgarian Constitutional Court’s decision put an end to the controversy over the legality of the Turkish party. As Bogoev underlines, ‘The judgement was a definitive contribution both to the democratic process and to the supremacy of law’ (Bagoev 2000, 190). The MRF’s inclusion in Bulgarian politics via peaceful ways and the precious opportunity carved out enabled Turks to express their demands at the Bulgarian Parliament. The MRF became a king-maker in elections and played an active role in all critical legislative processes in Parliament.

*The enabling role of the European Union*

Following the collapse of Communism, the integration with Euro-Atlantic structures emerged as a key priority for Bulgarian political elites. Even though the EU membership was not on the horizon during the 1990s, the pro-reform leaders of both the minority and majority sides framed the EU as a common denominator. The legitimacy of inclusive policies was ensured by referring to EU norms and values. The EU constituted one of the rare unifying targets upon which ex-communists, the Bulgarian mainstream, and the Turkish minority agreed.

Bulgaria’s new political elites prioritized the establishment of a liberal democracy and a market economy as the most viable alternatives to the ineffective state-led economy developed during the single party regimes. Zhelyu Zhelev was a dedicated liberal and true believer in the European project. Ahmet Doğan also claimed the ‘Europeanisation of Bulgaria’s political and parliamentary life’ was the best way ‘for guaranteeing social peace in Bulgaria’ (Dogan n.p.d., 10)

The EU’s leverage over Bulgaria increased gradually over the years. The EU funded Bulgaria’s transition via PHARE programs, and successive Bulgarian governments received 2.36 billion euros during the pre-accession process from 1990 to 2006 (European Commission 2015, 110). The financial support of the EU proved crucial in keeping the Bulgarian economy afloat (Bechev 2012, 115). The Copenhagen criteria and the minority friendly legislations prescribed by the EU as part of the political convergence, such as the Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities, created a locked-in effect in the Bulgarian political system, consolidating inter-ethnic moderation and reconciliation.

**Lessons for Cyprus and the way forward**

As noted above, there are key differences between the cases of Bulgaria and Cyprus. First, the presence of the EU led to very different results in the two countries. In the 1990s, the EU emerged as a new and promising actor that could use its power to ‘catalyse’ a peace settlement in Cyprus (Richmond 2005; Rumelili 2007; Tocci 2007). As in Bulgaria, the EU could have provided the ideal forum to change public attitudes, by creating a ‘win-win’ framework and setting the stage for a settlement (Yesilada & Sozen 2002; Hadjipavlou 2007; Anastasiou 2008; Kaymak 2012). But unlike Bulgaria, accession to the EU has not catalysed a settlement. Second, unlike the Bulgarian conflict in the 1980s, the Cypriot one has been relatively peaceful with almost zero casualties since 1974 (Doyle and Sambanis 2006, 257-281; Heraclides 2011). This fact alone could have been conducive for a peace settlement since unlike post-Zhivkov Bulgaria, a generation of Cypriots has grown up with almost no direct exposure to violence. Yet Cyprus has remained divided, with repeated failures in UN mediations.

Although no final settlement has been reached in Cyprus, some significant progress in the relations of the two communities is reminiscent of the Bulgarian-Turkish case. For example, the two communities have made important early steps in reconciliation areas particularly with regards to addressing the question of the missing, developing successful bi-communal projects and cooperation across a wide range of humanitarian, cultural, environmental, crisis management and other issues.

The most significant example is the Committee for Missing Persons (CMP), an institutionalized bicommunal body responsible for the exhumations of those individuals reported as missing in the inter-communal fighting of the 1960s and early 1970s, as well as in the events of July 1974 and afterward. Despite the political stalemates in bicommunal talks, the CMP has become a very successful bicommunal project, having exhumed the remains of more than half of the missing, despite protracted political stalemates. Creating the infrastructure and, more importantly, the public knowledge of DNA extraction proved extremely important when the government appealed to the Turkish Cypriot relatives of the missing to give blood samples to enable the matching of the community’s missing with their families. Journalists have played a role as well, challenging the dominant views in their respective communities by emphasizing the common victimhood of all families of the missing. A prominent example has been Sevgül Uludağ; her newspaper articles and books have been published on both sides of the divide, despite persecution and continuous threats on her life (2006).[[14]](#endnote-14) More importantly, her readers often provided additional information for suspected massacre sites enabling exhumations and the recovery of the missing persons.

Since 2004, both members of both communities have collaborated in the process of exhuming bodies, thus indirectly acknowledging their responsibilities for violent crimes. In comparative terms (see Kovras 2014), the number of exhumations is a major success for a divided island; like Bulgaria’s recognition of past wrong-doings, in Cyprus the trauma of the missing has initiated a process of reconciliation across communities and at the leadership level. A major initiative in late 2018 included the joint declaration of Greek and Turkish Cypriot political parties asking for the construction of common memorial sites for the dead and the declaration of a joint day for commemorating the victims of the Cyprus conflict.[[15]](#endnote-15)

**Moderate Leadership?**

Another key dimension in the Cyprus-Bulgaria comparison relates to the role of leadership. Contrary to conventional wisdom, supporters of reunification in Cyprus have frequently demonstrated how moderate leadership can reverse even the most difficult aspects of territorial division. As in Bulgaria, we see a type of moderation across communal lines, with leaders on both sides of the divide agreeing on certain core issues and priorities for confidence-building. Interestingly, even under conditions of division in Cyprus, a key bicommunal project has emerged in every decade since the 1970s. Even during the darkest moments of the island’s post-1974 division (current Turkish Cypriot leader) Mustafa Akinci and Lellos Demetriades, the two mayors of the divided capital Nicosia resorted to an ad hoc set of arrangements to address the city’s impending environmental disaster caused by the absence of a sewer system. Leaving legalistic formalities aside, they agreed to call themselves ‘representatives’, rather than ‘mayors’, of the city and managed to upgrade the city’s sewer system, thereby taking the first step towards Nicosia’s ‘underground’ re-unification in the early 1980s. Shortly after, the two mayors agreed on a ‘Master plan’ for Nicosia based on the framework of a ‘town which is going to be united’ (Loizides 2016).

The 1990s also saw an intensification of the emergence of grassroots movements to support the reunification of Cyprus, not only across the ethnic divide but also across the traditional left-right division. In the Turkish Cypriot community, left-wing parties began to challenge the hegemonic position of the nationalist right. The *Bu Memleket Bizim* (‘This Homeland is Ours’) movement brought these forces together and mobilized the Turkish Cypriot community in massive peace rallies in 2002-2004. As a result of these mobilizations, the Turkish Republican Party (CTP) and its leader Mehmet Ali Talat gradually came to control almost all major posts in the Turkish Cypriot community by 2005. In April 2003, in response to the public demand for cooperation, the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş lifted his restrictions on travel across the so-called Green Line that had separated the two communities for decades, allowing travel for the first time since the island’s division in 1974. Crossings took place without violence and, in most cases, past and new owners of disputed properties engaged with each other on amicable terms.

The ‘Yes’ vote by the Turkish Cypriots in the 2004 Annan Plan referendum and the mere fact that Cyprus has come close to a federal settlement twice since then are other indications of the resilience of the peace movement in the island and the capacity of moderate leaderships to achieve a better future for the island.

**Conclusion**

We would argue that despite the lack of a settlement, the future for Cyrus is not without hope. The Bulgarian case demonstrates that a peaceful cooperation is possible even after intense conflict. There are three main lessons from Bulgaria relevant to other divided societies and Cyprus. The Bulgarian leadership not only recognized the role of the Turkish community in the country but also apologized for its past wrongdoings and sought effective ways to address historical injustices. The Bulgarian concessions of the 1990s did not lead to new demands, violent communal conflict, or Turkey intervening to dominate the country. Greek Cypriot hardliners often argue across these lines and emphasize fear and insecurity while pointing to the future negative influences of Turkey in order to oppose a compromise in the current peace talks. Contrary to these fears and expectations, Bulgaria suggests that accommodation could work; the Turkish minority became more moderate, autonomous in its orientation and attached to European values following the adoption of a more conciliatory approach. Secondly, this compromising approach was win-win; unlike, other countries in the region, Bulgaria managed to join the EU and avoided new violent conflicts while the Turkish minority gained the right of return back to its ancestral villages and cities and effectively repatriated almost half of its members expelled during the Zhivkov era. Finally, the Bulgarian case suggests a number of institutional lessons for instance as to the role of representative parliamentary democracy and coalition governments serving both majorities and minorities. Even though consociationalism has not been institutionalized formally in Bulgaria, it worked successfully as an informal mechanism enabling inclusivity and cooperation.

What makes our comparison more intriguing, is that Cyprus has also developed a number of informal proto-consociational structures in its own through various successful joint projects, associations, and bicommunal committees. Like Bulgaria, Cyprus has leaders and established political movements capable of sustaining workable peaceful relations in a future reunited island. Reconciliation attempts continue despite the division on the island. Besides the CMP, there are multiple other successful examples including the work of the Committee on Cultural Heritage for the restoration of ancient monuments, mosques, and churches, as well as committees on gender, education, entrepreneurship, and crisis management (Makriyianni & Psaltis 2007; Psaltis et al. 2017).[[16]](#endnote-16) In the past decade, historical monuments have been protected from destruction, police operations have prevented crimes, including child abductions, and both sides have helped each other during emergencies and electricity shortages. The message of these breakthroughs is twofold: first, Cyprus is not very different from other cases where conflict transformation has become possible, particularly within wider Europe; second, the two communities in the island should become more confident in rallying for reunification and in identifying novel solutions to transcend their division and bring forward reunification.

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**Endnotes**

1. For the role of insecurity in the region and the broader conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean see Heraclides (2001, 2010). [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. Various first author’s communications with Achilleas Demetriades 2016-2018. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. For exceptions but focusing more specifically on ethnic mobilization see Alptekin (2017) [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. Iskra Baeva (Professor, Department of History, Sofia University ‘St Kliment Ohridski’) and Evgenia Kalinova (Professor, Department of History, Sofia University ‘St Kliment Ohridski’), interview by the second author, March 22, 2016. Also see Baeva and Kalinova (2012). [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. Bakalova (2006: 234) says the number was approximately 850,000. Yet according to an official letter of the Bulgarian Ministry of the Interior on 27 May 1989, the names of 1,306,000 people were altered in 1984. T. Bobev prepared the document and First Deputy Minister General GrigorŞopov signed it (Ministry of the Interior, Republic of Bulgaria, 1989). [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. For an autobiographical account of the protests in Kardzhali region, see Yusuf Türkoğlu (2013). [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
7. It is hard to get exact figures for the number of Turkish minority members taken to Belene camp because of the lack of official documents and contradictory numbers provided by secondary sources. These numbers are based on the second author’s interview with Mehmet Niyazi, Secretary General of BAHAD – the Association of Justice, Rights, Culture and Solidarity of Belene Camp Victims, on 28 March 2015 in Bursa, Turkey. The interviews were conducted as part of the JUSTICE 2.0 Project (2015). [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
8. On 10 November 1989, Todov Zhivkov was forced to leave because of a palace coup. The political developments that brought him down were unlike the popular revolts in other Central and Eastern European countries. It was a ‘coup’ within the Communist Party itself. For a detailed account, see Baeva (2004); Bakalova (2006). [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
9. http://www.nsd.uib.no/european\_election\_database/country/bulgaria/electoral\_system.html [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
10. ZhelyuZhelev (the leader of UDF and first democratically elected President of Bulgaria, 1990-1997), interview by the second author, on 21 May 2010 and 30 October 2012. [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
11. Mihail Ivanov (Professor at New Bulgarian University and adviser to President ZhelyuZhelev on minorities and inter-ethnic issues), interview by the second author, 23 and 27 March 2016. [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
12. Ahmed Hussein (DOST Party member February 2016-present; former MRF deputy and the Assembly of Religious Studies Commission Vice-President at the Bulgarian Parliament), interview by the second author, 10 May 2010. [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
13. Ivanov Interview. [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
14. KutluAdali, Uludağ’s brother-in-law, opposed the Denktaş regime on several occasions. He was assassinated in 1996, likely by Turkish ultra-nationalists or criminal groups associated with the deep state in Ankara. There has been no arrest for his murder and according to a landmark ECtHR decision, no ‘effective investigation into the killing’ by Turkey or the Turkish Cypriot authorities (ECtHR 2005). [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
15. http://www.kathimerini.com.cy/gr/politiki/koino-mnimeio-kai-imera-mnimis-gia-e-k-kai-t-k-agnooymenoys-zitoyn-politika-kommata [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
16. For a full list see [https://kktcb.org/en/technical-committees)](https://kktcb.org/en/technical-committees%29) [↑](#endnote-ref-16)