For the good of the game(?): The legacy of the Football Trust, the Football Pools & the dangerous seduction of political promise

Abstract

During the late twentieth century, the United Kingdom’s football infrastructure and spectatorship underwent transformation as successive stadia disasters heightened political and public scrutiny of the game and prompted industry change. Central to this process was the government’s formation of an independent charitable organisation to oversee subsequent policy implementation and grant-aid provision to clubs for safety, crowd and spectator requirements. This entity, which began in 1975 focusing on ground improvement, developed into the Football Trust. The Trust was funded directly by the football pools companies who ran popular low-stakes football betting enterprises. Working in association with the Pools Promoters Association [PPA], and demonstrating their social responsibility toward the games’ constituents, the pools resourced a wide array of Trust activities. Yet, irrespective of government mandate, the PPA and Trust were continually confronted by political and economic obstacles that threatened the effectiveness of their arrangements. In this paper I investigate the history of the Football Trust, its partnership with the PPA, and, relationship with the government within the context of broader political shifts, stadia catastrophes, official inquiries and commercial threats. I contend that while the Trust/PPA partnership had a respectable legacy, their history afforded little protection against adverse contemporary conditions.

Key words

The Football Trust, Pools Promoters Association, Taylor Report, stadia disasters, government
Introduction

Since its inception in 1975 the Football Trust was the lead protagonist in providing charitable assistance to the United Kingdom’s (UK) football clubs. Aided by financial benefactions from the nation’s football pools companies, the Trust developed a successful track record as an agent of change. The existence of the Trust also demonstrated how the popularity football (as evinced through pools patronage) and the commercial enterprises of the pools companies (represented by the Pools Promoters Association [PPA]) could be utilised for the betterment of the game and its constituents. Providing aid following stadia disasters in the 1980s further consolidated the organisation’s reputation. In 1989/1990 the Trust’s abilities were tested again with the Hillsborough stadium tragedy and the subsequent release of Lord Justice Peter Taylor’s inquiry (detailed shortly). The events were a definitive moment for the UK’s football industry, yet, for the Trust they also demarcated the start of a new historical chapter. A key element of this was the redevelopment of the antecedent Football Trust and its partner organisation, the Football Grounds Improvement Trust (FGIT), to more effectively oversee implementation of Lord Taylor’s reforms (colloquially known as ‘Taylor work’).

The Trust’s reformation also coincided with a moment of distinct political change; namely the exit of Margaret Thatcher and entrance of John Major as head of the Conservative government. Throughout the 1980s the Trust had operated within the context of Thatcher’s administration which, while generally supportive of the Trust’s work, was critical of the degradation of football and its spectatorship culture, and, unsympathetic to the PPA’s calls for taxation relief to support its charitable donations. The Trust relied on contributions secured from the pools industry. The viability of this arrangement was contingent on the pools industry protecting their businesses from competition and any threats to income generation. As such, during the 1980s the PPA lobbied the government to protect the pools industry. Foremost of their concerns was securing tax deduction (specifically via a reduction in pool betting duty [RPBD] that currently stood at 42.5%), and, preventing the imposition of a national lottery scheme. The former directly carved into the
pools companies’ profit margins and their ability to provide the Trust with sufficient funds for football work, while the latter presented a formidable counter enterprise that drastically reduced pools income.

The trio of incidents in the late 1980s at Bradford, Heysel and Hillsborough helped the Trust’s legitimacy by demonstrating their commitment to improving football’s infrastructure and spectatorship; however, struggles with the government persisted. RPBD lobbying continued, for example and the introduction of the National Lottery went ahead in 1994. Promises, hope and potential salvation came in May 1997 in the form of Tony Blair’s new Labour government that, amongst other agendas, heralded new socially transformative policies (including favourable approaches to the nation’s sport culture, patronage, and development). Invariably, Blair’s government represented an optimistic boost to the morale and future of the Trust and the PPA. However, while the organisations’ members may have felt an improvement in their relationship with the government was forthcoming, political assurances about their future could not be guaranteed. Nor, for that matter, could its members foresee that the eventual outcome would be transformation of the Trust, dismay among its members, changes to the partnership between the Trust and the PPA, the rise of the national lottery and the pools industry’s slow demise.

The relationship between the Football Trust, PPA and government during the 1990s is, thus, significant in highlighting the extent to which those working for ‘the good of game’ went to protect their efforts and investments. Moreover, with regards to the PPA, the period of turbulence experienced circa.1990-1997 is also demonstrative of the ways in which corporate stakeholders (in this case, pools companies) not only tried to protect their income generation, but also, endeavoured to maintain their capacity to fulfil philanthropic obligations and commitment to socially responsible enterprises. It is this period of activity that this paper takes as its focal point. While previous scholarship has focused on changes to UK’s football culture and spectatorship during the 1980s, and, how the football fraternity responded to the stadia disasters and governmental criticism of the sport during the era, the roles of the PPA and Trust at this historical juncture have not received significant attention. The paper also contributes to an emergent interest in analysing the political influences on sport trusts and the associated role of football supporter trusts. The paper adds to these assessments in particular by underscoring the complex intersections between
central government, prevailing economic conditions, and political agendas within the charitable and professional football sectors.

In what follows I examine the legacy of the Football Trust, its renovation in 1990, and, the development of its relationship with the government in the post-Hillsborough era. I also consider the roles the PPA played in this process; in particular by attempting to preserve their financial support to the Trust through lobbying for RPBD and holding the government to account for the consequences of the National Lottery. I then discuss the spirit of optimism and opportunities afforded to the PPA and Trust by the commencement of the Labour government in 1997, and, the results this had for continued operations. I argue that while the PPA and Trust enjoyed a respectable reputation being at the forefront of profound industry change, any historical capital this may have garnered offered a weak defence against being blindsided by a set of contemporary circumstances in the political present (e.g. largely unforeseen or unrealised commercial threats, government redirections, or personal conflicts). To underscore its social and political value to the football industry, and the UK’s sport culture writ large, I begin by outlining a history of the Trust.

**The genesis of the Trust and reinvigoration in tragedy**

The Football Trust began, primarily, in response to the combined forces of the Ibrox stadium disaster in 1971, the consequent Wheatley Report in 1972 and the government’s introduction of the Safety of Sports Ground Act in 1975. On the 2\textsuperscript{nd} of January 1971 a fatal crush incident occurred in a stairwell at Rangers’ home ground of Ibrox stadium, Glasgow, during a match with rivals Celtic. The event led to the deaths of 66 people and injury to over 200 others.\textsuperscript{7} Fatal incidents at football grounds had occurred previously;\textsuperscript{8} however, the significant scale of the event on this occasion prompted clearer political action on stadia conditions and spectator safety. The government followed with an inquiry chaired by Sir Norman Wheatley to examine existing stadia safety arrangements and improvements in the context of current law or potential legislative changes.\textsuperscript{9} Among its various recommendations across infrastructure, safety, policing and administration, the Wheatley Report encouraged the adoption of a rigorous stadia licensing system for all UK football clubs. The initiative would not only ensure a tighter safety compliance regime among the sport’s clubs, but also,
provide a legally binding set of quality standards for stadia and reassurance for club patrons. To this end, in 1972 the Conservative government tabled the Safety of Sports Ground (SSG) bill. Given the range of stakeholders involved in the game (e.g. the government, Football Association [FA], Football League [FL], club owners, local authorities, football patrons, businesses and the PPA), and the concomitant issue of determining where the onus of responsibility for change lay, there was considerable debate over the appropriate funding mechanism. The indecision delayed the bill’s introduction until 1974 when the Labour government resumed office and sports minister Denis Howell expedited its ratification.

Central to the implementation of the Act was formation of an independent and official body, the Football Grounds Improvement Trust, resourced using funds (approximately £8 million per annum) redirected from the football pools’ popular ‘Spot-The-Ball’ (STB) competition.

The Trust’s remit was to operate an extensive grant-aid system to support clubs in their efforts to comply with the SSGA 1975; with particular emphasis on countering anti-social behaviour, and, facility and ground improvements. In addition, the Trust was also empowered to support relevant projects at the community and club levels. With the PPA providing the financial foundations, the FGIT began a vigorous campaign, initially within football’s first and second divisions, to rejuvenate the UK’s football landscape and bring about shifts in spectator attitudes and behaviour. The establishment of the Trust signified the government’s most concerted effort up until that point to attend to the needs of the game and its constituents. Its formation was also an additional acknowledgement that although the morality of the gambling industry had been historically criticised, the pools could be utilised to affect good causes for the game.

In 1979, and in partial response to government’s Royal Commission on Gambling, the PPA and the FGIT came under further discussion. Critical of the links between the profitability of gambling, taxation levels and commitments of the industry to social responsibility, the report noted the work of the FGIT as a good example of how betting revenue could be appropriately invested. The report was praiseworthy of the FGIT, yet it belied the fact that since its inception the PPA had ardently lobbied the government for tax reductions that would better enable the Pools businesses to support philanthropic enterprises. Consequently, following further government discussions, the Trust’s scope was
extended and the funding arrangements altered. Foremost of the changes was the separation of the FGIT work from the Trust’s other football-related social work, community development and research projects. While the FGIT was still responsible for overseeing stadia and ground infrastructure and safety work at the upper levels of the game, a separate overarching entity, the Football Trust, would provide and extend grant-aid throughout the football strata. The broadened scale of activities were funded by a marginal increase in the Pools donations to the Trust (essentially, now 21% of STB turnover) which amounted to a revised total income for the Football Trusts of approximately £4million per year. The new arrangement made it easier for the Trusts to facilitate a much wider schedule of activities across the UK. Though, with 40,000 football clubs around the UK all in various states of structural and financial need the Trust’s resources were stretched. The PPA tried to ensure favourable economic conditions for pools companies that would, in turn, enable their continued Trust contributions, however, in 1979 they were confronted by a political shift with the onset of Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government. While noting the work of the Trusts, the Conservative party were unable to entertain the PPA’s calls for reductions in the betting duty (which in 1979 remained at 42.5%). The fiscal conditions set by the government may have provided a challenge, yet it did not distract the Trust or PPA from their football obligations.

The 1980s, the return of disaster and the reassertion of legitimacy

For the first half of the 1980s the Trusts worked efficiently and effectively, redistributing pools contributions toward a range of initiatives. Grant-aid activities included, variously: funds for specific target populations (e.g., small cities, low socio-economic areas or under-resourced communities), pitch and facility upgrades and replacements, community engagement projects, non-league club work, civic and transport developments, and research support. In conjunction with the FA, for example, the Trust provided a £1.45million investment in all-weather pitches. In addition, they supported upgrades to the country’s international-class stadiums in London, Glasgow and Belfast, cooperated with local authorities to improve train station and stadia connections, and, provided approximately £6.2 million for the installation of CCTV at grounds across the UK. The Trust also upheld its commitment to the centre for football research which they had been
complicit in founding at Leicester University. All this was valuable, welcome, and in many cases vital, work. Ibrox may have provided the initial impetus for the Trust’s endeavours; but, by the mid-1980s it was evident that organisation had considerable utility beyond merely being just a funding conduit and arbiter of clubs’ safety-related needs. Over 10 years the Trusts implemented a football development scheme on a scale not previously experienced, and in so doing, evidenced their credibility and legitimacy as a key industry protagonist. As noteworthy as this transformation to the game may have been, calls for grant-aid did not abate and the Trusts’ resources remained strained. Notwithstanding the challenging economic conditions set by Conservative government, PPA and Trust members had shown resilience and fortitude. Yet, as the decade progressed they were confronted by events that tested the partnership, prompted changes to the Trusts’ structure, and, exacerbated government tussles.

The first event was the Bradford stadium fire on the 11th May 1985 that resulted in the deaths of 56 people and injury to 265. The Bradford fatality led to the establishment of an inquiry chaired by Lord Oliver Popplewell. The commission had barely begun its work when on the 29th May 38 fans died and around 400 were injured during a crush incident at the European Cup final against Italian team Juventus at Brussel’s Heysel stadium. Popplewell’s eventual reports, which took into account both disasters, detailed an extensive set of recommendations traversing fire precautions, health and safety provision, policing, crowd control, administrative responsibilities, stadia certification and compliance, anti-social behaviour prevention, and communication measures. Popplewell cited the Trusts’ support of football; however, he noted that in spite of concerted efforts to improve safety standards more still needed to be done. Moreover, financial constraints still existed at the club level (and also with the Trust) that made it difficult for the required work to be undertaken in an expedient and proficient manner.

With the recognised knowledge, record and strategic position to oversee Popplewell’s recommendations, for nearly three years the PPA and Trusts laboured to change football safety and spectator culture. Then, on April 15th 1989, the UK was struck by the third football tragedy of the decade. During a FA Cup semi-final match between Nottingham Forest and Liverpool at Sheffield Wednesbury’s Hillsborough stadium a crush occurred that resulted in the deaths of 96 people and injury to 776. Similar to the sport’s
other fatal incidents, the severity of the Hillsborough disaster reverberated throughout the UK and wider football fraternity. The government responded by establishing a Royal Commission of Inquiry chaired by Lord Justice Peter Taylor. In addition to undertaking a thorough analysis of incident, the commission also considered Hillsborough in light of the broader context of the sport. Thus in addition to detailing the mechanics of the catastrophe, Taylor was able to comment on administration and management, fan culture, alcohol, surveillance mechanisms, club leadership, finances, SSG Act 1975 and Safety of Places of Sport Act 1987 compliance, ticketing and membership, and, the community impact of the sport in general. When the final released on the January 18th 1990, the report comprised some 76 recommendations covering practical stadia and crowd concerns as well as cultural, political, economic and social factors.

The Taylor Report consolidated a series of profound concerns about the state of football; especially with regards to the game’s cultural identity and its popular image, and, its social and political contributions. Of particular importance, certainly as far as the Trusts and the PPA were involved, was that the Taylor report had underscored the vital necessity of supporting infrastructural improvement and social development work throughout all levels of the sport. To this end, Taylor complimented the FGIT and Football Trust who, he acknowledged had been instrumental in overseeing a large scale of activities (in particular, CCTV installation, improved policing, and academic research support) for the betterment of the game. Although the report presented the Trusts positively, it also highlighted that the scale of Taylor’s recommendations (particularly ensuring all clubs meet necessary compliance standards) would require substantial financing that would likely exhaust the Trusts’ healthy, but still relatively small, funds.

Having an established record as a grant-aid provider, and, a respected role in transforming the game’s physical spaces, the Trusts were Taylor’s organisation of choice. Of all the stakeholders in the game, the Trusts had the best capacity and ability to manage Taylor work. Although the Trusts accepted their involvement, adequate resourcing remained a concern. Taylor’s suggestion was for money to be obtained from within the pools industry and to a lesser extent the football authorities, which had all benefited significantly from the game already. For the PPA (whose ideas were echoed by the FA and Trusts), one of the most obvious sources remained the government reducing the pool...
betting duty. A reduction of 2.5% (from the current rate of 42.5%), the PPA argued, could provide approximately a further £16 million per year for Trust activities and Taylor work. Considering the estimated 10-year implementation period for Taylor work and the hypothesised £100 million total investment that was required, a constant and reliable income stream was clearly needed. Concomitant with funding, however, what the PPA and Trusts also required were amiable political conditions that attended to the PPA’s concerns regarding its commercial viability, and, recognised the pools companies’ sustained commitment to football philanthropy.

Post-Hillsborough, Reconsolidation and threats made manifest

Since inception the Trusts had operated successfully within the context of their respective remits of aiding ground improvement and club, community and social development projects. The foremost consequences of Hillsborough and the Taylor report, however, was a swift and substantial increase in the Trusts’ workload. Yet, the extensive nature of Taylor work and the government and industry expectations placed upon the organisations in the post-Hillsborough context, made the split Trust arrangements seem inefficient and counter-productive. Thus, shortly after the Taylor report was released, and with government backing, the work of the FGIT and Football Trust was consolidated into one entity; the Football Trust (1990). The reintegration effectively streamlined administration and financial procedures, reaffirmed solidarity with the PPA and Pools companies, provided a stronger political voice, and, better equipped the Trust in its football work and new Taylor-related imperatives.

Consolidation fortified the Trust, but, they were afforded further assistance by governmental changes that shifted (if albeit slightly) the prevailing political current. In the government’s 1990 budget, in the first instance, Chancellor John Major began by supporting a RPBBD decrease to 40% on the condition that the reduction specifically was used for Taylor work. The alteration would potentially yield a further £20 million over the next 5 years. The second turn came when Major replaced Thatcher as Prime minister in November 1990. Major’s succession precipitated a closer dialogue between the government, Trust and PPA. However, Hillsborough and Taylor-work pressures continued to place football, its
stakeholders and spectators under considerable scrutiny, and in particular, the Trust under perpetual pressure to validate its existence and utility in enabling football improvements. Although RPBD concerns may have been central to the PPA and Trust’s governmental parleys in the early 1990s, a further lingering fear began to materialise. That specific danger was the advent of a national lottery scheme.

The notion of a government-backed national lottery scheme (effectively a UK-wide, low-stakes, betting initiative to compete with the pools) had been present for a considerable time. The Government’s intention may not have necessarily been for the national lottery to specifically compete with the Trust’s activities; nonetheless, the Trust and PPA clearly saw the lottery as a competitor who had the potential to disrupt their business and the sustainability of their future activities within and beyond football. As early as 1968, for example, the PPA expressed concerns that the idea represented a threat to the pools and that efforts would be made to dissuade the government from taking this course. At the time, the PPA’s efforts worked and, on account of lacking the force of a dedicated body of protagonists such as the pools enjoyed, the national lottery concept retreated into relative dormancy. With the 1970s came government changes (as detailed above) and the fateful events at Ibrox. All of these, inadvertently or otherwise, detracted attention from the national lottery; or, at the very least, produced conditions in which the PPA’s philanthropy, and latterly the FGIT and Trust’s work, gained political credence and public acknowledgement. Toward the later part of the 1970s, however, and amidst the context of the Royal Commission on Gambling, the national lottery concept re-emerged.

By the 1980s PPA members had already noted general down-turn in pools business; largely hastened by increased payments to the FA and FL for fixture lists, rising postal prices, administrative and management obligations, and, a generally crowded and competitive gambling market place. As such, and mindful of the Royal Commission’s general endorsement of an overarching lottery scheme, the PPA moved to advance their cause. Even before the release of the commission’s formal report the PPA began lobbying the government to first halt the lottery, but if that proved unsuccessful, ensure that operation of the lottery would be placed in the PPA’s hands. Again, the association achieved a small triumph. While a lotteries council was established to oversee existing small lotteries businesses, the imposition of a national initiative failed to materialise. Integral to the
success of PPA in being able to parry criticism of the pools and fend off the National Lottery up to the latter part of the decade was leverage the Trust’s work provided in evidencing the industry’s sustained and wide-reaching commitment to social responsibility. By 1990, however, with Thatcher’s resignation, there was new political climate in which national lottery enthusiasts and the PPA could advance their causes.

For the next four years the PPA (aided significantly by Richard Faulkner, the Football Trust’s Deputy Chairman, as their parliamentary advocate and advisor) worked vigorously to destabilise the national lottery while simultaneously reaffirming the Pool’s national utility. Key to the PPA’s case was highlighting the legacy of the Trust and their current government arrangement to facilitate Taylor work. The STB funds, for example, now provided the Trust with approximately £12 million a year; £9 million of which was set aside for essential safety and improvement work at the upper levels of UK football. By 1992 the Trust had also provided £120 million in grants toward the professional game. Moreover, in just two years the Trust had committed a further approximately £53 million in major project aid covering club administration, national stadia investment, policing and surveillance, and, safety and improvement grants. In addition, the PPA could also claim their contributions to additional investments in the game (for example, the building and refurbishment of new grounds and stand, provision of family, disability and community facilities, CCTV initiatives, and in excess of £40 million allocated to non-professional football and the sports grassroots). The PPA and Trust may have still been able to fortify their case with a legacy of development work in general; however, the high profile nature of Hillsborough and the Taylor report was timely in adding substantial moral and social weight to their cause.

With such a strong history of service to the game the Trust and PPA might have been lulled into complacency. However, the National Lottery lobby persisted. By late 1991 and early 1992 the PPA were forced to fight harder and seek higher profile for the pools companies. PPA members soon found themselves in battle with a formidable opposition and the mood among the association was invariably one of great concern. “It was agreed, basically”, the association minutes reported, “that there was still a need to get the message over that the Pro National Lottery Lobbyists are still disseminating misleading ‘facts’ and information and we should pursue with vigour the policy of correction”. A further obstacle was also placed in the PPA’s ways with the release of the Government’s white paper on the
gambling and lottery industry also placed way by advocating for tighter political controls and regulations on the industry. With the paper, and irrespective of their previous praise for the Trust, the PPA also realised the Conservative government remained strongly in favour of the National lottery and had placed it high on their campaign agenda for the 1992 general election. Although the PPA and Trust persevered with their case, their best hope rested in the potential of a political change to Labour that could have quashed (or at least diminished) the extent of the National Lottery and its consequences.

Irrespective of the PPA’s concerted effort to prevent, suspend, and in the end mitigate the effects of its introduction, the Conservatives return to office in 1992 effectively made the National Lottery’s entrance a fait accompli. Although the survival of pools and subsequent ability of the Trust to do Taylor work remained in jeopardy, the partners looked upon their defeat strategically. Essentially, the organisations seized the opportunity to retain a close relationship with the government as an industry expert, and, be a constructive party within National Lottery establishment discussions. Central to the PPA’s logic, and in a seemingly last-ditch effort to protect the pools collective, was the idea that if the National Lottery progressed the Trust was best placed to manage the operation. Having been opposed to the lottery for so long this position was, invariably, met with some trepidation. “We cannot be seen to be running with the hare and chasing with the hounds”, the Trust noted, “We must be careful not to be too virulent in our opposition to the concept of a National Lottery and then at the same time be too enthusiastic over our proposal to run it”. Although the PPA and Trust continued their opposition (buoyed by a barrage of support from the wider football industry), over the course of the next two years the nature of discussions changed. In particular, when the government selected the betting outfit Camelot to run the lottery, and, the date for the first draw was set for November 24 1994, the PPA’s strategy turned away from prevention and resistance toward negotiation and mitigation. The PPA received some help in 1994 when the RPBD was set at 37.5% (largely in aid of protecting the continuation of Taylor work).

The PPA persistently lobbied the government for relief, but, to no avail. “We had hoped that by the time the lottery started its operation the terms of competition between it and pools would have been fair and level”, the PPA wrote in plea to the Department of National Heritage’s Arts and Lottery Committee, though,
We regret that that is not the case, and are mystified why the Government continues to deny the pools companies the opportunity to advertise on television and radio, given the lottery’s stated intention to spend tens of millions on these media. We remain extremely concerned therefore PPA members’ businesses may still be seriously damaged by unfair competition from the national lottery.50

As had been suspected by the PPA, the consequences of the National Lottery were swift and severe. In the first instance, income from both the RPBD and STB fell by 50%. By 1995/96 the former had been reduced by 40% and the latter 66% from their pre-lottery levels. Prior to the lottery the Trust had received approximately £22.6 million from the RPBD and a further £14 million from STB. However, due to profit falls Littlewoods (the primary pools company) was forced to reduce their standard donation rate (that had for considerable time remained at 20-21%) to 15%, and then, in late 1996 to just 10%. Littlewoods also forecast continual decline for their foreseeable future. The corollary for the Trust was that RPBD income fell by 1996 to approximately £13 million and STB funds to just £4 million per annum. By 1997/98 the predictions were for the respective contributions to fall further to £11 million and £3 million.51 Additional strain came with the government’s mandate that the Trust extend its Taylor work to clubs at all levels of the game (an exercise that expected to cost in the vicinity of £200 million for the remainder of the implementation plan to 1999/2000). Combined, the events left the trust with a projected shortfall of between £33-55 million over the next 5-6 years.

The short sharp shock the lottery had on the pools caused considerable dismay and frustration among PPA and Trust members. Littlewoods, for example, wrote directly to John Major advising him that they would be no longer able to sustain their sizeable contributions to the Trust and would have to eventually cease their STB donation. “It is our duty”, the pools company wrote, “to protect our business and the future of our employees and this must be our overriding consideration”.52 “The Football Trust has done tremendous work over the years in improving facilities and safety in football grounds”, Littlewoods wrote to the Trust, and “…there is still more to do in order to complete the implementation of the Taylor Report. We are therefore sad to see the Trust’s income fall so substantially”.53 As Trust chairman, Lord Aberdare, reported at the end of 1996, the organisation was in crisis and effectively “had no choice but to review its commitments to national stadia projects. [And] the government should be asked to take over the Trust’s commitments to the national
stadia from lottery funds”. Åberdare added the present conditions had been created by the current government and they “must accept responsibility for helping the Trust which was implementing government policy”. Mindful of the wealth that circulated in football’s professional realms the Trust also argued that the PPA held an unfair share of the economic burden, and, that other football stakeholders (such as the Premier League and Football League) should be called upon to increase their assistance. “There is a widespread perception that football”, Trust members noted, “and the following successive television and commercial sponsorship deals is awash with money. And so it is, at the very top of the game. Life in the lower divisions is another world. Here the proper implementation of Taylor will not take place without significant Trust grant support”. Difficult as the situation may have been, the PPA and Trust remained committed to their cause and persisted with government lobbying. The association and Trust were not, however, oblivious to the prevailing political climate, and, like others elsewhere, anticipated a government change at the forthcoming election.

The allure of new Labour and a rescue

Signs of a political turn may have been evident for some time prior, but for the PPA and Football Trust by late-1996/early-1997 there was certainly a strong belief (and hope) that governmental change was forthcoming. Realistically, and as had occurred previously, the duo had to be prepared for whatever the political outcome. The Conservative government had not exactly produced the most favourable working environment, nor, fully acknowledged the substantial work the organisations had done for the good of the game in what were (specifically after the National Lottery) very adversarial commercial conditions. As such, the PPA and Trust recognised a strategic opportunity to leverage fresh political support and salvage what remained of the Pools enterprise and Trust’s economic viability. That hope came in the form of Tony Blair, his party’s New Labour campaign, and the backing of Tom Pendry (the then shadow-minister for sport). Prior to the general election Trust members worked with Pendry (and also with members of the Conservative government) to advance their case.
In mid-January 1997, for example, Faulkner wrote to Sir Terence Burns (Permanent Treasury Secretary) outlining the dire situation the PPA and Trust now found itself in. “Our over-riding objective is to safeguard the future of the Trust”, Faulkner wrote, as it still has important work to do not only in helping clubs to complete the Taylor task but also in continuing with the priorities of safety and improvements...[yet] it is inconceivable that the Trust could play a significant part in this process without substantial additional income. And with the loss of the Spot the Ball money, what it has from RPBD will in future have to cover safety and other improvements, as well as Taylor.  

The Trust called upon Pendry to voice their concerns to the House of Commons and lobby Iain Sproat, Conservative minister for sport, on their behalf. “Already”, Pendry lamented to Sproat, “the Football Trust has seen a fall in its income of nearly two-thirds as a result of the decline in business of the pools companies and this is before the advent of the second week of the lottery draw”. By way of a solution, Pendry challenged the Conservative government to adopt stronger support for the Trust, and, work collectively toward salvaging pools from the consequences of the National Lottery. Governmental support, Pendry believed, would spurn concomitant investment in the Trust from the sports other key stakeholders (namely, the Football Association and the Football League). As persistent as Pendry was, Sproat remained resistant. “Football”, Sproat replied, “does not need preferential treatment to benefit from the lottery”. Sproat’s remarks were later underscored by Prime Minister, John Major. “I would foresee no difficulty if the English Sports Council were to use the undoubted expertise the Football Trust has built up over the years to advise on Lottery applications”, Major argued, ...However, I remain unconvinced of the case for Lottery distributor status for the Trust. We already have Lottery distributors for sport in the form of the home country Sports Councils. I think the sports community would consider it invidious for football to continue to be singled out for special treatment, particularly once Taylor requirement are met. Other sports could justifiably demand similar treatment. These sentiments were also echoed in the public sphere by the likes of Denis Vaughan, ardent pro-lottery campaigner, who at the same time was working to challenge the perceived monopoly of the Trust on charitable pools monies. 

Facing such opposition the Trust increased their activity. Aberdare, for example, wrote directly to Blair reaffirming the organisation’s legacy and its vital role as football’s
grant-aid awarding body. Grateful for Labour support, Aberdare continued the correspondence. “I believe we have gone about our work efficiently and effectively and we wish to continue to do so”, Aberdare wrote,

Our annual income at some £9m is now a quarter of what it was at its pre-national lottery level and if our future is to be secured we need new resources... We ask for no privileged position for football we simply contend that, knowing the game, we are the ideal vehicle for administering football’s fair share of the money the lottery makes available for sport.

Labour’s shadow-Chancellor, Gordon Brown, also offered support for the idea to have the Trust be a named lottery distributor, and, to have the Premier League play a greater role in aiding the Trust’s work. It helped, too, that the PPA also approached Brown regarding the perpetual effects of the lottery and the necessity of RBPD decreases.

The culmination of their pre-election efforts came when Labour released its Sporting Nation and A new framework for football manifestos. Both documents were complimentary of the Trust, and, detailed measures to better protect the charity and its financial arrangements. Foremost of Labour’s plans was to place on record its policy intentions to have the Trust be a named lottery recipient. In advocating for change within football, however, Labour was also cogniscent of the role the governments were required to play in keeping the industry in check. “Every year government contributes millions of pounds by way of tax concessions to football via the Football Trust”, Blair wrote, and as such, “it has a responsibility to ensure that this money is spent prudently”. Consequently, the party promised to support the Trust, and, guarantee efforts to challenge current pools betting legislation (in particular by restoring the RPBD to 32.5%). Football, and indeed the Trust, was not the only (sporting) priority in the political battle (other concerns included the paucity and inequalities of funding grass-roots and elite sport, criticism of the governmental administration structures for sport, lack of revenue sources for capital investment in sport, and depleted resourcing of school sport) (REF - policy). However, persistent lobbying and correspondence had clearly afforded it a pronounced place in policy discussion and development as the political tide turned.

The aftermath
Labour won the election on May 1st 1997 with Blair replacing John Major as Prime minister. Following the election result, the Trust and PPA worked quickly to ensure the new government came good on its promises. What they did not foresee, however, was a change in Blair’s ministry that saw Tom Pendry replaced with Tony Banks as the new minister for sport. The Trust and PPA had formed a close partnership with Pendry, and at the outset it appeared that Banks would fulfil a similar role in supporting the organisation. In the first instance, the Trust secured a government-endorsed £55 million cash injection; principally comprised of English Sport Council and Football Association’s annual allocations of £5 million per annum for three years to support non-Taylor work, and, Premier League and Football Association donations providing a further £5 million over four years for Taylor work.73 The boost only partially and temporarily alleviated the consequences of the National Lottery; yet, it symbolically renewed government investment and support, and, in the short-term kept the Trust viable.

Labour’s arrival prompted a step change for the Trust that not all its members were content about. With new funding, for example, came closer governmental involvement and calls for greater stakeholder recognition and representation in the Trust’s administration. Where the Premier League, Football Association and Sports Council sought representation on the Trust board, Labour went even further with intervening in the administration. With Lord Aberdare’s retirement pending, and counter to Aberdare’s own strong recommendations for long-serving deputy Richard Faulkner to succeed him, Labour appointed Tom Pendry as Trust chairman. Along with Pendry’s appointment the government also called for reformation of the Trust deed and an overhaul to its operations (to account for the new administration and funding arrangements). In addition, and to the PPA’s frustration, the promised concessions to the pools industry also failed to materialise in Labour’s 1997 budget.74 For the remainder of 1997 Aberdare endeavoured to support Faulkner’s succession to chairman, and with it ensure the continuity to the good work and name of the trust, but to no avail. Labour, and in particular Pendry and the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (which oversaw the Trust’s activities and its use of government funding), ultimately had other designs for the organisation. To note, Pendry did attempt to soothe the situation by empathising with Faulkner (but stopped short of supporting his desire for an executive position), and, he remained committed to supporting labour’s
intentions for institutional change in the Trust and wider football sphere (part of which entailed the formation of a new Football Task Force). Over the course of mere months the Trust went from being an independent, yet government-allied, charitable organisation, to a distinct political agenda item in the new Labour administration.

The Trust and PPA had courted Labour in hope that the party could facilitate a more favourable working environment; in particular, by countering the consequences of long experiences of Conservative austerity and the commencement of the National Lottery. While the establishment of Blair’s government had brought about a necessary and timely financial boost, their new political arrangements had been a double edge sword. The Trust may have been economically equipped to fulfil Taylor work commitments and football development work to a degree, yet, securing political favour inevitably made them susceptible to government changes and priority changes (in this case, the imposition of Pendry as chair, and, drastic restructuring imperatives). Over the next two years the Football Trust continued with its grant-aid work, however, their demise was largely a fait accompli. With Taylor-work nearing completion, pools companies’ support dwindling, the government called for further change. Trust members, too, also expressed concerns that since Labour’s involvement the culture, ethos, transparency, quality and accountability of their organisation and its activities had been significantly comprised, and, ultimately undermined the good reputation and respect they had established.

While it is possible to lament the demise of the Trust due to political and economic shifts, a counter assessment can also be made. The debates around and eventual commencement of the national lottery in the early 1990s presented considerable challenges for the PPA and Trust and influenced their abilities to achieve their planned objectives. In particular, the challenges the organisations faced, and specifically the significant reliance on income from pools patronage and intentions to retain autonomy from government involvement, made the operational model and administrative structure vulnerable. When the consequences of the lottery began to materialise from 1994 onwards and the severe income reductions materialised, the Trust and PPA were ill equipped, or, unable to react expediently enough to alter their administration and respond effectively to the changing environment. The Trust and PPA experienced considerable difficulties after the lottery, however, its members remained adamant that their work for football necessitated
continued government investment and that based on its long-history of development work
the Trust should have a privileged, if not pronounced, place within any new sport
funding/grant-aid schemes. Moreover, in need of financial security (particularly to ensure
the completion of Taylor-work), the Trust and PPA also had to rely more so than before of
its Premier League and Football League contributions. In addition, the professionalization of
football at the same time had brought new economic streams in the form of lucrative
television rights and sponsorship deals to football and exacerbated the commercial
imperatives that underpinned the leagues’ corporate agendas and political relationships
with the government. In particular, and despite Trust and PPA members’ arguments to the
contrary, the government appeared reluctant to increase investment into football when it
was apparent the game was experiencing a significant economic development.77

Within this context the Trust and PPA endeavoured to retain organisational
autonomy, however given their increased reliance on both the government and
stakeholders within the game their continued existence (and autonomy) in their current
form was in doubt. When the expected political shift eventuated in 1997 it brought some
hope for the Trust and PPA, but what transpired was confirmation that the arrangement
remained politically and economically exposed and eventually unsustainable without
significant alteration and/or restructuring. The Trust evidently had its thoughts on how such
changes might be able to be made (in the first instance by having Richard Faulkner assume
Chairmanship of a reconstituted body). Yet, as the government’s responsibilities for
propping up the Trust increased it clearly felt entitled, and invariably rightly so, to have a
stronger say in its administration and agendas. What followed from 1997 into the latter
parts of the decade may have looked like the demise of the Trust and the dissolution of a
long-standing, worthwhile, valuable institution; however, from the early part of the decade
the organisation had been largely predisposed to failure (certainly more so than before) and
its eventual decline became a fait accompli. However hard fought by its members, the
future of the Trust and the beneficence of government and football stakeholders in assisting
its work could not be guaranteed by its legacy alone, or, against contextual shifts. The Trust
may have served a unique purpose in improving stadia and spectatorship cultures and
developing the game writ large but they could not assume that they were the only
organisational capability or mechanism available for developing the game and its infrastructure into the future.

Eventually, in 2000 the organisation was wound up and its activities subsumed within the new Football Foundation. For the PPA, the pools remained, but they were unable to present competition to the National Lottery. In 2000, primary pools company Littlewoods Leisure (which owned the STB competition) was bought for £161 million by Rodime which later became Sportech. In addition to lottery contributions via the Sport Council and professional leagues of the game, Sportech continues to make grant-aid contributions to football clubs and community initiatives around the country. What had effectively sustained and propelled quality standards in the game for over 20 years had all but evaporated in the space of a few short years. Although the catch-all Football Foundation offered a mechanism for grant aid delivery (and, particular support for a wider remit of educational and coaching related activities), it came at the expense of the disappearance of the Trust, its long-established relationship with the PPA, and, soured the amiable support both organisations had found in Labour since the Trust’s inception in 1975.

Conclusion

Ultimately, the Trust’s downfall was a consequence of its own success. Throughout the latter 1970s and 1980s the Trust had earned legitimacy and power within the football world and political sphere through its charitable activities. While the existence and continued necessity of the Trust had been borne out of, and further consolidated by, tragedies, by embracing its remit to develop and support clubs at all levels of the game, the organisation had demonstrated it cultural and civic value beyond being merely a stadia safety grant aiding body. Moreover, as fatal events exacerbated their workload, the Trust proved its administrative capacities and industry expertise (certainly in terms of ground safety and improvement, club management, crowd safety and comfort, and, community engagement). The Trust, as with the PPA too, had also shown skill in being able to work relatively effectively irrespective of government imperatives or political climates. The Trust’s record of success afforded them the respect of football’s stakeholders, and, provided them with a recognised public profile and governmental esteem. Yet, in spite of this history, the Trust
and PPA were unable to deal with the series of rapid shocks that followed the Hillsborough, the Taylor report, the Trust’s reformation, and, the advent of the National Lottery. In spite of the Trust’s weighty portfolio of work, in essence, the organisation’s historical legacy provided weak defence against what evolved into difficult political and economic conditions. All of which compounded to make the partnership that that Trust and PPA had enjoyed rather untenable, and, set the pair on a trajectory that belied their contributions to the UK’s football environments and spectator experiences writ large.

Until Labour’s return to office in 1997, the Trust and the PPA had worked in effective symbiosis for 22 years. For nearly seven of those years they had collaborated (under closer governmental scrutiny) to help implement Taylor work and procure lasting changes in football stadia safety and spectator culture. However, while their efforts for the good of the game afforded them a modicum of political currency, their ability to function efficiently and effectively (and in the Trust’s case exist) remained contingent upon the prevailing governmental ether. The Conservatives’ re-election in 1992, for example, had dual consequences for the PPA and the Trust. Major had been able to affect minor RBPD changes that enabled the pools to continue their Trust contributions. Yet, the government had finally approved the introduction of a national lottery scheme that had negatively affected the pools relationship with the Trust and the government. For three of these years the PPA had continued to support the Trust despite the consequences imposed upon the pools by the National Lottery. Although generous, the PPA’s effectively benefited from maintaining their commitment to the Trust and its work; politically in terms of representation and participation in government sport discussions, economically via tax concessions, and publically as a result of their community and civic work. With the re-entrance of Labour in 1997, the PPA and Trust were again presented with optimism, hope and seductive political promises of change. Once more, what they received was only partial satisfaction. While Labour oversaw necessary economic investment in sport writ large, there were unfortunately inadvertent (or certainly unforeseen) specific compromises for the Trust; namely, the loss of administrative power and control, tighter government regulation and involvement, personal grievances among long-standing members, the loss of a well-deserved public profile, and, the end to a respectable quarter-century history as a key protagonist of football’s development.
Notes


7 *The Times*, 4 January 1971.

8 Johnes, ‘“Heads in the Sand”’.


11 The Spot-the-Ball competition was a low-stakes enterprise that required participants to guess the location of the missing football from a picture taken from a recent football match.


16 The Football Trust, *Briefing for the Heritage Secretary and the Minister for Sport* (Worcester: Lord Faulkner Collection, 1997).

17 For a good overview of the landscape of sport policy and trajectory of government changes during the latter part of the 20th and early 21st century see Kevin Jefferys, *Sport and Politics in Modern Britain* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).


19 Oliver Popplewell, *Committee of Inquiry into Crowd Safety and Control at Sports Grounds: Final Report*.


21 Ibid, 42.


23 Ibid; Johnes, ‘“Heads in the Sand”’.


25 Ibid, 40.

26 Ibid, 41.

27 Ibid 42.


29 The Football Trust archives, 7 March 1990 (Lord Faulkner Collection: Worcester).

30 The trust’s remit involved distributing funds to clubs at all levels for various causes, including: the management of unruly behaviour, general crowd control, legislation compliance, facility and ground improvement, development of sport and recreation services, and, other community/social/civic projects. The


33 Johnes, “‘Heads in the Sand’”; Ward and Williams, *Football Nation*.


35 PPA members were even perturbed enough to commission research from the Institute of Economic Affairs that would support their claims about the detrimental effects of the lottery, and, add weight to their case encouraging the government to withdraw its interest. PPA, *Official Minute Book*, 21 March 1968 (PPA archives: Liverpool).


43 The Football Trust, *The Blue Book*.


50 Roger Calvert (PPA Secretary) to Andrew Ramsay (Head of Arts and Lottery group, Dept National Heritage), The Football Trust Archives, 30 June 1994 (Lord Faulkner Collection: Worcester).


55 Ibid, 4.


57 The Football Trust, *Declining income*, 2.


60 Tom Pendry to Iain Sproat, The Football Trust Archives, 4 February 1997 (Lord Faulkner Collection: Worcester).

61 Ibid.


63 Major to The Football Trust, The Football Trust Archives, 23 April, 1997 (Lord Faulkner Collection: Worcester).


65 Lord Aberdare to Tony Blair, The Football Trust Archives, 7 March 1997 (Lord Faulkner Collection: Worcester).

66 Lord Aberdare to Tony Blair, The Football Trust Archives, 10 April 1997 (Lord Faulkner Collection: Worcester).


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