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Ideology and Post-structuralism after Bernard Stiegler

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Abstract

What is the objective of ideology critique today? A unique answer to this question can be found in the work of Bernard Stiegler: the object of ideology critique is stupidity. Stiegler’s work will be situated with regard to the study of ideology and post-structuralism, reframed as respective versions of a dichotomy between critical and neutral theories, to show how Stiegler’s conception of ideology encompasses both. How he thinks ideology ‘after’ post-structuralism will be explored through his reading of Deleuze and Guattari. First, by seeing how Stiegler capitalises upon the theoretical developments of Deleuze and Guattari to rethink the notion of ideology. Second, by seeing how this understanding of ideology is folded back on their work, in order to discern how post-structuralism can be critiqued by a theory of ideology that utilises its views. From the perspective of his reading of desire in Deleuze, Guattari, and Freud, Stiegler shows how ideology destroys the desire to rethink ideas, and enforces stupidity. Third, after Stiegler’s theoretical labour, we arrive at a notion of ideology dichotomised between the critical and the stupid, tasking critique with the invention of new forms of desire, and the struggle against stupidity.

Keywords: Stiegler, Deleuze, Guattari, Stupidity, Critique.

What is the objective of ideology critique today, when the notion of the ideological masking of a single underlying truth is disregarded both by the so called ‘end of ideology’ thesis and the post-structuralist denunciation of the fixity of truth? One can find a unique answer in the work of Bernard Stiegler: the object of ideology critique is stupidity. In order to understand the meaning of this answer, Stiegler’s work must be situated with regard to two theoretical positions typically seen to be opposed: the study of ideology, and post-structuralism. To position Stiegler with regards to these two fields, I
will reframe the relationship between ideology theory and post-structuralism as respective versions of a dichotomy between critical and neutral theories. The critical aims to uncover the truth below an ideological discourse, while the neutral sees ideologies are merely competing positions devoid of a correct or truthful ground. Rather than existing in an oppositional structure, I will map ideology\(^5\) and post-structuralism in a manner that shows both encompass views that can be considered critical or neutral.\(^6\) This is important for understanding Stiegler’s contribution to the theory of ideology for two reasons. First, his conception of ideology critique encompasses both the critical and the neutral. Second, he forms this conception through a reading and critique of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, and hence we must begin from a productive relation between ideology and post-structuralism, rather than an opposition or separation.

Reconfiguring the field of ideology studies and post-structuralism will allow us to delve into the particular part of this dichotomy between the critical and the neutral that is relevant to Stiegler, this being the work of Deleuze and Guattari. Following a brief reconstruction of Stiegler’s philosophy, we will see he produces a conception of ideology, from a position ‘after’ post-structuralism. This brings his work on the relationship of the human to technics to bear on the rejection of ideology by Deleuze and Guattari, and post-structuralism more generally.\(^7\) This ‘after’ will be considered in three ways. First, in terms of manner. By reconfiguring the relationship between ideology and post-structuralism as fields of study, we can see how Stiegler capitalises upon the theoretical developments of Deleuze and Guattari to rethink the notion of ideology (ideology after post-structuralism). This will take place through a consideration of Stiegler’s adoption of the concepts of the quasi-cause and of stupidity. Second, in the sense of after Stiegler’s folding of Deleuze and Guattari’s theoretical tools back on their work, in order to discern how post-structuralism can be viewed from a theory of ideology that utilises its concepts (post-structuralism after ideology). This necessitates a digression through Stiegler’s understanding of desire, his critique of Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of this term, and his reference to Freud’s distinction between desire and drive to make this critique. From this perspective, the critique of ideology shows how ideological processes destroy desire, desire being that which transforms ideas. Third, in relationship to Stiegler’s own work. This ‘after’ of post-structuralism pushes us to consider what ideology critique looks like after this theoretical labour. The
concept we are left with is Stiegler’s dichotomy between the critical and the stupid, encompassing both sides of the critical/neutral distinction made at the beginning of the paper.

The Critical and the Neutral: The Relationship between Ideology and Post-Structuralism

The relationship between ideology and post-structuralism is complex, given that each has a multiplicity of understandings, value-judgements, and positions attributed to it. There are two key reasons why I intend to reconfigure the relationship between the two fields, in order to begin from more productive footing. First, it is difficult to identify either post-structuralism or ideology as a homogenous field of study. The former is especially difficult to pin down, as it does not have the acknowledgement of those seen to be its pioneers, or indeed a single subject matter that it attempts to deal with. Nevertheless, the term post-structuralism will be used here, as Stiegler situates his project and its political stakes in relation to it. He distinguishes himself from these thinkers by exploring the political ramifications of the philosophy of originary technicity, correcting what he sees as the ‘forgetting’ of ideology, and thinking these two themes in terms of the pharmakon. Reconfiguring the relationship between post-structuralism and the study of ideology according to variants of a ‘critical’ or ‘neutral’ perspectives in both, one can isolate a particular part of a multiplicity of understandings of either term, in order to investigate Stiegler’s relationship to his view of the post-structuralist variant of these positions. Second, redefining both positions in terms of neutral and critical perspectives will help dispel the negative depiction of post-structuralism as seeking the simple dissolution of the ideological problem in discourse, power, or forces, in order to displace the privileged ‘non-ideological’ space of the critic. Again, this is to ensure we begin from a productive, rather than antagonistic, relation between the two fields of study.

To make this distinction, one can adopt David McLellan's conclusion to his short book on ideology where he distinguishes two strands of ideological analysis. First, the critical, which demarcates truth and illusion, sees the ideology theorists' role in understanding how the latter can be unmasked. Second, the neutral, which sees ideology as representing the omnipresent and inescapable forces and views that structure society, without any recourse to illusion. Articulated slightly differently, this
expresses a distinction between the role of the theorist as the critic that shows the truth underlying a deceptive picture of reality, and the theorist that studies a ‘flat’ surface of relating ideas or concepts, none of which is subordinate to an underlying structure to be revealed. Understood as such, any substantial difference between ideology and post-structuralism evaporates, as both the critical and neutral positions are found in both theories.

A brief, yet not exhaustive, sketch of these various positions can be provided. Within the field of ideological analysis, the critical position can be seen to encompass the traditional Marxist concept of ideology as false consciousness (whichever the articulation), but also approaches that are not Marxist in orientation. Neutral positions include the view common to political science that sees ideology in terms of the beliefs that organise society, irrespective of any illusory role, but also some variants of Marxist theory. Within post-structuralism, the neutral position appears to be more prevalent, characterised as a rejection of ideology as a useful concept, in favour of an analysis of the forms of power that constitute political reality. But the critical position is also key to post-Marxist positions that rely heavily on the claims of post-structuralism and post-modernism, where the ‘truth’ revealed by critics is not so much the real state of affairs, but the ontological or metaphysical structure upon which all political organisations are grounded.

Understood as such, it is now possible to situate Stiegler’s work in relationship to both ideology and post-structuralism. Through his reading and critique of Deleuze and Guattari, Stiegler unites the critical and the neutral positions. Ideology is both an instrument of deception that needs to be critiqued, and something that is formative of different societies according to their particular views and ways of life. In turn, critique does not identify a universal ‘truth’ below an ideological discourse or apparatus, but rather that ideology operates through perpetuating stupidity. This is the inability to conceive and transform an always artificial and contingent set of beliefs that structure a society. As such, ideology as deception pervades human history, but according to local and anthropologically differentiated forms, without a transcendental category of truth. This argument rests on his understanding of the co-constitution of the human by technics, where there is no human outside the technical apparatuses that form its modes of existence. Our desires and needs are formed in the
manner in which technical life puts the human beyond the needs of instinct, drives, and subsistence, into the realm of consistence: ideas that do not exist but consist, and are therefore open to change. Ideology operates by *naturalising* this contingent system of artifices, which in turn destroys the consistence of ideas and desire, and therefore their openness to change. It is the various articulations of this *stupidity* that ideology perpetuates, and that critique is tasked with identifying.

**The Technical Constitution of Humanity**

It is not possible here to explore the entirety of Stiegler's philosophy of technics in detail\(^{21}\), which draws on a variety influences (including, among others, Edmund Husserl,\(^{22}\) Martin Heidegger,\(^{23}\) Jacques Derrida,\(^{24}\) André Leroi-Gourhan,\(^{25}\) and Gilbert Simondon\(^{26}\)). What will be unpacked are the key concepts that form Stiegler's understanding of ideology; organology, pharmacology, and proletarianisation. Underpinning these terms is a conception of the human as emerging from a supplementary relation with technics, irreducible to any simple moment of origin where the almost-human is separated from the human. Expanding upon the Greek term *tekhnē*, which denotes the domain of skill, Stiegler takes techniques to encompass all aspects of human life.\(^{27}\) Techniques and their materialised form as prostheses of memory are not supplementary in the sense that they are merely exterior to the human, but instead come to constitute the human as a form of technical life: *'the pursuit of the evolution of the living by other means than life'*.\(^{28}\) Hominization is this paradoxical relationship between interior and exterior that cannot be reduced to one coming before the other, for it is in the coupling between life and technics that the human emerges.\(^{29}\) Characterized by this 'default of origin',\(^{30}\) the human is left without essence, apart from the supplementary relation to technical objects, a logic Stiegler develops from Derrida's *Of Grammatology*.\(^{31}\) The grammatisation of techniques in material forms, the discretisation of all human activity and consciousness, is not supplementary in the sense that it simply *reproduces* human activity, but plays an irreducible role in *constituting* it. Grammatisation demarcates the limits of human existence, but also the condition of possibility of any community. Humans do not exist without these technical objects, with geographic and cultural differentiation creating the possibility of local idiosyncrasies that introduce the wealth of possible human difference out of this default of essence.\(^{32}\)
The challenge that this raises, according to Stiegler, is thinking that what we refer to as the human is in fact a complex intertwinement between biological, technical, and social realities. This relationship is referred to as \textit{organology}: 'the thinking of grammatisation calls for a general organology, that is, a theory of the articulation of bodily organs (brain, hand, eyes, touch, tongue, genital organs, viscera, neuro-vegetative system, etc.), artificial organs (tools, instruments and technical supports of grammatisation) and social organs'.\textsuperscript{33} The history of human existence regards the relationship between these three organs, without a prior, non-technical human, or 'pure' form of humanity to act as its measure. Adopting a term from Gilbert Simondon, Stiegler describes the relationship between the three organological levels as 'transductive'.\textsuperscript{34} Put simply, this means that they are within a dynamic relationship, where changes in one realm affect the other two, putting them in a constant transformative becoming.\textsuperscript{35} Transformations in the technical realm impact upon social relations, which in turn impact upon bodily functions.\textsuperscript{36} For example, the study of the functions of the brain cannot be taken in isolation, for this organ is constituted \textit{within} transductive relationships with social and technical systems.\textsuperscript{37} The human is the result of this constantly transforming complex of organological relations.

This co-constitution is not simply one of benevolence, increasing the power to act over the world. Technics introduces a fundamental ambiguity into the very essence of the human. Technics is what Stiegler calls a \textit{pharmakon}, both a poison and a cure, a term derived from Derrida's reading of Plato's \textit{Phaedrus}.\textsuperscript{38} What is at stake for Derrida is Plato's attempt to separate philosophical truth from the rhetorical practice of the sophists, and therefore from writing, which ultimately fails, because of the irreducibility of writing and knowledge. Writing may have the ability to weaken memory, but this is only because it acts as its very condition. For Plato, in Stiegler's words, this is a question of writing 'bypassing and short-circuiting thought…depriving the souls of citizens of that knowledge lying at the foundation of all citizenship'.\textsuperscript{39} Stiegler adopts this logic and expands it to organology as a whole, meaning that we must 'identify the role of \textit{pharmaka} in the formation of desire in general, and in the formation of reason in particular - in the formation of consciousness as attention, in the sense of both psychic attention and social attention, that is, moral consciousness'.\textsuperscript{40} This perspective opens up the
question of how the history of organology is defined by poisonous and curative possibilities, at
different points in space and time, constituting pharmacological analysis as a genealogy of
organological forms.\textsuperscript{41} In short, a history of how the works of human sociality, the life of the mind,
can be threatened by the very thing that is their condition.

One such mode of destruction is the final concept to be introduced before moving on to Stiegler's
discussion of ideology: proletarianisation. Stiegler understands this in terms starkly different to the
orthodox Marxist notion. Proletarianisation does not refer to a universal class of history, but rather to
the loss of knowledge through a process of externalisation without any re-interiorisation. This
perspective has its origins in Marx, if we distinguish a \textit{general} movement of de-skilling from the
constitution of a universal class.\textsuperscript{42} Stiegler advocates the moment in the \textit{Grundrisse} where Marx
describes the passing of the workers' skill into the machine, a process that eradicates the need for
knowledge on the part of the worker.\textsuperscript{43} He supplements this general tendency with two points. First,
with Simondon, that when 'the machine...takes the place of man because man grants to the machine
the function of tool-bearer',\textsuperscript{44} this is a sign of disindividuation, the inability of the worker to interiorise
and singularise the process of working, reducing it to monotony.\textsuperscript{45} Second, this disindividuation is
not just a characteristic of the labour process, but internal to the constitution of all knowledge: 'the
fate of knowledge consists in its exteriorisation, which is both its condition and the possibility of its
loss'.\textsuperscript{46} All forms of knowledge\textsuperscript{47} find their condition within this horizon of exteriorisation, which is
internal to the very constitution of the human. The pharmacology of knowledge is considering how it
can either be proletarianised, stripped from individuals, or interiorised and therefore transformed by
individuals into singular, rather than homogenised, forms of knowledge.

This leads Stiegler, against Marx, to suggest that Plato was the first thinker of proletarianisation, as
he considered the pharmacological effects of writing upon thought.\textsuperscript{48} Anticipating our discussion, one
can argue that Plato's \textit{pharmakon} also opened the path for Stiegler to think ideology. It ceases to be
a modern concept, and becomes a characteristic of human ideas in general.\textsuperscript{49} This is because
Stiegler has a specific understanding of ideas that relies upon the three concepts unpacked here.
But furthermore, he distinguishes between three realms in order to situate ideas; subsistence,
existence, and consistence. The first concerns 'the immutable order of needs and their imperative, the imperative of survival'. Subsistence as the order of needs is the changing, but always necessary, satisfaction of the biological characteristics of humanity (hunger, thirst, reproduction). Existence concerns the human's being outside of itself, projected into the future by its transductive relationship with technics. This constitutes its ability to desire, precisely because the human is not given in the present, and comes to constitute objects of this desire as singular visions of the future. These visions concern the third realm, consistence. This realm is that of ideal consistences that do not subsist or exist, but can only be thought as singularities. Consistences, from justice to God, are always articulated heterogeneously; we speak of instances of justice, and not justice in itself. What is important to add, is that these three realms of existence are all differentiated by forms of technics, and the consistence of ideas requires an externalised and discretised technical support. For Stiegler the production of knowledge is the creation of singularity from these shared, and thus non-singular, supports of consistence.

This reference to singularity brings us back to the pharmakon. If proletarianisation is internal to the organological condition, then the singularisation of forms of knowledge as objects of desire can be thwarted, because the condition of consistences is the pharmakon. The ability to re-think the consistencies that shape human existence can be destroyed. What is at stake in the question of ideology for Stiegler, is this destruction of the ability to re-think ideas, which naturalises an always artificial and contingent human situation. As such, we can foreground the niche which Stiegler’s theory of ideology will fill. It is both a critical concept which uncovers how the singularisation of knowledge is thwarted, but also neutral, as it concerns how this process works in different situations, according to different technical supplements and organological situations. The pivot that turns us towards Deleuze and Guattari is that Stiegler considers ideas as singularities that are desired, and therefore how ideology poses the possible destruction of this desire.

**Ideology after Post-Structuralism**

Before considering desire, we must relate the above concepts (organology, pharmacology,
proletarianisation, consistence) to ideology, by turning to two particular terms from Deleuze: quasi-causality and stupidity. The joint aim of the use of these concepts by Stiegler is to show that ideas are rooted in a pharmacological organology, which can allow the transformation of ideas that consist (quasi-causally), or, through proletarianisation, disindividuate the capacity for knowledge of such consistencies, and therefore naturalise an artificial situation (stupidity). In turn, the quasi-cause and stupidity are directed against Deleuze in his work with Guattari, in order to show how they do not accept that stupidity destroys desire, through the working of ideology. First, these two terms taken from Deleuze will have to be briefly unpacked.

Put forward by Deleuze in the *Logic of Sense*, the quasi-cause refers to a level of freedom of sense and meaning from happenings between physical bodies. Ideas, also referred to as sense events,\(^{52}\) emerge from happenings between material bodies, yet the relationships between them constitutes sense on the condition that it can be re-articulated. Meaning arises from a series of events occurring between bodies, but not as a result of *direct* causality. Sense refers to things that happen, but is not overdetermined by them. Deleuze writes:

> the event has a different nature than the actions and passions of the body. But it results from them, since sense is the effect of corporeal causes and their mixtures. It is always therefore in danger of being snapped up by its cause. It escapes and affirms its irreducibility only to the extent that the causal relation comprises the heterogeneity of cause and effect.\(^{53}\)

Causality at the level of bodies is only accessible through the intermediary of connected sense events. Sense is both prior to the cognition of the relation between bodies, and simultaneously produced by it. This leads to an apparent paradox, where the *cause* of the sense of an event is only intelligible through the sense that constitutes it retroactively. There is, therefore, a multiplicity of understandings and perspectives that can arise from any one particular state of affairs, something for which strict, logical causality does not allow room. Stiegler summarises this quasi-causal perspective as follows: '[s]omething escapes corporeal causality, and it is from this *escape* that sense emerges. The event, which is what insists, not what exists, is not reducible to bodily causality...*the effect is not reducible to its causes'\(^{54}\). Because of this insistence events *consist*, rather than subsist. They arise from the materiality of bodies, but their meaning, or knowledge of them, is
derived from singularities that cannot be totally reduced to their physicality. Stiegler connects this constitution of sense to technics: '[t]he question of quasi-causality is in this way consistency - whose conditions of projection are retentional for us, that is to say organological'.55 Particular consistences emerge from particular organological situations, but not in a relation of necessity or absolute causality: how this situation is perceived can be transformed. Hence for Stiegler the 'singularity of the object of desire is inscribed in an organology', and human reality is 'the production of such singularity'.56 A singular object of desire is a particular, indeterminable projection into the future, which re-interprets and re-orients the determined technical context within which sense events are produced and understood.

Because this relationship between quasi-causality and organology is not defined by any necessity, it can be inverted by the pharmakon: 'the heterogeneity of meaning is...constituted by an organological heteronomy that is not itself reducible to physical causality. This heteronomy is the pharmakon'.57 Constituting knowledge from an organological situation requires the singularisation of this pharmacological condition of knowledge, whereas the destruction of this capacity through proletarianisation induces stupidity. Deleuze understands stupidity not as error, but as a reactive mode of thought that can never be eliminated: '[s]tupidity is a structure of thought as such: it is not a means of self-deception...[s]tupidity is not error or a tissue of errors'58 Instead, he sees it as the ever present possibility of being unable to determine and singularise a problem, or in terms from the Logic of Sense, an event. Stupidity 'is neither the ground nor the individual, but rather this relation in which individuation brings the ground to the surface without being able to give it form', which is 'evidence of an inability to constitute, comprehend or determine a problem'.59 Knowledge is not external to stupidity, a correction of its inability to comprehend an event. Instead, for Stiegler, 'stupidity is proper to knowledge, that is, the impropriety of knowledge'.60 The technical default at the root of humanity opens up the consistency of ideas, but this lack of origin comes to introduce a fundamental pharmacological ambiguity within all knowledge. It can transform the ideal consistencies that constitute the sense of things, or it can come to perpetuate stupidity, a situation where these ideas cannot be transformed. We can never escape stupidity because it arises from this technical default, from 'the poisonous aspect of this pharmacology [which] is irreducible. For example, if individuation
occurs as rational knowledge, this knowledge may always some day or other come to serve stupidity: there is no absolute knowledge.\footnote{61}

This refusal to countenance any absolute knowledge corroborates Stiegler's use of the quasi-cause and stupidity to forge a concept of ideology coherent with post-structuralism. That there is no essence to the human does not overrule the possibility of ideology as deception, for '[i]deology is that which is based on redoubling this oversight, as a forgetting of forgetfulness, that is to say a naturalization of the artificiality of any given organological and pharmacological situation.\footnote{62} The quasi-cause signifies that there is no rigid cause and effect relationship between ideas and organology, and that stupidity is the perpetuation of the inability to re-think this contingent causality. That technics is pharmacological, means that the proletarianisation of forms of knowledge renders individuals unable to re-think organological conditions. This post-structuralist understanding of ideology is neutral, deriving from how particular ideas are quasi-causally related to an organological situation. But it is also critical, for it searches out the way in which this quasi-causal relationship inverted and turned into stupidity. It criticises the particular, organological processes by which the possibility for singular projections of desire are destroyed by the pharmacological condition of stupidity.

**Post-Structuralism after Ideology**

It is this understanding of ideology that is turned back onto post-structuralism. Stiegler's claim is that ideas are always objects of desire, and ideology perpetuates and naturalises a situation, by decomposing desire into drives. This turns the things that give meaning to existence, consistences, into mere subsistences, apparent necessities for survival. Putting forward this position requires that Stiegler argue against a monist conception of desire that he sees as characteristic of post-structuralism, in favour of a two-level understanding. Desire is not a metaphysical given that constitutes the realm of sense, but in fact is something that is produced by technical objects. The monist mistake, for Stiegler, is not just found in Deleuze and Guattari, but is symptomatic of post-structuralism at large, and highlights an inability to establish proletarianisation as a facet of the
technical condition, for this would require a distinction between desire and drive as found in Freud.\textsuperscript{63} Stiegler’s discussion of this issue takes place through a consideration of Deleuze and Guattari and Freud, and hence this is where I will focus this discussion.

Speaking of, and concurring with, the work of Michel Foucault, Deleuze states that: ‘power arrangements rely neither on repression nor on ideology’.\textsuperscript{64} In this vein, in both volumes of Capitalism and Schizophrenia, co-authored with Guattari, there is an endorsement of a field of desire that is never repressed, but only ever productive of all elements of social and political life. There is no ideological deception; there is only the production of a particular state of affairs, within a reality devoid of any deeper truth.\textsuperscript{65} This means that ‘[e]ven the most repressive and the most deadly forms of social reproduction are produced by desire\textsuperscript{66}, and such an operation of constitution ‘has nothing to do with ideology. There is no ideology and never has been’.\textsuperscript{67} Stiegler’s contrary perspective, sees desire not as productive and metaphysically primary, but produced. Libido is constituted by the binding of biological drives into desire, meaning that desire is only quasi-causally related to its objects, and can be reduced to stupidity instead. The attachment of desire to singular ideas, which consist, requires a coupling of the biological and the metaphysical through the organological. Desire, a non-biological concept, is formed by a connection between the technical, the biological and the social. This means it cannot be primary and metaphysical, as in Deleuze and Guattari’s account. To make this case, Stiegler reconsiders Freud’s account of the relation between desire and drive, and how this is not taken into account in Deleuze and Guattari’s critique of psychoanalysis.

The key connection between Stiegler and Deleuze and Guattari is the view that ‘[f]aced with the alleged autonomy of the sphere of ideas…there is a heteronomy that lurks behind all historic forms of consciousness’.\textsuperscript{68} What is at stake between them is the form that this heteronomy takes. Deleuze and Guattari reject any illusion disguising this heteronomy, referred to by Wilhelm Reich as ‘vulgar Marxism’, a mode of thought that ‘completely separates economic existence from social existence as a whole, and states that man’s “ideology” and “consciousness” are solely and directly determined by his economic existence’.\textsuperscript{69} The heteronomy lurking behind historical modes of consciousness is not an ideologically masked economic mode of production, but an immanent complex of relations
where desire is not repressed, but is machinic and productive of the very relations that appear to be illusory. In Deleuze and Guattari's words: '[i]f desire produces, its product is real. If desire is productive, it can be productive only in the real world and can produce only reality'.70 There is no ideology, precisely because desire produces reality and nothing else.

Counter posed to a critique of ideology that would unmask the true determining structure underpinning social relations, Deleuze and Guattari open the social field up to its production by flows of desire. The upshot of this is an analysis of capitalism that does not reify it as a repressive apparatus, but instead shows how it is constituted from the same flows of desire which can be used to resist it. It operates through the 'axiomatic' recoding of social organisations onto the flows of capital, which is precisely why Deleuze and Guattari claim that capitalism is 'schizophrenic'; it 'liberates' social organisations from their restrictions, only then to re-code these organisations back onto the imperative to produce surplus value.71 These processes are immanent with each other, there is no a-historical truth or movement to history, only a conjunction between these forces of desire. Ideology's impotence stems from its status as 'an execrable concept that hides the real problems,' these being the formation of the social field by desire that is not repressed, but channelled.72

Stiegler does not accept their key premise, 'that the social field is immediately invested by desire'.73 In particular, he takes issue with the notion that desire attains a gregarious form under Fascism, which is not seen as a repression of desire, but a channelling of it in a particular manner. This so-called 'perversion of gregarious desire' in Fascism marks the point that Stiegler uses to deconstruct Deleuze and Guattari's conceptual edifice.74 If desire is the individuation of a quasi-causal idea as a singularity, a specific projection into the future, then in what sense can this desire be said to be gregarious?75 Stiegler understands this term in the sense given to it by Jacques Lacan, a state where the becoming of individuals is referred solely to the group or the social, thwarting any singularisation of the organological context it arises from (in the sense that Stiegler gives to stupidity).76 If desire singularises, it can never be gregarious. This complaint is also expressed against the language of A Thousand Plateaus, where Deleuze and Guattari describe desire as a 'Body without Organs' (BwO):
The BwO is desire; it is that which one desires and by which one desires. And not only because it is the plane of consistency or the field of immanence of desire. Even when it falls into the void of too-sudden destratification, or into the proliferation of a cancerous stratum, it is still desire. Desire stretches that far: desiring one’s own annihilation, or desiring the power to annihilate.77

Deleuze and Guattari make no distinction between a desire that is ‘positive’ and a desire that is ‘fascistic’ or ‘destructive’; these are merely articulations of the same force.78 For Stiegler, gregarious, cancerous, and fascistic forms of desire are contradictions in terms.79 Deleuze and Guattari do not see that desire is a singularising power that does not destroy its ideal object, but rather maintains that object as a projection of a possible future from a particular organological context. Desire cannot be conflated with actions that annihilate, destroy, and consume, for these concern the realm of subsistence and not consistence.

It is worth remarking at this point that Stiegler’s reading of Deleuze and Guattari is not all encompassing. As he notes, they worked within a context where the Althusserian concept of ideology was, in their view, doing more harm than good.80 His emphasis on this point is, unfortunately, to the detriment of sustained critical engagement with their entire body of work. For example, in A Thousand Plateaus they write:

Assemblages are passional, they are compositions of desire. Desire has nothing to do with a natural or spontaneous determination; there is no desire but assembling, assembled, desire. The rationality, the efficiency, of an assemblage does not exist without the passions the assemblage brings into play, without the desires that constitute it as much as it constitutes them.81

Here, we see Deleuze and Guattari advocating a position much closer to Stiegler than he gives them credit for; desire appears to be produced at the same time that it is producing. We can attribute this to either inconsistency on Deleuze and Guattari’s part, or a reluctance of Stiegler to construct a holistic reading of their work, or perhaps both. While this does not undermine the reconstruction of his theory of ideology as a whole, as this rests on his broader philosophy of technics, we should note that his reading of Deleuze and Guattari on the concept of desire is incomplete.
This partisan critique is also motivated by a return to Freud, and as such is undertaken from this perspective. Expanding upon the distinction between subsistence, existence, and consistence, through a connection with the distinction that Freud makes between desire and drive, Stiegler argues that this is not seen to be of consequence by post-structuralism. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle Freud claims that 'one of the earliest and most important functions of the mental apparatus is to bind the instinctual impulses which impinge on it, to replace the primary process prevailing in them by the secondary process.' ‘Instinctual’ drives and libido are distinguished, the binding of the former producing both pleasure and reality principles that operate within the secondary level of experience. While Freud attempts to locate the dominance of the pleasure principle as desire, Derrida shows that this originary binding process undermines any possible priority it could possess. This is taken further by Stiegler, who claims that there is no desire outside of the binding of the drives, and more crucially, that this occurs differently according to different organological situations. It is only with the emergence of technical life that instinctual drives can be bound into desire.

It is important to note that drives are not conflated with 'instinct' by Stiegler, and he does not betray the distinction between drives and biological instinct that is insisted upon by Lacan. On this, Stiegler writes that:

the drive is the transformation of the dynamic that in animals is called instinct, but it is not instinct precisely because its goals can be diverted, both into polymorphous perversion and into sublimation. The drive-based regression of desire is therefore a privative mode of the libido, an unbinding of the drives resulting from a failure of the socialization of the drives in which desire consists.

Stiegler is not denying that there is a biological basis to the human psychic apparatus, but instead claiming that this psychic apparatus is formed in a relationship between the biological, the social, and the technical. Biological instinct is perceived as a form of automation, where the genetic program unfolds in tandem with the particular degrees of freedom accorded to it within its environmental milieu. This freedom is opened up considerably with the coupling of the vital and technical forms of individuation, creating the possibility of instinct becoming drive. Genetic programs are coupled
with technical programs, which on the one hand naturalises particular, contingent behaviours, while on the other making possible the 'de-automation' of these processes, producing unexpected and singular projections of the future, and new models of behaviour.

As with the default of origin, this is not a simple grafting of the human psychic apparatus upon a biological foundation, but rather an originary complex between the human and the technical that institutes the relationship in a manner that cannot be reduced to a simple beginning. The pursuit of life by means other than life displaces the possibility of regression to 'instinct', as there is no instinct to regress to, but rather a set of partially automatic behaviours produced through the coupling of the biological and the technical. Desire is produced in an interplay between the binding and unbinding of drives, rather than instincts, that Stiegler claims is instituted by technics and the new form of automatism that it institutes. The difference between subsistence, existence, and consistence rests upon this distinction between drive and desire. Different forms of subsistence exist at the level of the drive, which consumes its objects, and can be calculated according to the automatic unfolding of programs of behaviour. But existence and consistence are given meaning by objects of desire which consist, beyond physical existence, and hence only quasi-causally. It is desire, therefore, that is the subject of all politics, in that it produces a future comprised of the openness of these quasi-causal ideas, irreducible to the demands of automation.

This development rests upon something that Freud did not think: a distinction between genetic heredity and cultural heritage, with desire being the concern of the second. Freud approached this problem but ultimately ontologised desire, removing any historical element from it (something that Stiegler and Deleuze and Guattari agree on). He moves close to the historical conception of desire in Totem and Taboo, arguing that the continuity of psychoanalytical investigation requires the passing down of psychic structures, and asks the question as to 'how much can we attribute to psychical continuity in the sequence of generations? And what are the ways and means employed by one generation in order to hand on its mental states to the next one? Even more forcefully, in Moses and Monotheism we read that psychoanalytic concepts 'only become intelligible phylogenetically—by their connection with the experience of earlier generations.' Freud's response to this problem is,
however, disappointing: 'memory enters the archaic heritage if the event was important enough, or repeated often enough, or both'.\(^97\) For Stiegler it is not mere repetition or importance that allows an event or its psychic consequences to be passed down, but its retention in technical forms and the automatisms that they produce. Forms of desire are passed down not because of their mere repetition in the psychic, but by the connection between the psychic, the social, and the technical, in which the individual psyche is formed.\(^98\)

This does not mean, therefore, that drives and desire are opposed to biological functions in this schema. Rather, they are produced by the de-functionalisation and the re-functionalisation of the biological by the technical. Again, Freud is close to this position when he suggests that '[t]he fateful process of civilization would...have set in with man's adoption of an erect posture', this being what set off the chain of re-functionalisation of instinctual impulses into drives.\(^99\) Nevertheless, he goes on to suggest that civilization in fact opposes the sexual libido, idealising the latter.\(^100\) The significance of the relationship between upright posture and libido for Stiegler is that it means desire is only ever generated within the relationship of tools to the freeing of the hands from mobility. The development of the upright stance allows technicity to condition the re-functionalisation and sublimation of drives into the libido in an economy of exchanges with technical supports.\(^101\) Libidinal economy is organological, and hence the condition of sublimation is historical. Desire becomes an object of a general organology because it is formed by the transductive relationship between technical supports, biological organs, and social arrangements.\(^102\)

This is the point at which Stiegler's break with Deleuze and Guattari is clearest, for he puts forward a theory of desire that is produced rather than productive. Erich Hörl notes that Deleuze and Guattari pave the way for such a historical concept of desire, but 'left the systematic position of the technical object in the order of desire unexplained'.\(^103\) For Hörl:

\begin{quote}
what has been lacking in every other attempt to deal with libidinal economy is precisely such an exact determination of the technicity of object relations and of the original artefactuality of desire—one that would be able to do justice to the caesura in the history of desire and draw consequences from it.\(^104\)
\end{quote}
One such consequence is the potential of producing a theory of ideology from a historicity of desire. It is the pharmacological dimension of the technical object that allows us to suggest such a possibility. This is the significance of Stiegler's critique of Deleuze and Guattari: below Freud's idealism is not a primary field of productive desire, but a history of technical objects that bind drives into desire.\(^{105}\) That Deleuze and Guattari do not make anything of the distinction between desire and drive, and that they reject ideology by relying upon a metaphysical desire that is primary, means they cannot conceive of how desire can be destroyed. Conversely, for Stiegler desire is produced in a conjunction between both biology and metaphysical ideas which consist, without the possibility of recourse to either as a ground. This is precisely because the technical object is what supplements the human as biological being, connecting it to metaphysical ideas that consist. Desire is formed by the conjunction of the biological and the technical in automatic programs, but exists as the permanent possibility of de-automating and singularising these processes. The pharmacological character of these organological situations means that the binding of drives into desire can be de-composed, and is not permanent.\(^{106}\)

Such a de-composition is thought by Stiegler through his adoption of the concepts of quasi-causality and stupidity from Deleuze. Desire is only quasi-causally attached to its objects through technicity, which frees these ideas for re-thinking and re-invention. However, stupidity, as the inability to individuate an idea, perpetuates the sense of a particular state of affairs. Stupidity is the root of ideology, as ideology naturalises what is otherwise an artificial situation.\(^{107}\) Ideology operates by imposing stupidity as the decomposition of desire into drives, preventing the quasi-causal singularisation of objects of desire. This is what Stiegler refers to as an 'organological reversal', the inversion of a situation of contingency, into a false and illusory necessity.\(^{108}\) In other words, desire is seen as the naturalised cause of states of affairs, as a biological characteristic of the human being, rather than the product of the play of automation and disautomation. This reversal proletarianises the capacity for desire, leaving subjects bereft of the ability to critique these processes of naturalisation and automation.

One such ideological reversal that Stiegler focuses on is the destruction of desire by marketing.
Marketing takes advantage of the constitutive role that technical programs play in forming human life, allowing the re-direction of behaviours towards objects of consumption. Marketing attempts to control technical automatisms in order to posit its interests as primary in driving behaviour. This attempt to naturalise desire as consumption short-circuits the social systems by which desire is bound from drives, replacing systems and practices of care with services and profit targets. Marketing creates behaviours, the very core of the organological condition, but attempts to calculate and control how they are adopted. Singular projections of desire are dissolved into homogenised, gregarious, drive based behaviours. This is the critical significance of the distinction between subsistence, existence, and consistence. Subsistence can only ever concern the realm of the calculable, which pertains to marketing. Consistence always concerns objects of desire which engage in the disautomation of behaviour through a singular projection into the future. For Stiegler, the ideology of marketing perpetuates itself by naturalising a particular historical condition of desire, preventing its singularisation, and in turn destroying it.

Technics is the keystone in this understanding of ideology for it is the pharmakon that both forms and de-forms desire, in different ways across history. Most importantly, the stupidity inherent in the pharmacological condition can never be eliminated, and therefore neither can ideology. In this light, Stiegler’s focus on marketing is not the object of ideology critique par excellence, but rather a stage in the history of developments through which the relationship between desire and stupidity has unfolded through technical objects. By positing an originary field of desire, Deleuze and Guattari cannot think this history of deformations of desire through ideology, a position that Stiegler derives from within post-structuralist concepts. Conversely, for Stiegler the critique of ideology is always a re-thinking of the operation of the pharmakon, and as such an invention of new ideas, and therefore the production of forms of desire. As Christina Howells summarises, this requires the invention of 'a new form of libidinal economy without which no future aims or purposes will be possible'. It is ideology that prevents this, by thwarting the formation of desire.
We can now emerge from this detour through Deleuze, Guattari, and Freud, in order to position Stiegler in regard to the dichotomy between the neutral and the critical. Stiegler’s work cuts across both sides of this distinction. First, it conceives of ideology as neutral because it is a both a characteristic of human knowledge, and also differentiated across societies, with no universal truth to be uncovered. Second, it includes a critical function within this definition, because depending upon the organological situation in question, there are different ways in which ideology prevents change by enforcing a situation of stupidity. Ideology critique directs itself towards uncovering a particular ‘truth’ pertinent to the organological context which it concerns.\textsuperscript{114} Stiegler’s focus on marketing as a function of ideology is a response to the \textit{particular} pharmacological problematic of the contemporary. The critical and the neutral intersect: there are forms of stupidity particular to individual social systems, but no final truth to be uncovered through the critique of this pharmacological condition. The theorist of ideology must be aware of the ways in which desire is formed in different situations, and, conversely, how the capacity of individuals to rethink the quasi-causal relationship between ideas and this situation can be proletarianised, decomposed into a form of stupidity where desire regresses into drives. Ideology does not mask a universal truth, or induce a universal state to regress to, but rather represents the tendency towards stupidity, of which one must be ever vigilant, as it has no universal response.

The consequences of the eponymous ‘after’ of the title can now be clearly summarised. First, Stiegler utilises quasi-causality and stupidity to produce a theory of ideology that is coherent with the aims of post-structuralism. Quasi-causality represents the impossibility of reaching a final system of meaning, while stupidity adds a critical dimension to this neutral concept. While there is no ‘truth’ beneath ideology, it can still cause the thought of ideas to stagnate. Second, post-structuralism is subjected to a critique from this perspective, in order to show how desire must be seen as produced by different technical organisations. This organological conception of desire includes the possibility of its destruction and decomposition into drives, something that the purely productive notion of desire cannot account for. The manner in which the rethinking of ideas by desire can be thwarted cannot be thought by post-structuralism, and requires considering it \textit{after} this reconception of ideology as the enforcement of stupidity over desire.
Third, and last, this allows one to conceive of how ideology is to be thought after Stiegler. We can generate three key principles from his perspective. The first is a displacement of the distinction that opened this article by one between the critical and the stupid. Stupidity is everywhere in potential, as it is a characteristic of all social systems. As such, the task of ideology critique is not so much to unmask a universal truth, but to show how the possibility to rethink ideas is obscured by particular forms of stupidity (the ideology of marketing, for example). Second, this means that ideology is not something that can merely be overcome, but is a product of the implicitly political character of the technologies that constitute humanity. Organology frames the details of psychic life, and that the space within these states of affairs for re-thinking ideas exists between the quasi-causal and the stupid. It is precisely this ‘infinite’ character of ideas that consist that acts as the condition of this critique; ideas are quasi-causal, irreducible to their conditions. 

Lastly, this ties ideology critique to a practical task of re-inventing the ideas that structure society. There is no final ‘truth’ for ideology to uncover critically, nor does it signify the merely neutral interaction of viewpoints. Rather it reveals the task of a practical re-invention of all the institutions and structures that replace desire with stupidity, preventing the rethinking of the ideas that articulate the field of sense. Ultimately, it is this commitment to this re-thinking of ‘truth’ as pertinent to ideology critique that Stiegler salvages from post-structuralism. The aim of ideology critique is no less than the re-invention of the very things that constitute us as human, as the perpetual renewal of the future of humanity.
Ideology and Post-structuralism after Bernard Stiegler

1 Many thanks to Iain MacKenzie, the members of the Centre for Critical Thought at the University of Kent, and the two anonymous reviewers for their extremely useful critical remarks on this piece.


6 Contrastingly, some have argued that the rejection of ideology by post-structuralism is merely apparent. See: Benoît Dillet, 'Deleuze’s Transformation of the Ideology Critique Project: Noology Critique', in Ceciel Meiborg and Sjerp van Tuinen (Eds.), Deleuze and the Passions (New York: Punctum Books, forthcoming); Robert Porter, 'From clichés to slogans: towards a Deleuze–Guattarian critique of ideology', Social Semiotics, 20:3 (2010), pp.233-245.


8 For a variety of alternate perspectives on the relationship between ideology and post-structuralism see: Malešević and MacKenzie, Ideology After Poststructuralism, op. cit., Ref. 4.


21 For general and critical summaries of Stiegler’s work see: Christina Howells and Gerald Moore (Eds.),


28 Stiegler, ibid., p. 135.

29 Ibid., p. 141–42.

30 Ibid., p. 123.

31 Ibid., p. 136.


37 Ibid., p. 68.


40 Ibid., p. 23.

41 Ibid., p. 33.


46 Ibid., p. 138.

47 Stiegler identifies three forms of knowledge: savoir-faire (knowledge of how to do, know-how), savoir-vivre (knowledge of how to live), and conceptual or theoretical knowledge (knowledge of how to think at an abstract level). See: Stiegler, Pharmacologie du Front National, op. cit. Ref. 7., p. 53, 84, 196-7.


Stiegler, ibid., p. 290.


Ibid., p. 61.


Ibid., p. 29.


Ibid., p. 176.

Ibid., p. 344.

Ibid., p. 29.

Ibid. Translation modified.

Stiegler, Pharmacologie du Front National, op. cit., Ref. 7, p. 192


That Foucault dubbed Anti-Oedipus with the alternate title of ‘an Introduction to the non-Fascist life’ perhaps challenges this designation. What is at stake for Stiegler is that Deleuze and Guattari cannot conceptualise how desire and ideology are linked on a methodological and philosophical level, which means that a non-fascist politics cannot identify how desire is destroyed by fascism. See: Michel Foucault, ‘Preface’, in Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, op. cit., Ref. 65, p. xv.


Ibid., p. 25-9.

Thanks to one of the anonymous reviewers for drawing my attention to this citation. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, op. cit., Ref. 67, p. 399.


Freud, ibid., p. 34–5.


Ibid., p. 61.

24
97 Ibid., p.101.
100 Ibid., 104.
102 Ibid., pp. 120–21.
104 Ibid., p. 6.
106 Ibid., p. 207.
107 Ibid., pp. 222–23.
111 Ibid., p. 338.
112 Ibid., p. 221.
113 Christina Howells, “*Le Défaut d’origine*”: The Prosthetic Condition of Love and Desire’, in Howells and Moore op. cit., Ref. 21, p. 149.
114 Recently, Stiegler has drawn upon the late work of Foucault regarding regimes of truth and *parrhesia* to make this point. See: Bernard Stiegler, *Dans le disruption: comment ne pas devenir fou*? (Paris: Éditions les liens libérant, 2016), p. 56, 159.