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Networks and Actors: Foreign Office Attitudes Towards European Integration, 1957-73.

Adam Rolewicz

Word Count: 99,273
Abstract

The history of Britain’s relationship with Europe is one which has received significant attention from scholars and laypeople alike, especially in recent times. It has been explored from a wide range of angles and perspectives, all of which offer unique insights into what has often been characterised as an awkward or reluctant relationship. This thesis’ contribution employs a specific focus on the attitudes of Foreign Office officials towards European integration in the years 1957-73, and the ways in which these attitudes shaped the foreign policymaking process. The role which Foreign Office officials played in Britain’s approach to membership of the EEC was extremely significant, and their attitudes had a profound impact on the policymaking process. In certain cases, these attitudes conflicted with those of their political masters and resulted in serious struggles and confrontations in the corridors of power.

This study will examine four case studies in Britain’s approach to European integration in the years 1957-73, which cover the most critical junctures in the Foreign Office’s approach to European integration across this period. In each case study, the attitudes and actions of the officials most intimately involved in European policy will form the main focus, including an in-depth analysis of how their attitudes had been shaped through their own formative experiences. It will become clear that officials’ attitudes towards European integration were exceptionally diverse and were not reflective of a rigid departmental orthodoxy. Foreign Office personnel were increasingly recruited from a wider base of social and educational backgrounds and this in turn created a diplomatic service containing a broad range of views. However, a gulf in attitudes between the elder and younger generations of officials became increasingly evident, with the latter being much more receptive to the principles of European unity after their experiences of the Second World War. The result was a department which increasingly viewed membership of the EEC as the future of Britain’s foreign policy strategy.
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<td>BDOHP</td>
<td>British Diplomatic Oral History Programme</td>
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<td>Bodleian Library</td>
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<td>CCC</td>
<td>Churchill College, Cambridge</td>
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<td>CRO</td>
<td>Commonwealth Relations Office</td>
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<td>DEA</td>
<td>Department of Economic Affairs</td>
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<td>ECIU</td>
<td>European Communities Information Unit</td>
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<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community</td>
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<td>EFTA</td>
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<td>European Integration Department</td>
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<td>Euratom</td>
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<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
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<td>FTA</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>TNA</td>
<td>The National Archives</td>
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<tr>
<td>UKDEL</td>
<td>United Kingdom Delegation to the European Communities</td>
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<td>UKREP</td>
<td>United Kingdom Permanent Representation to the European Communities</td>
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<td>UN</td>
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**WEU:** Western European Union

**WOCD:** Western Organisations and Coordination Department

**WOD:** Western Organisations Department
Acknowledgements

In many respects, undertaking a PhD is a solitary and isolating affair. One is largely left to one’s own devices to spend endless hours sifting through documents in the archives or slumped in front of a computer, typing away incessantly. However, it would be disingenuous and categorically untrue to say that we PhD students make it to the end without huge amounts of support, both personal and professional, from a wide range of colleagues and friends. A few lines of text in a document which very few people will ever read certainly does not amount to the praise and gratitude which each of these people deserve, but the lowly academic only has so many tools at their disposal. I’m afraid this will have to do.

Firstly, I would like to pay tribute to the administrative staff at the University of Kent’s School of History. In particular I would like to thank Rob Brown, Jenny Humphrey, Jackie Waller, and Dr Kirsty Corrigan. Over the years I have come to you with some of the daftest and strangest requests and queries, and you have always pointed me in the right direction. Your support will never be forgotten, particularly when things were very difficult for me. I owe you a great deal of gratitude for doing all the tasks which most academics like to pretend they’re too clever and important for but in actual fact haven’t the first clue about. I never took your help and advice for granted. Thank you.

Secondly, I would like to thank the academic staff at the School of History, especially Dr Philip Boobbyer, Dr Julie Anderson, Dr Juliette Pattinson, Dr Mario Draper, Dr Stuart Palmer, Dr Liam Haydon and Dr Aske Brock. Philip always acted as a great mentor and second supervisor, and I was always grateful for his boundless enthusiasm. Julie was my course convenor for the Modern British History module I taught in 2016/7 and couldn’t have been a better choice in terms of professional advice and support. Mario, Stuart, Liam and Aske are all intellectual giants and good friends. I won’t forget the games of Friday football which helped maintain some small level of sanity and the various sporcle sessions in the PGR.

Thirdly, I would like to express my gratitude to all the staff at the Foreign and Commonwealth office, both past and present, who have contributed towards my project in some way. In particular, I would like to thank Neil Smith CMG, the former British ambassador to Finland, for taking the time to speak to me about his former colleagues; Sir Simon McDonald, the current Permanent Under-Secretary for agreeing to an interview and for his general support and enthusiasm; Sir Jon Cunliffe, the Deputy Governor of the Bank
of England who also gave us a good deal of his time to be interviewed, and Sir Stephen Wall, Sir Nicholas Bayne, Sir Andrew Wood and Kara Owen for agreeing to participate in our workshop on the British and French foreign ministries. I would also like to thank Dr Patrick Salmon, Dr Richard Smith, James Southern and the rest of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office historians for their constant help and support.

Fourthly, I would like to thank the PhD community in the School of History, many of whom I now count as my closest friends. In particular I’d like to thank Peter Keeling, Sophie Kelly, Hugh Roberts, Dani Gonzalez, Rob Newman, Daniel Belteki, Chloe Trainor, Paul Ketley, Emma Ketley, Emily Bartlett, and all the other PGR veterans who fought alongside me in the thesis trenches. I have too many fond memories of my time with you both inside and outside the university environment. You have been the most incredible pillars of support and sources of laughter and joy. I will miss you all terribly (no really, I actually will). This PhD is as much yours as it is mine. In addition, I would like to thank the friends I made on the conference circuit, particularly Todd Carter, Darius Wainwright, Dan Feather and Dean Clay. As fellow international history PhD students, there was never a political or diplomatic crisis we were unable to resolve over a pint of beer and a chat.

I would also like to pay huge thanks to Professors John Keiger and Gaynor Johnson for being mad enough to take me on board as a PhD student on their AHRC project. It would not be an exaggeration to say that I simply would not be the person I am today without the two of you. This PhD opened up a number of doors and opportunities which I never could have dreamed of four years ago. Your patience and support throughout my time at the University of Kent has been steadfast and I am incredibly grateful. From trawling through the latest drivel I’d written and offering feedback, to allowing me to participate in high-level interviews at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Quai d’Orsay, you have always put your trust in me and I hope I have always delivered. This thesis would not have been possible without your help and dedication.

I reserve my final thanks for the two individuals who have always believed in me and have been the strongest pillars of support and encouragement. Evana, you are my rock and have helped me through some of the darkest times of my life. Your constant love and unbridled optimism made the completion of this thesis a much easier task than it should have been. It is clear to me that I could not have finished this PhD without you. Words cannot fully convey the strength of my love and gratitude, but I sincerely hope they are self-evident. Thank you.
I owe my largest debt of gratitude to my father, Karl Rolewicz. You persuaded me to apply for this PhD and you were over the moon when I came out of the interview to say that I had been accepted. I still remember receiving a barrage of congratulatory text messages from relatives whom you had informed thirty seconds after I set foot outside. I still remember you constantly taking an interest in the thesis every time we spoke on the phone or in person, particularly after the Brexit referendum debate kicked off. I remember you stressing the importance of history to me and saying how proud you were that I was undertaking a PhD. I remember receiving that awful phone call from our neighbour saying that you’d suddenly passed away. I remember thinking that you’d never see me finish the thesis or graduate. This work is dedicated to your memory. You made me the man I am today and I hope I have been able to make you proud. I will always treasure the fact that you were the one who nurtured a love of history in me and inspired me to take it to the highest levels.

1 June 2018
Introduction

...the history of European integration is inextricably intertwined with many of the most important dynamics in post-World War II Europe and international relations: the transformation of the welfare state, the Cold War, and the North-South conflict and globalisation.¹

Shifts in Foreign Office attitudes take place but they do so slowly. They may result from changes in political leadership, from generational differences, and from practical experience. A study of attitudes towards the European Union would be highly welcome.²

On 1 January 1973, the United Kingdom formally became a member of the European Economic Community (EEC). This event signalled a watershed moment in the history of both British foreign policy and domestic politics. The island nation which had built an empire upon which the sun never set and had emerged victorious from the two most destructive conflicts of the twentieth century was now an equal partner with its old continental rivals in a supranational organisation. The country’s pursuit of membership had been fraught with difficulty, doubt, and disappointment. Unlike the six founding members of the EEC, Britain had initially elected not to participate in the creation of a European common market, withdrawing from the Messina negotiations which resulted in the Treaty of Rome in 1957. This monumental reversal in foreign policy represented one of the most significant changes in the history of Britain’s international relations.

The primary focus of this research is the evaluation of senior and middle-ranking Foreign Office officials’ attitudes towards European integration, how they were shaped by their formative experiences, including their social background, their education, and their early careers, and how this affected British foreign policy towards the EEC in the years 1957-73. Specifically, this study aims to provide a prosopographical study of the key officials most intimately involved with European integration affairs in a bid to account for the department’s change in stance on EEC membership from one of caution and suspicion to

broad enthusiasm and support. The internal politics and divisions within the Foreign Office on the issue of European integration will also be explored, including how and why such differing attitudes were held and the effects on the policymaking process. An additional focus is how the Foreign Office adapted and changed its internal structure in response to the challenges of European integration. The thesis will explore how the leading sub-departments on European affairs changed names, functions, and size across this period, as well as the amalgamation of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and its implications for European integration policy. Despite the vast output of written material on the history of European integration, very little research has been conducted on how Foreign Office officials approached and considered the question of European unity. This is an absolutely critical omission from the scholarship. Further investigation in this area has the potential to revolutionise perspectives on the history of foreign policymaking and will benefit international historians and political scientists immensely with its examination of the actors and networks which shaped Britain’s foreign policy towards European integration. By extension, this research may potentially pave the way for similar projects on other Whitehall departments and the influence key groups of officials had on policy and strategy.

The history of Britain and its approach to European integration is consistently one of the most extensively covered topics in academic literature and has been labelled ‘the most consistent theme in British foreign policy since the end of the Second World War’. Largely considered one of the most significant political narratives of the twentieth century, it has garnered the attention of politicians, journalists and laymen alike. The scholarship can be broadly divided into two disciplinary categories; history and political science. The literature from these two disciplines varies widely in both methodology and style. The historical studies tend to offer a narrative of the events which account for the changes in Britain’s foreign policy towards Europe, whereas political scientists are chiefly concerned with testing specific theories which can explain Britain’s handling of the process of European integration. The historical interpretations are characterised by certain divisions: the oldest literature from the 1960s and 1970s tends to frame the issue of European integration

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through Britain’s global strategy. As a result, Europe is sometimes relegated to a mere ‘sideshow’ in British foreign policy or simply a single component in the ‘bigger picture’ of Britain’s overall strategy. This is the argument presented by Northedge, one of the leading authorities on post-war British foreign policy history. British policymakers viewed the nation’s foreign policy through the Churchillian lens of the ‘three circles’, which framed Britain’s primary interests in terms of three interlocking areas: the United States, the Empire and Commonwealth, and Europe. It has been argued that Europe was seen by successive British governments as the least important circle of interest. Senior politicians were convinced that in order to reassert Britain’s status as a world power and revitalise its economy it needed to maintain a close relationship with the United States and bolster trade with the Commonwealth. As such, scholars of the history of post-war British foreign policy largely overlooked European integration in favour of Anglo-American relations, Commonwealth relations and the decolonisation movement. This orthodox school has therefore only offered a partial view of the nature of Britain’s foreign policy strategy towards European integration prior to her accession to the EEC in 1973. European integration tended to be discussed in relation to other major challenges in post-war international history, particularly the Cold War and Transatlantic defence objectives: ‘A divided Europe became simply part of the global balance between Washington and Moscow.’ This produces an incomplete picture which demotes European integration to a secondary feature of the Cold War and does not allow it to be evaluated on its own terms. For example, Norhedge attributes the Macmillan government’s sudden change of course towards membership of the EEC as a ‘knee-jerk’ response wholly in reaction to pressure from the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, who considered European integration a

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10 Hanrieder and Auton, *The Foreign Policies of West Germany, France, and Britain* (1980), 178.
top priority as a counterweight to the Eastern bloc. The orthodox school operates on the assumption that Britain placed all of its post-war foreign policy ‘eggs’ in the ‘baskets’ of Anglo-American relations and Commonwealth ties, and was ‘forced down the tortuous path to an essentially European orientation’ without any prior serious European strategy. These arguments present an oversimplified narrative of post-war British foreign policy, and downplay the importance of Europe in Britain’s strategic endeavours.

These earlier accounts of post-war British foreign policy have since been revised after a wave of scholarship from the 1990s onwards sought to redress the academic balance of British international relations history by employing a specific focus on Britain’s policy towards Europe, as opposed to its overarching world strategy. The revisionist literature covers three main junctures in Britain’s approach to European integration in the years up to 1973: Britain’s self-exclusion from the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the EEC, Britain’s failed applications for membership of the EEC under Macmillan and Wilson, and the Heath government’s success in negotiating Britain’s entry into the Common Market. This section of the scholarship revealed that Britain’s policy towards Europe was in fact far more proactive than had been previously assumed, and successive British governments had approached the issue of European integration with careful consideration. In addition, the objectives of Britain’s foreign policy towards Europe were far more complex than had been argued by the earlier scholarship. The conclusions reached by authors such as John W. Young, James Ellison and Wolfram Kaiser include a firm resolution that the failure of Britain’s applications for membership were not inevitable, and that Britain’s primary foreign policy objectives remained largely consistent, namely revitalising Britain’s role as a world power. There is little debate over the fact that in the

13 Hanrieder and Auton, The Foreign Policies of West Germany, France, and Britain (1980), 181.
period in which the British government did not actively pursue membership of the EEC, British foreign policy was governed by the sentiment ‘cooperation without commitment’. The Attlee government pursued its security and defence objectives by strongly encouraging cooperation in Europe and observed the developments across the English Channel with great interest – Britain lead the way with France in the creation of the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in 1947 and signed the Treaty of Brussels in 1948, a defence pact which bound together much of Western Europe. Beyond these gestures of cooperation, however, the British government did not approach the idea of closer union with enthusiasm. The British flatly refused to fully engage with the European economic integration project, observed the proceedings at Messina in 1955 with extreme scepticism, and thereafter approached the issue of EEC membership with caution and hesitation.

The issue which most scholars seem to contest is the motivation behind this stance. Shearman, Aspinwall and Gowland and Turner argue that Britain’s reluctance to enter into a European union was largely due to historical-cultural explanations. Britain had a long and successful history as a world power, it was the only major country in Western Europe to have not been occupied during the Second World War, and the historical longevity of its political institutions entrenched a sense of superiority in her political elites. More specifically, Bulmer contests that the long-cherished principle of Parliamentary sovereignty was the single most important factor in Britain’s refusal and subsequent reluctance to join. Denman, Gowland and Turner also argue that combined with these conservative, historical sentiments was a patronising ‘aloofness’ amongst British elites which convinced them that any attempts made by the Western European states to forge a political or

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21 Ibid.
economic union would be abject failures and a waste of British time.\textsuperscript{23} This can be seen in the Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden’s reaction to a proposal for a European Defence Community (EDC) by the French Prime Minister, René Pleven – George argues that Eden ‘appears to have assumed from an early stage that the EDC scheme would fail’, and when it did in 1954, this only served to reinforce the British government’s view that Europe was incapable of creating a meaningful power base.\textsuperscript{24} Conversely, other academics emphasise more practical considerations. One of the British government’s top priorities in the post-war period was to revitalise Britain’s world role and reassert her status as a ‘great power’ in order to maintain national prestige and influence in international diplomacy.\textsuperscript{25} Wilkes and Young argue that British policymakers widely believed that this could only be achieved by employing a broader outlook which extended beyond Europe to Britain’s overseas possessions and commitments, and that by restricting Britain to a narrow, Eurocentric project, her relations with the United States and the Commonwealth would suffer.\textsuperscript{26} Gowland and Turner have also demonstrated how Britain’s economic policy and trade were also major reasons for the government’s reluctance to fully engage. In the years 1952-4, 47% of Britain’s imports and 48% of her exports went to the Commonwealth, whereas the founding members of the EEC (France, West Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries) accounted for only 12.6% of Britain’s imports and 19.6% of her exports.\textsuperscript{27} Indeed, Hanrieder and Auton have noted that until 1961, Britain ‘still had the most productive economy in Western Europe, with impressive technological capabilities’.\textsuperscript{28} Therefore, there was no persuasive logic dictating that Britain’s membership of the Common Market would yield economic success.\textsuperscript{29}

Overall, the revisionist literature on Britain’s approach to membership of the Common Market presents a complex picture with a range of factors and motivations in the construction of British foreign policy towards Europe. Indeed, Bulmer argues that Britain’s ‘turn to Europe’ is ‘not easily explained’ given the different themes and dimensions

\textsuperscript{24} George, \textit{An Awkward Partner} (1998), 25.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid; Bulmer, “Britain and European Integration” (1992), 8.
\textsuperscript{27} Gowland and Turner, \textit{Reluctant Europeans} (2000), 94.
\textsuperscript{28} Hanrieder and Auton, \textit{The Foreign Policies of West Germany, France, and Britain} (1980), 231.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid.
involved. The contributions made in this area of the scholarship are fundamental to the analysis of the history of Britain and European integration, but there are criticisms which can be applied. These ‘official’ accounts tend to focus too heavily on party politics and the agency of elected government ministers which has the potential to distort and refract the evaluation of British foreign policy. Governments and politicians are temporary and prone to constant shifts and changes, which strongly suggests that foreign policy was influenced by other groups and institutions given the levels of consistency in Britain’s foreign policy objectives in this period. In response to European integration, Britain’s machinery of government was forced to undergo significant changes and adaptations in order to facilitate the negotiations with the EEC, and yet this is rarely mentioned in this area of the scholarship. Although the Heath government’s application was not necessarily ‘doomed to succeed’, the negotiations were made significantly easier by the failed attempts of the previous governments. Over the course of the decade, British officials and policymakers had managed to acquire greater knowledge of the EEC’s inner workings and the overarching attitudes of its six member states. In doing so, the British government had far more manoeuvrability in terms of being aware of where compromises and deals could be reached with the member states, in particular the French. The institutional apparatus of Britain’s bureaucracy in Whitehall proved to be a remarkably powerful tool in the pursuit of entry to the Common Market, and yet has been largely overlooked by the ‘official’ accounts of European integration. The permanence of the civil service meant that senior officials and diplomats maintained both a high level of input and a strong line of consistency in overall British foreign policy. Therefore, it is crucial to gain an insight into Whitehall’s role

30 Bulmer, “Britain and European Integration” (1992), 7.
32 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
in Britain and European integration and how much influence it wielded in both Britain’s approach and negotiating stance.

It is in the most recent developments in the scholarship on Britain and European integration that Whitehall’s role has received more attention. There has been an increasing amount of research conducted on the civil service, the diplomatic service and permanent officials as scholars attempt to delve deeper into the construction and implementation of British foreign policy. This has also led to a surge in the number of interdisciplinary studies on the subject, drawing from history, political science, economics, and other social sciences. As a result, there has been a radical change in how British foreign policy is evaluated and discussed. It is becoming increasingly clear how much control senior civil servants had over policy, and how this power was sometimes used to directly contradict, challenge or indeed completely bypass government ministers when disagreements arose.

It is often argued that the British civil service adapted remarkably well to European integration, and it is here that the most significant effects of the quest for membership of the EEC on British central government can be seen. One of the most significant sections of the literature to have emerged hails from the realm of political science and draws on institutional theory in its investigation of Whitehall’s responses to European integration. Kassim has offered a detailed analysis of the theoretical implications of ‘Europeanisation’ for national administrative systems and how they adapt to membership of regional political unions. In doing so, two broad responses to European integration can be identified: ‘convergent’, that is, when national bureaucracies adapt and change in similar ways to the challenges posed by EEC membership, and ‘divergent’, when administrations respond by interpreting membership of the EEC through pre-existing structural arrangements and values, thereby creating a unique response through their own adaptations and adjustments. In specific reference to Whitehall, Kassim argues that the UK’s response was largely divergent – the administrative machinery of government responded to the EEC on

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43 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
its terms and with its own ad hoc arrangements. Prior to membership of the EEC, the British civil service implemented its own internal measures through the establishment of the Common Market Negotiations Committee in 1961 and a European Unit in the Cabinet Office under Harold Wilson, both of which involved complex and extensive cross-departmental co-ordination in response to the challenges of European integration. The ‘core’ departments involved in the negotiations for membership by the time of accession in 1973 included the Department for Trade and Industry, the Ministry for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, the Department of Customs and Excise, the Foreign Office, and the Treasury. Therefore, the scholarship shows that Whitehall was exceptionally effective in organising a broad range of government departments and collecting information from each administrative enclave in order to launch the most cohesive possible bid for membership of the EEC. This strongly suggests that the civil service had a significant amount of influence in British policymaking and Britain’s strategy for Europe, something which the ‘official’ accounts do not investigate fully.

The Foreign Office, more specifically, was given an increasing amount of power and influence as the European question became more central to the domestic political agenda. Scholars have gone to great lengths to highlight the degree of the department’s control and influence over European affairs and vice versa, labelling the UK Permanent Representation to the European Communities in Brussels (UKREP) its ‘hidden arm’ across the Channel. During the negotiations for entry and after accession, the Foreign Office became ‘a spectacular new power centre on domestic questions’ as it began to claim jurisdiction over a whole host of national issues which had strong implications for European issues such as economics, energy and agriculture. According to Wallace and Wallace, the Treasury had long been the most prestigious and powerful government department in Whitehall, but by 1973 had lost its influence as the ‘central hub’ in the British civil service to the Foreign Office and the Cabinet Office. One example is Gliddon’s study of the Foreign Office’s role

46 Ibid.
49 Hugo Young and Anne Sloman, No, Minister: An Inquiry into the Civil Service (London: British Broadcasting Corporation, 1982), 73; Hennessy, Whitehall (1990), 253.
50 Young and Sloman, No, Minister (1982), 79.
in coordinating the domestic propaganda campaign in promoting British membership of the EEC; a task which under normal circumstances would have fallen to a home civil service department.\(^{52}\) Across the period 1960-72, the Foreign Office assumed the duties of the Treasury, the Central Office of Information and the Department of Economic Affairs in the publicity drive for the EEC.\(^{53}\) A monumental programme of public information was launched by the Foreign Office which included the printing and distribution of hundreds of thousands of posters and leaflets designed to present the case for entry in the most favourable way possible whilst still being deemed ‘informative’.\(^{54}\) By Heath’s premiership the Foreign Office’s influence over information on the EEC for public consumption was so great that the European Communities Information Unit (ECIU) was created for the sole purpose of promoting British membership of the Common Market at home and abroad.\(^{55}\) Hennessy and Hugo Young report that a significant amount of autonomy and independence was handed to Foreign Office officials in negotiations and general management of UK-EEC relations to the point where government ministers did not feel fully in control.\(^{56}\) Criticisms from prominent politicians such as former Foreign Secretary David Owen, former Foreign Office minister Roy Hattersley and former Secretary of State for Energy Tony Benn include that the department had ‘transferred its allegiance to Brussels’, been given ‘too much leeway’ in its dealings with the EEC and having a great enthusiasm for ‘continuing an institution [UKREP] that gives them this very substantial increased power’.\(^{57}\) Whilst these criticisms may be exaggerated, the thrust of Young and Hennessy’s arguments present a convincing case that the Foreign Office was the ‘chief beneficiary of Britain’s membership with the EEC’ and the most important government department in the negotiations for entry.\(^{58}\) It is for these reasons that a strong rationale for studying the Foreign Office and its approach to European integration can be established.

Alongside the scholarship from the field of political science, an ever-expanding body of historical studies on the Foreign Office and diplomatic service exists. Scholars of British international history are increasingly aware of the need to research the attitudes and the influence of officials as it becomes more apparent that the Foreign Office did not and often

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\(^{53}\) Ibid.

\(^{54}\) Ibid.

\(^{55}\) Ibid.


\(^{58}\) Hennessy, *Whitehall* (1990), 404.
was not capable of exercising complete political neutrality. Hugo Young, Kane, Allen and Oliver identify a collective mentality in the Foreign Office which slowly shifted in the post-war period. As a department, the Foreign Office is often described as being extremely conservative and more open to gradual adjustment as opposed to radical reform. In the 1950s, the dominant view in the department was that the Common Market was a doomed venture and that Anglo-Americanism was ‘at the heart of British national interests’. However, the younger generation of officials and diplomats had a completely different outlook on the new world; one which was shaped by first-hand experiences of the destruction of the Second World War and a firm conviction that such havoc should never again be inflicted upon the world. This made the new generation more receptive to the concept of a united Europe with common interests and objectives. After the ‘new breed’ began to replace the elder generation of officials in the 1960s, the Foreign Office became increasingly vocal about joining the EEC, emphasising the potential dangers Britain faced from exclusion. At certain points, this new orthodoxy put the Foreign Office at odds with the views held by Britain’s political leadership. Helen Parr has demonstrated this in her landmark study on Britain’s second application for EEC membership, where the department’s attitude towards French obstruction was judged too aggressive by the Prime Minister Harold Wilson. In addition, there has been increased interest in the role which key individuals played in the construction of British foreign policy, particularly edited volumes containing biographical accounts of Britain’s ambassadors and Foreign Office Permanent Under-Secretaries. The most recent attempt to provide an in-depth analysis of

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62 Young, This Blessed Plot (1998), 100.
63 Ibid.
the post-war diplomatic service was conducted by Hughes and Platt. The post-war diplomatic service was conducted by Hughes and Platt. In a ground-breaking article, they demonstrate how officials’ social and educational backgrounds changed significantly in the years 1945-1975, with an increased emphasis on specialisation as opposed to the generalist ‘all-rounders’ who had previously dominated the service. It is hoped that this study will contribute towards this most recent development in the scholarship with a more specific focus on those Foreign Office officials most intimately involved in European integration affairs.

Despite the major advances in academic research on the Foreign Office and its influence in the policymaking process, crucial areas remain unexplored. As Steiner’s quote at the beginning of this chapter indicates, a specific study of Foreign Office officials and their attitudes towards European integration is absent from the scholarship. A deeper and more rigorous analysis is needed in order to identify the key actors and powerbrokers in the process of European integration within the Foreign Office. Neilson and Otte’s landmark prosopographical study of the Permanent Under-Secretaries of the Foreign Office from 1854-1946 proposes that ‘it is people who make institutions work and...it is through the prism of individual personalities that the student of the past can best elucidate past international affairs.’ Indeed, Steiner has argued further that the very term Foreign Office ‘represents a fiction, for the people who constitute the Foreign Office are individuals with their own personalities, ideas and actions.’ This is a direct contradiction of Bulmer and Burch’s institutional analysis of Whitehall and Europe, which contends that individual actors are defined and confined by the institutions in which they are participants. This line of argument completely denies individual actors agency and assumes that institutions such as the Foreign Office act in and follow a singular, linear pattern whereas the situation is far more complex. Individual actors constantly attempt to move in different directions and often conflict with other actors within the same institution, as has been proven by Hugo Young in his presentation of the ‘old’ versus the ‘new’ generation in the diplomatic service.

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69 Neilson and Otte, The Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs (2009), xv.


71 Bulmer and Burch, The Europeanisation of Whitehall (2009), 31.
and their attitudes towards the EEC.\textsuperscript{72} However, not all actors are equal in the amount of power and influence they wield. It is for this reason that this study intends to conduct a prosopographical analysis of the most significant departmental actors in the process of European integration. As Young and Gliddon have suggested, there were certain individuals who may have had a greater impact on British foreign policy than others and certain personalities were fundamental in driving Britain towards the EEC.\textsuperscript{73}

Prosopography can be loosely defined as ‘collective biography’ or ‘the inquiry into the common characteristics of a group of historical actors by means of a collective study of their lives’.\textsuperscript{74} As a methodology, prosopography varies widely in its application and is not deployed as a rigid framework.\textsuperscript{75} This flexibility is a great asset. It has been used successfully to construct comprehensive studies of very small groups as per Ball’s \textit{The Guardsmen}, or exceptionally broad catalogues such as Keats-Rohan’s \textit{Domesday People}.\textsuperscript{76}

Prosopography can also take the form of a collection of biographies of people who have held a specific position in government or the civil service over a period of time. Examples include \textit{The Washington Embassy} by Hopkins \textit{et al} and \textit{The Paris Embassy} by Pastor-Castro and Young.\textsuperscript{77} As a methodology, it has proven to be increasingly popular across all sub-disciplines of history, and its malleability makes it an ideal framework for this thesis.\textsuperscript{78} Stone has argued that it is particularly valuable as a tool for ‘the analysis of the social and economic affiliations of political groupings; the exposure of the workings of a political machine; and the identification of those who pull the levers.’\textsuperscript{79} This is the precise aim of this study. It is hoped that by examining certain groups of officials in each chapter, trends will be established in their socio-educational and professional backgrounds, the major changes in the Foreign Office’s institutional approach towards European integration will be

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\item Young, \textit{This Blessed Plot} (1998), 100.
\item Lawrence Stone, “Prosopography,” \textit{Daedalus} 100, no.1 (1971), 46.
\item Keats-Rohan has noted that it has become increasingly popular with historians of all periods, particularly since the turn of the 21st century: Keats-Rohan, “Introduction” (2007), 3.
\item Stone, “Prosopography” (1971), 46.
\end{thebibliography}
identified and explained, and the most influential officials working on European integration will be identified and the impact of their actions examined. Unlike some of the vast quantitative studies which have been undertaken by scholars of ancient and medieval history, this thesis will focus on small groups of officials in each chapter and examine their backgrounds, formative experiences and attitudes towards European integration thoroughly. The rationale for this is that the Foreign Office was a relatively small, close-knit institution in which a select number of key personnel dealt with specific areas of policy. In addition, only a small number of officials in the middle or upper echelons could have hoped to wield significant influence over major policy questions such as European integration. This is confirmed by the archival evidence, which will be explored in greater detail below.

The study of individual or group attitudes is often fraught with conceptual and theoretical complications which can erect intellectual barriers for researchers. On the most basic level, defining ‘attitudes’ and accounting for their change, resilience or adaptability is a question which has vexed social theorists for generations. This study will employ the works of Gordon Allport and Karl Mannheim, which provide excellent frameworks for any historian or social scientist who seeks to unravel psychological factors when investigating an individual’s personal views and how this determines their actions. Allport has loosely defined attitude as ‘a mental and neural state of readiness, organised through experience, exerting a directive or dynamic influence upon the individual’s response to all objects and situations with which it is related.’ Therefore, attitudes are learned and entrenched by an individual’s formative experiences in their upbringing, their education, their career, and their relationships with other people. An individual can hold multiple attitudes, or a ‘constellation’, which vary in strength and range from highly positive dispositions to extremely negative ones. In turn, these attitudes can alter over time as a person’s experiences causes them to reassess their views. Examples of potential causes of attitudinal change include trauma or ‘cognitive dissonance’, social integration in the workplace, and religious conversion. In this study’s case, the social integration of officials into the Foreign Office and diplomatic service represented a highly significant turning point in their personal and professional lives. The social psychologist Halloran has argued:

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81 Allport, “Attitudes” (1967), 810.


'attitudes which have strong social support through group affiliations are difficult to change. If a person values his membership in a group he will tend to cling to the attitudes endorsed by that group in order to maintain status and position.' Membership of the Foreign Office ‘group’ itself was therefore an important determinant in every official’s personal views and attitudes, but there were still very clear differences in opinion, particularly between age groups. The current Permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Sir Simon McDonald, has himself asserted that in the Foreign Office, there exists ‘a very strong group identity’ for officials who joined the service in the same year. Furthermore, he also argued that this spoke to a wider generational mentality: ‘The world of your teen years is going to be very important as you’re starting your career in your twenties. And the generation ahead of me were definitely more viscerally pro-European.’ Indeed, Napoleon Bonaparte is often recorded as stating that ‘to understand the man, you have to know what was happening in the world when he was twenty.’

The common formative experiences of the generations of officials involved in British foreign policymaking towards European integration in the years 1957-73 are therefore the crux of this study. Mannheim has argued: ‘our culture is developed by individuals who come into contact anew with the accumulated heritage...a fresh contact always means a changed relationship of distance from the object and a novel approach to assimilating, using, and developing the proffered material.’ In other words, a new generational attitude exists when a group of new participants interacts with and re-evaluates the culture and values which it has inherited from the previous generation. The case of Britain’s world role, and by extension, its approach to European integration, is a classic example of such a re-evaluation. The impact of the Second World War was the single greatest formative experience for those who joined the Foreign Office in the post-war period, particularly those who had served in the armed forces during the War and witnessed its devastation first-hand:

These new men knew well enough that Atlanticism, the American relationship, the god before which [Roger] Makins and his generation worshipped, was at the heart of British national interest. The war and the victory had proved it. But theirs was a

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84 J. D. Halloran, Attitude Formation and Change (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1967), 60.
85 Simon McDonald, interviewed by author, John Keiger and Gaynor Johnson, 2 August 2016.
86 Ibid.
different kind of war, far from the armchair generalship that had imparted to older men a single-minded obsession with the Pax Americana. For them, the shot and shell of the front line were what they could never forget. Their war gave them a different perspective. And since they were the men of the future, many of whom rose high in the Foreign Office by the time the prejudices of their elders proved to have been misdirected, they are a cadre of some interest. ⁸⁹

Young’s argument is one this study strongly endorses and intends to contribute towards. Of course, this line of debate does not suggest that the elder generations of Foreign Office officials were not affected by the Second World War, merely that their experiences of it differed markedly from their younger colleagues. Paul Gore-Booth, the Permanent Under-Secretary 1965-9, wrote in his memoirs that during his time in the Washington embassy ‘United States-United Kingdom cooperation and a year’s full alliance had brought about by 1943 an integration of effort of truly astonishing proportions between two completely independent countries.’ ⁹⁰ Denis Greenhill, who succeeded Gore-Booth, also commented upon the closeness of British and American foreign policy objectives in the immediate post-war period, and how it framed much of his early experiences as a junior diplomat. ⁹¹ The glory days of the ‘special relationship’ was what coloured the elder generation’s memories of the War. Other major events in British international relations in this period which were potential causes of attitudinal change include the Suez Crisis, de Gaulle’s first veto on British membership of the EEC, and Britain’s successful accession. This thesis will also explore how these subsequent experiences challenged departmental orthodoxies and individual attitudes, and how these affected conceptions of Britain’s world role and her approach to European integration.

Identifying and evaluating attitudes in the source material presents a number of challenges for researchers. It can be difficult to extrapolate an individual’s personal views from a few pages of correspondence, and ascertaining whether these thoughts and beliefs translated into action is particularly ambitious. However, the modern or contemporary historian is dealt a significant advantage in this regard, as there is no shortage of sources for such an investigation. The Foreign Office documents deposited in the National Archives are this study’s largest source of evidence, particularly the general correspondence files and the Foreign Office personnel lists. The personnel lists were fundamental in understanding the department’s internal changes and identifying the most senior officials involved in

⁸⁹ Young, This Blessed Plot (1998), 100.
European integration affairs. This, combined with a detailed evaluation of which officials contributed the most towards European policy in the Foreign Office correspondence files, and the extent to which these contributions impacted upon decision-making at higher levels, provided the rationale for selecting the officials under discussion in each chapter.

The archival sources have been supplemented by private papers, particularly those of Paul Gore-Booth and Patrick Reilly in the Bodleian Library, and a large collection of officials’ memoirs, including those of Gladwyn Jebb, Christopher Audland, Denis Greenhill, Roderick Barclay, Paul Gore-Booth, David Hannay, Alan Campbell, Henry Brind, Wynn Hugh-Jones, Con O’Neill and Curtis Keeble. These papers and memoirs provided absolutely critical insights into the officials’ relationships with their colleagues, but more importantly their own thoughts and views on British international relations and European integration.

Churchill College’s British Diplomatic Oral History Programme has also been a valuable resource, as have interviews conducted by the author with Neil Smith, Sir Simon McDonald, and Sir Jon Cunliffe. Finally, the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography and obituaries in newspapers such as The Times, The Guardian, The Independent and The Telegraph have been additional sources used to track officials’ careers and gain a greater insight into their professional achievements. This wide range of source material ensures that such a study of Foreign Office attitudes is highly plausible and attainable. In many instances, the officials themselves referred to their own ‘attitudes’ towards issues such as European integration, Suez, Britain’s world role, and Anglo-American relations in the source material. There is therefore a wealth of tangible evidence which speaks to Foreign Office officials’ attitudes, and this will be demonstrated throughout the thesis.

The thesis will examine four major case studies in British foreign policy towards European integration in the years 1957-73. These case studies cover the most critical junctures in the Foreign Office’s approach to European integration across this period. Chapter 1 will focus on the Western Organisations Department (WOD) in the Foreign Office and its attempts to create an alternative framework to the EEC for European political cooperation in what became termed the ‘Grand Design’. Firstly, it will identify the key actors involved in the contributions towards the ‘Grand Design’ and explore their formative experiences through their socio-educational backgrounds and early careers. The chapter will then explore the wider historical context of British foreign policy and the Foreign Office after the Suez Crisis, and how this shaped the departmental orthodoxy in response to the creation of the EEC.

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92 Neil Smith is a former British ambassador to Finland. Sir Jon Cunliffe is currently Deputy Governor of the Bank of England but was previously British Permanent Representative to the EU.
There will then be a detailed examination of the evidence and a narrative account of how the ‘Grand Design’ was formulated, the difference in official attitudes towards Britain’s place in Europe and the wider world, and the actors’ engagement with the United States and the Six. In the years 1957-9, the Foreign Office remained largely ambivalent towards the EEC but attempted to pursue a proactive approach towards European cooperation through institutions such as NATO, the Council of Europe and the OEEC. However, there were elements of the department who fundamentally disagreed with this policy and argued in favour of closer association with the EEC.

Chapter 2 will examine the rise of the European Economic Organisations Department (EEOD) as the principal department concerned with European integration affairs and the Foreign Office’s cautious and reluctant turn towards launching Britain’s first application to join the EEC. This will demonstrate that the Foreign Office’s senior officials were still largely unconvinced about the case for British entry but were compelled by an anxiety that the United States would begin to increasingly view the EEC as its main Cold War partner in Europe. The younger, middle-ranking officials tried to press a more enthusiastic approach towards EEC membership, but there remained a gulf in generational attitudes. The chapter will begin by briefly contextualising Britain’s slow turn towards Europe, and how the EEOD was created and absorbed many of the WOD’s functions as the department began to view the EEC more seriously. The key officials involved in European integration policy will be discussed, with an overview of their formative experiences and attitudes. An account of the Foreign Office’s movement towards launching the first application will then be provided, identifying the key areas of debate and disagreement within the department, including the role of EFTA and potential overtures to Euratom and the ECSC. The chapter will not give a lengthy account of Britain’s negotiations for entry with the Six and will instead focus on official attitudes towards the negotiations themselves and their ultimate failure. It will be argued that the ‘Brussels breakdown’ of January 1963 was the most significant turning point for Foreign Office attitudes towards European integration, and the department pursued EEC membership much more vigorously thereafter.

Chapter 3 will study the effects of de Gaulle’s first veto on Foreign Office attitudes and how this influenced the department’s reassessment of Britain’s foreign policy strategy and the second application under Harold Wilson. The British Delegation to the EEC (UKDEL) in Brussels was strengthened significantly after the veto and signalled a more serious approach towards British membership and European integration more generally. After a discussion of the academic literature on the second application and a contextualisation of
Foreign Office attitudes, the chapter will identify the Foreign Office’s main actors in European policymaking and the influence of their formative experiences. The chapter will then give a detailed analysis of the Foreign Office’s revaluation of British foreign policy towards European integration and its attempts to push Downing Street towards a renewed application. A significant feature of this chapter will be the tensions between No. 10 and the Foreign Office in how to approach EEC membership, with the former opting for an Anglo-French partnership whereas the latter insisted on pursuing an alliance with the ‘Friendly Five’ to isolate France and re-establish Britain’s leading position on the continent. De Gaulle’s second rejection was fully expected, and it will be argued that the second application was largely a triumph for the Foreign Office tactic of demonstrating continued commitment towards EEC membership. The result was that British membership became the government’s key foreign policy priority, with the French becoming further ostracised by their EEC partners due to their obstructive behaviour.

Finally, chapter 4 will focus on the amalgamation of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Anglo-French relations, and Britain’s successful bid for membership of the EEC. As the political and economic importance of the Commonwealth waned with the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’, the Foreign Office decided to completely overhaul the structure and shape of the department and diplomatic service. Officials orientated the Foreign Office towards European and economic issues, recognising that this was the future of Britain’s foreign policy strategy. After the amalgamation, the Foreign Office pursued a reconstruction of Anglo-French relations in a bid to launch a third application for membership, a policy which had been prioritised by the government. The chapter will contextualise the state of British international relations in the late 1960s and examine the literature on the Heath government’s European policy. The amalgamation of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office will then be evaluated, particularly the internal politics of the merger and how certain officials saw it as a golden opportunity to divert greater resources towards European integration and economic diplomacy. It will be argued that the amalgamation was not driven by a desire to make financial savings, but to prepare the department for British accession to the EEC. The chapter will then look at the development of European integration policy after the amalgamation and the fallout of the Soames Affair, which paved the way for de Gaulle’s departure and a renewed bid for membership. By this point, Foreign Office support for EEC membership was practically unanimous, and the General represented Britain’s greatest obstacle. In lieu of a narrative account of the successful negotiations, the Foreign Office’s approach to Anglo-French reconciliation and
its pivotal role in Britain’s membership bid will instead be evaluated. It will be
demonstrated that the Foreign Office’s part in the reconstruction of Anglo-French relations
proved to be the decisive factor in Britain’s successful accession to the EEC.

In June 1955, the six founding members of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) – France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg – met at a conference in Messina, Sicily. At this conference, they decided to embark on a more ambitious programme of European integration through the creation of a common market, strengthened political unity, and an atomic energy community. The eventual outcome was the foundation of the European Economic Community (EEC) with the signing of the Treaty of Rome in March 1957. The creation of the EEC represented one of the most significant moments in the continent’s history. After the horrors of two world wars, the nations of Western Europe agreed to bind themselves together under a supranational authority and become completely interdependent. The one notable exception in this act of solidarity was Britain.

The nature of the British response to the Messina Conference and Treaty of Rome has been hotly contested by historians. The orthodox school, led by scholars such as Northedge, has argued that Britain was largely indifferent to the European integration project, citing her ties to the United States and the Commonwealth as more valuable areas of foreign policy. Post-war British foreign policy was broadly governed by the Churchillian ‘three circles’ doctrine, which marked the United States, the Commonwealth and Europe as Britain’s principal areas of interest. However, Europe was often designated a distant third by politicians and officials, with the Anglo-American partnership seen as the epicentre of international power and influence. European integration was therefore initially perceived

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94 Ibid.  
as a sideshow in the corridors of British power. In a more accusatory vein, revisionist scholars such as Kaiser, Young and Ellison have advanced the view that the British government actively sought to sabotage the creation and development of the EEC following its lukewarm reception to the European Defence Community (EDC).\(^8\) This line of argument follows that British ministers and officials were in agreement that ‘the Common Market was contrary to British policy and should therefore be opposed.’\(^9\) Overall, the scholarship paints a picture of Britain being at best ambivalent and at worst completely hostile. This chapter will demonstrate that these conclusions are not entirely accurate and that the Foreign Office took a proactive approach towards European integration, considering the issue carefully and formulating their own policies on the matter. Some of the most senior officials in the Foreign Office and the diplomatic service considered Europe to be a higher priority than the Middle East, and the evidence shows that they began to construct an alternative vision for a united Europe – what became termed the ‘Grand Design’.\(^10\) The ‘Grand Design’ was, in part, the British response to the Common Market. The plan advocated the creation of a wider Atlantic Community which would encompass a European Community in order to promote security and stability in the West and reorganise the various European assemblies into a single parliamentary body, which included the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Assembly of the Western European Union (WEU) and the Common Assembly of the ECSC.\(^1\) This venture was, of course, a failure. It is not the purpose of this chapter to dispute this. Rather, this chapter seeks to establish how Foreign Office officials devised British European integration policy in the early years of the EEC and why they pursued particular objectives with regards to Britain’s role in Europe and the wider world. Within the Foreign Office and diplomatic service, there was often disagreement and even conflict over Europe which had the potential to divide the department into factions. These disputes made the formulation of foreign policy a complicated process which included constant consultation and

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\(^10\) Gladwyn Jebb, “European Integration”, 11 December 1956, TNA/FO371/130966/WU1072/7; Selwyn Lloyd, “’The Grand Design’: Cooperation with Western Europe”, 5 January 1957, TNA/CAB129/84/46/CP(57)6.

reassessment. The Western Organisations Department (WOD), which had the most influence over European and Atlantic cooperation in this period, will form the main focus of this chapter. In 1957 British European integration policy was still in its infancy, and this was reflected in the Foreign Office’s internal structure. The main department concerned with the multilateral institutions of Europe was the WOD. The WOD had responsibility for NATO, the Council of Europe, the WEU, and certain aspects of the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC).102 Another smaller department, the Mutual Aid Department (MAD), controlled United States aid, NATO economic affairs, OEEC economic affairs, and later the planning and coordination of the failed Free Trade Area (FTA) and European Free Trade Association (EFTA).103 Neither department held a great deal of clout within the Foreign Office itself, though the WOD’s dealings with NATO, and by extension the United States, gave it more prestige than the MAD.104

As argued in the introduction, officials’ formative experiences and personal backgrounds had a significant influence on their attitudes towards major issues in British foreign policy such as European integration, and their professional lives were often informed by their own beliefs and prejudices. Therefore, the officials’ backgrounds will be examined thoroughly and analysed alongside the views and attitudes they expressed in their capacities as Foreign Office employees. In order to construct a cohesive and logical narrative of the policymaking process and the major strategic decisions taken, the primary actors involved will first have to be identified. The degree of influence an individual official held over a certain area of policy can generally be ascertained by tracking how much input they had in the Foreign Office general correspondence. Through a rigorous examination of the files in the National Archives, it becomes clear that a particular ‘core’ of officials and diplomats were consistently contributing to the discussions on Britain’s foreign policy towards Europe; more specifically the ‘Grand Design’. This group of individuals includes the highest rankings members of the WOD, Lord Samuel Hood (Assistant Under-Secretary) and Patrick Hancock (Head of Department) as well as Sir Christopher Steel, the ambassador to West Germany, Sir Gladwyn Jebb, the ambassador to France, and Wynn Hugh-Jones, a middle-ranking official and First Secretary in the WOD. Of these five officials, the first three held very similar views and attitudes towards Europe and foreign policy in general, whereas the latter two developed a reputation for proposing more radical measures and challenging.
the status quo. This group will constitute the main focus of this chapter, but there were indeed other officials who occasionally voiced their opinions. These perspectives will also be incorporated into the discussion where relevant in order to broaden this study’s range by drawing on the views of as many officials as possible.

The most striking fact one notices about the aforementioned group of officials is the similarity – uniformity even – in their social and educational backgrounds, with the exception of Hugh-Jones. Jebb and Steel were born in the first decade of the 20th century, with Hood and Hancock being born in the first half of following decade. Jebb and Hood both attended Eton College, Hancock attended Winchester College, and Steel was educated at Wellington College. All of them had studied at either Oxford or Cambridge. Thus, the elder four were moulded as gentlemen in the country’s most prestigious and exclusive schools, in keeping with their aristocratic lineages, and would have been educated and conditioned in very similar environments. Indeed, Hancock and Hood, who were a mere four years apart in age and worked together extremely closely in the WOD, had both attended Trinity College, Cambridge and joined the diplomatic service within two years of each other. With the exception of Hugh-Jones, all of them entered the service in the 1920s and 1930s and became integral to Britain’s wartime administration. For the elder four, their experiences as officials during the conflict would have been fundamental to both their careers and their views on international and domestic politics and society.

Hugo Young has argued that the War had ‘proven’ to a generation of officials and diplomats that the ‘special relationship’ with the United States was firmly at the heart of British national interest, and that it would continue to be the most important component of British foreign policy in the post-war world. In his memoirs, future Permanent Under-Secretary Sir Paul Gore-Booth recalled that during his time in the Washington embassy ‘United States-United Kingdom cooperation and a year’s full alliance had brought about by 1943 an integration of effort of truly astonishing proportions between two completely independent countries.’ Denis Greenhill, who was to succeed Gore-Booth as Permanent Under-Secretary in 1969, also commented upon the closeness of British and American foreign policy objectives in the immediate post-war period, and how it framed much of his early experiences as a junior

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107 Hugo Young, This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair (London: Macmillan, 1998), 100.
diplomat in Washington.109 These sentiments also appear to have been shared by the group being studied in this chapter. During the War, for example, Hancock worked in the Ministry of Economic Warfare, which saw a high degree of collaboration with the United States government.110 In addition, Steel was Head of the Political Division of the Allied Control Commission from 1945-47, Political Advisor to the British Commander-in-Chief until 1949, Minister at the Washington embassy 1950-3, and the UK’s Permanent Representative to NATO 1953-7.111 These strong groundings in Allied military cooperation and diplomatic relations with the United States made Steel an ardent Atlanticist. Roy Denman, who served under Steel at the embassy in Bonn, described him in an interview as an ambassador of the old school who was firmly committed to the ‘special relationship’ and a hardened sceptic of the Common Market.112 In a row with Denman over Britain’s involvement in the EEC, Steel is said to have snapped: ‘Her Majesty’s Government could not possibly associate itself with this continental cockalorum, but it was damned impertinent of them to think of going it on their own.’113

Conversely, Gladwyn Jebb is a much more complex case. As the elder of the group and a blue-blooded Etonian, Jebb was quite committed to Britain maintaining her Empire and Commonwealth as a means of preserving her great power status, and recognised the primacy of the Atlantic Alliance for much of his career, particularly during his time at the Ministry of Economic Warfare and then in New York as Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations.114 However, the ‘Titan at the Foreign Office’, as he is labelled by Sean Greenwood, became more sympathetic towards the Six’s goals as he witnessed the developments at Messina from his position as ambassador to France.115 The foundation of the EEC, coupled with the Suez Crisis, convinced Jebb of the need for British involvement in Europe.116 In his memoirs, Jebb argues that he perceived Suez as the death of the ‘special relationship’, despite the Macmillan government’s attempts to rebuild from the wreckage of the Crisis.117 In this regard, Jebb was an exception – the Anglo-American alliance and the

111 Ibid.
113 Ibid.
116 Ibid.
Churchillian thesis of Britain’s ‘three circles’ of foreign policy interests dominated the mindset of the majority of the senior officials and diplomats in the 1950s. His views were more in keeping with the younger generation of post-war recruits such as Wynn Hugh-Jones, whose formative experiences differed significantly from the elder four. Hugh-Jones, in stark contrast to the upper and upper-middle class backgrounds of the other members of the group, was a Welsh grammar schoolboy from a lower-middle class family. During the War he had served in the Royal Air Force (RAF) and was posted to France and Italy, where he witnessed first-hand the devastation and suffering inflicted upon Europe. Hugh-Jones stated that these experiences in his early adult life convinced him of the need for European solidarity and made him a lifelong supporter of European unity. This seems to have been further reinforced by his diplomatic career. Following his discharge from the RAF, Hugh-Jones joined the diplomatic service in 1947 and after working at the Foreign Office in London and at the British embassy to Saudi Arabia in Jeddah, he was transferred to Paris where he claims that he and Jebb engaged in an intense discussion on the political merits of British membership of the Common Market. Hugh-Jones also remarked that the two men became lifelong friends, and the archival evidence suggests that Hugh-Jones’ time in the WOD was characterised by his strong support for the suggestions which Jebb sent to London from across the English Channel. Indeed, the pro-European perspectives of Jebb and Hugh-Jones acted as a counterweight to the cautious scepticism of Hood, Hancock and Steel in the WOD correspondence on the ‘Grand Design’. Therefore, it can be argued that Jebb and Hugh-Jones provide crucial insights into the disputes which the WOD encountered as it formulated its foreign policy strategy towards Europe.

As it will become clear over the course of this chapter, these two ‘factions’ of officials appear to have been part of a wider discord in the Foreign Office over Britain’s place in the world, and the best strategy for maintaining her prestige. In order to fully comprehend the mindset of the Foreign Office official in 1957, it is essential to contextualise the overall state of British foreign affairs, and how this fed into their personal outlook. The following section will attempt to place the attitudes and mindset of this group in a broader context by examining the state of British foreign policy after the Suez Crisis, and whether or not the

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119 Wynn Hugh-Jones, Diplomacy to Politics: By Way of the Jungle (Spennymoor: Memoir Club, 2002), 3.
120 Ibid.
122 Ibid.
123 Ibid.
Crisis constituted a major shift in British foreign policy strategy, as well as in the psychology of Britain’s diplomatic elites.
At the end of 1956 and the beginning of 1957, the most dominant feature of British foreign policy was Colonel Nasser’s nationalisation of the Suez Canal and the events surrounding it. The Suez Crisis had far-reaching consequences for British foreign policy in the Middle East, her overall grand strategy, her relationship with the United States, and the psychology and attitudes of the top politicians and policymakers involved. It is often hailed as a ‘watershed’ in the history of the British Empire, and in British foreign policy. The true extent to which Suez altered the course of British political and diplomatic history is difficult to determine, but it was certainly a significant event in its own right. The Crisis permanently weakened Britain’s position in the Middle East by disillusioning the Arab states, leading to the collapse of the Baghdad Pact in 1958, which had bound Britain, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey together economically and politically. The damage to British prestige was so great that Arab nationalist movements began to directly challenge British authority in the region and anti-British sentiment became rife. In 1958, Iraqi revolutionaries toppled the pro-British King Faisal II and purposefully assassinated high profile members of the Iraqi government who were sympathetic to Britain. In the longer term, Suez set in motion an exodus and eventual disappearance of British power in the region, with the final knell ringing in 1968 when the Wilson government announced the ‘East of Suez’ withdrawal, much to the chagrin of the Americans who had relied on British support against communism in the Middle and Far East and still held out hope for some level of involvement in Vietnam from their old allies. In short, Suez can be considered a turning point for British foreign policy in the Middle East, and arguably nudged Britain’s attention towards Europe and the Common Market.

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with the political landscape a mere few decades earlier, when the Suez Canal was seen as the ‘vital imperial highway’ of the British Empire.\textsuperscript{128}

In addition, Suez is held as one of the most potentially damaging events in the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’, and one which subsequently altered Britain’s overall foreign policy strategy. Scholars such as White and Butler argue that the crisis forced the United States government to accept that ‘the age of colonial empires was drawing to a close’.\textsuperscript{129} However, whilst it was indeed a disaster for British prestige, as argued above, the evidence suggests that it was not necessarily reflective of a rift in Anglo-American relations. Louis has argued that American disdain for British imperialism was ‘always subordinate to the more urgent problem of anti-communism’.\textsuperscript{130} The Eisenhower administration was more fearful of the possibility that Eden’s direct military intervention would result in Middle Eastern nations being driven towards communism and the Soviet Union out of disillusionment with the West.\textsuperscript{131} Eisenhower continued to see the British Empire as an ‘essential’ ally, and that relations needed to be ‘rebuilt as soon as possible’.\textsuperscript{132} This sentiment was, of course, shared by the Macmillan government, which went to great lengths to repair the damage done by Suez.\textsuperscript{133} The Prime Minister immediately dispatched the future Permanent Under-Secretary Harold Caccia, a well-respected Foreign Office official with strong American connections through his wife, to heal the diplomatic wounds and resurrect Britain’s most valuable alliance.\textsuperscript{134} Thus, the British government’s response to Suez with regards to the United States did not signal a departure from the prioritisation of the ‘special relationship’. The successful renewal of this relationship can best be seen in the Anglo-American response to the Lebanese insurrection and the Iraqi revolution of 1958. Eisenhower had drawn the conclusion that the Iraqi revolution was a component of a


\textsuperscript{131} White, \textit{Decolonisation} (2014), 216.


Soviet-Nasserite plot designed to damage the West’s position in the region. United States marines were deployed in Beirut and British paratroopers were dropped into Amman to stabilise Jordan and Lebanon, which had also been stirred into unrest. Louis has described the joint intervention as ‘a measure of Macmillan’s success in restoring good will and trust between the British and American governments...and an equal measure of Eisenhower’s need for British collaboration’. However, it can be argued that Britain’s actions had deeper implications. It was a clear statement from the British government that it still considered the Anglo-American alliance to be one of the key components in Britain’s global foreign policy strategy, despite the damage and embarrassment caused by the Crisis.

Whilst Suez contrastingly marked a momentous shift in British foreign policy and prestige and a minor blip in Anglo-American relations, it can be argued that it represented a significant impact on the psychology of Britain’s diplomatic elites. Lyon’s assertion that Suez was a ‘major psychological watershed’ for the British establishment can be qualified by the evidence surrounding some of the Foreign Office’s most senior figures. The magnitude of the Suez Crisis’ effects on the department is due in part to the Eden government’s handling of the situation. With the exception of a few top officials and confidants, the Foreign Office was barely consulted on the decision to attack Nasser in coalition with France and Israel. This resulted in a level of malcontent in the ranks, with several officials threatening resignation and condemning the actions privately, notably Paul Gore-Booth, who at the time was Deputy Under-Secretary. The strong opposition to the scheme from the Foreign Office and the devastating political consequences it yielded rocked the department and permanently altered the officials’ perspective of Britain’s place in the world. Indeed, Hugo Young has argued that the coincidence of the Suez Crisis and the Treaty of Rome ‘raised the question of national identity as a predicament that has perhaps been experienced more acutely in Britain than in any other European nation.’

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137 Ibid.
141 Young, This Blessed Plot (1998), 99.
majority of senior Foreign Office officials and diplomats in 1956 belonged to a generation which had been brought up ‘with a world view that presented the British Empire as a natural and unchangeable fact.’\textsuperscript{142} Suez challenged and to a certain extent demolished this paradigm, showing that Britain was incapable of military intervention without severe political repercussions. This launched a foreign policy search for a ‘surrogate for empire’ and a new means of maintaining British power.\textsuperscript{143} In a minute drafted by Samuel Hood, it firmly stated that: ‘If we are to be a first class power...it can only be done in association with other countries.’\textsuperscript{144} This was a momentous departure from the pre-Suez orthodoxy in the post-war period, which was geared towards maintaining Britain’s status as an independent great power in the same tier as the United States and the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{145} The full acceptance that Britain was no longer one of the ‘Big Three’ had substantial repercussions for Foreign Office attitudes and British foreign policy.

From a social psychological point of view, Suez represented an ‘irreconcilable conflict’ for some officials in their psyches or a ‘cognitive dissonance’.\textsuperscript{146} This is what Allport defines as the primary cause of attitudinal change, which can be either immediate or gradual.\textsuperscript{147} A psychological rupture, caused by Britain’s ‘national humiliation’ in the aftermath of the Crisis, would have potentially created the conditions for attitudinal change in Britain’s socio-political elites regarding her position in the world.\textsuperscript{148} With specific reference to post-war Foreign Office officials and diplomats, however, Blackwell argues that ‘cognitive dissonance’ will not necessarily produce alterations in an individual’s attitudes or views, particularly when they are conditioned by institutions and networks.\textsuperscript{149} As mentioned in the introduction, Halloran has argued that attitudes which are reinforced by ‘group affiliations’ are exceptionally difficult to alter. Indeed, an individual may maintain a particular attitude which has been endorsed by the status quo to preserve their own position within a group or institution.\textsuperscript{150} It is therefore crucial to acknowledge that attitudinal change is not a simple process and cannot be framed in terms of ‘cause and effect’. This is particularly true

\textsuperscript{144} Samuel Hood, “The Grand Design”, 6 January 1957, TNA/FO371/130966/WU1072/2G.
\textsuperscript{149} \textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{150} J. D. Halloran, \textit{Attitude Formation and Change} (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1967), 60.
of Foreign Office officials, who were not only involved in complex foreign policymaking decisions where neutrality and objectivity were supposedly championed, but were for the most part also strongly attached to the collective identity reinforced by the department and the group attitudes this perpetuated.\textsuperscript{151} In addition, it must be noted that despite the high degree of social homogeneity in the diplomatic service, it was rarely a ‘united, self-conscious and self-interested social group.’\textsuperscript{152} Steiner has also argued this point, stating that the Foreign Office is dominated by separate personalities, ideas and interests which do not necessarily act in unison.\textsuperscript{153} This would have directly fed into British foreign policymaking, and the evidence paints a picture of disagreement as much as it does concurrence between officials on Britain’s approach to European integration. Despite the continued prioritisation of the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ and the maintenance of the department’s overriding ‘group attitude’, the Suez Crisis did force the Foreign Office to think more seriously about committing to the changing political landscape in Europe, which was a relatively significant policy shift in itself. As a result, Britain’s foreign policy strategy was constantly discussed and reassessed, with two clear ‘factions’ emerging; those in favour of Britain’s involvement in the movement for European unity and those who advocated a more cautious and conservative approach based on cooperation and intergovernmentalism. The ‘Grand Design’ was in keeping with this cautious and conservative approach; representing the British government’s response to the Treaty of Rome and a means of providing an ‘alternative Europe’ via institutional association. The ‘Grand Design’ was not necessarily intended to wrest control of the movement for European unity and cooperation from the Six, but it was certainly marketed as a complementary scheme.

Britain’s domestic political situation is also worth briefly discussing in order to ascertain the reasons behind the Foreign Office’s decision not to seek full membership of the EEC and instead construct an ‘associative’ relationship. Britain’s economic performance and standard of living still far outweighed that of the Six, and the overwhelming majority of her trade was still reliant on the Commonwealth: in the years 1952-4, it accounted for 47% of British imports and 48% of British exports.\textsuperscript{154} By comparison, only 12.6% of Britain’s imports

\textsuperscript{154} Gowland and Turner, \textit{Reluctant Europeans} (2000), 94.
and 19.6% of her exports came from and went to the Six respectively.\textsuperscript{155} Therefore, at this point in time there was little to suggest that the EEC would become the great success that it did a mere three years later, prompting Britain’s first application for membership. As such, there was little incentive for the British government or the Foreign Office to pursue membership of the Common Market, and this belief was reinforced by the firm conviction amongst the top officials that the EEC was primarily an economic venture, not a political one.\textsuperscript{156} This was indeed one of Sir Gladwyn Jebb’s main objections to the ‘party line’, as he recognised that the Six were seeking to establish a Community with strong political functions, and tried in vain to convince his colleagues that the question of European integration was loaded with political considerations.\textsuperscript{157} However, the orthodoxy of the upper echelons of Whitehall stood fast and remained opposed to supranationalism.\textsuperscript{158} In his correspondence with Jebb, for example, Hancock is insistent on a European Community developing ‘within the Atlantic Community’ yet at the same time urges British leadership of the proposed European Community, which strongly implies that he was in favour of Britain making a genuine political commitment to Europe, but believed that it was both in Britain and Europe’s best interests for it to be a subcomponent of the Atlantic Alliance.\textsuperscript{159} In short, the Foreign Office and, more specifically, Hood, Hancock and Steel, sought a British association with Europe which would be detached from the supranationalism of the EEC and supported by American and Canadian participation. Despite this, it can be contended that the ‘Grand Design’ was not a poorly constructed and half-hearted attempt to ‘get closer’ to Europe and the sincerity of the scheme can be observed in the archival evidence, but it was hampered by some of the top officials’ unyielding commitment to the Atlantic Alliance and the Commonwealth.

In conclusion, the Suez Crisis had varying degrees of impact on British foreign policy, Britain’s diplomatic relations, and the psychology of Foreign Office officials. The magnitude of the Crisis forced the Foreign Office to rethink Britain’s overall foreign policy strategy and

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\textsuperscript{155} Ibid.
paved the way for what was perceived by senior officials to be a more committed approach to Europe. As Ellison has argued, ‘Suez may not have led to acceptance of a European destiny for Britain, as it did in France, but the establishment of new Anglo-European links was an integral part of policy.’ However, the Foreign Office’s line was to continue to prioritise the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ at all costs, which was reflected in the ‘Grand Design’ and its conceptions of European unity, despite the dissenting voices of officials such as Jebb and Hugh-Jones. This was the background to Britain’s early years outside the Common Market, with the objectives of the British government diverging significantly from those of the Six. The profound differences in opinion for a united Europe eventually caused friction, and resulted in the ‘Grand Design’ being struck down by the Six and other European states from outside the EEC. With this context in mind, the main focus of the remainder of this chapter will consist of how the aforementioned group of officials constructed and reassessed the ‘Grand Design’ and how their personal views and experiences fed into the policymaking process, particularly in light of the overall picture of British foreign policy.

‘A European Community within the Atlantic Community’

On 5 January 1957, the Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd submitted a memorandum to the British Cabinet. The memorandum called for a ‘rationalisation’ of the European assemblies and the creation of a new Atlantic assembly, which would encompass all aspects of Western cooperation. The new assembly would replace the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Common Assembly of the ECSC, the WEU Assembly and the Conference of NATO Parliamentarians, with a special provision for the proposed EEC assembly should the Six choose to join, which suggested that the two bodies share the same location and secretariat. The assembly would be an intergovernmental, consultative body, coordinated by an ‘international steering group’ with five committees: defence, political, economic, social and cultural, and legal and administrative. Wolfram Kaiser has suggested that the ‘Grand Design’ was an attempt to sabotage the Six’s European integration efforts, whereas Young and Camps have argued that it was a genuine and sincere political initiative which aimed to bring Britain closer to Europe. This study strongly endorses the latter view. Even Gladwyn Jebb, who later came out in opposition to the plan, acknowledged that it was ‘an intelligent and indeed useful scheme’, albeit hampered by poor timing. The origins of the proposals are more difficult to ascertain; Ellison has argued that there is too much ambiguity to pinpoint them definitively, but Young suggests that they are an ‘improved version of the 1952 Eden Plan.’ Regardless, it can be argued with a degree of certainty that the ‘Grand Design’ was conceived not by the elected politicians in Cabinet, but by the Foreign Office, and more specifically, by the WOD. This view is shared by Ellison, who states that the Foreign Office ‘inspired the brief development in European policy under the Macmillan government.’ This claim can be corroborated by the evidence. The files on the ‘Grand Design’ show an extraordinary amount of revision and reassessment by officials before the plan ever reached the

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163 Ibid.
164 Ibid.
166 Ibid.
Cabinet. The WOD’s role in the forging of this policy was to ‘iron out’ some of the ideas proposed in the ‘Grand Design’ and tailor them into something which would be both acceptable to the Cabinet and the member states of the EEC. However, two of Britain’s most prominent ambassadors, Sir Christopher Steel and Sir Gladwyn Jebb, were also key players in the formulation of the policy. As such, the ‘Grand Design’ benefited from the insight of the British ambassadors to France and West Germany, whose expertise should have made the proposals more attractive to the two most important members of the Six. As shall be argued below, however, this was not necessarily the case as the personal views and convictions of the officials directly affected the policymaking process.

Firstly, it is crucial to understand what the Foreign Office’s objectives were with regards to European policy. Kane and Greenwood have argued that the Foreign Office’s overall attitude towards European integration was framed by the Cold War and defensive considerations. This certainly appears to have at least been the case for the senior officials in the WOD, including Hood and Hancock, who were adamant that Western Europe be united against the Soviet Union and the international threat of communism. This can be observed in the ‘Grand Design’ itself, which called for the eventual inclusion of the Eastern European states in the proposed assembly as a means of détente. Secondly, the Foreign Office’s ‘two-pronged’ approach to European integration separated the economic from the political, with the MAD becoming closely involved with the FTA negotiations and the WOD being saddled with the overarching political questions, which included devising a plan for an association between the UK and the Six via the rationalisation of the European intergovernmental institutions. This division of political and economic functions between the two departments, dictated by the belief that Britain could exempt itself from any loss of national sovereignty and involvement in supranational institutions whilst reaping the economic benefits of the Common Market proved to be a grave error. For the Europeanists in the ranks of the Foreign Office such as Jebb and Hugh-Jones, the most frustrating exercise was trying to convince the sceptics that the EEC was intended to be a powerful

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174 Ibid.
175 Kane, “European or Atlantic Community?” (1997), 83.
political bloc and not simply a customs union. In addition, the WOD’s top brass considered the maintenance of Britain’s ‘special relationship’ with the United States to be the absolute priority, and refused to consider anything which could potentially jeopardise it, particularly after the devastation of the Suez Crisis. The effect of Suez on British foreign policy was of such magnitude that an element of ‘paranoia’ entered the policymaking process. Suggestions that Britain’s political association with Europe could be considered a ‘third force’ between the two superpowers, and perhaps provide ‘friendly rivalry’ to the United States were swiftly struck from the ‘Grand Design’ and emphasis was instead placed on the wider framework of the Atlantic Alliance in order to quash implications of Western European neutralism or separatism in the ‘special relationship’. The Cabinet also vehemently rejected any reference to cooperation with Europe on thermonuclear weapons and research from the first edition of the document on similar grounds: there were fears that such a radical proposal could antagonise the Americans, who were still Britain’s main partners in nuclear collaboration, and the main source of the uranium needed for her civil atomic programme. In summary, the WOD’s chief concerns with regards to European integration were containment of the Eastern bloc, preservation of the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’, and a desire to participate in the movement for European unity without submitting to supranationalism. These objectives would frame the intradepartmental debates on Europe and became the source of conflict and friction within the group of actors identified for this study.

After much reassessment and editing, the second edition of the ‘Grand Design’ met with Cabinet approval – the proposals for nuclear collaboration and implications of an independent Western European bloc had been axed and the Foreign Office were ready to put the plans to the Europeans. However, this did not halt the advance of the diplomatic service’s dissenting voices. After the circulation of the new edition, Jebb wrote to Hood and offered a damning critique of the WOD’s attitudes and concerns. Jebb attacked what he perceived as the single-mindedness of those who were opposed to ideas of a ‘third force’ on the grounds that it would damage links with the United States and Commonwealth, arguing that this view was borne from outdated delusions of imperial grandeur, and a

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177 Samuel Hood, “Cabinet Paper: The United Kingdom and Europe”, 29 January 1957, TNA/FO371/130966/WU1072/34.
178 Ibid.
179 Ibid; Roger Makins to Harold Macmillan, 8 January 1957, TNA/TS225/714.
belief that the ‘third force...should be the United Kingdom with her Commonwealth and Empire’. Jebb also drew on the dominance of Anglo-American relations in British foreign policy, acknowledging its importance but stressing that ‘alliance with America is one thing; complete dependence is surely another.’ This was quite a departure from the Atlanticist orthodoxy of the day. Jebb’s perspective was highly conditioned by the lens of the Suez Crisis, and he indeed makes reference to the merits of a foreign policy strategy independent of the United States; something which he believed could be achieved through European unity. Furthermore, and perhaps more significantly, Jebb warned Hood that the ‘two-pronged’ approach was inadequate, and that the FTA could not achieve true European unity through the OEEC, an organisation which, in Jebb’s words, moved at ‘the pace of the slowest member.’ The ambassador hinted that the separation of political and economic issues in Britain’s approach to European integration was a ‘mistake’, and that no agreement would be reached on rationalisation of the institutions before the EEC and the FTA had been fully established. This point is of particular interest for this study. One of the most frequent criticisms of the ‘Grand Design’ in the scholarship is its poor timing, given the imminent completion of the EEC negotiations and the signing of the Treaty of Rome, which aroused the suspicions of the Six.

The rationale behind the timing of the announcement of the plan must be carefully considered. It is highly unlikely that the British government intended to deliberately irritate and alienate the Six, and equally unlikely that they were blissfully unaware that such an act would antagonise the European states – this possibility had been mentioned in a minute drafted by Hugh-Jones. Ellison has advanced the theory that the ‘Grand Design’ was in large part a knee-jerk response to Suez, and a means of currying favour with the United States, who strongly endorsed European integration. This study does not contest this argument, and the evidence certainly suggests that the spectre of the Crisis loomed in the forefront of the British government ministers’ and officials’ minds. However, there was a genuine desire on the part of the Foreign Office and the government to either directly participate in the movement for European unity, which they had hitherto done so with

182 Ibid.
183 Ibid.
184 Ibid.
186 Wynn Hugh-Jones to Patrick Hancock, 7 January 1957, TNA/FO371/130966/WU1072/2G.
reluctance and scepticism, or gain the political leadership of Europe. In both cases, a willingness to engage in European integration is betrayed, and this can be observed in the ‘Grand Design’ itself, with Hood stating: ‘there is a great opportunity for the UK to give a lead in Europe’. There is a strong possibility that this could have been the motive for announcing the ‘Grand Design’, and fears in the Foreign Office that Britain was potentially being ‘left behind’ by the Continent did exist, albeit to a small extent. Moreover, the timing of the announcement reveals a great deal about the mindset of the senior officials and their attitudes towards Europe. Despite Jebb’s warnings that the EEC was very much a political association, Hood and Hancock were convinced that the ‘Grand Design’ could be achieved in isolation from what they perceived to be largely economic developments in Europe. The Foreign Office’s administrative separation of political and economic integration efforts in Europe was one of the biggest sticking points for the ‘Europeanists’ in the department. Jebb and Hugh-Jones were diametrically opposed to the strategy, but they were in a minority. Hood and Hancock’s convictions were also reinforced by reports from Steel in Bonn and Sir Hugh Ellis-Rees, the British representative to the OEEC in Paris, the latter assuring his colleagues that the ‘Grand Design is the only hope for the well-ordered development of the unification of Europe’. Indeed, at this stage much of the Foreign Office’s upper ranks were dubious that the Six’s initiative would ever come to fruition. Gowland and Turner report that the new Permanent Under-Secretary, Sir Frederick Hoyer-Millar, remained ‘sceptical’ for the entirety of his career, whereas his predecessor Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick was even more scathing of Britain’s continental counterparts: ‘the French will never allow a common market. Fancy the French wine-growers allowing any French government to agree.’ Confident that the ‘Grand Design’ was a sound and acceptable plan, the WOD put the proposals to the Council of the WEU on 26 February. The decision to choose the WEU Council as the first institution to test the proposals was a calculated one. The WOD realised that in order to gain the support of the ‘uncommitted’

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188 Samuel Hood, “Cabinet Paper: The United Kingdom and Europe”, 29 January 1957, TNA/FO371/130966/WU1072/34.
189 See: Young, This Blessed Plot (1998), 100; Roy Denman, interviewed by Malcolm McBain 4 May 1999, CCC/BDOHP/61/3.
191 Christopher Steel to Samuel Hood, 2 January 1957, TNA/FO371/130966/WU1072/1; Hugh Ellis-Rees to Paul Gore-Booth, 21 February 1957, TNA/FO371/130967/WU1072/51.
192 Kane, “European or Atlantic Community?” (1997), 87; Gowland and Turner, Reluctant Europeans (2000), 121.
European nations, they would have to win over the Six, who were still regarded as the ‘nucleus’ of European unity.\textsuperscript{194} The WEU Council was well-suited to this ‘testing of the waters’, as the only members were the UK and the Six.\textsuperscript{195} In a bid to increase the appeal of the ‘Grand Design’, Hood, who was also Permanent Representative to the WEU Council, reportedly downplayed references to the Atlantic Alliance and instead placed ‘more emphasis on [the ‘Grand Design’] being for Europe’, despite arguing in private that American and Canadian participation was fundamental to the plans.\textsuperscript{196} In the drafting of the proposals, Hood convinced the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, David Ormsby-Gore, that ‘neither European defence nor European cooperation can be realistically discussed without the Americans.’\textsuperscript{197} This reveals that Hood was fully aware of European sensitivities surrounding integration, and was prepared to ‘gloss over’ the Atlanticist objectives of the ‘Grand Design’ in order to gain the approval of the Six.

Robertson has argued that many European states, particularly the Six, believed European integration to be ‘an independent necessity’, separate from the wider Atlantic Alliance.\textsuperscript{198} This overriding attitude towards American and Canadian involvement explains Hood’s actions in the WEU Council. Indeed, as part of this strategy, Britain’s Permanent Representative to the Council of Europe was ordered to ‘keep the wolves at bay’ and ‘damp...down’ discussion of the ‘Grand Design’ to prevent the ‘uncommitted’ European countries from potentially scrutinising and criticising the proposals too heavily.\textsuperscript{199} The paper which Hood presented to the WEU Council contained strong condemnation of the current state of European assemblies, stating the system had brought ‘the idea of international parliamentary association into disrepute.’\textsuperscript{200} Ellison has argued that in this regard, the ‘Grand Design’ was ‘a thoroughly undiplomatic attempt’ by the Foreign Office to contribute to the European integration movement by undermining the current system through disparaging statements.\textsuperscript{201} This is an argument which this study strongly endorses. Nevertheless, the proposals were successfully tabled for discussion, and the WEU Council

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194 Wynn Hugh-Jones to Gerald Meade, 13 March 1957, TNA/FO371/130967/WU1072/57. \\
196 Samuel Hood to John Coulson, 11 March 1957, TNA/FO371/130967/WU1072/65; Wynn Hugh-Jones to Gerald Meade, 13 March 1957, TNA/FO371/130967/WU1072/57. \\
197 Samuel Hood to David Ormsby-Gore, 25 February 1957, TNA/FO371/130968/WU1072/80A. \\
198 Robertson, \textit{The Council of Europe} (1961), 105. \\
199 Wynn Hugh-Jones to Gerald Meade, 13 March 1957, TNA/FO371/130967/WU1072/57. \\
200 "Scheme for a General Parliamentary Assembly for Europe", 22 February 1957, TNA/FO371/130967/WU1072/59A. \\
\end{flushright}
agreed to ‘embark on an urgent study of the closer association and possible unification of European assemblies.’\textsuperscript{202}

In the meantime, the WOD sought to court American and Canadian support and participation in the ‘Grand Design’. Hood and Hancock’s pro-American and pro-Commonwealth sympathies ran deep, and their correspondence with Washington reveals a great deal about their psychological outlook on European integration. Hood met with representatives from the American embassy in London, where he went to great lengths to reassure the State Department that the British government had no intention of undermining or duplicating NATO’s functions, and that NATO would retain ‘primacy...in the military and political fields’ which was the United States government’s primary concern.\textsuperscript{203} Hood also argued that Britain’s initiative was designed to complement the EEC, and that the British government were not hostile to the Six’s goals ‘as such’.\textsuperscript{204} These promises were likely made as part of Britain’s strategy to smooth over strained Anglo-American relations after the Suez Crisis, but also to demonstrate British sincerity and commitment to the European integration effort, something which the United States government strongly supported.\textsuperscript{205} In conjunction with his talks with American officials, Hood discussed the government’s strategy with the British embassy in Washington, which offers even greater insight into the WOD’s intentions. In a telegram to John Coulson, the minister of the embassy, Hood mentioned that it was the aim of the Foreign Office to have the United States and Canada ‘in from the outset’, despite acknowledging that the proposed assembly was marketed as being ‘for Europe’.\textsuperscript{206} Moreover, Hood directed Coulson to allay American concerns over Britain’s suggestions for greater cooperation in armament research and development with the Six in the WEU Council, arguing that such cooperation would be strictly ‘within the limits of our special obligations to the USA’, and that such a move was merely a diplomatic gesture of goodwill rather than anything concrete.\textsuperscript{207} The WOD’s communications with Canada reinforce the view that British foreign policy towards Europe was framed by Atlanticist and Commonwealth sympathies. In meetings with the Canadian

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\item \textsuperscript{202} Samuel Hood to Gerald Meade, “Suggested draft statement to be made by the UK Permanent Representative to the Council of Europe”, 5 March 1957, TNA/FO371/130967/WU1072/58.
\item \textsuperscript{203} Samuel Hood to Western Organisations Department, “Grand Design”, 13 March 1957, TNA/FO371/130967/WU1072/68; Samuel Hood, “Memorandum”, 14 March 1957, TNA/FO371/130968A.
\item \textsuperscript{204} Samuel Hood to Western Organisations Department “Grand Design”, 13 March 1957, TNA/FO371/130967/WU1072/68.
\item \textsuperscript{205} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{206} Samuel Hood to John Coulson, 11 March 1957, TNA/FO371/130967/WU1072/65.
\item \textsuperscript{207} Ibid.
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High Commissioner, Hugh-Jones reported that the Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) invited the Canadians to join the British scheme ‘as fully as possible from the outset’, despite Canadian reservations that the ‘Grand Design’ had placed too much emphasis on the plans being for ‘Europe’ as opposed to the Atlantic community. Hugh-Jones was instructed to curb these concerns by assuring the High Commissioner that the Canadian government would have the opportunity to evaluate the plans and offer their own suggestions. This is of particular interest due to the fact that Canada and the United States were the only countries outside of the WEU Council who had been extended the courtesy of discussing the ‘Grand Design’ before its introduction to the Council of Europe, and were both granted a further opportunity to review the plans at the Bermuda Conference on 21-23 March 1957. As such, the British government were effectively lavishing ‘special treatment’ on their Anglophone allies whilst the ‘uncommitted’ European states were forced to wait.

The above evidence suggests, as argued previously, that Hood and the WOD deliberately downplayed the Atlanticist objectives of the ‘Grand Design’ to the Six whilst simultaneously trying to foster American and Canadian support for the plans. This strategy of acting as a ‘middle man’ or ‘bridge’ between North America and Western Europe was very much in keeping with the Churchillian ‘three circles’ orthodoxy of the late 1950s and early 1960s Foreign Office, and Hood’s personal world view was undoubtedly shaped by this doctrine. As such, Hood was utterly convinced that any European community had to be developed ‘within the Atlantic community’, a point argued by his colleague Hancock. Conversely, the ‘Europeanists’ attempted to argue the case that the Six would be reluctant to accept North American involvement, which can be observed in some of Hugh-Jones’ correspondence. In Hugh-Jones’ case, the scrutiny of the evidence must be especially rigorous – as a middle-ranking official, Hugh-Jones was professionally obliged to ‘tow the party line’ and not cause too much disagreement or disruption, something he himself

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209 Ibid.
acknowledged in an interview. Therefore, the content of much of his correspondence does not necessarily contain explicit statements of dissent, but the tone and language used suggest a different attitude towards British foreign policy and the WOD’s objectives than his superiors. For example, when writing to the UK Permanent Representative to the Council of Europe, Gerald Meade, about the developments in the WEU Council with regards to the ‘Grand Design’, Hugh-Jones is noticeably pessimistic in tone. He argued that despite the Council agreeing to study the closer association and rationalisation of the European assemblies, Britain’s negotiating position with the ‘uncommitted’ European nations and the United States and Canada was ‘not strong’. Hugh-Jones instead placed greater emphasis on the necessity of ‘carrying the Six’ and the ‘possibility of the Customs Union…retaining its special powers and identity’ even after the ‘Grand Design’ was put into practice. Hugh-Jones also vigorously defended the use of the term ‘European community’ when sceptics argued in favour of different, less ‘extreme’ wording when discussing the ‘Grand Design’ with the Six, arguing that the approval of the Six was the single most important factor in the potential success of the British plans. This view contrasted markedly with Hood and Hancock’s firm conviction that American and Canadian participation was the vital component. In light of Hugh-Jones’ pro-Common Market views, it is clear that he was advocating a closer association between Britain and the EEC, instead of what he perceived as an overreliance on the ‘special relationship’ and the Commonwealth, something which he dismissed as ‘pie-in-the-sky’ and outdated.

Hugh-Jones’ arguments were reinforced by Jebb, who sent a telegram to Hood as soon as he received a copy of the paper submitted to the WEU Council. However, as a senior diplomat who carried some weight in the Foreign Office, Jebb made his criticisms of the scheme more overt and vocal than Hugh-Jones. Firstly, Jebb stated that the proposed assembly was inadequate given its purely consultative functions, and that it would not stimulate much interest from the Six. Secondly, the ambassador painted a bleak picture for Britain’s future prospects in international diplomacy should she continue to remain opposed to the principles of the EEC: ‘the UK will be gradually forced out of Europe and

214 Wynn Hugh-Jones to Gerald Meade, 13 March 1957, TNA/FO371/130967/WU1072/57.
215 Ibid.
pushed towards the United States, in whose eyes she will, I fear, come increasingly to represent a small client and poor relation.”

Jebb also expressed his scepticism over American enthusiasm for the ‘Grand Design’, arguing that the United States government’s primary objectives were the preservation of NATO as the heart of Atlantic cooperation, and the ‘far reaching integration of the Messina Six’, which they strongly supported. By highlighting these points, not only did Jebb provide a damning critique of British foreign policy and the Foreign Office’s prioritisation of Anglo-American relations, he also suggested that Britain’s current trajectory would result in an enormous loss of prestige and global standing; something which the most senior officials such as Hood and Hancock were specifically trying to prevent. Thirdly, and perhaps more radically, Jebb called for a change in the ‘Grand Design’ which he believed could result in the British government taking the leadership of the European integration movement at the expense of the ‘federalists’. Jebb advocated for the creation of a ‘European Committee of Ministers’ alongside the proposed ‘General Assembly’, which would have supranational functions and a system of weighted voting. This suggests two things about Jebb’s views: he was not necessarily opposed to the ‘Grand Design’ but believed it was not far-reaching enough, and that British participation in a supranational union was an inevitability which the Foreign Office needed to adjust to. As such, Jebb’s fourth point is particularly insightful. The ambassador stressed to his colleagues yet again that ‘the Six are...on their way to forming a “political union”’ which Britain had to associate with on some level, and that the Foreign Office’s separation of political and economic issues in its approach to Europe was an inadequate foreign policy strategy. Therefore, this group of actors represented a wider conflict in the Foreign Office over Britain’s policy on European integration. Jebb and Hugh-Jones were more sympathetic towards the Six’s endeavours for a supranational union and believed that the time was ripe for a reorientation of British diplomatic interests away from the ‘special relationship’ and the Commonwealth, whereas Hood, Hancock and Steel were in favour of an ‘alternative’ Europe, firmly rooted in the wider ‘Atlantic community’ and intergovernmental cooperation. Above all, however, there was a fundamental disagreement between the two factions on whether or not the Foreign Office should

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219 Ibid.  
220 Ibid.  
221 Ibid.  
222 Ibid.  
223 Ibid.
pursue a ‘two-pronged’ approach to European integration by separating political and economic association efforts into two different schemes and departments.

The initial reaction of the Six and other European states to the ‘Grand Design’ was defined at best by uncertainty and ambivalence and at worst by hostility and criticism. The Italian government were the first to express their opposition to the plans after a meeting with the British ambassador, Sir Ashley Clarke, where officials and ministers argued that the ‘Grand Design’ had ‘too Atlantic a flavour’. Italian opposition would prove to be detrimental to the Foreign Office’s European integration strategy, as will be discussed in greater detail below. A couple of days later, Konrad Adenauer, the Chancellor of West Germany, expressed his uneasiness towards the British proposals, stating:

...the member states of the Common Market could not accept a situation where those countries not concerned with the Common Market, or who had no direct interest in it, or who were perhaps even unfriendly towards it, might be able to overrule them in parliamentary institutions.

Sir Christopher Steel’s dispatch to the Foreign Office on Adenauer’s press conference did not declare any opinions on the attitude of the West German government as it was merely a brief, factual report on the Chancellor’s comments, but the telegram is certainly pessimistic in tone. Adenauer’s reference to states who were ‘unfriendly’ to the Common Market is rather vague, but it can be argued with a degree of certainty that this was a subtle reference to the British government, whose ‘Grand Design’ was perceived as antagonistic at a time when the EEC negotiations were nearing completion. In addition to his telegram to the Foreign Office, Steel wrote to Hood personally, urging him to persuade Selwyn Lloyd to write to the West German Foreign Minister, Heinrich von Brentano, in a bid to clear up any misunderstandings over the ‘Grand Design’ and to give Steel a tour d’horizon with von Brentano which the ambassador could use in order to create an atmosphere of goodwill and amiability following Adenauer’s press conference. Steel’s attitude towards European integration and the West German government is quite apparent in his correspondence, as he warns Hood that the ‘whole fuss...about the Grand Design is

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227 Christopher Steel to Samuel Hood, 8 April 1957, TNA/FO371/130970/WU1072/134.
certainly inspired by the Chancellor’s entourage, who are interested now almost exclusively in the ratification of the Rome Treaties.”

Steel also reported that sections of the Bundestag possessed a ‘peculiar devotion’ to the Council of Europe, which would prove problematic for the British proposals if they put pressure on the government to reject the ‘Grand Design’. Steel’s opposition to the Common Market is evidenced in his dismissal of what he perceived to be the pro-EEC members of Adenauer’s retinue stirring an unnecessary ‘fuss’. However, the ambassador’s wholehearted support for the ‘Grand Design’ and its proposed abolition of the Council of Europe is also shown, which suggests that Steel was sceptical of attempts to forge European unity through institutions which were not firmly rooted in the wider Atlantic Community.

This attitude of the West German government did not bode well for the discussion of the proposals at the next meeting of the WEU Council, which was scheduled for 10 April. Indeed, reports from the Foreign Office on the proceedings painted an uncertain picture. In addition to the ‘Grand Design’, the Council was presented with an alternative proposal from the Italian delegation, as well as a Dutch ‘questionnaire’ designed to ascertain the attitudes of the WEU member states towards rationalisation. The French and the Belgians opposed any further alteration of the European assemblies, whereas the Germans pledged to seriously consider the plans on the condition that the Six-Power Assembly be excluded, which dented British hopes that the EEC would eventually associate with the proposed Atlantic assembly. During the discussions in the WEU Council, Frederick Hoyer-Millar received reports of stirrings of French suspicion regarding the British embassy in Paris’ activities. Hoyer-Millar was forced to write to Jebb in order to inform him that ‘more than one source’ had suggested that the ambassador was actively trying to sabotage the Common Market by attempting to prevent its ratification in the French Parliament through his connections with French politicians. To make matters worse, the foreign diplomats and politicians who had raised their concerns over Jebb’s alleged actions had assumed that he was acting on instructions from London. From a diplomatic perspective, this was a disastrous development for the British government. The accuracy of the rumours was of little relevance; the fact remained that suspicions had been aroused and as a result the

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228 Ibid.
229 Ibid.
231 Ibid.
233 Ibid.
‘Grand Design’s’ appeal had been tainted. Jeff countered and condemned the rumours in
a reply to Hoyer-Millar, who had also expressed severe doubts over the validity of the
accusations given Jeff’s well-known pro-European sympathies. However, the damage to
Britain’s standing had been done and the fallout soon became apparent. Four days after
the discussions had opened, the British plans were dealt a blow when France and the
Benelux countries declared their support for the Italian proposals, albeit with minor
reservations. The Italians successfully argued in the WEU Council that the British
government’s proposed abolition of the Council of Europe was unachievable and would be
unacceptable to the parliamentarians in the member states’ legislatures, and that North
American participation would alienate the ‘neutral’ European countries.

Following the setbacks suffered in the WEU Council, a brief was sent to the UK Permanent
Representative to the Council of Europe to offer direction on the line to take at the next
meeting of the Committee of Ministers. As argued previously, the Foreign Office appear
to have been adamant that plans for the rationalisation of the European assemblies be
deliberated and decided upon in the WEU Council before any consultation with the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe:

...we would prefer there to be no decisions either of substance or procedure. We
should particularly wish to avoid the Committee of Ministers embarking on its own
study of the rationalisation of European assemblies. We want if possible to keep
this study in the hands of the WEU...It would be fatal to our scheme if this study
were transferred to Strasbourg.

The reasons for the Foreign Office’s apprehension over the Grand Design’s reception in the
Council of Europe, as argued above, stemmed from their very real concern that the
‘neutral’ Europeans would be quick to reject any plans which did not have the approval of
the Six or were perceived to be sodden with Atlanticism. Another principal concern was the
Council of Europe’s Acting Secretary-General, Dunstan Curtis, and his pro-European
convictions. Curtis was a British ex-lawyer and one of the main architects of the Council of

235 “Grand Design: One Assembly”, 17 April 1957, TNA/FO371/130969/WU1072/138; Robertson, The
Council of Europe (1961), 103.
237 “Council of Europe Brief: 20th Session of the Committee of Ministers in Strasbourg”, 29 April 1957,
TNA/FO371/130970/WU1072/145.
238 Ibid.
Europe. As an outspoken proponent of European integration, he was a source of much irritation to the Foreign Office, particularly because of his previous employment in the diplomatic service at the British embassy in Paris. In the previous meeting of the Committee of Ministers, Curtis submitted a document advocating an exchange of views between the Committee, the WEU Council and the Brussels intergovernmental conference, with a view to the Secretariats of all three issuing a joint paper on the rationalisation of European institutions. In addition, he drew up plans for an amalgamation of the OEEC and the Council of Europe, or the closest possible association, taking into account the different memberships of the two bodies. Curtis’ plans included transferring the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe to Paris and the provision of international parliamentary supervision for the OEEC’s activities, including the FTA negotiations. This move sent alarm bells ringing in Whitehall, who considered it a matter for national governments, and resented Curtis’ attempts to wrest the leadership of the rationalisation movement from the British government. One particular point of contention was that the proposed OEEC-Council of Europe merger was too narrow as it did not address the need for rationalisation across all of the European institutions. Even more unsettling, however, was the possibility of the Secretariat of the Council of Europe having control over the FTA negotiations in the OEEC, which would jeopardise both of the British government’s ‘prongs’ in their approach to European cooperation.

As a means of stalling Curtis and his plans, the brief expressed the hope that the meeting of the Committee of Ministers would be dominated by the WEU member states, who would argue that negotiations in the WEU Council on proposals for rationalisation were ongoing, and that the Council of Europe should therefore wait until a report was produced by the former. The Foreign Office’s chief tactic, therefore, was to play for time for the WEU Council whilst simultaneously promoting the ‘Grand Design’ in the Council of Europe. This tactic did not prove effective. In a report from the meeting of the Committee of Ministers, it was revealed that the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe,

240 Ibid.
241 Ibid.
242 Ibid.
243 Ibid.
244 Ibid.
245 Ibid.
246 Ibid.
Fernand Dehousse, argued that it was unreasonable and inadequate that the British and Italian plans for rationalisation were only being reviewed in the WEU Council, given that the Council of Europe ‘included the largest number of countries concerned’. The exclusivity of the WEU Council’s study also drew criticism from other prominent European statesmen, including Paul-Henri Spaak, who stated that the procedures in the WEU Council were ‘unacceptable’ to many of the non-WEU states such as Sweden, Turkey and Greece. This view was shared by the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Halvard Lange, who warned the Committee of a ‘crystallisation’ of the proposals in the WEU Council before the OEEC or the Council of Europe had been consulted. The Committee’s criticisms were not confined to the discussion of the plans; the substance of the ‘Grand Design’ was also subjected to scrutiny. The Italian delegation highlighted the fundamental differences between the British and Italian proposals, reminding the members that the ‘Grand Design’ would not include the Six-Power Assembly, which in the eyes of the ‘neutrals’, significantly lessened the appeal of the British plans.

The Foreign Office officials began to respond to these changing circumstances as the plans were discussed in the WEU and Council of Europe, revealing a high degree of attitudinal resilience. Sir Gladwyn Jebb took a particularly firm line in a letter to the Foreign Secretary, where he reiterated his view that the Common Market had ‘far greater political than economic significance’. This was a continuation of Jebb’s criticism of the Foreign Office’s ‘two-pronged’ approach to European integration, and what he perceived as an overemphasis on Atlanticism and defence objectives, a paradigm he argued was ‘unduly thwarting...the European movement’. Jebb also denounced what he perceived to be the Foreign Office’s unrealistic and romanticised vision for Britain and the Commonwealth to be the ‘third force’ after the United States and the Soviet Union as opposed to a united Europe, a strategy which the Foreign Office had been relentlessly pursuing since 1945. The ambassador questioned the feasibility of such a strategy, arguing to Selwyn Lloyd that a close association of Britain and its Commonwealth and a maintenance of an Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ would not develop Britain’s position as an independent

247 Sydney Cambridge to Wynn Hugh-Jones, 30 April 1957, TNA/FO371/130970/WU1072/150.
248 Ibid.
249 Ibid.
250 Ibid.
251 Gladwyn Jebb to Selwyn Lloyd, “The United Kingdom and the Western World”, 27 April 1957, TNA/FO371/130970/WU1071/156.
252 Ibid.
power, but would instead result in her being relegated to a mere ‘dependency of America – a sort of glorified 49th state.’\(^{254}\) Of course, the majority of Jebb’s points had been made in earlier correspondence, and in many ways, this letter to the Foreign Secretary can be classified as an exercise in reaffirmation. This reinforces the view that Jebb’s pro-European sympathies were deeply held, in that the constant reiteration of his convictions in the face of departmental adversity was unlikely to precipitate any major paradigmatic shifts in policymaking, and yet he continuously attempted to win over hearts and minds despite being aware of Whitehall’s reluctance to confront his question préalable that the British government would either have to enter Europe or withdraw completely.\(^{255}\) He warned Lloyd and the Foreign Office that any collapse or failure of the EEC would have grave consequences not just for Western Europe but also for British strategic interests, in that the ‘bulwark’ against the Eastern bloc would be permanently weakened.\(^{256}\)

It was in his concluding remarks, however, that Jebb advanced his most radical proposal to date: ‘we should concentrate on how best we can...lead “Europe” from within.’\(^{257}\) This was a significant departure from Jebb’s earlier comments, and represented a bold decision to advocate a policy against the status quo; one which would certainly provoke highly emotional debate. In this statement, Jebb heavily implied that the ‘Grand Design’ was completely inadequate, as it was still an attempt to control Europe with ‘one foot in the door’, and that the only viable alternative was to join the EEC and use Britain’s influence and prestige to direct the Common Market and make it more compatible with British interests. Jebb’s letter to Lloyd caused a stir in the Foreign Office and attracted comments from a number of officials, including Wynn Hugh-Jones, who was quick to voice his cautious support on a couple of issues. Hugh-Jones strove to maintain an objective tone and did indeed dispute Jebb’s assertion that the UK would at some point be forced to join Euratom, but his pro-European sympathies can be detected elsewhere.\(^{258}\) He stated that the British government would find it ‘very difficult to resist being drawn into a European Council of Ministers with effective political authority.’\(^{259}\) By arguing this point, Hugh-Jones had effectively conceded that British membership of a supranational European institution was

\(^{254}\) Gladwyn Jebb to Selwyn Lloyd, “The United Kingdom and the Western World”, 27 April 1957, TNA/FO371/130970/WU1071/156.


\(^{256}\) Gladwyn Jebb to Selwyn Lloyd, “The United Kingdom and the Western World”, 27 April 1957, TNA/FO371/130970/WU1071/156.

\(^{257}\) Ibid.

\(^{258}\) Wynn Hugh-Jones, “Minute”, 8 May 1957, TNA/FO371/130970/WU1071/156.

\(^{259}\) Ibid.
an inevitability, which suggested that the ‘Grand Design’ and the proposed FTA were futile exercises, as both were specifically designed to curb the rise of supranationalism by allowing Britain to associate with European states on an intergovernmental basis. Jebb and Hugh-Jones’ more overt support for British participation in European integration and supranationalism appears to have stemmed in large part from the ‘Grand Design’s’ lack of progress in the WEU and the Council of Europe. The Six’s firm resolution that the ‘Grand Design’ not include the EEC Assembly would have dented British hopes of closely binding the European Community to the Atlantic Community, which in turn may have encouraged Europeanists such as Jebb and Hugh-Jones to urge the Foreign Office to pursue an alternative course of action.

In addition to Hugh-Jones’ comments, Jebb’s letter received a cool response from the MAD, which was handling the FTA negotiations. Alan Edden, the Head of the department, was particularly scathing about Jebb’s suggestion that Britain consider joining the Common Market: ‘We do not like all aspects of the proposed Customs Union. Still less do we like it irrespective of whether we can get a Free Trade Area.’ The main thrust of Edden’s argument, however, was that Jebb’s thoughts were in line with the Foreign Office’s current position, and that he was ‘preaching to the converted’. Edden did not recognise the fundamental differences between the institutional orthodoxy of the day and Jebb’s attitudes towards Europe, and seemingly argued that the British government was just as committed to the European integration effort as the governments of the Six. As well as Edden’s thoughts on European integration in general, his comments on specifics such as agriculture and tariffs on foodstuffs are particularly revealing about the attitudes of many of the Foreign Office’s senior officials. Edden asserted that the British government could not entertain the possibility of conceding the Commonwealth preference system as a result of EEC membership, citing Britain’s special ‘difficulties’ with Commonwealth trade. As such, Edden argued that any tariff reductions made as a result of the creation of the FTA or association with the Common Market would have to have safeguards in place to protect British trade interests. Not only does this reinforce the argument that the majority of the Foreign Office’s top policymakers were in favour of an ‘alternative’ Europe where Britain would reap the economic benefits whilst exempting itself from any commitment to supranationalism, but Edden’s correspondence also arguably demonstrates an emotional

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261 Ibid.
262 Ibid.
attachment to the Commonwealth, and Britain’s historic links with her former Empire. The preservation of Commonwealth ties was very much in line with the most senior policymakers’ views – the Permanent Under-Secretary expressed his explicit disappointment on the French government’s insistence that the EEC tariff scheme include overseas territories.\footnote{Frederick Hoyer-Millar to Gladwyn Jebb, 18 April 1957, TNA/FO371/130971/WU1072/161.}

This conservative outlook on British foreign policy can also be found in comments made by Hood on a forthcoming meeting between Harold Macmillan and Konrad Adenauer. Following the ‘Grand Design’s’ lukewarm reception in the WEU and the Council of Europe amidst various allegations of British opposition to or sabotage of the Six’s plans, the Prime Minister insisted on a meeting with the Chancellor in order to resolve any misunderstandings over Britain’s attitude towards European integration.\footnote{John Bushell, “Prime Minister’s Visit to Bonn”, 30 April 1957, TNA/FO371/130971/WU1072/170.} In a preliminary meeting with German embassy officials in London, John Bushell, the Assistant Head of the WOD, was warned that the West German government were not in favour of the British plans for developing European integration as a subcomponent of Atlantic integration.\footnote{Ibid.}

This led Bushell to advise his superiors to ‘emphasise the stress the Prime Minister must lay on our very real desire to assist European unity.’\footnote{Samuel Hood, comments on John Bushell, “Prime Minister’s Visit to Bonn”, 30 April 1957, TNA/FO371/130971/WU1072/170.} Hood commented at the bottom of the minute: ‘Yes, but NOT at the expense of our North American connections’, a sentiment which Hoyer-Millar shared, adding ‘Exactly.’\footnote{Frederick Hoyer-Millar, comments on John Bushell, “Prime Minister’s Visit to Bonn”, 30 April 1957, TNA/FO371/130971/WU1072/170.} This evidence provides conclusive proof that the upper echelons of the Foreign Office continued to regard the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ as an immutable and absolute priority which would not be challenged by the changing political landscape in Europe. More significant, perhaps, is the fact that this is a clear indication of both the strong influence officials had on broader issues of British foreign policy and the fundamentality of their personal convictions in the policymaking process. Here it can be observed that Hood and Hoyer-Millar were not merely dealing with day-to-day specifics, but with substantial, overarching questions on Britain’s place in the world and the future of its relationships with the ‘three circles’, and engaging with such questions on highly personal terms, reflecting their own deeply-held views and beliefs.
The response of the European states to the ‘Grand Design’ in the WEU and the Council of Europe was a severe setback for the WOD, and as events unfolded the leadership for institutional rationalisation gradually slid away from the British government. In early May 1957, the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted their own resolution on the rationalisation of European institutions, something the Foreign Office had specifically tried to prevent. The resolution stated:

...the appointment of at least partially identical delegations to both the Assembly of the Six and the Assembly of the Council of Europe is the most important step that can be taken to ensure a close relationship between the Six and the Fifteen at parliamentary level...

This development was a disaster for the British government. Not only had the Consultative Assembly wrested the initiative for institutional rationalisation from Britain, but they had also created the conditions for ties between the proposed Six-Power Assembly and the Council of Europe, something the WOD had hoped to achieve with the proposed Atlantic Assembly. British plans to include Canada and the United States with the Western European states in a wider Atlantic Community had been rendered all but obsolete. The resolution also advocated the appointment of a delegation from the Consultative Assembly under the leadership of Fernand Dehousse to meet with the Interim Committee of the Common Market and Euratom and the WEU Council in order to present the Council of Europe’s plans for rationalisation. This particular point put the Foreign Office in a difficult position. As Hugh-Jones argued in a report for a meeting of the WEU Council, the worst possible outcome would be for the delegation to receive a ‘good hearing’ from the Six but a poor one from the WEU, as the blame would fall on the British government if a joint resolution was rejected by the one institution in which Britain carried substantial political weight, particularly in light of the recent allegations of sabotage. Once again, however, Hugh-Jones conditioned his response in a way which presented the European case in a favourable light and seemingly limited Britain’s options for diplomatic manoeuvre. Hugh-Jones expressed apprehension at the prospect of allowing a delegation from the Council of

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269 Ibid.
270 Ibid.
Europe when the WEU Council had already rejected one from the WEU Assembly on the grounds that it would undermine the role of national governments, arguing that the Assembly would feel irritated and alienated.\textsuperscript{272} He also stated that there was little the government could do but hope that the Six would ‘take the lead in turning down this request’, which would abrogate British culpability in the event of a failure to reach an agreement.\textsuperscript{273} This gave the Foreign Office little choice but to wait for news from Brussels. Shortly after this discussion in the WOD, the Six agreed to receive the Council of Europe’s delegation in Brussels as an ‘audition’, not a consultation.\textsuperscript{274} As a result, the WEU Council also agreed to an ‘audition’, after ‘the Secretary-General pressed the Council hard to agree to return a favourable reply immediately.’\textsuperscript{275} The Foreign Office’s plan to keep the discussion of institutional rationalisation in the WEU Council, where it was believed that the ‘Grand Design’ would receive a more favourable hearing, had been an abject failure.

As argued above, the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, Dunstan Curtis, had drawn up separate plans for the amalgamation of the OEEC and Council of Europe. This was much to the chagrin of the Foreign Office, who considered it to be too narrow a venture and potentially problematic for the FTA negotiations which were taking place in the OEEC.\textsuperscript{276} The discussions in the OEEC for this potential merger ran concurrently with the more general debates over rationalisation in the WEU and Council of Europe.\textsuperscript{277} Therefore, the Foreign Office were forced to conduct two sets of negotiations on matters which were very much ‘interrelated’ and possible conflicts of interest.\textsuperscript{278} In addition, the counter-proposals submitted by other national governments such as France and Italy had seriously undermined the appeal of the ‘Grand Design’ and slowed its momentum in the WEU considerably. By the end of May 1957, the British government’s plans for institutional rationalisation had been largely ‘forgotten’, according to an official in the Belgian foreign ministry during a meeting with British diplomats in Brussels.\textsuperscript{279} The Belgian official attributed this in large part to two specific reasons: European suspicions over the British

\textsuperscript{273} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{276} “Council of Europe 20th Session of the Committee of Ministers in Strasbourg”, 29 April 1957, TNA/FO371/130972/WU1072/208.
\textsuperscript{277} Wynn Hugh-Jones, “Rationalisation of European Assemblies”, 14 May 1957, TNA/FO371/130972/WU1072/208.
\textsuperscript{278} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{279} Basil Boothby to Patrick Hancock, 31 May 1957, TNA/FO371/130972/WU1072/200.
government’s objectives had not entirely dissipated, and the West German government were strongly opposed to any radical changes to the existing institutions, including the grouping of the secretariats in one location.\textsuperscript{280} These reports stirred a level of apprehension in the WOD, and Hugh-Jones was quick to point out that the ‘Grand Design’ seemed to no longer be an attractive option for the EEC member states, arguing that ‘the Six are...beginning to weaken on the idea of bringing the existing assemblies together under one roof’.\textsuperscript{281} Hugh-Jones qualified this statement by suggesting that the Six had granted more than an ‘audition’ to the aforementioned delegation on rationalisation from the Council of Europe and had instead allowed a consultation with the delegation.\textsuperscript{282} In doing so, Hugh-Jones indicated that even if there was a strong desire for the amalgamation of the European institutions, the Six were not interested in the British government’s plans and instead favoured something centred around the Council of Europe.\textsuperscript{283} Hood took Hugh-Jones’ warnings on board and decided to circulate a paper on the current status of the ‘Grand Design’. In his paper, Hood conceded that the British plans had ‘found little support’ and that the majority of European states had alternative visions for institutional rationalisation.\textsuperscript{284} Hood also acknowledged that Britain’s campaign for an ‘alternative Europe’ had been criticised for being ‘too Atlantic in flavour’ and proposing the subordination of the Six-Power Assembly to the Atlantic Assembly, suggesting that supranationalism had been firmly established and could not be undermined so easily.\textsuperscript{285} As a result, Hood offered a reassessment of the British government’s position, stating that the ‘Grand Design’ was no longer realistically achievable and that the Foreign Office should instead try and encourage the closest institutional association possible.\textsuperscript{286} Suggestions from Hood included merging the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers with the OEEC Council, increasing membership of the WEU, and creating either a General Assembly for all three of the institutions, or a common secretariat and meeting place.\textsuperscript{287}

The response from the department and the diplomatic service varied. Hood’s admission that the ‘Grand Design’ had all but failed provoked strong reactions from across the spectrum. Edden from the MAD took a much harder line than Hood and argued that the

\textsuperscript{280} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{282} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{283} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{284} Samuel Hood, “Grand Design”, 6 June 1957, TNA/FO371/130972/WU1072/207.
\textsuperscript{285} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{286} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{287} Ibid.
WEU was Britain’s last hope for a ‘counterweight to the Assembly of the Six’ and advocated an increase in its political functions to stem the tide of supranationalism.²⁸⁸ As head of the department in charge of the FTA negotiations, Edden also argued that:

...a Strasbourg Assembly which was empowered to look after the Free Trade Area would secure thereby a permanent lease of life without, however, necessarily acquiring any greater authority by comparison with the Assembly of Six than it has at present.²⁸⁹

This statement reveals that the MAD were fearful that both the economic as well as the political ‘prongs’ of the British government’s approach to European integration would potentially be submerged by the EEC. Instead, Edden hoped that a strengthened WEU would be able to act as an effective parliamentary body for the FTA and allow it to flourish as an alternative scheme to the Common Market.²⁹⁰ Edden’s approach was slightly different to Hood’s proposals, but largely in line with the Foreign Office orthodoxy of opposing supranationalism and providing an alternative to European cooperation. Conversely, the Europeanist dissenters seized upon the faltering of the ‘Grand Design’ as an opportunity to be bolder and advance the view that the British government needed to overhaul its foreign policy strategy towards Europe. Hugh-Jones responded to Edden and Hood’s comments with scepticism, stating that the Six’s influence over the ‘neutral’ countries was too great for the British government to convince them that the WEU was a suitable institution for the coordination of the FTA’s activities, and that the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe would probably be the European states’ preferred choice.²⁹¹ A more damning critique of the British government’s position, however, emerged from a highly influential individual in the diplomatic service. A powerfully emotive and persuasive document emerged from the Rome embassy at the same time as the circulation of Hood’s reassessment, under the signature of the ambassador to Italy Sir Ashley Clarke, former Deputy Under-Secretary.²⁹² Clarke was a popular and well-respected figure in the Foreign Office and reportedly had the full confidence of the Italian government, serving a total of nine years as ambassador in Rome – ‘more than twice as long as any British foreign

²⁸⁹ Ibid.
²⁹⁰ Ibid.
²⁹² Ashley Clarke to Selwyn Lloyd, “The United Kingdom and the Western World”, 3 June 1957, TNA/FO371/130972/WU1072/198.
service officer in an important embassy had the right to expect’. Clarke’s open letter to the Foreign Secretary was, in large part, a statement of support for Jebb, with whom he agreed strongly. Clarke stated that from the Italian government’s perspective, the Common Market was ‘political first and economic second’ and that the ‘European idea’ has a strong historical appeal for the Italians’. In conclusion, the ambassador argued that British membership of the EEC was an inevitability which the Foreign Office and government needed to face up to, and the sooner Britain joined the more she would be able to exert her influence over the European integration effort, particularly with her clout in thermonuclear research.

The Foreign Office responded to Clarke’s letter in a similar manner to Jebb’s earlier correspondence, by widely circulating it and the attached comments around Whitehall as a means of isolating and marginalising the departmental ‘renegades’. Sydney Cambridge dismissed Clarke’s suggestions that the British government try and seek an avenue into the EEC by flaunting its nuclear capacity, stating: ‘the UK cannot join Euratom’ and that ‘mere technical collaboration has no political impact’. Hood and Bushell seized Clarke’s letter as an opportunity to reinforce the departmental line in light of the recent diplomatic setbacks in Europe and provide a fuller response to Jebb’s letter to the Foreign Secretary. Bushell argued that he sympathised with Jebb’s concerns, but that ultimately there were certain things the British government could not accept, such as supranationalism. He also provided a critical insight into the mindset of the Foreign Office official with the following statement:

The Whitehall or civil servant conclusion...is to pursue a sober and cagey middle way i.e. to take every possible step to safeguard our trade with Europe while surrendering as little of our sovereignty as we have to.

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294 Ibid.
295 Ibid.
296 Ibid.
300 Ibid.
This provides an excellent summary of the departmental orthodoxy of the day. Bushell made it plain that it was the job of officials to steer policymaking away from radical solutions and instead encourage gradual, evolutionary change which would do little to upset the status quo. This institutional conservatism was a fundamental part of the Foreign Office’s operations and its group identity. This also partly explains the Foreign Office’s aversion to supranationalism, which Bushell vehemently denounced as incompatible with British interests. Conversely, Bushell championed the FTA as the British government’s most promising policy with regards to European integration, acknowledging that it was initially conceived as an ‘alternative’ to the Common Market, but that it had become the most logical and realistic ‘middle course’ in European economic cooperation and could complement the Six’s initiative. Bushell’s support for the FTA as both an alternative and complementary scheme seemingly stemmed from his emotional attachment to the Commonwealth. In his minute, Bushell argued strongly against British membership of the Common Market, emphasising ‘the desirability of maintaining the Commonwealth alliance’ and that Jebb’s prediction of the Six becoming a powerful political bloc was not necessarily an absolute certainty.

Hood bolstered Bushell’s thoughts by drafting his own response to Jebb and Clarke, ensuring that copies were forwarded to all British embassies and institutional representatives in Europe in a bid to limit the appeal of the dissenters’ views. The tone of Hood’s despatch betrays a firm belief that the future of Europe lay with the British government’s policy of association and intergovernmentalism, and a deep scepticism of the Common Market’s potential. Indeed, Hood suggested that Britain would likely have to ‘step in and save the situation...much as it did with the Western European Union proposals after the collapse of the EDC.’ This dismissal of the EEC was combined with a strong conviction that the Six could not expect Britain to commit to the Common Market without offering her special terms and safeguards. Hood’s most damning criticism, however, was reserved for his perceived attitude of the Six’s national governments:

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301 Ibid.
302 Ibid.
303 Ibid.
304 Ibid
305 Samuel Hood to Gladwyn Jebb, 4 July 1957, TNA/FO371/130972/WU1072/222.
306 Ibid.
...there can be no closer United Kingdom association with Europe and the Six-Power communities whilst the Six maintain their somewhat arrogant belief that Europe begins, if not ends, with their communities and that all they need to do about the 11 or 14 peripheral countries of Europe is to wait for them to beg to come in.  

This statement at the very least demonstrates Hood’s disdain for the Six’s approach to European integration and could be construed as open hostility.  

Hood also argued that ‘it is in this attitude of the Six that is to be found the seeds of the division of Europe into blocs.’ This suggests that not only did Hood have a personal aversion to the EEC, but he believed that it was detrimental to wider European solidarity and unity, which is of particular interest as Hood is the most senior London-based official under study, and was extremely influential in the Foreign Office’s policymaking process. As a supervising Under-Secretary, his opposition to European supranationalism would have carried a lot of weight in Whitehall and his attitude would probably have been shared by a number of other top officials. This would explain why the departmental orthodoxy was rooted in a vision for an ‘alternative Europe’ with broader membership and more flexible governance.

The Foreign Office’s continued prioritisation of Anglo-American relations and the Commonwealth were also reflected in Hood’s correspondence with Jebb. He argued that a European ‘third force’ would have to strengthen the Atlantic Community and the Commonwealth Alliance and not become a ‘group of truculent allies, still less a rival to the United States.’ Hood placed emphasis on Britain’s special position within the Atlantic Community, arguing that her thermonuclear capacity should place her at Europe’s head, but that the ‘special relationship’ with the United States would require Britain to have specific ‘terms of association’ due to the American government supposedly preferring to ‘deal with the UK apart.’ Hood’s Atlanticist and imperialist convictions underlined his resolve that Britain would be able to successfully associate with the EEC without submitting to all the conditions of membership, thus maintaining her position as the vital ‘centre’ of the three circles. In conjunction with his views on European supranationalism and Britain’s global standing, Hood’s most intriguing comments were concerned with the ‘timeline’ of European integration and the amount of time the British government had to reach a

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307 Ibid.
308 Ibid.
309 Ibid.
310 Ibid.
311 Ibid.
suitable arrangement with the Six. Hood argued to Jebb and Clarke that their insistence on an immediate commitment to European unity was ill-founded given that it would be ‘according to the Treaty [of Rome], 1971 or more probably 1974 before...the Common Market is in being.’\(^{312}\) This belief that the Common Market would very gradually and slowly come into being is vital in dissecting the mindset of the senior policymaker in the 1950s. At this early stage in the European integration effort, there was little to suggest to the Foreign Office that the EEC would become an economic powerhouse with supranational oversight in a relatively short space of time. The high level of economic performance and political integration the Six had experienced a mere three years after the signing of the Treaty of Rome, prompting the Macmillan government’s application for EEC membership, could not have been easily predicted.\(^{313}\) The majority of the Whitehall elite were confident that they had time to negotiate with the Six and that Britain’s political and economic clout would not be threatened so quickly and so seriously by the EEC. This deeply entrenched attitude towards European integration reinforced the departmental orthodoxy of association and intergovernmentalism.

Even at this late stage, when the WOD had failed to capture the imagination of the Six and the other Western European states, the Foreign Office’s most senior personnel refused to deviate from the official line of cooperation, association and intergovernmentalism in an ‘alternative Europe’. The ‘Grand Design’ had effectively been confined to the diplomatic gutter and yet major figures such as Hood and Hancock decided not to consider a major redrawing of British foreign policy towards Europe, as evidenced in Hood’s ‘reassessment’ of the British government’s position.\(^{314}\) What followed the withering of the Foreign Office’s plans for institutional rationalisation can best be described as departmental conservatism, rigidly reinforced by a group of senior officials who did not see any merit in pushing against the status quo due to their personal convictions and formative experiences. These officials could not contemplate allowing Britain to weaken her ties with the Commonwealth, which for most establishment figures was a highly ‘ideological’ cause, or indeed risk denting the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ any further, which was considered an absolute priority after the devastation of the Suez Crisis.\(^{315}\) The calls for Britain to join the Common

\(^{312}\) Ibid.
\(^{313}\) Bulmer, “Britain and European Integration” (1992), 7; Greenwood, *Britain and European Integration* (1992), 82.
Market or try and reach a deal with the Six on associative membership of the EEC were still coming from a minority of vocal visionaries, namely Jebb and Clarke, with middle-ranking officials such as Hugh-Jones still not overtly advocating their personal support for the European idea. In the words of Hugo Young: ‘In London there were the beginnings of dissent from the ideology that gripped upper Whitehall...In the Whitehall of the middle 1950s, they did not get a hearing, but they did exist.’ As will be argued below, the Foreign Office continued to try and pressure and influence plans for rationalisation of the European institutions despite having lost the initiative, and would later support other countries’ attempts to increase the political power of Europe’s intergovernmental organisations. As such, the ‘two-pronged’ approach towards European integration remained intact, as did Britain’s political strategy of forging an ‘alternative’ to the EEC.

316 Young, This Blessed Plot (1998), 100.
Old Tricks: Foreign Office Conservatism and the Rationalisation Agenda

In the latter half of June 1957, Hugh-Jones was charged with drafting a paper on the future of the ‘Grand Design’ and the Foreign Office’s position on institutional rationalisation. Following Hood’s admission that the ‘Grand Design’ had ‘found little support’, one would expect the WOD to have altered their policy towards European integration, but instead the department favoured a conservative approach which was consistent with previous ideas.317 The paper hinted that if the British government was unable to forge an Atlantic Assembly with North American participation, then it would at least try and bring about the closest possible association of the European assemblies for more effective intergovernmental cooperation.318 The WOD’s primary objective, however, was to shield the proposed FTA from any undesirable political interference from the Six and other non-FTA member states in the Council of Europe.319 Therefore, relations between the OEEC, where the FTA was to be launched, and the Council of Europe, were top of the WOD’s rationalisation agenda.320 Hugh-Jones’ document was extremely detailed and complex. It described Europe’s political landscape as it then stood, stating that the Six ‘have shown themselves principally interested in establishing their communities as the nucleus of Europe’ and would therefore strongly oppose any attempts to ‘prejudice’ the EEC.321 However, he acknowledged that the ‘general idea of rationalising the pattern of Western organisations has been fairly welcomed’ despite differences in opinion on the best course of action.322 In light of the fact that the ‘Grand Design’ and the creation of an Atlantic Assembly had been rejected by most European states, the paper proposed a closer association of the OEEC and the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe in order to stop the FTA from coming under the political influence of the EEC or other non-FTA national governments.323 In addition, it advocated a gradual transition period for the amalgamation to prevent any disruption to the FTA negotiations in the OEEC.324 The plans also expressed the hope that the Six would agree to send reports from the EEC and Euratom to the Consultative Assembly, which would

319 Ibid.
320 Ibid.
321 Ibid.
322 Ibid.
323 Ibid.
324 Ibid.
establish the Council of Europe as the ‘senior Assembly with the broadest scope’. To the
British government this was much more preferable, as it would neutralise the growing
growth of the Common Market and stem the tide of supranationalism in Europe.

Therefore, the WOD’s new plans were not a significant departure from the ‘Grand Design’.
Given United States and Canadian membership of the OEEC, the British government hoped
that a merger of the Consultative Assembly and the OEEC would allow for North American
participation in parliamentary procedures. The WOD’s most controversial proposal,
however, stemmed from the Foreign Office’s desire to concentrate all European
institutions in a single city as a means of streamlining cooperation and preventing
functional overlaps in the assemblies. The ultimate objective was to bind the FTA to the
Common Market and further strengthen the intergovernmental bodies as counterweights
to the EEC Assembly. This proved to be a contentious issue for certain European states,
particularly members of the Six who did not want the FTA to be on a level pegging with the
Common Market or an extension of it. In particular, German suspicion of British intentions
once again began to surface, which became detrimental to the WOD’s rationalisation
agenda.

In a letter circulated by the MAD, the Deputy Under-Secretary for Economic Affairs, Paul
Gore-Booth, stated that the ideal scenario would be for the European institutions to
‘gravitate’ towards Paris, as the OEEC and NATO were already based there, but warned his
colleagues that the national governments of the Six were reluctant to establish the EEC in
Paris given the ‘pressure which French private interests exercise’, and that a recent
discussion with the Dutch ambassador had confirmed this hesitancy. The gravity of this
issue is made abundantly clear by Gore-Booth characterising the complete exclusion of the
FTA from the Common Market as being ‘left out in the cold’, resulting in Britain being
diplomatically isolated in Europe. In order to inform the WOD of the attitude of the West
German government towards Britain and institutional rationalisation, the British embassy
in Bonn sent a report detailing their most recent exchanges. The report stated that the
Germans were much more convinced about the sincerity of Britain’s efforts to cooperate

325 Ibid.
326 Ibid.
327 Ibid.
328 Ibid.
330 Ibid.
331 British Embassy in Bonn to Western Organisations Department, 25 June 1957,
TNA/FO371/130972/WU1072/180.
with Europe, but were deeply suspicious of British plans to concentrate the European institutions in Paris. Certain elements in the German Chancellery were convinced that the French and British governments had conspired to bolster their national influence at the expense of the EEC. As such, the West German government were opposed to Paris becoming the centre of European cooperation, and remained sceptical of any radical proposals for the amalgamation of the European institutions.

The Foreign Office continued to face internal problems as well as external ones. Following Hood’s reassessment, the disquiet stirred by Jebb and Clarke’s earlier correspondence surfaced once again from another distinguished ambassador in Europe. The British ambassador to Spain, Sir William ‘Ivo’ Mallet, circulated a letter he had written to Clarke in which he strongly supported the latter’s call for Britain to fully join the European integration movement. Mallet criticised the ‘overconfidence in our special relationship with the United States’ and warned his colleagues that the ‘Europeans are far more interested in making Europe than they are in the Atlantic community’ and that the very concept of an Atlantic community was regarded with deep suspicion. Mallet’s words did not fall on deaf ears. The ambassador wielded a considerable amount of influence and was well-respected in the department having served as Assistant Under-Secretary 1949-51 and then as ambassador to Yugoslavia 1951-4. Officials from the WOD, the MAD and the Southern Department all attached comments to Mallet’s letter in order to once again try and counter the dissenters. Kenneth Pridham of the Southern Department dismissed the entire premise of Jebb, Clarke and Mallet’s points, arguing that Sir Roger Makins’ heavily Atlanticist ‘Notes on British Foreign Policy’ from 1951 should be updated and used to explain the Foreign Office’s overarching world view. Alan Edden of the MAD’s response criticised Mallet’s assertions, arguing that in order for Britain to continue to act as a global player, she needed to maintain her links with the United States and the Commonwealth as well as with Europe. Edden firmly defended the need to ‘keep our relations with all three

332 Ibid.
333 Ibid.
334 Ibid.
335 Ivo Mallet to Ashley Clarke, 5 July 1957, TNA/FO371/130973/WU1072/226.
336 Ibid.
338 Makins’ notes argued in favour of an extremely close partnership between Britain and the United States, and that Britain would become increasingly dependent on American support for national security as the Cold War unfolded: Roger Makins, “Some Notes on British Foreign Policy”, 11 August 1951, TNA/FO371/124968/ZP24/2; Kenneth Pridham, 17 July 1957, TNA/FO371/130973/WU1072/226.
in balance’, and that if a European political bloc was indeed formed, ‘then we have to find ways of living with this’. John Bushell, the Assistant Head of the WOD, also announced his strong disagreement with Mallet, stating: ‘if we had to make a choice...I believe we would always choose the United States before continental Europe.’

The most momentous contribution in the correspondence surrounding Mallet’s letter, however, came from Christopher Steel in Bonn. Hitherto, Steel had not fully expressed his thoughts on European integration or Britain’s foreign policy strategy but had decided to take the recent debate as an opportunity to voice his opinions on the matter. Steel mainly directed his dispatch towards Jebb’s earlier correspondence in April, offering a perspective from West Germany, which along with France was one of the two most influential members of the Six. Steel’s first point of contention was Britain’s future with the Commonwealth. The ambassador argued that an abandonment of the sterling area would be economically unsound, but there are hints of an ideological and emotional attachment elsewhere. In a direct challenge to Jebb’s statement that some elements of Whitehall were unrealistically chained to the idea that the ‘third force...should be the United Kingdom with her Commonwealth and Empire’ and could not possibly fall to the Six, Steel argued that the EEC states had ‘no hinterland like the twentieth century colossi...not even the very real hinterland represented for the United Kingdom by the Commonwealth connection and...sterling area.’ Steel dismissed what he perceived to be the argument of ‘the enthusiastic Europeans’ in the department that the Common Market would one day rival the United States and the Soviet Union, labelling it ‘one of the commonest fallacies put forward’. Steel’s most damning critique of the EEC, however, was reserved for the attitudes of the French and the Germans:

...it is inevitable that, if the French and Germans find themselves joined together inside a ring fence of the Six, their basic differences of approach will lead first to economic argument and before long to serious political collision. Unless the circle

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340 Ibid.
342 Christopher Steel to Selwyn Lloyd, “The United Kingdom and the Western World”, 17 July 1957, TNA/FO371/130973/WU1072/228.
343 Ibid.
345 Christopher Steel to Selwyn Lloyd, “The United Kingdom and the Western World”, 17 July 1957, TNA/FO371/130973/WU1072/228.
346 Ibid.
of the free trade partners can be widened so as to spread the shock of these contradictions, the fate of the whole enterprise will be inevitable collapse.\textsuperscript{347}

As argued above, this belief that the Common Market was destined for failure was not uncommon amongst the senior generation of Whitehall officials, and Hood had made a similar point in an earlier correspondence with Jebb.\textsuperscript{348} Steel’s argument represented the institutional conservatism of the Foreign Office and bolstered the departmental line of opposition to full membership of the EEC. His correspondence, as well as the comments from the other officials discussed above, also heavily imply that the Churchillian ‘three circles’ doctrine still carried significant weight in the corridors of power, despite the setbacks suffered by the British government in their attempts to push the rationalisation agenda.

Mallet and Steel’s letters spurred Hood and Hancock into devising a fully coordinated rebuttal of the Europeanists’ views. Whilst Hood and other officials in the Foreign Office had replied individually to Jebb or had commented on Clarke and Mallet’s dispatches upon arrival, there had not been an interdepartmental response to silence the whisperings of dissent. Hancock wrote to Gore-Booth, calling for a reply to Jebb and the other ambassadors with the main objective being ‘to circulate it fairly widely in print.’\textsuperscript{349} The draft would incorporate comments from the WOD, the MAD, the Permanent Under-Secretary’s department and the Treasury, and would include consultations from the Board of Trade and the Ministry of Power.\textsuperscript{350} The purpose of widely circulating a document countering the issues raised the by the Europeanists and including the opinions of a broad cross-section of Whitehall is not made clear in the evidence, but it can be argued with a high degree of certainty that the primary aim was to marginalise and isolate the dissenters and strengthen the status quo of the Whitehall establishment. The context is also essential in order to fully grasp the implications of this evidence. At this point in time, the ‘Grand Design’ had all but failed and the British government’s position in Europe was precarious. This had damaged the strength and appeal of the departmental orthodoxy that association and intergovernmental cooperation was the best approach to European integration. The upper echelons of Whitehall were eager to maintain and protect the vitality of this entrenched

\textsuperscript{347}\textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{348} See: Samuel Hood to Gladwyn Jebb, 4 July 1957, TNA/FO371/130972/WU1072/222.
\textsuperscript{349} Patrick Hancock to Paul Gore-Booth, 2 August 1957, TNA/FO371/130973/WU1072/237.
\textsuperscript{350} \textit{Ibid.}
group attitude towards European integration, which would have been another powerful motive in trying to slow the Europeanists’ momentum.

The final draft of the letter to Jebb was completed in October and copied to all the major embassies and representations in Europe. In order to add further weight and legitimacy to the document, the officials had it signed by the Foreign Secretary.\(^{351}\) This also created the impression that the entire department and government were united in opposition to the Europeanists, and at several points the letter purports to represent the opinion of ‘Her Majesty’s government’.\(^{352}\) This is of particular interest due to the fact that according to the evidence, government ministers had absolutely no input in the drafting of the letter whatsoever – all of the minutes and comments consist of opinions from Whitehall officials. The drafting of the letter cannot be dismissed as too low a priority for the Foreign Secretary either. The opinions of the British government’s most senior ambassadors were of great importance in the policymaking process, and if there was significant disagreement at the official level, it was in the ministers’ interests to try and resolve this to maintain a united front in foreign affairs.\(^{353}\) This response to Jebb is evidence of senior officials bypassing ministerial input, but also of the resilience of overriding group attitudes which were prevalent in Whitehall. The senior officials in the Foreign Office made it abundantly clear in the dispatch that they had no intention of contemplating full or associative membership of the supranational EEC, arguing that Britain had ‘a plethora of institutions to choose from in its approach to European integration and that there were ‘too many unknowns’ for the government to make a definitive step towards closer relations with the Common Market.\(^{354}\)

The document also expressed a deep scepticism of the Six’s plans, conjuring up the memory of the ‘EDC fiasco [that] made everyone so sceptical of the Messina initiative’ as justification for the British government’s reluctance and hesitation.\(^{355}\) This was coupled with a condemnation of the ‘economic division of Europe inherent in the Six-Power Common Market’ and the British government’s noble attempts to forge links with the wider European community via the FTA initiative, including the Scandinavian states, Portugal, Ireland, Austria and Switzerland.\(^{356}\) Not only does this suggest that the senior

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\(^{351}\) Selwyn Lloyd to Gladwyn Jebb, “United Kingdom and Europe”, 24 October 1957, TNA/FO371/130974/WU1072/252.

\(^{352}\) Ibid.


\(^{354}\) Selwyn Lloyd to Gladwyn Jebb, “United Kingdom and Europe”, 24 October 1957, TNA/FO371/130974/WU1072/252.

\(^{355}\) Ibid.

\(^{356}\) Ibid.
officials in the Foreign Office were still confident that the Common Market might fail, but it also argued that the Six were responsible for the political fragmentation of Europe. This line allowed the Foreign Office to defend its decision to not commit to the EEC and instead place emphasis on a search for a better, ‘alternative’ Europe which Britain would lead.

The rhetoric employed in the letter also had highly ideological connotations. There was a firm conviction that British relations with the United States and the Commonwealth should continue to be prioritised, and that closer association with Europe could jeopardise these ties.\textsuperscript{357} In addition, the document argued that ‘the United Kingdom could not contemplate sinking its identity completely in Europe’ which betrays one of the biggest fears of the senior administrative elite.\textsuperscript{358} Officials such as Hancock and Hood fervently believed that British membership of the Common Market would undermine Britain’s national identity and prestige, relegating her to a component of a federal Europe, something which Wallace has described as ‘confronting the contradiction between the Anglo-Saxon and European conceptions of Britain’.\textsuperscript{359} This ideological attachment to national prestige in foreign policy was not a new one; it had dominated the mindset of Foreign Office officials since the Edwardian period and was reinforced by Britain’s position as one of the victorious powers in 1945.\textsuperscript{360} This narrative of ‘great power’ status can be observed in the document’s comments on defence and security. As argued previously, the Foreign Office’s attitude towards European integration was framed in large part by the Cold War and defensive considerations.\textsuperscript{361} In this regard, the senior officials viewed Britain’s position in NATO and her alliance with the United States to be of ‘overriding importance’ and argued that the Six would not be able to establish an effective framework for cooperation in armaments and research outside the WEU or NATO: ‘development of a Six-Power military grouping seems remote since the demise of the EDC.’\textsuperscript{362} There was also a heavy implication that only Anglo-American oversight could guide the ‘political unity in Western Europe’ and guarantee that

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{357}{Ibid.}
\footnote{358}{Ibid.}
\footnote{361}{See: Greenwood, \textit{Britain and European Integration} (1996), 4; Kane, “European or Atlantic Community?” (1997), 84.}
\footnote{362}{Selwyn Lloyd to Gladwyn Jebb, “United Kingdom and Europe”, 24 October 1957, TNA/FO371/130974/WU1072/252.}
\end{footnotes}
it ‘adhered firmly to the Atlantic Alliance and did not become a neutralist third force.’

This is something which had been repeated constantly in the ‘Grand Design’, but in this particular document a sense of apprehension and anxiety can also be detected. The authors hint at the possibility of having to ‘contain the Six and the European idea’ in order to ensure that ‘the leadership of Europe did not pass into the control of the Six’. The most significant statement in this paper, however, referred to the possibility of countering the EEC through the FTA: ‘We might have to aim at investing the institutions of the Free Trade Area with as much dignity and authority as those of the European Economic Community.’ It is not entirely clear what was meant by this, but it suggests that the Whitehall establishment was more concerned with curbing the influence of the Six in Europe than providing an alternative to European cooperation, and would go to great lengths to achieve this end. In short, the top officials in the Foreign Office were more anti-EEC than pro-Europe.

The letter to Jebb greatly strengthened the Foreign Office orthodoxy and the senior officials’ position in the policymaking process. The internal divisions had been — at least temporarily — quelled and the WOD moved back towards advocating the rationalisation agenda. Their efforts were met with little success as European affairs increasingly gravitated towards the EEC and the Six, which benefited from the support of the United States. British attempts to provide an alternative framework for European political cooperation had been thwarted, and Britain’s influence and standing in Europe began to be challenged by some of the very nations which she had helped liberate or defeat little more than a decade ago. It is unsurprising, therefore, that Foreign Office attitudes largely held fast. The failure of the EDC was still fresh in policymakers’ minds, and the post-Suez Foreign Office still saw the Anglo-American partnership as the most viable foundation for British foreign policy. European integration may have been the central doctrine of the Six’s foreign ministries, but the concept had yet to win over the hearts and minds of senior Foreign Office officials such as Hancock, Hood and Steel. The younger generation of officials, represented here by Hugh-Jones, were motivated by a desire to see Britain participate fully in the process of European unity and solidarity after their experiences of the Second World War. They were supported in this endeavour by some of their more radical older colleagues.

363 Ibid.
364 Ibid.
365 Ibid.
such as Jebb, Clarke and Mallet. However, the arguments of the pro-Europeans failed to
galvanise broad departmental or ministerial approval. Within the Foreign Office itself, the
WOD saw its status dwindle as the EEC’s clout expanded at the expense of the WEU, the
Council of Europe and the OEEC. This decline became even more apparent after the
successful launch of EFTA in 1960, which had been the MAD’s brainchild. The latter
department became increasingly important, and as shall be demonstrated over the course
of this study, eventually established itself as one of the Foreign Office’s most influential and
prestigious units. However, this only took place after officials’ attitudes towards European
integration changed dramatically. Britain’s ‘turn to Europe’ would be fraught with division,
caution, and reluctance.

367 Foreign Office, Foreign Office List and Diplomatic and Consular Year Book 1960 (London: Harrison
and Sons, 1960).

...there was a growing perception in 1960-1, among civil servants, ministers, journalists, industrialists and other elite groups, that EEC membership was the only way forward if Britain was to remain a leading influence in world affairs. 368

...it is now apparent that there are strong reasons of foreign policy for our joining the Six. If the Six "succeed", we should be greatly damaged politically if we were outside, and our influence in world affairs would be bound to wane; if we were inside, the influence we would wield in the world would be enhanced... 369

The above quote from a Cabinet Office paper presented to ministers in July 1960 perfectly summarises the reluctant reversal of British foreign policy towards European integration. The document’s ultimate conclusion was that full membership of the Common Market should be seriously considered lest Britain see its international standing shrink – better in than out. 370 As such, the British government’s decision to apply for membership of the EEC was driven less by an ideological conversion than by the practical foreign policy realities of the day. However, the causes of this ‘turn to Europe’ are less simplistic. The discussions in Whitehall and more specifically, the Foreign Office, were laced with debate, disagreement, and uncertainty. The degree of caution and scepticism which had characterised British official attitudes towards Messina and the Treaty of Rome had certainly not evaporated entirely. Indeed, many of the reservations harboured by senior officials in the 1950s remained and marked the stance taken by the government during the negotiations. The application for membership was part of a slower and more gradual ‘evolution’ of British foreign policy rather than diplomatic and attitudinal ‘revolution’. It will be the aim of this chapter to examine this adjustment in British foreign policy from the perspective of the officials in the European Economic Organisations Department (EEOD) and how their attitudes shaped the decision to apply for membership of the EEC.

370 Ibid.
The scholarship on Britain’s first application identifies a number of themes in accounting for the shift in British foreign policy towards European integration. Bulmer argues that the change in attitude is ‘not easily explained’, citing the Suez Crisis, the Six’s strong economic performance, fear of the EEC’s potential political influence, and pressure from the United States as potential reasons. Despite the enduring arguments of scholars such as Lamb, the significance of the economic factors in the British government’s decision have been called into question by much of the literature. Camps has argued that ‘Britain’s relationship with the Six had now become a key foreign policy question and was no longer looked at primarily as a commercial problem.’ This argument has been reaffirmed by other historians such as Greenwood, Tratt, May and John W. Young. Therefore, the strategic and diplomatic connotations surrounding the decision to join the Common Market were of great consequence, and this was certainly true of the Foreign Office; perhaps more so than anywhere else. Hugo Young has argued that ‘in the Foreign Office, the economic issue [in European policy] tended to be swept aside as if it barely needed addressing.’ The Foreign Office’s lesser interest in economic affairs can be attributed to the attitudes of the senior officials which reinforced the institutional orthodoxy. Economics and public relations were perceived as ‘vulgar modernisms’ by much of the older generation, who preferred to focus on fundamental questions of international diplomacy and security.

This is directly reflected in the archival evidence, where officials in the EEOD acknowledged that the fundamental questions of European integration were of a political nature, despite the fact that the department’s name implied that its remit was restricted to ‘European Economic Organisations’, and this will be expanded upon below.

This is a crucial point in light of the findings of the previous chapter. The Foreign Office’s separation of political and economic policy towards European integration into two departments, the WOD and the MAD, had been a failure. It was becoming clearer to senior officials that in order to construct a more comprehensive foreign policy strategy, a more cohesive approach was needed which incorporated both political and economic considerations. The earlier warnings from figures such as Sir Gladwyn Jebb that the ‘European idea’ was the ‘great...dominating political issue’ of the day were starting to be taken much more seriously. This is partly how the EEOD was created and designated more control over political issues. At the beginning of 1960, the MAD was renamed the EEOD and was made responsible for relations with the ECSC, the EEC, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), the OEEC, and the Council of Europe. Prior to these changes, the MAD had been chiefly concerned with United States aid, the financial and economic implications of NATO and more recently, the EFTA negotiations. This was largely because the MAD was the successor of the European Recovery Department, which was renamed and restructured in 1950 in response to the inception of NATO and the OEEC. However, as the significance and influence of the various institutions in Europe grew across the 1950s, so too did the importance of the MAD. By 1960, its control over British foreign policy towards European integration had become more established, and it overtook the WOD as the principal department concerned with multilateral European institutions, with the WOD only retaining control over NATO and WEU affairs. This could possibly be attributed to the success of EFTA and the failure of the ‘Grand Design’ in influencing the direction of European integration, but also the British government’s attempts to use EFTA as a ‘bridge’ to associate with the Common Market. The MAD therefore benefited from the government’s continued use of EFTA as their primary ‘bargaining tool’ in European

integration policy. The EEOD’s increased importance provides the main rationale for this chapter. As the EEC’s political clout swelled, the Foreign Office abandoned its previous attempts to create an alternative framework for European political cooperation and instead tried to adapt itself institutionally to the Common Market, accepting its central role in the European integration movement. The EEOD and its activities were direct results of this institutional adaptation and provide a critical insight into the transition of British foreign policy towards application for membership of the EEC.

Much like the WOD’s approach to the ‘Grand Design’, the EEOD had a select group of officials and associated diplomats who were in constant consultation over the application for membership of the Common Market and the wider political issues. Despite the fact that the British government’s delegation for the negotiations in Brussels was made up of personnel from a range of Whitehall departments, including the Treasury, the Foreign Office, the Board of Trade, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Colonial Office, the EEOD retained some influence over the direction of the negotiations. All reports on the proceedings of the formal negotiations and on informal discussions between the delegates and other foreign officials were fed back to the EEOD. It is through the analysis of these documents that the department’s primary actors can be identified. The same names contributed continuously across this period towards the debate on Britain’s eventual decision to apply and then the progress of the negotiations. These were Sir Roderick Barclay, Sir Patrick Reilly, Roger Jackling, Francis George ‘Ken’ Gallagher, Christopher Audland, and John Robinson. This group of gentlemen represented an eclectic mix of individuals, varying in age and social and educational background. Barclay and Reilly were both born in 1909, Jackling was born in 1913, Gallagher was born in 1917, Robinson was born in 1925 and Audland was born one year later, though was in the same school year as Robinson. Barclay was educated at Harrow, Jackling was educated at Felsted School, an independent boarding school in Essex, Reilly and Audland both attended Winchester College, Gallagher was educated at St. Joseph’s College, a Roman Catholic school in South London, and Robinson was educated at Westminster School. Therefore, whilst these

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385 Ibid.
officials were still from relatively privileged families, at least two of the officials’ backgrounds were not as exclusive as some of their predecessors.\textsuperscript{386} In addition, their university educations reveal even greater diversity in the ranks of the Foreign Office. Whilst Reilly and Robinson elected to study Greats – the mandarin’s favourite – at New College and Christ Church, Oxford respectively, Barclay studied languages at Trinity College, Cambridge.\textsuperscript{387} Even more unusually, Jackling and Gallagher did not attend Oxbridge at all, studying Public Administration and Law respectively at the University of London.\textsuperscript{388} As such, they provide excellent case studies in understanding how the ‘Oxbridge bar’ started to weaken ever so slightly as the Foreign Office moved into the 1960s. Audland is the one exception when it comes to higher education. Having initially secured a place to study languages at Caius College, Cambridge, he elected to try and enter the diplomatic service via the ‘reconstruction method’, which was for ‘young people who had spent in the armed forces the years when they might normally have gone to university’.\textsuperscript{389}

The broadening range in the officials’ socio-educational backgrounds would suggest that this had little impact on their attitudes towards European integration. However, their birth dates span three decades and represent an interesting generational shift in attitudes. Much like Hugh-Jones, who was discussed in the previous chapter, Audland and Robinson were ardent Europeanists, driven passionately by an emotional and ideological attachment to the idea of European unity. This is demonstrated in the literature and in interviews, as well as the archival evidence.\textsuperscript{390} The two men came from privileged backgrounds; both attended


\textsuperscript{389} Audland, \textit{Right Place – Right Time} (2004), 63.

Both men had also served as NCOs in the Second World War where they encountered first-hand the sufferings inflicted upon the Continent – Robinson, for example, worked with and befriended Italian prisoners of war and Audland had close connections to French families who had lost several relatives in the War. Their wartime experiences certainly contributed towards their wholehearted support for European integration, and Audland specifically admits as much in his memoirs. Audland has also stated that the two men were lifelong friends and worked together extremely closely on Britain’s first application to join the EEC, which is of particular interest to this study. In Audland’s words, their relationship ‘was symbiotic’ and their closeness strongly indicates that the two men were part of a younger generation of like-minded officials in the ‘vanguard’ of pro-Europeanism. Robinson was reportedly quite a unique personality in the Foreign Office. He worked uninterrupted on European integration issues for sixteen years in Paris, Brussels and London in the years 1956-1972, allowing him ‘to become a real European expert.’ However, the question of whether or not Robinson was a passionate ‘Europeanist’ is contentious. The amount of energy and effort he poured into his work, as well as his confrontational style which made him notorious for berating colleagues with alternative points of view, would certainly suggest so. His obituary in The Times states that he ‘found it difficult to accommodate other men’s views’ and had an ‘inability to dissemble his own feelings’. Conversely, Hugo Young disputes Robinson’s ideological commitment towards European integration, arguing that the man ‘depised “belief”’ and was much more focused on the ‘technical aspects’ of his work.

The elder four’s attitudes are much more complex. Their enthusiasm for the European project was heavily guarded and qualified, which was typical of the upper echelons in Whitehall at the time. As the elders of the group, Barclay and Reilly embarked on their careers in the early 1930s. Barclay entered the service in 1932 and served in Brussels and


395 Young, This Blessed Plot (1998), 174.


397 Young, This Blessed Plot (1998), 180.
Paris, giving him a strong grounding in European affairs. However, most of his time during the War was spent at the Washington embassy where he witnessed the full force of the Anglo-American alliance and the attitudes this fostered in the British diplomatic service. Following a term as ambassador to Denmark 1956-60, he returned to the Foreign Office as Deputy Under-Secretary with a special remit as ‘adviser on European trade questions’. According to his obituary in The Times, Barclay ‘helped to create the series of multilateral alliances which still provide a framework for international relations’ and even named his dog Efta after the European Free Trade Association! Barclay’s position as one of the ‘flying knights’ on the negotiation delegation for British membership of the Common Market and his special status within the Foreign Office make him a significant figure in understanding the attitudes of Foreign Office officials towards European integration, and why the senior generation began to drift towards the EEC when previously they had shunned it. Reilly’s career was equally impressive. Having been elected as a fellow of All Soul’s, Oxford in 1932, he entered the diplomatic service in 1933, topping the Foreign Office entrance examinations. From 1953-6, he returned to Paris as minister of the embassy where he worked closely with the ambassador, Gladwyn Jebb. In late 1956 Reilly was promoted to Deputy Under-Secretary but was very soon after moved to Moscow and made British ambassador to the Soviet Union. This proved to be one of Reilly’s most challenging positions, and he was forced to endure highly sensitive points in the Cold War, including the U2 spy plane incident of 1960. Following his tenure as ambassador to the Soviet Union, Reilly was recalled to London and reappointed Deputy Under-Secretary, in charge of European economic affairs. It can be argued with a degree of certainty that Reilly’s early experiences in Britain’s wartime administration, as well as his training in the Imperial Defence College and his various postings relating to defence and anti-communist operations, had a powerful effect on his attitude towards foreign policy in

400 Ibid.
406 Ibid.
407 Ibid.
408 Ibid.
his professional life. Like many of his colleagues, he was prone to viewing European integration through the lens of the Cold War, which often resulted in Atlanticist sympathies given the United States’ principal role in the containment of the Eastern bloc.

Jackling and Gallagher had less ‘established’ backgrounds than many of their colleagues and had entered the diplomatic service via unusual career paths. Jackling was slightly older than Gallagher and had practiced as a solicitor before he entered the service in 1939 as Acting Vice-Consul at the British Consulate-General in New York.409 Following this he was appointed Second Secretary at the Washington embassy, and remained here until late 1947.410 Therefore, Jackling also developed his early career as a diplomat immersed in the high watermark of Anglo-American cooperation. The fact that he also married a Canadian and later retired to Florida where he died also suggest strong Atlanticist sympathies and influences in his private life.411 In 1959, Jackling was appointed Assistant Under-Secretary and supervisor of the EEOD alongside Deputy Under-Secretary Patrick Reilly.412 Jackling’s earlier professional experiences were equally dominated by Atlanticist influences, particularly his frequent encounters with United States government personnel in the age of the Marshall Aid plan and the American initiatives behind European reconstruction.413 Gallagher had also come to his career in the Foreign Office later than many of his colleagues; entering the service in November 1945 at the age of 28.414 By 1960, he was 43 and already Head of a Foreign Office department, but had also been young enough to serve in the War alongside his younger colleagues Robinson and Audland. After his time in the EEOD, Gallagher continued to serve in a variety of posts relating to European affairs, including Head of the Western Economic Department in the Commonwealth Office, Head of the Common Market Department, Assistant Under-Secretary of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in charge of European economic affairs, and UK Permanent Representative to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).415 This suggests that he was considered an authority on European economic issues and clearly had a degree of influence during Britain’s first application to join the EEC.

410 Ibid.
411 Ibid.
412 Ibid.
415 Ibid.
The group of officials under study for this chapter represent a complex mixture of personalities and show how Foreign Office personnel had begun to slowly diversify as it entered the 1960s. This complexity, in turn, directly impacted the policymaking process as the British government slowly turned away from devising schemes for an ‘alternative’ Europe and instead moved towards association with the EEC. The origins of the Foreign Office and Whitehall’s gradual and guarded conversion will be explored below, including how and why the government eventually decided that full membership of the Common Market was the best course of action. It will become clear that this foreign policy strategy was not a ministerial initiative, but an ‘officials’ operation’ which was driven at the bottom by passionate Europeanists, and at the top by cautious and reluctant converts.416

416 Young, This Blessed Plot (1998), 123.
One Foot in the Door: Turning towards Europe

The landmarks in the shift in the British position towards entry into the EEC during 1960 are familiar. The cancellation of the British Blue Streak weapons system, American refusal to back EFTA as against the EEC, the failure of the Paris Summit on East-West disarmament, plus a general recognition that the Commonwealth was no longer a pedestal for London’s world authority gave a nervous edge to British self-perception.417

As argued by Greenwood, the year 1960 was ‘pivotal’ in Britain’s decision to apply for membership of the Common Market.418 Before the Macmillan government decided to apply, there were various initiatives emerging from Whitehall which advocated partial association with the EEC or membership of the ECSC or Euratom, but not full membership of the EEC. This is heavily indicative of a very reluctant and guarded change in British foreign policy. Indeed, many of the concerns voiced by officials during Messina and earlier continued to frame the debate in 1960. Domestic agriculture, Commonwealth ties and Britain’s involvement in EFTA continued to be highly contentious issues which hampered officials’ earnestness and commitment. In the words of Gowland and Turner, the decision to apply was ‘taken not in a fit of Euro-enthusiasm, but out of a reluctant recognition that it represented the lesser of two evils’.419

The slow reversal of policy and the more ‘pro-European’ line being taken can possibly be attributed to the change in personnel at the top of certain departments at the beginning of 1960, particularly the Treasury.420 For example, the ardently Atlanticist Roger Makins had been replaced as Joint Permanent Secretary by the vehemently pro-European Sir Frank Lee.421 In addition, Eric Roll, who was an Austrian-born economist with strong pro-European convictions, took over from R.E. Stedman at the Ministry of Agriculture.422 The

418 Ibid.
420 Ibid.
422 Gilbert Holliday, “European Economic Questions: changes in senior officials in Whitehall dealing with this subject”, 20 January 1960, TNA/FO371/150152/M611/85; Frances Cairncross, “Roll, Eric,
upper echelons of the civil service were slowly becoming more open to the idea of associating with the Common Market on some level. 1960 also saw the launch of EFTA, the British government’s strategy to regain control of the European integration movement. Whilst the ‘Grand Design’ and attempts to rationalise the European assemblies in favour of more ‘streamlined’ political coordination had failed, Britain had succeeded in the creation of an alternative trade bloc which did not rely on supranational oversight. However, the successful establishment of EFTA and the British government’s continued reliance on it proved to be a damaging foreign policy gamble.

Before Britain had even considered devising alternative forms of European cooperation, the United States had made clear from the outset that it supported the Six’s endeavours and would not look kindly upon any British attempts to frustrate or undermine them.423 The opinions of the Eisenhower and later the newly-elected Kennedy administrations on EFTA, however, had not been fully ascertained. The Deputy Under-Secretary for European economic affairs, Paul Gore-Booth, who was soon to be transferred to India and appointed British High Commissioner, wrote a letter to Harold Caccia, the British ambassador to the United States, asking for him to ‘keep us continuously informed of the development of the ideas of the Americans in Washington’ regarding the EEC and EFTA.424 The Foreign Office knew that EFTA’s viability as a competitor of the EEC would be largely dependent on the attitude of the United States and therefore needed as much information as possible. The very future of British foreign policy towards Europe hinged on this factor. Certain officials were particularly apprehensive given the apparently unenthusiastic response to EFTA in the world press compared with the EEC’s overwhelmingly positive reception.425 Discussions in the OEEC and elsewhere about the EEC and EFTA proved frustrating for the British government. For example, the United States government supported the Six’s decision to lower the common tariff, thereby greatly accelerating the process of economic integration, and expressed their sympathy for the Six’s refusal to strike a deal on tariffs with the EFTA member states.426 The United States attempted to reassure EFTA by arguing that it ‘supported the general intentions of the EEC’ and that ‘the


425 “European Economic Integration: Note of Meeting held in Mr. France’s room, Treasury”, 21 March 1960, TNA/FO371/150159/M611/163.

statement does not reflect animosity towards EFTA’. This did little to quell the Foreign Office’s apprehension:

...the statement had created the impression in the United States and elsewhere that the Americans are supporting the Six against the Seven. We therefore fear that it may seriously prejudice discussions in the Trade Committee and cut across our efforts to find acceptable means of dealing with the European trade problem.

In light of what was perceived as the United States’ lukewarm attitude towards Britain’s participation in the European integration process, the Prime Minister began consulting the Economic Steering Committee and Whitehall in March 1960 about the government’s potential options. After some suggestions from Conservative MP Peter Kirk and others, the Foreign Office were asked to provide thoughts on the possibility of Britain joining the ECSC and Euratom, but not the EEC. Gilbert Holliday, the soon to be replaced Head of the EEOD, circulated a minute in which he argued that ‘the balance of advantage between staying out and coming in has changed since 1953’, stating that Britain could stand to gain significantly from membership of the ECSC and Euratom, but that this would be in direct conflict with EFTA and would probably result in eventual accession to the Common Market anyway. The initial thoughts of other officials varied. John Coulson argued that the ‘political kudos’ of joining either organisation would probably be quite limited, and would do little to convince the Six that the British government were more committed to the ideal of European unity. The Permanent Under-Secretary, Frederick Hoyer-Millar, also waded into the debate and added that ‘the case for joining both Euratom and ECSC is stronger than before’, but also acknowledged that the launch of EFTA was a ‘complicating factor’ and that the government would struggle to justify their move towards the Six without offending the Seven on some level. The Economic Steering Committee’s findings also favoured a greater commitment to European integration. Frank Lee forcefully argued that EFTA was no longer a practical solution and that Britain could no longer rely on the

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427 Ibid.
428 Ibid.
430 Gilbert Holliday, “United Kingdom Relationship with the European Atomic Energy Community and the European Coal and Steel Community”, 7 April 1960, TNA/FO371/150160/M611/172.
Commonwealth. In addition, Lee discarded the notion of an Atlantic Free Trade Area as ‘not a practicable objective’. According to Hugo Young, Lee was aware at this stage that he could not bluntly recommend membership of the EEC given the division of opinion in Whitehall, but he did make the case for ‘near-identification’ with the Common Market. This stance tallied with the cautious calls for membership of one or more of the European Communities and opened the door to more support for initiatives concerned with associating with the EEC. On the whole, most Whitehall officials were in agreement that a re-examination of Britain joining the ECSC and Euratom was warranted, with Macmillan adding: ‘I certainly agree that it would be a fine thing if we reconsider the case for the United Kingdom joining the European Coal and Steel Community and Euratom’. However, it is crucial to delve into the deeper implications of this decision. The motivation behind re-examining the case for British membership of the ECSC and Euratom was, in large part, concern over American attitudes towards British European policy. Therefore, Britain’s approach towards European integration was still heavily influenced by Atlanticist considerations. In addition, the government’s initial refusal to consider full membership of the Common Market was in keeping with the cautious and guarded approach towards European integration which had characterised post-war British foreign policy. The push for British participation in Euratom and the ECSC was not a dramatic reversal of foreign policy; it was merely an alternative means of achieving long-held objectives, principally the preservation of Britain’s global influence.

Upon agreeing that the case for membership of the ECSC and Euratom was worth pursuing, the Foreign Office decided to ascertain the opinions of the Six and the United States. Sir Harold Caccia’s reply from the Washington embassy was the most important given the British government’s desire to placate the Eisenhower (and later the Kennedy) administration. Caccia’s telegram confirmed what London had feared:

They would...tend to welcome an offer by us to join Euratom and/or the ECSC and regard it as a sign of grace on our part that we at last showed signs of moving in the direction in which they had always hoped we would move. But I think they would inevitably conclude that this was merely the first step and that with one more heave they would be able to get us into the European Economic Community (sic).

433 Young, *This Blessed Plot* (1998), 120.
435 Young, *This Blessed Plot* (1998), 121.
Otherwise they would not see much point in our taking this step and the favourable reaction would soon wear off. 437

The reaction from Bonn was slightly more optimistic. Sir Christopher Steel argued that large numbers of German politicians had called for ‘some contribution or gesture’ from Britain in order to counter the view that the EEC and EFTA were causing divisions, and that membership of Euratom and the ECSC would go some way to allay these fears. 438 Gladwyn Jebb’s report from Paris painted a more complex picture with regards to French attitudes. Jebb stated that Britain could expect ‘a guarded welcome accompanied by some smug satisfaction that we had at last seen the error of our ways.’ 439 In a similar vein to the Americans, Jebb also reported that the French would interpret British membership of Euratom and ECSC as the first step towards eventual accession to the Common Market. 440 In addition, Jebb warned that French suspicions of ‘our offering to join these two organisations was a deep-seated ploy by Perfidious Albion somehow to weaken the Six and to play them off against the Germans’ would be harboured and that de Gaulle’s attitude would ultimately prove decisive. 441 Despite some of the variations in the responses from the overseas embassies, several conclusions appeared to have been reached: the obstacles which had previously prevented Britain from joining the Communities were now less problematic; membership of the ECSC and Euratom would broadly be seen as a positive step towards European integration but would also conjure up suspicions over why Britain continued to refuse to enter the EEC; and British relations with EFTA and the Seven would likely suffer in the event that she enter the ECSC and Euratom. Compounding the warnings of the diplomatic service, the Chancellor of the Exchequer Derick Heathcoat-Amory presented the Treasury’s assessment to the Prime Minister, which somewhat contradicted the Foreign Office’s more optimistic case. Heathcoat-Amory argued that ‘there would be little political advantage to be gained from our taking an initiative now to join either or both of these Communities’ and that ‘it would not of itself bring about any significant change in the attitude of the Six towards us’. 442 This argument summarised the

438 Christopher Steel, “UK Membership of ECSC and Euratom: German Attitude”, 6 May 1960, TNA/FO371/150160/M611/176.
440 Ibid.
441 Ibid.
442 Derick Heathcoat-Amory to Harold Macmillan, 16 May 1960, TNA/FO371/150161/M611/196.
departmental scepticism of the Treasury towards the very idea of European integration, as argued by scholars such as Hugo Young, Ludlow, and Bulmer and Burch.\textsuperscript{443} The case for membership of the ECSC and Euratom, was, therefore, plagued with uncertainty and conflicting points of view.

The British government’s hopes for a guarded and qualified relationship with the Six via the ECSC and Euratom were soon dealt a blow when Arthur Tandy, the ambassador to the EEC, sent a report to the Foreign Office from Brussels detailing a conversation he had had with William Walton Butterworth of the United States mission to the EEC:

He said that it had been decided that, if the United Kingdom were to propose joining Euratom and/or the ECSC but not the European Economic Community, the United States government would oppose acceptance of this by every means within their power no matter how much embarrassment was caused. The United States government believed that such action would be disruptive of the unity of the Six to which they attached so much importance...\textsuperscript{444}

The Eisenhower administration had previously expressed their support for the Common Market and refused to act as mediators between the two economic groupings in the OEEC, but this had gone further in its condemnation of Britain’s half-heartedness.\textsuperscript{445} The diplomatic service’s findings confirmed London’s fears and spurred Macmillan into action, who was extremely concerned by the tidings which had reached him from Washington. The Prime Minister telegrammed Selwyn Lloyd, who at the time happened to be in the American capital, ordering him to discuss the attitude of the Eisenhower administration towards Britain’s relationship with Europe with the Secretary of State, Christian Herter.\textsuperscript{446} Macmillan urged Lloyd to try and convince Herter that the British government’s attempts to integrate with Europe were absolutely sincere and raise concerns about the ‘good many indications that the State Department and its officials are critical of British policy.’\textsuperscript{447} Lloyd’s report back to London was short but stated that Herter had denied that the Americans


\textsuperscript{444} Arthur Tandy to Foreign Office, 30 May 1960, TNA/FO371/150161/M611/209.


\textsuperscript{446} Harold Macmillan to Selwyn Lloyd, 1 June 1960, TNA/FO371/150162/M611/214.

\textsuperscript{447} \textit{Ibid.}
were consciously working against the British government on European integration. Tandy’s telegram also provoked a response from John Robinson, a First Secretary in the EEOD. Robinson recognised that Britain needed to pursue its own independent policy towards Europe without constantly trying to justify their reluctance to the Americans. His minutes on the telegram betrayed a passionately pro-European stance, where he argued that ‘we ourselves recognise that we should not take a decision on ECSC and Euratom in isolation’ and that British accession to the Common Market was the next logical step. In actual fact, this directly contradicted the attitudes of more senior officials such as Steel and Hoyer-Millar, who were hopeful that membership of the two Communities would allow Britain to continue her policy of prioritising the Anglo-American partnership and acting as the ‘bridge’ between North America and Europe without submitting to the EEC’s stringent trade regulations. This attitude was expressed in Roger Jackling’s more Atlanticist comments:

It is nevertheless for consideration whether we ought not to make yet another attempt to persuade the US to be of help to us, be that following a course of sympathetic passivity in our attempts to get our relationship with Europe right.

These comments from Robinson and Jackling are strong evidence of the gulf in attitudes between the elder and the younger generation in the Foreign Office. Both groups, of course, held the same objectives – to preserve and promote British power and prestige in global politics. However, there was a profound disconnect in the generations’ views on how this could best be achieved.

The mixed signals from Washington did not prevent the government and the Foreign Office from pursuing communications and meetings with officials and politicians from the Six. Roderick Barclay, the Deputy Under-Secretary for European economic affairs, summoned the ambassadors of the Six to his office in London – what became known as the ad hoc committee – and opened discussions over Britain’s possible accession to Euratom and the ECSC. The WEU Council had tabled a recommendation on the subject a week earlier, and

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448 Selwyn Lloyd to Harold Macmillan, 3 June 1960, TNA/FO371/150162/M611/214.
the delegates agreed that informal discussions between representatives of Britain and the Six was the best way to proceed for the time being.  

Barclay’s views in the meeting provide a critical insight into the senior officials’ mindset as Britain drifted towards the European Communities. He asserted that membership of Euratom and ECSC ‘did not represent a new British initiative’ or a ‘great change of policy’, and that it was in line with the government’s policy of ‘seeking ways and means of associating with Western Europe’. It could be argued that Barclay had taken this line in an attempt to project the British government’s position as one of strength and resolve, but even if this is the case, it betrays the fact that senior officials and ministers were concerned with how British foreign policy towards Europe was perceived by the Six, and how this could potentially affect Britain’s negotiating position. Conversely, if Barclay’s statements in the meeting were indeed sincere, then this is direct evidence of the Foreign Office pursuing what they considered to be a conservative and moderate strategy which did little to revolutionise the government’s stance on European integration and was largely in keeping with the cautious and guarded approach which had been employed previously. As well as reaffirming the British government’s line on European integration, the meeting served a dual purpose. Barclay went to great lengths to seek assurances that Britain would be granted the opportunity to apply to the ECSC and Euratom without applying to the EEC. The ambassadors of the Six offered no such guarantees, with the Dutch ambassador arguing that a decision would only be reached when ‘details of possible adherence had been agreed’. This did little to comfort Barclay, who responded negatively when the ambassador from Luxembourg stated that the meeting itself showed that the Six accepted the UK’s application to the European Communities in principle.

The ad hoc committee met again at the end of July 1960, where Barclay once again took a firm line on Euratom and the ECSC, stating that the British government needed some indication of the Six’s attitudes towards such a venture. However, Barclay also referred to a speech made by the Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, where the latter made clear that the government understood that British membership of the two Communities could not be ‘decided in isolation’ and that it was part of the ‘wider problem’ of her relationship with

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452 Ibid.
453 Ibid.
454 Ibid.
455 Ibid.
456 Ibid.
the Common Market. As will be argued below, Lloyd’s speech in the House of Commons had a profound impact on the Six’s perceptions of British attitudes towards European integration, and gave them a fund of goodwill with the Germans and Italians in particular. Barclay’s stance was seemingly contradictory, and the ambassadors of the Six tried to explain to Barclay that given the uncertain future of the Communities, as well as their possible amalgamation, a definitive position on Britain joining the ECSC and Euratom was not possible. The Dutch ambassador pressed Barclay further and asked if the British government were completely unable to accept accession to the EEC; Barclay replied rather vaguely that ‘this was still not known’ and that Britain’s relationship with Euratom ‘could not be divorced from the major question’. It was agreed that the questions raised by Barclay in the meeting would be referred to the Six’s Permanent Representatives to the European Communities in Brussels, where they would be subjected to a lengthy process of consultation and assessment. The bid for membership of Euratom and the ECSC would have to wait.

Whilst the EEOD continued to examine the case for British membership of the ECSC and Euratom, things were moving quickly in the Cabinet and the Economic Steering Committee. Frank Lee’s findings in April and May had reportedly significantly influenced the Prime Minister, and on 13 July 1960 a Cabinet meeting was called. Ministers were presented with a report from Cabinet Office officials based on Lee’s recommendations and a momentous debate ensued on the possibility of Britain joining or associating with the Common Market. Despite Lee’s position as Joint Permanent Secretary of the Treasury, foreign policy questions formed an integral part of the discussion. The document plainly acknowledged that the EEC was fast becoming an ‘effective political and economic force’ and would soon become ‘the dominating influence in Europe and the only Western bloc approaching in influence...the USSR and the United States.’ Interestingly, the document also went to some length to dispel any beliefs that the Six would form a controversial, non-aligned ‘third force’ in global politics which had been a sticking point for many officials in

458 Ibid.
459 Ludlow, Dealing with Britain (1997), 33.
460 Ibid.
461 Ibid.
462 Ibid.
465 Ibid.
the previous chapter.\textsuperscript{466} It was argued that the Six would only deviate from the United States and the Atlantic Alliance to a very limited extent, which quelled fears that some of the Western European states, particularly France and West Germany, might seek some form of \textit{rapprochement} with the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{467} The issue which probably had the greatest impact on Cabinet ministers, however, was Britain and the EEC’s future relationships with the United States. It was argued in the document that there had been a ‘growth of direct consultation between the Six and the United States’ which was likely to continue and would almost certainly jeopardise Britain’s perceived role as the ‘mediator’ between North America and Western Europe.\textsuperscript{468} The notion that Britain’s ‘general decline in...influence – especially in Europe – would inevitably encourage the United States to pay increasing importance to the views of the Community’ was a serious concern for a generation of politicians and officials who had put a lot of stock in the ‘special relationship’.\textsuperscript{469} There were still warnings that joining the EEC would endanger Britain’s agreement with the United States on atomic energy and potentially antagonise trade relations with American goods facing strong discrimination from the common external tariff, but the argument that Anglo-American relations would suffer inside the EEC had been turned on its head.

This, for many of the senior policymakers in Whitehall and in government, eventually became the ‘clincher’ which prompted the decision to apply for membership of the Common Market. The Cabinet did not agree to apply on 13 July 1960; several ministers still had reservations over the Commonwealth and EFTA, but as Lamb has argued, ‘Macmillan had broken the ice’ and the meeting is now regarded by some historians as the decisive moment when the first application became a reality.\textsuperscript{470} Furthermore, Macmillan’s subsequent Cabinet reshuffle two weeks later saw a number of pro-European ministers promoted, including Edward Heath as Lord Privy Seal, Christopher Soames as Minister for Agriculture and Duncan Sandys as Minister for Commonwealth Relations.\textsuperscript{471} Selwyn Lloyd was appointed Chancellor of the Exchequer and was replaced as Foreign Secretary by Alec Douglas-Home, who ‘by temperament and background...was some distance removed from Heath’s passionate commitment to a united Europe’ and was more than content for Heath

\textsuperscript{466} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{467} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{468} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{470} See: Lamb, \textit{The Macmillan Years} (1995), 139; Young, \textit{This Blessed Plot} (1998), 123.
\textsuperscript{471} Young, \textit{This Blessed Plot} (1998), 124; Greenwood, “Not the “General Will” but the “Will of the General”” (2005), 179.
to take the lead on the negotiations. The board was set, and Macmillan had invested in the pieces which he believed would deliver him a political ‘checkmate’ in Europe. The Prime Minister’s first move was Selwyn Lloyd’s speech on European trade in the Commons.


http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/60455
‘The Need for Political and Economic Unity in Europe’

The first matter mentioned in the Motion is that of European unity, the need for political and economic unity in Europe. I want to make certain points absolutely clear. We in Britain regard ourselves as part of Europe. By history, by tradition, by civilisation, by sentiment, by geography, we are part of Europe...the fact that the English Channel had not been crossed successfully in war as often as had some other physical barriers in Europe did not disqualify us from European status. The fact that our Queen is Head of the Commonwealth and that we are a member of that association does not disqualify us from European status.473

Selwyn Lloyd’s speech during the European trade debate in the House of Commons in his new position as Chancellor of the Exchequer represented a significant moment for the British government’s stance on European integration, and was an exceptionally well-timed political gambit. Just as the Foreign Office had opened up discussions with representatives from the Six on membership of the ECSC and Euratom, the Chancellor had confirmed Britain’s strong commitment to the ideal of European unity. The move yielded results almost instantaneously. Macmillan met with Adenauer a couple of weeks after the debate in the Commons, where the two men had highly productive talks on British association with the EEC, with the Chancellor announcing that he strongly believed Commonwealth free entry could and should be preserved.474 This was a remarkably radical statement, with an article in The Times commenting: ‘it can be said that the conversations yesterday and today have made it possible for Britain to contemplate association with the Six that seemed almost impossible only a few weeks ago.’475 Adenauer also suggested further bilateral talks with Macmillan on the ‘Six/Seven’ issues plaguing relations between EFTA and the EEC in the autumn of the same year, which eventually took place in November.476 So far, the Prime Minister’s political manoeuvring was proving successful.

The EEOD continued to play a crucial role as the government pushed for association with the Common Market at the high political level. In light of the progress made by the Prime Minister, the department changed its rhetoric on British involvement in Europe and became much less guarded, at least in internal correspondence. In preparation for the Lord Privy Seal, Edward Heath’s visit to the WEU Assembly, a brief was drafted which updated

475 Ibid.
476 Ludlow, Dealing with Britain (1997), 33.
the department’s line on European integration. The brief betrayed an alternative stance to the one which had been followed previously, stating:

We have now come round to the view not only that membership of Euratom and ECSC alone would bring no direct gain for us (indeed membership of Euratom and ECSC alone would bring serious disadvantages unless we could negotiate special treatment), but that it would not materially assist us to achieve our political objectives. These can only be achieved by membership, or something very similar to membership, of all three Six-power Communities. Moreover, it is most improbable that the Six would grant us membership of only two of the three communities. 477

This was a significant departure from the orthodoxy which had prevailed a couple of months earlier, where membership of two of the European Communities was seen as a viable option worthy of serious exploration. The reasons behind this change are not entirely clear. The Prime Minister’s increased interest in European integration and his supposed ‘conversion’ towards applying for membership of the Common Market in the summer of 1960 certainly appear to have played a role. 478 However, Greenwood’s assertion that the Foreign Office’s objectives had evolved from ‘Six/Seven bridge building’ to ‘a more radical approach to Europe...based upon the political advantages to the Soviet Union of dissension among the West Europeans’ is very much in line with the archival evidence, particularly departmental concerns over United States attitudes towards British detachment from the Six. 479

The Foreign Office’s new line on European integration was reinforced by a telegram from Arthur Tandy, the UK Representative to the European Communities. Tandy argued that ‘anything short of membership would deprive the UK of the right to participate in [the common commercial policy’s] drafting, approval, administration or subsequent modification’ and that the British government ‘should not contemplate entering into any relationship with the EEC other than one which would be accepted as membership

479 Greenwood, “‘Not the “General Will” but the “Will of the General”’” (2005), 185.
conferring the right of participation in all Community institutions.’ Tandy’s fundamental argument was that Britain stood to lose more from exclusion than it did from inclusion – better in than out. The comments on his telegram appear to have been broadly in agreement, which again suggests that the EEOD were moving towards a more ‘radical approach’ to Europe. The passionately pro-European John Robinson stated that there was nothing in Tandy’s communication ‘with which we need disagree’. This was high praise indeed from an official who had a reputation for berating many of his colleagues’ thoughts and suggestions. Ken Gallagher, the Head of the EEOD, was equally in accordance with Robinson, writing: ‘the conclusions in Mr. Tandy’s note are entirely in line with our own views.’ Gallagher, however, went further in his analysis of Tandy’s points. Tandy had argued that the Foreign Office’s pursuit of an association with the ECSC High Authority was misplaced due to the latter’s dwindling influence within the institutions of the European Communities. Gallagher concurred and also stated his belief that following the Treaty of Rome, the Council of Ministers was fast becoming ‘in practice the policymaking body’, due to the ‘decline in the federalist idea’, which the Foreign Office and British government were largely hostile towards. Gallagher added that given the Council of Ministers’ status as the principal decision-making body in the EEC, national governments were at less risk of being overruled or having their authority challenged by the Commission. In short, the supranational barrier was seemingly a much lesser problem than it had been previously. This could lend further justification for a British bid for membership of the Common Market. Gallagher’s analysis was in keeping with the political climate of the day: de Gaulle’s anti-federalist sentiment was no secret and the French President had been pressing for regular intergovernmental meetings between the Six’s heads of state to stem the tide of supranationalism. For a pragmatic and ‘painfully logical’ mind such as Gallagher’s, this threat to British sovereignty had been minimised. As such, it could be argued that Gallagher’s acceptance of a British application for membership of the EEC was largely due

480 Arthur Tandy, “UK Association with the European Communities”, 24 November 1960, TNA/FO371/150165/M611/287.
484 Arthur Tandy, “UK Association with the European Communities”, 24 November 1960, TNA/FO371/150165/M611/287.
486 Ibid.
487 Northedge, British Foreign Policy (1962), 324; Bulmer, “Britain and European Integration” (1992), 8; Young Britain and European Unity (2000), 65.
488 Neil Smith (former British ambassador to Finland), interview with the author, 16 June 2016, Canterbury.
to practical considerations, as opposed to Robinson’s personal attachment to the principle of European unity. These attitudes defined the differences between the elder and younger generations of officials under study in this chapter.

The new departmental line continued to bear fruit. In December 1960, the WEU Assembly passed a resolution stating that ‘negotiations should be opened between the member governments of WEU with a view to the United Kingdom’s entry as a full member into the European Economic Community’. The resolution was deemed ‘perfectly satisfactory’ by the Foreign Office, and it even proposed ‘the adherence of the UK to the Treaty of Rome on terms acceptable to the UK’. Whilst this may seem like a diplomatic victory, it is worth acknowledging that this resolution meant very little in the grand scheme of things. The WEU Council was completely separate from the institutions of the European Communities and in fact had no say in the membership process. The Foreign Office were aware of this and decided that it was in the government’s best interests to ‘not take any cognisance of it as yet’. However, the WEU Council was made up of delegates from the six member states of the EEC, which potentially gave the resolution special status as a ‘precursor’ of acceptance for Britain. In this sense, one could argue that it provided the British government with a valuable propaganda coup which could be referred to as the negotiations unfolded. The near-unanimous support for a British bid for membership of the European Communities was a strong endorsement and a gesture of goodwill on the part of the Six. The substance of the resolution is, however, of less importance than the wider impact it had on attitudes in the Foreign Office. Having received word of the resolution from Brussels, the Foreign Office circulated a telegram to all British High Commissioners in Commonwealth countries with a view to giving assurances on the future of Commonwealth trade. The telegram instructed the High Commissioners to inform the Commonwealth governments that the member states of the EEC were beginning to appreciate the importance and the complexity of Commonwealth trade as a potential bar to British entry of the Common Market. In addition, the telegram mentioned the fact that there was a ‘recognition that political and economic problems are inseparable’ with regards to Britain’s links with the Commonwealth.

489 “WEU Assembly Accepts Offer to Britain”, The Times 1 December 1960, 12.
491 Ibid.
492 “WEU Assembly Resolution Inviting the United Kingdom to Accede to the EEC”, 1 December 1960, TNA/FO371/150165/M611/289.
493 Ibid.
This statement is crucial in comprehending the Foreign Office’s adjustments in European integration policy. For years, the department had pursued a strategy of separating economic and political issues, as argued above. For example, the ‘Grand Design’ and the Free Trade Area were two schemes created by separate Foreign Office departments in order to boost British cooperation with Europe, and whilst the two complemented one another, there was a clear separation of political and economic considerations between the WOD and the MAD. Indeed, the Macmillan government had continued to attempt to forge economic links with Europe without paying the political price of loss of sovereignty via EFTA. It was an argument which Sir Gladwyn Jebb had consistently tried to make to his colleagues, that the EEC was primarily a ‘political association’, and that the political and economic questions needed to be considered jointly. 494 This new attitude towards European integration, albeit still very guarded and cautious, was a more radical one than that which had preceded it. Indeed, in his memoirs, Christopher Audland suggests that the naming of the EEOD was part of the ‘establishment’s desire to play down...the essentially political character’ of the department’s work. 495

Conversely, the EEOD’s Atlanticist concerns over the United States government’s attitude towards EFTA and a possible Six/Seven solution endured. These concerns were exacerbated by the uncertainties surrounding the creation of a new administration under the newly-elected President John F. Kennedy. Although the Foreign Office had moved towards a more favourable position on the EEC, there were still very serious questions surrounding issues such as EFTA, agriculture, and the Commonwealth. Barclay launched enquiries with the Washington embassy ‘to see what policy the new administration will follow on the Six/Seven issue.” 496 Barclay was confident that the new personnel in the State Department would be less hostile to EFTA and that progress could be made on an association with the Common Market. 497 As argued above, Barclay had a highly personal stake in the success of the EFTA. His position as Deputy Under-Secretary and special adviser on European trade questions had seen him play an integral part in the launching of EFTA, which he also named his dog after, highlighting his strong emotional attachment to his work. 498 Barclay stressed the need for ‘the benevolent neutrality of the US government and if possible their active

496 Roderick Barclay to Harold Caccia, 22 December 1960, TNA/FO371/158160/M614/1.
497 Ibid.
support’ in order to solve the political divisions in Western Europe. \(^{499}\) Barclay was very clear in his discussion of the Six/Seven problem that it was a matter of great political magnitude, and acknowledged that it could not simply be relegated to a debate on tariffs and economic interests. \(^{500}\) In addition, Barclay made reference to the fact that a Six/Seven association would open the door to more favourable arrangements on agriculture and the Commonwealth for Britain in the event that she acceded to the EEC. \(^{501}\) In this sense, Barclay represented the cautious and conservative wing of the Foreign Office, who were in principle unopposed to membership of the Common Market but demanded a heavily qualified relationship with safeguards in place. As such, the line being taken by the more senior figures in the EEOD was not radically different to the institutional orthodoxy a few years earlier, when membership of the EEC was ruled out completely.

The ambassador to the United States, Harold Caccia, replied to Barclay and seems to have harboured very similar views. Caccia argued that the best course of action would be to try and ‘win over’ several key American policymakers, including the new Secretary of State Dean Rusk and the chiefs of the Economic Affairs department. \(^{502}\) The ambassador suggested that this be accomplished by appealing to the State Department’s Cold War objectives by making the argument that a Six/Seven solution would substantially bolster the strength of the Western bloc. \(^{503}\) Caccia’s preoccupation with international defence strategies and overarching global security matters was typical of the senior generation, who tended to view most foreign policy matters through the ‘internationalist’ lens of the Cold War, as argued in the previous chapter. This is made abundantly clear in Caccia’s telegram, where he states that the British government’s ultimate objective was to forge ‘an economic system embracing the North American countries as well as the rest of Europe.’ \(^{504}\) This attachment to an ‘Atlantic Community’, spearheaded by Anglo-American leadership, was an idea which never lost traction with those who had witnessed the administrative peak of the ‘special relationship’ during the War. Caccia suggested that a new memorandum be drafted for the Washington embassy to use and refer to during discussions with members of the Kennedy administration. \(^{505}\) This would give the embassy a

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\(^{499}\) Roderick Barclay to Harold Caccia, 22\(^{nd}\) December 1960, TNA/FO371/158160/M614/1.

\(^{500}\) Ibid.

\(^{501}\) Ibid.

\(^{502}\) Harold Caccia to Roderick Barclay, 28 December 1960, TNA/FO371/158160/M614/1.

\(^{503}\) Ibid.

\(^{504}\) Ibid.

\(^{505}\) Ibid.
line to follow which would hopefully prove agreeable to members of the State Department. Barclay agreed and the EEOD began drafting immediately.\(^{506}\)

The memorandum for the Washington embassy is extremely important to this study for two reasons. Firstly, the four senior officials under study in this chapter – Roderick Barclay, Patrick Reilly, Ken Gallagher and Roger Jackling – were all consulted on the draft. Secondly, it highlights the weight which concerns over United States attitudes carried in the Foreign Office, and more specifically, the EEOD, which was supposedly occupied with European economic issues, not Anglo-American relations. The first draft of the memorandum acknowledged that hitherto, two different methods of European cooperation had manifested themselves: supranationalism and intergovernmentalism.\(^{507}\) These differing approaches were labelled as the causes of the ‘present split in Western Europe’.\(^{508}\) This admission is of particular interest to this study, as it affirms the findings of the previous chapter, where it is argued that the Foreign Office sought to construct an ‘alternative’ framework for European cooperation. Whilst the draft recognised that these competing visions of European unity had contributed towards the formation of a rift in Western Europe, the rhetoric employed hinted that the blame lay with the Six and their refusal to accept ‘wider arrangements designed to preserve the economic unity of Western Europe as a whole’.\(^{509}\) This is another point of significance for this study. The Foreign Office’s official line on EEC had indeed changed, as outlined above, but the acceptance that an application for membership was imminent did not remove all traces of reluctance and reservation. Officials such as Barclay, Reilly, Jackling and Gallagher were still adamant that safeguards for British interests such as EFTA were essential preconditions for accession. This is the overriding attitude which coloured the memorandum for convincing the new United States administration of the British government’s point of view. The essential arguments which were deployed included the fact that the Commonwealth was integral to the ‘strength and stability of the free world’ in the struggle against the international threat of communism, and that damaging the economic interests of the Commonwealth by forcing Britain to yield its policy of free entry would be a blow to the Western bloc.\(^{510}\) In addition, the draft made reference to the incompatibility of Britain’s domestic agricultural policy with the EEC’s,

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506 Roderick Barclay to Harold Caccia, 3 January 1961, TNA/FO371/158160/M614/1.
508 Ibid.
509 Ibid.
510 Ibid.
citing a potentially sharp rise in food prices.\textsuperscript{511} The possibility of an EEC-EFTA association was presented as the main solution to these problems, and the recent WEU resolution and bilateral talks between Macmillan and Adenauer were used as evidence of a more sympathetic view emerging from the Six.\textsuperscript{512}

The first draft of the memorandum came under some criticism from the strongly pro-European Edward Tomkins, the Head of the Western Department and a future ambassador to France.\textsuperscript{513} The official had a number of concerns which he echoed to his colleagues. Firstly, Tomkins argued that the memorandum in its current form would do little to win over more sceptical members of the State Department such as Douglas Dillon.\textsuperscript{514} His main concern was that the draft unduly implied that the British government’s objectives for European unity were the same as those of the Six, which he believed to be fundamentally untrue.\textsuperscript{515} Secondly, he said that such a statement would provoke a strong rebuttal from the State Department, as it was their view that the EEC and EFTA’s aims were divergent, ‘and it is for this reason they have supported the Six and not the Seven’.\textsuperscript{516} Thirdly, Tomkins also urged caution with regards to the criticisms levelled at the Six in the draft, suggesting that it would do little to further the Foreign Office’s cause, particularly given current State Department sympathies.\textsuperscript{517} The top officials in the EEOD took exception to Tomkins’ criticisms. Patrick Reilly dismissed Tomkins’ suggestion that criticism of the Six was unwise, stating that ‘there are real dangers in the present situation and it is very hard to say this convincingly without...implying some criticism of what the Six are doing.’\textsuperscript{518} Barclay largely concurred with Reilly’s comments, adding that there were in fact some suggestions that the criticisms of the Six should be ‘expanded and strengthened’, but that they had resisted this.\textsuperscript{519} Jackling was more scathing of Tomkins’ remarks, arguing that he had read his colleague’s thoughts ‘with suspicion’ and that the British government’s policy on European integration was more positive than negative; ‘searching always for the widest of schemes’.\textsuperscript{520} Gallagher added that Tomkins had misunderstood the aim of the

\textsuperscript{511} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{512} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{514} Edward Tomkins to Patrick Reilly, 13 January 1961, TNA/FO371/158160/M614/7.
\textsuperscript{515} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{516} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{517} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{518} Patrick Reilly, “Minutes”, 13 January 1961, TNA/FO371/158160/M614/7.
\textsuperscript{519} Roderick Barclay, “Minutes”, 13 January 1961, TNA/FO371/158160/M614/7.
\textsuperscript{520} Roger Jackling, “Minutes”, 13 January 1961, TNA/FO371/158160/M614/7.
memorandum itself: to present the British government’s policy in the most favourable light, and that the draft had not created a ‘misleading or inaccurate impression’ in this cause.\(^\text{521}\) Having been firmly isolated by the EEOD’s senior officials, Tomkins was overruled and the memorandum was sent to the Cabinet for approval. The ministers reviewed the memorandum and after adding a couple of suggestions from the Prime Minister, authorised it to be sent to Harold Caccia.\(^\text{522}\) The overtures to the Kennedy administration were given the green light.

Meanwhile, the Lord Privy Seal, Edward Heath, decided to write to Macmillan in order to update him on the progress of the Six/Seven issue in light of the bilateral talks which had been conducted with the Germans and Italians, as mentioned above. Heath informed the Prime Minister that so far the talks had been quite productive, but that the French still remained the greatest barrier to further progress.\(^\text{523}\) Heath attributed this to the French’s lack of understanding of the British position and concerns.\(^\text{524}\) He suggested bilateral talks with them as soon as possible in order to establish a mutual understanding of the two countries’ policies.\(^\text{525}\) The government had tried to hold tripartite talks with both the French and the Germans, but the former had refused on the grounds that they would be diplomatically ‘cornered’ by the other two.\(^\text{526}\) Heath’s thoughts on consulting ministers over these new developments were pragmatic and calculating. The Lord Privy Seal knew that it would be ‘a mistake to raise before the Anglo-French talks the fundamental questions of foreign policy, national sovereignty and the problem of association with or membership of the Common Market’ with the Cabinet, as he believed that the reservations which had appeared at the momentous Cabinet meeting of July 1960 would resurface.\(^\text{527}\) Instead, Heath argued that ‘we should try to carry our colleagues with us’ by emphasising the positives of the Anglo-German talks.\(^\text{528}\) Heath knew that there would be fierce opposition from certain members of the Cabinet such as the Home Secretary Rab Butler, but elected to keep his colleagues in the dark for the time being.\(^\text{529}\)

\(^{522}\) Roderick Barclay to Harold Caccia, 10 February 1961, TNA/FO371/158160/M614/16.
\(^{523}\) Edward Heath to Harold Macmillan, 7 February 1961, TNA/FO371/158264/M634/12.
\(^{524}\) Ibid.
\(^{525}\) Ibid.
\(^{526}\) Arthur Tandy to Ken Gallagher, 6 January 1961, TNA/FO371/158170/M615/5.
\(^{527}\) Edward Heath to Harold Macmillan, 7 February 1961, TNA/FO371/158264/M634/12.
\(^{528}\) Ibid.
\(^{529}\) Ludlow, \textit{Dealing with Britain} (1997), 38.
Simultaneously, Macmillan had ordered the Foreign Office to draft a Cabinet paper on British policy towards the Six and the Seven, which the EEOD took the lead on. The paper, which was edited heavily by Barclay, reaffirmed the British government’s justifications for membership of the EEC on political grounds. The main motivation for membership, as it had been since the reassessment in July 1960, was the possibility of British power fading next to the increased significance of the Six; the mentality that Britain was better off in than out.530 The document also made much of the overarching security issues which would unfold if the Six were to fail and the Western bloc was to be weakened.531 These points had essentially been transplanted from the previous Cabinet paper and made no new developments in British foreign policy. However, the paper’s exploration of the potential reduction in national sovereignty was much more candid. It stated that ‘to join the Six would involve a greater surrender of our national sovereignty, e.g. in the powers of Parliament, than we have hitherto contemplated.’532 Despite this frank assessment of national sovereignty, the paper went to great lengths to emphasise the advantages of Britain’s increased say in the Council of Ministers and the maintenance of her global prestige in order to quell fears of Britain’s sacrosanct political institutions being sold down the river.533 The most significant statement, however, referred to the choice between membership and association:

Joining rather than associating would be the best way to achieve our foreign policy objectives. Moreover, an offer to join would be more likely to appeal to General de Gaulle than an offer to associate, which he would suspect as designed to secure the benefits without paying the price.534

The open acknowledgement that an application for full membership would convince the French of Britain’s sincerity and would, on balance, be more positive in the fulfilment of British foreign policy objectives was a slightly bolder line than that which had been espoused earlier. The possibility of an associative relationship had dominated policymaking throughout much of 1960. The attraction of full membership, albeit with safeguards in place, was becoming stronger in the Foreign Office, and further consultations on the

531 Ibid.
532 Ibid.
533 Ibid.
534 Ibid.
matter were to include ‘a comparison of the respective advantages and disadvantages of joining the Community as opposed to “association”’. 535

Bilateral talks with the French were arranged and took place on the 27 and 28 February in the Foreign Office. The British delegation was led by Sir Roderick Barclay and the French delegation was led by Olivier Wormser, head of economic affairs at the Quai d’Orsay. 536 Ludlow has stated that the Foreign Office ‘had come to fear and respect [Wormser] in the course of the free trade area discussions’ for his firm and uncompromising negotiating style. 537 Therefore, the talks were regarded as highly important and extremely sensitive. Barclay knew that Wormser would not be persuaded easily. The discussions began on EFTA and the need for safeguards for the Seven. 538 As Heath had predicted, the French responded by urging the British to accede to the Treaty of Rome and that their attitude towards individual issues such as EFTA would depend heavily on whether the UK was seeking full membership or a loose association. 539 The French delegation also argued that the British government’s readiness to accept the common external tariff was a welcome step forward, but that it was loaded with caveats on Commonwealth free entry which limited the advance in Britain’s position. 540 When Barclay pressed the French on how their attitudes would differ if Britain chose a loose association over membership, the French avoided giving a definitive answer. 541 This would have been particularly frustrating for the Foreign Office, who under Heath’s instructions were going to great lengths to ascertain the French position on the British ‘sticking points’. On agriculture, the French firmly ruled out any special provisions for British farming and argued that any demands on this front would make negotiations ‘extremely difficult’ and would ‘raise problems’. 542 This statement effectively slammed the door shut on the possibility of an extended transitional period for British agriculture; something which, according to Christopher Audland, the Ministry of Agriculture would later take great exception to and cause great difficulties over. 543 Overall, the meeting had proven largely unsatisfactory to the Foreign Office. Barclay wrote that

537 Ludlow, Dealing with Britain (1997), 35.
539 Ibid.
540 Ibid.
541 Ibid.
542 Ibid.
'although there was an exchange of views which both sides agreed had been useful, not much common ground was found.'\textsuperscript{544} The dismissal of the possibility of an associative relationship with the Common Market by Wormser was a bitter pill to swallow, particularly for Barclay who favoured a looser arrangement in order to protect EFTA and the Commonwealth.\textsuperscript{545}

The lukewarm hearing from the French was compounded by the response from the United States. In late March, the American Under-Secretary of State for Economic and Agricultural Affairs, who was also responsible for European affairs, George Ball, visited London.\textsuperscript{546} Ball is most famous for his opposition to the Vietnam War, but he was also passionately attached to the idea of ‘a strong, unified Western Europe’.\textsuperscript{547} Ball believed that Europe was the pivotal political arena of the Cold War, and that the ‘key to East-West rapprochement’ was through European integration.\textsuperscript{548} In his memoirs, Ball stated that after Kennedy took office he saw his duties ‘as twofold’:

\begin{quote}
I would encourage the British to take the plunge, but, at the same time I must not let insular British elements destroy the institutional potential of the Rome Treaty and turn the European Community into a mere trading bloc.\textsuperscript{549}
\end{quote}

Ball’s appointment, therefore, turned out to be a headache for the Foreign Office. Barclay and the other top officials in the EEOD had hoped that the new State Department personnel would be much more sympathetic towards Britain’s difficulties, but Ball harboured no such sympathy. He was particularly critical of what he perceived to be British ‘aloofness’ towards European integration, and that Britain ‘had not yet adjusted to reality’ with the loss of her empire, reminding them that they were ‘merely an island nation on which the sun not only set, but set every evening – provided one could see it for the rain’!\textsuperscript{550} At the meeting in London, which was attended by Heath and Sir Frank Lee, Ball

\textsuperscript{544} Roderick Barclay, “Anglo-French Talks on the Six/Seven Problem”, 28 February 1961, TNA/FO371/158172/M615/55.
\textsuperscript{545} Roderick Barclay, “European Economic Association Committee: EQ (61)3”, 13 March 1961, TNA/FO371/158265/M634/21; Ludlow,\textit{ Dealing with Britain} (1997), 36.
\textsuperscript{546} Ludlow,\textit{ Dealing with Britain} (1997), 36.
\textsuperscript{547} Robert D. McFadden, “George W. Ball dies at 84: Vietnam’s Devil’s Advocate”, \textit{New York Times} 28\textsuperscript{th} May 1994.
\textsuperscript{548} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{550} \textit{Ibid.}
remarked that he welcomed Heath’s more optimistic outlook on European integration, but urged the British government to go further. ⁵⁵¹ When pressed on the Six/Seven issue by Lee, who argued that the United States would surely prefer a less stringent arrangement in order to stem the tide of EEC protectionism, particularly with regards to agriculture, Ball flatly responded that the United States ‘was prepared for some temporary sacrifices of commercial interests to facilitate the political promise of the EEC’. ⁵⁵² This is not what the Foreign Office wanted to hear. The United States government’s reservations over trade discrimination and their balance of payments had been one of the few points which the Foreign Office had been able to use as an argument in favour of a looser Six/Seven association. Furthermore, Ball emphatically stated that the new administration would directly oppose any attempts by the British government to reap the economic benefits of membership of the Common Market without paying the political price of supranationalism. ⁵⁵³ This was a fatal blow for the senior officials under study in this chapter who fervently believed in a qualified relationship with the Six. By contrast, however, Ludlow has argued that the talks with the French and the Americans provided Macmillan, Heath and the other ‘Europeanists’ with the necessary political ammunition to convince the Cabinet and the Conservative party that full membership was the only available path, citing the Prime Minister’s impatience ‘with the slow advance of bilateral discussions’. ⁵⁵⁴ Ludlow argues that this political stratagem is evident in Heath’s letter to Macmillan in February, where he urged the Prime Minister to not call for a major policy review until they could ‘show [the Cabinet] that we have...done everything possible to achieve our object along the present lines’ and that all other options had been exhausted. ⁵⁵⁵ Regardless of whether or not the Prime Minister and the Lord Privy Seal had hoped that French and American stubbornness would provide them with the opportunity to launch the application for membership formally, one thing is certain: association was no longer seen as a viable strategy.

In response to the talks with France and the United States, Macmillan and Heath ordered Whitehall to begin seriously considering the potential results of a successful British accession to the European Communities. John Robinson and Christopher Audland were designated the task of re-examining Britain’s relationship with EFTA in the event that the

⁵⁵¹ “Meeting with Mr. Ball”, 30 March 1961, TNA/FO371/158162/M614/45.
⁵⁵² Ibid.; Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern (1982), 212.
⁵⁵³ Ibid.
⁵⁵⁴ Ludlow, Dealing with Britain (1997), 37.
UK joined the Common Market. As mentioned earlier, Audland has described in his memoirs how he and Robinson ‘were destined to be joint linchpins of the Heath negotiations’ and that ‘from start to finish, we saw every issue in the same way.’ The relationship of the two most junior officials under study in this chapter is key in understanding the EEOD’s drive towards the application for membership. For two First Secretaries, the two men commanded an extraordinary amount of influence on the everyday details of British foreign policy towards Europe and were given an incredible amount of freedom by their superiors. Robinson in particular was highly effective in projecting his views across Whitehall and Audland pays tribute to his tenacity, arguing that Hugo Young was right to devote a whole chapter to him in his book *This Blessed Plot*. With regards to the document on future EFTA relations, it is interesting to note that the EEOD took a clear lead and that the other European departments involved, namely the Northern and Central Departments, were merely consulted on a handful of minor issues. This reflected the shifting influence of the departments within the Foreign Office as the EEOD took on a greater role. Audland and Robinson’s assessment of the future of EFTA in the event of UK membership was frank and blunt:

...EFTA would not survive in its present form if the United Kingdom were to become a full member of the EEC. Membership of the EEC would not be consistent with the obligations of continued membership of the EFTA.

The candidness of the document’s tone suggested a cold, calculating perspective emerging from the younger officials, who appear to have been fully prepared to abandon EFTA if it proved necessary. Furthermore, the report argued that EFTA was unlikely to continue in some modified form, suggesting that it would be relegated to an ‘informal consultative group’ which would be largely ineffective and could not hope to achieve any further economic harmonisation. It was fully acknowledged that Britain’s abandonment of EFTA would breed a great deal of resentment from the Seven, particularly the Swedes and the Swiss, but it was also hoped that this could be allayed by pursuing ‘satisfactory

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559 Ibid.
560 Ibid.
arrangements’ for the EFTA members.\textsuperscript{561} This, however, presented a number of difficulties given the broad range of the Seven’s concerns and interests. Some members, such as Switzerland and Sweden, wished to jealously guard their neutrality, others such as Denmark and Norway would consider joining the Common Market alongside the UK, whereas Portugal was fiercely opposed to supranationalism, but attracted by the economic benefits.\textsuperscript{562} In short, Audland and Robinson seemed to suggest that potential resentment from the Seven and the probable collapse of EFTA were prices worth paying in pursuit of membership of the EEC. This view would have directly conflicted with those of their senior colleagues, particularly the EFTA architect Roderick Barclay, but as the likelihood of an application grew, so too did the confidence of the Europeanists.

Another area of reassessment the Foreign Office received was the constitutional implications of accession to the Treaty of Rome. This was an extremely unusual task for the Foreign Office to receive. Questions over Parliamentary sovereignty and the compatibility of supranational institutions with the British constitution went far beyond the department’s remit. Regardless, the Foreign Office relished the chance to examine such fundamental issues, and once again the EEOD were gifted a great deal of input on the matter, notably from Barclay and Robinson. The document which eventually reached the Cabinet in April 1961 was extremely comprehensive and employed a tone which minimised the negative consequences of joining the EEC.\textsuperscript{563} The opening paragraph detailed how the potential loss of national sovereignty had been seen as one of the greatest barriers to joining both the ECSC and the EEC, but that these fears were now less relevant:

As things now stand, it seems probable that a solution of our relations with Europe cannot be achieved without some political act which continental opinion can take as an earnest sign of our determination to play a full part in and with Europe. Some surrender of sovereignty would be involved and, although this might conceivably be less than was required of the present members of the EEC when they signed the Treaty of Rome, it certainly could not be more.\textsuperscript{564}

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{561} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{562} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{563} “Draft: Constitutional Aspects of Accession to the Treaty of Rome”, 5 April 1961, TNA/FO371/158266/M634/58.
\item \textsuperscript{564} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
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This statement presented any loss of sovereignty as something of little consequence, and that since the drafting of the Treaty of Rome, the practical realities of policymaking in the European Communities had meant that member governments still retained a high degree of control over Community affairs.\textsuperscript{565} This was something which Cabinet ministers would have found extremely satisfactory. Concerns over the sanctity of Parliamentary sovereignty being violated was something which alarmed the political elite, and these concerns indeed remain to this very day.\textsuperscript{566} The report stated that previous treaties had already imposed certain restrictions on Britain’s freedom of action, particularly membership of the WEU and GATT, but that these restrictions were over specific and defined areas, whereas the Treaty of Rome would result in restrictions on ‘a range of indefinite obligations over a wide field of action which could subsequently be translated into specific obligations within the same field’.\textsuperscript{567} This was much more far-reaching than anything which Britain had opted into in the past. The document acknowledged that this was the case but went to great lengths to downplay the cons by highlighting the advantages of membership and the amount of influence the British government would exercise within the organs of the Community given the country’s size and political clout, as well as the whole host of policy areas the EEC would not be able to legislate on.\textsuperscript{568}

However, the constitutional gravity of accession was made quite plain. The report argued that whilst the British government and Parliament would \textit{de jure} reserve the right to withdraw from the EEC ‘if continued membership became intolerable’, the government had to be aware that ‘renunciation of the Treaty in its totality would be politically disastrous and...accession would be an irrevocable step towards close integration with Western Europe.’\textsuperscript{569} This effectively indicated that membership would be, in practice, an irreversible foreign policy decision which could attract significant criticism both within and without Parliament.\textsuperscript{570} The officials did not simply inform the Cabinet of the potential criticisms, however. Detailed advice on how to best make the case for membership to both

\textsuperscript{565} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{567} “Constitutional Aspects of Accession to the Treaty of Rome”, 5 April 1961, TNA/FO371/158266/M634/68.
\textsuperscript{568} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{569} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{570} Ibid.
Parliament and the public was attached. The document strongly advised ministers to be up-front about the constitutional difficulties and tackle them pre-emptively by bringing them ‘into the open at a suitable opportunity in the context of the wider issues in order to prevent their being used with damaging effect later on’ and even gave them certain lines to follow in the event that they were questioned on it by the press. The officials knew that if the government did not take the initiative and address the sovereignty issue early on, it would plague the negotiations and stir up animosity from an uninformed and unfamiliar public. The role of the Foreign Office in domestic propaganda on the EEC has been explored in great detail by Paul Gliddon, who argues that the department became key in promoting membership of the Common Market at home, despite the fact it should have fallen to a department concerned with public information campaigns such as the Central Office of Information. This evidence appears to strongly support Gliddon’s arguments and highlights the growth of the Foreign Office’s influence within Whitehall across this period. The officials framed the sovereignty question as a secondary consideration and largely assumed that ministers would accept the imminence of an application to join the European Communities. With the Prime Minister now firmly in favour of membership, this document would have provided even further justification to the Cabinet for his bid for membership.

The most controversial area of reassessment prior to the application was, by far, the future of Britain’s relations with the Commonwealth. The question of the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ did indeed loom large but by now the prevailing attitude was that membership of the EEC would enhance relations with the United States, as evidenced in the EEOD’s drafts on the matter. There was no such certainty surrounding the Commonwealth issue. Whilst the bulk of the communications and meetings with Commonwealth governments were carried out by Duncan Sandys and the Commonwealth Relations Office, this did not prevent members of the EEOD from voicing their own concerns. The ambassador to France and future head of the negotiations delegation in Brussels, Pierson Dixon, wrote to Patrick Reilly from Paris, informing him that there was a difference of opinion on how to handle Britain’s Commonwealth ties, particularly between the French and the Germans. The Germans were reportedly more inclined to offer

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571 Ibid.
574 Pierson Dixon to Patrick Reilly, 24 May 1961, TNA/FO371/158270/M634/140.
concessions to the British government, which came as no surprise, but by Dixon’s admission, ‘the sixty-four dollar question is surely whether we could ever be completely certain of obtaining the concessions that we want...for the Commonwealth interests in advance of negotiating about them.’\footnote{Ibid.} As Dixon argued, the manner in which the question of Commonwealth trade should be broached before the negotiations was a serious concern. Officials were unsure whether it would be preferable to firmly demand certain concessions as preconditions to the negotiations or whether the negotiations themselves should determine the terms of Britain’s entry. Dixon opted for the latter option, arguing that the endless consultations were largely unhelpful and did little to assure the Six that Britain was embracing the opportunity to apply enthusiastically.\footnote{Ibid.} Reilly replied to Dixon and stated that he appreciated the ambassador’s concerns, but that the Prime Minister and the Foreign Office’s hands were tied due to the fact that certain Cabinet ministers and powerful lobby groups such as the National Farmers’ Union remained to be convinced, meaning that precious time had to be spent listening to and allaying concerns.\footnote{Patrick Reilly to Pierson Dixon, 26 May 1961, TNA/FO371/158270/M634/140.} The EEOD were therefore sensitive to the domestic barriers to membership of the EEC, and were aware that an application could potentially conjure up strong opposition. Barclay concurred with Reilly, reminding Dixon that the consultations with the Commonwealth governments were still underway and until they had been fully examined the government could not yet announce their intention to apply.\footnote{Roderick Barclay to Pierson Dixon, 5 July 1961, TNA/FO371/158270/M634/140.} Roger Jackling also reinforced these points, citing the need to satisfy the ‘essential requirements’ of the Commonwealth before applying.\footnote{Roger Jackling, “Minutes”, 5 June 1961, TNA/FO371/158275/M634/200.} By the time the statement which declared Britain’s intention to apply was being drafted by Foreign Office officials, it became clear that Dixon’s advice had been heeded and that the government intended to establish the conditions of Britain’s entry during the course of the negotiations:

As the member governments of the Community are aware, the United Kingdom government would need, in the course of the negotiations, to ensure that special arrangements were made to take account of United Kingdom obligations to the Commonwealth and of differences between the United Kingdom agricultural system and the systems prevailing amongst the present member states.\footnote{“Communication to the President of the Council of Ministers of EEC”, 20 June 1961, TNA/FO371/158274/M634/183.}
The draft statement went further and argued the value of the Commonwealth to the ‘free world’ and indicated that it was in the Six’s interest to grant Britain concessions in order to help preserve this crucial union.581 However, emotional attachments to the Commonwealth ran deep. The Deputy Under-Secretary of the Commonwealth Relations Office, Henry Lintott, argued that the Commonwealth issue should not be ‘lumped in’ with agriculture and should have much more text emphasising its contributions as a strong political force towards international security in the statement.582 This may have been mere departmental jostling on Lintott’s part, but his remarks appealed to the ‘Inner Group’ in charge of the draft and were incorporated accordingly.

As the consultations with the Commonwealth dragged on and the EEOD grew more impatient, elements of dissent began to enter the documents on Britain’s Commonwealth ties. Foreign Office officials espoused the view that the Commonwealth was an economic cul-de-sac which provided no alternative to the framework of the Common Market.583 Only significant investment in the Commonwealth would produce a trade bloc remotely comparable to the EEC, but this was ‘beyond [Britain’s] resources’.584 The department also fully acknowledged that Britain could not ‘go on providing unlimited open markets’ for Commonwealth countries after accession, and seemed confident that the EEC would provide greater opportunities for trade and investment.585 This brutally calculating perspective from the EEOD was game-changing. Senior figures such as Barclay and Reilly, who had been born into an age of imperial grandeur and Britannic heroism must have found it personally difficult to recommend moving away from the Commonwealth, but did so because they knew that in practical terms, Britain’s economy and balance of payments were underperforming when compared to the Six.586 It has been argued by the likes of Hugo Young and Paul Gliddon that the Foreign Office was seen as the most ‘pro-European’ and ‘enthusiastic’ of all the Whitehall departments by the time of the first application, and

581 Ibid.
582 Henry Lintott to Arnold France, 26 June 1961, TNA/FO371/158274/M634/183.
584 Ibid.
585 Ibid.
586 Ibid.
the EEOD’s attitudes appear to support this case. Membership of the Common Market was the only way to progress.

It was at this point, after the lengthy consultations within Whitehall and with the Commonwealth governments, that Macmillan decided that the application needed to be launched. As will be explored in the following section, the departmental officials were eager to apply as soon as possible as it was felt that the ‘goodwill’ which the government had hitherto harvested was slipping away in the wake of the extensive consultations with the Commonwealth and the Seven. With the members of the EEOD now completely committed to membership of the Common Market, all that was left was for Macmillan to pressure the Cabinet into approving the launch of the application.

587 See: Young, _This Blessed Plot_ (1998), 176; Gliddon, ”The British Foreign Office and Domestic Propaganda on the European Community” (2009).
The ‘Flying Knights’ Take Off: Application and Negotiation

‘It is true’ Roger Jackling wrote, ‘that, as the weeks go by, the Commonwealth and our EFTA partners are likely to become increasingly resigned to the prospect of our applying to accede to the Treaty of Rome’. However, Jackling simultaneously warned that if the government did not announce its intention to apply before Parliament’s summer recess, ‘the present favourable tide of European opinion may well recede.’ This sense of apprehension at the time being taken to announce the application was present throughout the EEOD. The officials were becoming increasingly impatient and wanted negotiations to begin as soon as possible. Fears that the Six would start doubting Britain’s sincerity in light of the lengthy consultations with EFTA and the Commonwealth were a real concern, and Jackling communicated this to his colleagues. Barclay argued that the Commonwealth issues could not be rushed but agreed that the government should at the very least release a statement on its position. The political climate in Europe was also pressuring the British government. Evelyn Shuckburgh, the Deputy Under-Secretary in charge of NATO and Western European affairs reminded his colleagues that the escalating tensions in Berlin which would eventually culminate in the construction of the Wall were at a critical juncture, and the imminent withdrawal of British armed forces from West Germany would result in the government being subjected to sharp criticism from its allies. Shuckburgh was extremely pessimistic about the future and the implications it would have on an application for membership of the EEC: ‘During the last three months of this year, if we have not got a war on our hands, I believe that our stock in European minds may be exceptionally low.’ He strongly endorsed Jackling’s calls for the application to be announced as soon as possible and argued ‘from a Foreign Office point of view’ that any further delays would be diplomatically dangerous. John Robinson concurred with his superiors, and added that domestic opinion was another factor which called for a sense of urgency. Robinson argued that no announcement before the summer recess would be treated with extreme suspicion, as certain sceptical groups would accuse the government

589 Ibid.
590 Ibid.
593 Ibid.
594 Ibid.
of trying to ‘shoehorn’ the application without a Parliamentary debate. Ted Heath was sensitive to these concerns from his subordinates, and ordered Ken Gallagher to draft a paper for the Cabinet outlining the arguments in favour of applying before Parliament adjourned at the end of July. Gallagher’s paper presented a thorough analysis of the advantages of an early announcement including the fact that the British government were currently benefiting from political momentum and favourable press coverage, the relatively positive attitudes of the Six, and the political developments in Germany. A few weeks later, as a House of Commons statement on the application was being drafted for the Prime Minister, Christopher Audland went further than other members of the EEOD by effectively suggesting that the department needed to pressure ministers into complying with the announcement:

...it is difficult to see what else could be said if ministers do not in fact decide to seek to enter into negotiations before Parliament rises. At the same time it is surely the duty of officials, in submitting these texts, to make very clear to ministers the effects, which would certainly be unfortunate, of putting off a decision until the end of October.

Audland’s assertion that it was the duty of the officials to advise ministers frankly on the potential consequences of a delay was almost certainly entirely sincere, but this reveals how desperate the EEOD were to launch the application. At this point, the entire department appears to have been fully committed to British membership of the European Communities and wanted to press ahead as quickly as possible. The fact that the application was announced merely a couple of weeks after Audland’s minute suggests that the EEOD’s endeavours ultimately paid off. The actors were now unanimously convinced that Britain was better off in than out, albeit due to a variety of factors.

Thus, on the 21 July 1961 the Cabinet officially approved Britain’s application for membership of the European Communities, with the Prime Minister announcing it to the House of Commons on the 31 July. One of the most striking entries in the minutes from the meeting is the attitude of the Cabinet ministers towards the Commonwealth. As argued

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596 Ibid.
above, the EEOD had started to become much more exasperated with the Commonwealth as the consultations were painstakingly prolonged, seeing them as a hindrance to progress with the Six, and this opinion appears to have been shared by much of the Cabinet. It was concluded that:

If [Community and Commonwealth interests] could not be reconciled, the government would be in a stronger position, both generally and in relation to the Commonwealth, if this were clearly demonstrated as a result of genuine negotiations which they were obliged to break off than if they were to announce that informal soundings had led them to the conclusion that negotiations could not succeed. 600

The British government, therefore, wished to be seen by the Commonwealth governments as fighting vigorously for safeguards, but realised that certain issues were irreconcilable which would give them much more manoeuvrability in the negotiations. As such, whilst Ludlow’s assertion that the application was ‘highly conditional’ is entirely correct, it does not account for the motivations behind this position. 601 The government were purposefully trying to project a robust stance in order to appease sceptical third parties, particularly Commonwealth governments and the National Farmers’ Union. To be sure, certain high profile ministers such as Reginald Maudling and Rab Butler were still quietly opposed to membership of the Common Market, but Macmillan had persuaded the majority of the Cabinet and managed to carry the dissenters with him, largely by treading carefully and consulting them on every single detail. 602 For example, the Cabinet met once again four days before the Prime Minister’s announcement in the House in order to go through the proposed statement with a fine toothcomb. 603 Seemingly minor alterations to the phrasing which made the British government sound more resolute on safeguards and concessions, such as changing ‘with a view to securing satisfactory arrangements’ to ‘if satisfactory arrangements can be made’ were imposed. 604 Indeed, Tratt has gone so far as to say that ‘the objections of the French and the opinion of the US President were secondary, in the PM’s mind, to securing Cabinet agreement’. 605 Regardless of whether or not this argument

600 Ibid.
601 Ludlow, Dealing with Britain (1997), 41.
604 Ibid.
is entirely accurate, one cannot dismiss the importance Macmillan placed on Cabinet approval. The Prime Minister’s statement to the House was met with an overwhelmingly positive reception in the press and from the Six, with the exception of France.\textsuperscript{606} It was a promising start for the government. However, the EEOD were still apprehensive about the amount of lip-service constantly being paid to the Commonwealth and EFTA, with Sir Patrick Reilly commenting that ‘it will have a damping effect abroad’, particularly in France.\textsuperscript{607} The British government were simultaneously attempting to please the Commonwealth governments, the Six, the Seven, domestic pressure groups and members of their own political party. It could be argued that the attempts to appease all these different groups at the same time was one of the most significant reasons for the failure of the application. Gowland and Turner have suggested that Britain’s application was under an incredible amount of scrutiny from a number of interest groups, whereas the Six had benefited from slightly less attention during the negotiations for the Treaty of Rome.\textsuperscript{608} Such publicity would ultimately prove to be the British government’s downfall.

The EEOD made no delay in following the procedures for the submission of a formal application. Ken Gallagher wrote to Arthur Tandy, the ambassador to the EEC, with a copy of the Prime Minister’s formal letter of application to the Secretary-General of the Council of Ministers and specific instructions on its execution.\textsuperscript{609} As argued by Ludlow, the substance of the letter of application was ‘highly conditional’.\textsuperscript{610} Immediately after declaring the formal application in the first paragraph, the second launched into a defence of Britain’s ‘need to take account of the special Commonwealth relationship as well as of the essential interests of British agriculture and of the other members of the EFTA’.\textsuperscript{611} The letter reflected the tone of Macmillan’s speech in the Commons – couched in cautious terms, emphasising the negatives of exclusion, and laced with ambiguity. As Hugo Young has argued, ‘the political formula was established which has laid its hand on the British approach to Europe ever since this first effort was undertaken.’\textsuperscript{612} Consequently, the officials in the EEOD were eager to launch the negotiations as soon as possible in order to capitalise on the current climate of goodwill and enthusiasm amongst the Six. As

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\item \textsuperscript{606} “British Move Welcomed by Common Market”, \textit{The Guardian} 2 August 1961, 9; “Ministers of EEC Countries Welcome British Decision”, \textit{The Times} 2 August 1961, 9; Ludlow, \textit{Dealing with Britain} (1997), 43.
\item \textsuperscript{607} Patrick Reilly to Ken Gallagher, 27 July 1961, TNA/FO371/158279/M634/248.
\item \textsuperscript{608} Gowland and Turner, \textit{Reluctant Europeans} (2000), 126.
\item \textsuperscript{609} Ken Gallagher to Arthur Tandy, 9 August 1961, TNA/FO371/158282/M634/306.
\item \textsuperscript{610} Ludlow, \textit{Dealing with Britain} (1997), 41.
\item \textsuperscript{611} Harold Macmillan to Christian Calmes, 9 August 1961, TNA/FO371/158282/M634/306.
\item \textsuperscript{612} Young, \textit{This Blessed Plot} (1998), 129.
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mentioned above, there was an awareness that the constant focus on the need for safeguards and conditions was a source of irritation and suspicion in Europe. Sir Patrick Reilly expressed this concern in a minute, arguing that ‘these negotiations are going to be difficult, and that they may well be long drawn out.’ Sir Patrick Reilly supported Jackling’s comments, agreeing that an early response from the governments of the Six would best suit ministers and officials. Such was the level of urgency in the Foreign Office that the Permanent Under-Secretary circulated a minute discussing the composition of the negotiation delegation before the Prime Minister’s official letter of application had even been sent. Hoyer-Millar was adamant that the Foreign Office seize the initiative and begin the process of assigning members of the department to the delegation. He argued that ‘there is a strong case for the senior official on the British side being found by the Foreign Service’ given that ‘the political considerations will loom very large and many of the major decisions will be taken primarily on political rather than economic grounds.’

The acknowledgement that the negotiations would primarily be of a political nature by the most senior official in the Foreign Office is crucial in understanding the new attitudes being fostered by the elder generation. Dealing with the European Communities was no longer seen as an economic venture. The foreign policy implications of membership were now regarded as extremely significant, and as such, the Foreign Office expected to be given a leading role in the negotiations. More specifically, this attitude would directly benefit the EEOD, as it was the principal Foreign Office department concerned with European Community affairs. For example, Hoyer-Millar immediately demanded that Sir Roderick Barclay be attached to the delegation, regardless of ‘whether or not a Foreign Office official is chosen to lead the delegation’. Unsurprisingly, Barclay and Reilly echoed the Permanent Under-Secretary’s sentiments. Reilly wrote that in the event that the minister in charge of the negotiations was not from the Foreign Office, then the department ‘ought to insist that the official leader of the delegation should be a member of the Foreign Service.’ Barclay was decidedly less compromising, arguing that it was ‘essential’ that the minister in charge come from the Foreign Office. Despite Norman Brook’s protestations

617 Ibid.
618 Ibid.
619 Ibid.
621 Roderick Barclay, “Minutes”, 1 August 1961, TNA/FO371/158283/M634/329.
that the ‘actual content of the negotiations will, surely, be mainly economic’ from the Treasury, the senior figures in the EEOD and Permanent Under-Secretary stood fast.\(^{622}\) Across this period, as the government pressed for membership of the EEC, the Foreign Office gained a significant amount of influence in Whitehall and was ultimately the ‘chief beneficiary’, as argued by Hennessy.\(^{623}\) Therefore, when departmental jostling came to a head, the Foreign Office were increasingly confident that they would be able to get their own way as Britain’s bureaucratic apparatus adapted to the challenges presented by European integration.\(^{624}\) Ultimately, the Foreign Office managed to assert itself and the delegation’s leading figures were drawn from the diplomatic service. Pierson Dixon was appointed head of the delegation, with Sir Roderick Barclay as another ‘leading member’.\(^{625}\) Eric Roll of the Ministry for Agriculture was appointed deputy head of the delegation, but the Foreign Office had succeeded in relegating the role which the Treasury, its main rival in Whitehall, would play in the negotiations. The Treasury would have three officials on the delegation to the Foreign Office’s sixteen.\(^{626}\) The EEOD were ready for the negotiations and had manoeuvred themselves into a key role.

It was at this high watermark of Foreign Office optimism and confidence that the negotiations began in November 1961.\(^{627}\) It is not the intention of this chapter to produce a lengthy narrative account of the negotiations themselves as this has already been achieved by a number of scholars.\(^{628}\) However, it is instructive for this study to examine the attitudes of the officials under study in this chapter towards the negotiations, and, more importantly, towards their failure. Audland’s memoirs are particularly valuable for this exercise. Audland noted that first and foremost, the negotiations ‘started with a clean slate’.\(^{629}\) From his perspective, there was initially very little to suggest that the negotiations for entry would eventually fail, but he did express his doubt that ‘it is fully appreciated in Whitehall that the initiative in breaking log-jams in the negotiations can only come from the United Kingdom’,

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622 Norman Brook to Frederick Hoyer-Millar, 31 July 1961, TNA/FO371/158283/M634/329.
626 Ibid; “Narrative Reports by the United Kingdom Delegations to the Conferences at Brussels and Luxembourg for British Accession to the three European Communities: 1961-1963”, 8 April 1963, TNA/FO371/177369/M1091/50/G.
627 Young, *This Blessed Plot* (1998), 132.
and not from the forced hand of the EEC.\textsuperscript{630} Audland advocated a much more flexible approach to the negotiations than the rigid line which had been followed so far, but was nonetheless quietly confident that the talks would unfold successfully.\textsuperscript{631} His optimism was shared by much of Whitehall. In a letter from a Treasury official to Ken Gallagher, a hope was expressed that the delegation would be able to break the back of the negotiations by August 1962.\textsuperscript{632} This was a hope that Gallagher shared in his reply, and many of his thoughts on the timetabling of the negotiations operated upon this assumption.\textsuperscript{633}

Gallagher’s opinions are extremely difficult to definitively pinpoint – according to a former colleague, he had a ‘painfully logical mind’ as a result of his legal training at university.\textsuperscript{634} In this sense, Gallagher may not have had too much of a personal attachment to the ideals of European solidarity but viewed himself as an extremely hard-working and dutiful public servant, which meant executing the Lord Privy Seal’s orders without question.\textsuperscript{635}

Audland is more critical of Gallagher’s position. He stated in an interview that the ‘pedestrian Head of department’ was not firmly committed to the cause of membership of the EEC and ‘was a virtual nonentity’.\textsuperscript{636} This is a particularly scathing picture of Gallagher, and the comment about him being a ‘nonentity’ does not tally with the amount of input he has in the Foreign Office correspondence files or indeed his reputation as an exceptionally hard worker who rarely dictated anything and took the burden of writing minutes and dispatches largely upon himself.\textsuperscript{637} However, his pragmatic and logical approach to the question of European integration may have caused friction with the deeply personal and ideological motivations behind Audland and Robinson’s support for accession. In any case, it is quite clear that Audland did not hold Gallagher in high regard, and the latter’s attitude to the negotiations differed to the former’s. Barclay was also broadly positive about the negotiations despite harbouring suspicions about the French’s position, arguing that the ministerial meeting in Brussels on 8–9 November had been ‘as good as we can reasonably

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\item[630] Christopher Audland, “Tactics in the Negotiations”, 17 November 1961, TNA/FO371/158304/M634/714.
\item[632] C. C. Lucas to Ken Gallagher, 8 November 1961, TNA/FO371/158302/M634/675.
\item[634] Neil Smith (former British ambassador to Finland), interview with the author, 16 June 2016, Canterbury.
\item[635] \textit{Ibid}.
\item[636] Christopher Audland, interviewed by Thomas Raineau, 20 June 2012, CCC/BDOHP/138/19.
\item[637] Neil Smith (former British ambassador to Finland), interview with the author, 16 June 2016, Canterbury.
\end{footnotes}
expect’. In discussing the delegation’s future tactics with the negotiations, Barclay added that ‘we should continue to give the impression that we are reasonable, patient and constructive’ in order to preserve the goodwill of the Six and, more importantly, to appease the sceptical Commonwealth governments. Barclay later conceded that he had always favoured a wider association based round EFTA, which accounts for his ambivalence towards the European integration project. Audland remarked that Barclay ‘sailed with the wind a bit. He was not opposed, but was not tremendously in favour.’

In a similar vein, Parr has written that Reilly was a ‘strong supporter’ of Frank Lee’s conclusions on seeking membership of the Common Market, but it is highly likely that his decision was reached only after it became clear that the risks of exclusion far outweighed those of inclusion. As argued previously, Reilly had cut his diplomatic teeth in the high politics of the Cold War and anti-communist operations. It would not be unreasonable or illogical to assume that his approval of the application was qualified by concerns over the cohesion of the Western bloc, and this is highlighted in his memoirs which focus primarily on de Gaulle’s personality and the threats the latter posed to the united front in the struggle against communism. Indeed, in a meeting on future European policy with Heath and other high-ranking officials after de Gaulle’s veto, Reilly disagreed with the Lord Privy Seal’s proposals, arguing that continuing to pursue membership contained too many difficulties, and that other opportunities would arise, such as an Atlantic free trade area with Canada. This pessimism and dismissal of future attempts to join the Common Market directly contradicted the new institutional orthodoxy which the ‘Europeanists’ championed after the failure of the negotiations, and betrayed Reilly’s rather shallow

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commitment to European integration. In an assessment of the failures of the first application in 1964, Reilly argued that ‘the whole subject was of course of particular difficulty politically at home, and it is not easy for officials to form an unbiased judgement’, suggesting that he appreciated that the personal convictions of those involved contributed towards the Brussels breakdown.\textsuperscript{646} Reilly also reportedly lacked the ‘hard-edge of decisiveness and self-confidence’ which many of his colleagues possessed, which no doubt made his commitment towards the application at best reserved and at worst undecided.\textsuperscript{647}

This is where the generational differences in attitude became more apparent. Barclay, Jackling, Reilly, and Gallagher favoured the ‘conditional’ approach which government ministers were much more comfortable with, as it projected a tough and resolute stance designed to bolster their negotiating credentials, but Audland and Robinson believed this was an impractical approach which failed to appreciate the Six’s attachment to the principles laid down in the Treaty of Rome.\textsuperscript{648} Hugo Young and George Wilkes have both crafted particularly apt summaries which are worthy of repetition:

\ldots [it was] a conditional and tentative venture, creeping in a state of high suspicion towards this moment of historic destiny, declining to make a commitment until the Europeans had shown what ground they were prepared to surrender, and reserving even then the option of a British veto...the British were not prepared to do more than negotiate and hesitate. They were not, actually, applying. They made it clear that they wanted the Treaty of Rome, which they had declined to participate in drafting, unpicked in certain parts, and weren’t necessarily willing to accept the acquis communautaire — the patrimony of principles, politics and laws already agreed by the Community — that were the basis of the great project.\textsuperscript{649}

The views of eyewitnesses of how large the contribution of the UK to its own setbacks was diverged widely according to their perspective on how the government policymaking machine worked. Officials in Brussels were more likely to perceive a split between senior and junior policymakers over the necessity of greater flexibility vis-à-vis the Six, junior officials being more critical of the UK’s diplomatic failings during the negotiations.\textsuperscript{650}

\textsuperscript{646} Patrick Reilly, “A Personal Footnote to the Histories of the Brussels Negotiations”, 16 March 1964, TNA/FO371/177367/M1091/21G.
\textsuperscript{648} Audland, Right Place – Right Time (2004), 129; Christopher Audland, interviewed by Thomas Raineau, 20 June 2012, CCC/BDOHP/138/22;
\textsuperscript{649} Young, This Blessed Plot (1998), 137.
\textsuperscript{650} Wilkes, “Eye-Witness Views of the Brussels Breakdown” (1997), 228.
The cautiousness of both the application and the negotiations was a direct result of the attitudes of the senior policymakers in the government and the Foreign Office. Their commitment to the cause was firm, but it was not born from an enthusiastic and ideological attachment to the concept of European integration. In the words of Wilkes, there was a gulf between the British ‘vision’ and the practical ‘realities’ of the European Communities; something which became apparent to the Six as the negotiations progressed.651

The negotiations have been roughly divided by some commentators and historians into a number of ‘stages’. Audland and Camps have favoured a ‘three stage’ model: the first phase from November 1961 until Easter 1962, the second phase from Easter 1962 until August 1962, and the third from September 1962 until January 1963.652 Ludlow has employed a more nuanced timetable, underlining the complex nature of the negotiations, arguing that the first stage was from October 1961 until March 1962, with an overlapping stage from January 1962 until July 1962, then the events surrounding the momentous tenth ministerial meeting in July-August 1962, and finally the ‘agricultural impasse’ in September-December 1962.653 Regardless of the differing divisions of the timeline, Wilkes has argued that there was a broad consensus amongst eyewitnesses from the Six that the negotiations were far from complete when de Gaulle exercised his veto in January 1963.654 This would suggest that many of the difficulties which the British delegation had hoped it would overcome were still significant barriers by the time the negotiations were aborted. The officials under study in this chapter do not share this view. British ministers and officials tended to lean towards the view that a deal was ‘close to being on the cards’ – Heath was adamant that there was nothing to suggest that the talks ‘were doomed to break down’ – and that the fault mainly lay with the French.655 Audland is highly critical of the attitude of the French throughout the negotiations, labelling them ‘a bloody nuisance’.656 He adds that this was also John Robinson’s view, stating that the two friends were in agreement that ‘the French were being a bit of a pest.’657 This certainly tallies with Sampson’s portrayal of the man, who argued that Robinson was ‘suspicious of Gaullist

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651 Ibid.
652 Camps, Britain and the European Community (1964); Audland, Right Place – Right Time (2004), 130.
653 Ludlow, Dealing with Britain (1997).
655 Young, This Blessed Plot (1998), 142.
657 Ibid.
attitudes and [relished] confrontations with the Quai d’Orsay.⁶⁵⁸ There was, of course, widespread outrage at de Gaulle’s perceived duplicity and obstructiveness. Reilly privately condemned de Gaulle’s personal treatment of Macmillan, believing it to be a betrayal of the loyalty and goodwill the latter had shown the former during the War.⁶⁵⁹ Barclay, perhaps the group’s most sceptical official, was also extremely bitter about de Gaulle’s treatment of Britain and the outcome of the negotiations, and as ambassador to Belgium would later remind the Belgian Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Hendrik Fayat that it was the Six, not Britain, who had formally terminated the application.⁶⁶⁰ Barclay was fiercely opposed to the idea that Britain’s approach had been too conditional or inflexible, stating:

There is no doubt that we were right to set out our main requirements pretty fully on all our three principal problems, the Commonwealth, agriculture and EFTA. The statement was accepted as a basis for opening negotiations by the Six and the French have not been able to maintain that we concealed any of the major difficulties.⁶⁶¹

The full reasoning behind de Gaulle’s decision to slam the door shut on British membership of the EEC will probably never be known, but the EEOD were certain that several factors contributed towards his decision. Audland is convinced that the Polaris deal with the United States was pivotal in providing the General with a way of justifying his opposition to British entry on the grounds that Britain was too reliant on her relationship with the United States and that British accession would be a ‘Trojan horse’ for American influence.⁶⁶² This view is shared by a number of authors, including Hugo Young, John Young, and May.⁶⁶³ However, Ludlow’s assertion that de Gaulle was primarily motivated by the preservation of French national grandeur and the fear that British membership would threaten this is also extremely compelling.⁶⁶⁴ In his memoirs, de Gaulle certainly spent much ink detailing how a peaceful Europe working together in harmony was key to revitalising France’s prestige

⁶⁵⁹ BODL, Private Papers of Sir Patrick Reilly, MS.Eng.c.6924, 236.
⁶⁶⁰ Roderick Barclay to Charles Johnston, 17 September 1964, TNA/FO371/177368/M1091/34.
⁶⁶³ Young, This Blessed Plot (1998), 143; May, Britain and Europe Since 1945 (1999), 36; Young, Britain and European Unity (2000), 78.
given her principal role, even though, according to him, France ‘had no real need of an organisation of Western Europe, since the war had damaged neither her reputation nor her territorial integrity.’ Whether or not de Gaulle intended to block Britain’s bid from the very beginning is unclear, and it is tempting to speculate on whether the negotiations could have succeeded had he not used his veto. Roy Denman, a vehemently pro-European official later wrote that ‘when Macmillan had visited Paris in June 1962, the General had seemed resigned to British entry.’ The guarded, conditional approach employed by the senior officials in the EEOD and Whitehall certainly did little to instil confidence in the Six. Audland and Denman argue that the weight given to Commonwealth and agricultural considerations slowed the negotiations down considerably, when what was needed was a speedy approach which could have created the basis for a deal earlier on and prevented the General from wrecking the application. De Gaulle reportedly only felt secure enough to block Britain’s bid after his referendum and election victories in October and November 1962. Audland also argues that ministers and senior officials were overconfident on the concessions they could secure for transitional arrangements on the Common Agricultural Policy and the common external tariff. Even Barclay, who was largely sympathetic of the British delegation’s performance, acknowledged that they had ‘[opened] our mouths fairly wide on some issues’ and that the need to carry the Cabinet, the Conservative party, the Commonwealth, the Seven and the public had been a complicating factor.

The fallout from the veto was monumental. As will become clear in the following chapter, de Gaulle may have succeeded in preventing Britain from joining the EEC, but he also created an atmosphere of hostility and resentment amongst the Six – Paul Henri Spaak stated that he had been ‘deeply offended by the dictatorial manner of de Gaulle’s statement.’ The Six would continue to be plagued by de Gaulle’s autocratic and nationalistic tendencies through the ‘Empty Chair’ Crisis and the Luxembourg Compromise. The effect which the veto had on Foreign Office attitudes was even

666 Denman, Missed Chances (1996), 222.
668 Denman, Missed Chances (1996), 222.
672 Simon Serafty, France, de Gaulle and Europe: The Policy of the Fourth and Fifth Republics towards the Continent (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1968), 135; N. Piers Ludlow, The European Community
greater. The institutional orthodoxy completely transformed from one of cautious,
conservative and guarded support for membership to a firm conviction that Britain’s future
lay with the European Communities. De Gaulle had humiliated Britain and the Foreign
Office sought revenge and vindication. Audland specifically admits that many officials felt
that their professional pride had been wounded by de Gaulle’s ‘dirty trick’ and became
convinced that accession to the Common Market was an essential objective. There can
be little doubt that the Brussels breakdown was, for the attitudes of the Foreign Office
officials under study in this chapter and beyond, a watershed moment. The language in
reports and dispatches changed completely. The Six were rarely referred to as a collective –
from this point on, they became the ‘Friendly Five’ plus France, who had been designated
as the enemy and the barrier to British entry. This coincided with the decreasing economic
importance of the Commonwealth and the decline in the ‘special relationship’ between
Harold Wilson and Lyndon B. Johnson in the age of Vietnam and the ‘East of Suez’
withdrawal. The Atlanticist concerns which, for senior policymakers, had been the
decisive factor in the launch of the first application were of far lesser importance by the
time the second application was announced. By then, Europe was seen by the Foreign
Office as central to Britain’s foreign policy strategy.

and the Crises of the 1960s: Negotiating the Gaullist Challenge (London: Routledge, 2006), 42; Mark
674 Ibid.
Application to Join the EEC, 1964-67” in Britain, the Commonwealth and Europe: The Commonwealth
and Britain’s Applications to Join the European Communities, ed. Alex May (London: Palgrave, 2001),
144; Jonathan Colman, A ‘Special Relationship’? Harold Wilson, Lyndon B. Johnson and Anglo-

There was no alternative for Britain...but membership of the EEC, a conclusion accepted throughout the Foreign Office and in Whitehall. In addition, the EEID’s more radical conclusion was that European membership could be a vehicle to disengage from Britain’s world commitments rather than a means of boosting Britain’s strength. 676

Emerging here...was a new, younger breed of Foreign Office orthodoxy to replace the old scepticism...Europe wasn’t yet the path of choice for every ambitious diplomat, but it promised to be much more interesting than the Commonwealth...By 1963, a corps of diplomats was present in and around the Foreign Office who saw the future for both themselves and their country inside Europe. The interest of their country and their careers coincided. It was an appealing symbiosis. The fact that France had, for the moment, obstructed it was less a deterrent than a challenge to their ambition. 677

The Brussels breakdown in January 1963 was a severe blow to the British government and the Foreign Office. The collapse of the negotiations led to an extensive period of review and reflection in order to ascertain why the application had failed and what future British European policy should entail. The Foreign Office produced an extremely detailed account which painstakingly dissected the sequence of events prior to the application and the course of the negotiations themselves. 678 In addition, the European Economic Organisations Department (EEOD) began establishing its new strategy for European cooperation. The conclusions which were ultimately drawn were that the long term objectives of British foreign policy should be the pursuit of full membership of the European Communities, and ‘to influence the Community so that it develops in ways which will best facilitate our eventual accession; and to seek to cooperate with the Community in

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677 Hugo Young, This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair (London: Macmillan, 1998), 177-8.
678 “Narrative Reports by the United Kingdom Delegations to the Conferences at Brussels and Luxembourg for British Accession to the three European Communities: 1961-1963", 8 April 1963, TNA/FO371/177369/M1091/50/G.
as many fields as possible’. However, there was an acknowledgement that ‘full membership is at present barred’ and would be for the foreseeable future unless de Gaulle and the French government changed its attitude towards British accession. Despite this understanding that membership would be unachievable for quite some time, there can be little doubt that this was a seismic shift in British foreign policy. The first application to join the EEC had been a cautious and ambiguous venture with fundamentally ‘un-European’ objectives. The application’s failure, however, had hardened Foreign Office attitudes and completely transformed the institutional orthodoxy of the day to being overwhelmingly in favour of joining the European Communities. There were, of course, a broad number of reasons why many in the Foreign Office now fully endorsed membership: some were passionate believers in the cause of European solidarity; some saw it principally as a way of revitalising British power and prestige; some believed there were great economic benefits to be had; some simply wished to counterbalance French power on the Continent, particularly after de Gaulle’s humiliating veto. In addition to this new orthodoxy gripping the department, many of the ardent ‘Europeanists’ who had previously occupied middle-ranking and junior roles in the service found themselves being moved to key positions in London and Brussels in the years between the failure of the first application and the launching of the second. The government also responded to the breakdown by strengthening the United Kingdom’s Delegation to the European Communities in Brussels (UKDEL) and the increased use of bilateral economic committees with the Six. The line pursued for the remainder of 1963 was, in large part, a gesture of defiance against the French. The British government and the Foreign Office wished to create the perception that Britain would not simply give up and saunter off with her tail between her legs. She had unfinished business.

It will be the aim of this chapter to examine the effect which the 1963 Brussels breakdown had on Foreign Office attitudes and how this shaped British foreign policy towards the

679 Derek Thomas, “European Economic Community: Brief for Minister of State’s Courtesy Call on M. Rey”, 23 April 1963, TNA/FO371/171423/M1091/321.
680 “United Kingdom Policy Towards the European Communities”, 29 April 1963, TNA/FO371/171428/M1091/328.
682 “United Kingdom Policy Towards the European Communities”, 29 April 1963, TNA/FO371/171428/M1091/328.
683 Ibid.
European Communities in the years leading up to the Wilson government’s second application for membership. The Wilson government’s application was extremely short-lived. Having been announced in May 1967, de Gaulle quashed the initiative in November of the same year. However, the Foreign Office had worked tirelessly to steer the government towards a more positive and enthusiastic approach towards European integration before the decision to apply was actually taken. Given the application’s extremely short lifespan, historians have granted it less attention than the first application under Macmillan. Furthermore, the bulk of the literature on the second application tends to focus on the internal divisions within the Labour party, Labour’s lack of interest in the EEC compared with the Commonwealth, and the short termism of Harold Wilson’s foreign policy tactics. There is an overarching assumption that the second application was a ‘sideshow’ in the British government’s foreign policy strategy which was primarily concerned with running down international military commitments and upholding the Commonwealth as a global interracial community for international cooperation. Indeed, Steinnes and Broad have argued that after de Gaulle’s veto, ‘the question of British entry into the EEC was dead for some time’, citing the lack of coverage it received in the 1964 general election campaign. As will become clear over the course of this chapter, this paradigm is rather narrow and simplistic. These studies fail to account for the reasons behind the Conservative and Labour parties’ lack of focus on Europe after the veto. It was purely a temporary, pragmatic calculation. De Gaulle’s veto was, quite obviously, still firmly entrenched in the memories of British politicians and the public, and his position showed no sign of immediate change. Avoiding the issue of EEC membership in public

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685 Parr, “Gone Native” (2003), 75.
690 Ibid.
was simply a way of allowing Britain’s diplomatic wounds to heal and did not represent the attitudes and ideas which were being formed or continued to be held behind closed doors. Wilson, for example, continued to maintain that he favoured British accession under ‘the right conditions’. The Foreign Office in particular continued to be exceptionally proactive when it came to European policy. This has been demonstrated in Helen Parr’s landmark studies. Parr’s work has completely transformed the scholarship and highlighted the pivotal role which the Foreign Office played in the policymaking process under Wilson’s premiership. In addition, the role of Britain’s Delegation to the European Communities in Brussels (UKDEL) became increasingly important after de Gaulle’s veto, with its staff sending valuable information on the Six and the progress of the EEC back to London, allowing the Foreign Office to develop the appropriate diplomatic responses as events unfolded. Over this period, the Mission was also staffed by some exceptionally influential officials who would later become fundamental to the successful negotiations under Prime Minister Ted Heath.

Accounting for the motivations and reasons behind the government’s eventual decision to apply a second time is also a source of fierce contention in the scholarship. Lieber has famously advanced the view that the application was, in large part, a case of ‘collapsing alternatives’. That is, the British government had no option but to stake the future of its power and prestige on membership of the EEC. Lieber attributes this specifically to the various crises which the Wilson government endured: Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence, Singapore’s withdrawal from the Federation of Malaya and the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 all indicated that the Commonwealth was no longer a community of nations united under a common cause. British relations with EFTA also suffered after the government decided to levy a 15% surcharge on all imports without any consultation, which infuriated the other member states. The ‘special relationship’ was under strain

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693 “United Kingdom Policy Towards the European Communities”, 29 April 1963, TNA/FO371/171428/M1091/328.
695 Ibid.
696 Ibid.
with the ascension of Lyndon B. Johnson, who made no effort to disguise his view that Britain was an unequal, subordinate partner – something Wilson wrestled with as he firmly opposed extending military support to the United States in Vietnam.\footnote{Ibid; Wilson, \textit{The Labour Government 1964-1970} (1971), 48; Jonathan Colman, A ‘Special Relationship’? Harold Wilson, Lyndon B. Johnson and Anglo-American Relations ‘At the Summit’, 1964-68 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), 3; John W. Young, "International Factors and the 1964 Election", \textit{Contemporary British History} 21, no. 3 (2007), 352.} Therefore, In Lieber’s view, British foreign policy was being painted into a corner and only the EEC seemed to provide an opportunity to re-energise Britain’s economy, which was suffering from a weak currency and a burgeoning balance of payments deficit.\footnote{Glen O’Hara, “‘Dynamic, Exciting, Thrilling Change’: The Wilson Government’s Economic Policies, 1964-70” in \textit{The Wilson Governments 1964-1970 Reconsidered}, ed. Glen O’Hara and Helen Parr (London: Routledge, 2006), 83.} This argument has been accepted by Wrigley, who adds that Wilson’s decision to apply was a ‘deflecting’ tactic, designed to divert attention away from ‘other serious problems, both international and domestic’.\footnote{Wrigley, “Now You See It, Now You Don’t” (1993), 123.} Roy Denman, an ardently pro-Common Market official who was Deputy Under-Secretary of the Board of Trade during the second application also subscribes to this view that Wilson was driven by domestic concerns, arguing that ‘he was above all a tactician; his supreme aim was to keep the Labour party together’ and even suggested that had Wilson won the 1970 general election, the renewed membership bid would have failed again.\footnote{Roy Denman, \textit{Missed Chances: Britain and Europe in the Twentieth Century} (London: Indigo, 1996), 231.} May has also intimated that Wilson was motivated by electioneering opportunism; accession to the EEC under Labour would steal a march on the Conservatives, who under Heath made membership their foreign policy priority.\footnote{May, \textit{Britain and Europe Since 1945} (1999), 43.}

Ellison, Parr and John Young have led the charge of reappraisal on these points, emphasising the strategic concerns which Wilson harboured and the role which more pro-European members of his Cabinet such as George Brown played in steering towards the application.\footnote{John W. Young, \textit{Britain and European Unity 1945-1999} (London: Macmillan, 2000), 85; James Ellison, “Dealing with De Gaulle: Anglo-American Relations, NATO and the Second Application” in \textit{Harold Wilson and European Integration: Britain’s Second Application to Join the EEC}, ed. Oliver J. Daddow (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 173; Parr, \textit{Britain’s Policy Towards the European Community} (2006), 13.} In addition, they have contextualised the practical realities and difficulties which Wilson faced during his premiership, and how these severely limited his manoeuvrability in foreign policy. For example, de Gaulle’s antagonism over NATO and his continued opposition to British entry were obstacles which the Prime Minister could not
have surmounted.\footnote{Ibid.} The scepticism of many of Wilson’s backbenchers could also not be ignored, particularly when Labour were initially governing with a majority of four; soon reduced to three after a by-election defeat.\footnote{May, \textit{Britain and Europe Since 1945} (1999), 38.} However, as mentioned above, Parr’s emphasis on the role of the Foreign Office and Whitehall in the formulation of European policy and the constellation of attitudes and motivations which drove this radical reorientation towards full acceptance of the Treaty of Rome and membership of the EEC has defined the new ‘frontier’ of scholarship on the second application. Therefore, a second aim of this chapter will be to contribute towards and complement Parr’s findings by shedding more light on the personalities in the Foreign Office and their input in the policymaking process.

As in the previous chapter, the role of the top officials in the EEOD, which remained the principal Foreign Office department concerned with European integration affairs, will form part of this chapter’s focus, but this study also intends to incorporate the role of the British Delegation to the European Communities in Brussels more centrally. The rationale for this is twofold. Firstly, as argued above, the Permanent Mission was greatly strengthened after the failure of the first application in a bid to maintain strong Community relations and monitor its progress.\footnote{“United Kingdom Policy Towards the European Communities”, 29 April 1963, TNA/FO371/171428/M1091/328.} Secondly, many of the most influential officials in the formulation of British foreign policy towards Europe and the launching of the second application were, at some point in this period, stationed in Brussels. Con O’Neill, who became one of the most ardent advocates of British entry to the Common Market, was Head of the Mission until 1965, when he was replaced by James Marjoribanks, who had been Assistant Under-Secretary in charge of European economic affairs and supervisor of the EEOD.\footnote{Foreign Office, \textit{Foreign Office List and Diplomatic and Consular Year Book 1964} (London: Harrison and Sons, 1964); “Sir James Marjoribanks”. \textit{The Telegraph} 1 February 2002; Roy Denman, “O’Neill, Sir Con Douglas Walter (1912-1988)” in \textit{Oxford Dictionary of National Biography}, 2004, accessed 14 November 2016, \url{http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/39892}.} O’Neill subsequently became Deputy Under-Secretary in charge of European economic affairs, thereby replacing Marjoribanks in a slightly more senior capacity.\footnote{Denman, “O’Neill, Sir Con Douglas Walter (1912-1988)”.} In addition, John Robinson was stationed as First Secretary of the Delegation throughout this period, continuing the work he started with the first application.\footnote{Roy Denman, “Robinson, John Armstrong (1925-1998)” in \textit{Oxford Dictionary of National Biography}, 2004, accessed 18 May 2016, \url{http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/69317}.} Therefore, there was a
significant amount of interaction between the EEOD and the UKDEL, both in terms of personnel and policymaking. Other key figures in this period include Paul Gore-Booth, who was recalled to London from India in 1965 and appointed Permanent Under-Secretary, Curtis Keeble, Head of the EEOD 1963-5, and Norman Statham, Assistant Head of the EEOD 1961-5 and then Head of the department thereafter. This is not to say that other individuals did not make significant contributions towards British European policy in this period – for example, Michael Palliser was incredibly influential as Private Secretary for foreign affairs to the Prime Minister from 1966 until 1969. Sir Patrick Reilly continued to play an important role as ambassador to France and Sir Frank Roberts served a five-year term as ambassador to West Germany where his views on the developments within the EEC were highly respected. Therefore, the perspectives of other officials will also be incorporated at certain points in an attempt to broaden the scope of this study.

In a similar vein to the previous chapter, these officials hailed from a wide range of socio-economic statuses and educational experiences, though O’Neill and Gore-Booth had remarkably similar backgrounds. They were only three years apart in age; Gore-Booth was born in 1909 and O’Neill was born in 1912. Both men were descendants of the Anglo-Irish gentry, they both attended Eton, and they both went on to study at Balliol College, Oxford. O’Neill was the son of an Ulster Unionist MP, Sir Hugh O’Neill, and Gore-Booth was the nephew of Constance Markievicz, the prominent Sinn Féin politician and the first woman elected to the House of Commons. Therefore, both men were born into a world where national duty and public service were the orders of the day. At Oxford, Gore-Booth elected to study Greats but stayed on for a fourth year and completed a degree in Politics, Philosophy and Economics, gaining a second in both. O’Neill managed to distinguish himself slightly more than Gore-Booth: he took a first in English and was granted a law

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712 Ibid.

713 Ibid. Though, of course, she did not take her seat.

fellowship at All Souls College the year after graduating.\textsuperscript{715} After completing his studies, Gore-Booth travelled around Germany and Poland for a year from the summer of 1932.\textsuperscript{716} In his memoirs, he vividly describes how the Great Depression had seriously damaged social morale in Germany, and that many cities were transformed into ‘ghost towns’.\textsuperscript{717} He went on to describe how the Nazi parades were incredibly impressive affairs, and that it was easy to see why the party had attracted so much support.\textsuperscript{718} In Poland, he had the opportunity to speak to several officials in Warsaw about the Prussia/Pomerania controversy and German antagonism on the border.\textsuperscript{719} There can be little doubt that these experiences as a young man had a profound effect on Gore-Booth, who took the Foreign Office entrance exam immediately after his return and joined the diplomatic service in 1933.\textsuperscript{720} O’Neill’s early career almost directly mirrored Gore-Booth’s. O’Neill too had an interest in Germany and the German language, and when he was appointed Third Secretary at the Berlin embassy in 1938, just two years after joining the service, he was thrilled.\textsuperscript{721} However, O’Neill was famously a man of ‘ unbending principle’, and he resigned in disgust over the policy of appeasement which the Chamberlain government opted for.\textsuperscript{722} This was to be his first of two resignations from the diplomatic service, and, as has been pointed out by Roy Denman, was truly remarkable given how high he managed to climb up the diplomatic career ladder.\textsuperscript{723} Gore-Booth was also a highly principled member of the service. During his time as Deputy Under-Secretary for European economic affairs, he wrote to the then Permanent Under-Secretary Ivone Kirkpatrick criticising the government’s actions over Colonel Nasser’s nationalisation of the Suez Canal.\textsuperscript{724} Gore-Booth was probably the most senior and prominent member of the Foreign Office to voice such open dissent, and later admitted that he had seriously considered resigning over the fiasco.\textsuperscript{725} He had criticised government policy in the full knowledge that the potential consequences for his career would be severe.

\textsuperscript{715} Denman, “O’Neill, Sir Con Douglas Walter (1912-1988)”.
\textsuperscript{717} \textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{718} \textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{719} \textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{720} \textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{721} Denman, “O’Neill, Sir Con Douglas Walter (1912-1988)”.
\textsuperscript{722} \textit{Ibid}.; “Sir Con O’Neill: Brilliant and Turbulent Diplomatic Career”, \textit{The Times} 12 January 1988, 12.
\textsuperscript{723} Denman, “O’Neill, Sir Con Douglas Walter (1912-1988)”.
\textsuperscript{725} “Lord Gore-Booth: Former Head of Foreign Office”, \textit{The Times} 3 July 1984, 14; Greenhill “Booth, Paul Henry Gore-, Baron Gore-Booth of Maltby (1909-1984)”.}
Upon the outbreak of War, the two men’s careers began to diverge. Gore-Booth was stationed in the Tokyo embassy and received Japan’s declaration of war in 1941, resulting in his internment for nine months before being allowed to leave in 1942 when he was appointed First Secretary in Washington.\(^{726}\) He remained in the United States until the end of the War, witnessing the full force of the Anglo-American partnership at the official level, which he described as ‘an integration of effort of truly astonishing proportions between two completely independent countries’.\(^{727}\) After leaving the Washington embassy, Gore-Booth immersed himself in post-war European reconstruction and internationalism, heading the economic and social divisions of the United Nations department and later the European Recovery department, which was the Mutual Aid Department’s and, subsequently, the EEOD’s predecessor.\(^{728}\) In 1949 he was appointed director of the British Information Services in the United States which was largely a public relations role, an appointment which was met with some criticism from the British press due to Gore-Booth’s lack of experience in such a field.\(^{729}\) Gore-Booth served as ambassador to Burma in 1953-6, after which he returned to London as Deputy Under-Secretary.\(^{730}\) His vocal opposition to the Suez operation has already been noted, but Gore-Booth’s impact in this role is of greater importance to this study. Gore-Booth managed to establish himself as an incredibly effective operator in the field of European economic affairs and ‘won the respect of the economic departments in Whitehall’.\(^{731}\) Gore-Booth’s attitudes towards European integration at this juncture appear to have been largely in keeping with most of the senior generation at the time – the EEC was seen primarily as an economic venture within the wider political framework of NATO, and ‘political justification’ for British membership of the Communities would not come, in his view, until a later date:

The question remains, could we have done better over Europe? With hindsight, of course we could. We could have understood quicker and reacted earlier. In that event the tone of relations with the European Community by 1960 might have been more cordial but I doubt whether events themselves would have been greatly

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\(^{726}\) Greenhill “Booth, Paul Henry Gore-, Baron Gore-Booth of Maltby (1909-1984)”.  
\(^{727}\) Gore-Booth, With Great Truth and Respect (1974), 121.  
\(^{728}\) “Lord Gore-Booth: Former Head of Foreign Office”, The Times 3 July 1984, 14; Greenhill “Booth, Paul Henry Gore-, Baron Gore-Booth of Maltby (1909-1984)”.  
\(^{731}\) Ibid.
different. The inertias in the early and mid-fifties were to my mind too great for us to have got in on the European ground floor.\textsuperscript{732}

Gore-Booth left this post in 1960 in order to become British High Commissioner in India, but it is interesting to speculate on his career trajectory had he stayed in London.\textsuperscript{732} When the Foreign Office were deciding which officials to attach to the delegation for the first application for membership of the EEC, Gore-Booth was considered by most, including the Permanent Under-Secretary Frederick Hoyer-Millar, to be the best and most experienced candidate to lead the negotiations.\textsuperscript{734} However, it was also acknowledged that he could not simply be recalled from India in the middle of a major appointment.\textsuperscript{735} In any case, had Gore-Booth indeed headed the delegation, the outcome would almost certainly have been the same. Gore-Booth’s enthusiasm for British membership of the EEC was cautious and guarded like many of his senior colleagues, and his approach would have been largely in keeping with the orthodoxy of the day. In 1965, he was recalled to London and appointed Permanent Under-Secretary.\textsuperscript{736} Unlike his predecessors, Hoyer-Millar and Harold Caccia, Gore-Booth took an active interest in British European policy and contributed significantly towards minutes on the issue. The reasons for this are not entirely clear. Gore-Booth had certainly had a much stronger grounding in European affairs earlier on in his career than Hoyer-Millar and Caccia, which would have made him more interested in European integration on a personal level, but his involvement may represent something more significant. After de Gaulle’s veto in 1963, membership of the EEC was considered a top priority by the Foreign Office.\textsuperscript{737} The Permanent Under-Secretary’s increased participation in policymaking may have reflected the new orthodoxy gripping the Foreign Office, which no longer relegated European integration to a secondary consideration.

After his resignation in the wake of the Munich Agreement, O’Neill joined the army intelligence corps in 1940.\textsuperscript{738} He returned briefly to the Foreign Office in the latter part of the War, and despite the Foreign Office’s protestations was unable to secure a permanent position; Sir Horace Wilson, the head of the civil service, ‘had not forgiven his resignation’

\textsuperscript{733} Greenhill “Booth, Paul Henry Gore-, Baron Gore-Booth of Maltby (1909-1984)”.
\textsuperscript{734} Frederick Hoyer-Millar, “Minutes”, 27 July 1961, TNA/FO371/158283/M634/329.
\textsuperscript{735} Patrick Reilly, “Minutes”, 28 July 1961, TNA/FO371/158283/M634/329.
\textsuperscript{736} Greenhill “Booth, Paul Henry Gore-, Baron Gore-Booth of Maltby (1909-1984)”.
\textsuperscript{737} “United Kingdom Policy Towards the European Communities”, 29 April 1963, TNA/FO371/171428/M1091/328.
\textsuperscript{738} Denman, “O’Neill, Sir Con Douglas Walter (1912-1988)”.

and blocked the appointment. Instead, O’Neill joined The Times as a lead writer, fulfilling one of his teenage ambitions to become a journalist. He rejoined the Foreign Office a year later and in 1948 was transferred to the Political Division of the Allied Control Commission in Germany. Here he witnessed the early efforts to reconstruct post-war Europe, which reinforced his ‘Europeanist’ views. He gained the rank of Counsellor in 1951 and in 1953 spent a year at the Imperial Defence College as Foreign Office representative. In 1954 O’Neill became Head of the Foreign Office’s News Department, where he proved to be an effective public relations manager. He was transferred to Beijing in 1955 and appointed chargé d’affaires, where he remained for two years before returning to London as Assistant Under-Secretary for Eastern European affairs and UN organisation and disarmament. In the year of the submission of Britain’s first application for membership of the EEC, O’Neill was appointed ambassador to Finland and would remain there throughout the negotiations. As such, he was largely removed from one of Britain’s key attempts to redefine its relationship with Europe. In 1963, however, his appointment as ambassador to the European Communities in Brussels was a career turning-point. O’Neill proved himself to be a highly skilled operator in Brussels despite being in constant confrontation with the French, and ‘in this rather frustrating post he acquired the knowledge of Community affairs which was later to prove so valuable’. He returned to London as Deputy Under-Secretary for European economic affairs in 1965 and would continue to be instrumental in European policymaking and the launch of Britain’s second application. O’Neill resigned a second time in 1968 after being snubbed by the Foreign Secretary George Brown for the ambassadorship in Bonn, a job he had long coveted. He returned once again in 1969 as Deputy Under-Secretary for European integration affairs, and was later appointed head of the delegation for the successful negotiations for EEC membership under the Heath government. O’Neill’s role in Britain’s successful accession to the EEC has been highlighted by a number of people, and his

740 Ibid.
741 Ibid.
744 Ibid.
746 Ibid.
748 Ibid.
750 Ibid.
significance cannot be underestimated. Hugo Young has argued that alongside John Robinson, he was the most important official in Britain’s search for membership, but also adds that ‘O’Neill...was the senior of the two, and therefore possibly the more important.’ Stephen Wall’s official history of Britain and the European Community credits O’Neill with injecting ‘some hard-headed rigour into British European policymaking’ after the humiliation of the Brussels breakdown. O’Neill’s account of the 1970-2 negotiations is still referred to as one of the most important and authoritative sources on Britain’s accession to the EEC. His commitment to British membership was unquestionable, but he was not an ideologically driven ‘supranationalist’. O’Neill was first and foremost concerned with British power and prestige and its revitalisation: ‘What mattered was to get into the Community, and thereby restore our position at the centre of European affairs which, since 1958, we had lost.’ Regardless of his motivations, O’Neill was at the head of the Foreign Office’s Europeanist vanguard and worked tirelessly for Britain to enter the Common Market. His attitudes and input are absolutely crucial to this study.

In contrast to Gore-Booth and O’Neill, Marjoribanks, Statham and Keeble came from rather humble backgrounds; particularly the latter two. Marjoribanks was born in 1911, the son of a Church of Scotland minister in Edinburgh. He was educated at Merchiston Castle School and Edinburgh Academy, two prestigious independent schools in Edinburgh, and went on to read modern languages at the University of Edinburgh. Keeble was born into a working class family in Essex in 1922: his ancestors had worked for generations on Thames barges and tea clippers, though his father was a clerk at Bethnal Green Council. He attended Clacton County High School, the local grammar school, and then Queen Mary College at the University of London, where he elected to study modern languages but his studies were interrupted with the outbreak of the Second World War. Keeble enlisted in 1941 and served in the army for the remainder of the War.

751 Young, This Blessed Plot (1998), 179.
758 Ibid.
759 Ibid.
his knowledge of Russian was put to use as an interpreter for the two thousand Russians in Liverpool who were being repatriated back to the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{760} Statham was also born in 1922 in what is now Greater Manchester and attended Manchester Grammar School.\textsuperscript{761} He gained a place to study modern languages at Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge and upon graduation in 1943 worked for the Intelligence Corps in Italy and Austria until 1947.\textsuperscript{762} Statham was reportedly ‘not a typical diplomat’.\textsuperscript{763} He had a ‘bluff, north country manner’ and had also lost a leg in a motorcycle accident in his twenties.\textsuperscript{764} This atypical style also applied to Keeble and Marjoribanks. Keeble ‘did not look or sound the part he played so well...he took pride in his simple origins...he was an odd figure in the regalia of the GCMG with which his services were marked when he retired in 1982.’\textsuperscript{765} Marjoribanks was a ‘shrewd...and magisterial’ Scot, socially and culturally quite far removed from the public schoolboys and Oxbridge graduates who represented the typical ‘profile’ of a diplomat.\textsuperscript{766} All three men were reportedly strongly in favour of British membership of the EEC.\textsuperscript{767} Marjoribanks ‘saw more shrewdly than most of his generation what was going on in Europe’ and was disappointed that he had to retire in 1971, a year and a half before the successful conclusion of the negotiations for membership.\textsuperscript{768} After his retirement, he was chairman of the group ‘Scotland in Europe’ and campaigned to keep Britain in the EEC during the 1975 referendum.\textsuperscript{769} In his memoirs, Keeble stated that he believed Britain’s aloofness towards the Messina Conference and the Treaty of Rome was ‘the biggest mistake in British post-war foreign policy.’\textsuperscript{770} Keeble goes further and argues that whilst it was a mistake made by government ministers, the Foreign Office was ‘still obsessed with Britain’s role as a major world power and with the special relationship with the United States [and] did not seek to persuade them otherwise.’\textsuperscript{771} Therefore, Keeble directly acknowledged that the attitudes of senior officials in the Foreign Office contributed

\textsuperscript{760} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{762} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{763} “Sir Norman Statham”, \textit{The Telegraph} 27 November 2001.
\textsuperscript{764} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{765} “Sir Norman Statham”, \textit{The Times} 20 November 2001, 19.
\textsuperscript{766} Roy Denman, “Sir James Marjoribanks”, \textit{The Guardian} 5 February 2002.
\textsuperscript{768} Roy Denman, “Sir James Marjoribanks”, \textit{The Guardian} 5 February 2002; “Sir James Marjoribanks”, \textit{The Telegraph} 1 February 2002.
\textsuperscript{769} Roy Denman, “Sir James Marjoribanks”, \textit{The Guardian} 5 February 2002.
\textsuperscript{771} Ibid.
towards Britain’s self-imposed exile from the early years of the European Communities. Statham had a more personal attachment to Europe. His time in the Intelligence Corps during the War and the early Occupation period had a profound impact on him, and he later married an Austrian, which gave him a love of the German language. Before entering the diplomatic service in 1951, he worked for a Manchester oil company which gave him a strong grounding in economic and trade issues; this would influence his career at the Foreign Office. Statham cut his teeth in economic positions in Bonn and New York before joining the EEOD, where he spent an enormous chunk of his career: with the exception of a two year posting as Consul-General in Sao Paulo in 1968-70, he worked as Assistant Head and then Head of the department 1963-71. Statham established himself as an authoritative European trade expert, later spending five years as Economic Minister at the Bonn embassy and then Deputy Under-Secretary for European economic affairs at the Foreign Office.

In a similar vein to the previous chapter, this group of officials are evidence of an increasingly socially and educationally diverse diplomatic service. O’Neill and Gore-Booth certainly represented the ‘archetypal’ diplomat: public schoolboys from aristocratic families who had both attended Balliol College, an institution, which, according to Herbert Asquith, produced men possessing ‘the tranquil consciousness of an effortless superiority’. However, Marjoribanks, Keeble and Statham could not have been more different from this traditional ‘mould’. This eclectic combination of personalities contributed significantly towards the policymaking process and these officials, amongst others, attempted to steer the government towards closer relations with the EEC and, eventually, a second application for membership. The officials’ social backgrounds and educations seemingly had little influence on their attitudes towards European integration, and they were motivated by a range of factors. Gore-Booth and O’Neill were dutiful patriots who wished to see Britain’s global grandeur preserved; Statham was a hard-nosed economic expert who believed that British trade and economic power would be strengthened within the Common Market; Marjoribanks and Keeble were much more ideologically attached to the principles of European unity and solidarity. It was these

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attitudes which coloured the background of the Foreign Office and the Wilson government’s European policy.
In light of Britain’s increased marginalisation in Europe, Whitehall decided to launch an inter-departmental study of British membership of the EEC. It was headed by David Pitblado, Third Secretary at the Treasury. Parr has argued that the Pitblado report ‘revealed the dominance of the Foreign Office in formulating policy towards the European Community’. This is an argument which this study strongly endorses. More specifically, the EEOD were given a high degree of input in the Pitblado report, and the political and strategic arguments in favour of continuing to pursue membership were given considerable weight. As supervising Under-Secretary and Head of the department, Marjoribanks and Keeble had a great deal of influence over the initial drafts. Their thoughts and comments during the discussions for the Pitblado report are essential in dissecting their attitudes towards European integration. Marjoribanks argued that the Foreign Office should ‘turn...towards tactical considerations’. He suggested that EFTA be built up in a bid to strengthen Britain’s position in Europe and that the British government ‘be as positive as we can on European political union’. The former was merely a continuation of British foreign policy from EFTA’s founding in 1960, but the latter was a much more radical proposal. European political union was something which ministers and officials had been wary of, particularly the implication of supranational oversight. However, the political developments in the European Communities required a more enthusiastic approach from the Foreign Office, one which would shore up support from the ‘Friendly Five’ and demonstrate Britain’s continued commitment to membership. Keeble concurred with this line in his draft paper, adding: ‘because the Six are building political integration upon an economic base we cannot achieve our full political and economic objectives without membership of the Communities.’ Keeble also argued that de Gaulle was, realistically, an absolute bar to British accession, but that this was no reason to stop declaring Britain’s interest in joining the Common Market. This negativity would play into the hands of the French, who would use it as evidence of British half-heartedness towards European unity. There was a growing acceptance amongst members of the Foreign Office that ‘the

777 David Pitblado, “UK Relations with the EEC: Review of UK Policy in Relation to the Progress of European Integration”, 11 September 1964, TNA/T312/1011/2F415/04C.
778 Parr, Britain’s Policy Towards the European Community (2006), 17.
780 Ibid.
782 Ibid.
783 Ibid.
price for our entry into the Community will be acceptance of the Treaty of Rome’. As Parr has noted, instead of demanding safeguards before accession, which had been the strategy in the first application, ‘the British would seek to agree to the principle of membership and then work to safeguard Britain’s essential interests from the inside.’ Marjoribanks, Keeble and O’Neill were among the first officials to fully accept this and argue it forcefully to their Whitehall colleagues. The ‘conditional’ approach was no longer a practical strategy.

In addition to preparing papers for the Pitblado report, the Foreign Office decided to embark upon their own reassessment, free from the constraints of other Whitehall departments’ criticism and jostling. These documents are of even greater value in deconstructing officials’ attitudes. Keeble submitted a paper to the chiefs of the EEOD, the Western Organisations and Coordination Department (WOCD) and the Western Department, outlining ‘purely a personal view’. Keeble highlighted the need for the incoming government to define its immediate short-term policy towards European integration not too long after the election, as there would be pressure from the Six for reassurance and reaffirmation. Furthermore, Keeble gave a frank and stark picture of Britain’s future should she remain outside the European Communities. It had already been accepted that British exclusion from the EEC would harm Anglo-American relations, and that the United States would continue to look towards the Six as their principal European partners in international defence, but Keeble went further and argued the benefits which membership would bring to the ‘special relationship’. He argued that the United States would see Britain as a ‘valuable element in influencing European policy and will therefore pay us...much more attention’.

The new departmental attitudes towards the Commonwealth were also quite different from those which governed the first application. Keeble conceded that ‘our relations with the old Commonwealth, may, for a time suffer, but in the long run we may expect to enjoy the positive advantages flowing from a dominant position in a powerful grouping.’ The casual dismissal of the potential weakening of Commonwealth ties as a temporary setback and price worth paying differed markedly from the stance taken before the Brussels breakdown. Certain members of the EEOD had expressed in private the view that the Commonwealth was an economic cul-de-

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784 James Marjoribanks, “Europe”, 14 May 1964, TNA/FO371/177371/M1903/43.
785 Parr, Britain’s Policy Towards the European Community (2006), 18.
786 Curtis Keeble, “Europe”, 12 May 1964, TNA/FO371/177371/M1903/43.
787 Curtis Keeble, “The United Kingdom and Europe”, 12 May 1964, TNA/FO371/177371/M1903/43.
788 Ibid.
789 Ibid.
sac compared to the opportunities which the Common Market presented, but there was still an understanding that political consultations with Commonwealth governments would continue to be of value. 790 This was no longer the case as far as the Foreign Office was concerned. Only a political relationship with the EEC would allow Britain to continue to project influence across the globe. With regards to EFTA, Keeble seemingly echoed Marjoribanks’ sentiments in January. He argued that it should be built up with the possible intention of creating a wider customs union with the EEC as an ‘interim solution’ to the economic divisions in Europe. 791 However, Keeble acknowledged that this would not be a long-term solution given the fact that ‘the argument for joining the Community flows from an assessment of its long term political importance rather than from the possibility of significant economic advantage.’ 792 In contrast to the notion that Britain was, on balance, marginally better off inside the European Communities than outside, which was the ultimate motivation behind the first application, the new orthodoxy argued that membership, for all its drawbacks, was the only way to preserve British power and that Britain’s fate was tied to whether or not she could join the EEC. 793 In the words of Marjoribanks, it was ‘only a question of time when we shall eventually join up with Europe’, indicating the amount of stock which the Foreign Office was placing in British membership. 794

Keeble’s paper was circulated to UKDEL in Brussels, where it came under O’Neill’s scrutiny. The attitudes which these two men harboured towards European integration were broadly similar, but there were still divergences of opinion on certain issues. O’Neill had the benefit of direct access to the Six’s representatives to the EEC and was probably the most well-informed member of the diplomatic service with regards to the politics of European integration and the Community’s developments, with the possible exception of John Robinson. As such, he went to some lengths to dispel some of the ideas which Keeble had presented as possible policies towards the EEC. Unlike Marjoribanks and Keeble, O’Neill was completely opposed to using EFTA as a bargaining tool. 795 He dismissed Keeble’s plans for an ‘interim’ free trade area, which could be used as a transitional stage for Britain and

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791 Curtis Keeble, “The United Kingdom and Europe”, 12 May 1964, TNA/FO371/177371/M1903/43.
792 Ibid.
794 James Marjoribanks, “Europe”, 14 May 1964, TNA/FO371/177371/M1903/43.
795 Sir Con O’Neill to Curtis Keeble, 28 May 1964, TNA/FO371/177371/M1903/43B.
other EFTA members prior to full accession to the EEC, arguing: ‘I wonder if it has even...limited appeal, quite apart from its attainability.’\textsuperscript{796} O’Neill was of the opinion that EFTA was an obstacle to the success of the first application, and ‘might well have kept us out of the Community even if de Gaulle had not uttered his veto.’\textsuperscript{797} It is not entirely clear whether Marjoribanks and Keeble also shared this view or if they had advocated closer cooperation with EFTA in order to promote a generally more proactive approach towards Europe. The latter is probably more likely. The majority of the Foreign Office had, by this point, come to the realisation that EFTA did not provide a long-term solution and could only be used as a temporary answer to the divisions in Europe.\textsuperscript{798} O’Neill’s most insightful remarks, however, come from his attitude towards membership as a whole. He stated that ‘the possible political disadvantages of...staying outside the Communities’ were, in his view, ‘the most powerful argument for...coming in’.\textsuperscript{799} This attitude seems to have been harboured by much of the senior generation of officials after the Brussels breakdown. As argued above, the consequences of exclusion were now seen as far too great and constituted the main motivation for joining the Common Market as opposed to some of the potential advantages which Keeble had tried to emphasise. For the more conservative officials, accession was more a means to an end and did not necessarily represent a ‘conversion’ to the principles of European solidarity and unity.

After this exchange with Keeble, O’Neill began work on a paper which would define the new frontier in British European policy. It was addressed to the Foreign Secretary and circulated widely around Whitehall. It was comprehensive and mercilessly analytical. In the paper, O’Neill admitted that his views had been completely transformed in his current post.\textsuperscript{800} This is a crucial point. O’Neill had not been a fierce advocate of British participation in a European union for much of his career. During his time as a correspondent for The Times, he had criticised the concept of European unity as ‘platitudinous or controversial’ in response to Winston Churchill’s speech as Chairman of the United Europe Movement at the Albert Hall in May 1947.\textsuperscript{801} However, his position as ambassador to the EEC had given him a unique insight into ‘its fundamental purposes, its inner compulsions, its methods, its

\textsuperscript{796} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{797} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{798} Parr, “Gone Native” (2003), 77; Wall, The Official History of Britain and the European Community Volume II (2013), 93.
\textsuperscript{799} Sir Con O’Neill to Curtis Keeble, 28 May 1964, TNA/FO371/177371/M1903/43B.
\textsuperscript{800} Sir Con O’Neill to R.A. Butler, “Britain’s Future Relationship with the EEC”, 23 July 1964, TNA/FO371/177372/M1093/70.
limitations, some of its leading personalities, its probable course of development’ which convinced him that European political and economic cooperation was the future of international security. He outlined his new views to his colleagues:

...I feel that we in Britain still, in general, underestimate the extent to which the European Communities are and always have been concerned with politics and power. Their economic titles and functions still blind us to a fact the “Europeans” themselves have never sought to conceal: that they aim, through union, to revive their influence and power, not merely the prosperity, of their countries and peoples.

O’Neill managed to observe what the overwhelming majority of Foreign Office officials had failed to realise since the founding of the Communities. The Common Market was intended as both a political and economic venture, and British attempts to artificially separate the two in policymaking and their diplomatic responses were severely hampering officials’ abilities to understand and predict the behaviour of the Six and the EEC’s future trajectory. As a result, Britain had been temporarily locked out of participating in European Community affairs and diplomatically ostracised by France, which was proving to be extremely damaging to British interests. O’Neill addressed Britain’s future strategy to try and mitigate this damage. Once again, he advocated a positive approach towards the EEC, acknowledging that it ‘would bring no early results’, but that a negative attitude ‘would be the signal for which our enemies in Europe...are waiting.’ His picture of Britain’s relationship with Europe should the government decide to withdraw its desire to seek membership was stark. O’Neill stated that it ‘would amount to taking off the brake...on the Community’s development away from us’ and would be an ‘irreversible’ step which would permanently sever Britain’s influence in Europe. Britain was not just, in O’Neill’s opinion, infinitely better off in than out, but would also have to proclaim her intentions long and loud in order to demonstrate her commitment. In Parr’s words, ‘evidence of Britain’s desire to join the European Community would act as a corrective to French influence in Europe, reminding the Five that there were alternatives to a political settlement on French

802 Sir Con O’Neill to R.A. Butler, “Britain’s Future Relationship with the EEC”, 23 July 1964, TNA/FO371/177372/M1093/70.
803 Ibid.
804 Ibid.
805 Ibid.
806 Ibid.
terms.\textsuperscript{807} The Foreign Office’s tactic of using the ‘Friendly Five’ to bring pressure on the French and check their influence within the EEC was also a new, radical strategy. O’Neill identified that the Six could no longer be treated as a collective and that the divergence of national interests had threatened the Communities’ continued existence. The British government could potentially play this to their advantage by presenting Britain as a counterweight to French dominance. These ideas would colour many officials’ thoughts in the run-up to the second application.

O’Neill’s paper provoked a wide response from within the Foreign Office and the great embassies of Europe. The Head of the WOCD, John Barnes, labelled it a ‘valuable despatch’ and that he was in agreement with ‘almost all of it’.\textsuperscript{808} Where the UKDEL’s opinions differed from those in London, however, was over political consultations with the Six. O’Neill had argued that it was not in Britain’s interest to try and participate in discussions on European political union because Britain would still be outside the EEC’s institutions and therefore removed from policymaking – a political community of the Seven could not coexist with an economic community of the Six.\textsuperscript{809} In addition, he was adamant that such political discussions would not amount to anything and would be a diplomatic wild goose chase for the British government.\textsuperscript{810} Barnes disagreed with O’Neill’s diagnosis and argued that it would be to Britain’s advantage to try and influence the proceedings, advocating the widening of the EEC’s ‘political roof’ to include other European states, ‘rather than...letting the Six go ahead to build a Little Europe on their own.’\textsuperscript{811} These ideas stemmed from a long-held orthodoxy in the WOCD that Britain could participate in political developments with the Six without necessarily going all the way into the Common Market. Parr has also argued that Barnes was first and foremost an Atlanticist and subscribed to the idea of an ‘Atlantic Community’, another popular departmental view within the WOCD since the mid-1950s.\textsuperscript{812} Barnes, unlike O’Neill and many other figures in the EEOD, had still failed to appreciate that only full membership of the EEC would grant Britain the political influence the government sought in Europe. However, de Gaulle’s pursuit of these political consultations between the Six’s national governments in a bid to curb the power of the

\textsuperscript{807} Parr, \textit{Britain’s Policy Towards the European Community} (2006), 19.
\textsuperscript{808} John Barnes, “Minutes”, 11 August 1964, TNA/FO371/177372/M1093/70.
\textsuperscript{809} Sir Con O’Neill to R.A. Butler, “Britain’s Future Relationship with the EEC”, 23 July 1964, TNA/FO371/177372/M1093/70.
\textsuperscript{810} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{811} John Barnes, “Minutes”, 11 August 2016, TNA/FO371/177372/M1093/70.
\textsuperscript{812} See chapter 1 on the ‘Grand Design’ and: Parr, \textit{Britain’s Policy Towards the European Community} (2007), 37.
supranational Commission had reinvigorated interest in such arrangements. Indeed, Harold Wilson would later voice his attraction to de Gaulle’s conception of *Europe de patries* versus the Five’s more federalist vision to the Foreign Office.

Frank Roberts, the British ambassador in Bonn, sent his own major paper to the Foreign Secretary as a response to O’Neill’s points. Roberts was largely in agreement with O’Neill on German attitudes towards British membership of the EEC and how the West German government believed that Britain could not participate in any meaningful political integration without first joining the Communities. He also agreed that the British government would have to publicly maintain a highly positive approach to Europe in order to demonstrate their continued commitment. Roberts’ full acknowledgement that there was ‘no institutional way to bring the EEC and EFTA together’ was another more radical stance which chimed with O’Neill’s arguments. However, like Barnes, Roberts was adamant that British participation in a European political union was essential, and likened O’Neill’s suggestions to that of Britain ‘[staying] on the sidelines and [letting] the Six fight it out amongst themselves.’ Roberts cited the Five’s impatience and the lack of political will to simply ‘wait for Britain’, which some saw as evidence of British half-heartedness. At the opposite end of the spectrum were the more conservative members of the diplomatic service who still held out hope for an association with the EEC. Roderick Barclay, one of the officials under study in the previous chapter and now ambassador to Belgium was one such individual, as was Edgar Cohen, Britain’s Permanent Representative to EFTA. Barclay admitted that ‘the bitter experience of 15 months and more of negotiations with the Community have left me with a subjective dislike of it’ and stated that he continued to believe that the application would have been successful had it been for an associative relationship rather than full membership. Cohen echoed Barclay’s thoughts on association with the EEC and the possible construction of a free trade area, but his

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814 Parr, “Gone Native” (2003), 79.

815 Franks Roberts to R.A. Butler “Future British Policy Towards Europe”, 24 August 1964, TNA/FO371/177372/M1093/78.

816 Ibid.

817 Ibid.

818 Ibid.

819 Ibid.

despatch was dismissed as ‘somewhat inadequate’ by Curtis Keeble. These responses to O’Neill’s paper highlighted the disunity within the Foreign Office and diplomatic service. In particular, calls for an association between Britain and the Six had not yet disappeared completely, underlining the durability of officials’ personal attitudes towards European integration. However, the majority of officials at this point were convinced that nothing short of membership would satisfy Britain’s essential interests. This was the overriding attitude which embodied the Foreign Office’s contributions to the Pitblado report, and O’Neill’s paper continued to be quoted as the ‘blueprint’ on Foreign Office policy towards Europe.

The final version of the Pitblado report was submitted in October 1964, in time for the incoming Labour government following their election victory. It was an exceptionally comprehensive document which took into account Anglo-American relations, the Commonwealth, the likely economic consequences of accession, and the state of British foreign policy in general. The Foreign Office had it circulated to the Western European and American embassies and the permanent missions to NATO, EFTA, the OECD and the EEC. In his letter to Charles Johnston, the Deputy Under-Secretary for European economic affairs, David Pitblado thanked the Foreign Office’s representatives in Europe, the Commonwealth and the United States for their input, but singled out Con O’Neill for his contributions, stating that he alone had established the ‘framework for our studies’.

There can be little doubt that the sections of the report which dealt with foreign policy were heavily influenced by O’Neill’s papers from UKDEL. Indeed, some of the language employed is near-identical, particularly the new Whitehall perspectives on the political dimensions of the European Communities. The ‘Atlantic partnership’ was also given much more consideration. Discussions preceding the first application between Foreign Office officials had largely dismissed fears of the EEC becoming a ‘third force’. However, de Gaulle’s disdain for ‘Anglo-Saxons’ and his desire for a more independent Europe were now viewed as a serious threat to the unity of the West. The idea that Britain could act as a bridge between Europe and the United States from outside the EEC was now gone –

824 Ibid.
825 James Marjoribanks to Pierson Dixon, 23 October 1964, TNA/FO371/177374/M1903/121.
826 David Pitblado to Charles Johnston, 14 October 1964, TNA/FO371/177374/M1903/121A.
without British membership, there would be no bridge at all. It was warned that the current attitude of the West German government, which was ‘firmly opposed to the concept of Europe as a third force’ could easily change in the face of shifting national interests vis-à-vis reunification or the role of NATO.\textsuperscript{828} These issues added further impetus to the urgency of British accession and demonstrated the potential dangers of exclusion. In the eyes of the Foreign Office, only British membership of the EEC could curb these deviations and preserve the integrity of the Atlantic Alliance. The resurgence of fears of the creation of a ‘third force’ went hand in hand with the divergence of political vision within the European Communities: ‘On the one hand is the movement towards integration...On the other is the nationalist tradition, symbolised at present by Gaullism.’\textsuperscript{829} As argued above, the Gaullist conception of the EEC was attractive to many British politicians and officials, as it downplayed the supranational components of European integration and reaffirmed the primacy of national governments. However, as Parr has demonstrated, the Foreign Office knew that the real issue was not whether the French approach was more compatible with British interests, but that de Gaulle remained stubbornly opposed to British membership.\textsuperscript{830} In practical terms, that meant making a tactical decision to support a federal Europe even though most ministers and officials were opposed to such an arrangement.\textsuperscript{831} Reconciling these two conflicting objectives would cause a rift between Downing Street and the Foreign Office which would frame the debates on the decision to apply to the EEC a second time and the state of British foreign policy towards Europe. Indeed, shortly after the new government had taken office, they were presented with their first challenge which threatened the future existence of the EEC.

\textsuperscript{828} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{829} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{830} Parr, “Gone Native” (2003), 78.
\textsuperscript{831} Ibid.
Building Bridges: Britain, EFTA and the Empty Chair Crisis

The Wilson government’s attitude towards Europe was, as argued above, rather ambivalent. As Parr has noted, Labour’s policy on membership of the EEC was governed by the ‘five conditions’: guarantees for the protection of British agriculture, safeguards for Commonwealth trade, the maintenance of Britain’s commitments to EFTA, the right to use central economic planning and nationalisation in government policy, and full control over foreign policy.832 These rather inflexible criteria did not give the Foreign Office much room for manoeuvre, and by February 1965 officials ‘began to pressure Wilson more directly to declare his hand in favour of eventual accession to the European Community.’833 Michael Palliser, then the Head of the Foreign Office’s Policy Planning Staff, was instrumental in convincing the new Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart to urge the Prime Minister to pursue a more consistent European policy.834 The Planning Staff Department was a new creation and had usurped control of a large part of the WOCD’s functions, namely ‘general planning’ and policymaking, which had reportedly incensed John Barnes, the latter’s chief.835 The decreasing importance of the WOCD, which only retained control over NATO, WEU and Council of Europe affairs, is further evidence of the EEOD’s ascent and establishment as the principal department concerned with multilateral European institutions in the 1960s.836 More specifically, it represented the Foreign Office’s continued orientation towards the European Communities and European integration efforts as opposed to the more Atlanticist line taken by the WOCD.

Stewart and the Foreign Office’s attempts to steer Wilson towards a more ‘Europeanist’ foreign policy had mixed results. The Prime Minister was clearly not particularly enthusiastic about the notion of declaring Britain’s intention to reapply for membership of the EEC, commenting on Stewart’s letter: ‘Unless [the EEC] was genuinely outward looking and not autarkic it must be inimical to Atlantic and Commonwealth links. The real test is agricultural policy, which in its present form...would deal a death-blow to Commonwealth trade.’837 Once again, the Churchillian ‘three circles’ doctrine reared its head and flaunted

832 Broad, Labour’s European Dilemmas (2001), 44; Parr, “Gone Native” (2003), 76.
833 Ibid.; Parr, Britain’s Policy Towards the European Community (2006), 36.
its enduring legacy in the attitudes of British politicians. However, Wilson was not entirely opposed to greater cooperation with Europe, and publicly stated in February 1965 that he would discuss the development of ‘a bridge between EFTA and the Common Market’ in his bilateral talks with Chancellor Ludwig Erhard.\(^{838}\) Parr has argued that Wilson was ‘inspired by Foreign Office anxieties of Britain’s diminished political influence in Europe’, especially after the imposition of the 15% import surcharge at the end of 1964 which had antagonised the other members of EFTA and put Britain in the diplomatic doghouse.\(^{839}\) Whilst the EEOD were pleased with this slight progress, there were still concerns over the practicalities of Wilson’s ideas. In response to press commentary on Wilson’s announcements, Norman Statham stated that ‘there must be doubt as to whether the Community would be interested’ and instructed the Foreign Office’s News Department to downplay the potential success of such a proposal.\(^{840}\) Marjoribanks also expressed his disappointment, suggesting that such an out of date idea would ‘re-emphasise in the EEC that we are out of touch with realities.’\(^{841}\) Keeble argued that an EEC-EFTA association ‘was regarded by the Community as a non-starter’ and would probably not receive much of a hearing.\(^{842}\) However, the Prime Minister had decided that the issue was worthy of exploration and instructed the Foreign Secretary to circulate a note on possible links between EFTA and the EEC to be considered by ministers in late March.\(^{843}\) The EEOD’s paper reaffirmed much of what had been said previously, but in slightly more detail. Firstly, it was argued that an association would likely disrupt EFTA rather than create a functional link with the EEC.\(^{844}\) The EEC’s enhanced economic integration and productivity could potentially sap EFTA of investment and industrial output.\(^{845}\) In addition, the EEOD were keen to stress that ‘association...would probably require acceptance of most of the obligations of full membership without a corresponding degree of control’ and would amount to little more than being treated as ‘second class citizens’ in Europe.\(^{846}\) This was quite a damning view of Britain’s future should she continue to rely on EFTA and an associative relationship, something which had been largely debunked by most Foreign Office officials. Wilson was not unsympathetic towards

\(^{838}\) “Making EEC Ninth EFTA Member”, The Times 26 February 1965, 12.

\(^{839}\) Parr, Britain’s Policy Towards the European Community (2006), 41.

\(^{840}\) Norman Statham, “Minutes”, 26 February 1965, TNA/FO371/182345/M10723/7A.

\(^{841}\) James Marjoribanks, “Minutes”, 26 February 1965, TNA/FO371/182345/M10723/7A.

\(^{842}\) Curtis Keeble, “UK/ECC Relations”, 1 March 1965, TNA/FO371/182345/M10723/7B.


\(^{845}\) Ibid.

\(^{846}\) Ibid.
these views, and did raise the question of EEC membership with the Cabinet on a number of occasions. Parr has suggested that this was a more calculated ploy in order to appease the pro-European wing of the party, led by the First Secretary of State, George Brown. Regardless of Wilson’s motivations, the government were slowly beginning to investigate ways in which Britain could try and forge new links with the EEC.

It was at a Cabinet meeting on the 27 April that Wilson announced his interest in creating closer links between EEC and EFTA. It is important to note, however, that Wilson continued to maintain that membership of the EEC was currently not an option as the ‘five conditions’ could not be satisfied. From his memoirs, it appears that Wilson was largely concerned with currying favour with the other EFTA member states, which would explain his continued interest in a ‘bridge-building’ exercise. The main cut and thrust of his approach consisted of accommodating the economic interests of the EFTA members in an EEC-EFTA association as opposed to appreciating the political connotations of the EEC. The various schemes which sporadically tumbled onto paper ranged from tariff reductions and the creation of a wider free trade area to a single customs union. This is an argument shared by Parr, who has stated that the bridge-building initiative was a ‘response to short-term pressures...to help prevent the self-made problem of the fragmentation of EFTA and thus of Britain’s influence in Europe.’ Unsurprisingly, the EEOD and UKDEL immediately voiced their concerns. In response to ideas for a ministerial contact committee between the EEC and EFTA, the now Head of the department following Keeble’s transfer to Switzerland, Norman Statham, suggested that the scheme was mere ‘window dressing’. Furthermore, if the creation of the committee actually did get approved, it would be limited to the economic field and ‘political questions would not be within its sphere of competence.’ EFTA and the EEC were, Statham argued, ‘totally different animals’ and attempts to try and coordinate the two groups’ polices would be a haphazard and disjointed affair. However, Statham did not fail to point out that the most fundamental

848 Parr, Britain’s Policy Towards the European Community (2006), 45.
850 Ibid.
852 Ibid.
853 Ibid.
854 Parr, Britain’s Policy Towards the European Community (2006), 46.
855 Norman Statham to Patrick Hancock, 4 May 1965, TNA/FO371/182345/M10723/33A.
856 Ibid.
857 Ibid.
barrier to an EEC-EFTA association was the French, something which Michael Palliser later reiterated.\textsuperscript{858} In this sense, the other issues with the bridge-building exercise were largely irrelevant, as it was doomed to failure. Patrick Hancock, the new Assistant Under-Secretary for European economic affairs following Marjoribanks’ departure for Brussels commented: ‘I understand that the PM is quite aware that the French can be expected to reject the idea of the contact committee; and that he does not mind.’\textsuperscript{859}

This epitomised the Wilson government’s approach to Europe in its first year: awash with ambiguity and more concerned with political posturing than practicalities. To borrow from Stephen Wall, the Labour government had ‘a toe in the water’ and showed no immediate signs of reaching a definitive position on European integration.\textsuperscript{860} At a meeting of the EFTA heads of government in late May in Vienna, it was agreed that EFTA should investigate possible links for collaboration with the EEC.\textsuperscript{861} Schemes such as tariff reduction or commercial harmonisation were regarded as the most promising initiatives in light of French opposition to wider political consultations.\textsuperscript{862} Whitehall were ordered to draft papers on potential ‘bridge-building’ plans, which provoked a number of reactions. The word from UKDEL in Brussels was that the Vienna initiative would be completely rebuffed by the Six.\textsuperscript{863} Marjoribanks reported: ‘On the basis of...indications we have had of Community reactions, we should have no illusions that there is any likelihood of the Vienna initiative meeting with a favourable reaction’.\textsuperscript{864} Marjoribanks’ number two at UKDEL, Arthur Maddocks, stated that the President of the European Commission, Walter Hallstein, was worried that the bridge-building initiative would play into the hands of the French by using it to their advantage by inserting proposals which would curb the power of the Commission.\textsuperscript{865} This was dangerous for two reasons. Firstly, the French already dominated the EEC. Any measures which would enhance their influence would be to the detriment of both Britain and the Five. Secondly, if Britain supported a bridge-building initiative which

\textsuperscript{858} Ibid.; Michael Palliser, “EFTA/EEC Contact Committee”, 5 May 1965, TNA/FO371/182345/M10723/33E.

\textsuperscript{859} Patrick Hancock, Comments on Statham’s letter, 6 May 1965, TNA/FO371/182345/M10723/33A.

\textsuperscript{860} Wall, The Official History of Britain and the European Community Volume II (2013), 80.

\textsuperscript{861} Parr, Britain’s Policy Towards the European Community (2006), 47.

\textsuperscript{862} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{863} James Marjoribanks to Foreign Office, 11 June 1965, TNA/FO371/182346/M10723/68.

\textsuperscript{864} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{865} Arthur Maddocks to Norman Statham, 2 June 1965, TNA/FO371/182346/M10723/69. Interestingly, Maddocks and Statham were the same age and both attended Manchester Grammar School at the same time. It is not clear whether or not they were old friends, but they certainly shared similar views on Europe.
would result in a diluted Commission and open the door to further French domination, the ‘Friendly Five’ would be enraged.

The Vienna initiative hit an obstacle with the inception of what has been dubbed the ‘Empty Chair Crisis’.

After a couple of gruelling weeks of discussion in the EEC’s Council of Ministers over the financing of the Common Agricultural Policy in June 1965, Maurice Couve de Murville announced the withdrawal of the French delegation from the negotiations.

Parr has argued that it appeared ‘initially to be no more than a temporary breakdown’, but in actual fact resulted in a French boycott of all EEC institutions until the ‘Luxembourg Compromise’ of January 1966.

It is at this juncture that the EEOD and UKDEL started drafting significantly fewer papers and minutes on EEC-EFTA association and bridge-building. This is largely because the Empty Chair Crisis made the likelihood of an associative relationship between the two groupings even slimmer than before given the deadlock within the EEC. Given the sensitivity of the situation, the Foreign Office’s response was to avoid controversy and prevent the government from embarking on any outlandish schemes for European cooperation. In early September, Statham responded to a paper from the Department of Economic Affairs (DEA) which made a number of suggestions on areas for cooperation between the EEC and EFTA.

He lambasted the paper for highlighting the fact that there was a ‘continued lack of apparent scope for significant bridge-building’, and that the proposals ‘scarcely seem sufficient to warrant all the song and dance about bridge-building initiatives since the Chequers meeting in April’.

Statham was aware that the EEC was not in a fit state to consider the proposals, and that it would simply suggest that Britain was attempting to strengthen EFTA for its own sake, which would only serve to irritate the Five. This view was confirmed by reports from

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868 Parr, Britain’s Policy Towards the European Community (2006), 48.

869 The DEA was created after Labour’s election in 1964. Its primary function was long term economic and industrial planning in the form of a ‘National Plan’ for economic growth. It was also partly set up to curb the power of the Treasury and appease George Brown, its first Secretary of State, who was considered a rival of Harold Wilson. See: Kevin Theakston, The Labour Party and Whitehall (London: Routledge, 1992), 121; Andrew Blick, “Harold Wilson, Labour and the Machinery of Government” in The Wilson Governments 1964-1970 Reconsidered, ed. Glen O’Hara and Helen Parr (London: Routledge, 2006), 41.

870 Norman Statham, “EEP Committee Meeting of 2 September”, 2 September 1965, TNA/FO371/182348/M10723/151.

871 Ibid.
Marjoribanks and UKDEL in Brussels. Marjoribanks wrote to O’Neill informing him that the Empty Chair Crisis was unlikely to resolve itself before the end of the year, which would likely result in a complete standstill to the bridge-building initiative.⁸⁷² The attitude of the French remained the decisive factor. Marjoribanks suggested that de Gaulle was playing for time until the presidential elections in December 1965, when he would be more confident of his position and would be able to force the Five to make a favourable deal.⁸⁷³ On the prospect of bridge-building gaining any immediate momentum, Marjoribanks’ assessment was bleak. He argued that Britain wading into the Empty Chair Crisis and seemingly trying to play it to its advantage would foster a great deal of resentment, and the French in particular would fight tooth and nail to prevent a challenge to their influence within the EEC.⁸⁷⁴ However, he did suggest that there was a possibility that Britain could have a ‘major indirect influence on the outcome’ of the crisis:

There is...a chance that during 1966 the key to developments may once more lie with us. If we then decided that it was in our interest to join the Five in working a Community of the kind established by the Rome Treaty, we might in return enjoy a bargaining position very much stronger...when it came to discussing the economic details, notably the Common Agricultural Policy...on the other hand...’it would be open to us to wait until the Five, as a result of the difficulties operating of the Community à cinq, turned increasingly to the idea of a wider and looser trade organisation.⁸⁷⁵

In short, Marjoribanks’ thoughts indicated that the time was not yet ripe for Britain to try and establish a new relationship with the EEC, but that the Empty Chair Crisis could eventually lead to Britain having a stronger bargaining position. Indeed, he warned that ‘there is nothing to be gained, and much likely to be lost, by making a move to develop our relations with the Six before it is clear whether France is going to win the current dispute.'⁸⁷⁶ Marjoribanks’ comments also kept the possibility of a wider free trade area alive, which would be more compatible with British economic interests. The feasibility of such a suggestion is less relevant than the confidence which this projected. Marjoribanks

⁸⁷³ Ibid.
⁸⁷⁴ Ibid.
⁸⁷⁵ Ibid.
⁸⁷⁶ Ibid.
clearly felt that a future bid for building bridges was imminent and had a chance of succeeding.

Marjoribanks’ report caused a stir in the EEOD and several officials decided to contribute minutes in response. Statham responded to Marjoribanks’ doubts over the feasibility of bridge-building in the midst of the Empty Chair Crisis by arguing that ‘it was important not to let the impetus of bridge-building flag’. Slowing the initiative down or prematurely quashing it would leave Britain without any future bargaining chips and would also incense the Danes, who had taken up the cause of bridge-building with a great deal of enthusiasm. As such, Statham outlined three potential options for the government: do nothing; establish the parameters of a bridge-building initiative but defer approaching the EEC until its internal divisions had healed; or immediately approach the EEC with an initiative. Statham immediately dismissed the first option out of hand, citing the reasons given above. He expressed his personal preference for the third option, but added that it would probably be easier to implement the second option. O’Neill weighed in and suggested that the second option was the best course of action in light of comments made by Dutch contacts who expressed reservations over the pursuit of bridge-building in the current political climate. He was supported in this by Gore-Booth, who as Permanent Under-Secretary added that ministers could be prone to changing their minds on the matter and that a paper should be produced on the implications of the Empty Chair Crisis for the bridge-building initiative. In short, the Foreign Office line, approved at the very top, was to dig in and play for time. Marjoribanks’ report from Brussels was also relayed to the Foreign Secretary, who raised the issues at a Cabinet meeting. Stewart informed his colleagues that the current deadlock in the EEC ‘limited the scope of any initiative to promote a wider Europe’ and as far as Britain was concerned, the stand-off was a double-edged sword. It was in the British government’s interest that the Five stand fast against French demands, as an EEC dominated by France would be ‘inward-looking and less satisfactory as a partner in our politico-military policies in Europe.’ Conversely, however, France’s opposition to a powerful Commission and its scepticism of supranationalism was

877 Norman Statham, “Bridge-building between the EEC and EFTA”, 24 September 1965, TNA/FO371/182348/M10723/163B.
878 Ibid.
879 Ibid.
880 Ibid.
881 Con O’Neill, “Minutes”, 25 September 1965, TNA/FO371/182348/M10723/163B.
882 Paul Gore-Booth, “Minutes”, 28 September 1965, TNA/FO371/182348/M10723/163B.
884 Ibid.
more in line with British views than the Five’s.\textsuperscript{885} Repeating the advice of his officials, Stewart urged patience and caution, but it was generally agreed that in the near future the Cabinet ‘would reassess our attitude to the Community and re-examine, in the light of developments in recent years, the conditions which the Labour party had attached to the United Kingdom accession.’\textsuperscript{886} Indeed, Michael Palliser had argued earlier that the time had come to try and convince ministers that the ‘five conditions’ were a serious hindrance to the government’s efforts to integrate with Europe and that it had become a symbol of Labour’s overarching attitude, which raised suspicions among the Six.\textsuperscript{887} Patrick Hancock concurred and even went as far as to say that the Foreign Secretary should go to some lengths to disavow them in public, as it was simply not enough ‘to just stop talking about the five conditions.’\textsuperscript{888} The pressure which the Foreign Office had applied to Stewart to tread lightly on bridge-building and subtly raise the possibility of a future bid for membership, free from the shackles of the ‘five conditions’ appears to have worked.

In November, at the request of the Foreign Secretary, the EEOD began drafting a Cabinet paper on the implications of the Empty Chair Crisis for Britain’s future relationship with the EEC. Sir Con O’Neill took the burden of the first draft upon himself, and produced an extremely comprehensive and persuasive paper. O’Neill effectively argued that the crisis was a turning point for the whole of Europe, and the outcome would have significant consequences for future British interests.\textsuperscript{889} However, the paper also betrayed O’Neill’s vehemently anti-French views. O’Neill argued that a French victory in the crisis would be ‘bad and even dangerous’, whereas a victory for the Five ‘could turn to our advantage.’\textsuperscript{890} In response to later comments from Barnes, O’Neill even went as far as to suggest that ‘if there must be an odd man out I would sooner it were France than we’ and that French expulsion from the EEC was a price well worth paying for British membership.\textsuperscript{891} This cut against the prevalent thinking at No. 10 and other Whitehall departments such as the DEA, where it was believed that France’s anti-supranationalist tendencies could help accommodate a British accession to the EEC on more favourable terms, as mentioned above. Indeed, Sir Eric Roll, Permanent Under-Secretary of the DEA, wrote to Gore-Booth

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\textsuperscript{885} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{886} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{888} Patrick Hancock, “Minutes”, 30 April 1965, TNA/FO371/182377/M10810/45.
\textsuperscript{889} Con O’Neill, “The United Kingdom and the Crisis in the European Community”, 1 November 1965, TNA/FO371/182378/M10810/112G.
\textsuperscript{890} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{891} Con O’Neill, “Britain and Europe”, 2 November 1965, TNA/FO371/182378/M10810/112G(E).
arguing that if France forced the Five to submit, the power of the Commission would be weakened and the ‘federalist’ connotations of EEC membership which alienated many senior British politicians would be removed. O’Neill completely rejected this line of thinking. He argued that reinforcement of French dominance would ‘make the Community even harder for us and the rest of the world to live with than it has been up to now’, citing the possibility of an agricultural settlement even more favourable to the French than previously and a probable increase in protectionist measures. In addition, O’Neill listed the potential politico-strategic consequences, including de Gaulle’s overt anti-Americanism and disdain for NATO, which could cripple the Atlantic Alliance. Even more worryingly, O’Neill suggested that French nationalist tendencies could filter through to West Germany, making the Franco-German axis more prone to acting like a ‘third force’, which was unacceptable to Britain and the United States given the potential for the Soviet Union to exploit the situation. Such was O’Neill’s fear and resentment of France’s abrasiveness in the European arena that he did not shy away from stating that a breakdown of the EEC or a French expulsion would be more advantageous than a French victory. The Five would in all likelihood gravitate towards Britain and EFTA, which would result in Britain becoming the principal European power once again. This was, to be sure, very radical thinking, and O’Neill specifically admitted as much, concluding that ‘colleagues may regard my proposal as difficult and even revolutionary.’ His attitude towards European integration was clearly couched in terms of searching for a revitalisation of British prestige rather than any idealist attachments to continental solidarity.

O’Neill’s Foreign Office colleagues welcomed the paper enthusiastically. Gore-Booth and Hancock labelled it ‘very persuasive’ and even suggested that if they pitched it to the Prime Minister as the ‘Wilson Plan for Europe’, it would massage his ego enough for him to be persuaded. Statham also praised O’Neill’s draft, arguing that he had presented the case ‘very convincingly’. It was suggested that the second draft of the paper should contain a

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892 Eric Roll to Paul Gore-Booth, 20 October 1965, TNA/T312/1015/2F415/06D.
893 Con O’Neill, “The United Kingdom and the Crisis in the European Community”, 1 November 1965, TNA/FO371/182378/M10810/112G.
894 Ibid.
895 Ibid.
896 Ibid.
897 Ibid.
898 Ibid.
899 Patrick Hancock, “The United Kingdom and the Crisis in the European Community”, 1 November 1965, TNA/FO371/182378/M10810/112G(A).
section on the ‘five conditions’ which would allay some of the concerns harboured by the Six, that Britain’s enthusiasm for European integration was limited and restrictive. Palliser drafted an additional section on the ‘five conditions’ and tried to instigate a reappraisal on the matter. Palliser argued that ‘it has never been [the Labour party’s] view that these conditions must remain immutable or that the passage of time and changing events would never affect them.’\textsuperscript{901} The entire tone of Palliser’s draft was one of reassurance and reaffirmation of Britain’s commitment to Europe. The motives behind this were, of course, partly cynical. Any declaration which could potentially draw the Five closer to Britain and away from France in the midst of the crisis would play to Britain’s advantage. However, Palliser’s pro-European credentials are well-documented, and it would be logical to assume that he was also anxious over the government’s public image in Europe and saw fit to rehabilitate it.\textsuperscript{902} The fact that this happened to coincide with the general direction which the Foreign Office were taking suited Palliser’s agenda. Despite this, O’Neill’s response to Palliser’s suggestions demonstrate the divergence of thinking amongst the officials who backed British membership of the EEC. O’Neill, who was much less enthusiastic about European integration than Palliser, stated that the draft was ‘too closely geared to an actual prospect of negotiation’ whereas he believed that a ‘statement of intent’ was much more appropriate which would effectively place the British ‘ball’ in the Five’s ‘court’ whilst making British accession to the EEC a more attractive prospect.\textsuperscript{903} After O’Neill and Hancock finished work on the second draft, Palliser responded to his colleague’s criticisms by arguing that presenting the government as ready to negotiate with the Six would encourage ministers to see the benefits of a second application, as many were eager to see progress with Europe.\textsuperscript{904} There was an awareness that a new approach to Europe would require a certain degree of ‘Cabinet tactics’ to win over some of the more sceptical figures in the government, and that the Foreign Office would need to advise the Foreign Secretary on how to broach the subject.\textsuperscript{905} Indeed, when Gore-Booth submitted the paper to Stewart for his consideration, he mentioned that there were points of procedure with regards to

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\footnote{Michael Palliser, “Britain and Europe”, 1 November 1965, TNA/FO371/182378/M10810/113.}
\footnote{Palliser’s ardent pro-Europeanism has been noted in a number of interviews and obituaries: Michael Palliser, interviewed by John Hutson, 28 April 1999, CCC/BDOHP/37/15; David Hannay, “Sir Michael Palliser Obituary”, \textit{The Guardian} 20 June 2012; “Sir Michael Palliser”, \textit{The Telegraph} 20 June 2012; “Sir Michael Palliser: Senior Diplomat who helped take Britain into the Common Market”, \textit{The Independent} 3 July 2012.}
\footnote{Con O’Neill, “Minutes”, 2 November 1965, TNA/FO371/182378/M10810/113A.}
\footnote{Michael Palliser, “Britain and Europe”, 8 November 1965, TNA/FO371/182378/M10810/114A.}
\footnote{John Nicholls, “Minutes”, 8 November 1965, TNA/FO371/182378/M10810/114A.}
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other Whitehall departments which needed to be discussed.\textsuperscript{906} The ‘procedure’ became clear in O’Neill’s later comments: Stewart consulted George Brown and Harold Wilson alone first.\textsuperscript{907} This suggests that Stewart wanted approval from the Prime Minister and the First Secretary of State before putting the paper to the Cabinet. Only then would he feel confident enough to propose a renewed membership bid.

Wilson’s reaction to the paper was not the one which the Foreign Office had been hoping for. His Private Secretary Malcolm Reid wrote to the Foreign Secretary’s Principal Private Secretary, Murray Maclehose, informing him that Prime Minister found much of the document ‘hard to swallow’.\textsuperscript{908} Firstly, Wilson did not accept that the French views on the future trajectory of the EEC were ‘dangerous’ as they coincided with many British views, such as opposition to supranationalism and curbing the power of the Commission and majority voting.\textsuperscript{909} Secondly, he still had concerns over the continued independence of British foreign and defence policy and the potential cost of the Common Agricultural Policy to Britain’s balance of payments and inflation, on which score he believed ‘no analysis’ had been given.\textsuperscript{910} The Foreign Office was disappointed with the Prime Minister’s lukewarm reply. O’Neill stated that he was ‘very far indeed from being ready to accept the basic concepts expressed in our paper’.\textsuperscript{911} Indeed, Wilson’s negative attitude towards supranationalism appeared to be so strong that O’Neill doubted that ‘any arguments...put forward will convince him of our case’.\textsuperscript{912} Gore-Booth also contributed his own thoughts, which juxtaposed the attitudes of the leadership of the Foreign Office and the government. The Permanent Under-Secretary said that Wilson’s reply was not disappointing because of the questions which had been raised, ‘but because of the mood which seems to underlie the questions’.\textsuperscript{913} As such, Gore-Booth was effectively suggesting that the Prime Minister was being deliberately obstructive and narrow-minded. He suggested that the solution was a comprehensive rebuttal of the view that the French approach towards the EEC was compatible with British interests.\textsuperscript{914} In a remarkably progressive tone, Gore-Booth detailed...
how the French view was ‘in terms of Europe in the second half of the twentieth century, backward looking’ given that the EEC was an integration movement, not an alliance between a group of independent states. This statement alone represented a significant change in attitude in the upper echelons of the Foreign Office. There was a realisation that the Six had formed the EEC with very specific ideas on its functions and future trajectory in mind, and that attempts to disrupt this – as de Gaulle was doing – would breed suspicion and ill will in the long term. As far as the Five were concerned, there could be no suggestion that the British government viewed the internal divisions within the EEC as an opportunity to pursue their own agenda.

By the end of 1965, British policy towards the EEC remained fraught with ambiguity and conflicting views of the right approach towards Europe. Downing Street remained unconvinced that French conceptions of the EEC’s future were dangerous or contrary to British interests, whilst the Foreign Office’s attempts to pressure the government into making overtures towards the ‘Friendly Five’ had largely been in vain. The potential effects of the Empty Chair Crisis continued to weigh heavily on officials’ minds, particularly after de Gaulle began to intimate that Britain could join the EEC during and after the French presidential election campaign of December 1965. It was in the early months of 1966 that events began to move quickly and opinions began to shift. The Empty Chair Crisis was resolved at the end of January with the Luxembourg Compromise; Wilson called a snap election in March which resulted in a landslide victory for the Labour government; and de Gaulle withdrew France from NATO, precipitating yet another international political crisis. Britain’s second bid for membership of the EEC drew ever closer, and became complicated by what was a highly sensitive and turbulent time in European history.

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915 Ibid.
916 Indeed, tensions between No. 10 and the Foreign Office had got to the point where Gore-Booth had to write to Wilson and explain that the Foreign Office was not ‘anti-Prime Minister’: Paul Gore-Booth to Harold Wilson, “Foreign Offices and No. 10”, 23 February 1966, Gore-Booth Papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford, MS.Eng.c.4563.
‘How to get into the Common Market’: The July Economic Crisis and the Move towards Membership

At the end of January 1966, the deadlock which had been caused by France’s withdrawal from the European Community institutions was resolved in what has now been dubbed the ‘Luxembourg Compromise’. The settlement reached was rather superficial. Nugent has argued that it was not so much a compromise but more ‘a registering of differences’. The Six effectively acknowledged their differing opinions on the use of qualified majority voting with a vague declaration that they would agree to disagree. There was no formal resolution or clarity on which areas of policy would be subjected to unanimous decision-making; the French simply stated that ‘when very important interests are at stake, the discussion must be continued until unanimous agreement is reached’. The actual substance of the compromise was less significant than what it represented in political terms. The cohesion of the Six had been reinforced, albeit unconvincingly and temporarily.

The Luxembourg Compromise provoked a range of reactions from the Foreign Office. Statham’s immediate response was laden with pessimism. He stated that ‘the opportunities for a closer relationship between the Community and the UK have receded’ and argued that the Six would be preoccupied with maintaining the unity of the EEC and the fusion of the three Communities’ executives. O’Neill was less despondent, suggesting that the Five had ‘scored a victory, on points, over the French’, which was much more preferable than the alternative scenario. John Nicholls, Deputy Under-Secretary for Information and Cultural Affairs as well as superintendent of the Policy Planning Department, was much more optimistic. He argued that the Five would not tolerate any further French attempts to create a deadlock after the most recent debacle, and would become more receptive to an arrangement with the British in order to counter France’s...

920 Camps, European Unification in the Sixties (1967), 112.
dictatorial tendencies. Conversely, Nicholls also suggested that de Gaulle would be more willing to allow Britain to accede to ‘keep the Germans in their place’, who had grown weary of France’s jostling and whose political and economic power was growing at such a rate that it would soon be a threat to French hegemony within the EEC. What had ‘receded’ was the ‘opportunity for a closer relationship between the Five’ and Britain, but Nicholls believed this could be reversed by an Anglo-French partnership. In conclusion, he stated that the likelihood of membership had not disappeared and was either still in place or had been increased. These lines of thought demonstrate an essential point. Whilst most of the Foreign Office favoured British membership of the EEC, there was still some disagreement over whether to align with the French as a means of curbing the Five’s conception of *Europe de la Commission* or with the Five in order to pressure France into accepting British accession and making another veto as politically and diplomatically damaging as possible. In addition, it revealed that elements of the Foreign Office perceived British membership of the EEC to be so vital to the nation’s future influence that they were willing to achieve it by any means necessary. The issue of membership was not given much consideration in the immediate aftermath of the Luxembourg Compromise, but events stirred some Foreign Office officials into action.

In early March, de Gaulle informed President Lyndon B. Johnson that he was withdrawing French forces from the Allied Command Structure of NATO and expelled American military personnel from France. In light of this startling new development, Norman Statham drafted a Foreign Office memorandum on the political motivations for British membership of the EEC. In addition to outlining the dangers of the EEC becoming a ‘third force’, an anxiety long-held in the Foreign Office ever since the Communities’ inception, the document addressed an issue which was becoming increasingly apparent, and was probably a significant influence on French attitudes and actions. This was the resurgence of Germany.

By the mid-1960s, the West German economy was being galvanised by the *Wirtschaftswunder* or ‘economic miracle’ which had been forged under the Ordoliberal

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923 John Nicholls, “Minutes”, 4 February 1966, TNA/FO371/188328/M10810/31A.
924 Ibid.
925 Ibid.
927 Norman Statham, “Political Reasons for UK Participation in a wider grouping such as the Community”, 25 March 1966, TNA/FO371/188332/M10810/115G.
social market economy model adopted by Konrad Adenauer and Ludwig Erhard. The ascent of de Gaulle coincided with this exponential boom in West Germany’s political and economic clout, and the General was aware that French dominance of the EEC was starting to be challenged. Indeed, the Empty Chair Crisis had in large part been precipitated by the Germans’ insistence that the financing of the Common Agricultural Policy be overhauled. The rise of Franco-German rivalry within the EEC had not gone unnoticed in the Foreign Office and had significant implications for British foreign policy towards Europe. Statham wrote: ‘If...we stay out of the Community, Germany seems bound in the long run to become the dominant influence’ and even intimated that there would be a ‘greater danger of nationalist tendencies’, invoking the trauma of recent history. Statham also added that Italy and the Benelux states continued to voice support for British membership for this very reason – they still feared German resurgence and had nothing but contempt for the instability of the Franco-German axis. British accession would act as a counterweight to these tendencies and would also be crucial in realigning the EEC with the Atlantic Alliance. Therefore, a renewed British bid for membership was now, in theory, more attractive to all members of the Six. France would benefit from an additional check on German power, West Germany would benefit from the same vice versa, and the remaining members of the EEC would have a potentially powerful ally who could stand up to the French and the Germans. These thoughts were given further credence after a report was forwarded from the Permanent Mission in Brussels to London, detailing a conversation with the Secretary-General of the High Authority of the ECSC, Edmund Wellenstein. Wellenstein was convinced that de Gaulle would seek a rapprochement with Britain in order to prevent West Germany from further asserting itself and following a more independent foreign policy, particularly after the French withdrawal from NATO. Further examinations of Britain’s relationship with the EEC from across Whitehall drew similar conclusions, especially with regards to the potential dangers of a more independent and assertive West...
Germany. The DEA argued that it was of crucial importance to ‘keep Germany closely integrated in a Western grouping which she does not dominate’ and that ‘our presence in the EEC would prevent the EEC from being dominated by France or by Germany.’\(^{935}\) British membership of the EEC was now absolutely integral to maintaining the cohesion of the Western Alliance as well as preserving Britain’s status as an international power.

The conflation of the NATO crisis with the issue of British membership of the EEC caused tensions in the Foreign Office. John Barnes, the chief of the WOCD, argued quite forcefully that the two be kept separate as ‘the French had an interest in linking them’ and that this ‘could hatch some malodorous red herrings.’\(^{936}\) Barnes believed that the French were trying to distract from the disruption which they had caused in Europe by wooing a British bid for membership. He strongly advised against ‘making concessions over NATO in order to smooth our path into the EEC’, suggesting that de Gaulle would not necessarily be receptive to such a bargain and that such an arrangement would infuriate the Five.\(^{937}\) In some ways, this was Barnes simply trying to protect his department, which, as mentioned above, had lost a great deal of influence since the 1950s and did not want its control over NATO affairs to be annexed by the increasingly powerful EEOD. In addition, the Atlanticist leanings of the WOCD continued to make the department sceptical about the case for membership of the EEC. However, he was not incorrect in his conclusions about French attitudes. Ludlow has written at length over how the French remained opposed to British accession, even after the March 1966 general election.\(^{938}\)

During bilateral talks between the French and the Germans in April 1966, the Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder felt encouraged by British attempts to discuss membership more positively, whereas Couve de Murville remained negative and continued to dwell on potential obstacles.\(^{939}\) Barnes’ objections were ultimately overruled by Paul Gore-Booth, who in accordance with George Brown argued that ‘the broad political and military question in its relationship to the economic implications of joining the Common Market’ could not be considered separately and that ‘working out views and policies in regard to our policy towards NATO and the EEC and their interrelationship’ was paramount.\(^{940}\) The old Foreign Office orthodoxy of

\(^{935}\) Department of Economic Affairs, “Future Relations with Europe”, 1 April 1966, TNA/FO371/188333/M10810/129G.

\(^{936}\) John Barnes to Con O’Neill, “Europe”, 4 May 1966, TNA/FO371/188336/M10810/198G.

\(^{937}\) Ibid.

\(^{938}\) Ibid.

\(^{939}\) Ibid.

separating political and economic issues with regards to European integration had all but died, and it was agreed that the DEA would work in partnership with the Foreign Office to further plan for Britain’s future relations with the Six.\footnote{Ibid.}

Further signs of French ambiguity and possible hostility were reported from Paris and Brussels. John Robinson wrote to Statham detailing a conversation Olivier Wormser, the Director of Economic and Financial Affairs at the Quai d’Orsay had had with officials at the Dutch embassy in Paris.\footnote{John Robinson to Norman Statham, 15 June 1966, TNA/FO371/188339/M10810/277.} Wormser stated that Britain’s financial difficulties, especially the increasing weakness of sterling, would make any new initiative extremely difficult.\footnote{Ibid.} Conversely, he believed that the Labour government had ‘reached the stage that the Conservatives had reached in 1962 as regards their attitude to membership.’\footnote{Ibid.} Statham also reported on conversations between Couve de Murville and Patrick Reilly on the British government’s attitude towards the Common Agricultural Policy and French attempts to appear ‘reasonably open-minded’ on transitional arrangements in order to ‘influence British attitude in the NATO context’.\footnote{Norman Statham, “French Attitude to UK Membership of the Community”, 16 June 1966, TNA/FO371/188339/M10810/290.} This rather enigmatic stance did little to quell ministerial and official anxieties about the viability of a new overture towards the Six. Whilst officials knew that they could count on support from the ‘Friendly Five’, this, in Parr’s words, was ‘a tactic for the long-term’.\footnote{Parr, Britain’s Policy Towards the European Community (2006), 66.} Reconciling with de Gaulle was the key to a short-term solution. The government decided to try and smooth over relations with the French. George Brown, who was becoming increasingly vocal about a renewed bid for membership and who would be appointed Foreign Secretary in August partly because of his strong pro-European credentials, wrote to the Prime Minister that the upcoming visit from the French Prime Minister and Foreign Minister was an ideal opportunity.\footnote{George Brown to Harold Wilson, 23 June 1966, TNA/PREM13/906.} The EEOD immediately began drafting ideas about how best to approach the meeting and probe the French attitude on British membership. The tone of the ‘speaking notes’ was enthusiastic and radical. Officials believed that there was a need to ram home the belief that Britain was ‘an integral part of Europe...any grouping that purports to be “European” without including us is incomplete.’\footnote{Foreign Office, “Visit of the French Prime Minister and Foreign Minister: 6 to 8 July, 1966”, 1 July 1966, TNA/FO371/188340/M10810/303.} In addition, it was emphasised that there was now a great deal of
political and public support within the UK for membership of the EEC. This rhetoric would have appealed to the French ministers. It was unashamedly Europeanist and demonstrated that Britain was ‘ready and willing’ to join the Common Market. There was no mention of Anglo-American relations, NATO, or the cohesion of the Western bloc. Indeed, Wilson had recently publicly disassociated himself from the United States’ bombing of Vietnam, which had incensed Washington and marked the beginning of a slump in the ‘special relationship’. As well as showing Britain’s commitment to European integration, the Foreign Office also wanted to apply pressure to the French by playing on the German question and reminding them that they were largely isolated from the Five.

The meetings held during the French ministers’ visit had mixed results. The British position was to ascertain whether or not France would attempt to block another bid for membership and to convince them of the sincerity of their enthusiasm for the European project. The French Prime Minister Georges Pompidou went to great lengths to explain the difficulties of participating in the Common Market, and the great sacrifices its members had had to endure. He argued that ‘there existed a false impression that France alone had squeezed enormous advantages out of her partners’ but that their concessions to the Germans on an industrial free trade area showed that matters were not so simple. Pompidou then took aim at Wilson and asked if Britain was truly ready to enter the EEC and take on ‘the responsibilities and burdens’ of membership. This was a veiled criticism of Britain’s past approach to the EEC; demanding stringent concessions during the first application’s negotiations and attempting to ‘dilute’ the integration process. Wilson responded by asserting Britain’s commitment to accession whilst ensuring that ‘essential interests were safeguarded.’ However, he did not shy away from highlighting the various economic problems which Britain faced, including the balance of payments deficit, the weakness of sterling and the likely effects of the Common Agricultural Policy. His most adroit statement was on the future of political union – Wilson emphasised that the government was primarily motivated by economic and commercial interests and were not considering the advantages of full political integration. This was a crucial point. Wilson

949 Ibid.
952 Ibid.
953 Ibid.
954 Ibid.
955 Ibid.
was subtly opening the door to potential Anglo-French partnership on curbing the supranational tendencies of the Commission, which would have appealed to Gaullist visions of Europe. He even went so far as to suggest bilateral talks on the ‘practical problems’ of political union.\footnote{Ibid.} Whilst the French appeared to have been receptive to such ideas, their leaks to the press suggested that the meeting had been a failure. An article appeared in The Financial Times\footnote{“M. Pompidou spells out the terms”, The Financial Times 11 July 1966, 8.} in which a ‘French source’ said that Britain would not be able to join if sterling was in a constant state of turmoil.\footnote{JĂŵĞƐ MĂƌũŽƌŝďĂŶŬƐ ƚŽ CŽŶ O͛NĞŝůů “ƚĞǁĂƌƚ ͞VŝƐŝƚ ŽĨ Mƌ GĞŽƌŐĞ BĂůů Ϯϲ JƵůLJ ϭϵϲϲ Ϯϴ JƵŶĞ ϭϵϲϲ Ϯ ϰϯϰϯ ϰϯϭϬϴϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϯϴϱ ϰϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬϭϬ ϰϯϭϬ словам \footnote{One of the officials mentioned in O’Neill’s paper is Thomas Balogh, who was Economic Adviser to the Cabinet Office and had a strong working relationship with Wilson. He was utterly opposed to British membership of the EEC: “Lord Balogh: Economic Role in the Labour Governments”, The Times 21 January 1985, 12.}} the Anglo-French talks had been so fruitless and offer potential United States support.\footnote{Con O’Neill to Paul Gore-Booth, 13 July 1966, TNA/FO371/188343/M10810/388.}

Reactions from officials within the EEOD were highly pessimistic. As the French leaks appeared in the press, Whitehall studies of Britain’s economic position confirmed the Foreign Office’s fears. O’Neill wrote to Gore-Booth and did little to disguise his bitter disappointment over the implications for EEC membership. He described the reports as ‘extremely depressing’ for those ‘who had hoped that our relatively early entry might prove feasible.’\footnote{Ibid.} The predictions for the impact of accession on the balance of payments and the cost of the Common Agricultural Policy to the Exchequer were even more stark than before. The projections for Britain’s entry to the Common Market cited losses of hundreds of millions of pounds a year.\footnote{Ibid.} O’Neill was convinced that such studies refused to acknowledge the potential long-term advantages and instead concentrated on the short-term factors.\footnote{Ibid.} He accused the Prime Minister’s economic advisers\footnote{Ibid.} of creating ‘a strong atmosphere of pessimism, not to say defeatism.’\footnote{Ibid.} However, O’Neill also acknowledged that it was ‘extremely difficult for the Foreign Office to argue effectively against the kind of"
presentation which is now taking shape, since we lack expertise and authority in this sphere.”

965 Gore-Booth’s response to O’Neill was also laden with frustration. He labelled the dispatch a ‘depressing survey of the current mood’ and that Britain was now ‘economically less capable of competing with Germany than...Belgium and Italy.’

966 This was a staggering admission from the Permanent Under-Secretary, who also stated that Britain’s overseas defence commitments were an increasing burden, though presumably a necessary one.

967 Gore-Booth’s most radical statement was reserved for Britain’s policy towards European integration: ‘people should realise that there is no alternative to joining the Common Market. There is nowhere else to go.’

968 This summarises the departmental orthodoxy of the day perfectly. Senior Foreign Office officials, particularly those in the EEOD, knew that Britain’s fate was tied to the EEC. There was no other alternative available which could preserve Britain’s waning diplomatic and economic power. The longer Britain was denied membership of the club, the longer and deeper her slump in influence and capacity would be.

969 However, by mid-July the pressure on the pound had become so great that ministers were distracted from the European question entirely. The Foreign Office were even forced to cancel George Brown’s visit to Bonn, which was to be an opportunity to further consult with the Germans on British cooperation with the EEC.

970 Officials in the EEOD were aware that the looming financial crash would suspend any ministerial interest in a renewed European initiative and were forced to bide their time.

971 After the sterling debacle, Brown and Stewart swapped roles in August 1966, the former taking leadership of the Foreign Office, a job he had long coveted.

972 Parr has argued that this move revealed Wilson’s ‘willingness to endorse a shift in European policy’. This was certainly the case, but it was also a qualified victory for the Foreign Office. As an ardent Europeanist, the department could rely on Brown to continue to push the agenda for membership of the EEC in Cabinet, and he was certainly capable of being frank and even...
abrasive. Conversely, Brown was a ‘wild card’ and would not timidly kowtow to the Foreign Office’s point of view:

...what bothered me, made as I am, was the thought that it was they [the Foreign Office] who were deciding the areas I should be briefed about, and I quickly became aware that, unless I was very determined, I would inevitably become the purveyor of views already formed in the Office.

The tensions caused by Brown’s instability would become a serious issue for Gore-Booth as he dealt with various grievances, notably an incident when Brown drunkenly insulted the wife of Patrick Reilly at a dinner party at the French embassy in London. However, his arrival presented officials with an opportunity to revitalise discussions about Britain’s potential accession to the Common Market. O’Neill produced an extremely comprehensive paper entitled ‘How to get into the Common Market’. The paper was not circulated to other Whitehall departments and only Foreign Office officials had been consulted. This was because some of the conclusions went ‘well beyond existing government policy’ and some areas of Whitehall continued to remain sceptical. O’Neill described how the Ministry of Agriculture was the ‘main opponent’, but also that the economic advisers at Downing Street and the Cabinet Office saw EEC membership as ‘undesirable’. The Treasury’s confidence had been shaken by the recent economic turmoil and potential consequences of accession. With the possible exception of the DEA, the Foreign Office stood alone. The paper was both radical and realistic. From the outset, it was acknowledged that ‘there is no prospect of early entry into the Community because of the French position’. This was an extremely significant statement. The upper echelons of the Foreign Office were now fully aware that British accession to the EEC was simply unachievable in the short-term, but it was necessary to maintain a façade of enthusiasm and to continue to press the Six, and France in particular on the issue. It was suggested that the government publicly declare its

974 Gore-Booth recalled a discussion he had with Brown where he had to suggest that the Foreign Secretary not berate his staff in front of third parties: Paul Gore-Booth, 22 September 1966, Gore-Booth Papers, BODL/MS.Eng.c.4563.
978 Ibid.
979 Ibid.
acceptance of the Treaty of Rome, that it should begin frank bilateral discussions with the
Six on how to enhance Britain’s negotiating position, and above all, to prepare for the very
real possibility that certain EEC policies would be non-negotiable and that Britain would
have to ‘grin and bear’ their own internal problems and adopt transitional arrangements.\footnote{Ibid.}
It was emphasised that the final point ‘should not be stated publicly’ given its extremely
controversial conclusion.\footnote{Ibid.} Once again, officials knew that they were at odds with public
and political opinion, but they perceived Britain’s diplomatic position to be so weak that
membership of the EEC was essential, if not inevitable. The report also fully acknowledged
that the French would probably exercise their veto once again and that they were an
‘absolute bar’ to membership.\footnote{Ibid.} Even if Britain reached a provisional agreement with the
Five, there was little guarantee that the diplomatic pressure on France to accept a British
application would be sufficient to prevent a veto.\footnote{Ibid.} Officials believed that the only way to
buy French support would be to disassociate from American intervention in Vietnam, the
Atlanticist leanings of NATO, and to revise Britain’s nuclear strategy.\footnote{Ibid.} Unsurprisingly, this
was considered far too high a price to pay. It was concluded that the government would
have to ‘rely on time and circumstances, which are the most effective agents of change.’\footnote{Ibid.}
Brown did not accept this line of argument, furiously scribbling: ‘what nonsense –
otherwise why are we here?’\footnote{Ibid.} Similar comments throughout the paper reveal the
divergence in attitude between the new Foreign Secretary and the top officials. Brown was
not convinced of the apparent inflexibility of the EEC application process. He stressed that
United States support for British membership and the fact that the Six needed Britain’s
influence to develop the EEC in the long-term counted in the government’s favour.\footnote{Ibid.}
The memory of the Brussels breakdown and years of French obstruction gave officials a
completely different perspective. Views had hardened to the point of Francophobia,
something which the ambassador to France, Patrick Reilly, confirms in his memoirs.\footnote{Ibid.}
Brown’s Assistant Private Secretary, Nicholas Fenn, wrote to Gore-Booth to inform him that
the Foreign Secretary found the paper ‘disturbingly negative and in particular defeatist

\footnote{George Brown, comments on “How to get into the Common Market”, 18 August 1966,
TNA/FO371/188346/M10810/458.}
\footnote{Ibid.}
about the French attitude."\(^{990}\) He ordered it to be revised and redrafted. The revisions did not change much of the substance in the original paper. However, it seemed to convince Brown that a new approach towards the EEC was needed, and he was soon presented with an opportunity to make the case.

In light of the increased pressure on the economy and Britain’s international commitments, Wilson began to plan for a major meeting with the Cabinet at Chequers, where the government’s top priorities would be discussed. This included Europe. The DEA and Foreign Office jointly drafted a paper for the Chequers meeting on the issue of EEC membership, to be presented by the First Secretary and Foreign Secretary to the Prime Minister.\(^{991}\) There can be little doubt that this was Brown and Stewart’s great coup for a European initiative, and in this cause Wilson’s Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Michael Palliser, an ardent Europeanist, was instrumental in keeping No. 10 and the Foreign Office in synchronicity.\(^{992}\) Indeed, Parr has argued that it was at the Chequers meeting that Wilson firmly made up his mind to apply for membership of the Common Market.\(^{993}\) Parr also adds that he was primarily motivated by strategic concerns as opposed to economic ones.\(^{994}\) The sterling crisis was certainly a factor, but the cost of Britain’s role ‘East of Suez’ and the chaos within the Commonwealth following Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence were serious long-term strategic problems which required difficult decisions.\(^{995}\) One of these decisions was to try once again to get Britain into the EEC, and by doing so hopefully shore up international influence and benefit from larger markets and economies of scale. The Foreign Office intended to argue this to Wilson, and the EEOD took the lead on the steering briefs for the Chequers meeting. Statham recycled the main points from the earlier paper ‘How to get into the Common Market’.\(^{996}\) The draft was broadly acceptable to his colleagues and did not necessarily present any new thoughts on membership, but O’Neill took the liberty of forcefully addressing the politico-strategic issues at hand, which he knew would appeal to ministers’ anxieties. O’Neill fully acknowledged that ‘the general political argument’ was ‘a rather subjective one’, thereby conceding that his convictions were not necessarily based on hard facts and data.\(^{997}\) This is critical. The Europeanist line taken by

\(^{990}\) Nicholas Fenn to Paul Gore-Booth, 23 August 1966, TNA/FO371/188346/M10810/458(A).
\(^{991}\) Patrick Hancock to Con O’Neill, 18 August 1966, TNA/FO371/188344/M10810/408/G.
\(^{993}\) Parr, *Britain’s Policy Towards the European Community* (2006), 78.
\(^{994}\) Ibid.
\(^{995}\) Ibid.
\(^{996}\) Norman Statham, “Brief for Chequers Meeting”, 18 October 1966, TNA/FO371/188347/M10810/479/G.
\(^{997}\) Con O’Neill, “Chequers Meeting”, 21 October 1966, TNA/FO371/188347/M10810/475/G.
certain officials was explicitly ideological. When reports such as those which foretold of the likely strain membership would put on sterling and Britain’s balance of payments were produced, these officials’ attitudes and opinions would not be altered or silenced. In O’Neill’s case, he passionately believed that Britain’s future power was contingent on her membership of the EEC:

For the last 20 years this country has been adrift. On the whole, there has been a period of decline in our international standing and power. This has helped to produce a national mood of frustration and uncertainty. We do not know where we are going and have begun to lose confidence in ourselves.998

Brown and Stewart seized upon this rhetoric and argued that accession was the only way to prevent Britain from becoming a second-rate power.999 Parr has argued that Wilson was receptive to these points, and became ‘willing to address the economic changes membership would bring’.1000 Wilson recorded that ‘a majority [of the Cabinet] by this time felt we should be ready to move forward’, despite the fact that a veto from de Gaulle was still likely.1001 The Prime Minister shied away from making an immediate public declaration, but a new attitude towards Europe now governed No. 10: getting into the Common Market was a top priority.

The key decision taken at the Chequers meeting was to conduct a ‘high level probe’ in the form of a tour of the Six’s capitals and bilateral exchanges with their respective heads of state and/or government.1002 The tour would be conducted by Wilson and Brown and would establish whether there was a ‘reasonably positive’ atmosphere and ‘satisfactory assurances’ on the terms of membership.1003 This fell short of the declaration of acceptance for the Treaty of Rome which the officials had been hoping for. However, it was recommended that the Foreign Secretary support the Prime Minister in his decision.1004 In any case, according to Wilson, Brown had already accepted this strategy at the Chequers

998 Ibid.
999 “Britain and Europe: First Secretary and Foreign Secretary”, 18 October 1966, TNA/CAB134/2705/E(66)11.
1000 Parr, Britain’s Policy Towards the European Community (2006), 81.
1002 Ibid.
1004 Con O’Neill, “Cabinet Meeting: Tuesday, 1 November”, 28 October 1966, TNA/FO371/188347/M10810/495.
meeting.\(^{1005}\) The EEOD were cautiously supportive of the venture because there were ‘still serious doubts among the Six about the seriousness of our intentions, and in particular about the extent to which the Prime Minister himself personally supports membership’.\(^{1006}\) It was hoped that the probe could be used as an opportunity to convince the Six of the government’s sincerity.\(^{1007}\) Wilson’s speech in the Commons on 10 November in which he outlined the probe in public went some way in addressing these concerns.\(^{1008}\) The delegations in Brussels and Luxembourg reported that the announcement had ‘an enthusiastic welcome’ and was regarded as the most momentous step forward for the British since the breakdown of 1963.\(^{1009}\) However, some of the speech’s language was still coloured with the same constraints as the first application. There was still talk of consulting with EFTA and the Commonwealth and the need for ‘safeguards’ and ‘acceptable terms’.\(^{1010}\) This could be explained away as simple caution under the spotlight of public scrutiny, but the French did not appear to be fully convinced. Roger Reynaud, the French member of the High Authority of the ECSC, stated that political opinion in France was still divided and that the General was too unpredictable.\(^{1011}\) It was clear that many French politicians were still anxious over Germany’s growing influence and were in favour of enlarging the EEC which counted in Britain’s favour, but there was little concrete reassurance that a new bid for membership would go unchecked.\(^{1012}\) Further reports to London stated that de Gaulle was ‘disinclined to comment to HM ambassador’ on the Prime Minister’s speech and an official in the French embassy in London argued that ‘it was a statement of interest: it was not a statement of intent.’\(^{1013}\) French ambiguity would continue to frustrate British officials and politicians throughout the probe and after the launch of the application, and once again, it would result in a bitter rejection.

\(^{1006}\) Con O’Neill, “Cabinet Meeting: Tuesday, 1 November”, 28 October 1966, TNA/FO371/188347/M10810/495.
\(^{1007}\) Ibid.
\(^{1009}\) Oliver Kemp to James Marjoribanks, “Reactions to the Prime Minister’s Speech on Entry into the Common Market”, 14 November 1966, TNA/FO371/188348/M10810/507.
\(^{1011}\) Oliver Kemp to James Marjoribanks, “Reactions to the Prime Minister’s Speech on entry into the Common Market”, 14 November 1966, TNA/FO371/188348/M10810/507.
\(^{1012}\) Ibid.
The ‘probe’ of early 1967 yielded few instantaneous results with regards to the French attitude towards a British application. It was largely taken for granted that the ‘Friendly Five’ would be supportive and that everything hinged on the visit to Paris. The Foreign Office’s briefs for the Cabinet on how best to approach de Gaulle were very much in keeping with their previous line: to downplay any potential problems Britain might have with the terms of the Treaty of Rome and maintain a positive tone. This was at odds with Wilson’s desire to seek safeguards and assurances, but could potentially create an atmosphere of goodwill. In addition, the Foreign Office wished to create conditions where any French veto would prove extremely politically damaging for the General, and ensure that he had as little justification as possible. Parr has argued that the Foreign Office were successful in convincing Wilson to present an enthusiastic façade, and that Palliser was instrumental in encouraging the Prime Minister to focus on the political issues surrounding German resurgence to further pressure the French into accepting British membership. However, Wilson insisted on what he called ‘free-wheeling’ with de Gaulle – that is, not sticking to a rigid set of points and improvising on certain issues. John Young has argued that this approach ‘came to nothing’, and that de Gaulle was unimpressed by Wilson’s attempts to focus on technological cooperation, which already existed between the two countries outside the framework of the EEC. Whilst de Gaulle conceded that he was ‘particularly struck’ by the more positive tone employed by Wilson compared with Macmillan’s threats of ‘economic warfare’, he still pressed the Prime Minister on the state of sterling and Britain’s potential difficulties with agriculture. In his memoirs, Brown argued that ‘there was no shaking de Gaulle’s opposition to having Britain in the Common Market’ during the meeting, and that the only real outcome of the probe was later securing Cabinet approval for an application. Nevertheless, the discussions were greeted in the press with a great deal of optimism, and Wilson had managed to dispel some scepticism about his intentions.

During discussions over the launch of the application, the Cabinet ordered that a White Paper on membership be drafted before any official statement to the House of

1015 Ibid.
1016 Parr, “Gone Native” (2003), 84.
1017 Young, Britain and European Unity (2000), 92.
Commons. O’Neill took charge of the draft and whilst there were references to Commonwealth and EFTA consultations to appease the more sceptical ministers, he forcefully argued the Foreign Office’s line on Britain’s participation in the political development of Europe. Indeed, at a meeting of officials on European policy, O’Neill reported that he ‘threw as much cold water’ as he could on the idea that other departments such as the Commonwealth Relations Office could draft their own white papers on the application. The final version circulated by the Cabinet Office was ‘nearly identical with that produced in the Foreign Office’, highlighting the latter’s domination of European policy in Whitehall. Cabinet approval for an application came on 2 May, and Wilson announced it to Parliament. Marjoribanks was given the green light to present the government’s official letter of application in Brussels on 11 May, which was greeted with an overwhelming sense of positivity in the press. However, despite the euphoria, the application hit a barrier almost as soon as it was announced. De Gaulle called a press conference on 16 May where he issued the ‘velvet veto’ and ‘made it absolutely plain...that Britain cannot be allowed into the EEC so long as sterling remains a reserve currency’. The General played on fears over future pressure on the pound and the dangers of devaluation, and in doing so effectively halted the application in its tracks. With the French refusing to open negotiations, Brown became increasingly anxious about the notion that Britain had been ‘snubbed by the Community’ and was irate at the lack of progress, ordering the Delegation in Brussels to do more to provoke a response from the Council of Ministers. Reports from senior officials in both London and Brussels seemed to confirm that the negotiations would never take place so long as France refused to participate. The Foreign Office were not entirely surprised by this development. They were aware that de Gaulle did not want Britain to join the EEC and knew that a second veto was a likely outcome. Their tactics focused on the long-term, and how they could potentially play

1025 Parr, Britain’s Policy Towards the European Community (2006), 135.
1028 George Brown to UKDEL, 2 June 1967, TNA/FCO30/92/MEK1/7/1/63.
1029 James Marjoribanks to Foreign Office, 5 June 1967, TNA/FCO30/92/MEK1/7/1/68; Paul Gore-Booth to Norman Statham, “Conversation with Dr Van Kieffens: Application to Join the EEC”, 6 June 1967, TNA/FCO30/92/MEK1/7/1/72A; David Hannay to Foreign Office, 15 June 1967, TNA/FCO30/93/MEK1/7/1/117.
French obstruction to their advantage. O’Neill drafted a paper entitled: ‘Maintaining the Impetus of our Approach in Europe’. The ideas were simple and clear: ministers and officials should not, under any circumstances, allow the application to flag. O’Neill argued that the best strategy was to continue to demand an opening meeting with the Six and settle for nothing less. By demonstrating their continued commitment, this would keep the Five on Britain’s side and isolate France even further. This tactic appeared to work. At a meeting of the Council of Ministers in July, Couve de Murville intimated that British accession would amount to an intensification of the Cold War, thereby further entrenching divisions between East and West Germany.

This was clearly designed to play on German anxieties over reunification, but it backfired spectacularly. Leading politicians from the Five condemned the remarks, as did sections of the French press. Statham reported that ‘the French tactics of obstruction...must be irritating and offending the Five’ and that as a result Britain had ‘a not inconsiderable net gain’ from France’s actions. By the time of de Gaulle’s press conference on 27 November in which he reaffirmed the so-called ‘velvet veto’, France had sustained serious damage to her diplomatic credibility. In Parr’s words, in contrast to the 1963 veto, the 1967 veto was ‘a signal of de Gaulle’s weakening power’. The British government’s recent devaluation of the pound had theoretically given him the perfect ammunition with which to quash the application, but the General’s dictatorial tendencies had irritated far too many parties at home and abroad. It was a Pyrrhic victory. He would fall from power 18 months later, and would be dead 18 months after that. Wilson, for his part, continued the Foreign Office line of defiance by declaring in the Commons: ‘We have slammed down our application on the table. There it is, and there it remains.’ Over the coming years, the Foreign Office and UKDEL continued to demand that negotiations be opened and never yielded to France’s terms. The application had, in some ways, been a qualified success:

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1030 Con O’Neill, “Maintaining the Impetus of our Approach in Europe”, 9 June 1967, TNA/FCO30/93/MEK1/7/1/120.
1031 Ibid.
1032 Patrick Hancock to Murray Maclehose, “Note for Secretary of State in Cabinet about meeting of Council of Ministers in Brussels”, 11 July 1967, TNA/FCO30/94/MEK1/7/1/166.
1033 Patrick Reilly to Foreign Office, 11 July 1967, TNA/FCO30/94/MEK1/7/1/160; Patrick Hancock to Murray Maclehose, “Britain and the EEC”, 24 October 1967, TNA/FCO30/95/MEK1/7/1/200B.
1036 Parr, Britain’s Policy Towards the European Community (2006), 153.
1037 “Mr. Wilson repudiates ‘knocking on the door’ of Europe: ‘We have slammed our application on the table’”, The Times 29 November 1967, 6.
The second try assembled, for the first time, a critical mass of support among the political class for the proposition that Britain should become a European country. The government was committed, the opposition agreed, the moving powers in business were desperate, and the people did not dissent.\(^{1038}\)

The Foreign Office’s ‘Europeanist’ vanguard, motivated by a range of factors, had managed to make membership of the EEC the most important foreign policy issue of the day and a political priority. As the ‘special relationship’ continued to wane, and as the Commonwealth became increasingly fractured, Europe was seen as the only viable option for Britain to maintain its world role. Membership was within her grasp. France’s opposition was unsustainable and Gaullism was on the retreat. All that was left was to plan for accession and plan for Europe.

\(^{1038}\) Young, *This Blessed Plot* (1998), 197.

...in August 1966, the Commonwealth Office absorbed the Colonial Office and the amalgamated department was in its turn absorbed by the Foreign Office to form the new Foreign and Commonwealth Office. In addition, there were some evident impacts of Europe on departmental arrangements. Notable was the development of expertise and specialist sections within the relevant key departments to both monitor what was happening in the EEC and later to prepare for entry. The FO’s European Economic Organisations Department, established in 1960, was renamed the European Integration Department in May 1968 when John Robinson became its head.  

The most recent change within the Foreign Office...arises from our membership of the European Economic Community. It is this that has entirely altered the framework in which diplomatic business is done both within the Community and in foreign countries with which the Community has a relationship. Probably, as time goes on and the EEC develops further, more changes and adaptations in the structure of the Foreign Office...will be seen as necessary.  

Unlike the Brussels breakdown of 1963, de Gaulle’s ‘velvet veto’ in May 1967 was not as damaging to Britain’s international standing and did not impact as much upon Foreign Office attitudes. The General’s disdain for ‘Anglo-Saxons’ and his desire to maintain French leadership in Europe were well-known and his actions were unsurprising. The Foreign Office was already committed to membership of the EEC and France’s obstruction was merely treated as a temporary setback. They refused to accept a second rebuff and continued to advocate cooperation with Europe. However, the fact remained that Britain had no hope of joining the Common Market as long as de Gaulle remained in power. Meanwhile, the future of Britain’s global influence was in question: the East of Suez withdrawal was announced in January 1968, which effectively marked the end of the British Empire, the Commonwealth was still in turmoil over the Rhodesia crisis, and Anglo-American relations had reached a new low after Wilson’s public disassociation from the Vietnam campaign. Indeed, the East of Suez withdrawal damaged the so-called ‘special

relationship’ even further, with the American Secretary of State Dean Rusk saying: ‘Don’t pull out, Britain, because we cannot do the job of world policeman alone’. The battle for EEC membership was all Britain had left. Everything hinged on accession to this organisation, and the Foreign Office’s inner workings reflected this reality. The amalgamation of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office was a clear signal that the old imperial territories were no longer considered to be of great importance to British interests, at least on an administrative level. Suggestions for a ‘United States Department’ to be created in order to reverse the ‘decay of the special relationship’ during the department’s reorganisation in 1968 were swatted away. The European Economic Organisations Department was renamed the European Integration Department (EID) in May 1968 after intense lobbying from John Robinson, another indicator that the Foreign Office was staking Britain’s future world role on political and economic integration with the rest of Europe. The officials were planning for Europe and waiting for the right moment to strike.

This chapter will explore the amalgamation of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and how officials continued to orientate the department specifically towards European integration as the government opened negotiations with the Six. The majority of officials were now completely committed to British membership of the EEC, and this was reflected in the institution as a whole as well as through their individual attitudes. Over the course of the 1960s, British officials and policymakers had managed to acquire greater knowledge of the EEC’s inner workings and the general attitudes of the Six. In doing so, the Heath government had far more manoeuvrability in terms of being aware of where compromises and deals could be reached with the member states, in particular the French. The Foreign Office and, more broadly, Whitehall, had already made numerous adjustments and adaptations to facilitate the coordination of European policy prior to the amalgamation, but there is scant literature on the effects of the merger on official attitudes towards

1041 Ronald Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonisation 1918-1968 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 387.
1043 Hugo Young, This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair (London: Macmillan, 1998), 199.
1045 Ibid.
European integration and Britain’s accession to the EEC.\textsuperscript{1046} The implication of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office merger for the Heath negotiations is one of the crucial gaps in the scholarship on Britain’s approach to European integration and on the history of the Foreign Office itself, and warrants further examination. The coinciding of the amalgamation with the East of Suez withdrawal, the decline of Anglo-American relations and the radical redefinition of Britain’s world role adds further impetus to this research. Britain’s quest for membership of the EEC in the late 1960s and early 1970s has often been framed as a matter of politicians and officials ‘choosing’ between Europe and the Commonwealth, or as a natural progression (or decline) from Britain’s imperial, Atlanticist role to a regional and continental one.\textsuperscript{1047} Of course, the reality was more that Britain’s political and diplomatic elites had gone to great efforts to salvage her ties with the United States and the Commonwealth over the years, but that domestic economic constraints and external factors such as the dissolution of the Malayan Federation, the Indo-Pakistani War and UDI in Rhodesia caused irreversible damage to Britain’s international influence and her ability to finance her overseas commitments.

In a similar vein, some assessments of the Heath government’s foreign policy operate on the assumption that the Prime Minister’s strongly pro-European credentials made accession an inevitability.\textsuperscript{1048} There is a strong case in the literature that prior to Heath’s election as Prime Minister, de Gaulle alone presented an ‘absolute bar’ to membership of the EEC, and the General even conceded that under Heath’s leadership, Britain would probably succeed in joining.\textsuperscript{1049} The enthusiasm and commitment for European integration which Heath projected provided him with ‘a fund of goodwill’ in the member states of the

\textsuperscript{1046} It is covered briefly in Bulmer and Burch’s \textit{The Europeanisation of Whitehall} and Hennessy’s \textit{Whitehall}. Theakston’s \textit{The Labour Party and Whitehall} focuses on the civil service more broadly, with only passing references to the Foreign Office. Moorhouse’s \textit{The Diplomats} contains some interesting points on how the Foreign Office’s world view changed with the merger.


EEC which undoubtedly strengthened the British case for membership. However, it must be stressed that the success of the negotiations were by no means a foregone conclusion. Denman, Hanrieder and Auton have suggested that if Labour had returned to power in 1970, Britain’s bid for membership would have been lost. This heavily implies that Britain’s entry into the Common Market was by no means guaranteed. The enduring issue of Commonwealth trade, the future of sterling as a reserve currency and the implications of the Common Agricultural Policy were the three most significant obstacles to accession.

The cost to the British economy and the potential for food prices to soar as a result of the Common Agricultural Policy continued to be serious concerns for the government, especially in light of the fact that Britain did not stand to benefit from the policy given its relatively small agricultural output. Campbell has argued that the French refused to compromise on the Common Agricultural Policy as they were its main beneficiaries, which ‘augured badly’ for the negotiations. This deadlock produced a real warning ‘of the possibility of failure’. Indeed, the reconstruction of Anglo-French relations with the ascension of Georges Pompidou, which was critical in the success of the negotiations, was not necessarily caused by a political backlash against Gaullism or a gesture of goodwill on the part of the French. The increasing assertiveness and independence of West Germany under the leadership of Willy Brandt and their challenge to French leadership within the EEC forced the French to reconsider allowing Britain to join and act as a counterweight to German influence. Had a less energetic and independently-minded politician risen to lead the West German government, there was a real possibility that France could have rebuffed Britain’s renewed initiative and continued to rely on the Franco-German partnership.

More broadly, Heath’s success in Europe is often juxtaposed with an otherwise disastrous premiership, symptomatic of Britain’s domestic turmoil in the 1970s, which supposedly

1055 Ibid.
mirrored the nation’s decline on the world stage. However, as argued by Hill and Lord, the desire for EEC membership was ‘as much about the shoring up of Britain’s traditional relations with the Commonwealth and the United States as it was concerned with West Europe’. This is a crucial point. Britain’s accession was not perceived, at least by most officials and politicians, to be an admission of defeat or an acceptance of a diminished world role. Likewise, members of the British political and administrative elite had not suddenly converted to the ideals of European unity in the late 1960s. British entry into the Common Market was still seen principally as a means to an end – preserving Britain’s international power and influence. As Young has suggested, the Heath government believed that EEC membership did not necessarily ‘involve the surrender of historic British interests, but would rather allow them to be defended more successfully in a new context.’ Other scholars note that Heath downplayed notions of Britain’s ‘special relationship’ with the United States and romanticised attachments to the Commonwealth because he firmly believed that the revitalisation of Britain’s world power status would come from across the Channel as opposed to from across the Atlantic and beyond. Heath was hopeful of a Europe which could ‘act politically as one’ with its own foreign and defence policy, with Britain leading the way in this new era of global politics. The overall objective of bolstering Britain’s status and reasserting her position as a world power was a goal which never altered over this period. Of course, there were a number of politicians and officials who were devoted to the ideological goals of European integration – most notably Heath – but they were in a minority. In this chapter, it will become clear that the Foreign Office were acutely aware of Britain’s reduced influence, but did not necessarily accept that it was an irreversible fact. In addition, it will be argued that officials did not take accession for granted after de Gaulle’s resignation. As outlined above, there were still very real obstacles and challenges during the Foreign and Commonwealth Office merger and over the course of the negotiations.

1061 Young, “The Heath Government and British Entry into the European Community” (1996), 261.
'The Mini-Britain of the 1970s': The Amalgamation of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office

As arrangements were being made for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office merger, it became clear to the Personnel Department that the Foreign Office and diplomatic service suffered from a 'serious promotion blockage'. The main cause of this blockage was 'the high rate of recruitment twenty years ago' and 'the fact that after a period of expansion, the service has now ceased to grow in size.' The great 'post-war bulge' of the latter half of the 1940s had resulted in an increasingly overcrowded diplomatic service. According to Colin Crowe, the Foreign Office Chief Clerk and the main overseer of the amalgamation, the average age of a newly-appointed Counsellor in the early 1950s was 36; this had risen to over 40 by the late 1960s. A shortage of senior posts in grades 4 and above left younger officials anxious for their future career prospects. John Ford, a member of the post-war intake who was born in 1922 and had served during the War, expressed such anxieties to the Personnel Department as Commercial Counsellor in the Rome embassy: 'people in the post-war bulge (i.e. people like myself)...are on very weak ground in trying to alter radically the structure of the service to solve a very temporary problem'. Like many members of his generation, Ford was an ardent Europeanist and later served as Assistant Under-Secretary for European integration affairs in 1970-1. He was one of the chief architects of the European Communities Information Unit (ECIU) in the Foreign Office, which effectively distributed propaganda to bolster public support for membership of the EEC.

1063 Ibid.
1064 John Ford to Gerald Clarke, 14 June 1967, TNA/FCO79/40/DSP22/1/13.
1065 Indeed, Robinson, who was regarded as one of the ablest officials of his generation, did not obtain the rank of Counsellor until the age of 43: Colin Crowe, “Promotion and Pay in the Diplomatic Service”, 21 June 1967, TNA/FCO79/40/DSP22/1/12.
1066 John Ford to Gerald Clarke, 14 June 1967, TNA/FCO79/40/DSP22/1/13.
1068 The ECIU’s activities were kept secret from the public and its staff were ordered to ‘be covert’: John Ford to Caroline Petrie, “European Communities Information Unit”, 27 August 1970, TNA/FCO26/1212/PMW2/7/1. An excellent account of the Foreign Office’s use of pro-European domestic propaganda in this period has been conducted: Paul吉ddon, “The British Foreign Office and Domestic Propaganda on the European Community, 1960-72”, Contemporary British History 23, no. 2 (2009), 155-180.
Aside from the effects of their wartime experiences on their attitudes towards European unity and solidarity, the opportunities presented by British accession to the EEC were extremely appealing to the post-war generation. The promise of defending British interests in dynamic and interesting jobs at the heart of one of the most significant and powerful organisations in international diplomacy was very attractive and would serve as the perfect antidote to the blockages in promotions. If the amalgamation of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office was conducted in a way which orientated the service even further towards European integration, there would be a greater chance of a renewed bid for membership succeeding, and thus of securing both a new arena for shoring up British influence and new job opportunities for an overstuffed Foreign Office. As such, the amalgamation of the two departments had thrown into question the very nature of Britain’s role in the world, and the expectations some officials had for her future.

Amalgamation had been planned for some time after the recommendations of the 1964 Plowden Report: ‘The logic of events points towards the amalgamation of the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Foreign Office. The unified control and execution of our external policy...would be a rational and helpful development.’ The report had made plain the view that Britain’s strength could no longer match that of the United States and the Soviet Union, and that her economic resources were ‘less adequate than once they were to serve as a lever for exerting influence or pressure overseas’, but the country’s international standing had suffered even more since the report’s publication. Britain had endured a second rebuff from the EEC, the pressure on the pound had forced the government into devaluation, the balance of payments deficit had grown even further, and the cost of Britain’s overseas commitments had become unaffordable. As such, the reality of Britain’s position in late 1967 and early 1968 was much more precarious than that a mere four years earlier. In light of these daunting circumstances, some elements of the Foreign Office believed that a reduction of overseas staff was needed to reflect Britain’s lessened responsibility and capacity. These officials tended to be younger and more radical in their thinking. During discussions within the Foreign Office Personnel Department on the

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1069 Committee on Representational Services Overseas, “Report of the Committee on Representational Services Overseas appointed by the Prime Minister under the chairmanship of Lord Plowden, 1962-63” CMND-2276, (1964), 12.
1070 Ibid.
future of the diplomatic service after the amalgamation had been completed, one official by the name of Bryan Cartledge stated:

Do we really believe that the mini-Britain of the 1970s will need a larger overseas service than the ‘Big Three’ Britain of the 1950s? This is the assumption on which our current manpower planning and recruitment programme is based. It is, to say the least, unproven; I personally consider it preposterous.

It was this orthodoxy which guided much of the Personnel Department, and indeed the amalgamation more broadly. An awareness of and sensitivity towards Britain’s waning power acted as a catalyst for radical thinking on the future of the Foreign Office, and how its new structure would respond to the challenges presented to British foreign policy, principally membership of the EEC. In a major paper on the future of the diplomatic service, Cartledge noted the ‘emergence of doubts and concerns’ from ‘younger members’ of the service about the Foreign Office’s future role and the need for ‘closer coordination between our forward political thinking and our long-term administrative planning’. It is also abundantly clear that these anxieties about the diplomatic service’s future were not held by a minority of younger officials: ‘From experience of a number of conversations across this desk, I can confirm that the phenomenon is a fairly general one.’ Responses to Cartledge’s paper from his Personnel Department colleagues also added that they had ‘numerous straws in the wind’ that younger officials had been actively reassessing the future of the diplomatic service and that Cartledge ‘had a number of conversations with First Secretaries of the age group mentioned…all of whom have made in broad outline the same points’. The main grievance of the younger generations of officials was, as Cartledge put it, the sense that more senior members were ‘waiting upon political events instead of making…some effort to anticipate them’ and deferring planning for the future of the service. By this, there can be little doubt that Cartledge was arguing for a diplomatic

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1071 At the time a middle-ranking official at First Secretary, but went on to become an expert in Eastern European affairs, ending his career as ambassador to the Soviet Union (1985-88).
1074 Ibid.
service more orientated towards Europe, which was the cornerstone of Britain’s future foreign policy:

The primacy which has been accorded to Europe in our external relations can be assumed to be permanent. Europe is now the focus of the United Kingdom’s economic and defence policies. Given the reduction of our commitments in other parts of the world it is, indeed, difficult to see on what other viable foundation this country’s foreign policy could rest. ¹⁰⁷⁷

Cartledge also argued that the ‘focusing of British policies on Europe, probable British membership of the EEC and the priority to be given to British economic and commercial interests abroad’ had a direct impact on the future structure and functions of the diplomatic service. ¹⁰⁷⁸ This is strong evidence in favour of this chapter’s main argument: that the amalgamation of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office was in large part motivated by a desire to redefine Britain’s world role as a European one, and to increasingly adapt the diplomatic service as a whole to European integration affairs. Furthermore, the notion that the savings to be made from the cuts to overseas staff and spending was the main motivation for the merger is misleading. ¹⁰⁷⁹ Cartledge argued that there would be a need for a substantial increase in economic and commercial officers both in London and abroad, as well as the staffing of the European Commission, which would ‘be likely to absorb the savings’. ¹⁰⁸⁰ The Permanent Under-Secretary Paul Gore-Booth himself stated to the Fulton Committee that ‘the diplomatic and home civil service would have to contribute a lot of people to the Commission and to Common Market affairs’ before and after accession. ¹⁰⁸¹ Crowe, who oversaw much of the amalgamation, also stated that the merger would result in ‘an organisation which is smaller than the sum of the two Offices but not very much smaller.’ ¹⁰⁸² Indeed, Cartledge was quick to suggest that the embassies and missions of Western Europe ‘be exempt from any reduction in their political staff on

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¹⁰⁷⁷ Ibid.
¹⁰⁷⁸ Ibid.
¹⁰⁷⁹ Indeed, Moorhouse has argued that cost-cutting ‘had apparently been no concern of Lord Plowden’s Committee, which concluded that, if anything, overseas representation was likely to increase rather than dwindle, and had allowed for the topping up of existing manpower by 10 per cent.’ Geoffrey Moorhouse, The Diplomats: The Foreign Office Today (London: Jonathan Cape, 1977), 25-26.
¹⁰⁸² Colin Crowe to Patrick Dean, 17 May 1968, Sir Paul Gore-Booth’s Private Office Papers, TNA/FCO73/104.
the grounds that political traffic...is likely to increase rather than diminish.'\textsuperscript{1083} This was a clear statement that Europe would become the ‘surrogate for empire’ for which Dean Acheson claimed Britain was searching.\textsuperscript{1084} The younger generations of officials who were, broadly speaking, much more in favour of British membership of the EEC than some of their elder colleagues, were adamant that Britain’s new world role satisfy both their personal and professional ambitions.

Cartledge’s views were echoed by Marrack Goulding, a middle-ranking official in the Planning Department.\textsuperscript{1085} Goulding drafted a paper in which he identified three main sources of discontent in the ranks of the diplomatic service: the slowness and inflexibility of promotion, the number of increasingly irrelevant and unnecessary jobs, and the lack of professionalism and specialist expertise.\textsuperscript{1086} In 1968, there were over 150 grade 5 officials over the age of 40, showing the full extent of the ‘promotion blockage’ identified by Crowe.\textsuperscript{1087} Goulding also argued that the service was continuing to do ‘the same jobs as it did when I joined in 1959’, despite the fact that Britain’s world role had ‘changed immeasurably’ since then.\textsuperscript{1088} He strongly believed that deep cuts were needed to areas ‘no longer important in terms of British interests’.\textsuperscript{1089} By this, he meant posts in former territories of the British Empire and Commonwealth countries which continued to maintain unnecessarily large representations.\textsuperscript{1090} Goulding forcefully argued that Britain’s diminished power meant that it no longer needed officers constantly reporting on developments in their respective regions as the government did not have the capacity to act upon such information or need to be fully informed about areas of the world in which it held little stake.\textsuperscript{1091} With regards to specialist training, Goulding conceded that he did not believe in a ‘service of specialists’, but acknowledged that the increasing importance of trade, industry, science and technology in external relations meant that relevant training and expertise

\textsuperscript{1084} Paraphrased from ‘Britain has lost an empire and has not yet found a role’ in: Hennessy, \textit{Whitehall} (1990), 253.
\textsuperscript{1085} Goulding was a notoriously radical member of the service. In 1977, he was ‘banished’ to the Lisbon embassy after producing a damning report on overseas representation which the departmental leadership found difficult to accept. He ended his career as Under-Secretary-General of the UN; a post he held for 11 years: Marrack Goulding, \textit{Peacemonger} (London: John Murray, 2002), 4.
\textsuperscript{1086} Marrack Goulding to Christopher Barclay, “The Diplomatic Service”, 20 January 1968, TNA/FCO79/49/DSP22/6/4.
\textsuperscript{1087} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1088} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1089} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1090} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1091} Ibid.
were necessary. One of Goulding’s colleagues in the Planning Department, Christopher Everett, echoed these sentiments but was even more radical in his vision of Britain’s future: ‘Britain’s withdrawal into a purely European role will not be reversed and...our global power and role will continue to diminish.’ Everett advocated cuts to overseas staff in the Third World, with a prioritisation of North American and European embassies and missions for Britain’s future influence. Like Goulding, he argued that ‘the promotion and protection of economic interests’ demanded a service which had elements of expertise and training in commercial affairs. The savings made from the cuts to ‘irrelevant and unnecessary’ positions would be reinvested in posts for trade and economic diplomacy:

What is already clear is that our external policy is, and will increasingly be, governed by economic considerations...The economic aspects of your amalgamation exercise are crucial to any authority which the Office will enjoy in Whitehall – certainly for the next ten years, and probably for a good deal longer. It would be tragic if the exercise were conducted from the point of view of saving the odd body here and there.

It is unsurprising, therefore, that current and former members of the EID and authorities on European economic affairs were heavily consulted on the future structure of the service. The fact of the matter was that the EEC and its institutions represented the most dynamic arenas of economic and industrial diplomacy, and the fastest growing and most attractive market at the time was, of course, the Common Market. Indeed, the potential for the Foreign Office to continue to branch out into commercial affairs as a means of modernising British diplomacy and strengthening British economic power had been endorsed by the Plowden Report, the Permanent Under-Secretary, and other officials in the Personnel Department. This could be achieved by sending officials on sabbatical in industry,
secondments to the Treasury, and training courses at the Bank of England. From mid-1968, the Foreign Office took over all commercial training programmes from the Board of Trade, reflecting the department’s increased encroachment on economic affairs. Increasing the number of staff in the EID, the Economic Relations Department, the Oil Department and the UN Department for Economic and Social Affairs, as well as increasing the number of commercial posts abroad would allay the overcrowding in the Foreign Office and allow the department to further orientate itself towards Europe. The functions of the Commonwealth Office needed to be redistributed in the newly merged department, which gave rise to an opportunity to downgrade the importance of Commonwealth affairs in favour of Europe. Alan Furness, an official in the Economic Relations Department, proposed that the EID take over the functions of the Commonwealth Office’s Western Economic Department, with the current posts in the latter department being cut. In addition, the Economic Relations Department would benefit from taking on a variety of policy areas, including the majority of the Commonwealth Trade Department’s responsibilities. A new Export Promotions Department would also be created with the specific purpose of promoting British economic interests abroad – this had been advocated by the Head of the Economic Relations Department as a fundamental component of the new Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s foreign policy strategy.

Norman Statham, then Head of the EID was quick to defend both his department’s interests and the Foreign Office’s continued orientation towards Europe. Like Furness, he argued that the EID should take over the functions of the Commonwealth Office’s Western Economic Department, citing the fact that European integration was ‘one of the key elements in our foreign policy as a whole.’ However, Statham went further and advocated the EID taking over all Commonwealth affairs relating to British accession to the EEC and the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement. In doing so, the Foreign Office was very clearly downgrading Commonwealth affairs as a secondary issue to the more important

1101 Ibid.
1104 Ibid.
objective of securing membership of the Common Market. With the EID now in charge of all areas of external policy concerned with accession, and with the department’s members being some of the staunchest supporters of membership of the EEC, any bars to accession from Britain’s ties with the Commonwealth would be treated with lessened interest or being of little consequence. Statham also stated that the EID should continue as the principal department on European integration affairs, as ‘any absorption of the functions of this department by another with less clear responsibilities and less convincing a European title could only be regarded as signifying reduced interest.’ This was a crucial point. Statham was aware that the impetus behind British membership of the EEC needed to be maintained and that the Foreign Office needed to continue to show that it gave European affairs serious weight and consideration. Statham mentioned that he had cleared his ideas with John Robinson, who was to succeed him as Head of the EID. Both men were among the most vocal supporters of British membership of the EEC; particularly the latter. Their coordinated response to the Personnel Department and the Permanent Under-Secretary’s office reveal a conscious effort to press the ‘pro-European case’ and influence the amalgamation. The fact that this coincided with a departmental orthodoxy which had accepted that British membership of the EEC was the future of British foreign policy and power gave their views greater clout.

Another former Head of the EID’s predecessor (the European Economic Organisations Department), Ken Gallagher, voiced similar points to those made by Statham and Robinson, who sent him a copy of the original letter. Gallagher was now Head of the Common Market Department in the Commonwealth Office, which was to be abolished in the merger. He supported Statham’s proposals for the Commonwealth Office’s economic work to be largely absorbed by the EID, particularly that which had a direct bearing on British policy towards the EEC. However, he also stated that the Commonwealth Office’s work on European integration affairs was much more substantial than Statham and Robinson had assumed: ‘all the major Commonwealth countries are intensely interested in the evolution of our European policy’. This meant that the future EID would need more personnel in order to take on the additional responsibilities, which would have given the department even greater influence within the new Foreign and Commonwealth Office as it widened its

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1105 Ibid.
1106 Ibid.
1107 Ken Gallagher to Keith Oakeshott, 1 April 1968, Sir Paul Gore-Booth’s Private Office Papers, TNA/FCO73/104.
1108 Ibid.
remit to include British economic relations with the Commonwealth. Statham and Gallagher’s recommendations were also reiterated at a higher level by Arthur Snelling, deputy head of the diplomatic service, to Colin Crowe and Roger Jackling.\textsuperscript{1109} Snelling himself was ‘an economics specialist who represented a new breed of post-war diplomat – with practical skills and a leaning towards trade and industry.’\textsuperscript{1110} His input on the reorganisation of economic work in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office was highly respected and his suggestions, along with those from Statham and Gallagher, appear to have been broadly implemented.\textsuperscript{1111} These new arrangements were further steps towards a diplomatic service better equipped for economic diplomacy and international trade.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office formally came into being on 17 October 1968.\textsuperscript{1112} As argued above, the supposed staff and cost-cutting initiatives did not appear to bear much fruit, and the department seemed to be aware of this. In a document on the Office’s staffing after the merger, the Personnel Department suggested comments on staff reductions for press consumption: ‘The number of Permanent and Deputy Under-Secretaries has been reduced through the merger by 25% and there has also been a significant reduction at [Assistant Under-Secretary] level.’\textsuperscript{1113} This was a cunning use of statistics. In the year to January 1969, there had only been an overall reduction of five staff in grades 1-3; from 32 to 27.\textsuperscript{1114} One of these positions was the Permanent Under-Secretary of the Commonwealth Office, which was due to be cut after the merger anyway, given that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office was to become a single department. With regards to financial savings, the Duncan Report, which was ‘inspired by Treasury pressure for cuts in expenditure’\textsuperscript{1115} and published in 1969, even conceded that Britain’s overseas representation cost the Exchequer less than 1% of total government spending – a ‘tiny proportion’.\textsuperscript{1116} As such, the pressure for cuts in expenditure was not significant and is not

\textsuperscript{1109} Ibid. Snelling had previously been Deputy Under-Secretary for Commonwealth affairs. At this point, Jackling was Deputy Under-Secretary for economic affairs.

\textsuperscript{1110} “Sir Arthur Snelling” The Times, 1 July 1996, 25.

\textsuperscript{1111} Economic work (including the Commonwealth) was delegated to the EID, the Economists Department and the Export Promotions Department: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, The Diplomatic Service List 1970 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1970).


\textsuperscript{1114} Ibid. Indeed, this misleading statistic was quoted to the House of Commons Defence and External Affairs Sub-Committee.

\textsuperscript{1115} Moorhouse, The Diplomats (1977), 25.

reflected in official figures. According to the Duncan Report, the total cost of all overseas services for the year 1968-9, including the operations of the Foreign Office in London, was £105.8 million. In the year 1970-1, this had risen to £129.4 million, according to evidence submitted to the House of Commons Defence and External Affairs Sub-Committee. Both of these figures included the British Council, external broadcasting services and British Information Services, but even if one examines the figures for the Foreign Office and overseas representation alone, they are £63.4 million for 1968-9 and £63.8 million for 1970-1. Furthermore, the Heath government’s public spending review in 1971 continued to project increases in real terms for spending on overseas services and representation to an estimated £131 million by 1974-5. Therefore, there were no substantial cuts to spending after the merger or the Duncan Report, whose principal aim was to help obtain ‘the maximum value for all British government expenditure and the consequent desirability of providing British overseas representation at lesser cost’.

Indeed, the budgets for all overseas representation and services saw quite substantial increases, with the Foreign Office and diplomatic service benefiting from small increases year upon year. This debunks the view that the amalgamation of the two departments was driven by financial factors. The creation of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office was chiefly driven by a desire to radically overhaul the shape of the service into one which reflected the new realities of Britain’s world role and her external interests; namely European integration, commercial diplomacy, and a decline in the importance of the Commonwealth, something which the Duncan Report explicitly acknowledged. In addition, further impetus was given by the serious ‘promotion blockage’ being experienced by the post-war generation of officials. These officials’ professional interests happened to coincide with their personal

1117 Ibid.
1122 Ibid. “We were appointed at a moment when there had been a major shift in British foreign policy—the decision announced at the beginning of 1968 to withdraw our military forces from the area East of Suez...the priority given to the renewed British bid for membership of the European Common Market and the greatly increased emphasis on the support of our commercial effort overseas prompted by the long-drawn-out series of balance of payments crises.”
ambitions of Britain joining the EEC. As such, the future of the diplomatic service was very deliberately and consciously adapted and orientated towards European affairs in a bid to satisfy concerns about Britain’s waning international influence and the careers of their staff. It was an extremely attractive symbiosis. The Foreign Office now turned its attention towards fulfilling its main objective. Officials were still faced with several challenges, least of all the obstructive and abrasive General in Paris. Very soon, however, an opportunity would present itself, and the Foreign Office would not take it for granted.
European Policy after the Merger: The Soames Affair and the Fall of De Gaulle

After de Gaulle’s press conference in November 1967, British policy towards Europe ‘followed a period...in which no serious progress was made.’ German proposals for a ‘commercial arrangement’ between Britain and the Six in 1968 were rejected by the Foreign Office, who refused to consider anything less than membership. Indeed, officials went to great lengths to crush dissenting voices within the ranks of the British government who were tempted by some of these initiatives. The President of the Board of Trade, Tony Crosland, wrote to Michael Stewart and said that the government’s inflexibility towards a potential trade arrangement was damaging to British relations with EFTA. Lord Chalfont, a Foreign Office minister with responsibility for Europe and one of Stewart’s subordinates, concurred with Crosland’s position, much to the annoyance of officials. The Deputy Under-Secretary for European economic affairs, Patrick Hancock, fiercely rebuked Chalfont and offered a robust rebuttal of the case for a trade arrangement, concluding: ‘It would be uncomfortable for you to have to defend the policy of HMG if you did not believe it was right. Hence this argument, for which please forgive me, is designed to reassure you that it is right.’ The entire tone of Hancock’s minute to the minister was both patronising and derogatory – an almost astonishing level of insubordination. Such was the Foreign Office’s unyielding commitment to EEC membership. In alliance with the Foreign Secretary, they sought to keep the wavering ministers in line and maintain a united front within the government. The EID and the Permanent Mission in Brussels were in the vanguard of this cause, but the level of inactivity was exceptionally frustrating. The officials hungered for progress.

The most influential Foreign Office officials across this period are familiar. Con O’Neill and John Robinson were by far the most prominent and energetic officials in London engaged in European integration affairs. As the EID grew in importance and personnel after the amalgamation, the input of other officials also became more pronounced. The department was staffed by John Killick, the Assistant Under-Secretary for European

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1126 The EID had grown to such an extent that it was divided into two separate departments in 1971: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, The Diplomatic Service List 1972 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1972), 10.
integration affairs who served under O’Neill, and the two Assistant Heads of department under Robinson, James Adams and Henry Brind, all of whom were well-versed in European affairs.\textsuperscript{1127} In Brussels, James Marjoribanks remained in place as Head of the Delegation to the EEC, retiring at the end of 1971 as the negotiations were being completed.\textsuperscript{1128} The Mission in Brussels had also grown in size and importance,\textsuperscript{1129} and Marjoribanks was aided by some exceptional individuals from the post-war generation: Kenneth Christofas, the Deputy Head of the delegation, James Mellon, First Secretary and Head of the Chancery, and David Hannay, First Secretary.\textsuperscript{1130} All three men were strongly in favour of British membership of the EEC, as was their chief.\textsuperscript{1131} The Paris embassy continued to play a crucial role, with Christopher Soames, the son-in-law of Winston Churchill, taking over from Patrick Reilly in 1968.\textsuperscript{1132} Soames’ deputy in Paris was none other than the ardent Europeanist Michael Palliser, who was transferred there from the Prime Minister’s office in 1969.\textsuperscript{1133} Most senior officials, including Paul Gore-Booth, accepted that Britain’s future lay with Europe. Interestingly, Gore-Booth’s successor as Permanent Under-Secretary, Denis Greenhill, was ‘soaked in Atlanticism and the Commonwealth, a man whose juices did not rise to Europe,’\textsuperscript{1134} Indeed, Greenhill later criticised what he called the ‘ultimate federal objectives’ of the EEC, stating: ‘History will record how we were steadily outsmarted between 1972-1992.’\textsuperscript{1135} However, the scepticism of the Foreign Office’s most senior figure was largely irrelevant by this point. The departmental orthodoxy of the day was one which


\textsuperscript{1128} Foreign and Commonwealth Office, The Diplomatic Service List 1971 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1971), 108. Marjoribanks was replaced by Palliser, who then went on to become Permanent Under-Secretary.

\textsuperscript{1129} By 1972 the Delegation had 26 staff ranked at Third Secretary and above, compared with 10 in 1968: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, The Diplomatic Service List 1972 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1972), 108.


\textsuperscript{1134} Young, This Blessed Plot (1998), 198.

\textsuperscript{1135} Denis Greenhill, More By Accident (York: Wilton, 1992), 167.
was fully committed to British membership of the EEC, and Greenhill’s misgivings were mostly ignored or neutralised.

With the exception of O’Neill and Marjoribanks, all of these officials joined the diplomatic service after the Second World War, and with the exception of Hannay, all of them had served in the armed forces as volunteers or as part of their national service. Robinson, Christofas, and Killick had joined the Foreign Office via the ‘reconstruction method’, which was specifically for young men whose university educations and early careers had been disrupted by the War. As such, they were part of the generation of officials who had witnessed the destruction of Europe first-hand. Adams, Brind, Hannay and Mellon were all born in the late 1920s and early 1930s, and whilst they were too young to have served during the War, still had vivid memories of the conflict which hardened their attitudes in favour of European unity. As was the case in the previous chapter, the educational backgrounds of this group were diverse. O’Neill was an Etonian, Christofas was an Old Merchant Taylor, Hannay was a Wykehamist, and Robinson attended Westminster School, but the remaining officials had attended lesser independent schools or grammar schools. Crowe attended Stowe School, Marjoribanks attended Merchiston Castle School and Edinburgh Academy, Killick attended Latymer Upper School, Mellon attended St. Aloysius’ College, a Jesuit school in Glasgow, Adams attended Wolverhampton Grammar School, and Brind was educated at the Barry County School in Wales. Their university educations reveal a similarly eclectic picture. At Oxford, O’Neill studied English, Hannay studied Modern History, and Robinson took a degree in Greats. Adams also studied at Oxford, but there is no record of what subject he took. Christofas studied Economics and Classics and Killick studied French and German, both at University College London. Marjoribanks studied modern languages at Edinburgh, Brind studied History at Cambridge, and Mellon studied at Glasgow. As such, there is no indication that social class or educational background determined their career paths or indeed their views on Europe. The Foreign Office in the

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1138  Brind, Lying Abroad (1999), 85; James Mellon, interviewed by Malcolm McBain, 14 April 2003, CCC/BDOHP/73/11; David Hannay, Britain’s Quest for a Role: A Diplomatic Memoir from Europe to the UN (London: IB Tauris, 2013), 35.
1139  Stowe, Merchiston Castle School, Edinburgh Academy, Latymer Upper School and St. Aloysius’ College were independent. Wolverhampton Grammar and Barry County were state schools.
1140  There is no record of what subject Mellon studied at Glasgow.
post-war period recruited from a broader socio-economic and educational base, which supposedly prized ‘intelligence and nous [more than] a particular and easily defined skill set’.\footnote{Michael J. Hughes and Roger H. Platt, “Far Apart but Close Together: A Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis of the Career Structure and Organisational Culture of the Post-War British Diplomatic Service”, \textit{Diplomacy and Statecraft} 26, no. 2 (2015), 268.} Indeed, Killick stated in an interview that he was ‘appalled...about the virtual total lack of any training or introduction’.\footnote{John Killick, interviewed by John Hutson, 14 February 2002, CCC/BDOHP/69/2.}

All of these officials were committed to British membership of the EEC, though some were more enthusiastic than others. As argued in the previous chapter, O’Neill was largely driven by a firm belief that Britain’s international power and influence would be revitalised inside the EEC, and not by any ideological attachment to European unity and solidarity.\footnote{O’Neill, \textit{Britain’s Entry into the European Community} (2000), 355.} Killick was ‘devoted to the support of the Atlantic Alliance’, serving as President of the British Atlantic Committee after retirement.\footnote{“Sir John Killick”, \textit{The Times} 19 February 2004, 36.} His work on the reconstruction of post-war Germany in the Allied Control Commission, and as ambassador to Soviet Union and later to NATO suggest that his support for accession was primarily motivated by Cold War considerations.\footnote{His language in this interview also suggests an element of Russophobia and strong anti-communist sentiment: ‘Western politicians tend to make the mistake of assuming that the Soviet leadership were really people just like them’: John Killick, interviewed by John Hutson, 14 February 2002, CCC/BDOHP/69/8.}

The younger officials were much more pro-European both from a professional and a private point of view. Mellon has stated: ‘I joined the Foreign Office to get to Brussels to help do something about Europe...to make Europe safe, so to speak.’\footnote{James Mellon, interviewed by Malcolm McBain, 14 April 2003, CCC/BDOHP/73/15.} Similarly, Hannay has argued that ‘European economic integration has been an enormous force for economic growth and development’ for Britain, and that she had ‘lost the will to keep the Empire’ after the Second World War.\footnote{David Hannay, interviewed by Malcolm McBain, 22 July 1999, CCC/BDOHP/38/27.} Christofas’ pro-European convictions were so great that his biographer has stated: ‘He would have wanted to be remembered for his role in Britain’s participation in the ever closer European union’ and that he ‘confirmed that a great Englishman could also be a great European’.\footnote{Nicol, “Christofas, Sir Kenneth Cavendish (1917-1992)”.} The latter part of his career was spent at the heart of the EEC, first at Britain’s Delegation in Brussels and then as Director-General of the Secretariat of the European Council of Ministers.\footnote{Ibid.} Much of Adams’ career was also defined by European affairs; he was Assistant Head of the EID 1969-71 and Head of one of the two EIDs after the department was split in 1971 before
being transferred to the British Delegation to the European Communities from 1973-7.\footnote{1150}

This cohort of officials showed that Europe was now the absolute top foreign policy priority and that every ambitious diplomat began to see the continent as containing the most coveted posts in the diplomatic service. The Foreign Office were aware that accession would present new opportunities in terms of postings and an expansion of representation in Europe. As Hennessy has stated, ‘in bureaucratic terms, the chief beneficiary of Britain’s membership of the EEC has been the Foreign Office. The diplomats have found a new place in the sun, if that is not too vivid a climatic metaphor for Brussels, Luxembourg and Strasbourg.'\footnote{1151} The amalgamation of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office was a crucial step in cementing this sentiment, and the cuts to Commonwealth posts and staff made Europe an increasingly attractive destination, both personally and nationally. Planning for the future equated to planning for Europe, and these attitudes governed the restructuring of the Foreign Office in the 1960s, as well as its firm commitment to membership of the EEC.

After a period of deadlock, British European policy was given a sudden jolt shortly after the appointment of Christopher Soames as ambassador to France. In February 1969, Soames met with de Gaulle for a series of serious discussions on Anglo-French relations. The General proceeded to tell Soames that ‘he had no part in the creation of the Common Market, neither did he have any particular faith in it.’\footnote{1152} This was a frank admission, but not entirely surprising. De Gaulle’s opposition to the federalist objectives of the EEC was well-known. However, the comments which followed would lead to one of the biggest diplomatic crises of the 1960s:

He personally foresaw [the EEC] changing, and would like to see it change, into a looser form of a free trade area with arrangements by each country to exchange agricultural produce. He would be quite prepared to discuss with us what should take the place of the Common Market...His thought was that there should be a large European economic association, but with a small inner council of European political association consisting of France and Britain, Germany and Italy.\footnote{1153}

\footnote{1152}Christopher Soames to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 5 February 1969, TNA/FCO30/414/MWK4/12/3.
\footnote{1153}Ibid.
De Gaulle had opened the door to Anglo-French discussions on the effective dissolution of the EEC in its current form. Soames himself was unsure about the sincerity of de Gaulle’s invitation but thought that it had been extended with ‘an open mind’. The Foreign Office was entirely unconvinced and dispatched Patrick Hancock to Paris in order for him to explain the government’s predicament to the ambassador. Hancock took a firm line and stated that the Prime Minister had no choice but to disclose the contents of de Gaulle’s conversation to the West German Chancellor, Kurt Kiesinger, whom he was visiting later that week. The rationale was that British relations with the ‘Friendly Five’ would suffer significantly if the details of possible Anglo-French collusion ever came to light, which jeopardised the strategy which the Foreign Office had been pursuing since the General’s first veto. According to Hancock’s record, Soames was ‘very upset’ by the news and argued that it would compromise the purpose of his mission in Paris. He went to great lengths to try and convince Hancock that his conversations with de Gaulle had been misinterpreted and created ‘too clear-cut and too dramatic’ a picture. Hancock insisted that the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary had already made up their minds. In an interview with Hugo Young, John Robinson argued that the decision to inform Kiesinger was conceived and suggested by the officials alone, and even alluded that it was tantamount to ‘dictating’ to ministers.

Robinson, now Head of the EID, drafted some notes for the Foreign Secretary’s next Cabinet meeting, in which the department’s preferred course of action was outlined. There was a clear anxiety that the French would use de Gaulle’s invitation against the British by informing the other members of the EEC, thereby crushing the credibility of the government’s stance on membership. In the eyes of Robinson, the Foreign Office’s arch-Europeanist, this could not be allowed to happen. Soames was instructed to tell de Gaulle that they found his proposals ‘significant and far-reaching’, but that they rejected his attitude towards NATO and planned to inform the Five to ensure that ‘our partners are

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{1154} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{1155} Patrick Hancock, “President de Gaulle’s Approach to Mr. Soames”, 10 February 1969, TNA/FCO30/414/MWK4/12/18.
  \item \textsuperscript{1157} Patrick Hancock, “President de Gaulle’s Approach to Mr. Soames”, 10 February 1969, TNA/FCO30/414/MWK4/12/18.
  \item \textsuperscript{1158} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{1159} See: Young, This Blessed Plot (1998), 205.
  \item \textsuperscript{1160} John Robinson to Patrick Hancock and Michael Stewart, “De Gaulle’s Proposals to Mr. Soames: Speaking Note”, 19 February 1969, TNA/FCO30/414/MWK4/12/21.
\end{itemize}
fully in the picture’. Indeed, the Five and the United States had already been informed of the discussions, but this would significantly limit the potential damage which France could cause. Almost immediately after this, an article appeared in Le Figaro which contradicted the British account, presumably leaked by the French authorities. Reports from Soames indicated that the French were particularly sensitive about the allegation that they had suggested a ‘four-power political directorate’ and had been informally denying it at official level. In ruthless fashion, one Foreign Office official exclaimed: ‘we’ve got the bastards at last’. Soames was ordered to show the full account of his conversation with de Gaulle, which had been approved by the Quai d’Orsay, to the Five’s ambassadors in Paris. The French were trapped. The final nail in the coffin was a full leak of the account from the Foreign Office, on the orders of Robinson, which caused an explosion in the international press. The furore and embarrassment was all the greater given that Richard Nixon was due to arrive for a tour of Europe the following day. De Gaulle’s fury was ‘impossible to describe’, according to Lacouture. Soames was summoned by the French Foreign Minister, Michel Debré, and given a fierce rebuke – he described the situation as ‘a field of ruin’. Debré also decried the ‘delusions’ of those in London who ‘had been hoping for a long time that the General would soon go’ and reminded the ambassador that even after de Gaulle’s departure, ‘it would be the same people conducting the same policies’. This was directly aimed at the likes of Robinson and O’Neill, the Foreign Office officials who had pursued a line of supporting the Five and

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1161 Ibid.
1162 Christopher Soames to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 21 February 1969, TNA/FCO30/415/MWK4/12/104.
1163 Ibid.
1164 There is no certainty over who said this in response to the article in Le Figaro, but Hugo Young was convinced that it was Robinson: Young, This Blessed Plot (1998), 206.
1169 Christopher Soames to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 22 February 1969, TNA/FCO30/415/MWK4/12/130.
isolating the French in the hope that the likelihood of British membership of the EEC would increase. Gaullism would not die with de Gaulle, and French national interests would continue to endure. Soames reported that the French press perceived the affair as ‘an all-time low in Anglo-French relations’. With the benefit of hindsight, there can be little doubt that this assertion was correct.

The fallout from the Soames affair was monumental and had far-reaching consequences. Anglo-French relations, which the government had tried extremely hard to improve, were in tatters. The Foreign Office was much more concerned with relations with the Five, however, and the affair seemed to have demonstrated Britain’s commitment to EEC membership. Reports from James Marjoribanks in Brussels stated that the Italians had full faith in the British after Michael Stewart confirmed that the transcript of the meeting had been approved by the Quai d’Orsay. There was great sympathy for the predicament the Foreign Secretary had been placed in; ‘an incorrect statement on an occasion such as this would have meant political suicide’. Marjoribanks also noted that the Italians believed that de Gaulle had shown his true colours, and that he had always planned to undermine and replace the EEC. This was not necessarily the case, but Marjoribanks added that such suspicions did ‘no harm to us’. The Dutch also complimented the British approach, telling Marjoribanks that ‘we had demonstrated convincingly that we stood by the European method and discarded bilateralism.’ Furthermore, the majority of the Commission admitted that despite being faced with an impossible choice, the British ‘had no alternative’ but to act as they did. The Belgian Director-General of social affairs praised Britain for finally compelling the General to explain himself after years of divisiveness. Marjoribanks was proud to report that the French were losing ground by ‘continuing to harp on procedural points’ and that ‘more and more people are seeing our European policy in perspective.’ This was an incredibly significant coup for the Foreign Office. Their strategy had finally paid off, and they had been proven right. The battle with No. 10 over whether or not to pursue an anti-supranationalist partnership with France had been decisively won. As for de Gaulle, the General’s days were numbered. It would perhaps

1171 Ibid.
1172 James Marjoribanks to John Robinson, 28 February 1969, TNA/FCO30/417/MWK4/12/41.
1173 Ibid.
1174 Ibid.
1175 Ibid.
1177 Ibid.
1178 Ibid.
1179 Ibid.
be an overstatement to say that the affair contributed directly towards his resignation, but it certainly exacerbated his already tenuous position. The Foreign Office were well aware that he had been ‘badly shaken’ by the turbulence of May 1968 and the worsening of the ‘serious economic and social problems’ in France.\footnote{Christopher Soames to Michael Stewart, 21 March 1969, TNA/FCO30/418/MWK4/12/295.} The Quai d’Orsay had ordered a radical review of French foreign policy in October 1968 with British intelligence indicating that there was a desire for warmer relations with the United States.\footnote{Ibid.} French anxiety over a resurgent Germany and using Britain as a potential counterweight was also a significant factor in this reassessment.\footnote{Ibid; Keiger, France and the World Since 1870 (2001), 182.} In short, de Gaulle’s abrasive style of politics and diplomacy was out of mode.\footnote{Andrew Knapp, Gaullism Since De Gaulle (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994), 13.} His decision to tie his future to a referendum on government decentralisation and senate reform, which he lost, was ill-fated, but at this point the General was fatigued and demoralised.\footnote{Lacouture, De Gaulle: The Ruler 1945-1970 (1993), 574.} He resigned the presidency on 28 April 1969 full in the knowledge that carrying on would ‘wear me out without any benefit to France.’\footnote{Ibid.}

With regards to the Foreign Office, the Soames affair and de Gaulle’s resignation opened the floodgates to internal politics and external criticism. As Hugo Young has noted, the department’s handling of the Soames affair was condemned by officials and ministers who still opposed British entry.\footnote{Young, This Blessed Plot (1998), 207.} For them, de Gaulle’s proposals represented a chance for Britain to build a new organisation for European cooperation, free from the shackles of the Common Agricultural Policy and other undesirable elements of the EEC, and the pro-marketeers in the Foreign Office and government had let the opportunity slip away.\footnote{See: Richard Crossman, The Crossman Diaries: Selections from the Diaries of a Cabinet Minister 1964-1970 (London: Magnum, 1979), 577; Douglas Jay, Change and Fortune: A Political Record (London: Hutchinson, 1980), 431-433; Barbara Castle, The Castle Diaries 1964-1970 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1984), 605-606.} The new Permanent Under-Secretary, Denis Greenhill, was one of the sceptics who saw the events of early 1969 as an opportunity to ‘search for a new organisation’ for European political and economic cooperation, arguing that France was already doing so and that it would be more compatible with British interests.\footnote{As mentioned above, Greenhill was lukewarm in his commitment to EEC membership, and after the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty became a vocal opponent of the EU: Denis Greenhill to Lord Chalfont, “European Policy”, 8 April 1969, TNA/FCO30/421/MWK4/14/2.} Lord Chalfont, the Foreign Office minister who had already irritated officials with his enthusiasm for the ‘commercial arrangement’ proposed by the Germans in 1968 agreed with Greenhill along the lines that
domestic support for membership of the EEC was flagging. On the eve of the General’s resignation, Robinson submitted a lengthy paper with a view to quashing these notions which had managed to make their way back into the upper echelons of the department. He began by keenly reminding his superiors that these ideas directly contradicted government policy and if details of the discussions ever leaked, it would be extremely damaging ‘from both the foreign policy and the domestic political points of view’. The main conclusions of his secret paper were that the political advantages of EEC membership were in line with British interests and would allow for greater influence with the United States and West Germany, who were now ‘the countries most capable of affecting our interests’. Whilst Robinson conceded that the economic organisation of the EEC was not ideal, he reaffirmed the argument that Britain had missed its chance to influence the creation of the Common Market and that the best course of action was to join and influence it from within. The only possible instance in which Britain should consider an alternative framework, Robinson wrote, was if the Six proposed something as a collective. In this way, there would be no suspicion or bad faith in the construction of a new organisation for European cooperation. This was the very danger presented by de Gaulle’s proposals, and something which had been overlooked by Greenhill and Chalfont. Moreover, the likelihood of the Six abandoning the EEC completely was perceived as miniscule: ‘It is not realistic in the foreseeable future to suppose that alternatives will be available to us of a kind which involve the dissolution of the European Communities.’ Robinson’s dismissal of Greenhill and Chalfont’s ideas was successful and both of them agreed that ‘this exercise should be put to one side for the moment.’ De Gaulle’s resignation also went some way in quelling the anti-EEC elements of the Foreign Office. The Europeanist officials had been vindicated in their handling of the Soames affair and the General’s departure removed the most significant obstacle to British entry. Slowly but surely, they were edging closer towards their goal.

In the immediate aftermath of de Gaulle’s resignation, the Foreign Office were extremely cautious. Greenhill ordered that the News Department volunteer ‘no comment’ on the

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1191 Ibid.
1192 Ibid.
1193 Ibid.
1194 Ibid.
1195 Thomas Brimelow to Arthur Snelling, 14 May 1969, TNA/FCO30/421/MWK4/14/16.
matter at the next press conference.\footnote{Denis Greenhill to Michael Stewart, “De Gaulle”, 28 April 1969, TNA/FCO30/445/MWK4/312/1/47.} They monitored the presidential election campaign for the General’s replacement closely, with regular reports from the Paris embassy. Georges Pompidou, the former French Prime Minister, had been positioning himself as de Gaulle’s natural successor for months by declaring his intention to run in various interviews and speeches.\footnote{Knapp, \textit{Gaullism Since De Gaulle} (1994), 18.} He had enjoyed great popularity since his handling of the May 1968 crisis and was seen as the architect of the Gaullists’ victory in the legislative elections of June 1968.\footnote{Serge Berstein and Jean-Pierre Rioux, \textit{The Cambridge History of Modern France: The Pompidou Years, 1969-1974} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 5.} Pompidou was the favourite to win, and the divisions amongst the political left in France seemed to confirm this.\footnote{Ibid.} John Galsworthy,\footnote{John Galsworthy to John Robinson, 4 June 1969, TNA/FCO30/445/MWK4/312/1/76.} Economic Counsellor at the embassy, informed Robinson that he had spoken with the Head of the EEC affairs department in the Quai d’Orsay who had stated on the issue of British membership that ‘some sort of opening’ towards Britain was ‘a virtual certainty’.\footnote{Ibid.} The French official argued that on the assumption that Pompidou won the election, the French government would be unable to resist ‘pressure from the Five’ for enlargement.\footnote{Ibid.} However, the French government and civil service were still very much Gaullist strongholds. Indeed, Galsworthy made clear that ‘there is undoubtedly a substantial body of opinion in the Quai which believes that there is an element of bluff in our public posture and less British enthusiasm for Europe than we pretend.’\footnote{Knapp, \textit{Gaullism Since De Gaulle} (1994), 355.} As Knapp has argued, Pompidou’s approach to Europe was ‘inspired more by practical policy concerns than by transcendent faith in an ideal.’\footnote{Ibid.} The leading candidate may not have had the same personal animosity towards Britain as de Gaulle, but he would not welcome them with open arms if it threatened French interests. Further reports from Paris seemed to confirm this. Leslie Fielding,\footnote{Fielding was very much in favour of Britain joining the EEC, but despised the approach taken by the likes of O’Neill and Robinson, calling the former ‘aloof and cold’ and the latter ‘devious and pig-headed’: Leslie Fielding, interviewed by Thomas Raineau, 24 April 2012, CCC/BDOHP/139/9.} a First Secretary in the embassy, compiled a report on Pompidou’s comments to the press on British membership of the EEC. During the election campaign, Pompidou argued that he could see Britain ‘purely and simply entering the Common Market and accepting its...
rules. This was a remarkably straightforward statement in comparison to the numerous difficulties and complications conjured up by de Gaulle. Pompidou also declared his personal support for enlargement and made clear that it ‘would not be honest to confine oneself to emphasising the obstacles in the way of enlarging the Community’, placing emphasis on both France and its partners reaching an agreement on the matter. This was effectively a direct criticism of de Gaulle’s approach to the issue of enlargement and his dictatorial style within the EEC. The Foreign Secretary was encouraged by these statements, commenting that ‘the element of irrational prejudice’ which characterised de Gaulle’s style of diplomacy would disappear, but also added in a letter to the Prime Minister that they could not expect ‘rapid or radical’ changes to French foreign policy. However, there was a feeling that Anglo-French relations would be given a fresh start, and that the veto which had blocked Britain’s path to the EEC would be lifted.

Pompidou won the second round of the election comfortably and was duly elected President of France on 15 June 1969. His first few months were largely preoccupied with the formation of a government and internal affairs, but the new President’s stance on foreign affairs, particularly Europe, was being meticulously scrutinised by the Foreign Office. Michael Palliser, who had moved from his position as Wilson’s private secretary for foreign affairs to serve as Soames’ deputy in the Paris embassy, relayed an account of a conversation between the Italian ambassador and the new French Foreign Minister, Maurice Schumann. Schumann stated that he and Pompidou were both agreed that a new attitude would govern their approach to the question of British entry: ‘such that no-one could justifiably lay on France the blame for obstructing the negotiations.’ By this, he meant that the Five had not yet been honest about the difficulties and problems which British membership of the EEC could bring. However, Schumann was much more positive in his attitude towards perceptions of British international relations. He stated that talk of the ‘Anglo-Saxons’ and Britain’s unwillingness to distance herself from the United States were ‘quite out of date’ and that he was convinced that Britain ‘regarded her future as linked with Europe’. Palliser argued to his London colleagues that they could ‘draw a
reasonable amount of encouragement’ from Schumann’s remarks, but there were still some areas of uncertainty and ambiguity.1214 A more concrete brief was sent by the head of the chancery to London in late August, giving a full assessment of the new government’s position.1215 The main conclusion was that there had been ‘a fundamental and favourable shift in the French attitude since the departure of General de Gaulle.’1216 In addition, the embassy confirmed that France would no longer exercise a veto on opening negotiations with Britain, and that they saw ‘longer term political benefit from our membership’.1217 More broadly, there was a great deal of goodwill towards Britain and the enlarging of the EEC in general amongst French journalists, politicians, pressure groups and the public.1218 The report also made clear, however, that Britain would be ‘in for a difficult period of bargaining with a tough-minded French government’.1219 Despite anxieties about German hegemony and assertiveness, the French were not prepared to make concessions on the Common Agricultural Policy or the EEC budget, and given the recent devaluation of the franc and internal economic uncertainty, they would be wary of any potential disruption which British accession might cause.1220 In short, Britain’s place in the EEC was by no means guaranteed. The Foreign Office’s plans for membership of the EEC were far from completion.

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1214 Ibid.
1216 Ibid.
1217 Ibid.
1218 Ibid.
1219 Ibid.
1220 Ibid.
Third Time Lucky? Launching the Application

The latter part of 1969 saw the government and Whitehall manoeuvring for the reopening of negotiations with the Six. On 1 September 1969, Con O’Neill returned to the Foreign Office as Deputy Under-Secretary for European integration affairs. He had been summoned back for one reason: to lead the negotiations which would take Britain into the EEC. In addition, George Thomson was appointed the minister in charge of the negotiations with the title Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. In this capacity, he was given a seat in Cabinet and was attached to the Foreign Office. There were also positive signs from the member states of the EEC. After nearly seven years of French obstruction, the Six officially agreed to open negotiations with the applicant states at a summit in The Hague in December 1969. In return for its cooperation, France demanded that the financing of the Common Agricultural Policy be settled. Whilst ending the French veto on negotiations was a great victory for the Foreign Office, the new terms of the Common Agricultural Policy effectively raised the price of Britain’s membership. However, according to Krotz and Schild, the EEC summit ‘proved to be of crucial importance for the settlement of the British accession problem.’ John Young has supported this, calling the summit ‘one of the most important in the history of the Community.’ O’Neill himself concluded that ‘the French government did in fact effectively take at this summit meeting the decision which admitted us to the Community.’

The Foreign Office wasted no time in reasserting the government’s position on EEC membership. James Adams submitted a draft paper on the political factors motivating the British application, which Robinson used ‘extensively’ for his own drafts of the introductory and concluding sections of a White Paper on the cost of membership which had been ordered by the Prime Minister. O’Neill immediately seized the opportunity to present

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1222 Ibid.
1223 Bulmer and Burch, The Europeanisation of Whitehall (2009), 72.
1224 Ibid.
1225 Ibid.
1226 Ibid.
the case for accession as favourably as possible. In correspondence with William Nield,\textsuperscript{1231} the Permanent Secretary for economic affairs in the Cabinet Office, he argued: ‘the White Paper should contain a strong – and fairly lengthy – passage about the positive achievements which we want to see in the Communities.’\textsuperscript{1232} O’Neill was worried that too much emphasis on the potential financial and economic losses of accession would put Whitehall and the government on the defensive, whereas ‘a strong positive slant’ on the ‘development of a balanced and integrated Community in the industrial field’ would galvanise public and political support.\textsuperscript{1233} However, Robinson was still required to list some of the dangers of membership in his draft. He stated that ‘it is clear that the Common Agricultural Policy will involve a substantial charge on the balance of payments’ ranging from £100 million to £1,100 million, and that the cost of accession ‘must be expected to be substantially greater than was expected in 1967.’\textsuperscript{1234} The possible rise in the cost of living index of 4-5% and in the retail price of food of 18-26% were also detailed, but Robinson made clear that these would be temporary and over a short transition period.\textsuperscript{1235} There is no doubt that these points were included on Wilson’s orders; Hugo Young has cynically argued that the Prime Minister was taking care ‘not to cut off all escape routes’ from the EEC, but according to Wilson’s memoirs, he was genuinely concerned with providing an ‘independent and objective’ view ‘entirely free...from ministerial interference.’\textsuperscript{1236} Indeed, the drafts for the White Paper were prepared under the chairmanship of the Cabinet Office and included consultations from the Foreign Office, the Treasury, the Board of Trade, the Ministry of Technology and the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food.

The focus on the possible economic consequences of membership clearly irritated the Foreign Office, with Robinson complaining that the White Paper had ‘deliberately chosen the opponent’s ground’, avoided making the key political arguments and did not ‘calculate the cost of not joining’.\textsuperscript{1237} He railed against the need to provide estimates for the cost of

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\textsuperscript{1231} Nield’s role in British accession to the EEC was fundamental. He chaired the Approach to Europe official committee which coordinated European policy across Whitehall. Nield reportedly had ‘passionate views about...the need for Britain to join the European Community.’ Arthur Green, “Nield, Sir William Alan (1913-1994) in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 2004, accessed 10 October 2017 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/55167]


\textsuperscript{1233} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{1235} Ibid.


membership, arguing that they had not been provided in 1967, which would lead to critics demanding to know why the government had not disclosed such information before. Robinson also argued that there were too many variables to accurately predict the cost of accession, and that such predictions did not take into account any potential benefits. The pro-European elements in the Foreign Office were particularly sensitive about how the White Paper would be perceived by the public and the press. Robinson even suggested there would be a need to ‘cushion’ the effects of its publication. Indeed, the Foreign Office had created ECIU in November 1969 to ‘coordinate the home information effort on European affairs’ and to ‘counter the propaganda of the “anti-marketeers”’. He agreed that the title should be ‘Britain and the Common Market: An Economic Assessment’ as opposed to the more negative ‘Britain and the Common Market: An Assessment of Cost’, which had been proposed as an alternative by officials. The Cabinet did in fact opt for the former over the latter. Robinson also feared that the Six could interpret the White Paper as an attempt by the government to lay the political groundwork for the abandonment of its policy on membership of the EEC by deeming the risks and costs too great. However, reports on the European press’ reaction to the White Paper after its publication in February 1970 from the ECIU suggested that commentary was ‘on the whole balanced’ and ‘generally fair to Britain’. French and German newspapers reported on the document from a variety of angles; L’Aurore argued that the cost of membership would be offset by the long term benefits to British finance and commerce, whereas Le Monde offered a very sympathetic picture of Wilson’s stance, arguing that he had demonstrated his commitment to the political and economic arguments in favour of membership and that the government would enter negotiations ‘from a position of strength’. The German Frankfurter Allgemeine argued that Wilson had shown his desire for Britain to play a ‘political role’ in Europe and that the cost of accession would be dwarfed by enormous

1238 Ibid.
1239 Ibid.
1240 Ibid.
1244 Ibid.
1246 Ibid.
advantages in the industrial and technological sectors.\textsuperscript{1247} \textit{Le Figaro} and the \textit{Münchner Merkur} adopted more sceptical positions, stating that the White Paper would provide anti-EEC groups with ammunition against the case for entry and suggested that it was hard to believe in Wilson’s supposed enthusiasm for membership.\textsuperscript{1248} Despite these criticisms, the Foreign Office was satisfied with the amount of wide factual coverage and ‘considerable interest’ which the White Paper received.\textsuperscript{1249}

The paper was debated in the House of Commons on 24–25 February, but no vote was held.\textsuperscript{1250} Reactions from the British press suggest that the government was given a balanced reception. The tone of articles in \textit{The Times} betray an element of suspicion for Wilson’s motives, with them leading with Conservative Reginald Maudling’s words on 25 February that the Prime Minister was ‘trying to cash in on the public mood against entry into Europe.’\textsuperscript{1251} However, they were also quick to highlight Britain’s economic durability in the face of the potential shocks to trade and retail prices.\textsuperscript{1252} The reignition of the European debate in British politics and the publication of the White Paper gave the Foreign Office an ideal starting point for preparing for the negotiations. Con O’Neill wrote to William Armstrong in the Cabinet Office, detailing his initial selections for the negotiating delegation.\textsuperscript{1253} He recommended that the Permanent Mission in Brussels prioritise the negotiations in its everyday operations, and that James Marjoribanks and Kenneth Christofas – the head and deputy head of the Mission – be nominally attached to the delegation.\textsuperscript{1254} O’Neill also immediately nominated Robinson as his number two who would commute with him from London to Brussels for the negotiations.\textsuperscript{1255} The other senior members of the delegation were officially named in April 1970: O’Neill was appointed lead official, with Roy Denman from the Board of Trade, Freddie Kearns from the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Patrick Shovelton from the Ministry of Technology, and Raymond Bell from the Treasury.\textsuperscript{1256} In a meeting of the Cabinet Office EURO Committee, which was responsible for coordinating European policymaking across Whitehall, O’Neill
stated that the negotiations would probably follow a different format to that adopted during the first application.\footnote{1257} As such, the briefs which had been drafted in anticipation of negotiations in 1967 would have to be revised, particularly with regards to political unification after the settlement reached by the Six on the Common Agricultural Policy in December 1969.\footnote{1258} One particularly striking comment O’Neill made, however, concerned the new approach to be taken with regards to Commonwealth interests. He stated that unlike the 1961-3 negotiations, Britain would be ‘attempting to negotiate less on behalf of the Commonwealth’ and would not hold joint consultations with Commonwealth governments on the same scale that it did during the first application.\footnote{1259} Furthermore, he argued that the Commonwealth Liaison Committee not be used as a forum for regular consultation, and that the Commonwealth Secretariat be completely excluded from any formal negotiating role in Brussels.\footnote{1260} Even British trade with New Zealand, which was considered to be a potential sticking point for the negotiations, was downplayed by the Foreign Office. A paper submitted to the Cabinet Office’s Working Group on Europe highlighted the specific decline in New Zealand’s dairy exports to Britain, and a more general decline in the proportion of New Zealand’s total exports to Britain from 48% in 1965 to 40% in 1970.\footnote{1261} In addition, the value of British exports to the EEC exceeded that to the Commonwealth for the first time in 1970: 21.8% versus 21%.\footnote{1262} This is clear evidence of Commonwealth interests being downgraded after the amalgamation of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, both due to the decreasing importance of Commonwealth trade for British economic interests and the redefinition of Britain’s world role as a primarily European power.\footnote{1263} Indeed, O’Neill later argued that in the negotiations ‘we got more for New Zealand than was necessary and had ourselves to pay a heavy price

\footnote{1257} “Cabinet: Official Committee on the Approach to Europe”, 16 February 1970, TNA/CAB134/2826/EURO(70)2. 
\footnote{1258} Ibid. 
\footnote{1259} Ibid. 
\footnote{1260} Ibid. 
\footnote{1261} Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “Negotiating Aims on New Zealand”, 5 May 1970, TNA/CAB134/3338/WGE(70)6. 
in order to do so’. Clearly, negotiating on behalf of certain Commonwealth countries was seen as at best an inconvenience and at worst a serious hinderance to Britain’s accession to the EEC.

Briefs from Robinson to the EURO committee indicated that the Six could agree to open negotiations as early as June, but that the French were using the imminent British general election as an excuse to delay until the autumn. The Foreign Office line was to press for the opening of negotiations before July or as soon as possible thereafter. In the event, the government received an official reply from the President of the Council of Ministers on 9 June, inviting them to begin negotiations in Luxembourg on 30 June. With a general election scheduled for 18 June, the campaign ‘had necessarily led to some interruption of preparations for the opening of negotiations’ and no response was immediately issued. Furthermore, the unexpected Conservative victory in the election was an additional source of confusion. Polls had consistently put Labour ahead, but Heath’s party emerged with 330 seats and a comfortable working majority. The significance of Heath’s assumption of the premiership for Britain’s commitment to Europe has been well-documented and does not need to be repeated in full here. A committed Europhile, Heath had long made British membership of the EEC his personal ambition, and his intimate involvement in the first application under Macmillan as Lord Privy Seal and chief negotiator gave him impeccable credentials. There can be little doubt that Whitehall’s pro-Europeans welcomed the return of their old ally with enthusiasm. Denman, the Board of Trade’s Under-Secretary on the negotiating delegation said that had Wilson been re-elected, Britain ‘would have been thoroughly rebuffed and kept out of Europe for a long, long time.’ His reasons were that ‘Pompidou and Wilson got on very badly’ and that Wilson’s ‘heart was [not] really in it’, whereas Heath was a ‘genuine European’. The Foreign Office immediately began redrafting the statement to be made by the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster at the

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1266 Ibid.
1271 Ibid.
opening meeting in Luxembourg to take into account the change in government.\textsuperscript{1272} The new statement emphasised the key role Heath and the Conservatives had in earlier overtures towards Europe, quoting the then Lord Privy Seal: ‘Europe must unite or perish’.\textsuperscript{1273} These reminders of Heath’s personal campaign for European integration would presumably have struck a chord with the Six. However, the statement purposefully took a tough line on ‘fair and sound’ terms for Britain, specifically with reference to potential contributions towards the EEC budget.\textsuperscript{1274} According to \textit{The Times}, this particular point stung the French, who ‘disliked’ Barber’s comments on an issue so sensitive it could make or break the deal.\textsuperscript{1275}

After the Luxembourg meeting, the Foreign Office immediately began planning for the format of the negotiations. The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster had expressed an interest in initially focusing the entire delegation’s efforts towards securing a favourable solution on Britain’s contributions to the EEC budget, then moving on to other areas.\textsuperscript{1276} O’Neill wrote to Barber highlighting the dangers of such an approach. Namely, the Six would immediately suspect that Britain’s primary concern was simply lowering the cost of entry, which would sully the negotiations just as they began, or worse, they would insist that a settlement on EEC budget contributions become a precondition for negotiations on any other issue.\textsuperscript{1277} O’Neill instead suggested tackling several issues at once to create a sense of momentum and progress.\textsuperscript{1278} He argued that the priority for the ministerial meeting on 21 July should be the establishment of working parties for a range of issues, including the EEC budget, dairy products, sugar, the Common External Tariff, the ECSC and Euratom.\textsuperscript{1279} The working parties would be divided up amongst the Under-Secretaries on the negotiating delegation based on their areas of expertise.\textsuperscript{1280} Barber consented, labelling O’Neill’s ideas ‘a sensible allocation’.\textsuperscript{1281} However, the Ministry of Agriculture subsequently

\textsuperscript{1273} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1274} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1275} At this point, Barber was Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, before being promoted to Chancellor of the Exchequer on 20 July 1970 following the death of Iain Macleod: Elter Strafford, “Britain demands fair terms from Six as entry talks open”, \textit{The Times}, 1 July 1970, 1.
\textsuperscript{1276} He expressed this interest to O’Neill: Con O’Neill to Crispin Tickell, “Europe: Meeting with the Communities on 21 July”, 3 July 1970, TNA/FCO30/754/MWK4/6/42.
\textsuperscript{1277} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1278} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1279} Con O’Neill to Crispin Tickell, “Meeting with the Communities on 21 July”, 8 July 1970, TNA/FCO30/754/MWK4/6/16.
\textsuperscript{1280} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1281} Anthony Barber, comments on \textit{ibid}. 
lobbied against working parties on dairy and sugar, suggesting instead that the department retain separate control over New Zealand, Commonwealth sugar and British agriculture.\footnote{John Robinson to Con O’Neill and Crispin Tickell, “Europe: Meeting with the Communities on 21 July”, 9 July 1970, TNA/FCO30/754/MWK4/6/20.}

The Foreign Office strongly opposed these proposals on the grounds that a group on domestic agriculture would put pressure on Britain to voice acceptance of the Common Agricultural Policy from the outset, which would constitute a serious blunder on an issue so sensitive to the government and public.\footnote{Con O’Neill, “Working Parties to be Established on 21 July”, 20 July 1970, TNA/FCO30/754/MWK4/6/45.} At the ministerial meeting in July, the British proposals for the working groups were not immediately consented to by the Six, but there was broad agreement on which areas to tackle first with the exception of Euratom.\footnote{Peter Strafford, “Six agree on first steps towards British entry”, \textit{The Times}, 22 July 1970, 1.}

The Six agreed to parallel discussions on agriculture, the industrial customs union and the transition period, the former of which the delegation specifically broke down to milk products, pork, eggs and sugar.\footnote{“Draft of the conclusions adopted at the first ministerial meeting between the European Communities and the United Kingdom held at Brussels on 21 July 1970”, 23 July 1970, TNA/FCO30/754/MWK4/6/79.} In doing so, the British delegation were attempting to create the impression that their reservations were limited to a small number of issues as opposed to the Common Agricultural Policy as a whole. According to Robinson’s European contacts, Barber’s handling of the opening meeting ‘had been excellent and exactly the right impression of firmness and friendliness had been left.’\footnote{John Robinson to Con O’Neill and Crispin Tickell, 23 July 1970, TNA/FCO30/754/MWK4/6/80.}

The July meeting also established the format of the negotiations: there were to be two ministerial meetings every quarter and a two-day meeting of the deputies every fortnight.\footnote{O’Neill, \textit{Britain’s Entry into the European Community} (2000), 66.} The negotiations had been launched.

It is not the aim of this chapter to provide a long and exhaustive account of the negotiations, which has already been provided by O’Neill’s extremely detailed report.\footnote{See \textit{ibid}.} Instead, the remainder of this chapter will focus on Foreign Office attitudes towards the negotiations, and what measures the department took to ensure their success. In particular, the Foreign Office’s role in the reconstruction of Anglo-French relations and its implications will be explored, which proved to be the decisive factor in Britain’s accession to the EEC. In the words of Wright, given the fact that the ‘Friendly Five’ had long...
supported Britain joining the Common Market, the negotiations ‘came down to bilateral talks between the British and the French’.  

In May 1970, the Foreign Office Planning Staff, in partnership and consultation with the EID, submitted a major paper to the Permanent Under-Secretary entitled ‘Anglo-French Relations’.  

The purpose of the paper was to consider the state of Anglo-French relations, the areas of common interest and conflict, and the implications for Britain’s membership of the EEC. As argued above, the paper explicitly acknowledged in the first paragraph: ‘Its point of departure is recognition of the fact that without French agreement we shall not get into the Communities’.  

The Foreign Office knew, more than any other branch of Whitehall or government, that an Anglo-French deal was the key to accession. Therefore, the paper’s assertion that ‘the departure of General de Gaulle has led to substantial improvement in the climate of Anglo-French relations’ was extremely significant.  

The Foreign Office were confident that the French were taking ‘a more pragmatic attitude’ which had resulted in cooperation on a range of policy areas including defence, the Middle East, Africa and East-West relations. This alone boded extremely well for British prospects of joining the Common Market. However, as acknowledged by officials, there were still very real obstacles and differences between the two countries. There was still suspicion of Britain’s relationship with the United States, and in particular her staunch commitment to NATO, which France viewed as little more than another tool of American hegemony in Western Europe.  

Cultural competition and French fears that their national heritage was declining in importance also fuelled tensions; the serious drop in the use of French as a language of international diplomacy and business was viewed as a ‘major psychological obstacle’ by the Foreign Office. In addition, diverging economic interests in the fields of technology, aviation, oil and industry solidified the Anglo-French relationship as a fiercely competitive one. In light of these factors, the Foreign Office acknowledged that the negotiations were a high-risk diplomatic gamble. Failure to secure membership would lead to a ‘sharp deterioration in Anglo-French relations’ whereas

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1291 Ibid.

1292 Ibid.

1293 Ibid.

1294 Ibid.

1295 Ibid.

1296 Ibid.
success would be ‘decisive in improving Anglo-French relations’ and enlarge the ‘areas of common interest’ between the two countries. The likelihood of France accepting British accession was also stronger than it ever had been since the inception of the EEC. The resurgence of West Germany both economically with the *Wirtschaftswunder* and the strength of the Deutschmark, and diplomatically with Brandt’s *Ostpolitik* factored into French reassessments of their attitude towards enlargement, as did Pompidou’s more pragmatic attitude towards foreign policy than that of his predecessor. Despite this counting in Britain’s favour, the Foreign Office acknowledged that the price of membership on French terms would be high, and would involve substantial concessions. Provided that these could be reconciled, the paper concluded that Britain’s application was ‘likely to succeed.’

The Planning Staff’s paper was supplemented by a detailed report from Soames to Alec Douglas-Home, who took up post as Foreign Secretary after the general election. The ambassador’s thoughts reinforced the point that there was still a great deal of suspicion about Britain’s motives in France. In Soames’ words, French public and political opinion was ‘puzzled and dismayed’ by the perception that little had been done by the British government to ‘evoke real enthusiasm...for the concept of Europe’, and that instead there was a preoccupation with the cost of entry. As such, Soames described the French view of Britain’s application for membership as ‘that of a somewhat nervous passenger on the platform whose skirt has somehow got caught up in the door.’ The cautious and defensive tone of Britain’s approach had been accepted on the grounds that there had previously been no guarantee of negotiations being opened. However, Soames explained that now that negotiations had begun and the general election was out of the way, there was an expectation that the government would adopt a more optimistic tone and attempt to stoke public opinion in favour of the European project. Crucially, Soames reminded the Foreign Secretary that a greater enthusiasm for the ideological principles of European unity would have a positive effect on French attitudes towards the negotiations. The Foreign Office seem to have embraced this advice eagerly. The ECIU was given new
instructions in August 1970 from John Ford, the Assistant Under-Secretary for European integration affairs, to make ‘public opinion in the United Kingdom its first priority target.’\footnote{1306}{John Ford to Caroline Petrie, “European Communities Information Unit”, 27 August 1970, TNA/FCO26/1212/PMW2/7/1.} The ECIU were ordered to analyse anti-EEC propaganda and advise counter-measures and publicity material, collaborate with pro-EEC organisations such as the CBI and the TUC to coordinate information efforts, and develop contacts in the British press and media ‘with a view to influencing them and encouraging them to use our publicity material’; the latter being nothing short of planting propaganda.\footnote{1307}{Ibid.} Foreign Office minister Anthony Royle also used the ECIU for a public opinion campaign of ‘increasing intensity’ with the specific aim of achieving ‘favourable UK public opinion’ towards British membership of the EEC, and also ‘to achieve the maximum vote in favour of our policy in the House of Commons.’\footnote{1308}{Ibid.} Royle outlined a strategy of garnering votes from both Conservative and Labour backbenchers which can only be described as political collusion, himself admitting that he was ‘anxious that I should not do this personally as it might emerge that ministers have been colluding with the opposition’.\footnote{1309}{Ibid.} At a local level, he ordered the ECIU to work with the British Council of the European Movement to ensure that ‘a continuing stream of speakers is injected into local organisations throughout the country’ to promote the arguments for Britain’s membership of the EEC.\footnote{1310}{Ibid.} Royle also recommended that the ECIU and the Information Department arrange for a constant flow of individual letters to be sent to local and national newspapers as part of the public opinion strategy.\footnote{1311}{Ibid.} It was made clear that the Foreign Office could not be seen to be trying to influence public or political opinion, and that the operation would have to appear to be the work of independent bodies.\footnote{1312}{Ibid.} However, if public opinion was to turn in the EEC’s favour, the government and Whitehall would still reap the benefits of goodwill from the Six.

As the negotiations made ‘modest progress’ after the summer of 1970, the Secretary-General of the Quai d’Orsay, Hervé Alphand, met with the Permanent Under-Secretary in
London to discuss a range of foreign policy matters. The presence of Con O’Neill at the meeting indicated that EEC membership would be one of the topics of discussion, which the French were no doubt prepared for. O’Neill tried to probe Alphand by stressing the importance of a swift negotiation and successful application for both Britain and the Six. Greenhill added that a third failure ‘would be serious’ and effectively end all possibility of Britain joining the Common Market, as a fourth attempt would be ‘very difficult’, both politically and diplomatically. Rather cryptically, the Secretary-General replied that France had three objectives: to see the Community enlarged, to see Germany firmly linked to the EEC, and to trade with Russia. In order to try and apply pressure to the French position, Greenhill broached the subject of European defence cooperation and the possible withdrawal of American troops from Western Europe. This would mean that the Western European commitment to defence security would have to be enhanced, and Greenhill suggested that NATO could provide a good framework for such cooperation. These appeals to French anxiety seemingly had little effect. Alphand was confident that the United States’ withdrawal would not be absolute and that they would continue to maintain a serious presence in Western Europe, also rejecting any notion that France could reintegrate its military with NATO. He stated that the situation in Europe had changed dramatically since the end of the Second World War, and that the threat of nuclear retaliation from the United States was keeping the Soviet Union’s designs on Western Europe in check. Alphand’s calm and confident responses to the Foreign Office’s probes were frustrating for officials. It was noted that there were still differences over defence cooperation between the two countries, something which Britain hoped it could play to its own advantage by effectively pledging support, particularly in the nuclear field, in return for EEC membership. The French seemed to be aware of this potential quid pro quo and sought to circumvent it.

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1313 “Record of conversation between the Permanent Under-Secretary of State and the Secretary-General of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs”, 4 September 1970, TNA/FCO30/771/MWK4/312/1/139.
1314 Ibid.
1315 Ibid.
1316 Ibid.
1317 Ibid.
1318 Ibid.
1319 Ibid.
1320 Ibid.
1321 Ibid.
By November, there was clear anxiety from Foreign Office officials on the progress of the negotiations. John Ford reported to O’Neill that Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, the French finance minister, had expressed serious doubts over breaking the back of the negotiations by the summer of 1971. In addition, Ford’s own conversations with French officials in London and Paris seemed to confirm this line. Even after agreement was reached on a five year transitional period for industry and agriculture in early December, the French Permanent Representative to the EEC bluntly told his British counterpart that Britain could not afford membership. He argued that the British economy would not be able to endure the pressures of membership, and that the weakness of sterling continued to be a serious liability. This was compounded by reports from Soames on President Pompidou’s comments in the press and overall attitude towards EEC enlargement. Whilst Pompidou publicly expressed support for a successful conclusion to the negotiations, he argued that Britain would have to ‘cast completely adrift from the United States’ to become a truly European nation in the long run. It was acknowledged that France had come a long way since the days of de Gaulle’s inflexibility, but the Foreign Office were irritated that Britain’s links with the United States continued to be an easy and attractive target for the French. Soames stated that on this score he wished that Pompidou was ‘a shade less dogmatic’ and that close cooperation with the United States was not ‘inevitably...disadvantageous to the development of effective European unity.’ In the EID, Norman Statham submitted a brief for the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary on how to counter these points diplomatically and use the Anglo-American relationship to Britain’s advantage with regards to the EEC. In the Foreign Office it had not gone unnoticed that Pompidou ‘had a deep personal regard for President Nixon’, whose support for enlargement had been ‘staunch, consistent and discreet.’ Statham proposed, with O’Neill and Greenhill’s approval, that Heath raise the point of British membership with

1323 Ibid.
Nixon on his next trip to Washington, and try to get him to persuade Pompidou that Britain’s accession would be in Europe’s interests. Statham also highlighted the need to gain the United States’ understanding of Britain’s desire to pursue closer defence cooperation with the French and construct a firm ‘European pillar’ in the Western alliance. The dangers of this were clear. The British government did not want to be accused of weakening its ties to the United States and NATO in order to gain entry to the Common Market, and it certainly did not want to be accused of using the Americans to put pressure on the French.

Nixon’s attitude towards EEC enlargement seemingly supported the British line of argument. The new administration expected its Western European allies to help shoulder the burden of Soviet containment, and Nixon even wrote to Pompidou arguing in favour of a multipolar system in which the EEC would fully participate, stating ‘it was not healthy to have just two superpowers’. High-level meetings between the State Department and the Quai d’Orsay reveal that the United States did indeed try to pressure the French by arguing that ‘the natural and prudent way to organise Europe was on the foundation of the Entente Cordiale’ – a reference to the Anglo-French alliance during the First World War. In discussions with Heath, the American President had stated that Britain was the only country in Europe ‘capable of taking a world view of events’ and that she should play a leading role in European integration. The impetus for this was greater given that the United States was suffering from a widening balance of payments deficit and the consequences of the disastrous Tet Offensive in Vietnam. In short, the cost of acting as the world’s policeman was becoming too great. Furthermore, Nixon mentioned to Heath that Britain could be a strong liberalising influence on the EEC, which showed signs of becoming a protectionist economic bloc at the expense of American business. Therefore, the national interests of Britain, France and the United States were broadly aligned on British membership of the EEC. The French sought to counterbalance German power in Europe and improve their relations with the United States; the Americans wanted to decrease its military commitments in Western Europe and gain greater access to the

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Common Market; the British wished to revitalise their international influence and economy by joining the EEC. All three countries stood to benefit in some way from British accession. The significance of this coincidence cannot be underestimated. As argued previously, Pompidou would almost certainly not have entertained the idea of Britain joining the European club if it was not directly compatible with French interests.

However, by the beginning of 1971, the negotiations appeared to be at an impasse. Such was the level of consternation in the Foreign Office that Robinson drafted a minute in which he outlined the very real possibility of failure and the likely consequences. He wrote that it would become clear whether or not the negotiations would succeed within the following seven months, and that it would be in Britain’s best interests for the ‘final crunch’ session to be confined to Britain’s financial contributions to the EEC budget and imports from New Zealand. In theory, this would narrow the field of debate and help secure better terms on the most significant issues, but Robinson also warned that the French would sense advantage in keeping the debate wider to extract more concessions. Finally, he advocated the creation of contingency plans in the event that the negotiations failed. This would allow the Foreign Office to fully consider the implications of exclusion from the EEC and prepare for the worst case scenario.

Robinson’s paper was presented to Geoffrey Rippon, who replaced Barber as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster in July 1970. Rippon agreed with the majority of Robinson’s points on the negotiating strategy but was cautious about the inclusion of the contingency plans, opting for them to be prepared separately instead. After further consultation with No. 10 and the Cabinet Office, O’Neill submitted an updated paper which gave a more concrete timetable of the future phases in the negotiations. He reached the conclusion that a breakthrough on EEC finance, New Zealand trade and Commonwealth sugar had to be made by May 1971. This would allow sufficient time for any outstanding issues to be resolved, but also would ensure that Britain entered the EEC on 1 January 1973; this was

1337 Ibid.
1338 Ibid.
1339 Ibid.
1340 Ibid.
the government’s official aim and one which drove the Foreign Office’s entire breakthrough strategy.\textsuperscript{1343} Despite these preparations, the single most important factor in the negotiations could not be ignored – the attitude of the French. By March, officials had floated the idea of a meeting between Heath and Pompidou which could avoid a deadlock in the negotiations.\textsuperscript{1344} This was considered preferable to a summit conference in Brussels, which had the potential to be weighed down by procedures and public scrutiny.\textsuperscript{1345} Reports from Soames in Paris indicated that the French were ‘waiting for [Britain] to make the move’.\textsuperscript{1346} By this, he meant that a face-to-face meeting between Pompidou and Heath would be the only way to prove that the British government was serious and the only way to reach a deal with the French.\textsuperscript{1347} In order for this to be successful, however, Soames argued that it was crucial that ‘the gap between our respective positions...must have narrowed before the two leaders meet’.\textsuperscript{1348} O’Neill reinforced this line of thinking, arguing that a crisis in the May ministerial meeting of the negotiations would sour the atmosphere of a bilateral meeting, but conceded that the French were likely to pressure the British position by being purposefully obstructive anyway.\textsuperscript{1349} Indeed, Soames identified the Quai d’Orsay as the main instigators of anti-British sentiment and negative attitude towards the negotiations within the ranks of the French civil service due to certain die-hard Gaullist elements who maintained suspicions of Britain’s motives.\textsuperscript{1350} Regardless, the Anglo-French meeting was likely to be the ‘crunch’ session which would seal Britain’s fate within or without the Community, and the Foreign Office knew it.

The significance of the Heath-Pompidou summit has been explored in some detail by the literature. Hugo Young claims that it was ‘decisive in securing British entry’ to the EEC and ‘the moment that decided everything.’\textsuperscript{1351} In his memoirs, Douglas Hurd described the summit as the ‘greatest single feat of Mr Heath’s premiership.’\textsuperscript{1352}

\textsuperscript{1343} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1345} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1347} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1348} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1349} Con O’Neill to Crispin Tickell, “EEC Negotiations: Prime Minister’s Meeting on 23 April”, 22 April 1971, TNA/FCO30/1151/MWK11/312/1/17.
\textsuperscript{1351} Young, \textit{This Blessed Plot} (1998), 233-234.
\textsuperscript{1352} At the time, Hurd was Heath’s Principal Private Secretary and had not yet entered Parliament: Douglas Hurd, \textit{An End to Promises: Sketch of a Government} (London: Collins, 1979), 64.
Campbell wrote that the Prime Minister ‘performed superbly’ and formed a good rapport with the French President.\footnote{Campbell, Edward Heath (1993), 359.} O’Neill himself concluded that it was ‘by far the most significant meeting that took place in the whole course of the negotiations’.\footnote{O’Neill, Britain’s Entry into the European Community (2000), 336.} Therefore, there is broad consensus that the meeting was exceptionally important, if not fundamental to the successful outcome of the negotiations. Furthermore, this also reinforces the argument that a deal with the French was the key to British accession. The talks took place over two days on 20-21 May 1971, and were wide-ranging in scope. The Paris embassy and the Elysée were chiefly responsible for organising the meeting, which was a calculated decision. Heath was wary of what he labelled the Foreign Office’s ‘anti-French mutterings...which still dogs them’ and the Quai d’Orsay’s Gaullist prejudices were also perceived to be a potential obstacle by Michel Jobert, the Secretary-General of the Elysée Palace.\footnote{Ibid.} The Prime Minister had been briefed thoroughly by the Foreign Office and other departments, and one of the key issues which Pompidou sought clarity on was the Heath’s vision for Britain’s future world role and her commitment to the European ideal.\footnote{Christopher Soames to Denis Greenhill, “Prime Minister’s Visit to Paris”, 7 May 1971, TNA/FCO30/1154/MWK11/312/1/95.} On this score, Heath seems to have convinced his opposite number extremely effectively by expressing his desire for a looser association of states rather than a federal European project.\footnote{O’Neill, Britain’s Entry into the European Community (2000), 406; Charles Hargrove and Patrick Brogan, “‘Our views on Europe are close enough’, M Pompidou declares”, The Times, 21 May 1971, 1.} The two men also quickly came to an understanding on the role of sterling, with Heath agreeing to gradually run down overseas holdings of sterling and Pompidou providing assurances over European Monetary Union and the preservation of national monetary autonomy.\footnote{Young, Britain and European Unity (2000), 105.} Pompidou voiced his sympathy and understanding for Britain’s ties to the Commonwealth and agreed that temporary safeguards be put in place for New Zealand imports, which had been discussed at the May ministerial meeting.\footnote{Ibid.; John Robinson, “Minutes of the ministerial meeting on 11-13 May”, 4 June 1971, TNA/FCO30/1107/MWK4/1/148.} Whilst not every single issue was resolved during the summit, namely Britain’s contributions to the EEC budget, the atmosphere of trust and goodwill between the two nations represented a monumental shift in British European policy. In a highly symbolic gesture, the press conference after the summit was held in the Salon des Fêtes of the Elysée Palace, the very
same room in which de Gaulle had exercised his first rejection in 1963. Britain had, in effect, reversed the veto.

The Foreign Office’s reaction to the summit was one of celebration and optimism. There was an understanding that several issues still needed ironing out, but they had achieved a significant breakthrough. Soames’ report on the meeting between the two leaders gave a glowing account of Heath’s performance and the significance of the Foreign Office’s diplomatic victory. He quoted Pompidou as saying that ‘it would be unreasonable to think that agreement between Britain and the EEC will not be reached in June’. The French President’s statement to the press also publicly revealed a historic change in French foreign policy:

Many people believed that Great Britain was not and did not wish to become European and that Britain wanted to enter the Community only so as to destroy it or divert it from its objectives. Many people also thought that France was ready to use every pretext to place in the end a fresh veto on Britain’s entry. Well, ladies and gentlemen, you see before you tonight two men who are convinced of the contrary.

Correspondence between Statham in the EID and Soames in Paris reveals the full extent of the department’s jubilation. Statham wrote that the meeting ‘set the seal of approval at the highest level in France on the restoration of the Entente Cordiale’ and that ‘there can have been few summit meetings where the stakes were higher and the preparations more important.’ Statham personally congratulated Soames and the staff at the embassy for their part in the summit and also reiterated the Prime Minister’s praise for the Paris staff in ensuring both a smooth meeting and all their preparatory work, which was considerable. Outside British circles, reports indicated that congratulations had been passed on to Foreign Office officials by a large number of foreign diplomats based in London, who ‘universally [regarded] the Paris visit as a great success’. This was supplemented by favourable press coverage from Brussels which revealed that the Belgian

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1360 Young, This Blessed Plot (1998), 237.
1362 Ibid.
1363 Ibid.
1364 Norman Statham to Christopher Soames, 8 July 1971, TNA/FCO30/1156/MWK11/312/1/202.
1365 Ibid.
1366 Ibid.
1367 Nicholas Barrington to Peter Moon, 27 May 1971, TNA/FCO30/1155/MWK11/312/1/161.
government and European Commission gave the results of the Anglo-French talks a ‘warm welcome’ and argued that they had ‘long term implications for political unification in Europe.’ As a result of the atmosphere of goodwill forged by the summit, the next ministerial meeting of the negotiations in June saw significant progress made on a number of issues. Rippon struck a deal with the Six both on New Zealand imports and Britain’s contributions to the EEC budget. Butter exports from New Zealand were guaranteed to stay at 80% of existing quantities by Britain’s fifth year of membership; a remarkable achievement given that the French had initially proposed 50%. Britain’s financial contributions to the EEC budget in 1973 would amount to 8.92% and rise to 18.92% by 1977; a significant reduction from the 15% opening bid tabled by the European Commission. These tough concessions were a great credit to Britain’s negotiating delegation and the sheer determination of the Foreign Office and Whitehall in the pursuit of their goal. All that was left was to put the terms to Parliament.

The terms secured in June formed the basis for the government’s White Paper on Britain’s membership of the EEC, published in July 1971. The paper was designed to present the case for accession ahead of the Parliamentary vote in October. In contrast to the Labour government’s fixation on the cost of entry in the White Paper of February 1970, the Heath government’s paper laid out a bold vision for the future of British foreign policy and Western Europe, which was heavily influenced by O’Neill’s attitude towards European integration:

The choice for Britain is clear. Either we choose to enter the Community and join in building a strong Europe on the foundations which the Six have laid; or we choose to stand aside from this great enterprise and seek to maintain our interests from the narrow – and narrowing – base we have known in recent years. As a full member of the Community we would have more opportunity and strength to influence events than we could possibly have on our own: Europe with the United Kingdom in her councils would be stronger and more influential than Europe without us.

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1370 Ibid.
1371 Ibid.
1372 Ibid.
The paper also did not reserve judgement on the potential consequences of Britain’s exclusion; a point which Robinson had consistently argued when criticising previous papers and analyses. The government argued that a decision not to join the EEC would be ‘a rejection of an historic opportunity and a reversal of the whole direction of British policy under successive governments during the last decade.’\(^{1373}\) There was also a certain element of fearmongering, with the document stating that a rejection of the terms would ‘touch all aspects of our national life’ and that there would be uncertainty over Britain’s ‘future role and place in the world’.\(^{1374}\) This entirely pessimistic view of the necessity of Britain’s membership of the EEC is one which plagued British politics until the referendum of 2016 and beyond. In the 1970s, ‘project fear’ was alive and well.

The White Paper was scheduled to be debated in the House of Commons in late October. The Foreign Office immediately began drafting briefs for the Foreign Secretary and the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster with the specific aim of countering anti-EEC arguments and shaping public opinion in favour of accession.\(^{1375}\) Their work on this front was given greater impetus by the increasingly hostile attitude of the Labour party towards EEC membership, which was bitterly divided on the issue. Indeed, the Foreign Office went so far as to collaborate with pro-European Labour MPs to try and measure the likelihood of a government defeat in Parliament. The archival evidence shows that David Owen spoke regularly to Martin Morland, the Assistant Head of EID, on the party’s attitude towards the EEC and the pro-marketeers’ tactics.\(^{1376}\) Owen warned the Foreign Office that elements of the Labour party simply saw a controversial vote on EEC membership as a golden opportunity to inflict a humiliating defeat on the government.\(^{1377}\) This was confirmed by a resolution proposed for the party conference by Labour’s National Executive Committee (NEC) that they would oppose membership of the Common Market on the terms outlined by the Conservative government in the White Paper.\(^{1378}\) After the party released its own background document entitled ‘No Entry on Tory Terms’, Whitehall was incandescent. Correspondence between officials in the Cabinet Office and Foreign Office show that the claim that a Labour government ‘would have insisted on a total renegotiation of the

\(^{1373}\) Ibid.

\(^{1374}\) Ibid.


\(^{1377}\) Ibid.

\(^{1378}\) Roger Broad, Labour’s European Dilemmas: From Bevin to Blair (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), 81.
Common Agricultural Policy’ enraged the top civil servants. One official, Roy Croft, labelled it ‘an attempt to rewrite history of almost Stalinist proportions.’ The Foreign Office analysed the document rigorously and prepared briefings for ministers which could be used to repel Labour’s central criticisms, including quotes from Wilson in 1967 where he stated that the Common Agricultural Policy was not negotiable. The reaction of the European press towards Labour’s position was characterised by even greater anger and frustration than in Britain. One German journalist from Die Zeit, Dieter Buhl, personally wrote to the Foreign Secretary detailing his outrage at Labour’s anti-German and anti-European sentiments, referencing comments by Jack Jones, the General Secretary of the Transport and General Workers’ Union and member of the Labour NEC, who claimed that the Germans were pursuing a ‘silent invasion of Britain’ via EEC membership.

Likewise, the French press lambasted the Labour party and singled out Wilson for personal criticism, deriding his perceived duplicity and ‘bad faith’. When it came to the October debate in Parliament, ministers were well-prepared for anti-EEC attacks. In his speech which was revised by the EID, Douglas-Home attacked the opposition by arguing that the terms secured by the government were ‘fair and honourable’ and would have been identical to those negotiated by a Labour government. Reports on the debate in The Times showed fierce clashes between Reginald Maudling, the Deputy Conservative leader and Harold Wilson, now Leader of the Opposition. Ever the political tactician, Wilson seized upon the terms negotiated by the government as unacceptable and claimed that a Labour government would renegotiate a settlement more amenable to British interests. Maudling dismissed his claims, arguing that Labour would not have been able to secure better terms and criticised Wilson’s inconsistencies in his position on Europe. Labour’s deep splits over EEC membership were laid bare when 69 of its members voted with the

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1380 Ibid.
1383 Christopher Soames to EID, “French press comment on the Labour party’s NEC decision”, 30 July 1971, TNA/FCO30/1062/MWK2/35/12.
1386 Ibid.
1387 Ibid.
government in favour of the terms, with 20 abstentions. The motion was carried with a landslide majority of 112 votes.

With a resounding endorsement in Parliament behind him, Heath signed the treaty of accession in Brussels on 22 January 1972. The Foreign Office had fought long and hard to take Britain into the EEC and were finally victorious. This period represented the high watermark of optimism in the European project. There was a sense of relief, optimism, and professional satisfaction. For the likes of O’Neill and Robinson, they believed they had played a part in restoring Britain’s position on the continent of Europe, and in world affairs more broadly. For the more ideologically motivated officials such as Palliser and Mellon, Britain had finally joined her European partners at the altar of post-war peace, prosperity and solidarity. The Britain of the 1970s would enter a brave new world as a European nation, not an imperial or global power. There can be little doubt that Britain’s accession was a turning point for British foreign policy and domestic politics, and it can be qualified as one of the Foreign Office’s greatest achievements. The amount of energy and dynamism employed by the Foreign Office and Whitehall more broadly in adapting itself to the Common Market, undertaking the incredibly arduous and complex negotiations for membership and carrying British public opinion simultaneously was phenomenal, and ranks as one of the department’s greatest ever diplomatic victories. There can be little doubt that the Foreign Office subsequently reaped the rewards of this feat. It benefited from the lucrative new positions in Brussels as well as the opportunity to project British interests within the EEC’s institutions. In terms of political and administrative influence, the Foreign Office reached its zenith in the 1970s. It was free from the constraints of a powerful personality in No. 10 and had managed to tighten its grip on an array of domestic affairs under the guise of European policy. As Hennessy has argued, the diplomats ‘found a new place in the sun’.

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1389 Ibid.
Conclusion

The Foreign Office’s sense of optimism and achievement did not last long after the successful conclusion of the negotiations. Once inside the institutions of the EEC, doubt and frustration began to set in.\(^\text{1393}\) It became apparent that Britain could not simply push the EEC towards its own agenda or shape it effectively from within. Michael Palliser, who had been appointed British ambassador to the EEC, sent an annual review to the Foreign Secretary on Britain’s performance within the EEC during the ‘interim period’ between the signing of the treaty and formal accession on 1 January 1973. He warned: ‘we must...accept that a choice will sometimes have to be made between a specific national objective and a wider Community interest.’\(^\text{1394}\) Palliser described quite frankly the difficulties which Britain’s Permanent Representation to the EEC had encountered, particularly in areas such as agriculture and transport, where he stated that ‘the Six seemed to have forgotten that they had agreed to open the door of the Community to us’\(^\text{1395}\). The enlargement of the EEC also appeared to create new tensions between member states which had not been anticipated. No longer were the Six and the four applicant states negotiating as blocs; disagreements began to ‘cut across the boundaries of old and new.’\(^\text{1396}\) Palliser attempted to downplay the frustrations felt by the officials in Brussels, arguing that ‘we...have felt ourselves genuinely and increasingly welcome in the European Community’, and writing off any serious logjams as the cost of doing business in Europe.\(^\text{1397}\) The same attitude was adopted by John Robinson, who argued in June 1973: ‘The fact is that we shall not achieve a major advance at the end of this year on the basis of present policies. We are not even seeking it.’\(^\text{1398}\) Oliver Wright, the Deputy Under-Secretary for European economic affairs, took a similar view: ‘progress can be slow provided it is sure. Europe is a long-term business.’\(^\text{1399}\) The Foreign Office’s overall attitude was that there was a need for patience, and that EEC membership would not yield instant results. This was in stark contrast to the rest of Whitehall, where there was an expectation that Britain would be able to immediately alter the inner workings of the EEC to its own benefit. Wright argued that this

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\(^{1394}\) Ibid.

\(^{1395}\) Ibid.

\(^{1396}\) Ibid.

\(^{1397}\) Ibid.


\(^{1399}\) Oliver Wright to John Robinson, 7 June 1973, TNA/FCO30/1650/MWE11/548/5/45.
‘attitude lies at the heart of the battle which the FCO have been having in Whitehall during the past six months’. The Foreign Office recognised that Britain’s sixteen-year exclusion from the EEC meant that it had ‘fallen far behind…in the prosperity stakes’ and needed to take a greater interest in what the EEC was capable of achieving for Britain’s interests in the future.

This defence of Britain’s position in the EEC – that there was serious potential for future progress and that exclusion or withdrawal would be damaging – coloured Foreign Office attitudes for decades. It was an attitude which invited sharp criticism from the rest of Whitehall, politicians, and the press that the department had ‘gone native’ or was too pro-European. The current Permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office has stated:

...it is assumed that the Foreign Office is hopelessly, unquestioningly Europhile, whereas actually I think we’ve been…enthusiastically, energetically trying to defend British interests within Europe for the last forty years. People like David Hannay and Nigel Sheinwald and John Kerr would take on their European colleagues in order to advance the British interest; they didn’t think: ‘oh, this is for Europe, therefore we’ll go along with the consensus developed elsewhere’.

This feeds directly into the first conclusion which this thesis has drawn, and perhaps the most significant one. The attitudes of Foreign Office officials towards European integration and British membership of the EEC in the years 1957-73 were extremely diverse. Even when officials were largely in favour of joining the EEC in the mid-late 1960s, there were a number of very different motivations behind these attitudes. The binary, essentialised view that the Foreign Office was made up of ‘Europhiles’ versus ‘Eurosceptics’ is an illogical one which should be discarded. To be sure, there were a group of passionately pro-European officials who were motivated by the grand ideological vision of a united, peaceful and prosperous Europe after the horrors of the Second World War. This vision was a powerful one, particularly for the men who had served on the frontline. For them, the creation of the EEC represented a defining moment in Europe’s quest for reconciliation and solidarity, and

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1401 Ibid.
1403 Simon McDonald, interviewed by author, John Keiger and Gaynor Johnson, 2 August 2016.
Britain was dutybound to play a full part. There were also older officials who shared their view. Gladwyn Jebb and James Marjoribanks were both staunch supporters of British membership of the EEC and of the European ideal but did not share the same generational experience as their younger colleagues. However, they appear to have been exceptions. The majority of officials were not motivated by such emotional attachments. The likes of Con O’Neill, John Robinson, Paul Gore-Booth, Patrick Hancock, Patrick Reilly, Roger Jackling, Ken Gallagher and Samuel Hood looked towards Europe as an opportunity for Britain to reclaim her status as a global power. As Britain’s international standing began to wane with the Suez Crisis, de Gaulle’s first veto, the erosion of the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’, domestic economic turmoil, the diminished political and economic relevance of the Commonwealth and the East of Suez withdrawal, membership of the EEC became increasingly attractive as a means of preserving her influence and prestige.

Of course, there were officials who remained sceptical for the entirety of their careers and in later life. The Permanent Under-Secretary in 1969-73, Denis Greenhill, stated in his memoirs:

In retrospect I regret I did not take part in the war in Europe itself. I did not see with my own eyes the havoc in the ruined cities and the vast human tragedy...In later years in the Foreign Office when dealing with European questions I did not fully share the deep feelings of those who had seen these events and who sought to prevent their repetition by radical new developments in Europe.  

This statement proves that Greenhill himself was aware that the wartime experiences of many of his younger colleagues meant that they were more positively disposed towards European integration, and that his experiences gave him a different perspective. After the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, he reflected that Britain had been ‘steadily outsmarted’ and tricked into complying with the federal objectives of the EEC’s founders, revealing his enduring Euroscepticism. Christopher Steel, the ambassador to West Germany who made the misguided prediction that the EEC would ‘lead first to economic argument and before long to serious political collision...the fate of the whole enterprise will be inevitable collapse’ was also a lifelong opponent. Steel once chastised his subordinate, Roy

1406 Christopher Steel to Selwyn Lloyd, “The United Kingdom and the Western World”, 17 July 1957, TNA/FO371/130973/WU1072/228.
Denman, a member of the post-war generation of officials, for his pro-EEC leanings, labelling him ‘a bloody fool’ and dismissing the EEC as ‘continental cockalorum’. Roderick Barclay was another official who was never fully convinced by the case for British entry. As one of EFTA’s chief architects, he always believed that Britain’s place was with this looser association as opposed to the rigid structure of the EEC. Following de Gaulle’s first veto, he commented that ‘the bitter experience of 15 months and more of negotiations with the Community have left me with a subjective dislike of it’. Indeed, Barclay even turned down the post of British ambassador to the EEC in 1963, stating in his memoirs that ‘I had had enough of the Community’. These attitudes were not in step with the departmental orthodoxy by 1973, but they were very much the dominant view 10-15 years earlier. The crucial point is that while the Foreign Office eventually became broadly in favour of British membership of the EEC, different officials altered their attitudes for different reasons, whereas a handful never warmed to the idea of European integration.

This leads to the second conclusion, which is the impact of officials’ formative experiences and the factors behind the differences in attitudes towards European integration. This study has found absolutely no evidence that officials’ attitudes towards European integration were determined by their social backgrounds or educational experiences. In the years 1957-73, the Foreign Office was composed of officials from an exceptionally wide range of backgrounds. Hughes and Platt have argued that the department recruited from a broader socio-economic base in the post-war period, with an emphasis on ‘intelligence and nous [rather than] a particular and easily defined skill set’. This is a conclusion which this study strongly endorses, and the officials under discussion in this thesis reinforce this line of argument. From the old public schools, there were four Etonians, four Wykehamists, one Old Harrovian, one Old Merchant Taylor and one Old Westminster. There were also two Old Wellingtonians, which, though not classified as a public school by the Clarendon Commission, was still a highly prestigious independent school. However, these men only represent roughly half the group under study. There were four old grammar schoolboys,

two from Roman Catholic schools, one from a local county school, and one each from lesser independent schools such as Bishop’s Stortford College, Felsted, Stowe, Latymer Upper School, and Merchiston Castle School. There appears to have been no group attitude based on school affiliations. For example, Samuel Hood, Gladwyn Jebb, Paul Gore-Booth and Con O’Neill were Etonians, but their attitudes towards European integration differed markedly. As argued in chapter 1, Hood and Jebb’s views on European integration were very much at odds with one another. Hood was broadly cautious and sceptical of the case for British membership, arguing to Jebb in 1957 that ‘there can be no closer United Kingdom association with Europe...whilst the Six maintain their somewhat arrogant belief that Europe begins, if not ends, with their communities.’ Conversely, Jebb was fully immersed in the ideological and political objectives of European unity and passionately defended them at the end of his career and in later life. O’Neill was one of the Foreign Office’s leading pro-marketeers from 1963 onwards, but his attitudes were very much framed by the desire to reassert Britain’s position as a leading global power. Gore-Booth was motivated by similar reasons but seemed to be much more anxious about Britain’s perceived decline, highlighting the lack of alternatives to the EEC and the necessity of a new foreign policy strategy.

The officials’ university educations present a similarly eclectic picture. Oxford and Cambridge continued to send large numbers of graduates to the Foreign Office, but there was also a significant cohort of officials who had studied at Edinburgh, Glasgow, King’s College London, Queen Mary London, and University College London. In addition, the subjects studied by officials varied considerably. These included Greats, History, Classics, English, Modern Languages, Law, Public Administration, and Economics. This heterogeneity in officials’ university educations reflected extremely diverse attitudes towards European integration, and there is no evidence of a correlation between them, or of a network of officials based on university affiliation. This was confirmed by the current Permanent Under-Secretary, who stated: ‘I wasn’t aware whether it was Cambridge or Oxford people because very quickly you’re more aware of your working environment rather than the academic environment you’ve left’. Sir Simon McDonald instead argued that joining the

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1412 Samuel Hood to Gladwyn Jebb, 4 July 1957, TNA/FO371/130972/WU1072/222.
1416 Simon McDonald, interviewed by author, John Keiger and Gaynor Johnson, 2 August 2016.
Foreign Office itself was the key watershed moment for most officials, and that each year group had a strong identity.\textsuperscript{1417} This is a salient point. Officials seemingly had more in common with those in the same age group, or more broadly, generation. This is at the very heart of this study’s central argument. The most significant determinant of Foreign Office officials’ attitudes towards European integration was generational experience. More specifically, the psychological impact of the Second World War and the traumatic memories of a continent devastated by the most destructive conflict in history decisively shaped the attitudes of the future officials who had witnessed it on the front line as soldiers or on the home front as adolescents. The likes of Michael Palliser, Wynn Hugh-Jones, James Mellon, Curtis Keeble, and Christopher Audland were the most vehemently pro-European officials, and all of them have confirmed that their wartime experience was the single most important factor in establishing their convictions.\textsuperscript{1418} This generational attitude was not a narrow one. The majority of post-war Foreign Office recruits had seen service in the armed forces, either during the War itself or as part of their national service, and many had joined the department via the ‘reconstruction method’, which was specifically devised for young men who had had their university educations disrupted by the War.\textsuperscript{1419} The Foreign Office also became much more open to the idea of European integration as the post-war generation climbed the career ladder to more senior positions. By the year of Britain’s accession, the department possessed a highly positive attitude towards the EEC. The new Permanent Under-Secretary in 1973, Thomas Brimelow, was an ardent Europeanist, as was Palliser, his successor.\textsuperscript{1420} This post-war generation of officials formed the Europeanist vanguard within the Foreign Office and were the most influential group in driving Britain towards EEC membership. They were chiefly responsible for convincing their elder colleagues to adopt a more positive attitude towards European integration, and for eventually securing Britain’s place within the Common Market.

This study’s third main conclusion concerns when the Foreign Office developed a more positive attitude towards British membership of the EEC and the causes of this shift. This study contends that the Brussels breakdown of January 1963 was the most significant

\textsuperscript{1417} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1419} Audland, Right Place – Right Time (2004), 63.
turning point for officials’ attitudes towards European integration in this period. Prior to the first application and over the course of the negotiations in 1961-3, the departmental line had been cautious and pessimistic. Senior officials such as Samuel Hood, Christopher Steel and Patrick Hancock had advocated an associative relationship with the EEC or complete alternatives in the form of EFTA or the ‘Grand Design’. These ventures failed to garner much attention or support from the Six or the United States. When the Foreign Office began to consider an application for membership in 1960-1, the overarching attitude was largely unchanged. Correspondence between senior officials still argued in favour of a ‘halfway house’ approach which suggested that Britain join Euratom and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), but not the EEC.\footnote{1421} Anglo-American relations was still considered to be the top priority in Britain’s foreign policy strategy. Senior officials were particularly fixated on the United States’ attitude towards British European policy, and the Washington embassy was ordered to keep London informed of the administration’s views.\footnote{1422} The United States ambassador to the EEC stated they would oppose Britain only joining the ECSC and Euratom ‘by every means within their power no matter how much embarrassment was caused’.\footnote{1423} Similarly, the Under-Secretary of State in charge of European affairs, George Ball, told Heath and senior officials that the Kennedy administration refused to accept any dilution of the EEC or a wider association within EFTA.\footnote{1424} Once it became clear that the United States expected Britain to participate as a full member of the EEC and that further exclusion would result in them looking towards the Six as their principal Cold War partners, senior officials begrudgingly accepted the necessity of an application.\footnote{1425} The first application was therefore exceptionally conservative and not launched in a spirit of enthusiasm for European integration. The Foreign Office also took a rigid stance during the negotiations, with an insistence on safeguards and special arrangements for British agriculture and Commonwealth trade.\footnote{1426} It was ‘a conditional and tentative venture, creeping in a state of high suspicion towards this moment of historic

\footnote{1421} Gilbert Holliday, “United Kingdom Relationship with the European Atomic Energy Community and the European Coal and Steel Community”, 7 April 1960, TNA/FO371/150160/M611/172.  
\footnote{1422} Paul Gore-Booth to Harold Caccia, 21 January 1960, TNA/FO371/150152/M611/87.  
\footnote{1423} Arthur Tandy to Foreign Office, 30 May 1960, TNA/FO371/150161/M611/209.  
\footnote{1424} Harold Caccia to Foreign Office, “Meeting with Mr. Ball”, 30 March 1961, TNA/FO371/158162/M614/45.  
destiny, declining to make a commitment until the Europeans had shown what ground they were prepared to surrender.\textsuperscript{1427}

After the General’s first veto, the language and tone adopted by officials in their correspondence changed dramatically.\textsuperscript{1428} The humiliating failure of the first application caused a permanent psychological shift which changed Foreign Office attitudes towards European integration irreversibly. There was a realisation that Britain could not shape the EEC to fit its own interests, and that long-term exclusion from the club would be detrimental to British international influence. In the words of Con O’Neill, the department’s leading pro-marketeer in the 1960s: ‘the possible political disadvantages of...staying outside the Communities are the most powerful argument for...coming in’.\textsuperscript{1429} The new orthodoxy accepted by the majority of officials was that Britain simply had no alternative means of preserving her status as a world power.\textsuperscript{1430} The Foreign Office’s reassessments of European integration policy in 1963-4 all reached the conclusion that Britain should try and influence the EEC’s future developments to make them more compatible with British interests, thereby facilitating an eventual accession to the Community.\textsuperscript{1431} Some officials such as James Marjoribanks and Curtis Keeble argued that full acceptance of the Treaty of Rome was the only way to ensure a successful accession, and that British membership was now an inevitability.\textsuperscript{1432} This was a momentous departure from the cautious and conditional approach which had been espoused before 1963. Over the course of the 1960s, officials’ anxieties over Britain’s waning power and influence heightened with events such as Rhodesia’s unilateral declaration of independence, the Anglo-American rift over Vietnam, Britain’s sluggish economic performance, and the East of Suez withdrawal. These anxieties caused the Foreign Office to place an ever-increasing trust and confidence in British membership of the EEC. Such was the level of concern that by July 1966 the Permanent Under-Secretary Paul Gore-Booth stated: ‘people should realise that there is no

\textsuperscript{1427} Hugo Young, \textit{This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair} (London: Macmillan, 1998), 137.
\textsuperscript{1428} Foreign Office, “United Kingdom Policy Towards the European Communities”, 29 April 1963, TNA/FO371/171428/MI91/328.
\textsuperscript{1429} Con O’Neill to Curtis Keeble, 28 May 1964, TNA/FO371/177371/M1903/438.
\textsuperscript{1431} Derek Thomas, “European Economic Community: Brief for Minister of State’s Courtesy Call on M. Rey”, 23\textsuperscript{rd} April 1963, TNA/FO371/171423/M1091/321.
\textsuperscript{1432} Curtis Keeble, “The United Kingdom and Europe”, 3 April 1964, TNA/FO371/177371/M1903/3; James Marjoribanks, “Europe”, 14 May 1964, TNA/FO371/177371/M1903/43.
alternative to joining the Common Market. There is nowhere else to go’.\textsuperscript{1433} This statement was even more remarkable given Gore-Booth’s earlier attitude towards the EEC, which was that ‘the inertias in the early and mid-fifties were...too great for us to have got in on the European ground floor.’\textsuperscript{1434} After the Brussels breakdown, British membership of the EEC became the top foreign policy priority of the day, and this was reflected in Foreign Office attitudes. However, events beyond the Foreign Office’s control such as de Gaulle’s stalwart opposition to British accession and Harold Wilson’s ambiguous stance on European integration frustrated officials’ efforts to successfully pursue membership. The department continued to adapt and orientate itself towards Europe, but it was not until the end of decade that an opportunity for a successful application presented itself.

The ways in which the Foreign Office adapted and responded to the question of European integration form the basis for this study’s fourth conclusion. Over the years 1957-73, the Foreign Office became increasingly ‘Europeanised’ and underwent major internal restructuring to meet the demands of British foreign policy towards Europe, most notably through the amalgamation of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. This was a consequence of changes to Foreign Office attitudes as opposed to a cause. It was the officials who initiated the alterations to the department’s organisational structure and orientated the diplomatic service towards European integration affairs. At the start of the period, the Foreign Office had two departments which dealt with multilateral European institutions: the Western Organisations Department (WOD) and the Mutual Aid Department (MAD).\textsuperscript{1435} The former was chiefly concerned with NATO, the Council of Europe, and the Western European Union.\textsuperscript{1436} The latter had initially only focused on British policy towards the OEEC and the Marshall Plan, but soon took charge of negotiations for the creation of EFTA, EEC affairs, and economic affairs relating to NATO and the Council of Europe.\textsuperscript{1437} In 1960, the MAD was rechristened the European Economic Organisations Department (EEOD) to reflect the Foreign Office’s slow orientation towards European integration.\textsuperscript{1438} According to Curtis Keeble, the department’s name had been ‘inspired by the need for intergovernmental cooperation in the post-war years’.\textsuperscript{1439} As argued above,

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\textsuperscript{1433} Paul Gore-Booth to Con O’Neill, 14 July 1966, TNA/FO371/188343/M10810/388.
\textsuperscript{1436} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1438} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1439} Curtis Keeble, “Memoirs” (2001) CCC/BDOHP/51/34.
\end{footnotesize}
the departmental orthodoxy prior to 1963 was characterised by caution and reluctance towards the EEC, and this was evident in the Foreign Office’s choice of words. The younger, more pro-European officials disliked the name intensely. Keeble stated that the name ‘European Integration Department’ (EID) was specifically avoided at this stage due to the fears and anxieties of those ‘who feared that Britain was about to surrender sovereignty through integration into the Community.’1440 Christopher Audland was more scathing, stating that it was ‘typical of the times that our unit was called the European Economic Organisations Department, reflecting the establishment’s desire to play down in public the essentially political character of the Rome Treaties.’1441 John Robinson, who later successfully changed its name to the EID in 1968, complained: ‘It used to be called Mutual Aid, for God’s sake...That’s the way it was looked at in the fifties, a sub-branch of economics which the Foreign Office could let the Treasury and Board of Trade get on with.’1442 It is no surprise, therefore, that the Treasury-dominated Economic Steering Committee was responsible for the coordination of policy during the first application with the Foreign Office taking a more prominent role later in the period. Indeed, according to Sir Jon Cunliffe, the current Deputy Governor of the Bank of England and a long-serving Treasury official, ‘the Treasury still has somewhere a kind of inner belief that Europe is intergovernmentalism.’1443 It was the attitudes of the Foreign Office’s upper echelons which governed the structure of its internal departments, and this in turn shaped the officials’ approach to European integration policy. In the early 1960s, it was not considered a top priority.

It was after de Gaulle’s first veto that more significant changes were made to the Foreign Office’s internal structure. These changes reflected a more cohesive approach to European integration affairs, as argued in chapter 3. The UK Delegation to the EEC in Brussels was strengthened, and in 1964 had ten staff ranked at Third Secretary and above.1444 By 1970, this number had risen to fifteen, and then rose exponentially to thirty officials by 1972.1445 Similarly, the EEOD underwent expansion after the Brussels breakdown. In 1963, the

1440 Ibid.
1442 Young, This Blessed Plot (1998), 199.
1443 Jon Cunliffe, interviewed by author, John Keiger and Gaynor Johnson, 2 September 2016.
department was given an additional Assistant Head and an increased number of desk officers ranked at First Secretary and below, including Derek Thomas, Robin O’Neill, Stephen Barrett and John Rich.\textsuperscript{1446} Having been renamed the EID in 1968 by John Robinson, the department’s work continued to grow until it became so large that it was split into two separate departments, simply labelled EID (1) and EID (2).\textsuperscript{1447} The presence of two powerful departments dealing with EEC affairs within the Foreign Office continued well into the 1980s, with the current Permanent Under-Secretary recalling that ‘we had something called ECDE and ECDI, which was European Community Department Internal and European Community Department External.’\textsuperscript{1448} This precedent had been set after Foreign Office officials accepted the necessity of British membership of the EEC and designated it as the most important foreign policy issue of the day, and the most significant component in the administrative structure of the Foreign Office.

However, the most far-reaching act in the department’s reorientation was the amalgamation of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in 1968. As demonstrated in chapter 4, the merger was only partly driven by financial considerations and was primarily a result of officials’ changing attitudes towards Britain’s world role and European integration. There was a broad consensus among officials that the amalgamation be used as an opportunity to prepare the Foreign Office for the future of British foreign policy, which was principally geared towards obtaining EEC membership. Bryan Cartledge, a First Secretary in the Personnel Department, argued: ‘The primacy which has been accorded to Europe in our external relations can be assumed to be permanent. Europe is now the focus of the United Kingdom’s economic and defence policies.’\textsuperscript{1449} At this point in the period under study, Cartledge’s views were very much in step with the departmental orthodoxy. This attitude was, by the admission of senior officials, ‘a fairly general one’ as far as the post-war generation was concerned.\textsuperscript{1450} Simultaneously, the Foreign Office was severely overstaffed by the mid-late 1960s and this had resulted in a ‘serious promotion blockage’, preventing most officials from reaching grade 4 and above.\textsuperscript{1451} This blockage could only be allayed by either an increase in postings or a large number of redundancies. Unsurprisingly, most of

\textsuperscript{1446} “United Kingdom Policy Towards the European Communities”, 29 April 1963, TNA/FO371/171428/M1091/328; Curtis Keeble, “Memoirs” (2001) CCC/BDI/SP/51/34.
\textsuperscript{1448} Simon McDonald, interviewed by author, John Keiger and Gaynor Johnson, 2 August 2016.
\textsuperscript{1450} Mark Russell to Frank Mills and John Duncan, 25 January 1968, TNA/FCO79/49/DSP22/6/4.
\textsuperscript{1451} Colin Crowe, “Promotion and Pay in the Diplomatic Service”, 21 June 1967, TNA/FCO79/40/DSP22/1/12.
the middle-ranking officials who were affected opted for the former, arguing that British accession to the EEC would create a strong demand for jobs in European integration policy and economic affairs. Indeed, this very point had been made by the then Permanent Under-Secretary, Paul Gore-Booth. Individuals such as John Ford, Bryan Cartledge, Marrack Goulding, Christopher Everett, Norman Statham, John Robinson and Ken Gallagher all lobbied intensively for increased staff in Western European embassies and Foreign Office departments in London concerned with European economic affairs. These men were all members of the post-war generation and were strongly in favour of British membership of the EEC. The fact that these deeply-held views coincided perfectly with a solution to the overstaffing of the department was extremely appealing to the officials.

This study has demonstrated that the efforts of the ‘Europeanist’ officials were successful, and that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office was restructured with a greater focus on European and economic affairs. In 1968, the Foreign Office began running the commercial training programmes which had previously been the demesne of the Board of Trade in a bid to bolster the diplomatic service’s economic expertise. The EID inherited responsibility for all Commonwealth affairs relating to British accession to the EEC and the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement, which has previously been held by the Western Economic Department and Common Market Department in the Commonwealth Office. The Economic Relations Department was created, and the remaining functions of the Commonwealth Office were redistributed which resulted in the Commonwealth being permanently downgraded in importance. As a direct result, the Commonwealth became a far lesser obstacle to British membership of the EEC in the negotiations. This was demonstrated in chapter 4, when Con O’Neill argued that the government would be

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‘attempting to negotiate less on behalf of the Commonwealth’ and consultations with the Commonwealth governments would be severely reduced from the number held during the first application. In the minds of Foreign Office officials, the Commonwealth had outlived its usefulness as a viable political partnership and a source of economic regeneration. Europe was now the top priority, and the cuts to Commonwealth posts in London and abroad confirmed this.

However, it must be emphasised that the amalgamation and the reduction in Commonwealth affairs staff did not yield financial savings, which has hitherto been the overarching assumption. The total cost of British overseas services in 1968-9 was valued at £105.8 million by the Duncan Report. By 1971, this had risen to £129.4 million, and the Heath government’s spending reviews projected budget increases to £131 million by 1974-5. It was also not in officials’ interests to reduce the size or budget of the diplomatic service. Terence O’Brien, the Head of the Economic Relations Department, argued that the results of the amalgamation would be fundamental to the Foreign Office’s future influence within Whitehall, and that cutting the number of sub-departments or staff would be ‘tragic’.

The Chief Clerk during the merger, Colin Crowe, specifically advocated a Foreign and Commonwealth Office with roughly the same number of staff as its two predecessors, and proposed minimal cuts to the number of Deputy and Assistant Under-Secretaries in the combined Office. The amalgamation was also the first time in history when a single department had been in charge of all of Britain’s external affairs. This reflected the Foreign Office’s increasingly central role in the British civil service, and the department assumed a range of functions in trade and economics which had previously been dominated by the Treasury. The Foreign Office’s strengthened influence was a consequence of officials’ changing attitudes towards European integration. Once officials became convinced that the future of Britain’s international power hinged on membership of the EEC, there was a

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1461 Only 4 of 32 Deputy and Assistant Under-Secretaries were cut after the amalgamation: Colin Crowe to Patrick Dean, 17 May 1968, Sir Paul Gore-Booth’s Private Office Papers, TNA/FCO73/104.
concerted effort to adapt the service to the machinations of the Common Market and European affairs more generally.

The years 1957-73 represented some of the most momentous changes to Foreign Office attitudes and the department’s structure in history. These changes were driven by external events and the arrival of a new generation of recruits with markedly different views from their predecessors. Shaken by the Suez Crisis and increasing marginalisation on the global stage, officials began to embrace more radical thinking on the exact nature of Britain’s world role, a fact which had been largely unchallenged for the best part of a century. The consensus which emerged in the 1960s was that the very future of Britain’s international influence lay with membership of the EEC. However, this consensus had been reached after a long period of caution, scepticism, and fierce debate between officials. For the senior officials, there was simply no alternative to the EEC. For the younger, more radical officials, the EEC was and always had been Britain’s salvation since its inception. There was also an element of self-interest. It is no coincidence that the Foreign Office reached its zenith after accession in the 1970s, having claimed ownership of all external affairs and an array of domestic policies. Brussels became a new centre of power for the officials, and a destination for the most ambitious diplomats.

Despite successfully redefining Britain’s world role and carrying the nation into Europe, the relationship which followed was a largely awkward and reluctant one with an institution which had initially been seen as Britain’s saviour from decay and decline. As the EEC widened and deepened over the years, the suspicions harboured by sections of the British political class, press, and public would result in a complete rejection of the arguments which had been presented and accepted in the 1970s. True to the attitudes and opinions of the post-war generation, many of the Foreign Office’s mandarins did not support the result of the 2016 referendum. Since then, the Foreign Office has seen its influence dwindle further with the creation of the Department for Exiting the European Union and the Department for International Trade. It has been constantly besieged by critics as a bastion of Europhilia and incapable of acting in the national interest. As the government

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1463 Jake Wallis Simons, “‘The Sir Humphreys will derail Brexit’: Leave camp launches stinging attack on Foreign Office warning ‘pro-EU fanatics’ will not fight for Britain”, Daily Mail, 2 July 2016;
attempts to redefine Britain’s world role as a global trading nation, the diplomats have once again found themselves embroiled in a crisis of identity and attitude. The Foreign Office was, and remains, haunted by the ghost of Europe.

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