The Second-Generation Liberation Movement in Southern Sudan: Anti-Colonialism as a Set of Practices

In 1955, a mutiny that started in a Sudanese army garrison in the Southern town of Torit marked the beginning of one of the longest liberation wars in post-colonial Africa.¹ This struggle of the black Southern Sudanese, most of whom Christians or followers of indigenous religions, for independence from the rule of a predominantly Muslim-Arab elite in Khartoum lasted for nearly six decades, until the independence of South Sudan in 2011. The Southern Sudanese struggle, mainly its first round in 1955-1972, often termed the First Sudanese Civil War, marked the beginning of a new episode in post-colonial history. It was one of the first instances in which a liberation movement born in a former colony challenged the post-colonial boundaries. As a pioneer of these struggles, there is much we can learn from Southern Sudanese separatist struggle.

The argument here is that such movements, which the article defines as second-generation liberation movements, were shaped to a great extent by their interaction with the first-generation liberation movements, namely those movements that fought for liberation of European colonialism and imperialism. The founders of second-generation liberation movements closely observed the first-generation liberation struggles. When they launched their own liberation struggles, the ideas, identities and strategies of the first-generation liberation movements served the second-generation liberation movements in defining their own identity and strategies – against those governments and states that emerged out of the first-generation liberation movements.

This embracement of anti-colonial discourse, ideas and strategies was not necessarily deliberate. Certainly for the Southern Sudanese, this was a struggle against what many of them perceived as their persecution and marginalisation by Khartoum. The resort to anti-colonial
discourse and actions, and consequently their challenge to international norms of sovereignty and state-making, was an outcome of their exposure to the first-generation anti-colonial struggles, through their interaction with Sudanese nationalists, neighbouring Arab and African liberation movements and other anti-colonial ideologies. Examining the experience of the Southern Sudanese and other second-generation liberation movements through the prism of practice theory in International Relations suggests that we can understand decolonisation and anti-colonialism not simply as a historical phenomenon, limited in time and space, but also as a set of practices that became influential for future liberation movements.

The first part of the article discusses the way in which the existence of post-colonial liberation struggles challenges predominant conceptualisations and the potential to understand decolonisation and anti-colonialism as a set of practices. The following section establishes the existence of inter-generational interaction between the Southern Sudanese and neighbouring liberation movements. The article then examines the impact of this interaction on the discourse, identity and strategy of the Southern Sudanese liberation movement. The analysis of the Southern liberation struggle has benefited from the availability of new primary sources. The opening to public of the South Sudan National Archives (SSNA) in Juba afford scholars with unprecedented insight into both the rebel camp and the Sudanese governments during the war. The exploration of this archive is complemented by the growing effort to make primary sources available at other collections, such as the Middle East Documentation Unit at the University of Durham, and the online Sudan Open Archives (SOA).
Rethinking Decolonisation and Anti-Colonialism

Broadly speaking, decolonisation has meant for historians and political scientists the withdrawal of European empires from their possessions in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. Decolonisation in this sense has been seen as a series of events that reached their peak in the second part of the twentieth century. To give just a few representatives examples, Prasenjit Duara (2004) describes decolonisation as a process that took place in ‘Asia and Africa from the early years of the twentieth century until the 1960s’. Raymond Betts (1998, p. 1) has labelled decolonization as ‘a clutch of fitful activities and events, played out in conference rooms, acted out in protests mounted in city streets, fought over in jungles and mountains’. According to Betts, Britain’s return of Hong Kong to China made it ‘certain… [that] in the political sense of the word, decolonization is over and done with’. Sociologist David Strang (1990, p. 846) has related to decolonisation as an event taking place between 1870 and 1987, in which ‘130 colonial dependencies of Western states became recognized independent states or were fully incorporated as parts of sovereign states during the twentieth century’. Brian Urquhart (1989, p. 2), the former Undersecretary-General of the United Nations, suggested that ‘decolonization was virtually completed within thirty years [of its inception]’. Uriel Abulof (2015) has associated the demise of the invocation of the right of self-determination in the international system with the end of decolonisation.

In a sense, this understanding of decolonisation, and consequently anti-colonialism, reflects the triumph of the idea that colonialism and imperialism were perpetrated exclusively by European powers in overseas territories. Initially adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1952 as the ‘blue water thesis’, this principle served as the legal basis for the decolonisation of former African, Asian and Middle Eastern colonies. It was embraced by the nationalist leaders in the colonies also as a way to preserve the territorial integrity of the new states, and contest separatist demands (Patil 2008: 86-93).
This grasp of colonialism, and consequently decolonisation and anti-colonialism, was contested from an early stage. European empires, for example Belgium, sought to expand the definition to the United States and the native American population. And groups and nations that were excluded from the wave of decolonisation, for not fitting into the criteria of the blue water principle, sought to apply to their case as well. Among the first of those groups to contest this exclusion were Central Asian and Eastern European nationalists, who tried to push for Soviet rule to be labelled as imperialism. At the 1955 Bandung Conference, considered a constitutive moment for the anti-colonial movement, such calls received support from some delegations, including Arab ones, but were vetoed by China and India (Burk 2010: 32-33). Later, this idea that colonialism was not solely a European practice, but could be used to describe the actions of non-European governments, was adopted by separatist movements struggling for independence from newly-formed post-colonial states. In Biafra, Western Sahara, Eritrea, Iraqi Kurdistan and of course Southern Sudan, liberation movements began depicting their governments as colonialist and imperialist in nature, and hence their struggle as anti-colonial one (Heerten and Moses 2014; Allan 2016; Weldemichael 2013; Gunter 2013). In Southern Sudan too, the leaders of the insurgency came to depict themselves as freedom fighters struggling against Arab colonialism (Akol Ruay 1994, pp. 78, 129, 139; Rolandsen 2011b).

This contestation, it must be noted, was a practical move, not simply an exercise in political thought. The blue water principle gave birth to the principle of _uti possidetis_, namely the sanctity of post-colonial borders. This principle was legally manifested in the UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (1960), but was embraced and practiced most passionately by regional organisations, such as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). This norm, developed by the first-generation anti-colonial movement, meant not only that foreign powers cannot challenge the
borders of an existing state, but also that post-colonial nationalist movements stood little chance of gaining international support for their claims to self-determination (Crawford 2002; Zacher 2001). Thus, these movements faced from the beginning a challenge that their predecessors had not encountered – namely a fierce normative and moral objection to their demands. This, as will be demonstrated in the case of Southern Sudan, stood at the heart of their turn to anti-colonial practices.

The idea that colonialism can be practiced by non-Western states, and that anti-colonialism went beyond the struggle against European empires, has also been picked up by critical historians. Eve Troutt Powell (2003), for instance, argued that Egyptian attempts to gain influence and control over Sudan during the 19th and 20th century, as part of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, should be understood as a form of colonialism, practiced by a colonised government. Not unlike the British, the Egyptian ruling elite belittled the Sudanese independent identity, and engaged in the exploitation of Sudan and its resources, including slavery. Awet Weldemichael (2013) has depicted Ethiopian rule over Eritrea and Indonesian rule over East Timor as examples of ‘Third World colonialism’. Like Troutt Powell, Weldemichael highlights the exploitative and racist nature of the so-called Ethiopian and Indonesian colonisation projects: ‘in pursuit of their own national interest, or those of small ruling elite, important African and Asian powers implemented policies toward weaker entities that were no less colonial and sought no less imperially grandiose than Europe’s’ (Weldemichael 2013, p. 2).

Thus, the liberation movements that emerged in post-colonial settings turned into second-generation liberation movements, in that they embraced the same logic, justification, and as I demonstrate through the case of Southern Sudan, also forms of organisation and operations. Defining an actor as a second-generation liberation movement is not simply a chronological
description. The Southern Sudanese liberation struggle, for example, overlapped with some of the first-generation liberation struggles in North and Sub-Saharan Africa. What makes a second-generation liberation movement is that it struggles for liberation from a former colony. As such, second-generation liberation movements have faced a challenge that the first-generation liberation movements had not encountered, namely that of the sanctity of territorial integrity. Their actions and policies have aimed to challenge this barrier to their claimed right to self-determination.

If colonialism and decolonisation are contested, then anti-colonialism can be contested as well. If colonialism is not an exclusively a Western European practice, and if decolonisation has not been confined in time and space, then anti-colonialism cannot be seen simply about Asian, African and Middle Eastern colonies seeking to set free from imperial rule. From this perspective, certainly for the second-generation liberation movements, anti-colonialism became a set of practices, a tool box containing practical means for justifying claims for self-determination and achieving them. These have included violent and non-violent means. These practices had been developed by the first-generation anti-colonial movement in its struggle against European colonialism and imperialism. But practices, especially ones that become institutionalised, do not simply dissipate after the goals that they aim to serve are reached. They remain influential and relevant to others. Second-generation liberation movements turned to the anti-colonial ideas and practices that served their ‘predecessors’ because they had been constantly exposed to them, and these practices were now readily available.

The literature on practice theory, which has gained a growing attention in the International Relations literature in the past years, can help us to contextualise and better comprehend this argument. Practice theorists have maintained that ‘actors are driven less by abstract forces – such as the national interest, preferences, and social norms – than by practical imperatives, habits, and
embodied dispositions’ (McCourt 2016, p. 475). Knowledge, according to the practice literature, is ‘has an irreducibly engaged, practical component. Knowing what to do and how to do it are fundamentally conjoined as aspects of practical activity’ (ibid. p. 478). Actors may adopt certain behaviours or policies not as an outcome of a conscious cognitive process, but as result of traditions or routines within which they are embedded. Inspired by sociologist Barry Barnes’ (2001, p. 27) definition of practices as ‘socially recognized forms of activity, done on the basis of what members learn from others, and capable of being done well or badly, correctly or incorrectly’, practice theorists have come to view international politics as ‘made up of a myriad of everyday practices that too often go overlooked’ (Adler and Pouliot 2011, pp. 3-4).

Background knowledge, or ‘the inarticulate know-how from which reflexive and intentional deliberation becomes possible’ (Pouliot 2008, p. 258) has been highlighted as the key to survival and evolution of practices in international politics. According to Vincent Pouliot (ibid), ‘most of what people do, in world politics as in any other social field, does not derive from conscious deliberation or thoughtful reflection… Instead, practices are the result of inarticulate, practical knowledge that makes what is to be done appear ‘self-evident’ or commonsensical’. This background knowledge is gained through interaction and exchanges of ideas. Actors interact at different levels, exchange ideas and become exposed to new forms of action. It is through these interactions that ‘people are guided to act in certain ways, and not others, on the basis of the projections, expectations, and memories derived from a multiple but ultimately limited repertoire of available social, public, and cultural narratives’ (Somers 1994, p. 614). Practices do not remain unchanged; upon being adopted, they are usually ‘made to fit in with other already established practices through omissions, additions and creations’ (Neumann 2002, p. 636). After these alterations, practices are institutionalized, and then eventually naturalized. As a ‘naturalised social
force’, practice ‘authorises its own stories of what things should be like, thereby entrenching its authority. The practice speaks: “this is how we have always done things around here”’ (ibid).

Several students of first-generation anti-colonial movements have pointed out the prominence of existing ideas and practices in the emergence of this struggle. The works of Daniel Philpott (2001), Neta Crawford (2002) and Margaret Kohn and Keally McBride (2011), for example, demonstrate how the exposure of colonised elites to ideas developed in the imperial metropoles, revolving around justice, equality and sovereignty, encouraged them to challenge colonialism and imperialism. Similarly, Erez Manela (2007) has highlighted the ‘Wilsonian moment’. As Manela shows, the American President Woodrow Wilson’s ideas about the right to self-determination in the aftermath of the First World War inspired not only Wilson’s designated audiences in Europe, but also burgeoning nationalist movement in Asia and Africa, including China, India, Korea and Egypt. However, liberation struggles contained not only ideas, but also actions, policies and in fact practices about how to achieve liberation. Exploring the intergenerational interaction between first- and second-generation liberation struggles helps to demonstrate this point.

Within the available examples, the Southern Sudanese case provides a fascinating example. The availability of a vast body of primary sources affords an analysis not only of discourse, important in itself, but also of how this discourse has reflected ideas, internal discussions among the leaders of the Southern Sudanese liberation movement, and how this affected their actions and justification of their struggle. Hence, the rest of this article traces the process through which the Southern liberation movement absorbed anti-colonial ideas and practices, and they affected this movement’s actions, whether in justifying its cause, addressing various audiences, or organising its operations.
To stress again, the idea here is not that these liberation movements were born simply because anti-colonial ideas had emerged around them. The Southern Sudanese separatists did not seek to alter the borders of Sudan because anti-colonialism was a trend. For the Southerners, secession from Sudan was a solution to what they saw as a growingly oppressive government (Rolandsen and Leonardi 2014, pp. 621-622). However, the evolving nature of the Southern liberation struggle was shaped not only by its motivations and triggers. Like most other liberation struggles, it was an outcome of other factors, including geographical conditions, foreign intervention, the availability of resources and ideas about the legitimacy and justification. Whereas most of these factors have been identified in other works (Poggo 2009; Gidron 2018; Rolandsen 2011a,b; Johnson 2003), this work dedicates more attention to the latter factor, namely ideas about liberation and decolonisation, and their contribution to the formation of the Southern liberation movement and its actions and strategies. To establish the importance of interaction to the formation of a Southern Sudanese anti-colonial identity, the following section examines Southern engagement with the first-generation liberation movements.

The Southern Sudanese, Intergenerational Interaction and Anti-Colonial Practices

The starting point of understand the emergence of the Southern Sudanese second-generation liberation campaign is the practices developed by the first-generation liberation movements in their fight against European imperialism and colonialism. Very broadly, these practices combined international diplomacy, campaigning within the imperial metropoles, and guerrilla warfare. Campaigning and diplomacy aimed to put pressure from both the outside and the inside on the European colonial powers. They relied primarily on applying to emerging international norms about equality, sovereignty, human rights and self-determination that emerged in the West
(Philpott 2001; Connelly 2002). Much of this action relied on shaming the European empires for failing to apply their own values, especially after claiming to fight for them internationally (Crawford 2002; Manela 2007). Public debates in international forums, convening international conferences, constant writing, and petitioning international organisations were all important tools employed by the first-generation anti-colonial movements in their campaign throughout the first part of the twentieth century (Patil 2008; Reus-Smit 2001; Burke 2010; Hargreaves 2014). The Committee of 24 (Special Committee on Decolonization), UN General Assembly, and Bandung Conference are just a few notable examples of forum that served for petitions and debates.

Southern Sudan’s neighbours, Arab and African, and especially in Khartoum and Cairo, played a crucial part in this establishing these practices, and it is through the interaction with these movements that the Southern Sudanese ended up absorbing and assuming anti-colonial practices and identity. Already during the first part of the twentieth century, Egyptian nationalists sent delegations to world capitals, petitioned the League of Nations and began publishing newspaper dedicated to delegitimising the colonisation of Egypt (Manela 2007, pp. 63-75). This was intensified after the Second World War and the ascent of Gamal Abdul Nasser to Egypt’s leadership. Nasser’s Egypt was among the convenors of the Bandung Conference, in which the non-aligned movement was born. It was also the founder of the Committee of 24, which was in charge of responding to petitions from colonies, thus enabling the process of decolonisation (Burke 2010, pp. 62-69). The Algerian liberation movement, Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) became during the 1950s a symbol of the liberation struggles across the colonial world. Its leaders mastered rebel diplomacy, which, according to Connelly (2002), proved more powerful than its guerrilla tactics and ended up inspiring future liberation movements. Sudanese nationalists as well were an integral part of this campaign, joining hands with other Arab liberation movements and
participating at the Bandung Conference. The Arab liberation movements were also joined, even if somewhat later, by Sub-Saharan liberation movements. Ideas that began to get a hold among Western and Eastern African intellectuals in the 1930s (Philpott 2001) evolved in the 1940s and especially the 1950s into making African anti-colonial leaders, such as Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, Julius Nyerere in Tanganyika, and Ahmed Sékou Touré in Guinea, the backbone of the global anti-colonial movement (Hargreaves 2014), in what some contemporary observers described as the African awakening (Davidson 1955). Their movements embraced both guerrilla tactics, absorbed through engagement with notable guerrilla leaders such as Mao Tse-tung (Mortimer 1970), but also the diplomatic and advocacy tactics that characterised the first-generation liberation struggles.

Pointing out the practices developed by the first-generation liberation movements, it is now necessary to establish the existence of interaction between Southerners and first-generation ideas and practices. Egyptian and Sudanese nationalist ideas served as the initial points of interaction. Egyptian ideas about Nile Valley Unity between Sudan and Egypt inspired uprisings in the early 1920s among intellectuals and military officers in Northern Sudan. Among the Sudanese military officers were also cadets of Southern and Nuba background, who rose through the ranks as descendants of freed-slaves (Vezzadini 2013; Daly 2004). After the uprisings were quashed by the British, some of the Southern officers were forcibly resettled into the Southern provinces, where they carried ideas with them (Sikainga 1996, p. 107). Leonardi (2013, p. 133), for example, tells of a freed-slave soldier of a Dinka origin, who returned to his province in around that period, integrated into the Dinka tribal life, became a chief, and kept pressing for independence for a united Sudan.³ Relating to these days, Mohammed Omer Beshir (1974, p. 78) suggested that ‘in southern Sudan, too, the seeds of unrest sown by the army officers and the northern merchants were showing signs of germination’.
Fearing of a further influx of nationalist ideas to the Southern provinces, though justifying this with the claim of fighting slavery (Mayo 1994, pp. 168-169), the British authorities decided to isolate the South from the North. They introduced the Southern Policy, and issued ‘closed district ordinances’. These ordinances banned ‘non-Africans’, i.e. Arabs from the North, from entering Bahr al-Ghazal, Upper Nile and Equatoria. The Southern provinces in turn were to be governed by ‘native administrations’, in which tribal elders were appointed to lead small self-contained tribal units, based on so-called ‘traditional’ legal systems, which had often been invented by the authorities (Mamdani 2009). The division between Northerners Arab and Southerner Africans was artificial; the assumption of such ethnic identities in Sudan was a process of historical construction motivated by various interests and considerations. (Sharkey 2008). But the British authorities accepted these ethnic divisions as an objective biological reality. For example, one intelligence dispatch surprisingly informed about Shilluk communities maintaining close ties with neighbouring Arab settlements, telling surprisingly about how the Shilluk ‘have adopted the Arab way of living’.

The Southern Policy generally failed to fully isolate the Southerners from the Northerners. Muslim civil servants, policemen and Northern traders, remained in the Southern provinces in large numbers (Beswick 1994, pp. 174-175). Nevertheless, even if artificial, this forced division did enhance the evolution of a distinct sense of identity and the ensuing hostility (Alex De Waal 2005; Willis 2015). Mission schools, which after the introduction of the closed districts ordinances replaced the Arab-language schools, played a crucial role in this process. They taught primarily in English, but also in vernacular languages, to support British efforts to sustain a ‘natural’ Southern identity (Mayo 1994, p. 167). The quality of training and the curriculum in these schools were questionable, and the schools could accommodate only a small portion of the Southern population.
Still, Rolandsen (2011a, p. 109) suggests that ‘Christianity, English, and the notion of the Southern Sudan as a territorial concept had provided educated Southerners with an identity that transcended the differences between them, while making those between Northerners and themselves more prominent’. Even if far from primordial, the seeds of separating the Northerners from the Southerners will grow in the future to a growing hostility, which leaders of both groups would later use to mobilise their camps in the name of an Arab-African conflict (Poggo 2002, p. 67).

In the meanwhile, the withdrawal of British troops from most of Egypt in 1936 inspired hopes among Sudanese nationalists about the future of Sudan (Hargreaves 2014, pp. 131-132). Even as the idea of an independent Sudanese state was gaining more influence, with British encouragement (Ginat 2017, p. 90), Sudanese intellectuals continued to be highly influenced by nationalist ideas and trends in Egypt. The number of Sudanese students in Egypt grew rapidly, from 44 in 1937, to hundreds during the 1940s. They joined thousands of Sudanese who found employment in Egypt, and were buttressed by the growing number of students who attended Egyptian educational institutions within Sudan (Voll 1976, p. 212). The formation of the Graduates General Congress, which led the Sudanese nationalist demands, was heavily influenced by the Egyptian discourse and experience (Hargreaves 2014, p. 72). And it was important to the Congress to win Cairo’s blessing, especially after the latter blamed the Congress for serving the British aspirations to destroy Nile Valley unity (Warburg 2003, p. 112).

Like other first-generation anti-colonial movements, the Graduates General Congress used the Atlantic Charter, which declared the United States’ and Britain’s recognition of peoples’ right to self-determination, to demand this right for Sudan (Hargreaves 2014, p. 72). The British accepted this demand, though they sought to guarantee that Sudan will remain independent of Egypt. The Congress also demanded that the South will be reintegrated into the North, which the
British conceded to. This opened the way to the termination of the Southern policy, and the gradual extension of the Northern-based state institutions to the South (Mayo 1994, p. 178). The Juba Conference, held in 1947 under British auspices, aimed to lay the ground for this re-integration. The Southern representatives included tribal chiefs and civil servants, which were handpicked by the British. Although not having a popular mandate, they agreed to unification in return for a commitment to a full and equal integration of the Southerners into state institutions. But the Southern representatives, and especially the chiefs, remained suspicious toward the Northerners. According to Peter Woodward (1980, p. 183), even those more inclined to unification still believed that the resolution of the conference confirmed the Southerners’ right to determine their fate in due course.

This suspicion notwithstanding, some Southerners saw the conference and gradual re-integration as an opportunity to the Sudanese political process. William Deng Nihal, a future leader of the Southern Sudanese liberation movement, but then a junior civil servant, declared that ‘The South and North quickly realized that they were one people despite the exaggerated differences… our beloved Country, the Sudan has every chance to lead in Africa and to add to the world peace and progress’. Here the idea of federalism also began to appear, as a way to guarantee Southerners’ cultural and linguistic rights. The Liberal Party, which claimed to represent the interests of the Southerners in Khartoum, was one of the first to put federalism in its agenda (Johnson 2014, p. 9). Nevertheless, as Rolandsen and Leonardi (2014, p. 612) state, at this stage, even those Southerners who supported federalism, ‘in their daily execution of administrative responsibilities, they adhered to the northerners’ governance agenda and perceptions of southern Sudanese society’. Some Southern leaders even rejected federalism and expressed support of a unitary government. In 1957, for instance, a Southern senator from Khartoum sent a letter to the
Shilluk *Reth* in Fashoda and the District commissioner, in which he proclaimed that the Nilotic people (he counted Dinka, Nuer, Shulluks, Jur, Anuak and the Acholi) are loyal to a ‘United Sudan’. This is because their areas lacked the resources to sustain themselves. He blamed the Fertit tribes for pushing for federation, because they had independent sources of income.\(^6\)

These processes since the abolition of the Southern policy paved the way to renewed interaction between Southerners and Northerners. William Deng’s words echoed the optimism of many educated Southerners, who found work in the Sudanese civil service and integrated in national politics. 22 Southern representatives were elected to the newly-inaugurated Sudanese National Assembly in 1948, and by 1957 their number rose to 46, either joining the Liberal Party or predominantly Northern parties. An increasing number of Southerners travelled to the North to attend schools and seek employment.\(^7\) These numbers increased in the late 1940s and early 1950, as Southerners began to attend military schools and joined the Sudanese army.\(^8\) Northerners too returned the South in greater numbers. These included mainly civil servants, soldiers and traders. Arabic-language Islamic schools were opened, as well as the first Secondary School in the town of Rumbek, in Bahr al-Ghazal. Northern technical experts also flowed to the Southern provinces, to work in the Zande agricultural development scheme and sawmills in Katire, Gilo and Loka (Ruay 1994, 57).

This interaction exposed the Southerners to anti-colonial ideas, sentiments and actions. One of the first Northern movements that began to operate in the South was the Black Bloc. Having its roots traced to the 1930s, the Black Bloc was founded by black former military officers who had settled down in the Three Towns area (Khartoum, Omdurman and Khartoum North) after the suppression of the 1924 uprising. Advancing an anti-British agenda and Nile Valley unity, the Black Bloc saw the termination of the Southern Policy as an opportunity to spread their cause to
the South. Southern politicians in Khartoum as well tried to reach out to the Black Bloc in the late 1940s. Other political groups from the North also began travelling to the Southern provinces to meet with the local population, sharing with them their anti-colonial enthusiasm and Sudanese nationalist sentiments. In 1952, for instance, a group of Northern journalists toured the South, where they debated with the population about Sudan’s future. Following the creation of a Ministerial Committee for Southern Affairs in February 1956, Northern ministers and MPs travelled to hold meetings with Southern audiences on the nature of Sudan and the demand for federalism.

Southerners also developed strong ties with the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP). The SCP’s main focus at the time was ‘that of national liberation: liberation from colonialism, liberation from despotism, and liberation from sectarianism and parochialism’ (Ismael 2013, p. 185). Many Southerners were attracted to these ideas and one Southerner, Joseph Ukel Garang, climbed the party ranks and reached its top echelons. In 1954, Southern delegates attended for the first time the SCP-dominated Sudanese Workers’ Trade Union Congress. These ties were dense enough to cause alarm among British observers. The SCP did not support the idea of independence for the South, a point which was made by Garang (1961). But this does not change the fact that through this interaction, more Southerners were exposed to anti-colonial ideas and sentiments that had developed among the Northerners.

The opening of Southern Sudan also paved the way to other interactions, for example with the Egyptians. During the early 1950s, Nasser saw the South as a gateway to unification between Sudan and Egypt and invested in propaganda in the region. In the period leading to Sudan’s independence in 1956, Egyptian propagandists frequented the Southern provinces. In 1953, Egypt’s Minister of National Guidance, Salah Salem, toured the South. In the town Amadi, in the
Equatoria province, Salem spoke before an audience, which included tribal chiefs and members of the local community. In his speech, Salem attacked the British for colonial and imperialist policies. He then urged the audience to sign a petition calling for the unification of Sudan and Egypt. An intelligence report from 1955 told of the influx of Egyptian magazines and newspapers to the Southern provinces, along with radio broadcasts targeting Southern audiences, propagating anti-colonial and pro-Nile Valley unity sentiments. In one instance, Cairo sent to Equatoria an army officer of Southern origin, ‘dressed in native custom [and] alleging that he was searching for relatives and visiting friends’. His real aim, according to the report, was to spread pro-Egyptian and anti-British propaganda. Cairo also used Egyptian doctors, engineers and officers, who were sent to work in developmental projects in the South, as conveyers of Egyptian propaganda among the Southern population. Finally, in 1955, Southern representatives met with Nasser in Cairo to discuss Sudanese independence. The Sudanese authorities may have misinterpreted Egyptian involvement in the South, due to their suspicion of Nasser’s expansionist aspirations (Ginat 2017, p. 53). Still, regardless of their intentions, this meant an interaction between these Egyptians and Southern Sudanese revolving around anti-colonial practices and discourses.

In the late 1950s, these were also neighbouring African movements that shaped Southern thinking. Southerners had travelled to Uganda for work and education already in the 1930s. Many of the future leaders of the Southern liberation movement, including Aggrey Jaden, Joseph Oduho and Father Saturnino Lohure attended schools and seminars in Uganda and Kenya in the 1940s (Kuyok 2015). During this period, which also witnessed the so-called African awakening, following rising tensions in the country, Southern leaders in Khartoum and the South went into exile in Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania and Ethiopia (Poggo 2009, pp. 62-63). These leaders were among a large number of refugees that fled South Sudan during that period. According to a report
by Southern leaders in exile, the number of Southern refugees in Uganda alone was 50,000, in addition to 30,000 refugees in Congo and 25,000 in Ethiopia. Although wary toward Southern Sudanese secessionist aspirations, the post-colonial governments in these countries gave shelter to the exiles. They also enabled the Southern leaders to travel across Africa and meet with leaders in West Africa, including the 1963 All African People’s Congress in Lagos, Nigeria (Poggo 2009, pp. 114-115). At around the same time, Sudanese intelligence reports pointed out to growing exchanges between Southern soldiers, mostly of Dinka and Latuko ethnicity who were dispatched to Equatoria, and Congolese soldiers on the other side of the border. In 1960, the Sudanese intelligence also reported on visits to the region by Chinese and East German diplomats (the report did not state if they were stationed in Sudan), who toured the Southern provinces. In this tour, these diplomats met with local audiences to spread the word about the advantages of Communism. There are no testimonies as to how much listeners absorbed the messages by these visitors, but this is a further demonstration for the Southerners’ exposure to outside anti-colonial influences.

The Emergence of the Southern Sudanese Second-Generation Liberation Movement

All of this interaction served to create the background knowledge that eventually fed the Southern Sudanese anti-colonial movement. As independence was looming, the Northern elite in Khartoum renegaded on its commitments to full and equal representation for black Sudanese. The process of Sudanisation, which aimed to replace the Condominium’s civil servants with Sudanese ones, turned out to be a campaign to Arabise and Islamise the country. The government introduced the knowledge of Arabic as a precondition for employment in the civil service, which excluded the mission-trained Southerners. Southerners were also excluded from the negotiations with Egypt
over the future of Sudan (Poggo 2002). These signs of exclusion and discrimination enraged Southern politicians and even resurfaced among some Southerners memories of enslavement and persecution by the hands of the Northerners (Jok 2001; Tounsel 2017). In one of its 1963 volumes, with the civil war in the South now becoming a reality, the Voice of Southern Sudan, the mouthpiece of the Southern liberation movement, stated that ‘We thought the dark history that characterised relationship between the South and the North… would not be relieved in the modern Sudan. But alas! The record of the last nine years of Northern administration… added more fuel through political slavery today’. 22

Amid the rising tensions between Southern and Northern politicians in Khartoum,23 the idea of federalism gained more popularity. The Liberal Party advocated federalism in the South, as well as to other black communities, including the ‘the Fur of Darfur, Fung of Blue Nile, and Nuba of Kordofan’ (Johnson 2014, p. 11). The Northern parties dismissed the demands for federalism at the outset. While the debate took place in Khartoum, tensions escalated in the Southern provinces. In 1955, the Torit mutiny broke out, spreading across Equatoria, and from there to Bahr al-Ghazal and Upper Nile. Southern mutineers turned their anger toward Northern civil servants and merchants. By the time the Northern soldiers succeeded in quelling the uprising with the aid of British forces, 261 Northerners and 75 Southerners lost their lives (Rolandsen 2011a, pp. 109-110).

The government suppressed the mutiny, executing participants, arresting many others, and driving the rest to flee to the bush. However, it failed to address the Southerners’ grievances. Instead, the Umma Party-led government securitised the South and repressed any sign of protest. Consequently, Southern alienation from Khartoum intensified. The government did consent to discuss federalism. But in 1958, a military coup overthrew the elected government and brought to
power the Sudanese Free Officers, under the leadership of General Ibrahim Abboud. Abboud not only rejected the idea of federalism, but also intensified the repression, Arabisation and Islamisation of the South, closing down mission schools and assassinating Southern intellectuals (Poggo 2002). This violence, becoming more intense in the years 1961-1963, made the deterioration of tensions into a full-scale civil war inevitable.24

Abboud’s ascent to power and the intensification of repression resulted in an exodus of Southern leaders, intellectuals and politicians to neighbouring capitals, especially after 1961. At the same time, a large number of Southern soldiers who had been arrested following the Torit mutiny were released from prison, with the end of their imprisonment term. Many of them joined those who had escaped to the bush after the mutiny. The idea of federalism, though still holding sway among some Southerners, began losing popularity. Southern leaders, particularly in exile, began advancing the idea of independence for the South (Johnson 2014, p. 15). As one analysis of the situation in Sudan in the Voice of Southern Sudan stated, ‘The generous gesture of Southern Sudanese, calling for federal relationship was bashed aside… The army takeover put an end to a freely negotiated settlement, and the Southerners are left with no choice but to fight for freedom and exercise their right to self-determination’.25 But it was also at this stage that the Southern Sudanese realised the objection they faced. Sudan and Egypt naturally contested the Southern right to secede. But other African states too remained antagonistic to Southern Sudanese desire for secession and self-determination. Separatist violence that threatened to tear the Congo-Léopoldville justified the OAU’s fear of secession (Nasser 1970). Much as violence and repression at home incentivised the Southerners to demand their right for self-determination, international antipathy drove them to develop a comprehensive liberation strategy.
Perhaps the most immediate example for the impact of interaction with first-generation liberation movements and ideologies on the Southern leadership was the fact that, once the desire for self-determination was expressed, Southern leaders and intellectuals immediately resorted to anti-colonial discourse to describe their situation. This was almost instinctive; the notion embedded in the mind of Southern thinkers was that colonialism was tantamount to injustice, and since this injustice was inflicted upon by ‘aliens’, they were subjected to colonialism. Hence, their struggle for justice was necessarily an anti-colonial one. Already in 1957, in a secret blueprint for federalism circulated among its members, the Liberal Party called them to embrace a Third-Worldist agenda, inspired by the Non-Aligned Movement. According to this plan, the party should advance a foreign policy that would ‘(a) suit condition of attracting neighbouring Southerns [sic] outside the present International Frontiers of F.E. Africa, Belgian Congo, East Africa and Abyssinia locally. and [sic] (b) that the Sudan should not depose herself to either west or East Military Pacts [sic]’. The Southern desire to build links with neighbouring African nations, in the midst of the so-called African awakening, exemplifies the initial penetration of ideas about liberation and anti-colonialism into the Southern and the association of the challenges faced by the Southerners with the ones facing the recently-colonised, and even still colonised, neighbours. This does not indicate that the Southern Sudanese necessarily began to see their struggle in anti-colonial terms yet. But it shows that the necessary interaction was taking place.

This consciousness toward anti-colonial dynamics became part of the Southern diplomatic campaign for independence. In 1961, Southern exiles in Eastern African states formed the Sudan African Closed District National Union (SACDNU), as the first organised Southern liberation organisation at the time. This name later changed to the Sudan African National Union (SANU). In one of its first actions, one of SACDNU’s founders, the aforementioned William Deng,
petitioned the UNGA to recognise Southern Sudan’s right to self-determination. In this petition, Deng described Southern Sudan as ‘still virtually a colony of the Arabs’. Shortly after, SANU representatives petitioned the African Liberation Committee, the OAU’s body responsible for supporting African liberation struggles, for support of its liberation struggle. The petition, presented at the Committee’s gathering in Dar es Salaam in 1963, reminded the African leaders of how they benefited from the UN Charter’s recognition of nations’ right to self-determination. It pleaded them to allow the Southern Sudanese this right too. In 1964, a group of Southern Sudanese students in the United Kingdom petitioned the Arab League, African governments and the UN Committee on Human Rights in demand of action against the Abboud regime’s oppression. The petition evoked symbols of the anti-colonial movement, including the UN General Assembly’s Declaration on Universal Human Rights, as well as the solidarity of the ‘Afro-Asian World’. The petition protested that ‘in the Sudan, politically the Afro-Arab dominates the Negro, economically he exploits him, and socially he degrades him… These are the things the Negroes hate and will continue to fight against be it in South Africa, Angola or Southern Rhodesia’. Comparing Sudan to these three cases associated the Sudanese government with the most striking examples of European colonialism. Even if one contests the fact that the Southern Sudanese had been subjected to such brutalities, this analogy indicates the Southerners’ evolving idea about colonisation as the quintessential form of exploitation and deprivation. As such, it explains the growing reliance of Southern Sudanese on anti-colonial discourse, ideas and modes of operation.

Petitioning international organisations and bodies for the right to self-determination was one of the basic practices of liberation movements. This tool became even more influential after the formation of the Committee of 24, where petitions became the main mechanism for demanding the right to self-determination (Reus-Smit 2001, p. 533). During that period, amid the growing
repression of the Abboud regime, that Southern exiles began organising and operating in exile, among states involved in setting and petitioning to the Committee of 24. In the following years, Southern delegates participated in international conferences on human rights and liberation.\textsuperscript{30} Such statements were also directed at Khartoum and the Arab World. Upon the formation of Anya-Nya as the rebel army by Southern leaders in exile (Rolandsen 2011, p. 222), the organisation circulated a letter among police stations in Equatoria, which warned that:

Now, Anya-Nya the national liberation army of the Southern Sudanese Africans who have been suffering victimisation, exploitation and social discrimination by you have lost patience… You shall know we desire nothing short of un-qualified freedom for our country and our people. We have… the right to achieve our national independence from you, the Arab Northern Sudanese [sic].\textsuperscript{31}

Trying to appeal to the anti-colonial history of other Arab regimes, the Southern Sudanese efforts focused on two of the symbols of Arab anti-colonialism, Algeria and Egypt. For example, in 1963, the Voice of Southern Sudan, stated that ‘the case of Southern Sudan cannot easily be grabbed unless the living example of the white domination in South Africa is borne in mind as well as the O.A.S [Organisation de l’armée secrète – the French settlers’ militia in Algeria] attempts to keep Moslem Algeria French’.\textsuperscript{32} Elsewhere, the Voice of Southern Sudan declared that Khartoum’s hunger for power has ‘made them [the government] blind to experiences of other countries, in particular Algeria, that the use of force is temporary’.\textsuperscript{33} And in another article it added that ‘as we know, Britain lost her base as well control of the Suez Canal because the Egyptians sacrificed their blood for it. We shall win our freedom and independence, likewise by iron and blood’.\textsuperscript{34}
In 1964 General Abboud was forced to step down from office following mass protests. The interim government led by Sirr Al-Khatim Al-Khalifa agreed to negotiate federalism with SANU. Some of SANU’s leaders returned to Khartoum, and the party divided into SANU-inside under William Deng, advocating federalism; and SANU-outside, under the leadership of Aggrey Jaden, which continued the party’s pursuit of independence. In 1965, a new Prime Minister, Muhammad Ahmad Mahgoub, was elected. Mahgoub, of the Umma Party, withdrew from the negotiations and resumed to Abboud’s repressive measures, and even worsened them by deporting Southern populations into government-controlled ‘peace villages’ (Collins 2007, p. 1781). This setback encouraged more Southern youth to join the Anya-Nya ranks, and to the Southern leaders in exile to intensify their advocacy. An Anya-Nya commander named Fredrick Maggot petitioned the Committee of 24. The Southern Sudan was not eligible to petition the Committee, not being considered a colony according to Resolution 1514. Yet, Maggot did petition, explaining that:

We, the four million Africans of Southern Sudan, have for the past fifteen years, been subjected to colonial rule from the Northern Sudanese’… [I]n the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations Organization, we appeal to you, Mr. Secretary General, to try and understand our reaction to the colonial policies of the Sudanese government.35

Along the development of this anti-colonial discourse when addressing international audiences, Southerners in exile and in Sudan also embraced a nativist discourse. Nativist ideas spread across the post-colonial world during the process of decolonisation. These ideas were heavily inspired by colonial manipulation of identity, and the colonialists’ division of colonised populations into natives and non-natives (Mampilly 1996), as happened for instance as part of the Southern Policy. After independence, many post-colonial elites embraced this dichotomy to justify their domination and the exclusion and persecution of those group not deemed non-native.
Sudanisation, in a sense, was a form of nativism. It sought the replacement of the Condominium’s personnel, language, laws and even religion with what the riverine elites in Khartoum considered the native Afro-Arab Sudanese identity. Sudanisation was the Southerners’ first encounter with post-colonial nativism. Nativism, in the sense of rejecting the so-called non-natives, came to shape the Southern approach to Northerners, and especially those living in the South. The influx of Northerners to the South after the removal of the Southern Policy alarmed Southern observers, who began discussing it in terms of internal colonialism (Rolandsen 2011a, p. 109). But the Southern nativist discourse appeared mainly in the 1950s. Debates within the Liberal Party in 1954 saw one Southern trade unionist claiming that ‘the coloured Northerners immigrants from Asia and Egypt are never Sudanese at all. Mostly in the Towns, this coloured people can be found [sic]. They are Robbers [sic]’. Another participant warned that ‘the northerners are now pouring into the South in great numbers… What shall we do to controll [sic] this stream of northerners of evil Characters [sic] pouring into the South?’

Such references to the Northerners became even more forceful as the conflict loomed. In 1964, Clement Mboro, a Southerner who served as the Minister of Interior in the provisional government after Abboud’s resignation, while being the president of the clandestine Southern Front, reported to the government that in meetings with him, Southerners had ‘blamed the [Northern] traders for being the reason for the Southern problem and a cause for concern’. They then demanded that the Northerners ‘should stick to the work they have come to do... They are merely guests in the region, and guests should honour their hospitality’. Sudanese intelligence reports told of the Secretary of the Ministry of Transportation, a Southerner, who, when travelling to the Upper Nile, carried a fierce anti-government speech. In this speech, the secretary ‘warned his listeners of allowing Northerners to cultivate their lands… reminding them that Sudan is the
land of the Southerners and that their [the Northerners’] territory is limited to Tuti Island [the Three Towns]. This nativist view became widespread and adopted by the grassroots. When Shilluk and Dinka elders wrote a letter of complaint to the authorities for their discrimination vis-à-vis Northerners in the Upper Nile, they referred to the latter as ‘immigrants’, bemoaning the fact that ‘[we] accepted with kindness the immigration of the Northern’. Such references also appeared in the Southerners’ internal discourses. For example, after an attack by the Sudanese security forces on the Anya-Nya, a local rebel commander reported to his superiors that ‘the Arabs…killed a lot of people from among the Natives’. He then continued: ‘We better watch… otherwise the Arabs will consume our natives people [sic]’. This perception remained so powerful that it survived even after a peace agreement was signed in 1972. In 1973, Southern teachers were reported to demand separate schools for Northerners and Southerners. They were even alleged to be willing to kill Northern teachers to achieve that. Similarly, the return of Northerners to the South sparked fears among Southerners about the return of Arabs, leading to riots in Juba, Malakal and other towns.

This nativist discourse also served Southerners to appeal for pan-African support. The Anya-Nya for example, circulated a leaflet among African governments, in which it claimed that, unlike the conflict in Biafra, theirs was ‘a fundamental struggle pitting an indigenous African culture against alien invading forces – Arabization and Soviet imperialism’. Similarly, in a letter sent to the Ugandan President, Milton Obote, upon his visit to Sudan, SACDNU contended that ‘in the Sudan the Arab invaders are holding four million Negroes here in chains… to wipe out our African heritage’. The Southern struggle, therefore, was ‘part and parcel of the movement of the African Negro Peoples to reassert themselves’. Southern Sudan, in this respect, was the ‘part of Africa which first comes face to face with the Arab menace’.
The above sections provide only a sample of the public appeals made by Southern liberation activists. This discourse reflected the manner in which the Southern liberation movement, on its various factions, bodies and individuals, has embraced and internalised the anti-colonial identity that evolved during the first-generation liberation campaigns. Nevertheless, this discourse was an indication to further changes. As the following sections suggest, the first-generation anti-colonial model served as well to shape the way the Southern Sudanese liberation movement organised, and the fighting tactics that it embraced in the years of the civil war.

The Organisation of the Southern Struggle

The impact of first-generation liberation struggles on the Southern Sudanese liberation movement can also be seen in its organisation and fighting tactics. The organisation of rebellion and insurgency greatly depends on the conditions on the ground, including the political circumstances, geography, resources at the disposal of both parties, popular support, and external intervention. Yet, organisation also has patterns, which had appeared across different organisations, and in different settings (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Buhaug and Gates 2002; Daly 2012). The manner in which the second-generation Southern liberation movement organised, not the reason for this organisation, can be seen as an outcome of learning through interaction with, and exposure to, other liberation movements at the time.

In terms of organisation, one can identify notable similarities between the way the Southern leadership had tried to form, arrange and manage its liberation struggle. Rolandsen (2011b, p. 215) has observed that ‘in rebellions elsewhere in Africa only one “liberation” group was recognised by the international system as the legitimate representative of the African majority’. When operating from exile, liberation movements aspired to be ‘the assumed “government in waiting”
in case the rebellion was successful’ (ibid, p. 218). The Southern leadership in exile operated in the same manner. The formation of SANU reflected the impact that first-generation liberation movements in neighbouring states had on the Southern liberation activists. The name SANU itself was chosen because it was similar to notable African liberation movements, such as Jomo Kenyata’s Kenya African National Union, or the Tanganyika African National Union (Poggo 2009, pp. 114-115).

As the war continued, several of the Southern leaders tried to form a government in exile. Most notable of them was Aggrey Jaden. One of SANU’s founders, in 1967 Jaden formed the Southern Sudan Provisional Government (SSPG). Rather than concentrating only on fighting fighting, the SSPG initiated ministerial portfolios for the future Southern state. But several others such governments and ‘states-in-the-making’ were formed by Jaden’s rivals, including the Sue River Republic, or Anyidi Revolutionary Government (Gidron 2018, p. 446). These attempts to form competing governments and institutions reflected the divisions within the Southern liberation movement and among the Southern people based on ethnicity, geography, language, religion, ideology and even personal rivalries (Arnold and LeRiche 2012, p. 29). Notwithstanding this competition, the necessity to form a semblance of governance in preparation to statehood affected the Southern leaders. Jaden, tried to resolve divisions by moving to co-opt other Southern leaders and mixing Anya-Nya units and sending fighters outside of their home districts. This, nonetheless, had only a limited success (Poggo 2009, p. 138).

At the same time, the SSPG continued its advocacy of Southern Sudanese independence based on the international norm of decolonisation. In 1968, for example, Jaden wrote an open letter to Julius Nyerere, Tanzania’s first president and one of the OAU founders, following his support of the Biafran right to self-determination. Endorsing Nyerere’s stand that ‘unity can only be based
on a general consent of the people involved’, Jaden alluded that Southern Sudan was even more worthy of independence than Biafra, because Southern Sudan was subjected to colonial rule, ‘this time, under the Northern Sudan Arabs’. Nyerere’s response was disappointing; whilst he acknowledged that the Southerners suffer atrocities, he made no reference to the Southern right to self-determination. Instead, he brought up Khartoum’s complaints about Southern attacks on Northern security forces.

Beyond political organisation, the armed conflict in the South also followed the line that developed by the first-generation anti-colonial movements. Violence of course was first and foremost a Southern response to Khartoum’s violence. Southerners had used violence against invaders long before the civil war. But if we examine the way violence was justified, and to an extent organised, rather than the causes of this violence, it reflects the process of learning that the Southern leaders went through. For instance, while the Anya-Nya probably resorted to guerrilla fighting because of the Southern inferiority to the government forces at the beginning of the war, one must remember that guerrilla fighting as a strategy of inferior forces was developed in this period by anti-imperial, mainly Marxist, theorists, the most famous being Mao Tse-tung and Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara. These theories became highly popular among African liberation movements in the 1960s (Mampilly 2011), especially through the Algerian War of Independence, in which the People’s Republic of China played an important role in patronising and guiding the FLN (Connelly 2002).

And indeed, the Southern rebels in the period leading to the outbreak of the full-scale conflict and its early days were a group of loosely-connected rebels, organised mainly around ethnic lines. Instead of fighting the government forces, they mostly raided local populations in Equatoria from their hiding place in the bush. But as the Southern leaders realised that war was
coming, they came to see the need for a better organisation and consolidation. Already in 1962, the Southern leadership in exile approached Captain Peter Mogga Kobaa, a deserter from the Sudanese military, with a request that he would lead guerrilla operations against government forces (Kuyok 2015, pp. 370-371). In another example of the impact anti-colonial ideologies on Southern indoctrination and understanding of the conflict, Southern Sudanese students in Europe demanded ‘The centralisation of the Anyanya under one command and their training according to the modern guerrilla warfare tactics, directed by well trained [sic] officers or military experts’. Even the debate over the Anya-Nya’s name reflected the anti-colonial impact on Southern thinking. Several of the Anya-Nya’s founders wished initially to name it the Sudan Pan-African Freedom Fighters (Rolandsen 2011b, p. 222). The name Anya-Nya was eventually selected because of Peter Mogga Kobaa’s argument that ‘the movement needed a name similar to Mau Mau in Kenya’ (Kuyok 2015, p. 371). Some of these founders were certainly well-versed in Marxist writings and theoretical literature about guerrilla fighting. Joseph Akuon, an influential Anya-Nya commander, ‘had a collection of Che Guevara and other Marxist literature on guerrilla warfare’ (ibid, p. 313). Other Anya-Nya commanders received training in neighbouring states, such as Congo and Uganda.

External aid to the Anya-Nya was crucial to its eventual battlefield successes against the Sudanese security forces. What can be described perhaps as a game-changer was Israeli support for the Anya-Nya. After initial unsuccessful Southern approaches to Israel in search of aid, based on Israel’s conflict with the Arab World and Sudan in the 1960s, it was Lagu who succeeded in persuading the Israeli government to support the Southern struggle in 1969 (Poggo 2009, pp. 155-161). Israel provided arms to the Southern rebels, but also propaganda, which built upon SANU’s own discourse about Arab imperialism, and exacerbated these descriptions (Gidron 2018). But external support fitted into the Southerner’s learning of guerrilla tactics. Thus, unlike Jaden’s
attempts to mix soldiers of different ethnic groups, Lagu preferred to use the fighters in their places of origin, to benefit from the ‘dynamics of co-operation between the Anya-Nya and the people’.52

Lagu’s rise to power within the Southern liberation movement and his successes in attracting Israeli support and organising the rebellion, along internal political dynamics, drove Khartoum to seek peace. In 1972, Sudan’s ruler, Ja‘far Nimeiri, who had risen to power in 1969 in a military coup, signed a peace agreement with Lagu. Though still falling short of formal federalism, as Nimeiri objected to any use of this term (Nimeiri 2014, p. 18), the Addis Ababa peace agreement granted broad autonomy to the Southern provinces. But when this peace collapsed in 1983, the war was renewed.

Conclusion

The Southern Sudanese liberation struggle may have emerged in response to what many in the South perceived as persecution and marginalisation by the riverine elite from the North. Even after breaking out, throughout the so-called First Civil War, separatism was never the only solution on the table. Yet, from an early stage, and certainly after the war entered its more advanced stages, in the 1960s, anti-colonial ideas, discourse, justification and strategies characterised the struggle of the Southern Sudanese for liberation. Those supporting and leading the Southern liberation struggle came to describe the government in Khartoum as a form of Arab colonialism and imperialism, the Southern provinces as colonies, and the Southerners as black Africans aspiring to remove the yoke of this Arab colonialism. This discourse has been used vis-à-vis Khartoum, neighbouring Arab and post-colonial African states, the international community, and the Southern population itself. And while the fighting had many causes and motivations, its organisation and
the strategies employed by the Southern insurgents echoed those exercised by previous generations of insurgents. It was certainly justified in these terms.

The premise of this paper has been that the Southern resort to anti-colonial forms of resistance and liberation was not simply an emulation of other struggles or movements. It was an outcome of practices that were entrenched and absorbed by those Southerners that sought to challenge Khartoum’s rule. And even if this was not the Southern insurgents’ main (or even secondary) goal when rising against the Sudanese government, they ended up challenging the prevalent norms of the international community. Based on that, and like other post-colonial liberation movements, the Southern Sudanese struggle challenges the way we perceive anti-decolonisation. Through the prism of the second-generation liberation movements, we could see decolonisation as a set of practices that had an immense impact on the politics of liberation and self-determination in the years to come.

This opens a new set of questions. Liberation struggles still continue to take place. The Southern Sudanese liberation struggle itself only reached a conclusion in 2011, with the formation of the Republic of South Sudan. How have the practices kept changing as the second-generation liberation struggles continued into the late 20th and early 21st centuries? As new conflicts are looming and new states are once again created, could we ever witness the emergence of third-generation liberation struggles? And if this is the case, how would the practices that emerged and evolved in the past decades could affect this conflicts and the impending liberation movements. This article, therefore, strengthens the foundations for future studies of struggles for liberation, self-determination, and separatism.
1 Here a historiographical debate must be addressed: The prevalent perception of the Sudanese civil war is that it started in August 1955, with the outbreak of the Equatoria Corps’ mutiny in Torit (Johnson 2003; Poggo 2009). Recent studies of the conflict have challenged this view. Øystein Rolandsen (2011), for instance, maintains that the war only broke out at full scale in 1963 and that the preceding period witnessed low-intensity violence and disturbances, but not a war. The period of 1956-1962, Rolandsen maintains, was a period of low-intensity violence and disturbances, but not war. Therefore, had Khartoum addressed the grievances of the Southern population, the war might have been prevented (See also Rolandsen and Leonardi 2014). While this is a persuasive case, this article follows the assertion that the Southern Sudanese liberation struggle could be traced to 1955. This is because ideas about self-determination became growingly popular among Southern Sudanese already in the second half of the 1950s. The violence in 1963 was a culmination of this process.

2 While it is true that the Southern Sudanese were divided throughout the conflict, and that no single group or organisation represented the Southern claim to self-determination, we can still speak of a broad group acting to achieve a political goal, even if vaguely-defined.

3 This information is based on interviews conducted by Leonardi, as well as from Rumbek District Monthly Report, January 1937, SRO EP 57.D.10; Minutes of the first meeting at Wau of the Bahr el Ghazal Province Council, 12–13 November 1948, SRO EP 1.C.2; and Bahr el Ghazal Province Intelligence Report, December 1955–January 1956, NRO UNP 1/20/168.


6 SSNA, BD/44, BD.50.J.1, 4 March 1957.


8 Unity of the Sudan, FO 3711141363, no. 2121, May 18, 1944. In Johnson (1998a, p. 44, doc. 21).


10 Kuyok mentions Benjamin Lowki’s contacts with the bloc’s founder, Dr. Adam Adham (Kuyok 2015, entry: Benjamin Lowki).


16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.


19 These numbers may have been inflated, but they indicate a sense of alarm among the Southern leadership. Voice of Southern Sudan, ‘O.A.U to Examine Southern Sudan’s Question’, 2, 2 (1964), p. 9.


22 The Southern Sudan Today: A Test Case in Afro-Arab Co-Operation II’, Voice of Southern Sudan 1, no. 3 (1963), pp. 22.

23 For detailed analyses of the history of the civil war see Poggo (2009); Johnson (2003); Rolandsen (2011); Rolandsen and Leonardi (2014).

24 Rolandsen, “False Start,” p. 106.


27 ‘A Letter from William Deng to General Ibrahim Abboud’, c.1961. SOA, at http://sudanarchive.net/cgi-bin/pageso?u=pdf&d=Dygrgd1_24.1.1&dl=1&sim=Screen2Image, accessed November 22, 2015. The use of the term ‘virtually’ is interesting here. Perhaps it indicates the discomfort that Deng felt when applying this concept to the state he had endorsed only a short time before, and would continue to endorse later, when he returned to support the idea of federalism in 1965 (Johnson 2014, 15-16).
30 For example, SANU reported the sending of a delegation led by its Secretary of Information, M.G.A Kwanai, to the Mediterranean Colloquium, which discussed subjects such as colonialism and repression of minorities. The Sudanese government, according to the report, refused to send a delegation. Voice of Southern Sudan, ‘S.A.N.U for Talks on Human Rights’, 2, 2 (1964), p. 12.
34 ‘Southern Sudan Today’, pp. 7-8.
37 Ibid., p. 134.
46 Ibid. (p. 159).
49 Ibid., pp. 8-9.
51 For example, Aquila Manyoun, an Anya-Nya commander, was trained in Congo (Kuyok, 2015, p. 227).
References


