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WHY WE STILL NEED TO TALK ABOUT RACE

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A culture of racial equivalence

When I was a visiting professor in Malmo, Sweden, in 2013, I gave a series of talks. In each of these, I often encountered someone who declared that, in effect, they didn’t ‘do’ race in Sweden, and that it was a North American affliction (and to a lesser extent, a British one). Nevertheless, there was ample talk of ‘racism’ – though what, exactly, this constituted, was the subject of widespread debate.

In Europe, Sweden, a country of 9.5 million people, has been the poster child for welcoming migrants and refugees, until recently taking in more Syrian refugees per capita than any other European country (New York Times 2016). But like many other European countries, Sweden is now weary (and wary) of more migrants, and grappling with societal tensions about how the influx of migrants will affect Swedish values, culture and society. In June 2016, Sweden enacted new restrictions which would limit the number of refugees granted permanent residency, and rules which make it harder for parents to be reunited with their children (ibid).

No, this is not an article about Sweden, but I draw on it to argue the following: while the use of the term ‘racism’ is more ubiquitous than ever, many official bodies and people shrink from the concept of ‘race’ – and what has happened is that our understandings and assertions of racism are increasingly divorced from historical understandings of ‘race’ and racial difference. This tendency, to refer to racism, without reference to its racial basis, is now common throughout much of Europe.

A Harvard study of the Implicit Association Test (IAT) on about 288,000 White Europeans between 2002-2015 found that Sweden was quite low in its mean IAT scores, in comparison with, say, Italy, Portugal, Bulgaria, or the Czech Republic (Banaji & Greenwald 2013). So this one measure would appear to confirm Swedes’ conception of their society as a relatively open and non-prejudicial one. But of course, it is only one measure of ‘racism’, and not without controversy, since implicit racial bias scores may not always be associated with people’s behaviors.
I point to the Swedish case as an example of how difficult it is to make definitive pronouncements about societies as ‘racist’ – in particular because such a bewildering array of scenarios and interactions are now called ‘racist’. On the one hand, in Britain, some analysts and politicians claim that ‘racism’ has significantly receded. For instance, while acknowledging that racism is not yet wholly defeated, Munira Mirza, the former cultural advisor to Boris Johnson, the former London mayor, argued in 2010 in the center-Right magazine *Prospect*, that the politics of race generated a culture of victimhood. Mirza also pointed to Trevor Phillips, the (then) head of the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), who believed the term “institutional racism” was no longer relevant in Britain.

On the other hand, many others would deny the degree to which racism has diminished in Britain, and point to a variety of examples – such as a persistent educational attainment gap between White and ‘BME’ students in British universities (Gillborn 2008), which is due, at least in part, to racial barriers and prejudice. In fact, the human rights watchdog the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) recently pointed to the need for urgent government action to tackle the "very worrying combination" of a post-Brexit rise in hate crime and "deep-rooted" racial inequality faced by Britain’s ethnic minorities. Furthermore, the EHRC review found that Black university graduates are paid 23.1% less than the average white worker with a degree. Black, Asian and ethnic minority workers with degrees are also two and a half times more likely to be unemployed than white workers with a university education, while black workers with degrees earned 23% less on average than a white worker with similar qualifications (Time 2016).

We are certainly living through a time when Britain (like much of Europe) is nervously coming to terms with its increasingly diverse population. David Coleman (2010), a prominent demographer at Oxford, reflected on Britain’s impending changes:

'[A]…transition to a “majority minority” population, whenever it happens, would represent an enormous change to national identity—cultural, political, economic and religious…. It would be curious if embarrassment or demographic ignorance [about this impending majority minority shift] permitted an old society to marginalise itself in its own homeland without discussing it."

Despite the polarized nature of this debate, there is often a common thread that runs through both sides of the argument: many proponents on both sides speak of, and conceive of, ‘racism’ in such general terms, that it is little wonder that they readily find those who disagree with them. In fact, even well-meaning defenders of the view that racism is still a major problem in
contemporary society can talk about racism in a way that seems to suggest its monolithic and everywhere nature.

In the aftermath of the murder of the Black teenager Stephen Lawrence (in 1993), the Macpherson Report (1999) and its elaboration of institutional racism resulted in a widely disseminated set of ideas about racism, including, the definition of a ‘racist incident’: ‘A racist incident is any incident which is perceived to be racist by the victim or other person’ [Macpherson Report 1999]. This astonishingly broad definition of racism is emblematic of the conceptual (and political) contestations around particular understandings of racial discrimination, disadvantage, prejudice, and/or stereotyping.

In Britain, especially in comparison with the USA, there is no singular way of being racist, and various British scholars have criticized (albeit in different ways) a racial binarism which has traditionally conceived of racialized interactions in terms of a Black/White field (see Cohen 1996; Modood 1994). Making sense of the myriad racially inflected interactions and phenomena which now occur in multi-ethnic societies is not easy (Solomos & Back 1996; Rattansi 2007), where the actors are not always easily categorized in relation to the majority or minority, or as the oppressors or the oppressed.

In fact, for decades, there has been a wide-ranging theoretical debate among British scholars about ‘racism’ and ‘racialization’. In their 2005 volume on racialization, Karim Murji & John Solomos critically assess the use of terms which have become popular in our lexicon, such as ‘racialization’ – an idea that they find ‘... useful for describing the processes by which racial meanings are attached to particular issues’ (3). However, they rightly argue that there is confusion about what exactly is meant by the term ‘racialization’: ‘It is not always clear what the race in racialization refers to – a specific and narrow discourse of biologically distinctive races, a process of cultural differentiation, or a code in which the idea or language of race is not manifest at all.’ (4)

Among the many issues raised in what we mean by racism or racialization, Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1992: 2) contend that various ‘modes of exclusion, inferiorization, subordination and exploitation’ can involve differing levels of severity, and are ‘differentially experienced by different class, ethnic and gender categories’. Another is a more postmodern conceptualization of racism (e.g. Ali Rattansi 2007), which challenges the simplistic binaries of racist v. non-racist, and which has destabilized the old (often overly neat) certainties around how we have understood racism. So while there has been ample debate about achieving a more nuanced understanding of racism, so that we are better able to theorize specific racial incidents which can involve sometimes
contradictory and ambivalent people, we also need to retain an understanding of racism which is not overly relativized or solely individualistic in emphasis – that is, racism as a structured system of power and domination (while changeable) which has a historical basis (Bonilla-Silva 2001).

Related to these debates about how we should conceive of ‘racism’, I have argued elsewhere that a culture of racial equivalence is now widespread in Britain (Song 2014). This culture of racial equivalence is manifested in terms of: a) a tendency to see all racially inflected interactions and scenarios as ‘racist’ in a one size fits all way, without a careful consideration of context, or significant differences in outcomes; b) White backlash against charges of racism and assertions that White people, too, are the victims of racism -- as being on par with the historically devastating depictions and treatment of many non-White people in the not too distant past. Stephen Small (1994) has written eloquently about the historical experiences of Black people in particular, and the importance of this for our understanding of racism today, as well as in the not too distant past; c) and often vacuous and bite size exchanges about racism (often done on Twitter and other social media) which militate against the kind of reasoned and qualified argumentation that is required for any sensible discussion about racism in contemporary society.

An avoidance of ‘race’ (or de-coupling of racism and race)

Thus, this culture of racial equivalence, amidst a political climate in which it is suggested that anyone can be a ‘victim’ of racism, has resulted in assertions of racism which have either become ‘inflated’ and have lost precision, or discussions of racism which are so relativized that it is difficult to formulate any way forward – this culture of racial equivalence makes the need to specify what we mean by racism all the more urgent – but in order to do so, we need to talk about ‘race’, and its centrality to understandings of racism.

To continue talking about race is not necessarily to insist upon its a priori salience, irrespective of specific contexts, or the parties involved. But in order to be able to differentiate the mishmash of essentialist beliefs, xenophobia, and ethnocentrism (all of which are treated as ‘racism’), we must address and grapple with ideas and beliefs about race, which are still very much in circulation.

But despite the widespread use of the term ‘racism’, there has been a de-coupling of ‘racism’ and race in Britain, and arguably, other European societies. Even in the USA, where the idea of race has been a fundamental feature of its social and political history and institutions,
analysts increasingly point to the prevalence of ‘color blind racism’, which is characterized by a denial that race and racial differences continue to matter (see Bonilla-Silva 2003). The language of ‘race’ – while not as absent as in Sweden -- can be oddly absent and avoided in British conversations, especially those among (often well-intentioned) academics and official bodies, such as the Office for National Statistics (ONS), which favours the term ‘ethnicity’. This reluctance to use the term ‘race’, and the preference for ‘ethnicity’, as others too have argued, translates into an equivocation about race. As Patrick Simon has recently argued, something is lost by using mere ‘proxies’ of race.

In arguing for the importance of not shying away from the use of race and racial terminologies, it is not my intention to champion ‘race’, as opposed to ‘ethnicity’. Both concepts are necessary to understand the increasingly diverse societies in which we live, and of course essentializing arguments can be made about both ethnicity and race. While race and ethnicity can coincide in particular ways (Song 2003), in general, ‘race’ is understood in terms of an imposition of power via the categorization of subordinated peoples by dominant Whites.¹

While I cannot go into any detail, here, about the historical basis for the avoidance of ‘race’ on this side of the Atlantic – something that has been fundamentally shaped by the horrors of the Holocaust and Nazi ‘race science’ -- this avoidance of the term also stems from the post-racial aspirations articulated by various scholars on both sides of the pond and the understandable concerns about the reification of race and racial ways of thinking.

For decades, there has been considerable discussion and debate about the problematic reification of race and racial thinking. Various analysts have argued against the use of ‘race’ in social science – for instance, see the work of Michael Banton (1977), Roger Miles (1989), and Paul Gilroy (2000). The philosopher Naomi Zack (1993; 1995) has argued against a multiracial concept and category and argues for a post-race theory of ‘racelessness’ and ‘deracination’. Zack insists that she has no racial affiliation, and that she will not accept any racial designations. But as Wendy Roth pointed out recently, it is not empirically proven that using ‘race’ in scholarship actually reinforces people’s sense of race.

It would be naïve and even disingenuous to assume that we really have moved away from thoughts about race and racial difference, as argued by various scholars or race. For instance, Ann Morning (2011) has argued that biological interpretations of race have remained powerful in our society, and that the belief that race is a socially constructed phenomenon is widespread is probably wishful thinking (and see Duster 1990).² Even when people articulate the idea that race is socially constructed, such assertions can be eclipsed or counteracted by evidence that many people still,
'deep down', subscribe (whether consciously or not) to the idea that human beings are racially different in meaningful and consequential ways.

Given the significant and increasing demographic diversification in Britain (and many other societies), there is now even more urgency in addressing this avoidance of race, as it is not possible to effectively capture this diversity, or to rescue and rehabilitate the concept of ‘racism’ without doing so. Britain is undergoing notable demographic changes. In Britain, ‘super-diversity’ (Vertovec 2007) is evident in both the long settled descendants of Britain’s former colonies in the Caribbean, Africa, and Asia, along with the much more recent migrants who have come to Britain as part of the enlargement of the European Union. As such, we now live in societies where there is an intermingling and overlapping of racial, ethnic, national, and religious backgrounds.

In fact, the growth of the ‘White Other’ category (as opposed to ‘White British’) in the 2011 Census coincides with the fact that Polish people now outnumber Indians as the largest foreign-born group in the UK. Polish is the second most spoken language in Britain. The growing presence of White ‘others’ (such as Poles) -- necessitates that we retain our focus on race and the ways in which White racial appearance and privilege (even amidst xenophobic sentiments, post-Brexit) remain of central importance to particular social formations.

Another significant demographic change (and the one I will now focus upon in the remainder of the article) – the growth of interracial unions, and related to this, the growth of mixed people -- has been marked in Britain, especially in the last two decades. This growth also illustrates the importance of not de-coupling race and racism and of specifying, clearly, the basis for racial, as opposed to other, bases of disadvantage and stigma.

I will now discuss the avoidance of race by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) in Britain, and in particular how its use of ‘ethnic’ categories is problematic for mapping racial stigma or disadvantage. The use of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘ethnic group’ is not just a semantic issue, but one that hampers our ability to differentiate between interethnic and interracial unions, and by extension, between people who are ethnically as opposed to racially mixed.

The Office for National Statistics – and its use of ‘ethnic group’ and ‘ethnicity’

Britain engages in a significant amount of data collection concerning what the Office for National Statistics calls ‘ethnic group’. The decennial England and Wales census has had an ‘ethnicity’ question since 1991. In the 2011 England and Wales census, we are asked: ‘What is your ethnic
“Ethnic group?”; a question which elicits self-identification. ‘Ethnicity’ and ‘ethnic group’ are the overarching terms used by the ONS. The Office for National Statistics is clear that the ethnic group question is based on self-definition: ‘Membership of an ethnic group is something that is subjectively meaningful to the person concerned, and this is the principal basis for ethnic categorisation in the United Kingdom. So, in ethnic group questions, we are unable to base ethnic identification upon objective, quantifiable information as we would, say, for age or gender.’ (‘Ethnic Group Statistics’ 2003 ONS, p. 9).

**Fig. 1. England and Wales 2011 Census: ethnic group question**

**What is your ethnic group?**

→ Choose **one** section from A to E, then tick **one** box to best describe your ethnic group or background.

**A White**

- English/Welsh/Scottish/Northern Irish/British
- Irish
- Gypsy or Irish Traveller
- Any other White background, write in: ________________________________

**B Mixed/multiple ethnic groups**

- White and Black Caribbean
- White and Black African
- White and Asian
- Any other Mixed/multiple ethnic background, write in: ________________________________

**C Asian/Asian British**

- Indian
- Pakistani
- Bangladeshi
- Chinese
- Any other Asian background, write in: ________________________________

**D Black/African/Caribbean/Black British**

- African
- Caribbean
- Any other Black/African/Caribbean background, write in: ________________________________
While there is no explicit statement to this effect, the ONS’s consistent use of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘ethnic group’ suggests a desire to avoid the language of race. This use of ‘ethnic group’ (and avoidance of ‘race’) is a meaningful ‘discursive frame’ which is intended to avoid the baggage associated with ‘race’ and beliefs about racial difference. Yet, there is often an unacknowledged slippage into what are clearly references to race and racial difference. But this avoidance of ‘race’ by the ONS is striking, given the over-use of ‘racism’ in the wider society and many official publications.

Two related demographic factors – the growth of what the ONS call ‘interethnic unions’ and ‘mixed/multiple ethnic groups’ people in Britain – highlights the difficulties of not using racial terminology. The mixed population is certainly one of the fastest growing sectors of the British population (Coleman 2010). The 2011 England and Wales Census revealed that the ‘Mixed/multiple ethnic groups’ grew from 1.2% in 2001 to 2.2% of the population in 2011 (ONS 2012), but this is almost certainly an undercount. And the latest US Census report – that 2.1% of the American population was multiracial – is also an undercount, if one considers the racial ancestries of people with parents and/or grandparents of disparate races, which would bring the multiracial population up to 6.9% (Pew 2015).

In light of the significant demographic diversity we are witnessing today, in which there are multiple and overlapping modes of ‘mixing’ (which may not involve racial mixing), it is even more pressing that we refer explicitly to ideas and discourses about race. In fact, the avoidance of ‘race’ in the conceptualization and measurement of both ‘interethnic unions’ and ‘mixed’ people in the British census seriously compromises our ability to map racially distinctive ways in which mixed relationships occur, as well as our understanding of the racial diversity contained within the category ‘mixed’.

What is the stated purpose of the ethnic question? ‘The ethnic group question provides information on the population’s ethnic characteristics which can be used by private and public organisations to monitor equal opportunities and anti-discrimination policies, and to plan for the future through resource allocation and informing provision of services.’ (ONS 2012). Yet this self-
defined measure of ‘ethnic group’ can be at odds with the aim of capturing information about ethnic and racial diversity, not to mention information about racial (in)equalities and opportunities.

The definition of ‘inter-ethnic unions’ and its implications

Let us now look at a specific example of how the overarching use of ‘ethnic group’ and ethnicity in the British census informs our understanding of ‘difference’ in British society – in its conceptualization and measure of ‘inter-ethnic unions’. To the extent that measures of intermarriage or interracial unions are a key indicator of social integration and the blurring or declining of racial boundaries, and an important marker of true social acceptance by the wider (dominant) society, such measures are considered to be very important (Gordon 1964; Park 1928; Alba & Nee 2003; Alba et al. 2017). However, some scholars have more recently questioned the assumptions about the social outcomes of intermarriage with White people (see Song 2009; Vasquez 2014; Rodriguez-Garcia 2015). Furthermore, increasingly, intermarriages will involve unions without wholly White partners (see Gambol 2016).

In general, there is evidence that attitudes toward interracial relationships have relaxed in Britain, and there is growing evidence of what Chamion Caballero, Ros Edwards, and Darren Smith (2008) call ‘cultures of mixing’ which can involve partners from different racial, ethnic, and/or religious background which increasingly comprise normal, everyday life in many urban and suburban regions. By ‘interracial’ unions, I mean those involving people seen as belonging to visibly different ‘races’, as opposed to ‘interethnic’ unions, which may involve individuals of disparate ethnic, but not ‘racial’ backgrounds, such as French/English, or Chinese/Korean.

According to the ONS, ‘Inter-ethnic relationships are defined here as a relationship between people living in a couple who are married, in a civil partnership, or cohabiting and each partner identifies with an ethnic group different from the other partner (within any of the 18 ethnic group classifications used in the census). For example, if someone who identified as Black Caribbean and someone who identified as White British were in a relationship then that would be an inter-ethnic relationship. An inter-ethnic relationship can also be between groups within the broad ethnic group categories, such as someone who was a Gypsy or Irish Traveller and someone who was White British.’ (ONS 2014).

Here, ‘broad ethnic group categories’ [see the Census 2011 categories] are effectively akin to racial groupings, though this terminology is not used. In this excerpt above, the union between a ‘Gypsy or Irish Traveller and someone who was White British’ (both of whom are [usually] ‘White’) is treated as equivalent to an ‘interethnic’ union between a Black Caribbean and White British person (the five ‘broad ethnic group’ categories in the census include: ‘White’, ‘Mixed/multiple...
Therefore, as I have argued elsewhere, this measure of an ‘inter-ethnic’ union does not differentiate between unions which are interethnic and those which are interracial, and is thus problematic (Song 2015). Only individuals and their partners who tick the same box among the 18 categories in the 2011 census will be considered NOT to be in an interethnic union). So not only does this method of measuring and enumerating ‘inter-ethnic’ unions disregard the distinction between interethnic and interracial unions, it also obscures the racial overlap between, say, a Black Caribbean and Black African couple who may have ticked two separate boxes (of the 18).

By extension, since the Office for National Statistics does not provide a clear definition of 'Mixed' (see Bradford 2006), we can only derive a working definition from the ONS’s definition of an ‘interethnic’ union – mixed people are the progeny, presumably, of the ‘interethnic’ unions described above. As such, ONS’s working definition of a 'Mixed’ person also conflates someone with two or more ethnic ancestries (e.g. French and English) with two or more racial (in addition to ethnic) ancestries (e.g. Indian and English).

If the stated purpose of the British census ethnicity question (‘what is your ethnic group?’) (see above) is to best discern the population’s ethnic characteristics to engage in forms of equal opportunity monitoring, the collection of ethnic data in the form of self-identification (using the ‘ethnic’ categories in the 2011 census) does not provide the most useful (or necessary) information. A key problem with the way in which ‘interethnic’ unions is measured, above, is that it suggests the direct equivalence of interethnic unions (e.g. French and English) with interracial unions, which are still regarded as much more socially transgressive, and which are certainly much more visible in social contexts (Song 2014).

Increasingly, we need to differentiate interethnic and interracial unions, given the number of White European migrants to Britain, esp since 2004 (e.g. Polish, Romanians, etc.). Jon Fox (2012) talks of the ‘uses’ of racism on the part of Hungarian and Romanian migrants in Britain, who assert their Whiteness (vis-à-vis non-White Britons or migrants) so that they are able to accrue both social-psychological and material benefits especially in terms of accessing the labour market. Sociologically, it will be very interesting to see what the ‘integration’ trajectory for second generation White European migrants (such as Poles and Hungarians) will be, since most are seen as White, even if they are ‘lesser Whites’ than the British (Garner 2010).

And if we consider another demographic trend, the adult mixed population in Britain, who have themselves partnered, and have become parents, the importance of not losing sight of race is even more pronounced. In Britain, as in other Western societies on both sides of the Atlantic, many multiracial people (most of whom are part White) partner with White individuals (ONS 2005). There are yet no clear

conventions for how we characterize endogamous or exogamous relationships for multiracial people (Song 2015). Furthermore, with the growth in ‘multigeneration’ mixed people who are several generations removed from their non-White ancestry, there is likely to be a tipping point at which mixed people may not identify as multiracial – yet the penalty of looking anything other than incontrovertibly White will be borne differentially among disparate types of mixed people. For example, the recognition of Black ancestry is still often salient in the lives of partially Black people in Britain (Aspinall & Song 2013). Non-white racial appearances (including racially ambiguous phenotypes) will continue to matter (Telles 2006). In the coming years, we are more likely to see unions between disparate non-White people, and while they may remain relatively small in numbers, we will want to differentiate between multiracial people who are mostly White in their ancestry, as opposed to those who are mostly non-White – as their lived experiences are likely to be divergent, though in ways which require empirical investigation, in terms of their class, regional, and gender backgrounds.

CONCLUSION

To conclude, I have argued against the dangers of a ‘culture of racial equivalence’ and the importance of retaining a focus on race. We need to understand the central place that long-standing beliefs about race and racial difference play in instances of racism, and to distinguish these from instances of xenophobia or ethnocentrism (which may or may not have a racial dimension). But in order to resuscitate a more careful definition of ‘racism’, we must continue talking about race, as opposed to the more sanitized term ‘ethnicity’. So while we cannot assume the automatic salience of race in social scenarios (especially with super-diversity & multigeneration mixed people), ethnicity should not be used as a means of avoiding talk about ‘race’.

One issue which will continue to resurface is the question of how we conceive of certain religious groups in relation to religion, ethnicity, and race. We need to re-double our efforts to look at the often messy co-minglings of race, ethnicity, and religion. For example, why do many analysts continue to conceive of anti-Muslim sentiments and actions as having an exclusively religious basis, as opposed to being, as Nasar Meer (2013) argues, co-constituted with race? The categorization – both theoretically and in policy terms – of Muslims in Britain is by no means uncontested. As Murji and Solomos (2005) have pointed out, scholars such as Robin Cohen have argued against the use of ‘racialization’ in relation to a broader array of groups, such as Muslims. In a rather different vein, Nancy Foner (2015) has recently compared the ‘color coded race in the United States’ [specifically in relation to Black people] with the [religious] stigmas faced by Muslims in Western Europe. In fact, most Muslims in Britain are South Asian, Black, or Middle Eastern, and
there is ample evidence of Britons of those backgrounds being subject to demeaning discourses and stereotypes in which the distinctions between racial, religious, and ethnic inflections are often quite blurred.

The careful use of the term ‘ethnic group’ and ethnicity does not result in the erosion of racial thinking – the specter of race is still there, and this avoidance can actually undermine our ability to 1) produce robust social science; this avoidance makes it difficult to engage in clear and meaningful measures of difference; b) second, this avoidance also undermines our ability to challenge various forms of ethnic and racial discrimination and disadvantage, or to recognize the specificity of many types of discriminatory experiences across increasingly diverse societies such as Britain. Ideas about race and racial difference have been employed, historically, in too many devastating ways. The concept of race is central to an understanding of racism which involves both structures of inequality and various modes of domination; as such, we still very much need ‘race’.

But even as we continue to pay attention to understandings of race and racial differences, we cannot make assumptions about the a priori salience of race and racial differences for all people who are racialized and subject to forms of racial prejudice and discrimination. People’s racial experiences will clearly be mediated significantly by their economic and human capital, class backgrounds, gender, sexuality, and region, to name a few of the most fundamental variables. As Garner (2010) has observed, class influences the ease with which racelessness can be invoked. Furthermore, a Black and White British couple in a diverse British city may report that the fact of their different racial backgrounds is relatively inconsequential in certain ways and settings (in light of their shared Britishness), while a White English and White Polish couple may report difficulties in terms of their different ethnic backgrounds. However, as I have argued above, the variability of how race is experienced by disparate people and groups does not mean that racially based forms of assignment and treatment are the same as those which are not based upon the identification of non-White phenotypes which are historically associated with negative and often subhuman characteristics and values.

The boundaries and meanings of huge categories such as ‘White’ and ‘Black’ will increasingly require scrutiny and disaggregation, given the fast pace of demographic change and diversification, in large part because of the growing rates of interracial unions and the numbers of multiracial people. In light of such changes, the classifications of people in racially stratified societies continue to be in flux and subject to contestation. One continuity we can count on is the historically arbitrary and changeable ways in which people are racially categorized, and the often significant consequences of such categorizations for their treatment by the wider society. But with forms of boundary blurring and growing diversification, social scientists must continue to investigate the
relationship between the mainstream (though what ‘mainstream’ now entails is also debated) and minority individuals and groups, and the role of race in that changing dynamic (see Alba & Nee 2003; Jung 2015; Kasinitz et al. 2008).

REFERENCES


Martin Bulmer (1986) has neatly defined race as ‘socially defined, but on the basis of physical criteria’, while ethnicity is defined as ‘socially defined, but on the basis of cultural criteria’.

The Philosopher Michael Hardimon (2017) has recently argued that simply dispensing with the notion of ‘race’ does not help us to address and to challenge the many pernicious ideas and practices associated with this concept. Hardimon argues that it is possible to use the concept of race in a minimalist way, which is not laden with pernicious, racist ideas and thoughts. In fact, he argues for a realistic understanding of ‘race’ which recognizes certain physical features of race, without imputing any significant meanings to those differences.

In the 2011 census, those who chose ‘English/Welsh/Scottish/Northern Irish/British’ as their ethnic group decreased from 94% in the 1991 England and Wales Census to 86% in the 2011 Census (ONS 2012).

Some analysts have argued that the use of ‘ethnicity’ (as opposed to ‘race’) has been a way for certain elites and policymakers to mask and/or deny the power of race (see Thompson 2015).

This is almost certainly an under-count if the population of mixed people is based on the number of people with interracial parentage, as opposed to those who self-identify as mixed on official forms (Nandi & Platt 2012). In fact, an analysis of the UK Household Longitudinal Study data (2010) indicated that of those with parents who were of different ethnic groups, only 30% identified as ‘mixed’ (ibid).

‘The most common inter-ethnic relationship was between Other White and White British (366,000 people or 16% of all people in inter-ethnic relationships). Other White is made up of numerous groups, a large proportion include Polish, other Western European and numerous others. Other White is the second largest ethnic group in England and Wales (4% of the overall population)’. (8)

Interestingly, the historical ‘White’ designation of Americans of Middle Eastern origins (since the early 20th century) is now likely to change, with a new census category ‘MENA’ (Middle East and
North African), which will probably be introduced in the 2020 US census (Krogstad, in Pew Survey 2014; Mahdawi 2014).