Abstract

In order to avoid the exhaustion of critique, this project aims to assemble a positive, creative and immanent conception of critique that connects to the world in order to transform it, through an examination of the work of Deleuze and Guattari. The journey into critique begins with the Kantian project of immanent critique as a call to establish the limits of reason. However, according to Deleuze, Kant’s reliance on the transcendental subject meant that Kant was both unable to account for the constitution of real experience and to take immanence to the limit. The next step of the expedition is Nietzsche, as the philosopher who, according to Deleuze, was able to complete the project of an immanent critique with the will to power as a principle of internal genesis of the real, as opposed to the Kantian external conditioning. Additionally, Nietzsche provides a positive and creative conception of critique that moves beyond reaction, into the affirmation of an active mode of existence. Moving on to an examination of Deleuze’s own excursion through the history of philosophy, in order to further develop his conception of immanence, through the positioning of the univocity of Being. The next stop is Deleuze and Guattari’s development of an immanent account of philosophy and thought, where they forge a connection between thought and a given territory. Finalizing the journey by examining Kafka’s literary machine as the most positive and powerful expression of a critique that aims to create movement and multiply its connections with the world.
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‘Since each of us was several, there was already quite a crowd’
(Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 3)

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‘The main interest in life and work is to become someone else that you were not in the beginning. If you knew when you began a book what you would say at the end, do you think that you would have the courage to write it? What is true for writing and for love relationship is also true for life. The game is worthwhile insofar as we don’t know what will be at the end’ (Foucault 1988b: 9).
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A Problem Setting Introduction

For my undergraduate dissertation I explored the question “Is a Non-normative Critique of Liberalism Possible?” by looking at the work of Michael Foucault. I developed a defence of Foucault against accusations of being normatively confused (Fraser 1981), or lacking a ‘normative yardstick’ (Habermas 1986: 108) in order to evaluate life (Taylor 1986: 93). In contrast to notions of critique that aim to establish universal norms as principles of evaluation; Foucault develops an immanent conception of critique through a historical investigation of the events that have brought us to our present, in order to show its contingency and therefore the possibilities of going beyond our given situation (Foucault 2007: 113; Foucault 1988a: 1). As the end of the project was approaching, my inquiry into the work of Foucault led me to his relationship to Nietzsche and Deleuze. Unfortunately, I was unable to explore these lines of research due to the space and time constraints of an undergraduate dissertation. This is where I picked up the project when I started this MRes thesis: following the thread of an immanent conception of critique, starting on Deleuze’s work on Nietzsche. However, there was three questions that I had to deal with in order to situate my reading of Deleuze: What is Deleuze’s relationship to the Kantian critical tradition? Is the concept of critique still relevant today? And what is Deleuze’s relation to political thought?

Situating the Project

Three problems: Kant, Critique, and Politics

The main problematic guiding this thesis is the concept of an immanent critique through different works of Gilles Deleuze and his collaborations with Félix Guattari. In particular, there are three questions that served as a guide for the inquiry into critique in order to situate this project. First, we have the question of Deleuze’s relationship to Kant and the critical tradition, in response to Alain Badiou’s (2000) claim that Deleuze is a pre-critical thinker in the sense that he ‘does not submit to the critical injunctions of Kant’ (Badiou 2000: 45). In this respect, against Badiou, this project argues Deleuze’s relationship to the Kantian critical tradition can be understood as a version of post-Kantianism, where Deleuze takes on the Kantian project of an immanent critique and takes it to the limit (Bogue 1989; MacKenzie 2004; Smith 2012). Second we have the question posed by Bruno Latour (2004): Has Critique Run out of Steam? This question is particularly relevant given that today’s radical intellectuals seem to have abandoned the concept of critique (MacKenzie 2008: forthcoming). For example both Latour (2004) and Graham Harman (2011) argue that critique has become exhausted because it either reduces or exaggerates
the ontological status of objects; or Badiou’s claim that the equation of philosophy and critique leads to a negative conception of the task of philosophy, instead of philosophy as an affirmative discipline (Badiou and Žižek 2009: 80). Third, we have the question how Deleuze can contribute to political theory. Arguing against Peter Hallward’s claim that ‘the political aspect of Deleuze’s philosophy amounts to little more than utopian distraction’ (Hallward 2006: 162). It is worth noting that the accusation of depoliticization is not limited to the philosophy of Deleuze, this criticism has also been raised against postructuralism in general (Dillet, MacKenzie and Porter 2013: 508). These three questions are going to be treated more in detail in the following section.

Is Deleuze a Political Thinker?

According to Hallward, Deleuze’s equation of being with creativity leads to a philosophy of immaterial abstraction that rejects any form of constitutive relation to the world and therefore ‘far from engaging in a description or transformation of the world, instead seeks to escape it’ (Hallward 2006: 5, 7). As Crockett argues, although Deleuze is critical of traditional conceptions of relations, this does not mean that he reject all types of relations. Particularly, Deleuze criticizes internal relations that are based on identity in favour of a conception of relations that are external to their own terms (Crockett 2013: 17). However, it is important to acknowledge that there are a number of difficulties that have to be confronted by those who seek to read Deleuze and Guattari as political thinkers. As Robert Porter and Iain MacKenzie point out, although there is large secondary literature on Deleuze and Guattari’s political theory, their status within English speaking political theory is still marginal (MacKenzie and Porter 2011: 13). This might be explained by three reasons: first, as Ian Buchanan and Nicholas Thoburn claim, when it comes to political philosophy Deleuze and Guattari ‘took great pains to craft it in such a way that it could not easily be reconfigured as a political programme, or policy model’ (Buchanan and Thoburn 2008: 1). Second, as explained by Paul Patton, Deleuze and Guattari did not engage in the central problems of Anglo-American normative political theory like the nature of justice, freedom and democracy (Patton 2000: 1). Third, Deleuze and Guattari ‘propose concepts that do not readily map on to even the most enduring fictions of Western political thought’ like the idea of the autonomous subject or social contract theory (Patton 2000: 2-3). However, despite the mentioned difficulties, following the path of Patton, MacKenzie, Porter, Buchanan, Thoburn and others, one of the main arguments of this project will be that the fact that Deleuze and Guattari do not propose a political project does not mean they should not be considered political theorists in the broad sense of ‘thinking the nature of the political domain’ (MacKenzie and Porter 2011: 14). As Iain
Buchanan and Nicholas Thoburn argue, Deleuze and Guattari ‘offer a rich set of insights and, more importantly, conceptual tools for critical intervention in contemporary political thought and practice’ (Buchanan and Thoburn 2008: 7). Particularly, Deleuze and Guattari provide what MacKenzie and Porter describe as a two-fold ontology of the real - in terms of the virtual and the actual or the plane of immanence and the concept – which allows them to provide a dynamic account of the political domain (MacKenzie and Porter 2011: 64).

This brings us to the question of Deleuze’s (and poststructuralist’s) stand on philosophical foundations. As MacKenzie explains, poststructuralism has been erroneously portrayed as ‘a lazy and inconsistent anti-foundationalism’ for its failure to eliminate philosophical foundations despite claiming the contrary (MacKenzie 1997: 12). However, as Michael Hardt explains, although poststructuralism does criticize transcendental philosophical foundations, its aim is to replace transcendentalism with an immanent conception of foundation (Hardt 1993: xv). In Michael Hardt words, Deleuze and poststructuralism are ‘not oriented simply toward the negation of theoretical foundations, but rather toward the exploration of new grounds for philosophical and political inquiry’ (Hardt 1993: ix). Therefore, as Hardt argues, poststructuralism contains ‘critical and constructive powers’ that can be further developed in order to respond to new problems (Hardt 1993: ix).

**Has Critique Run Out of Steam?**

Bruno Latour’s persuasive article *Has Critique Run Out of Steam?* can be understood as a call for intellectuals to be critical of the concept of critique. Some of the questions raised by Latour include: have we taken the activity of critique too far? Have we reached a point where we are subtracting to the reality of scientific objects instead of adding to it? What happens when one of the lessons of critique - that there is no sure ground - is taken by the worst possible people? Are our own weapons being used against us? Are we using old weapons against a new enemy? (Latour 2004). Although at times the tone of the article might seem slightly exaggerated, and it might be problematic to frame the problem in terms of a sharp distinction between us (intellectuals) against others, Latour raises a number of legitimate questions, which anyone interested in the concept of critique must think about.

In particular, Latour’s problematizes two common critical gestures. In the first gesture, referred as the *fairy position*, the role of the critic is reduced to showing that objects are ‘empty white screens on which is projected the power of society, domination, whatever’ (Latour 2004: 238). In the second gesture, referred as the *fact
position, the role of the critic is to show how our ‘behavior is entirely determined by
the action of powerful causalities coming from objective reality’ that the rest of the
people are not aware of (Latour 2004: 239). The problem of these positions is that
they either weaken or they exaggerate the power of objects, in Latour’s words:
‘objects are much too strong to be treated as fetishes and much too weak to be
treated as indisputable causal explanations of some unconscious action’ (Latour
2004: 242). Graham Harman makes a similar criticism of critical theory by arguing
that the status of the object is either undermined when objects are posited as ‘mere
surface effect of some deeper force’ or objects are overmined when they are
conceived as a ‘useless superstition in comparison with their more evident qualities
or relations’ (Harman 2011: 6, 13).

Although this thesis will not address the question of the ontological status of
objects, it shares Harman and Latour’s worry about the exhaustion of critique when
it is reduced to the mentioned critical gestures. As Latour argues, it is important to
develop a conception of critique where ‘the critic is not the one who debunks, but
the one who assembles’ (Latour 2004: 246). Additionally, Deleuze identifies three
more problems of critique. First, in his book on Kafka, Deleuze (and Guattari) argue
critique loses its power when it is reduced to a simple representation of the world,
as opposed to connecting with the world in order to transform it (Deleuze and
Guattari 1986: 48). Secondly, in Nietzsche and Philosophy, Deleuze criticises Kant
for reducing critique to the false application of values, instead of questioning the
value of values (Deleuze 1983). Finally, in What is Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari
argue that critique becomes exhausted when it is reduced to a perpetual discussion
between authors working on different problems; or when it is content criticising old
concepts that do not have the force to deal with our present problems. In Deleuze
and Guattari’s words: ‘those who criticize without creating, those who are content to
defend the vanished concept without being able to give it the forces it needs to
return to life, are the plague of philosophy’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 41).
Therefore, the aim of this project is to develop a conception of critique that is
immanent, that goes beyond the simple representation of the world and that is
creative.

Is Deleuze a Critical Thinker?

In The Clamor of Being, Alain Badiou argues ‘Deleuze’s philosophy is in no way a
critical philosophy’ (Badiou 2000: 19). Deleuze’s philosophy, according to Badiou, is
classical in the sense that it ‘does not submit to the critical injunctions of Kant’
(Badiou 2000: 45). In opposition to Badiou’s reading, this thesis will advance a
reading of Deleuze as a post-Kantian. What does it mean to be a post-Kantian? As
MacKenzie explains, post-Kantianism can be understood as bringing ‘to light questions that lie dormant or undeveloped within Kant’s philosophy itself’ in such a way that you ‘tackle Kant from within’ (MacKenzie 2004: xxi). This approach is consistent with Deleuze’s treatment of different figures of the history of philosophy. In Deleuze’s words his approach involves ‘taking an author from behind and giving him a child that would be his own off-spring, yet monstrous’ in order to deal with new philosophical problems (Deleuze 1995: 6). Although Deleuze does develop pre-Kantian topics such a return to metaphysics, and he does draw inspiration from pre-Kantian sources such as Spinoza and Leibniz, he can still be considered a post-Kantian for the way he deals and reformulates the following Kantian problems. Deleuze and Guattari can be considered as post-Kantians in the sense they accept ‘the relationship between critique and indifference bequeathed by Kant’ (MacKenzie 2004: xxi, 43). As Kant’s revolution in critical thought showed us one of the goals of critique must be to overcome indifference, which results from endless criticism engendered by both dogmatism and scepticism (MacKenzie 2004: xix). Second, as Ronald Bogue argues, one of Deleuze’s aims in alliance with Nietzsche was the completion of the Kantian critical project in terms of a criticism of Western rationality (Bogue 1989: 15). Third, as Smith contends, Deleuze is a post-Kantian in the sense he developed Maimon’s critique of Kant and his demand for a genetic and productive principle of difference (Smith 2012: 68). This will be explored more in detail in the following chapters when we look at Deleuze’s relationship to Kant and his attempt to find a minor post-Kantian tradition (Smith 2012: 68). For now we cannot overstress the importance of the study of Deleuze’s relationship to Kant in order to understand Deleuze’s project. As MacKenzie maintains, ‘to dismiss or downplay the critical dimensions of the thought of Deleuze and Guattari is to virtually eradicate the idea that their work constitutes a critical intervention in the world’ (MacKenzie 2004: 44).

Methodological problems

Reading and writing about Deleuze is in no way an easy task. Throughout this project I encountered a great number of methodological difficulties that are not only related the discipline of political philosophy but also to Deleuze’s thought in particular. Although these challenges have been already identified by the secondary literature on Deleuze’s work, it is important to acknowledge these problems and how they guided this project before starting the discussion. The first dilemma I encountered was that of which path to follow in terms of Deleuze’s influences from the history of philosophy. As Jones and Roffe point out ‘Deleuze’s thought is one which unfolds internal to an examination of the thought of others’ (Jones and Roffe 2009: 3). This is evident in Deleuze’s early monographs on individual thinkers such
as Nietzsche (1962) or Kant (1963). Additionally, this is also true for Deleuze’s later work ‘in his own name’ and for his collaborations with Felix Guattari. The reason for this is that Deleuze has a problematic approach to the history of philosophy that involves finding a problem, such as the problem of immanence or the problem of difference and repetition, and using different thinkers of the history of philosophy to provide an answer. As Deleuze explains in *Difference and Repetition*, writing philosophy involves gathering the arrows of ‘those which seem to us the finest in order to try to send them in other directions’ (Deleuze 1994: xv). This means ‘there is no way to grasp the philosophy of Deleuze in itself. It must be approached through the many doorways and intersecting paths provided by the multitude of others with whom Deleuze’s work engages’ (Jones and Roffe 2009: 5).

This brings us to the problem of selectivity. As Williams argues there is no right or wrong path to follow, just as there is no need to choose a single figure from the history of philosophy. Deleuze’s philosophy offers multiple openings so ‘the field should be allowed to remain open enough to allow this plurality of interpretations to co-exist in productive conversation’ (Williams 2010: 117). Therefore, instead of asking ‘who is right?’ a more appropriate question when looking at Deleuze’s work is ‘whose line to follow and transform?’ (Williams 2010: 117). However, this does not mean that all interpretations are equally valid; rather it means that validity is determined in terms of practical developments or what philosophy can do depending on the problem that is being explored (Williams 2010: 117-118). As Hardt explains, Deleuze himself followed this method when studying different figures of the history of philosophy, his engagement with them was not comprehensive and faithful, but selective in order to make his own use of it (Hardt 2006: xii).

The second difficulty I encountered was the complexity of Deleuzian concepts. As Claire Colebrook explains, for Deleuze ‘concepts are intensive: they do not gather together an already existing set of things (extension); they allow for movements and connection’ (Colebrook 2005: 1). Therefore, one of the main challenges of this project was keeping the dynamism of Deleuze’s concepts and project, while being able to give it order and consistency in an assemblage of the concept of immanent critique. As Colebrook explains, an assemblage ‘gives some sort of order or consistency to a life which bears a much greater complexity and dynamism, but it also enables - from that order - the creation of further and more elaborate orderings’ (Colebrook 2005: 3). The aim of this project was not to dig deep into particular expressions of the problem of critique, nor to provide a synthesis. The intention was to remain as true to the notion of immanent critique by assembling, making connections, following lines without a pre-established research route or an
end point.

What is an Assemblage?

What does it mean to assemble the concept of critique? Deleuze first introduced the term *agencement* - which is usually translated to assemblage - in *A Thousand Plateaus*. As Wise explains, the most common meaning of the term is ‘putting together’ or ‘laying out’ (Wise 2011: 91). However, Deleuze’s use of the term is not as evident as it might seem and some important clarifications have to be made. First, it is important to note that for Deleuze and Guattari concepts are always in a process of becoming (Deleuze and Guattari 1994). As Paul Patton shows, a good example of the dynamism of concepts is the different types of assemblages made up of different content presented by Deleuze and Guattari in *A Thousand Plateaus*, including collective assemblages of enunciation and books. Both concepts are going to be explained in detail further on, for now the important point is that the analyses of different types of assemblages alter the concept of the assemblage itself. In Patton’s words ‘those analyses transform and deform the concept of assemblage in such a manner that it exemplifies the continuous variation which Deleuze and Guattari ascribe to philosophical concepts’ (Patton 2000: 42). So it is not the case that an assemblage is simply a multiple expression of a single concept, there are different types of assemblage that change the concept itself (Roffe 2005: 176). Secondly, it is important to highlight the procedural aspect of the term. In Wise’s words ‘it is not the arrangement or organization but the process of arranging, organizing, fitting together’ or a ‘becoming that brings elements together’ (Wise 2011: 91). Third, an assemblage is a gathering of heterogeneous elements (Wise 2012: 92). For example in the case of a book as an assemblage, it also includes the author and the world so there is no distinction between these three different fields of reality (Deleuze 1987: 23). In this sense Deleuze and Guattari argue an assemblage is a multiplicity (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 23). As Roffe clarifies, a multiplicity can be understood as an ensemble or ‘a complex structure that does not reference a prior unity’ (Roffe 2005: 176). In other words, the different fragments of the multiplicity are not merely parts of a whole: ‘the assemblage does not constitute a part-whole relation’ (Buchanan 2015: 388). This means an assembling is not about arranging predetermined parts of an already existing structure, not about arranging completely random parts either (Wise 2011: 91). The reason for this is that there is a sense of unity or consistency that comes from assembling together different parts, but this unity is only temporary, as you cannot divide the assemblage or add to it without changing its nature (Roffe 2005: 177). This in turn represents a move away from notions of essence or identity, favouring practice and how the assemblage functions and in connection to what it functions (Roffe 2005: 177, Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 4).
Structure: Assembling Critique

What is going to be assembled? After the literature review, which is going to provide a summary of Deleuze’s relation to three important of the critical tradition: Kant, Hegel and Marx, and Foucault as another thinker who shares the problem of an immanent critique; Chapter one deals with Deleuze’s relation to Kant. As we will see, Deleuze adopts Kant’s project of an immanent critique but takes it to the limit, and in this sense Deleuze can be read as a post-Kantian. While Kant is concerned with establishing the conditions of possible experience and setting the limits of knowledge, Deleuze’s project aims to find the genetic conditions of the real - how the given is given (Bergen 2009: 8). In the second chapter, in order to push immanence to the limit, Deleuze uses Nietzsche’s concept of genealogy as that of an immanent critique, with the will to power as the principle of internal genesis as opposed to an external standard of evaluation (Patton 2000: 23). Additionally, Nietzsche also helps Deleuze to develop a conception of an active and creative critique, instead of critique as a reaction such as in Deleuze’s reading of Hegel. Chapter three will deal with the question of Deleuze’s univocal ontology. Although this chapter does not deal directly with the concept of critique, its importance lies in the fact that in order to advance an immanent philosophy, Deleuze needs a univocal ontology – where being is said on one and the same sense of everything (Deleuze 1990: 179). However, Deleuze’s univocal ontology raises an important question that has to be dealt with: is Deleuze a Platonic thinker of the One? (Badiou 2000). In order to respond to this challenge we are going to look closely at Deleuze’s development of the concept of univocity through different thinkers of the history of philosophy, starting with Aristotle and ending with Nietzsche.

Chapter four examines Deleuze and Guattari’s last collaboration: What is Philosophy? where they develop an immanent conception of philosophy. Deleuze and Guattari define philosophy as ‘the art of forming, inventing, and fabricating concepts’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 2). As we will see, Deleuze and Guattari’s constructivist philosophy represents a radical break from Plato’s philosophy as contemplation, Descartes and Kant’s philosophy as reflection and Husserl’s philosophy as communication. The problem of these approaches is that they confuse the image of what it means to think with thought itself granting the image transcendental status (MacKenzie 1997: 9). Deleuze and Guattari’s conception, on the other hand, is an immanent conception of philosophy. Immanence is retained by positing philosophy as the creation of concepts alongside an image of thought as pure movement – retaining the distinction between the image of thought and thought itself (MacKenzie 1997: 11). Additionally, thought as pure movement maintains immanence through a vitalist ontology where ‘movement is not the image
of thought without being also the substance of being’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 38). In other words, in contrast to Kant who maintained thought and being separated, Deleuze aim is to examine the genesis or connection between them (Lord 2012: 85). As we will see, the consequence of this is a conception of philosophy that is co-extensive with the world itself (MacKenzie 2004: 66). This link will become clearer after exploring the role of conceptual personae. These mysterious figures allow Deleuze and Guattari to move beyond the distinction between the subject and the object, in favour of an impersonal conception of thought that is immanent. According to Deleuze and Guattari, thought does not originate in a thinking subject: thought is engendered after an encounter forces us to think. Additionally, thought can be understood as a movement that connects a given territory with the particular conceptual persona that express this movement; again creating an internal connection between thought and a given territory (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 86-85).

While chapter four examined how Deleuze and Guattari’s constructivist philosophy forges a connection between philosophy as the creation of concepts and the world; chapter five explores the capacity of art to intervene in the world by creating blocs of sensations, moving beyond art as the simple representation of the lived experience (Deleuze and Guattari 1994). The chapter will centre on Deleuze and Guattari’s book Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, where they show how writing is an activity co-extensive with the world itself and it can therefore go beyond the individual concern into the political and the social world. It is in this chapter where Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of critique is at its most positive and where its power to intervene directly in the world is expressed more clearly. However, before turning to Kafka, we are going to examine Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus, where they argue the main function of language is not communication and information but to order our world. Alternatively, if language has the power to order our world, language also has the power of disordering and transformation. As Robert Porter argues, Kafka’s work avails to this power (Porter 2009: 6). It is important to note Deleuze and Guattari provide a very particular reading of Kafka as a social and political thinker, against common psychoanalytical or theological interpretations that tend to overemphasise the individualist character of his work. According to Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka’s method of writing is political in the sense it simultaneously translates everything into assemblages in order to dismantle those assemblages (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 47). This constitutes a direct experimentation with the world in order to transform it, for example by defamiliarizing the traditional conception of the law as transcendental in favour of an immanent conception of the law (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 45-46, Porter 2009: 2, 6, 45); or by providing a comic exaggeration of the Oedipal figure of the father to
the point of absurdity (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 58; Porter 2009: 20). According to Deleuze and Guattari, ‘this method is more intense that any critique’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 48). However, it is important to understand Deleuze and Guattari are criticising a particular type of critique: critique as representation - where the role of critique is simply to portray social issues such as precarious working conditions. Deleuze and Guattari argue Kafka goes one step further than critique as representation by directly connecting to the world and transforming it (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 57-58; Porter 2009: 25-27).

Undoubtedly, this project involves a long journey into the assemblage of the concept of critique. For this reason, it is worth to emphasise how the concept of critique only makes sense after going through the whole assembling process. Starting from the more negative expression of the problem of critique through Deleuze’s critique of Kant; through the detours of developing and deepening an immanent account of philosophy, which is necessary for immanent critique but also complicates the picture; to the most positive expression of critique in the work of Kafka, where we finally go beyond critique as representation into a critique that connects to the world.
Literature Review: Kant, Hegel, Marx and Foucault

The aim of this literature review is to provide a summary of Deleuze’s relationship to three important thinkers of the critical tradition: Kant, Hegel and Marx. Moreover, Foucault is also included in this list, as he shares Deleuze’s project of proving an immanent conception of critique in order to move beyond our present situation.

Kant

Kant’s critical philosophy consists of three critiques: the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781, 1787), *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788), and the *Critique of Judgement* (1790). In summary, in the first critique Kant explores the problem of the limits of reason; the second critique deals with moral philosophy; and the third critique with aesthetics and theology. Kant’s critique of *Pure Reason* was a response to the call to ‘institute a tribunal which will assure to reason its lawful claims and dismiss all groundless pretensions’ (Kant 1961: 9). Kant’s concern was reason’s propensity to seek application beyond its cognitive context (Rush 2004: 10). In other words, reason is prone to claim knowledge that cannot be established; for example knowledge concerning God, freedom and immortality (Adams and Searle 2004: 417). As Lumsden explains, the Enlightenment had replaced faith, tradition and dogmatic authority with reason. However, according to Kant, the Enlightenment had just ‘removed the foundations of belief systems’ without grounding or securing its own claims. Therefore the need to make a critical examination of the authority of reason by placing reason ‘under the same kind of critical lens with which the Enlightenment had examined everything else’ (Lumsden 2013: 26). This critique had to be carried out by reason itself (Rush 2004:10) and ‘reason, concepts and norms had to be able to ground themselves without appeal to anything beyond their human determination’ (Lumsden 2013: 27). In the second critique, the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant establishes a connection between human freedom and moral law, while justifying the need for the existence of God and the immortality of the soul by appealing to practical philosophy (Guyer 2007: 4, 20). As opposed to theoretical philosophy, where the categories form our experience of the world, practical philosophy is about how the world ought to be, creating the possibility for the creation of a moral world by following moral law (Rohlf 2016). Finally, in the *Critique of Judgement*, Kant deals with aesthetic judgment on the beautiful and the sublime, and teleological judgement - how the appeal to ends affects our understanding of nature (Guyer 2007: 4; Ginsborg 2014). However, as Adams and Searle explain, the *Critique of Judgement* ‘has the potential to severely disturb the edifice of Kant’s Critical Philosophy’ as established in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. In the third critique, Kant moves away from the examination of determinate judgment
which goes from the universal to the particular guided by the category of understanding; to the examination of reflective judgment – where the particular is given and the universal has to be found, giving creation precedence over understanding1 (Adams and Searle, 2004: 417).

As it is going to be explored more in detail in the chapter dedicated to Kant, Deleuze has a complex relationship with his self-proclaimed ‘enemy’ Kant (Deleuze 1995: 6). Firstly, Deleuze admires Kant’s project of a purely immanent critique of reason, where illusion arises not from external causes but from the tendency of reason to go beyond its own limits (Deleuze 1983: 91). However, according to Deleuze, Kant did not take immanence to the limit for two reasons. The first reason is Kant’s reliance to the transcendental subject (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 46). Second, Kant resurrected transcendent Ideas (the Self, the World, and God) as postulates of moral law in the second Critique (Smith 2012: 17-18, Deleuze 1994: 87). Therefore, Deleuze’s project can be understood as a reformulation of the Kantian project, although in a different way from the major post-Kantian tradition, for example by Hegel (Smith 2012: 107). In this sense, Deleuze’s Nietzsche and Philosophy can be understood as a realization of Maimon’s critique of Kant, where genealogy serves as a genetic and differential principle (Smith 2012: 68). Additionally, Deleuze’s theory of Ideas can also be understood as a reformulation of the Kantian project by pushing it to its immanent conclusion (Smith 2012: 110, 119). In this respect Difference and Repetition can be seen as Deleuze’s response to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, where transcendent Ideas are replaced by differential, genetic and immanent Ideas (Smith 2012: 96, 110). Anti-Oedipus can be read as a response to Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, presenting a purely immanent theory of desire without appeal to the Kantian transcendental moral law (Smith 2012: 116, 118). Finally, according to Deleuze, while in the first two critiques a dominant faculty regulated the relationship between the other faculties (the faculty of understanding dominated in the Critique of Pure reason, and reason dominated in the Critique of Practical Reason); in the Critique of Judgment, Kant gives room for the possibility of the faculties entering into a free and unregulated relation that takes each faculty to their limit and beyond recognition (Deleuze 1984: xi-xii, Smith 2012: 93). As explained by Smith, Kant argues that the confrontation of the faculty of the imagination with the sublime forces imagination to confront its own limit: the inability to comprehend the sensations of the sublime. This can be understood as a

1 As Beth Lord explains, the reading the Critique of Judgement in opposition to the Critique of Pure Reason represents a common trend in Twentieth-century continental philosophy. However, as Lord shows, for Deleuze the thread that unites both Critiques is the discovery of internal difference – the difference of the subject from itself – created by the subject thinking its own being (Lord 2015: 85, 101; 2012: 82).
breach between the demands of reason and imagination, forcing imagination to go from what according to the empirical point of view is unimaginable, into that which can only be imagined from the transcendental point of view. Deleuze extends this possibility to the other faculties in the Kantian project (Smith 2012: 93). This is important for Deleuze’s project of transcendental empiricism because, in contrast to Kant who limits the bounds of knowledge to the empirical realm; Deleuze aims to ascend beyond experience into the transcendental realm, in order to grasp how experience is constituted (Bergen 2010: 7-8). Whilst Kant posits a sharp distinction between the empirical and the transcendental (noumenon and phenomenon), Deleuze aims to bridge this distinction. In Lord’s words: ‘Deleuze wants to recover a more determinate version of Kant’s noumenon: one that does not have a transcendent relation to phenomena. He seeks “the noumenon closest to the phenomenon” which is internal to it and produces it immanently’ (Lord 2012: 87)

Hegel

Hegel criticises Kant’s transcendental and moral philosophy for ignoring ‘the social context of moral principles and changing practical conditions for the acquisition of knowledge’ (Hoy 1994: 152). In response to this, Hegel provides a historicist account of truth and knowledge where ‘historically situated forms of social rationality determine the content of the concepts and the nature of the objects that the content is about’ (Rush 2004: 16-17). Furthermore, for Hegel history is a dialectic process where Spirit, which is the absolute, strives to ‘attain knowledge of its own nature’ (Hegel 1953: 23). What this means for knowledge is that Hegel initially accepts Kant’s distinction between thought and the world. However, in Hegel we have a progression from ‘less to more adequate ways to think of the thought–world relation’ until we reach an absolute standpoint where the distinction disappears (Rush 2004: 17). This is done through a dialectical process, moving from thesis, to antithesis, to synthesis; where ‘each thesis is cancelled, lifted up, and preserved, from pure subjectivity to the “absolute standpoint” of spirit as substance’ (Adams and Searle 2004: 552). Therefore, as Steven Smith explains, the role of critique in Hegel can be understood as an ‘internal or immanent examination of the various sources of deception, illusion, and distortion that the mind undergoes in its journey to Absolute Knowledge’; and from the social institutions that express these illusions (Smith 1987: 99). Deleuze criticises Hegel’s dialectic for relying on a model of

2 It is important to note there are interpretations of Hegel that try to refute he was an advocate of teleological historical development. For example Robert B. Pippin claim that ‘there is little evidence he understands teleology… as if some eventual end-state drew everything toward it and needed to be invoked to explain what happens’ (Pippin 1999: 196); or Terry Pinkard (2017).
contradiction and negation for the determination of being, where abstract being is determined by negating nothingness in order to differentiate itself from it, leaving determination external to being (Smith 2012: 59; Hardt 1993: 2-5). However, it is important to note that Deleuze’s is not an anti-dialectical thinker; Deleuze aim is to develop a new conception of the dialectics based on a principle of difference and affirmation by drawing inspiration from Bergson and Nietzsche (Smith 2012: 59).

Marx

Marx inverted Hegel’s dialectic by arguing historical and social development is imbedded in the material world of human productive activity, as opposed to Spirit’s development (Carver 2010: 47). In Marx’s own words: ‘The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the language of real life’ (Marx 2004: 614). Moving from Hegel’s idealist conception of history into historical materialism, which states history proceeds through different but necessary series of modes of production, driven by class struggle that will culminate in communism (Carver 2010: 47-48, Wolff: 2015). However, it is worth noting that this is a more traditional reading of Marx that has led to many debates regarding the role of the human subject in the transformation of the world against economic deterministic positions that tend to reduce the explanation of the social and political realms to the economic base. In order to move from these debates, we can extrapolate a more nuanced position from Marx’s eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach: ‘The philosophers have only interpreted the world in different ways; the point is to change it’ (McLellan 2000: 173). As Wolff explains, in this Thesis Marx distanced himself from both the materialist undermining of the subject; and Hegel’s idealism, which acknowledges the active role of the subject but reduces it to the contemplation of the world. Instead, Marx argues the subject transforms the world through material activity (Wolff 2017). MacKenzie and Porter put forward a poststructuralist interpretation of thesis eleven where a connection is forged between knowing the world and changing it. In MacKenzie and Porter’s words, ‘knowledge regarding the social and political world, in particular, will only emerge in the process of transforming society and politics’ (MacKenzie and Porter 2011: 65). This connection is made through Deleuze and Guattari’s two-sided ontology of the virtual and actual, where the actual can be understood as the given state of affairs and the virtual can be understood as the intensities or forces that constitute the actual. However, this does not mean that the actual is reduced to the virtual, as we can also access the virtual realm by changing our world ‘revealing the forces at work within things’ (MacKenzie and Porter 2011: 64). Therefore, there is no separation between the political world and the activity of studying it, creating a link between epistemology and critique.
(MacKenzie and Porter 2011: 2). However it is important to note that this is a non-normative interpretation of thesis eleven where there is no assumption of changing the world for the better (MacKenzie and Porter 2011: 36-37). Claiming to change the world for the better would imply reliance on a pre-established system of evaluation outside the bounds of critique, reintroducing a transcendent element (MacKenzie 2004).

**Foucault**

Foucault’s relation to the critical tradition is not as straightforward as in the case of Kant, Hegel and Marx. As mentioned in the introduction, Foucault’s place in the critical tradition has been questioned by a number of important intellectuals including Habermas (1986), Fraser (1981) and Taylor (1986) who argue there is a normative lack in Foucault’s work. However, these criticisms are based on the presupposition that critique has to be universal (Ashenden and Owen 1999: 12-13), which means evaluating Foucault’s project in the terms of the critics and not on his own terms (Bové 1988: xviii). Foucault work on critique is an interesting example of a conception of immanent critique that does not relies on transcendental norms, and it is therefore relevant for this project, as both Foucault and Deleuze work can be understood as a response to the Kantian immanent critical project. Foucault explicitly places himself as part of Kant and the Enlightenment’s critical tradition in the following way: ‘the thread that may connects us with the Enlightenment is not faithfulness to doctrinal elements, but rather the permanent reactivation of an attitude… of a philosophical ethos that could be described as a permanent critique of our historical era’ (Foucault 2007: 109). However, this critique involves refusing what Foucault calls the blackmail of the Enlightenment where you are either for or against the enlightenment and rationality (Foucault 2007: 109-110.) This new form of critique involves a transgression. This means that instead of following the Kantian question of the limits of knowledge, for Foucault the role of critique is to question what is given to us as universal or necessary to find its contingency. In Foucault’s words, the point is ‘to transform the critique conducted in the form of necessary limitation into a practical critique that takes the form of a possible transgression’ (Foucault 2007: 113). The consequence of this is that as opposed to Kant, criticism is not ‘practiced in the search for formal structures with universal value, but rather as a historical investigation into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects’ (Foucault 2007: 113). Therefore, for Foucault critique is not transcendental or metaphysical, but archaeological and genealogical. Archaeological because it does not aim to identify universal structures of knowledge or moral action, rather than to approach discourse as a historical event (Foucault 2007: 113-114); and genealogical in the sense that it involves ‘the idea of asking
who one is by way of tracing how one has arrived at this point’ (May 2006: 63). Moreover, according to Foucault genealogy will separate us from the contingency of the present, giving us the possibility to transform ourselves (Foucault 2007: 114). To summarize: ‘The critical ontology of ourselves has to be considered not, certainly, as a theory, a doctrine, nor even as a permanent body of knowledge that is accumulating; it has to be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them’ (Foucault 2007: 117). Deleuze shares Foucault’s concern of going beyond our historical conditions. For example, in What is Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari argue ‘We lack resistance to the present. The creation of concepts in itself calls for a future form, for a new earth and people that do not yet exist’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 108). However, while for Foucault the critical project is historical, Deleuze’s project explores the philosophical conditions of critique through a two-sided ontology of the real.
Chapter 1: Deleuze and Kant

‘You have to work your way back to those problems which an author of genius has posed, all the way back to that which he does not say in what he says, in order to extract something that still belongs to him, though you also turn it against him. You have to be inspired, visited by the geniuses you denounce’ (Deleuze 2004: 139).

As already mentioned, Deleuze has a complex relation with Kant. On one side he described his book on Kant as ‘a book on an enemy’ (Deleuze 1995: 6); on the other side Deleuze also claimed to be fascinated with Kant (Deleuze 2004: 139). This apparent contradiction can be explained by the fact that Deleuze sees Kant as ‘one of the greatest philosophers of immanence’, placing himself in this Kantian tradition, while also arguing that ‘Kant was unable to push the thought of immanence to its necessary conclusion’ (Smith 2012b: 21). This chapter will concentrate on Deleuze’s critique and reformulation of Kant. Starting with an explanation of what is the Kantian immanent critique and why, according to Deleuze, Kant failed to take its immanent critique to the limit. As we will see, Deleuze argues the main problem of the Kantian critical project is that it makes the plane of immanence immanent to the subject, therefore reintroducing transcendence (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 46). Furthermore, the second problem of Kant is that it relies on a method of external conditioning that is unable to account for the production of the real. In opposition to this, Deleuze will develop a method of genesis based on a principle of difference (Smith 2012: 67).

What is a purely immanent critique? As Smith explains, an immanent critique is ‘a critique that does not seek “errors” of reason produced by external causes, but rather “illusions” that arise from within reason itself by the illegitimate (transcendent) uses of the syntheses of consciousness’ (Smith 2010: 101). In Deleuze’s words: ‘Kant’s genius, in the Critique of Pure Reason, was to conceive of an immanent critique. Critique must not be a critique of reason by feeling, by experiencing or by any kind of external instance. And what is criticized is no longer external to reason: we should not seek, in reason, errors which have come from elsewhere - from body, senses or passions - but illusions coming from reason as such’ (Deleuze 1983: 91). What exactly are these errors internal to reason? As Ross explains, the problem of reason is making claims to knowledge that are outside its domain, confusing ‘what it is possible to think with what is possible to know’ (Ross 2005: 137). To be more concrete, illusions arise when reason claims knowledge of entities that cannot be
empirically established, for example God, the soul and freedom (Adams and Searle 2004: 417). Therefore, Kant’s critical philosophy constitutes an attempt to ‘institute a tribunal which will assure to reason its lawful claims and dismiss all groundless pretensions’ (Kant 1961: 9).

According to Deleuze, Kant failed to fully realize his critique by making the plane of immanence immanent to a transcendental subject and thus reintroducing transcendence (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 46). What is the role of the transcendental subject in Kant? Kant creates a distinction between the world in itself and the world as it appears to us. While we cannot know the world in itself, we are able to perceive appearances that are intelligible to us as subjects (Adams and Searle 2004: 416). More specifically, the subject makes sense of the world through time and space, which are ‘the medium within which possibility is realized’ (Bryant 2008: 34); and through understanding that ‘schematizes the sensible experience according to logical categories’ (Adams and Searle 2004: 416). These categories are a priori in the sense that they are not derived from experience, but without them experience would be unintelligible to us (Adams and Searle 2004: 416). Therefore, the need of a universal subject with predetermined faculties that ‘constitute the organizing structure for sensation and form the condition of possibility for experience’ (Ross 2005: 138). In opposition to this, for Deleuze immanence cannot rely on a subject or an object (Deleuze 1999: 171-172). In Deleuze’s words, immanence cannot ‘relate to something that is a unity superior to everything, nor a subject that is an act operating the synthesis of things’ (Deleuze 1999: 171). The reason for this is that by making immanence immanent to something else you reintroduce transcendence (Deleuze 1994: 45). Therefore, for Deleuze, it is not until the plane of immanence is actualized that we can talk about a subject and an object in which it is actualized (Deleuze 1999: 173).

The second problem with the Kantian subject is that it is conceived as ‘a structure consisting of invariant categories’ (Bryant 2008: 17). For Deleuze, the use of invariant categories is misleading because reality is always in a constant process of becoming so it is impossible to represent it in a fixed or limited way (Williams 2005: 125). However, this does not mean that Deleuze is against representation per se; Deleuze’s point is that behind representation there is always a series of unidentifiable processes. This means ‘there can be no identity without pure differences standing in the background as a condition for the illusory appearance of a pure, well-determined identity’ (Williams 2005: 125). So, as explained by Smith and Protevi, while for Kant the question is ‘how can the given be given to a subject?’ for Deleuze, under the influence of Hume, the question is ‘how is the subject constituted within the given?’ (Smith and Protevi 2015; Deleuze 1991: 8).
In Kant the invariant subject becomes the condition for all possible experience as it is posited as that which organizes experience (Bryant 2008: 37). Kant’s commitment to this subject creates two more problems. First, it creates an opposition between concepts and intuition. In this respect, Deleuze is inspired by Solomon Maimon’s argument that Kant had failed to establish both the facts of experience and ‘our right to apply concepts to it’ (Lord 2012: 85). This opposition arises from Kant’s reliance on a finite subject with passive receptivity, while conceptual thought is active (Bryant 2008: IX, 36). As explained by Bryant, if ‘I can think my concepts at will, while I must await my intuitions in sensibility, it is held that the two must form entirely different orders of cognition’ (Bryant 2008: 36). So if concepts and intuition are two different sources of cognition the only possible way to relate them will be by an external relation (Bryant 2008: 28; Lord 2012: 85). This means that Kant is unable to show the internal connection between the structures of thought and the given (Lord 2012: 85). To summarize: ‘So long as the difference between concepts and intuitions is treated as being merely an external difference, we are left without the means of explaining how complete determination is arrived at between determinable intuitions and determining concepts. Or alternatively, we are left without the means of determining how a synthesis of the two is effected’ (Bryant 2008: 27).

The second problem that arises from positing the subject as the condition of all possible experience is that the structure of possibility will be illegitimately restricted to the subject (Bryant 2008: 36). This in turn will create the following problem: ‘When the subject and the object, being outside the plane of immanence, are taken as universal subject or object in general to which immanence itself is attributed, then the transcendental is completely denatured and merely replicates the empirical (as in Kant)... (Deleuze 1999: 171). In simple terms, Deleuze is criticizing Kant for tracing the transcendental from the empirical realm (Deleuze 1990: 105; Welchman 1999: 616). How is this problematic? As Bryant identifies, given that Kant’s transcendental philosophy aims to account for the conditions of possible experience, and given that the only way of attaining knowledge of these conditions is through experience, it would seem to make sense that the conditioned (experience) resembles the condition (consciousness) (Bryant 2008: 30). So why is the resemblance of the transcendental to the empirical problematic? As Bryant explains, the problem for Deleuze is not simply a problem of resemblance; the problem is a problem of circularity where consciousness refers to experience reproducing its image creating a vicious circle (Bryant 2008: 31). In other words, for Kant ‘the conditions are supposed to account for what makes experience possible’ (Bryant 2008: 31). However, if for Kant conditions are external to that which they condition (Bryant
2008: 29), this inevitably leads to thinking of consciousness in reference to experience in a way where we claim consciousness is true if we take experience to be true (Bryant 2008: 32). So the conditions are supposed to account for the possibility of truth within experience, yet the conditions themselves get their justification insofar as experience is taken to be true’ (Bryant 2008: 32).

Furthermore, as already explained, Kant relies on a priori categories of understanding which constitute the structure of possibility. The problem is that by relying on these categories, we are incapable of explaining how ‘realized experience adds anything to the concept’ (Bryant 2008: 34). In other words, if the possible is supposed to resemble the real, while the real resembles the possible we end up with a mere reproduction of one after the other. So ‘it becomes impossible to determine whether these conditions are indeed conditions of all possible experience, or rather retroactive constructions of real, lived, and consequently conventional and arbitrary experience’ (Bryant 2008: 34). In other words, we end up treating the possible as the ground for the real, even when the possible has been traced from a ‘contingent moment in the real and is illicitly universalized to cover all experience’ (Bryant 2008: 34).

As Smith argues, in order to challenge Kant and avoid being caught in this vicious circle of determination where the condition reproduces the image of the conditioned, Deleuze following Maimon, will attempt to find the genetic conditions of real experience as opposed to the conditions of possible experience. As Bryant explains, a genetic method is preferred because it permits us to see how experience is generated within time, as opposed to presupposing experience and foreclosing it from change (Bryant 2008: 198-199). Furthermore, Kant’s opposition between concepts and intuition can only be avoided through the formulation of a principle of difference, which in turn constitutes the genetic and productive condition of real thought (Smith 2012: 67). So in opposition to Kant, who recognized the difference between thought and being but undermined it with the identity of the subject, Deleuze uncovers pure, productive internal difference (Lord 2012: 83-84).

Therefore, in opposition to Kant’s transcendental idealism we have Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism, moving from the simple conditioning of being to genesis, to an internal account of determination and difference in itself (Lord 2012: 88-89). This project is empirical because under Hume’s influence, Deleuze argued that ‘philosophy must begin with the immediate given – real conscious awareness – without presupposing any categories, concepts or axioms’ (Stagoll 2005: 283). So the abstract (for example the subject and the object) will not have any explanatory project, but ‘must itself be explained’ (Smith and Protevi: 2015). However, the
transcendental is still needed to avoid mere empiricism, as ‘reality as it is experienced does not reveal the preconditions of experience’ (Stagoll 2005: 283). So as explained by Welchman: ‘The transcendental demands a way of thinking that is not modelled on the empirical... but rather a way of thinking that subjects the limitations, illusions and complacencies of common sense to critique, attempting to find the conditions of production for what is usually simply taken as given’ (Welchman 1999: 616)

According to Deleuze, the conditions of real experience are ‘not logically necessary, but contingent upon the nature of experience as it is lived’ (Stagoll 2005: 283). This is because for Deleuze, the condition cannot resemble the conditioned (Welchman, 1999: 616). So if the empirical realm is individual and personal; the transcendental will be pre-individual, non-personal and a-conceptual’ (Welchman 1999: 617; Smith and Protevi, 2015). Additionally, for Deleuze the transcendental must be differential. This is because the transcendental is a ‘virtual field that serves as the genetic or productive condition of real experience, and that exists prior to the constitution of the subject’ or identity (Smith 2009: 34). Here, Deleuze positions the virtual in opposition to the possible, where the possible is usually wrongly conceived as something that pre-exists the real and is therefore less than it (the real minus existence) (Smith, 2009: 35-36); in contrast to this, for Deleuze the virtual is ‘not something that lacks reality, but something that enters a process of actualization by following the plane that gives its own reality’ (Deleuze 1999: 173).

As shown in this chapter, although Deleuze celebrates Kant’s project of giving a purely immanent critique of reason; Kant fails to realize this project by making the conditions of possible experience dependent on a transcendental subject. This leads Kant to the opposition between concepts and intuition, which means Kant is unable to give an account of internal determination. In contrast to Kant, Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism will attempt to find the conditions of real experience by formulating a principle of difference, which is able to account for the conditions of the production of the real.
Chapter 2: Nietzschean Critique

From the Kantian tribunal of reason to a genealogy of values

In the previous chapter we dealt with Deleuze’s relation to Kant. As already mentioned, Deleuze celebrated Kant’s purely immanent critique of reason: ‘a critique that did not seek, within reason, “errors” produced by external causes, but rather “illusions” that arise internally from within reason itself by the illegitimate (transcendent) uses of the syntheses of consciousness’ (Smith 2010: 101). At the same time, Deleuze argues that Kant failed to realize his project of a purely immanent critique by making the plane of immanence immanent to the subject and therefore reintroducing transcendence (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 46). Consequently, the conditions of possible experience are subordinated to the transcendental subject who organizes it, creating problems such as the opposition between concepts and experience and the tracing of the transcendental from the empirical (Bryant 2008: 36-37). Following Maimon’s critique of Kant, the way to avoid these problems is by articulating a principle of difference, which functions as the genetic condition of real experience (how real experience is produced, as opposed to the Kantian conditions of possible experience) (Smith 2012: 67-68). This brings us to Nietzsche who according to Deleuze satisfied Maimon’s demands with the concept of the will to power as the genetic and differential element of production (Deleuze 1983: 51, Smith 2012: 51, 68). Additionally, as we will see, the concept of the will to power is connected to Nietzsche’s conception of immanent critique as genealogy, where the role of the philosopher is to evaluate the relationship of forces that give rise to a phenomenon such as values (Deleuze 1983: 51). Deleuze’s study of Nietzsche then can be understood as part of Deleuze’s quest for an alternate post-Kantian tradition: moving beyond Fichte, Schelling and Hegel by focusing on Maimon, Nietzsche and Bergson (Smith 2012: 107). Additionally, while Deleuze uses Kant to formulate the problem of immanence that Kant himself did not take to the limit, Deleuze’s search for an alternate post-Kantian tradition can be seen as an attempt to deal with the problem of immanence positively.

In Nietzsche and Philosophy Deleuze argues Kant failed to realize his project of an immanent critique for two reasons: Kant’s critique failed to be totaly positive. Firstly, although Kant understood critique had to be total, in the sense that ‘nothing must escape it’, in practice Kant’s critique was still a ‘conciliatory or respectful’ critique (Deleuze 1983: 89). The reason for this is that the Kantian critique left values untouched. The Kantian critique was directed towards false applications of the values such as knowledge, morality and truth and not on the values themselves.
In Deleuze’s words: ‘critique has done nothing insofar as it has not been brought to bear on truth itself, on true knowledge, on true morality, on true religion’ (Deleuze 1983: 90). Why is a partial critique problematic for Deleuze? As Hardt argues, the failure to a pose critique in terms of values is related to Deleuze’s critique of transcendental philosophy, where values represent ‘a region outside the bounds of the critique that effectively functions as a refuge against critical forces, as a limitation on critical powers’ (Hardt 1993: 29). Furthermore, there are two consequences of values being left untouched. First we have the flourishing of indifference, when debate becomes exhausted after being reduced to claim and counter claim, without challenging the common assumptions of both positions (MacKenzie 2004). Second, as Hardt explains, the failure of a total critique is related to the failure of instituting a positive critique. The reason for this is that in order for a critique to be positive we need a total destruction that clears the ground for creation (Hardt 1993: 29).

How do we move from a partial critique into a total critique? As Deleuze explains, Kant was incapable of carrying critique to its logical conclusion because he ‘was unable to pose the problem of critique in terms of value’ (Deleuze 1983: 1). Nietzsche’s overall project on the other hand, was to introduce the concepts of sense and value into philosophy (Deleuze 1983: 1). This implied a critical reversal where values go from being principles of evaluation - Kant ‘criticising things in the name of established values’ - to values being evaluated themselves (Deleuze 1983: 1-2). In Nietzsche’s words: the origin of morality ‘concerned me only for one end… for me it was the question of the value of morality’ (Nietzsche 1994: 6). Nietzsche argues values are not abstract and eternal, nor absolute or relative, they have an origin in which their own value is determined. This means values can be seen as ‘receptacles to be pierced, statues to be broken open to find what they contain’ (Deleuze 1983: 2, 55). What do we find behind values? According to Nietzsche’s philosophy of force, all phenomena are symptoms of forces that take hold of them (Deleuze 1983: 4, Stagoll 2005: 106). Therefore, Nietzsche replaced the Kantian persona of the philosopher as a tribunal judge whose role is to establish the limits of reason, with the philosopher as a genealogist whose role is twofold: first to interpret the sense of force, and second to evaluate its will to power (Deleuze 1983: xix, 2).

The first instance of genealogy interprets the sense of something, the ‘relation to the force which takes possession of it’ (Deleuze 1983: 8). In Deleuze’s words: ‘we will never find the sense of something… if we do not know the force which appropriates the thing, which exploits it, which takes possession of it or is expressed in it’ (Deleuze 1983: 3). This can be understood in terms of action and reaction, where a dominant force is interpreted as active and a dominated force is interpreted as
reactive (Deleuze 1983: 40). However, this is still a limited explanation of Nietzsche’s philosophy of force. As Stagoll explains, force cannot be thought in isolation (Stagoll 2005: 107). While a force can struggle to take possession of an object, the object is always already possessed and expresses another force. In Deleuze’s words ‘the being of force is plural, it would be absolutely absurd to think about force in the singular’ (Deleuze 1983: 6). Nietzsche’s philosophy of force is therefore better understood as ‘that of a force which is related to another force’ (Deleuze 1983: 7). Nietzsche calls the principle of force in relation to other forces the will to power, moving on from interpretation of the sense of force in terms of action and reaction, into evaluation in terms of affirmation and negation as the second aspect of genealogy (Deleuze 1983: 8, 91).

However before explaining what the will to power and evaluation are, it is important to clarify what the will to power is not, as it has been a widely misinterpreted term. As Deleuze elucidates, the will to power is ‘not wanting, coveting, or seeking power’ (Deleuze 1983: xviii, 145). As we will see, this is merely one conception of the will to power - that of the slave - which Deleuze will submit to a critique (Deleuze 1983: 10). Additionally, as Bogue explains, the will to power is ‘not a ‘will’ in the common sense of the word, that is, a conscious agency of decision separable from the actions it motivates’ (Bogue 1989: 20). More importantly, the will to power should not be understood as a personalistic or individualistic reference, the will to power refers back only to a component of force (Deleuze 1983: xvii). As Deleuze explains, ‘force is incomplete and undetermined without an inner will attributed to it’, that which complements force and is internal to it (Deleuze 1983: 49).

The rejection of personalistic references in favor of a pre-subjective force can be understood in relation to Nietzsche’s confrontation with Platonic idealism, where there is a shift from the platonic question ‘what is...?’ to the question ‘which one?’ (Hardt 1993: 30-31). What is the difference between the two questions? While the answer to the question ‘what is...?’ is formulated in terms of a universal essence, positing essence as a transcendental space outside the realm of critique; the answer to the question ‘which one?’ is given in terms of forces and capabilities that change in relation to each other, allowing us to examine the immanent dynamic of being and the different perspectives of appraisal (Deleuze 1983: 77, Schrift 2010: 39, Hardt 1993: 30). Therefore, as opposed to the Kantian universal transcendental subject, in Nietzsche the critical standpoint is not the subject or any form of man but the will to power itself, which is always plural (Deleuze 1983: 77, 94) Additionally, the will to power affirms the power of chance, as the element that brings different forces in relation to each other, so the outcome of the struggle cannot be determined in advance (Deleuze 1983: 53, 91). Therefore, the will to power must be
understood as an immanent and plastic principle, as opposed to a transcendental principle such as in Kant (Deleuze 1983: 93). In Deleuze’s words ‘the will to power is not separable from the forces it conditions; it ‘changes itself with the conditioned and determines itself in each case along with what it determines’ (Deleuze 1983: 50).

How does the will to power determine the relationship of forces? As Deleuze explains the will to power is not force, but ‘the differential element of force’ (Deleuze 1983: 7, 197). This means the will to power is the component that produces the difference in quantity between different forces in relation to each other and their difference in quality. While difference in quantity reveals the quality of force as active or reactive (dominant and dominated). The difference in quantity itself stems from the differential element of the will to power in terms of the quality of affirmation and negation (Deleuze 1983: 50-53). Again, it is important to note that we have moved from interpretation of force (action and reaction) into the evaluation of the will to power (affirmation and negation). We have two sets of qualities that are interrelated to each other but should not be confused. In Deleuze’s words: while ‘active and reactive designate the original qualities of force... affirmative and negative designate the primordial qualities of the will to power’ (Deleuze 1983: 53-54). Whilst we can say that there is affirmation in every action and negation in every reaction, the will to power goes beyond the realm of action and reaction into the realm of becoming. In this sense, action and reaction can be seen as means of the will to power that affirms and denies. In Deleuze’s words: Affirmation is not action but the power of becoming active, becoming active personified. Negation is not simple reaction but a becoming reactive’ (Deleuze 1983: 54).

In other words, affirmation and negation go beyond specific actions into the expression of different modes of existence. Affirmative modes of existence are referred as high and noble and negative modes of existence are referred as low and base. High and noble are used to designate the superiority of active forces, their affinity with affirmation (Deleuze 1983: 86) and their tendency to take ‘to the limit of what they can do by appropriating and dominating’ other forces (Baugh 2005: 116). On the contrary, low and base are used to designate the victory of reactive forces and their affinity with the negative (Deleuze 1983: 86), how forces are ‘separated from what they can do through a limitation that comes either from external dominating forces or from turning against themselves’ (Baugh 2005: 116).

This is related to the evaluation of values because different modes of existence give rise to different values. To be more precise, ‘at the origin of values is difference, but there are two distinct ways of making differences, one affirmative and one negative’ (Bogue 1989: 16). Affirmative modes of existence are referred as high and noble
and are portrayed by the persona of the master; and negative modes of existence are referred as low and base and are personified in the slave (Deleuze 1983: 55, 86). This distinction between master and slave comes from Nietzsche’s distinction between master morality and slave morality in the *Genealogy of Morality*. On one hand, the master goes from the positive premise ‘I am good’ to the negative conclusion ‘therefore you are evil.’ As Deleuze explains, ‘what is negative in the master is always a secondary and derivative product of his existence’ (Deleuze 1983: 10). The slave, on the other hand, has to go through two negations in order to affirm itself: ‘since you are evil and I am not you, therefore I am good’ (Deleuze 2006: x). In Nietzsche’s words ‘whereas all noble morality grows out of a triumphant saying ‘yes’ to itself, slave morality says ‘no’ on principle to everything that is ‘outside’, ‘other’, ‘non-self’: and this ‘no’ is its creative deed’ (Nietzsche 1994: 20).

Nietzsche’s distinction between slave and master morality is also a critique of Hegel’s dialectic. This is related to Kant because as Deleuze explains, ‘the dialectic comes from the original Kantian form of critique’ and its incapability to determine the forces that give rise to sense and value (Deleuze 1983: 89, 197). However, it is important to note it is the slave who represents the dialectician, not the relationship between the master and the slave (Deleuze 1983: 10). As already mentioned, we are presented with two ways of making difference (Bogue 1989: 16). The slave personifies ‘the abstract thought of contradiction… over the concrete feeling of a positive difference’ of the master (Deleuze 1983: 10). In order to better understand Deleuze’s critique it is useful to go back to Deleuze’s early work on Bergson³. As Hardt explains, Deleuze’s ‘reading of Bergson continually retains the attack on Hegel as its own critical edge’ (Hardt 1993: 1). Deleuze’s attack is directed towards Hegel’s logic of the determination of being where abstract being is determined by negation - being negates nothingness in order to difference itself from it. However, the problem of this approach is that determination remains external to being, failing to capture the necessity of being. In other words, determination is dependent on an “other” that negates it, reducing determination to an accident (Hardt 1993: 2-5). Furthermore, Deleuze argues that Hegel’s conception of difference is too abstract in the sense that it is unable to reach the concreteness of being. The reason for this is that an effect cannot contain more reality than its cause (Hardt 1993: 8). How are these criticisms related to the personification of the dialectic in slave morality? First, the differential relation between the opposite clauses ‘you are evil’ and ‘I am good’ is an external relation mediated by the term ‘therefore’. This implies there is no causal necessity for the conclusion; it is merely accidental. Second, the slave cannot really affirm ‘I am good’ since the effect cannot contain more reality than the cause.

³ For other accounts on the relationship of Deleuze and Bergson, see: Eric Alliez (1998), Giovanna Borradori (1999) and Craig Lundy (2017)
This can be understood in opposition to the master who starts from the positive statement ‘I am good’ and the term ‘therefore’ will mark an internal movement from the cause to the effect ‘you are evil’ (Hardt 1993: 34).

Deleuze’s reading of Bergson in confrontation with Hegel, serves as the foundation for Deleuze’s attack on the logic of the dialectic expressed in the persona of the slave. Nietzsche’s contribution to this attack is the question of will (Hardt 1993: 33-34). As Hardt explains, from a Nietzschean perspective, the slave’s statement ‘you are evil’ is a negative evaluation. From the slave’s perspective ‘the evil one is the one who acts... and the one who is good is now the one who holds himself back from acting’ (Deleuze 1983: 121). According to Deleuze, this evaluation is based on the slave’s conception of power as representation, where power is conceived as an object of recognition, and a separation is introduced between force and action (Deleuze 1983: 10, 23). This means power, for the slave, is an external capacity; while for the master power is an internal manifestation of force (Deleuze 1983: 34-35). As Hardt explains, these two conceptions of power are related to the problem of two conceptions of critique. While the master’s conception of power shows a destructive inner force that is carried to its logical conclusion, creating a complete rupture; the slave’s conception of power is only able to carry a partial destruction as power is restrained or separated from what it can do, preserving the enemy (Hardt 1993: 41-43, 52).

So far we have looked at how critique determines the genealogy of values in terms of their nobility or baseness, based on the typology of forces and the doctrine of the will to power (Deleuze 1983: 87). Additionally, we have showed how the distinction between the noble and the base corresponds to two conceptions of power linked to two conceptions of critique. However, we still have to establish why affirmation is better than negation and how destruction is linked to creation. In order to do so we have to turn to Nietzsche’s doctrine of the eternal return. We can start with some background, as Williams explains, Deleuze’s reading of the eternal return can be understood as part of Deleuze’s wider project to redefine the conception of difference through a critique of the main figures in the history of philosophy, including Plato and Kant (Williams 2003: 79). According to Deleuze, Plato’s project was guided by the motivation to find a way to differentiate between true and false claims in Athenian democracy (Smith 2012: 5-6). In Deleuze’s words: ‘anyone can lay claim to anything in Athenian democracy... if each citizen lays claim to something, then we need to be able to judge the validity of claims’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 9). As Smith explains, Plato’s solution was the concept of the idea as something pure, which serves as the foundation from which you can judge legitimate claims and counterfeits, depending on the claimant degree of participation in the pure
idea through contemplation (Smith 2012: 7-9). In Deleuze words: ‘universals of contemplation are supposed to gauge the respective value of rival opinions so as to raise them to the level of knowledge’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 74). However, the problem for Plato is that he ends up subjecting immanence to the transcendent Idea (Smith 2012: 9). In opposition to this, Kantian Philosophy can be understood as an attempt to overturn Platonism (Ross 2005: 208). As already mentioned, Kant’s first Critique (1781, 1787) denounced the illegitimate status of transcendent Ideas. However, Kant resurrected transcendent ideas as the postulates of moral law in the second Critique (1788), failing to take immanence to the limit (Smith 2012: 17-18). For this reason, as Williams explains, ‘Deleuze allies this reversal of Platonism not to anything found in Kant, but rather to Nietzsche’s model of eternal return’ (Williams 2012: 50).

As we did with the will to power, we can start by explaining what the eternal return is not. As Elizabeth Grosz and James Williams note, Deleuze’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s conception of time and the eternal return should not be understood as cyclical or as a return to the same or similar (Grosz 2004: 150, Williams 2011: 116). In William’s words, Deleuze’s reading of the eternal return ‘stands in direct opposition to any notion of eternal return as rebirth, reincarnation, identical cycles, reminiscence of the same events, and the repetition of events, ideas or even patterns’ (Williams 2011: 116). In opposition to this, Deleuze argues it is difference what returns. In Deleuze words: ‘It is not the 'same' or the 'one' which comes back in the eternal return but return is itself the one which ought to belong to diversity and to that which differs’ (Deleuze 1983: 46).

If the will to power is the principle of the differential relation of forces, the eternal return is the expression of this principle, that which affirms the difference (Deleuze 1983: 49; Bogue 1989: 30). The eternal return ensures the return of active forces instead of reactive. In Deleuze’s words the ‘eternal return will not let reactive forces subsist’ (Deleuze 1983: 86). Therefore, the eternal return can be understood as the principle of selection of affirmative forces over the negative. There are two moments of selection, firstly the selection of willing by thought, ‘whatever you will, will it in such a way that you also will its eternal return’ (Deleuze 1983: 69). This ensures the removal of half-willing or that which can only be willed once (Deleuze 1983: xvii, 69). However as Bogue explains, the first selection is not enough as it is still possible to will negativity (Bogue 1989: 31). So we need a second selection that is different from the first one, this is the selection of becoming by being. Deleuze calls this selection the being of becoming (Deleuze 1983: 71). In Deleuze’s words ‘return is the being of becoming itself, the being which is affirmed in becoming’ (Deleuze 1983: 24). However, one question still has to be answered: how does the being of becoming
ensure the return of only the active and affirmation and not becoming-reactive? According to Deleuze ‘only becoming-active has being’ (Deleuze 1983: 71). In opposition to the negative and the same, which are the opposite of becoming (Deleuze 1983: xvii- xviii). Additionally as Bogue explains, active forces are connected to becoming because ‘active forces, in going to the limit of their capabilities, transcend all constraints, including those of their own identity. Active forces impose forms on other forces, but they also change form themselves’ (Bogue 1989: 31). In other words, the eternal return cannot create something without changing its own nature. Reactive forces are taken to the limit by the negation of negation, which leads to the active-destruction of reactive forces, which turn against themselves by becoming-active. Therefore we move from the first moment of selection where the thought of the eternal return removes from willing everything that is external to it into a second selection of being which is also the most creative and affirmative moment of the eternal return (Deleuze 1983: 69-71).
Chapter 3: Is Deleuze a Thinker of the One?

As shown in the previous two chapters, Deleuze is inspired by the Kantian project of an immanent critique, a project that according to Deleuze, Kant was unable to complete. Subsequently, what Deleuze finds in Nietzsche is the competition of the Kantian project of an immanent critique, through the concept of genealogy as a method that establishes the origin of values such as knowledge and morality through the differential modes of existence they express (Smith 2012: 149; Deleuze 1983: 3). However, as explained by Bergen, in order to give immanence its right we need a univocal conception of Being, where Being is said in one and the same sense of all beings (Bergen 2009: 11). This chapter will examine Deleuze’s development of a univocal ontology through different thinkers from the history of philosophy, starting from Aristotle and ending the journey with Nietzsche. As we will see, the problem of univocity raises some questions that challenge Deleuze’s philosophy. In particular we are going to look at Badiou’s claim that Deleuze’s univocal ontology leads to a renewed Platonism of the One (Badiou 2000: 25).

According to Badiou, although Deleuze’s project appears to be driven by the motivation to move beyond the opposition between the One and the multiple, in reality ‘Deleuze’s fundamental problem is most certainly not to liberate the multiple but to submit thinking to a renewed concept of the One’ (Badiou 2000: 9-10). The reason for this is Deleuze’s univocal ontology where ‘being is said in a single and same sense... of all its forms’ (Badiou 2000: 24). The great contribution of Badiou’s reading of Deleuze is its standing against the image of Deleuze ‘as an advocate for an unrestrained realization of desires’ (Badiou 2000: 8). Additionally, as MacKenzie explains, Badiou reminds us of the need to disassociate Deleuze’s work from the postmodernist slogan of ‘philosophy without foundations’ (MacKenzie 2004: 43). However, as Crockett identifies, the problem is that ‘Badiou confuses One-ness with univocity, which are strictly speaking incompatible’ (Crockett 2013: 19). Nathan Widder argues the same by saying ‘Badiou’s entire critique rests upon an erroneous conflation of the univocity of being with a Platonist conception of the One’ (Widder 2001: 438). In order to show why the univocity of being is incompatible with the One three questions have to be answered: What is the problem of univocity about? What is the history of the problem of univocity?

What is the problem of univocity about? The doctrine of univocity was an ontological theory that was developed by Duns Scotus in the thirteenth century. Scotus was contributing to the ontological debate surrounding the nature of Being:
‘Being is said of beings, but in what sense? (Smith 2001: 168). There are three different answers to this question. One, Being is univocal when it is said in one and the same sense of everything (Smith 2001: 169). Second, in opposition to univocity, Being is equivocal when it is said in several senses with no common measure between them. Third, the middle ground position is analogy, Being is analogical when it is said in different senses but there is ‘a common measure to the forms of Being’ (Smith 2001: 169; Widder 2009: 32).

Why was Deleuze interested in this medieval debate? As Smith explains, Heidegger reintroduced the question of ontology into modern philosophy by posing the problem of the difference between Being and beings or how is Being distributed among beings (Smith 2001: 169). As Deleuze mentions in Difference and Repetition, Heidegger ‘follows Duns Scotus and gives renewed splendor to the Univocity of being.’ However, according to Deleuze, Heidegger was unable to ‘effectuate the conversion after which univocal Being belongs only to difference’ (Deleuze 1994: 66). This is one of the central problems that Deleuze takes in Difference and Repetition, where Deleuze aims to find a way to think difference in itself, without reducing it to identity and representation (Deleuze 1994: xix). In order to do this, Deleuze needs a univocal conception of being. As Foucault puts it: ‘the univocity of being, its singleness expression, is paradoxically the principal condition that permits difference to escape the domination of identity’ (Foucault 2000: 364). This will become clearer as we go through a brief history of the concept of univocity. Contrary to Badiou, what this chapter aims to show is that the problem of univocity has always been about difference, not about the One. In Widder’s words: ‘univocity is hardly concerned with establishing a unity among differences, but rather with linking differences through their difference’ (Widder 2001: 239).

Following Widder, the problem of univocity can be approached in the context of Aristotle and his interpretations in medieval theology (Widder 2001: 439). Aristotle criticized Plato’s use of transcendental forms in order to maintain individual identities (Widder 2009: 28). In contrast to this, Aristotle’s project was to look at how difference functions to define identities within larger indeterminate genera. However, this approach remains insufficient to determine difference, for two reasons. First, individual difference prevents it from being reduced to a higher category. This means a category can tell us what is common among its members but not what makes them different. Second, although Being applies to all beings, there is no category that can unify or encompass all the categories of being (Widder 2001: 440; Roffe 2012: 12). In other words, Being cannot be the highest set (Widder 2001: 441). This is due to the fact that being is predicated both on identity and difference’ (Widder 2009: 30). However, for Aristotle this does not mean that Being is
equivocal. Even when there is no common identity that can be reduced to one category being still ‘implies a relation or connection across differences.’ However, Aristotle did not develop what this connection means (Widder 2009: 31).

Christian theology introduced a third problem concerning the relation between God and the world. The Christian God was derived from the Platonic ‘Good’ - which is transcendent to Being (Smith 2001: 170). The problem is that if God is both the creator of the world and what transcends the world, this means there is a radical difference between God and his creation. This difference impedes the possibility of having access to a positive knowledge of God. Plato could not provide an answer to the issue of knowledge of God because his own philosophy was affected by this problem. For Plato to know is to see clearly and the Good is the source of illumination. However, this means the good remains opaque because it cannot be both the source of illumination and be illuminated at the same time. Augustine could not provide a solution to this problem either. Therefore, the challenge for Christian theology was ‘to establish a relation of the divine to the world that maintains their irreducibility and disjunction’ and the answer was drawn from Aristotle. This shows that even though univocity was employed by a Platonist-theology trying to relate the One to the many, it was not a Platonist doctrine (Widder 2001: 441; 2009: 31-32).

The next thinker we are going to look at is Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas chose an analogical conception of being, inspired by Aristotle, where being can be said in different senses which are proportionate to one another in terms of a common substance of being. This means the created world can derive from God, without being in the same sense than God. For example, God can be said to be wise in a primary sense and his creations can be wise in a subsidiary sense. Additionally, analogy also allows for a unidirectional resemblance between God and the world, where the world resembles God, but God does not resemble the world. This maintains the hierarchical relation between God and his creatures and allows the creatures to at least gain an incomplete knowledge of God (Widder 2001: 442-443; 2009: 32-33).

The problem with analogy is that it fails to account for the diversity of individuals within a given category, ‘it cannot say what constitutes their individuality’ (Deleuze 1994: 38). The reason for this is that individuating differences are not a matter of proportion. Widder makes this clear in the following example: ‘what makes Socrates this particular man is not somehow analogous to what makes Plato a different particular man, nor does it make him more or less of a man than Plato.’ Therefore, under analogy difference is inevitably reduced to an accidental factor (Widder 2009: 33). Additionally, analogy does not get rid of the problem of the categories of being
that we mentioned when discussing Aristotle. The difference of an individual cannot be found in the general category it belongs to (Deleuze 1994: 38). As Williams explains, the problem of the categories is that by allowing different ways of the expression of being, they create a distribution of being that divides it into different pre-established categories (Deleuze calls this a sedentary distribution). However, ‘any fixed definition of categories of existence cannot account for the way in which things evolve and have evolved outside these categories’ (Williams 2003: 65-66). This is why Foucault argues ‘the most tenacious subjectivation of difference is undoubtedly that maintained by categories’ (Foucault 2000: 359).

Given analogy is still a deficient solution to the problem of difference the only solution left is univocity. Univocity provides an alternative distribution of difference beyond logic of proportionality between a transcendent God and its derivative world (Widder 2001: 443). Furthermore, a univocal conception of being gets rid of the categories of being by expressing being in a single sense. This in turns allows a nomadic distribution of being where ‘all things distribute themselves and are only answerable to themselves in overcoming their internal limits and the way they become fixed’ (Williams 2003: 66). Deleuze wants to show that individuating differences precede identity and in order to do so he needs a principle of individuation that is ‘no less capable of dissolving and destroying individuals than of constituting them temporarily’ (Deleuze 1994: 38).

The first moment in the history of the construction of the univocity of being is represented by Duns Scotus (Deleuze 1994: 39). In Deleuze’s words: ‘there has only ever been one ontological proposition: Being is univocal. There has only ever been one ontology, that of Duns Scotus, which gave being a single voice’ (Deleuze 1994: 35). Scotus was able to posit the univocity of being by making being neutral. This means that being is indifferent to the distinction between for example an infinite God and finite beings (Deleuze 1994: 39). Additionally, Scotus showed being can possess different attributes and these attributes can vary without losing the unity of being (Williams 2003: 67) - positing a relation between univocal being and difference in itself (Deleuze 1994: 40). However the problem of Scotus is that he imposes a limit on univocity. As Roffe explains, for Scotus particular beings (haecceities) exceed univocity and therefore they cannot be explained by a univocal ontology (Roffe 2012: 12). As Widder summarizes: ‘while Scotus’s univocity establishes a relation between finite and infinite substances that otherwise share nothing in common, it is not applied to the third form of heterogeneous difference – individual difference’ (Widder 2001: 445).
Spinoza represents the second moment of the history of univocity\(^4\). As Smith clarifies, Spinoza’s problem in *Ethics* was ‘the problem of ontological difference in terms of the difference between infinite substance (Being) and finite modes (beings)’ (Smith 2001: 170). Spinoza’s achievement was to extend the univocity of being to the modes (Williams 2003: 67). In Deleuze’s words: ‘Being itself is said in a single unique sense of substance and the modes, even though the modes and substance do not have the same sense or do not have that being in the same manner’ (Deleuze 1994: 40). Additionally, Spinoza also postulated the univocity of the attributes - according to Spinoza we can only know two of God’s attributes: thought and extension (Smith 2001: 171). The attributes constitute both the essence of God and the essence of beings, even though God and beings do not have the same essence (Deleuze 1994: 40; 1988: 92). For example, bodies have an extension in the same way that a divine substance does (Deleuze 1988: 52). As Smith points out, this is a radical answer to the question of the relationship between God and its creatures, as the univocity of the attributes necessarily implies the rejection of transcendence (Smith 2001: 171). Finally Spinoza postulated the univocity of the cause, which means ‘God is the cause of all things in the same sense that he is the cause of himself’ (Deleuze 1988: 53). As Smith explains, if being is univocal this means being is ‘equally and immediately present in all beings, without mediation or intermediary. There is no distant cause, no ‘chain of Being’, no hierarchy...’ This is important because as Smith argues, a univocal ontology is incompatible with a philosophy of the One where ‘being is a gift or donation of the One.’ This kind of philosophy is more compatible with an emanative causality where the One ‘remains within itself in order to produce’ but the product comes out of it (Smith, 2001: 173-174). As Smith points out, when Badiou claims the ‘One endangers, in an immanent manner, a procession of beings, whose univocal sense it distributes’ (Badiou 2000: 26) he seems to confuse univocity with an emanative ontology (Smith 2001: 181). In other words, Badiou is claiming being originates in the One and it is then distributed to beings. This description is compatible with emanation, which De Beistegui defines as an ontology where the One ‘gives being to all beings’, not with a univocal ontology that rejects granting a hierarchical position to the One (De Beistegui 2010: 33).

Going back to Spinoza, his contribution was to make univocal being the object of pure affirmation (as opposed to Scotus where being was neutral). In Deleuze’s words: ‘With Spinoza, univocal being ceases to be neutralised and becomes

\(^4\) It is important to note that neither Spinoza nor Nietzsche (who represents the third moment of univocity) use the term univocity. As explained by Smith, what Deleuze is doing is ‘using a ‘foreign’ concept, not explicitly formulated by the thinkers at hand, to bring out aspects of their thought that might otherwise remain obscure’ (Smith 2001: 170)
expressive; it becomes a truly expressive and affirmative proposition.’ Being becomes affirmative because substance is expressed by the modes according to their degree of power, which is the capacity to maintain and affirm existence. However, the problem of Spinoza is that he maintained a distinction between substance and its modes, giving substance primacy over the modes. In Deleuze’s words: Spinoza’s substance appears independent of the modes, while the modes are dependent on substance’ (Deleuze 1994: 40; 1988: 99). What Deleuze needed was ‘a kind Spinozism minus substance’ (Smith 2001: 175) so univocity could be pushed to its limit.

Nietzsche represents the third moment of the history of univocity. According to Deleuze, in order for being to be purely univocal ‘substance must itself be said of the modes and only of the modes’. This condition can only be met by a categorical reversal that affirms the primacy of becoming over being and difference over identity, so being and identity are only secondary (Deleuze 1994: 40). As Widder explains, Deleuze finds this in Nietzsche’s ontology of constitutive forces and the principle of the eternal return. For Nietzsche, a thing is a product of different forces that take hold to it (Widder 2001: 446-447). As Deleuze elucidates in Nietzsche and Philosophy, there is a differential relationship between forces, which are always confronting one another. This is the principle of the will to power, which expresses the quantitative and qualitative relations of forces. The eternal return is a principle of selection of forces where ‘only that which becomes in the fullest sense of the word can return, is fit to return. Only action and affirmation return: becoming has being and only becoming has being’ (Deleuze 1983: xvii). Therefore in the eternal return it is only difference that returns, no identity or the same (Deleuze 1983: xvi). The Will to power can be understood as the mobile individuating factors and the eternal return is what is common of this metamorphoses. In this sense the eternal return marks the realization of univocity (Deleuze 1994: 41). However Widder explains, this commonness of the return should not be confused with a Platonic One. It should be understood as a disjoining that escapes the distinction between the One and the Many (Widder 2001: 447). Roffe argues the same by saying the univocity of being delineates ‘the unity of manner in which beings are expressed... beings all express being in the same way.’ However, the eternal return excludes the possibility of a final unity (Roffe 2012: 14).
Chapter 4: What is Philosophy?

The previous chapter dealt with how in order to give immanence its right, Deleuze needs to provide a univocal ontology (Bergen 2009: 11). However, while examining the problem of immanence we seem to have lost the problem of critique. This chapter explores Deleuze and Guattari’s development of an immanent account of philosophy that is necessary for an immanent conception of critique. Starting, by differentiating Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of philosophy from the philosophies of Plato, Descartes, Kant and Husserl. Finalizing the chapter by looking at Deleuze and Guattari’s figure of conceptual personae. As we will see, conceptual personae allow Deleuze and Guattari to move beyond the subject. Additionally, the section on conceptual personae will help clarify some aspects of Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy such as the relationship between becoming and history and the relationship between thought and its territory.

Philosophy as contemplation, reflection and communication

In What is Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari define philosophy as ‘the art of forming, inventing, and fabricating concepts’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 2). In order to understand the critical impact of Deleuze and Guattari’s definition we can start by looking at the conceptions of philosophy they exclude (MacKenzie 2004: 28). In Deleuze and Guattari’s words ‘we can at least see what philosophy is not: it is not contemplation, reflection, or communication’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 6). As MacKenzie clarifies, the rejection of philosophy as contemplation is a move from Plato’s objective idealism, where Ideas pre-exist in a transcendental realm. Second, the rejection of philosophy as contemplation can be seen as a move from Descartes and Kant’s subjective idealism, where ideas are situated in subjective reflection (in the subject who doubts in the case of Descartes and in the subject’s transcendental categories in the case of Kant). Finally, the departure from philosophy as communication can be understood as a move from Husserl’s intersubjective idealism, where the Kantian transcendental subject is grounded in experience and Ideas derive from intersubjective interaction (MacKenzie 2004: 28-29, 1997: 7-8).

What is the problem of these three approaches? As MacKenzie clarifies, the problem is not contemplation, reflection and communication per se. The problem is to confuse philosophical activity itself with these actions, because these three concepts are themselves created (MacKenzie 1997: 8). In other words, the problem is to set up created concepts as that which represents the uncreated (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 29; MacKenzie 1997: 8). In the case of Plato actual concepts are presupposed by the virtual image of what is already-thought; in Descartes the
concept ‘I think’ presupposes subjective understanding (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 40); in Kant the ‘I think’ presupposes the subject’s undetermined experience (that becomes determinable through time) (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 31); and in Husserl the ‘I think’ presupposes an intersubjective world of other selves (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 36). To summarize, the problem of Plato, Descartes, Kant and Husserl is that they confuse the concepts they create of what it is to think (contemplation, reflection and communication respectively) with thought itself (MacKenzie 1997: 9).

How do Deleuze and Guattari avoid this problem? In order to avoid the confusion of the concept with thought itself, Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy must make sure these two aspects of philosophy remain distinct. Therefore philosophy as constructivism involves two different but complementary aspects: the creation of concepts and the laying out of a plane of immanence (the image of thought) (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 36). We can start by examining the first aspect in detail: what are concepts for Deleuze and Guattari? Firstly, concepts are multiple. They are not simple, as ‘there is no concept with only one component’; nor universal, ‘neither is there a concept possessing every component’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 16). For example the Cartesian Cogito is made up of three components: doubting, thinking and being; and the Platonic One is made up of two components: being and nonbeing (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 25, 29). A concept can be defined by the sum of its components, which are totalized in it and give it an irregular contour (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 16-17). In this sense a concept is a whole, but only a fragmentary whole: ‘concepts are not even the pieces of a puzzle, for their irregular contours do not correspond to each other’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 23).

How can a concept be whole and fragmentary at the same time? As Daniel Smith explains ‘the analytic of concepts presented in What is Philosophy? is an attempt to insert the form of time into philosophical concepts’ in the form of pure variation (Smith 2012: 134). Therefore the problem of Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy is to create concepts by bringing together different components to form a consistent whole; while at the same time leaving the possibility open for the concept and its components to disperse and change (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 42). This is what Deleuze and Guattari mean when they say a constructivist philosophy unites the whole and the fragmentary or the absolute and the relative in the concept (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 22). Concepts are whole or absolute in the sense they mark a point of condensation of its own components, the plane and the problem they relate to. On the other hand, concepts are relative in three senses: first concepts are problematic ‘all concepts are connected to problems without which they would have no meaning’ and everything changes when a new problem is discovered (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 16). Second, concepts have a history: every concept ‘has passed
through previous constellations of concepts and been accorded different roles within the same constellation’ (MacKenzie 1997: 8). Third, concepts have a becoming because every concept ‘forms a junction with other concepts within the same or adjacent field of problems’ (MacKenzie 1997: 8). To summarize concepts are fragmentary because they are ‘relative to its own components, to other concepts and to the problem it is connected to’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 21).

Now we can turn to the second aspect of a constructivist philosophy – the plane of immanence. As Deleuze and Guattari explain, the philosophy that creates concepts ‘always introduces a powerful Whole that, while remaining open, is not fragmented: an unlimited One-All... that includes all the concepts on one and the same plane’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 35). In this sense the plane of immanence can be understood as the absolute ground or absolute horizon of philosophy, what holds the concepts that populate it together and secures the links between them (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 36-37, 41). In Deleuze and Guattari’s words: ‘concepts are like multiple waves, rising and falling, but the plane of immanence is the single wave that rolls them up and unrolls them’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 36).

However, as Deleuze and Guattari warn us in several occasions ‘it is essential not to confuse the plane of immanence and the concepts that occupy it’ or to assume that concepts can be deduced from the plane (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 39-40). A constructivist philosophy implies two different moments because the creation of concepts and the setting up of a plane are two different activities. While the creation of concepts marks the beginning of philosophy; the plane of immanence is prephilosophical, it is that which is presupposed by philosophy but does not exist independently from it (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 40-41). In this sense the plane of immanence is also defined as the image of thought. In Deleuze and Guattari’s words ‘the plane of immanence is not a concept that is or can be thought but rather the image of thought, the image thought gives itself of what it means to think’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 37).

We have already mentioned these presuppositions or image of thought when we talked about philosophy as contemplation, reflection and communication confusing these created concepts with thought itself (MacKenzie 1997: 9) This criticism can now be reformulated as a criticism of transcendence, in opposition to Deleuze and Guattari’s immanent project of philosophy. Where does transcendence come from? When we confuse the plane of immanence and the concept, concepts become universals (confusing the image of thought with thought itself) (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 35). Universal concepts give rise to transcendence by making immanence immanent to themselves (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 49). This was originally the case for Plato where immanence is immanent to a higher One - the Object of
contemplation (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 44, 46, 51). On the other hand, Descartes, Kant and Husserl reintroduce transcendence in a different way: by making the plane of immanence immanent to the pure consciousness of a transcendental subject (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 46; 51). What is the problem of transcendence? In the case of Plato, instead of having a plane of immanence that encompasses everything - the One-All; immanence is immanent to a transcendent One (the object of contemplation), which is superimposed on the immanent One. This leads to the plane of immanence being attributed to the concept: the plane of immanence ‘only possesses in a secondary way that which first of all is attributed to the transcendent unity’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 44-45). In the case of Descartes, Kant and Husserl where immanence is immanent to pure consciousness (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 46) we find what Deleuze describes in The Logic of Sense as a ‘vicious circle which makes the condition refer to the conditioned as it reproduces its image’ (Deleuze 1990: 105). In other words, while the subject’s consciousness is positioned as that which makes experience possible, the subject’s consciousness itself is justified in reference to experience (Bryant 2008: 32).

To summarize, we have established that although Deleuze and Guattari do not deny that the activities of contemplation, reflection and communication are activities of thought, they nonetheless argue thought cannot be ultimately defined as contemplation, reflection and communication. Doing so would posit these concepts to the level of transcendental universals, creating a confusion of the plane of immanence and the concept, without providing an explanation of how these activities themselves came to be (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 49). Furthermore, Deleuze and Guattari are wary of universality and transcendence because when concepts become transcendental universals, they lose their singularity and their openness (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 35). In Deleuze and Guattari’s words ‘transcendence enters as soon as movement of the infinite is stopped’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 47). This goes against Deleuze and Guattari’s project of introducing continuous variation into philosophical concepts (Smith 2012: 130); and of going beyond a representation of states of affairs.

**Thought as movement**

If thought cannot be defined as contemplation, reflection and communication, what is left? According to Deleuze and Guattari thought is movement: ‘Thought demands “only” movement that can be carried to infinity. What thought claims by right, what it selects, is infinite movement or the movement of the infinite. It is this that constitutes the image of thought’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 37). What makes this definition different from the definitions Deleuze and Guattari have distanced
themselves from? The first point is also the most simple, in opposition to idealist philosophies that set up created concepts as what represents the uncreated (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 29), if all concepts are created, the plane of immanence must remain conceptless (MacKenzie, 1997: 10). In other words, the concept creation cannot be doubled as the image of thought. By defining thought as movement Deleuze and Guattari are ensuring the concept and the plain remain distinct.

Second, a conceptless philosophy also implies ‘there is no place for a subject and an object that can only be concepts’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 37-38). Therefore the plane of immanence can be described as an impersonal field of thought where there is no presupposed subject or object of creation (MacKenzie 1997: 9). As Deleuze and Guattari explain, the plane of immanence is made of infinite movement with no destination that is not limited to ‘neither objective reference point nor moving object that experiences itself as a subject’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 37). Instead, Deleuze and Guattari posit the figure of personae that cannot be reduced to the philosopher in question or to a specific subject. This figure is going to be analysed more in detail later, but for now it should suffice to say that conceptual persona do not represent the philosopher, the philosopher is the ‘envelope’ of his main conceptual persona and all the other personae who play a role in its own philosophy (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 64). As Daniel Smith explains, there is a ‘universal thought flow’ that goes through the philosopher but does not originate in him (Smith 2012: 141).

Third, Deleuze and Guattari argue the image of thought must be ‘distinguished from contingent features of the brain or historical opinions’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 37). While contemplation, reflection and communication can be understood as different activities of thought, by defining thought and movement they are avoiding giving priority to a specific activity, specially the activity of concept creation. It is precisely the movement of thought what constitutes the variations of the plane: the different images of thought in different times, or even the coexistence of different images of thought at the same time (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 38-39; 59).

Fourth, in order to avoid confusing the plane and the concept a constructivist philosophy must institute a nonphilosophical plane of immanence. This means that thought is not understood as the aim of philosophy but as the nonphilosophical of philosophy (MacKenzie 1997: 10). The reason for this is that thought is not an exclusively philosophical activity; for example ‘art thinks no less than philosophy’ it just does so in a different way (through affects and percepts); and the same is true for science (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 66, 197). Additionally, as De Beistegui explains, if the plane of immanence is not philosophical, this implies that philosophy
is never fully able to conceptualize its own image: ‘the dimension that shapes thought most decisively is also the dimension that escapes thought, that thought is never quite able to bend backwards towards its own presupposition, and make its own image transparent to itself’ (De Beistegui 2010: 11). For this reason Deleuze and Guattari argue the plane of immanence is the infinite movement which must be thought and cannot be thought at the same time. In Deleuze and Guattari’s words: ‘Perhaps this is the supreme act of philosophy: not so much to think THE plane of immanence as to show that it is there, unthought in every plane’ (Deleuze and Guattari: 1994: 59).

Why is the plane of immanence that which must and cannot be thought at the same time? As Lord explains, in order to understand this we need to refer to a recurrent theme of Deleuze’s work on Kant: the difference between being and thinking. In Kant, the ‘I am’ - the being of the self – is determined by its own thinking activity. The problem is that determination happens in time so ‘the being that is determined is different from the being that is determinable.’ Therefore, in Kant the determinable is that which must be thought but cannot be thought at the same time. This problem is evoked in What is Philosophy in terms of the plane of immanence or the image of thought (Lord 2012: 82). In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant’s posits the subject as a legislator whose role is to assure reason remains ‘within the bounds of possible experience’ and what is not is excluded from the plane (Lord 2012: 95-98). This means there is an inside that can be thought in conceptual terms and an outside that can only be thought in speculative terms (Lord 2012: 97). As Lord points out, Kant makes a double gesture: he reveals the unthinkable at the heart of thought and he conceals it (Lord 2012: 98). Similarly, Deleuze and Guattari ‘show us what philosophy is by playing out the impossibility and the exigency of thinking its own unthinkable sources’ (Lord 2012: 99). Smith provides another way of understanding the same problem this time terms of aesthetics and the limits of the faculty of imagination: ‘From the empirical point of view, this limit is inaccessible and unimaginable; but from the transcendental point of view, it is that which can only be imagined, that which is accessible only to the imagination in its transcendental exercise’ (Smith 2012: 93)

Before finalizing, as MacKenzie clarifies, Deleuze and Guattari are aware that there is no perfect philosophy, all philosophies can fall into the problem of confusing the concept and the plane of immanence, and of course the plane of immanence is ultimately a concept itself; the point is to attempt to keep the plane and the concept as separate as possible so the plane remains immanent to itself. (MacKenzie 1997: 10). How does the plane of immanence remain immanent to itself? Although it might initially seem like the image of thought as pure moment confuses ‘the ‘mental’ concept of creation with the ‘physical’ plane of being’ (MacKenzie 1997:
Deleuze and Guattari’s are actually getting rid of this opposition so there is no distinction between conceptual innovation and actual innovation (MacKenzie 2004: 66). How do they eliminate this opposition? This opposition is eliminated by a vitalist ontology\(^5\), where Deleuze and Guattari create a link between thinking and being through movement. In Deleuze and Guattari’s words: ‘movement is not the image of thought without being also the substance of being’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 38). It is for this reason Deleuze and Guattari are able to make the claim that ‘one does not think without becoming something else’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 42). In this sense, philosophy can be understood as an activity that is ‘co-extensive with activity in the world itself’ (MacKenzie 2004: 66).

### Conceptual Personae

As already mentioned, Deleuze and Guattari’s constructivist philosophy – philosophy as ‘the art of forming, inventing, and fabricating concepts’ – involves two aspects: the creation of concepts and the setting up of a plane of immanence (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 2; 36). In order to avoid transcendence, the plane of immanence and the concept must not be confused (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 39). However, one question still has to be answered: how do we conceptualize the relation between the plane and the concept, in order to avoid confusing them? As MacKenzie explains, following Deleuze’s work on Hume, the relation between the plane and the concept can be understood as external to their own terms (MacKenzie 1997: 11; Deleuze 1994: x). Why are relations external to their own terms? Deleuze postulates the idea that relations are external to their own terms (as opposed to internal relations) in order to move from the principle of identity (Crockett 2013: 17-18). This means that what relates the concept and the plane is not something internal to them, rather the relation follows its own external logic, in this case mediated by conceptual personae (MacKenzie 1997: 11; 2004: 35).

What are conceptual personae? First it is important to clarify that conceptual personae are not another name to refer to the thinking subject or to a philosopher (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 64). Deleuze and Guattari’s constructivist philosophy is connected to a radical empiricism, where the plane of immanence or image of thought is no longer immanent to a subject (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 47-48). Why is the subject problematic for Deleuze and Guattari? First, as already mentioned

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\(^5\) Although Deleuze and Guattari do not use the term vitalism in What is Philosophy? In the context of Deleuze and Guattari work, a vitalist ontology can be understood as an ontology of ‘differential vitalism... which introduces change into the very mechanics of life’ as opposed to nineteenth century vitalism which argues there is a vital force made up of dead matter behind life (MacKenzie 1997: 17)
when highlighting the difference between Deleuze and Guattari’s constructivist philosophy and the philosophies of Descartes, Kant and Husserl, making the plane of immanence immanent to a subject reintroduces transcendence, while Deleuze and Guattari aim to give an immanent account of philosophy (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 46, 51). Second, Deleuze and Guattari attempt to move beyond the distinction between the thinking subject and the world as an object of thought, in favor of a conception of philosophy as ‘an activity co-extensive with activity in the world itself’ (MacKenzie 2004: 66). Third, as Williams clarifies, attributing thought to a subject cannot account for the individuality of thoughts, or what makes the thought of one person different to another (Williams 2003: 203-204).

If conceptual personae are not a replacement of the subject, who are they? Firstly, Deleuze and Guattari argue conceptual personae are the condition for the exercise of thought (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 4). However it is important to clarify that this does not mean thought originates in conceptual personae, as this would imply that conceptual personae are a replacement of the thinking subject. If thought does not originate in the conceptual personae, where does thought come from? As Deleuze argues in Difference and Repetition and Proust and Signs, thought does not originate in an individual with a natural capacity to think and an affinity with truth (Deleuze 2001: 130-131). In opposition to this traditional image of thought, Deleuze argues thought originates involuntarily in the contingency or accident of the encounter, when something forces us to think (Deleuze 1994: 138-139; 2008: 12). In Deleuze’s words: ‘it is precisely the contingency of the encounter that guarantees the necessity of what it leads us to think’ (Deleuze 2008: 62). There is a violence to thought that forces each of the faculties to reach their limit in order to go beyond the world we recognize (Deleuze 2008: 62; 1994: 145). Thus the impersonal nature of thought: ‘I am no longer myself but thought’s aptitude for finding itself and spreading across a plane that passes through me at several places’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 64).

Second, as opposed to a pre-given subject, conceptual personae are invented by philosophy, just as the plane of immanence is laid out, and concepts are created. The three elements of a constructivist philosophy are fabricated, as opposed to being already given, and they are united by their moment of creation but must remain distinct (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 76-77). This is where the role of conceptual personae becomes crucial for ensuring the three aspects of a constructivist philosophy are coherent but distinct. Deleuze and Guattari describe conceptual personae as mysterious figures that have a ‘hazy existence halfway between concept and preconceptual plane, passing from one to the other’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 61). Why a hazy existence? They have a hazy existence because
they exist in between the concept and the plane preforming what might seem as
contradictory roles. On one side, they must ensure the correspondence of the
concept and the plane. In Deleuze and Guattari’s words the correspondence
between concept and plane ‘goes beyond even simple resonances and introduces
instances adjunct to the creation of concepts, namely, conceptual personae’
(Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 40). On the other hand, conceptual personae also have
to make sure the concept and the plane are not assimilated into one another; or that
they do not merge into the conceptual persona itself. Therefore, Deleuze and
Guattari argue there is a relationship of coadaptation between the three instances of
philosophy without ever merging into one another (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 75-
77).

Deleuze and Guattari also ensure the concept and the plane of immanence remain
distinct by attributing different features to each of them, while the concept is made
up of intensive features, the plane is composed of diagrammatic features (Deleuze
and Guattari 1994: 39-40). These features will show us two different characteristics
of conceptual personae. First, the concept is intensive in the sense that it ‘does not
have spatiotemporal coordinates’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 21). In other words,
concepts are not actual entities (Boundas 2005a: 131). We will explain this more in
detail when we talk about Deleuze’s distinction between the actual and the virtual;
for now it should suffice to say that although concepts can be actualized in bodies
and states of affairs, they cannot be reduced to them. Therefore the role of
conceptual personae is not only to think about concepts, but most importantly
conceptual personae feel and perceive concepts (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 131).
Second, diagrammatic features of the plane of immanence are expressed in
movement. The role of conceptual personae is to express different types of
movements depending on the image of thought they personify. For example in the
traditional image of thought, thought is about turning towards the truth. While in
the eighteenth century thought is about following the track of knowledge (Deleuze

Different conceptual personae not only express different movements but they also
personify different presuppositions of what it means to think and of the role of
philosophy. For example in Descartes’ philosophy, between the concept of the
cogito and the image of thought that everyone knows what it means to think and
everyone wants the truth, stands the conceptual persona of the idiot – a private
thinker who doubts everything in order to arrive to truth by himself (Deleuze and
Guattari 1994: 61-62, 70; 1994: 129; Alliez 2004: 9). In Greek philosophy we have
the conceptual persona of the friend who pursues wisdom and who has a
relationship of rivalry with other claimants who share the love for wisdom but are
also rivals in this pursuit (Deleuze 1994: 3-4, 71). Additionally, conceptual personae are not only different from each other, but they also change over time, playing an important role for the transformation of philosophy (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 5). For example, a different kind of idiot resurfaces in Dostoyevsky. This idiot is still related to the old idiot we found in Descartes, but this time instead of looking for the truth as in Descartes, he is looking for the absurd and the incomprehensible (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 63). This shows how the role and characteristics of conceptual personae change depending on the different planes of immanence they occupy and concepts they bring together (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 70).

Deleuze and Guattari portray philosophy as mobile, as being in a constant transformation. How can we reconcile this with the fact that concepts and conceptual personae are always dated and signed? (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 8) For example: Aristotle’s concept of substance or Nietzsche’s conceptual persona Zarathustra (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 7; 64). According to Deleuze and Guattari, although concepts would not be able to exist without the signature of their creators, concepts also ‘have their own way of not dying while remaining subject to constraints of renewal’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 8). The reason for this is that concepts and conceptual personae cannot be reduced to the philosopher who created them or to their time (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 64). As Craig Lundy’s explains they ‘have a life independent of the philosophers that both create and use them’ (Lundy 2012: 165).

This raises two questions. First, if conceptual personae cannot be reduced to the philosopher, what is the relationship between the philosopher and conceptual personae? And second, if a constructivist philosophy is related to its epoch but it can also go beyond it, what is the relationship between creation and history? We can begin by examining the first question regarding the relationship between the philosopher and conceptual personae. As already mentioned, Deleuze and Guattari attempt to think of philosophy as an activity that is coextensive with the world (MacKenzie 2004: 66). This means getting rid of the opposition between the thinking subject and the world by providing an impersonal conception of thought. This also means the opposition between the philosopher and philosophy (including the concept and conceptual personae) collapses. If the opposition between the philosopher and conceptual personae crumbles, how can we understand their relation? Deleuze and Guattari argue there is a relationship of double becoming between the philosopher and conceptual personae. On one side, ‘the philosopher is only the envelope of his principal conceptual persona’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 64). On the other side, just as the philosopher becomes his conceptual personae, conceptual personae become the philosopher: ‘Dionysus becomes philosopher at
the same time that Nietzsche becomes Dionysus’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 65).

This shows how there is no pre-given subject of philosophy just as there are no historically given conceptual personae; there is only a simultaneous becoming of the philosopher and conceptual personae aA the activity of thinking transforms them (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 65-64; 42).

Moving on to the second question, what does it mean to create for Deleuze and Guattari? As MacKenzie points out, Deleuze and Guattari’s work can be understood as an attempt to move beyond the opposition between historical and ahistorical accounts of creation: where creation is either conceived as creation ex nihilo, which means creation without history; or creation is conceived as simply a new arrangement of already existing elements (MacKenzie 2004: 74). In Deleuze and Guattari’s words ‘concepts are not waiting for us ready-made, like heavenly bodies’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 5); and concepts ‘are never created from nothing’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 19). As MacKenzie clarifies, the problem with both approaches is that they ‘both rely in positing a transcendent identity prior to the creative act.’ Either by setting a void between the world and what is created and thus making the creative act transcendent to reality, in the case of creation ex nihilo; or by positioning history itself as that which transcends its own pre-given unfolding, in the case of historical accounts (MacKenzie 2004: 74).

How can creation be conceived beyond this opposition? Deleuze and Guattari provide a useful way of thinking about creation by saying conceptual personae can be understood as cultivators, the plane of immanence as the ground and concepts as seeds (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 7). This description is important because it shows how concepts are related to the ground where they grow from and to the cultivators, without being reduced to them (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 76-77). This brings us to the relationship between history and becoming. According to Deleuze and Guattari, created concepts are related to the historical time from which they emerge from, while at the same time having the potential to go beyond it and becoming something new (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 70). In this sense, creativity can be understood as ‘that which remains historical… but also that which maintains the openness of the future (MacKenzie 2004: 74). This definition of creativity also applies to our understanding of conceptual personae. What is the relationship of conceptual personae to history and becoming? Conceptual personae emerge in a given historical period to which they are related, without being reduced to it (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 67; 70). In Deleuze and Guattari’s words ‘conceptual personae and psychosocial types refer to each other and combine without ever merging’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 70). This means that although conceptual personae might have certain characteristics that might be related to their epoch,
they are also susceptible to being determined by the power of pure thought which
takes them beyond their historical experience into the event (Deleuze and Guattari

What is the event? As Deleuze and Guattari explain in *What is Philosophy?* The
event can be initially understood in contrast to the state of affairs or as that which
‘eludes its own actualization in everything that happens’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994:
156, 52, 101). On one side we have history or the state of affairs as the set of
conditions that determine our life; and on the other side we have becoming which
‘wrests itself from this history in order to create’ something new. Deleuze and
Guattari argue the event and philosophy (including its concepts and conceptual
personae) belong to becoming as the unhistorical element that allows them to go
beyond the state of affairs (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 96). However, the event and
philosophy can also be actualized in a state of affairs or a body (Deleuze and
Guattari 1994: 156). This means there is a much more complex relationship between
the event and the states of affairs, a relationship that goes beyond a simple
opposition. While events can be actualized in states of affairs, states of affairs also
hold a potential for being absorbed into the event and being transformed (Deleuze

What is the relationship between philosophy and the event? Deleuze and Guattari
argue the task of a constructivist philosophy is to ‘extract an event from things and
beings’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 33). How is this done? To answer this question
we have to look at the relationship between the event and the different aspects of a
constructivist philosophy. Regarding the creation of concepts, Deleuze and Guattari
argue ‘the philosophical concept does not refer to the lived, by a way of
compensation, but consists, through its own creation, in setting up an event’
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 34). In other words, it is the event - and not the state of
affairs - which gives philosophy its consistency (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 21, 126).
For example Descartes’ concept of the cogito, configured as the activity of doubting
thinking and being, represents an event that is always being renewed (Deleuze and
Guattari 1994: 24). Second, the plane of immanence can be understood as the
absolute horizon or reserve of concepts that make up the event, that which takes the
concept beyond the states of affairs, and is never exhausted by the concept
(Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 36). Finally, conceptual personae relate to the event as
that which express or embody the possible worlds that are created by concepts

The relationship between Deleuze and Guattari’s constructivist philosophy and the
event shows how philosophy can constitute a call ‘for a future form, for a new earth
and people that do not yet exist’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 108). In this way, Deleuze and Guattari describe philosophy’s task as utopian in a non-conventional sense of the term: not as a dream or as the realization of an imagined state of affairs, rather than as that which connects philosophy to the present in order to move away from it. According to Deleuze and Guattari, it is at this point that ‘philosophy becomes political and takes the criticism of its own time to its highest point’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 99-100). Here there is a strong resonance between Deleuze and Guattari’s critical philosophy and Foucault’s. In Foucault’s words: ‘it is a question of searching for another kind of critical philosophy…’ Moving away from the Kantian project ‘to determine the conditions and the limits of our possible knowledge of the object…’ into an affirmative and creative conception of critique: ‘...a critical philosophy that seeks the conditions and the indefinite possibilities of transforming the subject, of transforming ourselves’ (Foucault 2016: 24).

Similarly to Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari institute a connection between philosophy and critique, however we still have to clarify how is this connection made. The answer is through the relationship between thought and the earth and territory. According to Deleuze and Guattari ‘thinking takes place in the relationship of territory and the earth’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 85). For example the emergence of the Greek conceptual persona of the friend who shares the love of wisdom with other friends, who are also his rivals, coincides with the formation of the city, which is made up of equal entities that are also rivals (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 4). Why are the earth and territory so important? The earth, according to Deleuze and Guattari, is constantly experiencing a movement of territorialization and deterioratorialization: ‘the earth is not one element among others but rather brings together all the elements within a single embrace while using one or another of them to deteritoralize territory’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 85). Therefore, the earth is constantly opening territories and having territories restored to it (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 86). What is the relationship between philosophy and these territories? Deleuze and Guattari argue concepts are referred to a territory instead of an object. This means two things, first that the creation of concepts involves a reterritorialization of the earth; and second that concepts have a past, present and a possible future territory (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 101). In the case of conceptual personae as thinkers, they show us the territory of thought with its deteritorializations and territorializations (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 70). For this reason, Deleuze and Guattari argue conceptual personae institute a point of view in relation to thought, where we can distinguish different conceptual personae inhabiting different planes of immanence or bringing them together; and playing and important role for their transformation (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 75).
Finally, as MacKenzie demonstrates, Deleuze and Guattari’s discussion of conceptual personae can be used to develop an account of the role of the social critic. This account avoids any presupposition of the role of the critic - for example the critic as creator. Additionally, this definition also avoids situating the critic outside critique, which would render critique impure by allowing the existence of certain unquestioned elements beyond the scope of critique itself (MacKenzie 1997: 7; 2004: 65-67). Alternatively, MacKenzie argues the critic can be understood as ‘the mediator of life’s creative power and the differences it creates’ (MacKenzie 2004: 69). Situating the critic at the intersection between becoming and being (MacKenzie 2004: 71, 73). Just as conceptual personae are situated between history and becoming. The consequence of this is that the critic is not an identifiable subject; its existence is merely transitory in the process of creation (MacKenzie 2004: 71).
Chapter 5: What is Art?

This chapter will focus on Deleuze and Guattari’s book *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature*, as the most positive expression of immanent critique. However, before turning to Kafka, the chapter will explore Deleuze and Guattari’s exposition of the power of art, language and literature to transform our world. This chapter is about creating movement and multiplying connections: the connection of art with the world in order to create a movement of deterritorialization; the connection of language and politics through the establishment of order, and the possibility of disrupting that order; the relationship between major languages and major literature as constants, and the minor and its revolutionary potential as that which creates variation within the constant. All of these connections are expressed in Deleuze and Guattari’s reading of Kafka’s as the most political and social author (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 42). According to Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka’s literary machine - made up of Kafka’s letters, stories and novels – seeks to convert everything into assemblages in order to dismantle those assemblages (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 47). To be more precise, Kafka attempts to dismantle three aspects of the law: transcendence, the interiority of guilt, and subjectivity (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 45). Moving away from critique as representation of the world, into a critique that uses humour in order to create a comic amplification that shows lines of escape, a critique that creates movements and connections as ways of becoming-other and transforming the world, and a critique that connects the individual to the political.

What is Art?

In *What is Philosophy?* Deleuze and Guattari argue the role of art is not to provide an immobile picture of the world, but to create blocs of sensations – percepts and affects - that stand up on their own (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 164). Percepts and affects stand on their own because they are independent of an object of reference, of the artist that created them, and of anyone who experiences them (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 163-164; 166). Art preserves and is preserved, but what is preserved is not the lived experience, nor the material condition of art, but the percept or affect in itself (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 166). In this sense, art is not about resemblance, art is about pure sensation (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 167). Sensation is not merely realized in the material and exists only in relation to it, rather ‘the material passes into sensation’ becoming expressive (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 166-167, 193). By becoming expressive, art adds varieties to the world and creates zones of indetermination that dissolve the lived experience, allowing us to go beyond opinions (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 173-175). Art confronts the chaos,
‘the infinite speed with which every form taking shape in it vanishes’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 118); to create sensations that challenge opinions (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 204). For this reason, Deleuze and Guattari argue that art is not about commemorating or celebrating the past but about present sensations and becoming-other (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 167; 176). What is peculiar about art is that it passes through the finite, which is the material condition of art, to rediscover the infinite of affects and percepts (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 197).

Language

We are now looking at Deleuze and Guattari’s work on language in plateau four of A Thousand Plateaus, where Deleuze and Guattari argue language has the power to both order our world and to transform it; and where they forge an immanent connection between language and politics.

Deleuze and Guattari begin the plateau by arguing that the main function of language is not communication and information but the transmission of order-words (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 85). In Deleuze and Guattari’s words ‘information is only the strict minimum necessary for the emission, transmission, and observation of orders as commands’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 76). What Deleuze and Guattari are referring to here is the power of language to shape and order our world (Porter 2009: 1-2; Holland 2013: 78). As we will see this definition is important for two reasons. First they ‘insist on affirming the power, vitality or capacity – the autonomy – of language to intervene directly in the social and political field.’ Second, they dismantle the idea that the primary role of language is representation (Porter 2009: 1).

How does language order our world? Firstly, language orders our world through giving orders. Deleuze and Guattari’s example of this is a schoolteacher instructing her students a grammatical rule; what the schoolteacher is doing is not merely informing her students, but commanding them or imposing on them the foundations of grammar (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 75-75). However, order-words are not only limited to the imperative use of language. As Holland explains ‘commands are only the most obvious instance of order-words’ (Holland 2013: 78). There is also a relation between speech and actions, where the action is accomplished in saying it or speaking. For example I swear by saying ‘I swear’; or when I say ‘I love you’ I am not only expressing my love, I am also making a promise. According to Deleuze and Guattari, these speech acts are coextensive with language; language cannot be defined independently from them (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 77). This implies order-words are not a specific category of
statements, for example imperative statements, but ‘the relation of every word or every statement… to speech acts that are, and can only be, accomplished in the statement’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 79).

It is important to note that by arguing language cannot be defined independently from speech acts, Deleuze and Guattari are providing a critique of linguistics. As pointed out by Holland, Deleuze and Guattari are positioning pragmatics – ‘the study of the use and effects of language in social context’ – at the centre of linguistics, instead of merely seeing it as a sub-discipline. What Deleuze and Guattari are saying is that factors that are usually considered external to language are actually inseparable and internal to language (Holland 2013: 79; Deleuze and Guattari 1997: 85, 91, 94). As we will see next, Deleuze and Guattari also critique linguistics for tying enunciation to a subject without recognizing its social character (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 82).

Third, language orders our world through indirect discourse. Language goes beyond one person communicating what she has seen to another person. Language ‘goes from saying to saying’ transmitting what we have heard to other people, from a second party to a third party and so on, perpetuating a certain order of the world (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 76-77). This is important for two reasons, first it shows how the primary role of language is not the communication of information, because most of what it is said is basically repeating what we have heard. Second, it implies it is not a question about the origin of language (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 76-77), as there is no subject of enunciation to which we can attribute the order-word (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 89; Holland 2013: 78).

If speech acts cannot be defined in reference to a subject of enunciation, what explains a speech act? Deleuze and Guattari argue that the relationship between acts and statement can be explained by a social obligation, therefore enunciation has an intrinsic social character. This social character is accounted by what Deleuze and Guattari call a collective assemblage of enunciation (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 79-80). In Deleuze and Guattari’s words ‘it is the assemblage, as it freely appears in this discourse that explains all the voices present within a single voice’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 80). Before explaining what a collective assemblage is, it is worth noting what Deleuze and Guattari mean when they talk about the voices present within a single voice. What Deleuze and Guattari are referring to is the redundancy of language as order-words. Language is redundant in different senses for example in what is being repeated from saying to saying, and also there is a redundancy between speech and act; in other words there is a prior order that is being repeated (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 75; 80; 84). Moving on, a collective assemblage can be
understood as the social context of a statement, its particular place and time (Holland 2013: 78). For example, in Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, Deleuze and Guattari argue the statement is a function of the national, political or social community (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986: 84). However, it is important to clarify that Deleuze and Guattari are not saying that there are no individual statements or subjects of enunciation, what they are saying is that collective assemblages come first and individual statements and subjects of enunciation are derived from them, not the other way around (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 80; Holland 2013: 78).

What are the effects of collective assemblages of enunciation? Here is where the power of language to shape the world is the most evident. Deleuze and Guattari argue that collective assemblages designate the relation between statements and the incorporeal transformations they express (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 81). Incorporeal transformations can be understood as a transformation that has no immediate effects on the body of a person, but it is still a transformation (Holland 2013 79). For example when a judge declares an accused man guilty, the man is immediately transformed into a convict; a declaration of war or peace that immediately changes the status of the participants; or the transformation of passengers into hostages on a plane (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 80-81). An incorporeal transformation can be recognized by the simultaneity of the statement that expresses the transformation and the effect that is produced (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 81).

This means the relation between the transformation and enunciation is internal, there is an immanent relation between language and bodies. The implication of this is that we cannot ignore the circumstances of a given statement. For example the statement ‘I swear’ is different depending on where it is said, it will not be the same statement or the same transformation if it is said in a court as opposed to a family situation for example. Therefore, the immediacy of a statement ‘gives it a power of variation in relation to the bodies to which the transformation is attributed’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 82). This means two things, first that there is an excess in language that cannot be accounted by constants (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 82). The second implication is that there is an immanent relation between politics and language. As Deleuze and Guattari explain ‘politics works language from within’ producing a change in order-words. This means a statement can only be evaluated in relation to the political circumstances that provide the conditions of possibility of language (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 83, 85).
Minor and major language

In the same passage of *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari also provide a distinction between minor and major that can be used in reference to music, literature, linguistic, politics, etc. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 105). The problem Deleuze and Guattari are addressing with this distinction is the relationship between constants and variation, where the major is given the power of constants and the minor is given the power of variation (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 101). In this sense the major can be understood as an abstract constant, a standard of measurement that we use to evaluate the world; while the minor is that which is always becoming. This implies two things, first, that the distinction between minority and majority is not simply a quantitative distinction, where the most numerous group conforms the major and the least numerous conforms the minor. For example, although there might be more mosquitoes or women than ‘man’, man can still be understood as the major because he appears twice: once in the standard and once in the variable. The second implication is that the major, being an abstract standard is actually never anybody; while the minor is everybody else. The minor is constantly becoming and potentially deviating from this model. In this sense Deleuze and Guattari are giving the minor a creative and revolutionary power of becoming-other (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 105-106).

In the case of language, what is the relationship between minor and major languages? Firstly, to avoid misunderstandings it is important to note that the distinction between minor and major does not mean that there is a simple and clear opposition between a major language and its different dialects; in fact each minor language has a zone of variation to the point that it is difficult to delimit where one minor language ends and the other starts (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 101-102). For this reason, Deleuze and Guattari argue that a minor language can only be defined in relation to the major language it functions from. For example French from Quebec has to be evaluated in relation to major French and in relation to major English (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 102). Additionally, the relational aspect of language means a language can be minor and major at the same time. For example in the Austrian Empire, Czech was a minor language in relation to German and German from Prague was a minor language in relation to German from Vienna (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 104). In this sense there are not two different types of languages; rather there are two possible treatments or usages of the same language: the first treatment is about extracting constants from language and the second treatment is about extracting continuous variation from language (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 103; 107). For this reason Deleuze and Guattari argue that the problem is not actually about the distinction between a major and a minor
language; the problem is about becoming, of deterritorializing or transforming the major language (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 104). The more a language becomes major, the more it can be affected by variations that reverse it into a minor language (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 102). The consequence of this is that we can say that minor languages are more than sublanguages; they are the potential agents for the major language becoming-minoritarian (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 106).

As Holland summarizes, what Deleuze and Guattari do in plateau 4 is first to emphasize the power of variation of language, instead of focusing on constants. Second, they elevate the minor to the universal revolutionary figure over the abstract major, giving it the power of deterritorializing the major. Third, they posit pragmatics at the center of linguistics, instead than at the margin. Finally, at the end of the passage Deleuze and Guattari return to the concept of order-words to give it a new power, the power of disordering and transformation (Holland 2013: 81). In Deleuze and Guattari’s words, the other aspect of the order-word is flight (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 108). The question now becomes, not how to escape the order-world, but rather ‘how to maintain or draw out the revolutionary potentiality of the order-word’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 9). There are two possibilities: first the stratification of order words, and second words of passage that exist beneath order-words. In Deleuze and Guattari’s words, ‘a single thing or word undoubtedly has this twofold nature: it is necessary to extract one from the other – to transform the compositions of order into components of passage (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987:110).

Kafka’s minor literature

Deleuze and Guattari define a minor literature as ‘that which a minority constructs within a major language’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 16). This means that a minor literature is not derived from a major language; rather it works from within language to transform it. In Deleuze and Guattari’s words ‘minor no longer designates specific literatures but the revolutionary conditions for every literature within the heart of what is called great (or established) literature’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 18). Therefore, the first aspect of minor literature is that it affects language ‘with a high coefficient of deterritorialization’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 16). In other words, a major language is subjected to a defamiliarizing movement through minor literature (Porter 2009: 2). For example Kafka’s defamiliarization of the concept of law, where he moves from a transcendental conception to an immanent conception, we will come back to this point further on (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 43). The second aspect of minor literature is that as opposed to major literature, where social concerns are seen as an extension or the background of individual concerns; in major literature the individual is immediately linked to the political, ‘everything in
them is political.’ For example we can see how in Kafka the family triangle is directly connected to other triangles, like the economic or juridical triangles (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 17). The force of the judges, commissioners, bureaucrats, etcetera are combined in the father, rather than being a substitute for him, and it is the father who submits to them and has a role in the submission of the son (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 12). Hence, the third characteristic of minor literature: ‘everything takes on a collective value’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 17). It is important to note that this does not mean that the individual concern disappears or is unimportant. As we will see, the opposite is the case. Deleuze and Guattari challenge the opposition between the individual and the collective (Beaulieu 2009: 210; Porter 2009: 21). The implication of this is that, in Deleuze and Guattari’s words, ‘the individual concern thus becomes all the more necessary, indispensable, magnified, because a whole other story is vibrating within it’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 17).

**Kafka’s Literary Machine**

As Robert Porter explains, ‘if language has a power and capacity to order our world... then Kafka’s body of literary works avail of this power’ (Porter 2009: 6). However, it is important to note that Deleuze and Guattari provide a really provocative reading of Kafka. As Porter notes, Deleuze and Guattari’s work on Kafka itself can be understood as an intervention, which gives it new attributes and defamiliarizes common scholarly interpretations (Porter 2009: 19). Firstly, Deleuze and Guattari provide a ‘critique of all readings of Kafka that are founded on a logic of representation and interpretation’ (Bogue 1989: 108). This includes psychoanalytical readings that interpret Kafka in Oedipal terms and religious readings that interpret Kafka as an advocate of a negative theology. Most importantly, what Deleuze and Guattari want to avoid is the temptation of drawing Kafka toward the ‘individual concern... towards personal psychology, neurosis, or an author’s individual tastes’ (Bensmaïa 1986: xviii). As Porter points out, the problem of overemphasizing the individual is that it presupposes a disconnection to the social, creating a distinction that Deleuze and Guattari want to avoid: the distinction between Kafka’s life and the life that transverses his writing (Porter 2009: 19). As Deleuze tells us in Negotiations, there is a power of life that can be found in a line of writing and in art: ‘any work of art points a way through for life, finds a way through the cracks’ (Deleuze 1995: 143). In this sense Kafka’s work is deeply connected to the social and the political, far from fleeing the world he is drawing lines of escape, ‘never has there been a more political and social author’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 41-42; 46). However, as Claire Colebrook warns us, we have to be careful with vitalistic readings of Deleuze (and Guattari’s) conception of art. The image of life proliferating through the work of art might rob art from its radical potential by
ignoring its power of disruption (Colebrook 2007: 29). As we will see, art is not about the continuation of life but about the ‘potentiality of life beyond its defining territory’ (Colebrook 2007: 30).

In opposition to psychoanalytical or theological readings of Kafka, which tend to emphasise the individual aspect of his work, Deleuze and Guattari argue Kafka’s work (including the letters, stories and novels) is ‘a rhizome, a borrow’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 3; 41). What is a rhizome? A rhizome book can be understood as a multiplicity, which connects a diverse range of elements in a non-hierarchical way (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 8-9; Bogue 2001: 107). There are three important aspects of Deleuze and Guattari’s definition of rhizome in Kafka. First, what is important about a rhizome is not the point of entry, there is no privileged entrance, so you can enter it at any point; rather what is important is the connections between these points: ‘what crossroads and galleries one passes through to link two points, what the map of the rhizome is…’ The second important aspect is the possibility of modification of this map: ‘how the map is modified if one enters by another point.’ Thirdly, the principle of multiple entrances is important because it makes it harder for interpretation of the work, as there is no pre-established way of accessing the text, favoring the possibility of open experimentation (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986: 3).

Moreover, as Eugene Holland points out, the image of the rhizome Deleuze and Guattari develop in Kafka can be understood as a new image of thought. This image of thought was restated one year later in Rhizome, the introduction of A Thousand Plateaus (1976) (Holland 2013: 11-12). What is a rhizome book? It is a book that doesn’t rely on ‘object nor subject’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 3). As explained by Holland, it does not rely on subjects in order to provide an image of thought that allows us to think with the world instead of thinking about the world (representation) (Holland 2013: 37). This impersonal conception of thought can be traced back to Spinoza and Nietzsche’s influence on Deleuze. For Spinoza, thought is not limited to thinking subjects; it is an attribute of the world (Holland 2013: 37). In other words, there is a ‘continuous flow of thought in the universe’ that does not originate in a subject (Smith 2012: 141). Nietzsche argues something similar by pointing out ‘thought comes when “it” wishes, and not when “I” wish’ so it is a mistake to place the subject as the condition of thought (Nietzsche 1984: 54).

On the other side, a rhizome book does not rely on objects, in order to avoid the distinction between the book and the world (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 4). This distinction is avoided because the book functions as a machinic assemblage; that is constantly forming new connections to other machines (Deleuze and Guattari 1986:
The concept of the machine was first developed in Anti-Oedipus (Bogue 2003: 4); where Deleuze and Guattari argue that everything is a machine, real machines not figurative ones: the mother’s breast producing milk, the mouth, the individual, the stars and rainbows in the sky (Deleuze and Guattari 2003: 1-2). This means that there is no longer a distinction between man and nature, ‘only a process that produces the one within the other and couples machines together’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2003: 2). Additionally, the concept of the machine does not particularly refer to men and women in their labour activity; but to the whole field of social activities such as leisure and personal relationships. In other words, what Deleuze and Guattari are referring to is not a technical machine; but a social machine, made up of a multiplicity of heterogeneous elements such as men, women, relations, ideas, animals, manufactured objects, etc. (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 8; 81; Deleuze and Parnet 2007: 56, 69).

Deleuze and Guattari approach Kafka’s work from the perspective of the machine (Bogue 2003: 4). As Bogue explains, in Kafka the problem of the machine is the question of the relationship between the literary machine and the real (Bogue 2003: 59). The book, as a machinic assemblage ‘has only itself, in connection with other assemblages…’ For example in Kafka the literary machine was connected to the bureaucratic machine (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 4); and the literary machine can also be linked to the capitalist or fascist machine (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 60). Additionally, Deleuze and Guattari also talk about the intersection between the familial, conjugal and bureaucratic machines in Kafka (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 65). In this sense, individual concerns are always connected to the collective and writing is always connected to the world (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 60). For this reason, Deleuze and Guattari argue that ‘there is no difference between what a book talks about and how it is made’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 4). So the question when looking at a book shifts from the meaning of the book to how it functions and in connection to what it functions (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 4). As Deleuze claims in Proust and Signs, ‘the modern work of art has no problem of meaning, it has only a problem of use’ (Deleuze 2008: 95).

Kafka’s Letters

How does Kafka’s literary machine work? Deleuze and Guattari argue that Kafka’s literary machine is made up of three components: the letters, the stories and the novels (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 40). We can start by looking at the letters. As explained by Bogue, the aim of Kafka’s letters is to maintain the letter exchange, while avoiding the entrapment of marriage (Bogue 2003: 4). As already mentioned, the main question when looking at the literary machine is the question of its
function. In the case of the letters, their first characteristic is that they function as a replacement for love and the conjugal contract, ‘the flux of letters replaces seeing, arriving’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 29; 31). A diabolical pact emerges through the letters, to keep writing, to maintain the flow, while avoiding the proximity of the conjugal contract (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 33; Bogue 2003: 76).

Second, Deleuze and Guattari argue that there are two subjects in the letters: the subject of enunciation, who writes the letter and can be understood as the form of expression; and the subject of the statement, that can be understood as the form of content (which is different to the addressee of the letter). According to Deleuze and Guattari, what Kafka is trying to do in the letters is to play with this duality by assigning movement to the subject of the statement instead of the subject of enunciation. It is the sending of the letter, its path that expresses this movement. By reversing the relationship between the two subjects, Kafka produces a doubling (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 30-32). What is the function of the double? As Deleuze explains in Proust and Signs, it provides a new system of subjectivity of a doubled or split subject where instead of having a narrator, which functions as a subject, you have a machine that aims to becomes collective as it forges different connections to the outside (Deleuze 2008: 117; Deleuze and Guattari, 1986: 18).

Third, what is interesting about the letters is that the subject of the statement attempts to achieve exactly what the subject of enunciation is trying to avoid – the conjugal contract. Kafka will create a map of the obstacles that the subject of the statement will attempt to remove, while at the same time, the subject of enunciation is bringing about these obstacles. One might be tempted to ask who is guilty in this situation? However, Deleuze and Guattari argue that the letters postulate everyone’s innocence: the innocence of the subject of enunciation that has done nothing; the innocence of the subject of the statement that has done everything, that has ventured ‘forth in the letters, attempting valiantly but in vain to overcome the obstacles to physical encounters’ (Bogue 2003: 76); and the innocence of the addressee. According to Deleuze and Guattari, this creates both a torturous and a humorous situation (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 31-32). Kafka’s humour, as Porter explains, is intimately connected to his politics (Porter 2009: 17; 20). Instead of an apolitical, and psychoanalytical or neurotic reading of Kafka - where guilt is assigned to the father; Deleuze and Guattari argue that Kafka is a comic and political writer whose letters provide a critique of the interiority of guilt through a critique of conjugality and Oedipus and the family (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 9, 32, 95).

This criticism is made through a comic amplification or comic enlargement (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 10; 14), where Oedipus is ‘enlarged to the point of absurdity’
(Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 10). This means the image of the father is projected into the whole world, showing aspects of the father that were not visible before (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 20). Therefore, the first consequence of comic amplification is the discovery that behind the familial triangle – made up of the father, the mother, and the child – there are other triangles at work; the family is subjected to outside powers for example of the economy or the state (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986: 11; 17). As Porter explains, the consequence of this is that the Oedipal figure is ‘revealed as product of a certain combat or regime of power.’ Therefore, before Oedipus and the Oedipus complex, there is power and the capitalist state apparatus (Porter, 2009: 21). This is the argument Deleuze and Guattari develop in Anti-Oedipus, where they claim Oedipal psychoanalysis supports the reproduction of capitalism by reinforcing capitalist subjectivity (Holland 2012: 318). The second aspect of comic amplification is that by exposing the other triangles that are connected to the familial triangle, a possible line of escape appears (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 12). This line of escape is not about achieving absolute freedom, but about finding a path where there did not seem to be one (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 10; 13).

However, the letters will ultimately be unable to provide a line of escape and they will entrap the author (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 34). There are three reasons for this. First, the doubling of the subject is not enough to get rid of subjectivity (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 30). Second, as Deleuze and Guattari explain, the postulation of everyone as innocent is the worst accusation because it shows a submission to outside powers creating an impasse (Deleuze and Guattari 1946: 11). Third, in the letters there is a re-Oedipalization, not by a return of guilt but by fatigue and by an outside judgement or a trial by the family, friends or a tribunal (Deleuze and Guattari 1946: 33). Nonetheless, even though the letters remain insufficient, Deleuze and Guattari argue they are indispensable for Kafka’s literary machine. The letters help set the machine in motion. In Deleuze and Guattari’s words ‘The elements of the literary machine are already in these letters, even if they are insufficiently utilized and remain ineffective’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 29).

Kafka’s Stories

Now we can turn to the second component of Kafka’s writing machine: the stories. As already mentioned, the letters set in motion the machine, but they were not enough to find a line of escape. In the stories, on the other hand, the animal will attempt to find this line of escape that was missing or unsuccessful in the letters (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 34-35). For example, in The Metamorphosis, Gregor’s becomes-animal in order to find a line of escape away from the familial triangle and
the bureaucratic and commercial triangle (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 14). What does becoming-animal entail? First of all, as Deleuze and Guattari explain ‘there is nothing metaphoric about the becoming-animal. No symbolism, no allegory’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 35), and no imitation (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 13-14). Instead, as Bogue explains, becoming-animal can be understood as a process of becoming-other, which gives people an opportunity to move away from human codes by interacting with animals (Bogue 2007: 158). However, this only shows one side of the process. Deleuze and Guattari argue there is a double process of deterritorialization, a simultaneous becoming-animal of the human and a becoming-human of the animal (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986: 14; 35). In order to clarify this double process of deterritorialization, we can turn to Deleuze and Guattari’s most famous example of this process: the relationship between the orchid and the wasp. On one side, the orchid becomes deterritorialized by creating an image of a female wasp, which attracts a male wasp that is reterritorialized in this image. On the other side, the wasp becomes deterritorialized by becoming part of the orchid’s reproductive apparatus, reterritorializing the orchid by transporting its pollen (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 10; Deleuze and Parnet 2007: 2; Adkins 2015: 28). This can be understood as a double process of becoming (Holland, 2013: 39), where there is a simultaneous wasp-becoming of the orchid, as a sexual organ of the wasp; and an orchid-becoming of the wasp, as part of the reproductive apparatus of the orchid (Deleuze and Parnet 2007: 2).

Nonetheless, Deleuze and Guattari argue the animal stories indicate a line of escape that the animal is ultimately unable to follow (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986: 37). The stories remain insufficient for two reasons. First, although becoming-animal allows Kafka to overcome the duality of the letters, moving away from subjectivity; Deleuze and Guattari argue the animal still plays the role of a collective subject (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986: 15, 36, 84). In Deleuze and Guattari’s words ‘the animal was still to close, still to perceptible, too visible, too individuated…’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 37). Second, the stories will either close on themselves in order to be finished; or they will open up to the point of being interminable (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986: 36). In this sense, the letters show us a way into the assemblage, without actually making the assemblage work (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986: 37, 84).

**Kafka’s Novels**

It is not until the novels that a more complex and functioning assemblage is developed (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 37). As Bogue explains, in the novels Kafka is finally able to maintain the movement that keeps the writing machine functioning (for this reason the novels always remain unfinished) (Bogue 2003: 4). However two
questions remain: what is the difference between the stories, the novels, and the letters? What makes the novels work? The difference between the letters, the stories and the novels is that they each form a different type of machine. First we have the machinic index of the letters, where you can appreciate individual pieces that are sign of an assemblage, but we do not know how they function together yet (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986: 47). Second, we have the abstract machines of the stories, which remain transcendental, thus they are unable to develop in a concrete way and connect to other assemblages (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 47-48). Third, we have the assemblage of the machine in the novels, where we move from machinic indexes or abstract machines, into real self-sufficient assemblages (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986: 48). This means that in order for the machine to develop, it needs to connect into concrete political and social assemblages (Deleuze and Guattari 38; 39). In other words, in the novels the lines of escape are finally ‘connected into specific circuits’ (Bogue 2003: 78); that go across the personal, familial and socio-political domains (Bogue 2003: 192). In the novels, Kafka is finally able to get rid of the subject, the subject becomes a ‘general function’ that is connected to series and proliferates. In this sense, as already mentioned, the individual is not opposed to the general, but connected to it (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986: 84). In Deleuze and Guattari’s words, K, in The Trial, functions as ‘a polyvalent assemblage of which the solitary individual is only a part, the coming collectivity being another part, another piece of the machine’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 85).

In the novels we can fully appreciate the critical power of Kafka’s literary machine, which was present in the letters and the stories, but was still insufficient. However, before discussing the critical power of the literary machine it is important to make a note on the relationship between the letters, the stories and the novels. Deleuze and Guattari argue there is a constant communication, in different directions, between these three components of the literary machine. In this sense the lived experience of the letters is as connected to the written experience, as the written experience is connected to the lived experience; there is no primacy of one over the other (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 40).

Going back to the critical power of the literary machine, which is fully developed in the novels Deleuze and Guattari argue there are two simultaneous functions of writing: first, to convert everything into assemblages; and second, to dismantle these assemblages (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 47). As Porter emphasizes, Deleuze and Guattari are arguing that translating everything into assemblages, and dismantling these assemblages, are part of the same task (Porter 2009: 27). The question is, how exactly are translation and dismantling connected? Deleuze and Guattari’s example in Kafka is his dismantling of three particular aspects of the law:
‘the transcendence of the law, the interiority of guilt, and subjectivity of enunciation’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 45). We can start by looking at the critique of the transcendence of the law. According to Deleuze and Guattari’s reading, in opposition to the transcendent understanding of the law, where there is a pre-existent conception of the Good, Kafka portrays the law as having no content and no object. There are two consequences of this, first the law is unknowable and ambiguous, and thus it can only be justified with reference to its practical necessity. Second, the law only functions through its expression in a sentence, ‘it is the statement, the enunciation, that constructs the law in the name of an immanent power of the one who enounces it’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 45); this statement is then attributed to a body through punishment (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 43-45). In other words, the law is conceived as the effect of an action, rather than as an end in itself (Colebrook 2002: 310). The second aspect of the law that is dismantled is guilt, according to Deleuze and Guattari Kafka replaces the Oedipal theme of guilt with fear, escape and dismantling. Thus, the letters are driven by a fear of entrapment instead of by guilt, the animal stories are driven by the need of finding a line of escape, and the novels are driven by an attempt to dismantle the assemblage (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 46). Finally, as already mentioned according to Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka’s literary machine is driven by an attempt to move away from the subject. However, it is not until the novels where statements are not attributed to a particular subject of enunciation, but to a collective assemblage of enunciation (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 84).

As Bogue summarizes, through the transcription and dismantling of assemblages, Kafka modifies familiar codes and institutions: ‘Kafka defamiliarizes the law by depriving it of its conventional, commonsense logic’ (Bogue 2003: 80). Therefore, as the example of Kafka’s dismantling of the law demonstrates, the function of Kafka’s literary machine is not to represent the world, but to transform it; Kafka is first and foremost a political author. Kafka’s literary machine is infused with a critical power that directly intervenes in the real. However, it is important to clarify what it is meant by critical, as Deleuze and Guattari claim that ‘there is never any social criticism in Kafka’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 46). How can Kafka be conceived as a political writer and not a critical writer? As explained by Porter, in Kafka, Deleuze and Guattari provide a critique of ‘any image of critique grounded solely or simply in representation’ (Porter 2009: 39). In Deleuze and Guattari’s words, ‘the method of active dismantling doesn’t make use of criticism that is still part of representation’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 48). Instead of representation, critique can be understood as experimentation, an attempt to connect to the virtual (but not less real) movement which transverses social field (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 49; 58
Conclusion

Given a summary of the project was already provided in the introduction. The aim of the conclusion is to provide a reformulation of the project of immanent critique, through Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism, in order to highlight the critical aspect of Deleuze’s project. The importance of transcendental empiricism lays in the fact that it provides a critical philosophy a way of going beyond the representation of the world into that which constitutes it, opening up the possibilities of transformation. As Bryant explains, transcendental empiricism can be understood as ‘the philosophical position which determines the conditions of the real rather than possible experience’ (Bryant 2008: 3). This represents a move away from Kant’s transcendental idealism, which posited a sharp distinction between things as they appear to us (phenomena), and things in themselves (noumena) (Stang 2016); which led to the conditions for the possibility of knowledge being limited to phenomena through the subject (Bergen 2009: 7-8). However, according to Deleuze, the problem with Kant is that the condition (the subject’s consciousness) ends up replicating the image of the conditioned (experience) in a vicious circle (Deleuze 1990: 105; Bryant 2008: 31). In Bryant’s words: ‘the conditions are supposed to account for the possibility of truth within experience, yet the conditions themselves get their justification insofar as experience is taken to be true’ (Bryant 2008: 32). In opposition to this Deleuze, following Maimon, aims to establish the genetic conditions of real experience through a principle of difference (Smith and Protevi 2015). Breaking away from the Kantian dualism between phenomenon and noumenon (Bergen 2009: 8). As explained in chapter two, according to Deleuze, Nietzsche satisfied these two exigencies with genealogy as a genetic method and the will to power as a principle of difference (Smith and Protevi 2015).

Following Bergson, the problem of noumena and phenomena, or the transcendental and the empirical, can also be articulated in terms of the virtual and the actual (Bergen 2009: 8). As already mentioned, in contrast to Kant, for Deleuze the conditions cannot resemble the conditioned (Smith and Protevi 2015). Therefore, while the actual refers to the state of affairs and individuals (Boundas 2005: 296), the virtual refers to a pure transcendental field made up of pure or intensive differences (Bergen 2009: 8). In other words, while the actual refers to our experience of the world and the identities that conform it, the virtual is the ground for those identities and it is therefore purely differential (Smith and Protevi 2015). What does it mean to be purely differential? As explained by Williams, one of Deleuze’s aims in Difference and Repetition is to think difference in itself, beyond identity and representation, for example as in the case of ‘the difference between two things’ (Williams 2003: 55). The problem of these approaches to difference is that they presume the identity of
related things, which leads to the abolishing difference (MacKenzie and Porter 2011: 60). Therefore, when Deleuze talks about intensive relations or relations of pure difference he is referring to internal difference or the difference of ‘Being from itself’ as opposed to ‘external difference between beings’ – providing a mobile picture of the world (Smith 2012: 41).

How can we understand the relationship between the virtual and the actual? As Clisby and Bowden explain, there are two main interpretations of the relationship between the virtual and the actual. On one side, we have commentators such as Badiou (2000) and Hallward (2006) who grant ontological priority to the virtual over the actual (Clisby and Bowden 2017: 153). The consequence of this interpretation is the portrayal of Deleuze as a mystic or spiritual thinker who is ‘indifferent to the politics of this world’ (Hallward 2006: 162). In contrast to this, other authors such as Smith (2012) and Williams (2003) understand the relationship between the virtual and the actual as one of ontological influence (Clisby and Bowden 2017: 153). As Boundas suggests, this interpretation can be portrayed in the following diagram:

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virtual/real <-> actual/real <-> virtual/real
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As this diagram shows, not only can we access the actual through the virtual, we can also access the virtual through the actual (Mackenzie and Porter 2011: 64). In other words, although the virtual is actualized in a given state of affairs, we can also move from the actual state of affairs, through its virtual potential, into its actualization in a new state of affairs (Boundas 2005: 297). Second, the diagram shows how for Deleuze both the actual and the virtual are real. As MacKenzie and Porter explain, the difference between the virtual and the actual is that the virtual is made up of relations of pure differences that are indeterminate: ‘they have a role in determining individuals but cannot in themselves be determined.’ However, the virtual is still real in the sense that it is a component of actual determinable things (MacKenzie and Porter 2011: 61).

As MacKenzie and Porter show us, the advantage of this interpretation is that it is compatible with a reading of Deleuze philosophy as a critical philosophy, which provides us tools for the transformation of the world (MacKenzie and Porter 2011: 65). How is this the case? As Smith explains, if ‘the virtual and the actual are related to one another and entail changes in one another’ (Smith 2003: 198), then it follows that you can access the virtual through changing the actual (MacKenzie and Porter 2011: 64). To be more precise, the only way of accessing the virtual is through experimentation with the actual, since the virtual is not identifiable as an object of knowledge (Smith 2003: 197). Therefore, as argued by MacKenzie and Porter (2011) Deleuze’s philosophy can be understood as part of a lineage of critical methods inspired by Marx’s thesis 11 on Feuerbach ‘philosophers have only interpreted the
world, in various ways, the point is to change it’ (McLellan 2000: 173). Broadly speaking, the main point uniting this lineage of critical methods is that ‘knowledge regarding the social and political world... will only emerge in the process of transforming society and politics’ (MacKenzie and Porter 2011: 65).

Before finalizing, it is important to acknowledge the last challenge that was faced when putting the different sections of this project together. While the problem of immanence was present quite explicitly throughout the thesis, this was not the case for the problems of critique and politics; or at least not as explicitly. It seems to be the case, that when we concentrate on the immanent philosophical side of the problem of an immanent critique, we tend to lose sight of critique and of politics. Therefore, one question still remains: how do we develop an account of the philosophical conditions of critique without losing track of politics and critique itself? Additionally, there is a similar question that I have been struggling with as the end of this project approached, while attempting to develop a PhD proposal: how do we develop an account of the philosophical conditions of resistance without losing track of politics and resistance itself?
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